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The Regionalisation of New Zealand's Territorial Forces, 1999 - 2005

By Richard Campbell
ABSTRACT

The following is a review of the structural changes which were made to New Zealand's Territorial Forces (TF) between 1999 and 2005. These administrative reforms, often referred to as the regionalisation process, are studied with reference to four relevant Army General Staff Directives (1999, 2000, 2002 & 2005) which detail both the intent of the initiatives and their outcomes. Commentary is also provided by a number of Army officers who were either directly involved with formulating these changes or have been members of the TF at the time or since. Discussion is further framed by reference to proximate trends in the international defence and security environment, relevant reserve component policies in other nations (particularly Australia and the US) and by social, economic and political influences within New Zealand itself.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When this project first began in 2008 it was anticipated that it would be completed in that same year and this writer, with reservations, felt that it would proceed with relatively few hiccups. How wrong he was! Almost three years later, as I sit here writing this, I now look back on a period in my life that could not have contained more complications, angst and near catastrophes if it had been the result of the creative machinations of a writer in some fictional melodrama. As such, it is important that I recognise all of the people who have helped me over or, sometimes, around the many hurdles that have stood in my way.

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Finally, thanks to my parents, for taking me in when the storm broke, for caring and so much more.

Hail to you all.
# THE REGIONALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND’S TERRITORIAL FORCES 1999 - 2005

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INTRODUCTION

The Territorial Force has a long and proud history as part of New Zealand's Defence Force. It has provided an expansion base in past conflicts and supported local communities on numerous occasions. Recent operational deployments have highlighted the importance of maintaining an effective, deployable reserve of competent soldiers, ready for and capable of operational duties.¹

Speaking to the Territorial Force (TF) Employers Council in 2009 the Associate Minister of Defence, Heather Roy, had the following to say about TF numbers in New Zealand: “Compared to allied countries where reserves comprise between twenty-five and forty-seven percent of total force structure, New Zealand sits well clear at the bottom of the table.”² Reserve force numbers, throughout the world, have shrunk. However, the decline in New Zealand's TF numbers during the last decade has been dramatic: In 1998 there were 4500 Territorial soldiers. Two years later, the 2000 Army General Staff (AGS) Directive set a cap on TF personnel at 4000.³ This cap was superfluous. There was never any danger that this number would be breached as numbers declined, by the year 2007, to 1888.⁴

The years between 1999 and 2005 saw a number of structural changes to New Zealand's Territorial Force reserves.⁵ There were modifications to their

administrative organisation; in their distribution throughout New Zealand; in the way that they trained; in their recruitment processes; in the roles that they undertook and in the ways that they deployed on operations.\textsuperscript{6} The aim of this work is to analyse this metamorphosis. It will do so in the context of a fundamental transformation in the international system that has occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall and with regard to the consequent increase in operational tempo experienced by many defence forces around the world.\textsuperscript{7} It also outlines some of the reserve policies of like-minded nations as their initiatives have both influenced and framed the changes made to New Zealand's TF since 1999. Primary evidence, in the form of the four relevant Army directives (1999, 2000, 2002 & 2005), is provided, revealing both the intentions and outcomes of the changes that occurred during the period. Additionally, commentary about the initiatives is given by a number of New Zealand Army officers, both Regular Force and Territorial Force.

Briefly, it should be noted that there has not been a lot written about this subject in the New Zealand context. As such, this work relies heavily on the content of the four directives and the oral testimony of the interviewees to evaluate the regionalisation process. However, it shall be discerned that there are a number of consistent themes and points that run through this evidence which has given this writer the confidence to go ahead with the project.

A 2008 article on the New Zealand public's perceptions about its defence force reveals that most New Zealanders perceive the NZDF as being deficient in a

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, passim.
\textsuperscript{7} A. Ryan, \textit{From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia Pacific and the “New Age” Coalition Operations}, Study Paper No. 232, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Jan. 2000, p. 3.
number of crucial areas.\textsuperscript{8} This impression is reinforced by defence reviews and NZDF Annual Reports which consistently reveal shortfalls in capability.\textsuperscript{9} At the same time, the last decade has seen a decline in Territorial Force numbers to a point where their numbers stood at less then half of what they were in 1999. This must be of concern to the Army leadership because, as exemplified by the quote at the beginning of this introduction, they have continuously reiterated that the TF make an important contribution to Army outputs. Increasing the utility of New Zealand's reserve component was a prime goal of the TF initiatives that began in 1999. As such, the question must be asked: how successful were the 1999 through 2005 initiatives, in terms of increasing TF capability?\textsuperscript{10}

It is important that those changes be seen in the context of longer term trends. The post World War Two history of the New Zealand Army is one of a systematic reduction in both its size and capabilities. From the end of that war, when a decision was made to re-constitute it as an “augmented infantry division”, through the 1960s, as the structural focus was reduced to that of a brigade group, and onto 1978, the year a Defence Review reduced it further, to a battalion group, there has been an ongoing process of downsizing the Army in both personnel strength and possible outputs.\textsuperscript{11} This is reflected in comparing the Fraser Government's post-war ambition, which encompassed the provision of something akin to the NZEF divisions of the two world wars, with more recent defence force targets that are expressed in terms of companies and battalions and are affected, anyway, by

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{8} D. Elvy, “Defence: Exploring the silent consensus” in \textit{New Zealand International Review}, May/June 2008, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, p. 24: Elvy says that 84% of the public believe the NZDF is incapable of defending New Zealand. “This must have an impact on the ways in which the NZDF interacts with the wider public, in terms of morale, recruitment and overall public support.”
  \item \textsuperscript{10} AGS, 1999, p. 2.
\end{itemize}
equipment and personnel shortfalls.\textsuperscript{12}

Throughout this process transformations were made that were either misguided, given available resources, or irrelevant because the strategic environment had changed.\textsuperscript{13} There were serious equipment deficiencies throughout and the level of training was not sufficient to fulfill the mobilisation schedules committed to by successive governments.\textsuperscript{14} This is particularly relevant to the history of the TF because it was reserve personnel who provided the bulk of the personnel for these divisional and brigade structures.\textsuperscript{15} However with the demise of first, Compulsory Military Training and, second, National Service, the numbers requisite for such ambitions became impossible to generate.\textsuperscript{16} The Army was reduced in scale and RF units took over many of the responsibilities that had once been the TF regiments'.\textsuperscript{17}

At the end of the 1990s, Brigadier Roger Mortlock came back into contact with the TF and found a very different component to the one he had been associated with twenty years earlier:

When I took office commanding all the elements of the field army as land commander and with the TF as my personal responsibility … I discovered that there had been a massive decline. The path taken since the cancellation of National Service had been essentially unimaginative. Because you have got RF officers calling the shots, at the highest level, they've got their own problems and I think the TF came close to being prioritised out of business in favour of the RF.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{14} Fenton, pp. 201-203

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, pp. 205-206.

\textsuperscript{18} R. Mortlock, Interview 23/09/08.
In the intervening period, the focus, for the Army administration, had shifted from training and equipping the TF battalions provided by National Service to the provision of a single high readiness battalion of regulars in Singapore.\textsuperscript{19} No longer a priority, the TF groups were allowed to atrophy, both in terms of their numbers, and in their training and equipment. In theory, if a major crisis developed, they were supposed to contribute a battalion to a brigade group. In reality, as Rolfe acknowledged in 1999, “numbers within these battalions are not maintained, efficiency is not high and there must be some doubt as to their viability as military units.” At that point there were six infantry battalions, four artillery batteries and a number of other units who were training for twenty days per annum. However, their training levels were inadequate and it would have taken six months to get them to a level where they could be deployed. There was also a lack of legislation protecting their civilian employment beyond the 20 days established by the 1973 Volunteer Employment Protection Act.\textsuperscript{20}

It is at this point that the regionalisation process began which is the focus of this work. It shall be seen that the initiatives that resulted were part of the longer term trends outlined above and that they were also an attempt to address the decline in the TF that had resulted. It is also important that a number of other factors are considered including changes in the international strategic context, world wide reserve trends, New Zealand’s budgetary and defence decision making processes and the effects of a reserve strategy known as “Total Force” policy. These influences frame the discussion of the next six chapters.

\textsuperscript{19} Fenton, p. 203 & 205-6.
CHAPTER 1

In less than a decade, the international community has witnessed a fundamental transformation in attitudes to the legitimate use of military power by states … also in flux is the question of what ways armed force may be employed … Military forces are expected to provide a wider range of capabilities, at less cost, than ever before.¹

The strategic intentions announced by New Zealand's 1997 Defence White Paper were predicated upon acknowledgement that there had been a number of changes in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War: the predictability of the superpower standoff was being replaced by an era of regional frictions and intrastate conflict whilst the international community was increasingly making security decisions based on humanitarian solicitudes. The same paper also noted that as a result of the break in the UN Security Council impasse that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall many countries, including New Zealand, had taken part in more peacekeeping operations in the post Cold War period then in the previous forty-five years.²

In the post Cold War period outside agencies and armed forces were becoming involved in solving intrastate problems whilst as opposed to after they were occurring.³ However, this led to a range of difficulties that the UN itself proved incapable of managing. This occurred because the international body was ill-equipped to deal with the growing threat of intrastate actors and the consequent changes to the international system that had dominated relations between states

¹ Ryan, 2000, p. 3.
since the Treaty of Westphalia.⁴ For much of its existence the international organisation's primary mandate reinforced the inviolability of state sovereignty. However, this was increasingly being contradicted by the growing importance of human rights agendas in the 1980s. Then in the 1990s, with crises in Kurdish Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda, humanitarianism became the primary force for framing the ways in which the international community dealt with individual states.⁵ This paradigm shift in international relations remained extant through the turning of the millenium. In 2005, when a group of notable defence analysts met with Secretary-General Kofi Annan to decide how best the UN could deal with the question of intervening in internal crises, the panel decided that the protection of people superseded the sovereignty of states.⁶

This confirmed a modus operandi that had been developing in international relations since World War Two.⁷ It has been asserted that four times as many people were killed by their own governments as died in interstate and civil wars in the twentieth century. Understandably then, public pressure on governments to deal with this problem, particularly when the deaths of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people are recorded by modern media, has substantially increased. Inevitably, its implications for the world’s military forces have been manifest: numerous interventions around the world demonstrate that soldiers, sailors and airmen are frequently used to solve intrastate conflict and maintain the peace. Additionally, the coalition wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that they

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⁴ “All states are of equal status and legitimacy.” Westphalia (1648) denotes the rights of each state to govern its own affairs without interference from other nations. It framed international relations until the second half of the twentieth century. R. Thakur, War In Our Time: Reflections on Iraq, terrorism and Weapons Of Mass Destruction, United Nations University Press: Tokyo, 2007, pp. 47 & 65 & Ryan, 2000, p. 7.


⁶ Thakur, p. 145.

Internationally, it has meant that the “job description” of turn of the century armed forces was far broader than it had been fifty years previously: as well as conventional war fighting capabilities servicemen and women were now required to be peace-makers and peace-keepers, anti-terrorists and anti-pirates, humanitarian aid workers and reconstruction companies. Armed forces had to move away from a sole focus upon territorial defence to being ready-reaction expeditionary forces, adaptable to these various tasks whilst sustaining themselves over the long periods required to rebuild conflict ravaged nations.

Inevitably, the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) recent history also reflects these trends. Whereas the 1991 White Paper listed peacekeeping as the seventh policy aim in a list of ten, its 1997 equivalent placed far greater emphasis upon it. Then Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, acknowledged it's prevalence in his foreword and, under the title “The Blueprint For Investing In Defence”, the same paper stated that an Army re-equipment project was required so that it could “undertake the more demanding peace support operations”. A contemporary analyst commented: “The call for participation in multilateral cooperative and peacekeeping activities will drive much of the international and regional demand

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11 For example: in 1987 there were less than 40 people serving on peacekeeping missions but by 2000 this figure had risen to 783, with 671 in East Timor alone. J. Rolfe, “New Zealand & Peacekeeping” in *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 2001, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, p. 4.
for New Zealand’s defence forces.”

Neither was the situation, vis-à-vis heavy work-loads, about to improve for these same service-people. The conceptions of comparative serenity and increasing globalisation that had followed the fall of the Berlin Wall were only slightly disturbed by the flare-ups in Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and other areas in the 1990s. However, the events of September 11, 2001 were not so easily ignored. This attack and its causes and consequences provided a new focus for military strategists around the globe as a new, even more uncertain era of international relations arrived. Before that date, says Ramesh Thakur, the United States existed in a comparative age of innocence. Afterwards, he continues, any feelings of impregnability Americans felt were forever lost and the nation entered a “fallen world of post-modern terror”. They were not alone. Closer to home, the Bali bombings of October, 2002 made Australasians realize that the Asia-Pacific region was not immune to the threat of terrorist attack. “We understood very well,” said the Englishman, Sir Michael Howard, “that ‘9/11 posed a threat to ourselves, not just to the United States.” It transformed terrorism from a localized problem into an international bogeyman with tentacles reaching out to every part of the globe. It also posed a profound threat to US hegemony, in specific, and western strategic thinking, in general. Additionally, the challenges posed by various intrastate actors, the insurgents and their terror attacks proved to be persistent. Rather then being a key moment in the GWOT, the invasion of Iraq

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14 Thakur, p. 10.


18 Ibid, pp. 41-2.
that followed 9/11 only divided the western world and added impetus to the Islamic militancy. \textsuperscript{19}

During the invasion of Iraq the coalition forces were initially given guarded support by much of the Iraqi populace. However, the lack of “boots on the ground” at the end of the conventional phase, led to security issues which alienated many of these same supporters. This is relevant because various peacekeeping missions have highlighted the need for the local population to be impressed by the commitment of occupying forces.\textsuperscript{20} A similar failure had occurred during the initial year of “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan when a mistaken reliance on local allies to eliminate the Taliban had allowed many elements of that group to evade capture.\textsuperscript{21} All these elements: “boots on ground”, “commitment” and the prolonged and complex nature of peacemaking and peacekeeping missions have important ramifications for the armies undertaking these kinds of missions. It is also very relevant to the reserve elements that augment them.

Technology has often been trumpeted as a panacea for these ills. However, inserting ground forces and being prepared to accept the possibility of casualties in return for “physical domination of ground” is vital to success in operations of this type.\textsuperscript{22} As an example, some commentators saw the negotiated peace that concluded the Balkan war in 1999 as proof that air-power could settle a post-modern conflict on its own. At the beginning of the crisis, the Clinton

\textsuperscript{21} Rich, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{22} R. H Scales, Jr., \textit{Future War}, US Army War College, 2000: Pennsylvania, pp. 17-18 & 25
administration perceived it as an efficient form of coercion without the risk of excessive casualties amongst ground forces and civilians. Yet the protracted nature of the campaign, when what had been intended as a short, sharp shock to bring Milosevich to the negotiation table, and criticism that it lacked clear direction, demonstrated that this strategy had proved to be flawed. In particular, critics sharply rebuked NATO’s avowed intention to deliver wholesale destruction upon the Serb forces without the use of any ground forces. Major General Charles Link called it “a good example of a political leader (President Clinton) perceiving political imperatives in a way that hamstrings military success” while Alexander Haig said it was a “prime example of ‘excessive rhetoric supported by underwhelming force’”.  

The evidence of mass atrocities and refugees fleeing into Macedonia and Albania caused an immediate re-think. It should be noted that the air campaign itself changed tack, increasing in both strength and direction against Serb targets. However, the part played by ground forces in providing assistance to refugees, entering Kosovo to act as peace-keepers as well as guarding the Albanian and Macedonian borders, and designating targets for attack by the air force cannot be under-estimated. Along with the Navy they “contributed significantly” to the campaign. Ground operations forced Serb forces out into the open where they were more prone to air power.

The mythologizing about the (air) campaign ignored one
inconvenient fact: that it followed a period of sharp Serb military reverses on the ground, including the mass expulsion of the Serbs from the Croatian Krajina.30

There is no substitute, then, for soldiers, when it comes to making and keeping the peace. This prevalence of peacekeeping missions and the consequent importance of ground forces was increasingly emphasised by New Zealand policy-makers: The “Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000” asserted that the NZDF should, henceforth, be trained and equipped to levels where it could make a viable contribution to peacekeeping operations where combat might occur. As such, resources had to be concentrated where they were most needed.31 Speaking just prior to the 1999 election, the Labour Party's Phil Goff said that New Zealand's security was dependent on the maintenance of international law and peacekeeping was this bulwark's cornerstone. He stressed that this, rather than attempting to cover a wide range of contingencies, should frame the nation's defence procurement and structuring policies.32 Later, the 2001 Government Defence Statement indicated there were fewer requirements for home defence whilst peacekeeping would be the NZDF’s predominant role in the future. As such, the NZDF should be structured to reflect this.33

These assertions were based on two main assumptions: first, that the postmodern security environment was, to quote then Prime Minister Helen Clark, “incredibly benign” and that inter-state war was so unlikely that New Zealand would probably not be involved in conventional warfare in the foreseeable future; second, that

after years of neglect the Army was in serious need of a major capital injection and, given the plethora of peacekeeping/stability tasks they had undertaken in recent years, it was this component that should become the focus of improving capability. Where previously the three services had been equal partner in defence henceforth, a major part of the RNZN and RNZAF's role would involve supporting the Army in various overseas peacekeeping and stability missions.

Returning to the 1997 White Paper, the perception that there was no longer any major threat on the international horizon and that peacekeeping and stability missions were becoming primary employment contexts led to the statement that, henceforth, two regular force infantry battalions were the “critical mass” required by the Army plus combat support elements to support the deployment of a single battalion at short notice. A brigade structure would remain in place but only as an insurance policy against the unlikely event of a significant global or regional crisis. The paper emphasised that the TF's continued role would be as an adjunctive element to the RF in “rounding out” this brigade. It also indicates, in one paragraph, that the TF was to “supplement” the latter during extended deployments. Here then, is the signal for the TF's new role in the Army.

These proposals were taken up by the senior elements of the Army and led, two years later, to the Army General Staff (AGS) directive titled: “Territorial Force Regionalisation”. It was this paper which initiated the changes that were to occur in the New Zealand Army's reserve component over the coming months and

36 1997 DWP, p. 31.
37 Ibid, pp. 31 & 47.
years.\textsuperscript{38} It began by acknowledging the changed strategic situation and consequent structural requirements for the Army (battalion group for short-term deployment with no need for a high readiness brigade). This differed from the articulated aim of the 1991 paper, which called for a brigade to be ready for deployment within six months. It meant that the current Army's structure, including its TF elements, was excess to demands. As such, it continued, much of the TF structure, as it stood, was superfluous. A decision had been made to regionalise the TF with the objective being to change the way they trained and contributed to Army deployments. Also it was deemed necessary to “rationalise” the reserve component's real estate.\textsuperscript{39}

By the end of the 1990's there had been recognition around the world that there had been a number of significant changes in the international security environment. The 50 year long focus on the possibilities of a major war between the east and the west as well as the endless machinations of strategy between the two sides had ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990. This cynosure was replaced by a burgeoning awareness of the various humanitarian crises that festooned the globe and a concurrent willingness to intervene in intrastate conflicts that frequently caused them. There was also an increased willingness by some states to undertake missions to other nations to preempt perceived threats. It meant that armed forces around the globe were being asked to intervene in an exponentially greater number of crises and to remain in theatre until the complex problems that persisted were solved. In the post-Cold War security environment,

\textsuperscript{38} AGS, 1999.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p. 1.
with its focus upon the challenges posed by the various localised conflicts and, given the effective shelving of the major tenets of the Westphalian paradigm, defence forces were becoming something akin to political firefighters. Firefighters whose job description included putting out the conflagrations of the world's communities; making sure those hot spots don't blaze into life again; providing relief to affected communities and making sure that the increasingly clever and dangerous “arsonists” could not strike again.

They were expected to do so with fewer numbers, under the scrutiny of a media just waiting for them to slip up and for a public that they had increasingly become estranged from. For ground forces, in particular, this presented a hefty challenge, but as can be observed in numerous operations over the last twenty years, their presence was vital to achieving mission goals. All this meant their skill levels were increasingly important. It also meant they required the skills and extra manpower provided by their reserve or territorial force soldiers.

New Zealand was not exempt from these trends. The NZDF was participating in an increasing number of peacekeeping and stability missions by the end of the 1990s. As such, the 1997 Defence White Paper signaled a need for various changes that would meet the requirements of frequent employment in these areas. This included the TF, which would be re-structured to make a greater contribution to Army outputs in key areas. It was one of the articulated determinants behind the 1999 regionalisation directive which initiated the far-reaching changes which are the focus of this work.

However, there were other factors at play in the move to change the structure of
the TF. An important one was signaled, two pages ago, by former Prime Minister Clark's statement about the post-modern international security environment being “incredibly benign”. It reflected wider perceptions in the post-modern international community. Perceptions that led to increased pressures upon defence expenditure around the globe.
CHAPTER 2

The defence debate has often been reduced to a superficial argument over lost opportunity cost for social expenditure (frigates versus hospitals).¹

In the March/April 2000 New Zealand International Review David Dickens reviewed “The Armed Forces of New Zealand” by James Rolfe whilst Paul Goldstone did the same for “A False Sense of Security: The Force Structure of the New Zealand Army 1946-1978” by Damien Fenton. While the former article praises Rolfe's work because it acknowledged a gap between what the public expected from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and what they are prepared to pay to fund it, the latter is critical because: “Given that Fenton's principle thesis is that the Army failed to meet commitments made by successive governments because of parsimonious politicians, more attention should have been paid to the reasons for the gap between policy and funding.”²

“Too often,” says Ryan, “factors other than objective strategic considerations shape force planning.” These factors include budgetary constraints, antimilitarism, ideological fads and “the periodically fashionable assumption that war is a thing of the past.”³ The same writer points out that reserves, even more than their full-time counterparts, are a product of their social and economic environment. Defence force structuring is a controversial issue because it is subject to the same scarcity of resources that all public institutions must grapple with. The worth of reserve forces has traditionally been established by their

² Dickens, pp. 30-31 & Goldstone, pp. 31-32.
readiness for major war but in the absence of said major conflagration, or at least, the perception that one is likely to occur, their value can only be ascertained by assessing the contribution they make to ongoing military operations. On the other hand, governments, who are beholden to public opinion and competing budgetary requirements, continuously underestimate what is required to insure the effectiveness of all of their armed forces, let alone their traditionally low priority reserve components. These factors have a profound effect upon the structure of defence forces and their reserves. It is for this reason that the budgetary context will be analysed to provide context to the structural changes that occurred to New Zealand's Territorial Forces (TF) between 1999 and 2005.

Writing in 1997, Ronald Sortar identified three major influences upon modern strategy and the composition of armed forces around the world: the end of the Cold War, the one sided nature of the 1991 Gulf War and an increasing intransigence amongst world communities towards the increased budgetary requirements of modern defence forces. Many commentators believed that wars between states, let alone a global conventional conflict, were becoming increasingly unlikely events as the twentieth century drew to a close. The depth of this schism between late-modern and post-modern defence strategies was dependent upon other social, economic and political changes in the host societies, but it was perceptible amongst all. Impressions of decreased threat stemming from the end of the Cold War, along with America's trouncing of Iraq in the Gulf War, motivated a public expectation, particularly in western nations, that a peace dividend was due. If there was no longer any real chance that the Soviet juggernaut would crash into NATO defences in Europe then why was there a need

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6 Downes, pp. 182-3.
for large standing armies anymore? In fact, many questioned whether there was still a requirement for defence forces that reflected potentially irrelevant national agendas in an increasingly globalised community.\(^7\)

Elvy, in his 2008 article about public opinion, showed that New Zealand citizens are consistent in their support for military operations whilst being less enthusiastic about increasing defence spending to support them. For example, 40 percent supported the Global War On Terror but only half of that number were willing to pay more taxes to do so. Likewise, almost every respondent felt that there was likely to be encroachment on the nation's fisheries, yet only 43 percent of that vast majority would pay more to protect those resources.\(^8\) Changing this situation would be very difficult because this parsimony has long been a major factor in determining defence expenditure.

Around the world expenditure on defence was being reduced.\(^9\) New Zealand followed this trend. It meant that the NZDF's capabilities had significantly declined during that same period. To provide one example at this point: in October 1998, the Director General (Resources) of the Logistic Executive, Brigadier Stuart Jameson, told the Chiefs of General Staff that the Army was now only capable of garrison and prisoner handling tasks.\(^10\) Furthermore, many of the capability deficiencies that blighted the NZDF had been concealed in the intervening decade by the generally low level of commitments of that period (two to six percent of personnel per annum). That was about to change. In line

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\(^8\) Elvy, p. 25.

\(^9\) (All figures 1993 to 1998) Australia 2.4% down to 1.9%; UK 4.1 → 2.7; Canada 1.7 → 1.2; USA 4.7 → 3.0. G. Crawley, p. 12.

\(^10\) Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee, pp. 89-90.
with the foreign policy trends around the world that were outlined in the last chapter there was, developing, a greater willingness to commit the NZDF to more regional and UN peacekeeping missions. This meant that after 1999, the Army would be deploying between 14-25 percent of its force including 35 percent of its RF personnel on a yearly basis (figures taken in 2005).\textsuperscript{11} These two factors meant that, in New Zealand defence in the late 1990s, there were lower funding levels and a concurrent increase in employment tasks. This could only lead to increasing strain upon the NZDF.

The 1991 White Paper had instituted the organising principle of the “‘credible minimum’ of capability in key operational areas”\textsuperscript{12} It followed closely upon the 1988 Resource Management Act which directed that defence expenditure levels could be established by working out the minimum funding necessary to make an acceptable contribution to international security.\textsuperscript{13} The 2005 Defence Capability and Resourcing Review summarised this “credible minimum” as follows:

Maintaining high levels of preparedness is costly, in terms of personnel and equipment … The NZDF therefore seeks to hold the majority of its forces at an intermediate stage of preparedness, the Directed Level of Capability (DLOC), which enables it to deliver an Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) within agreed time frames when required.\textsuperscript{14}

This means that most of the NZDF is equipped and trained to a level where they will be ready for particular types of operations in months and years rather then in

\textsuperscript{11} DCARR, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{14} DCARR, p. 18.
days and weeks. Despite this lower than optimal, level of capability, which had been in place for fourteen years, the same review noted that, as a result of inadequate funding “capacity and capability in some areas is below the requirements of government policy” (i.e. below DLOC). This included, significantly, the numbers of personnel available.15 Before 1990, the average percentage of GDP spent on defence was 1.9 percent.16 At this figure, defence commentators were talking about pervasive equipment deficiencies.17 By 1998, it had fallen 30 percent from that figure.18 When planners sat down to write the 1997 DWP they were, in essence repeating the same exercise in scraping the bottom of the barrel that they had undertaken for ten years. The only difference in 1996 was that they had “hit rock bottom”.19

What it has meant, in terms of Government policy, is that “fiscal restraint” is always being balanced with the need to properly equip and maintain the NZDF.20 The 1997 White Paper set out the blueprint for redressing some of the critical equipment deficiencies that had emerged in the previous decade. It announced the plan to redress these as follows: “The rebuilding of New Zealand's defence capabilities will take shape over the next five years. Funding increases will have to be limited in the intermediate term while other Government priorities are addressed.”21

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15 Ibid, p. 4.
17 For example, D. M. Fenton, p. 206: “in June 1997 the Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, Don McKinnon, publicly admitted that the Army was no longer capable of raising even a company-sized unit for overseas deployment...This dramatic erosion of capability...appears to confirm the existence of a damaging 'out of sight, out of mind' mentality on the part of the government in regard to the Army's required needs.”
18 Woodman, p. 2.
19 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
20 1997 DWP, p. 7.
Later it lists “the level of defence preparedness the community is willing to pay for” followed by allies' expectations and finally “military factors” as key elements in the determination of defence expenditure.\(^{22}\) Four years later, that is four-fifths of the way into the five year time-frame that the 1997 DWP had set to redress the major shortfalls it outlined, Defence Minister Mark Burton, commented that much of the Army's equipment was “old or obsolete” and needed replacement. However, in the same article, he says that “any decision on defence policy or capability must be tempered by … the unavoidable issue of funding pressures”.\(^{23}\)

In fairness, counter-arguments can be made. For example, Crawley asserted that the post Cold War strategic situation did justify lower levels of spending, providing evidence that the ABCA (America-Britain-Canada-Australia) nations had all decreased their defence expenditure over the previous five years. He believed that the closures of camps and bases throughout New Zealand was merely “trimming fat” and that security threats in general were less then what they had been. He also said that there was a fundamental dichotomy between defence perceptions of their main role (homeland defence, regional security etc.) and consequent fiscal requirements and what the public saw as their raison d'être: peacekeeping.\(^{24}\)

The 1997 White Paper did signal over $1.1 billion in spending on capital projects spread over the following five years.\(^{25}\) This would reverse the inexorable decline in operational standards that had been caused by budget shortfalls over the

\(^{24}\) Crawley, p. 12.
\(^{25}\) 1997 DWP, pp. 9-10.
previous decade but it needed to be maintained over the long term. However, at the end of the next decade Schouten is still dubious about the NZDF's ability to undertake fundamental tasks: the number of personnel on overseas commitments means the Army could only field a company in a crisis, not a battalion; the Navy's operational and training time had been severely curtailed by personnel shortages, equipment problems and the unavailability of expected vessels and the Air Force was hamstrung by a lack of staff, antiquated equipment and aircraft in refit. The same article highlights personnel shortfalls, capability gaps and the same lack of direction that other commentators were bemoaning in the wake of the 1997 White Paper. At the same time, as a percentage of GDP, the defence budget had continued to decline over the last twenty years, from 1.5 percent down to 0.9, and, when compared to Australia, Singapore, the USA and UK, Denmark, Norway & Sweden, New Zealand's defence budget was markedly lower per head of population. Twelve years on from the 1997 DWP, the NZDF is still dealing with the same budget stringencies it was subjected to in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Its ramifications, vis-à-vis the main topic of this work cannot be stressed enough.

Major General Maurice Dodson was Chief of General Staff at the time of the 1997 White Paper and the consequent 1999 TF directive. He said a primary motivation for the changes to the TF that were about to occur was equipment: by the late 1990s, the Army's, as a whole, was antiquated to the point of obsolescence and he was going through the process of attaining the necessary funds for replacing it. However, he soon realised that there would be nothing available for the TF battalions. As it was, the bulk of the proposed capital expenditure was going to the Navy and the Air Force, so Dodson believed the Army would get just

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26 Dickens, p. 17.
27 Alach, p. 23.
enough to re-equip the RF and nothing more.

I realised that in five years time there was going to come a time when the TF would have no equipment whatsoever. Now, at the same time the TF numbers were declining and had been steadily declining for the last ten years. All the units were under strength. We still had a structure that looked like a mini division but there was hardly anybody in it.28

Aside from the six TF infantry battalions there were a number of other corps units scattered throughout New Zealand. Rolfe commented that this was causing logistical difficulties and extra costs that were difficult to justify when some units' rolls had fallen to little more then a handful. He believed it was “defended on the grounds that these units keep links with the local community and give some additional flexibility to Army operations”.29 Many of these units had histories that went back beyond the two world wars and beyond. However, in terms of personnel they were perceived by many in the Army leadership as not being viable anymore. At the same time there had been the sharp increase in operational deployments that has already been noted and the Army was struggling to find the requisite numbers to rotate their deployed units. Dodson believed that it would make sense to incorporate the TF into the RF in both training and operations. The other option was to get a third infantry battalion but the Army leadership believed the cost was too high. Manpower costs alone would have added 50 million dollars per year, said Dodson. In the financial situation the defence was in at that time this option was never going to be approved by the government. It seemed to Dodson that using the TF on operations would be a more sensible approach to avoid raising another infantry battalion.30

28 M. Dodson, Interview 01/10/08.
30 Dodson.
Dodson said that the TF, with its long heritage extending back to the nineteenth century, had ample support within the Army and at the political level. However, in the modern operational context, with its requirements for complex skill sets and short lead times for training, many senior regular personnel, particularly in the Air Force and Navy, could not see how the reserve component had sufficient levels of training to justify their continued existence. If the TF was to maintain relevance in the modern operational context it needed to be re-structured to provide greater benefit to an increasingly taxed Army.

At that time, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, in his position as Chief of Operations, was talking with the TF Brigadier, E. P. (Ted) Dean, about the problems that existed in the TF. Between them they decided that something had to be done. Part of the problem lay in the fact that the TF was still structured and training to facilitate company and battalion level capabilities. However, their lack of personnel made this unrealistic and, anyway, the current operational environment meant that the Army needed a different kind of contribution from them. As such, the two men mooted the setting up of TF depots where recruits would be trained to provide individual augmentees to the RF during their deployments.

(We) wrote a paper, argued it out between us and then we put the proposition to the senior TF officers ... at Linton Camp. Now, Ted and I thought that we would be in a lot of trouble, that this would sink quickly and when it came to question time we were greeted with a thunderously heavy silence. And then one officer at the back put his hand up. (I said) “Yes, Colonel?”

“Sir,” he said, “it's about bloody time.” And we were in.32

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31 Ibid.
32 R. Mortlock, Interview, 23/09/08.
The 1997 DWP had signaled these changes as follows:

To better focus the contribution of the territorial forces, they will be consolidated within the provincial areas. This will improve their effectiveness and retain the important linkages between the Defence Force and regional communities.33

The changes that followed meant that all TF units would be administered by six regionally based regiments who would be responsible for infantry training and maintenance as well as the provision of leadership skills. Specialist groups such as artillery, engineers, medical units etc. were to be administered by these same regiments but would be trained by relevant RF units designated the “centre of excellence (COE)”. Also, in future, the TF would undergo the same training as their RF counterparts with provision being made for modules and longer time-frames. Finally, it was expected that the TF would contribute ten per-cent of personnel to all future peacekeeping operations.34

The concurrent “rationalisation” of real-estate meant a reduction in the number of depots being used by the TF around the country:

In many areas, the current facilities are no longer suitable for use, being either too large for the number of local TF personnel, or poorly located. In a few areas, there are so few TF personnel that retaining a permanent facility cannot be justified.35

33 1997 DWP, p. 9.
34 Ibid, p. 2.
Oamaru, Petone, Rotorua and Waipukarau would no longer have a local depot in which to conduct their activities.36

Dodson says that while the regionalisation proposals were being formulated there were a number of concerns expressed about how the “rationalised” sub-units would react to losing their independence, particularly given long histories that stretched back to the beginning of the century and beyond.

Perhaps a classic example would be something like the “Scots” (The NZ Scots – a TF Armoured Squadron in Dunedin) which was, theoretically, an armoured unit. The fact was that all they had was landrovers but it had its own esprit de corps. But from the Army's point of views its utility was nothing; it couldn't because it didn't have any equipment and it was never going to get any.37

Practicality, inevitably, is given greater emphasis then sentimentality, particularly when the Army as an organisation had, to again quote the commentator earlier in this chapter, “hit rock bottom”. The decision making group that Dodson was part of, needed the TF to make a contribution to the Army's operational outputs but had serious concerns about the level of training that was being provided to the reservists by their own units. The TF was too small in some places to run effective training programmes, particularly for officers. It was thought that if they joined with the RF then they would get the training they needed to more effectively contribute to army outputs.38

Financially too, it made sense to many in the Army's leadership to part with

37 Dodson.
38 Ibid.
property that seemed to be serving little purpose except as, what many perceived to be, social bases for a dwindling number of personnel who were hanging on in towns and smaller cities. However, those on the receiving end only saw the loss of assets that were vital to their continued existence. Speaking about these reforms a decade later, the Honorary Colonel of the TF 5th Wellington West Coast and Taranaki Regiment (5WWCT), Martin Devlin, had a number of criticisms. In terms of the loss of real-estate, he believed that many units lost viability because closed facilities like drill halls were an important part of their identity.39 Mortlock agreed:

A lot of our simplistic thinking is driven by capped defence budgets...You could understand the staff in Wellington thinking that they could save a lot of money by closing the TF offices and drill halls in, for example, the city of Christchurch: regionalising and moving the headquarters inside Burnham Camp. In monetary terms, an enormous saving. But I will bet you that if you look at … the timing, and the next dip in TF numbers, you will find they coincide. It comes back to the signature in the community.40

Lieutenant Colonel David Rhodes said that these reforms reflected a lack of understanding about TF culture. There were a lot of very good part time soldiers outside of the main centres who were lost as the TF regiments were centralised into Auckland, Tauranga, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin.41 They also lost valuable training facilities. In some cities administrative and social bases remained but many training facilities were closed. As an example, the New Plymouth Company of the 5WWCT no longer has an armoury, nor any real estate in which to conduct small arms training. Therefore, its personnel travel from their home town, for approximately six hours, by bus, to

39 M. Devlin, Interview 24/09/08.
40 Mortlock, Interview.
41 D. Rhodes, Interview 23/12/09.
In an ideal world defence forces would be shaped by present strategic circumstances and analysis of future requirements. However, in the real world there are a number of other factors which determine how they are structured and what capabilities they can maintain. In New Zealand this arrangement of defence component parts stems from a number of non-military factors: the geo-strategic situation with its edge of world isolation; its dependence on trade and diminutive size; the political landscape with a three year election cycle and political parties who are products of their ideologies and desire to distinguish themselves from their opponents; an economic fragility given the nation's small and dependent economy and a raft of social portfolios competing for governmental budgets. All these pressures lead to constraints upon what the NZDF is able to do in a world where keeping up with modern technology is an increasingly expensive business.

There can be little doubt too that budgetary considerations were a primary motivation behind the initiatives that were outlined in the 1999 document. The NZDF was having to find ways to do more with less and the pressure to find cost savings from administrative structure and real-estate would have been great. These pressures were passed down to the Army chiefs who then had to find ways to make every dollar count. And this was one of the major factors in the decision to regionalise the TF units and rationalise their real estate. There is no doubt too

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42 This was personally observed by the writer who was at a live firing exercise where the New Plymouth Company joined us in 2008. The following cities were designated “shop front” only from 2000: Whangarei, Tokoroa, Hamilton, Whakatane, Gisborne, Masterton, New Plymouth and Timaru. Annex H of CGS Directive, 2000.
that many of the TF units and their real estate were servicing increasingly small
groups of personnel. However, the extinguishing of units and bases throughout the
nation was never going to improve recruitment and retention of TF personnel. As
the New Plymouth example shows it takes great reservoirs of motivation and
dedication to become and remain a TF soldier in New Zealand. As shall be seen,
the loss of TF assets in some parts of New Zealand had many ramifications, some
of which were highly detrimental. This point will be expanded upon.

A greater merging of the TF with their RF counterparts in training and operations
was another major motivation behind the 1999 directive. The major theory which
framed this aspect of the regionalisation plan is considered next.
CHAPTER 3

The US defence establishment has devoted enormous intellectual capital to determining how best to utilise its reserves … In America, it is a major political issue with implications for future force projection. Its use of reserves determines where it will fight and for what cause, and is a significant issue for all its allies.¹

As Ryan acknowledges above, the Americans have invested a lot of time and energy into their reservists and there has been an extensive and ongoing debate about how best to structure and integrate them into “Total Force”, the US defence initiative which effectively became the paradigm for integrating reserve components with their regular components around the world. This includes New Zealand where its major tenets were seminal to the regionalisation initiatives. As such, this chapter will investigate the Americans wrestle with “Total Force” in the postmodern context. It shall be seen that it has been no easy road and that it has had a significant influence on the Americans ability to meet the extensive number of commitments they have undertaken in recent years.

The origins of “Total Force Policy” and its Army equivalent, “Total Army Policy”, can be found in the manpower problems that accompanied United States operations in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to meet said shortfalls, Presidents Johnson and Nixon eschewed their reserve forces instead opting for the draft, a decision which proved to be both militarily and politically controversial. In 1974 the draft was abolished and the US Defense Department began looking at how they might better employ their reserve component in future operations to overcome the problems revealed in Vietnam. The resulting policies initiated

¹ Ryan, 1999, p. 23.
fundamental changes in both the Army Reserve National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) and their relationship to the Army's full-time component. Prior to these changes, like many other nations, the reserve component was seen as a contingency force, to be employed only in the event the homeland was threatened, or if a major war, particularly against the Soviets, occurred. After them, it was envisaged that they would play a key role in all types of missions around the globe, providing additional ready deployment capability to the Army. ² To reinforce this centrality, the “Abrams Doctrine”, a closely associated document to “Total Force”, predicated that any future commitment of US forces to major operations must be undertaken in conjunction with mobilisation of the reserve component. In this way, it was intended to avoid the political in-fighting that accompanied operations in Vietnam whilst also insuring that the US only went to war with the support of the American people.³

As the US was not involved in any major operations immediately after Vietnam, and given a leadership culture that was unsure about how best to utilise its reserve component in operations short of a major regional conflict, it would be almost twenty years before either policy was tested, in the 1991 Gulf War.⁴ At its conclusion, a dispute arose between the ARNG and Army leadership over the failure of the latter to employ the former's high readiness round-out brigades. This reflected senior leaders' uncertainty about their reserve elements' combat capability despite the tenets of “Total Force”. This hesitance was deep rooted. In fact, the strained nature of the relationship between the Active and Reserve

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⁴ Sortar, p. 72.
Components was nothing new. It had been a factor for over 200 years. It was to continue. In 2005, Owens observed that whilst confidence was increasing, many recent presentations by the Army leadership at the US War College showed that there was still pervasive uncertainty about the Reserve Component's capabilities.

This disquiet has been compounded by the pressures of personnel cuts and increasing commitments since the Cold War. Prior to this demarcation point, American personnel averaged one million hours of duty per year. By 2003 this figure had reached sixty-three million. To relieve the stress on overworked regulars, reservists were being used on more and more occasions. In the early 1990s, an average of 15 000 reservists were mobilized per year, a figure that rose to 35 000 by the late 1990s. Yet this increase pales in comparison to the quite dramatic upsurge that followed 9/11, when 100 000 plus part-time soldiers, on average, were buttingress US missions annually. By 2004, of the 350 000 American soldiers deployed in 82 operations around the world, 210 000 were reservists. At the same time the ARNG made up 34 percent of Army structure and 40 percent of those serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Part of the reason that reservists have become such an attractive proposition, when operational demands are considered in light of budget cuts, is that they cost

9 Owens, p. 569.
10 Davis, p. 4.
11 S. B. Thompson, p. 9
less, per soldier, then their regular counterparts.\textsuperscript{12} For example, in 2006, the ARNG only constituted ten percent of the US Army budget but contributed 32 percent of army outputs.\textsuperscript{13} However, these increased demands meant that, in essence, the Reserves had gone from being a strategic force, as was intended by “Total Force” to being an operational contingent.\textsuperscript{14} Reservists were increasingly showing the strain of the increased commitments inherent in their wholesale employment in the “long war” by leaving the service, and recruitment, in both the Reserve and Regular components, was suffering.\textsuperscript{15}

Two factors contributed to these problems. First, in line with their status as a strategic reserve, resources were allocated to most elements of the ARNG and USAR under the assumption that they would not be deploying into operations in the early stages. However, this is exactly what was happening and this problem was being compounded by reserve units leaving their equipment in theatre for use by other operational forces.\textsuperscript{16} It was further exacerbated by equipment and personnel being transferred from non-deploying to deploying units. The overall effect was that the ARNG, for example, reported that its units had less than one-third of the equipment they needed to operate. At the same time, the USAR reported they had approximately half of their requisite stocks.\textsuperscript{17} This had serious implications for reserve units because it affected their training and their preparedness for local defence, an issue which gained increased focus after

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ryan, 1999, pp. 28-9.
\item \textsuperscript{13} H. S. Blum, “The National Guard: Transforming to an Operational Force” in Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 43, 4\textsuperscript{th} Quarter, 2006, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Weitz, p. 5, Davis, pp. 4 & 7 & Ryan, 1999, p. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{16} 64 000 pieces of equipment left in Iraq by the Spring of 2006 valued at US $1.2 billion. Ibid, p. 207.
\item \textsuperscript{17} J. A. Saint Laurent, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21\textsuperscript{st} Century Challenges, (electronic version) United States Government Accountability Office, 2006, retrieved 30/04/08, pp. 2-3 & 6-7.
\end{itemize}
Thompson contended that the US leadership had to make a choice: the reserve component could be employed for the GWOT, or it could be utilised in homeland security. Trying to do both was running it into the ground.¹⁹

There was also the social impact of these ongoing commitments: upon families; upon the reservists' jobs and the businesses that employed them; and on whole communities where significant numbers of reservists were deployed.²⁰ The Defense Manpower Center published the “May 2004 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members Leading Indicators”, a barometer of Reserve feelings about military life. It found that all indicators had fallen since the previous survey.²¹ Similarly, in December, 2006, the US Labor Department reported that there had been a significant increase in the numbers of reservists who were experiencing problems with their jobs as a result of their deployments. Additionally, this was only the tip of the iceberg, as many more incidents were not being reported.²² Legislation that was meant to protect employees was failing to do so and self-employed reservists were often losing their businesses. Finally, as more personnel were being taken from their original units to prop up overseas missions, RC leaders were reporting that there were serious shortfalls available for future operations: by 2006, only 90 000 ARNG soldiers were available for deployment out of 522 000. The USAR reported similar statistics. Increasingly, Reserve leaders were having to cobble together units for deployment which compromised unit integrity.²³

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¹⁸ Ibid, abstract.
¹⁹ S. B. Thompson, p. 17.
²⁰ Cordesman, p. 144
²² Ibid, p. 162.
²³ Ibid, p. 207.
Reserve leadership reaction to this varied. The Commander of the ARNG, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, seemed perfectly at ease with the pressures his wards were experiencing, saying: “It's not a train wreck. It's not a crisis. But it bears watching”. However, his USAR equivalent, Lieutenant General James Helmy, was less sanguine; indicating that commitments to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom meant his component was no longer a viable contingency for anything else that might develop in the world:

(The USAR) ... is rapidly degenerating into a “broken” force. The requirement to leave substantial amounts of equipment for other service forces and contractors in theater; the policy inhibitors limiting demobilized soldiers in their training; and the failure to act on numerous requests to change and modernize regulatory policies regarding retention and personnel management, are eroding daily our ability to reconstitute into an effective operational force.25

This all led to a domino effect which stemmed from the shrinking force size and concurrent increase in commitments: as numbers decreased, the costs, per serviceman, rose, because greater incentives were required to retain personnel who were expected to take on numerous, extended tours of duty. This put further strain on the defence budget leading to reactive personnel cuts and so on. As such, retention became an increasingly important factor since each soldier, sailor and airman cost more to train. An important aspect of this was insuring that their workload, and in particular their commitment to high-stress deployments, was kept at a reasonable level. Finding the right mix then, of active and reserve personnel, deployable with the requisite skills, to maintain these commitments

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24 S. B. Thompson, pp. 10-11.
was key to the successful implementation of Total Force Policy.26

Richard Weitz has provided an in-depth summary of the recent trends in the reserve policies of nations throughout the world. He notes that the end of the Cold War led to a change in focus for most nations' reserves. There was no longer an expectation that a major conflict was inevitable or even likely. Instead, the last twenty years have seen a marked increase in a variety of missions associated with peacekeeping, regional stability and the global struggle with intrastate actors variously labeled, amongst other things, as terrorists or insurgents.27 Reserves were traditionally situated as the main force multipliers in the event of a significant inter-state conflagration. However, as perceptions grew that this was now an unlikely contingency in the post modern world and given the higher operational tempo for armed forces that resulted from frequent interventions in global hot-spots, most western nations have followed the Americans who treat their “reservists as complimentary and integral components of their 'total' military forces”.28 The Americans themselves formalised this arrangement through “Total Force” and the “Abrams Doctrine” and other nations instituted it through legislation which removed barriers to calling up their reserves for events short of a major war (e.g. Australia in 2001). In effect there has been, what Weitz calls, “a de facto globalization of the Abrams Doctrine”.29

It has been noted that the cooperative skills necessary for any military unit to fight wars takes time to develop.30 There is also anecdotal evidence that unit integrity is compromised by the continual deployment of individuals out of

26 Saint Laurent, pp. 132-4.
27 Weitz, p. 121.
reserve units to participate in ongoing overseas deployments. The same issues apply for the deployed ad hoc units and this has led to some reluctance, in the American Army for example, to deploy them: “Drawing volunteers from a number of units to form a deploying unit affects not only the effectiveness of the deploying unit, but also the readiness of the units from which the volunteers were obtained.” Additionally, it can be argued that the continuous deployment of personnel from units may compromise their ability to prepare for a major military emergency. As such, it is often suggested that reservists deploy as either platoons or as companies in order that this cohesiveness is maintained. Fisher and Stewart, for example, noted a number of benefits to British reservists who deployed as units. Similarly, Morgan and Antonik, in referring to the US Marine Corps Reserve asserted:

Our Service doctrine relies upon unit cohesion, among other things, to achieve success during combat operations. Integration of the RC should not include “poaching” trained reservists from SMCR (Selected Marine Corps Reserve – mine) units to “round out” the battle roster of Active units. As stated in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0 Marine Corps Operations, “Marine forces train as units and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact.”

Ryan, for one, believed that many of the reserve initiatives that have allowed “integrated force” militaries to maintain the extensive itineraries of the postmodern period have been “provisional and short sighted”. He also noted that the recommendations of a number of relevant studies which seek to mitigate

31 Cordesman, p. 207.
32 Sortar, pp. 82-83.
some of these negative effects have not been implemented because motivation is lacking amongst both political and military leaderships.\textsuperscript{37} The almighty dollar is often scarce, particularly in an age when many perceive defence forces to be more a luxury than a necessity, therefore senior army leaders sometimes lack the motivation to change existing structures. It can also be discerned that budgetary pressures often lead to regular-reserve frictions despite the fact that the latter has become increasingly dependent on the former to carry out their heavy employment schedules.\textsuperscript{38} Regular officers often see reserve appointments as something akin to a demotion and when cuts are required it is often the reserves who receive them.\textsuperscript{39} Also, there are frequently reserve accusations of being given second-class status when it comes to training opportunities and even when they are deployed.\textsuperscript{40} These points will be expanded upon in the next chapter.

In the years that straddled the new millennium the Australian Reserve (ARes) fulfilled three separate functions: first, they were frequently required to provide individual reservists and specialists in a rapid response role alongside the regulars; second, they allowed rotation by providing more augmentees and whole units during prolonged deployments; third, they were expected to maintain expansion capabilities to meet the requirements of a major war.\textsuperscript{41} Given confused political direction and contemporary circumstances this trichotomy of reserve responsibilities seemed a given. However, Donovan, amongst others, believed that the augmentation role that the reserves played in fulfilling the first two roles compromised their ability to perform the traditional tasks of preparing for a major

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\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 47.  \\
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p. 40.  \\
\textsuperscript{39} Donnelly, p. 40.  \\
\textsuperscript{40} Weitz, p. viii & 123.  \\
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Deployments at the turn of the century, such as the ones to East Timor under the auspices of INTERFET and UNTAET demonstrated that few Australian reserve units were trained to a level where they could contribute to rapid deployment capability. It also revealed that compromises had to be made for them to fulfill any role at all. However, it was impractical to attempt to provide every reservist with all the skills requisite for all possible contingencies because of their limitations as part-time soldiers. The Australian's solution to this dilemma was similar to that of the British and Canadians. In 2003 the Project Army scheme initiated a scale for reservists and their units. It led to six categories of reserves and also to four types of service. It meant that reservists with similar capabilities and time availability could train together and organise themselves with the standards required to fulfill their assigned roles clearly laid out for them.

These initiatives were not without precedent. A scheme had been introduced in 1991 creating a group of reserves who had significantly higher levels of training than the average part-time soldier. The Ready Reserve (RRes) Scheme trained selected reservists for an entire year to a level commensurate with regular personnel and then for fifty days per year for four years afterwards. Additionally,

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43 For example, reservists in the 2nd/14th Queensland Mounted Infantry had received sufficient training to perform their roles as drivers in East Timor but were found wanting in basic infantry skills. J. Grey, “Land Force Reserves & Homeland Security: Lessons Learned from the Australian Experience” in *Journal of Military & Strategic Studies*, Winter 2004, Volume 7, Issue 2, retrieved 07/04/08, pp. 7-8
44 Ryan, 1999, p. 45.
46 Six categories of Reserves: High Readiness; High Readiness Specialist; Specialist; Active; Standby and “other categories determined by individual branch”. Four service types: ordinary; voluntary unprotected full-time; voluntary protected full-time and compulsory full-time (government call-up). Weitz, p. 73.
it offered incentives for educational training in order to attract educated recruits who would also be available for longer periods over summer because of the tertiary year.\(^\text{47}\) It provided, says Horner, an “invaluable pool of trained personnel” to the Army.\(^\text{48}\) It attracted a good level of recruits and would have been invaluable to the Australians as they entered their higher operational tempo towards the end of that decade. However, it was scrapped as a cost saving measure in 1996. The Ready Reservist cost forty-five percent of his regular counterpart over the five years of his/her training as opposed to ten percent for normal reservists. This quotient rose to sixty-five percent for whole RRes units. The incoming Labor Government of that year saw this cost as prohibitive and abolished the scheme. Smith voiced the dismay of many commentators when he said of this decision that training men and women for less cost only produced “large numbers of reservists who can not be used, certainly not in formed units.”\(^\text{49}\) It was precisely the highly trained infantry that the scheme produced that would have been invaluable in the deployment to East Timor which, as was noted above, did not deploy reservists until later, comparative low-intensity, rotations. Additionally, as the ADF informed the senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in May 2000: “the cessation of the very successful Ready Reserve (RRes) Scheme in 1996 resulted in a significant downturn in reserve retention and recruitment.”\(^\text{50}\)

Grey writes that the ARes structure is, like its US equivalent, a legacy of the Vietnam War. “Total Force” was designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War with its possibility of a major confrontation or occasional confrontations between the east and the west. It was not created to meet the high tempo operational

\(^{47}\) Grey, p. 10.


\(^{49}\) Grey, p. 11. Also Horner pp. 93 & 329-330.

\(^{50}\) Grey, p. 11.
requirements of the postmodern era. All over the world reservists were fulfilling their roles ably as augementees with regular force units but the resultant strain on their lives led to many part-time soldiers voting on the conditions of service with their feet.51

The influence of Total Force can be discerned in the regionalisation process: the second directive, released in 2000, by New Zealand's Army General Staff articulates the TF's future role as being: “to prepare and provide trained individuals in order to top up and sustain operational and non-operational units to meet directed outputs (emphasis mine).”52 The TF regiments were to provide individual soldiers of various trades (e.g. infantry, engineers, medical etc.) to operational deployments. These directions, along with a few lines in the very brief 1999 directive and the sentiments expressed by Brigadier Mortlock in the previous chapter, demonstrate that the New Zealand Army was instituting its own version of Total Force. It is enunciated throughout the four directives that are the focus of this work.53 The apprehension of decreased threat to homeland security and the concurrent increase in pressure on regular elements as a result of the post Cold War security environment with its numerous deployments, meant that the Army required a greater contribution from its reserve component to ongoing operational deployments. However, the effects of Total Force Policy on the US Army's Reserve Components have been numerous and disruptive. Can similar symptoms be discerned from evidence in New Zealand?

The manifest purpose of the regionalisation process was to increase TF training

51 Grey, p. 12.
52 AGS, 2000, p.2.
53 Examples: “top up” and “sustain” in the 1999 and 2000 Directives. The 2002 Directive refers to “one-Army concept” (p. 2) while the 2005 Directive says: “Ref B the warning order for integrating the reserves in total force planning”, p. 1. (all emphases mine)
standards to a level where they would more easily augment RF units with individual TF soldiers during deployments.\textsuperscript{54} It remained central to directed aims in 2002.\textsuperscript{55} However, “topping up” deploying units with individual reservists is not seen, by many commentators, as ideal policy. Sortar, for example, contributes the following to the topic:

Ad hoc composite units formed using individuals, particularly reservists, and deployed quickly do not have the time to develop the unit cohesiveness and collective skills desired in most Army units ....It may be better to form sections, platoons, or even companies that would be integrated into active units, but manned by reservists, and would train with the active unit on a continuous basis.\textsuperscript{56}

Colonel Devlin of 5\textsuperscript{th} WWCT believed that reserve units created and trained together for specific missions such as those that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, were a better idea then the current augmentation strategy.

It makes it extremely difficult for a unit commander to maintain a unit identity with people coming and going all the time ... The requirements for deployments are so stringent that you could spend something like a year just on courses.\textsuperscript{57}

He suggested that, given the predictable time-frames of many contemporary deployments, that the Army should recruit TF soldiers specifically for those deployments and then organise and train them, as units. It would, he believed, take pressure off the RF, whose personnel are continuously deploying, given said shortfalls, and it would have less impact on unit integrity in the TF Battalion

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\textsuperscript{54} AGS, 1999, pp. 2 & 3.
\textsuperscript{56} Sortar, p. 82 & 87.
\textsuperscript{57} Devlin.
\end{flushright}
Groups. Colonel Jon Broadley confirmed this: “We have learned that we can get reserve units to build soldiers to do security operations.” Devlin said that for too long there was too much ambiguity about what TF soldiers were being trained for. He wanted to see reservists brought together, as units for training for a specific purpose: for a specific operation:

If the Defence Force said to a unit like ours (5WWCT): “your job is to produce a platoon, or two platoons, of trained infantry a year for rotation through (East) Timor or the Solomons then that's clear, it's measurable, it's time-bound, you can do it.”

As Phillips has shown, regimental pride, whilst it is not as developed as in many British units, is still an important part of what it is to be a TF soldier. Fisher and Morgan outlined a three phase, six week training course which was separate but identical to the regulars and was sufficient to successfully deploy British TA personnel, as units, to Iraq. This method had the advantage of keeping the reserve personnel together throughout training and deployment with consequent advantages to unit morale and cohesion.

On the other hand, there are arguments for the “topping up” function. For example, Mortlock denied that unit cohesion was dependent on a constancy of personnel. He pointed out that during the normal course of a unit's existence its cohesiveness is always under threat as a result of casualties, illness, re-assignment and other factors. It is up to good leadership, he continued, to off-set its effects. “Your cohesion is never a constant. There is always someone leaving, someone

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58 Ibid.
59 J. Broadley, Interview, 21/12/09.
60 Devlin
coming in. The life of a unit is a constantly changing personnel environment.”

“Total Force Policy” was originally designed to integrate the RC into the US Army and, to an extent, it has been successful. But it was designed for the Cold War and to position the RC as a strategic rather than operational reserve. Given the post-Cold War environment, with its plethora of expeditionary missions, it is debatable whether it remains relevant to the requirements of the US Army of the twenty-first century. This is relevant to other western defence forces because the American's struggle with “Total Force” in the postmodern context has, as Ryan acknowledged, reflected a wider contemplation of the ways in which reserve components can best be integrated into contemporary armies.

Certain themes are consistent with reserve issues around the globe: the struggle of reservists to gain trust and recognition from their regular counterparts; their efforts to obtain the resourcing necessary to undertake their heavy schedules; the necessity to modify both the RC and AC structures to make them more pliant to the variety of challenges they now faced; and the pervasive effects of the new security environment on reservists' professional and private lives dictating the need to take better care of them given their centrality in “Total Force” armies.

Little is known about what effect the individual augmentation or “topping up”

63 Mortlock, Interview.
strategies of the last decade has had on retention in the TF. However, anecdotal evidence from other countries suggests that there may be a correlation between Total Force's “rounding out” strategy and falling reservist job satisfaction. Further investigation is required. Training and deploying as units, as has occurred with the New Zealand Army TF in the Solomons may ease some of these concerns.
CHAPTER 4

You hear about this “Army of One”. Well there isn't one Army. It's an Army of them (the regulars) and us. (A US reservist in Iraq)

As was alluded to in the previous chapter, part of the problem with “Total Force”, in all its various national guises, is that there has been a number of inherent frictions created by the pervasively poor relationships that exist between the regular and reserve components of the armies that have employed it. Evidence can be provided from around the world that reserve units and reservist soldiers have been treated poorly by army leaderships at a policy level and by their regular commanders and comrades whilst in training and when on deployment. In this chapter it will also be seen that there is evidence that similar problems have been experienced by TF soldiers in New Zealand.

Part of the problem that the Americans have found with trying to make “Total Force” work lies in the subservient nature of the Reserve Component to the Active Component as a profession. At a senior leadership level only two reservists have held the rank of Lieutenant General. It means that senior Reservist officers, who have more knowledge about and affinity to reservists as a whole, have little influence on Army policy. Additionally, Reserve officers have substantial non-military experience that is often very relevant to modern military operations but is undervalued because reservists, as a group, are marginalised within the army. This is also applicable to their military skills which are, generally, less esteemed by army leadership when compared with RC officers'

Evidence, in the New Zealand context, of this lack of input by TF leaders can be found in the various interviews with TF officers undertaken for this work. Lieutenant-Colonel Holley's reveals that he has had opportunities to voice his opinions about the 1999-2005 initiatives. However, Ashcroft, Strombom and Devlin's testimony indicates that they had little input into the changes that so profoundly affected them and their units. Colonel Devlin is a business studies academic who offered a number of insights into how organisations work best to achieve operational goals. In his interview he articulated a number of ideas about how the TF might be better organised to contribute to Army outputs but, it seems, he was not consulted at the time of the reforms, nor since.

At the same time, despite best intentions and efforts to integrate the reserves, there is still anecdotal evidence from around the world that reserve soldiers are not always receiving fair treatment: Thompson has provided extensive commentary on American reservist complaints of poor treatment despite their centrality to “Total Force”. They, like British reservists, who are included in his study, perceive that they are under-trained and being “used as a cheap labour pool to beef up their respective understaffed armies”.\(^3\) That writer is damning in his criticism of unprepared reserve units being sent into theatre with inferior training and an expectation that they will be able to perform at the same level as their regular counterparts: “Many reserves told the \textit{Stars and Stripes} newspaper that their units simply were not ready to fight.”\(^4\) Active Component indifference meant one unit reported that they had asked hospitals in the US for medical

\(^2\) Owens, pp. 571-572.  
\(^3\) R. Thompson, p. 417.  
\(^4\) Ibid, pp. 417-418.
supplies because they could not get them from the Army while another unit was restricted to two bottles of water per day in order to keep regular personnel stocked. “It is a reasonable assumption” concluded Thompson “that these poorly treated troops will not have strong motivation.” 5

As another example, here is evidence of a British Territorial Army (TA) soldiers' chagrin in Iraq:

They call us stabs (stupid TA bastards), and while you try to dismiss it, it does get to you, especially when you are supposed to be working as one team...They treat us like outcasts and they wonder why morale is low and most of us cannot wait to get home and leave the TA. 6

Territorials eat at separate tables to regular soldiers, slept in TA designated tents and were often held up from leaving the theatre by regulars who received priority. Thompson concludes this study by asserting that neither the US nor the UK governments have invested the time nor the resources necessary to insure that their reservists were prepared for service in Iraq and he concludes that unless two seminal points are acknowledged by its overseers, “Total Force” will remain a failure in both nations: first, he asserts that reservists need longer time to train and equip for modern deployments and that failure to do so is little more then “penny pinching”; second, he says that regular soldiers are “insular, parochial and filled with the most arrogant delusions about their unit and their battle reputation”. They are distrustful of all outsiders and anyone they consider to lack their level of professionalism. “Unless governments begin to understand military culture and accept that war is costly, ugly and unfair, Territorial Force Policy should be considered a failure at its very inception.” 7 The effect of these problems,

5 Ibid, p. 420.
6 Ibid, p. 418.
7 Ibid, pp. 420-421.
particularly the higher operational tempo that many reservists have been asked to maintain, has been to cause most relevant nations to experience problems with recruiting and retention.⁸ If effective changes in the utilisation of reserves are to be implemented these are the kinds of frictions that must be overcome.

In New Zealand there has not been anything written about the effect of the augmentation strategy on reserve personnel. However, Lieutenant Colonel Holley suggests that TF soldiers experienced problems in deploying with RF units to East Timor:

On “Bat 4” (A rotation of troops to East Timor) they had a policy where they had to have two Territorials in each section but if they got “bumped” (injured) they would be replaced with the original RF soldiers … What happened was you had those RF infantry sections; a couple of the guys would get dropped off and a couple of TF guys would get thrown in. They (the RF personnel) would do everything to reject those two TF guys because then their (RF) guys would come back in.⁹

These issues are consistent with testimony from reservists in other nations. It would only be natural if there were problems integrating TF soldiers into parochial RF units in New Zealand. However, neither the commanding officer of “Bat 4”, Colonel Peter Wood, nor his Adjutant, Major Rob Te Moana, could recall any integration problems of this type on that deployment. Wood remembers that there were a number of difficulties with TF pay but this was pervasive at the time. He did drop a number of reservists out of the initial deployment training because they were not at a standard to continue but he did the same with RF personnel. Otherwise both men believe that the augmentation policy worked on “Bat 4”.

⁸ Weitz, p. 121.
⁹ J. Holley, Interview, 06/01/09.
“The TF were essential to our rotation's success” concluded Wood.  

The relationship of the RF and TF elements was also important to the later component's training because specialist training, that is all training with the exception of infantry skills, was to be conducted in conjunction with RF units designated the “centre of excellence (COE)”. TF specialist training became the responsibility of the commanding officer at the relevant COE. This was not a problem where those commanders had a good rapport with their affiliated TF units but this was not always the case.

1RNZIR (1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment) was effectively the COE for the TF battalions (in the North Island) and they'd never really had any relationship prior to this with the TF. They'd come out of Singapore when I was a junior officer and they'd never really engaged the TF at all. And of course, at this point in time, East Timor came along … so they had no concern at all … (about the TF).

2/1 (2nd Battalion/1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment) because they had “2 Cants” (2 Canterbury Nelson Marlborough West Coast Regiment – 2 Cant NMWC: a TF regiment in Christchurch that had moved to Burnham) there (and) … there was always opportunities for 2 Cants guys to go along. They build that relationship and the 2 Cant standards lifted. It was a win – win.

1RNZIR had no desire and so the TF regiments in the North island wandered off into the abyss … It came down to, for a lot of the (TF) regiments, to the attitude of the COEs: their commanding officer's view of the TF.

Holley was made commander of 6th Squadron, a TF signals unit in Auckland. He says that the first RF commander he had to work with had no interest in the TF and this made it very difficult to get the resources needed for various exercises. However, he was replaced by an entirely different character who went out of his

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10 P. Wood, Interview, 22/10/09 & R. Te Moana, Interview, 22/10/09.
12 Holley. Also K. Ashcroft, Interview 03/11/09 who confirmed that 2/1RNZIR and 2 Cant have had a close relationship since the latter moved to Burnham Military Camp.
way to be supportive and facilitated numerous training opportunities. What was lacking, Holley continued, was an officially delegated responsibility and performance relationship between the RF COEs and the TF regiments. Major Rob Te Moana, the current Deputy Director of Reserves, confirmed this, saying that “personalities were one factor” in RF/TF training coordination issues. On the other hand, Colonel Bede Fahey demurs: the COEs were struggling with their responsibilities anyway, particularly as they were having to provide training for the East Timor rotations, let alone being given responsibility for the TF units. As such, it proved to be incredibly difficult to move units around for training. At the same time, the changes led to a break down in some long standing arrangements between RF and TF units. Lieutenant David Rhodes provided an example of No. 4 Medium Battery, a TF artillery unit, which had an excellent relationship with the RF 163 Battery. Many of the TF gunners were long serving soldiers with a raft of excellent skills but these had atrophied over the previous decades. Their cohesion with the RF personnel contemporised those skills and had symbiotic benefits for both groups. However, with the new training regime initiated by the regionalisation process, both groups went their separate ways.

“There is and always has been a bit of tension between the RF and the TF” said Devlin. Because they receive a smaller share of the resources, as well as tensions with their civilian employment and the consequent short term nature of their deployment contracts, TF personnel are often perceived as being “poor second cousins” by their RF counterparts. Given the constant scramble for funding that all the services undertake in a highly restricted budgetary

13 Te Moana.
14 B. Fahey, Interview, 18/01/10.
15 Rhodes.
16 Devlin.
17 Phillips, p. 75.
environment, it is not surprising that many RF administrators saw the TF as nothing more than a burden. However, given the pervasive shortages in personnel experienced in the last decade, given the clearly articulated aims of the regionalisation process and given the proven ability of TF soldiers to bolster and even, through the provision of specialist capabilities gained in civilian life, add value to operations, the Army needed to maximise the contributions being made by the TF.

At that time a lot of attention was being given to bringing the regular army up to a higher standard given the criticisms that were laid against them in, for example, Bosnia. The Army's professional reputation was at an all time low and something had to be and was done to mend it. “The RF had too many of their own problems” said Rhodes, “the TF got put on the back burners. The game plan was constantly altering which led to a vacuum.” 18 As a result, the TF units' needs were overshadowed and this led to some mutual animosity that was mostly, but not always, expressed in a light hearted way. 19 It is something that the army as a whole must manage if the TF is to, as the 2000 Directive states, “enhance the integration and operational readiness of the NZ Army”. 20

Pay issues were another pervasive issue for the TF. Ashcroft recalls that they were a blight upon any TF soldier's deployment experiences and Strombom confirmed that this has not changed to date (end of 2009). As an example, TF soldiers at the time of Bat 4, despite their full-time status, were only being paid for five days when, for months, they were training for seven. Often, there were issues with even receiving pay. Ashcroft also asserts there was a lot of resentment amongst

18 Rhodes.
19 Phillips, p. 103.
the Regular Battalion personnel at the inclusion of TF personnel. He spoke to one TF soldier on that mission who told him that he overheard a senior NCO's pleasure because he had “just got rid of another two of those bastards from the TF.” He recalls that a Warrant Officer First Class, with a wide range of skills and training in his background, went to East Timor as a Corporal: “It was assumed that they did not have the skills and they were treated accordingly.”

Much of this evidence is anecdotal, provided by TF officers who are obviously disappointed with how they have been treated by the Army. However, there is a consistency about their observations and evidence from other nations corroborates, at least, the implications of their testimony for augmentation strategies in New Zealand. It also has important ramifications when the regionalisation process is considered: if there is an element of anti-reservist feeling in New Zealand's senior Army leadership, then many of the decisions that were made during this period could be construed as not being in the TF's best interests. To reiterate, evidence is lacking because commentary, in New Zealand, is minimal and further investigations are necessary to discover if there is a problem and, if necessary, provide solutions.

21 Ashcroft.
CHAPTER 5

In a world where libraries overflow with literature extolling successful business management and risk avoidance, there is no equivalent textbook to guide us about risk in international dealings. Indeed many standard international relations texts are woefully inadequate anyway to explain the modern world.¹

The 1999 Directive begins its situation report with the following sentence:

Reference A (the 1997 White Paper) identified the requirement for Army to consolidate the TF structure within provincial areas and to focus training at a level commensurate with the current strategic environment (emphasis mine)²

Previous chapters have outlined the complex nature of the post-modern strategic environment. At the same time it has continuously been acknowledged that the regionalisation process was both a product of, and reaction to, that same environment. However, there is evidence, both from various policy statements of the period, as well as contemporary analytical commentary, that there was a pervasive lack of certainty about what, exactly, the NZDF's strategic priorities were and should be. This chapter will outline the various debates. It will do so along with similar debates and commentary from the Australian context as there are a number of consistencies that can be discerned.

As with the other like-minded nations, there have been a number of ramifications for Australia's reservists from meeting the higher operational tempo of the late 1990s and early millennium whilst also continuing their more traditional role as a

¹ O’Brien, 2005, p. 25.
strategic reserve. It has created numerous challenges for them and led to several problems. There has also been an ongoing debate amongst commentators about how best to utilise the nation's reserve component. This debate lead to wider reflections about how reserves might best be employed in the post-modern context and how they should be structured to do so.

As with its partners in ABCA (American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies Interoperability Relationship), the Australian Reserve (ARes) has, until the post Cold War era, been almost exclusively focused upon facilitating force expansion capability in the event of a major military threat to the nation. The Defence Act of 1903 set up Citizen Military Forces to fulfill this role whilst clearly preventing their use in expeditionary missions. This restricted their role in the years following the Second World War and led, eventually, to a perception that the ARes had little utility whatsoever. Throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century their resources were systematically reduced, culminating in 1974's Defence Act which explicitly stated their “secondary support position” in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Albert Palazzo went so far as to suggest that the ARes had ceased to have any function: “the Army Reserve was allowed...to decline in strength and military capability, and has gradually been excluded from a specific role in national defence.”

Likewise, as with the ABCA partners, that situation has been transformed since the Cold War by their increased involvement in a variety of postmodern operations. It was officially recognised in 2001’s National Defence Act, legislation which legally enabled, for the first time, the Australian Government to

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utilise its AReS for overseas missions. It meant the ADF could commit to more military operations then at any time since the Vietnam War. This included contributions to operations in Sudan, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq. It also required the increased commitment of reserve personnel in a variety of roles, both at home and abroad.

Our principal allies have all concluded that there are definite roles for part-time forces, at a range of readiness levels. These forces both support full-time forces on short notice deployments and prepare for less likely or less demanding contingencies at a reasonable cost.

The intervention in East Timor, which revealed numerous shortfalls in capability in the Australian Defence Force, and other proximate events, led to an intense debate amongst Australian analysts about force structure: should it be aimed at meeting the challenges of asymmetric warfare, the Global War On Terror or peacekeeping? Or was the main task still preparing to meet an invasion of the Australian continent? The 2000 White Paper named homeland defence as the top priority and seemed to indicate that the second level of precedence should be given to “lower level operations” such as peacekeeping. On the other hand, the 2003 equivalent downplayed the possibility of invasion and, whilst warning that a major war could not be discounted, sought a “more flexible and mobile force”

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4 The ADF was involved in 28 peacekeeping operations between 1998-2003. That is, prior to their commitment to Iraq. Dibb, p. 66.
5 No reserves were deployed in INTERFET, the initial response to the crisis in East Timor, although they did perform a support function in Darwin. On the other hand, they have been deployed under the auspices of UNTAET, the UN sponsored operation that succeeded INTERFET. Grey, pp. 2-4 & Weitz, pp. 71-72.
6 Leahy, electronic version, p. 4. The commitment of over 1000 reservists to East Timor exceeded total reserve commitments between 1945 and 1999. Also Bostok.
7 Donovan, 2005, p. 48.
9 Cotton, p. 135.
capable of the peacekeeping and security missions that had become prevalent.\textsuperscript{10} Finally, throwing a third policy consideration into the mix, South East Asian security remained unstable and collective arrangements were poor, indicating that defence policy should be aimed at meeting the needs of an unstable regional environment.\textsuperscript{11}

These considerations are reflected in an ongoing debate about the role of the Australian Reserve forces (ARes) in the postmodern context. Lieutenant General Peter Leahy asserted that the changing strategic environment meant it was no longer necessary to focus ARes upon a major conflagration and that reservists, as such, should be trained and equipped for the plethora of postmodern expeditionary operations. They could also, he continued, provide a number of skills, necessary to fulfill the new style of missions, that did not normally exist in sufficient numbers in the regular component.\textsuperscript{12}

One representative of the opposing camp believed that whilst the post Cold War world meant the threat of a major invasion was minimal, 9/11's events indicated that territorial defence, on a different scale, should remain the reserve component's focus. John Donovan postulated that the main challenge for contemporary military forces lay in meeting a range of low level attacks by irregular forces. The exorbitant price tags attached to many modern weapons technology systems puts them beyond the reach of most military groups, both state and non-state, and these actors increasingly looked at asymmetric methods as a way to achieve their goals. To meet these threats with full-time personnel would be too costly for most Australian states but specially trained reserve forces

\textsuperscript{10} Donovan, 2005, p. 42.  
\textsuperscript{11} Cotton, p. 138.  
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, pp. 7-8.
could be utilised at a more acceptable level of expenditure.\textsuperscript{13} An extensive catalogue of ARRes involvement in low level security tasks at a variety of recent domestic events in Australia demonstrated that they were capable of performing such functions.\textsuperscript{14} The capabilities necessary to combat these localised threats would be easily attained by reserves and they would have the added advantage, because of their localised basing, of familiarity with the areas they were operating in. Trained and organised as “fully developed units” these reserve units would not need the full gamut of skills necessary for conventional warfare.\textsuperscript{15}

However, not all Australian commentators were convinced that this focus upon operations other than war was sensible. Dibb acknowledged the threat of terror attacks and the western response but asserted: “it does not mean the war on terror should become the sole organising principle for Australia’s defence policy.”\textsuperscript{16} 9/11 may have been an isolated event; future challenges may have differed markedly from the ones that had influenced the beginning of the new millennium; and extensive alterations to the Australian force structure risked leaving it without the capability to meet a major threat to national security. The structure of the ADF allowed Australia to play a significant part in their region’s security whilst also facilitating an expeditionary capability as demonstrated in Somalia, Angola and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{17} Focusing force structures on lower level threats of the moment presumed that high intensity/conventional warfare was either a thing of the past or a long way over the horizon. Yet, as history constantly demonstrated, major wars

\begin{itemize}
\item[Dibb, p. 59.]
\item[Ibid, pp. 66-67.]
\end{itemize}
and regional high-intensity conflicts break out frequently and without warning.\textsuperscript{18}

By extension, focusing the ARes on low-intensity tasks that would allow them to augment the regular component might lead to an atrophy of essential skills:

Assigning the reserves a limited role will downgrade the force's ability to sustain even low-level operations and destroys its ability to rapidly generate additional, collectively trained, combat capable units at a high-level contingency.\textsuperscript{19}

This then is the quandary: it is difficult, given the limited amount of time reservists can commit to training, and also expensive, to train reserve personnel to meet the wide variety of tasks that face them in postmodern operations and yet, because of the pressures inherent in falling personnel numbers and rising commitments, they have become increasingly integral to fulfilling all of these differing defence force obligations. What some Australian commentators were suggesting was that the defence force could ease these conflicting pressures by training and equipping reservists to meet lower-level contingency tasks, particularly at home, leaving the regulars to prepare for the expeditionary/high intensity challenges abroad. However, other commentators were concerned that this would atrophy the essential war fighting skills that were necessary to meet the threat of a major conflict, particularly as the ARes would constitute an expansion base in such an event.\textsuperscript{20}

New Zealand faced the same dilemmas at the turn of the century and there were

\textsuperscript{18} Ryan, 1999, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{20} For example, Donovan, 2005, p. 78 “recent strategic guidance places emphasis on 'fully developed' forces. This has been interpreted to give a different rationale for the Reserves, focusing them on supporting the Regular forces (on)...'constabulary' tasks, but apparently overlooking or minimising the need ... for homeland defence forces. The level of development of homeland forces, even in the 'fully developed' form required by strategic guidance, could be different to that required for overseas 'constabulary' tasks.”
the same uncertainties about what roles the NZDF and, by extension, the TF, would best be structured for. Regional security had long been one major focus of the NZDF. The 1997 DWP listed it as one of three principal elements in its policy (another legacy of the 1991 paper). This is understandable given that the Asia-Pacific is a region “of incomplete and contested nationalisms”. Although there has been little in the way of change in the state boundaries of Asia and the Pacific since World War Two (the unification of Vietnam, the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia, and the creation of Bangladesh and East Timor are notable exceptions) a number of internal tensions remain simmering just below the surface. There had been a significant increase in Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia during the late 1990s which had increased conflict within the nation and was one of the factors behind the 2003 Bali bombings. When the obvious instability of, amongst others, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Fiji, is noted, it can be seen that New Zealand cannot take its regional security environment for granted.

As the 1999 conflict in East Timor demonstrated, both the Asian Regional Forum and ASEAN had great difficulties in mobilising an organised response to a security crisis in the region. Instead, individual member nations were asked to contribute to a hastily arranged coalition response to the crisis. It became an important moment for the NZDF which was one of the few military forces considered reliable enough to be sent to the newly formed Indonesian/East

21 1997 DWP, p. 7.
22 Cotton, p. 1.
25 Dibb, p. 65.
Timorese border. Australia, who was leading the intervention, was unsure of whether it had the resources available to tackle the task and requested the light infantry capability that New Zealand was able to supply at a battalion level. It was an important moment for the New Zealand Army and the NZDF. As Dickens commented, East Timor was a perfect illustration of the importance of capable armed forces in carrying out New Zealand's foreign policy objectives in its own backyard:

New Zealand and Australia were afforded the opportunity to act independently precisely because their armed forces had the equipment and people to do their job. If the military had failed, so too would have diplomacy … Without balanced forces, neither New Zealand or (sic) Australia could have exercised an independent policy on East Timor.

An important part of that contribution was constituted by Territorial Force reservists. From 1999 to 2003 approximately 460 TF soldiers served in East Timor representing between ten and eighteen percent of each six month rotation. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion/1\textsuperscript{st} Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment's (2/1RNZIR) commander, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Dransfield said of the part-time soldiers in East Timor: “They are fitting in very well indeed. I know that I and most of my officers now cannot tell the difference and I have to be reminded that so-and-so is actually a TF soldier. They are all doing a good job.” On the other hand, it is notable that the TF were rarely deployed in leadership positions above the rank of

26 Cotton, p. 127.
28 Dickens, p. 30.
lance corporal, particularly in combat roles. Lieutenant Colonel John Holley, a TF officer, noted that during his time in East Timor he was aware of only one TF infantry platoon commander and that NCO had completed the RF platoon commander's course. Colonel Peter Wood, who led one of the rotations, said that TF NCOs lacked the training and experience to lead sections. However, he often made them second-in-command so they would gain the necessary exposure to lead these small groups in the future. As such, it can be seen that an important part of the New Zealand Army's responsibilities includes regional security. By extension, the TF should be trained to contribute in this area. However, it is not the only role that must be prepared for.

It has been an ongoing theme of this work that there has been an increased prevalence of low-intensity peacekeeping and stability missions around the globe. Some commentators believe that conventional warfare is becoming a thing of the past; replaced by these low-intensity military operations. Martin van Creveld went so far as to assert that in the future soldiers would be gradually replaced by “police-like security forces”. There is no doubt too, that peacekeeping and stability missions had become mainstream employment for NZDF personnel. On the other hand, focusing NZDF capability in this way would carry inherent risks. Such a focus would have made it difficult for them to be committed in a conventional war fighting role and conventionally focused allies, such as Australia, have little time for New Zealand positioning its military

32 Holley.
33 Wood.
in such a way that militates against its traditional war fighting capabilities. This last argument is echoed by Alach who said that there is a perception that the NZDF had evolved into a peacekeeping force at the expense of its combat capability. As he pointed out, the “Foundations of Military Doctrine”, which is essentially the blueprint for training and organising the NZDF, continuously emphasised the applicability of war fighting capabilities to other military tasks. This doctrine is supported by Mortlock, who asserted that peacekeeping problems, such as those he personally experienced in Angola, as well as others in Somalia, the Balkans and Rwanda, are best avoided by the provision of military forces that have the ability to back peacekeeping intent with conventional military capability. He quotes Major General Peter Cosgrove, who led the mission to East Timor:

> Forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary for war were actually very effective, probably more effective than had they been less capable. Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanction that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric. A force optimised for peacekeeping would have in my view invited more adventurous behaviour by our adversaries.

In another article, Cosgrove said that “high end capability” was essential for peacekeeping. However, Glenn, in a review of the mission to the Solomon Islands, asserted that a warrior mindset is unhelpful when it comes to keeping the peace. This echoes Rothstein's observations about US soldiers in Afghanistan.

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37 Ibid, p. 17.
38 Alach, p. 22.
40 Ibid, p. 33.
41 Cotton, p. 129.
42 R. W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance*
Peacekeepers then, walk a fine line: on the one hand they must nurture ongoing consent amongst local groups through a non-aggressive stance whilst at the same time conveying sufficient military menace to deter aggressive acts which might compromise their mission objectives.44

The “Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000” Committee recognised this specialisation by recommending that the types of skills necessary to peacekeeping operations would be added through additional training that was “not a substitute for developing conventional military skills”.45 It should be noted at this point that, given budgetary constraints and operational commitments, training schedules are always under considerable pressure in the NZDF. Maintaining conventional fighting skills and the unique capabilities that make for good peacekeeping is a delicate balancing act, particularly given the regularity of operational events. The 1993-1999 National Government's response to an earlier, interim report to the above inquiry, asserted that the NZDF should not be structured nor equipped according to the requirements of peacekeeping. This was because regional and global security remained the number one focus and conventional military skills were essential to peacekeeping operations anyway.46 However, Rolfe, in his 1999 review of the NZDF, commented that the Army had already been reoriented towards peacekeeping operations “perhaps in conscious or unconscious recognition that its capacity for more combat intensive operations is not high”.47

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45 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, pp. 31-32.
47 Rolfe, 1999, p. 120.
Alternatively, Alach concluded his afore-mentioned article by writing that the NZDF's training remains focused upon conventional tasks not on counter-insurgency. As with governmental policy on the matter, there seemed to be little consensus amongst commentators as to how much focus there was, and ought to be, upon peacekeeping versus conventional, high intensity, capabilities in the NZDF.

The answer might be found, to the first quandary at least, in more recent annual reports. Then Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae, in his introduction to the 2007 Report, said that “performing well as peace-keepers and providers of relief support is premised on the NZDF being militarily capable and trained in combat”. However, he also commented:

Nonetheless, there are some areas within the NZDF where preparedness states are at a lesser standard, especially given the unpredictable security setting. This relates primarily to our ability to conduct operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, where there are personnel and equipment shortcomings.

This is reiterated in the following year's report which notes that commitments to Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomons were “causing significant tension between the provision of forces for current operations, and being ready for future and potentially more lethal operations ... When Army force elements deploy to the current theatres of operations, they lose a significant proportion of their combat capability.” This is the “key issue” facing the army, the report concludes. The main conundrum then, is not how the army trains and equips itself and whether its

49 Ibid, p. 16.
focus should be peacekeeping or conventional operations, but how it can maintain the high-intensity edge to operate at the optimal level in both types of environments when it is constantly being committed to a variety of overseas missions. If the TF were to make an important contribution to army capability in any key area it could well have been this one.

While peacekeeping, stability and nation-building tasks had become a primary focus for the NZDF, other employments remained the subject of intense debate. New Zealand's defence policy was predicated on a presumption that a major threat to the home territory is highly unlikely and, if at all possible, contingent upon a long period of development by the hostile party. The “Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000” lists “defence of New Zealand as the last of its “priorities for defence tasks” and, whilst not dismissing the possibility outright, says that “risk assessment gives little weight to the need to defend New Zealand against any significant military threat”. Responding to criticisms of these assumptions in the 1997 DWP the Minister of Defence, Max Bradford, dismissed the possibility as “unlikely” and contended that any threat that did emerge would concern larger allies anyway. On the other hand, he dismissed Crawley's assertion that, given the moderate international security environment, the NZDF could be positioned for civil and domestic tasks: “Who predicted the Gulf War?” he asked, “or the Balkans”, the intimation being that major conflict was still a distinct possibility, just not on New Zealand's doorstep. A decade later, in his introduction to the 2007 Annual Report, Mateparae acknowledges that part of the NZDF's primary mission is “to secure New Zealand against external threat” but then, inevitably, given current employment contexts, documents the previous year's activities

51 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, pp. 5-6 & 18.
Could New Zealand structure its defence force on the presumption that a major threat to our independence was a remote possibility and if it was to occur that we would have sufficient time to prepare for it given force capabilities? Given the end of the Cold War, it could safely be asserted that the United Kingdom finds itself in a similar position. However, Tucker, in 2003, wrote that “the current strategic context suggests that threats could emerge quickly and out of the blue” and that this justified his nation's concept of graduated readiness.\textsuperscript{54} Viggers expressed concern at the lack of an expansion base for major war saying, “the UK is now the only major country in the world with such a limited capability to reconstitute a larger mobilized army in the long term.”\textsuperscript{55} As Ryan noted, with reference to the Kosovo crisis, governments are prone to miscalculating risks in the modern security environment.\textsuperscript{56} He also said: “if we accept that the international situation provides no ... guarantee that western countries ... might not have to provide substantial forces at short notice to meet a crisis contingency, then Australia needs to provide a credible mobilisation base.”\textsuperscript{57} It could be, that the lack of a direct threat has induced in western democratic nations a somnolence in defence matters that is pervasive.\textsuperscript{58} However, there is an “inherent unpredictability” about war that does not allow for the dismissal of any contingency. As such, versatility should be the cornerstone of any force

\textsuperscript{56} Ryan, 1999, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{58} K. Spohr Reedman, Building Sustainable & effective Capabilities: A Systematic Comparison of Professional & Conscript Forces, retrieved 08/05/08 from http://books.google.com/books?id=amanFL46_kyc8p9=PA418dq=%22reserve+forces+structures ... p. 41.
structure.\textsuperscript{59}

There are similar arguments put forth in the 1997 DWP:

> Even in current circumstances, significant mid-level or high-level conflicts could break out at short notice in areas where New Zealand's interests would be affected. In any event, the lead time for acquiring new capabilities might be significantly longer than the warning time.\textsuperscript{60}

Whilst the focus remained upon structuring our defence force for current operations there was a risk that remote possibilities that posed a greater danger to the nation's well-being would be forgotten.\textsuperscript{61}

Traditionally, homeland defence was seen as being central to the TF's roles and responsibilities. However, the 1999 Directive downplays its importance, instead emphasising its positioning as augmentees to the RF in ongoing tasks.\textsuperscript{62}

It should also be remembered that there are a number of threats to New Zealand that are not military but still fall within the NZDF's gamut. Amongst many others these include environmental catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and flooding; the effects of climate change including the possibility of food shortages; and the endless possibilities for economic sabotage that an isolated trading nation such as New Zealand faces.\textsuperscript{63} Whether the NZDF is positioned to meet the needs of its current operational circumstances with its predominant peacekeeping missions or if it decides to focus more on conventional contingencies, there are always risks inherent because prescience about security threats is an elusive

\textsuperscript{59} Scales, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{60} 1997 DWP, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{61} Beath, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{62} AGS, 1999 , passim.
Vertzberger attempted to provide such an analysis and concluded that “there are no coherent perceptions about acceptable levels of risk in international affairs”.

“We believe agility is paramount” says Mateparae in his opening to the 2008 Annual Report. He recognised the limitations to what the NZDF could do given finite resources but acknowledged that peacekeeping had become an ongoing task that must be accounted for in structuring defence. He also reiterated that conventional military skills were essential to the creation of good peacekeepers.

The 2007 Annual Report conveys this complexity by listing five major categories and twenty-seven sub-categories of employment contexts. At the same time, there continues to be a lack of analysis about exactly what it is the NZDF should be doing. Rolfe puts it succinctly: “what we want is for the NZDF to do a little bit of most things without forcing it to narrow its focus too much”. In this, he echoes Crawley, who, almost a decade earlier, was bemoaning the lack of discussion about how to frame our defence force for future challenges.

Woodman was generally appreciative of the 1997 DWP which, he said, established important capability baselines and providing cash for capital projects. However, he was still moved to say: “What is missing from the white paper is any real sense of direction or priorities.” Throughout, there is a pervasive sense of uncertainty and hesitance.

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64 Rolfe, 2008, p. 17.
68 Rolfe, 2008, p. 15.
69 Crawley, pp. 10-11.
70 Woodman, p. 5.
This brings the discussion to the provision of a clearly defined role for army reserves. Australian commentators have noted its importance: The strength of the ARes increased significantly in the 1980s when the government called for volunteers in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, Donovan asserted that the healthy rolls present in volunteer emergency services, at a time when the Army was struggling to maintain its paid reserve numbers, was a direct result of the former group responding “to a clear need”. By the late 1990s the ARes had ceased to have any discernible function except as augmentees to a generally indifferent regular component. This failed to provide the reservists with “a sense of purpose”, particularly as formed units.

Providing clarity by establishing primary defence roles is important. As things stand, soldiers, sailors and air personnel must be trained and equipped to meet a myriad of operational circumstances in the limited periods between their ongoing deployments. At the same time they must work to maintain the traditional combat skills that are necessary to meet that “rainy day” of international relations: a regional or major/global conflict. It is likely, but not a certainty, that there would be a significant time-frame available to meet such a contingency. There can be no such assurance that these threats have become so rare that they can be discounted altogether. History constantly demonstrates the pitfalls of not being prepared for such events. Given that low-intensity deployments have become so pervasive; given that our regional environment’s security cannot be taken for granted and given that a major conflagration cannot be completely discounted, the NZDF must

71 Donovan, 2006, p. 79.
72 Ibid, pp. 79-80.
be particularly canny in the way it juggles all of its resources, particularly its personnel. It is even more important, given their time constraints, with regard to part-time soldiers. However, from reading both commentary and policy, it appears that there is a lack of clarity regarding role provision. It is evident in the Australian readings as well as from commentary in New Zealand. This uncertainty would have filtered down to those who were making decisions that impacted the TF.
CHAPTER 6

Fostering stronger links with the community.
(One of the stated aims of the Army 2005 project in the 2000 Directive)\(^1\)

In the last chapter it was established that the provision of a readily identifiable role is important to recruitment and retention in army reserves. Similarly, defence force numbers can be linked with the exposure of the various services to the public. In this respect the army reserves have had an important role.\(^2\) Has this important factor in public relations been utilised in New Zealand and what were the effects of the regionalisation process?

In an extensive article on the New Zealand society's perceptions of the military, Elvy has shown that the public, in general, begrudge defence expenditure to a greater degree then, for example, the Australians. At the same time the majority (84\%) of that same public believe that the NZDF would be incapable of defending itself if it was attacked. This is likely to lead to less motivation amongst the potential recruiting population to serve in an institution because many perceive it to be ineffectual in a key area of its responsibilities. This is borne out by recruitment figures that, in spite of extensive advertising, in all three services in the year Elvy's surveys were done (2008), were significantly lower than hoped for.\(^3\) Research by Kusnitz and Burstein showed that, when it comes to foreign affairs and defence policy, governments are highly sensitive to public opinion.\(^4\) As such, the defence establishment's prolonged malaise, when it comes to its struggle with budgetary levels, could fairly be linked with its poor image amongst the New.

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1 AGS, 2000, p. 2.
2 Weitz, pp. ix-x.
3 Elvy. The Navy's strength increased by 34, the Army, 17, and the TF decreased in number by 150.
4 Ibid.
There is an element of anti-militarism in New Zealand society, or, at least, a perception that the defence industry is guilty of something by its association with war. New Zealand's birth as a nation coincided with significant contributions and sacrifices in the two world wars. As well as earning great respect for their fighting capabilities, the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Forces (NZEF) suffered numerous military disasters and a large number of casualties. In fact, per head of population, New Zealand suffered more deaths and injuries than any other nation in the Great War and this left an indelible impression on the young country: “We are a nation that knows how to weep over our dead” quotes Phillips, who notes that New Zealand and Australia have different perceptions of the ANZAC tradition. Whereas the Australians embrace the tradition as part of what it is to be “Australian” and associate it with self confidence and capability, in New Zealand the two World Wars and their heritage are primarily connected with the cost, in terms of the dead and the maimed, and with remembering military defeats (Gallipoli, Crete and Monte Cassino are relatively well known to the average New Zealand citizen, the deeds of the 1st NZEF in stopping the German offensive of 1918, or the important role played by the 2nd NZEF at El Alamein are not).5

Mortlock believed that this focus upon military disasters and casualties, combined with a strong anti-authoritarian trait amongst New Zealand people, has led to a negative perception of the nation's defence force. “It is worth remembering that after World War One about every tenth man you passed in the street had a visible injury like a leg missing or something like that. It was right in your face: the army got you hurt.”6

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6 Mortlock, Interview.
Frequently too, the Army has been used to quell civil protest. During the Second World War there were a number of dairy industry strikes which were put down by soldiers. They were also used during the waterfront strike causing considerable ill will. Before the 1981 South African rugby tour to New Zealand Government wanted to use the army again in this role but the latter refused, saying that the suppression of domestic disturbances was police business not theirs. However, they still provided logistical support. Even more recently, the Army has filled in for striking prison officers. “I think our society has long memories of the way troops have been used,” said Mortlock, something which has led to a long standing diffidence regarding the nation's armed forces. 7 It has not led, in the main, to pacifism but it has led to pervasive indifference towards everything military with the exception of commemorations of the fallen.8

Australian analysts have noted the importance of their reservists in terms of exposing the defence force to the public. Because they are based in the south, whereas the regulars predominantly operate in the north, the ARes are the most visible members of the Army to the majority population centres in those parts of Australia.9 Writing in 2001, Horner commented that most Australians had no affinity with their defence force.10 The ARes presented the ADF with its best chance to make the required connection because of their basing amongst local communities. “Experience suggests that … recruitment is best carried out by Reserve units in local areas.” Providing clearly articulated and testing roles for

7 Ibid.
8 Phillips, pp. 76-77.
9 Horner, p. 194.
10 Ibid, p. 331.
them would also help in this recruitment.11

The French, as another example, instituted *la reserve citoyenne* when they scrapped conscription “to sustain the link between the French nation and its armed forces that conscription was thought to have provided”.12 In the UK, many RF bases have been closed, but the continued existence of over four hundred reservist bases, particularly Territorial Army units, makes “them the most visible face of the British armed forces in many places.” This aids in recruitment and provides leaders with a military background to towns and cities.13 The British have further strengthened that bond by creating 14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces that assist civil defence and many other nations are still struggling with the dilemma of how best to include their reserves in homeland defence.14

It was noted in Chapter 1 that military budgets have been subjected to increased pressure since the end of the Cold War as a result of perceptions that a peace dividend was due. This expectation was shared by most New Zealanders. The country's geographical remoteness gives most of its residents the perception that security threats are minor and expenditure on the NZDF reflects this. At a time of economic recession there has been a great deal of pressure put on the government to put more money into domestic programmes.15 At the same time it is generally assumed that that same defence force that has had its budget reduced will pull its weight in the international arena and make a significant contribution to maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region.16 As such, momentum gathered to

12 Weitz, p. 125.
15 Downes, pp. 182-184 & 187.
16 Ibid, pp. 184 & 186.
change the shape of the NZDF to reflect its increased deployment into low-intensity operations as much as it did the requirements of the global strategic environment.\(^\text{17}\) As much as anything, this situation (less dollars/increased required outputs) has been created by public ignorance about defence matters. The media is always on the hunt for controversy in the military: sex scandals, expenditure issues, redundancies and the privatisation of defence property and work have all created negative headlines for the military. In New Zealand, the closure of a number of bases has also affected the civil-military relationship.\(^\text{18}\)

The 1999 Directive encouraged the civil-military connections role for the TF through the continued development of the Youth Life Skills programme and civil defence and emergency tasks. “This,” the directive continues, “represents another way that the TF can be used to further develop the links with the local community.”\(^\text{19}\) This theme continues in the 2000 and 2002 directives:

TF regiments remain the main link into the community for the Army and are to continue to develop their links as directed ...\(^\text{20}\)

It remains essential that we provide excellent customer service, remain innovative and maintain and improve our strong link with the community.\(^\text{21}\)

Clearly then, the NZ Army recognised the importance of their part-time component to public relations, marketing and recruiting. However, the regionalisation process would appear to have adversely affected this link: “The closure of territorial training depots within urban centres restricts civilian access

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20 AGS, 2000, p. 3.
to military culture and impairs civil-military relations” wrote Phillips. “Without access to territorial barracks, the community bond is broken.”22 Mortlock agreed:

The Army as a whole, the RF, would only prosper if the TF are prospering because it is the TF that are our roots into the community. And of course … we sold an awful lot of real-estate which just so happened to be TF real-estate. So our signature in the community is getting smaller and smaller at a frightening rate of knots.23

The Army's well-being, as part of the NZDF, is tied closely to its level of appreciation amongst the New Zealand community because politicians in a democracy, who decide the levels of defence funding, are highly responsive to the will of the people. As such, when it comes to competing for cash with schools and hospitals the military needs to utilise every advantage at its disposal. The TF regiments with histories linking them to their local communities that go back to the dawn of colonial New Zealand can provide and have provided important benefits in this regard.

Closely related to this theme is the issue of recruitment in the TF itself. The 2000 directive had stated that the TF regiments, as regional structures, controlled recruitment, “as directed by Army Recruiting”.24 However, this system was clearly not working, given a statement by the CGS, in the 2002 directive, that a lack of clarity and apprehension of responsibilities was causing a decline in recruits. As such, a decision had been made to centralise recruiting under the Adjutant to the Chief of Army General Staff – Human Resources.25 However, the same document states that emphasis will be placed on the TF to effectively recruit

22 Phillips, p. 74.
23 Mortlock, Interview.
24 AGS, 2000, p. 2
for themselves. Devlin called this system, which he saw as centralised recruiting: “a nonsense … It's all generic and so people don't identify with the local unit. They identify with that strange...virtual miss (animated Lara Croft like character on mid-2000s decade Army television advertisements).”

It should be noted then, that as a senior leader in a TF regiment, he did not perceive that his unit remains pivotal to the recruiting process as articulated by the 2002 document. It should also be remembered that similar sentiments had been expressed about centralised recruiting in Australia. Devlin also believed that centralised recruiting had led to certain recruit lucrative areas being overlooked. Specifically, he mentioned Massey University, where he works in the Commerce Department. In fact, universities were specifically mentioned as a recruiting source by the 2002 document (Annex B) and, given a plethora of young people en situ to a major Army base (Linton) it seems an obvious place to be promoting part-time soldiering. However, aside from the Kippenburger officer cadets from Linton studying there, Devlin believed the Army’s profile was negligible.

Holley pointed to the over lengthy initial questionnaire as discouraging many potential recruits. Neither was the follow up system efficient enough in getting recruits into uniform and off to TF units. As a result, he concluded, there was a significant gap between the numbers of people applying for the TF and those that arrived at Waiuru Army Camp for basic training. Figures indicate that two out of every three potential recruits never make it to that point. Having personally

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26 Ibid, Annex B.
27 Devlin.
28 Ibid.
29 Holley.
30 “The one area of concern to me is the difficulty we have in processing and holding recruits to get them to their intake (RITs [Regular Infantry Training or basic training as it is commonly known – mine]). Our data tells us we are not short of applicants. But of those who do apply about 60-70% drop out before the RIT.” Brigadier A. Howie, Territorial Force Advisor, “TF continue to step up and step up we must” in Army News, Defence Public Relations Unit, 12 August, 2008, p. 19.
experienced these vagaries of TF recruitment it is easy to understand why so many enquires fail to produce trained TF personel.\textsuperscript{31} There are plans underway to simplify the process but, as Holley points out, if that one in three had been one out of two over the last decade, the TF’s falling rolls might have ceased to be a problem.\textsuperscript{32}

Similar sentiments can be found when examining recruit retention in the TF. The 2002 document noted that more part-time soldiers were leaving then joining and noted a number of initiatives that sought to address the problem. These included pay equity with the TF, extra allowances and the initiation of the Employer Support Scheme. It also acknowledged problems with career management of TF personnel.\textsuperscript{33} These expedients would have been appreciated by TF personnel but, as shall be seen in the next chapter, have largely been reversed (the exception being the Employer Support Scheme) and, anyway, TF commanders see the problem in a different light: Devlin asserted that young NCOs and officers were not doing enough in terms of pastoral care for their wards. He also said that there were so many options available for young people in the modern world that this will always be an issue. “We shouldn't be worried about that ... because there appears to be no shortage of youngsters wanting to come in ... As long as the structure remains you'll always get people circulating.” It follows then, that he believes the rationalisation of real-estate in the late 1990s decimated the social

\textsuperscript{31} I well remember the 100+ questionnaire marathon which greeted me when I first walked into the recruiting office to apply for the TF in August 2006. I filled it out and then heard nothing from the Army until the middle of the following year. The recruiting NCO rang me and I undertook my medical, mental aptitude and “Required Fitness Level” (RFL) tests not long afterwards. I then heard nothing for another year. The recruiting NCO who rang me in the middle of 2008 had changed and he asked me to undertake the same tests that I had completed in 2007. He explained that my file had been lost with the departure of his predecessor and so required a repeat of the tests. In the end most of my file was re-discovered and I was only required to do the RFL again. I was attested in July 2008, almost 2 years after I initially applied.

\textsuperscript{32} Holley.

\textsuperscript{33} AGS, 2002, pp. 4-5.
edifice which was the bulwark in many communities for retaining part-time military personnel.

The loss of community real-estate means you've lost a social focus and for a lot of people that drill hall with its little bar out the back is a real place of identity ... They also lost their local rifle ranges, which for an infantry person that's disastrous.34

Lieutenant Colonel Holley contended that the loss of real estate had a highly detrimental effect upon many units and he still cannot understand why much of it occurred. His unit was moved to smaller premises which caused them innumerable problems and he remembered a significant drop-off in the numbers attending parades and training. He acknowledges that it made sense to bring the disparate elements of the TF closer together, particularly in terms of their training, because there was too much replication occurring in terms of equipment requirements when all the different elements were conducting separate training. However, the loss of cadre staff that occurred during this period offset any benefits that might have been gained:

I was in a logistics company as the regionalisation occurred. In a logistics company we had transport, repair and supply. And we had a cadre NCO for each because they are separate trades in their own right. What happened with regionalisation and East Timor occurring is shortages in senior NCOs; those three positions ended up coalesced down to one. So suddenly, you'd lost a technical advisor in at least two of the trades you had to support...So you had a reduction in the cadre staff, reduction in the ability to conduct training and the training got dumbed down.35

Both Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Ashcroft and Major Simon Strombom, the first of whom was a TF officer between 1996 and 2002 and the second, current commander of the Wellington Company of the 7th WnHB Regiment (late 2009),

34 Devlin.
35 Holley.
confirmed this opinion. Stombom said that like any group, a major motivation for joining the TF is about forming relationships and having opportunities to socialise. The rationalisation of real-estate took away a major foundation for this important group bonding process. He acknowledged that some people were overly focused on this aspect of TF life but believed that this was more then offset the many benefits including the attaining and retaining of personnel. A lot of important people, in terms of developing a unit identity, left the TF when their unit halls closed down, commented Ashcroft.36

Which returns the discussion to public connectivity because, as the 2002 document acknowledges, recruiting levels were directly related to the level of support the TF received from the community.37 What the TF staff interviewed for this work are suggesting, is that bond was put under greater strain by the closure of important social and operational facilities during the regionalisation process. The same document aims to arrest the decline in TF numbers in the financial year 2002-3.38 As this work has documented, that has not occurred. Questions must be raised then about the recruiting and retention issues that were being utilised. In particular, it is notable that emphasis was to be placed on the “main population centres” (Auckland, Tauranga, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin).39 This policy neglected important cities and regions such as, for example, Hamilton (Waikato), Whangarei (Northland) and New Plymouth (Taranaki). It also highlighted a limited knowledge of TF culture which had deep roots into many smaller communities. Rhodes, in particular, believed that many

36 Ashcroft & Strombom.
38 Ibid, p. 20.
good rural TF soldiers were lost as the focus changed to the major cities.\textsuperscript{40}

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It has been established that there has been a significant drop in the number of part-time soldiers serving in New Zealand since 1998. As this was something that had been occurring since the 1970s then more long term influences would need to be factored in before assessing the effects of the regionalisation process. However, the closure of local depots and training facilities must have had a detrimental effect on the number of people willing to become and indeed, remain, reservists. As the New Plymouth Company example demonstrates, it requires huge reservoirs of dedication and good will for TF soldiers in some areas to undertake the training that is necessary for them to get to the level where they can be deployed. Given that the regionalisation process' expressly articulated aim was to raise the levels of training there must be some question as to whether closing training facilities in remote areas was entirely practical. Given that, as shall be shown in the next chapter, shortfalls in Army personnel continue to be a major concern for senior military and political leaders, and given that the TF roll stands at less then half of what it did in 1998, further equivocations are inevitable.

\textsuperscript{40} Rhodes. Many of these cities and regions still contain “shop front” properties and/or their own Companies: e.g. Alpha Company of the Hauraki Regiment in Rotorua which has a shop front in Arawa Street. However, the opportunities for training and exercises that promote the TF is curtailed in these areas because of the lack of appropriate facilities.
CHAPTER 7

The first illusion is that change is a process which leaders can actively plan and guide in a staged and linear sequence; and, moreover, that to ensure success, the most senior people in Defence must construct and lead change...It is not a philosophy limited to Defence, but is a siren call for Defence leadership because it mirrors the broader command and control philosophy that lies at the core of military culture...A flexible, adaptable and versatile institution will not emerge from an organisational philosophy of top-down driven, tightly controlled, centrally managed change, but rather from the true application of “mission command”, continuous open debate and a common sense of purpose (emphasis mine).¹

In December 2002 the new Chief of the Army General Staff, Major General Jerry Mateparae issued a directive on the state of the TF. In it, he noted that it had become apparent that additional guidance was required to successfully implement the tasks generated by the earlier directives:

There is some confusion over the exact role of the TF, the outputs required and concerns with the current training regime...The aim of this directive is to provide policy guidance on the development of the TF in order to enhance their integration with the Regular Force and contribution towards the operational readiness of the New Zealand Army.²

The 2002 directive acknowledged that training issues remained despite the reforms by linking, in a single sentence, falling numbers in the TF with “training and retention issues”.³ Many of these issues stemmed from a lack of coordination between the RF “suppliers” of equipment and training opportunities and the TF “customers”. As they were not made directly responsible for the TF, by way of performance criteria, and they were not allocated funds to facilitate their new

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³ Ibid, Annex B.
responsibilities, many relevant RF commanders failed to take sufficient care of the TF units' training needs. East Timor further exacerbated these issues.⁴

Concurrently, within the TF regiments, many people lost sight of their responsibilities in regard to providing challenging training to their soldiers in their specialist areas.

The TF battalions said “Great, we don't need to train people to be drivers anymore, for weekends, or signalers or medics because we've got these people (the COEs) who can provide it for us...The infantry battalions, those basic soldier skills; the old carrying a rifle, were lost...people became lazy ... Those second line units started to drop down (in numbers) because people weren't doing what they joined up for … A whole lot of that stuff happened.⁵

There were also problems with equipment. For a start, the East Timor deployments had begun and this, along with the cut backs initiated by the regionalisation, had taken away a large proportion of the TF's equipment.⁶ This meant, for example that there were not meant to be any artillery pieces held north of Linton, yet there was a TF artillery unit in Auckland. Holley remembered going to a planning conference where there were six different units training on the same weekend. The signals group he was part of was last in line for receipt of their logistics and could not be allocated any radios because they had all been given to an infantry and artillery unit. Like Devlin, he noted confusion over unit identity and divided allegiances: where previously his group (1 Logistics Company) had come under the command of 2 Logistics Battalion, after the changes they were also part of the Auckland/Northland Regiment:

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⁴ Rhodes.
⁵ Holley.
⁶ Te Moana.
I was finding it much more difficult. So when I became “sigs” (signals) OC I had to do politics to get my training … I had to talk to my counterpart at “2 Sig” and say to him: “I want you to say that this is the weekend that you can train, to support us” so that I could get my guys to train on a separate weekend with the regiment. Because we just weren't getting the kit (training equipment) … otherwise the commander would say “we need you” and we’d say “sorry, sir, 2 Sig can't train that weekend, it has to be this weekend”. We had to go to those lengths.7

Mateparae, in the 2002 directive, acknowledged these problems and signaled a number of required changes. These included changes to TF regimental structures, including a trial with 2 Canterbury Nelson Marlborough West Coast (TF) Battalion Group* to investigate how a more flexible management structure might work. At the same time, he directed that the new structures be given time to work over the next two years when a review would be held.8

In line with the reserve policies of other nations there has been constant acknowledgement that reserves constitute a valuable reservoir of specialist skills that are too expensive to maintain in the RF.9 This was specifically acknowledged in the 2000 Directive which states that greater emphasis needed to be placed on recruiting specialists in IT, medicine, equipment support and police.10 Dodson attributes a large proportion of the motivation for the regionalisation process to the need to get more out of TF soldiers with important civilian skills.

A lot of the skills, for example, we had too many medical units but, on the other hand, the medical skills, we

7 Holley.
8 AGS, 2002, pp. 3-4.
9 For example, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, p. 92: “There are some skills that is (sic) excessively expensive to retain in larger numbers...in the regular force, but which the Government might wish to draw on in an emergency. This indicates another role for the territorial force, as an active reserve of personnel from medicine, dentistry, information and communication technology, and a wide range of other non-combat support activities.”
10 Army General Staff, 2000, Annex E.
couldn't afford to have in the RF. There's no way a small army could maintain the skills of a surgeon or an anesthetist; just wouldn't have enough operations even if

*The TF regiments had been officially re-designated as battalion groups by the 2002 directive although they would continue to be referred to as regiments.

we had our own hospital. So it made sense for those skills to come from outside. That is, through the TF...

The last of the TF directives covered by this work, produced in 2005, paints a gloomy picture about the state of the reserve component and its specialist groups:

Over the past decade the number of TF personnel has declined, impacting on the ability of the TF to either train effectively to a directed level or sustain Army operations. At the same time the NZDF level of operational tempo remained high, with the TF increasingly called upon to sustain operational outputs.11

It announced a reversal of the situation of the specialist groups who, until that point, were administered by, and part of, the 6 TF Regiments but were supposed to exercise their specialist skills with the relevant COEs. From August 2005 certain specialist groups were to return to their parent corps as a trial “to address skill fade evident in non-infantry trades and address the decline in TF numbers”.12

Here then, is acknowledgement that the changes initiated by the regionalisation process had caused problems in this key area that it was designed to improve: that is skill and personnel retention levels amongst specialist TF personnel. If the trial proved successful, then the other specialist trades would also make the same transition. Interestingly, the directive allows a large amount of “freedom of action” to the relevant formations and units so that “practical and workable solutions in this trial will be utilised as the direction for” the remaining unit's re-

12 AGS, 2005, p. 1
designations.\textsuperscript{13} This experiment proved to be a prolonged one. For example, an engineering group was still being administered by “C” Company of 5\textsuperscript{th} WWCT Battalion Group at Linton Camp where this writer was a member in 2008. At that time there was talk that the return of that group to its parent corp would happen in the near future. However, this protracted transition is hardly likely to have developed in the specialists any sense of assuredness in their roles and identity.

Holley said that the difference between the 1999 regionalisation project and the later transformations was that, whereas the former “was about cost cutting and saving money” and it's good ideas about training were hamstrung by a lack of ownership by many of the relevant COEs, the later initiatives had clearly articulated responsibilities and were more realistic about what reserve skills can be taught and where:

What this transformation process is doing is making sure that the reserve is actually considered a strategic force … Reserves are really there now to help sustain the New Zealand Army and we are looking at areas that we can meaningfully contribute to … The performance of the TF units is part of the criteria for the (COE) COs. So when they come to the annual reporting, they can't ignore their TF units … They have a self-interest now in making sure that things are correct … (In the 1999 TF regionalisation initiatives) there was no performance tie between the COEs and the Regiments.\textsuperscript{14}

For too long, Holley continued, the required outputs for the reserves and the training prescriptions to achieve them, were ill-defined. Particularly, when compared with the RF. By late 2008, the METTLES (Mission Essential Tasks) were being established for reserve officers to train their units as platoons, or

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{14} Holley & Annex F of the AGS, 2002 Directive (pp. 32-33) which outlines the new command and control arrangements for the TF.
troops, or companies etc. to a standard where they could contribute in certain employment contexts. It meant more commitment than the traditional twenty days per year but it would mean that, with a little pre-deployment training, they could reach the standard required to deploy for certain tasks.

That's what this Army transformation is going to do because the COEs are going to … say, “here are the METTLES you've got to achieve if you want to...deploy.” People will know what (level) they have to train to. That was missing in (the year nineteen - ) ninety-nine.¹⁵

However, Major Strombom, the OC of the Wellington Company of the 7th WnHB, was not as optimistic. He believed the Army had never caught up with important changes in New Zealand society. For example, he pointed out that with far more working women there are increasing pressures on reservists to stay home when they could be training. The same applies to the increase in solo fathers in the TF. “My soldiers get home from training hard over the weekend and they are exhausted. This makes their wives unhappy and their employers unhappy. The RF don't understand that.” He asserted that training has been “dumbed down” since the initiatives, particularly for specialists, and even more specifically for their officers. “Even now there is no training for officers in specialist trades, only infantry.” The TF cannot get access to the modern equipment that the Army is now based on and they cannot get access to training opportunities. Being a soldier is a very technical business in the twenty-first century but the TF, both as individuals and as collective units, cannot get exposure to the learning experiences necessary to reach levels of proficiency.¹⁶

¹⁵ Holley & Annex C of the AGS, 2002 Directive (pp. 23-28) which outlines the training schemes for the TF.
¹⁶ Strombom.
Even more importantly Strombom noted that, in the meantime, there were no longer any unit level rotations of TF going through the Solomons and TF soldiers were not being sent to East Timor. Advertisements still trumpeted deployments as a primary reason to become a TF soldier but they did not reflect the reality of the situation as it stood. He concluded: “The TF, today, it has no role that I can see.”

In reply, Broadley who, as Deputy Commander of Land Force Group, had a lot to do with breaking down barriers between the regular and reserve components, said that Strombom was being slightly disingenuous. The Australians had recently taken over a greater responsibility for the Solomons and, given the contemporary recession, regular personnel numbers were robust and, therefore, there were sufficient full-time numbers to fill these deployments.17 His point was valid but so was Strombom’s. The greater convenience of deploying regular personnel did not obviate the concerns of TF commanders who could not give their personnel any assurances about the likelihood of being deployed.

Major Te Moana identified three factors which inhibited the regionalisation process leading to the training issues experienced at the beginning of this decade: First, the deployments to East Timor, which took away a lot of the equipment and staff that could have facilitated the initiatives. It was not only the TF that experienced the equipment problems that Holley highlighted, RF units were grappling with the same issues. Second, “personalities” played a part. Some relationships that were important to the successful undertaking of the RF/TF training arrangement broke down, for various reasons, including RF/TF estrangement. Third, “the staff work was poor” said Te Moana, who mentioned the brevity of the relevant section in the 1999 Directive (effectively four pages).

17 Broadley.
He also pointed out that there always seemed to be a shortage of RF cadre training staff.  “We dropped the ball” said Broadley, who was insistent that East Timor be factored into the equation, “and we didn't realise we were losing people like we were.”

Rhodes, a lifelong TF soldier is similarly pointed: “A lot of RF senior soldiers say how wonderful things are but it is just lip service.” He perceived that the RF resent the TF because they believe that the reserve component is just a drain on valuable resources. “Many young and talented (TF) officers have left because they just cannot see a way forward.” Strombom was equally cynical and he was the commander of 158 members of the TF: a significant proportion of New Zealand's total strength. He asserted that only about a thousand of the eighteen hundred TF personnel quoted by current Army figures (and confirmed by Te Moana, from the Directorate of Territorial Forces in the same period – October/November 2009) were actually active reservists. The TF were badly resourced; received inadequate opportunities to hone important skills; lacked cadre staff; had been continuously mistreated and neglected by leadership at senior levels; lacked basic intranet access available throughout the RF; had ongoing pay problems and recently lost invaluable traveling compensation. Finally, he commented, the TF had no clear role. “I am disillusioned with the Army,” he commented by way of concluding our conversation, “but I stay because of the people.”

18 Te Moana.
19 Broadley.
20 Rhodes.
21 Also verified by figures quoted by H. Roy (Associate Minister of Defence) in speech to Territorial Force Employer Support Council.
22 Strombom.
David Schmidtchen's work about the change process in the modern military provides some relevant insights into what might have been one factor in the problems that occurred in the regionalisation process of 1999 - 2005. He quoted General Gordan Sullivan, who presided over a number of structural changes that occurred in the US Army in the 1990s. At that time, the RMA and economic pressures were driving momentous budgetary cuts and personnel reductions. Sullivan's ultimate conclusion about the effects of the transformations was that “the Army must not only change, it must change the way it tackles change.”

Clearly, Schmidtchen found some value in Sullivan's observations about military culture and the change process. However, he saw flaws in the General's assertion that the main impetus for change must come from above: the so called “great man” model. “In practice, this approach strengthens a “machine” model of organisation in which the workforce is just another lever for leaders to pull … in order to achieve ideal organisational performance.”

Schmidtchen had issues with this top down driven model, what he called “vertically integrated command and control philosophy” because it ignores the necessity for small groups to interact in facilitative ways if successful organisational transformation is to occur. Too often, army leadership failed to account for the ways in which their soldiers as small groups interact with strategy, technology and organisation.

The management of change must move away from using a top-down, mechanistic and short-term model that subscribes to the view that change naturally falls from senior leaders expressing a grand strategic design. It needs to become a more sophisticated, detailed and long-term

23 Schmidtchen, p. 168.
commitment that subscribes to the view that change is a function of individual and group psychology and sociology.26

One does not have to look far to find evidence of this “top-down” change management style in New Zealand defence. For example, the “Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000” Committee found that there was a valuable reservoir of knowledge below senior level in the NZDF that was virtually untapped when it came to policy advice.27 Similarly, it has already been seen via the 2002 Directive, that there were management problems with the new battalion group structures and a lack of flexibility at command level. This led to the trial with 2 Cant to try to introduce “a flexible establishment regime for the remaining TF units.”28 Rhodes, in particular, noted that there were a number of Senior TF Staff working at the headquarters of 2 LFG who were never consulted during the regionalisation process. It has also been noted by Holley that TF commanders went about finding a range of solutions to a variety of problems with training processes that had stemmed from the transformations. In line with Schmidtchen’s theories, it was the ongoing machinations of lower level commanders that facilitated the new initiatives in spite of, not because of, the content of the directives. Similarly, Strombom made the comment that the TF continues to function because of the work of TF people in the units not because of the Army initiatives.29

For successful change to occur, consultation with staff at all levels is necessary because they are the ones who are continuously interacting with the complex

26 Ibid, pp. 175-176.
27 Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee, p. 42.
29 Strombom.
system of parts that constitute any large organisation. Thie et al, for example, have written that the amalgamation of reserve and regular components is best achieved from within rather than as a formula prescribed from outside. This is because work cultures are never imposed from above but emerge from the day to day activities of small groups going about their business. A number of the interviewees noted that the working relationship of the regular 2/1RNZIR and TF “2 Cant” had been successful because of their close proximity and familiarity with each other. With the regionalisation process initiatives it appears that not enough consideration was given to how TF units and RF COEs would be integrated at this lower level. Schmidtchen's theories about successful strategic vision requiring “nuts and bolts” level cohesion is highly pertinent.

The initiatives that stemmed from the 2002 and 2005 directives were aimed at addressing the “skill fade evident in non-infantry trades” along with the decline in TF numbers. The first part proved to be a lengthy process and its outcomes will be need to be evaluated in the near future. TF numbers continued to decline and the TF officers' testimony indicates a continued problem with morale in the component. What conclusions can be reached, then, about the regionalisation process and the later changes?

As Weitz concluded, in his work on the world's reserve policies, there has been pervasive implementation of the United States' “Abrams Doctrine”. In most like-minded nations, reserves have become integral to their armies meeting the extensive commitments that they have been required to undertake in the post-modern international security environment. Most of the armies studied in this work have found themselves under increasing strain as a result of numerous deployments to the plethora of conflicts and humanitarian crises that blanket the globe on a yearly basis, and all would struggle to meet these obligations without their part-time soldiers. It is important then, to remember that “Total Force Policy” and “Abrams” was designed to situate part-time soldiers as a strategic rather than operational reserve. The reserves were supposed to be situated as a back-up in the event of an occasional, major crisis. Instead, many reservists have found themselves being constantly utilised to augment deployments. This has caused numerous problems and revealed a number of shortcomings in the policy.

As such, when NZDF annual reports regularly provide evidence of personnel and capability shortfalls, given that reserve numbers stand at less than half of what they did at the beginning of the regionalisation process in 1999, and noting that the current Associate Minister of Defence has said that New Zealand lags a long way behind allied countries in terms of its reserve component size (see Heather Roy’s quote on first page of introduction), some doubts must be raised about the

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1 Strombom.
efficacy of the reserve policy changes that occurred in New Zealand between 1999 and 2005. These were changes that transformed the Territorial Force into an operational reserve. The question must then be asked: how much of a factor was the regionalisation process and subsequent reforms in the TF, as articulated in the 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2005 TF directives, in the declining numbers of men and women who were and are willing to serve as part-time soldiers?

A logical reply might be that TF numbers had been declining for decades prior to that process. As such, any criticisms that might be leveled are compromised by an inability to identify 1999-2005 as a turning point. It can also be argued that changes were necessary because TF training standards had dropped to an alarming degree in the years since the end of National Service and the consequent decline in the battalions that had once been the mainstay of the Army. Many units no longer had the necessary numbers, nor the requisite equipment, to provide their soldiers and commanders with the training experiences that would enable them to make significant contributions to operational outputs. Additionally, in a political-financial environment where the NZDF was having to make every dollar count, a structural edifice that had ceased to contribute anything significant to outputs was seen by many, in the political and military leadership, as excess to requirements. As Dodson pointed out, the TF's equipment was becoming obsolete and it was unlikely that the Army was going to be obtain the necessary funds to upgrade it. Therefore, it made sense to give them access to RF stocks. It also seemed logical to align their training standards with the RF's and that the only way this might be achieved was by combining their learning activities with the latter component's training groups and facilities.
However, as with many changes that occur in public institutions, the difference between intentions and outcomes are often markedly pronounced. In many ways they were a success. The standard of TF training in many areas was raised by the reforms and this has enabled the component to make the requisite ten per-cent contribution to twenty-first century deployments. TF soldiers have integrated with their RF counterparts in a number of roles and in specialist areas they have made numerous valuable contributions. On the other hand, all of the interviewed TF personnel (Devlin, Holley, Ashcroft, Strombom, Rhodes and Fahey) have noted that the process created a number of training and administrative issues. These stemmed from a fundamental disconnect between the intention that RF COEs would take responsibility for working with them and, in particular, for facilitating their training; and the actual results which indicate a lack of cohesion and coordination between the two groups.

Much of this stemmed from a lack of motivation, amongst RF commanders, for providing the training opportunities that the directives had expected them to. It has been seen, throughout the world, that there are inevitably frictions between full-time professionals and part-time civilian-soldiers. For the Army leadership to direct its RF formations and units, who had either been subsisting and concentrating on their own survival in the local environment for two decades or had been operating out of an ivory tower in Singapore for the same period, to provide the resources for a group which many could not see the point of, and not insure responsibility was taken through performance linked means, was sheer naivety. Once again these criticisms are mitigated by the proximity of East Timor which undoubtedly complicated the issue. Additionally, both Wood and Te Moana pointed out there are inevitably problems with coordinating the equipment and
training needs of a range of disparate units throughout New Zealand. Wood also said that because units do not “own” equipment, maintenance is often neglected and, therefore, equipment becomes unavailable because of wear and tear.\(^2\) However, the clearly articulated aim of the reforms, as expressed by Dodson, was to insures that the TF was provided with the equipment and training opportunities to raise their standards to a level where they would make a greater contribution to army outputs. To a large extent, this was compromised by problems caused by this disjunction between the RF COEs and the TF units.

The most obvious corroboration for the evidence provided by the TF officers can be found in the 2002 directive where Mateparae notes that “further direction is required” in respect to the regionalisation and expresses his concerns and doubts about the TF’s role, outputs and training (p.1 of the directive). The 2002 directive is highly prescriptive, and responsibilities are more clearly articulated, when compared with its 1999 equivalent which indicates that the relevant groups were in need of greater guidance about the new structures.\(^3\) The same levels of disquiet are evident vis-à-vis recruitment and retention and it does not require a large leap of intuition to attribute problems in training and administration to shortfalls in recruitment and retention. Further evidence is found in the 2004 DCARR and the 2005 directive that there were concerns about the same areas. Therefore it can reasonably be concluded that the processes enacted by the initial regionalisation process were not a pervasive success.

Turning to the rationalisation of real-estate, almost all of the interviewees had

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2 Wood & Te Moana.
little positive to say about the closing of TF bases and facilities throughout New Zealand. The sole exception was Dodson who, as head of the Army, was intimately involved with the late 1990s decision making process that led to the closing of the drill halls, rifle ranges, armouries etc. He said there was never any concern about losing a TF “regional footprint” in some areas although it was regrettable that some units lost their unique identity: “We did move out of some places where the numbers just didn't add up” but this process had begun a decade previously.4 There were a lot of smaller cities and towns where the TF was struggling for numbers and at a time when the rationalisation of assets had become something of an organisational mantra in New Zealand, the selling off of depots that supported a mere handful of personnel would have had numerous advocates. However, you cannot catch fish where you have not cast a net. The closure of bases in many cities and towns throughout New Zealand effectively nullified the kind of exposure to military culture that many overseas commentators considers vital to civil-military relations. Short term financial gains have had long term effects on the span of the Army's recruiting net which, given the ongoing problems they have had with finding young men and women who want to be part-time soldiers, can only be seen as an erroneous decision.

Another potential area of enquiry in New Zealand concerns the effects of blending TF soldiers, as individuals, with RF units during deployments. Numerous studies from a variety of nations around the world demonstrate that it adversely affects reservist morale. RF units tend to be inwardly focused, provincial groups who have little or no time for outsiders including a class of soldiers that many of them perceive as being inferior. In New Zealand there is a

4 Dodson.
lot of evidence that "topping up" RF units with TF personnel has been a successful policy. TF personnel have consistently met the quotient requirements of the Army on deployments and there are still many reservists who are willing to deploy with the RF. However, there is also evidence that TF personnel are unhappy with their experiences within RF units. The experiences of reserve personnel on Australian, American and British deployments suggests that there are inevitably negative effects on the retention of reserve personnel. This requires further investigation in the New Zealand context.

New Zealand has deployed their reserves as units; the Solomons mission demonstrates that it can be done. The problem is, as Holley elucidated, that TF personnel cannot possess all of the skills necessary to deploy as units and undertake the complex array of tasks that many operations require. In this respect, the increased compartmentalisation of reserve responsibilities that is occurring in many of the ABCA nations may be seen as a way forward. If reservists are assigned set roles that they can train and prepare for as units this may facilitate unit identity and cohesion and eliminate the possible issues that occur with blending RF and TF personnel. This is not to say that “fixing and mixing” the two components is entirely without merit. Every Army is possessed of a unique culture and the New Zealand Army may be one that has made a success story of its version of “Total Force” or “One Army”. However, the benefits of TF personnel serving with their own units cannot be underestimated either.

The discussion of role provision is important because it may have flow on benefits in terms of TF morale and recruitment. A number of Australian commentators assert that providing the ARes with specified roles would help with both attracting greater numbers of volunteers and in making a greater contribution
to Army outputs. If unit commanders are given clear-cut job-descriptions for their soldiers it will help them to organise their unit's training activities. At the same time, with efficient public relations, clearly articulated reserve component roles and responsibilities may facilitate improved recruitment figures. Evidence provided in this work suggests there is a definite connection between the two. Concurrently, the Army as a whole benefits because, with reserve component focus on prescribed roles and operations, regular soldiers are freed up to concentrate on the myriad of complex skill sets that are required of them. Given constant concerns about inadequate time availability for training to meet the wide variety of challenges that they are required to undertake in the twenty-first century, if the regular component were able to concentrate on certain skills/functions while the reserves focused on others, symbiotic effects might be garnered.

However, this will only occur if the motivation is there to identify how more, and better trained, reserve personnel can be generated and if the resources are provided to facilitate it. This has not occurred to this point. The 1999 to 2005 TF Directives articulate an aim to make positive changes and, particularly in the 2002 contribution, there has been a lot of thought put into how it might best be achieved at an organisational level. There has also been the initiation of the Employers Support Council which has sought to alleviate TF civilian employer concerns about reservists' military commitments.\(^5\) This is important because many reservists are employed by small businesses in New Zealand which causes considerable difficulties if the TF soldier wishes to deploy.\(^6\) An informal

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5 Roy.
6 For example Tenby Powell, the CEO of the Rakino Group, said: “For some commercial employers, especially owners of small to medium sized businesses, there are issues with employing reservists. Key concerns are costs associated with covering leave taken for training and
interview with two privates in “Charlie Company” (5WWCT) at Linton Camp revealed that civilian job security was still a major concern for them when they considered deployment. This is an impediment that must be mitigated to the greatest possible extent if the TF is to make a greater contribution to outputs. There was also the initiation of the new remuneration system which brought TF pay and conditions into line with their full-time counterparts. However, it appears from Strombom's testimony, that this was no longer the case. This can only be seen as another step backwards.

Given Holley's misgivings and the other TF personnel interviewee's expressed disillusionment, it must be concluded that there has been a gap between the “rhetoric and the reality” of the regionalisation processes' written intentions. The TF officers are all still serving despite their misgivings. Ashcroft, for example, is now an RF officer, but he has little positive to say about what occurred in the years between 1999 and 2002 (when he changed to the RF). This includes unbridled cynicism about the selling off of the real-estate, the attitude of RF personnel to the TF and the level of resourcing the Army leadership is providing to back their written objectives.7

Schmidtchen says that “cultural and social processes” help organisational members to deal with periods of uncertainty and that organisational changes mitigate against those processes.8 The changes that were enacted between 1999 to 2005, in removing important facilities and elements of unit identity that are vital to such

7 Ashcroft.
8 Schmidtchen, pp. 185 & 193.
processes, undermined essential social and cultural bulwarks which had allowed the TF to survive the extended period of uncertainty that followed the end of National Service. As many of the interviewed TF personnel asseverated, people volunteer for the TF because they seek out the community aspects of its work/experience. The relevant Army General Staff documents which, because there has been no fundamental changes to the TF since 2005, nor any more directives, remain extant today, were aimed at increasing the contribution of TF soldiers to the New Zealand Army's post-modern operational context. To a degree, they have been successful, but this is in spite of not because, of the change management process as articulated in the four directives. The TF have had valuable input into to a number of operations and tasks in the last decade. However, contemporary annual reports indicate there are serious shortfalls in numbers and capability in the reserves. There is also a great deal of evidence, as provided by the interviews with those who have been associated with the TF over the last decade, that civilian-soldiers are still inadequately cared for in most areas of their conditions of service. “Rhetoric and reality.” The Army must change the way it changes in regard to the TF to reflect the nature of modern reservist soldiering which is buttressed by the social and cultural process of the relevant groups scattered throughout New Zealand. In many ways these cultures were damaged by the outcomes of the regionalisation process. Time will tell if the damage is irreparable.
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