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HOUSING, THE STATE AND URBAN POOR ORGANISATIONS IN METRO MANILA.

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies at

Massey University

Donovan Storey

1996
This study has sought to place housing into social and political contexts of analysis. It suggests that the failure to house the urban poor is a result of particular political systems in operation throughout the Third World. In particular, the system of neopatrimonialism is forwarded to explain the logic of many Third World regimes and to describe the nature of their relationship with society. Civil society is neither passive nor stagnant however. The proliferation of community organisations and Non Government Organisations in the South is testimony to this. Many feel that these actors may create enough pressure to challenge current development directions. Whilst this study supports this argument it is qualified support, as the nature and direction of this change is not clearly understood nor apparent. In examining these processes research was conducted in Metro Manila during 1994. There is strong evidence to confirm the endurance of neopatrimonialism in the Philippines and its effect on the logic of politics and the character of state-society relations. There are also clear connections between the historical development of the Filipino state and the housing crisis. In looking at the response of social actors, two urban poor organisations are studied in a comparative context, as is the role of an intermediary NGO. This study finds some support for the argument that NGO/UPO alliances are more progressive and impactive than 'traditional' UPOs, though there is evidence to suggest there are as many similarities as contrasts. UPOs that operate within urban or national social movements may be involved in change, though it is still unclear whether this is progressive or will be at the forefront of social and political transformation. While UPOs play an important role in civil society, expectations of their place in an 'alternative society' should still be circumspect and cognizant of the adversities these groups confront.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is the result of a number of people who have supported me over the past several years. In particular, those friends in the Philippines that offered their homes, food, hospitality and warmth made this all possible. The life opportunity to live with these wonderful people (herewith unfortunately referred to as ‘the urban poor’), was a rare opportunity and life changing experience. To Poning and family, Albi and family and the residents of the two communities I had contact with, salamat, I am forever in your debt.

I also derived a great deal of support on other levels. To Croz Walsh who first inspired me on these issues, to Jeff Sluka who offered great advice and frank thoughts throughout, and to John Overton whose support and patience was endless (though I think I got close at times) I also offer thanks. I can’t wait to be able to talk to you without asking for something!

In the Philippines I benefited from opening doors of opportunity made possible by two very able people, ‘Jing’ Karaos and Annie de Leon. Thank you both. You offered refuge to an otherwise flabbergasted visitor and helped define the direction this study has taken. The work you do is an inspiration to me and I hope this effort offers some contribution to the struggle.

Helen Mitchell has stood by me, racked with concern and a hint of dismay as I have enrolled in course after course, degree after degree over the years. Helen was particularly industrious over the last weeks with offers of help as she sought a mention in the acknowledgments. You were always there Helen, but thanks for the help anyway! This study is as much a reflection of her hard work and commitment to the cause as any other persons. Also, my mother, Roselyn, has given me support throughout my student ‘career’. To all other friends and ‘professional’ students whose friendship and ideas helped inspire my own, perhaps this would have finished earlier if it was not for your interesting company. To all those who have ‘loitered with intent’ in the Graduate room (you know who you are!), I’ll miss your company.

This work is dedicated to Kate Mitchell, who died while I was completing fieldwork in Manila.
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## GLOSSARY OF FILIPINO WORDS AND TERMS

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<td>Children of the Philippines</td>
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<td>Anak Bayang Tondo</td>
<td>Children of Tondo</td>
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<td>Balik Probinsya</td>
<td>'Back to the Provinces' policy</td>
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<td>banyo</td>
<td>bathroom</td>
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<tr>
<td>barangay</td>
<td>pre-colonial community and now the smallest political unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>burgis</td>
<td>colloquial for bourgeoisie</td>
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<tr>
<td>compadre</td>
<td>chosen sponsors of children in baptism and confirmation</td>
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<td>datu</td>
<td>leader of traditional barangays</td>
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<tr>
<td>hiya</td>
<td>shame</td>
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<tr>
<td>ilustrado</td>
<td>university (usually foreign) educated leaders of nationalist movements in 19th Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>kagawad</td>
<td>barangay councillor</td>
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<tr>
<td>kamote</td>
<td>tubular starch plant eaten by rural and urban poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>katipunan</td>
<td>name given to group of revolutionaries in late 19th Century</td>
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<tr>
<td>katol</td>
<td>slow burning insect repellent</td>
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<tr>
<td>pakikisama</td>
<td>smooth interpersonal relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>personalismo</td>
<td>the social and political elevation of the individual</td>
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<tr>
<td>principalia</td>
<td>Spanish-created local elite</td>
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<td>Punong</td>
<td>barangay captain</td>
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<td>riles</td>
<td>railway lines</td>
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<tr>
<td>sambayanan</td>
<td>community, or community spirit</td>
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<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>a festival</td>
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<td>sari-sari</td>
<td>small community stores</td>
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<td>tagalog</td>
<td>official language of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>taglish</td>
<td>language which combines tagalog and English</td>
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<td>utang na loob</td>
<td>debt of gratitude</td>
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

ALMA NOVA  Alyansa Ng Mga Maralita Sa Novaliches
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
BIKTIMA  Bighis Tinig Maralita
BLISS  Bagong Lipunan Sites and Services
C-5  Circumferential Road Number Five
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CO  Community Organisation
COMELEC  Commission for Elections
CPP  Communist Party of the Philippines
DPWH  Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD  Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDSA  Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
FDA  Foundation for Development Alternatives
GRO  Grassroots Organisation
HUDCC  Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
ICSI  Institute on Church and Social Issues
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INGO  Intermediary Non Government Organisation
KPML  Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralita Lungsod
LGC  Local Government Code
LOI  Letter of Instruction
MHS  Ministry of Human Settlements
NACUPO  National Congress of Urban Poor Organisations
NCR  National Capital Region
NGDO  Non Government Development Organisation
NGO  Non Government Organisation
NHA  National Housing Authority
NHMFC  National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
NIC  Newly Industrialising Country
NSP  National Shelter Programme
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY

During the period of fieldwork one American Dollar was equivalent to 27 Pesos (P) and one New Zealand Dollar was equivalent to 15 Pesos (100 Centavos make one Peso).
INTRODUCTION

There has been no lack of written accounts and policy advocacy on the topic of housing the urban Third World poor over past decades. Since the early 1960s Western academics and institutions, in particular, have been producing a steady stream of publications discussing the urban housing crisis. Beginning with the post-war concern of human geographers and planners over urbanisation trends, the debate has further drawn sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. Over time, reports, project and policy evaluations, as well as dissertations and other academic works, have satisfactorily outlined the nature of the housing problem from a variety of perspectives and disciplines.

Although the literature has somewhat abated, this concern continues. Both the United Nations and the World Bank announced in the early 1990s that urban poverty and housing would be a central concern to them throughout the decade (World Bank, 1990). In mid-1996, ‘so-called’ experts from around the globe will meet in Istanbul, Turkey, for the second Human Settlements conference (Habitat II). This will be twenty years after the initial meeting in Vancouver, Canada, a conference whose major themes were barely reflected in the majority of Third World housing policies and which had a relatively minor and narrow effect on the world’s urban poor.

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1 Already, prospects that Habitat II will have an impact on the housing crisis are dim. Ana Marie Karaos (1995a:6) of Ateneo de Manila University, considers that the conference will steer clear of the underlying political economy of housing, preferring instead to reaffirm a private sector/market driven course.
This study adds to the research on the urban poor's struggle for housing in the Third World. It attempts to address the situation of housing and the urban poor in a political/state-society context at both local and national levels of analysis in Manila and the Philippines. In so doing, this study highlights dynamics and features of the Philippines that may be familiar to Filipinists and theorists alike. By examining the nature of Philippine development and poverty, this dissertation attempts to provide a context for understanding the origins and forms of its current and future urban development problems in the context of the Philippines as a whole.

Although this setting may be well known to some, I have sought to place the struggle for poor people's housing into largely unfamiliar arenas, synthesising several areas of research topical to the issue of housing and to the Philippines that have emerged of late. The outline of the study consequently reflects current concerns of Filipinos involved in housing: the nature of the state in the post-Marcos period, including the crisis of policy implementation; the continuing tragedy of both housing the urban poor and Manila's spiralling urban poverty; and the response of civil society in the form of urban social movements and other localised urban poor organisations.

Such questions and subjects are topical for the Philippines for several reasons. Firstly, there is wide concern in the Philippines, and elsewhere, that the unresponsive and ineffectual nature of the Filipino state and politics has been one of continuity with that of the Marcos and pre-Marcos administrations. That is, the state continues to act as a vehicle for elite control and enrichment. In the case of housing policy and attitudes to the urban poor, this represents the perpetuation of policies of exploitation and neglect. At best this may be benign, at other times malicious and severe. Urban poverty, inadequate housing, and underdevelopment appear to be worsening with minimal response from the authorities. This thesis thus examines the issue of housing from a political development perspective, that is, the issue of housing is intertwined with issues of state formation and the manner and implementation of policy.
Secondly, this study examines the response of the poor themselves to this situation. Recently there has been a modest amount of literature on the response of the urban poor and what the record and success of this response has been. In the Philippines these issues are particularly relevant. The urban poor, since the early 1970s, have played a proactive but only an occasionally effective role in policy formulation. Notably, urban poor organisations have played an increasingly collaborative role with the country's relatively powerful and well developed Non Government Organisation (NGO) community. Many within this community believe that this coalition may be able to place enough pressure on government to force meaningful change in the Philippines, and for the urban poor in particular.

These relationships, though, are worthy of greater attention than they have received in the past. Ton van Naerssen (1993:18-19), for one, has alluded to the importance of these support organisations on urban poor communities in Metro Manila, on their politicisation, orientation and success. However, several questions arise from this relationship. Thomas Carroll (1992), among others, has questioned whether this relationship is a positive one for the urban poor or another form of dependency.

Some of these questions can only be fully highlighted through comparison. Consequently, an important aspect of this dissertation is a comparison of one organisation that exhibits seemingly traditional patterns of patronage and control, and a second settlement that has undergone a process of training and incorporation into Manila's urban social movement through its relationship with a prominent NGO. This comparison raises several questions, such as whether 'connected' organisations are superior to other local organisations in terms of the characteristics of its operation, the nature of its objectives and its ability to achieve goals and the methods used. How the organisations define their problems with regard to the system and the nature of their response is also of interest. Finally, I ask, how successful are these different organisations in bringing benefits to members with regard to housing and how effectively are
they at manipulating or transforming the system that has created and perpetuated their position.

The purpose of this study is to provide a richer, fieldwork-based assessment of the potentials and limitations of urban poor organisations and urban social movements in Manila and the Philippines. While the beginnings of this research were originally centred on housing alone, this final form has derived from my own experience of ‘scaling-up’ questions and areas of research over time. As a result, my concerns became increasingly centred on the nature and path of the development process itself, and then from a conviction that the poor are neither passive recipients of theoretically contested housing advice, nor are they homogeneous or clearly oriented toward a populist-constructed ‘New World Order’. How these organisations may act to alter the future and defend their interests is an important aspect of this thesis.

Significantly, the nature and direction of this study has developed from my personal experiences in Manila over a six month period and from the advice and guidance given to me by indigenous academics, activists and the urban poor themselves. While it may appear ambitious and somewhat expansive, it does reflect those avenues of topicality and attention of Filipinos themselves. Wherever possible, I have tried to remain as true to these judgments as possible while retaining a personal view. In particular my evaluation of Muntinlupa (one of the case studies) was influenced by perceptive advice and opinion I was offered while in Manila rather than from any overly predetermined theoretical, personal or abstract presupposition of my own.

In Chapter One I introduce the nature of the housing problem as it stands today. While some of this coverage is frequently cited, I go on in Chapter Two to place the housing crisis in the historical context of unproductive and at times belligerent state-society relations. In particular, the focus is on urban poor-state relations and how local level politics acts as the meeting point for the battle over policy implementation (and not necessarily problems with policy per se).
The (in)ability of the urban poor to influence the nature of policy implementation is cited as a particularly important area of attention. The system of neopatrimonialism has been a constant source of exploitation of the urban poor. In spite of occasions when the urban poor can use it to some advantage, it is an inherently unequal, repressive and exploitative relationship.

Chapters Three and Four focus on the Philippines and in particular on Manila. The aforementioned theoretical constructs are examined and are discussed as extremely significant to the Filipino situation. Chronologically I trace the political nature of the Filipino state and the crisis of urban poverty. Contiguous to this, Chapter Four highlights the response of civil society in general, and NGOs and urban poor organisations in particular. In this, the potential of the NGO-UPO alliance and the nature of their system-oriented approach is discussed.

Chapter Five explains the experiences of fieldwork and methodologies used in Manila. This is both a theoretical evaluation and explanation of the approach taken and a description of what it was like to carry out this research in the slums of Manila.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight represent the three case studies used in this study. Chapter’s Six and Eight present the two community organisation studies, while Chapter Seven outlines the role of an intermediary NGO, the Foundation for Development Alternatives. After first describing the communities, I focus on the nature of the organisation’s work, the issues defined by local leadership and the methods used to pursue these interests, and the role of each of the organisations in the May 1994 barangay elections.

In the final chapter, I draw some main conclusions with regard to the two organisations, the nature of NGO support organisations, and the future of urban poor organisations. Additionally, I discuss some of the wider implications, such as urban social movements and the urban poor in the political context of Philippine development and state-society relations. Finally, I outline the need
for further research into some areas and issues that have arisen from this study.

Some of the issues dealt with in this study will be of wider application elsewhere. Issues of housing, urban poverty and civil society/state relations in patronage systems are not unique to the Philippines nor the Third World. Above all else though, this dissertation is an attempt to renew debate and research concerning housing the urban poor, and alter or widen this focus from that of charity, projects and the private sector, to one of empowerment and rights for the majority citizens of Third World urban cities.\(^2\)

\(^2\) Even this argument is not necessarily new, Angel and Benjamin (1976:24) arguing a similar position twenty years ago.
CHAPTER ONE

THE THIRD WORLD HOUSING CRISIS

Introduction

Autonomous settlements are likely to constitute approximately half of the entire urban population of the Third World by the early Twenty-First century (Rondinelli, 1990a:154). This growth has been rapid, indeed, unparalleled in human history. In the last fifty years of the Twentieth century alone, the Third World’s urban population will have grown by 1.4 billion (Drakakis-Smith, 1987:5). Many of these families are of the poor and in time the majority of the poor will live in urban rather than rural areas. Urban households in poverty are expected to double from the 33.5 million in 1975 to 74.3 million by 2000 (Rondinelli, 1990a:154). Despite the apparent slowdown in urban growth rates of late, the rate of this increase, coupled with rural-urban migration and time lag affects, will ensure the growth of urban populations to unprecedented levels. The United Nations reports that this rapid urbanisation will continue for a number of decades, will concentrate almost wholly in the Third World and there will be particularly high growth in Asia (United Nations, 1993).

Most of this massive movement of peoples has been to the primate, or dominant capital city of the country where government, the health system, education and industry are centralised. Megacities, or those urban areas with populations of 10 million or more, are becoming less of an exception and more of a reflection of our urban future. Two-thirds of the world’s urban population is living in the Third World (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:v) and over 90% of current urban growth is in the periphery (Devas and Rakodi, 1993:2), meaning that
future global urban problems will also be development issues. Outside of megacities, the level of urbanisation in the Third World will pass the fifty percent mark around 2015 (United Nations, 1993:3). In most cases these cities were the result of colonial design, being established to act as centres of extraction and control. Despite political independence, the effect of neocolonialism has meant that this situation has largely been maintained and reinforced. Urbanisation is still a primary focus of development. "In the developing countries ... the desired industrial take-off on a national scale is being sought almost wholly through city-oriented policies" (Dwyer, 1990:279).

Most significantly, this population accumulation in Third World cities has clearly outstripped these cities' ability to cope in terms of the provision of basic services and infrastructure (Dwyer, 1990:294; Devas and Rakodi, 1993). While the debate continues over whether this 'hyperurbanisation' constitutes development or decay (Lipton, 1977; Devas and Rakodi, 1993:25-28; Angotti, 1993; Timberlake, 1985; Lin, 1994), for a long time now it has been evident that this post war urban explosion has clearly outstripped the ability of the authorities to cope in terms of the provision of resources, health, education, employment and housing. A combination of restricted access to steady employment, high levels of underemployment, limited income, a lack of government investment in infrastructure on a parallel scale, the high cost of land, and city planning which has failed to adapt to the needs of the population has meant that many have been driven into unstable and predominantly low income informal employment and in the case of housing, to live in primarily self-built, illegal, non-serviced, and poor areas (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:123).

This chapter seeks to place the issue of urban poor housing into the political context of state-society relations and to describe and outline the parameters of those actors and relationships. Firstly, the issue of housing is outlined against the continual failure of the state and other actors to respond. The housing issue is not argued to be the result of insufficient advice nor an absence of alternatives but rather a crisis of resource distribution and policy
implementation. Consequently it becomes necessary to discuss the nature of the Third World state and politics, particularly at the local level, which is described as the 'centre' of the system.

**Housing Directions: From Lerner to Turner**

Autonomous housing, it has been argued, is merely the visible manifestation of urban poverty (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:114). Perhaps it is because of the high visibility of these settlements that the problem has attracted so much debate and attention, even though this attention is still only of recent origin. The housing issue has been a concern of the two central development paradigms (liberal and radical) since the Second World War. In the pre- and immediate post-war periods government attitudes toward the problem were characterised by the prevailing attitude toward development at the time. The tenet was pursued in the theoretical and intellectual environment of the post war period that over-resourcing the settlements would result in the unproductive use of finances (Handelman, 1988). Rather, the benefits of economic growth would eventually 'trickle-down' to allow the poor to afford market supplied or state housing. Squatting and autonomous settlements were thus seen as a transitory phenomenon before the ‘take-off’ of the Third World as a whole.

Concern, though, developed on two fronts. These were the massive growth of post-war Third World cities coupled with the inability of state housing to match the demand for shelter, and concurrently, the unaffordability of this housing for most of the intended recipients. The answer for many was to seek their own shelter and this led to the rapid growth of autonomous settlements. Governments soon realised that the problem was massive and proving intractable with the current trickle down policies. Throughout, though, the problem was perceived as a crisis of housing stock and of incorporating marginal migrants into 'western' type urban plans (Ward, 1982:2). The dominant approach thus became one of slum clearance occasionally combined with
public rehousing (Handelman, 1988; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989:41-50, 106-117; Palmer and Patton, 1988:6-7). Significantly, this policy developed with strong intellectual underpinnings and support from the West, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the reality was that in most cases neither goal has been achieved and, in fact, the result of these policies may have had the effect of worsening the problems of the poor. Slum clearances often occurred with the support of dubious and judgemental rhetoric over the character of squatters (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989:41-46). More likely reasons were the needs of capital in redeveloping the sites or of the government portraying an image of strength and control.

In nearly all cases slum clearance and relocation was an expensive failure leading to the return of squatters to the urban area. In the 1960s slum clearance and relocation to sites 35-40 kms from cities in the Philippines were common (Rondinelli, 1990a:156), if sites were provided at all. What usually greeted the urban poor were bare fields with limited shelter and few services, distant transportation, and limited access to employment opportunities (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989:41-50; Laquian, 1969). The unsurprising result was the return of most squatters to the city and to new settlements, or to established ones, thus placing a greater strain on existing resources. In Madras the government cleared slums containing more than 58,000 families between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s replacing their houses with public housing tenements. The costs of the policy were extremely high, both for the poor and the government, and the move failed to house nearly all the intended recipients. In Malaysia the government spent more than $230 million between 1956 and 1975 on public low-cost housing programs in slum areas - a policy involving the forced clearance of 28,000 squatters off their land. In turn, less than half the available units were allocated to the dispossessed and less than one-third of the slum dwellers were ever rehoused, moving into other already congested settlements (Rondinelli, 1990a:157-58). Such experiences were not unique. Consequently, by the early 1970s this approach had been recognised globally as a failure (Rondinelli, 1990a:158; Palmer and Patton, 1988:7).
Concurrently, and once again led by western scholars, a significant reassessment by writers and practitioners toward the problem of autonomous housing was under way. The 1960s were a time when particularly town planners and anthropologists took another look at the problem which massive public housing schemes and forced relocation were not improving at all. Although not specifically in the Third World context, Charles Stokes (1962) began the differentiation of what he termed ‘slums of hope’ and ‘slums of despair’ and the defining of escalator and non-escalator groups in the United States. In his model, slums of hope with escalator groupings tended to become self-eliminating slums with a capacity for social development and integration into the urban environment (Mathey, 1992:379). In more directly referring to Third World conditions, Charles Abrams (1964) emphasised life in shanty-towns as ‘an interim stage from poverty towards hope’ and was the original voice heard for a sites and utilities approach to the problem. This method would consist of the government offering relocation alternatives of core houses on serviced sites. Thought of as the ‘father’ of the Progressive Development School of thought, Abrams was nonetheless sceptical of a solution to the problem, but as an advisor to the United Nations his views did have some important listeners at the time (Mathey, 1992:380). In the same period, writers such as Leeds (1969) were emphasising different types of slums at different stages of development in India and Latin America and writers such as Mangin (1967) argued that squatting should indeed be approached as a solution to the problem (Ward, 1982:4), and not the other way around.

This was the intellectual environment in which the works of John F.C. Turner appeared. By no means was he the first to say what he did, but clearly his ideas have become the most complete, articulate and influential. Seen as a product of his time, of appropriate technology, decentralisation and the desire to meet the basic needs of the poorest, Turner’s immediate concerns were to provide an alternative to the slum clearance and public housing approaches of the era.
Essentially, Turner saw the housing crisis as one of supply and demand. Houses supplied by the state were modern and expensive while people’s needs and affordability were much less. With current government housing policies these disparities were not likely to be bridged (Turner, 1972, 1976). The state’s housing supply did not fulfil the idiosyncratic needs of the urban poor and in fact, by weighing them down with unmanageable debt and divorcing them from their resources, more often than not acted as a barrier rather than a vehicle for community development. Instead ‘people as users’ were seen as the most efficient and effective users of resources and only through their increased control as occupiers could the demand for shelter be met in ensuring that what was built matched their needs (Turner, 1982:99).

In Turner’s mind, though, there still remained a crucial role for the state. While his views on the state’s role have changed over the past three decades, throughout his model implies that the community takes control of decisions which primarily affect the neighbourhood, whereas access to crucial resources (land, energy, tools) are responsibilities that still need to be assumed by the central state or local authority. The most crucial thing an authority could do, and one which would ensure the positive aspects of squatting, was to grant security of tenure and then provide services. Such an approach would lead to the development of the physical settlement and the social progression of the inhabitants.

Despite criticisms, Turner not only had an enormous influence on scholarship, but on governments and international agencies as well, including the world’s biggest lending agency, the World Bank. Throughout the 1970s, with the World Bank’s support, the mood progressively changed from public housing provision and demolitions toward the provision of sites with services and the upgrading of low-income settlements, or ‘helping the poor to help themselves’. Turner’s ideas corresponded with the shift in the thinking of international lending agencies in the 1970s and 1980s toward redistribution with growth theories and basic needs approaches (Burgess, 1992:81). Indeed, the attitude in the 1970s
and 1980s so much favoured the provision of sites with services and the upgrading of settlements that the self-help approach came to be considered as the ‘New Orthodoxy’ (van der Linden, 1986:47).

In the self-help philosophy, users were to become more involved in building activities as well as in the financing and management of their house construction (something which the state had previously done, see Skinner and Rodell, 1983:1) while the authorities would seek to provide basic infrastructure and utilities, land tenure, and low-cost credit facilities. Yet, "those policy recommendations that were regarded as incompatible with [The World Bank’s goals] were either ignored or underplayed (e.g. dweller control, political devolution)" (Burgess, 1992:82).

World Bank reports though, portrayed positive images of the approach. Observers noted that sites and service projects could provide appropriate housing for three to five times less the cost of public housing (Rondinelli, 1990a:160). World Bank evaluations indicated that the poor borrowed heavily to invest where necessary, built at successful rates, and that house improvements were substantial (Rondinelli, 1990a:160).

Despite these findings, the concept of self-help was, and has been limited to funding from international agencies, and rarely has it moved beyond the project phase to a policy level or beyond the semi-periphery (Burgess, 1992:83). Implementation was constrained by the lack of change to such fundamental structures as asset ownership and power (Burgess, 1992:82). Despite some improvements, the approach has not even kept up with, let alone solved, the crisis as it expands to an ever increasing number of the needy.
The Housing Debate and the Showdown that Wasn't

Criticisms originated from both major theoretical paradigms. Within the liberal school reservations centred on the problems of cost recovery, affordability, design and implementation (Rondinelli, 1990a:161). Also, important questions were raised over local participation and the relationship between governments and community groups. Turner's aspects of participation were watered down in differing political and social contexts (Skinner and Rodell, 1983:235) to serve as a means to an end rather than an end in itself (Moser, 1992:59). Results from projects showed that "...the participation component is often executed half-heartedly and in part only. The only forms of participation which are actually encouraged, though highly regulated, are in terms of labour for construction and in terms of payments" (van der Linden, 1986:124). This occurred to the point where even Turner himself became outwardly critical of the lack of grassroots participation in self-help projects (Turner, 1982:110). Increased community participation was seen to result in delays and higher project housing costs (Skinner and Rodell, 1983:234) leading Hans Harms to describe many types of participation as conscription (Harms, 1982:27).

The most virulent and damning critique of the self-help approach though came from the identification of the social, economic and ideological issues that surrounded it by both Marxist and non-Marxist writers (Ward, 1982:1). Marxist writers sought to explain the housing problem as part of the capitalist mode, arguing that its solution could only occur with the system's abolition (van der Linden, 1986:31; Burgess, 1977, 1982, 1985). Ward (1982) has noted that criticisms focused on labour exploitation and the underwriting of low wages and the manner in which the adoption of self-help maintained the status quo and retarded necessary structural change (thus rationalising poverty and the urban crisis), were particularly effective and well supported (Ward, 1982:10). The state, perceived as the 'handmaiden of capital' and the representative of ruling class interests (the 'instrumentalist state'), was seen to create and maintain structures that perpetuated the housing problem (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:62).
Marxist writers have protested that this political nature of self-help has been denied along with a lack of examination of class and power structures (Burgess, 1982:57,74-5), yet these are central to the understanding of its implementation.

It was additionally argued by other non-Marxist writers that self-help projects functioned more as alleviative and control mechanisms than as progression toward a solution. This failure was furthermore 'aided' by poor administration; unrealistically high and unattainable standards; land and location difficulties; the near impossibility of keeping prices low enough for the majority; problems of reaching the target group; and efforts at (full) cost recovery (van der Linden, 1986:51-2). Increasingly, authors came to see that the implementation and administration of projects were grounded and shaped by both the socio-economic and political factors surrounding the intervention and the outcomes and limitations of this intervention (Mathey, 1992:27). Moreover these interventions were historically grounded in both the developed and Third World (Harms, 1982).

According to van der Linden, these environments have worked principally to the advantage of implementors pursuing their own interests, and factors such as poor administration were due to a lack of political motivation at the highest levels (van der Linden, 1986:54). Harms (1982:18) has argued for the historical understanding of self-help as a policy solution adopted to integrate or contain conflict and dissent (Harms, 1982:18). In the case of housing, bureaucracies were said to have interpreted public needs in terms of their own objectives and interests (Gilbert, 1992:445). In particular, the bureaucracy acts as a buffer between demand making and policy action, especially with regard to community participation and urban land reform (van der Linden, 1986:55). "To such interests, it is very convenient that bureaucracies are so weak, that intra-agency rivalry is so rampant, that professionals are not attuned to their tasks, or that outdated standards are being maintained" (van der Linden, 1986:72). As such, it was argued that the limitations of the approach were due both to the operations of bureaucracies and reaction to the redistributational nature of self-
help (particularly in the ideas put forward by Turner) (van der Linden, 1986:57). According to Burgess (1982:76), to change this situation would imply that the state would have to legislate against itself.

Other criticisms centred around the wholesale acceptance of the approach particularly in non-democratic environments in which governments responded not to solve the housing crisis, but acted to shore-up elements of legitimacy. Self-help allowed repressive governments to gain access to international resources and to demonstrate their putative concern for the poorest. According to Gilbert and Gugler (1992:143), critical issues, such as urban reform, progressive taxation and curbing land speculation, can be evaded when the illusion is maintained that self-help can solve the housing problem.

Despite these valid critiques, theoretical progress regarding the housing crisis was seen to be grounded by the mid 1980s. Generally, governments discarded many of the progressive development school’s calls for greater empowerment and control by the poor over housing, which were central tenets of the original thesis. The radical school, while highlighting significant processes and effectively selecting the weaknesses of self-help projects and the role of the state, have not offered any real alternatives for the urban poor and have been accused, with some justification, as approaching the problem in an overly theoretical and deterministic fashion (Gilbert and van der Linden, 1987). Both schools of thought, additionally, have utilised eurocentric tendencies and have, according to the literature and reflected in policy trends, looked to have run their course by the late 1980s. The gap between theory and practise with regard to housing has appeared for some time now to be widening (Walsh, 1980) and is another example of the impasse in development theory that was acknowledged by Andrew Booth in the mid 1980s (Booth, 1985).
Beyond the Theoretical Impasse: The Policy Impasse

As a result of these criticisms and the disappointing results of the self-help approach, by the mid 1980s the World Bank and governments cooled toward upgrading and sites and services schemes in particular (while still promoting them as their central housing policy). Reasons put forward for this shift included the move towards monetarist neo-liberal economic philosophies emphasising subsidy reduction, restructuring, and trickle down, (and away from the direct provision of housing) (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:60), as well as the prevailing international fiscal crisis particularly in the Third World, and, the frustration at the lack of progress of the approach. One significant economic barrier emerging was the commercialisation of land and the commodification process in general, highlighted throughout neo-Marxist critiques of self-help (Gilbert, 1992:440; Palmer and Patton, 1988:14).

Thus, in the 1980s governments were doing much less, ironically in a period of increasing national and urban poverty. The World Bank in its lending policies, which were critical both to the support and implementation of self-help projects, reverted to the post-war line on housing the urban poor, that the Bank didn’t seek to solve the housing crisis per se - instead, the housing problem should be capable of solving itself (van der Linden, 1986:28). Its newly embraced catalytic approach promoting indirect ‘enabling’ strategies (Baken and van der Linden, 1993) were further largely welcomed in a Third World now simply too broke to do anything more expansive. According to Gilbert (1992:436) governments did not need to be convinced to do less, as they were going to be doing less anyway. New ideas continued to focus on the housing aspect of poverty in terms of how to avoid the commodification of construction apparent in ‘conventional’ strategies, a situation argued to be encouraged by governments and at least partially supported by empirical evidence (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:67). In their place appeared calls for cooperative/community programs, more encouragement for the private and informal sectors, and modifications to land use patterns (Rondinelli, 1990b:263). Effectively, this
meant policies regarding housing complimented the thrust of Structural Adjustment Policies in the wider economy (Baken and van der Linden, 1992:73). Overall, the emphasis is to tailor housing policies to individual environments, needs, and resources of the poor (Rondinelli, 1990b). Yet, almost at once, arguments appeared that the private sector would not be able or willing to fill this role in essentially a 'non-profit' environment (Gilbert, 1992:436), and that these 'approaches' continued to ignore political aspects of state/society relations (Rezende, 1991).

Evidently, policies and dialogue appear to be becoming increasingly circular. Old approaches of 'trickle down' are being revisited and theoretical support or criticism continues in the legacy of the theoretical (housing) impasse (Marcussen, 1990:32-33). Marxist writers continued to be criticised as being highly (and perhaps overly) theoretical and deterministic with little predictive power, at least in the short to medium term (van der Linden, 1986:33, Mathey, 1992:29-30). Monetarist proponents on the other hand, were seen as failing to involve critical/structural theories and merely were diagnosing the symptoms in the vain hope that these were the disease (Burgess, 1977:55). As a result the axis between theoretical debate, policy, and daily reality appeared to be widening throughout the 1980s.

Out of The Impasse: New Polemics

At the same time, and as a result of the theoretical debates and policy experiences of the 1980s, new perspectives appeared reflecting the changing nature of government-citizen relations (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:28). The politics of housing is, according to Baken and van der Linden (1993:78), a key missing element in World Bank programmes and analysis, though housing scholars attribute it a central place in their assessments. With regard to the housing experience, self-help was reinterpreted as being one component in the
dialogue and efforts of leverage over issues of housing between the urban poor and the authorities. Tony Schuman noted at the end of the 1980s that ironically "it is precisely because self-help does not work as a solution, that it has potential" (cited in Mathey, 1992:389). Indeed, writers such as Mathey have highlighted the point that self-help, despite being used as a method of control, has actually increased the demand and need for reform and has created a politicised arena of negotiation in which debate over the (re)distribution of resources has occurred (Mathey, 1992). Fiori and Ramirez have even suggested that political relations that have developed around self-help negotiations represent the key issue for investigation (quoted in Ward and Macoloo, 1992:71, my emphasis). "Reforms, while often intended as a counter-revolutionary weapon, can generate a momentum for more radical demands" (van der Linden, 1986:138), though the experiences and results of this have been mixed (Skinner and Rodell, 1983:236; Mathey, 1992:338).

While these are the hopes, in many places apparently little has changed. Historically the state has managed to avoid the issue of housing and demands of the urban poor due to the lack of continuous political pressure exerted on the state. Indeed, detrimental policies are more likely to appear in situations where the poor have a lesser degree of political influence and power, as "political influence is clearly a vital ingredient in the orientation of housing policy" (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:148). Support has increasingly appeared that has focused on the housing problem as essentially a political issue rather than a technical one, which could be influenced and determined by the prevailing conflicting power relations. What the increasingly political debate over housing had done was to provide a platform for the urban poor to assume a mantle of legitimacy and to enter into redistributive dialogue with the state. For example, in the case of Lima, political mobilisation of the urban poor centred on the failure of housing projects to confront aspects of structural change, and on the authorities' continual underplaying of the relationship between the housing issue to and considerations of power, autonomy and political participation (Ward, 1982:222-7).
Such situations as Peru though may not be typical. According to van der Linden, the norm of government control may still prevail in many places, where "political parties have often more interest in the creation, maintenance and piecemeal improvement of informal settlements than in a policy aiming at the solution of the problem" (van der Linden, 1986:69), and in most places the urban poor are still the benefactors rather than the protagonists of (housing) policy (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:149-150). And yet, van der Linden (1986:73) still feels that change is likely to occur when sufficient pressure has been exerted on governments by the poor, complementing the argument of Gilbert and Gugler that "sensitive housing and planning policies depend less upon an awakening in professional attitudes than upon more political pressure from the poor" (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:148). This further supports the view that the urban poor, when mobilised, may be effective in forcing even wider change through the dialogue over housing.

Indeed, Steinberg has noted that self-help itself, in a number of environments including Indonesia, has "become the response of the state to (overt or still potential) social pressures" (cited in Mathey, 1992:353). In this, the adoption of self-help is seen within the context of conflicting state-poor relations. For the state, self-help is seen as a political implement and mechanism in the demobilisation and integration of the grassroots in seeking social control (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:72). In particular this is achieved through the individualisation of goals and subsequently the stratification of individuals and division of social classes. The result is the undermining of common ideological awareness and collective action is subverted (Ward and Macoloo, 1990:74).

Consequently, housing policy for both liberal, and more particularly neo-Marxist theorists, has come to be seen as a political issue that needs to be placed in a political context (Skinner and Rodell, 1983:230, Mathey, 1992:27-31; Rezende, 1991; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992). This requires further investigation and interpretation in individual contexts (van der Linden, 1986:36; Marcussen,
In this respect, the implementation of policies and the application of regulations in the field of land and housing can be regarded as the outcomes of a political calculus of interest groups, which often takes the form of phenomena known as machine politics, political mediation and clientelism. These phenomena are embedded in a political and bureaucratic culture which significantly differs from a western concept of politics and bureaucracy (Baken and van der Linden, 1992:80).

In gaining a greater depth of understanding then of the rationality of government response, there is a need to know more about the state in Third World societies, or, in effect, a greater understanding of the 'logic of the government response' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:145). Consequently, in the case of housing consumption, Mathey (1992:390) has advised that "it is important to understand self-help in terms of the redistributive struggle instead of physically laying one brick upon the other". Self-help policies did not have monolithic effects, even in the same macro-political context. Beneficiaries as well as projects included winners and losers and ranged from top-down approaches to participatory projects, even in the same city (van der Linden, 1986:48). In this context then, self-help developed precisely during periods of economic crisis (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:73; Harms, 1982). Accordingly, Walton describes self-help as part of the "continuous struggle among various classes, status groups and authorities in which domination is less the rule than negotiation" (cited in van der Linden, 1986:139-40).

Subsequently, a new direction of scholarship that has begun to lead the problem out of its theoretical impasse, has brought many analysts and activists closer to the daily reality of the problems at hand. This move away from theoretical determinism, particularly with regard to state-squatter relations, has been towards the position that "whatever the truth about long term effects, government policies do matter and political pressure can somewhat influence
such policies" (van der Linden, 1986:34). But currently, according to Fadda (1991:321), the urban poor have few means for having their voices heard over such issues as development and housing. Thus they are unable to influence the policies that affect them. The state holds dominance over both discourse and power, meaning that urban poor-state ‘encounters’ are innately and unambiguously ‘unbalanced’ and unequal ones (Fadda, 1991; Rezende, 1992). The urban poor lack the political clout to make their own preferences stick, and thus lose out in access to scarce resources, lacking control over policy decisions and administrative bodies (Bratton, 1990:90-91). According to Mathey (1992:390), it appears that the outlook for fundamental improvements in urban poverty and housing are dim if there is no fundamental social transformation. This then shifts the housing focus on to the effects and possibilities of squatter-based urban social movements and community organisations.

Indeed, Nyoni has asserted that no nation on earth has developed through (particularly borrowed) projects alone, and that “a nation can only become liberated or developed when its poor people become aware of the forces which oppress or underdevelop them and mobilise to deal with these forces themselves” (Nyoni, 1987:52). Consequently the battle for consumption between the urban poor and the state has increasingly appeared as a focus in literature on Third World housing. It has also appeared outside the direct self-help housing debate, which, after all directly affected very few and concentrated on the physical, and avoided the political. For example, government authorities may focus on shelter provision and technical improvements but not on urban land reform and a community’s civic and human right to public goods (Fowler, 1991:69). It became apparent that rather than the poor being ‘recipients’ of policies and programs of government and international agencies, each with their own agenda, “the large majority has to find its own solutions to the problems of housing and basic services, and the only way to do that is through organisation and collective action” (Schuurman and van Naerssen, 1989:22). Evidently, these efforts indicate the attempt of the urban poor to assert greater control over their environment (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:12).
Areas of analysis have subsequently shifted away from what the state (in collusion with international agencies and other ‘experts’) can or cannot do for the urban poor, toward how civil society can become a greater socio-political influence over the state. This is seen as necessary in order to redress the distribution of resources more favourably toward the poor. Thus, the issue is reframed away from the concern of improving policy reach, to instead pose the question of how the poor majority can reach and influence public policy (Bratton, 1990:89). In so doing, scholarship needs to examine further the ways and the directions in which change may or can occur, the context in which this happens, and the actors involved.

THE URBAN POOR, HOUSING, AND THE THIRD WORLD STATE

While there are a great range of explanations and prescriptions for development, recently development issues have again been placed more firmly within a political framework (Leftwich, 1994). The nature of a regime, the context of policy making and implementation, and the opportunity for influence from even the very poorest, can all be approached as essentially political questions. The allocation of funds for housing and the strategies pursued by states toward housing are also being analysed as political matters. Additionally, the scope given to the urban poor and those who advocate on their behalf, such as some Non Government Development Organisations (NGDOs), all occur (and have succeeded or failed) within political environments.

In the past, the study of the state has been dominated by the two major paradigms, liberal and radical, and their evaluations and prescriptions have often been antithetical, resulting in what Kamrava (1993b:1) has titled the ‘dialogue of the deaf’. During the 1980s though, heightened by the awareness of implications of this impasse (Booth, 1985), reassessments were taking place.
to reactivate the study of Third World politics and the state. Out of these efforts came an extraordinary rush to discuss and propose state theory (Evans et al., 1985:4). While many writers stressed the diversity of state-society relations based on historical experience, it had become apparent to a significant body of scholars that while states had clearly penetrated Third World societies following independence, they had failed to manufacture change and most significantly, had failed in their development objectives (Migdal, 1988:4), if indeed this was ever a primary objective. The two major paradigms were also criticised for not been able to either explain the problematic, nor to align their concepts with substantial empirical research (Nordlinger, 1987:362). Subsequently, these theories (along with pluralism and state instrumentalism) were largely discredited throughout the 1980s as been unable to evaluate the political context of development (Carter, 1995:603), leaving Manor to describe the study of Third World politics as being in 'disarray' (Manor, 1991:1). Recent research-based analysis has outlined a more multifarious and enigmatic set of political relations than previous paradigms had described. Questions of power, resistance, discourse and change have been enriched through qualitative-based study that has expanded the manner and direction of political investigation outside of the 'mainstream' of previous inquiry.

Third World politics is characterised by unique attributes of power and extreme fragility, and by the nature in which states operate (Clapham, 1990:39). Despite the appearance of apparently united independence movements only decades ago, the typical Third World state is said to be notable for its distinct lack of values shared with the population. Seen as 'the prize', as it is the principal mechanism to both power and personal wealth, elites vie for control of the state apparatus. Consequently, according to Clapham, the state is 'owned' and controlled by one elite or another and becomes in their hands both a source of benefits in itself and also a means to defend themselves against their rivals. The state apparatus becomes a weapon in the punishment of enemies as well as a tool of control, self preservation and advancement of elite interests. The advancement of elite self-interest is regarded as the ends of politics in
themselves. Activities such as development objectives and programs are secondary concerns to the control and harnessing of power. Subsequently such efforts are patchy and inadequate and sometimes even non-existent, highlighting the divide in state-citizen concerns (Clapham, 1990:39-40).

There is considerable agreement on the part of scholars that the 'typical' Third World state is said to be characterised by a distinct lack of legitimacy which has a strong association with a feeling of insecurity by its members. Huntington has referred to this as the poor states' Catch-22, that state legitimacy and effectiveness erode each other in a declining spiral (White, 1995:30). Without this security, Third World governments have been prone to align themselves with the most powerful and influential members of society, either the elite, or the military (literally, the 'friends of the family'). This has also included external dependence. Formal structures of colonial control have been replaced by more subtle, but no less powerful, neo-colonial relationships. While the neo-colonial state appears to be independent, it is in fact subject to outside intervention and control (Nkrumah, 1974.ix).

In turn, this has affected the autonomy of Third World states, which are characterised as being largely dependent and lacking autonomy (Nordlinger, 1987). This lack of autonomy furthermore impinges on the capacity, or capability, of states to pursue policy ends. While autonomy is said to be related to policy issue and content, Third World governments have typically been caught up with the requirements of elite classes and their interests, rather than acting 'for the common good' (Midgal, 1988; Crone, 1988, Figure 1.1). The identification of these underlying features of the Third World state are essential to any behavioral analysis.
FIGURE 1.1 Third World State Typologies

A = Strong states, collaborative styles and able to implement policy.
B = Coercive, instrumentalist states, able to use coercion effectively.
C = Autonomous, ineffectual states, policy implementation is difficult.
D = Weak states, with a low capacity to execute policy.

Adapted from Crone (1988) and Migdal (1988)

The Neopatrimonial State

While the rush to state theory has been 'extraordinary' and has delivered to the subject a range of theoretical tools, it has been the concept of 'neopatrimonialism', or state based political clientelism, that has gained the greatest purchase. So much so, that Bratton and de Walle (1994:458) has referred to neopatrimonialism as the 'master concept' for the analysis of Third World politics and state theory³. It has been used as the principal analytical

³ Alan Carter (1995) has argued that concepts such as neopatrimonialism can be placed within the wider 'State-Primacy' perspective. State-Primacy Theory has emerged from the bourgeois/neo-Marxist impasse to view the state as supportive of any economic and political order that allows it to maintain and expand its own interests.
tool in analysing Third World settings by writers such as Clapham (1990), Hutchcroft (1991), and Kamrava (1993a, 1993b).

Third World politics is characterised by forms of neopatrimonialism, whereby public administration is a personal affair and political power becomes personal property (Hutchcroft, 1991:415). Neopatrimonialism is defined as "a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and representative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines" (Clapham, 1990:48). While this model is an effective base from which to analyse the Third World state, there is a great variance of types of neopatrimonial regimes moving from personal dictatorships to those systems that are developing into more democratic forms, the 'multiparty poligargies' (Bratton and de Walle, 1994:472).

This formation is the legacy of the politicisation of traditional patrimonial systems. These traditional/peasant based systems consisted of informal clusters (clients) linked to a power figure (the patron) who was able to offer security and/or inducements in turn for client loyalty and support (Scott 1977:124; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Cornelius, 1977; Guasti, 1977). State resources have been used to create massive and intricate web-like systems that act as the foundations of state-based political clientelism (Figure 1.2). The patron-client dyad may be traditional, but it now has modern social boundaries (Scott, 1977:132), and so, despite rapid industrialisation, clientelist systems of analysis still appear as relevant today as Scott noted in the 1970s: "Patron-client networks still function as the main basis of alliance systems among non-kin throughout Southeast Asia" (Scott, 1977:137).

In this model, positions are held as a type of private property and behaviour reflects personal status rather than official function. Among other manifestations, this has led to a near total loss of accountability and the pervasion of corruption (Clapham, 1990:48-9). For example, in Karachi (often cited as a clientelistic city) the government is seen as chaotic,
Neopatrimonialism is linked to the population through a series of patron-client networks which act as the binding force between the Third World state and the population, thus deriving the state some degree of 'traditional' legitimacy (Weber, 1968:12; Gerth and Wright Mills, 1991:78-79), security, and capacity (Crone, 1988; Clapham, 1990:43). According to Clapham, in the absence of political machine systems, the state must seek ways to bridge the gap between political power and mass participation and support. This is necessary to allow the state at least some degree of assurance. Thus, the forms of clientelism and
state based neopatrimonialism that have emerged have been the most common response to this need.

*Clientelism* can thus be defined as "the application of the principles of neopatrimonialism to relationships between superiors and inferiors" (Clapham, 1990:55), and characterised in operation as a "form of representation based on the exchange of political support in return for the allocation of politically-mediated resources, and involving a hierarchical relationship between dependent client(s) and superordinate patron(s)" (Fadda, 1991:333). Traditional patronage relations have penetrated the state’s relationship with itself and civil society in turn has developed into ‘state-based political clientelism’ (Migdal, 1988:255). The state’s resources have been used in such a way creating massive patron-client distributions to the population of state goods and benefits in order to establish and/or maintain regime legitimacy.

This acts as the base political structure of society (Guasti, 1977:422), far more pervasive and powerful than parties or the existence of interpersonal government departments. It is the principal political structure in that it (re)distributes all types of material and nonmaterial resources to society and mediates conflict arising from this distribution (Guasti, 1977:424). Elections, and electoral systems have not altered these patterns (Ames, 1994). In fact, according to Scott (1977:140), electoral politics in Southeast Asia have had the effect of formalising, expanding and politicising patron client systems.

This ‘system’ consists of a series of vertical relationships more important than universal or class groupings (Chalmers, 1977:414) and dependent on aspects of *personalismo*, or, the personality (Kamrava, 1993b:6). These relationships, replacing the role of institutions and political party systems in liberal democracies, have a resilience and strength that should not be underestimated. This order can survive and flourish in political climates ranging from the military dictatorship of Indonesia, to the American-styled representative democracy of the Philippines. It is a system which binds the elite to the poorest, providing a
political structure, and some form of representation and political participation. Subsequently, clientelism has "a resilience, a flexibility, and a degree of rationality for the interests of both patron and client which enable them to survive even the most drastic attempts at their suppression" (Clapham, 1990:58).

The state becomes bound up with the elite through these ties. "The state's legitimacy thus rests on its continued ability to provide patronage to politically significant elite groups" (Kamrava, 1993b:11). As such, the state in effect lacks autonomy, having drawn its principle decision makers from the group. It is unlikely then to act against its principal interests. While this may not mean that the state is instrumentalist (in the Marxist sense), as with any organisation it is likely to reflect the attitudes and preoccupations of its members.

Essentially, clientelism has also acted as an internal structure of control (Guasti, 1977:422). Its foundation is both the persistence of inequalities in the control of wealth, status, and power (a situation more or less accepted as legitimate), combined with the relative absence of firm, interpersonal assurances of physical security, status and position or wealth (Scott, 1977:133). Its rationale is founded on ensuring security and advancement (Clapham, 1990:58-9, Scott, 1977). It is a system primarily characteristic of societies with sharp divisions, in which controlling the state apparatus allows those with power to provide, or withhold, security and to allocate benefits in the form of jobs, investment, development projects and more (Clapham, 1990:56) and in some areas has developed from its origins in serfdom (Platteau, 1995:767). Consequently, the clientelistic system can be described as a political structure "whose basis is a highly unequal distribution of resources within a society, and whose functioning serves to maintain the dependency of each class above it" (Guasti, 1977:423).

As a system of vertical dependency and control, clientelism additionally acts to empower patrons to check horizontal linkages which may allow the population to collectively alter their subordinate position in society (Nowak and Snyder,
and to challenge the socio-political system. As a client, for example, a squatter can bargain over most things but not his or her basic position in society (Nowak and Snyder, 1970:261). In Caracas, Brumlick has noted that clientelism has been successfully used as a mechanism of the state "to maintain (the) situation and prevent the building up of class consciousness in the exploited sector of the population, social manipulation has been employed, and an increase in clientelism has diminished the level of social and economic struggle within the informal sector" (Brumlick, 1992:306-7). In Indonesia where there are strong vertical relationships with the government, community leaders act as transmitters of government information and mechanisms of control (Steinberg, 1992:357). And in the Philippines, where the head of a trade union is likely to be a lawyer, "proletariat consciousness and the development of a labour movement based on horizontal linkages have in part been retarded by the effectiveness of the more specialised systems of patron control" (Nowak and Snyder, 1970:268).

One of the principal legacies of this form and type of rule, has been the effect on the character and nature of political relationships and social power (Evans et.al, 1985:218). Evans has referred to the fact that the "greatest legacy" of state behaviour has been on political culture and the nature of politics in Third World societies. The nature of the state is likely to shape the nature of politics, the formation of (political) groupings in society, and the direction and form of social change (Evans et.al, 1985:21-2). Thus, clientalism has created a form of political culture and politics that has penetrated right to the grassroots of political participation (Kamrava, 1993b:168). This has manifested itself into a lack of interpersonal trust, mistrust of others' intentions, cynicism and high degrees of currency given to control theories (Kamrava, 1993b:154).

Leftwich (1994:365-77), in this context, has defined politics as referring to the relations over resources between different groups and peoples. It is a mediating function of distribution and so is central to development. Politics is also "a contest between different interests about power and the institutions which
distribute it" (Leftwich, 1994:377). Thus, battles over distribution and power and
the use of resources are all critical to development. This has occurred within
the context of the state seeking legitimacy, control and security (Migdal, 1988).
The state's organisations and activities have affected political culture which in
turn has largely determined the types of political issues that are raised (Evans
et.al, 1985:21), the types of behaviour, and the nature of the demands that are
made (or, simply, the nature and form of political participation and activism). In
particular, political administration is driven by a type of 'politics of survival' and
a state-society battle for control over policy in which accommodation and
control take precedence over change and development (Migdal, 1988:397,418).

People's actions throughout the system are driven by concerns over insecurity,
advancement and the continuation of inequality (Scott, 1977). Control from the
centre is ensured through such things as 'the big shuffle', political appointments
in key areas, and violence (or threat of) (Migdal, 1988:213). By moving
bureaucrats constantly, leaders continually strive to offset alternative power
bases from emerging. With the placement of personal appointments, the state
additionally creates new forms of patronage and loyalty. This 'dizzying game of
musical chairs' can be quite extraordinary in scope. In Mexico, for example, one
particular post-election purge affected tens of thousands of officials (Migdal,

This has the effect of creating poorly motivated and overlapping bureaucracies
and in doing so creating what Midgal (1988:208) has referred to as the
'institutional paradox'. That is, by attempting to buttress its own narrow source
of power by weakening bureaucracies, the state is in fact contributing to its own
conditions of insecurity, as strong and independent bureaucracies are the basis
of any autonomous and effective state.
Neopatrimonialism at the Grassroots: The Urban Poor, Local Level Politics and Resource Allocation

The principal place in which these battles are fought out between different groups in society is at the local level. "For those interested in discerning how Third World societies are ruled and the influence of politics on social change, the local level often holds the richest and most instructive hints" (Migdal, 1987:424). The local is the battleground in which the state and civil society converge for social control and influence (Evans et al., 1985:27). It is the arena in which weak states meet strong societies and where the state seeks to pursue public policy, but, according to Migdal, ends up accommodating the more powerful and their interests (Migdal, 1987:397-9). Consequently the local level is the predominant sphere in which individuals and groups pursue conflicting interests and compete for access to scarce resources (Grindle, 1980:19), affecting both the content and impact of programmes.

The local level has been described by Migdal (1987) as the "apex" of the system. It is also by looking at the local that one can establish and explain the differences between policy rhetoric and program implementation and outcome. This implementation stage is central to the patronage system and its continuance is vital for the maintenance of the clientalist state. Within this, a 'triangle of accommodation' occurs at what is the output stage of the system, where policy 'goods' are fought for and allocated. In this, political style at the top has a considerable effect on those implementors/bureaucrats at the juncture of policy implementation (Midgal, 1988:238). At the local level, implementors are crucial to whether states can accomplish their stated goals. They are caught within a complex political web involving their supervisors, clients of the programs, their peers, and local caciques and interest groups (Midgal, 1988:239). In this context, the final allocation rests on the respective bargaining powers of the actors involved, coupled with the implementors own concerns regarding their career security and the needs of the system above all to maintain control and political support (Midgal, 1988:252. See Figure 1.3). Those
groups powerful and capable enough to report back to superiors regarding the performance of local bureaucrats and policy failures are the most likely in this system to pose a threat to the implementor, and thereby are the least threatened by policy (Migdal, 1987:422-3). Consequently, programmes that involve considerable change to the system are duly forgone as the programme enters the stage of implementation.

The result of this is the prevailing of ‘politics of survival’ over ‘politics of development and change’. While programmes for social change may still be the basis for public rhetoric and even for policy statements and legislation, at the local level the ‘politics of survival’ subverts and undermines the capability of state agencies to see those programs through (Migdal, 1987:418). As a result, Cleaves has demonstrated in this context the more popular and achievable policies are those that involve single objectives, last a short duration, and result in only a marginal change for the status quo (Cleaves, 1980:287). Consequently, political systems have had the effect of weakening communication with civil society and encouraging local bureaucrats not to respond or listen to popular needs and demands (Bratton and de Walle, 1994:461-2).

Within the system of patron-client relations, a central role is played by the cacique⁴. These caciques dominate the arena of local politics and play a central role in Migdal’s ‘Triangle of Accommodation’. Caciques rely on state acquiescence in order to maintain the dependency of their portion of the population on both themselves, the local implementors, and the state. Even in large international cities and in presidential electoral campaigns, local caciques

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⁴ *Cacique* is a term widely used throughout the Spanish-speaking world. It has extensive usage but always refers to a person with "strong individual power over a territorial group held together by some socioeconomic or cultural system ... [which implies] ... detachment or freedom from the normative, formal, and duly instituted system of government" (Friedrich, 1977:266).
FIGURE 1.3 The Context of Policy Implementation

Regime Policy

National / Regional Bureaucrats

Regional Economic Elites

Regional Political Elites

Implementor

Local Economic Elites

Caciques

Clients (Urban Poor)

Local Political Elites

Policy

Strong Relationship
Weak Relationship

Adapted from Migdal (1988) and Grindle (1988)
are a powerful force in politics (Midgal, 1988:253; Ames, 1994), fragmenting the voice of the urban poor and continuing their dependence on the system by means of directing the population's political behaviour and weakening their potential for mobilisation on community or class lines (Mingione, 1977).

At the extreme, caciques are said to have 'captured' areas of local control. In the case of Venezuelan cities, Ray (1969) found that many communities were represented by caciques who "represent the supreme, and almost absolute, authority in their barrios. They sanction, regulate, or prohibit all group activities and exercise a strong influence over any decisions that might affect their communities" (cited in Cornelius, 1977:338). At the very least, these local leaders stand guard over the vital synapse between community and state (Midgal, 1988:347) and are recognised by the authorities as the most powerful person in the community with whom to do business. In the clientelist environment, this local system acts toward cooption and control, and the maintenance of dependency and powerlessness. Grindle has noted that within this environment "the governors, the caciques, and other political actors have far more to gain from the present system than if they championed the political rights of their followers" (Grindle, quoted in Migdal, 1987:424).

Implications of the Model for the Urban Poor

This is an environment that works to the disadvantage of the urban poor if they are not effectively organised and are not able to apply sustained pressure on the implementors or the system to ensure that the allocation of policy goods will work to their advantage. Housing is seen as an issue demanding multi-department networking to provide a divisible good to disadvantaged and largely powerless groups of people (Grindle, 1980:9-10). For example, in Cali (Rothenberg, 1980) and Nairobi (Temple and Temple, 1980) the urban poor could not politically affect housing allocation, due to, among other things, the
fragmentation of the communication and implementation process, and a lack of power and influence to counter the leverage of more affluent groups.

Political reform may be necessary, even crucial to development, but the system is retained as it is logical to many (Cornelius, 1977:350). Change to this system is most likely to stem from the local level where the most interaction takes place between the state and the grassroots. Traditionally though, the urban poor have been unable to change their lot at the local level, being ill-prepared to understand or benefit from the programmes offered by the government (Grindle, 1980:201). Still, several authors writing on the nature of the state and the politics of policy implementation have agreed that the best chance for the urban poor to change their lot is through direct organisation (Cleaves, 1980; Temple, 1980; Grindle, 1980; Migdal, 1988; Bratton and de Walle, 1994). Consequently, there is a need, according to Migdal, for the poor to organise in order to create "countervailing influences and forces", so that they may change these structural circumstances. Only massive social disruption that targets the structural relations between state and society are likely to be effective in the long term (Migdal, 1988:271-7). In the short to medium term though, it is necessary to increase the effective power of civil society in relation to the state and policy. "Thus, the objective would be to strengthen low-status clienteles in relation to the political and economic elites who generally have the capacity to subvert program goals" (Grindle, 1980:222).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the type of political participation that will evolve from the urban poor will be a response to the nature of the state and politics, and therefore it is wise to consider how far community participation and empowerment can go within this framework (Midgley et.al, 1986:vii). Particularly in periods of democratic government, local level organisation and aggregate demand making may be crucial to future change. Thus, a strengthening of civil society may "lay the groundwork for political liberalisation by sapping government's legitimacy and creating alternative socially based, centres of power" (Bratton and de Walle, 1994:489)
In order to achieve this, the population needs both tenacity and knowledge in order to increase their capacity to affect policy and politics. These are factors conspicuous by their absence in the majority of low-status Third World communities (Grindle, 1980:203-4). In effect, the need is for a greater degree of *consciousness*. The objective is to strengthen low-status clienteles in vis-a-vis the political and economic elites who generally have the capacity to subvert programme goals (Grindle, 1980:222). The urban poor need to become politically significant by being able to 'report back' to the regime, as effectively as the local elite, about their needs, policies, and demands. This would correlate into political power, perhaps either creating a redefinition of policy objectives or stopping an unpopular policy being implemented (Grindle, 1980:195-6). It is within this political context then, that the genesis and operation of community organisations should be examined and evaluated.

**Summary**

This analysis establishes the issue of housing the urban poor as a socio-political issue as much, if not more than, a solely economic or technical problem. In utilising this level of inquiry it is possible to regard the demise and poor performance of previous housing policies as reflective of the low importance attached to the urban poor, in turn an indication of the lack of (political) pressure that historically the poor have had on policy and the distribution of state resources.

Consequently, the issue of housing the urban poor can and should be placed into the orbit of state-society relations. Critical to this is an understanding of the culture and functions of the Third World state. The neopatrimonial state literature provides explanatory tools that shed some light on the reasons for the lack of commitment of governments to the policies which could at least go some way to housing the urban Third World poor. As a mechanism of and for
the elite, the state acts both as a means for personal position and gain, and
ensures, through patronage ties, the subordination and disempowerment of
dependent clients, particularly the poor.

The grassroots is the culmination of the system, local caciques maintaining
control and distributing scarce resources to political supporters of the status quo
in the ‘triangle of accommodation’. The repercussions for the urban poor are
that they are crowded out of resource allocation in favour of local elites and
they tend to lack the ‘clout’ necessary to change the nature of their
subordination and dependency.
CHAPTER TWO

BALANCING STATE HEGEMONY: NGOs AND THE RESPONSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

The urban poor are not passive actors in this system. They seek, through organising and alliance building, to pressure actors within the system and maintain some influence over the flow and distribution of resources. The significance of the response of Third World proletarians to their disempowerment at the hands of the modern Third World state and their reaction in the form of the resistance and rejuvenating of civil society, have all been issues raised through the growing literature on civil society - state relations. Civil society includes the organisation of communities into associations and the like that can be differentiated from other sectors such as the state and the economy (Atienza, 1994; Cohen and Arato, 1992). As such, the articulation of civil society is in the arena of popular organisations, social movements, voluntary organisations, citizen associations and forms of public communication (Atienza, 1994:5).

Interest in these actors has increased parallel to the apparent failure of the modern Third World state and this is particularly significant in light of efforts at re-democratisation that prevail within a number of Third World countries (White, 1995:27). Concerns have arisen "that many states have not been accountable to society and indeed have been more interested in controlling and moulding society to suit their own interests, than in responding to the needs of that society" (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:5). Herman (1982:2) has noted that in a number of Third World countries, including the Philippines, states have
come to exhibit common characteristics. These include the elite nature of the regime and their interests, the hegemonic use of terror to keep proletarians powerless and disorganised, the corrupt nature of the regime, and the highly inequitable character of society. The outcome has been that the population continues to live in a state of deprivation. State neglect, particularly of the poor, has been possible because of the political and organisational weakness of civil society whereby political legitimacy has been claimed through (exploitive) clientelist relations and decisions have and continue to be made within small elite circles with limited or nonexistent levels of consultation and accountability. These situations arise, according to Cohen and Arato (1992:xii), "when the institutions of economic and political society serve to insulate decision making and decision makers from the influence of social organisations, initiatives, and forms of public discussion". The inference is that what is necessary to hold the state accountable for resource allocation and the nature of decision making (in particular its level of inclusiveness), is a strong, organised and politically active society that is able to convey demands from the grassroots that policies and programmes be implemented to meet basic needs (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:9). As not much can be expected from the elite, the strengthening of civil society is important to (at least) maintain pressures of accountability on the state (White, 1995:29). As such, these organisations may play an increasing role in the democratisation of their countries, particularly when civil society becomes 'politicised'. Subsequently, civil society as 'political/civil society' can play an essential role of representing the concerns and needs of those excluded from the decision making process.

Despite the numerical predominance of the urban poor in Third World cities, however, they have rarely managed to maintain regular pressure on the elite in the majority of cases. NGOs have come to be viewed as significant actors in altering this balance. In partnership, some authors (Korten, 1987, 1990) feel that an effective alliance between UPOs and NGOs may change the balance of power in many Third World societies. This chapter discusses these
propositions and counter arguments over the nature and direction of Third World civil society and the principal issues involved in the debate.

The Proliferation of Civil Society Organisations: Non Government Development Organisations

It has been in the proliferation of Non Government Organisations (NGOs) and Peoples Organisations (POs) that this ascent and strengthening of civil society has been most evident throughout the Third World. It is estimated that there are some 10,000 to 20,000 Southern NGOs assisting up to 100 million people today (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:13). Emerging in the 1960s from the frustrations felt over the apparent failure of both governments and the business sector in development efforts (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:169-70), NGOs have come to represent a popular and populist alternative to top-down development strategies (Sanyal, 1994:35). NGOs seek to increase and strengthen institutional and social capacity away from the centralised command of resource management which, in the past, is said to have led to vast national patronage systems and other ‘wastes’ that have contributed to the massive concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of a small number of elites at the summit of highly stratified social systems (Korten, 1987:145).

In contrast, NGOs are at the forefront of ‘trickle up’ development. In particular, this is because of their ‘comparative advantage’ (Drabek, 1987:ix) of alliances with social movements at the macro level and proximity to the poor through Grassroots Organisations (GROs) at the local level. NGOs, despite some scepticism (Schmale, 1993; Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994), have been cast as the vanguard of urban poor representation and the democratisation of civil society (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:10). This conviction has been drawn from a number of apparent advantages NGOs have over the formal sector in their operating methods. These include a smaller, less bureaucratic and more responsive operating size, a predominantly grassroots base and therefore high
empathy with 'the people', and a good knowledge of local problems and how to respond to them. Additionally, they are autonomous, neither seeking control nor profit, and they are simultaneously influential at both the micro and macro level (Sanyal, 1994:38-9). However, it has been suggested that these 'advantages' may also be cast in another, less advantageous light (Annis, 1987). Despite the almost universal support and encouragement for NGOs in the development literature, problems of smallness, limited impact, distance from policy makers and decisions, professional and technical inadequacies, poor coordination, and problems of accountability, responsibility and representation still remain (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:25).

The term NGO, represents a bewildering array of organisations that may have little in common with one another (Korten, 1990:95) ranging from business clubs to even government NGOs, or GONGOs (Constantino-David, 1992). According to Thomas Carroll (1992:3), there is still little understanding of the aggregate meaning of NGOs at work in the Third World and, despite the impressive growth in NGO literature, still no accepted method nor criteria for measuring NGO performance. In fact, the percentage of those NGOs involved with development work, or Non Government Development Organisations (NGDOs), is relatively minor. In the case of the Philippines, it is estimated that just 2,000 of 18,000 registered NGOs are in fact NGDOs (Constantino-David, 1992:138). Furthermore, these NGDOs range from those involved with charity assistance work to those at the vanguard of national movements and, from those oriented toward economic issues at the project level to those who participate in national electoral activities and take part in international forums (Korten, 1990:113).

NGDOs then, have different concerns and activities which are derived from differing assumptions regarding the nature of the development problem (Korten, 1990:113). This means that they may vary in terms of affiliation, objectives, methods of action, and internal structure (Frantz, 1987:123). Differences are shaped by the organisations' institutional relationships as well as their internal
characteristics (Padron, 1987:71-2; Landim, 1987:29). Often, contextual factors determine approaches - particularly in regard to the political context (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:26). As Padron effectively urges, one must examine these characteristics with regard to the particular historical and institutional context in which the NGDO is operating:

> The specific nature of the national, regional and local reality conditions the NGDOs and their projects ..., their relationships are partially determined by levels of participation in their own societies as well as what development means for them; in their identification of their beneficiaries; in their understanding of participation; and by the way they define their role in the participation process (Padron, 1987:72).

Nevertheless, there are a great number of commonalities and shared experiences among NGDOs. One functional definition is that of Padron (with regard to Latin American NGDOs), that "these are, in general, private non-profit organisations that are publicly registered (have legal status for example), whose principal function is to implement development projects favouring the popular sectors" (Landim, 1987:30). The range of ‘the organisation’ and its type of ‘functions’ can be significant though. A large number of NGOs use their flexibility and contacts effectively enough at the project level of intervention. They may be involved in financial lending, developing a local refuse system or water supply. However, these types of basic need development strategies have become increasingly criticised as "localised, insignificant and posing no real alternative to the status quo" (Constantino-David, 1992:139). Despite thousands of projects throughout the South, relatively few people have benefited from the project approach. Without serious structural examination then, projects will remain isolated adventures (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:13-14).

In response to this situation, NGDOs have increasingly looked to "scale-up" their activities and role with the objective of increasing their impact (Edwards and Hulme, 1992a:77). This encompasses playing a more significant role on the
macro level, networking with other NGDOs and sectors, (thereby becoming involved in forming social movements for change), and affecting change at the level of government policy (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:15). With regard to Brazil, NGOs have been referred to as "the instrumentalisation of the action of social movements" (Frantz, 1987:121). In taking this approach NGDOs have altered their focus from the micro or local project level, to addressing the source of the 'development problem'. According to this position, Bonhoeffer has commented, "we should not only tend the wounds of those who have been run over by the cart, we have to stop the cart as well" (cited in Theunis, 1992:319).

More 'mature' NGDOs consequently have become increasingly political and causal as, according to Theunis (1992:322), all the NGOs in the Third World do eventually find themselves in conflict with existing structures to some extent. Scaling-up therefore is a 'logical need' (Constantino-David, 1992:143). The NGDO still addresses issues of basic needs, but within a pedagogic-educational process. The end goal is not just meeting peoples needs, but helping people to gain a voice in articulating those needs (Drabek, 1987:x). Meeting basic needs then becomes a means, but not an end in itself (Theunis, 1992:320). In this role, the NGDO acts as a catalyst between the community and the macro-policy level and through this seeks to strengthen civil society, creating a movement for development (Korten, 1990:127). Through a balance of micro and macro strategies, "development at local level and advocacy at other levels form complementary components of the same overall strategy" (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:23). Such a strategy though is not without its problems, as conflict between the local and national/international spheres can occur. According to Munck:

The central dilemma of alternative development is that its initial emphasis on smallness must be increasingly framed in terms of a national and even global strategy, without this concern for larger issues stamping out the autonomy of local action (cited in Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:23).
Urban Poor Organisations

Otherwise known as Grassroots Organisations (GROs), People's Organisations (POs), and Community Organisations (CO), Urban Poor Organisations are also NGOs, but are established or formed at the citizen level of daily life and consciousness. UPOs are "those institutions set up and controlled by (poor) people themselves for their own advancement and to serve their own interests" (Fowler, 1991:79). These organisations have developed into the most significant collective activity on the part of the urban poor to both represent their interests and to demand some level and degree of change in the local 'system'. In particular they are seen as the most likely and popular method of obtaining tenure, infrastructure and services where "many local communities have little control over the provision and operation of basic services and infrastructure" (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:178). These peoples organisations are seen by Korten and others as being a vital part in the rebuilding of civil society and the establishment of a "people-centred development strategy" (Korten, 1990:101). The principal underlying conviction in regard to these organisations is that "people can participate effectively in the management of their own surroundings only if they have developed a sense of community and have organised themselves into associations" (Hollnsteiner, 1976:28).

This community participation is a response both to internal and external factors. Internal maldevelopment and misery and the belief of the power of change in turn is driven by the conviction that all the important groups to community development, officials, politicians, and local leaders, are susceptible to popular pressure (Yap, 1983:268). Local government is important and its role can be augmented through the active involvement of community organisations (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:178). This is particularly so with regard to obtaining services, perhaps, as in the classic patronage system, in return for votes.
Despite considerable differences, community organisations both in the Developed and Third World tend to exhibit common characteristics. It is rather tenuous though to take an all encompassing stance toward these organisations or movements, as each is strongly specific to its environment. As Castells has forewarned, "the production of the structural formula leading to Urban Social Movements [USMs] is specific to each national-cultural context, and any attempt to find a general formulation is to resort to metaphysics" (Castells, 1983:324). Instead, it may be more useful to explore boundaries of definitions applicable to the context and content of these organisations that act as a bridge between the individual in private life and the large institutions of public life (Cnaan, 1991:629).

Definitions are typically inclusive, such as that given by Jurgen Ruland, that Neighbourhood Representing Organisations are "a collective and communicative process of demand making, self-help activities and/or protest against existing social conditions, the participants not necessarily being formally organised" (Ruland, 1984:326). These groups are grassroots, or community based organisations which are controlled by their own members (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:14). According to Korten, peoples organisations must possess three defining characteristics. Firstly, the association must be of mutual benefit to its members, that is, the organisation's legitimacy is based on its ability to serve its members interests. Secondly, the association must have a democratic structure that gives members ultimate authority over their leaders. Finally, the organisation should be self-reliant so that its existence and operation should not depend on external initiative or funding (Korten, 1990:100). Any attempted definition of the organisation should also include aspects of consciousness and behaviour (Pivan and Cloward, 1979). Accordingly, the evolution of protest movements is most likely to occur when the system loses legitimacy and there is a feeling of injustice regarding rulers and institutions, and when there is an assumption of rights that imply demands for change. Furthermore, there must be some sense of efficacy and people should believe that they have the capacity to alter their lot.
Consequently, and despite warnings of reductionism (Cnaan, 1991), some general observations can be made regarding the experience and role of community organisations which can be tentatively applied. Generally they are voluntary organisations with the aim of greater empowerment and autonomy from the state rather than the acquisition of state power itself (Frank and Fuentes, 1990:162). They can collectively pressure the state apparatus for collective consumption goods in the conviction that these goods (including services) can be provided and will be if the correct pressure is applied. These organisations, at their best, can be “instruments for distributing power within society by strengthening the economic and political power of the previously marginalised”, training people for ‘democratic citizenship’ and thus they may become a building block in the institution of democracy (Korten, 1990:101-102). Consequently, these organisations can help generate demands for greater responsiveness to grassroots concerns, in the process facilitating collective bargaining power that can enable groups such as urban squatters to negotiate on more equal terms with government bureaucracies, wealthy patrons or corporations (Korten, 1990:102). Depending on the cultural-political context such demands will consist of petitions, letters, invitations, open demonstrations, delegations, and nuisance tactics (Hollnsteiner, 1976:24-25). These demands will most likely be based around territorial issues (Castells, 1983).

Generally, and according to Mitlin and Satterthwaite (1992), these community organisations have a threefold role: they can establish and realise tangible programs, through such efforts as fund raising, resource development and allocation through projects and so on; they are important for “developing the fabric of the community”; and, perhaps more significantly, they can act as pressure groups on local government, with the goal of securing infrastructure and services for their members and ensuring that their interests are not forgotten nor ignored. In performing such functions they can support the democratisation process which is critical to ensuring that government at all levels is more responsive to the needs of the poor (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:178). This is seen by many as part of the critical and important step in the
move towards grassroots development populised since the 1970s. Consequently, the poor need to organise themselves not as another political party that could be coopted by the system, but as small, territorially bounded, autonomous groups (Sanyal, 1994:36).

Castells (1977, 1983) goes further to argue that these organisations seek to achieve a new urban meaning through conflict, reshaping urban functions and subsequently urban form and the shape of cities. Other writers too, have placed much emphasis on these organisations and movements being the vanguard of either a wider global grassroots struggle for democratisation of the future (Korten, 1990) to Marxist claims of their historical role in revolution (Amin et.al, 1990; Arrighi et.al, 1989). Yet in most cases, these urban poor organisations are not likely to constitute a national alternative and are unlikely to be conscious agents of structural social change. Rather they are symptoms of resistance to social domination and as such they appear to be responding to situations of crisis rather than acting as the bearers of a greater project of historical transformation (Henry, 1985:144). Ideological indoctrination and the conscious dedication to far reaching socio-political structural change can be for the most part distant and secondary factors to the more pragmatic and narrow demands on issues which directly shape their lives, such as housing, schools and health care.

There may be quite different types of goals involved. Schuurman (1993:202), has sought to differentiate between what he terms "defensive" and "pro-active" movements and organisations. The former type are organisations that adopt a defensive discourse. Leaders and members are distrustful in their outlook, thus preferring a survivalist posture over pursuing an alternate stance. Pro-active groups, however, seek to influence. In so doing they are more positive regarding change and seek to become incorporated into the 'system', rather than withdraw from it. They may also, though not necessarily, seek to promote an alternative social order and system.
Daily, continuous forms of resistance are perhaps more common than ideological/revolutionary mass movements (Forbes, 1984:178-179). As Scott (1990:136) has stressed, "most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between". In certain circumstances this resistance may erupt into mass defiance, though this is rare given the risk of violent backlash this entails. Subsequently, political life and opposition may be articulated in more disguised forms of discourse (Scott, 1990:199). Stealing from employers, lying to or misleading authorities, foot dragging over participation in authority requests, slandering politicians and the elite and boycottting events are all example of daily resistance that are open to the disempowered and poor (Lewellen, 1992:171-173). These avenues of protest and opposition can be utilised in even the most authoritarian of regimes. However, while resistance cannot be merely dismissed as a minor form of defiance, it is not transformative and is seldom effective in directly bringing about those structural changes needed that could lead to greater empowerment (Lewellen, 1992:180).

Nonetheless, any organisation whose role is to provide for a social group in place of state agencies is inherently political:

The construction of organisations is an unavoidably political act: it involves the exercise of power. It consists of efforts to maximise control over the factors that affect the realisation of shared goals, and seeking to influence - through lobbying and alliance building - those factors which cannot be directly controlled (Bratton, 1990:91).

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5 On this Scott (1990:199) has pointed out that, "So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion. To do so is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of subject classes. It is to focus on the visible coastline of politics and miss the continent that lies beyond".
Such demands may indeed force change on the system. Exceptional cases have occurred, particularly in Latin America, in which a politicised community has gained a great level of political autonomy and power in the national system. Such as in Monterrey and Villa El Salvador, Lima. One common and crucial factor here which has wider implications for the nature of UPOs was that in both cases political demand making was facilitated and encouraged by regimes which provided a high level of political support in allowing demands for redistribution to be made and met (Cockburn, 1992:319). Consequently, political conjuncture is an important factor to be considered in relation to the nature of and response to demand making.

Such cases though are rare, and in actuality many UPOs struggle with diverse and divisive characteristics that belie the belief that they are homogeneous (of 'the poor') organisations. The nature of a community organisation's strategies and its method of seeking to acquire its goals, are factors also considerably determined by the communities' internal characteristics. The level of renters and owners, the number of new and old residents, age and ethnic divisions, and different income levels and standards of living are all factors which determine an individual's or group's perception of its needs and attitudes. There may be different political allegiances. Separate followings of multiple leaders may emerge in which more effort is placed in undermining political rivals than promoting the community's interests. Geographical features may also divide, creating different concerns or dangers which become the most important issue of that group but perhaps not of another (War and Chant, 1987:93). Participation in UPOs is also highly uneven, with the active minority usually the greatest participants and strong, able leaders playing the necessary but alienating 'Lawrence of Arabia syndrome' (T.Carroll, 1992:92). Beyond formal structures and regulations there is often little practice of democracy and situations of alienated membership with members only seeking to volunteer valuable time and take part when there are perceived short term benefits (T.Carroll, 1992:92-93). There may also be a leader/follower split in regard to goals and expectations. Leaders may be more interested in revolution and/or
heightened consciousness, while residents are more concerned with acquiring a comfortable neighbourhood and respectability (or vice versa).

Financial and management resources also hamper urban poor organisations. As Farrington and Bebbington (1993:14) have argued, the myths of the ability of community organisations to effectively manage their own development and operation is open to question: "The poorest of the poor are often the least able to bear the costs implied by organising". Subsequently, the often-heralded potential of these grassroots organisations in advancing a new order needs to be continually placed into the perspective of the daily experience of these communities. Significantly though, even in these cases, leaders could only readily mobilise their settlements around issues that had a direct impact on their lives. Service-related issues were popular but 'remote' political and ideological topics were not that welcomed, even in so-called 'politically' settlements (Handelman, 1975:42).

There may also be gender factors to consider. Moser has noted in her studies of community participation and representation that women have a greater emphasis on consumption issues while men have more of an interest in production issues. This is a reflection of their different spheres of daily activity, but also a divisive and weakening factor in community demand making activities (Moser and Peak, 1987). Community organisations confront issues such as housing, services and the high cost of living which traditionally are the domain of the mother/wife/household. Subsequently, women play a significant and vital part in any grassroots organisation (Bennett, 1992:255-6). While the springboard may be consumption issues, however, these actions have the potential to become much greater challenges and struggles. Therefore,

poor women, though seemingly organising around their families needs, are also negotiating and sometimes challenging power relations in their daily lives and thus are chipping away at hegemonic discourses about gender, development, and politics and developing critical perspectives on the world in which they live (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:320).
Externally, many UPOS also struggle in dealing with and prospering within an often hostile and potentially captive clientelistic environment. It is this external environment that is fundamental to the orientation and success of community organisations. Indeed, according to Handelman (1975:58,64), a community's political orientation and behaviour may depend less on the neighbourhoods internal characteristics than on the opportunities which the national political system allows reformist or radical political parties to seek and acquire political power. Consequently, the actual political behaviour of urban poor communities, as opposed to their potential for politicisation, will depend on the nature of their links to the state, organised political parties, and other external actors. In systems of clientelism where social power is weak and elites are dominant, oppositional forces can be more diffuse and less well articulated, thus weakening their effect and levels of cooperation and trust (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:299-300). Thus, while organisations, as part of significant urban movements at certain political conjunctures, have achieved a great deal in the case of Latin America, they tend to be somewhat exceptional and unrepresentative, perhaps even unrealistic, examples.

Far more common experiences are those of Madras and Karachi. Here broadly based class organisations have not developed. In these cases it is believed that the clientelist response of the state has actually increased over time, and that community leaders are a significant element in this equation (Schuurman and van Naerssen, 1989:4-5). As Carroll has noted in regard to urban poor organisations, some "seem more adept at building clientele relations within the state than improving the status of the very poorest social groups" (T.Carroll, 1992:105). Community leaders may act as patrons, or brokers, in their communities and may be unpopular with most of the residents leading to a great deal of mutual distrust and a lack of participation and cooperation. Indeed in the case of Madras, initiatives from residents are actually discouraged (de Wit, 1989:80). In Karachi, patronage effectively blocks the emergence of social movements. The outcome of this is that livelihood struggles become reduced to petitions and pleas for limited solutions to singular problems, and
that these are sought from individuals/patrons rather than agencies and without reference to rights and services (van der Linden, 1989:93). As such, "popular organisations remain in a stagnant position, reproducing and managing their structurally defined poverty" (Cockburn, 1992:320). Thus the system, through the leaders, pervades and shapes their efforts at effective mobilisation, with the leaders playing the role of the state's penetrative mechanism. Consequently, "it appears to be the government, the politicians and (behind them) the business classes who have most to gain from the present position of the leaders" (de Wit, 1989:87).

Community organisations then, form a vital link between the community and the external environment and as such act as representatives of the community as a territorially defined unit. These organisations, established by prominent and/or committed individuals within the community, can, in the right circumstances and in relation to certain activities and objectives, promote the communities interest effectively enough. Yet, according to Uphoff, "while isolated instances of local institutional development can be impressive, their cumulative effect is negligible ... what counts are systems of networks of organisations, both vertically and horizontally" (cited in Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24).

The ‘Missing Link’: INGOs, UPOs and the Building of Urban Social Movements

Consequently, many NGDOs in the South look toward mobilising the grassroots into a framework enabling them to force change upon the system (subsequently moving from Schuurman's "defensive" to "pro-active" movements). In most cases, these relationships concern credit-based NGO initiatives, as this is seen as one of the more important aspects of community organising and NGO-PO relationships (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:173). Yet, once again, while these credit programs are progressive, they would need to be replicated on a massive scale to have any substantial impact (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:177). As
Milton and Satterthwaite (1992:178) have argued, the poor are not only poor in a monetary sense. Networks with other GROs, NGOs and social movements are also needed. "Support for individual and community level initiatives within low-income settlements will need the support of a wider network of NGOs who can provide training, advice, representation and a host of other services" (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:178). Principally this is being done by developing networks with GROs that have already been established or, through founding these peoples organisations themselves as part of a strategy to educate and mobilise the poor into a network for progressive change as articulated through a social movement. This primarily occurs through NGOs, who nurture grassroots groups "so that they may acquire greater mastery over their situation, greater autonomy in their behaviour and greater control over their initiatives, projects and institutions, thus serving as vehicles for the transfer of knowledge, technologies and resources" (Nogueira, 1987:169).

Consequently, NGDOs may play the role of catalysts between peoples organisations and social movements. NGOs are said to work as a service organisation to the peoples movement it supports (Korten, 1990:127), and these POs are likewise central to the activities of many NGOs (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24). In this role, NGDOs have,

recognised and adopted an intermediary role to accelerate the creation of local organisations, to provide assistance in strengthening and expanding such organisations, and fostering linkages between them [and] this, it is believed, will lead to the proliferation of grassroots organisations that can, as a 'people's movement', have a beneficial impact on development policies and wider political processes (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24).

Intermediary NGOs (INGOs), a term first coined by Thomas Carroll (1992), have become a particular area of interest since the mid-1980s. This was the period when NGOs were beginning to both "scale up" from welfare and civic work and move towards mobilisation and social activism, particularly in Latin America (T.Carroll, 1992:2). INGOs can best be described as a subset of
NGOs which work with marginalised and grassroots organisations in order to encourage their participation, focus their direction and improve upon their achievements (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:xiv). They have been credited with the proliferation in GROs since the 1980s. In Peru, for example, the dramatic rise in GROs would probably not have occurred without the vigorous support of INGOs in both grassroots organising and in articulating relationships between organisations at the local, regional and national levels (T.Carroll et al, 1991:100).

Essentially, INGOs have played the role of contributing to the emergence of local organisations, in their legal registration, ongoing skills training from the technical through to the economic and the political (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:112), including mediating disputes, dissensions and political rivalries (T.Carroll, 1992:89). These relationships, furthermore, are said to have deeper more cumulative advantages such as through local leader training, increasing popular awareness to grassroots organising and alternative development, and facilitating the "mental empowerment" of communities to change their circumstances (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:113).

Another key contribution has been in the form of linking and federating several organisation into ‘social movements’. This involves linking and supporting organisations that otherwise would remain small, localised, unconnected and vulnerable to cooption and collapse and then forming them into significant and (politically) meaningful groups (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:13).

By working with grassroots groups in diverse capacities - such as training, or the joint selection, implementation and monitoring of projects and programmes - by stimulating contact among such groups, and by facilitating their creation where they do not already exist, the best NGOs can play an important role in ensuring the survival, maturation and indeed internal democracy of those organisations (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:12).
INGOs may well be able to act as the "missing link" (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:xiv) in formalising this participation toward demand making at the institutional level and thus acting as a counterforce on behalf of civil society, thereby increasing the demand for policy change and increased state accountability (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:113). The INGO plays the role of linking the micro and the macro, and implicit in this "is the notion that microinterventions cannot be effective when some of the crucial macrofactors are unfavourable" (T.Carroll, 1992:123). Indeed, policy influence that will favour their disadvantaged clients is becoming more expected of the INGO (T.Carroll, 1992:123). There is a widespread belief that strengthening and linking community organisations and politically empowering them and their members will lead to a considerable affect on policy (Bratton, 1990; Annis, 1987). Indeed, as Farrington and Bebbington argue, INGOs claim that strengthening and empowering community organisations, and building base capacity, they will contribute to the bursting of the poverty cycle and that the greater the strength of these organisation the more likely that they will be able to influence regional political and economic processes (Farrington and Bebbington, 1993:100).

In this event, the process of organising people is seen as more important than necessarily the content of what these groups pursue. In principle, these NGOs work in response to what the grassroots population want from them: "The aim of these NGOs is to work out new, creative and horizontal forms of partnership and interaction with the people concerned, in order to help them develop their own alternative approaches to their development problems" (Theunis, 1992:320). These processes, for example, may include aspects of awareness raising and development education, conscientisation and the facilitation of new forms of popular participation in their own society, group formation, leadership, and training in management skills (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24; Padron, 1987:75). Thus, these organisations are transformed into self sustaining lobbyists and the populace into significant political actors. This final point may be the most important in this process and the goal of enabling the poor to take control of the decision making process is the ‘bottom line’ of many NGOs.
NGOs may play a lot a positive roles in development, but their most important, according to Jon Clark, "...is [this] potential for helping to ensure that ... in particular vulnerable groups ... become more involved in decisions that affect them in development planning and resource allocation" (Clark, 1995:600).

Ideology and 'conceptual roots' (along with contextual factors) (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24) can have a significant effect on these methods and content depending upon the NGDO that engages in the group formation. Yet, while there can be considerable differences, there are, according to Edwards and Hulme (1992b:24) certain common underpinnings in the notions and actions of community organising. These include the position that disadvantaged individuals need to be stimulated into taking group action, that groups of the disadvantaged can have discernable impact on the local situation, and that the combined efforts of grassroots organisations can coalesce into movements that have the potential to influence policies and politics at the national level.

While there are pluralist overtones to this, other strategies are sometimes underpinned by radicals who see GROs as confrontational and even revolutionary (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24). Paulo Freire (1973), for example, has argued that there is a need to 'conscientise' the poor "as an initial step in the process of identifying and ultimately challenging the social and political structures that oppress them" (cited in Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24). However, the end goal of all NGDOs and one which permeates their relations with GROs is the eventual 'empowerment' of the target population. Empowerment here means, "the process of assisting disadvantaged individuals and groups to gain greater control than they presently have over local and national decision-making and resources, and of their ability and right to define collective goals, make decisions and learn from experience" (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24). The NGO-PO dialectic then is argued to be essential for the promotion of self-reliance and overcoming traditional and ever present
obstacles of paternalism and dependency through the mobilisation of local
groups (Frantz, 1987:121).

NGDOs also look to ‘scale up’ GROs, attempting to develop GRO experiences
into horizontal linkages, but also develop vertical linkages with other GROs. Such vertical linkages have the effect of creating more effective local action
through such things as exchanges of information, access to pooled resources
and external resources. Most significantly, these linkages are seen as important
in making it possible to take actions that are beyond the capacity of local
associations (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24). Consequentially, linkages may be
horizontal (for example networking between GROs so that they can exchange
information and negotiate collective information) or vertical (for example,
federating GROs into a regional or national level democratic organisational
structure) (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:25). In regard to vertical relationships
in the Philippines, for example, a highly sophisticated NGO network and
confederation has developed to challenge national policies and establish new
institutions (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:24).

The idea that all that is necessary for UPOs to become part of an urban social
movement is to increase their resource base, is the central concept of resource
mobilisation theorists. These social movement theorists argue that small local
resistance is, and will remain, "localised, ephemeral, and easily repressed"
(Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:327), unless it is coupled with the resources,
organisation, facilities and other both tangible and intangible assets that other
actors can provide (Jenkins, 1983:533). These links connect small and local
resistance into wider movements directed at political and economic redefinitions
at the state level. The key actors in this equation are the outside organisers
(INGOs). In essence, INGOs move the ‘social base’ into a ‘social force’
(Pickvance, 1977), thus applying the Castellian logic that a true movement must
be measured by its success in structural transformation (Reintges, 1990:110;
Castells, 1977). In short, INGOs are seen as crucial in providing the elements
missing from the pre-movement situation (Jenkins, 1983).
Nevertheless, resource mobilisation theorists have been criticised for (over)concentrating on the measurable (political and economic) outcomes of these organisations. In so doing, those UPOs that offer little direct political challenge to the state (those that Castells would see as reformist or coopted) can and have been erroneously ‘written off’ as weak and/or meaningless in their function. As Escobar (1992) has warned, there are dangers in making stark comparisons of organisations operating within differing social, political, and cultural fields of significance. Indeed, it is a form of reductionism to limit analysis to measurable and visible applications of protest, such as confrontation and effects on policy. In fact “minor’ forms of resistance ... should not be despised merely because they do not lead to the fulfilment of sizable demands or important structural transformations” (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:7). These challenge’s to resource mobilisation theory have therefore argued that while strategy is an important part of these organisations, equally so is identity and the cultural struggle taking place (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:5).

Subsequently, the goals of UPOs may be seen as qualitative as well as quantitative. This is the central component of the alternative New Social Movement theorists who argue that these movements are principally reactions to subordination and expressions of autonomy and resistance. Urban poor organisations, as much as seeking concrete goals in the form of material benefits or policy impact, are also seeking to reformulate discourse and issues regarding development. In so doing these organisations are deepening democracy and challenging authoritarian relations, something which in itself can be legitimately included as a political act (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:326; Bratton, 1990:91). Consequently, the cultural or local empowerment approach to community organising (Aina, 1990) can add a layer of evaluative richness to the purely outcome and strategy-oriented approach of many social movement theorists.

While these two approaches are seen to be antithetical, they can be used effectively in unison (Canel, 1992). In examining social movements and local
responses, it is important to look both at the macroprocesses that give rise to and shape these organisations, but equally important is to examine the microprocesses, or those components that are the 'nuts and bolts' of organising (W. Carroll, 1992:23-50). As William Carroll (1992:50) has argued: "Only a theory that takes these factors into account can provide an adequate explanation of social movement and explain the linkages between micro and macro, civil society and the state, instrumental and expressive action, politics and culture".

As the example of the M-19/Democratic Alliance in Colombia demonstrates, movements not only work at the political level, but also the cultural/social level. The alliance redefined styles of politics, political parties, and democratic participation and also provided alternative solutions to problems of violence and development (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:13). Thus a synthesis is not only possible, but highly desirable between the 'political' and 'ethnographic'/cultural approach in fully evaluating and accounting for the 'hows' and 'whys' of organising (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992:317-8).

The INGO-UPO Nexus: Rethinking Utopianism

Nevertheless, such claims over the positive and potentially transformative relationships between INGOs and GROs are not without their problems and critics. These criticisms centre on the overestimated affect and historical significance of both these organisations, the nature of dependency in INGO-GRO relations, and the limitations of GROs themselves. Schmale (1993:2) has challenged the positive faith that both NGOs and GROs procure and instead argues that "the strategy of supporting NGOs and [GROs] has yet to prove its effectiveness in making a major contribution towards the eradication of underdevelopment". Indeed, it is still not clear whether NGOs are at all superior to state agencies in overcoming poverty (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994:555). Consequently, it is also unclear whether those UPOs aligned with INGOs have
been any more successful than independent and local urban poor organisations. Indeed it is evident that commonly held assumptions and expectations regarding the benefits of promoting development through NGOs should not be accepted without critical scrutiny (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994:566; Aldaba, 1990, 1992).

Other criticisms go even further. With regard to Bolivia, Arellano-Lopez and Petras (1994:555-557) have commented that NGOs have actually undermined grassroots organisations representing the poor’s interests and facilitated the co-optation of grassroots organisations. INGOs, by acting as mediators, have increased the communicative space between the authorities and the government, in the process usurping the political power and influence that these UPOs once had (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994). Carroll has also suggested that the relationship between INGOs and the poor can be one of dependence and control. Indeed, in the case of training, INGOs often see themselves as advisors and teachers of the poor rather than as protectors or mediators (T.Carroll, 1992:27). In fact, because of the (continued) material poverty of UPOs, they remain dependent on their INGO and this dependence maintains and reinforces top down structures in society (Schmale, 1993:233). Thomas Carroll has also noted that some INGOs can be accused of hanging on to community organisations beyond their need and desire for independence, identifying possible problems of weaning and transference (T.Carroll, 1992:113). This dependence may in fact increase forms of clientelism through NGOs convincing the poor to forsake political struggle in favour of lobbying contacts in institutions for greater access to development funds (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994:557). Moreover, questions over the sustainability of these organisations may pose important and legitimate questions over the desirability and progressiveness of these relationships.

Additionally, as each INGO carries its own ideological experience, the urban poor may have also been divided ideologically and philosophically, and as a result, the divisions between the urban poor as a class may in fact weaken the
collective bargaining power that the poor may already or could have had. For example, with the case of Latin America, Arellano-Lopez and Petras found that instead of working together, "grassroots organisations find themselves competing with one another for favour and funds, instead of building alliances with one another to struggle for power" (1994:557).

While strong arguments can be made for supporting and linking grassroots organisations - that they 'empower', relate knowledge with action, are sensitive to local contexts, are flexible, and, in the case of collective action, can tackle regional and national issues, - problems have emerged in these relationships and approaches which have demonstrated the potential dangers of the strategy in practical terms. Basically, these can be explained through management problems and issues of control and dependency. Consequently, one of the principal objectives of NGOs is the encouragement of self-management in grassroots groups (Nogueira, 1987:173). From the Program-Management perspective, "there are difficulties in maintaining the interests of poor people in conscientisation, mobilisation and empowerment when they have pressing short term needs" (Edward and Hulme, 1992b:25). In regard to the trend to establish horizontal relationships, for example, the urban poor often live far from each other and do not have the opportunity, time, nor resources to travel to meetings, organise activities and maintain communication (Theunis, 1992:334). Subsequently, many of these initiatives suffer from what Theunis calls the 'butterfly approach': they are "rather haphazard in nature and feedback fails after a single meeting". Therefore, networking, according to Theunis, should remain local and institutionalised in order to succeed. If it does, it has the potential to develop into a movement (Theunis, 1992:334).

While these problems may also be overcome through leader training and democratisation of information (Theunis, 1992:335), working with and through leaders may also pose other considerable problems. Significant problems can occur through the strategy of working through leadership (Ward and Chant, 1987; Schoorl et.al, 1983). For example, if training and education are provided
to leaders it is hoped that the emergence of the gap between leaders (formal or informal) and the other members will be countered or prevented (Theunis, 1992:333). There are several critical questions in regard to the NGDOs relationship with the local leaders including: How are local leaders elected or appointed? And, how do the followers accept the leader? (Theunis, 1992:334). Consequently, there are important issues to be considered in regard to NGDO-GRO relationships through the dynamic of leadership.

Another significant concern with NGDO-GRO relationships is that of fostering dependency and control. Learning, and the accumulation and transfer of knowledge, is very important in each of these relationships (Nogueira, 1987:169). Perversely, while INGOs work toward conscientisation, education and empowerment, these programs "can also be seen as contradicting the logic of empowerment and group autonomy" (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:25). All partners must recognise that community organisations have an essential role to play and must be able to control resources and take decisions in respect of their own future. Failures are almost inevitable when outsiders try to impose their point of view (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 1992:179). Thus, the objectives for action should be defined locally by the population and not by the NGO (Frantz, 1987:126). Otherwise, such programmes may make members into 'recipients', particularly in regard to the service element to the relationship (Edwards and Hulme, 1992b:25). While in the past few decades GROs have grown in strength and influence largely through NGDO support networks, GROs still rely on NGDOs to act as legitimate brokers with (government) decision makers. Therefore, these community organisations look likely to continue to rely greatly on the professional and technical sustenance of support NGOs (Padron, 1987:69).

This then raises the question of how to evaluate the role of INGOs. Although it is still a field of study in its infancy, certain writers such as Thomas Carroll (1992), Fincher (1987), and Jenkins (1983), representing a wide divergence of perspectives, tend to concur over measures to evaluate both internal and
external activities of these organisations. Subsequently, a tentative threefold evaluative criteria may be used. Firstly, community organisations must be able or attempting to meet the basic needs of the community. In particular, activities that directly benefit members and residents in providing development services. Secondly, the organisation should be directing toward changes in (local) power structures, including the operation of a democratic ethos of participation and one that has the effect of increasing capacity, improving class status or otherwise. Thirdly, the organisation should have some degree of wider, external impact. This may involve the changing of (external) power relations, increasing the likelihood of greater future civil involvement or acting in some way toward social reform, including the ability to 'scale up' and develop horizontal linkages (T.Carroll, 1992:32).

Summary

It is at the local level where the urban poor in many situations have the potential to force change to the neopatrimonial system. The proliferation of UPOs and NGDOs over the past decades has led many to claim that Third World civil society may soon be able to respond to, and balance state hegemony. The most popular means has been through linking the poor to support organisations, fusing the grassroots to organisers, that then link up their energy both horizontally and vertically, to form urban social movements. INGOs are claimed by some to move UPOs away from situations of dependency and disempowerment to become effective mangers and representatives of their community and thus play a part in the growth of civil and political society.

Such claims do not, however, go unchallenged. The ability of the urban poor and their organisations to play this role can be questioned, as can the influence played by the support NGDO. Consequently, INGOs can be conceived as part of the disempowerment of the urban poor, playing a role in the fragmentation of the urban poor as a class. Additionally, smaller less 'effective' UPOs cannot
be dismissed as subordinate to the patrimonial state. Both types of organisation subsequently provide an interesting area for analysis and some degree of comparison and contrast.

Such issues shall be examined in the following chapters in regard to the Philippines in the post-Marcos era. If indeed, effective housing policies are the outcome of balanced state-society relations then it follows that housing policy can be influenced at the political level, by NGOs, urban poor organisations and their efforts. In the neopatrimonial state this is not a straightforward proposition. The ability of the urban poor to affect this pressure is nevertheless crucial to change.
CHAPTER THREE

STATE, POLITICS AND HOUSING IN THE PHILIPPINES

Introduction

In the 1960s the Philippines was one of the more vibrant and promising economies in the South East Asian region. Hopes that the Philippines would become one of the development Dragons of the region prevailed throughout the excesses of the Marcos era. Even in the aftermath of the overthrow of Marcos, there were many who felt the political obstacle to development had been removed (Diokno, 1989:15), and the country would prove itself again to be the Spanish-coined ‘pearl of the orient’. Such analysis, though, is ahistorical and omits both the narrow base of this development and growth and its fragile underpinnings. Most notably, it ignores the consistent growth in national poverty and the facade of contested electoral democracy that reached well into the institutions of Spanish and American colonial rule and had been continued since in the form of ‘Filipino-style democracy’. Thus, the Philippine political-economy has always been elitist and preferential, supported by the elite in order to protect and promote their interests better than any other system could.

Historically, the Filipino state and economy has been governed by a landed then heterogeneous elite class. Throughout the Twentieth century this elite has increasingly used the state apparatus to legislate for its affairs (and against its adversaries). Meritorious, constructive policies and addressing the concerns and needs of the population have not, historically, been necessary conditions of office nor criteria of those seeking political service. Customarily then, the state and bureaucracy have not proved a system responsive to the needs of the poor. In only some intervals (such as during the communist New Peoples
Army or the Moro National Liberation Front insurgency) has civil society been capable of demanding alternative visions. It is within this context that the problems of housing and the response of the urban poor and their allies has been placed. This chapter traces the nature of the Filipino state from its colonial legacies to the present day. Despite this wide coverage, continuity remains a key theme. The Philippines has developed into a political economy dominated by and centred around the country's elite and their interests. As a result, policy and implementation have been captured by minority elite interests, with grave results for the majority/poor population. Their problems, including housing, remain largely unaddressed. In the urban context, housing and housing policy have been victims of Filipino politics, with the urban poor unable to change this situation. Thus, housing is directly linked to the Filipino state, politics and state-society relations. Such analysis necessitates a closer understanding of the nature of the Filipino state.

The Philippine State and Philippine Style Democracy

Characteristic of Third World experience, the Philippines was originally a colonial construct and has been strongly affected by its colonial history. Politically independent for less than five decades, the islands underwent a 471 year colonial history. Somewhat unique in the Third World context though, was the experience of being under the tutelage of two colonial powers, first Spain then the United States. From one point of view this could be argued as creating a dual colonial legacy for the Philippines, of being ‘four hundred years in a convent, fifty years in a brothel’. Yet despite this experience there did remain a remarkable degree of continuity throughout the two periods.

In pre-colonial times, life revolved around the barangay, a kinship group consisting of less than 100 households and headed by a datu, or chieftain. The barangay was the largest political unit and the datu served as a focus for unity,
maintaining peace and social norms and providing for the needs of the community (Wurfel, 1988:1-2). Traditional patron-client systems defined relationships, and a datu’s strength was measured in terms of the followers s/he had (Wurfel, 1988:3; Sidel, 1993:109).

Spanish rule, beginning with Magellan’s conquest in 1521, created some unique and significant legacies that have remained through to the present day, notably, of urbanisation, agricultural retardation, balance of payment deficits and trade dependence. But Spanish officials also built upon and politicised previous traditional systems. Local control was integral to colonial rule. Based on traditional dyadic ties and relationships, the Spanish recruited local caciques (usually the former datu) to form the lower rungs of the colonial administrative system and they became known as the principalia, enjoying certain class privileges (Parrenas, 1993:67; Magno, 1989). Official posts were sold and officials were allowed to benefit personally from their privileged positions (Wurfel, 1988:5). This politicised the traditional datu system and created a local elite class which profited as landowners under the Spanish patronage structure. Particularly at election time, local elected posts became surrogate battles of personal interests and clan rivalry6 (May, 1989:15-17). They gradually took on sizable dimensions as the rewards of office became clear. “Defeat meant not only to be deprived of the potential benefits of office, but also to be subjected to the harassment that would be meted out by a successful opposing faction” (May, 1989:35).

One of the principal and most lasting effects of the Spanish period was the policy of ‘bringing people under the bells’ to pattern small towns (F. Magno, 1993:204). The policy was to both facilitate tax collection and conversion to Catholicism. Concurrent to this were the first signs of rural neglect and exploitation and the development of a class structure based on control of agricultural land (Boyce, 1993:5). During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth

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6 Glenn May (1989) refers to these early elections as elite "rituals".
centuries, signs of increasing land concentration and landless labourers emerged, the effects of which led to the agrarian revolt of 1745. A third pattern that was also set early in the colonial period was that of exporting raw materials and the importing of manufactured and finished products. Additionally, throughout their rule, the Spanish failed to create a united nation. Distinct local societies, elites and economies emerged, each tied to the global economy in different ways (McCoy, 1982:8). Regional autonomy was powerful and cultural integration incomplete (Cruz, 1989:57).

For the first two centuries of colonial rule however, the Philippines remained a peripheral land. The islands were bound predominantly to the world economy and Spain through the galleon trade and were even administered from distant Mexico. Locally, the church was given free reign to the extent that SarDesai (1989:145) refers to the islands as a “friarocracy”, so great was the church’s role on policy and the economy through the friar estates. The archipelago remained a poor distant outpost, with only a small isolated European population based almost entirely in Manila, already the focus of the Philippines.

With the onset of the industrial revolution in mainland Europe, however, and the consequent increased demand for raw materials, Spanish control increased in interest throughout the 1800s (F.Magno, 1993:208). In 1834 the Philippines was opened up to world trade to a much greater degree. However, Spain was weak and in decline as a world power and the Philippines were distant lands. Consequently it was in a poor position to benefit from the growth in trade generated (Stauffer, 1985:243). As a result, the Anglo-Chinese role in the islands increased to fill this void, so much so that, in truth, the 19th Century was a period in which the Philippines became a British colony in all but name (Carino, 1988:15). Britain actually held the Philippines between 1762 and 1764. Consequently, it became a popular saying at the time that "Spain kept the cow while Britain and the US drank the milk" (Stauffer, 1985:244).
The context for revolt against Spain was opportunism of the *ilustrado* elite (those sons of the elite typically educated in Spain). They sought to secure a place for themselves in the future regime as Spanish rule began to topple. "They were practical men, and with the Spanish colonial regime teetering on the brink of collapse they saw in the Revolution prospects of political success and protection for their economic interests" (Wurfel, 1988:7). In fact there were two revolutions in the mid-1890s, a conservative circle led by Aguinaldo, and the more nationalist and radical independence movement led by Bonafacio and his *katipunan* (Pomery, 1992:21). In the spirit of aristocratic intrigue Aguinaldo had Bonafacio betrayed and executed to ensure the elite and their interests would remain undisturbed (Abueva, 1988:31; Pomery, 1992:25-30). The fledgling Independence Declaration of 1898 subsequently sought to establish a Congress of "lawyers and *ilustrados*" (Wurfel, 1988:7)

It was this traditional elite that continued to develop and dominate local society and politics into the American period of colonial administration (1898-1946). The USA, which had gained the islands along with Cuba and Puerto Rico after defeating the Spanish fleet decisively in Manila Bay, took over a decade to gain control of the burning independence movement in America’s ‘first Vietnam’. Conservative estimates placed the death toll of Filipinos at 10% of the total population, and up to one-sixth of the population of Luzon (Boyce, 1993:5-6; Pomery, 1992:2; SarDesai, 1989:149; Karnow, 1989). Once resistance was overcome, the USA effectively controlled business, continuing a pattern of control and exploitation which had become the principal characteristic of the Spanish period.

In fact, the promotion of elite control through the politicisation of traditional patron roles was further strengthened by the USA with elections introduced in 1901 at the municipality level, in 1903 at the provincial level, and finally in 1907 for the national legislature. The franchise was strictly limited however, by gender, age, literacy and wealth. Indeed, only 1.4% of the population voted in
the 1907 elections (Paredes, 1989:44). The franchise was fully extended to the population only in the 1930s.

As a result, while democratic procedures may have widened, the roots of democracy did not deepen. Elections served to elevate and politicise traditional factional rivalries (Paredes, 1989:7). American imperial policy served to divide Philippine society through allying with the elite and against peasants and the middle class (Pomery, 1992:6). Those local elites that entered national politics (or sponsored advocates) did so to promote and/or protect local interests (de Jesus, 1982:448). Thus their landlord interests were moved into Congress and national power status (Magno, 1989:13). Colonial administrative positions, even once a person had been elected, were granted by colonial authorities on the basis of the candidate's following and influence (Paredes, 1989:7). Assertive, nationalist leaders, such as Pardo de Tavera, lost patrons and position until they learned to "play the game" (Paredes, 1989:8-10,59). While two main parties emerged (the Federalistas and the Nacionalistas) the poor and vulnerable population preferred to stay with patronage politics and extend loyalty to patrons. Similarly the USA preferred to rule through a few individuals granted American patronage ties (Abueva, 1988:40-44). Indeed, throughout the American colonial period, patron-client relations reached through Philippine politics to Washington DC in a neo-colonial relationship (Paredes, 1989:6; Pomery, 1992:155-183; Karnow, 1989). Revolutionary moderates such as Jose Rizal were promoted through the school curricula and political moderates such as Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon were given the necessary American patronage to campaign and hold office, based not on their service to the population but their manipulation of the system (Paredes, 1989:11).

Elite families took hold of politics and the economy7 (McCoy, 1993). According to Anderson, elite relatives took over local and provincial positions: brothers,

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7 McCoy (1993), and contributors, make an excellent case for studying Filipino politics through family historiographies.
uncles, cousins for senior posts and sons and nephews for junior positions (Anderson, 1988:12). At the dawn of the Second World War, the pattern of elite control, along with an increasing urban/rural divide and increases in income disparities and standards of living, was firmly established. McCoy even feels that by 1941 the Commonwealth government under Quezon "appeared to have many of the attributes of President Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law regime" (McCoy, 1989:117). So great was Quezon’s centralised power that it bordered on authoritarianism (McCoy, 1989:118). Parties had become mere meeting points for the ambitions of landed individuals and their families, with the peasants kept at a distance (Wurfel, 1988:11).

In 1946 the Philippines gained political independence from the USA, but it was a ‘weak state’. It was a country still highly dependent on the USA, highly fragmented as a nation (Magno, 1990:221), and dominated by a traditional landowning elite linked to the population through personalised patron-client followings, rather than mass politics.

By independence the power of the landed oligarchy had become so entrenched in politics that, parliamentary democracy was "principally a system whereby these powerful landed families and their representatives competed for the spoils of political office via shifting alliances of patronage" (Pinches, 1992:391). Radical candidates that had been elected to Congress in the 1946 elections were actually expelled (de Quiros, 1992:13; Pomery, 1992:151).

In name two parties, the Nacionalista and the breakaway Liberal Party, gave the appearance of a strong American-style two party political system. But there was little to differentiate the two and they acted more as ‘alliances of convenience’ allowing individuals and families access to party funds and campaign machinery (Timberman, 1991:35). Party switches were common (Parrenas, 1993:68) and loyalty was weak. Manifestos or party ‘lines’ were almost non-existent.
Nevertheless, increased urbanisation and the decreasing significance of the agricultural sector, wrought a certain degree of change on traditional systems, particularly at the local level. Following independence there had been a significant shift in the Filipino patronage system whereby traditional patronage systems began eroding and the state now replaced the role of the landlord as patron (Magno, 1989:11). This signified the emergence of what Hutchcroft (1991) has termed 'state clientelism'. Indeed the state was the fastest sector to grow in the post war period, from 29,420 employees in 1930 to 361,310 thirty years later, a growth of 1,100% (Wurful, 1988:13). Nevertheless, the political system underwent break-down following the war, with bitterness over the collaboration of the elite (fully exonerated by their own), a succession of unpopular presidents, increasing fraud and violence (particularly during the 1949 elections), the Huk insurgency and the growth of warlordism in the provinces (Wurfel, 1988:14).

Personal or linked access to the state apparatus became increasingly critical to one's career and chance of wealth. A popular 1950s business saying, that "business is born, and flourishes and fails, not so much in the market place as in the halls of the legislature or in the administrative offices of the government" (Hutchcroft, 1991:423) highlighted the situation. In comparison, the civilian and state apparatuses remained weak and divided performing as a secondary institution, and with an incoherent bureaucracy failing to remain neutral (Hutchcroft, 1991:423).

Yet, while the state was expanding, it remained weak vis-a-vis powerful elites, even in the use of force (McCoy, 1993:10-13). In comparison, rural and urban labour remained disorganised and unable to coherently alter the status quo to their advantage, "they could neither assert the necessary policy demands on legislators or administrators, nor provide adequately the required public scrutiny and support needed by a well functioning democracy (Abueva, 1988:53). In any case, patronage retained a coherent logic for most people: "The artesian well, bridge, or road might come only during elections, but better that they did, if only
on those occasions, than not at all" (de Quiros, 1992:19; also see Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:129-130). And so, soon after independence, patronage features quickly (re)asserted themselves and blurred the distinction between 'official' and 'private' spheres (Hutchcroft, 1991:424).

Despite these omens, in the first two decades following independence the Philippines was statistically the fastest growing and most industrialised nation in Southeast Asia. It was notable in the region as the 'model of modernisation' in which all the key ingredients for 'take off' appeared to be there: a middle class, an educated workforce and a strong entrepreneurial population (Pinches, 1992:390). However, this appearance masked the continuing dependence of the country on a narrow family-based economic and political elite and their interests, which had by now diversified into industry, real estate and banking (Pinches, 1992:392). This small, exclusive group controlled the nature of economic growth and its direction over any national or popular consensus. Increasingly, workers and the elite became polarised from each other. Elites moved to Manila and built luxurious lifestyles in places such as Forbes Park (which Anderson describes as "sociologically unique in Southeast Asia") and the army's even more exclusive Corinthian Gardens (Anderson, 1988:17). Growth and its benefits were won through keeping labour cheap, working conditions and wages at a minimum and worker's access to resources constrained (Carino, 1988,16). Most significantly, political and social development were not occurring at comparable rates. To paraphrase Wurfel, there was simultaneously development and decay (Wurfel, 1988)

Even those from outside of the elite who were hailed as popular reformists failed to break this mould. Although often acclaimed as a nationalist and reform-oriented leader, President Magsaysay (the self-appointed 'father' figure of politics in the 1952-55 period) promoted, rather than challenged, the paternalistic role of politics and stunted the development of interpersonal state institutions (Doronila, 1992:97-109). Additionally, Magsaysay was hardly revered by radical groups as, with the help of CIA aid and American marines, he

In the post-war decades, Congress consisted of a disparate group of individual patrons, linked to the population through a series of patronage ties, pursuing particularistic legislation on behalf of clients in return for political support at the next election. In the 1960s though, with increasing demands on the system to deal with the problems occurring with the import substitution development strategy and increasing poverty resulting from the general economic decline, Congress appeared frozen, and was seen to be increasing its patronage role, doing nothing to address the problems of the nation.

This personal/political culture had also permeated itself as the 'administrative culture' of the 1960s. Once considered one of the most efficient and professional of institutions, the bureaucracy had become subsumed by clientelism by the time of Abueva's study in the late 1960s. In this, Abueva uncovered a marked blurring of the public/private role, a condescending and dismissive attitude toward both the population and democracy, and a grateful, submissive attitude toward 'father like' heads. Primary loyalties were to one's family and patron. Nepotism, regionalism and factionalism were rife, creating a highly politicised, isolated and acquiescent bureaucracy (Abueva, 1970). The Philippine bureaucracy has continued to lack independence and autonomy, captured by centrifugal forces seeking rents and patronage (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:24).

It was in this environment that Ferdinand Marcos was elected president in 1966. Rather than seeking far reaching reforms though, Marcos changed little, and in fact it has been argued by many that he effectively perfected the patronage system more than any other preceding president had managed (McCoy, 1993:436). Soon after his election victory, Marcos immediately embarked on the massive Infrastructure Development Program significantly involving his future tripartite basis of support - the technocrats, military, and
over seas support - through massive foreign borrowing (Stauffer, 1985:250). The program reached the farthest corners of the country and aided in developing a much needed infrastructural base in the Philippines. It was also important in giving Marcos an effective base for launching his 1969 reelection campaign. He embarked on this political spending spree in a highly favourable international environment, able to borrow inexpensive petrodollars to support this early expenditure. Subsequently it could be seen in many ways as a gigantic form of patronage, as Marcos went about centralising and expanding his power to a much greater extent than any of his predecessors had imagined.

The Filipino economy continued in the Marcos presidency to be structured around particularistic business and political interests closest to the palace (Hutchcroft, 1991:431). The debt driven growth-path approach to economic development for example, was not demanded by any particular class nor did it come about through any significant group pressure. Rather it was in response to family and individual allied demands closest to the presidential family.

Subsequently, within only a few years of the Marcos presidency, the state had been developed into a giant patron, effectively bypassing the stymied and increasingly irrelevant Congress. In so doing, Marcos became the ‘supreme godfather’ (Hutchcroft, 1991:443), and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos the self proclaimed ‘father and mother of the nation’ (Hutchcroft, 1991:443). At one time Marcos was said to be compadre (godfather) to 20,000 people (Timberman, 1991:15). Realising the centrality of the local level to Philippine politics and the patronage system during the 1969 election campaign, it is estimated that Marcos alone wrote 2,000 personal cheques to barrio captains (Doronila, 1985:114). However, far from been considered outrageous, Bulatao has argued that this placed Marcos at the ‘quintessence’ of Filipino values. He placed loyal friends and family in key positions, responded to debts he owed, and was a strong president, even if authoritarian (Bulatao, 1989:323). But he also exploited cultural values more effectively than his predecessors, bonds such as utang na
loob, pakikisama, and fierce loyalty. At the local level, clientalism depended heavily upon exploiting these virtues (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:129).

However, the state simply could not afford these election excesses, and Marcos was soon faced with the dilemma after winning the 1969 elections of balancing a weak resource base with an increasing need and demand to 'pay out' (Hutchcroft, 1991:428). This led to massive borrowing and plunged the country into recession. The political system subsequently went into decomposition. It was the result of a long standing combination of a number of factors: the political polarisation of the population; the economic crisis arising mostly from the level of foreign debt and concerns of foreign investors; and anxiety over the increasing power of the state and, in particular, the political ambitions of the Marcos family (Pinches, 1992:393; Wurfel, 1988:21; Lapitan, 1989:236).

But the crisis can also be seen as the response of the elite to preserve their increasingly tenuous legitimacy in the face of a social revolution. Following the 1969 election radical urban and rural unrest escalated, and demands for political and socio-economic reform grew (Wurfel, 1988:17). The 1971 local elections demonstrated this anger with a massive anti-administration vote illustrating the dissolution of clientelism. The emergence of class consciousness also grew among students and the communist 'New Peoples Army' (Jones, 1989). In the early 1970s, Wurfel argues, the system appeared to be on the precipice of collapse and renewal (Wurfel, 1988:18). In short, the old order and forms of consensus appeared to be breaking down and a new order approaching. It was evident to the regime, according to Wurful, that "principled opposition to those in power had become better organised and more deeply committed than at any time in Philippine history" (Wurful, 1988:332). The response was swift. With resulting mass unrest in the 1970-1972 period the 'military option' replaced the 'political option' (Doronila, 1985:115). In 1972 the

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8 The role or exploitation of these values continues to be an important factor in Filipino clientelism (Pinches, 1991).
Philippines moved from being an 'inclusionary' to an 'exclusionary state' (Parrenas, 1993:68) with the announcement of martial law. Marcos then about creating a 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' state based on the ideals of neopatrimonialism.

Over the next 14 years the Filipino state all but eradicated civil society. Local politics and elections, long the form of influence over the centre, were terminated (Timberman, 1991:84). Traditional checks and balances in the system, parties, institutions, civil disobedience and demonstrations were forbidden (Timberman, 1991:95-96). All power emanated from the centre. Between 1972 and 1979 Marcos issued 688 Presidential Decrees (PD) and 283 Letters Of Instruction (LOI) (Timberman, 1991:107).

Throughout the Martial Law period, arguably the greatest winners were the crony capitalists, technocrats (particularly in the early years), and the military - the three legs of the regime's support. The cronies were a group which included friends and relatives with preferential access to contracts, tax privileges, finance and protected industries, which led to government approved monopolies in the coconut and sugar markets (Pinches, 1992:394; Manapat, 1991). While some of these contacts were from the landed oligarchy, most rose from relative obscurity into core interests of agribusiness, construction, shipping, banking, and real estate (Pinches, 1992:394). It has been estimated that by the late 1970s the Philippine economy was controlled by as few as sixty families (Timberman, 1991:17).

Although Marcos gained early popular support with his 'New Society' ideals, such a method of rule could not last. By the early 1980s Marcos' position had become tenuous, compounded by both financial and health problems. Undoubtedly Marcos was supported past his mandate by American and foreign interests (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:12) particularly the Reagan administration. Hutchinson (1993:197) describes this support as the regime's 'life-support machine'. When the Marcos administration was clearly becoming
violent and increasingly fraudulent, Vice President Bush at the post electoral victory in 1981 saluted Marcos: "We stand with you sir ... We love your adherence to democratic principles and to democratic procedures" (Boyce, 1993:1). Indeed, it was primarily due to American and World Bank support that Marcos lasted as long as he did in the turbulent 1980s. Politically, the exclusion of many powerful interests and families had created significant opposition, growing more formidable and militant with each passing year.

The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 further plunged the regime into turmoil, as increasing instability led to massive overseas capital flight and the country's worst economic crisis in its postwar history (Parrenas, 1993:69). Real per capita income declined by 16% and fell every year from 1982 until 1986 (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:46,52). Internationally, US support for Marcos waned, due both to the increasing internal instability of the country and the massive and mounting foreign debt from $360 million in 1962 to $28.6 billion in 1986 (Boyce, 1993:10). This increase resulted in loan defaults in 1983 (Pinches, 1992:394). To a substantial degree, Marcos' cronies were also responsible for his downfall (Manapat, 1991). In the financial crisis they became a weighty and highly public economic burden and embarrassment, offsetting any possibility of reform to meet a rapidly changing international economy. As the regime could not bail them all out, their publicly condemned drain on the economy led also to increased demands for more far reaching economic and political reforms from both home and abroad.

The end came suddenly for the Marcos regime. In 1985, on American television (and no doubt in large part to appease American interests) Marcos announced a snap presidential election. In a fraudulent and desperate manner Marcos announced victory over Corazon 'Cory' Aquino, but a reinvigorated civil society and more significantly a fractionalised military command (including Fidel Ramos) declared 'enough' and held out in army barracks along EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue). No longer able to muster his support nor effectively
repress his rivals, Marcos withdrew from confrontation and soon fled the country.

In 1986, Corazon Aquino was elected president. Her support came noticeably from those sidelined by the Marcos administration and American forces keen to see an agreeable successor to Marcos (Pomery, 1992:279; Kerkvliet and Mojares, 1991:4-5). But while this gave her a great deal of widely based ‘peoples power’ it also meant that her support was a coalition of fragile, shifting alliances, a fractious coalition (Parrenas, 1993:70; Magno, 1990:219; Dohner and Haggard, 1994:14,219). This ‘rainbow’ coalition was not strong enough, nor had the political will, to confront the structures of society that hemmed in its options. Land reform, perhaps the most significant litmus test of change, was arrested in Congress. Aquino was widely criticised for serious human rights abuses into the late 1980s and for condoning vigilante armies throughout the countryside (van der Kroef, 1988:630,641). It was predominantly Aquino’s charisma, popularity and political skill which kept her coalition together and avoided a potentially dangerous split as well as maintaining some form of popular legitimacy.

The Aquino coalition did manage to succeed in its primary aim of ensuring democratic institutions were supported and that a return to the days of dictatorship was less possible. Yet it also meant that the regime was unable to deliver basic services and ensure justice, quality legislation and economic management (Parrenas, 1993:73). Thus, it has often been referred to as a political rather than social revolution (Magno, 1993,226; Dohner and Haggard, 1994:69; Haggard, 1990:250; Nemenzo, 1988). Bulatao (1989:324) has referred to it as a ‘yellow’ rather than ‘red’ revolution. As Timberman has put it, “The reality is that the February uprising was a revolt against Marcos, not a revolution in Philippines politics and society” (Timmerman, 1991:158).

Throughout the Aquino era, the bourgeoisie and cronies once again were able to consolidate their political positions aided by the free enterprise economic
approach adopted, combined with the decentralised political climate. Aquino herself was from the hacienda-owning Conjuangco clan, "one of the wealthiest and most powerful dynasties within the Filipino oligarchy" (Anderson, 1988:3). Thus the Aquino-Conjuangco clan replaced the Marcos-Romualdez family at the palace (Timberman, 1991:386). Once again, personalism emerged over policy. The 1987 constitution plebiscite became 'Cory’s Constitution', and Congressional candidates were ‘Cory's' Candidates' (Timberman, 1991:386).

And while there was evidence that the patronage system was on the decline throughout the 1980s (most evidently through the rise of the middle classes and Chinese population in political-social life), the 1988 local elections were, with a few exceptions, a triumph for those from the provincial, urban and municipal elites (Lapitan, 1989:241). Eighty-four percent of those who fashioned the 'new' Congress were from traditional political clans and in keeping with pre-martial law traditions, the bulk of legislation sought special appropriations for local ‘pork barrel' projects (Timberman, 1991:262). In the same campaigns progressive groups were "bruised and humbled" (Arquiza, 1992:246). The Partido ng Bayan (PnB), a collection of people's organisations popular with the peasantry, working class and middle class was comprehensively outspent and outmuscled at election time, despite widespread popularity and legitimacy (Hawes, 1989:16-17).

The ideals of the 'people's revolution' soon faded. No civilians protested the coup attempts against the administration that followed and gradually celebrations of EDSA attracted only a trickle of interest (Stauffer, 1990:17). Throughout the period of Aquino’s regime, liberals and social activists were expelled from cabinet, and a shift to the right, particularly in the wake of the coup attempts, ensued (Sussman, 1990:36). As late as 1989 select armed forces were planning a coup that would make General Enrile head of a military state, possibly with CIA consent (Sussman, 1990:37). But support for this path faded over time, for, as Stauffer has put it, democracy best suits the Philippine oligarchy as it can be used to prevent change, to resist reform, and to benefit oneself personally (Stauffer, 1990:10).
Thus, Aquino has been criticised as restoring traditional Philippine elite democracy (Magno, 1990; Pomeroy, 1992:334; Hawes, 1989:15). "She proclaimed no clear goals - beyond a return to constitutionalism - established authority over no political party, and made no attempt to replace patronage with issue-oriented politics" (Wurfel, 1988:340). Philippine income distribution remained one of the most unequal in the Third World (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:16; Jackson, 1989). Filipino expectations over a better quality of democracy, one responsive enough to address issues of land reform, equity and the bringing to justice of those human rights abusers of the past were never met (Hawes, 1989:27). Public opinion polls commissioned throughout Aquino’s administration showed declining levels of support among all classes correlating with their declining quality of life, particularly in the Metro Manila area. There were also corresponding falls in satisfaction with regard to the Senate and House of Representatives (ACSPPA, 1992: 6-10). Before long, the elite disenfranchised by the Marcos dictatorship returned for their turn in office, including the new landed oligarchy in Congress (Magno, 1993:238). Lapitan (1989:241) has noted that the big winners of 1986 were in fact the pre-1972 elites. Indeed, one of Aquino’s greatest efforts was in stripping Marcos’ support base of its assets (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:67). According to Alex Magno, the World Bank and IMF continued to dictate policy (Bello et.al, 1982), the bureaucracy remained bloated, the government soon committed the country’s resources to pay back the Marcos debt (at the expense of social spending), and the communist insurgency continued (Magno, 1993:239). Indeed, when efforts were made to ‘reform’ the bureaucracy, the result was the purging of Marcos appointees who were replaced with new Aquino placements (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:75).

So while perhaps less significant than in the past and despite an increasingly critical electorate and pluralist political landscape, patronage politics is still alive
and well\(^9\) (de Castro, 1992:42-47). Fidel Ramos, who was elected president in 1992 and owner of the country's largest book chain, mining and drilling operations, (Sussman, 1990:41), is generally accepted to have won the presidency (with only 24% of the vote) because he had the superior patronage system (Parrenas, 1993:70). According to de Castro, the 'going price' for a vote in the 1992 presidential campaign was P100 (de Castro, 1992:65). The 1992 national elections continued to demonstrate the importance and vitality of individuals, families (Gutierrez, 1994) and personalities vis-a-vis party politics. Politics is indeed still characterised by groups and individuals competing for power (Parrenas, 1993:75; Brillantes, 1992:144; Alegre, 1995:6). A former film star, Josef Estrada became Vice President. Additionally, in the same campaign, a lawyer representing one of the most significant of the Marcos cronies, Eduardo Cojuncunco, is reported to have lectured to the press during the run-up to the presidential election: "let's not waste time with a lot of propaganda crap about national interest ... the bottom line is he is running for President to protect his own interests" (Pinches, 1992:397). As Wurfel has put it, policy implementation has seldom been an important source of regime legitimacy (Wurfel, 1988:327).

Ramos' main policy package is 'Philippines 2000'\(^10\) and his theme 'A better quality of life for every Filipino' (Flores, 1993:1). The plan envisages a GDP growth rate of 6-8% from 1992 to 1998, a reduction in the poverty rate below 30% of the population, single-digit inflation, an increase in exports and investment, and an increase in annual per capita income to US$1,000 (Doronila, 1994:10). Subsequently it has been criticised as an over ambitious 'statement of targets', and too subservient to IMF objectives (Flores, 1993:1). Additionally, progressive Senator Tanada has decried the plan's lack of emphasis on land and urban reform, social access to basic needs, and

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\(^9\) Public projects are often personalised, and are referred to as "the project of ..." (see Plate 2)

\(^10\) In 1994, a cynical Filipino joke interpreted 'Philippines 2000' as meaning development of the Philippines in 2000 years.
Barangay politics is very personal in nature. Here a sign is posted on a door in the Mountain Province.

Patronage sign in Muntinlupa school, Metro Manila.
addressing socio-economic inequalities (Tanada, 1994:91). Indeed, the plan offers little in clear policy terms for the urban poor on the question of housing (Karaos, 1993:10-11). In the public's mind little has changed. A *Philippine Daily Inquirer* editorial in 1994 found that the majority of Filipinos either had not heard of, nor did not know the details of the plan (*Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 30 May 1994:4).

It appears then, that while there has been change in the Filipino political culture, this should be realistically appraised in light of the continued vitality of the patronage system and the continued strength and meaning of the well known attitude and phrase, ‘after all, what are we in power for?’ Self-reported congressional millionaires increased during their terms between 1992 and 1994. On election there were 185 peso millionaires, but by May 1994 this had increased to 196 of the 212 members. The least wealthy was the urban poor representative (de Guzman, 1994:1). In an interview, a sectoral representative in Congress noted that "politics is still the biggest business in the Philippines" (interview OT06, June 16 1994)\(^{11}\). "Philippine political life remains defined by special interests vying for government favours in the form of bureaucracy, regulation and protectionism" and 'paralysed by politics' (Tiglao, 1994:5). Throughout 1994, Ramos struggled to get initiatives passed by the legislature and implemented, often having to use financial pork barrel inducements, even to those in his own party! (Tiglao, 1994:23). In 1994, gridlock and slow passage hindered Congress which failed to pass an anti-Dynasty law and proposed electoral reform was moving slowly (Riedinger, 1995:209-10). As recently as 1995 Riedinger was lamenting the time worn problem that "[t]he autonomy and capacity of the Philippine state are constrained by elite penetration of the state and the exclusionary nature of Philippine democracy" (Riedinger, 1995:209). Indeed, as the mayor of a Mindanao town has recently been quoted as saying, "[p]olitics has not changed here and never will" (Tiglao, 1994:22).

\(^{11}\) For details on interviews refer to Appendix One.
Nevertheless, some elements of change have occurred in the post-Marcos period. As Timberman has paradoxically noted in *A Changeless Land*, "no society is completely changeless" (Timberman, 1991:380). In 1994 the economy grew significantly and some quarters saw this as evidence of a national turnaround (McIntosh, 1994:11), though for the poor any benefits were offset by increasing inflationary pressures (Sayson, 1994:13). There has been the emergence of organisations in civil society and increased political activism to take advantage of the increased ‘democratic space’ (Tancangco, 1988:110). There have also been increased moves toward decentralisation, begun in the 1987 Constitution (de Guzman et.al, 1988b:237).

In this, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1992 has been referred to by Brillantes as probably the most radical and substantial legislation passed by the Aquino administration as it devolves considerable powers to the local level, though he was sceptical over its implementation (Brillantes, 1992:142). Significantly the Code decentralises powers of expenditure and legislature to the *barangay*, thus furthering the significance of the local (Ayson and Abletez, 1994; Pimentel, 1993). Progressively, it offers a greater change of ‘popular’ will, with the provision that at least 25% of council personnel must be from NGOs (Brillantes, 1993; Pimentel, 1993).

It has been at the local level where change is most likely (at least in the short term). Indeed William Carroll (1992:42) has noted that the greater the spatial and functional decentralisation of a given system, the more likely that social movements can be effective and autonomous. It has been *barangay* elections which have become the arena for most efforts of ‘progressive’ elements in their efforts to challenge the *status quo* (Alegre, 1995:5). However, the 1988 *barangay* elections (the first local elections since 1971) were a disappointment for progressives. Hailed as a test of the strength of the left and of traditional family dominance, personal connections proved more important than ideological coherence. "In only a handful of contests did ideology and party political platforms play a significant role in determining the results" (Timberman,
Political violence continued. In fact, more people died in the 1988 local polls than in the 1986 February revolution (Timberman, 1991:195). In 1994, the importance of the elite in controlling the barangay was again exposed when Congressional members took leave to ‘work’ in their home provinces during the campaign period, as victory was key to their own reelection in 1995 (Ng, 1994:10). In the 1995 Senate elections most violence, fraud and post-election protests occurred at the local level (Alegre, 1995:5). These elections once again demonstrated the predominance of clan politics, including the rise in the Marcos’ family fortunes. Yet, there were elements of change in the late 1980s. Family dynasties like the Laurels of Batangas and the Sumulongs of Rizal fell using traditional clan/patronage strategies (Magno, 1989:13). And 23% of those elected were new to politics (Magno, 1989:14).

Evidently, there are some avenues for change in the Philippines. Timberman (1991:398) has noted that perhaps the most beneficial way would be through increased scrutiny on the political leadership, factors that would make governments and their bureaucracies more responsive to peoples needs. This pressure could make leadership more accountable. Political change also needs to occur in the population at large. There needs to be greater voter education and a more critical electorate capable and willing to call officials and agencies to task, factors absent in Philippine civil/political society. New leaders from society must also continue to emerge from outside the elite to compete for office. “If non-traditional [leaders] parties and organisations become more effective at representing the interests of constituencies not served by traditional [leaders and] parties then the traditional parties will eventually have to change in order to compete” (Timberman, 1991:272). Filipinos then need more non-traditional politicians and less TRAPOs12 (traditional politicians) (Montiel, 1986; Gregorio and Santiago, 1992).

12 ‘Down with TRAPOs’ was a popular catchcry during EDSA.
Urbanisation, Poverty and Housing

Historically, the Philippine state has not purposefully and continuously sought to accomplish social development goals. As argued, the nature of the state and its linkages to the population have precluded the necessity of the elite focusing policy and vigour on issues such as poverty and housing. Subsequently, urban poverty, itself a result of rural poverty and neglect, increases unaffected by political discourse. There has been a historical process of disregard which has led to the situation today whereby urban poverty and poor housing has reached a crisis point in Manila’s development (or decay) with little prospect of change.

The Philippines has had a comparably long history of urban development, particularly when compared with its regional neighbours (Pernia, 1976). Although founded by Raja Soliman, Manila was a product of colonialism, being a direct manifestation of the Spanish policy of urbanisation. Early growth of the city though was slow, reflecting the lack of direct interest of Spain and the limited links of Manila to the world economy outside of the sporadic galleon trade. In 1570 Manila had a population of just 2,000, and for centuries the Spanish area of intramuros could be circumnavigated in less than an hour’s moderate walk (Murphy, 1990c:40). While Spanish rule was ’Manila-centric’ it was still marginal to the empire and was barely sustained by its surrounding haciendas (McCoy and de Jesus, 1982:3,6). Despite being part of an empire and the galleon trade which linked the Philippines with Latin America, at the end of the Seventeenth century the town remained a small, poor outpost.

Throughout the Nineteenth century Manila grew steadily. It benefitted from increased Anglo-Chinese investment and influence, and its role as an export processing zone from the mid-Nineteenth century. Yet the wealth generated was highly uneven, predominately accumulated by the local (European) elite. The city was also structurally divided, with the Chinese and indigenous populations living outside the walls surrounding, serving and defending the colonial population.
With steady economic growth, the population of Manila increased gradually into the Twentieth century to the extent that it became a primate city with increasing urban problems. Urban populations have outgrown rural growth since the 1930s with Manila increasing its primacy steadily throughout the century (Pernia, 1976:8-17; United Nations, 1993:146; Arn, 1995:196). Even then, housing constituted a concern for authorities. Problems soon materialised with regard to providing enough housing for the landless labourers now attracted to the city. The first recorded slums of any note appeared in the 1920s with the American colonial authorities sponsoring the first report on housing in 1926 but with no consequence. In 1933 a study was undertaken into early Tondo slums, the response to which was bulldozing (Caoili, 1988:52). "Thus by the end of the American regime, Manila's modern problems - congestion, poverty, slum dwelling, inadequate public services and others were already evident and becoming critical" (Caoili, 1988:53). Before any further action was defined though, the war years intervened, and Manila was laid to ruin by successive American and Japanese occupations.

Manila experienced striking growth in the post war years, increasing at an average annual rate of over four percent between 1950 and 1995 (United Nations, 1993: 141). Immediate post-war growth was particularly evident in the port of Tondo. Yet it was evident even at this stage that the response of the authorities to the city's primacy and urban problems and increasing income disparities was inadequate. Effective action was hampered by a combination of problems. In particular, uncoordinated policies and ineffective local councils resulting in poor policy and housing planning, a lack of a national housing policy, and uncoordinated and ad hoc bulldozing, which encountered in most cases strong resistance and failed to house the majority of the urban poor. Efforts were failing to address effectively the town's burgeoning problems. Wide and all-encompassing political reforms were clearly necessary, but the pervasiveness and strength of patronage politics effectively prevented any coordinated approach from developing.
Metro Manila (MM) has undergone spectacular growth since the early 1970s and now attracts around 240,000 newcomers each year (McBeth and Goertzen, 1991:30). Murphy (1990c:40) puts the figure at 300,000. By 1995, the United Nations (1993:146) estimated that one-third of all urban Filipinos lived in Metro Manila. The modern growth of urban populations and the NCR has been closely paralleled with the rise of rural poverty, urban poverty and autonomous settlements. Urban poverty as a proportion of urban population has historically remained at around 40-45%, the highest proportion in ASEAN, and it has increased throughout the 1980s (Ramos-Jimenez et al, 1988:81). Compounded by a lack of access to formal employment and blocked by price from the housing market, nearly half of Metro Manila’s population work in the low paying irregular informal sector and earn incomes below the official poverty line. By no means, however, is Metro Manila a city entirely of the poor, but it is one with a highly inequitable distribution of income (see Plates 3 and 4). According to Murphy (1990c:40) the poorest 50% of Manila’s population earn only 17% of the city’s total income.

Around the year 2000, half of all Filipinos will be urbanites and urban poverty will become, quantitatively, the dominant social problem of the country (Murphy, 1993a:v; United Nations, 1993:76-77). The squatter settlement population has doubled from that of a decade ago (McBeth and Goertzen, 1991:30) and this growth is expected to increase by over 60% to number 5.48 million in 1997, with squatter citizens then accounting for 57% of the entire urban population (IBON, 1993:8).

The policy response of the regime and bureaucracy to the issue of housing has closely mirrored international policy and trends. It was in the late 1940s that local governments in Metro Manila realised the slum and squatter ‘problem’ (Ramos-Jimenez, 1988:83). Manila, only comparable to Warsaw in its World War Two destruction, was unable to cope with migration from the ravaged countryside in the post war years. Intramuros and the foreshoreland of Tondo
were the earliest squatter sites and by 1946 the first count of squatters was estimated to be around 46,000 (van Naerssen, 1993:3).

In response was the creation of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) in 1947. The PHHC was one the dominant agencies involved with housing from the 1950s to the mid-1970s (Tojos et.al, n.d:198). Additionally involved were the Social Security System, Government Service Insurance System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Public Works. The PHHC and other agencies were to encounter and create the difficulties that were to burden later agencies empowered to build for the poor. Most notable were problems with overlapping functions, excessive administration, a lack of resources and the lack of a clear housing agenda or roadmap (Tojos et.al, n.d:8). While its aims were to provide cheap houses for the poor, it was also necessary to recover full costs and it soon became apparent that it was building ostensibly for the middle classes and its production levels were chronically poor (van Naerssen, 1993:5). Between 1948 and 1975 these five institutions produced a mere 135,114 housing units (Tojos et.al, n.d:8).

With the problem of squatter settlements being defined as a legal issue (Ramos-Jimenez, 1988:83) policies of eradication and relocation were favoured, with the Slum Clearance Committee being established in 1950 (van Naerssen, 1993:5). The authorities, however, still lacked a clear and comprehensive housing policy amongst the many agencies involved in shelter. These relocation sites were marginal to the metropolis (and therefore to employment, schools and services) and poorly developed. Subsequently such forced removals were resented and sites often abandoned with squatters preferring to move back into the city (Viloria and Williams, 1987:13; Laquian, 1969). Under the balik probinsya (return to the provinces) policy, some families were forced to move up to four times (Arn, 1995:203). Still, mass evictions and relocation were not sustained or comprehensive until 1963-64 (Tojos et.al, n.d:7) with the opening of several relocation sites and the case of the failed Sapang Palay project well
documented by Laquian (1969). Even in demolition and relocation, government efforts failed principally because of a lack of coordination, particularly with regard to the preparation of sites (Tojos et al., n.d:7).

Partially in response to these failures but just as much in response to the shift in international philosophies (in particular the World Bank), the authorities expanded policies to include sites and services and upgrading programs, though demolition and relocation was never completely abandoned. Upgrading became a national housing policy through LOI 555 in 1975 (van Naerssen, 1989:206) and LOI 557 in 1977 (Tojos et al., n.d:8). Under the Zonal Improvement Programme (ZIP) of 1977, slum improvement took on a massive scale in Manila’s oldest and densest area, Tondo. ZIP grew to be one of the world’s largest housing programmes supported by the World Bank to the tune of US$130 million in loans by 1986 (van Naerssen, 1989:207).

Self-help policies took place in an extremely repressive environment. Laws were passed that made squatting a crime (PD 772), allowed demolitions on private and public lands for those without permits for riverside and railroad dwellers (LOI 19), or PD 296, which granted authorities to impose penalties for living in ‘illegal’ settlements (van Naerssen, 1993:8). At the same time as declaring Metro Manila an urban land reform zone, Marcos immediately qualified it by excluding the vast majority. Additionally, throughout his term he carried out hostile actions against the urban poor (Tojos et al., n.d:11).

Consequently, participation of the poor in these programs was highly restricted, usually being used as a pool of reserve labour to keep costs low enough for projects to be completed. Very few of the poor benefitted from these programmes anyway. With World Bank and government insistence on cost recovery, the majority of those advantaged were middle class, even in the much heralded Tondo ZIP program. While many had regarded the visually successful Tondo program as a success, a 1979 West German study later showed that
Plate 5. The urban poor as represented in the press.

Plate 6. Demolition at dawn to make way for a shopping mall.
between 60-70% of families could not afford the rent (van Naerssen, 1989:207).

The finding was not untypical of worldwide experiences, and the programme failed to take root elsewhere. The National Housing authority, established in 1975, also failed to house the poor. It was formed to replace most previous organisations to act as a central coordinating body of all housing aspects. In its 1983 production, however, only 769 units were provided for the poor, whereas 4,000 were constructed for higher socioeconomic groups (Solon, 1988:181).

Needs though far outweighed resources for the self-help project approach to be successful as a solution. For example in the early 1980s the government identified 415 slums, of which 255 had the potential for upgrading and 160 required relocation. Little action was undertaken regarding these initiatives. Concurrently, it was estimated that “the total demand for upgraded lots in Metro Manila will be approximately 300,000 plots by the end of the century” (Viloria and Williams, 1987:13), far greater than could possibly be provided.

The history of housing policies particularly during the Marcos period reflects a list of "fragmented, uncoordinated, ineffective and inefficient programs" (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:7). Typically departments entrusted with policy making, financing, and implementation were financially stressed and divided from one another. Routinely, these programmes were both vehicles and victims of patronage politics. As such, housing programmes were dictated by the political agendas of those in power (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:8). Often, projects were the ideas of politicians who wanted to use them for leverage and political purposes, as with ‘pork barrel’ funds in general. politicians set up ‘adhocracies’, or new organisations to bypass the traditional bureaucracy with its inadequacies, as well as to allow them more personal control over distribution and reciprocal obligations (de Guzman et.al, 1988a:195).

Imelda Marcos’ Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) has been described as a ‘super patronage’ machine. Established in 1978 as a rival to the NHA it
subsumed all significant housing agencies into its orbit. Originally established for housing construction, the MHS grew to include nineteen corporations and its operations came to be used as a source of ‘pork barrel’ patronage in housing, food distribution, finance and health provision. Primarily, it was involved in the construction of tourist hotels (Dohner and Haggard, 1994:35). Resource misallocation was commonplace. A 1994 investigation discovered P97.9 million of MHS funds had been misappropriated in 1985 alone (Reidinger, 1995:212). Additionally, Imelda Marcos’ BLISS (Bagong Lipunan ‘New Society’ Sites and Services) programme built condominiums for friends and allies. Other projects offered subsidised housing to the ‘politically favoured’ wealthy (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:8). Far from being conciliatory, often Imelda Marcos would publicly admonish the poor for coming to the city without previously securing accommodation. Consequently, she was reluctant to build houses for the poor believing this would make them “mendicant” (Bello et.al, 1982:107). By the time of the Marcos’ demise, the housing sector had liabilities amounting to P1.76 billion and the industry was a labyrinth of agencies and programmes (almost wholly headed by political appointees) each duplicating, competing and overlapping each other’s (albeit ill-defined) functions (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:9). In 1985 the housing industry was on the verge of collapse. On the eve of the revolution all housing construction was either cancelled or deferred (Abueva, 1988:69).

In the euphoria that surrounded the ‘people’s revolution’ of 1986 expectations among the urban poor were high that significant social change would follow the political revolution. Nevertheless such confidence sowed the seeds of its own destruction as the squatter population of Metro Manila underwent incredible growth. Some urban poor areas doubled in size in the years that followed EDSA (Murphy, 1993a:15). Throughout the 1980s squatting grew at a phenomenal 12% per annum (van Naerssen, 1989:201; Arn, 1995:199) and the squatter population of Metro Manila was said to have doubled throughout the decade. Two years into Cory Aquino’s term, studies indicated that poverty was still increasing unabated.
With a bankrupt public housing sector the Aquino regime was not able to meet ever increasing needs, so much so that even only half way through her term experienced writers such as Constantino-David were despairing that little had changed with EDSA and the poor had not at all benefitted from her policies. Indeed the urban poor may have even become worse off (Constantino-David, 1989:32). In the 1980s, recession struck the Philippines and in particular Metro Manila, with great effect. Real wages plummeted, unemployment rose, and malnutrition in children from 1982 steadily increased and there was a halt to the falling levels of infant mortality rates (Solon, 1988; Ramos-Jimenez et.al, 1988; Constantino-David, 1989; Formilleza, 1989). From its heady days in the 1950s, the Philippines had now come to be seen as the single greatest economic failure in a region packed with NICs, trailing all in ASEAN and harbouring the greatest levels of poverty in the region (Pinches, 1992:390). In 1991 the Department of Social Welfare was still allocated just 1% of the national budget (McBeth, 1991:32).

What the new regime did see to was the creation of new housing agencies and the purging of the previously Marcos-supported organisations. The centrepiece of the Aquino government was the National Shelter Programme which boldly estimated it would benefit 300,000 squatters in Metro Manila in her term alone (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:9). In it there was a reorientation of housing direction away from direct provision toward providing mortgage finance directed at the poorest, and the provision of in-city upgrading alternatives rather than resettlement outside the metropolis (ICSI, n.d). What wasn't provided though was the land and money to make the plan work (ICSI, n.d). The plan may have failed miserably but there was no respite in the proliferation of agencies, commissions and reports on the situation. The NSP involved no less than over a dozen government organisations (Tojos et.al, n.d:13; see Figure 3.1). Additionally, in the first year of her term, two new agencies, namely the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) and Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), were established to coordinate, plan, and communicate with the poor. The emphasis was on the increased
NATIONAL SHELTER PROGRAM

IMPLEMENTING MACHINERIES

HUDCC
(Executive Order No. 80)
(Executive Order No. 357)

KEY HOUSING AGENCIES

FUNDING AGENCIES

SUPPORT AGENCIES

PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE

MAJOR PROGRAMS

PRODUCTION

MORTGAGES

DEVELOPMENT LOANS

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS

NHA
- Skills and Services
- (Un)establishment
- New Unit Joint Venture

HIGC
- Managed Assets

NHIMFC
- Unified Home Lending Program
- Development Loan Fund
- Housing Guaranty
- Group Housing Program
- Corporation Housing Program
- Individual Program
- Par-Passu
- Repair

GSIS
- Individual Housing
- Mass Housing Program

SUB-PROGRAMS

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER HOUSING COMMITTEE
(M.O. 151)

UNCHS/UNDP and other Foreign-Assisted Projects

World Bank Technical Assistance

Source: NHA Flyer (n.d)
involvement of the private sector, to help in streamlining the functions of the various agencies, and to reorient programs to the poorest (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:9). The result appeared to be even greater overlapping and lesser coordination in the housing sector. An Ateneo de Manila University study found that the program had "glaring gaps between policy statements and program implementation" (ICSI, n.d).

The PCUP is an interesting example of the possibilities and limitations of the immediate post-Marcos period. Established at the end of 1986 as a reaction to urban poor demands to have an organisation that would work with them (van Naerssen, 1989:212), the PCUP was mandated to make recommendations to government, to help coordinate government policies, and even to aid the building of UPOs (Florano, 1993:16). Throughout its short life though, the PCUP has been a weak and highly politicised organisation. In its first seven years it had five changes of chair and three reorganisations. It has had a vague role in regard to other agencies and is greatly underfunded and poorly staffed. According to Florano, money has simply 'disappeared' into the organisation (Florano, 1993:16). As a result, the PCUP is greatly mistrusted by the urban poor and NGOs alike (Mendoza and Rivera, 1995:5) who feel it needs to be purged of its political appointments and must have more political clout to be meaningful (Tojos et.al, n.d:34; Am, 1995:216). Following inauguration and in keeping with tradition, Ramos bypassed the agency and created his own Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty, thus adding yet another layer of bureaucracy to the encumbered list. Consequently the PCUP is now just one of three similar agencies with no real power or influence to enforce its recommendations (Tabora, 1993:4).

It is now the National Housing Authority that is entrusted with housing construction and alternative programmes for the urban poor. And yet it is still financially bankrupt and dependent on other organisations for external financing (Robles, 1994b:12). Indeed, Karaos argues that the agency is so much in debt that in order to survive it needs to profit from its housing programmes (Karaos,
1994:11). It can no longer even afford to purchase land for redistribution to the poor, relying on private sector contributions as part of its joint venture social housing programme (Tojos, n.d:34; NHA, 1994). The emphasis of the agency has been on slum improvement, relocation, sites and services and the construction of affordable core housing units (Gregorio-Medel, 1989:9; NHA, 1993). Due to its financial position, however, it relies more now on joint venture and private sector arrangements to produce housing13 (Karaos, 1994:11; NHA, 1991). As a result it has slowly moved away from sites and services and upgrading toward medium rise constructions affordable only to the middle classes (Karaos, 1994:11). Throughout the Aquino and into the Ramos administration, the NHA has moved into housing construction for the salaried lower middle classes (ICSI, n.d). This has paralleled the desire of post-Marcos administrations to move toward a facilitating role in housing and away from the previous building role (Tojos et.al, n.d:29). Consequently, the main organisation entrusted with building for the urban poor is no longer playing this role to any significant extent.

Additionally, even though it is still the principal housing agency, the NHA is generally not held in high esteem by the poor. Partly this is due to its long history which has given little benefit for those seeking affordable shelter. Also the agency is perceived to be exploitative, using the slogan of participation in order to elicit cheap labour for housing schemes (Tojos et.al, n.d:39). Indeed in one protracted case involving the residents of Manresa, a planned NHA project was violently resisted leading to the death of a local in 1992. Residents considered Aquino’s National Shelter Programme to be nothing more than a ‘hoax’. With a history of not being considered or consulted over their housing needs, residents complained that “whenever they were promised something

13 President Ramos, in the 1993 National Housing Authority Annual Report clearly views housing in economic parlance: “Let me emphasise that I have considered the housing program not only as a means to directly provide for the shelter needs of our people but likewise to boost the economy. Housing is one of my administration’s major pump-priming activities considering its multiplier effect to create demand, generate jobs and stimulate industrial production” (NHA, 1993:2).
good, things turned out for the worse" (Tojos et.al, n.d:31,60). Disillusioned with the PCUP’s lack of action over their complaints they felt forced to stand and fight. Nevertheless the upgrading programme eventually proceeded. As of 1994 there remained tension between original squatters and the new more wealthy residents (interview OT01, 6 March 1994).

Even organisations with the objective of lending to the poor such as the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) favoured the middle classes (Robles, 1994b:12). A Private Sector Low Income Housing Association (PHILSHA) study showed that up to December 1992, 72% of money loaned for housing needs was to higher income borrowers. In the late 1980s in order to get a P100,000 loan from the HUDCC the homebuyer had to pay P7,000 in application and processing fees alone, the equivalent to an average earner’s two months salary (Tojos et.al, n.d:36). The current Community Mortgage Program also appears to be undergoing this fate (Karaos, 1994:11). Additionally the overlapping lending agencies are prone to compete with each other for housing loans (Tojos et.al, n.d:37).

Thus, over Aquino’s term, few significant structural changes affected the housing sector and there was little improvement in the condition of the urban poor. Indeed, the situation appeared to be worsening. Housing agencies remained politicised and vulnerable. The housing sector continued to be chaotic, overlapping, uncoordinated and underfunded. The sector and the population were awash with laws, proclamations, bureaucracies and red tape. Between 1975 to the late 1980s no less than seventy five housing laws had been passed (Tojos et.al, n.d:15). The urban poor either ignored them or mistrusted the bureaucracies they had to deal with. Additionally, throughout Aquino’s term demolitions and forced resettlement to distant sites continued. Indeed, the average number of poor affected by demolitions throughout Aquino’s term averaged 100,000, with Quezon City alone issuing 100 court orders for ‘official’ demolitions each year (Murphy, 1993a:9-15). Throughout Aquino’s term, public satisfaction over her administration’s handling of the
housing crisis crashed from an approval rating of +32 in 1988 to -15 in mid-1992 (ACSPPA, 1992:8). Housing implementation continued to favour the more wealthy classes and agencies continued to be used as a source of 'pork barrel' politics (Karaos, 1994:9,11).

Such was the legacy that the Ramos administration inherited. Housing executives warned in 1994 that if urban growth continued the Philippines faced an 'urban nightmare' at the turn of the century (Nocum, 1994:8). Typically, early policy statements conveyed the government's commitment to at least tackling the problem. Under the 'Philippines 2000' programme (Yap and Ungson, 1993; Flores, 1993) the regime over the following six year period aimed to pursue a two pronged policy of relocating 164,000 people to sites outside Metro Manila and developing medium rise and rental complexes within Metro Manila. The programme, if implemented, is likely to cost hundreds of millions of pesos. Yet, IBON estimates that even if all these targets are met, these grandiose plans will still only affect 10% of the squatter population (IBON, 1993:8). According to Mercene, to have a serious impact on the problem, the government would need to spend P180 billion to build 1.2 million low cost housing units by the end of the decade, a task that economically, as well as politically appears to be an "impossible dream" (Mercene, 1993:47). Concurrently, in 1994 Manuel Villar was warning that the existing housing industry faced collapse due to a lack of funding (Editorial, Manila Chronicle, 3 June 1994:4).

Ramos has sought to make the government the 'enabler' rather than the provider of housing (and thus reflecting current international trends and discourse). The private sector has also being encouraged to become involved, but due to low returns and other problems (most importantly dealing with government) it has not been keen (Dabu-Foz, 1994:SB-9). The financial crisis in the housing sector coupled with an inability to coordinate the type of housing most needed continue to hinder the administration. These remain age old problems, with very few current solutions.
Conversely, other aspects of the ‘Philippines 2000’ programme, such as the building of circumferential roads, require massive demolition and relocation (Rodriguez, 1994: B-24). Poverty issues are clearly taking a back seat in ‘Philippines 2000’ and demolitions continue regularly (Rivera and Mendoza, 1996:7-9). There is a lack of interest in urban poor issues in Congress and a hostile attitude towards their Sectoral Representative. Urban poor issues are often "shelved indefinitely" (interview OT06, June 16 1994). There remains an embattled attitude of the authorities to the urban poor. For the poor the government has lost credibility, particularly when it comes to promises regarding relocation and compensation. For the authorities a kind of conflict mentality prevails. In one recent example of an infrastructural project of the administration, a civil engineer, when asked why his organisation did not give squatters the legally required thirty day notice to move before demolition responded, "It’s war. In war you don’t warn your enemies" (Murphy, 1993b:5).

In a case of Manila versus a community of squatters seeking to forestall demolition, Judge Sanchez is quoted to have summed up thus:

Squatting is a crime ... it does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare, it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice ..., squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government (Legarda, 1994:10).

But while Ramos pledged in 1992 to purge the country of the real causes of squatting, those professional squatters (including officials, police and army personnel) who exploit and stop the poor from taking advantage of current programs, not one person has been arrested on this law (Robles, 1994a:10). Additionally, in late 1995 Ramos vetoed a bill that would have extended the moratorium on demolitions enshrined within EDSA. In so doing, this was the first time in the three-and-a-half year presidency in which Ramos has used his veto powers (Karaos, 1995b:25).
Continuity and Change: Housing and the Urban Poor

Historically, there has been a continual gap between stated goals and actual implementation in regard to providing housing alternatives for the urban poor (Constantino-David, 1989:32). From Marcos' 'New Society', Aquino's 'people empowerment' and Ramos' 'Philippines 2000', the urban poor have witnessed a steady deterioration in their living standards. As Constantino-David (1989:32) has put it,

> it has become more and more difficult to recall the events at EDSA without feeling a sense of despair. For the majority of Filipinos who had, rather simplistically, expected immediate and dramatic changes as a result of the ouster of a dictatorship and the reintroduction of constitutional democracy, a growing sense of disillusionment has replaced the euphoria of February 1986.

This has continued well into the Ramos administration's housing targets and programmes. While in 1992 an UDHA regulation called for local officials to make lists for people to avail themselves of social housing programmes, by mid-1994 the *Manila Chronicle* reported that "[r]ecords at the interior and local governments department shows that not a single local government unit has compiled with the new housing law" (Agoncillo, 1994:3). In this, housing plans and programs have not been immune to the wider issues of bureaucratic mismanagement and politicisation of their work, corruption, poorly coordinated and administered programmes which have been and are inadequately funded (and then pass on the costs to the poor). Throughout, the Philippines has lacked a socially responsive housing programme. This lack of coordination is also a problem at the state/local government level. This was borne out clearly in a University of the Philippines research exercise during Aquino's term:

> Some local governments have their own housing programme independent of the national housing agencies. A number of mayors interviewed do not know about the programmes of government. They adopt policies which are not always
Subsequently, as Constantino-David (1989:36-7) has argued, the state has historically doubly failed. It has failed to design programmes that are responsive to the needs and priorities of the urban poor, and additionally, the bureaucracy has been unable to properly and efficiently implement programmes that benefit the most in need. Additionally, concurrent administrations have simply lacked the political will to address the housing crisis (Tojos et al, n.d:30) and its causes, which centre around the political unwillingness to pursue national development (Robles, 1994b:12).

Yet along with increasing poverty in the 1980s has also emerged an increased consciousness of this poverty (Gilbert, 1992:452). "Until recently, few people have reflected on the fact that these people are victims of social injustice. Their plight is the result of our society not facing up to this and the structural measures needed to alleviate it" (McBeth, 1992:33). Combined with this has been the proliferation in the growth of community organisations and social movements throughout the country, particularly in Metro Manila. Metro Manila has indeed become a highly politicised city with over 17,000 NGOs in the mid-1980s in operation (Parrenas, 1993:69). Denis Murphy, a prominent local activist has stated the "[p]erhaps more urban poor people have organised, demonstrated and pressured government for change in Manila than in any other Asian city" (Murphy, 1990c:39). It is perhaps these organisations and their efforts to solve local problems that may indirectly or directly address the wider political and structural causes of poverty and contribute significantly toward some improvement of urban poverty and the housing crisis.

At certain junctures, and particularly in the post-Marcos period, the urban poor (and the NGOs that work with them) have managed to challenge and change the structures that have failed them. Although implementation has been slack, two examples are the establishment of the PCUP and the Urban Development
and Housing Bill of 1992. Additionally, UPOs have proliferated since 1986. These have either sought to use space available to improve their own communities, or they have sought collectively to alter the structural and political environment to their advantage, to break the structures of patronage and subordination. Increasingly these groups, which are typically UPO/NGO coalitions, have become increasingly significant and able.

Summary

For over a century Philippine politics have been the preserve of the economic elite. In the Philippines, wealth equates to political power and in turn access to office augments prosperity for oneself and family. Thus, ‘Philippine style democracy’ has led to the advancement of one class at the expense of others, linked through patronage and bound by an unequal dependency.

Although altered by time and circumstance, the patron-client system has been and remains the fundamental political order. Examining Filipino politics and state-society relations through clientelism is more productive than comparable analysis on conventional political institutions such as parties, laws and constitutions. Clientelism binds the poor to the wealthy in a manner which preserves the status quo and enhances the authority of the patron. Such a system is not contingent on its degree of responsiveness to problems such as urban poverty and housing. Subsequently, the housing crisis can be examined through the nature of Filipino politics. Meeting the needs of the urban poor has minimal significance unless the poor are able to capture patrons. Any meaningful political analysis of the Philippines and issues of poverty and marginalisation need to account for this political reality of power.

Within this system the local level holds particular prominence. Control of the barangay was crucial to Marcos’s centralisation process and remains central
to the political fortunes of the elite. It is at this level where votes are traded and where the system procures enough legitimacy and logic to permit its conservation. Diametrically though, the local level is also where communities such as the urban poor have numerical preeminence and where many commentators perceive change can be initiated: to politics, to empowerment, and to policies which elevate the urban poor’s plight from its current and historical marginality.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESPONSE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: NON GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS, URBAN POOR ORGANISATIONS AND THE URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN MANILA.

Introduction

This chapter examines the response of Philippine civil society to issues such as urban poverty and housing in both a chronological and thematic manner. Firstly, there is a discussion on the changing nature of state-society relations and how this has affected popular organisations and their ability or otherwise to pressure the elite/state to respond to worsening conditions of underdevelopment. Following this, several themes are introduced which are pertinent to the case studies in following chapters. Issues of NGO and UPO effectiveness are addressed; questions of sustainability, orientation and political impact are raised and the expectations held of civil society in the Philippine context are critiqued and evaluated.

Non Government Organisations in the Philippines

According to experienced commentators (Murphy, 1990c), the Philippines is home to the most politicised NGO and PO community in Asia. Commonly, it is estimated that there are over 18,000 NGOs in the Philippines, with over 5,000 new ones emerging in the first few years following EDSA (Ledesma, 1990:61). This figure however conceals the fact that many of these are not development
NGOs. There has been widespread growth concurrently in the number of 'business front' NGOs, tax havens, political NGOs and so on (Ledesma, 1990:62). Nevertheless, the 2,000 or so plus Non Government Development Organisations in the Philippines are considered to be the most advanced community in South East Asia, and are considered to have been a dominant and constant fixture in Philippines society and politics for over a decade (Tigno, 1993:61; Brillantes, 1993:230, reports 3,500 NGDOs in 1992).

Although dating back to the 1950s, NGOs in the Philippines ironically gained most momentum when their freedom of manoeuvre and expression was at its most constrained, during the martial law period of 1972-85. Indeed it was this martial law repression that helped initiate much of the NGO-PO community (Argonza, 1990:99). Many of these groups, however, either eventually collapsed under the weight of dictatorship or were subsumed into the orbit of the system, filling the role of (non-political) self-help associations and cooperatives. While martial law provided the rationale to unite, it also led to the suffocation of those embryonic challenges. Likewise, it was eventually because of these organisations' cooperative nature that many did collapse, having failed to adequately address the needs of the people (Argonza, 1990:99).

However, a combination of weakening authoritarianism, the growing power vacuum, and state incapacity, led to a renaissance in the size and depth of NGDOs in the early 1980s. Many of these organisations became prominent in the 'parliament of the streets' during the 1980s. With conscientication being the main objective, the NGO community were able to win the minds of the disenfranchised so that by the mid-1980s, "people's and nongovernment organisations altogether became a force - a collective power centre - to reckon with" (Argonza, 1990:100). Indeed, Fernando Aldaba referred to NGOs as the 'flavour of the decade' throughout the 1980s (Aldaba, 1992:10). Their influence and ability to mobilise became most evident in the events of 1985-86.
In the post 1986 period, NGOs have had to realign their strategies to the opening up of democratic space. In this, and with the entry of activist personalities into powerful political positions in the first Aquino cabinet (positions which later gave way to the return of conservative politicians), NGDOs have felt encouraged to enter into a more permanent and politically significant role. Whether this was sought through electoral channels and contests, or through the creation of multi-sectorial social movements, NGDOs in the post Marcos era were seeking to play a more national role in the country's development. NGDO leaders now feel that past educational efforts, while still important, have reached their limits of revolutionary potential, and now more structured and long term political goals and methods are necessary (interview NG05, March 17 1994; interview NG02, March 11 1994). The LGC represented a new maturity in government-NGO relations from confrontation to manipulation. Indeed, according to work done by Aldaba, conscientisation now ranks last in NGO objectives, behind income generation and linkaging efforts (Aldaba, 1992:37).

According to this view, it is unlikely that the elite will ever legislate against their own interests and increase equity and promote more even income distribution (de Castro, 1992:65). In short, elite-styled democracy will continue with elite dominance in decision making bodies and legislatures. Accordingly, both NGDO and partner POs need therefore to 'scale-up' their activities into the seats of the decision making process.

Recently, this has been sought through electoral participation; national development consultations, experimenting and articulating alternative paths to development and through 'scaling-up' to create national social movements which link the PO grassroots level to the corridors of power. According to Aldaba, most Philippines NGOs either directly or indirectly work with or assist a grassroots organisation (Aldaba, 1992:3). Still, the essential question remains, of what role NGOs and in particular INGOs play in social transformation in the Philippines (Aldaba, 1992:10).
Despite gains in recognition and alliance building over the years, the NGO community is a deeply fractured one. This is not, however, necessarily endemic to the Philippines. McCarthy and Zald (1977) have noted that social movements are rarely unified and are diverse in organisation, tactics and ideologies. Cooperation in an environment of scarce resources and disparate ideologies is exceptional. Political differences (in particular the left/right division) and a lack of coordination have traditionally plagued efforts at a united front in Manila (interview NG05, March 17 1994). Indeed, Karaos (interview NG04, March 15 1994) identified three main NGO blocs operating with the urban poor in the city which crudely form an ideological continuum from right to left. On the one side is the government coalition, the National Urban Poor Coordinating Council (NUPCC) which works with the PCUP organising communities for official accreditation and access to government programmes. Roughly speaking, in the centre is the Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULR-TF), which has formed a coalition of groups (including the FDA) into an influential lobby group whose successes included UDHA. Remaining on the left is the KPML, the above ground organisation of the CPP. According to Murphy, the KPML had enormous support in the 1970s but, having failed to deliver daily needs, has become more marginal of late (interview NG05, March 17 1994). At certain times, such as lobbying for UDHA, these coalitions have worked together with some degree of success. Typically though, they have quarrelled ideologically and failed to form a workable coalition.

The Response from the Grassroots: Peoples Organisations and the Urban Poor

Grassroots movements have been active historical agents in political change throughout the Third World (Karaos, 1993a:3). Though their ability for extensive social change is doubted by some (Murphy, 1990a:52), they have been prominent in the Philippines since the late 1970s and are said to now operate
at virtually all levels and regions of Philippine society (Tigno, 1993:64). Thus, the Philippines is at the forefront of urban poor organising in South East Asia (van Naerssen, 1989:199). The first fledgling UPOs emerged in the 1950s in Tondo (The Federation of Tondo Foreshore Land Tenants Association) in order to lobby for laws to allow them to purchase the land they were squatting on, a battle that was directed at the legislators and was at least partially successful (Tojos et al., n.d:51-2).

Overall, however, urban poor organisations were not widespread before the 1970s. Organisation was in fact inspired by external situations of state repression, most notably the increase in demolitions and relocations that surrounded the imposition of martial law (Karaos, 1993a:3; Argonza, 1990:99). These evictions led to a growth in squatter consciousness and organisation (Viloria and Williams, 1987:13). This was most evident in the creation of Zone One Tondo Organisation (ZOTO) in 1969, which was followed by a plethora of community organisations and coalitions. These developments reflected the growing desperation of the urban poor and a greater willingness to confront the authorities over their actions. But the authorities responded with repression in the Martial Law period and squatting was made illegal through several presidential decrees in the 1970s (especially PD 772 which made squatting a crime and has yet to be revoked). The situation lead to a mutual standoff, however, the urban poor and their allies had demonstrated their potential power in organising and were reasonably successful in checking the governments approach of demolitions on a mass scale.

Throughout the 1970s, UPOs continued to exist in two distinct forms. Firstly, there were those organisations that were forced underground through political repression. These groups adopted a political protest and combative posture, even forming into urban coalitions, the most successful of which was ZOTO. The more militant and politicised organisations placed the condition of urban poverty and housing within the 'grander issues' of opposing the dictatorship,
elite control and foreign domination (Karaos, 1993a:3) and in doing so were considered to be 'political subversives' (Argonza, 1990:99).

On the other side were those organisations that were non-political and civic in nature. In the martial law period the majority of these organisations were characterised by their depoliticised civic and self help nature and played the role of servant in elections characterised by patronage and warlordism. Usually these organisations were in the form of self help associations or cooperatives and were extensions of government control (Argonza, 1990:99). The communities, for their part, were accustomed to negotiating with candidates for basic services in exchange for votes. Urban poor leaders, acting as dispensers of patronage goods from politicians, found in electoral exercises a useful way of reinforcing their leadership roles in their communities. Thus, elections served little purpose other than to strengthen patron-client ties between politicians and urban poor communities (Karaos, 1992a:5). Throughout the martial law period then, the 'urban poor movement' was deeply fractured and fractionalised on both a political/ideological level, and between urban poor communities with different levels of state penetration.

Yet in the lead up to EDSA, POs played a significant, though in some cases an overstated role in the ousting of Marcos. Participating in what became known as the 'parliament of the streets', the urban poor had become a powerful sector to be reckoned with (Argonza, 1990:99-100). Consequently, in 1987 the Philippines emerged with one of the worlds most 'pro-people' constitutions in the world (Nolledo, 1987) giving POs a formal place in society, and one encouraged, respected and recognised by the state and its agencies (Tigno, 1990:65). The Philippine constitution recognises that POs are critical to any democratic and pluralistic society (Aldaba, 1990:77). In this supportive (or at least, less repressive) post-EDSA environment, POs flourished as citizens sought to gain leverage in the widening democratic space created (Karaos, 1992a:5). The popular hope was that these Filipinos, once politicised by the events of the 1980s, would become more active and effective in politics
(Timberman, 1991:168). The ideal was a "manifestation of the increasing awareness of people to mould there own developmental projects in response to their perceived or felt needs" (Argonza, 1990:98).

As with NGOs, POs have had a greater responsibility placed on them in this environment, and this has been problematic for these organisations. With previous tactical skills less valid, POs needed to become more flexible and able in pursuing longer term objectives that would benefit the community (Argonza, 1990:99,101). Significantly, these organisations have sought to have a greater impact at the macro as well as the micro-level - as they are affected by what happens there (Aldaba, 1990:77).

Paradoxically though, Murphy has noted that "[i]t seems almost universally true that the more local and concrete issues are, the more people will be interested in supporting them" (Murphy, 1990b:5). In this, a more sober and realistic assessment of the limitations of POs in the Philippines appears. Organisers have had some success in organising communities into single issue problems, such as water and electricity, and to get a community organisation to develop around these issues. The more fundamental, substantial, and perhaps important problems and issues, such as urban land reform and employment, are harder to solve or to gather a mass base of participation, as negotiations with authorities can drag on for years until most community organisations disintegrate (Interview NG05, March 17 1994).

In inspiring and coordinating the participation of the poor, POs have also had a patchy and less successful record. In the case of UDHA, the urban poor managed to unite across ideological boundaries to affect change at the national level - but at the 1992 elections the sector "did not figure in the electoral field as a united force" (Karaos, 1992a:5). Efforts toward uniting the urban poor to affect change, while only recent, have proved disappointing. Perhaps this can be at least partially attributed to what Murphy and others have noted, that in the
post-EDSA period many of the urban poor are politically jaded, preferring to work at the local level (Murphy, 1990b:19).

The Role of Intermediary NGOs in Urban Poor Organisations in the Philippines

The relationship between NGDOs and POs in the Philippines has a rich history and in many cases the two levels cannot be easily separated. In the 1970s, PO growth was largely the result of NGO aided and agitated development. Indeed, it can be argued that the relationship was symbiotic. The Philippine Ecumenical Centre for Community Organising (PECCO), as the first significant INGO in Manila, was instrumental in the development and rise of ZOTO, the first consequential urban poor coalition in the capital (Tojos et al., n.d:51; van Naerssen, 1989:202-203). At this time, NGO work was based around Alinsky-style conscientisation, developed through a rigorous process of community agitation and organisation building (Mendoza, 1995:18). Due to the hostile political nature of the regime, however, most of this work was done 'underground'. Most often these organisations worked to combat offensive government policies, usually basing themselves around single issues. The origins of many of these urban movements date back to this period in the 1970s, when big development projects and Marcos' 'aggressive urban policies' including bulldozing and forced relocation, coerced the poor onto the defensive. Due to the militant nature of the government, urban poor NGO coalitions thus assumed a less potent and more defensive character (Karaos, 1993a:3).

In the post-Marcos Philippines, a frenzy of NGO organising and networking of POs has occurred (though this may be tapering). On the positive side, it is argued that "nongovernment organisations consciously develop autonomous POs that will be able to think, decide, and act by themselves. Once nongovernment organisations are able to establish autonomous POs, they automatically reproduce themselves" (Aldaba, 1990:78). Thus, according to
Tigno (1993:60), NGOs and POs have now emerged as actors that are perhaps even more significant than conventional political bodies such as parties and interest groups (Portes and Itzigsohn, 1994 provide similar examples from the Caribbean). The principal movers toward change must be the grassroots organisations (Aldaba, 1992:38). NGOs have also taught UPOs valuable skills and tactics which have, over the years, been used successfully to draw attention to urban poor issues on a national scale through such things as hunger strikes, demonstrations, public plays, media announcements and even being interviewed on television talk shows (Tojos et.al, n.d:61). UPOs are now effectively working as conduits of information to the press and policy makers on policies, corrupt local officials and so on (Tojos et.al, n.d:61).

Primarily, in the Philippines as elsewhere, these partnerships are forged to link the grassroots and the middle class nature of NGOs into a movement for change. These visions include organising people’s organisations, consciousness raising and value orientation, encouraging critical analysis of the system, helping develop community infrastructure and economic independence, and building coalitions (Aldaba, 1992:40-41). Historically, activity from the early 1980s to 1986 with the so-called ‘people’s revolution’, promotes the ideal view of this approach/partnership. Yet it has been a troubled and difficult path. The ‘urban movement’ has, since the 1970s, been split into ideological camps - reflecting the different concerns of the middle classes amongst other things. NGOs are a decidedly middle class phenomenon in the Philippines. Professionals account for around 90% of NGO boards, with approximately 80% having tertiary qualifications (Aldaba, 1992:37). Unity was also elusive in the movement throughout the martial law period, when different groups were split ideologically over how to define issues and in practical terms regarding how to form a response (Karaos, 1993a:4). This was most evident at times when political pressure intensified and unity was most desperately needed - such as during Imelda Marcos’ ‘last campaign’ of 1982. In this case, the urban poor failed respond collectively and coherently, factionalism causing the urban poor to take a back seat in the resolution of the crisis.
Plate 7. NGO/UPO public education display.

Plate 8. Demolition over the implementation of UDHA.
Despite signs of unity in EDSA, there were significant differences in the pro-poor movement - evident in the Aquino presidency when the movement broke roughly into three ideological camps. And while, after Marcos, "coalition-building in the urban poor movement became the order of the day" (Karaos, 1993a:4), this reflected and intensified the ideological rift of POs. However, the need for unity was (and is still) great. In the immediate post-Marcos period, it was clear to many that "the passage of favourable urban poor measures depend[ed] on the strength and unity of the urban poor organisations" (Zablan, 1990:11). In this, UPOs have fallen victim to NGO divisions, becoming fragmented as a movement and defined ideologically through their parent organisations.

One of the most significant issues which is problematic of NGO-PO relations is that of equality and dependency (Tumbaga and Ramiro, 1993:17). While conscientisation and empowerment work is seen as crucial in social transformation, INGOs may play their part in the oppression and suppression of people's organisations. According to Antonio Ledesma:

Non-government organisations have formed another network of oppression ... They do not allow the true spirit and dynamism of the people at the base to emerge because of their own vested interest ... The intermediary nongovernment organisations are the ones dictating the development policies within the NGO world. I do not see peoples' movements coming out to challenge this dominance (cited in Aldaba, 1992:2).

And so, INGOs may be creating "paternal and dependent relations" with UPOs (Aldaba, 1992:2). UPOs are financially dependent on their NGO and may not have control over the direction or purpose funds are used (Aldaba, 1992:49). Money may reach the UPO through a kind of 'trickle-down' effect with similar norms as in other forms of patronage. Some INGOs may be acting as professional service contractors rather than empowering the poor, and in the process making them perpetually dependent on them (Aldaba, 1992:12; Tumbaga and Ramiro, 1993:17). This may even occur at the organising stage. The way that the INGO and the individual organiser defines issues and
suggests the way the community reacts is a type of ideological control. This defining role can also post-date UPO ‘independence’ when the INGO continues to play a ‘consultative’ role (Aldaba, 1992:46). Thus the type of relations that exist are important to examine. Such issues reimpose the question, do INGOs play the role of harnessing UPOs for empowerment within sustainable organisations, or are they adding another layer of bureaucracy and oppression for the urban poor?

Additional to the significant ideological issues involved with NGOs and POs ‘scaling-up’ into urban or national movements, there are great practical difficulties. There have been tensions between local and national levels, particularly in regard to peoples organisations. Two attempts at post-EDSA urban social movements, NACUPO and People’s Force ‘failed’ because they did not balance local, sectorial, and national issues (Karaos, 1993a:4). This balance of micro and macro issues is the key to a successful movement. ZOTO is said to have suffered greatly when it went national with its issue emphasis (Murphy, 1990c:18; Mendoza, 1995:19). According to Murphy, the more national the organisation, the more educated and sophisticated it becomes, and the more the poor/mass base shrinks (Murphy, 1990b:18). Paradoxically, according to these same authors it is only when pressure is exerted at the national level that things are likely to change.

Yet, it has been argued that these organisations at both the local and national level have disappointed in their effect on the system if measured both by political/policy and poverty alleviation. In an assessment of seven large urban poor alliances based in Metro Manila, the majority have “scored few victories at the community level with regard to a moratorium on demolitions, land acquisition, and securing financing assistance” (Zablan, 1990:10). Nevertheless, in 1991 the activist community announced its bold strategy to become significant players in the electoral and policy arena. Project 2001 aims to give political muscle to the movement through research, education, lobbying and the direct fielding of candidates for positions in office (Arquiza, 1992:247).
To date, the only organisations that have survived to continue are those with the structure of the Urban Land Reform-Task Force (ULR-TF),\textsuperscript{14} which, emerging from the frustrations of the poor, began as "a loose alliance of urban poor groups, NGOs, church groups and individuals" in a flexible, unstructured organisation (Karaos, 1993a:5). Recently though, it has sought a more formal proactive role, albeit only at the expense of abandoning the left wing. Short-run coalition efforts now predominate in urban social movements as the desire and need to unite are overpowered by the recurrence of past mistakes and shortcomings (Karaos, 1993a:18).

Basically, while the need is there and is as great as it has ever been, efforts to unite UPOs have been disappointing. "Many years of experimenting with building coalitions and of trying to make them work have produced very humbling, if not frustrating, results" (Karaos, 1993a:3). Predominant factors in this failure have been a disunity over ideology and strategies above single ‘popular’ issues - such as demolition, and a lack of electoral and political clout to affect significant change on a national issue (Zablan, 1990:11; Karaos, 1993a:18). Urban poor politics reflects the wider political culture through factionalism and bitter personality-driven disputes. Coupled with differing concerns and attitudes to issues, the urban poor community fails to speak in one clear and effective voice. While these coalitions are inclusive and widely represented this same inclusiveness also makes them fragile coalitions (Arquiza, 1992:246).

\textsuperscript{14} The ULR-TF is a coalition primarily composed of UPOs and NGOs. Traditionally the main objective of the ULR-TF has been to help the poor through pursuing urban land reform through lobbying policy makers and promoting effective implementation of current laws. Recently it has widened its mandate to aid in the empowerment of the urban poor through organising and has become involved in a variety of urban poor issues beyond land reform (ULR-TF Flyer, n.d; Gatpatan, 1994:6,18). In June 1996 it expects to send one delegate to the HABITAT II conference (Annie de Leon, personal correspondence, January 23, 1996).
Some of these concerns were borne out in several interviews that were conducted in 1994 with GONGOs and NGDOs that worked with the urban poor in Metro Manila. In one interview with an NGO formally active in building alliances with UPOs, Theresa felt that UPOs were actually "on the wane and struggling" in Manila. She felt this was due to poverty and a lack of resources on the one hand, and the leadership mentality of Filipinos on the other. Subsequently, some of the organisations they had established were dependent and unsustainable (interview NG03, March 14 1994). Nevertheless, the LGC was seen as a possible area of breakthrough for NGOs. One government employee noted several difficulties with peoples organisations. On the one hand ethnic and language divisions divide communities and foster parochialism, while on the other hand peoples poverty mitigates against their participation. Consequently, community organising was spoken of as "necessary, but tedious work" best left to NGOs (Interview OT03, June 2 1994).

Critical to pro-poor coalition strategies are the goals of affecting change and increasing influence at the local level. Increasingly, NGOs are encouraging UPOs and rural POs to run for, or support, popular non-traditional contestants for barangay elections. Consequently, there is great potential, if only in promise, for political clout. In the 1994 barangay election one mayor estimated that while just over 20% of home owners voted, over 60% of squatters went to the polls (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 May 1994:5). Generally, polls have supported the fact that while almost one-half of Filipinos distrust national politics and elections, there is still significant support for barangay politics (ACSPPA, 1992:22-23). In the 1995 Senate elections the urban poor were expected to form a formidable voting bloc, particularly in Quezon City, where they are considered well organised (ACSPPA, 1995:9).

There are historical as well as practical reasons for difficulty in these projects. Traditionally, local politics are rarely ideological (political parties are banned from competing). Selections are primarily based on parochial considerations of kinship, accessibility and the promise of rewards (Editorial, The Manila
During the 1994 barangay elections, on being polled on why they voted for those they did, the majority of respondents cited people’s looks, their connections, and even having an easy name to spell ahead of any ideological considerations (Malaya, 10 May 1994:1,3).

Some of the difficulties of this project have been borne out through experience already. A PULSO study of the impact of NGOs and POs in the 1992 elections illustrated several difficulties faced by these groups and their relative ineffectiveness throughout both the campaign and post election proceedings. Factionalism, inexperience, resources (vis-a-vis traditional politicians) and an inability to transfer support into bloc votes were factors that plagued the progressive candidates in the several case studies. Nevertheless, as an early electoral experiment, these attempts did demonstrate that with greater cohesion and experience the popular sectors could become politically effective in time (Clamor, 1993).

Summary

Community organisations and organising have a strong history in the Philippines. Metro Manila, in particular, has one of the largest and most politicised NGO populations outside of Latin America. Since 1986 communities have been organising themselves, at one level or another, with great fervour. The quality and direction of this organising, however, should not be pre-supposed. Urban poor organisations can be non-political, weakly organised and dictatorial as much as they can be progressive. Organisation may even serve to support and increase exploitive patronage relations between the community and patrons, particularly through community leaders. On the other hand, local organisations and leaders may offer much to a community and elicit a degree of benefits and protection from the outside system. As of yet, relatively little is
known of the nature and directions of Self-Organised Community Organisations (SOCOs) and the role that they play.

For over two decades now, NGOs have also been active in establishing and dealing with UPOs. Since the martial law period, NGOs have increased their activity in consciousness work and have encouraged the politicisation of the urban poor. Additionally, NGOs have sought to build alliances and federations including efforts to generate urban (and wider) social movements. The logic is that the urban poor as a sector must unite to force change upon the system that exploits their labour but does not provide for their needs: "Substantive improvements for Manila's poor will likely continue to rely on the urban poor's own organisational abilities" (Arn, 1995:220). Increasingly, these efforts have been centred at the local level.

These relationships have not been entirely unproblematic. Issues of dependency and sustainability, ideological indoctrination, and hostility are not unknown. Nevertheless, UPOs linked to NGDOs are felt to be more system-oriented and have had some degree of success in altering structures and placing democratic pressures on decision makers (such as in UDHA). While difficulties have arisen over creating an urban social movement of some coherency and cohesion, these alliances have demonstrated promise in regard to their lofty objectives. Other UPOs, those that have developed around local issues and are largely non aligned, have had less of an impact on the outside environment, though they may be more cohesive internally. Indeed, these SOCOs are by far in the majority. Murphy has estimated that only 5% of the urban poor are formally organised and that most of the poor have not even heard of NGOs (interview NG05, March 17 1994).

While much is spoken about peoples organisations, however, insufficient research has been carried out on UPOs and the relationships between support organisations and the urban poor (van Naerssen, 1993:18-19). Additionally there has been a deficiency in research that has sought to analyse these
organisations through comparative research. Whether the former type of organisation is the more progressive and capable of challenging and changing the patronage environment that withholding and restricts their development is a question to be considered throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
CHAPTER FIVE

METHODODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK

Introduction

The fieldwork component of this dissertation focused on observing two urban poor organisations in Metro Manila and examining and discovering issues germane to UPOs in the Philippines in a comparative context. Accordingly, the type of research undertaken was case study research and involved living in urban poor communities over a six month period in 1994. This time was wholly divided between living in two autonomous settlements, barangay Sauyo in Quezon City to the east of Manila, and barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa, in the south of Metro Manila along Laguna de Bay. From my arrival in early March till late May, I lived and worked in Muntinlupa. From late May I moved house to the second community, Sauyo, staying there until late July (see Map 5.1).

Originally I left for Manila with the intention of studying leader-community relations, though I was open to adapting this focus to studying UPOs generally and how they operated in the patrimonial system (and perhaps how leaders mediated these interactions). Later, as is demonstrated below, this study changed both to reflect current issues of UPOs in Manila as well as what was appropriate and possible given resource and other limitations. This involved scaling up research to include looking at UPO-NGO relations. Overall, the study focus did not change dramatically, and I was able through the fieldwork period to carry out research that was topical and of significance.

Occasionally, frustration did occur in both adapting these themes to my surroundings and in deriving some explanations. These concerns, which occurred to varying levels and at different times, tended to dissipate over the
fieldwork period. In April I was deeply concerned with how things were going and that I had not discovered anything 'solid' as yet. But over time I came to the acceptance that 'discovery' is not a rushed thing. As I wrote in my fieldnotes:

Today I found some quite good materials at the Social Policy library at Ateneo, though not great ones. I've rather given up on 'discovering' the answers - I just don't think the work's been done.

The methodological techniques used for the study consisted of those regarded as ethnographic and anthropological techniques. Though originally (as will be discussed) this was not because of any epistemological or ideological proclivity. Research consisted of observation (and occasional participation), informal discussions and more structured interviews, and where possible, using previous surveys and reliable information\textsuperscript{15}. In this chapter I discuss both the methodological and personal experiences of my fieldwork in Manila during 1994. Issues of adapting methodology and research direction are addressed as is the personal aspect of fieldwork that play's an important role in one's research and personal experience. In both areas of study research proved satisfactory, and the degree of freedom I had at times even surprised me.

Research Procedures: The Discovery and Adaptation of Methodology

During the research period prior to fieldwork I had decided, with the aid of supervisor advice, to utilise ethnographic methods, though I had little previous formal experience of these. Originally, this was out of the desire to live the experience of the people I had been studying over the years, an opportunity I

\textsuperscript{15} According to Van Maanem (1988:127-130) this puts this study into the "critical tales" type, where fieldwork is carried out researching strategically selected groups placed within wider theoretical/structural analysis and arguments.
did not want to miss. But it was also out of a misgiving over survey techniques that I had originally contemplated, mostly due to the concern that these methodologies ‘presupposed the people, questions, and issues to be studied’ (Sjoberg, et.al 1991:68; Hammersley, 1990:7-8). Subsequently I committed myself to ethnographic and anthropological techniques because they seemed more suited to the research problem. Only later did I become interested in them as an alternative method of study and epistemology (Hammersley, 1990, 6-7).

Additionally, it was through this ‘discovery’ of methodologies that I came to the awareness of case study research (Feagin et.al, 1991; Yin, 1994; Stake, 1994). Once again, I had decided upon this form of study as a natural way to undertake research, and not out of any analytical commitment. In the case of urban anthropology, which is the study of urban ‘enclaves’ (Ellen, 1984:83), case study research is a suitable match. Subsequently, case study techniques were adopted as they suited my research approach of comparing urban poor community organisations. As Yin has argued, the case study approach provides useful techniques for the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions of research (Yin, 1994:1,9).

Finally, my method of employing multiple research techniques was not out of any dedication to triangulation per se, but more out of a natural urge to substantiate findings and gather all that was available to me. The dangers of subjectivity and selectivity inherent to participant observation can be at least partially offset by triangulation methods (Babbie, 1989:280). Efforts toward reliability and validity can also be enhanced (Babbie, 1989:123). Additionally, participant observation and ethnography are inadequate in revealing macro-level eco-political structures and wider factors that need to be taken into account and understood (Ellen, 1984:84). Better research is generated by the use of multiple research methods, and the need for this is recognised by a wide spectrum of methodologists (for example see Babbie, 1989:96 and Ellen, 1984:84).
Subsequently, these methods in the context of the environment and topic can be seen as the natural methodology to be used in these particular settings. Ellen (1984 84-85) makes a strong case for adapting different methodologies to particular settings. Both Varadacher (1979) and Bellwinkel (1979) have found that in their fieldwork in Asian slums, participant observation and informal techniques yielded more accessible information, particularly political data, and that formal techniques could create more trouble and less reliable conclusions than their worth. Indeed, both researchers began their studies using more quantitative techniques but while in the field fell back on qualitative methodologies, and soon gained rich information 'hanging around' shops, water taps, and even toilets. After having had great difficulty using quantitative techniques, Bellwinkel writes of increasing the width and breadth of her data and increasing her feeling of belonging. Indeed, Bellwinkel writes: "Asking questions increasingly became mutual communication, things were disclosing themselves without my having to strain after them" (Bellwinkel, 1979:149). In these cases, qualitative techniques served to emancipate voices that other more rigid techniques would silence (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:5). Snow and Anderson (1991:166) who studied the homeless in Texas, felt that natural science methodologies were irrelevant to marginal populations and they were the basis of both "misunderstanding and dehumanisation". In complex, pluralistic and sensitive areas, qualitative approaches can increase information available and produce more accurate and graphic accounts (Orum et.al, 1991:20-3).

Consequently, methodology in the field should be both flexible and reflective. According to Babbie, "to the field researcher, the formulation of theoretical propositions, the observation of empirical events, and the evaluation of theory are typically all part of the same ongoing process" (Babbie, 1989:279). Methodology is not a matter of rigidly applying a set of techniques in studying phenomena (Hammersley, 1990:130). The open-endedness of research can make it a "dynamic, recursive research process" (Snow and Anderson, 1991:162). Roselie Wax (1971:10) has rightly warned of the dangers of over
rigidity of any method, technique, or doctrine in the field, likening it to confining oneself to a cage. This is particularly true in the early days of fieldwork. As Wax (1971:19-20) has forewarned, "it is during this period that the fieldworker ... discovers that [s/he] cannot possibly do what [s/he] hoped to do and, simultaneously, that there are many unsuspected avenues of investigation open to him [or her]" (see also Stake, 1994:240). Both questions and answers therefore, as much as possible, should be discovered while in the field (Emerson et.al, 1995:112) along with local meaning, orientation and discourse (Emerson et.al, 1995:119-126). This 'open endedness' of study is a theme of qualitative research (Snow and Anderson, 1991:162) and of case study research which often becomes more focused over time after beginning with a set of broad questions (Snow and Anderson, 1991:162). Opportunities and directions of research can also be a question of resources, time, money, opportunity, and even expertise (Hammersley, 1990:130; Van Maanen, 1988:5).

**Research Practise**

Consequently, my methodology was overwhelmingly dependent on the environment I found myself in, with all the opportunities and constraints one is confronted with. As Peil has asserted, "the possibility of doing research and the success of the techniques used are often strongly affected by local or national structural and cultural variables", or what she calls the key 'situational variables' (Peil, 1983:71). For me, there was little set routine as this is not really possible in such an environment. Information gathering took place at any time, day and/or night. Collecting information was divided between spending time in the community, chatting with people (R.G. Burgess, 1982a), interviewing leaders and watching (and sometimes participating in) activities. Other days were spent travelling around Manila in search of information, conducting interviews with NGO leaders, academics and activists and searching for secondary information. This was a very important part of the research. Generally there has been
considerable work done on the urban poor in Manila, but it tends to be unpublished and piecemeal. These local documents and data were an invaluable resource over the research period. Yet, another type of day’s activity can be defined - those spent on developing and working with methodological issues and developing a thesis and strategies to follow up ideas. Between these, some days were spent doing little direct fieldwork as there was a great need for rest, relaxing with the host family and friends, exploring parts of Manila and so on.

Predominantly, research was carried out through ethnographic techniques including participant observation. The goal was to assess the orientations and activities of the two urban poor organisations and to observe the role of leadership. In both settlements I lived near or with the families of local community leaders. This allowed me to communicate extensively with them over a period of time and carry out longitudinal interviews and observations. This gave me the opportunity to evaluate words and actions over time and to note the response of leaders to various crisis situations and later ask them questions about these. This is a technique that Whyte (1982) favours in evaluative style research (also Babbie, 1989:285; Orum et.al, 1991:9-12; Hammersley, 1990:6-8). Ward and Chant (1987:124) note that in this research it is important to build up trust with urban poor leaders over time, using numerous interviews. Other resources were regularly tapped, such as talking with residents, academics and NGOs that had been or still were active in the area, collecting documents and also surveys that had been carried out in the communities by indigenous researchers. I was also active in several activities in order to assess the nature of the organisation’s role with the external community. This involved attending meetings, demonstrations, conferences, social events as well as being occasionally active in path building and even serving in a community bakery.

In questioning informants my line of enquiry was rarely passive. Though open to exploration and alternative directions my questions often had a direction,
topic and 'line of inquiry'. This form of 'flexible direction' is favoured by Babbie (1989:272) and Hammersley (1990:31). De Vaus (1991:83-6) also offers useful guidelines on keeping language simple and unambiguous. I kept topics open enough to heed Emerson’s (et.al, 1995:112) advice on interviewing, that in good ethnographic research "both questions and answers must be discovered from informants" (similar advice is given by Whyte, 1982:111).

With a limited range of Tagalog, I was lucky in that many Filipinos spoke or understood English. But because of the important social role (Ellen, 1984:184; Sluka, 1994) of language acquisition I worked hard to communicate in Tagalog (particularly as one of my host families could speak very little English). Over the fieldwork period I was able to learn enough Tagalog words and phrases to understand Taglish, a popular local mixture of English and Tagalog.

There are also important cultural factors to take into account when asking questions, particularly in Asia. While Wuelker (1983:165) has argued that non-Asians interviewing Asians are 'fiascos', others, such as Emily Jones (1983:254), have noted that it is possible given certain understandings. Namely, it is wise to;

- keep the atmosphere agreeable and the topic pleasant, avoid affronting or humiliating another, don’t disagree with one of higher status, make compliments where possible, delay the main subject with small talk, and never fail to offer hospitality (Jones, 1983:254).

In almost all cases I did not take notes during interviews, nor did I take recordings (the only exceptions were a long interview with an NGO figure, and in discussing issues with academics). This choice was firmly mine and was derived from a gut feeling that it would have affected information. Notes were written up as soon as possible after the event as has been suggested by Whyte (1982:118-9) and Emerson (et.al, 1995:40-1). With the use of carbon sheets I kept my notes in duplicate for safety (R.G. Burgess, 1982b:191) as is common
among fretful fieldworkers (Sanjek, 1990). At times this meant writing up notes on buses, in takeaway bars and while squatting on busy street corners.

Generally, as is frequently advised (Ward and Chant, 1987:124; Ellen, 1984:138; Emerson et.al, 1995:21), I was open regarding the nature of my research and aware of my responsibilities (NZASA, 1990) though the extent of this did vary with the company. At the very least I outlined my research as being a study of community organisations and how they operated. As Hammersley (1990:132-5) has suggested, researchers rarely tell everything about their research, which makes all study covert to some degree. Roth (1962) has suggested that this divulgence operates as a continuum, that runs from open to covert, rather than as an either/or issue. Certainly Wikan (1980), who worked in the slums of Cairo, took on an extremely unethical position by abandoning all efforts at honesty, fearing this would endanger both her and her research. Generally I took a more flexible approach to honesty, though I never deceived anybody over the area of my research.

Use of Journals

Throughout the fieldwork period I maintained a methodology diary, or, as I called it, the ‘blue book’. I used it to think through ideas, list avenues that had opened and closed, as well as things I needed to do. I was able to look back at ideas and issues that needed to be followed up and areas that could be explored. Also in the case of comparing case studies it helped to maintain similar data and methodologies - a kind of checklist of information gathered that could be compared. Thus the book helped me to think through ideas and have it recorded.

The ‘blue book’ was particularly helpful in the initial period of methodological orientation. On March 18, after only two weeks in the field, I was able to list a
couple of pages of propositions, ideas, and points of comparison, though these were embryonic and some ideas were later discarded. Being able to write out considerations like this gave me a thinking board and the confidence to record changes in strategy and direction while in the field. I was able to write what I’d ideally like to do at each stage, and then what would be at least the most acceptable. I also noted how I could improve propositions, validity, reliability, and define issues. Subsequently the study/research evolved through the book.

I thought it would be invaluable when I got back (in following up ideas with secondary research for example), but in fact it was the most useful while still in the field. In this way there is an entry of thought at least every few days, sometimes daily, when decisions had to be made or when activity was at a high point. A lot of the ideas came to be unfulfilled questions, but the real value lay in the writing of them.

I also used the ‘blue book’ to record advice regarding the study and methodology I received from academics, locals, and NGO workers and in the preparation of questions and themes for interviews, to which I could look back on afterwards. Additionally, I would write in pertinent points of important articles and think how they related to my topic. This integrated in the page with my own ideas in a kind of reflective thinking board and kept it in touch with other local research. I was also able to add in letters from supervisors which I received monthly. Thus the ‘blue book’ was an invaluable source of ideas and experience and open ended questions I left myself. The book was also useful to point out unanswered questions, and possibilities for new research, as much as to record open doorways than to record what I had been doing. Objectives could be as simple as reminding myself to count how many people attended a meeting and who they were or they could be more challenging. On April 1, 1994 one note included:

After today - quite a big day - need to develop some new analysis and have particular questions to answer from now on. Need to find out more about the local leadership and their relations with the barangay system. I also need to observe the organisations role in a political environment, perhaps next month’s barangay
The book was also useful for sounding out personal views, though I still kept a personal diary (the 'green book'). I was able to record little things, not important to the thesis, about life in Manila and the urban poor which interested, intrigued, or troubled me. On looking back they seem somewhat naive and unimportant, but at the time writing about such things helped. I was even able to put in little humorous stories that surprised or amused me, such as on April 4: "Smokey Mountain has quite a name, even a local popular rock group has adopted the name and one contestant for Miss Universe said how much she had heard of it and wanted to visit it as soon as she arrived".

By as early as April I had sketched out my plans for the rest of my trip, though the details still remained open. I had narrowed down the case studies, talked to several academics and NGO workers, sometimes twice, and had gained permission for the study from all the right gatekeepers. This first month of hard work was well worth the effort in hindsight, as time seemed to go faster the longer my stay.

By May I had established the basic parameters of the thesis, aspects of which were refined over time. Towards the last month I was able to use the diary to raise criticisms and questions about aspects of the study, and things I would need to consider and develop when I returned home thus bridging fieldwork, analysis and writing. I included several issues and areas that would need to be explored on my return to push out the thesis and act as a foundation for the two case studies. This was quite comprehensive and detailed, and acted to keep me busy exploring topics I had defined while still 'in the field'. These were links that may have been lost on return\textsuperscript{16}. This was not necessarily deliberate,

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\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{16} Van Maanen (1988:6-7) points out though that the writing-up period of study is in fact a re-representation of what occurred or was learnt in the field. Consequently, the direct links between fieldwork experience and writing are questionable.
\end{flushright}
and at times were just scribbled thoughts, but they provided invaluable ideas and trains of thought.

Research Experience: Introduction to Manila

"Fieldwork is a period of intellectual and emotional self-examination" (Ellen, 1984:90). Above all else, the fieldworker is a human being (Gans, 1982) and the period of fieldwork is one of cultural and physical interaction, often leading to personal re-evaluation sometimes on a profound scale (Clarke, 1975). Feelings of going mad, panic in the field and high anxiety (that may even preclude some from fieldwork entirely) are all normal and usual predicaments (Clarke, 1975). Indeed, Clarke believes that the personal lessons of fieldwork can even be greater than the research work itself. Consequently, as Whyte emphasised in 1964, a real explanation of the research experience involves some degree of explanation of life in the field (Whyte, 1955) and the researcher’s interaction within it.

Aside from making several contacts over the previous year by mail and having someone familiar to greet me at the airport and stay with for the first four weeks, to a great extent it can be said that I arrived in Manila ‘cold’. I arrived on a long term visitor’s visa with a few books, addresses and ideas. I suffered from self-consciousness and shyness (Flinn, 1990), and had little language capability. Nevertheless, I did have a strong commitment to what I wanted to do and a (perhaps over-optimistic) sense that I could achieve all of my goals with time to spare.

Manila itself was a shock to me and some aspects of life and work were never overcome. Traffic, pollution and the frustration of finding and contacting people never lessened over time. Some (particularly officials) had certain non-confrontational methods of diverting me from superiors and colleagues, such as passing me incorrect telephone numbers or addresses. Added to this was
Plate 9. Some of Manila's icons; jeepneys, traffic and religion.

Plate 10. The local sari-sari store in Putatan with Susan, the owner.
adjusting to the Filipino ‘yes’ or invitation, which, according to Roces, can mean anything from ‘maybe’, ‘I don’t know’, ‘if you say so’, ‘if it will please you’, or even, ‘I hope I have said it unenthusiastically enough for you to understand I mean no’ (Roces and Roces, 1985:28). Such efforts, to avoid hiya (shame) and maintain smooth interpersonal relations (pakikisama) though, are not impossible for one to adjust to as they somewhat parallel pakeha efforts of avoiding embarrassment and open conflict. These similarities (rather than just differences) are often ignored in cultural accounts and preparations for fieldwork. Fortunately there were allowances made. Clumsiness, embarrassment and ignorance will generally be tolerated, though not for long, as Ellen has noted (1984:103).

Culture Shock and Orientation

"Was that a train?" I actually hadn’t even noticed the tracks as I entered the house (with the taxi driver to haggle over the fare - I lost and handed over every peso I arrived with). On my arrival the close proximity of the tracks was my overriding concern and fascination, along with the plethora of foreign noises and smells.

Arrival at house a real shock. The access road consisted of the railtracks dotted with smouldering fires. Terrifying. Trains pass regularly! They toot all the way through to clear the lines of people, they give the house a real shake and the dog howls.

I had a feeling of ‘this is it’ and a desire to get the very next plane home. The first few nights were ones bordering on panic and it took weeks to adapt to noises, the heat, and insects that shared the house. Even after two more weeks I noted irritably, “the dogs barked all night and the train got on my wick". This is not unique in the literature. Schwartz in 1964 wrote that his initial period “was one of disorientation, shock, and disequilibrium” (cited in Wax, 1971:18).
Gradually though, I found my feet. By joining in on sing-songs at a nearby *sari-sari* store and enjoying the company of my hosts I slowly bridged the wide cultural and linguistic gaps. After three weeks my mood began to stabilise and enjoyable times were had whiling away time in the community, visiting new friends and joking about our differences and, soon, I began noting problems of sleeping in!

Culture shock is something most people will experience at one time or another. Nevertheless it is dramatically accentuated as a researcher. Not only must one cope in a new environment but also to work prosperously in it and meet such demands as gaining legitimacy and developing a thesis. Looking back, moving straight into a settlement after a week with old friends in Brisbane was an astronomical step. Learning how to use the toilet and have a wash with a few litres of bucket water were the first steps I felt proud (and relieved) to master. Insisting on washing my own clothes (see Plate 11) and occasionally cooking would create quite a crowd and range of advice, even from children (see Emerson et.al, 1995:115, for the experiences of a fieldworker learning to cook). Mastering jeepneys, Manila and social customs followed. In such a short period, with so many expectations, fieldwork really was a sink-or-swim exercise.

Living with Filipino families allowed me access to the richness of daily life and experience, yet no doubt accentuated my feelings of culture shock. No matter how much I adapted to life, I remained a ‘visitor’ embedded in another culture. Adaptation is a continual labour that is not always successful. Adapting to being the centre of attention (particularly of children), losing a degree of privacy and private time must all be adjusted to (Ellen, 1984:104). As Smith-Bowen has argued “It is an error to assume that to know is to understand and that to understand is to like” (cited in Clarke, 1975:114). Such direct culture shock caused Wikan to leave Cairo’s slums for the sanctuary of a flat after three to four weeks (Wikan, 1980:4-5). Yet, as with Whyte (Clarke, 1975:107), this family life was crucial for me personally. It gave me a home, familiar surroundings and a place to relax and not be a researcher, as well as a place
to escape, to listen to the radio, read, and discuss the merits of television shows and Filipino entertainment 'megastars'. Family life accentuates issues and difficulties of diet, language, etiquette, and yet provides some of the best friends I have ever made.

Each house for me provided its array of issues to be dealt with. In my initial home I had the comfort of a small family. Immediately I was given the sole bed in the only separate room in the house. I quickly learned to accept such gestures as resistance proved futile. Indeed, people's friendliness and changing to suit my (or my perceived) needs could even cause frustration: "sometimes I get frustrated and overreact". This included even foregoing good opportunities to meet relatives and friends; "he was going to take me to Bayanan to meet a relative. Thank God he forgot - I was beat". Even well intentioned friends seeking to help with contacts could (occasionally) be the cause of stress. It was only in the final week that I was allowed to sleep on the concrete floor in the entrance room and convince others to take the bed. Diet here was not an issue. A wonderful cook, my host provided me with all I could want. Problems of family debt though reinforced my guilt over contributions and reciprocity (Counts, 1990), though I found many avenues to respond such as contributing toward schooling expenses for the children and furniture for the house (see Plates 15 and 16). There were also alternative forms of reciprocity. On some occasions, unduly popular nights cooking pasta or hamburgers for the family would act as outlets. These were very popular times and helped offset my feelings of unbalanced reciprocity, that I was benefitting from the situation more than they were.

The second of my two homes and research areas presented much different demands and lessons. Now I was confronted with living with up to 20 people at times, with minimal bedding on elevated wooden boards. Still my position over others was preferable. At least I had a room of sorts while others slept on either the floor or tables. As well, only infrequently did we have electricity, at best between two and five hours at night though that only applied to electric
Plate 11. Learning to wash clothes under the watchful eye of some experts.

Plate 12. Family banyo.
fans. Even this was only supplied to the house because of my presence - though at the time I didn't feel the need to object! Food was also sparse and the settlement isolated, so it was necessary for me to make efforts to supplement my diet, though it was important to do so discreetly.

Still, intellectually the family here kept me involved in a variety of activities and they were much more politically active than my previous household. This gave me renewed vigour for work but also allowed me an insight into another urban poor family and circumstance. Once more, another period of settling in had to be gone through: "I'm still going through the process of being accepted and known - although I find that I'm answering more questions than asking". However, I found these experiences were much less traumatic the second time around. Living in Quezon City was preferable for work and life. It was cooler, coincided with the rainy season, and was a lot more spacious and close to the places I visited most often (such as Universities, government departments and so on).

By this point in my fieldwork I was much more versed in Filipino ways and was able to arrange (after much debate) to pay a weekly contribution to the household for my keep. To my delight but not surprise, each fortnightly payment was spent carefully on improving the family's surroundings, the first time on concreting the banyo and the second on a gas lamp to light up the house at night.

The climate in both settlements was also a central issue in my thoughts and activities. Little has been written on the effects of climate apart from the advice of "keep out of the midday sun" (Ellen, 1984:196). Excessive heat though restricted my ability to function, sometimes at all. Weulker has found that the climate "has a far-reaching influence on the zeal of interviewers and interviewed" (Wuelker, 1983:164-5). In late May (the peak of the hot dry season) I complained, "the heat, it's so hard to work in it - how do you get things done in such heat?". Lethargy and feelings of grubbiness passed away
I was always offered the best sleeping conditions available.

Washing day in Muntinlupa. Within this photograph there are no less than four separate houses. At the extreme bottom left one can see the proximity of the riles.
several days. This was accentuated by my living in poor communities. In the first few months brownouts (localised blackouts) were a constant reminder of the importance of a fan for a good night’s sleep. In the second settlement, electricity was a luxury, and most nights were spent in a pool of sweat surrounded by katols (burning insect coils) and the persistent buzzing of mosquitoes. The rainy season, while appreciated, brought new problems, not the least of which was a second bout of bronchitis. Additionally, in spite of at times excessive heat, it was still necessary when visiting officials in particular to dress formally, as public appearance and cleanliness are important to Filipinos (Roces and Roces, 1985:17). Consequently, in nearly 40°C heat it was necessary to wear long pants and formal shoes and not become sweaty or dirty in transit, which could be quite impossible.

Five months was also a long enough time for another issue and potential danger to emerge, that of almost forgetting one’s role and becoming immersed in daily life. Reciprocity is crucial to building relationships and successful fieldwork, but the danger is that this can become very time consuming. Yet at times one must be prepared to perhaps sacrifice even information gathering to become an accepted part of family life. To pursue one’s work at the expense of other social obligations, I felt, was a danger which fieldworkers could make. In Sauyo, stories abounded of the behaviour of a (much respected) foreign researcher who offended many local people by acting as a hermit and appearing aloof. People’s reaction to such behaviour helped me to keep these things in mind and. After all, it would be very rare for the community to directly benefit from your presence through your research. Yet it became obvious to me at least that building relationships was a positive lifetime experience that could be at least equally shared.

Related to this, it became increasingly difficult to switch roles so constantly. After a while, as has been written about by Ellen (1984:91) and Gans (1982:57), researchers tend to relate and side with ‘their’ communities. I found this as well. Additionally, I found it increasingly difficult to relate to people,
Plates 15 and 16. Reciprocity could be extended through donations to projects around the home. Above, a sink is installed, and below, a concrete banyo replaces that in Plate 12.
particularly better-off Filipinos, outside of the urban poor. Sporadic visits to middle class homes inevitably led to another form of culture shock (similar to that of arriving home, perhaps greater). Generally, well meaning hosts did not understand my concerns about urban poverty, and did not appear particularly interested. I had found myself in a mode of living and interaction that had become difficult to move from. This was particularly accentuated a few days before my return to New Zealand. With leftover money, and wishing to see the soccer World Cup final, I decided to spend one of my last nights at a plush Manila resort. After a hot bath and huge meal first boredom, then guilt, set in (similar feelings are offered by Wax, 1971:44 and Wikan, 1980:9). Before long I found myself staring off the balcony toward Manila wondering what my host families were doing. I had an empty feeling of having missed out on their company.

This could even apply to living within urban poor settlements. Although not as extreme as the Cairo case (Wikan, 1980), where the urban poor deeply distrust each other, Filipino life revolves principally around the family unit and those who live in close proximity to the house (Roces and Roces, 1985:41). I had not expected it, but over time I also developed this sense of parochialism. At times I felt uneasy walking around parts of the settlement in which I was not immediately known, especially when unaccompanied by a friend or member of my host family. It was something that I had to battle against, because one could quite easily adopt this sense of loyalty and familiarity with one’s hosts to the neglect of other areas and people.

Gaining Access and Choosing Sites

One of the most pressing and urgent of problems associated with fieldwork, and one that many at my university had voiced, was in gaining access to communities to study (this is even a constant problem for experienced researchers, see Gans, 1982:57). For better or worse this was a problem
largely overcome by luck on my arrival. Unbeknown to me, a Filipino student I knew lived in a slum community bordering the principal railway lines of Metro Manila. Finding accommodation in crowded urban poor communities and in megacities can be a significant problem (Wax, 1971:7-8). It was my first immersion into Third World urban poverty and became one of the two settlements I studied and a ‘home’ for me throughout my fieldwork period. Without this initial ‘into the frypan’ experience, access would, or possibly could have been, a significant issue. All fieldwork has an essential ingredient of luck (see Ellen, 1984:91). This became apparent to me on the second day as I was toured around Manila by public transport to visit several of my compadre’s relatives in squatter settlements throughout Metro Manila. Finding relatives let alone leaders was a headache. Winding our way through tiny, congested, concrete communities with cries of ‘hey Joe’ to meet congenial yet suspicious leaders was enough for me. Even on that second day I decided to opt out of perhaps some more interesting areas and call where I landed ‘home’. Fortunately for me this settlement was a good example of what I wanted in one of my case studies.

With regard to the second settlement I benefited from what Polsky has termed the ‘snowballing’ technique of community access (cited in Sluka, 1990:121). By gaining permission from both the NGO that had worked in the area and then the leader, I was able to make a smooth entry into the area. In relation to my particular area of research, Ward and Chant have noted that NGO contact is a good way of gaining entry to communities and a satisfactory way of introduction to both leaders and residents (Ward and Chant, 1987:121).

As a white foreigner (always labelled American) with few language skills, unclearly defined and rather political interests, access in a place like Manila is a difficult proposition. Yet even when this is achieved there is no guarantee of success. Defining, and in many cases redefining one’s original preconceptions and ideas can be a sometimes painful but crucial step. Valuable time often appears to be ticking away while the fieldworker grapples with applying what
seem to be sometimes unbridgeable gaps between theories and readings to what one see’s outside the door. I was perhaps fortunate in that the changes I needed to make weren’t overly dramatic as I had spent a considerable time researching the issues before I left. Still, sometimes it is hard to ‘let go’ of some ideas and harder still to accept that whole new areas have to be explored which one is not proficient in. This period was central to the success and failure of my fieldwork. I perhaps only realised this near the end of my stay when visiting the library of one of the major universities when I came to meet another (British) fieldworker who had been in the Philippines for roughly the same period of time. She had failed to gain access or adapt her topic to the demands of fieldwork. Subsequently she was filling in the rest of her stay with travel and library visits and was not looking forward to contacting her supervisor upon returning to England.

Yet another obstacle to research in chaotic Third World megacities is the process of discovering, gaining access to, or even being aware of valuable resources. Tied into this are the problems involved in the fragmentation of knowledge both cognitively and physically. As the researcher obviously is the only one who knows what s/he needs or wants, quite frequently a vast array of important and perhaps crucial information can be but a door away while one scrambles through half relevant materials provided by the most well-meaning of hosts. Only in the last week of my visit did I fully appreciate the frustration of discovering vast amounts of information which I would have longed for a few months or even weeks before.

Physical considerations in getting to information should also not be overlooked. To reach a university library could quite often involve several modes of transport involving up to a five hour return journey. Usually, this would leave only two to three hours for work at most. In days of 38 C heat such trips could be exhausting (see Plate 9). To talk to the staff of the NGO I was involved with usually consisted of queuing for long periods the previous day to use the
community phone followed by an up to five hour return trip the next day, sometimes for a 20 minute chat! In such circumstances, days can fly by.

Though living in the communities I studied allowed me access to a vast amount of information, paradoxically it was necessary to distance oneself from familiar surroundings and family life to jot up thoughts and reflect. It was necessary when coming up with new avenues to explore to 'step back' physically. Mostly I spent this time in air conditioned libraries or even restaurants, wading through notes and trying to organise my thinking (Ellen, 1984:198 suggests University departments). Other reasons for this are also practical, such as avoiding heat, and in the case of the lack of lighting in the second community I studied, getting access to well lit rooms to write up notes.

Legitimacy and Role

Arriving 'cold' into another people's world can obviously lead to a lot of personal examination (Hahn, 1990:72). Gaining respect takes on great importance at times. More often than not I sensed that these feelings of insecurity and self worth were often felt by myself and not the community. On the contrary, quite often one feels guilt at being perceived as very important by some members of the community. As well, these feelings of legitimacy could become overwhelming as they are faced all and every day.

Quite often, in one's neighbourhood, one also has to gain legitimacy outside of one's work (as a person) as well as a researcher (Billings, 1990:7; Gans, 1982). And perhaps in many cases these two go hand in hand. You cannot be unscrupulous, or be seen to be, throughout the day and yet expect to have help when one wants to have information. This is an important consideration not often written about but critical nonetheless. One must gain legitimacy as a person in order to gain it as a researcher. In Sauyo I was flattered to know that
I had achieved this to a degree, when one of my hosts confided in me “I was worried before you came, we thought you might be a burgis (a local colloquial of bourgeoisie), but you are just like us!” Subsequently, I was made to feel one of the family and received honest and limitless help in my enquiries.

Generally, it was accepted that I was a researcher and this was a comfortable area in which to define one’s role. Indeed, as education is highly prized by Filipinos this even gave me something of a ‘high status’ position. As a single male I did attract a little more attention. Though at times embarrassing, I found that by making it clear I had a partner at home I was given less scrutiny.

I was surprised as to how much latitude I was given in my friendship with females. Gender, for me at least, played a very minor role in regard to access. There are plenty of accounts to the contrary (for example Jones, 1983:259). With the exception of embarrassed single females, I was able to communicate and socialise with women of all ages. Of significant consequence here is the quite assertive and public role Filipinas play in Philippine society. Subsequently, it was acceptable for me to live in the house of a married woman with female children, and to spend time in the company of other female community leaders. In fact, the vast majority of leaders, academics and activists I met and confided with were women. This helped to make available the special and substantial insights that women bring to the issues I wished to research (as is later discussed).

Even once issues of access appear to be resolved, one’s position is never entirely secure. To my amazement and disbelief, four weeks before I left the Philippines a neighbour to my house and someone quite well known to me throughout my stay asked if I was a missionary! (Sluka, 1990:121 notes that this is often a category assigned to fieldworkers). I also made similar mistakes. In another example a few nights before my departure I made the faux pas of calling the local population squatters (even though I was aware that this is
Plates 17 and 18. Host families and friends.
resented by many, including myself, and had avoided it for nearly six months). I consequently received a heavy and embarrassing public rebuke.

Summary

Contrary to the assurance of McCall and Simmons that "anyone who is not a complete idiot can do fieldwork" (Clarke, 1975:105), there is a great number of things to consider for the researcher involving methodology and the research experience. There is also more to fieldwork than the "behave like a gentleman, keep off the women, take quinine daily, and play it by ear" (Clarke, 1975:105) type advice that Clarke feels is typical. Indeed, both methodology and personal experiences are dynamic, adapting and interrelated forms of the research experience. Research I undertook in studying two urban poor communities involved adopting and adapting ethnographic techniques supplemented by other means when and where possible and suitable. After all, methodology is not the point of research. As Orum et.al (1991:23) notes, "the best methodologies of qualitative and quantitative research have come from those engaged in active research in which methodology has been subordinated to the ardent desire to know and communicate something significant about human life".

By and large this research conformed to the 'rules' of fieldwork, though at times other factors, rightly or wrongly, came into play. At times luck played a role as great as skill, but management and awareness are also critical components of fieldwork. As Clarke (1975:104) so effectively argues, the personal and professional aspects of research are interwoven and contingent. The fieldworker, particularly in stressful and difficult environments should not neglect that. Perhaps idiots can do fieldwork in these situations, though it might be banal and irrelevant to conduct, if not to read.
CHAPTER SIX

SAMAHANG BIYAYANG TUBIG

Introduction

Muntinlupa is one of the largest and most populous municipalities in the Philippines. With over 270,000 residents it has an increasingly high proportion of urban poor and squatters in its population. This number has increased significantly since the opening of 'political space' after 1986. As a percentage of total population, those living in autonomous housing have increased from 32% in 1985, to 56% in 1988 (DSWD, 1990) scattered throughout some 140 plus "depressed communities" (Santos, 1992:7).

As with many urban poor communities, the people of barangay Putatan (within Muntinlupa) have been represented by an organisation since at least the early 1970s. This chapter is an analysis of the current organisation, Samahang Biyayang Tubig (Association of Blessed Water), which can be described as a Self-Organised Community Organisation, or, SOCO that is largely based around the issue of water. As a SOCO, SBT was established by local notables who felt that the community should have some authority to represent their collective concerns and provide for the community's development. SBT is also described and approached in this chapter as a 'traditional' or 'civic' organisation, or one that has evolved indigenously and that operates in accordance with the norms of Filipino culture and holds no relations with outside organisations. As such, it provides an invaluable case study of an urban poor organisation centred within the neopatrimonial status-quo.

Several aspects of the organisation's operation are introduced and addressed throughout this chapter. Beginning with an introduction to the area and SBT, it
MAP 6.1  PENCIL SKETCH OF FIELDWORK AREA IN MUNTINGLUPA
is shown that the current organisation evolved from a particular historical context and subsumed other like-minded organisations nearby. Following this is an account of the organisation’s activities, goals and methods. Finally, there is an analysis of the role SBT played in the May 1994 barangay elections, and some conclusions and generalisations are drawn about the organisation that can be used to compare and contrast it with the following case study.

**Settlement History**

Like many squatter and slum areas in Metro Manila, the study area along the *riles* and towards the bay is very much a post EDSA phenomenon. The area accommodates a rapidly expanding population over a varied geography and includes a number of social classes. There are few things that actually incorporate or unite the population. Consequently, the domain under study (and SBT) is in fact an artificial case as there are no physical or other boundaries separating residents of the *riles* from San Pedro to the south, or to the far north of Metro Manila, a continuous settlement over a distance of some 25 miles. Nor are there many bonds outside of geographical proximity between those residents who live along the *riles* and those towards the Laguna de Bay (which locals refer to as ‘the lake’; see Plate 30).

The research area is diverse, spanning an area of approximately 1.5kms from the national road to the lake and another two kilometres along the railroad tracks. Generally the housing structures are of a permanent nature and are easily differentiated from those more shanty type dwellings that characterise other areas of Manila. Many have concrete and/or plastered walls and the use of tin is widespread. Wood is also widely used and more than a few houses, mostly in Tavera compound, have glass windows.
Population density in the area is highly uneven. Along the rifle congestion is the norm and dwellings usually share the same partition and may be several deep from the rail lines. In this, there are clear indications of income and length of stay. Those older and more established houses may have courtyards, a number of rooms, and well demarcated living areas, while others are closely packed and may only consist of one or two rooms. Incongruity is the norm.

Away from the tracks and towards the lake, one enters an area of wide open spaces and tree lined dirt tracks. Often it is possible to see vehicles parked in yards and some degree of wealth. Clearly the cost and value of land here is much higher than along the rail lines. The area also borders a middle class subdivision, a number of churches and a paved basketball court. The settlement’s demography is also far from homogeneous. A wide range of people live in the compounds including white collar workers, government employees, craftspeople and scavengers.

The development of the community has been ad hoc and sporadic, with little formal control. The issue of tenure security is accordingly complex and far from homogenous. In the post war period the Philippine National Railway (PNR) allowed farmers to use the land up to the rifle but avoided giving rights for people to erect permanent structures. During the Green Revolution in the 1960s smaller farms were encouraged and the land became more intensively cultivated and divided up among farmers, but building lots beside the tracks was still prohibited and enforced throughout the Marcos administration (interview ML08, May 5 1994).

Nevertheless, as the population of the metropolis expanded and intensified over time, these small landholders did build houses - or would permit others to do so on ‘their’ land (interview ML09, May 6 1994). These early structures are the predecessors of what stand today. Early settlers were often sold the rights to build from the farmers, though legally the land was not theirs to do so (interview ML09, May 6 1994).
Such demographic and infrastructural development has occurred in a brief period of time. When the current leader of SBT, Meding, moved here in 1974 there were no permanent settlers along the tracks (interview ML06, April 23 1994). The land here consisted of farms up until the mid 1980s with the only permanent structure being that of the former Barangay Hall (interview ML06, April 23 1994). According to Meding, the area from the *rioles* to the lake was planted in paddy. Other areas were characterised by vegetables, particularly *kamote* (interview ML06, April 23 1994). Occasionally shanty structures appeared along the tracks but they were rapidly demolished both before and during the Martial Law period (interview ML06, April 23 1994).

In the mid-1980s a local paddy farmer legitimately sold his land to residents in the Tavera compound. Farming was becoming more difficult and water supply less dependable. He offered to either sell or rent parcels of land to residents. Most purchased their land outright and now Tavera residents enjoy a high security of tenure with a correspondingly high degree of housing development (see Plate 22). After 1986, the surrounding areas "grew up like mushrooms" (interview ML09, May 6 1994) and occupation spread from the *rioles* to the lake (see Table 6.1). Like much of the ambiguous legal nature of the majority of autonomous settlements, the area has developed in little over 15 years from a peripheral farming area to a densely populated home to thousands of people.

Tenure relationships elsewhere in the area are complex and unclear due to the development of the settlement over a twenty year period. Clearly the PNR still owns the land along the *rioles* and it is (still) against the law to live there. Nevertheless, many residents, even those clearly along the tracks, are firm in their belief that they hold legal title over the land. Additionally, the problem of professional squatting is apparent, though it is not addressed by the organisation. It is even possible to see occasional ‘For Sale’ house signs on railway land (see Plate 27). Many others also rent or lease from those who are believed to hold land claims and had originally built a house on the site but
Plate 19. Bustling early morning scene including informal sector workers, those on their way to work and passers of time. The tracks act to unite the community and play an important role in peoples lives.

Plate 20. Train lines looking north toward Manila.
Plate 21.
Crowded housing adjoining the riles. Note the diverse use of building materials.

Plate 22.
The area also includes more impressive housing and white collar workers.
have since moved. Subsequently, many of the residents who now live along the
riles have either paid for the tenure of their land or pay a rental for their
houses.

Table 6.1. Population Characteristics of Putatan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Esporales</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>2035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tave ra</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>2910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putatan</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1573</td>
<td>7865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Emergence of Local Organisations

There have been formal organisations in the area since at least the 1970s. PACO, the Putatan Athletic and Civic Organisation, was the principal formation of the late 1970s. In its time, according to a previously active leader, PACO was a substantial umbrella organisation which stretched for miles in all directions. One of the most well known of PACO’s successes was the installation of an electricity supply to many residents. At that stage this most likely applied to the residents of Tavera. Principally this was achieved through some lobbying and the collection of a substantial P12,000 collective deposit from members/residents (interview ML09, May 6 1994). However PACO was beset with political cleavages in the increasingly tumultuous early 1980s with schisms between followers of the Marcos regime and those of Ninoy Aquino. Racked with ideological dispute, PACO underwent what Meding described to
Plates 23 and 24. Muntinlupa housing and sari-sari store.
Plate 25. Informal sector business and electricity meter.

Plate 26. Housing pride.
me as a "political and natural death" after EDSA. After the people's revolution of 1986 and the resultant 'big shuffle', many of the leadership favourable to Ninoy Aquino were hand appointed by the Aquino regime to fill barangay council positions purged of Marcos supporters (interview ML07, May 3 1994).

The emergence and nature of Samahang Biyayang Tubig (SBT) was largely a legacy of these antecedents. SBT’s leadership was heavily drawn from the remnants of PACO and in particular, its character is the legacy of the personal vision of leaders such as Meding. SBT was founded in 1991 in response to what Meding says was his desire to unite the people of the areas into one organisation. This was in order, among other things, to make the area a "happy place" for its residents (interview ML07, May 3 1994). While residents I spoke with were unaware of it and more than a little surprised, the organisations founding was built on a ‘sponsorship’ payment of P200 (each) of 15 sponsors whom in turn had become the ‘Organisational Council’ (interview ML02, March 24). One particular resident of over five years standing admitted to not recognising any of the 15 sponsors referred to on the founding Council. Nevertheless, in 1994 SBT was the paramount organisation in the area. It represented the wider community in negotiations, and sought collective goals for its members. While residents may be unclear over the details, leaders can indicate a clear division of its responsibilities and domain.

**Samahang Bayayan Tubig**

SBT is an umbrella organisation consisting of thirteen divisions/districts and an estimated 500 families are members (interview ML01, March 16 1994). In accordance with law, the organisation was officially accredited with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 1, 1994. According to local leaders, in order to save time and expense the organisation when gaining accreditation chose the blueprint SEC regulations. Elections for leadership
positions are held each year on the fourth Sunday of December and all leaders must be elected. Only members may vote.

The structure of decision making appears very hierarchical. There is, by SEC regulation, only one general assembly for members each year, although Meding claimed that he "tries for two" (interview ML05, April 18 1994). On the last Sunday of each month, leaders of the 13 groups hold a meeting alternately at leaders' homes. These meetings, by one resident's account, are sometimes attended by the barangay captain and even municipal councillors (interview MR02, March 10 1994). This indicates some degree of association and legitimation of the organisation with local officials.

At monthly leader meetings, discussions are entered into on issues raised and voting takes place with a simple majority prevailing (interview ML10, May 25 1994). After this "leaders report back to the members" (interview ML05, April 18 1994). Nevertheless, with difficult decisions, such as those that require a financial contribution from members, it is common for leaders to hold separate meetings with the residents to gauge opinion. It is then up to the leaders to vote at the leaders meetings (interview ML10, May 25 1994).

Although an acceptable practise and form of democracy, the leader of the organisation informed me, in regard to the instigation of plans, that local leaders will come to him with a plan or proposal for the federation on a personal level. Meding then, as the "ultimate leader" as he described himself to me, is the "final single adjudicator" with regard to decisions (interview ML04, April 7 1994). It is probable that elements of internal patronage do abide in these relationships. While democratic structures exist in concept, in my experience the meetings with residents were poorly attended, ad hoc, and exclusionary. At one time, the members of the family I lived with were not aware of any meetings taking place on a regular basis. They had frequently not been invited to gatherings, even to those held outside their door. At another time a sari-sari
Tenure arrangements are not often clear.

With no garbage collection, rubbish is either burned or dumped in a communal area. The refuse problem is not addressed by SBT.
store owner explained that only "home owners" could attend meetings and vote, even though "non home owners" (a peculiar and somewhat dubious semantic) could be fully paid members (interview MR07, April 30 1994). This was in spite of the fact that renters clearly considered themselves as members (interview MR01, March 8 1994) none the least as they made the monthly fee payments.

At another point the leader of SBT once explained to me that community development was only available to those who pay - or 'members' of the organisation. This was confirmed to me by other residents and belied the implicit collective consumption demeanour of the organisation. Clearly, it was best to be a member, or to at least cultivate good relations with certain personalities to ensure that the undefined resource distribution methods would favour oneself and family.

Demographically, these leaders appeared generally older and were dominated by males. This was a trend particularly at the higher levels of decision making. So while there was a good gender balance at the councillor level (with 7 of the 15 being women), at the highest strata all were elderly males. Predominantly, the leadership consisted of people who were well established in the area and from better off groups. A rule was in place that a person must have been a resident for at least five years before standing in any election, with the rationale that they needed that time "to become aware of community needs" (interview ML04, April 7 1994). Many of these leaders worked out of the area by day and many others were sari-sari store owners. Typically, leaders were older males involved in business, either as owners or white collar workers. Many others also rented out properties in the area, thus qualifying as a community landlord.

Meding himself, as the president of the alliance, was educated at university and has been a land owner and landlord for a long period. Previously his family were landowners in the Tondo area, and since 1988 Meding has rented out a past home for a comparatively large sum of money (interview ML03, April 1 1994). Additionally, he works outside of the community as a manager for a food
importing company (interview ML01, March 16 1994). His income, when coupled with family workers overseas, places him in a comparative degree of affluence in relation to the rest of the community.

Meding has had a long history in community organising. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, he was involved in organisation building in Tondo including the area of Smokey Mountain. In this role he was the president of Anak Bayang Tondo, which was affiliated to the national Anak Bayang Pilipino, or, 'Children of the Philippines'. This was a predominantly civic organisation concerned with promoting the Filipino language, patriotism and a clean and safe environment (interview ML07, May 3 1994). Since arriving in the area in the mid-1970s, Meding had felt compelled, because of his previous experiences, to be involved in community organising. Consequently, he defines his participation as "altruistic", having become involved out of a feeling of duty and experience (interview ML03, April 1 1994).

Many of these reasons he cited emanated from the conviction that the basis of community organising is good leadership. Indeed, on many occasions, Meding noted the importance of good and strong leaders for the organisations well being. Nothing could be achieved unless these leaders "lead the people" (interview ML05, April 18 1994). In this, he was critical of the quality of many urban poor leaders. Citing the problems of leadership, Meding often lamented leaders becoming involved in the quest for private gain and those who desired to be "big personalities", but lacked any strong standing, convictions or great ability. Consequently, he defined himself as an "alternative" leader (interview ML01, March 16 1994).

The other significant personality in the organisation is in fact a long time kagawad, though he did not stand for reelection in the May barangay polls. Arceiga is one of the community's longest residents having lived in the community since the 1950s. A continuous kagawad since 1960, Arceiga had in fact been a staunch Marcos supporter right up until the 'people's revolution' of
1986 (interview ML14, July 18 1994). Stripped of his position by the Aquino regime, he was able to use his considerable resources to win re-election soon after and following political retirement, made an unsuccessful attempt to support his son to replace him.

By the community's standards Arceiga is a very wealthy man. Since the mid-1980s he has lived in the formerly public Barangay Hall and has subdivided half of it for rental (see Plate 33). Additionally, he is also the operator of a fishpond on 'the lake', as well as being the owner of several nearby properties. Arceiga's brother also owns a considerable amount of land in which he raises fighting cocks (interview MR02, March 10 1994). Increasingly, Arceiga has been given a powerful position in the local organisation, though as the 'advisor' it is an unelected position. As advisor, Meding admitted that Arceiga had a "very important part" to play in the organisation (interview ML10, May 25 1994). His significance was said to stem from his depth of contacts. Over his time in politics these connections have not only been developed at the barangay level, but also reached into the level of municipality. Subsequently, he was praised for getting projects done, and was described as very "persuasive" in conversation (interview ML10, May 25 1994). So much so, that Meding at one time suggested his enthusiasm for passing over the mantle of Chairperson to Arceiga, if it was asked of him (interview ML10, May 25 1994).

Such suggestions and rumours create a great deal of suspicion among residents about the true intentions of the highest leadership. In one conversation, a local resident confirmed to me the elite nature of the leadership. It was felt that the community leader was both the predator (on the community) and prey (from local officials) (interview MR05, March 31 1994). Accordingly, in return for acceptance and support for projects, the community organisation was being used by kagawads as a means to garner support for senators and mayors when the time eventuated (interview MR04, March 22 1994).
Organisation Objectives and Methods

Perhaps typical of many 'survivalist' people's organisations, SBT, it can be asserted, is lacking any clear vision with regard to its future goals outside of current individual projects. Indeed, each time I discussed the topic with the leader of SBT I received a different and somewhat ad hoc response. The same could also be said regarding the organisation's projects and plans, and the two are not unrelated. In many ways the tone of SBT's constitution and by-laws reflect this somewhat civic and non-issue or 'non political' nature of its orientation. Its written objectives reflect more a concern with the moral fibre and duty of the community's citizens and their action within existing structures rather than in any confrontation of them. Such concerns are clearly reflected throughout the organisation's constitutional objectives which strongly promote its non-political goals which include improvement in the state of the community "within the existing laws and morals" of the country (See Appendix Two).

These values are also illustrated in the organisation's activities and methods. As reflected in the organisation's long term goals, its current and future programmes are either of the basic needs type or of an ad hoc nature, responding predominantly to the concerns of the hierarchy. Predominately, SBTs projects can be characterised as either infrastructural or civic in nature.

With regard to the community's physical development, a major issue has been and continues to be the provision of water. The organisation's primary goal is in attempting to develop a permanent water supply. Previously, water was supplied free by the Ayala Corporation in return for maintenance and piping costs being covered by residents (and purchased, it appeared, off Ayala Corporation). Throughout March and April of 1994, Ayala Corporation had approached Meding about ending the current water arrangement as the user population had increased, apparently lowering the water pressure to other, wealthier, subdivisions. In turn Ayala requested that SBT build a deep well, at around 70 metres depth and at the enormous capital/equipment expense of
P200,000, once more to be purchased off the Ayala group (interview ML02, March 24 1994). As time passed into July, Ayala increased its stand on the water issue, threatening in August to cut the water supply to half days only (interview ML12, July 17 1994).

Estimates of the cost of such development varied considerably. At one time it was estimated by Meding that it would likely cost up to P380,000 to build a deep well, without including operating expenses and infrastructure (interview ML12, July 17 1994). At an earlier date the sum of P1,000,000 had been spoken of, and it appeared that in both cases the community would have to bear an extraordinary amount of money for the project (interview ML02, March 24 1994). By July, Meding had already been turned down in an application for municipal development funds to at least 1995. Partly this was the result of the organisation losing a key patron in the municipal government. As a result of the community's support in the 1992 elections, a municipal councillor had previously approved funds for the project. However with his suspension in March 1994 for corruption charges, all of his previous projects were suspended (interview ML11, June 12 1994).

As time progressed, many residents were becoming increasingly frustrated over the situation and suspicious of the outcome. Meetings held in late May barely contained the growing friction. By July, open physical conflict was occurring over queuing as one of the standpipes had become inoperable and queues at the other outlets were becoming intolerable (interview MR08, June 12 1994).

Toward the end of the year it was becoming clear that the organisation would have to wait until the following Ayala Corporation budget to approve funds for the project of constructing a deep well. This project was estimated to cost around P380,000 without the establishment of electricity, which would need to be secured through other means. While Meding had no idea where this money would come from, he did want to pursue the idea of cost recovery from users. For example one idea included selling 44 gallon drums to households and then
Plate 29. One of the water outlets accrued through SBT. The Chairman's house is to the left - note the personal supply line.

Plate 30. Laguna 'lake' front. Here the issues are very different. Flooding and fish depletion are of concern. Most fish pens are owned by politicians and the elite.
charging P6 per filling, a cost said to be less than that charged by other community organisations (interview ML12, July 17 1994). Such charges would help in the maintenance of the system and would keep the water itself free. Consequently, the organisation was caught in a fix. With the cessation of the water supply apparently imminent, the construction of some kind of deep well had been decided upon by the leader, yet no funds were available for the project.

Despite the seriousness of the issue very few residents I spoke to, including my host family, knew of the problem. And indeed, when I spoke of the issue with one male resident he exclaimed both surprise and anger at the situation, stating that if people were to be moved on then the whole project would be a waste of money, and he felt that other issues were much more important (interview MR03, March 24 1994). Clearly a great deal of this situation has developed due to the operation of SBT in its external and internal dynamics. However, this communication lapse could also be explained through gender relations. Women were more likely to attend meetings. Such roles and issues were subsequently described to me as "women’s work" (interview MR03, March 17 1994), and this may go some way in explaining why a number of men approached were not aware of the details of decisions being made.

Evidently, many of these problems in gaining community improvements and of leader-resident relations are a direct result of the processes by which goals are defined and the methods in which they are obtained. External personal relations were said to be very important to the success and even survival of the organisation. Accordingly, if the organisation was not "correctly aligned politically" then the organisation would be strangled by those in power. Subsequently, it was critical for the organisation to be in the favour of those ‘winners’ and "to be friends to all and enemies of no-one" (interview ML04, April 7 1994). In particular, it was essential to maintain good relations with the barangay, as it was they who controlled the money and resources for
development projects (interview ML05, April 18 1994; interview MR04, March 22 1994).

At the centre of this struggle lies the pervading ‘personal approach’ aspect of local politics. While at times difficult, Meding did emphasise that it is possible to get sponsors for most projects, but it was a calculated approach that required careful selection of people to projects. For example, in many instances the organisation would approach the political advisor Arceiga for access, but sensing that he had become unpopular of late, Meding relied more heavily on personal ties with the barangay secretary whom he would ask to pressure the Punong for support of a particular project.

Use of these methods does not necessarily imply satisfaction with them, even though it presumes the reproduction of patronage politics over the community through the organisation. On several occasions Meding lamented the dependence of the organisation on patrons, suggesting that in attempting to maintain good relations with so many politicians the leaders were akin to clowns, going from person to person keeping them content and amused (interview ML05, April 18 1994). And yet a certain resignation to this system prevailed, characterised by a critical dismissal of other ways: “that is politics here in the Philippines” (interview ML09, May 6 1994).

Other infrastructural projects centred around the construction of pathways. Built predominantly from cement left over from other projects or supplied by ‘donors’ and with free local labour (sambayanan) over the previous 12 months, pathways had been constructed around the Putatan Compound. Indeed, the construction of the pathways, sponsored by a local kagawad and ‘advisor’ to the organisation, had been prolific in 1994, and had provided relief in the rainy season for the much used tracks linking much of the settlement to the National Road.
Plates 31 and 32. Building of pathways. Meding (above) is rightly proud of these achievements. Note that the ‘sponsor’ is given great profile. Below right is the cock farm owned by a brother of Kagawad Arceiga.
Another prospective plan of Meding was to connect the lake to the National Road with a road for jeepney access (interview ML03, April 1 1994), though I was not sure of the conviction behind this or the other 'project-type' responses to questions that were given over time. Future plans varied between finding a sponsor for a basketball/volleyball tournament, organising a Santa Cruz for 1995, sponsoring a gifted school child with monies collected from SBT funds, or establishing a library, particularly for children. While it would not be appropriate to doubt the worthiness of these projects, they always appeared to develop from the convictions of the leader, rather than from the ground swell of member demands. Indeed in all our discussions I could not establish any projects where the idea was established from the grassroots. And Meding often admitted to this.

To an overwhelming degree, the SBT relies on its own very limited financial and other resources and survives as a (formally) independent organisation. Financial resources depend on members' 'contributions'. Of the P10 that is collected monthly, half goes to the organisation for development works in the individual areas, while the other half is used to pay the 'cost' of the water (meaning the salary for maintenance, etc). Any savings are "tucked away" for future and current projects, for example, the pathway construction program (interview ML01, March 16 1994)\(^{17}\).

Even in the context of this fee, community suspicions could quickly become aroused. At least one resident I knew was rather confused and unconvinced about what the money was for and only became aware that the water was actually free when I discussed the matter in her company with Meding. She had felt that the water was to be paid for directly until this point (interview MR02, March 10 1994). Another male resident was not even aware that his wife was paying a fee, or that it even existed, and became rather agitated when the

\(^{17}\) During this interview, Meding offered to 'show me the books' to demonstrate that the use of monies was above board.
matter surfaced. One further resident was unhappy and suspicious regarding the whole incident, convinced that a secret ‘deal’ had been made between the leaders and the water company (interview MR04, March 22 1994). Such suspicions often found fertile ground.

SBT maintains no formal relationship with any other grassroots or NGO body. Indeed the leaders I spoke with appeared outwardly hostile at times to even local external contact. One such nearby organisation of 157 members did approach SBT regarding their water needs. Their leader’s idea was to extend the SBT supply further down the riles but this appeared to be too expensive without a ‘sponsor’ (interview ML05, April 18 1994). He consequently approached Meding about this and in particular sought some help in the building of an artesian well. In reply Meding admonished the leader, stating irately that he was not a candidate for the election and to go and see the kagawad who was running! (interview ML06, April 23 1994). And yet on another occasion, Meding noted that in the future the organisation may seek to expand south along the lines in order to “help other communities” (interview ML05, April 18 1994).

Links with NGOs were also non-existent. Meding did have some personal contacts in such groups as the Lions and Jaycees, though he was suspicious of their political membership. As individuals he was occasionally tempted to approach them for help but had yet to do so. There appeared to be no contact with NGDOs, and furthermore, on the occasions I asked, no real differentiation or understanding of the NGDO/NGO distinction. Indeed, any attempt at networking with NGOs was likely to be shunned through political suspicion. For Meding, NGDOs on the whole were “left leaning, nationalist/communist organisations” (interview ML13, July 20 1994).

Though there are clauses in SBT’s constitution for community education programmes, very little emphasis is placed on these exercises. With regard to the public debate over the implementation of a Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1994,
SBT held no public forums or information days on how this would affect the community or if it should become an issue for the organisation. Instead, leaders conveyed to me that the community population were "simple people" and that such meetings would be a waste of time as the issues would not be well understood. Rather, it was better to leave such debate to the "learned and educated people ... we will follow what the politicians decide is best" (interview ML12, July 17 1994).

The idea of mobilising the community was also shunned (interview ML12, July 17 1994). Meding often criticised the events of the Batangas Port Project as being the result of people wanting "something for nothing". In this, they were agitators attempting to exploit laws and regulations with the help of "trouble making lawyers" (interview ML12, July 17 1994). Even some of the provisions under UDHA were criticised at times as leading to this situation. "True Filipinos", in contrast, were those who demonstrated loyalty to the government (interview ML12, July 17 1994).

**Political Participation of SBT**

The municipality of Muntinlupa encompasses over 35,000 registered voters. Within this, the community organisation is a small part, and subsequently has limited potential as a significant vote mobiliser and political actor. Nevertheless, at all electoral levels, leaders are approached by various candidates for their assistance.

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18 The Batangas port 'occupation' was a situation that captured much attention in June and July of 1994. Essentially, squatters inhabited an area of the port that was due to be developed under the Batangas Port Development Project. The urban poor, aided by support from NGOs and lawyers citing UDHA regulations, continually stalled the project and demanded a better relocation deal than was offered. A standoff ensued, in the end broken by forced and violent demolitions in early July (Alvar, 1994:8).
Generally, political participation is a distant factor in the area outside election times. Activity is greatly heightened when the run-in fortnight begins, these 14 days being the officially allowed time for political campaigning. Nevertheless, numerous group debates, jockeying and political meetings take place outside this timetable.

In the past, SBT had taken an active position in supporting external electoral contestants. In 1992 the organisation supported candidate Martinez in the Mayoral elections, but he was defeated by Bunye. Since then, it has been very difficult or "impossible" to get any support or development programmes as Bunye was well aware of the organisation's official position in the elections (interview ML04, April 7 1994). While Martinez was supportive to the organisation after his loss, he had no access to 'pork barrel' (community development) funds (interview ML04, April 7 1994). Subsequently, on the outside, it has been very difficult for the organisation to get access to development project funds.

It was this experience, claims Meding, that made him aware of the need to make SBT non-political. One would expect then that the SBT would have played a non-aligned or neutral role in the barangay elections, though this was far from the case. In fact, SBT took an active role in the elections including outwardly supporting several contestants.

The decision to play an active role in supporting contestants was an opportunist and rather cynical one. Meding had noted that under COMELEC rules the nature of the barangay election is legally 'non-partisan'. As a result it became possible for the organisation to support candidates, as the elections were technically non-political. Subsequently, SBT was free to become politically involved (interview ML07, May 3 1994). It was felt by Meding, in particular, that during election times the organisation adopts the philosophy of "we use them, or they use us" (interview ML04, April 7 1994).
This agenda of support began at the organisation's induction evening in mid-April which was attended by some 200-300 residents. Only three weeks previous to the election, the event was clearly used as a political vehicle and was attended by several contestants. Indeed, all significant political contestants were invited to the evening as the organisation was conscious of not being placed in the politically vulnerable position of favouring some candidates over others (interview ML04, April 7 1994).

While a broad range of politicians, including the current administration, were invited, it was those who tuned up providing furniture, hamburgers, soft drinks and beer and several promises of further support who were later supported in the election (interview ML05, July 18 1994). In turn, kagawads clearly and regularly expected returns from their 'sponsorship'. There was little talk of peoples rights to public funds\(^{19}\). Throughout the evening, speakers made reference to support being linked to a better position for the organisation.

Such events reflected and reinforced the nature of politics in the community. Personalities and contacts, rather than issues, were pre-eminent. Indeed, in one interview the leader of SBT openly laughed when I raised the role and significance of issues in local politics in the community. Clearly, it was the person that was the major factor. People's votes gravitated toward those they knew and could hold some influence over. Subsequently, it was said that the candidates must get to know a lot of people before the ballots were cast. In practical terms this was said to involve the candidate supplying a lot of beer at parties in the election period in order to have any chance of winning (interview MR06, April 17 1994).

In the run up period to the barangay elections discussion and gossip over candidate pay outs were rife. Rumours of hopefuls buying beer at parties and

\(^{19}\) A resident of several years noted to me that issues had never been an important part of past elections in the community, and he doubted that they ever would (interview MR04, March 22 1994).
Plates 33 and 34. Induction night of SBT leaders. Above is the former barangay hall now in the 'ownership' of Kagawad Arceiga which is rented out.
solving problems were common. One week before the induction evening there were even excited rumours of thousands of pesos worth of McDonalds being supplied. Residents told me of their experiencing the 'golden handshake'. This consisted of up to P500 being left in one’s hand after meeting and shaking the hand of a candidate (interview MR06, April 17 1994). During one of the speeches at the induction evening one resident noted to me, "Where is the money? No money, no vote!", something that was often repeated in both public and private (interview MR02, March 10 1994). Vote buying appeared to be common, and highly anticipated by locals.

During the elections those sponsors of the induction evening were supported with the addition of Arceiga's son. It was decided at a ballot of the leadership to support the two kagawads who turned up for the induction (interview ML07, May 3 1994). It was also decided to support Arceiga's son because of probable leverage through Arceiga Senior as the 'advisor' to the organisation and long time kagawad. It was said to me that if SBT was to support Arceiga and if he was to win, then the organisation "would be in a good position" (interview ML07, May 3 1994).

The actual support of the contestants was outwardly low-key during the campaign period. It consisted of pamphlet distribution (see accompanying examples in Figure 6.1) and leaders of SBT placing signs at their door of who the organisation was supporting. In fact, Meding stated that neither he nor the organisation was that busy in this election, as very few candidates had approached the organisation for its help (interview ML10, May 25 1994). While it was difficult to gauge the influence of the support on actual voting behaviour, Meding did assure me that all the contestants carried the area. Of those people I had contact with, several did not bother to vote (the voting place was quite
distant) and those who did, voted on reputation\textsuperscript{20} (interview MR02, March 10 1994).

With regard to \textit{utang na loob}, it could be quite openly flouted and used to one's (albeit small) advantage at the local level. In one example, a local resident sitting with friends at a \textit{sari-sari} store was approached by Arciaga Snr and asked to distribute leaflets for his son and one other contestant. In return, everyone at the table was given a soft drink. Once the patron was out of distance, the soft drink was consumed and the papers went on to the fire coupled with plenty of jocularity. One resident of some five years and government official noted that generally now there was discontent and withdrawal of people from politics, particularly following the outcome of EDSA, and that politics was now, or had remained, a "game of the elite" (interview MR05, March 31 1994).

The record of those candidates SBT supported in the elections was actually quite poor. All three lost, though only one badly. Only Arciaga Jnr actually directly asked for help in the campaign period (interview ML10, May 25 1994). Overall, throughout the community, the visibility of the election was low and people appeared not to be greatly concerned with either participating or even voting. Though one could feel obvious concern for the consequences of SBT's actions in repeating the mistakes of the past, Meding felt there would be no recriminations from unsupported winners toward the organisation nor the community. Indeed, he felt that he was "friends with them all" and that just because he helped those "friends who asked", there should be no problems. Meding went further to say that in approaching winners for help, you were in fact acknowledging their position and that then all is forgiven. Accordingly, this

\textsuperscript{20} Kerkvliet and Mojares (1991:7) have questioned the interest the poor really hold in Philippine elections. "A pronounced sentiment is that elections are essentially contests among candidates with little genuine interest in the problems of the poor majority, hence who wins is not terribly important to most people ... they see office holders more often than not using public office for their own purposes rather than for public service".
FIGURE 6.1 ELECTION FLYERS

VOTE!

Banig Espeleta
For
Kagawad
Bgy. Putatan

VOTE!!

Tirso A. Andres
Kagawad
Bgy. Putatan

May 9, 1994

Vote: Banig Espeleta
For
Kagawad
Brgy. Putatan

Laitigan,
Ma. Blanca Napo, tayo nang laban! 😎

Marla Malvar
Kagawad

Sandy Arciaga
Kagawad

XHA I

BOTO

 Vote!!
Plates 35 and 36. Barangay election materials posted near the community.
was a part of the "special nature of the barangay" (interview ML10, May 25 1994).

There was very little time given to the idea of the organisation sponsoring its own candidate in the barangay elections. There were several reasons for this. Ironically, it was the 'non-political', character of the organisation that prevented it from producing a candidate for a public position. Another was the sheer cost of running for barangay because of the nature of patronage politics. With Putatan being a considerably sized barangay and the urban poor being well in the minority, Meding estimated the costs of running for barangay captain would be from P200,000 to P500,000 and between P50,000 and P100,000 for a council position. On more than one occasion, Meding noted the "impossibility" of carrying the area's votes in such an expansive and therefore expensive area. On estimating this, Meding felt to win as kagawad meant "you need one million" (interview ML13, July 20 1994). These figures were roughly confirmed by residents, academics and NGOs. For example, it was said that Martinez had spent around P6 million of his own money in Muntinlupa in the 1992 Mayoral election, and he still failed (interview ML04, April 7 1994).

Furthermore, with the size of the barangay it was very unlikely that the urban poor, or at least one organised group, would be capable of successful bloc voting, especially considering the politically disparate nature of UPOs. Meding in fact mentioned this point on one occasion: that the poor's vote gets lost in such a large barangay. And while the COMELEC rules were "all right" in smaller barangays, the need to spend up to P3 per person in such a large electoral area makes the costs of running appear quite astronomical (interview ML10, May 25 1994). Nevertheless, in the political culture of the Philippines it was not important for the candidate himself/herself to be wealthy. When I facetiously noted that candidates must have to be wealthy to run, it was noted to me that this was not so important as there were plenty of millionaires willing to sponsor potential candidates, along with the obligation of utang na loob (interview ML01, March 16 1994).
Significantly though, the desire to pursue this electoral path is not great. Meding himself (perhaps the most likely to stand or promote it) felt that it was not even that important who ran for elections in regard to whether they were rich or poor. It was more important whether they had "good character" (interview ML13, July 20 1994). Furthermore, the organisation’s leaders were not likely to strongly support urban poor candidates in local elections. This was partly born of cynicism but also of past experience. In previous elections the organisation has felt the frustration of supporting ‘independents’, only to find that when they have been successful in reaching office they have quickly aligned themselves to one of the major (current administration) parties, and thus into patronage politics (interview ML01, March 16 1994; interview ML07, May 3 1994). Clearly, this is a case of national dynamics being replicated at the local/barangay level.

Additionally, local politics may be non-partisan in law, but people do form themselves into groups which are recognised by voters, and this is partisan politics in action. During the Putatan election, the eventual winners were often referred to as ‘Teves and his group of six’. This group were often seen together and gave voters the impression they were running as a group and under the same banner.

Outside of election periods, SBT maintains very low levels of political participation and activism. Additionally, leaders were only vaguely aware of the Local Government Code (LGC) and not familiar with the empowering clauses of the UDHA. With regard to the LGC, it was viewed as a positive move in getting away from central control. Entwined in this is the belief that the national-congressional politicians were not interested in barangay affairs and that "barangay captains have the best interests of the community at heart" (interview ML13, July 20 1994). Indeed, Meding and the organisation presented a very ‘system-friendly’ posture in further claiming that the barangay was and is good for community development. However, over several interviews, the LGC was itself never expressly viewed as being positive in terms of opportunities for urban poor organisations. The organisation was also not involved, nor
seemingly interested in taking an active role in the beneficiaries listing program, feeling that this was a municipality issue. Indeed, in one exchange, Meding noted that he thought that the government should be "building houses, not making lists" (interview ML12, July 17 1994).

Summary

The settlements of and around Putatan are typically diverse in character and prove difficult to define with regard to their demography, income and nature of housing. The 'community' has evolved in a classically chaotic and ad hoc fashion, with the events of 1986 being a key factor in the area's growth and evolution.

As with most urban poor communities, there is a history of organisation in the area. Over the years these have gone through normal processes of growth and decline. Historically, particularly during the Marcos administration, the local organisation (PACO) was solely civic in nature, providing for community activities and obtaining electricity for some residents. Eventually though, in the tumultuous mid-1980s, PACO disintegrated under the weight of divided political loyalties.

The emergence of the present organisation and its leadership and structure has been very much grounded in this past. In particular, traditional community leaders have survived into the 1990s and continue to lead the organisation on behalf of its members. Clearly there is a considerable gap in levels of interest and participation within the organisation. For some, it is even seen as a personal and political vehicle for the elite, it is distrusted and plays a very minor part in their lives. The structure of the organisation reflects these beliefs, and it is clear that most decisions and information is restricted to a select group, whether defined by gender, income or age.
The issue of water provision highlights these processes in action and emphasises the methods SBT uses to gain access to resources. The personal approach is the tactic most favoured by the organisation's leaders, and with the issue of water it is possible to see the benefits and disadvantages of this practice. One could surmise from this that the organisation plays a role in the penetration of clientelist culture and relationships. In turn, this has maintained the continued dependency of the community. This does not, however, necessarily imply satisfaction with this situation, as has been noted.

Nevertheless, by working within the system in this manner, the organisation can be seen as reproducing poverty within a closed sphere of dependent patronage relations, relations over which the organisation has little or no control. Notably, by not offering any behavioural or ideological alternatives to the system, the organisation can be seen as perpetuating the status quo. One should note though, that while the community may be disadvantaged from this situation, the leaders may actually gain from these relationships.

SBT maintains itself as a 'non political' organisation. In so doing, throughout the 1994 barangay elections it was possible to note the dependence of the organisation with regard to its inability to contribute to the nature and content of the campaign, and gain any leverage for the community. In fact, the area was all but ignored during the election. Instead, it confined its activities to traditional sponsorship, and local aspirants obliged. Likewise, attitudes in the leadership opposed any direct political empowerment of the community through ‘taking control of the barangay’, though it should be noted that this was also the result of previous negative experience and practical obstacles.

Nevertheless, these systems and relationships can also occasionally be used to the advantage of some residents and utang na loob at times could be flouted. Additionally, in presupposing the dependent nature of the community, it is important to note that improvements are taking place. Footpaths, electricity, and an (albeit insecure) water supply are all positive legacies of the
organisation and its leaders. Consequently, it is also necessary to take into consideration these achievements in assessing the organisation and its performance.
CHAPTER SEVEN

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE SOCIETY? THE FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES

Introduction

The Foundation for Development Alternatives (FDA) emanated from the events of 1986 and has evolved to be one of the more significant NGO actors in the capital. Emerging through the EDSA revolution with only one part time worker, FDA now plays a significant role in community organising and works in concert with a number of UPOs and NGO alliances. It is currently active in four major urban poor coalitions (ALMA NOVA being one) and has established six community organisations. Additionally it has been at the forefront of land acquisition through the Community Mortgage Programme, has acquired basic services for urban poor communities, and was a significant actor in the campaign for the passage of UDHA (FDA, 1992). Up to 1992, FDA had been involved in training over 2,000 urban poor leaders and members on leadership skills, issues, and value formation (FDA, 1992).

Central to these efforts is the goal of creating ‘An Alternative Society’ whereby,

it [FDA] seeks to evolve alternatives to the modes of social change and development ... a society where people meet their basic needs, both material and non-material, and responsibly exercise their rights and fulfil their responsibilities ... [and where] the urban poor ... unite among themselves and stand up to become a real factor in forging an alternative society (FDA flyer, n.d).
Consequently, the Foundation works at both quantitative (through the Livelihood Support Programme) and qualitative amelioration. It aids in people’s actual and felt empowerment and in providing material needs through infrastructure, health, and education scholarships (FDA, n.d) and plays a mediating role between community, the state and the media. William Carroll (1992:44) refers to such NGOs as “social movement entrepreneurs”.

The organisation is now at the vanguard of Metro Manila’s urban social movement and continues to be active in community organising, alliance building, national lobbying, and working to develop cross sectoral linkages. Included in this work is the establishment of PAKSA LUPA (National Alliance of Urban Poor Organisations for Urban Land Reform), an organisation which is a meeting point for community organisations and NGDOs. Above all, the FDA now plays a pivotal role in urging grassroots organisations and coalitions to elevate their struggle to the societal and national level.

This chapter outlines the direction and issues involved in FDA’s work. As a credible and significant INGO in the Manila region, FDA typifies many of the prospects, expectations and obstacles associated with grassroots support organisations in a ‘real world’ daily praxis. This chapter opens with an outline of the organisation, its structure and history. Following this, the nature of FDA’s relationship with GROs is evaluated, as this is the most important part of the Foundation’s work. From this, several significant issues are raised with regard to FDA-GRO relations and the FDA strategy that are both unique to the NGO itself, but also are somewhat typical of INGO-GRO relations in general. This chapter thus provides an introduction to the ALMA NOVA case study that follows, but also introduces several significant topics that relate to the theoretical literature on the role of intermediary NGOs.
FDA: Framework and Evolution

The Foundation for Development Alternatives was established through the actions of several who were involved in the anti-Marcos movements of the mid-1980s. Through their socially active work, these activists met and worked with several urban poor leaders. In the post-EDSA period they wanted to continue the work that had been initiated at this time. Furthermore these activists sought to establish an organisation that would move beyond an activist/protest role and toward maintaining and developing urban poor leadership governing durable and sustainable community organisations. Above all, these social activists wanted to help sustain those organisations of the urban poor that had emerged in the 1980s, optimistic that they could become an urban social movement in the post-Marcos era. Prior to 1986 there was no coherent urban poor ‘sector’ to speak of (interview NG07, April 21 1994).

Within this there were several avenues and sponsors available in the post-EDSA environment that made community organising viable and appealing. Firstly, FDA was welcomed into a significant and potent NGO community in the form of a national alliance. Additionally, although there was no urban poor ‘sector’ at this stage (unlike a well recognised labour and peasant faction), there were several active people’s organisations and groups working at the grassroots level that had acquired a degree of political seasoning through the 1980s. What was also favourable was the political climate, whereby there was increased (or perceived) democratic space for the popular sectors that made this kind of activity and role both attractive and timely. Politicians had been made keenly aware of the potential of ‘people’s power’ and were in a more conciliatory and concessionary mood in 1986. Finally, at the grassroots level there remained many adversities for the poor and barriers to change. Demolitions were (and remain) a phenomenon which leads to agitation and organisation. Presidential Decree 772 and other ‘anti-poor’ Marcos laws remained, and there was a general concern to keep the revolutionary ball rolling.
to challenge any return to the old order. There was a desire that the momentum created in the 1980s should be made to be self-sustaining.

While officially registered in 1985, FDA did not begin programme implementation until 1987. Originally the organisation worked at training organisers, organising communities and pursuing educational (known as ‘conscientisation’, see Friere, 1973) work in several communities which have continued as the backbone of their work. As time has passed, FDA has expanded into research, networking and consultancy, though its administration level five years on had not grown in proportion to the number of community organisers and trainees.

FDA’s linkages with other NGOs illustrate the shifting nature of Filipino alliances and organisations. Following its founding, FDA came into methodological conflict with its sponsor organisations over how to achieve UPO empowerment. Subsequently, FDA shifted emphasis and partners and has regularly done so since 1988. Overall though, the organisation has maintained itself as a significant player in the centre grouping of Filipino civil society and has increasingly sought to work with like-minded organisations.

FDA and Community Organisations

Fundamental to the organisation’s work and strategy is its relationship with urban poor organisations. The Sambayanan (Community) Organising Programme concentrates on organising, educating, and training leadership and citizens to strengthen UPOs and their organisational infrastructure (FDA, 1992). In so doing, FDA seeks to create a ‘model’ type of UPO through various planned out stages.

The characteristics of the ideal UPO that FDA aspires to generate are sundry. FDA’s stated goals are that, firstly, the UPO should be cause oriented. It should
respond to both local and national issues and make connections between the
two. It should also be able to ‘identify and assist’ with other UPOs, and even
organisations from other sectors. Secondly, the organisation should be self-
sustaining, able to evaluate its own performance, and in consultation with its
membership, able to find collective solutions to the area’s problems. The
membership, not the leadership, should be the backbone of this strength and
sustainability, and be capable of making its leaders accountable and responsive
to community needs and concerns. Additionally, the UPO should be financially
sustainable, either through utilising its own resources or soliciting support from
external sources. Thirdly, the organisation should value and employ collective
action. Fourthly, the organisation should be legitimate in the eyes of the
community and government. Finally, political awareness and strategy should be
elevated, and UPOs should endeavour to live out an alternative culture in their
discourse, recreation, and politics (FDA Flyer, n.d).

Throughout this process FDA plays a critical formative and directional role.
Consequently, it has devised a planned five ‘stages of organisational growth’
through which UPOs should graduate (see Figure 7.1). The first two stages
consist of FDA community trainers identifying communities, educating on felt
issues (usually land issues), and selecting and training leaders. This includes
leadership seminars on conflict management, issue analysis, political education,
evaluation, and legal skills (FDA Flyer, n.d). Typically, this is expected to take
from one to three years. The second phase of growth, around years four to six
is spent on strengthening the organisation and increasing support programmes,
typically in health, housing and research, perhaps in the form of building
community cooperatives. Additionally, FDA encourages UPOs to become more
advocational and concerned with forming and entering alliances, both with other
UPOs and wider movements. At this stage, UPOs affiliate with PAKSA-LUPA,
a coalition of UPOs that have also been institutionalised by FDA. Most of UPOs
are at this stage, having had relations with FDA since the late 1980s. The final
phase of direct FDA contact centres on the development of self-sustainable
UPOs, organisations that are then strong enough to be phased out of the
FIGURE 7.1 FDA AND THE STAGES OF COMMUNITY ORGANISING.

STAGE ONE
Preparatory Stage: Ground Clearing, Foundation-Laying

STAGE TWO
Formation of Community Base Organisations, Issue Resolution, Leadership Selection and Orientation Seminars.

STAGE THREE
Consolidation Stage. Territorial Alliances, Secondary Leadership Development

STAGE FOUR

STAGE FIVE
Phase-out Stage: Strong Regional & National Alliance Becoming a Real Factor in Forging an Alternative Society. Self-Sustaining Community

Source: FDA Flyer
programme and enter into a ‘consultative’ capacity with FDA and act independently as part of a self-sustaining movement and an ‘alternative society’, the end goal of FDA (interview NG07, April 21 1994).

Several areas of interest can be raised in regard to this strategy of building ‘alternative and sustainable’ UPOs. These relate to the nature of the relationship and the prospects for success. Such issues include the effects the FDA approach have on the nature of the emerging organisation, and in particular the desire to create more progressive, responsive and ‘alternative’ leadership. Secondly, what has been the experience of scaling-up on UPOs? Can FDA be cast in the position of creating ideological hegemony over UPOs? What issues arise from local poor organisations when they are obliged to step up into the wider and more hostile political environment? Thirdly, what likelihood does the electoral challenge strategy have for success, and what has been the experience for UPOs? And finally, can FDA and like minded organisations create sustainable, alternative and autonomous organisations, and what degree of dependency and antagonism exists between UPOs and its head organisation? While FDA is in comparative infancy with regard to several of these questions, much has been learned regarding relationships, strategies and degrees of success.

FDA and Community Organising

FDA seeks to create organisations that are responsive and accountable to members, as well as being skilfully led by respected and capable leaders. Important to this approach is the emphasis on training and creating ‘non-traditional’ leaders and organisational structures that are ‘base-up’ rather than ‘top down’ (interview NG07, April 21 1994). In ‘traditional’ situations, leaders act as community brokers in which campaigns are won or lost depending on that lone individual. In these situations, if that particular leader is lost then so are
those gains and contacts that have been accumulated (interview NG07, April 21 1994). As well, the community must pay a cost for these gains, usually in the form of political acquiescence or subordination. In ‘traditional’ organisations the leadership is the organisation, with participation and experience beginning and ending with a select few. In the non-traditional situation, the leader’s strength is through the people, if negotiations fail then mobilisation or group pressure becomes an option (interview NG07, April 21 1994).

Consequently, the FDA strategy regards an educated and energetic membership as essential. Nonetheless it still concentrates its primary efforts on leaders and leadership. FDA still attests that leaders are vital in that they be able to negotiate and represent the community and filter down information to them. According to FDA executives, people have different levels of consciousness and those that see needs are often the leaders. Indeed, that is why they are selected. This strategy is a necessity as it is often impossible to ‘explain it’ to everybody, especially given the heterogenous nature of many urban poor communities (interview NG07, April 21 1994).

Problems emerge, and have done so in the past, when leaders follow their own interests and lose touch with their communities. Often community representation is demanding of a few, who are then likely to seek reward or compensation. Populist leaders have been known to revert to patronage ways when entrenched in positions of authority and accumulation. Additionally, over time leaders spend more time with officials, university leaders and the like and less time with the community. Different interpretations and attitudes are experienced and carried. Leaders have been known to use their position in the UPO as a springboard for furthering their political careers.

In creating alternative organisations with member support for this, UPOs must be able to meet the material needs of the population, at least as well as traditional means. The danger is that with increased community expectations little can still be financially afforded. The temptation may be to revert to
reciprocal arrangements as in the past. One example of this are events in a UPO that FDA had phased out in 1994. In seeking to establish a cooperative and day care centre, the UPO was hampered through a lack of money and resources. As a result, the organisation accepted monies from local politicians, though had rejected one Congressman's attempt to supply them from his timber supplies in return for *utang na loob*.

Problems and conflict can also occur between the organiser, local leaders and the population. One interpretive case of the difficulties that can emerge is the events which took place over a period of time from 1988 in FDA's plans to organise communities in the Novaliches area (this is further discussed in the following chapter). In 1988 FDA began its operations in Novaliches through concientisation and leadership training which led to a group named BIKTIMA being established. Almost immediately there appeared some irreconcilable differences in management and style within the leadership. Largely this centred around the fact that BIKTIMA covered two areas with distinctly different leaders who drew their support entirely from their own areas. Throughout 1989 these local leaders pursued their own interests under the framework of the wider BIKTIMA organisation. As time passed conflict appeared to heighten between both the leaders and members of each organisation with accusations of back stabbing, empire building and organisational operation and philosophy. Some of this was due to political ideology and operation. One FDA report highlighted that fights would break out regarding the two organisations "ways of soliciting money" and the nature of discussions with local land owners (FDA, 1991b).

Gradually FDA, originally through its local organisers, was drawn into the conflict. By late 1989 FDA workers felt it was impossible for the two groups in the organisation to work effectively together and it would be for the better if they were to separate and form their own organisations. Immediately a backlash occurred towards FDA from local leaders suggesting favouritism and an FDA plot to dismantle the organisations. BIKTIMA's leaders were strongly
supported by a few local organisations that called into question FDAs true intent. One letter to FDA read:

Any organiser or employee of FDA represents FDA, he brings with him what FDA is, the discipline and principles whatever the circumstances and wherever he may be. Therefore the loss of respect, trust, and ruining/destroying the credibility of FDA because of the rumours of [the FDA organiser] betraying the BIKTIMA organisation needs to be proven, for it means lost trust, respect and credibility of the whole situation and of the FDA in general (FDA Report, 1991b).

This disharmony was intensified when one of the original organisers left FDA in mid-1990 but was later to be found supporting one of the factions, even to the extent that FDA officials suspected he had forged submission letters of complaint to FDA about the rival organisation.

By late 1990, FDA’s alliance-building efforts in the area were under threat. FDA’s partiality was called into question and trust was severely eroded among the three parties. This continued even with the inception of another FDA organiser. By early 1991 he also was been attacked for favouritism and ethical competence. New leadership among the two rival organisations continued this conflict and eventually threatened to withdraw from the fledgling ALMA NOVA alliance. FDA, meanwhile, while desperately working to resolve the issue, was finding it increasingly difficult to work with BIKTIMA, arguing that the present leadership was unappealing and had questionable credibility among the population. Additionally, FDA officials lamented that BIKTIMA had not maintained some of its commitments, such as secondary leadership training and education. Rightly, FDA and some organisations within ALMA NOVA were concerned that the case was not only affecting its credibility in Quezon City, but also as an organising NGO. Eventually, FDA was able to effectively put its case to organisations within ALMA NOVA. Soon after, BIKTIMA withdrew. During interviews held in 1994, I found that support for BIKTIMA was low among other group leaders though they wished to restore the former area to the alliance.
The case of BIKTIMA demonstrates some of the problems associated with organisation and alliance building of poor communities in Manila and the Philippines. Although FDA eventually was able to prevail relatively intact after the dispute, the whole incident is still fresh in the minds of all parties. Hard earned trust can be evaporated overnight and suspicion is never further than a rumour away. Local loyalties can often be traded quickly and patron mentality can quite quickly subsume years of alternative political efforts. Likewise, FDA organisers can be dragged into local disputes and power plays, in the process jeopardising the credibility of organising work and the sponsor’s partiality.

Widening the Impact

A principal aspiration that FDA arouses in its organisations is that of being able to define local issues as part of the national context and then being able to act out community needs on these wider platforms. Mostly a UPO will focus on local issue based concerns, but gradually the FDA hopes that definition and resolution will advance into a more political stand or movement (interview NG02, March 11 1994). From this, UPOs should build their own alliances as well as working within wider, even cross sectoral, movements. In the past this has happened more easily in some communities than others, but generally it is the end-point blueprint for all.

While this aspect of INGO work is often praised (Korten, 1990; Clarke, 1995), several problems have arisen. Primarily there is a conflict between local and wider issues. Early in its operation, FDA attempted to get UPOs to work significantly at the higher level. Problems materialised as UPOs lacked the resources and ability to be active at this level. Attention to, and support of local issues was more evident and so while success was been achieved in policy, the grassroots was suffering. Subsequently, it has been the more preferred option that local organisations should concentrate their efforts at local politics and local issues, while, at the same time, seeing these as part of the national
system (interview NG07, April 21 1994). Selective representation can then become involved with more national campaigns but only as part of a well organised and funded machinery (interview NG07, April 21 1994). In the Philippines, to be politically credible and audible, an organisation must be part of a significant alliance.

Additionally, FDA linked organisations have been a casualty of the factious nature of Filipino alliance politics. Historically, it has been very difficult to unite INGO/UPO alliances of the centre with those of the left, particularly with regard to national issues. FDA leaders noted that these organisations "have different analysis when it comes to resolving a major issue" (interview NG07, April 21 1994). On the other hand, tactical alliances are possible at the local level on local issues and quite often local organisations will unite across ideological divisions.

Finally, there are considerable limitations on resources. As economically self-reliant communities, local organisations must rely on limited and sporadic community collections on, at times, intangible projects. Subsequently leaders are often left to account for their own costs, and often get into financial debt to carry out necessary external work.

**Electoral Empowerment Strategies**

At the centrepiece of FDA's strategy to scale up the effect of local organisations is their electoral empowerment strategy. Through this, FDA programmes seek to "institutionalise the participation of the urban poor and people's organisation in local governance and policy formulation and implementation" (FDA flyer, n.d). Inspired through their commitment to Project 2001, the procedure of how to participate in and win elections is a central theme for FDA, and as with the NGO/PO community as a whole, FDA is still very much on the learning curve of political participation. In this, FDA is also trying to encourage non-traditional
electoral behaviour and attitudes, both in regard to candidates and the electorate.

Subsequently the intention is to develop non-traditional leadership and voting behaviour with the intention that the poor ‘stick together’ at election time and hopefully elect leaders into barangay or other government positions. Subsequently, it may be possible under the opportunities of the Local Government Code for the poor to gain access to development funds and local centres of power. It is the intention then, to move voters and candidates away from patronage politics and more toward issue-based campaigns and behaviour. UPOs should take advantage of their position to "capture the barangay" if not by winning elections, then at least through influencing them (interview NG07, April 21 1994).

However, certain problems have occurred with this strategy. Despite efforts at non-traditional politics, the culture and expectation that these leaders can and should ‘deliver’ and return the favour of being elected is strong. People still use their vote as a bargaining chip and expect rewards via projects in the end (interview NG07, April 21 1994). FDA leaders noted that while members are enthusiastic in practising non-traditional politics over issues, at election time people are more likely to use their vote to pay back favours to those in the barangay council and to use their vote to maximise personal gain and leverage (interview NG07, April 21 1994). This has had some effect on maintaining personality driven and factious politics even among the urban poor themselves. Additionally, leaders have not been immune to abusing this support. In one widely known example a leader took the opportunity to stand for a post in a Crony-dominated party once his position in the community to deliver votes was secure.

Finally, although the idea of ‘capturing the barangay’ is rationally sound, it has been very difficult for the poor both financially and time-wise to operate successful campaigns. To run as an independent, one must have both money
and political machinery, two resources lacking in urban poor communities. In attempting to offset financial constraints, urban poor candidates have been known to accept help from political parties in lieu of future *utang na loob* (interview NG07, April 21, 1994), such is the power and pervasiveness of patronage politics. As of yet, it has been very difficult for the urban poor to run effectively as independents. Still, while significant problems have emerged efforts are still young and windows of opportunity still exist.

**UPO Viability and Sustainability**

According to FDA philosophy, the final objective of the intervention cycle is UPO autonomy, and the establishment of "self-reliant people’s organisations" (FDA flyer, n.d). Organisations, once FDA has phased out, should be able to stand on their own and even "thrive without us there" (interview NG07, April 21, 1994). The idea is to teach people ideal ways of organising so they may solve their daily problems. UPOs, in the form of local alliances, should be able to have a significant impact on development at the local level and be in a position to demand and win concessions from local government (interview NG07, April 21, 1994).

Typically, the FDA hopes to leave a legacy of cause-oriented, self-sustaining independent organisations that value and put their faith in collective action. The phase-out period though can, and sometimes has been, somewhat acrimonious. Some organisations have felt that FDA has phased-out too early, leaving projects incomplete and local consensus undefined (FDA, n.d). Others have felt the chaff of FDA control, wanting to pursue their own objectives and resentful of a slow phase-out process.

Nevertheless, the relationship is by no means over at this point. Following 'independence', the two parties are expected to join into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby each agree on the other’s "role and expectations" for the
future (interview NG07, April 21 1994). In the blueprint, FDA remains as consultant to the UPO offering data, technical assistance and advice. As well, the parent NGO remains a vital conduit for legal assistance, rewards and alliances. The two organisation then enter into a symbiotic relationship which is intended to benefit each equally into the future.

While the hope is that these UPOs will continue to develop and act as role models in non-traditional politics, FDA’s Director has noted that reversion to "old ways" has been a particular problem after FDA has relinquished its direct role (interview NG06, April 8 1994). Such occurrences are frustrating, but to be expected in such a large project. The FDA project is highly ambitious.

Summary

The Foundation for Development Alternatives has emerged since the events of the 1980s to become one of the more significant NGOs in Metro Manila. For nearly a decade it has worked at conscientisation, organisation and counsel to the booming community of UPOs that now dot the landscape. This is not to say that NGO-PO relations affect all, or even most POs. Community organising is indeed a laborious process with a great many obstacles along the way.

For those affected, FDA acts as a conduit between the local, regional and national. It gives UPOs some degree of legitimacy and standing, particularly in their relations with government and other officials. The FDA project is a highly ambitious one. It attempts to organise and (re)educate at the local level, to lobby and become politically active at the regional and national level, and then to link these two spheres in a progressive manner to create no less than "an alternative society" (FDA Flyer, n.d). Consequently it is attempting to operate at several levels where other NGOs have failed before.
In this struggle, FDA has had a number of issues and problems to confront. At the local level it has had to contend with factionalism, suspicion, apathy, political culture and even problems caused by its own community workers. It has had to confront people's needs and demands for livelihoods as well as expectations that it can provide for the poor in another form of patronage. At other levels it has attempted to change a neopatrimonial system and culture that is still logical and legitimate to the majority and has laboured to construct a viable national NGO/PO coalition where none has existed for any reasonable period of time in the past. It would be easy therefore to find fault or generate disappointment with the result of FDAs work if one were to measure it by even the high standards it has set itself. Problems have occurred and continue to do so. Issues of community organising, leadership dependency, limited political success, and modest grassroots impact are evident. Nevertheless, other areas of FDA's work have been significant in achievement. In looking at FDA's work in Quezon City both these avenues and borders to FDA's objectives can be further and more thoroughly surveyed.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ALMA NOVA ALLIANCE

Introduction

The history of ALMA NOVA (Alyansa Ng Mga Maralita Sa Novaliches, meaning 'the Alliance of the Poor of Novaliches') is inseparable to that of the work of FDA. Since its somewhat difficult beginnings, ALMA NOVA has established itself as a credible organisation which has already accomplished several benefits for the community. Nevertheless, ALMA NOVA also exhibits features of other more traditional and/or struggling urban poor organisation in Manila. ALMA NOVA then, is a pertinent and rewarding organisation in which to focus attention in order to highlight the more significant issues within these 'alternative' and 'progressive' people's organisations and their ability to form an effective social movement.

In describing the experiences of the Sauyo Community Organisation (the Sitio Cabuyao Neighbourhood Association) in particular, and the issues confronting the ALMA NOVA alliance in this chapter, it is therefore pertinent to focus on three key aspects: First, what are the issues on which the community organisation has focused its energies? Second, what have been the problems in seeking to address the problems of the community?; and third, what have been the methods employed in responding to both the community's needs, and the demands placed upon the organisation with regard to its role in progressive sectoral representation?
Area History

Sauyo is an established squatter community set amongst middle class communities, empty blocks and occupational housing estates. It is located in Novaliches, in the north of Quezon City, home of over one million residents living in autonomous settlements\textsuperscript{21}. Quezon City has the highest ratio of autonomous settlements in Metropolitan Manila. The Sauyo community itself is old by Manila’s standards with some dwellings dating back some 40 years. Often it was possible to talk to residents who had lived in the settlement since the early 1970s or even those who were second generation residents (interview NR01, June 1 1994). While it is difficult to establish an actual population of Sauyo due to variations in family and household size, it is estimated that Sauyo is home to some 500 families (interview NL01, June 1 1994) and possibly around 2,000 people. Accuracy is problematic. For example, the household where I stayed was home to up to 18 people at various stages and less than a dozen at others.

As with Muntinlupa and Manila generally, prior to EDSA the community’s population was limited with only a few houses scattered through forested fields. Since the events of 1986 however, the settlement has grown steadily (interview NR01, June 1 1994) and one could clearly see this in settlement patterns. Pre-1986 houses tended to be very large with several compounds, while more recent structures were densely packed. Surprisingly, while security of tenure is very precarious with the future construction of the apparently imminent C-5 road, building types were very permanent and settlement patterns clearly demarcated. Many houses had several rooms and a basketball court had been constructed with an asphalt base. A 1992 survey of the area showed that nearly one-third of the households had a refrigerator and nearly half owned a television set and washing machine (ACSPPA, 1992). Shops were also

\textsuperscript{21} According to Department of Social Welfare and Development figures (PCUP Flyer, n.d), the squatter/urban poor population in Quezon City nearly doubled between 1985-1988 alone, from 29% of the City population, to 49%.
MAP 8.1 PENCIL SKETCH OF SAUYO
Plate 37. An established high quality house.

Plate 38. Local sari-sari store. Note the flood marks from rainy season.
Plate 39. Bakery established by recent migrants to Metro Manila.

Plate 40. One of the original houses of the area with courtyard. In this case a community panelbeater has a place to work.
scattered throughout the community, selling a comprehensive range of goods and servicing both residents and those nearby to the community. As well, a community hall, which doubled as a creche/school, had been built within the last few years.

The community is economically integrated into the local surrounding areas, with extensive use being made of the local market, transportation and so on. Home improvements in the community were common, with many houses very well established to the standard of middle class housing. Although in parts the settlement was cluttered, shared vegetable patches were still cultivated. As with settlement types and patterns, the population could hardly be generalised upon in terms of occupation, with employment ranging from engineers, builders, transportation workers and those with relatives overseas. Nevertheless, over half of the community do not have access to any formal employment and work sporadically in the informal sector. Most of those that do work are involved in the service sector (ACSPPA, 1992). Educational levels are diverse as well. While the majority of people have no formal educational qualifications, nearly 5% are college graduates (ACSPPA, 1992).

**Organisation History**

As part of the area alliance, ALMA NOVA, the Sauyo organisation has been linked with several other squatter settlements up to eight kilometres away. Previously, there has been a history of organisations in the area now covered by ALMA NOVA. None though, according to prominent ALMA NOVA representatives and others who had been involved, were overly active (interview NLO2, June 1 1994). They also were said to have operated in the "old ways" (interview NL11, June 17 1994). Vilma, a current leader in ALMA NOVA and one who has been involved in community organising since 1980, recalled that in the past organisations used to operate by approaching
Plates 41 and 42. Flooding during rainy season. Below left a communal vegetable garden.
Plates 43 and 44. Common problems of stagnant water and garbage disposal.
politicians in a classical patronage fashion. There were many organisations here at that time but she claimed that they all lacked direction. For example, there were no efforts in issue-education in the past. Previous organisations mostly concentrated on infrastructure projects and "were not issue based" (interview NL11, June 17 1994). This was often a distinction that was made between the present situation and the past.

ALMA NOVA was officially founded in August 1989, centred around the organisation of BIKTIMA, the core organisation set up by FDA. Already the alliance's list of accomplishments is impressive. Individually and collectively, the local organisations that make up ALMA NOVA have secured water and electricity supplies, built day care centres, fences and lamp posts, constructed concrete pathways and improved drainage. Apart from these aesthetic and infrastructural gains, local organisations have been active in identifying the status of their land, negotiating with local and public authorities over the environment and questions of rights and mobilising over causes such as UDHA and the status of the American bases. All of the still active organisations maintain committees dealing with research and education, infrastructure and mobilisation (FDA, 1991a).

Since its founding, local groups have come and gone. The most important loss was of the original organisation, BIKTIMA, which resigned in a political and personality-dominated split in 1991. The alliance, which at one time consisted of seven groups, now consists of three active, three dormant and one resigned local organisation. ALMA NOVA acts as an umbrella organisation linking these local organisations (see Figure 8.1). Membership of ALMA NOVA has most recently been estimated at around 2,000 (ACSPPA, 1989:1). Nevertheless, these figures may be misleading and encouraging participation is a constant struggle. Even in the most active of the local organisations (Sauyo and Pinagpala) only a minority of residents are members and a minority again are considered active members in their local organisations (FDA, 1991a). One
FIGURE 8.1 ALMA NOVA and Local Organisations

Plate 46.
Electricity is often 'tapped' from secondary lines allowing some use of supply, but also causing overloading.

Plate 45.
Water supply to a house. Water flows periodically where it is bucketed to a drum inside.
study showed that low turnout - less than 5% of members - was common (Amorado et.al, 1993: 11). Nevertheless, there appears to be widespread support for the local organisations among the community. The vast majority believe in community organising and the positive change and development such activities can bring to a community (ACSPPA, 1992).

Organisation Structure

The structure of ALMA NOVA is clearly defined and transparent, and while power appears to emanate from the centre, certain democratic functions and grassroot structures ensure that processes are not exclusively limited to being top-down. ALMA NOVA consists of a General Assembly which meets once a year, but the decision making core of the organisation is the Council of Leaders (COL). The general assembly has to have 50 members from each local organisation attending to be held. The Council of Leaders consists of ten representatives from the three remaining active organisations. It is this group that debates resolutions and makes decisions which are then passed on to the local organisations for implementation. ALMA NOVA has no power of direct implementation. A simple quorum is all that is required to have a majority, and this majority is mandated to be respected and accepted by all (interview NL17, June 29 1994).

Many of the resolutions taken to the Council actually emanate from the local organisation meetings and, due to differing interests, problems occasionally arise of special local interests being pursued by each organisation. Yet, internalised in the structure are certain democratic checks and balances to promote democratic obligations.

Both the umbrella ALMA NOVA, and the local organisations are led by democratically elected representatives. Local organisation leaders are elected by that organisation's population (interview NL17, June 29 1994). The position
of the chair is only for one year, but there are no term limits. This position is
elected on a block delegate voting technique. Each delegation has ten votes
and five residents who are not leaders also vote. Although these are individual
votes, voting as a block is common. The current leader, for example, picked up
all 30 votes from her immediate areas but less than half from the other two
areas, giving her a highly imbalanced majority. One positive feature of this
election though was that 12 candidates contested the post.

Despite these structures, it still appears that few initiatives on the organisation's
direction and issue base actually emanate from the grassroots. Local
organisation meetings are mostly a chance for local leaders to report back to
their members the resolutions of the Council of Leaders and other leader
meetings. This was confirmed to me by one leader as the consequence of the
knowledge gap between the leadership and the community.

The leaders of the organisations within ALMA NOVA are women (with only one
exception), who either have been or are politically involved outside of the
community. Indeed, most of the officials of the local organisations and their
representatives in the ALMA NOVA alliance are middle aged women with
families. An anomaly is that all of the local barangay officials are male
(interview NL03, June 2 1994).

Luc and Poning, two of the key personalities and leaders in the alliance, both
have political appointments outside of the community. Poning has worked as
a community program officer at the Vice Mayor's office at Quezon City Hall
since being drafted at an NGO meeting she attended as a representative of
ALMA NOVA. By her account, she was spotted by councillor Liban and
approached regarding a position at Quezon City Hall (interview NL13, June 22
1994). At first, she felt unsure of taking the position, but in fact she was finally
swayed by the encouragement from FDA officials, who advised her it would be
a good way "to build up contacts" (interview NL13, June 22 1994).
Luz also has a position in the City Council, but both rarely spend any time in these occupations. Naturally, such a situation raises a concern of patronage relationships developing. Indeed, both leaders expressed that neither Liban nor his office were greatly concerned if they did not work in their positions, happy for both to be "ghost workers" with pay, in order to have their influence on board (interview NL20, July 15 1994). While both are aware of this and attempt to work at the office, the title of 'ghost worker' appears to apply with perhaps serious ramifications of *utang na loob*.

Quite clearly, even despite the efforts to create 'alternative organisations with alternative leadership', the organisations described here in ALMA NOVA are characterised by traditional problems of leader dependency (Amorado, 1993:11). This was referred to me as a two way process: of leaders leading organisations, and a problem of residents willing to abdicate participation and responsibility onto leaders. Consequently, in the Philippine and local context, this predominance of leadership can also be seen as an expectation held by the community. For example, on more than one occasion Poning stated to me that one of the most significant challenges the community organisation faces in the near future is that of membership expectation that leaders do all that is needed. Described as a problem of "leader centred" consciousness, members often expect leaders to do everything, and subsequently, to carry the entire community's burdens. Leaders carried a great deal of responsibility and peoples expectations were high of them (interview NL17, June 29 1994). Often local leaders would be admonished for not heeding everybody's individual concerns.

The cult of personality and significant dependence on individuals has also led to severe political divisions within the alliance. During 1992, ALMA NOVA almost ceased to exist as a credible and representative people's alliance. Three of the seven groups, including the original local group, BIKTIMA, left ALMA NOVA or ceased to be functional. Of the three, it appeared that one organisation's leader became too busy at work and so failed to turn up to meetings. In time the organisation lost touch and folded. In another example a
leader became pregnant, withdrew, and similarly the organisation lacked secondary leadership. Consequently, as a direct result of the discontinuance of leadership, these organisations lost contact with the alliance (interview NL17, June 29 1994). Additionally, this was reflected at the member level with either a lack of confidence demonstrated in local leadership, or heightened factionalism. Despite general satisfaction over the way programmes are run by local organisations, the great majority of members were acutely aware of the problems of factionalism in their organisation, mostly attributing this to differences in management and leadership styles (Amorado, 1993; ACSPPA, 1992; This is not unique to ALMA NOVA: interview OT05, June 5 1994).

Another significant factor here was the lack of a defining and unifying issue. Both of these organisations were not directly affected by the C-5 project and as a result the leaders appeared to "just get bored" (interview NL17, June 29 1994). Notably though, these organisations had small bases and were represented by only a few experienced people. Some members later expressed their dissatisfaction at their organisation's collapse, but lacking the time themselves, felt that it was futile to continue if their local leaders were no longer motivated (interview NL17, June 29 1994).

By far the most dramatic split, though, occurred with the loss of BIKTIMA from the alliance in late 1992. While this loss was also the result of the aforementioned difficulties, the split appeared more to do with a battle of key personalities for control over the alliance, than of any other single reason. BIKTIMA's leaders walked out of the alliance following the loss of their leader, Artim, in his efforts at becoming president in the 1991 local elections. While some leaders expressed the belief that once these quarrels had been smoothed over the local organisation would rejoin, under government rules once ALMA NOVA is registered with the SEC this would not be possible. Competition for power within the alliance between personalities of certain organisations appears to be one of the most significant threats to the existence and success of ALMA NOVA and its affiliated groups.
Another hinderance to the possibility of a much stronger set of organisations lies in the conflict over gender relations and ascribed roles. While most of the alliances membership and leadership are female, this has more to do with the domestic extension roles ascribed to women than any passing on of controlling functions in a patriarchal society. Quite often conflict would occur over the extent of the female’s role in community organising. While this was seen as a natural role in the local context, tension and conflict would often be apparent when these duties became more than local or symbolic. It was not uncommon for the female activists to be expected to spend their time travelling around the city on menial errands, while the male leaders accept trips as community representatives to such prestigious places as Baguio and seaside resorts (interview NL08, June 8 1994). For example, in the case of one local leader her husband refused her consent to leave town to attend meetings (interview NL11, June 17 1994). Consequently her role as Vice President of the alliance was greatly compromised. Additionally, she was placed under great pressure to abandon her role in the organisation to return to domestic duties (interview NL11, June 17 1994). Nevertheless, she stood for election in 1994 for the role of Vice President, unbeknown to her husband. Quite remarkably, she carries on this highly responsible and politically active role without the knowledge of her family.

As with all community organisations of the urban poor, financial constraints are often referred to as the most pressing of problems, and one that threatens the ability of the organisation to be proactive, or to even exist at all (Amorado, 1993:11). The organisation's financial resources originate from a number of sources. Firstly, there are the local fees of P5 per month for the local organisation, 50c of which goes to PAKSA LUPA and 50c to the local alliance. The four remaining pesos are mostly used for transportation costs for representatives, leaders, committees (such as the now defunct committee for electrification) and their expenses. It may also be saved for special events, marches, demonstrations and the like. While the money is useful, it is rarely collected by the treasurer and leaders will mostly use their own money for small
expenses. The organisation is also funded through its NGO linkages and relationships. Each month, FDA contributes P1400 towards PAKSA LUPA costs, money which is available to the alliance in the form of education scholarships (interview NL06, June 4 1994) and possible grants for mobilisation events. Significantly, while under the tutelage of the FDA, resources were less of a concern. However, the desire to become politically independent proved greater than the need to stay financially secure (interview NL07, June 7 1994). This trade off is often ruefully noted by many of the leaders.

Still, the lack of financial resources is seen by the leaders of ALMA NOVA as the most important problem in their organisations and the alliance (interview NL17, June 29 1994). As one example, long and drawn out negotiations which necessitate daily travel incur costs beyond the individual’s budget. The Vice President of ALMA NOVA further highlighted these concerns to me. She bemoaned that the lack of resources meant that she was unable to afford to do the things that needed to be done, such as attending meetings or travelling to meet with people (interview NL09, June 9 1994). Such constraints hinder the ability of leaders to involve themselves and the community in social movement work. They also place financial pressures that may be too great on the community to participate and for the leaders to carry out their duties and the communities expectations. Throughout urban poor organisations then, it is these financial constraints that most threaten their ability to participate and develop into social movements of any consequence and political meaning.

**Organisation Objectives and Methods**

The example of Sauyo embodies both the traditional difficulties in community organising coupled with the opportunities and issues regarding its role as part of an urban social movement. In its methods the organisation’s operations reflect a schizophrenic equilibrium between the old and the new, in the use of
both 'traditional' and 'progressive' tools in defining and addressing community needs.

As with 'typical' urban poor organisations, much of the groups' resources and focus is on issues of consumption and basic shelter needs and these are highlighted as the most important of objectives in the organisation's constitution and by-laws (see Appendix Three). In the past, the organisations that make up ALMA NOVA have successfully lobbied for the implementation of UDHA and have concentrated on alliance building and networking. Today one of the principal concerns of the organisation is over imminent relocation, as one of the Ramos administration's key infrastructural projects, the C-5 road, will eventually pass through the area. Despite the fact that the road has been planned since the early 1960s and is still not expected to be constructed in this area until 1998 (Quintos, 1994:14), it is still the predominant issue among the community. Indeed, the road project is a survival issue and is responsible for a continuing degree of unease over the necessity of other long term projects. Yet, to date, the community organisation has been rather successful in its lobbying over the roads construction, having in the past convinced the authorities on a narrower road and some minor detours. Despite these gains, the road construction will increase the cost of land to an extent the community cannot meet and so an appropriate relocation site is being sought.

As over 25,000 houses will be demolished along this stretch of the road, the issue has been the catalyst for a great many pressure groups to organise and alliances to develop. Indeed, the necessity of a strong organisation for those who are to be affected is critical as government agencies will only negotiate with community organisations and not individuals. "Without an organisation, the squatter community would be getting almost nothing from the government" (Quintos, 1994:15). Above all, the community is seeking relocation within Quezon City close to the factories many work in and the children's schools for those directly in line with the new road. For others in the community, the demand is for on-site development similar to the Zonal Improvement
Programme by way of self-help housing (ALMA NOVA, n.d.). To date, the leaders seem to have been successfully ‘noticed’ over the issue and have achieved their goal of becoming a factor in the decision making process - one of the organisations principal aims (interview NL05, June 4 1994).

Another of the major consumption issues of the organisation is electricity. The community has not had a regular supply since January 1994, when overloading of the lines through illegal tapping caused the system to explode. Meetings continued throughout 1994 as the community sought a stable supply. These debates became a battleground for contesting political forces within the community. While the local organisation leader wanted to follow the prolonged course the power company had set, other personalities wanted to fast-track installation through more traditional methods. One of these local notables was Fred. Fred had previously presided over the Committee on Electrification which had in fact not only failed to secure supply, but had collapsed when the community’s money disappeared along with the treasurer. Still, Fred reappeared at meetings with quite specific offers to pay the indebted P21,000 as well as the additional P28,000 needed for supply, in return for votes in his presidential aspirations (interview NL01, June 1 1994). As a result, the community was divided over strategies, though it had appeared toward the end of 1994 that the ‘progressives’ had won this particular battle. Since then, the community leaders have dealt with the power company as consumers and avoided the temptation of resorting to traditional patronage methods.

These debates regarding strategy appear to be a way of life for the leaders and the organisation. While patrons are still the more preferred way for people to operate, there appears to be desire among leaders and members to create alternative behaviour and systems of action. In the case of long awaited electricity connection the use of contacts was not used. The leaders and most residents preferred to pay for the connection and remain on the waiting lists rather than to resort to traditional (and perhaps more effective) strategies. These struggles were encapsulated during one week in July, 1994. On the
Monday, the Vice President of ALMA NOVA was informed that another high ranking official had been tapping electricity for residents in return for a fee, while on the following Sunday at a general meeting of the executive committee, representatives were at pains to emphasise to onlookers that the organisation no longer wished to be a part of TRAPO politics (interview NL10, June 11 1994; interview NL11, June 17 1994).

At other times though, personal contacts are still critical in gaining access to resources, information, and knowledge. For example, in requesting even public information from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) regarding the C-5 road, the leaders of ALMA NOVA still needed ‘personal recommendations’ from city hall to get appointments and for the organisation’s leaders to gain access to plans and documents. Indeed, this request was a prerequisite for not only the viewing of public documents, but also in having an appointment accepted to see public officials. After several attempts, one local leader lamented that it is frustrating trying to build an alternative society in such a culture of patronage. Even ‘alternative’ organisations, at times it seems, must somehow operate within the pervasive ‘traditional culture’ (interview NL13, June 22 1994).

On other occasions too, contacts have been directly used. In the case of acquiring a water pump, Poning went directly to her friends in City Hall and duly had one installed (interview NL01, June 1 1994). In the case of finding suitable land for relocation, it may be the organisation’s leaders who find the land, but it will be their political contact(s) who represent the community in negotiating for it (interview NL18, July 6 1994; interview NL20, July 15 1994). It is these high level contacts that have been greatly responsible for the degree of development and dialogue which has occurred in the area. Local leaders emphasised to me on several occasions that it was an advantage to know people in City Hall in order to get things done. Previously, many projects were blocked by a somewhat hostile and disinterested barangay which was loath to direct funds to the area. Consequently, it has proven very difficult for the
organisation to get development projects either approved or implemented - even with local contacts in the nearby subdivisions.

Poning even went as far as to say that it was nigh impossible to gain access to barangay development funds. Furthermore it was felt that local barangay officials always tie projects up with future promises of support (interview NL14, June 23 1994). As all the kagawads are from the 13 middle class subdivisions that surround the area, Poning felt that the barangay council simply "do not understand our wants" (interview NL17, June 29 1994). As well, in the local council's view the residents of Sauyo did not have the right to resources as they are squatters. As a result, almost no projects have been implemented through the barangay of late. Indeed in the case of improving an access road to the community the local kagawad dismissed workers from the site apparently on the grounds that the project was not 'his' and subsequently was a poor political investment of resources. Yet a visit to City Hall later had the same official offering all possible assistance to complete the project (interview NL08, June 8 1994).

At many times and in many ways then, Sauyo's and ALMA NOVA's leaders still operate in traditional ways. Most projects and strategies are still through leaders' contacts with 'friends' in higher places such as City Hall and Congress. These contacts at City Hall, the PCUP, NHA and Congress were crucial if the alliance was to be taken seriously (interview NL17, June 29 1994). Use of these contacts is still a significant part of the way the organisation operates. Such contacts, usually referred to as "friends of the urban poor", may even be used to help other areas, such as in the avoidance of the demolition teams (interview NL05, June 4 1994). Subsequently, both mobilisations and personal contacts, the new and the old, are used as strategies (interview NL05, June 4 1994). So while many strategies of ALMA NOVA are typical of those likely to be found in other organisations throughout the Philippines, clearly the FDA relationship has some influence over ideological and operational patterns.
Yet the overriding political culture of the city still permeates alternative behaviours. While emphasis in conversation and protocol points toward ‘alternative’ patterns and ways, on questions of *utang na loob*, leaders still refer to themselves as being "practical people" aware of the need to "give and take" (interview NL06, June 4 1994). And so, there are elements of schizophrenia here. Local leaders do know from experience the *barangay* officials can be made to cooperate if the client knows their rights and the local governments obligations, as set out in the LGC (interview NL14, June 23 1994). Local leaders also feel that they themselves operate very differently from past community organisations and distinctions are often made. Previous organisations were said to have lacked "direction", having dealt only with infrastructural projects in the "old ways". Since FDA contact, which is often referred to as the landmark of the organisation, projects have been issue-based with an emphasis on education as practised in such ways as education days and the Alternative Politicians Training Program. Luz (a local leader) stated that when politicians offer to do things she makes it clear that there will be no *utang na loob* and that the organisation is not interested in TRAPO relations even though sometimes it causes embarrassment, and even potential sponsors to withdraw (interview, NL11, June 17 1994).

At the heart of the movement toward progressive change lies education. Education is seen by many of the current leaders as what stands the organisation apart from other ‘civic’ organisations such as the adjacent Area-6 organisation. Without the educational focus members would ask "what are we organising for?" (interview NL05, June 4 1994). During my stay, I attended meetings with leaders disseminating knowledge to other leaders on current issues and topics, as well as community meetings on such things as the introduction of, and issues surrounding, the implementation of the VAT, the rights of squatters under UDHA, and the form that would appear soon regarding beneficiary listing for state housing projects. Generally, these meetings are well attended, though this depends strongly on the issue being discussed. For example, one study in the area showed that skills training was the most
popularly attended while a seminar on the LGC, for example, was poorly attended (ACSPPA, 1992). This sharing of information and concerns furthermore applies to leader contacts with other local organisations over issues such as the C-5 or other perceived needs. Additionally, contact with other sectors ranging from the unions to NGO environmental groups is common. Through these linkages ALMA NOVA has the opportunity to place its own concerns and activities alongside those of other communities and sectors in a more coordinated social movement fashion. Education is also a two way process, typified by the attendance of two of ALMA NOVA’s leaders at a two day seminar on the Local Government Code in Manila, valuable information later to be shared with the community.

Such alliance building and networking with other urban poor concerns goes beyond the traditional local subsistence/consumption orientations of many UPOs. While these basic needs efforts are still very important to the alliance, the organisation is far from being uni-dimensional. Indeed many activities are multi-faceted in operation with concerns over education, alliance building, and networking - even with other sectoral groups such as women’s groups and trade unions. This is part of what a 1989 Ateneo survey discovered as being the alliance’s emphasis on "a deeper analysis of the real root cause of the problem" (ACSPPA, 1989:1. My emphasis).

Consequently, the residents of Sauyo are firmly and formally networked into a web of organisations reaching from the grassroots up to the national and even international levels of participation and information. Clearly, one of the most influential factors of FDA’s involvement in regard to strategy has been the linkaging of the organisation with other like-minded groups to form alliances. The people of Sauyo have become, from their original contacts with FDA, entwined with the alliance of ALMA NOVA which joins them with local organisations in the areas of Bagbag and Talipapa, local city organisations which share similar problems of the C-5 such as the NTMQC, NGOs and peoples organisations from the urban poor and other sectors seeking to
participate more meaningfully in local and national politics such as the QC3, as well as nationally based NGOs such as the ULR-TF and PAKSA LUPA (see Figure 8.2).

Both Poning and Luz, prominent leaders in the area, felt that these alliances and networks were very important for the local population and organisation. Luz noted that it was clearly easier to be demolished if you were just one community standing alone (interview NL06, June 4 1994). Poning felt as strongly on this issue and as Vice President of the local PAKSA LUPA branch, felt that most of the organisation's strength has come through its alliances. These networks have given the community access to councillors, congressmen and NGOs, as well as an understanding of and even participation in, laws and acts that affect the urban poor, such as UDHA. NGDO contacts allow the organisation to participate in meetings and educational seminars. As well as participating, the organisation gains access to valuable information and advice, respectability and, through unity with larger groups, some political standing and clout. As a consequence, they felt that the government could not simply ignore them or shift them on without having to deal with these allies first - a formidable process (interview NL07, June 7 1994).

Access to such resources have consequently created a 'proactive' people's organisation. Publicity is something which is often sought. Lamenting the negative or non-existent coverage of the urban poor and their issues in the press, Poning was able to attend a media course at Ateneo University for NGDO workers (interview NL05, June 4 1994). Here ALMA NOVA officials see their role as part of a two way educative process, Poning saying that part of the organisations role is to "educate" the government (interview NL06, June 4 1994). Mobilisation in conjunction with other sectors, even to Malacanang Palace itself, and participation at the legislature when urban poor issues are raised are common tactics of participation in governance. These linkages provide both financial and non-financial resources for the organisation.
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<td>Municipal, District, Regional Level</td>
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<td>COMMUNITY ALLIANCES</td>
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<td>LOCAL ORGANISATION</td>
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Local, cause-related groups such as NTMQC have served to link areas affected by C-5 in Quezon City to meet and discuss strategies to protect their interests as well as offering a communication and information support channel between urban poor communities. NTMQC itself has had some degree of recognition within Quezon City. In one oft-told event in which a community on Mindanao Road was demolished without warning, Mayor Mathey\textsuperscript{22} is said to have rushed to the scene and despaired out loud, "What have you done! Wait till the NTMQC hears of this, the trouble it'll cause!" (interview NL14, June 23 1994).

Regular attendances of 15-20 (the vast majority women) have met regularly since 1992 to educate themselves on such issues as UDHA. ALMA NOVA itself got involved with NTMQC through its involvement with FDA and PAKSA LUPA.

As the local representative of PAKSA LUPA, Poning also attends QC3 meetings, an association of the basic sectors attempting to organise strategies to participate more effectively in local governance. As mainly an educational/lobby group, it organised a three day retreat on issues of the LGC for NGOs and POs, providing invaluable knowledge to such groups as ALMA NOVA.

National NGOs such as the ULR-TF and PAKSA LUPA, provide ALMA NOVA with a national setting for their concerns. The ULR-TF, for example, plays an important role in providing contacts and lawyers, as well as been able to explain regulations and legislation (such as the complex alterations to the Community Mortgage Program) and organising activities. Such coalitions have also acquired a degree of political power in the post-Marcos Philippines and are valued for the political clout they can provide (interview NL14, June 23 1994).

\textsuperscript{22} Mayor Mathey is a master of patronage politics and a remarkable political survivor, being Imelda Marcos’ vice-governor in Metro Manila during the Marcos era (\textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, 9 April, 1992:23). Clearly, he knows the importance of garnering political support among the urban poor who constitute such a large population in Quezon City.
In the case of PAKSA LUPA, one prominent ALMA NOVA official noted that if they are having difficulties they can take it to the PAKSA LUPA group which can then lobby Malacanang and the Senate or Congress on the local organisation’s behalf (interview NL04, June 4 1994). These linkages are valued and used because they provide a powerful lobby for local concerns when local resources and expertise are limited. For example when residents were defined as ‘professional’ squatters by the government in the past, the local leaders through ALMA NOVA and then PAKSA LUPA pressured the government to clarify their definition of the term (interview NL06, June 4 1994). Subsequently, government agencies reconsidered their position which would have had enormous repercussions for the Suyo settlement.

Poning also felt that the problem of legislation regarding the urban poor in the Philippines is not necessarily getting it passed, but rather the problem is one of implementation. Projects simply do not reach those they should. Groups such as the ULR-TF can help in their ability to exert pressure on government and keep officials honest both to the letter and to the spirit of the law (interview NL14, June 23 1994).

Over the next two to five years, the goals of ALMA NOVA’s leaders reflect this multi-dimensional aspect of community organising. Among these objectives are to get security of tenure and successful relocation for all, as well as to expand ALMA NOVA from the barangay to the district level. At other times the UPO has even used its resources and influence to represent other area concerns. For example, a nearby leader requested support in helping to get a road diverted around her housing area through lobbying and visiting the DPWH with ALMA NOVA’s leaders, though they had little to directly gain from the exercise themselves (interview NL09, June 9 1994).

Despite the positive aspects of this networking, such intense participation does create great strain particularly on the community’s leadership. Local organisations still suffer from a lack of resources to maintain their high level of
activities, and as with all other UPOs, leaders in ALMA NOVA still cite resource constraints as the major problem of the organisation (interview NL11, June 17 1994). This lack of resources stems from the poverty of the constituency and inhibits the ability of both members and residents to participate in meetings, training exercises and demonstrations.

Still, nearby groups have expressed interest in joining the organisation and people like Luz are keen, in the belief that there is power in greater numbers (9/6). And so one of the principal future directions of ALMA NOVA is to establish a wider alliance of local areas affected by C-5, to enlist local communities with or without organisations, such as nearby Fairview. Efforts were being made in 1994 to see if these groups have similar ideas and are willing and able to join together and fight over common grounds and issues (interview NL05, June 4 1994).

**Political Participation**

Although still the focus of political attention, political participation in the Sauyo and other communities is not limited to election periods. Often, local meetings are held to discuss issues and strategies. Delegations to lobby officials are at times accompanied by residents. Demonstrations on issues attracting wide interest, such as demolitions and threats to the community, can induce dozens of members to participate. It is also not uncommon for those unable to participate fully to make contributions toward the costs of those that do. While most members are deeply dissatisfied with the central government in regard to peace and ordiliness, protection of human rights, housing and graft, feelings of efficacy, or the belief that the situation can be changed, appear strong among the membership (ACSPPA, 1992). Most members feel that enough pressure can change government policy and that the government is not ‘captured’ by any class or group in society. The vast majority appear to believe that positive and peaceful change can be brought about through lobbying and mobilising and a
similar number agree that working through a community organisation in several forms is the best way to do this (ACSPPA, 1992). Consequently, participation in the area can actually be defined quite broadly in terms of education, consultation, representation, and activism.

Indeed, in the case of continual activism, local women activists in the area have been labelled the 'Katipunaras' due to their reputation as been the most noticeable and noisiest at marches, especially during their lobbying involvement in regard to UDHA (interview NL06, June 4 1994). This is also due to their profile at demonstrations to Malacanang, the Quezon City Council and with delegations to the Senate and Congress (interview NL06, June 4 1994). At times members opt to join in on leader delegations to visit officials. They are encouraged to do this as it is a source of pride to the leaders (interview NL05, June 4 1994).

Nevertheless, it is still the campaign period of an election which draws the greatest amount of participation and intrigue - even in a 'so-called' politicised area such as Novaliches. And this is also not restricted to external elections, but also in the sometimes quite dramatic intrigue of local elections.

As with the Philippines in general, elections in the local areas have had the effect of division and personal gain. Political rivalry between the local groups even delayed for three years the holding of elections for the alliances presidential position. From 1991 to 1994 no electoral contest was held for the highest position as it was feared a contest would split the ALMA NOVA alliance at a critical time and disrupt its action over UDHA. Even when elections were held, possibly the most popular and experienced local leader did not run for fear of offending and inciting 'opposition' groupings within the alliance. Poning, who won her local election by the incredible margin of 150 to 8, did not stand.

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23 This name is derived from the katipunan of late 19th Century fame.
for the position. The reason given was that she did not want to cause a politically divisive showdown. Even in her local electoral victory there was talk from other groups of unfair conduct. In one example, some accused her of using her rice cake deliveries to create patronage through swapping cakes for votes! (interview NL10, June 11 1994; see Plate 49).

Despite the FDAs concerted effort to encourage locals to stand for the positions of kagawad, there was no coordinated effort to support members to do so in the May 9 (1994) barangay elections. Some reasons for this parallel those of the Muntinlupa experience. While the urban poor population of the barangay is significant, it is surrounded by affluent subdivisions and voters. It is possible that since urban poor contestants were not likely to gain too much middle class support, the demographics of the voter population discouraged many. As well, resource and economic considerations played a role, both in regard to the cost in time and the lack of financial means necessary to operate a campaign and ensure support (this was also a problem in Payatas: interview OT05, June 5 1994). Despite these obstacles, at least three did compete, though neither were successful. The odds were firmly in favour of those men (all were male) in the subdivisions winning for a number of reasons. The most significant were money, contacts, a larger voting pool, access to resources, and experience.

At the local level this does not always translate into electoral success however. For example, in the local election the two groups standing were divided both financially and by gender. This was exemplified at the final campaign meeting when the all-male ticket appeared with balloons, ribbons and dressed like congressmen for the debate. In the final analysis it was the female ticket that won handsomely.

Yet, at the barangay level and above, it does appear that resources play a significant role in electoral outcomes. Additionally, the reasons for this failure were also due to internal dynamics - dynamics which have played a large role against poor people 'capturing the barangay' throughout the Philippines. FDA
staff originally wanted Poning to stand for a barangay seat, as this was and is part of their empowerment strategy. Poning felt however, that she didn’t have enough time for the position and may have lacked “resources” (interview NL10, June 11 1994). So, despite having the best chance, particularly in light of her good relations with several families in the subdivision, she decided not to stand.

One highly placed local leader did stand though, and her experiences are illuminating. Vilma, who is the local leader from Bagbag, was encouraged to stand when both Luc and Poning decided not to. This was perceived as one way of avoiding the fermentation of separatist feelings, as it was not long after the resignation of BIKTIMA, from the alliance. Vilma’s campaign though, while well supported, was dogged by traditional Filipino problems, particularly those surrounding personalismo, group conflict and jealousy, personal reasons and once more a “lack of resources” (interview NL11, June 17 1994).

Originally taking part in order “to serve” (interview NL11, June 17 1994) rather than as part of any coordinated strategy, Vilma was undermined largely by the wife of Artim. It had been Artim who had lost the position of president of ALMA NOVA to Luz, who in turn had been heavily championed by Vilma. According to several leaders, Artim’s wife followed Vilma on her campaign rounds and actively discouraged people from voting for her (interview NL11, June 17 1994). Poning agreed that this sort of thing is a big problem, notably the politics and personal battles that occur between the core groups of ALMA NOVA. All groups have their own personalities they want to have as their “top dogs”, probably for traditional reasons of access and influence (interview NL08, June 8 1994). Accordingly, while most members are cooperative and work together through the year, at election time situations can become very divisive as groups and areas rally behind “their” person (interview NL08, June 8 1994).

Another contributing factor was Vilma’s lack of resources. According to the hierarchy of ALMA NOVA, all other candidates who ran were well sponsored by parties through the current Punong. To win therefore, according to Vilma,
Plate 49. Poning on her once infamous ‘rice cake run’, supplying early morning workers with breads.

Plate 50. NGO and UPO activists meet at a ULR-TF conference to discuss the future.
one needs to help out with birthdays, and special events. She could not afford this and subsequently while she won in her own area she could not win any of the subdivisions and she claimed that this was the reason why "all the poor were losers" in reference to those urban poor who stood (interview NL11, June 17 1994).

Another recently arrived resident of the community also stood for a barangay position. As he had only recently moved here however, he was not well known. Nonetheless he was still well supported by the urban poor and defeated two former kagawads for votes. Finally, a women from the nearby area of Bagbag ran for Punong, but as her local organisation was affiliated to the KPML, she got a cool response from locals outside her area. As an example of this, Poning described her as a "militant" and "not like us" (interview NL17, June 29 1994). Though they were said to get along as friends, the deep philosophical and historical/political division between them negated much political cooperation. Even at the local level, political conflict hinders efforts and possibilities to unite the urban poor into any singular social and political movement (interview NL08, June 8 1994).

Additionally, the organisation itself was approached by "many" candidates wanting support for the election campaign (interview NL10, June 11 1994). In deciding who to choose apart from the urban poor candidates who stood, the organisation took an evaluative criteria, seeing who was popular and asking candidates to undergo a public questioning forum (interview NL10, June 11 1994). This even meant going as far as requesting an evaluative general meeting with all the kagawads attending (a request met with surprise and subsequently rejected) (interview NL10, June 11 1994). Following this, the barangay captain requested the organisation to support one particular contestant (an incumbent). However, the leaders discovered that he was not popular among residents and subsequently this support was withheld (interview NL10, June 11 1994).
Indeed, while the survey’s findings showed that 80% of coalition leaders agreed that organised groups should participate in local governance through the LGC, it was demonstrated that this support may be limited to leadership echelons. Results from member surveys reflected that awareness of the population toward the LGC provisions is generally low. Data also showed that very few members (under 20%) had actually attended seminars and training on the LGC. And while the research survey demonstrated a leader/member differential, it also strongly indicated that enthusiasm towards the code among leaders is in fact substantially lower than those of other NGOs and POs in the survey from other parts of the Philippines (ACSPPA, 1993).

Consequently, in the national setting, traditional politics influences electoral behaviour. Even a year before the 1995 Congressional elections Poning has already indicated her commitment to support Liban. In return, Liban would support the community in the community listing program and help in a favourable relocation for the community. It may be the community leaders who will find the land, but, in the Philippines, it will be the well positioned ‘friend of the poor’ who will negotiate for the land on the community’s behalf. Even in a progressive organisation such as this, realities of dependency weigh heavily.

Summary

ALMA NOVA has successfully lobbied for water connections and electricity supplies, provided the communities with pathways, and held together despite the most painful of conflicts. Externally, the alliance has become an active participant in Quezon City politics, and has additionally taken its causes and problems to the highest of levels. With regard to all this, ALMA NOVA has been a relatively successful and active alliance, ably led by ‘progressive’ leaders that FDA seeks to cultivate.

Concurrently, ALMA NOVA reveals problems with community organisations that are common to all organisations of the urban poor, and additional difficulties
which relate to its added aspirations inherited from FDA’s philosophy. Traditional problems of leadership dependency, resource constraints and either membership apathy or incapacity which act to confine the organisation’s livelihood and potential, are all apparent. Additionally, in working at a transformative level, the alliance struggles to maintain its local focus and base. Ironically, if changes do not occur at a structural or wider level then it is probable that membership dissatisfaction will increase as gains do not eventuate.

Nevertheless, while concrete gains are unspectacular, the potential of the alliance, and the intangible effect it has both on members, leaders and external players (in particular, politicians and officials) should not be overlooked. In continuously fighting for alternatives, even if mixed with traditional strategies, the alliance is creating an alternative society, if only at a micro level (to date). In seeking to affect local politics and the wider system through alternative philosophies, its goals may be considered sceptically as utopian. Yet, avenues for change do exist for the urban poor and it is these gateways that will have to be breached.

POSTSCRIPT

At the end of 1995, the Government announced that both the areas of Bagbag and Sauyo were to be demolished and cleared in May 1996 to make way for the C-5 road. This action is expected to affect 5,223 families. Currently ALMA NOVA is still negotiating with the Department of Public Works and Housing (DPWH) for an orderly relocation process and acceptable relocation site. Additionally, FDA is negotiating with the principal financiers of the project, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, to ensure that the action conforms to the regulations stipulated in UDHA (Annie de Leon, personal correspondence, 23 January 1996).
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This study has sought to examine the socio-political nature of the housing crisis and the response of the urban poor and their allies (NGOs) to housing poverty and disempowerment. In so doing, I have focused on the Philippines as it provides excellent examples of state primacy, housing poverty and an energetic and politicised civil society. The use of two comparative UPO case studies (one ‘traditional’ and the other ‘progressive’) has been employed to highlight the issues involved in state-society relations: the potential for the urban poor in the post-Marcos period, and the continuation of elite democracy and enrichment through the state at the expense of groups such as the urban poor.

This concluding chapter will highlight several recurring and central themes with regard to the previous chapters: on housing, the Third World state, and the response of civil society. This will be done in both a theoretical manner and with particular reference to Manila and the two case studies highlighted in this study. Additionally, this final chapter raises both the major themes of this study and also the opportunities for further analysis in this dynamic area of housing research.

In this study I have sought to examine the social and political parameters and environments that construct the housing crisis, the domains of response available to the poor in responding to their housing condition, and the outcomes of these efforts. Initial arguments demonstrated the confines and limitations of past and previous institutional attempts to house the urban poor. These approaches have been universal and deterministic in nature. Additionally, they
have generally failed to properly examine and address the wider complexities of the problem and place particular housing systems into their specific socio-political contexts, preferring instead to see the issue of building houses for the ‘homeless’. One of the principal aims of this study, then, has been to help correct these deficiencies in housing debates and literature.

This study also illustrated some problems associated with the ‘response’ aspect of the literature. In particular, it critically examined the argument that social transformations, and development, will result from NGOs/UPOs and their social movement ‘alliances’. In so doing, this thesis has explored several questions that have sought to pay closer inspection to the role of these organisations in a comparative context: what are the common and divergent problems faced by UPOs and what are the internal/external responses and dynamics involved; what role do UPOs play in representing and orienting the urban poor’s concerns; and, somewhat rudimentarily and facetiously, can UPOs and NGOs solve the housing crisis?

**Manila’s Urban Poor Organisations: Comparative Evidence**

A major contribution of this study has been to demonstrate the workings of UPOs in 1990s Manila. In particular, the focus has been on comparing a so-called ‘traditional’ organisation with the ‘progressive’ alliance of the urban poor in Quezon City. Several themes have been highlighted through the nature and directions of these UPOs as measured by their goals, structures and methods. In raising some of these processes, and in addressing the direction of especially Filipino literature, the study concentrated on the effect these UPOs were having, or possibly could have, in moving the poor from their current position of political disempowerment. The May 9 1994 barangay elections provided some context for these questions.
Another important element of this study was to address a question posed by van Naerssen in 1993: in the context of Manila, what is the importance and role of NGOs in the emergence and functions of UPOs (van Naerssen, 1993:18-19)? This has been further interpreted here as asking, are UPOs through NGOs more effective and stable, and do they serve member’s interests better? Furthermore, do INGOs act to empower or hinder, and are NGOs the ‘answer’ to UPO sustainability and empowerment?

Since the events that led up to EDSA and the verbal approval of ‘people’s power’ (though not necessarily ‘empowerment’), those active in pursuing change have sought to replace the ‘traditional’ with the ‘progressive’. Naturally, this debate has included urban poor organisations. Progressive organisations are said to be more oriented to reforming state-society relations and even the nature of the state and politics. They are said to be the antithesis of traditional politics and politicians. Participatory in nature, they link the urban poor to the wider system. Well connected with other peoples organisations, NGOs, academics and even progressive politicians, these UPOs are seen as more likely to compel change and benefits for the urban poor. Traditional organisations, however, have been coopted by the state and neopatrimonial politics. While they may secure benefits to their members, these are piecemeal and incur the political ‘payment’ of quiescence to the patron.

While the study highlighted several of these processes at work, and does lend support to some of these generalities, such sharp distinctions would be imprudent. It may be that there are different forms of resistance and discourse in evidence. ALMA NOVA exhibits direct forms of resistance, while residents and perhaps leaders in SBT (Muntinlupa) show disguised and even undisclosed forms (Scott, 1990:198). Within this, less dangerous and confrontational methods of ‘foot dragging’ and undeclared failures to comply can be just as political as more direct, confrontational methods. However, the argument in this study is that the former is less likely to challenge and change oppressive structures. ALMA NOVA, through its goals and means, confronts the
established order and demonstrates through its actions and discourse that an alternative future is possible. Certainly, with wider support and protection networks, ALMA NOVA is better placed to take on this function.

This study has showed similarities in the problems of political participation within the system, and others in challenging it. Some problems are common to both organisations, while others are more specific. While ALMA NOVA contains seeds of hope, it also testifies to the daily realities and problems of community organising and neo-populist expectations of grassroots-based change. As with the Muntinlupa example, it too contends with leader-led ('top heavy') paradoxes. Both these organisations can be considered as suffering from leader imbalances, limited resources, resident apathy and the weight of the traditional patrimonial culture.

A principal aim of FDA and 'progressive' NGOs has been to create non-traditional leadership. Yet, as has been demonstrated in the case study chapters, this has proven to be problematic in application. While at times Sauyo is able to make significant headway in achieving its ambitious goals, at other times it too must work within the system in 'traditional' ways to acquire benefits and maintain some degree of local legitimacy through 'delivering' to the local community. Additionally, the ALMA NOVA alliance must also confront specific stresses and problems regarding the responsibilities involved in playing their role in a local, regional, and even national movement.

Muntinlupa also offers several possible interpretations and paradoxes. While it may be portrayed as an elite-led organisation playing a role in the maintenance of oppressive patrimonial relations at the expense of the community, its position and behaviour could also be reinterpreted. Certainly, the organisation is inward looking, absorbed by its own issues and relations and even hostile to external contact. Yet local leaders and residents I spoke to at times appeared frustrated and disillusioned with the system and sought both to maintain more independence and fight for greater empowerment. To make any greater and
definitive conclusions about the true nature of SBT would be problematic. Much more time and research would be required to have any greater certainty over the direction and role of the organisation, other than to conclude that it appears to be simultaneously a bastion of the ‘traditional’ while also exhibiting elements of resistance and opposition.

Nevertheless, several stark comparisons can be made between the two organisations. ALMA NOVA explicitly seeks to act as an alternative peoples organisation that makes demands on the basis of rights rather than reciprocation. It maintains highly active contacts with other UPOs, NGOs and politicians who, for the most part, are also committed to creating new forms of politics and moving the problems of the urban poor to the forefront of political debate. Community and leader education is also a prominent aspect of ALMA NOVA which separates it from SBT. Whereas SBT openly shuns issue and political education, ALMA NOVA elevates it as a centrepiece of their role. Electoral and political education is promoted as are issues which affect the urban poor as a class, such as the introduction of VAT. While SBT is interconnected with local traditional politicians, ALMA NOVA exhibits some degree of independence from barangay politics.

Perhaps the activities of the two organisations during the 1994 barangay polls best highlight some of these contrasts and commonalities. Through FDA strategies, local politics and political participation have been elevated to a central element within ALMA NOVA’s political strategy. While still embryonic and unable to directly affect the outcomes of local politics, ALMA NOVA sought a proactive role during the campaign period. It also attempted to field its own candidates, though with limited success. SBT on the other hand, supported candidates that gave the direct impression that they would act as the most effective patron for the community. Indeed, SBT’s induction evening was all but hijacked by political grandstanding and patronage politics. In any event, those SBT ‘sponsored’ candidates lost convincingly at the ballot box. Interest in the election, at least among several families I knew, was low. In fact, I met no-one
who chose to vote, though they strongly indicated to local leaders that they would support particular candidates.

The Role and Impact of Intermediary NGOs

NGOs in the Third World today are playing important roles as organisers and facilitators of peoples organisations. There are conflicting opinions whether these intermediary NGOs are playing a positive and crucial role as a catalyst for people's empowerment, or if they are controlling and overshadowing the poor ideologically and strategically. Certainly, as the increasing civil society literature would testify (Korten, 1990) there is a strong conviction in progressive circles that INGOs may be the catalyst for a type of 'New Social Order'. This conviction, however, and the whole gamut of relationships between INGOs and POs, is a far more complex one than is often portrayed and deserves a greater degree of scrutiny and attention.

There are simultaneously both opportunities and constraints in initiating urban poor movements through direct NGO intervention. The case study presented here highlights the work of FDA, which is a significant player in Manila and one that places a great deal of effort and resources into organising and assisting the urban poor. Additionally, FDA seeks to place its partner UPOs within a community of NGOs and other UPOs that aspire to function as an effective and significant urban social movement in the capital and even beyond. The study tentatively supports the proposition that POs, through NGOs, have a greater impact. However, this impact, as yet, remains more potential than actual.

NGOs offer UPOs expertise and access that they would otherwise not enjoy. A study conducted in 1993 did show that "POs that were closely attached or were still connected to their parent NGOs had greater strength and capability compared to relatively independent POs" (Tumbaga and Ramiro, 1993:17). In the case of Sauyo, the UPO there clearly had greater clout because of its
relations with FDA. For the leaders at least, their relatively harmonious relations with FDA officials was a source of pride, offering dignity and elevated self-esteem. These qualitative benefits should not be underestimated. They clearly had some influence on leaders, encouraging them to challenge prescribed roles and the unspoken inferiority of the poor as quantified by society through housing poverty. Poning, for one, felt able to call upon and even confront those leaders and officials representing more affluent people in elevated positions. In so doing she not only challenged institutions of patriarchy, but also indigenous ascriptions such as hiya and pakikisama.

ALMA NOVA was afforded a position greater than that of a reasonably sized UPO in Manila. Its leaders were able to meet with officials and politicians of high standing, as well as attending conferences and meetings which enabled it access to legal, political and administrative advice of some magnitude. Materially though, ALMA NOVA still struggled with a typically tight resource base, even more so because of the expectations placed upon its leaders and the organisation.

The study also highlighted limitations in the NGO-catalyst approach. In particular, problems do exist of UPO dependency and sustainability. In the past, FDA/ALMA NOVA relations have been strained over issues of direction, performance and conduct. Ideologically, FDA has prescribed the course and direction of groups such as ALMA NOVA. In so doing, the criticism could be levelled at FDA of regulating the nature and objectives of ALMA NOVA, thus placing its role outside of the control of the people themselves. This conclusion though may be slightly unfair and unfounded. There was considerable space for independent action from the community organisation and opportunity for dialogue with FDA. Nevertheless, such elements of the relationship, of control and dependency, will continue to remain significant in any analysis of NGO-PO relations.
Sustainability is also a point of some consequence. It is evident that even ALMA NOVA, a relatively established and reasonably sized UPO alliance, regards itself as unsustainable without some form of FDA assistance. It was remarked to me on several occasions of how much financially stronger the organisations were before ‘independence’ from FDA. Whether INGOs create sustainable peoples organisations is an interesting question for future research.

Areas For Future Research

This study’s focus has been largely confined to NGO-UPO relations and not on community consciousness. This meant a less thorough account of the affect that NGOs have on the politicisation of members (rather than leaders). Clearly, this is an interesting and important topic for further investigation. While this study has sought to begin to understand these processes through the orientation of community organisations it has not sought to investigate in any comprehensive manner the affect on the community of this, and compare that to attitudes and responses of other more ‘traditional’ organisations.

This dissertation involved snapshot into the issues confronting, and responses of, two UPOs in Manila during a six month period in 1994. It should be apparent that there is hardly a ‘typical’ UPO in Manila, the Philippines, or elsewhere. There are criticisms that case study research further adds to these limitations of wider generalities being made. Although only representative of themselves, these organisations, I believe, do exhibit characteristics ‘typical’ of their type in particular, and most UPOs in general. There are also problems involved in comparing UPOs, locally, nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, in placing this study within the context of other similar studies elsewhere several common themes are apparent that do allow generalisations to be generated. Locally embedded research should not preclude comparisons and generalisations being made in situ.
Additionally, the nature of research techniques used in this study raise the problem of how these findings stand up over time (rather than just place). As Babbie has asked: "Do the descriptions and explanations that result from a particular study accurately represent the situation of ten years from now, or do they represent only the present state of affairs?" (Babbie, 1989:89). Several times, it has become apparent that many of the questions asked within this research reflect this problem. It is difficult, even spurious, to attempt to generalise on the role and future impact that even these quite dissimilar organisations will have. Clearly, there is a great need in this type of research for more longitudinal research, preferably in concert with indigenous research and researchers. Only then can we truly evaluate and understand what the nature of ‘an alternative society’ will be, what benefits it will bring to the urban poor and who will be at the vanguard, or whether it will eventuate at all.

Re-Thinking Housing

Throughout the Third World there is a striking history of failed housing strategies and policies. While it is possible to argue that housing is but one development problem and that resources cannot hope to keep pace with demand (at least in the short term), there has been continuity in themes of hostile state-poor relations, poor policy implementation and imbalanced development. To a great extent these issues can be traced to the neopatrimonial character of Third World states and conditions of state-primacy. Yet, housing issues and the growth of urban poverty are problems that have clearly been identified as a concern to academics, policy makers and leaders alike. For decades, the issue of housing has usually been debated either in isolation - as a problem of matching production to needs (Rezende, 1991) - or approached from within the deterministic outlooks of the two principal and competing development theory paradigms (modernisation theory and neo-Marxist critiques) (Walsh, 1980). Meanwhile, a great amount of (post-impasse) literature (Schuurman, 1993) variously relating to the post-modern critique,
people centred development (particularly the roles of POs and NGOs), and increasing diversity in the study of the Third World state and state-society relations (Carter, 1995; Clapham, 1990; Manor, 1991) have remained outside the mainstream of the debate on housing the urban poor.

The current shift in thinking over housing the Third World poor is unlikely to have any significant affect. In fact, in the face of increasing urban poverty in many Third World cities, policies of market enhancement and ‘enabler’ (rather than ‘provider’) approaches may do a lot of damage to Third World cities (Baken and van der Linden, 1993). The issues raised through these policy platforms are inappropriate ones. They have been created by the World Bank and governments (both representing elite interests), and have sought to move the discourse away from rights, corruption, the nature of the state, and the underlying political aspects of the housing crisis.

One of the fundamental arguments of this study, therefore, is that housing needs to be put into this wider debate and environment of analysis and action. We need to move housing into a political context of conflicting power relations, with the axis of conflict moving increasingly to the local. Housing also needs to be elevated into the framework of (post-war) state-society relations. Additionally, the issue also needs to be approached through post-impasse development theory and out of the parameters (or prison) of the deterministic and prescriptive paradigms of the two major schools. Housing is a manifestation of urban poverty, which is part of national poverty and inequality, in turn the result of a conscious political, social and economic system in action. Consequently, one of the central efforts of this study has been to explore these systems and show their relationship and relevance to the issue of housing the urban poor. As it is, the likely ‘solutions’ to urban housing are likely to come from outside current technological and policy debates. Progress will be made when the wider socio-political relationships that operate in Third World countries, such as the Philippines, change. A housing solution needs to move beyond the idea that housing is the problem.
Prospects and Myths of ‘Empowerment’

In the case presented, political empowerment of the urban poor is crucial for this change and the local level has been identified as a key to opportunities of people empowerment. Efforts, at least in the Philippines, are under way to create an ‘alternative’ political culture. This is a demanding and burdensome task. Recently the NGO/UPO community has focused its energies on electoral strategies at the local level, in some cases actually directly competing in elections. However, as raised through the case studies, the need for alternative and progressive political and social movements has a number of problematic issues surrounding it.

While many call for the empowerment of the poor and hope for revolutionary change, they currently measure this through NGOs and POs. As Frans Schuurman (1993:204) has stated: "at present, political empowerment of the poor is the name of the game". However, while the proliferation of UPOs and even NGOs looks good, the quality of these organisations is contestable and deserves greater scrutiny. Nevertheless, to date, there has been limited focus on the quality, direction and nature of this organisation and ‘empowerment’. The limited research that has been done (which principally is Latin American in focus) has shown that in many cases community politics does not generally run deep. Activism among leadership may contrast with apathy among the population. Peattie, writing from Lima, found that people she talked to in the settlement "seemed to know little or nothing of the political history and present organisational life of the settlement" (Peattie, 1990:29). Additionally, such literature and expectations assumes some degree of homogeneity of the urban poor and NGO community. At present this is a highly questionable assumption. One of the foremost arguments of this study is that these aspects of civil society require greater scrutiny and less generalisation. The ability of civil society to gain some consensus and build working relationships will be a key test in the battle over the direction and nature of ‘development’.
As Farrington and Bebbington (1993:12) have noted, organisations, and in particular social movements, have weaknesses of an institutional nature that range from limited management and administrative skills, to vulnerability to capture by leaders and elites, to ephemerality. These limitations weaken the possibility that movements are able to sustain political pressure on the state. The neo-populist ideal that people may come to shape their own (development) future through organising themselves into social movements is fraught with analytical and real world weaknesses and contradictions. In addition, the role of INGOs raise issues of power, intervention and knowledge in each particular social setting. Whenever any 'intervention' occurs it constructs questions of power and discourse. Community organisation research needs to place more emphasis on defining and describing these wider considerations.

There are also dilemmas of empowerment in the role of experts 'leading' the people. Notable problems include the dependency of groups on expertise, resources, political access and influence. While such connections can bring benefits of access, education, prestige and contacts to a local organisation, the relationship may also pose dangers as well. Such 'emancipation' can become manipulation. Empowerment is not a panacea. Indeed, efforts toward empowerment can become another burden on the poor. According to Townsend (1993:173), "in many countries, grassroots organisations of all kinds are being asked to take on tasks for which they have neither the scale nor the expertise". There are multifaceted power relations between development practitioners and their local 'partner' NGOs, as the 'strategic agency' brings external social commitments, contracts, and discourse to affect the nature of their relations with the poor and the directions of change (Long and Villarreal, 1993:160-1). Unity among all these local organisations is difficult, probably because of the different discourses both within and between social movements (Schuurman, 1993:201). It is therefore difficult for them to unify and network effectively. These relations are always changing too, constantly reconstructing, depending upon internal and external factors, though commonalities of exploitation, exclusion and discrimination exist. NGO intervention therefore, may
act to divide the poor and prevent them from forming into a coherent, effective social movement as much as it may aid them.

As such, it is a demanding task to create development and even development theories from the grassroots and those who work with them. Nevertheless, it is still widely perceived as a valuable and worthwhile path, particularly if ‘true’ development is to occur. As the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (29 February, 1996:5) has recently insisted in an editorial commemorating ten years since EDSA, people power in the Philippines “hasn’t failed. It hasn’t been tried”. It would be a mistake to condemn those that are trying at least to create an alternative future.

With regard to the Philippines, complex and specific forces concurrently offer the observer and participant both hope and pessimism for the future. Any historically embedded political analysis reveals that the nature of the Filipino state, state-society relations and the dynamic of politics has had a serious effect on Philippine development. Additionally, aspects of urban poverty, housing and disempowerment also have significant connections with ‘Filipino style’ democracy and ‘development’. An important part of this study has been to identify and discuss these connections and their relevance to the problem of urban housing. The argument here is that the specific nature of the Filipino state, neopatrimonial politics, state-society relations, and the power of the state over civil society have had a profound and direct impact on the underdevelopment of the Filipino population, and subsequently has had a significant impact on rural and urban poverty and the housing crisis. Additionally, while the visible condition of poor and inadequate housing is a global problem with common dimensions, the way that the housing crisis will continue to manifest itself and the ways in which it could be resolved or alleviated are particularly Filipino issues that need to account for the nature of Filipino social and political relationships. Any prescriptions that do not concede this atypicality will founder. The housing crisis is one manifestation of complex, locally embedded socio-political relations and cannot be examined outside of
them (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:28; Rezende, 1991). Until these change, there is little cause for hope regarding improving the housing conditions of the urban poor.

**Highlighting and Re-Thinking the Third World State**

Throughout this study the neopatrimonial model has been advanced as an effective way of studying both the character of the Filipino state and the consequence for development on a wider scale, as well as housing on a more particular level. Neopatrimonialism has evolved through neocolonial ties to create a state dominated by rent seeking elites pursuing their personal and family interests through state power and agencies. This is at the expense of national development, including the pressing need for adequate shelter. There is an element of continuity in this circumstance, a constancy the urban poor cannot afford. Overall, this state-primacy model has proven an effective tool in understanding the nature of the Filipino political system. The oft-quoted EDSA ‘revolution’ has not noticeably altered the nature of the Filipino state. The threat of authoritarianism still remains. And yet EDSA has exposed possible avenues of change in decentralisation through the LGC, the empowering clauses of UDHA, and the increasing role and feeling of efficacy in the UPO and NGO community.

The traditional patrimonial model, however, is not without its critics and criticisms (Kerkvliet and Mojares, 1991:8-11; Bauson, 1987). In particular, it is open to debate as to the extent to which patronage binds the population to the political elite, and if the urban poor are drawn effectively into these relationships. The Sauyo case provided evidence that the urban poor can act with some degree of independence from the system, and even seek to challenge it. However, there were also several examples that indicated the pervasiveness of the patronage in people’s consciousness and behaviour. Muntinlupa additionally, is far from being an example where patron-client
relations are watertight and determine members behaviour and loyalties. Indeed, throughout the 1994 barangay elections it was debatable how effective the organisation was in delivering votes to certain candidates. Perhaps though, this may be seen as resulting from the perception that the organisation and leadership was not particularly strong nor effective in playing this role. Possibly, when capable leadership emerges, particularly with an alternative message to deliver (thus becoming a threat to the system), patrimonial relations and patrons seek to play a much greater role.

Within this theoretical groundwork, the local level is argued to be the essential part of the neopatrimonial system. Simultaneously however, the local is beheld as the arena in which positive, even ‘alternative’ responses can be made through collective efforts by the poor. The barangay institution is then both friend and foe to change. As the hub of the system, it has rightly been evaluated by activists as having a central place in their analysis (interview NG07, April 21 1994), and with increasing power being vested to local institutions under the provisions of the LGC, this may continue to be a political window of opportunity for the poor.

Where to From Here? Some Future Directions for Research

In light of this study’s focus and conclusions, future research needs to more fully integrate the factors that affect housing and the avenues which exist for change. Clearly, in most cases, researchers and authorities know enough about the urban poor themselves and the magnitude of housing needs. More research needs to connect the housing crisis with other aspects of development in a multi-disciplinary nature that is embedded in local environments and analyses (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:28).

Likewise, the recent upsurge in writing on NGOs needs to be more qualified and researched. Quite often, highly theoretical and critical publications and
concepts end with positive, open-ended statements regarding the 'special nature' of NGOs in an almost venerable and hallowed manner. Alan Carter (1995:615) recently ended one highly researched article on the role of the state in underdevelopment thus: "We must rely neither on rich states nor on poor ones for genuine liberation. Rather, it is to the peoples of this world (not their states) and to the nongovernmental organisations which help them to help themselves that we must look for a future that is non-exploitative of people and the planet". These expectations are great, and while there may be some merit in them, they need to be more fully evaluated as has been attempted here. Above all, researchers need to develop key concepts and methods by which to study, analyse, and perhaps even gauge NGOs and the work they do, particularly if their claim is to empower the poor.

In the case of the Philippines these issues are particularly relevant. With a housing crisis of immense proportions both in Metro Manila and other urban areas, the urban poor are organising and networking to an extent unique in South East Asia. As these organisations seek to play a more direct political and electoral role, through studying their progress much may be learned about the nature of the political process, the possibilities of 'electoral revolutions' from previously disadvantaged sectors, and the nature and capability of POs, INGOs and NGDOs in a rapidly changing environment.
### APPENDIX ONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Person/Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>ML01</td>
<td>March 16 1994</td>
<td>Meding, community leader of SBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML02</td>
<td>March 24 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with Meding and community resident, Mario*.</td>
</tr>
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<td>April 1 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with Meding.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Discussion with Meding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML11</td>
<td>June 12 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with Meding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML12</td>
<td>July 17 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with Meding.</td>
</tr>
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<td>ML13</td>
<td>July 20 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with Meding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML14</td>
<td>July 20 1994</td>
<td>Arceiga, local leader and former barangay councillor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR01</td>
<td>March 8 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with several residents at local sari-sari.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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24 Interview codes are as follows: NG refers to Non Government Organisation interviews and academics; ML to Muntinlupa leaders; MR to Muntinlupa residents; NL to Novaliches leaders; and OT to Others, including community leaders, activists of other areas and politicians. The remainder of the code is for numbering purposes. When a star appears (*) following a name this means the name is fictitious allowing for confidentiality when requested or when permission was not gained.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>MR02</td>
<td>March 10 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with three women from <em>Putatan</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR03</td>
<td>March 17 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Mario</em>.</td>
</tr>
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<td>MR04</td>
<td>March 22 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Mario</em> and partner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MR05</td>
<td>March 31 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Mario</em> and partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR06</td>
<td>April 17 1994</td>
<td><em>Mimi</em>, <em>Putatan</em> resident of five years.</td>
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<td>MR07</td>
<td>April 30 1994</td>
<td>Susan, local <em>sari-sari</em> owner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR08</td>
<td>June 12 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Mimi</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG01</td>
<td>March 10 1994</td>
<td><em>Theresa</em>, of a notable Manila NGO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG02</td>
<td>March 11 1994</td>
<td>Annie de Leon, Director of FDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG03</td>
<td>March 14 1994</td>
<td><em>Theresa</em> (see note NG01).</td>
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<td>March 15 1994</td>
<td>Ana Marie Karaos, ICSI, Ateneo de Manila University.</td>
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<td>NG05</td>
<td>March 17 1994</td>
<td>Denis Murphy, Urban Poor Associates.</td>
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<td>Annie de Leon, Director of FDA.</td>
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<td>Annie de Leon, Director of FDA.</td>
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<td>July 19 1994</td>
<td>Annie de Leon, Director of FDA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NL01</td>
<td>June 1 1994</td>
<td><em>Poning</em>, leader of <em>Sauyo</em> Neighbourhood Association and active in ALMA NOVA.</td>
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<td>NL02</td>
<td>June 1 1994</td>
<td><em>Sauyo</em> community organisation meeting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NL03</td>
<td>June 2 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Poning</em>.</td>
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<td>NL04</td>
<td>June 4 1994</td>
<td><em>Sauyo</em> community organisation meeting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NL05</td>
<td>June 4 1994</td>
<td>Discussion with <em>Poning</em>.</td>
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</table>
Discussion with Poning, and ALMA NOVA representative, Luz.

Discussion with Poning and a leader from Cavite.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Luz.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussions with several leaders at an ALMA NOVA monthly meeting.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Luz.

Discussion with Luz and Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Discussion with Poning.

Antonio*, resident of Manresa.

Ramon*, resident of an inner city slum.

Ricardo*, an employee at Quezon City Hall.

Melvin*, a community leader of Payatas.

Edgardo*, member of the Philippine Congress.

Butch*, a rural development worker.
APPENDIX TWO

To: All Members

These are the objectives of our association. Please help me accomplish these objectives as soon as possible. Thank you very much.

Meding Sandoval
Chairman of the Board

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
OF
SAMAHANG BIYAYANG TUBIG
OF PUTATAN, FROM AYALA LAND INCORPORATED

(PREAMBLE)

We, the residents of Arceiga Compound, Bisig Tramo 2 and 3, Esporales Compound, Tavera Compound, and others in adjacent Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, with the guidance of our Divine Providence, strive to help the improvement of our community, and upliftment of our standard of living do hereby unite and bind ourselves together into an association, regardless of our political beliefs and affiliations, religion and business, and do hereby affix our signatures therein and approve this Constitution and By-Laws.
ARTICLE I. NAME AND OFFICE

Section 1. The association shall be known as "Samahang Biyaying Tubig Ng Putatan, Mula Sa Ayala Land, Incorporated".

Section 2. This association shall be non-stock, non-profit and non-political.

Section 3. The principal office of the association shall be in Daang Bakal, corner NIA Road, in front of NIA Pumping Station, Putatan, Muntinlupa, Metro-Manila.

ARTICLE II. OBJECTIVES

Section 1. To initiate and maintain the improvement and peace of the community.

Section 2. To promote the ideals of an honoured, industrious, and a nationalistic society.

Section 3. To all help by way of improving our community, above all to raise the standard of living of every member in conformity with our existing laws and morals of our country.

Section 4. To pursue or help in the other tasks of our country towards the betterment and improvement of our fellow Filipinos.

Section 5. To conduct seminars, training, research and other similar things for the purposes of strengthening the concerted efforts of the members towards completing tasks for their upliftment.
Section 6. To train those deserving and potential members, and give them the chance to hold responsibilities in the association.

Section 7. To help in sending to school the children of the members, with talent, that are deserving and qualified to the standards prescribed by the association.

Section 8. To protect and enhance through discipline and proper ways, the usage, consumption, and distribution of water given by the Ayala Land Incorporated, not only in words, deeds, but also in actions.
APPENDIX THREE

CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF ALYANSA NG MARALITA SA NOVALICHES (ALMA NOVA)

PREAMBLE

We, the member organisations of Alyansa ng mga Maralita sa Novaliches (ALMA NOVA), are Filipino citizens who unite/join together to pursue a secured housing and employment, to obtain the basic welfare services, to promote democratic rights, Filipino ideas towards change in Filipino community with a genuine democracy, and equitable distribution of resources, faith in God and nationalism. To take action/mobilisation and implement these intents/purposes through organisation and education, and promote them according to our responsibilities and the programmes that we adopt.

ARTICLE I
GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Creator will guide us in our action/mobilisation and in the struggle for freedom for our community.

Section 2. The Person having created with free will and determination have the right to form an organisation and take action to protect their goals/objectives.

Section 3. The freedom in the future will be fully attained through collective action and by being organised in order to establish a community with democracy, faith in God and nationalism.

Section 4. The land must be used for the benefit of all.
ARTICLE II
GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES

Section 1. To deal with the security for housing and the basic social services.

Section 2. To unite and join in the action/mobilisation by the organisation of urban poor in times of their needs and hardships concerning problems or issues they faced.

Section 3. To strengthen and expand the line of ALMA NOVA and its local member organisation within the alliance/federation, which will promote in their struggle the voice and strength of the poor.
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