

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

**WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? THE PRACTICAL AND
THEORETICAL CRITERIA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
GUARDIANSHIP**

A thesis
presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in **Geography**
at Massey University

PETER ANTHONY RAINE

1998

ABSTRACT

In the modern era, solutions to many environmental problems appear to be beyond the reach of a dialogue based solely on argumentation, dialectics, and the presentation of 'evidence'. The purpose of this study is to construct a bridge between incommensurable ways of perceiving reality, a bridge which can facilitate dialogue across worldview boundaries on environmental issues. The methodological framework underlying this study is derived from the work of Raimon Panikkar, who in a search for a means to encourage interreligious dialogue, developed a three-step interpretative method. Panikkar's hermeneutic model was originally designed to overcome the limitations imposed by a single approach to ascertaining truth, i.e., the secular rational approach espoused by the Western tradition. The framework outlined in Panikkar's diatopical model can be used as a basis for the conceptualisation of a new theoretical model which can provide for complex environmental issues to be approached from the perspective of differing traditions. Both practical and theoretical considerations are presented in two major case studies; the question of time and timing, and forests as sacred places. The model provides a pathway to link theological, philosophical, and ecological aspects of environmental issues as they are presented to different peoples. Using the three-step model, a symbolic discourse is arrived at which shows how an exchange of ecological wisdom can be facilitated. If the views of 'others' can be validated as being equally intelligible as one's own, then meaningful dialogue can proceed. From meaningful dialogue, practical and theoretical criteria for environmental guardianship can be elucidated. The question of who will guard the guardians can then be answered.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could never have been completed without the assistance of many people. I owe a debt of gratitude to John Flenley whose consistent encouragement throughout my undergraduate and postgraduate studies determined that my academic development reached to an advanced level. Without his continued support as chief supervisor this project would have never eventuated. I am also indebted to Scott Eastham for his substantial contributions to the topics included in this work, for introducing me to the works and thought of Raimon Panikkar, and for his sharp editing skills which encouraged me to express my ideas as clearly as possible. The numerous discussions and debates with Peter Horsley over a number of years have been of inestimable value to the development of my intellectual independence. As supervisor and friend, Peter made himself available at short notice to discuss, edit, and comment upon various chapters. Without the continued support of my partner, wife, and dear friend Simmi Krishnan, the difficulties and struggles of the PhD experience would have been unbearable. Simmi endured long periods of virtual 'widowhood' while I spent months writing the basic drafts of each chapter, for this I offer both thanks and apologies.

Kalaveti Batibasaga willingly donated his time to explain the essence of Fijian attitudes towards, and values for forests on his home island of Viti Levu. I am also greatly indebted to Kalaveti and his wife Sera for their hospitality during my visit to their home in Navola village. I also wish to thank Peter Schouls for his contribution on the philosophy of John Locke, and Stuart Lawrence for his help on the interpretation of certain early Greek terms. Thanks also to my friends Charlotte Sunde, who willingly edited my final copy, and Adrian Heays for his many suggestions on certain chapters. Many thanks to you both for many inspiring conversations and discussions over numerous dinners and coffee breaks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
 <u>CHAPTER ONE</u> - MYTHS, WORLDVIEWS AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS	
 <u>PART I</u> - OUTLINING THE PROBLEM	9
 INTRODUCTION	9
THE RISE OF APOLOGETIC UNIVERSALISM	14
DIALOGUE AS AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS	18
 <u>PART II</u> - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO WORLDVIEW CONSTRUCTION	29
 PLURALISM.....	29
<i>MYTHOS</i> AND <i>LOGOS</i>	37
SYMBOL AND SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE	43
FAITH AND BELIEF	49
WORLDVIEW CONSTRUCTION	51

CHAPTER TWO - THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

<u>PART I - ENVIRONMENTAL ORIGINS OF WORLDVIEWS</u>	58
A TYPOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM.....	60
THE NORTH AMERICAN EXCEPTION	66
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES	67
<u>PART II - THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN ATTITUDES TO NATURE</u>	73
RELATIONSHIPS TO NATURE IN THE EARLY GREEK TRADITION.....	73
INTERPRETATION OF SOME EARLY GREEK TERMS	75
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE	79
THE JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW	80
THE RISE OF SECULARISM	85
TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF ECONOMICS	92
THE CURRENT ERA.....	99

CHAPTER THREE - A PATH TO DIALOGUE

THEORETICAL CRITERIA	103
DIALECTICAL DIALOGUE.....	108
DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE	109
THE DIATOPICAL MODEL	111
BARRIERS AND DIFFICULTIES FOR DIALOGUE.....	119
THE CRISIS OF THE INTERMEDIARY	122
INDUCEMENTS TO DIALOGUE.....	124
PRACTICAL CRITERIA.....	127
INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES	130
ENTERING THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE.....	132

CONCLUDING COMMENTS	135
---------------------------	-----

CHAPTER FOUR - TIME: A STUDY

<u>PART I - TEMPORAL DISCOURSES</u>	137
INTRODUCTION	137
TEMPORAL MAPS.....	139
TIME AND PLACE: A NECESSARY UNITY	141
THE WESTERN TRADITION OF TIME	146
CLOCKS, CALENDARS AND SCHEDULES.....	149
CYCLIC TIME IN THE INDIAN TRADITION	151
TIME IN THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL WORLDVIEW.....	156
THE 'HISTORY' OF TIME.....	160
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN LINEAR TEMPORALITY	161
METAPHYSICAL TIME CONCEPTIONS	162
THE EMERGENCE OF LINEAR TIME.....	165
SCIENTIFIC TEMPORALITY.....	168
SPACE AND TIME BECOMES SPACETIME	171
TIME IN THE INDIAN WORLDVIEW.....	173
DREAMING AND CREATION IN THE ABORIGINAL WORLDVIEW	179
<u>PART II - TEMPORALITY AND LOCAL RHYTHMS</u>	184
MYTHIC AND SYMBOLIC COMPARISONS	184
TEMPORALITY AND PLACE.....	192
MAORI AND CELTIC CALENDRIAL CORRELATIONS	198
CONSERVATION AND TEMPORALITY	205
CONCLUSION	210

**CHAPTER FIVE - FORESTS: SACRED PLACES OR ‘STANDING-STOCK’
RESOURCES**

<u>PART I - SACRED PLACE: ANCIENT AND MODERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO FORESTS.....</u>	212
INTRODUCTION	212
PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS	216
SPACES AND PLACES: THE SACRED AND THE ORDINARY	221
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO FORESTS: FROM SACRED GROVES TO PROFANE PLACES	229
THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS	245
JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS	249
 <u>PART II - FIJI: FORESTS IN TRANSITION.....</u>	 259
INTRODUCTION	259
BARK CLOTH AND KAVA: SYMBOLS FROM THE FOREST	263
THE WAY OF THE CHIEFS	264
LAND TENURE	267
ARRIVAL OF EUROPEANS: STRANGERS WHO TRAVELLED ON THE SEA. .	269
LAND TENURE REVISITED	273
THE FATE OF THE SACRED FORESTS OF VITI LEVU	276
THE BURENITU FORESTS	280
FORESTS AS MYSTERY: SYMBOLS IN COMMON?	282
OBJECTIVE INQUIRY AS A BARRIER TO A SACRED ENCOUNTER.....	289
A PATH TO SACRED EXPERIENCE?	293
PROTECTION OF FIJIAN FORESTS AS SACRED PLACES	296
CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF SACRED NATURAL PLACES	299
CONCLUSION	300

INTERLUDE	303
 <u>CHAPTER SIX - THE PATTERN THAT CONNECTS</u>	
 <u>PART I - MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE AND SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES</u>	
	307
 UNIVERSALISM: A BARRIER TO DIALOGUE.....	308
THE ‘ONE’ AND THE ‘MANY’: TOWARDS A PLURALISTIC ATTITUDE TO TRUTH.....	313
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: UNIVERSAL CULTURAL MODELS OR STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT?	324
TOWARDS A NEW HORIZON: UNIVERSALISM REVISITED	330
APPROACHING A NEW MYTHIC HORIZON	333
AN ONTONOMIC <i>MYTHOS</i>	336
 <u>PART II - THE DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GUARDIANSHIP</u>	
	345
 EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL GUARDIANS.....	356
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	360

Errata

Because of the need to use different word processing software programmes for printing purposes, default printer settings resulted in some unintended formatting changes. Some footnote texts thus appear on the page following the footnote reference number. Associated changes have also resulted in missing paragraph breaks on page 31 [at the end of line 2], page 87, and page 315.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental issues are becoming increasingly complicated. In part, this is due to a general increase in our understanding of the complex interactions inherent within natural systems, but it is also due to the rise of a new pluralistic attitude. This attitude means that it is no longer appropriate to disregard other peoples views on environmental issues, especially those issues which effectively cross worldview boundaries. The ensuing dialogue with 'others' has proven to be a process fraught with difficulty, because listening to another's view is a different matter to that of actually validating that view as an expression of reality comparable to one's own. The following example, drawn from personal experience, illustrates this problem.

Some years ago I attended an informal pre-hearing meeting on a contested development proposal which required resource consents for construction of a geothermal power station in the northern part of New Zealand. Apart from some other concerned citizens and myself there were representatives of the developers, some geologists, and spokespeople for the local Maori tribe, Ngapuhi. The main point of contention was the possible negative impact upon a series of naturally occurring hot springs, which not only have medicinal and recreational value, but also are considered to be sacred places by certain Ngapuhi elders. The proposal involved drilling deep wells in order to tap pressurised and superheated geothermal fluid. Not only was this fluid separated from the surface by a thick layer of rock but also, as test drills had shown, it was highly toxic. The trial drills had already affected the pressure system which resulted in changes to the hot spring and a spillage had totally destroyed native vegetation surrounding the test site.

Geologists employed by the developers gave their description of the geothermal field according to scientific principles, and presented a reasoned and logical elucidation of the situation. Following this, a Ngapuhi elder (or *kaumatua*) offered his people's understanding of the field which is known to them as *Ngawha* (hot place). To Ngapuhi the springs are only a small part of the wider vulcanism of the area, and each hot spot, cinder cone, and rhyolite dome was named in connection with an

underground *taniwha* (spirit-nature being). The hot springs existed because this was the place where a spine rising from the *taniwha*'s back pierced the surface. To Ngapuhi, the wider geothermal field is all connected to the surrounding landscape, and the *kaumatua* believed that drilling holes into the earth at this point would not only spoil the springs but also upset the harmony of the whole region – apart from the danger inherent in such activities.

The assorted group of scientists, developers, planners and local people of European origin went on to discuss pragmatic matters without seriously considering the *Kaumatua*'s presentation. They effectively paid 'lip-service' to the Ngapuhi view which was an equally coherent, although radically different, description of the situation. The problem was that while the two parties were talking about the same geothermal region, they were offering entirely different explanations for its composition and origins. So different, in fact, that there was no dialogue, because in this case the inherent intelligibility of the Ngapuhi view was disregarded by the scientists and others who, without realising it, believe that their description of reality is the only valid one.

What was so striking about the whole situation was that each description, according to its own set of criteria, presented an entirely legitimate worldview, yet the Western scientific perspective was sanctioned and the Ngapuhi view was relegated to the realm of 'myth'. The non-Maori New Zealanders did not stop to question the validity of their own presentation in relation to that of the Ngapuhi elder; indeed, they did not seriously question any of their own assumptions and presuppositions. Matters of 'fact' take precedence over so-called 'mythological' presentations in the Western worldview.

When environmental issues are raised in general conversation, as depicted in the above narration, most of the associated questioning is of a static nature. People tend to concentrate on *what* is happening on the environmental scene, i.e., the facts of the given matter or issue. Sometimes there is an occasional questioning as to *why* environmental degradation seems to continue unabated, but rarely are there any serious attempts to suggest *how* 'we' are going to solve these problems. By 'we', I mean any 'we', because it is no longer appropriate to suggest that one group of

people belonging to a particular culture, or a certain way of perceiving reality, can provide solutions to complex environmental problems. The *how* question raises the issue of inter-cultural communication, because although all peoples inhabit this same Earth, not all of them describe or relate to the Earth in the same way. For some peoples, their environment is sacred, for others it is a source of philosophical inspiration, and for yet others it is a matter of scientific fact or a source of economic materials.

These diverse claims lead to a very important question: Who will be responsible for guarding our life-giving Earth from harm? This question is, of course, a transformational question¹ because it can ultimately lead to a deep inquiry into one's own way of perceiving reality. It means we may need to question our own fundamental assumptions and presuppositions. It has long been assumed that Western-style rationality is the sole criterion for discerning truth about any given matter, yet it is now becoming increasingly obvious that there are different ways of perceiving reality, many of which may be wholly incommensurable to each other. The *how* question leads us to look at the foundations of intelligibility which act as the horizon for development of worldviews, including our own. Before modern environmental guardians can emerge, dialogue between different worldviews must be undertaken so as to ascertain those who are capable of speaking and acting for their places, and the issues which concern them. It is no longer acceptable to suggest that one group, culture, or nation can decide how another may relate to the natural world, even less so to expect them to follow the Western example. In the modern era, science, technology, and economics have combined to become a globalising force which has led many to believe in the ideological concept of the 'global village' where all peoples would be united for the well-being of all of humankind.

The unexpected side effects of such an urge towards globalisation have been twofold. Firstly the deleterious impact of technological and economic 'development' on the Earth's living systems (i.e., the environmental crisis), and secondly the increasing demand of indigenous and autochthonous peoples to express their own unique claim

¹ Transformational questions and their implications are discussed in detail by Fran Peavy. See Peavy, F., *By Life's Grace: Musings on the Essence of Social Change*. New Society Publishers. Philadelphia. 1994, pp.87-111.

to a coherent, intelligible, and equally valid worldview. These people not only wish to guard their own Earth, but also to guard it from the actions of people who belong to the predominant Western worldview. That technology, science, materialism, and even rationality may be rejected by some, comes as a surprise to many modern people, especially those who are wholly convinced that their's is the only way to apprehend reality.

Currently accepted Western methods of dialogue tend to fail when people from radically different worldviews try to communicate. It is not just a matter of different languages and cultural expression; rather, it is a matter of different horizons of intelligibility. These horizons of intelligibility, and the boundaries which enclose each worldview arising from that horizon, present a seemingly insurmountable barrier. To overcome the gap between worldviews we need a new model, a model which can reach to the *topoi*, i.e., the places between worldviews, where commonality may be found. Such a model, if it were to be successful would not only need to overcome argumentation and dialectics, but would also need to facilitate the exchange of wisdom so that the outcome is not simply conversion from one to another, but one of mutual enrichment. Such an exchange of mutually respected wisdom could allow the emergence of new environmental guardians, guardians who would be spokespeople for diverse groups. How such a dialogical model may be developed, and how it could be applied so that it could provide guidance for newly emerging environmental guardians, is the main focus of this research.

Communication across worldview boundaries is, however, no simple matter. It requires the melding of many different themes. We need to know what a worldview actually is, and how different horizons of intelligibility emerge in the first instance. Within the framework of environmental values we need to see how different peoples have evolved their attitudes to, and values for the natural world. We also need a method to show how a new model for communication between worldviews can be applied. The application then needs to be applied to examples which can reveal how commonalities may emerge. Finally we need to discuss the problems which may arise and suggest possible solutions so that the model may be applied to further examples.

The weaving of these themes requires many different approaches, as well as a methodology flexible enough to encompass a wide-ranging exploration across many disciplines. For this reason the hermeneutic methodology has been chosen because it allows the focus to shift from one particular strand to another without losing overall coherence. Many of the themes included are not designed to be exhaustive elucidations of a particular topic, but rather an interpretation which reveals hidden presuppositions and assumptions necessary for a dialogue to proceed beyond argumentation and dialectics.

The first part of Chapter One begins by outlining some of the problems associated with the current environmental crisis, including the effects of the Western worldview on peoples and places. It outlines how a primary conflict has developed between sacred and secular conceptions of reality and the kinds of problems this has caused. The difficulties posed by a universalistic attitude to knowledge as well as the possible limitations of scientific method and indeed, rationality itself, are discussed. Part II considers theoretical aspects of worldview construction as well as a discussion of the emerging pluralistic attitude which is beginning to break down long established barriers to inter-cultural understanding. The relationship between *mythos* and *logos* along with faith and belief is connected to the centrality of symbols as a means to present that which is not easily explainable to the conscious mind. The actual construction of coherent worldviews based on foundational myths and stories leads to a point where considerations of how various people's originating environments may have influenced the evolution of their particular worldview.

Part I of Chapter Two revisits the concept of environmental determinism and its association with cultural evolution. Four distinctly different environmental types are contrasted with each other to suggest how sacred and secular concepts of nature have arisen as a response to certain environmental limitations. The worldview which evolved in Europe stands in stark contrast to those evolved in many other regions. Why this is so cannot be entirely explained by environmental limitations alone and Part II concentrates on the evolution of Western attitudes to the natural world. This begins with the early Greeks, particularly the Stoic concepts of nature, and includes some of the philosophical underpinnings of Platonic and Aristotelian thought. The influence of Judaic and later Christian concepts are of particular importance because

they continue to influence Western thinking to the present day. The rise of science and the secular attitude, as well as the introduction of economic principles and technology, culminated in utilitarian ethics and an almost complete denial of the sacred elements within the Western worldview. The elevation of objectivity as the only acceptable method of approaching knowledge about the natural world resulted in a worldview which was radically different to all others. The result of European expansion meant that this particular expression was carried across the world usually to be imposed upon 'discovered' peoples.

In Chapter Three a method to overcome the barriers between worldviews is elucidated. This is based on the diatopical model which is derived from the extensive works of Raimon Panikkar.² The diatopical model involves a three-step hermeneutical process whereby the problems normally associated with argumentation, dialectics, and ideology are overcome within the first two interpretative stages. The first deals with how a worldview appears to its adherents, the second is an interpretation of the historical texts and events which explain how a particular worldview came to be as it is. In these two stages argumentation and dialectics are suitable vehicles of expression. The third hermeneutical level leaves the way open for a symbolic discourse where commonality between seemingly incommensurable expressions of intelligibility may be approached.

In Chapter Four the diatopical model and its associated dialogical methodology is applied to the difficult question of temporality. Time and timing is a fundamental parameter of the Western worldview, however, it is not a universal principle and not all peoples agree with Western time reckoning. Part I compares and contrasts Western, Indian and Australian Aboriginal time concepts, and then proceeds to interpret each concept according to the three-step process. The resulting symbolic discourse sets the scene for revealing the three respective *mythoi* which underpin each intelligible expression of temporality. In Part II an inter-cultural understanding

² Professor Panikkar has written some 30 books and over 300 articles on a wide range of issues pertaining to interreligious and inter-cultural dialogue. Panikkar was born into two major religious traditions, the Catholic-Christian and the Hindu, and has been an active participant in the emerging pluralistic worldview. Panikkar has three doctorates, in science, philosophy, and theology and has lived and worked in Europe, India and the USA. As a consecrated priest and a speaker of 12 languages Panikkar has a unique insight into the possibilities and problems associated with dialogue across worldview boundaries.

of time is approached where each temporal concept is validated as an intelligible expression of reality. An example of possible correlations is drawn between Celtic and Maori seasonal temporal rhythms and their importance for the New Zealand region, where a globally standardised time scale has been imposed contrary to southern hemispheric seasonal conditions. The link between temporality and conservation is drawn, suggesting some reasons why a dialogue on time is an important issue for environmental guardianship.

In Chapter Five the discussion moves from time to place. The second case study is focused on forests and their relationship to sense of place. One example is drawn from Fiji where forests have always been central to the worldview of inland dwellers who resided in the once-great tropical forests of Viti Levu. Current Western-style conservation methods appear to be unsuited to the issues which are raised by local spokespeople. In their view the forest has a sacred purpose, as well as currently accepted utilitarian ones. The idea of forests as sacred places is not part of the secular scientific worldview. In Part I, an interpretation and investigation into the history of European attitudes to forests is embarked upon to see if any commonalities or symbolic correlations can be revealed which may form the basis for dialogue. In Part II, Fijian history is presented from oral traditions and interpretations of various active forest symbols. The inquiry, using the diatopical model, searches for places in between the two worldviews where symbolic commonality may provide a vehicle for mutual enrichment of both worldviews in terms of conservation and environmental guardianship.

Part I of Chapter Six reiterates the purpose of meaningful dialogue between worldviews on environmental issues, and approaches some of the major stumbling blocks in some detail. These include the problem of universalism, dualism, and the Western insistence on a sole criterion for discerning truth. The influence of scientific method, technology, and economic activity on many traditional worldviews is also considered. The impact of the idea of 'materialism' as a meaningful activity on the Western worldview and its consequences for the future is also examined. A suggested direction for a new pluralistic attitude to environmental issues is attempted, an attitude which is neither a return to pre-scientific methods, nor a slightly adjusted revision of the current state of affairs. Rather, it is a search for a

holistic approach based on meaningful dialogue with others, which could result in shared understanding leading to a renewed concept of environmental guardianship. Finally, the practical and theoretical implications for meaningful dialogue on environmental guardianship are outlined in Part II.

CHAPTER ONE

MYTHS, WORLDVIEWS, AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

PART I - OUTLINING THE PROBLEM

“It is the Tao [way] of heaven to take from what has excess in order to make good what is deficient. The Tao [way] of man is otherwise. It takes from those who are in want in order to offer this to those who already have more than enough.” Lao Tzu.¹

INTRODUCTION

Who will act as guardians for this Earth? Who will watch over these guardians should they be appointed?² Which group, culture or society can claim to have such thorough knowledge of everything that it may act as guardian for all life? As the twentieth century draws to a close, effective guardianship has passed to those of the new economic order who wield their power through the widely accepted ideology of capital and the belief that economic activity will result in the greatest good for the greatest number.³ Those who drive the global economy receive power from the extraordinary ‘religion’ of science, and its irresistible handmaiden, technology. Politicians and institutions are directed by this new international order to ensure its survival and the ever-increasing domination of all the world’s people and the myriad things. How did those who are now damaging the sacred Earth emerge as its ‘guardians’? What monumental illusion has been constructed that seems able to fool most of the people most of the time?

¹ Lao Tzu., *Tao Te Ching* (translated by D. C. Lau). Penguin Books. London. 1963, p.139.

² From the Latin: *Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes* - Who is to guard the guardians themselves? Juvenal., *The Satires* (translated by N. Rudd). Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1992, [line 347], p.50. Juvenal’s comment was originally in reference to guile. How those who wish to corrupt a system would naturally begin with their guardians who are supposedly susceptible to complicity. The question is, therefore, how can true guardians, those who will not need to be guarded, emerge?

Those who have refused to be converted to this pervasive illusion have been either destroyed, converted or sidelined by a belief system which is so well concealed that it has become part of the human mind itself. This illusion is presented as the notion of dualism.⁴ Dualism is the effective separation of mind from body, inner from outer, male from female, subject from object, and the sacred from the secular. Dualistic thinking has led to the emergence of a conflict model where the submission of those who disagree is accepted as the norm. Under this regime, the strongest survive and the weak are denigrated at every opportunity.

The dualistic stance has culminated in the politics of argumentation and dialectics, which means that the strong are rewarded with power while everything and everyone is subordinated to the machinations of those most powerful. This initially had disastrous consequences for those peoples who held worldviews⁵ distinct from mainstream dualistic thinking (as the saga of colonialism only too clearly shows). In the modern period the rise of scientism⁶ and technocracy has led to a crisis⁷ of unprecedented proportions. This crisis within the Earth's living system has been precipitated by the combined effects of human activities which are now impinging upon ecosystem integrity on a global scale.

Action to mitigate such effects is urgently required. Yet little is being achieved and ecological deterioration continues, even though enough information and knowledge

³ Bentham's concept of utility. See Chapter Two, Part II.

⁴ Currently referred to as Cartesian dualism but, as we shall see, is in fact of far earlier origin in Western culture. The essential nature of Cartesian dualism can be summarised in four maxims:

i. There are two, and only two, kinds of finite substances: corporeal things and thinking things (minds or rational souls).

ii. The essence of mind is thought, the essence of the body is extension.

iii. Human bodies and their properties are objects of sense perception. Minds and their properties cannot be objects of sense perception.

iv. Interaction between mind and body is 'rationally unintelligible'; in a human being a mind and a body are 'substantially united'.

Baker. G. and Morris. K., *Descartes' Dualism*. Routledge. London and New York. 1996, p.56.

⁵ Worldview is used here in the sense of a picture of the way things in sheer actuality are the concept of nature, of self and society. A worldview contains the most comprehensive ideas of order. It is the lens and focus by which reality is perceived. See Geertz. C., *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books. New York. 1973, p.127.

⁶ Scientism means a method or doctrine regarded as characteristic of scientists. Scientism usually has a derogative connotation meaning an excessive belief in the application of scientific method. (Oxford Concise Dictionary).

has already been gained to support the urgency of such action. The question then arises, why does denial of these problems persist when it is obvious that urgent action is required? The answer is far from simple and involves a set of complexities as varied as life itself. One of the discernible problems is that often a conflict between worldviews arises where different cultures, as well as individual groups within those cultures, will not - and often can not - agree on which path of action to follow.

A primary conflict occurs between worldviews where sacred and secular conceptions of reality, life and meaning arise from different horizons of intelligibility. In the last four centuries a new worldview has emerged which asserts that the sacred dimension can be explained in Western culture by reason and logic alone. This secular explanation is centred on the idea of objective method⁸ whereby experimentation provides a 'clear and distinct' conclusion. This results in the belief that messages about the actual nature of material reality - indeed all that can be known - can be decided by logical deduction and reason without recourse to direct experience. The essence of experimental method is its repeatability: Any number of repeated trials by different experimenters can be expected to show similar results which provide a certainty not necessarily available to other ways of knowing.⁹

The undeniable problem inherent within the scientific method of deciphering reality is that science and logic tend to destroy meaning, or at least reduce the meaning of being to the lowest common denominator. And so we end up, as cosmologist Carl Sagan suggests, living in a pointless universe; a universe which is the result of a mere selection of chance.¹⁰ While many moderns accept this state of affairs, an increasing number question this descent into meaninglessness. This leads us to ask: How is it

⁷ Crisis - from the Greek *krisis* meaning a judgement or decision. Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and The Metaphysics of Nature*. Humanities Press. New Jersey. 1995, p.3.

⁸ Method implies a disciplined mode of 'following after' (*meta* - after, *hodos* - way) truth. See Rolston Holmes III., *Science and Religion: A Critical Survey*. Random House. New York. 1987, pp.1-6, for a critique of scientific objective methodology.

⁹ In the case of shamanic or psychic knowledge, the result may not necessarily be the same each time; indeed, the shamanic or religious practitioner may not be able to repeat their experience at all. This leads to a kind of uncertainty about the nature of reality and is quite distinct from the experimental knowledge preferred by the scientific worldview. Only a shaman can experience and receive wisdom from their visions, but anyone can repeat a methodological scientific experiment.

¹⁰ Sagan. C., *Cosmos*. Ballantine Books. New York. 1980 pp.1-2. See also Dawkins. R., *The Blind Watchmaker*. W. W. Norton. New York. 1986, pp.4-5.

possible for the secular worldview to hold sway over people in such a powerful fashion when significant numbers of its own adherents have serious doubts about the validity of scientific truth? The answer lies in the power of myth.¹¹

The certainty of science and the secular conception of life depends upon a set of presuppositions¹² and beliefs which underpin its intelligibility. To actualise a theory of any sort, one has to start somewhere¹³ and a standpoint must be found from which to begin one's investigation. At the foundation of any worldview lies the *mythos* which remains hidden until it is 'pierced' by *logos* (i.e., reason, logic, intellect), at which point it is transformed into ideology and ceases to function as a guiding principle. The scientific worldview prides itself on its ability to pierce the *mythos* of nature to show how reason and logic can overcome belief and faith. The problem, of course, is that the very objectivity that science upholds is itself a myth.¹⁴ Science has developed the objective view by ignoring the subjectivity of the conscious participant taking part in the 'objective' observation.

To explain, it is useful to briefly examine the issue from an etymological perspective. The word subject is made up of two parts: *sub-* close to, and *ject* (from *icere, jacere*) - to throw. The subject is what is thrown close to, or towards us. Object, on the other hand, comes from *ob* - meaning against or in the way of, and *jacere* - meaning to throw. The object is what is thrown against the mind.¹⁵ The early Greek philosophers considered this to be in the realm of imagination and illusion. For them, an object was that which could be revealed by *techné*, i.e., that which is concealed in nature,

¹¹ Myth in this situation is not the myth of fable; rather it refers to the fabric upon which the pattern of intelligibility is woven. All worldviews have a myth (or myths) as a master narrative upon which their whole conception of reality rests; even those worldviews which deny the existence of such myths. R. Panikkar describes myth as: "The fabric upon which intelligibility is woven" or that "which you believe in without believing you believe in it" Panikkar. R., "Myth and History," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. Paulist Press. New York. 1979, pp.98-99. See also part II, *Mythos and Logos*.

¹² Panikkar defines presupposition as: "something I uncritically and unreflectively take for granted. It belongs to the myth in which I live and out of which I draw the raw material to feed my thinking" Panikkar. R., "Metatheology as Fundamental Theology," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics* Paulist Press. New York. 1979, p.324. [Emphasis added].

¹³ Godel proved this with his incompleteness theorem where he stated that to prove a mathematical theory one had to develop another theory and so on *ad infinitum*. Wittgenstein also noted that the same problem occurs in language - we cannot use words to make sense of words. Language is that which comes through one via a mythical process that we cannot penetrate. Wittgenstein. L., *Philosophical Investigations* (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe). MacMillan. New York. 1958, p.46.

¹⁴ Exactly how this is so will be outlined in Chapter Two, Part II.

¹⁵ From the Oxford Concise Dictionary.

but could be brought forth by the mind.¹⁶ The subject was that which emerges forth from concealment of itself, effectively ‘ex-sisting’¹⁷ towards ourselves and all other beings. The difference between subject and object is subtle indeed, but of greatest importance to understanding the difference between sacred and secular worldviews. Objectivity is arrived at through experimentation, subjectivity through experience, and these modes of knowing preclude each other in an important manner. The experience is never exactly repeatable, therefore not objectifiable. The experiment is never directly experienced, due to the presupposition that each objective experiment is something separate from the subjective experimenter. In this sense science provokes nature to give up secrets that it would not naturally reveal, nor would the mind or even imagination sense their possibilities (as understood by *techné*). Hence a new way of ‘seeing’ the world came into being with the scientific revolution, a way that the ancient Greek thinkers could never have imagined because they did not see beings as objects.

Today, objectivity is the acme of our intellectual pursuits; only the supposedly ‘primitive’ archaic¹⁸ traditions continue to seek direct experience as a way of knowing. Scientific objectivity is now a self-declared truth-revealing method for discerning all there is to know about reality. Scientific theory is utterly different from attention or direct experience, in the sense that science entraps and sets upon its objects forcing them to meet the demands of a predetermined pro-ject.¹⁹ Nature has its own means of revealing itself which is only available to consciousness on the level of direct experience and through relationship. Only science forces nature to reveal itself in a certain manner which is then taken as the truth of reality even if the

¹⁶ Heidegger. M., *The Question Concerning Technology*. Harper and Row. New York. 1977, p.10.

¹⁷ Heidegger considered that to *ek-sist* (i.e., exist) meant to ‘stand out’ as a presence in three dimensions or: “existence is that being through which an entity is genuinely and immediately established outside of the causes, with the result that non-being ceases and something enduring begins to be.” Heidegger. M., (citing M. Suarez) in *What is a Thing* (translated by W. B. Barton and V. Deutsch). Henry Regnery. Chicago. 1967, p.418.

¹⁸ Archaic is usually used in a derogatory fashion, but it really means those still surviving cultures who did not and do not objectify the world. Goldsmith uses the term vernacular which I will use in other contexts. Goldsmith. E., *The Way: An Ecological Worldview*. Shambhala. Boston and New York. 1993.

¹⁹ Heidegger. M., cited by Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature*. op. cit., p.78.

direct experience of an observer does not show it to be so.²⁰ In the sacred worldviews, being is the prolegomenon to thought. In the scientific worldview thinking precedes being.²¹

THE RISE OF APOLOGETIC UNIVERSALISM

The primacy of thought has become a universal principle in the modern era. How did such universalism come about? How did one group of people representing a single cultural imperative come to the conclusion that they could decide the truth of all that is? David Krieger describes universalism as:

“The way in which any human community establishes its collective identity, orientates itself in the ‘world’ and articulates its basic common convictions about what is real, meaningful and of value.”²²

Universalism in this context becomes a barrier to the understanding of other ways of being in the world, especially when it is applied apologetically. Apologetic universalism, as the fundamental means of expression in the Western worldview, leads to the exclusion of others who may approach truth from a different horizon of intelligibility. Krieger continues:

“Apologetic universalism is that form of encompassing worldview constituted by the presupposition of its own absolute totality and the denial of the validity and truth of other worldviews. It is based on a principle of exclusion and inclusion which nurtures the hope that eventually all opposition will be overcome.”²³

²⁰ For example, science tells us that the Earth goes around the sun, even though our direct experience seems to suggest otherwise. Watching a sunset is another good example: Direct experience gives us a mystical and emotional quality far beyond the scientific description of light being refracted through suspended water droplets.

²¹ Panikkar notes: "It is one thing to assert that thinking tells us what being is and another thing to make being utterly dependent on thinking....The laws of thought are laws of being, and this makes science possible, but not necessarily vice-versa. Or rather, Being does not have to have - or always follow - laws, however useful such a hypothesis may be. Being is not exclusively restricted to be what thinking postulates." Panikkar. R., "The Dialogical Dialogue," in *The World's Religious Traditions* (edited by F. Whaling). T. T. Clark Ltd. Edinburgh. 1980, p.213.

²² Krieger. D., *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1991, p.4.

²³ Krieger. D., (*ibid*), p.4.

Universalism has a long history in the West,²⁴ beginning with the Greek philosophers who tried to find original causes for the order they perceived to exist in the world. However, universalism gained dominance through the Judaic concept of a universal creator God who was responsible for all originations and all beings. Later, the Christians melded those universalistic ideas (which they could accept) with the religious teachings of the historical Jesus and used them to supplant the cosmological foundations of the classical Greek and Judaic worldviews. The early Christian churches vigorously attacked the presuppositions of other religions while at the same time incorporating specific religious histories into their own particular framework. Apologetics proved to be extremely successful in facilitating the domination of other belief systems within relatively short spaces of time.²⁵ The early Christians genuinely believed that they had access to a truth which would end all arguments²⁶ about how reality was ordered.

The advent of science and the power of objective thinking applied exactly the same apologetic principles to defeat the Christian church of the Middle Ages.²⁷ There is now only one way of assessing ultimate truths, one way of government, one time scale, one economic social structure, one set of universal laws, and so on. The secular scientists, armed with technology and driven by utilitarianism, seemed invincible until the final decades of the twentieth century when the effects of economic growth and technology on the Earth's biosphere have culminated in the current environmental crisis. Even this did not halt 'progress'²⁸ since blind 'progress' toward a technocratic future still seems to continue unabated. However, in the past fifty years

²⁴ I am using the term 'West' here to describe the Mediterranean and European region whose peoples and their influences have become widespread throughout the world. For a detailed understanding and elucidation of Western ideas see Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind*. Ballantine Books. New York. 1991.

²⁵ See Chapter Two, Part I for further discussion of Christian apologetic universalism.

²⁶ Interestingly they used argumentation, not direct experience, as a means to convert others. Christianity began as a somatic religion and ended up denying the bodily nature of reality. Berman. M., *Coming to Our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West*. Unwin Paperbacks. London. 1990, p.138.

²⁷ Schleiermacher tried to claim secularism for Christianity by the apologetic method, using the same argument as the early Christians, i.e., what you possess, but don't properly understand belongs to us. See Schleiermacher. F., *The Christian Faith*. Harper and Row. New York. 1963.

²⁸ Progress is essentially eschatological in that it implies progressing to an ultimate state, heaven, or utopia.

a new and unpredictable situation has developed, the rise of pluralism²⁹ - which may prove to be the nemesis of dualism.

As the scientific and technological megamachine³⁰ gained power over the resources of the world and converted millions to its myth of 'progress', it was assumed by most thinkers that a kind of homogenised global village culture would emerge, where all peoples would unite under the banner of democracy to celebrate the great achievements of science and technology. It was thought that cultural differences would be set aside and all peoples would eventually convert to the Western image of how life should be. What was not clearly understood was that in any clash of worldviews there are always several possible outcomes. In the first instance, the stronger culture effectively destroys the other by sheer domination, as has happened with so many indigenous cultures in the past. Secondly, the dominating culture may try to convert the other to their own beliefs (in the model of Christian apologetic conversion),³¹ or impress upon them their superiority. This method was very successful for the early Europeans when they encountered existing civilisations which were large enough to be able to resist physical decimation.³² In the third situation, the dominating culture merely ignored the 'other' culture[s] and, without considering their interests in any way, proceeded with colonisation. This effectively reduced these peoples to a status of sub-human savages of little consequence.³³ All rights and privileges can be stripped from such people, especially their resources and lands. The unexpected result of such actions was that traces of those cultures which

²⁹ For a detailed discussion of the rise of pluralism see Part II.

³⁰ Coined by Lewis Mumford. See Mumford, L., *Technics and Human Development: The Myth of the Machine*. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich. New York. 1970.

³¹ See Chapter Two, Part II for further discussion of Christian apologetic conversion.

³² India is a good example. The British could not hope to control India without converting substantial numbers of the ruling classes to their worldview with regard to the importance of material things. China proved more problematic but eventually the Europeans converted the rulers to accept the Western model of trade even though they had to convert part of China's population to opium dependence. The Meiji restoration effectively converted Japan to the modern cause.

³³ This attitude is discussed in Chapter Five, Part I in association with John Locke and his moral arguments concerning property rights in relation to American Indian Nations. A wholly negative attitude towards aboriginal peoples was also expressed by many colonisers in much more definite terms. For example, General W. Tecumseh Sherman on American Indians: "The more Indians we can kill this year the less will have to be killed in the next war, for the more I see of them the more convinced I am that they will all have to be killed or maintained as some species of pauper. Their attempts at civilisation are simply ridiculous." Turner, F., *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness*. Rutgers University Press. New Brunswick. 1993, pp.282-283. [Emphasis added].

were not utterly destroyed by the European onslaught actually survived, to re-emerge in the twentieth century restating their claims as legitimate representatives of coherent worldviews.

The latter half of the twentieth century has seen an unprecedented resurgence of cultural and national identity sweep the world. Those cultures which had previously been thought of as dead or dying enjoyed a renaissance, reappearing in new forms and resurrecting ancient traditions to challenge the dominant Western myth. Those existing civilisations which had not been wholly incorporated into Western ways began to use science, technology and economics to advance their own unique cultures. They refused to entirely submit to the Western stereotype and began challenging the West on its own terms.³⁴ Parallel to this development was the re-assertion of traditional religions and in many cases a wholesale rejection of both Christianity and secularism.³⁵

As the century draws to a close it is becoming increasingly obvious that the re-emergence of diverse worldviews is beginning to erode Western hegemony which, in turn, may result in the end of the expansion of the Western worldview. This is a peculiar situation, considering that the Western economic system has almost achieved its goal of dominating the world.³⁶ However, Western thinking based on expansion and progress may have reached its limit. The West can no longer destroy, dominate, or convert the majority of the world's people to its views, belief systems, or religious values. Millions do not believe in the one creator God, nor do they accept the superiority of the European 'mind' over their own worldview. Moreover, long suppressed worldviews are being revived and their adherents are not only demanding autonomy, but also seeking reparations for past wrongs. Those peoples who believe in the myth of Western superiority are being forced to confront the limits of their own worldview, a worldview with no position to 'progress' to.

³⁴ Japan is a good example of a nation retaining its own cultural flavour but at the same time competing with the West successfully. Many other nations are now following Japan's example.

³⁵ The rise of Islam in Iran and its rejection of the secular model of government is a good example here.

³⁶ The recent formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the signing of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the formation of many other international economic agreements are designed to facilitate a 'new world order' based on purely economic principles.

DIALOGUE AS AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS

The emerging environmental crisis has added an unexpected difficulty for the proponents of the new economic world order. The modern economic system is based on the idea of 'free' environmental goods and services: air, water, soil fertility, biodiversity, ecological replication and standing stocks of forests, fish, etc.³⁷ These 'constant capital stocks' are diminishing rapidly in some situations, with a multitude of claims being made on them. Scientists have now turned their attention towards the incremental problems of global warming, deforestation, sea level rise and soil erosion as well as many other serious environmental concerns. The long term prognosis is not good. No matter how fast technology provides substitutes, the global environment is being influenced in a manner which is resulting in ecosystem degradation and an increase in suffering for many people.³⁸ Coupled with this are the increasing demands by indigenous peoples to be heard on their opinions and beliefs about so-called 'resources' which are often their sacred sites and sources of life according to their own worldview. The current situation is one of the economically powerful desperately trying to hold on to positions which guarantee their wealth, while being assaulted by an ever-increasing clamour of diverse claims. Many of these claimants base their rights on the validity of worldviews diametrically opposed to the currently dominant one.

³⁷ The idea of 'free' environmental services or constant capital stocks is that these necessary components of capital wealth are in effect common resources which exist naturally without human input or contribution to their existence. Economic 'externalities', such as air pollution, are an unconsidered cost in economic production. It has traditionally been considered by the economic paradigm that vast tracts of forests or fisheries are free in the sense that no one pays for them to be as they are. Capital is gained simply from harvesting such resources. In the modern era governments act as agents for resource strippers who pay certain access fees but take no consideration of intergenerational equity. Harvesting quotas are regulated by legislation as a means to limit resource stripping. The open waters of great areas of the major oceans are open slather for deep-sea fishers. Beyond the 200 kilometre economic zones there is no limit to exploration. Prior claims to forests, waters and oceans are only just beginning to be recognised; however, the economic system vigorously resists such limitations wherever possible. See Pearce. W. and Turner. R. K., *Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment*. Harvester Wheatsheaf. New York. 1990, pp.50-57, and Tietenburg. T., *Environmental and Natural Resource Economics*. Harper Collins. New York. 1992, pp.56-59.

³⁸ As Panikkar points out, many millions of poor people already live in the holocaust of environmental degradation predicted for the future populations of rich nations. Panikkar. R., "The Crisis of History," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T. Eastham). Orbis Books. Maryknoll. New York. 1993, p.117.

What will be the outcome of such conflicts? How can such conflicts be resolved when destruction of the 'other' is now no longer possible and conversion seems unlikely to succeed? Dialogue between conflicting parties may be the only solution. The question is: How do those who belong to different worldviews discuss these issues with each other in a manner which can lead to meaningful outcomes? This is especially problematic considering that while they may be talking about the same 'thing'; each party is not necessarily saying the 'same' thing about 'it'. What is one person's resource may be another's home. Moreover, one person's way of interpreting the world may be wholly incomprehensible to another. Can any basis be found for a dialogue across these worldview boundaries?

In order to answer the question, one must first understand what a worldview actually is. There are several concepts which must be investigated. The first and most important is to understand the centrality of myth as a basis of worldview construction. The second is to realise that myth is always expressed in symbolic form because myth cannot be made an object of knowledge or be entrapped by concepts. The third is that all worldviews have essential founding stories³⁹ which act as a central focus point from which they are extended to a worldview boundary. Worldview boundaries are not fixed but are always connected to the essential founding texts and events, and their symbolic presentation.⁴⁰ If an individual or group moves sufficiently far away from the central myth that they effectively form a new centre, then they have created the basis for a new worldview.⁴¹ The fourth important concept is that those who hold to myths which are outside a particular worldview boundary must be recognised as 'other', depending on how closely one holds to the central myths of one's own worldview. One cannot know or judge the truth of a worldview from a point totally outside that worldview.⁴²

³⁹ A story does not have to be written, it may be presented orally, symbolically, or in written form. A founding story is also a text upon which the context of a worldview is constructed.

⁴⁰ See Part II for more detailed discussion of these key points.

⁴¹ As an example, Protestantism and fundamentalism in Christianity are still included within the boundaries of the Christian worldview because they still accept the myth and symbol of Jesus of Nazareth as the Son of God. If a new religion emerged which accepted Christian principles but denied the centrality of Christ, they would find themselves outside the boundaries of the Christian worldview.

The problem with totally enclosed worldviews is that they tend to form orthodoxies (common in many sacred worldviews), or to universalise their concepts of truth (as in the modern secular worldview). Neither of these situations ultimately leads to freedom, but rather to constriction, increasing conceptualisation, and ultimately the reduction of meaning to a function of power.

Orthodoxy occurs when an original founding textual revelation is structured into a doctrine and loses its somatic,⁴³ transformational and transcendent dimensions. Faith and belief become confused. Exclusivism becomes the dominant vehicle for enclosure, and so faith must then be defended against the contrasting claims of other perceptions of the truth, rather than directly experienced. In the secular worldview, rejectionism is the commonly accepted method whereby belief must defend itself against other forms of ascertaining truth. Secular thought has taken over the task of defending itself by using the principles of closure, exclusion, and selective inclusion to promote its own brand of universalism.⁴⁴

Considering these difficulties, is dialogue between worldviews even possible? If it is, what do conflicting worldviews actually share in common - if anything? A commonality shared between worldviews may be seen in the following:

1. All peoples inhabit the same Earth from which all conceptions of reality arise.

2. At the heart of all worldviews is a myth or set of myths by which intelligibility is measured.

⁴² It is unlikely that a fundamentalist Christian would have much to discuss with a fundamentalist Hindu, or that either would be able to enter into dialogue with a neo-Darwinist about the origins of life.

⁴³ In the history of the West, heretical movements have been common. Morris Berman claims that these have taken the form of somatic revolutions to try and claim the 'body' back from entrenched orthodoxies which have become spiritually restrictive. Christianity originally began as a somatic faith. Berman also cites the Cathars, the scientific revolution and the Nazi experiment as heretical movements against the orthodoxy of structured Christianity. Berman, M., *Coming to Our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West*. Unwin Paperbacks. London. 1990, p.153.

⁴⁴ From Krieger, D., *The New Universalism op. cit.*, p.79.

3. All myths are expressed through symbols and many of these symbols are intelligible to those who hold differing worldviews.⁴⁵

4. All peoples can express their horizon of intelligibility through the medium of a language or languages.

If languages can be translated, then the symbols by which we present⁴⁶ our worldview must have meanings which are also translatable. This means that dialogue between worldviews should be possible on a symbolic level.

To approach any kind of meaningful dialogue at a symbolic level, the various parties presenting their worldview must have a genuine desire to communicate with those presenting other worldviews. This situation needs to be free from any kind of coercion: no one can be forced to submit to another's version of truth. The dialogue needs to be ordered in such a way as to avoid argumentation and dialectics as the sole means of communication.⁴⁷ The willingness to understand⁴⁸ is of paramount importance because successful dialogue cannot occur if any of the parties to it are under any kind of duress.

The first stage of such a dialogue is the discussion of the form that one's worldview has.⁴⁹ Each party needs to describe to the other how the world looks and feels to them. This is a description of the way a worldview is revealed to its adherents; what is important to that participant, how truth about being in the world is revealed and in what form.⁵⁰ The second stage is a discussion of the history of the worldview, its founding texts and stories, how it came to be and what its guiding principles are. This

⁴⁵ If this were not so languages themselves could not be translated from one to another. Language is essentially a mythical process; words and sounds are the symbols which enframe discourse.

⁴⁶ A symbol does not represent (re-present) meaning, it is meaning for those who recognise the symbol.

⁴⁷ See Chapter Three: "A Path to Dialogue" for further discussion.

⁴⁸ Literally to "stand under" - a position of openness and humility. Panikkar comments: "To understand is to stand-under the spell of the thing which we under-stand, it is to be got by the spell of the thing, and to stand under it in admiration, or perhaps scepticism." Panikkar, R., "The Pluralism of Truth," in *Invisible Harmony*. Fortress Press. Minneapolis. 1995, p.93.

⁴⁹ For a detailed description of the hermeneutical model suggested for intercultural dialogue across worldview boundaries see Chapter Three: "A Path to Dialogue".

⁵⁰ Panikkar termed this stage morphological hermeneutics, from the Greek, *morphe* meaning form. Panikkar, R., "Introduction," to *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics op. cit.*, p.8.

interpretation is of particular importance, as many worldviews have a historical starting point or event from which their founding text is derived. Yet others may be generated by the ancestors of the participants, who may have genealogies which show that they, themselves, are direct descendants of the creators of the world. A certain sensitivity to other people's beliefs and faiths is required because fundamental differences in horizons of intelligibility may be elucidated. This type of interpretation of one's culture is time-oriented and historical.⁵¹

The third stage is a mythico-symbolic discourse. Such a discourse is directed to find the 'place in between'⁵² worldviews; an interpretation of common symbols and common meaning. The 'object' of such an interpretation is neither the myth which hides behind a particular mythology nor the orthodoxy which remains unquestionable. The realm of *logos*, as the foundation of intellectual understanding, ever unable to penetrate the hidden mystery, sets restrictive boundaries and encloses dialogue within dialectics and argumentation.⁵³ So it is the symbol, linking and encompassing the whole, which can join the two poles of the real; the subject and the object. Symbols should not be considered to be mere signs,⁵⁴ nor should symbolic comparison be reduced to polemical arguments about phenomena.

The first level of discourse mediates communication within the boundaries of a particular worldview horizon, whether that horizon is a sacred or secular one. This involves discussion about matters of fact; it conveys information about the worldview and what it is like to live within that particular worldview. Such discourse is a discussion of the values, beliefs, and faiths associated with a particular worldview.

⁵¹ Panikkar termed this diachronical hermeneutics, from the Greek: *dia* - across and *chronos* - time. Diachronical hermeneutics is essentially a boundary discourse because it overcomes the distance and alienation of meaning through time Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.9.

⁵² Diatopical hermeneutics, from *topoi* - place (between). Panikkar notes here "diatopical hermeneutics stands for the thematic consideration of understanding the other without assuming that the other has the same basic self understanding as I have." Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.9.

⁵³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.10. For more detailed discussion of the difference between dialectical dialogue, argumentation and Panikkar's dialogical dialogue, see Chapter Three: "A Path to Dialogue."

⁵⁴ The secular worldview fails to overcome the problem of misunderstanding symbols on a regular basis, usually misinterpreting them as signs. For example, money is always presented as a sign when it is, in fact, a symbol which contains signs. (See Symbols and Symbolic Discourse below).

The second level of discourse establishes the boundaries of a worldview. The communication sets the criteria of meaning and validity. This stage is limited to establishing the unity and continuity of a historical tradition by retrieving of its founding texts.

The third level of discourse operates within the space of encounter between different worldview boundaries. Situated beyond argumentation and dialectics, as a discourse of disclosure,⁵⁵ it is a discussion of how truth, values, beliefs, and faith are presented in symbolic form. To the adherents of a particular worldview, the discourse of disclosure symbolically presents their 'world' to another.

This type of dialogue requires a peculiar kind of conversion. Such a conversion⁵⁶ is not a simple matter of 'jumping across' the worldview boundary to become included within another. It is also a matter of realising that another's truth is as equally valid as one's own. Participants cannot be asked to sacrifice their own worldview for another, but rather, to expect theirs to be enriched by additional revelations of truth. This is the essential result of active and positive pluralism - a direct contrast to the current model of fragmentation, where one universalistic worldview tries to dominate others to affirm its own being. By disregarding the collective wisdom of a multitude of diverse perceptions of reality, universalistic worldviews isolate themselves by retreating to a defensive position.

The difficult problem for a meaningful dialogue capable of transcending dialectics lies within the scientific secular worldview, which tends to confuse faith with belief. This results in a compulsion to assign belief to the realm of the subjective, which in turn, allows it to base its own claims upon the methodological ideal of value-free objectivity.⁵⁷ The scientific method is therefore incapable of reaching the level of knowledge upon which the third stage of dialogue takes place. The consequences of

⁵⁵ This is essentially different from accepted methods of conflict resolution where people try to enclose their symbols with powerfully persuasive arguments.

⁵⁶ *Convertere* means to turn about. It implies a change and can be related to *metanoia* - a transformation of thinking. See Krieger, D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p.53, and Nicol, M., *The Mark*. Watkins. London. 1954, p.93.

⁵⁷ Krieger, D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p.5.

this inability leads to the problem of *epoché*.⁵⁸ The inherent myths, symbols, rituals, and values which underpin the secular worldview are concealed in such a way that the adherents of that worldview are unaware that they have them.⁵⁹ In other words, what this suggests is that the scientific secular worldview also has at its foundation an unquestionable set of inherent value criteria, and a strong symbolic element arising from a mythical structure. In this sense, it is possible to determine that the secular worldview is functionally similar to religion and not, as the secular scientists tend to claim, an independent system capable of determining absolute truth.

If there is no single universal truth upon which all other versions of truth may be measured, then truth itself must be a symbol of meaning relevant to a particular culture or group to whom it is revealed. In this way science can be seen as a special way of revealing specific truths about the order and pattern perceived⁶⁰ in the world and beyond. The means of interpreting any truth belongs to the realm of myth. To apprehend truth, common criteria of meaning must be accepted so people may concur on what the final meaning is within a particular worldview. It is possible for those who have different horizons of intelligibility (i.e., myths) to interpret the same 'data' differently and arrive at entirely different explanations of the same phenomenon. These explanations would present the 'truth' of any given matter in a way which is coherent relative to the mythological and symbolic base of that particular worldview. Although seemingly divergent, these interpretations would be entirely accurate and legitimate renditions of reality.

⁵⁸ There is much of discussion as to the meaning of this term. Leaning towards Husserlian phenomenology, Panikkar describes it as a bracketing of values and presuppositions. See Panikkar. R., *A Dwelling Place for Wisdom*. Motilal Banersidass. Dehli. 1995, p.172. Heidegger, on the other hand, adds his own interpretation to *epoché*, describing it as a special kind of concealment which acts in a way which remains invisible to the concealer. I will use Heidegger's explanation. See Heidegger. M., *Time and Being* (translated by F. Capuzzi). Harper and Row. San Francisco. 1991, p.239. (Also Chapter Two, Part II, for further discussion on why this is a central problem for the Western tradition).

⁵⁹ The attitude of Frank Tipler illustrates this: "The evidence is clear and unequivocal: If scientists have no need of the God hypothesis, neither will anyone else." Tipler. F. J., *The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead*. Pan. London. 1996, p.10. While this could be construed as sheer arrogance it also reflects the essential presupposition that scientists know what truth is. This kind of argument portrays the myth of objectivity which is so central to the scientific worldview. He goes on to maintain that: "Theology simply *must* become a branch of physics if it is to survive." (*ibid*). No room for dialogue here!

⁶⁰ Perception is not entirely limited to the original sense organs even though it must be interpreted through them. Technology has allowed us to perceive things beyond the range of natural senses. See also Chapter Six, Part I, for discussion of the idea of the pluralism of truth.

For example, a group of climbers attempting to reach a certain mountain peak may choose different routes. A chosen ridge route, although experienced as an entirely unique journey, would eventually deliver each climber to the same peak as any other choice. If this group of separate climbers related their experiences afterwards, a listener could be forgiven for assuming each climber had traversed a different mountain. The only coherent description would be of the view from the peak, but only if each saw it in the same frame, or happened to look in the same direction! If our listener is to conceive of each climber's journey in any coherent fashion, both the peak and the routes taken to it must be named.⁶¹

Naming is a fundamental parameter of human culture.⁶² Humans are naming creatures.⁶³ Our naming and speaking are symbolic acts.⁶⁴ Language generally is a mythic process where any effort to explain the world must begin with a leap of faith.⁶⁵ Naming is also important in another context. The naming of entities creates a sense of place, which is of paramount importance to many cultures, and in particular, to vernacular worldviews.

Sense of place is of vital importance to issues of environmental guardianship and to any meaningful dialogue on such matters. Those who live in a sacred place know this. They name their places according to the patterns the places themselves reveal. This place is home. It is imbued with meaning; it is a sacred space filled with

⁶¹ The name (from *gno, jna* - to know) is that which lets know. Panikkar. R., "Words and Terms," in Olivetti. M. M., *Archivo de Filosofia*. Instituto di Studi Filosofici. Rome. 1980, p.132. In this context a name is something which involves us in the process of letting something be known.

⁶² R. Panikkar writes: "It is not that reality has many names, as if there were a reality outside the name. This reality is many names and each name is a new aspect, a new manifestation and revelation of it, yet each name teaches or expresses, as it were, the undivided Mystery." Panikkar. R., *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1981, p.29.

⁶³ Correctly speaking we are the beings through which language speaks itself. (cf. Aristotle's words: *logon de monon anthropos echei ton zoon* [often rendered as: *zoon echon logon*] i.e., "Man is the only animal whom nature has endowed with the gift of speech. *Polit.* I, 2, 1253a sq.) It is not we who speak language, but language which speaks through us. Heidegger claims that being speaks to us through language. See Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth. op. cit.*, p.137.

⁶⁴ For example, in Genesis: "And the Lord God formed out of the earth all the wild beasts and all the birds of the sky, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called each living creature, that would be its name." [Emphasis added]

⁶⁵ We have no way of explaining how it is that our theories are capable of describing what we take to be reality. That would require another theory *ad infinitum*. So we have to take a stand somewhere, i.e., a leap of faith and mythic projection. See Winch. P., "Language, Thought and World in Wittgenstein's Tractatus," in *Trying to Make Sense*. Basil Blackwell. Oxford and New York. 1987, pp.9-17 for a fuller explanation of language as a search for order.

symbols that present the order of the world and suggests to the individuals and societies what responsibilities they have with regard to its sacrality. Modern secular culture has all but destroyed this sense of place with its incessant objectification and ordering of reality according to its own criteria.⁶⁶ Names are reduced to terms and symbols to signs. Modern naming disregards any sense of place by using names which are arbitrarily selected from non-local sources.⁶⁷ Vernacular names tell of the stories and legends surrounding the mystery inherent within their sense of place. As well as descriptions of events and geographical phenomena, their whole sense of 'being' in the world can be expressed in a name.⁶⁸ The loss of this sense of place, which is crucial to individual and social coherence in relation to nature, is but one example of how secular scientism diminishes meaning by choosing a single, narrow description of reality.

To recap: We are looking for ways to facilitate dialogue between worldviews which have different conceptions of the truth about reality. Environmental issues and many problems associated with environmental degradation are particularly complex because they cross worldview boundaries and are, in some way, of concern to all of the peoples of the world. For the theologians the problem is moral, for the philosophers the question is of values and ethics and for the secular scientist the question becomes a matter of fact. The current situation is one where different worldviews challenge each other through interpretations based on argumentative and dialectical processes with the apologetic method being the weapon of the most powerful. How can scientists, philosophers, the religious,⁶⁹ or even ordinary folk speak with each other without engendering conflict, and without sacrificing or compromising their own beliefs, faiths, and philosophies?

⁶⁶ See Chapter Four, Part I on place-centredness for a wider discussion of these issues.

⁶⁷ As an example: I live on a street named after an unknown Welshman (Hughes) in a town named after an English general (Palmerston) on an Island named after a geographical direction (north) in a country named after an area in Holland (Zealand). This is not very meaningful in relation to the actual area. Maori named this area Papoeia - a clearing in the forest. They would go on to describe Papoeia as being on the banks of the Manawatu River which shelters under the Ruahine and Tararua ranges on the Island which the semi-divine Maui drew out of the sea (Te Ika A Maui) in the land of the long white cloud (Aotearoa). They have a sense of place in their names, I do not.

⁶⁸ Deloria. V., *God is Red*. Delta. New York. 1973, pp.202-203.

⁶⁹ By this I mean those who hold a sacred worldview.

While the domain of this research is environmental guardianship and environmental issues which cross worldview boundaries, the research itself is focused on finding a suitable method to facilitate meaningful dialogue between worldviews with respect to the complex and pluralistic nature of environmental concerns. As Panikkar notes in his elucidation of the diatopical model:

“By diatopical hermeneutics I understand a hermeneutic which is more than the purely morphological (drawing from the already known deposit of a particular tradition) and the merely diachronical one (when we have to bridge a temporal gap in order to arrive at a legitimate interpretation). It is a hermeneutic dealing with understanding the contents of diverse cultures which do not have cultural or direct historical links with one another. They belong to different loci, *topoi*, so that before anything else we have to forge the tools of understanding in the encounter itself, for we cannot - should not - assume a priori a common language.”⁷⁰

A dialogue based on such hermeneutics may be applied to certain environmental problems so that a solution understandable to all involved parties may be reached. Through this kind of dialogue, links between ecology, environmental ethics and nature-centred spirituality can be made, which could then act as a bridge to reunite the sacred and secular worldviews. This is not simply a matter of negating or setting up a radical critique of the currently dominant secular worldview. Rather, it is an opening up of those exclusivistic factions within the secular worldview to different ways of knowing and revealing truth. People of all worldviews ask similar questions about life. These questions which have vexed humans since the beginning of time always have common themes. They ask: Is there an order and purpose to the universe? What is the meaning and purpose of death? Does individual life ultimately mean anything in the fullness of time? Why is the world the way it is? and so on. These questions, whether they are scientific, religious, or philosophical, occur time and again throughout history; they ask about the meaning of life and its purpose. The answers sought may be divergent in different ages because knowledge about the physical world changes, but the questions remain very much the same.⁷¹ This suggests that while there may be no universal answers, the act of seeking seems to be

⁷⁰ Panikkar, R., “The Dialogical Dialogue,” in *The World’s Religious Traditions. op. cit.*, pp.205-206. See also Chapter Three: “A Path to Dialogue” for a more detailed elucidation of the diatopical model and its suitability as a method for intercultural communication.

⁷¹ Cupitt, D., *Only Human*. SCM Press Ltd. London. 1985, p.187.

a human invariant. The dialogical process is founded on similarities, rather than differences, at a mythic and symbolic level.

Before the intricacies of such dialogue can be discussed, it is necessary to define and explain several key concepts. The following section incorporates: (1) a detailed discussion of pluralism in the modern context, (2) *mythos* and *logos*, (3) symbols as presentations of reality, (4) faith and belief, and (5) further elucidation of the nature of worldviews as social constructs.

PART II - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONNECTED WITH WORLDVIEW CONSTRUCTION

PLURALISM

“Pluralism challenges the assumption that modern reason is the ultimate and non-negotiable canvas on which we need to situate our awareness of reality - the myth of reason.” Raimon Panikkar.⁷²

Pluralism is both a problem for thinking and an ideal to be attained. Evolving pluralistic attitudes do not suffer from any compelling obsession to reduce everything to absolute unity, nor do they subscribe to any ultimate duality. Panikkar comments:

“The pluralistic attitude accepts the stance that reality may be of such a nature that nobody, and no single human group, can coherently claim to exhaust the universal range of the human experience. Reality is not totally objectifiable because we, the subjects, are also part of it.”⁷³

This means that no single worldview, as such, can be pluralistic. Worldviews, including the religious ones, can be open, tolerant, and non-absolutistic. But each worldview has its own set of beliefs, practices, and rules which may be different, and even contradictory to others. Furthermore, no single philosophy can be pluralistic either, because any claim to truth is focused through a particular language and contextual framework which always reflects someone’s standpoint. Panikkar comments:

“Pluralism is not a supersystem, a metalanguage, a referee in human disputes, an intellectual panacea. Pluralism is an open human attitude, which therefore entails an intellectual dimension that overcomes any kind of solipsism, as if we - any we - were alone in the universe, the masters of it, the holders of the absolute”.⁷⁴

⁷² Panikkar. R., “The Defiance of Pluralism.” *Soundings* 79. 1-2 1996, p.169.

⁷³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.172.

⁷⁴ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.181. Panikkar also notes that a supersystem calling itself pluralistic would be merely an ideology in the most negative sense, a new system for domination to serve the interests of social engineers. See also Panikkar. R., “A Universal theory or a Cosmic Confidence,” in *Towards a Universal theory of Religion* (edited by L. Swidler). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1988, p.125,

Pluralism precludes blank condemnation, absolute verdicts, total breaks in communication, and the demand for total surrender. Pluralism in its most positive sense is the nemesis of orthodoxy and universalism, as well as both exclusivism and inclusivism, simply because it facilitates the dialogical process. In the current era, a multi-perspectival and cross-cultural approach to conflicts may be more suited to finding solutions to environmental problems which often occur on a global scale. Pluralism is an emerging paradigm, in part caused by the meeting of cultures and the new climate of tolerance towards different descriptions of reality.

This was not always so. Pluralism has not been an accepted part of the Western tradition since the classical Greek era of the Presocratic philosophers. Pluralism has emerged in the modern era, at least partly in response to the fundamentalism⁷⁵ of the universalistic and exclusivistic worldviews like secular scientism and the market ideology, as well as orthodox Christianity and Islam; all of which tend to stifle spiritual inquiry into the meaning of life. The meeting of cultures engendered by the age of European expansion has facilitated cross-cultural encounter, which has in turn fostered an awareness of differing perceptions of the world. European history is littered with examples of the established orders moving against any group which tried to reclaim meaning as a personal experience rather than a doctrinal directive. Those who succeeded in creating new orders usually did so with great difficulty and only survived by reducing the basis of their interpretations to an even more rudimentary path than the dogma they were trying to replace.⁷⁶ Science itself arose as a heretical movement which succeeded in claiming autonomy from the rigid constraints of orthodox notions of divine creationism. The scientific abandonment of theological

where Panikkar comments: "Pluralism in its ultimate sense is not the tolerance of a diversity of systems under a larger umbrella; it does not allow for any superstructure. It is not a supersystem. Who or what principles would manage it?"

⁷⁵ The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines fundamentalism as: "The strict maintenance of ancient or fundamental doctrines or principles of any religion."

⁷⁶ For example, the Protestant revolution succeeded due to its call to an even more rigid interpretation of the Bible than the Catholic Church. The somatic revolutions were suppressed utterly for denying the centrality of strict biblical interpretation. Monastic heretical movements generally succeeded due to their austerity and isolationism where they could not threaten the authority of the church. Berman, M., *Coming to Our Senses. op. cit.*, p.181.

principles endured only because the church hierarchy of the time did not fully recognise the significance or potential of the emerging scientific worldview.⁷⁷ On establishing its basic parameters the scientific heresy also retreated into its own brand of fundamentalism when challenged, and predictably resisted radical new additions. Following traditional apologetic methods, those initiated into the scientific worldview tried to repress the evolving discipline of quantum physics, because quantum theory raised metaphysical questions.⁷⁸ James Lovelock, in formulating the Gaia hypothesis, suggested the possibility of the Earth as an intelligent living entity. The Gaia hypothesis attempted to explain the seemingly intelligent action of biospheric interactions with non-living components, which results in the creation of a stable environment capable of sustaining life. This hypothesis has come under sustained attack from mainstream scientists because it alludes to a quasi-religious explanation of evolutionary processes. Rupert Sheldrake's concept of morphogenic fields as an alternative to evolutionary ideology was also highly criticised on similar grounds.⁷⁹ The history of the West reveals a strong preference for grand master narratives which provide a secure and distinct basis for stability in its worldview. Because of this tendency, the West has traditionally been sharply critical of, and resistant to other worldviews, especially those which embraced a plurality of explanations for reality. Pluralism is not a concept which rests easily in the minds of Western thinkers. However, the emerging modern pluralistic awareness renders fundamentalism unacceptable to all but the most dogmatically inclined thinkers.

⁷⁷ On this issue Carl Becker wrote: "June 8, 1794 was when citizen Robespierre inaugurated the new religion of humanity by lighting the conflagration that was to purge the world of ignorance, vice and folly." Becker. C., *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*. Yale University Press. 1932, p.43. By this time the scientific revolution was beyond the control of church authorities. See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion on the evolution of science.

⁷⁸ Schrodinger's cat, Hiesenberg's indeterminacy theory, Godel's incompleteness theorem, Bohm's implicate order, to name a few. Einstein once commented that either quantum theory is wrong or the universe is insane. See Davies. P., *The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate Meaning*. Simon and Schuster. London. 1992, for further discussion of metaphysical questions in quantum physics.

⁷⁹ See Sheldrake. R., *A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation*. Blond and Briggs. London. 1990. Evolution is a seriously defended scientific explanation for the origin of life. Evolutionists resist even the most reasoned formulations of alternative explanations. For an interesting review of early alternatives, see Kropotkin. P., *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. Freedom Press. London. [1902] 1987, pp.47-73.

In comparison, India has embraced plurality in religion and culture.⁸⁰ The religious basis of Indian philosophy is itself pluralistic with no dominant or universal conception of one God. Pluralism is so embedded in the Indian worldview that even the advancement of secular scientism into modern India has met with stubborn resistance. Western ideas and ways of being are evident in certain parts of India but do not seem to dominate, rather they are generally absorbed as part of the new cultural imperative within a wider cultural milieu of sacred and secular worldviews. Indian scholars are quick to point out the universalistic aims of the West,⁸¹ and India remains a widely diverse nation where religious tolerance is still widely practised despite regular reports of local incidents to the contrary.⁸²

The rise of modern pluralism can be traced to the age of Western expansion and colonisation which brought Europeans into contact with cultures which had radically different and often incomprehensible worldviews. Many devout Christians were startled that there existed such a vast number of people who had never heard the Word of Christ. Many Christians began to wonder how God would judge such 'heathens' and 'pagans' in the final judgement. This concern, coupled with the proselytising⁸³ nature of Christianity, sparked a quest for conversion. Wherever possible, conquered peoples were converted to Christianity and to associated Western ideas of economics, temporality, democracy, and work ethics. The problem began for the universalists when highly complex civilisations were encountered, where resistance was often too great to allow conversion. The destruction of the entire populations of such civilisations was practically impossible. The inability to impose Western values and religions upon such conquered nations proved difficult and eventually led to a growing awareness of the plurality of worldviews, and indeed,

⁸⁰ See Chapter Five "Time: A Study," for the example of the plurality of temporal constructs in India.

⁸¹ For example see K. N. Panikkar's critique of the Western notion of globalisation which he maintains is just another example of cultural hegemony by Western nations to induce belief that their worldview is the dominant one. In his view globalisation is a myth constructed to seduce others to believe they have no choice but to accept the global economic metanarrative. Panikkar, K. N., *National and Left Movements in India*. Vikas. New Dehli. 1980.

⁸² This is not to suggest that India is some kind of pluralistic paradise. It has its own forms of orthodoxy, fundamentalism and intolerance, but generally India is more tolerant to differences than its Western counterparts.

⁸³ Proselytism is the method to convert 'others' to one's own view. The alternative is the resolution to conquer or destroy the 'other'.

hints at the possibility of the pluralism of truth itself.⁸⁴ As trade and commerce strengthened between such nations, the West was influenced by ideas and conceptions which filtered back from some of these worldviews. The infiltration of these ideas and conceptions began to subtly change the West's conception of reality from within.⁸⁵

The suspicion that reality itself may be pluralistic and irreducible to a single principle is becoming increasingly apparent. Currently the notion of pluralism is on the ascendant. Most peoples now generally accept that there are a plurality of cultures and religions, and that they cannot be reduced to any kind of unity (see below). Further, this pluralism does not allow for a universal system which acts as an umbrella for the tolerance of difference.⁸⁶

Pluralism should not, however, be confused with mere plurality or sheer relativism. The fact that there exists a plurality of worldviews is obvious, and that these have not been reduced to any sort of unity is commonly understood. Pluralism means something more than sheer acknowledgment of plurality and a desire for some sort of unity. There is a plurality of truths about reality. Pluralism is not the eschatological expectation that in the end all shall be one.⁸⁷ Relativism, on the other hand, is merely the obverse of objectivism and dogmatism. Relativism suggests that no point of view is better than any other, and if any differences exist, they are not worth arguing about anyway. There is no need for dialogue in the relativist explanation, because there is an already established method of ascertaining truth (i.e., the rationalist explanation) and therefore there is no need to consider alternative ideas.⁸⁸

Raimon Panikkar, writing on pluralism, comments:

⁸⁴ This radical, though not widely accepted thesis, developed by M. Heidegger and R. Panikkar, will be discussed in Chapter Six, Part I.

⁸⁵ Swami Vivekananda successfully introduced Hinduism into England at the end of the nineteenth century with the establishment of the Sri Ramakrishna mission. Cupitt, D., *Only Human. op. cit.*, p.102

⁸⁶ Panikkar, R., "The Jordan, the Tiber and the Ganges," in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions* (edited by J. Hick and P. F. Knitter). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1987, p.110.

⁸⁷ Panikkar, R., "The Jordan, the Tiber and the Ganges," (*ibid*), p.109.

“Pluralism is fashionable. Political pluralism has almost become a democratic dogma. It [pluralism] amounts to giving up one of the pillars on which many a civilisation has built its fundamental ideas for at least twenty-five centuries: the harmonious correlation between thinking and being. Truth was the traditional name for this correlation. In pluralism thinking ceases to be the controller of being. The different religious traditions become expressions of the creativity of being striking ever new adventures into the real.”⁸⁹

The importance of pluralism and the pluralistic attitude is that at the close of the twentieth century, many worldviews (including the universalistic ones) are beginning to endorse the possibility that the idea of absolute truth itself may be ephemeral. Truth implies a certain correlation between our faculties of apprehension and what they perceive. Panikkar adds:

“The question of truth is a question of the intellect and for the intellect. The truth of religions [worldviews] is not their symbols, myths and practices, but the intellectual content of them; its interpretation”.⁹⁰

Panikkar maintains that there are radically different ways of perceiving reality, many of which may be, at the morphological level, totally incomprehensible to one another. Nevertheless, they each uphold their own validity and are presented symbolically as separate horizons of intelligibility. The genuineness of others’ criteria of validity can not, and must not, be quantified objectively. One cannot know or judge the validity of a worldview from the outside.⁹¹ Each worldview is inherently pluralistic in that it contains a historical accumulation of actualities arrived at from many sources, including other religions and disciplines.⁹²

If the validation of reality according to variable criteria is pluralistic, can any universal elements be discovered which, when applied to all worldviews, could provide a basis for dialogue? Perhaps it is safe to say that all worldviews have one essential aim and that is to seek the improvement of the human condition. This

⁸⁸ Gare. A., *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis*. Routledge. New York and London. 1995, p.111.

⁸⁹ Panikkar. R., "Religious Pluralism: The Metaphysical Challenge," in *Religious Pluralism* (edited by J. S. Rouner). University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame, Indiana. 1984, p.97.

⁹⁰ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.99. [Abridged].

⁹¹ Panikkar. R., *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.9.

attempt to improve on the given conditions is reflected as material betterment in the secular scientific worldview, salvation in the Christian worldview, enlightenment according to the Buddhists, and so on. The human predicament remains central to all concerns, whether in the realm of religion, ethics, or materialism. Worldviews which act against human improvement ultimately fail⁹³ or are replaced with a new *mythos* and its associated *logos*.

In order for proponents of differing worldviews to enter into meaningful dialogue with each other they must accept one another's intrinsic viability. In modern times, as in no other previous period, acceptance of the reality of global pluralism is increasing the chances of such an acceptance. Acceptance of the right to existence for the 'other' has important implications for the dialogical process. Such acceptance means that no one group will be able to dominate others at all levels, and eventually dialogue may be seen as the only alternative to destructive conflict. As population pressure increases, the need to share rather than secure resources will become of paramount importance to the survival of people, whether rich or poor, 'developed', or 'under-developed'.

Environmental issues are at the centre of the pluralistic debate as the so-called 'global' economic forces try to secure ever increasing access to 'resources' which they deem necessary for production of consumable materials. Many of these 'resources' are not situated within one particular nation or defined by any one worldview boundary. Those who claim the right to guardianship over those 'resources' are often presenting reasons which are unintelligible to those who wish to utilise and exploit them. The difficulty for peoples whose worldview is radically dissimilar to the scientific secular worldview is that they are often compelled to accept argumentation and dialectics as the only means to defend their claims.

⁹² Interestingly most of the world's main 'religions' are the results of mutual fecundation, e.g., Aryan/Dravidians, Jews/Greeks, Indians/Muslims. The modern worldview is receiving input from an increasing range of differing perspectives at a global level.

⁹³ Examples here include the People's Temple mass suicide in Guyana, the egocentric religions perpetrated by some Eastern gurus, the Waco cult, etc. Many of these 'cult' religions collapse after a very short space of time, e.g., the Bagwan Shree Rajneesh group. (See Fitzgerald. F., *Cities on a Hill: A Journey Through Contemporary American Cultures*. Pan Books. London 1987 for a full account of the Rajneesh phenomenon). Many consider that the scientific secularised modern worldview driven by

Resource strippers who attempt to forcibly subdue such peoples are being regularly condemned for their practices from a wide variety of sources. If cajolement, bribery, and attraction of material wealth will not induce the resource holders to give up their worldview and convert to another, then parties must begin to understand and accept each other's differences. They need to enter into a process of meaningful dialogue that attempts to reconcile differences which then may allow the participants to arrive at a point of mutual agreement.

In the past, the pervasive power of materialism and technology has forced many peoples to succumb to the dominant paradigm. The pluralistic attitude is now steadily securing the right for those who hold different views of how reality is constructed to re-emerge and claim their worldview as a valid criterion of truth.⁹⁴ In many subtle ways, pluralism is acting upon and changing some of the world's most universalistic worldviews. Pluralism is beginning to open these worldviews up to new ideas and concepts of reality to which, in previous times, they were resistant.⁹⁵

The positive aspects of pluralism offer hope for the evolution of meaningful dialogue and some reduction in the power of universalistic and exclusivistic worldviews is already apparent. The assertion of power through apologetic methods is receding as a new conciliatory emphasis gathers strength within the dominant nations. One of the negative aspects of pluralism, however, is the emergence of the highly relativistic postmodern culture. Postmodernism is associated with the development of tolerance for what appear to be radically alternative ways of thinking and understanding the world. This is particularly apparent when considering postmodern attitudes

economics will prove to be detrimental to the long-term interests of humanity. See Heidegger, M., on *The Question Concerning Technology. op. cit.*, and many others.

⁹⁴ Examples abound. In New Zealand the recognition of the validity of the Treaty of Waitangi and the acceptance of the Maori worldview has seen successful dialogue taking place which has resulted in settlement of many Treaty claims. This unfortunately falls short of acceptance of Maori sacred worldview but it is a beginning for a people whose culture, eighteenth century European anthropologists predicted, would die out within a single generation.

⁹⁵ However there are exceptions, the economic worldview is one of the last bastions of universalistic exclusivism, it is even more closed in upon its own presuppositions than science is. Panikkar comments: "Today's pan-economic civilisation is radically intolerant of any human activity (contemplation for example) that is not at least indirectly profitable. It leaves room for anti-economic factors only in so far as it can eliminate or co-opt them." Panikkar, R., "Introduction," to *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.33.

concerning the natural world.⁹⁶ In spite of this, little has been translated into changing the way people live and the way economies are organised. The inherent nihilism, absence of fixed reference points, abhorrence of narrative coherence, and sense of detachment promotes disorientation and lack of political will to undertake any serious action to confront the existing social order. Postmodernism has effectively undermined organised opposition to the rise of global capitalism which has, in turn, resulted in further environmental destruction. Gare comments:

“On the other hand, postmodernism has exposed the basic framework upon which Western civilisation is constructed. We now live in one of those rare instances in which it has become possible to fully understand the nature and limitations of the whole of European civilisation”.⁹⁷

The implications are that with the rise of postmodernism and pluralism a new and critical understanding of secular scientism is evolving. Perhaps it is now possible to partially overcome the concealment of mythical expression inherent within the Western worldview. The hidden myths of the dominant culture of our time may be revealed. Before such myths can be elucidated, it is necessary to explain what myth is, and how the understanding of mythico-symbolic expression can lead to an interpretation suited to meaningful dialogue.

MYTHOS AND LOGOS

“*Man cannot live without myths.*” Raimon Panikkar.⁹⁸

For those who subscribe to the modern secularised worldview the above statement seems surprising if not downright incorrect. For the modern mind, where rationalism is the path to understanding the real; myth surely, is a product of the unenlightened and primitive past! In the modern era we are erasing myth with clear and distinct objectivity which is the natural result of a reasoned ‘civilisation’. We now ‘know’ that the mythical explanations of the past were the result of lack of knowledge and inability to explain natural phenomena. Myths were developed to explain the

⁹⁶ Deep ecology, eco-feminism, green politics, eco-tourism as well as New Age sensitivity to sacred worldviews are examples. Gare. A., *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis. op. cit.*, p.100.

⁹⁷ Gare. A., (*ibid*), p.35.

unexplainable and an attempt to create security within the mysterious and unknown world which surrounded primitive Man.

Rationality encourages moderns to discount myths as quaint stories about the fantastic, the imaginary, the unreal, and the fictional. Although such myths may be seen to contain some interesting moral revelations, myths generally are no longer taken to be a serious representation of reality. Humankind, according to reasoned argument, is now free of Gods and spirits. Rational explanations for everything can be found. Science has convinced entire populations that logical explanations will eventually be found for all phenomena, and these explanations will answer all ontological questions previously regarded as religious questions.⁹⁹ In this sense, those who promote secular scientism, with its associated philosophies and disciplines, see themselves as the pinnacle of human achievement. The realm of myth and mythology is something from the distant past as far as they are concerned. And yet the statement that: "Man cannot live without myths" remains legitimate in spite of the protestations forwarded by secular scientists and rationalists who continue to uphold intellect as the fundamental principle of logical discernment. However, we are speaking here of a conception of myth different from that of 'archaic' fables and stories. G. Van der Leeuw expresses the new conception of a new myth as:

"It yields a worldview that is totally different from the usual conceptions. Nothing is fixed, in fact nothing *is*. Nothing can appear except by being forever newly created, by being activated as myth. But this means that every myth is aetiological, not in the old sense that it 'explains' a fact, but in the sense that it provides a guarantee for this fact."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Panikkar. R., "Myth and History," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.100.

⁹⁹ Gilkey. L., "Nature as a Realm of Meaning," in *Nature, Reality and the Sacred: The Nexus of Science and Religion*. Fortress Press. Minneapolis. 1993, p.131-132.

¹⁰⁰ Van der Leeuw. G., "Primordial Time and Final Time," in *Man and Time: Papers From the Eranos Yearbooks* (edited by J. Campbell). Routledge Kegan Paul. London. 1958, p.332. B. Malinkowski describes myth as: "not merely a story told, but a reality lived - not an intellectual reaction upon a puzzle, but an explicit act of faith - a statement of primeval reality which still lives in present-day life and a justification of any precedent." Malinowski. B., *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. Kegan Paul. and W. W. Norton. London and New York. 1926, p.21. Further, R. Pettazzoni notes: "Myth is true history because it is sacred history: by virtue not only of its content, but also of the concrete sacral forces that it sets in motion...Their [myths] truth is not of a logical nor of a historical order: it is above all a religious and more specially magical order. The efficacy of myth in serving the ends of the cult, in preserving the world and life, resides in the magic of the word, in the evocative power of the word, of the *mythos*, of the *fabula*, not as a fabulous discourse but as an arcane and potent force akin - also according to the etymology - to the power of *fa-tum*." Pettazzoni. R., *Miti e Leggende*, Vol I. Turin. 1948, p.v.

All worldviews, whether they are sacred or secular, have an original starting point or horizon for the intelligible interpretation and expression of reality. This is the mythic base upon which a worldview rests. Panikkar notes that:

“Myth, like experience, enables us to stop somewhere, to rest in our quest for the foundations of everything. Otherwise there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. You cannot go beyond myth, just as you cannot go beyond experience. If you could you would lose both the myth and the experience. Neither allows for further explanation. The moment you explain a myth, it ceases to be a myth; just as explaining an experience is no longer the experience. They are ultimate.”¹⁰¹

Myth “seen and lived from within” shows where the *given* stands out against a horizon; myth is “the ultimate reference point from which facts and truth may be recognised”. From inside a worldview boundary this reference point is unquestionable. “From the outside, myth appears to be a series of legends and presuppositions”¹⁰² which seem to have little in common with ‘factuality’. No matter how unusual, or even bizarre, the myths of the ‘other’ may seem to the outside observer; those who live within that horizon of intelligibility find their world eminently coherent. Panikkar explains:

“Myth then recounts in its own way the ultimate ground of a particular belief; either of others’ belief (myth seen from the outside) or of our own belief (myth lived from the inside). *In the latter case, we believe the myth without believing in the myth*, since it is transparent for us, self-evident, integrated into that ensemble of facts in which we believe and which constitute the real.”¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Panikkar. R., “The Supreme Experience: The Ways of East and West,” in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.297.

¹⁰² Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), pp.295-298.

¹⁰³ Panikkar. R., “Myth and History,” in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics op. cit.*, p.98-99. [Emphasis mine]. This explanation of myth is not what is commonly called mythology which is the science of myths or the reflection on myth. Mythology effectively destroys myth because myth cannot be made an object of thought. Only very recently has mythology renounced its pretension to being science and rediscovered that its role is one of recounting myths or telling the story of myths. Idries Shah in his *World Tales* comments: “What does a folk-tale (mythical story) really mean? Scholars and others take them to pieces; ideologues look for those which support their beliefs about tales; literary people often use them for the basis of their own works....In spite of the enormous amount of work done on the collection, analysis and study of tales, how many collectors have troubled themselves to ask the reciters themselves, the experts what the tale means and what effect it is supposed to have?” Shah. I., *World tales: The Extraordinary Coincidence of Stories told in All Times in All Places*. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanivich. New York. 1979, p.135.

No amount of impassioned denial by rational scientists can lift the secular conception of an objective worldview out of the actual realm of myth. The main barrier to understanding this conception of myth for the modern worldview is that it has as its foundational myth the empowering discovery of reason. Reasonable people truly *believe* that no reality is valid except the rational one, and that all of reality can be apprehended and explained by scientific concepts, ideological formulations and logical discernment. For the modern secularised worldview, myth looks like a barrier to ascertaining clear and distinct truth. Modernity attempts to de-mythicise everything in the quest for absolute truth, and to achieve this, the shadows of the obscure mythical realm need to be dispelled by the clear light of reason. *Mythos* is to be replaced with *logos*. The upshot is the reduction of everything to the level of human thought, which now stands as the ultimate horizon of intelligibility; which is to say, our myth.¹⁰⁴ For the Western worldview, rationality is the standpoint from which to decide where the *mysterium* ends and reality begins; implying that those who do not think rationally are outside the boundaries of intelligibility as far as the secular Western worldview is concerned. Hence a great difficulty arises in accepting and tolerating conscious activities which are intuitional, transcendent, or belong to different orders of consciousness. For this reason, Westerners have great difficulty with the notion of non-human and non-living entities acting as crucibles of meaning to those of other worldviews.

This is not to say that modernity is invalid as a worldview. To the contrary, the knowledge and discoveries of rational thinking are legitimate and important revelations of a particular kind of truth. If wisdom gained from rational methods could be combined with revelations of truth collected by those who practice other ways of knowing, a comprehensive elucidation of reality and its meaning could emerge. The problem of Western universalism is solved not by destroying the scientific worldview but by opening science up to the reality of its own limitations.

¹⁰⁴ R. Vachon notes: "Modernity is unaware or does not want to acknowledge that it itself is a myth among others. The present myth is science. It is unaware and refuses to admit its deep unreality; it would like to replace the mythico-symbolic reality with a conceptual construct, objective, subjective, or both. It confuses the context and the horizon with the conceptual framework. It is not aware that to demythicise is always to re-mythicise and trans-mythicise. Hence its logocracy, its scientific fanaticism." Vachon, R., "Guswenta or the Intercultural Imperative: The Intercultural Foundations of Peace." *InterCulture*, (Part 1, section 1) 1995, p.42.

There is a need to prepare pathways for science to accept the truth from other worldviews which could result in a fusion of the horizons of human wisdom.¹⁰⁵

Reason, as an absolute, cannot be universalised in a pluralistic world. The modern myths of rationalism and objective thinking are becoming increasingly destructive for the majority of the world's people.¹⁰⁶ Mythical expressions can change; indeed myths are always changing as the horizon of intelligibility shifts. For the Western worldview, the constant deconstruction of myth has led to a replacement with new myths which are not necessarily fulfilling the essential aim of improving the human condition.¹⁰⁷

Myth is a whole; it cannot be reduced to its parts, nor can it be pierced by the *logos*. *Logos* is the realm of the intellect: it is the reasonable, all that is thought and spoken of. *Logos* is the domain of the rational, the reasonable, and the communicable. *Logos* originates from the *mythos*, yet if a myth is rationalised or pierced by reason it ceases to be *mythos*. However, if a myth is recognised by *logos* it then becomes part of the intellectual realm and a new myth emerges to replace it. In this way the horizon of intelligibility is always sustained. Panikkar explains the relationship between *mythos* and *logos*:

“*Mythos* is never the object of thought (i.e., of the *logos*), nor is it objectifiable; rather myth is what allows thought to conceptualise itself, and faith to express itself....the *logos* is disengaged from one myth only to be re-mythicised, embedded in another.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ H. G. Gadamer suggested that we have not achieved a genuine "fusion of horizons in our understanding of the other." Gadamer. G. H., *Truth and Method*. Sheed and Ward. London. 1975, p.273.

¹⁰⁶ It is the eschatological nature of modernism which is the source of self-destructiveness. Life is seen as an endless progression towards a final goal or *telos* which means that the solution to all serious problems lie in the future and all endeavour is projected into a retreat from a negative historical past to a preferred future. The danger of such a vision is that there develops a belief in final solutions and no matter how much damage is done today, a future solution will be discovered. This allows the moderns to artificially negate the potential destructiveness of current activities in the hope of future solutions. Nowhere is this more apparent than in environmental issues where technology and objective thinking is devastating the potential of the natural world to renew itself. (See Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth. op. cit.*, p.3-4). Even the most optimistic projections show that current economic processes will destroy the potential for humans to provide for an increasing population within a century or two. See Georgescu-Roegen. N., *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1971.

¹⁰⁷ In fact the rate of ecosystem degradation causes many to suggest that there will be serious and long term negative effects which will impinge upon human populations by causing the very environment which shelters us to become hostile to us.

¹⁰⁸ Panikkar. R., "The Notion of Infallibility," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p. 399.

The task is to make room for both *mythos* and *logos* without setting them up in some kind of battle where one must subordinate the other. *Logos* can interpret *mythos* without destroying it, and still retain its component of rationality. In this sense Western thought has mistaken *logos* for *mythos* and so its rigorous and penetrating focus continually causes its own myths to recede to a point of concealment. This in turn allows Western thinkers to believe that their way of perceiving reality is without mythical expression. However, as Panikkar explains, the two are inextricable:

“*Mythos* and *logos* are two human modes of awareness, irreducible one to the other, but equally inseparable.”¹⁰⁹

And:

“*Mythos* and *logos* go together because they designate two aspects of the word, the first being the word which expresses thoughts (*as realities*), the second being the act of intelligence and the operation run by the thing expressed in the word. *Logos* designates the word in reference to the subject who thinks or speaks: what is thought and calculated. What *mythos* designates primarily is not the word in reference to what is thought, but in reference to what is real.”¹¹⁰

Thus we can see that all worldviews are constructed from a mythical base and all truth is revealed to their adherents in a way which enhances their understanding of the way the world is, in reality. Each has its own validity in creating a sense of being in relation to the actuality of existence. Each *mythos* is situated within a changing panorama of *mythemes* which are continually adjusted as the horizon of experience dictates.¹¹¹

The universalistic modern worldview, in light of its continuing failure to impose a global worldview based on its own mythical presentations and apologetic method, must now make room for others in an environment of pluralism. The war of *logos*

¹⁰⁹ Panikkar. R., "Myth and History," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.100.

¹¹⁰ Panikkar. R., *Le Mystere du Culte dans L'hindouisme et le Christianisme*. Cerf. Paris. 1970, p.12, cited by Vachon. R., in *InterCulture. op. cit.* 1995, p.43.

¹¹¹ For example, an isolated tribe observing an aeroplane for the first time cannot discount the experience even though they may have no idea what it means. A new myth including aeroplanes springs into being. A myth which may have little in common with so called 'rational' explanation. The science of cosmology has adapted to many equally unlikely possibilities in the last fifty years, many of

against *mythos* must cease.¹¹² The Western myth of eternal progress is coming to an end. Its extrication from its own eschatological demise lies in the influence of other worldviews to temper its slide into ontological reductionism, meaningless and moral decay. A new myth is emerging, as it must.¹¹³ This new myth is aetiologically determined by the positive aspects of pluralism. In a sense, the eschatological goal for the West is the transcendence of its own universalistic myth of the superiority of reason and rationality.

The dialogical process needs to take note of the primacy of *mythos* in the act of communication and not be led astray by logical argumentation about whose criteria of truth should be chosen. If the *logos* pierces and breaks down myth, then what can be used to convey and communicate the meaning of differing myths from one worldview to another? The answer is that symbols are the instruments whereby myth expresses its experience to the intellect. Symbols are also the first expression of meaning arising from the *mythos*. Symbols are the bridges between *mythos* and *logos*.

SYMBOL AND SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE

"Symbols cannot be found lying about nor can they be invented; they must be revealed." Raimon Panikkar.¹¹⁴

Symbols do not represent things: they present them. Symbols are not like signs which point to something other than the sign itself. Rather, symbols are realities in themselves. The symbol and its reality are in a *sui generis* relationship with each other. Much of human interaction is symbolic. For example, language is a symbolic presentation of a myth and words cannot be used to explain why language conveys the meanings about reality that it does. A certain sound is commonly recognised as presenting an image of reality to those within a certain language group. The fact that

which are of mythical dimensions. See Gribbin, J., *Unveiling the Edge of Time: Black holes, White holes, and Wormholes*. Crown Trade Paperbacks. New York. 1996.

¹¹² Perhaps this is what Jesus Christ meant when he said: "Take the beam out of your own eye before you take the splinter out of your brother's eye." (Matthew 7:1-5). In a sense, the seducing power of objective thought has blinded us to the reality of our own worldview construction.

¹¹³ See Chapter Six, Part I, for further discussion of the emergence of a new *mythos*.

¹¹⁴ Panikkar, R., "The Rhetoric of the Dialogue," in *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Asian Trading Corporation. Bangalore. 1984, p.17.

the same sound can also be presented in written form or as hand signals and still convey the same meaning as the sound, shows that language has a mythic dimension which can be expressed in a variety of symbolic forms. Language has a definite starting point where a commonly agreed symbol always presents the same meaning. For example, the sound for the animal 'cat' in English always brings to mind an image of a certain kind of creature. The sound 'cat' does not present an image that is in any way similar to what a 'tree' sound presents.

How and why this agreement works is a mythic process, that is: "It is what you believe in without believing you believe it." If, however, people resolved that these sounds meant different things within one language group, that language would breakdown and lose its coherence.¹¹⁵ If logic is applied to try and explain why 'cat' actually means 'cat', no reasonable answer can be discerned. The mythic foundation of language is presented in multivalent symbols called words. The myth is fixed at a certain horizon but the word-symbols can be presented in a surprising number of ways. So it is with all symbols.

The symbol puts us in contact with reality. Symbols mediate between *mythos* and *logos*. Symbols exist because they denote a richer and more multifaceted reality than the analytical intellect is able to grasp. Here Panikkar notes:

"... it [the symbol] implies the relativity between a subject and an object. The symbol does not pretend to be neither universal nor objective. It seeks rather to be concrete and immediate and to speak without intermediary between subject and object. The symbol is at one and at the same time objective/subjective; it is constitutively a relationship."¹¹⁶

In this sense, symbols are the bridge between object and subject as well as the means of presenting *mythos* to the intellect in a way which provides meaning that does not need to reveal the hidden aspect of the myth. Humans symbolise that which they cannot easily describe intellectually. For example, physicists describe invisible

¹¹⁵ Cf. Wittgenstein's argument against private language. Meaning according to Wittgenstein is use; words, signs gestures etc are not meaningful in themselves but only within rule-governed activity. A private language could not be used; it is not governed by pragmatic conditions. Wittgenstein. L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (translated by D. Pears and P. Guinness). Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1961.

¹¹⁶ Panikkar. R., "The Religion of the Future." *InterCulture*. Vol. XXIII, No. 2-3. 1990, p.13.

probabilities through mathematics (i.e., number symbols) which present ideas to the mind which are not necessarily comprehensible in word form.¹¹⁷

Religious symbols often present the image of the central or foundational text or event upon which the religion was founded. In Christianity the cross is such a symbol. The cross presents not only the central ideas of Christianity but also underpins the religious faith of the Christian. As a symbol, the cross is recognisable to many diverse worldviews and has a particular meaning for each individual depending upon their association with Christianity. The important aspect of symbols, in a religious sense, is that sacred symbols also present meaning to the emotions, sentiments and beliefs which connect to faith as the basis of religious experience.

In the modern world, symbols also present meaning in a similar manner even though the secularised worldview tries to deny faith and belief. Money is a powerful symbol in the modern era. Money, especially paper money, symbolises the mythic coherence of global economic systems. If money somehow lost its symbolic power, much of the supporting base of Western power would collapse, because without the symbol the myth cannot be realised or come into being. If the pure light of logical exegesis was applied to analysing paper money, in the same way as it has been applied in the past to the symbols of other cultures, paper money becomes merely coloured paper with various sets of images and numbers printed on it.

To a culture without a money myth, these inscribed papers would have no special significance apart from the attractiveness of the print, as an art form, a curiosity, or some kind of fetish. Money for the modern worldview is a quasi-religious symbol; it can elicit powerful emotional responses, indeed, whole nations will defend money symbols by resorting to military action. People die, are killed, and can be imprisoned because of money (or the lack of it). Those who reject money and its power are immediately regarded with suspicion and soon find themselves outside the

¹¹⁷ Einstein's famous $E=mc^2$ equation is a symbol of the highly complex Special Theory of Relativity which requires a long and complex explanation about a particular aspect of how the universe operates. The symbolic presentation offers an instant 'picture' of what is meant even to those who do not understand the full implications of the general theory. This symbol also presents an image of Einstein the person, relativity in general and physics as a discipline: that is, it is a multivalent and polysemic symbol.

worldview boundary. Money is as important a symbol for the modern worldview as the cross is to Christians. It is a focus for action, for belief, and ultimately faith in the cultural milieu of modern society. The mythical basis of money cannot be expressed without the multivalent symbol.

The symbol is the vehicle whereby the myth manifests itself in reality. Without the myth there can be no symbol; without the symbol the myth is not manifest. Myth and symbol are intrinsically related to the intelligibility of reality. While the myth remains 'unseen', the symbol is highly 'visible' and can be interpreted in a seemingly infinite variety of ways. Symbols can manifest in simple forms, such as the Christian cross, or they can be exceedingly complex as in the case of paper money where various signs, images, and icons can be incorporated into the symbol.¹¹⁸

In vernacular worldviews, symbols often originate from natural sources and phenomena. In New Zealand, for example, a powerful symbol presents the sacredness of trees. In the Maori worldview the forest God, *Tane*, is symbolised by the Kauri tree (*Agathis australis*).¹¹⁹ The largest remaining Kauri tree in New Zealand is *Tane Mahuta* (God of the forest), and this majestic tree symbolises the respect and sense of awe which not only Maori, but also many others who visit this sacred site, are reminded of the mysterious power of nature. For most New Zealanders the Kauri symbolises the intrinsic value of trees and indigenous forests. The Kauri reveals itself as a symbol which is active across worldview boundaries, successfully bridging the gap between sacred and secular. It allows Maori to express their myth in a symbol which can be interpreted, and also presents meaning to people outside the Maori worldview. This pervasive symbol has become part of secular New Zealanders sense of national identity without losing its sacred meaning for Maori.

¹¹⁸ Cf. United States Dollar symbols. Joseph Campbell describes the Great Seal of the United States (reproduced on American dollar notes) as presenting the central idea of a 'New World order'. The 'all seeing eye', pyramid, etc., presents the idea that: "Mankind, that is to say, has herewith come of age and taken to itself responsibility and authority for the shaping of human lives according to Reason." See Campbell, J., *The Inner Reaches of Outer Space: Metaphor as Myth and as Religion*. Harper Perennial. New York. 1988, p.26.

¹¹⁹ Kauri (*Agathis australis*) is the southernmost member of the ancient family Araucariaceae. Kauri are very long-lived and grow to enormous size. The largest Kauri tree ever recorded (at Mill Creek, Mercury Bay) in 1850 measured 21.8 metres to the first branch with a trunk circumference of 23.43 meters. This tree, at over 60 metres high, was one of the world's largest trees. Salmon, J. T., *The Native Trees of New Zealand*. Heinemann Reed. Auckland. 1989, p.9.

Some symbols may appear in many worldviews seemingly independently, but may present the same myth. The symbol of the eternal knot is found across a wide range of worldviews. The first recorded example of this symbol, an interlinked and never ending triangle is found in ancient Minoan culture approximately 4,000 years before the present.¹²⁰ The endless knot is a central symbol in the Celtic worldview where it appears as the symbol of the eternal return. The knot is found in Islamic culture in the Middle East, in India, Tibet, China and Southeast Asia, in Polynesia and Central American Maya and Aztec cultures. In each case the symbol conveys a similar message about the cyclic nature of being and the integration of life, even though it is interpreted somewhat differently in each culture. Whether this symbol arose independently in each geographical area or whether it spread by inter-cultural contact is unknown. The important point is that this symbol was recognised by peoples from divergent worldviews as being a significant and relevant interpretation of a foundational parameter which expressed a mythic correlation in an intelligible manner.

In the dialogical process, symbols are of paramount importance because they are capable of crossing worldview boundaries and conveying meaning into new horizons of intelligibility. Furthermore, symbols have a certain fluidity of meaning; those within a worldview boundary can recognise and derive meaning at different levels. Symbols arise where myth needs to be presented both to those within a worldview and those of other worldviews. One of the most inspiring symbols of modern times is the image of the Earth from space. The image symbolises the whole, the containment of the sphere, the unity of life on Earth. The symbol speaks to us, telling us that this immensely beautiful globe is all we have, this Earth is our only home in the ultimate hostile environment of open space. This symbol speaks to us about our fragility and the need for unity among all the peoples who should be guardians of the living Earth.¹²¹ It may well be one symbol for an emerging myth.¹²²

¹²⁰ See Herberger. C. F., *The Thread of Ariadne: The Labyrinths of the Calendar of Minos*. Philosophical Library Inc. New York. 1972, p.95.

¹²¹ It should be noted that this image also has been interpreted in a contradictory manner. Joseph Campbell saw it as positive in the text mentioned above, but Wolfgang Sachs writes: "...it can imply ownership and emphasise man's vocation to master and to run this common property. Consequently, the image of 'our' planet conveys a contradictory message; it can either call for moderation or

Not all symbols have a positive meaning, even though they may arise from a natural source. The association of evil, as symbolised by snakes in the Christian tradition, is one example which conflicts with the Hindu symbol of snake (*naag*) as the creature which shelters the slumbering Vishnu, the sustainer of the universe. The Nazi symbol of the swastika (an inverted Buddhist peace symbol) has a wholly negative significance which obscures the original meaning. Money may be used for good or evil purposes. However, negative symbolism does not in any way negate its purpose of presenting reality to a beholder.

In the symbolic discourse between worldviews, it is the commonality of symbols which is important and not the interpretation for good or evil purposes. Symbols can stand in the place (*topoi*) between worldview boundaries, beyond argumentation and dialectics. This is the realm of true understanding where convincement¹²³ can occur. As all worldviews have a mythic foundation, they also present meaning in the form of symbols. As Panikkar suggests, symbols are not just lying around for anyone to gather, rather they emerge as an expression of experience, and as the instrument of myth they present the whole.

Symbols as the vehicle of myth, present the expression of experience in a similar way that concepts, signs and terms; as the instrument of *logos*, present the interpretation of experience.¹²⁴ The two should not be confused for they belong to different levels of meaning.

megalomania" Sachs. W., "Environment," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (edited by W. Sachs). Zed Books. London. 1995, p.26.

¹²² This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six on ontology. See also Panikkar. R., *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness. op. cit.* for a full discussion on emerging myth.

¹²³ Convincement means more than conversion. If I am convinced of what you are saying then your truth becomes part of my truth. Convincement does not mean inclusivism or the subjective state of being convinced but rather a broadening of my own understanding and revelation of my own myth. Convincement is an essential part of the emergence of a new myth. See Panikkar. R., "On the Pragmatics of Convincement," in *Worship and Secular Man*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1973.

FAITH AND BELIEF

Faith and belief also belong to different levels of meaning. Faith may be described as “existential openness.”¹²⁵ The word faith often has religious connotations but is, in actuality, common to all worldviews. As myth is a hidden horizon, so faith is the acceptance of unquestioned events which happen simply because they happen. Faith implies a quiet, confident assurance of how things are. For example, when a gardener sows seeds in moist, warm and fertile soil, he or she ‘knows’ that they will germinate. This is not a mere belief based on rationality. When a person sleeps they ‘know’ that sleep is not death and that they will eventually return to everyday consciousness. Physicists do not have to question the ability of the atmosphere to carry sound waves from time-to-time. The atmosphere just ‘is’ always able to do such a thing. Belief, on the other hand, is the articulation of faith. Belief stems from faith, but it is not faith. Belief knows ‘what’ it believes: it is the conceptual content expressed in *logos*. Faith knows only ‘that’ it believes, but cannot quite say in ‘what’.¹²⁶

The rational secular worldview denies faith, and demands that beliefs must be proven to ensure they are not just assumptions. However, faith is as much part of the objective experiment as it is of the religious experience. To carry out an experiment one must believe that there will be a result. One must have faith in objectivity and objective observation - indeed in reason itself - and one must believe that one’s symbolic presentation of data will reveal something meaningful. Faith is part of science in that each particular scientist ‘knows’ that certain physical laws are inviolable. This is a different kind of faith from religious faith - only if one accepts that secular science is somehow separate from religion! As we have seen previously, the secular scientific worldview has its mythic foundations, expressed in its own symbolic forms. In order to present these myths intelligibly, there is a structured belief system which allows it to reveal truths about the physical world. This revealed truth is derived from a faith in the inviolability of natural laws.

¹²⁴ Adapted from Vachon. R., “Guswenta or the Intercultural Imperative” *op. cit.*, pp.56-57.

¹²⁵ Panikkar. R., “Faith as a Constatative Human Dimension,” in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.213.

¹²⁶ Panikkar. R., “Introduction” to *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics (ibid)*, pp.5-7.

In summary, we can say that faith and belief belong to orders of understanding quite distinct from sensory evidence and sensory proof.¹²⁷ They belong with symbols and rituals,¹²⁸ to the mythic dimension (i.e., the expression of experience). This contrasts, but in a complementary way, to the interpretation of experience which arises in the logical dimension. *Logos* is essentially hermeneutic and belongs to a second level of meaning (i.e., that which is accessible to thought and all that can be thought). *Logos* is the 'partner' of *mythos* from which knowledge (*epistēmē*) can be elucidated. Concepts, signs and terms are instruments of the *logos* just as symbols are the expressions of *mythos*. Reason is the vehicle of *logos* in the same sense as faith is the vehicle of *mythos*. Finally, science is one expression of the *logos*, just as belief and ritual are expressions of *mythos*.¹²⁹

In the secular worldview *logos* and *mythos* are often confused, with the result that secular scientism has sought to divorce itself from its own foundational structures and deny any link with its own *mythos*. What has been misunderstood is that just as there are secular aspects of sacred worldviews, there are also sacred elements inherent in secular worldviews. There is no *logos* without *mythos*. *Mythos*, on the other hand, cannot be expressed in any meaningful way without *logos*. The secular worldview, despite its rejection of all things mythic, is just as bound to its own mythic foundations as all other worldviews. It too requires symbols and beliefs, as well as faith and ritual, to express its own unique experience of reality as objective science, reason, and concept.

Heidegger's criticism of the illusory nature of objectivity as a universal truth revealing method remains valid when one considers the inherent 'subjectivity' involved in observing the world. The subjective personality can only exist as a result of the *sui generis* relationship between *mythos* and *logos*. Objectivity can only

¹²⁷ Nicol. M., *Living Time and the Integration of the Life*. Watkins. London. 1979, p.46.

¹²⁸ Rituals are the expression of myth or the celebration of myth. There is no myth without ritual or ritual without myth. Panikkar comments: "A myth without its ritual is only cold orthodoxy. But a rite without its myth is pure superstition." Panikkar. R., "Myth and History," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹²⁹ Derived from Vachon. R., "Guswenta, or the Intercultural Imperative." *op. cit.*, p. 56-57.

function as a coherent expression of intelligibility because it is in relation to a subjectivity derived from *mythos*.¹³⁰

The whole of human consciousness is in intimate relationship with the experience (i.e., *mythos*); the expression of experience (symbols, faith, belief and ritual) and the interpretation of the experience (i.e., *logos*), as concept, reason and knowledge. Together these make up the horizon of intelligibility and facilitate the expression of intelligence in a reality bounded by the mysterious. The mysterious, unthinkable, unsayable, unknowable and unobservable realm of non-being is precisely the 'resourcefulness' of the source from which all 'being' arises.¹³¹

WORLDVIEW CONSTRUCTION

All worldviews have a starting point from which an explanation of how reality comes into being must be addressed. In many sacred cultures this is the creation story which acts as a foundational myth and provides a basis upon which reality, or a point of departure for the dynamism of all being and becoming, rests. Creation myths are common to most cultures. Creation myths are concerned with fundamental explanations of how order emerges from chaos, how darkness gives rise to light, how something comes from nothing, indeed, how the *mysterium* can be expressed as reality. These foundational myths are starting points for the expression and explanation of why the world is the way it is, and why we human beings, with our self-reflective consciousness, come to exist at all. The creation myth is an expression of original causes which presents the meaning for being in a world in the first instance.

¹³⁰ See Foltz, B., *Inhabiting the Earth. op. cit.*, pp.63-81.

¹³¹ Langdon Gilkey suggests that the greatest ontological question of all is: "Why is there something rather than no-thing?" Gilkey, L., "Whatever happened to Immanuel Kant," in *Nature, Reality and the Sacred op. cit.*, p.54. (Heidegger also addresses this question which he sourced from Presocratic philosophers such as Parmenides). This is one of the great mysteries of life which has no answer. Myth is the only vehicle for mystery in this case and each worldview must begin their explanation by making a standpoint from which to build a concept of reality. Even scientific explanations such as evolution make a standpoint to avoid endless regression to a former point. Big Bang theory cosmology does the same because if you question what caused the origination of the Big Bang there is no comprehensive explanation. The mystery evokes the 'why' questions which give rise to foundational myths. Logic, on the other hand, can only deal with *how* questions.

While the details of each creation myth may vary widely, the central idea is common to all. Even the so-called myth denying, non-sacred scientific worldview has its own particular brand of creation story based on the cosmology generated by astrophysicists and cosmologists. In this creation story the universe begins with a quantum singularity called a 'Big Bang' where energy comes into being (from a mysterious and unexplainable source) to form the basis of the eventual material universe. According to cosmologists and physicists this was the origination of time itself, which along with primal energies, proceeded to expand in a lineal way. The science and mathematics of such theories are complex and often bewildering to the lay person even though most are quite happy to accept such proclamations uncritically.

What is interesting here, is that this kind of originating explanation is very similar to the other creation stories consistently rejected by secular scientism as unreasonable, illogical, or mythological. The similarity lies in the mysterious 'nothingness' which supposedly gives rise to the singularity in the first place. Cosmologists will offer detailed explanations about the kinds of processes which were occurring one millisecond after the Big Bang and ignore the period one millisecond before that event.¹³² This is because that which occurred before time was, and before form was, is exactly the unsayable, unthinkable and unobservable mystery mentioned above. For the scientific worldview, the Big Bang is a creation myth, a starting point for an intelligible horizon upon which a secularised and scientific worldview can be constructed. Scientific cosmology, in rejecting prior notions of a creator God, is itself subsequently forced to confront the mystery of first causes. As scientists studied the universe, more and more mysteries appeared, many of which required further explanation. The discovery of black holes, the gravitational warping of space-time, the theory of relativity, the vastness of the universe, the concept that space may be expanding, and wave/particle duality, all raised more questions than answers. In a vacuum of original causes the mystery deepened and so a creation myth had to be

¹³² Physicist Paul Halpern comments "Although the issue of what preceded the Big Bang is a deep and important question in cosmology, many astroparticle physicists prefer to start the count at several milliseconds *after* the explosion and call this period the early universe for want of a better description." Halpern, P., *The Cyclic Serpent: Prospects for an Ever-Repeating Universe*. Plenum Press. New York. 1995, p.10.

revealed to provide an intelligible explanation of why things are the way they are. The 'Big Bang' is just such a creation story.

Many branches of science invent their own starting point. Evolutionary biologists created the myth of the primordial 'soup' to explain the origin of the first living things on Earth from which we all supposedly evolved. Neuroscientists posit all kinds of explanations for how the brain gives rise to the mind. Human evolutionists use myth to link human evolution to a particular species of primate at a certain place and time.¹³³ Such theorists are apt to be very defensive if seriously questioned about the absolute validity of their sources. For these scientists, and those who accept their explanations, these perceptions are not myths; they are the way things in sheer actuality are, because these myths, like all other myths, are fundamentally transparent to them.

Scientists have elaborated many symbols to present their respective myths and to ensure consistency over time. The more symbols are added, the more 'solid' and defined that particular way of viewing things becomes, and eventually a kind of orthodoxy springs up which defines 'doctrinal' approaches to further research. As time passes, the scientific worldview becomes an ever-increasingly orthodox 'system' through which information is filtered to ensure that knowledge fits within certain established conceptual boundaries. Here we see a model emerging which is often used by science against all other worldviews, be they sacred or secular, in order to decry their validity and strengthen the scientific worldview as the sole source of truth about reality. The universalism is plain. Science perceives scientific methods as the only way to be absolutely sure of things.

At this point it will be useful to compare and contrast some creation stories from widely differing worldviews. The following very brief outlines reveal a remarkable

¹³³ Some hard evidence entirely refutes the evolution of humans at a particular time in Africa. Consider the following example from America: "The most important find from this time is the Calaveras skull discovered in February 1866 during the digging of a shaft in a gold mine near Altaville in Calaveras County California. The cranium was found at a depth of 43 m, embedded in a gravel layer under volcanic tuff which came from the Tertiary eruptions of the Sierra Nevada. No scientist of the time questioned the credibility of the frequently re-examined circumstances surrounding the find; it was not

similarity in that each origination begins with a certain standpoint from which intelligibility arises.

1. As we have seen, the scientific creation story begins with the 'Big Bang', which gives rise to energy, which in turn forms into gaseous physical matter. This matter orders itself into the stars and planets of the galaxies. Physical matter, so ordered, eventually gives rise to the formation of self-replicating life forms which then evolve into the myriad living things (including conscious humans capable of perceiving and understanding such realities).¹³⁴

2. The Judaeo-Christian creation story begins with an all-powerful but essentially incomprehensible God who linearly creates light on the first 'day', sky and water on the second 'day'. And from the third to the sixth 'day' creates land, sea, plants, sun, moon, birds, fish, animals and humans, respectively. In this sense God alone is responsible for the creation and manifestation of the myriad things.

3. The Taoist creation story begins with T'ai Chi, the Great Ultimate, from which arose movement, the heavenly way (yang), and tranquillity, the Earthly way (yin). Yang and yin gave rise to various elements: from yang came fire and wood from yin came water and metal. The neutral Earth lay between movement and tranquillity, fire and wood, water and metal. From the heavenly way rose the male and the earthly way gave rise to the female and from them came the myriad things.

4. In the Maori creation story Te Po, the great darkness, gave rise to sky (Rangi) above and Earth (Papa) below. From Rangi came Tawhiri (wind and storm); from Papa came Tane (forest), and Tangaroa (sea and fish). From Tane and Tangaroa came Haumia (wild foods) and Rongo (cultivated foods), and finally Tu (The People). From these arose the myriad things.¹³⁵

until the emergence of evolutionary dogmas that the find sank into oblivion." Muller. W., *America: The New World or the Old?* Verlag Peter Lang. Frankfurt am Main. 1989, pp.222-223.

¹³⁴ See Swimme. B. and Berry. T., *The Universe Story*. Harper. San Francisco. 1992, for a detailed description of the Scientific creation story.

¹³⁵ After Yoon. H. K., "Maori Identity and Maori Geomentality," in *Geography and National Identity* (edited by D. Hooson). Blackwell. Oxford. 1994, p.306. See also Chapter Four, Part II, for a further elucidation of Maori creation myths.

This simplified presentation of four creation stories reveals certain similarities. Each story has a starting point where mystery gives rise to myth, where the unthinkable becomes the unthought and undefined, and in each story the mythical expression arises out of the unknowable in a way which allows the intellect to grasp it. In each respective story, the Big Bang, God, T'ai Chi and Te Po are the founding event from which reality may be made 'real' to the mind. Without these, there is nothing which can be said, no horizon at which to begin, no human relationship to forge. To each of these respective worldviews, the myth of origins is paramount to establishing intelligent communication between people, whether they are from the same tradition and language group or from another. The creation or origination myth is then presented to consciousness in the symbols relevant to each creation story. Faith, belief and ritual are developed from the symbolic presentation of the myth in order to secure a comprehensive and communicable horizon of intelligibility. From the horizon of intellect emerges thought, concept, reason and gnosis (science) which completes the realm of *logos*. Here we see an example of the *sui generis* relationship of *mythos* and *logos* which constitutes the essential coherence of each and every worldview.

Creation stories are just one example among many, of myths which make up the boundaries of a worldview. Secular scientism has many myths associated with its creation story. As can be seen above, both the modern worldview and the Judaeo-Christian worldview share a common myth in linear time.¹³⁶ One myth which is firmly embedded in the scientific/economic worldview is that of 'progress'. Progress, in the modern understanding, implies a movement from the 'primitive' and 'undeveloped',¹³⁷ past to a 'civilised' future where science and technology will banish all ills and provide global social justice through the medium of increased material wealth derived from control over nature. The eschatological notion of progress parallels the Judaeo-Christian idea of final judgement and the establishment of 'Heaven on Earth' through the grace of God. Moderns are always on the way to somewhere, always progressing to the next event. The problems of today will be

¹³⁶ The myths associated with time concepts are discussed in detail in the case study on time. See Chapter Four, Parts I & II.

¹³⁷ Development itself is a myth of the modern era. See Estava. G., "Development," in *The Development Dictionary. op. cit.*, pp.6-23.

solved tomorrow, and the future is always seen to be brighter and more exciting than the past. This means that moderns live in a horizontal world, ever 'progressing' towards some unknown destiny which must be better than today.¹³⁸ The myth of progress which has emerged over the last four centuries is responsible for a great deal of needless destruction of nature as well as peoples and their cultures. Jose Maria Sbert comments:

"With the rise of the modern world, a distinctly modern faith - faith in progress - arose to make sense of, and give ultimate meaning to the new notions and institutions that were now dominant. Our deep reverence for science and technology was inextricably linked up with this faith in progress. The universal enforcement of the nation state was carried out under the banner of progress. And increasing conformity with the rule of economics, and intensified belief in its laws, are still in the shadow of this enlightened faith."¹³⁹

The *mythic* aspects of progress are largely unacknowledged and the doctrinal message remains inviolate in the modern era, as those who have tried to raise doubts about the concept of 'progress' have discovered. Economic and social 'progress' is a mythic conception whose meaning has been reduced to a function of power. The negative influences of 'progress' are currently devastating the potential of nature to restore its balance amidst the technological might of modern civilisation.

All worldviews have myths, both positive and negative,¹⁴⁰ which form the basic

¹³⁸ Carl Jung relates a meeting with Pueblo Indian Elder, Ochwayi Bianco, who describes how European people appear to him: "How cruel the whites look. Their lips are thin, their noses sharp, their faces furrowed and distorted by folds. Their eyes have a staring expression; they are always seeking something. What are they seeking? The whites always want something; they are always uneasy and restless. We do not know what they want. We do not understand them. We think they are mad." Jung, C. G., *Memories Dreams and Reflections*. Collins, Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1963, p.233.

¹³⁹ Sbert. J. M., "Progress," in *The Development Dictionary. op. cit.*, p.192.

¹⁴⁰ Negative myths are common in many worldviews. For example, in the Christian tradition the church doctrine has upheld the myth of eschatology implied by Christ's teachings. This has resulted in many adherents denying spiritual experience in the present in hope of some final redemption. Christianity became 'other-worldly' rather than 'this-worldly'; effectively suppressing ecstatic celebration of the present and causing the rise of many heretical sects which tried to reclaim somatic experience. In Hinduism the idea that suffering was a result of past life experience has led to a great deal of unalleviated suffering of the poor and dispossessed. The myth of reincarnation has led to a cultural fatalism which has engendered social injustice. In many vernacular worldviews the emergence of mythical spirit beings has generated a great deal of fear towards naturally occurring phenomenon and has resulted in many wasteful and destructive practices as well as social inequities. Other examples include wholesale slavery of families accused of associating with negative spirits, the burning of landscapes which were seen to be inhabited by evil spirits, and the evolution of black magic cults.

parameters for their expressions of reality. Symbolic presentation of myth provides a commonality which situates all worldviews on a similar plane for the purpose of entering into meaningful dialogue as symbolic discourse.

Before outlining a dialogical method, we need to understand how (and why) those who live within various worldviews perceive and relate to the natural environment in different ways. Considering that all peoples inhabit the same 'Earth'¹⁴¹ and this 'Earth' is central to the emergence of any human horizon of intelligibility, some discussion is necessary to help explain why such variation between worldviews arises in the first instance.

¹⁴¹ I.e., the Earth as *anima mundi*. Panikkar describes it as: "The conviction that the universe is a living organism and that 'we mortals' share in the destiny of this cosmos, that our life participates in this universal illumination." Panikkar. R., The Three Kairological Moments of Consciousness," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, p.30.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

PART I - ENVIRONMENTAL ORIGINS OF WORLDVIEWS

“All my life I have felt close to place. Place speaks. Place talks. Place communicates. Place is a growing organism, a form of being. Place is an interrelated community playing between Man and Cosmos.” Rana P. B. Singh.¹

All peoples have a place of origin, a place which is identified as the cradle of a particular culture, religion and language. This place is centred on a particular geographical region and associated with this are the natural symbols which present foundational myths. For example, Polynesians have a long association with the sea and the islands of the Pacific region and while they ranged over great distances, similar threads which run through their language, spirituality, culture and rituals can be recognised. These similarities stem from the mythic basis of a shared vision derived from the natural world they inhabited.² Every region in the world has similar associations. A person born in high northern latitudes would evolve very different ideas about the world from a person born on the Tibetan Plateau, or someone born in the great deserts of Australia. The natural environment is central to the sense of belonging to the world and the creation of a sense of place.³ It is also central to the evolution of environmental values. The way cultures carry out their activities in a certain place is largely a response to the natural conditions that surround them.

¹ Singh R. P. B., "Introduction," to *The Spirit and Power of Place: Human Environment and Sacrality* (edited by R. P. B. Singh). National Geographic Society. Varanasi. 1993, p.5.

² Sahlins. M., *Social Stratification in Polynesia*. University of Washington Press. Seattle. 1971, pp.3-9.

³ The term environment stems from *environ* - meaning to surround, form a ring, surround a person or place protectively, and *ment* - forming. (Oxford Concise Dictionary). Unfortunately the original connotations have been lost in the modern age where the term environment has been used to describe situations such as the military environment, the work environment, the micro environment and so on. Environment no longer means home. It has been debased from a word to a term. [A word in this sense is a living symbol which reflects a total human experience whereas a term is an epistemic sign which orientates humans in a world of objects. Panikkar. R., "Introduction," to *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Paulist Press. New York. 1978, p.XXV]

This response to certain environments leads to some important questions. Why, for example, is it that some environments gave rise to predominantly sacred societies and others to more secularly oriented societies? And why did some environments encourage the establishment of large cities and others result in thinly spread tribal groupings? Furthermore, we can ask why did some civilisations evolve monotheistic religions and others develop animistic and pantheistic conceptions of the divine? There is also the question of why some cultures developed advanced philosophical conceptions while others focused on institutional and bureaucratic structures? The answers to these questions have exercised anthropologists, historians and sociologists for some time, and no single explanation has yet been agreed upon.

In spite of this disagreement, the theory of cultural evolution is worth reconsidering in the light of environmental guardianship and sense of place. Sahlins and Service,⁴ writing in 1966, defended the theory that cultures evolve as a response to environmental limits along the lines of classical ecological theory.⁵ The authors maintained that *Homo sapiens*, like all the Earth's other species, are essentially ruled by biological needs. The more well-developed the energy capture system is, the more vigorous the culture will be. As plants and animals have developed relationships to the environment through ecosystem interactions, so humans manipulate the environment to ensure their own survival. Stability is one of the most basic ecosystem concepts.⁶ According to classical ecological theory, ecosystems are selectively sustained by their success at stable arrangement of needs and adjustment of their component parts to obtain the highest possible organisation in order to avoid chaotic influences.⁷

⁴ See Sahlins. M. D. and Service. E. R., *Evolution and Culture*. University of Michigan Press. 1966, pp.66-92.

⁵ See Odum. E. P., *Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems*. Sinauer Associates Inc. Sunderland, Mass. 1993, p.191-197. Classical ecology theory suggests that ecosystems have responded to environmental limitations by adapting their processes to operate within certain parameters defined by energy capture and stability.

⁶ The concept of stability has, in recent years, been vigorously debated by ecologists. The earlier concepts of stability as represented by the 'J' curve where populations reach a stable limit close to environmental limitations has gradually been replaced by the notion that environmental extremes cause populations to fluctuate widely and that the smooth stable population is a very rare occurrence. See De Angelis. D. L. and Waterhouse. J. C., "Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium Concepts in Ecological Models," *Ecological Monographs* No. 57(1). 1978, pp.7-10.

⁷ Jorgensen. J. E., *Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern*. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Amsterdam. 1992, p.340.

When stress is introduced into an ecosystem it will be driven to a new optimum and will never return exactly to its former state. It can be argued that cultural adaptation works on the same principle as ecosystem adaptation; the most stable (or in some cases the most resilient) culture, relative to a given set of environmental conditions, endures and strengthens itself as increased comprehension of its surroundings is acquired. Culture is a dynamic construct which seeks stability within certain boundaries. Peoples adapt to the environmental conditions in which they find themselves in ways which ensure their survival in the best possible manner. As we have seen earlier, the mythic foundations of a culture and its worldview are vehicles of mystery. These myths, their associated symbols, faiths, beliefs and rituals, are firmly rooted in the place of origin of that culture. The geographic setting provides a 'geomentality'⁸ which becomes the source of cultural life and survival. These founding images of nature have long-lasting effects and implications for the evolution of a particular culture.

A TYPOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM

Natural environment and worldview are closely related. Yi Fu Tuan notes:

"Worldview, unless it is derived from an alien culture is necessarily constructed out of the salient elements of a people's physical setting. In non-technological societies the physical setting is the canopy of nature and its myriad contents. Like means of livelihood, worldview reflects the rhythms and constraints of the natural environment."⁹

A symbolic presentation of myth arising from peoples who live in a tropical forest environment would be significantly different from those who lived in arctic regions. Symbols of whales and seals would mean little to those living in tropical forests. On the other hand, tree symbols would have little relevance to those living in icy

⁸ Geomentality is a neologism coined by H. K. Yoon. He describes it as: "... an established and lasting frame (state) of mind regarding the environment. It is necessarily translated into a geographical behavioural pattern and is reflected in a pattern of cultural landscape. An individual or a group of people can hold a geomentality about a particular landscape. What an architect's plan is to a building, a geomentality is to a pattern of cultural landscape. Geomentality is ultimately responsible for the development of a cultural landscape pattern." Yoon H. K., "On Geomentality." *Geojournal* 25. 4. 1991, p.387.

⁹ Tuan. Y. F., *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values*. Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey. 1974, p.79.

northern realms with scarcely any vegetation at all. Moreover, spatial conceptions would be radically different as peoples of dense forests have little need of distance perspective,¹⁰ whereas those of open lands rely on their ability to orientate themselves in seemingly endless horizons.¹¹ There are however, some striking similarities in the way these cultures are structured.

Type One Environments¹²

Both arctic and tropical rainforest cultures reside in environments where agriculture is not successful (or even possible) due to environmental extremes. Human populations are nomadic or semi-nomadic and totally dependent upon communal cohesiveness for their survival. Cities do not abound and populations are often highly mobile, depending upon hunter/gatherer techniques to secure food supplies. The people of these cultures live in nature and their mythical associations are derived from the natural world which surrounds them. Such societies develop a strong sense of respect for the natural world, and religious considerations are usually focused on divinisation of various natural phenomena. People living in these regions can exert very little control over their environment and must learn to live in harmony with nature. These are essentially sacred societies which evolve a pragmatic balance necessitated by the need to cope with natural crises, adapt to trading situations, and defend themselves from enemies.

¹⁰ For example C. M. Turnbull relates the bewilderment expressed by the forest dwelling BaMuti, Kenge, when he was taken to open grasslands. A flock of buffaloes grazed several miles distant, Kenge asked: "What insects are these?" when Turnbull told Kenge that they were buffalo he roared with laughter and told Turnbull not to tell lies. "Kenge didn't believe, but strained his eyes to see more clearly and asked what kind of buffalo they were that they could be so small." From Turnbull. C. M., *The Forest People*. Chatto and Windus. London. 1961, p.228.

¹¹ In contrast, Aivilik Eskimo orientate themselves in such open conditions that they must depend on shifting relationships of snow conditions, on the types of snow, wind, salt air, and ice crack for directional messages. Tuan notes: "The direction and smell of the wind is a guide, together with the feel of the snow underfoot. The invisible wind plays a large role in the life of the Aivilik Eskimo." Tuan. Y. F., *Topophilia. op. cit.*, p.11.

¹² The suggestion that there are 'types' of environments in which different cultures evolve is not new. This selection and the three following ones are loosely based on Betty Meggers ideas which were published in 1954 and have been largely ignored by sociologists, anthropologists and archaeologists, but which have interesting implications for environmental studies, particularly the evolution of environmental values. See Meggers. B. J., "Environmental Limitations on the Development of Culture." *American Anthropologist*. No. 56. 1954, pp.808-820.

The types of environment in which these kinds of societies are found include deserts, arctic regions, high mountain areas, heavily forested regions of the wet tropics and some steppeland areas. They are non-agricultural cultures with varying degrees of animal domestication and a certain dependence on harvesting wild food through hunting and gathering. Spirituality in such cultures is predominantly nature-centred, focused on sacred space and sacred time which are of great importance in the direct experience of their worldview. The natural environment is very highly valued in these cultures and they perceive people as an intrinsic part of the natural world which supports them. Many of these cultures existed without disruption well into the modern era and some still endure in remote parts of world.¹³

Type Two Environments

The second type of environments are those which can only support agriculture at very basic levels due to poor soils, inhospitable climates, or difficult terrain. Food production is minimised in these conditions and cannot be successfully extended even by adaptation to wider areas. Such environments include rainforest areas bounding the wet tropics, some tropical islands (particularly coral atolls), continental regions where biannual extremes of temperature occur, and many desert areas where water is available only in limited quantities. Peoples inhabiting these environments tend to evolve cultures based on semi-sedentary lifestyles. Permanent settlements are few and large settlements rarely survive due to their inability to be self-sufficient in basic needs over a long period. If tree crops can be grown or supplementary foods such as fish and wild game acquired, small semi-permanent settlements can be established. These kinds of societies and cultures also emerge as having predominantly sacred worldviews for similar reasons to the cultures mentioned in the type one environment. Their environmental value systems revolve around conservation concepts often associated with revitalisation of soil fertility,

¹³ The Kalahari bushmen still maintain some degree of autonomy as do some Amazonian forest peoples. In the Andaman Islands one group of Islanders on North Sentinel Island to this day have refused all contact with the outside world. In other areas such as Tibet some nomadic cultures are still intact despite outside influences. In the main, these cultures have been seriously disrupted by resource seekers making inroads into their homelands and desecrating their sacred world. Another fine example is the Kogi of the Sierra Nevada mountains in Colombia. See Ereira. A., *The Heart of the World*. Jonathan Cape. London. 1990.

maintenance of special food plants,¹⁴ and wild food stocks. Myth, symbolic ritual and celebration centred on natural cycles are a cohesive element in presentation of their worldview. Often elaborate attention is paid to the appeasement of a wide range of guardian spirits to ensure protection against environmental extremes. Sacred place and time are also important and their religions tend to be polytheistic.

The cultures in type one and two environments tend to be oral cultures, valuing direct experience over objective cognition. They are inherently stable and conservative but respond readily to change when necessary.

Type Three Environments

The third type of environments are those areas of the world where the climate, terrain, water supplies and soil fertility are such that an agricultural surplus is easily attainable. Once suitable production processes are developed, maintenance of supply is constant without need for great technological advances. The large fertile river valleys in the subtropical and semitropical regions of the Earth fall within this description. Much of India, South East Asia, China, the Nile region of Egypt, some parts of the Middle East and Central America are included in this environmental type. In these environments, cultures develop which are inherently stable, well ordered, with much time and effort being devoted to cultural practices, religious celebration and philosophy. Populations concentrate in small areas and constant production surpluses facilitate the growth of cities in what become highly stratified societies. These richly diverse societies are essentially oriented towards the sacred conservation of their immense soil fertility. Rivers are often considered to be sacred due to their life-giving waters and fertile silt loads. Intricate links are made with particular places and religion is often the hub of cultural activity.¹⁵ Such societies often pay elaborate attention to the symbolic presentation of diverse and highly complex mythical realms.

¹⁴ Usually fruit and nut bearing trees, herbs and wild seed-bearing plants. See Golson. J. and Ucko. P. J., *Tropical Archaeobotany: Applications and Developments* (edited by J. G. Hather). Routledge. London. 1994, pp.14-19.

¹⁵ For example, in Bali there are 20,000 temples and 200 religious festivals a years. See Wikan. U., *Managing Turbulent Hearts: A Balinese Formula for Living*. University of Chicago Press. New York. 1990, p.270.

These cultures are usually self-sufficient. While trade with others is common, military expansion is rare; arms being used to defend borders rather than to conquer new territories. Cultural domination of other groups is usually by a process of absorption rather than direct conquest. Cultures from these regions usually give rise to so-called 'polytheistic' religions which engender a high degree of tolerance toward other belief systems. Pluralism is natural to such cultures who celebrate diversity.

Type three cultures endure for long periods of time, effectively stabilising themselves and their productive systems. Problems occur due to the tendency of secular institutions and bureaucracies to become too moribund to effectively rule their given societies.¹⁶ Population pressure is one of the most common causes of decline for these cultures when over-harvesting occurs and fertility is depleted. The cultures which have evolved in type three environments have, in the past, been the most successful and enduringly stable cultures known.

Type Four Environments

The fourth general environmental type are those where agricultural production potential can be increased. In these regions, with the application of labour, fertiliser, water and technology, an increasing population can be sustained and stability maintained even though environmental conditions are, at best, variable. Wealth and stability in these regions depends upon problem-solving, innovation, and mastering of dynamic conditions. Food producers in these regions face major temperature differentials, oscillating soil fertility, and a variety of terrains. The areas of the world where such conditions occur are the temperate regions including: Europe and the Mediterranean region, northern China, northern and western parts of the Middle East, some areas within the Trans-Himalayan range and temperate mountain regions of South America (North America as a temperate region is only included in modern times; the reasons for this are discussed below).

¹⁶ The history of China shows regular cycles of dynastic collapse caused by a tendency for overburdened bureaucratic systems to fail in times of extreme stress.

The cultures from type four environments are extremely fluid and highly dependent upon their ability to manipulate and control given natural environments. This requirement facilitated an anthropocentric and utilitarian concept of the world. The sacred aspect of these cultural worldviews tended towards monotheism and not a sacrality derived from the physical world because they could not hold in reverence that which they could easily manipulate. Religion and spirituality became an 'internal' matter, separated from the external objective world. These peoples, through the power of their own deduction, could control nature to a greater extent, and those who could adapt successfully to varying conditions could rapidly stabilise their culture. Adaptation to new situations and rapid expansion of borders to capture new resources in whatever way possible was rewarded with success. It is easy to see how belief in logical deduction, reason and human power could arise from such situations, and how secular anthropocentric ideas would gradually increase.¹⁷ However, development of technology became the most important aspect of these cultures whose innovative powers were concentrated on altering the human condition. It is the technological aspect of these cultures which provided their peoples with the power to control and dominate the natural world. This in turn led to the evolution of an anthropocentric and fully secularised worldview.

While the above model of environmental types is somewhat elementary and does not cover all actualities,¹⁸ it does offer some idea of how, and why, sacred and secular worldviews came to be as they are. Environmental limitations in some way facilitate worldviews which reflect the dominant natural forces surrounding any given culture.

¹⁷ In contrast to this increasing secularisation of culture, great attention was paid to aesthetics, naturalism and symbolic value which for a long time acted as a balance to the harsh utilitarian use of the natural world. Kellert, S. R., "The Basis for Human Values for Nature," in *The Biophilia Hypothesis* (edited by S. R. Kellert and E. O. Wilson). Island Press. New York. 1993 pp.42-54.

¹⁸ This way of conceptualising the relationship between environment and culture is referred to as 'possibilism' by modern anthropologists. K. Milton notes "Thus environmental determinism [possibilism] suffers from a lack of analytical potential" Milton, K., *Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Environmental Discourse*. Routledge. London. 1996,

THE NORTH AMERICAN EXCEPTION

One of the main doubts raised about Meggers' typology was the North American region where American Indian nations lived in temperate zones but did not develop typically type four cultures. A closer analysis is necessary to help explain this possible exception. Much of North America falls into type one and two environments where agricultural production would have been difficult without modern technological and energy subsidies. Those regions which could have been manipulated to produce surpluses required a huge energy input from either a large population or some kind of domesticated animal capable of heavy work. The Europeans had a major advantage with the domestication of the horse, with which they accomplished a great deal in situations which would have been very difficult for manual human labour alone. Once initial land 'breaking' and forest clearance was achieved, populations could be increased, which, in turn, could facilitate further environmental change.

In North America, the aboriginal inhabitants (i.e., the 'Indians') migrated southwards into temperate regions with cultural constructs which had evolved from typically type one and two environments. As these were essentially sacred cultures centred on respect for nature, they did not necessarily conceive of changing the environments they encountered. Instead, they artfully adapted to the natural environment as they found it. This meant that some nations remained hunter/gatherers while others formed more stable agricultural societies. The Indians lived in an astonishing variety of landscapes and climates: from semi-polar regions, to the vast cool wet forests, through the great prairies to the deserts and mountains.¹⁹ Through all of this they retained cultural coherence and held steadfastly to their sacred worldview.

p.42. However it cannot be discounted either because of the obvious effect that a particular environment has on the expression of myth by locally derived symbols.

¹⁹ J. Donald Hughes writes "There was not a single section of land unknown to some Indian tribe, and there was nowhere they did not go. Indians hunted buffalo on the plains and deer in the eastern forests. They planted corn in the rich river bottomlands and near springs in the high desert. They caught salmon in the northwestern streams and set their boats on the Pacific waves in search of the great whales. Everywhere they went they learned to live with nature; to survive and indeed prosper in each kind of environment the vast land offered in seemingly infinite variety." Hughes, J. D., *American Indian Ecology*. Texas University Press. El Paso. 1983, p.138.

Further south, arriving in semitropical areas, type three civilisations of the Aztec and Maya arose in the fertile areas. Further south still, the Inca Empire developed along classical type four lines and the great tropical rainforests spawned type one cultures yet again. True to style, the Indians were extremely adaptable people who were successful in a very wide range of environmental types. The North American continent is today a highly productive region, and yet much of that productivity is a result of large and sustained energy subsidies sourced from fossil fuels. If the energy supply was cut off and the domesticated animals removed, it is likely that only small areas of the continent could sustain current human populations. The Indians were masterful adaptors²⁰ but they adapted along cultural and mythical lines which had evolved in different environments. The only area where they could have successfully set up type four cultures is along the great fertile rivers in the southern warm temperate parts of the continent. Had population pressure required it, Indians in those regions in time might have done just that, but at the time when Europeans arrived there was simply no need.

Far from being stagnant and changeless cultures, the Indian nations were as adaptable to differing conditions as were the Europeans. The difference was one of needs and a worldview which focused on harmony with nature rather than an urge to control it. The rise of utilitarianism and extreme secularity in the West has other causes, as well as a determining environment. (See Part II, below).

ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

The plurality of the world's cultures has a direct link to their geographic location. Environmental values arise in relation to the given. The physical realities surrounding a people determine to some extent how their myths are presented in symbols. Those

²⁰ The introduction of horses by the Spanish to the great plains regions shows how quickly the Indians adapted. The horse allowed the hunters to increase their access to meat sources which caused the abandonment of semi-sedentary crop growing which was at best marginal. Horse-riding spread quickly across the plains as crop growers realised the opportunities provided by horses and lifestyles quickly adapted to incorporate the animals. However in the east, wooded hills were predominant and little extra utility could be gained by forest dwellers who retained their own food sourcing measures. At this point horse riding culture found a boundary. On the plains, horses provided a comparative advantage, in the forest they did not. Sahlins. M and Service. E. R., *Evolution and Culture. op. cit.*, p.80.

cultures which were utterly dependent on nature in its uncontrolled form, developed intricate bonds with the animals, plants and landscapes which gave them the gift of life. As their worldview evolved, and they learned more about their particular situation, their perception of nature as sacred became increasingly central to their explanation of how things came to be, including their own place in the scheme of things. This is not to suggest that such peoples did not make environmental mistakes or develop secular aspects to their cultures. Rather, it suggests the formation of a balance between sacred and utilitarian aspects of reality, an overall respect for nature and their place in it. This aspect of predominantly sacred cultures allowed people to live in a world which, while it could not be called untouched was, however, unspoiled. These peoples did not devastate the potential for nature to revitalise itself. Like all living things, they changed certain aspects of their environment, sometimes over-hunted, sometimes their fires burned out of control, and occasionally they hunted species to extinction.²¹ Yet, in spite of this, their environment remained teeming with a diversity of life which was sustained over long periods of time.²² For

²¹ For examples see Cassels. R., "Faunal Extinctions and Prehistoric Man," in *Quaternary extinctions: A Prehistoric Revolution* (edited by P. S. Martin and R. G. Klien). University of Arizona Press. Tuscon. 1984, pp.741-747. There seems to be little doubt that the overkill scenario was widespread throughout many of the world's environments and occurred over long time spans. The most recent being the extinction of the Moa by Polynesians in New Zealand as recently as 500 years before present. What is of interest to this particular discussion is not a denial of such excesses but the subsequent evolution of sustainable practises combined with spiritual and ethical valuation of nature which became an intrinsic part of many worldviews. Europe also suffered many such extinctions (a point not widely discussed in *Quaternary Extinctions*) and while a similar ethic may have evolved among early European peoples, it did not endure and the present day activities of those who hold to the Western worldview resembles quite closely the type of actions which led to the early overkill scenario. As Jared Diamond points out: "Thousands of species and local populations have become extinct in recent centuries under the eyes of biologists and other literate observers." Diamond. J., "Historic Extinctions: A Rosetta Stone for Understanding Prehistoric Extinctions," in *Quaternary Extinctions. (ibid)*, p.824. What is notable here is the obvious diversity of life associated with so called 'primitive' peoples and the fact that they overcame species extinction by developing a religious relationship with nature. In contrast, the Western worldview at the time of contact had a highly developed religion which did not include religious respect for nature, and which allowed them to exploit nature in a way far more devastating than the prehistoric overkill. Scientists studying the prehistoric overkill phenomenon concentrate almost entirely on ideas of primitive hunter/gather societies using sophisticated hunting methods to excess. They tend to ignore the intellectual, religious and ritualistic aspects of such cultures. Cultural evolution is possibly far more complex than biogeographers, archaeologists and anthropologists care to admit. Tool making and use is only one aspect of prehistoric culture which influences their activity. Language and communication was probably far more influential.

²² J. D. Hughes adds: "When Indians alone cared for the American Earth, this continent was clothed in a green robe of forests, unbroken grasslands and useful desert plants, filled with an abundance of wildlife" Hughes. J. D., *American Indian Ecology. op. cit.*, p.131.

these peoples unsustainable practices meant losing grip on a tenuous living.²³ They had no alternatives but to learn to work with nature and not against it.

This kind of knowledge did not suddenly spring into being. It was learned over a long period of time by trial and error, and often with great sensitivity to the sacred elements of their worldview. Such knowledge was their *gnosis*, their science, which was passed through the generations in stories, songs, and rituals.²⁴ Such peoples as the Aborigines of Australia who have lived in their land for as long as 170, 000 years²⁵ attained a high degree of understanding of their complex and often difficult environment. This science of nature presented in the form of songs, stories and 'Dreamtime' rituals²⁶ was every bit as sophisticated as so-called 'modern' science. The difference lies in the mode of expression and the total acceptance of the sacred and mythical basis of their lives. The direct experience of life in many oral cultures is vastly different to the dualistic mode of modern science. Aborigines did not necessarily separate their own being from that of their world.²⁷ They related as subject-to-subject, being-to-being, in a manner wholly incomprehensible to modern scientists. And yet their worldview was coherent: It enabled them to live in places which, even with modern technology, are considered to be difficult and extreme environments.

The American Indian nations lived in a careful balance with the natural environment. Since they lived so close to nature, they were entirely dependent on it, and therefore mistakes in their dealings with nature engendered harsh and often swift retribution if

²³ See Bahn. P. and Flenley. J. R., *Easter Island, Earth Island*. Thames and Hudson. London. 1992, for a description of the fate that befell the Easter Islanders when they effectively destroyed the forests of their Island.

²⁴ For an informative elucidation of indigenous science, see Kremer. J. W., "Indigenous Science" *Revision*. Vol 18, No 3. Winter, 1996, pp.2-9.

²⁵ This information about the dates of initial Aboriginal inhabitation is based on very recent accounts from archaeologists working in north east Australia and is not yet published. However sediment core evidence from Lake George (New South Wales) and Lynch's Crater (Queensland) showed abrupt changes in vegetation patterns usually associated with humans appears at least one hundred thousand years ago. See Singh. G. and Geissler. E. A., "Late Cenozoic History of Vegetation, Fire, Lake Levels and Climate at Lake George, New South Wales, Australia." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*. 311. 1985, pp.379-447 and Kershaw. A. P., "Climate Change and Aboriginal Burning in North-East Australia During the last Two Glacials." *Nature*. 322. 1986, pp.47-49.

²⁶ See Chapter Four, Part I, "Time: A Study," for a more detailed discussion of the 'Dreamtime' and Aboriginal temporal concepts.

²⁷ See Chapter Four for a detailed description of Australian Aboriginal place-centred ontology.

the balance was disturbed. Indians did not see this relationship in purely economic terms; their actions were guided by their view that nature is composed of a host of spiritual guardians with whom they shared their world. These guardians of nature were not hostile to people, they were friends and mentors guiding people to respect and understand nature, and natural phenomena. J. Donald Hughes comments:

“The Indians saw themselves as at one with nature. All their traditions agree on this. Nature is the larger whole of which mankind is only a part. People stand within the natural world not separate from it; and are dependent on it, not dominant over it.”²⁸

Nature was to them a great and inter-related community. People did not see themselves as autonomous²⁹ individuals, but as a part of a whole which included many other kinds of beings, some living, some non-living, and yet others in spirit form. As the tribal elder Black Elk maintains: “With all beings we shall be relatives.”³⁰

The Indian peoples were profoundly ecological; they did not conceive the concept of human domination of the natural world. Their actions with respect to nature were essentially in harmony with their view of the world as a sacred place. These kinds of worldviews are common amongst indigenous and autochthonous peoples throughout the world, irrespective of which part of the Earth they inhabit. These are worldviews which have originated from peoples who lived in natural environments that they could not, or did not, see the need to control or manipulate. These worldviews were in direct contrast to those which evolved in Europe.

When European explorers arrived on the shores of North America, they found what they described as a ‘wilderness’³¹ of unbridled richness and variety.³² Its environment

²⁸ Hughes. J. D., *American Indian Ecology. op. cit.*, p.138.

²⁹ For further discussion of the kairological divisions of human history, the heteronomic, autonomic and the emerging ontonomic periods, see Panikkar. R., “The Three Kairological Moments of Consciousness,” in *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T. Eastham). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1993, pp.21-53. See also Chapter Six, Part I.

³⁰ Black Elk., *The Sacred Pipe* (edited by J. E. Brown). Penguin Books. New York. 1973, p.105.

³¹ From the English wild-deer-ness - the place of wild beasts, not of humans. J. Donald Hughes notes that the word appeared countless times in explorers and settlers journals. They saw the lands before them as places of loneliness, a deserted territory, a place without humans. Hughes J. D., *American Indian Ecology. op. cit.*, p.132.

teemed with animals, fish and birds.³³ To those European strangers it was either a threatening untrodden tract, empty of human life, or some kind of garden of Eden still as it was when the hand of the Creator rested. The Indians who inhabited this vast region were summarily dismissed as primitive, as savages, as some kind of human predator living in primal simplicity ignorant of civilisation, and at best some kind of noble, yet uncorrupted, innocents.³⁴ How could it be that the Europeans conceived a land thronging with inhabitants as a 'wilderness'? To the Europeans it looked like a wilderness, unmarred and unexploited and unowned.³⁵ They could not understand how the Indians could make so few changes to the land and its forests, not build permanent settlements and have no perceivable 'civilisation'. This pattern of reaction by European invaders was repeated all around the world wherever they encountered peoples whose worldviews facilitated life in harmony with nature. In southern Africa, Australia, New Zealand, all of the Americas, the islands of Oceania and the polar regions indigenous peoples were ignored, displaced and disregarded by the 'civilised' Europeans who saw these new lands and all they contained as resources to exploit.³⁶

³² North America is only one example among many. Europeans had similar reactions to environments in Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and many other regions. See chapters Four and Five for further discussion of European attitudes to Australian Aborigines, Fijians and New Zealand Maori.

³³ F. Turner describes some of the natural wonders which early settlers in North America encountered: "Waterfowl took flight under their advances with thunderous wings and deer in unconcerned droves browsed lush meadowlands. Squirrels and huge turkeys barked and gobbled in the endless forests that stretched all the way from the coast to the huge river that Soto crossed and recrossed. Elsewhere ground fruits lavished themselves on the land: scarlet blankets of strawberries covered the ground and swollen clusters of grapes bowered the streams and rivers.....while overhead flocks of passenger pigeons travelled the skies in such numbers that for hours at a time the sunlight would be obscured." Turner, F., *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness*. Rutgers University Press. New Brunswick, New Jersey. 1994, pp.256-257.

³⁴ See Chapter Five, Part I, for discussion of Locke's attitudes towards Native American Indian peoples.

³⁵ Luther Standing Bear, in reply to the European concept of Indian lands as wilderness said "We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful rolling hills, and winding streams with tangled growth as 'wild.' Only to the white man was nature a 'wilderness' and only to him was the land 'infested' with 'wild' animals and 'savage' people. To us it was tame. Earth was bountiful and we were surrounded with the blessings of the Great Mystery." Standing Bear, L., *Land of the Spotted Eagle*. University of Nebraska Press. Lincoln. 1978, p.38.

³⁶ On this issue Vine Deloria Jr. notes that the hegemony of Western sciences still tries to usurp the Indian's claim to their lands through the process of biased anthropology and archaeology by claiming the Indians were simply earlier invaders who discovered an empty land by migrating across the Bering strait 12, 000 years previously and carrying out the classic overkill scenario on local fauna. This argument is common to all lands where indigenous peoples lived prior to European 'discovery'. Deloria also attacks the whole land bridge argument as being yet another attempt to suggest that all archaic people were fleeing some natural disaster, population pressures, or war. He suggests that 'prehistoric' peoples may have travelled to new lands out of astonishment as to how the world was and a natural human desire to explore rather than to escape trauma. He also comments regarding the land bridge

This leads us to the question: Why did the Europeans have such an anthropocentric worldview that they could dismiss others so easily? Why do their environmental values seem at odds with most of the other cultures of the world? Certainly their origins in a type four environment contributed to their ability to manipulate and control nature. But this does not provide a complete explanation of the radical difference between the European worldview and those of all other cultures. To gain a more detailed insight into how and why the European worldview emerged in the form it has, it is necessary to follow their religious, philosophical, and intellectual history.

A full and detailed unfolding of the history of Western ideas is outside the scope of this research. However, some understanding is necessary to elucidate the dialogical process required to communicate across worldview boundaries. In the following section, a discussion of some major periods of influence will be attempted. There is a strong focus on the influence of Greek thought, as it is an essential part of understanding many important Western conceptions which are enfolded within European languages (including English).³⁷ Rather than trying to cover the entire history of Western ideas, the following section will concentrate on attitudes to nature, the evolution of environmental values and the development of dualism and objective thought.

scenario: "Recognising that Indians may have been capable of building boats seems a minor step forward until we remember that for two centuries scientific doctrine *required* that Indians come by land because they were incapable of building rafts." Deloria. V., *Red Earth White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact*. Scribner. New York. 1995, pp.48-49. Western science has consistently under-estimated the ability of such peoples to explore and settle new lands in a planned and intelligent manner. That is to say that only the civilisations which Westerners recognise by way of imposing human-induced change on the environment to any great degree are capable of valid expansion. This kind of thinking has also been used to back colonial claims to confiscate 'idle' and 'empty' native lands to their own purposes (as evidenced in the Americas, Australasia, etc.).

³⁷ Hans-George Gadamer writes: "...do we not begin to recognise that the whole of our conceptual philosophical language and its derivative, the conceptual language of modern science, are in the final analysis of Greek origin?" Gadamer. H. G., *Truth and Method*. Ward and Sheed. London. 1975, p.494.

PART II - THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN ATTITUDES TO NATURE

“Alienated from nature, human existence becomes a void, the wellspring of life and spiritual growth gone utterly dry. Man grows ever more ill and weary in the midst of his curious civilisation that is but a struggle over a tiny bit of time and space.”

Masanobu Fukuoka.³⁸

RELATIONSHIPS TO NATURE IN THE EARLY GREEK TRADITION

One of the main characteristics of the Greek culture and its philosophy was the sustained and highly diversified interpretation of the world in terms of archetypal principles. The Greek universe was ordered by a plurality of timeless essences which underlay concrete reality, providing form and meaning. Richard Tarnas writes:

“These archetypal principles included mathematical forms of geometry and arithmetic, cosmic opposites such as light and dark, male and female, love and hate, unity and multiplicity; the forms of man (*anthropos*) and other living creatures; and the idea of the Good, the Beautiful and the Just, and other absolute moral and aesthetic values”.³⁹

These archetypal essences and principles were originally expressed mythically as partial personifications such as Eros, Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos as well as the fully personified figures such as Zeus, Aphrodite and Hermes. Prior to Plato, Greek thinking was profoundly concerned with human relationships to the natural world. The Gods, already in existence before humankind, fashioned living creatures out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both.⁴⁰ Humans were seen to possess the qualities and skills derived from the Gods. Furthermore, humans belonged to a different order than all other living things and the relationship to the natural world was central to ethics and virtuous behaviour.

³⁸ Fukuoka. M., *The Natural Way of Farming: The Theory and Practice of Green Philosophy*. Japan Publications Inc. Tokyo. 1985, p.27.

³⁹ Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind*. Ballantine Books. New York. 1991, p.4.

⁴⁰ Glacken. C. J., *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought From Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century*. University of California Press. Berkeley. 1967, p.41.

The Stoic tradition was centrally concerned with the idea of *oikeiosis*, which when translated (usually transliterated) means ‘recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one’ or ‘coming to be well disposed towards something’.^{41,42}

Oikeiosis was used to support the Stoic doctrine of the final end (*telos*) and as the foundation of justice. The idea of the *telos* can best be expressed by asking the question: What is the natural aim and point of reference for all action? For humans it was said to be not just physical, but also included the intellectual and spiritual end; a kind of perfecting of being. A life lived in accordance with nature was seen to be a virtuous life.

The Stoics maintained that once we have come to realise that which makes our natural, instinctive behaviour good or right is its accord with nature. Furthermore, reason, with its ability to uncover and discover truth, should lead to a harmonious attitude, to a life shared with other beings. Living a life of reason, or in accordance with nature, is the same as living virtuously. However, the problem of how to determine the causes and contents of nature’s laws which reason observes to be the virtuous perfectings of the *telos*, was not so easily answerable.

This *oikeiosis* as an appropriate relationship for humans was the foundation for natural justice: The urges which arise from nature to love one’s kin, to live in a community, to care for the bountiful Earth, to live according to the impulses given by nature. The issue of natural justice and *oikeiosis* facilitated a strong desire to understand how nature worked; how it unfolded its being, and what human abilities were, in relation to it.⁴³ This central concept was at the foundation of early Greek thought, and had it persisted, may have led to a very different relationship to nature than that which arose when the focus shifted to reason and ratio as the basis for the separation of humans from nature.

⁴¹ *Oikeiosis* has the same etymological root as ecology and economics, i.e., *oikos* - the house, the Earth, and the metaphorical family of nature to which one belongs. *Oikeiosis* is essentially making the *oikos* one’s own, or drawing to one what is one’s own - in this sense *oikeiosis* links the ‘house’ with one’s being and all beings in general.

⁴² Striker, G., “The Role of *Oikeiosis* in Stoic Ethics,” in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1996, p.281. See also Cicero, M. T., *De Finibus Honorum et Malorum Liber III* (edited by M. R. Wright). Aris and Phillips. Warminster. 1991.

⁴³ Long, A. A., “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics.” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. LXX. 1970-71, p.102.

INTERPRETATION OF SOME EARLY GREEK TERMS⁴⁴

The early Greeks devised words and terms to describe the workings of the natural world and its meanings in great detail. Martin Heidegger maintained that one of the central concepts in the Greek understanding of nature was revealed in the meaning of the word *physis*, which he interpreted as 'self emergence'.⁴⁵ Heidegger claims that *physis* did not originally designate the merely physical as it does today, but a special aspect of being. The Greeks described reality as 'emerging' from concealment in a similar manner to the way a bud opens to reveal leaf and flower, or how a seed bursts forth to become a tree. Reality emerges from the concealed mystery to stand out (i.e., ek-ist) in three dimensional actuality as the myriad things of the world. That which is self-unfolding emerges from self-concealment into being. This process the Greeks called *poiesis* - or bringing forth.⁴⁶ The craft of the artisan was to recognise and 'bring forth' (*poiesis*) the forms which lay within a thing but remained concealed. This was *techné* which, like *physis*, was a bringing forth, not of itself, but of another.⁴⁷

Both *techné* and *physis* were not only modes of *poiesis*, but also kinds of *aletheia* (un-concealment, un-hiddenness, or dis-closure), in their own respective ways. *Physis* was that which emerged towards one as it is; how reality 'looks', i.e., its *eidos*. *Techné*, on the other hand, was a human ability which reveals a potential which is concealed within reality, a potential that is not self-revealing but which is potentially pre-existing.⁴⁸ That part of *physis* which was alive was called *zoe* - meaning

⁴⁴ Here I am referring to Heidegger's hermeneutical translation of original Greek terms. Heidegger decides his own authority to interpret the original Greek in the manner which speaks volumes about the depth of Greek conceptions of nature. This is not isolated to Greek thinking alone, ancient Chinese and Sanskrit texts present similar richness of meaning. Modern interpretative reductionism applied to ancient texts does not reveal the richness of meaning implied by those ancient authors. Heidegger's interpretations must rest upon their own self-evident sensibleness. It is my opinion that his discoveries are poised to become part of the common knowledge of humanity in times to come.

⁴⁵ Or, "that which unfolds and emerges of and from itself." Heidegger. M., cited by Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature*. Humanities Press. New Jersey. 1995, p.10.

⁴⁶ Heidegger. M., *The Question Concerning Technology*. Garland Publishing Inc. New York and London. 1977, p.10.

⁴⁷ From Heidegger. M., *The Question of Being* (edited and translated by W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde). College and University Press. New Haven, Connecticut. 1958, pp.10-13.

⁴⁸ *Techné* is the etymological root of technology which has become a dominant feature of modern life. See below, also Chapter Six, Part I.

intensified self-emergence.⁴⁹ Living beings stand out from non-living entities in their ability to self-organise, self-sustain and proceed towards a certain goal or end (*telos*). Living things also contained *psyche* - breath, life, soul.⁵⁰ In *zoe*, *physis* is intensified in the manner of *psyche*: not only self-unfolding but also self-opening.

Because of this self-opening, "no living thing ends at the boundaries of its bodily surface."⁵¹ If living things make contact with humans in their self-emergence it is because they are essentially in contact and open to what is around them. In human beings this existential openness,⁵² as part of their intensified self-emergence, requires them to participate in the unconcealment of *physis* and knowledge of *zoe* in a way which preserves and protects all things. Hence *techné*, *poiesis* and *eidōs* are linked in the human through the special gift of *logos*.⁵³ This relationship was originally based on the virtuous mode of existence suggested by *oikeiosis* which guided people to act in a responsible manner towards the Earth in all its ways of being.

The later Greek philosophers began a sustained search for order in a world of astonishing variety. From this arose Plato's archetypes, Leucippus's and Democritus's formation of the *atomoi*, Aristotle's *hulē* and *morphē*. It also slowly but surely cemented in the centrality of human consciousness as the pivot between the gods on one hand, and nature on the other. This anthropocentrism inherent within Greek philosophy provided a basis for the hierarchical structuring of reality so common in the latter part of Hellenistic culture. The activity of humans becomes more important, because of their ability to change and control their surrounding environment.

⁴⁹ Heidegger. M., "Aletheia," in *The Question of Being. op. cit.*, p.114.

⁵⁰ For the Greeks, to be alive was to be 'besouled'. See Heidegger. M., "Aletheia," in *Early Greek Thinking* (edited and translated by D.F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi). Harper and Row. New York. 1975, p.102.

⁵¹ Heidegger. M., *Poetry, Language, Thought* (translated by A. Hofstadter). Harper and Row. New York. 1971, p.375.

⁵² Cf. Panikkar's concept of faith. See Panikkar. R., "The Rhetoric of Dialogue," in *The Intra-religious Dialogue*. Paulist Press. New York. 1987, p.18.

⁵³ Heidegger interprets *logos* in this situation as a characteristic of being that allows things to be sayable (and hence allows them to 'be' in human terms) and allows us to 'say'. See Heidegger. M., "The Nature of Language," in *On the Way to Language* (translated and edited by P. D. Hertz). Harper and Row. New York. 1971, pp.61-69.

The rise of various theories of the purposiveness of universal nature led to teleological explanations for the seemingly ordered progression of natural elements. Such teleological explanations encouraged the consideration and development of reason as a means of observing order in the world, meaning that: 'one's true self is reason'.⁵⁴ Humans, as rational beings, have been given reason in accordance with a more perfect form of management; hence it is natural for them to live by the guidance of reason.⁵⁵

The later Stoics argued on a variety of grounds that universal nature must be rational. Cosmic reason organised and governed the world; as can be seen in the order, regulation and coherence of all its parts. Reason occupied the highest place in the Stoic hierarchy of things. This development of the idea of reason being the first source of order and harmony in the cosmos found its ethical relationship in *oikeiosis* as 'coming to be well disposed towards something'. The problem was that no explanation could be found as to why this should be so.

The Stoic explanation showed how the Earth was ordered due to the design of reason and, unlike the rest of creation, people were endowed with discerning minds so that they could experience reality in a special way by improving on the original design and by manipulating the Earth to make it more responsive to their own ends. Within the framework and ethical balance of *oikeiosis* and the understanding of *physis*, *zoe* and *poiesis* the early Greek worldview was essentially a sacred conception where their astonishment at the diversity of being led them to live within the limits of nature.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Cicero (103-143 BC) suggested that as human beings mature they come to recognise more and more things which belong to their *oikeia*, or being in accordance with their nature (*kata phusin*) and they reject what goes against it, eventually coming to an agreement with nature. The human personality then arrives by insight and reasoning to the conclusion of what is good and harmonious. This, in Cicero's terms, was living in agreement with nature. See Cicero. M. T., *De Finibus Honorum et Malorum. op. cit. (De Finibus III: 16)*. The 'insight' that Cicero mentions comes at a final stage of human development, meaning that: "one's true self is reason." See Striker. G., "Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics," in *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. op. cit. p.226*. According to Striker, Cicero effectively elevates rationality to the central concern for ethical behaviour.

⁵⁵ Striker. G., (*ibid*), p. 228.

⁵⁶ Heidegger. M., *What is Philosophy?* (translated by W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde). Twayne Publishers Inc. New York. 1958, p.49.

The early Greek worldview was underpinned by a universe ruled by anthropomorphic deities.⁵⁷ In the sixth century BC, Anaximander and Anaximenes initiated a philosophical approach with profound consequences. These two philosophers saw nature and the divine as entwined within an underlying rational unity. They began to search for a simple fundamental principle or *arché* which both governed nature and composed its basic substance. Here began an overlap of mythic and scientific modes, and the Greek philosophers now strove to discover a natural explanation for reality by means of observation and reasoning. Once begun, this process of de-mythicisation weakened the power of the old gods and the idea of independent human intelligence grew stronger.⁵⁸ This culminated in Parmenides' declaration of the autonomy and superiority of human reason as a judge of reality: "For what was real was intelligible - an object of intellectual apprehension; not of sense perception."⁵⁹

The rise of the Sophists followed this decisive shift in the character of Greek thought, and the chaotic mix of the extremes of the atomists⁶⁰ with the earlier sacred traditions, facilitated a new understanding. The Sophists recognised that each person had their own experience and therefore their own reality. They claimed that in the final analysis, all understanding is subjective opinion, and because of this, genuine objectivity is impossible. All that each individual can really know is a set of probabilities. Absolute truth is unknowable. The Sophists considered nature to be an impersonal phenomenon whose laws of chance and necessity bore little concern for human affairs.⁶¹ The rise of the Sophists coincided with the increasing ability of the people to control their environment, produce food surpluses, and build permanent settlements and cities. The power of human expertise and reason was on the rise, not

⁵⁷ See Rockefeller. S. C., "Faith and Community in an Ecological Age," in *Spirit and Nature: Why the Environment is a Religious Issue* (edited by S. C. Rockefeller and J. Engels). Beacon Press. Boston. 1992, pp.147-149.

⁵⁸ Here we see the de-mythicisation of the old sacred worldview giving rise to a new myth of reason. The new myth of independent intelligence and autonomy of human reason did not transcend myth altogether, it was simply a new myth arising from the mystery of being. This transmythicisation is common to all worldviews and modern commentators who derive their thinking from the modern myth of reason usually overlook this very important point. See Panikkar. R., *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics op. cit.*, and *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, for various examples and a detailed discussion of transmythicisation.

⁵⁹ Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind. op. cit.*, p.20.

⁶⁰ Particularly Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius who suggested that reality is constituted by discrete, indestructible, material atoms, and the entire universe is constructed out of their purely mechanical relations.

⁶¹ Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind. op. cit.*, p.28-29.

only philosophically, but also physically.⁶² The sacrality of nature became secondary to the centrality of human ability.

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and some of the later Stoics became increasingly focused on the human ability to reason and its centrality to the order of things. Thus the way was opened up for a utilitarian worldview to emerge. Plato concentrated on the idea that human thinking did not stand precariously on its own, but was underpinned by eternal ideas; the archetypes of absolute good, truth, beauty, and so forth. For Plato, the world was illuminated by universal themes and figures whose governing principles could be known by the power of the human mind. With Socrates and Plato, the Greek search for order and clarity returned, in part, to its original mythic base. Instead of anthropomorphised gods, there were universal archetypes discernible to the human intellect. The human mind stood at the centre, as it were, of the visible and the invisible; a tool which could be improved by attention to philosophy and willed to reveal the secrets of the world. Tarnas writes:

“The belief that the universe possesses and is governed according to a comprehensive regulating intelligence, and that this same intelligence is reflected in the human mind, rendering it capable of knowing the cosmic order, was one of the most characteristic and recurring principles in the central tradition of Hellenic thought. After Plato, the terms *logos* and *nous* were both regularly associated with philosophical conceptions of human knowledge and the universal order, and through Aristotle, the Stoics and later Platonists, their meanings were increasingly elaborated”.⁶³

Logos and *nous* eventually came to denote the path by which human intelligence could attain universal understanding. *Logos* was seen as a divine revelatory principle found in nature and humans alike. The new quest for the Greek philosopher was to find the inner pathway to the archetype of reason and thereby contact the supreme rational and spiritual principle that ordered the universe on one hand, and revealed it on the other. Plato created one of the great visions of the spiritual quest, but he also

⁶² See Chapter Five, Part I for further discussion on deforestation and environmental change in the Mediterranean region during Plato's era.

⁶³ Tarnas. R., (*ibid*), p.46.

taught that there is a radical separation between the spiritual world and between the soul and the body.

The later Greeks had not abandoned the natural world; they had effectively transcended it by the use of rationality and logic. Aristotle refined the process of logical deduction in a way that eventually provided a basis for the evolution of modern science and the secular worldview. Aristotle's philosophy was profoundly teleological: Nature he maintained, like Man, is a craftsman, only an infinitely more powerful one. Men craft things for certain purposes, as does nature in its design of all things, each to its own ends. Aristotle did not seriously question how 'unconscious' nature could give rise to purposeful ends, nor did he concern himself with why the world came to be as it was.⁶⁴ Steven Rockefeller comments:

"Aristotle's philosophy involved a deep appreciation of unique human capacities and his teleological interpretation of nature recognised in all things a certain inherent value, but his hierarchical modes of thought can easily be used to foster the idea of nature as a mere means in a universe that exists primarily to serve the needs of humanity or a certain class of humanity."⁶⁵

It was Aristotle's hierarchical way of understanding the world which later merged with Christian thinking.

THE JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW

The Greek and the Roman⁶⁶ cosmology, based on design, teleology and hierarchy, never fully succeeded in finding a defensible cause for the universe and the

⁶⁴ W. D. Ross notes: "Aristotle appears to rest content, as many thinkers have done since, with the surely unsatisfactory notion of purpose which is not the purpose of any mind." Ross, W. D., *Aristotle*. Meridian Books. New York. 1959, p.125.

⁶⁵ Rockefeller, S. C., "Faith and Community in an Ecological Age." *op. cit.*, p.149.

⁶⁶ As the power of the Greek civilisation waned, there arose a new force in the Mediterranean region; that of the Romans. The Roman civilisation elevated anthropocentric utilitarianism to its greatest height in the ancient world. The Romans absorbed much of the Greek philosophy, especially Plato's hierarchy of power, his authoritarian beliefs and the ideas of mind and reason as being superior to physicality and emotion. Aristotle's rationalist and anthropocentric view of nature appealed much more to the Roman mind than did the early Stoic's more biocentred conception. Marshall, P., *Natures Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking*. Simon and Schuster. London. 1992, p.72. The Romans concentrated their efforts in the manipulation and control of nature and they developed technological solutions to a wide range of situations which the Greeks had largely ignored. The Roman Empire combined the Greek philosophical elements pertaining to human domination of nature with technological advances to become the most powerful force of their times. Creating a seemingly

emergence of the myriad ways of being. In contrast, the original Judaic creation story and foundational myths presented a powerful portrayal of ultimate causation, where an invisible and transcendent God created the universe, and all it contains as an act of will. The beauties of Earth were seen as God's work, as were human beings who received, among other things, the special gift of stewardship.⁶⁷ The Jewish God had a plan for every created thing; the outcome of which was the final judgement and the redemption of goodness. This particular conception of temporal unfolding was profoundly eschatological and central to the Judaic worldview.⁶⁸ In the fullness of time, God would destroy all that had been created reforming it perfectly in the next cycle of creation. Those who rejected God's goodness would perish; those who lived by his law would be rewarded at the end of the world.

One of the results of the monotheistic foundations of Judaism was that no other Gods could be tolerated, nor could any images or symbols (particularly those derived from animistic religions)⁶⁹ be considered to be anything other than idolatry, which the Jews rigorously excluded from their worldview. The natural world was not God; rather it was only His creation. Glacken writes:

“No matter how fervid the natural theology, no matter how deep is the realisation of earthly and celestial beauty, there must never be any confusion between the maker and his works.”⁷⁰

The Jews believed that people owe everything that they are to God, including the right to dominion over nature.⁷¹

invincible military civilisation, the Romans attempted to conquer and influence all the peoples and their lands they came in contact with. Nash. R., *The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics*. University of Wisconsin Press. Madison. 1989, p.90.

⁶⁷ See Bratton. S. P., "Christian Ecotheology and the Old Testament," in *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence* (edited by S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler). McGraw-Hill. New York. 1993, p.482.

⁶⁸ See Chapter Four: "Time: A Study" for a more detailed explanation of eschatology and its influence on the Western worldview.

⁶⁹ See White. L., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." *Science*. 155. 1967, pp.1203-1207, for a discussion on Jewish and Christian rejection of animism.

⁷⁰ Glacken. C., *Traces on the Rhodian Shore. op. cit.*, p.165.

⁷¹ In Genesis I and II and again in the Psalms, it is clear that Man has the right to use all things for his own purposes. "Man may not be able to enforce this right at all times but fundamentally, he has it, thanks to God's establishment of man as lord of the earth." Louis. C., *The Theology of Psalm VIII: A Study of the Traditions of the Text and The Theological Import*. Catholic University of America Press. Washington. 1946, p.93.

It is beyond the boundaries of this study to carry out a full account of Judaic history. However, if it was not for the advent of Christianity, Judaic universalistic claims might never have gained the influence that they did over the development of the Western worldview.⁷² What is of interest to this discussion is the evolution of Christian orthodox doctrines and the apologetic method which they used against other worldviews to determine a definitive history and validation of the Christian conception of reality.

The early Christians were profoundly moved by the personality of Christ, and theirs was religion originally founded on faith alone. Jesus of Nazareth was raised in the Jewish tradition; hence his theology was expressed in Judaic terms, even though his message was essentially heretical.⁷³ Jesus reclaimed spirituality for the individual and rescued dynamic faith from the rigid orthodoxy of Judaic law. However, he did not leave any written record of his teachings and his disciples were left with little else but an extraordinary set of parables and allegories to back up their faith in his claims to divine *gnosis*. As the generation who lived in the time of Christ passed on, the faith founded by the witnessing of him as a living being began to wane, and the early writers of the Gospels attempted to express their experience. Panikkar writes:

“The early Christians did not imagine that they formed a new religion. Rather they witnessed the living words heard at the Jordan and confirmed the resurrection. They witnessed to a fact that transformed their lives and, although soon interpreted in certain ways, remained a kind of transhistorical event. They were not living exclusively in history. Eschatology was an ever-present factor. They could fearlessly face death. They were martyrs, witnesses to an event”.⁷⁴

The writing of the Gospels formed the basis for Christianity as a religion. Surrounded at the time by a climate of ‘paganism’ and Jewish orthodoxy, the task of Christians moved from witnessing to conversion. To do this, they needed a highly specialised structure which would act as the vehicle for Christ’s teaching in order to convince

⁷² The content and discourse of Jesus of Nazareth's teachings are fully documented in numerous scholastic and religious works.

⁷³ See Berman. M., "The Gnostic Response," in *Coming to our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West*. Unwin Paperbacks. London. 1989, pp.136-155, for a full rendition of heretical responses to religious orthodoxy in the Western tradition.

others of their version of divinely revealed truth. They needed a historical basis as well as a philosophical and metaphysical background to support the legitimacy of their proclamation of Jesus as the Anointed Christ. The early Christians naturally resorted to the historically determined Judaic tradition which, with its constant reference to a prophesied Messiah, effectively underpinned the phenomenon of Christ. The evolving religion of Christianity incorporated much of the Jewish history and effectively dismissed Judaic validity by claiming that the Jews had not recognised their own Messiah.

After appropriating much of Judaic history,⁷⁵ the Christian scholastics turned to absorbing much of the Greek philosophy, especially that which pertained to justifying the elevation of reason and anthropocentric domination of nature. While rejecting the polytheistic attitudes of Greek religion, the Christians argued that the Greeks had accumulated much wisdom but because they had not recognised Christ, or witnessed his existence, they could not be blamed for their 'heathen' concepts.⁷⁶

By this apologetic method⁷⁷ the Christians formed a cohesive and powerful worldview, which eventually led to the establishment of political allegiances and eventually an empire. Christians began to develop the idea that Christianity was the only true religion, and the universalistic tendencies inherited from the Judaic and Greek traditions reached their ultimate elaboration.⁷⁸ The combination of universalism, exclusivism and orthodoxy, compounded by the apologetic method, led to the idea of the crusade against all other religions, beginning with heretical

⁷⁴ Panikkar. R., "The Jordan, the Tiber and the Ganges," in *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness* (edited by J. Hick and K. Knitter). Orbis Books. New York. 1987, p.93.

⁷⁵ Whether this was a deliberate action or a result of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the early church is not known. However, the later council of Nicea definitely made decisions which directed Christianity towards an increasingly apologetic stance.

⁷⁶ The pagans were rigorously suppressed because they formed their sacred worldview mainly from the natural world and as idolaters could not be tolerated, for they were effectively dismissing the creator and worshipping his creation. See Chapter Five, Part I.

⁷⁷ The apologetic method has three steps; first a common ground, a unitary horizon within which two opposing groups may meet is projected. Secondly the weaknesses of the opponent are discovered (e.g., the alleged misunderstanding of prophecies on the part of the Jews) and thirdly, the apologist must show that the solution to their opponent's problem lies within the apologist's view. This allows the apologist to expropriate and incorporate the opponents views or as in the case of the Christians claim that Judaism with its laws has had its day. This method was also successful in dealing with the Greeks. Christians claimed that Christ was the embodiment of *logos*. Krieger. D. J., *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology*. Orbis Books. New York. 1991, p.20.

⁷⁸ Panikkar. R., "The Jordan, The Tiber and the Ganges," *op. cit.*, p.94.

movements within its own order. Thus orthodox Christianity became a powerful influence in the Mediterranean and European region.

In the Christian worldview, a hierarchy evolved where a transcendent, but physically distant, God was paramount. 'Man', as a free-willed steward in God's created world could, within reason, subordinate nature to fulfill his own ends. The 'real' world was seen to be spiritual, disembodied and other-worldly. Temporal life was subject to the 'fall' and therefore less than perfect. The old ideas of living in harmony with nature receded as any spiritualisation of nature was forbidden by Christian doctrine. The world ruled by God was meant for 'Man', and 'Man' having free will could, and should, mould it to his own ends.⁷⁹ The relationship of 'Man' to God was where meaning lay and actions towards other people counted only as long as they shared the fellowship of Christianity.⁸⁰ Nature was not entirely forgotten, but its value was reduced to a lesser level than those who previously held that harmony with nature was the source of virtue.

The Christian Empire set the scene for the evolution of an ever-increasing anthropocentrism whereby nature was subjected to technological devices designed to increase the power of the human realm.⁸¹ After the collapse of the Roman world many centuries of decline followed, and much of the philosophy and knowledge of the Greeks and Romans was forgotten. However, it was during this period that the

⁷⁹ Origen [185-254 AD], for example, describes: "The world of flesh is the world of demons. Gross matter... is the domain of Satan." cited by Santmire. H. P., *The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology*. Fortress Press. Philadelphia. 1985, p.50. David Kinsley cites Thomas Aquinas [1225-74]: "We believe all corporeal things have been made for man's sake, wherefore all things are stated to be subject to him. Now they serve man in two ways, first as sustenance of his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made." Kinsley. D., "Christianity as Ecologically Harmful and Christianity as Ecologically Responsible," in *This Sacred Earth: Religion Nature and Environment* (edited by R. S. Gottlieb). Routledge. New York and London. 1996, p.110. Other examples include Saint Bonaventure [1221-1274], Martin Luther [1483-1546], and John Calvin [1509-1564] who all clearly compounded negative Christian attitudes to Nature. See also Chapter Five, for further discussion of Christian ideas about the natural world.

⁸⁰ See Chapter Five for further discussion of some of the effects of Church teachings on indigenous people.

⁸¹ This point is reiterated by many commentators; the most commonly referenced is that of Lynn White Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." *op. cit.*, pp.1203-1207. A more balanced version is given by Kinsley. D., "Christianity as Ecologically Harmful," in *Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 1995, pp.103-115. See also *Religion and the Environmental Crisis* (edited by E. Hargrove). University of Georgia Press. Athens and London. 1986, pp.172-186.

Church established itself as the centre of learning and wisdom and eventually emerged in a position of dominance over the minds and hearts of the people. The Church imposed its will on many sectors of European life and Church doctrines dictated the moral framework under which people had to live. In short, for a number of centuries the church had an 'iron grip' on most European societies as the sole representative of God's will on Earth. Under this regime many other sacred beliefs were stifled, including those which had previously held a high respect for the natural world.⁸²

One of the contributions of Judaeo-Christian tradition to the Western worldview was the refinement and development of universalism, rejectionism and the eschatological vision which resulted in the eventual evolution of a truly secularised utilitarian worldview. This secularisation was an unexpected result of the totalitarian orthodoxy that the Church had instigated for itself. The transition from sacred to secular conceptions of life occurred as the result of a wholly unexpected event: The great plagues of the fourteenth century.

THE RISE OF SECULARISM

The fourteenth century was a time of continuous warfare, political uncertainty and general social change. The power of the Church to legitimate and control the political world was severely diminished. This effectively facilitated the demand for secular control of government and the reign of the 'divine' monarchs was thereafter weakened.⁸³ The fourteenth century also saw the loss of vital trade routes to China due to the final collapse of the remnants of the Mongol Empire in Central Asia. One of the unexpected results of the great plagues of the fourteenth century was the beginning of a great doubt about divine purpose and control of the Earthly realm.

Historian Barbara Tuchman writes:

⁸² See Eliade, M., *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Harper Torchbooks. New York. 1954, pp.112-115, for a detailed description of the domination of the Christian worldview.

⁸³ The idea of divine Kingship did not die easily. Charles I, King of England tried to reinstate his right of 'absolute sovereignty' in the seventeenth century, however he was ultimately defeated during the English Civil War and thereafter the power of the civil Parliament increased. Pocock, J. G. A., "A Discourse of Sovereignty," in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* (edited by N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge and New York. 1993, p.388-389.

“Survivors of the plague, finding themselves neither destroyed nor improved could discover no divine purpose in the pain they had suffered....If a disaster of such magnitude, the most lethal ever known, was a mere wanton act of God, or perhaps not God’s work at all, then the absolutes of the fixed order were loosed from their moorings, minds that had opened to these ideas could never again be shut...The black plague may have been the unrecognised beginning of the modern era”.⁸⁴

The Church, during previous centuries, had supported the academic enterprise of the emerging universities and the scholastic stream. It had kept a tight balance between its spiritual role and its intellectual role. By a process of condemnation and suppression it held the intellectual stream within boundaries allowing it to progress only up to a certain point. A kind of proto-science was developing in Europe and particularly in England where Roger Bacon was beginning to apply mathematical principles, as understood by the Platonic tradition, to the observation of the physical world recommended by Aristotle.⁸⁵ The power of scholastic perception began to grow, and by the fourteenth century, Nicole d’Oresme using Aristotelian theory, predicted the possibility of a rotating Earth. The intellectuals, unable to seriously question creation theology, turned their attention to the only thing permissible: the secrets hidden in physical reality. This focus projected the medieval mind toward intellectual independence and the ability to question the Church’s ultimate authority. This was effectively the beginning of the autonomous period, partly precipitated by the gradual development of the scholastics, and partly due to the weakening of Church authority caused by the plagues and other disruptions common to the period.

In this revolutionary period arose the figure of William Ockham, a British philosopher and priest whose thinking effectively began the journey towards the secular scientific era. Ockham’s central principle was the denial of the reality of universals outside of the human mind and human language.⁸⁶ Tarnas describes Ockham’s arguments:

⁸⁴ Tuchman. B., *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century*. Penguin Books. London. 1978, p. 123.

⁸⁵ Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind. op. cit.*, p.201.

⁸⁶ This is known as nominalism, and is the root of classification and method.

“Ockham argued that nothing existed except individual beings, that only concrete experience could serve as a basis for knowledge, that universals existed not as entities external to the mind but only as mental concepts. In the last analysis, what was real was the particular thing outside the mind, not the mind’s concept of that thing.”⁸⁷

Universals, Ockham argued, are not God’s pre-existing ideas governing his creation of individuals. Only His creatures exist, not ideas of creatures. Metaphysical questions were in fact epistemological questions, matters of grammar, reason and logic, not of ontology. For Ockham, all knowledge of nature arose solely from what could be revealed by the senses. The world was purely physical, the spiritual was encompassed within the Christian doctrine and the two were not necessarily connected or comprehensible, nor were they necessarily continuous. Ockham effectively split the physical observable world from the invisible spiritual realm and opened the way for the evolution of a purely secular worldview.⁸⁸ And so it was that the long assumed metaphysical unity between concept and being began to break down.

The secular worldview did not evolve in the sense of a revolution, but rather as an incremental process where the authority of the Church was gradually weakened. The focus of the new and emerging scientific worldview was essentially concentrated on the physical world and, as such, did not appear to be as great a threat as those movements which questioned the Church’s spiritual domination. There is no doubt however, that the emergent and newly self-conscious autonomous⁸⁹ thinkers, were in fact rebelling against the Church’s authority. Throughout the periods of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the scientific revolution, the hegemony of the Catholic Church was severely eroded and a new individualistic, sceptical and secular consciousness emerged.

Early scientists and thinkers such as Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo elevated the idea of a new heliocentric cosmology. This led to philosophic questions being raised about the validity of ‘naive’ sense perception, considering ‘reason’ had shown that

⁸⁷ Tamas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind op. cit.*, p.202.

⁸⁸ See Ockham. W., *Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part 1 of the Summa Logicae* (translated by M. J. Loux). University of Notre Dame Press. 1974, p.110-113, and *William of Ockham: A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings* (edited by J. Kilcullen and A. S. McGrade, and translated by J. Kilcullen). Cambridge University Press. 1995, pp.178-181.

Earth was no longer the centre of the universe. Moreover, the Church was shown to be wrong in believing that the Earth was the unmoving and predetermined centre of all reality. Tarnas comments:

“The nature of reality had fundamentally shifted for Western man, who now perceived and inhabited a cosmos of entirely new proportions, structure and existential meaning.”⁹⁰

The search for intellectual freedom necessitated an ever-increasing belief in the power of the human mind to perceive and identify truth. Rationality was increasingly perceived to be the only reliable and verifiable method to ascertain and apprehend truth. The senses were the gateway, but uninterpreted sense data was seen as naive and simplistic. The ability of the reasoning intellect to interpret incoming data was the only clear and distinct method of ensuring reliable knowledge, which could be applied to the real world in which humans functioned and operated. Empiricism and experimentation could, if conducted objectively, yield trustworthy results whereas metaphysical and religious deduction could not be relied upon to produce tangible outcomes.

From the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries we can see that the idea of humans as the rulers of nature began to crystallise along modern lines. Here begins a unique formulation of Western thought, that of unparalleled anthropocentrism, based on power over nature.⁹¹ Glacken notes:

“These ideas were associated with a belief that man with tools and knowledge was improving the earth as surely as he was improving himself; the two improvements could go hand in hand.”⁹²

⁸⁹ From autonomy - to give oneself the law, see also Chapter Six, Part I.

⁹⁰ Tarnas, R., *The Passion of the Western Mind op. cit.*, p.283.

⁹¹ D. T. Suzuki maintains that this formulation was markedly different to other great traditions such as the Indian and Chinese who were also concerned with the relationship of man and nature but in a way which did not deny the essential sacred aspect inherent in the natural world. See Suzuki, D. T., “The Role of Nature in Zen Buddhism.” *Eranos-Jahrbuch*. Vol. 22. 1954, pp.291-321.

⁹² Glacken, C., *Traces on the Rhodian Shore op. cit.*, p.495.

The idea of a purposive human manipulation of nature was forcefully expressed by Bacon and Descartes. Francis Bacon wrote in his *New Atlantis* of the 'greatest jewel', the development of:

“A foundation for the knowledge of causes and secret motions of things and the enlarging of the human empire to the effecting of all things possible.”⁹³

Descartes described Man as the 'master and possessor of nature'⁹⁴ and his *Discourse on Method* stands as a landmark in the history of Western thought.⁹⁵ Descartes was particularly interested in claiming autonomy in order that he might overthrow the Augustinian authority inherent within Christian orthodoxy.⁹⁶ Descartes wrote in his *Meditations*:

“It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once and for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences.”⁹⁷

Descartes places himself under his own authority. For Descartes, all knowledge which comes to us from outside, our perceptions of the external world as well as traditional opinions handed down to us, are subject to distortion. Descartes decided that the only thing given before all experience was his own consciousness. The 'I', as knower, must exist before anything else can be known, hence, 'I think therefore I am'. For Descartes, the knowing subject is not deducible from anything other than itself; what is not the subjective knower must be the objects which are known. This was the birth of the modern version of dualism. All that there is 'out there', is

⁹³ Bacon. F., *The New Atlantis* [1627] (edited by G. C. Moore). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1900, p.34.

⁹⁴ Originally from Protagoras, *Truth [fragment 1]*. See Deils. C. H. and Kranz. W., *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker*. (3vols. 10th edition). Berlin. 1960.

⁹⁵ See Mumford. L., *The Pentagon of Power: The Myth of the Machine Vol. Two*. Harcourt Brace and Jovanivich. New York. 1977, p.77.

⁹⁶ Augustine laid down authoritarian principles in stating: "Greater is the authority of the Scriptures than all the powers of the human mind." Cited by Randall. J. H., *The Making of the Modern Mind*. Houghten and Mifflin. Cambridge. 1940, p.96.

presented to the mind as objects. The dichotomy of form and substance was at last elucidated in Descartes philosophy, where mind is separated from body and subject from object.⁹⁸

Descartes was, of course, merely trying to think for himself, not a difficult problem it would seem to those of the late twentieth century. It was however, a major turning point in the evolution of the scientific and secular worldview. What Descartes achieved was the 'deconstruction' of the myth of a divinely planned and ordered universe ruled by the Judaeo-Christian God. Descartes effectively divinised the individual human mind, which facilitated a new myth. A new starting point was revealed, a new autonomous origin of the knowledge and the pathway to the discernment of absolute truth. In Cartesian philosophy all religion is now only possible within the limits of reason alone. So began the life-or-death struggle between the two most powerful worldviews in the Western tradition, both worldviews claim absolute and universal validity.⁹⁹

In the ensuing struggle, the scientific secular tradition used the same apologetic method to conquer its foe as did the early Christians of the ancient world. Krieger explains:

“Autonomous rationality, grounded in itself, becomes the new centre of a purely secular universalism, which operates with exactly the same apologetic method as the Christian universalism before it. The inherent truth and value of Christianity is ‘neutralised,’ what it has of lasting value is ‘expropriated’ and finally the Christian worldview as a whole is ‘incorporated’ into the allegedly wider and more encompassing truth of secular universalism.”¹⁰⁰

The incorporation of Christianity also carried much of the earlier expropriated Greek philosophy, and this philosophy became the vehicle for the evolution of the metaphysics of science. Descartes's own metaphysics represents a further elucidation

⁹⁷ Descartes. R., "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes* (translated and edited by E. S. Haldane and G. R. Ross). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1967, p.144.

⁹⁸ Gregory Bateson pointed out that Western science has attempted to build a bridge to the *wrong* half of the ancient dichotomy between form and substance, "rather than explain mind, Western science has explained it away." Bateson. G., *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. E. P. Dutton. New York. 1979, p.62.

⁹⁹ Krieger. D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p. 10.

of what was incipient in metaphysics at the beginning.¹⁰¹ The Greek concept of *hypokeimenon* (that which lies present before us of itself) presented the idea of a special convergence of *physis* and *logos*. Only that which emerges and comes forth solely of its own accord can be gathered together and be presented as something to the human mind. *Hypokeimenon* was translated into the Latin as *subjectum*, which was then understood as ‘what is placed and thrown under in the *actus* of creation and can be joined by other things’.¹⁰² In the same manner Aristotle’s *energeia*, that which originated the *morphé* (the essence or appearance - in Latin, the form), was translated as *actualitas* (in distinction to *potentia*). In the Christian conception, God was the cause, the prior and underlying ultimate ground. Nature as creation, is what issued from a cause external to it; its self-emerging potential taken away. Descartes claimed that it is we ourselves who are the *subjectum*. Whereas previously, every entity was actually encountered as a *subjectum*, now only the knower, the conscious ‘I’, retains this status. All else becomes the *objectum*, i.e., that which is thrown up opposite the mind.¹⁰³

The actual now shows itself as object.¹⁰⁴ The medieval concepts of *subjectum* and *objectum* undergo a radical reversal in Descartes’s philosophy.¹⁰⁵ This is to say that Descartes formulated the prevailing juxtaposition of thinking and being.¹⁰⁶ This particular view of conscious individual self as subject and all else as object is the

¹⁰¹ Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature*. Humanities Press. New Jersey. 1995, p.77.

¹⁰² From Heidegger. M., *Vortrage und Aufsätze*. Neske. Pfullingen. 1961, p.50, cited by Foltz. B., (*ibid*), p.74.

¹⁰³ For example, the imagination can posit before the mind any kind of illusion possible. That which is thrown against the mind is, to the Greeks, illusion or imagination. In the Vedic tradition this was *maya*, the illusion of material reality. In this sense a radical critique of objective thinking could be that scientific knowledge belongs to the realm of illusion. Scientific knowledge is a kind of ultimate trickster, the Western version of coyote, the modern Hermes, etc. Scientific thought in this sense is an interpretive method which cannot be trusted to reveal truth in a trustworthy form; exactly opposite to the claims of the scientific worldview itself. See Bohm. D., *Thought as a System*. Routledge. London and New York. 1994, and Combs. A. and Holland. M., *Synchronicity: Science, Myth and the Trickster*. Floris Books. New York. 1994.

¹⁰⁴ Panikkar notes that: "Things are more or less animate. They have an *animus*. This amounts to saying that they are not only objects but also subjects. Culture on the other hand, is a world of objects, *objecta*: 'things thrown,' put before awareness so that we are capable of thinking about them. These objects are states of consciousness or fields of awareness." Panikkar. R., "The Defiance of Pluralism." *Soundings* 79. 1-2, 1996, pp.173-174.

¹⁰⁵ The role of Descartes in providing a decisive link between the metaphysics of the ancients and the moderns is beyond the scope of this inquiry. For detailed a commentary, see Baker. G. and Morris. K. J., *Descartes' Dualism. op. cit.*, pp.100-138.

¹⁰⁶ Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth. op. cit.*, p.78.

central and founding myth of the modern scientific secular worldview. Such objectification gives rise to the scientific worldview, and science as method, is one very decisive way in which all that is presents itself to us. Divorced from any ontological basis, science was set free to reign supreme over nature. Heidegger maintains that the understanding of nature as an object represents the extreme outcome of the metaphysical tradition almost unrecognisable from its distant origins, where “nature did not, and could not, have presented itself to the early Greeks as an object.”¹⁰⁷

TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF ECONOMICS

In the last part of this brief history of ideas, the rise of technical ability and the evolution of economics needs to be considered because they are both completely intertwined in the modern myth. Because science effectively subdues its ‘objects’, forcing them to present themselves in conformity to a pre-planned and pre-conceived framework within which they are calculable and predictable, scientific theory is utterly different from any manner of mere onlooking. Heidegger argues that scientific theory and method sets upon and entraps its objects, working over and refining them to meet the demands of its own project. In this manner, nature’s own prior ground as self-emerging is neutralised, allowing science to force and provoke nature into revealing itself in a way which it does not do of itself.¹⁰⁸

Technology is a very different process to *techné* where the craftsman reveals those forms (*morphé*) which lie ‘slumbering’ within *physis*. There is no doubt, however, that nature can be made present in this manner. The difficulty is that technology devastates the potential of nature to emerge in its own way. It turns nature into ‘standing stocks’ and ‘resources’ to be manipulated into providing material for the ‘benefit’ of humankind. To the scientific way of seeing things, a tree may be made into whatever science wants; there is no sense of art as in trying to see what form the wood is concealing in its grain. Any kind of tree can be made into a plank or a sheet of newsprint. In this way the intrinsicality of *physis* is violated. ‘Man, the master and

¹⁰⁷ Cited by Foltz. B., (*ibid*), p. 79.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger. M., *Aus der Arfahrung des Denkens* Auflage. Pfullingen. 1965, p.65.

possessor of nature' decides how nature will reveal itself and what its meaning (or lack of meaning) is.

With the evolution of the scientific method, technology developed very rapidly in the West. The full power of the intensely focused scientific mind began to reveal all kinds of increasingly useful things which were used to overcome the natural limitations previously imposed by 'ignorance' of nature's laws. Bacon expressed the power of the new science and its technological potential as:

"They do not, like the old [arts], merely exert a gentle guidance over nature's course; they have the power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations".¹⁰⁹

As science and technology progressed, philosophy took upon itself the task of justifying the new secular humanist worldview, and two major players appeared on the scene who strove to add meaning to the new world order. They were Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith;¹¹⁰ one a philosopher and the other an economist. Both were deeply committed to the secular worldview and at the same time were concerned with human suffering. Bentham denounced human suffering and concluded that all humans sought pleasure and happiness in life. Being a rationalist, Bentham attempted to apply a scientific methodology to his investigations on the underpinnings of his moral theory. He suggested that pain and pleasure could simply be attributed relative values. The sum total of these, according to his moral arithmetic, could be compared to see if a decision or action was right or wrong.¹¹¹

Prior to Bentham, morality was considered to be a consequence of divine inner presence which intuitively guided humans to make correct moral decisions. Bentham considered the old moral order to be inadequate due to the fact that humans had a tendency to pursue a morality which was most advantageous to their particular interests at the time. The cornerstone of Bentham's political and legal philosophy

¹⁰⁹ Bacon, F., "Thoughts and Conclusions," in *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (translated by B. Farrington). University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1964, p.93.

¹¹⁰ John Locke's influence is not to be discounted but will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, in association with ideas about property rights and sacred place.

¹¹¹ Grassian, I. V., *Moral Reasoning: Ethical Theory and Some Contemporary Moral Problems*. Prentice Hall Inc. New Jersey. 1981, p.44.

was the idea of ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’.¹¹² Bentham espoused the consequentialist view that the future could not be accurately predicted and therefore a currently useful moral decision may have a long-term negative influence. Bentham’s theories led to consideration of things and events only from a short-term view; what is useful now, and provides the greatest good for the greatest number, is morally correct. This philosophy neatly underpinned the evolving notion of ‘progress’, technological innovation and ‘development’, and provided a moral base for the secular scientists. Their worldview could be legitimised by the material benefits that science and technology would provide to future peoples. The linearity of Christian eschatology was reformed into ‘progress’ towards a new golden age of material wealth and the banishment of human suffering. Bentham’s utilitarianism found a new basis for the long dominant myth of the West: that of the progress of the Chosen People on their way to the Promised Land by moving through time to a better, more powerful and more knowing human condition. Combined with the expropriated Christian sense of mission, this aspect of secular thought became a quasi-religious crusade to convert the peoples of the world to their universal cornucopian ideas.

That pleasure and happiness was associated with material wealth allowed Adam Smith to form a link between moral philosophy and economic¹¹³ principles. Smith’s economic theories, including the conception of an ‘invisible hand’, were a natural and appropriate extension of Bentham’s utilitarian ethic. Smith looked to the hidden hand of God to transform self-interest into a vehicle for the common good. Thus ‘the law of nature becomes a sanction for *laissez faire* and unrestrained competition for the good things of the earth’.¹¹⁴ Smith’s economic theory was based on the argument that the individual:

¹¹² Grassian. I. V., (*ibid*), p.45.

¹¹³ Economic, from *oikos* - the house, and *nomos*, - law. This word, while derived from the Greek *oikos*, bears a meaning utterly divorced from the earlier conception of *oikeiosis*. For the Greeks the *oikos* was home, the place where human reality found its being. The modern definition of economics is now totally severed from any original sacred conception of how the ‘house’ is ordered. The neologism *bionomy*, i.e., *bio* -life and *nomos* - law is closer to the original conception. See Chapter Six, for a discussion of the use of *nomos* in relation to heteronomy, autonomy and ontonomy.

¹¹⁴ Marshall. P., *Natures Web. op. cit.*, p. 299.

“Intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to connote an end which was no part of his intention...By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it.”¹¹⁵

Smith called for people to be as self-interested as they could possibly manage, because the greatest good for the greatest number could only be supplied through the process of dedicated selfishness.

Smith's economics arrived in a period which saw the beginning of the mechanised skills concept and the development of centralised power units which later evolved into the now well-known factories. From humble origins in the guilds and polytechnics of the Medieval Era, the idea of the factory grew rapidly to absorb Smith's ideology that there was only one efficient speed of production, faster, only one desirable size, larger, and only one acceptable goal, more.¹¹⁶ Economics developed rapidly in the West to become the vehicle of science and the source of power for the domination of nature. Technology provided the means to gain control over objects, and the associated military technology was ruthlessly used against all who defied the might of colonial Europe. Such was the pride in technology that the Europeans began to judge the advancement of other civilisations on the basis of technological achievements alone. Those non-technological cultures were considered to be populated by 'savages' and 'primitives' who must be converted to the goals of the new world order by enslavement, or in turn, destroyed as worthless. Humankind was now on the road to glory: science, technology, utilitarianism and economics provided the way with which European people would wrest control of the entire Earth to their own purposes.

Throughout the long evolution of the Western worldview, the value and sacredness of nature was gradually undermined; to be subordinated to the level of objects which were manipulated for the greater good of the new 'Gods' of the Earth; humankind

¹¹⁵ Smith. A., *The Wealth of Nations* (Books i-v. introduced by D. D. Raphael). Random Century Group. London. [1910] 1993, p.ii, 9.

¹¹⁶ Mumford. L., *The Myth of the Machine: Techniques and Human Development*. Harcourt Brace Jovanivich. New York and London. 1967, pp.284-286

itself.¹¹⁷ Rationality and reason, as the central myth of the secular scientific world, gave rise to the myths of objectivity, dualism, linear time, progress, utilitarian morality, economics, the work ethic,¹¹⁸ development, and the autonomous authority to discern absolute truth by reason and logic alone. The secular rejection of religion allowed Western philosophers to deny the mythical basis of their own worldview. In the process of concentrating on conceptual truth and epistemic awareness, the mythical dimension was subsumed and eventually denied. The secular scientific worldview attempted to sever and lift the logical dimension out of the mythical dimension, and so hold back from itself its own presuppositions. Its way of seeing the world is clear and distinct: no myths, no symbolic expression, no faith or belief and certainly no cult, ritual or worship. Instead of seeing itself as one way among many ways of knowing reality, science became the only way of deciding truth from falsity and good from bad; in short, the only way of deciding anything.

As we have seen in this elucidation of the Western history of ideas, the mythical expression of the *mysterium* is still present, as is the experience of faith and the projection of belief. Symbolic presentation, although changed in form, still presents secular ideas arising from *mythos*. In this sense, the modern Western worldview is simply one religious worldview among many, and its claims to universal truths are no more valid than those of whom it replaced, or any others it encountered. While the scientific worldview, through its ethical and moral progress, has added uncounted benefits to mankind, the problem lies within its inherent and absolute universalism, combined with the secular rejection of the validity of other worldviews. The apologetic method, combined with the self-blindness and denial of its own mythical

¹¹⁷ It must be noted that there were many who resisted this incremental degradation of the value and importance of nature by the Church and secular worldviews. Among the most notable were figures such as: Francis of Assisi, Hildegard of Bingen, Giambattista Vico, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Aldo Leopold.

¹¹⁸ The work ethic evolved as a consequence of the Protestant reformation (see Tarnas. R., *The Passion of the Western Mind. op. cit.*). Subduing the Earth was seen as the 'great work' and was given divine sanction. The work ethic evolved as a vehicle to control the masses; idle minds and bodies caused trouble. Guilt was associated with unemployment, and productiveness aligned with spirituality. The upshot of this was that work became a sanctified activity, and those who did not work were considered to be amoral and useless to society. This myth is still prevalent and leads R. Panikkar to state that modern man is a 'working animal', sacrificing his life on the altar of materialism. See Panikkar. R., *The Cosmotheandric Experience*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1993. See also Rifkin. J., *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post Market Era*. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York. 1996, Chapter 1. European origins of property rights, evolved from the concept of 'work', are discussed in detail in Chapter Five, Part I.

dimension, has made it a dangerously destructive force to many peoples.¹¹⁹ The Western conception of nature as 'object' has led to unprecedented environmental destruction.

The Western worldview has evolved down an utterly different path to all other worldviews with respect to the values for nature. In part, and as discussed earlier, it was due to the kind of environment the peoples of the Mediterranean region found themselves in, where innovation was required to manipulate and control natural forces to facilitate physical and cultural stability. The extraordinary mixing of cultures, ideas and religions in this region gave rise to a worldview inconceivable to those who lived in parts of the world where nature was the dominant force or those who built their civilisations on the fertility of the sacred soils of the great river valleys. This is not to suggest that those other cultures did not develop secular attitudes or scientific modes of interpretation, however they did not lose their mythico-symbolic presentation of the divine or mysterious origin of all things. Secularity remained a strand within their sacred worldview; it did not become their worldview.

The dominant Western worldview, in denying its own mythic basis, effectively cut itself off from the sacred and mysterious source of all being and thereby impoverished its peoples and nature of sacred value. Mechanistic science brought with it new myths which not only transformed the Greek notion of science but also changed the 'maps' of the world which each person carried unconsciously within.¹²⁰ Not only was nature seen to be a set of interacting objects, but also society, and even human nature itself were restructured. People came to be seen as separate and distinct 'objects' connected to each other and to the natural world only where direct contact

¹¹⁹ Not only the destruction of entire peoples and their cultures but also languages. Panikkar writes: "In this century alone, over one thousand languages have disappeared...Languages are not only tools, but each language constitutes a world - not only a worldview. Each language is a wealth of human life. Not only animal species are rendered extinct; hundreds of human heroic characters and myths are also disappearing or are close to extinction. The reason is that we have assaulted the languages as if they were simply means of information, like satellites or radios." Panikkar. R., *A Dwelling Place for Wisdom*. Motilal Banarsidas. Dehli. 1995, pp.49-50.

¹²⁰ David. F. Peat writes: "We all relate to nature, society and our bodies in other more subtle ways. In a sense we all still possess a native map enfolded deep within each one of us, yet this map has become overshadowed by the power and authority of the map of science." Peat .D. F., "I Have a Map in My Head." *Revision*. Vol. 18, No.3. Winter. 1996, p.14.

was possible. The older notions of harmonious sympathy were reduced to the status of superstition.¹²¹ Descartes's juxtaposition of subject and object had special import to the modern worldview; it effectively isolated the subjective knower from the world of objects, thereby facilitating individuation and separation from the unity of being expressed in the Greek *hypokeimenon*. The moderns lost their ability to directly experience the reality in which their being unfolded. Increasingly they found themselves isolated and alone in an array of externalised objects devoid of meaning. It effectively terminated their intimate bond with the rest of the cosmos and locked them into a gilded prison of their own reflective mind. The mythico-symbolic structure, culture, education, family structure, and personalisation reinforced individuation to a point where people can no longer directly experience reality even if they wish to.¹²² This is the price paid for 'success' in manipulating and controlling the objective world.

In contrast to those of the secular scientific worldview, the sacred worldviews¹²³ sanctioned direct experience and countenanced unity, rhythm and harmony as subject-to-subject relationships in nature. Many never conceived the ideas of experimentation and thus sophisticated technology was not a possibility. Many cultures who lived in their sacred world suffered greatly from the vagaries of natural forces and the invasion of technically superior invaders, i.e., people with guns. Direct experience they had, but they were also vulnerable to forces they could neither predict nor mitigate. They also paid a price for their inability to adapt to the way of experimentation.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Combs. A. and Holland. M., *Synchronicity: Science Myth and the Trickster*. Floris Books. New York. 1994, p. xviii.

¹²² As the Goddess Ishtar is said to have told the first city dwellers of Uruk in ancient Iraq: "This gift of civilisation I give to you, but with one warning, once you accept it you can never give it back. Whatever happens from now on is the result of your own choosing." The ruins of Uruk now stand in one of the most desolate deserts on Earth, considered by many to be the abandoned site of the gardens of Eder, now well known as the Judaic Eden.

¹²³ I am not including the Judaeo-Christian worldview here in the sense of a sacred worldview as it separated humans from nature in a way which acted as a precursor to the scientific worldview. This is not to say that a sacred experience of nature is not possible for the committed Christian, rather, that the orthodox doctrine preached against harmony and worship of nature.

¹²⁴ Here it is possible to cite numerous cultures and even civilisations which stagnated and perished in the long course of human history. Examples include the destruction of the Minoan civilisation by the volcanic eruption of Thera, the decline of the early Mesopotamian civilisations due to soil salination, the Easter Island example where forest destruction resulted in population crash, the climate change which effectively destroyed the early Mayan civilisations, certain Papuan tribes who contracted fatal brain diseases from the ritualised consumption of deceased relatives, which eventually caused their

In the union of the sacred and the secular it is possible to envisage a worldview which facilitates fluidity, where comparative experimentation and direct experience could be available to the conscious knower by an act of will. Direct experience requires immediacy: a direct link between thought and feeling. The natural 'mentality' for humans would seem to be direct experience, which is precisely what science endeavours to exclude. The question for dialogue rests upon the retrieval of the experiential method as a legitimate means of understanding.

THE CURRENT ERA

Given the remarkable successes of the scientific method, the advent of globalisation, and the emergence of the new economic world order, the Western worldview seemed set to attain its universalistic goal of total domination of nature and all the peoples of the Earth. The modern claim to absolute truth seemed invincible, its power unquestionable. But like many civilisations before it, serious challenge to power came from an unexpected quarter.

Two main elements emerge. The first was the growing recognition at the end of the colonial era that other cultures and their worldviews had not been entirely subsumed by European domination, nor had their peoples been entirely converted to European religions. This was, perhaps, the beginning of the recognition of the modern notion of pluralism. The second element was the growing awareness of the impact of technology and the economic system upon the natural world. By the middle of the twentieth century many scientists were becoming aware of the devastation of nature and its possible outcome. Writers such as Aldo Leopold¹²⁵ and Rachel Carson¹²⁶ sounded the alarm for the West. And so began a new movement within the Western worldview which directly challenged the power of the established order. A great doubt about the economic vision emerged, the great horn of plenty seemed to be limited, and changes to ecological systems on a grand scale were observed. The idea of environmental limits for humans was raised and many believed that humans were

demise as a people, and so forth.

¹²⁵ See Leopold. A., "The Land Ethic," in *A Sand Country Almanac*. Oxford University Press. New York. 1949, pp.223-224.

¹²⁶ See Carson. R., *Silent Spring*. Hamish Hamilton. London. 1963.

headed for a population 'overshoot'.¹²⁷ The rise of 'environmentalism' as a new worldview became a possibility. This was of course seriously challenged by the defendants of the status quo who turned all the power of modern science and technocracy upon the new radical thinkers. This attack was not without success, but as in the aftermath of the great European plagues, once a new idea has taken root it cannot easily be dispelled.

Radical critiques of scientism and economics emerged, and a newly self-critical portion of the population began to question the very foundation of their own worldview which, many claimed, no longer held meaning because it had become divorced from the natural world. Coinciding with this came the rising awareness of values and meaning inherent within indigenous worldviews which the West had chosen to ignore for centuries. In Asia, nationalism and cultural identity began to flourish, effectively resisting the tide of Western secular universalism, and asserting themselves in opposition to Western hegemony.

On the surface, pluralism and environmentalism seemed to have little effect on the general trend towards globalisation of the Western dream. Yet a heretical movement has begun, and while the economic technocracy remains in control, their claim to dominance is waning. As the concept of environmental sustainability¹²⁸ became commonly accepted, Western economic hegemony was attacked on all fronts. Grassroots resistance movements in Africa, Asia, Latin America, as well as environmentalists from within its own worldview boundaries, began the process of demythicising the economic myth.

The resulting difficulties have led to an increasing awareness that cross-boundary conflicts need to be solved by some process of dialogue. However, this dialogue has been thwarted because those who prefer to impute knowledge through direct experience are marginalised by the moderns who refuse to acknowledge its validity,

¹²⁷ See Catton. R. W. and Dunlap. R. E., "Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm." *American Sociology*. Vol. 13. 1978, pp.41-49.

¹²⁸ Gro Harlem Brundtland is seen to be responsible for launching this concept. See: *Our Common Future*, [World Commission on Environment and Development]. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1987.

due to the non-verifiability of their methods.¹²⁹ This has led to an acceptance of a quasi-dialogical process based on argumentation, dialectics and battles over 'evidence' presentation. Non-literate cultures are usually coerced into using Western notions of proof in order to validate their worldview in a manner which essentially sidelines their oral traditions, and therefore forces them to submit to the conflict and submission model.

As the recognition of 'rights' continues to gain influence, such dialogues and the ability of the dominant system to use force wanes. Many of the so-called 'resources' are becoming less easily accessible to capitalist interests. The general demands of those who hold sacred worldviews to be recognised as the valid guardians of their own lands (and 'resources') is adding increasing pressure to the conflict and submission models of dialogue. This problem is critical in environmental issues because, as we have seen, many sacred worldviews have arisen from their intimate relationship to a natural environment. This environment is the source of the symbols which present their myths and their foundation for intelligibility. For the materialists, this same environment contains important elements necessary to express their myth of progress, development and material well-being. The problem is that these elements themselves do not present meaning; only when they are transformed into saleable utilities do they become symbols. The destruction, control and ownership of natural environments is essential to sustain the modern myths.¹³⁰ Yet such destruction, control and ownership of nature directly violates the horizon of intelligibility of those

There is a fundamental conflict of intelligibility involved here - one that requires a dialogue which goes beyond argumentation and dialectics, a 'dialogical dialogue' where mythico-symbolic discourse can be facilitated. True guardianship of people for nature requires a sharing of wisdom, not the domination of one worldview by

¹²⁹ In actuality, no experience is repeatable directly in the same manner as previous ones. The self-deception inherent in memory which compounds, as one repeats the experience so that the arrived at 'truth' becomes a farce which must then be defended in order to sustain its power to influence reality. Bohm, D. and Edwards, M., *Changing Consciousness: Exploring the Hidden Forces of Social, Political and Environmental Crises Facing Our World*. Harper Collins. New York and London. 1991, p.36.

¹³⁰ See Chapter Five.

another. To find and express this collective wisdom, meaningful dialogue is a necessity. Only then is guardianship even possible.

CHAPTER THREE

A PATH TO DIALOGUE

THEORETICAL CRITERIA

“The dialectical dialogue is a dialogue about objects which, interestingly enough, the English language calls ‘subject matter’. The dialogical dialogue, on the other hand, is a dialogue among subjects aiming at being a dialogue about subjects.” Raimon Panikkar.¹

How can traditions originating from different myths communicate with one another about their perceptions of reality when their fundamental worldviews are incommensurable and therefore mutually incoherent? This is a profound human problem, especially in the modern climate of pluralism. On this issue Panikkar writes:

“To be sure, each tradition, seeing itself from within, considers that it is capable of giving a full answer to the religious urge of its members and, seeing other traditions from the outside, tends to judge them as partial. It is only when we take the other as seriously as ourselves that a new vision may dawn. For this we have to break the self-sufficiency of any human group. But this requires that we should somehow jump outside our own respective traditions. Herein seems to lie the destiny of our time.”²

As we have seen earlier, dialogue on environmental issues is a pressing problem and current models of conflict resolution are proving inadequate to the complexities arising when divergent worldviews are involved. It is not satisfactory, or in many cases not possible, to base such dialogue solely on methods originating from the secular scientific worldview which demands that all other worldviews must be subject to the validation of reason. Some worldviews, if subjected to the currently

¹ Panikkar. R., "The Dialogical Dialogue," in *The World's Religious Traditions* (edited by F. Whaling). T. & T.Clark Ltd. Edinburgh. 1980, p.209.

² Panikkar. R., *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1981, p.34.

dominant assumption of value free objectivity, cannot be seen as being 'reasonable' and yet remain entirely coherent to those living within that worldview.³

The common response to indigenous land and 'resource' claims is to offer compensation by way of financial reward. When this is rejected, as it often is, the respective authorities and institutions dismiss the claimants as 'ungrateful' or regard them as economically naive.⁴ No serious attempt is undertaken to understand how past (and current) devastation of nature can destroy a sacred worldview, nor is there interest in according such worldviews any validity in the modern sense. Dialogue requires more than just platitudes and feigned tolerance for others; it requires an interpretation which facilitates the sharing of another's views.⁵

Current methods of conflict resolution rely on interpreters (usually referred to as mediators) who, by being grounded in their own implicit convictions, often cause polemical distortions and block understanding. To share in the worldview of another one must be convinced of, and even 'converted'⁶ to, their way of presenting truth. This does not refer to apologetic or exclusivistic confessional conversion, but to a methodological conversion where one opens up to new possibilities for life and thought. This implies a genuine communication between worldviews in place of defensive apologetics which burdens so much of modern 'communication'.

³ An example is of Maori who, in resisting river pollution, say: "But I am the river and the river is me." This is totally incomprehensible to a modern scientist who 'knows' that a river is only inanimate water acted upon by gravity. This was related to me by Tom Waho, a member of the Muaupuko tribe in connection with his grandmother who was so incensed by the actions of a local council in piping raw sewerage into the sacred lake Horowhenua that she attacked the metal pipes with an axe. Her outrage was not just at the defilement of the lake itself as a "food basket" but the defilement of her person and all those of the tribe including generations as yet unborn. To the Europeans of the time her actions were considered irrational and were of course ignored. Fifty years of pollution has rendered the shallow lake hypertrophic and only now are the spiritual concerns of Maori being given any consideration. Even so, most European New Zealanders still cannot accept the validity of the Maori worldview and continue to pay lip service to their claims to the sacred aspect to nature.

⁴ Vine Deloria relates a situation concerning the Taos Indians refusing compensation for their claim to the sacred Blue Lake. He describes a common reaction to such refusal: "It seemed that for someone in America to turn down a dollar was unusual. When it was a little group of Indians living on the edge of starvation, it presented a more profound and difficult moral question than is usually raised in government circles." Deloria, V., *God is Red*. Delta Dell Publishing Co. New York. 1973, p.9.

⁵ R. Panikkar states: "One cannot really understand the views of another, if one does not share them." "Verstehen als Uberzeugtsein," in Gadamer, H. P. and Volger, P., *Anthropologie*, Nr. 7, *Philosophische Anthropologie*. Teil II. Stuttgart 1975, pp.132-167, cited by Krieger, D., *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1991, p.51.

What is required is a horizon of encounter which at once facilitates a conversion and yet does not require loss of one's own coherent worldview. Rather, such a conversion should act as an enriching experience leading to an understanding not bounded by rejectionist or exclusivistic barriers. To achieve this, a method must be found which reaches beyond universalism, orthodoxy and secular rejectionism. As we have seen, the mythological foundations of all worldviews are functionally similar⁷ and the symbolic presentations arising from the myths allow themselves to be interpreted, whether they are sacred or secular symbols. One does not have to believe in the secular worldview to understand the symbolic presentation of paper money, nor does one have to be Christian to understand what the cross symbol presents. The interpretation needs to be free of universal pretensions because if, for example, paper money symbols are believed to be symbols presenting ultimate power (as they are in the modern period), then one must reject other power symbols as having no validity whatsoever. The result of this, is radical exclusion of the 'other' in order to bolster and defend one's own presentation of truth. Such is the history of the Western traditions that has so often led to a fanaticism of monstrous proportions.⁸

A possible solution to exclusivism has often been taken by other cultures in the face of obvious difference in worldviews. Indifferentism suggests the idea that different worldviews are like parallel lines and do not need to be compared with one another. Indifferentism means that each adherent to a particular worldview is best served by devoting themselves to practices within their own boundaries and letting others believe what they will. This effectively avoids conflict and superficial eclecticism,⁹ but it also ignores the historical inter-connectedness, mutual influence and interaction of different cultures and religions. This mutual indifference stifles new possibilities for growth and encapsulates each worldview within its own self-sufficient mini-

⁶ Convert from the Latin *convertere* - to turn about.

⁷ Panikkar, R., "The Rhetoric of Dialogue," in *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Paulist Press. New York. 1978, p.22.

⁸ Judaic exclusionism, Catholic inquisitions, Islamic fundamentalism, Marxist extremism, Nazi fanaticism and the scientific obsession with 'objective' thinking to name a few. It cannot however, be said that the Western tradition is the only worldview prone to extreme fanaticism, yet a historical analysis suggests that it is more common within the Western tradition.

⁹ Krieger, D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p.60.

world.¹⁰ It is a path to stagnation rather than dialogue, and leaves open the possibility of a return to exclusivism the moment one group or culture decides that its worldview is superior to that of others.

Inclusivism, the third alternative taken by some polytheistic worldviews,¹¹ positively acknowledges others but not quite to the same degree as their own. In doing this they 'water down' and diminish the revelation of truth inherent in the other's mythico-symbolic presentation as well as denigrating their unique history. Inclusivism attempts to acknowledge the truth of other worldviews without placing its own truth into question.¹² With the rise of pluralism, the secular worldview has increasingly relied on inclusivism to soften reaction to its truth claims. Secular institutions continually reiterate the right of religious freedom which is supposedly enshrined in modern secular systems. But this religious freedom is viable only as long as the religious beliefs in question do not challenge or threaten to disrupt the economic myth of 'business as usual'. As long as one pays one's taxes one may believe anything. If, on the other hand, one's religion prohibits such activities then the secular worldview will immediately retreat into exclusivism in order to enforce its directives. To shun the monetary system means total exclusion from the monetary fold. To be a Muslim is to be tolerated, but if a Muslim government arises which in any way threatens the global economic order then that governing body will be excluded and condemned. Religious inclusivism is also common in the modern era. For example, New Age religions practice inclusivism by uplifting bits and pieces of many religious worldviews and presenting them as a new whole while at the same time holding fast to their status as part of the economic middle class.¹³ Inclusivism has become the 'easy way out' for those who are tired of conflict and can see no need for a path to meaningful dialogue.

¹⁰ Panikkar refers to this indifferentism as parallelism. See Panikkar. R., *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. *op. cit.*, pp. xviii-xix.

¹¹ Hinduism is an example where religious tolerance is high in a pluralistic situation. However no orthodox Hindu, while tacitly accepting Christians (or Muslims), would consider those faiths equal to his own. He may say that Christ is just another reincarnation of Vishnu but does not thereby accept the validity of Christian uniqueness.

¹² Krieger. D., *The New Universalism*. *op. cit.*, p.60.

¹³ Gare. A. E., *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis*. Routledge. London. 1995, p.33.

For the purposes of outlining how a meaningful dialogue between worldviews may be experienced, it is necessary to undertake a systematic reconstruction of Panikkar's method for conducting the intra-religious dialogue. In doing this, the full body of Panikkar's thought is somewhat narrowed, and what follows does not do justice to the depth of his understanding of the wider issues which form the underlying 'ground' upon which his philosophical and theological work is based.

Raimon Panikkar outlined his 'methodological conversion' to apply to inter- and intra-religious dialogue where he maintained that we are confronted with a decision, namely:

“Either [one] must condemn everything around him as error and sin or he must throw overboard the exclusivistic and monopolistic notions he has been told embody truth - truth that must be simple and unique, revealed for once and for all, that speaks through infallible organs and so on.”¹⁴

As discussed earlier and in previous chapters, the secular worldview shares functional similarities with religious worldviews and, as Paul Tillich suggests:

“The sacred has not been fully absorbed by the secular...The sacred does not lie beside the secular but in its depths.”¹⁵

Secularism has at its foundation a series of myths and symbols which underpin and enshrine rationality as the primal path to intelligibility. Secularism is not all profane; it contains its own sacred elements, and is 'religious' in the most primal sense - however much its adherents may attempt to reject religiosity. With this in mind we can apply Panikkar's reconstructed intra-religious dialogue methodology to the horizon of encounter between sacred and secular worldviews.¹⁶

¹⁴ Panikkar. R., "Preface," to *The Intrareligious Dialogue. op. cit.*, p.5

¹⁵ Tillich. P., "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," in *The Future of Religions* (edited by J. C. Braur). Harper and Row. New York. 1966, p.82.

¹⁶ While this dialogical method can have wide applications in terms of intercultural and interreligious dialogue, the central concern here is a focus on dialogue between sacred and secular worldviews on the specific issues involved in the environmental arena with particular regard to guardianship.

DIALECTICAL DIALOGUE

The current model of dialogue, commonly referred to as conflict resolution or conflict mediation, is essentially a dialectical dialogue. Dialectical dialogue is based on the fundamental assessment that we are all rational beings and that the nature of reality is logical and objective. Dialectical dialogue is a 'reasonable' dialogue which assumes that thought takes priority over being, and that cultural universals preclude un-reason. It is a dialogue concerned with objects, opinions, and doctrines welded together by ideas and definitions; the product of knowing subjects.¹⁷ The horizon of intelligibility in a dialectical dialogue is firmly grounded in the *logos* of a particular culture and usually neglects the mythic core of other worldviews. The dialectical dialogue is currently used as an instrument of power in so-called conflict resolution. It does so because argumentation and dialectics cannot reach the level of dialogue required to overcome the radical distance which separates different worldviews from one another. Panikkar comments:

“There is no pure dialectical dialogue: When two persons enter into dialogue, in spite of efforts to keep the personal to a bare minimum, it emerges all along. We never have an encounter of pure ideas. We always have an encounter of two (or more) people. This emerges conspicuously in the actual praxis of the dialectical dialogue, in which the partners, forgetting they are supposed to be thinking beings indulge in getting involved in quite different but real aspects of human life. To disregard these aspects as ‘sentimental,’ or as passions obscuring the work of Reason misses the point. Sentiments also belong to the human being. But there are also cases in which what is at issue are not emotional ingredients but fundamental options stemming from *differing understandings*.”¹⁸

Dialectical dialogue cannot reach the ‘place’ between worldviews where the horizon of encounter emerges on a symbolic level. For this we need a dialogical dialogue.

¹⁷ Vachon. R. “Guswenta, or the Intercultural Imperative.” [Sequel to Part I, sections 1 and 2.] *InterCulture*. Vol. XXVII, No 4. 1995, pp.3-4.

¹⁸ Panikkar. R., “The Dialogical Dialogue,” in *The World's Religious Traditions. op. cit.*, p.207.

DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE

Dialogical dialogue starts from the standpoint that humans are believing and relational beings; that reality is not necessarily totally objectifiable, nor does it have to obey certain fixed and presupposed laws. Dialogical dialogue has creativity as its locus. This creativity “is not concerned so much about opinions as about the different viewpoints from which respective opinions are arrived at.”¹⁹ It is about horizons of intelligibility. Panikkar calls this the ‘I-thou’ dialogue in contradistinction to the ‘I-it’ dialectical dialogue.²⁰ Obviously these two types of dialogue can complement each other because they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Dialectical dialogue is useful to discover and discuss the form²¹ of a worldview; how it ‘looks’ and ‘feels’ from inside a single worldview boundary. The dialogical dialogue is for ‘going through’ the *logos*, to reach a point of elucidation which is beyond the *logos* structure of reality. Panikkar explains the function of the dialogical dialogue:

“It [the dialogical dialogue] pierces the *logos* and uncovers the respective myths of the partners.”²²

Dialogical dialogue is capable of reaching far beyond mere dialectics into the arena of beliefs, faiths, symbols and ultimately touching the *mythos* itself. It is also a dialogue between people, not a contest of concepts or ideas.

Dialogical dialogue facilitates the uncovering of those presuppositions which preform our basic assumptions about reality. These are the assumptions which provide us with the axioms or convictions which form the foundations of our views. This unearthing process we cannot do alone; only the other can reveal to us the myth we are living within. This requires a certain trusting attitude towards the dialogical partner. Panikkar comments:

¹⁹ Panikkar. R., "The Dialogical Dialogue," (*ibid*), p.214.

²⁰ Panikkar suggests that: "There is no dialogical dialogue alone. Two subjects can enter into dialogue if they 'talk' about something. ...It is precisely the importance of the subject matter of the dialogue that unveils the depths of the respective personalities and leads to the dialogical dialogue proper. In the latter, the interlocutor is not only object or subject putting forward objective ideas for discussion, but a *thou*, a real *thou* and not an *it*." Panikkar. R., "The Dialogical Dialogue," (*ibid*), p.207.

²¹ See morphological hermeneutics, below.

²² Panikkar. R., "The Dialogical Dialogue," *op. cit.*, p.218.

“I trust the other not out of ethical principle (because it is good) or an epistemological one (because I recognise that it is intelligent to do so) but because I have discovered (experienced) the ‘thou’ as a counterpart of the ‘I’. I trust the partner’s understanding and self-understanding because I do not start out by putting my ego in front of everything.”²³

This trusting attitude is not possible within the realm of dialectics and argumentation, nor can it occur when dialogue is being used as a means to power²⁴ by the oppressor to the detriment of the oppressed. A ‘level playing field’ founded on a mutual recognition of validity is required. This implies that much effort is needed to establish and facilitate common understanding between diverse worldviews before the dialogical dialogue can commence (see below). The dialogical dialogue, at a philosophical level, means overcoming both monism and dualism, and reaffirming non-duality. At the epistemological level it means overcoming the subject/object dichotomy by returning to holism. This is a holism where process, form and relationship are primary; where wholes are seen to have properties that parts do not have. Such holism means that living systems (and minds) cannot be treated as though they are reducible to their individual components.²⁵

Panikkar firmly maintains that the dialogical dialogue does not replace dialectics, but complements it. What the dialogical dialogue achieves is an opening of the *logos* to reconnect with the *mythos*. Such an opening overturns the secular rejection of the sacred and, in its turn, allows the secular worldview to recognise the inherent *epoché* which always emerges in its encounters with others. Panikkar summarises thus:

“In the dialogical dialogue, I am open to the other in such a way that my partner can discover my myths, my underlying assumptions...and vice-versa. The authentic dialogue exists neither in what I say nor in what my partner says but that in the ‘event’ of the dialogue itself. Neither of us knows what is going to happen beforehand, nor have we any power over it in the process.

²³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.219.

²⁴ On this issue Panikkar states that: "Dialogical dialogue prevents all power relations and further intention, like to dominate or even to know the other for ulterior motives." Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.210.

²⁵ Berman. M., *The Reenchantment of the World*. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 1981, p.238.

Only when we 'stand-under' the spell of the words happening between us, can we 'under-stand' each other. We both listen."²⁶

To move from the currently accepted dialogue based on dialectics and argumentation to the dialogical dialogue, a process and methodology is required which will effectively move the horizon of encounter to a deeper level. To achieve this goal, an interpretive or hermeneutic method is necessary. Panikkar refers to this as the diatopical model. The diatopical model has three stages which lead the dialogue to the horizon between worldview boundaries where symbolic discourse may reveal a commonality of mythic expression.

THE DIATOPICAL MODEL

1. Morphological Hermeneutics

The first of the three levels of discourse upon which communication may occur is that which takes place within the culture, tradition and religion which make up a worldview. Panikkar termed this morphological hermeneutics.²⁷ It involves the

²⁶ Panikkar. R., (unpublished English version of *La Philosophie de la Religion devant le Pluralisme Philosophique et la Pluralite des Religions*. p.13-14) cited and amended by Vachon. R. *Guswenta*, op. cit., pp.7-8.

²⁷ Panikkar explains hermeneutics as: "The art and science of interpretation, of bringing forth significance, of conveying meaning, of restoring symbols to life and eventually letting new symbols emerge. Hermeneutics is the method of overcoming the distance between a knowing subject and an object to be known, once the two have been estranged." Panikkar. R., "Introduction," to *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. Paulist Press. New York. 1979, p.8. Hermeneutics is a broad field of inquiry. Here we are concerned with a particular hermeneutical inquiry based on ideas derived from Gadamer, Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Rorty. Gadamer was primarily concerned with overcoming the positivistic assumption that the development of an objective knowledge of phenomena is a worthy goal for philosophic inquiry. A distinct discipline of hermeneutics had its origins in the nineteenth century attempts to formulate a specific theory of interpretation as relating to theological understanding. Schleiermacher expanded the scope of hermeneutic questions by suggesting that it was not just how biblical and historical texts should be interpreted but also what their meaning was. Dilthey was interested in the methods which could permit an objective reading of symbolic structures of any kind. Dilthey's interest was how the understanding of meaning could be raised to the same level of methodological clarity that characterised the natural sciences. Rorty rejected positivist distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive disciplines and argued that natural science is itself hermeneutic. In this discussion a hermeneutic of meaning is of central importance to the dialogical process (as defined by Panikkar above, and Gadamer's conception of a 'fusion of horizons'). General ideas on hermeneutics are variously sourced from the following: Gadamer. H. G., *Truth and Method*. Seabury Press. New York. 1975, pp.57-59,97,102-118,146,169,175-189,211,228-24, 273,334,347,363-346; Rickman. H. P., *Dilthey: Selected Writings*. Cambridge University Press. 1976, pp.170-178,235; Rorty. R., *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton University Press. Princeton. 1979, pp.317-349; Schleiermacher. F., *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts* (translated by J. Duke and J.

explanation of components of a worldview as experienced by an interpreter within its own boundaries. This stage is of vital importance to the dialogue because it situates the partners in a common frame. The discourse communicates in the everyday language by which we explain things to each other within our own horizon of intelligibility. The first step consists in obtaining a faithful and critical understanding of one's own tradition, so that explanation of the set of taken-for-granted truths about reality which constitutes our 'world' can be elucidated. This is a matter of verification, of 'how we do things', what we do, and why it is important that we do them. As a simple example, explaining how to play chess requires the presupposition that the inquirer understands what a 'game' is. What the pieces represent and how they are made to act is then relatively simple. The inquirer may become adept with a little effort. If the idea of 'game' is not understood, explanation becomes problematic and a whole new level of explanation is required.²⁸

While dialectics and argumentation are effective tools for the first level of discourse they must not be used to reduce the communication to the divisive level of power games. What is essential is an existential openness²⁹ derived from a genuine desire to understand the other. Such openness cannot be evoked under duress, nor can it be forced upon another. The typical modern ideas of dispute resolution, mediated conflict resolution and arbitration, often fail to provide an adequate climate for such openness. Neither morphological hermeneutics nor dialogical dialogue can occur within restricted parameters imposed by outside agents who are often acting in their own interests. The interpretation of the form that adherents of a particular worldview use to express their own unique individuality and validity to each other, and those of other worldviews, is the first step along the path to dialogue.

Forstman., edited by H. Kimmmerle). Scholars Press. Missoula. 1977, pp.109-110. See also Warnke. G., *Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason*. Polity Press. Cambridge. 1987, pp.1-3, 117-173.

²⁸ For concrete and detailed examples see the case studies in Chapters Four and Five.

²⁹ Panikkar suggests an essential prerequisite to all levels of dialogue: "A deep human honesty in searching for the truth wherever it can be found; a great intellectual openness in this search, without conscious preconceptions or willingly entertained prejudices; and finally a profound loyalty towards one's own tradition." Panikkar. R., *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism*. *op. cit.*, p.35.

2. Diachronical Hermeneutics

The second hermeneutical step is a process of defining the boundaries of a worldview. These boundaries are defined by the relationship between the core aspects of a worldview, which are embedded in its founding texts and events.³⁰

Worldview boundaries set the limits to which interpretations can expand without denying the founding myths. In Christianity, for example, Christ is essential to the Christian worldview. Without Christ, all Christian history, philosophy and doctrine fails to achieve coherence. If one rejects Christ's centrality, one is rejecting the whole symbolic presentation embodied in the Christ figure, which in turn reduces the entire Christian religions to a set of meaningless fables. At this point, one has jumped outside the boundary of the Christian worldview. The same applies to the scientific worldview; deny the centrality of reason and verifiable objectivity and one is no longer 'doing' science, rather, one is merely indulging in speculation.

All worldviews have boundaries which are more or less flexible depending upon the degree of orthodoxy and ideology encountered. Adherents of any particular worldview may situate themselves at any point within that boundary depending upon their interpretation of the founding texts. Those who hold to rigid and verbatim interpretations of their central texts are likely to support fundamentalist attitudes which lead to a defence of their doctrines. As there are many types of Christianity, from liberal churches through many orthodox establishments to fundamental sects, so there are many positions within the secular scientific worldview. These positions range from classical Newtonian physicists through liberal social scientists to the increasingly radical holistic sciences of quantum physics, chaos theory and systems ecology.³¹ The same applies also in many vernacular traditions where some members hold to orthodox interpretations and others take a more liberal approach. In the dialogical dialogue, retrieval and interpretation of these founding texts is essential to the development of an understanding attitude.

³⁰ Text here does not necessarily mean written text. It is the context within which a worldview is recognised and decided upon. Texts may be oral presentations of symbolic events or ritual presentations of founding myths. The text is not the myth itself, but what the myth says.

³¹ Systems ecology is markedly separate from conventional reductionist ecology; it includes the Gaia Hypothesis, morphogenic fields, etc. See Goldsmith. E., *The Way: An Ecological Worldview*. Shambhala. Boston and New York. 1993, for excellent examples of holistic ecological thinking.

Panikkar calls this step diachronical hermeneutics by reference to the changing contours of context over time necessary to understand a text.³² Panikkar maintains that this is of singular importance because:

“The temporal gap between the understander and that which is to be understood has obscured or even changed the meaning of the original datum.”³³

This means that we need to understand what was meant by those who presented the founding texts in the context that they themselves experienced at that time. For example, a text or artefact from ancient Greece originates from a time and a situation where the language and worldview may have been utterly different from modern conditions. Similarly, a founding story related by Polynesians originating at the dawn of their history contains images and symbols from a world which now may not exist due to the geological and climatic dynamism of the Pacific region.³⁴

Understanding now requires that the context itself be reconstructed and mediated within our own present-day context and worldview. This reconstruction effectively sets the boundaries of our worldview as well as outlining the central focus of our horizon of intelligibility without ‘deconstructing’ the mythic basis from which our worldview presents itself. Whereas logic is the method for morphological hermeneutics, dialectics are the path for diachronical hermeneutics. The movement here is from the present to the past in order to incorporate, subsume or delete those aspects which are not appropriate to current understanding of reality. Panikkar states:

“Diachronical hermeneutics is not the youngster learning about the past from contemporaries. It is the adult firmly based in his present degree of awareness trying to enrich himself by understanding the past.”³⁵

³² Panikkar. R., "Introduction," to *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.8.

³³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.9

³⁴ Maori, in recounting their place of origin, consistently refer to Hawaiki as their original homeland from which they migrated to Aotearoa. European commentators consider Hawaiki to be a mythical construction, or at best a mispronunciation of Hawaii. However it is possible that Hawaiki was submerged due to tectonic forces or destroyed by catastrophic vulcanism, both of which are relatively common events in many areas of the Pacific region, (cf. the ideas of Atlantis in the European tradition).

³⁵ Panikkar. R., "Introduction," to *Myth Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.9.

To understand the essential nature of another's worldview one must know where the 'other' is coming from, i.e., the 'how' and 'why' of their founding texts. The knowledge of these founding texts also allows each worldview representative to enclose their worldview within a definable boundary. This allows the partners in dialogue to understand the point beyond which intelligibility is dissipated and the myth ceases to become expressible. The understanding of foundational texts leads each group of participants to perceive a 'picture' of a complete worldview, from its inner sanctum to its outer limits of potential expansion. Diachronical hermeneutics leads to a discourse of enclosure. For meaningful dialogue to achieve its stated aim, each party needs to know where a worldview begins and ends, what its mythic expression is and how far intelligible cognition extends. Only in relation to others can each party see the limits of its own worldview in a way which overcomes universalistic claims to absolutism. Each worldview can be seen as a kind of perceptual 'cell' surrounded by an elastic and semi-permeable noetic membrane. A worldview, like any living thing, has an origin and emerges in the same manner as a tree from a seed to expand and grow to the limit of its teleological necessity. Worldviews are dynamic; always adapting to new situations and from time to time giving rise to new mythical expressions. Diachronical hermeneutics brings a particular way of 'seeing' and 'knowing' the world to life by revealing its beauty, wisdom and intrinsic coherence to those of other worldviews. This in turn leads to the third hermeneutical step, namely identification of the common ground that lies between worldviews. Here the dialogical dialogue proper may begin.

3. Diatopical Hermeneutics

Panikkar describes the third hermeneutical stage of the dialogical dialogue as an attempt at overcoming:

“...the gap existing between two human *topoi*, 'places' of understanding and self-understanding, between two or more cultures that have not developed their patterns of intelligibility or their basic assumptions out of a common historical ground or through mutual interest.”³⁶

³⁶ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.9

Such differences cannot be overlooked in today's pluralistic climate³⁷ where it is recognised (but not necessarily accepted), that radically different interpretations of reality exist.

Diatopical hermeneutics leads to a discourse of disclosure; the disclosure of the symbols which present the expression of the encompassing *mythos*. Diatopical hermeneutics is the search for, and interpretation of, symbols which may be common and intelligible to divergent worldviews. Because symbols present the myth, a symbolic interpretation does not pierce the *mythos* and so avoids the demythicisation associated with dialectics and argumentation involved in the first two levels. As we have seen earlier, symbols make up the actual centre of a worldview. They are expressions of the myth which give rise to the practices, beliefs and doctrines appearing from the first and second levels of discourse. It is these authentic symbols which grant our beliefs their unity, continuity and power to legitimise and sustain a 'world' of meaning and values.³⁸ The open space between worldview horizons is neither the logical difference between entities nor the mythological difference between cosmos and chaos. It is what may be called the symbolic difference.³⁹ With care, symbols may be interpreted, but not by comparison. Comparison is not an interpretive method because there is no superior neutral standpoint from which to make such comparisons. With comparison the belief of the believer is denied, and non-phenomenological symbols are turned into signs.⁴⁰ We must learn to think in, and with, the symbols of another tradition as we do with our own.⁴¹ This leads to the difficult question of how different symbols may be 'thought' together. Panikkar suggests as an example of what is needed:

³⁷ Panikkar notes: "The crumbling of cultural, religious, political and other walls today has allowed a pluralistic wind to blow all over the world....Life is no longer viewed as a human privilege, nor can it be reserved for plants and animals exclusively." Panikkar. R., "Anima Mundi - Vita Hominis - Spiritus Dei," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T. Eastham). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1993, p.144.

³⁸ Krieger. D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p.64.

³⁹ An expression developed by Panikkar. See Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man* Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1973.

⁴⁰ A sign, according to Panikkar: "...is an epistemic reality. It points towards the thing (other than itself) for which it acts as a sign. It belongs to the epistemically real. It signals, it points toward the 'thing' like a signpost or flag. It can be self-explanatory or it may require some explanation ... But in order to understand it you need not transcend thinking." Panikkar. R., *Percées Dans la Problematique Interculturelle*. (p.18), cited by Vachon. R., "Guswenta," *op. cit.*, p.14.

⁴¹ This excludes the allegedly neutral language of science and the exclusively valid symbols of a particular confessional proclamation. Krieger. D., *The New Universalism. op. cit.*, p.70.

“We may use the notion of homology, which does not connote a mere comparison from one tradition with those of another. I want to suggest this notion as the correlation between points of two different systems so that a point in one system corresponds to a point in another. The method does not imply that one system is better (logically, morally or whatever) than the other, nor that the two points are interchangeable: You cannot, as it were, transplant a point from one system to another. The method only discovers homologous correlations.”⁴²

An example of such homologous correlation might be the Kauri tree mentioned earlier, which symbolises both the Maori sacred presentation of the forest God *Tane*, and the European secular understanding of the awe inspiring, and intrinsically valuable power of nature. In both traditions the Kauri is a sacred symbol, respected and understood as a source of meaning for each worldview. Behind each of the symbolic presentations stands the mystery from which the great Kauri trees spring forth.⁴³ In both worldviews the common symbol engenders self-transcendence. This is what the discourse of disclosure expresses. Diatopical hermeneutics prepares the partners for the encounter, by way of the dialogical dialogue, to cross their own worldview boundaries to find a commonality in their respective symbolic presentations.

Panikkar outlined the diatopical model for the intra-religious and inter-religious encounter. However, this model would work just as well for an inter-cultural dialogue. For the purposes of this commentary it is the dialogue between the secular scientific worldview and sacred worldviews which is of immediate interest. Unlike the intra-religious dialogue, meaningful dialogue on environmental issues does not necessarily require full disclosure of one’s entire worldview, because the patterns for dialogue are based on mutually agreed terms. The sacred place exists, it stands out in the world of three dimensions. Whether it is a mountain, or forest, or some other aspect of the natural world, it is observable by all. A sacred mountain, for instance,

⁴² Panikkar. R., "Preface," to *The Intra-religious Dialogue. op. cit.*, p.14.

⁴³ Of course, many secular scientists would reject this proposition with the argument that the tree came into being through the process of evolution which they regard as a known fact. A deconstruction of evolutionary theory however, reveals that there can be no serious explanation if one regresses the horizon of intelligibility to a point prior to the Big Bang. See Rolston Holmes III, *Science and Religion*. Random House. New York. 1987, Chapter 2: “Models, Patterns, Paradigms,”(pp.8-16) for an interesting discussion on the limits of scientific knowledge.

can be described scientifically in terms of geological processes derived from observed experimental methods as well as directly experienced as a spiritual symbol. The dialogical point is concern for how, and why, meaning is derived in terms of symbolic presentation. There can be no doubt that the mountain is there, in reality, as a 'thing'. As such, the mountain in all its ways of existing is *physis*; that which emerges from concealment according to its own being. It is not in any way a creation of 'Man'.

The task for the dialogical dialogue in this situation is to allow each partner to understand and become convinced of the validity of the other's symbolic perception of particular aspects of the natural world. And to free the secular scientific worldview from its dogmatic self-enclosing universalism, so that the accumulated wisdom of other ways of perceiving those aspects may allow new values to enter its worldview boundaries. On the other hand, those from the sacred worldviews may partake of the accumulated knowledge of science and its focus on problem-solving techniques to enlarge their understanding of their sacred places. When two peoples meet and can mutually enrich each other's worldview in such a manner, a sound basis for guardianship may be established which will be neither inherently exclusivistic nor unduly inclusivistic.

In the current era pristine nature is a rarity. Ecological disturbances from a variety of sources have affected all the world's environments with varying degrees of change. For those who see certain aspects of nature as sacred this incremental degradation is a serious problem, because it is eroding the very basis of the sacrality of nature. Such peoples need to be able to mitigate and creatively solve ecological problems occurring in their natural world. Those of the modern worldview need the ecosystem services vital to their particular myths of development, progress and materialism. Conservation of nature and its guardianship is central to both worldviews, although for different reasons.

This ability to focus on common issues greatly simplifies the diatopical model in relation to its applicability in practical terms. Inter-religious dialogue is fraught with difficulty, in a pragmatic sense, due to the esoteric nature of many religious

perceptions. The dialogue on nature however, is essentially pragmatic because of the undeniability of the existential reality of the natural world. The dialogical dialogue is in this instance a dialogue about meaning, and the essential parameters of that meaning are already defined by nature herself. What we are trying to achieve is a commonality between ecological wisdom (whether sacred or scientific), and values (whether philosophical, ethical or spiritual). We are looking for the common ground between ecology, environmental ethics and nature-centred religion: the *oikos*, the *ethos* and the *theos*.

BARRIERS AND DIFFICULTIES FOR DIALOGUE

There are, of course, some major difficulties to consider before a common ground can be forged. As discussed earlier, orthodoxy and universalism present major barriers which the diatopical model is specifically designed to overcome. Further difficulties arise within Western thought where both secular and theological apologetics give rise to ideology.⁴⁴

Ideological thinking is blind to its own relativism. This occurs because certain criteria of meaning, truth and value are projected as the common ground upon which the 'other' may be met.⁴⁵

Panikkar describes ideology in this sense as:

“The doctrinal system that enables you to locate yourself rationally in the world at a particular time in a particular place.”⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ideology has a vast range of meanings. Here we are concerned with ideology as the demythicized view of the world which poses a problem at the level of meaning. We are not talking about political ideology as such. Ideology springs from the process of piercing *mythos* with *logos*. The more the myth is dismantled by reason, the more hidden it becomes in another form and what is left is ideology; the *idea* of the myth. The idea of the myth must be supported by defensive argumentation because the myth itself no longer presents its meaning symbolically (i.e., directly). "For many people today, God and science," says Panikkar, "are no longer myths but ideologies" - the essential meaning is lost from them; as a foundation for rationality only the ideas they represent are left, which results in meaninglessness. See Panikkar. R., "Anima Mundi - Vita Hominis - Spiritus Dei," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, pp.149-151.

⁴⁵ Krieger. D., *The New Universalism, op. cit.*, p.80.

⁴⁶ Panikkar. R., "Myth," in *Myth Faith and Hermeneutics, op. cit.*, p.21.

However, this does not mean that ideological formulations actually present the truth of any given matter. More often than not, ideology is used to persuade unsuspecting populations of the correctness of certain ways of operating which actually obscure truth. For example, democracy as an ideology, purports to represent all peoples equally with universal rights to free speech; yet those who by their questioning threaten the system which gives them the rights, cannot be tolerated. Democracy seems to be an idea that an individual can subscribe to, which is flexible and may be adjusted at will. However, the ideology inherent within modern democracy is inflexible and cannot be changed by individual will. Ideological democracy is a product of the collective beliefs of a particular society, and as such, holds them within its grip.⁴⁷ Anarchists and communists cannot be tolerated by proponents of democracy because they seriously question the democratic ideology as a system. Ideology is correlative to myth; it cannot be questioned from within, because as soon as it becomes questionable it is no longer ideology. In the modern sense then, democracy cannot be questioned; it is automatically assumed by those who believe in democratic principles that democracy is the only way to govern society.

For the dialogical dialogue, ideology poses a special problem in that it always ascends to the claim of universalism. Ideological thinking represents the personal acceptance of a collective self-delusion as the prior ground for truth. This prior ground is usually set by those with power interests in order to control those who are unconscious of the hidden agenda within the ideological lie. This does not imply that all ideological views of reality are merely arbitrary. Kreiger writes:

“We see the world in the way we want because what we want is to affirm our own being. Thinking is an expression not merely of will, but of will to power. The problem of a plurality of such views in conflict with each other is, therefore, a problem which cannot be solved by a synthesis based on some neutral and common standard, but only by the external imposition of unity through power. In the realm of ideas it is a question of the survival of the ‘fittest’. Overcoming fragmentation and achieving unity is only possible when one worldview dominates over the others. Meaning is thus reduced to a function of power.”⁴⁸

⁴⁷ M. Berman notes "An idea is something you have; an ideology is something which has you." Berman, M., *Coming to Our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West*. Unwin Paperbacks. 1990, p.312.

⁴⁸ Krieger, D., *The New Universalism, op. cit.*, pp.88-89.

For the dialogical dialogue to succeed, ideology must be set aside as a criterion for meaning. In a sense, ideology is the hidden “myth” of *logos*. One of the tasks for meaningful dialogue is to reveal the hidden agenda of ideological processes to the Western mind in order for it to reclaim meaning at other levels. To do this, the task of critical thinking must move from comparing to integrating.

This is the role of the third level of discourse where conditions for coherence and consensus must be discovered that are beyond shared worldview horizons. Those who wish to support the modern worldview must renounce their ideological prejudices when attempting to enter into dialogue with those from worldviews where meaning is not a function of power. Not all cultures elect their representatives along democratic lines. Speakers entering into dialogue may have status due to ancestrally inherited rights or shamanic powers. They may be chosen because they are venerated tribal or societal elders and not by democratic deliberation. In Maoridom, for example, the elders of the tribes have the right to speak for all, because they are *Kaumatuā*; initiated into the secret and ancient wisdom of the tribe. In some Melanesian societies hierarchies are often decided by the accumulation of numbers of pigs.⁴⁹ These ‘Big Men’ are thereby entitled to speak on behalf of their peoples. When dialogue between such diverse groups occurs, each party must accept the validity of the other’s right to select representatives according to their own custom; democratic ideology can only have a disruptive influence on such meetings.

The dialogue is not just a matter of bringing diverse worldview representatives together in a manner which suits only the Western ideal, nor is it a meeting of ‘experts’ as defined by scientific ideology. Rather, it is a dialogue between human beings, on a human scale and with a human voice in order to reach consensus, and not necessarily ‘solutions’, as defined by the modern concept of finality. On the issue of the appropriate settings, Panikkar comments:

⁴⁹ This, of course, is a simplification. On the island of Tanna (Vanuatu), accumulation of the required number of pigs is a complex process, requiring many years of negotiation through difficult obligations and reciprocal agreements with other village members. It is not simply a matter of ‘buying’ animals. Usually the recognised ‘Big Man’ (i.e., he who has accumulated the required number of pigs) is over forty years old, and has by then also accumulated enough knowledge and experience to rule wisely.

“It has been too hastily supposed that ‘other’ cultures should come to our table, where we eat with the knife of dollars and the English fork, on the tablecloth of democracy, on plates served up by the state, drinking the wine of progress and using spoons of technological development, while seated at the chairs of history.”⁵⁰

This unusual metaphor sums up the ideological and mythical presuppositions of the modern secular scientific worldview as it relates to communication with those of other cultures. Meaningful dialogue must begin with the appropriate recognition and respect for other ways of doing and being in the world. On the other hand, the predominantly sacred worldviews must recognise the Western avoidance (and misunderstanding) of exclusive ritual and celebration for their part in selecting appropriate settings.

THE CRISIS OF THE INTERMEDIARY

In the Western tradition there has often been a reliance on intermediaries. These intermediaries have taken many forms: as divine kings, priests, sacraments, secular leaders, and even concepts⁵¹ which interpret meaning for the masses.⁵² With the rise of secular governments, institutions have become the modern intermediaries which are relied upon to deliver meaning and make judgements on the truth as they see fit. These institutions, as intermediaries, are supposed to be disinterested parties which, by remaining impartial, act as catalysts for ‘impartial’ judgements on issues of conflict. These individuals or organisations act as agents who do not have decision-making power, but are supposed to be facilitators assisting the parties to reach agreement. This is the situation in respect to arbitration, adjudication, conciliation,

⁵⁰ Panikkar. R., *Cultural Disarmament: The Way to Peace*. Westminster John Knox Press. Louisville. 1995, p.102.

⁵¹ One of the most remarkable of which is the intermediary concept of objectivity. Panikkar states: "Western culture has married the intermediary: the objective world." Panikkar R., "Words and Terms" in Olivetti. M. M., *Archivo de Filosofia*. Institutio di studi filosofici. Roma. 1980, p.130, (note 8).

⁵² This has often been used as a means of control and, as Berman points out, most of the heretical movements within the Christian tradition have been trying to reclaim their own path to spiritual experience. Secular governments arose to oppose the power of the then current theocracy, and the modern legal system was an attempt to reclaim justice for the people by the people. It is interesting to note that in the modern era all attempts at autonomous freedom have been circumvented by the now dominant institutions which have replaced former intermediaries as power brokers. The World Trade Organisation is set to be the most powerful (and personally disempowering) institution in the history of humankind in its task to ensure 'free' trade among nations. See Lang. T. and Hine. C., *The New Protectionism: Protecting the Future Against Free Trade*. Earthscan. London. 1993.

mediation and conflict resolution in the modern sense. However, behind this institutionalised system lies an ideology which reflects the belief that people are incapable of directly experiencing, expressing, or solving their problems as autonomous individuals.⁵³ The general trend in the West is towards a growing mistrust of traditional institutions as intermediaries. The reaction has led to a new kind of fundamentalism where trust is now being vested in wholly faceless entities - for example, the transnational corporations whose ideology of 'market forces' declares that natural justice can only be delivered by the 'invisible hand'. Because of this, effective environmental guardianship has passed to the new international order.⁵⁴

Institutions and unofficial intermediaries cannot fulfill the role of mediators in the dialogical dialogue. An intermediary is a broker, a go-between, an independent agency or a disinterested party, while a mediator is an involved participant who shares in each of the worldviews he or she mediates.⁵⁵ The mediator for meaningful dialogue between worldviews must refuse to reduce the people who come from different horizons of intelligibility to objects, nor reduce their conceptions to objective and subjective realities. The mediator must avoid definitions and categorisation and yet believe in, and have respect for, the differing cultural identities and their languages. The task of such mediators is the founding of a common horizon which can give rise to a new and shared common myth presented by new symbols. These common myths and their respective symbols can provide a basis for the mutual convincement which will actually link the wisdom of different traditions together.

The mediator or mediators must be chosen carefully or else the dialogue will eventually be reduced to dialectics and communication across the worldview boundaries may fail. Who could such mediators be? Where can they be found? A mediator does not have to be an 'expert' or an intellectual or a representative from a particular culture. A mediator needs to be respected by each party for whatever

⁵³ Many people now do not wish to act on their own behalf and the power of decision is abrogated to a higher level of authority. The Western-style justice system is a good example.

⁵⁴ This, of course, refers to the new right movement, for further discussion of this see Chapters Four and Five. See also Gare. A., *Nihilism Incorporated: European Civilisations and Environmental Destruction*. Eco-logical Press. Bugendore. 1993.

⁵⁵ Panikkar. R., "Religion as Freedom," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*, *op. cit.*, pp.442-443.

reason; be it age, experience, or expertise. Such mediators may be drawn from a number of sources but usually they would be people who have lived in many 'worlds', who know the values of those 'worlds' and can facilitate the expression of the deepest aspects of those worldviews. Mediators can be chosen by the various parties or they may spontaneously emerge from the dynamics of the dialogue itself. Mediators, must not however, take their 'mandate' from representatives or institutional intermediaries.

Of course, there is no suggestion here that mediation has to be carried out by one person alone; indeed, the spokespeople involved in the dialogue are, in actuality, the mediators. However, orthodoxy, exclusivism, absolutism or any kind of fundamentalism should be discouraged in the dialogical dialogue. Those who wish to practice polemical argumentation have many other outlets. The intention of the dialogical dialogue is to overcome barriers to communication, not to set up new ones.

INDUCEMENTS TO DIALOGUE

At this point some serious questions arise. Firstly, why would anyone (or any people) want to enter into a dialogue which requires a high level of trust where the innermost secrets of one's own worldview may be exposed to criticism? And secondly, why should those who are currently in power be interested in such any activity which might reveal their own presuppositions and ideologies? The answers to these very important questions require two levels of explanation; the first is at the level of meaning and the second a pragmatic matter. We will deal with the pragmatic level first.

Pluralism, human rights legislation and global communication systems have provided a vehicle for change unforeseen in prior eras. Pluralism, as we have seen, is sweeping away the walls erected by universalistic secular attitudes towards other worldviews since the collapse of European colonialism. Secular governments and their institutional intermediaries can no longer isolate themselves from the reality of multiculturalism, human rights issues, and the ever-increasing tide of environmental legislation. Thus far, little progress has been made in the reparations offered to

indigenous peoples who suffered under colonial imperialism.⁵⁶ In fact mere tokenism has been the norm. Legal re-recognition of past treaties has paved the way for such peoples to enforce their right to be heard and their right to claim back their lands and sacred sites from some governments. Environmental laws have been passed in many countries which require Conservation Departments (or the equivalent authority) to actively advocate environmental preservation, protection and conservation. Many international treaties have been signed, ratifying basic principles pertaining to these issues. Most environmental legislation has included the legal protection of the aboriginal rights of indigenous peoples to their lands and resources.⁵⁷ These respective institutions now find themselves in a situation where they are obliged to enter into some kind of dialogue with peoples who perceive the environment in entirely different ways.

Repressive governments and resource-hungry multinational corporations are experiencing increasing difficulty in claiming any legal right to dominate and control lands and environments belonging to others. This is partly due to the globalisation of the media. It is now far more difficult to hide such actions and even harder to justify them in light of increasing awareness of human rights and environmental destruction. The situation which is developing sees governments and their agencies struggling to find solutions to these problems. Dialogue is sought in many situations and for the resolution of many conflicts, albeit with a system which is inadequate to the task. The need for dialogical dialogue exists wherever these encounters develop - locally, nationally or internationally. There exists a need,⁵⁸ as well as an emerging political

⁵⁶ While there are several high profile settlements in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, it should be remembered that indigenous peoples are not an insignificant minority. In spite of the claims to globalisation of the world economy, it is estimated that there are some two hundred million indigenous people effectively living in traditional and semi-traditional lifestyles, representing four percent of the world's population. IUCN, UNEP, WWF., *Caring For the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living*. Gland, Switzerland. 1991, p.61.

⁵⁷ For example, Part II of New Zealand's Resource Management Act 1991 includes as its purposes and principles the following: "All persons exercising functions and powers.... shall recognise the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites waahi tapu and other toanga," (section 6 (e)); "also have particular regard to Kaitiakitanga" (Section 7(a)), "and the intrinsic values of ecosystems" (section 7 (d)). Section 8 requires that the Treaty of Waitangi shall be taken into account on all resource issues. The fourth schedule, assessment of effects, requires consideration of any effect on natural and physical resources having aesthetic, recreational, scientific, historical, spiritual or cultural, or other special value for present or future generations. *Resource Management Act*. Government Print. Wellington. 1991, pp.25-26, 359.

⁵⁸ This need is also apparent for the indigenous cultures who are struggling to protect their sacred worldviews from the universalist intentions of the current political, social and economic hegemony.

will, to find ways to mediate satisfactory solutions to such fundamental conflicts within and between nations.⁵⁹ A move from dialectical dialogue to dialogical dialogue is a real possibility, given the current global awareness of the urgency and importance of these issues.

In the modern era a crisis of meaning is emerging. This is partly due to continuing rational demythicisation which is eroding the secular horizon of intelligibility to the point where the emergent myths are becoming increasingly negative. It is becoming clearer that the end result of environmental destruction and degradation is a world which may well be hostile to human existence altogether. Economic might, facilitated through technology and science, is already rendering large areas of the earth uninhabitable to humans.⁶⁰ This has precipitated a crisis in the human-nature relationship, causing many people to look for new pathways for reclaiming a meaningful relationship with the natural world. This new and meaningful relationship embraces a type of holism which rejects the old dichotomies inherent within dualistic thinking, which viewed nature as some kind of defective machine. The emerging discipline of environmental ethics is a field of inquiry that addresses the ethical responsibilities of human beings for the natural environment, and supports the search for epistemological and metaphysical motives to value nature.⁶¹ While moderns enclose nature in scenic reserves, national parks, and the like, a living and direct experience of nature in a meaningful manner continues to elude them. This is partly due to the belief in rationality and reason as the prior ground of being and partly due to the extreme individuation that the subject/object division engenders.⁶² To allow a

For them, legal recognition is paramount to their own sovereignty and an aid in their fight to halt the incremental degradation of their natural world.

⁵⁹ Nations are not only those political structures recognised as governments by other governments but also those who consider their sovereignty 'external' to the modern concept of nation states. These non-territorial (or '4th world') nations may exist on the basis of tribal affiliation, cultural link or spiritual similarity and are usually physically situated within a national boundary of a modern nation state. See Vachon, R., "Guswenta, or the Intercultural Imperative." [Sequel to Part I, sections 1 and 2] *InterCulture*. Vol. XXVII, No 4. 1995, pp.33-37.

⁶⁰ For example, since the first Earth day in 1970, nearly 200 million hectares of natural forest have been lost, deserts have expanded by 120 million hectares and thousands of plants and animals have been made extinct. More than 1.8 billion people have been added to the world population and at the same time an estimated 480 billion tons of topsoil have been lost. Brown, L. R. (et. al.), *State of the World 1992*. W. W, Norton. New York. 1992, pp.3-26.

⁶¹ Armstrong, S. J. and Botzler, R. G., "Introduction," to *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*. McGraw-Hill Inc. New York. 1993, p.XV.

⁶² See Chapter Six, Part I, for further discussion on the mythic basis of the dualistic division of humans (subjects) and Nature (objects).

new and positive mythic expression to emerge in the secular worldview, a new relationship with nature must be sought in dialogue with those who still follow the way of mythical communion with Earth as *anima mundi*.

Those at home in a the sacred worldview can also learn much from the positive aspects of Western science about how to restore and revitalise devastated regions of the Earth. Western science, instead of devastating the natural environment, could become a powerful ally in restoring and enhancing it, helping form a harmonious relationship with nature for all peoples.

Modern people need to rediscover the Earth as their home. They need to allow the world to be a world, by setting it free to reveal its sustaining power in its own way.⁶³ This sustaining power is currently being exhausted by technologically-induced exploitation in order to fulfill a myth which is no longer a viable expression of meaning for many of those who live within it. The dialogue between worldviews, which leads each to enrich the other is, in reality, the last vehicle available to rescue the secular worldview from its own decline into ontological reductionism and meaninglessness.⁶⁴

PRACTICAL CRITERIA

"Nature is not only more complex than we think. It is more complex than we can think." F. Egler.⁶⁵

If nature is indeed more complex than we can think, as an increasing number of ecologists concede, then the current obsession with ecological 'management'

⁶³ Through the self-emergence of *physis* and the self-seclusion which shelters and protects ongoing possibilities of *physis*. A return to *techné* rather than an advancement of technology is necessary.

⁶⁴ C. Maser comments: "Having learned little or nothing from history, our civilisation is currently destroying the very environment from which it sprang and which it relies on for its continuance. Civilisation as we know it cannot, therefore, be the final evolutionary stage for human existence. What is the next frontier for civilised people to conquer. Is it outer space, as so often stated? No, it is not outer space. What then? It is inner space, the conquest of oneself, which many assert is life's most difficult task." Maser. C., *Resolving Environmental Conflict: Towards Sustainable Community Development*. St Lucie Press. Delray Beach, Florida. 1996, p.XIV.

⁶⁵ Egler. F., *The Way of Science: A Philosophy of Ecology for the Layman*. Hafner Publishing Company. New York. 1970, p.21.

represents yet another version of the Western notion of mastery over nature. The modern meaning of the term 'management' is derived from the Latin word *maneus*, meaning - to put a horse through its paces (i.e., training horses). Unlike horses, nature cannot be trained. Ecological 'managers' can not, and should not, approach ecosystems as something somehow separate from themselves to be divided into component parts before the whole may be comprehended. As eco-philosopher Masanobu Fukuoka reiterates: "Man is not in a position to 'know' nature."⁶⁶

Ecological management as an approach to nature is merely a watered-down and slightly softened version of Descartes' and Bacon's ideas of human domination over nature. The emerging concept of co⁶⁷-management of natural systems, where the intermediary institutions attempt to include indigenous peoples, is a new form of apologetic tokenism. Co-management merely offers, to those who see nature as the realm of the sacred, a concept of guardianship firmly rooted in scientific superiority. Meaningful dialogue is subsumed by the act of inclusivism in the very idea of co-management because no serious attempt is being made to fully validate other ways of knowing in any real sense. For example, ecological scientists cannot work directly with those who evoke shamanic power as a means of healing imbalances within given environments. For ecologists and shamans to work together they first must understand each other in a way which facilitates the mutual validation of their respective ways of knowing and acting with nature. An ecologist who attempts to 'know' an ecosystem process inherently more complicated than the cognitive tool being used, is only 'managing' to indulge in a self-delusion of monumental proportions.

Active guardianship involves not only thinking together, sharing common horizons of meaning, presenting common symbols and expressing new myths, but also praxis: working and acting together in a physical manner. A dialogue which leads only to understanding and conviction is insufficient to the task of active environmental guardianship. That which surrounds us and grounds our being is the realm of the real,

⁶⁶ Fukuoka. M., *The Natural Way of Farming: The Theory and Practice of Green Philosophy*. Japan Publications Inc. Tokyo. 1985, p.49.

⁶⁷ Co - is defined as a prefix meaning - joint, mutual or common. As adjective and adverb as - jointly or mutually, and as a verb as - together with another or others. (Oxford Concise Dictionary.)

the source of our lives and the realm of entities from which our common needs are met. The purpose of the dialogical dialogue - to enrich and reveal - must be complemented by emergence of practices which enhance and protect the sacred ground from which all things emerge. This is to say that the commonality of *oikos*, *ethos* and *theos* should bear fruit. Conservation, protection and enhancement of nature must become integrated in our dwelling in the Earth and not, as is currently accepted, as an aside to the 'business' of living. Just 'getting by' with a new myth and set of meanings is insufficient to the task at hand.

It is not outside the bounds of possibility that the current trend toward devastation of the natural world can be reversed. Such a reversal is as yet unprecedented, but it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the revitalising power of nature is exhausted. Much damage had been done through the constant pressure exerted by modern technological production in the name of progress and development, but all is not yet lost. The practical outcome of dialogue needs to be reflected in shared activities, shared approaches to solving environmental problems and shared responsibility for nature as guardians. Shared guardianship elicits a new horizon for actively preserving, conserving, respecting, and living, in the natural world. The results of meaningful dialogue should allow those of different worldviews to express their own rituals, live within their own time scales, follow lifestyles which reflect their own manner of being, and not be subjugated to the dominant paradigm of the day.

What must be believed in and hoped for, is the emergence of a worldview which is more holistic, pluralist and egalitarian, that is essentially participative in its approach to environmental guardianship.⁶⁸ Such a worldview would see human beings as the co-creators of their own reality through participation - through their experience, their imagination and intuition, their thinking and their action. As Peter Reason puts it:

⁶⁸ Adapted from the works of Gregory Bateson. See Bateson, G., *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. Chandler. San Francisco. 1972, and *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. E. P. Dutton. New York. 1979.

“Our reality is a product of the dance between our individual and collective mind and ‘what is there,’ the amorphous and primordial givenness of the universe.”⁶⁹

The final outcome of the dialogical dialogue on issues and problems associated with active environmental guardianship should lead to the integration of a common understanding of nature with praxis. The practical applications should not be left to ecological managers, environmental planners, or any other such ‘objectively’ situated pragmatists.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES

Two case studies will be used to outline the issues and illustrate the kinds of problems which can occur in the dialogical process. However, they are not designed to be definitive or conclusive studies based on an exhaustive elucidation of the topics concerned. Rather, the two studies are based on an interpretation of time and place which attempts to facilitate an understanding between worldviews. It is simply not possible to cover all the detailed aspects of temporality or all the factors involved in the definition of place-centredness. The search for commonality between diverse truth claims is the goal. Both of these case studies involve issues which cross worldview boundaries, issues which have sacred and secular components where values must be derived to satisfy a diverse range of conceptual perspectives. By explication of comparative and *imparative*⁷⁰ approaches to each case, the resulting symbolic discourse will help to reveal the commonality from which understanding can lead to active participation in terms of providing both theoretical and practical outcomes. Each case study is approached by using the three hermeneutical steps outlined earlier in this chapter to discuss the way each respective worldview conceives each issue, the historical origins of that conception, and finally, a symbolic

⁶⁹ Reason. P., “Three Approaches to Participative Inquiry,” in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. (edited by N. K. Denzin. and Y. S. Lincoln). Sage Publications. London. 1994, p.324.

⁷⁰ Panikkar uses the neologism *imparative* which he derived from *imparare*. In contradistinction to the comparative method, the imparative method seeks to “learn from the other, opening ourselves from our standpoint to a dialogical dialogue that does not seek to win or convince but to search together from our different vantage points.” Panikkar. R., “A Universal Theory or a Cosmic Confidence?” in *Toward a Universal Theology of Religion* (edited by L. Swidler). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1988, p.141.

interpretation or symbolic discourse which searches for the place between worldviews.

Time and Timing

In the first study, the vexed question of time and timing is considered. Three different and seemingly incommensurable concepts of time have been selected to reveal the mythic nature of temporality and timing in general. The Western concept of time is compared and contrasted with Indian and Australian Aboriginal perspectives. From this, it can be seen that time is indirectly experienced through a wide variety of conceptual attitudes and measuring devices, all of which are arbitrarily decided upon. In the case of Australian Aboriginal worldviews, time and timing is entirely absent.

For those who accept time and timing as central to their ontology, appreciation of their sense of place may be enriched by a time celebration which reflects the seasonal and cosmological cycles relevant to a particular geographical region. To sense sacred time and sacred place, one's perception must be directly related to forces 'near at hand'. The modern world is directed and driven by the concept of measured passing time. This linear concept has come to dominate sacred and psychological time through global institution of what is known as Universal Standard Time (UST). Not only does UST override local and sacred time, but it also imposes northern hemispheric time scales on southern realms. Part of the purpose of dialogue on temporality is driven by the need for those who inhabit southern hemispheric regions for a local time scale which can facilitate local celebrations in a meaningful manner. This is particularly important for those still dwelling in sacred worldviews. Those who would be guardians for their places need to understand local rhythms and be able to celebrate their own seasonal cycles. The study of time is, then, an interpretation of the varying myths which have given rise to the differing expressions of intelligibility in each worldview.

Sacred Place

In the second study the focus shifts to place-centredness. The three interpretative steps are applied to the consideration of whether forests are sacred places or simply 'standing stocks' of resources. European and Fijian traditional attitudes to forests are considered according to a diachronical analysis. A contrast between the sacred conception of forests and the secular and scientific approach is drawn. The evolution of property rights and their subsequent imposition on Fijian peoples has led to a rapid decline in Fijian traditional beliefs which in turn has resulted in the widespread destruction of their once-sacred forests. The purpose of meaningful dialogue in this case is based on the need to generate common understanding which may lead to appropriate action to save the remaining forests. The dialogue may also help modern people of European origin to reactivate their own sacred tree and forest symbols.

The point of dialogue is to introduce the sacred element of forests, as understood by Fijians, to scientists and economists. It also introduces scientific knowledge and values to those who hold to a sacred worldview. The exchange of collective wisdom can then lead to an accord which provides the basis for holistic and participative action in a situation of joint guardianship.

ENTERING THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE

To research the case studies, it would be easy to assume that one could simply set up potential dialogical situations with representatives from different worldviews. The participants could then enter into dialogue on the given topics while the researcher would carry out some kind of qualitative or quantitative research. In this situation the task is problematic because the diatopical model, as yet not fully elucidated, does not actively exist as a method. The case studies remain in the realm of conjecture until such time as they are worked through in an interpretative manner. If a researcher were to arbitrarily set up such mock dialogues they would not be real examples because the purpose would be to allow the researcher to carry out research and the dialogue would never reach the level required for a discourse of disclosure. The purpose of such research would be defeated by its own limiting parameters. A

situation suitable to the dialogical dialogue must emerge of its own accord before the model can be actualised in practice. Emergence cannot be forced, nor can it be defined within the limited parameters of what constitutes 'research'.

In this sense there is no 'prior ground' to act as a verification procedure. There is no transcendental point from which to contemplate the process of which the researcher is irretrievably a part.⁷¹ The hermeneutic circle is a methodological device in which one considers the whole in relation to its parts and also vice-versa, precisely as a means of inquiry. To avoid regressing into monologue the hermeneutic method requires that the research be an open and honest interpretation of texts (be they oral, visual or written) pertaining to each worldview's presentation of that particular concept or issue. Texts from a variety of sources must be retrieved according to the requirements of each hermeneutic level outlined in the diatopical model. These texts, if sincerely interpreted, would allow the researcher to participate, as it were, in the understanding and convincement necessary to validate each worldview. The interpretive method is not only an 'objective' exercise, but also potentially a transcendent experience for the researcher.⁷²

The case studies allow the interpretation to be focused in a manner which avoids the generalities which would otherwise arise if only theoretical aspects were to be considered. In each situation the existence of the place, element, or concept is presented to each worldview by a common awareness of its ultimate reality. How each worldview conceives that given reality is the concern of the hermeneutical inquiry which leads to dialogue.

The hermeneutical inquiry aims to move back and forth, from the sacred to the secular, in order to find the symbolic common ground. This commonality can then be tested for its 'rightness', or orthodoxy in each tradition. If found inadequate, the inquiry returns to the level of morphological hermeneutics and begins again.

⁷¹ Bauman. Z., *Hermeneutics and Social Science*. Hutchinson. London. 1978, p.17.

⁷² As a researcher I will also have to come to terms with the myths and presuppositions concealed within my own worldview, which will be revealed by following the interpretive method. As Gadamer correctly and provocatively insists: "to understand at all we must understand differently." Gadamer. H. G., *Truth and Method. op. cit.*, p. 292.

The hermeneutic methodology begins with describing how each of the selected worldviews envisages time and place. It then moves on to ascertaining how and why each worldview has developed this perception and finally, which symbolic correlations the respective worldviews share in each specific case study.

Interpretation of implicit as well as explicit statements stemming from science, on the one hand, and traditional (religious) cultures, on the other, are needed because neither can be reduced to the other, nor can either be discarded.

We can say that the scientific method is the experiment; this is a comparative method where verification is achieved by replicating the results of one experiment by another. In a sense, experimentation is a matter of 'going over' the data in a double sense: 'checking' it by repeating in a quantifiable manner and taking an 'objective' stance, understanding from 'outside' the object of study. This means a 'going above' the subject matter which rules out all 'subjective' concerns placed methodologically out of bounds from the outset.

The traditional method of experience (i.e., the *imparative* method) means 'going through' an experience, understanding from within. This method of undergoing an experience is not repeatable and therefore not verifiable from outside the personal and cultural horizon which makes it possible. For this reason experience is always seen as unscientific in that the 'subjectivity' of the experiencing subject, the belief of the believer, is inextricably part of the subject matter. Experience is thereby ruled out of the experiment and repeatability or verification is ruled out of experience.

If 'compare and contrast' methodology is used, one is a scientist; if one demands initiation into the mysteries in order to 'experience' the experience, one is a traditionalist. So neither a purely objective, nor a purely subjective approach to the case studies will ever suffice. It is a matter of 'verbalising' the encounter of worldviews in a way that is both critical and creative, allowing each to challenge the other by turn in an expressive manner. In this way each method reveals its respective worldview and what is needed is an interpretation of the strengths and weaknesses of each. The method of expressive interpretation 'goes between'; it seeks the mythical, symbolic and ultimately dialogical middle ground by assuming that neither subjective

nor objective approaches can be exhaustive. Each needs the other to participate in a shared horizon of intelligibility. Each of the case studies will employ the interpretative method by examining the other methods in varying proportions.

The participative hermeneutic is the 'multimethodical method' needed to overcome traditional dialectical methods, which fail to appreciate the difficulty of crossing worldview boundaries. To find the necessary commonality required for active sharing of wisdom in environmental matters, communication at another level is required. Panikkar's diatopical hermeneutics overcomes the limitations of objectivism to forge a new path to a dialogue on environmental guardianship by allowing ecological wisdom to be shared in thought and in action. Those who will be the guardians of this Earth will be those who win the respect and admiration from others through a shared expression of common understanding.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

From the ideas covered in Chapters One, Two and Three it can be seen that environmental guardianship can only be effective in relation to a sense of place which allows mythic expression to present a horizon of intelligibility capable of encompassing the whole. Holism requires a relationship between peoples and their Earth which engenders respect for all beings. No one group of people can claim absolute guardianship rights for another or over a place that is not part of their mythico-symbolic expression. To ascertain who should be the guardians of any given region, a meaningful dialogue between all who choose to make their home within that particular area is necessary. Such dialogue may lead to mutual enrichment of each worldview concerned, so that a thinking and acting together can begin to heal the wounds created by centuries of domination over nature. The emergence of guardians capable of actively promoting environmental well-being must reflect the pluralistic attitude, an attitude which demands an end to universalism, orthodoxy, and hegemony.

A new myth is emerging,⁷³ one that seeks to express the reunion of the sacred with the secular. The search has begun for a mode of common understanding which can ultimately link humankind with the Earth to rekindle a new awareness of the *mysterium* at the basis of all things. Abiding within all the myriad things of the universe is a mystery which cannot be approached by rationality alone. There is a need to include theological, philosophical and rational approaches to the emerging environmental crisis.⁷⁴ The means to the expression of this new myth is by way of the dialogical dialogue, a dialogue which reaches beyond the arena of conflict to a symbolic discourse of disclosure. From the pioneering works of Raimon Panikkar we can co-construct a method to facilitate such a dialogue. The diatopical model posits three levels of interpretation culminating in a communication of symbolic presentations capable of crossing worldview boundaries. A new horizon of intelligibility based on shared symbols can then form a basis for environmental guardianship in both practical and theoretical terms.

⁷³ See Chapter Six, Part I, for further discussion and an outline of the direction that an emerging *mythos* may take.

⁷⁴ Panikkar coined the term cosmotheandric to explain this trinitarian connection. *Cosmos, theos* and *anthropos* (*andros*) realigned to form a new spirituality for the emerging myth. See Panikkar, R., "Anima Mundi - Vita Hominis - Spiritus Dei," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience, op. cit.*, pp.149-152.

CHAPTER FOUR

TIME: A STUDY

PART I - TEMPORAL DISCOURSES

INTRODUCTION

“What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know. But at any rate this much I dare affirm I know; that if nothing passed there would be no past time; if nothing were approaching, there would be no future time; if nothing were, there would be no present time.

But the two times, past and future, how can they be, since the past is no more and the future is not yet? On the other hand, if the present were always present and never flowed away into the past, it would not be time at all, but eternity. But if the present is only time, because it flows away into the past, how can we say it is? For it is, only because it will cease to be. Thus we can affirm that time is only in that it tends towards not-being.” St. Augustine.¹

The riddle of Augustine’s time suggests a paradox in the sense that time exists because it is tending towards not-being and yet our very being affirms that we live in time. In one sense we are time, and yet time is somehow our own construction.²

Temporal recognition is a reflection of the human desire, and need, for a horizon of intelligibility which can explain the apparent sequence³ of events encountered in everyday reality. Time appears to be an ephemeral dimension which, while seemingly knowable and self-existent, remains

¹ St Augustine., *Confessions XI* (translated by F. J. Sheed). Doubleday. London and New York. 1944, p.14.

² The concept of time is constructed in a similar manner to that of space. It is a univocal concept applying to the experience of succession, process, events and continuity of our total world. Jaques. E., *The Form of Time*. Heinemann. London. 1982, p.49.

³ Sequence originates from the Latin *sequi* meaning to follow (Concise Oxford Dictionary). Reality as humans perceive it, appears to unfold in sequences where events or occurrences follow one after another in an endless pattern. Recognition of sequential patterns has been interpreted in many different ways by various peoples; hence the emergence of many temporal structures.

incomprehensible as a logical reality in itself. Time cannot be absolutely defined by any particular worldview, nor can it be explained rationally without reference to its own symbolic presentation.

To elucidate the importance of time and timing to human life in all its diverse forms, it is necessary to reveal the mythical expression which gives rise to differing temporal symbols. A dialogue on temporal conceptions, in order to recognise the relationship between time, place and environmental issues, begins by accepting that time can be perceived and experienced in contrasting forms.

In the modern sense, time is usually perceived to be a fundamental parameter of reality defined by clocks, calendars, and schedules. Few people living within the modern worldview seriously question the existence of time. Time is essential to modern lifestyles where temporal parameters define and dictate the rhythms of daily life. Not only is time and timing the pivot of modern life, but the type of time experienced is rigidly defined by a technique of measurement which is profoundly linear. However, the concept of linear time is not necessarily a universally accepted method of time-reckoning and many peoples across the world understand time in distinctly different ways.

Many of these 'time maps' are radically different to the widely acknowledged and generally accepted modern method of time measurement and time conception. Until the latter part of the nineteenth century⁴ local time scales were the norm and traditional calendars regulated by differing astronomical calculations or environmental phenomena were commonplace.⁵ Prior to the modern era there existed some traditions, such as the worldview encompassed by the Aboriginal inhabitants of what is now called Australia, who did not measure time at all. Time-avoiding cultures pose a special problem for those proponents of time as a force inherent in

⁴ Convention and common sense requires me to use a "standard" time reference frame even though I am well aware that this is in itself part of the problem in any intercultural interpretation concerning time. Ultimately any time scale I should choose is essentially arbitrary, so I use one from my own tradition, with which I am all too familiar.

⁵ Rifkin J., *Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History*. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1987, p.133.

nature and a particular difficulty for those of the modern worldview whose ontology is markedly temporal.

TEMPORAL MAPS

In the study of time, three general categories of temporal perception and measurement can be discerned. The first category is the linear time perception formulated and developed from the European context. Linear time is essentially eschatological, proceeding from a beginning through a sequence of past, present, and future, to a final point.⁶ In a theological context, time begins with an act of creation by an atemporal being (or beings) which proceeds to a teleological conclusion via the passage of time. The scientific linear time map, arising in complementarity with the religious tradition, developed and refined measured time into clocks, calendars and schedules of ever-increasing accuracy. This accuracy and technological refinement has resulted in what is now known as Universal Standard Time (UST).⁷ Time-directed ontology leads to a worldview where events may be perceived as independent of places. This in turn allows expansionism: Such a culture can maintain meaningful temporal coherence in places which are radically dissimilar to its place of origin. The result of a worldview whose ontological focus is linear time could therefore be considered to be a 'fall' from place.⁸

⁶ J. A. M. Merleau-Ponty, writing on linear time, explains: "Time's arrow symbolises the western world with its emphasis on progress and growth and with its view of time as an entity going forwards in a straight line from the infinite past to the unknown future." Merleau-Ponty J. A. M., "The Time Sense in Psychiatry," in *The Voices of Time* (edited by J. T. Fraser). George Braziller. New York. 1966, p.248.

⁷ Universal Standard Time is a recent development of the old standard of Greenwich Mean Time originating from British navigational requirements. Universal Standard Time is now measured by a caesium beam clock known as the Bonn device. One second is no longer a particular fraction of the day it is 9,192,631,770 beats of a caesium atom. Paul Davies explains: "The Bonn Device and a network of similar instruments across the world, together constitute the 'standard clock'. The individual instruments, of which the German model is the most accurate, are caesium-beam clocks. They are continually monitored, compared, tweaked and refined via radio signals from satellites and television stations, to cajole them into near perfect step...Thus originate the famous pips, the radio time signals by which we set our watches." Davies. P., *About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution*. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1995, p.21. Calendrical reform has also been carried out using the precise measurements of such atomic clocks.

⁸ Associated with the creation text, the story of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden is important. The first people chose the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge and were cast out. Most interpretations of this parable suggest that the two were cast into another place where the rules governing reality were considerably different to those of Eden. Another possible meaning is that they 'fell' into temporality, into a state of cognition of the world quite different to the conditions of innocence. To have knowledge in the Western tradition means to live in time, to observe sequences and recognise one's mortality and thus search for meaning through the unfolding of events.

The second category can be loosely defined as cyclic time.⁹ Cyclic time scales and perceptions are usually based on cosmological cycles and the recognition of the cyclic nature of all apparent things. Religious concepts within these worldviews present cycles of creation by supreme beings, where life itself is recreated through reincarnation, and Earthly cycles are perceived to be reflections of cosmic realms. Such temporal conceptions give rise to worldviews which recognise and measure passing time as a reflection of solar, lunar and seasonal cycles but do not necessarily accept time as a unidirectional force. The cyclic concept recognises and celebrates the return of all things in endless patterns, including human participation in cyclic returns. Beings pass away only to return to a new existence in the next cycle. Ontologically, such worldviews are both time- and place-centred, but are not ultimately eschatological because the eternal return ensures that there is no end to reality, only a change of expressive form.

The third category belongs to those who do not measure time at all. These worldviews have avoided the inclusion of time into their ontology and remained almost wholly place-centred. Such peoples recognise and experience what is called 'past', 'present' and 'future' but they do not measure life within such a framework and actively avoid allowing these concepts to become worked into an ontology which would concede the sovereignty of time.¹⁰ In these worldviews history is not a formulated concept. It must be noted that this does not imply a weak development of historical consciousness or a denial of temporality in terms of being 'timeless' or 'a-historical'.¹¹ Such a place-centred ontology gives rise to cultures which are not likely

⁹ Loosely because the idea of cyclic time as described by Western scholars is essentially a line returning upon itself when in fact the eternal return is more like a spiral. Situations are not repeated exactly, as if time were going backwards; rather a new world event is created which has similar conditions to the previous ones but not necessarily similar experiences, i.e., the golden age will return but not with the same inhabitants. See Eliade, M., *The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Harper and Row. New York. 1959.

¹⁰ Swain, P., *A Place for Strangers*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1993, p.23.

¹¹ Many Western scholars have tried to fit 'time avoiding' worldviews within the concept of cyclic time. Mircea Eliade in his work on Australian Aboriginals tries to suggest that the Dreamtime is a time-regenerative process in his model of the eternal return. "There exists no culture without history" he suggests: "But this history is not acknowledged as such by the primitives." Eliade, M., *Australian Religions: An Introduction*. Cornell University Press. Ithaca. 1973, p.61. Eliade based his ideas upon implications that Aboriginals recognised a supreme creative being. This allowed him to formulate the 'forgotten history' idea from his conception of an aboriginal ancestral monism responsible for the creation of an *axis mundi*. Tony Swain rigorously refutes this claim and cites convincing evidence that

to seek to expand beyond their own predetermined geographical boundaries. It also suggests that much of the scientific type of temporal inquiry commonly encountered in the modern era would never have arisen from time-avoiding worldviews because the governing laws of their reality would have been firmly rooted in their *mythos* of place. Temporal explanations of phenomena were simply not necessary.

These three categories are not absolutes; worldviews use several parallel concepts of time interchangeably. Some, such as the Balinese, use standard time for certain activities, the Hindu calendar for religious ritual and celebration, and their own qualitative time reckoning which does not describe what day it is but rather what kind of day it is.¹² It is now common in countries such as India to observe UST set comfortably with the secular affairs of the state, while the celebration of sacred time according to Christian, Moslem, Hindu and Buddhist calendars continues without serious conflict. Certainly a plurality of time scales can function in those worldviews which do not demand universalistic adherence to a certain and definite manner of temporal recognition. Serious conceptual conflicts occur between wholly time-centred and wholly place-centred worldviews where the horizons of intelligibility appear to share little commonality. When the Western worldview is confronted with the conception of another worldview in which the modern concept of history is simply absent, it asserts the principle of exclusion, usually by denying the validity of that worldview.¹³ A similar problem occurs in discourses about cosmological and cyclic time because Western standard time is generally perceived to be the only accurate means of measuring time.

TIME AND PLACE: A NECESSARY UNITY

Place-centred worldviews have accepted the ontological status of time to varying degrees. In general, the more place-centred they are, the more time is avoided. This

the high God idea arrived as a consequence of Christian influences. See Swain. T., *A Place for Strangers. op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

¹² See Geertz. C., "Person, Time and Conduct in Bali," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books. New York. 1973, pp.360-411.

¹³ A question raised by Merleau-Ponty. M., "Phenomenology and the Science of Man," in *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, Vol I*. North West University Press. Evanstown. 1973, p.103.

suggests that time and place are represented ontologically as opposite poles in the sense that temporal development leads to the depreciation of place as the source of meaning. In the modern era, such depreciation of place is common, yet the recognition of temporality does not necessarily preclude place-centredness. A time structure drawn from inherently natural elements such as day length, seasonal changes, weather cycles and physical surrounds does not always have to be at odds with socially necessitated time concepts.

How did humans first learn to recognise and distinguish sequences? They did so through the observation of natural phenomena from the place in which they found themselves. Observations of natural phenomena could have included examples such as: when the sun appeared to rise over a certain mountain, how long a flower took to blossom, when a particular fruit appeared ripe, how long it took to travel to a summer pasture, when a bear began hibernation, how long it takes for a certain tree to mature enough for harvesting timber, or when salmon first enter into a river. These were all natural rhythmic events originating within places. Time measurement was originally derived through observations discerned from the perspective of a people living in a certain place or places from where they gathered the sustenance which enabled them to form social cohesion.¹⁴ The people of the far northern latitudes understood their sequences in a different manner from those of the tropical regions. Certain activities required the knowledge of the oncoming winter or the dry season, while learned experience suggested that some patterned events were immutable, and that in each place unique natural events occurred to which people had to adapt. Essentially, the environment in which people found themselves informed them of the nature of temporal sequence. The place dictated the time.

By nurturing place and relating to place, events revealed themselves in sequences which could be symbolically measured. A time scale out of kilter with place would

¹⁴ Eliade comments that: "In most primitive societies the New Year is equivalent to the raising of the taboo on the new harvest, which is thus declared edible and innocuous for the whole community. Where several species of grains or fruit are cultivated, ripening successively at different seasons, we sometimes find several New Year festivals. This means that divisions of time are determined by the rituals that govern the renewal of alimentary reserves; that is, the rituals that guarantee the continuity of life of the community in its entirety." Eliade, M., *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal*

have spelled doom. For example, if Inuit¹⁵ left their whale hunt too late into the winter the people would starve in the cold and in Europe if crops were not stored at the proper time, they would rot in the autumn rains. The maintenance of social stability was determined by the 'when' of the necessary activity but was firmly grounded in the place in which the activities were carried out. Similarly, if too many fish were harvested or too many trees cut, the sequence would be altered in a manner which could result in future hardships. A time scale which belonged to the place was essential to conservation of resources and the assurance of a balance between humans and the natural world. A sense of time, appropriate to the place of which they were an integral part, was paramount to sustainable life. Whether this time scale was measured in a particular way or not was immaterial to the function of sequence recognition.

The development of time meters varied according to local events; for some it was the day length, for others the cycles of the moon or the cycle of the Earth around the sun. Each time meter was essentially decided according to the natural environment of a particular place. For some peoples it was not necessary to count the sequence at all, for others measuring became a focus for social activity. In each situation the origin of recognising sequences, measured or unmeasured, originated from place recognition.

To generate place sense in the modern era, a time sequence appropriate to the actual places where people live is of paramount importance. To care for one's place one needs to live within temporal rhythms associated with that place. Fully developed temporally-orientated ontology leads to a dislocation from place and often results in decreasing care for where one actually resides. Spatial dislocation is a result of temporal dislocation. Vine Deloria makes an acute observation that worldviews which are ontologically temporal must defend themselves from history while those who are spatially orientated have clearly defined geographical boundaries. It is much easier to protect actual and presently existing boundaries than to defend past-

Return. Harper Torchbooks. New York. 1954, p.51. See also Nilsson. M. P., *Primitive Time Reckoning*. Acta Societas Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis I, Lund. 1920, p.270.

¹⁵ While Inuit is preferable to the European use of Eskimo, Inuit is a shortened spelling of Inuivialuit, which is what the northern people collectively call themselves.

orientated events which are irrevocably beyond reach.¹⁶ In the positive sense it is easier to care for an existent place than it is for an uncertain future which has questionable boundaries.

Socially orientated sequential recognition arose as a result of the observation of natural events and their relation to social well-being in a place. One of the most common misinterpretations of the modern era is to divide 'society' and 'nature' as though they were in some way separate kinds of entities or ways of being in the world. Norbert Elias notes:

“We are apt to think and speak in terms which suggest that ‘society’ and ‘nature’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, exist independently of each other. This is a fallacy which is hard to combat without a long term perspective.”¹⁷

The ‘when will it happen’ is derived from place orientation whereas the ‘when shall we do it’ is derived from social orientation in response to naturally existing phenomena. In timing, ‘nature’ and ‘society’ are fundamentally linked. The difficulty arises when a certain level of temporal abstraction is reached whereby a society becomes separated from nature and timing is perceived wholly as a human construct. Descartes, Kant, and others who followed in their footsteps maintained that time was a special endowment which humans possessed which allowed them to make specific connections as though these connections were somehow inherent within the fabric of the universe. Elias comments:

“Unless one keeps in mind the unbreakable relationship between the physical and the social levels of the universe - unless one learns, in other words, to perceive human societies as emerging and developing *within* the larger non-human universe - one is unable to attack one of the most crucial aspects of the problem of time...The conventional tendency to explore ‘nature and ‘society’ and therefore the physical and the sociological problems of ‘time’ as if they were completely independent of each other gives rise to a seemingly paradoxical problem, which as a rule, is tacitly swept under the carpet in discussions about ‘time’: How is it that something which appears in general reflections, as a high level of abstraction, can exercise a very strong compulsion on people?”¹⁸

¹⁶ Deloria. V., *God Is Red*. Dell. New York. 1973, pp.76, 82 -83.

¹⁷ Elias. N., *Time: An Essay*. Blackwell. Oxford. 1992, p.42.

¹⁸ Elias. N., *Time: An Essay*. (*ibid*), p.45.

Such compulsion is most marked in worldviews which have accepted time as the basis of their ontology and least amongst those which have remained place-centred. Sense of place anchors one's being to immediate considerations. Those who live within a time framework which is incommensurate with the actual place in which they reside are liable to dislocation. This dislocation is likely to enhance the possibility of local environmental degradation and the development of attitudes which do not incorporate sustainable living within the world as a whole. Temporal awareness which is associated with local natural rhythms is likely to enhance the possibility of uniting society and nature.

Paul Ricoeur suggested that a people's view of time must not be forced to cast its vote in a two candidate typology, but rather should be left to be understood in their own terms.¹⁹ In considering different time conceptions apart from lines or cycles, Ricoeur's analysis is important. In the modern world UST is perceived as an absolute standard by which all others must be measured. The idea of cyclic time is tolerated by Western scholars because the concept was given credence by early Greek philosophers, as with Heraclitus, Empedocles and some of the Stoic philosophers.²⁰ The difficulties arise in considering time conceptions where the arrow of time is seen to move in the reverse direction, as with Malagasy people²¹ or the aforementioned polychronic Balinese and atemporal Aboriginal worldviews, whose temporality is at variance with commonly accepted Western methods of time measurement.

¹⁹ Ricoeur, P., "The History of Religions and the Phenomenology of Time Consciousness," in *The History of Religions: Retrospect and Prospect* (edited by J. M. Kitagawa). MacMillan. London. 1985, pp.15,19.

²⁰ In Stoic Philosophy: "At the end of the Great Year, the world is supposed to be destroyed and reborn in a great conflagration." Merleau-Ponty, J., "Ideas About Beginnings and Endings," in *The Study of Time III* (edited by J. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence and D. Park). Springer Verlag. New York. 1978, p.339.

²¹ O. Dahl notes: "In Madagascar what occurs in the past is expressed by notions such as *taloha* or *teo aloha* (before, in front), while present events are denoted as *izao*, which is demonstrative: 'this'. Future events are designated by *aorina*, (after, behind)... Several informants explained that both the present and past times are known and visible. What has already happened, as well as the experiences of the ancestors was seen 'in front of the eyes' while the future is totally unknown and is therefore behind." Dahl, O., "When the Future Comes From Behind: Malagasy and Other Time Concepts and some Consequences for Communication." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. Vol. 19, No. 2. 1995, p.198.

To begin to understand time from another's point of view is a task not easily suited to universalistic notions common within the Western worldview.²² To follow the previously presented hermeneutical model we must begin with a frank and open discussion on what it is like to *be* in the time of different worldviews; what the historical basis is, and finally, what the possible mythic and symbolic commonalities may be. In order to somewhat simplify the discussion, only three time perceptions will be presented here. The first is from the Western worldview of time as a linear and existent 'entity;' clock time, or UST. The second is the Indian cyclic concept where time is measured in vast cycles of renewal divided into *Yugas* (or 'ages'). The third is the qualitative and event-related concept of the Australian Aboriginal worldview where time is unmeasured and temporality is subordinated to the priority of place.²³

THE WESTERN TRADITION OF TIME

In the Western worldview time is central to all cognitive experience. Evtar Zerubavel writes:

"The temporal regularities of our everyday life-world is definitely among the major background expectancies which are at the basis of the 'normalcy' of our social environment."²⁴

Temporal regulation is a way of making sense in that it defines, sorts, and orders reality into a comprehensible pattern. A useful way of demonstrating how important

²² E. Jaques comments: "The concept of time is in this respect no different from any other universal. Universals do not have qualities or properties; they are qualities or properties. No valid propositions can be made about a universal other than a statement of its existence." Jaques, E., *The Form of Time*. *op. cit.*, p.51.

²³ The reasons for choosing these three examples, apart from the availability of textual sources, is my own life experience. I was born into the Western worldview and essentially live within its time frame as a condition of being of European origin. During the course of my life I have had the opportunity of living and travelling in India for a period of more than two years in total. As for Australia, I lived with Aboriginals on the fringes of the city of Cairns (Queensland) and worked extensively with them during my time as a remote campsite chef on cattle stations in the Gulf of Carpentaria. I also had the opportunity to visit remote regions of Arnhem Land in the Northern Territories where I spent time with Aboriginal people who followed many traditional customs. While I can truly speak only for my own tradition I believe I have a 'feel' for Indian and Aboriginal senses of time, and with the help of many scholarly studies on this topic, can construct a fair presentation of the morphology of time as it pertains to these particular worldviews.

²⁴ Zerubavel, E., *Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1981, p.21.

time is to the Western worldview is to consider the implications and consequences of its absence.²⁵ Benjamin Worf explains:

“If a rule has absolutely no exceptions, it is not recognised as a rule or as anything else; it is then part of the background of experience of which we tend to remain unconscious. Never having experienced anything in contrast to it we cannot isolate it and formulate it as a rule until we so enlarge our experience and expand our base of reference that we encounter an interruption of its regularity. The situation is somewhat analogous to that of not missing the water until the well is dry, or not realising how we need air until we are choking.”²⁶

Time in this sense, is a seamless presence; there is no door to non-time, no escape from its overwhelming “is-ness”. Time for the Westerner can be an encumbrance simply because time passes whether one is aware of it or not; asleep or awake the clock ticks on, measuring the weight of ones days.²⁷ Time passes; each and every ‘now’ passes away, never to return. There is no punctual present: either it is already past, or still in the future. G. Van Der Leeuw adds:

“And yet time, today’s time, is our vital element. We like to imagine that we stand at a fixed point, from which we look comfortably back into the past or expectantly towards the future. But there is no fixed point; we are carried along by time as though by a torrent. We are temporal - that is to say, we can neither grasp nor hold fast a point in time, can neither grasp nor hold fast to our own existence. The man of nine thirty is not the same as the man of nine twenty five. We *are* time.”²⁸

Western linear time has an inviolable arrow which points from the past to the future. Time’s arrow directs beings towards a never-ending future where all the hopes and aspirations of individuals and societies will be realised. The paradoxical nature of this particular conception is that the future also contains the moment of non-being of which each person is always acutely aware. The resulting tension between the desire for the rewards of the future, but at the same time fearing one’s final demise, creates

²⁵ Zerubavel. E., *Hidden Rhythms*. (*ibid*), p.22.

²⁶ Worf. B. L., "Science and Linguistics," in *Language, Thought and Reality* (edited by J. B. Carroll). MIT Press. Cambridge. 1956, p.209.

²⁷ Hall. E. T., *Beyond Culture*. Doubleday. New York. 1976, p.19.

²⁸ Van Der Leeuw. G., "Primordial Time and Final Time," in *Man and Time: Papers From the Eranos Yearbooks* (edited by J. Campbell). Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1958, p.326.

much of the tension so apparent to those who study temporal dislocation in Western civilisation.

A child growing up in such a highly time-regulated society needs from seven to nine years to 'learn' time,²⁹ that is, to understand the complex symbolism of watches, clocks and calendars in order to read time accurately and regulate his or her own feeling and conduct to fit in with the wider social time constraints.³⁰ Once this has been learned however, members of such societies appear to forget that they initially had to learn time. Time becomes a horizon where perception of the sequential world is contained within a particular structure, from which a certain and definite order is derived. This involves a high level of self-constraint which is required to fit one's actions into a proscribed social network. This self-constraint, based on linear temporality, is the hinge and lynchpin of modern civilisation. Once a sense of timing is acquired, the ever-present existence of time is so compelling that it appears to be part of one's natural make-up. In this way the linearity of time becomes a social, philosophical and physical absolute. To think clearly about time as a human construct becomes not only unnecessary, but also a nearly impossible task. It becomes hard to believe that human beings could exist who are not as time regulated as oneself, let alone those who have no words to describe 'time'. Western time regulation covers the whole life of people. There can be no fluctuations. Time becomes inescapable.³¹

One of the fundamental ideas which permeates much of the Western worldview is the desire for something 'different and better'.³² Linear time conception has fostered a desire for self perpetuation at any cost, and a constant wish for self-improvement in the face of the seemingly inescapable demise of one's own being at a certain point in the future. This has also created an obsession with the notion of security because people want to ensure that as far as possible, the future can be made predictable and controllable.³³ The result is the constant denial of the present, and a tendency to live for the future while looking back at the past as something irrevocably lost. A state

²⁹ See Piaget, J., "Time Perception in Children," in *The Voices of Time. op. cit.*, pp.214-216.

³⁰ Elias, N., *Time: An Essay. op. cit.*, p.139.

³¹ Elias, N., *Time: An Essay. (ibid)*, p.147.

³² See Polak, F. L., *The Image of the Future. Vol I.* A w Sitijschoff. Leyden, Netherlands. 1961, p.49.

³³ Rifkin, J., *Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History.* Simon and Schuster. New York. 1989, p.147.

which not only encourages a sense of insecurity, but also fuels the compelling urge to attain future goals where one may feel safe. Time is both a structure to enhance social cohesion and an enemy to be defeated. As Gregory Bateson and others have concluded, this tension creates unbearable pressure on the individual, often resulting in personal fragmentation, breakdown and disintegration.³⁴

CLOCKS, CALENDARS AND SCHEDULES

The measurement of time has become central to the efficient functioning of modern society. However, clocks, calendars and schedules are merely time meters and not time itself. The idea that these time meters indicate or measure time is open to misunderstanding. Elias insists that:

“Clocks (and time meters generally) human made or not, are simply mechanical movements of a specific type, employed by people for their own ends.”³⁵

All time meters, whether they are the Earth or planets moving in relation to the sun, clock hands moving in relation to the clock face, electrically-driven dials or numbered digits passing in sequence, all are proceeding at speed through a continuous succession of changing positions. These changing positions are rotational patterns which are used to measure any number of sequences. Because the duration of time units which follow each other in a non-recurrent sequence recurs, comparison through reference to them of other sequences allows duration to be measured. Thus we can say how many seconds a leaf takes to fall a given distance from a tree, how many weeks a holiday may last, how many years an elephant lives, and so on. Refinement of time units to a very high degree of accuracy has allowed physicists to study subatomic reactions and drawn certain conclusions about the nature of the material universe. Conversely, extremely long time sequences can be envisaged which allows calculations to extend to the final demise of the sun and even the heat death of the universe itself.

³⁴ See Bateson. G., *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. E. P. Dutton. New York. 1979, pp.61-64.

³⁵ Elias. N., *Time: An Essay. op. cit.*, p.118.

This remarkable utilitarian ability of time has absorbed Western science to the point where the question of what the time meters are actually measuring, is no longer asked. Our symbols (i.e., clocks, calendars and schedules) have become so functionally adequate at serving a specific purpose that it has been forgotten that they are symbols of time and not time itself.³⁶ In Western cultures, if one asks what is the time, the answer will invariably be given as something o'clock or a named day in a week of a certain numbered year. The answer will not be: it is 'now'. 'Now' no longer makes sense to a worldview wedded to passing linear time.

Linear time conceptualisation acts as a basis for social organisation in the Western worldview, facilitating the formation of governments and the setting up of institutions and bureaucracies. Linear time underpins scientific inquiry, technological innovation, the economic system and the possibility of forward planning. It unites its citizens in a common view of the necessity of work as a means to security.

Segmented time acts as a window on the world, forming and shaping the very kind of reality in which people live.

The disassociation of 'society' and 'nature' in the West causes a problem in that a time scale which separates people from natural rhythms becomes a 'commodity' to be saved and compressed. Time can also be spent, wasted, lost, made up, accelerated and slowed down as if it were an object in its own right. Rifkin, writing on this issue, notes:

“Time, like space, is perceived as a premium, a rare resource that is used to shape and mould the social life of the nation in ever more sophisticated ways. Modern Man has come to view time as a tool to advance the collective well being of the culture. ‘Time is money’ expresses the temporal spirit of the age.”³⁷

Linear time is like a road down which everyone must travel on a journey which has no possible return. Along this road, time may be bought and sold, conserved or squandered, but it cannot be avoided or denied. Time, in the Western worldview, is a

³⁶ Elias, N., (*ibid*) p.83.

³⁷ Rifkin, J., *Time Wars. op. cit.*, p.12.

result of a long historical process in which society has emancipated itself from nature and from its own sacred origins.

Western temporal conceptions also have positive aspects. Temporal regulation has allowed for the development of an extraordinary competence and ability to deeply penetrate and understand the sequences of the universe as we perceive it. Social organisation in the West is engineered to a highly sophisticated level allowing the development of stable governing institutions, systems of social welfare, divisions of labour, the encouragement of arts and learning facilities which can act to the betterment of society as a whole. Temporal regulation has also created access to a degree of personal privacy unattainable in many societies. Zerubavel concludes:

“In short the very institutions that are directly responsible for much of the rigidification of our life - namely the schedule and the Calendar - can also be seen as being among the foremost liberators of the modern individual.”³⁸

Historical evidence shows that the positive aims and aspirations of the West for its future are rarely achieved, yet the potentiality remains and all the fruits of the Western temporal tree are not bitter.

CYCLIC TIME³⁹ IN THE INDIAN TRADITION

In contrast to the Western worldview, Indian existence in linear time is ontologically nonexistent; time is ultimately an unreality, an illusion. Eliade describes the Indian concept of time in terms of its illusory nature:

“The world is illusory because its duration is limited, for seen in the perspective of eternal recurrence it is non-durational. This table is unreal

³⁸ Zerubavel. E., *Hidden Rhythms. op. cit.*, p.166.

³⁹ The idea of cyclic time is a peculiarly Western description and does not take into account the great diversity of Indian concepts of time, especially considering that no unanimous view of time has been elucidated. Balslev comments: "Hindu thinkers discussed and debated about such issues as whether time is discrete or continuous, real or appearance, perceived or inferred, an independent category or not, there is no record to my knowledge of any such dispute whether time is cyclic or not." Balslev. A. N., "Time in the Hindu Tradition," in *Religion and Time* (edited by A. N. Balslev and J. N. Mohanty). E. J. Brill. New York. 1992, p.177. For the purposes of this discussion I will refer to cyclic time as a means to contrast it from linear time (see the diachronical analysis for further elucidation of Indian time concepts).

because it does not exist in the strict sense of the term, not because it is an illusion of the senses, for it is not an illusion: at this precise moment it exists - rather, this table is illusory because it will no longer exist in ten thousand years."⁴⁰

From the standpoint of cosmic rhythms, the historical world does not endure and is therefore not real in comparison to the eternal cycle of divinely created universes. However, historical time considered in relation to a living being, appears to pass and can be counted. In the Indian tradition time is measured and is perceived to be passing, but its measurement is bound to the sequential revelation of *Maya*⁴¹ which is subordinated ontologically to the Great Time of the Gods and illuminated ones. Time ceases to exist to those who, by their efforts, attain enlightenment and are thereby freed from the cycle of birth and rebirth.

Cosmic time exists above and within the historical world; as the creator of the world, and yet at the same time, existing without a world at all. Time is a state of consciousness where the least conscious endure increased temporal duration, and at the highest level, consciousness is elevated to an eternal state. Instantaneous illumination as a religious practice can result in a paradoxical leap outside time. This requires a long discipline and a certain mystical technique.⁴²

Unlike Western eschatological temporality, the end point of Indian time conception is a return to the beginning. Not exactly the same point, as if history was to exactly repeat itself, but a new life as in *karmic* reincarnation,⁴³ or a new world as recreated

⁴⁰ Eliade. M., "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought," in *Man and Time: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. op. cit.*, p.181.

⁴¹ *Maya* is commonly interpreted to mean illusion, but it is also associated with such ideas as transitory, ever-changing, elusive, ever-returning as well as with 'unreality'. Conversely *Maya* is imperishable, changeless, steadfast and eternal. H. Zimmer notes: "The noun *maya* is related etymologically to measure. It is formed from the root *ma* which means to measure or lay out; to produce, shape or create; to display. *Maya* is the measuring out or creation or display of forms; *maya* is any illusion, trick, artifice, deceit, jugglery, sorcery or work of witchcraft; an illusory image or apparition, phantasm, deception of the sight." Zimmer. H., *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilisation*. Harper Torchbooks. New York. 1946, p.24.

⁴² For further discussion of this subject in relation to time, see Eliade. M., "Cosmic Homology and Yoga." *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art V*. Calcutta. 1937, pp.103-203.

⁴³ The concepts of reincarnation and *karma* will be discussed further in the historical analysis of Indian time concepts. However, as Panikkar suggests: "*Karma* is a kind of condensation of time. Time past means past *Karma* and future time means future *Karma*." Panikkar R., "The Law of Karma and the Historical Dimension of Man," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. Paulist Press. New York. 1979, p.381.

by *Brahma* which unfolds through the same influences in terms of *Yugas* (see below). Time is neither negated solely as illusion, nor is it desired as a way to make oneself real in the world. Rather, most people live in historical time while preserving an opening towards Great Time, never losing their awareness of the essential unreality of historical passing time. Eliade comments:

“If time as *maya* is also a manifestation of the Godhead, to live in time is not in itself a ‘bad action’; *the bad action consists in believing that there exists nothing else, nothing outside of time*. One is devoured by time, *not* because one lives in time, but because one lives in the *reality* of time and hence forgets or despises eternity.”⁴⁴

Time in the Indian worldview is a curious mixture of the recognition of historical passing time, and cyclic return. The past does not flow ceaselessly into the future, never to return, but rather the future subtly becomes a new past conceived in the eternal return.⁴⁵

The measurement of time in the Indian tradition is divided into four *Yugas* which total to 4,320,000 solar years. Each *Yuga* becomes progressively shorter by one quarter so that the present *Kali Yuga* (fourth in the series) has a duration of 432,000 years.⁴⁶ Each *Yuga* is characterised by successively decreasing moral order and the compression of time resulting in increasing chaos and loss of cultural cohesion.⁴⁷ Once the *Kali Yuga* has passed a new cycle of four *Yugas* (a *Mahayuga*) will commence with *Prem Yuga*: the golden age once again. One thousand *Mahayugas* (4,320 million years) are equal to a *Kalpa* which is one day in the life of *Brahma* the Creator. The *Brahmic* year is 360 ‘days’ (*Kalpas*) long and *Brahma*’s life span is 100 years (311,040 billion solar years). This immense cycle of creation is followed by

⁴⁴ Eliade. M., "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought," *op. cit.*, p.199.

⁴⁵ For an excellent discourse on the concept of eternal return, see Eliade. M., *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Harper and Row. New York. 1954, pp.51-92.

⁴⁶ Fagg. L. W., *The Two Faces of Time*. Theosophical Publishing House. Madras and London. 1985, p.81.

⁴⁷ The name *Kali* comes from the Sanskrit *kala* meaning time. *Kali* also means black and is associated with darkness violence, and evil. It is interesting to note that the modern worldview is obsessed with time.

total dissolution of the universe which endures for a further 100 divine years, after which the cycle begins again.⁴⁸

To live in such a time conception is quite distinct from linear time because even though the cycles are of colossal proportions, the cycle is never ending; eternally repeating upon itself. Measured time in India is not a fundamental parameter of social life, rather, priority is given to temporal quality rather than quantity. Everyday tasks are rhythmic activities coordinated by social position and status. Hectic activity is rare, because what is not completed today can be done tomorrow. The future looks after itself, and indeed, is already decided by past actions. Security against the future is of no consequence in traditional Indian thinking because the events of the past which determined the status of one's being in this life, will work through socially determined relationships to decide the future. Time passes slowly as a rhythmic event, part of an endless recurrence of cycles of being where efficiency is not as important as endurance. Those who find meaning within the limitations of their life are more respected than those who efficiently accumulate material goods.

Time is a pluralistic and polyvalent concept in India. Sacred time is the time of religious festivals, celebrations, rituals and pilgrimages. People in India celebrate secular holidays and yet have no difficulty with the plethora of religious calendars; being able to switch from profane to sacred time with apparent ease. In the villages and rural areas, life changes so slowly as to hardly seem to occur at all.⁴⁹ The 'now' is of primary importance to Indian ontology, the quality of the moment at hand, what is present 'now' is that which has to be dealt with in Earthly existence and where meaning must be sought. This is not so much a denial of history or avoidance of the past, but the condensation of past acts with potentialities to be realised in the future which form the 'now'. Panikkar sums up Indian temporal philosophy:

⁴⁸ Fraser. J. T., *Of time Passion and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence*. George Braziller. New York. 1975, p.41.

⁴⁹ Panikkar, on village life in India, comments: "Village life has, in this sense no 'historical' future. Even today if you want a career you go to the city. Village time has its seasons, its past and future; the year is its unit; but the presiding value is the present as conditioned by the past. And for the present, for the encounter with a friend, the celebration of a feast, a marriage,....village Man may easily

“In this sense a great part of Indian philosophy could be considered a philosophy of history; not a philosophical reflection on external events, but a philosophical meditation on the historicity of being, on the peculiar temporal character of the human being and all the cosmos, which is so configured that nothing is lost. Everything accumulates and emerges in a present that condenses all past actions and realities. And this to such an extent that to consider a being as only what it is now, neglecting what it was and ignoring what it shall be, could be called a philosophical sin. It is almost taken for granted that I am a condensed result of the past, that all I have is simply *karma* (historicity), that there is no original newness, no genuine beginning, that revolutions are childish, politically speaking, if it is supposed that they can begin with a *tabula rasa*.”⁵⁰

The negative aspect of Indian temporality is the slowness of positive social change, the tendency towards fatalism, and the inability to prepare for future contingencies. There are many well-documented social inequalities in India. Dire poverty amidst abundant wealth is common in urban areas with no discernible attempt being made to alleviate the suffering of the poor. Fatalistic attitudes towards many social and environmental problems are engendered amongst people by the concept of a predetermined future (i.e., the *Kali Yuga* must result in a decline into chaos and destruction). Fatalism encourages people to accept inappropriate situations such as the 100 million bonded labourers⁵¹ (most of whom are children) trapped by the inequities of moneylenders, or the *zemindar* land ownership style which creates an underclass of landless peasants forced into intergenerational poverty. A temporality focused on immediate events is inclined towards the development of a system which is unable to grasp future needs in terms of social planning in areas such as population limitation, control of industrial development, environmental pollution and unplanned urban expansion.

In terms of place orientation, the sacred element inherent within Indian temporal conception enhances the valuation of places and environments which are perceived to be relatively more perdurable than human life. Sacred places and sacred spaces are

endanger or even sell his entire future." Panikkar. R., *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T. Eastham). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1993, p.102.

⁵⁰ Panikkar. R., "The Law of Karma and the Historical Dimension of Man," in *Myth Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.383.

⁵¹ Krishnakumar. A., "Review of *The Small Hands of Slavery*." [Human Rights Watch, Children's Rights Project and Human Rights Watch Asia] *Frontline*. Vol. 14. No. 1, January 11-24. 1997, p.85.

common in India where the rhythm of life is, in the villages at least, eminently place-centred.

Indian and Western conceptions of temporality share time measurement and historicity. There is, however, one fundamental difference. In the Indian worldview, cosmic history suffers a kind of 'negative inertia',⁵² where the corporeal world winds down to a point where divine intervention is required to 'renew' creation in the next *Yugic* cycle. In the Western tradition time and human affairs flow 'uphill', advancing steadily towards a human created 'utopia'.⁵³ In such a worldview people are burdened with the task of creating a better future and the 'now' becomes a fleeting step towards a certain goal. For the Indian, the 'now' is the best possible situation because decline is inevitable. The human task is acceptance and surrender to the given conditions. The Westerner, on the other hand, rejects the present and lives ever in hope of future beneficence.

'TIME' IN THE AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL WORLDVIEW⁵⁴

In discussing the Aboriginal concept of time it must be noted that all the Western notions of temporality need to be discarded. Even Heidegger's insistence on "time as the horizon of Being"⁵⁵ fails to equate to Aboriginal temporality. The term history is not applicable to the situation either, because Aborigines did not describe their being

⁵² Panikkar. R., "The Law of Karma and the Historical Dimension of Man," in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics. op. cit.*, p.384.

⁵³ The word utopia comes from the Greek *ou* - meaning not, and *topos* - a place. The *telos* for modern man is not a place at all! Smith. J. Z., *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religion*. E. J. Brill. Leiden. 1978, p.101.

⁵⁴ It needs to be remembered that Aboriginal people have been subjected to more than two hundred years of European temporal domination at varying degrees of intensity. Aborigines have nearly destroyed themselves trying to adapt under duress to the Western worldview. In discussing Aboriginal temporality we are referring to it as it was prior to European arrival and as it is to those who are reconstructing the Aboriginal worldview intellectually and those who are living it by returning to traditional life as far as possible. Remarkably, Pintupi people returning to the Western deserts discovered a band of their own people who had never migrated to missions and white settlements. These isolated groups made their first contact with white Europeans on October 5th, 1983. See Myers. F. R., *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place and Politics Among Western Desert Aborigines*. Smithsonian Institution Press. Washington. 1986, pp.7-11. Researchers have documented a vast amount of knowledge of the Dreamtime and Aboriginal ontology directly communicated from elders of many tribes throughout Australia which provides a glimpse into a worldview utterly distinct from the European conception.

⁵⁵ Heidegger. M., *Basic Writings: From Being and Time to the Task of Thinking* (edited by D. F. Krell). Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1978, p.61.

in terms of historical consciousness. Unlike many of those cultures who lived in non-historical consciousness,⁵⁶ Aborigines are not affected by the past because the 'past' for them is also the absolute present. To the Aborigines time is now. Then is past; however, that past is also present here and now.⁵⁷ Yanyuwa tribal elder Mussolini Harvey expresses this dilemma in answer to questions on the Dreaming:

"White people ask us all the time, what is the Dreaming? This is a hard question because the Dreaming is a really big thing for Aboriginal people...The Dreamings made our Law...This Law is the way we live, our rules. This Law is our ceremonies, our songs, our stories...The Law was made by the Dreamings."⁵⁸

"The Dreaming made our Law and yet the Law was made by the Dreamings" describes the temporal dimension of ontologically place-centred Aborigines. The Dreamtime⁵⁹ is not *time* at all; it is an event which is not bounded by passing time in any way, nor is it cyclic time as there is no return. What Westerners call the past, the present and the future is a single seamless unit in the Aboriginal worldview. Events are abiding; that is, they are transtemporal events residing in a place.⁶⁰ The Dreamtime is, therefore, a spatial concept and not as the English rendition of Aboriginal thought suggests, a temporal concept.

⁵⁶ Nonhistorical consciousness is described by Panikkar as *theocosmic* where the divine permeates the cosmos. Time, while recognised as past, present and future and possibly measured according to cosmic cycles, is not ontologically superior to place-centredness. However, the past is important in the accumulation of knowledge and power through genealogies, etc. Panikkar notes: "But pre-historic man is haunted by the past. If he forgets it, then only those who can remember have the knowledge and the power. Tradition is powerful because it transmits the past." Panikkar, R., *The Cosmotheandric Experience*, *op. cit.*, pp.93-97,98. Aborigines on the other hand while being essentially nonhistorical have no need at all for history and do not recall genealogies beyond living memory. Diane Bell comments: "The shallowness of genealogical history is not a form of cultural amnesia but rather a way of focusing on the basis of all relationships that is the Dreaming and the land. By not tracing deceased relatives, people are able to stress a relationship directly to the land." Bell, D., *Daughters of the Dreaming*. McPhee Gribble/Allen and Unwin. Sydney. 1983, p.90.

⁵⁷ Elkin, A. P., *The Australian Aborigines: How to Understand Them*. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 1964, p.234.

⁵⁸ Harvey, M., "The Dreaming," in *Yanyuwa Country: The Yanyuwa People of Boroloola Tell the History of Their Land* (edited by J. Bradley). Greenhouse Publications. Richmond. 1988, p.xi. [Emphasis added].

⁵⁹ Dreaming is used in preference to Dreamtime because as T. G. H. Strehlow notes: "Dreamtime is a mistranslation of the *altjira* root which meant something like 'eternal, uncreated, springing out of itself' and from *altjiringa* as tha 'having originated out of its own eternity'. The addition of time is misplaced as there could be discovered no word for time, as Europeans conceive it, in any Aboriginal languages." Strehlow T. G. H., *Songs of Central Australia*. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 1971, p.614.

⁶⁰ Swain, T., *A Place for Strangers*. *op. cit.*, p.22.

What does it mean to live entirely within the realm of *topos* while disregarding *chronos*? It is difficult to write about because script itself is a means of temporal storage, which like numbering, the Aborigines did not conceive. Nor were Aborigines entirely an oral culture in that daily Dreaming ceremonies allowed them to enter into states of consciousness where direct sharing with other members of the clan transferred 'knowledge' from one to another. Cultural knowledge and understanding was not conveyed from generation to generation by means of oral transfer and so genealogies are of lesser importance to Aborigines than they were in many other traditions. The Dreaming carries connotations of a heroic past but as W. E. H. Stanner writes:

"A central meaning of the Dreaming *is* that of a sacred, heroic time long long ago when Man and nature came to be as they are; but neither 'time' nor 'history' as we understand them is involved in this meaning. I have never been able to discover any Aboriginal word for *time* as an abstract concept. And the sense of history is wholly alien here. We shall not understand the Dreaming fully except as a complex of meanings."⁶¹

The 'creator beings' are still present today; the dreaming cannot be fixed *in* time. It was, and is, *everywhen*.⁶² Everyday life for Aborigines was arranged around actual events and not by the calibration of sequential or successive occurrences. Swain renders some of the states (events) of the world as:

"The Milky Way is stretched out across the centre of the sky.
The Bandicoots back into their burrows.
Light glimmers.
The outline of trees and objects clearly defined.
The sun is burning down.
The shadows are variegated.
The sun is sinking.
The sky is aflame with red and yellow."⁶³

These concrete events may be observed as rhythmic and repeatable, perhaps predictable, but not cyclic in the Western and Indian sense, because Aborigines did

⁶¹ Stanner. W. E. H., "The Dreaming," in *Traditional Aboriginal Society* (edited by W. H. Edwards). MacMillan. Melbourne. 1987, p.225.

⁶² Stanner. W. E. H., *The Dreaming*, (*ibid*), p.225.

⁶³ Swain. T., *A Place for Strangers. op. cit.* p.19. See also Strehlow. T. G. H., *Songs of Central Australia*. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 1971, pp.706-8.

not attempt to measure them. Events simply occur. Decisions on social actions are made through the Dreaming, where the actions of the still-present ancestral beings guide the clan. The Ancestral beings reside in the landforms, plants and animals which people encounter as everyday reality. For example, the Yunytjunya hill in the Kinatore range (Central Australia) is the Dreaming of the monitor lizard *Ngintaka* turned to stone after his long travels across the Great Western Desert.⁶⁴ *Ngintaka* is a rocky outcrop in everyday reality, upon which animals and plants may be seen and used for customary purposes, but in the Dreaming reality, *Ngintaka* is a lizard who tells the people of the place connections with other Dreaming ancestors so that 'place lines' or pathways may be established.

Place moves in the Aboriginal worldview; place itself is stretched by conscious action. Humans exist because they are moving place spirits, incarnated place beings who, at the death of the body, once again become place. A person is born at and from a place to which he or she is linked for life. However, this does not mean physical movement from one's birthplace is not possible, because the ancestral spirits exist as places all over the country.⁶⁵ Space and place are entirely subjective, being linked by the physical reality, and by conscious place beings capable of movement. Social cohesion and organisation is centred on relationships to an original and originating place. This associates each member of society with a special set of totemic place beings to whom each person is related, be they fish, birds, trees, animals, wind, rain or men and women.⁶⁶

This is not to suggest that Aboriginal people do not perceive past, present and future; a mother worries about a child, one may remember a deceased relative or look forward to an end to the hot season, but the meaning of life is not defined by temporally defined events and sequences. Gregory Bateson intuitively grasped the ontology arising from the Dreaming and described it in Western terms as:

⁶⁴ Myers. F. R., *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place and Politics Among Western Desert Aboriginals. op. cit.*, p.64.

⁶⁵ 'Country' is a term Modern Aboriginal people use to describe their particular places of origin and also to the whole of Australia (i.e., from an Aboriginal perspective). This is in no way similar to the modern representation of country as some kind of political unit.

⁶⁶ Harvey. M., *The Dreaming. op. cit.*, p.xi.

“The Individual Mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the body, and there is a larger mind of which the individual is only a subsystem. The larger mind is comparable to God and is perhaps what some people call God, but it is still immanent in the total interconnected social systems and planetary ecology.”⁶⁷

To live in Aboriginal ‘time’ means an extensive sense of stability; both in terms of the environment or ‘country’ one is part of, and in social relationships elucidated from the Dreaming. Past events are not lost, nor are they recurring; each ‘now’ is a totality of all possible events which abide within, and surround each person.

Aboriginal place-being allowed the Aboriginal worldview to endure and remain stable for very long periods; at least 100,000 of our years. Colonisation and the appropriation of land by Europeans effectively disinherited the Aborigines of their anchor and meaning. Without access to their sacred places Aboriginal peoples could hardly sustain the Dreaming, and their culture almost totally collapsed. Today the first people of Australia still struggle with Western linear time, resisting as much as possible, in the hope that they may one day regain their own ‘country’ and be reunited to their sacred places once again.

THE ‘HISTORY’ OF TIME

To understand how time concepts evolved within different worldviews it is necessary to recover the origins and interpret the development of temporality according to each tradition. In terms of Aboriginal time-avoidance such an interpretation would seem spurious. However, time-avoidance and place-centredness also has a ‘history’ in the sense that Aboriginal peoples developed their ontology for specific purposes to account for their being in the world. A large quantity of literature is available on the evolution of temporality in the Western tradition; too much, in fact, to undertake a complete exegesis of the topic. For the purposes of this inquiry only certain key points can be elucidated. In the Indian worldview the origination of time concepts and timing has a particular connection to theology and the evolution of time. These

⁶⁷ Cited by Lovelock, J., *The Ages of Gaia*. W. W. Norton and Co. New York and London. 1988, p.218.

concepts remain typically an ancient concept linked closely to the concept of *Karma* as an ontological parameter of Indian religious and secular life.

THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN LINEAR TEMPORALITY

To avoid a lengthy monologue focused on reworking the efforts of numerous scholars, and to simplify our inquiry into Western temporal development, a division into three separate but interrelated influences can be outlined. The first is the metaphysical dimension of time as it was widely debated by early Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Democritus, which continued through to Kant, Descartes and more recently to Heidegger. The second is the linear conception arising from the Judaic tradition which was carried through Christian influences into early science and resulted in the technology of clocks and accurate calendar measurement culminating in the precision of time meters in modern times. The third is the physical time recognition associated with Einstein's revolutionary formulation of relativity and the resultant inquiry into spacetime. All three of these strands of time have linked together to secure time its ontological priority in the Western worldview.

The notion of causality clearly underpins each of these strands. The idea of a beginning and the concept of causality are dependent on the observation of sequences which formulates the Western concept and resulting experience of time. M. Merleau-Ponty concludes that:

“As an obvious consequence, any logical representation of the beginning of the world, a super event, or any question about it, must be linked to some concept of causality.”⁶⁸

Hence the Greek temporal metaphysics, the Judaeo-Christian creationism and modern 'Big Bang' myths are all centred on beginnings, causes and endings. And yet these three cosmological models have a history of conflict concerning primary causes. Much of the tension relates to the differences between the Aristotelian notion of the existence of only one world (since there is only one time), based on the

⁶⁸ Merleau-Ponty. M., "Ideas of Beginnings and Endings in Cosmology," in *The Study of Time III* (edited by J. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence and D. Park). Springer Verlag. New York. 1978, p.335.

premise that actual being is prior to potential being, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition which determined that creation is an act of God. These two perceptions have co-evolved through history, with modern science supporting the former in terms of evolutionary theory and Newtonian philosophy of nature, and the Christian tradition upholding the latter concept of an eternal Godhead, where only the inferior parts of the physical universe are subject to temporal change and decay. In science, the temporal arrow is directionally determined and exists universally, manifesting itself as causality. Christian temporal conception suggests two levels of time, linear time for creation and eternal time for the creator; i.e., the creation creates time. Causality, then, is a result of the act of the eternal creator. It was this conflict which resulted in the third revolution of time, that of Einstein's theory of relativity where time emerged, not as an inherent part of the universe, nor as a result of creation, but as a relationship between matter and motion.

METAPHYSICAL TIME CONCEPTIONS

Prior to the advent of the Greek culture, timing among European peoples was cosmological. Time measurement in calendars was based on seasonal, planetary and astronomical events, and as the relics like Stonehenge reveal, early peoples devoted considerable efforts to measuring and celebrating solstices and equinoxes.⁶⁹ The meaning of timed sequences may, or may not, have been of importance to such peoples. It was however, an important component of early Greek philosophy where time was abstracted into a single entity, a cosmological principle, the God *Chronos*.⁷⁰ *Chronos* was awarded full anthropomorphic and divine attributes, and for Sophocles and Solon, time was both the supreme teacher and judge as well as the consoler of Man.⁷¹ Time, as a deity, came under scrutiny from such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and Democritus. Plato maintained that:

⁶⁹ This is not to discount the Egyptians who recognised solar patterns and formulated a yearly calendar of 365 days, twelve 30 day months (with 5 epagomenal days) and 24 hour days, nor the Babylonians who integrated solar and lunar cycles into a thirteen month year. Ariotti. P. E., "The Concept of Time in Western Antiquity," in *The Study of Time III. op. cit.*, p.69.

⁷⁰ Kirk. G. S. and Raven G. E., *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1966, p.55.

⁷¹ Kirk. G. S. and Raven. G. E., (*ibid*), p.120.

“Time came into being together with the heavens, in order that, as they were brought into being together, so they may be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should come to pass.”⁷²

Plato believed in original causes but also based the ordered intelligibility of the world on the Socratic principle of Mind (*Nous*). The craftsman, the God, shapes the world after an eternal model which is the world of ideas, implying that temporal existence is but an imperfect substitute for eternity and that time is not fully real.⁷³

Aristotle, by contrast, shunned beginnings and endings and conceived the world as eternal and permanent in the harmony of its motions, with only inferior parts subject to change. Aristotle conceived time as a number, or measure of circular motion, and noted:

“Everything is measured by something homogenous with it, unit by unit, horse by horse, and similarly times by some definite time, and as we said, time is measured by motion as well as motion by time...If, then what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular circular motion is above all else the measure...the revolution of the heavens is the measure of all motions because it alone is continuous and unvarying and eternal.”⁷⁴

Aristotle’s time was focused on the geocentric spherical model of early astronomic observations. His time was rooted in the physicality of the world from which sequences could be deduced by intelligent beings.⁷⁵ Time became an expression of ontological priority; in this case priority of the circular motion of the heavens to our ideas and sense of time.⁷⁶ It became possible to reduce time to becoming and later, to a function of the mind.

⁷² Plato., *Timaeus* 38B [(translated by F. M. Cornford), in *Plato's Cosmology*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1937]

⁷³ Plato., *Timeaus*.29-31, (*ibid*).

⁷⁴ From Aristotle’s *Physics*, cited by Ariotti. P. E., "The Concept of Time in Western Antiquity," in *The Study of Time III. op. cit.*, p.78.

⁷⁵ Aristotle writes: "The question remains, then, whether or not time would exist if there were no consciousness; for if it were impossible for there to be the factor that does the counting, it would be impossible that anything should be counted; so that evidently there could be no number... And if nothing can count except consciousness and consciousness as intellect..... it is impossible that time should exist if consciousness did not." Aristotle., *Physics*. Book VI, Chapter 14, 223a. [(translated by E. Hussey). Clarendon Press. New York 1983].

⁷⁶ Fraser. J. T., *Of Time, Passion and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence*. George Braziller. New York. 1975.

Democritus posited an infinite multiplicity of worlds made of an indeterminate number of 'atoms' where all concepts of beginnings and endings were excluded.⁷⁷ Time for Democritus was a necessity, a mechanical process and not a unitary principle. Merleau-Ponty comments on Democritean thought which he suggests permeated classical scientific concepts:

"...infinite space, infinite time, no real unity of the world except the formal unity provided by the universality of physical laws, no definite concept or beginning or end of the world, mechanical and local causality, excluding cosmic order and final causality. It is probably not a purely accidental coincidence that the atomic concept, which is usually considered as the most characteristic element of Democritus's philosophy was also the favourite hypothesis of 19th century science."⁷⁸

Intelligibility remained an important parameter for the Greek metaphysics of time, but specific beginnings of things were not widely speculated upon. In contrast, the Judaic temporal tradition concentrated primarily on an original cause from which all things proceeded in a linear fashion towards a final end.⁷⁹ Time was so important to early Jews that the American Jewish theologian A. J. Heschel characterises Judaism in the following manner:

"Judaism is a religion of history, a religion in time. The God of Israel was not found primarily in the facts of nature. He spoke through the events of history. While the deities of other peoples were associated with places or things, the God of the prophets was the God of events: The redeemer from slavery, the revealer of the Torah, manifesting himself in the events of history, rather than events or places."⁸⁰

The Judaic conception of creation as an event carried out in time was very important to the formation of the Jewish calendar for two reasons. Firstly it delineated the seven 'days' of creation into a week⁸¹ and secondly it separated profane time from sacred time. The seventh day, the Sabbath, was symbolic of the rest day of God when he

⁷⁷ Merleau-Ponty. M., "Ideas of Beginnings and Endings," *op. cit.*, p.336.

⁷⁸ Merleau-Ponty. M., (*ibid*), p.343.

⁷⁹ F. H. Colson noted that: "To the Jew the week is only the interval between two Sabbath's and apart from this has no sanctity." and "The pivot upon which the week turns, the day from which the others are measured." Colson. F. H., *The Week*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1926, pp.29,107.

⁸⁰ Heschel. A. J., *God in Search of Man*. Octagon Books. New York. 1955, p.201.

paused to enjoy and celebrate his works. Profane activities of everyday life were severely restricted on the holy day when each person was required to concentrate on spiritual matters and praise their creator in respect of the given world. Time was strictly circumscribed into days prior to the Sabbath and those preceding it. The Sabbath itself was a particular kind of time when social renewal occurred and the quality of time was more important than quantity.

THE EMERGENCE OF LINEAR TIME

As Judaic thought evolved, determinism and apocalyptic writings began to emerge during the messianic era of Talmudic literature when the prophetic understanding of history was abandoned.⁸² History became a sequence of events which had been predetermined long ago and was fundamentally tainted by evil. History was seen as 'the present evil' to be overcome by salvation in the 'world to come'.⁸³ The origins of such eschatology are widely debated amongst Jewish scholars, however the importance of this particular view of time is that it had a profound influence on Christianity. Christianity could be called a religion *about* time in that it united the horizon of mythical time with historical remembrance into a seamless whole.⁸⁴ The mythical time of Genesis proceeds to an End which is presented in terms of a future event in 'real' everyday time where an eternal afterlife will be instigated by God. This was originally conceived as the end of the physical world, but as the decades and centuries passed, such an event did not eventuate and individual death came to be seen in an eschatological fashion as Peter Manchester comments:

"Eternal life, as afterlife, began to detach from its original apocalyptic context, the *aion* to come with its resurrection of the body, its new heaven and new earth became mainly a matter of individual and personal survival, finally merging with Platonic ideas about restoration of the soul to contemplative union with the divine Platonic *aion*, eternity."⁸⁵

⁸¹ This has early foundations in the Babylonian and Sumerian traditions in the seven tasks of Marduk. See Eliade. M., *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Harper and Row. New York. 1959, pp.51-61.

⁸² Steensgaard. P., "Time in Judaism," in *Religion and Time* (edited by A. N. Balslev and J. N. Mohanty). E. J. Brill. New York. 1993, pp.98-99.

⁸³ Steensgaard. P., (*ibid*), p.97.

⁸⁴ Manchester. P., "Time in Christianity," in *Religion and Time. op. cit.*, pp.126-127.

⁸⁵ Manchester. P., (*ibid*), p.127. Manchester adds that: "This individuation evolved into the mysticism and otherworldliness ascribed to medieval Christianity."

Much later, the Christian theologian and philosopher Augustine, on pondering the paradox of time, decided that there was no 'before' the creation and that the present is where our being is situated, whereas the past and future could only be considered to be some variety of non-being or half-being.⁸⁶ Augustine seems to suggest that the experience of the present, if it did not fall into the past, would be eternity. The falling away of the present into the past could be described as the decay or degeneration of eternity.⁸⁷ Augustine makes explicit a more complex ontological structure than the Greek philosophers (such as Aristotle) and the subsequent Christian temporality became future-focused due to the perception that God's power could transfigure the past. This is not the utopian future of modern times but rather a future inspired by hope and faith in the resurrected life in Christ.⁸⁸

Time in this sense becomes a central part of Christian being in the world.

Temporality defines the beginnings, the end and the attitude of present generations to their life within the stream of passing time. It is not surprising that modern time measurement finds its roots in the Christian monastic traditions and in particular the Benedictine monks who effectively divided each day into units defined by bells. Previously, time had been measured with devices like sundials and the Jews developed sophisticated methods of ushering in the Sabbath.⁸⁹ The week was well known from the Jewish time reckoning system and hours were instituted from the Roman tradition; however, the Roman hours were of different lengths depending upon the time of year. Most time measuring revolved around seasonal and festival events outlined through the use of calendars and, in general, most people lived in rhythmic time without strict delineation of seconds, minutes and hours. Daily activities were not strictly regulated by time measuring machines so that time

⁸⁶ Merleau-Ponty. M., *op. cit.*, p.340.

⁸⁷ Merleau-Ponty. M., (*ibid*), p.341.

⁸⁸ In the Gospel of Matthew 13:33, Christ suggests in a parable the positive aspects of faith hope and love: "It is like the little bit of leaven from which the whole loaf takes rise."

⁸⁹ The Jews also used auditory signalling by blowing a rams horn or trumpet. Six blasts divided the passage into the sacred time of the Sabbath. The first three were to alert the people to abandon their work and return home to begin Sabbath celebrations, the last three blasts to usher in the actual Sabbath when ritual must begin. So deep was the fear of desecrating the Sabbath that debates erupted as to whether the signaller was 'working' when the instrument was carried back to his house. See Zerubavel. E., *Hidden Rhythms. op. cit.*, pp.128-129.

remained a loosely binding means of social regulation. Calendar based macro-time measurement did not suit Saint Benedict whose cardinal rule “idleness is the enemy of the soul”⁹⁰ required a special type of temporal division. Jeremy Rifkin describes the Benedictine temporality:

“Like the merchant class that would follow in their shadow, the Benedictines viewed time as a scarce resource...The Benedictines organised every moment of the day into formal activity. There was an appointed time to pray, to eat, to bathe, to labour, to read, to reflect and to sleep. To ensure regularity and group cohesiveness, the Benedictines reintroduced the Roman idea of the hour, a temporal concept little used in the rest of medieval society.”⁹¹

In the sixth century the notion of an appointed time for every activity was a revolutionary idea. A series of bells ordered the hours of the day and the weeks, months, and years were infused with strict temporal regulation. The greatest revolution in terms of Western temporality was the elevation of the concept of temporal regulation to the level of a moral principle.⁹² The importance of such regulation meant that this monastic society effectively became the first mechanistic organisation of people in history. The Benedictines eventually invented the first mechanical clock to ensure absolute management of daily schedules.⁹³ The outcome of this mechanisation of time was that human activities were synchronised by the hands of the clock and not by the natural rhythms of the days and seasons. By the fifteenth century mechanical clocks became commonplace in the new urban landscapes. Often elaborate and of huge proportions, clocks and clock towers became a central feature of towns symbolising civilisation in the Western world and as Rifkin notes:

“Time, which had always been measured in relation to biotic and physical phenomena, to the rising and setting of the sun and the changing seasons, was henceforth a function of pure mechanism.”⁹⁴

⁹⁰ De Grazia. S., *Of Time, Work and Leisure*. The Twentieth Century Fund. New York. 1962, p.41.

⁹¹ Rifkin. J., *Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History*. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1989, p.96.

⁹² Rifkin. J., (*ibid*), p.97.

⁹³ Lewis Mumford remarked that: "The mechanical clock dates from the fourteenth century and the process of time measurement itself had come in with the earlier water clock and the astronomical armillary." Mumford. L., *The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development*. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanivich. New York. 1967, p.286.

⁹⁴ Rifkin. J., *Time Wars. op. cit.* p.101

Temporal quantity was accentuated to the detriment of quality and the way was open for the myth of progress to unfold through the scientific and industrial revolution arising in part from the efficiency of clock time.

SCIENTIFIC TEMPORALITY

Newton and Leibniz contended that time was universal and unique. In revitalising Aristotle's concepts of time, Newton and Leibniz agreed that the universe unfolded in a wholly linear fashion, each state existing for an instant where successive instants were ordered in an indefinitely extended straight line.⁹⁵ Newton saw time as an inherent characteristic of the created universe which was subject to a decay process that would eventually run the world down unless God intervened to correct the imbalance. In Newton's arguments, traces of all the historical strands of temporality can be seen: the created beginning, the motions of the heavens, linearity and precise time measurement. His contribution to Western temporality was the idea of the existence of time as a definite and measurable actuality of absolute continuance. While Newton had grounded his ideas within theological background, his followers effectively reinstated Democritean time by rejecting the theological considerations leaving time as an empty, though real, form which was not in any way related to any particular or exceptional event concerning the universe as a whole.

In the age of classical science, time emerged as an entity of itself. Divorced from sacred and social contexts, the secularisation of time influenced the Western worldview in a profound manner. The idea of progress evolved, in association with efficient use of time, towards a future where human goals would be achieved by manipulation of the material world. Answers to all questions could be sought and in time knowledge would account for all phenomena including the origin of life itself. The Western concept of time was gradually universalised as the only possible means of understanding temporal sequences. Rifkin aptly sums up the evolving temporality of the age of 'enlightenment':

⁹⁵ Whitrow, G. J., *Time in History: Views of Time From Prehistory to the Present Day*. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1988, p.130

“To be modern was to be punctual, disciplined, fast-paced and future-directed....The new man and new woman were taught to expose the totality of their lives to an exacting schedule and to fill every moment with a productive task. The clock culture called forth a new faith: the future could be secured if everyone would only learn to be on time...Time was stripped of its sacred context and made into a utility to advance the productive goals of an increasingly secular civilisation.”⁹⁶

Philosophers struggled with the emerging understanding of secular time. Immanuel Kant, for example, concluded that his own experience and concept of time as an intellectual synthesis *a priori* must be an unalterable and inborn condition of human experience. Kant did not question whether this hypothesis could be tested, nor did he consider whether in fact all people everywhere had a time concept at the same level of synthesis as his own.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Kant’s ideas permeated the thinking of the era and Western philosophy turned increasingly towards the concept of being as something associated with time.

Accurate timing became the catchcry of the industrialists, the colonists and the capitalists who used time as a means to power over materials, peoples and monetary systems. The ‘efficient’ use and division of time quickly became a force equally as powerful as religious inducement. Once clock mentality was imposed, and subsequently transferred to each successive generation, timing became so ingrained that it could not be overthrown (as the French revolutionary experiment clearly showed).⁹⁸ Continual adjustments and refinements of calendars paralleled significant increases in clock accuracy and sophistication to a point where parts of a second could be measured with reasonable accuracy. The universalisation of timing centred on the European conception was rapidly introduced to other cultures. Once rigid

⁹⁶ Rifkin, J., *Time Wars. op. cit.*, p.113.

⁹⁷ Elias, N., *Time: An Essay. op. cit.*, p.63.

⁹⁸ The French revolutionary calendar was decimalised into three ten day weeks, each day had ten hours and each hour had 100 decimal minutes and so on. Months were given new names and new holidays instated. The negative response was elicited partly due to Catholic resistance to the replacement of holy days, partly because workers would lose customary rest days but most of the resentment was simply due to the inherent strangeness of the new time schedule. Later Stalin’s communists and Hitler’s Nazis would encounter the same resistance when they tried to make significant adjustments to the European calendar. See Zerubavel, E., *Hidden Rhythms. op. cit.*, pp.82-96.

temporal constraint was imposed on a people it was easier to manipulate them into conforming to the Western worldview as a whole.

The continuing scientific revolution contributed much to the secularisation of time. Geologists Hutton⁹⁹ and Lyell¹⁰⁰ tentatively challenged biblical durational description by contending that the Earth was, in fact, much more ancient than Church predictions. The knowledge gained from the study of geological history was the beginning of the idea of evolution championed by Darwin¹⁰¹ who explained the diversity of life as unfolding over very long periods of time. Darwinistic evolution provided fuel to the arguments of those who wished to find a fully secular explanation for the origins of life as well as the material universe. Sacred time became the business of theology while secular time dominated the everyday workings of society. The secular explanation of reality owed its success to the now fully established linear time reckoning system; years could be counted in millions and billions easily allowing enough time for the slow process of mutation and natural selection.

By the end of the eighteenth century Newton's absolute time remained inviolable, but it was now measured on vast scales allowing for geological and evolutionary processes. Time and being were intimately linked on the metaphysical and physical planes; progress, expansion and the future goal of society were dependent upon the strict regulation of passing time. Efficiency emerged as the primal motivation of industry and technological innovation. Western temporality had reached a high degree of refinement through the physical sciences and the idea that humans were a product of time, and that their being was revealed through time, was firmly established in the modern worldview.

⁹⁹ James Hutton wrote *Theory of the Earth* in 1795 after pondering the significance of fossils and the recognition of multiple cycles of uplift which led him to realise the immensity of time involved leading to his famous statement: "The mind seemed to grow giddy by looking so far into the abyss of time." Cited by Gould. S. J., *Time's Arrow Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time* Harvard University Press. Massachusetts. 1987, p.62.

¹⁰⁰ Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1872) is regarded by most geologists as the founding document of their discipline.

¹⁰¹ Charles Darwin published *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* in 1859 which started a debate between the Church and science which has not yet been resolved. Natural selection, mutation and evolution have been universalised by neo-Darwinists to a degree not necessarily visualised by Darwin himself who did not disregard the act of original creation.

SPACE AND TIME BECOMES SPACETIME

Albert Einstein was born into such a worldview, and yet he was responsible for the development of the third revolution in the Western understanding of time, which effectively overturned Newtonian physics and revived the ancient science of cosmology. Einstein's revolution remains unfinished, but the theory of relativity has had a profound influence upon the Western worldview.¹⁰²

Einstein's theory of relativity introduced into physics a notion of time which is intrinsically flexible, and in so doing, showed that Newton's universal time is a fiction. Time exists, according to Einstein, due to the relationship between matter and motion, and is real only so far as it is relative to an observer experiencing certain conditions. The implications of Einstein's theory are that space, time and mass are not absolute; they are just relationships we measure with yardsticks, clocks and scales; instruments whose readings depend on their relative motion.¹⁰³ The speed of light was, for Einstein's theory, the maximum possible speed that information of any kind can be transferred from one point to another.¹⁰⁴ This indicated that astronomical observations of very distant stellar objects could only identify such objects as they were when that particular light left them in the distant past. Telescopes are also timescopes. When observers look into the night sky they see the actual past, and in

¹⁰² The relativity of space, time and matter led to speculation about a great number of things including: the fate of stars, the gravitational effect on time, black holes, dark matter, the heat death of the universe, the ultimate collapse of the universe into a Big Crunch, time reversal, the possibilities of time travel, wormholes in space and perhaps the most significant development, quantum physics, which has in turn led to many startling discoveries about subatomic particles and the notion of wave/particle duality, Heisenberg's indeterminacy theory and the interaction between consciousness and the collapse of the wave function of energy into particles. The entire spectrum of inquiry sparked in part by Einstein's general theory and subsequent special theory of relativity is far too large a subject to cover within the framework of this discussion of time; they are, however, an all-important part of the Western worldview and have many, as yet, unknown implications for future understanding of time and space. An excellent source for quantum reality is Zohar, D., *The Quantum Self*. Flamingo. New York. 1990. For general discussion on astrophysics see the following three references and for a general history of scientific inquiry associated with Einstein's revolution, see Thorne, K., *Black Holes and Time Warps: Einstein's Outrageous Legacy*. W. W. Norton and Co. New York. 1994.

¹⁰³ Johnson, G., *Fire in the Mind: Science, Faith and the Search for Order*. Viking Press. London. 1995, p.73.

¹⁰⁴ Light, as well as many other kinds of waves, are in effect transmitters of information in that they allow sensual perception to be interpreted. If information could be carried faster than the medium then all sorts of strange events would occur such as the possibility of sending messages back in time. Causality would be compromised. To date, nothing has been found to contradict Einstein's prediction although at a quantum level it appears that some particles may temporarily exceed the speed of light

the case of very distant objects observed with radio telescopes, observers are seeing them as they were at a time before the Earth itself existed.¹⁰⁵ This idea led astrophysicists to search for a possible age of the universe and how it may have come into being. And so began the quest to formulate and substantiate the Big Bang theory where the universe is said to have evolved out of a quantum singularity¹⁰⁶ and expanded to its present proportions after some twenty billion years.

In the last decades of the twentieth century Western temporality incorporated three important conceptualisations of time into the most detailed and complete understanding of sequences ever known. Metaphysical time, linear time and spacetime combined into a temporal ontology so powerful that it is fully accepted as the foundation of all reality. Western Man is now a temporal being. Beginnings and endings of all things are encapsulated by a temporal sequence; social order and cohesion are dependent upon accurate time measurement and finally, meaning is found not in place but in the unfolding of passing time. In the current era time is fully secularised, universal and, for all practical purposes, immutable.¹⁰⁷ Einstein's legacy of relative time has not, as yet, been incorporated into social time, which remains

under certain conditions called the tunnelling effect. See Davies. P., *About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution*. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1995, pp.177-178.

¹⁰⁵ In fact there may be objects that are so far away from Earth that their light has not yet had time to reach us and so we cannot yet perceive them. G. Johnson writes: "Assuming, like Einstein, that nothing can travel faster than light, the big bang theory implies that the farthest we can possibly see is perhaps ten or twenty billion light years in every direction. That doesn't mean that there is nothing beyond that limit. From our vantage point on earth, we might detect an energy source fifteen billion light years away in the direction we quaintly call north, then swing our instruments around and detect another source fifteen billion light years to the south. These two objects would be separated from each other by thirty billion light years; they cannot be touched by each other's light. Since we are presumably not at the centre of the universe, we can assume that there are objects thirty billion light years from us. But we cannot see them. The light emitted by whatever is beyond our horizon hasn't had time to reach us" Johnson. G., *Fire in the Mind. op. cit.*, p.61. This has serious implications for the Big Bang theory which states that the universe is 15-20 billion years old. If the actual universe is 30 billion light years across in terms of distance it must also be at least 30 billion years old which does not fit with current calculations.

¹⁰⁶ Singularities are events outside of the space-time continuum where the laws of physics breakdown completely. The centre of black holes contain such singularities where infinite gravity created by an imploding neutron star warp time in an infinite manner. See Gribbin. J., *Unveiling the Edge of Time: Black Holes, White Holes and Wormholes*. Crown Trade Paperbacks. New York. 1992, pp.47-57, for an interesting discussion of singularities and their effect on time.

¹⁰⁷ Only man-made time can deliver accurately and with absolute precision the ticks of clocks which regulate life. Paul Davies remarks: "We know clocks need not agree: the Earth gets out of sync with the Bonn clock. So which one is right? Well presumably the Bonn clock, because it is more accurate. But accurate relative to what? To us? Whose time is the Bonn clock telling anyway? Your time? My time? God's time? Might there be another clock, perhaps on another planet somewhere, faithfully ticking out another time altogether, to the joy of its makers?" Davies. P., *About Time. op. cit.*, p.22.

firmly wedded to the Newtonian concept. The reason for this is complex, but essentially revolves around the efficiency of absolute time and the ability of UST to act as a means to keep economic and social systems running smoothly. If time could be perceived as a relative and symbolic relationship, the driving force of Western style economic progress might well collapse as people sought meaning in the present and not the future. The difficulty, of course, is that time in the Western worldview is that which “we believe in without believing that we believe in it.” Western temporality arises from our *mythos* in the same way as all other temporal conceptions, but the connection to the sacred and the mysterious has been lost in the secularisation process.

TIME IN THE INDIAN WORLDVIEW

In the Indian tradition the development of temporal concepts originated from ancient sources and, unlike Western conceptions, did not unfold in a linear pattern. Rather, variations on the original theme were added according to particular interpretations. Many of these interpretations are not in accord with each other, resulting in a plurality of time views. For example, four main strands of time conception can be found in the Vaisesika, Sankya, Yoga and Advaita ‘schools’ of thought.

The Vaisesika view is a model of absolute time as an independent category of reality. It is without beginning or end. There is no movement or change within time as such, however no change, movement, or becoming is possible without it. Time divisions are not integral to time but are necessary to conventional practices which divides time according to standard motions such as that of the solar procession. The Sankya school accepted the reality of change, but did not concern itself with the need for a category of time *per se*; rather space, time and matter were combined into the same principle. There is no event-in-time in this conception; only a causality which is the key problem for understanding of change and becoming.¹⁰⁸ The Yoga school has similar ideas about time to the Sankhya thought. It, however, has a distinct theory of discrete time. The objective reality of the moment is central, but the notion of collected moments (i.e., a time continuum) is said to be a mental construction.

Objective time, or an objective series of time, is seen as a purely subjective representation. The Advaita Vedanta approach is phenomenological in that it focuses on the absolute foundational character of consciousness. Being is timeless. The veil of illusion (*maya*) covers the essential self (*atman*) and projects a world of multiplicity and movement.¹⁰⁹

These concepts of time are all loosely associated with the cosmological cycles defined as *Yugas* (discussed earlier) where huge cycles of creation and dissolution follow each other without beginning or end. This is a very ancient and fundamental idea in Indian time concepts and is found in the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita and the Puranas.¹¹⁰ The Puranic texts contain many fascinating narratives which reveal the human significance of the vast cycles of cosmic time.

One such narrative involves Indra, the king of the Gods who, after winning a formidable battle with the titans, decides that his residence is not of suitable quality to such an important being as himself. He instructs Vishvakarma, the celestial builder to build a palace such as has never been seen before. After great effort on Vishvakarma's part, Indra who has become selfish and arrogant, remains unsatisfied. Vishvakarma believing that, as both he and Indra are immortals, this problem could go on for a very long time. Vishvakarma appeals to Vishnu, and on hearing of the problem Vishnu agrees to help. Vishnu, garbed in the appearance of a small boy, arrives at Indra's palace and asks to see the greatest palace that any Indra has ever had constructed. Indra reacts immediately asking the boy what he means by 'any' Indra. The boy replies: "The life and kingship of an Indra endures for 71 aeons (4,320,00 solar years) and when 28 Indras have expired, one day and night of Brahma have elapsed. Brahma lives for 100 of his years then sinks into the navel of Vishnu to rise again in an endless series. There is no end to those Brahmas to say nothing of

¹⁰⁸ Balslev. A. N., "Time in Hindu Experience," in *Religion and Time. op. cit.*, p.172.

¹⁰⁹ The discussion of these four schools is sourced from the *Yoga-Sutra* of Patanjali including the *Bhasya* of Vyasa, the *Tattvavaisaradi* of Vacaspati Misra and the *Vritti* of Boja. Translated by J. H. Woods. Benares. 1972.

¹¹⁰ The Puranas are sacred books of mythological and epic lore, supposed to have been compiled by the legendary sage and poet Vyasa. There are 18 Puranas (*Purana* - ancient, legendary) and associated with each are a number of secondary Puranas. Zimmer. H., *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilisation*. Harper Torchbooks. Washington. 1946, p.18.

Indras. And as the universes exist side by side at any given moment, who will count the number of Indras who have existed, and will exist in all those worlds.”

By this time Indra is beginning to feel uncomfortable and as the boy prepares to leave he spots a parade of ants crossing the palace floor, he laughs. “Why do you laugh?” Indra asks. The boy replies: “You see those ants, they are previous Indras each and every one. Like you, each by virtue of pious deeds once ascended to the rank of King of the Gods, but because of pride and selfishness each has descended through countless rebirths to become an ant again.”¹¹¹ Indra is humbled by the dizzying evocation of countless worlds and the immensity of time, and decides to fully accept his place in the scheme of things and act accordingly.¹¹²

The basic tenet of this, and many other such narratives, is the notion of no absolute beginning or end to the world-process which, in turn, is associated with the Hindu view that: “being cannot come out of nothing.”¹¹³ Pure Being, as *Atman*, (self) is beyond time and remains ever-identical, untouched by change. Time, therefore, becomes real for Beings only through incarnation into the world of *Maya* where physicality is subject to *Karma*. The concepts of *Atman*, *Maya* and *Karma*¹¹⁴ are the pivot upon which Indian temporality revolves. The measurement of time in terms of units, whether they be solar units, clock units or cosmological units, was of secondary importance to the religious significance of time consciousness.

The concept of *Maya* can best be understood by relating Sri Ramakrishna’s version of an ancient parable.¹¹⁵ It concerns Vishnu’s *Maya* and a famous ascetic named Narada who gains the favour of Vishnu through good works and numerous austerities. Narada asks Vishnu to show him the magical power of His *Maya*. Vishnu consents and the two undertake a long walk in the hot sun on a deserted path. After

¹¹¹ In South India to this day, women arise early and draw complex mandalas (*rangolis*) outside the doorways of their houses with coloured chalk. The reason is to attract the goodwill of the Gods to their houses. Traditionally these *rangolis* were made of coloured sugar in order to feed the ants who were believed to be reincarnated Gods.

¹¹² From Zimmer. H., *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilisation. op. cit.*, pp.3-7.

¹¹³ Balslev. A. N., “Time in the Hindu Experience,” *op. cit.*, p.168. See also *Bhagavad Gita. 2/16*.

¹¹⁴ These three concepts are remarkably complex in meaning and there is a vast religious literature discussing and elucidating their meanings. For the purposes of this discussion only those aspects concerning temporality will be considered.

some time Vishnu asks Narada to visit a nearby village to ask for water as He is Thirsty. Narada duly obeys and on reaching the village asks at the first house and is met at the door by a beautiful young woman. Narada, enthralled by her beauty, promptly forgets the reason for his visit. He is duly received by her parents with the respect due to a saint. Time passes and Narada marries the woman who bears him three children. Twelve years pass and Narada who has inherited land from his father-in-law lives the contented life of a householder. It comes to pass that a huge flood sweeps across the land and Narada's herds are drowned, his house destroyed and crops lost. As he struggles in the floodwaters, his children and his wife are swept away, and finally Narada loses consciousness and falls into the torrent. When he regains consciousness he finds himself cast upon a rock and suddenly hears a familiar voice: "My child where is the water you were to bring? I have been waiting for more than half an hour!" Narada opens his eyes and sees in place of the torrent the deserted sunbaked trail. "And now do you understand the secret of my *Maya*?" Vishnu asks him. Narada realises that the fundamental power of Vishnu's cosmic *Maya* is that it is manifested through time.

In the Indian tradition, that which is manifested in historical time is precarious and ontologically unreal. The *Atman* exists clothed in *Maya* to which unrealised life is subject to constant cycles of incarnation in historical time. *Maya* can be overcome by the contemplative way, by renouncing the world and practicing ascetism and related mystical techniques or by living in the world but ceasing to enjoy the fruits of one's actions¹¹⁶ (i.e., by 'burning' one's *karma*¹¹⁷). *Karma* is essentially the crystallisation of action within temporal reality. Panikkar describes *Karma* as:

"Having to do with *samsara* (the world) *kala* (time) *duhkha* (suffering) and the whole human and cosmic pilgrimage toward realisation. *Karma* is the symbol of the relative, the changing, the provisional and the temporal. The locus of *Karma* is the temporal existence of reality, the temporal existence of this world and, above all, of man."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Ramakrishna., *The Sayings of Sri Ramakrishna*. Book IV. Mylapore, Madras. 1938, Chapter 22.

¹¹⁶ Eliade. M., "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought," in *Man and Time: Papers From the Eranos Yearbooks*. *op. cit.*, p.183.

¹¹⁷ "To transcend *Karma*, to burn it, to extinguish all *Karma*, means to escape time, to go beyond it and enter the timeless." Panikkar. R., "The Law of Karma and the Historical Dimension of Man." in *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. *op. cit.*, p.382.

¹¹⁸ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.375.

And in relation to self as person in the concept of *Atman* Panikkar adds:

“We could use the familiar distinction between having and being. Properly speaking, *Karma* is not what I *am*, but what I have. What I am belongs to the mystery of the person, and ultimately one can only say ‘I am’ (*aham asmi*). What I have is my *Karma* and with it I have to deal with my earthly existence. But if we overlook that ‘I’ for which the ‘am’ is ultimately meaningful, then all the actions of the human being, including psychological consciousness, ‘are’ its *Karma*: a condensation of acts past, a dynamism of tendencies to be realised in the future: all that composes the present.”¹¹⁹

The timeless self, sheathed in *Maya* and subject to *Karma*, lives in the time of the world only in the sense that escape from time is not sought. Once sought, escape from temporality is a process facilitated by exhausting *Karma*, dissolving *Maya* and returning to the tempiternal¹²⁰ core. Existing in such a state is the ideal of Indian religious tradition, be it Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina. Time is left behind, stepped out of, no further rebirths into the temporal circle are necessary and death is finally conquered.¹²¹

The ancient Indian texts define temporality in terms of religious consciousness where a passage from passing or illusory time to cosmic time is suggested as the path for human beings. To be delivered from the illusion of time it is sufficient to achieve consciousness of the unreality of time and to ‘realise’ the rhythms of Great Cosmic Time;¹²² the eternal nature of pure being unhindered by the events and sequences which draw each person back to renewed incarnation in physicality. There are three possible states of the human condition: firstly those who are ignorant and who live solely in time and illusion, secondly those who seek salvation such as the yogins and

¹¹⁹ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.383.

¹²⁰ Tempiternity is a neologism coined by R. Panikkar. He describes tempiternity as: "The fundamental intuition of tempiternity flows from the experience of the present in all its depth, discovering in it not only the past in potency and the future in hope but also what the objectified projection of mankind has called eternity and the subjectified human sensibility has called time (or temporality in our terms). The experience of the present, in fact, pierces as it were the crust of the provisional and the flowing, not to fall into the static, intemporal bed, not to deny time but to relish its kernel." Panikkar concludes that: "Any profound human experience occurs in time and yet is not bound to or by time." Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man*. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1973, p.45.

¹²¹ Panikkar explains: "The time of death, the moment of our death is the death of time. Each moment that we succeed in killing time we overcome death and we live time up to its full depth. A static frozen time, a time which could stop would be no time at all; on the contrary, it would kill us." Panikkar. R., "The Time of Death: The Death of Time: An Indian Reflection," in *Symposium International de Philosophie*. Athens. 1977, p.120.

sages who endeavour to escape time altogether and thirdly, those who live in historic (passing) time but preserve an opening towards Great Time while not losing their awareness of the unreality of historic time. The third situation is the search for tempiternity; that is, the melding of the temporal with the eternal.

The peoples of the Indian subcontinent have been subject to many waves of invaders over millennia. Alexander the Great introduced Hellenic ideas of time, the Moghuls brought Islamic time to India during their 500 year rule, Europeans introduced modern Christian temporality and the British imposed Western time reckoning. In spite of all these influences the Indian concept of temporality has essentially remained unchanged because passing time has always been seen as an illusion and therefore how it was measured was of little consequence. Although they may be measured by units introduced from the West, the great cycles of creation and dissolution and how the self becomes bound to *Maya* through *Karmic* action remain at the forefront of Indian understanding of time. The task for each person is a soteriological goal; that of overcoming time altogether, and in this sense, Indian Being remains free of the temporal ontology which predominates in the Western worldview. Linear time as a means of measurement has been incorporated into Indian temporal reckoning but remains of secondary importance ontologically to how time is experienced.

It is significant that the current temporal cycle is the *Kali Yuga*. The term *Kali* refers to the colour black, and darkness as well as signifying dispute and discord. In the *Kali Yuga*, man and society attain the supreme point of disintegration where property alone confers social rank, wealth becomes the sole criterion of virtue and purely ritualistic religion is confounded with spirituality. Further *Kali* is linked to the personification of time.¹²³ Eliade associates the Goddess *Kali* with the *Kali Yuga* and comments:

“...the association of *kala*, Time, with the goddess *Kali* and *Kali Yuga* is justified: Time is black because it is irrational, hard, pitiless; and *Kali*, like all

¹²² Eliade. M., "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought." *op. cit.*, p.200.

¹²³ Przulski. J., "From the Great Goddess to Kala." *Indian Historical Quarterly XIV*. Calcutta. 1938, pp.267-74.

other great Goddesses, is the mistress of Time, of the destinies she forges and accomplishes.”¹²⁴

This remarkably accurate description of the current era as *Kali Yuga* is not one which has evolved over time; it was described in the *Vishnu Purana* (IV, 24) of antiquity. The quintessence of Indian temporal cognition is its seemingly changeless nature. These original ideas about time which were outlined long ago, remain central to Indian thought despite repeated attempts by others to convert Indian peoples to their particular temporal ontology.

DREAMING AND CREATION IN THE ABORIGINAL WORLDVIEW

Because Aborigines avoid time, a diachronical hermeneutic must be focused on how Aboriginal people conceived the given sequential unfolding of events intelligibly without concerning themselves with temporal concepts. Nancy Munn expressed Aboriginal concepts thus:

“In their view, the ancestor first dreams his objectifications while sleeping in the camp. In effect he visualises his travels - the country, the songs and everything he makes - inside his head before they are externalised. Objectifications are conceived as external projections of an interior vision: they come from the inner self of the ancestry into the outer world.”¹²⁵

The ritual songs and dances which Aborigines practiced each day celebrated the movement from subjective to objective that created the world. The movement of consciousness from dream to reality is the model which describes the universal activity of creation. Whether it be sunlight, gravity, rocks, trees, animals or people, everything has both a subjective and an objective expression, or as the Aborigines say, “each has its own Dreaming.” It is possible then, for grasses, leaves and the animals which feed on them to pre-exist within the dream of light which is visualised as a creative ‘light’ power in the womb of the great Rainbow Serpent.¹²⁶ The passage

¹²⁴ Eliade. M., "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought." *op. cit.*, p.179.

¹²⁵ Munn. N. D., "The Transformation of Subjects into Objects in Walbiri and Pitjantjartjara Myths and Religion," in *Aboriginal Australia: An Anthology* (edited by M. Charlesworth, H. Morphy, D. Bell and K. Maddock). University of Queensland Press. St Lucia. 1984, p.59.

¹²⁶ Lawlor. R., *Voices of the First Day. Awakening in the Aboriginal Dreamtime*. Inner Traditions. Rochester, Vermont. 1991, p.38.

of what could be called 'time' is not a movement from past to future but as the passage from a subjective state to an objective expression. Likewise Aborigines did not perceive space as distance. Lawlor comments:

“Space for them is consciousness, and like consciousness, space is divided into two modes. The perceptible, tangible entities in space are like the conscious mind, and the invisible space between things corresponds to the ‘unconscious’ mind. [The term unconscious is misleading: the unconscious mind is always conscious; it is a continuum of Dreaming]...The visible actuality of a form exists simultaneously with its invisible potential, just as the conscious perception exists simultaneously with the flow of the unconscious. Similarly the potential of the seed and the actuality of the plant appear to follow one another in sequence as day follows night. From the perspective of the dreaming, though, day and night exist simultaneously as the opposite sides of a spinning sphere.”¹²⁷

In the Aboriginal worldview, the universal manifesting field is consciousness which externalises the world of thoughts, forms or matter. The dreaming is an attunement between physical reality and the energy of its preceding and contiguous state. For the Aborigines there is no ‘fall’ from a paradise or descent from a golden age; what exists is sufficient unto itself. The Earth is paradise in the sense that nothing needs to be transcended or gone beyond. Destructive and constructive potential is ritualised in the Dreaming and is not, therefore, acted out in the external societal world as endless cycles of actualisation.

The world in all its entirety has always existed to Aborigines, with no beginning and no end required to explain sequential phenomena. There was no need to fashion linear or sequential time, rather, a sophisticated patterning of events in accordance with their rhythms was recognised. As Tony Swain suggests:

“...we can say at least theirs [the Aborigines] was a highly developed interpretation of rhythm which does not require extension into the arena of time.”¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Lawlor. R., *Voices of the First Day*, (*ibid*), p.41.

¹²⁸ Swain. T., *A Place for Strangers: Towards a History of Australian Aboriginal Being. op. cit.*, p.20. [Emphasis added].

The basis of Aboriginal world theory essentially rests on the maxim that a place-being emerged, moved, and established an abode.¹²⁹ Place itself is stretched by conscious action as sites become entities such as animals and humans; that is, as subjects who travel only to conclude their sojourns with self-objectification as the transformations of Subjects into Objects.¹³⁰ While this is often referred to as the action of distant Ancestors, it must be remembered that the Ancestors themselves are constrained by a prevision of their objectified form.¹³¹ Swain comments on Aboriginal place-centred ontology:

“The issue seems not to revolve around time versus the atemporal, nor free will versus determination, so much as it simply states that place, like all existents, is conscious. From an Aboriginal vantage this, of course, reverses the order of logic: all life is conscious because it is an extension of the consciousness of place.”¹³²

The movement of place should not be interpreted as ancestral mobility from one physical situation to another or as a shift from pre-form to form, but as an inherent structural linkage whereby places are related. For Aboriginal peoples the connection between sites is predetermined by the pathways which are the stretching of the being of conscious-place.¹³³ Thus ‘place lines’ crisscross the landscape connecting a plurality of ancestral events. When clans were making their way across their ‘country’ they regularly entered the Dreaming where the elemental paths could be seen as lines of power allowing them to orient themselves and discern their position relative to other place lines. By following such ‘pathways’ or Dream-tracks, clans and family groups could meet at the same place at the same ‘time’ in order to carry out various social activities and ensure cohesion among groups who often ranged far and wide across large distances.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Swain. T., *A Place for Strangers*, (*ibid*), p.32.

¹³⁰ Munn. N., "The transformation of Subjects into Objects in Walbiri and Pitjantjatjara Myths and Religion," *op. cit.*, p.145.

¹³¹ Munn. N., "The Spatial Presentation of Subjects into Objects in Walbiri Iconography," in *Primitive Art and Society* (edited by A. Forge). Oxford University Press. London. 1973, p.197.

¹³² Swain. T., *A Place for Strangers*. *op. cit.*, p.33.

¹³³ Swain. T., (*ibid*), p.33.

¹³⁴ Lawlor comments: "Early anthropologists were amazed by Aborigines who walked through immense desert expanses, unerringly finding their way to tiny water holes or distant settlements. One anthropologist has remarked that no one has ever met a lost Aborigine." He goes on to relate how children as young as six or seven can find their way to sacred sites of more than a day's journey without ever having been there before. He concludes: "Aboriginals young and old seem to move throughout the countryside instinctively..." Lawlor. R., *Voices of the First Day*, *op cit.*, p.105.

This permanent, enduring and unchanging place-centred ontology does not lead, as many have assumed, to a static or stagnant changeless culture.¹³⁵ The Dreaming organises experience so that it appears to be continuous and permanent, yet the actual experience of everyday life is diverse as it is for any other peoples. The difference lies in the fact that the Dreaming denies the erosion of time; it presents all that exists as arriving from an unchanging and timeless derivation of place in a cosmos which has always been as it is and cannot be different. Myers concludes:

“What appear to be changes do not challenge the fundamental ontology of all things ordained once and-for-all. New rituals, songs, or designs - for Westerners the products of human creation - are for the Pintupi clearer sights of what was always there. This construction denies the impact of human actions by asserting that the events and existents of the visible world remain reflections of ontologically prior events. Though we see in the Dreaming merely the ‘moving shadow of the present’ (as Stanner once described it), its participants see a sustained correspondence. Time - in this sense as an abstract dimension detached from subjectivity - is captive to the cultural constructions of continuity.”¹³⁶

Aboriginal logic is *synchronic*, rather than the diachronic mode of European and Indian temporal concepts.¹³⁷

Thus far the discussion has centred on Aboriginal concepts as they were prior to the invasion of their lands by other peoples whose worldview had a significant temporal component. The Europeans were not the first, even though they had the most significant impact on Aborigines. Melanesian people influenced Aborigines in the Cape York Peninsula, bringing with them agriculturalist traditions and associated hero cults. This effectively stretched Aboriginal concepts of space and introduced the idea of ‘another place’, but as the Aborigines did not accept agriculture, little change was wrought by the Melanesian influence. The advent of Indonesian traders on Arnhemland’s shores in the Northern Territories had serious consequences for local

¹³⁵ Myers. F. R., *Pintupi Country Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place and Politics Among Western Desert Aborigines. op. cit.*, p.53.

¹³⁶ Myers. F. R., (*ibid*), p.54.

¹³⁷ Synchronic logic is based on several relational principles operating simultaneously. Diachronical logic suggests oppositional relationships such as simple to complex (i.e., evolutionary) or beginnings to endings. Western interpreters have often perceived such synchronic logic as inconsistent or as sheer muddleheadedness. Examples of synchronic logic are also evident in Native American and some African peoples. See Lawlor. R., *Voices of the First Day. op. cit.*, pp.316-318, for further examples.

Aboriginal peoples. The Macassans introduced concepts derived from their own animistic tradition which was also influenced by Islamic temporal concepts. The idea of death as a finality and the evolution of an 'All Mother' cult was widespread in this region as a result of Indonesian influence. However, ubiety endured and time was not permitted to alter the shape of the land.¹³⁸

European temporality presented the true antithesis of Aboriginal cosmology in the notion that sacred power is neither Earthly nor plural, but the realm of a supreme deity who was somehow removed from the world. Western linear time was not only incomprehensible to the Aboriginal worldview but also actively destructive. Early contact between the two peoples resulted in attempts by Aborigines to incorporate the 'Sky Father' concept, but the loss of lands and places was ultimately disastrous.

Today Aboriginal people have been forced to accept Western time measurement in order to survive. However, successful land rights claims have allowed some tribes to return to their own country where they are progressively breaking ties with the European order and returning to traditional ways. By slowly moving their camps further and further away from towns and roads peoples such as the Pintupi are reclaiming their sacred places and reliance on hunting and nomadism is allowing them to shed temporality once again.¹³⁹ It remains to be seen how successful this course of action will be. The urbanised Aborigines face a much more difficult task as they have become temporally *and* spatially disorientated in the wake of European colonisation. Once 'timing' is learned by successive generations, it is very difficult to relinquish. In spite of all these difficulties and outside influences, the Aboriginal worldview survives as long as there are elders who can access the Dreaming. All that Aborigines once knew is still present, coherent and recoverable to those who will it to be so.

¹³⁸ See Swain, T., *A place for Strangers. op. cit.*, for a detailed study of Melanesian and Macassan influences on Aboriginal peoples in the Northern Territories and Cape York Peninsula.

¹³⁹ See Myers, F., *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self. op. cit.*, pp.40-46.

PART II - TEMPORALITY AND LOCAL RHYTHMS

MYTHIC AND SYMBOLIC COMPARISONS

“Every day, we observe a great mystery: everything that exists has a seed. Time is the duration between seed and fruit. R. A. Schwaller De Lubicz.”¹

The mystery which Schwaller De Lubicz refers to is the common human experience that reality unfolds itself in sequences. Human awareness, in making such sequences intelligible, expresses this mystery first as the *mythos* of temporality which is revealed in the symbols of timing in order to explain an unknowable, yet given, condition of the reality in which various peoples find their Being. The mysterious nature of sequential unfolding has given rise to differing mythical expressions which have often resulted in the presentation of entirely different horizons of intelligibility. The concept of linear time in the Western tradition, cyclic time in the Indian tradition and abiding events in the Aboriginal tradition share functional similarities even though the rational expression is entirely different. Underpinning the origin of various temporal myths is the question of why reality unfolds as it does; why this seed always becomes that tree, why changes only appear to occur in a single direction, and why life emerges, unfolds and passes away in certain perceivable stages. Also linked to the need to make the sequential mystery meaningful is the desire common to all peoples to make sense of their own inescapable mortality.

From the previous interpretations we can see that the natural sequence of unfolding events can be symbolically presented in radically different images. In the Western tradition, clocks, calendars and schedules symbolise the continuum of sequential changes. Elias comments:

“...the word ‘time’, one might say, is a symbol of a relationship that a human group, that is, a group of beings biologically endowed with the capacity for

¹ Schwaller De Lubicz. R. A., *The Temple in Man*. Inner Traditions International. Vermont. 1977, p.58.

memory and synthesis, establishes between two or more continua of changes, one of which is used by it as a frame of reference or standard of measurement for the other (or others).”²

Such continua of change may be derived from the ebb and flow of tides, the phases of the moon, the rising and setting of the sun or the cycles of the Earth around the sun.

If these time meters prove too inaccurate for certain social needs, people can establish more exact or reliable sequences as a standard to measure other sequences.

Elias continues:

“Clocks are precisely this; they are nothing other than human-made physical continua of change which, in certain societies, are standardised as a framework of reference and a measure for other social or physical continua of changes. To relate different continua of changes to each other as time is therefore to link at least three continua: the people who connect, and two or more continua of changes which takes on, within particular societies, the function of a standard continuum, a framework for the other. Even if an individual of such a group uses himself as a frame of reference, as in the case where one uses one’s own life as the standard continuum for timing other events, the relationship is functionally tri-polar: there is oneself as the person who integrates and times; there is oneself perceived as a continuum of changes from birth to death and, in that capacity, used as a standard continuum; and there is a host of other changes which one measures in terms of the span of one’s own life - of oneself as a continua of changes.”³

Clocks and calendars are symbols by which things are made present in the Western temporal myth. The mystery inherent in change is that it is ultimately unexplainable in logical terms. Change occurs. No reason can be found as to why reality is revealed to us the way it is.

Most traditions attempted to explain causation and sequential events in terms of sacred myths. In the Western worldview however, the demythicisation of the sacred

² Elias. N., *Time: An Essay*. Blackwell. Oxford and Cambridge. 1992, p.46.

³ Elias. N., (*ibid*), pp.46-47.

understanding and expression of time has been remythicised⁴ as an 'object' which exists in its own right as part of the fabric of existence. 'Natural Time', as portrayed in the Western tradition, is a construct arising from the myth of inherent temporality. Nonetheless the sacred symbols endure even though they are subsumed in the perception of time as an absolute. In the Indian tradition similar symbols appear, such as: the *Kalpa*, the *Yuga*, the 'Great Time' and the solar cycle as a means of measuring the continuum of sequential change. However, Indian myths have not been culturally denied⁵ and remain central to temporal understanding as we saw in the 'Parade of Ants' narrative and Narada's experience of 'Vishnu's *Maya*'.

The difference between the two traditions lies in the fact that the Western time myths have become an ontological priority whereas the Indian myths dismiss profane temporality as an illusion of material reality alone. Sacred time in Indian thought belongs to a different mythical conception; that of a beginningless and endless cycle of discrete events to which each being, whose essence as *Atman* exists outside of time, is immersed due to the law of *Karma* and *Maya*. In the Aboriginal worldview, sequential change is explained according to the myth of Abiding Events where the actuality of observed changes and sequences are disregarded ontologically, being neither counted nor measured. Aborigines interpreted sequential change to be the result of the passage from subjective Dreaming to objective reality. The ontological explanation is presented in place-centred symbolism where ancestral beings set in motion potentials which are caused to unfold by the ritual act of the Dreaming.

In each worldview the mystery of sequential change is expressed as *mythos*, each of which has sacred and profane elements. In the Western worldview the sacred symbols of time have been subordinated to secular symbols. For example, the week

⁴ Panikkar states: "Demythicalisation is necessary once one is unhappy with his 'myth' because the logos has already replaced it; but each demythicalisation brings with it a remythicalising. We destroy one myth - and rightly so if that myth no longer fulfils its purpose - but somehow a new myth always arises simultaneously." Panikkar, R., *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics*. Paulist Press. New York. 1979, p.345. The demythicalisation refers to the denial of sacred time ascribed to Christian and Judaic temporality and the remythicalisation of objective time in the form of UST.

⁵ Bettina Baumer reflects: "Indian philosophy, unlike its Western sister, has never discarded its own myths as 'stupid'; instead it has elaborated and reinterpreted them." Baumer, B., "Panikkar's Hermeneutic of Myth," in *The Intercultural Challenge of R. Panikkar* (edited by J. Prabhu). Orbis Books. New York. 1996, p.167.

which originally divided the sacred Sabbath from the profane days, has been secularised into the modern week where holidays⁶ are simply a break from 'everyday' activities and not a celebration of sacred time. In the Indian temporal *mythos*, the atemporal realm of eternal being is of prior importance to secular temporal measurement. The Aboriginal *mythos* presents an entirely sacred interpretation of life in all its diverse relationships, where temporality has no place at all.

To make the mystery intelligible, the *mythos* becomes *logos* via symbolic presentation. In this sense time concepts and their symbolic presentations are like languages, in the sense that languages can only function as long as they are common to whole groups of people. Timing devices would lose their coherence if every person made up a time of their own. Each individual within a particular worldview must attune their temporal notions to that of the larger group in order to allow a temporal regime to function cohesively, and in order for timing to have any meaning at all within any distinctive worldview context.

The way time is measured is a means of determining coherence within a certain framework which pertains to a worldview whether it is of European, Indian or any other origin. Time meters, whether they are clocks, calendars, solar cycles, ages, eras or aeons are symbolically presented in relation to the larger mythic conception within a worldview boundary. Time meters, in themselves, do not present 'time' as such; they are symbols expressing temporal myths. Whether time is measured in the numbers of years since the birth of Christ or Buddha or some other anthropocentrically-defined event is of little consequence to the importance of temporal myths themselves.

In the West the objectivisation of time has occurred as a consequence of the universalisation of time units, time meters and temporal constructs. The fact that Aboriginals do not conceive time at all poses a special problem for those who

⁶ Holiday is etymologically derived from the Old English *haligdaeg* - meaning Holy Day. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary).

promote time as an absolute.⁷ Until recently the reaction to Aboriginal time avoidance was simply rejectionist. Their view was discarded by European colonists as hopelessly inadequate and plainly incorrect.⁸ This, however, is not a useful position if one wants to enter a meaningful dialogue with Aboriginal people on temporal matters. The Aboriginal position lies outside the Western worldview boundary and vice-versa. There is no dialectical commonality and arguments cannot construct any useful exchange of understanding. Indian temporality, while including elements contained within Western and Aboriginal concepts, cannot be entirely included within either worldview.

When the time-avoiding worldviews are contrasted with time-orientated worldviews, symbolic correlation is difficult to discern. Clocks and calendars have no relevant counterparts in the Aboriginal worldview and the abiding events actualised by the Dreaming are, on the surface at least, incomprehensible to Western people. While there exists symbolic correlations between Indian presentations and Western ones, little commonality can be seen with Aboriginal symbolic expression. Yet at the level of *mythos*, a common need to express the meaning of sequential change, continua and duration can be found. The resultant expression in the form of symbols, rituals and beliefs leads to rational explanation as an intellectual description of natural unfolding.

The commonality between each case is difficult to discern except by interpretation of myths and symbols arising from a shared horizon of expression. Such commonality can only be appreciated if it is understood that symbolic presentation of the temporal

⁷ Aborigines are not the only people who avoid time. Benjamin Lee Whorf documents that the Hopi Indians of Arizona have no words, grammatical forms, constructions or expressions which refer to time or any of its aspects in their language. Whorf used the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' to denote Hopi explanation for change. He concluded that objective referred to sensorial reality with no reference to past and present and where the future (as understood in the Western tradition) is excluded. The subjective refers to the spiritual realm which the Hopi regarded as essentially predestined. Hopi language is tenseless. Whorf. B. L., *Language Thought and Reality* (edited by B. J. Carroll.). M I T Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1956, pp.57-64. Like the Aborigines, Hopi did not deny time, rather they avoided it ontologically.

⁸ This debate continues to the present day. Noted Australian archaeologist Rhys Jones was recently 'booed' and 'hissed' at by scientists at a Cambridge University conference for suggesting that the Aboriginal view of their being created in their own country as part of ancestral Dreaming was just as valid as the evolutionist ideas of the origin of modern humans in Africa. See Jones. R., "Between a Rock and a Hard Place." *Bulletin*. May 6, 1997, pp.24-25.

mythos expresses the same mystery; that of reality revealing itself through sequential change. Physical time exists only in relation to possible measurements, predictions and theories that each worldview presents as its horizon of intelligibility.⁹ Each worldview's myths are not complete when contrasted with another, even though they appear so to those living within them.

The temporal myths expressed by Western, Indian and Aboriginal peoples are only truly valid as long as they do not seriously encounter¹⁰ each other at the deepest level. From this it follows that there is no single method by which sequential change can be approached or understood. And yet each one has elements of the other within their overarching mythical conceptions. The idea of cycles is well known in the West, particularly in the disciplines of sciences such as geology, biology and astrophysics. Everyday personal observation is capable of comprehending daily cycles, seasonal cycles, yearly cycles, and so on. The cycle is the most commonly described order of nature; from the immense cycles of matter and energy on a universal scale, to vast geological cycles of the Earth and to micro-cycles in particle physics.

Where Western 'time' differs from the cyclic concept is that each person perceives cycles from a linear point of view, which is derived from the experience of an individual life arising at a certain fixed point and passing away at another. Indian temporality includes life as a cyclic process where the *Atman* proceeds to a new life within the cycle of material existence. The Indian temporal *mythos* also presents the essence of spiritual reality as profoundly atemporal; that is, outside of time. This atemporality is homologous with Western religious conceptions of the eternal nature of God and the relativity of time as a causal force of the reality of a material universe. Proponents of the Big Bang theory of causation suggest that time and motion are linked with the expansion of the universe. The difficulty arises when considering whether time existed before the originating event or whether it will exist after the 'Big Crunch' when the universe collapses in the distant future. That which exists before and after the universal event can only be expressed in terms of timelessness or

⁹ See Heidegger, M., *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. University of Indiana Press. Bloomington. 1984, p.199.

¹⁰ Encounter, as in 'attack', via the medium of argumentation and dialectics.

eternity. In the Aboriginal worldview, the Earth has always existed; all that can be known and experienced has eternal duration.

Abiding or rhythmmed atemporal events can also be discerned in the seemingly changeless nature of certain naturally existing entities such as a mountain, a river, or the oceans which, when considered in relation to the human life span, endure for generations with only minor changes in erosion patterns, riverbanks or sea shores. To a single life (ignoring for a moment the influence of clock time), mountains, rivers and oceans are, in essence, perpetually abiding entities. Even the heavenly motions of stars and planets endure for such incomprehensibly long periods that the origin and termination of such events seems largely irrelevant to human existence. Measurement of such events can be made with varying degrees of accuracy, but such quantification remains an abstraction to the everyday consciousness within which most people perceive their world.

To become fixed in a definite temporality to the exclusion of all others in the modern era is to live within a myth which has become static.¹¹ The question arises: Is a plurality of time conceptions possible without eroding the basic parameter of each worldview? Certainly each conception has a special value in specific circumstances and for certain purposes. The difficulty in accepting such a plurality lies mainly with the Western tradition which, in universalising its particular view of time, has declared all others to be invalid. However, it is possible that people could learn to live in different kinds of time instead of being subject to one absolute. Clock, calendar and scheduled time are useful for social organisation and cohesion to the extent that they facilitate a certain kind of ordering of events. Indeed the whole Western system of economic and technological domination is underpinned by its particular temporal order.

¹¹ The static nature of the modern temporal myth can be seen in the increasing desire of many people to escape 'time', especially the treadmill of passing time and the rigid fixation of modern technological timing. This need to escape has resulted in a turn to time avoiding activities such as immersion in Eastern religions, drug addiction, and various types of leisure pursuits designed to 'stretch' time. R. Panikkar, writing on technology and time, maintains that technological culture is dominated by the time of the machine. Effectively this represents a rupture in the human experience of time, a mortal wounding of the human synchronic rhythm. See Panikkar. R., "Time and Sacrifice: The Sacrifice of

The celebration of cyclic time in harmony with natural rhythms does not need to be rigidly excluded from the currently accepted calendars.¹² The atemporal place-centred conception also exists within the experience of those who regularly visit, or live in, natural areas less influenced by human activities. By leaving clock time behind, a sense of what the Aborigines understood and lived by can be experienced by anyone who so wills it. In the wild places of the Earth there is no passing time, only rhythmised and cyclic events; any time one may perceive has been carried there by human cognition. Immersion in a natural life-scape, like meditation, can banish time altogether. On the same basis Aboriginal people can, and indeed do, accept clock time for certain activities without relinquishing their place-centred ontology.

Temporality is not an absolute, it is a learned process, but this does not mean that it cannot be stepped away from or out of. There is no genuine reason why many differing time scales cannot operate simultaneously without due pressure on any particular group to accept any that they do not want. The example of the Indian acceptance of Western style linear time or Balinese multi-calendrical measurement¹³ shows that this is possible. The temporal myths which have arisen to explain natural sequences are, in the final analysis, reflections of a certain way of seeing things symbolically presented in certain forms which are intelligible in a manner according to a particular worldview. These symbols can also be interpreted by others if they so choose. The myths of cyclic time, linear time and abiding events are not necessarily mutually exclusive; although if universalised, they tend to become immutable to those who incorporate them within their ontology.

The myths and some of the symbols common to each tradition, if interpreted within the wider framework of temporality as *mythos*, can be said to be homologous correlations. The search for the meaning of sequential change by various human groups has resulted in symbolic presentation which appears to differ in fundamental

Time and the Ritual of Modernity," in *The Study of Time III* (edited by J.T. Fraser, D. Park and N. Lawrence). Springer-Verlag. Heidelberg and Berlin. 1978, p.705.

¹² This is particularly poignant considering that Western calendars originated from astronomical observations focused on the solar year where special attention was given to solstices, equinoxes and seasonal changes.

intelligibility. Yet once the wider mythical implications are included, it becomes clear that time can be interpreted and expressed in any number of ways, each intrinsically reasonable explanations within a shared myth. There is no need for exclusionism or rejectionism of other's temporal myths. In the modern era a new myth of time is emerging to counter the constrictions and inappropriateness of UST as a universal symbol. Sacred time, linear time, cyclic time and rhythmic time each has its own place within a multicultural world and within the perception of individual lives.¹⁴

We cannot say with any degree of accuracy what time is, but we can understand that it may well be different things to different peoples and yet remain intelligible. In terms of environmental guardianship and sense of place, time and timing is important because to fully appreciate a place (any place) an appropriate sense of timing is necessary. Those who live in cities have different time requirements from those who live in the countryside. Those who live near the sea regulate their intuitive timing differently from those who live in mountains and valleys. Each place has its own appropriate time, as does each activity carried out by any given society at that place. The problem in the modern era is that one universal time scale (i.e., UST) has been imposed upon all the regions and peoples of the world, irrespective of local conditions, hemispheric orientation or cultural traditions.

TEMPORALITY AND PLACE

To show how a society is temporally out of tune with the place which it inhabits we

¹³ See Geertz. C., "Person, Time and Conduct in Bali," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books. New York. 1973, pp.360-411, for discussion on Balinese temporal plurality.

¹⁴ As an example, each person experiences temporal shifts every day as they disconnect from daily time concepts to sleep and dreaming temporality, where all measurement systems break down and mystery reinstates itself. Sleep as a state of consciousness where the daily awareness of a flow of 'nows' ceases to exist. There is a profound discontinuity between the temporal awareness of the state of sleep and that of being awake. For a thoughtful discussion of this discontinuity, see Hart. J. C., "Phenomenological Time: Its Religious Significance," in *Religion and Time* (edited by A. N. Balslev and J. N. Mohanty). E. J. Brill. New York. 1993, pp.32-42.

will consider the example of New Zealand.¹⁵ The modern nation of New Zealand consists of a group of islands situated in the mid-latitudes of the southern hemisphere where Universal Standard Time is not only contrary to its physicality, but also to its indigenous people and many of the European peoples whose ancestors migrated from various parts of Europe where Celtic calendars once operated. The most obvious problem with a northern hemispheric time scale is that it forces a calendrical reversal where celebrations such as Christmas and Easter fall in the opposite seasons to their original meaning. Christmas was originally an ancient festival celebrating the European midwinter solstice¹⁶ and many of the non-Christian symbols have a definite winter origin.

In New Zealand Christmas falls in mid-summer. As a means to symbolically recreate northern hemisphere conditions, people spray Christmas trees (usually an exotic species of *Pinus*) with artificial snow, tell their children of the tales of Santa Claus with his reindeer sleighs, and generally decorate Christmas paraphernalia with European winter symbols.¹⁷ Easter, in Europe, is a Christian festival coinciding with ancient spring rites where the hope of the resurrected Christ is associated with lengthening days and the promise of summer. In New Zealand non-Christian people celebrate with Easter eggs, rabbit images and hot-cross buns without much

¹⁵ New Zealand is also called Aotearoa by some Maori, but there is no general agreement on the origin of this name. Traditionally each island has its own name and many tribes had no overarching conception of the region as a whole in terms of naming. I will use New Zealand as it is accepted in the modern era rather than the contested Aotearoa which is not as yet officially accepted. However, New Zealand includes the multicultural society of peoples all of whom are migrants in the sense that the region was uninhabited by peoples until relatively recent times. While Maori can be considered to be the first people they are not in any sense autochthonous in the terms of originating from the land. Maori are tangata te whenua, the people of the land, but as their own myths suggest, they arrived from the central Pacific region in a migratory pattern common to many Polynesian peoples.

¹⁶ As an Early Christian writer recorded: "The reason why the fathers transferred the celebration of the sixth of January to the twenty-fifth of December was this. It is the custom of the heathen to celebrate on the same day as the birthday of the sun, at which they kindled lights in token of festivity. In these festivities the Christians also took part. Accordingly when the doctors of the church perceived that the Christians had a leaning to this festival, they took counsel and resolved that the true nativity should be solemnised on that day and the festival of Epiphany on the sixth of January." cited by Frazer. J. G., *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*. Macmillan. London. 1996, p.472.

¹⁷ Green symbolism in winter solstice festivals celebrates the triumph of the life force. Juliet Batten comments: "In Egypt a 12-leaf palm was used to symbolise the completion of the year. In Rome people decorated the temples with evergreens, especially holly and exchanged holly twigs to wish each other good health and well-being. They also decorated pine or fir trees at winter solstice, with streamers, a bird and ornaments of gold and silver. The pine tree was the sacred tree of the vegetation god Attis and the fir belonged to the Teutonic God Odin, known in Britain as Woden." Batten. J., *Celebrating Southern Seasons: Rituals For Aotearoa*. Tandem Press. Auckland. 1995, pp.47-48.

understanding of the meaning or origin of such symbols.¹⁸ Easter falls in mid-Autumn when the days are shortening and the passage into winter is upon the land. Much of the uplifting message of Easter is lost. The consequences of temporal reversal means that New Zealanders have few, if any, celebrations arising from the conditions of their own land. Maori celebrations and temporal cognition have been almost entirely lost since the imposition of European time scales. Yet there remains a compelling reason to establish a truly New Zealand calendar; the land itself which by its dynamic nature compels its inhabitants to take notice of not only the landscape but also the climate and weather patterns which sweep over the oceans to its shores.

Maori recognised this dynamism in their cosmology by elevating the wind (and meteorological events generally) to the status of the God *Tawhiri* who in siding with the Sky-Father (*Rangi*), sought revenge upon the children of *Papa* (Earth) and *Rangi* forcing *Tangaroa* (fish and sea creatures), *Tane* (trees), *Rongo* (food) to be variously dispersed to the ocean, shattered, and hidden in the soil. Only Man (*Tu*) was able to resist *Tawhiri*, but even he was separated from his kin into the various tribes of Men. All the other children were defeated by *Tawhiri's* fury and a great part of the land was lost to the ocean.¹⁹ Weather is a pervasive force in New Zealand, which due to

¹⁸ The rabbit or Easter bunny originates from the hare a sacred totem symbol of the Goddess Eostre. The eggs which the hare laid were symbols of the sacred container of all creation and throughout Europe the custom was to present colored eggs to children as a sign of goodwill. The hot-cross buns recall the sacred cakes delivered to the Goddess Eostre on the day of the spring solstice. The cross, a stylised version of ox horns is linked to the phallic tree of life presented as Wotan's cross in the Celtic tradition. Brasch, R., *The Book Of The Year: Special Days and Their Meanings*. Angus and Robertson. Sydney. 1991, pp.43-44.

¹⁹ The myth surrounding *Tawhiri's* powers is summarised by Gregory Schrempp, abridged as follows: "Rangi (sky) and Papa (earth) at first cling together enclosing their children in darkness. The children multiply and seek for a way that they might grow. Some argue that the parents should be killed, while others argue that, rather, they should be separated, so that only one, the Earth, might remain a parent, while the other, the Sky, should remain distant to them. They agree to separate the parents, with *Tawhiri* (wind) dissenting. Each of the children in turn attempts to separate the parents without success. Eventually, *Tane* (trees), by putting his head down and feet up, is able to push up the sky. Once separated, the myriad things hiding in the hollows of the bosoms of *Rangi* and *Papa* appear. *Tawhiri*, because he had not agreed to the separation decides he will fight against the others; and so, when the Sky is pushed up rather than joining the earth mother remains in the hollows of the Sky. He then raises up a brood of descendants being various types of clouds and meteorological phenomena. The children of *Tawhiri* are sent against the children of Sky and Earth. They attack *Tane* and snap him apart. They strike against *Tangaroa* who escapes into the sea to become fish with some hiding among the remaining trees as lizards. *Tawhiri* turns his attack on *Rongo* (sweet potato) and *Haumia* (fern root) but the earth mother protects them by hiding them within her body. *Tawhiri* then attacks *Tu* (man) who alone does not flee. *Tu*, in repelling *Tawhiri's* anger turns on his brothers to seek vengeance and they become subject to his will and are thus made *noa*, (ordinary, no longer sacred) and are eaten by him as a retribution for their sending him to fight *Tawhiri* alone. Thus the race of men ascends over the

its temerity invades most aspects of social life. It is an unavoidable, yet given condition of being a New Zealander, to be subject to the vagaries of a climate influenced by two great and powerful weather systems.

The first of the weather systems arises from the north where warm tropical air crosses the oceans to deliver humid air to the New Zealand region. The second is the influence of cold polar fronts, surging out from the Antarctic ice cap, which frequently cross the southern ocean to meet with the south-bound warm fronts. The result is rapid changes in climatic conditions from warm, humid, high rainfall conditions caused by warm air being uplifted by the cold dense air arriving from the polar regions. After the rains, a swift transition to cold, showery and windy conditions results in a rapid lowering of temperatures in a very short space of time. The whole effect is exacerbated by the long narrow island chain whose mountains not only whip up the wind and attract snow but also create huge differences in local climate from the extremely high rainfall on western sides to semi-desert on the eastern flank. In some parts the distance between wet and dry is less than fifty kilometres. Relief from this dynamic pattern occurs when drifting high pressure systems arrive from Australia. During these periods of settled weather the land bathes in glorious sunlight with windless conditions.²⁰ At any particular time of year any of these weather regimes can dominate, with winter being somewhat cooler but nowhere near the extremes of continental Europe.

The seasonal patterns of these islands are disposed towards irregularity where the definition between seasons is obscured by dynamic conditions. Consequently, peoples arriving from Polynesia and Europe discovered a land entirely different from their original homelands. Maori brought with them temporal conceptions arising from tropical regions, and being unable to greatly modify local conditions quickly adapted their activities to a timing appropriate to the new situation. The Europeans, on the other hand, attempted to impose their own environmental conditions by

children of Tane, Tangaroa, Rongo and Haumia while Tawhiri alone remains independent of Human control." Schrempf, G., *Magical Arrows*. University of Wisconsin Press. Madison. 1992, pp.58-59.

²⁰ Summarised from Sturman, A. and Tapper, N., "Weather Systems in the Australian and New Zealand Region," in *The Weather and Climate of Australia and New Zealand*. Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York. 1996, pp.166-190.

replacing indigenous vegetation²¹ with exotic species ranging from extensive grassland development with associated domestic animals to the large scale plantations of exotic trees. Much of the imported vegetation was of European origin where it had adapted to a particular climatic condition which was essentially temperate. The result of such landscape intervention was the imposition of a foreign regime and the retreat of local ecology.

In terms of temporal conception this replacement resulted in an environment which mirrored far distant Europe, but which responded to an imposed timing system. Many exotic trees break dormancy and flower according to day length whereas the indigenous vegetation responded to an entirely different order, making the best of warm autumn and wet winter conditions to grow effectively, and becoming dormant in what Europeans call 'spring'. The wet cool soils and predominance of southerly conditions means that spring is unfavourable to growth for most subtropical and warm temperate species. Maori soon discovered that their subtropical food plants, such as kumara (*Ipomoea batatas*) yam (*Dioscorea nummularia*) and taro (*Colocasia spp*), had to be cultivated according to the natural conditions which were not always suitable until early summer.

The Maori calendar, while being based on cosmological events, focused pragmatically on the seasonal changes which determined their social and economic activities. In this sense Maori temporality became attuned to the place in which they lived. The Europeans imposed a distant temporality and set about redesigning the place to their own conception, to a point where the intrinsic value of indigenous cycles was almost totally repressed and devalued. In consequence, European settlers in New Zealand lived in an artificial environment and even today the idea of living in the natural evergreen rainforest is eschewed by most citizens who still prefer the open living of European origins. Maori often lived in, and with, the vast tracts of forests learning and adapting their *mythos* to include the new environment.

²¹ The indigenous vegetation was unique, resembling tropical jungle rather than the open woodlands common in Europe. New Zealand's 70 million years of isolation from other land masses preserved some of the world's oldest and to the Europeans, strangest plant life, much of which originated in tropical regions of the ancient continent of Gondwana.

The transformation of much of the New Zealand landscape by the European settlers resulted in a sense of place which was connected to the distant continent of Europe. This dislocation of natural values meant that the uniqueness of New Zealand's environment was degraded as indigenous flora and fauna were displaced. The general populace was faced with a contrived landscape which looked like Europe (particularly England) but they had to live in a climate and a geological landscape which was utterly non-European. The abandonment of European spatial ontology strengthened the retreat into temporal ontology where events and social cohesion were increasingly orientated along temporal lines. New Zealanders found themselves in a peculiar situation of living a European lifestyle yet surrounded by the remnants of what was to them an alien ecology, and battered by dynamic climatic elements. The time with which people chose to regulate and order their society was markedly inconsistent with the natural rhythms of the lands in which they lived.

Such inconsistency led to very weak development of a local environmental ethic, and even today the natural world of old New Zealand is seen by most as something to visit as a wilderness experience, to undertake leisure activities or enjoy the view of, but not to live in or with. Geoff Park notes:

“A century and a half of European settlement banishing nature from the lowlands has carved a divide in New Zealanders minds. Seldom now does anyone locate the spirit of the land in what a poet once called ‘the savage forests that form the groins and armpits of the hills so fiercely look’. The mountains, not the plains, are the location of New Zealander’s passion for the natural world...New Zealanders are not a mountain people. The vast majority of us are coastal dwellers, edge-of-the-land or plains people inhabiting the grid squares of the 19th century’s surveyors, keeping our distance from the uncolonised nothing.”²²

The result of all this was the evolution of a scenic reserve mentality where ‘nature’ existed for the benefit of human purposes but had very little ‘use’ of its own. In the modern era, this mentality still permeates local conservation philosophies, and is a prevailing concept amongst the general population.²³ Part of the reason for this is that

²² Park. G., *Nga Uruora (The Groves of Life)*. Victoria University Press. Wellington. 1995, p.303.

²³ The origins of scenic reserves, national parks, etc. and the general ideas behind preservationist mentality is discussed in some detail in Chapter Six, Part I.

the natural systems are not well understood by a people who live European urban lifestyles where nearly all traces of natural rhythms are despoiled. The appropriation of UST is partly responsible for this lack of natural rhythm in modern New Zealand society, tied as it is to a regulatory time meter relentlessly processing the hours, days and years according to a time machine located in far distant Europe.

Part of the evolution of an environmental ethic suitable to the New Zealand region is the reconsideration of time classifications. There is a need to find alternatives to the hegemony of UST, which while useful in international transactions and the everyday business of social interaction, has little relevance to the actual place where people live. There are three possible alternative temporal sources: the Maori calendars, the old Celtic calendars²⁴ and the seasonal calendar which originates from the natural rhythms of the place itself.

MAORI AND CELTIC CALENDRIAL CORRELATIONS

Until the modern era, most calendars were woven from a blend of religious, environmental and social considerations. Celtic and Maori calendars were no exception, being based on cosmological events (particularly lunar cycles), seasonal cycles focused on planting times, harvest festivals and in the Celtic tradition the cycles of animal movements were combined with social events and social timing. Many of the temporal constructs of the two peoples were connected to sacred events, and celebrations were also religious festivals. Maori began their year with the rising of the Pleiades (*Matariki*) on the new moon of June²⁵ bringing new year close to the winter solstice. The first month *Pipiri*, meaning clinging together (due to the cold), coincides with the change of *Ra*, the sun God. *Ra* was said to have two wives, the

²⁴ Celtic calendars are of importance to timing in New Zealand because a sizeable proportion of European peoples currently residing in New Zealand are descended from Irish Scottish and Welsh ancestors of Celtic origin. The Celtic tribes were first colonised by the Romans who replaced Celtic time reckoning with the Julian calendar and subsequently by the Anglo Saxons in the fifth century AD. The Celtic language and culture has enjoyed a renaissance in the last fifty years in its homelands and there has been a small but intense interest by New Zealanders of Celtic origin to revive some of the old rituals including the resurrection of solstice and equinox celebrations. See Batten. J., *Celebrating Southern Seasons. op. cit.*, pp.15-18.

²⁵ Elsdon Best notes that the traditional Polynesian new year commenced in December with the rising of the Pleiades. Best E., *The Maori Division of Time*. Government Printer. Wellington. 1973, p.5.

Winter Woman of the south who represented the work of fishing and the Summer Woman who dwelt on the land and is associated with gathering of food, hunting, and the growing of crops.²⁶

Winter

The Celts celebrated the winter solstice with great ceremony. The light was reborn to the world and hope was renewed for the return of the sun and plentiful times ahead. The Oak King, God of the waxing year, conquered the Holly King, God of the waning year. The symbols were fire and greenery; the cleansing of the old year, and the promise of new leaves and the greening of the land. Theologically the solstice was symbolised by the birth of the divine male child from the dark womb of the parthenogenetic Goddess. The child of light had many names throughout the greater European region; respectively known as Attis, Green Man, *Horus*, *Orisis*, *Helios*, Dionysus, or *Aeon*.²⁷

Maori experienced wet cool winters in New Zealand and the new year symbolised a return to bird hunting activities in the evergreen forests, and fishing on the shores of the seas, where the climate was often milder. Celtic people of Northern Europe endured cold winters with heavy snow covering the predominantly leafless deciduous forest lands where hope for longer days and more equitable conditions was foremost in their thoughts. In New Zealand the plains and coastal areas experience milder conditions when compared with the mountains and inland valleys which are subject to snow and heavy frost. Both the Celtic and Maori solstice celebrations are appropriate to the variable conditions of New Zealand winter.

Spring

The rising star, *Aotahi*, announced the arrival of the spring in the fourth lunar month *Mahuru-Matawai* (spanning September and October), when 'all things of the earth

²⁶ Batten. J., *Celebrating Southern Seasons. op. cit.*, p.40.

²⁷ Frazer. J. G., *The Golden Bough. op. cit.*, p.472.

now sprout'.²⁸ The land was now ready for preparing the kumara beds and the deity of the kumara, the Goddess *Pani-tinakau* must be called to germinate the long stored tubers.²⁹ At this time the native forest plants would be just beginning to emerge from their dormancy and the southwesterly winds would be upon the land; a lean time for people when the last stores of winter were nearly depleted but the new forest foods were not yet ready. Spring was a difficult time which required much attention to ceremony to ensure the good harvest of the coming season.

In Europe the deciduous forests would have unfolded their new leaves and blossoms. The land was warmer and the corn sowing rituals began. Resurrection of *Attis*, the vegetation God or Green Man who dies each autumn must be induced by ritual and celebration. *Eostre* (modern Easter) and her totem the Hare are also celebrated to ensure a good summer season for animals and crops. Due to the influence of imported European and exotic trees deciduousness is now a common factor in the New Zealand landscape, as is the sowing of crops and the blossoming of fruit trees. This is the time Easter should be celebrated; the resurrection of Christ as the divine child in association with greenness of spring pastures and the promise of new growth in the native forests. Equinoctial gales and late snowfall in the mountains are common during this time and the promise of summer is not yet fully manifest.

Summer

Summer solstice arrives in New Zealand when 'all things greet *Rangi* and *Papa*'. It is the beginning of the seventh month of *Hakihea* when 'birds are now sitting in their nests'.³⁰ Now is the time of harvesting the wild berries and seeds of the forest and tending the young kumara plants. It is also time to celebrate the changing of the sun God *Ra* who begins the return to his winter wife. The solstice begins the shortening of days, but also promises the heat of summer, the autumn harvest and bountiful catches of *kaimoana* (seafood). A busy but cheerful time to celebrate the warmth of

²⁸ Best. E., *The Maori Division of Time. op. cit.*, p.22.

²⁹ Batten. J., *Celebrating Southern Seasons. op. cit.*, p.79.

³⁰ Best. E., *The Maori Division of Time. op. cit.*, p.19.

summer. For the Celts the solstice was when the sun stands still, when people are busy tending crops and making hay for domestic animals. Batten comments:

“Whereas the winter solstice was a festival of hope, being a celebration of the sun’s birth, summer solstice was a more complex time. From this moment the sun’s energy would begin to decline. At winter solstice people let themselves go in riotous feasting and revelry knowing one thing was certain that the darkest night was now safely behind them. Summer solstice was no time for such irresponsible festivities...they knew the necessity of storing the sun’s energy in time for winter. Their summer solstice rituals focused on sympathetic magic to entice the sun to stay.”³¹

In Northern Europe the summer is much shorter than in New Zealand which experiences warm autumn conditions with less wind. The summer solstice festival in New Zealand ought to be a joyous occasion where the best part of the year is still to come.

Autumn

The ninth month of the Maori calendar is *Huitanguru* when crops can be lifted and growth begins to weaken. Also called *Ngahuru-kai-paenga*, ‘the food threshold of the tenth’ which was the beginning of harvest time for the kumara and people were happy because there was now an abundance of good things to eat.³² Ritual and celebration centred on the kumara harvest, mainly to ensure successive good harvests, and to store excess tubers for the long winter ahead. The autumn equinox is only the beginning of such harvest as the subtropical kumara and yam often matured and were lifted as late in the season as possible to ensure maximum size. Many forest berries and seeds ripened in the autumn season and some of them were stored for winter. Similarly in the Celtic traditions, autumn was harvest season when dark and light were in balance and the grains were ripe. Dependence on storable grain parallels Maori kumara storage, and the Corn Goddess³³ must be sacrificed in order to reap the

³¹ Batten. J., *Celebrating Southern Seasons. op. cit.*, p.114.

³² Beattie. H., *Tikao Talks: Ka Taoko O Te Ao Kohato: Treasures From The Ancient World of the Maori*. Penguin. Auckland. 1990, p.45.

³³ See Frazer. J., “The Corn Mother and the Corn Maiden in Northern Europe,” in *The Golden Bough. op. cit.*, pp.480-495, for an interesting discussion on corn rituals.

grains.³⁴ In both traditions the autumn equinox period is a time of plenty and cause for celebration of the good things of the Earth. Momentarily the oncoming winter is forgotten and

the bounty provided by the summer warmth is enjoyed with feasts and merriment.

There are other seasonal festivals celebrated by Celtic traditional calendars on the 'cross quarter days' which lie between solstice and equinoxes, such as Beltane or May Day, Halloween and Lammas. These were specific to European cultural life and do not have exact correlations in Maori tradition. The Maori calendar was based on lunar observations and each month had a name which symbolised the natural conditions within a given region. There was no common system, nor was there agreement as to how many months filled a year; some decided on thirteen months others on just ten. Maori were not particularly concerned with the accuracy of the solar year or any distinctive quantitative system. Their calendars were preoccupied with seasonal change and variations which they experienced in different parts of the land. Years were not counted or recorded as they were in Europe where the growing fixation with accuracy eventually resulted in the formulation of the modern calendar. There are many elements within the Maori and Celtic calendars which are appropriate to the New Zealand situation which could complement the standard calendar. Solstice and equinoctial celebrations are suitable for southern seasons with particular emphasis on winter solstice and autumn equinox as special characteristics of local conditions. Spring celebrations are better suited to late October and summer festivals to late January/early February, with harvest festivals late in the autumn period.

The standard calendar used in New Zealand has some local and national holidays which could be combined with seasonal festivals. In late October, Labour Day is celebrated to recognise the efforts of workers. This is an excellent time to celebrate spring which is beginning to emerge from a long, wet and windy period common to the New Zealand region. In early February, Waitangi day is celebrated to recognise the Treaty of Waitangi signed by the English crown and the Tribes of New Zealand

³⁴ Cooper. J. C., *The Aquarian Book of Festivals*. Aquarian Press. Northants. 1990, p.128.

in 1840.³⁵ This national day, which respects the rights of both peoples, falls at the height of summer and could be easily combined with summer celebrations. Another current national holiday falls in late May or early June and is known as Queen's Birthday. This holiday falls short of the winter solstice, however, if currently considered republicanism is ushered in sometime in the future, a new holiday could be set to align with the solstice when people could celebrate nationalism and the beginning of the new year as celebrated in the Maori and Celtic traditions. Christmas and Easter would be difficult to reverse in accordance to southern seasons as the religious connection with such festivals to northern hemisphere celebrations remains strong. However, incorporation of seasonal celebrations appropriate to local conditions could help to enhance such festivals. For example, autumn festivals could be celebrated on the Easter weekend as part of the religious tradition and a Halloween-type festival could be made to coincide with National War Day (ANZAC day): The day of the dead. A mixture of seasonal and spiritual celebrations could greatly enhance a sense of belonging for Maori and European peoples who inhabit the Pacific Islands known as New Zealand.

Maori temporal concepts are patterned on the recurrent manifestation of the same experience. The Maori world unfolds as an eternal return where events are hardly unique or new, but are perceived in the received order of cosmic and cosmogonic structure as identical with their origin. Marshall Sahlins notes:

“This collapse of time and happenings is mediated for Maori by a third term: tikanga, the distinctive action of all beings that comes of their particular nature. If the present produces the past, it is because the denizens of this

³⁵ There is, of course, a great deal of debate about the Treaty of Waitangi, particularly concerning the difference between Maori and English translations of the original text. The English version said that the Maori were to cede their sovereignty in return for full protection by the English Crown. The Maori version said they were to cede their 'kawanatanga,' a word coined for the purpose of the Treaty and yet meaningless except in the context of Western constitutional law. The English version guaranteed Maori possession of their lands as rangatiratanga which means both possession and chieftanship. In 1840, for Maori, the difference between giving up kawanatanga and retaining rangatiratanga would have been a confusing meld of similar concepts. The result was, as history records, a typical expression of colonial dispossession and alienation of Maori culture and their lands. Schwimmer, E., *The World of the Maori*. Reed. Wellington. 1966, p.107. In the modern era divisions between the two versions are widely debated and resulting tension has turned Waitangi day into a focus for conflict between Maori and European New Zealanders. The alignment of Waitangi day with a summer celebration could help reunite both peoples in a common understanding of the place they both call their home.

world are instances of the same kinds of being that came before. This relation of class to individual is the very notion of ascent, i.e., of the relation of the ancestor to descendant, and it is well known the whole universe is for Maori a comprehensive kindred of common ancestry.”³⁶

Maori perceive themselves as being descended from the land as well as from human ancestors. Environmental guardianship is embedded in relationships between the people and the elements of the place of which they are an intrinsic part.³⁷

Traditionally *Kaitiakitanga* - the Maori form of guardianship - referred to a wide range of spiritual, physical and social responsibilities which encompassed the people, the natural environment and religious ritual. Mere Roberts (*et. al.*) describe *Kaitiakitanga* as:

“*Kaitiaki* is a word derived from the verb ‘*tiaki*’ (to guard; to protect; to keep watch for; to wait for) with the prefix ‘*kai*’ denoting the doer of the action. Hence a *Kaitiaki* can be translated as a guardian and *kaitiakitanga* the act of guardianship. Relationships between the various offspring of *Papatuanuku* (the environmental family) were governed in traditional Maori society by complex laws of culturally correct customary practices. Compliance with these rules, based on respect and reciprocity were primarily enforced by fear of divine action of *murū* (confiscation of resources). *Kaitiaki* acting directly or indirectly through the medium of *tohungas* or animal guardians were an essential ‘controlling’ component of this complex network of checks and balances whereby relationships within the environmental family were maintained.”³⁸

Many of these checks and balances have temporal components. *Kaitiaki*, in determining the planting times for crops and hunting cycles, developed acute sensitivity to natural cycles. Over many generations, *kaitiaki* accumulated wide-ranging knowledge of natural seasonal change indicators. Many of these relate to native plants, such as: the height of the new seasons flower stems of *Harakeke* (*Phormium tenax*), the timing of the bud burst of *Kumarahou* (*Pomaderris sp.*), the way in which certain fern fronds unfurl, and so on. Much of this regulation of human

³⁶ Sahlins. M., *Islands of History*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 1985, p.59.

³⁷ The Resource Management Act of New Zealand gives special attention to Maori guardianship in the form of *Kaitiakitanga* which is defined in legal jargon: "The exercise of guardianship; and in relation to a resource [sic], includes the ethic of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself." *Resource Management Act 1991*. Government Printer. Wellington. 1994, p.15.

³⁸ Roberts. M., Norman.W., Minhinnick. N., Wihongi. D. and Kirkwood. C. "Kaitiakitanga: Maori Perspectives on Conservation." *Pacific Conservation Biology*. Vol. 2. 1995, p.8.

activities in key planting, hunting and harvesting rituals arose from long association with a place. This kind of place-centredness arises from a cosmology and temporality which is directly associated with nature, and a recognition of spiritual links between all the diverse activities of people and the given world.

CONSERVATION AND TEMPORALITY

The problem with the standard calendar arises in part from its secularity and the fact that there is no direct connection with natural cycles or reflection of spiritual values. This inherent linearity suggests an endless and unchanging sequence of regulated 'nows' forever passing into the past. There is no place to rest and consider the cyclic return, or the intrinsic temporality arising from the land itself. The peculiar linear conception arising from time meters such as the Western clocks and modern calendars results in a manner of thinking which is often contrary to the reality encountered. In New Zealand much of the conservation effort is based on short-term considerations set by Western temporal rationalisation, whereas the land itself and its flora and fauna follow a vastly different scale. The land of New Zealand's islands is both enduring and dynamically renewing itself through tectonic uplift and vulcanism which spawn the frequent earthquakes and active volcanoes which regularly alter the landscape. The perennial cycles of the ancient forests endure and adapt to these changes. Some of the oldest trees still living were, in all likelihood, quite large when the first Polynesian people discovered the land,³⁹ and many living trees were once browsed by the now extinct Mōa.⁴⁰ The cycles of the native forests cover long periods of time and have been subject to a wide variety of changes from climate change, to human firing and introduction of predators. The landscape changes, yet the forests endure as abiding events; revealing their presence in great cycles of unfolding, covering and protecting the land from the vagaries of extreme climatic and tectonic effects. In this sense Maori are correct in referring to the great forests as *taonga*: treasures.

³⁹ While New Zealand trees generally do not achieve the great age of species such as the Californian redwoods (*Sequoia sp.*) and Bristlecone pines (*Pinus aristata*) they are nevertheless long-lived. The largest existing Kauri (*Agathis australis*) is estimated to be 2,200 years old and some other species such as Puriri (*Vitex lucens*) are known to have similar longevity.

⁴⁰ Flannery, T., *The Future Eaters*. Reed Books. Chatswood, NSW. 1994, p.57.

Modern conservation practice, on the other hand, is concentrated on short-term preservation which is based on European cognitive models of forests whose ecology is not well understood in the long-term. Forests which have endured with relatively little change for 60-70 million years⁴¹ cannot be neither understood nor managed by people who live within a strictly regulated time scale where goals and aims are bounded by the temporality of economics, fashion, politics and the relatively recent discipline of science. A holistic conservation ethic is required, an ethic which can overcome limited human temporal scales in order to begin to comprehend the enormity of such endurance. To begin to understand the land and its living treasures some sense of its natural rhythms is important. Western profane temporal conceptions are clearly inadequate to this task. Incorporation of Maori seasonal, cyclic and spiritual temporality could help to enhance sincere inquiry as well as facilitating Maori involvement in conservation practice.

Apart from indigenous ecosystems, New Zealand has now incorporated exotic species of flora and fauna as part of the natural landscape. As most of the 'productive' lands are now subject to agricultural and urban regimes, it is important to recognise their value and begin to consider enhancement and celebration of this unique landscape. To date, conservation has concentrated almost wholly on native species, to the detriment of altered landscapes. This imbalance has resulted in the idea that exploitation and unsustainable use of such lands is acceptable because only the natural ecology (i.e., forest and birds) is worth preserving. In valuing and celebrating the exotic influences in New Zealand landscapes, the traditional Celtic temporal schedules are of importance. Most New Zealanders live in urban and agricultural regions where the ancient forests have been replaced by anthropocentric

⁴¹ 60-70 million years is a somewhat inaccurate time frame considering that the lineage of some New Zealand forest species are much longer. Consider the kahikatea (*Dacrycarpus dacrydioides*) and its ancestor *Podocarpidites ohikaensis* whose pollen has been identified as being common in New Zealand as far back as the Eocene (37-54 million years B.P.) is a descendent of the early Gondwanan Podocarps. The kahikatea has a line of descent extending back at least 100 million years. Early species of *Agathis* (Kauri) can be traced to the Jurassic (135-190 million years B.P.). The most ancient of all are the tree fern species which date from early Jurassic or possibly Triassic times (190-230 million years B.P.). Unlike the northern hemisphere the glacials did not entirely extinguish New Zealand's forests, which managed to survive in various isolated refugia to the present day. Salmon. J. T., *The Native Trees of New Zealand*. Heinemann and Reid. Auckland. 1989, pp.40-42. See also De Laubenfels. D. J. "A Taxonomic revision of the Genus *Podocarpus*." *Blumel*. 30 (2), 1985, pp.251-278, and Allen. A. H., *Flora of New Zealand*. Vol I. Government Printer. Wellington. 1961.

creations; yet these places are valid expressions of a way of life now dominant across the country.

A dialogue between Maori, Europeans, and original island peoples on temporal concepts would be useful to establish a sense of place linked to the actual conditions inherent in New Zealand as a Pacific nation with predominantly European and Polynesian influences. The ties with Europe have been steadily weakened in recent decades and the time is ripe for a new sense of identity linked to the cultural, social and environmental uniqueness of New Zealand's place in the South Pacific region. An appropriate sense of local time which is attuned to the place is now required to enhance a sense of value for the land as it now reveals itself. Inherent within such temporality is the sense of abiding events as found within the ancient endurance of the forests, the cyclic nature of geological and climatic events, and the tempiternal spiritual connection between peoples and their places. This does not need to exclude linear time, but it does suggest a thoroughgoing reconsideration of calendrical celebrations and holidays.

Linear time, as one way of making sequential events meaningful, needs to be set alongside the various alternatives derived from the *mythos* of other worldviews. A temporal schema dislocated from sense of place is ultimately harmful to the natural environment and the society which attempts to organise its cultural activities along such lines. New Zealand, as a modern nation attempting to develop a multicultural society, as well as to protect and enhance its unique natural environment, should also consider its temporal ontology currently attached to a time scale inappropriate to its lands and peoples. An emerging conservation ethic based on linear Universal Standard Time is unlikely to generate the desire and enthusiasm of the people to value their landscape in its entirety. A constructive dialogue with those who adhere to other 'timings' would be a step towards understanding not only the natural world, but also the culture and traditions of those who share New Zealand as their home.

The emerging concept of co-management between European institutions and Maori has failed to achieve widespread support. In part, this is due to the aforementioned problems of communication and dialogue between the conflicting perceptions of the

two parties. However, it is not only a matter of how conservation, protection and enhancement should be carried out, but also a question of when such things should be done and over what time period. The Western obsession with future orientation and projected results ignores the historical and spiritual relations of Maori to the natural world. It also fails to grasp the significance of the longevity of New Zealand's vegetation cycles as an abiding event. Much of modern ecological modelling is concentrated on short-term observation and prediction. This approach, combined with conservation methods and objectives focused on time scales suited to a managerial style (e.g., the 'fiscal' year), does not coincide with the eternal return inherent in Maori temporal concepts. Nor does it embrace the long-term vision required to comprehend the multitemporal character of the land and its ecology.

Maori tend to take a longer term view of such matters and are not necessarily motivated to act at a speed which satisfies European temporal objectives. Achievements expected to arise out of the effort of a single human generation seems somewhat insignificant when compared to the 'Great Time' of natural cycles of which the land itself speaks. Agendas set by conservation managers based on economic and political inclinations do not satisfy Maori, nor are they sufficient to alleviate many ecological problems which beset the New Zealand environment.

While calendrical reform would help encourage the development of a truly place-centred attitude to the land, there are other considerations of equal importance. As discussed earlier, one of the greatest barriers to place-centred ontology is the Western notion of the separation of 'society' and 'nature'. Temporal conception as a mythical explanation of sequential change has greatly contributed to this conception in the Western worldview where there is a 'time' for people and another 'time' for nature. This separation has resulted in the utilitarian ethic which promotes the priority of the human species and the objectification of nature as that which is largely excluded from human moral consideration. In the Maori worldview, non-human entities - landforms, rivers, trees, birds and fish - are considered to be ancestors of the people and are, therefore, treated with respect and valued as important components of life in all its complexity. Secular temporal constructs actively obstruct this kind of unity by elevating humans as time measurers above non-human time metered 'objects'.

Simple conversion to another's myth does not solve the dilemma of the Western universalised temporal constructs; rather, a new myth needs to emerge. A new myth in the climate of pluralism means that exclusivism is inappropriate, and requires a shared vision. The symbolic presentation of varying mythical expression suggests that timing and temporality can be approached from many different angles. For humans, time can be experienced or denied in many different ways depending upon the particular *mythos* it expresses. It is quite possible to experience 'time' in different ways depending on the need. Scientific time conceptions are useful to pursue a particular agenda, as is cyclic time or 'timelessness' depending upon the conditions people find themselves in.

In New Zealand there are elements which pertain to many different temporal interpretations. There is the cyclic time of seasonal return recognised by Maori temporal understanding. There is also a sense of the Great Cycles conceived by the Indian tradition in the unfolding of landforms, oceans and climatic patterns. The enduring forests can be described as abiding events similar to the Aboriginal conception. The ancient European division of time according to the renewal of life dictated by harvests, leaf fall, planting times and the cycle of domestic animal husbandry can be found in the transformed rural landscapes. In the urban areas where commerce, industry and social regulation are major concerns, linear time predominates.

In considering all these temporal expressions, the conclusion drawn is that time is a polysemic construct which should act to unite people and their lands in common understanding. The currently dominant directive of standard time is divisive, peoples are set apart from each other, and the human world is at odds with the natural world. The benefits derived from such a time scale are oriented toward the manipulation of capital and material gain. A new temporal myth generated through dialogue is required to address this problem. The dialogue between those whose worldviews arise from differing temporal myths could facilitate the ability for people to experience time in different ways depending upon what kind of temporality is required or needed.

CONCLUSION

Is it possible to overcome temporal rigidity and adapt timing to agree with one's position or place at any given time? Can Westerners walk away from their time sense at will or Aborigines adopt linear timing if they so choose? Can cosmic cycles and the eternal return be experienced at will in everyday life? Does the recognition of seasonal cycles necessarily obscure a sense of abiding events?

The answer to these questions very much depends upon how tightly one is anchored to one's worldview in terms of temporal constructs. A dialogue on time could facilitate the understanding of the mythico-symbolic nature of time and temporal constructs and thereby free people from any rigid way of explaining the mystery of sequential unfolding. Freedom from temporal constraint and the ability to choose one's time at will would be, for those who experience time as a burden, a freedom indeed. No longer strapped to the clock, calendar or schedule, Western people could experience abiding events, cyclic return and the cessation of the unending flow of their lives into an unknown and insecure future.

What purpose does a dialogue on time serve? In terms of environmental guardianship it is important that natural rhythms be understood. Those who live close to the land - whether farmers, foresters, villagers, hunter/gatherers, desert nomads, or rainforest tribes - have learned in intricate detail the sequences of natural events which pervade the particular environment they each inhabit. In many situations environmental conservation is seen to be achievable by locking up nature in reserves, national parks and the like. There remain, however, vast inhabited regions where people make their living by dwelling within a landscape.

These people are effectively guardians of their own lands and they live in a temporal cycle which embraces the nature of that particular place. They know when to plant crops, harvest wild food, select trees for lumber, take animals to certain pastures, and they know that the limits of each activity is dependent upon the rhythmic cycles of their lives and those of their ancestors. It must be remembered that the majority of the world's people live in this manner. The continents of Africa, Asia and South America

are still largely populated by land-based peoples. In Europe, North America, Australia and Japan there still exists a reasonable proportion of people who live rural lives. The great cities of the world do not hold a majority of the world's human population. The globalisation theory, as a harmony of common interests,⁴² remains the myth of the wealthy and mostly urban minority whose quest to control resources impinges upon the lives of many land-based peoples.

Sustainable environmental practice depends on knowledge and wisdom which can only truly arise from peoples who live in some kind of harmony with the place they inhabit. Such habitation also suggests harmony with natural events which unfold each to its own scale. In past centuries, one kind of temporality has been imposed on people and places who often have little need for strictly divided and regulated timing. This temporal regime has disrupted lifestyles, cultures and age-old practices which, in many cases, have sustained people for vast periods of time. In the case of particular peoples such as the Australian Aborigines, a dialogue on any issue regarding Aboriginal ways of living and perceiving the world must begin with a dialogue on time.

Those who hold to the modern worldview need to understand that their time conceptions are neither absolute, nor appropriate to all situations or peoples. On the other hand, it is equally important for others to understand the centrality of time for Western ontology. Part of the evolution of pluralism in its most positive sense requires the acceptance that there are many equally valid temporal regimes, not all of which are aligned to the currently dominant Western mode. Meaningful dialogue holds out the hope of understanding time in such a way that each participant in the dialogue may give expression to their own *mythos* without threatening the intelligibility of their worldview. Such a dialogue would go a long way toward facilitating intercultural understanding, which in turn may lead to a deeper awareness of how certain peoples see their environment and how they may act as guardians for their places.

⁴² See Latouche. S., *In the Wake of Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post Development*. Zed Books. London. 1993, pp.68-77, for a commentary on 'the myth of the harmony of interests'.

CHAPTER FIVE

FORESTS: SACRED PLACES OR ‘STANDING-STOCK’ RESOURCES?

PART I - SACRED PLACE: ANCIENT AND MODERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO FORESTS

“Sacred space is a place where human beings find a manifestation of divine power, where they experience a sense of connectedness to the universe. There, in some special way, spirit is present to them.” J. Donald Hughes.¹

INTRODUCTION

The following study is markedly different from the previous consideration of time. A dialogue on time requires discourse on an ephemeral subject; time cannot be seen, described, or in any way observed as a ‘thing’. This study relates to a place filled with actual events and living beings. The conflict of worldviews in this circumstance is largely one of meaning. Different horizons of intelligibility are formed to describe the same place, but perception of the underlying reality is expressed in different ways.

The place in question is an area of forested land on the Island of Viti Levu in the Pacific nation of Fiji. This particular sequence of forests remains essentially unaltered by human activities. It is what is quaintly known as ‘virgin’ forest.² What is important about this particular forest is that it is a crucible wherein the primal

¹ Hughes. J. D., “How Much of the Earth is Sacred Space?” *Environmental Review*. 10:4. Winter, 1986, p.247.

² The idea of a forest being anthropomorphised into a virgin is a very ancient idea and is part of the conflict that the Western tradition has encountered since its sylvan origins. See Part II.

worldview of the 'hill tribe'³ people is contained.⁴ Traditional Fijian ways have been greatly affected by nearly 200 years of colonisation resulting in conversion to modern and Western styles, to greater or lesser degree. The remarkable survival of some of the original forest into the last part of the twentieth century is, at least in part, due to the continued recognition that the forest has a sacred aspect: sacrality which was able to withstand the conversion to Christianity and all that adoption of a foreign religion entails. In recent years new pressure on the forests has appeared through the demand for commercial exploitation of valuable tropical timbers.

An important aspect of this forest is that it has a guardian who is spokesperson to the *yavusa*.⁵ Under Fijian tribal law, Kalaveti Batibasaga, who is of aristocratic lineage, holds a certain degree of respect in terms of his ability to speak to his people on the important issue of preserving the remaining forests which are within the direct control of his clan and extended kinship connections. Kalaveti's task is a difficult one in that he has to successfully resist the agents of development instituted by a modern and secularised government and he has also to convince many of his own people of the wisdom of forest preservation in the face of ever-increasing economic incentives offered by logging companies. In the short term, arguments based on utilitarian concerns have only been partially successful in containing forest destruction. He has been able to convince some landowners to resist the temptation to accept logging royalties. His long term aims are to reintroduce the traditional sacred concepts which he believes are the only way in which the forest can be spared from the pressures of economic development.

³ The people who lived in the interior forested regions of Viti Levu were designated the name 'Hill Tribes' by the British administration to describe the people who chose to live in the forests eschewing coastal regions. They are linked along kinship lines but the spiritual connection to their place is what makes them distinctive to the more mobile and often seafaring coastal peoples. Some of the hill tribe clans have chosen to live on the coast in response to administrative pressure and since their conversion to Christianity late in the 19th Century. Today descendants of the original hill tribe peoples inhabit many parts of Fiji but their traditional ties remain connected to the inland regions. See Part II.

⁴ There are also utilitarian reasons for forest protection such as: natural resources of wild food, firewood, fish stocks, soil and reef conservation, etc. These will be discussed in more detail in Part II.

⁵ *Yavusa* is a social unit of agnatically related members which claim descendants from a common founding male ancestor. This grouping is larger than the clan or local social unit and involves complex historical interrelationships of lineage. Ravuvu, A., *Vaka i Taukei: The Fijian Way of Life*. Institute of Pacific Studies. Suva. 1983, p.123.

In this study the crucial issue is not one based solely on arguments about biodiversity, soil conservation, hydrological cycles and other 'scientific' reasoning but the concept of sacredness. It is all too common in the modern era to have to defend conservation in terms of utilitarian concepts. Alternative 'uses' must be found to defend preservation of the natural world and these may be framed in terms of aesthetics, recreational values, intrinsic values or many other utilitarian concepts, but the idea of a sacred purpose is usually dismissed as irrational or as an unreasonable alternative.

To understand the sacred value of the forests in question it is necessary to enter not only traditional Fijian ways of life and culture but also to reinterpret Western culture and the various Western elements introduced into the Fijian worldview in recent times. The search is for mutual understanding whereby both modernised Fijians, and those from outside Fiji who present the modern worldview, can approach sacred values in a manner which is coherent for their own particular conceptions. It is not an easy task to elucidate sacrality to a secularised worldview, nor is it simple to reintroduce traditional understanding to a people influenced by a universalised religion such as Christianity which openly rejects what its own doctrine refers to as animistic theology.

To begin with, the idea of space and place (sacred or profane) requires some introduction. What is meant by 'place' and how is it different from 'space'? What is a sacred place? How does an 'ordinary' place become sacred, or vice-versa? The second task is to look at European and Fijian attitudes to forests in terms of historical and contemporary analysis. The question of why the Western worldview has such a contrasting image of, and attitude toward, forests from those of traditional forest peoples such as the Fijians is an important step in understanding the essential conflict. Associated with attitudes to forests is the question of land tenure and property rights. The way the Western tradition treats land as alienable property is in direct contrast with the Fijian notion of *Vanua*.⁶ This interpretation requires a

⁶ The word *Vanua* has many complex meanings. Usually translated as 'land' by outsiders, *Vanua* means far more than what Westerners express by land, as it encompasses both land and society. It also refers to the decision-making hierarchy and protocols which are part of the norms and values of a community. Similar concepts are expressed in the Maori *Whenua* and in nearby Melanesian *Vanua-tu* (meaning people of the land). *Vanua* is discussed in greater detail in Part II.

historical account of the evolution of property rights in Europe, which led to the idea of forests as resources. In particular, the transition from the ancient Saxon freehold to Lockean property rights needs to be considered. Much of the modern economic system is based on just such beliefs.

The fourth requirement is to understand the historical intrusion of the Western *mythos* into the minds of the people of Fiji and the effects this has had upon their worldview. In short this interpretation is essentially historical, contrasting the textual records left by the colonisers with the oral traditions which survive in modern village Fijians. What has happened in Fiji in terms of land alienation, religious life and development ethics is crucial to understanding the current situation regarding Fiji's forests.

The last part is an attempt to articulate what the 'sacred' might mean to a secularised worldview. The question is: How can sacred concepts be understood and expressed by modern peoples without resorting to someone else's belief system or regurgitating well-worn aspects of orthodox Christian theology,⁷ both of which have become unacceptable to many who value the natural world intrinsically. Sacred values are at the core of this study and by their very nature, they require a step beyond argumentation, dialectics and indeed, rationality itself. The three-step hermeneutical method discussed earlier will be used in this study to reveal symbolic correlations between the forest lore of Western and Fijian traditions in hope of arriving at a new horizon of intelligibility which can include an understanding of sacred value.

In the previous study each of the three hermeneutic steps were structured in sequence to unveil mythico-symbolic correlations. This example is, of necessity, less structured due to the need to contrast back and forth from one worldview to another.

⁷ Christianity in its orthodox form appears to contain a set of rigid doctrines which confine value for the natural world within boundaries unacceptable to many modern people. However this does not mean that Christianity is necessarily unable to change. Within Christianity there are numerous symbols expressing value for nature, many of which have been misinterpreted. A reinterpretation of some of these symbols could reinstate value for nature in a manner which does not contradict basic Christian theological principles. See Birch, C., "Christian Obligation for the Liberation of Nature," in *Liberating Life: Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology* (edited by C. Birch, W. Eakin and J. B. McDaniel). Orbis Books. New York. 1990, pp.57-71.

Historical interpretation is paramount to trace the evolution of current Western attitudes to forests. The central concepts involved in traditional Fijian forest lore are presented mainly from oral traditions. The history of Western influences in Fiji is sourced from both textual and oral sources. The oral sources also reveal elements of the Fijian worldview, and as such, act as a morphological hermeneutic. The recognition of an established guardian who is socially supported by some of the forest 'owners' means that this study is focused on an active principle of guardianship rather than a theoretical exposition.

PLACE AND 'PLACELESSNESS'

The concept of place usually brings to mind the idea of landscapes, buildings, home, or wherever one happens to be situated at a particular time. The traditional concept of place is usually approached in terms of 'functional' or 'visual' considerations, and is often regarded by many scholars as being too abstract to define. Yet place-centredness appears to be a fundamental parameter of human life. As we saw in the previous study, place-centred ontology is more important to some worldviews than others, but there exists no known human community which has absolutely no sense of place. Heidegger attempted to explain the fundamental parameters of place by introducing his concepts of 'earth' and 'sky':

"Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the glitter of the stars, the gloom and glow of the night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and the blue depth of the ether."⁸

Heidegger goes on to say that all human inhabitation occurs between earth and sky: "The world is the house where mortals dwell."⁹ This is an undeniable condition of being in a world; nevertheless what is really important is how we relate meaningfully to our given condition in a way which enhances well-being. We are already placed

⁸ Heidegger. M., *Poetry, Language, Thought* (edited by A. Hofstadter). Harper and Row. New York. 1971, p.149.

⁹ Heidegger. M., *Hebel der Hausfreund*. Pfullingen. Neske. 1957, p.13. (Cited in English by Norberg-Schulz. C., in *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*. Rizzoli. New York. 1980, p.10.)

between predetermined boundaries even before we construct our personal spaces and places. Our ontology is always derived from some relationship to our place between Earth and Sky.

On the other hand, 'placelessness' is in a fundamental sense always a relative classification,¹⁰ and yet it is an important consideration in terms of how we relate psychologically, emotionally and spiritually to the kind of place we inhabit. Placelessness relates to lack of rootedness in a place, the inability to orientate or identify oneself authentically¹¹ according to our surroundings. Placeless inauthenticity¹² involves a levelling down of the possibilities of being, giving rise to mediocrity and superficiality which often results in pessimism, nihilism and fatalism.¹³

One of the enduring problems of modernity is the increasing orientation of social organisation towards criteria set by global market ideology. These criteria are only minimally oriented to local cultural concerns associated with a particular homeland as a distinct place.¹⁴ Global market forces are squeezing out local culture, history, social identity and natural elements which once were the main determinants of the character of places and the ways of living which evolved within them. New 'places' are being created without a distinct identity, where people are in effect exiles in their own land. They are living in 'nonplaces'; not slums or poor housing tenements, but

¹⁰ Placelessness can refer to the idea of a certain freedom to travel, explore, break the boundaries of social constraint, to be mobile, follow one's own will, etc. However, in this context we are interested in placelessness in regard to the loss of meaning in one's own place which is caused by a mode of dwelling, style of architecture, uniformity of structure and lack of natural connections which fails to generate intimacy with the society and environment of which we are part.

¹¹ An authentic attitude to place is a direct and genuine experience of the entire complex of the identity of places, i.e., not mediated through a series of arbitrary social and intellectual fashions about how that experience should be. Relph writes: "An authentic sense of place is above all that of being inside, and belonging to your place, both as an individual and as a member of a community, and to know this without reflecting upon it." Relph, E., *Place and Placelessness*. Pion Ltd. London. 1986, p.65.

¹² Inauthenticity, in contrast to authentic openness to the world, means living through other people's opinions, pleasures and judgements; what Heidegger called the "dictatorship of the 'they' (das Mann)." Heidegger, M., *Being and Time* (translated by F. Capuzzi). Harper and Row. New York. 1962, p.168. This may also be seen as the objective and often artificial world of the 'public' where decisions are made by administrators, planners and the like in a world of assumed homogeneous space and time.

¹³ Relph, E., *Place and Placelessness. op. cit.*, pp.80-81.

¹⁴ Bunske, E. V., "The Emerging Postindustrial Landscape as Exile and its Possible Consequences for Sense of Place," in *The Spirit and Power of Place: Human Environment and Sacrality* (edited by R. P. B. Singh). National Geographical Society of India. Varanasi. 1993, p.67.

places where local, cultural or physical contexts are disregarded entirely.¹⁵ These nonplaces are constructed according to images of a kind of homogeneity and uniformity which do not express the complexities of local differences.¹⁶ This trend towards uniformity is not a recent phenomenon. Alex de Tocqueville writing in 1830 comments:

“Variety is disappearing from the human race; the same ways of acting, thinking and feeling are to be met with all over the world. This is not only because nations work more upon each other and copy each other more faithfully, but as the men of each country relinquish more and more the peculiar opinions of caste, a profession, or a family, they arrive at something nearer to the constitution of man, which is everywhere the same. Thus they become more alike without having imitated each other.”¹⁷

De Tocqueville did not consider this to be a high aspiration but rather, as a kind of ‘levelling down’ process. This levelling down of the human capacity for diversity is reflected in Rudyard Kipling’s comment to William James in 1896 where he predicted that:

“The curse of America...sheer, hopeless, well ordered boredom...is some day going to be the curse of the world.”¹⁸

Kipling’s prediction has become all too obvious in the so-called ‘developed’ countries where urban and suburban landscapes are often uncannily uniform, effectively subjecting their citizens to a type of boredom which has, in many situations, developed into a deep despondency, or led to vandalism. In the modern era, access to a living and vibrant sense of place seems impossible for many people.

¹⁵ This is discussed by a number of authors. See: Cullen. G., *The Concise Townscape*. The Architectural Press. London. 1971, (on placeless geography), Ellul. J., *The Technological Society*. Random House. New York. 1967, (on *technique* as attention to objects, efficiency and ‘busyness’), Grant. G., *Technology and Empire*. Anasi. Toronto. 1969, (on the disenchantment created by modern architecture).

¹⁶ Examples include synthetic or pseudo-places such as: landscapes made for tourists, entertainment districts, commercial complexes, ‘museumised’ and ‘disneyfied’ places. Standardised places such as: instant new towns, industrial developments, roads and airports, skyscrapers, megalopoli, subtopias which all have features unrelated to cultural or physical setting. Other examples include: areas undergoing continuous redevelopment and areas developed for standardised suburban dwellings. Derived from Relph. E., *Place and Placelessness*. *op. cit.*, pp.118-119.

¹⁷ De Tocqueville. A., *Democracy in America Volume II*. Vintage Books. New York. 1945, p.240.

In 1915 Patrick Geddes¹⁹ coined the term *kakotopia* to refer to slums in large cities. Derived from the Greek *kakos* and *topos* meaning bad, evil or foul place, *kakotopia* aptly describes many slums. Yet meaning may still be found in such places, as the resistance to slum clearances shows, people have social relationships and recollect memories both good and bad in such conditions.²⁰ The nonplaces of modernity are truly sick²¹ places because they reflect nothing at all. Dwellers in such places are often excessively individuated, lonely, and live meaningless lives resulting in all kinds of negative and antisocial behaviour not necessarily experienced in 'slums'. These people have become exiles who are cut off from their roots, their land and their past. Edward Said describes exiles:

“With very little to possess, you hold on to what you have with aggressive defensiveness. What you achieve in exile is precisely what you have no wish to share, and it is in the drawing of lines around you and your compatriots that the least attractive aspects of being an exile emerge: an exaggerated sense of group solidarity as well as a passionate hostility towards outsiders.”²²

True exiles, forced out of their own country, can be dangerous people but at least they have a connection to a place which was their original homeland. The modern exile in a placeless society has no such stabilising sense of place and this is one reason why psychopathology is so apparent in modern urbanised societies. These placeless exiles are ever-increasing in number, separated from the nourishment of belonging to a place which has even rudimentary social coherence, they become increasingly unpredictable, prone to violence, addiction and anti-social behaviour.

¹⁸ Cited by Mumford. L., *City in History*. Harcourt Brace and World. New York. 1961, p.494.

¹⁹ Geddes. P., *Cities in Evolution*. Benn, New Edition. London. 1968, p.400.

²⁰ See Walter. E. V., *Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment*. University of North Carolina Press. London. 1988, pp. 6-7, 36-42, 151-152, for discussion on the meaning of place to slum dwellers in Manchester and Boston. Walter cites the case of an elderly slum dweller who expressed grief at the clearance of a Manchester slum: "They're knocking our life and times away" he lamented (p.212). For him and many others, the so-called slums had meaning for a particular way of life which was completely misunderstood by city planners who were guided by purely material conditions relating to standard of living.

²¹ Sick as in the meaning of the Greek word *keres*. The *ker* was the soul of dis-ease, the emotional as well as causal which could manifest as madness, melancholy, disorientation, alienation as well as physical diseases such as plague. Harrison. J., *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. Meridian Books. New York. 1957, p.212.

²² Said. E. W., "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on the Life in Exile." *Harpers*. 269:1612, September. 1984, p.51.

Why is sense of place so important to human psychological stability, orientation and well-being? In part, it is because humans are experiential beings and all experience occurs somewhere in a place. Human senses are orientated to perceive actual events. The eyes register light reflected off surfaces, sound is received from vibrations made by objects. Tactile sensations respond to contact with things orientated in space. In short, human sensory perception responds to things in places. Empty space reflects no image which can be made intelligible. This implies that if our viewpoint begins and ends with sensory perception we will recognise place as a physical dimension which allows for the unfolding of human life. If however, we observe the intelligibility of sense-based data we will make distinctions between things and events, and then place will be a symbol for the underlying basis of multiplicity.²³ At a more subtle level, place will be the invisible 'container' of potentiality which is the source of being in the world. In simple terms: no place, means no place to be, and therefore no self.

Human life and cognition is reflected by sense of place and the spaces within places. This is why 'bad', 'negative', and 'meaningless' places give rise to distorted reflections of self. Places are also the locus of human relationships, history, emotional bonding and orientation. Meaning is ontogenetically derived from places and relationship to the animate and inanimate beings which exist there. Places are the basis of human relationships to the world. Heidegger declared that:

“‘Place’ places man in such a way that it reveals the external bonds of his existence and at the same time the depths of his freedom and reality.”²⁴

If places are a fundamental aspect of human existence in the world as sources of security and identity for individuals and groups of people, then it is important that these places continue to be experienced as significant in a manner which results in individual and collective well-being. In the modern world, recognition of the significance of place has been gradually eroded and transformed into functionalism

²³ Derived from Panikkar. R., "There is No Outer Without Inner Space," in *Concepts of Space: Ancient and Modern* (edited by K. Vatsyayan). Abhinav Publications. New Dehli. 1991, p.13.

²⁴ Heidegger. M., "An Ontological Consideration of Place," in *The Question of Being*. Twayne Publishers. New York. 1958, p.19.

by the secular elevation of individual property rights. Ancient mystical understanding which recognised the quality of sacred places has been replaced by monetary considerations.

SPACES AND PLACES: THE SACRED AND THE ORDINARY

Places are full of spaces; indeed, place and space coexist to allow presence, i.e., they allow all kinds of beings to stand out in three dimensions as presences. Space and place do not, however, mean the same thing. Space may mean gaps between trees in a forest or the space between planets and galaxies. Space may also be imagined or presented as symbol. For example, in the Judaic tradition, the ark of the covenant (which was, astonishingly, an empty box), was carried by the tribes of Israel until it was finally contained within the temple at Jerusalem as a symbol of the invisibility of their universal God Yahweh.²⁵ Heidegger comments on spaces:

“Spaces receive their being from places and not from ‘the space’. Man’s essential relationship to places and through them to space consists in dwelling...the essential property of human existence...”²⁶

Architect and philosopher Norberg-Schulz, in his consideration of the spirit of place, identifies the relationship between space and place:

“When man dwells, he is simultaneously located in space and exposed to a certain environmental character. The two psychological functions involved, may be called ‘orientation’ and ‘identification’. To gain an existential foothold man has to be able to orientate himself; he has to know where he is. But he also has to identify himself with the environment, that is, he has to know how he is in a certain place.”²⁷

²⁵ Young, D., *Origins of the Sacred: The Ecstasies of Love and War*. Harper Perennial. New York. 1991, p.274.

²⁶ Heidegger, M., *Poetry, Language, Thought* (edited by A. Hofstadter). Harper and Row. New York. 1971, p.152.

²⁷ Norberg-Schulz, C., *Existence Space and Architecture*. Rizzoli International Publications. New York. 1980, p.19.

Dwelling²⁸ is a fundamental human instinct. People dwell in places by personalising the spaces provided, shaping them in accordance with meanings which are derived from sense perception, intelligibility and mystical experience. These meanings are contained within the *mythos* of each particular worldview and, expressed as symbols, they are presented in ritual, language and culture. Different worldviews offer interpretations of their dwelling according to different criteria. Some focus on the secular aspects of dwelling while others emphasise the sacred or spiritual values of place and space.

The separation of ordinary and extraordinary places seems to be an element common to most worldviews. Certain locations are designated as common places, others may be private, and still others places of ritual and worship. Special significance is often accorded to places where the historical actions of an important figure have occurred, or where an unusual event has taken place.²⁹ Places are important because they tell stories about people and events which form the basis for genuine historical experience. Experience derived from places, not only joins people together, but also grounds them in a common understanding. A common expression of place is essential to impart coherent worldviews intelligibly across generational boundaries.

The idea of sacred space and sacred places is an ancient one. The Greeks, for example, described the concept of *theoria*³⁰ to express a way of grasping experience

²⁸ Dwell and dwelling originates from the Old English word *dwellan* meaning to go astray or fall by the wayside and has associations with nomadic peoples of Indo-Aryan origin where a 'dweller' was one who gave up the travelling way of life for a more sedentary lifestyle which was considered to be an inferior situation. Dwelling in modern terms has associations with houses and settled forms of life, a kind of estrangement from the non-human world, sheltered by human construction. Such dwelling only becomes meaningless when connections with the greater world are abandoned as can be seen in many modern cities. To truly dwell means to authentically inhabit the spaces within a place by recognising all the interconnected relationships associated with the place. See Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1992, p.265, and Foltz. B., *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature*. Humanities Press. New Jersey. 1992, pp.159-163.

²⁹ Examples may be diverse. For example, there are places where Buddha was born (Lumbini), attained Nirvana (Bodhgaya) and gave his first teaching (Sarnath); all are revered places of pilgrimage. On the other hand, the death camps of Dachau, Treblinka and Buchenwald are visited as places where the basest of human actions once occurred. For many vernacular peoples natural sites are the places where extraordinary events occur. For example, the Australian Aborigines recognise a myriad of sites where a dreaming ancestor has become a particular landform.

³⁰ *Theoria* is the root of the familiar English word theory, but the ancient *theoria* meant nourishing visions, ideas and images gained from travel through many lands. *Theoria* was also an essential

which involved every kind of emotional, cognitive, symbolic, imaginative and sensory experience. Some scholars suppose that *theoria* originally meant to travel to places in order to gain a worldview based on holistic experience.³¹ Places in ancient Greek times were described in two distinct ways. The familiar *topos* was used as a means of geographical orientation and description of objective features of the place.³² The less common but more important *chora* referred to subjective statements about places commonly considered sacred. *Chora*, the oldest Greek word for place, was usually used in reference to emotional concepts of place as they are expressed in drama and poetry. Plato described *chora* as one of the great modes of being.³³ E. V. Walter comments on Plato's *chora*:

“*Chora*, which may be translated as either ‘place’ or ‘space’ depending on the context, is one of the independent, eternal modes of experience - one of the three great types of Being in the universe.....*Chora* is the receptacle of sensory experience and the seat of phenomena. Whereas the eternal models [concepts and perceptual ability] exist without specific location, every instance of sensory experience must emerge in place. Yet despite its importance as the seat or foundation of experience, we cannot perceive the nature of *chora* or understand it rationally. In its own way, however, it is intelligible. This mode leads the mind to archaic mythical thinking.”³⁴

Chora engenders *mythos* because it is neither rational nor irrational; and yet it reflects the encounter with mystery. Sacred places expressed as *chora*, point one towards the ineffable; they recount the mythical and remind us of the mysterious nature of being.

element in the mystery religions where ritual led to the dramatic contemplation of sacred objects. It was later connected with detached thinking and philosophy in the works of Pythagoras and Aristotle. Emmet. D., “Theoria and the Way of Life,” in *Journal of Theological Studies*. 17, Part I. 1966, pp.38-52.

³¹ Walter. E. V., *Placeways. op. cit.*, p.204.

³² Yi-Fu Tuan coined the neologism *topophilia* to broadly include: "All of the human being's affective ties with the material world." Tuan. Y. F., *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values*. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey. 1974, p.93.

³³ See Plato., *Timaeus* 48e-52c. Also Taylor. A. E., *Plato the Man and His Work*. Methuen and Co. Ltd. London. 1928, pp.454-458, for a translation and interpretation of the original Greek text of *Timaeus* which discusses *chora* as the primary expression of place.

³⁴ Walter. E. V., *Placeways. op. cit.*, p.122. [Brackets and emphasis added].

Sacred places can be described as having at least four special phenomenological features.³⁵ The first fundamental principle is that sacred places are not chosen; they choose.³⁶ The spirit(s), the ineffable, the mysterious chooses to be revealed only according to non-rational criteria. Sacred places (and their powers) seek out people by resisting rational explanation and deterministic searching. The second axiom is that sacred place is ordinary place, ritually made extraordinary. Often sacred places are found to be suprisingly unremarkable in terms of aesthetics, setting or functional importance to the life of a particular community. The ritual acts performed in these sacred places create their uniqueness. The third aspect is that sacred places can be trod upon without being entered. Such places are recognised by peoples according to their conscious perception of special qualities which may be wholly invisible to those coming from another worldview. The fourth important aspect of sacred places is that they contain elements pertaining to both local and universal scales. Such places are centres of extraordinary experience but also point to the universal nature of spiritual experience.

From the works of Mircea Eliade, Rudolf Otto and Yi-Fu Tuan³⁷ three special characteristics of the sacred can be discerned:

1. The sacred is absolutely pure and spotless.
2. Because of its purity, the sacred is peculiarly vulnerable to being polluted.
3. In many instances the sacred can be dangerous to mere mortals and particularly to those who have not been initiated through appropriate ritual. The sacred is also veiled from those who do not understand or respect it, (i.e., those from outside a particular worldview boundary).

³⁵ Lane. B. C., *Landscapes of the Sacred*. Paulist Press. New York. 1988, p.15.

³⁶ Eliade notes: "In actual fact the place is never 'chosen' by man, it is merely discovered by him." Eliade. M., *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. Sheed and Ward Ltd. London. 1958, p.369.

³⁷ Particularly: Eliade. M., *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. Harcourt Brace. New York. 1959, Otto. R., *The Idea of the Holy* (translated by J. W. Harvey). Oxford University Press. London. 1923, and Tuan. Y. F., *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*. Edward Arnold. London. 1977.

There are many levels of sacred expression in place. The foremost is the invisible, unexplainable mystery which is usually symbolised as sacred space by a temple, church, icon, altar, or other magic signs. A second level is the actual place where the symbol is situated, where for a wide range of reasons, sacredness has been observed or has 'called' to a people. A third aspect of sacred place are the stories, language and text which arise from people's historical observations of the extraordinary events and experiences which occur at such places.

The defilement of sacred places is a very important issue because in many instances the inherent sacredness which shelters the spiritual mystery has its origins in natural phenomena. Once a grove of sacred trees is felled, the religious significance can be wholly lost. The logging of a sacred forest defiles the source of spirituality embodied within such forests.³⁸ Religions founded upon spiritual recognition of such natural features of the landscape suffered the most from the impositions of other creeds, because, not only was the pure and spotless nature of the sacred fully embodied in natural objects, but also artificial structures and written texts were often absent. The sacred was experienced directly and expressed through oral tradition. The removal of people from a particular geographic region was in some cases enough to destroy their religious worldview.³⁹ In modern times the destruction of sacred landscapes continues unabated. In many instances the sacred forests, mountains, rivers and other natural phenomena represent a focus for previously colonised people to relocate their traditional values and restore their spirituality.⁴⁰

In contrast to sacred places which focus upon purely spiritual dimensions, another level of sacred place can be discerned; that of the home. Humans have constructed

³⁸ It is worth noting here that many temples, shrines and churches have been destroyed or replaced by structures presenting a different religious worldview. Many Christian churches have been built on top of traditional sacred sites replacing Celtic, Aztec and animistic spiritual symbols. Muslims arriving in India defaced many Hindu, Buddhist and Jain temples, often constructing mosques on traditional sites sacred to conquered peoples. It appears that the sacrality of certain places is evident to other peoples and the reconstruction of differing religious structures may not be simply a matter of cultural domination.

³⁹ Examples include Australian Aborigines, North American Indians, some Pacific Islanders and numerous tropical forest dwellers in South America, Africa and South East Asia.

⁴⁰ The impact upon the traditional Fijian worldview of European religion, government, economics and land tenure system is discussed in detail in Part II.

dwellings and imbued them with meaning for their entire history. Gaston Bachelard writes:

“All really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home. [Here] memory and imagination remain associated, each one working for their mutual deepening. In the order of values, they both constitute a community of memory and image. Thus the house is experienced from day to day, on the thread of a narrative, or in the telling of our own story. Through dreams the various dwelling places in our lives co-penetrate and retain the treasures of former days....The house is one of the greatest powers of integration for the thoughts memories and dreams of mankind....Without it, man would be a dispersed being.”⁴¹

The home is strongly identified with a sense of well-being; it is the centre of personal existence. Unlike many idealised sacred spaces and places, the home is a definite physical construct which exists in an actual place. In archaic times, and for vernacular peoples, houses tend to be simple structures where personal ownership is not necessarily the prime concern. Homes are personal shelters which are connected to the broader environment and lands of which the people considered themselves part.⁴² Panikkar suggests that the etymology of the word house (*domus*)⁴³ has three components: the human element, the natural element and the artificial element.⁴⁴ The human element is the domain of the family. The building, the shaping of space using materials derived from the surrounding environment is the natural element. The act of enclosure, the art of construction in a manner which reflects the containment of space separated from habitat is the element of artifice, i.e., the architecture. Panikkar writes:

“The traditional architect became the builder of houses for God and Men. A house is neither a box, nor a hole, and much less a garage. A house was, is,

⁴¹ Bachelard, G., *The Poetics of Space*. Beacon Press. Boston. 1994, pp.5-6.

⁴² Callicot, J. B., *Earths Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics From the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback*. University of California Press. Berkeley. 1993, p.95.

⁴³ There is a distinction to be made here between the concept of the house as the dwelling places constructed by humans and the Greek *oikos* which refers to the house of being. *Oikos* is the Earth because the Earth houses all beings.

⁴⁴ Panikkar, R., "There is No Outer Without Inner Space." *op. cit.*, p.17. Panikkar gives a detailed etymology citing over twenty Sanskrit words for house, six Greek words and three Latin terms with further references to doors, courtyards, internal and external characters of houses and many words of Indo-European origin meaning protect, conceal, hide, shelter and nest. See footnote 67, p.32 .

the main symbol for being in the world, and the proper space to live and handle things.⁴⁵”

Houses may be personalised in terms of construction, sacralised by inclusion of icons or personal shrines, and humanised by ritual activity. They are, in a sense, both sacred and profane spaces acting as natural and cultural places for habitation. There are varying degrees of connection to the wider environment depending upon the needs of house dwellers. In the modern era, a situation has developed where cities may be so large that the perceived environment is almost wholly artificial. The modern city dweller tends to lose sensitive connections to the greater natural world, surrounded, as they often are by totally constructed environments. Like prefabricated prostheses, many modern houses, apartment blocks and rented accommodations are simply a means to ‘get by’ and no longer function as sacred spaces containing elements which nourish the dwellers. Hence the ‘placelessness’ mentioned above. Not only are the homes dysfunctional but the greater artificial habitat also denies people the spiritual nourishment which a strong sense of place can, and should, engender.

Wealth and technology have allowed many to escape from these ‘nonplaces’ and to construct for themselves elaborate homes fitted out with numerous material benefits. This effectively creates an artificial environment which is often bedecked with exotic materials including furniture and fittings constructed from imported timbers. The wealthy create meaning, internal vistas and sense of place for themselves often at the expense of others. Heidegger, in considering the role of technology in the ‘commodification’ of the resources of ‘others’ comments:

“The object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly and completely. Not only does it establish all things as producible in the process of production; it also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into a calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth as a world market, but also trades in the nature of Being and thus subjects all beings to

⁴⁵ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.15.

the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers.⁴⁶

Our interest here is in forest products. The high demand for quality timber elevates prices and creates demand for an ever-increasing supply which is usually sourced from areas of the world where poorer (but possibly more place-centred) people live. Certainly such demand is not the only cause of deforestation. But in the case of Fijian tropical timbers, the main end-use is for high quality woods required for construction of furniture, panelling and decking for expensive buildings in foreign countries.⁴⁷

This demand causes a fundamental conflict, because the desire to overcome placelessness and alienation from nature through the acquisition of material goods directly impinges upon the sacred places necessary to retain and preserve the traditional Fijian worldview. We are confronted with a conflict between horizons of intelligibility arising from entirely different presentations of *mythos*. For the Fijians, who were originally forest people and whose cosmology, theology and philosophy was centred on forest symbolism, the loss of forests is not just a matter of resource depletion; it is the steady erosion of an entire worldview.⁴⁸ For many modern people (irrespective of their ethnicity), property rights and the quasi-religious duty to accumulate goods (including money), are pillars which support the whole rational function of modern society. In order for the modern world to survive it must consume products and generate wealth. Some of these products, namely hardwoods sourced from Fijian forests, are essential to the maintenance of a coherent Fijian worldview. Forest *mythos* and the symbols arising from them can only survive as vital elements of the Fijian worldview if the forests themselves remain where they are.

The questions which arise from this conflict are the focus of this particular consideration for meaningful dialogue. The first inquiry involves a diachronical hermeneutic to unveil the history of European attitudes to forests to understand why European symbolism contains so many tree and forest images. How did early

⁴⁶ Heidegger. M., *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Harper and Row. New York. 1971, p.114-115. [Emphasis added].

⁴⁷ Tabunakawai. K., (et al), *Forest Information 1993*. Department of Forests, Ministry of Agriculture; Fisheries and Forests, [Fiji]. August. 1993, pp.31-33.

European peoples become alienated from the forests which once covered most of the greater European landmass? Why did they enclose themselves within city walls and cast their shadow into the forests? The second inquiry requires an understanding of the origins of modern practices of land alienation and property rights which are the hinge and lynchpin of the economic process. These two factors are in direct contrast to the traditional Fijian worldview where 'wealth' was determined by how much an individual could give away and where the people belonged to the land and not *vice-versa*.

Sense of place, of being an intricate part of a landscape, of dwelling; not only forms, but also informs the human being.⁴⁹ Place is where we all begin, where our lives unfold, and where meaning is sought. For each worldview, places generate intelligible descriptions of reality according to differing mythical foundations. What is a sacred place to one worldview can be resource or raw material to another, and the difference is not necessarily a rational one. This much is certain; reason, logic and rational explanation currently championed by modernity are insufficient to the task of comprehending what a sacred place might be. Even less so is modernity equipped with adequate tools capable of comprehending why sacred value should be respected on an equal basis with utilitarian ones.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO FORESTS: FROM SACRED GROVES TO PROFANE PLACES

"The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions. This was the order of human institutions: first the forests, after that the huts, then the villages, next the cities, and finally the academies." Giambattista Vico.⁵⁰

The actual origin of European peoples remains a widely disputed matter and mostly one of conjecture. However, one of the main influences upon the region, beginning in

⁴⁸ The destruction of forests is not only a problem for the Fijian worldview. There are many other forest peoples who are suffering from massive forest loss in their homelands. Many such forest dwellers have no control over their ancestral lands or what happens to their forest cover.

⁴⁹ Panikkar. R., "There is No Outer Without Inner Space," *op. cit.*, p.21.

the fourth millennium B.C. was the migration of Indo-European people from an original homeland somewhere near the Caucasian mountains into the greater European region.⁵¹ It seems likely that these groups penetrated Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, western and northern Europe, as well as India, bringing with them not only their language⁵² but also their religion, value structures and social divisions.⁵³ They also arrived with cattle, horses, a penchant for pasturage, rudimentary agriculture and a highly developed notion of patriarchal Sky-Gods. The Earth Goddess was also worshipped by these early migrants and she became the central deity among the peoples who later inhabited the great forests of northern Europe. In the south, the later Greeks and Romans relegated her to the wild regions while the Indo-European Sky-Gods gained favour in the ever-widening forest clearings.

Agriculture, and in particular cropping of grains and cereals, probably spread into southern Europe from the east. It seems clear that in ancient times most of the Mediterranean region, including northern Africa, was forested.⁵⁴ The clearing of forest for horticulture and grazing purposes was probably an *ad hoc* and incremental affair, not necessarily intended to deforest large areas. It was the construction of permanent settlements which set the scene for deliberate and sustained forest loss.⁵⁵ With the development of enduring settlements, attitudes towards forests began to change. The forests were initially prized for the materials they yielded and the functions they performed, as well as the embodiment of sacred elements. On the other hand, wooded regions were also regarded as a rival for the space needed for

⁵⁰ Vico, G., *The New Science* (translated by T. C. Bergin and M. H. Fisch). Doubleday and Co. New York. [1774] 1961, p.36, (LXV 238&239).

⁵¹ Wooley, L., "The Bronze Age," in *History of Mankind Volume I: Prehistory and the Beginnings of Civilisation* (edited by J. Hawkes and L. Wooley). Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 1963, pp.387-391.

⁵² Language is the traceable connection to such peoples where a common proto-language links most of the European language groups to Indo-European origins. Walter Burkert notes: "It has long been known that the Greek language is so closely related to a group of other languages from Europe and Asia that it is possible to reconstruct a common proto-language. It is a compelling conclusion that the reconstructed language was once spoken by a people, a group or groups of Indo-Europeans." Burkert, W., *Greek Religion* (translated by J. Raffan). Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1985, pp.15-16.

⁵³ Patriarchal organisation, the central position of the father within the extended family and the caste system are some examples. Burkert, W., (*ibid*), p.17.

⁵⁴ See Attenborough, D., *The First Eden: The Mediterranean World and Man* Little, Brown and Co. Boston. 1987, p.56.

⁵⁵ Thirgood, J. V., *Man and the Mediterranean Forest: A History of Resource Depletion*. Academic Press. London. 1981, pp.8-9.

new crops and grazing animals.⁵⁶ The evolution of increasingly sophisticated agricultural practices facilitated a growing awareness of the ability of humans to alter and control natural processes. This was probably the origin of the idea of a separate destiny for people and nature. Ambivalence towards forests, in terms of sacred and profane values, has continued to confuse Europeans down to the present day.

The earliest known written example of such a transformation in attitudes towards forests is revealed in the allegorical Epic of Gilgamesh.⁵⁷ Gilgamesh was a legendary but real king, referred to as the 'builder of the walls of Uruk'. In part of the epic, Gilgamesh decides to undertake a journey to slay the forest guardian *Huwawa* on Cedar Mountain.⁵⁸ This excursion can be interpreted at many levels. However, one of the key elements in the legend is the desire to overcome death. In the epic Gilgamesh asks the permission from *Utu*, the sun god proclaiming:

“In my city man dies, oppressed is the heart,
Man perishes, heavy is the heart,
I peered over the wall,
Saw the dead bodies floating on the river;
As for me, I too will be served thus; verily 'tis so.
Man the tallest, cannot stretch to heaven,
Man the widest, cannot cover the earth.
Not yet have brick and stamp brought forth the fated end
I would enter the 'land', I would set up my name.”⁵⁹

Some commentators suggest that what Gilgamesh intends to do is to fell some of *Huwawa's* sacred trees and float them down the river as if they could somehow take the place of the bodies of the dead. Certainly the practice of floating logs down the Euphrates river was traditional in the days of Uruk. It was also customary for the

⁵⁶ Thirgood notes that: “The peoples of the classical period had a very clear understanding of their environment and an advanced husbandry, and it is important that this should not be belittled.” Thirgood. J. V., (*ibid*), p.7.

⁵⁷ Gilgamesh is thought to have lived during the Early Dynastic period, around 2700 B.C. some 600 years before the first Sumerian epics were written to commemorate him. Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, p.15.

⁵⁸ Many commentators and interpreters of the epic suggest that this expedition was a raid on the cedars of Lebanon, Anti-Lebanon and Amanus mountains. It is thought that raids by bands from surrounding countries which lacked trees was a common event. See Butterworth. E. A. S., *The Tree at the Navel of the Earth*. Walter De Gruyter and Co. Berlin. 1970, p.138.

⁵⁹ Lines 22-31 of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* translated by S. N. Kramer. See Kramer. S. N., "Gilgamesh and the land of the living," in *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (edited by J. B. Pritchard). Princeton University Press. Princeton. 1969.

bodies of the dead to be offered to the river by floating them on small wooden boats.⁶⁰

Gilgamesh laments the oppression and limitations of his city and sees that the forests present the Earth's enduring transcendence. The law of the Earth and its forests are far older than the law of civilisation, and for all their abilities men must die. They cannot become gods; they cannot endure in the way that nature does. In the epic, Gilgamesh and his servant Enkidu slay the forest guardian and cut down cedars, not only the sacred ones but also many other trees in the forest. In the Epic it is written that "Enkidu cleared their [the cedars] roots as far as the banks of the Euphrates,"⁶¹ suggesting that trees were harvested for the purpose of sending them down the river to Uruk, not only because they were valuable timber but also as a signal of Gilgamesh's success against the forest guardian. Considering that the whole reason for the journey is to overcome human mortality it is possible that the logs from *Huwawa's* sacred forests were actually intended to be symbolic replacements for dead bodies. Harrison writes:

"Gilgamesh will make the trees share the fate of those who live within the walls. *Logs will become cadavers*. The hero who dies within the city will project his own fate onto the forests. The hero who dies within the city will project his own personal fate onto the forests."⁶²

Gilgamesh and his city with its walls are symbols of human separation from nature. Without a direct relationship with nature people feel lonely, isolated and their achievements seem irrelevant in the face of death. Rather than seeking a new relationship, Gilgamesh like countless people after him, seeks revenge on nature.⁶³

⁶⁰ See Kramer. S. N., *The Sumerians: Their History, Culture and Character*. Chicago University Press. Chicago. 1981.

⁶¹ *The Epic of Gilgamesh* (introduction by N. K. Sandars). Penguin Books. London. 1975, p.83.

⁶² Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, p.18.

⁶³ The Epic of Gilgamesh is more than a story about mortality and the doom of mankind. It is perhaps a story of paradise lost. Butterworth writes: "Gilgamesh, the descendant of nomad shamans had once known a way of escaping from the mortal world into the spiritual but, taking upon himself the Sumerian kingship, had abandoned it for the secular duties, the formal rites and the political aims of a ruler. He had entered a closed world of a human society, which found its purposes within itself." Butterworth. E. A. S., *The Tree at the Navel of the Earth. op. cit.*, p.149.

From the times of Gilgamesh onwards a religious transformation can be traced.

Lewis Mumford notes:

“...there is a general evidence of a shift in interest and authority from the Gods of vegetation and animal fertility - subject to human weakness, to suffering, misfortune and death - to the Gods of the sky: the moon, the sun and the planets, the lightening and the storm wind - powerful and implacable, awful and irresistible, not to be swayed from their course.”⁶⁴

Thus forests have gradually become *nemus*; ‘the place of no one’,⁶⁵ profane places where Gods no longer dwell. The transition from Earth-Gods to Sky-Gods proceeded very slowly, because as Mumford notes:

“These earth gods and sky gods remained side by side in most cultures; but if the vegetation gods continued to be the more sympathetic, lovable and popular, there is no doubt which were the more powerful.”⁶⁶

This struggle has been repeated down the ages, and in most parts of Europe, the Earth Goddess lost ground to the Sky-Gods⁶⁷ as human-controlled landscapes replaced nature as the source of *chora*.

The destruction of forests in southern Europe continued at such a pace that two thousand years after Gilgamesh, Plato recalls the deforestation of his beloved Attica:

⁶⁴ Mumford. L., *Technics and Human Development: The Myth of the Machine Volume One*. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich. New York. 1967, p.167.

⁶⁵ The Latin word *nemus* and its usage by the Romans to describe forests originates, according to Frazer, from the sacred grove and sanctuary of Diana *Nemorensis* or Diana of the Wood at Nemi in the Alban hills. In this sanctuary a priest dwelt, who was both ritual servant and murderer. The priesthood could only be held by armed defence against other candidates who sought to slay the incumbent with the aid of superior strength or greater cunning. This precarious tenure also carried the title of King and yet no one could expect to hold it for long, the smallest mistake or sign of weakness would be a death warrant. The idea of *nemus* as meaning 'no one', may have also been derived from the legend of Diana's priest at Nemi. See Frazer. J., *The Golden Bough*. Penguin Books. London. 1996, pp.1-3.

⁶⁶ Mumford. L., *Technics and Human Development. op. cit.* p.167.

⁶⁷ Harrison comments: "In retrospect we could say that the goddess's demise as the dominant deity of antiquity probably represents the most momentous cultural revolution in our human past to date. It was a result it seems of her violent overthrow by the male sky Gods that erupted on the scene during the Bronze Age. The nomadic Hebrew tribes, following their sky-and-thunder god, Yahweh waged a pitiless war against her. Nor was the thunder-and-sky god of the marauding Indo-Europeans less inimical towards the aboriginal earth religions of the settled, Neolithic peoples they encountered in their restless migrations. The Dorians in particular were fiercely intolerant of the goddess, destroying her temples wherever they went." Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, pp.19-20.

“In comparison of what then was, there are remaining only the bones of a wasted body...all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in the primitive state of the country, its mountains were high hills covered with soil...and there was an abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain, for although some of the mountains now can afford substance to bees, not very long ago there were still to be seen roofs of timber cut from trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses; and there were many other high trees cultivated by man and bearing an abundance of food for cattle.”⁶⁸

Deforestation was apparently already a common problem in some parts of the Mediterranean in Plato’s times.⁶⁹ It is well known that the Romans caused widespread devastation to Mediterranean forests as well as those in North Africa.⁷⁰ To the imperial Romans, forests were not just resources, but also obstacles to the conquest and domination of peoples and regions. Large forests acted as buffers which enabled some communities to resist the ‘Romanisation’⁷¹ of the landscape and hold on to their indigenous culture. In northern Europe tribes of forest dwelling Germans fiercely resisted and sometimes defeated Roman armies. In *Germania*, the Roman author Tacitus describes the appearance of the country as being covered in “bristling

⁶⁸ Plato., *Critias* (3.75). In *The Complete Dialogues* (translated by B. Jowett). Random House. New York. 1937.

⁶⁹ There is a great deal of scientific information available to back evidence of early Mediterranean deforestation. For example, see *The Mediterranean Environment and Society* (edited by R. King, L. Proudfoot and B. Smith). Edwin Arnold. London. 1997.

⁷⁰ Of the Romans, Attenborough writes: “To them it seemed nature could be ravished and plundered as men wished....When states went to war, entire forests were devastated to provide armies with vehicles and the navies with ship. So as the classical empire spread from east to west along the Mediterranean and north into Europe, the forests were demolished... The provinces of North Africa were, originally among the richest in all the empire. Six hundred cities flourished along the African shore, producing half a million tons of grain a year to supply the huge city of Rome which had outstripped its own agricultural resources. The end was not long in coming...though rainfall did diminish, the crucial blow was the stripping away of the trees and relentless ploughing and reploughing to extract a maximum tonnage of crops. Year after year the soil was lost, baked by summer sun and blown away by wind. In winter, rainstorms swilled it away....All along the African coast, the land dried out. Wheat could no longer be grown. Olives were the only crops that would grow, then even they began to fail...” Attenborough. D., *The First Eden. op. cit.*, pp.117-118.

⁷¹ By this I mean the homogenous nature of Roman architecture, roads and institutions which were remarkably uniform throughout the Empire, whether in Britain or Asia Minor. See Williams. W. A., *Empire as a Way of Life*. Oxford University Press. New York. 1980.

forests or fowl swamps”⁷² whose people revered invisible Gods in sacred forest groves:

“The Germans do not think it in keeping with the divine majesty to confine gods within walls or to portray them in the likeness of any human countenance. Their holy places are woods and groves and they apply the names of deities to that hidden presence which is seen only by the eye of reverence.”⁷³

The Roman attitude to forest peoples was extremely negative. They were considered to be barbaric savages, to be conquered and have their lands converted to Roman modes as quickly as possible. The Roman perspective on nature in general was so deleterious that it caused the Stoic philosopher Seneca, writing in the first century A.D., to ask:

“How long shall we weary heaven with petitions for superfluous luxuries, as though we had not at hand the wherewithal to feed ourselves? How long shall we fill our plains with huge cities? How long shall the people slave for us unnecessarily? How long shall countless numbers of ships from every sea bring us provisions, for consumption of a single mouth?”⁷⁴

The later Greeks and Romans had lost their spiritual association with nature and particularly their forests.

And yet in earlier times, both peoples revered natural places as a source of their religious inspiration. Nearly all early Greek temples were originally tree-sanctuaries (usually cited near running water). The divine statues were originally all wood and even some statues as late as the fifth century (B.C.) were built around a wooden core.⁷⁵ Walter Burkert, describing early Greek temples writes:

“The tree, however is even more important than the stone in marking the sanctuary. The shade giving tree epitomises both beauty and continuity across

⁷² Tacitus., *The Agricola and the Germania* (translated by H. Mattingly.) Penguin Books. [98 AD] 1970, p.104.

⁷³ Tacitus., (*ibid*), p.109. [Emphasis added].

⁷⁴ Sidley. H. C., *Seneca: A Selection* (translated by A. Stewart). George Bell and Sons. London. 1904, p.47

⁷⁵ Burkert. W., *Greek Religion. op. cit.*, pp.28,39,91.

the generations...The tree is closely associated with the goddess. The carved image of Athena in Athens is made of olive wood and the image of Hera in Tiryns is made of wild-pear wood...Often a tract of woodland belongs to the sanctuary, a grove, *alsos*, called *altis* in Olympia either constituting the sanctuary itself or lying immediately adjacent.”⁷⁶

The groves and sacred trees were ritually ‘cut off’ from profane (*bebelon*) activity and became *temene*; dedicated to a God or hero. The *temenos* is set apart for sacred work and becomes the precinct of the temple.⁷⁷ In the same sense that the empty space of the Judaic Holy of Holies was the *temenos* of the temple of Jerusalem, so in early Greek tradition the wood and the tree were the *temenoi* of their shrines to various Gods and Goddesses.

Artemis and Dionysus are examples of early Greek deities who had forest origins. Artemis, one of the earliest Greek (or even pre-Greek) deities, was primarily the Goddess of the open countryside beyond the towns and villages and beyond the fields tilled by people. Artemis was the Goddess of the wild places of the world; she presided over hunting and the initiation of young girls, and was the mistress of sacrifices. Artemis was celebrated in sacred groves, altars and shrines which always contained trees as their *temenos*. First fruits were offered to Artemis in her sanctuaries where a tithe of what the fields bore each year was sacrificed to the Goddess as part of the festival of the hunt.⁷⁸ Dionysus, usually defined as the God of wine, was also a God of trees and vegetation in general. Frazer writes:

“He [Dionysus) was the patron of cultivated trees: prayers were offered to him that he would make the trees grow; and he was especially honoured by husbandmen, chiefly fruit growers, who set up an image of him, in the shape of a natural tree stump in their orchards. He was said to have discovered all tree fruits and he was referred to as ‘well fruited’ and ‘he of the green’Amongst the trees particularly sacred to him, in addition to the vine was the pine-tree, and the fig tree.”⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Burkert. W., (*ibid*), pp.85-86.

⁷⁷ Burkert. W., (*ibid*), p.86

⁷⁸ Burkert. W., (*ibid*), p.67. See also Abrahamsen. V. A., *Women and Worship at Philippi: Diana/Artemis and Other Cults in the Early Christian Era*. Astarte Shell Press. Portland. 1995, pp.46-48.

⁷⁹ Frazer. J., *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*. Penguin Books. London. 1996, p.466.

Both Artemis and Dionysus, the earliest Greek vegetation Gods, were worshipped during rituals, usually in special sanctuaries or sometimes in the wild places themselves. The drinking of wine, easing of sexual taboos, dancing and general merrymaking were the focus of cults dedicated to the nature Gods. The fertility and the abundance of nature's benevolence were celebrated in association with forests, fields, orchards and vineyards. The influence of the vegetation Gods eventually waned in ancient Greece as the power of the *Polis* gained favour. However, as if to unbind the growing civic laws, the cults of Artemis and Dionysus withdrew to the wild woodlands where adherents revised the wildness and gay abandon in ecstatic worship of the uncontrolled elements of nature.

As in early Greece, Rome likewise had forest origins. In his seminal work, *The Golden Bough*, James Frazer traces the Sylvan origins of the early Roman kings. Frazer maintains that Rome was founded by settlers from Alba Longa. The Alban dynasty bore the name of *Silvii* or Wood from the tradition of Jupiter, God of the Oak as well as of thunder and rain. The early Latin kings were the personification of Jupiter himself and a chaplet of oak leaves formed the insignia which marked the monarch as the human representative of the oak God.⁸⁰ Legends of Rome's origin tell of Rhea Silvia who, raped by the God Mars, gives birth to twins who are first suckled by a wild forest wolf. One of the twins, Romulus, grows up in the forest⁸¹ and eventually becomes a leader of homeless people. The semi-divine Romulus founds his city in a clearing on Capitoline Hill, and peoples it by offering asylum to fugitives and criminals. One of his first tasks was the construction of a temple to Jupiter built beside a sacred oak tree.⁸²

The forest origins of Rome are traceable not only through legends and historical texts, but also from linguistic origins. One such example can be discerned from the

⁸⁰ Frazer. J., (*ibid*), pp.178-179.

⁸¹ At this time most of what is now modern Italy was forested. Theophrastus [400 B.C.] describes the woods of Latium: "The land of the Latins is all moist. The plains produce laurels, myrtles and wonderful beeches; for they fell trees of such a size that a single stem suffices for the keel of a Tyrrhenian ship. Pines and firs grow in the mountains..." cited by Frazer. J., in *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. op. cit.*, p.181.

⁸² Livy., [1.7,1.8] in *The Early History of Rome* (translated by A. de Selincourt). Penguin Books. London. 1960.

meaning of the modern word 'law' which originates from the Latin *lex*. Vico explains:

“First it must have meant a collection of acorns. Thence we believe is derived *ilex*, as it were *illex*, the oak; for the oak produces acorns by which the swine are drawn together. *Lex* was next a collection of vegetables, from which the latter were called *legumina*. Later on, at a time when letters had not been invented for writing down the laws, *lex* by necessity of a civil nature must have meant a collection of citizens or the public parliament, so that the presence of the people was the *lex* or 'law'.”⁸³

As *lex* evolved from acorn gathering to law,⁸⁴ so Rome grew from forest clearing to empire; an empire so powerful that it nearly turned the whole of Europe into one vast clearing. With the founding of Rome the notion of the civic begins, and the boundary between the law of *res publica* and the law of *res nullis* of the wild forests is drawn. Slowly but surely the Latin forests gave way to the growing city of Rome whose origins in forest clearings became lost in the rising power of its civic heroes.

Like early Greek and Roman traditions, tree symbols abound in many original Judaic texts including Genesis where the Tree of Life stood in the Garden of Eden along side the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.⁸⁵ Chapter 3 of Genesis tells the story of the fall of Man. The serpent tells Eve that, although God has told her that she and Adam are not to touch the tree lest they die, in fact God knows that “in the day you eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” The fruit of the tree is wisdom, but the gift of wisdom also means separation from divine harmony. Adam and Eve, the progenitors of humankind, not only become self-aware but are also cast out of the Garden of Eden. They must now

⁸³ Vico. G., *The New Science. op. cit.*, p.36 [240].

⁸⁴ Harrison comments: "Although the concrete referent word changes according to the stage of social evolution, the law of humanity remains constant insofar as it represents the law of gathering, collecting, binding. The word for Vico's *lex* in Greek is *logos*, from *legein*, which has the ancient meaning of 'gathering' or 'relating'. Through this law of the *lex* or *logos*, civil society comes into being as a gathering; not an orgiastic gathering in the sense of communal Dionysian ecstasy but rather a gathering bound by limits, identity form, and restraint." Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, p.35.

⁸⁵ Genesis 2.9. [All Biblical references from *The Authorised King James Version*. Tyndale house. Wheaton, Illinois. 1981.] Christ is often associated with the verdant cross or as crucified on the tree of life. There is also a Buddhist tree of wisdom, the Muslim Lote tree symbolising the boundary between human understanding and divine mystery and Chinese tree of life. See Schama. S., *Landscape and Memory*. Harper Collins. London. 1995, p.218.

decide between good and evil, what is useful and what is useless, so that they can begin to shape their lives independently. Tree and plant theophanies are common in the early Judaic tradition. Examples include the burning bush from which God spoke to Moses on his sacred mountain Horeb,⁸⁶ the angel of the Lord who came and spoke to Gideon and ‘sat under an oak tree which was in Oprah’,⁸⁷ the idea that trees could give forth oracular sounds,⁸⁸ and the oak of Moreh beneath which Abraham built an altar after the Lord had appeared to him there.⁸⁹ These examples suggest that in some fundamental way religious experience, and particularly spiritual knowledge, was associated with trees and vegetation. The sanctuaries of Semitic primary religion were often adorned with sacred trees.⁹⁰

In the later Christian tradition, the image of Christ as a great tree growing from heaven to Earth was common. Christ was the ‘scion of David’, ‘the man called branch’; he who was called ‘the true vine’ in John’s Gospel, he who spoke in parables about the Kingdom of God which grows from a tiny mustard seed to a great tree in which ‘all the birds of the air’ find shelter.⁹¹ This great tree is presented in folklore and non-canonical Christianity throughout Europe and particularly in Ireland.⁹² The mystical tree is described in the Gospel of Nicodemus:

“Learned tradition tells of a wonderful tree, with its upper part above the firmament, its lower part in the earth, and every melody in its midst. Another part of its marvellous features was that it grew downward from above. It grew downward from a single root. There were nine branches, each more beautiful than that above. There were pure white birds on the forks of the branches, listening to their many melodies throughout the ages. The tree is Jesus Christ, the acme of all Gods creatures. All the melody in the tree’s midst represents the perfection of bliss in the mystic depths of the divinity. Its single root is the one Godhead of divinity. The roots below are the twelve apostles; the nine branches are the nine heavenly orders, with each order more noble than that

⁸⁶ Exodus, 3, 1.

⁸⁷ Judges, 6, 11.

⁸⁸ Samuel, 5, 24.

⁸⁹ Genesis, 12, 6-7.

⁹⁰ See De Vaux. R., *Ancient Israel, Its Life and Institutions* (translated by J. McHugh). London. 1965, pp.278-286.

⁹¹ Mark, 4, 30-32, Luke, 13,19, Matthew, 13, 31-32.

⁹² Low. M., *Celtic Christianity and Nature: Early Irish and Hebridian Traditions*. Edinburgh University Press. Edinburgh. 1996, pp.102-104.

before it. The white birds among the branches are the shining souls of the just among the heavenly orders.”⁹³

The Christian cross is often depicted as the Tree of Life in many parts of Europe. This Tree of Life can be seen as a prototype of all miraculous plants which bring the dead to life, heal the sick, restore youth, and so on.⁹⁴ And yet, Christian and Judaic traditions essentially evolved from a Sky-God religion,⁹⁵ which began as a spiritual expression developed from the open spaces of less forested regions. As Christianity evolved, it drew increasingly upon its Judaic roots⁹⁶ and developed an orthodoxy where denial of nature as a sacred source strengthened to the extent that the Church became openly hostile to nature worship.⁹⁷

As if to spite the glory of ‘civilising’ influences derived from Greek, Roman and Judaic sources, the tree and forest symbols of old Europe refused to be entirely displaced by the influences of *res publica*. The provincial people stubbornly held onto their high regard for trees and forests. In the great forests of northern Europe trees were still foci for religious worship. To the people who lived within these immense woodlands,⁹⁸ trees and forests were not only a place for dwelling, but also

⁹³ From *The Gospel of Nicodemus* (edited by M. Herbert and M. MacNamara), IBA. Edinburgh. 1989, p.55. (Abridged).

⁹⁴ Eliade. M., *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. Sheed and Ward. London. 1958, pp.287-288.

⁹⁵ It is now commonly accepted that Hebrews were a Semitic people with close links to Sumer. Abraham is said to have been born in Ur, a Sumerian city dedicated to the Moon God and there is little doubt that early Judaic traditions were heavily influenced by Sumerian religions. Leonard Wooley writes: "The Sumerian did not evolve gods from his inner consciousness, he encountered them; they revealed themselves through the phenomena of the physical world. Living in the flat Mesopotamian valley a man cannot fail to be impressed and at times overwhelmed by the vast expanse of circling sky, to realise his own insignificance in the face of its unbridgeable remoteness." Wooley. L., "Religious Beliefs and Practices," in *History of Mankind. op. cit.*, p.701. See also Winter. I. J., "Reading Concepts of Space From Ancient Mesopotamian Monuments," in *Concepts of Space: Ancient and Modern*. Ahibnav Publications. New Dehli. 1991, pp.57-58.

⁹⁶ An example of this attitude is revealed in the proclamations of St Eligius, who as early as 640 A.D. stated: "No Christian [shall] place lights at the temples or the stones or at the fountains and springs, or at trees... let no one presume to purify by sacrifice, or to enchant herbs, or to make flocks pass through a hollow tree or an aperture in the earth; for by doing so he seems to consecrate them to the devil. No one shall go to trees, or wells, or stones, or enclosures [circles of trees], or anywhere else except God's church and there make vows, or release himself from them." cited by Bates. B., "Sacred Trees" in *Resurgence*. No.181. 1997, p.39.

⁹⁷ This is probably also of Sumerian origin where contact between the citizen and the images of the gods became rarer and rarer as they became more secluded in the temple sanctuaries. The idea of the innumerable gods became more important than the actual images. Wooley. L., "Religious Beliefs and Practices." *op. cit.*, p.710.

⁹⁸ Frazer notes that the Hercynian forests (eastwards from the Rhine) were so vast that even as late as the first century B.C.: "Germans who Caesar questioned had travelled for two months through it

the very ground of their existence. So vast were many of these forests that people had little experience of open lands. All that was essentially mysterious originated from within the forest glades. There can be little doubt that for early European forest dwellers, the great woods and the trees within them, were a source of inspiration and a cause for celebration of the sacred. A life without trees would have been as unimaginable as a life without water or air. The *mythos* which arose from these forests would have been a celebration of the unexplainable nature of forest life and the expression this *mythos* was tree, wood and forest symbols.

In northern Europe age-old forest demons, elementals, elves, fairies, sprites, oak Gods and nature spirits continued to fill the woodlands and people maintained their reverence for the old forest Gods and Goddesses, worshipping in their natural temples wherever they remained. One particularly fascinating example is the great Nordic Ash tree *Yggdrasil*, whose roots and trunk fasten the Earth between underworld and heaven as a World Tree, continued to hold sway over northern peoples.⁹⁹ *Yggdrasil* was not only a sacred World Tree but also central to the worldview of the northern peoples.

The cosmology of *Yggdrasil* is outlined by Peter Salus and Paul Taylor:

“The world-ash tree *Yggdrasil* has one of its three roots embedded in *Asgard*, the second in *Utgard* and the third in *Niflheim*. Under the first root is the spring of Urd (Future or Fate; Old English *Wyrd*, Shakespeare’s weird as in the weird sisters of *Macbeth*), under the second is the well of *Mimir*, Odin’s source of wisdom, and under the third is the spring *Hvergelmir*, source of all rivers. The Dragon *Nidhogg* (Deep Biter) gnaws at the deepest root, and above four dwarves (North, South, East, and West) support the sky.”¹⁰⁰

The tree contains the middle world (*Midgard*) of humans and Gods which is bounded by the outer world (*Utgard*) containing frost giants, elves, dark elves and vanes. Beneath is the realm of the Goddess Hel (*Niflheim*). Above is the crown of *Yggdrasil*

without reaching the end." Frazer, J., *The Golden Bough. op. cit.*, p.132. See also Schama, S., *Landscape and Memory*. Harper Collins. London. 1995, pp.83-85.

⁹⁹ Schama, S., (*ibid*), p.218.

¹⁰⁰ Salus, P. H. and Taylor, P. B., "Introduction," to *The Elder Edda* (translated by W. B. Auden and P. B. Taylor). Faber and Faber. London. 1969, pp.30-31. See also Cook, R. *The Tree of Life: Symbol of the Centre*. Thames and Hudson. London. 1974, p.12.

where a perched eagle protects the tree from predators. The world of Gods (*Asgard*) is separate from the human realm, but joined by the famous rainbow bridge (*Bifröst*). Odin in his human form takes upon himself the shamanic journey across the rainbow bridge and by descending to *Niflheim* and traversing *Utgard*, drinking of the waters of *Urd*, *Mimir* and *Hvergelmir*, rediscovers himself as a God. He returns transformed and tells the people of *Midgard* of the wisdom he gained, including the knowledge of the *Wyrð*¹⁰¹ and the Runes. From *The Elder Edda*, we read:

“Wounded I hung on a wind swept gallows
 For nine long nights,
 Pierced by a spear, pledged to Odin,
 Offered myself to myself:
 The wisest know not from whence spring
 The roots of that ancient rood.

They gave me no bread, they gave me no mead:
 I looked down; with a loud cry
 I took up runes, from that tree I fell.”¹⁰²

Nordic symbols not only link trees to cosmology but also to the shamanic wisdom traditions which were once the religious pathways of the forest peoples of Europe.

The spread of Christianity ultimately changed many of the ancient tree and forest religions as their devotees were forced to accept the transcendent Judaeo-Christian God, who could be found neither on Earth nor in the Sky. And yet sacred Oaks, Hawthorns, Ashes and Yews continued to inspire Irish and English Celts well into the Christian era.¹⁰³ Corn rituals, first fruit rites, May-pole and May-tree celebrations, solstice activities, as well as the embodiment of the oak and mistletoe as sacred symbols continued to be a regular part of the life of European peoples.¹⁰⁴ The ancient *mythos* of sacred forests and tree spirits refused to be entirely superseded by new

¹⁰¹ Brian Bates discussing the origins of the word *wyrð* writes: “The original, archaic form meant in Anglo-Saxon ‘destiny’, but also ‘power’ or ‘magic’ or ‘prophetic knowledge’. *Wyrð* was still ‘unexplainable’, but the unexplainable was the sacred the very ground of existence, the force which underlay all of life. And one way it was manifested was in trees which were regarded as sacred by the peoples of ancient Europe.” Bates. B., *The Wisdom of the Wyrð: Teachings For Today From Our Ancient Past*. Rider. London. 1997, pp.263-264.

¹⁰² Strophes 130 and 131 of *The Elder Edda*. *op. cit.*, p.56

¹⁰³ Low. M., *Celtic Christianity and Nature*. *op. cit.*, pp.80-85.

religions originating from Rome, Greece or Israel where the Earth Goddess had been replaced by the ever-more important Sky-Gods.

Gradually, the waning of the ancient forest *mythos* coincided with the waxing of civic life. A greater part of the population accepted settled life in towns and cities as well as the increasingly agriculturally determined rural landscapes. *Chora*, the receptacle of sensory experience and the seat of phenomena, was now to be experienced as part of human creations in the form of cultured fields, townscapes and architecture. Sense of place was now a human dimension. The remaining forests became the 'other'; the *nemus*, the place of no one, places of danger, outlaws, outcasts and wild animals, where unpredictable events may occur. The sacred was sought in churches whose precinct was the invisible and physically distant, yet transcendent God who had no apparent material presence. The old forest symbols presenting the sacred power of nature had little credibility in places regulated by human endeavour. *Chora* in untamed nature was now a nostalgic or romantic vision of paradise lost; the spirits of the forest no longer spoke to mortal men.

The symbols presenting the essence of the old myths did not however disappear, and forest symbols continued to hold a central position in European life for a long while after the demise of the old religions. These pervasive symbols survived into the secular age where a certain respect for, and love of trees and forests, continues to the present day. The family tree, the evolutionary tree, the love of parks and gardens and the colour green, the attraction of wild places and the sense of well-being engendered by wooded vistas¹⁰⁵ are all legacies of Europe's sylvan origins. In modern buildings natural wood is desired, and landscape art is still highly valued. Trees still provide *temene* to many of the places which are respected and admired in the modern era. Symbols derived from the forest still surround modern people even though their secular worldview tends to deny the sacred aspect once openly sought.

¹⁰⁴ Many of these sacred rites are covered in great detail in Frazer's *Golden Bough* (*op. cit.*), but are far too complex and wide ranging to deal with here.

¹⁰⁵ In contrast, the Australian Aboriginal desert tribes much prefer the red-brown hues of their homelands to the sharp green grasslands of the eastern coasts. Tibetan nomads of the vast treeless Chang Thang plateau do not enjoy visits to forests where they feel enclosed.

Europeans are no longer forest people. They still suffer from the fear of death, and like Gilgamesh they stare, not over the city walls, but out from their academies and institutions across the vast mechanised and controlled landscapes which bound their civilisation, at the remorseless transcendence of nature. The Earth, revolving in her relentless cycles, still turns the new 'kings' and 'heroes' of materialism into cadavers. Like Gilgamesh they still take revenge upon many of the great forests of the world in an attempt to avoid their mortality in the face of nature's continued endurance.

The religious history of the greater European region reveals a battle between the Gods of the Earth and the Gods of the Sky, a battle which has not yet been entirely won by the latter. In the modern era, there is a definite resurgence in interest in old European religions and their symbols derived from natural phenomena. The last living remnants of Europe's great forests are fiercely defended from those who wish to exploit them. And a growing awareness of forest destruction worldwide is one of the driving forces of the modern environmental movement. It is now widely recognised that destruction of the last remaining forests is morally and scientifically unsustainable; yet deforestation continues at an alarming rate, far beyond what is sensible or even rational.

The question is: What is driving those of the modern world to devastate forests at ever-increasing rates even though in the long term it is not in their best interest to do so? Why, when so many are searching for a true sense of place, do they still treat the forests as though they were *nemus*?

In part, the answer can be found in modern attitudes to, and beliefs about, the ownership of goods and property as well as the idea that material accumulation will quell the fear of mortality and provide a source of meaning. The desire for material security remains stronger than the need for spiritual fulfillment. On the other hand, it could be argued that gaining material possessions is the modern equivalent of a sacred duty.

THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

“The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, what wars, what murders, what miseries, what horrors would the human race have been spared by someone who, uprooting the stakes or filling in the ditch, had shouted to his fellow-men: Beware of listening to this imposter; you are lost if you forget that the fruits belong to all and the earth to no one!” Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1755]¹⁰⁶

The collapse of the Roman empire in northern and central Europe was largely brought about by Germanic tribes who, through a series of military successes, effectively evicted the Roman legions and ended the dominance of Rome over their lives and homelands. The Roman tradition of forest clearance and town building had altered the physical and cultural landscape to a point where the old forest dwelling ways could not always be sustained. The rise of the Germanic peoples brought significant changes to land-use patterns, not only in north and central Europe, but also in Britain. The Germanic tribes had four classes: a few nobles or Earls, a large class of freemen, some slaves and a small number of semi-freemen or serfs.¹⁰⁷ Freemen, being the most common class, accepted only limited authority over their activities by the nobles. The free men worked the land as they wished, when and where they chose. Each freeman held a large tract of land, a freehold farmstead where he grazed animals and grew crops with the help of other freemen, slaves and serfs. Freemen were also mobile and could leave their freehold to take up another in a new area if local areas became overcrowded. Thus the Germanic people expanded their influence across Europe.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Rousseau. J. J., *The First and Second Discourses* (edited by R. D. Masters and translated by J. R. Masters). St Martins Press. New York. 1964, pp.141-142.

¹⁰⁷ Hargrove. E. C., "Anglo-American Land Use Attitudes," in *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence* (edited by S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler). McGraw-Hill Inc. New York. 1993, p.198.

¹⁰⁸ Ross D. W., *The Early History of Land-Holding Among the Germans*. Soule and Bugbee. Boston. 1883, pp.15-17.

Strictly speaking, the freemen did not own land. The idea of landownership in the modern sense was still many centuries away, but the freemen did have some limits. Freemen could not hold more land than they needed and tributes had to be made to local Earls. In general the freemen prospered by fostering local social harmony or moving on if things went bad. Population problems eventually triggered the major difficulties for the freehold system. When new lands were used up, or borderlands could not be acquired, a system for transferring freehold rights began to evolve. Usually the eldest son inherited everything and the remaining children became semi-free and often were reduced to the poverty-stricken life of serfs. Sometimes freeholds were divided but this usually resulted in children of the next generation inheriting worthlessly small lands. Eventually the freemen represented an increasingly smaller proportion of the population, thus weakening their political power over the nobles. The subsequent rise in power of the noble class meant that they were able to exert a new measure of control over the freemen and the traditional tributes paid to nobles became fees¹⁰⁹ and taxes. Many freeholders became overburdened by such taxes and a large proportion of them were forced to relinquish their land. The Germans thus made a transition from prefeudal to feudal conditions which gradually evolved as holdings were amalgamated and remaining landholders merged with nobles to become a minority ruling class.¹¹⁰

While most of mainland Europe made the transition to feudalism, England and its German descendants, the Saxons, continued the freehold system with impunity. Bryant describes the Saxons and their freeholds prior to the Norman invasion:

“These people loved the soil and the tending of it and its beasts. They left their memorial, not like the Romans in stone or the Bronze Age men in burial grounds, but in the imperishable shape of the earth they tilled; it is writ large across our shires, with their villages, meadows and ploughlands. And in the work of their artists that has come down to us, in their carvings in wood and stone of leaves, trees and animals, we can see their depth of feeling for nature.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ The modern term *fee simple* - meaning that the title holder has an absolute right to alienate land - is a relic of freemen traditions as is *freehold* - meaning land holding which is not subject to rent, lease, or direct control of government institutions or other land owners.

¹¹⁰ Hargrove. E. C., “Anglo-American land Use Attitudes” *op. cit.*, p.199.

¹¹¹ Bryant. A., *The Medieval Foundation of England*. Collier. New York. 1968, pp.15-16.

The Saxon freemen, however, were more concerned with relatively short term gains than they were about the wider duties which may have been expected from the local communities and neighbours. The freemen were, in effect, a law unto themselves in terms of land management.¹¹²

Saxon freemen had usufructuary rights over land; ownership as such was not considered necessary, which meant that those areas still covered by forests were generally considered to be common lands. These common forests were used for hunting, wood gathering, intermittent grazing and collection of medicinal plants. The invasion of the feudal Normans from France ended freehold rights and many common lands, especially forests, were transferred to the administration of the new King. Walter writes of the Norman influence:

“Twenty years after the conquest, he [King William] ordered a survey of the land to determine how it was held. This investigation perceived only one dimension of the way land was held, it was a study of *dominium*. It confined itself to cadastral realities, determining the monetary value of the land and establishing a basis for taxation and administration.”¹¹³

The ‘place’ or locus of the Saxons gradually became the manor, ‘the place where the lord dwells’; a lord who may enjoy the fruits of the land without ever setting foot on the soil.¹¹⁴ One of the enduring legacies of the freeman period is the idea of landholding being based on work. The landholder took possession of the land by clearing it, constructing buildings and preparing fields for crops and pasturage. Inheritance was also based on the transferral of rights based on work. The early German word for inheritance, *Arbi*, has the same root as the High German word *Arbeit*, meaning work.¹¹⁵ The concept of ‘work’ as a determinant to the right to hold

¹¹² This particular Saxon legacy is reflected in many of the arguments put up by modern landowners to counter environmental concerns about sustainable land management.

¹¹³ Walter. E. V., *Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment. op. cit.*, p.34. Walter notes that the results of the survey were collected in the *Domesday Book*, the earliest public record of England.

¹¹⁴ This was anathema to Saxon thinking and many freeholders took to the forests to become outlaws. For example, Hereward, Fulk Fitzwarren and Eustace the monk. The historical and mythical forest hero Robin Hood symbolises the right of the Saxon freeholders to resist the demands of the feudal state. The popularity of this figure suggests that there were a large number of disaffected Britons who saw the loss of their rights as a great injustice. See Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation op. cit.*, pp.75-81, for an interesting outline of forest outlaws in post-Norman Britain.

¹¹⁵ Ross. D. W., *The Early History of Land-Holding Among the Germans. op. cit.*, p.24.

land survived the feudal period to emerge as the basis for legally established land rights in the seventeenth century (see below).

As for the wooded lands, many were reserved for the King's pleasure and recreation, set aside from the commons. In fact the word forest is derived from such 'setting aside'. Harrison explains:

"The word 'forest' originates from a juridical term. Along with its various cognates in European languages (*foresta*, *fôret*, *forst* etc), it derives from the Latin *foresta*. The Latin word does not come into existence until the Merovigian period. In Roman documents, as well as in the earlier acts of the middle ages, the standard word for woods and woodlands was *nemus*. The word *foresta* appears for the first time in the laws of the Longobards and the capitularies of Charlemange, referring not to woodlands in general but only to royal game preserves. The most likely origin is the Latin *foris*, meaning 'outside'. The obscure Latin verb *forestare* meant 'to keep out, to place off limits, to exclude'."¹¹⁶

Forest, like *nemus*, has connotations of being outside the normal social sphere; it is a place for wild beasts and dangerous people where frightening events may occur.¹¹⁷

By the end of the sixteenth century forest laws were being abused to a point where degradation and loss of forests were so commonplace that in 1598 John Manwood attempted to reinvigorate royal forest decrees in order to preserve remaining wooded regions. In *A Treatise and Discourse of the Lawes of the Forrest*, Manwood seeks to

¹¹⁶ Harrison R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, p.69.

¹¹⁷ This idea is reflected in Dante's *Divine Comedy*. He writes:

"Half way along the road we have to go,
I found myself obscured in a great forest,
Bewildered, and I knew I had lost my way. (Inferno, Canto I: 1-3)

It is hard to say just what the forest was like,
How wild and rough it was, how overpowering;
Even to remember it makes me afraid" (I: 4-6)

Dante, *The Divine Comedy* (translated by C. H. Sisson). Caracanet New Press Ltd. Manchester. 1980, p.3. While these lines are part of a much larger quest, a purely literal interpretation gives a powerful expression of forests as negative places. Dante's lines can be interpreted and used to promote the idea of forests as dangerous and confusing places where the rule of fear dominates. Dante's *selva obscura*, or dark forest, appears to be a symbol of the secular world, deprived of God's light. A place of disorientation and bewilderment where the straight way is lost. This confusion, fear and darkness becomes archetypal in later medieval literature and the idea of 'wild' forests as places of fear become central in the European mind.

define forests as sanctuaries for wild beasts and the domain of the privileged. While much of the *Treatise* was dedicated to rights of royal hunters and the duties of forest officers whose task was to uphold particularised forest laws, the idea of forest as preserves dominates. For Manwood a forest was:

“A certain territory of woody grounds and fruitful pastures, privileged for wild beasts and fowls of the forest, chase and warren, to rest and abide there in the safe protection of the King, for his delight and pleasure...And therefore a forest doth chiefly consist of these four things: of vert and venison; of particular laws and proper officers. All of which are appointed that the same may be better preserved for a place of recreation for Kings and Princes.”¹¹⁸

After Manwood the idea of wooded lands as preserves becomes an increasingly important part of Western attitudes to conservation and protection of forested areas. The National Park concept, being the ultimate development of royal forest preserves, has become the focus of much of the modern attempt to conserve natural regions still held under the various equivalents of crown land. The lands held outside of the Royal preserves suffered an entirely different fate.

JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

By the seventeenth century a number of political, social and religious changes were beginning to alter the fundamental parameters of the Western worldview. Politically, the function of absolute monarchy was under consideration by the parliamentarians who were seeking a new autonomy for civil governance. In terms of religious matters the Christian church was split between the ideas of those who supported Protestant reformation and those who held to the orthodox Roman doctrine. And to compound the theological dilemma, scientific and secular thinking was beginning to emerge through the writings of scholars such as Descartes, Bacon and Newton, some of whom directly challenged the dominance of Christian authority. Socially, the rise of technological innovations and the contact with new and different cultures in the colonies of Africa, Asia and the New World had the effect of broadening the European concept of the world.

Concepts of landholding changed apace. By the end of the Middle Ages land which was not circumscribed by the Crown, was in short supply and landholders began to enclose their land to ensure exclusive use.¹¹⁹ Land ownership became an official legal designation in England in 1660 when feudal dues were abolished; but it was not until 1690 that property entered into the public arena as a political, moral and economic philosophy. This was almost entirely due to the work of the English moral philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704).¹²⁰ Locke's main task was threefold: to generate a moral justification for the enclosure of lands, to define property rights, and to present arguments for the rights of English migrants to colonise and actively alienate land from the native peoples of North America.¹²¹

Locke maintained that a human being is an individual, and by this he meant that a human person is corporeal, rational and a free being. Such an individual has three essential qualities: life, reason and freedom. The condition of a life of freedom was the right to self-preservation in terms of food and shelter. Locke maintained that this was an original, fundamental and rationally inviolable right which was made real through the action called 'labour'. Labour, Locke claimed, aims at realising the duty and right to self-preservation through deliberate (free) bodily and rational action.

¹¹⁸ Manwood, J., *A Treatise and Discourse of the Lawes of the Forrest*. [Reprint of the 1598 edition Wight and Norton. London], Garland Publishing Inc. London. 1978, pp.1-2.

¹¹⁹ Hargrove, E. C., "Anglo-American Land Use Attitudes," *op. cit.*, p.203.

¹²⁰ Locke is considered to be the chief architect of the Western notion of the natural right to property. However, Locke was not entirely alone in his moral and political philosophies of property rights as he built some of his ideas on the works of Richard Hooker (1554-1600), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1692) and his adversary Sir Robert Filmer (1558-1652). Locke also drew upon the philosophy of Aristotle to outline his own ideas of archetypes and what he called ectypes. This particular aspect of Locke's philosophy is far too complicated to elucidate in this brief overview. For a detailed exposition of Locke's philosophy in a historical context, see Tully, J., "Philosophical Underpinnings," in *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1980, pp.3-50.

¹²¹ Locke had an extensive knowledge of and interest in European contact with aboriginal peoples. As secretary to Lord Shaftesbury, secretary of the Lord Proprietors of Carolina (1668-71), secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations (1673-74) and a member of the Board of Trade (1696-1700), Locke was influential in shaping the old colonial system during the Restoration. Locke also invested in the slave-trading Royal Africa Company (1671) and the Company of Merchant Adventurers to trade with the Bahamas (1672), and he was a Landgrave of the proprietary government of Carolina where he wrote *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* (1696). He also drafted Carolina's agrarian laws (1671-2) and proposed reforms for Virginia (1696). Locke also wrote policy recommendations for the boards of trade covering all the colonies as well as various histories of European exploration and settlement and manuscripts on a wide range of topics concerning property and government in America. Tully, J., "The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights," in *An Approach To Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts*. Cambridge University Press. 1993, pp.142-143.

Locke concluded that since the product of labour is property (see below), then property is the physical manifestation that the individual has exercised through his right and duty to self-preservation. Property is then, both a right and a duty.¹²²

Locke underpinned his new moral philosophy of property with essential biblical text.¹²³ For example, Locke writes:

“God gave the world to men in common, but since he gave it to them for their benefit...it cannot be supposed that he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and the rational.”¹²⁴

Locke argued that Genesis 1.28 [“Then God blessed them and said to them, be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves on the earth”] meant that Adam was granted private dominion over the Earth and all inferior creatures. This private dominion was given in common with all mankind, but the goods created through the efforts of individuals using their natural rights to food and shelter were their sole possessions. These sole possessions were, therefore, private property which each individual had the right to alienate from any others who may try to lay claim to them.¹²⁵ Here Locke is making a distinction between natural rights and natural law. Natural right is due to us because we have the free uses of things (i.e., God given), whereas natural law derives from externally imposed obligatory constraints (i.e., God’s moral commands).¹²⁶ In Locke’s terms this meant that provided we do not violate natural law, we stand in the same relation to the objects we create as God stands in to us; we own them just as he owns us.¹²⁷ Building on the

¹²² Summarised from Goodwin. R. E., “Property Rights and Preservationist Duties” *Inquiry*. 33. 1990, pp.401-432, and Marshall. P., *Natures Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking*. Simon and Schuster. London. 1992, pp.210-213.

¹²³ Locke’s elucidation of biblical texts to back up his arguments was comprehensive. The most thorough coverage of Locke’s theological exegesis can be found in Harris. I., *The Mind of John Locke*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1994. (See chapters six to ten) .

¹²⁴ Locke. J., *The Two Treatises of Government* (edited by P. Laslett). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1967, [second treatise paragraph 34].

¹²⁵ Tully. J., *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1980, pp.60-61.

¹²⁶ Shapiro. I., “Resources, Capacities and Ownership,” in *Early Modern Concepts of Property* (edited by J. Brewer and S. Staves). Routledge. London and New York. 1996, p.23.

¹²⁷ Tully. J., *A Discourse on Property op. cit.*, pp.109-110.

old Saxon and German freemen idea of work as a determinant for individual rights to landholding, Locke considered that it was the act of labour which enclosed land, i.e., the improvements made to the land were private property. Those who improved land through their own labour should enjoy inalienable rights to ownership.

The fulfillment of God's intentions in giving 'Man' dominion not only contributes to the common good of civil society but also benefits the industrious individual. Locke suggests that:

“The provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are...ten times more, than those which are yielded by an acre of land, of equal richness, lying waste in common. And therefore he that encloses land and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres, than he could have from a hundred left to nature may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind.”¹²⁸

Here Locke is concerned with the moral and social issues to which property and labour can be put in a regulated society. From the *Two Treatises* we can summarise Locke's central ideas. Locke tells us that “every man has a property” and by extension “the labour of his body and the work of his hands.” When a person removes a thing from its natural state, he has “mixed his labour with and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property...for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to.”¹²⁹ The emerging idea suggests that by mixing what is yours (i.e., your labour) with what is available as a right of nature, you make any other's taking of that thing without your consent unlawful. Because, by the taking of the improved thing, that person is in fact stealing your labour (i.e., that which is your God given right to call your own). Thus by labouring, you extend your natural property in yourself to things external to you. By mixing your labour with a thing it is then joined to you in the manner of annexation.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Locke. J., *The Two treatises. op. cit.*, paragraph 37.

¹²⁹ Locke. J., (*ibid*), paragraph 27.

¹³⁰ Mautner. T., “Locke on Appropriation,” in *American Philosophical Quarterly*. July. 1982, p.261. Also Becker. L., *Property Rights*. Routledge and Kegan Paul. London. 1977, pp.33-34, and Simmons. A. J., *The Lockean Theory of Rights*. Princeton University Press. New Jersey. 1992, pp.253-256.

His idea of 'waste' was the common lands within England's borders and those areas of the world where native peoples lacked the kind of civil society deemed to be advanced by Europeans. This perception facilitated the idea that native people who did not cultivate their lands by practice of 'commercial agriculture' and therefore did not mix their labour with their lands should not claim superior rights to European settlers who wish to improve such wastelands.¹³¹ Locke maintained that lands such as those claimed by American Indians were in fact still in a 'state of nature' and that the Indians represented the earliest 'age' in worldwide historical development. James Tully, writing on Locke's ideas about civilisation comments:

"The first trope that Locke vouchsafes in his premise that 'in the beginning all the world was America.' This grounds the convention that all the societies in the world are the same in the beginning and can be ranked on one scale of world historical development. Amerindian societies are by definition primitive and can be studied to see what politics and property were like at the beginning of European society. On the top are European societies, 'civilised' by virtue of their property and state formations. This Eurocentric conception formed a framework for the eighteenth century debate and theories of development to this day."¹³²

The Indians did not have 'civil' societies: they lacked laws, established judges and a legislature, and as they had no political society they lived in a 'state of nature'. Living in a state of nature meant that they had no motive to acquire more than they needed and therefore did not apply their labour to any but a few small spots of enclosed and cultivated land. According to Locke, this meant that all other lands claimed by Indians for hunting and gathering did not represent a true claim, and such lands being 'waste', could and should be expropriated at will by European settlers.¹³³

Such arguments were quickly disseminated throughout Europe and the Lockean codes were written into the Law of Nations. Emeric de Vattel, in writing such laws, declared that the establishment of colonies was 'entirely lawful'. He states:

¹³¹ Pocock. J. G. A., "A Discourse of Sovereignty," in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*. (edited by N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1993, p.418.

¹³² Tully. J., "Placing the Two Treatises," in *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*. (*ibid*), p.264.

¹³³ Tully. J., *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1993, pp.166-168.

“The cultivation of the soil is an obligation imposed upon man by nature...Every nation is therefore bound by the laws of nature to cultivate land which has fallen to its share. There are others who, in order to avoid labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the fruits of the chase...Those who still pursue this idle mode of life occupy more land than they would under a system of honest labour, and they may not complain if other more industrious nations, too confined at home should come and occupy part of their lands...When the nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no special need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of them and establish colonies in them.”¹³⁴

The upshot of Locke’s theories was that the earth now became the arena in which, through labour, one can claim part of what is in ‘common’ and make it exclusively one’s own as property. The conceptual connection is made between ‘individual action’ (i.e., labour) and ‘property’. And the commons held by peoples who did not mix labour with land were deemed to have no intrinsic rights to those lands they inhabited without improvement. Having the Earth in common now means that lands still held in common have no owners and are therefore open to expropriation by others. Locke also included some restrictions in his property rights. The first was that the potential of property to yield goods should not be destroyed.¹³⁵ A landowner did not have the right to spoil the basis of production derived from labour. This did not of course apply to wooded lands which were brought into productivity by labour, and as such, land clearance cemented rights to enclose the given lands. Locke also contended that each owner should leave his property (whether through sale or inheritance) in a condition which allowed others to benefit by being able to contribute their labour.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ De Vattel. E., *The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law* (translated by C. G. Fenwick). Carnegie Institute. Washington. 1902, pp.207-210.

¹³⁵ One of the positive aspects of Locke's theory was that each property owner had a right to accumulate for comfort and convenience but not just need satisfaction. Locke writes that possessions should not be 'spoiled' or 'perished' but should be put to productive use. This did not apply to natural resources such as coal or oil. Simmons. A. J., *The Lockean Theory of Rights. op. cit.*, p.285.

¹³⁶ Simmons. A. J., (*ibid*), p.295. Locke attempted to include 'fairness' to others in this restriction. However this fairness only applied to 'civilised' people and in the absence of scarcity.

At the same time he lifted restrictions on money as the agent of transfer for property.¹³⁷ Locke also maintained that as there was no longer any physical limitation to land acquisition in the colonies, there was therefore no scarcity of potential property, and by doing so, he opened the New World to unrestricted exploitation. Not only was this exploitation to be unrestricted and unlimited, there was no need to consider what we now call sustainable land management.

The next stage in the evolution of Lockean property rights into neo-classical economics was the idea that as individuality had been established through property then the more a person could own the more 'real' he or she would become.¹³⁸ Such a person would become more independent, freer and increasingly able to define themselves in relation to others - the more property they accumulated. Property ownership, accumulation of goods and money, gradually became an ontological necessity for an increasingly secularised worldview.

There were of course, some serious problems to contend with resulting from the enclosures of land and the individuation of property. The central issue revolved around the free, but essentially irrational, behaviour of thieves and those who attempted illegal expropriation,¹³⁹ and the problem of securing the individual's right to claim the fruits of their labour. Private property, freely and rationally obtained

¹³⁷ Locke noted that money arises naturally from barter but he considered it useful when trading perishable goods (such as seasonal fruit crops) so that an individual's labour could be stored in lieu for purchase of necessities at another time. Money overcomes temporality as it acts as potential future 'goods' for those restricted to certain kind of labour based production. MacPherson notes that: "Locke overcomes the natural law restriction on inequality by arguing that money encourages the enclosure of land which increases the common stock and benefits even those who are left with much less or no land at all. All are in fact made better off by inequalities in shares of natural resources and money." MacPherson, C. B., *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1962, pp.211-213.

¹³⁸ Other neo-classical assumptions included: (i) there is no limit to acquisition, (ii) in the process of acquisition as few as possible costs should be included, (iii) social costs should be excluded, (iv) pollution and resource depletion and other natural costs are excluded, (v) short term benefits for present generations should be sought even if they may add costs to future generations.

¹³⁹ Also the idea of the 'free riders' who could reason that while they were dependent on the institution of property and contracts, which in turn was dependent on people respecting it, it would make an insignificant difference if they personally breached their obligation in order to profit for themselves. The only way to deal with the free rider problem was to propose systems of coercion so efficient that potential free riders would be deflected by the extent of possible punishment. This leads to the draconian theft laws which characterised the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And it remains a major problem in modern times. See Olson, M., *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1977, (Chapter 2).

through labour, was insecure without appropriate legal and physical means of defence. Private property owners had to find a way to assign the duty to protect their interests to someone and they needed a legal system to defend such protection. Thus the evolution of complex land and property laws which were upheld by the governments, states, and monarchs.¹⁴⁰ Modern political machinery was originally put in place to protect private property rights and if the state did not uphold this right then it becomes responsible for potential losses. In this way the modern state has been contracted into being to protect a certain idea of personhood characterised by rational individualism.

The idea of labour was transformed into 'work'. Work becomes the means to achieve the desired goal of acquiring material possessions. Those who choose not to work or are for various reasons unable to find work, are generally considered to be of a lower social order than those who devote much of their lives to the ritual sale of their labour. Work has become an all-encompassing duty in the modern world and all who aspire to join the modern worldview, no matter what their ethnic origins, must undertake the ritual sacrifice of their time in the form of work to earn their status as individuals defined by property. To 'work' is to accumulate the material symbols which generate meaning for those who define their being through ownership. On the issue of labour (i.e., work) in the modern era, Panikkar writes:

“It looks as if the modern addiction to labour is becoming an epidemic for humankind. You have to labour because apparently your naked existence has no value; therefore you have to justify your life by its usefulness...you cannot afford to be an ornament; you have to become an asset... You are expected to produce, to make something which is not you, something which must be objectified, and through money made available and interchangeable. You have to earn what you consume, in addition to your reputation and privileges, or you will be looked down upon as a worthless parasite. So you must try and try harder and compete again...Nothing is gratuitous, comes as a gift,

¹⁴⁰ Rousseau noted the primacy of property in the formation of civil law. Writing in his 'Fragments Politiques', he states: "For all civil rights being founded on that of property, as soon as the latter is abolished it is impossible for any other to survive. Justice would be no more than a delusion and the government no more than a tyranny, and public authority having no legitimate foundation, no one would be obliged to acknowledge it except in so far as he would be constrained to do so force." Cited and translated by Coleman. P., "Property, Politics, and Personality in Rousseau," in *Early Modern Concepts of Property* (edited by J. Brewer. J. and S. Staves). Routledge. London and New York. 1996, p.254.

everything has a price and you must earn enough to pay that price. Works may be of many types, but all are homogenised inasmuch as they are convertible into money. The realm of quantity required by science has become the realm of money for human life. Money is that which allows for the quantification of all human values and thus makes their transactions possible.”¹⁴¹

Work is a modern myth which has come to dominate Western activities. Such work is also linked to the need to accumulate material possessions which, in turn, drives the demand for increasing quantities of ‘standing stock’ resources.

Locke’s political and moral philosophy generated a set of myths which have become entrenched in the minds of modern people. The acquisition of property and the very notion of ownership has become functionally similar to a religious belief. Property is the modern icon. People seek material gain to explain themselves in what remains a largely unexplainable world. Such materialism generates a desire to act (work) in the world, to live in passing time, as a source of meaning, and an ontological basis for most modern people. Sense of place now means ownership of things in a place.¹⁴² Rather than experiencing place as *chora* embedded in nature, only the symbolic presentation remains of an ancient time when people lived with their forests, between Earth and sky.

The forests and forest peoples of the world have suffered greatly from Western myths. When Lockean settlers first arrived on the island shores of tropical Fiji in the eighteenth century, they brought with them a worldview constructed from a *mythos* which could only have been utterly incomprehensible to the forest dwelling tribes of Viti Levu. The new settlers immediately set to converting the ‘natives’ to their own

¹⁴¹ Panikkar. R., "The Contemplative Mood," in *Invisible Harmony: Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility*. Fortress Press. Minneapolis. 1995, p.10.

¹⁴² This particular outcome was probably not Locke's intention. It is easy in hindsight to blame Lockean thought for most of the woes of modern economics. However Locke, like Descartes and many others, was presenting moral theory within a certain historical context which at the time was concerned with agendas and situations quite different to those encountered in the modern era. Certainly Locke's concerns about the potential for abuse of money, destructive land use and the moral requirement for a property owner to leave renewable resources in a fit state which would ensure that future owners could benefit were positive aspects which have only recently been revisited in modern debates.

conception of reality. First came trading, then land alienation, and after that the Judaeo-Christian Sky-God and finally *res publica* in the form of rational individualism. The forests of Fiji, the dwelling place of the people and their source of spiritual power, were reduced to places of no one. For the Fijians, the loss of their forests meant that their Gods and spirits no longer had a place to be.

It is to Fiji we now turn to interpret their traditional *mythos* and to understand what effect colonisation had on their worldview. As in the European worldview, forest symbols persist in the Fijian language and culture and here we must look for symbolic correlations which may aid a meaningful dialogue between the two worldviews.

PART II - FIJI: FORESTS IN TRANSITION

“*Noqu Kalou Noqu Vanua*” [My Gods My Land].¹

INTRODUCTION

The name Fiji and the term Fijians usually presents an image of a place with a uniform tropical landscape inhabited by a people with one distinctive culture. This however, is a modern misperception. There are some 300 islands in the Fijian group with a wide range of regional variation in terms of climate, physical attributes and vegetation patterns. Some islands are atolls while others have high ranges. The climate varies from the wet southeastern regions which are subject to the southeast trade winds to drier western rain-shadow areas. Most of the Fijian region is subject to cyclonic storms of varying strength and frequency. Vegetation patterns range from dense lowland rainforests to submontane forests in the mountains of Viti Levu where frosts have been known to occur. Drier regions on the leeward sides of the larger islands support open shrublands and some grasslands, yet palm fringed coastal regions give Fiji its ‘tropical island paradise’ image. Peter France writes:

“The islands which are called Fiji include extensive rolling plains as well as precipitous mountain steeps; barren fern country and rich tropical forest; low coral islands with their scant fringe of undernourished palms as well as their high limestone neighbours whose earth sustains giant hardwood trees from which are built the great sea going canoes of Fiji and Tonga. It is this diversity of conditions which is embraced when we speak of Fiji.”²

The Fijian people are equally diverse in terms of ethnic origin and lifestyles. Western anthropologists suggest that Fijian peoples arrived in various migrations from Pacific regions designated as ‘Polynesian’ (to the east and north) and ‘Melanesian’ (west) with the possibility of some Micronesian influence (northwest).³ Certainly Fijian

¹ An ancient Fijian saying, variously used as a greeting chant, a welcome call and a traditional battle cry. It is a national symbol which appears on the modern Fijian flag.

² France. P., *The Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonisation in Fiji*. Oxford University Press. London. 1969, p.3.

³ Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian are terms invented by early European explorers and subsequently used by anthropologists to delineate broad physical, linguistic and cultural units. The actual terms are credited to French explorer Dumont d'Urville for whom Melanesia was the ‘black

people celebrate customs and characteristics of all three of the above cultural categories including linguistic similarities. Archaeological evidence, mostly based on pottery styles, reveals an early migration of peoples commonly called Lapita arriving in Fiji approximately 3200 years BP. The Lapita peoples are thought to be a branch of the Southeast Asian Austronesian group.⁴ There is also a second type of pottery, distinctly different from the Lapita style, which appears in Viti Levu at about 2700 BP.⁵ And to confuse the issue even further some evidence of pre-Lapita obsidian tools, called Talsea, suggests some kind of inter-island trading occurring as early as 5000 BP.⁶ All this remains a matter of conjecture, but it suggests that there were at least two, if not three, identifiable migrations into the Fijian region in antiquity and possibly many more in recent times.

In the nineteenth century European proto-anthropologists and historians created a number of fanciful tales to explain the origins of Fijians. David Wilkinson maintained that the ancestors of the Fijians were somehow descended from the aboriginal inhabitants of the garden of Eden which was situated in Western Asia.⁷ Others linked them to the lost tribes of Israel and some were convinced that the original homeland was in various parts of Africa, particularly the Ethiopian Nilotic Negro.⁸ The study of prehistory in Fiji has proven to be an elusive discipline due to a lack of hard evidence, with conflicting accounts originating from many commentators. A chronological elucidation of Fijian prehistory is unlikely to reveal the kind of consistencies observed through analysis of written texts.

islands', Micronesia, the 'tiny islands' and Polynesia, the 'many islands'. Later anthropologists expanded these terms to include language culture and 'mythology'. These artificial categories are coming under increasing scrutiny and are proving to be vulnerable to new interpretations. Linnekin, J., "Contending Approaches," in *The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders* (edited by D. Denoon). Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1997, p.8.

⁴ It is thought that Proto-Austronesians split into Formosan and Malayo-Polynesian groups around 5000 BP. The Malayo-Polynesian group spreading westwards to island Melanesia and into the Eastern Pacific. Denoon, D., "Human Settlement," in *The Cambridge History (ibid)*, p.58.

⁵ Palmer, J. B., "Lapita Style Potsherds from Fiji," in *The Journal of the Polynesian Society LXXV*. 1966, p.373. This particular era has been named the Navuta phase and is characterised by impressed ceramics which is connected with similar styles discovered in New Caledonia. Bayliss-Smith, T. P. Bedford, R. Brookfield, H. and Latham, M., *Islands, Islanders and the World: The colonial and Post Colonial Experience of Eastern Fiji*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1988, p.19.

⁶ Allen, J. and Gosden, C., *Report of the Lapita Homelands Project*. ANU Prehistory Occasional Paper. 20. 1991.

⁷ Wilkinson, D., "Origin of the Fijian Race," *Transactions of the Fijian Society 1910*. Suva, [reprinted 1925]. pp.8-10.

Traditionally, however, there were distinct differences between the people who inhabited the coastal regions and smaller islands and those who preferred the forested highlands of the main islands. The so-called Hill Tribes of Viti Levu lived in a manner quite distinct from those of other parts of the Fiji group. The people who inhabited the hills and mountains of Viti Levu were forest dwellers. Instead of choosing rich bottomlands or coastal fringes, these people preferred the heavily forested highlands even though the soils and the climate were not always suited to intensive cultivation. While they had access to the lowlands and the coast where they controlled land through kinship obligations, they remained steadfastly committed to life in the forests which had a value far greater to them than the open regions which were the source of many of their foodstuffs. The often densely forested and rugged hills contained the places where the Gods had been found to dwell. The Hill Tribes elected to live in close contact with these original spiritual sources rather than have an easier life on the coasts. They preferred to “drink the water as it gushed from the rock rather than accepting the mixed and polluted water of the rivers and estuaries.”⁹

These were the people who sprang from the land; whose ancestors were land-creating Gods who had lived in caves and forests in the mountains. The people of Colo¹⁰ had no stories of migration; they consider themselves to have always inhabited their folded hills and mountain ramparts. The coastal and island peoples were considered to be the ‘strangers who travelled on the sea’, who had migrated from other places. The Colo people believed that while they themselves were truly autochthonous, their chiefs were descended directly from the Gods themselves.¹¹ The guardian spirits or Gods (*Kalou*) could be found in the landscape, and particularly in the forests. The *Kalou* provided the people with all that they required, bringing the

⁸ Ewins. W. J., "Early Migration to Fiji of Man Presently Known as the Fijian Race." *Transactions of the Fijian Society 1919*. Suva, [reprinted 1925]. p.19.

⁹ Kalaveti Batibasaga, July 1997, (personal communication). The referencing in this section includes oral traditions as related to me by Kalaveti Batibasaga. Conversations with Kalaveti on matters of traditional Fijian life were carried out over a period of six months between April and November 1997 while he was studying at Massey University, Palmerston North. Many of these conversations were taped. Further discussions at Kalaveti's home in the village of Navola in Fiji occurred in January 1998 with many of the people concerned with the tribal forest holdings.

¹⁰ Colo (pronounced tholo), meaning interior, is the Fijian word used to describe the region inhabited by the aforementioned 'hill tribes'. The British administrations divided the greater Colo region into the provinces of Colo North, Colo East and Colo West, with the southern parts being renamed Serua and Namosi.

¹¹ Kaplan. M., *Neither Cargo nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the Colonial Imagination in Fiji*. Duke University Press. Durham. 1995, p.49.

wild pigs within range of hunters, guiding the people to forest foods such as wild yams¹² and various fruits. These spirits, in the form of sharks, chased fish into the nets and river guardians directed fish and prawns to move upstream so that the mountain people could find them. The people lived in close association with natural guardian spirits who were the focus of their religious life. Many of these guardian spirits were considered to be ancestral spirits who, after passing to the realm of death from special sacred places, returned to serve their descendants.

These Gods were not Sky-Gods but rose from the land and its living mantle, the great forests themselves. Kalaveti Batibasaga describes this relationship:

“Each tribe has its own totems and Gods to call on for all their needs. This was not God in Christian terms. A ritualistic relationship with the whole of the land included the forests as special places of worship where first fruits were offered. The forests, the sea and all of the natural landscape were their ‘cathedrals’¹³; their places of worship in nature.”¹⁴

The Gods were also an active part of many other aspects of life, including war. Shamanic priests accessed the spirit realm through the ritual use of kava or *yaqona* (*Piper methysticum*). Ranked according to the deities they served, the priests presided over large temples (*Bure Kalou*).¹⁵ Seated on bark cloth (*tapa*) the priests would ingest *yaqona*, become possessed by the deity or ancestor spirit and bring forth predictions, deliver pronouncements and make decisions on many matters of concern to the people. These concerns included hunting, planting times, marriage,

¹² While walking in the forest near Navola village I observed many deep pits which had been dug seemingly at random in what seemed to be quite remote places. These pits were up to 6 feet long and 3-4 feet deep and were scattered all over the steep (and often heavily forested) hillsides. The village people explained that in the month of September most of the population goes to harvest the wild yams (*Dioscorea nummularia*). The digging of the large tubers is apparently quite a skilled task as the yam grows very deep in the soft soils and turns and twists as it grows and the tuber must be broken in the correct place to ensure that a new vine will sprout. The people also informed me that the wild yam does not grow where bulldozers used for logging have passed because the blade destroys the tubers.

¹³ The idea of nature as a ‘cathedral’ is common to many worldviews who inhabited forested regions. For example Knudtson and Suzuki quote a young Canadian Lytton Indian as describing “the Stein valley as his ‘Cathedral’, a spiritual place where he could go and feel the pressures of modern life fall away as he regained a sense of peace and oneness with nature and a reconnection with the past.” Knudtson, P. and Suzuki, D., *Wisdom of the Elders*. Allen and Unwin. St Leonards, Australia. 1992, p.xxvii.

¹⁴ Kalaveti Batibasaga, June 1997, (pers. comm.).

¹⁵ Some of these temples were quite large with extensive stone works. Lorimer Fison included a drawing of the “great temple at Bau” describing the temple mound as being higher than that of a chief’s house. See Fison, L., *Tales From Old Fiji*. [1907] reprint by R. McMillan. Auckland. 1967, p.27,164.

matters of health and the birth of children as well as battle strategies. Many lesser priests were considered to be seers (*dau rai*) and dreamers (*dau tadra*) who could communicate with spirits and were often called upon to predict the future.

BARK CLOTH AND KAVA: SYMBOLS FROM THE FOREST

Two of the most important symbols in traditional Fijian religious life had forest origins. The first was the tree bark cloth (*tapa*). Nineteenth century anthropologist Lorimer Fison describes the manufacture of the cloth:

“Native cloth is called *gatu* when it is made in large pieces. It is made from the bark of a tree called *Malo* or *Masi* [*Broussonetia papyrifera*]. The bark is first dried, then well soaked in water and then beaten out on a large plank. This work is called *samu samu* and is always done by the women. *Gatus* are often very beautifully painted in tasteful and intricate patterns, sometimes in various colours...Some of the colours are very brilliant. They are all I believe extracted from vegetable productions.”¹⁶

The bark cloth has a deeper significance. It also symbolised the placenta, which upon the birth of a child is buried in the soil.¹⁷ Furthermore the women who prepared the bark cloth were called *kunga ni Vanua* meaning the ‘flesh’ of the land. The symbolic importance of this title is derived from the most important food plant, the Taro, whose leaves and stalks were edible directly, but the much-prized root was enclosed with a ‘skin’. This skin was the contact with the soil of the *Vanua* as the placenta is the contact between mother and foetus, and so the bark cloth presents the contact between the spirit world and the human world.¹⁸ This is why bark cloth is symbolically draped on the rafters of the temple where it serves as the path of the God; it is the avenue by which the God descends in order to enter the priest.¹⁹ The bark cloth symbol also has wider implications in relation to the forests. The forests were the ‘skin’ of the *Vanua*, not only protecting the soils, but also the rivers and estuaries from flooding. The spiritual relationship between the people and the *Vanua* was also a ‘skin’ which both empowered the people and protected the life-giving

¹⁶ Fison. L., (*ibid*), p.162.

¹⁷ Frazer notes that in some parts of Fiji the placenta of a newborn child is planted together with a coconut or a cutting from the breadfruit tree, and from then on the child's life is intimately connected with that of the tree. Frazer. J., *The Golden Bough: A Study of Magic and Religion*. Penguin Books. London. 1996, p.818.

¹⁸ Kalaveti Batibasaga, October 1997, (pers. comm.).

land. This spiritual relationship is presented by the living mantle of the forests which clothed the land and enfolded the people. In the Burenitu dialect, the word for forest is *vikaikai*; *vi* - many and *kaikai* - powers, hence many powers. The word *kai* also means wood which links the word *vikaikai* not only to power but also to the trees themselves as a source of spiritual meaning.²⁰ In the expression of the traditional Fijian *mythos*, symbols arising from forest in the form of bark cloth unite the spiritual and the human sphere with the forests and the land in a coherent and intelligible manner.

The second important forest symbol was the drinking of Kava/*yaqona* which was called the 'water of the land'. The growing, preparation and consumption of Kava was of great importance to the early Fijians and remains so to this day. Kava is derived from the root of what once must have been a wild forest plant. Traditionally it was chewed and infused with water, which when mixed has the appearance of muddy water and a distinctly earthy flavour, hence the symbolic term 'water of the land' reflects its real appearance. Kava drinking²¹ was (and is) a ceremonial procedure usually accompanied by chants and the relating of traditional stories in the form of carefully preserved tribal histories and songs.²² Apart from the religious usage by priests, kava was also central to the anointing of new chiefs.

THE WAY OF THE CHIEFS

The installation of a new chief was one of the most elaborate and fascinating symbolic ceremonies of the old Fijian worldview, retaining equal importance in modern times. The essential role of the chief as a ritual specialist of the highest order is to act as a communicator between the people, their ancestors, and the ancestral

¹⁹ Sahlins. M., *Islands of History*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 1985, pp.85-86.

²⁰ Kalaveti Batibasaga, October 1997, (pers. comm.).

²¹ The act of kava drinking also contains many forest symbols. The kava bowl (*tanoa*) is carved and constructed from certain indigenous hardwoods. The drinking container is made from half a coconut shell and the sacred rope directed towards the chief or guest of honour is woven from coconut husk fibres.

²² France notes: "These *meke ni yaqona* contain probably the oldest Fijian words still in use, and the tales they tell have been in circulation longer than any others." France. P., *The Charter of the Land*. *op. cit.*, p.10.

Gods.²³ The duty of the semi-divine chief is to ensure that the *vanua* prospers and to do this he has to 'face the land' which means he has to enter the sacred world of the greater *Vanua*²⁴ in order to learn how best to keep the balance between respect and power; how to receive the gifts of the people and how to redistribute them so that the people fared well and none is neglected.

Traditionally chiefs were considered to be descended genealogically from the Gods, and as such, were 'strangers' to the common people who had sprung from the land. As strangers, the chiefs had to be ritually made human in order to become associated with the powers of the Earth; with growth and the peaceful acts of agriculture and food gathering. The women's work on the bark cloth (and the cultivation of taro) symbolises all that is earthly, concealing and culturalising, and so it is used to 'catch' the spirit of the God-chief. The chief must retain the 'bark cloth of the land' and he must drink the 'water/*yaqona* of the land' to be reborn as a domestic God. The chief is ritually killed by the act of drinking Kava which conveys the land to his authority, and then he is revived by a second cup of pure water from the mountain spring. The chief 'dies' as he is intoxicated by the Kava and is 'reborn' from the spring water which neutralises the intoxication. The new chief is now encompassed by the people. Metamorphosed by the power of women (makers of bark cloth) and plants (Kava and *mali/maso*), he is brought from the periphery of society to the centre. Thereafter the chief and his lineage will become the people at the centre of the village.

These rituals traditionally had important implications for land tenure because, as Sahlins notes:

"Indeed, at the rituals of the installation, the chief is invested with the 'rule' or 'authority' (*lewa*) over the land, but the land itself is not conveyed to him. The soil (*qele*) is specifically identified with the indigenous 'owners' (*i taukei*), a bond that cannot be abrogated. Hence the widespread assertion that traditionally the chiefly clan was landless, except for what it had received in provisional title from the native owners, i.e., as a marriage portion from the

²³ Griffin. C. M., "Social Structure, Speech and Silence: Fijian Reactions to the Problems of Social Change," in *Thinking: The Expanding Frontier* (edited by W. Maxwell). Franklin Institute Press. Philadelphia. 1983, p.59.

²⁴ Because the word *vanua* means not only the holistic concept of 'land' but also the social relationships between members of a tribe and the spiritual connection between land people and spirit, I have designated the capitalised *Vanua* to encompass this wider meaning. The lower case *vanua* relates to issues concerning the physical aspects of land or the social unit also known as *vanua*, see below.

original people or by bequest as their sister's son. The ruling chief has no corner on the means of production. Accordingly, he cannot compel his subjects to servile tasks, such as providing or cooking food, which are obligations rather of his own household, his own line."²⁵

In this sense it can be said that the chief does not 'own' land but he 'owns' the people of the land, and so it came to be that most of Fijian community relations are based on specific obligations rather than autocratic rule. The Chief was, therefore, bound to rule wisely because his power was based on the continued respect of the people and not by the power of controlling resources. If the chief's rule was too tyrannical then internecine warfare²⁶ could result in his replacement. The chiefly manner (*Vakaturaga*) is the most important concept depicting the ideal behaviour among Fijian people. Ravuvu outlines *Vakaturaga*:

"A man is said to be *Vakaturaga* if he displays certain chiefly qualities. He shows love and kindness to all, irrespective of their social status and affiliation. He is ready to help and serve others. He is dignified and composed. He maintains his self-respect and authority and avoids being drawn into unnecessary confrontation with others...He has tolerance and is ready to excuse and forgive. He is a protector and a defender, and he makes sure that those around him are neither ill-treated nor unhappy."²⁷

The chief is bound to his people through symbols and symbolic behaviour. Other tribes may be included through kinship connections but those peoples not connected to the tribal *vanua* are treated in an entirely different manner. The 'strangers' may inhabit certain lands and places, but must pay tributes to the particular ruling chief. Ties may be founded through marriage or tithe but failure to pay tribute to the ruling clan often resulted in conflict and inter-tribal war. The overarching principle of the chiefly way was reciprocating communal obligations designed to ensure that the greater spiritual concept of *Vanua* was maintained.

²⁵ Sahlins. M., *Islands of History. op. cit.*, p.95.

²⁶ This was a common problem in Fiji prior to the cession to Britain. As F. Clunie notes, the role of the Chief was such that: "Too tyrannical a rule could result in rebellion or desertion of vassals but more particularly tribute paying vassals to a rival power; so that the Chiefs had to be skilled politicians in order to retain their popularity with the bulk of their followers while having to punish offenders so as not to appear weak." Clunie. F. "Fijian Weapons and Warfare," *Fiji Museum Bulletin*. No. 2. Suva. 1977, p.5.

LAND TENURE

The Fijian word for 'land', *vanua* is part of a greater physical, cultural, social and spiritual entity also called *Vanua*. Land 'ownership' in terms of personal alienation would have been unthinkable to Colo peoples in pre-European contact times. To them the land and its people were an inseparable unit. Life and land were woven together to such an extent that separation from the *Vanua* would have been tantamount to parting with one's life.²⁸ The people are the *lewe ni Vanua* (flesh or members of the land), and in terms of social organisation, the *vanua* is the largest group of kinsmen who are structured into a number of social units which are related to one another.²⁹ The people inhabiting the mountains and hills of Viti Levu who share kinship originating from a divine source would be a *vanua*.

The *yavusa*, on the other hand, is a social unit composed of a group of people who can trace their descendants through the male line to a common ancestor God. The members of a *yavusa* can also trace their ancestry back to a particular site of origin. The *mataqali* were a sub-clan of *yavusa* usually linked along kinship lines who also worshipped common paternal ancestors. *Mataqali* however, referred to certain classes of people such as warriors, priests, heralds, fishers or carpenters. Members of a *mataqali* occupied one or sometimes several areas of the village with which they are identified through years of occupation.³⁰ *Mataqali* were further subdivided into *tokatoka* which were smaller household or extended family groups.³¹ For example, the Burenitu people as part of the greater Colo *Vanua*, are a *Yavusa* which can then be divided into four *mataqali* representing different activity groups such as chiefly families, priests, fishers and craftsmen. Each of the four *mataqali* are further separated into many extended family *tokatoka* made up of directly related kin. In this example the chief is the eldest member of the chiefly *yavusa*.³²

²⁷ Ravuvu. A., *The Fijian Ethos*. Institute of Pacific Studies. University of the South Pacific. Suva. 1987, p.18.

²⁸ Ravuvu. A., *Vaka i Taukei: The Fijian Way of Life*. Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific. Suva. 1983, p.70.

²⁹ There is however one larger grouping, the *matanitu*, which is essentially a political alliance where several *vanua* join to for a kind of confederacy ruled by a paramount chief. Examples, such as the confederacy of Bau, Lau and Bua, ruled various areas of Fiji (prior to cession to Britain) under the paramount chiefdom of such figures as Thakombau and M'fau.

³⁰ Ravuvu. A., *Vaka i Taukei. op. cit.*, p.81.

³¹ Kaplan. M., *Neither Cargo Nor Cult op. cit.*, p.25.

³² Kalaveti Batibasaga, October 1997, (pers. comm).

Traditionally *vanua*, *yavusa*, *mataqali* and *tokatoka* were all coherently linked to the land and all it contained. Rights to inhabit, gather foodstuffs, hunt, harvest fish and grow crops were all apportioned by the paramount chief who inherits his power through the *yavusa*. In situations of conquest or inter-marriage the dominant *yavusa* issued rights via the chief to the newly incorporated people. In none of these situations could the chief, or the heads of the chiefly family, permanently alienate land from anyone, nor could they alienate land for themselves. The idea of personal ownership or permanent alienation of land was an impossibility in the traditional worldview. Usufructuary rights were not permanent and did not necessarily encompass all the available land and resources.

Many sacred places existed: burial sites of paramount chiefs, the abodes of certain Gods or ancestral spirits, original house sites of the founding ancestors as well as certain tracts of forest where spirits dwelt.³³ These *Vanua tabu* were not utilised for any kind of mundane activities. Semi-sacred sites, such as sites of burial for non-chiefly people or certain house foundations, could be used for limited natural resources but not for establishing villages or performing ceremonial activities. All other areas were *Vanua tara* or secular places where common everyday activities of any kind could be carried out as sanctioned by the chief. Essentially land was ‘held’ in common and all land uses were directed by the chief who himself was subject to the people. This complicated land relationship was identified by W. T. Pritchard, British Consul for Fiji in 1860, who wrote:

“From this complicated tenure, it is clear that the alienation of land, however large or small the tract, can be made valid only by the collective act of the whole tribe, in the person of the ruling chief and the heads of the families.”³⁴

Pritchard was correct about the hierarchical process, but he was completely wrong in the idea that land could be permanently alienated under the traditional Fijian system.

³³ Ravuvu. A., *Vaka i Taukei. op. cit.*, p.83.

³⁴ Pritchard. W. T., *Polynesian Reminiscences: Or, Life in the South Pacific Islands*. Chapman and Hall. London. 1866, p.243. In spite of Pritchard's enlightened view of Fijian land tenure he, and subsequent British governors, continued to support European style land alienation which eventually precipitated a crisis for the traditional Fijian worldview. See below.

ARRIVAL OF EUROPEANS: STRANGERS WHO TRAVELLED ON THE SEA

All these aspects of Fijian life were little understood by intruding Europeans arriving on the island shores in the eighteenth century. Their worldview was the result of an entirely different *mythos*; a *mythos* whose intelligibility arose from symbols which appeared to have little, if any, correlation with those of the indigenous peoples of Fiji. The Fijian worldview was so misconstrued that an early visitor wrote of the Fijians as follows:

“They are, in one word, the very *dregs of mankind*, or Human Nature, dead and buried under the primeval curse, and nothing of them alive but the *brutal part*, yea, far worse than the brute savage, quite unfit to live, but far more unfit to die.”³⁵

This of course, was a description derived from early missionaries who considered Fijian spiritual practices to encapsulate ‘the rule of Satan’. Tribal warfare, cannibalism, widow strangling, polygamy and nakedness were utterly condemned by the pious newcomers who had taken on the task of converting the natives to their version of Christianity.³⁶ It is certain that Fijian society had a dark side in the form of warfare,³⁷ cannibalism and the like; but European society also had its own shadows.³⁸ The judgement vested on Fijian peoples by European missionaries,

³⁵ Gunson. W. N., “Evangelical Missionaries in the South Seas 1797-1860,” Unpublished PhD. Thesis. Australian National University. 1959. (Cited by France., P. *The Charter of the Land. op. cit.*, p.29).

³⁶ France. P., *The Charter of the Land. op. cit.*, pp.29-31. France writes of the early missionaries: “They aimed to civilise, as well as to convert, and the less ardently evangelical believed in the benign influences of civilised practices as aids to conversion. This teaching affected both spiritual and secular authorities in Fijian society since it was aimed at the destruction of the old religion and the encouragement of the customs, and eventually the laws, of Western civilisation.” (p.30).

³⁷ Warfare in the Fijian sense is quite different to European conceptions of ‘total war’. Brewster writes: “We had seen some tribal fighting and thought we understood its system. When parties on the war trail met there was much interchange of abuse, boasting and challenges to mortal combat. Then should a man fall, the side to which he belonged promptly bolted. Victory always inclined to the side which made the first kill, as it was the custom, and indeed the correct thing, for the other to run....Although [the tribal histories] relate to a period of almost unbroken warfare, little blood was actually shed... The impression on my mind after study of their legends and folklore stories was that life in the hills in olden times was like a huge game of hide and seek.” Brewster. A. B., *The Hill Tribes of Fiji*. Seely Service and Co. Ltd. London. 1922, p.59.

³⁸ Evidence of this is common throughout European history. Examples include: the Spanish inquisition, the innumerable European wars, the systematic hunting and extermination of Tasmanian Aborigines, the deliberate poisoning of flour given to many native peoples, etc. The reaction towards cannibalism is a matter of perspective. To the Fijians, the poverty common in London in the early nineteenth century would have been an abomination considering it was not caused by lack of food. Even more revolting would have been the exile of petty thieves to Australia for life when their crime may have only been stealing food. To the communal Fijians, such penalties would have been unthinkable injustices. This is not to suggest that cannibalism or widow strangling should be revived

traders, planters and later administrators, was made through a lens of cultural and racial prejudice.³⁹ The Fijians were a people of colour, they had few 'modern' technological innovations, no centralised or democratic government and did not appear to have a desire to own land or acquire property. Later administrators and anthropologists referred to the 'stone age' Fijians as being in 'the middle period of barbarism'.⁴⁰

The Missionary activities had limited success during the initial period. As in every society there are always a number of people who are somehow disadvantaged by their social system and are always ready to embrace new faiths in order to improve their situations.⁴¹ The first converts were of this kind, however most tribes resisted, especially the Colo peoples who were the last to accept the alien religion.⁴² Another factor in conversion was the overwhelming power of European technology. In the traditional Fijian worldview all things were granted by the Gods and ancestral spirits. If a hunter was successful in killing a wild pig it was due to his connection to the spirit, either through his own *mana* or via the priests.⁴³ So it was for many activities; the power of the spirit determined the success of the individual and the clan in many important matters. Early Europeans brought their technology with them including iron tools, medicines and guns. The medicines were particularly powerful against their introduced diseases which traditional Fijian healers could not cure; iron pots

any more than reinstating crucifixion or public torture would be a good idea. Early Europeans explorers and those who contacted peoples who practiced cannibalism, widow sacrifice or religious human sacrifice always condemned them to a low level of barbarism without ever considering the barbarism inherent within their own traditions. It is not my intention to say that the Fijian traditions are better or worse than European ones, only that one group of people should not judge another without looking at their own shadow. What we are really interested in here is the positive aspects of both worldviews and how to elucidate them in a way where their respective wisdom can be shared.
³⁹ This kind of prejudice can be clearly seen in early writings such as that of William Lockerby, an early sandalwood trader who greatly contributed to the demise of the image of south sea Islanders as 'noble savages'. Lockerby, Patterson and other commentators had very little experience or knowledge about the inland peoples as their interests were confined to coastal regions. Nevertheless their accounts greatly prejudiced the minds of later settlers. See *The Journal of William Lockerby: Sandalwood Trader in the Fijian Islands During the years 1808-1809* (edited by E. Im Thurn and L. C. Wharton). Reprint by Fiji Times and Herald Ltd. Suva. 1982.

⁴⁰ Fison. L., *Land Tenure in Fiji*. Harrison. London 1881, pp.12-13, and Morgan. L. H., *Ancient Society: or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress, From Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilisation*. Holt. New York. 1877, pp.545-546. Morgan (administrator) and Fison (anthropologist) elevated Fijians from savagery to barbarism because they thought that the Chieftainships represented a primitive state of feudalism which was sophisticated enough to elevate them beyond their stone age status.

⁴¹ Other examples include: Maori slaves who sought protection on Christian mission stations in New Zealand and low caste Hindus converting to Islam and Christianity to avoid the strictures of caste.

⁴² Brewster. A. B., *The Hill Tribes of Fiji. op. cit.*, pp.56-59.

⁴³ Kalaveti Batibasaga, July 1997, (pers. comm.).

and tools were much more efficient and the gun was the most powerful of all. That gun-toting Europeans could kill a pig at a distance meant to the local people that the European Gods and spirit guardians must be more powerful than their own. The Fijians did not realise that European technology was a result of human effort alone and not necessarily due to specific spiritual connections. European technology, to the Fijian, meant a more powerful spiritual force and this is one of the reasons for the steady increase in Christian conversion.⁴⁴

Resistance to conversion continued until such time that the paramount chiefs themselves acceded to the new faith. Sahlins relates the example of paramount chief Thakombau:

“Thakombau was the ruling chief of the Mbau confederacy, the dominant power in nineteenth century Fiji. On 30 April 1854, he finally declared for Jehovah, after more than fifteen years of missionary hectoring. Earlier, in mid-1852, the missionaries had counted only 850 ‘regular worshippers’ in the Mbau area. But directly on Thakombau’s conversion, ‘the Holy Ghost poured out plentifully’ in the Mbau dominions, so that by mid-1855 church attendance had increased to 8,870. This proves that in the mathematics of Fijian history $8870-850=1$. The statistical difference was Thakombau.”⁴⁵

The people followed the chief’s directive. After Thakombau, many other lesser chiefs also followed his example causing a wave of conversions across Fiji. The Colo people, keeping to their forest and mountain Gods, held out longest but came into increasing conflict with the Christian coastal dwellers.⁴⁶ The effect of Christianity

⁴⁴ For the Fijians, the concept of something being ‘true’ (*dina*) is related to the idea of *mana* which is ‘a power of bringing into existence’. This why, as David Cargill relates, the Chiefs said to the missionaries: “True - everything is true that comes from the white man’s country; muskets and gunpowder are true and your religion must be true.” *The Dairies and Correspondence of David Cargill 1832-1843* (edited by A. J. Schutz). Australian National University Press. Canberra. 1977, p.95. The extraordinary ability of the Europeans was considered to be due to a powerful *mana* which could only have been granted by an equally powerful God! However this does not necessarily mean that they believed what the new religion said but they definitely accepted the power of a God which could confer such powerful *mana*.

⁴⁵ Sahlins. M., *Islands of History. op. cit.*, p.37.

⁴⁶ The evolution of the *Tuka* movement and the rise of the prophet Navosavakadua precipitated the famous ‘little war’ in the highland districts. Navosavakadua claimed Christianity as a part of the history of the Fijian Gods in a last attempt to save traditional spirituality. Navosavakadua, the *Tuka* and the ‘little war’ are covered in great detail in Kaplan. M., *Neither Cargo Nor Cult. op. cit.*, chapters 2-4. In other parts of the Pacific, similar movements occurred at a time when traditional worldviews were about to be overwhelmed by European religions. For example: Rua Kenana and the Maungapohatu rebellion in New Zealand (See Binney. J., Chaplin. G. and Wallace. C., *Mihaia: The Prophet Rua Kenana and His Community at Maungapohatu*. Oxford University Press. Wellington. 1979, chapters 1 and 2), the Cargo Cults in PNG and Vanuatu (See Williams. F. E., *The Vailala*

was devastating to traditional religious beliefs. The Christian God was not to be found in nature; he created it, but was not of it. Moreover, the Christian God was invisible and could only be openly worshipped in humanly constructed churches. The forest *mythos* was steadily replaced with the Sky-God *mythos* and most of the old land-people linking symbols fell into disuse. The 'skin' of the *Vanua* was thereby ruptured. Not only was the spiritual connection to nature essentially modified, but the ensuing social change radically altered the Fijian sense of place. In the Colo region, the British governing body put in place a series of manoeuvres designed to relocate the 'hill tribes' to coastal regions for ease of administration. This effectively separated the people from their places of origin, cutting age-old ties with sacred places and ancestral sites. This relocation, combined with Christian conversion, fractured traditional relationships with the forested hills, and effectively brought about the demise of the Colo people as a powerful and independent force on the island of Viti Levu.

Even today, the direct descendants of the hill tribe people maintain that they are still paying a price for their resistance to British and Christian domination, and their repeated claims to independence. Ratu Sakiusa Lulubongi, paramount chief of the region of Colo North, suggested that the current government, which is effectively controlled by paramount chiefs from the eastern islands, denies Colo peoples funding for roading, education facilities and basic services. He maintains that because his ancestors fought a war against the British colonialists and the newly converted Christians as well as the chiefly kingdoms of the eastern islands, the descendants of his old enemies are still denying his people their dues by ensuring an imbalance in the distribution of wealth. This in turn, places even greater pressure on Colo peoples to sell their logging concessions so that they can have access to essential services.⁴⁷

Madness and Other Essays [edited by E. Schwimmer.] University of Hawaii Press. Honolulu. 1977, pp.331-341) and the Djinimin cult in northern Australia (See Swain. T., *A Place For Strangers: Towards an Australian History of Being*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1993, pp.246-252).
⁴⁷ Ratu Sakiusa Lulubongi, Nasoqo Village, Colo North Province. (Personal communication. January 1998). Ratu Sakiusa's village was six hours horse ride from the nearest road end, or around ten hours walking. There is no electricity in the region, but ironically high voltage transmission lines pass near

LAND TENURE REVISITED

The impact of European traders and early settlers was also important in terms of land tenure. The traders were initially not particularly interested in major land purchases; rather they acquired rights to build storage sheds and shelters for sandalwood and *beche-de-mer*⁴⁸ harvest. The Fijian Chiefs, who had no concept of permanent land alienation, gave the traders the 'right' to use various sites for such time as they needed them. The traders had different ideas once they realised how easily the chiefs would part with land and they began to actively trade axes, muskets and knives for land, gradually accumulating properties in the most strategic areas. France comments on traders and their land acquisition:

“The first reaction of Fijians to the European demand for land must have been one of surprise and delight that a commodity which existed in apparently inexhaustible quantity could be exchanged without effort or inconvenience for European trade goods. The earliest settlers had been unhesitatingly granted the use of land without payment, but when planters arrived in increasing numbers, Fijians began to demand a return for what had previously been gratuitously offered. It was much simpler to mark a cross on a piece of paper giving permission for the occupation of an unused block of land than to fill two 160-gallon casks with *beche-de-mer*; yet both actions were valued, in European eyes, at one axe.”⁴⁹

Thus land alienation began in earnest. The Fijian land use rights (*lewa*) did not include fencing or banishment of other local people from the site. In order to defend their 'property' the planters began a process of exclusion because, as they saw it, they were converting 'wasteland' to productivity through private enterprise and labour. As far as the settlers were concerned, Locke's ideas about Native Americans not having rights to 'wasteland' they did not 'use' applied equally to Fijians. Tribal strife was further exacerbated by various lesser chiefs actively 'selling' land, not under their jurisdiction, to new settlers. Some powerful tribes 'sold' the land of their enemies to prospective European settlers. This often resulted in skirmishes which sometimes turned into major conflicts. The end result of many such conflicts was

the village from a hydroelectric dam constructed on his peoples land in order to supply Suva. This land was confiscated without recompense and yet local people receive no benefit from it.

⁴⁸ Commonly known as sea cucumbers these marine animals were much prized by Chinese for medicinal purposes. The sea cucumbers were collected from inner reef areas and dried for transport in barrels.

⁴⁹ France. P., *The Charter of the Land. op. cit.*, p.46.

that the local people turned against the planters themselves, who in retaliation took up arms, attacking and often decimating Fijian villages.⁵⁰ The plantation owners, desperate for reliable labour, imported workers from the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands under the infamous 'blackbirding' scheme.⁵¹ This particular form of slavery was not overly successful and as a solution large numbers of indentured labourers were brought from British India to fill the labour gap.⁵²

By the end of the nineteenth century the Fijian worldview had been radically altered. Foreign influences had imposed a new spirituality; land alienation was widespread, introduced diseases had reduced the indigenous population; and, finally, indentured labourers were brought in to displace Fijian workers. The Fijians were in spiritual and social decline with population numbers dropping rapidly.⁵³ The British administration decided to introduce policy to save the Fijian people from extinction. One of these policies was to attempt to introduce a system of legally binding native land tenure. Various consuls⁵⁴ had decided that the mistakes made in the colonies of New Zealand and Australia should not be repeated in Fiji.⁵⁵ To avoid such mistakes a native title system had to be made legal to protect the rights of indigenous Fijians. The British also had another agenda. They knew from experience that to govern the new colony successfully the power of the paramount chiefs had to be weakened, because as 'owners' of the people, they had the ability to control the *vanua*, *yavusa*,

⁵⁰ France. P., (*ibid*), pp.51-53. France cites an example from Derrick. R. A. "Letters From A Planter in Fiji," (*Transactions and Proceedings of the Fiji Society* VII. 1963, pp.73-89.) describing the attitude to what certain planters called the 'big heads' in the 1870's: "So we made up our minds for another expedition. Twenty four whites started, We went along at twelve o'clock at night....we reached the town just after daylight. We rushed in and shot all we saw. We then plundered it and burned everything, destroying all else we could. We then sat down and had a smoke..." France. P., (*ibid*), p.42.

⁵¹ 'Blackbirding' is the term given for the practice of seizing workers from coastal villages in many parts of Melanesia, and was undertaken not only for Fijian labour but also by the Australian government to procure labour for Queensland sugar plantations. It was in fact a form of slavery, even though such people were not sold as chattels, because it was done without consent.

⁵² Kaplan. M., *Neither Cargo Nor Cult. op. cit.*, p.73.

⁵³ In 1875, the indigenous Fijian population stood at around 140,000. Between the census of 1891 and 1901 a decline of 11,397 people was recorded and the indigenous population dropped to just 94,397. MacNaught T. J., *The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neo-traditional Order Under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II*. Australian National University Press. Canberra. 1982, p.13.

⁵⁴ Notably consuls: W. T. Pritchard, William Owen, H. M. Jones, Arthur Gordon (the first governor of the British Colony of Fiji), and John Thurston.

⁵⁵ These 'mistakes' included the series of so-called 'Land Wars' with Maori and the wholesale extermination of Tasmanian Aborigines. The general policy towards mainland Australian Aborigines was one of genocide. There were few dissenting opinions among European settlers and politicians on

mataqali and *tokatoka*. In short, if the chiefs would not agree to allow the British crown to rule Fiji then it would be resisted by all the various subjects in all the islands.⁵⁶ As long as the chiefs remained divided, the British administration could rule; if they ever united against the foreigners, the Consuls knew that real trouble could result.

The Consuls knew full well that the Chief's rule was based on social obligation and reciprocity and not on actual land ownership. They also realised that permanent alienation of land was anathema to the Fijian worldview, and yet the planters and settlers also had rights which needed protection. Indeed, the British system of government existed to protect landholders; i.e., to ensure their right to alienate and develop private property. The Consuls were faced with a paradox: No matter what course of action they took, one side or the other would be less than satisfied. Many years of work on the issue resulted in the institution of native land tenure being founded on the *mataqali* principle. This meant that actual titles could be offered to Fijians where leases and previously alienated land could be checked and recorded as a permanent record of landownership.⁵⁷ While this seemed to be a fair solution to settlers and the governing bodies, the Fijians themselves remained confused about permanent title because the chiefs had only ever controlled usufructuary rights and not ownership of land.

The selection of *mataqali* as land ownership was extremely successful in eroding the traditional power of the chiefs. The eldest son of each *mataqali* group effectively inherited chiefly rights, as they became able to decide land use rights for all the various *tokatoka* within his sector. This of course divided the people even further and

these practices at the time. However it seems that the British regretted some of these actions in hindsight and they were determined not to repeat such actions in Fiji.

⁵⁶ Fiji was ceded to Britain on October 10th, 1874 by the council of paramount chiefs.

⁵⁷ France, writing on governor Gordon's commission to investigate native land alienation comments: "All Europeans having claims to land should be required to give satisfactory evidence of the transactions with the natives on which they rely as establishing their title; and; if the land appears to have been acquired at a 'fair price', Crown grants were to be issued.....Gordon was warned that the claims of Europeans were likely to be in many cases excessive or unfounded and that a most strict inquiry would be necessary. His policy required that Fijians retain a great deal of the land in the colony on which to develop slowly in accordance with their own traditional institutions." France. P., *The Charter of the Land. op. cit.*, p.114. This brought Gordon into direct conflict with Europeans who demanded that he, as representative of the crown, should uphold their rights to private property. The result was that the Lands Claim Commission decided on the *mataqali* as the land owning unit without really comprehending the consequences.

created a new wave of conflict between various *mataqali* within the *yavusa*. Hence the political and physical *vanua* was yet again divided and the moderating ability of the old chiefly system was all but destroyed.

The peculiarities of the land issues were unique to Fiji in the sense that in most colonies the indigenous people were encouraged, if not forced, to accept European values, attitudes and ways of life. In Fiji the colonial administration tried to protect what they believed to be the 'natural Fijian way of life' without realising that they were preserving something which had already been radically altered by nearly one hundred years of foreign intervention. Not only was traditional Fijian life misconstrued but it was also assumed that all the indigenous inhabitants of the several hundred islands known as the Fiji group belonged to a single cultural entity. Had the British actually preserved the native institutions, the rapid population decrease and subsequent social decline might have been avoided. Encouragement to adopt European customs might have had a similar result, but the creation of a pseudo-communal society did little to prepare Fijians for the events of the twentieth century where the full weight of Western style development was to fall on them.⁵⁸

THE FATE OF THE SACRED FORESTS OF VITI LEVU

By the early twentieth century many of the Colo peoples had largely retreated from their forest strongholds to lowland and coastal regions. The forests, no longer the centre of their spiritual life, receded in importance to everyday lives as well. The temples, abandoned for Christian churches, quietly dissolved back into the forests. The chiefly *leva* no longer active, *mataqali* heads decided the fate of once common lands. Indian labourers and European settlers took out leases⁵⁹ on much of the rich lowlands for agricultural production and the Fijians held to their village life and semi-subsistence lifestyle gaining little economic benefit on their leases. Much of the rugged forest land was left as places for hunting, some shifting agriculture and an ever-increasing demand for timbers needed to fuel a growing economy.

⁵⁸ France. P., *The Charter of the Land.. op. cit.*, pp.127-128.

⁵⁹ These leases along with many other aspects of native title were administered by the Native Lands trust Board (NLTB) established in 1932. The NLTB has been widely criticised for its inability to fairly distribute proceeds from leased land and for supporting many unsuccessful development

The people, separated from their age-old traditions of *Vanua* lived in a state of limbo encouraged by colonial administrators who believed they were preserving an indigenous culture. The village way of life predominated, being self-contained as to food gathering and many basic needs. However, monetary pressures in the form of taxes, school fees, church tithes, and the steady introduction of various imported goods led to an increase in production of saleable items. Initially these consisted of surplus food crops but as roading and contact with the evolving urban areas grew, new products could be marketed. More and more village people turned their activities into semi-commercial enterprises. Associated with this were the increasing numbers of people leaving the interior for coastal and urban regions where paid employment was more readily available. By this migration many members of the *mataqali* groups ended up living in places far from their village origin, yet under the *mataqali* based land tenure they had a right to decide land use for regions in their home villages. Initially this was not necessarily a problem for the Colo peoples as leases were not often sought by Indians or Europeans over what was considered marginal lands. The problem arose when forest products began to become valuable and demand for export timber began to rise.

For many of the interior villagers, the forests were still important as a source of plant materials and hunting grounds even though most of the sacred aspects had been replaced by various Christian interpretations of spirit. While some forests were cleared for crop production and animal grazing, much of the forest was left intact. Large scale logging operations began in a similar manner to the land alienation experienced in the previous century. The forest resources initially seemed inexhaustible and provided a good source of income for little apparent input in terms of labour and effort by the forest owners. Logging companies backed by the Native Lands Trust Board and government agencies interested in economic 'progress' promoted and encouraged forest concessions. Absentee *mataqali* members also benefited from the new form of income which enhanced their economic progress in the coastal towns.

The result of early logging was spectacular in terms of soil erosion and associated pollution of rivers, maritime estuaries and coral reef areas. On the so-called Coral Coast in the south east of Viti Levu, the entire inner and fringe reefs have been buried in silt, resulting in the demise of the living coral. The death of the reefs is particularly tragic because many local villages were dependent upon reef fish as a major food source, not to mention the possibility of increasingly severe coastal erosion encroaching upon the villages themselves.⁶⁰ Soil depletion was compounded by logging tracks which also facilitated the introduction of exotic pests and encouraged widespread clearances for livestock and cropping. Logging roads also increased contact with the more 'developed' coastal regions which made sale of village products easier. The authorities responded to erosion problems by encouraging reforestation with exotic species in plantation style.⁶¹ These mainly monocultural plantations no longer acted as a source of food for the local people, and their grazing animals were of course excluded. The villagers, losing more and more of their natural resources, were forced to rely increasingly on the monetary economy which put more pressure on land owners to sell further forests to loggers. This particular cycle closed in on the interior people and they became increasingly dependent on external market forces, adding further pressure on the dwindling forestlands. Soil erosion and river pollution compounded the problem, further impoverishing the people and making them even more susceptible to development projects and the further harvesting of their forests.

The environmental degradation and failure of many development 'projects'⁶² eventually led village dwelling landowners to begin to resist further logging. This proved difficult because the need for money was steadily increasing and external *mataqali* members tended to be satisfied with concessions they received. The impact

⁶⁰ Many older Fijians can remember a time when the all of the reef was living. This devastation is the result of high rainfall (3800-9000mm in the southeastern highlands), eroding deep tropical soils of basaltic origin. In January, during the wet season all the major rivers run red after moderate rainstorms. Devastating cyclonic storms, common during the wet season, greatly increase the erosion rate.

⁶¹ In particular, Mahogany (*Swietenia macrophylla*) and *Pinus caribaea* (var. *hondurensis*).

⁶² Most of these projects have been failures. They include cattle ranching, rice projects, coffee, cocoa and cotton plantations all of which proved to be culturally inappropriate and ecologically unsustainable in local conditions. Some \$100 million of foreign aid has been largely wasted on such ill planned and misdirected development schemes over the past 25 years. See Overton, J., "The Adoption of Rice by Village Fijians," and Ravuvu, A., "Development Communication: A Study of Two Beef Cattle Projects," in *Rural Fiji* (edited by J. Overton). Institute of Pacific Studies. University of the South Pacific, Suva. 1988, pp.147-164,179-203.

of all this was a further deterioration in *yavusa* relationships and a new kind of land alienation. The spiritual connection to the forested lands, ruptured by Christianity and fractured by the *mataqali* land tenure system, was being terminated by the physical destruction of the living 'skin' of the *Vanua*; the forests themselves. The worldview of the once proud and independent forest dwellers had been systematically undermined and replaced with an imposed worldview which was not only foreign but also dysfunctional. Those *yavusa* who have successfully resisted 'development' of their forests are now under enormous pressure to sell their concessions. The people of the villages are not materially wealthy in the modern sense. They are, by and large, forced to choose between the 'individualism' of the modern worldview and a 'rigid authoritarian collectivism' which is but a shadow of the old ways.⁶³ Western style development has failed to deliver the material benefits enjoyed by 'first world' societies. The destruction of social institutions by the Churches and colonial administrators resulted in a system of social control which tends to severely limit personal and spiritual freedom.

In many respects the on-going destruction of the forests is the final act, which if continued at present rates, will bring about the death of the *Vanua* in its physical and social manifestations. The links to the traditional Fijian worldview exist in the modern era only in symbolic form. The *yaqona* ceremony, the preparation of bark cloth, the initiation of chiefs and the Fijian language contains a wealth of forest symbols which contain meanings derived from the old worldview. But the most powerful living symbol is the remaining forests themselves, which are the crucible of traditional culture and religion and, as such, present meanings arising from the original *mythos*. Trapped half way between the material basis of modern individualism and a distorted image of true collectivism, many modern Fijians need to tread the path of the forests to reclaim their meaning and sense of place. Denied wealth by false economic development and separated from a direct spiritual connection with their places, the people of Viti Levu's forests have been effectively disinherited of all they should rightly be able to call their own. The renaissance of the Fijian worldview, if it is to happen at all, depends upon the preservation of the remaining forests of their homeland.

⁶³ Spate. O. H. K., *The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects*. Fiji Legislative Council Paper 13, Government Printer. Suva. 1959, p.9.

THE BURENITU FORESTS

The Burenitu *vanua* collectively holds tenure over one of the largest forests remaining in Viti Levu.⁶⁴ The people themselves have been coastal dwellers for more than one hundred years since converting to Christianity and leaving their forest strongholds. Until recently they have survived economically without selling major logging concessions due to their location in a region which has been developed for tourism. They have also been well placed between two urban centres which has allowed them to rely on cropping and fruit production for income. In addition to economic matters, much of the forested area is of rugged terrain and this has made it less desirable for timber harvesting. However, the growing demand for tropical timber, increasing prices, and advancing technology has meant that in recent times pressure has been applied to the various *mataqali* by government and private interests to allow logging to occur in their forests. Many of the coastal forests have already been stripped and Malaysian companies backed by the Fijian government are now encroaching upon interior regions. This has caused a serious split between those who support commercial operations and those who wish to protect the remaining forests. The debate about accepting further logging concessions continues to divide the people, some of whom are accepting considerable financial gain while others refuse all monetary benefits.

In the Burenitu *vanua* no high chief has been selected and the *mataqali* heads have unrestricted jurisdiction over forest concessions. One of the most influential of the spokespeople is Kalaveti Batibasaga who has dedicated his energies to conserving the remaining Burenitu forests. His reasons, as outlined earlier, radically differ from common Western attitudes to nature preservation. While aware of scientific arguments about biodiversity loss, soil erosion and other such matters, Kalaveti is primarily concerned with the spiritual significance of his people's forests.⁶⁵ Western conservation methods based on conservation and preservation ethics such as intrinsic or aesthetic values also fall short of what is required in this situation. The forests cannot be viewed as a reserve or a kind of 'living museum' manifesting traditional

⁶⁴ The forest held within the Burenitu *vanua* amounts to 70,000 hectares, about two thirds of which have been logged. The remaining third is protected only due to resistance by some *mataqali* heads and the mountainous nature of the forested region.

⁶⁵ Kalaveti Batibasaga, July 1997, (pers. comm.).

Fijian values. The National Park ideology is also unsuitable, as the management of nature in a setting which is somehow separated from everyday life is a purely modern concept.⁶⁶ The Burenitu *yavusa* has kinship links with many of the Colo villages where other large tracts of forests remain unlogged. Kalaveti's vision is to create a 'Vanua Watershed Trust', a system of interlinked and village based conservation initiatives which would protect forests in the headwaters of all the main rivers of Viti Levu. While there is an obvious need to conserve the forests for the maintenance of biodiversity, to halt environmental degradation, and as a primary source of food and building materials for the villages, the first principle is the protection of the *Vanua*.

This introduces the sacred aspect of forest conservation and it is where the dialogical exchange must begin: What is a sacred place? What might sacred mean to those who live within the secular worldview? The issue of sacredness is equally important to other Burenitu people who have fully accepted the Christian religion. Can Christianity and scientific materialism understand and embrace the sacred nature of traditional relationships to the forests? Certainly in terms of argumentation and dialectics it is unlikely that any useful understanding can be reached. Christian, secular, and traditional forest worldviews seem to have little in common, which means that any understanding based on traditional argumentation and presentation of evidence would most likely fail to reach a point of commonality. Any sharing of wisdom would be stifled by contradictory approaches to, or rejection of, the sacred aspects of forests.

A symbolic interpretation, on the other hand, may reveal many similarities. As outlined in the first part of this chapter, the European worldview has discernible

⁶⁶ This is clearly indicated by Western ideas about 'nature' and 'natural'. Westhoff outlines four general divisions: (a) Natural: a landscape (or ecosystem) not influenced by man; (b) Subnatural: a landscape similar to natural but influenced by some degree of human activity (e.g. shifting slash and burn agriculture, hunting and gathering, etc.); (c) Semi-natural: a landscape in which flora and fauna are largely spontaneous but the structure is altered in such a way as it belongs to an imposed formation (e.g. pasture moorlands, heaths, etc., derived from original woods), (d) Cultural: a landscape where flora and fauna have been essentially influenced by man in a way that dominant species have been replaced by others more suitable to human interest (e.g. arable land, exotic forests, etc.) Westhoff, V., "Man's Attitude Towards Vegetation," in *Man's Impact on Vegetation* (edited by W. Holzner, M. J. A. Werger, and I. Kusima). Dr W. Junk Publishers. The Hague. 1983, p.7. This generally accepted categorisation is unsuitable to the Fijian situation where people interact with forested areas to varying degrees. It also completely ignores the sacred concept by relating only to human use or non-use. National parks are considered only in terms of category (a).

forest origins. The modern secular worldview shares with Christianity an abundance of forest symbols expressed in language, art, architecture and ritual.⁶⁷ While there may be no exact correlations with each other, or with the Fijian worldview, many of the forest symbols originate as expressions of an original common *mythos*.

FORESTS AS MYSTERY: SYMBOLS IN COMMON?

The Gods have not returned. "They have never left us"

They have not returned. Ezra Pound.⁶⁸

Before approaching a symbolic discourse we need first to try to identify the essential mystery which gave rise to a forest *mythos*. The idea of environmental determinism could explain, at least in part, why forests and trees have always been perceived to have a mysterious aspect by people who have dwelt within them. But there is a deeper connection. Heidegger touched on the mysterious nature of forests when he wrote:

“‘Wood’ is the old name for forest. In the wood are paths which mostly wind along until they end suddenly in an impenetrable thicket. They are called ‘woodpaths’. Each goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest. Often it seems as though it were like another. Yet it only seems so. Woodcutters and forest dwellers are familiar with these paths. They know what it means to be on a woodpath.”⁶⁹

A woodpath is more than a simple path through the forest. Travelling the woodpath is similar to the path of life itself: Woodpaths have no beginning; after much wandering they end abruptly and mysteriously, seemingly for no discernible reason. The mystery of the forests is the mystery of life. Plant life is the basis upon which all

⁶⁷ Some of these were mentioned in Part One of this chapter. The Christian attitude to nature has often been criticised, but there are some important issues which have been considered, particularly the idea of stewardship (Genesis 2:15) where Man is commanded to look after and protect the garden of Eden, and the fact that the world prior to the creation of man was ‘good’ and this inherent goodness serves to glorify God. See Passmore, J., *Man's Responsibility for Nature*. Duckworth. London. 1974, p.27, for a detailed discussion of Judaic concepts of stewardship. See also Bruggemann, W., *The Land*. Fortress Press. Philadelphia. 1977, chapters 1 and 2.

⁶⁸ Pound, E., “Canto CXIII,” in *The Cantos of Ezra Pound*. Faber and Faber. London. 1975, p.787.

⁶⁹ From Heidegger, M., *Holzwege*. Translated and cited by Krell, D. F., in the “Introduction” to Martin Heidegger’s *Early Greek Thinking* (translated by D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi). Harper and Row. New York. 1975, pp.3-4.

other life rests; without plants there are no animals, no food or fibre, and no oxygen. The very fertility of cultivated fields and gardens arises from humus created by the lifeways of plants. Every place on Earth which humans have adapted to originates from some essential relationship with plants in one way or another. Whether these plants be micro-algae and plankton which feed the seals and whales essential to life in the polar regions, or the vast expanses of tropical forests; plants are always somehow the basis of our food source. Plants provide not only food but also medicine, shelter, and they also tell us a story about the world, its history and the mystery of its being.

There are few regions in the world which are totally devoid of plant life of one sort or another. These are the true 'deserts' where few people have ever lived.⁷⁰ Most of the land surface of the world was originally clothed in plant life, mostly in the form of forests. From the sparse dry-land and boreal forests to the tropical jungles,⁷¹ trees and plants are the most common form of life. From ancient times, the way in which plants manifest themselves and flourish has always been a mystery to people. For early European peoples, like the mountain dwelling Fijians, the forests were home. Their sense of place was dominated by the vast and essentially mysterious phenomenon of trees. How such entities came into being was unknown. Why tree life was so different from their own could not be explained, but they knew that they were utterly dependent upon them for most of their needs.

Plant life, in contrast with what Western people commonly refer to as 'animate life', manifests itself in unusual ways. Trees and the forests they were part of, are of ancient lineage. In Fiji, like New Zealand and many other places, the forests are older

⁷⁰ True deserts exist naturally in regions such as the high plateau of the Antarctic continent, high elevation regions of mountain chains and a few true waterless deserts. Most deserts, however, contain flora and fauna sufficient to support human groups like the Kalahari Bushmen and Bedouin. Today, deserts are considered to be non-forested and barren dryland regions like central Australia. Yet the Aboriginal peoples who live there do not see their landscape as being barren or devoid of life any more than the Bushmen or Bedouin consider their places to lack beauty and diversity simply because they lack forests.

⁷¹ It is interesting to note that the modern word jungle is derived from the Hindi *jangal* and the Sanskrit *jangala* meaning desert! The English word, desert, is derived from the Latin *deserere*, meaning to leave or forsake. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). The irony of this is reflected in the fact that in many situations the destruction of tropical 'jungles' results in the creation of a real desert, i.e., a place which trees have forsaken.

than the landforms.⁷² There appears to be a seamless continuity between successive generations of trees, many of which live much longer than people. Trees, although strong and enduring, are also peculiarly passive and non-threatening, almost willingly offering their services of firewood, protection from elements, shade, fruit and nuts as well as harbouring animals, birds and insects. Furthermore, trees and forests present themselves to humans as the essence of roundness.⁷³ Tree trunks are round, as are roots, flowers, leaves, fruit and even their very shapes. Forests 'round off' the sharp ridges of mountains; they clothe steep valleys and seem to soften the land in a rounded fashion. The roundness of all things associated with plant life has traditionally been connected to the role of the nurturing and fertile female principle which is the giver of life in the world.

Trees and forests reflect images of the eternal and unchanging permanence of life's great cycles and the principle of passive benevolence. Trees and forests present the idea of tolerance, strength, endurance and the striving towards light. The immense diversity within what appears to be a chaotic and random pattern is also evident in forests. There is little uniformity, each plant an individual growing in its own way, and yet the result of such individuality is a common sheltering canopy. The idea of communalism probably originated in the forests where trees are close together, sharing and recycling parts of themselves for the benefit of the whole community.⁷⁴

⁷² The forests of Viti Levu are considered to be of Gondwanan origin and share much in common with the subtropical forests of Northern New Zealand. Some shared genus groups include: *Dacrycarpus*, *Podocarpus*, *Planchonella* *Agathis* *Macaranga*, *Elaeocarpus*, *Dysoxylum*, *Schefflera*, *Metrosideros*, *Freycinetia*, *Cordyline* and *Syzygium*. Smith. A. C., *Flora Vitiensis: A New Flora of Fiji*. Pacific Tropical Gardens, Lawaii, Hawaii. 1981.

⁷³ Gaston Bachelard maintains in the tradition of Karl Jaspers (who wrote: "Every being seems in itself round" [*Das Dasein ist Rund* from *Von Der Wahrheit* p.50]) that cosmic reality is essentially round. That our being is rounded, and surrounded by a round universe is connected to trees in Rilke's poetic lines:

"Tree always in the centre
Of all that surrounds it
Tree feasting upon
Heaven's great dome"

Rilke's *Poèmes Français* (p.169) cited by Bachelard. G., in *The Poetics of Space*. Beacon Press. Boston. 1994, p.239.

⁷⁴ Darwin, of course, saw these relationships as competitive ones where the strongest survived by out-competing the weak. New interpretations of forest ecology are now appearing which show that competition may not be the driving force at all. Kropotkin called this concept mutualism which correlates with many indigenous perspectives of forests as communities. In his famous work *Mutual Aid* he maintains that the struggle for life was based on cooperation and the competitive element takes

For forest peoples the great woods are not places of fear or darkness; rather, they are intrinsic to their sense of place, both physically and spiritually. One of the enduring mysteries of forests in the modern age is the fact that they cannot be recreated by human action. Scientists can now manipulate plant genes with ease, whole regions can be planted with trees, but the remarkable randomness of natural forests cannot be replicated.⁷⁵ Left to itself, a ruined forest will renew itself over time into a new level of organisation, but this process can not be 'made' by human input, nor can the randomising process be fully understood rationally. Another aspect of a forest system is the remarkable degree of symbiosis between its various species.⁷⁶ This has led many ecologists to question Darwinian competition models by suggesting that mutualism and homeostasis⁷⁷ are the origin of diversity rather than survival of the fittest.

In the European tradition, symbolic expression and rituals associated with forests and trees are no longer obvious. This weakening of forest symbols and ritual is the result of a long separation of European peoples from their sylvan origins. Today, many of the old forest symbols have been degraded to mere metaphors. In the previous study we saw that clocks, calendars and schedules are still functioning as active symbols presenting the mystery of sequential change. In contrast, the forest symbols in modern culture are latent. Their power to present the deeper significance of the original forest *mythos* has been weakened by centuries of denigration, and by the widespread destruction of forests throughout the world. However, Europeans still speak of the virgin forests, the feminine Earth, and of how trees clothe the land without necessarily realising that this is symbolic language in the sense that it once had a deeper and more profound meaning.

place not between individuals, but against adverse circumstances. Kropotkin. P., *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. Freedom Press. London. 1987, pp.268-270.

⁷⁵ Variability of tree growth is an established fact. Indeed, the more productive a site, the greater variability and the greater the error in prediction. See Walsh. B. J., Karsh. M. B. and Ansell. N., "Trees, Forestry and the Responsiveness of Creation," in *This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment* (edited by R. S. Gottlieb). Routledge. London and New York. 1996, p.428.

⁷⁶ One of the most common forms of symbiosis is the relationship between trees and mycorrhizal fungi, where both trees and fungi can live independently but usually form associations where fungi act as the senses of the tree roots searching for water and nutrients. The fungi benefit from surplus carbohydrates provided by the tree. In some species such as Avocado the mycorrhiza covers the roots like a sock protecting the tree from attack by soil pathogens and parasites. See Swain. R. B., *Earthly Pleasures: Tales From A Biologists Garden*. Penguin. Markham, Ontario. 1981, pp.132-134.

⁷⁷ See Goldsmith. E., *The Way: An Ecological Worldview*. Shambhala. Boston. 1993, pp.127-132.

Scientists speak of the evolutionary tree; linguists of the language tree and genealogists of the family tree, usually without recalling the deep and ancient meaning symbolised by the tree itself. This potent symbol inherent in the word 'tree' has, for the most part, been reduced to a term. Yet in common language, youth is said to 'flower', evil has a 'root', rivers have 'branches', book pages are 'leaves' and the word 'book' itself is derived from the Beech trees, on boards of which the first runes were scorched. Even the human body is said to have a 'trunk'. These are all unacknowledged tree symbols which are applied to everyday concerns. The Christmas tree, the May-tree, the mistletoe and even the humble acorn all have greater significance as symbols than is now commonly recognised.

And yet what remains is a deep, if not fully acknowledged, love of trees, forests, flowers and vegetation of many kinds. Many modern people are still attracted to the forests for inspiration and relief from everyday tensions. People still love trees in their parks, gardens, streets and houses even though they have no apparent 'use' value. They are valued for their beauty. Even though the forests have been abandoned as dwelling places, the memory of a deep connectedness with forests lingers in European imagination. No scientific reasoning can explain the allure of plants for modern people; love of plants has a deeper root, one which can be traced to forest origins long ago. The trees, shrubs and flowers which are planted and tended by modern people are living symbols of our time. Meaning is embodied in the beautiful parks, gardens and wooded landscapes in rural and urban settings. While the forest, as a place to dwell and seek spiritual nourishment, has been largely forsaken, the deep connections to forests are reflected in people's desire to relate to plants in a ritual and ceremonial form. A new symbol for modernity has evolved from such affection for plants; a symbol embodied in the modern interpretation of the word 'green'. Not only is being 'green' a term of affection for greenness of plants, but also as a presentation of values for the natural world. It is now common to speak of 'green' politics, the 'greening' of business and 'green' ethics, etc. While many do not necessarily accept 'green' values, it remains a powerful expression for a certain kind of value for the natural world.

Throughout the modern world, ceremonial trees are planted to mark special sites and celebrate auspicious occasions. Trees are increasingly being planted in large urban

areas throughout the 'developed' world in an apparent attempt to 'soften' the impact of modern architecture and to create spaces which have a certain kind of ambience which seems to appeal to city dwellers. This raises the question as to why living trees are preferred, when they are plainly not necessary in a fully constructed environment? Perhaps the planting of trees in the modern cityscape is an echo of a time when trees were perceived not only as being spatial, i.e., rising from the ground, but also alive in the way that every year the tree re-enacts the very process of creation.⁷⁸ As Mircea Eliade, notes:

"To the primitive [sic] religious mind, the tree *is* the universe, and it is so because it reproduces it and sums it up."⁷⁹

The tree, stretching to heaven, yet rooted in the Earth remains a potent modern symbol.

For Fijians, the rituals and symbols associated with forests are much more active than in the secular West where the modern myths of individualism, rationality and definition through property ownership have eroded the mythical basis of the original forest worldview. The most powerful forest connecting symbols of the Colo people are the bark cloth, Kava, and taro symbols which link the forests to the land in a physical, social and spiritual sense. The religious relationship with the forest is essentially a habitation in the spirit, where ritual makes transparent the 'skin' between everyday life and supernatural life. In the traditional worldview of forest-dwelling Fijian people the forest embodied all that was truly real in the world. It was a symbol of cooperation and collectivism reflected in the relationships of the social *vanua*. It was sheltering, food-bearing and fertile; strong, enduring and yet strangely submissive. The forests were the 'Mother' to all life, both physical and spiritual.

It is clear that in the European tradition there are two levels of symbolism. The first level presents myths concerned with common issues which are related to purely utilitarian concepts, in terms of prosperity, fertility, and the health of the people, their

⁷⁸ Norberg-Schulz. C., *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*. Rizzoli. New York. 1980, p.25.

⁷⁹ Eliade. M., *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. Ward and Sheed Ltd. London. 1958, p.269.

crops and their herds.⁸⁰ The second level is one of esoteric symbols which are concerned with spiritual and shamanic perception of trees and forests. The 'otherworld' trees such as: *Yggdrasil*, the Tree of life, the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, the Tree of Heaven, are all speaking of a deeper level of understanding and connectedness to a sacred dimension. In European traditions attention has been given to trees and tree symbols rather than forests as a whole. In Fiji there are also two levels of symbolism. The utilitarian concerns are presented in terms of individual trees, such as the breadfruit tree, trees where first fruits are placed and trees from which ceremonial items are created. However, the symbols of deeper spiritual connections arise from the forest in its entirety. There were no special forest Gods or World Trees, rather the whole of the forest was both a spiritual dimension and a secular reality existing in unity. The shamanic or spiritual path was, like Odin's rainbow bridge, embodied in the forest as a whole.

While there are symbolic correlations between the two worldviews, both of whose symbols present a sacred dimension of trees and forests, the significant difference is that the European symbols are embodied in trees, whereas the Fijian symbols are the forest. Whether this is because of the historical movement of early European peoples out of the great forests or simply a different perception is difficult to determine. The denigration of forests and forest religions by the Romans and later Christians may have induced a focus on individual trees, particularly the 'otherworld' trees, as a memory of the great forests. The Fijian forest dwellers, on the other hand, had no reason to develop specific tree symbols until the arrival of Europeans who actively deconstructed their forest theology. In Fiji, *Vanua* is alive, it does not need to be discussed or interpreted to reveal its meaning.

The damage to the spirituality of *Vanua* and the destruction of its symbols has been a direct result of the imposition of Christianity and the secular rejection of a forest religion, which has been introduced by Europeans only in the last 150 years. In spite of this, connection to *Vanua* remains strong in modern Fiji and the central symbols remain active in everyday life. For Europeans, forest symbolism is latent, and the deeper meaning is only revealed by historical exegesis. In modern times this is

⁸⁰ Butterworth. E. A. S., *The Tree at the Navel of the Earth*. Walter De Gruyter and Co. Berlin. 1970, p.200.

expressed as a quasi-religious urge to interact with trees and forests, but only as an exterior dimension of one's being. It is possible that through the process of meaningful dialogue with forest people such as the Fijians, Europeans may be able to reactivate some of their own symbols so that they may once again establish a spiritual relationship with forests. A symbolic discourse centred on trees and forests may be able to help modern people understand why the forests of Fiji have a value which lies beyond utilitarian concerns, and how a new approach to conservation of sacred places might be approached.

The remaining barrier to a modern understanding of forests in terms of the Fijian worldview is not only the latency of European forest symbols, but also the consistent tendency to rationally objectivise plants as being 'other' - as part and parcel of the secular rejection of the sacred altogether.

OBJECTIVE INQUIRY AS A BARRIER TO A SACRED ENCOUNTER

Rational and objective inquiry is the common method of perception in the modern worldview. It cannot be denied that scientific objectivity is a worthy ideal for science. Objectivist thinking exerts enormous power because the resulting advance of knowledge and scientific achievement has been so materially successful. And yet the scientific denial of subjective considerations - spirit, value, beauty, purpose and personal intuition - has largely been responsible for the evolution of the myth of a purposeless universe, resulting in a general perception of a cosmos from which we ourselves are somehow absent.⁸¹

Such purposelessness had led to a cosmic homelessness, which as John Haught explains, has its roots in the myth of dualism:

“Dualism prepares the way for scientism by rendering nature mindless and lifeless. And then through a series of philosophical transformations in our intellectual and spiritual history, it turns mind and life into strangers in the universe. They become ‘epiphenomenal’ intruders into an inherently inanimate, mindless world. In spite of its explicit suspicion of religion scientism remains tied to the same dualistic myths that have caused Christian and other spiritualities to distrust and even despise the natural world.

⁸¹ Polyani. M., *Personal Knowledge*. Harper Torchbooks. New York. 1964, p.142.

Scientific and religious puritanism have a common ancestry, a fear of the physical in its swampy, wild and untamed naturality."⁸²

In such a worldview, ontological primacy has been given to the substrate valueless world of primal qualities, while the world of values has been relegated to the ontologically rarefied and highly subjective realm of secondary qualities.⁸³ These so-called secondary subjective qualities are projected onto a cosmos which remains intrinsically alien to our deepest desires.⁸⁴ Religious myth and symbols no longer have the power to overcome the placelessness of the resulting exile from the sacred awareness so readily available to those who still feel at home in the world.

Those peoples who find their sense of place and their home in forests recognised that some trees have special sacred characteristics, but this does not mean that the sacredness of the forest as a whole is diminished or that other plants may therefore be of less value. A forest containing a sacred grove is always sacred forest. Parts of forests cannot be separated and preserved as individual units. The sacredness of a given forest is immutable, which is why Western style preservation fails to encompass sacred values. The evolving science of ecology is beginning to appreciate just how complex the inter-relationships within forest ecosystems can be,⁸⁵ but ecology stops short of recognising the mysteries inherent in this kind of knowledge. By listening to other ways of knowing and accepting the validity of such wisdom, ecologists could learn a great deal about forests from people who have had an intimate relationship with trees for countless generations.

⁸² Haught. J. F., "Religious and Cosmic Homelessness: Some Environmental Implications," in *Liberating Life: Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology* (edited by C. Birch., W. Eakin and J. B. McDaniel). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1990, pp.162-163.

⁸³ Haught. J. F., (*ibid*), p.164.

⁸⁴ Bertrand Russell comments on this sense of alienation: "That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs are but a mere outcome of accidental collection of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried in the debris of a universe in ruins...How in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature as man preserve his aspirations untarnished?" Russell. B., "A Free Man's Worship," in *The Meaning of Life* (edited by E. D. Klemke). Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1981, p.56.

⁸⁵ See Noss. R., *Maintaining Ecological Integrity in Representative Networks*. WWF Canada. 1995, pp.19-28, and Egler. F. E., *The Way of Science: A Philosophy of Ecology for the Layman*. Hafner Publishing Company. New York. 1970.

At the deepest level, humans share their planet, and their lives, with plants. This relationship, whether consciously recognised or not, is an intimate one. However, it seems among Europeans and Fijians alike, there is a common psychological need to be directly associated with plant life, and this need is more pronounced among people who have forest origins. Much of the alienation and dislocation of modern placelessness occurs in environments devoid of plant life or where natural plant ecosystems have been devastated by human actions. This placelessness is most marked in peoples who have had close associations with forests and whose worldview originated from a forest *mythos*.⁸⁶

While Europeans have generally adapted to urban life and accepted the myth of individualism to a greater degree than have many other cultures, forest symbolism remains an important part of their horizon. In a sense, the national parks and scenic reserves of the West are a modern manifestation of the ancient Greek *temene*, and many undertake pilgrimages to visit this modern version of sacred place. The problem for forest peoples arises from the secular rejection of sacredness, which in modern terms, amounts to refusal to acknowledge the mysterious nature of their own attraction to forests. Today, forest symbols and images pervade everyday life, but their spiritual meaning is denied.

In order to comprehend the importance of the remaining forests of Viti Levu as links to a spiritual reality, those who live within the boundaries of the secular worldview need to revisit their own religious histories and recognise their own sacred activities within the modern framework. Many wisdom traditions have suggested that the spirit cannot be explained, it must be experienced, and yet at no time in history has an expression of sacrality been more necessary than it is today. The *mythos* arising out of the age of 'enlightenment' presented new stories for Europeans to live by.

⁸⁶ There are many examples of this phenomenon. In many previously forested areas people who have been forced out of their sacred places into urban regions often react by living in a manner which appears to deny any connection with their origins. It is as if their spirit is completely cut off from any nourishment. Some of the most dejected slums in the world are filled with people who once were forest peoples. For example, in Suva there are high rise apartment buildings where people live virtually without any contact with the natural world in a state of dire poverty. Most of these people arrived from interior villages, where for various reasons, they could no longer sustain their communal lifestyle. The resulting collapse of their connections to land and kin has led to a serious loss of morale and a sense of defeat which has resulted in their degraded condition. Authorities often blame such people for being the cause of their own demise yet it is, in most cases, a total loss of connection to wider meaning which has caused their despair.

Rationality, scientism, secularisation, labour, property, progress, development, technology, and universalism have proved to be efficient and materially successful for millions of people, but they have also progressively weakened human links to the natural world. Despite all the knowledge gained, the age-old questions about the meaning of life have not been sufficiently answered in a way which enhances overall psychological well-being. The unexpected drawback of the new myths has not only been widespread devastation of nature but also an increase in the fear of the unknown, as well as a loss of the mystical experiences, which seem so important to a balanced life.

Frederich Nietzsche, writing in the nineteenth century, effectively summarised the 'Man' of the modern era and predicted the elevation to prominence of a new myth. Nietzsche writes:

“Alas the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself.

Behold, I show you the *last man*. What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star? Thus asks the last man, and he blinks.

The earth has become smaller, and on it hops the last man who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea beetle; the last man lives longest. ‘We have invented happiness’ - say the last men, and they blink.”⁸⁷

Nietzsche's sober description of the 'last men' elucidates one of the most pervasive myths of the current era; that of happiness. Happiness is the panacea for all ills, say the last men. But that is a deception.⁸⁸ The pursuit of happiness is the ultimate goal of the modern worldview and yet it has become an ephemeral dream for the millions who have failed to find utopia under the umbrella of scientific materialism.

Perhaps what is needed is a new experience of the sacred; a realm of meaning fostering a contentment which lies beyond the transitory nature of mere happiness. The wisdom of the sacred must be learned through one's own experience. One path

⁸⁷ Nietzsche, F., *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (translated by T. Common). George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 1967, pp.71-72.

to such wisdom is through sharing with others the sacred understandings of their traditions.

A PATH TO SACRED EXPERIENCE?

What can the sacred mean to those who have rejected their own religious traditions? It is perhaps the intense focus on individualism which acts as a block to comprehension of the sacred. Christians seek a personal relationship with God as a means to their salvation from suffering and ignorance and much of the spiritual renaissance in the modern age is concerned with individual realisation. Yet the question remains: Can experience of the sacred be separated from life as a totality?

A bird, for instance, cannot fly outside of the air any more than people can exist outside the connected whole. The sacred mysteries are for humans as the air for birds and water for fish. The separation of life from the underlying interconnective relationships between all beings is a purely modern concept arising out of the so-called 'Enlightenment'. Objectivisation and the separation of the 'I' from the 'Thou' (see below) has led people to believe that it is possible to exist without a direct relation to the whole. This, of course, is an illusion. Even logical and reasoned thought can lead to the knowledge of the interconnectedness of things. To enter the sacred, however, the exclusive focus upon rationality and self-centredness must be abandoned. This is a difficult, but scarcely impossible, task for those whose worldview is centred on rationality and whose meaning is found by concentration on the self in isolation from the other.

Jewish philosopher Martin Buber attempted to provide an alternative to such isolation when he suggested that we might enter an I-Thou relationship with a tree. Buber writes:

"I contemplate a tree...I can feel its movement: the flowing veins around the sturdy, striving core, the sucking of the roots, the breathing of the leaves, the infinite commerce with earth and air...I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its construction and its way of life. I can

⁸⁸ Or, as Heidegger puts it, 'a shining lie'. See Heidegger, M., *What is Called Thinking?* Harper and Row. New York. 1968, p.65.

overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I recognise it only as an expression of a law...I can dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between numbers and eternalise it. But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an 'It'."⁸⁹

Buber's conclusion that trees are responsive agents⁹⁰ seriously challenges scientific forest management ideology and suggests a way in which modern people might understand what forest peoples have always maintained: that trees are eloquent and responsive entities. Modern individualism tends to separate subjective experience from objective entities so that a forest becomes a series of individual objects 'out there', and the harmonious unity of all the beings existing in relation to each other is obscured. The forest has become 'the other' or that which is not 'self'. This is the way of disenchantment.

Traditional forest peoples tend to view whole entities rather than separate units and their definition of 'self' is not as clearly demarcated. To enter and experience the sacred forest means to see the connected whole as the cosmic relationships between entities. The sacred way is by necessity, a recognition of the mysterious interrelationships between all things. While people may recognise their own individual uniqueness, the problem occurs when individualism comes to dominate and define one's entire ontology. To enter the realm of sacred experience means to relax the boundaries between what is purely objective and what is inherently subjective, to relinquish the desire to control everything, and to recognise unity. A sacred worldview does not necessarily require the exclusion of rationality or Western religious traditions: rather, it means accepting these endowments within a larger framework.

⁸⁹ Buber, M., *I and Thou* (translated by W. Kaufmann). Charles Scribner and Sons. New York. 1970, pp.57-58.

⁹⁰ Some scientific research has revealed the communicative ability of plants. Broomfield cites the example of red Oaks: "A red oak attacked by gypsy moth caterpillars will increase the amount of inedible tannin in its leaves, varying the levels throughout the tree in an asymmetrical pattern. This forces the caterpillars to explore for edible leaves, thus exposing them to birds. At the same time *untouched* red oaks in the vicinity also increase their tannin levels." From a documentary titled "The Nature of Things," cited by Broomfield, J., *Other Ways of Knowing: Recharting Our Future With Ageless Wisdom*. Inner Traditions. Vermont. 1997, p.66. Another even more startling discovery of

If people who choose to live within the modern worldview define scientific materialism and individuation as being the path to what is most real for them, and if that meaning requires an accumulation of material goods, there is no intrinsic reason why they should not do so. The difficulty arises when this desire for accumulation actively destroys the basis of another worldview. The deforestation of Viti Levu for wood products used to feed Western demand is actively eroding the mythical foundations of the traditional worldview of the Colo peoples. This represents a form of hegemonic injustice all too common in the modern age. Western style universalism, unable to accept the truth and validity of other ways of wisdom, tramples upon the sacred symbols of others without recognising the inherent intelligibility of those worldviews. It is a tragic twist to the Gilgamesh epic that modern people indirectly take revenge upon other people's forests in their attempt to avoid coming to terms with their own limitations. Harrison connects this with modern inability to come to terms with mortality. He writes:

“....we lose the instinctive knowledge of dying. Nature knows how to die, but human beings mostly know how to kill as a way of failing to become their ecology. Because we alone inhabit the *logos*, we alone must learn the lesson of dying time and time again. Yet we alone fail in learning. And in the final analysis only this much seems certain: that when we do not speak our death to the world, we speak death to the world. And when we speak death to the world, the forest legend falls silent.”⁹¹

The *logos* arising from modern myths is essentially that of estrangement and alienation, where other kinds of life are exteriorised. The sacred element is subsumed under rationality and reason, with the result that we are now ‘speaking’ death to ourselves.

Modern people need to explore the woodpaths of the sacred once again by accepting their inevitable mortality and moving their focus from the individual self to encompass wider and deeper experiences of life. But the first and most urgent task is to cease the destruction of forests, which are the origins of other people's *mythos*.

plant reaction to human thought can be found in Tompkins. P. and Bird. C., *The Secret Life of Plants*. Avon Books. New York. 1974, pp.5-31.

⁹¹ Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 1992 p.249.

PROTECTION OF FIJIAN FORESTS AS SACRED PLACES

The protection of the forests in Fiji is vital to the preservation of sacred elements of their worldview. Destruction of these once-sacred forests has occurred hand-in-hand with the imposition of Christianity. The Christian worldview is essentially a sacred one which has suffered centuries of misinterpretation and bureaucratisation. The *mythos* and symbols inherent to Christianity are derived from a locale radically different from the forested landscapes of Fiji. As a religious path, Christianity has many positive aspects, nevertheless, the sustained attack on traditional beliefs by the church has been very damaging to many peoples and their environments. Fiji has been no exception and the situation has been compounded by the tithe system whereby parishioners contribute a proportion of their income to the church. Indirectly the main churches of Fiji⁹² have encouraged economic development and the ensuing forest logging because they stood to gain from monetary benefits received by the villagers. How Fijian people of the future relate to Christianity in the long run is a matter for them alone to decide. However, in many parts of the world the influence of traditional Christianity has been steadily waning. In part this is due to the rising influence of the secular worldview and the power of its scientific apologetics. But a greater part is due to the fact that many indigenous peoples are experiencing a revival of their traditional practises as part of a cultural renaissance where they have sought to redefine themselves in order to resist the influences of cultural and economic globalisation. The situation in Fiji is likely to follow a similar path as development slowly erodes the Fijian sense of place. It is possible that future generations may seek to return to some of their traditional religious practices. To achieve this, the forests as living symbols are central to reclaiming the sacred worldview of old Fiji.

To approach forest conservation from the currently accepted Western mode is clearly inadequate for the situation in Fiji. Nevertheless there are many elements within

⁹² The Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist and Wesleyan churches dominate in terms of numbers but the Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, Mormons and a plethora of Fundamental and Pentecostal churches are common. All of these institutions not only exact tithes but also divide villages and sometimes members of family. Kalaveti maintains that while the church doctrine teaches the virtues of poverty for the villagers, the church organisation and its paid employees have accumulated great wealth, some of which is derived from logging concessions. (Kalaveti Batibasaga, November 1997, pers. comm.).

Western models which can be of use if they are included within the broader framework of what guardians such as Kalaveti Batibasaga are trying to achieve. Scientific knowledge, ethical limitations⁹³ and legal statutes could have some part to play, but the sacred dimension needs to be approached from a different perspective. In Western and developed nations, national parks and scenic reserves are seen to be a common method of protecting natural environments. But in the main, these reserves are designed to exclude human activities within such designations (effectively resurrecting the forest laws of the 16th century). In the Fijian situation this would be unworkable because the forests are places to source food and medicinal plants as well as acting as living symbols. The human/forest relationship is vital for the continued connection to the traditional forest worldview.

The problem is not one of land tenure either, because the forests are under the direct control of local people.⁹⁴ The destruction of the forests is related to the failure of economic development to provide benefits to village dwelling people who are placed under ever-increasing pressure to generate income. Alternatives to development funded by natural resource stripping must be sought.⁹⁵ Alternative land use for previously deforested regions is one possibility. This requires land and resource management law which is absent from the current Fijian administration. Resource management law drafted according to Fijian cultural imperatives would go a long way to protect local people from the interests of multinational companies whose driving force is profit at any cost. New Zealand's Resource Management Act is an

⁹³ Such ethical attitudes derived from Western thinking which are applicable to the Fijian situation are eloquently expressed by Aldo Leopold: "It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean in the philosophic sense so that a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Leopold, A., *A Sand Country Almanac*. Oxford University Press. New York. 1968, pp.223-224. See also Beatley, T., *Ethical Land Use: Principles of Policy and Planning*. John Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. 1994, pp.261-274.

⁹⁴ Some 80% of the surviving native forests in Viti Levu are under direct *mataqali* control. The Burenitu *mataqali* directly control all of the remaining unlogged forests within their *vanua* boundaries. (Kalaveti Batibasaga, November 1997, pers. comm.).

⁹⁵ Attitudes to 'development' are slowly changing. E. Dowdeswell, executive director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) stated: "First our fundamental definition of development must change. It can no longer be regarded as merely a problem of modernising traditional societies. It should not be a mere duplication of the energy and resource-intensive development path pursued by the developed countries. It has to recognise local circumstances, potential for internally regulated growth, the contribution of traditional institutions and knowledge. It has to be internally geared towards sustainability." Dowdeswell, E., cited in *Nettlap News*. Vol. 3, Bangkok. 1995, p.9.

example of appropriate legislation,⁹⁶ although much more attention would need to be given to the various cultural interests arising from local needs with less concentration on 'resource' issues. A legal framework recognising the importance of indigenous forests to the Fijian worldview could help to ensure that developments such as plantation forests do not impinge upon remaining natural areas.

Ecology and associated natural sciences have accumulated a wealth of information useful in providing rational arguments for indigenous forest conservation, particularly tropical forests. Ecology, at its best, is capable of discerning complex physical relationships between living and non-living components of ecosystems. Ecology can, within certain limits, predict the effects of adverse events and random changes upon the overall integrity of an environment. The limiting factor inherent in traditional ways of knowing in Fiji is that they are extremely localised, yet many of the ecological problems are caused by wider influences unknown in previous times. Examples include: the impact of technological applications to timber harvesting, climate change, introduced predator influences, the effect of exotic plants, etc. While local ecological knowledge is extremely detailed, it does not always encompass the wider view of bioregionalism. In Fiji there are many ecological problems which demand urgent attention, requiring a knowledge base which is not necessarily available to local people. For example, it is possible that if the original decision-makers had been able to understand the effect of soil erosion and its subsequent destruction of the coral reefs they may have been more reluctant to sell logging concessions. Concessions are now being justified on the basis that because the reef is dead there is nothing left to lose. In this case, ecologists can provide knowledge of the regenerative power of coral reefs, which can indeed occur if siltation is halted.

Some Western style principles of ecological management can be useful for protection of forests. These include botanical surveys, palynological and palaeo-ecological reconstruction of ancient environments, information about reserve sizes needed to ensure biodiversity conservation and the creation of ecological corridors to link isolated forest remnants. While these are useful tools, they can only be successful if

⁹⁶ Particularly the question of Kaitiakitanga which is the Maori physical and spiritual concept of guardianship defined in the RMA as: "...the exercise of guardianship; and, in relation to a resource, included the ethic of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself." *Resource Management Act 1991*. Government Printer. Wellington. 1994, p.15.

the ensuing benefits accrue to the villagers themselves and not to a government or some outside institution. Directives issued from urban dwellers and the academies have little use in this situation. The guardians of the forests must be the local people themselves. Top down management principles will inevitably fail to succeed within the village social structure, which is essentially based on mutual obligation and reciprocity. Transplanting Western conservation methods and ideology onto the forests and people of Fiji is, like the development projects, doomed to failure not only for local people but also for donor nations. Conservation in Fiji requires a new attitude and mode of operation to be successful.

CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF SACRED NATURAL PLACES

The conservation and protection of sacred places requires that spiritual or sacred concerns should be the starting point, followed by social benefits. After these axioms are met, science and law also have their place. Four main principles for the conservation of sacred places emerge:

1. The first principle is that sacred places cannot be managed according to rational processes alone. Sacred places are by their very nature mysterious, and they need to be approached with some degree of reverence, not objectified into a collection of 'resources'. Sacred places must be seen as wholes.

2. The second principle is that sacred places are places and spaces which contain meaning for people. Because of this, people should not be excluded from entering or carrying out rituals within them. Exclusion goes against the very principle of sacred place, since people experience the sacred in direct relationship to that place, and not from a distance.

3. The third principle is that sacred places should not be defiled by profane activities. Appropriate eco-tourism⁹⁷ may be acceptable; selective logging is not. The sale of

⁹⁷ Ecotourism is a modern 'buzz word' which has many interpretations. See Furze. B., De Lacy. T. and Birkhead. J., "Ecotourism," in *Culture, Conservation and Biodiversity: The Social Dimension of Linking Local Level Development and Conservation Through Protected Areas*. John Wiley and Sons. New York. 1997, pp.146-176. However, it is interesting to note that the notion of the sacred is not mentioned or recognised as a consideration for ecotourism operators.

cultural products such as carvings, medicinal preparations, etc., carefully selected from the forests may be acceptable; the wholesale commercialisation of such activities is not. Products and services derived from sacred places should have common benefits and therefore may not become privileges of the few.

4. The fourth principle is that sacred places need human guardians. Such guardians cannot be selected at random by the process of democratic election or institutional appointment. The guardian or guardians must have an intimate connection to the place and its inherent sacred aspects in order to ensure that they are not defiled. Guardians are usually selected by the sacred place itself and not necessarily through human agency, although local people need to be able to trust the authority of such guardians.

These four principles, if wedded to Western secular approaches to forest conservation including - ecological systems for biodiversity protection, legal constraints on 'resource' use, intrinsic value ethics, and certain managerial principles - could form a new direction for environmental protection of sacred places such as the forests of Viti Levu.

CONCLUSION

Placelessness is not yet a problem in rural Fiji because village dwellers remain in relationship to the places they inhabit. Their forest symbols are still an active part of their worldview, connecting ancient traditions to the living forests. In spite of more than 150 years of outside influence, much of which greatly altered their worldview, the lives of the descendants of the forest people still retain some connection with the sacred knowledge stemming from their forest origins. However, the current rate of deforestation endangers these links to a point where access to the spiritual knowledge inherent in the old ways could be lost forever. Future generations may well desire to understand their ancient cultural roots. To achieve this, it is of paramount importance that the remaining unspoiled forests be protected, not just as ecological or scenic reserves, but as sacred places containing the sources and the secrets of an ancient spiritual tradition.

For those who have an interest in matters of environmental protection in Fiji, secular approaches are clearly insufficient to understand the meaning of the forests to local people. The mysterious and sacred dimension of forests has suffered depreciation in modern times. A point has now been reached where the forests and their products are seen as mere resources to be harvested in order to derive economic benefit and to fulfill the desire to accumulate property and wealth. Forest symbolism inherent within the Western worldview is currently inactive as a path to understanding the sacred. The collective myths of modernism appear to be failing many people in terms of meaning and ontology. One of the results of this failure is that it has led to the construction of non-places which fail to capture the imagination of urban dwellers. Accumulation of property as a means to happiness is, for many, an empty quest. To create a meaning for dwelling in a place and discovering places in the tradition of *chora*, there is a need to reinvestigate the pathways of the sacred.

Modern people in this situation have much to learn from the 'woodpaths' of the traditional worldview of forest peoples including the Burenitu people and the villagers of the hills of Viti Levu. To reactivate their own forest symbols and seek new meaningful relationships with forests and trees requires an opening of the boundaries of the rationalistic worldview which has enclosed many within a dysfunctional *mythos*. To experience a true sense of place it is necessary to overcome placelessness by reconnecting to the wider non-human world and recognising the sacred by relating to the whole. As the old *mythos* ceases to act as a meaningful expression for everyday life, a new *mythos* must emerge. The new *mythos* may include a revaluation of the ancient forest *mythos* still reflected in European symbolic discourse.

Through dialogue with forest guardians such as Kalaveti, we of the West may be able to find our own 'woodpaths', so that we can cease to 'speak death' to the world and begin to find new meanings for ourselves which do not require the devastation of nature. Modern sense of place is, by and large, divorced from any direct experience of nature. Instead, modern people have substituted artificially created symbols for

real relationships and have ended up 'having everything and yet possessing nothing'.⁹⁸

To recover place as the locus of being, dialogue with those who still understand what sense of place in the tradition of *chora* means, is essential to reclaim Earth as home. Modern thinking has lost contact with its forest roots. The academies, which Vico maintained were the final product of 'civilisation', seem unable to touch the imagination of those who search for meaning in the great forest clearings which have now stretched across whole continents. Harrison comments:

"The moment thinking takes refuge within these walls [of the academies] and leaves the provinces of the mind, the nation, or the empire, it can no longer remain radical. At most it can become a form of 'metaphysics' that searches for cosmic foundations within the clearings of the enlightenment. The most fundamental kind of thinking is invariably provincial in one form or another."⁹⁹

To regain 'place', modern people need to seek meaningful dialogue with those whose worldview is still essentially 'provincial'. Such dialogue is also important if guardians such as Kalaveti, and those he speaks for, are to succeed in protecting their sacred places from the ravages of economic development and the continued secular devaluation of his people's worldview. Kalaveti needs institutional, legislative and financial support to realise his vision. Such support may come only by way of mutual understanding and reciprocity which in turn can only be engendered through a meaningful dialogue which transcends argumentation, dialectics and universalism.

⁹⁸ C.f. 2 Corinthians 6:10: "...as poor, yet making rich; as having nothing yet possessing all things." [Emphasis added] Alternatively, Matthew 16, 26: "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul."

⁹⁹ Harrison. R. P., *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation. op. cit.*, p.246.

INTERLUDE

Before entering the concluding sections which connect the method of dialogue to the concept of guardianship, we need at this point to reiterate the purpose of dialogue between worldviews and attempt to explain why it is so important. In chapters Four and Five, differing perspectives of time, place, and forests were compared and interpreted in order to find commonality, as well as to facilitate mutual understanding of these important human concepts. This was achieved in a manner which interpreted the *mythos* of each worldview without penetrating and destroying them. Such mutual understanding, which can lead to sharing of wisdom, is the goal of a dialogical dialogue. A second, but equally important outcome of dialogue, is that each participant is able to shed new light upon the hidden strengths and wisdom inherent within their own traditions. To reveal the wisdom intrinsic to one's own worldview is as important as finding commonality with others. Wisdom can only be shared if it is held at least in part by all partners to the exchange.

There is a tale from the Judaic tradition which clearly expresses this important insight. The story, entitled "The Treasure" or "The Rabbi From Cracow," is related by Martin Buber as follows:

"Rabbi Bunam used to tell young men who came to him for the first time the story of Rabbi Eisik, son of Rabbi Yekel in Cracow. After many years of great poverty which had never shaken his faith in God, he dreamed someone bade him look for a treasure in Prague, under the bridge which leads to the king's palace. When the dream recurred a third time, Rabbi Eisik prepared for the journey and set out for Prague. But the bridge was guarded day and night and he did not dare to start digging. Nevertheless he went to the bridge every morning and kept walking around it until evening. Finally the Captain of the guards, who had been watching him, asked in a kindly way whether he was looking for something or waiting for somebody. Rabbi Eisik told him of the dream which had brought him from a faraway country. The Captain laughed: 'And so to please the dream, you poor fellow wore out your shoes to come here! As for having faith in dreams, if I had had it, I should have had to get going when a dream told me to go to Cracow and dig for a treasure under the stove in the room of a Jew - Eisik, son of Yekel, that was the name! Eisik, son of Yekel! I can just imagine what it would be like, how I should have to try every house over there, where one half of the Jews are named Eisik, and the other Yekel!' And he laughed again. Rabbi Eisik bowed, travelled home,

dug up the treasure from under the stove and built the House of Prayer which is called Reb Eisik's Shul.

'Take this story to heart,' Rabbi Bunam used to add, and make what it says your own: There is something you cannot find anywhere in the world, not even at the zaddik's, and there is nevertheless, a place where you can find it."¹

This tale suggests that one's 'treasure' lies within a familiar place, but to find such 'treasures' one needs advice from an 'other' source. In this story the Rabbi learns of the treasure first by repetitive dreams which lead him to a place where a person from another culture and religious tradition tells him of its actual whereabouts. However, the captain does not know that he has passed vital information to the Rabbi. So it is that our own *mythos* is opaque to us, yet through dialogue with those whose *mythos* is different from our own we can see the horizon whence our own worldview arises. *Mythos* is not deconstructed, as in the case of rational exegesis; rather, it becomes transparent so that we may gain wisdom.

Meaningful dialogue is primarily aimed at mutual understanding between people of dissimilar worldviews, but along the way each participant may give the other the gift hidden within their own tradition. This in turn facilitates further exchange and so the dialogue can build on itself. What is crucial, though, is that we accept the call to dialogue in the first instance. We have to be prepared to sacrifice something, to step into the unknown, to be open to the possibilities which such dialogue offers, and prepared to accept the changes in our own understanding which may result. If Rabbi Eisik had lacked faith in his dreams he would not have set out on the journey to the unknown land, nor would he have been able to accept the message he received there. Existential openness, firm grounding in one's own tradition, and a genuine acceptance of the mysterious nature of reality are the bases of the dialogical process.

The value of the dialogical process can be seen in the previous case studies. The hermeneutic of time reveals not only the depths of temporal ontology in the Western worldview but also the need, and possible pathway, to live a multi-temporal life. Dialogue between participants may reveal not only the validity of their expressions of

the mystery of sequential change, but also new ways to approach temporality. In the forest study there emerges the clearly defined need for modern people to reactivate their own latent tree and forest symbols while at the same time gaining an understanding of the *mythos* of forest dwelling peoples. Dialogue means we are not only telling our 'stories' to others but also to ourselves.

There are however, many obstacles that challenge our understanding of the *mythos* of another worldview. The most conspicuous is the blanket refusal to acknowledge the reality and validity of the other's myths. This particular point is manifested in an old tale related by Laurens van der Post. It is a story about a supernatural woman and the mortal man who falls in love with her. In van der Post's African version, the woman lays down certain conditions. If he violates these, she will abandon him. The story goes:

"Before she would marry him his wife made him promise that he would never lift the lid of her basket and look inside until she gave him permission to do so. If he did then a great disaster might overtake them both. But as the months went by the man began to forget his promise. He became steadily more curious, seeing the basket so near day after day with the lid firmly shut. One day when he was alone he went to his wife's hut, saw the basket standing there in the shadows and could bear it no longer. Snatching off the lid he looked inside. For a moment he stood there unbelieving, then burst out laughing. When his wife came back in the evening she knew at once what had happened. She put her hand to her heart and looking at him with tears in her eyes she said, 'You've looked in the basket'. He admitted with a laugh, saying 'You silly woman. You silly silly creature. Why have you made such a fuss about this basket? There's nothing in it at all'. 'Nothing' she said, hardly finding the strength to speak. 'Yes nothing' he answered emphatically. At that she walked straight away into the sunset and vanished. She was never seen on earth again."²

Van der Post continues, recalling what his old servant explained to him about the story:

"And do you know why she went away, little master? Not because he had broken his promise but because, looking in the basket, he had found it empty. She went because the basket was not empty; it was full of beautiful things of

¹ Buber. M., *Tales of the Hasidim: The Later Masters* (translated by O. Marx). Schocken Books. New York. 1948, pp.245-246.

² Van der Post. L., *The Heart of the Hunter*. Penguin Books. London. 1961, pp.140-141.

the sky which she had stored there for them both, and because he could not see them and just laughed, there was no use for her on earth any more and she vanished.”³

If we look into the ‘baskets of other peoples myths’⁴ and do not perceive their validity, we effectively reject the basis of their worldview. Not only do we deny ourselves the wisdom contained therein, but we also lose a chance to enrich our own. In the story the man laughs at the ‘silliness’ of his wife’s concerns, thereby rejecting her sacred gifts. In the modern era it is all too common for those who subscribe to the rationality of scientific materialism to deride the beliefs, symbols and myths of others, because they have become convinced that theirs is the only way to perceive reality. This is exactly what meaningful dialogue and symbolic discourse seeks to overcome. If we continue to ‘laugh’ at the ‘primitive’ Australian Aborigines and their Abiding Events, we not only denigrate them as a people; we also lose the possibility of an experience which could release us from the hegemony of our own lineal temporality. If we refuse to acknowledge the *Vanua*, not only do we undermine a comprehensive and holistic worldview, but we also lose the path to experiences which may deepen our own understanding of trees and forests as a sacred thread leading back to the ancient origins of our own worldview.

Communication across worldview boundaries has considerable potential as a means to share wisdom, but there may be serious obstacles along the way. In the next section we will look at some of these problems in more detail and investigate the potentials of such dialogue in relation to environmental guardianship.

³ Van der Post. L., (*ibid*), p.146.

⁴ A term coined by Wendy Doniger-O’Flaherty. See Doniger-O’Flaherty. W., *Other People’s Myths*. MacMillan Publishing Co. New York, 1988, pp.76,138.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PATTERN THAT CONNECTS

PART I - MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE AND SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

Daughter: *What does 'objective' mean?*

Father: *Well. It means that you look very hard at those things which you choose to look at.*

Daughter: *That sounds right. But how do the objective people choose the things they will be objective about?*

Father: *Well. They choose those things about which it is easy to be objective.*

Daughter: *You mean easy for them?*

Father: *Yes.*

Daughter: *But how do they know that those are the easy things?*

Father: *I suppose they try different things and find out by experience.*

Daughter: *So it's subjective choice?*

Father: *Oh, yes. All experience is subjective.*

[Dialogue between Gregory Bateson and his young daughter, Mary Catherine.]⁵

From the previous studies of time, place, and forests we can see that the process of revealing a symbolic commonality between differing horizons may be made through morphological, diachronical and diatopical hermeneutics. An interpretation of *mythos* is possible through the mediation of common symbols, which can show how various human communities have developed their horizons of intelligibility as a response to the mysterious nature of being. In the case of time, this response was to the mystery of sequential change. With forests, the mystery of life-ways so radically different for different peoples led to an expression of spirituality which placed trees and forests within a sacred dimension. Forest symbols are a response to the mysterious nature of life's diversity. Symbolic correlations and homologies can help those of different worldviews communicate with each other, forging new and mutual understandings.

⁵ Bateson, G., "Metalogue: What is an Instinct," in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. Ballantine Books. New York. 1972, p.47. [Emphasis added].

A symbolic discourse overcomes many of the barriers raised by current conflict resolution models which are based on argumentative and dialectical methods.

UNIVERSALISM: A BARRIER TO DIALOGUE

As we have seen, one of the central obstacles for dialogue is universalism, which has become a fundamental characteristic of the Western worldview. In the modern era, universalism is actively promoted and encouraged by the apparent success of technology and economics which act as vehicles for scientific materialism. Technology and economics have become a kind of transcultural force which effectively provides an entry point for scientism and reductionism, as well as for the argument that rationality is the only truth-discerning method, to become influential in other worldviews. Truth, in Western terms, is subject to the inviolable principle of non-contradiction.⁶ The assertions of universalism and its demand for a unitary principle of truth are, however, called seriously into question by the dialogical dialogue. Meaningful dialogue based on the interpretation of *mythos* through symbolic discourse not only challenges scientific materialism as just one *mythos* among many, but also suggests that truth itself may be plural. Such dialogue also calls into question the supposedly solid foundation within which the dualism of objective scientific methods is grounded.

Universalism, unitary truth principles, and dualism are all linked within the conception of monism. For the Western worldview, rationality, as expressed by the triad of technology, economics and scientific objectivism, is actively promoted as a globalising force. It becomes very difficult for 'others' to reject any or all of these main principles without situating themselves outside the mainstream drive of 'development' which forces such unifying assumptions and values upon peoples and cultures. To reject technology, economics, or objective rationalism is to open one's worldview to ridicule and denigration. Panikkar expresses this point in terms of cultural evolution. He writes:

“It is evident that, even today, not all people or peoples agree with this idea of

⁶ See Aristotle., *Metaphysics*. Book Kappa 5 (1062, 9, 10) & Book Gamma, 3 (1005b, 20).

universality, just as it is obvious that monotheism has not convinced everybody either. It is clear, we suppose, that some peoples and culture have not 'yet' arrived at 'our' stage of evolution. There have undoubtedly been meanders and even regressions but on the whole, we reassure ourselves, we proceed towards a single goal. In the modern parlance: 'Development' is inevitable. In this tantalisingly 'imminent' *eschaton*, the universality is finally going to be - is already being - realised. The anticipated universality is but a function of time. We need only a little patience. This is the monotheistic mentality visibly straining to put up with the obvious fact that its expected universalisation never quite comes to pass. So it plays for time...even offering a prophetic eschatology, if need be, in economic or scientific or technological terms."⁷

Those who seek to determine their own destiny, a destiny which does not necessarily include universalist principles, are faced with an overwhelming task. The common defence of the universalistic attitude is that 'technology, economics and objective rationality are all so obvious'. Furthermore, if for instance, a Buddhist monk uses a computer or dares to drive a car, this is seen as confirmation of the superiority of the technological mode of being. One is seen to accept all of the tools of the universalistic worldview if one is involved in any part of it. Hence modernity looks at the Bushman's wearing of a watch,⁸ even though s/he lives a hunter/gatherer lifestyle, as a sign that development is on the rise in Bushman culture. This often leads to a claim by the proponents of development and progress that Bushmen are obviously accepting the superior Western worldview because they are using Western tools. Can we claim, however, that technology is culture? Is technology and the science which produces it not in fact advanced, and very sophisticated, tool-making? Can tool-making or tool-use really define peoples as belonging to a certain level on the 'evolutionary' hierarchy? Here lies the key to understanding universalism.

Panikkar notes:

⁷ Panikkar. R., *The Rhythm of Being*. Unpublished manuscript, 1989 Gifford Lectures. (p.115). [Forthcoming volume entitled *The Rhythm of Being - The Radical Trinity*. Orbis Books. New York.2000 (?)].

⁸ The term Bushman or Bushmen is somewhat archaic, however, the use of *San* for the hunter/gatherer tribespeople who inhabit the Kalahari region does not present a coherent history of the people who once inhabited much of southern Africa. This wider group named themselves Khoi khoin (men of men) or KhoiSan (small men) which referred to a distinct people who engaged in a wide range of nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles ranging from 'traditional' San or Bushman cultures to the pastoralism of the Khoi (or Hottentots). The term Bushmen today refers to a distinct branch of KhoiSan people who still survive on the margins of 'civilisation' by withdrawing into inhospitable regions where their age-old skills are still practiced. Watson. L., *The Lightning Bird*. Hodder and Stoughten. London. 1982, pp.107-112. See also Boshier. A., "The Earliest Miners," *South African Journal of Africana*. (1). 1978, pp.9-10.

“If something is true we tend to believe it has to be universal, because the claim to universality, we also believe, belongs to the very nature of the human spirit. Moreover this universality is taken to be the very criterion of truth. If we can universalise our code of conduct, this must be the supreme ethical rule.”⁹

Technology is true; therefore it must be not only neutral, but also universal. The Bushman using a watch or the Buddhist with a computer strengthens the conviction that this is so. Cultures may vary, but our tools are universal! Universalism is a self-fulfilling doctrine; the more successful it is, the more successful it becomes. The result of such circular thinking is the ultimate culmination of universalism: One God, one truth, one form of government, one economic system, one technocracy, and so forth. Universalism presents a seemingly insurmountable barrier, not only to those within such a worldview, but also to those of different worldviews seeking to understand one another in any wider context.

An effective critique of universalism is problematic, as Panikkar notes in his discussion of the problems with monotheism:¹⁰

“If we submit monotheism [universalism] to critique, we cannot do it from the ‘outside’ which by definition does not exist. If we do so, we have already rejected monotheism [universalism] from the start. There is then nothing to discuss. And the critique from the ‘inside’ has to use the very tools that monotheism [universalism] has furnished.”¹¹

But is such a critique necessary? The Western worldview, in its attempt to extend its domain over all and sundry, has demonstrably failed to apply its universal principles in a manner so as to convert of all other worldviews to its own mode. For example, a Fijian villager using corrugated iron to protect his house from tropical rainstorms, has not suddenly been converted to the modern worldview. He has simply used a tool derived from scientific discovery, yet he remains essentially Fijian in his way of seeing things. The same applies to peoples all over the world who have accepted

⁹ Panikkar. R., *The Rhythm of Being. op. cit.*, (p.114). [Emphasis added].

¹⁰ Monotheism contains as a central doctrine that there is only one God. In this sense monotheists claim universality.

¹¹ Panikkar. R., *The Rhythm of Being. op. cit.*, (p.110). [Bracketed words added].

Western systems to varying degrees. Technology, science and objectivity, while they are important influences, cannot by themselves convert people from one worldview to another. The underlying assumption is that if a people accept some aspects of the universalistic worldview they are somehow converted wholly to that universalistic mode and all it entails. And yet the secular rejection of sacredness has not destroyed religious beliefs even in the West, let alone convinced peoples who express other views of the sacred. For example, scientific apologetics has eroded the basis of Christian monotheism, but this has not led to the demise of Christianity.

Furthermore, a vast range of cultural and religious traditions continues to resist conversion to the secular mode. This suggests that despite the sustained effort of rational apologetics to undermine religious assertions, wholesale acceptance of the secular attitude has not come about. Nevertheless, in the modern era there are many people who attempt to bridge these two seemingly opposed approaches to the nature of reality.

For example, many people within the Western worldview have embraced science and Christianity. There are many ecologists and biologists who, on the one hand, accept the principles of Darwinian evolution, but are also regular church-goers and committed Christians. And yet the mythical horizons of biological evolution and Christian creationism would seem to be mutually exclusive. It would seem that either the universe and its life forms were created by God *ex nihilo*, or else they evolved by chance from an original Big Bang. How can such incommensurable differences be bridged without accepting contradictory truths? Essentially the apparent paradox is solved by compartmentalising truth, i.e., scientific truth is valid when 'doing' science and religious truth, ritual, and morality is accepted and practised on a personal and social basis. There are many other examples of compartmentalising truths. Japanese businessmen, *zaibatsu* leaders, and technologists are able to live and work in a world which appears to be exceptionally Westernised, but they can also change modes and immerse themselves in traditional (and wholly Japanese) Shinto rituals with no seeming contradiction in terms of their everyday lives. Some Thais, in a similar situation, renounce the outer trappings of their workaday lives and retreat to a Buddhist monastery for up to three months, totally immerse themselves in its contemplative spirituality, only to return once again to their 'normal' existence.

However, the act of setting contradictory truth claims into separate compartments does cause certain problems. Most notable are the kinds of cognitive dissonance which may arise if one is called to logically defend his or her respective positions. Not only does this invite rejection, but it can also lead to a kind of schizophrenic separation of conflicting truth claims which can have a destabilising effect on individuals and communities. In spite of such difficulties, the compartmentalisation of truth continues to be a common mode of human existence in the modern world. It is, indeed, one of the defining characteristics of modernity.

This alone suggests that the unitary principle of truth does not successfully universalise people's thinking. Universalism may not be as impermeable as it looks at first glance. Indeed, the supposedly fixed boundaries of the Western worldview appear to have many cracks. The Western worldview has not succeeded in converting all peoples to its particular form of monism. It has failed in many important areas: monotheistic theology, dualistic philosophy, cultural reductionism and the desire to impose a democratic ideology globally. Technology, economic systems and scientism appear to be transcultural forces which unite everyone within the Western myth of the global village. But this model of uniformity is culturally superficial. Now the Western worldview is faced with the ultimate challenge to its supposed supremacy: Either all other forms of thinking are wrong, imperfect, or primitive, or else the West must give up its claim to universality.¹² It has become increasingly obvious in recent times that this claim has been abandoned in many areas, partly due to the rise of pluralism as a social impetus, but also because it has been forced to accede to the reality that not all peoples have accepted its universalistic premises.

However, the central criterion of truth as a non-contradictory principle remains essentially inviolate. Compartmentalisation may suffice to partially overcome certain paradoxes, but the question of the pluralism of truth remains largely unvisited. Few scholars have attempted to approach such a vexed question and to date the only serious commentators have been Raimon Panikkar and Martin Heidegger. The question of truth and the possibility of the pluralism of truth is of major concern to the success of meaningful dialogue between differing worldviews.

Truth, however it is realised, is always expressed and communicated through the intellect; i.e., truth is a function of the *logos*, the word, intelligibility. While truth may be discerned through 'feeling' or intuition, it must be communicated intellectually on the basis of thinking. However, thinking is not necessarily capable of comprehending the whole of reality. There are aspects of being opaque to the intellectual function. Panikkar comments:

"Perhaps Thinking does not exhaust Being, perhaps Being has a dimension opaque to the intellect. Perhaps not everything can be reduced to Oneness; Being may not even be utterly reducible to consciousness. And certainly consciousness is the only faculty capable of reducing multiplicity to unity."¹³

Does this allow for the pluralism of truth? It depends on whether we place emphasis on the appearances¹⁴ of 'things' or on the 'being' that gives rise to those appearances. The former focus is the basis of modern objective inquiry; the latter is the shamanic way, the mystical pathway and the search for nondual perception (see below). Truth which may be communicated through each of these portals of experience may be radically different, or even contradictory, to the other. Before we investigate these 'alternative' truth claims, we need to discuss the wider implications of the notion that truth itself may be pluralistic.

THE 'ONE AND THE MANY': TOWARDS A PLURALISTIC ATTITUDE TO TRUTH

Panikkar's hermeneutics are primarily concerned with religious truth in terms of the One and the Many, a polarity which, as he says, has always haunted the human mind. On the pluralism of truth, Panikkar writes:

"Pluralism affirms neither that truth is one, nor that it is many. If truth were one, we could not accept the positive tolerance of a pluralistic attitude and would have to consider pluralism as a connivance with error. We could, at

¹² Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), (p.121).

¹³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), (p.119).

¹⁴ Appearance is used here to mean 'outward appearance' or *eidos*. It is a looking *at* which, as Heidegger maintains: "is always a way of assuming a definite direction toward something, a glimpse of what is objectively present." Heidegger. M., *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit* (translated by J. Stambaugh). State University of New York Press. Albany. 1996, p.57, [61].

best, refrain from any judgement regarding disputable or irrelevant matters. But truth is not manifold either. If truth were many, we would fall into plain contradiction. We said already that pluralism does not stand for plurality, the plurality of truth in this case. Pluralism adopts a non-dualistic or advaitic attitude that defends the pluralism of truth because reality itself is pluralistic; that is, incommensurable with either unity or plurality.”¹⁵

Truth, it would seem, is always a relationship which makes reference to people and their perception of reality. Truth in and of ‘itself’ does not exist. Whether it is the relation of subject to object, knower to known, lover to beloved, there is always a human person doing the relating and each person involved in this relating has only a limited view of the whole. Panikkar writes:

“The pluralism of truth is an eye-opener, first of all, for contingency; I don’t have a 360-degree vision; nobody has. Second, and here is the most daring notion, truth is pluralistic because reality itself is pluralistic, not being an objectifiable entity. We subjects are also part of it. We are not only spectators of the Real, we are also co-actors and even co-authors of it. *This is precisely our human dignity.*”¹⁶

The mystery at the foundation of all things gives rise to various *mythoi* from which different symbols present the intellect with an order, upon which a view of reality is then constructed and communicated. No single worldview can encompass all of reality; even less so a single individual. How then, can any absolutes be declared by any one human community receiving its intelligibility, as it must, from a particular mythical expression of what is, ‘in itself’, the unknowable and unsayable *mysterium*? Can anyone speak with absolute authority about that which is essentially indeterminate or opaque to the intellect? This allows us to see one way in which truth may be pluralistic without being contradictory.

Alternatively, Heidegger offers a phenomenological approach to the pluralism of truth. He observes the important difference between the appearance of ‘things’ and the actual being of those ‘things’. If we accept subject/object dualism, then the perceiving subject observes ‘objects’ in terms of their appearances, i.e., the form which an object presents to the interpreting mind through the perceptual ability of the

¹⁵ Panikkar, R., "The Pluralism of Truth," in *Invisible Harmony: Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility*. Fortress Press. Minneapolis. 1995, p.97.

senses. This is the logical mode of empirical science which attempts to build its certainties on the basis of exact observation.¹⁷ This is indeed a mode of revealing a truth, but it does not necessarily penetrate to the being which gives rise to its 'objective' appearance. For example, a botanist (or plant scientist) may be able to describe a particular tree in terms of its functional manifestation in great detail according to its appearance on a macro- or micro-scale. Many interesting and important descriptions can be made within the framework of such an observation. But what is missed, or hidden from objective inquiry, is the being of the tree itself which unfolds into its own presence, around which we may then objectively perceive and build our concepts. The being of a 'thing' is opaque to objective intellectual searching, no matter how refined the science. The dualistic attitude has led many to believe that such 'being' does not, in fact, exist. Only the appearances are 'real'.

If we are in search of the 'being' of the given tree we plainly need a different approach. This is the shamanic, mystical or non-dual perception which relies upon 'subject' to 'subject' experiences. The objective nature of the tree is not rejected *per se*, but one seeks rather to penetrate beyond mere appearances. The truth of a being may not be as exact as the objective science of appearances; it is, nevertheless, a method of revealing truth which has worked well for many peoples for millennia. The difficulty with this shamanic, mystical and nondual path is that not all who enter such a subjective state will agree on what they perceive, even if the object (e.g., a tree) is a single entity. Verification is therefore not always possible. The principle of non-contradiction is no longer the sole criterion of truth and the expression and communication of such experiences tends naturally toward storytelling, metaphor and analogy. In other words, communication of this kind of perception to others relies on complex symbolic forms not easily reducible to logical analysis. The determinate and exact sciences facilitate definition; the stories of the elders rely rather upon suggestion, personal authority and conviction.

Is it then possible to say that an intellectual process, such as that of science or logic, has a way of revealing truth which must always be non-contradictory? All people agree that a tree trunk is round, that leaves and flowers are coherent appearances

¹⁶ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*) p.101

manifested by a tree, and so on. We can all agree that the given tree is there. It exists. We can agree on the basic tenets of its outward expression of 'treeness'. We may use different symbols, names, terms and images to present our particular perception, but on this much we can agree. It is in the qualitative aspects of our tree where differences begin to appear. A simple example of this occurs if we consider a rainforest vista. We can all agree that the green hues of the forest belong to objective sensation, but the charm, the aspect of beauty, the aesthetic quality, belong to subjective sensation. Yet not all peoples find 'greenness' charming or even aesthetically pleasing, not so very long ago, rainforests were called 'jungles', 'wetlands', and 'swamps'.

To carry our examples further, the scientist and the shaman may agree that the forest is green, but may differ radically on the question of what the forest is. The scientist, working with appearances, sees a collection of species, a functional ecosystem containing exceptional biodiversity, exchange between biotic and non-biotic components, etc. He can recite a history of such a forest, its origins, its climatic parameters, its evolutionary journey, and so on. He may, or may not, experience such a forest as extraordinary, beautiful, or inspiring in a qualitative sense. To him it may represent a living laboratory or just a bunch of 'unharvested' or 'standing stock' resources. The shaman or mystic, on the other hand, may tell an entirely different set of stories about the history of the 'being' of the rainforest; the events which have occurred there and the meanings derived from such entities. For him the forest has individual parts which may be named and used for utilitarian purposes, but overall his subjective response to it can be expressed as respect and reverence. Following the shamanic path to experience, he may have perceived the holistic connecting pattern, not only between entities in the forest, but also their human connections. The forest for him may have a sacred origin.¹⁸

Are these notions of a single rainforest vista really as mutually incompatible as they seem? The shaman is not necessarily rejecting the scientific observation of

¹⁷ From Heidegger. M., *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (translated by P. Emad and K. Maly). Indiana University Press. Bloomington. 1997, pp.67-70.

appearances, because he sees them too. The key question is: Does the scientific way of knowing have to reject the subjective and qualitative experience of the shaman? The barrier is, of course, the self-imposed criterion of non-contradiction for accepting any truth claim. Is it possible to accept differing truth claims without contradiction? The essential difference between these two views is that for the scientist, appearance and the ability to measure and record is the primary quality; for the shaman or mystic the primary quality is the 'being' behind or within the appearances. Is it therefore necessary for the scientist to exclude the truths of the shamanic view? Can being be discounted because it is not objectifiable or readily apparent to sensory perception? Why indeed, should such an exclusionary principle be introduced in the first place?

Perhaps it is because the actual degree of certainty achieved by rational objectivity is not as sound as it appears and therefore each position must be defended. Rational observation may be unable to express meaning except by holding fast to its particular set of presuppositions and assumptions. The shamanic or mystical tradition may not need such certainty because, by its very nature, certainty is not a primary principle; the meaning of being does not require quantification. The assumptions and presuppositions inherent within the scientific method appear to have an insecure foundation simply because they are dependent upon knowledge of appearances, which is continuously corrected and revisited by ongoing intellectual inquiry.¹⁹ Gregory Bateson (following Karl Popper) maintains that science never proves anything. He writes:

“Science sometimes *improves* hypothesis and sometimes *disproves* them. But

¹⁸ In the previous chapter, this idea was explored by considering and interpreting the difference between modern concepts of forests as resources in comparison with the traditional Fijian view of forests as living symbols of *Vanua*.

¹⁹ Heidegger claims that the scientific research is 'ongoing activity'. He writes: “But because research is, in essence ongoing activity, the industrious activity of mere 'busyness', which is always possible, gives the impression of a higher reality behind which the burrowing activity proper to research work is accomplished. Ongoing activity becomes mere busyness whenever, in the pursuing of its methodology, it no longer keeps itself open on the basis of ever-new accomplishing of its own projection-plan, but only leaves that plan behind as a given; never again confirms and verifies its own self-accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after results and calculation....It is true that the more completely research becomes ongoing activity, the more constantly does the danger of mere industriousness grow within it. Finally a situation arises in which the distinction between ongoing activity and busyness not only has become unrecognisable, but it has become unreal as well.” Heidegger, M., “The Age of the World Picture,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (translated by W. Lovitt). Garland Publishing INC. New York. 1977, p.138.

proof would be another matter and perhaps never occurs except in the realms of totally abstract tautology. We can sometimes say that *if* such and such abstract suppositions or postulates are given, *then* such and such must follow absolutely. But the truth about what can be *perceived* or arrived at by induction from perception is something else again. Let us say that truth would mean a precise correspondence between our description and what we describe or between our total network of abstractions and deductions and some total understanding of the outside world. Truth in this sense is not obtainable.”²⁰

This uncertainty suggests a fundamental insecurity inherent within the scientific method. An insecurity which results in the rejection of other ways of knowing in order to shore up its own tenuous claims. Bateson concludes:

“As a method of perception - and that is all science can claim to be - science, like all other methods of perception, is limited in its ability to collect the outward and visible signs of whatever may be truth. Science probes; it does not prove.”²¹

It is obvious that in matters of common sense, truth claims should not be contradictory. For example, the Earth cannot be both flat and round; it must be either one or the other and, in the modern era, there is enough clear evidence to accept that it is round. However, if we ask whether the Earth is an animate being which organises and maintains itself according to the ‘Gaia hypothesis’ or simply an inanimate lump of rock upon which life evolved by chance, we have an entirely different situation. Both of these positions can be argued from the basis of appearance. According to one set of assumptions based on Big Bang cosmology and evolutionary theory, the Earth is a product of random events. This view claims truth on the basis of evidence as a result of detailed observations of matter and genetic change. Within its own presuppositions its truth claim is valid. The Gaia hypothesis (as well as the ancient concept of *anima mundi*) is derived from the observations that life on Earth appears to act co-operatively in an intelligent manner to maintain its own dynamic balance. Are there distinct and contradictory truth claims here? Can the Earth be both self-organising and a product of chance? It would seem that both claims are not necessarily mutually exclusive because observation of the Earth’s appearance in terms of how it works can equally lead to both conclusions.

²⁰ Bateson. G., *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. E. P. Dutton. New York. 1979, p.27.

²¹ Bateson. G., (*ibid*), p.30.

This approaches the idea of how truth may be pluralistic. Whichever proposition we choose to accept does not necessarily deny the validity of the other. But that choice, if it needs to be made at all, will be based on which presuppositions and assumptions are accepted as the basis of a set of particular beliefs. When a community is operating within a common system of meanings on any one issue, then an inquiry can tend towards a convergent truth claim. However, when interpreters who have different sets of meaning structures attempt such convergence the result is often problematic. It is clear that there are a plurality of interpretations among varying groups of interpreters on any given topic, and these differences cannot be resolved by merely collecting 'the facts'. The pluralism of truth may indeed often be hidden from view in the misplaced drive towards a common conclusion based on 'the evidence'. There are not only different 'facts' which present a certain kind of 'evidence', but also different methods, standards, criteria and ways of perceiving which lead to the determination of which collection of 'facts' should be accepted. These divergent and often incommensurable perspectives have, in effect, created different 'worlds'. The 'world' of science and rationality, dependent as it is on the everyday world of 'common sense', is no more ontologically privileged than any other approach to the nature of reality.

In a dialogue between worldviews, harmony may be found between competing truth claims simply by realising that it is not necessary wholly to convert others to a single view. This is especially important for issues of meaning, sacredness, ontology, and subjective qualities like beauty, charm, and value. These cannot be known by any one person with any certainty, nor can they be defined by purely objective inquiry. The truth according to appearances can be different from that resulting from an inquiry into the nature of being. Furthermore, truth is always a relation which arises at a particular time, and largely depends upon what is being sought. Seemingly contradictory truth claims may be seen to complement each other if the starting point is recognised. The important point here is the recognition that there are differing ways of perceiving reality according to varying *mythoi*, symbolic presentation and intelligibility. To overcome duality and find a possible means to express the pluralism of truth, people need to find a way of combining the truth of appearances with the truth of being. Truth can be pluralistic - neither one nor many - if it is

recognised that all intelligible horizons have common roots in the limitless and unbounded mysterium.

This mysterious nature of being, which gives rise to innumerable presentations of reality, is usually overlooked by everyday consciousness. Heidegger explains:

“Everyday opinion, therefore, self-assuredly and stubbornly bypasses the mystery. Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights everything present in its presencing. But they turn from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present....Everyday opinion seeks truth in variety, the endless variety of novelties which are displayed before it. It does not see the quiet gleam of the mystery that everlastingly shines in the simplicity of the lighting.”²²

This ‘quiet gleam of mystery’ is exactly what universalistic criteria for discerning truth seeks, quite systematically, to exclude. The principle of non-contradiction is the hallmark of the Western tradition, but this does not mean it is a universal principle. To enter meaningful dialogue with those of a different worldview, a basic requirement is that truth should be seen as relational, because each originating inquiry does not necessarily arise from the same set of assumptions.

Truth only becomes a serious problem in the dialogue if one, or all, parties hold to the notion that their method of inquiry is absolute in its ability to reveal truth. We may have to agree on matters which require ‘common sense’, such as whether the Earth is round or flat, but we do not need to conform to a unitary principle when qualitative or subjective issues arise. This is particularly important in areas where arguments about appearance and being arise. Rather than being divisive, these are precisely the issues which are of paramount importance to the sharing of wisdom between traditions. It is common that many indigenous worldviews which focus on aspects of being, sacredness, and mysticism often lack decisive and comparative intellectual tools available to more pragmatic worldviews, and also *vice-versa*.

Appearances are perceived and presented to the mind by the conscious act of

²² Heidegger, M., "Aletheia," in *Early Greek Thinking* (translated by D. F. Krell and F. A. Capuzzi). Harper and Row. New York. 1975, pp.121-122.

gathering together sensory information which allows people to create images of the real. For example, if we consider water, as in a stream, we have many ways to apprehend what water may be. We hear the sound, see the light reflected off its surfaces; we can taste the liquid and touch it with any part of our bodies, and it is even possible to smell water, yet these differing senses are not in any way similar if analysed independently of each other. Each sense by itself creates a separate impression, but we (any we) tend to assimilate these images to form a holistic entity which is what we call (or think of as) water without having to put these disparate sensations together consciously. It seems to be automatic. Sensory experience of water, in terms of thought and language is not the 'thing' itself. We do not have water in our minds, only images of it. The 'thing' we call water is not knowable as it is, because all the senses merely reflect certain limited aspects of its being.

The fact that observation derived from the scientific method has reduced water to H₂O does not mean that water cannot be perceived in different ways.²³ What lies beyond sensory experience is essentially mysterious, and even though technological advances have resulted in the determination of water as an element which can be manipulated, forced down pipes, etc.; the actual water itself remains undefined and undefinable. In many worldviews water is the symbol of spirit, it is identified with the life force and revered as a vital element in many rituals. Can water be H₂O and spirit at the same time? Undoubtedly the scientific description is only one among many possible descriptions which can be derived from sensory information. There are no absolute criteria which can accurately define, once and for all, what water actually is. It is possible to perceive the essentially mysterious nature of water, in all its varied manifestations, as a symbol of spirit and a natural element which appears to have determinable qualities.

In the previous chapter we saw how forests and trees could be perceived and interpreted in a variety of ways. For Fijian forest dwellers, trees and forests were living symbols which presented a connection between spiritual, human and natural phenomena. In the modern era, trees and forests are usually perceived objectively as

²³ See Illich, I., *H₂O and the Waters of Forgetfulness: Reflections on the Historicity of Stuff*. Heydey Books. Berkeley. 1985, pp.3-5,75.

life-forms which present themselves according to definable criteria as 'things'. The holistic connections of *Vanua* are discarded by the process of dualistic perception and the sacred interpretations are largely excluded for the sake of detailed objective determination. Yet both of these images are intelligible expressions according to different ways of perceiving the same existential phenomena. The truth about forests can be pluralistic if it is understood that perception and image creation is a result of intelligible combinations which arise from a common horizon, i.e., derived from a particular *mythos*. There can be no absolute certainty and therefore no absolute truth which covers all the possible interpretations of sense data.

This leads to the question of what exactly nondual perception presents to the mind. David Loy attempts to elucidate the problem of 'thinking' about non-dual perception. He writes:

“Because our usual understanding of experience is dualistic, we can ‘think’ non-duality only in one of two incompatible ways. Either we conceive consciousness materialistically, as panpsychically residing ‘in’ physical subjects, or we can idealistically reduce the object to an image ‘in’ the mind. It is the first conception, in which the object somehow incorporates consciousness, that falters before the causal process of the sense-organs. The second conception, in explaining the sense-organs too as objectified mental experience, reduces the material sense-organs to mental percepts that are no more privileged than any other percepts, thus escaping the difficulty. This is not to claim that the second conception is valid whereas the first is not. Both are inadequate because they are based on dualistic categories of understanding.”²⁴

What is important to consider here is that dualistic perception may be, like the Western concept of time, so functionally adequate that it has become an ontological priority. Dualistic perception may well have mythical origins which, like those of time, are learned. But once learned, each individual immediately forgets that it is not an inherent quality of perception. If this is so, then there are major implications with respect to the pluralism of truth. Non-duality is not a new conception. Many traditions highlight nondual perception and action. Most notable non-dual traditions are found among Eastern religions and philosophies: Mahayana and Hinayana

²⁴ Loy, D., *Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. Yale University Press. New Haven. 1988, p.93.

Buddhism, Ch'an and Zen Buddhism, Taoism and Advaita Vedanta. The shamanic way, which forms the basis of many indigenous and tribal cultures, appears to include non-dual perceptions as do the mystical and contemplative traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Sufism. Dualism, it would seem, is scarcely a universal mode of perception. However, there is little doubt that dualistic perception seems universal to many people because it is their sole, and therefore seemingly 'natural', way of assessing reality. If dualism does actually arise from the Western *mythos* then we believe in this dualism "without believing we believe in it." This has important implications for the question of the pluralism of truth because, if the perceptual division of subject and object is in fact not a human invariant, then it cannot be defended as the only way to validate truth claims. If dualistic perception arises from its own *mythos*, then it too is open to interpretation and could form the basis for a meaningful dialogue.

There is a need for further inquiry into the question of dualistic versus non-dualistic perception in relation to *mythos* and the construction of worldviews. The study of non-duality as a religious and philosophic method requires a much broader framework than is possible here. In terms of dialogue, it is an important consideration for participants who are attempting to understand others whose worldview may present radically different truth claims. Universalism may not even be the greatest barrier to dialogue for modern people even though it seems insurmountable in some situations. The dualistic stance would appear to be the most difficult problem simply because modern people are unable to discern any alternative which are in any way open to the *logos*, that is, capable of intelligible expression. And yet everyday common sense experience suggests that not all phenomena can be clearly objectified or rationally explained according to the dualistic tradition. Nineteenth century philosopher Charles Peirce wrote:

"It is sufficient to go out into the air and open one's eyes to see that the world is not governed altogether by mechanism. When we gaze upon the multifariousness of nature we are looking straight into the face of living spontaneity."²⁵

²⁵ Peirce. C. S., *The Collected Works of Charles Saunders Peirce Vols 1-6* (edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss). Belknap Press of Harvard University. Cambridge. 1931-35, [Vol 6], p.553-554.

Not only is there a spontaneity in nature, but also an indeterminacy²⁶ which suggests that no single description of reality can stake out absolute truth claims for any given matter. An approach to the pluralism of truth requires that we live by the truths of our own worldview but at the same time accept that there are other equally valid possibilities. Knowledge which leads to wisdom may well be cumulative but this does not mean that such a cumulative process will lead to a final unchanging truth. To place such a demand is to misunderstand the indeterminately rich natural universe, the nature of noetic activity, and the nature of the world within which both are unified. Truth, as Panikkar notes, cannot be one, or many. It can be neither one for all worldviews, nor many within the horizon of any particular worldview.

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: UNIVERSAL CULTURAL MODELS, OR STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT

While it is all too easy to see technology as just advanced tool-making, and global economic structures as just hyper-sophisticated trading mechanisms, the effects of these two systems belie such simplistic explanations. For people who have neither the tools nor the capital to successfully provide basic physical necessities, the problem is at times overwhelming. The influence of technology and economics must be recognised as a coercive force which undermines the basis of many people's worldviews. Technology is not just the business of making machines as a means to an end, but it is a cultural force because it is a human activity. Heidegger comments:

“...the essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.”²⁷

²⁶ Werner Heisenburg in his indeterminacy theory of quantum physics elucidated this particular aspect of reality. Briefly stated it suggests that at a subatomic level all human inquiry discovers is the ever-increasingly indeterminate nature of reality due to the so-called wave/particle duality. See Heisenburg. W., *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Physics*. Harper and Row. New York. 1962.

The essence of technology is a revealing of something. Heidegger continues:

“Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step, into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacture lies in revealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we heed this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.”²⁸

Technology as a means of revealing truth may seem startling and disturbing at first glance, but as we discussed in Chapter Two, technology is a bringing forth in the sense of *poiesis*. Technology is *techné*, a mode of *aletheuein*, (un-covering) where revealing and unconcealment take place, i.e., truth happens.²⁹ Technology is a particular kind of truth-revealing method which, as a product of reason, *ratio*, and logic, presents images to the senses which greatly enhance the dualistic position. Through technology people challenge nature in a manner which serves their own ends; and in this sense, technological devices have been successful in providing humankind with many useful objects. The downside is environmental degradation and social disintegration, yet the products of technology remain attractive to many people.

Personal knowledge is no longer needed to make complex machines; all that's required is enough capital to buy them. Hence technology and economics are linked, in that technology which cannot be manufactured locally requires a connection to the global monetary system. People or peoples who attempt to maintain traditional lifestyles often find their efforts eroded by the pervasive attraction of technological gadgets. They are drawn into a vicious cycle where the need to generate money for exchange usually results in an equivalent loss of self-reliance. This, in turn, leads to the sale of valuable resources, as the Fijian predicament indicates. The sale of timber may generate income, but it also erodes the Fijian worldview by destroying the living symbols of the *Vanua*. This problem and its long-term effects on people cannot be

²⁷ Heidegger. M., "The Question Concerning Technology," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. op. cit.*, p.4.

²⁸ Heidegger. M., (*ibid*), p.12.

²⁹ Heidegger. M., (*ibid*), p.13.

underestimated as the background to entering any dialogue between worldviews.

Technology is so pervasive and attractive simply because it is such a powerful mode of revealing. Technological devices make possible the realisation of many dreams: We can fly, transport ourselves across continents, grow more plentiful crops, ensure quicker harvests, produce more 'things' and so forth. Technology appears to 'save' the world from all kinds of pre-technological disasters, but the price to be paid is a heavy one. Panikkar describes the paradoxical 'cost' of mechanical civilisation:

“Nothing is gratuitous; nothing is grace; nothing is free. You have to work in order to eat - one of the most devastating distortions of the real principles of human dignity and freedom. Everything has a price-tag. Your time is mortgaged and broken into pieces which you sell to the highest bidder. And space equally so. You have to conquer - with money at least - the place you occupy - the place in society as well as the place in space. For everything a thousand pieces of money (pieces of paper) are required. Technology does not allow us to have free food, free water, free fields, free earth. The entire culture has been monetised. All have become marketable. The realm of grace goes against the second principle of thermodynamics. It has no place in the technocratic complex.”³⁰

The connection between monetary systems and the acquisition of technology means that either a people must reject modern inventions and effectively 'walk' away from the modern world, or that alternative means of creating income in monetary terms must be found. While technology and economics are not necessarily cultural forces in themselves, their combined effect on any given society inexorably erodes the foundations of that particular worldview. Not only are worldviews altered, but there is often some kind of conversion to the Western mode, which is usually detrimental to peoples and their cultures.³¹

The apparent technological/economic double-bind not only affects 'others'; it also

³⁰ Panikkar. R., "The Destiny of Technological Civilisation: An Ancient Buddhist Legend, Romavisaya." *Alternatives*. X. (Fall), 1984, p.247.

³¹ There is a vast amount of literature devoted to the problems of economic and technological development and their combined effects on peoples and cultures. The overwhelming conclusion is that what is required is a form of development appropriate to each given situation and that the current pan-monetary model is clearly inadequate to solving the problems of so-called 'third world' countries and indigenous peoples. However, mainstream ideologies continue to claim that the 'trickle down' effect will in time bring all people to a certain level of wealth in spite of its continued failure to actualise such a goal.

ties modernised people into the delusion that the very mechanisms which have instigated global ecological and social crises can now be applied to solving them. Furthermore, technology and economics have also trapped many of the people in 'developed' countries in an endless cycle of material acquisition which has become an end unto itself. This cycle has resulted in a lifestyle which demands ever-escalating complexity, and where certainty about anything is less and less attainable. People are replaced by machines, power falls into ever fewer hands, and the goal of providing a stable material basis for society is even more distant than it was when the quest began. Scientific inquiry and technological advancement begin as a way of revealing truth, yet the inclusion of economic principles results in a transformation of belief so that technological domination and material accumulation seem to be the only means to provide goods, services and social cohesion. It is no easy task to question a universalistic worldview; yet such questioning of this fundamental parameter of modern life is precisely what must now be attempted.

Any meaningful dialogue between worldviews on environmental issues must take account of the influence of these techno-economic forces. It is not enough simply to understand this problem; viable alternatives need to be sought. The current hegemony of pan-monetary technocracy is such that alternative economic systems and appropriate technology have little chance of success if globalising forces continue to be threatened by such initiatives. It is unacceptable to suggest to those who wish to live according to their own values, that they should somehow renounce the use of technology and withdraw from economic activity because they hold views which are at odds with modern ideology. People should be able to choose how far their involvement in technological and economic development will proceed without being forced to defend their position or converting to another. The dialogue, if it is to have any practical importance, needs to be able to arrive at agreed alternatives which can allow people the dignity of their own way of life without at the same time consigning them to poverty or technological simplicity.

Technology and economic forces continue to dominate many aspects of human life in the modern era. It is unlikely that either technology or trading will disappear from the human horizon, but the way these means are approached as a truth-revealing method

must be adjusted so as to be less destructive to the Earth and its peoples. If technology and its attendant material accumulation continues to stand in a central position as a human mode of meaning then we will no longer encounter ourselves. The ordering capacity of economic and technological reality is not a truly human order because there are no subjective qualities involved: no love, no beauty, no *poiesis*, no art, and no intrinsic value. In this desire to reveal truth as an ordering of 'things', the possibilities of other ways of revealing become increasingly limited. If technology and economic activity become the sole meaning of being for humankind, have we not then lost what makes us intrinsically human in the first place? Not only do we lose our humanness, but we also circumscribe ourselves within an ever-shrinking horizon of inquiry. Such enclosed inquiry limits the possibilities of being, and in so doing, effectively reduces human expression to a single horizon. When we consider the pathways available to other worldviews, such a reduction in horizons would seem to be a self-limiting process which can only result in a deterioration of the human potential to embrace many diverse aspects of reality.

The universalistic Western worldview boundary remains contained by its own orthodoxy. Even though scientific and technological knowledge appears to be advancing, this advancement, for all its apparent success, remains unidirectional. It is fundamentally unable to question the basis of its own assumptions and presuppositions. Such a worldview is destined to fulfill its own eschatology, i.e., it is hastening its own destruction. Panikkar explains:

“Technology claimed, in its self-justification, that it would free Man from the terror and shackles of nature - after it had blasphemed and desecrated her, of course. Now we are not only inundated with technical gadgets, but entangled in the technological universe. It entraps us in a purely technocratic world which is neither divine, nor human, nor cosmic. It creates an artificial empire from which there is no exit...The power the megamachine puts in human hands is a superhuman power that Man cannot handle.”³²

To halt such decline, dialogue with other worldviews is not only a choice which ought to be made, it is also a necessity. The very survival of the modern worldview depends upon breaking open the rigid universal boundary which currently encloses it

³² Panikkar. R., “The Destiny of Technological Civilisation,” *op. cit.*, p.246.

within a mode of revealing which is essentially destructive to the Earth and its peoples. Its destructiveness is not in the first instance due to the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology, or to the rampant greed of material accumulation. The problem lies with incorporating these activities as a source of meaning within the human essence. By elevating technological revealing as an ultimate measure of truth, and incorporating materialism as the only proper goal for human achievement, the Western worldview has set itself down a dangerous path. Dangerous because the more its universal principles are challenged the tighter must be the defence, which in turn draws it further into perfecting its own limited methods of inquiry and control. Such a 'perfect' system, if it could actually be attained, would not only 'choke' its human members but would eventually eliminate all freedom and end by destroying itself. The very ideal of a technologically perfect society is a contradiction in terms.³³ Panikkar suggests that a truly cross-cultural approach is needed to overcome these limitations. He writes:

“It is not therefore a question of just reforming the technocracy, or of returning to a pre-technological lifestyle, or of finding a convenient escape hatch. Neither is it any longer merely a question of wresting the reins of the historical process from the powers that be and taking them into our own hands, but rather of attuning ourselves once again to the rhythms of Reality, of relearning to cooperate with the entire universe in and around us for the very survival of Being.”³⁴

The dialogical dialogue which can lead to symbolic discourse offers a way to open up the shutters of universalistic worldviews to let in the 'light' of other ways of knowing. To achieve this, not only should the essence of technology and economics be called into question, but also a new cooperative focus needs to emerge so that humans and nature may co-exist in harmony. A new horizon for human endeavour needs to emerge, a horizon open to all the myriad possibilities of Being.

³³ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.248.

³⁴ Panikkar. R., *The Rhythm of Being, op. cit.*, (p.138).

TOWARDS AN OPEN HORIZON: UNIVERSALISM REVISITED

For the dialogue between worldviews to be successful, on both a practical and theoretical level, an open horizon of intelligibility must be sought. The universalistic horizon effectively rejects the mythical basis of its own worldview and disregards the validity of others' as unreal, non-rational or fanciful. This problem seems insurmountable at one level, but if the central presuppositions and assumptions of such a worldview are revealed through careful interpretation it can be seen that the universalistic *mythos* is not in fact the sole avenue to the real. While all worldviews have the ability to develop universalistic attitudes, the Western worldview presents all its parameters in a universal form. Not only does this exclude other horizons of intelligibility, but it also stultifies change from within. Any attack or challenge, either from within or without, merely acts to strengthen the basic orthodoxies. Both approaches fail to overcome superficial reactions, which not only further erode the old view, but also make more difficult the discovery of any new alternative. We can say that the *mythos* or horizon of the Western worldview is becoming ever more dysfunctional for a greater proportion of its people, and that this requires an opening of the old horizon to new possibilities. What we are seeking is an open horizon which allows for mutual understanding without the need to enclose this quest within a single perspective, vision or system.

As little as a hundred years ago much of the world's population consisted of an unrelated plurality of peoples, cultures and worldviews, many of which had little or no contact with one another. There now remain few peoples without at least some knowledge of an 'outside' world. The idea of a unified goal for humankind which has emerged from the meeting of widely diverse peoples is not necessarily a negative one if it is approached as a celebration of difference. An open horizon begins with the general acceptance of diverse presentations of the underlying mysteries with which we all must reckon. Such openness begins by accepting that mystery is revealed through differing symbolic presentations, each of which seeks to explicate the same mysterious qualities of existence. To entrap an emerging *mythos* within the parameters of a single worldview is to repeat the universalistic pattern. A new *mythos*, if it is to be acceptable and sufficient to present a holistic vision of reality,

must have symbolic polyvalence which is recognisable to all the peoples for whom it offers a horizon of intelligibility.

A universalistic vision in the tradition of scientific materialism will not suffice any more than would a purely Christian, Muslim or Hindu one. While the new vision is seeking the whole, if it retreats into old universalistic modes it fails to achieve its unifying goal. All peoples must be able to recognise themselves within such a vision. In sum, what this means is that no one worldview can successfully exert universalistic claims over another, nor can any worldview claim that the others do not exist. Either stance generates conflicts impossible to resolve. In this sense, Western universalism has already failed. And a return to a plurality of mutually exclusive and non-communicative worldviews is impossible, simply because pure isolationism is no longer an option in an interconnected world.

It is also no longer appropriate to segregate different levels of human inquiry. Theology, philosophy, and science can no longer be compartmentalised as totally diverse ways of approaching complex issues. For example, many environmental concerns appear to be purely ecological, but there are usually religious, philosophical and social aspects which are often only recognised when the views of 'others' are incorporated into an inquiry. The pattern that connects people to places cannot be understood in an isolated fashion. A holistic vision requires that links between these traditionally diverse methods of inquiry be found so that a unifying human horizon may spontaneously arise. Understanding the living Earth is not just a matter for ecology or natural science; it is for many people a religious experience, and for others a source of philosophical inspiration which can determine many ethical relationships. An open horizon demands interdisciplinary approaches to a dialogue across worldview boundaries. As we have seen in the studies of time and place, religious conceptions are often an intrinsic part of many peoples' ecological understanding. A separation of sacred from secular aspects of reality will no longer suffice. The dialogical dialogue suggests a pathway for integrating and linking theological, philosophical and ecological consciousness in a manner which does not require diverse truth claims to compete on a purely rational (which is to say Western) basis.

The Western, or modern worldview, has become surrounded by such a plurality of views that its expansion towards its universalistic goal has been effectively halted on many fronts. Indeed, expansion of the European cultural mode has been a demonstrable failure. Scientific, technological, and economic principles appear to have had a global impact, but they are no longer accepted *per se*. The whole basis of Western-style 'development' is under scrutiny and even the secular attitude is being eroded. European monotheistic religions have not convinced everyone, and wholesale conversions seem increasingly unlikely. Many people now seek more meaningful explanations for issues which remain unanswered and unanswerable by the scientific approach. Furthermore, the secular triad of rational observation, technological innovation and economic expansion has, in the final decades of the twentieth century, become the last bastion of Western universalism. An enclosed and purely secularised worldview repeatedly fails to meet the requirements and desires of vast numbers of people who seek a wider and more open horizon upon which to build meaning and communicate with each other. It is likely that people who continue to cling to universalistic claims will find themselves increasingly isolated if they are unable to participate in dialogue or become part of the emerging *mythos*.

Universalism is, then, a barrier to communication across worldview boundaries, but paradoxically it also encourages dialogue because its enclosures limit human freedom and thereby sow the seeds of discontent for people who find themselves trapped within its narrow confines. Those who seek dialogue with others are those who seek to broaden their own horizon of understanding. The participants in dialogue are usually those who already stand on the boundaries of their respective worldviews. In their search for meaningful responses to human crises, people who occupy a position on the periphery of their own tradition actively seek dialogue with others, both within their own tradition, and with those from other worldviews. While the dialogue must take note of universalistic claims and seek to find alternatives for many of the pressing problems caused by such claims, the dialogical process itself is not necessarily threatened by universalism. The beauty of dialogical dialogue is that it avoids argumentation and dialectics as a means of justification, but can use those same tools interpretively to reach mutual understanding through symbolic discourse.

It is symbolic discourse which offers hope that a new mythic horizon might emerge from the foundations of the Western universalistic *mythos*.

APPROACHING A NEW MYTHIC HORIZON

As we have seen throughout this study, mythic horizons are not static and new situations facilitate the evolution of new horizons. Through diachronical interpretation it is possible to trace the origins of such horizons and note the factors and influences which generate change. In recent times, many worldviews have been altered by the intrusion of the modern world into their traditional horizons. There are also many examples of historical interactions between cultures which have brought about significant alterations to other worldviews. Some of these, and their effects, have been discussed in the case studies. The transformative effect of European monotheistic religion on the predominantly nature-centred Fijians is one such example. The influence of Western temporal concepts on traditional Indian and Aboriginal worldviews is another. There are also many examples which could be drawn from the innumerable cross-cultural interactions throughout human history. However, if we envisage human history in very broad terms, we may suggest that there have been two dominant modes of being to which humans have been drawn.

The first is the idea that the world is ruled by 'other' (i.e., non-human) powers which belong to a higher order. Human life may be variously influenced by one God, or many gods, the fates, nature spirits, elemental powers, and so forth, but all things are in some way subject to an external law. This attitude reflects the idea the presence of different (*hetero*) laws (*nomos*), i.e., a sacred heteronomic order where there are distinct differences between the sacred and secular aspects of the world. Panikkar refers to heteronomy as a kairological moment.³⁵ He writes:

³⁵ Panikkar uses the word kairological - a moment of destiny - because the heteronomic and autonomic periods are not always strictly chronological in an evolutionary sense, and may overlap or co-exist. Many heteronomic worldviews exist contemporaneously with autonomic ones. There are also various historical developments of autonomic worldviews prior to the modern era (e.g., Roman, Chinese etc) which although not as clearly defined or necessarily universalistic as the current western worldview, did develop along similar lines. See Panikkar. R., "The Three Kairological Moments of

“The first kairological moment could be called the *ecstatic* moment of intelligence: Man knows. He knows the mountains and the rivers, he knows good and evil, pleasant and unpleasant. Male knows female and vice-versa. Man knows Nature and knows also his God and all the Gods. He stumbles, he errs, and he corrects his errors by allowing himself to be instructed by the things themselves. Man learns mainly by obedience, i.e., by listening to the rest of reality, which speaks to him, addresses him, teaches him. In the ecstatic attitude, the mind is predominantly passive.”³⁶

Examples of heteronomic worldviews include: Australian Aboriginal place-centred traditions, Fijian *Vanua* spirituality, early European forest religions and numerous other indigenous worldviews. These worldviews often existed in comparative isolation from one another but they were essentially Earth-centred; where human life was directed and determined by non-anthropocentric factors. They are other-directed, dependent on one or more non-human spiritual influences and therefore heteronomic.

The second mode is expressed particularly by the later European tradition of profane autonomy, i.e., self-directed, the law (*nomos*) of the self (*autos*). The autonomic attitude can be wholly anthropocentric, where ‘Man’ becomes “the measure of all things.”³⁷ Autonomy, individualism and monism are the hallmark of the modern era. Panikkar relates this as a second kairological moment:

“By autonomy we understand the world as well as the human being to be *sui iuris*, i.e., self determined and determinable, each being a law unto its self. This autonomy means that any injunction from outside, even if it is said to come from above, is regarded as an abusive imposition.”³⁸

And in another place:

“The second moment is the *enstatic* moment of human intelligence. Man knows that he knows. He knows that he is a knowing being. But he also senses that this reflective knowledge, like original sin, will sooner or later expel him from Paradise.”³⁹

Consciousness," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T Eastham). Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1993, pp.20-22.

³⁶ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.48.

³⁷ Protagoras., 'Truth' in *Fragment 1* {Deils. H. and Kranz. W., *Die Fragment Der Vorsokratiker* (3 Vols), 10th edition] Berlin. 1960.

³⁸ Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man*. Orbis Books. New York. 1973, p.28.

³⁹ Panikkar. R., "The Three Kairological Moments of Consciousness," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, p.48.

In this situation people are no longer an intrinsic part of nature, they become superior by objectivising differences. Separation begins. We now know that we know, but cannot find an absolute basis for this knowledge. The period of profane autonomy is best reflected in the philosophy of Descartes, who along with many other post-medieval European philosophers created the foundations for what has become one of the most important parameters of the modern worldview. The rise of this attitude has been discussed in Chapter Two as well as in both case studies, and does not need to be revisited here. However, the autonomic tradition has severely eroded heteronomic worldviews precisely because it lacks - and therefore demands - a unifying principle. Once traditional worldviews were exposed to a wider experience of human endeavour, their horizons also had to change in order to incorporate new aspects of reality.

While there are many commendable qualities within both heteronomic and autonomic modes, it is unlikely that these can merge into a new horizon because they are in so many ways mutually exclusive. It is no longer possible to deny the vision of an interconnected world, and a retreat into an 'ignorant' past seems impossible, but denial of the sacred dimension is not acceptable to many peoples. A unifying vision embraces a pluralism of views, which suggests that the elevation of universal principles will no longer suffice. This means that the dominance of the autonomic period may also be nearly at an end. The emerging *mythos* can be neither heteronomic nor autonomic; it cannot be a mere blend of the two, which is somehow compartmentalised to satisfy both secular and sacred worldviews. A solution to the current dilemma would require an appreciation of both the secular elements of human consciousness and its continuity with historical and contemporary sacred interpretations. This leads us to ask: What form will an emergent *mythos* take? This of course, cannot be fully defined because the new *mythos* has not fully emerged; it is not yet *logos*.⁴⁰ While the form is essentially unknowable, a possible direction may be outlined.

⁴⁰ Panikkar. R., (*ibid*), p.52.

AN ONTONOMIC⁴¹ MYTHOS

How do we approach the idea of ontonomy, i.e., the law or rule (*nomos*) of being (*ontos*)? Panikkar outlines the prerequisites for an ontonomic moment:

“Today however, this holistic vision seems to be the undimmed hope of an ever-growing number of people and the explicit goal of human consciousness. Man, who has never sought partial truths, now suspects that many traditional convictions may in fact be only partial. Man has always sought the ultimate reality, and now he suspects that by ruthlessly transcending everything he may well leave reality behind. Man is not satisfied to attain the peaks if from there he cannot see the valleys as well. The entire reality counts, matter as much as spirit, goodness as much as evil, science as much as mysticism, the soul as much as the body. It is not a question of regaining the innocence we had to lose to become who we are, but of conquering a new one.”⁴²

What does a new innocence entail? How can modern Man, armed with scientific and technological knowledge, give birth to a new innocence? Within the scientific horizon there appears to be solid evidence for a foundation of knowledge which can eventually explain everything. However, when we consider that all mythic horizons arise from the human need to make the mystery of Being intelligible, we can suggest that there are other ways of approaching that essential mystery. There is no need to retreat into a pre-scientific mentality to see that this is so. Science, and indeed the entire edifice of objective inquiry, approaches the being of ‘things’ from a single angle, i.e., the dualistic stance. But such a means of knowing is still unable to answer many of the elusive questions which have always concerned humans in their endeavour to comprehend reality. These are essentially questions of Being, and as such, remain fundamentally unanswered by secular science or philosophy. They are commonly considered to be ‘religious’ questions which lie outside the boundaries of rational inquiry. And yet a lingering doubt about the certainty of secular rationalism continues to inspire many people to search instead for meaning in the many mysterious aspects of life.

⁴¹ Ontonomy is a neologism coined by Panikkar from *nomos* - the law of - and on - being, hence the law of being. Ontonomic, ontonomous, etc., are derived from this neologism See Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man. op. cit.*, p.29.

⁴² Panikkar. R., “The Cosmotheandric Intuition,” in *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, p.57.

This quest can lead to a new innocence. A deep and sustained inquiry into all aspects of knowledge and ways of knowing will ultimately lead to the realisation that the unknowable *mysterium* from which all horizons arise, is at least somewhat opaque to the intellect. Hence a transcendent experience is required to overcome the limitations of intellectual means of knowing. Such experience does not have to reject what has been learned, nor does it require the denial of any particular way of knowing. But it does have to overcome both universalistic and dualistic methods. The ontonomic vision is not just a perfecting of already existing systems nor is it a deconstruction of them; rather, it is a search for an open horizon which can intelligibly unite Being and its appearance into a whole. Neither ‘superstitious’ religious plurality nor individualistic rational certainty will suffice. The new innocence is a celebration of human achievement as well as a recognition that all that is known arises from a mysterious and indeterminate source. The whole of reality will never be known, but the human search will always continue. This search is not just the sole prerogative of a single worldview but is a quest which requires that all human pathways of inquiry are exercised; whether they be theological, shamanistic, non-dual, rational, scientific or of any other type. The ontonomic vision realises unity by celebrating diversity.

Panikkar suggests that ontonomy stands for:

“The recognition neither of heteronomy, i.e., the regulation of the activity of a particular being by laws proceeding from another higher being, nor of autonomy, i.e., the affirmation that each field is absolutely self-normative and patron of its own destiny. Ontonomy is intended to express the recognition of the inner regularities of each field of activity or sphere of being in the light of the whole. The whole is, in fact, neither different from nor merely identical with any one field or sphere. Ontonomy rests on the assumption that the universe is a whole, that there is an internal and constitutive relationship between all and every part of reality, that nothing is disconnected and that the development and progress of one being is not to be at the expense of another...In our case ontonomy does not accept any dualism or metaphysical dichotomy: the field of the sacred is no longer defined in opposition to that of the secular.”⁴³

This law of being (*nomos* of the *on*) is neither purely religious nor purely secular. Rather, an ontonomic attitude fully accepts the insight of secular consciousness into

⁴³ Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man. op. cit.*, pp.41-42. [Emphasis added].

the 'ultimacy' of temporal history, and its consciousness of the 'sacred' is such that it refuses to be enslaved by time or historical forces.⁴⁴ This is not an intellectual synthesis where traditional religions and sacred worldviews are somehow 'fitted' into a concept of secular movements or an evolutionary schema. It does not focus on autonomous rights or declare a heteronomous hierarchy, but rather suggests an abandonment of predetermined concepts of religion and secularity. In effect, the law of being requires an end to the polarised conception of a sacred/profane dualism. However, the blurring of all differences is not the goal, otherwise the quest fails and falls back on the undifferentiated unity of some universalistic process. An ontonomic *mythos* points towards a holistic conception which recognises that Being in its entirety holds ontological primacy, where aspects of temporality, individuation, materialism, rationality, etc., are of secondary importance, but not necessarily negated.

The emergence of a new *mythos* requires new symbolic disclosures. Some of these may be revitalised and reinterpreted symbols which have in previous times presented similar meanings. A new *mythos* does not require that all previous meanings and presentations be discarded. The beginning of an ontonomic attitude and the emergence of a new *mythos* with its own appropriate symbols is a complex field of study which has very far-reaching implications which cannot be discussed in detail here.⁴⁵ What we are primarily concerned with is how meaningful dialogue can bring an ontonomic focus to environmental issues, specifically that of environmental guardianship. The growing awareness of the complexity of global environmental dilemmas has led many to believe that the 'environmental movement' in all its diverse forms is the emerging *mythos*. However it may well be, as Panikkar suggests, simply an 'ecological interlude'. He writes:

“Ecological consciousness arises when Man begins to discover that nature is not just infinite passivity and that this planet is a limited vessel. So Man decides to be a more humane manager of Mother Earth and tries to deal more

⁴⁴ Hall, G., *Raimon Panikkar's Hermeneutics of Religious Pluralism*. (unpublished PhD Thesis) University Microfilms International. Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1994, p.193.

⁴⁵ This is the basis of Panikkar's cosmotheandric vision. His work entitled *The Cosmotheandric Experience* presents the culmination of fifty years of inquiry into the emergence of just such a new *mythos*.

rationally with Nature, but this really amounts to only a tactical change: 'Now our exploitation must be milder and more reasonable'The *oikos* is still dominated by *logos*. As long as ecology is a science, we have not overcome the second moment of scientific knowledge, i.e., we still fall under the rule of the theory which guides our praxis by trying to make it as reasonable as possible - which is an improvement to be sure, but certainly not enough. Indeed, today Man cultivates a new attitude towards Nature; he rediscovers her beauty, her value, and even begins a new companionship with the Earth. He becomes sensitive and learns to treat her with care, even love. But Man is still the boss, the king, although perhaps as a constitutional, rather than an absolute monarch."⁴⁶

The ecological attitude is still an active scientific, technological and managerial attitude aimed at re-directing human actions, rather than an acceptance of the relationship between 'Man' and 'Nature' as a mutual sharing of being.

Such attitudes are still contained within a limited anthropocentric vision. Autonomic attitudes to the natural environment which have evolved in the modern era may be expressed as follows:

1. It is people against the environment.
2. It is the individual that matters (also the individual species, environmental type, nation, etc.).
3. Living systems are, in principle, reducible to inorganic parts. Nature is ultimately a machine.
4. Because nature is known from externalised experimentation, people can have unilateral control over the environment and should strive for such control.
5. People live within an infinitely expanding frontier: Progress is infinite and all of reality will eventually be known.
6. Economic determinism amounts to common sense.
7. Technology and science can ultimately break through environmental limitations.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Panikkar. R., "The Three Kairological Moments of Consciousness," in *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, p.45.

⁴⁷ These and the following summaries of heteronomic attitudes to nature are derived from several sources. These include: Panikkar. R., *Worship and Secular Man. op. cit.* and *The Cosmotheandric Experience. op. cit.*, Bateson. G., *Steps to an Ecology of Mind. op. cit.* and *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. op. cit.* and Berman. M., *The Reenchantment of the World.* Cornell University Press. Ithaca 1981.

Currently there are many who support a return to heteronomic attitudes as a means to solve the environmental crisis. However, heteronomic environmental attitudes are not without certain limitations. Heteronomic attitudes may be expressed as follows:

1. Nature is sacred and intrinsically superior to people. Guardians regulate human/nature relationships.
2. The well-being of tribe, clan, or 'nation' takes precedence over the rights of the individual.
3. Knowledge of natural environments is extremely detailed and focused on local concerns and places.
4. Environmental determinism directs cultural development.
5. People are subject to the uncontrollable and often indeterminate forces of nature.
6. Appeal to supernatural forces is often the only means to alleviate environmentally determined stress.
7. The natural world sets limits to appropriate technology.

These two modes have important limitations, the former because it results in widespread environmental destruction, the latter because people are regularly subject to severe environmental limitations which can result in widespread suffering. The effects of current autonomic attitudes on the global environment are well known. However, localised heteronomic knowledge sometimes leads to disastrous mistakes, such as that of the Easter Islanders who depleted their resources so completely that it led to the collapse of their own population. Other examples of localised environmental degradation include: severe over-cropping leading to soil depletion in many regions, the desertification of North Africa, soil salination in ancient Mesopotamia, extinction of megafauna such as the Moa in New Zealand, and many other extinctions of valuable species due to over-harvesting. These are well-documented examples of environmental change induced by heteronomic cultures, many of which occurred prior to European contact. Certainly neither autonomy nor heteronomy as human modes of being can claim totally harmonious relationships with nature. The heteronomic worldviews have the advantage of preserving a certain respect for the natural world and establishing many sacred relationships with the Earth. In many places, and over periods of time, the heteronomic attitude allowed

people to learn from their environments which, in turn, eventually enabled them to develop sustainable practices. Many of these insights are applicable in the modern era, but the localised nature of these relationships is now unable to meet the demands of expanding resource depletion which has followed in the wake of economic development. Lack of unity and a wider awareness of interconnected issues has allowed such peoples and their environments to be severely exploited by outsiders.

On the other hand, the autonomic mode, in spite of its other destructive influences, has brought about significant changes in human awareness of the Earth as a whole. Advances in ecological knowledge have led to a popular understanding of the interconnectedness of all life. It has also created the potential for human populations to free themselves from the vagaries of natural catastrophes. Biodiversity conservation measures, environmental reconstruction methods and ethical considerations are but a few of the gains won from scientific and philosophic inquiry. However, many of these positive outcomes remain latent in terms of their potential to forge a new relationship between humans and the natural world.

The ontonomic attitude seeks to improve on the positive contributions of both heteronomic and autonomic modes. Each attitude represents the other's blind spot; each reveals much that cannot be seen from the other perspective. The sacred reverence for nature now includes the whole Earth. The tools of secular science and philosophy can be used to enhance the well-being of all life and in every environment. National boundaries can be disregarded for the purpose of conservation and protection of natural environments. Cessation of the war between sacred and secular conceptions of reality would allow dialogue to become the natural way of sharing knowledge and wisdom between worldviews on crucial environmental matters. The ontonomic attitude requires a deeper understanding; an understanding which draws from theology, philosophy and ecology. Such an attitude may be expressed as follows:

1. Nature is revealed in our relations with it. Fact and value are inseparable; process, form and relationship are primary.

2. 'Unconscious' mind is primary: mind/body and subject/object are each two aspects of the same process. The goal is wisdom.
3. Wholes have properties that parts do not; living systems are not reducible to their components. Nature is alive.
4. Only a fraction of reality is knowable; mystery is expressed in many forms by both secular and sacred worldviews.
5. It is people with nature. The goal is harmony, where people are neither dominant over nature nor entirely 'subject' to nature's whims. Neither dependence nor independence, but interdependence is the fundamental insight.
6. Dialogue seeks to validate the truth claims of diverse worldviews: a pluralistic attitude.
7. Technology and economics are tools and means to be shared rather than the dominant symbols and unilateral actions of a universalistic worldview.

A mythic horizon which can give rise to a truly ontonomic attitude needs to include essential linking myths, symbols and concepts. These links may arise from dialogue between worldviews as wholly new inspirations or they may be drawn from traditional sources to be revitalised within the modern context. One example of a concept which attempted to link people with nature can be drawn from the European tradition. The ancient Stoic notion of *oikeiosis* - how people should act appropriately, and in accordance with how the house (Earth) unfolds its Being - may be a preferable means of inquiry for environmental concerns than the current use of scientific ecology, deep ecology or even ecosophy.⁴⁸ The vision of how the Earth unfolds its Being is essentially ontonomic, whereas ecology - how the house works - is an anthropocentric conception. An 'ecological' crisis seems to carry less weight because it can easily be separated from human involvement. The ecological crisis is 'out there', it is not 'us'; "we can solve it with more technology and more applied knowledge" - is the claim of scientists, economists, managers, and most ecologists. A crisis of *oikeiosis*: a crisis of the unfolding of 'our' house; i.e., the 'house' which is

⁴⁸ Ecosophy is an unusual neologism used by Panikkar to suggest a dialogue with the Earth itself and its many voices which, as he suggests, modern Man no longer hears. This concept was also used by Rudolf Steiner, the founder of biodynamics, to suggest Earth (oikos - house) wisdom as a balance to his concept of anthroposophy (human wisdom). Ecosophy is closer to *oikeiosis* in concept than either scientific or deep ecology.

the very ground of our being, seems at once more urgent and important. Science and technology cannot approach the entirety of this problem because it involves us all, in all our ways.

Solutions to the so-called environmental crisis cannot be found by narrowing the focus. They will emerge through careful consideration of Being in all its myriad manifestations. There can be no simple answer, no technological 'fix', no single ethical restraint, no particular religious urge which will bring about reconciliation of the linked destiny of humans and nature as *oikeiosis*.⁴⁹ There are many more examples which have ontonomic potential. Fijian spirituality encompassed in the notion of *Vanua* is applicable to the wider Pacific region where similar concepts are partially or fully expressed as profoundly ecological concepts which link people to their places. The ontonomic vision can be approached regionally as well as globally. The need is to draw people together to find ways of facilitating understandings which can generate positive outcomes for people and their places wherever they are situated.

In the final analysis, an ontonomic vision requires nothing less than a radical metanoia. Not just a change in the direction of thinking, as the ecological attitude would seem to suggest, but rather a transformation in the way we think about ourselves and the world of which we are part. This raises questions which are related to the meaning of Being; questions which Heidegger attempted to address in his seminal work, *Being and Time*. In his concluding remarks, Heidegger wrote:

“We can never inquire into the origin and possibility of the ‘idea’ of being in general with the means of formal logical ‘abstraction’, that is, not without a secure horizon for questions and answers. We must look for a way to illuminate the fundamental ontological question and *follow* it. Whether that way is at all the *only* one or even the *right* one can be decided only after we

⁴⁹ In terms of linking symbols, the modern photographic images of a beautiful, and somehow mysterious, blue-green planet Earth spinning in space reminds people of the splendid isolation of their *Oikos*. It is an emerging symbol for the ontonomic *mythos*. It brings us all to realise how utterly inter-dependent we are, and the reason that we are capable of any kind of existence at all is because Earth's being shelters us. Our sense of dominance over the Earth is ultimately our own self-delusion. A dialogue between worldviews may reveal many more ontonomic visions and symbols which offer ways of approaching complex environmental problems on a holistic basis.

have *followed* it. The *strife* in relation to the interpretation of being cannot be settled *because it has not yet even been started.*"⁵⁰

Since Heidegger called for an inquiry into the meaning of Being much has been achieved by many scholars. It is now safe to suggest that a Heideggerian interpretation of Being has been started and that the seeds of a new *mythos* have been sown. This present study, building on Panikkar's pioneering work, contributes to the meaning of being by suggesting a way in which wisdom may be shared across worldview boundaries through meaningful dialogue. If it is followed, this 'way' may lead to a new understanding of how human beings may relate to nature's being. A radical transformation of current attitudes to nature is required and meaningful dialogue may facilitate mutual understanding between diverse human groups on environmental issues. A crucial aspect of this transformation and subsequent mutual understanding is the emergence of a new concept of environmental guardianship.

⁵⁰ Heidegger, M., *Being and Time. op. cit.*, p.389, [437].

PART II - THE DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GUARDIANSHIP

*“But where the danger is, grows
The saving power also.”* Friedrich Hölderlin.¹

The danger, as discussed in Chapter One, is the activity and impact of people on their surroundings, their environment and each other, which is reducing the ability of the Earth to sustain itself. The danger is the environmental crisis - both a crisis in nature, and in fundamental human relations. It is a crisis of meaning, a crisis of theology, philosophy and ecology. It is a crisis of Being; a crisis which cannot be solved by any one group, people, or worldview. And yet within this very danger lies the saving power. It is just this danger which brings the crisis to the attention of people from all worldviews, religions and cultures. It is a truly global crisis to which unifying solutions must be sought. There is no longer a choice. The ‘saving’ power of science, technology and economics has thus far proved inadequate to the task of finding solutions to problems which they, by and large, have created.

To save means to emancipate, to spare, to harbour protectingly, to take into one’s care, to put something back into what is proper and right, and to keep safe. Saving not only snatches something from a danger, it can also mean to loosen, to set something free to express its own essence.² That which genuinely saves is that which keeps safe, i.e., safekeeping.³ The human mode of safekeeping is guardianship. The guardian watches over, defends and keeps from harm the things or people of value. The Earth, the very dwelling place of Being, has value far beyond its merely economic or monetary importance. The Earth is the foundation of human existence whence all intelligibility arises. It is the source of all life.

¹ Hölderlin. F., “Patmos,” in *Hymns and Fragments* (translated by R. Sieburth). Princeton University Press. New Jersey. 1984, p.89, (lines 2-3).

² From Heidegger. M., *Basic Writings* (edited by M. Krell). Harper and Row. New York. 1977, p.328.

³ Heidegger. M., “The Turning,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Garland Publishing INC. New York. 1977, p.42.

Environmental guardianship is not only to conserve and preserve nature, but also letting it loose, releasing it, as Heidegger would say, “into its own” so that it can remain as it is, in its own essence. Conservation means ‘to look after’; to use while keeping sound and intact. We can conserve our house (i.e., our *oikos*) but we must also live in it. A house is not genuinely a house if it is simply preserved but not inhabited. It would then be a museum. When we dwell, we protect; we take care, we conserve, and we save our house from decay in order that it continue to shelter us, so that we also may endure. To do this conserving, protecting and saving, not only are we guardians, but also dwellers: We must also live in our natural environments. Living which is not merely utilising, exploiting or using up, but also safeguarding the essence of the Earth as *Oikos* - the house of all Being.

True guardianship requires a special kind of inhabitation or dwelling: an act of tending and attending that grants things leeway to disclose themselves and endure. A guardian in this sense is a true ‘care-taker’, who, being in the ‘familiar abode’ where things are close-at-hand, gathers them together to form a world.⁴ True guardianship implies a new way of revealing which allows nature to ‘speak’ to us in a manner which does not enclose its essence within the boundaries of an objective worldview. Such objectification causes us to forget that our own essence ‘is’ always in constant relationship with all the myriad beings of the world. Guardianship requires that we no longer perceive nature solely in terms of resources or power. Heidegger writes:

“But nature must not be understood here as what is objectively present, nor as the power of nature. The forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is the wind ‘in the sails’. As the surrounding world is discovered, nature thus discovered is encountered along with it. We can abstract from nature’s kind of being as handiness; we can discover and define it in its pure objective presence. But in this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what ‘stirs and strives,’ what overcomes us, entrances us as landscape, remains hidden. The botanist’s plants are not the *flowers of the hedgerow*, the river’s ‘source’ ascertained by the geographer is not the *source in the ground*.”⁵

⁴ Derived from Heidegger. M., *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit* (translated by J. Stambaugh). State University of New York Press. Albany. 1996, pp.51-58 [55-62], 62-67 [66-72].

⁵ Heidegger. M., (*ibid*), p.66 [70].

It is precisely these 'flowers of the hedgerows', those 'trees of the *Vanua*' and the 'abiding rhythms' of nature that we are now obliged to save from the danger of being reduced to mere 'things' to be used (and used up) or 'events' to be managed and controlled.

True guardians are rare. Guardianship roles were once common among many indigenous cultures, but today their voices are largely unheeded by the majority of those actively participating in economic, technological and scientific 'progress'. This desire for 'progress' has encouraged widespread exploitation and despoliation of the Earth's resources to the point where global environmental ruin may well be imminent. This very danger has led to a questioning which, in the long term, reveals its saving power.

In Chapter One we began with the observation that effective environmental guardianship has passed into the hands of those who are least likely to protect, conserve or save the Earth. Multinational corporations, national governments, lawmakers, and managerial institutions have taken upon themselves the task of regulating our world. Yet beyond 'cashing' in on their immediate windfalls, such a task appears to have been far too complex for them alone to achieve any effective solution. The problem worsens incrementally as so-called 'experts' study, quantify, inspect and attempt to regulate exploitative human activity. Success is unlikely because their methods are identical to the ones which created the problem in the first instance. Moreover, the 'environment' is not simply an arena for rational calculation or deduction. For many peoples it is a sacred source of meaning, for others a basis for philosophic inquiry, and for yet others a creative inspiration which leads to artistic expression of many kinds. Any successful approach to solving pressing environmental problems requires a multi-dimensional approach; the narrow focus of a single worldview is clearly inadequate. A multi-disciplinary communication across worldview boundaries is necessary to find consensus solutions to complex environmental issues.

The rise of pluralism suggests that such a communication is not only sensible, but also necessary in a world where exclusionary principles are no longer acceptable. To

discover how meaningful dialogue could transcend argumentative and dialectical conflict as a means of communication, an understanding of how worldviews are constructed was required. Following Panikkar's investigation into the origins of intelligible expression, it can be seen that all worldviews have mythic horizons from which their *logos* is derived through symbolic presentation. Each mythico-symbolic expression of this *mysterium* is inherently intelligible within a particular worldview boundary at the level of *logos*. However, the intelligibility of each worldview may be radically different from any another, hence the potential conflicts. Furthermore, while the *mythos* and *logos* of one worldview may be essentially incomprehensible to another, the symbols which present the mythical horizon as an intelligible and communicable reality may be interpreted in a manner which is intellectually coherent. A symbolic interpretation does not need to penetrate and break down mythic horizons. A symbolic discourse could facilitate the sharing of wisdom in a manner which does not descend into argumentation, dialectics and, ultimately, conflict.

In Chapter Two the idea of environmental determinism was raised to show how different natural surroundings may have led to different mythico-symbolic presentations of nature's mysterious being. In many environments, various human groups had determined a sacred relationship with the natural world; either because of the bounteousness and fecundity of their places or because they were overwhelmed by the sheer power of the natural forces to which they found themselves subject. In both situations a respect for the natural world evolved where people entered into a predominantly sacred relationship with their natural environment.

The type of environment in which European peoples lived allowed them to expand their populations by manipulating nature in a manner which increased the productivity of their lands. The application of their labour, to increase soil fertility, to clear forests, to irrigate crops hand-in-hand with rudimentary technological development, allowed European peoples to gain control over production systems which were not directly a result of nature's bounty. This gradually increased peoples awareness of their ability to control certain aspects of nature, which in turn eventually led to a separation, where people and nature were no longer seen to co-exist as

equals. What could be controlled and manipulated could no longer be held in awe. Thus the foundations were set for the evolution of an increasingly anthropocentric worldview.

The expansion of European anthropocentric universalism was greatly aided by the Judaic monotheistic tradition and the later Christian apologetics. Monotheism and apologetic universalism severely eroded those aspects of early polytheistic nature-centred religions which could not be co-opted into the structure of institutionalised religion. The rise of secular science and its dominant dualistic attitude effectively replaced the sacred worldview once common in the greater European region. Rationalism, objectivity and universalism gradually became dominant across the globe as technological advances allowed Europeans to colonise and conquer other lands and peoples. The Europeans came to believe that their worldview would eventually supplant all others and that their universal goals would come to be seen by all peoples as the only way of discerning reality. It was simply the 'march of civilisation'. Instead, the emergence of an environmental crisis has been a major obstacle to attaining that goal. It has not only set limits to 'progress', but has led to questioning of the entire set of Western assumptions about the nature of reality, the meaning of being, and the secular attitude itself.

The questioning of the predominantly anthropocentric Western worldview stems not only from the many diverse worldviews now subject to Western dominance, but also from people within its own boundaries. These questions highlighted many unresolved issues with respect to colonial influence, materialism, religious pluralism, the uncritical acceptance of science and technology, and the rights of indigenous people to stake their own truth claims. The one question which remains largely un-answered is how we humans are going to reverse the steady degradation of the Earth and all her living systems. In recent decades it has become increasingly obvious that the currently dominant worldview cannot solve this crucial problem; indeed, it is part of the problem. A second dilemma which has emerged is that conflict resolution models which rely on argumentation and dialectics have repeatedly failed to resolve issues which involve radically different worldviews. The question of how humans can approach a problem of such global magnitude collectively, when basic

communications about simple everyday matters often fails, remains unanswered by conventional thinkers. A means to bridge differing worldview boundaries seems essential if any wisdom on environmental issues is to be shared meaningfully.

In Chapter Three, a method of dialogue which leads to a potential commonality between worldviews was discussed. This is Panikkar's diatopical model which offers a way of overcoming the supposed barriers between worldviews. Panikkar developed the diatopical model with the idea of finding a means to enter into dialogue with differing religions. The dialogical dialogue also has important implications for environmental issues, most of which have sacred and secular aspects, depending upon which worldview horizon one is speaking from. The diatopical model has three important aspects. It begins with a morphological interpretation of how each worldview perceives a particular issue and where its boundaries are. The dialogue then proceeds to describe how that perception arose by means of historical exegesis or a diachronical hermeneutic. The third and most important step is the symbolic discourse where participants seek to interpret their respective *mythoi* in a manner which reveals the symbols capable of transferring meaning across worldview boundaries. Such commonality then leads to a shared understanding and a fusion of intelligible horizons. Participants in the dialogue can, through symbolic discourse, not only become convinced of the validity of the others' worldview, but also include newfound knowledge within their own worldview in a non-contradictory manner.

In chapters Four and Five this diatopical method is applied to the difficult and varied notions of time and place. The question of time and timing was approached by comparing and interpreting three radically different temporal concepts using morphological, diachronical and diatopical hermeneutics. It is clear that time is not a universal principle even though temporal measurement is fundamental to Western ontology. Australian Aboriginal peoples constructed a coherent and intelligible worldview without recognising time or timing in any form. Each worldview explicated the mysterious sequential unfolding of reality in remarkably different ways, and yet at a mythico-symbolic level each explanation is coherent and can be communicated to others. Not only are these expressions equally valid, but they also offer a means for people to enter into a multi-temporal experience of reality. Time

can be seen as a tool rather than a universal and self-limiting structure which ties people to a lineal eschatology. The hermeneutic of time reveals not only a means to understanding and communication across worldview boundaries but also widens the temporal horizons of the potential participants. It is also clear that environmental guardians require an understanding of natural rhythms which are not necessarily regulated according to lineal temporal constraints.

In Chapter Five, attention was focused on the notion of place by interpreting secular and sacred concepts. Using forests as an example, the dialogical process was used to search for symbolic correlations which can bridge the sacred/secular divide. The ancient Fijian *mythos*, expressed as *Vanua*, was recognised through symbolic expression and compared with traditional European forest symbols. The outcome of our analysis is the recognition that modern peoples of European origin have a deep, yet mostly unrecognised, connection to trees and forests. They, too, are forest peoples. The dialogue in this case reveals not only traditional Fijian sacred relationships with forests but also offers a way for modern people to reactivate their own latent symbols. The dialogue aims at revealing different kinds of values. Forests in the modern sense, are either 'standing stocks' of resources or they are set aside as 'reserves' where various ecological values are protected. Subjective considerations such as intrinsic and aesthetic values are usually mentioned, but are not usually the main reason for conservation or preservation. Forest guardians in the modern sense are conservation officers, environmental managers and various legal representatives of secular institutions.

In the Fijian situation traditional relationships to forests were not only holistic but also symbolic. The people, their chiefs, their land, and the forests were encompassed within the spiritual principle of *Vanua*. Guardians were not managers; rather, they were guardians of a sacred world. Destruction of large tracts of forests led to a collapse of the entire mythic horizon of forest-dwelling Fijians. Modern Fijian forest guardians and spokespeople are engaged in a desperate struggle to save the remaining forests and forestall the degradation and possible loss of the *Vanua*. Most of the destruction originates from the demand placed on the forests by global economic forces and the modern desire to accumulate material goods which has become an

important part of contemporary ontology. Local guardians have little legal or economic power. For them, dialogue is the only alternative. If those who seek to extract timber products can come to understand the sacred value of such forests to the Fijian worldview, and the Fijian forest owners to effectively participate in decisions about their lands, then and only then will viable alternatives emerge.

The two case studies not only suggest a pathway for cross-cultural communications, but also a means to revitalise traditional practices within a particular worldview. In Fiji for example, many people have lost their vital connections to the *Vanua*. They also need to find a means to consolidate and renew their own traditions within the modern context. A new balance must be sought which allows them to retain their cultural integrity, while at the same time developing their relationship to modernity without the need to reject the positive gains won from contact with the contemporary world. Likewise Aboriginal peoples cannot all walk away from Western temporality. They need to retain their traditions within a modern context so that they, too, can effectively walk in two worlds. A recourse to strictly traditional ways of life is not possible for many, yet a total conversion to modernity is lethal. Meaningful dialogue within a given worldview boundary has merits of its own. The participants may be able to find pathways for reviving their essential ontologies within today's multicultural context.

These case studies have shown that Panikkar's hermeneutical method can be successful because it allows an interpretation through a symbolic discourse which does not penetrate and break down the *mythos* of any given worldview. Presuppositions and assumptions, which are often unquestioned, can be revealed in a non-threatening manner which allows for the breaking up of orthodoxies and the opening up of horizons. This is of particular importance because those who defend universalism and orthodoxy are often unaware of their own latent symbols and mythic horizons. Only 'the other' can show you what you take for granted. The dialogue facilitates a 'freeing up' of restrictive worldviews and allows them to encounter the essential value of their own perceptions, while at the same time revealing the limitations of any single way of knowing. If it is clearly understood that no one worldview is capable of 'knowing' all the diverse aspects of reality, the door

opens for an inquiry which can include other modes of perception. The current barriers between sacred and secular attitudes which have led to mutual exclusion can be removed, allowing for the emergence of a new holistic *mythos*.

The basis for meaningful dialogue and its important implications for potential guardians, rests upon Panikkar's important (and quite traditional) insight that reality is, and always has been, unknowable in its totality. The unbounded and limitless mystery of life requires that all peoples determine an original horizon from which to construct a worldview. To each human group, depending upon the environmental setting in which they dwell, this horizon is manifested as the *mythos* which serves as the unquestioned foundation for that culture's being in the world. All worldviews, in this sense, are functionally similar, even though their intelligible expression as *logos* may appear to be radically different. A dialogue founded solely on the basis of *logos* is bound to fail because such expressions are often incommensurate with one another.

Symbols are central to meaningful dialogue because they present *mythos* to *logos* in a manner which avoids an infinite regress into inexpressible mystery. While the *mythos* remains essentially transparent, symbols are highly 'visible' and may be interpreted in many ways. Symbols and symbolic presentations common to different worldviews are parts of the pattern which connects diverse mythical expressions of mystery. A symbolic discourse which reveals commonalities can overcome universalism. Such discourse also restrains secular exclusionism because the central assumptions, presuppositions and myths upon which the rejection of sacred concepts is based can itself be revealed. Not only does this place each worldview on a more level playing field, but it also allows the crucial concealed sacred aspects within the secular worldview itself to be unveiled.

The diatopical model has previously been outlined mainly in terms of inter-religious dialogue. This present study has indicated its suitability for a dialogue between worldviews on environmental issues, particularly those which contain theological, philosophical, and ecological elements in relation to guardianship. In recent times the focus of environmental inquiry has been on ecological issues. It has become readily apparent that the biosphere has been affected by human activities in many diverse

ways, most of which have degraded natural systems. The effects are obvious, and determinable predictions have been made which suggest possible action to counter further degradation. Ecology, as a science, has provided many useful insights into what is occurring in the natural world, but it has also raised a number of philosophical questions. The question of how we *ought* to relate to nature is an important inquiry which forms the basis of the new discipline of environmental ethics.

Ethical relations cannot be separated from ecological research into the environmental crisis because the crisis is a direct result of human actions. We can determine the kinds of activity which have led to the crisis; we can outline what is actually occurring, and even suggest how we ought to act, but we cannot say with any certainty what nature, and all that it entails, actually *is*. This is the theological aspect which advances questions that are not only profoundly indeterminable, but remain within the realm of myth. It is here that the essential conflict remains largely unresolved.

The purpose of the dialogue is to draw links between worldviews which can shed light upon the mysterious being of nature. This could lead to a re-evaluation of how we ought to relate to our world and how we should act to alleviate human induced pressure on our environment. The links between theology, philosophy, and ecology are the focus of the meaningful dialogue on environmental issues because, collectively they can lead to a holistic response, and an understanding of the diversity of human relationships to the natural world. Within this diversity there may well be ways of life and being which remain opaque to the current scientific and philosophical secular inquiry.

There are however, many other applications worth considering. For example, the possibility mentioned earlier of dialogue on the nature of perception where dual and nondual perspectives could be elucidated in a symbolic discourse. There is also a need to seriously question the essence of technology and economics and their effects on the human mode of being. Other examples include: cross-cultural psychology, inter-cultural anthropology, Western science in relation to indigenous science, the

pluralism of truth, and many other multidisciplinary issues which are currently at loggerheads. Dialogical dialogue is applicable to many cross-cultural matters and could build on the gains made by anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and human geography to form a new multi- and inter-disciplinary inquiry. These examples all require further research to elucidate the procedures which could lead to meaningful dialogue.

In terms of environmental dialogue, there is a multitude of issues appropriate for the diatopical model. Time and place, as we have seen, are central concepts in the evolution of environmental understanding, but there are many other examples. The element water, in all its varied manifestations, is a suitable topic for meaningful dialogue because water is perceived as a source of sacred meaning by many worldviews, and is also an important resource for economic activity.⁶ Sacred mountains, hills, escarpments, craters, rocks, caves, and other landforms are also important symbols for many worldviews and are equally addressable only in and through dialogue. Indeed, there are few, if any natural phenomena which do not have a sacred aspect to some human group. Animals, plants, insects and fish are also sources and mediators of sacred meaning - and indeed of dialogue - for some cultures.⁷ Guardians are needed to save, protect, and release such places and their living symbols from human actions, which not only encroach upon and damage their physical essences, but also actively degrade their spiritual significance.

⁶ Natural phenomena which include waters such as: lakes, rivers, pools, springs, waterfalls, geothermal emanations and certain oceanic regions, have all been influenced by modern human activities. Some of these are polluted by industrial activities, others utilised as resources to feed urban demand and generate electric power. Many important water bodies are enclosed within reserves or national parks and others have become the private property of people who no longer respect the sacred value of others to whom they once belonged. Overfishing, commercial development, pollution and wanton destruction of waterways are important environmental issues of our time. They are issues that involve a dialogue which can reach beyond the mere appearance of things, because for many, the various manifestations of water are sacred symbols and not just resources.

⁷ For example, the vexed issue of whale harvesting has serious implications, not only for those who seek to exploit them commercially, but also those for whom the whales are symbols as well as traditional sources of food. Many endangered species are subject to cultural 'use rights' which, in some cases, could lead to their extinction. There is a urgent need for dialogue on such matters in order to avoid wholesale poaching and to generate understanding between conflicting claims. Not all traditional practices are sustainable in a world where biodiversity is steadily diminishing.

EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL GUARDIANS

There are many traditions which embrace environmental guardianship to greater or lesser degrees, but most of these guardians are, so to speak, enclosed within particular worldviews. In Chapter Four we saw that environmental guardianship is a well-developed concept in Maoridom, but currently only Maori can exercise *kaitiakitanga*. There are no non-Maori *kaitiaki* because non-Maori are not well-versed in the traditions and history of this particular expression of guardianship.⁸ While it is important that Maori shelter their traditions, such an attitude can also lead to isolation and an inability to express their concerns. This can be a serious problem, especially where the kinds of problems Maori guardians are attempting to solve are no longer confined within the limits of their traditional knowledge. The introduction of exotic species, the impact of global economic demands, the rise of the secular worldview, and the influence of other cultures has meant that traditional principles of *kaitiakitanga* are not easily able to adapt to such wide-ranging changes. Nevertheless traditional knowledge of the natural environment is important in the sense that *Kaitiaki* have much to contribute to the scientific ecosystem approach. Such contributions can only be successful if the worldview from which they arise is actively validated by those who seek to communicate with them about environmental issues. The dialogue offers a means to share wisdom collectively so that each of the partners may gain a deeper understanding of the whole. Guardians must, therefore, be not only firmly grounded in their traditional ways of knowing, but also conversant with the worldview of the other partner. The emerging guardians are those who not only resist orthodoxy and reject universalism, but who are comfortable in many worlds. These guardians, will in most cases, be people situated on the boundaries of

⁸ This is reiterated by Maori themselves. Kirkwood writes: “*Kaitiaki* is a big word...to know *kaitiaki* is to know the Maori world. Everybody in this world has a role to play as a guardian. But if you use the word *kaitiaki*, that person must be Maori because of the depth and meaning of the word and the responsibilities that go with it. The reason is that to be *kaitiaki* means looking after one's own blood and bones - literally.” And as Minhinnick notes: “The physical *kaitiaki* system is based on *whakapapa*, lineage and inherited nurtured responsibility. It is traditional and unalienable. *Kaitiaki* cannot be filled by a group from anywhere because the status of *kaitiaki* stems from long tribal associations. Only *tangata whenua* can be *kaitiaki*, can identify *kaitiaki*, can determine the form and the structure of *kaitiaki*.” Both quotes from Roberts. M., Norman. W., Minhinnick. N., Wihongi. D. and Kirkwood. C., “*Kaitiakitanga*: Maori Perspectives on Conservation.” *Pacific Conservation Biology*. Vol. 2. 1995, pp.10-11.

their own worldview, prepared to enter and validate the truth of others without the need to 'jump across' or lose connections with their own traditions.

There are also numerous unacknowledged, yet potential guardians, who in their everyday lives accumulate a wealth of environmental knowledge through practical experience. These people are farmers, fishers, foresters, and even urban dwellers who observe the rhythms and cycles of their natural environments. They may not hold conventional academic qualifications or follow any particular religious expression, but they are essentially place-centred people who have deep connections to the natural world. Most farmers who are not wholly absorbed by commercial ideology possess detailed knowledge of their soils, animals, plants and climatic cycles - not only the sum total of their own personal experience, but also the combined knowledge of many generations of landholders. Likewise, fishers know the sea and recognise changes in fish stocks; they are aware of the interconnections in the dynamic ocean environment. Foresters watch trees, river and lake dwellers observe the endlessly changing nature of water, and many urban dwellers are aware of changes in seasons, of local bird and insect life, and know very well how their gardens grow.

An intimate knowledge of their local environment and an acute awareness of change is the common element which links a vast group of unrecognised people to the principle of guardianship. The dialogue is not an exclusive arena where only theologians, academics, scientists or culturally prescribed guardians may gather. The 'small' people, the 'locals', the 'uneducated' and the unpretentious are also invited to share their wisdom, irrespective of which worldview they espouse. Detailed local and place-centred knowledge can provide important insights which can contribute to possible solutions for the global environmental crisis. In the final analysis, environmental guardians will not be just the spokespeople for a particular group, culture, nation, nor will they be only academics and institutional or government representatives. If people, as guardians, are to keep the Earth safe from exploitation and degradation, then they must emerge from all the diverse ways in which humans inhabit their world.

There is a need for guardians to watch over all of nature's myriad expressions of being, as well as all the places where people actually dwell. It is important for all participants to realise that their task is also a social undertaking. Meaningful dialogue on the issue of environmental guardianship seeks to embrace diverse social relationships between peoples as well as their respective environments. Involvement in meaningful dialogue is not, and should not be, the private preserve of the privileged, because recognition of all human needs is an intrinsic part of guardianship. It is clear that there can be no environmental justice without social justice. To ignore the needs of human dwellers for the sake of saving nature is doomed to failure because, in most situations, people are an intrinsic part of the places they inhabit. Emerging environmental guardians must be as aware of the social structures within which people (or peoples) live, as they are of the environment which they wish to safeguard.

The dialogical dialogue is a way for those who are actively on the lookout for possible solutions to pressing modern environmental problems to extend their inquiry, so that it includes all the diverse pathways of human experience. It is no longer simply a matter of ecological awareness or the evolution of an ethic which protects the natural environment. A spiritual understanding of all the interconnected pathways of human life must be attempted. This spiritual aspect facilitates not only a new or renewed respect for nature, but also a deepening care for the wider needs of people in all their diverse ways of living. The inclusion of the religious dimension is essential if those who are committed to developing a sustainable environmental attitude are to succeed in cultivating a caring attitude for all life.

This study has outlined the theoretical criteria for meaningful dialogue on the vexed question of environmental change and its implications for the emergence of environmental guardians. It offers a means to overcome seemingly incommensurable differences which arise when communication is enclosed within a particular mythic expression. Not only does this dialogue allow for the inclusion of theological and philosophical dimensions within an ecological horizon, but it presents a way for potential guardians to share wisdom arising from their own traditions with others by successfully communicating across worldview boundaries. And finally, the dialogical

dialogue prepares for the evolution of a new mythic horizon which provides fertile ground for the emergence of a truly ontonomic attitude.

While practical outcomes have been suggested, an actual dialogue between real participants is required to determine suitable actions. The 'real' dialogue would naturally follow different paths to the theoretical elucidations outlined in this study because the participants are relating to each other on a personal level. The dialogue between people who venture to take the three hermeneutical steps outlined here may well result in outcomes not encompassed by the solutions and possibilities suggested. This is because the interactions which occur between people are not as predictable as a research project focused on seeking a particular conclusion. When we look into the 'baskets' of other people's myths we cannot say what treasures may be revealed. In the arena of human communications anything is possible.

One thing is certain, the question of who will 'guard' the 'guardians' retains its full force solely for the modern usurpers, who are guardians in name only. The potential guardians, those who dare to engage in meaningful dialogue and emerge with an acceptance of the mysterious foundation of all being, will not need to be watched over. These guardians will safeguard the whole Earth by carefully watching their every step! Once again, as it did to Plato, the very idea that a 'guardian' is required to 'guard' every guardian will appear to be absurd.⁹

⁹ Cf. Plato: "What an absurd idea - a guardian needed to guard a guardian?" Plato., *The Republic*. [Book III], (translated by P. Shorey). Heinemann. London. 1963, 403-E.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahamsen, V. A. *Women and Worship at Philippi: Diana/Artemis and Other Cults in the Early Christian Era*. Portland: Arstare Shell Press, 1995.

Allen, A. H. *Flora of New Zealand Vol I*. Wellington: Government Printer, 1961.

Allen, J. and Gosden, C. "Report of the Lapita Homelands Project." *ANU Occasional Paper* 20. 1991.

Allen, R. E. (ed) *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*. [8th Edition] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Altizer, T. J. J., Beardslee, W.A. and Young, J. H. (eds). *Truth, Myth and Symbol*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1962.

Ambler, R. *Global Theology: The Meaning of Faith in the Present World Crisis*. London: S.M.C. Press, 1990.

Archard, D. (ed) *Philosophy and Pluralism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Aristotle. *Physics: Books 3&4* (translated and edited by E. Hussey.) New York: Clarendon Press, 1983

_____. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (edited by J. Barnes). [2 Vols.]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

_____. *The Politics* (edited by S. Everson). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Armstrong, S. J. and Botzler, R. G. (eds) *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.

Ash, M. *The Fabric of the World: Towards a Philosophy of Environment*. London: Green Books, 1993.

Attenborough, D. *The First Eden: The Mediterranean World and Man*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1987.

Attwood, B. (ed) *In the Age of Mabo; History, Aboriginies and Australia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996.

Auden, W. B. and Taylor, P. B. (translators) *The Elder Edda*. London: Faber and Faber, 1969.

Augustine. *Confessions XI* (translated by F. J. Sheed). London and New York: Doubleday, 1944.

Bachelard, G. *The Poetics of Space*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1994.

Bacon, F. *The New Atlantis* (edited by G.C. Moore). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1627] 1900.

Bahn, P. and Flenley, J. R. *Easter Island, Earth Island*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1992.

Baker, G. and Morris, K. *Descartes Dualism*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Balslev, A. N. and Mohanty, J. N. (eds) *Religion and Time*. New York: E. J. Brill, 1992.

Barbour, I. *Issues in Science and Religion*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

_____ *Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford Lectures, Volume I*. San Francisco: Harper, 1990.

Barnes, B., Bloor, D. and Henry, J. (eds) *Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis*. London: Althone, 1996.

Barret, C. *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.

Barrow, J. D. and Tipler, F. J. *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

Bates, B. "Sacred Trees." *Resurgence*. No. 181, 1997.

_____ *The Wisdom of the Wyrd: Teachings For Today From Our Ancient Past*. London: Rider, 1997.

Bateson, G. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.

_____ *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979.

_____ *Angels Fear*. New York: MacMillan, 1987.

_____ *A Sacred Unity* (edited by R. E. Donaldson). New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.

Batten, J. *Celebrating Southern Seasons: Rituals for Aotearoa*. Auckland: Tandem Press, 1995.

Bauman, Z. *Hermeneutics and Social Science*. London: Hutchinson, 1978.

Bayliss-Smith, T. P., Bedford, R., Brookfield, H. and Latham, M. *Islands, Islanders and the World: The Colonial and Post Colonial Experience of Eastern Fiji*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Beatley, T. *Ethical land Use: Principles of Policy and Planning*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Beattie, H. *Tikao Talks: Ka Taoko O Te Ao Kohato: Treasures From the Ancient World of the Maori*. Auckland: Penguin, 1990.

Becker, C. *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932.

Becker, L. *Property Rights*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Bell, D. *Daughters of the Dreaming*. Sydney: McPhee Gribble/Allen and Unwin, 1983.

Berger, P. L. *The Social Reality of Religion*. London: Faber and Faber, 1969.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Doubleday, 1967.

Berman, M. *The Reenchantment of the World*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.

_____ *All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

_____ *Coming to our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden History of the West*. London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1990.

Best, E. *The Maori Division of Time*. Wellington: A. R. Shearer, Government Printer, 1973.

Bharati, A. *Indology and Science: Towards a Hermeneutical Coalition*. Calcutta: Roy and Chowdbury, 1989.

Bible. *Authorised King James Version*. Wheaton: Tyndale House, 1981.

Biderman, S. and Scharfstein, E. (eds) *Interpretation in Religion*. New York: E. J. Brill, 1992.

Binney, J., Chaplin, G. and Wallace, C. *Mahaia: The Prophet Rua Kennana and His Community at Maungapohatu*. Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Birch, C., Eakin, W. and McDaniel, J. B. (eds) *Liberating life: Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology*. New York: Orbis books, 1990.

- Black Elk. *The Sacred Pipe* (edited by J. E. Brown). New York: Penguin Books, 1973.
- Bohm, D. *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- _____. *Thought as a System*. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Bohm, D. and Edwards, M. *Changing Consciousness: Exploring the Hidden Forces of the Social, Political and Environmental Crises Facing Our World*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
- Boshier, A. "The Earliest Miners." *South African Journal of Africana I*. 1978.
- Botkin, D. B. *Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology For the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Boyer, P. *Tradition as Truth and Communication: A Cognitive Description of Traditional Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Bradley, J. (ed) *Yanyawa Country: The Yanyawa People of Boroloola Tell the History of Their land*. Richmond: Greenhouse Publications, 1988.
- Brasch, R. *The Book of the Year: Special Days and Their Meanings*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1991.
- Brennan, A. (ed) *The Ethics of the Environment*. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995.
- Brewer, J. and Staves, S. (eds) *Early Modern Concepts of Property*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Brewster, A. B. *The Hill Tribes of Fiji*. London: Seely, Service and Co., 1922.
- Broomfield, J. *Other Ways of Knowing: Recharting Our Future With Ageless Wisdom*. Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1997.
- Brown, D. E. *Human Universals*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.
- Brown, L. R. *State of the World 1992*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- Bruggemann, W. *The Land*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977.
- Bryant, A. *The Medieval Foundation of England*. New York: Collier, 1968.
- Buber, M. *Tales of the Hasidim: The Later Masters* (translated by O. Marx). New York: Schocken Books, 1948.
- _____. *I and Thou* (translated by W. Kaufmann). New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1970.

Burkert, W. *Greek Religion* (translated by J. Raffan). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Burnstein, R. J. *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.

Butterworth, E. A. S. *The Tree at the Navel of the Earth*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter and Co., 1970.

Callicot, J. B. *Earths Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics From the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Campbell, J. (ed) *Man and Time. Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

_____ *The Hero With a Thousand Faces*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.

_____ *The Inner Reaches of Outer Space: Metaphor as Myth and as Religion*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1988.

Carson, R. *Silent Spring*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963.

Casimir, F. L. (ed) *Building Communication Theories: A Socio/cultural Approach*. New Jersey: LEA Publishers, 1994.

Cassirer, E. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume Two: Mythical Thought* (translated by R. Manheim). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

Catton, R. W. and Dunlap, R. E. "Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm." *American Sociology*. Vol. 13, 1978.

Charlesworth, M., Morphy, H., Bell, D. and Maddock, K. (eds) *Aboriginal Australia: An Anthology*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984.

Checkland, P. (ed Rosenhead) *Soft Systems Methodology in Rational Analysis For a Problematic World*. Chichester: J. Wiley and Sons, 1989.

Cicero, M. *The Basic Works of Cicero* (edited by M. Hadas). New York: Modern library, 1951.

_____ *De Finibus Honorum et Malorum Liber III* (edited by M. R. Wright). Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1991.

Clunie, F. "Fijian Weapons and Warfare." *Fiji Museum Bulletin*. No. 2, 1977.

Cohen, J. and Stewart, I. *The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World*. New York: Viking, 1994.

- Colborn, T., Dumanoski, D. and Myers, J. P. (eds). *Our Stolen Future*. New York: Dutton (Penguin), 1996.
- Colson, F. H. *The Week*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926.
- Combs, A. and Holland, M. *Synchronicity: Science Myth and the Trickster*. New York: Floris Books, 1990.
- Commoner, B. *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology*. New York: Knopf, 1971.
- Cook, R. *The Tree of Life: Symbol of the Centre*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1974.
- Cooper, J. C. *The Aquarian Book of Festivals*. Northants: Aquarian Press, 1990.
- Cullen, G. *The Consice Townscape*. London: The Architectural Press, 1971.
- Cupitt, D. *The Leap of Reason*. London: Sheldon Press, 1976.
- _____ *Only Human*. London: S.C.M. Press Ltd, 1985.
- Dahl, O. "When the Future Comes from behind: Malagasy and Other Time Concepts and Some Consequences For Communication." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 19, No. 2. 1995.
- Dante. *The Divine Comedy* (translated by C. H. Sisson). Manchester: Caracanet New Press, 1980.
- Davies, P. *The Mind of God: Science and the Search For Ultimate Meaning*. London: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
- _____ *About Time: Einstein's Unfinished Revolution*. London: Simon and Shuster, 1995.
- _____ *The Last Three Minutes*. New York: Basic Books, 1994.
- _____ (ed) *The New Physics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Davidson, G. *The Unforgiving Minute: How Australia Learned to Tell the Time*. London: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Dawkins, R. *The Blind Watchmaker*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1986.
- De Angelis, D. L. and Waterhouse, J. C. "Equilibrium and Nonequilibrium Concepts in Ecological Models." *Ecological Monographs*. No. 57(1), 1987.

De Grazia, S. *Of Time, Work and Leisure*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.

Deloria, Jr. V. "If You Think About it You Will See That it is True" *Resurgence*. Winter, Vol. 18. No. 3., 1996.

_____ *Red Earth White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact*. New York: Scribner, 1995.

_____ *God is Red*. New York: Delta, 1973.

Denoon, D. (ed) *The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications, 1994.

Descola, P and Isson, G. (eds) *Nature and Society: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Routledge, 1996.

De Tocqueville, A. *Democracy in America: Volume II*. New York: Vintage Books, 1945.

De Vattel, E. *The Law of Nations or the Principle of Natural Law* (translated by C. G. Fenwick). Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1902.

De Vaux, R. *Ancient Israel: Its life and Institutions* (translated by J. McHugh) New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

Doniger-O'Flaherty, W. *Other People's Myths*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988.

Doty, W. G. *Mythography: The Study of Myth and Rituals*. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1986.

Dreyfus, H. L. and Hall, H. (eds) *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

Dunlap, R. C. *National parks and Reserves System: A Plan For Fiji*. Suva: National Trust For Fiji, 1980.

Edwards, W. H. (ed) *Traditional Aboriginal Society*. Melbourne: MacMillan, 1987.

Egler, F. *The Way of Science: A Philosophy of Ecology for the Layman*. New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1970.

_____ *The Nature of Vegetation: Its Management and Mismanagement*. Norfolk: Aton Forest, 1977.

Ekennia, J. N. "Committed Dialogue as a Response to Pluralism." *International Philosophical Quarterly*. No. 1 (141), March, 1996.

Eliade, M. "Cosmic Homology and Yoga." *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art* V. Calcutta. 1937.

_____ *Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism* (translated by P. Mairet). London: Harvill Press, 1952.

_____ *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1954.

_____ *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. London: Ward and Sheed Ltd, 1958.

_____ *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959.

_____ *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

_____ *Australian Religions: An Introduction*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973.

_____ *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

Elias, N. *The Symbol Theory*. London: Sage Publications, 1991.

_____ *Time: An Essay*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

Elkin, A. P. *The Australian Aborigines: How to Understand Them*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1964.

Ellen, R. and Fukui, K. *Redefining Nature: Ecology Culture and Domestication*. Oxford: BERG, 1996.

Ellul, J. *The Technological Society*. New York: Random House, 1967.

_____ *The Meaning of the City* (translated by D. Pardee). Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1970.

Emmet, D. "Theoria and the Way of Life." *Journal of Theological Studies* 17. Part I, 1966.

Ereira, A. *The Heart of the World*. London: Jonathon Cape, 1990.

Evernden, N. *The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

Ewins, W. J. "Early Migrations to Fiji of Man Presently Known as the Fijian Race." *Transactions of the Fijian Society*. 1919.

Fagg, L. *The Two Faces of Time*. Madras and London: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1985.

Fairley, B. *A Translation of Goethe's Faust*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.

Farrington, B. *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Feenburg, A. "Marcuse or Habermas: Two Critiques of Technology." *INQUIRY: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. 39, 1996.

Ferre, F. and Hartel, P. *Ethics and Environmental Policy: Theory Meets Practice*. London: University of Georgia Press, 1994.

Feyerabend, P. *Against Method*. London: Verso, 1993.

Fison, L. *Land Tenure in Fiji*. London: Harrison, 1881

_____ *Tales From Old Fiji*. [1907] Auckland: Reprint by R. MacMillan, 1967.

Fitzgerald, F. *Cities on a Hill: A journey Through Contemporary American Cultures*. London: Pan Books 1987.

Flannery, T. *The Future Eaters*. Catswood: Reed Books, 1994.

Foltz, B. V. *Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics and the Metaphysics of Nature*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995.

Forge, A. (ed) *Primitive Art and Society*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Foucault, M. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* (edited by C. Gordon). New York. Pantheon, 1980.

Fox, M. *Original Blessing: A Primer in Creation Spirituality*. New Mexico: Bear and Co., 1984.

Fox, W. *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations For Environmentalism*. Boston: Shambala, 1990.

France, P. *The Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonisation in Fiji*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Fraser, J. T. (ed) *The Voices of Time*. New York: George Braziller, 1966.

_____ *Of Time, Passion and Knowledge: Reflections on the Strategy of Existence*. New York: George Braziller, 1975.

_____ *Time: The Familiar Stranger*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.

Fraser, J. T., and Lawrence, N.(eds) *The Study of Time II*. Springer Verlag, New York. 1975.

Fraser, J. T., Lawrence, N. and Park, D. (eds) *The Study of Time III*. New York: Springer Verlag, 1978.

Frazer, J. G. *The Golden Bough: A Study of Magic and Religion*. London: MacMillan, 1996.

Friedland, R. and Bosen, D. (eds) *NowHere: Space, Time, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Fukuoka, M. *The One Straw Revolution*. Emmaus: Rodale Press, 1978.

_____ *The Natural Way of Farming: The Theory and Practice of Green Philosophy*. Tokyo: Japan Publications Inc., 1985.

Gadamer, H. G. *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1975.

Gardiner, J. and Maier, J. *Gilgamesh: Translated From the Sin - Lequi - Unninni Version*. New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1984.

Gare, A. E. *Nihilism Incorporated: European Civilisations and Environmental Destruction*. Bugendore: Ecological Press, 1993.

_____ *Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis*. London: Routledge, 1995.

Gaziano, E. "Ecological Metaphors as Scientific Boundary Work: Innovation and Authority in Sociology and Biology." *American Journal of Sociology*. January, Vol. 101, No. 4. 1996.

Geddes, P. *Cities in Evolution*. Benn, London: New Edition, 1968.

Geertz, C. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Gell, A. *The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images*. Oxford: BERG, 1992.

Georgescu-Roegen, N. *The Entropy Law and the Economic Process*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

_____ *Energy and Economic Myths*. New York: Pergamon, 1976.

Gilkey, L. *Religion and the Scientific Future: Reflections on Myth, Science and Theology*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

_____ *Society and the Sacred*. New York: Crossroad, 1981.

_____ *Nature, Reality and the Sacred: The Nexus of Science and Religion*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993.

Glacken, C. J. *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought From Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Glesne, C. and Peshkin, A. *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: An Introduction*. New York: Longman, 1992.

Goldsmith, E. *The Way: An Ecological Worldview*. Boston and New York: Shambala, 1993.

Golsen, J. and Ucko, P. *Tropical Archaeobotany: Applications and Developments* (edited by J. G. Hather). London: Routledge, 1994.

Goodwin, B. *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots*. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1994.

Goodwin, R. E. "Property Rights and Preservationist Duties." *Inquiry*. 33, 1990.

Gottlieb, R. S. (ed) *This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment*. New York and London: Routledge, 1996.

Gould, S. J. *Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle. Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Grant, G. *Technology and Empire*. Toronto: Anasi, 1969.

Grassian, I. V. *Moral Reasoning: Ethical Theory and Some Contemporary Moral Problems*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1981.

Gribbin, J. *Unveiling the Edge of Time: Black Holes, White Holes and Wormholes*. New York: Crown Trade Paperbacks, 1996.

Grof, C. and Grof, S. *The Stormy Search For the Self: Understanding and Living With Spiritual Emergency*. London: Thorsons, 1991.

Guthrie, S. E. *Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Habermas, J. *Knowledge and Human Interests* (translated by J. J. Shapiro). Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

_____ *The Theory of Communicative Action* (translated by T. McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press, 1985.

Haldane, E. S. and Ross, G. R. (eds) *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Hall, E. T. *Beyond Culture*. New York: Doubleday, 1976.

Hall, G. V. *Raimon Panikkar's Hermeneutics of Religious Pluralism*. Ann Arbor: U.M.I. Dissertation Services, 1994.

Halpern, P. *The Cyclic Serpent: Prospects for an Ever Repeating Universe*. New York: Plenum Press, 1995.

Hargrove, E. (ed) *Religion and the Environmental Crisis*. Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

Harris, I. *The Mind of John Locke*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Harrison, J. *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek religion*. New York: Meridian Books, 1957.

Harrison, R. P. *Forests: The Shadow of Civilisation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Hawking, S and Israel, W. (eds) *300 Years of Gravity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Hawkes, J. and Wooley, L. *History of Mankind Volume I: Prehistory and the Beginnings of Civilisation*. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963.

Hawking, S. and Penrose, R. *The Nature of Space and Time*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Heidegger, M. *Holzwege*. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950.

_____ *Hebel der Hausfreund*. Neske: Pfullingen, 1957.

_____ *What is Philosophy?* (edited and translated by W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde). New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1958.

_____ *The Question of Being* (edited and translated by W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde). New Haven: College and University Press, 1958.

_____ *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (translated by R. Manheim). New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.

- _____ *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Neske: Pfullingen, 1961.
- _____ *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Neske: Pfullingen, 1965.
- _____ *Discourse on Thinking* (translated by J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund). New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- _____ *Being and Time* (translated by J. Maquarie and E. Robinson). New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- _____ *What is a Thing* (translated by W. B. Barton and V. Deutsch). Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967.
- _____ *What is Called Thinking*. New York, Harper and Row, 1968.
- _____ *On the Way to Language* (edited and translated by P. D. Hertz). New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- _____ *The End of Philosophy* (edited by J. Stambaugh). New York: Harper and Row, 1973.
- _____ *Poetry, Language, Thought* (translated by A. Hofstadter). New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
- _____ *Early Greek Thinking* (edited and translated by D. F. Krell. and F. A. Capuzzi). New York: Harper and Row, 1975.
- _____ *The Piety of Thinking* (translated by J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- _____ *Basic Writings* (edited by M. Krell). New York: Harper and Row, 1977.
- _____ *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (translated by W. Lovitt). New York: Garland Publishing INC., 1977.
- _____ *Basic Writings: From Being and Time to the Task of Thinking*(edited by D. F. Krell). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
- _____ *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984.
- _____ *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (translated by T. Kisiel). Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1985.
- _____ *Being and Time* (translated by F. Capuzzi). San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1991.

_____ *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit* (translated by J. Stambaugh). Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.

_____ *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (translated by P. Emead and K. Maly). Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997.

Heisenberg, W. *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Physics*. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

_____ *Physics and Beyond* (translated by A. J. Pomerans). New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971.

Herberger, C. F. *The Thread of Ariadne: The Labyrinth of the Calendar of Minos*. New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1972.

Herbert, M. and MacNamara, M. *The Gospel of Nicodemus*. Edinburgh: IBA, 1996.

Heschel, A. J. *God in Search of Man*. New York: Octagon Books, 1972.

Hick, J. and Knitter, P. F. (eds) *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*. New York: Orbis Books, 1987.

Hitchcock, J. *The Web of the Universe: Jung, the New Physics and Human Spirituality*. New York: Paulist Press, 1991.

Holderlin, F. *Hymns and Fragments*. (translated by R. Sieburth). New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Holmes Rolston, III. *Science and Religion: A Critical Survey* New York: Random House, 1987.

Holzner, W., Werger, M. J. A. and Ikusima, I. (eds) *Man's Impact on Vegetation*. The Hague: Dr W. Junk Publishers, 1983.

Hooson, D. (ed) *Geography and National Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Horgan, J. *The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age*. New York: Helix Books, 1996.

Howarth, J. M. "Ecology: Modern Hero or Post Modern Villain? From Scientific Trees to Phenomenological Wood." *Biodiversity and Conservation*. 4, 1996.

Hughes, J. D. *American Indian Ecology*. El Paso: Texas University Press, 1983.

_____ "How Much of the Earth is Sacred Space?" *Environmental Review*. 10:4, Winter, 1986.

Illich, I. *H₂O and The Waters of Forgetfulness: Reflections on the Historicity of Stuff*. Berkeley: Heydey Books, 1985.

Im Thurn, E. and Wharton, L. C. (eds) *The Journey of William Lockerby: Sandalwood Trader in the Fijian Islands During the years 1808-1809*. Suva: Reprint by Fiji Times and Herald limited, 1982.

Ito, S. and Yasuda, Y. (eds) *Nature and Humankind in the Age of Environmental Crisis*. Kyoto: International Research Centre For Japanese Studies, 1992.

IUCN., UNEP., WWF., *Caring For the Earth: A Strategy For Sustainable Living*. Switzerland: Gland, 1991.

James, W. *A Pluralistic Universe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Jaques, E. *The Form of Time*. New York: Crane Russak, 1982.

Johnson, G. *Fire in the Mind: Science, Faith and the Search For Order*. London: Viking, 1995.

Jorgensen, J. E. *Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern*. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.

Jung, C. *Memories, Dreams and Reflections*. London: Collins, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.

Juvenal, *The Satires* (translated by N. Rudd). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Kaplan, M. *Neither Cargo Nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the Colonial Imagination in Fiji*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

Karp, D. G. "Values and Their Effect on Pro Environmental Behaviour." *Environment and Behaviour*. Vol. 28, No. 1. January, 1996.

Kauffman, S. *At Home in the Universe: The search for Laws of Self Organisation and Complexity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Kawanabe, H., Ohgushi, T. and Higashi, M (eds) "Ecology For Tomorrow." *Physiology and Ecology Japan*. Vol.27, Special Number. March, 1990.

Kellert, S. R. and Wilson, E. O. (eds) *The Biophilia Hypothesis*. New York: Island Press, 1993.

Kepenes, S. *The Text As Thou: Martin Buber's Dialogical Hermeneutics and Narrative Theology*. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992.

Kershaw, A. P. "Climate Change and Aboriginal Burning in North-East Australia During the Last Two Glacials." *Nature*. 322, 1986.

Kilcullen, J. and McGrade, A. S. *William of Ockham: A Letter to the Friars Minors and Other Writings* (translated by J. Kilcullen). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

King, R., Proudfoot, L. and Smith, B. (eds) *The Mediterranean Environment and Society*. London: Edwin Arnold, 1997.

Kinsley, D. (ed) *Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Kirk, G. S. and Raven, G. E. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Kitagawa, J. M. (ed) *The History of Religions: Retrospect and Prospect*. London: MacMillan, 1985.

Kleinig, J. *Valuing Life*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Klemke, E. D. *The Meaning of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Knudtson, P. and Suzuki, D. *Wisdom of the Elders*. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1992.

Kocklemans, J. J. *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.

Kramer, S. N. *The Sumerians: Their History, Culture and Character*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981.

Kremer, J. W. "Indigenous Science." *Revision*. Vol. 18, No. 3. Winter, 1996.

_____ "Evolving into What, and For Whose Purposes: Reading Bateson." *Revision*. Vol. 18, No. 3. Winter, 1996.

Krieger, D. J. *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology*. New York: Orbis Books, 1991.

Kropotkin, P. *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. London: Freedom Press, [1902] 1987.

Kuhn, T. S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Lane, B. C. *Landscapes of the Sacred*. New York: Paulist Press, 1988.

Lang, T. and Hine, C. *The New Protectionism: Protecting the Future Against Free Trade*. London: Earthscan, 1993.

Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching* (translated by D. C. Lau). London: Penguin Books, 1963.

Latouche, S. *In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An Exploration of Post Development*. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1993.

Lawlor, R. *Voices of the First day: Awakening in the Aboriginal Dreamtime*. Vermont: Inner Traditions, 1991.

Leopold, A. *A Sand Country Almanac*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.

Livingstone, R. W. (ed) *The Legacy of Greece*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.

Lloyd, G. *Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993

Locke, J. *The Two Treatises of Government* (edited by P. Laslett). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Long, A. A. "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. LXX, 1970-1971.

Louis, C. *The Theology of Psalm VIII: A Study of the Traditions of the Text and the Theological Import*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1946.

Loux, M. J. (trans) *Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.

Lovelock, J. *The Ages of Gaia*. W. W. New York: Norton and Co., 1988.

Low, M. *Celtic Christianity and Nature: Early Irish and Hebridean Traditions*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996.

Loy, D. *Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

Lyotard, J. F. *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*. California: Stanford University Press. 1991.

McDowell, J. *Mind and World*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

McLennan, G. *Pluralism* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.

MacNaught, T. J. *The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neo-Traditional Order Under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II*. Canberra: ANU Press, 1992.

MacPherson, C. B. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Malinowski, B. *Myth in Primitive Psychology*. London: Kegan Paul & W. W. Norton, 1926.

Mander, J. and Goldsmith, E. (eds) *The Case Against the Global Economy and For a Turn Towards the Local*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996.

Manwood, J. A. *A Treatise and Discourse on the Lawes of the Forrest*. [Reprint of the 1598 edition. London: Wight and Norton.] London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1978.

Marshall, P. *Natures Web: An Exploration of Ecological Thinking*. London: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Martin, P. S. and Klien, R. G. (eds) *Quaternary Extinctions: A Prehistoric Revolution*. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1984.

Maser, C. *Resolving Environmental Conflict: Towards Sustainable Community Development*. Delray Beach: St Lucie Press, 1996.

Mautner, T. "Locke on Appropriation." *American Philosophical Quarterly*. July, 1982.

Maxwell, W. (ed) *Thinking: The Expanding Frontier*. Philadelphia: Franklin Institute Press, 1983.

Meggers, B. J. "Environmental Limitations on the Development Of Culture." *American Anthropologist*. No. 56, 1954.

Mellor, D. H. *Real Time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Merchant, C. *Key Concepts in Critical Theory Ecology*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994.

Merlau-Ponty, M. *Phenomenology of Perception* (translated by Smith. C). New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

_____ *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences Volume 1*. Evanstown: Northwest University Press, 1973.

Milton, K. *Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Environmental Discourse*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Mitra, K. *Catholicism-Hinduism: Vedantic Investigation of Raimundo Panikkar's Attempt at Bridge Building*. New York: University Press of America. 1987.

Moore, R. and Gillette, D. *The Magician Within: Accessing the Shaman in the Male Psyche*. New York: William Morrow and Co. Inc., 1993.

Morgan, L. H. *Ancient Society: Or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress, From Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilisation*. New York: Holt, 1877.

Muller, W. *America: The New World or the Old*. Frankfurt Am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1989.

Mumford, L. *The Myth of the Machine: Techniques and Human Development*. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanivich, 1967.

_____ *The Pentagon of Power: The Myth of the Machine Vol. Two*. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanivich, 1977

Myers, F. R. *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place and Politics Among Western Desert Aborigines*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.

Nash, R. *The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

Nasr, S. H. *Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man*. London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1976.

Nerlich, G. *What Spacetime Explains: Metaphysical Essays on Space and Time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Nicol, M. *The Mark*. London: Watkins, 1954.

Niebuhr, R. *Nature and Destiny of Man..* New York: Scribners, 1941.

Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book For All or None* (translated by T. Common). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1967.

_____ *Living Time and the Integration of the Life..* London: Watkins, 1979.

Nilsson, M. P. *Primitive Time Reckoning*. Lund: Acta Societas Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis I, 1920.

Norburg-Schulz, C. *Existence, Space and Architecture*. New York: Rizzoli International Publications, 1980.

Noss, R. *Maintaining Ecological Integrity in Representative Networks*. Toronto: WWF Canada, 1995.

Oaklander, L. N. and Smith, Q. (eds) *The New Theory of Time*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Odum, E. P. *Ecology*. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1975.

_____ *Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems*. Sutherland: Sinauer Associates Inc., 1993.

Olivetti, M. M. *Archivo de Philosophia*. Rome: Instituto di Studi Filosofici, 1980

Olson, A. M. *Studies in Philosophy and Hermeneutics* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.

Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Orr, D. W. and Ehrenfeld, D. "None So Blind: The Problem of Ecological Denial." *Conservation Biology*. Vol.9, No.5. October, 1995.

Otto, R. *The Idea Of The Holy* (translated by J. W. Harvey). London: Oxford University Press, 1923.

Outhwaite, W. *Habermas: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1994.

Overton, J. (ed) *Rural Fiji*. Institute of Pacific Studies. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1988.

_____ *Land and Differentiation in Rural Fiji*. Canberra: ANU Press, 1989.

Palmer, J. B. "Lapita Style Potsherds From Fiji." *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*. LXXV, 1996.

Panikkar, K. N. (ed) *National and Left Movements in India..* New Dehli: Vikas, 1980.

Panikkar, R. *The Trinity and World Religions*. Madrid: The Christian Literature Society, 1970.

_____ *Worship and Secular Man*. New York: Orbis Books, 1973.

_____ "Cross Cultural Studies: The Need For a New Science of Interpretation." *Monchanin*. 8:3-5, 1975.

_____ *Time and History in the Tradition of India: Kala and Karma. Cultures and Time*. Collective Paris: Work of UNESCO, 1976.

_____ "Non Dualistic relation Between Religion and Politics." *Religion and Society*. XXV/3, 1978.

_____ *Myth Faith and Hermeneutics: Cross Cultural Studies*. New York: Paulist Press, 1979.

_____ *The Unknown Christ of Hinduism* New York: Orbis Books, 1981.

_____ "The Destiny of Technological Civilisation: An Ancient Buddhist Legend, Romavinya." *Alternatives*. X. Fall, 1984.

_____ *The Intrareligious Dialogue*. Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 1984.

_____ "Some Theses on Technology." *Logos: Philosophical Issues in Christian Perspective*. Vol. 7, 1986.

_____ *The Silence of God*. New York: Orbis Books, 1989.

_____ "The Religion of the Future." *InterCulture* Vol XXIII. no. 2-3, 1990.

_____ *A Dwelling Place For Wisdom*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993.

_____ *The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness* (edited by S. T. Eastham). New York: Orbis Books, 1993.

_____ *Cultural Disarmament: The Way to Peace*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995.

_____ *Invisible Harmony: Essays on Contemplation*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995.

_____ "The Defiance of Pluralism." *Soundings*. 79:1-2, 1996.

_____ *The Rhythm of Being - The Radical Trinity*. New York: Orbis Books, [2000?].

Park, C. *Sacred Worlds: An Introduction to Geography and Religion*. London: Routledge, 1994.

Park, D. *The Image of Eternity: Roots of Time in the Physical World*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1980.

Park, G. *Nga Uruora: The Groves of Life*. Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1995.

Passmore, J. *Man's Responsibility For Nature*. London: Duckworth, 1974.

Paul, E. F., Miller, F. D. and Paul, J. (eds) *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Pearce, W. and Turner, R. W. *Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990.

Peat, F. D. "I Have a Map in My Head." *Revision*. Vol.18, no.3. Winter, 1996.

Peavy, F. *By Life's Grace: Musings on the Essence of Social Change*. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1994

Peirce, C. S. *The Collected Works of Charles Saunders Peirce Vols. 1-6* (edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1931-35.

Peters, T. "Theology and Science: Where Are We?" *Zygon*. Vol.31, No.2. June, 1996.

Pettazzoni, R. *Essays on the History of Religion* (translated by H. J. Bose). Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967

Phillipson, N. and Skinner, Q. (eds) *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Plato, *The Complete Dialogues* (translated by B. Jowett). New York: Random House, 1937.

____ *The Republic* (translated by P. Shorey). London: Heinemann, 1963.

____ *Timeaus* (translated by F. M. Cornford). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Platvoet, J. and van der Toon, K. (eds) *Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour*. New York: E.J. Brill, 1995.

Polak, F. L. *The Image of the Future Vol. I*. Leyden: Aw Sitijhoff, 1961.

Polyani, M. *Personal Knowledge*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Pound, E. *The Cantos of Ezra Pound*. London: Faber and Faber, 1975.

Prabhu, J. (ed) *The Intercultural Challenge of Raimon Panikkar*. New York: Orbis Books, 1996.

Pritchard. J. B. (ed) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Pritchard. W. T. *Polynesian Reminiscences: Or, Life in the South Pacific Islands*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1866.

Przyluski, J. "From the great Goddess to Kala." *Indian Historical Quarterly*. XIV. Calcutta, 1938.

Race, A. *Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology Religions*. London: S.M.C. Press, 1983.

Race, A. and Williamson, P. (eds) *True to This Earth: Global Challenges and Transforming Faith*. Oxford: Oneworld, 1995.

Randall, J. H. *The Making of the Modern Mind*. Cambridge: Houghten and Mifflin, 1940.

Ravavu, A. *Vaka I Taukei: The Fijian Way of Life*. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1983.

_____ *The Fijian Ethos*. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1987.

Relph, E. *Place and Placelessness*. London: Pion Press, 1986.

Resource Management Act 1991. Wellington: Government Printer, 1994.

Richards, G. *Towards a Theology of Religions*. London: Routledge, 1989.

Rickman, H. P. *Dilthey: Selected Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Ricoeur, P. *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.

_____ *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on language, Action and Interpretation* (translated by J. B. Thompson). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Rifkin, J. *Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

_____ *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Force and the Dawn of the Post Market Era*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1996.

Robert, J. and Murray, S. J. *The Cosmic Covenant: Biblical Themes of Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1992

Roberts, M., Norman, W. Minhinnick, N., Wihongi, D. and Kirkwood, C. "Kaitiakitanga: Maori Perspectives on Conservation." *Pacific Conservation Biology*. Vol. 2, 1995.

Robertson, G., Mash, M., Tickner, L., Bird, J., Curtis, B. and Putnam, T. *FutureNatural: Nature, Science, Culture*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Robinson, J. A. T. *Honest to God*. London: S.M.C. Press, 1964.

Rockefeller, S. C. and Engels, J. (eds) *Spirit and Nature: Why the Environment is a Religious Issue*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.

- Rorty, R. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Ross, D. W. *The Early History of Land-Holding Among the Germans*. Boston: Soule and Bugbee, 1883.
- Ross, W. D. *Aristotle*. New York: Meridian Books, 1959.
- Roszak, T. *The Voice of the Earth*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
- Rouner, L. S. (ed) *Religious Pluralism: The Metaphysical Challenge in Religious Pluralism*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
- _____ (ed) *On Nature*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
- Rouse, J. *Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Rousseau, J. J. *The First and Second Discourses* (edited by R. D. Masters and translated by J. R. Masters). New York: St. Martins Press, 1964.
- Russell, R. J., Stoeger, S. J. and Coyne, S. J. (eds) *Physics, Philosophy and Theology. A Common Quest for Understanding*. Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988.
- Sachs, W. (ed) *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. London: Zed Books, 1995.
- Sagan, C. *Cosmos*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1980.
- Sahlins, M. *Social Stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971.
- _____ *Islands of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Sahlins, M. and Service, E. R. *Evolution and Culture*. Grand Rapids: University of Michigan Press, 1966.
- Said, E. W. "The Mind of Winter: Reflections on the Life in Exile." *Harpers*. 269:1612, September, 1984.
- Salmon, J. T. *The Native Trees of New Zealand*. Auckland: Heinemann Reed, 1989.
- Sandar, N. K. (ed) *The Epic of Gilgamesh*. London: Penguin Books, 1975.
- Santmire, P. H. *The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.
- Schama, S. *Landscape and Memory*. London: Harper Collins, 1995.

Schleiermacher, F. *The Christian Faith*. Harper and Row. New York. 1963

_____ *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*. (edited by H. Kimmmerle and translated by J. Duke and J. Forstman). Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977.

Schofield, M. and Striker, G. (eds) *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Schremp, G. *Magical Arrows: The Maori, The Greeks and the Folklore of the Universe*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.

Schutz, A. J. (ed) *The Dairies and Correspondence of David Cargill 1832-1843*. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977.

Schwaller De Lubicz, R. A. *The Temple in Man*. Vermont: Inner Traditions International, 1977.

Schweiker, W. and Anderson, P. M. (eds) *Worldviews and Warrants: Plurality and Authority in Theology*. Washington: University Press of America, 1987.

Schwimmer, E. *The World of the Maori*. Wellington: Reed, 1966.

Scruton, R. *Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994.

Seidenberg, R. *Post-Historic Man: An Inquiry*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.

Serres, M. *Hermes: Literature, science Philosophy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Serres, M. and Latour, B. *Conversations on Science Culture and Time*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Shah, I. *World Tales: The Extraordinary Coincidence of Stories Told in All Times in All Places*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

Sharpe, K. J. *From Science to an Adequate Mythology*. Auckland: Interface Press, 1984.

Sheldrake, R. *The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God*. London: Century, 1990.

_____ *A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation*. London: Blond and Briggs, 1991.

_____ *The Participatory Mind*. London: Arkana (Penguin), 1994.

Sidley, H. C. *Seneca: A Selection* (translated by A. Stewart). London: George Bell and Sons, 1904.

Simmons, A. J. *The Lockean Theory of Rights*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Singh, G. and Geissler, E. A. "Late Cenozoic History of Vegetation, Fire, Lake Levels, New South Wales, Australia." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*. 311, 1985.

Singh, R. P. B. (ed) *The Spirit and Power of Place. Human Environment and Sacrality*. Varanasi: National Geographic Society, 1993.

_____ (ed) *Environmental Ethics: Discourses and Cultural Traditions*. Varanasi: National Geographic Society, 1993.

Skolimowski, H. *Eco-Philosophy: Designing a New Tactics For Living*. Boston: Marion Boyars, 1981.

Smith, A. *The Wealth of Nations*. (edited by E. Cannon). London: Random Century Group. [1910] 1993.

Smith, A. C. *Flora Vitiensis: A New Flora of Fiji*. Lawaii: Pacific Tropical Gardens of Hawaii, 1981.

Smith, Z. *Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religion*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978.

Smoot, G. and Davidson, K. *Wrinkles in Time*. New York: Avon Books, 1993.

Spatte, O. H. K. *The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects*. Suva: Government Printer, 1959.

Spurway, N. (ed) *Humanity Environment and God* Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.

Stambaugh, J. *Impermanence is Buddha-Nature: Dogen's Understanding of Temporality*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

Standing Bear, L. *Land of the Spotted Eagle*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978.

Strelow, T. G. H. *Songs of Central Australia*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1971.

Striker, G. *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Suzuki, D. T. "The Role of Nature in Zen Buddhism" *Erano-Jahrbuch*. Vol. 22, 1954.

Swain, R. B. *Earthly Pleasures: Tales From a Biologists Garden*. Markham: Penguin, 1981.

Swain, T. *A Place For Strangers: Towards a History of Australian Aboriginal Being*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Swain, T. and Trompf, G. *The Religions of Oceania*. London: Routledge, 1995.

Swidler, L. (ed) *Towards a Universal Theology of Religion*. New York: Orbis Books, 1998.

Swimme, B. and Berry, T. *The Universe Story. From the Primordial Flaring Forth to the Ecozoic Era: A Celebration of the Unfolding of the Cosmos*. San Francisco: Harper, 1992.

Tabunakawai, K. *Forest Information 1993*. Suva: Department of Forests, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, 1993.

Tacitus, *The Agricola and the Germania* (translated by H. Mattingly). London: Penguin Books, [98AD] 1970.

Tarnas, R. *The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1991.

Taylor, A. E. *Plato: The Man and His Work*. London: Meuthuen and Co. Ltd., 1928.

Taylor, C. *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Tejera, V. *Nietzsche and Greek Thought*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.

Thirgood, J. V. *Man and the Mediterranean Forest: A History of Resource Depletion*. London: Academic Press, 1981.

Thorne, K. *Black Holes and Time Warps: Einstein's Outrageous Legacy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1994.

Tietenburg, T. *Environmental and Natural Resource Economics*. New York: Harper Collins, 1992.

Tilley, A. *Plots of Time: An Inquiry into History Myth and Meaning*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995.

Tillich, P. *The Significance of the History of Religions For the Systemic Theologian* (edited by J. C. Braur). New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

_____ *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Tipler, F. *The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead*. London and New York: Pan Books, 1996.

Tobias, M. *The Naked Man*. Freemont: Jain Publishing Company, 1994.

Tomkins, P. and Bird, C. *The Secret Life of Plants*. New York: Avon Books, 1974.

Tuan, Y. F. *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1974.

_____ *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*. London: Edwin Arnold, 1977.

Tuchman, B. *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century*. London: Penguin Books, 1978.

Tucker, M. E. and Grim, J. *Worldviews and Ecology: Religion, Philosophy, and The Environment*. New York: Orbis books, 1994.

Tully, J. *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

_____ *An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Turnbull, C. M. *The Forest People* London: Chatto and Windus, 1961.

Turner, F. *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993.

Vachon, R. "Guswenta or The Intercultural Imperative" (Part I, section II and part II). *InterCulture*. Vol XXVIII. No. 2,3 and 4, 1995.

Vail, M. *Heidegger and Ontological Difference*. London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972.

Van der Post, L. *The Heart of the Hunter*. London: Penguin Books, 1961.

Vatsyayan, K. (ed) *Concepts of Space: Ancient and Modern*. New Dehli: Abbinav Publications, 1991.

Vico, G. *The New Science* (translated by T. C. Bergin and M. H. Fisch). New York: Doubleday and Co., [1774] 1961.

Von Wright, G. H. *Culture and Value: Ludwig Wittgenstein*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

- Waddington, C. H. *Tools For Thought*. London: Jonathon Cape, 1977.
- Wallace, B. A. *Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of Reality*. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1996.
- Walsh, R and Vaughan, F. *Paths Beyond Ego: The Transpersonal Vision*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1993.
- Walter, E. V. *Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment*. London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
- Warnke, G. *Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
- Watson, L. *The Lightning Bird*. London: Hodder and Stoughten, 1982.
- Whaling, F. (ed) *The Worlds Religious Traditions: Current Perspectives in Religious Studies*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Ltd, 1980.
- White, L. "The Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." *Science*. 155, 1967.
- Whitehead, A. N. *The Concept of Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930.
- Whitrow, G. J. *Time in History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Whorf, B. *Language, Thought and Reality* (edited by B. J. Carroll). Cambridge. MIT Press, 1956.
- Wikan, U. *Managing Turbulent Hearts: A Balinese Formula For Living*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Wilkinson, D. "Origin of the Fijian Race" *Transactions of the Fijian Society*. 1910.
- Williams, F. E. *The Vailala Madness and Other Essays* (edited by E. Schwimmer). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1977.
- Williams, W. A. *Empire as a Way of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Wilson, E. O. *The Diversity of Life*. London: The Penguin Press, 1993.
- Winch, P. *Trying to Make Sense*. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
- Winter, G. *Liberating Creation*. New York: Crossroad, 1981.
- Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations* (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe). New York: MacMillan, 1958.

_____ *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (translated by D. Pears and P. Guinness). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

Wolin, R. *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Wood, D. *The Power of Maps* London: Routledge, 1993.

World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Yoon, H. K. "On Geomentality." *Geojournal*. 25.4, 1991.

Yong, H. "Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue: Beyond Universalism and Particularism." *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*. 37, 1995.

Young, D. *Origins of the Sacred: The Ecstasies of Love and War*. . New York: Harper Perennial, 1991.

Yourgrau, P. *The Disappearance of Time: Kurt Godel and the Idealistic Tradition in Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Zerubavel, E. *Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Zimmer, H. *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilisation*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1946.

Zohar, D. *The Quantum Self*. New York: Flamingo, 1990.

Zohar, D and Marshall, I. *The Quantum Society*. London: Bloomsbury, 1993.

Zukav, G. *The Dancing Wu Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics*. New York: Bantam Books, 1980.

Zweers, W. and Boersema, J. J. *Ecology, Technology and Culture: Essays in Environmental Philosophy* Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1994.