

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

The Regionalisation of New Zealand's Territorial Forces, 1999 - 2005

By Richard Campbell

ABSTRACT

The following is a review of the structural changes which were made to New Zealand's Territorial Forces (TF) between 1999 and 2005. These administrative reforms, often referred to as the regionalisation process, are studied with reference to four relevant Army General Staff Directives (1999, 2000, 2002 & 2005) which detail both the intent of the initiatives and their outcomes. Commentary is also provided by a number of Army officers who were either directly involved with formulating these changes or have been members of the TF at the time or since. Discussion is further framed by reference to proximate trends in the international defence and security environment, relevant reserve component policies in other nations (particularly Australia and the US) and by social, economic and political influences within New Zealand itself.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When this project first began in 2008 it was anticipated that it would be completed in that same year and this writer, with reservations, felt that it would proceed with relatively few hiccups. How wrong he was! Almost three years later, as I sit here writing this, I now look back on a period in my life that could not have contained more complications, angst and near catastrophes if it had been the result of the creative machinations of a writer in some fictional melodrama. As such, it is important that I recognise all of the people who have helped me over or, sometimes, around the many hurdles that have stood in my way.

First, to all to the many staff at Massey's library who have always been willing to lend a hand with various searches, provision of information and even “how to” instructions in terms of utilising various search engines and facilities. In a similar vein, many thanks to Catherine Kaa, who was most helpful during the morning that I spent at the Army Headquarters Library in Wellington.

Gratitude is extended to my original supervisor, Major Steve Challies, who facilitated the acquisition of the four directives through a friend whose name I do not know but whose contribution was vital to the completion of this project. Thanks too for the advice and other resources that were provided, Steve. To the staff at the Centre for Defence Studies who were continuously helpful and encouraging throughout my trials and tribulations. In particular, I should acknowledge Piers Reid who provided the topic as well as advice and resources

whenever I sought them. A big shout out too to the two secretaries: Tania Lasenby and her successor, Pam Dolman, both of whom were friendly and facilitative at all times. Professionals all.

A friend in need is a friend indeed and at a time when I needed them most many To those who have stood by me when lesser people have walked away. In particular, thanks to Mark and Megan, Steve and Dianne, Pete and Amy, Pete and Jenny, Daws and Jane, Ron, Patrick, Fraser & last but not least, Richard. I hope that I can repay all your faith.

To Dr. John Moremon, who became my course coordinator when Piers retired, I extend a most heart-felt thanks. John went above and beyond the call of duty for me in taking over responsibilities that were not, rightfully, his. He reviewed my original efforts and provided an excellent critique of the results. Any kudos obtained for this work is his to share.

This work would not have been of any utility whatsoever without the contributions that were made to it by the eleven interviewees. Their generosity in giving their time and their well thought considerations has been the difference between completion of this project and otherwise. Brigadier (rtd.) Roger Mortlock, in particular, was completely selfless in his willingness to provide me with his thoughts on a process that he was integral to. Major General (rtd.) Maurice Dodson welcomed me into his home, put up with me as I experienced some silly technical problems and provided invaluable reflections on something he was also an important part of. Lieutenant-Colonel John Holley shouted me coffee and gave a wonderful exposition on life as a TF officer in the twenty-first

century. Colonel Martin Devlin took time out from his busy academic schedule and had a number of excellent thoughts on the regionalisation process. And to all the other interviewees, who were interviewed via phone, or in person, many thanks for your time and patience: Colonel Jon Broadley, Lieutenant Colonels Bede Fahey, John Rhodes and Peter Wood and Majors Simon Strombom and Rob Te Moana.

Finally, thanks to my parents, for taking me in when the storm broke, for caring and so much more.

Hail to you all.

THE REGIONALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND'S TERRITORIAL FORCES 1999 - 2005

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	7
Chapter 1.....	12
Chapter 2.....	23
Chapter 3.....	37
Chapter 4.....	53
Chapter 5.....	61
Chapter 6.....	79
Chapter 7.....	90
Conclusion.....	101
Bibliography.....	110

INTRODUCTION

The Territorial Force has a long and proud history as part of New Zealand's Defence Force. It has provided an expansion base in past conflicts and supported local communities on numerous occasions. Recent operational deployments have highlighted the importance of maintaining an effective, deployable reserve of competent soldiers, ready for and capable of operational duties.¹

Speaking to the Territorial Force (TF) Employers Council in 2009 the Associate Minister of Defence, Heather Roy, had the following to say about TF numbers in New Zealand: “Compared to allied countries where reserves comprise between twenty-five and forty-seven percent of total force structure, New Zealand sits well clear at the bottom of the table.”² Reserve force numbers, throughout the world, have shrunk. However, the decline in New Zealand's TF numbers during the last decade has been dramatic: In 1998 there were 4500 Territorial soldiers. Two years later, the 2000 Army General Staff (AGS) Directive set a cap on TF personnel at 4000.³ This cap was superfluous. There was never any danger that this number would be breached as numbers declined, by the year 2007, to 1888.⁴

The years between 1999 and 2005 saw a number of structural changes to New Zealand's Territorial Force reserves.⁵ There were modifications to their

-
- 1 Army General Staff (AGS) Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *CA Directive 06/05: TF Integration – Phase One*, Wellington, 2005, p. 1.
 - 2 H. Roy, “Territorial Force Employer Support Council Function”, beehive.govt.nz/speech/territorial+force+employer+council+function, retrieved 17/12/09.
 - 3 Army General Staff Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *CGS Directive 15/00: Territorial Force Regionalisation*, Wellington, 2000, p. 2.
 - 4 Z. Alach, “Continuity & Change In The New Zealand Defence Force” in *New Zealand International Review*, January/February 2007, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, p. 23.
 - 5 Army General Staff (AGS) Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *Army 2005 Directive 10: Territorial Force Regionalisation*, Wellington, 1999, pp. 1-2.

administrative organisation; in their distribution throughout New Zealand; in the way that they trained; in their recruitment processes; in the roles that they undertook and in the ways that they deployed on operations.⁶ The aim of this work is to analyse this metamorphosis. It will do so in the context of a fundamental transformation in the international system that has occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall and with regard to the consequent increase in operational tempo experienced by many defence forces around the world.⁷ It also outlines some of the reserve policies of like-minded nations as their initiatives have both influenced and framed the changes made to New Zealand's TF since 1999. Primary evidence, in the form of the four relevant Army directives (1999, 2000, 2002 & 2005), is provided, revealing both the intentions and outcomes of the changes that occurred during the period. Additionally, commentary about the initiatives is given by a number of New Zealand Army officers, both Regular Force and Territorial Force.

Briefly, it should be noted that there has not been a lot written about this subject in the New Zealand context. As such, this work relies heavily on the content of the four directives and the oral testimony of the interviewees to evaluate the regionalisation process. However, it shall be discerned that there are a number of consistent themes and points that run through this evidence which has given this writer the confidence to go ahead with the project.

A 2008 article on the New Zealand public's perceptions about its defence force reveals that most New Zealanders perceive the NZDF as being deficient in a

⁶ Ibid, passim.

⁷ A. Ryan, *From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia Pacific and the "New Age" Coalition Operations*, Study Paper No. 232, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Jan. 2000, p. 3.

Dodson said that the TF, with its long heritage extending back to the nineteenth century, had ample support within the Army and at the political level. However, in the modern operational context, with its requirements for complex skill sets and short lead times for training, many senior regular personnel, particularly in the Air Force and Navy, could not see how the reserve component had sufficient levels of training to justify their continued existence.³¹ If the TF was to maintain relevance in the modern operational context it needed to be re-structured to provide greater benefit to an increasingly taxed Army.

At that time, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, in his position as Chief of Operations, was talking with the TF Brigadier, E. P. (Ted) Dean, about the problems that existed in the TF. Between them they decided that something had to be done. Part of the problem lay in the fact that the TF was still structured and training to facilitate company and battalion level capabilities. However, their lack of personnel made this unrealistic and, anyway, the current operational environment meant that the Army needed a different kind of contribution from them. As such, the two men mooted the setting up of TF depots where recruits would be trained to provide individual augmentees to the RF during their deployments.

(We) wrote a paper, argued it out between us and then we put the proposition to the senior TF officers ... at Linton Camp. Now, Ted and I thought that we would be in a lot of trouble, that this would sink quickly and when it came to question time we were greeted with a thunderously heavy silence. And then one officer at the back put his hand up. (I said) “Yes, Colonel?”

“Sir,” he said, “it's about bloody time.” And we were in.³²

31 Ibid.

32 R. Mortlock, Interview, 23/09/08.

Oamaru, Petone, Rotorua and Waipukarau would no longer have a local depot in which to conduct their activities.³⁶

Dodson says that while the regionalisation proposals were being formulated there were a number of concerns expressed about how the “rationalised” sub-units would react to losing their independence, particularly given long histories that stretched back to the beginning of the century and beyond.

Perhaps a classic example would be something like the “Scots” (The NZ Scots – a TF Armoured Squadron in Dunedin) which was, theoretically, an armoured unit. The fact was that all they had was land-rovers but it had its own esprit de corps. But from the Army's point of views its utility was nothing: it couldn't because it didn't have any equipment and it was never going to get any.³⁷

Practicality, inevitably, is given greater emphasis than sentimentality, particularly when the Army as an organisation had, to again quote the commentator earlier in this chapter, “hit rock bottom”. The decision making group that Dodson was part of, needed the TF to make a contribution to the Army's operational outputs but had serious concerns about the level of training that was being provided to the reservists by their own units. The TF was too small in some places to run effective training programmes, particularly for officers. It was thought that if they joined with the RF then they would get the training they needed to more effectively contribute to army outputs.³⁸

Financially too, it made sense to many in the Army's leadership to part with

36 Taken from Ibid, Annex C: “Property for Disposal” & Army General Staff, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, *CGS Directive 15/00: Territorial Force Regionalisation*, Wellington, 2000, Annex H: “TF Real Estate Rationalisation”

37 Dodson.

38 Ibid.

Timorese border.²⁶ Australia, who was leading the intervention, was unsure of whether it had the resources available to tackle the task and requested the light infantry capability that New Zealand was able to supply at a battalion level.²⁷ It was an important moment for the New Zealand Army and the NZDF. As Dickens commented, East Timor was a perfect illustration of the importance of capable armed forces in carrying out New Zealand's foreign policy objectives in its own backyard:

New Zealand and Australia were afforded the opportunity to act independently precisely because their armed forces had the equipment and people to do their job. If the military had failed, so too would have diplomacy ... Without balanced forces, neither New Zealand or (sic) Australia could have exercised an independent policy on East Timor.²⁸

An important part of that contribution was constituted by Territorial Force reservists.²⁹ From 1999 to 2003 approximately 460 TF soldiers served in East Timor representing between ten and eighteen percent of each six month rotation.³⁰ The 2nd Battalion/1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment's (2/1RNZIR) commander, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Dransfield said of the part-time soldiers in East Timor: "They are fitting in very well indeed. I know that I and most of my officers now cannot tell the difference and I have to be reminded that so-and-so is actually a TF soldier. They are all doing a good job."³¹ On the other hand, it is notable that the TF were rarely deployed in leadership positions above the rank of

26 Cotton, p. 127.

27 S. McMillan, "ANZAC Defence: finding a way ahead" in *New Zealand International Review*, July/August 2005, Vol. XXX, No. 4, p. 4.

28 Dickens, p. 30.

29 New Zealand Government, 2001, p. 6.

30 P. McKinnon "New Zealand: a spent force?" in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 20, 2001, retrieved 07/04/08.

31 J. Crawford & G. Harper, *Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor 1999-2001*, Reed: Auckland, 2001, p. 133.

designations.¹³ This experiment proved to be a prolonged one. For example, an engineering group was still being administered by “C” Company of 5th WWCT Battalion Group at Linton Camp where this writer was a member in 2008. At that time there was talk that the return of that group to its parent corp would happen in the near future. However, this protracted transition is hardly likely to have developed in the specialists any sense of assuredness in their roles and identity.

Holley said that the difference between the 1999 regionalisation project and the later transformations was that, whereas the former “was about cost cutting and saving money” and its good ideas about training were hamstrung by a lack of ownership by many of the relevant COEs, the later initiatives had clearly articulated responsibilities and were more realistic about what reserve skills can be taught and where:

What this transformation process is doing is making sure that the reserve is actually considered a strategic force ... Reserves are really there now to help sustain the New Zealand Army and we are looking at areas that we can meaningfully contribute to ... The performance of the TF units is part of the criteria for the (COE) COs. So when they come to the annual reporting, they can't ignore their TF units ... They have a self-interest now in making sure that things are correct ... (In the 1999 TF regionalisation initiatives) there was no performance tie between the COEs and the Regiments.¹⁴

For too long, Holley continued, the required outputs for the reserves and the training prescriptions to achieve them, were ill-defined. Particularly, when compared with the RF. By late 2008, the METTLES (Mission Essential Tasks) were being established for reserve officers to train their units as platoons, or

13 Ibid, p. 2.

14 Holley & Annex F of the AGS, 2002 Directive (pp. 32-33) which outlines the new command and control arrangements for the TF.

Even more importantly Strombom noted that, in the meantime, there were no longer any unit level rotations of TF going through the Solomons and TF soldiers were not being sent to East Timor. Advertisements still trumpeted deployments as a primary reason to become a TF soldier but they did not reflect the reality of the situation as it stood. He concluded: “The TF, today, it has no role that I can see.” In reply, Broadley who, as Deputy Commander of Land Force Group, had a lot to do with breaking down barriers between the regular and reserve components, said that Strombom was being slightly disingenuous. The Australians had recently taken over a greater responsibility for the Solomons and, given the contemporary recession, regular personnel numbers were robust and, therefore, there were sufficient full-time numbers to fill these deployments.¹⁷ His point was valid but so was Strombom's. The greater convenience of deploying regular personnel did not obviate the concerns of TF commanders who could not give their personnel any assurances about the likelihood of being deployed.

Major Te Moana identified three factors which inhibited the regionalisation process leading to the training issues experienced at the beginning of this decade: First, the deployments to East Timor, which took away a lot of the equipment and staff that could have facilitated the initiatives. It was not only the TF that experienced the equipment problems that Holley highlighted, RF units were grappling with the same issues. Second, “personalities” played a part. Some relationships that were important to the successful undertaking of the RF/TF training arrangement broke down, for various reasons, including RF/TF estrangement. Third, “the staff work was poor” said Te Moana, who mentioned the brevity of the relevant section in the 1999 Directive (effectively four pages).

¹⁷ Broadley.

He also pointed out that there always seemed to be a shortage of RF cadre training staff.¹⁸ “We dropped the ball” said Broadley, who was insistent that East Timor be factored into the equation, “and we didn't realise we were losing people like we were.”¹⁹

Rhodes, a lifelong TF soldier is similarly pointed: “A lot of RF senior soldiers say how wonderful things are but it is just lip service.” He perceived that the RF resent the TF because they believe that the reserve component is just a drain on valuable resources. “Many young and talented (TF) officers have left because they just cannot see a way forward.”²⁰ Strombom was equally cynical and he was the commander of 158 members of the TF: a significant proportion of New Zealand's total strength. He asserted that only about a thousand of the eighteen hundred TF personnel quoted by current Army figures (and confirmed by Te Moana, from the Directorate of Territorial Forces in the same period – October/November 2009) were actually active reservists.²¹ The TF were badly resourced; received inadequate opportunities to hone important skills; lacked cadre staff; had been continuously mistreated and neglected by leadership at senior levels; lacked basic intranet access available throughout the RF; had ongoing pay problems and recently lost invaluable traveling compensation. Finally, he commented, the TF had no clear role. “I am disillusioned with the Army,” he commented by way of concluding our conversation, “but I stay because of the people.”²²

18 Te Moana.

19 Broadley.

20 Rhodes.

21 Also verified by figures quoted by H. Roy (Associate Minister of Defence) in speech to Territorial Force Employer Support Council.

22 Strombom.

David Schmidtchen's work about the change process in the modern military provides some relevant insights into what might have been one factor in the problems that occurred in the regionalisation process of 1999 - 2005. He quoted General Gordon Sullivan, who presided over a number of structural changes that occurred in the US Army in the 1990s. At that time, the RMA and economic pressures were driving momentous budgetary cuts and personnel reductions. Sullivan's ultimate conclusion about the effects of the transformations was that “the Army must not only change, it must change the way it tackles change.”²³ Clearly, Schmidtchen found some value in Sullivan's observations about military culture and the change process. However, he saw flaws in the General's assertion that the main impetus for change must come from above: the so called “great man” model. “In practice, this approach strengthens a “machine” model of organisation in which the workforce is just another lever for leaders to pull ... in order to achieve ideal organisational performance.”²⁴

Schmidtchen had issues with this top down driven model, what he called “vertically integrated command and control philosophy” because it ignores the necessity for small groups to interact in facilitative ways if successful organisational transformation is to occur. Too often, army leadership failed to account for the ways in which their soldiers as small groups interact with strategy, technology and organisation.²⁵

The management of change must move away from using a top-down, mechanistic and short-term model that subscribes to the view that change naturally falls from senior leaders expressing a grand strategic design. It needs to become a more sophisticated, detailed and long-term

23 Schmidtchen, p. 168.

24 Ibid, p. 169.

25 Ibid, p. 172.

commitment that subscribes to the view that change is a function of individual and group psychology and sociology.²⁶

One does not have to look far to find evidence of this “top-down” change management style in New Zealand defence. For example, the “Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000” Committee found that there was a valuable reservoir of knowledge below senior level in the NZDF that was virtually untapped when it came to policy advice.²⁷ Similarly, it has already been seen via the 2002 Directive, that there were management problems with the new battalion group structures and a lack of flexibility at command level. This led to the trial with 2 Cant to try to introduce “a flexible establishment regime for the remaining TF units.”²⁸ Rhodes, in particular, noted that there were a number of Senior TF Staff working at the headquarters of 2 LFG who were never consulted during the regionalisation process. It has also been noted by Holley that TF commanders went about finding a range of solutions to a variety of problems with training processes that had stemmed from the transformations. In line with Schmidtchen's theories, it was the ongoing machinations of lower level commanders that facilitated the new initiatives in spite of, not because of, the content of the directives. Similarly, Strombom made the comment that the TF continues to function because of the work of TF people in the units not because of the Army initiatives.²⁹

For successful change to occur, consultation with staff at all levels is necessary because they are the ones who are continuously interacting with the complex

26 Ibid, pp. 175-176.

27 Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee, p. 42.

28 AGS, 2002, p. 4.

29 Strombom.

system of parts that constitute any large organisation. Thie et al, for example, have written that the amalgamation of reserve and regular components is best achieved from within rather than as a formula prescribed from outside.³⁰ This is because work cultures are never imposed from above but emerge from the day to day activities of small groups going about their business. A number of the interviewees noted that the working relationship of the regular 2/1RNZIR and TF “2 Cant” had been successful because of their close proximity and familiarity with each other. With the regionalisation process initiatives it appears that not enough consideration was given to how TF units and RF COEs would be integrated at this lower level. Schmidtchen's theories about successful strategic vision requiring “nuts and bolts” level cohesion is highly pertinent.

The initiatives that stemmed from the 2002 and 2005 directives were aimed at addressing the “skill fade evident in non-infantry trades” along with the decline in TF numbers. The first part proved to be a lengthy process and its outcomes will be need to be evaluated in the near future. TF numbers continued to decline and the TF officers' testimony indicates a continued problem with morale in the component. What conclusions can be reached, then, about the regionalisation process and the later changes?

30 H. J. Thie, R. J Yardley, P. Schirner, R. H Ehrenberg & P. Speed, Factors to Consider in Blending Active & Reserve Manpower Within Military Units, RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 40.

CONCLUSION

If you were going to give it (this thesis) a title, that would be a good one, “the rhetoric and the reality”.¹

As Weitz concluded, in his work on the world's reserve policies, there has been pervasive implementation of the United States' “Abrams Doctrine”. In most like-minded nations, reserves have become integral to their armies meeting the extensive commitments that they have been required to undertake in the post-modern international security environment. Most of the armies studied in this work have found themselves under increasing strain as a result of numerous deployments to the plethora of conflicts and humanitarian crises that blanket the globe on a yearly basis, and all would struggle to meet these obligations without their part-time soldiers. It is important then, to remember that “Total Force Policy” and “Abrams” was designed to situate part-time soldiers as a strategic rather than operational reserve. The reserves were supposed to be situated as a back-up in the event of an occasional, major crisis. Instead, many reservists have found themselves being constantly utilised to augment deployments. This has caused numerous problems and revealed a number of shortcomings in the policy.

As such, when NZDF annual reports regularly provide evidence of personnel and capability shortfalls, given that reserve numbers stand at less than half of what they did at the beginning of the regionalisation process in 1999, and noting that the current Associate Minister of Defence has said that New Zealand lags a long way behind allied countries in terms of its reserve component size (see Heather Roy's quote on first page of introduction), some doubts must be raised about the

1 Strombom.

efficacy of the reserve policy changes that occurred in New Zealand between 1999 and 2005. These were changes that transformed the Territorial Force into an operational reserve. The question must then be asked: how much of a factor was the regionalisation process and subsequent reforms in the TF, as articulated in the 1999 ,2000, 2002 and 2005 TF directives, in the declining numbers of men and women who were and are willing to serve as part-time soldiers?

A logical reply might be that TF numbers had been declining for decades prior to that process. As such, any criticisms that might be leveled are compromised by an inability to identify 1999-2005 as a turning point. It can also be argued that changes were necessary because TF training standards had dropped to an alarming degree in the years since the end of National Service and the consequent decline in the battalions that had once been the mainstay of the Army. Many units no longer had the necessary numbers, nor the requisite equipment, to provide their soldiers and commanders with the training experiences that would enable them to make significant contributions to operational outputs. Additionally, in a political-financial environment where the NZDF was having to make every dollar count, a structural edifice that had ceased to contribute anything significant to outputs was seen by many, in the political and military leadership, as excess to requirements. As Dodson pointed out, the TF's equipment was becoming obsolete and it was unlikely that the Army was going to be obtain the necessary funds to upgrade it. Therefore, it made sense to give them access to RF stocks. It also seemed logical to align their training standards with the RF's and that the only way this might be achieved was by combining their learning activities with the latter component's training groups and facilities.

to Army outputs. If unit commanders are given clear-cut job-descriptions for their soldiers it will help them to organise their unit's training activities. At the same time, with efficient public relations, clearly articulated reserve component roles and responsibilities may facilitate improved recruitment figures. Evidence provided in this work suggests there is a definite connection between the two. Concurrently, the Army as a whole benefits because, with reserve component focus on prescribed roles and operations, regular soldiers are freed up to concentrate on the myriad of complex skill sets that are required of them. Given constant concerns about inadequate time availability for training to meet the wide variety of challenges that they are required to undertake in the twenty-first century, if the regular component were able to concentrate on certain skills/functions while the reserves focused on others, symbiotic effects might be garnered.

However, this will only occur if the motivation is there to identify how more, and better trained, reserve personnel can be generated and if the resources are provided to facilitate it. This has not occurred to this point. The 1999 to 2005 TF Directives articulate an aim to make positive changes and, particularly in the 2002 contribution, there has been a lot of thought put into how it might best be achieved at an organisational level. There has also been the initiation of the Employers Support Council which has sought to alleviate TF civilian employer concerns about reservists' military commitments.⁵ This is important because many reservists are employed by small businesses in New Zealand which causes considerable difficulties if the TF soldier wishes to deploy.⁶ An informal

⁵ Roy.

⁶ For example Tenby Powell, the CEO of the Rakino Group, said: "For some commercial employers, especially owners of small to medium sized businesses, there are issues with employing reservists. Key concerns are costs associated with covering leave taken for training and

interview with two privates in “Charlie Company” (5WWCT) at Linton Camp revealed that civilian job security was still a major concern for them when they considered deployment. This is an impediment that must be mitigated to the greatest possible extent if the TF is to make a greater contribution to outputs. There was also the initiation of the new remuneration system which brought TF pay and conditions into line with their full-time counterparts. However, it appears from Strombom's testimony, that this was no longer the case. This can only be seen as another step backwards.

Given Holley's misgivings and the other TF personnel interviewee's expressed disillusionment, it must be concluded that there has been a gap between the “rhetoric and the reality” of the regionalisation processes' written intentions. The TF officers are all still serving despite their misgivings. Ashcroft, for example, is now an RF officer, but he has little positive to say about what occurred in the years between 1999 and 2002 (when he changed to the RF). This includes unbridled cynicism about the selling off of the real-estate, the attitude of RF personnel to the TF and the level of resourcing the Army leadership is providing to back their written objectives.⁷

Scmidtchen says that “cultural and social processes” help organisational members to deal with periods of uncertainty and that organisational changes mitigate against those processes.⁸ The changes that were enacted between 1999 to 2005, in removing important facilities and elements of unit identity that are vital to such

finding appropriate temporary staff.” *New Council to Boost TF*,

<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/feature-stories/20061031-ncbtf.htm> Additionally, Broadley gave the following figures: 85% of NZ businesses employ less than five staff & 96% employ less than twenty.

⁷ Ashcroft.

⁸ Schmidtchen, pp. 185 & 193.

processes, undermined essential social and cultural bulwarks which had allowed the TF to survive the extended period of uncertainty that followed the end of National Service. As many of the interviewed TF personnel asseverated, people volunteer for the TF because they seek out the community aspects of its work/experience. The relevant Army General Staff documents which, because there has been no fundamental changes to the TF since 2005, nor any more directives, remain extant today, were aimed at increasing the contribution of TF soldiers to the New Zealand Army's post-modern operational context. To a degree, they have been successful, but this is in spite of not because, of the change management process as articulated in the four directives. The TF have had valuable input into to a number of operations and tasks in the last decade. However, contemporary annual reports indicate there are serious shortfalls in numbers and capability in the reserves. There is also a great deal of evidence, as provided by the interviews with those who have been associated with the TF over the last decade, that civilian-soldiers are still inadequately cared for in most areas of their conditions of service. "Rhetoric and reality." The Army must change the way it changes in regard to the TF to reflect the nature of modern reservist soldiering which is buttressed by the social and cultural process of the relevant groups scattered throughout New Zealand. In many ways these cultures were damaged by the outcomes of the regionalisation process. Time will tell if the damage is irreparable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Army General Staff Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *Army 2005 Directive 10: Territorial Force Regionalisation*, Wellington, 1999.

Army General Staff Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *CGS Directive 15/00: Territorial Force Regionalisation*, Wellington, 2000.

Army General Staff Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *CGS Directive 18/02: Territorial Force Development*, Wellington, 2002.

Army General Staff Headquarters, New Zealand Defence Force, *CA Directive 06/05: Territorial Force Integration – Phase One*, Wellington, 2005.

Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee, *Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000*, Report to New Zealand House of Representatives, 1998.

New Zealand Government, *Government Response To The Interim Report Of The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee On The Inquiry Into "Defence Beyond 2000"*, Report to the New Zealand House of Representatives, 1998.

New Zealand Government, *A Government Defence Statement: A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched To New Zealand's Needs*, Wellington, 2001.

New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2007*, Wellington, 2007.

New Zealand Government, *New Zealand Defence Force Annual Report 2008*, Wellington, 2008.

New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence: A White Paper*, Wellington, 1997.

New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Final Report: Defence Capability & Resourcing Review (DCARR)*, 2005.

Readiness for 21st Century Challenges, United States Government Accountability Office, 2006, retrieved 30/04/08.

R. Weitz, *The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis*, Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, 2007 retrieved 30/04/08.

Masters Level Thesis

Phillips, C. J. *The Shape of New Zealand's Regimental System*, Massey University: Palmerston North, 2006.

Interviews

Lt. Col. Ashcroft, K. 03/11/09.

Col. Broadley, J. 21/12/09.

(Hon.) Col. Devlin, M. 24/09/08.

Maj. Gen. (rtd.) Dodson, M. 01/10/08.

Lt. Col. Fahey, B. 18/01/10.

Lt. Col. Holley, J. 06/01/09.

Brig. Gen. (rtd.) Mortlock, R. 23/09/08.

Lt. Col. Rhodes, D. 23/12/09

Maj. Strombom, S. 08/11/09.

Maj. Te Moana, R. 22/10/09.

Lt. Col. Wood, P. 22/10/09.