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The State of the World: Colonialism, Statism and Humanitarian Intervention

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Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been a major issue in International Relations scholarship, especially since the end of the Cold War. Once the Cold War was over, the United Nations found itself drawn into conflicts with different characteristics and for different reasons. This dissertation examines the contours of second generation peacekeeping operations from a standpoint informed by postcolonial theory and other critical theoretical perspectives. It examines the emergence of widened peacemaking and peace enforcement activities in Somalia and Haiti, and also examines alternative approaches to conflict transformation by examining networked social movement responses. In particular, it explores and expounds the postcolonial view that peacekeeping interventions silence and disempower Southern (or Third World) populations, operating as a form of crisis management. It explores the hypothesis that the duty to protest is another form of colonialism, coinciding with structural destabilisation to produce unequal power.
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Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................ 5

Chapter 1: Peacekeeping Theory and the Hegemony of Statist Assumptions ....... 12

Chapter 2: Problems in State Peacekeeping and Peacemaking ...................... 24

Chapter 3: Simulating Peacekeeping: the 2004 Intervention in Haiti ............ 43

Chapter 4: Lost in the Desert - the UN/US Failure in Somalia, 1992-5 ........ 73

Chapter 5: Networked Conflict Transformation ........................................ 98

Conclusion ........................................... 119

Bibliography .......................................... 123
Introduction

The discussion of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding has been a major part of international relations (IR) scholarship for the last twenty years. This centrality reflects the growing role of such practices since the rise of a discourse of ‘humanitarian intervention’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This discourse was built on top of a more humble tradition of United Nations (UN) activity. In the early years of the UN, peacekeeping referred simply to preventing direct conflict between parties which had established a ceasefire. This type of peacekeeping has been overshadowed by more recent developments. As Mayall argues, "peacekeeping techniques were developed within the constraints imposed by the Cold War, thus making a virtue out of necessity. Once it was over, the Organisation found itself drawn into conflicts with different characteristics and for different reasons".1 So-called ‘second generation’ peacekeeping of the kind which became prevalent after the end of the Cold War passed over into peacemaking and often involved a dense network of specialist interventions to reshape societies.2 This has expanded the scope of peace operations. As Neclâ Tschirgi argues, "[i]n the complex conflicts of the 1990s where the boundaries between war making and peace making were blurred, peacekeeping and peacebuilding became closely interlinked".3

As a result of this enlargement, concepts of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention have undergone conceptual broadening to cover what are now called peace operations or peace maintenance.4 Since the 1990s ‘peace enforcement’ operations have tended to dispense with the requirement of state consent.5 The

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extension of peacebuilding into conflict settings undermined the separation between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding which was still present in 1990s UN documents.\(^6\) As a result of this cumulative expansion, peacekeeping has become not merely a method of conflict management but a system of globalising liberal-democratic models of governance, imposing these models on politically weak peripheral countries.\(^7\)

Such operations also often drew the UN into armed conflicts. Marrack Goulding coined the term ‘grey-area operations’ to describe a host of operations that lie between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.\(^8\) This change has been predictably controversial. Discursively, it was underpinned by the idea of a duty to protect victims of abuse, and by an explosion of mainly liberal texts defending humanitarian intervention as a political imperative and duty. A range of scholars have argued for the expansion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the form of humanitarian intervention, arguing that gross human rights violations provide ethical grounds for overriding state sovereignty.\(^9\) This is typically based on a liberal view of international relations, in which it is assumed that states can be induced to act ethically by international normative systems. While the underpinnings are liberal, the methods are those of the state of exception,\(^10\) and peacekeepers can easily find themselves involved in illiberal measures such as random armed searches of private homes for weapons.\(^11\)

While interest has declined with the rise of the ‘war on terror’, humanitarian

\(^6\) Richmond, ‘Limits’, 40.
\(^8\) Robert Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American peacekeeping doctrine and practice after the Cold War (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 2004), 27.
intervention remains a crucial part of the current situation. The fears of critics who saw humanitarian intervention as a wedge in the door of a world order based on non-interference have been partly confirmed in the extension of humanitarian intervention discourse to cover cases in the ‘war on terror’. As Menkhaus argues, concern over whether nation-building can work has been eclipsed by the insistence that it must. Donini et al. argue that humanitarianism is suffering a “malaise” and “crisis” in the aftermath of the 2004 Iraq war, owing to problems in maintaining a position independent of geopolitical security issues. A particular overlap occurs in situations where intervention is urged because of the alleged or actual absence of a functioning local state, a situation becoming increasingly common with the end of Cold War patronage flows and causing significant problems for a world order based on state power. This problem of ‘failed states’, combined with the growing potential to link isolated areas into global networks, has led to a sizeable literature expressing fear of the ‘black holes’ where state power breaks down and insurgents can flourish. These are arguably the contexts where the temptation to intervene today is strongest.

This dissertation will seek to critically interrogate discourses of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. It will explore the contention in critical and postcolonial theory that such interventions disempower populations they are meant to benefit. The approach taken here will be based on critical theory, drawing especially on postcolonial critiques of Northern epistemological privilege. Postcolonial theory argues that the global frame, split between Northern (or developed) and Southern (or Third World) countries, is haunted by residues of colonialism, persistent epistemological privilege favouring the North, and processes of 'crisis management' which reproduce Northern power. The

16 See, for example, Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004; Mark Duffield,
dichotomy between North and South is thus crucial in interpreting events across the boundary, such as peacekeeping interventions.

This postcolonial approach is a variant of the broader field of critical theory. Critical theory views the role of international relations (IR) theory in terms of the subversion of dominant assumptions and the excavation of underlying structures and silenced voices. In Robert Cox's famous formulation, as reformulated by Andrew Linklater, problem-solving theory (such as most types of realism and liberalism) "takes the world as it finds it" and tries to solve problems "within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure", whereas critical theory "is more reflective upon the process of theorising itself", becoming aware of its own perspective and others and hence opening up "the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world". Cox argues that problem-solving theory artificially segregates areas of research, reproducing power-relations by consolidating specialised fields of study. “Because problem-solving theory [takes] the basic existing power relationships as given, it [is] biased towards perpetuating those relationships". One of the crucial roles of critical IR theory is to denaturalise dominant realities which are socially and historically constructed, but are taken for granted. Another role is to point to and enable voices which have been silenced or elided in the construction of dominant paradigms. For instance, in feminist IR scholarship, Sandra Whitworth’s study shows how assessments of ‘successful’ military intervention ignore the rather different experiences of women on the ground. Whitworth further argues that peacekeeping violence is "a necessary if unfortunate feature of an organisation whose existence is premised on valuing aggression and violence". Thirdly, many critical theorists also take on a role of analysing and exposing deep structures, which can be

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19 Linklater, International Relations, 1541.

20 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Sandra Whitworth, Men, militarism and UN peacekeeping (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

theorised as material, structural or discursive. Poststructuralists approach deep
structures by seeking the underlying discursive or psychological basis of events in IR. Such approaches share the emphasis on denaturalisation which will inform this
dissertation.

This application of critical theory to humanitarian intervention is distinct from but
draws on a substantial critical literature. Mark Duffield’s classic study shows how
the nexus of power involved in peacekeeping contributes to problematic regimes of
global power. Noam Chomsky similarly argues that humanitarian intervention is a
legitimating ideology, replacing Cold War ideology as a pretext for American power
projection. Tobias Denskus argues that the idea of ‘peacebuilding’ has
depoliticised discussions of the causes of conflict and allows agencies to ignore
Northern dominance in engaging with peace and development. Jan Nederveen
Pieterse describes peacekeeping as "a smokescreen for a new politics of containment
in peripheralised regions". These structural approaches are useful, but greater
discursive depth is needed to make sense of the construction of asymmetrical power.

The continuity of peacekeeping with colonialism has been noted by both advocates
and critics. Wheeler shows that humanitarian intervention existed before 1945, but
raises the problem that it tended to be premised on intervention by ‘civilised’
countries in ‘uncivilised’ ones, and hence contradicted the idea of equality among
states. Paul Johnson explicitly calls for colonialism as an extension of
peacekeeping, arguing that "[t]here simply is no alternative in nations where
governments have crumbled and the most basic conditions for civilized life have
disappeared", as in "a great many Third World countries". The UN should take on

See, for example, Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, identity, and justice in
Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).


Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Sociology of humanitarian intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and
Intervention and Beyond* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 19998), 230-265, at 236.


the mantle to "impose order by force" and "assume political functions". Writing on Haiti, Engler and Fenton argue that the "responsibility to protect", if not combined with a ban on destabilisation, is "another name for colonialism": major powers can destabilise a country then intervene to protect it. Liisa Malkii argues that humanitarianism cannot be viewed as historically desituated, but rather, is part of a long history of Northern discourses ranging from philanthropy to diplomacy. Meanwhile, Francois Debrix argues that peacekeeping differs from colonialism only in its need for virtual display for the media.

In terms of this colonial frame, the voicelessness of victims or survivors of conflict settings is a recurring concern. In part, this is an external construct. A study of trauma documentaries by Patricia Zimmerman argues that victims rarely speak in terms of personal pain, instead articulating political concerns as questions of injustice. Yet peacekeeping discourse is premised on speaking for victims as voiceless bearers of suffering. The victims are voiceless, one can speculate, because the offence of disorder and atrocity as perceived by the peacekeeper is not primarily an offence against the victims at all, but rather, an offence against the gaze of the transcendental observer. As Debrix puts it, America hurts because it sees suffering; for the response to fit its narrative, the victim must remain a victim.

Other critics emphasise the ineffectiveness of intervention. Darby and MacGinty present the absence of violent enforcement as one of the necessary conditions for a successful peace process. Peace processes are criticised for neglecting underlying causes of conflict such as legal inequality and land distribution. Hence, "it is perfectly possible for the macro-level dynamics of the conflict to survive largely

29 Johnson 92-3.
30 Engler, Yves and Anthony Fenton (2005), Canada in Haiti: Waging war on the poor majority, Vancouver: Red/Fernwood, 22.
34 Debrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping, 119.
unchanged".  It can also lead to entrenching the positions of combatants, excluding civilian voices and strengthening conflictual identities. Hence, peace processes can “freeze” a conflict in a "negative peace", even while providing real humanitarian benefits. On a different but related note, Sarah Lischer is concerned that humanitarian interventions can be counterproductive as refugees are militarised, prolonging civil wars. While distinct from a critical approach, such pragmatic concerns are also echoed in this dissertation.

This thesis will apply a postcolonial frame to analyse limits to liberal peacebuilding, first by examining liberal authors such as Rawls and Teson, then by examining specific examples of peacekeeping interventions. Its structure is based on a process which first establishes problems at a theoretical level, and then explores how these problems play out in particular cases. This dissertation will be divided into five major chapters. The first chapter will demonstrate the persistence of problematic assumptions across a large body of liberal theory, as well as in the work of some major critics of liberal assumptions, focusing on several iconic peacebuilding/peacekeeping theorists such as Rawls, Wheeler, Coady and Teson. After showing the existence of implied assumptions in these authors' work, the thesis will seek to expose and briefly interrogate these key assumptions. The second chapter will pursue a more detailed interrogation along three main lines, throwing into question the assumption of the necessity and benevolence of the state, the assumption that Southern states are especially pathological and the assumption that states have the greatest power to intervene usefully in crises. The third and fourth chapters will demonstrate the critique in practice, interrogating the intervention in Haiti in 2004 and the debacle in Somalia. The chapter on Haiti will contrast postcolonial accounts of the fall of Aristide with the narratives of pro-UN commentators defending military operations in the country, suggesting that, from the former perspective, the intervention can be seen as reproducing colonial power. The chapter on Somalia will focus on the assumption that peacebuilding requires statebuilding, and its devastating consequences in a context unconducive to the

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37 Ibid.
creation of state power. Finally, an alternative theory will be put forward advocating the use of networks instead of hierarchical states as the main agents of peaceful or armed humanitarian intervention. The distinction should here be borne in mind between states, as vertical, hierarchical organisations, and social movement networks, which in the cases discussed, are predominantly horizontal and voluntaristic. Throughout this dissertation, horizontal networks are counterposed to states as an alternative way of engaging with complex social realities.
Chapter 1: Peacekeeping Theory and the Hegemony of Statist Assumptions

The purpose of this chapter will be to establish the prevalence in liberal and related theories of peacekeeping of certain assumptions connecting such theories to a Northern colonial frame. The series of assumptions will be traced through a number of liberal authors later in this chapter. Before providing textual evidence for these assumptions, let us briefly summarise what beliefs are being traced. Firstly, liberals and other statists assume the possibility of a universal ethics. In addition to rejecting relativism, they also pursue procedures which render their claims regarding universal ethics dependent only on attachments and values internal to the North. Their interventions are thus based on an ethical frame which does not attempt dialogue with the recipients. The assessment of ethical universalism and relativism is outside the scope of this study, but suffice it to say that, whatever their merits, a standpoint clearly connected to demonstrably particular aspects of privileged Northern standpoints, and closed to dialogue with difference, cannot conceivably be valid forms of universalism.

Secondly, they assume that the state is necessary for a decent life. Society cannot exist without the state, and people cannot live a worthwhile life in a stateless society. State collapse, societal collapse, civil war and criminal-like behaviour are taken to be a single phenomenon. As a consequence of this view, they attribute conflict and crisis to the absence of the state or of the right kind of state, rather than to specific everyday or contingent causes. Thirdly, they assume that “victims” can be spoken for and their ethical claims expressed without substantial reference to them, in particular, without reference to their social situatedness or culture. The liberal scholar or political leader can decide that an intervention is in the interests of or demanded by a group who need to be ‘rescued’, without this group being required to make any explicit call for help and without their having any say in the content of the ‘rescue’.
Fourth, they assume that ethical duties (or at least those duties of which humanitarian intervention is an example) are necessarily expressed, if at all, through the state. If victims have a right to be rescued, it is the state which is obligated to perform this rescue, and not for instance networked solidarity fighters or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). While the fact that states may not always have the ability to intervene is recognised, the framing of the duty to intervene implies that the greatest power to help is vested in the state. And fifth, they tend to exclude global colonial and postcolonial relations from their frame of inquiry, treating questions of intervention as if they occur between desituated entities. The liberal narrative views states as disembodied entities without history, operating inside a universal social contract, governed by rules and the disciplining of rule-breakers, much like the similarly disembodied individual selves of liberal theory.39

Liberal Peacekeeping Theory: Rawls, Wheeler, Coady, Tesón

These assumptions are clearest in the large literature of liberal political theory designed to justify coercive humanitarian intervention for purposes of peacekeeping or peacemaking. Let us start with John Rawls, arguably the founder of contemporary analytical liberal theory. Rawls’s method appeals to the ‘considered judgments of ‘reasonable’ members of the public culture of an ostensibly liberal society such as America.40 While these convictions are taken to be open to modification, the procedure for assessing them is arguably entirely internal to the individual consciousness, or at its broadest to the public culture of a single society. As a result, it is left up to citizens of liberal societies to determine the proper relations in which they will stand with other societies, with reference to their own ‘considered convictions’ but not those of the others. Rawls is uncompromisingly hostile to the idea that a stateless society could be anything but a site of chaos; "[t]he supposed alternative to the government’s so-called monopoly of power allows private violence for those with the will and the means to exercise it".41 Hence, state institutions are taken as necessary to a decent life.

41 Ibid, 26.
Rawls’s category of ‘burdened’ societies is crucial, because this is the category into which Haiti and Somalia would presumably fall. This class of societies cannot be members of the international society of peoples because they "lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital" to approximate conditions of legitimacy.\(^{42}\) As a result, richer societies have what Rawls terms a duty to assist burdened societies in attaining the basis to construct democratic institutions (though no redistributive obligations beyond this). Such societies are to be helped to "realize and preserve just (or decent) institutions".\(^{43}\) While liberal and ‘decent’ societies have a right to self-defence, other societies have no such right since they have nothing worth defending.\(^{44}\) Liberal societies are thus permitted to dominate other societies to ‘assist’ them to civilisation.

Similar views emerge in Nicholas Wheeler’s work on humanitarian intervention. While ordinary human rights abuses by states are not sufficient to cross the threshold to allow humanitarian intervention, "state breakdown... and a collapse of law and order" is sufficient.\(^{45}\) Peacekeeping is thus framed as intervention to restore a proper type of state. For Wheeler, "[d]isarming the warlords and establishing the rule of law were crucial in preventing Somalia from falling back into civil war and famine".\(^{46}\) State-building is also taken to be the creation of peace. The success of an intervention is shown if "a political order be established by the intervening state(s) that is hospitable to the protection of human rights".\(^{47}\) This test is constructed ambiguously so that, while on the one hand it refers simply to instrumental effects (ending widespread rights violations), on the other it is taken to imply state-building. In Somalia, the UN mission was "rebuilding Somalia as a law-governed polity".\(^{48}\) Whether this country really needed a ‘law-governed polity’ is not discussed. The absence of a state, rather than the actuality of relations among contending forces, is taken as the cause of humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The deaths from famine

\(^{42}\) Ibid, 106.
\(^{43}\) Ibid, 107.
\(^{44}\) Ibid, 92-4.
\(^{45}\) Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 34.
\(^{46}\) Ibid, 190.
\(^{47}\) Ibid, 37.
\(^{48}\) Ibid, 173.
happened "because of the chronic lawlessness that prevailed", and "the cause of the suffering was... the breakdown of civic authority". What was really needed was "the imposition of an international protectorate that could provide a security framework for years, if not decades, to come", in effect, a recolonisation of Somalia. This would necessarily by a coercive process. There is no way a violent occupation could be avoided, since creating a ‘law-governed polity’ required marginalising the warlords, who would resist.

Wheeler’s justification for intervention is not specific to states. The justification for acting is an overwhelming (apparently universal) moral duty, and the ultimate appeal of this duty is to the "values of... civilized societies". From the start of Wheeler’s account, however, it is assumed that states are the required actors, and the only choice is for them to act or do nothing. The reason is that states are taken as exceptionally powerful. "Governments are notoriously unreliable as rescuers, but where else can we turn to save those who cannot save themselves? At present, it is only states that have the capabilities to fly thousands of troops halfway round the world to prevent or stop genocide or mass murder". Hence individuals have international rights, but only states can enforce these rights.

The question thus becomes one of how to give states authority as legitimate interveners. This is constructed through an appeal to normative community. Crucially, this community of normative actors who legitimate actions is a community of states. Similarly, customary law is determined by how states, not other actors, behave. With stateless societies (and arguably also ‘rogue’ states) excluded from the field of normatively relevant actors, the process of legitimation occurs internally to the intervening force, without reference to the force against whom intervention is made. The voicelessness of stateless societies in the construction of international

49 Ibid, 176.
50 Ibid, 206.
51 Ibid, 306.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, 303.
54 Ibid, 1.
55 Ibid, 310.
56 Ibid, 12.
57 Ibid, 8, 23.
58 Ibid, 44.
norms is disturbingly reminiscent of the doctrine of *terra nullius* used in an earlier era to justify colonialism. While Somalia and Haiti are not viewed as empty lands, they are viewed as devoid (empty) of a legitimate ethical voice owing to the absence of a legitimate state, and therefore, the process of constructing such a legitimate voice can be carried on regardless of the wishes of locals. Haitians and Somalis are thus bracketed out as ‘people whose voices don’t matter’.

While local voices are excluded from the process of arriving at legitimate conclusions, it is the claims of ‘victims’ which are the moral ground for intervention. The ‘victims’ are the proper "referent object for analysis" in testing if an intervention is justified.\(^59\) Indeed, the claims of such victims are constantly invoked throughout the text.\(^60\) The paradox is that victims are permitted a strong, even overwhelming, ethical weight, but are not permitted a voice in the theory with which to articulate their claims. We learn very little about these silent victims, and hear from them only rarely. Further to silencing the claims of locals, colonialism is marginalised from the discursive frame. The theme of westerners going to the South to save others, even "sacrificing" citizens to save "strangers", is central to Wheeler’s framing, along with overwhelming sympathy for the difficulties faced by state leaders.\(^61\) Those with a longer memory may doubt that people in the South are really such ‘strangers’. There is also a tendency to frame situations in terms of villains and helpless civilians, ignoring the social insertedness of the former. Social agency is locked out of such settings, except as a matter of moral culpability. Rhetorically, humanitarians are not fighting or even policing, but "firefighting".\(^62\) The conclusions of Wheeler’s analysis are clear: Northern agents are to adopt a subject-position as rescuers, acting on calls they perceive through their own ethical lens, to construct legitimate states where these do not exist.

Fernando Tesón offers an even more uncompromising version of the liberal paradigm. He adopts an unapologetic ethical universalism, in which the basic moral truths of ethical theory are taken to be absolutely independent of their origins.\(^63\)

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59 Ibid, 38.
60 Ibid, 10-11, 50, 185, 298, 305.
61 Ibid, 303.
62 Ibid, 304.
63 Tesón, *Liberal Case*, 12.
Tesón does not set out the means whereby moral ‘truth’ or ‘plausibility’ is established, but it doubtless refers mainly to the sentiments of an in-group. Hence, when he writes of “the shock we felt” over Srebrenica, he refers to an in-group, a ‘we’, with certain definite capacities: not only is it morally opposed to genocide, but it is apparently tuned in to the global media, and is sufficiently insulated from extremity to be surprised (rather than fatalistically aware) that it happens.

From this epistemologically privileged standpoint, he asserts that the absence of the state amounts to barbarism. "Anarchy is the complete absence of social order, which inevitably leads to a Hobbesian war of all against all". People are thus prevented from conducting "meaningful life in common". Typical "behavior" in "situations of extreme anarchy" is a serious form of injustice. The implication is that state breakdown, social collapse and civil war go together so closely that they need not be conceptually distinguished. "Tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of sovereignty", and there is an obligation to rescue their victims. This is not, he thinks, a matter on which there can be legitimate ethical debate. The difference between liberal regimes and situations of anarchy is not a matter of legitimate dispute between, say, forms of life or ways to realise collective goods. They are simple matters of what all reasonable views will accept and what they will not. Tesón’s claim that it would be "unreasonable" to embrace "situations of anarchy" is emotively motivated by reference to the effects of civil war in particular, but also effectively declares as unreasonable any approach which maintains that civil war should be mitigated without moves towards a statist type of social order. This is dangerous in constructing the standpoint of peacekeepers as inherently intolerant of the local cultural differences that they are likely to find on the ground. If it turns out that the ‘victims’ in fact adhere to certain of the assumptions taken as ‘unreasonable’ (such as seeking a stateless society or supporting a demonised leader), an intervention in their name quickly transmutes into an occupation against their wishes.

Ibid, 44.
Ibid, 7.
Ibid.
Ibid, 3.
Ibid, 2.
Ibid 13-14.
The conception of the state in Tesón’s theory is heavily moralised. The state is conceived, not as a historical construct, but as derived analytically from autonomous ethical agents. According to him, "a major purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights". Hence, the humanitarian intervenor "is helping to restore justice and rights, the purpose of all justified political institutions – most prominently the state". This goal is "normatively privileged" over, for instance, saving lives; it is more important to defend rights and justice from anarchy than to save lives. Human rights is here located on the side of intervening states. It is assumed that human rights cannot exist in the absence of the state, and that the existence of the state does not itself undermine human rights as exercised in stateless societies. Humanitarian aid simply addresses "the symptoms of anarchy and tyranny", whereas building "democratic, rights-based institutions... addresses a central cause of the problem" and does "the right thing" for the society. That justice and rights are the ‘purpose’ of the state is inconsistent with a range of anthropological and historical evidence (see below, Chapter 2), and doubtless expresses a normative position on what Tesón thinks the purpose of the state should be. Yet there is little reason to assume that states created in contexts such as Somalia and Haiti will view themselves as having such a purpose. The assumption that states serve an essential purpose sits uncomfortably with the building of states which end up serving other purposes entirely.

The claims of ‘victims’ are again taken as obvious to the observer and needing little specification, although interventions must be "welcomed by the victims" to be legitimate. "People trapped in such situations deserve to be rescued". While he toys with recognising a right of victims (apparently as individuals) to refuse intervention, he does not see it as a major problem, and does not provide any means for allowing such a refusal to be exercised. In practice, the derivation is from what

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70 Ibid, 6.
71 Ibid, 1.
72 Ibid, 37.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, 4.
76 Ibid, 8.
77 Ibid 23.
victims would decide based on Kantian presuppositions.\textsuperscript{78} No need is suggested for interveners to be acting on behalf of the actual desires, or to show respect for the political projects or aspirations, of the victims. Indeed, quite the opposite. "The intervenor has a right to expect [citizens’] reasonable cooperation" in their project.\textsuperscript{79}

What is more, innocent people can legitimately be harmed in the course of an intervention because of its overwhelming ethical status.\textsuperscript{80}

The status of colonialism is even more marginal here than in Wheeler’s account. He occasionally ventures into comparisons in which its invisibility is made explicit. Hence, when Tesón argues that "tyranny and anarchy" have caused much greater harm than "humanitarian interventions",\textsuperscript{81} he presumably separates the latter from the history of colonial genocides, slavery and violent occupation which were justified by a rhetoric dangerously close to his own.

C.A.J. Coady offers a more subtle but otherwise similar justification of humanitarian intervention. Coady’s theory is more sophisticated than the other liberal views discussed here, seeking to neutralise the colonialist and statist biases by means of adding qualifiers onto the basic liberal positions. Yet the core of what he advocates is very close to the other authors. The performative effect of his caution is to inflect but not broadly alter the basic discursive frame.

Like the others, he is an ethical universalist. Ethics is a "body of knowledge" and is not "entirely relative to culture or society", so one can make "judgements of universal scope".\textsuperscript{82} How does one decide what knowledge in this field is valid? For Coady, one brings various possible answers "before the courts of reason, feeling, experience, and conscience".\textsuperscript{83} Crucially, none of these ‘courts’ require dialogue across difference, or that a view appeal to anyone outside the moral theorist’s cultural field; nor do they require that the historical origins of existing beliefs and reactions be unpacked. While many culturally local voices are to be allowed to offer options,

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 20.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, 33-4.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 30.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 14.
there is no account of epistemological privilege or even of a means of distinguishing what is universal from what is relative; the philosopher is permitted to determine this from her or his subject-position. Hence, claims about which values are universal and which are local are definitely made, and the former are even ordered as to whether or not they can be imposed.\textsuperscript{84}

It is suggested that an intervention is humanitarian when it is aimed at "rescuing foreign people" from the very state authorities "responsible for their protection".\textsuperscript{85} Again, the assumption that states exist for benevolent purposes is prominent, along with the emphasis on strangeness (rather than historical complicity). "Humanitarian interventions are seen as attempts to rescue the innocent and helpless from persecution and extreme distress",\textsuperscript{86} and "the cries of the victims... carry an urgent appeal to conscience".\textsuperscript{87} One long-term goal of intervention is "ensuring political stability and enduring safety", albeit by non-military means.\textsuperscript{88} This statism is balanced somewhat by a recognition that states have an "appalling record" in the "unjustified employment of lethal force to devastate populations, economies, and cultures over the centuries".\textsuperscript{89} Nevertheless, Coady reproduces the key assumptions that victims have moral claims but not voice, and that the goal of intervention is to create a legitimate kind of state.

Coady goes furthest of the authors discussed here in recognising the limits to the power of states. States are recognised as having limited power in terms of altering outcomes, equivalent to trying to stop a killing with a stick.\textsuperscript{90} Military power is "ambiguous at best", and great powers such as America should stay out of direct peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{91} He never considers, however, the possibility of agents of a non-statist type. Indeed, he wishes to centralise authority further. He argues, in a typically statist manner, that instead of each (even each state) being entitled to act on its duties, action is also constrained by legitimate authority, which is vested ideally in

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 16.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, 11-12.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, 21.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, 32.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 30.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 17.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 30.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 35.
a world state or realistically in its closely equivalent, the UN.\textsuperscript{92} Hence, Coady deviates from the unapologetic statism of the author authors, while retaining a broadly similar model of intervention.

In contrast to the other liberal authors, Coady shows a clear awareness of the relevance of the history of colonialism to discussions of peacekeeping, and sounds a warning about similarities to US imperialism in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{93} This lesson of colonialism is taken to show the need to avoid \textit{instinctive} claims to superiority, the location of ‘evil’ in particular sites, and the demonization of enemies.\textsuperscript{94} Also, longer-term solutions should not take too long, "escalating into a colonial saga".\textsuperscript{95} While these are valuable insights, they add subtlety to the basic colonial matrix rather than overturning it. Hence, claims to superiority will still be made, but less instinctively; others will still be viewed as "very bad" or "purely murderous",\textsuperscript{96} but with a less exclusive dualism.

\textbf{UN Reform as Solution to State Self-interest?}

Dangers of imperialistic or self-interested motivation are widely recognised in relation to state interventions. A common response to this dilemma is to call for the UN to take on a more direct role, usually by forming a standing army.\textsuperscript{97} The logistical problems with such a reform are massive. As many scholars admit, discussions of direct UN interventions are moot for as long as the UN remains dependent on the Security Council, with its great-power vetoes.\textsuperscript{98} The UN would also have to address its dependence on contributions from member states (and deficits in payments from certain powerful states) to secure its independence and capability to act.

A direct UN role based on a reformed UN could in principle put the UN outside the self-interest of specific members states, but it is questionable if this would evade the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 26.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 8, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid, 15-16, 35-6.
\item \textsuperscript{95} Ibid, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid, 16, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Ibid 31-2, 34; Lepard, \textit{Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention}, 376; and the UN’s influential Brahimi Report, cited in Doyle and Sambanis, \textit{Making War and Building Peace}, 188.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Jocelyn Coulon, Phyllis Aronof and Howard Scott, \textit{Soldiers of diplomacy}(Toronto:}
problem of state bias, rather than simply displace it. If the UN went down this path, it would gain many of the attributes of a state itself. It is therefore questionable whether it would be able to avoid picking up its own ‘interests’ along the way, and hence becoming a dangerous global power. The Brahimi Report raises disturbing signs of such a move when it introduces discussions of power projection and deterrence, in effect depicting a future UN behaving as a powerful state. Already perceived as anything but impartial in practice, the UN’s impartiality would be further compromised by entanglements in great-power politics through military involvement. In addition, UN peacekeepers would still carry problematic assumptions from their military background and training. As we shall see in the Somali case below, the assumption of the civilising mission of peacekeepers tends to reproduce colonial assumptions which are not limited to agents of dominant states.

Non-liberal Statisms and the Reproduction of Dominant Assumptions

Before proceeding to the substantive discussion of cases, an objection should be considered. How do non-liberal peacekeeping theories fit into the picture? I would argue that their existence does not problematise my general thesis. Many critics of the expansivity of neoliberal peace initiatives also reproduce their statist underpinnings, particularly if they operate from a ‘problem-solving’ perspective. As positivistic social scientists, they tend to be uninterested in lengthy ethical justification. Rather, they take a certain goal for granted, and specify the best instrumental means to realise the goal. In this way, the possibility of universal ethics without dialogue is retained, but rendered implicit. For instance, Michael Lund’s list of criteria to assess peacebuilding include a "functioning government" providing "security".99 He views such criteria as more imperative than broader human security goals which, while laudable, are only viable once conflict is suppressed.100 He is, however, deeply critical of the unrealistic aspirations of liberal projects.101

Similarly, Paris criticises the "enormous experiment in social engineering" which is

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100 Ibid, 28-9, 47-8.
101 Ibid, 22.
liberal peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{102} In practice, he argues, the introduction of liberal markets has increased social conflict in a number of affected countries.\textsuperscript{103} The conclusion, however, is not to dispense with statism but to strengthen it. While liberalised societies tend to be more peaceful, the process of liberalising is itself destabilising.\textsuperscript{104} Hence, effective peacebuilding requires a strong state first, and liberalisation later. The dangers of Paris’s approach are that they encourage an even more aggressive colonial project than liberal peacebuilding allows. While Paris may conceive peacebuilding to include the opening of political space, his approach dovetails with interventions such as that in Haiti, where peacebuilding provides a pretext for ostensibly transitional dictatorships in the name of democratisation.

These examples should suffice to show the prevalence of problematic assumptions. They underpin other authors’ discussions of specific interventions. Hence, discussing Somalia specifically, Clark and Herbst view the existence of armed factions, as opposed to a state monopoly on violence, as the cause of conflict.\textsuperscript{105} They neglect the actual disputes among the factions. Similarly, Lyons and Samatar argue that "[w]ithout the state, society breaks down", conflate state collapse and civil war, and assume that successful peacekeeping will rebuild "legitimate political authority".\textsuperscript{106} This widespread reproduction of problematic assumptions well beyond the literature of liberal theory strictly speaking is strong evidence for the unquestioned hegemony of such assumptions. The next chapter will examine such assumptions in closer detail.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 6, 45-6.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 151-2.
Chapter 2: Problems in State Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

As we have seen above, and shall see again in the rhetoric on Somalia below, one of the key claims of liberal peacekeeping theory is the claim that people cannot live decently without a state. The absence of a state is taken to lead to a Hobbesian state of nature in which human rights and basic needs are constantly at risk, an absence which as we shall see below, is metaphorised in North American discourses as ‘Indian country’, as parallel to the *terra nullius* posited by European metropolitan states in relation to indigenous societies, and to the discourses and fears which justified westward expansion and genocide in the Americas. This section will explore problems with this construction of the question of state ‘failure’, firstly by questioning the view of the state as a necessary part of society which provides the basis for social peace, secondly by examining the subject-position of peacekeepers as agents of state power, and thirdly by examining the problems faced by states in relation to societies constructed to ‘ward off’ the formation of a state. It will discuss a number of issues in peacebuilding theory, such as the problem of networked asymmetrical warfare and the discussion of ‘spoilers’, to explore possible reductive implications of peacekeeping interventions. The *leitmotif* of the section is to point to alternative theories and ways of seeing which problematise the liberal model of statist peacekeeping, mostly by showing how such models contrast with a more complex reality and become mired in resultant problems.

The Myth of the Peace-giving State

A first line of critique is that the state is not necessarily a force for peace, and given the centrality of violence to its self-definition, it is dubious to suggest it to be. It draws on criticisms of the state as such as an entity counterposed to society. As we have seen, peacekeeping discourse tends to conflate state collapse, predatory interpersonal actions and civil war, whereas in fact, these are distinct phenomena any
one or two of which can exist without the others. Hence, focusing on statebuilding can undermine the distinct project of peacebuilding, which can be pursued without constructing a state.

In thinking about the relationship between the state and social peace, it is crucial to remember the centrality of violence and social division to the very identity of the state as a concept. The state has been defined in various ways, but recurring features include its separation from social networks such as kinship, its operation of socially separated armed power and its images as a coherent representative organisation. As a special armed body separated from social power, the state can often be seen as a force of oppression. Meanwhile, its stress on representation runs contrary to immanent forms of social life. Often, the state-form finds itself pitted against everyday forms of social power which are decentralised, networked, immanent and which reject representation and external force. Hence, it is problematic to view the state as a force for peace. The liberal response to this problem is to claim that state violence is necessary to ward off the greater violence of a Hobbesian state of nature. This response runs aground on the actuality of stateless societies. Political anthropologists have documented a wide range of societies, which often maintain peaceful situations through social rather than state power. Contrary to liberal assumptions, the emergence of the state appears to have been an exceptional process which never occurs endogenously in most non-state societies. This problematises the view that the state is necessary for peaceful social life.

A range of critical theorists have problematised liberal orientations to the state as a

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benevolent force. Agamben suggests that the state has an underlying logic of exception or emergency which is inherently illiberal and undemocratic. On this view, the claim to sovereign power relies on the reduction of the sovereign’s Other to ‘bare life’ and hence on the denial of human rights. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari view the state as a "global (not local) integration" which reduces the density of horizontal connections and hence undermines social life. State violence is "a violence that posits itself as preaccomplished, even though it is reactivated every day". The liberal view is closely related to the modern state as a particular type, which is of even more recent vintage and, disturbingly, has been theorised by diverse authors such as Virilio, Harvey and Giddens as an outgrowth of the industrialisation of war. Authors such as Nazeh Richani argue that the military becomes a part of cycles or structures of violence which prolong the conflicts it is sent to end. Hence, the state may reproduce forms of social action which frustrate liberal ideals. Anthropologist Richard B. Lee has suggested that even if the state is effective in reducing some types of violence such as fist-fights, it creates other types such as war. Anarchists such as Colin Ward and Richard Day view the state as prone to break down and decompose social relations, rearranging society in hierarchical forms. The state tends to view horizontal association, and also informal vertical hierarchies, as inherently threatening because it removes the intermediary of the state itself. Crucially, since the state operates to decompose social relations, it does not actually provide order among subordinates, but simply represents existing order as flowing from it, or simulates social order in the form of ritual. In fact, as Ward argues, the state is dependent on those it subordinates, who either keep it running based on tacit knowledge or sabotage it. Paradoxically, therefore, the idea that

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113 Ibid, 447.
without the state there is chaos, a lack of order, actually covers over a fear of excessive social composition which renders the state unnecessary.

Since the state constructs asymmetrical relations, it thus also introduces the potential for social war, in effect creating a permanent regime of occupation. As Hardt and Negri argue, "[m]odern sovereignty… does not put an end to violence and fear but rather puts an end to civil war by organizing violence and fear into a coherent and stable political order". Virilio claims that the state has an underlying logic of seeking to actualise the essence of the military in a struggle against spontaneity in the physical and social environment. Popular forces which have historically been able to defend themselves become dependent on the military and subject to ‘endocolonialism’ or internal colonisation. As Virilio argues, indigenous and rural populations defend themselves, but do not develop the spatial conception of defence associated with modern states; they do not seek a closure of space as a means of warding off difference. Yet in cases such as Somalia and Haiti, one is dealing with societies which have been externally colonised and in which forms of popular defence remain active. How does a state behave when faced with popular defence? According to Chomsky, the military logic, when faced with a people’s war, becomes genocidal, seeking to destroy the people either by killing them, destroying their society or driving them into controlled sites. In Vietnam, as Race shows, a conflict emerges in which competing definitions of security are crucial: the American definition of security as prevention was ultimately defeated by the Vietnamese view of security as social insertion.

Do peacekeepers adopt subject-positions which prevent them from in fact promoting peace? As we shall see in the discussion of Sherene Razack’s work on Somalia (below), this is indeed a frequent problem with peacekeeping. It is unsurprising given the relationship between the state and claims to discursive privilege. As a representative body, the state claims to bring law-giving violence and hence to found social order. In fact this claim is based on a gesture of substituting for and violating

120 Ibid, 13-14.
121 Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia: Essays on Indochina (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2004), 196.
social life and connections. Statists, imagining themselves to be bringers of order in an extremely hostile environment, also interpellate themselves in the positions of master-signifier or ‘lawgiver’, and as coloniser attempting to govern an inferior society for its own good. As a ‘lawgiver’ in Benjamin’s sense of the term, the peacekeeper is in a certain sense above the law: law-bringing violence is placed outside the normal constraints on violence. Therefore, statists take a stance likely to provoke conflict with others who deny its primacy or refuse to feel indebted to it. In addition, the disorder perceived by the peacekeeper is thus introjected and acted-out against the other, and the supposedly inherent violence of Southern societies becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: even when not faced with actual violence, peacekeepers act as if they are in a lawless and violent setting. They thus become the agents of sovereignty in Agamben’s sense.

Another problem is the lack of communication between peacekeepers and locals. With dialogue rendered impossible by the despotic stance of the coloniser and by radical difference in discursive frames, the situation in peacekeeping is less one of ‘war’ as conflict between symmetrical adversaries than one of what Baudrillard terms ‘non-war’, a military conflict involving manoeuvres of opponents who are playing drastically different games; "each plays in his own space and misses the other". Dominant group strategy transmutes into a "spiral of unconditional repression" because of its silencing and depoliticisation of otherness, and because it gains an underlying imperative to reduce and absorb difference. Unable to imagine an adversary, warmaking becomes a war against the warmaker’s own shadow. Faced with incommunicability, peacekeepers turn to violence as ‘the only language the Other will understand’. In practice, the outcome is the opposite; violence deepens the lack of dialogue. Findley and Young show empirically that counterinsurgency violence increases rather than undermines the popularity and strength of all but the

127 Ibid, 86.
weakest insurgencies.\textsuperscript{129} In this context, terrorism emerges as a means of annulling the power of deterrence.\textsuperscript{130} By identifying with the site of absolute uncertainty, terrorists can continually frustrate the project of warding-off uncertainty which is at the root of statist peacekeeping, enacting a constant disruption and interruption of the simulation of social peace.

Another issue is raised in feminist international relations scholarship regarding the hegemonisation of narratives of war by masculine and patriarchal conceptions. In particular, Cohn argues that the portrayal of states as if they are unitary masculine actors elides the complexity of social forces, locks out effective peacemaking strategies and restricts conduct to a frame metaphorised as a fistfight or vendetta.\textsuperscript{131} We shall see this below in the personalisation of the Haitian state. In addition, the stance in favour of peacekeeping tends to involve a masculine bias. To take a well-known example, the intervention in Cambodia is in contrast generally viewed as a success. However, Sandra Whitworth’s work on peacekeeping in Cambodia suggests that the reading of this initiative as a success depends on the elision of women’s everyday experiences. On the ground, peacekeepers brought with them problems such as prostitution, rape, HIV/AIDS, dangerous driving and food price inflation, which killed more people than were dying in war.\textsuperscript{132} Thus, the claim to be bringing peace is linked to a failure to perceive the structural violence implicit in the role of the military.

Statist peacekeeping poses particular problems when it is carried out in a society such as Somalia where power is traditionally networked and diffuse. Certain societies contain inherent social dynamics constructed to ward off concentrations of power, and in effect, to prevent the state from emerging. According to Clastres, indigenous societies aim to maintain autonomy by preventing the emergence of representation

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 36.
\textsuperscript{130} Jean Baudrillard, \textit{In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities and Other Essays} (New York: Autonomedia, 1983), 51-3.
\textsuperscript{132} Whitworth, \textit{Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping}, pp. 53-84. See pp. 63-4 on inflation, 68-9 on sex workers and HIV/AIDS, and 70-1 on rape and sexual violence.
and transcendence. This gives intergroup warfare an important social function, guaranteeing "the will of each community to assert its difference", "to assure the permanence of the dispersion, the parcelling, the atomization of the groups". This centrifugal logic is directed against the formation of a state, a transcendental despotic-signifier, and a general law. This is the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of indigenous war-machines as apparatuses directed against the state. According to these authors, warrior societies ward off the state through "a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor". Hakim Bey similarly argues that indigenous societies have explicitly refused centralised power: "[t]hey want a society, but they don’t want the state”. Clastres’ conclusion is also replicated in Max Gluckmann’s research.

Hence, there are settings in which state power is systematically excluded. The introduction into such a setting of concentrated formal power such as a peacekeeping force is likely to dangerously imbalance the relations among groups. Power asymmetry can act as an impediment to peace. It is also worth remembering that the worst spoilers are paradoxically similar to states: they exhibit a high level of commitment to achieving goals of total power and authority. Political forces in a conflict setting are often centrifugal, and hence militate against forming a centralised neoliberal state, frustrating the transition to ‘peace’. The statist standpoint is unable to make sense of the centrifugal logic of the war-machine. To a statist, such actions as indigenous war appear as a kind of primal violence against order or a

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135 Ibid, 164.
constitutive crime prior to law. Since the function of war is centrifugal, the concentration of power is likely to escalate war, while the seriousness and lack of ritual constraints exhibited by state violence is likely to negate pressures towards peace. When states are formed in contexts such as Somalia, Afghanistan and the Sudan, the effect has often been to intensify intergroup conflicts, introduce more dangerous weapons and set off a power-struggle among contending groups.\footnote{Sharon E. Hutchinson, \textit{Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Menkhaus, 'Governance without Government'; Angelo Rasanayagam, \textit{Afghanistan: A Modern History} (London: IB Tauris), 202.} We can thus conclude that the state is a force for war, not peace, in the context of formerly stateless societies. While indigenous societies are not always peaceful, and there are particular forms of indigenous war, there is nothing inherent in indigenous societies which makes the strong prey on the weak or creates Hobbesian disorder. Rather, it is the disordering effects of the ‘political principle’ which disrupt peacekeeping institutions within indigenous societies and escalate warlike dynamics.

In contrast, forces such as elders, women and ritual can operate as counterpoints to war among warlike peoples such as the Nuer and the Sambia.\footnote{E.E. Evans-Pritchard, \textit{The Nuer} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Gledhill, \textit{Power}, 34-6; R.M. Keesing, \textit{Kin Groups and Social Structure} (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), 50.} The absence of state power neither renders war incomprehensible, nor precludes the possibility of peace.

The Legislative Gaze and Postcolonial ‘Disorder’

The disempowerment of Southern agents is particularly explicit in the case of stateless societies, but is by no means redressed when one considers Southern states. Often, Northern discourse functions to dispossess Southern states of legitimate agency in much the same way it dispossesses stateless peoples, by portraying such states as chaotic, failing and ethically void. For instance, during the 2004 intervention in Haiti, US politician Condaleezza Rice was quoted as saying that President Aristide had "forfeited his ability to lead his people, because he did not govern democratically".\footnote{Cited in Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (2004), \textit{Getting Haiti Right This...}} This implies assumptions about what it means to ‘govern democratically’, or indeed, to ‘govern’ at all. In Aristide’s case, his crimes against Northern discourse express the imperfection of his mimicry of Northern states: his
reliance on and indebtedness to popular movements, his alleged complicity in ‘corrupt’ forms of power based on patronage and extra-state violence (the so-called Chimeres), his abolition of the army and so on. As we shall see below, this is the American excuse for failing to protect a democratically-elected and widely popular head of state from violent overthrow by a small ‘rebel’ movement of former army and death squad leaders. Yet Aristide’s form of politics was neither especially undemocratic nor particularly unusual in the global South. The ways in which it was marked as Other are indicative of a broader pathologisation of Southern politics which creates an overlap between the theoretical literature discussed above, and the specific cases discussed below.

In this context, a postcolonial critique contributes to understanding the limits to liberal peacekeeping and its complicity with dominant forms of power and violence. According to postcolonial theorists, Northern metropolitan reason is grounded on a discourse of silencing and exclusion which constructs the North as ‘knowing subject’ by disqualifying and silencing other knowledges and epistemologies.147 Theorists such as Zygmunt Bauman and Vandana Shiva have argued that colonial discourse constructs a ‘global-local’, positing as global and universal a set of themes and assumptions which are in fact particularly Northern and ethnocentric. While this Northern particularity is able to ‘globalise’ itself through cosmopolitan non-spaces such as international hotels and airports, the South remains irreducibly local, held in place by borders, immigration controls and walls around cosmopolitan spaces.148 This correlates with the idea of ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ terms: Northern subjectivity is dominant partly through being ‘unmarked’, being the assumption implied by general categories such as ‘Man’, ‘human’ and ‘life’, whereas Southern subjectivity is always marked as specific to its culture.149 Postcolonial theory points towards some very un-peacelike implications of liberal peacekeeping, in which an epistemological war of colonisation continues to be waged.

Liberal international relations theorists such as those discussed above fall into the trap of constructing a ‘global-local’ around the Northern state, reproducing colonial epistemology in a conception of humanism centred on the unmarked Northerner as ‘human’. What they take as universal assumptions, such as the primacy of the state, the need for law as a primary form of social regulation and the normality of social peace, are actually socially-contingent ‘considered convictions’ of Northern society, carried into theory complete with their sanctioned ignorances and elisions. As a result, these assumptions are complicit in silencing local voices and framing local realities in a manner complicit with colonial epistemological dominance. Hence, as Richmond argues, interventions can be rendered ineffective as well as unethical.

"There are large parts of the planet where [liberal] norms and regimes are alien, and individuals are unwilling to be (re)colonized by such western discourses".  

This is particularly dangerous in the case of humanitarian intervention because liberal states are intervening in Southern contexts based on these assumptions, reconstructing colonial dominance by attempting to impose Northern forms of social order. As Paris argues, such peacekeeping operations impose a particular "idea of what a state should look like and how it should act". As we shall see below, this misrepresents complex realities and leads to disasters as in Somalia. On a deeper level, however, the problem is not simply misrepresentation but subject-formation. Since the global-local intervenes in a field of uneven forces, its claims to universality will doubtless be rejected. Hence, the practice of intervention "is invariably perceived as one-sided", and apparent victories are marred by the persistent resentment of defeated populations such as Kosovo Serbs.

In terms of peacebuilding and the causes of conflict, a focus on societies has subversive effects on the colonial frame of Northern interventions. It has been recognised in the literature that engaging with society may require confronting inequalities. Lederach observes that "people judge change by what can be felt and touched and by what touches their lives". "Much of what is seen as constituting

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genuine change in [conflict] settings involves changes in the social structures and institutions”. This requires connectedness to those affected by conflict. A peace process lacks depth if people feel it simply happens to them.\textsuperscript{154} Jeong argues that “[m]any protracted conflicts are locked in vicious cycles of confrontation characterised by social divisions along ethnic, religious, and class lines”.\textsuperscript{155} Hence, peace settlements need to be extended into society to be effective.\textsuperscript{156} If transformation does not reach the local level, new groups may emerge which take up the cause of marginalised groups.\textsuperscript{157} Deprived groups who do not see concrete gains from peace may return to conflict.\textsuperscript{158} Former militants for instance may need peace incentives to integrate into a post-war society, or else they may well continue violence in new forms, as community militias or criminal gangs.\textsuperscript{159} Hartzel’s study found guarantees to combatants to be a crucial determinant of peace; these could include power-sharing, territorial autonomy and army integration.\textsuperscript{160}

The problem is that addressing the causes of conflict and the problem of integrating grassroots populations into peace processes collides with the global regime of inequalities. Questions have been raised over whether conflict management is used as a substitute for development.\textsuperscript{161} In many cases (such as Haiti), the redressing required for peacebuilding would mean taking sides with the excluded or marginalised, since elites will fight to maintain their privileges. In practice, since these privileges intermesh with those of Northern elites, the temptation is strong for peacekeepers and peacebuilders to instead side with elites and label the poor as ‘spoilers’. Peacebuilding then transmutes into armed support for a continual war against the poor. In this context, peace may consist in transforming the exceptional, disturbing violence of open warfare into the invisible, generally tolerated, but equally fatal violence of life in extreme poverty.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 60.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{157} Elhan Atashi, ‘Challenges to Conflict Transformation from the Streets’, in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from violence to sustainable peace, ed. Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (New York: Routledge, 2009), 45-60
\textsuperscript{158} Atashi, ‘Challenges’, 49-50.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid, 48, 54-5.
\textsuperscript{160} Caroline A. Hartzel, 1999. ‘Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate
Silencing Southern States and Societies

The crucial assumption holding back liberal peacekeeping focuses on the nature of the state. Much of liberal theory is devoted to normatively evaluating and passing judgement on the circumstances in which the use of force and social sanctioning are justified (see above). This discussion is hamstrung by its persistent assumption that sanctioning (or at least, justifiable social sanctioning) necessarily takes the form of concentrated formal sanctions exercised by something akin to a modern state structure. It is assumed that the modern state will take the role of an autonomous political and juridical elite, mediating between competing claims and establishing a regime of legal power, sometimes termed ‘good governance’, across society. The silencing of the forms of subversion and mimicry involved in Southern politics in this liberal narrative has several dimensions. In postcolonial situations, local epistemologies mutually intermesh with colonial epistemologies, producing a gap between the colonial model and its reproduction in postcolonial contexts. One can thus speak of postcolonial political actors as unconsciously subverting colonial forms of power and knowledge, inflecting dominant institutions inherited from colonialism with a second layer of meanings and relations expressing submerged cultures and voices. Hence, there are a range of ways in which dominant forms such as the state are mimicked and subverted, producing effects in the gap between order and disorder. What is treated as ‘disorder’ in liberal theory is just as characteristic as ‘successful’ states and societies as it is of ‘failed’ ones, namely the insertion of postcolonial states in complex Southern societies. Indeed, such ‘disorder’ is constitutive of the apparently ‘orderly’ functioning of Southern states.

The first point to make is that the postcolonial state is in certain regards constitutively weak. In much of the global South, the state-form is weakly implanted and externally oriented, lacking popular legitimacy. Some states exist only as Wars’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (1999), 3-22.

161 Duffield, Global Governance.

162 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge 1984), chapter 4; Gyan Prakash, ‘Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography’, Social Text 31 no. 2 (1992), 8-19.

channels for external funding. This is not to say, however, that the Southern state does not ‘work’ or that Southern states necessarily ‘fail’. Rather, the crucial point is that the success or failure of the state has little to do with the creation or absence of social peace. The Southern state pursues – and often achieves – insertion in local society through syncretisms with local forms of politics which can involve the state being taken over by informal power-networks, becoming something like a vast patronage machine. The state which ‘works’ in such a context is not the state of concentrated formal sanctions, but rather, a state dominated by ‘shadow’ power-holders who subvert procedural fixity by using concentrated and diffuse informal sanctions. The conditions for war or peace are thus found in the relations among ‘shadow’ agents and power-networks which are simultaneously inside and outside the state. Similarly, the forces of ‘disorder’ which return in the ‘failure’ of states such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Afghanistan are also the forces which enabled these states to function in earlier periods, and which sustain state structures elsewhere. Movements involved in state breakdown, like states themselves, derive from informal belief-systems and shadow movements rooted in particular societies. Agents in systems of exclusive patronage may establish an autonomous base through the direct exercise of armed force to control crucial physical resources. Hence, the image of societal structures breaking down in a Hobbesian orgy, and needing to be built from scratch by well-meaning outsiders, leaves Northern ‘peacekeepers’ ill-prepared for the actual power-structures of Southern societies.

Another aspect of postcolonial contexts is that social movements, not states, are the

usual basis of social peace and democratic representation. With states oriented externally to receipt of patronage and recognition from overseas, and often acting as a result as agents of international financial and political institutions, the idea of a representative state breaks down. As Mozambique specialist Graham Harrison argues, "old ideas of government representing the 'national interest' seem inappropriate"; rather, social movements and civil-societal organisations become the bearers of national interests which are borne against the state as a carrier of external influences.\textsuperscript{169} The builders of social peace and order in such contexts are not states but collective popular organisations mobilising everyday forms of reciprocity, often in the form of social networks or autonomous social movements.\textsuperscript{170}

A situation of social peace is thus most likely to prevail when states avoid provoking conflict with social networks and movements. Paradoxically, the ‘success’ of the state in suppressing social movements and everyday reciprocity networks and in freeing itself from the need to buttress itself through downward distribution, is also often the cause of the state’s ‘failure’, the social conditions in which the state becomes irrelevant to survival and to social power, and in which predatory extraction, intergroup looting and organised crime replace state-integrated patronage networks. The ‘working’ Southern state thus has an extractive structure, expressing what Chatterjee calls the ‘politics of the governed’, the reformulation of categories of governmentality as means of integrating the excluded through novel forms of state-society negotiation.\textsuperscript{171} State ‘weakness’ is thus an induced effect: with states based on ‘extractive’ politics,\textsuperscript{172} the withdrawal of external funding and the reduction of the state’s ability to extract surpluses from global trade flows can have disastrous effects on stability. Furthermore, it is the level of everyday relations which makes or breaks peace. As Darby and MacGinty argue, "local level reconciliation often relies on humdrum functional interaction between divided communities", and matters such as

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{169}] Graham Harrison, Issues in the Contemporary Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Struggle and Resistance(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002), 135.
\item[\textsuperscript{172}] Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa(Boston: George Allen and Unwin 1984), chapter 3.
\end{itemize}
agricultural trade will "make or break a peace process" by undermining or reinforcing suspicion and distrust.\textsuperscript{173} The success of peace agreements made by political leaders may also depend on the extent to which their support-base accepts the agreement as beneficial.\textsuperscript{174}

Hence, Southern states and societies operate in a kind of borderland between ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, constantly on the edge of ‘chaos’, as a signified which slips under the signifier of colonial epistemology. Forms of ‘disorderly’ politics which make use of disintegrative aspects of the state are not a failing, but rather, a constitutive feature of certain political regimes.\textsuperscript{175} In this context, the introduction of statist social forms can be viewed as having a destabilising and violence-inducing effect. For instance, in Fiji, critical theorist Aselea Ravuvu has argued that chiefs are losing their ‘mana’ or spiritual power because of their unresponsiveness and fixity, compared to pre-colonial situations where chiefs were selected and removable. This change is blamed on colonial and state power.\textsuperscript{176} The effects will be particularly disastrous where local groups are prone to adopt balancing strategies against powerful adversaries, as in Somalia, or where state power falls to a self-serving extractive elite, as in Haiti. It often becomes possible for local political agents to stage performances for the colonial gaze, generating and ‘managing’ disorder to induce interventions in their favour or to render interventions unviable.

Netwar, Asymmetrical Warfare and the Crisis of State Capability

The problems discussed above relate to the disempowerment and silencing of Southern actors, both outside and within states, in dominant discourses of peacekeeping. A further, related problem should here be added: the elision of Southern actors also elides problems relating to the actual operation of external power in Southern conflict settings marked by the local power of silenced actors. An assumption of near-omnipotence often shadows the silencing of local agency. While deploying both states and conceptions of a state-like UN, peacekeeping theory tends

\textsuperscript{173} Darby and MacGinty, ‘What Peace?’, 5.
\textsuperscript{174} Zahar, ‘Spoiler Debate’, 120.
\textsuperscript{175} Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, \textit{Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument} (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999).
to assume that a state or state-like force would be able to dominate situations to a sufficient degree to create an outcome. This appears to derive from the fact that the intervener’s access to air and seaborne weapons, which depend on high levels of industrial complexity, creates a strong asymmetry in interventions. There is a gap, however, between asymmetry and effective power. The importance of overwhelming military force in contemporary power has been widely questioned. The state is having difficulty keeping up with the speed of digitised transactions and networks, and might never catch up. Asymmetrical conflict is now increasingly the normal form of conflict, and in particular, the form of conflict peacekeepers and peacemakers are most likely to face. Discussing Vietnam, Arrighi argues that "the shift of the confrontation between systemic and antisystemic forces onto non-conventional terrain was strengthening the latter and hampering/paralyzing the former". Similarly, Stephen John Stedman argues that, whatever the UN’s legitimacy, "internal parties will still command the asymmetries of civil war" and will "win by not losing" as international will is corroded by costs. The emergence of guerrilla warfare and the proliferation of small-arms have compromised the ability of states to win consistently in local battles across a wide terrain. The state is losing its monopoly on violence to transnational and communal networks embedded in society, and can exercise dominance only in the form of a permanent war at the expense of resources and legitimacy. Hence, it is problematic to assume that states (as opposed to networks) have the power to construct peace in situations of network warfare.

This weakness has been recognised by strategic thinkers. After the defeat to networked opponents in Vietnam, American strategists formulated the doctrine of the

179 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, 327.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). According to RMA proponents Arquilla and Ronfeldt, states have difficulty fighting networks (such as the Vietminh, the Algerian FLN and the Zapatistas), and the only way they can do so is to master the network form themselves.\textsuperscript{184} Crucially, they maintain that the current balance of network capabilities favours guerrillas and insurgents over states.\textsuperscript{185} This kind of netwar, for instance, is typical of the Iraqi insurgency.\textsuperscript{186} These capacities of networks have been reinforced by a broader context in which the power of the state is declining. For example, Susan Strange argues that power in international economic relations has become increasingly diffuse, at the expense of the state.\textsuperscript{187} Power is now held by a wide variety of transnational networks ranging from international bureaucracies and transnational corporations to organised crime networks. Similarly, Rosenau argues that global power is being relocated from states to supra- and subnational groups, meaning the problem of the moment is not how to strengthen government but how governance and order can occur in the absence of government.\textsuperscript{188} A recent article on Somalia has echoed Rosenau’s view, referring to a system of governance without government.\textsuperscript{189} Duffield argues that new wars are increasingly fought between networks, and operate either around or beneath states, rendering states irrelevant to these wars.\textsuperscript{190} The new field of network warfare is marked statistically as a decrease in interstate and increase in intrastate conflicts. All but three of the 61 major wars in the period 1989-98 were civil wars, mostly ethnoreligious in origin.\textsuperscript{191} Metz and Millen similarly argue that ”most armed conflicts in coming decades are likely to be internal ones”.\textsuperscript{192}

Netwarriors have an advantage because they are able to draw on a context of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{184} John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, \textit{Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy} (California: RAND Corporation, 2001), 55.
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Arquilla and Ronfeldt, \textit{Networks and Netwars}, 45.
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Ahmed Hashim, \textit{Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq} (London: Hurst, 2006), 152-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Susan Strange, \textit{The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  \item \textsuperscript{190} Duffield, \textit{Global Governance}.
  \item \textsuperscript{191} J. A. Scholte, \textit{Globalisation and Governance: From Statism to Governance}, CSGR Working Paper NO.130/04 (2004), 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Colin Gray, “How has war changed since the end of the Cold War?”, \textit{Parameters} (2005), 22.
\end{itemize}
instability which favours those who develop social connections. With exclusion replacing exploitation in the periphery, the poorest countries such as Somalia and Haiti are "ravaged by the geopolitics of neglect and delinking from the world supply networks... [and] displacement and marginalization from the networks of global accumulation". One aspect of the crisis is the ‘restive youth problem’, in which young people denied opportunities in a declining formal and state sector fight for a local share in resources through protest, insurgency and discontent. This supplements the capacity of networks to resist states with the motive to do so and the personnel to carry on netwars.

In the context of peacekeeping, asymmetrical war strengthens the position of ‘spoilers’. Groups may have a variety of reasons to resist peace settlements, including their own marginalisation and mundane concerns such as control of economic resources. The success of failure of ‘spoilers’ who sabotage peace processes is argued in the literature to be determined by whether they are effectively managed by international custodians, an analysis criticised as excessive. Peceny and Stanley falsify the emphasis on security guarantees by showing that such guarantees do not correlate with the success of peace processes. Rationalistic approaches tend to view external peace enforcement as necessary to reduce incentives and raise costs of ‘spoiling’ agreements. Such approaches, however, substitute fictional agents for socially-situated agents. It is based on the fallacy of treating custodians as trustworthy, since otherwise, they would be unable to resolve the trust issues among local actors. Furthermore, it ignores the degree to which spoilers will nearly always be able to sidestep custodians through asymmetrical war.

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195 Zahar, ‘Spoiler Debate’, 118.
196 Ibid, 114, 116-17; Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems’.
198 Zahar, ‘Spoiler Debate’, 119.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the weakening of the state which leads to the pressure for the expansion of peacekeeping into peacemaking. Political geographer Colin Flint and discourse analyst Michael Innes have shown that the geopolitical imagination is haunted by the dissonance between the world of states and the threat of "deteriorialised, transnational social networks that overlay them". In an analysis which could easily be expanded to the fear of ‘black holes’, Arjun Appadurai analyses the fear of small groups in terms of fears arising symptomatically from the loss of power of the state. "[M]ajorities are the flash point for a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its fast-shifting global backdrop". These anxieties arise because of the decline of the power of the state in the era of globalisation, and resultant uncertainties about national identity and global flows. The result, however, is that states become bogged down in the very field of conflict they wish to erase. Duffield argues that global governance creates ‘strategic complexes’ of states and other agencies, including for instance intergovernmental organisations such as the UN and private security companies. Paradoxically, these complexes are complicit in the very field of network warfare they are supposed to regulate, creating selective links between the agents within the complexes and the field of network war.

Conclusion

Liberal peacekeeping theory makes a series of problematic assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that the state is a necessary and benevolent part of social order, without which there cannot be security or a worthwhile life. This leads to a bias towards attempting to reconstruct the state, or type of state with poor institutional fit with its society, in contexts where such a state has never existed and has little popular basis, or where only certain kinds of state are viable. Secondly, it assumes that peacekeepers viewing situations from a Northern perspective can intervene unproblematically in former colonial contexts. And thirdly, it assumes that states have the capacity to dominate and reconstruct settings in which the balance of forces

199 Innes, ‘Protected Status’, 1.
201 Duffield, ‘Global Governance’.
strategically favours networked adversaries. The next two chapters will explore how these issues play out in two concrete cases. It will be shown that the western project of state-building is inappropriate in both cases – in Haiti because it empowered a dictatorial military against a democratic fusion of state and society, in Somalia because the dominant forms of social power were networked rather than statist.
Chapter 3: Simulating Peacekeeping -
the 2004 Intervention in Haiti

This chapter will examine the actual effects of peacekeeping discourse in the case of the intervention in Haiti in 2004. Its aim is to problematise the mainstream view of Haiti by contrasting this view to an alternative narrative which portrays the intervention as a simulation of disorder for the purpose of recolonisation. While the details of the transition will doubtless remain murky, the decisive certainty of pro-UN accounts is problematic given the unrebutted possibility that the crisis may have been simulated. The intervention was a contentious move to back an unelected interim government after the overthrow of the twice-elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The twin US-UN role was a repeat of the "now familiar formula" of humanitarian intervention. In April 2004, the UN published a ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ on Haiti, which embraced the intervention as an opportunity for peace and democracy and claims that "Haiti had to call again on the international community to help it overcome a serious political and security situation". In practice, this meant that, as Weisbrot argues, "democracy is being destroyed... with the support of the “international community” and the United Nations" Hence, this chapter will examine the possibility that the Haitian crisis was simulated. In addition to examining the standard narrative, this chapter will examine the counter-narratives provided by Aristide, his supporters, and critics of the intervention.

In discursive terms, the intervention was cast in classical peacekeeping terms, linked to the ideas of ‘failed states’ and humanitarian crisis. Donais for instance views Haiti as a “failed state”. According to Chomsky, the "standard" discourse is that Haiti,

203 Ibid, 45.
205 Timothy Donais, 'Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti', Civil Wars 7:3 (2005), 285. Donais also accepts 'local ownership' of peace processes, but only if this occurs within internationally-framed criteria of acceptability. This is reminiscent of the 'indirect rule' model of colonial governance.
like Iraq, is a ‘failed state’ in need of democracy enhancement and nation-building.\textsuperscript{206} The New York Times for instance covered Haiti as a "complex and violent society with no history of democracy".\textsuperscript{207} This style of coverage was reproduced in much of the peacekeeping literature, which tends to focus on operational effectiveness and take for granted a back-narrative about Haiti. For instance, A. Walter Dorn briefly reasserts – but provides no evidence for – the standard official narrative in which Aristide won “questionable” elections, presided over rising disorder and was about to be deposed by armed rebels. MINUSTAH intervened to prevent a “bloodbath”.\textsuperscript{208} Similarly, in Michel Duhamel's account, the country's historic governments are taken to all be equally incapable of delivering services or security, embodying a prolonged culture of corruption.\textsuperscript{209} He treats the Aristide regime as simply a continuation of Haiti's history of instability, locating Aristide in a continuous series of dictatorships. In addition, international structures are factored out of the account of Haitian poverty, which is ascribed solely to internal factors.\textsuperscript{210} Aristide is therefore viewed as a potential destabilising force who could “throw Haiti back into turmoil”.\textsuperscript{211} Mobekk similarly characterises the situation after the UN left in 2001 as “continuous political upheaval and abuse”.\textsuperscript{212} Donais similarly considers Aristide to have slipped into the “old Haitian political authoritarian habitus”, with his “creeping authoritarianism” causing “well-founded paranoia” among opponents.\textsuperscript{213}

The appearance provided by such sources is an appearance of inherent chaos. “For the uninitiated”, argues Randall Robinson, "Haiti must appear to be a bewildering stew of obscure and violent events, a homogeneously black place that is mined in arcane routines of chronic instability and engulfed in bloody internecine conflicts.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{207}{Chomsky, ‘Noble Phase’, 3.}
\footnote{208}{A. Walter Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAG), 2007-07', Intelligence and National Security 25 no. 6, 805-35, at808.}
\footnote{210}{Duhamel, 'Haiti', 2, 8.}
\footnote{211}{Ibid, 13.}
\footnote{213}{Donais, 'Back to Square One', 277.}
\end{footnotes}
from which no one emerges unscathed. The good and the well-meaning are indistinguishable from the venal and self-seeking”. Hence, "the casual consumer of mainstream commentary was encouraged to believe that what was at stake... [was] just a convoluted free-for-all". Facing a bloodbath, American troops moved in to prevent chaos. From France to Canada, the Northern media gave slanted coverage. Indeed, the media were used by the US and the rebels as a tool of destabilisation.

While this conception reflects certain forms of instability which arose from the destabilisation of Haiti, its effect is to reduce to an extremely partial frame a complex situation the main outlines of which are much clearer. Beneath the surface, Haiti is very comprehensible in terms of severe class conflict exacerbated by racial and cultural privilege. Haiti is the second most unequal country in the world. There is also a strong strand of international dependency in its economy. The conflict over Aristide was "a protracted battle between the poor majority and a tiny elite". Pro-UN sources admit that a small minority controls most of Haiti's assets. The historical background is not so much one of instability as of despotism, a small white and mixed-origin elite engaged in extreme economic exploitation while allied with tyrants with summary power. In this context, Aristide was objectionable mainly because he was "too democratic". The removal of Aristide was the culmination of a long period of economic warfare designed "not simply to suppress the popular

Randall Robinson, An Unbroken Agony: Haiti, from Revolution to the Kidnapping of a President (New York: Perseus/Basic Civitas, 2007), 89.
Weisbrot, ‘Undermining Haiti’.
Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 89.
Mobekk, 'Minustah', 114-15.
Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 49.
Ibid, 233.
movement but to discredit it beyond repair”.226

This opens up the possible line of argument that the liberal prejudice against Southern forms of government exhibited in peacekeeping theory provides a discursive basis for an elite-oriented, deeply illiberar colonial project directed at disempowerment of the Southern poor. This possibility is made possible by the systematically-produced gaps in liberal peacekeeping theory, through which the voices of local actors are foreclosed. In practice, this means that state control is legitimated under the cover of a discourse of peace. According to Donais, “restoring public security remains a prerequisite to successful peacebuilding”.227 This suggests that state dominance is to be established first of all, without local legitimacy in the early stages, and state control prioritised over human rights, in the hope that legitimacy and human rights will follow later. It is problematic whether this 'later' will ever come, since militarised peacebuilding reproduces the conditions for conflict by silencing local voices. In practice, this means that state control, not peace, is the outcome.

The mistakes of peacekeeping theory are reproduced point by point in Haiti: statism in the privileging of the Haitian army, and colonial modernism228 in pathologising Haitian state-forms under Aristide and the silencing of colonial history. These elisions combine to construct an official discourse in which the intervention is cast as a restoration of democracy. Condaleezza Rice stated that Aristide "forfeited his ability to lead his people, because he did not govern democratically".229 He was deemed undemocratic because of alleged links to crime gangs, the drugs trade and human rights violations.230 Jeb Bush was later to claim that "Democracy means more than elections. It means respecting the rule of law and supporting a vibrant, robust civil society. Aristide destroyed those principles in Haiti”.231 As we shall see below, to fail to govern democratically, in this context, means to fail to be capitalist or statist

227 Donais, 'Back to Square One', 285.
228 This term is used to refer to the insistence on a specifically modern form of the state, modelled on the Northern state, when state-building in the South.
230 Ibid, 115; Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 58.
enough. Aristide was more democratic than his successors or predecessors, though the possibility of reading Haiti through a Northern statist lens is limited. It is doubtful if Haiti can be termed a democracy given the constant constraint of governmental and popular power by external forces and internal destabilisation. The crucial point, however, is that it is the marking of Haitian democracy as Southern and networked which grounds its dismissal as undemocratic. As we shall see below, Aristide’s democratic promise is premised on a fusion of his state project with networked popular movements, in recognition of the actuality of diffuse power in the periphery. This fusion is one of the reasons that Haitian democracy was deemed insufficiently ‘democratic’.

Let us first of all summarise the events under discussion. Haiti is a country of massive poverty and exclusion, with a huge stratum of "supernumeraries" marginal to capitalism.232 In this context, free elections tend to return pro-poor candidates hostile to neoliberalism. Hence, in trying to reconstruct Haiti through successive interventions, America faces a problem of what to do about Haitian voters, who keep voting for Aristide.233 In 1994, America (under Clinton) had aided Aristide’s return, but with neoliberal strings attached,234 while other sections of the American state were allegedly aiding the coup leaders.235 While heavily restricted by neoliberal agendas, Aristide nevertheless pursued an agenda of social reform.236 According to Regan, in the aftermath of the 1994 intervention, America refused to help combat rights violators, instead funding and institutionalising a paramilitary opposition movement.237 Aristide claimed to be fighting a "form of apartheid" around various categories of social privilege.238 He had accepted US and IMF impositions, but

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231 Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 254.
236 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 100; Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 39.
238 Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 119.
resisted their implementation by means of foot-dragging.\footnote{239}{Hallward, ‘Option Zero’, 32-3; Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 301-2.} Hence, according to Engler and Fenton, "the real fear was that Haitians preferred to do what was good for their country, not what was good for the World Bank".\footnote{240}{Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 29.}

In 2004, after twice being re-elected as president, Aristide faced an apparent rebellion by armed groups in the north of the country. Aristide and his American supporters requested "a few dozen" peacekeepers before his overthrow but they were not forthcoming.\footnote{241}{Ibid, 17; Kim Ives, ‘The Full Story of Aristide’s Kidnapping’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 119-30; Ira Kurzban, ‘US is Arming Anti-Aristide Paramilitaries’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 47-58, at 54; Maxine Waters, ‘US Warns Aristide: Stay Out of Hemisphere’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 157-64.} The ‘rebels’ would also accept a peacekeeping force, but only once Aristide was gone.\footnote{242}{Goodman, Interviews, 60.} The US basically backed the ‘rebel’ line. The US demanded a settlement before peacekeepers would be sent,\footnote{243}{Mildred Aristide, ‘From the Palace’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 69-96, at 75; John Conyers, ‘From the Palace’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 69-96, at 84.} though they also gave misleading reassurances that they would not allow “thugs” to overthrow Aristide.\footnote{244}{Robinson, Unbroken Agony, 84.} This was an impossible demand which enabled the ‘rebels’ to refuse any accord until the government fell.\footnote{245}{Conyers, ‘From the Palace’, 84.} It is alleged that America threatened to unleash the ‘rebels’ on the capital unless Aristide resigned,\footnote{246}{Ives, ‘Full Story’, 121.} which he refused to do.\footnote{247}{Kevin Pina, ‘From the Palace’, interviewed by Amy Goodman, in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 69-96, at 89.} With the crisis grabbing international attention, Aristide left the country in contentious circumstances. He claimed to have been kidnapped by American troops, a plausible claim since he was cut off from the outside world, taken out on a plane with blacked-out windows and without a telephone.\footnote{248}{Randall Robinson, “I was Kidnapped, Tell the World it is a Coup” and ‘US Warns Aristide: Stay Out of Hemisphere’, interviewed by Amy Goodman in Getting Haiti Right This Time, ed. Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004), 157-64.} At this point, with Aristide gone, the UN,
US, France and Canada sent peacekeeping troops. Aristide wished them luck, but denounced the mission as an occupation.

The regime created in 2004 after Aristide’s exit was a de facto dictatorship led by Gérard Latortue, a former Duvalierist technocrat and UN official. This regime lasted two years before fresh elections (minus the exiled Aristide and his party, banned from standing on a technicality) returned Rene Préval as President. Préval was a former ally of Aristide, though better liked by America for his neoliberal sympathies. His election was an act of reassertion by Aristide’s supporters; "[f]or many, if not most [of Préval’s supporters], a vote for Préval was a vote for Aristide". During Préval’s inauguration, the building was overrun by supporters holding posters of both Préval and Aristide. Randall Robinson alleges that UN and Latortue regime forces had tried to prevent Préval’s victory by reducing access to voting booths in poor areas, but failed to contain the sheer numbers of the Haitian poor. Nevertheless, international occupation has persisted. The UN forces have not been withdrawn. Préval was forced to form a ‘unity’ government with elite opponents. In April 2008, continuing increases in food prices led to mass protests and unrest. Five protesters were killed by police and UN troops. This was apparently the end of popular patience with Préval. In short, the ‘peacekeeping’ intervention has not ended the social war between rich and poor in Haiti, and has turned into a prolonged enforcement of neoliberal power.

'The Axe Forgets, the Tree Remembers’: Silencing Colonial History

Without dismissing explanations which emphasise economic and other interests in the intervention, this chapter shall emphasise how the possibility of a neoliberal
invasion being passed off as legitimate peacekeeping was enabled discursively. In order for the account of Haiti as a ‘failed state’ based on internal chaos to be accepted, there is a need to forget a long history of outside interventions and structural causes of instability. For instance, the disastrous state of the Haitian economy is sometimes blamed on the financial havoc wreaked by the colonisers in the first years of independence.\textsuperscript{258} Scholars such as Charles Ogletree argue that much of Haiti’s current situation can be attributed to the colonial and postcolonial history of exploitation and repression.\textsuperscript{259} Hence, in constructing humanitarian crisis as a desituated ‘present’, peacekeeping discourse is complicit in the silencing of the legacy of colonialism.

Randall Robinson argues that the situation echoes an African and Haitian proverb – the axe forgets, the tree remembers.\textsuperscript{260} Americans, he argues, were "being led to disremember" that Aristide was an elected leader.\textsuperscript{261} The silencing of colonial history is a revealing aspect of the dominant discourse. Paul Farmer claims that when he tries to raise even recent history in interviews with journalists, he is cut off and told to focus on the future, not the past.\textsuperscript{262} Hence, there is a selective forgetting of the origins of social problems in Haiti, a process of forgetting which makes it possible to view recent crises as inexplicable. Powerful colonial agents see the world in a limited way, "flat, unremembering, and in the present tense".\textsuperscript{263} Hence, the discursive focus is placed (for instance) on Aristide as ‘good guy’ or ‘bad guy’, rather than the content of his claims.\textsuperscript{264} This stance makes more sense if this one man is taken as a stand-in for an entire popular movement, if the emphasis on Aristide is a personalisation of an attempt to destroy an entire social movement.

On the other hand, memory makes it difficult to ‘pacify’ Haiti, because the return of memory revives the social antagonism which dominant discourse seeks to suppress. "Haitians remember: they consider themselves living legacies of the slave trade and the bloody revolt” against the French which ended in the world’s first successful

\textsuperscript{258} Robinson, \textit{Undying Agony}, 22.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid 58.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid, 24.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid 106.
\textsuperscript{262} Farmer, ‘What Happened’, 11.
\textsuperscript{263} Robinson, \textit{Undying Agony}, 157.
slave revolution. Aristide’s political discourse draws heavily on tropes from the revolution, and he imitates revolutionary leader Toussaint L’Ouverture in his rhetoric. The Haitian revolution is received by its supporters as a “shimmering, new pulsating consciousness of tangible, embraceable possibility”. It is publicly remembered, and this memory is threatening to present-day elites. One of the first acts of the ‘rebels’ when they entered Port-au-Prince was to destroy a museum of artworks about the revolution. On a personal level, too, memory is powerful: Randall Robinson refers to one case of an Aristide supporter haunted by memories of the American occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. "For the old woman, time seemed to have stopped there", and the present crisis was lived as a repetition. In many ways, the Aristide regime is a bearer of postcolonial memory, whereas the intervention bears colonial forgetting.

Underlying these issues is the question of who has the right to voice, or to construct social narratives. Randall Robinson narrates a discussion with an elderly pro-Aristide voter before observing that "before too long [others] had so burdened the public’s understanding with deflection and noise, as to deny the old man’s very existence". At one point, a pro-American official is reported to have said that the problems stem from the fact that the international community are letting Haitians run Haiti. Hazel Ross-Robinson also reported the same official claiming that, while Aristide has the support of the majority, he does not have the support of "the real people", the ones who "matter". This construction of exclusion has a colonial and racial underpinning. Engler and Fenton also place a "deep-seated racism" among the causes of the overthrow, arguing that media reporting portrays Haitians as "helpless and destitute, unable to take care of their own affairs". Related to this is the

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265 Ibid, 12.
266 Ibid 24.
267 Robinson, Undying Agony, 62.
269 Ibid 165.
270 Bhabha, Location of Culture; Edward Sāi, ‘Permission to Narrate’, London Review of Books6 no. 3 (1984), 13-17.
271 Robinson, Undying Agony, 78.
272 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 32.
persistence of a racialised discourse of exclusion. Hence, one sees a repeat of the
typical colonial gesture of excluding the voices of the colonised.

The tendency to pathologise the poor as spoilers is particularly strong in the
discourse on Haiti. While avoiding the term ‘occupation’, Mobekk terms the situation
a “violent and protracted transition”. MINUSTAH lacks legitimacy and faces
“credibility problems” because it is viewed as an occupation. It is “labouring
under an image problem” and is “regularly criticised harshly”, with sectors of the
population viewing it as illegitimate and biased. Despite this apparent
illegitimacy, the UN operation is taken as being beyond criticism. Groups opposed
to UN dictates are deemed “spoilers”, and global critics deemed to be “fuelling the
instability by promoting extremist views”. Apparently all observers are expected
to share a single frame and cooperate in imposing UN power. Similarly, Donais
blames such “spoilers” for promoting instability. Haiti has thus become, in the
pro-UN literature, a small war in which only one side is recognised, in which this
side fights an adversary variously characterised as criminal, amorphous or extremist,
yet in a context where the adversary is indeterminable from a wider field of
discontent and subjective illegitimacy which even pro-UN authors can barely fail to
register.

Simulating a Humanitarian Crisis

This present situation of the construction of a voiceless, faceless adversary can be
connected to the conditions in which the intervention occurred, which are in turn
rooted in a reading of Haitian history. In the dominant frame, the present is
constructed by eliding the past while simultaneously reproducing inherited
inequalities. It is also reconstructed in such a way as to render a particular discourse
plausible. In the construction of the ‘peacekeeping’ intervention, a coalition of
forces staged what amounted to a simulation: a simulation of state failure, a

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277 Ibid, 120.
278 Ibid, 153-4.
279 Ibid, 114, 119.
280 Ibid’, 120.
simulation of a pro-democracy revolt, a simulation of the fall of a regime. This is not simply a matter of misrepresentation, though plenty of that went on; it is also a question of actually producing events which confirm a certain account, which provide nodal points in a particular constellation of meaning - instability as an effect of destabilisation.\textsuperscript{282} This demonstrates a certain manipulability in peacekeeping discourse: focused on a present emptied of history, of brute facts without movement, it is open to the construction of the present through contingent means. The brute facts necessary to activate the theory can be brought into being. Instability and state failure can be induced by destabilisation. These facts are simulations in a Baudrillardian sense – there is not a gap between material reality and its (mis)representation, but rather, the creation of a reality which is nothing more than a self-representation, which does not refer to something else.\textsuperscript{283} The facts are not part of the overall situation and do not have a broader referentiality; they simply exist in order to create the conditions of applicability of a particular discourse.

Let us take, for instance, the Jeb Bush quote cited above.\textsuperscript{284} On the one hand, it was misrepresentation – it is absurd, for instance, to argue that Aristide destroyed the rule of law and the rebels upheld it, when the latter were terrorising the countryside with extrajudicial killings and releasing human rights abusers from prison. But on the other, it makes a certain distorted sense as a discourse. Bush’s construction of ‘democracy’ is constructed to mean a society dominated by the formal state, in which it is not contaminated by social forces, and to require the empowerment of ‘civil society’, meaning capitalistic elites. In this sense, he was simultaneously misrepresenting (in relation to what he could reasonably expect listeners to infer that he meant), and representing correctly within the frame of a particular discourse.

In Haiti, social unrest was simulated by the activities of externally-resourced ‘rebels’ who were few in number and incapable of realising their apparent objectives. Their role was to create "a televised spectacle" of the "inexorable fall" of the government through an "unimpeded march from town to town".\textsuperscript{285} Indeed, the very nature of the

\textsuperscript{282} Engler and Fenton, \textit{Canada in Haiti}, 22.
\textsuperscript{284} Robinson, \textit{Undying Agony}, 254.
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid, 186.
medium of television news exaggerated the scale and importance of the rebellion. In December 2001 for instance, gunmen briefly held the Presidential Palace in a supposed coup attempt. They did not have the resources to hold the building for long, as residents besieged the under-supplied rebels. Either the rebels had badly miscalculated the likely public reaction to the raid, or the whole thing was an "act of lethal theater". If the latter, then it was effective: media coverage gave an impression of instability, emphasising the outpouring of anger from Aristide’s supporters and their attacks on opposition buildings. "[W]hat the rebels did... was part of a larger strategy to create in Haiti... a general impression of escalating instability". The situation is therefore not just one of misrepresentation, but of actual events being carried out to render plausible a particular narrative.

This was repeated with the revolt which supposedly toppled Aristide. External impressions were of chaos and the government teetering, about to be overthrown in a bloodbath. Yet this is more an appearance than a military reality. It is questionable whether the ‘rebels’, with few fighters and facing determined popular opposition, could have taken Port-au-Prince. Thousands of Haitians had barricaded the city’s roads, before Aristide, responding to calls for talks, called on them to dismantle the barricades. The nearest the rebels got to Port-au-Prince was on their initial entry to the country, and at the time of Aristide’s fall, they were entrenched in Gonaïves. External observers were unlikely to know the distances and geographical problems involved, and hence would not notice the gaps between the rebels’ actions and their portrayal. Similarly, the ‘rebels’ had allegedly obtained American arms and training, giving them a temporary military advantage. This situation was to be redressed shortly, as Aristide asked allies for help. Venezuela may have offered military aid, and a shipload of South African arms, which would have severely reduced the ‘rebels’ military advantage over the Haitian police, were about to arrive in Haiti.

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286 Ibid 194.
287 Ibid, 45.
290 Engler and Fenton, *Canada in Haiti*, 18; Ives, ‘Full Story’, 121.
293 Pina, ‘From the Palace’, 88; Ratner, ‘From the Palace’, 90.
294 Ives, ‘Full Story’, 125.
Before the disadvantage could be addressed, however, Aristide had been overthrown by American forces.

If one is to take certain accounts of events in Haiti to be true, then this abduction was itself misrepresented as a resignation so as to simulate the internal fall of the government. In a mass-mediatised society, it is control of the flow of information for the first few days of an event which is crucial; after this period, it is rare for the media to be interested enough to reverse perceptions. In these first crucial days, Aristide was effectively silenced by American-allied forces, firstly by being denied telephone calls and then by being held without media access in the Central African Republic (CAR), a particularly remote country where it was known he would be hard to reach.295 It was made extremely difficult to visit, see or telephone Aristide.296 Only after a media delegation travelled to the CAR was he allowed to speak publicly, and even then under restrictions.297 The media, meanwhile, was running a video of another occasion and claiming it showed the fall of Aristide.298 The silencing in this case was extremely effective.

The Charges Against Aristide: Simulating Civil Society

Another aspect of the dominant discourse was the denunciation of Aristide as an individual leader. The accusations against Aristide were a mixture of real issues and fabrications by the local media elite.299 There were a grouping of themes here: Aristide and his regime were viewed as corrupt, despotic, unpopular and counterposed to a ‘civil society’ which embraced human rights and democracy. Again there was a combination here of misrepresentation with the simulation of alternative realities, in particular, of a parallel civil society. Accusations of corruption tended to be unsubstantiated and the Aristide period contrasts favourably with those before and after.300 Human rights abuses arising from difficulties regulating police (often former soldiers) often involved ‘rebels’ such as Guy Philippe

295 Robinson, Undying Agony, 163.
296 Ives, ‘Full Story’, 126.
297 Goodman, Interviews, 119.
298 Robinson, Undying Agony, 172.
299 Pina, ‘From the Palace’, 82.
300 Robinson, Undying Agony, 158; Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 82-3.
and may not have been within the Aristide regime’s power to control.  

Aristide was blamed for problems of corruption which are widespread in Southern states, and for which his government is neither particularly responsible nor unusual. Similar points can be made about Haiti’s inability to feed itself, a “failed state” symptom derived directly from neoliberal policies which decimated agriculture. Still another is a dispute over the counting mechanism used in cases of close elections, a concern which was raised in a strategic juncture after the method had previously been endorsed internationally. This technical objection has been used to create an appearance of unfairness. For instance, Mobekk suggests the elections under Aristide were not free and fair, ignoring the rather ephemeral nature of the accusations. The US also wished to portray Aristide as “an isolated and rejected figure” and deeply unpopular, in spite of his massive popularity in Haiti. This is an attempt to frame not only Aristide but the popular movement attached to him as marginal and insignificant, hence to cut these voices out of the discussion. One can similarly refer to the absence of coverage of pro-Aristide demonstrations in the global media, and the comparatively extensive coverage of much smaller opposition protests. The armed revolt against the government was portrayed internationally as a result of disappointment by Aristide’s supporters. In fact, Aristide retained a strong lead in the polls.

In western discourse, ‘civil society’ was synonymous with opposition to Aristide. Haiti is portrayed as polarised, but in fact only the elites and the small middle class are polarised about Aristide; the appearance of a divided society is a perspective-distortion arising from the clarity of certain voices and the elision of others. Public discourse is dominated by elite voices, which possess the symbolic power necessary to reach international audiences. Western news media tend to rely on Haitian

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302 Hallward, ‘Option Zero’, 31; Chomsky, ‘Noble Phase’, 7; Schuller, ‘Food Riots’.
informants who speak English or French, ensuring an elite bias in a country where the majority speak Haitian Creole. Opposition to Aristide came mainly from Haiti’s business elite (including media owners) and the former military and paramilitary forces. However, it was these forces which received western support. For instance, Canadian government funding to NGOs entirely ignored the vast network of pro-Lavalas NGOs rooted in communities of the Haitian poor. America similarly claimed to have shifted aid from the government to "democratic forces’, which in fact refers to powerful elites in society. In contrast to aid to the elite opposition, the arms embargo against Haiti was not lifted when Aristide took power, and aid and loans were blocked. Hence, at the same time that the government was being destabilised and impoverished, elite forces were given an appearance of credibility bolstered by financial support.

Civil society opposition to Aristide was largely simulated using elite and US-created organisations. For instance, there was a Group of 184 (G-184) opposed to Haiti, but these were elite groups connected to the US-backed Convergence party. G-184 could only muster a few hundred for its largest protests (against thousands of counter-protesters), and its general strike was only heeded by private business owners, not in the state or informal sectors. Protests and strikes called by the elite opposition were used to "create a climate of insecurity and tension" that cast a sympathetic light on the paramilitary uprising which followed. Much attention was given to the US-backed Democratic Convergence, an opposition group composed mainly of the Haitian elite, and its launch of an election boycott. This allowed America to call Aristide’s democratic credentials into question. Encouraged by a pouring-in of American aid, the opposition became increasingly intransigent.

308 Ibid.
309 Ibid, 16.
310 Ibid, 28.
311 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 50.
313 Robinson, Undying Agony, 108.
315 Aristide also received some opposition from popular movements, but from the opposite direction (for accepting IMF terms), and only marginally (Hallward 2004: 34-5).
316 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 45.
318 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 46.
319 Ibid, 30.
The Convergence had little reason to compete in elections it could not win, instead preferring behind-the-scenes machinations with the Organisation of American States. In effect, the group demanded that ‘democracy’ be restored via an undemocratic settlement. The opposition’s goal was *Option Zéro*, the annulment of the 2000 elections and disbarring of Aristide. The Convergence openly called for another US invasion or failing that, a rebellion such as later happened.

Simulation has also been deployed in the field of human rights. Among pro-UN authors, Mobekk for instance also claims the police were abusive, “lacked legitimacy” and were “widely feared” under Aristide, but provides little evidence for this. While independent organisations continued to report some problems under Aristide, observers have noted that this was the first period when opposition forces were able to operate openly, a sign that "Haiti was becoming a more tolerant place". Amnesty International reports suggest that political violence was reduced drastically under Aristide, and most of what occurred was by the opposition. On the other hand, the UN-backed interim government and the ‘rebels’ have been accused of massive human rights violations. According to Engler and Fenton, the new regime was responsible for a "quantitative and qualitative leap in human rights abuses". Randall Robinson claims that at least 4000 people were killed during the two-year dictatorship, around the same number killed during the previous, much longer period of military rule. A whole series of serious violations such as massacres, rapes and detention of dissidents without charge have been documented.

How was the regime nevertheless able to maintain the appearance that the transition served human rights? The reason is that a set of special organisations were created to produce the *appearance* of human rights investigations. In contrast to reports from

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323 Ibid, 41.
324 Mobekk, 'Minustah', 126.
327 Engler and Fenton, *Canada in Haiti*, 71.
328 Robinson, *Undying Agony*, 144.
independent human rights groups, a whitewash of human rights abuses by the new regime was conducted by specially funded human rights organisations which denied all reports of abuse. These groups, in particular the National Coalition of Haitian Rights (NCHR), played a crucial role in confusing international public opinion about the coup and its aftermath. NCHR had the exclusive role in monitoring the police and military over human rights, a position allowing it to whitewash abuses to the international media. This creates a situation of circular self-assessment, where all the elements in society are simulated by particular organisations which are part of the same social circle. There are even cases where a minister funded by a Canadian government agency is assessed by a supposed human rights group funded by the same agency, both of which whitewash the Canadian government’s role. For as long as the circle of colonial discourse remains intact, silenced voices are not able to emerge – though it is not difficult to find independent reports to contradict the whitewash.

*Social Composition as Instability: Networks and Power in Haiti*

One of the criticisms made in the previous chapter is that state-based peacekeeping discourse is flawed in assuming the state to have the power to alter situations in cases where power is exercised by networks. While this is clear in the Somalian case, its relationship to Haiti is more indirect. The first point to make is that the overthrow of Aristide was accomplished partly by networked means. Indeed, Haitian paramilitaries have always been partly networked, a "giant-bottomed pyramid" in the words of Abbott. Hence, in a popular metaphor, removing a dictator removes the tree, but not the roots. In the case of the ‘rebels’, one sees the return of the ‘roots’, the shadow networks of the state, as a force of destabilisation. Furthermore, NGOs are also accused of creating parallel systems of service delivery to undermine connections to the state. Hence, it would be inaccurate to view the Haiti intervention as an intervention of states against states, or against networks. Rather,

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329 See, for example, Engler and Fenton, *Canada in Haiti*, 71-90.  
331 Ibid, 57.  
332 Ibid, 60.  
335 Engler and Fenton, *Canada in Haiti*, 49.
certain networks were mobilised against others, and used as the basis to rebuild a hierarchical state. This is part of the reason that the problems of ‘fourth generation warfare’ did not arise to frustrate this intervention.

This reliance of the intervention on networks did not preclude the mobilisation of official discourse to contrast networks unfavourably with states. Aristide’s reliance on typically Southern articulations of state and society, and on the cultivation of support in diffuse social networks potentially subversive of state power but mobilised in support of a state project, is crucial to his portrayal as an imperfect democrat. The poor Haitian use dense social networks to survive, relying on food sharing and solidarity lending. "Unnoticed by mainstream accounts, this collectivist tradition in Haiti allows people living on the margins of society... to survive".336 The political extension of these networks also takes a primarily networked form which is uncomfortable for the advocates of control by the state. Lavalas itself, meaning ‘flood’, refers to the wave of political groups, trade unions, local church groups, peasant associations and other social movements arising from the movement against Duvalier.337 With Lavalas in power, the poor became more confident, and the rich became increasingly afraid, retreating into gated communities and investing massively in private security.338

It is in particular the category of chimères which carries the hostility to Aristide’s social insertion. Aristide’s supporters were denounced under this label, a term taken in the foreign press to refer to pro-Aristide armed thugs, but which also has connotations of extreme poverty and social dislocation – people who, because of the impact of neoliberalism and war, had grown up outside the traditional nurture of the lakou or familial community.339 The figure of the chimères – variously shadows, unmen, and informal networks – shows Aristide’s insertion in the networks of everyday life which construct everyday power among the Haitian poor. The chimeres worked in “overlapping networks” and used asymmetrical warfare techniques.340 Robinson suggests that the term chimères refers to self-organised groups of sparsely armed

336 Schuller, ‘Food Riots’.
340 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 826.
street children who organised against their own exclusion, whose link to Aristide was never clearly proven. 341 Hence, they are a variant of the ‘restive youth’ stratum cited in studies of social unrest worldwide. 342 Always a source of instability, it is rare for this stratum to be drawn inside a formation of political power. The chimères are a figure for the ambiguity of the Southern ‘state in society’, its reliance on patronage politics and fusions with informal social forces. The identification of the chimères as a case of undemocratic governance is thus in effect an assertion that the Southern state can never be ‘democratic’ enough for the liberals, since the state does not exercise dominance over society.

When America accuses Aristide of violence and portrays its own role in terms of peacemaking, ‘violence’ must be interpreted as a placeholder for the disruptive effect of the social antagonisms which are elided in American discourse. Aristide’s simple presence in the western hemisphere was taken by America to be "promoting violence", 343 a significant claim: the ‘violence’ invoked here is the possibility of antagonism in discourse, of the breaching of the dominant transcript of events, a breach which could empower countervailing voices to action. Lavalas is a ‘bitterly divisive force’ only because it is unusual in questioning massive inequalities in Haitian society. Aristide, rejecting claims of violence by his supporters, claims that his critics consistently blame non-violent people and the poor for violence initiated by elites. "When [you] are poor, [you] are violated in their eyes". 344

The status of the ‘peacekeeping’ operation as a war against everyday networks can also be seen in the aftermath. After the takeover there was an "extermination campaign" against suspected Aristide supporters in some shanty-towns, with people with dreadlocks singled out to be murdered. 345 According to Peter Hallward, the aim of this mass murder is to destroy the Lavalas networks in the slums. 346 Killings of street children also resumed after a hiatus from 1995 to 2004. 347 More broadly, the new regime has undermined the capacity of the poor to subsist. The coup was

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341 Robinson, Undying Agony, 147.
342 Watts, ‘Petro-Insurgency’.
343 Goodman, Interviews, 146.
344 Aristide, ‘Exclusive Interview’, 112.
347 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 91.
supported by elites opposed to Aristide’s price-stabilisation policies, and after the coup, staple foods increased massively in price.\textsuperscript{348} Hence, both directly and indirectly, state power was mobilised, not to construct social order, but to \textit{decompose} the social movements which constructed everyday survival and politics.

In the pro-UN literature, this campaign is portrayed as liberation. Dorn portrays the Haitian slums as sites where “gangs dominated the populace through murder, intimidation, extortion, and terror”.\textsuperscript{349} He also admits that the “problem of gang warfare” was concentrated in “pro-Aristide areas where the population generally rejected the US-backed government”, and that aggressive operations, such as the indicatively named operation Iron Fist, caused “collateral damage” and led to “large protest demonstrations” against the UN.\textsuperscript{350} What Dorn terms “gang” activities included what would better be described as political insurgency, such as ambushing UN troops. Similarly, when Dorn claims that “gang leaders... gained psychological dominance by referring to the UN troops as ‘foreign occupiers’”\textsuperscript{351}, he indicates that the stakes were really political, not criminal. Similarly, Dziedzic and Perito view the gangs as “a deadly threat... to the Haitian government and the peace process”.\textsuperscript{352} They recognise that the gangs were “primarily political”, cultivating support by distributing resources to the poor.\textsuperscript{353} He also admits they were mainly Aristide supporters, but wrongly locate them in continuity with earlier, anti-poor paramilitary groups.\textsuperscript{354} Against this political resistance, the UN operation was primarily military, seeking to “assert control”.\textsuperscript{355} Donais also admits that the gangs are largely pro-Aristide whilst Mobekk argues that the gangs are deemed to provide material benefits and protection, gaining some degree of local legitimacy by exercising a kind of counter-power, excluding police from certain areas.\textsuperscript{356} In short, a political assault on strongholds of Aristide supporters was portrayed as an attack on gangs in order to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{348} Ibid 89.
\item \textsuperscript{349} Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 805.
\item \textsuperscript{350} Ibid, 812.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid, 813.
\item \textsuperscript{353} Ibid, 2-3.
\item \textsuperscript{354} Ibid, 1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{355} Ibid, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{356} Mobekk, 'Minustah', 118, 128; Donais, 'Back to Square One', 279.
\end{itemize}
Depoliticise it.

Why is this attack taken as valuable? This discourse draws heavily on the emphasis on state power in peacekeeping theory to portray state control as a good in itself or as a necessary prerequisite for other goods. Non-state security provision is deemed illegitimate and destabilising in advance, whereas a police force – any police force – is deemed an improvement. For instance, Aristide is alleged by Mobekk to have relied on “young armed men to control the community” although the boundary between control and local security provision is unclear here. The difficulty is that, while credited with providing “law enforce[ment]” and “security”, the groups are nevertheless taken to be a “primary cause of instability”. The partial reliance on informal networks seems to be pathologised in advance as abusive on the basis of its contrast to a rather idealised model of 'democratic' policing. Similarly, Donais argues that Haiti needs an effectively managed and capable police force to solve its “long-term public security problem”. Again this is based on the idea that the police can be rendered “politically-insulated” and “professional”, with a “public service ethos”. Aristide is correspondingly condemned for lacking “commitment to the rule of law” because he also relied on chimeres. This approach gives an overwhelming impression that there is a single type of legitimate state and society (based on an idealisation of Northern systems) which must be realised in Haiti. No wonder, therefore, they see the task as indefinitely large and prolonged – in Donais's terms, a “long-term effort to disrupt and destabilize the culture” of Haitian policing. The sustainability of such mimicry of the North is simply assumed. There is, admits Donais, little ground for optimism about sustained change.

Similarly, in Dorn's account, MINUSTAH is credited with “taking on” the gangs and bringing “law, order, and government control”. Security, namely a “calm and

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357 Ibid, 116.
358 Ibid, 116-117.
359 Donais, 'Back to Square One', 271.
360 Ibid, 275, 282.
361 Ibid, 277.
362 Ibid, 279.
363 Ibid, 282.
364 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 805.
secure environment”, is taken to be the “top priority”. The criterion of success was the ability of MINUSTAH and allied Haitian forces to patrol certain streets in the targeted areas and to send UN officials to “walk freely” in the area. This is taken to end the “era of reigning gangs” and a “victory over the gangs”. The value for peacebuilding of such control is assumed rather than demonstrated. Dorn admits that the MINUSTAH operation was an aggressive military operation or “forceful measures” in a “battlespace”, based on intelligence and “overwhelming force”, against opposition forces which controlled large areas of Haitian cities. MINUSTAH sought to militarily dominate neighbourhoods at the expense of locally rooted forces. This did not involve peacebuilding, but rather, deliberate provocations which would “force” opponents to “retaliate”. So how was it constructed as a force for peace? In Dorn’s account, because certain slums became no-go areas for state forces, peacekeepers were “prevented” from “helping the people they were assigned to protect”, people whom Dorn assumes, with no evidence, would have wanted or deserved such help. He claims that “the population demanded action” and that there was “strong popular will” behind MINUSTAH, but without any evidence of such support aside from one anecdotal statement. Nor does Dorn show whether anything constructive was done with the new UN access, as opposed to the reign of terror alleged by opponents. The main evidence Dorn provides for an improved situation is not either subjective or objective improvement for locals. It is simply that the slum became less “foreboding” and “inaccessible” for police and UN workers. Hence, the alleged victory is not a matter of peacebuilding, still less of democracy promotion or human security, but simply of statebuilding. Worse, since Aristide already exercised state influence in the slums, it was simply a boast of attaining by violence what Aristide had apparently obtained by cooperation.

Dorn also assumes the military subduing of the gangs to be equivalent to their “defeat”, when in fact their military potential is simply an epiphenomenon of their

365 Ibid, 808.
367 Ibid, 833, 835.
368 Ibid, 806-7, 814.
369 Ibid, 814.
370 Ibid, 812.
371 Ibid, 813, 834-5.
social power. By his own admission, the gangs tended to disengage from difficult
encounters, preferring asymmetrical actions. Quite possibly, their “defeat” was more
of an accommodation. Dorn admits that the supposed success has not altered the
pervasiveness of crimes such as kidnapping and drug trafficking, and has simply
displaced some activities to other shanty towns. In spite (or maybe because) of the
intervention, Cite Soleil is still being referred to as Haiti’s most dangerous slum. Clearly, the invasion of Cite Soleil was simply a question of containing the crisis by
violent means, rather than creating conditions for peace. MINUSTAH created, at
considerable cost, an appearance of control which is quite probably skin-deep, but
which in their own discourse, is mistaken for peace. In any case, Cite Soleil is only
the most visible and strategically important of Haiti’s many shanty-towns. The
emphasis on controlling it has to do with guaranteeing Haiti’s vital infrastructure and
creating an appearance of control, whereas an attempt to address the problems of
Haiti’s poor would be far less exclusive.

There is little indication that the role of gangs in Haitian life has lessened. This
stems from a broader problem in which the UN tends to overestimate its impact by
assessing outputs rather than outcomes. After the anti-gang operation, the gangs
did not disappear, but rather, became lower-profile, avoiding visible leaderships and
blending into the population. Indeed, part of the UN goal was to impel gangs to
enter their demobilisation and disarmament program, in effect buying them off.
The UN also undercut gangs by means of a greater supply of potential bribes for
information. Further, the Haitian police were considered so compromised that
they were not consulted or even forewarned of operations. In short, there is little
reason to assume that the 'successful' operations altered the structure of power in
everyday life in Haiti’s slums, or that it undermined the social base of the 'gangs'.

372 Ibid, 805.
373 Ibid, 834.
374 Associated Press, 'Haiti to Relocate 400,000 Homeless Earthquake Survivors', Associated
375 Duhamel, 'Haiti', 'Haiti', 13-15
376 Mobekk, 'Minustah', 142.
377 Dziedzic and Perito, 'Haiti', 5.
378 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 820.
379 Ibid, 822.
380 Ibid.
According to Mobekk, the UN has not been able to transform the situation of reliance on informal armed groups.\textsuperscript{381} The various operations have failed to prevent violence.\textsuperscript{382} At most, an unstable temporary domination has been established allowing public visibility at the expense of a lack of social insertion extending even into the Haitian state. Donais claims that the Haitian police's “paramilitary-style raids” in its “war” with Aristide supporters “had terrorized local populations and further undermined the force's reputation”.\textsuperscript{383} This contradicts his own view that security precedes peacebuilding. Rather, attempts to create 'security' without legitimacy impede peacebuilding.

An advocate of a decades-long occupation, Duhamel claims that the UN has been too timid in bringing security and development to Haiti, not staying long enough to restructure the society.\textsuperscript{384} This is a logical consequence of the importance he attaches to eliminating corruption: it is, of course, difficult to foresee how a western-type state could exist in a context like Haiti, so that if its establishment is the prerequisite for withdrawal, the occupation becomes timeless. Why support such an occupation? Its necessity is framed in national security terms, as defence of the US. A chaotic Haiti is pathologised as a source of deterritorialised flows of terrorists, drugs, refugees and disease, thus Duhamel claims that “the international community needs to maintain its presence to implement much needed reforms and projects”.\textsuperscript{385} He seems unconcerned as to who decides which measures are needed, using 'development' as a trump card over Haitian political choice. Haitians are, instead, deemed “easily influenced by local rumor networks and disinformation”, and in need of effective control of information by the occupiers.\textsuperscript{386} Haitians are thus offered no say in whether or not they wish to embark on the neoliberal developmental trajectory for which Duhamel wants indefinite armed support. Indeed, his proposal to relocate Cite Soleil shows that he believes that the poor will continue to be a source of resistance.

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Dziedzic and Perito claim the popular response to the UN operations was “overwhelmingly positive”, 388 with 97% supporting the crackdown, 85% feeling safer than before and 78% claiming services had improved. 389 This would seem to suggest some degree of credibility to pro-UN claims, at least with regard to their local popularity. There is reason, however, to doubt the reliability of such high levels of support. The apparent support could be because the UN waited for a high-profile moral panic before attacking, 390 or because of (likely temporary) inputs of money and services to encourage support, 391 though such a high percentage of apparent support suggests the survey was misleading; it is likely that respondents would have distrusted US or UN-aligned questioners enough to conceal their opinions. Dziedzic and Perito also claim the “local population is able to move about freely” and “is no longer terrorized and intimidated”. 392 Given the fact of permanent military occupation, the mass arrests of dissidents and the dragnet-style operations used by UN forces, this is clearly a subjective judgement concealing a mere transfer of intimidation and movement control from one armed political force to another. Claims of popular support are inconsistent with the fact of mass protests against (and not for) the UN invasion. Dziedzic and Perito admit that the operation was only able to avoid greater outcry because of the popularity of Preval. 393 The emphasis placed in the piece on the need to stabilise areas through development assistance and the need to suppress peaceful protests shows that Dziedzic and Perito are acutely aware of the operational effects of a lack of local legitimacy, and that their pretence of local support is at least partly in bad faith. This raises the further question of the relationship of the UN occupation to the Haitian army.

Privileging the State: the Haitian Army

If the assumption that networks are forces of chaos is crucial to the construction of Aristide’s government as insufficiently democratic and Haiti as unstable, the assumption that the state is a force for order and peace underlies a similarly flawed

388 Dziedzic and Perito, 'Haiti', 1.
389 Ibid, 5.
390 Ibid, 3.
391 Ibid, 9.
392 Ibid, 5.
393 Ibid, 7.
view of the role of the Haitian army. The army and its adjunts serve as the model of the state to which peacekeeping discourse was applied. It is not a simple case of states against networks or of state failure, because Aristide’s movement itself constituted a variety of state power, a "state of law" and "constitutional order". This was, however, a trimmed-down and simultaneously broadened state, trimmed of its military and paramilitary agencies but retaining police and prison capabilities alongside a rudimentary welfare infrastructure. One might view Aristide’s state as a state directed towards human security rather than state security. Indeed, Aristide took the idea of peace as incorporating human security, for instance education and healthcare; hence, the US occupation of the new university of medicine and its use as a military base is rhetorically iconic. "They closed the faculty of medicine and they are now in the classrooms. This is what they call peace." One thus finds in Haiti a contrast between the ‘peace’ proposed by the ‘peacekeepers’ and a different conception of ‘peace’ based on welfare and dignity.

The main action Aristide took against the established Haitian state was to disband the Haitian army, which had been the crucial kingpin of a series of dictatorships. According to opinion polls, 62% of Haitians supported the disbandment, and only 12% opposed it. As Engler and Fenton put it, "without a military the wealthy no longer had an internal force to protect their interests and property in the event of a popular mobilization". Aristide also wished to disarm the army, but was unable to do so, and critics claim that America refused to disband or capture the death squads they helped create in the 1991-4 period. One could view this project of disbanding the army as a peacekeeping move by Aristide, which was sabotaged by outside forces. From a mainstream viewpoint, however, it would seem that Aristide had reduced crucially the capabilities of the Haitian state. Although the disbanding of an army which had only ever been used against its own people was a move towards social peace, the function of the Haitian army to protect the elite and

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397 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 101.
398 Aristide, ‘From the Palace’, 72.
399 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 24.
400 Ibid 45.
stabilise capitalism had been lost, which from an elite-centric liberal point of view, could be viewed as a case of state failure. The ‘rebels’ were actually "organized... as a military commando strike force that's going from city to city". Most were former members of the disbanded military or the death squads of the paramilitary group FRAPH. Hence, as Hallward argues, the rebellion was actually "a low-level war between elements of the former armed forces and the elected government that had disbanded them".

Social warmaking is at the core of the regime backed by the peacekeepers. The first act of the new regime was to declare the abolition of the military unconstitutional. While the army has not been formally re-established, former military and paramilitary figures have been absorbed into the police, with 85% of post-transition graduates and nearly all new commanders being ex-military. Substantial aid was given to pay off former soldiers and ‘rebels’. Northern states also provided training and support. The Canadian civilian police (CIVPOL) contingent was headed by a counterinsurgency specialist recently returned from Iraq, whose main role was to oversee training of the Haitian police in a period where they were routinely involved in assassinations and political imprisonment. The type of policing reform provided by the UN has tended to reinforce abuse by emphasising capability over legitimacy. Mobekk argues that policing reform has lacked local input in framing the type of reform needed. Further, the US controlled the process, excluding applicants through a vetting system without providing reasons to the UN or Haitians. Similarly, according to Donais, the UN approach to policing has focused too narrowly on technical issues at the expense of politics and legitimacy.

The role of the UN in rebuilding a repressive state in Haiti is even more sinister than its indirect support for dictatorship. The UN peacekeeping force, MINUSTAH, was

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401 Kurzban, ‘US is Arming’, 51.
403 Hallward, ‘Option Zero’, 42.
405 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 65.
406 Ibid, 64.
407 Ibid 66.
408 Mobekk, ‘Minustah’, 128, 152.
409 Ibid, 151.
directly involved in human rights violations. The Harvard University Law Student Advocates for Human Rights investigation into rights violations in Haiti found that MINUSTAH’s main area of activity was in supporting police operations which include human rights abuses, and that, according to a shanty-town resident, "every time the [Haitian police] want to kill or arrest people, they send in MINUSTAH first". MINUSTAH operations were run alongside the Haitian police, as the peacekeepers had no power of arrest. Officially, MINUSTAH is meant to perform a supporting role to the Haitian government and police. In practice, the police were not even consulted prior to operations. Yet this is hardly a move towards a less corrupt society. Duhamel quotes local officials that 25% of police are involved in corruption and 30% are absentees, though this is bizarrely taken as a case for rather than against the occupation, presumably on the basis that it will somehow be improved by capacity-building. In its first week, the force, claims Hayward, "operated almost exclusively in pro-Aristide neighbourhoods and killed only FL supporters".

Clashes between gangs and UN forces have now become "regular occurrences" in poor areas. A Canadian CIVPOL unit commander similarly told the Miami Law School human rights investigators that he was involved in "daily guerrilla warfare" in Haiti’s slums. The commander of the Brazilian peacekeeping contingent told a congressional commission in Brazil that he was "under extreme pressure from the international community to use violence" in operations against "gangs" – code for Aristide supporters. Another international report suggests that peacekeepers, along with gangs, police and paramilitaries, bring fear in poor areas. Residents of a slum saw 23 bodies after a UN raid to kill a supposed gang leader, and houses have also been destroyed by peacekeepers. Another UN raid on July 6th 2005 led to dozens

410 Donais, 'Back to Square One', 271.
411 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 67.
412 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 832.
413 Duhamel, 'Haiti', 10.
414 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 822.
415 Duhamel, 'Haiti', 5.
416 Hayward, ‘Option Zero’, 44.
417 Schuller, ‘Food Riots’.
418 Engler and Fenton, Canada in Haiti, 68.
419 Ibid, 69.
420 Ibid, 74.
of injuries, a number of people shot in their homes or as bystanders, and dozens injured. The UN claimed to have killed five "criminals" in a "firefight", but Reuters later found bodies of young children and an elderly woman. On 27 April 2005, Haitian police backed by UN peacekeepers killed at least five protesters after opening fire on a human rights protest. Amnesty International reports for 2004 make only one accusation against Aristide: possible suppression of opposition protests. The new regime, in contrast, is accused of large-scale unlawful killings, prolonged detention without trial, torture, arbitrary and illegal arrests, attacks on human rights defenders and journalists, rapes and gang-rapes, and impunity for past abuses.

Even supporters of the occupation frequently admit rights violations. For instance, Duhamel admits that prisons are overcrowded and only 10% of prisoners have been convicted, yet this does not stop him from assuming those arrested with UN support to be guilty. This is implausible. The most dangerous gang in Cite Soleil was “estimated at about 40-50 men” and the slum was divided between only four major gangs, yet UN operations over a few months arrested 800 supposed gang members. The discrepancy in scale provides strong evidence that the 'gang' account does not tell the whole story. In addition, despite seeking to downplay human rights violations, he also admits “dragnet” tactics such as stopping “all the men of working age” in an area. Similarly, Dziedzic and Perito admit the suppression of peaceful protests to clear spaces for military attack, while 52% of respondents to a US Institute for Peace survey in Cite Soleil reported friends, family or neighbours killed or wounded during the UN invasion of the slum. Donais concedes that there is “some justification” for Lavalas claims of persecution. While also accusing Aristide's police of abuses, Mobekk admits that the UN-backed Latortue regime was involved in human rights breaches including arrests of

421 Engler and Fenton, \textit{Canada in Haiti}, 75-7.
422 Ibid, 77.
425 Dorn, 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping', 812, 818, 820.
426 Ibid, 823.
427 Dziedzic and Perito, 'Haiti', 10.
428 Ibid, 5.
opponents, summary executions and torture, and that the human rights situation worsened under their rule. 'They wanted to eradicate Lavalas' powerbase and... used their time in office to obtain that goal'. 430 The UN has contributed to abuse because police reform, without judicial reform, leads to “abuse and extra-judicial killings by the police”. 431 In addition, the UN has handed prisoners over to a judicial system “not able to conduct fair and unbiased trials”, 432 and a prison system awash with systematic abuse and overcrowding so severe that prisoners lack space to lie down. 433 The UN has done little to rectify such appalling conditions. In one prison, the UN invested in an unused key safe but not in running water. 434 To continue to support arrests in such circumstances is effectively to render oneself complicit in human rights abuse, to place the goal of exercising state control ahead of concern for human rights. While recognising the problematic gap between liberal ideals and authoritarian statist realities, pro-UN commentators have been slow to reach such conclusions.

Conclusion

Overall, therefore, one can hardly view the intervention in Haiti in 2004 as an effective form of peacekeeping or peacemaking. In Haiti, it is plausible that American-backed former military forces created an artificial crisis so as to gain power using peacekeeping discourse as a tool. The ‘duty to protect’ thus indirectly contributes to its opposite: a practice of violence to provoke the invocation of this duty. Far from bringing peace, the initiative undermined attempts to empower the poor minority which, while embodying social antagonism, created a potential to move beyond the instability engendered by decades of military dictatorship. Hence, as Paul Farmer argues, it was an intervention which reinforces the social trends and social forces productive of ongoing violence. "More guns and more military may well be the time-honoured prescription for policing poverty, but violence and chaos will not go away if the Haitian people’s hunger, illness, poverty, and

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429 Donais, 'Back to Square One', 280.
430 Mobekk, 'Minustah', 116-17.
431 Ibid, 124; Donais, 'Back to Square One', 276.
432 Mobekk, 'Minustah', 127.
434 Ibid, 134.
disenfranchisement are not addressed".\textsuperscript{435}

Hence, paradoxically, peacekeeping and peacemaking in Haiti were directed mainly against the initiatives with which the official peacekeepers are now aligned. We see in the Haitian case a wave of attempts at peacekeeping and peacemaking by forces other than the UN and powerful states: by transnational solidarity activists bringing pressure on America and achieving effects such as breaking Aristide’s isolation in CAR; by states such as Venezuela and South Africa, attempting to bolster the Haitian state against destabilisation; and by Aristide’s popular supporters, forming their own groups to fight military oppression and mobilising to make the fall of the capital impossible.

The crucial point regarding the argument of this thesis is that the realities in Haiti go against the assumption that the state is on the side of peace, networks on the side of war and instability, and rebuilding the state a means to reconstitute a more peaceful social order. In contrast, the strong state is associated with elite power and repression, whereas democracy and the pursuit of peace are associated with the typically Southern conjuncture of networks and a weak state. The application of liberal peacekeeping theories in this context reinforces the illiberal outcome of enforcing the power of despotic elites and the army.

\textsuperscript{435} Farmer, ‘What Happened’, 36.
Chapter 4: Lost in the Desert -  
the UN/US Failure in Somalia, 1992-5

So far, this dissertation has theorised the problems with liberal peacekeeping discourse and applied them to a case of the replacement of locally-inserted state power with external power in the global South. It remains to apply the critique in understanding interventions in stateless societies. This chapter will examine the spectacular failure of the UN missions to Somalia during its civil war in the early 1990s. It will begin by situating the intervention in terms of its goals, context and significance. It will then seek to relate the intervention to the statism of liberal peacekeeping theory, showing the disparity between UN and Somali assumptions about the state and problematising the view that statebuilding is a necessary prerequisite for peacebuilding in Somalia. It will then situate the intervention in a colonial context, drawing heavily on the work of Sherene Razack. It will examine how the liberal assumptions outlined above reappear in accounts of abuse of Somalis by peacekeepers. It will then show the effects of the lack of local knowledge on the intervention, showing the UN rules-based approach to be inappropriate in a situation of diffuse clan power. This disjunction will be used to account for the failure of the mission. Finally, it will be contrasted with successful local peacebuilding in certain Somali regions during and after the civil war.

The intervention arose in response to famine and civil war in the early 1990s. During this period, social problems arose from persistent clashes between militias in a context of state breakdown. In contrast to the Haitian case, this was not a simulated crisis, nor apparently a matter of concealed interests. From May to December 1991, Mogadishu suffered daily clashes between two factions (out of around fifteen operating nationwide), with 5000 killed and hundreds of thousands fleeing.\textsuperscript{436} It was, however, famine, from which hundreds of thousands were at risk, which was the main reason for intervention. The intervention occurs in a situation widely misperceived as general social breakdown, but which was actually a mixture of
militia extortion, civil war and clan rivalry. Lyons and Samatar portray the crisis as "a Hobbesian world without law or institutions" and the problem as simply "to protect the most vulnerable from the most vicious", with a primary division between the "armed and powerful" and the "disarmed and vulnerable". Yet when it comes to explaining the conflict in detail, they instead refer to clan rivalries, and even on the distorting effects of capitalism and statism. The Somali crisis was not an inevitable effect of statelessness. The conditions of 1991-2, combining widespread military sweeps with drought, were extremely contingent and unlikely to recur. Yet in the dominant discourse, statelessness, banditry and war were conflated into a syndrome of problems to be dealt with through surgical military intervention.

From the earliest days of intervention, alleviating famine was conflated with the creation of a centralised state. The UN Security Council called for action "to restore peace, stability and law and order" followed by a "political settlement". UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali viewed the militias as a criminal establishment and extortion racket that had taken over the country, and allegedly tried to impose disarmament and police-building roles on the US as a condition for handover. The confusion of the goals of famine alleviation and statebuilding haunted the mission throughout. American intervention also seemed to respond to very fickle media-driven public opinion. The UN mission went through three stages, UNOSOM I (a small force deployed on the basis of consent and peace negotiations), UNITAF (the main US-supported force ostensibly pursuing famine relief) and UNOSOM II (the force the US was to hand over to, which had explicit nation-building and disarmament objectives). It is the last phase which is usually viewed as the failure, though the other phases also had great difficulties. The

438 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 46.
439 Ibid, 19, 21, 24.
441 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 34.
442 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 58, 99.
443 Richmond, Maintaining Order, 181-2, 300.
"conventional wisdom" according to Wheeler is that things went wrong when the UN mission was expanded from humanitarian relief to state-building.\footnote{Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 203.}

Somalia is an iconic case, firstly because it broke with the tradition of non-intervention, permitting a Chapter 7 intervention for humanitarian reasons for the first time, and secondly because its failure led to non-intervention in later cases.\footnote{Ibid, 172-3.} It was arguably "the first UN military operation conducted solely for the sake of human rights".\footnote{Rutherford, Humanitarianism, xvi.} According to Finnemore, it is a particular problem for Realist objections to humanitarian intervention because it has no apparent strategic or economic rationale.\footnote{Finnemore, Constructing Norms, 154.} Its effects have not been correspondingly great. "Given the amount of external intervention" since 1991, "it is a depressing commentary on the quality of international engagement that so little of a worthwhile nature has been accomplished".\footnote{Ioan Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland (London: Hurst and Company, 2008), ix.} As we shall see below, a combination of asymmetrical war, local strategic situations and the perils of statism brought down an overoptimistic intervention.

The underlying causes of intervention were rooted in insecurities in Northern sensibilities arising from global 'disorder'. Intervention, argues Debrix, is "visual simulation", performed as if to a script, "following a previously agreed upon scenario" , to act out the appearance of order, control and governance.\footnote{FrançDebrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 97-9.} Its assigned role is "a closing of reality" around "a safe and certain identity" and meaning, at the same time portraying neoliberalism as a final and irrefutable condition of humanity,\footnote{Debrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping, 99.} to bridge the gap between rhetorical reality and vision, and to "gain a spectacular representation" for "the New World Order vision".\footnote{Ibid, 111.} It is meant to "suture" or bridge the gap between the image of the New World Order and the apparent reality of disorder.\footnote{Ibid.} It ultimately failed to do so because narrative closure could not be realised and images instead started to disempower, deactivate and
Whether the mission had the redeeming feature of saving lives is debated. Nobody knew with much accuracy how many people had died or were at risk. Alex de Waal argues that the military intervention played virtually no role in ending the famine. In contrast, a Refugee Study Group reports suggests that the humanitarian aspects of the intervention saved 110,000 lives. The reason for the military intervention was that international aid was routinely looted and stolen. One development agency estimated that only 40% of relief was reaching its intended targets; others put it as low as 20%. This said, the operation also cost billions of dollars, raising the question of whether more lives could have been saved with this amount. Claims of effectiveness in saving lives would have to be weighed, not simply against inaction, but against other possible courses of action such as spending on additional aid and extortion, or evacuating refugees to safer areas. Looting of aid could have been minimised by using decentralised entry points and hiring Somali merchants to transport food. It is quite possible, therefore, that other means could have been found to save lives without deploying soldiers.

Peacebuilding Versus Statebuilding? The Perils of the State in Somalia

The liberal and statist underpinnings of the UN project are clear in the Somali case. As Debrix argues, "Boutros-Ghali’s redefinition of peacekeeping... is, once again, the rhetorical, if not practical, bridge between 'anarchy in Somalia' and 'a liberal-democratic state in Somalia', no matter how subtle and complex the Somali society actually may be". The intervention in Somalia was an attempt to impose the New World Order through "rebuilding an anarchic state without the consent of local

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452 Ibid, 107.
453 Ibid, 126.
454 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 50.
456 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 189.
457 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 78.
458 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 53, 68.
459 Menkhaus, ‘Vicious Circles’, 152.
461 Debrix, Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping, 110.
actors”. The intervention “ignored the conflict resolution mechanisms of the Somalis themselves, in favour of western models. As a result, the UN’s interventions ran up against the centrifugal forces of Somali society and the problem of Somali perceptions of the state.

While in fact a much bigger commitment than humanitarian relief, state-building seemed to be viewed as a quick-fix. Pushed by a US desire for quick withdrawal, UNOSOM II adopted "state-centric preconceptions" which emphasised creating a central government and police force, preconceptions which "revealed an insufficient appreciation of the roots of Somali conflict and the depth of social divisions". In Mogadishu, police were deployed without any civilian authority to which to report. Judges, meanwhile, were appointed despotically from the centre, and often in a way which upset the clan balance and caused violence in sensitive regions. It is no surprise that this attempt to conjure a state out of nothing failed.

In practice, an effective local state had never existed in Somalia; what had existed was an externally-oriented state geared to global flows. External actors seeking to build effective police and judicial institutions imagine they are recreating something which existed before, when in fact it never did. The Cold War-era state was possible only due to intrusive repression and patronage politics financed from external flows which are no longer available. The Somali state, when it existed, was mainly a means for elites to insure or accumulate wealth, thereby distorting Somali society. History shows that the state-form was never well-established in Somalia, and that it took pathological directions because of its inappropriateness for a decentralised, clan-based society. On the one hand, competition for concentrated power encouraged kleptocracy, extractive manipulation and despotic means of

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463 Ibid, 162.
466 Ibid, 69.
government. On the other, concentrated power upset the delicate balance among the clans, impelling some to take advantage of state power and others to mobilise to balance against it. In this context, centralised state power simply involves dominance by a particular clan or alliance of clans, and state armies behave like one big, and especially brutal, warlord. Hence for instance, in the words of Lyons and Samatar, "Barré’s regime had long been regarded as an institution captured by one set of clan interests". In the aftermath of the Ogaden war and with declining external support, the central government quickly withered in the late 1980s, with power diffusing to clan militias. UN attempts to recreate centralised authority "exacerbated the conflict, as competing militias positioned themselves for the potential spoils of a new aid-dependent state". Warlords such as Ali Mahdi were able to gain UN support by creating the appearance of a national government despite continuing fighting. The UN apparently harmed itself by seeming to side with Mahdi against Aidid, who subsequently interfered with UN involvement.

Hence, during the UN interventions, outsiders viewed a state as a means to stability and peace, but Somalis questioned this view. Indeed, “there is perhaps no other issue on which the worldviews of external and internal actors are more divergent than their radically different understanding of the state”. With their experience of the colonial and Barré regimes, Somalis remain suspicious of centralised power. "For many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population". This echoes Clastres’ argument, and he would doubtless have endorsed the Somali view of the state. In Somalia, zero-sum views of control of the state put state-building and peacebuilding at odds. In fact, fear of capture by rival clans makes Somalis risk-averse about projects to restore a central state. If a state forms in Somalia, it is likely to be a "mediated state" which coexists with and works

470 Ibid, 13-14; Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 76.
471 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 19.
474 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 16, 23, 40-1.
through local forms of power, the strategy Menkhaus favours.479

Similarly, the conflation of state collapse and societal collapse shows a fatal lack of knowledge of Somali society, which is "predominantly pastoral, subsistence, and decentralized" with its own "complex and powerful system of ethical norms and rules".480 60-70% of Somalis are nomadic herders, with most of the remainder farming.481 Somalia has traditionally had a kinship-based system which was "highly egalitarian and democratic" and had established means of conflict resolution (heer) to deal with frequent internecine feuds.482 Processes of warmaking and peacebuilding in Somalia cannot be understood without a sense of interclan relations. Relations among clans approximate those among states in international affairs, using means such as balancing, negotiation and customary law to manage conflict.483 Clan units form and break up in response to circumstances, and peace is maintained between them by consensus decision-making or balancing.484 Clans and sub-clans are most united when there is an external threat; when distributing resources, they tend to fragment.485 Even external flows from the diaspora tend to operate to reinforce clans.486 Hence, the overall tendency was towards centrifugal social and political forms similar to those discussed by Clastres. Menkhaus and Prendergast argue that centrifugal forces outweigh centralising ones in Somalia, and this, not simply diplomatic failure or the poor leadership of specific local states, is the cause of state collapse.487 Somali nomads show "defiant scorn" of outsiders seeking dominion, and "[d]isplays of superior force are apt to earn only temporary respect as these most ungovernable people bide their time".488 This social structure renders statebuilding difficult if not impossible in Somalia, while also creating space for peacebuilding without statebuilding.

480 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 7.
481 Ibid, 3.
482 Ibid, 10.
484 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 1.
488 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 25.
Indeed, statism is arguably one of the causes of the humanitarian crisis. Pieterse argues that ethnicity is not a cause of conflict but something to be explained, and that rigid ethnic categories emerge from authoritarian institutions and political cultures and what he terms ‘the politics of hard sovereignty’. According to Pieterse, humanitarian intervention is counterproductive because it reinforces state authoritarianism and hard sovereignty. While this hypothesis is contested, it is certainly relevant in cases where statebuilding is priorities. In Somalia, this is clearest in the way that setting up a locus of central power triggered conflict. State centralism tends to be favoured by those with clan interests in retaining land occupied in warfare, though local political forms can also express exclusionary tendencies. The emphasis on a national government led to clan conflicts for control of Mogadishu, the site of national power. In Somali understandings, the capital embodied the state and anyone occupying its ‘houses’ became the holder of the state. This was why, for instance, Aidid felt justified in demanding recognition as Somalia’s ruler. To complicate the good state - bad warlords dichotomy further, states seem no less prone than warlords to commit human rights violations, and there was a constant flow of personnel (such as former general Aidid and US military trainee Morgan) between the two.

Hence, statebuilding and peacebuilding must be disaggregated. As Menkhaus argues, state collapse should be disaggregated from criminality and civil war as concepts. State collapse is not inherently linked to criminality, insecurity or war; certain regions of Somalia have shown that peace and security can persist without state control. Before the 1980s, Somalia was one of the safest places in Africa, due to communal rather than state structures. On the other hand, forming a state would not end armed conflict but rather, transform it into insurgency. In addition,
the process of statebuilding tends to cause conflict. Lack of caution and local knowledge leads to interventions with a raft of unintended, negative effects. Ameen Jan lists a whole number of negative unintended effects of UN interventions ranging from resentments over high wages to UN employees to entrenchment of the social power of militia leaders and their separation from their social bases, to triggering clan conflicts by requiring quick censuses to allow elections in disputed areas. With factions competing for UN resources, indigenous reconciliation processes were frozen in a rush for UN resources. "Locally based clan reconciliation conferences... were in fact much more conducive to peacebuilding efforts". Menkhaus argues that the intervention also had unintended positive effects because the influx of funding and contracts strengthened business interests with a stake in peace.

**Recolonising Somalia?**

Postcolonial theory offers important insights into the Somali situation. In particular, Sherene Razack’s study of peacekeeping violence exposes the underlying colonial logic of the intervention. The Canadian peacekeepers discussed by Razack are not unreconstructed agents of American or nation-state imperialism. They are stereotypically ‘good’ peacekeepers from nations with a commitment to multilateralism and the UN. Razack links abuses committed by Canadian peacekeepers to Canada’s attempts to construct a performative-imaginary space in which the nation is seen as good. Unlikely to have encountered Africans before, soldiers reacted based on representations in popular culture.

Razack observes that this moral universe of dominant discourse is marked by a "colour line" between civilising white knights and the "dark corners of the earth", in which the Northern self places itself outside history. Under the colour line,

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500 Ibid 75-6.
501 Ibid 63.
503 Razack, *Dark Threats*, 35.
504 Ibid, 9, 10-11, 13, 24, 45.
506 Ibid, 12.
peacekeeping is thought to be about civilised nations sorting out at peril to themselves the problems of the South, though one should remember as a qualifier that troops from Southern nations, particularly those deemed sufficiently reliable and modern, are often deployed. Such interventions may remain colonial because of the selection and organisation of peacekeepers, the definition of their role, and the colonial legacy embedded in postcolonial militaries. Whatever the balance of forces, peacekeeping tends to reproduce divisions between 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' countries in a way which reproduces colonial power. In Razack's words, "[p]eacekeeping today is a kind of war, a race war waged by those who constitute themselves as civilized, modern and democratic against those who are constituted as savage, tribal and immoral. Already organized to produce men who do not think on their own, militaries operating on the basis of these racial premises invite brutality". Peacekeeping takes place "on colonial terrain", in a world viewed by peacekeepers as being "in a different, inferior moral and social category". This allows Northern nations such as Canada to "negotiate the tension between democracy and military intervention" on the basis that "the natives will understand little else but force". "History is evacuated and the simplest of stories remains: more civilized states have to keep less civilized states in line". The role of peacekeepers is thus to save natives from the excesses of their own tribal society, or even to help them towards a "normal lifestyle".

This colonial stance required the silencing of Somali voices. Following Liisa Malkii, Razack argues that the silence of victims of atrocities signals an investment of narrators in appearing to be outside history, and hence viewing atrocities as unknowable. Hence, it is no coincidence that the trigger for the war between the UN and Aidid was an operation which could have shut down Aidid’s radio station, effectively establishing a UN monopoly on the airwaves. Even in the Northern

507 Ibid, 32.
508 Ibid, 86.
509 Ibid 54.
511 Ibid, 48.
512 Ibid, 68.
513 Ibid, 69.
514 Ibid, 22.
515 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 130.
media, the UN had little control and was humbled by Aidid, as according to Debrix, Aidid was able to produce images which undermined the UN’s media strategy. This said, the colonial aspect of the situation is also clear in media images. The media simplified the situation to a few key tropes such as starving victims and cruel warlords. Catherine Besteman shows that media coverage of Somalia views it as a "country unable to rid itself of ancient rivalries", ignoring the "dynamic hierarchies of status, class, race, and language that were central to the patterning of violence" and historical factors such as the US-backed development boom. Media coverage spoke of bringing Somalia back to life and of a society helpless in the face of its own backwardness. In the film portrayal Black Hawk Down, Somalia is portrayed as an uncivilised country in which people had not learned nonviolent ways of resolving disputes and did not know when to back down. Similarly, in military trials of Canadian rights violators, both sides accepted "that Somalia was a lawless land in which well-intentioned peacekeepers were besieged by ungrateful Somalis, an encounter that required 'rough justice’".

A look at the ‘psyops’ material distributed by US forces provides further evidence of discursive asymmetry. The leaflets suggest a lack of sophistication and a matter-of-fact, threatening demeanour; repeated threats to use force against anyone who violates various tersely asserted prohibitions are prominent. The message focused on rules and gave an impression of the messages ‘we will enforce our rules whether you like it or not’ and ‘we will act on our perceptions, not yours’. The absence of appeals to legitimacy is apparent, and in a culture based on honour, the decisiveness and non-dialogical insistence of the message risked it being read as a discursive assault. More positive messages were distributed by newspaper and radio, though

516 Debrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping, 126-7.
517 Ibid 128.
518 Tin, Spaces of Civil, 91.
520 Razack, Dark Threats, 120.
522 Razack, Dark Threats, 89.
these also managed to antagonise some warlords. Ultimately it seemed to lose out to Aidid’s less well-resourced but more locally inserted propaganda machine.

Razack questions whether intervention is actually carried out on behalf of victims, because their silence testifies to the investment of Northern agents in their own subject-positions. Media stories of atrocities draw the viewer to victims "mostly so that we might feel the horror of what it was like for Northern men and women to witness such atrocities", and it is the trauma of peacekeepers, not locals, which is the focus of coverage. The iconic symbol of the Somali intervention, an image of an American soldier’s body being dragged through Mogadishu symbolises the idea of peacekeeper as victim. The peacekeeper embodies the "universalist standpoint" of an almost disinterested agent. Locals become more or less invisible; the violence of atrocities is taken to be "aimed at us". The trauma of peacekeeping in such contexts is the feeling of being powerless to help, whether or not local peacemaking procedures are effective. Hence, the peacekeeper takes action to empower her/himself. Peacekeepers end up paradoxically claiming "special responsibilities" towards others while simultaneously "car[ing] less about the human rights of others". This is closely related to the voiceless ‘victim’ on behalf of whom the peacekeeper claims to act.

In Canada, Somalia will be remembered for the phenomenon of violent abuse of detainees. This is not an isolated incident. As Razack observes, "[n]o peacekeeping mission involving Western peacekeepers seems to have been without violence directed at the local population". In Somalia, there are widespread cases involving American, Belgian and Italian as well as Canadian troops. The controversy in Canada focused on two cases: the shooting in the back of two fleeing Somalis on 4 March 1993, and the torture to death of Shidane Abubakar Arone two weeks later.

525 Razack, *Dark Threats*, 19.
526 Ibid, 22.
527 Ibid, 37.
528 Ibid, 23.
529 Ibid, 22.
530 Ibid, 21, 38.
531 Ibid, 14.
532 Ibid, 53.
There are, however, dozens of recognised and scores of reputed incidents. In the first of these incidents, Somali civilians who posed no risk were shot in the back after an order to shoot anyone seen fleeing the camp, and one was then killed at close range.\textsuperscript{534} In the latter, a prisoner died after being beaten for hours and subjected to other torture including water-boarding.\textsuperscript{535} Against the usual accounts of abuse as exceptional, it is notable how unremarkable it seemed to be to those who perpetrated or observed it.\textsuperscript{536} Captures of Somalis may have happened weekly or daily during the deployment, and abuse of detainees was systematic and widespread, with "screams in the night... a common occurrence".\textsuperscript{537} Razack shows how the sudden awareness of abuse is covered over in Canadian national discourse by being exceptionalised and relativised. In her words, "[r]ace disappears from public memory through a variety of tricks, and incidents of racial violence become transformed into something else, something we can live with".\textsuperscript{538}

Razack asks what the abusers thought they were doing, and concludes that their violence was a way of convincing themselves of racial and masculine superiority.\textsuperscript{539} Canadian troops had been deployed to Belet Huen, a peaceful town with little risk of hostile encounters. Despite this, the soldiers in the first incident seemed to see themselves as "Rambo executing a well thought out plan to entrap saboteurs", assumed to be "well-trained, armed Somali militia".\textsuperscript{540} Their abuse was a way of acting-out a pre-constructed narrative which was performed in spite of its lack of empirical plausibility. Somalis were from the beginning viewed as dangerous almost to the point of infectiousness, and petty theft from bases was feared out of all proportion to its risks.\textsuperscript{541} Crucially, abuse is linked to the warrior identity. Peacekeepers adopted one of two different strategies, either identifying as warriors among an enemy population or as humanitarians. The former expresses the colonial situation most forcefully, while the latter, more common among black soldiers and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{534}{Ibid, 73, 78.}  
\footnote{535}{Ibid 97.}  
\footnote{536}{Ibid, 115.}  
\footnote{537}{Ibid, 81, 94, 99.}  
\footnote{538}{Ibid, 7.}  
\footnote{539}{Ibid, 10.}  
\footnote{540}{Ibid, 79, 81.}  
\footnote{541}{Ibid, 53, 72. This is reminiscent of Whitworth, Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, which argues that hyper-masculinity is often the root of wartime atrocities.}
\end{footnotes}
women, expresses discomfort with it. Razack’s account emphasises the nationalist basis of peacekeeping violence and its specific relationship to particular national identities and projects. Could the problems be solved by, for instance, a UN army? The question would still arise of what UN-employed peacekeepers would think they were doing. If they still thought they were bringing civility to savage external sites, their self-conception would doubtless be very similar to that of Canadian peacekeepers. In any case, it was the UN, not the US, pushing for disastrously broad goals in Somalia. While African peacekeepers did not reproduce Northern patterns of abuse in Somalia, this may not always be true, since peacekeepers are placed in a position of asymmetrical power in the service of world order, regardless of their country of origin.

Imagining Social Collapse

Following from its colonial stance, a major difficulty in the intervention was that it showed little knowledge of local political and social conditions. Indeed, it seemed to be based on the premise that technical and military power could substitute for local human and social knowledge. The mission was to be "swift, precise, powerful, and successful", instead of taking into account local needs and particularities. The US plan was apparently to "overawe" Somali militias out of resisting. In the absence of local knowledge, peacekeepers projected dubious assumptions refracted through cultural racism. For instance, Somalis travelling long distances to find water, not a rare occurrence in a nomadic desert society, were viewed as engaged in risky activities far from home. Paul Brodeur argues that soldiers in Somalia fell into racism because they misperceived local institutions different from their own as an absence of institutions. The portrayal of Somalis as passive victims was according to Menkhaus also part of the problem. "Too often, external interventions into conflict and post-conflict settings make the false presumption that communities beset

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542 Ibid, 106.
543 Ibid, 12.
544 Ibid, 54.
545 Debrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping, 115.
547 Razack, Dark Threats, 131.
548 Jean-Paul Brodeur, Violence and Racial Prejudice in the Context of Peacekeeping (Ottawa:
by predatory banditry or war are passive victims, when in reality they are expert at the art of survival and adaptation", generating predictable systems of interaction which are often invisible to outsiders.549

In contrast, civil war and social collapse are not inherent in Somalia; these arose from contingent factors. The difficulty with international intervention is that the model of functioning intergroup relations in Somalia bears little resemblance to the ideal of a modern state which western agents carried with them. Local politics contains both forces for conflict and forces for reconciliation, such as the relationship between young men and elders. Such divisions are also gendered; strong clan identities are associated with male bonding and patriarchal power within clans, whereas women are more attuned to a multiplicity of connections.550 Hence, in a typical scenario of complementary opposition, conflict arises when forces are pulled in the direction of one pole, and can be counterbalanced by empowering the opposite pole.

Menkhaus and Prendergast argue that the "radical localization" of Somali politics has been misconstrued as a symptom of crisis and ‘anarchy’, and that it is instead an effective adaptation which performs essential functions of governance and holds local legitimacy. An example of such a misconstrual is Makinda's study of the intervention, which argues that Somalia’s fissiparous social life is the cause of the country’s problems.551 This misconstrues the nature of the problem by projecting the absence of a (non-viable) statist solution into the definition of the problem. In contrast, Menkhaus views local forms as a law-like form of social order which nevertheless is not a nascent state.552 Localism in Somalia is a challenge for international agencies because of its fluidity and situational nature as well as the absence of a central authority.553 Local polities should be judged on the basis of their local support, performance and good government (such as human rights), rather than

Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997).

549 Menkhaus, ‘Vicious Circles’, 163.
Problems in the Dominant Framing

The dominant framing of the situation as dictatorship by militias was similarly problematic, firstly because militias were formed of socially marginal youths and not dominant groups, and secondly because of their strong clan basis. Hence, Lewis refers to the militias as clan militias struggling for control of territory. Lyons and Samatar provide a list of the main militias which shows them to be clan-based and arranged into an alliance system of two major groups. The hard power of militias rested on fairly light military technology such as the ‘technicals’, which are basically civilian jeeps with a machine gun and light artillery piece attached. The militias also depended on social support to a greater degree that outsiders assumed. Far from the militias intimidating locals out of peace, it seems they had insufficient power to implement national accords or coerce compliance at a local level. While uncontrolled banditry doubtless occurred, some forms of tribute extraction are widely accepted, making the assumption of such practices as criminality dubious. The demand for tolls from humanitarian convoys passing through clan territories is viewed as legitimate in Somalia, despite its widespread rejection by peacekeepers. Similarly, raiding is a traditional part of Somali society, and is used to establish ascendancy, not to subjugate others. Apparently chaotic actions often had a subsistence rationale and broader social resonance. Militiamen may have caused famine to attract lootable aid, but they were also feeding their families with loot, and some employees (such as guards) might be feeding up to 80 people from one paycheque. The special role of militias during the early 1990s was an effect of the development-security nexus. During the war, aid agencies became the funding arm of a militia- and extortion-based economy. The ‘warlords’ were major

554 Ibid, 2.
555 Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 75.
556 Ibid 77-9.
557 Ibid, 80.
beneficiaries of the UN-based urban economy. They quickly realised that famine and war deaths brought humanitarian relief, from which they could extract tribute.\textsuperscript{564} Aidid in particular opposed peacekeepers but called for food aid.\textsuperscript{565}

While exceptional atrocities and suffering occurred during the civil war, it is mistaken to conflate these contingent effects with the structural nature of the diffuse Somali social system. In normal circumstances, conflicts within clans and communities over leadership are more important than the rarer bouts of inter-clan fighting, and are often affected in ignorant ways by international diplomats.\textsuperscript{566} The civil war was less a vicious circle than a cyclone; while self-reinforcing in the short term, it burnt itself out.\textsuperscript{567} Inter-clan commercial linkages help to undermine clan-based warfare.\textsuperscript{568} Soon after the intervention, forces of stability reasserted themselves. From 1995 to 2006, armed conflict in Somalia became less frequent, did not usually involve attacks on civilians and approximated the blood-feud model.\textsuperscript{569}

The declining power of warlords is due to increasing unwillingness of their own clans and of businessmen in the cities to finance them. In Mogadishu, the wealthy simply bought militiamen out from under the warlords and assigned them to local courts.\textsuperscript{570} Hence, the specific locus of forces which created the civil war was contingent, and vulnerable to a whole range of possible changes. It was by no means the basket-case the US and UN assumed.

Victimisation happened, but the simplistic binary of ‘victims and vicious’ is another gross misrepresentation. "Somalis who have suffered disproportionately in the conflict are those belonging to a variety of ethnic or clan groups that were neither part of, nor allied to the numerically and politically dominant clans".\textsuperscript{571} The main risk was faced by small groups with weak militias, such as the predominantly agrarian Rahanweyn, who have had to militarise to resist invasion.\textsuperscript{572} Urban groups such as the Rer Benadir, who are relatively small and lack traditional militias, were

\textsuperscript{564} Rutherford, \textit{Humanitarianism}, 25.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{566} Menkhaus and Prendergast, ‘Political Economy’, 7.
\textsuperscript{567} Menkhaus, ‘Vicious Circles’, 153.
\textsuperscript{568} Ibid, 157.
\textsuperscript{569} Menkhaus, ‘Governance without Government’, 87-8.
\textsuperscript{570} Ibid, 88.
\textsuperscript{571} Lewis, \textit{Understanding Somalia}, 131.
targeted because of their reputation for trading and wealth.573 Other targets included low-status clans descended from slaves from outside Somalia, and hunter-gatherers.574 These groups lacked the well-armed militias and connections of the nomadic clans, were subject to negative perceptions and bore the brunt of the violence. Hence, the military defence or arming of these groups was key to eliminating the conditions for plunder. Menkhaus attributes the arming of groups such as the Rahanweyn as one of the reasons for declining banditry after 1995.575 Hence, the balancing (not disempowering) of social groups is the key to avoiding dominance. The capacity of each lineage to seek revenge for wrongs is crucial in impelling clans to seek resolutions through customary law instead of violence.576

Local Knowledge and the UN Intervention

Given this balance of forces, locally informed commentators such as Lewis and Menkhaus consistently favour working through clan institutions over top-down political processes or externally initiated reconciliation. Early attempts under UNOSOM I along these lines were somewhat effective.577 The UN focus on hard power quickly undermined such approaches. It was after the decision to deploy troops without local consent that leaders such as Aidid became uncooperative.578 Paradoxically, these interventions strengthened the militias. The initial goal of UNITAF was humanitarian, and created an "overriding imperative" to avoid clashes with militias. This in effect gave the militias great power since it relied on their inactivity, though it seems to have produced a "nonaggression pact" allowing the US deployment.579 Early efforts at reconciliation, focused on militia leaders, gave them substantial legitimacy.580 Certain leaders such as Aidid gained power both from national-level manoeuvres separate from their clan base, and from fomenting anti-

572 Jan, ‘Somalia’, 54-5; Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 38, 59.
573 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 9-10, 131.
578 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, 205.
579 Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 43.
580 Ibid, 45.
Militias with a base in Mogadishu were able to shore up their patronage networks due to the UN presence. The relative success of UNITAF has sometimes been attributed to US military strength, but it is more likely due to local circumstances. The limited goal of UNITAF was acceptable to warlords such as Aidid, whereas the expanded mandate of UNOSOM II was not.

Under UNOSOM II, the UN attempted a contextually inappropriate rules-based approach, setting limits backed by threats. This led to engagements as militias overstepped the limits. Aidid’s hostility to the UN arose partly from clumsy attempts to enforce the UN rules in Kismayu, which failed to prevent Aidid’s ally Jess from being driven out by rival Morgan, but were used to prevent Morgan from retaking the city. In the eyes of Jess, Aidid and their faction, the SNA, the UN was supporting their rival. It seems unlikely that this was intentional, since the UN oriented to a body of rules which did not distinguish between militias, and had punished Morgan on an earlier occasion. It is also, however, quite predictable that involvement in conflicts in a society operating in Clastrean terms would be viewed as side-taking. The abstract rule-based conception was doubtless lost in a society where the would-be transcendental rule-setter is viewed as one agent among many. What are intended as impartial gestures of enforcement are necessarily re-encoded locally as taking sides. This apparent misunderstanding is a structural effect of an entirely appropriate understanding of the asymmetrical effects of concentrated power.

In UNOSOM II, policing and disarmament because increasingly central to the UN’s role. US troops got drawn into intrusive disarmament measures including house-to-house searches. In a society focused on diffuse power, disarmament by an armed force is bound to appear hypocritical. In any case, the effect of disarmament was mainly on potential victims of violence rather than the major militias. Disarmament was recognised by some as problematic given cultural meanings of

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582 Ibid, 4.
585 Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 56.
586 Ibid 47.
587 Ibid 41.
588 Ibid 42.
Weapons in Somalia,589 and was viewed as a threat by many Somalis.590 With the price of an AK-47 rising from $50 to $1000,591 it also doubtless increased asymmetries and hence vulnerability. The Hawadle of Belet Huen, site of the Canadian abuses, were renowned for their peaceful relations with their neighbours and for traditions of dispute resolution. The Canadian peacekeepers confiscated their weapons, then left soon after, leading to the invasion of the area by Aidid’s militia. It took the Hawadle nine months to liberate themselves.592 Disarmament both violated local culture and increased asymmetries among groups, and hence was a disastrous goal to pursue, though an inevitable consequence of the orientation to statebuilding.

The disaster began in earnest after Aidid attacked UN forces apparently after an inspection was carried out by force in spite of an ultimatum.593 Because he happened to be the first warlord to defy the transcendental-statist frame, Aidid was reclassified almost overnight from a major legitimate player to a demonised pariah, "the world’s number one public enemy".594 US forces carried out massive retaliatory attacks, bombing and strafing parts of Mogadishu and alienating locals.595 Aidid responded in a characteristically reciprocal way. When the UN put a bounty on his head, he responded by placing the same price on the head of UNOSOM’s leader.596 Since Aidid’s attacks were predictable, and not necessarily due to anything which differentiated him from other militia leaders, the reaction is deeply problematic in strategic as well as ethical terms. It was an overreaction to predictable violence in a setting where peacekeepers clearly should have anticipated such risks, and would have done so had strategists been aware of the dynamics of conflict in centrifugal settings.

The failure of UNOSOM II is clearly explicable in terms of the gap between local and Northern assumptions. In the Northern US/UN frame, Aidid had passed over into villainhood by violating the principle of sovereignty and attacking the protected

591 Ibid 119.
596 Lewis, *Understanding Somalia*, 79.
bodies which symbolised the epistemological privilege of the coloniser and sovereign. He was framed in this way because of a transcendental discourse requiring a red line against attacks on UN forces out of a fear of attacks elsewhere and fear of seeming unconcerned at the deaths. Indeed, Debrix goes further, suggesting the US was looking for a simplified figure of evil to emerge when it went in; having an enemy made US troops’ identity and goals clearer. As bearers of this special mythological status, the lives of peacekeepers were taken to be ‘worth more’ than those of Somalis. For the US, the issue was a "no-brainer" which was later admitted to have not been thought through. This is, no doubt, because it provided the easy framing sought as a way to manage the confusion of the situation.

Yet from the levelling, centrifugal standpoint of a clan ethic of equivalence, honour and retribution, the UN were simply one faction among others. Why, for instance, did Aidid’s ambush of armed UN troops render him worthy of capture and unworthy as a future partner in power, whereas the various atrocities of warlords against Somali civilians did not? The gesture involved was clearly colonial. When the hunt for Aidid was launched, UNOSOM went from neutral interlocutor to interested party, and after killings of civilians, became seen as the "sixteenth Somali faction". Aidid’s response in contrast was reciprocal, claiming an equal right to set the rules and to use force. The UN’s overreaction simply confirmed this conception of their status and proved the fallacy of their claims to neutrality and the dangerous concentration of power on which their project was based. It also placed itself beyond possibilities of reconciliation. By failing to stay neutral in the face of predictable provocation, the UN force confirmed the suspicion that it was simply another faction. It passed from the difficult task of seeking reconciliation, to the even harder one of seeking a reconciliation between factions including itself.

There is some debate as to whether the failure was due to the US withdrawal and subsequent lack of deterrent force of the UN. This would seem to be easily resolved. If the failure was due to UN incapacity after the successful UNITAF mission, it is

598 Debrix, *Re-envisioning Peacekeeping*, 115-16.
600 Jan, ‘Somalia’, 72.
inexplicable that Aidid made no attempt to de-escalate in response to American re-escalation. Hence, in contrast to Stedman’s argument regarding spoilers,602 the mission faltered not from a lack of force against recalcitrant militias, but from excessive force. The spiral of demonization produced an unwinnable situation.

With the launching of the hunt for Aidid, Somalis, now empowered, were reconceived as villains instead of victims.603 The elevation of Aidid into villain par excellence was a massive exaggeration of his actual importance. Clan militias in Somalia were speculative ventures of limited durability and were subject to rapid turnover of leadership and power.604 Killing Aidid would not have stopped his clan from fighting the UN.605 Indeed, Aidid was not an irreplaceable figure. The image of Aidid as symbolic supervillain, and the demonisation of militias, exaggerated massively their permanence as powerful forces in Somalia. Most of the militias underwent a collapse as rapid as their rise. Aidid’s faction lost much of its power in late 1994 due to feuding between its component clans, and seemed to depend for its influence on common threats to the Habr Gedir.606 This rapid rise and fall is consistent with viewing militia leaders as Clastrean chiefs whose power within clans is highly contingent and vulnerable to sudden withdrawals of support. Militias are not solid power-structures but ad hoc coalitions of forces at particular conjunctures. The ‘most wanted’ label is also problematic because of Aidid’s and the warlords’ shifting status in US discourse. Soon after the Black Hawk Down battle, Aidid agreed to a ceasefire and released two hostages,607 while after 2001, America has paradoxically switched sides, allying with the ‘warlords’ as part of a counter-terrorist front.608

In military terms, the US was basically ‘defeated’ by means of asymmetrical warfare. As Rutherford argues, "the UN’s firepower was insufficient to overcome wily opponents acting on their home turf".609 America was repeatedly outsmarted by

602 Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems’.
603 Debrix, Re-envisioning Peacekeeping, 119.
604 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 80.
605 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 132-3.
607 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, 165-6.
608 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 85.
609 Rutherford, Humanitarianism, xvii.
Somalis with local knowledge.\textsuperscript{610} The war ended because of an ambush of US Army Rangers which led to the iconic image of a US soldier’s body dragged through Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{611} In fact, the casualties they suffered - 18 dead, 84 injured and 1 captured, against around a thousand of Aidid’s militia killed in the battle - were militarily not especially terrible.\textsuperscript{612} However, Aidid had correctly calculated that in an asymmetrical war, morale, and the failure to achieve a quick and overwhelming victory, were crucial. Lyons and Samatar term this a lack of commitment to stand up to the forces of disorder,\textsuperscript{613} but this may well overestimate both the capacity and the real strategic position of peacekeepers. Once their weakness was established, UN troops lost their immunity and status, and were unable to achieve anything much at all; Somalia returned to the balance of power prior to their arrival, and peacekeepers were preoccupied in keeping themselves alive.\textsuperscript{614} By the end of UNOSOM II, the SNA was able to increase its operations while UN sweeps were limited.\textsuperscript{615} Hence, this was a real defeat, not merely a retreat.

Conclusion

Was Somalia simply too far-gone into ‘anarchy’ to be dragged back to peace? This is unlikely. Rather unexpectedly, the UN withdrawal was followed by peace and even widespread demobilisation. According to Ameen Jan, the withdrawal of the UN did not result in bloodshed but in a resumption of previously frozen political processes in which the territory was subdivided along clan lines and civilian life resumed.\textsuperscript{616} Somaliland and Puntland became \textit{de facto} independent, while Islamic governance emerged in other regions. This was enabled by a balance of power among clan leaders.\textsuperscript{617} The de facto partition has brought a "restoration of clan-based governance" and "civilianisation" of clan leaderships.\textsuperscript{618} Hence, it is clear that peace was possible, but not by the means the UN officially pursued.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[610] Lewis, \textit{Understanding Somalia}, 79.
\item[611] Lyons and Samatar, \textit{Somalia}, 59.
\item[612] Ibid, 59.
\item[613] Ibid 69.
\item[614] Ibid, 60.
\item[615] Rutherford, \textit{Humanitarianism}, 146-7.
\item[616] Jan, "Somalia", 53.
\item[617] Ibid, 53-4.
\item[618] Ibid, 55.
\end{footnotes}
Parallel cases elsewhere, and later, show that the UN was taking the wrong approach by focusing on top-down processes and ‘hard’ security. Peacebuilding is unlikely to work without "reconciliation of issues such as territorial occupation and conquest". The "anomaly" of Somaliland, the northwest part of Somalia which has been de facto independent since 1991, is that, while it has attracted little international support, it has managed to maintain peace based on homegrown institutions in this period. Lewis attributes this success to their focus on building local consensus before attempting to build a government, "exactly the opposite" of the US, UN and EU approaches. According to Lewis, peace in Somalia succeeds when it begins with "satisfactory peace agreements at the grass roots", instead of starting by forming a national government. This confirms the argument that the relationship between the state and society problematises projects which view security as a condition for, rather than an effect of, the reconstruction of social life. By 1991, extensive peace between the dominant Isaq and smaller clans had been established, largely through the efforts of clan elders. The process involved in effect a national heer treaty stressing the role of elders in peacemaking, and focusing on societal pressures as crucial to peace. Crucially, it addressed wide ‘human security’ issues and causes of conflict, not simply ‘basic’ security. For instance, it restored traditional reciprocal access to grazing lands and the return of alienated land. Militia demobilisation was attempted only after the agreement. It succeeded through massive payoffs (around 50% of state revenue) to demobilised militiamen. As militiamen married and got older, and younger men found other careers in conditions of peace, Somaliland effectively negated the threat from uncontrolled gunmen. Similar approaches brought some success in neighbouring Puntland and nascently in the Rahanweyn region around Baidoa. The later political growth of the Islamic Courts

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620 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, ix.
621 Ibid, ix-x.
622 Ibid, 91.
624 Lewis, Understanding Somalia, 94-5.
625 Ibid, 95.
626 Menkhaus, ‘Vicious Circles’, 91.
627 Ibid, 160.
Union, a nascently centralised formation, also depended on its local insertions.\textsuperscript{628}

Hence, Somalia was not by any means what the outside world imagined it was. Its crisis may well not have been persistent and systemic, but rather, a temporally limited transition from a despotic state to a more diffuse social form, and the ‘crisis’ in this sense was simply a matter of minimising the humanitarian impact of this transition, not reversing or overriding it. The social divisions were a result of Barré’s rule, so the resultant conflict could be viewed as an ironing-out of the distortions arising from an earlier period of statism.\textsuperscript{629} Because of problematic assumptions about the relationship between state collapse, violence and suffering, peacekeepers sought to do too much: instead of seeking the minimum path from a violent diffuse acephalous society to a peaceful diffuse acephalous society, or even seeking to use the minimum force needed to protect relief supplies and vulnerable civilians, the project was imbued with assumptions that the state-form must be revived (whether by the coercive suppression or the incorporation of militias) and even with ideas of ‘trusteeship’ reminiscent of colonialism. Since actual social and military power in Somalia is diffuse, it makes little sense to attempt to centralise power as a means to achieve peace. With peace dependent on social mechanisms, state militaries do not have the ability to make peace effectively as their tools are limited to force, which produces exclusion or grudging participation rather than changes at a social level. Hence, as Menkhaus argues, peacekeepers needed the skills of diplomats and social workers, not soldiers.\textsuperscript{630} The UN intervention in Somalia failed because it was trying to do the wrong thing.

\textsuperscript{628} Lewis, \textit{Understanding Somalia}, 85-8.
\textsuperscript{629} Jan, ‘Somalia’, 63, 79.
\textsuperscript{630} Razack, \textit{Dark Threats}, 137.
Chapter 5: Networked Conflict Transformation

The previous discussion has sought to problematise two recent interventions by the UN and by major states, arguing that these interventions have reproduced structures of social dominance and have been counterproductive in terms of concrete achievements of peace and human security. This, however creates a dilemma. Faced with a genuine crisis such as the pending genocide in Rwanda or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, is one to oppose intervention because it is necessarily counterproductive, or support it in spite of its limits? It is here that one can propose a move from state peacekeeping and peacebuilding to network peacekeeping and peacebuilding (which, following John Paul Lederach, is rephrased as ‘conflict transformation’). The approach proposed here views social movement networks, organised horizontally, as an alternative to states in conflict transformation. Such interventions can occur in a range of ways which will be explored below. It should be remembered that peacekeeping interventions occur in contexts of localised warfare, which often hinge on questions beyond those of conventional combat. Asymmetrical and ‘full-spectrum’ wars involve a range of issues, not simply the military balance of power but also matters such as the composition and decomposition of social structures, morale and demoralisation, and the construction of media discourse and information flows. This creates prospects for alternative forms of peacebuilding which are similarly multidimensional. The goal should not be to prevent or reverse state collapse, but to alter power-balances among networks in such a way as to best enable peace. Most often, this means allying with or reinforcing weaker civilian groups or their popular defence forces.

This chapter will explore a number of cases of networked conflict transformation. Firstly, it will consider dialogical transformation from below, concentrating on the case of La Ruta Pacifica in Colombia, relating this case to Lederach's conflict transformation theory. It will then consider transnational human rights advocacy as a form of conflict transformation, before discussing the transnational protest strategy of the International Solidarity Movement and the political humanitarian relief operation
of Workers' Aid to Bosnia. Finally, it will examine the possibility of armed humanitarian intervention by networks, examining the cases of the International Brigades in Spain and the global salafi movement. In each case, it will attempt to demonstrate how networked energies coalesce in mobilisations by examining the social breakdown and motives of participants. It will consider how horizontalism can operate in certain cases to problematise colonial binaries and to get beneath ‘ideological’ media constructions. It will also discuss what positive effects each intervention can be said to have had, in spite of falling short of its ultimate goals.

A point should first be made. This discussion primarily concerns social movement mobilisation through networks, and not the far more common phenomenon of NGO activity. There is an important distinction between NGOs and social movements. NGOs are frequently centralised, institutionalised, vertical and bureaucratic. While they play a courageous role in many conflicts, they are also accused of complicity with statist intervention and in perpetuating conflict.631 Bureaucratic funding priorities can lead to an emphasis on projects with visible results and a downplaying of more important processes of ‘soft’ peacebuilding.632 Differential distribution, neoliberal distortions and the absence of long-term, extensive projects all impact on effectiveness.633 In effect, state and intrastate control of funding subsumes NGO projects into a statist, bureaucratic model. The need to get around the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of states is the major barrier to effective conflict transformation, and there are limits to how far NGOs have served, or can serve, this goal.

**Networked Peace Construction: Dialogue from Below**

The first type of networked conflict transformation to be examined are movements of conflict transformation from below. These movements echo Jean-Paul Lederach’s approach to peace, based on the idea of creating just relationships, and nonviolence and human rights as a way of life.634 In this approach, conflict transformation seeks

632 Pugh, ‘Social-Civil Dimension’, 116-17.
to turn negative energies in conflict into creative energies for transformation. Dialogue is the basis for both peace and social justice. Hope is mobilised against fear in surviving and moving beyond conflict. Empowerment is also taken to be central to peacebuilding.

Various attempts have been made to pursue peacebuilding along these lines. Social movements pursue peace through means such as citizens’ diplomacy and peace protests. ‘Track two’ or citizens’ diplomacy has emerged in a number of settings as an alternative to state diplomacy, and seeks to enable dialogue between communities in conflict, albeit usually supplementary to rather than instead of state diplomacy. Such non-state agents are better able to connect to the grassroots of conflicts, and are neglected in the emphasis on state intervention. Particularly crucial to a number of previous cases of grassroots peacebuilding are women’s movements, which often take the lead in campaigning for peace. In many societies, women are assigned a traditional role of maintaining social ties which makes them more alert to their decomposition. Less involved in conflicts, women are often well-placed for peacebuilding. Hence, they can potentially form an immanent counterpoint within societies to the forces reproducing cycles of violence.

The situation in Colombia provides a clear sense of what women’s movements can do. With social movements under attack, women’s groups have increasingly become major bearers of a wide variety of ‘democratic’ demands such as human rights. One of the most interesting groups in terms of innovative grassroots peace construction, La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres are organised around a feminist

mation.pdf, 1.
636 Ibid, 4.
639 Dayton, ‘Useful but Insufficient’, 68.
proposal for a negotiated end to the war, based on an ethic of non-violence and solidarity.\footnote[643]{Martha Colorado, ‘In Colombia, in the midst of war, women weave love knots’, \textit{Educational Insights} 8 no. 1 (2003), \url{http://www.ccfi.educ.ubc.ca/publication/insights/v08n01/praxis/colorado/english.html} accessed 14-01-2010.} Their approach includes an emphasis on dialogue at levels from the everyday and local to the national, and calls for coexistence and respect for difference.\footnote[644]{Cockburn, ‘Violence’, 9.} The group was formed in 1995 in response to the silence surrounding massacres in conflict zones.\footnote[645]{Martha Colorado, ‘Colombian Women: Survival Amidst War;’, \textit{Women’s Health Collection} 7 no. 99 (2003).} It is a network of more than 300 organisations and groups.\footnote[646]{Cockburn, ‘Violence’, 7.} Examples of affiliate groups include the Casa de la Mujer, a women’s social centre in Bogotá which provides the network’s base of operations, and Medellín’s \textit{Corporacion para la Vida Mujeres que Crean}, a group stressing education for empowerment.\footnote[647]{Ibid, 8.}

\textit{La Ruta Pacifica} have a broad sense of the social situatedness of conflict and its connections to power-asymmetries and silencing. They conceive their role as being "to place boundaries on the madness of war", viewing the way to peace in terms of justice, development, social responsibility, negotiation and inclusion, rather than force of arms. Crucially, violence in warfare is linked to violence in the wider society, particularly against women, and to broader systemic injustices arising from capitalism and neoliberalism.\footnote[648]{Colorado, ‘Colombian Women’.} Everyday power and colonial forgetting are central to their critique. Although peace is their main goal, they also oppose impunity as a means to peace, because it may lead to continued violence and "an attempt to forget".\footnote[649]{Cockburn, ‘Violence’, 18.} The objection seems to be less punitive than psychological, a need for the wounds to be healed rather than covered over. In the event of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, says an activist from another women’s group, women would contribute the truth bit.\footnote[650]{Interviewee, cited in Cockburn, ‘Violence’, 20.}

At the level of method, their main approach is large-scale nonviolent popular mobilisation. \textit{La Ruta Pacifica} carry out "high-profile incursions into public
space" by large numbers of women in areas blighted by violence, where fear and repression devastate social life, so as to reclaim such spaces. Marches are held to conflict zones and villages threatened with forced displacement. In one case, hundreds of women dressed in black rallied outside a place of detention of thirteen women activists in Medellin. The women were released a few days later. In another case, they staged a protest in the zone of Chocó, which had been heavily militarised after armed clashes. Locals had been rendered helpless because the military had occupied the vital waterway and prohibited them from using it. A large group of women reclaimed the river by occupying it en masse, visibly and peacefully. The paramilitaries were reportedly bemused and unable to respond. The largest mobilisations are "pilgrimages" to sites of conflict. These rallies have become "a powerful way of communicating a message of solidarity and courage, rather than fear and disillusionment. The morale-boosting effects of such activities help sustain the movement against collapse or compromise in the face of setbacks. For instance, the women’s movement was able to maintain momentum after the collapse of the government-FARC negotiations. Similar claims can be made for other women’s groups in Colombia. Organizacion Femenina Popular (OFP), a local group in Barrancabermeja, had grown from 1970s campaigns for land rights and women’s equality into a "vital community resource". The group also takes direct action in cases of violence.

Groups such as La Ruta also organise psychological and symbolic acts of collective mourning, healing and "social weaving’ to recompose emotional relations in the aftermath of violence. Rituals involving poetry, exorcism and symbolism are used as ways of mourning without reproducing wrongs. Ritual and symbolism are taken to revive the sacred in social life. In practice, such rituals are taken to disarm the armed

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652 Colorado, ‘Colombia’.
653 Ibid.
656 Brouwer, ‘Margins’, 74.
and weave invisible threads between participants. Their approach involves "the deconstruction of the pervasive symbolism of violence and war and the substitution of a new visual and textual language and creative rituals". It seeks to create combinations of thought, emotion and intuition powerful enough to interrupt dominant logics. The symbolic image of weaving is particularly crucial, a metaphor for recomposition in the face of the disruptive effects of war. Weaving represents the recreation of social connectedness and the creative cycle of life and death. This has strong effects on individual wellbeing. Women often view the effects of activism and resistance to violence in terms of the recovery of inner strength and physical recovery.

The success of such activities occurs mainly at the levels of visibility and voice. In reconstructing power in a setting of asymmetry, visibility and morale are crucial terrains of bottom-up peacebuilding. Visibility is a major goal and effect of mobilisations. Mass actions are also effective in generating a feeling of solidarity and sisterhood, and a glimpse of other possible worlds. OFP has a slogan that silence is an accomplice of violence. Voice is thereby constructed as resistance to violence. Hence, significant claims can be made for the effectiveness of this approach to peace construction. Ruta Pacífica and other women’s groups have not actually managed to end the war to date, but their effects remain positive and indicative. Such approaches could also be applied in other cases such as Somalia. For instance, a peace agreement mediated by women between the Dinka and Nuer in Sudan suggests this type of model may be relevant for segmentary clan-based societies.

**Accompaniment for Peace: Transnational Human Rights Advocacy**

Transnational human rights advocacy offers another possible model for networked
conflict transformation. The "primary movers" of such advocacy are local and transnational NGOs, though they function in a network also including agencies of states and intergovernmental bodies.\textsuperscript{667} According to Keck and Sikkink, "transnational networks are increasingly visible in international politics".\textsuperscript{668} Human rights had been introduced as a global framework in 1948 due to NGO lobbying, but without means to actualise the ideal.\textsuperscript{669} Hence, networks were crucial to monitoring and strengthening international human rights regimes.\textsuperscript{670}

These groups operate through unconventional horizontal connections disconnected both from their own and the target state.\textsuperscript{671} As Burgerman argues, "[t]he strategies typically employed by transnational networks are those which use the relatively weak power base of nonstate actors to the best advantage".\textsuperscript{672} Their main role is to get around blockages created by state power. When domestic channels for redress are blocked, networks can bypass states by appealing transnationally.\textsuperscript{673} In the Guatemalan case, this occurred because exiled dissidents formed strong local links to global groups based in their host countries,\textsuperscript{674} while Argentine exiles also set up human rights groups and testified abroad.\textsuperscript{675}

Direct intervention is also possible. Peace Brigades International (PBI) have a method of accompanying vulnerable individuals, accompanying them in everyday life to provide a shield and witness against abuse.\textsuperscript{676} Because threats against transnational activists bear higher costs than those against local activists, locals are protected to some degree.\textsuperscript{677} This affects power-dynamics in war situations. PBI’s

\textsuperscript{669} Sikkink, ‘Human Rights’, 414, 417.
\textsuperscript{670} Ibid, 439.
\textsuperscript{672} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 910.
\textsuperscript{673} Keck and Sikkink, ‘Activists Beyond Borders’, 221.
\textsuperscript{674} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 911.
\textsuperscript{675} Sikkink, ‘Human Rights’, 424.
\textsuperscript{676} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 909.
\textsuperscript{677} Patrick Coy, ‘Cooperative Accompaniment and Peace Brigades International in Sri Lanka’, in \textit{Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State}, ed. Jackie Smith,
"strategic use of information" changes the options available for local activists, enabling them to network with international groups and to take activity with less risk.\textsuperscript{678} In Guatemala, a team had operated from 1983 to 1995 without official status, using the capability of networks to operate clandestinely.\textsuperscript{679} PBI accompaniment is often reported by beneficiaries to reduce levels of harassment.\textsuperscript{680}

More indirectly, transnational networks allow local activists to call global attention to threats as a form of self-protection.\textsuperscript{681} With human rights recognised on paper but not in practice, visibility can expose the gap, making "states' repressive practices more visible and salient".\textsuperscript{682} The main role of human rights networks is "providing information to mobilize moral outrage and shame".\textsuperscript{683} The effect is thus "to raise the costs of repression" in terms of a loss of soft power.\textsuperscript{684} Sikkink argues that "[n]etworks attempt to alter state human rights practices primarily by changing the information environment in which state actors work".\textsuperscript{685} For instance, Mexico got away with the 1968 massacre because of a lack of human rights networks at the time and resultant state control of information flows, which today would not happen.\textsuperscript{686} Local groups are empowered by their centrality to the network. It is their role to provide the symbolic imagery the global groups need to mobilise global pressure.\textsuperscript{687} They enable Northern NGOs to work with rather than simply for Southern groups, undermining the voiceless victim discourse through bearing witness.\textsuperscript{688} As with women’s peace movements, there is also a psychological dimension: Sri Lankan agents referred to "fear psychosis" during the peak conflict period, which visibility was directed at mitigating the demoralising effects of conflict through hope and confidence-building.\textsuperscript{689}

How effective is transnational social movement pressure in terms of alleviating

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Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnuccio (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 81-100, at 82.
\textsuperscript{678} Coy, ‘Cooperative Accompaniment’, 81.
\textsuperscript{679} Ibid, 87.
\textsuperscript{680} Ibid, 93, 99.
\textsuperscript{681} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 910.
\textsuperscript{682} Sikkink, ‘Human Rights’, 414.
\textsuperscript{683} Ibid, 437.
\textsuperscript{684} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 917.
\textsuperscript{685} Sikkink, ‘Human Rights’, 441.
\textsuperscript{686} Ibid, 428-9.
\textsuperscript{687} Burgerman, ‘Mobilizing Principles’, 922.
\textsuperscript{688} Keck and Sikkink, ‘Activists Beyond Borders’, 221.
\end{flushright}
human rights abuses? As Alison Brysk argues, success should not be measured simply by the ultimate goal of ending repression, but by intermediate goals such as the survival of dissidents, the construction of new institutions and the delegitimation of the state.690 In some cases, these effects are very direct. Hence, Sikkink suggests that Mexico improved its human rights practices after receiving international network attention in 1988-92691, arguing that the new government would not have reformed without pressure. Mexico acted quickly to protect a carefully constructed appearance of human rights advocacy. In the case of Argentina, the impact was less direct: NGO reports were fed to the US state, which threatened crucial aid flows.692

PBI accompaniment can therefore help to create a "breathing space" in settings with little political space.693 Sikkink also argues that nonstate actors are crucial in explaining changes in discourses on sovereignty.694 Hence, they contribute to building a global discursive space which renders their specific campaigns increasingly effective. However, there are limits to the effectiveness of this type of activism.

Burgerman posits three key conditions for effectiveness - that no major state opposes human rights pressures, that factions in the ruling elite are concerned about international appearances, and that local activists are organised and connected into transnational networks.695 States can ignore pressure for a very long time if they do not care about pariah status.696 Effectiveness seems strongest when openings occur, and this means that apparently ineffective actions may nevertheless have longer-term effects. Networks can take advantage of openings when they arise, affecting the nature of eventual settlements.697 While there are limits to how far such networks challenge global power-asymmetries, their relative effectiveness is worth taking heed of in understanding possibilities for peacebuilding.

689 Coy, ‘Cooperative Accompaniment’, 90-1, 97.
696 Ibid, 915, 919.
Transnational Protest: the International Solidarity Movement

Another approach available to network movements seeking to combat humanitarian crises is to adopt the methods of direct-action activists in the North while travelling directly to sites of conflict. While this is most noticeable in the global summit protests, it has also been used as conflict transformation. In particular, the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) in Palestine has mobilised for nonviolent direct action in solidarity with Palestinians. The ISM is an ostensibly Palestinian-led international network which sends volunteers to engage in nonviolent direct action in coordination with Palestinians in areas of the occupied West Bank at risk of human rights violations. It is one of a number of similar solidarity groups with slightly different mandates, which often cooperate. The ISM is primarily a youth group (though not identifying as such), making use on the particular "available time, mobility, communication savvy, and excitement of things global" associated with Northern youth, and its members organise in small affinity groups using consensus decision-making, loosely linked but with dense information flows. ISM recruits in an extremely loose networked manner, with unscreened volunteers able to sign up through the ISM website or local groups. Up to 2006, ISM had sent 3000 volunteers to Palestine.

In contrast with state peacekeepers, the ISM places a strong emphasis on the importance of local voice and leadership, erring on the side of self-abnegation. ISM explicitly "takes sides" with the Palestinians. They are "striving... to work in horizontal solidarity with Palestinians", taking the Palestinians’ own struggle, rather than intervention in their domestic affairs, as the starting-point. Its actions

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701 Pollock, ‘Struggling for Solidarity’.
702 Ibid.
are always organised jointly with local NGOs or political parties. ISM activists accompany at-risk Palestinian individuals, attend demonstrations where Palestinians are at risk of Israeli army violence, and occupy houses at risk of demolition. When they are unable to prevent violence, they remain able to bear witness. They view their role as being to use their privilege in solidarity with Palestinians and to spread the Palestinians’ stories in the North, and are extremely aware of the difficulties of a postcolonial world, deciding both to defy and utilise hierarchies of human worth. Hence, visibility is crucial. In Ilan Pappe’s view of how the movement could develop, visibility is explicitly linked to global reframing of the conflict with the aim of making Israel a ‘pariah state’ while the occupation lasts.

How successful is ISM? Its effects are more indirect than direct. Dudouet reports that roadblocks and fences which are removed by activists are rebuilt the following day, and no house demolition has been prevented. On the other hand, the ISM campaigns may have contributed to a "dramatic increase in popular resistance in Palestinian villages", and to creating the conditions for a series of legal setbacks for the separation wall. Reports suggest that the ISM presence has reduced violence and raised international coverage on Palestinian anti-wall protests. While deaths at ISM-linked protests are uncommon, one participant reports that Israeli troops had killed thirteen Palestinians at a similar protest without international activists. ISM actions are often covered in major global newspapers. West Bank residents questioned by Veronique Dudouet were unanimously in favour of ISM and wanted to see more activists rather than fewer. Villagers regularly provide activists with free board and food. Locals sometimes theorise the ISM’s role in terms of imposing a price of visibility on Israeli oppression.

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705 Ibid, 7.
706 Pollock, ‘Struggling for Solidarity’.
707 Pappe, ‘Joint Movement’.
709 Ibid, 9-10.
711 Pollock, ‘Struggling for Solidarity’.
713 Ibid, 6.
714 Daraghmeh, ‘New Ghandists’.

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"greatly raised the morale of the Palestinians". 715 Seitz further argues that increased Israeli pressure on the ISM over time proves that it is somewhat effective. 716 Overall, this is a strong record for a loosely networked group of a few thousand volunteers.

Humanitarian Convoys as Political Resistance: Workers’ Aid to Bosnia

In continuing the discussion of nonviolent forms of networked conflict transformation, the types of physical disruption supported by ISM are perhaps less obvious than the direct transport of aid. Humanitarian aid is a common tactic of NGOs, and has faced significant criticisms. NGOs, themselves often hierarchical and bureaucratic, have not always been more effective than states. They have fused with states to some degree, through funding for example. 717 Aid agencies have sometimes undermined local initiatives by overly rigid schemes ignoring local politics. 718 Distribution of aid can be crucial to the persistence of conflict, for instance if it tilts power balances towards warmakers. 719 Boyce therefore emphasises a need for balance in funding and a focus on distributive equity so as not to upset the balance of forces which enabled a peace settlement 720, arguing that it is the targeting of aid, not its quantity, which influences peace. Africa Rights Watch’s Rakiya Omaar accused relief agencies of having too many qualms about feeding armed men along with civilians. 721 Questions thus arise of how to provide aid without patronising or reinforcing conflict.

Workers’ Aid to Bosnia offers a possible answer through a social movement network approach. Workers’ Aid explicitly took sides with the Bosnians in the war, and particularly the multicultural city of Tuzla. While most people looked to the great powers to intervene, Workers’ Aid viewed "the other Europe" of ordinary people,
and the workers’ movement in particular, as a potential counter-power. It is too easy to dismiss this as ‘old left’ dogma; it served as an organising imaginary orientation around which effective action was mobilised and a nascent network counter-power began to emerge. This oppositional idea made sense to Bosnian contacts of Workers' Aid, but not to labour movement activists in Britain and Europe, who instead put their faith in the UN. The counter-power of the network short-circuited beneath what might, in Debrix’s terms, be termed the ideological framing of the situation through the spectacle, connecting directly to silenced agents inside the situation.

In principle, the group was created out of a desire to be a workers’ movement and it sought to mobilise labour movement support. In practice, faced with the need for action and the hostility of labour movement leaders, it emerged as a broad network of the excluded and marginalised: young and long-term unemployed people, students, refugees, laid-off former workers in sectors such as mining, ex-soldiers and ex-convicts - people with enough free time and “madness” (or lack of commitments) to drive into a warzone. Blanked out by the union bureaucracies, they recount having to work from the outside, “as if the whole movement did not exist”. Hence, their labourist orientation was undermined by the force of positive energies coming from elsewhere. “People outside the unions were approaching and saying, ‘we want to help - tell us what to do’. It was impossible to ignore them.” Most often, it was with Bosnian refugees, rather than labour groups, that convoys were organised. Hence, the movement, run on volunteer labour, small donations and without organisational backing, is a demonstration of what can be achieved on a networked social movement basis, separate from large bureaucratised NGOs.

In contrast to most NGOs, Workers’ Aid was explicitly political and devoted to working with and empowering Bosnian survivors. The group denounced

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722 Workers’ Aid to Bosnia (various authors), Taking Sides against Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: The Story of the Workers’ Aid Convoys (Leeds: Workers’ Aid to Bosnia, 1998), 12, 39, 52, 83. In lieu of academic coverage, this account necessarily relies on participants’ accounts, which are, however, multi-voiced.
723 Workers’ Aid, Taking Sides, 83.
724 Workers’ Aid, Taking Sides, 8, 20, 67, 85, 103, 162, 185
725 Ibid, 89.
726 Ibid, 40.
humanitarian NGOs for refusing to take sides against ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{728} It took a stance against the idea of a ‘civil war’ driven by ancient tribal hatreds, instead insisting on a political analysis.\textsuperscript{729} Hence, the group provided politically targeted aid and avoided complicity in ethnic cleansing. Its status led to difficulties which had to be addressed by networked means. Workers’ Aid could not organise many of the things large NGOs took for granted. To begin with, they even lacked tax, insurance and MOT for their lorries.\textsuperscript{730} However, the urgency of action made bureaucratic and logistical niceties seem luxuries which were correspondingly neglected.\textsuperscript{731} One can see in this the power of direct engagement overriding formal barriers. Faced with disruption along the route, the group resorted to the tested method of excluded groups: direct action. When the convoy was impeded en route by local police, border guards or UN forces, participants would take action such as blocking roads and buildings or sounding their horns until their demands were met, usually successfully.\textsuperscript{732} They also relied on lobbying from abroad in cases of interference and arrest, mobilising support through horizontal connections.\textsuperscript{733} Hence, effective use was made of network power to impose costs on interference and often overcome barriers.

The horizontal nature of the mobilisation, and its support for political demands of the oppressed, were crucial to its impact. Aid was delivered through the miners’ union in an attempt to strengthen local self-organisation and to avoid acting as outsiders "play[ing] God".\textsuperscript{734} At the request of Tuzla exiles in Croatia, the group made repeated (unsuccessful) attempts to open the northern road to Tuzla instead of using the nearly-impenetrable southern route, a political stance against the UN’s complicity in the economic war against Bosnia.\textsuperscript{735} They came to be viewed as leaders of the campaign to open the route.\textsuperscript{736} Accurately perceiving the wide-spectrum nature of the conflict, viewed this as an act of participation in a war in which "food was a

\textsuperscript{727} Ibid, 34, 42.  
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid, 1.  
\textsuperscript{729} Ibid, 9.  
\textsuperscript{730} Ibid, 65.  
\textsuperscript{731} Ibid, 128.  
\textsuperscript{732} Ibid, 22, 25, 48, 60, 71, 175.  
\textsuperscript{733} Ibid, 35, 71, 72.  
\textsuperscript{734} Ibid, 61, 126.  
\textsuperscript{735} Ibid, 19, 45.  

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weapon" and the closed northern route signified the "strangulation" of Bosnia.737 Hence, Workers’ Aid was not simply addressing suffering, but also the war itself.

Morale is crucial to the impact of the mobilisation, and is closely connected to its locus in intense active energies. The aim of getting a convoy on the road was meant to show others what could be done, and provided a testimony in this regard.738 The initial convoy quickly received "a flood of requests" to visit particular towns whilst International groups raised money and added their own lorries.739 In Tuzla, the convoys were met with enthusiasm belying their small scale.740 The coalescence of energy that emerged with the convoys was highly contingent and temporary, and drifted apart rapidly as the war ended.741

The political dimension was remoralising and gave voice to Bosnians. "We had faxes coming in from Bosnians in Australia, the US and elsewhere - they wrote with surprise and joy that people from outside the country understood the war and the significance of the northern route. They felt that no-one else had grasped what was going on in Bosnia",742 The group succeeded in getting media coverage in countries such as Croatia and claim to have helped the voices of Tuzla to be heard.743 On one occasion, they also took along the Desert Storm rave group and their sound system, recruited on the protest against the Criminal Justice Bill. This gesture faced extensive criticism in Britain, this was appreciated as morale-boosting solidarity in Tuzla.744 According to a recipient trade unionist, the aid itself was inadequate, but the "moral support" of appearing to not be alone was crucial.745 Compared to disillusionment with the UN and mainstream NGOs, this boost in morale is a great success for a badly resourced shoestring outfit run by a network of socially marginal people. It indicates the massive potential which a more systematic and persistent reliance on network approaches would have.

736 Ibid 36.
737 Ibid, 42, 53.
738 Ibid 3, 130.
739 Ibid, 15-16.
740 Ibid, 55, 127.
741 Ibid, 163.
742 Ibid, 46, 50.
743 Ibid, 23, 197.
745 Ibid, 178.
Armed Humanitarian Intervention: Brigadiers in Spain, Muslim Networks in Chechnya

The discussion will now move from nonviolent forms of networked intervention to the vexed question of whether armed humanitarian intervention can be carried out by non-state actors. As we have seen, networked peace construction efforts using nonviolent methods can have strong positive effects in terms of morale, information, visibility and framing. However, they are limited in cases where a regime is able to withstand pariah status or has strong external support. In such cases, it may be appropriate to use the network model to mobilise armed support for vulnerable groups under direct attack. This is the most taboo form of network involvement in conflicts, and requires a rethinking of the ethics of intervention.

The most famous historical example of network mobilisations in wartime is the case of the Spanish International Brigades, mobilised to fight the far-right Francoists on behalf of the left-leaning Spanish Republic during the civil war. Rosenstone endorses Vincent Sheean’s statement that the mobilisation was "a reflex of the conscience of the world". Estimates of the percentage of Communists range from 25% to 80%; most were idealistic young Party recruits or non-aligned activists. Many were "the same people who in another era would be going on freedom rides... or demonstrating against the Vietnam war". Most American volunteers were recruited from among unmarried men in their twenties, socially dislocated and from blue-collar backgrounds. Many suffered from the Depression of the 1930s and a large proportion was of immigrant origin.

Brigade volunteers tended to be idealistic and in solidarity with those they defended. Brigadiers are distinguished by their spirit of commitment and optimism. They

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748 Rosenstone, *Crusade of the Left*, 113, 115.
749 Ibid, 114.
751 Rosenstone, *Crusade of the Left*, 98.
752 Carroll, *Odyssey*, 4.
were motivated, in most cases, by a strong desire to fight the rise of fascism in Europe, and included many refugees from the German and Italian fascist states, and Jewish anti-fascists. Some black participants became involved to find a concrete way to hit back at racism, and around 30% of American recruits were Jewish. As well as fighting fascism, the Brigades offered a fraternity of equality. Brigadiers were motivated by political convictions which gave personal pride to their participation in the war. Some volunteers viewed themselves as struggling for peace against oppression. Participants may have been influenced by a wider culture of discussion and concern about Spain, through labour and student movement groups.

Viewing themselves as a workers’ or people’s army, the International Brigades were in fact an army motivated by political and normative commitment. "Viewing themselves as part of an international proletariat, American radicals welcomed this opportunity to take the struggle against fascism to another stage of history”. The imaginary construction of the movement was crucial to its composition as a social force. To be sure, the mobilisation was only possible because of the organising capabilities of the communist movement at the time, but its ability to mobilise was enabled by the attractions of idealism among the disenfranchised young and other marginalised groups. The International Brigades ultimately failed to stop Franco’s victory, but their military and iconic importance suggests that this ultimate failure was not inevitable. The arrival of the Brigadiers is taken to have enormously raised the morale of Madrid’s defenders. The mobilisation of thousands of volunteers for an ideological cause connected to human rights (the defeat of fascism) is suggestive of the potential for similar mobilisations in other situations of the same kind in which people feel a need to act but states are unable or unwilling to do so.

Moving to the present day, Muslim international armed groups are the most notorious instance of networked warfare today. They have gained notoriety due to the involvement of a minority of their members in human rights abuses including

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753 Ibid, 18.
754 Rosenstone, Crusade of the Left, 109.
755 Carroll, Odyssey, 111.
756 Ibid, 10.
757 Rosenstone, Crusade of the Left, 117.
758 Carroll, Odyssey, 12.
759 Preston, Concise History, 122, 128.
terrorism, and have become synonymous with ‘international terrorism’. It is not clear, however, that this designation is entirely fair. After interviewing people interned in Britain for supporting international armed struggle, Gareth Peirce concluded that people who went to training camps in Afghanistan were often like the International Brigade in Spain, "decent young men… motivated… by altruism" to fight what they perceived to be injustice in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya.\(^\text{760}\)

As a normative network, this international force is heavily affected by issues of just war. In 1989, Afghan \emph{jihadi} Abdullah Azzam had called for the creation of transnational Muslim brigades to defend frontline Muslim communities around the world. These brigades went to sites such as Chechnya, Bosnia and Algeria, creating a "nomadic jihad".\(^\text{761}\) Azzam provided a theory of \emph{jus ad bellum} (just war) to ground their support for armed opposition in cases where oppressive armies attack Muslim societies.\(^\text{762}\) Since only defensive war is justified by this doctrine, struggles against Muslim regimes had to be justified by claims of external colonial dominance or apostasy.\(^\text{763}\) While this can lead to open-ended warfare against an expansive range of targets identified as non-Salafi, it also provides the possibility for ethical appeals to affect whether conflict occurs. In Algeria, atrocities against civilians led to withdrawal of support for the GIA insurgency from international Salafis including bin Laden.\(^\text{764}\)

This international movement is not a hierarchical armed group, but rather, a loose network. The Salafi movement is highly decentralised and subject to centrifugal pressures.\(^\text{765}\) It operates through "micromobilization" in contexts such as friendships, study groups and prayer circles.\(^\text{766}\) The goal of the network is not material but rather, the creation of imagined communities which connect like-minded Muslims in an

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\(^\text{760}\) Gareth Peirce, Internment under the ATCS Act: the first two years, \emph{Statewatch}, 14:1, Jan-Feb 2004, 17-20.


\(^\text{762}\) Ibid, 217-18

\(^\text{763}\) Ibid, 221-2.

\(^\text{764}\) Ibid, 224.

\(^\text{765}\) Ibid, 209.

ethical community. Scholars gain leadership by reputation, leading to a fluid dynamic similar to Clastrean chieftdom. Marc Sageman’s account of Salafi groups emphasises the importance of the ‘small-world network’, in which relations are limited to a particular group but the ties (of friendship, kinship, discipleship and suchlike) are extremely strong and positive, creating an emotional force of cohesion. Despite their apparent ideological cohesion, Sageman suggests that Salafi groups exhibit little evidence of a coherent political strategy or grand plan, and have varying degrees of commitment.

Looking at the mobilisation in Chechnya further complexifies the picture. The Chechen separatist movement started out as nationalist, and secular nationalism remains a significant force within it. It has always remained primarily a separatist struggle, despite Russian and Salafi efforts tending to actualise the ‘Muslims versus infidels’ framing they both adopt. Chechnya was forced to look for support after its initial victory over Russia because of continued Russian pressure and a de facto blockade. In this context, Chechen warlords sought to connect Chechnya to political Islam in order to trigger solidarity from Islamic organisations, movements and states. Their main connection was at the elite level, based on "guns and money" rather than popularity. Even in the case of apparently Islamist warlords, the alliance was purely strategic, and foreign sponsors have not been successful in coopting Chechnya on a local level.

It was therefore the lack of other sources of support which led the Chechen leadership to accept the political Islamisation of the insurgency. In particular, Chechen President Maskhadov was very reluctant to ally with Islamist-backed warlords and only did so when under military pressure which made him dependent

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767 Ibid, 211.
768 Ibid, 214.
771 Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock’, 36.
772 Ibid, 52.
773 Ibid, 47-8.
774 Ibid, 42, 52.
775 Ibid.
on Salafi warlords’ resources.\textsuperscript{776} In other words, the fact that support was only available through Salafi networks, due partly to the ‘war on terror’ and resultant pressures against other forms of solidarity networking, increased the power of these networks. It should be added that, during the second war, the Chechen struggle reportedly received millions of dollars in aid via transnational Muslim networks.\textsuperscript{777} Furthermore, Chechnya won the first war against Russia and continued effective asymmetrical warfare after its re-invasion. On a purely military level, the alliance was a sensible move. The mere fact of an ability to assist militarily and financially in a context of human rights abuses widely admitted as too risky for humanitarian intervention is impressive, an instance of networks going where states fear to tread.

The Chechen case confirms the broader analysis provided by Kilcullen, who argues that Salafi groups gain international visibility and power mainly by articulating themselves into otherwise localised insurgencies.\textsuperscript{778} Besieged Muslim communities are effectively forced into the arms of Salafi networks to gain funding, skilled foreign fighters and global visibility, much as an older wave of local struggles were forced into the arms of the Soviet Union. This suggests that it is the ability of Salafi groups to operate as an effective international network which enables them to gain from such situations. This is paradoxically enabled by the growing tendency to prohibit international mobilisations. The capacity of such insurgencies to recruit internationally without relying on Salafi groups would substantially undermine the appeal of the latter.

The strategic nature of the link between Salafis and Chechnya should give grounds to reconsider the dominant discourse on such international mobilisations. Peirce’s investigation suggests that involvement in Chechnya was one of the reasons for internment in Britain. Several internees were accused of funding Abu Doha, a supposed terrorist involved in the Chechen insurgency. During interrogation the defendants admitted providing aid to Chechen resistance networks but denied that this was unlawful as they were aiding self-defence and self-determination. The British state has apparently decided that all aid to Chechen resisters, even to a “good”

\textsuperscript{776} Ibid, 48-51.
\textsuperscript{777} Wilhelmsen, ‘Between a Rock’, 44.
\textsuperscript{778} Kilcullen, \textit{Accidental Guerilla}.  

120
(non-Islamist) or “middle” (Islamist but not terrorist) Chechen resister, "if you sent boots that ended up on the feet of the bad [al-Qaeda] resister fighting alongside the good and the middle, then you were assisting international terrorism with a link to al Qaeda".\textsuperscript{779} It thus becomes a crime to support what may well have been a just war by any means.

It may be more effective, as well as more ethical, to recognise the legitimacy of networked just war in cases of human rights violations and oppression than to seek to criminalise all transnational armed networks. Legalisation could conceivably mitigate the worst effects of the violence of transnational armed networks. Firstly, if international armed mobilisations in cases of just war were widely accepted as legitimate, people called by feelings of solidarity would not need to affiliate with Salafi groups to evade prohibition; they could do so through open-ended networks. Secondly, even if people mobilised through Salafi networks, the fact that such mobilisations would be internationally legal if human rights were respected could act as a constraint on atrocities against civilians and appeal to participants’ own use of just war criteria. It is also possible that the idea of a ‘covenant of security’ would combine with toleration of armed activities in repressive contexts to defuse the risk of violence at other sites.

The argument against recognising transnational Muslim armed networks would doubtless hinge on the widespread portrayal of such networks as ‘terrorists’ prone to rights violations, and as part of al-Qaeda. It is certainly the case today that transnational Muslim armed mobilisations are typically carried out by Salafi groups oriented to armed struggle. However, only a tiny minority of the thousands of foreign fighters who attended training camps or fought in previous wars have gone on to commit acts of international terrorism. The denial of exit options from armed opposition has made people more likely to persist in armed activities and escalate to terrorism properly speaking. This leads to people being placed at risk of persecution for activities which fall well short of terrorism and which are motivated by fundamentally ethical principles of solidarity. The one-sidedness of the situation makes it difficult for any conflict transformation to take place in cases such as

\textsuperscript{779} Peirce, Internment’, 20.
Chechnya.

Summary

Conflict transformation and humanitarian intervention are thus quite possible without the use of powerful state agencies. Each of the mobilisations above has had certain effects. Recurring positive effects of network conflict transformation include raising the morale of beleaguered groups, raising visibility, transmitting local voices along horizontal lines, empowering participants, imposing costs on rights-violators, and slowly changing the framing of situations. It is to be remembered when assessing the effects of network interventions, firstly that they are being compared to two state interventions which could have been deemed to have better momentous failures, and secondly that they were often carried out with extremely small numbers of volunteers and very limited resources compared to these state efforts. Wider social recognition of the effectiveness, value and justification of networked mobilisations and greater direction of NGO, social movement and public resources towards such mobilisations would vastly increase their scope and effectiveness. Hence the account suggests overall that networked mobilisations are successful relative to their extremely limited resources.
Conclusion

Using a critical approach to problematise recent interventions in Haiti and Somalia shows deep flaws in the dominant model of humanitarian intervention. The justifications for such interventions by dominant states or state-like UN forces are replete with problematic theoretical assumptions which can act reproduce colonialism, assert epistemological privilege and fail to comprehend the actualities of situations into which they intervene. Interventions are thus caught between unintended consequences and ineffectiveness on the one hand, and dubious colonial and statist goals on the other.

In the first chapter, these problematic assumptions were approached from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the writings of liberal peacekeeping theorists such as Coady, Wheeler and Rawls. These theorists were shown to share a series of problematic assumptions: that Northern ethics is universal, that the state is necessary for a decent life (so that statebuilding is a necessary part of peacebuilding), that external agents can determine the interests and substitute for the voices of ‘victims’, and that the state is the proper agent for redressing humanitarian crises.

In the second chapter, these assumptions were problematised from a critical, postcolonial perspective by drawing on a range of fields outside the usual peacekeeping literature. It was suggested that the Northern model of the state includes social logics productive of war, that Southern states are often deemed to be 'failing' because of a misperception of the conditions necessary for state survival in postcolonial contexts, and that Southern societies and social movements provide models of warmaking and peacebuilding outside of the context of state power. These distinct realities of postcolonial contexts render the assumptions of liberal peacekeeping deeply problematic. Liberal peacekeeping theory, and by extension, applied peacekeeping discourse, function to silence agents (both state and non-state) in Southern contexts and show ignorance of local conditions which can clumsily reproduce or even exacerbate conflicts. Where these problems are combined with situations of asymmetrical war, the result is ineffectiveness. The state is not
necessarily the most effective peacemaker, the Northern state is not necessarily an applicable model in Southern contexts, and claims to speak for 'victims' cannot be made in isolation from empirical situations which are socially meaningful for participants.

We saw this in practice in the cases of Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, a culturally inappropriate and highly insensitive intervention inadvertently caused a continuation of war, abuse of Somalis, and eventually the defeat of the UN and US in an asymmetrical war arising from the arrogance of its goals and the insensitivity of its methods. The argument advanced here showed how defeat was partly an effect of inappropriate attempts to impose alien and unpopular state forms in a social context marked by the diffusion of power. By trying to act like a state in a situation where state power was viewed as self-interested predation, the UN turned itself into the 'sixteenth Somali faction' and found itself routed by local forces with greater contextual knowledge and mastery of asymmetrical warfare.

In Haiti, the possibility of simulating crisis rendered humanitarian intervention complicit in destabilisation, and enabled powerful forces to replace an arguably more humane with a less humane regime under the cover of peacekeeping. The attempt to impose a Northern-endorsed form of the state involves the disempowerment of Haitian social forces, because a popular and functioning state-formation in Haiti necessitates widespread inclusion and the breakdown of the boundary between the state and society. By pathologising everyday social networks as 'gangs', peacekeeping discourse renders itself complicit in the reproduction of dictatorial state-forms separated from society, and hence in the disempowerment of the Haitian majority and the reproduction of the conditions for conflict. While the cases differ in that the victim of silencing in the Haitian case was a state, as opposed to diffuse social power in Somalia, there are also clear similarities in that peacekeeping in both cases elided and substituted for widespread forms of local agency, empowering authoritarian agents in the process. In both cases, it is clear that the short-circuits between liberal theory, media discourse, peacekeepers’ assumptions and the complexity of actual situations creates a disastrous matrix for the emergence of authoritarian forms of power.
A central focus of this dissertation is on the close relationship between humanitarian intervention discourse and the state. While the proximate causes of humanitarian intervention is a contingent incident of particularly brutal civil war or genocide, the way such causes are refracted through the Northern discursive lens renders them matters of the loss of values embodied in state power, expressed in ideas such as ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘order’. Thus, while humanitarian intervention may override the sovereignty of specific states, it is fundamentally connected to the imposition of the state as a social form. Humanitarian intervention does not negate the idea of state sovereignty, but makes it conditional and rescindable in certain extreme cases; it is based on the view that states are sovereign over societies, and that such sovereign states are the best, most ethical, or most irreducible units of global order, but that a state which has 'failed', either in the sense of being unable to control its territory or failing to perform what liberals take to be its basic functions, should lose any right to recognition.

Against this, this dissertation has counterposed the possibility of network forms of conflict transformation, ranging from dialogical peacebuilding to armed solidarity networks. In the fifth chapter, it was shown that peacebuilding has been pursued by a range of movements distinct from the UN and the state. A deliberately broad range of examples encompassed for instance the grassroots social movement solidarity of the ISM and Workers’ Aid, the pacifistic deconstruction of conflict dynamics by in situ agents in the case of La Ruta Pacifica and cases of armed intervention by networked non-state organisations.

Overall, this dissertation has shown that the current field of conflict studies (with a few notable exceptions) may well be flawed in its overemphasis on the state as an agent of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Northern ethical positions cannot be universalised in conflict situations as this disempowers local agents, and local agents should not be treated as passive victims without voice. This does not rule out solidarity with 'victims' or agents in conflict situations, but rather, requires that local agency and meaning-production be placed at the heart of peacebuilding strategies. The state is neither necessary, nor in all cases helpful, in peacekeeping or peacebuilding. In many cases, networked forms of social life are more effective
producers of social peace, while state interventions can consolidate authoritarian forms of power, entrench militarised conflicts and cause new conflicts over control of centralised resources. In many regards, diffuse social power is more appropriate in building peace than centralised power. Where states are able to 'work' in the postcolonial world, this is possible only on the basis of what are widely taken as conditions for state 'failure', notably the mutual interpenetration of the state and diffuse networks of 'shadow' power in society. Aristide's Haiti, for instance, was an effective state to the extent that it was able to coalesce a concentration of popular forces, allying with rather than attacking popular social networks. Finally, the state is not the most effective means of intervention in many kinds of conflict situations. At the very least, other modes of intervention must be considered. At most, it is possible to imagine a world in which humanitarian response groups, activist networks and diffuse networked armed groups replace state and UN soldiers as the agents of humanitarian intervention.

This leaves the possibility for further research to expand and consolidate these findings, looking in more detail at how such networks could operate in a range of different settings, the conditions for their success and failure, and the normative implications of their potential power. In particular, it requires a rethinking of normative theory from attempts to justify or oppose state interventions to attempts to set the proper conditions for just war and other forms of intervention in networked settings. A basis would have to be found to distinguish apparently justified interventions, whether armed, humanitarian or nonviolent, from those (such as American aid to Haitian ‘rebels’ and ‘civil society’, and Russian neo-Nazi aid to Serb ethnic cleansers) which perpetuate oppressive situations. Research could also expand the critique of hierarchical peacekeeping to other settings such as Bosnia, and relate network peacekeeping to other fields of research into networks. It also suggests a practical agenda: normative and legal reform to recognise the importance of network approaches, and concrete political action to strengthen network conflict transformation. Statist peacekeeping and peacebuilding have sadly shown their limits repeatedly, but other options enabled by the changing international field are becoming available, creating a future potential for a more peaceful and just world.
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780 On the latter, see Workers’ Aid, *Taking Sides*, 74.


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