Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for
a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and
private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without
the permission of the Author.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND NEW ZEALAND

SECURITY POLICY, 1945-1960

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at Massey University

John-Martin Battersby

1994
Massey University Library

Thesis Copyright Form


(1)  (a) I give permission for my thesis to be made available to readers in Massey University Library under conditions determined by the Librarian.

(b) I do not wish my thesis to be made available to readers without my written consent for ....... months.

(2)  (a) I agree that my thesis, or a copy, may be sent to another institution under conditions determined by the Librarian.

(b) I do not wish my thesis, or a copy, to be sent to another institution without my written consent for ....... months.

(3)  (a) I agree that my thesis may be copied for Library use.

(b) I do not wish my thesis to be copied for Library use for ....... months.

Signed

Date

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

The copyright of this thesis belongs to the author. Readers must sign their name in the space below to show that they recognise this. They are asked to add their permanent address.

NAME and ADDRESS

DATE
ABSTRACT

The contention of this thesis is that the United Nations remained a primary focus in New Zealand's pursuit of security between 1945 and 1960 and this was not altered in any significant way by the development of regional security arrangements or changes of government during the period. Throughout this time the pursuit of security was a fundamental objective and it was the UN's value as a security provider which saw it remain vitally important to New Zealand. Such changes as there were in New Zealand security policy between 1945 and 1960 occurred gradually and were not related to changes of government or the advent of regionalism. Continuity rather than change characterized New Zealand's approach to the UN during this period.

This thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 investigates New Zealand security and the UN in the period of the Fraser Labour Government. It will be argued that Labour's approach to the UN during this time stemmed primarily from security considerations. Differences between Labour and National were not substantial and did not make a significant impact on New Zealand's approach to the UN.

Part 2 will investigate the relationship between the UN and the growth of regionalism. It will be argued that regionalism was not a development peculiar to the 1950s, or to the National Party's approach to security. The regional emphasis apparent in New Zealand security policy during the 1950s was solidly based on precedents established in Fraser's time and was, furthermore, never strong enough to marginalize the UN. Regionalism was a phenomenon which grew alongside the world organization in the 1940s and was not detrimental to New Zealand's continuing attachment to it. At times regionalism and the UN were perceived as closely related in the pursuit of New Zealand security objectives.
Part 3 will demonstrate the continuing commitment to the UN displayed by New Zealand, under National, in the 1950s. The underlying impetus and characteristics of New Zealand security policy in the 1940s remained central in the decade that followed. An analysis of New Zealand’s approach to regionalism in the 1950s, and a number of case studies involving New Zealand at the United Nations, will be used to demonstrate the enduring nature of this policy originally fashioned in the mid-1940s.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .................................................................................................................. ii
Table of Contents .................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... v
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... vi
Preface ................................................................................................................... ix

Chapter

Introduction:
The United Nations and New Zealand Historiography ........................................ 1

**Part 1**

1 The Path to San Francisco ...................................................................................... 17
2 Beyond San Francisco, 1945-49 ............................................................................ 18
3 Labour and National and External Affairs ......................................................... 40
Conclusion to Part 1 ................................................................................................. 81

**Part 2**

4 The Origins of Regionalism, 1944-47 .................................................................. 103
5 The Continuance of Regionalism, 1948-49 ........................................................... 120
6 National and Regionalism, 1949-54 ................................................................. 135
Conclusion to Part 2 ............................................................................................... 158

**Part 3**

7 Recovery of Confidence, 1950-54 ....................................................................... 161
8 The Suez Initiative, 1954 .................................................................................... 193
9 The Invasion of Guatemala, 1954 ....................................................................... 210
10 Security Problems in Burma, 1953-56 ............................................................... 231
11 Indochina, 1954 ............................................................................................... 245
12 The Gibraltar of the Pacific: Formosa and Offshore Islands Crisis, 1954-55 .... 264
13 The Membership Issue, 1955 ............................................................................ 294
14 The Suez Crisis, 1956 ....................................................................................... 316
15 The Second Offshore Islands Crisis, 1958 ........................................................ 349
16 The End of an Era Conclusion ........................................................................... 363

**Appendix 1** ........................................................................................................... 380
**Appendix 2** ........................................................................................................... 386
**Appendix 3** ........................................................................................................... 389
**Bibliography** ......................................................................................................... 394
LIST OF TABLES

Personnel and Expenditure Levels, Department of External Affairs, 1945-55 96

Overall Expenditure, Department of External Affairs, 1945-55 98
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTRO   Australian Archives, Australian Capital Territory Regional Office (Canberra)
ADelUN  Australian Delegation to the United Nations
AHC     Australian High Commissioner
AJHR    Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives
AJIA    Australian Journal of International Affairs
ANZUS   Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Tripartite Security Treaty) 1951
AO      Australian Outlook
APM     Australian Prime Minister
CGO     Committee of Good Offices (United Nations)
CMC     Collective Measures Committee (United Nations)
CROSEC  Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office
EAR     External Affairs Review
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
GAOR    General Assembly Official Records
HPS     Historical and Political Studies
IAPC    Inter-American Peace Committee (Organization of American States)
ICJ     International Court of Justice (United Nations)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>IHR</em></td>
<td>International History Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>JICH</em></td>
<td>Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mixed Armistice Commission (Palestine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDT</td>
<td>Mutual Defence Treaty (United States-Formosa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Minister of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min. &amp; Dept.,</td>
<td>Minister and Department of External Affairs (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MinIs</td>
<td>Minister for Israel (Diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>New Members Committee (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZAmb</td>
<td>New Zealand Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZCom</td>
<td>New Zealand Commissioner (Diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZDel</td>
<td>New Zealand Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZDEA</td>
<td>New Zealand Department of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZEmb</td>
<td>New Zealand Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZHC</td>
<td>New Zealand High Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NZIR</em></td>
<td>New Zealand International Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NZJH</em></td>
<td>New Zealand Journal of History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZLeg</td>
<td>New Zealand Legation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZMin</td>
<td>New Zealand Minister (Diplomatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NZPD</em></td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPM</td>
<td>New Zealand Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPMUN</td>
<td>New Zealand Permanent Mission, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPRUN</td>
<td>New Zealand Permanent Representative, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>Peace Observation Commission (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUA</td>
<td>Suez Canal Users Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEACDT</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact, 1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecEA</td>
<td>Secretary of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPNFZT</td>
<td>South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Raratonga, 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKHC</td>
<td>United Kingdom High Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCCP</td>
<td>United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCGO</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force (Sinai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOP</td>
<td>United Nations Special Commission on Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

This study is concerned with the role of the United Nations in New Zealand's pursuit of security from 1945 to 1960. The approach which has been adopted is that of an empirical historical work, directed at the particular experience of New Zealand in the UN. It is not a theoretical analysis of the general role of world organizations in the security of small states. This study contends that the UN remained a major focus for New Zealand and that this was unaffected by the development of regionalism or changes of government during the period. Security considerations were central to New Zealand's approach to the UN throughout, and led to a UN policy characterized by continuity rather than change.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first deals with the way the UN was approached under the First Labour Government and discusses the formation of New Zealand policy in the mid-1940s. Attention will be given to the San Francisco Conference at which the UN Charter was drafted, the pursuit of collective security, the veto and other related issues. Also investigated here is the relationship between Labour and National and, in particular, the significance of their respective approaches to the UN.

A further concern, dealt with in Part 2, is the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in New Zealand's approach to security problems. The emergence and development of regionalism will be traced from the mid-1940s with attention to its effects on New Zealand's approach to the UN. The commonly held view that regionalism was necessarily detrimental to a continuing emphasis on the UN will be rejected. It will be demonstrated that the growth of regionalism did not significantly affect New Zealand policy toward the UN and at times the two were closely related. As early as 1944-5 New Zealand approached regional and UN initiatives as complementary elements in its pursuit of security. This dualism became the foundation of New Zealand policy subsequently.

Finally, Part 3 will analyze the nature of New Zealand's commitment to the
UN after 1950 and investigate the degree to which it was similar or different to policy in the previous decade. The bases of New Zealand security policy concerning the UN, and its relationship to regionalism, were established and maintained under the Fraser Labour Government. These will be traced through the period 1950-60, demonstrating an essential continuity in New Zealand’s approach to the UN.

The fundamental concern of this thesis is the issue of New Zealand’s security. New Zealand foreign policy from 1945 to 1960 consisted of a number of components, including trade, human rights, trusteeship and colonialism, international law, and security. Security was the most urgent of these. New Zealand found itself in a very different security environment following the Second World War. British power had been weakened and the Royal Navy no longer commanded the seas as it had done in earlier times. New Zealand had experienced a direct military threat in the Pacific, sent in excess of 100,000 men to fight overseas and, at the conclusion of it all, faced an uncertain future. Would British power return? Would the United States face up to its international responsibilities (including the defence of New Zealand) or revert to pre-war isolationism? What was to stop the outbreak of another world war, or another hostile Asian power asserting itself in the Pacific? It was in this context that New Zealand embraced the UN. It promised a general security system, which, if successful, would solve New Zealand’s complex security problems.

Security remained the major issue for New Zealand after 1945. The onset of the Cold War, and instability and conflict in Asia, continued to fuel anxieties that New Zealand might again face a direct threat to its territorial integrity and political independence. The UN remained part of New Zealand’s effort to overcome the security problems of the Cold War. While defence commitments and regional arrangements became more significant in New Zealand security policy, these did not displace the UN as an organization which could be used, and was used, to meet potential military threats to New Zealand.

Throughout the period covered in this thesis other important issues such as trusteeship and human rights were major components of New Zealand’s activity in
the UN. These issues were not unconnected with security. The observation of basic human rights and the institution of a gradual and orderly system of self-determination through trusteeship were considered as means of eliminating the potential for world conflict. However, legal, constitutional, and administrative issues, rather than security, dominated New Zealand’s approach to its trusteeship responsibilities in Western Samoa. Furthermore, Samoa did not pose a security risk, nor give rise to any major security problem in the way crises in Southeast Asia or other international problems did.

Human rights issues were also important, but New Zealand’s immigration policy and approach to South Africa in the 1940s revealed inconsistencies between precept and practice in this area. Clearly, New Zealand believed that the UN should primarily observe the integrity of the sovereign state and deal with human rights issues only when this priority would not be compromised. New Zealand’s approach to the UN was built around security concerns. The UN was useful and important for many other purposes, but security was the issue New Zealand perceived as most fundamental and which it expected the UN to face up to before anything else. Consequently, trusteeship and human rights and have not been dealt with in detail in this thesis.

An issue more directly related to security, that of disarmament, has not been considered either. This issue did not impact significantly on New Zealand and was overshadowed by other Cold War issues. New Zealand was supportive of nuclear and conventional disarmament but frustrated by the lack of progress and soon accepted that, until the international climate improved, any move toward disarmament was unlikely. Disarmament was not considered an avenue which contributed significantly to New Zealand security during the 1950s.

This study has 1945 as its starting point, the year the UN was formed. However, the nature of the UN, and New Zealand’s approach to it, had already been developed in the later stages of the Second World War and some attention will, therefore, be given to years immediately preceding 1945. New Zealand’s Labour
Government, elected in 1935, had a history of supporting international organizations. It enthusiastically endorsed League of Nations action against Italy following the invasion of Abyssinia and was critical of the League’s failure to act effectively. In 1936 New Zealand produced a comprehensive document outlining means by which the League might be made more effective. This emphasized that there was no material fault with the League Covenant, but identified major problems with member nations not fulfilling their obligations under it. Many facets of Labour’s approach to the League were transferred to its policy toward the UN. But it was the Second World War, not the League, which shaped New Zealand’s UN involvement. The failure of the Singapore strategy and the Japanese invasion of the eastern Pacific in the 1940s made the need for new security arrangements imperative.

The finishing date of 1960 marks the end of a period distinguished by the importance of the UN in New Zealand security policy. The closing years of the 1950s saw extensive changes in the UN’s membership and the effect of this began to tell after 1960. New Zealand became a smaller part of an ever-increasing world organization made up of unfamiliar nations which did not approach the UN in the same way as New Zealand traditionally had done. The period 1945 to 1960 was, therefore, a period in which New Zealand had a profile and influence in the UN well out of proportion to its size, and certainly in comparison with the following two decades. This enabled New Zealand to pursue security priorities, established originally by the First Labour Government, through the UN for some 15 years. After 1960, the security emphasis in New Zealand’s approach to the UN was no longer as influential. New Zealand’s influence in the organization declined with its increasing membership. The loss of Western dominance in the UN, also due to increasing membership, deterred the Western nations from using the UN as a means of dealing with major security problems. Consequently, in the 1960s, unlike in 1954, the UN offered little comfort to New Zealand over problems in Vietnam.

In order to meet the new international climate of the 1940s, New Zealand’s wartime Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, established a diplomatic service. With Britain struggling to defend itself at home in 1940, the importance of the United States to
New Zealand’s security increased, and became critical after the Japanese drive into the Pacific in 1941-2. Walter Nash, Fraser’s deputy, was sent as New Zealand’s first Minister to the United States in 1942. The following year the Department of External Affairs was established and gradually the personalities who would have a major impact on New Zealand foreign policy after the war were drafted into it.

Initially, experienced government servants were drawn into the service. Carl Berendsen, Head of the Prime Minister’s Department from 1935 until 1943, had had a significant influence in New Zealand foreign policy, such as it was, since the mid-1920s. Almost alone, he had constituted New Zealand’s Imperial Affairs Office, a section of the Prime Minister’s Department. Later he was a central character in the formulation of the Labour Government’s approach to the League of Nations, collective security, and opposition to appeasement. In 1943 he was sent to Australia as New Zealand’s first High Commissioner and replaced Nash as New Zealand’s Minister (later Ambassador) to the United States in 1944. Berendsen went with Fraser to the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and was New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the UN until he retired in 1951. Berendsen had a powerful personality, was dogmatic in his views and expressed them forthrightly. He tended to be independent and autocratic and other departmental officials held him in awe.

Alister McIntosh, Berendsen’s successor as Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, became the inaugural Secretary of External Affairs and remained in that post until his retirement in 1966. He was less dogmatic and outspoken than Berendsen. While his relationships with political superiors, apart from Fraser, were not easy, his personality gained their respect and he exercised a major influence on foreign policy decisions for more than twenty years.

Other important personalities included Foss Shanahan, War Cabinet Secretary from 1940-45 and Assistant Secretary of External Affairs from 1943 to 1955. He became New Zealand Commissioner to Southeast Asia following the creation of SEATO in 1955. J.V. Wilson was also influential in New Zealand foreign policy-making until the mid-1950s. Wilson had been with the League of Nations secretariat
in Geneva from 1923-40 and later joined the Department of External Affairs. Like Berendsen, he made an important contribution to New Zealand policy at San Francisco and was involved in New Zealand’s UN delegation subsequently. Other personalities included Frank Corner, who joined the Department of External Affairs in 1943 and George Laking, who originally joined the Prime Minister’s Department in 1941. Both had a series of overseas postings and were important in policy formation in the period covered by this thesis. These officials have also been an important influence in the historiography of the period. McIntosh, Wilson, Corner, Laking, and others, including R.H. Wade, R.R. Cunningham, Bruce Brown and particularly Malcolm Templeton, have all made important contributions to the literature available on the various aspects of New Zealand foreign policy.

Amongst the politicians, Peter Fraser and Walter Nash dominated the formulation of foreign policy between 1940-49. Fraser was Minister of External Affairs from the Department’s establishment until Labour’s election defeat in December 1949. While Fraser usually consulted Cabinet on major issues, he tended to make foreign policy decisions himself. He was a tough and autocratic politician whose determination and commitment to the UN, in particular, created a strong personal following in the Department of External Affairs.

Nash was the only other Labour politician in the 1940s who was involved to any significant extent in foreign policy. He frequently represented New Zealand at Commonwealth Conferences, but not at the UN, of which he was also an enthusiastic supporter. Nash became Prime Minister in 1957 following the election of Second Labour Government and, like Fraser, served as Minister of External Affairs.

From 1950 to 1957 National was in power under Prime Minister Sidney Holland. Holland did not take the External Affairs portfolio, but was influential in foreign policy. He was unpopular with officials in the Department of External Affairs, who perceived him as uncompromising and uninterested in international issues. Frederick Doidge was National’s first Minister of External Affairs until he
retired in 1951. Clifton Webb was Minister from 1951 to 1954 when he, too, retired and again succeeded Doidge, this time as New Zealand’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Despite being somewhat resented by departmental officials, Webb had an important influence in foreign policy from the closing years of the Korean War until the height of the first Offshore Islands Crisis in 1954-55. Though dominated by Holland, Webb was a conscientious Minister, interested in international affairs and a determined broker in negotiations with other nations. Thomas Macdonald was National’s third Minister of External Affairs. He saw out the first Offshore Islands Crisis and had to deal with the Suez Crisis the following year.

These political personalities, of major importance to the period, are far less influential in the historiography of it. Few have written at all, and then not extensively. Fraser and Nash have been less affected by this. Fraser was the founder of the Department of External Affairs; understandably, those for whom it became a career have looked favourably on him, and the years 1943-49, in which many of them entered the Department. His contribution to foreign policy has been well covered. National’s Ministers, by contrast, fare less well; there were various conflicts of personality between officials and National politicians, and National explicitly halted departmental recruitment in 1950. As a consequence, officials, and even academics, have tended to be more critical of them.

With Berendsen’s retirement in 1951 came the appointment of Leslie Munro as New Zealand’s Ambassador to the United States and UN Permanent Representative. Munro was not a member of the Department of External Affairs and had no diplomatic experience. He had been Professor of Law at Auckland University, editor of the New Zealand Herald and a member of the National Party. The fledgling Department resented such political appointments and Munro was consequently unpopular there. Munro’s egoism exacerbated the problem and frustrated his ministerial superiors as much as his colleagues. He was not fondly remembered, but his contribution was immense.
Finally, I wish to thank my supervisors Dr James Watson and Dr Warwick Tyler for their continuing support and advice over the past two and half years. James’ contribution, as Chief Supervisor, has been particularly fundamental to this thesis. I owe a special debt to Professor Barrie Macdonald, I feel sure that without his constant and willing support I probably would not have undertaken this project. I would also like to thank Professor Kerry Howe for his assistance, encouragement and warm personality (not to mention accommodation) during this time, and Professor Paul Lauren of Montana University whose advice and experience were extremely valuable. I am grateful also to Dr Norman Austin, a constant friend and mentor, and Mrs Anne Austin for her kindness and encouragement. Thanks also to Dr Peter Lineham for his assistance and role as a departmental curiosity. I extend my appreciation to my fellow graduate students, Mrs Sarndra Rauzi and Ms Mary Gillingham; very special thanks go to Miss Evelyn Louis who, I’m sure, now knows more about New Zealand and the UN than she ever wanted to know, but has been a constant source of support nevertheless. I would also like to thank Mr Ian McGibbon for his friendship and assistance. Thanks also to Mrs Rama McGee and Miss Mary-Lou Dickson of the Department of History for their assistance, and for providing me with occasional work experience.

I am very grateful to the Historical Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs which granted a study award in 1992 to assist in the costs involved with this thesis. I would like to thank the Graduate Research Fund at Massey University which gave valuable financial assistance, particularly for a research trip to Canberra to use Australian Archives. My appreciation is also extended to Professor Glynnis Gropp, Dean of Humanities, for her funding assistance.

The staff at National Archives and National Library in Wellington, and at the ACT Regional Office of the Australian Archives in Canberra, deserve special mention for all the assistance they have given me in the course of this project. I am grateful also to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for allowing me access to restricted files and to Mr Malcolm Templeton and Mr Frank Corner CMG for access to the McIntosh Papers. I wish to thank all those who agreed to be interviewed for
this project, Mr Bruce Brown, Mr Frank Corner CMG, Sir George Laking, Mr Malcolm Templeton and Mr Terence O’Brien. While this thesis does not necessarily reflect their views, their insights into the workings of New Zealand foreign policy have been immensely valuable.

I owe special thanks to Bryce and Dorothy Battersby for their support and assistance, (and for the frequent emergency cash, accommodation and car repairs) throughout my years at Massey University.
INTRODUCTION

THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND HISTORIOGRAPHY

The United Nations constitutes one of the longest running international organizations to which New Zealand belongs and encases some of the most consistent themes in its foreign relations since 1945. Furthermore, the UN has always been the most extensive forum for New Zealand's contact with the international community. New Zealand is a small country with insufficient resources to support a comprehensive diplomatic network with the other nations of the world. This, on its own, dictates a place of considerable importance for the UN in the formation of New Zealand's foreign policy. However, New Zealand's participation in the UN has so far received little attention from historians. There is no general survey of New Zealand's relationship with the UN. A handful of articles are available on New Zealand and the UN¹ and there are a few theses which cover aspects or periods of New Zealand's UN experience, but they are limited in scope.²

One reason for this limited academic interest in the UN has been the assumption that its significance to New Zealand security waned early. It has been argued that the UN was envisaged by its founders as a general security organization, but failed to tackle the major problems of the late 1940s, and consequently its significance to New Zealand faded. It is asserted that more effective regional associations were adopted and performed the role initially intended for the UN. Historians have therefore treated the UN as a something of a transitory phenomenon in New Zealand's external relations and certainly in the country's approach to


security.\(^3\) Ian McGibbon in 1977 saw the UN’s failure to provide a security guarantee to New Zealand evident from its establishment: ‘the United Nations collective security machinery created in 1945 contained many defects, which introduced a fatal element of uncertainty regarding its operation’.\(^4\) Fifteen years later McGibbon remained convinced that the results of the San Francisco Conference, which created the UN, left a ‘fatal element of uncertainty’ about its ability to function as a security provider.\(^5\)

Similarly, T.C Baker wrote in 1971 that when ‘the hopes and ideals of small nations faded in the shadow of the veto New Zealand was forced to look elsewhere’ for its security.\(^6\) A year later, Richard Kennaway came to the same conclusion:

For reasons largely outside New Zealand’s control, the United Nations while performing many useful minor functions has proved much less successful than many of its founders hoped in helping to eliminate the problems of international conflict. In many of the numerous conflicts since 1945, the role of the United Nations has been marginal.\(^7\)

Paul Enright asserted in 1982 that, as a result of the UN’s failure over the partition of Palestine, ‘New Zealand was forced to accept that the United Nations was an ineffectual agency for collective security and... sought to guarantee its security through more traditional arrangements.’\(^8\) Bruce Brown, a former secretary

\(^3\) This is identifiable also in Australian historiography, Edwards and Pemberton, for example, note a quick decline in Australia’s hopes for collective security through the UN; Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965 (Sydney, 1992), p.11.


\(^7\) Richard Kennaway, New Zealand Foreign Policy 1951-71 (Wellington, 1972), p.133.

\(^8\) Paul Thomas Enright, ‘New Zealand’s Involvement in the Partitioning of Palestine and the Creation of Israel’, MA Thesis (Otago University, 1982), p.iii.
to Walter Nash and subsequently an official in the Department of External affairs, put forward a similar view in 1970:

New Zealand soon found that its idealistic conception of collective security, expressed in the League before the Second World War and again most dramatically at San Francisco in 1945, simply did not fit the emerging post-war world; we were soon obliged to come to terms with the need for more prosaic regional security guarantees.9

Twenty years later, the same sentiment was expressed by Roderic Alley who, in 1991, lamented the failure of New Zealand to 'effectively follow through with the small state activism that Fraser had performed with distinction at San Francisco in 1945'.10 The general belief is, therefore, that New Zealand ceased to view the UN as an important factor in its pursuit of security.

Replacing the UN were, as Brown suggested, 'more prosaic regional security guarantees'.11 This is an idea which has tremendous strength in New Zealand historiography. After dealing in short with the UN, McGibbon went on to outline New Zealand's developing regional security machinery.12 Similarly, Kennaway concluded that the UN was not significant:

Whatever other options may have existed, therefore, it is hard to see that reliance on collective security through the United Nations has been a valid option.... In effect, therefore, New Zealand like many other small states has relied on regional security arrangements rather than the universal collective security envisaged by the U.N. Charter.13

In 1977 Malcolm McKinnon developed the idea that the concept of universal

---


11 Brown, p.4.


13 Kennaway, p.134.
collective security mutated at some point after 1945 and manifested itself in a more limited form within the Western alliance structure thereafter. This conclusion does not separate him from other historians and he has basically presented the same idea of the UN superseded by regional organizations. The orthodox view is perhaps best put by Brown, who succinctly argued that there was a fundamental transition in the way New Zealand foreign policy was conducted in the post-war years:

In 1945 there had been no firmer advocate than Fraser of genuinely international rather than regional collective security; four years of post-war divisions and the paralysis of the United Nations security system caused by Great Power antagonism had brought him to a frank recognition of the need for regional alliances.

The movement from the UN to regionalism is an unmistakable feature of the frame through which historians have viewed New Zealand’s past foreign policy. This has led to the assumption that the UN on the one hand, and regionalism and regional alliances on the other, were natural and necessary opposites. Brown observed an ‘interesting dualism’ in New Zealand foreign policy in the mid-1940s; an emphasis on the UN, on one hand, and a clear interest in regional security measures, on the other, existing at the same time. But the ‘apparent conflict’ was prevented by the UN failing to become significant:

There is an interesting dualism here because for some years New Zealand’s conceptions about the way in which collective security should be organised in an international framework co-existed side by side with a continuing and active concern in Government to secure guarantees for our national security in a more specific and regional sense. An apparent conflict between the two approaches was for some time avoided in public postures by the zeal with which the holy grail of international security through the United Nations system was pursued, and the high hopes which initially were entertained for it. But on the premises accepted by the Government of the day (and by almost all Western Governments) the threat to Western interests which


15 Brown, p.10.

16 ibid, p.25.
the Communist world under the leadership of the Soviet Union represented in the late 1940s spelt the end of this immediate post-war idealism.\textsuperscript{17}

This theme was reasserted in 1991 by Alley who wrote that ‘New Zealand’s membership of United States-led military alliances’ contributed to its inability to maintain a strong UN policy after Fraser’s initial attempts in 1945.\textsuperscript{18} This line of argument has been reinforced by Alley and other commentators who have claimed that membership of ANZUS and SEATO caused New Zealand to default on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which obliged UN members to refrain from the use of force.\textsuperscript{19} Mary Woodward argued in 1968 that there was ‘no doubt that all regional pacts do weaken the United Nations’.\textsuperscript{20} These alliances are presented as reflecting a lack of confidence in the UN and detrimental to its importance in New Zealand’s approach to world affairs.\textsuperscript{21}

Within this well-established dichotomy exists a further assumption - the belief that the First Labour Government followed an extraordinarily distinctive, farsighted, ‘principled’ and ‘idealistic’ foreign (and security) policy. F.L.W. Wood in 1958 wrote of the New Zealand Delegation at San Francisco in 1945 expressing radical views and reaffirming moral principles in its approach to the proposed world organization.\textsuperscript{22} J.V. Wilson in 1962 noted that ‘it was impossible not to admire the moral earnestness, pertinacity and conviction’ of Peter Fraser at San Francisco.\textsuperscript{23} Brown described Fraser’s policy as the high point of New Zealand’s ‘international

\textsuperscript{17} ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Alley, p.167.

\textsuperscript{19} ibid, p.170.

\textsuperscript{20} Mary Woodward, \textit{SEATO: No Place for New Zealand} (Christchurch, 1968), p.4.


idealism' reflecting its 'outlook of international righteousness'. Inaugural Secretary of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, referred to Fraser's moral fervour and farsightedness, and of the idealism of the New Zealand Government in the 1940s. Collective security and New Zealand policy at San Francisco is therefore presented as a 'principled' foreign policy rather than a 'pragmatic' one.

Implied, but not often stated, in this portrayal of Fraser and Labour in the 1940s, is the absence of any such idealism apparent in the National Party Opposition during the same period, or after it became government in late 1949. Recently Roderic Alley and former Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Malcolm Templeton, have asserted that National was a poor successor to Labour. Alley has claimed that a 'general lack of political direction...afflicted the conduct of New Zealand's external relations for considerable periods during the early and mid-1950s'. Templeton, in a number of publications, has argued that National fell short of the moral, principled and evangelical standards Labour set:

There was, admittedly, a head of moral steam behind the foreign policy positions adopted by the first Labour Government: opposition to the appeasement of European dictators, for example, support for an effective collective security system to deter any future aggression once the war had ended, promotion of self government for colonial peoples, and international action to accelerate economic and social progress, including full employment and respect for human rights. Ministers in that government would not have dissented from Carl Berendsen's dictum that "what is morally right must be politically right"....

Ministers in the National government... did not share their predecessors' moral fervour nor their desire to be seen to follow an independent foreign policy. There was scepticism about the need for New Zealand to have its own diplomatic service and a notable reluctance to spend money on it. In general, the National Government's approach to foreign affairs was less evangelical and

24 Brown, pp.5-6.


26 Alley, p.167.
more pragmatic.27

According to Templeton, Prime Minister Sidney Holland had only two objectives: 'to present himself as an Empire loyalist by fully supporting British policies, and to avoid spending the taxpayer's money'.28 Where Labour was prepared to take radically independent stances on international issues, National was 'happy for the most part to wear the 'silken bonds' of Empire'.29 Naturally, New Zealand's commitment to the UN suffered as a consequence; National kept the 'general line of policy' supporting the UN, but did so 'with less conviction'.30 Alley claims that under National, 'New Zealand's approach to the UN remained one of constructive, yet secondary engagement' and was generally a 'sideshow' in foreign policy.31

This perceived difference in approach also extends to the way in which Labour and National approached the UN and regionalism. Ann Trotter's handling of this in 1990 is the most explicit example.32 Trotter presented New Zealand's move toward regional alliances as directly related to the change of government in 1949. She argued that Fraser had little interest in regional security and, instead, pursued universal collective security through the UN. Trotter notes Fraser's Ottawa statement of January 1949: 'If the need arose for the democratic nations in the Pacific to stand together, I am sure we would see a Pacific Pact[,] developing along the lines


29 ibid, p.4.

30 ibid, p.6.

31 Alley, p.167.

of the Atlantic Pact which is shaping up now.\footnote{Memorandum for Shanahan, Pacific Pact, 31 July 1949, PM 111/3/3, Part 1; Trotter, p.110.}

This statement, she argued, was the first public acknowledgement of New Zealand’s position on a regional security arrangement.\footnote{Trotter, p.110.} ‘The tentative language used by the Prime Minister suggested that, in his view, the need had not yet arisen for the conclusion of a Pacific pact on the lines of an Atlantic pact.’\footnote{ibid.} According to Trotter, there was a fundamental resistance in Labour’s security policy to the development of regional organizations. Trotter then contrasted this with National’s approach, less concerned with the UN and orientated more toward Cold War regionalism:

While the new government did not seek to alter the main lines of New Zealand foreign policy, the emphasis changed. By the time Fraser left office, the Cold War was already an important factor in foreign policy considerations and, for both Doidge and Holland, the ‘red tidal wave’ became a very real threat. In the National Party’s period in office, there was to be less stress on collective security and the United Nations and more on ‘the march of communism’. Defending New Zealand against this march was a priority and, ironically, given their ‘Empire centred’ view, Doidge and Holland found themselves, in the interests of New Zealand security, looking to American protection and leadership at least in Pacific and Asian affairs.\footnote{ibid. p.114.}

Generally accepted in the historiography, therefore, is the existence of idealism and an attachment to the UN under the Fraser Labour Government. This is contrasted with a more pragmatic approach and an emphasis on regional security under National. In some cases the UN’s failure and the move toward regionalism has been identified as occurring prior to National’s accession.\footnote{McGibbon, ‘The Defence of New Zealand’, p.146; Brown, p.10.} Overall, however, there is a strong belief that the idealistic policy of supporting collective security through
the UN declined, either completely or partly, because of National’s general approach to external affairs.  

That differences between Labour and National are the key to understanding New Zealand foreign policy between 1945 and 1960 will be directly confronted in this thesis. McKinnon’s position that New Zealand foreign policy has historically contained a far greater element of continuity than change will be endorsed. It will be argued that continuity was also the major feature in New Zealand’s relationship with the UN. In the 1940s, New Zealand’s approach to the UN was primarily defined by security concerns. In terms of this thesis, security is defined as, essentially, aiming to prevent the emergence of any military threat to New Zealand and, at the same time, attempting to provide protection against such a threat if one did eventuate. New Zealand’s search for security remained fundamental to its approach to the UN from 1945 until 1960 and as critical in the UN’s continued significance to New Zealand during this period.

The contention of this thesis is that the UN remained a primary focus in New Zealand’s pursuit of security between 1945 and 1960 and was unaffected by the development of regionalism or changes of government during the period. The purpose of Part 1, is to investigate the basis of New Zealand security policy vis-a-vis the UN in the period of the Fraser Labour Government. It will be argued that Labour’s approach to the UN during this period was dominated by security considerations. The Second World War had comprehensively re-structured the global and regional environment in which Australia and New Zealand existed. It was believed that Japanese armed forces had almost got to New Zealand in 1942; with

38 A similar theme can be detected in Australian historiography, Geoffrey Sawyer, for example, noted two phases in Australian policy toward the UN, the Evatt period (1945-49) and the Spender-Casey Period (1950-55); Geoffrey Sawyer, ‘The United Nations’, Australia in World Affairs 1956-60, ed. Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (Melbourne, 1963), p.145.


terrifying swiftness they had reached New Guinea, bombed Darwin, and the Japanese Navy, in the Coral Sea, had been only days away from New Zealand. Weaponstechology had developed so dramatically that New Zealand’s isolation was no longer an adequate preventative. British power had been reduced, American power was blossoming, but uncertain of its place, and for New Zealand, like Australia, a new means of security became imperative.

It is difficult to ascertain precisely what historians have meant in describing policy of this time as ‘idealistic’, for they offer no definition of the term. They appear to mean that Labour’s foreign policy, inclusive of its pursuit of security, genuinely observed considerations of morality and principle. Furthermore, it was a policy which was formed with considerable vision and farsightedness and was not compromised by harsher world conditions. The National Government, which succeeded Labour, has been identified as ‘pragmatic’ by comparison, implying that the ‘idealistic’ foreign policy followed by Labour had less or no ‘pragmatic’ component. It seems, therefore, that what is meant by an ‘idealistic foreign policy’ in New Zealand historiography is a principled, ethically sound and morally correct policy, which is unaffected by ‘pragmatic’ considerations, at least to the extent that they did not interfere with its basic ‘principled’ or ‘idealistic’ nature.41

The difficulties in accepting this dichotomy based on the role of ‘idealism’ or related assumptions are immense. The term has not been defined and associated features, such as ‘principle’, ‘morality’, ‘vision’, ‘evangelism’ contain their own definitive problems. Assuming comprehensive definitions could be produced, it would be a difficult operation indeed to present any convincing case that National’s foreign policy in general was ‘immoral’ or ‘unprincipled’ or without ‘ideals’ or ‘vision’. National was often just as critical as Labour of other nations’ policies

41 See also Bruce S. Bennett, New Zealand’s Moral Foreign Policy 1935-1939: The Promotion of Collective Security Through the League of Nations (Wellington, 1988). Bennett supported this idea, arguing that Labour’s foreign policy between 1935-9 was fundamentally a moral one. Bennett did not offer any definition for the term ‘moral’ or suggest what moral code he used. However, he described Labour’s policy as denouncing ‘Realpolitik’ and he contrasted ‘practical and effective’ British policy to ‘the New Zealand search for the correct moral choice’ (p.11.). He described Fraser and Nash as ‘idealists’, but again neglected to define this term (p.13.).
which were perceived as placing expediency ahead of principle. It is worth observing that Fraser did not describe himself, or his policies, as ‘idealistic’ and, similarly, National did not perceive its policy being motivated by expediency without regard to ‘principle’. While security policy decisions were inevitably based on security considerations, National nevertheless perceived its attitude to the Korean War, Security Council issues, the Suez Crisis and other events in the 1950s as, fundamentally, the ‘right’ approach. J.V. Wilson wrote in 1962 that New Zealand in the 1950s moved away from its 1940s role of ‘Major Prophet’ on international issues, toward that of ‘honest broker’. Despite claiming that a significant change occurred in New Zealand’s relationship to world events, Wilson perceived no alteration in the moral quality of New Zealand policy.

The 1956 Suez Crisis provides an illustration of the difficulties inherent with this type of dichotomy. Templeton, who was a member of New Zealand’s UN Mission in New York at the time of the Crisis, recently asserted that New Zealand’s approach to it could not be reconciled with ‘principle’. He gave no explicit indication of what he meant by ‘principle’. He appeared to mean that New Zealand’s policy over Suez was morally indefensible, that it was in fact ‘wrong’ to support the use of force against Egypt in order to reimpose international control of the Suez Canal.

However, the New Zealand Cabinet of the time was not in accord with Templeton’s view. As McIntosh observed at the time, Cabinet had been ‘determined to stand by Britain through thick and thin, the more so if she is wrong which, however, they do not believe.’ If Berendsen’s dictum is applied in this instance, ‘what is morally right must be politically right’, there seems to be little case for judging the National Government’s action as ‘immoral’ or ‘unprincipled’. The National Government did what it believed was ‘right’.

42 Wilson, p.76.
43 Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire, p.1.
44 Draft Telegram - McIntosh to Corner, Unnumbered, 6 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.
A further example of this problem is evident in New Zealand's approach to the Palestine issue a decade earlier. An External Affairs Committee paper produced in 1947 concluded that 'on "realistic" grounds' it was wise to support the partition of Palestine.\footnote{Palestine: Supplementary Points for Consideration, 20 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.} It went on to state, however, that there were 'certain moral principles involved' that should be considered in any decision.\footnote{ibid.} These were discussed briefly:

It may be all right to support a proposal on "practical" grounds, but we should beware lest we support a type of outlook and a principle that can be turned against us.

1. Even if it is just to give the Jews a chance to build a home, should an international body have the right to carve up a country and give part of it to another people, even though that people does need it? (Imagine the same line of practical thinking being applied to New Zealand - Chinese could make better use of the Canterbury plains, therefore they should have them).

2. Has an international body the right to order a people (the Arabs) to receive immigrants whom it does not want to receive? (Imagine the position being reversed and [the] United Nations deciding by [a] two-thirds majority that New Zealand should receive a million Indians, and enforcing that decision).

It is perhaps these two principles which the United Kingdom has in mind when they say they will not enforce a settlement which is not inherently just.

Is the United Nations primarily concerned with the rights of states or with the rights of individuals? That is an important question for prosperous New Zealand to consider.\footnote{ibid.}

The above discussion purports to deal with two 'moral principles'. Yet, at the same time, these issues are identified as directly relating to New Zealand’s own explicit national interests and this is done without, in the view of the author, detracting from the initial perception of their inherent morality.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. The decision on whether or not a given policy was principled seems, in the first instance, to rely too heavily on assumptions of 'right' and 'wrong'. These differ remarkably between places, people and time and therefore historical judgements based upon them are of indeterminable validity. In the second, a moral principle in policy can be perceived to exist or be upheld regardless of whether or not it has inherent pragmatic value. Distinguishing Labour from National on the basis of one being more or less oriented toward moral principles or pragmatic considerations than the other is, therefore, of dubious value.

It is concluded here, therefore, that the dichotomy which is frequently applied to Labour and National approaches to foreign policy and especially the UN, is ill-defined and problematical, and should be abandoned as a basis upon which the period can be understood. There is no attempt made in this thesis to deny the existence of 'idealism', or elements thereof, whatever it means, in foreign policy approaches of either political party at any time during the period under review. It will be asserted in Part 1, however, that during 1945-49 New Zealand’s primary national concern was its security. Security considerations motivated the major objectives pursued at San Francisco and at the UN after 1945 and was a fundamental impetus underlying the UN’s continuing significance to New Zealand. New Zealand’s policy leading up to and including the San Francisco Conference and issues such as the veto, Palestine and the problem of domestic jurisdiction, will all be investigated. Differences between Labour and National approaches to external affairs will also be scrutinized. It will be argued that these were less marked than has been commonly believed and had no significant impact on New Zealand’s relationship with the UN.

Part 2 will investigate the relationship between the UN and the growth of regionalism in the context of New Zealand security policy. Once again, the presentation of New Zealand security policy in terms of a simple dichotomy will be challenged. Universalism and regionalism are not necessarily competitive phenomena, existing only independent of, and inevitably detrimental to, each other. Furthermore, security policy is not a monolithic entity capable of only one specific
and major focus at any one time.

This thesis will assert that regionalism was not a development peculiar to the 1950s, or to the National Party’s approach to security. The regional emphasis apparent in New Zealand security policy during the 1950s was solidly based on precedents established in Fraser’s time and never developed in a way likely to marginalize the UN. The significance of alliances such as ANZUS have been exaggerated and credited with a greater impact on security policy than they really made. Regionalism was a phenomenon which grew alongside the UN in the 1940s, it did not interfere with New Zealand’s basic attachment to the UN and at times the two were closely related. New Zealand pursued its regional security through the UN and designed other regional initiatives to fit into UN security machinery. Regionalism and the UN were not only separate and compatible means to attain security, but were often linked together in pursuit of it.

‘Regionalism’ is once again a term which lacks definition when it is used in New Zealand historiography and this has led to some misunderstanding of what the term meant in the 1940s and 1950s. This thesis accepts regionalism generally, in a security context, to mean New Zealand’s approach and relationship to a specific geographically defined and related area. No standard area should be connected with the term ‘regionalism’ and New Zealand’s regional policy encompassed approaches to various regions at various times (occasionally at the same time), but most often referred to the South and Southwest Pacific, the Pacific generally, or Southeast Asia. As will be made clear in Part 2, regionalism was used during the 1940s and 1950s to describe extensive and geographically distinct alliances, more often than not being promoted as alternatives to a universal security system. This aspect of regionalism has been distinguished by this thesis by the term macro-regionalism, a term which could readily apply to Churchill’s regionalized world organization of 1944 and to other regionally inclusive alliances such as NATO. New Zealand also confronted regional security on a much more limited basis, through arrangements and alliances which were easily defined as specific to a region, but were not regionally inclusive. This was understood in the period covered in this thesis as being different from
macro-regionalism and, in recognition of this, the term micro-regionalism has been adopted here. The individual arrangements concluded between the United States and Japan, the United States and the Philippines, and ANZUS fitted this mould.

Part 2 will question New Zealand's approach to regionalism on the basis set out above and, by analysing the periods 1944-47, 1947-49 and 1949-54, will illustrate how regional policy emerged and developed over the period. The basic distinctions between macro- and micro-regionalism were maintained, the former resisted and the latter accepted, through each of these periods and they provided the basis for a consistent policy despite the emergence of the Cold War and a change of government late in 1949. It will be argued that this consistency made New Zealand's regional policy and commitment to the UN compatible. Regionalism was not, therefore, a phenomenon which caused a diminution in the UN's importance to New Zealand.

Part 3 scrutinizes New Zealand's approach to the UN after 1950. It comprises a number of case studies of crises which involved New Zealand during the decade. These studies will demonstrate the consistency in New Zealand's approach to the UN. Once again a strong commitment to the UN was evident due to the perception of its value as a security-provider for New Zealand. New Zealand remained committed to the UN's overall authority in world affairs and opposed to macro-regional alliances as alternatives to it. New Zealand continued to pursue regional security through means which were separate and compatible with the UN. Significantly, regional security was also sought directly through UN machinery. The distinctive feature of New Zealand's pursuit of security through the UN between 1945 and 1960 was its continuity. Security objectives, and the means to obtain them, established by Labour in the mid-1940s, remained the fundamental basis of policy throughout the next decade. Looking back on this period, Alister McIntosh noted in 1977, the similarity in Labour and National policies toward regionalism and the UN, and the persistence of the belief in universal collective security:

It was almost with relief that New Zealand in 1950, under the Holland Government, joined with the United States in the United Nations call
for collective action in Korea and in supporting the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution in the General Assembly in that year. New Zealand was, in fact, taking advantage of the extension of the Assembly's powers for which it had fought so strenuously at San Francisco. As F.W. Doidge, the National Government's first Minister of External Affairs said in New York following the consistent theme: 'The world will not be safe from the risk of armed aggression, unless and until the collective resistance that is to come to the aid of the victim is both automatic and immediate.' That this vein of consistency was being maintained is shown by the reiteration in 1951 and 1952 by Doidge and his successor, Clifton Webb, that regional security arrangements which had by then come so much to the fore - and these included the ANZUS Treaty and later SEATO - were only a second best and that efforts should still be made to build up an effective world-wide system. It does seem in looking back that we tended to cling to the concept of universal collective security after it had become plainly unrealistic.48

Part 3 will demonstrate that the major emphasis on the UN as a security provider for New Zealand, clearly identified by McIntosh, endured long after the change of government in 1950. In summary, this thesis will assert that the UN retained a major role in New Zealand's pursuit of security between 1945 and 1960 and this was unaffected by changes of government or the growth of regionalism.

48 McIntosh, pp.27-8.
Part 1

The United Nations and New Zealand

Security Policy

1944-1949
CHAPTER 1

THE PATH TO SAN FRANCISCO

When New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser signed the United Nations Charter on 25 June 1945, it came as the culmination of an intense period of diplomatic activity. During this time, New Zealand staunchly advocated universal collective security through the United Nations. This is usually seen as an extremely distinctive period in the history of New Zealand foreign policy, in which extraordinary and innovative objectives were pursued with an unusual degree of enthusiasm. They were objectives which, furthermore, ‘did not fit the emerging post-war world’¹ and were not pursued once the Cold War had chilled the international climate, certainly not after the National Government took office in 1949.² It is a period in which foreign policy is usually described as being ‘idealistic’, a term which fails to adequately take account of the complex nature of New Zealand’s security objectives, which were such a major part of its foreign policy at that time.

This chapter will reappraise New Zealand’s security policy under the Fraser Labour Government in the period leading up to, and including, the San Francisco Conference of April-June 1945. It will be argued that the formation and pursuit of New Zealand’s approach to the UN during this period was dominated by security considerations. The determinants of policy, and the conditions in which it was made, will also be investigated in order to demonstrate that New Zealand’s security policy of the period was not unusual or extraordinary. It was in fact closely enmeshed in the security problems arising from the global and regional environment of the mid-1940s and the international political context in which it was pursued.

The Second World War not only produced the impetus for New Zealand's post-war security policy, but laid the foundations upon which that policy was shaped. The war began with the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939, and by 1941 it had spread through Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific. For the second time in half a century what had begun as a localized conflict had become a world war. This sustained a general belief, particularly strong in the New Zealand Labour Party, that conflict in any part of the world could very well proliferate and spread to threaten all of it. Fraser observed in 1944 that one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Second World War was the indifference of European nations to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.³ The concept of limited war, geographically confined, was not easy to grasp in 1945. In July 1945 Labour Member Philip Connolly (Dunedin West) described war as 'a complicated and chronic disease'.⁴ If unchecked war could spread uncontrollably and any war threatened to bring total war.

The events of the Second World War also alerted New Zealand to its own vulnerability. With the entry of Japan into the war New Zealand faced a direct threat. Like Australia, New Zealand had always felt threatened when British interests were imperilled, and enthusiastic contributions had been made to the Boer War and the First World War. The Second World War produced not only a threat to New Zealand via Britain, but a direct menace from Japan to New Zealand's political independence and territorial integrity. Faced with this, the Royal Navy had proved impotent as a defender, Singapore fell, and British warships sent to the Pacific were quickly sunk by Japanese forces. Australia and New Zealand were suddenly deprived of the protection which had been fundamental to their defence policies for over a century. Only the power of the United States had been able to offer security, but even it had been unable to prevent times of acute anxiety from the successive Japanese victories during the first half of 1942. The defeat of the Axis powers had only come as a result of an alliance of powers, including the United Kingdom, the

⁴ NZPD, 268 (1945), p.669.
United States and the Soviet Union, pooling their entire resources towards a common end.

As potent as the Second World War alliance proved, it had come late, evolving slowly as the world crisis worsened. The United Kingdom had declared itself for the defence of Poland only after the Rhineland had been re-militarized and Austria and the Sudetenland had been annexed by Germany. The Soviet Union had not acted until attacked and had colluded in the German expansion in 1939-40. The United States had avoided direct participation in the war until Japanese forces destroyed its Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour. The United States, furthermore, had a tendency to isolate itself from world events in times of anything other than an extreme threat to its interests. New Zealand surmised that, if war was to be prevented in the future, this alliance had to be maintained in peacetime; and it had to be able to react when a threat first arose, not after it had become acute.

The war also brought with it huge advances in weapons-technology. The San Francisco Conference was over before the atomic attacks on Japan were carried out. Nevertheless, the advances in conventional weapons, particularly in air technology, were perceived as pointing to a Third World War being so destructive that to allow it to start, observed Labour’s Benjamin Roberts in the House, would mean annihilation for the human race. There was an urgency in New Zealand, as in other places, about the need to prevent another war. The destructive power of atomic weapons, demonstrated in attacks against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, reinforced this belief.

For many nations threatened or invaded by Axis forces, including New Zealand, the Second World War had also been a war to retain or regain independence. The currency of the terms sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, had been enshrined in the Atlantic Charter concluded between American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the

---

5 ibid, p.591.
Placentia Bay Conference in August 1941. The Atlantic Charter

renounced territorial aggrandizement, asserted the right of all peoples to choose how they should be governed, condemned territorial changes contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory and looked forward to an equitable distribution of raw materials, fair trading practices, freedom of the seas, disarmament and an international security system.6

For New Zealand, the Atlantic Charter connected intimately with the anxieties experienced during the war. At the time the Charter was concluded, New Zealand was singularly dependent on Britain for economic and military security.7 If Britain was defeated by Germany the consequences for New Zealand would have been severe. The Battle of Britain had been won in 1940, but the U-boat blockade was still in force in 1941 and Britain's future was far from certain. New Zealand's insecurity increased when Japan entered the war, presenting a direct military threat to New Zealand territory. By 1942, the Atlantic Charter seemed to present a genuine solution to the security dilemma facing New Zealand. The denunciation of territorial aggrandizement and the assertion of the right to self-determination were serious objectives when the Japanese presence in the Pacific (or German in the English Channel) carried severe implications for New Zealand's sovereignty. Equal distribution of resources and fair-trading practices aimed to eliminate the perceived causes of aggression; an international security system would confront such aggression if these measures were not sufficient. The Atlantic Charter contained the recipe for New Zealand's long-term survival in a world in which traditional reliance on the United Kingdom would no longer be a viable guarantee of security.

During the early 1940s New Zealand also faced a quite different security dilemma, emanating not from the enemy but from the very nations from which it

---


drew protection. Conscious of the major security threat caused by the Second World War, New Zealand had (relative to its size) made huge contributions in military forces to the Allied war effort. After the Japanese entry into the war, it became clear that New Zealand had little real influence over the direction of Allied policy in the Pacific theatre. New Zealand's security was tightly entwined with developments in that area and this created the impetus for unprecedented developments in its approach to world affairs. Diplomatic representation in the United States was established in 1942 and a Department of External Affairs was formed in 1943. The necessity for 'an eye, an ear and a voice' in world affairs had been realized.

Even so, New Zealand still found itself in a position of considerable isolation on war and, more alarmingly, post-war policy. Major decisions affecting the latter in particular, were made at various conferences throughout the war years, in Placentia Bay, Cairo, Moscow, and elsewhere. These conferences had taken place between the leaders of the three major powers - Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill - usually in secret and sometimes without any prior consultation being offered to the minor allies. New Zealand first learned of the Cairo Conference through newspaper reports, and only then when it had finished. Deep suspicions grew that the Great Powers were planning to keep the post-war scene to themselves and ignore the large number of smaller allies which had participated in the war.

In January 1944, New Zealand's Labour Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, and Australian Labour Prime Minister, John Curtin, and Minister of External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, met in Canberra. There they concluded the Australian and New Zealand Agreement (Canberra Pact), which strongly reflected the unease which had been caused by the exclusiveness of major power planning in general policy. The Pact explicitly stated that Australia and New Zealand had 'vital interests' in peace arrangements concerning the war and asserted their intention to be involved 'at the

---

8 ibid, p.20.

highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies.'\textsuperscript{10} The Pact asserted further that Australia and New Zealand regarded it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should both be associated, not only in the membership, but also in the planning and establishment, of the general international organisation referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943.\textsuperscript{11}

Later that year a conference between the three major powers was held at Dumbarton Oaks in the United States, to discuss the creation of a post-war general security organization. Once again, the minor powers were left out.\textsuperscript{12} The old suspicions consequently proliferated. New Zealand’s Minister to the United States, Carl Berendsen, was closely monitoring the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and wrote of the conference in August 1944:

I am convinced what is coming out of Dumbarton Oaks will not be satisfactory to us, and I am equally convinced that it will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to alter it. It is going to be a Four Power affair and, so far as they can make it so, a Four Power affair only.\textsuperscript{13}

New Zealand received the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the blue-print of the UN Charter, with considerable dismay.\textsuperscript{14} Under the auspices of the Canberra Pact, Australian and New Zealand representatives met in Wellington to discuss the


\textsuperscript{11} ibid, p.142. The Moscow Declaration was the first specific indication that the major powers were looking at a general security organization. The name 'United Nations Organization' was not settled on until 1945, although the term 'United Nations' was used from 1942 to refer to the Allied nations fighting Germany, Italy and Japan.

\textsuperscript{12} Representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States attended this conference.


\textsuperscript{14} Sir Carl Berendsen, Reminiscences of an Ambassador, Book II, p.3-1-01.
proposals in November 1944. Once again the deliberations which took place between the two reflected apprehension about their non-involvement in major post-war decisions. It was asserted in Wellington that Australia and New Zealand desired to play their full part in the establishment of what was to become the UN. It was further noted, that while the success of the organization depended on the leadership of the Great Powers, it was ‘essential that all members should actively participate in the general control and direction of its affairs’. The experience of the war had indeed formed a new imperative in the pursuit of New Zealand security. New Zealand must have a voice in world affairs.

All these factors combined to shape the way New Zealand security was perceived in the mid-1940s. The threat to New Zealand during the Second World War had been that same as that which had threatened British interests in Asia, and American interests in the Pacific. The threat had been overcome by those same nations, and many others, in a concerted war effort. New Zealand security, therefore, was seen during the Second World War as intimately related to that of the rest of the world. A threat to world peace had emerged, and it had threatened New Zealand; a major alliance had been formed to check the threat, and that alliance had eliminated the threat to New Zealand. Understandably, when New Zealand's defence and political leaders set their minds toward New Zealand’s post-war security, it was within this world framework that they perceived both threat and protection. Berendsen told the General Assembly in 1946 that there could be no lasting peace and prosperity in New Zealand unless there was peace and prosperity throughout the

---

15 Draft Memorandum, 19 October 1944, 104/301/1, Australian Archives, ACT Regional Office, Canberra. Subsequent references to documents from Australian Archives will be preceded by ACTRO.


17 ibid.

18 General International Organisation: Military Proposals, Chiefs of Staff Committee, March 1945, PM 111/7/1, Part 1.
During the War, New Zealand had been marginalized from major policy decisions which were of direct significance to itself. The Canberra Pact was revealing in its assumption that Australia and New Zealand had 'vital interests' in the armistice agreements with Axis powers. With its interests affected in this way, and with the unwillingness of the major powers to include smaller nations in post-war decision making, New Zealand felt a strong need to assert itself. If the UN became nothing else, it would at least be a mouth-piece through which some influence could be exerted in affairs perceived to be of direct significance to New Zealand. Thus New Zealand security policy in 1945 owed a great deal to the experience of the recent past. Like ANZUS in 1951, New Zealand's early commitment to the UN was largely the result of looking back.

The San Francisco Conference was convened on 25 April 1945, and was attended by 50 nations involved or associated with the war effort against the Axis powers. New Zealand's delegation to the conference was led by Peter Fraser. Carl Berendsen, with Fraser, attended the most important committee meetings. Other senior officials, Secretary of the Department External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, and Assistant Secretary, J.V. Wilson, were also included.

The anxieties of the Second World War were clearly evident in New Zealand's approach to the Conference, especially in amendments it proposed to the purposes and principles of the new organization. On these New Zealand asserted the need for an undertaking to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of each member-nation. The independence and integrity of nations was a major concern to New Zealand. This concern extended from the security of existing nations to colonial territories, which had yet to obtain independence, and

---


20 Amendments Proposed by New Zealand at the San Francisco Conference, May 1945, ibid, p.86.
even had an influence on New Zealand’s position on trusteeship. The desire to create an international system to administer colonial territories in the interests of the inhabitants themselves, was, in part, an expression of New Zealand’s determination to protect its own right of independence. The Atlantic Charter had asserted the right of a nation to its independence; the Second World War had involved a series of struggles to maintain, or regain, independence against the Axis powers which had invaded or threatened a number of nations, including New Zealand. New Zealand perceived independence to mean security, and the new world organization was seen as a possible means to preserve that independence, particularly for small states, from future threats.

To be noted also was Fraser’s perception that in the complete recognition of a nation’s specific right to its independence lay the basis of world peace generally. World war had threatened New Zealand - world peace was the only way to prevent a further threat emerging. Peace could be established if the territorial borders and political independence of each nation acquired international sanctity and protection. Thus Fraser had aimed to engrave in the UN Charter an undertaking to preserve these things for all nations.

Having established that the independence of nations was the fundamental tenet on which a lasting peace could be obtained, Fraser set about guaranteeing that independence. He proposed that all UN members pledge themselves to ‘undertake collectively to resist every act of aggression against any member’. This would achieve Fraser’s desired goal of ‘an effective and lasting system of collective security’. Should any nation make war on another, the UN would react forcefully in defence of the victim.

If this could be facilitated, New Zealand’s security problems, so acute during

21 ibid, p.87.

the early 1940s, would be eliminated in the future. The source of world conflict would be dealt with by confronting aggression while the latter was still in its infancy, thus preventing it reaching New Zealand. Furthermore, security would be obtained by the collective force of all UN nations. New Zealand was a small, economically, politically and militarily insignificant state which did not have the resources to provide security for itself. The resources of the Royal Navy, and then the United States, had been required to protect New Zealand up until 1945. Neither had been able to secure New Zealand completely against all sources of anxiety, and therefore New Zealand desired a ready-made alliance of nations pre-committed to resist aggression in the future. At San Francisco New Zealand sought the use of resources, particularly those of larger nations, for a universal collective security system, and ultimately for New Zealand's defence. In effect New Zealand aimed to institutionalize the alliance system which had gradually developed during the Second World War.

These aims were established to counter the threat of renewed aggression and dealt specifically with the security and territorial integrity of states. Fraser was also well aware that there were vital security considerations for New Zealand which existed well beyond its national borders. This led to further proposed changes to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals specifically to enhance New Zealand's influence over decisions in which it felt it had a vital interest.

The most well known of New Zealand's attempts to break the monopoly of the major powers in international decision-making was its opposition to the rule of unanimity, or the veto. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals envisaged a world organization with two tiers, a Security Council and a General Assembly. The Security Council was to be made up of five permanent members, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States by virtue of their status as major powers. The Security Council was to be primarily responsible for dealing with threats to international peace, and was empowered to invoke collective measures, including economic sanctions and the use of force. The Security Council did not need recourse to the General Assembly in order take these measures, nor could it be
compelled to take action by the General Assembly. The rule of unanimity, agreed on after Dumbarton Oaks, required that any decision, other than on matters of Security Council procedure, had to have the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This gave each permanent member the ability to veto Security Council action.

The General Assembly, on the other hand, lacked power. While every member of the UN was represented in the Assembly, its powers were limited to discussion and recommendation on issues which were not being dealt with by the Security Council.

New Zealand was concerned at the restrictions placed on the General Assembly's influence in the political sphere. Fraser became well known for his criticism of the veto. New Zealand was among a chorus of smaller powers, including Australia, Cuba, Colombia, Denmark and Mexico, which vocally supported the various attempts to have the veto removed, or its application restricted, and consistently argued against it. In Fraser's view, the veto severely handicapped the ability of the organization to provide an effective collective security system. On a number of occasions he pointed out that any great power could act aggressively and avoid retribution by its power of veto. Even worse, in his view, was the possibility that any smaller power (similar to Germany, Japan or Italy) could take aggressive action, and avoid retribution. The power of veto could result in 'a cloak of protection' being cast over the aggressor nation by a permanent member unwilling to chastise an ally.

---

23 Commentary on World Organization (Dumbarton Oaks) Proposals, undated, PM 111/1/12, Part 1.

24 Statement by the Right Honourable Peter Fraser at the Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1945, Statements and Documents, pp.84-5.

25 ibid; NZPD, 268 (1945), pp.579-80.

26 NZPD, 268 (1945), pp.579-80.

27 Statement by the Right Honourable Peter Fraser at the Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1945, Statements and Documents, p.85.
Opposition to the veto was also part of a general campaign waged by small states to have the power of the Security Council reduced, and that of the General Assembly increased. Fraser was strongly identified with this campaign asserting the 'rights' of small states. Based on the way in which the smaller powers had cooperated with the Allied war effort, Fraser had reason to assume that the interests of smaller powers in peace and security issues would generally coincide. Certainly, in arguing against the veto, New Zealand found allies in small nations, such as Cuba, Colombia, Denmark and Norway, with which it had little or no contact prior to the San Francisco Conference.

Fraser was confident, therefore, in asserting changes to the functions and powers of the General Assembly, and to the provisions concerning enforcement measures. New Zealand called for the elimination of restrictions on the General Assembly's competence to discuss issues of peace and security, and the removal of provisions allowing the General Assembly to act only on the Security Council's recommendation. There was also a proposal that the General Assembly be solely empowered to admit new members to the organization, an issue in which New Zealand took a high profile some years later.

More significant was an amendment New Zealand put forward proposing that any Security Council enforcement decision be contingent upon General Assembly approval. This amendment was designed to establish small power influence over collective enforcement actions and contained a paradox. The Christchurch Press was impressed with Fraser's stand, reporting that New Zealand was one of the 'foremost protagonists' of the right of every nation to be heard before any decision was taken.

---

28 Feutz, pp.79, 165; McIntosh, p.26.

29 Amendments Proposed by New Zealand at the San Francisco Conference, May 1945, Statements and Documents, pp.88-91.

30 ibid, p.88.

31 ibid, p.90.
which would commit them to war, or measures short of war.32 Fraser was indeed concerned with this and declared at San Francisco:

In matters of peace and war, no responsible government, large or small, can sign away the right to pass judgement on itself in its own parliament... We are not prepared to be relegated to a position of "theirs not to reason why; theirs but to do and die". 33

The major powers were not prepared to allow the UN to dictate, or restrain, their policies on international affairs and imposed the veto. Fraser was also uneasy about the possibility of the world organization effectively forming policy for New Zealand and other small powers without allowing them any significant influence on the process; hence his desire for greater General Assembly control over enforcement decisions. In discussions at San Francisco, Fraser attacked the Security Council veto, while, at the same time, seeking a collective General Assembly veto, using an argument which could have been advanced as a solid case for the former. Fraser was determined to harness the military resources of the major powers to the security of small states, and he did not want interference in that security from the veto. But he did not want to be committed to a war, which could very possibly be in defence of a small nation, without at least the opportunity of New Zealand first being able to consult its own interests.

New Zealand’s proposal that all UN members pledge themselves to 'collectively resist' aggression against any UN member also contained paradoxical elements. This was a policy designed to maintain peace, by a pre-meditated commitment to war and the maintenance of military forces in a state of readiness sufficient to go to war at short notice. It was fundamentally a policy of deterrence, a term more commonly associated with the Cold War than Fraser’s security policy. If deterrence failed and one state invaded another, the universality of the commitment

32 The Press, 16 May 1945, ACTRO H45/775/2.
33 Statement by the Right Honourable Peter Fraser at the Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1945, Statements and Documents, p.83.
to resist aggression meant, in effect, world war. The concept of universal collective security, therefore, suffered from the paradox of deterrence - world war was to be avoided by the constant threat of world war.

The paradoxical element in New Zealand's policy toward the use of force was also evident in other areas. Fraser was committed to world peace, but he nevertheless showed a remarkable preparedness to pursue broader security objectives by the deployment of armed force. While the San Francisco conference was meeting to establish the UN, what was possibly the first theatre of the Cold War was opening over the future of Trieste. Trieste was a city situated on the northern tip of Adriatic and was legally Italian territory. However, Yugoslavia, led by Marshal Tito, claimed that Trieste had been unjustly given to Italy under a previous peace agreement. Tito hoped to rectify the problem by occupying Trieste in the confusion of the last days of the war. The New Zealand Division, having participated in the Italian campaign, occupied part of Trieste in mid-1945, thereby involving New Zealand in the dispute.

The Yugoslav policy over Trieste caused a disagreement between Fraser in San Francisco and the Cabinet in Wellington. Fraser wanted to prevent Tito from taking the city, and was convinced that the New Zealand Division could be used for this purpose. In writing to Nash on the issue in May 1945, Fraser outlined his position:

If Marshal Tito is permitted to succeed in his policy of smash and grab then the war and the peace are both lost. It will be the complete

---

36 Wood, p.364.
37 ibid.
38 Roberto Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste and the United States and the Cold War, 1941-1954 (Oxaca, 1988), p.54.
triumph of unscrupulous force and ruthlessness, a complete violation of all the principles of international justice[, cooperation and even decency.

I cannot imagine that our New Zealand Government which has won such a high position of esteem and regard among the United Nations for the clarity and courage of its attitude and pronouncements on international questions and which takes second place to none in its support at great cost of the principles which it has so firmly upheld, could possibly be a passive spectator while all it stood for in international affairs was being undermined and destroyed. I cannot force myself to believe that it is possible.39

However, Cabinet perceived the issue differently. With Yugoslavia threatening to take Trieste by force, the New Zealand Division could have been involved in further hostilities. Cabinet found this disturbing and wanted the Division withdrawn in order to avoid what it considered to be unnecessary, and unpopular, involvement in further conflict.40 In Wellington the expediency of avoiding what was likely to be an unpopular conflict and a further expensive commitment in men and other resources, tended to outweigh Fraser’s apparently more lofty motives.

Fraser had ascertained for himself what he considered the most desirable outcome. In order to achieve it, he was prepared to use the presence of force, and New Zealand force at that, to bring about concessions on the part of the Yugoslavs. Clearly, Fraser perceived the Trieste issue as involving certain ‘principles’. Nevertheless, these ‘principles’ were intimately woven into what had so recently caused New Zealand a major security threat. Fraser was emphatic. ‘Appeasement brought war upon the world. Appeasement at this stage would destroy any chance or hope of establishing peace.’41 He perceived the threat of the Second World War re-emerging over Trieste and was compelled by the lessons of recent history to stand fast on the issue. His policy over Trieste mirrored the approach adopted toward the formation of the UN - a strong emphasis on the threat of force and an overwhelming


40 ibid.

41 ibid.
orientation toward objectives which, it was hoped, would soothe New Zealand security concerns.

In approaching the UN, Fraser and his advisors, Berendsen, McIntosh and Wilson, marked out a policy which would have required an unprecedented level of international cooperation. The difficulties in implementing and coordinating such a system would have been immense, even if the degree of political cooperation necessary was attained. As Richard Kennaway pointed out, there were other problems which severely curtailed the practicality of a collective security system, including the development of nuclear technology and proliferation of guerilla conflicts. These things were not foreseen by Fraser and other supporters of universal collective security at San Francisco; they tended to look back to the experience of the Second World War as the model of future conflicts. The conclusion, that Fraser's policy would have been impossible to implement in practice, has naturally arisen in consequence. 'It does seem', wrote McIntosh, 'that we tended to cling to the concept of universal collective security after it had become plainly unrealistic.' New Zealand policy 'simply did not fit the emerging post-war world'.

Fraser, however, could not see the future and a closer analysis of New Zealand's approach to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals strongly suggests that it was an appropriate response to the conditions of 1945. Neither Fraser nor Berendsen, the two people most associated with New Zealand's policy at San Francisco, considered New Zealand's objectives impractical. They were aware that the enlistment of international support for New Zealand policy was going to require a tremendous effort; they were not under any illusion that what they sought at San Francisco was going to be easily attained, or even attained at all. There was a strong current

43 ibid, pp.133-4.
44 McIntosh, p.28.
45 Brown, p.4.
running through policy formation which stressed the need to accept the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and make do.

Prior to the San Francisco Conference, Fraser had attended a Commonwealth Conference in London. There he fully outlined New Zealand policy on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. This did not meet with a particularly good reception. Berendsen remembered the London talks with considerable disdain:

We found ourselves being treated with that kind of friendly and patronizing tolerance which adults show to the fractious child. We were told, not of course in so many words for that might be interpreted as impolite, that we were unrealistic, that we were not facing the facts of international life. It was of course the Great Powers that were not facing the facts....

The New Zealand Delegation to the London Conference considered their policy to be eminently practical. Certainly Berendsen saw it so, and he had little time for things he viewed otherwise. In subsequent years Berendsen severely criticized several international bodies for their 'idealism too rampant to be practical'.

When the Dumbarton Oaks proposals became available to New Zealand in late 1944, they prompted little enthusiasm. The amendments moved by New Zealand at San Francisco reflected what were perceived as major weaknesses. Wilson made a study of the proposals in early 1945. It was he who pointed out that the proposals made no provision for the protection of the territorial or political integrity of states. The professed intention of the new world organization was 'the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression'. Wilson noted, however, that there was no definition of aggression given, nor any

---

46 Reminiscences of an Ambassador, p.3-2-01.
47 ibid, pp.3-1-5/6.
48 Commentary on World Organisation (Dumbarton Oaks) Proposals, undated, PM 111/1/12, Part 1.
49 ibid.
undertaking to preserve independence and integrity. This meant that there was ‘no
touchstone’ by which to judge whether the action of the organization really would
prevent aggression.\textsuperscript{50} Wilson found that Berendsen’s earlier prediction, that the new
organization would be largely a major power ‘affair’, had proved to be accurate. The
provisions enabling the UN to be used by a small power in the event of an attack
were considered to be ‘rather vague and nebulous’.\textsuperscript{51} Wilson concluded that the

ordinary member...has little to appeal to, and it may be said that
membership of the new organisation will not mean so much adherence
to a programme as a vote of confidence in the Great Powers as
leaders of a party.\textsuperscript{52}

Berendsen responded at some length to Wilson’s conclusions, though his own
did not differ substantially. Berendsen described the purposes of the UN as set out in
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as ‘too woolly’, and lacking any real
effectiveness.\textsuperscript{53} Small powers, he noted, appeared to ‘acquire only duties’ from the
proposals, rather than benefits, and he doubted whether many would join as a
consequence.\textsuperscript{54} Berendsen indicated that he was ‘positively certain’ that the body
proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals could not be effective in the long
run.\textsuperscript{55} He noted, however, that ‘the Dumbarton proposals or something extremely
like them, may be the very best that can be obtained in the present
circumstances’.\textsuperscript{56} He then went on to identify clearly the relationship between New
Zealand’s own interests and the desire for collective security. He emphasized New
Zealand’s vulnerability:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Comments on Mr. Wilson’s Paper on - "Proposals for Establishment of a General International
Organization", 9 January 1945, PM 111/8/6, Part 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} ibid.
\end{itemize}
I would like to mention...the extreme vulnerability of this little group of European peoples - Australians, New Zealanders, and a handful of British, of Dutch, of French, etc. living on a high standard of living[,] cheek by jowl[,] with countless millions of Asiatics living on a handful of rice. Quite apart from the morality of the problem, collective security is of the most vital concern to us from a practical point of view.... we must face the fact that in the years to come - certainly in the immediate post-war period - Great Britain will have infinitely less power than she has had in the past, and we must also face the fact that in the long run the Pacific may turn out to be only a hobby for the Americans and[,] that they might very easily in the time to come[,] divest themselves of all interest in affairs in our part of the world.57

Also evident in Berendsen's conclusions was the belief that the organization envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would fail unless it was improved.58 Aware of this and other shortcomings, New Zealand proposed the amendments it felt necessary for the organization to succeed. While this was undertaken with considerable flair, it was unlikely that many in the New Zealand Delegation were optimistic about the outcome. In November 1944, for example, Berendsen reported that 'there was not much we can do about the Dumbarton proposals but accept them after we have made our position reasonably clear'.59 It was a position he had held for months, predicting as early as July 1944 that New Zealand would have little opportunity in a world organization 'to exercise any influence or express any views except through the United Kingdom'.60 This attitude also prevailed in Wellington. Wilson stated frankly in March 1945 that

Though the San Francisco Conference will give all the United Nations the opportunity of proposing amendments, some of which no doubt will be accepted, it is probably best to assume that the Great Powers at any rate are likely to enter the Organisation only if the Proposals

57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 Berendsen to McIntosh, 9 November 1944, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.83.
60 NZMin, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.384., 27 July 1944, PM 111/8/6, Part 2.
stand in their main lines.\textsuperscript{61}

In his opening address to the San Francisco Conference, Fraser stated that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, while valued, were not sacrosanct.\textsuperscript{62} 'The four great powers,' he stated, 'have not adopted a take it or leave it attitude' over the Proposals.\textsuperscript{63} Yet Berendsen and Wilson had consistently concluded that the major powers had indeed adopted such an attitude. Fraser had also the experience of the London Conference upon which to judge for himself. Berendsen later recalled that Australia and New Zealand had found themselves in a 'minority of two' over a number of issues in London and he described the London Conference as fruitless.\textsuperscript{64}

As Fraser progressed through his opening speech at San Francisco, it became clear that his statement was not an observation, but a veiled criticism that the major powers had, in fact, expected the Conference to rubber stamp the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. He attacked the veto with gusto, but appeared to have already concluded, albeit with some resignation, that it was immovable:

apparently this veto is a condition up to the present moment of the unity of the three powers, Russia, [the] United States, and the United Kingdom, in the promotion of the world organisation.... If this is so, I am afraid that the other countries will have no option but to accept it....\textsuperscript{65}

Fraser warned that he would make efforts in future years to have the veto removed, but, as this speech also made clear, he was prepared to accept it.\textsuperscript{66} It was,

\textsuperscript{61} Commentary on World Organisation (Dumbarton Oaks) Proposals, undated, PM 111/1/12, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{62} Statement by the Right Honourable Peter Fraser at the Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1945, Statements and Documents, p.82.

\textsuperscript{63} ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} Reminiscences of an Ambassador, p.3-2-01.

\textsuperscript{65} Statement by the Right Honourable Peter Fraser at the Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 3 May 1945, Statements and Documents, p.84.

\textsuperscript{66} ibid.
therefore, a position adopted prior to the Conference, not after it. Indeed, some weeks before the San Francisco Conference, Fraser had given the United Kingdom reason to believe that he had accepted the necessity of the veto, albeit 'grudgingly'. He had heeded the warnings of his advisors and did not want to jeopardize the successful establishment of a world organization because he could not achieve certain New Zealand objectives. On his return, he told Parliament that it was better to have 'some form of international organization, with whatever defects, than no organization at all'. Underlying this acceptance was the conviction that, without the major powers in the organization, it could not be effective. The fate of the League had proven this beyond doubt. Berendsen's prediction that small nations would not join the UN proved incorrect, however, and all 51 participants in the San Francisco Conference signed the UN Charter in June 1945. It would appear that for them, like New Zealand, the new UN Charter did not include everything they wanted, but it contained enough to be seen as clearly in their interests to sign.

Despite Fraser's strong advocacy, and the reputation he gradually built for himself, none of New Zealand's amendments relating to the security provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was successful. As unhappy as Fraser was about major power exclusiveness in wartime, and now in peace as well, he knew he had to accept it if wider goals were to be achieved. New Zealand policy toward the UN did not collapse with the outcome of San Francisco. This revealed in New Zealand policy an inherent preparedness to compromise and the belief that there were benefits to be derived from the world organization despite its defects.

Fraser's strong attack on the veto and his enthusiastic advocacy of universal collective security through the UN were not an attempt to implement the impossible. While it was recognized that changes to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would be

---

67 Feutz, pp.91-2.
69 ibid, p.585; NZDel, San Francisco to MEA, Wellington, No.26., 19 May 1945, PM 111/8/83, Part 1.
difficult to achieve, there was no harm in an attempt to do so. It was agreed, during a visit to New Zealand by Evatt in March 1945, that while pursuing changes to the Proposals could prove futile, there was little to be gained by simply accepting them.\textsuperscript{70} Change was not impossible, and even the most pessimistic of opinions in the Department of External Affairs conceded as much. New Zealand approached the San Francisco Conference therefore committed to bringing about what changes it could. After being defeated so heavily in security aspects, it was hardly surprising that in areas such as trusteeship and human rights, where great power resistance was less stubborn, New Zealand showed a strong determination to influence decisions.

New Zealand policy concerning the creation of the UN demonstrated a clear concern for security priorities and was fashioned according to the conditions in which it was pursued. The tremendous influence of the Second World War and anxieties experienced during that period, were formative in the policy which was advanced at San Francisco. Small, isolated, unable to defend itself, New Zealand was vulnerable to external threat even from the opposite side of the world, and was aware of it. The United Kingdom and the United States were major sources of security, but they were also unreliable and demonstrably so at key times during the war. In 1945 British power had declined and the United States was traditionally isolationist. New Zealand needed a world organization, committed to the defence of all states, upon which it could rely for security. Every effort was to be made to achieve this. There were few illusions, however, that this would easy to attain. Both Fraser and his advisors were profoundly aware of the realities of international politics.

\textsuperscript{70} World Organisation: Note for File: Interview with Dr. Evatt, 13 March 1945, PM 111/8/6, Part 2.
CHAPTER TWO

BEYOND SAN FRANCISCO

1945-49

New Zealand’s approach to the United Nations in 1945 was defined by security concerns. At the San Francisco Conference New Zealand sought a strong and effective organization which could protect its members from external threat. After 1945, New Zealand policy remained the same. The veto interfered with the UN’s ability to react to a crisis and left the critical problem of the major powers’ role in enforcement operations ambiguous, which seriously negated the value of the UN as a reliable source of security. For New Zealand, then, it became a primary objective to see it removed.

But the major powers had made the veto a condition of their UN participation. If the veto was removed, the Soviet Union would withdraw and the full cooperation of the other major powers would have been doubtful. New Zealand considered major-power involvement essential to the UN’s success and vital to its security functions. New Zealand also perceived that the UN, even with the veto, was an extremely valuable asset to world security. Efforts made against the veto were, therefore, tempered by the necessity not to create tensions in the UN which might prove detrimental to the organization’s existence. These considerations lay at the heart of the desire to remove, and to accept, the veto at San Francisco and this remained the case after 1945.

Security priorities also determined New Zealand’s attitude to other UN issues in the 1940s. The future of the British mandate of Palestine and the domestic policies in South Africa were two such issues. The Palestine problem was brought to the UN in 1947 by the United Kingdom. There had been over a decade of civil unease in the mandate between Nationalist Arab and Jewish groups. Both had aspirations for Palestine; the Jews sought a national homeland, the Arabs an
independent Palestinian state. Both sides perpetrated acts of terrorism against each other and frequently came into conflict with British authorities. The military burden this placed on the United Kingdom was immense. British attempts to reconcile the opposing views were unsuccessful and suppression of militant groups often attracted international criticism. The United Kingdom finally resorted to the UN.

New Zealand’s initial concern over the Palestine issue was for the United Kingdom and the broader interests of the British Commonwealth. As will be discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, the UN had always been envisaged in New Zealand as an instrument through which British security objectives would be sought. Conversely, those objectives were assumed to be entirely consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. This was strongly evident in New Zealand’s reaction to the problems in Palestine, and its initial support for UN involvement in the issue.

Emerging later was a more explicit concern about the role of the major powers in the enforcement of UN decisions. Support for the United Kingdom remained, but was weakened when the British intention to withdraw completely from Palestine became clear. New Zealand had initially not detected any inconsistency between British policy and UN obligations. But the intention to withdraw caused New Zealand to suspect that the United Kingdom was not fulfilling those obligations. New Zealand stressed the need for all powers, especially the major powers, to participate in the enforcement of UN decisions. The issue came to be seen as a case in which the ability of the UN to impose its decisions, by force if necessary, was put to the test. If collective security was to be successful, the UN had to act authoritatively and the major powers, including the United Kingdom, had to lead.

At the heart of the problems in South Africa were the racial inequities between the ruling white colonists and indigenous and other non-white inhabitants. White dominance had been established centuries before, though it had not been formally institutionalized. Various laws discriminating against Asian inhabitants of
South Africa had even been repealed in the 1920s. But during the 1940s racist legislation again became a part of South African politics and it was this which attracted the UN’s attention in the mid-1940s.

The issues involved with UN discussion of South Africa’s racial policies concerned New Zealand in a different way from the Palestine question. The UN had been established, in New Zealand’s view, to protect the sovereignty of its members against external interference. Fundamentally, this was a conservative approach, desiring protection for the international status quo from outside influences seeking to alter the political independence and territorial integrity of states. When the domestic affairs of South Africa came before the General Assembly in 1946, New Zealand perceived that the situation involved potentially serious implications for the sovereignty of states and inevitably its own interests. This can be detected also in New Zealand’s approach to various trusteeship issues. New Zealand moved to resist the UN, or what was perceived as the irresponsible elements in it, emerging as a threat of the type the organization was set up to resist. Throughout the late 1940s, therefore, security considerations remained the dominant influence in the formation of New Zealand policy toward the UN and related issues.

The UN General Assembly met for the first time in January 1946 mainly to discuss the shape of the organization and related administrative matters. The session ended the following month and the Assembly reconvened later in the year to discuss international issues in earnest. The veto issue emerged as a major priority and Australia quickly established itself as the leader of the anti-veto campaign. Other nations also took leading positions on the veto after 1945, including Argentina, Cuba, and the Philippines. New Zealand was an enthusiastic supporter of initiatives against the veto.

---

1 Paul Thomas Enright, 'New Zealand’s Involvement in the Partitioning of Palestine and the Creation of Israel', MA Thesis (Otago University, 1982), p.137.

2 ADeIUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.700., 15 November 1946, ACTRO 852/10/5, Part 1.
In November 1946 Australia, Cuba and the Philippines put forward draft-resolutions in the First Committee concerning the veto. Most UN issues were discussed initially by one of its six preliminary committees. The First Committee dealt with political and security questions, such as the veto and Palestine. Due to the number of issues usually on the First Committee's agenda, a further committee, the Ad Hoc or Special Political Committee, was established to assist in handling the work-load. Draft-resolutions on issues were formulated in committee stages and were then put forward in a full plenary session of the General Assembly for discussion and final voting.

Both Cuban and Philippine proposals put to the First Committee in 1946 called for alterations to Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter containing the rule of unanimity, which gave the permanent members the power of veto. Cuba desired a general conference of UN members to be called under Article 109, which allowed for Charter revision, with the view of amending 27(3). The Philippine proposal was more moderate, moving that the necessary five affirmative votes of the permanent members be reduced to three. The Australian proposal was more moderate again. It requested the permanent members to refrain from exercising the power of veto except in cases concerning enforcement measures.

In introducing his proposal, the Australian representative criticized the draft resolutions of the other nations on the grounds that amendment of the Charter, so soon after it had been signed, was premature. In the view of the Australian Delegation, the Cuban and Philippine proposals reflected an unhelpful extremism.

---

3 The other preliminary committees included the Second (Economic and Financial) Committee, the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural), the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee, the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee and the Sixth (Legal) Committee.

4 Appendix 1.

5 Appendix 1.

6 ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.700., 15 November 1946, ACTRO 852/105, Part 1.

Criticism of them, and other proposals offered during the course of debate, was part of a deliberate effort by Australia to 'extricate' its own case from 'too close an association' with more extreme views. The tactic worked. All other proposals were rejected in committee stages and the Australian draft was the only proposal which made it through to voting in the General Assembly. The Australian resolution was subsequently adopted.

New Zealand's position in this debate was somewhat different. It did not put forward any specific proposal on the veto. New Zealand's Delegation was small and, as a consequence, taking initiatives on such issues was taxing and done infrequently. Berendsen also adopted a practice of not speaking at any length in committee debate. He did so instead during full plenary meetings of the Assembly itself. Here his criticism of the veto was unforgiving. In 1946 he told the Assembly that New Zealand 'dislike[d] the veto as much as ever'. He asserted that New Zealand had a right to its proportionate voice in world affairs and that the veto interfered with this. He was also extremely critical of the hindrance the veto posed to universal collective security. Strong verbal attacks on the veto in the General Assembly characterized New Zealand policy expression throughout the 1940s.

New Zealand also adopted a position of supporting any attempt made against the veto and in 1946 Berendsen spoke and voted in favour of the Australian draft.

---

8 ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.714., 17 November 1946, ACTRO 852/10/5, Part 1.
9 ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.1027., 15 December 1946, ACTRO 852/10/5, Part 1.
10 Powles to McIntosh, 3 November 1947, McIntosh Papers.
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
He also voted in favour of the unsuccessful Cuban proposal and indicated further that he would vote in favour of any proposal endorsing Charter revision, even if there was no prospect of its success.\textsuperscript{15} New Zealand’s support of both Australian and more extreme drafts possibly proved a little embarrassing to the former, which wanted to maintain some distance between them.

Despite the adoption of the Australian resolution by the General Assembly in 1946, it was ignored by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s use of the veto continued to be extensive and was even exercised against nations applying to join the UN. In 1946 the Soviet Union vetoed the admission of Ireland, Portugal and Transjordan, after Albania and Outer Mongolia had failed to get the necessary seven affirmative votes in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{16} In following years, a number of Eastern Bloc nations failed to secure majority support in the Security Council and the Soviet Union retaliated by vetoing over half of the 14 nations applying prior to 1950. Thereafter the membership deadlock became complete, with no new members accepted by the UN until late 1955, when an operation, in which New Zealand was a central player, successfully brought 16 new states into the UN. The effort against the veto during the 1940s embraced a spirited, but unsuccessful, campaign to have nations applying for membership accepted. The continual Soviet veto against a number of applicant-nations angered the vast majority of General Assembly members and boosted the anti-veto campaign during the 1940s.

In following years, the anti-veto campaign continued to reflect the pattern of 1946. Australia maintained its moderate approach. New Zealand supported this, but also endorsed more extreme proposals, despite recognition that their success was unlikely.\textsuperscript{17} New Zealand had realized that any revision of the Charter was ‘merely a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} General Assembly - Second Session 1947 - [New Zealand’s Position on] Abolition of Veto, September 1947, ACTRO 852/10/5/1.
\end{itemize}
theoretical process' until the position of the Great Powers altered.\textsuperscript{18} New Zealand saw value in openly demonstrating concerted opposition to the veto itself, as a means of effecting its removal. But there was no intention of risking the collapse of the UN by insisting on the elimination of the veto in the face of direct Soviet opposition. It was observed by the Australian High Commission in Wellington that 'if presented with a choice between a United Nations with the veto and an organization without the Soviet[s]', New Zealand 'would accept the veto'.\textsuperscript{19} The participation of the major powers was perceived as critical to the UN's success and to any universal collective security system which might be developed. The veto was a problem, but the withdrawal of one or all of the major powers would have been disastrous.

Many nations in the Assembly had recognized by 1947 that the Security Council was an ineffective organ because of the Soviet veto. Consequently, many nations in the Assembly began considering proposals designed in some measure to circumvent the Security Council on specific issues. The most successful attempt in this area was the creation of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, or the Little Assembly. This was a United States proposal produced as a 'direct result of the stultification of the Security Council by the use of the veto'.\textsuperscript{20} It was proposed that the Little Assembly would have a representative from each member nation and sit between the regular Assembly sessions.\textsuperscript{21} It would not have powers similar to the Security Council, but the Little Assembly would have the ability to discuss situations likely to endanger international peace and security not currently on the Security Council agenda.\textsuperscript{22} It could also make recommendations to the Security Council and General Assembly which it felt could solve these disputes. The Soviet Union challenged the constitutionality of the proposal and it was decided to establish

\textsuperscript{18} ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} ibid.


\textsuperscript{21} ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
the Little Assembly for one year, during which it would investigate this and other issues, of which the veto was one, and report the following year.

New Zealand supported the creation of the Little Assembly. It would not remove 'the principal bar of the veto', declared Berendsen, but it was nevertheless a 'vital' step forward.23 The creation of the Little Assembly directly asserted the General Assembly’s competence over peace and security issues and empowered it to at least study and discuss world problems in more depth. Furthermore, it gave General Assembly members a body which could be convened easily to discuss urgent security issues if the Security Council failed to react. The General Assembly continued after 1948 to vote for the Little Assembly’s continuance.

The establishment of the Little Assembly had important implications for New Zealand’s contribution to the anti-veto campaign. Up until 1947 New Zealand had maintained vocal and voting support of efforts made against the veto, but had not itself taken any initiative. In 1948 the Little Assembly took up the veto issue and the New Zealand Delegation offered a proposal that Article 27(3) be altered so that Security Council decisions required only the concurring votes of four out of five permanent members.24 After submitting this proposal, Berendsen sought the support of the Australian Delegation in New York.25 The Australian Government was unimpressed. The proposal conflicted with Australian policy, which continued to develop along previous lines - seeking moderation, but not elimination, of the veto.26 The Little Assembly did not endorse the New Zealand proposal and it was not discussed further.

The New Zealand initiative prompted officials in Canberra to give more

23 ibid, p.25.

24 ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.230., 11 March 1948, ACTRO 852/20/3, Part 2.

25 ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.239., 13 March 1948, ACTRO 852/20/3, Part 2.

26 ADelUN, Paris, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.318., 3 December 1948, ACTRO 901/3/5.
attention to policy decisions in Wellington.27 This revealed to the Australians that New Zealand policy on the veto was being made in difficult conditions. By 1948 Berendsen had gained a great deal of discretion on the content of his statements made at the UN. This arose partly from Berendsen’s personality; he tended to hold dogmatic views and would express them with such fluency and passion that it was at times difficult for Wellington to restrain him. McIntosh noted of Berendsen in subsequent years that ‘after being overseas a while he felt that any instruction from Wellington was a gross interference and an insult’.28 Berendsen’s tendency for independent action was not helped by Fraser, who was opposed to the veto, and, not unhappy to see it criticised, tended to let Berendsen have considerable freedom. Furthermore, when issues did not appear to be making progress, Fraser often did not issue instructions to Berendsen, but left him to act at his discretion.

New Zealand policy on the veto was, therefore, strongly influenced by Berendsen, who was passionately opposed to it. He believed that there was no room for compromise: ‘the veto must go’.29 An officer at the Australian High Commission in Wellington noted that Berendsen was ‘half convinced’ that an ‘American plan for a new U.N. excluding Russia would be an improvement on the present body’.30 He seemed less perturbed by the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from the UN if the veto issue was pushed too far.31 Berendsen was motivated by frustration that the security value of the UN was negated by the presence of the Soviet Union. He therefore saw the removal of the Soviet Union as a means toward a more effective security organization.32

27 Memorandum No.347., AHC, Wellington, to SecEA, Canberra, 16 July 1948, ACTRO 901/3/5.
28 McIntosh to Munro, No.53/9., 7 May 1953, McIntosh Papers.
29 AHC, Wellington, to SecEA, Canberra, Memorandum No.347., 16 July 1948, ACTRO 901/5/5.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 Berendsen to McIntosh, 28 September 1947, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.144.
The Department of External Affairs in Wellington held a view 'diametrically opposed' to that of Berendsen. Departmental officials 'fully realize[d] the importance of keeping Russia in the United Nations', and were anxious to avoid pressing the veto issue too far. McIntosh wrote to Berendsen in November 1947, intimating that he was 'perfectly appalled' at the East-West conflict and its effects on the UN, but he stated that he saw 'no practicable alternative' to the UN as it was. He perceived that prospects for collective security through the UN would not be enhanced if any of the major powers were excluded from it.

Fraser stood between these two viewpoints. He was opposed to the veto, but not prepared to see the Soviet Union excluded from the UN. The New Zealand proposal in the Little Assembly was acceptable to him as a compromise between the conflicting viewpoints of his advisors in Wellington, and Berendsen in New York. It was an uneasy compromise, however; if successful, the proposal could have led to the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the UN and the Department did not support the initiative as a result. Fraser himself led the New Zealand Delegation to the General Assembly in 1948. On the veto issue he stated emphatically that he 'did not share the views of those who protested not against the unanimity rule but against its misuse.' He declared support for moderate and more extreme proposals put forward by other delegations.

However, there were doubts in the Department as to how far Fraser was

---

33 Memorandum No.347., AHC, Wellington, to SecEA, Canberra, 16 July 1948, ACTRO 901/3/5.
34 ibid.
35 McIntosh to Berendsen, 1 November 1947, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.151.
37 ibid.
39 ibid, p.73.
prepared to go. The experience of the League had deeply influenced him and he believed that if major powers began withdrawing from the UN, the organization’s future would be seriously jeopardized. The establishment of a world organization had been a major security objective for New Zealand; every possible step had to be taken to avoid a Third World War, to insulate New Zealand from further threats such as experienced during Japan’s Pacific campaign, and to provide a voice in world affairs. Any withdrawal of a major power placed the future of UN in jeopardy and was, therefore, detrimental to New Zealand’s security position. Fraser was not prepared to risk the Soviet Union’s non-involvement at San Francisco and accepted the veto. After 1945 New Zealand’s security position, and the role the UN played in it, had not changed. The involvement of all major powers was perceived as central to the UN’s success, and to the collective security system New Zealand hoped to see established. Fraser would not, therefore, have pushed his initiative to the point of risking the Soviet Union’s withdrawal.

Australia and New Zealand adopted different approaches to the veto issue. Yet both had reason to be encouraged by what appeared to have been achieved in 1946. Australia had won significant Assembly support. Berendsen reported that ‘more than three-quarters of the whole membership of the United Nations, including four out of the five Great Powers themselves, expressed dissatisfaction with the existing voting provisions on the Security Council’. Berendsen was buoyed by the level of discontent with the veto and predicted that soon world opinion would become ‘insistent on its removal’.

Other members of New Zealand’s Delegation were also clearly satisfied with the UN. Wilson observed in 1946 that ‘the Assembly gave an impression not only of boldness in speech, but of power’. This Assembly had seen the Soviet Union

40 Memorandum for SecEA, Canberra, No.347., 16 July 1948, ACTRO 901/3/5.
42 Berendsen to Fraser, 23 December 1946, PM 115/4/14, Part 1a.
muster significant support on a number of issues and this encouraged Wilson:

An interesting situation will arise in the United Nations if the U.S.S.R. should frequently obtain control of a majority in the Assembly. The situation might be still more interesting in the Security Council and might even change the Russian attitude towards the veto.44

In 1947 the Delegation was impressed yet again. Berendsen wrote of real progress:

In firm terms the Assembly expressed its indignation at the stultification of the Security Council by the use of the veto (and incidentally at the use of the veto on the admission of new members) and quite deliberately established the "Little Assembly" in order to ensure that if and when the Security Council, by reason of the veto, should in future prove unable to discharge its obligations under the Charter, the Assembly itself should always have an organ in permanent session ready to consider any threat to peace which the Security Council should be unable to meet.45

Attempts to modify or remove the veto eventually petered out, having achieved nothing substantial. By 1949 the Cold War had begun in earnest; West Berlin was under a Communist blockade imposed to force the occupying Western nations out, and relations between the major powers had deteriorated so far that there was no prospect of any progress on the issue.

New Zealand policy on the veto during the 1940s was determined by security priorities. New Zealand's opposition to the veto arose because it presented a major obstacle to an effective collective security system. Paradoxically, New Zealand's acceptance of it also emanated from security concerns - chiefly the belief that unless all the major powers were in the UN, it would not succeed as a security organization. This dilemma was encapsulated in the conflicting opinions of Berendsen and other departmental officials in Wellington. The latter view prevailed.

44 ibid.

45 Berendsen to Fraser, 6 December 1947, PM 115/4/15, Part 2a.
While the UN was clearly defective, New Zealand perceived it as important. Progress was seen to have been made in the establishment of the Little Assembly, and the vocal position on the veto testified to the UN's value as an organization through which New Zealand could have its voice in world affairs.

PALESTINE

New Zealand's initial anxiety over problems in Palestine was caused by concern for British interests in the Middle East. Once the UN began discussing the issue in 1947, New Zealand became more concerned about implications of any decision on Palestine for the future of the UN, particularly universal collective security and the effectiveness and authority of the UN in world affairs. New Zealand eventually perceived the issue as something of test of the UN's ability to solve international problems. If the UN could act firmly on this issue, then its ability to produce collective force in defence of its members would be confirmed.

Until 1940 New Zealand relied solely on British power for military security. Even after the fall of Singapore and the evident decline in British military strength, New Zealand's reliance on the United Kingdom did not end. After 1945 New Zealand continued to rely heavily on British markets and to see its security solidly within a Commonwealth context. But it was clear that the United Kingdom was facing severe economic problems and having difficulties maintaining military commitments at pre-war levels. During 1946 Australia and New Zealand accepted the necessity for a greater contribution by the dominions to the British Commonwealth, in order to relieve the United Kingdom's defence burden.46

46 NZHC, London, to MEA, Wellington, No.76, 23 May 1946, PM 156/1/1, Part 2.
New Zealand perceived the UN from 1945 as an organization through which major defence objectives of the British Commonwealth were to be pursued.\(^4\) This assumption led to New Zealand seeing the UN as a possible solution to the United Kingdom's burden in Palestine. Commenting on Palestine at the General Assembly meeting in January 1946, it was clear that Fraser perceived UN members having a responsibility to protect the interests of the United Kingdom:

I think the task is too great to be imposed upon one nation; it should be shared in some form. The mandate may remain as it is. I am not particular so long as all of us will range ourselves alongside the United Kingdom and say "This is a world problem and has got to be a world responsibility".\(^4\)

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London a few months later and discussed the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry established after the war to study the problem of European Jews and the future of Palestine. Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash represented New Zealand and praised the committee for establishing a United States commitment in the Middle East:\(^4\)

'It would be very valuable to us to have American assistance in an area so close to the Suez Canal.'\(^5\)

The Canal was seen as essential for Empire/Commonwealth communications and for the passage of oil to the United Kingdom. The successful defence of it in 1942, at the Battle of El Alamein, had seen a turn in Allied fortunes against the Axis powers. New Zealand's reliance on the United Kingdom, and the war experience, reinforced the perception that Suez was fundamentally important to New Zealand security.

Templeton's recent assertion that on the Palestine issue 'New Zealand was

\(^{4}\) General International Organisation: Military Proposals, March 1945, PM 11/7/1, Part 1; see Chapter 4.


\(^{4}\) Meeting of Prime Ministers: PMM(46) 8th Meeting, 30 April 1946, PM 277/5/2, Part 3.

\(^{5}\) ibid.
not prepared to follow blindly the British lead’ is somewhat misleading. The term ‘blindly’ implies an unseeing and unconcerned attitude in New Zealand policy - which was not the case. New Zealand saw the broader strategic interests of the United Kingdom as its own. Middle East issues, particularly involving Suez, or the maintenance of British power in the region, were not peripheral to New Zealand’s interests but perceived as essential to them.

While not blind, New Zealand was initially prepared to follow the United Kingdom over Palestine. In 1947 the on-going difficulties faced by the British authorities in the mandate forced the United Kingdom to bring the issue to the UN. A special session of the General Assembly convened in New York in April-May 1947 to discuss the issue. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established to investigate the problem and make recommendations to the regular session of the General Assembly beginning in September.

In the interim, New Zealand paid close attention to the direction of British policy. In May, Fraser considered that the problems between Arab and Jew in Palestine would be best solved by the creation of a state in which neither had ultimate control. This mirrored exactly what the Anglo-American Committee had recommended the previous month. New Zealand perceived the Committee’s findings as largely a statement of British views and, in April, Nash expressed his satisfaction that the United Kingdom had been a party to establishing the Committee. In August, a departmental study of the problem offered no

---


52 ibid, p.5.

53 Note for File, 27 May 1946, PM 277/5/2, Part 3.

54 Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine, 20 April 1946, p.3.

55 Meeting of Prime Ministers: PMM(46), 8th Meeting, 30 April 1946, PM 277/5/2, Part 3.
conclusions about what New Zealand policy should be. On the issue of a possible trusteeship agreement for the mandate, the report concluded that, as the United Kingdom had not advanced any opinion on the matter, New Zealand could not either. ‘All that can be said at this stage is that we should support whatever relief Britain herself desired - and that is really the only urgent issue, and the only one on which we need have no reservations.’

While Palestine was considered important because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, it was recognized in Wellington that Palestine was not vital to its defence. By early 1946 Fraser was aware that the costs of maintaining the mandate were greater than the benefits attained in doing so. In August 1947, it was concluded in Wellington that no moral obligation or imperial interest existed which justified the ‘risks and burdens’ of the present United Kingdom position in Palestine. It was further submitted that New Zealand should not be involved in ‘pressing Britain to assume, or to retain, responsibilities in Palestine beyond what she is prepared to accept’ and to resist any attempt to ‘broaden responsibility for Palestine into a Commonwealth responsibility’.

Two weeks later Fraser met the British Minister of State, Hector McNeil, in Wellington and again the association of British and New Zealand interests was absolute. Fraser and McNeil agreed that

it would be essential for the enforcement of any settlement on Palestine to be shared by all members of the United Nations and not by the United Kingdom or the United Kingdom and other members of the British Commonwealth alone. Our line should be, therefore, to

---

56 Palestine: Forthcoming United Nations Consideration, 14 August 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 6
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 Palestine, 16 August 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 6.
60 ibid.
follow the United Kingdom on this issue.61

The General Assembly convened for its regular session on 16 September and
UNSCOP reported its findings, recommending the early termination of the mandate
and the granting of independence to Palestine. But UNSCOP was divided over
whether to recommend the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish
states, or the maintenance of Palestine as a single state.62 After much debate the
partition plan was eventually accepted in November.63

Committee discussion on Palestine did not commence until the following
month and leading up to this New Zealand policy remained undefined. Fraser sent a
telegram to London on 19 September intimating that it was necessary for him to
instruct the New Zealand Delegation on the attitude it should adopt on Palestine.64
He therefore requested British views on UNSCOP’s report and some indication of
the degree of responsibility which they would be prepared to undertake in
implementing the recommendations.65 He clearly assumed that the United Kingdom
would make some form of contribution in this area.

The reply indicated that the United Kingdom had no wish to obstruct any
Assembly recommendation.66 It was noted, however, that the United Kingdom
reserved the right to decline implementing UN proposals which demanded the use of
force.67 In the view of the British Government the ‘essential question’ was
enforcement:

61 Extract from Note of Discussion Between the Prime Minister and Mr Hector McNeil,
31 August 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 6.
63 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York,
65 ibid.
67 ibid.
Our immediate attitude is that we are not prepared to accept responsibility of imposing a settlement in Palestine by force of arms against [the] wishes of either or both parties and that failing a settlement to which both Arabs and Jews consent, our only course is to withdraw.

To this point there was little difference in approach between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. They shared the view that the UN should involve itself in the Palestine issue, that it should enforce any solution itself and that the United Kingdom and Commonwealth nations should not be left with the burden of implementation. Furthermore, these concerns reflected New Zealand’s assumption that the UN should be used as a means of pursuing and protecting Commonwealth interests. The UN was seen as the means to rid the United Kingdom of a particularly troublesome problem, thereby assisting in the reduction of its military burden and avoiding a wider Commonwealth responsibility in Palestine. All of these things had a direct linkage to New Zealand’s own security interests. Any reduction of the United Kingdom’s military burden would assist in the re-founding of British power. Moreover, such a reduction would solidify the British commitment to remaining parts of the Empire, including New Zealand. These concerns remained important components of New Zealand policy throughout the period the General Assembly was concerned with the Palestine issue.

Jewish and Arab groups remained bitterly divided over UNSCOP recommendations. On 5 October Berendsen informed Fraser about the early stages of committee debate. He noted that Arab and Jewish positions were ‘wholly irreconcilable’ and that any decision the UN made would require enforcement. He went on to state that the United Kingdom intended withdrawing from Palestine at an early date and did not contemplate assisting with enforcement operations. Berendsen then described a proposal for a force involving smaller powers, including New Zealand, for ‘the task of policing Palestine’. Berendsen assumed that New

---

68 MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.151, 5 October 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 7.

69 ibid.

70 ibid.
Zealand would ‘not be prepared to undertake or participate in any duty of this kind’. Berendsen noted that no UN force existed to enforce a decision, and assumed that New Zealand would not expect ‘others to undertake a responsibility of which she would not be prepared herself to bear a proportionate share’. He concluded that any UN authority in Palestine would be ‘moral’ and that ‘enforcement...will be left entirely to the interested parties’.

Fraser replied to Berendsen, agreeing that New Zealand should support UNSCOP’s findings, and sturdily emphasizing that New Zealand would not be involved in any UN force deployed in Palestine. This was ‘quite unacceptable’, wrote Fraser; New Zealand ‘could not undertake or participate in any duty of such a kind’. ‘On the other hand’, he wrote, ‘we would hope that the United States would be willing to assume the largest possible measure of responsibility for effecting an acceptable settlement’.

However, Fraser had other concerns about enforcement. He had always envisaged that the major powers should take immediate responsibility in the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security. Their contribution to the international security system was essential to the UN’s success, and to any decision on Palestine. New Zealand, as a small state, was not important to the success of either, hence the initial reluctance toward involvement in Palestine. Fraser had already indicated that the role of the United States was central and he subsequently expressed similar views about the United Kingdom. On 16 October Fraser intimated to Berendsen that he sympathized with British difficulties in Palestine, but stated that

71 ibid.
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
74 MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.165., 9 October 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 7.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
he did not ‘consider that any member of [the] United Nations, including New Zealand, can divest itself of its proportionate share in finding a solution of this problem and if necessary in enforcing a just settlement’.77

The following day, Fraser had a telegram drafted for the Secretary of Commonwealth Relations in London, in which he severely criticized the British intention not to participate in the enforcement of any settlement in Palestine.78 The United Kingdom, stated Fraser, ‘has no more, but even less, right than other members of the United Nations to renounce that responsibility which falls on every member to share in making and carrying out a United Nations policy’.79

Fraser went on to emphasize that damage would be sustained to the UN’s authority and prestige if the United Kingdom refused to cooperate.80 Initial British policy revealed little inconsistent with Fraser’s views on UN obligations, but by October he had identified a clear problem. He quickly made his views known the United Kingdom, insisting that

the United Kingdom is one of the United Nations, and how can the United Nations ever work if individual members refuse to accept a share in carrying out a decision made by the full United Nations acting in accordance with the Charter?81

Fraser went on to state frankly what he expected of the United Kingdom:

I can understand the factors which led to your decision to evacuate Palestine and thus reduce your commitments. But commitments on behalf of the United Nations are in a special category, and your share, and New Zealand’s share, in enforcing a United Nations policy for Palestine would be in that special category. In due course I hope that

77 MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.172., 16 October 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 7.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
we shall maintain national armed force for two purposes only (a) for commitments on behalf of the United Nations and (b) for national commitments which have been specifically approved by the United Nations. At present you have 1,000,000 men in arms and none of the commitments for which they exist have anything to do with the United Nations. It therefore seems unfortunate to reject in advance the first direct United Nations commitment. If you were prepared to accept your share of the United Nations enforcement required, as we are prepared to do, we should be happy to discuss ways of working in with you....

Fraser stressed that if the United Kingdom and the United States did cooperate in applying the diplomatic and economic pressure there would be less need for physical enforcement. The prestige and power of the UN would be duly enhanced. This draft was not sent, a shorter version containing in essence the same points was used instead.

New Zealand policy subsequently became preoccupied with implementation and enforcement. Berendsen emphasized in UN meetings the necessity for a system of implementation in which all members would participate. Fraser rescinded his earlier intimation to Berendsen that New Zealand participation in any such action was unacceptable and indicated on a number of occasions that New Zealand would be willing to contribute if other members would shoulder their proportionate share of responsibility.

By November New Zealand was intensely critical of the policies of all major powers as UN discussions continued to avoid the issue of implementation. In mid-November Fraser described Soviet and United States policy as ‘completely unrealistic’, and charged them with ignoring the possibility of violent Arab

---

82 ibid.

83 ibid.


85 Palestine: Some Problems Which Face New Zealand as a Member of the United Nations, 28 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 7.
opposition to partition 'to a ridiculous extent'\textsuperscript{86} Later that month, Fraser was harshly critical of proposals for a commission of smaller powers to be established and given responsibility for implementing partition.\textsuperscript{87} This completely avoided any direct connection between implementation and the major powers, which Fraser had seen as essential, and also denied the committee any real force with which to confront possible opposition.

On 23 November Fraser informed Berendsen that New Zealand could not possibly support partition unless provisions for implementation were introduced.\textsuperscript{88} Unless critical changes in this area were made New Zealand would vote against it.\textsuperscript{89} Berendsen was, however, given some discretion to abstain if certain changes were made short of full effective enforcement provisions.\textsuperscript{90} Fraser continued to stress the need for the United Kingdom to participate in any enforcement measures agreed upon.\textsuperscript{91} He also instructed Berendsen to inform the United States that New Zealand, while supportive of partition, was 'not in favour of half measures', nor of the full burden for it being placed on the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{92} The United States was told that New Zealand would change this attitude if the United States 'would lend all its force and authority to the task of implementation'.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{86} MEA, Wellington, to Consul-General, New York, No.210., 14 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 7.

\textsuperscript{87} MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.222., 23 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.

\textsuperscript{88} MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.221., 23 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.

\textsuperscript{89} ibid.

\textsuperscript{90} ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Cable Summary, No.76., 24 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.

\textsuperscript{92} MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.224., 24 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.

\textsuperscript{93} ibid.
However, despite the hard-line adopted, New Zealand abstained in committee
voting and voted in favour of the partition resolution in the General Assembly on 29
November 1947. Fraser’s instructions to Berendsen on 24 November had called for
full American involvement in implementation, but noted also that ‘a private
assurance’ of this ‘would be of some value’, and there was a strong suggestion that
this would be sufficient to enlist New Zealand support.\footnote{ibid.} Even without this
assurance, Fraser expressed some optimism the following day when he discussed a
proposal by Denmark that the Security Council regard any interference in Palestine
by outside powers as a breach of the peace and act accordingly.\footnote{ibid.} ‘I take this to
include possible aggression by one of the Palestine States against the other’, and
noted that if successful it would be a ‘major step forward by specifically involving
the Security Council in the task of enforcement’.\footnote{ibid.} Ultimately, however, it was
concern about the future of the partition plan itself which softened the New Zealand
line. On 24 November Fraser sent a telegram to Berendsen in which he discussed the
dilemma the Palestine issue now presented:

As I see it the problem we now face is one of choosing between two
possibly disastrous courses. Whether it be no decision on the one hand
or on the other decision in favour of partition without implementation,
both will in varying degrees lead to chaos; I find it difficult to decide
which is the greater evil....

After weighing all the circumstances of this dilemma and the possible
consequences of the Assembly leaving the question undecided, I am
loth to accept the heavy responsibility of blocking partition.\footnote{ibid.}

Fraser issued instructions to abstain and subsequently to vote in favour of the
resolution in the General Assembly, even though the UN Commission charged with

\footnote{MEA, Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.227., 25 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.}

\footnote{ibid.}

\footnote{MEA. Wellington, to NZCon-Gen, New York, No.226., 24 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.}
implementing partition had no power to enforce it.\textsuperscript{98} New Zealand remained critical of all major powers, including the United Kingdom, for not adequately confronting the problem of implementation.

Five months after the UN resolution on partition was adopted, the UN commission reported to a special session of the General Assembly that it had had little success. Among the reasons given for this was one which would have come as no surprise to Berendsen or Fraser:

active opposition of the Governments of the Arab States and the Arab Higher Committee which made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly’s resolution without the assistance of adequate armed forces.\textsuperscript{99}

The United States responded by submitting a trusteeship proposal for Palestine. United States delegates argued that as partition had proved impossible to implement peacefully, a plan was necessary to maintain governmental and essential services in Palestine after the British mandatory obligations ceased on 14 May 1948. While the trusteeship agreement was in force, efforts would be made to reconcile differences between the Arabs and Jews with a view to creating a government in Palestine made up of both groups. While the United States did not declare that it had withdrawn support for partition, the implications were clear that it now favoured keeping Palestine a single state.

Berendsen met the trusteeship proposal with dismay. He described it in March 1948 as ‘one of the biggest bonehead moves of the century’.\textsuperscript{100} The partition plan had met with active opposition from groups prepared to use force in order to prevent it from being successful in Palestine. In New Zealand’s view, the UN’s prestige and authority in the mandate, and in world affairs generally, would be significantly undermined if the UN backed down. Therefore, the UN had to confront

\textsuperscript{98} ibid.

\textsuperscript{99} AJHR, A-2a (1948), p.5.

\textsuperscript{100} Berendsen to McIntosh, 19 March 1948, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.155.
the opposition of the various militant groups in Palestine and not, as the United States proposed, surrender to it. During the 1948 special Assembly session New Zealand adopted a position of stringent opposition to the trusteeship proposal and continued to support partition and enforcement of it 'through the joint action of all members of the United Nations'.\(^{101}\) Berendsen declared in committee debate that Palestine was

a test case, and, believe me, the future of this organization and the future of the world may depend upon the way in which it is decided. What the world needs to-day is not resolutions, it is resolution.... We must not, we dare not, add to the irresponsibility of our November decision for partition without enforcement, the further and final irresponsibility of a surrender to illegal force.\(^ {102}\)

The trusteeship plan was not accepted by the General Assembly. Even so, Assembly decisions which followed fell short of New Zealand objectives concerning enforcement. The decision to appoint a UN mediator to promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine, and other UN initiatives, were described by Berendsen as 'pitifully inadequate'.\(^ {103}\) With the end of the British mandate in mid-May, the Jews themselves forced the issue by declaring their own independence. The subsequent measures taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council were unable to prevent a worsening of the Arab-Jewish (Israeli) conflict.

For New Zealand the Palestine issue was a question in which its own interests were perceived as being vitally affected. Despite its geographical distance, Palestine's status as a British responsibility gave it immediate relevance to New Zealand security. The military burden it placed on the United Kingdom, at a time when New Zealand was actively concerned with the reconstruction of British power, made it essential that the Palestine crisis be solved.


\(^{102}\) ibid, p.9

\(^{103}\) ibid, p.17.
By October 1947 the implications of the Palestine question were seen to extend to the future effectiveness, prestige and authority of the UN. If the UN was to be taken seriously then, in New Zealand’s view, it had to act authoritatively. Its decisions, if resisted, had to be collectively enforced. When aggression was perceived in the actions of militant groups in Palestine and surrounding Arabs states, New Zealand viewed the desirable UN response as clear-cut - to secure the implementation of partition, if necessary by force. As early as 1 December 1947, Fraser had criticized the British for insisting on a plan which was acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.\textsuperscript{104} This was clearly impossible and the only practical course of action was to enforce partition regardless of the attitudes of those it affected most. The UN’s authority in world affairs, its ability and willingness to carry out collective enforcement, and the fulfilment of members’ obligations, bore a direct relationship to the UN’s ability to collectively defend small states. Berendsen had declared that the future of the UN, and the world, depended on the decisions which were facing the organization in April and May 1948. However, it was not the existence of the organization which was under threat if partition failed, but the universal collective security system which New Zealand envisaged through it. New Zealand could not easily comprehend the UN as separated from a role as a security provider - and, to New Zealand, the organization had little point, or chance, of successfully operating without it.

\textsuperscript{104} MEA, Wellington, to CROSEC, London, No.261., 1 December 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.
New Zealand’s preoccupation with its own security was dominant also approaching domestic issues in South Africa. Inherent in the Charter was an undertaking that the UN would not involve itself in the internal affairs of its members. Such involvement was interpreted in Wellington as external interference, and a threat to national security, which the UN had been established to prevent. Protection from this type of interference lay in Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter.\(^{105}\) It was not long before the limits of Article 2(7) were being severely tested over a number of issues, none more so than that of South Africa.

Peter Fraser had always maintained that the UN should be focused on international problems and especially the maintenance of national sovereignty. In order to achieve this, Fraser was convinced that the UN Charter should have recognized limits - while it should have the necessary strength to protect each nation from external threats, it should not, in his view, have the ability to interfere in the internal affairs of each nation.\(^{106}\) This was the way the Commonwealth operated and it was the way Fraser believed the UN should act also. It would not do to have a powerful organization designed to guard against external threats becoming just such a threat. This would immediately subvert the main purpose of the UN and undermine the concept of collective security that New Zealand was hoping to promote through it. New Zealand fully supported the inclusion of Article 2(7) in the UN Charter at San Francisco.

In 1946 the Government of the Union of South Africa brought into law the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, which re-established a discriminatory policy, segregating Indians from white South Africans and imposing

\(^{105}\) Appendix 1.

restrictions on land tenure. The Government of India brought the Act to the attention of the General Assembly in 1946, claiming that it constituted a human rights violation. Human rights violations were issues for which the UN Charter had asserted some responsibility, obliging member-nations to accord such rights to all citizens regardless of race, sex, language or religion. On these grounds, India argued that the General Assembly was competent to deal with the issue. However, the UN Charter did stipulate under Article 2(7) that nothing it contained authorized the United Nations to intervene in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The right to pass legislation on an internal issue was therefore protected by the UN Charter. South Africa claimed that, under the terms of Article 2(7), the Assembly did not have authority to deal with the issue.

The breach of human rights on one hand, and the limits of the UN Charter on the other, presented New Zealand with a serious dilemma. New Zealand frequently expressed dissatisfaction at the policies followed by South Africa towards Indians and, after 1948, towards black South Africans. Nevertheless, Article 2(7) existed and so, therefore, did legitimate doubts about whether the UN was competent to deal with the problem. It was an issue New Zealand wanted resolved, but consideration of the issue in the UN in 1946 brought alarm, not comfort, to New Zealand.

Discussion in the First Committee produced two major proposals in 1946. The first was a draft-resolution recognizing the breach of human rights, and therefore of UN obligations, by the Union of South Africa. It concluded that the relationship between India and South Africa had been impaired as a result. Under Article 14 the UN did have the right to recommend such action as it deemed appropriate to maintain friendly relations between states. The draft-resolution

---

107 The 1946 Session of the General Assembly was held in two parts, the first in London in January and February, the second in New York from October to December. The item ‘Treatment of Indians in South Africa’ was discussed during the second part of the session.

108 Because of the evident legal issue of interpretation of Article 2(7), this issue was in fact dealt with by a joint meeting of the First Political Committee and the Sixth Legal Committee. In subsequent years the issue was dealt with singly by either the First, or Ad Hoc, Committee.

109 Appendix 1.
therefore called on India and South Africa to seek a solution and report back to the Assembly the following year. The second draft-resolution provided for the issue of whether of not Article 2(7) applied in this instance to be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The two drafts reflected the respective opinions of India and South Africa, and encased the dilemma New Zealand perceived. J.V. Wilson, representing New Zealand, revealed this to the First Committee in 1946:

Some members of the Committee were prepared to affirm forthwith that the matter was not one of domestic jurisdiction. South Africa was prepared to affirm that it was. The New Zealand delegation thought the point sufficiently disputable to justify the proposed reference to the Court. Such a procedure was the least likely to prejudice the position of any member of the United Nations and the best calculated to ensure that any resolutions which the Assembly might ultimately be entitled to take would be solidly based.\(^\text{110}\)

New Zealand therefore argued for the issue to be referred to the ICJ and indicated it would not endorse any other action until the Court had clarified the legal position. New Zealand had no specific objection to the draft calling for India and South Africa to discuss the issue. Wilson pointed out that New Zealand was concerned about breaches of human rights and was not advocating a position where the General Assembly would be 'washing its hands of the matter'.\(^\text{111}\) But until the issue of the General Assembly’s competence could be established, New Zealand felt no judgement could be made on the merits of the issue.

New Zealand’s moderation was, however, not reflected in the positions of many other delegations. The New Zealand Delegation’s official report concerning the issue euphemistically stated that the debate over South Africa had 'displayed much of an emotional and even a passionate nature'.\(^\text{112}\) Berendsen had privately complained bitterly to Fraser at the way in which the Indian representative in

\(^{110}\) *AJHR*, A-2 (1947), p.44.

\(^{111}\) ibid.

\(^{112}\) ibid, p.46.
particular had whipped up the emotions of the Asian countries against South
Africa.\textsuperscript{113} It was a ‘disgraceful exhibition of hamacting’, he claimed, and a
particularly painful one coming from India, which hardly had a perfect human rights
record of its own.\textsuperscript{114} As a result, the proposal to refer the issue to the ICJ was
defeated, while a resolution recommending means of overcoming the problem was
adopted.\textsuperscript{115} In doing this the General Assembly had asserted its competence
without any serious attention given to whether it was legally entitled to do so.
Berendsen was disturbed by the outcome:

To see this almost hysterical emotion easily outweighing the logical
and responsible and clearly correct exposition on the issue by the
United States, United Kingdom and many others, was to me, in a
sense a frightening spectacle.\textsuperscript{116}

The power of the Assembly had shown itself in a way which New Zealand
had never envisaged, hence the emphasis in correspondence between New York and
Wellington on the ‘irresponsibility’ of many members of the General Assembly.
Wilson pointed out in early 1947 that the

chief question now seems to me to be not whether the United Nations
will be influential, but whether it will be just. I felt this particularly in
the debate on the position of Indians in South Africa, ... an Assembly
with a full sense of responsibility should see that the rights of one of
its member States were respected, however unpopular that member’s
case might be.\textsuperscript{117}

In subsequent sessions, the problem as New Zealand perceived it did not
improve; if anything it appeared to get worse. The proposed discussions between
India and South Africa did not produce results and the General Assembly
consistently called for efforts toward negotiations to continue. Attempts to have the

\textsuperscript{113} Berendsen to Fraser, 23 December 1946, PM 115/4/14, Part 1a.

\textsuperscript{114} ibid.

\textsuperscript{115} AJHR A-2 (1947), pp.45-6.

\textsuperscript{116} Berendsen to Fraser, 23 December 1946, PM 115/4/14, Part 1a.

\textsuperscript{117} Wilson’s Personal Impressions, 11 January 1947, PM 115/4/14, Part 1a.
question referred to the ICJ failed to win the necessary majority support and the Court was never consulted on the issue. The situation deteriorated when the South African Government brought into force the Group Areas Act of 1948, establishing apartheid.

In time a number of inconsistencies in New Zealand policy were identified. For example its position on human rights did not rest well with its position on South Africa. Moreover, New Zealand's position on South Africa did not rest well with its approach to issues relating to other states in which arguably Article 2(7) applied. Minister of External Affairs, Clifton Webb, wrote in 1954 of the problem which was manifest in New Zealand policy:

I find it difficult to escape the conclusion that if, in view of Article 2(7), the General Assembly is not competent to deal with apartheid, it is equally debarred from dealing with forced labour and religious persecution. But, because the two latter questions are directed against the Soviet Union, we haven't the same inhibitions about our competence to deal with them as we have about "apartheid", which involves one of our own family. It may be a natural attitude, but, in my opinion, it is not logical or justifiable unless we take the stand that what applies to others does not apply to our own.\textsuperscript{118}

While Webb was concerned about issues apparent in the 1950s, his description of New Zealand policy at that time accurately reflected the position in the 1940s. New Zealand's position on Indians and apartheid in South Africa was at considerable variance with its policy on human rights issues in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania in 1949.\textsuperscript{119} In the latter case, Berendsen confidently asserted the Assembly's competence on the basis of 'the many references in the Charter to human rights and fundamental freedoms'.\textsuperscript{120} 'Moreover', Berendsen went on, 'the concept of human rights was inextricably bound up with the concept of security

\textsuperscript{118} Webb to Munro, 29 January 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.


\textsuperscript{120} ibid, p.41.
embodied in the Charter'. Throughout the mid-to-late 1940s however, New Zealand abstained on almost all resolutions pertaining to South Africa, on the basis of the UN’s questionable competence.

If New Zealand’s approach to human rights was inconsistent, there was consistency in New Zealand’s motive for the differing approaches which it took. Its own security considerations underpinned all decisions in relation to these matters. At San Francisco, Fraser supported the inclusion in the Charter of Article 2(7). He had good reasons for doing so which he did not attempt to conceal. In the ratification debate in Parliament on the UN Charter in July 1945, Fraser pointed out that Article 2(7) had been ‘arrived at with great unanimity’. It stated, said Fraser, that ‘questions of a purely domestic nature will not be in any way interfered with by the Security Council or the United Nations’ Organization’. He described how this was relevant to New Zealand: ‘I may mention one question - that of immigration’. He went to the trouble of explicitly pointing out that it had been unanimously accepted at San Francisco that immigration was strictly a domestic matter and was not the concern of the UN. New Zealand maintained a restrictive immigration policy in 1945 which aimed to prevent Asians entering New Zealand. Asian encroachment into the South Pacific was particularly feared by New Zealand in the 1940s. The Japanese push into the Pacific in 1941-2 did nothing to soothe New Zealand suspicions that population pressures, or the perceived aggressive nature of many Asian regimes, might create a military threat to New Zealand. There were other problems; New Zealand’s objections to Churchill’s regionalized world organization in 1944-45 emanated primarily from this desire to

121 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 ibid.
125 ibid.
remain aloof from Asia, lest association with the region prove detrimental to New Zealand's position in the Commonwealth. Racial prejudice reinforced New Zealand's anti-Asian outlook, and immigration policies were put in place to guard against any dilution of New Zealand's Europeanness. Fraser would have considered it not only a severe infringement on New Zealand's sovereignty, but detrimental to New Zealand's security, had the UN been allowed to discuss immigration policy and he genuinely supported the broad intent of Article 2(7).

When the Indian Delegation complained about the treatment of Indians in South Africa New Zealand became concerned about the possible implications of this. New Zealand had joined the UN in the expectation that it would be primarily a security organization, oriented toward protecting the sovereignty of its members. A nation's right to legislate on issues concerning its own inhabitants was a vital part of its sovereignty. If the UN could interfere with this right, there was nothing to stop the UN interfering in any nation's political processes on any issue it found unacceptable. New Zealand immigration policy was discriminatory and the fact that it was India which brought the complaint against South Africa was not soothing. New Zealand's immigration policy discriminated against Asians.

New Zealand felt it could afford to be less concerned about these implications on issues regarding Eastern Europe. These issues centred around Communist countries under the control of the Soviet Union. New Zealand perceived the Soviet Union not only as the enemy of the West, but as most responsible for the failure of the Security Council. It actually served New Zealand's interests to attack the policies followed in those countries. South Africa, on the other hand, was a member of the Commonwealth. It had been a primary concern of New Zealand in the mid-1940s to see the UN as an organization which protected the Commonwealth, the latter perceived as fundamental to New Zealand's security. South Africa was 'one of the family' and it was never envisaged that the UN should take lines which were detrimental to the security of that 'family'. Issues involving Eastern European

---

countries were, furthermore, about forced labour, religious persecution, lack of political freedom and restrictions on the freedom of the press and of speech. New Zealand felt that these types of charges were most unlikely to be made against it or other Commonwealth members. Being beyond reproach on the types of issues involved, it was much less difficult for New Zealand to assert forthright views on human rights issues in the Eastern Bloc. Concerns about racism were much more difficult, New Zealand was aware that it might attract criticism in this area. It took some time it seems before the inherent inconsistencies of New Zealand policy on human rights came to be noticed by New Zealand itself.

Similar concerns about the limits of UN authority were evident in New Zealand’s policy on trusteeship. In 1946 New Zealand undertook trusteeship responsibilities for its former League of Nations mandate of Western Samoa, and was associated a year later with Australia and the United Kingdom in a trusteeship arrangement for Nauru. Apart from initial concerns about possible interference by the Soviet Union, and American base-rights on Upolu (in which the United States quickly lost interest), the administration of Western Samoa was not dominated by security concerns.128 New Zealand had only minor economic and strategic interests in the islands. For security it looked to international and regional arrangements.129 New Zealand’s approach to Nauru was predominantly determined by commercial factors, particularly access to phosphate, and was not significantly affected by security considerations.130 At any rate, it was felt in Wellington that Nauru was primarily related to Australian security, and New Zealand did not consider it important to its own security policy.131 However, like its immigration


129 ibid.


policy, the existence of New Zealand trusteeship responsibilities, particularly in Western Samoa until 1962, caused concern in Wellington at precedents occurring elsewhere in the 1940s and 1950s.

New Zealand's concern for the maintenance of national sovereignty and independence had a significant impact on its general policy on trusteeship. New Zealand was a strong advocate of the trusteeship system in which the 'welfare and advancement of native peoples' was to be the sole objective of colonial administrations. Under this system, colonial peoples would be gradually brought to a state of independence and come to possess a sovereignty of their own. A gradual transition to independence would therefore come about in a stable and peaceful environment. This was not a new or radical system. It was an improvement on the Permanent Mandates Commission established under the League of Nations in 1919. Most significantly, it reflected New Zealand's perception of British colonial policy, that it was undertaken in the best interests of the inhabitants and naturally resulted in their 'advancement' to independence. Trusteeship was the institutionalization of the way in which Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa had all become self-governing or independent. It was inherently paternalistic and not unrelated to New Zealand's perceived success of race-relations between European and Maori at the time. New Zealand's was a gradualist approach, opposed to quick or radical changes of status.

When questioned by United States State Department officials in 1946, on the possibility of the UN not approving the trusteeship arrangement with Samoa, Alister

---


133 NZPD, 268 (1945), p.582.

134 Boyd, p.6.

135 Mary Boyd, 'Political Development in Western Samoa and Universal Suffrage', PS, 8:1 (1950), p.45.
McIntosh stressed that New Zealand would remain in control of it.\textsuperscript{136} There was no possibility, insisted McIntosh, ‘of New Zealand relinquishing its authority over the mandate’.\textsuperscript{137} As McIntosh later noted in the 1970s:

Fraser held the view that for dependent peoples not only in the Pacific but in all other areas the solution lay in the establishment of an international body to supervise, though not administer, colonial territories and thus not infringe the sovereignty of present governing authorities.\textsuperscript{138}

New Zealand’s approach to trusteeship included a clear signal to the UN to oversee, but not interfere in, the execution of administrative responsibilities. The eventual sovereignty and independence of the trust territory was important, but not at the expense of that of administering power. The relationship between the UN and its sovereign members was thus defined, in trusteeship the UN was primarily an observer.

This aspect of New Zealand policy became increasingly evident after 1945 when various trusteeship issues were discussed by the General Assembly. In 1946 the South African UN representative asserted that his country did not intend placing its mandate of Southwest Africa (now Namibia) under a trusteeship agreement, but instead planned to incorporate it into the Union of the South Africa.\textsuperscript{139} Many UN members protested at the plan and pressed for a trusteeship agreement leading to independence. When the issue surfaced again the following year, South Africa indicated that it would not go ahead with incorporation, but neither would it place Southwest Africa under a trusteeship agreement. South Africa claimed it was under

\textsuperscript{136} Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States 1946: Volume 5 The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe} (Washington, 1969), p.9.

\textsuperscript{137} ibid.


\textsuperscript{139} \textit{AJHR}, A-2 (1948), p.73.
no obligation to do this, and such a course was contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants who favoured incorporation. The League of Nations, under which the mandate had previously been conferred and administered, no longer existed and the UN had no jurisdiction over mandated territories.\textsuperscript{140} South Africa declared it would therefore continue to administer Southwest Africa as a mandate.\textsuperscript{141}

This attitude caused major discontent in the Assembly, with most nations asserting that, under Chapter 12 of the UN Charter, South Africa was morally and legally obliged to place the mandate under trusteeship.\textsuperscript{142} A resolution was subsequently drafted to this effect.\textsuperscript{143} New Zealand clearly supported trusteeship and wanted to see the mandate under such an arrangement, but voted against the resolution in committee stages and abstained in the Assembly. Despite endorsing the view that South Africa did have a strong ‘moral obligation’ to submit a trusteeship agreement,\textsuperscript{144} New Zealand’s representative, Carl Berendsen,

\begin{quote}
stated that in view of the vague wording of the relevant article of Chapter XII of the Charter it seemed to him impossible to maintain that there was any legal obligation on a mandatory Power to place its mandate under the Trusteeship system.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

While trusteeship was fully endorsed by New Zealand, and favoured in the case of Southwest Africa, the broader issue of sovereignty interceded to moderate New Zealand’s approach. It had never been envisaged by New Zealand that the UN would assert the right to dictate the policy of the administering power in trusteeship or colonial issues. In New Zealand’s view, the freedom of decision in this area remained clearly with the relevant colonial power.

\textsuperscript{140} ibid, p.91.
\textsuperscript{141} ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} ibid, pp.91-2.
\textsuperscript{143} ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{AJHR}, A-1 (1948), p.47.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{AJHR}, A-2 (1948), p.91
This belief was evident even in New Zealand’s approach to the vexed issue of the future of the mandate of Palestine. New Zealand openly endorsed UN involvement in Palestine, supported partition and was extremely critical of the British for not cooperating with it. Nevertheless, the broader implications of UN decisions over Palestine for the sovereignty of UN members generally was a determinant in New Zealand policy. Fraser considered that the United Kingdom view that a mandatory power had the right to dispense with a mandate (and the South African view that a mandate could be retained) regardless of the expressed wish of the UN, was ‘opposed to the spirit of the United Nations’. But he would not accept that the UN possessed the right to force either state to adopt a policy to which they were opposed, even if that policy was more in accord with the spirit of the UN. While critical of the United Kingdom for not participating in the implementation of UN decisions, Fraser declared as ‘absurd’ the suggestion ‘that any country should be compelled by the United Nations to have its men killed and its money spent against its will’. A strong UN was important, but not if it meant the sacrifice - clearly a counterproductive one - of the inherent right of a nation to its sovereignty.

In subsequent debate on Southwest Africa, the Trusteeship Council initiated the practice of granting oral hearings to petitioners from various groups within the mandate, without the sanction of South Africa. This became the basis of an extensive policy affecting a number of African territories. This practice had no precedent under the League mandates system and was not constitutionally allowed for in the UN Charter. New Zealand reacted negatively to the development perceiving that UN authority had been asserted in a manner which seriously breached the sovereign rights of administering powers.

A further debate arose in the early 1950s over the authority to determine

---

147 ibid.
when a trust territory had reached self-government and when information from such a territory would cease to be conveyed to the UN. The anti-colonial powers argued that this authority should be given to the UN. New Zealand on the other hand, argued consistently that this remained the sovereign responsibility of the administering power. During the 1950s New Zealand backed away from any unequivocal endorsement of self-determination, lest it allow the UN a precedent to interfere in New Zealand administration of Western Samoa. Concern was also apparently expressed in the Department of External Affairs that the right of self-determination might be claimed by Maori and New Zealand forced by the UN to grant autonomy to a portion of its population. As early as 1947 New Zealand had expressed concern about the UN’s ability to do this.

New Zealand’s ‘open’ policy confidently expressed in 1945-46 was more conservative than it seemed. As it was originally conceived it implied no breach of sovereignty and New Zealand, considering itself as having nothing to hide, was quite uninhibited in revealing information concerning territories not under trusteeship agreements. But it was evident soon after 1945 that other UN members were not going to adopt the generally supportive attitude toward the administering powers which New Zealand had originally assumed they would. It was inconceivable, until it occurred, that British colonial policy - and New Zealand’s administration in Samoa - could actually be seen as anything other than progressive and enlightened. Soviet attacks during the early 1950s on New Zealand’s administration of Samoa bemused Minister of External Affairs Clifton Webb. He was irritated by the accusation that New Zealand was deliberately attempting to retain Samoan customs in order to prevent political development in Samoa.150 In recent meetings with Samoans, Webb had pressed for full political democracy and it was the Samoans who had rejected it, preferring the retention of their traditional systems of

---

148 McIntosh to Quentin-Baxter, 23 November 1955, McIntosh Papers.

149 Palestine: Supplementary Points for Consideration, 20 November 1947, PM 277/5/2, Part 8.

150 Webb to Munro, 13 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
government through local councils and titular heads of families.\textsuperscript{151} Attacks of this nature, made specifically to discredit administering nations such as New Zealand, had been occurring since New Zealand first placed its trusteeship agreement for Samoa before the UN in 1946. It considerably soured New Zealand’s initial enthusiasm for complete openness. This openness had always had inherent conditions - it was acceptable, indeed preferable, only as long as it did not compromise New Zealand’s sovereign interests.

Throughout the period 1946-49, New Zealand policy toward the UN was very complex. Policy revolved around the desire to extend the UN’s influence and effectiveness on one hand, and limiting it on the other. It consisted of an emphatic campaign for a number of major objectives and the acceptance of the UN adopting few of them. As at San Francisco, New Zealand policy after 1945 was a paradoxical mosaic of achievement and failure. Central to its complex character, however, was the theme of security. New Zealand saw the UN as a body through which security problems experienced during the Second World War could be overcome. It was essential, therefore, to eliminate the veto and to put ‘teeth’ into the enforcement provisions of the Charter. But it was just as necessary to prevent the Soviet Union from leaving, and to stop the General Assembly interfering with the sovereignty of member nations. The UN was far from the organization New Zealand sought at San Francisco, but it was nevertheless a body which was seen as useful. If it offered even a slight chance of preventing a further world war, and gave New Zealand a voice in world affairs it would not otherwise have had, then the UN had genuine value.

In the late 1940s New Zealand’s confidence in the UN declined. The failure of the UN to implement its resolution on the partition of Palestine had an impact on New Zealand’s perception of the UN. The organization had failed to settle a major international issue peacefully and had been unwilling to back its decisions with force. New Zealand’s confidence in the ability of the UN to enforce its decisions in

\textsuperscript{151} ibid; Webb to Munro, 31 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
the future was set back. Nevertheless, New Zealand continued to openly endorse a strong and effective UN, and insisted that regional security organizations be established adhering to UN Charter provisions and recognizing its ultimate authority. This period did not witness any decline in the perception that the UN must continue and that New Zealand’s membership of it was imperative. There is, furthermore, no suggestion that New Zealand was prepared to accept regional arrangements as a substitute for a security system based on the UN. The period of lagging confidence in the UN was temporary and lasted only until the Korean War, six months after Labour left office late in 1949.

The fundamental basis of New Zealand security policy in 1945 continued to be central to policy afterwards. The need for an authoritative organization, which was given the ultimate authority in peace and security issues, and which was designed fundamentally to protect the sovereignty of its members, remained principal features of New Zealand policy during the 1940s, despite the limited success of that period.
CHAPTER 3

LABOUR AND NATIONAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The belief that New Zealand policy towards the United Nations changed in 1949 is based on the assumption that Labour and National had very different approaches to foreign affairs. It has been claimed that foreign policy under National generally lacked firm political direction and that the UN became of secondary importance after 1950. National Prime Minister Sidney Holland's decision not to follow Fraser's example, and become Minister of External Affairs, allegedly reflected his own disinterest and that of his party. The change of government in 1949 has, therefore, been seen as a negative event in New Zealand's history, causing a complete change of emphasis in the nation's foreign policy. National's ministers were, it seemed, 'highly sceptical' of the need for foreign service or policy. National's concern about government expenditure has also been a source of criticism. It was widely perceived that National did not want a foreign policy and certainly did not want to spend money on one.

It is asserted in this thesis that changes in the conduct of New Zealand's security policy as a result of National's election in 1949 were in fact minimal. Party-political differences were not significant to New Zealand's pursuit of security between 1945 and 1960. This chapter will investigate the relationship between Labour and National during the 1940s in order to demonstrate that their approaches

---


3 ibid.

4 ibid.

to security issues, and in particular the UN, were more similar than different. As a consequence there was little basis for any change in the conduct of the nation’s security policy as a result of the 1949 election. Both parties accepted the UN Charter and followed a consistent policy of support for it. Differences which did exist tended to emanate from National’s lack of involvement in New Zealand security policy decisions during the 1940s. But once confronted with the problem of international affairs, National largely followed established lines of policy and did not impose significant financial restraints on the Department of External Affairs. The UN was a central part of New Zealand’s security policy prior to 1949 and it would remain so afterwards.

In July 1945 Fraser presented the UN Charter to Parliament for ratification. The debate which ensued produced an impressive show of enthusiasm on the part of Labour. Labour Members were generous in their praise of Fraser and of the UN Charter. The Minister of Agriculture, Benjamin Roberts, spoke of the Charter laying the foundation for a new world order, in which all nations would develop moral consciences.6 Frederick Hackett (Grey Lynn) saw the UN Charter as a stage in mankind’s inevitable progression towards a more perfect existence.7 Philip Connolly (Dunedin West) saw the veto as no obstacle to an effective UN. By virtue of international cooperation and good-will, he declared, the veto would soon disappear. Furthermore, Connolly predicted that the importance and authority of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) would eventually rise to the point where it transcended that of the Security Council. He envisaged it becoming the ‘paramount Council within the Charter’.8 Frank Langstone (Waimarino) continued in a similar vein. He declared the Charter ‘a wonderful document’, capable of pacifying a ‘war-ridden world’. He predicted ‘ultimate disarmament’ and ‘permanent peace’.9 The general approach of many Labour Party Members toward the UN was unmistakably

---

7 ibid, pp.628-9.
8 ibid, pp.669-670.
9 ibid, pp.675-6.
supportive and enthusiastic.

There was, by contrast, a greater degree of pessimism among the National Party Opposition. Frederick Doidge (Tauranga) warned that the people of New Zealand were not ‘rejoicing at the outcome of the San Francisco Conference’. He was harshly critical of the veto, and was unconvinced that the UN Charter could prevent another world war. He was scornful of visionaries and warned that instead ‘stark realism’ was required in approaching the post-war world.10 Clifton Webb (Kaipara) maintained that the reality of major power dominance was something to be accepted rather than resisted.11 Matthew Oram (Manawatu) was more critical, declaring that the UN Charter ‘was very nearly wrecked by well-meaning amateurs at San Francisco’.12 By far the most critical was Ronald Algie (Remuera), who expressed considerable disappointment with the UN Charter. In a statement which would adequately sum up the orthodox view of National’s attitude to the UN, Algie told Parliament:

It is grand that men should dream; it is fine that they should have their ideals. Without them, where would we be? But it is necessary that the ideals should rest on a basis of reality.... I want to look at the Charter as a contribution to reality, and in that regard I thought, if I might say it with respect, that the address of the Prime Minister was sadly disappointing....13

Algie threatened to vote against ratification, though in the event abstained.14 Without doubt then, criticism of the UN Charter and a distinct lack of enthusiasm for it was clearly evident among some National Party Members in 1945.

This apparently clear-cut distinction is, however, misleading. The attitudes of

---

10 ibid, pp.586-590.

11 ibid, p.597.

12 ibid, p.645.

13 ibid, p.695.

14 New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945.
Doidge and Algie were extreme even by National Party standards. Algie was the most uncompromising and he was the only Member of Parliament in 1945 not to vote for the ratification of the UN Charter. All other National Party members voted in favour.

The more critical reactions of many National Party Members were not, in fact, very different from Fraser’s own position. Doidge and Fraser both expressed dissatisfaction at the veto. Doidge was quick to point out that Fraser himself had once described the UN Charter as a ‘document without inspiration’.15 Webb too had kept a keen eye on Fraser’s activities. He noted the similarity between the great power veto and the amendment proposed by Fraser for greater General Assembly control.16

Several National Party Members were clearly ready to accept the veto, but this did not distinguish them significantly from Labour. Webb had argued convincingly for the veto’s acceptance, but nevertheless praised and supported Fraser’s efforts against it at San Francisco.17 Hackett claimed that he appreciated why the major powers had insisted on the veto. If they had not, smaller nations could ‘outweigh the votes of the larger nations’ on the Security Council, and that, in his opinion, could lead to war.18 He went on to state that the unity of purpose among the major powers was essential to permanent peace.19 Charles Williams (Labour, Kaiapoi) went further, stating that Fraser had done ‘the right thing’ in accepting the veto. ‘We must be realistic’, he went on,

we must face the fact that, of the five Powers that will exercise that power veto, two of them, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are so powerful that if a decision

15 NZPD, 268 (1945), p.590.
16 ibid, p.626.
17 ibid, p.627.
18 ibid, p.630.
19 ibid.
antagonistic to them were made, if there were any attempt to apply sanctions to either of those nations - they are so powerful - I believe that there would be a grave danger that the world would be plunged into a war compared with which the present war would appear to be a mere skirmish.\(^{20}\)

This statement reflected a major divergence from Fraser’s position. Indeed, Williams almost considered a virtue what Fraser considered a vice.

Further evidence that party distinctions were minimal were also apparent. Robert McKeen (Labour, Wellington South) praised Webb’s speech as an honest and fair analysis of the Charter.\(^{21}\) A number of Labour Party Members criticized Doidge’s speech, but then so did Webb, who distanced himself from Doidge’s pessimism.\(^{22}\) Nor was optimism and enthusiasm the sole preserve of the Labour Party. Webb perceived defects in the Charter, but they were not overly influential in his assessment of it. He questioned the need to ‘harp on’ the difficulties:

> We might just as well throw up our hands and say, "Human nature is imperfect, so why try to do anything?" I think that it is well that people should realize that those difficulties are there, but it is no reason whatever for not trying, at any rate, to make an improvement and rid the world of the greatest curse that has ever beset mankind.\(^{23}\)

Webb declared that peace could be achieved with the application of ‘good will and sincerity of purpose, and perseverance, and faith, [and] hope’. He saw in the UN Charter the possibility of conferring on the next generation the fulfilment of a verse he subsequently quoted:

> And may the nations see that men should brothers be,
And form one family the wide world o’er.\textsuperscript{24}

Ernest Alderman (National, New Plymouth), was even more enthusiastic. His predictions were entirely in accord with a number of Labour Party members. He felt the General Assembly would be a potent forum for the expression of world opinion. He could not visualize a situation where one nation would veto action against the will of the other forty-nine.\textsuperscript{25} Like Oram, Alderman appeared convinced that the General Assembly would in fact become the most important organ of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{26}

Differences between the approaches of the major parties toward the UN in 1945 were, therefore, not substantial. Indeed, just as Kathryn Peters observed in 1972 with reference to the League of Nations, the UN did not arouse clear-cut party divisions.\textsuperscript{27} Nor did Labour have a monopoly on enthusiasm and support for the UN, or National pessimism and criticism of it. There were in fact no clear party guidelines evident governing the way in which Members approached ratification. There was no standard Labour Party position on the veto, on the rights of small powers or on a number of other aspects which had been fundamental characteristics of Fraser’s policy at San Francisco. Similarly, there appears to have been no National Party directive to attack part or all of the Charter or government policy pursued at San Francisco. A number of National Party Members praised Fraser’s efforts and both parties had resolved to ratify the UN Charter.

Debates on external affairs issues in subsequent years followed a similar pattern, though National did become more critical as the UN was increasingly hamstrung by the Cold War. Doidge was especially prominent in disparaging the UN

\textsuperscript{24} ibid, p.628.

\textsuperscript{25} ibid, p.635.

\textsuperscript{26} ibid, p.644.

\textsuperscript{27} Kathryn Peters, ‘New Zealand’s Attitudes to the Reform of the League of Nations: The Background of the Memorandum to the Secretary-General, 16 July 1936’, \textit{NZJH}, 6:1 (1972), p.82.
due to its lack of progress toward world peace. He was at times scathing toward the lack of UN achievement in disarmament and the Security Council’s impotence. But again, Doidge tended toward a more extreme view-point than his colleagues. Webb in 1947 distanced himself from Doidge and agreed with government Members that New Zealand must persevere with the UN in striving to attain world peace. Disappointment at the Cold War’s effects on the ability of the Security Council to function was felt by Labour and National alike. Fraser himself often expressed discord at the lack of progress toward a universal collective security system, especially after the Palestine crisis, and regularly attacked the veto and the Security Council’s impotence. Fraser’s criticisms were not a reflection of his attitude to the UN itself, but certain aspects of it which curtailed its ability to function properly. Labour remained committed to the UN throughout the 1940s.

National’s approach was no different. The UN had a number of serious and clearly identifiable defects in the late 1940s and these attracted National’s disapproval. Like Labour, however, National in the later 1940s continued to support the existence of the UN and New Zealand’s participation in it. National also remained convinced, as its 1946 election Manifesto stated, that the UN offered ‘the only means of ensuring world peace’ and should not be abandoned. In the early 1950s public statements and private documents revealed the enduring nature of this belief. National frequently emphasized the bipartisan endorsement of a policy of full New Zealand support of the UN.

---

28 NZPD, 277 (1947), p.79.
30 NZPD, 277 (1947), p.86.
32 McKinnon, p.60.
33 EAR 1:8 (1951), p.5; The Present Situation of the United Nations, undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/52.
Differences which did exist between National and Labour in the 1940s were not significant and emanated mostly from the degree of involvement each party had in foreign policy making. The 1940s saw extensive change in the way New Zealand approached the rest of the world. Labour was the government for all but a few weeks of this period, while National remained in Opposition. Diplomatic representation, unheard of before the war outside the Commonwealth, had been established in a number of countries by the war's end. The Department of External Affairs was set up by Labour; it was Labour which signed New Zealand's first major international agreement, the Canberra Pact in 1944, and brought home the UN Charter a year later. Throughout the remainder of the 1940s it was Labour which initiated stands on the veto, Palestine and various other issues. The invention, evolution and execution of New Zealand foreign policy from 1935 to 1950 was completely dominated by the Labour Party.

National had not only been in Opposition during these developments, but had been deliberately excluded from them. A significant amount of criticism directed by National at Labour in 1945 emanated from the fact that no National members had been included in the Delegation to San Francisco. Doidge stated in Parliament that it was 'to be regretted' that while Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom had adopted the position 'that the San Francisco Conference transcended all considerations of party politics', the New Zealand Government had not.\(^{34}\) The United States had also been careful to include Opposition representatives. But National's exclusion from foreign affairs was by this time established government policy. The creation of the Department of External Affairs had not been complemented with a parliamentary external affairs committee, despite growing National Party calls for one.\(^{35}\) It was not until 1947 that Fraser finally agreed to such a committee, but it remained only consultative and gave National no influence over foreign policy decisions. When New Zealand representatives went to Australia to discuss the Canberra Pact, National was excluded.

\(^{34}\) NZPD, 268 (1945), p.589.

\(^{35}\) ibid, p.697.
New Zealand’s entry into the UN came about the same way. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals became available before the end of 1944, prior to the New Zealand Parliament rising for the year. Fraser discussed the proposals with Australian representatives in Wellington at a conference convened under the auspices of the Canberra Pact in November 1944. But he did not discuss them with the Opposition and did not allow Parliament to debate them. This contrasted with both Canada and the United Kingdom, in which the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were subject to parliamentary discussion prior to their respective Delegations leaving for San Francisco.

On hearing that Australia planned to include Opposition representatives in its Delegation to San Francisco, Fraser wrote a strongly worded letter to the Australian Prime Minister J.B. Chifley. Fraser indicated that if Australia went ahead with this plan, New Zealand would be compelled to do the same, and this might prove embarrassing. The differences of opinion in New Zealand between Labour and National were so immense, he claimed, that they made those existing between Republicans and Democrats in the United States look insignificant. Fraser emphasized that any differences of opinion arising within a joint Labour-National delegation would be ‘used in political charges against the Government’ back in Wellington. He also claimed that ‘opinions expressed in good faith’ would be ‘twisted and distorted’ by National ‘to the disadvantage of the Government’.

---


37 NZPD, 268 (1945), p.596.

38 ibid, p.632.

39 NZPM, Wellington, to APM, Canberra, No.24., 27 February 1945, ACTRO H45/775/2.

40 ibid.

41 ibid.
The Australian Delegation eventually went to San Francisco with Opposition representatives, but Fraser, despite claiming earlier that he would be compelled to the same, did not follow suit. Fraser’s assertion that the differences between New Zealand’s political parties were greater than those in the United States, was hardly sustainable. His decision not to take National Party Members also implies that he considered that New Zealand’s political divisions were more significant than those in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Yet how he came to such a conclusion is not at all clear. He subsequently abandoned this line in favour of an equally unconvincing claim that Opposition Members had been included in the British and Canadian Delegations due to pending elections in those countries.42

The ratification debate itself proved that there were no substantial party divisions in the way the UN was approached. During this debate Webb and Algie had both called for the creation of an external affairs committee.43 Webb had also indicated a desire that Labour and National, while differing on domestic issues, should nevertheless ‘strive to speak with one voice in external matters’.44 The Opposition cooperated fully with ratification and the UN Charter was unanimously accepted by the New Zealand Parliament. Algie had threatened to vote against ratification, but specifically abstained in order to maintain that unanimity.45 Had Fraser taken the trouble to seek Opposition views prior to San Francisco, it is doubtful whether he would have found anything which differed significantly from his own position.

Holland’s opinion in subsequent years was that National and Labour had basically shared a common approach to external affairs.46 This was also the view of experienced diplomats. Berendsen remained as New Zealand’s Ambassador to the

---

42 New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945.

43 NZPD, 268 (1945), pp.625, 697.

44 ibid, p.625.

45 New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945.

46 Speech Notes for Prime Minister, undated (mid-1956), McIntosh Papers.
United States and UN Representative, after National's election late in 1949. He found little difference between its approach to foreign policy and that of its predecessor. McIntosh also later wrote of a notable consistency in New Zealand's approach to external affairs in the period following National's accession to power.47

Fraser was an autocratic Prime Minister and tightly controlled foreign policy decisions. He seemed to have doubted National's competency in international affairs. More importantly, as the letter to Chifley suggested, Fraser was mindful of electoral considerations relating to the San Francisco Conference and deliberately excluded National to prevent potential criticism. Perhaps another motive was the desire to prevent National from gaining any credit from the successful establishment of an international organization. McIntosh's claim that Labour encouraged bi-partisanship in foreign policy is a doubtful one.48 Apart from Holland being able to see external affairs telegrams on major issues, Fraser did not keep National well informed and isolated it from developments in New Zealand foreign policy.49 National's only source of information during the San Francisco Conference was newspaper reports.50

If National was excluded from San Francisco, so also was Labour, aside from Fraser himself. Fraser doubted the competence of his own colleagues in international relations and did not often include them in policy deliberations.51 Fraser was the only member of the New Zealand Government in the Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, which otherwise consisted entirely of departmental officials. No other serving MP, not even Walter Nash, attended UN Assembly sessions during


48 ibid, pp.27-28.

49 ibid.

50 NZPD, 268 (1945), p.596.

the period Fraser was Prime Minister. James Thorn became part of New Zealand’s UN Delegation in 1948, but he had by this time resigned from politics.

Labour’s policy to both the League, and the UN was largely formulated and carried out without the bulk of the Labour Government or Party ever being involved.\textsuperscript{52} The generally supportive and optimistic approach of Labour Members to the UN in 1945 emanated from detachment, not acquaintance, with the actualities of foreign policy of the time. In 1948 Fraser issued instructions to the Department of External Affairs that official reports concerning the UN meetings were to be considerably shortened.\textsuperscript{53} He considered lengthy and detailed reports of value to him and the Department, but felt that the Ministers and the public wanted little more than a short statement of the main issues and how they were disposed of.\textsuperscript{54} In 1945 one National Member accused the Government of treating external affairs as its own personal business. Had he known more, he would have accused Fraser, rather than the Government.

Labour had a few high-profile individuals active in external affairs. Fraser was Savage’s deputy and then Prime Minister. Nash was a senior member of the Labour Cabinet and was New Zealand’s first diplomatic Minister to the United States in the early 1940s. He also later became Prime Minister. There were others in the Labour Government who were interested in external affairs as James Thorn’s presence at the UN in the later 1940s indicated. Nevertheless, it remains that Labour’s reputation in external affairs was built on the personal attributes of a few, rather than any widespread appreciation and understanding of such issues in its ranks.

National’s External Affairs Ministers, in contrast, lacked the high-profile of

\textsuperscript{52} ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} Departmental Memorandum from Shanahan, 29 April 1948, PM 115/4/14, Part 3.

\textsuperscript{54} ibid; see also McKinnon, p.116. McKinnon accords both Labour and National a reluctance to develop public interest in external affairs.
their predecessor, but it would be a mistake to interpret this as a reflection of National’s interest or competence in external affairs. Holland did not become Minister of External Affairs as Fraser and Nash had done, but he nevertheless exerted a significant influence over foreign policy. McKinnon’s portrayal of him in 1993 as incompetent and frequently guilty of ‘gaffes’ is misleading. His handling of many issues during the Korean War and the Offshore Islands Crisis demonstrated a significantly greater acumen than he has been given credit for.

The result of Holland’s not taking the external affairs portfolio was effectively to bring a broader array of people into active involvement in foreign policy. Holland, as Prime Minister, was involved in policy formation on all major issues. Doidge was National’s first Minister of External Affairs, retiring in 1951, to be followed by Webb and Macdonald. Ronald Algie acted as Macdonald’s deputy. Both Webb and Macdonald were extremely capable and conscientious and their contributions to policy-making are covered in detail later in this thesis. Many in the National Government remained outside this group, and interest or competence among them was probably not high, but this only made National comparable, not different, from Labour.

Labour’s foreign policy was also severely restricted by a lack of resources. Templeton, in particular, has criticised National’s reluctance to commit resources to external affairs activities. While in Opposition National frequently complained about UN related costs. When National became Government late in 1949, it halted departmental recruitment and made decisions on whether or not to attend international conferences at times solely on the basis of cost. National closed the New Zealand Legation in Moscow and kept the UN delegation in New York almost permanently understaffed.

55 McKinnon, p.114.

56 These issues and Holland’s involvement will be discussed in later chapters.

However, such an evaluation is again deceptive. The Labour Government was hardly a free-spender on external affairs during the 1940s. As Templeton himself pointed out in 1988:

Even if the Labour government had been reelected it might not have kept the [Moscow] post open in the face of an arbitrary revaluation of the rouble which took place in 1950, resulting in a substantial increase in its running costs.\(^{58}\)

Fraser also had occasion to restrict departmental recruitment.\(^{59}\) The growth of the Department of External Affairs was described by McIntosh in 1977, as ‘slow and halting’.\(^{60}\) In its formative years staff levels in the Department were never adequate.\(^{61}\) Preparations for international conferences were often hampered by insufficient resources. New Zealand’s material preparation for the Australian-New Zealand Conference in January 1944 was modest compared with Australia’s, and New Zealand had one of the smallest delegations at the San Francisco Conference the following year.\(^{62}\) Fraser and Berendsen had to join and leave major committee meetings part way through proceedings because of the insufficient number of delegates available to attend all such meetings. Throughout the 1940s Berendsen and Wilson and others associated with the UN continually complained that the New Zealand Delegation was being stretched beyond its resources.\(^{63}\) At one stage Wilson complained of having to send a secretary to a major committee meeting, and at times committee meetings were not attended at all.\(^{64}\)

---


\(^{59}\) McIntosh, p.19.

\(^{60}\) ibid.

\(^{61}\) ibid, p.28.

\(^{62}\) *Dominion*, 30 April 1945.

\(^{63}\) Berendsen to Fraser, 28 May 1947, New York Session: Wilson’s Impressions, 11 January 1947, PM 115/4/14, Part 1a; Berendsen to Fraser, 6 December 1947, PM 115/4/14, Part 2a.

The lack of resources seriously taxed New Zealand’s UN Delegation. It simply did not have the resources to participate effectively in many of the major committees and Berendsen immediately adopted the policy of speaking substantially only in the General Assembly. New Zealand seldom took the initiative on major issues during the 1940s because of the lack of resources and certainly could not prepare draft-resolutions or effectively lobby for support. New Zealand won its 1947 ECOSOC seat without lobbying. Guy Powles, First Secretary of the New Zealand Legation in Washington, wrote to McIntosh in 1947 criticizing Berendsen’s policy of speaking mainly in the General Assembly. ‘The Delegation must be large enough’, he stated, ‘to enable us to make [an] effective contribution to committee work. The present one is woefully small, and dispirited as a result.’ The committees were identified by Powles as the bodies in which the real decisions were made and in which New Zealand could potentially have had its greatest influence. By the time issues reached the General Assembly, they were all but decided and there was little point in making ‘broad and high-sounding declarations...because nobody listens’. Fraser did not seek re-election on ECOSOC in 1949, despite being virtually assured of success. Fraser also turned down the possibility of seeking a Security Council seat in the same year, again in the face of expected success and evident support from other Commonwealth members. The lack of resources was a major determinant in these decisions.

National came to power in 1950 emphasizing need to control government expenditure. This affected all government departments, including External Affairs. National’s policy was broad and developed in accord with domestic political and economic concerns. In terms of the UN, this policy increased the handicap under which New Zealand’s UN Delegation worked, but certainly did not create it. New Zealand was one of the smallest members of the UN and the resources available.

---

65 Powles to McIntosh, 3 November 1947, McIntosh Papers.
66 ibid.
67 Thorn to McIntosh, 1 August 1949, PM 115/1/19, Part 1.
68 ibid.
were always limited. Even if there had been a significant increase in the Delegation’s resources, limitations in one form or another would have persisted. Australia maintained a much larger delegation at the UN, but still had difficulties meeting all its obligations.\(^{69}\)

National did not actually cut the budget of the Department of External Affairs. An analysis of departmental spending for the period 1945 to 1955, consisting of five year segments of both National and Labour governments, reveals quite the contrary. As evident in figure 1 below, the number of officers in the Department’s employ fell by 60 in the year ending March 1951, National’s first full year as Government. Staff numbers at both the UN Delegation in New York and the Embassy in Washington were also reduced in that year and further the year after. The expenditure of the former declined by just over 50% between 1949 and 1953.

(Fig.1) Personnel and Expenditure levels, Department of External Affairs, 1945-55.\(^{70}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Embassy Staff</th>
<th>Expend. £</th>
<th>UN Del. Staff</th>
<th>Expend. £</th>
<th>NZDEA Total Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944-5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50,430</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40,035</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56,338</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52,426</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8,562</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49,727</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26,102</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47,574</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35,454</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1</td>
<td>14(7)</td>
<td>50,277</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36,934</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-2</td>
<td>14(5)</td>
<td>60,278</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27,905</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{69}\) Min. & Dept., Canberra, to ADelUN, New York, No.300., 23 June 1948; ADelUN, New York, to Min. & Dept., Canberra, No.566., ACTRO 852/20/3, Part 3.

\(^{70}\) The Source for this table comes from the Details of Estimates - Department of External Affairs, AJHR, B-7 Part 1 (1945-1956).
Despite these evident reductions, the budget figures in general do not support the contention that National was unwilling to spend on external affairs. The 50% reduction in the UN Delegation’s spending between 1949 and 1953 was complemented by an increase of almost 80% in the Embassy’s funding in Washington over the same period. The latter’s staff numbers fell only fractionally in 1950-51 and steadily increased afterwards. The practice of recruiting locally for administrative duties in overseas posts was introduced and largely compensated for decreases in staff levels in Washington. As the Ambassador was also the UN Representative, it is probably fair to speculate that work formerly done in New York was transferred to Washington. It is therefore difficult to substantiate the argument that under National, UN related activities were significantly affected.

Furthermore, overall external affairs expenditure, analyzed in figure 2, increased from just over £733,000 in 1949, to over £2 million in 1955, an increase of almost 195% over five years. This did not include additional expenditure caused by New Zealand’s deployment of UN observers in Kashmir and Palestine in the 1950s, or of forces committed to the Korean War, all of which were funded out of the Defence budget. There were years in which significant increases occurred under National, with the year ending March 1952 having the most substantial, almost 120%.

The figures in brackets in column 2 refer to additional staff recruited locally and should be added to the unbracketed figure.
(Fig. 2) Overall Expenditure, Department of External Affairs 1945-55.\textsuperscript{72}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Expenditure £</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Expenditure £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944-5</td>
<td>177,023</td>
<td>1950-1</td>
<td>736,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-6</td>
<td>208,670</td>
<td>1951-2</td>
<td>1,604,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-7</td>
<td>395,570</td>
<td>1952-3</td>
<td>1,800,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-8</td>
<td>673,909</td>
<td>1953-4</td>
<td>1,811,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-9</td>
<td>672,465</td>
<td>1954-5</td>
<td>2,070,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>733,009</td>
<td>1955-6</td>
<td>2,153,892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In considering the varying approaches of Labour and National to the United Nations during the 1940s it is clear that the differences between the two were, in fact, minimal. Labour in general appeared more enthusiastic, but most in the Labour Party were excluded from the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Fraser and Nash dominated in this area and, in terms of the UN, it was Fraser alone who directed policy. Criticism of the UN’s failings emanated from both parties and should not be interpreted as disinterest in the UN. Furthermore, Fraser was no free-spender and New Zealand, as a small state, necessarily acted constantly with severe resource constraints. National’s policy was affected by this lack of resources, but no more than Labour. It was, indeed, precisely this lack of resources which made collective security so important to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{73}

Differences were bound to have existed between two competing political parties. External affairs, as any other portfolio, would consequently have been affected, if only in the change of personalities and by the emergence of people to

\textsuperscript{72} The Source for this table comes from the Details of Estimates - Department of External Affairs, \textit{AJHR}, B-7 Part 1 (1945-1956).

government who were unfamiliar with it. But National throughout the 1940s did not approach external affairs issues in a way which distinguished it significantly from Labour. As far as the UN was concerned, little separated the two political parties; both were aware of its failings, but neither was prepared to abandon it. Consequently, there was little foundation to believe that, as a result of the change of government in 1949, the role of the UN in New Zealand security policy was likely to alter.
CONCLUSION TO PART 1

New Zealand’s approach to the United Nations under Labour in the 1940s was fundamentally concerned with security, particularly the types of security problems which had arisen during the Second World War. New Zealand was an isolated South Pacific nation, without the resources to defend itself, and vulnerable to world events. Threats to international peace and security were perceived to directly affect New Zealand. World peace and international security therefore translated into critical security concerns for New Zealand.

As a means of overcoming anxiety about its future security, New Zealand sought to institutionalize, in peacetime, the great Second World War alliance which had overcome the Axis powers. Within the UN Charter, New Zealand sought explicit guarantees and commitments to defend any state which fell victim to aggression. In this way New Zealand would be defended against any future attack. More importantly, such a menace would be dealt with at the point it first emerged, thus avoiding a small conflict becoming a world war and a direct military threat to New Zealand. The resources necessary for this would be found in the universality of the commitment to defend each member from aggression. Major power involvement and leadership was essential as it was ultimately their resources New Zealand was seeking to harness to the defence of all states. Therefore the veto was a major problem, as indeed was the ambivalence of many states toward observing their ‘obligations’ in Palestine. New Zealand acted in each case to maximize the ability of the organization to provide security for its members.

While New Zealand continually supported the UN’s authority in world affairs, there were limits as to how far this country wanted the UN’s powers to extend. The UN was perceived by New Zealand as an organization which should protect the sovereignty of states. The exclusiveness of the Security Council was perceived to interfere with the rights of states to formulate their own policy and attempts to alter the Charter to effect a greater degree of Assembly influence were
aimed toward overcoming this. But New Zealand considered that even the Assembly’s power should have clear limits. It endorsed Article 2(7) of the Charter and acted to prevent what it perceived as the Assembly dabbling in the legislative processes in South Africa.

All of these concerns were primarily influenced by New Zealand concerns for the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the nation-state in the post-war world. New Zealand security policy was entirely in accord with the conditions in which it was formed and deeply influenced by the anxieties of the Second World War. Labour and National did not have fundamentally different approaches to security problems. There were obviously differences between them extending from the unequal degree of experience in external affairs, different domestic political agendas and certainly different personalities. But these were not major differences and their impact on the conduct of security policy and approach to the UN was limited. The dominance of security priorities evident in New Zealand’s approach to the UN between 1945-9 continued to underpin policy decisions after 1949 and was a fundamental determinant in the continuity of New Zealand’s relationship with the UN after 1950.

New Zealand was a small nation, relatively new as an individual player on the international stage. The lack of resources was a constant constraint on its ability to perform and was always present in foreign policy decisions. The interplay of such constraints on decisions of the time were not expressions of disinterest, but evidence of the very problem New Zealand was attempting to overcome. New Zealand did not have the resources to defend itself and attempted from 1945 to enlist those of stronger nations to provide security.
Part 2

Regionalism in New Zealand
Security Policy

1944-1954
A widely accepted assumption in New Zealand historiography concerning the United Nations is that New Zealand security policy under Fraser was predominantly concerned with the UN and only marginally, if at all, with regionalism. The pursuit of security through regional arrangements is not usually considered significant in the mid-1940s and is overshadowed by the San Francisco Conference and establishment of the UN. Occasionally regional aspects of New Zealand security policy have been identified in this period, but the UN's failure is noted as a prerequisite for these developments. Regionalism, and the UN, are assumed to be unfitting bedfellows. The UN's decline is usually assumed to have precipitated, necessitated, or resulted from, the growth of regionalism. Consequently some scholars have asserted that Fraser had no interest in regional security organizations and have down-played evidence suggesting any such interest. The relationship between regionalism in the 1940s and New Zealand's commitment to the UN has, therefore, not been investigated.

A major factor contributing to this problem has been the tendency for New

---


3 Brown, p.10.

Zealand security policy to be presented as monolithic, focused primarily on only one area at a time. Thus the general history of New Zealand's security policy from 1945 is presented as a progression from an initial concentration on the UN in which regionalism did not feature, to a more enduring emphasis on regionalism in which the UN played little part. The possibility that the two could coexist, without necessarily threatening each other, seems not to have been considered by New Zealand historians. Brown clearly recognized that this did occur under Labour in the 1940s and wrote of an 'apparent conflict', implying, perhaps, that it was not a necessary one. But he did not discuss the issue further and noted the decline of 'Fraser's post-war idealism' soon after. He therefore did not challenge the idea that the UN and regionalism could not, or did not, co-exist successfully.

The origins and development of regionalism over the period covered in Part 1 will be investigated in Part 2 of this thesis. New Zealand's identification of, and approach to, its geographical locality and the relationship of this to its on-going desire for security will form the basis of this chapter. The limitations of presenting New Zealand security policy as monolithic will be exposed in this process and the co-existence of a focus on both regionalism and the UN will be demonstrated. Far from being incompatible with each other, it will be argued that New Zealand's regional policies, and approach to the UN in the mid-1940s, formed part of a diverse and at times integrated approach to security.

Fraser did have strong objections to the development of regionalism and was a noted opponent of proposals which emerged during 1944-45 for regional security organizations. Fraser was quick to dispel United States concern that the Canberra Pact indicated that the two countries favoured regional alliances over a more

5 Brown, p.4; Kennaway, pp.22-43, 130-4.
6 Alley, pp.166-168; Kennaway, pp.130-143.
7 Brown, p.25.
8 ibid.
universal world security system. He pointed out to the United States that the term ‘regional security’ had not been included in the text of the agreement and that ‘neither of the Dominions considered systems of regional security “capable of preserving the peace”.

Later in 1944 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, began to show a clear interest in post-war security organized along regional lines. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London in May 1944, Churchill put forward a proposal for a security scheme in which each major region would have its own autonomous organization. Churchill also envisaged a major world council being established to deal with problems of a more universal nature. He proposed that this council consist of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as elected representatives from each of the regional organizations holding non-permanent seats.

Fraser was extremely disturbed by Churchill’s proposal and strongly attacked the idea. He perceived Churchill’s emphasis on regionalism as contradicting the lessons of recent history, particularly of the Second World War. One of the main reasons for the outbreak of the War, asserted Fraser, was ‘that the European powers showed themselves indifferent to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1932’. The establishment of regional bodies would encourage the same type of reaction again. It was therefore quite a ‘wrong’ and ‘dangerous’ approach to peace and security and could well cause, rather than prevent, further conflict. He warned

---


10 ibid.


12 Feutz, p.45.


14 ibid.
against any attempt to organize security on a regional basis. He was convinced that if anything had emerged from the history of the previous twenty-five years, it was that peace was indivisible and could be only secured on a world scale. To revert to regionalism would entail returning to the state of affairs prevailing before the War. When Fraser returned from London, he told Parliament that the idea of regional security was a mirage. He declared that separate regional organizations in Europe, the Americas or the Pacific could not maintain world peace.

New Zealand's resistance to regionalism was carried over to the San Francisco Conference. Fraser was uneasy about the existence of the pan-American Act of Chapultepec, concluded in March 1945, which created a regional security organization for the Americas. At San Francisco, two months later, the member nations of the Chapultepec Agreement declared that they would not forego the security guarantee provided by it. The relationship of the Chapultepec Agreement, and regional organizations in general, with the UN was therefore 'very acutely discussed'. Fraser was unhappy about the 'dangers and difficulties' of regional organizations arising from priorities established on a 'continental as against a world outlook'. Members of the Chapultepec group were, however, insistent that their right to belong to such an organization be recognized in the UN Charter. While Fraser opposed such a development, he nevertheless accepted it. He told Parliament in July 1945 that a regional arrangement was 'a reality in the Americas; and it is better to accept the realities than to ask people to undo the organizations they have

---

15 ibid.

16 ibid.

17 Report to the New Zealand House of Representatives by the Prime Minister, 7 August 1944, PM 153/20/11, Part 1.

18 ibid.


21 ibid.
built up'. In January 1944, the same month as the Canberra Pact was concluded, Cabinet recognized 'real advantages' in the Pan-American Union, a non-security arrangement which preceded the Act of Chapultepec.

Faced with the existence of regional security organizations, Fraser attempted to have their role entirely subordinated to that of the UN. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had stipulated that regional organizations could exist as long they were consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. New Zealand proposed a significant strengthening of this provision by making a requirement that such organizations and their activities be approved by the UN. This proposal failed to get adequate support. Regional arrangements were thus accepted by the UN Charter under conditions laid down in Articles 52-54, that they were consistent with it and that they not take enforcement measures without the authorization of the Security Council. New Zealand policy at this time had an undeniably anti-regional character. A strong preference for a world security organization was evident and a desire to see any regional bodies subordinated to the former was clear.

The nature of the regionalism to which New Zealand so strongly reacted was fundamental to the development of this anti-regional policy. Regionalism in the period 1944-45 was a term connected with Churchill's proposal for regionalized world security system. This encased extensive macro-regionalism, which effectively divided the world into regions and delegated responsibility for world issues accordingly. It was also clearly being advanced as an alternative to a universal world

---

22 ibid.


24 UNCIO Report, p.96.


26 UNCIO Report, p.96.

27 Appendix 1.
organization in which no regional divisions were anticipated. The concept of a universal world organization was perceived by New Zealand as essential to world peace and its own security. It was perceived in New Zealand in 1945 that any war would likely mean total war. Fraser’s assertion concerning the reluctance of Europe to intervene against Japan in 1932 reflected the opinion that it was utter folly to divide the responsibility for peace and security regionally. The unity of the major powers, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had turned the tide of war against the Axis powers. It was that unity which New Zealand sought to preserve, and had accepted the veto in 1945 in order that that unity would not be jeopardized. Churchill’s regionalism would automatically divide these powers.

There were several other reasons why Churchill’s proposal was unacceptable to New Zealand, again for reasons closely related to its own security. Churchill’s scheme envisaged extensive regions such as the Americas, Europe and Asia. The only logical region in which Australia and New Zealand could be included was Asia, and New Zealand believed it had a great deal to fear from this eventuality. New Zealand was generally suspicious of Asians, had an anti-Asian immigration policy and in 1944 was at war with a major Asian aggressor, Japan, which was to be seen as a potential invader years after the war had finished. New Zealand had little in common with Asia and, if anything, wanted to be defended from it.

Regionalism was, furthermore, a concept which reminded New Zealand of its geographical distance from the countries with which it felt familiar. The idea of a regionally divided world presented New Zealand with images of isolation and vulnerability and brought back painful memories of the darkest days of a war which had yet to be won. Labour’s strong UN policy was intimately related with a perceived need to overcome its own remoteness. New Zealand wanted to remain in contact with global questions vital to its security and in contact with the parts of the

---


29 Feutz, p.46. Feutz makes the euphemistic statement - 'It was clearly felt that representation through a body such as the Council of Asia would be less than satisfactory.' This understates the clear security priorities and racial prejudice which contributed to New Zealand’s objections.
world its security emanated from - the United Kingdom and United States, not Asia. Churchill's regional scheme would have driven a wedge between New Zealand and these countries. Despite the clear decline in British power, the link to the motherland proved enduring in public sentiment and economic interest. A huge proportion of New Zealand exports were sent to British markets. New Zealand's identity stemmed from the British Empire and it was from within this framework that New Zealand understood its own existence. Regionalism of the type prescribed by Churchill, therefore, threatened to extinguish New Zealand's identity and presented a security threat, not a guarantee.

New Zealand's policy on regionalism was decided on the assumption that its security would in no way be enhanced by the development of macro-regional alliances as alternatives to the UN. However, this did not mean the absence of vital regional concerns or lack of interest by New Zealand in regional security arrangements. By the time the San Francisco Conference convened New Zealand had identified a number of explicit regional interests, extending from civil aviation routes in the Pacific to regional security. The Canberra Pact dealt not only with these issues, but also with the desire for a world security organization. Encased in one agreement, therefore, was evidence of the existence of both regional and global emphases in New Zealand security policy, without necessary conflict.

The Second World War was perceived in Wellington as a universal conflict, and security from the threats which emerged during it were seen as surmountable only in a world context. But the war had also seen a series of major regional conflicts in Europe, North Africa and the Pacific. This awakened New Zealand to the importance of peace and security in its own geographical vicinity. By 1944 New Zealand had identified two major regions which were of fundamental concern to its security, the general Pacific area, and the South and Southwest Pacific area. In

---

30 Australian-New Zealand Agreement, *Statements and Documents*, pp.48-54.

31 Paper on Post-War Security Prepared by the War Cabinet Secretariat, Prime Minister's Department, January 1944, Kay, pp.56-65.
January 1944 a War Cabinet paper noted significant objections to regional organizations, again perceived in a context of macro-regional alternatives to the UN.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, however, it ‘fully approve[d] the creation of a substantial barrier between Japan, Australia and New Zealand and British territories in the Pacific.’\textsuperscript{33} The need to keep American power in the Pacific and the desire for ‘close collaboration’ with the United States in Pacific defence was considered a major New Zealand objective.\textsuperscript{34} New Zealand’s own defence region was identified in the paper as including Norfolk Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, New Hebrides, the Ellice group, and the Cook Islands.\textsuperscript{35} It was clear that New Zealand’s concern in the Pacific was significantly broader than this. The paper noted China and Japan as potential aggressors,\textsuperscript{36} and expressed interest in a United States presence in islands north of the Equator.\textsuperscript{37}

Only weeks later the Canberra Pact asserted similar interests and included an undertaking, by Australia and New Zealand, to establish a regional zone of defence.\textsuperscript{38} Also specified was the intention to establish a South Seas Regional Commission, which while ‘ostensibly about economic and social development...was also seen as a means of promoting regional security’.\textsuperscript{39} The Pact also noted the desire for a general regional conference to allow ‘a frank exchange of views’ concerning territorial interests in the South and Southwest Pacific area.\textsuperscript{40} Fraser was

\textsuperscript{32} ibid, pp.59-60.

\textsuperscript{33} ibid, p.60.

\textsuperscript{34} ibid, pp.60-61.

\textsuperscript{35} ibid, pp.57-58.

\textsuperscript{36} ibid, p.59.

\textsuperscript{37} ibid, p.61.

\textsuperscript{38} Australian-New Zealand Agreement, Statements and Documents, p.50.


\textsuperscript{40} ibid, pp.52-3.
careful subsequently to allay American fears that the Canberra Pact reflected a desire for a regional, rather than a universal, security system. This was not indicative of a desire to avoid regionalism, merely a wish to avoid it being understood as an alternative to the UN. New Zealand had decided to exploit both universal and regional initiatives, in order to maximize its security, an understandable aim in terms of the massive threat posed during the Second World War. It was essential that regional security not be prematurely disregarded, or neglected in favour of a total reliance on the world organization, especially before it had even been established. At the same time, it was equally important not to jeopardize the creation of a world organization by a premature declaration of faith in more limited regional organizations.

This process of obtaining the benefit of both regionalism and the UN was reflected in two areas; Fraser’s statements against favouring regionalism over a universal world organization and in the strong presence of regional imperatives in New Zealand’s approach to the proposed world body. New Zealand’s Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in March 1945, just prior to New Zealand’s Delegation leaving for London and San Francisco. In considering future contributions to enforcement efforts of the proposed world organization, they concluded that New Zealand could furnish air and naval bases in the Pacific. The Chiefs went on to emphasize the need to define the geographical limits to the area in which New Zealand forces would be deployed. They had assumed, however, that New Zealand forces would operate solely in the Pacific - the question was over how far into the central and northern Pacific New Zealand forces would be likely to operate.

Similarly there was a direct connection between New Zealand’s emphasis on post-war Commonwealth planning and those same regional concerns. The Chiefs

---

41 General International Organisation: Military Proposals, March 1945, PM 111/7/1, Part 1.
42 ibid.
43 ibid.
of Staff suggested in 1945 that, in approaching Commonwealth security, New Zealand should play a much greater role in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{44} During 1946 Commonwealth countries concluded that, due to the declining resources of the United Kingdom, they would have to make greater contributions to its general defence. Both Australia and New Zealand had determined by mid-1946 that their major contribution to Commonwealth defence would be made in the Pacific area.\textsuperscript{45}

The similarity in approach to both UN and Commonwealth defence arrangements was complemented by the perception of a significant inter-relationship. It was accepted in defence and external affairs thinking during the 1940s, that the UN and the Commonwealth were parts of an integrated whole. The Chiefs of Staff concluded in 1945 that it should be accepted as one of New Zealand’s primary purposes ‘within a general system of international security, the necessity for ensuring the security of the British Commonwealth’.\textsuperscript{46} They considered that

\begin{quote}
there should be over-all planning between the Nations of the British Commonwealth of the contribution that they will each undertake for the defence of their own territories, the Commonwealth generally and the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

Clearly implied in the Chiefs’ conclusions was not only that the UN would protect the Commonwealth, but that New Zealand would make its contributions to the UN in a Commonwealth framework. Overall planning for Commonwealth defence would therefore ‘contribute in equal measure to the effectiveness of international peace and security’.\textsuperscript{48} In approaching the deployment of British Commonwealth forces in Japan the following year, a Department of External Affairs

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{45} NZHC, London, to MEA, Wellington, No.76., 23 May 1946, PM 156/1/1, Part 2.; Australian Agendum No.1041B., Regional Security in the Pacific, Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.
\item \textsuperscript{46} General International Organisation: Military Proposals, March 1945, PM 111/7/1, Part 1.
\item \textsuperscript{47} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{48} ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
report concluded that the Pacific and Far East would become increasingly New Zealand's area of responsibility. It was envisaged that New Zealand’s contribution to both international and Commonwealth security would, in the future, be focused mainly in this region.49

The theme persisted in the creation of a Commonwealth Liaison Scheme among Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 1946. In July the Chiefs of Staff produced a comprehensive report favouring New Zealand participation in the scheme.50 They concluded that New Zealand should establish liaison staffs in London and Melbourne.51 These would be primarily concerned with Commonwealth co-operation in defence and with military questions arising as a result of New Zealand's UN membership.52 In the case of the Melbourne office, the liaison staff would also be given the responsibility for regional defence planning 'affecting members of the British Commonwealth and members of the United Nations in the South and South-West Pacific areas'.53 New Zealand liaison offices were subsequently established for these purposes.

New Zealand policy-makers had therefore decided in the mid-1940s that New Zealand's approach to the UN was not to be divorced from the pursuit of regional security. Planning for New Zealand's defence was tightly related to both Commonwealth and UN security machinery. Even so, prior to the San Francisco Conference, New Zealand had pursued measures reinforcing security in the South and Southwest Pacific in a manner quite distinct from, and unaffected by, its policy toward the new world organization. Evident in documents relating to New Zealand security during the 1940s was the identification that the pursuit of a regional defence

49 The Case for the Retention of J-Force, 30 November 1946, PM 156/1/1, Part 2.

50 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Organisation for Commonwealth Defence, COS(46)12, 31 July 1946, PM 156/10/1, Part 1.

51 ibid.

52 ibid.

53 ibid.
policy was not inconsistent with the UN, and would not affect New Zealand's commitment to the world body.\textsuperscript{54} New Zealand had already adopted an assertive policy over the post-war administration of Japan. Japan was identified as a vital concern to New Zealand security and a harsh peace treaty was advocated as a result. Furthermore, Fraser successfully campaigned for New Zealand to be included in the Far Eastern Commission, over-seeing post-war policy in Japan, and for the deployment of New Zealand troops in Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces. While no regional arrangement was implied in this, it was nevertheless a clear regional security problem and Fraser determinedly pursued objectives relating to it outside the UN.

Despite New Zealand's involvement in Japan not having any link with a specific regional arrangement, Fraser and Nash were still actively seeking one. In mid-1946 Australia and New Zealand decided on a joint initiative to pursue a regional defence agreement with the United States.

During the War the United States had constructed a large number of military bases in the Pacific, many on islands which were not United States territory. These islands included Manus, part of Australia's New Guinea mandate, and Upolu in Western Samoa, a New Zealand mandate. The United States soon declared its interest in maintaining access to these bases after the war and was anxious to conclude formal base-rights agreements.\textsuperscript{55} Australia and New Zealand realized the potential benefits arising from this situation and agreed to seek a defence arrangement for the South and Southwest Pacific in return for granting base-rights to the United States.\textsuperscript{56} In discussions throughout April and May 1946, Fraser, Nash and several Australian representatives were involved in canvassing a plan to


\textsuperscript{55} SSDA, London, to APM, Canberra, No.2215., 11 December 1945, ACTRO H45/779/3.

\textsuperscript{56} Meeting of Prime Ministers: Extract From PMM(46) 5th Meeting, 26 April 1946; Extract from Proceedings of Conference of Prime Ministers, London, 21 June 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.
establish an American security guarantee for Australia and New Zealand. The formula favoured at the time was one analogous to the United States declaration for the defence of Canada in 1938.

The United States, however, proved unsympathetic. In its view there was little parallel between Canada on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other, making the 1938 declaration a somewhat inappropriate model. The United States felt that discussions on base-rights agreements should be divorced from those on regional security arrangements. This effectively scotched any prospect of Australia and New Zealand being successful, for the United States had no interest in discussing regional arrangements at all.

Realizing this reluctance to become involved, New Zealand sought to play down the link between base-rights and a possible Pacific security arrangement in discussions with the United States. This decision derived not from a lack of enthusiasm, but from the fear that if pressed too hard over security arrangements, the United States might review its interest in the bases altogether. Berendt's fear, in January 1945, that the Pacific area might in the long run 'turn out to be only a hobby for the Americans' was in fact a major defence concern in New Zealand. It had been recognized a year before that the 'creation of real United States interests in the Pacific' was an imperative policy objective. The United States desire for base-

---


58 ibid, p.31.

59 ibid.

60 ibid.

61 ibid.

62 Meeting of Prime Ministers, PMM(46) 5th Meeting, 26 April 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.

63 Commentary on Mr Wilson's Paper, 9 January 1945, PM 111/8/6, Part 2.

64 Paper on Post-War Security Prepared by the War Cabinet Secretariat, Prime Minister's Department, January 1944, Kay, p.61.
rights reflected its interest in the area and was therefore to be encouraged. In down-playing the link between the two, Nash, in London, was not wanting the issue of a regional security arrangement to be dropped. He suggested that meetings be convened separately on the possibility of security arrangements and that these might lead to ‘fuller discussions later’.65

New Zealand was, therefore, prepared to concede base-rights in Western Samoa even though the United States had no desire to participate in a security arrangement. New Zealand was careful, however, not to undertake to do this officially until the UN had approved the trusteeship agreement between New Zealand and Samoa in December 1946.66 This was done to avoid undue Soviet attention in Samoan affairs, New Zealand had recognized earlier in 1946 that Chinese or Soviet influence in Samoa was undesirable. Therefore anything likely to encourage such influence was to be avoided. As a consequence, states considered by New Zealand to be directly concerned with trusteeship arrangements for Western Samoa were limited to Australia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States;67 the same group which New Zealand envisaged as the basis of micro-regional security initiatives it pursued throughout the 1940s.

Despite New Zealand attempts, no regional security arrangement was forthcoming in 1946. However, it was considered in New Zealand that one might yet be achieved in separate discussions and, at any rate, important gains for New Zealand had already been made. Nash concluded that the American desire for base-rights was indicative of an implicit interest in the defence of the South Pacific.68

---

65 Meeting of Prime Ministers: Extract From PMM(46) 5th Meeting, 26 April 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.

66 Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), Foreign Relations of the United States, p.8.

67 Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Western Samoa, Statements and Documents, pp.119-126.

68 Meeting of Prime Ministers: Extract from PMM(46) 12th Meeting, 6 May 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.
Furthermore, the United States had accepted the concept of 'joint-use' of bases among Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Any Commonwealth defence co-operation in the Pacific would require the use of those bases by all members of the Commonwealth. The significance of the United States as a possible joint-user was not missed - it was a possible first step in enlisting American participation in a Commonwealth defence arrangement centred in the Pacific. That the United States was not interested at that time was no deterrent. New Zealand's Chiefs of Staff concluded in July 1946 that, while an arrangement with the United States was unlikely in the near future, New Zealand policy should be directed to obtaining one. The Chiefs went on to state that the proposed Commonwealth defence plan 'could be readily expanded to provide effective liaison with the United States of America if and when this can be arranged'.

Neither the attempts to link base-rights with a security arrangement, nor the desire for discussions on the latter, were successful, but New Zealand continued to encourage an American presence in the Pacific. In October 1946 Fraser extended the arrangement under which United States naval vessels had used New Zealand ports during the Second World War. From the end of the War until 1948 a significant number of American warships visited New Zealand on an operational basis. In January 1947 Fraser granted permission for US naval aircraft to operate out of Ohakea, with a sea-plane tender based in support at Wanganui. However, the west coast of New Zealand proved unsuitable for carrier operations, the reason for

---


70 Australian Agendum No.1041B., Regional Security in the Pacific, Including the Use of Bases by the United States, 26 July 1946, ACTRO 1818/2.

71 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Organisation for Commonwealth Defence, COS(46)12, 31 July 1946, PM 156/10/1, Part 1.

72 ibid.


74 USLeg, Wellington, to MEA, Wellington, 10 January 1947, PM 59/5/17, Part 1.
the presence of the tender, and the idea was abandoned.

Despite Fraser’s opposition to macro-regionalism, he conducted a vigorous regional policy. Contrary to the views of some scholars, he did seek comprehensive regional defence arrangements in the mid-1940s. These were envisaged in a much more limited context to that proposed by Churchill, and were not seen as alternatives to the UN. However, these initiatives were undeniably regional in character, directed specifically at a defined region for purposes of security. But they were not perceived as being regionally inclusive and most Pacific nations were not considered for participation in them. New Zealand sought to complement its reliance on a general world security system under the UN with micro-regional arrangements.

The Commonwealth Liaison Scheme established in 1946 had a clear regional emphasis and fell short of the comprehensive defence arrangement New Zealand desired. The reason for New Zealand’s apparent aloofness from regionalism was, therefore, not the absence of a regional policy, but the unwillingness of the United States, and the inability of the United Kingdom, to become militarily involved in the South and Southwest Pacific region. Even so, a defence arrangement with the United States, and more comprehensive Commonwealth planning, remained important objectives for the rest of decade. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Fraser wanted to get rid of the veto, but he was prepared to accept it with the proviso that he would support all future efforts to remove it. Likewise, in 1946, he wanted a regional security arrangement for the South and Southwest Pacific. He accepted the impossibility of achieving this in the short term, but continued to encourage Anglo-American interest in the region and was prepared to wait for a future opportunity which might deliver what he sought. Had he been more successful, ANZUS might well have been signed by the First Labour Government.

New Zealand security policy under the Labour Government in the mid-1940s contained a strong regional element, as well as an equally strong commitment to the

75 Feutz, p.31; Trotter, pp.107-14.
UN and the Commonwealth. These were not incompatible. Occasionally they existed independent of, and without detriment to, each other and, at times, they were closely related. The source of their compatibility was their common objective - the pursuit of security. New Zealand joined the UN primarily to enhance its security in the post-war world. New Zealand became involved in various other initiatives for precisely the same reason. Where regionalism and the UN appeared to conflict, the UN’s dominance over regional organizations was asserted. But this was a policy which allowed, rather than prevented, their co-existence.
CHAPTER 5

THE CONTINUANCE OF REGIONALISM

1948-1949

By the late 1940s the Soviet Union and the United States had become locked in the Cold War, which seriously diminished the effectiveness of the United Nations. The prospect of the UN becoming a significant collective security organization began to look less promising. The veto, the object of persistent small-power attacks, came to be seen as less temporary and more a problem which would last into the medium or long term. The Soviet Union emerged as the enemy of the West, especially after the onset of the Berlin Blockade in 1948-9. Regional alternatives were developed as it became evident that the UN would not be able to provide a security guarantee for its members. In New Zealand confidence in the UN lagged and regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were openly endorsed in public statements and private reports. There was a distinct readiness in New Zealand 1949 not only to accept the existence of regional alliances, but to seek one for itself.

Despite this, New Zealand security policy, as set out in the mid-1940s, proved remarkably resilient. New Zealand entered a period of declining confidence in the UN, but the emerging emphasis on regionalism internationally impacted only slightly on the nature of New Zealand’s own approach to the world body. The desire to see the UN as the dominant world security organization remained, as did the preference for the subordination of all regional organizations to it. The basic policy of maintaining compatibility between regional and universal security systems

---


persisted. New Zealand’s regionalism remained concentrated on a Pacific defence arrangement which included a guarantee from the United States. At no point, however, did New Zealand want to become involved in a regionally-inclusive defence alliance extending over Asia and the Pacific. New Zealand’s previous distaste for macro-regionalism remained. New Zealand did not change its approach to the UN.

Cold War tension had been at the heart of the Soviet Union’s increasing use of the veto after 1945. The Soviet Union vetoed Security Council action in relation to a significant number of issues. Even new members were prevented from entering the UN due to Cold War hostility. Initiatives aimed at mediating between the major powers and restricting the use of the veto came to nothing. The UN failed to enforce its partition resolution over Palestine and a general war between Arab states and Israel ensued until an uneasy armistice was established in 1949. The General Assembly had quickly become a forum for Cold War propaganda. Such initiatives as the Soviet Union’s attempts to prevent ‘war-mongering’, a response to American Marshal Plan aid to Europe, were used as major attacks on the West.\(^3\) The United States responded in a similar vein, with initiatives aimed at isolating the Soviet Union.\(^4\)

Cold War problems became a recurring theme in the observations of New Zealand delegates at the UN. Wilson noted after the 1947 Assembly that

The division between Russia and the U.S.A. was, of course, the dominant feature of the Assembly. Usually after a long Assembly one can say that the international atmosphere has improved. After the recent session it seemed neither better nor worse than at the beginning.\(^5\)

---

\(^3\) AJHR (1948), A-2, pp.17-24; AJHR (1950), A-2, pp.29-31.

\(^4\) AJHR (1950), A-2, pp.31-32.

The proposed Little Assembly, Wilson observed, had done little to soothe Soviet relations with the United States. It was perceived by the Soviet Union as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Security Council, thereby removing the Soviet veto. 'As the discussion proceeded', reported Wilson, 'the question became wholly political and a main battleground between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.' Wilson had stated only a year before that both the Soviet Union and the United States 'seemed to take the United Nations seriously'. By the beginning of 1948, however, he was no longer so sure and was clearly suspicious that worsening Soviet-American relations could become a major obstacle to an effective UN.

Berendsen was enthusiastic about the prospects of the Little Assembly and perceived that it might be a 'turning point in the affairs of the world'. His support of it emanated from the same source as Wilson's suspicion, Soviet-American tension. Berendsen described it to McIntosh in September 1947 as an opportunity to avoid the veto in the Security Council, and a means of solving the problem between East and West. 'I am now convinced', he wrote, 'that it would be better to have an organisation to preserve the peace of the world which is not universal but will work without a veto, than the present organisation which is universal but will not work with the veto'.

Berendsen was convinced that the Cold War would be an insurmountable obstacle to an effective UN security system and, as a result, adopted the position that it would be better if the Soviet Union was removed from it. The Soviet Union boycotted the Little Assembly, giving Berendsen at least a part of the UN without

---

6 ibid.


9 Berendsen to McIntosh, 28 September 1947, ibid, p.144.

10 ibid.

them. But the Little Assembly failed to improve prospects for collective security. It was merely an extension of the General Assembly and, as such, acquired no new powers with which to succeed where the Security Council had failed.

Fraser was also losing confidence in the UN. New Zealand’s 1948 initiative in the Little Assembly arose partly out of frustration at the lack of real progress on the veto issue, despite the overwhelming support against its misuse. Following the failure of the UN to enforce its decision over Palestine in 1947-48, serious doubts began to emerge in Fraser’s mind about the UN’s ability to provide collective security.\(^{12}\) By mid-1948 Fraser was openly admitting that the UN had not lived up to expectations and had failed to provide a security guarantee for its members. In an address to the Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa in 1948, Fraser stated that he saw no prospect of establishing peace through existing international machinery.\(^{13}\) In a public broadcast the following year, Fraser stated that the UN had not fulfilled the hopes of its founders in terms of world security.\(^{14}\)

In the meantime, new regional arrangements were developing in Europe. Late in 1947, France and the United Kingdom approached the United States about the possibility of an American-European defence alliance. The United States agreed in principle, but indicated that its involvement would be dependent on European governments first organizing a regional defence arrangement themselves.\(^{15}\) Spurred on by this, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948, pledging to assist one another in the event of attack.\(^{16}\) American intentions toward the Treaty were initially kept secret, but it was not long before the United States was officially approached and

\(^{12}\) McIntosh, p.27.

\(^{13}\) New Zealand’s Attitude to European Union: Selected References 1948-1954, undated, PM 111/14/3/8, Part 1.

\(^{14}\) Broadcast by Fraser, 3 July 1949, ACTRO 64/1.


\(^{16}\) Loth, pp.190-191.
discussions began on what would become the North Atlantic Treaty.

New Zealand perceived Soviet policy to be deliberately obstructive toward initiatives designed to enhance collective security and world peace. As a result, New Zealand was harshly critical of Soviet policy in the UN, particularly on issues in which the veto was prominent. The Berlin Crisis of 1948-49 convinced New Zealand of an inherent aggressiveness in Soviet policy. There was little promise that the UN would be able to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union and New Zealand realized the necessity for security to be sought outside the UN framework. Western interests were often militated against in the UN by the emergence of the anti-colonial group, led by India and including a number of Asian and Arab nations. This group at times backed the Soviet Union, or gained Soviet support, against the West. When the Brussels Treaty was signed, therefore, Fraser expressed "wholehearted support" for it and accepted the necessity for such arrangements against Communism in general. New Zealand policy from that time on showed a generally encouraging face to further regional developments in Western Europe.

Fraser described the Brussels Treaty as "the first great step towards the establishment of a position of strength in Western Europe", upon which "a permanent peace might be established". In March 1949 Fraser proclaimed New Zealand's warm endorsement of the newly established North Atlantic Treaty and its full support for the purposes the Treaty was designed to serve. Later in the year Berendzen told the General Assembly that the formation of NATO and similar arrangements were "incontestably justifiable".

---

17 McIntosh, p.27.
19 ibid; EAR, 3:7 (1953), p.22.
21 ibid.
22 EAR, 3:7 (1953), p.22.
New Zealand’s open support for general Western defence initiatives was accompanied by a desire to become involved in them. Arising out of negotiations after 1948 came plans for a Western European Union which included not only military cooperation, but also a degree of economic integration. Wilson noted at the time that the Union concept would be acceptable to New Zealand, especially so if New Zealand and Australia could participate as some form of ‘Southern mainstay’.\textsuperscript{23} In public statements and private departmental reports there was a clear emphasis on New Zealand’s Europeanness and the desirability to become associated with NATO.\textsuperscript{24}

With growing fears that a war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility, the United Kingdom asked New Zealand not to become involved in NATO, but in a Middle East defence plan. It was thought that any Soviet offensive would involve a two-pronged attack into Western Europe and the Middle East. Aware of the consequences a world war would have for New Zealand, Fraser accepted defence responsibilities in the Middle East as part of a Commonwealth arrangement in 1949. A reinforced infantry division of 33,000 men was to be prepared in New Zealand for despatch at short notice should war break out. Voluntary recruitment was considered inadequate to service such a commitment and a referendum was held on Compulsory Military Training. It returned a favourable vote and Fraser, the conscientious objector of the First World War, introduced conscription in peacetime New Zealand in 1949.

Along with New Zealand’s endorsement of the Western European Union and NATO went a distinct interest in becoming involved in a regional arrangement against threats which might arise in the general Pacific area. From mid-1948 until late 1949 Fraser, and other representatives from New Zealand, made a number of public statements calling for a Pacific pact. During the first week of July 1948 Fraser privately informed the United Kingdom of New Zealand’s interest in a pact

\textsuperscript{23} Attitude to European Union: Selected References 1948-1954, undated, PM 111/14/3/8, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{24} ibid.
including Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Fraser made public statements in Ottawa in January, and in Calcutta in April 1949, favouring the conclusion of such a pact. The Labour Member for Onslow, Harry Coombs, made a further appeal for a Pacific pact along the lines of NATO while visiting the United States in May. A month later the Governor-General's Speech from the Throne expressed the Government's desire for a regional arrangement in the Pacific.

Unquestionably, then, a strong regional emphasis was evident in New Zealand's security policy in the late 1940s. But this marked little more than the continuation of a policy which was already well established. NATO was a new development and one in which New Zealand had no part. Like the Chapultepec Agreement of 1945, the Brussels Treaty and NATO represented faits-accomplis, and as Fraser had prescribed in 1945, it was 'better to accept the realities than to ask people to undo the organizations they have built up'. In 1948 the reality was that the world had started along a path heading toward greater regionalization. The Eastern Bloc could be easily distinguished from the West and the Act of Chapultepec was superseded by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. NATO was part of a phenomenon which had become common international practice by the late 1940s.

New Zealand's desire to join NATO had a great deal in common with the country's interest in the UN. New Zealand felt itself very much a European country which identified strongly with the old "White" dominions in the Commonwealth. British participation in the Brussels Treaty, and, along with Canada, in NATO,

---

25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1949, ACTRO 1418/1.
caused unease in New Zealand. Fraser made his concern known to the Canadian Government in 1949, intimating his hope that membership in NATO would not disrupt Commonwealth consultation or defence planning.\textsuperscript{31} New Zealand’s desire to stay in close touch with world events, with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, created the impetus for wanting to be associated with general Western defence initiatives.

Despite endorsing regional developments in Europe and even desiring participation in them, New Zealand maintained strong objections to macro-regionalism. In mid-1948 McIntosh observed that Fraser was convinced of the need for some form of collective security arrangement against the possibility of Soviet aggression.\textsuperscript{32} Fraser did not, however, agree with the ‘fashionable view’ that regional collective security arrangements should be established recognizing only Article 51 of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{33} Article 51 stipulated each nation’s right to self-defence and to partake in defensive collective actions against attack.\textsuperscript{34} In line with established New Zealand policy, Fraser wanted more control over regional arrangements given to the UN and, therefore, felt that Articles 52-54 were more appropriate. These Articles asserted particularly that regional organizations could not take enforcement measures without the Security Council’s authority.\textsuperscript{35} The following year the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, observing only Article 51. While not abandoning his preference for a fuller use of Articles 52-54, Fraser openly endorsed NATO, showing his usual flexibility.

Early in July 1948 the United Kingdom informed New Zealand of its desire to establish a chain of regional pacts which would constitute ‘a world-wide system

\textsuperscript{31} Attitude to European Union: Selected References 1948-1954, undated, PM 111/14/3/8, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{32} McIntosh to Rive: Replies to Questions Asked by the Canadian High Commissioner in his Letter of 26 June 1948, 23 August 1948, PM 156/26/5, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{33} ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Appendix 1.

\textsuperscript{35} Appendix 1.
of collective security'. New Zealand replied that any extensive regional pact would not reinforce New Zealand’s security. ‘We tend to be disturbed’, wrote McIntosh in August,

by the United Kingdom advocacy of a series of regional pacts covering the globe; there are symptoms that such plans spring from a desire for artistic completeness rather than from an appreciation of the particular problems and needs of different regions.

New Zealand continued to view regional security arrangements ‘as very much a second best’. While the UN had clearly not been able to establish any effective collective security system, New Zealand had not abandoned it and adhered to the view that the UN should retain overall authority in security matters. Berendsen’s view that the UN should be re-established excluding the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc reflected the frustration in Wellington at the disappointing results the UN had produced so far. However, no one in the Department had any sympathy for Berendsen’s opinion and nor did Fraser. McIntosh informed Berendsen late in 1947 that there was no practical alternative to the UN as it was constituted in 1945. At the Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa in 1948 Fraser welcomed the proposed Western European Union but, at the same time, warned that there were ‘few problems which were purely regional’.

The view that New Zealand could be affected by events anywhere in the world remained strong and therefore so did the belief that its security was best enhanced under a universal collective security system. New Zealand’s defence chiefs concluded in September 1948 that the failure of the UN ‘to develop any security

37 ibid.
38 McIntosh to Rive: Replies to Questions Asked by the Canadian High Commissioner in his Letter of 26 June 1948, 23 August 1948, PM 156/26/5, Part 1.
39 ibid.
40 McIntosh to Berendsen, 1 November 1947, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.151.
enforcement arrangements whatsoever should not prejudice New Zealand's support in the future for proposals designed to bring such arrangements into being'.

They prescribed a continuing approach to world security on as broad a basis as possible and the development of 'interim arrangements...within the terms of the Charter'.

The UN had been identified as unsatisfactory as a security instrument, but this was not interpreted as a permanent state of affairs. An External Affairs paper concluded in April 1949 that New Zealand would continue to aim 'as and when circumstances allow[ed], [for] the merging of these systems into one single world-wide system of collective security'.

It was not acceptable to New Zealand that regional arrangements be touted as alternatives to the UN. Berendsen told the General Assembly in 1949 that New Zealand support for them was based on a number of conditions:

namely, that they do not represent any threat to any peace-loving State, that they are for the parties a real and not merely a verbal reinforcement of security, and - which is of primary importance to a country such as mine - that they are not regarded as an excuse for non-participation in more general action by the United Nations in the case of acts of aggression or threats to the peace which are not covered by the terms of the particular arrangement.

This approach to regional arrangements in general was in line with New Zealand's own specific desire for regional security in the Pacific. Prospects for an extensive regional arrangement in the Pacific area did not at any stage excite policymakers in New Zealand. When the United Kingdom proposed the world-wide system of regional pacts in July 1948, New Zealand's response was a guarded approval of

---


43 ibid.

44 New Zealand's Defence Policy, With Particular Reference to the Pacific, 30 April 1949, PM 156/1/1, Part 1.

45 EAR, 3:7 (1953), p.22.
an arrangement involving only Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Otherwise New Zealand rejected the idea as offering nothing which would enhance its security. Public statements by Fraser and others during 1948-49 at times mentioned the possibility of an extensive Pacific pact, including India and various South American countries, as well as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. A pact along these lines, however, was never seriously considered in New Zealand.

New Zealand objections to extensive regionalism which predominated in 1944-45, continued to be overwhelmingly influential in 1948-49. Fear of Asians, and an unwillingness to be categorized as part of Asia, was a major cause of New Zealand’s opposition to extensive regionalism. The United Kingdom were informed in July 1948 that

There are countries in Asia with which our relations, although we hope they will always be friendly, cannot be expected to have the intimate character necessary for a genuine security grouping. An organisation (apart from the United Nations itself) purporting to meet the security needs of both such countries and/or ourselves might have an attractive appearance as a means of rounding off a general regional scheme, but could well have little reality as a reinforcement of our own security.

The following year, a departmental paper written by R.W. Wade analyzed New Zealand’s security objectives. Unlike Fraser’s replies to the United Kingdom in 1948, Wade’s report was meant only for internal use. As a result it lacked the diplomatic polish of the former, and was astonishingly frank in its assertions. Wade wrote that New Zealand’s security policy in the Pacific had ‘two primary and vital objectives’: firstly to protect New Zealand from ‘Asian racial expansion’; and,

---


47 ibid.

48 ibid; McIntosh to Rive: Replies to Questions Asked by the Canadian High Commissioner in his Letter of 26 June 1948, 23 August 1948, PM 156/26/5, Part 1.

secondly, from ‘Communist aggression’.\textsuperscript{50} The two presented something of a contradiction to Wade. In order to defend New Zealand from Communism, which would be wisely confronted before it reached Australia or New Zealand, a security relationship with some Asian states was considered necessary.\textsuperscript{51} This, however, was not welcomed and the old objections resurfaced. Many of the Asian states were seen as supporting ‘corrupt, decaying and reactionary regimes’.\textsuperscript{52} They were perceived as overpopulated and therefore likely to resort ‘to external aggression with the object of securing lebensraum’.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, wrote Wade, participation in a regional arrangement with Asians would oblige New Zealand to cooperate militarily and economically with countries which, in time, might challenge New Zealand’s immigration policy. ‘The mere fact of association with Asian countries’, concluded Wade, could well ‘lead to a closer examination of our policies and the exercise of some sort of pressure against us’.\textsuperscript{54} The experience of South Africa featured in New Zealand’s security policy even outside the UN.

During 1949 the Japanese Government made a number of highly publicized statements endorsing a Pacific pact and expressing a desire to participate, a move spurred by Communist successes in China.\textsuperscript{55} However, a regional security arrangement including Japan was not acceptable to either Australia or New Zealand.\textsuperscript{56} Such a prospect caused New Zealand to recoil strongly from the idea of an extended regional arrangement. The desire merely to have the United States

\textsuperscript{50} ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Nippon Times}, 21 March 1949; \textit{Evening Post}, 11 May 1949; Extract from Listening Post Report, Department of Information, Australia, 8 April 1949, PM 11/3/3, Part 1; \textit{Melbourne Age}, 23 March 1949, ACTRO 1418/1.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Sunday Sun}, 1 May 1949, ACTRO 1418/1; Pacific Pact, Part 2.
provide a security guarantee remained New Zealand’s foremost objective.\(^57\) New Zealand’s approach to proposals for a Pacific pact were based on this priority, and usually in terms of an extension of Australia-New Zealand joint defence planning, at that time established under Commonwealth auspices. New Zealand was not interested in ‘a commitment to arrest the red tide in Asia’ in 1948-49.\(^58\) Involvement in Asia, or with Asians, was not desired. Asia was considered a threat against which New Zealand sought protection in its security and immigration policies.

In mid-1949 Berendsen was approached by the Philippine representative to the UN, General Romulo. Romulo informed Berendsen of a plan to convene a conference to discuss political and economic means to counter Communism in Southeast Asia.\(^59\) Two weeks later the Chinese Nationalist Consul-General in Wellington gave McIntosh a copy of the text of an agreement between Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and President Quirino of the Philippines. The document proposed the establishment of a ‘Pacific Union’ of nations, oriented against Communism along the lines of Romulo’s earlier suggestion.\(^60\) New Zealand’s reaction was non-committal, emphasizing the need to consult its allies before forming an opinion.

While genuinely interested in what Australia and the United Kingdom thought of the proposal, New Zealand’s reluctance to endorse the concept went considerably deeper. The Department of External Affairs was unenthusiastic, suspecting that there was more to the arrangement between Nationalist China and the Philippines than was immediately apparent. A departmental paper in July 1949 regarded it as an attempt to gain support for the tottering Nationalist regime in


\(^{59}\) ibid.

\(^{60}\) ibid.
China, and a pre-election ploy by the Philippines Government to distract domestic attention away from internal problems.\textsuperscript{61} The common distaste for Communism between the two countries was not considered sufficient to justify any New Zealand involvement.\textsuperscript{62} Suspicious also of the inherent anti-colonialist tendencies of proposed members such as India and Indonesia, it was concluded best to remain out of any such arrangement lest it ‘develop in directions absolutely inimical to New Zealand’s interests’.\textsuperscript{63} Opposition to the proposal surfaced quickly from many Asian states, as well as Australia, and Fraser was later able to politely decline the invitation to participate on the basis of no allied support, although the excuse covered over much deeper anxieties about association with Asia.

The late 1940s saw a considerable deterioration in international affairs and the onset of the Cold War, which seriously impeded the UN’s ability to provide security to its members. Despite this, New Zealand security policy underwent no significant change in the way it approached the UN or regionalism. There was no abandonment of the UN, nor of policies which solidly endorsed its dominance in international peace and security and particularly over regional security organizations.

Regional developments in Europe, the Brussels Treaty and NATO, did evoke New Zealand expressions of support and a desire to be associated with them. They also encouraged a greater interest in a Pacific Pact, particularly in public statements. During this period, however, little had changed in the way New Zealand approached regional security. An arrangement with the United States to provide a security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand and the South and Southwest Pacific area remained a fundamental objective. The Commonwealth context was the preferred mode in which United States participation in the region should be secured. While some interest in wider European involvement in the Pacific was expressed, New Zealand did not want to become part of a general regional arrangement in the Pacific

\textsuperscript{61} Note for File, 27 July 1949, PM 111/3/3, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{62} ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} ibid.
with Asian participants. Macro-regionalism, and the implications of a closer association with Asia, brought much more fear than comfort to New Zealand. Despite its inherent weakness, therefore, the UN continued to be perceived as the forum in which New Zealand's primary security interests were best served.
CHAPTER 6

NATIONAL AND REGIONALISM

1949-1954

The closing years of Fraser’s government were characterized by only very subtle changes in security policy. The existence of macro-regional alliances was accepted more readily than in the years immediately after the Second World War, but New Zealand had acquired no taste for macro-regionalism. While disappointed with the United Nations by 1949, New Zealand did not desire to see the organization superseded by a regional alliance system. In December 1949 Labour was defeated and National, under Prime Minister Sidney Holland, became the government. National’s approach to external affairs was not fundamentally different from that of its predecessor. National’s accession did not bring with it any change of emphasis in security policy towards favouring regionalism over the UN.

In the preceding two chapters, a set of clear regional objectives have been identified. These included closer Commonwealth defence planning, an American guarantee of New Zealand’s security, maintenance of New Zealand’s European identity and a particularly strong desire to avoid any significant association with Asia. These objectives had contributed to a strong micro-regional emphasis in New Zealand’s security policy. They had not interfered with New Zealand’s advocacy of universal collective security through the UN during the period 1945-49 and, in fact, had reinforced it. This chapter will concentrate on the period after National’s election in 1949 to the mid-1950s. It will be argued that not only did these objectives remain constant in National’s security policy during 1949-54, but the dual regional/UN focus, dominant under Labour, was also retained under National. New Zealand’s approach to regionalism continued to be micro-regional in emphasis, and wider regional arrangements were considered undesirable. With the conclusion of the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty (SEACDT) in 1954, and the creation of its associated organizational structure (SEATO) in 1955, New Zealand finally
became involved in a wider regional arrangement. But SEATO was not a Pacific NATO and was not strong enough to displace the UN as a major component in New Zealand's security policy.

In the months immediately following the 1949 election, it seemed as if the new government was indeed placing a particular emphasis on regionalism. Frederick Doidge, National's Minister of External Affairs, was a noted advocate of a Pacific pact. At a Commonwealth meeting in Colombo in January 1950, Doidge called for the formation of such a pact.¹ There were also indications that participation from a wide region was being considered; a departmental report late in 1949 mentioned a number of Central and South American countries as possible members.² Doidge indicated to the American Ambassador in Wellington at the end of January, that New Zealand would want India, Canada and the United States in any arrangement in the Pacific.³

In March 1950 Berendsen furnished the government with a comprehensive presentation of his views supporting the conclusion of a Pacific defence arrangement.⁴ He expressed concern at the worsening international situation and the growing prospect of war with the Soviet Union.⁵ He concluded that a regional alliance in the Pacific would be necessary to deter Soviet expansion in the area and advised that New Zealand should make approaches to the United States with this in mind.⁶ Berendsen felt that the American policy of restricting its defence commitments to the area between Japan and the Philippines was not set in stone - while this policy had been announced by the United States Government, it had not

¹ Note for File: Doidge’s Meeting with the US Ambassador, 30 January 1950, PM 111/3/3, Part 2.
⁴ Berendsen to Doidge, 14 March 1950, PM 111/3/5/1, Part 2.
⁵ ibid.
⁶ ibid.
received Congressional endorsement. It was possible, therefore, that the United States might be persuaded to extend its defence interests south, and that New Zealand should work toward achieving this.  

Despite the efforts of Doidge and Berendsen, however, the New Zealand Government as a whole did not favour establishing a regional alliance. Unlike Fraser, Doidge was not an influential member of the Cabinet and found little enthusiasm among his colleagues for a New Zealand initiative on a regional pact. In 1950 Doidge met a similar response from the Commonwealth. He was the sole advocate of a Pacific pact in Colombo, where his idea had little appeal.

Berendsen’s strong case for a regional alliance convinced no one in Wellington that the need was as urgent as he suggested. In a departmental commentary prepared on Berendsen’s despatch, it was observed that the type of commitment of which he spoke was ‘not a matter likely to be consummated by pressure from countries of the Pacific’. The commentary saw little need for a pact to deter Soviet aggression in the Pacific, pointing out that American policy already implicitly served this purpose. Furthermore, there were clear liabilities identified in the ‘inevitability’ of Asian participation, especially that of Japan. This latter eventuality cut ‘cleanly across New Zealand policy for security against Japan, and, quite apart from its inherent difficulties’, it was asserted, ‘such a change of policy would require a careful preparation of public opinion’.

---

7 ibid.
9 Note for File: Doidge’s Meeting with the US Ambassador, 30 January 1950, PM 111/3/3, Part 2.
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
In March 1950, therefore, New Zealand policy had not become any more disposed toward a regional alliance. In fact, it was already evident that the National Government was just as opposed to macro-regionalism as Labour had been. In February 1950 the Philippines Government again approached New Zealand with an invitation to attend a conference to discuss an anti-Communist organization in Asia.\textsuperscript{14} Like Fraser in 1949, Holland rejected the invitation. The Department of External Affairs considered the reasons for non-attendance to be overwhelming.\textsuperscript{15} The conference had no fixed agenda and there was a fear that discussion might stray on to New Zealand’s immigration policies.\textsuperscript{16} No basic community of interest could be identified among those invited and, most significantly, New Zealand participation would have confirmed ‘the assumption that we belong to the South East Asian region’.\textsuperscript{17} This was an assumption the government had no wish to encourage.

A new dimension was added, however, when on 22 February New Zealand was informed that the United States, which had previously been unenthusiastic about the conference, had come out in favour of it. Clearly implied was the possibility that the United States would consider associating itself with any resulting anti-Communist organization. New Zealand was therefore strongly urged to attend the conference to ‘give the State Department a fully reliable contact with the proceedings’.\textsuperscript{18} The United States did not want to be directly involved in any preliminary discussions for fear of charges of ‘imperialist’ activity. Still, it did indicate a preparedness to participate in a regional organization in the future if the conference came up with a viable arrangement. This position closely resembled the United States stand on the Brussels Treaty in 1948. During March the United States continued to press New Zealand to take part in the conference, but New Zealand

\textsuperscript{14} File Notes: Philippine Conference Proposals, 15 February 1950, PM 11/3/3, Part 2.

\textsuperscript{15} ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} ibid.

refused to alter its initial decision not to attend. 19 'New Zealand as a Commonwealth country', concluded a departmental report at the end of March, 'has a universal interest and only secondarily a regional interest'. 20

Also in February, while the Philippine proposal was being discussed, President Rhee of South Korea announced his intention to visit Australia and New Zealand in order to 'sound out views on a Pacific Alliance'. 21 The Department quickly briefed the Minister 'with the object of warning' him of South Korea's 'instability and undemocratic tendencies'. 22 The Government subsequently expressed no enthusiasm for the South Korean initiative and the President did not visit.

In the first few months after the 1949 election, therefore, the new government's security policy contained a marked reluctance to embrace any new regional initiatives. With the exception of Doidge, who was unsupported in Cabinet, there was no additional emphasis placed on regionalism by the government and no willingness to become involved in a Pacific defence alliance. The Department concluded at the end of March 1950 that the military advantages of a Pacific pact were not overwhelming. An American guarantee against aggression would be obtained through a Pacific pact, but it was concluded once again that such a guarantee was 'already implicit in United States' policy'. 23 Far from setting a determined course for either regionalism or a regional alliance, National was complacent about the absence of any such arrangement. American policy as it stood in 1950 was perceived to serve New Zealand's defence purposes sufficiently and, while a more explicit guarantee was desirable, there was no need to concede Asian inclusion in order to obtain it. Like the Labour Government before it, National had


21 Dominion, 18 March 1950.

22 Memorandum to Shanahan and McIntosh, undated, PM 111/3/3, Part 2.

23 Pacific Pact, 31 March 1950, PM 111/3/3, Part 2
decided that any defence arrangement for the Pacific area was not ‘immediately urgent’.  

That New Zealand did not have a regional pact high on its agenda in 1950 was confirmed after its entry into the Korean War. A number of recent studies have highlighted the influence of the Commonwealth on New Zealand’s decision making during June and July 1950. Certainly the decision on 29 June to despatch two frigates to Korea was made with little consideration of the possibility of a future American-led defence alliance.

Following the Secretary-General’s request in July for UN member nations to commit ground troops to Korea, Berendsen informed the New Zealand Government that the United States was now regarding this incident as a means of ‘separating the sheep from the goats’ and of distinguishing those countries who can be relied upon from those who cannot, and they show some signs of regarding this as a test for those who might, at the proper time in the future, form the foundation of a Pacific regional defence pact.

New Zealand had been unmoved by suggestions of an American association with a Pacific Pact a few months earlier in relation to the Philippine conference. When similar suggestions were made in relation to Korea, they too failed to evoke enthusiasm in New Zealand. McIntosh believed that a New Zealand commitment to Korea was necessary if ‘American willingness to come to New Zealand’s assistance in the future was to be counted be on’. While he was mindful of the need to ensure New Zealand’s security, these considerations were nevertheless quite different from the contemplation of a formal alliance. McIntosh was convinced of neither the

---

24 ibid.
26 NZPDeIUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.74., 17 July 1950, PM 324/2/7, Part 1.
necessity nor the practicality of a regional arrangement in the Pacific. The United States had quickly lost interest in base-rights in Western Samoa and Manus Island despite initial interest, would not American interest in the Pacific also recede after the Korean War had finished? The Korean War was after all considered a 'side-show' in Western (and New Zealand) global strategic thinking.

Even Doidge, the foremost supporter of a Pacific pact, was unenthusiastic. He had been convinced by the argument that the United States would come to the assistance of victims of aggression regardless of whether formal arrangements existed. In September he explained to Parliament that a Pacific pact was no longer as necessary as it had been some months previously and that United States action in Korea confirmed that Pacific nations could rely on its assistance in the event of aggression.

Ten months after the 1949 election, therefore, the National Government was still not stressing any need to re-orient New Zealand security policy. There had been no attempt by National to add any new regional emphasis to New Zealand's pursuit of security. Even once a pact with the United States became a more overt aim of the Government, the desire to resist any macro-regional alliance remained overwhelming. When the prospect of an extensive Pacific pact was considered in 1951, the Department External Affairs rejected it.

Within weeks of Doidge's parliamentary statement, he had changed his mind and was again calling for the establishment of a Pacific defence arrangement. 'This reassertion was almost certainly prompted by reports of Dulles's impending efforts


to bring about a Japanese peace settlement. This was a factor which not only saw Doidge revert to his original position, but also moved the new government away from its ambivalence on the Pacific pact issue.

When the Korean War broke out, the need to conclude a peace treaty with Japan became an urgent objective of American foreign policy. New Zealand had long hoped for a repressive peace treaty which restricted Japanese industrial and military potential to an absolute minimum. In the latter half of 1950, however, it became clear that the United States intended concluding a soft peace with Japan, free of the types of restrictions New Zealand desired. Unsure that Japanese foreign policy would in the future be conducted peacefully under such a treaty, New Zealand’s appetite for a Pacific defence arrangement was quickly whetted. Holland told the United States in February 1951 that the people of New Zealand

would not willingly accept a peace treaty with Japan which contained no safeguards against Japanese rearmament. They would find it even more difficult to agree to such a treaty which would in fact probably leave the way open for actual Japanese rearmament without some reassurance as to our own security.

Once again the nature of the defence arrangement which New Zealand sought revealed no change from previous policy under Fraser and no desire to embrace a fuller regional alliance. While visiting Washington, Holland wrote to Doidge about discussions he had had with American officials on the possibility of a Pacific defence arrangement. Holland considered that ‘by far the best solution’ was a tripartite agreement among the United States, New Zealand and Australia. ‘You will be familiar,’ he told Doidge,

with the objections to a too inclusive arrangement, one which would for example include countries like Indo-China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and "colonial" countries like France, and the Netherlands. Our main concern after all is to get an American guarantee of our own security and we do not necessarily want to

---


commit ourselves to defend regimes which we may find it morally and politically difficult to defend and find ourselves unable to persuade our people to defend.\textsuperscript{34}

The Department of External Affairs concluded at the time that a three-power treaty would best serve New Zealand’s purposes. Failing this, a Presidential Declaration analogous to that extended to Canada in 1938 would suffice, an objective sought by Fraser in previous years. New Zealand recognized the need to counter aggression in the general Pacific area, including Asia, and felt it necessary to support Asian nations if they were attacked. This was not new, as Wade’s paper in 1949 had identified the necessity of meeting any hostile threat in Asia before it reached New Zealand. Even so, Wade did not see the necessity to change New Zealand’s policy towards macro-regional arrangements. Holland saw no reason to alter it either. He considered New Zealand’s main concern as ‘our own security’ and anything broader than that should be avoided.\textsuperscript{35} A Departmental report concluded in February that in the event of aggression in Asia, ‘however imperfect the functioning of the United Nations’, its ‘machinery would offer full facilities for concerted action in such a case’.\textsuperscript{36}

Therefore, in pursuing a pact with the United States, New Zealand did not wish to establish a more significant regional emphasis in its security policy but, rather, to avoid doing so. A major consideration, publicly expressed before and after ANZUS was signed, was that

we [New Zealand] wished to fulfil our obligations to send troops and air forces to the Middle East as part of our contribution in the event of war. We feel that we could fulfil these obligations in the Middle East with much greater confidence if we had a guarantee that we

\textsuperscript{34} ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Memorandum, 20 February 1951, PM 111/3/3, Part 3.
would be protected and assisted if attacked while our men were away.\textsuperscript{37}

This is more suggestive of a desire to resist change than to embrace it. Closer Commonwealth defence cooperation had long been an objective for New Zealand security policy and the Middle East contingency plan had been developed within this framework in 1949. Furthermore, New Zealand had always wanted to remain separate from Asia, emphasizing its Europeanness instead. NATO had excluded New Zealand, but the desire to join it, or become identified with it, grew logically out of these old priorities. The Middle East plan established this link with European defence initiatives. The problem emerging out of this arrangement was, however, the same problem which had affected New Zealand during the Second World War; the geographical reality of New Zealand as a small Pacific nation vulnerable to aggression from the North. In 1951 the United States was seeking a soft peace treaty with Japan which did not remove its potential for rearmament. New Zealand was faced with either having to completely re-orient its security policy to the Pacific and Asia, or as had been the case during the Second World War, seek American protection. As in 1942, it was the latter course which proved the most attractive. The ANZUS Treaty was a backward-looking insulator against the necessity for change.

New Zealand’s insistence on a tripartite security arrangement was eventually rewarded in September 1951, when the ANZUS treaty was signed in San Francisco. But while this was a significant event in New Zealand’s history, ANZUS marked no revolution in the conduct of New Zealand’s security policy. The annual ANZUS Council meeting was the sole addition to departmental commitments as a result. There were no warship-visits or military exercises. Indeed, once ANZUS was signed New Zealand all but reverted back to the old complacency which had characterized the early part of the National Government’s first term. According to a departmental paper in 1952 New Zealand’s involvement in ANZUS introduced

\textsuperscript{37} Holland made this comment before ANZUS was signed: PM 111/3/3/1, Part 3, NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.44., 8 February 1951, PM 111/3/3, Part 3. For subsequent statements see: Diary Note, 18 February 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4; McIntosh to Munro, 10 June 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
a new emphasis, and to some extent a new direction, to New Zealand foreign policy. So far, however, there has been no acknowledgement that a transformation of that policy is involved. Whatever may prove to be the ultimate consequences of New Zealand's new relationship with the United States, it is to be assumed from specific declarations by the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs that certain basic political realities affecting New Zealand remain unchanged. 38

ANZUS had not altered New Zealand's basic desire to avoid macro-regionalism and its existence did not make that avenue any more attractive. Considerable disagreement occurred between Australia and New Zealand over the regional relevance of ANZUS. To New Zealand, ANZUS was a micro-regional defensive arrangement which encased an American commitment similar to the 1938 Presidential Declaration to Canada, the model arrangement which Labour had pursued in the 1940s. To the Australians, however, ANZUS suggested something much more comprehensive. Munro wrote to Webb in May 1952 concerning preliminary ANZUS discussions taking place in Washington. Despite the fact that 'the ANZUS Agreement is not a Pacific Pact, and not a regional security organisation,' wrote Munro, 'the Australian military representatives are tending to assume it is'. 39

Early in 1952 Australia became aware that the United States had not given any serious thought to the 'formal organization needed to put the [ANZUS] treaty into effect'. Furthermore, the United States was apparently 'lukewarm' about establishing an ANZUS security council. 40 This frustrated Australia, which felt it urgent that the appropriate ANZUS machinery be developed. In a meeting with Dulles during March, the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Percy Spender, had, according to Munro,

worked himself up in quite a state, and certainly threw his weight

---


39 Munro to Webb, 30 May 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/2.

40 Webb to Holland, 7 April 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
around, as if Australia had a population and army as big as those of this country [USA]. If the council was not properly established with political and military offshoots [Spender stated] he would return to politics. 41

As well as demanding an ANZUS security council, Australia wanted the United States to define what its commitments were under the new treaty and wanted Australian participation in ANZUS operational planning. New Zealand, however, was not as demanding and viewed with some cynicism the actions of its Tasman neighbour. In July McIntosh described the Australian attitude:

The Australian aim is, of course, to enter the door where global planning is being done, but my guess is that they will be lucky if they are allowed to press their nose against the frosted window pane before the guard at the door shoos them away. This does not mean that either the Australians or ourselves should not press our case. But the fact remains that the Americans are too big and too powerful to pay any attention to those whom they consider mere youngsters officiously wanting to take part in a man’s business. 42

While Australia undoubtedly believed that its policy would be of benefit to New Zealand in the long run, the former was unable to enlist much sympathy for their stance from the New Zealand Government. New Zealand indicated support for the Australian views, but its thinking was much more reserved. Content with the basic commitment that the ANZUS Treaty implied, New Zealand was reluctant to see the Treaty made any more comprehensive. In April 1952 Webb considered the ANZUS Treaty ‘all we need’, even though he identified the Treaty’s terms as ‘somewhat vague’. 43 New Zealand saw ANZUS as a major American concession to Australia and New Zealand and Webb felt that it would be ill-advised to press the United States over the development of ANZUS machinery in case it decided

---

41 Diary Note, 14 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/191.

42 McIntosh to Munro, 24 July 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.

43 Memorandum, Webb to Holland, 7 April 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
Webb observed, however, that Australia viewed the circumstances of ANZUS in a different light:

I do not think it would be wrong to say that the Australians regard acceptance of the Japanese peace treaty as the price they had to pay for American acceptance of the Security Treaty or Pacific Pact as it is commonly called. On the other hand, if the truth were known I think it would be found that the Americans regard their acceptance of the Pact as the price they had to pay for New Zealand and Australian acceptance of the [Japanese] Peace Treaty.45

Webb stressed the necessity to restrain Australia from moving either too quickly or from pressing the United States too far. New Zealand feared that if ANZUS was developed into a regional arrangement New Zealand security policy would have to become more regionally oriented - a prospect Holland’s government did not welcome. Holland’s statements since becoming Prime Minister had stressed that ANZUS was a ‘backstop’ in the Pacific which allowed New Zealand to maintain its traditional security outlook. Should a regional defence arrangement be established in the Pacific, or ANZUS enlarged into one, the ‘Australians might decide that they will not participate in the Middle East strategy’.46 Immense political pressure would therefore be placed on New Zealand, making it difficult to maintain a commitment to the Middle East and avoid taking a higher profile in the Pacific. Thus ANZUS’s regional significance became something frequently down-played by New Zealand.

The first ANZUS meeting in August 1952 proved provocative to various Asian states which were not included in the alliance. The conference attracted a high level of public scrutiny, particularly from the Asian press. With the publicity came a

44 M.A. McKinnon, ‘From ANZUS to SEATO’, New Zealand in World Affairs: Volume 1 1945-1957, Reprinted Edition (Wellington, 1991), p.118. McKinnon here makes the statement that the United States ‘signing of the ANZUS Treaty meant that she considered the security of Australia and New Zealand to be of importance to her.’ Webb in 1951 does not seemed to have been convinced of this.

45 Webb to Holland, 7 April 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.

strong focus on the regional significance of the ANZUS alliance. One Philippines senator was quoted as stating that conferences such as the ANZUS meeting were unfortunate. ‘The defence of the Pacific’, he asserted, was ‘not the concern of New Zealand and Australia alone’. He insisted that every country in Asia had ‘a stake’ in Pacific security.  

Criticism of this nature prompted New Zealand to protest at ANZUS being referred to as a regional alliance. The *External Affairs Review* observed in 1953 that

A good deal of confusion has been created because of the fact that the Press has tended to refer to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States as the Pacific Pact. It has been made clear that the Treaty is no such thing, and that the ANZUS Council was not established in order to decide the problems of the whole Pacific area.

Also a factor in New Zealand’s policy on the regional issue was the national budget. Holland strictly scrutinized government expenditure, a policy frequently subject to scorn from External Affairs officials. At the time ANZUS was signed, New Zealand had troops and warships committed to the Korean War and a compulsory military training programme preparing a division for the Middle East. Holland did not want further expense incurred by military commitments in the Pacific under the ANZUS Treaty. Munro noted cynically in March 1952:

I have a feeling that our P.M. will certainly not want to see the [ANZUS Security] Council backed by much of an organization if thereby our Military are to get Honolulu and the country will be put to any great expense.

New Zealand was not as convinced as Australia of the need to have ANZUS developed into a fully operational alliance. The dichotomy in approach was not aided by a lack of consultation between Australia and New Zealand on ANZUS issues. By

---

47 *Star Bulletin*, 6 August 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/11.


49 Diary Note, 14 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/191.
June 1952 Holland had become particularly annoyed with Australian Prime Minister Menzies over a lack of prior consultation concerning a number of his statements and actions in relation to the ANZUS Treaty. Webb in particular took the Australian failure to consult New Zealand as something of a personal insult. Webb had always suspected Australian motives in foreign policy and the failure to consult New Zealand on ANZUS issues did not impress him. ‘I cannot help feeling that he [Spender] is anxious that we should enter for the “Spender advancement stakes”’, he wrote to Munro in March 1952. ‘Needless to say we ... will not be unmindful of the proclivity of our Australian friends to regard themselves as the big brother in the Pacific’.

Webb adopted an uncooperative attitude to the development of ANZUS machinery. His presence at the Honolulu meeting and the sentiments expressed in his opening address suggested he had relented somewhat, but the following year McIntosh complained to Munro that Webb’s ‘idea is to damp the whole thing down and try to extricate ourselves from any active participation in [ANZUS] planning’. Australian officials were apparently ‘hopping mad’ at Webb’s attitude and McIntosh predicted some ‘bad feeling’ unless the New Zealand proceeded with some caution.

If New Zealand was mindful of its Australian ally over regional issues, it was no less so of the United Kingdom. There was considerable support in the New Zealand Cabinet for the United Kingdom to be associated with ANZUS. Pro-British sentiment was a strong factor, but so too was self-interest. As the smallest ANZUS member, New Zealand occasionally felt vulnerable to pressure from Australia and the United States, especially when the two had similar positions. McIntosh

50 McIntosh to Munro, 4 June 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
51 Webb to Munro, 31 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
52 McIntosh to Munro, 1 July 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
53 McIntosh to Munro, 22 July 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
54 ibid.
considered British participation desirable as a means of strengthening New Zealand’s position in ANZUS ‘vis-a-vis both the Australians and the Americans’.55

Despite the fact that McIntosh continued to express this view, the United Kingdom remained outside ANZUS.56 It had always been interested in being associated with any arrangement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and pressed seriously for involvement. New Zealand took up the issue with the State Department, on behalf of the British, during the negotiations leading to the conclusion of ANZUS. The United States, however, argued that if the United Kingdom was to be involved, then the Philippines and other Asian states wanting American defence assistance should also be included. This factor injected caution into New Zealand’s advocacy of British participation. The presence of the United Kingdom was welcomed by New Zealand, but ‘only if it could be secured without involving other, particularly Asian, countries’.57 ‘In the event the United States dropped the idea of including the Philippines and the question of United Kingdom participation was not pursued.’58

Despite its vested interest in having the United Kingdom associated with ANZUS, New Zealand was not prepared to concede Asian participation in order to secure British involvement. New Zealand’s priority was to gain a straightforward American security guarantee. British involvement meant risking Asian participation and would have effectively created a wider regional alliance. The decision to accept British non-participation in order to keep Asian nations out of ANZUS clearly emphasized the degree to which New Zealand wished to avoid any new regional direction in its security policy.

55 McIntosh to Munro, 1 July 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.

56 McIntosh to Munro, 24 July 1952; McIntosh to Munro, 16 September 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.

57 Prime Minister’ Conference, London, November 1952: ANZUS-United Kingdom Observer, 12 November 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/2.

58 ibid.
New Zealand’s policy concerning British participation did not initially cause undue difficulties, but this altered in October 1951 when the Conservative Party led by Winston Churchill won power in the United Kingdom. Churchill and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, were not as complacent over British exclusion from ANZUS as their predecessors in Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s Labour Government had been.59 Increased pressure was placed on New Zealand to secure American agreement for British involvement. However, New Zealand feared that the United States might still insist that such involvement, or even the provision of observer status for the United Kingdom at ANZUS meetings, be conditional on ‘other, particularly Asian, countries’ being involved. This militated against any serious New Zealand attempt to push the British case too far.

The relationship between Holland and Churchill consequently became rather strained and in December 1952 the two apparently had ‘quite a row’, Holland telling Churchill ‘that it was a novel idea that when a member of a family grew up he should have no friends outside the family’.60 Churchill was still smarting over ANZUS the following year, but both Holland and the Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, made clear that they would allow nothing to undermine ANZUS.61 Despite British protestations, Webb and McIntosh were also unrepentant. In response to British suggestions of a regional arrangement in the Pacific region, McIntosh wrote to Munro:

> Whatever happens, I hope New Zealand will resist any attempt to widen the basis of the Australian - New Zealand - United States security arrangement. If there is a wider one, let it be on some other basis, but let us keep what we have without the weakening effect which additional members are, for us, bound to give it.62

New Zealand’s only real commitment to the Asian region during this period

---

59 Munro to McIntosh, 3 September 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/5.
60 Untitled Paper, 16 December 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/16.
61 Holland to Munro, 19 June 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/7.
62 McIntosh to Munro, 24 July 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
remained strictly within the Commonwealth context. New Zealand contributed aid to underdeveloped countries through the Colombo Plan established in 1950. But this agreement, while a commitment to Asia, was also an excuse to stay uncommitted. Various proposals for economic organizations to combat Communism in Asia, such as the Philippines conference in 1950, were rejected on the grounds that New Zealand was already committed to the Colombo Agreement. New Zealand was also involved in the secret planning agreement with the United Kingdom and Australia, known as ANZAM. ANZAM had grown out of the Commonwealth Liaison Scheme of 1946 and consisted of ‘a joint committee to oversee wartime control of naval activities in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia as part of a global system of maritime control’. It was a low-key organization and its administrative requirements were met by Australia. While naval forces were nominally assigned to the ANZAM area, New Zealand’s role emphasized the Southwest Pacific, rather than Southeast Asia, and it resisted British moves to extend ANZAM protection to Malaya in 1953. This resistance lasted until after SEACDT was signed in Manila in 1954.

In the early 1950s associations such as ANZUS and ANZAM certainly appeared to have introduced a greater regional focus in security policy. Despite this, New Zealand policy had a strong non-regional character. New Zealand maintained a large contingency plan for the Middle East and continued to desire association with NATO. In rejecting an attachment with the only region of which New Zealand could realistically call itself a part, it tended to emphasize instead its Europeanness, just as it had under Fraser. In August 1952 the Department of External Affairs surmised that

It is, indeed, a feature of New Zealand’s place in the world that her relations with Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, remain extensive and deep seated, and that any diminution or abandonment of

---

63 ‘ANZAM’ was an acronym for the Australia, New Zealand and Malayan defence area.

64 Pearson, p.8.
them would constitute a major change in New Zealand policy.\(^{65}\)

The conclusion of SEACDT in 1954, and the development of SEATO committed New Zealand for the first time since the Second World War to a macro-regional alliance. But SEATO's emergence into New Zealand foreign policy occurred in a very different manner from that of ANZUS. ANZUS encased an American guarantee of New Zealand's security, a goal of vital national interest and one sought after since the end of the Second World War. SEACDT on the other hand, a regional alliance with Asian participants, was something New Zealand had traditionally wanted to avoid. New Zealand took quite some time to get used to the idea of a military association with Asians.

Mark Pearson's comprehensive study of the SEATO identified the continuing disinterest New Zealand demonstrated toward Asia after 1950.\(^{66}\) This disinterest, paradoxically, coincided with the growing perception of a Communist threat to the area and New Zealand's involvement in the Five Power Staff Agency (FPSA). The FPSA was a consultative body of representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand, which began operating in September 1953. Its concern was general Western strategy to be employed against Communist aggression in Asia. At this time, however, New Zealand 'continued to express distaste for any arrangement which linked New Zealand with unreliable Asian states'.\(^{67}\) New Zealand's main priority was 'still to engage its allies in closer defence cooperation in the Southwest Pacific' and New Zealand's policy toward Asia in early 1954 was in an 'inchoate state'.\(^{68}\)

In April 1954 New Zealand suddenly declared its interest in an American proposal for a collective defence system in the Southeast Asian region. This proposal

---


\(^{67}\) Pearson, p.14.

\(^{68}\) ibid, p.16.
was made in response to the deteriorating situation in Indochina. A number of Asian states subsequently showed support for the proposal and thus New Zealand became committed to the pursuit of a wider regional pact. Underlying New Zealand’s interest, however, were a number of more traditional imperatives. New Zealand strongly desired to see American and British policy in the Pacific reconciled.\textsuperscript{69} This arose from a broad concern extending even to Anglo-American policy in the UN. Constant differences between American and British interests in the Pacific were identified as a major problem and symptomatic of deeper problems concerning the Middle East, and global affairs generally. The United Kingdom’s exclusion from ANZUS did not help and, therefore, New Zealand was supportive of initiatives which would engender common ground over Pacific policy.

Furthermore, as discussed in a later chapter, Indochina was an issue which New Zealand showed a marked reluctance to embrace in any other forum than the UN. The period of tension arising out of the situation in Vietnam in 1953-54 witnessed American pressure on Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to participate in a plan labelled ‘united action’. United action envisaged a major military intervention in Indochina, aimed at restoring French influence in North Vietnam and the use of nuclear weapons was contemplated. The crisis in Anglo-American, and Commonwealth-American, relations at this time led to moves for a closer degree of consultation between the nations concerned. Compared to participation in military intervention in Indochina, New Zealand’s involvement in SEACDT indicated a very conservative approach to the region.

When New Zealand announced its support for a regional pact in April, little consideration had been given to the prospect of Asian involvement. When attention was finally given to the issue, it was concluded that Asian membership of any organization was useful but ‘not politically or militarily necessary’.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, New Zealand attempted to avoid SEACDT comprising a security guarantee of New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{69} Pearson, pp.18-19, 51.

\textsuperscript{70} Pearson, p.28.
Zealand. Such a guarantee had never been considered of value by New Zealand policy makers and the old fears prevailed. It might ‘encourage Asian interest in New Zealand affairs’ and compromise the ANZUS guarantee.\textsuperscript{71} It was clear in May that neither Australia nor New Zealand wanted ANZUS superseded by any more general regional pact.\textsuperscript{72} Apart from purposes of consultation, New Zealand indeed appeared to have a vested interest in seeing SEACDT remain weak, lest it give the United States an opportunity of abandoning ANZUS. When, despite New Zealand’s efforts, SEACDT did offer a security guarantee to all its members, it ‘was considered vague and unimportant, was rarely publicised, and was almost immediately forgotten’.\textsuperscript{73}

In fact, as Webb left for SEACDT discussions in September, New Zealand had still not committed itself to involvement. Holland made a press statement before Webb left that he ‘was going with an open mind to take part in discussions and that there would be no commitment’.\textsuperscript{74} On his way to Manila, Webb made two press statements ‘that nothing was going to come out of SEATO’.\textsuperscript{75} Webb did not have authority to sign the Treaty, and did so without it, causing a ‘frustrating and agonizing few hours’ while departmental officials persuaded a reluctant Holland to agree to New Zealand’s participation.\textsuperscript{76} New Zealand’s less than enthusiastic commitment to SEACDT in September largely reflected its subsequent attitude.\textsuperscript{77}

SEACDT did develop a formal organization, SEATO, but in no way did this resemble the comprehensive nature of NATO. A meeting of SEACDT representatives took place in Bangkok in January 1955 and established a Military

\textsuperscript{71} ibid, p.30.
\textsuperscript{72} Draft telegram from Min.& Dept., Canberra, to unstated recipient, No.30., 1 May 1954, ACTRO TS 1/4/2.
\textsuperscript{73} Pearson, p.30.
\textsuperscript{74} McIntosh to Munro, No.54/4., 24 September 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
\textsuperscript{75} ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Pearson, p.46.
Liaison Office and a small secretariat. Over the years various other organs were developed, both military and civil. American interest in SEATO, while uncertain initially, appeared confirmed in 1955-6 when they indicated a need for SEATO to be ‘upgraded’. Despite this intention, the degree of military and political cooperation in SEATO was limited by the lack of affinity between Asian and Western concerns. Most Asian nations remained out of SEATO and those in the organization became wary of associating themselves too closely to Western interests. French enthusiasm for SEATO deteriorated quickly and significant differences persisted between the United States, interested in countering Communism, and the United Kingdom, more concerned with its colonial possessions. Over time it became evident that aggression in Asia would be dealt with by the United States acting without SEATO. When the Americans committed troops to Laos in 1962, a nation under SEATO protection, SEATO was not consulted.

If SEATO itself was unreliable, New Zealand as a SEATO partner had a number of reservations about becoming too involved in the organization. It took several years for New Zealand to take the defence of Indochina or Thailand seriously, even though the latter was actually a member of SEATO. New Zealand had no presence in Bangkok initially and for some time did not attend SEATO meetings. New Zealand opposed the development of SEATO’s civil machinery. In December 1955 the Americans considered New Zealand to be showing only a mediocre commitment to the organization.

Despite New Zealand’s early reservations towards regional alliances generally, and to SEATO specifically, New Zealand security policy experienced a fundamental change in 1955. The contingency plan to commit troops to the Middle

---


79 Pearson, p.40.

80 ibid, p.45.

81 ibid, pp.47-48.
East in the event of war was abandoned. New Zealand finally agreed to the British proposal to extend ANZAM protection to Malaya and deployed troops there as part of the newly established Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR). The CSR was also intended to form the Commonwealth contribution to any SEATO force established in Asia and ANZAM developed functions directly related to SEATO. But the CSR encountered complications in its SEATO role. It was not established under SEATO auspices and had no equivalent among the other member nations. Malaya (after 1963 Malaysia) would not allow CSR to use Malayan/Malaysian bases for SEATO operations without prior approval. A further reflection of CSR’s ambiguous SEATO role was the temporary abandonment of its SEATO function during the 1963-1966 Indonesian/Malaysian Confrontation.\(^{82}\)

It is clear that the National Government elected in 1949 did not come to power with the intention of establishing a macro-regional alliance, or injecting any new regional emphasis into New Zealand security policy. Macro-regionalism was still identified as a phenomenon to be avoided, not embraced. It was certainly not envisaged as a substitute for the UN, and regional developments occurring after 1950 were never comprehensive enough to provide such a substitute even if one was desired. Far from any sort of change, the years after 1949 were characterized by a notable level of continuity. Objectives such as an American guarantee of New Zealand’s security, an emphasis on Europeanness, an attachment to the Commonwealth and a dislike of any Asian association, made a seamless transition from Labour to National. The role of the UN in New Zealand security policy did the same.

CONCLUSION TO PART 2

Between 1945 and 1949 New Zealand security policy maintained a strong attachment to the United Nations and a commitment toward developing a comprehensive and sophisticated regional policy. Regional security concerns were clearly evident in the mid-1940s and efforts were made, quite independently of the UN, to obtain a regional security arrangement with the United States and the development of Commonwealth machinery in the South and Southwest Pacific. Regional security was also sought through the UN itself and New Zealand’s contribution to the UN’s international security system was envisaged as overlapping with Commonwealth and other regional arrangements.

There was, then, a basic and broadly accepted compatibility between regional and UN aspects of New Zealand’s pursuit of security from 1945 to 1949. Where that compatibility was threatened New Zealand moved to impose clear boundaries. The UN’s position as the ultimate security organization was emphasized and regional organizations were subordinated to it. This policy was designed to allow for the continuing pursuit of security through both modes, the UN and more limited micro-regional arrangements. As a small, remote and vulnerable nation, New Zealand’s defence demands were high and it could not afford to neglect any potential source of security.

This shape was given to New Zealand’s security policy by the Fraser Labour Government at a time when a strong commitment to UN was plainly evident. A fully-fledged micro-regional policy constituted no inherent threat to the maintenance of a strong UN emphasis. When National came to power in late 1949 it did not bring any new regional direction to the conduct of New Zealand security policy. In approaching regional security, National virtually picked up where Labour left off and continued to pursue the same objectives. There was no fundamental change of emphasis toward regionalism and therefore no foundation to believe that National’s policy after 1950 threatened the continuation of a strong attachment to the UN. Part
3 of this thesis will show that National's commitment to the UN was far from weak and contained many of the characteristics Labour had displayed between 1945 and 1949. Regional developments did not affect the fundamental importance of the UN to New Zealand.
Part 3

The United Nations and New Zealand

Security Policy

1950-1960
CHAPTER 7

RECOVERY OF CONFIDENCE

1950-1954

By 1950 the First Labour Government, which had signed New Zealand’s name to the United Nations Charter, had been succeeded by the National Party, under the leadership of Sidney Holland. Despite an apparent ambivalence to the UN in the early part of National’s first term in office, regionalism did not gain prominence in New Zealand security policy. At any rate National’s ambivalence toward the UN did not last long. This chapter will demonstrate that, as a result of the Korean War, the lagging and ineffectual organization of 1949 took on a new lease of life in 1950 and, from an object of National’s grudging support, it became something which National approached with new interest. The UN had succeeded in undertaking collective action against aggression, and new procedures were developed in the General Assembly allowing for similar action in response to future crises. New Zealand perceived in these developments a revitalization of the UN and, indeed, the accomplishment of many of the objectives Fraser had pursued at San Francisco in 1945. Above all, the early 1950s witnessed the confirmation of the UN as a vital focus of New Zealand security policy and New Zealand’s profile within the organization increased accordingly. Neither ANZUS, nor other regional developments in the 1950s, caused any diminution in the importance of the UN to New Zealand.

In Opposition, National had been critical of the UN’s failure and of Fraser’s inability to produce a Pacific pact which could guarantee New Zealand security. As early as July 1945 Doidge had accused the Government of building up false hopes of a world organization capable of preserving peace. When the “acid test” was applied, stated Doidge, the United Nations Charter could not deliver the world ‘from
the haunting fear’ of war.\textsuperscript{1} By 1950 Doidge did not need to speculate about the UN’s failures, he could list them. The UN, he declared, had failed to control atomic energy, or atomic and conventional armaments, and had been incapable of enforcing Security Council decisions. Doidge described the Communist victory in China and the establishment of Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe as tragedies which the UN had been unable to prevent. He labelled the UN attempt to establish an international regime for Jerusalem a farce, and criticized the UN for neglecting to give the Trusteeship Council any force with which to impose UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{2}

In contrast to his ambivalence toward the UN, Doidge made no secret of his desire for a Pacific pact. He used the Colombo Conference early in 1950 to seek support for such a pact among Commonwealth members, attempting especially to attract India and Canada to his idea.\textsuperscript{3} Among other items discussed at Colombo were the Japanese Peace Treaty and the recognition of Communist China, issues with noted relevance to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{4} Doidge was not deterred by the lack of interest among Commonwealth members and continued to push for the development of a Pacific pact. There was little discussion about the UN at Colombo, and it was apparent to McIntosh that Doidge had no interest at all in the UN.\textsuperscript{5} Government policy toward the UN appeared to be confirmed by the Governor-General’s Speech from the Throne in July 1950. The Government admitted its discouragement at the ‘meagre’ results achieved by the UN and expressed ‘profound regret’ that it should continue to suffer as a result of the ‘disturbing attitude of some of the [UN’s] members’.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} NZPD, 268 (1945), p.590.
\hfill
\textsuperscript{2} NZPD, 289 (1950), p.338.
\textsuperscript{3} Note for File: Doidge’s Meeting With US Ambassador, 30 January 1950., PM 111/3/3/1, Part 2.
\textsuperscript{5} McIntosh to Berendsen, No.4/50., 12 April 1950, McIntosh Papers.
\textsuperscript{6} NZPD, 289 (1950), p.8.
In response to the Governor-General's speech, Fraser and other Labour Members were quick to criticize what they observed as 'a very pessimistic reference' which was unwarranted, imprudent and regrettable. Having chastised the Government for its pessimism, Fraser and his colleagues gave a concerted display of their own commitment to the UN, praising the UN's activities in Kashmir and Palestine as significant achievements. Such occasions tended to accentuate the differences between Labour and National in their approaches to the UN.

However, expressions of disappointment or criticism of the UN's shortcomings were not limited to the National Party. Doidge had said nothing in 1950 which Fraser had not already said himself. At the 1948 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, for example, Fraser had proclaimed the impotence of the UN, complained at its failure to enforce decisions, control atomic energy or bring about disarmament. The very stuff of Doidge's list of failures in 1950, the airing of which Fraser vehemently attacked, had in fact been identified and criticized by Fraser two years earlier. Fraser's position on the UN often differed depending on whether his audience was domestic or international. The differences between Labour and National were, therefore, not as clear cut as debates in Parliament made them appear.

Fraser was disappointed that the UN had not developed into the comprehensive institution he had envisaged. Despite this, he continued to see the UN as important. The representatives at the 1948 Commonwealth Conference, Fraser among them, agreed on the 'fundamental necessity of promoting and supporting by all practical means an effective United Nations Organization'. Fraser predicted

---

7 ibid, pp.144, 231, 343.
8 ibid, pp.144-5.
that the UN would survive,\textsuperscript{11} and he continued to advocate collective security through the organization.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, then, National's criticism implied no necessary rejection of the UN.

Even with the negative stances taken at times by Algie and Doidge, National did profess a basic level of commitment to the UN.\textsuperscript{13} This commitment was not as enthusiastic as Labour's and National was more prone to criticize the world organization. National, however, was not deliberately criticizing a successful organization, but one which was widely perceived as hamstrung by the Cold War and making no significant contribution to world security. Scepticism about the UN's abilities had become widespread by 1949-50. There was a belief that the UN's ineffectiveness had continued so long that unless something was done, it would soon collapse.\textsuperscript{14} Labour's attempts in July 1950 to claim a UN success over Palestine were hardly convincing and certainly did not reflect its attitude to the issue when in government two years earlier.

National had been in Opposition when the Charter was signed and had no representative at San Francisco, while Labour had put New Zealand's name on the UN Charter. Consequently, National lacked the inclination to defend the UN's failings and certainly had no political interest in doing so. Criticism which Doidge made of the UN during the 1940s appeared to have been validated by the organization's subsequent lack of success. There was little of substance to inspire a more optimistic outlook.

However, international events were occurring which had a profound effect on the place of the UN in New Zealand's security policy. Beginning tentatively in June 1950, New Zealand confidence in the UN increased and the criticism of National,

\textsuperscript{11} Dominion, 11 November 1947.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} NZPD, 289 (1950), p.8.

\textsuperscript{14} ibid; New Zealand Herald, 10 November 1949.
particularly by Doidge, faded. In place of this criticism came a rejuvenated commitment to the UN, and expressions of New Zealand support for the Charter and for collective security became more frequent.

On 25 June 1950 North Korea launched a full scale offensive over the 38th Parallel into South Korea. The Security Council, with the Soviet seat empty, met on the following day and passed a resolution condemning the invasion and calling for the withdrawal of all North Korean forces. The resolution went unheeded by North Korea, and on 27 June a second Security Council resolution called for members of the UN to give assistance to South Korea. As a member of the UN, New Zealand was obliged to consider the possibility of giving military assistance to South Korea.

Following the 27 June resolution, Holland ‘was not at all anxious’ to make any commitment to Korea. Korea was well outside the Commonwealth and New Zealand’s traditional area of defence concern. The British were also reluctant to get involved. The cost of a military contribution worried Holland, as did the effects of a deployment to Korea on New Zealand’s Middle East defence plan. The new government had only accepted the necessity of the Middle East contingency plan in March, and New Zealand’s senior military officers did not welcome a potentially significant disruption to it. Finally, Holland was not convinced that New Zealand forces could affect the situation in Korea one way or the other. Arguments put forward by the Department of External Affairs ‘in favour of supporting collective security efforts’ made no impression on him. Holland resolved to wait for a British response before making any decision.

On 29 June 1950 the British response became known. The United Kingdom


16 The Cabinet established a sub-committee to review the compulsory military training scheme on 3 March 1950. see, Memorandum for Minister of Defence, 4 March 1950, AAFD 807/3d, CM(50)10, 3 March 1950. The scheme was approved later in March.

had decided to commit warships serving in Japan to Korea. Holland immediately followed suit, announcing the despatch of two New Zealand frigates to Korean waters. Undoubtedly the United Kingdom was by far the greatest influence on Holland’s decision - the value of collective security through the UN had yet to be proven to National. However, while Holland had not been motivated by a belief in collective security, his action was not inconsistent with Fraser’s previous attitude. It had been perceived since 1945 that any UN action to defend wider international objectives taken by New Zealand would be done in concert with the Commonwealth. While Fraser could well have been more readily disposed toward a commitment on the basis of support for collective security, to have committed forces to Korea outside the Commonwealth context would have been a major break with Labour’s past policy.

While Holland was initially not motivated by UN considerations over Korea, his decisions would probably have differed little if he had more enthusiasm for the organization. Fraser’s swift support of Holland’s decisions to deploy naval and ground forces is indicative of this. ‘The action of the Government in this matter has my whole-hearted support’, declared Fraser to Parliament following Holland’s announcement.18 In writing to Berendsen on the subject of the Korean War, McIntosh demonstrated that he was also satisfied with the Government’s action, despite its motives: ‘Our people have been somewhat slow to move in this Korean business, but when they have moved - as they did on two occasions - they did exactly the right thing’.19 Berendsen agreed.20

As well as finding support among more fervent believers in the UN, Holland’s decision to become involved in Korea had a major impact on his own government’s relationship with it. National had made a major decision connecting itself with the UN in sending military forces to the UN’s first major collective

19 McIntosh to Berendsen, 7 August 1950, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.239.
20 Berendsen to McIntosh, 15 August 1950, ibid, p.242.
action. This meant that National suddenly acquired an active interest in the UN - in June 1950 National effectively signed the UN Charter.

The Korean War was well outside New Zealand's traditional Commonwealth area of concern. In the general Western view, the war was also a sideshow to more significant Soviet threats to the Middle East and Europe. Consequently, New Zealand's involvement in Korea could not be justified publicly in any other way than by association with the UN. On United Nations Day 1951 Holland made a public broadcast which confirmed the impact of his decision the year before. There had always been a New Zealand 'policy of full support for the United Nations', he claimed,

But in the last year or so, the vital role which the United Nations is performing in the defence of peace, and our place as members of the organization, have been brought home to New Zealanders with new and vivid significance. For in that time New Zealand servicemen have gone overseas to fight under the banner of the United Nations, in its first action against armed aggression.21

There was some pessimism apparent initially in the knowledge that while the UN had responded in a positive way during June 1950, it might prove too little, too late. The South Korean forces were caught in a 'depressing series of retreats' throughout June, July and August and initial American forces sent to assist them were badly mauled.22 The 'war in Korea goes badly' admitted Doidge to the House,23 while Sir William Perry lamented in the Legislative Council that Korea might become 'another Dunkirk'.24

Despite this pessimism, the mood in Parliament remained supportive of the UN's action and of New Zealand's naval and ground force contributions. It was

21 EAR, 1:8 (1951), pp.5-6.
22 Berendsen to McIntosh, 14 July 1950, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.235.
24 ibid, p.833.
believed that, in acting as it had done, the UN had already made some important achievements. The belief that the action taken in Korea had forestalled a Third World War was widely accepted. In standing up to the aggression perpetrated by the North Koreans, it was thought also that the UN had saved itself from the fate of the League of Nations. The League had long been considered a failure due to its willingness to accept appeasement and its inability to muster real force. The action taken in Korea, therefore, divorced the UN from the weaknesses of the League.

In doing these things, it was believed that the UN had made a significant step toward achieving what it had initially set out to do. National’s attitude of a grudging adherence to the UN changed to publicly supporting and defending its actions, whether or not they reflected international successes. Doidge, although still sceptical of the UN in July, described the UN response to Korea as ‘magnificent’. He saw the UN action as serving to ‘rekindle faith in the United Nations the world over, and that action inspires hope that the machinery of the United Nations will yet fulfil the purposes of the Charter’. His words bore a resemblance to those Berendsen confidently wrote to McIntosh in the same month: ‘the first attempt to apply the Charter as it was intended to apply, will indeed be the first successful forerunner of many more and of an efficient and operating system of collective security’.

UN Forces Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, conducted a spectacular campaign, beginning in September, which changed the face of the war in Korea. The North Koreans were pushed into a rapid retreat and were driven out of South Korea. On 7 October 1950 the General Assembly voted 47 - 5 in favour of a ‘vaguely worded resolution’ which was easily interpreted as sanctioning the invasion of North Korea by UN forces. The reserved New Zealand approval of the UN action of June and July 1950 was translated by the military success into a much

\[\text{References:}\]

25 ibid, p.899.

26 ibid, p.338.


28 McGibbon, p.141.
fuller confidence in the world organization. In casting New Zealand’s vote in favour of the 7 October resolution, Berendsen was satisfied that the UN was ‘at last on the right road’. Walter Nash proclaimed to the House that the decision to cross the 38th Parallel ‘was probably the greatest and most profound yet reached in history’. Early in September, Doidge, no longer a critic of the UN, described the North Korean attack as not only an assault on ‘the South Korean Republic, but upon the fundamental principles on which the United Nations itself is based’. With the full support of the New Zealand Government, the UN had acted appropriately in defence of those principles to restore international peace.

In November Doidge described the General Assembly, from which he had just returned, as ‘radiating urgency and vitality’ and spoke of ‘a new life, and new spirit, as the result of the successful handling of the Korean crisis’. Buoyed by the success of the UN forces in Korea, Doidge declared that ‘the United Nations...had an inescapable duty, and that was to pursue the aggressor and to destroy him completely’. During November he spoke in a totally different manner to his persistent and unforgiving criticism of the UN prior to June. Like Fraser returning with the Charter in 1945, Doidge’s treatment of the UN’s short-comings in 1950 reflected an optimism that they could be overcome. Doidge claimed that, by their success, the UN forces in Korea ‘had proved that by collective action the freedom-loving countries could destroy aggression’. The concept of collective security had been reawakened and even Holland had been convinced:

We must help to build up the resources of the United Nations so that it will be able to enforce its decisions, and so that we will be able to

---

29 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
deny to any selfish member of the United Nations the right to say, "Well, the majority can say what it likes, but we say the reverse, and that will obtain". 35

After June 1950 the belief that the UN had gained strength as a result of the Korean War was frequently expressed. It was a belief which stemmed not only from the precedents set by the war but by new powers which the General Assembly had voted to itself in October 1950. These new powers, which emanated from the American-sponsored ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’, were seen as confirmation of the UN’s willingness to act in the future. In New Zealand it was believed that yet another of Fraser’s objectives had been realized - the veto had finally been neutralized.

The Korean War had highlighted the power that the Security Council could wield when the Soviet delegate was absent. In contrast, his return rendered the Security Council immediately impotent. The resolution which sanctioned the UN invasion of North Korea in October was adopted by the General Assembly, not the Council. Aware that a Soviet boycott was not likely to recur, and impressed by the success of the General Assembly, the United States Delegation drafted a plan extending the Assembly’s powers to act in an emergency. This resolution held that if the Security Council failed ‘to exercise its primary responsibility’ because of the veto, the General Assembly could be called to convene within twenty-four hours to recommend appropriate action. 36 In the Assembly Doidge declared New Zealand to be strongly in favour of the proposals. ‘The resolution robs the veto of its power’ he told Parliament on his return, ‘No longer can any one power frustrate the purposes of the United Nations’. 37 ‘We all rejoice’, stated Holland, ‘that we have now such great hopes of being able to overcome the dread of the veto’. 38 Holland went on to

35 ibid, p.3956.
36 Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During the Period 19 September to 15 December 1950, GAOR, Fifth Session Supplement, No 20(A/1775), pp.10-12, Munro Papers, MS 2230/33.
38 ibid, p.3956.
claim, ‘Now that we have got around the corner of the veto, I believe that the United Nations will be a more effective power than it has been’. The following year Holland announced that the Korean War had led to

new developments in the functioning of the United Nations .... They have ensured that the United Nations will in future always be in a position to take rapid action in the event of aggression and cannot be obstructed by the veto of any power. These developments have immeasurably strengthened the United Nations as an instrument of collective security.

Doidge’s statement to the House that the Uniting for Peace resolution did not go far enough but was a step in the right direction, was not indicative of a lack of interest. In fact, a certain similarity can be seen between Doidge’s statement and Fraser’s appraisal of the UN Charter in 1945 - the Charter was ‘not security itself, but the way to security’. The Uniting for Peace resolution was not a comprehensive overhaul of the UN and it did not entail a revision of the Charter. Considering the objections to the Charter expressed by New Zealand since 1945, Uniting for Peace did not go far enough. But within its limitations, the resolution was perceived as a means of overcoming many of the problems which had so far proven insurmountable. It was considered a first step and promising better things to come.

Besides the new procedure which it introduced, Uniting for Peace established two new organs, the Collective Measures Committee (CMC) and the Peace

---

39 ibid, p.3957.


41 Terry Power, ‘New Zealand and the Korean War’, PS, 16:4 (1964), p.65. Power described Doidge’s attitude to the Uniting for Peace resolution as ‘not very enthusiastic’, but he takes no account of Doidge’s change of attitude which is so obvious in Parliament after June 1950. Nor has Power appreciated the similarity between Doidge’s attitude to Uniting for Peace in 1950, and Fraser’s toward the Charter in 1945, - the latter Power actually cited on his p.53.

Observation Commission (POC). The former had been given the responsibility for analyzing ‘methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter’. The latter was charged with investigating potential threats to international peace. Both had responsibilities which to some extent encroached on the powers of the Security Council and both could be utilized by the General Assembly or Little Assembly should the Security Council not function because of the veto. New Zealand was recommended for a position on the fourteen-strong POC. ‘I am proud’, declared Doidge in 1950 ‘that New Zealand has been recommended for membership of that very important committee’. New Zealand accepted the position.

The following year the CMC presented its report on the methods which could be used to maintain international peace and security. The report was well received and widespread ‘satisfaction was expressed that progress towards establishing a system of collective security was gaining momentum’. New Zealand was particularly pleased that ‘special prominence’ had been given in the report to the immediacy of collective measures to aid a ‘victim of aggression in defence of its territorial integrity or political independence’.

The POC never attained the profile of the CMC, and External Affairs officials subsequently did not rank its importance very highly. But, for a time, the POC was considered a significant addition to UN machinery by New Zealand and other UN members. The POC was associated with UN action relating to border problems experienced by Greece in the early 1950s and was considered to have been

---

43 United Action for Peace: Text of Resolution Approved by General Assembly, 3 November 1950, ACTRO 1823/1.


47 ibid, p.35.
successful there. It was initially established for a period of two years, but this was extended for a further two in 1953, New Zealand voting in favour of this decision, and it remained in existence for the rest of the decade. In 1954 Thailand made an application to the Security Council for a sub-committee of the POC to observe alleged hostile activity along its border with Indochina. New Zealand endorsed the Thai request, but the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal. The POC remained an option which was periodically considered in relation to various world events. In October 1954, New Zealand’s UN Representative Leslie Munro, suggested to the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that the POC be sent to Formosa in an attempt to settle the crisis over the Offshore Islands which had become serious at that time. There was some speculation that such a move was being planned the following year. The United States expressed further interest in the POC in relation to the Suez Crisis of 1956. The POC, therefore, remained for quite some time an effective option in contemplating UN action.

Uniting for Peace, and the establishment of the CMC and POC, occurred during October 1950 when the UN’s effort in Korea was going well. However, the reverses suffered by the UN forces following the Chinese intervention in December 1950 brought a much bleaker complexion to the Korean War. MacArthur’s spectacular gains of previous months evaporated and UN forces were pushed back south of the 38th Parallel. The war rapidly became deadlocked and the lofty objectives of October seceded to the less dramatic desire for a negotiated solution. The ability of the UN to overcome challenges to its authority was once again in doubt.


53 Corner to McIntosh, 26 July 1957, PM 217/1/13, Part 3.
Berendsen was outraged at the Chinese intervention and demanded that
Communist China be branded an aggressor. He was further appalled by the prospect
of negotiations with Communist China, which he likened to the appeasement policies
of the 1930s.54 Official thinking in Wellington, however, was different. Realizing
that the situation had been altered dramatically in Korea, the New Zealand
Government supported efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement. New Zealand
voted in favour of the 12 December resolution to establish a Cease-fire Group. New
Zealand also favoured the principles the group enunciated concerning cease-fire
negotiations and supported their conveyance to China. Although it subsequently must
have satisfied Berendsen to cast New Zealand’s vote condemning Communist China
as an aggressor, New Zealand remained in favour of a negotiated solution for the
duration of the War.

New Zealand’s rejuvenated confidence in the UN survived the reverses in
Korea. The New Zealand Government did not perceive a negotiated settlement as
any abandonment of the objectives the UN had set out to achieve. Nor did the
Government attach any less significance to the UN as a result. American requests for
Kayforce to be reinforced in February 1951 received a quick and favourable
response, despite the Holland Government needing servicemen for domestic security
purposes during the waterfront dispute, at that time in progress.55 It was believed
by New Zealand policy-makers that the signature of the armistice, in July 1953, ‘was
a complete vindication of the United Nations collective action’ in Korea.56 On
United Nations Day 1951 Holland confirmed that New Zealand’s view of the UN
and its action in Korea had not altered. The UN had a clear duty to act, and had
done so:

Since then, the forces of the United Nations have fought many a grim
battle in a campaign which has been as bitter as any warfare we have
known. They have stood firm, and they have carried out the collective

54 McGibbon, p.184.
55 ibid, p.217.
56 Craw to the First Committee, 13 November 1957, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 5.
determination of the United Nations that aggression must be resisted. 57

Perhaps if the UN forces had been completely expelled from Korea, New Zealand’s attachment to the UN would have lessened. But, despite the considerable gains on the part of North Korea as a result of the Chinese intervention, its initial success of June-July 1950 was not repeated. The UN not only retained most of South Korea, but eventually fought its way back to the 38th Parallel. The North Korean attack had been repelled and this was seen as sufficient reward for the UN action. Furthermore, the reverses in Korea coincided with the despatch of New Zealand’s ground force contribution. On 10 December Kayforce left New Zealand, arriving in Korea three weeks later. 58 With its ground forces actually involved in the war, New Zealand support for the UN effort was automatic. The issues at stake in Korea, for which New Zealand was now actively fighting, were not perceived to have diminished. The UN itself was still considered to have made vital progress in its ability to enforce its resolutions. In his United Nations Day speech, Holland connected New Zealand’s contribution to the Korean war with an important objective Fraser had sought in 1945:

Our men in Korea have upheld the principle which the League of Nations failed to uphold - the principle that the territorial integrity and political independence of the individual state are to be preserved against external aggression. 59

Holland also presented New Zealand’s contribution to Korea as part of an ongoing commitment to collective security which included the First and Second World Wars. Two weeks later Doidge made the same point to the General Assembly. 60 In the House, in October 1951, both Labour and National reaffirmed their commitments

58 McGibbon, p.188.
59 EAR, 1:8 (1951), P.6.
to the UN.\textsuperscript{61} Holland stated at this time that New Zealand

must at all times declare its faith in the United Nations Organization as the only hope for the peace of the world by the rule of law rather than by the rule of force .... When the United Nations accepted the challenge [in Korea] laid down by those who would ignore its decisions New Zealand responded, as she will respond in the future, to all the calls made upon it.\textsuperscript{62}

The Department of External Affairs was also encouraged by the UN effort in Korea. It perceived that objectives Fraser had sought in 1945 were now closer to being realized as a result of the war. An External Affairs report, probably written in 1952, concluded that

\begin{quote}

The fact that the United Nations appears to have fought its enemies to a standstill in Korea offers some hope that it may be able to survive no less severe tests. If that hope is fulfilled, we shall have in the United Nations an institution of the utmost value and importance.\textsuperscript{63}

The report went on to state that the UN had ‘showed itself capable of military action’. That the UN had done this was a fact which continued to impress New Zealand officials for some years.\textsuperscript{64} From this derived the belief that collective security now rested on a solid precedent. Furthermore, it was thought that the Korean War had ‘revealed what the main purpose of the United Nations’ was - ‘namely, to preserve[,] against external aggression[,] the territorial integrity and political independence of each member’.\textsuperscript{65} Fraser had recognized in July 1945 that the Charter had not preserved the integrity or independence of nations.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{61} NZPD, 295 (1951), pp.240, 272, 340.

\textsuperscript{62} ibid, p.341.

\textsuperscript{63} The Present Situation of the United Nations, undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/52. The content of this report suggests that it was written after the deadlock had prevailed in Korea, but before the war had finished.

\textsuperscript{64} ANZUS Council Meeting, 24 September 1955: Coordination of Planning for South East Asia, 8 September 1955, PM 111/3/3/3, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{65} Present Situation of the United Nations, undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/52.

\textsuperscript{66} NZPD, 268 (1945), p.577.
considered subsequently that the Charter had deliberately ‘refrained’ from guaranteeing the security of individual nations and that security had ‘become a generalised and abstract concept’.67 But the UN action taken in Korea ‘made the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of an inconsiderable state the precise and positive object its policy’.68 As a result, the report concluded that the UN could be expected in future ‘to help defend any member who is the victim of and itself resists external aggression. We are back to the Covenant, and it is a great step forward’.69

A further departmental paper in 1954 reflected continuing confidence.70 It was realized that, while the UN did not ‘afford the certainty’ of collective security, it did ‘provide the possibility of realizing such action’.71 It was concluded that, given time, the UN might well develop into an organization which could be ‘relied upon to mete out rough justice’ when required.72 The report also observed that the UN existed ‘to promote peace and security’, which constituted ‘its chief value’ to New Zealand.73 It went on to note ‘how greatly membership of the United Nations increases New Zealand’s international stature’.74 In ‘other fields’ New Zealand was ‘largely a spectator’, but in the UN it had ‘a defined status and a vote’.75 The value this extended to New Zealand was immense:

67 Present Situation of the United Nations, undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/52.

68 ibid.

69 ibid. The reference to the ‘Covenant’ referred to the League of Nations Covenant, the League’s equivalent of the UN Charter, which in Article 10 undertook to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of each League member. This is what Fraser had sought to have inscribed in the UN Charter at San Francisco in 1945.

70 New Zealand and International Affairs: A Survey, 24 November 1954, McIntosh Papers.

71 ibid.

72 ibid.

73 ibid.

74 ibid.

75 ibid.
Without such membership a country of the size of New Zealand would be a comparatively insignificant member of the world community. With it, New Zealand is enabled to play a part in world affairs almost certainly greater than what might be expected of a country of its size. It makes itself known, both for what it thinks and what it is and even has some degree of influence on the course of events.76

The Korean War, and the developments which went with it, had a lasting influence on New Zealand policy makers and especially officials within the Department of External Affairs. In the years after the War, Wilson and Munro described the effort in Korea as the UN’s greatest accomplishment.77 Munro was particularly impressed with Uniting for Peace and on a number of occasions described it as having both real and psychological power.78 At the very least, the Korean War had confirmed New Zealand’s perception that the UN was a major and lasting influence on world affairs. In 1954 J.V. Wilson described the UN as being ‘like telecommunications, an accepted part of our twentieth century equipment’.79

The rising stature of the UN was complemented by an increase in New Zealand’s involvement in the organization. New Zealand was one of sixteen nations involved in the UN effort in Korea. This in itself was a major contribution and led to a boost in New Zealand’s prestige within the UN. Berendsen reported to McIntosh in July 1950 that Holland’s announcement that New Zealand would send forces to Korea had been ‘very well received and we got great kudos and widespread appreciation for this immediate indication that we were one of those who do not

76 ibid.


confine our support of the principles of freedom to words alone'.

Perceiving a rejuvenation of collective security as a result of Korea, New Zealand’s advocacy of a universal collective security system became more vigorous. That New Zealand was among a minority of nations with forces in Korea added impetus. After June 1950 New Zealand representatives frequently stressed the need for a greater contribution from other nations to the effort in Korea. This overlapped with a consistent stress on the need for universal contributions to UN actions in general. In 1951 Doidge told the General Assembly that the framework existed for a successful collective security system within the Charter and the Uniting for Peace resolution. But he stated that the framework needed to be filled in, and reminiscent of Berendsen’s speech in 1947, spoke of the need for ‘courage, resolution and morale’. Doidge told the General Assembly that there could be ‘no effective world-wide system of collective security until all countries are prepared to pull their weight in deeds as well as words’.

Although not a member of the Collective Measures Committee, the periodic presentation of its reports gave New Zealand a number of opportunities to press further for collective security. In 1953 the CMC expressed considerable interest in a New Zealand proposal for the equitable sharing of costs incurred by collective actions, and New Zealand was widely commended for its suggestion. Although this concept was never applied to the Korean War, it was adopted for the UN Emergency Force deployed after the 1956 Suez Crisis, and in part because of New Zealand’s strong advocacy at that time.

The CMC had stressed in 1951 the need for nations to keep elements of their armed forces ready for UN service. New Zealand supported this motion, but stated

---

80 Berendsen to McIntosh, 14 July 1950, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.234.


82 ibid, p.8.

that it could not maintain a regular unit for UN action. The Department of External Affairs had attempted to persuade the Government to make some contribution in this area and was frustrated by the latter’s apparent intransigence.\textsuperscript{84} As was often the case under the Holland Government, the financial outlay required was a factor in the decision. To be taken into account was the fact that New Zealand had already deployed troops in Korea and increased their number in mid-1951. New Zealand understandably expected nations which had not offered military forces to the UN Command in Korea to make a contribution in the interests of collective security. This factor had been at the heart of New Zealand’s proposal for equitable sharing of costs. It was not a lack of interest in collective security - Doidge had stressed in declining the CMC’s request that \textit{while troops were in Korea}, no New Zealand unit would be available. As it happened, a New Zealand unit had been earmarked for UN service before New Zealand troops were removed from Korea in 1957. Cabinet decided in 1955 that New Zealand’s contingent to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve would be available for UN duties if they arose.\textsuperscript{85}

That New Zealand’s role in the UN had increased had been observed in Wellington by 1952. Webb’s instructions to Munro on his appointment as Permanent Representative revealed the changes which had occurred in New Zealand’s policy toward the UN. Munro was told that full support of, and participation in, UN activities had been the policy of successive governments. But since 1950 New Zealand’s role in the UN had increased and it was foreseen at the time that it would increase further still. ‘Our membership of the United Nations’, Webb wrote,

has assumed particular importance with the developments of the past two years during which time the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the powers associated with them have greatly increased their diplomatic and political activity within the organization. In this movement, New Zealand is naturally expected to play a part; in fact, we have already taken a considerable step in that direction by our contribution to the United Nations collective action in Korea. We may

\textsuperscript{84} McIntosh to Berendsen, 30 July 1951, \textit{Undiplomatic Dialogue}, p.270.

be expected, however, to assume in the future, a greater responsibility and to take a more active part in the political work of the United Nations.86

The year 1952 was significant for new developments involving New Zealand’s role in the UN. Late in 1951 Holland announced that New Zealand would send three army officers to serve as field observers in Kashmir. The origins of this deployment went back to November 1949, when a General Assembly resolution was passed forming a UN Panel of Field Observers.87 The Panel itself was 300 strong and charged with providing security and technical aid to UN field missions. The resolution also called upon the Secretary-General to form a list of 2,000 military officers from UN member countries who were qualified to ‘aid in observation and supervision work of the United Nations’.88 In response to a request by the Secretary-General during 1950, New Zealand nominated four RNZAF Reserve officers for the panel. But considerable correspondence passed between the UN and New Zealand over compensation if officers were killed or wounded on UN service. The issue was not resolved. While a list was apparently kept in Wellington,89 New Zealand ceased to send the names of its nominees to the UN in December 1951.90

However, during 1951 the Secretary-General had requested that New Zealand nominate three officers for observation tasks in Kashmir. Holland procrastinated for some time, to the dismay of McIntosh,91 but eventually decided that the soldiers would be sent in 1952.92 Significantly, they were the first New Zealand soldiers to serve as observers under the UN. Six officers were involved, the original three being

---

86 Instructions to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 18 January 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/1.

87 United Nations Panel of Field Observers [I], undated, PM 111/7/5, Part 1.

88 New Zealand Herald, 24 November 1949.

89 United Nations Panel of Field Observers [I], undated, PM 111/7/5, Part 1.

90 Peace Observation Commission and Panel of Field Observers, undated, PM 111/7/5, Part 1.

91 McIntosh to Berendsen, No.9/51., 15 November 1951, McIntosh Papers.

92 EAR, 1:9 (1951), pp.4-5.
replaced after a short period. New Zealand’s involvement in Kashmir lasted a little over a year.

The Panel of Field Observers was not regarded with much initial enthusiasm in New Zealand. Observation duties were a poor substitute for the type of collective security system New Zealand had always advocated. New Zealand abstained on the November 1949 resolution and a request in 1953 for two observers for Palestine was turned down on the grounds of expense, although troops were subsequently sent and New Zealand’s contingent was reinforced in early 1956. The concept of a permanent UN force continued to attract New Zealand. In 1953 New Zealand mildly criticized the CMC for not investigating the possibility of a UN legion.

Also in 1952 it was announced that New Zealand’s Assistant Secretary for External Affairs, John S Reid, was to represent the UN in Indonesia. Reid had been appointed as UN Resident Representative in Jakarta and headed a ‘team of some forty experts and advisors in such fields as industrial development, agriculture, fisheries, health, education, civil aviation and social development’. Reid went on to work for the UN in Africa in 1954.

Late in 1953, New Zealand’s election to the Security Council for the 1954-55 term further confirmed the country’s increasing role in the UN. Historically, New Zealand had not been interested in participation in the Security Council. When Fraser went to the General Assembly meeting in January-February 1946 he was only interested in a seat on ECOSOC. Even there, New Zealand was a late candidate and eventually pulled out of the race, allowing Yugoslavia to take the seat. This was a marked contrast to Australia, which was determined to gain seats on both the

---

93 United Nations Panel of Field Observers [II], undated. PM 111/7/5, Part 1.
94 ibid.
96 EAR, 2:8 (1952), pp.6-7.
Security Council and ECOSOC. The Australian Delegation had some explaining to do when, having gained election to the Security Council, it was removed from the list of candidates for ECOSOC and replaced by New Zealand.\textsuperscript{98} Despite clear Commonwealth support, and appeals from the New Zealand Delegation, Fraser declined the opportunity to seek a Security Council seat in 1949.\textsuperscript{99} Similarly, Holland declined suggestions in 1951 and initially decided against seeking election for the 1954-5 term.\textsuperscript{100} Only after considerable press criticism did Holland announce New Zealand's decision to seek election late in 1953.\textsuperscript{101}

The non-permanent seats on the Security Council were representative of the major groupings in the UN, and one seat was consequently reserved for members of the British Commonwealth. Commonwealth representation in the UN between 1945-55 was small, comprising only Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa. South Africa was not in contention for election due to the international unpopularity of its racial policies and, for the remaining Commonwealth members, Security Council election, if desired, was merely a matter of course.\textsuperscript{102} However, neither Fraser nor Holland were inspired by the ease of which election could be gained. In 1949 Fraser instructed Berendsen to support India's candidacy despite pained relations between it and New Zealand and grave doubts about whether India could satisfactorily represent the majority of Commonwealth members in the UN. It can only be surmised that both Fraser and Holland considered that General Assembly representation adequately served New Zealand's interests. Furthermore, they both appear to have considered that the extra cost of Security Council involvement would not result in any commensurate increase in the degree to which the UN could act in New Zealand's interests.

\textsuperscript{99} NZDel, ECOSOC, Geneva, to SecEA, Wellington, 1 August 1949, PM 115/1/19, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{100} McIntosh to Munro, 4 March 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6; Dominion, 7 October 1953.
\textsuperscript{101} McIntosh to Munro, 24 March 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
\textsuperscript{102} Copy of Press Message, No.61., undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/9.
As demonstrated in following chapters, its stint on the Security Council proved to be like the Korean War for New Zealand. While initial reasons for involvement were hardly inspiring, once on the Council, New Zealand took the position seriously and demonstrated a determined commitment to the UN. On the Security Council, New Zealand played a major role in issues relating to the Arab/Israeli conflict, the crisis over Formosa and the Offshore Islands and in the final solution to the UN’s own membership deadlock in late 1955. New Zealand attained a profile in the UN during this time significantly greater than during the previous decade.

Berendsen retired as Ambassador and UN Representative in 1951 and was succeeded by Leslie Munro. Munro had been a prominent lawyer and editor of the *New Zealand Herald*. His egoism was immense and an ever-present part of his personality. It left many of his colleagues with mixed feelings about his time in Washington and New York. He was, however, extremely intelligent and stepped into Berendsen’s shoes with incredible ease, considering that he had had no previous diplomatic experience. His stature as an international statesman and his influence over the events in which he was involved were at least as great as those of Fraser and Berendsen. Munro’s reputation and role between 1952 and 1958 unquestionably contributed to New Zealand’s strong UN profile during this period.

The 1950s were years in which New Zealand’s confidence and profile in the UN reached unprecedented levels. After a period of lagging confidence between the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s and the Korean War in mid-1950, the UN returned to a position of vital importance in New Zealand’s security policy. Fraser’s objectives at San Francisco re-emerged as major foci of New Zealand policy and progress toward them was identified. The UN had acted in defence of a small state and, therefore, there was reason to believe that it did take the territorial integrity and political independence of small states seriously. The concept of collective security through the UN had worked in limited, but effective, form in response to the Korean War. The UN had redeemed itself and confirmed its position in New Zealand security policy.
During this time New Zealand became a party to a number of regional organizations and these are often interpreted as reflecting a decline in the significance of the UN. ANZUS and SEACDT, however, marked no new direction in security policy, but fitted into New Zealand’s general approach to it. Not only was New Zealand’s original policy toward the UN retained after 1950, but the essence of its approach to regionalism survived as well. ANZUS and SEACDT were consciously designed to coexist alongside a strong commitment to the UN. They were neither intended, nor able to effect, any marginalization of the world body. The continued advocacy of the UN’s ultimate authority, the subordination of regional organizations to it, and the interlinking nature of these policy foci, allowed the same basic compatibility between them in New Zealand security policy after 1950 that had existed in the previous decade.

The content of the ANZUS Treaty was carefully constructed to observe the role of the UN and not to interfere with its universal jurisdiction. Those who drafted the ANZUS Treaty paid very careful attention to the UN Charter. It is interesting to compare ANZUS and SEACDT, normally considered as departures from the UN Charter, with the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZT) commonly thought to be closely related with New Zealand’s UN policy in the 1980s. The ANZUS Treaty refers directly to the UN Charter, or the UN itself, seven times, in the preamble and in four of its eleven Articles. SEACDT also refers to the UN seven times in the preamble and in three of its eleven articles. By contrast SPNFZT mentions the UN only once, in one of its sixteen articles, and then only in reference to where the Treaty would be deposited. Far from being marginalized, the UN had a significant influence over New Zealand’s conduct of foreign policy during the 1950s, and arguably more than it did in the mid-1980s.

---


104 ANZUS, Articles, 1, 4, 6, 8; Appendix 2.

105 SEACDT, Articles 1, 4 and 6; Appendix 3.

106 SPNFZT, Article 16.
The ANZUS Treaty recognized that an attack on any one of its three members 'would be dangerous to the peace and safety' of the other two. In the event of an attack all parties undertook to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. This was essentially little more than a vague undertaking by three nations to act to meet a common danger brought about by an aggressive act on one or more of them. It did not automatically prejudge an attack on one to be an attack on the others, and it did not specify that military action would necessarily follow. It was further stipulated that any action which was taken would be immediately terminated when the Security Council took measures to restore the peace.  

Both the ANZUS and SEACDT Treaties, in their respective first Articles, included the undertaking to refrain from the use or threat of force in international affairs. In the establishment of ANZUS and SEACDT, therefore, there was no conflict with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If Article 2(4) was breached by precipitate action by ANZUS or SEACDT members, so indeed would be the first Articles of both these treaties. Neither ANZUS nor SEACDT imposed any sudden divergence from the basic rules covering the conduct of international relations established by the UN Charter and no wanton acceptance of the use of force. The rules of international conduct were genuinely embraced by New Zealand, and military action under ANZUS or SEACDT was not envisaged without UN authorization.

New Zealand security policy during the 1950s vigorously maintained that neither treaty conflicted with the UN Charter. On numerous occasions during the 1950s various representatives went to great lengths to ensure that New Zealand’s adherence to ANZUS was not interpreted as a diminution of the UN’s  

---

107 ANZUS, Article 4; Appendix 2.  
significance. Soon after ANZUS was signed, Holland declared the Treaty to be entirely ‘in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter’, a sentiment repeated by Webb a few months later. The ANZUS Council itself, at its first meeting in August 1952, issued a communique declaring its consistency with UN principles. SEACDT too, was presented as a ‘purely defensive’ arrangement in foreign policy statements and seen by the New Zealand Government, privately and publicly, to be fully justified under Article 51. Fraser’s preference for regional alliances under Articles 52-54 was abandoned. But this was not a significant change, merely a recognition that justification of regional arrangements under Article 51 had become standard international practice by 1951. Fraser had, at any rate, endorsed NATO in 1949. There was no abandonment of the strong advocacy of regional organizations being subordinated to the UN despite the acceptance of Article 51’s role.

When New Zealand became a party to SEACDT, Webb asserted that in accepting obligations under the new treaty ‘we shall be helping to realize the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ This bore a startling resemblance to New Zealand’s approach to the Commonwealth Liaison Scheme in the mid-1940s, in which the defence of the South and Southwest Pacific region was seen in the same terms as New Zealand’s contribution to international peace through the UN. Webb’s closing address to the Manila Conference in 1954, after signing SEACDT, signalled immediately that New Zealand continued to see the UN and regional collective security as strongly intermeshed:

I shall conclude by saying that New Zealand has made it clear that by her participation in this Pact, as with her early participation in the United Nations, and her actions in Korea, she is prepared to take her

---

109 New Zealand’s policy in this area strongly resembled the Canadian attitude toward NATO from 1949.


fair share of the responsibility for collective action to resist aggression and to maintain peace and security.\textsuperscript{113}

Despite ANZUS and SEACDT, New Zealand recoiled from the idea that regional organizations could ever be a substitute for the UN. Doidge told the General Assembly in 1951 that New Zealand had no illusions that regional security organizations were a final or satisfactory answer to world peace. He went on to declare that ANZUS acknowledged the supremacy of the universal system of collective security as envisaged in the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{114} Munro insisted in 1954 that the UN’s ‘supreme and overriding authority’ went unchallenged by SEACDT. ‘We uphold’, Munro went on, ‘the unfettered discretion’ of the United Nations in matters affecting international peace and security.\textsuperscript{115} Webb intimated to Munro in September 1954 that the Government considered that regional arrangements were necessary, but they did not ‘change our adherence to the principle of primary responsibility of the United Nations’.\textsuperscript{116} In New Zealand’s view, the UN was the ‘supreme arbiter’ and care was taken not to have anything in policy surrounding those treaties which was likely to compromise this.\textsuperscript{117}

In tune with his instructions, Munro frequently outlined New Zealand’s attitude. He insisted in 1954 that the UN’s overall responsibility for international peace was supreme and was not threatened by regional organizations.\textsuperscript{118} Such organizations, he stated, were merely adjuncts and not substitutes for the UN. In the same year Webb declared that SEACDT implied no ‘bypassing’ of the UN, which he

\textsuperscript{113} Webb to Manila Conference, September 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/306.

\textsuperscript{114} EAR, 1:9 (1951), p.8.

\textsuperscript{115} EAR, 4:9 (1954), p.37.

\textsuperscript{116} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.219., 8 September 1954, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 4.

\textsuperscript{117} EAR, 4:9 (1954), p.39.

\textsuperscript{118} United Nations Department of Public Information: Press Release, GA/1160, Take 1, 28 September 1954, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 4.
insisted was the 'principal body charged with maintaining peace and security'.

He went on to state that, 'Far from being designed to bypass the United Nations the Treaty is meant to ensure that anything done under its terms will be done within the purview of the United Nations Charter'.

Munro declared in 1955 that a more regionally-orientated organization, 'might be able to act more promptly and effectively than the United Nations, but it [still] would not be a substitute for it...'.

'The [Security] Council is still the place to which it may most readily bring its case and most promptly get a hearing'. Munro also emphasized that the Security Council had no limitations on its discretion to investigate all possible threats to the peace. He insisted that even the initiation of action under the ANZUS and SEACDT treaties in no way interfered the Security Council's jurisdiction.

Munro also emphasized that the Security Council had no limitations on its discretion to investigate all possible threats to the peace. He insisted that even the initiation of action under the ANZUS and SEACDT treaties in no way interfered the Security Council’s jurisdiction.

He alluded to the Council’s unqualified right to give urgent consideration to any aggressive act. 'We fully support the principle of collective security through regional organizations' stated Munro, but,

The principle of the universal and overriding authority of the Security Council is one which seems to my government well worth maintaining against the happier day when it may be less affected by the stresses and strains of great power conflicts of interest: for while regional organizations are at present an indispensable support of international peace and security they...can not fully replace the Security Council.

---

120 ibid,
121 Munro to International and Comparative Law Section, American Bar Association, 17 August 1955, Munro Papers, MS 2230/306.
123 The Present Day Role of the Security Council in the Maintenance of Peace: Address by Munro, 30 April 1955, Munro Papers, MS 2230/306.
124 ibid.
The Bandung Conference in 1955, where representatives of African and Asian nations met to discuss issues of mutual interest, proved catalytic to New Zealand policy expression on the overriding authority of the UN. Satisfaction was expressed by New Zealand that the Bandung representatives had reaffirmed their support of the Charter. But New Zealand was still concerned that Bandung represented a threat to the UN. There was no difficulty perceived with the meeting taking place and in a speech in 1955 J.V. Wilson mentioned New Zealand's own regional associations. But Wilson went on to warn against allowing the discussions at Bandung to influence activity at the UN. He stated that the value of regional associations needed to be balanced 'by the reminder that the United Nations itself is based not on regional blocs, but on the sovereign equality of its members'.

'What prompts this observation', he went on,

is the growing frequency in the General Assembly of resolutions sponsored by regional groups. We regard such resolutions are entitled to respect due to the individual sponsors: we do not accept that their regional inclusiveness places them in a new dimension so to speak, of moral authority.\(^\text{126}\)

Macdonald echoed Wilson's sentiments in the Assembly the following year. While Macdonald accepted that some group consultation was essential and that New Zealand prized its Commonwealth associations, he felt regional groupings were playing too large a part in Assembly proceedings. Similarity of interest or outlook, he warned, 'should not usually be a more important factor than individual judgement'.\(^\text{127}\)

New Zealand's embrace of ANZUS and SEACDT in the early to mid-1950s was, therefore, neither prompted nor followed by any desire to have the UN subordinated to a regional alliance system. While New Zealand accepted the need for regional contingencies, it opposed the extension of their influence into the UN's

\(^\text{125}\) Draft Speech by J.V. Wilson, undated (1955), PM 115/4/6/7, Part 4.

\(^\text{126}\) ibid.

\(^\text{127}\) Macdonald to General Assembly, 23 September 1957, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 5.
sphere of authority. Soviet policy and Communism in general were perceived as aggressive to both the democratic world and the UN. In taking precautions against these ‘threats’ in more limited forms of collective security, it was believed that an effective contribution was being made to the cause of universal collective security. There was no perceived diminution in New Zealand’s adherence to the UN Charter in becoming a party to these organizations. But New Zealand remained wary of regionalism challenging the authority of the UN. Still unsure and suspicious of Asian nations in the mid-1950s, New Zealand did not want the UN replaced by a comprehensive regional association with Asia. While defensively regional alliances were seen as beneficial, New Zealand had far more to lose than to gain if the UN’s position was eclipsed by them.

Without question, the Korean War altered New Zealand’s perception of the UN. In the space of a few months in mid-1950, a struggling and seemingly ineffectual organization, widely believed to be heading towards collapse, was seen to be capable of action. If the Korean War was not the impartial use of collective force Peter Fraser had envisaged in 1945, Fraser himself showed no sign of disappointment. To Fraser, the North Korean action was a ‘clear’ and ‘unscrupulous act of aggression’ and the UN had reacted as he expected it to. His parliamentary colleagues saw the War in similar terms and perceived in the action taken that the UN could work at last to defend nations unable to defend themselves.

Furthermore, objectives which Fraser had striven for in 1945 - an effective collective security organization, an international commitment to the territorial integrity and political independence of all nations, and a UN free of the veto - all appeared to be attained following the outbreak of war in Korea. At the very least, the action which had been taken in Korea demonstrated that the UN was a real force in world affairs. As a result of the recovery of confidence in the UN, New Zealand’s profile and involvement in the UN increased significantly.

128 Alley, p.168.

The growing regional emphasis in New Zealand security policy did not emerge as a threat to a strong focus on the UN as a security provider. As during the previous decade, the growth of regionalism was a controlled phenomenon, cultured to mesh successfully with New Zealand's relationship to the UN. Fraser's original policy of subordinating regional organizations to the authority of the UN endured as a means of retaining their compatibility after 1950. The intention and perception that these organizations would complement and assist the UN in pursuit of world security further reinforced this. The growth of regionalism did not signal the decline of the UN in New Zealand security policy.
CHAPTER 8

THE SUEZ INITIATIVE,
FEBRUARY-MARCH 1954

Public expressions of New Zealand’s policy during the 1950s clearly enunciated the United Nation’s supremacy over regional organizations. Despite a growing participation in regional associations during the decade, New Zealand still received the UN as one of the most beneficial international organizations to which it belonged. Regional associations were not intended to become alternatives to the security system originally envisaged through the UN. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, confidence in the UN recovered and its authority in world affairs was seen as a central part of New Zealand’s security policy. In 1954 New Zealand took its first two-year term as a Security Council member. Following the recovery of confidence, New Zealand demonstrated a firm commitment to enhancing the UN’s prestige, and, from 1954, specifically of the Security Council, with a view to reaffirming its authority in world affairs. In practice, New Zealand policy toward the UN reflected the sentiment expressed publicly during the 1950s.

New Zealand’s first attempt to enhance the UN’s prestige occurred with its sponsorship of a draft-resolution on an Israeli complaint against Egypt in 1954. Egypt had imposed various restrictions on Israel’s use of the Suez Canal since 1950. Egyptian military occupation of islands in the Gulf of Aqaba also prevented Israel from using its only Red Sea port of Eilat. In 1951 a Security Council resolution demanded the cessation of the restrictions imposed by Egypt against Israel, but the Gulf of Aqaba problem was not dealt with, and at any rate, Egypt only complied for a few months. In 1953 Egypt imposed a complete ban on all ships using the Canal with cargoes moving to and from Israeli ports. Israel responded by bringing both Suez and Aqaba issues to the Security Council in January 1954.

A number of factors contributed to New Zealand taking the lead on this
issue. The United Kingdom and the United States both requested in February that New Zealand initiate Security Council debate, and Munro, always keen on the limelight, wanted to take a lead in order to raise his own prestige. Most significantly, however, the decision to become involved in the issue was primarily motivated by the position of the UN in New Zealand security policy. The Suez issue involved a previous Security Council resolution which had been ignored. This was perceived by New Zealand as weakening the Council’s authority, militating against its value as an effective security provider for small states. On a number of Security Council issues during the 1950s, including Vietminh infiltration in Indochina, and the invasion of Guatemala in 1954, assumptions about the role of the UN in small-state security strongly influenced New Zealand’s position. New Zealand’s approach to the partition of Palestine, six years before, had been determined overwhelmingly by concerns for the authority of the UN in world affairs. While far less dramatic than the events of 1947-48, New Zealand’s approach to the Suez/Aqaba complaint was also primarily influenced by the same concerns for the UN’s authority, and the importance of this to New Zealand security.

Arab-Israeli relations had featured regularly in Security Council discussions leading up to the 1954 complaint. Despite the 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its neighbours, from 1950 Arab states either endorsed, or did not discourage, terrorism against Israel and imposed an economic and diplomatic boycott of the new state. In response, Israel adopted a policy of open military retaliation against terrorist bases in surrounding Arab countries. The three Western powers on the Security Council, France, the United Kingdom and the United States generally took the lead in the Security Council concerning hostility between Arab states and Israel. But in 1954 the United Kingdom and the United States were unenthusiastic about taking any initiative on the Suez/Aqaba problem. Both were conscious of maintaining friendly relations with Arab countries; the United Kingdom wanted to retain its historic influence in the Middle East, and along with the United States, was conscious that Arab nations, disaffected by the West, were likely to seek stronger contacts with the Soviet Union. As a result both wished to avoid any strong association with Israel. The Suez/Aqaba complaint was an issue in which Israel’s
position, upheld in a previous Security Council resolution in 1951, would inevitably be favoured in any initiative and would, therefore, be perceived by Arab states as Western sympathy for Israel. American and British UN Delegations asked New Zealand to take the lead instead.

Malcolm Templeton’s conclusion that New Zealand’s involvement served no national purpose and came about simply ‘because it was asked to do so by the United States’, is, however, quite misleading. Templeton himself noted an earlier request by the United States for Munro, who held the rotating Security Council presidency in February, to use his position to avoid a debate on the issue. This approach was rejected. Initial approaches by the United Kingdom and the United States for New Zealand to sponsor a draft in the Security Council met a cool response. Minister of External Affairs, Clifton Webb, expressed concern about ‘following too closely in the wake of the British’ and was not enthusiastic about the idea. Webb reacted negatively to what he perceived as overbearing American or Australian policy on ANZUS issues of the time, and was wary of New Zealand being used as a pawn of United States foreign policy.

Webb strongly asserted his authority in policy relating to the Suez/Aqaba issue, something resented by departmental officials. McIntosh’s reaction to the initial British request ‘was to say ”Better help the blighters out”’, but Webb recoiled

---


2 ibid, p.38.

3 McIntosh to Munro, No.54/2., 8 February 1954, McIntosh Papers; MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.73., 5 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1. Templeton states (p.38) that the United States asked New Zealand to sponsor a resolution on 19 February, but clearly the British had approached Munro on this issue on either 7 or 8 February.

4 McIntosh to Munro, No.54/2., 8 February 1954, McIntosh Papers

5 Webb to Munro, 31 March 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.

6 McIntosh to Munro, No.54/2., 8 February 1954, McIntosh Papers.
from this approach. He scrutinized all McIntosh’s telegrams concerning this issue and re-wrote many of them. This frustrated McIntosh, and Templeton has subsequently been critical, accusing Webb of being ‘temperamentally unable to leave questions of detail to the delegation’, and showing ‘a tendency to drive from the back seat’. Apart from departmental dissatisfaction, this criticism reveals that Webb was the most influential person in the creation of New Zealand policy toward the Suez/Aqaba issue. Furthermore, Webb was not ambivalent toward it. Webb carefully assessed the problem in terms of what he perceived as New Zealand’s best interests - a simple American request would not have impressed him, and would have provided a singularly inadequate motive for him to act.

Not until he was convinced that it would be of some real value to New Zealand did Webb agree to undertake a Security Council initiative. ‘As I see it,’ wrote Webb in a telegram to Munro on 2 March, ‘our intentions in taking the initiative on this occasion have been to ensure the Security Council’s authority is reaffirmed (even if only in relatively mild terms)’. Egyptian non-compliance posed a threat to the Security Council’s prestige, a situation considered to be detrimental to New Zealand’s security interests. On 21 March, Munro privately communicated his agreement with Webb’s assessment, that ‘our purpose is to ensure the Council’s authority is reaffirmed’.

7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 Templeton, p.40.
11 ibid, p.39.
12 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.67., 2 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
13 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.105., 21 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1. Templeton (pp.41-42.) described Webb’s reasons as ‘conjured up’ and not related to national interest. However, Templeton only discussed the rather weak reasons given as justification in Webb’s February press statement announcing the initiative. These did not reflect the content of private telegrams, which Templeton did not take into account, and were only alluded to on one subsequent occasion.
New Zealand began preparing its draft-resolution late in February.\textsuperscript{14} It was a moderate draft, aiming to facilitate Egypt's observance of Israel's right of free passage through the Suez Canal as specified by the 1951 resolution. Condemnatory provisions, far more likely to evoke Egyptian defiance rather than cooperation, were not included.\textsuperscript{15} The draft also proposed referring the Aqaba issue to the Egyptian/Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC), part of the machinery established in 1949, following the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements, to deal with grievances between the two states.

Initial reactions from the United Kingdom and France were favourable, but Munro reported that the United States had some reservations.\textsuperscript{16} He observed that the 'Americans show[ed] a marked tendency to be gentle with Egypt and the Arabs' and had no clear indication for some time that their support would be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{17} Even when this support was confirmed, Munro reported to Webb that the United States 'which should be our strongest brother' was proving instead to be 'rather a weak sister'.\textsuperscript{18} Having accepted an American request to take the initiative, New Zealand found it extremely difficult to enlist an unequivocal statement of United States support.

The success of the resolution in the Security Council, and then Egyptian compliance with it, were equally important in attaining a reaffirmation of the UN's authority. A primary concern of New Zealand, therefore, was to remain impartial so that the resolution would be considered a fair one. 'We have no special interest in helping Israel score over Egypt', observed Webb, and he instructed Munro that

\textsuperscript{14}NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.75., 24 February 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{15}Copy of Draft Resolution, 1 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{16}The French indicated their support on 25 February, the United Kingdom the following day. NZLeg, Paris, to MEA, Wellington, No.7., 25 February 1954; CROSEC, London, to UKHC, Wellington, No.64., 26 February 1954,PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{17}NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.75., 24 February 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{18}NZPRUN, New York to MEA, Wellington, No.105., 21 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
statements made in the Security Council should be temperate. The desire to avoid a Soviet veto was also influential in keeping the draft as inoffensive as possible. Known Arab influence with the Soviet Union made it imperative that New Zealand avoid any appearance of favouring Israel.

As soon as Israel became aware of the text of the draft, it set about attempting to secure a number of alterations. The Israeli Minister to Australia, Mordekhai Nurock, visited New Zealand and met Webb on 2 March. Nurock suggested to Webb that a 60-day period be given for Egypt to comply, and that the Security Council revisit the issue if this did not occur. Nurock also pressed Webb to have the Security Council deal directly with the Gulf of Aqaba issue rather than have it referred back to the MAC. The MAC had proved ineffective and was in 1954 subject to an Egyptian boycott. While Nurock was appealing to Webb, Abba Eban, the Israeli UN Representative, was putting the same arguments to Munro in New York. The Israelis were also lobbying other delegations in an attempt to undermine support for the 'offending' provisions in the New Zealand draft.

Egypt was also unsatisfied. Egypt protested the MAC's legitimacy, hence the Egyptian boycott of it, and had no desire to see the UN insist on its use. In fact, Egypt would have preferred that the UN not be involved at all. In addresses to the Security Council on 12 and 23 March, the Egyptian representative claimed that the UN could not protect his country from Israeli aggression, and, therefore, Egypt was

---

19 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.67., 2 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.

20 Note for File, 2 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.

21 ibid.

22 ibid.

23 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.84., 3 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.

24 This is evident by Munro's report in No.84 that Israeli arguments had made an impression on great power delegations. Also, as early as 26 February the Israelis had asked for Australian support, knowing the latter had some influence with New Zealand. Hayden to Wilson, 26 February 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
acting in self-defence under Article 51. Egypt had already proposed a conference between itself and Israel in an attempt to head off Security Council action. When it became apparent that New Zealand was preparing a draft in earnest, Egypt announced it would lift restrictions on food and medical supplies and reiterated its desire for a conference.

Webb gave careful consideration to the Israeli case put to him by Nurock, but decided against any change to the draft. In Webb’s view, a declaration of the Security Council’s intention to revisit the Suez issue after a pre-set period would have severely damaged New Zealand’s chances of success. Webb had previously issued instructions that Munro not prejudge the possibility of Egypt’s non-compliance. A time-limit immediately implied such a judgement, and could have easily offended Egypt, virtually guaranteeing its non-cooperation. This would ultimately subvert attempts to see the 1951 resolution observed and the Security Council’s authority reinforced. At any rate, the Security Council had complete freedom to revisit the issue if it so wished without a previously declared intention to do so.

Furthermore, both Webb and Munro were convinced that the MAC was the appropriate body to deal with the Aqaba problem. The MAC was chaired by the chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), an organization with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace between Arabs and Israelis. The Aqaba issue was not subject to previous Security Council decisions and,


26 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.75., 8 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.

27 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.69., 3 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1. Templeton states (p.41.) that Nurock was reprimanded for this and cites a letter testifying to the fact. This is something of an anomaly because subsequently both Eban and Nurock maintained pressure on New Zealand.


29 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.67., 2 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
therefore, the handling of it did not have implications for the Council’s authority. The UN’s broader position in the Middle East was affected, however, if the MAC was not utilised. In a telegram to Webb, Munro indicated that he intended emphasizing to the Security Council that the ‘armistice machinery [the MAC] should be used to deal with complaints if [that] machinery’ was to remain credible. He observed further that the New Zealand draft merely called on the MAC to deal with the Aqaba complaint in the first instance. This did not diminish the Security Council’s authority, nor prevent it from dealing with the matter in the future should the MAC prove unsatisfactory. Consequently there was no alteration to the New Zealand draft. Subsequent Israeli appeals were unable to change the New Zealand position.

The Egyptian action did not impress New Zealand either. Webb predicted that the proposed talks would come to nothing and he considered that the offer to lift restrictions on food and medicine was ‘purely tactical’ and ‘clearly inadequate’. As Egypt’s sole concession, ‘the main issue of failure to obey the 1951 resolution would remain unaffected’ and the Security Council’s authority would, therefore, not have been enhanced.

While New Zealand was not responsive to the Israeli appeals, other countries were, and the support New Zealand had already enlisted began to appear less certain. Munro reported to Webb on 3 March that ‘all three great power delegations seem[ed] shaken by Israeli arguments’. Webb quickly realized the implications of

---

31 ibid.
32 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.69., 3 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
33 Aide Memoire, 11 March 1954; Memorandum for SecEA, 19 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
34 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.75., 8 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
35 ibid.
36 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.84., 3 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
wavering major power support. Munro had already tried to solidify support by impressing on the three powers the need for urgency.\textsuperscript{37} When this did not succeed, Webb issued instructions to Munro to take a stronger line.\textsuperscript{38} It was to be made clear that New Zealand would abandon the initiative if support was not forthcoming. Webb told Munro to

point out in particular to the American Delegation that it was the United States which first asked New Zealand to submit a resolution; that their original view of the proper way to deal with the Gulf of Aqaba issue was...the same as ours; that we are dissatisfied over the manner in which our resolution, framed from the outset in mild terms to meet the views of the Great Powers, has been steadily whittled down and that it is we who bear the onus of defending a resolution which in its latest form appears to us inadequate and may well be represented as futile.\textsuperscript{39}

New Zealand had from the outset been conscious that great power support, including both that of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, was necessary. New Zealand had moderated this to suit the major powers in order to gain their support, but when that proved less than certain and further moderations would have completely compromised New Zealand's objective, Webb saw no point in proceeding. His threat to withdraw, however, had a sobering effect on the major powers. Munro reported on 6 March that New Zealand’s position had strengthened as a result of Webb’s views being ‘forcibly’ put.\textsuperscript{40} Munro was soon confident enough to approach other delegations. A number of Security Council members, although not all, subsequently gave favourable responses when Munro showed them the New Zealand draft.\textsuperscript{41} Webb instructed Munro on 19 March to lodge the draft

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{37} ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.73., 5 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.87., 6 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{41} The Chinese indicated they would abstain, the Soviets did not indicate which way they would vote, and the Colombians were undecided at the time the draft was lodged.
\end{flushleft}
and the Security Council was set to meet on 23 March.  

Munro then turned his attention to the tactics he would employ when the Security Council met. 'I am anxious', he wrote to Webb, 'to secure at [the] earliest reasonable time a strong supporting speech from the Americans'. This would dispel the rumours of American reluctance and 'have important effects on [the] waverers' - the nations which had not yet indicated which way they would vote.

But the support of the major Western powers was even at this late stage proving somewhat fickle. Israel's appeals had found a receptive audience in the United Kingdom. By 20 March the British Foreign Office had decided to instruct its Delegation in New York to prepare an amendment to the New Zealand draft. The amendment proposed that a time-limit of 90 days be given for Egyptian compliance. This indicated a gap emerging between the United Kingdom and the United States, the latter remaining strongly pro-Egyptian. Anglo-American discord over the problem had been simmering ever since New Zealand was asked to take the lead on the issue, and was exacerbated by far more serious problems emerging in March over the deteriorating position of the French in Indochina.

When Webb heard of the British proposal, he responded angrily. 'The amendment proposed by the United Kingdom,' he wrote to Munro,

coming at this late stage and in such obvious relation to the Suez Canal negotiations, would I feel, when added to the forcible and explicit text which stands in our name, strike an unmistakeable note of menace and reduce still further the meagre chances of Egyptian compliance.
Webb instructed Munro to abstain on any amendment proposed by the United Kingdom along these lines. Webb had indicated earlier that he was prepared to accept moderate amendments, but he did not alter his objective of Egyptian compliance. He had twice rejected Israeli appeals to have a time-limit imposed, on the basis that to do so would be to pre-judge Egypt's reaction. When the United Kingdom proposed the same amendment, Webb only just stopped short of openly declaring it an 'ultimatum'.\textsuperscript{47} However, the British Delegation proved half-hearted about proposing the amendment and, despite Foreign Office instructions, chose not to do so. A potentially divisive move was thus averted.

A much more immediate problem was the prospect of a Soviet veto. The Chinese representative had intimated to Munro in mid-March that the Soviet Union would probably veto the resolution if Egypt wished. Webb subsequently authorized Munro to accept 'moderate amendments' to head off this threat.\textsuperscript{48} Webb indicated that changes could be made as long as the New Zealand resolution, as an absolute minimum, safeguarded the Security Council's position of 1951.\textsuperscript{49}

In a telegram to Webb on 21 March, Munro reaffirmed that New Zealand's chief concern was the Security Council's authority and indicated that this would be emphasized in his opening address.\textsuperscript{50} He added that some reference to New Zealand's interest as a maritime trading nation, directly concerned with the freedom of passage in international waterways, should also be given as a reason for the initiative.\textsuperscript{51} Munro was growing extremely suspicious of the influence Egypt had with the Soviet Union and feared a Soviet veto. While New Zealand placed a great deal of emphasis on the prestige of the Security Council, Egypt, and particularly the Soviet Union, did not. Munro surmised that the freedom of passage in international

\textsuperscript{47} ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} MEA, Wellington, to NZPUN, New York, No.89., 22 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} NZPUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.105., 21 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{51} ibid.
waterways, on the other hand, would have had a significantly greater appeal to the Soviet Union. Neither New Zealand, nor the Soviet Union, was affected directly by the problems in Suez, but both had a broader interest in the freedom of passage in international waterways. Munro hoped, by stressing protection of this principle, to pull the Soviet Union away from its expected support of Egypt, at least to a position where it would abstain.

The following day, Munro reported in a second telegram that there had been ‘considerable comment’ regarding New Zealand’s motives and he insisted that New Zealand should now justify its initiative ‘with reasons of greater substance’. Munro wrote that if ‘we are to avoid innuendo (or even charge) that we are merely acting at their [US, UK and France] direction, [the] very least we could do is refer to our own position in maritime trade’. Munro did not identify the source of the ‘comment’, but it almost certainly arose from Egyptian criticism aimed at discrediting the New Zealand draft in the eyes of the Soviet Union.

This development caught Webb by surprise. With an appointment in Auckland on the night of 22-23 March, he had little time to respond to Munro’s new point of view. Before leaving Wellington, Webb instructed McIntosh to reply to Munro’s telegram of 21 March. A full account of Webb’s views was accordingly sent to Munro the next day. Interestingly, McIntosh did not offer additional comment, despite there being no possibility of Webb revising the telegram.

McIntosh informed Munro that Webb had ‘specifically objected’ to the reference to maritime trade. Webb recalled, McIntosh wrote, ‘that little New Zealand registered shipping used the Canal’ and that this aspect would be more

52 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.111., 27 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
54 ibid.
55 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.91., 22 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
56 ibid.
appropriately dealt with by ‘the maritime powers themselves.’ Webb did not want to compromise New Zealand’s ‘impartiality’ by declaring interests similar to the major western powers. Webb had also strongly emphasized that New Zealand’s ‘sole objective was to obtain a reaffirmation of the Security Council’s authority.’ To mention an interest in the freedom of passage detracted, in Webb’s view, from both these objectives and would possibly make the Security Council suspicious of the integrity of New Zealand’s motives. Webb further instructed that Munro do nothing which would make it ‘harder for Egypt to comply with the Council’s direction or might influence waverers to oppose or to abstain from voting upon the resolution’.

On returning from Auckland the following day, Webb was acquainted with Munro’s second telegram. Webb realized Munro’s intentions were to refer to maritime trade regardless of instructions. Webb quickly wrote to Munro conceding that he had ‘no objection’ to Munro’s mentioning maritime trade. Webb qualified this acceptance, however, by stating that he was ‘firmly of the opinion that this should be advanced only as a secondary justification’. Webb reiterated that New Zealand’s status as ‘a disinterested power’ with a ‘general desire’ to see the Security Council’s authority reinforced should constitute an adequate explanation of New Zealand’s action. Webb dismissed Munro’s concerns about innuendo. ‘I do not see,’ wrote Webb curtly, ‘that initiative in these matters need be regarded as the preserve of any particular power or powers, great or small’.

57 ibid.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.94., 23 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
The next communication received from Munro was sent on the 24 March, after he had received both sets of instructions from Webb. This telegram referred to the first day of Security Council debate (the previous day) and finished on a rather enigmatic note. The last paragraph read; ‘I regret that substantial portion of your No.94. [Webb’s telegram of 23 March] was indecipherable. I endeavoured to meet what I understood as your points by adjustment of text.’

It is not clear how badly blurred Webb’s telegram of 23 March actually was when Munro received it. What is clear is that Munro did not carry out Webb’s instructions. In introducing New Zealand’s draft to the Security Council, Munro stated that the Israeli complaint was ‘a matter of profound concern’ to nations like New Zealand which relied heavily on the ‘preservation of freedom of passage on the high seas and in recognised international waterways’. Munro only very briefly mentioned New Zealand’s concern for the Security Council’s authority. The strong emphasis on the freedom of passage was gathered up by the press, with Munro being quoted as saying that

no Government interested in the preservation of the rule of law in international affairs, least of all my government depending for its livelihood on maritime trade, can contemplate this unhappy state of affairs for long without an earnest desire to bring it to an end.

New Zealand’s motives were publicly presented as being strongly concerned with its own position as a maritime trader. But the Suez problem of 1954 was not nearly as vital in terms of maritime trade to New Zealand as Munro had suggested. Direct disruption to New Zealand by any sort of blockade in the Suez area would have been minimal. But most importantly the public expression of New Zealand’s motive was at variance with the content of the private telegrams passing between

64 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.107., 24 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
66 ibid.
Webb and Munro throughout March. The sudden interest by Munro in the freedom of passage, therefore, did not reflect New Zealand policy. The decision to emphasize it was made by Munro in an effort to head off a Soviet veto.

Munro’s confidence in acting contrary to Webb’s instructions was based on fairly liberal discretionary limits conferred by Holland when New Zealand took up its Security Council seat in January. This was reinforced by McIntosh, who, resenting Webb’s practice of rewriting texts of instructions, advised Munro to allow himself considerable discretion when proceeding with the New Zealand initiative.\textsuperscript{68} McIntosh intimated to Munro what he perceived as Webb’s tendency to make decisions before all the facts were available.\textsuperscript{69} McIntosh was also somewhat concerned that New Zealand had not been on the Security Council before, and that himself, and Webb, had no experience with Council procedures.\textsuperscript{70}

The Security Council discussed the New Zealand draft during the week following 23 March, allowing all members of the Security Council, and Israel and Egypt, to speak before the vote was taken. On 29 March 1954 the New Zealand draft resolution was vetoed, having gained 8 votes in favour, an abstention from China and negative votes from Lebanon and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{71}

As the dust settled around the unsuccessful New Zealand attempt, the focus on the maritime trade issue waned and the Security Council’s authority again emerged as the primary concern. Munro did not make an extensive concluding speech. He stated in the Security Council on 29 March that the strong support the New Zealand draft had received reflected ‘its inherent reasonableness’. He stated also that ‘everyone who had the prestige of the Council and the United Nations at

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{68} McIntosh to Munro, No.54/2., 8 February 1954, McIntosh Papers.
\item \textsuperscript{69} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{70} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{71} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.112., 29 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
\end{itemize}
heart ... must be gravely disturbed by this veto'. This was a position much more in line with that evident in private telegrams.

On hearing of the veto, Webb, like Munro, did not make extensive comment. After what had proved to be a frustrating and drawn-out process, Webb merely sent a short consoling telegram to Munro. 'We have done our best' he wrote, 'and I think New Zealand would have gained some credit'. This was not, however, the ultimate objective for which New Zealand was aiming. Webb's adherence to reinforcing the Security Council's authority remained a constant objective throughout and it was one to which Munro, despite his brief aberration, was also committed.

From the time New Zealand first declared its intention to take the initiative on the Suez issue, the obstacles in the way of a successful outcome were numerous. The support of the United Kingdom, and particularly the United States, was always uncertain. Not until the closing few days of Security Council debate could New Zealand really be sure that major changes would not be pressed. American reluctance, which was clearly evident, had a marked effect on the willingness of the Latin American states of Brazil and Colombia to commit themselves. Lebanon opposed the draft outright and the Soviet Union was always likely to veto. The greatest hurdles, however, were the parties to the dispute. Neither was on the Security Council, but both wielded influence among the nations which were. Israel gained the ear of the United Kingdom and at one time a major amendment looked likely to upset the formula and jeopardize the support New Zealand had so painstakingly acquired. Egypt, on the other hand, opposed the New Zealand initiative and went to considerable lengths to discredit it. Finally, the Egyptians had Soviet support, virtually guaranteeing that the draft would not succeed.

The charges that New Zealand was acting under the direction of the Western powers were hardly accurate. Apart from the initial request, consensus between New

---


73 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.102., 30 March 1954, PM 217/1/1, Part 1.
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States was uncommon. New Zealand demonstrated a willingness to compromise in order to gain their support, but this was also evident toward the Soviet Union. New Zealand would not, however, alter the basic objective - upholding the 1951 resolution and avoiding anything which might prevent compliance - for the sake of support of either of the major power blocs. The Western powers, which had little enough to agree on among themselves, were hardly capable of providing any clear line to follow. New Zealand was, therefore, left to proceed with its own objective in mind and this it did, albeit unsuccessfully. The need to reaffirm the Security Council's authority was a priority which did not disappear subsequently. If anything, New Zealand's determination to see the Security Council's authority respected stiffened after March 1954 and was to be a formative influence in New Zealand policy in the months that followed.
CHAPTER 9

THE INVASION OF GUATEMALA,
JUNE 1954

New Zealand’s commitment to the authority of the United Nations had a major impact on the way New Zealand policy was expressed and pursued after 1950. This was demonstrated not only in efforts by New Zealand to see the Security Council’s prestige enhanced, but also in attempts to see regional alliances kept subordinate to the UN. Since 1944 New Zealand had carefully developed its regional policy to avoid any conflict with the UN. ANZUS and SEACDT clearly recognized the UN’s dominance and expressions of New Zealand policy frequently enunciated UN authority over all regional organizations. This was not merely an attempt to maintain lip service to the UN Charter, but genuinely reflected New Zealand’s outlook on world affairs. The possibility that regional organizations might become a substitute for the UN was greeted with alarm by Fraser in 1944-45, and in mid-1950s New Zealand was no more enthusiastic about the prospect.

In mid-1954 the small Latin American state of Guatemala was invaded by neighbouring Honduras and Nicaragua. What followed was interpreted by New Zealand as a clear challenge from the Organization of American States (OAS), a regional organization, to the supremacy of the UN. In 1945 Fraser had been unhappy about the existence of the Act of Chapultepec and advocated significant UN authority over regional organizations of its type. The OAS was the successor to Chapultepec and in 1954 New Zealand policy exhibited clear parallels with Fraser’s policy almost ten years previously. This did not please New Zealand’s main allies, the United Kingdom was ambivalent, and the United States dissatisfied with New Zealand’s position. But the UN was identified by New Zealand in 1954 as vital to small-state security. The Korean War had proven its value in this regard and New Zealand, as a small state, had a clear interest in seeing the UN’s overall authority in world affairs maintained.
The Guatemalan incident is the most well-known of New Zealand’s period on the Security Council, but its significance has largely been missed.\(^1\) Following the invasion by Honduras and Nicaragua, Guatemala appealed to the Security Council for assistance. The United States opposed the issue being brought to the attention of the Security Council, claiming it would be best dealt with by the OAS. The United States subsequently pressed New Zealand to vote against the issue’s inscription on the Security Council’s agenda, but New Zealand did not concur and voted in favour of the appeal being heard, against the opposition of the United States.

It has been assumed that this incident was an exception to New Zealand’s general security policy of ‘traditional’ and unbending support of its allies, particularly the United States. J.K. Cunningham argued in 1957 that the Guatemalan incident showed that when vital interests were not at stake, New Zealand would act independently of its allies.\(^2\) Roderic Alley in 1991 advanced the argument again, claiming that Guatemala showed that when ‘New Zealand was not directly involved...[it] was prepared to voice principle ahead of pragmatism’.\(^3\) Both seem oblivious to the anomaly they present - why would a nation act in a way so antagonistic to its allies if its interests were not being served?

The Guatemalan affair witnessed New Zealand’s continuing adherence to the belief, predominant since Fraser’s time, that New Zealand’s security objectives would be best attained by the UN. While the UN had not operated efficiently, it had operated sufficiently to ensure the defence of the small state of South Korea. When Guatemala fell victim to aggression in 1954, New Zealand saw it as essential that the UN security apparatus was not overlooked in favour of the OAS. Guatemala did

---


\(^2\) Cunningham, p.34.

\(^3\) Alley, p.170.
not provide an opportunity for New Zealand to escape from its own interests and demonstrate a pretended independence from its main allies. At issue were major considerations directly impacting on New Zealand’s security as a small state - the ability to utilize the Security Council in the event of attack and the maintenance of regional organizations as subordinate to the UN. These were held as so important that perceived obligations to the United States, arising from ANZUS membership, were thought of as secondary considerations.

The Guatemalan appeal to the Security Council involved a complex Latin American crisis with which New Zealand was not particularly well acquainted. New Zealand’s attention during 1954 was predominantly on events in the Middle and Far East and when Guatemala complained on 19 June 1954 that its territorial integrity had been compromised by foreign armed forces, New Zealand was caught with little working knowledge of the problem.

From 1951 Guatemala had embarked on a period of radical economic reform involving the nationalization of various foreign interests. While not itself Communist, it was perceived by the United States to have pro-Communist leanings and there was evidence of attempts by Guatemala to import weapons from the Eastern Bloc early in 1954. The combination of these factors, in the context of the Cold War and the United States desire to contain Communism, had made the Guatemalan Government unpopular with the United States and Latin American countries. Western arms embargoes were subsequently imposed. When arms from the Eastern Bloc arrived in Guatemala in May, the United States expressed concern that Guatemala might become a Communist satellite. The United States subsequently concluded military assistance pacts with Guatemala’s neighbours, Honduras and Nicaragua.

Preparations by Honduras and Nicaragua, in collusion with the United States and a number of Latin American countries, were probably well under way by this

---

time. On 26 May and 7 June unidentified aircraft violated Guatemalan air-space and dropped propaganda leaflets inciting the army to rise against the Government. In the days leading up to the attack, weapons were dropped in Guatemala and reconnaissance flights were carried out. On 18 June 1954 'Guatemalan exiles' invaded. The following day, with air attacks in progress against its major cities, Guatemala appealed to the OAS and then to the Security Council. Very soon after, Guatemala withdrew its request for OAS action, suspecting that the organization would not be sympathetic and that at least some members backed the invasion.

The Security Council met on 20 June 1954 and representatives of Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were invited to attend. The Guatemalan representative, speaking first, requested that a UN observation commission be despatched to his country to verify that an invasion by foreign forces had taken place. This was in dispute; the invaders called themselves Guatemalan exiles and some press reports enhanced the view that the 'rebels' were ill-trained Guatemalan peasants. Munro was informed by the United States State Department on 23 June 'that there was no basis for the charges of foreign intervention'. Aware of this, Guatemala consequently placed the attainment of an independent UN observation mission as a top priority.

However, the Security Council was not immediately receptive. The Honduran and Nicaraguan representatives, in conjunction with fellow Latin American Security Council members Brazil and Colombia, stated that the OAS should deal with the Guatemalan problem. The intention was for the Inter-American Peace Committee

---


7 ibid.

8 Luard, p.296.

9 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.91., 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

(IAPC), an organ of the OAS, to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the three nations involved. Brazil and Colombia then placed a draft resolution before the Council that called for the issue to be referred to the IAPC, which would report its findings to the Security Council. This received general approval.

The Guatemalan representative protested that the IAPC, while competent to arbitrate in disputes between nations, was incapable of dealing with an armed invasion. The French Delegation responded to this, proposing that the Security Council should have a more direct influence in the Guatemalan issue. It submitted an amendment calling for a cessation of hostilities and for UN members to refrain from giving assistance to the invaders. This amendment was reluctantly accepted by the sponsors and received general support from other Security Council members. The final text of the draft consisted of a Security Council directive for the cessation of hostilities and a provision that the matter be handed over to the OAS. There was no mention of a UN observation team and the onus for any such action was placed on the IAPC. The resolution failed, with the Soviet Union vetoing it in protest at the OAS provisions.

Following the veto, the French Delegation put forward its amendment as a full draft-resolution. This received unanimous support and was subsequently adopted. While the Security Council had not specifically referred the issue to the OAS, Guatemala still had reason for complaint. It considered the resolution too weak, there was no provision for the despatch of an UN observation team, and the OAS was not prevented from initiating action of its own.

New Zealand's position was overwhelmingly influenced by its lack of information on the Guatemalan situation. At first New Zealand was unaware of, and

---


12 This had been prearranged. It was clear prior to voting that the Soviet Union would veto the draft. Lodge, president of the Council in June, asked the French Delegation if, in the event of a Soviet veto, France would re-submit its amendment as a full draft-resolution. France agreed.

13 Luard, p.298.
did not suspect, United States and outside Latin American involvement in the
invasion. New Zealand did attempt to overcome this problem but it was largely
unsuccessful. On 22 June a telegram was despatched to Munro requesting that all
information on Guatemala be immediately relayed to Wellington, which was, at that
point, reliant solely on press and radio reports for the details of the crisis.\textsuperscript{14} Being
vaguely aware that Canada ‘was represented in the area’, Wellington also instructed
the New Zealand High Commissioner in Ottawa to seek Canadian Government views
on the matter.\textsuperscript{15}

Munro immediately began reporting all information he could obtain from
New York and Washington. While this proved significantly more than Wellington
previously had had access to, it was far from detailed. Munro reported Guatemalan,
Honduran and Nicaraguan statements in the Security Council, and subsequent public
statements concerning the affair. He also approached the United Kingdom and the
United States for information, but the response he received was vague in the case of
the former and untrue in the case of the latter. The British Foreign Office reported
on 22 June that air attacks had ceased, that the situation in the Guatemalan capital
was normal and that British and American nationals were not being advised to
leave.\textsuperscript{16} The United States State Department claimed to have no first-hand sources
of information and stated that, to the best of its knowledge, there was no evidence of
foreign intervention. The State Department further reported that the Government had
the advantage over the rebels and that the Guatemalan appeal to the Security Council
was instigated by the Soviet Union to discredit the United States.\textsuperscript{17} The United
States was passing on inaccurate information in order to down-play the seriousness
of the issue and prevent it being further investigated by the UN.

The New Zealand High Commissioner in Ottawa also replied promptly to

\textsuperscript{14} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.168., 22 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{15} MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, Ottawa, No.46., 22 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{16} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.197., 22 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{17} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.P87., 23 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
McIntosh’s appeal, but offered little additional information. Canada had only a trade commissioner in Guatemala and its closest diplomatic post was Mexico, which as at June had not reported on the Guatemalan situation. Canada was therefore inclined to ‘regard the affair as being local and to favour consideration by the O.A.S.’.  

Therefore when speaking in the Security Council on 20 June Munro had not received any instructions on the Guatemalan appeal and had only the information supplied by the American and British UN Delegations. His position in the Council was inevitably to support the status quo. Munro made clear that the Security Council was the body with the ultimate authority in peace and security matters. He defended Guatemala’s right as a small state, believing itself to be the victim of aggression, to appeal to the Security Council. But Munro then stated that ‘he did not feel in a position at this short notice to pass judgement on the facts of the case’. He went on to quote Articles 52 and 53, which related to the use of regional organizations, and declared that the action proposed by Brazil and Colombia was entirely consistent with them. Munro stated that the OAS was in ‘the best position to ascertain [the] facts’, and that it was fully ‘consistent with the Council’s overriding concern for international peace for it to refer the problem first to the O.A.S.’. Evan Luard’s claim in 1982 that New Zealand was only half-hearted in its concern that Guatemala be given a Security Council hearing regardless of OAS action is misleading. New Zealand desperately lacked information on the issue and, as the proposed course of action was legitimate under Article 52(2) of the UN

18 NZHC, Ottawa, to MEA, Wellington, No.54., 22 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 Luard, p.298.
Charter, there was no reason to oppose it. When the initial draft-resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the French proposal accepted, Munro saw no need to oppose separate OAS action, even though it had not been specified.

In subsequent days Guatemala repeatedly complained to the Security Council that the 20 June Resolution was not being observed and that attacks were continuing. On 22 June Guatemala requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Guatemala protested that it had specifically asked the OAS not to take action and that the 20 June resolution had meant that the Security Council had taken full jurisdiction over the issue. Guatemala further asserted that it had not ratified the Rio de Janerio and Bogota agreements (which established the OAS) and that the IAPC was only competent to deal with disputes between nations - it could not adequately deal with cases of open aggression. Guatemala requested that the UN use its authority to restrain Honduras and Nicaragua and bring about a cessation of hostilities.

The renewed request by Guatemala made the reconvening of the Security Council inevitable. But the United States held the presidency of the Security Council in June, allowing it to decide exactly when the Council met. The United States desire to delay, and if possible prevent, any further Security Council action had become increasingly apparent. A press statement issued on 22 June by Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Permanent Representative to the UN, strongly criticized the Guatemalan appeal to the Security Council and labelled Guatemala 'a catspaw of the Soviet conspiracy to meddle in the Western Hemisphere'. The following day,

25 Appendix 1.

26 Letter dated 22 June 1954 From the Representative of the Guatemala Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/3241, 23 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

27 ibid.

28 ibid.

29 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.201., 23 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

McIntosh, in Washington during June, reported that the United States were ‘anxious to forestall further United Nations action on the grounds that the incident is a civil war and has no direct international connections’. 31

It was assumed in Wellington that the United States reluctance to further involve the UN stemmed from the fear of a Soviet satellite being established in the West close to the Panama Canal. 32 The United States had appeared genuinely interested in a peaceful solution through the OAS. The OAS was in New Zealand’s view in the best position to act, and as long as it did so without compromising the Security Council’s overall authority, there was no reason for New Zealand to oppose it.

Despite Guatemalan requests on 22 and 23 June, the Security Council was not convened on those dates. 33 Lodge announced his intention to await the results of the IAPC fact-finding mission. 34 This was a tactic aimed at preventing any further Council proceedings. Guatemala had requested the IAPC to act on 18 June, the day its borders were breached by armed units from Honduras. Despite the appeals made in favour of this action by Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Nicaragua on 20 June, no attempt was made to establish a fact-finding mission until 23 June. It was not until four days later that the mission was finally established, by which time Guatemala had been all but overrun and Security Council action effectively nullified. 35

Naturally, Lodge’s intentions were completely unacceptable to Guatemala.

32 Webb to Munro, 30 July 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
33 Letter Dated 22 June 1954 from the Representative of Guatemala Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/3241., 23 June 1954; Cablegram dated 23 June 1954 from the Minister of External Relations of Guatemala Addressed to the Secretary-general, S/3248., 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
34 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.201., 23 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
35 Luard, pp.298-299.
Guatemala complained that it had withdrawn its request to the IAPC in favour of Security Council action. Furthermore, Guatemala had not been represented at the meeting which had decided to send a mission on 23 June. Guatemala then began lobbying Security Council members, including New Zealand, to apply pressure for an early meeting of the Security Council.

At this point a clear divergence between American and British thinking began to emerge. While the United States was intent on preventing any further Council action, the United Kingdom was not convinced of the propriety of this. The latter advanced a moderate proposal that the Council be convened in response to the urgent appeals from Guatemala and that the issue be adopted on the agenda. The Council would then adjourn until the IAPC had reported. The British formula appeared to differ only marginally from what Lodge had indicated on 23 June. On the surface the difference amounted to the United States not wanting the Council to meet until the IAPC had reported, while the British did want a Council meeting, but no action, until the IAPC report had been received. The difference lay, however, in the American intention not to convene the Council until the entire situation had been dampened down, and if possible not at all. It seems reasonable to assume that the IAPC was never intended to report until this had occurred, leaving further action by the Security Council unnecessary. The British action was based on the assumption that the IAPC would report quickly and it therefore implied further Security Council action on the basis of the report’s findings.

The United States reacted angrily to the British proposal. Anglo-American relations had been strained for some time over policy toward the French position in Indochina. In May, French forces were defeated at Dien Bien Phu and discussions between the major powers, on the future of Vietnam, commenced in Geneva soon after. The United States was favouring intervention to prevent Vietnam becoming a Communist satellite; the United Kingdom opposed any such move. At the time of the Guatemalan dispute in June, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and

---

36 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.91., 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, were in the United States in an attempt to overcome the problems in the relationship. But the talks were not going smoothly and new problems emerged when the United States heard of the British intention to support the Guatemalan appeal for the Security Council to be reconvened. McIntosh reported from Washington on 24 June that the United States was ‘deeply upset’ and ‘greatly irritated and disturbed by British and French support’ of Guatemala’s case.

McIntosh believed the American position to be ‘unnecessarily unreasonable’, but that it should nevertheless be respected by New Zealand. McIntosh was confidentially informed that Lodge had been instructed to tell the British Delegation at the UN that American support would be withheld from them over Cyprus and Suez, if the United Kingdom continued to oppose the American position on Guatemala. The gravity of this threat prompted McIntosh to warn Webb that New Zealand could be faced with ‘a serious dilemma’ if the United Kingdom continued with its proposed line on Guatemala. He urged that New Zealand not add its ‘discouragement’ to American policy until things had simmered down, lest a threat, similar to that made to the United Kingdom, be made against New Zealand.

When the proposed United Kingdom action had become known to Munro, he realized the potential implications it would have on the relationship between regional organizations and the UN. A clear problem was emerging over which organization, the UN or the OAS, should deal with the problem. Guatemala had specifically requested UN rather than OAS action, its request to the latter having been withdrawn. Article 35 of the UN Charter clearly stated that any nation, regardless of whether or not it was a member of the UN, could bring any dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council. Therefore, in the view of Denmark, France,

38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
41 Appendix 1.
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Security Council was obliged to act, even if only to acknowledge the complaint.

The OAS, on the other hand, through its members present at Security Council meetings on 20 and 25 June, insisted it should deal with the problem. There was little debate about the acceptability of this. Few on the Security Council, with the exception of the United States and Latin American states, were well informed of the events in Guatemala. No state outside these knew how deeply implicated the United States and some Latin American countries were and therefore saw little objection to a predominant OAS role. Article 52 specified the right of regional organizations to act in accordance with their own security interests, to attempt to solve disputes before their reference to the Security Council, and for the Security Council to refer disputes to them.42

The problem was that Guatemala had appealed to the Security Council and requested that the OAS not be involved. While Guatemala strongly desired a Security Council initiative, the United States and most Latin American nations wanted to prevent this and have the entire dispute dealt with by the OAS, without interference by the UN. This presented a clear challenge to the UN’s authority from a regional organization. Realizing this, Munro requested specific instructions from Wellington on how to deal with a ‘request by [a] member of [a] regional organization that precedence be given to United Nations over regional action...[and the] extent to which United Nations should rely on regional organizations’.43

This request arrived in Wellington late on the night of 23 June and a reply was despatched to Munro in the early hours of the following morning, probably by Wilson.44 The timing of the reply had meant that it had not been approved by the

---

42 Appendix 1.

43 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.201., 23 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

44 The reply telegram was sent at 1.15am New Zealand time. McIntosh was in Washington in late June.
Minister, but, anticipating Webb’s agreement, Wilson told Munro that New Zealand did not accept the Guatemalan case that the OAS not deal with the problem.\textsuperscript{45} Wilson pointed out that any member of the OAS could ‘call a meeting to discuss a situation prejudicial to regional security’.\textsuperscript{46} That Guatemala had withdrawn its request for IAPC assistance was irrelevant - it did not require Guatemala’s consent in order to take action.

Furthermore, New Zealand could not see any conflict in Guatemala’s concurrent obligations to the OAS and the UN. Action by the former, in New Zealand’s view, did not interfere with the latter’s authority to deal with international issues. New Zealand felt that the IAPC was an appropriate body to deal with the Guatemala complaint and indeed preferred it to do so, due to the general lack of information available.\textsuperscript{47} Wilson pointed out also that Guatemala had supported OAS action in reference to the 1948 invasion of Costa Rica by forces based in Nicaragua, a precedent significantly undermining Guatemala’s position.\textsuperscript{48} There was little problem, in New Zealand’s view, in the UN placing considerable reliance on regional organizations.

However, Wilson did not endorse OAS action. He stated at some length that New Zealand did not consider that the Security Council can object to a request by a member state that it examine a complaint even if this already be under examination in a regional organisation. At [the] San Francisco Conference, in discussion of regional arrangements, [the] New Zealand delegation placed special emphasis on [the] importance which they attached to supremacy of [the] United Nations over any and all of its regional

\textsuperscript{45} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.173, 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1

\textsuperscript{46} ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} This was implied in New Zealand’s position during the Security Council meeting of 20 June, when Munro stated that the OAS was in ‘the best position to ascertain [the] facts’. NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.P84., 20 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{48} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.173, 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
components. It is clearly provided in [the] Charter that [the] Security Council can not only conduct investigation independently of regional organisations[,] but can decide on measures for dealing with [a given] situation additional to[,] or even in conflict with[,] those recommended by the regional grouping.\textsuperscript{49}

These preliminary instructions marked out New Zealand policy clearly in favour of the proposal that the Security Council should meet. While New Zealand continued to favour the issue being handled by the OAS, it would not condone any surrender of the Security Council’s prerogative to act in the dispute. Wilson’s statement explicitly outlined New Zealand’s view that the Security Council had the ability to conduct itself independently of any regional organization. It could, moreover, openly confront such an organization by taking measures additional to, or in conflict with, it. Wilson, in the early morning of Thursday 24 June 1954, had comprehensively defined the UN’s primacy in New Zealand’s approach to international affairs. He had also heralded a stance on an issue which would isolate New Zealand from both major allies, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Increasing pressure from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France for the Security Council to meet, added to the appeals by Guatemala, finally saw Lodge convene a meeting of the Security Council on 25 June.\textsuperscript{50} While conceding this much, the United States had no intention of allowing the Guatemalan complaint to be discussed and were prepared to use the veto if necessary.\textsuperscript{51} Knowing of the American intentions, and their possible consequences, Webb on 25 June fully endorsed the position adopted by Wilson the previous day.\textsuperscript{52} Webb’s instructions to Munro were explicit:

\textsuperscript{49} ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Luard, p.298. Luard merely states that Guatemala was ‘no longer prepared to wait’ and with the support of the Soviet Union again requested the Council to meet. In fact Guatemala had never been prepared to wait and had requested Security Council action on both 22 and 23 June. The decision for the meeting on 25 June was made the day before, indicating that Anglo-French pressure was probably a factor.

\textsuperscript{51} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.227., 24 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{52} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.176., 25 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
While we sympathize with American difficulties we consider that these have been greatly over-emphasized and that we could not support them on an issue of adoption of the agenda without sacrificing a point of principle of great importance to small nations. I feel it is short-sighted and dangerous to base the interpretations of the Charter and our actions on considerations of expediency rather than principle.\(^{53}\)

Webb’s instructions absolutely astonished Munro. Munro noted in his diary that they ‘brushed aside Mcintosh’s report...of the American attitude and ignored the obvious repercussions of our vote’.\(^{54}\) In discussions with McIntosh, also recorded in his diary, Munro had attempted to derive some justification for not supporting discussion of the complaint, but had found none. By the time Munro arrived for the Security Council meeting on the afternoon of 25 June, the United Kingdom had given in to American pressure and indicated it would now abstain on the agenda issue. The British Delegation pressed Munro to do likewise.\(^{55}\)

The Security Council meeting opened with the United States, Brazil and Colombia strongly asserting that the OAS, through the IAPC, should handle the question. Colombia stated forthrightly that the ‘[Security] Council should not interfere in [the] action being taken by American regional machinery’.\(^{56}\) The United Kingdom and France indicated that they would abstain, while Turkey and China signalled their opposition to the Guatemalan complaint being heard. Munro repeated New Zealand’s support for the OAS to initiate action and undertake to report swiftly back to the Council. However, Munro explicitly indicated, ‘that the Council should not by any decision it might reach give the appearance of abdicating [its] supreme responsibility and authority conferred on it by the Charter’.\(^{57}\) He stated that New Zealand would support discussion of the Guatemalan complaint.

\(^{53}\) ibid.

\(^{54}\) Diary Note, 25 June 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.

\(^{55}\) ibid.


\(^{57}\) ibid.
Immediately following this discussion, and just prior to the vote being taken, Ross, of the American UN Delegation, told Munro he was ‘shocked’ at New Zealand’s intended support of Guatemala. American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, also rang Munro to request that New Zealand change its intended vote, at least to an abstention. Munro informed Dulles that his instructions allowed him no discretion to do this. When the issue was voted on, it was defeated, by four votes in favour (New Zealand, Denmark, Lebanon and the Soviet Union) to five against (Brazil, China, Colombia, Turkey and the United States). The United Kingdom and France abstained.

While the United States had successfully prevented the Security Council from discussing the Guatemalan issue, they were not impressed with New Zealand’s action. An enraged Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, rang George Laking, then New Zealand’s Minister in Washington, and severely reprimanded him over New Zealand’s vote. In his anger Smith stated that Munro would be refused any request to see him in the future. The British were more forgiving, and Bedell Smith too soon withdrew his threat not to see Munro. Munro, however, was not quite as forgiving of Webb. Munro’s diary reveals his disapproval of Webb’s action and the discomfort he and Laking had been caused. On 2 July Munro sent a memorandum to Webb outlining his objections to New Zealand’s policy.

Before Webb replied to Munro’s memorandum, the Guatemalan issue was once again brought to the attention of the Security Council. While the Security Council had voted on 25 June not to discuss the Guatemalan complaint, it was still

---

58 Diary Note, 25 June 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
60 NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.239., 28 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
61 Diary Note, 27 June 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
63 ibid.
officially seized of the issue. On 9 July the ‘new Guatemalan Foreign Minister’ informed the president of the Security Council that peace had been restored and the Guatemalan complaint should be completely removed from the agenda. Despite the United Kingdom’s abstention on 25 June, the British favoured a Security Council meeting to discuss the OAS report - which still had not been received - to satisfy itself that peace had been restored prior to the question’s removal. The United States once again considered any such action to be ‘unnecessary and undesirable’.64

New Zealand favoured the British line. While Webb had decided that it would not be politic for Munro to initiate such a proposal, he felt that if the United Kingdom did so, New Zealand would vote in support of it, against the United States.65 Webb told Munro that

We think it important in this issue, the first in which the relative fields of authority of the Security Council and a regional organization have been in question, the overriding responsibility of the Security Council should be preserved, or at any rate not by-passed.66

The Security Council did not reconvene and a second rift between the OAS and the UN, and between New Zealand and the United States, was averted. The events of June-July 1954 concerning Guatemala faded from international attention, although American feeling on the issue was evident for some time. This surfaced at the ANZUS Council meeting in August 1954, where Bedell Smith was still openly critical of New Zealand’s stance on Guatemala.67 Bedell Smith apparently stated at that time rather ‘facetiously that on the problem of Dutch New Guinea he would give Australia the same support as the Americans had received in the Guatemalan complaint from the ANZUS allies’.68 Dulles was also known to have felt that the

---

64 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.217., 14 July 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
66 ibid.
67 Summary of Munro’s Letter to Webb of 16 August 1954 - Guatemalan Complaint, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
68 ibid.
United States had been ‘deserted by certain of its ANZUS allies’ over Guatemala. During the meeting of the General Assembly during September, the Guatemalan issue was also briefly raised.

But Webb was unrepentant. In reply to Munro’s memorandum of 2 July, he expounded in full the reasons for New Zealand’s action. Webb noted the American interest in the independence of the OAS and ‘the strategic consequences of the successful establishment of a communist bridgehead near the Panama Canal’. But neither of these considerations, in Webb’s view, justified supporting a course of action which imperilled or appeared to imperil two vital principles; (a) the overriding authority of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security; [and] (b) the right of any state which considers itself a victim of aggression to appeal to the United Nations.

Webb went on to stress that it was ‘essential in New Zealand’s approach to international affairs that any nation should have the right to appeal to the Security Council for assistance’. He took heart in the fact that two other small states, Denmark and Lebanon, had voted with New Zealand on the issue and that public opinion in New Zealand had been supportive. He criticized the British and French abstentions as neither dignified nor admirable and stated that New Zealand’s purposes would not have been served by following their example. Finally Webb referred to the issue of regionalism:

We are fully acquainted, too, with the importance that the question of regionalism assumed at San Francisco. The correct balance between

---

69 ibid.


71 Webb to Munro, 30 July 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

72 ibid.

73 ibid.

74 ibid.
the two is, however, stated in terms of the Charter itself and to have
adopted any other attitude would, I feel, have left us open to the
charge that we had ignored the clear and specific directions of the
Charter in handling a question of major substance and importance. 75

In the first six months of New Zealand’s term as a Security Council member,
the Council’s authority had been challenged from three directions. The Arab League
had claimed the UN had no jurisdiction in relation to the Suez/Aqaba problem, the
OAS wanted to avoid any Security Council action over Guatemala, and the United
States had used the ANZUS Treaty in an attempt to cajole New Zealand into
accepting a passive role for the UN, again in relation to Guatemala.

By the end of that six months New Zealand had left no doubt about where it
stood on the relationship between regionalism and the UN. New Zealand, in
initiating a draft-resolution on the Suez/Aqaba issue, specifically sought to enhance
the prestige of the Security Council and openly defied the Arab claim that the UN
should have no competence in the affair. In relation to Guatemala, New Zealand not
only denied the OAS claim to exclusive jurisdiction, but stoutly refused to bow to
American pressure in which the ANZUS relationship was stressed. Webb had stated
explicitly on 30 July that the balance between regionalism and the UN ‘was stated in
terms of the Charter itself’ - a reaffirmation of the UN’s overriding authority in
world affairs.

The Guatemalan issue showed that regional activity was acceptable to New
Zealand only if it recognized the authority of, and was consistent with, the UN
Charter. This reflected the continuing New Zealand desire for compatibility between
regional organizations and the UN. The Charter was the benchmark which New
Zealand used in June 1954 to measure how it would respond to the issues which
were raised over the Guatemalan complaint. In accepting the need for OAS action,
Munro had, before and after his dispute with Webb over New Zealand’s action,
stated that the Security Council must not surrender its ultimate position in world
affairs. Public declarations by New Zealand of the UN’s supremacy during the 1950s

75 ibid.
reflected a genuine concern.

This concern was something which detached New Zealand from the majority of the Security Council members in 1954. In March, New Zealand had gained the support of Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States in an attempt to reassert the Security Council's authority against a challenge from Egypt. In June, only Denmark and New Zealand maintained their positions protecting the ultimate authority of the UN against the regional challenge posed by the OAS. Lebanon and the Soviet Union voted with New Zealand in June, but had voted against in March. New Zealand had demonstrated a fundamental continuity in adhering to the position adopted by Peter Fraser at the San Francisco Conference, almost a decade before.

In approaching the Guatemalan affair, New Zealand responded in favour of the Security Council's supremacy, perceiving grave implications for its own security if that ultimate authority was compromised. On numerous occasions during the 1950s, including Guatemala, New Zealand reacted to the plight of small states and vigorously defended the right of those states to appeal to the Security Council. Influenced by Churchill’s proposal for a regional world organization, Fraser had seen New Zealand’s interests threatened by regionalization in 1945. The tendency for New Zealand to look to the stance taken at San Francisco by Fraser, and to refer to the Charter itself, demonstrated that fear still existed. Furthermore, Webb was a rather unconvinced disciple of ANZUS and the stormy Anglo-American relationship which had prevailed throughout 1953-54 would have sown doubts about sacrificing the UN in favour of regional alliances.

That the security of small states like New Zealand was best protected by the observation of the UN Charter was a powerful assumption in the 1950s. New Zealand still perceived the Charter as setting the basic rules by which international affairs should be conducted. It had long been recognized that the UN would not provide a blanket security guarantee to small states and the need for regional organizations had been realized. But the emergence of those alliances had not seen a
desire on the part of New Zealand to forego the UN. Regional organizations were genuinely perceived by New Zealand in the 1950s as adjuncts to the UN, of greater or lesser significance, but not rivals, and never replacements. New Zealand’s interests were not perceived as being adequately served by a narrow reliance on regional organizations. New Zealand’s reaction to the Guatemalan complaint demonstrated that this remained a formative assumption from which New Zealand would not easily depart. Even though Munro had protested at the action New Zealand took in 1954, some years later he recalled that

> Any development in by-passing the United Nations is more true of the greater rather than the smaller powers. I naturally turn to my own country, New Zealand. Either with the National Party, now in power, or the Labour Party, support of the United Nations and opposition to its by-passing is axiomatic. ... This attitude has never wavered, even though we have a defensive alliance with the United States and Australia under the ANZUS Pact....

---

76 Untitled Address, undated, Munro Papers, MS 2230/304.
CHAPTER 10

SECURITY PROBLEMS IN BURMA,
1953-1956

After 1950 New Zealand maintained a policy of upholding the supremacy of the United Nations in world affairs and specifically against regional challenges to its authority. A significant aspect of this policy involved the use of the UN to deal with problems in Southeast Asia. With its eastern seaboard on the Pacific Ocean, Asia was seen to be an area of significant concern for New Zealand and indeed had been since the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia in 1941-2. Problems arising there contained potentially serious implications for New Zealand and the maintenance of peace in the region was seen as essential to New Zealand security during the 1950s.

Despite the necessity to deal with Asian problems, New Zealand remained wary of too close an association with the region. From 1950 to the end of 1954 New Zealand sustained military obligations in the Middle East, and maintained a division to be despatched to Egypt in the event of war. By contrast, there was only a limited military focus on East Asia, through ANZAM, and other low-level contingencies. New Zealand's commitment to the Korean War was oriented to broader UN objectives and when Asia eventually became New Zealand's primary military focus in 1955, it did so predominantly in the Commonwealth context. This was indicative of the fact that regionalism as a phenomenon in New Zealand's external relations emerged as an extension of its traditional security policy framework and did not present an alternative focus.

A number of Asian issues came to the attention of the world community during the 1950s and New Zealand demonstrated a marked preference to approach these through the UN. Issues such as Burma's relationship with the Republic of China (Formosa), which deteriorated in 1953, the future of Indochina in 1954, and the superpower stand-off over Formosa and the Offshore Islands in 1954-55, all
concerned New Zealand. In each case New Zealand demonstrated that it was far more comfortable approaching these issues through the UN than in smaller regional fora. The growing regional emphasis in New Zealand security policy, therefore, did not lead to a diminution of the role of the UN, but saw it retain its importance to New Zealand’s security. This chapter will briefly discuss the problems facing Burma from 1953 to 1956, emanating from its relationship with both Nationalist and Communist China, and the implications this had for New Zealand. In 1953 the Korean War had ended, but Sino-American relations had not eased and the United States commitment to confronting and containing Communism in Asia and Europe remained a fundamental aspect of American foreign policy.

New Zealand’s dual concern for peace in Asia and for small-state security led to a strong interest in Burmese problems. This proved a forerunner to New Zealand’s approach to questions arising later over Indochina and over Formosa and the Offshore Islands. New Zealand made extensive use of the UN in its approach to the difficulties experienced by Burma and proved reluctant to do so through any other organization.

The dispute between Burma and Formosa, which was brought to international attention in 1953, had its origin in the Communist victory in China in 1949. From that time, numbers of defeated Nationalist troops and refugees fled the new regime. Most took refuge on islands off mainland China’s coast, notably Formosa. Others fled south, to neighbouring countries such as the Associated States of Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), Thailand and Burma. In most instances they were disarmed, interned and later sent to Formosa. The Burmese proved to be an exception. Preoccupied with combating internal Karen insurgents in 1950, Burma did not intern the approximately 1200 Nationalists who crossed into Burma that year. The Nationalists, unmolested by Burmese Government forces, began recruiting local inhabitants, significantly swelling their number. In 1951 Nationalists operating from Burma twice crossed into the southern Chinese Province of Yunnan and engaged

---

1 *The Times*, 25 February 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1
Communist forces there. Both attacks were quickly defeated and the Nationalists retreated to Burma.2

Following these 1951 defeats, the Nationalists began to emerge as an internal security threat to Burma. Discipline deteriorated, and an alliance of sorts appears to have been struck between the Nationalist refugees and local Karen rebels. In January 1953 Nationalist troops attacked and killed villagers in northern Burma, sparking continuing clashes with Burmese Government forces.3 These troops were suspected by the Burmese of actually being under the direct command of the Nationalist Government on Formosa. Flights by transport aircraft from Formosa had landed in northern Burma with supplies, and General Mi Li, the Nationalist commander, was known to have regularly visited Formosa.4 Late in March 1953 the Burmese Government complained to the General Assembly, calling for the cessation of aggressive acts by Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma.5 Burma alleged that the Government of Formosa was responsible for the activities of the Nationalists.

Munro endorsed the complaint in the First Committee in April, despite the fact that New Zealand doubted that the General Assembly had the ability to solve the problem. Among policy-makers in Wellington, there was a clear belief that the UN should always heed a direct appeal from a small state, regardless of the circumstances.6 Munro told the First Committee in April that New Zealand had always had 'a keen concern in the legal grievances of small nations and had striven to uphold the United Nations as an organization in which we could place hope and

---

2 Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Agenda - Complaint by the Union of Burma, Summary of Reference to the United Nations, 27 August 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 4.
3 The Times, 24 February 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
6 Chinese Nationalist (KMT) Troops in Burma, 1 April 1953; NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.P62., 20 April 1953; Munro to First Committee, 3 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
reliance in time of trouble. Munro emphasized this again in November when he reiterated New Zealand's belief that small states should be able to rely on the UN for security against aggression.

The maintenance of peace in the Asian region was also a major concern to New Zealand. Asia bordered the Pacific and New Zealand had realized by 1953 that, especially in the Cold War environment, conflict in the region could spread and have serious implications for New Zealand security. It therefore became a priority that the UN be used to dampen down any potential conflict in order to preserve peace and New Zealand's aloofness from Asian problems. This concern had been evident in 1952 when Wilson had told the General Assembly that New Zealand, as a Pacific power, considered that any aggression in Southeast Asia should be urgently dealt with by the UN. Munro recalled this statement in April 1953.

New Zealand had good reason to be concerned about the Burmese problem. Some eight months after Nationalist forces had attacked Yunnan Province, the Soviet Union accused the United States of airlifting Nationalist reinforcements from Formosa to Burma. The United States immediately denied the charge. The Soviet Union then accused Thailand of assisting the Nationalists, an accusation which was also denied. The United States retaliated by issuing a warning about Communist aggression in Asia and the issue simmered down. A New Zealand departmental report concluded that 'this preliminary United Nations exchange highlighted the standing danger that Burma might become involved in an East-West conflict' because of the Nationalist presence. In April 1953, therefore, New Zealand

---

8 Munro to First Committee, 3 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
11 Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Agenda - Complaint by the Union of Burma, Summary of Reference to the United Nations, 27 August 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 4.
12 ibid.
readily accepted that aggression against Burma had taken place by foreign troops and that it constituted a legitimate case for the UN.\textsuperscript{13} New Zealand supported the removal of the Nationalists from Burma and wanted a means found to effect this.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the fact that Burma had implicated the Nationalist Government in the affair, New Zealand stopped short of supporting the condemnatory draft-resolution placed before the First Committee by Burma in March 1953. The Nationalist Government denied that it either controlled, or was involved in, reinforcing and equipping Nationalists in Burma. The Nationalist representative declared in the First Committee in April that aircraft attempting to travel between Formosa and Burma would not be given clearance to use Formosan airfields. Moreover, he stated that attempts would be made to halt the private collection of funds in Formosa for the Nationalists in Burma.\textsuperscript{15}

Given the strong denials of the Formosan representative, New Zealand considered that evidence of direct Formosan control over the activities of the Nationalists in Burma was less than compelling. The strongly condemnatory resolution Burma had proposed therefore appeared, in New Zealand’s view, to be unjustified. Wellington’s major objective had already been established as facilitating the pacific settlement of the dispute, reducing tension and the chances of conflict. A resolution condemning Formosa could well have proved counter-productive, and while careful not to appear less concerned for Burma’s plight, New Zealand supported a more moderate proposal. The final resolution, adopted unanimously on 23 April 1953, condemned the presence of the Nationalists in Burma and declared that they should surrender their arms and agree to internment. The resolution also reaffirmed measures which had already been initiated by the United States and

\textsuperscript{13} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, No.P62., 20 April 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{14} Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Agenda - Complaint by the Union of Burma, Summary of Reference to the United Nations, 27 August 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 4.

\textsuperscript{15} AJHR, A-2 (1954), p.42.
Thailand to facilitate the evacuation of the Nationalist troops.\textsuperscript{16}

In the meantime, a four power Joint Military Committee (JMC) was established with representatives from Burma, Formosa, the United States and Thailand. It was this body which was endorsed by the General Assembly in its April resolution. A plan for the evacuation of the Nationalists to Thailand, and then by air to Formosa, was concluded on 23 June 1953.\textsuperscript{17} Despite this agreement, there was a significant delay in implementing the plan and a number of disagreements between Burma and Formosa over precise numbers to be evacuated.\textsuperscript{18} On 17 September Burma withdrew from the JMC and Burmese military operations against the Nationalists commenced soon after.\textsuperscript{19} The JMC continued its work without Burma and on 30 September Formosa informed it that 2,000 Nationalists could be brought to the Thai border by 5 November for evacuation.\textsuperscript{20} Burma accepted this plan and suspended its military operations.

When the General Assembly met again on 17 September the JMC initiative had still to show signs of progress. Two days after the General Assembly had convened, Burma withdrew from the JMC. Inevitably, the issue had to be discussed again. However, the General Assembly's agenda was considerable and it was some six weeks before the Burmese issue could be discussed. By this time the preparations for the evacuation of 2,000 Nationalists were in progress.

New Zealand continued to see the Burmese situation as a matter of considerable urgency. The Department of External Affairs noted that the situation

\textsuperscript{16} ibid, p.45.

\textsuperscript{17} Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Agenda - Complaint by the Union of Burma, Summary of Reference to the United Nations, 27 August 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 4.


\textsuperscript{19} Complaint by the Union of Burma Regarding Aggression Against it by the Government of the Republic of China, A/2740, A/2740., 29 September 1954, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.

still posed a major threat to the security of Asia - ‘the continued presence of the KMT [Nationalist] troops offers Communist China a ready pretext for intervention in Burma if she wishes’. Such an intervention had occurred, albeit briefly and on a small scale, in July 1953.

The desire to see a satisfactory settlement therefore remained strong. The First Committee began discussing the Burmese issue on 31 October. By this time the Formosan offer had been made and the situation appeared to be improving. Munro felt that due to this progress it would be wise to refrain from further resolutions. This position received general approval. On 5 November the First Committee voted in favour of a resolution co-sponsored by New Zealand to adjourn consideration of the Burma issue until at least 23 November, a week after the planned evacuations would be completed. Munro was not advocating that the General Assembly ‘wash its hands of the matter’. ‘On the contrary,’ he told the First Committee on 3 November, ‘it is our duty, to maintain our vigilance until the present threat to Burma’s security is removed’.

The evacuation plan frequently encountered difficulties. In First Committee discussions between 31 October and 5 November, the Burmese

---

21 Eighth Regular Session of the General Assembly; Provisional Agenda - Complaint by the Union of Burma, Summary of Reference to the United Nations, 27 August 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 4.

22 Burma-China Border: Joint Intelligence Bureau (New Zealand) - Intelligence Report No.5/56., 31 July 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.


24 The other sponsors were Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

25 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.GA(P)46., 5 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.

26 Munro to First Committee, 3 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.

27 ibid.

representative had continued to charge Formosa with reinforcing and controlling the Nationalists in Burma. When First Committee discussions resumed on 27 November, Burma demonstrated considerable bitterness over the evacuation. While he predicted the current evacuation would probably consist of over 2,000 Nationalists, the Burmese representative

complained that the evacuees included a number of Burmese nationals and an undue proportion of the aged, infirm, and very young. Very few arms, he declared, and those mainly unserviceable, had been surrendered. It was obvious that Burma could not be satisfied with such a so-called evacuation.29

On the following day a draft-resolution was tabled which was again co-sponsored by New Zealand.30 This resolution took note of the evacuations currently taking place and of the difficulties Burma had had with the operation to date. It called on the United States and Thailand to continue their efforts to evacuate the Nationalists.31 The Burmese were clearly not satisfied that only 2,000 troops had been evacuated. However this resolution was adopted unanimously and gave hope that a more acceptable solution might be forthcoming. The conciliatory position of the Formosan Government, which promised 5,000 evacuations in return for Burmese cessation of hostilities against the Nationalists, was also encouraging.32

Following the General Assembly’s decision, the JMC, still without Burma, continued to seek further evacuations. In January 1954 it convened the first of several meetings with Nationalist representatives.33 This led to much more significant evacuations, although these were punctuated with a number of difficulties.

30 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.GA(P)68., 28 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
32 ibid, p.41.
33 Complaint by the Union of Burma Regarding Aggression Against it by the Government of the Republic of China, A/2740, A/2740., 29 September 1954, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
By the second week of May 1954, a total of some 7,000 Nationalists had been evacuated. On 11 May the Nationalist Government on Formosa announced that it wanted no further relations with any Nationalists still in Burma. 34

In October 1954 the Burmese again requested that the problem be discussed in the General Assembly. New Zealand assumed that this was a ‘washing up’ action, consisting of a report by the Burmese on the success of the evacuation procedure. 35 Webb acceded to a British request for New Zealand and the other sponsors of the draft in December to put forward an appropriate resolution. 36 A draft-resolution noting the satisfaction of the nations concerned and calling on the remainder of the Nationalists to disarm, was tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on 13 October. 37 New Zealand’s representative on the Ad Hoc Committee, A.R. Perry, spoke the following day, outlining once again New Zealand’s interest in the affair:

Evacuation eased the grave problem confronting Burma, was recognition and justification of the right of small countries to place trust and confidence in the United Nations, and relieved tension in an area of particular concern to New Zealand. 38

Some 6,000 Nationalists remained active in Burma, 39 but they posed much less of an internal threat than previously. The final resolution was adopted unanimously, with no abstentions, on 20 October 1954, concluding a period of fairly active New Zealand involvement with the problem at the political level. New Zealand was not directly concerned with the JMC, but had no cause to be since the

34 ibid.
35 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.264., 11 October 1954. PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
38 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.GA(P)25., 14 October 1954, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
39 Dominion, 2 October 1954, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
good offices of both the United States and Thailand had been requested by Burma since 1950. Both had attempted to facilitate the removal of the Nationalist troops through applying pressure on Formosa, but had been unsuccessful. The Burmese complaint to the UN added impetus for a solution. But New Zealand’s involvement in co-sponsoring three separate resolutions in November 1953 and October 1954 reflected a significant interest in solving the problem peacefully. New Zealand’s involvement was a forerunner to high profile on Asian issues in the UN during its 1954-5 term on the Security Council, concerning Indochina and the Sino-American stand-off over Formosa and Offshore Islands.

Moreover, the issue held important implications for the relationship between small states and the UN. This was evident in New Zealand’s statements and in the involvement of other small states, Australia, Mexico, Norway (an ally over the Guatemalan affair), Sweden and Uruguay. The UN had never been the potent security instrument Fraser had desired, but the realization of this had not meant that the UN became unimportant to New Zealand. Despite its weaknesses, New Zealand maintained a strong attachment to the UN and placed a great deal of emphasis on its role in small-state security. Munro’s statement to the First Committee in November 1953, concerning the Burmese complaint, reflected the enduring nature of this element in New Zealand foreign policy. Indeed he could have been talking about New Zealand:

Mr Chairman, limited though the power of this Assembly may be, we can never turn a deaf ear to an appeal for our moral and practical support from a small country, newly independent, facing serious difficulties in a critical area of a turbulent world.40

The conclusion of General Assembly action in response to the Burmese complaint during 1953-54 did not bring an end to New Zealand’s security concern with Burma. In September 1954 New Zealand became a party to SEACDT. Burma was not a member, but as a non-communist nation in Asia, it did feature in the projected SEATO area of concern.

40 Munro to First Committee, 3 November 1953, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
In July 1953 a small incursion by Chinese troops into Burma highlighted the problem the presence of Nationalist refugees in Burma could cause. The ambiguity of that border did not help the situation, significantly increasing the potential for incidents. A further incursion occurred in November 1955, indicative of the continuing problem Burma experienced with the Chinese.41

On 31 July 1956 reports of a more significant Chinese foray into Burma surfaced.42 The Chinese had established outposts in Burmese territory as bases for limited operations against Nationalist groups.43 American intelligence sources tended to infer a more sinister motive, asserting that the Chinese action was part of a more overt ‘systematic probing’ of the China/Burmese border.44

Burma was once again facing a considerable security dilemma. It was concerned to secure the withdrawal of Chinese armed forces quickly, and without antagonizing the Chinese Government. The possibility of an appeal to the UN was immediately ruled out as the result would almost certainly have been an acrimonious East/West exchange over the affair. Nationalist China could safely be hauled before the UN, but the Burmese calculated that similar action involving Communist China could end in disaster. Burma, therefore, sought bilateral negotiations with China to discuss the issue and these were in progress by 1 August 1956.45

Immediately following reports of Chinese activity in Burma on 31 July, a press agency in Bangkok requested a SEATO response. Foss Shanahan, New Zealand’s Singapore-based Commissioner to Southeast Asia, was in Bangkok as the chairman of the SEATO Security Council for July. Shanahan’s tenure of this

41 Burma-China Border: Joint Intelligence Bureau (New Zealand) - Intelligence Report No.5/56., 31 July 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 1.
43 NZCom, Singapore, to MEA, Wellington, No.26., 1 August 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
44 NZEmb, Bangkok, to MEA, Wellington, No.27., 1 August 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
45 NZCom, Singapore, to MEA, Wellington, No.26., 1 August 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.
position, held rotationally between SEATO members, ended at midnight on 31 July. Shanahan acted quickly, managing before he relinquished the chairmanship to get agreement from all representatives in Bangkok that no public statement on behalf of SEATO should be made on the issue.\(^{46}\) He had also attained initial agreement that no intervention by SEATO should even be suggested and that the whole problem would be best dealt with by the ‘neutralist’ countries.\(^{47}\) Wellington supported his initiative.

However, the following day the Australian representative, Bishop, took up the chairmanship of the Council. Bishop did not propose any substantial SEATO statement, but he did indicate a desire for a higher SEATO profile. He informed Shanahan that he proposed to circulate a note containing several ‘points of guidance’ to be issued as instructions to the SEATO Public Relations Office in Bangkok. Shanahan described Bishop’s note in a later memorandum:

> The document attempted an interpretation of the [South East Asian Collective Defence] Treaty in its application to Burma as a country situated within the Treaty area, the possible forms of action under SEATO and referred to the possibility of a meeting of the Council representatives in a sense which suggested that the Council Representatives were busying themselves with the problem.\(^{48}\)

Shanahan considered that Bishop had proposed action which went significantly further than directions to the SEATO Public Relations Office demanded, and he questioned the wisdom of such an approach\(^{49}\). Bishop replied by insisting that a meeting of the SEATO representatives should be called to deal with any disagreements. Shanahan recoiled at this suggestion, advising against it. He insisted that any meeting should be completely informal and convened away from

\(^{46}\) NZEmb, Bangkok, to MEA, Wellington, No.27., 1 August 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.

\(^{47}\) ibid.

\(^{48}\) Memorandum for MEA, 11 August 1956, PM 222/2/2, Part 2.

\(^{49}\) ibid.
SEATO Headquarters. This meeting was eventually held at a private residence and Shanahan’s views met with considerable support from the other SEATO representatives. Bishop’s points of guidance were subsequently diluted and shortened.

SEATO’s profile over the affair remained extremely low due to a desire to avoid the inference that a military threat had been perceived, lest it provoke a more belligerent Chinese reaction. Events in the Middle East surrounding Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July soon diverted attention away from the Burma issue and Shanahan was kept busy measuring the response of Asian nations to that issue. By the end of the year Chinese forces had been withdrawn from Burmese territory.

The initial action on the part of Shanahan, and the Government’s subsequent endorsement of it, provides an interesting comparison with the earlier events in Burma. Within the UN in 1953, New Zealand was prepared to involve itself with initiatives concerning an Asian problem which had potentially grave implications for Asian security, and indirectly for New Zealand’s. In 1956, however, on a similar issue, and with similar implications in security terms, New Zealand wanted to avoid even the appearance of SEATO interest in the events in Burma. New Zealand’s security priorities during this time were to maintain peace in Asia and avoid direct embroilment in disputes which did arise in the region. The UN provided a forum where this policy could be followed successfully and thus New Zealand was prepared to become involved in Asian issues in the UN. SEATO on the other hand, a military alliance and a framework through which possible Chinese aggression could be countered, was not a forum where these priorities could adequately be served. If a major war in Asia had actually broken out, SEATO could possibly have attained a much greater significance in New Zealand’s approach to Asia. But until

50 ibid.
51 ibid.
this happened, SEATO was not considered an organization which could rival the UN in New Zealand’s pursuit of its security priorities during the 1950s.
CHAPTER 11

INDOCHINA

APRIL-AUGUST 1954

Regionalism in New Zealand security policy grew out of the traditional framework of the Commonwealth and the United Nations and contributed to the resilience of the latter as an important focus in the 1950s. The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of the UN as a forum for the pacific settlement of disputes and New Zealand's preparedness to involve itself in Asian issues in the UN, as opposed to regional fora. The problems arising in Indochina in 1953-54 further demonstrated this feature of New Zealand policy. Peace in Asia was essential if New Zealand was to maintain its aloofness from the region and this contributed greatly to the centrality of the UN in New Zealand's quest for regional security.

In relation to Indochina, and subsequently Formosa (dealt with in the following chapter), there was a further concern which motivated New Zealand policy in the mid-1950s. New Zealand's regional associations, ANZUS and SEATO, were strongly linked with the United States and aimed to harness American power to the security of New Zealand. However, American power had always been perceived in New Zealand as something of a doubled-edged sword. During the 1940s New Zealand had been concerned that wartime use or acquisition of Pacific territories by the United States, essential as it was, would lead to the surrender of parts of the British Empire to American control. In the early to mid-1950s the draw-back New Zealand perceived in American power was the seeming over-confidence that nuclear dominance instilled in United States foreign policy. New Zealand was concerned that the apparent readiness of the United States to confront China and Communism might provoke, rather than prevent, a general conflict in the region. The UN, therefore, was

---

important to New Zealand for three major reasons: it was a means of avoiding embroilment in Asian problems, of averting conflict in Asia likely to be harmful to New Zealand's security interests and of restraining United States zeal to confront China.

The French position in Vietnam, one of the three Associated States of Indochina, had been steadily worsening since 1950. By the beginning of 1954, France's hold over Vietnam was in serious jeopardy. The Vietminh had gained control of much of the North Vietnamese countryside and France had responded by concentrating a large force at Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam. This was a position of considerable political significance and holding it gave the impression of French dominance, if not the reality. Aware of this, the Vietminh took the offensive and Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May 1954, prompting the abandonment of Vietnam by the French.

The United States had become so concerned at the spread of Communism in Asia as a result of the Korean War that the prospect of a French defeat in Vietnam was met with alarm. The Vietminh was identified by the United States as being under the ultimate direction of Moscow and Peking. The Korean War had been seen in the same light, but there Communism, after a lengthy war, had finally been 'contained'. A similar containment was considered necessary in Vietnam lest the Communists break out and engulf all of Asia - a prospect epitomized in the 'domino theory'. In December 1952 President Truman authorized a $60 million aid package for the French effort in Vietnam. As the French position continued to deteriorate, the United States began considering more direct means of assistance. The plan proposed by President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in April 1954 was to rescue the French position by a 'united action' - a major Western intervention in Vietnam. The United States would not, however, take any such action without the

---


3 ibid, p.140.
full support of its allies.

On Sunday 4 April 1954 Dulles convened an urgent meeting of Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom representatives in Washington. Munro noted in his diary the suddenness of the meeting and that Dulles had proposed an extensive plan of united action in Vietnam, by forces from Australia, the Philippines, France, New Zealand, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Munro noted that Australia would be asked for an aircraft carrier and New Zealand for the naval vessels currently serving in Korea.

None of the nations represented at the meeting favoured Dulles’ plan. Soon after learning of the American proposal, Webb asserted that any such action would require UN sanction. British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in a meeting with Frederick Doidge, then High Commissioner in London, ‘particularly approved’ of this proviso. Webb and Eden told American officials in the week following Dulles’ meeting that public opinion in New Zealand and the United Kingdom would demand that any action taken be through the UN.

Following Webb’s initial reaction to the American proposal, Dulles sent Webb a telegram stressing the need for the ANZUS allies to act together in meeting potential threats to Pacific security. Munro agreed with Dulles’ argument, and noted the ‘supreme importance’ of a united approach to security matters in the Pacific between Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Munro’s view, Australian and New Zealand interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific made the necessity for action in Indochina ‘even more immediate and compelling’. Munro clearly felt that a Vietminh victory would have extreme

---

4 Diary Note, 4 April 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
5 ibid.
6 Diary Note, 10 April 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
7 ibid.
8 Diary Note, 11 April 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
consequences for the security of Asia and believed that decisive action by the West was necessary and urgent. He was not impressed by Webb’s insistence on UN involvement. ‘Why stultify ourselves’, he wrote in his diary, ‘by interminable debates in the U.N. and then probably getting nowhere, while all the while the situation is going from bad to worse’. The gravity with which Munro viewed the situation was apparent in his final remark in his diary on 10 April - ‘I have decided to telegraph at some length to the Government summarising my views of the situation, so that history will not say I failed to advise and warn them’. 

Despite Munro’s strong opinion, and clear United States pressure for New Zealand to support a plan for Western intervention in Indochina, Webb would not change his mind. He did not respond favourably to American pressure, either to threats or more subtle forms of coercion. Furthermore, Webb, and for that matter, Holland, considered ANZUS as a means by which New Zealand achieved a security guarantee in the Pacific. It was not, in his view, a means through which the United States should undertake to influence New Zealand foreign policy; Webb opposed the development of ANZUS machinery which would be likely to imply this. Finally, during his time as Minister of External Affairs, Webb recoiled from the strongly confrontational attitude the United States adopted in relation to crises in Asia. He was reluctant later in the year to allow American strategic priorities in the Chinese Offshore Islands to influence New Zealand’s approach to the crisis occurring over them. In June 1954, he feared that United States intervention in Indochina would create a worse security threat than that which already existed.

On 7 May Dien Bien Phu fell and with it the French determination to further resist the Vietminh. Even so, officials in the United States were still seriously

---

9 Diary Note, 10 April 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.

10 ibid.

11 Interview with Frank Corner, 17 June 1993.

12 Diary Note, 18 February 1952, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.

13 McIntosh to Munro, 1 July 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
considering the use of force to save the French position. Webb visited the United States in May, but he maintained that New Zealand would not accept any intervention without the UN. Munro recorded in his diary a meeting between Webb and Dulles in mid-May:

Webb made his usual point about the necessity for United Nations approval, which he believed the N.Z. public would insist on and without which we would not have taken part in the Korean conflict. He repeats this ad nauseam.\textsuperscript{14}

Frustration was being felt by senior officials in the United States, Dulles among them, at the continual rebuffs by New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries concerning policy on Vietnam.\textsuperscript{15} But Webb remained adamant that New Zealand would not accept any action outside the UN and did not respond to American attempts to change his mind.\textsuperscript{16} The proposed American action was eventually abandoned, although during May Dulles advanced the idea of a collective defence agreement including Australia, New Zealand the United Kingdom and the United States, which was later concluded as SEACDT. Even then, Webb appeared unenthusiastic - 'Webb remained silent, and said merely that he would put it to cabinet'.\textsuperscript{17} As late as the beginning of September, when Webb was actually on his way to Manila for discussions which would lead to conclusion of SEACDT, he and Holland had non-committal attitudes to it.

Munro was unimpressed with Webb’s approach to the united action proposal and suspected Webb’s motives for placing such emphasis on UN involvement. Munro wrote in his diary in April that 'the truth of the matter is [that] Webb wants at all costs to avoid involvement in Indo-China.'\textsuperscript{18} Munro also noted Webb’s desire

---

\textsuperscript{14} Diary Note, 19 May 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.

\textsuperscript{15} ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Diary Note, 20 May 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.

\textsuperscript{18} Diary Note, 10 April 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.
to avoid commitments to Asia generally. New Zealand policy had long held it imperative to remain uninvolved directly with Asian problems and to approach security issues through the UN. Despite Munro’s dissatisfaction, this remained a primary objective of New Zealand policy in 1954. Webb explained this to Munro in a telegram on 1 June. ‘As you know’, wrote Webb, ‘we have always felt that it would be essential to obtain United Nations backing for any measures which might be taken to ensure the security of non-communist parts of South East Asia’. Any New Zealand involvement in Indochina, even under SEACDT, was not to be undertaken without UN authorization.

Even before the ill-fated discussions on united action had concluded, problems caused by the Vietminh in Thailand, Cambodia and Laos had been brought to the attention of the UN. As early as May 1953, Thailand had expressed concern at the presence of the Vietminh in Laos. Anxious to avoid Vietminh insurgency, Thailand considered a formal request for United Nations observers to be despatched to its northern borders. The United States smothered the plan and no action was taken.

The issue re-emerged in April 1954 when Cambodia complained to the UN concerning ‘aggression and atrocities’ committed by the Vietminh against Cambodia. Cambodia did not attempt to have its complaint discussed at that time, but its representatives made clear its intention to request specific UN action should the situation worsen. Some days later misunderstood instructions led to preparations for such a request. The situation was soon clarified and Cambodia did

---

19 Diary Note, 19 May 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/193.

20 MEA, Wellington, to NZAmb, Washington, No.143., 1 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.


23 ibid.
not appeal to the UN.\textsuperscript{24}

The Cambodian complaint had, however, awakened significant American interest. By the first week of May the American united action plan was facing serious difficulties. It lacked support from major allies and even the United States Congress had not been convinced.\textsuperscript{25} With the French collapse, the future of Vietnam was left to be decided by negotiations at the Conference on Korea and Indochina already meeting in Geneva. United States support for the conference was never more than luke-warm and its interest in intervention was not dispelled, a fact reflected by Webb’s need to stress UN sanction of any operation - ad nauseam - throughout May.

It was in this environment that the United States began to look at the prospect of either a state in Indochina, or Thailand, bringing a complaint to the UN. This would offer the United States an opportunity to deal with Communism in Indochina, with allied support, by utilizing the UN machinery upon which Webb and others had previously been so insistent. The United States pressed Thailand to make an appeal for the United Nations Peace Observation Commission, of which New Zealand was a member, to establish a sub-commission and deploy observers along the Thai/Laotian border.\textsuperscript{26} The proposed American tactics were made known to Western countries on the Security Council from the outset. When the Soviet Union vetoed the request, as seemed certain, a special session of the General Assembly would be convened under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The United States felt confident the necessary two-thirds majority could be gained to authorize the despatch of a POC sub-commission to the Thai border. Cambodia and Laos would, when ‘appropriate’, inform ‘the United Nations that they also would like a Peace

\textsuperscript{24} NZLeg, Paris, to MEA, Wellington, No.20, 27 April 1954; MEA, Wellington, to NZLeg, Paris, No.21, 28 April; NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.145, 4 May 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{25} Ambrose, p.141.

\textsuperscript{26} NZDel, Geneva, to MEA, Wellington, No.43, 20 May 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
Observation [Sub-]Commission sent to their countries'. The containment of Communism in the area could thus be effected, through the UN, with allied support.

The American plan ran into immediate opposition from the very allies to whom it was supposed to appeal, especially the United Kingdom. A New Zealand delegate at the Geneva Conference summed up British thinking on the American proposal, 'as a transparent manoeuvre by the United States to secure United Nations cover for their intervention in Indo China'.

New Zealand's position on the proposed Thai action strongly reflected its long-standing concern for small-state security and it was keen that the UN respond to Thailand's request. But wariness of American heavy-handedness in approaching Indochina - in and out of the UN - was already evident. A clear preference for a genuine UN solution, free of the overtones of American interventionism, emerged in New Zealand's policy over the situation in Thailand and Indochina. New Zealand learned of the POC proposal on 20 May, and Munro reported the following day that New Zealand might be asked to serve on the sub-commission if the proposal was successful. New Zealand's reaction was therefore somewhat mixed. The New Zealand Delegation in Geneva reported a few days later that the Thai proposal would be widely perceived as a guise under which American intervention in Indochina could be initiated. On 1 June, Webb made his concerns clear to Munro:

I must say, however, that I am not altogether happy about the circumstances under which the Siamese appeal is to be made. I feel that the rush to get approval for the despatch of observation teams may be regarded with suspicion in many countries, including our own.... We must be careful not to do anything which might be

29 ibid.
Webb implied that to press ahead with the proposal would be unwise, as there appeared no direct threat to Thailand, and pressure could well bring the collapse of the Geneva negotiations. The following day a departmental paper, written by Wilson, advised that the proposed action was superfluous as Thailand faced no direct threat from the Vietminh. Wilson went on to state that the POC was 'not particularly well fitted to report on subversion', and that the proposal had 'been prejudiced by the knowledge that it is part of a "drill" inspired by the United States'. Concern was also clear from Webb at the haste with which the United States wanted the proposal to proceed. He doubted whether it was desirable, in view of the Geneva discussions, to extend the scope of the POC beyond the borders of Thailand. Webb remained convinced that nothing should be done which would prejudice the Geneva negotiations, or at least until France, the United Kingdom and the United States had actually reached agreement on the proposed procedure.

While these concerns remained evident, New Zealand still gave precedence to the fact that Thailand, as a small state believing itself to be threatened, had the right to request UN assistance. Webb was uncomfortable with the American profile in the proposal and the possible consequences for the Geneva negotiations, but he was not prepared to forego Thailand's right of appeal. If Thailand made an appeal to the Security Council, New Zealand would support it. In less than a month a request by Guatemala would be treated in precisely the same way. Despite its objections, Wilson's paper of 2 June showed a clear preference for the issue to go before the

---

33 ibid.
34 United Nations and South East Asia: Wilson to Shanahan, 2 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
35 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.151., 3 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
36 ibid.
37 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.155., 10 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
He stated explicitly that the Thai action constituted 'a legitimate request for the United Nations to perform a legitimate function'. New Zealand subsequently endorsed the Thai application to the Security Council.

On 29 May 1954 the Thais handed the Secretary-General a request for the Security Council to be convened with a view to despatching the POC subcommission to Thailand. This led to attention on how the Thai request would be presented and handled in the Security Council. The United States accepted a French plan to adopt the Thai item on to the Security Council agenda and then adjourn until the Geneva discussions had concluded. Although the United States was anxious to have the Thai issue discussed, they observed the need for delay for a short time at least. This was sufficient to effect a compromise. The Security Council met on the 3 June and adjourned as planned after adopting the Thai item.

Webb informed Munro on the day of the Council meeting that he was glad the United States had accepted the French proposal not to discuss the issue immediately. New Zealand officials were at Geneva watching the discussions closely, and it was felt in Wellington that all encouragement should be given to a solution to the problems in Indochina. UN action was not ruled out, but its precipitate use was considered potentially counter-productive and New Zealand approached this cautiously as a result. New Zealand did not want American heavy-handedness to destroy prospects for a peaceful solution and Webb was concerned that the United States might not hold to its agreement to hold back on the Thai issue for very long. He was also wary that the Soviet Union might use the adoption and adjournment procedure as a basis to accuse the Western powers of not taking the

40 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.169, 29 May 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
41 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.170, 1 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
42 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.151, 3 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
43 ibid.
problems of Thailand and Indochina seriously. This was an assumption Webb was keen to avoid and he soon became convinced of the need for a greater UN profile on the issue. For the moment, however, uppermost in Webb’s mind was the need for a genuine solution, either in or out of the UN, and to avoid superpower interference in this process.

Following the adjournment, discussions ensued as to the contents of the Thai resolution which would be put forward in the Security Council. It was accepted that the draft would call for a POC sub-commission and observers, but there were serious disagreements over the area in which the proposed POC team would be active. The United States was keen to get a resolution adopted which sanctioned the despatch of POC observers to the ‘general area of Thailand’, referring to Cambodia and Laos as well. The United States wanted to avoid another meeting of the Security Council and General Assembly when, rather than if, Cambodia and Laos made requests for POC observers. France and the United Kingdom opposed this line and Australian sources reported on 3 June that ‘there seemed no way of reconciling US with UK and French views on POC team’.

Webb’s view on this reflected the Anglo-French position, although he did suggest a compromise in his telegram to Munro on 3 June:

Rather than take issue with the Americans on this point I think it would be better to go right to the heart of the matter which, as I see it, is to decide whether, with regard to the present state of negotiations it is desirable to extend the scope of observation. As I stated in earlier messages this can only be decided in the light of developments at Geneva.

The American proposal was not rejected by New Zealand, but its acceptability was considered dependent on results obtained at Geneva. This was a reaction to the overtones of interventionism implicit in the American proposal and offered a means through which it was hoped they might be somewhat dissipated.

---

44 ibid.
46 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.42., 3 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
Despite the tactful approach to the situation suggested by Webb, Munro was instructed to inform the Americans that New Zealand wanted to 'avoid creating the impression that the complaint by Thailand is only a subterfuge'.

Two days after the Security Council met, Dulles called Munro and Australian Ambassador Percy Spender, to a meeting at which he expressed concern that the Chinese might intervene in Indochina, and proposed an 'agreed minute', outlining the West's intention to react forcefully in that event. This was a reincarnation of the initial united action proposal earlier in the year, although encompassing merely a threat to intervene rather than an actual intervention. Munro did not make any immediate comment and subsequently relayed the proposal to Wellington. He did, however, press Dulles on the issue of Thailand's request, putting forward Webb's concerns that haste might have detrimental effects on the Geneva discussions.

Dulles expressed no desire to damage the prospects of a solution at Geneva, but reiterated that he wanted a resolution which provided the basis for POC deployment over a broad area encompassing Indochina as well as Thailand. France and the United Kingdom would not accept this idea and the differences between them and the United States rumbled on.

On 10 June Webb sent a telegram to Munro expressing alarm at continuing Anglo-American disagreements. Webb emphasized that any Security Council meeting should be delayed until differences had been overcome and agreement reached on the text of the draft-resolution to be put forward. Webb went on to

---

47 MEA Wellington, NZPRUN, New York, No.151., 3 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
49 ibid.
50 ibid.
51 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.177., 8 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
52 MEA, Wellington, NZPRUN, New York, No.155., 10 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
53 ibid.
reiterate New Zealand policy on the issue:

We consider that [the] Thai appeal is a legitimate request for [the] United Nations to perform what is a proper United Nations function. In carrying out their task, observers sent to Thailand to report the facts of the situation must obviously pay very close attention to developments in neighbouring states and especially in Laos and Cambodia... It seems to us, however, that a decision to extend the scope of observation must depend largely on the course of events at Geneva.54

The American proposal for a broader area of POC concern was acceptable only in the longer term, if conditions were appropriate. But for the meantime the use of the UN as a cover for a United States intervention in Indochina was something New Zealand clearly wanted to avoid. Webb began to look around for other means of successfully utilizing UN machinery in pursuit of a genuine solution. While he did not want to interfere with the Geneva discussions, Webb began to consider wider UN involvement and instructed Munro to find out if other countries were considering General Assembly discussion of the situation in Indochina.55 ‘While we are not suggesting that this course would necessarily be desirable’, wrote Webb, ‘it would certainly satisfy a large section of public opinion which feels that the United Nations is in some way shirking its responsibility in not discussing a situation which could lead to war’.56 In Webb’s mind also was the hope that such action would head off the continuing American tendency to favour a more direct form of action in Indochina.

Despite Webb’s desire for delay, the Security Council met five days later on 15 June and a draft-resolution was put forward calling for a POC sub-commission to be deployed in Thailand. Despite concerns of American intervention, New Zealand co-sponsored the draft in the Security Council. Munro subsequently argued in favour of it giving reasons for support which encased concern for specific regional, and

54 ibid.

55 ibid.

56 ibid.
general small-state, security:

Tension in the general area of Thailand [is a] matter of great concern to New Zealand and all peoples of the Pacific. New Zealand as a small country itself attaches the highest importance to the right of other small countries to invoke the support and assistance of the international community as a whole when they believe their security to be threatened.57

The Security Council reconvened on 16 and 18 June to discuss the Thai request, but debate ended, as had been predicted, with a Soviet veto on 18 June. According to prior American tactics, the next move was to invoke a special session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution and to create the POC sub-commission for Thailand. But disagreements continued among France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The French Government did not want any General Assembly discussion until August, after the Geneva Conference had concluded. The United States, on the other hand, was keen to keep the momentum going.58 Thailand decided on a contingency which straddled both points of view. It proposed to initiate General Assembly proceedings in August if agreement was reached in Geneva. If not, an earlier date in July would be sought.59 The Thai Delegation informed the Secretary-General of these intentions.60

As the Thai request was being discussed in the Security Council on 16 June 1954, possible appeals by Cambodia and Laos were already being considered.61 These were not being canvassed as follow-up requests, but advanced as entirely separate appeals.62 This avenue offered a possible way around the problem the Thai

60 Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Eighth Regular Session: Item Proposed by Thailand, A/2665., 7 July 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
62 ibid.
request was having, that of being seen as a cover for American intervention. Webb expounded the ‘principal advantages’ of a separate Cambodian/Laotian appeal to Munro on 16 June, that

it is not so much open to the suspicion of being dragged in by the heels and that it offers the United Nations the possibility in a less complicated way of direct action in Indo China should this become necessary, and that it may be more likely to command some degree of support from the independent Asian Powers.63

Webb’s enthusiasm for the Cambodian/Laotian appeal continued to increase. Such an appeal, he felt, avoided the ‘back door method’ implicit in the Thai initiative. Since aggression by the Vietminh had actually taken place in both Cambodia and Laos, Webb felt the circumstances of such an appeal were more favourable to a UN initiative.64 It had been decided in New Zealand that any Cambodian/Laotian request for assistance should take precedence over the Thai appeal and Webb instructed Munro to show restraint when speaking on the latter.65 It was realized by Webb that a Cambodian/Laotian appeal, free of the overtones still attached to the Thai request, would offer more appropriate conditions for a full statement of New Zealand policy on Indochina.66 The proposed agreed minute was also a major influence on New Zealand policy. Webb’s cautious approach to fuller General Assembly discussion of Indochina on 10 June had developed significantly a week later. By 17 June Webb was less disturbed by the possibility that Assembly debate on Vietnam would be difficult and was endorsing full UN discussion on Indochina once the Geneva Conference had concluded.67

Webb’s clear support for the Cambodian/Laotian appeal, did not mean Thailand became irrelevant. Thailand’s request for a POC sub-commission continued

---

63 ibid.

64 MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, Canberra, No.130., 17 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

65 ibid.


67 MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, Canberra, No.130., 17 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
to be seen in New Zealand as a legitimate request for UN assistance by a small state. Overtones of American intervention or not, the Thais had a right to be heard and New Zealand therefore continued to support UN action on Thailand. However, other nations did not see the situation as the straightforward case that New Zealand did and the Cambodian/Laoian appeal ran into problems similar to those Thailand had had. The United Kingdom supported the idea, but the United States did not, and this disagreement stalled further action being taken.

While disagreements over the possible UN role in Indochina continued between the major Western powers, the Geneva Conference reached agreement on the future of Vietnam in July. British and French support for UN action on Indochina completely evaporated thereafter. At the end of July it was reported that Thailand had abandoned the action. But the Geneva agreement had not eliminated the existence of the Vietminh, nor stopped its activity in Indochina. Thailand was still concerned about the possibility of Vietminh insurgency and soon wanted the earlier POC proposal resurrected, albeit in a modified form. In mid-August the Thai Delegation proposed that its complaint be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly meeting, in which it was planned to request the formation of a POC sub-commission which would sit in New York. This would allow it to be quickly deployed if Vietminh infiltration occurred, without having to invoke meetings of the Security Council or General Assembly. By the sub-commission remaining in New York, Thailand hoped that it would not undermine the Geneva agreement. The United States was supportive, as was New Zealand, but France and the United Kingdom were not, and once again nothing came of Thai efforts.

With the end of Security Council proceedings, and the successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference, came the end of UN initiatives aimed at the solving

69 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.239., 17 August 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
70 NZAmb, Washington to MEA, Wellington, No.319., 17 August 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
71 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.239., 17 August 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
problems in Thailand and Indochina. The Thai request was vetoed and subsequent attempts to bring it to the General Assembly were unsuccessful. The Cambodian/Lao issue was not brought before the Security Council. With these issues now out of the UN, and resolved for the meantime, New Zealand policy on Indochina did not develop further. There were clear indications, however, that New Zealand was prepared to follow through with its policy of supporting both Thai and Cambodian/Lao requests for POC sub-commissions and observers. As a member of the POC, any deployment of sub-commissions and observers under its auspices would have directly involved New Zealand. This did not deter New Zealand from co-sponsoring the Thai draft, nor did it prevent an enthusiastic reaction to the Cambodian/Lao appeal. The possibility of UN action in Indochina was encouraged by New Zealand and did not meet the staunch rejection that the united action proposal had.

The possibility of New Zealand’s inclusion in the POC sub-commission was raised soon after Thai plans to approach the UN surfaced and brought with them a number of problems. As well as the sub-commission requiring a representative, there was a need for observer groups made up of ‘vigorous and adaptable personnel’ to carry out observation duties in remote parts of Thailand.72 Webb admitted late in May that there would be difficulties in finding a representative for the sub-commission and military observers for the teams to be deployed in Thailand.73

Munro immediately made clear that he supported New Zealand’s participation in the POC sub-commission - ‘it would, in my opinion, be most inadvisable for us to decline this responsibility’.74 Despite his awareness of the problems, Webb sympathized with Munro, acknowledging that, as a member of both the Security Council and the POC, New Zealand ‘had a special responsibility’.75 Webb was

---

75 MEA, Wellington, to NZAmb, No.135., 26 May 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
scheduled to discuss New Zealand's possible participation on the sub-commission with Holland on, or soon after, 26 May. The results of this discussion are not known, but subsequent events suggested that it was unlikely Holland had opposed participation. New Zealand co-sponsorship of the Thai draft-resolution in the Security Council would have made it difficult to decline participation. This was an issue prior to Security Council action being taken and would inevitably have been a consideration in the decision to co-sponsor. Webb's growing enthusiasm for wider UN discussions, and particularly the prospective Cambodian/Lao appeal for a sub-commission, also implied that Holland was not preventing a strong New Zealand profile on Indochina. Australia's indication on 10 June that it would support New Zealand's membership of the POC sub-commission suggests that New Zealand was actively seeking membership of it.

The problems in Indochina, from the American proposal for united action in April 1954, to the final abandonment of UN action in August, demonstrated the underlying concerns in New Zealand security policy at that time. New Zealand was distinctly uncomfortable with prospects of embroilment in Asian problems outside the UN. American proposals for intervention in Indochina had wide implications for Pacific security, possibly provoking China to intervene in Southeast Asia. Even if this did not occur, the American united action plan could easily have led to New Zealand's involvement in a militarily and politically unsustainable war in Asia. New Zealand's objective was clearly to avoid such commitments. In contrast to the united action proposal and subsequent agreed minute, New Zealand was not reluctant to involve itself in initiatives within the UN aimed at solving the same, or similar, problems. New Zealand security was perceived to be directly affected by events in Asia and conflict in the region was a major concern. The UN was the organization through which New Zealand perceived its regional security most enhanced.

New Zealand's general security was also at issue. Events in Burma in 1953-4

76 ibid.

77 NZHC, Canberra, to MEA, Wellington, No.137., 10 June 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
and 1956 and in Guatemala at the same time as the Indochinese crisis, all saw a strong New Zealand concern for the UN's role in small-state security. New Zealand did not have a great deal in common with American policy over Indochina, opposing direct intervention and remaining unimpressed by the manipulation of UN machinery to effect something similar. But the fact that Thailand had made an appeal to the Security Council for assistance had a tremendous influence on New Zealand's position. It was a legitimate request for a legitimate UN function by a small state, and the UN had to react if it was to be a reliable security provider. Despite overtones of American interventionism, New Zealand was determined to endorse UN action and prepared to be involved in that action through the proposed POC sub-commission.

The United Nations had not become the potent collective security instrument Fraser had envisaged in 1945, but the UN's importance to New Zealand as an organization through which small-state security was to be achieved had not declined. Ten years after the UN was formed, New Zealand continued to see the UN as a body which could enhance small-state security and this was still a major influence in the formation of its security policy.
The Sino-American stand-off over Formosa and a number of the islands off the coast of mainland China in 1954-55 revisited many of the problems New Zealand had faced with Indochina. The state of Anglo-American relations remained a serious concern to New Zealand. Initially it seemed the Offshore Islands Crisis might offer some common ground between the United Kingdom and the United States, but this prospect waned early and the relationship remained difficult. As the Crisis developed, the United States preparedness to confront China, with atomic weapons if necessary, became increasingly apparent. China proved equally forthright in standing up to the United States and the situation presented a major security dilemma for the Pacific region. New Zealand reacted to this in a fashion characteristic of its approach to international affairs in the 1950s. It sought to avert what could have become a serious conflagration, and a threat to regional security, through the United Nations.

The Offshore Islands Crisis was a drawn-out dispute beginning in September 1954 and not ending until May 1955. Attempts to solve it were frustrated by the immense differences between the major powers. As a Security Council member, New Zealand was involved early, in an attempt to bring about the cessation of hostilities. This initiative proved to be, as the Crisis itself did, tremendously difficult and prolonged. New Zealand's motives and objectives in tackling such a herculean problem changed over time. Of concern was the Anglo-American relationship, the role of ANZUS, the implications for regional security involved in the loss of Formosa and, above all, the ever-present prospect of a world war unless the Crisis was resolved. These problems led to a strong commitment by New Zealand to a UN solution.
Following the Communist victory on mainland China in 1949, large numbers of Nationalists fled to the safety of the islands off the Pacific coast of China. With the exception of Formosa and the Pescadores, these islands were extremely close to mainland China - many of them within artillery range. This migration coincided with growing concerns in Washington about the continued defence of American interests in the Pacific against the new threat posed by Communist China.¹ In something of a volte face from policy prior to 1950, the maintenance of the Nationalist position in Formosa came to be seen by the United States as a necessity, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War. On 27 June 1950, two days after the North Korean invasion of the South, President Truman issued a directive placing Formosa and the Pescadores under the protection of the American Seventh Fleet;² the islands closer to the Chinese coast were not included.

This directive was revoked in 1953 by Truman’s successor, President Dwight Eisenhower.³ Early in 1953, with Communist China refusing to cooperate in Korean peace-talks, Eisenhower threatened to widen the theatre of operations and even to use atomic weapons. The United States sanctioned bombing raids by Nationalist forces against the Chinese mainland as a means of applying pressure on Peking.⁴ Communist Chinese representatives returned to negotiations, and in July the Korean War ended.

Eisenhower’s approach to the Korean War had lasting implications. The policy of brinkmanship, backed up with the threat of nuclear attack, became regarded by Washington as a proven diplomatic tactic in its approach to Communist China. The American determination to contain Communism also meant that the

strategic importance of Formosa, as part of a Pacific island chain of non-Communist nations, remained critical. This chain was considered by the United States as beginning with the Aleutian Islands and comprising Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. Any threat to Formosa was, therefore, perceived in the United States as affecting Japan and other 'free' Asian and Pacific nations. The importance of not abandoning Formosa, lest it lead to a collapse of general Asian 'resistance' to Communism, was a strong factor in American thinking. American public opinion became increasingly antagonistic to Communist China throughout 1954, and the retention of Formosa in Nationalist hands became a political necessity. By the end of 1954, the Eisenhower Administration risked losing ground politically if the Nationalist Chinese lost control of the strategically insignificant Offshore Islands.

The use of the Nationalist forces as a pressure point by the United States highlighted the security risk the Offshore Islands presented to Communist China. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Government, had at one stage confided to Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, his fear that the Nationalists would invade the mainland with American support. Nationalist troops had carried out incursions into China from Burma in 1951 and the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek openly proclaimed the reconquest of the mainland as his objective. It became imperative, in China's view, that the Nationalist presence in the islands be extinguished, and by the end of 1954 preparations to do that were well advanced.

Meanwhile, following the failure to gain the support of its main allies over Indochina, the United States undertook diplomatic initiatives toward what was to become the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty. The idea had been first mooted by Dulles in April 1954, and had subsequently been accepted by the United Kingdom. During May and June problems in Indochina had highlighted massive

---

6 Woodard, p.250.
7 ibid, p.250.
differences, in approach to Southeast Asia, between Commonwealth nations and the United States. In June the Guatemalan issue exacerbated the already tender American-Commonwealth relationship. In order that similar differences would not re-emerge in the future, the United States sought SEACDT as a planning organization to formulate a coordinated strategy for dealing with Communist threats in Southeast Asia. In the first week of September 1954 the prospective SEACDT powers met in Manila. China began shelling the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy in the same week. On 8 September SEACDT was signed, by which time the Offshore Islands Crisis had begun.

Following the conclusion of SEACDT, Dulles left for Formosa, where he secretly discussed with the Nationalist Chinese leadership the possibility of a Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) between Formosa and the United States. The hostilities around Quemoy had awakened fears of an imminent Communist Chinese invasion of Formosa, a threat the United States had declared it would resist. While the defence of Formosa was relatively straightforward, Dulles was not enthusiastic about embracing the defence of the Offshore Islands as well, and he conceived a plan for dealing with them through the UN instead. As hostilities between Quemoy and the mainland continued, he decided on a Security Council initiative aimed at bringing about a cease-fire in the area around Quemoy. It was hoped this would effectively neutralize the Offshore Islands while, for the meantime at least, leaving them in Nationalist hands. The conclusion of the MDT with Formosa would be an entirely separate operation. The United States National Security Council met and approved the plan on 12 September 1954.

The SEACDT discussions in Manila were the major focus of New Zealand's diplomatic activity during September. While Wellington knew of the hostilities

---

8 ibid, p.244.
10 ibid.
11 Woodard, p.244.
around Quemoy, officials appear not to have perceived a world crisis looming. New Zealand was aware also that Dulles would proceed from Manila to Formosa after the SEACDT discussions concluded. His plans to discuss a mutual defence arrangement with Formosa were not known, however, and New Zealand had no knowledge of the planned Security Council initiative until the end of September.

It was during a meeting at Anthony Eden's residence in London on 29 September, to which Frank Corner, deputy High Commissioner in London, and one other officer were called, that Dulles, with Eden's support, made New Zealand aware of his plan. The intention was to secure a Security Council resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities in the area of Quemoy. Corner was told to relay to Wellington a joint Anglo-American request that New Zealand initiate Security Council proceedings. The expectation was that New Zealand would put forward the necessary draft-resolution calling for a cease-fire. It had been agreed by Eden and Dulles that New Zealand was in the best position to initiate the action. It was a Security Council member and, by virtue of its location in the Pacific, was concerned for the security of the area.

This meeting provided the first opportunity since hostilities began for New Zealand to gain an insight into American thinking. The islands of Quemoy and Tachen were considered by United States strategists as essential to the defence of Formosa. Moreover, it was considered that any Communist Chinese attack on these islands would be a prelude to an invasion of Formosa. This claim was given

---

13 ibid.
16 ibid.
18 ibid.
credence by Communist China openly declaring its intention to invade. Consequently, in formulating contingency plans for the defence of Formosa, American defence chiefs had requested authorization to participate in the defence of the Offshore Islands as well. The full implications of this were made plain by Dulles himself, who pointed out that such an undertaking would involve American attacks on Chinese invasion forces and the Chinese mainland. The result would almost inevitably have been a general Sino-American war. Dulles, however, insisted that the United States did not want to provoke a conflict, but instead a cease-fire and a complete pacification of the region. Dulles’ policy was fully endorsed by Eden.

The emphasis in New Zealand diplomatic communications the following day lay on the sudden and rather surprising revelation that Anglo-American thinking was in accord. New Zealand had, by this time, been on the Security Council for eight months, a period dominated by strained Anglo-American relations. Now American and British minds appeared at last to have met and the possibilities seemed boundless. ‘New Zealand could be responsible for initiating a new stage in Far Eastern, and even wider, affairs’, wrote Corner on 30 September. Webb responded enthusiastically to the proposal, and enlisted Holland’s support quickly. Holland appeared determined that ‘the opportunity of playing a constructive role in furthering joint United States/United Kingdom policy in the Far Eastern area’ should not be passed up. McIntosh noted frankly a month later that Holland had hoped New Zealand ‘could take a bow on the world stage’, such as

---

19 ibid.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
23 McIntosh to Shanahan, 6 October 1954, McIntosh Papers.
the Prime Minister's anticipation of success.26

New Zealand's swift initial agreement to become involved in the Formosa issue was made, it seems, on the basis of national prestige. New Zealand would be seen as having facilitated a degree of Anglo-American détente which had so far been non-existent. The New Zealand Government would soon be facing a general election and such a success on the international scene was noted on more than one occasion to be electorally beneficial.27 It was reported by Comer that the United States could go to war if tension remained high over the Offshore Islands, and that atomic weapons might be involved in that event.28 But American policy expressed by Dulles in London had appeared remarkably moderate. It seemed clear that the United States did not want war and that Dulles had specifically enlisted Eden's assistance to prevent such an occurrence.

However, New Zealand's swift initial concurrence with Dulles' request masked strongly divided opinions in Wellington over what should be done about Formosa and the Offshore Islands. In days following the decision these surfaced and had a sobering effect on policy formation. Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, J.V. Wilson, was troubled by the request and aghast to learn that McIntosh, at Webb's instructions, had told the United Kingdom of New Zealand's willingness to acquiesce.29 Wilson quickly made his views plain to Webb, warning that 'we might be taken too readily as stooges' and 'be torn limb from limb' when the 'inevitable' Anglo-American 'misunderstanding' occurred.30 This immediately made an impression on Webb, who instructed Wilson to draft a telegram to Munro containing

26 McIntosh to Shanahan, No.54/3., 4 November 1954, McIntosh Papers.
27 Draft telegram, MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, Unnumbered, 29 September 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 1; McIntosh to Shanahan, No.54/3., 4 November 1954, McIntosh Papers.
29 McIntosh to Shanahan, 6 October 1954, McIntosh Papers.
30 ibid.
these concerns. Munro was duly informed of Webb’s concern that New Zealand maintain ‘an open mind on the issue’ and not create the impression that ‘we subordinate our judgement to others’. Finally Webb indicated that no draft-resolution would be submitted and that New Zealand would only go as far as initiating Security Council discussion.

This was significant change to the role New Zealand had agreed to only days before and it prompted a protest from the High Commission in London, which reported that the British Government had hoped New Zealand ‘would be willing to do more than merely initiate debate’. Webb indicated a few days later that he had always intended that New Zealand would put a resolution forward, but that he had concerns over ‘form, content and timing’.

Webb had outlined these concerns to Munro on 2 October. He accepted the strategic importance of Formosa to the security of the United States and acknowledged that the political impact of other Nationalist-held islands falling into Communist hands would be serious. However, Webb had doubts about the strategic value of those other islands, including Quemoy, and questioned the propriety of defending them. From the outset, then, American defence concerns did not influence New Zealand policy toward the Crisis.

Webb was far more concerned with what he recognized as ‘great potential

---

31 ibid.
33 ibid.
38 ibid.
dangers' existing in the Offshore Islands. He observed that the possibility of a Communist Chinese offensive against the islands, and United States involvement in their defence, could lead to a serious conflict. He felt that the maintenance of the status quo was the simplest solution to the problem, but as this would be disadvantageous to Communist China, some form of quid pro quo would be required from the Nationalist Government. Webb instructed Munro to seek from the United States, its opinion on the likelihood of gaining concessions from Nationalist China. He indicated further that he was prepared to initiate action in the Security Council on the grounds that 'we consider it quite legitimate for New Zealand...to bring before the Council a situation which all observers agree could become explosive'. But he qualified this, by warning that New Zealand would not do so without a clear objective in mind.

Only days after accepting the American request, therefore, New Zealand policy had significantly departed from that of the United States. New Zealand desired a long-term settlement, and for this to be achieved through the UN. While United States favoured UN action, it was not prepared to contemplate a general settlement. Moreover, concern about a general conflict arising in the Pacific had displaced the earlier pre-occupation with national prestige, although this was not immediately lost sight of.

On 2 October Munro was already attempting to clarify American policy. In a meeting with State Department representatives, he was informed that the United

39 ibid.
40 ibid.
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
States wanted the initiative ready by November. But Munro could not get them to shed more light on their ultimate intentions. Dulles, Munro learned, was already starting to have doubts about the whole idea. American policy very suddenly appeared uncertain and fluid, and was beginning to lose the moderation so apparent only days before. Pending American elections remained a factor - the desire to avoid war over the Offshore Islands was not necessarily compatible with public expectations on confronting Communism. State Department officials believed the Crisis would eventually pass and had considerable confidence in the United States ability to deter China from an aggressive policy toward Formosa. This confidence in deterrence had a particularly ominous tone - it was pointed out by Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, that the principal deterrent 'was that the Chinese Communists did not know what the United States would do in certain circumstances' - an uncertainty which, he admitted, was shared by the United States itself. This uncertainty in American policy reinforced Webb's concerns about the possibility of conflict. Dulles's moderate tone, and desire to avoid war on 29 September, had, only days later, become a policy of brinkmanship which seemed to increase the possibility of war.

The spectre of United States uncertainty had declined somewhat a week later, but this only precipitated new problems. Munro reported on 6 October that Dulles's doubts had been allayed. The following day, State Department officials proposed the formulation of an 'agreed minute' to be accepted by New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States as the declared intention of their action. The agreed

45 NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.383., 2 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1. A Department of External Affairs summary (see below) stated that at one stage the United States had planned to have proceedings initiated on 14 October, but British unease over the MDT led to this date being abandoned. The MDT did cause British support to dissolve. However, New Zealand did not know of the MDT until 14 October and there is no other evidence indicating that the Security Council initiative was due to go ahead on that day. Chinese Off-Shore Islands - Summary of Recent Developments, 6 December 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.


47 ibid.

minute included an undertaking that the Security Council initiative was to apply to the attainment of an immediate cease-fire around Quemoy alone. The initiative would not involve Formosa and would not be aimed at a general settlement of the Offshore Islands Crisis.49

The origin of this was United States concern about Nationalist China's position on the Security Council. Nationalist China feared that discussion of the Offshore Islands Crisis might provoke Assembly attention on the future status of Formosa itself.50 With a permanent seat on the Security Council, the Nationalist Chinese Representative could veto any resolution likely to damage his country's position. The agreed minute, restricting the scope of the New Zealand initiative, was an attempt by the United States to placate Nationalist China and prevent its veto. The minute was also designed to lessen the risk of Security Council discussion straying onto the issue of Communist China's admission to the UN, a prospect both the United States and Nationalist China were determined to avoid.

Webb did not object to the existence of the minute, considering it less important than the actual text of the draft-resolution.51 But he was not happy with the focus of the Security Council initiative being narrowed to hostilities around Quemoy.52 He asserted the need for a time-limit to be incorporated into it, allowing further action oriented more toward a general settlement if conditions subsequently proved conducive.53 The United States opposed any time-limit, but did alter the text of the minute, making clear that Security Council action on the Offshore Islands issue would not prevent a wider solution to the problem in the future.54

53 ibid.
Webb was, by this time, extremely concerned about the future of the proposed initiative. The agreed minute had evoked a less than enthusiastic response from Eden (whose objections had also led to alterations) and fears that New Zealand might be caught in an Anglo-American wrangle proliferated in Wellington. Webb and McIntosh expressed concerns that the initiative might become entirely governed by the United States and that New Zealand’s objective of a wider settlement might be completely subverted. Webb warned Munro repeatedly that New Zealand ‘must avoid the appearance of merely acting as an agent on this issue’. He was aware that acting within the constraints imposed by the United States might be perceived publicly as being unduly deferential to it. Webb was not motivated by United States concerns.

Webb’s determination to proceed with Security Council action extended from his increasing anxiety about general security in the Pacific. In a telegram to Eden on 10 October, Webb admitted that he was apprehensive about Security Council action, but that he was ‘more concerned over the prospect of Quemoy becoming a second Serajevo’, sparking off a world war. ‘That particular risk’, Webb noted, should be addressed even if it ‘exacerbated Anglo-American disharmony’. The desire to create a more coordinated Anglo-American approach to East Asia had been a key New Zealand concern initially, but by 10 October even this was subordinated to the more urgent problem of diffusing the Crisis.

Despite the agreed minute, Nationalist China was still opposed to Security Council action, and the United States was forced to go further. On 14 October New Zealand learned of the proposed Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and Formosa. The United States had been considering the MDT for some time,


57 ibid.

but the need to win Nationalist China's support in the Security Council gave fresh impetus to the idea.  

During a further meeting with Dulles on 15 October, Munro learned of the American intention to go ahead with the MDT regardless of the result of the Security Council initiative. This revelation caused some hesitation in Wellington and, probably aware of this, Dulles revealed further disturbing news. Should the New Zealand initiative fail, or not eventuate, an extension of the MDT to include other Offshore Islands would become a distinct possibility.

It also became evident that what was initially intended as two separate initiatives - action on the Offshore Islands Crisis in the UN, and a defence treaty with Formosa outside the UN - were in fact being merged into a single operation. Dulles' thoughts had gradually 'crystallised' as October progressed and he had decided eventually on 'dovetailing' the two. By 22 October Webb was confronted with the problem - should he decide to proceed - of acting in the Security Council within days of a formal announcement of the MDT. Such a prospect immediately placed the integrity of the Security Council initiative in jeopardy, making it appear a ploy by the United States to retain control of the Offshore Islands rather than a genuine attempt at peace. At the same time, the prospect of war continued to increase, and Webb perceived an urgent need for a genuine solution.

---


60 In discussions with Munro on 18 October Dulles denied that the MDT was a 'bribe' for Nationalist support, see NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.416., 18 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1. The Nationalists, however, stated they would not agree to Council action unless the MDT was concluded, see MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, Canberra, No.230., 26 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1.


The MDT issue alarmed Munro. On 15 October he pressed on Webb the significance of the strategic situation and the impetus it gave (or in Munro’s view should have given) to New Zealand policy. The MDT, argued Munro, merely formalized what was already an established part of American policy - the United States would defend Formosa against attack. He insisted that ‘the strategic line running from Japan to New Zealand’ should be guarded. But Munro was particularly disturbed by the American intention to extend the MDT beyond Formosa, and repeatedly warned of the consequences. He insisted that ‘it was not in New Zealand’s interests to have [the] United States involved in a rigid guarantee of the islands’. Munro predicted not only general war in such an event, but New Zealand’s possible involvement in it - ‘if the Communists attacked Quemoy and the Americans intervened the ANZUS countries would then have to face the question of their own involvement’. In Munro’s view, time was of the essence; New Zealand had to take the initiative in the UN in order to head off American moves outside the UN which could lead to a serious deterioration.

In a later telegram on the same day, Munro reiterated his reasons for wanting New Zealand to act. He identified Formosa as critical to Pacific security, particularly that of Australia and New Zealand, and warned of the ‘grave risk that if we do nothing [the] position will deteriorate into widespread hostilities involving [the] United States and possibly also ourselves’.

Webb agreed with the need for urgency to prevent the United States taking action which might cause the Crisis to worsen and create regional security problems.

---

66 ibid.
68 ibid.
70 ibid.
for New Zealand. But the revelation of the proposed MDT had shattered the fragile Anglo-American agreement over Security Council action on the issue. The United Kingdom had completely reviewed its approach to the situation in the Offshore Islands and now opposed Security Council action.\textsuperscript{71} The Foreign Office drew a strong distinction between an American policy to protect Formosa and a formal treaty commitment to do the same.\textsuperscript{72} Policies could be changed, but formal treaty commitments could not, and the latter would leave a new and permanent factor in the Offshore Islands Crisis.\textsuperscript{73} That new factor would be a definite obstacle to a more general settlement.

Webb’s position was similar. During a meeting with Dulles on 18 October, Munro was told that American policy on Formosa had not changed - the United States would not allow the Communists to take control of Formosa and the Pescadores.\textsuperscript{74} Munro indicated ‘that New Zealand also was not prepared to see this happen’.\textsuperscript{75} Webb strongly objected to Munro having said this, and issued instructions that the impression given by the latter’s statement was to be corrected. Webb’s memorandum concerning this carefully spelled out his position:

Whilst we do not want to see Formosa and the Pescadores fall to the Communists. I do not think we should go the length of saying we are “not prepared to see this happen.” In my view, this implies that we would actively oppose any attempt by the Communists to gain possession of these islands, and I, myself, would not take the responsibility of committing the Government so far.\textsuperscript{76}


\textsuperscript{73} ibid.


\textsuperscript{75} ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, [from Webb], 20 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1. In the memorandum Webb also stated that neither the Prime Minister or the Government would accept Munro’s statement.
Despite the clear American desire to proceed, Webb was not prepared to act without British support, although he was convinced of the need to take action in order to dampen down the Crisis. While he sympathized with much of the United Kingdom’s position, Webb was dismayed at its outright opposition to Security Council initiative. Webb remained conscious that the situation was serious and that New Zealand should ultimately proceed with its initiative. On 18 October Webb informed the United Kingdom that

Despite hesitations we believe that there may still be [some] advantage in pressing ahead with the operation. After all, the Security Council is only fulfilling its duty in taking cognizance of a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and in an explosive situation like Quemoy it would be failing in its duty if it did not attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities even if no immediate prospect of wider pacification opened up.\(^77\)

On 9 November, Webb reiterated his views to Eden. He saw the situation as serious and few alternatives to the action the Americans proposed:

the longer we allow the present situation to drift without doing anything to relieve the tension the greater is the risk of a most dangerous outcome... I still believe that, in the absence of any more promising proposal, we had better go ahead on the lines of our original intentions.\(^78\)

He was determined, however, not to be rushed into Security Council action without a clear and agreed objective in mind. Webb pressed Eden to overcome his differences with the United States, so that, without further delay, ‘an honest attempt to ease the pressure in a situation fraught with great danger’ could be made.\(^79\)

Webb had realized that any initiative would be doomed to fail if the Western allies were opposed to it from the start, and a failed Security Council draft could lead to more extreme American action. Preventing the United States from taking action likely to aggravate the Crisis had, by then, become a major New Zealand objective.


\(^{78}\) MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, No.1098., 9 November 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.

\(^{79}\) ibid.
Furthermore, elections were pending in both the United States and New Zealand and it was agreed by Holland and Webb that New Zealand should 'stand on the side lines' until the United Kingdom and the United States could work out their differences.\textsuperscript{80} A public display of Anglo-American disunity at election time was undesirable, especially so if it involved a New Zealand decision to back a United States initiative against the wishes of the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{81}

In the meantime the Crisis itself did not improve. The tempo of hostilities in the area grew in the first week of November. Discussions between Nationalist China and the United States, regarding the MDT, were made public on 5 November and this was not well received in Peking.\textsuperscript{82} Later that month the Communist Chinese authorities placed a number of United States Air Force pilots, captured during the Korean War, on public trial. This produced a wave of anti-Chinese feeling in the United States and contributed to the atmosphere of tension militating against any resolution of the problem.

Anglo-American differences rumbled on. The United Kingdom gradually became more sympathetic to the New Zealand position. It was felt essential in London to prevent American military involvement in the Offshore Islands,\textsuperscript{83} but the United Kingdom would not agree to support the Security Council initiative until the text of the MDT was made available. Australia announced its opposition to any Security Council action on 5 November,\textsuperscript{84} and when the text of the MDT did become available on 23 November, the United Kingdom did not respond positively. The Crisis was worsening, and New Zealand continued to perceive the need for a solution as urgent. Later in November the United States indicated it still desired

\textsuperscript{80} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.283., 16 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{81} ibid.

\textsuperscript{82} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.429., 5 November 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.

\textsuperscript{83} ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} Min. & Dept., Canberra, to AHC, Wellington, No.312., 5 November 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.
Security Council action and ominously declared that if New Zealand would not take a lead, 'someone else would'.

New Zealand's own position had become immensely complicated. The United States made it quite clear that they wanted the Security Council initiative to proceed, regardless of whether or not New Zealand would cooperate. Australia and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, saw no value in proceeding with the Security Council plan. Meanwhile a potentially explosive situation continued to exist off the coast of mainland China and the need to pacify the situation was perceived as urgent in Wellington. Further difficulties were posed by the looming general election in New Zealand and rising press criticism of American policy toward the Crisis. Over and above this, Webb was due to resign from politics and a new Minister of External Affairs, Thomas Macdonald, would be faced with the ever-increasing complexity of the Offshore Islands Crisis in December.

Webb had hitherto appreciated American strategic concerns inasmuch as they pertained to United States security, but was not convinced these related to New Zealand. This aspect of policy began to change under Macdonald and it gradually became accepted that these American strategic concerns were important to New Zealand as well. New Zealand had always seen the Crisis as a Pacific problem with severe regional implications. However, in 1954 New Zealand seemed not to have perceived the maintenance of Formosa in Nationalist China's hands as a security imperative. Webb's memorandum of 20 October 1954 revealed strong doubts about whether Communist control of Formosa would raise any real problems for New Zealand. Webb had always been suspicious of ANZUS and wary that New Zealand might be drawn into a conflict over Formosa by too close an association.

---


86 Memorandum for Official Secretary, NZHC, London, 10 November 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.

87 Memorandum for the Secretary of External Affairs, [from Webb], 20 October 1954, PM 264/3/2, Part 1. Earlier in the memorandum Webb had stated that neither the Prime Minister or the Government would accept Munro's statement.
with American strategic concerns. After Macdonald succeeded Webb, however, New Zealand policy attached more importance to the retention of Formosa in Nationalist (and therefore non-Communist) hands. In February 1955, Macdonald described Formosa in a press statement 'as a kind of Gibraltar in the Pacific'. This asserted an importance to Formosa which had previously been absent in New Zealand policy.

In April Macdonald informed the British Foreign Office that New Zealand had, indeed, accepted the strategic importance of Formosa. ‘We have never considered the Off-Shore Islands important,’ began Macdonald, explaining that New Zealand was primarily focused on an American disengagement from them. However, he pointed out that New Zealand’s position regarding Formosa was ‘quite different’. New Zealand now accepted the American belief that Communist China would not be satisfied with Formosa, and would continue to desire expansion. The loss of Formosa would therefore have serious implications for Pacific security. Macdonald considered that

The American decision to defend Formosa should, therefore, not be regarded as something which, though understandable, is unfortunate, because it could involve the rest of us, but as something which it may be essential for us to support even with military assistance if this should prove necessary.

This constituted an important development in New Zealand policy and reflected the new regional commitments which occurred in 1955. The Middle East contingency plan, in which New Zealand forces were maintained for rapid

---

88 McIntosh to Munro, 22 July 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6; McIntosh to Shanahan, 12 September 1953, McIntosh Papers.

89 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.67, 7 February 1955. PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.


91 ibid.

92 ibid.

93 ibid.
deployment to the Suez area, was abandoned. At the Commonwealth Prime
Minister's Conference in 1955, Australia and New Zealand agreed to orient their
defence focus to Southeast Asia. The Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR) was
established, with contingents from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
and was deployed in Malaya as part of a 'forward defence' strategy in the region in
line with SEATO.94 These forces were involved during 1955-60 in the Malayan
Emergency, a guerrilla war fought between the mainly Chinese Malayan
Communists and British and Malayan authorities.

But these developments did not make any significant impact on New
Zealand's approach to the Offshore Islands Crisis. The main lines of the policy
previously defined by Webb endured under Macdonald. The primary objective of
averting conflict did not change, and the realization that New Zealand might have to
accept obligations in a possible conflict did not mean any actual desire to do so.
Most significantly, the importance New Zealand placed on a UN solution to the
Crisis did not decline.

Macdonald's first contribution to the Offshore Islands issue came in the form
of a lengthy telegram to Eden on 1 December 1954, outlining New Zealand's views.
The telegram was an explicit statement of New Zealand's motives for pursuing
Security Council action, and had been approved by Cabinet before it was sent.95
'Our main preoccupation', the telegram stated, 'is to do what we can to help counter
developments which could result in the involvement of the Americans in a major
conflict with the Chinese'.96 Clearly the threat of war was foremost in Macdonald's
(Cabinet's) mind by December, and New Zealand was oriented chiefly towards
averting it. Additionally, New Zealand wanted to retain control of any initiative in
the Security Council, believing itself to be uniquely able to bring about a reasonable

94 Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy
95 Memorandum for MEA, 2 December 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.
solution. ‘It is possible and perhaps even probable that the question may be brought before the United Nations by somebody else with unexpected and possibly even embarrassing results.’ New Zealand felt that there was little alternative to the Security Council operation and that delay would damage its chances of success. The telegram yet again pressed the United Kingdom to overcome its differences with the United States.

This much was a restatement of previous New Zealand policy, but the telegram contained an important new development. With the conclusion and announcement of the MDT in December, the United States predicted that attacks by Communist China on the Offshore Islands might increase and had been considering stronger UN action in that event. The possibility of this was still under review in New Zealand on 6 December, but it made Wellington distinctly uncomfortable. Eden was told on 1 December that, in New Zealand’s view, the Offshore Islands Crisis was a conflict which should be seen in the context of the Chinese Civil War. This meant that New Zealand would not consider ‘belligerent action by either party, however much it may be deplored...[as] aggression of a kind necessarily demanding condemnation by the [Security] Council’. Munro was subsequently instructed to make this ‘explicitly’ clear to the United States.

In doing this, New Zealand clearly indicated that it saw the Offshore Islands Crisis in a profoundly different light from the United States. The context of civil war meant that UN action to defend the islands, or to maintain Nationalist control of them, was not a legitimate UN function and would constitute interference in

---

97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 Chinese Off-Shore Islands - Summary of Recent Developments, 6 December 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.
100 MEA, Wellington to NZHC, London, No.1191., 1 December 1954, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 5.
101 ibid.
102 ibid.
China’s domestic affairs. If possible, New Zealand wanted to prevent any Communist attack and had accepted the lead in the Security Council partially in order to prevent one. However, any condemnatory or collective action through the UN against a Communist Chinese attack would, in New Zealand’s view, be counter-productive to the objective of peace and would provoke rather than prevent war. New Zealand was prepared to accept the change of status of the Offshore Islands by force, if it served the objective of peace rather than war. Moreover, in New Zealand’s view, the UN should be used to resolve the Crisis, but not to further United States military objectives.

The new year brought significant changes in the Offshore Islands situation which eventually led to the operation being brought to the Security Council. Communist China had intensified its attacks early in January, capturing the island of Ichang. This prompted the United States to reassess its approach. It was eventually decided that the northern-lying Tachen group of islands could not feasibly be defended and, should therefore be evacuated. But this could not be done without some compensatory action to offset the likely adverse effect on Nationalist morale. The answer suggested was the extension of a provisional American defence guarantee to the island of Quemoy.

This alarmed both New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Any guarantee of Quemoy, provisional or otherwise, was seen in Wellington and London as being no temporary measure, despite American intentions. It was felt that once the United States extended such a guarantee it would be difficult to withdraw. It would essentially encase an extension of the MDT to Quemoy, an island which New Zealand and the United Kingdom considered an integral part of Communist China. Consequently, the extension of a guarantee would constitute American intervention in China regardless of whether military activity took place. This would understandably outrage China and possibly provoke a major confrontation between it and the United States. New Zealand had been anxious for some time to undertake action in the Security Council in order to lessen tension in the area and reduce the risk of such a confrontation occurring. The extension of a guarantee constituted
exactly what New Zealand was hoping to avoid and immediate hesitations began to surface in Wellington about the wisdom of proceeding with the Security Council initiative. Macdonald pointed out to Holland that the

basis of our earlier agreement to undertake the initiative (and also of the British support given to the project) was [the] desire to prevent [an] American commitment to defend [the] off-shore islands which might lead to hostilities against [the] mainland of Communist China. Dulles, in essence, presented us with [a] choice of unilateral action by [the] United States to defend [the] off-shore islands, or neutralization of [the] area through action in [the Security] Council. We now appear to be presented with [the] worst of both courses.\textsuperscript{103}

Macdonald recommended to Holland that the United States be told that New Zealand would have 'serious hesitations' about proceeding with the initiative.\textsuperscript{104} The United Kingdom, however, took a different line, indicating that it would be prepared to support Security Council action on the condition that the intended provisional guarantee was abandoned.\textsuperscript{105} Immediately the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States thawed, with the former withdrawing the idea of a provisional guarantee.\textsuperscript{106} Holland was at this time in the United States, on his way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London beginning on 31 January. He met Dulles on 21 January and was impressed with the new atmosphere.\textsuperscript{107} With initial concerns having been dissipated by the withdrawal of provisional guarantee proposal, Holland agreed that New Zealand would proceed with the Security Council initiative.\textsuperscript{108}

A working group was established to study the details of the Security Council

\textsuperscript{103} MEA, Wellington, to NZAmb, Washington, No.24., 21 January 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{104} ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.25., 21 January 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{106} CROSEC, London, to UKHC, Wellington, No.48., 22 January 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{107} CROSEC, London, to UKHC, Wellington, No.49., 22 January 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
\textsuperscript{108} ibid.
operation, which it had finalized, subject to the approval of the three governments, by 23 January.\textsuperscript{109} It was decided to call for a cease-fire in the Offshore Islands, and this was to be presented in terms which would make it difficult for either the Soviet Union to veto the proposal, or Nationalist China to refuse to cooperate.\textsuperscript{110} Communist China would also be invited to participate in Security Council discussions.\textsuperscript{111} It was initially considered by the British Ambassador in Peking, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, that there was a chance Communist Chinese representatives would attend discussions if invited.\textsuperscript{112}

However, complications arose almost immediately. On 24 January the American Congress formally gave President Eisenhower the power to use United States military forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the MDT.\textsuperscript{113} In Eisenhower’s address to Congress on the same day, his position concerning the Offshore Islands appeared vague, with the possibility of United States forces becoming engaged in their defence not being discounted.\textsuperscript{114} The following day, Trevelyan reported that the Chinese would not cooperate with the Security Council and were seeking separate discussions with the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{115} This prompted the United Kingdom to become somewhat lukewarm over the Security Council plan, but it remained supportive.

On 28 January Munro circulated a letter to all Security Council delegations,

\textsuperscript{109} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.34., 23 January 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{110} ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.33., 23 January 1954, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{113} Following Eisenhower’s Message to Congress, Holland issued a Press Statement describing the Message as ‘firm and unprovocative’. Holland went on to emphasise that New Zealand’s action in the Security Council arose from two areas, its membership of the Council and its status as a Pacific nation.


informing them of the planned initiative. The Security Council convened on 31 January 1955. Munro, on the last day of his presidency of the Council, introduced the item by emphasizing what had become New Zealand's foremost concerns:

My country, situated as it is in the Pacific Ocean, has a specific and inherent interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in that great region of the world. In these circumstances it seems to us incontrovertible that there exists a situation likely to endanger international peace and security. It seems equally incontrovertible, therefore, that this matter is within the province of the Security Council. I would go further: in our view, this problem is preeminently the kind of problem with which the Security Council is designed to deal. 116

The Council adopted the item on to its agenda, agreed to invite Communist Chinese representatives to attend the discussions, and adjourned until China replied. Munro did not table the New Zealand draft-resolution, the initial meeting being convened for preliminary discussion only and to invite Communist China.

However, Communist China rejected the offer and the problem for New Zealand became what to do next. The United Kingdom was reluctant to continue with Security Council action, fearing that if the New Zealand resolution was vetoed, the United States might attempt to invoke further (and stronger) UN measures. 117 The Australian position largely emulated that of the United Kingdom. 118 The United States was keen to press on with tabling the New Zealand resolution, always making it clear that if it was abandoned they would take the lead themselves. Munro supported the tabling of the New Zealand resolution, but without a vote being taken for some time. In this way, New Zealand could retain control of Security Council action, preventing the United States from putting forward a more extreme resolution.

By this time Holland was at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference

in London, where the situation in the Offshore Islands was a major point of discussion. Following the Chinese rejection of the invitation to attend Council discussions, Holland and the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers wanted a period of delay to allow the situation to settle down. Holland informed Munro on 4 February of his reluctance to table the New Zealand resolution. Further cause for reluctance came with the agreement that Nationalist Chinese forces would evacuate the Tachens, but not without American reassurances. A State Department press statement on 5 February declared that the United States would defend positions it considered necessary for the defence of Formosa. On the same day Munro warned Holland that the United States would defend Quemoy if they considered an attack on the island to be a prelude to an assault on Formosa, a warning that was repeated a few days later.

Holland remained unconvinced about proceeding in the Security Council, a position he stuck to despite repeated warnings from Munro about the American desire to take the initiative themselves. Holland told Macdonald that he was 'not so much concerned about the Americans introducing a more violent resolution', because he felt 'they would not have enough support'. Holland doubted also whether Communist China could actually launch an attack on Formosa from Quemoy. He told Munro on 6 February that New Zealand should not table the resolution, but rather seek a period in which the political atmosphere could cool. Holland did not want to risk an acrimonious Security Council debate which would not only dash hopes of New Zealand's success, but cause an atmosphere which would hinder any other attempts at peace. Like Munro, Holland realized the importance of


124 ibid.
maintaining control of the Security Council initiative and did not suggest that it should be abandoned. In the meantime, however, Holland doubted the wisdom of proceeding in the wake of the hostile Chinese reply and thought it better to wait until conditions were more conducive to success.

New Zealand and the United Kingdom were initially reluctant for the Security Council to meet again until conditions improved. An agreement was reached between the two and the United States to convene a Security Council meeting to consider the Chinese reply. The British and New Zealand objections to proceeding beyond this were eventually accepted by the United States. The Security Council met on 14 February; the Chinese reply was discussed, a Soviet counter-resolution was blocked and the issue was left. The New Zealand item remained on the Security Council's agenda for the rest of decade, but was not again discussed.

In the wake of the New Zealand decision to delay any action, a number of alternative attempts were made to solve the problem outside the UN. On 12 February the Soviets proposed a conference between themselves, Communist China, the United Kingdom and the United States and a number of Asian countries, but not Nationalist China. This did not find much favour with the United Kingdom or the United States. New Zealand felt it unreasonable to seek a solution without the Nationalists and was not enthusiastic about deliberately avoiding the UN. 'In view of our initiative and our policy of upholding always the United Nations', wrote Munro to Macdonald on 12 February, 'I would strongly prefer a conference to be at least

---

125 ibid.

126 ibid; MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.26., 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.


under the aegis of the United Nations'. Macdonald sympathized and, in issuing instructions concerning the Security Council meeting of 14 February, was quite explicit on the line New Zealand should take:

In any reference to the [proposed Soviet] conference we should, while endorsing the United Kingdom objections...maintain that the Security Council is capable of showing the necessary flexibility in the organisation of such discussions....

Subsequent New Zealand policy adhered closely to this line. The possibility of Security Council action was not ruled out by New Zealand, and Macdonald informed the United Kingdom that, while there was no intention to take such action immediately, the initiative was not being abandoned. About a week later Macdonald was considering the possibility of tabling the New Zealand draft in the Security Council as a forerunner to an attempted solution. In mid-April Macdonald put forward the idea of a UN resolution encasing a declaration on the importance of not changing the status of Formosa by force. In return for this, Nationalist forces would withdraw from the Offshore Islands.

The New Zealand plan was not well-received, although there was some Australian support. Nor was there much backing for the revival of the Security Council operation. At any rate, events overtook the many proposals which surfaced during March and April 1955. The conciliatory speech by the Chinese representative Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference in May signalled what was to

---

129 NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.48., 12 February 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
130 MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.28., 14 February 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
134 NZHC, Ottawa, to MEA, Wellington, No.41., 29 April 1955, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 6.
become a de facto cease-fire by the end of the month. Communist China ceased attacks on the Offshore Islands and the United States enlisted an agreement from the Nationalists not to attack the mainland without its approval. Despite attempts by India to act as an intermediary between China and United States, no more satisfactory solution to the Offshore Islands problem eventuated in 1955.

The dispute over the Offshore Islands in 1954-55 produced a major world crisis. New Zealand's initial reasons for involvement in an attempt to solve the Crisis were to facilitate closer Anglo-American relations and 'take a bow on the world stage'. These motives did not take into account the seriousness of the problem and, when this was realized, they were supplanted by an urgent need to prevent a general conflict and regional threat in the Pacific. The UN was perceived by New Zealand as the only organization offering any hope for a resolution of the Crisis. It was realized also, that having taken the initiative, New Zealand had to remain in control of it - to prevent the United States from taking more extreme measures and possibly provoking a war.

The gradual acceptance of American strategic assumptions about Formosa, which gave added significance to New Zealand's ANZUS connections, did not dilute the importance of a peaceful settlement of the problem or the UN's role in this process. While it was realized that New Zealand would need United States protection in time of war, this did not mean New Zealand subordinated itself to American policy objectives. The acceptance of Formosa as important to New Zealand came with a much tougher conviction that the Offshore Islands were not relevant. New Zealand resisted moves by the United States to take hasty action in the Security Council without British support and remained committed to a general solution to the problem. Moreover, New Zealand would not endorse possible United States attempts to use the UN to defend the Offshore Islands in the event of a Communist attack.

The Crisis itself, and in particular the United States willingness to go to war over the Offshore Islands, was seen in Wellington as a major security risk to New Zealand. It became imperative that the Crisis be resolved and that American
involvement in the Offshore Islands be prevented. The UN was perceived in New Zealand as the only organization offering anything toward either of these aims. The United States did attempt to manipulate New Zealand policy throughout, and placed constraints - the agreed minute and threats to take more extreme action - on the options available to New Zealand. But New Zealand policy was ultimately governed from Wellington, motivated by a desire to avert war and observant of the need to avoid hasty action, or action without adequate support. New Zealand resisted all attempts by the United States to hurry its initiative. In New Zealand’s view, the UN had been established to deal with such threats to the peace as the Offshore Islands Crisis posed; in line with its policy on Guatemala and Indochina, New Zealand pursued what it perceived as a legitimate UN function. The basic New Zealand objective of a pacific and general settlement remained unchanged during 1954-55, as did the conviction that the UN was the organization which had been purpose-built to solve major threats to international peace. Despite New Zealand’s growing number of regional associations by 1955, ANZAM, ANZUS, SEATO and the deployment of CSR, the UN remained a vital element in New Zealand’s pursuit of security.
Late in 1955 the United Nations finally decided to confront the issue of its own membership, which had been outstanding for nearly a decade. Under rules set down in Article 4 of the UN Charter, new members could be admitted through recommendation by the Security Council, followed by the General Assembly’s acceptance of that recommendation.\footnote{Appendix 1.} The qualifications for admission, also stipulated in Article 4, were relatively simple. A state had to be 'peace-loving' and prepared to accept, and able to carry out, the obligations imposed by the UN Charter.\footnote{Appendix 1.} The apparent simplicity of Article 4, however, did not make its application in practice a simple process. From 1946 until 1955 most nations applying for membership of the UN were unsuccessful. A number of states in the Soviet sphere of influence failed to get the requisite majority of seven affirmative votes in the Security Council. The Soviet Union, in turn, vetoed the admission of any state they considered to be pro-West in outlook. As a result, only nine new members joined the UN between 1946 and 1955, despite applications from some thirty nations.\footnote{The new members were Afghanistan (1946), Burma (1948), Iceland (1946), Indonesia (1950), Israel (1949), Pakistan (1947), Sweden (1946), Thailand (1946), and Yemen (1947). No new members were accepted between Indonesia’s entry in 1950 and the breaking of the deadlock late in 1955.}

The membership issue as such did not include the problem of the admission of Communist China to the UN. Nationalist Chinese representatives, occupying the Chinese seat in the General Assembly, and the Security Council since 1945, did not vacate it after their defeat by the Communists in 1949. The Nationalist Government on Formosa continued to claim that it was the legitimate Government of all China and occupied the UN seat accordingly until the 1970s.
After 1951 the Soviet Union annually proposed that Communist China be admitted to the UN. Cold War divisions between Communist and non-Communist countries, and particularly the United States policy of 'containment' of Communism, militated against the success of the proposal. Each year the United States, with the support of Allied powers including New Zealand, voted to postpone discussion, a policy which became known as the 'Moratorium' on China's admission. Peter Fraser was a staunch anti-Communist and he did not welcome the new regime in 1949. He felt recognition of the Communist regime would reward aggression and encourage Communism. His successor as Minister of External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, was also unimpressed. At the Colombo Conference in 1950, Doidge stated that New Zealand would not recognize Communist China. To do so could possibly encourage the United States to build up a strong Japan and that would prejudice the security interests of Australia and New Zealand. When Communist China intervened in the Korean War in 1950, New Zealand endorsed the UN condemnation of China as an aggressor, and Carl Berendsen, New Zealand's UN Representative, was a vocal critic of the Communist regime in China.

However, with Berendsen's and Doidge's retirements in 1951, New Zealand policy toward Communist China eased into the position which would typify it for the following twenty years. In principle, New Zealand would accept Communist China in the UN. Clifton Webb believed China's absence from the UN hindered the peace process in Korea, and had led to the drawn-out stalemate of the last two and half years of the war. Webb thus became converted to the necessity of China's admission and believed it essential if the international environment in the Far East was to improve. McIntosh noted Webb's support of China's admission to the UN in

---


7 ibid.
August 1953, and Munro complained in 1954 that during Assembly debate in the previous two years he had had great difficulty restraining Webb from openly endorsing Communist China’s admission to the UN. During the Geneva discussions over Korea and Indochina in 1954, Webb made a number of public remarks criticising the absence of Communist China from the UN and challenged Nationalist China’s claim of representing the mainland. The onset of the Offshore Islands Crisis prompted Webb, Holland and senior departmental officials to accept that China’s presence in the UN would aid the peace-process. In 1955 a meeting between Canadian and New Zealand representatives revealed that both countries supported China’s admission. This policy was maintained when Walter Nash became Prime Minister in 1957.

Ultimately, however, the United States would not move from its position of opposing China’s admission. It was recognized in 1955, during the Canadian/New Zealand discussions, that there was little point proceeding with any initiative aiming to allow China’s admission. A departmental briefing paper in 1958, under Nash, came to the same conclusion. The political atmosphere of the 1950s tended to militate against such a move. China’s intervention in Korea, support of the Vietminh in Vietnam, and position in the Offshore Islands Crises, meant that for large parts of the decade it was politically impossible for China to join the UN. China’s policy toward these issues was hotly criticized by New Zealand and, despite broadly accepting the necessity for China’s admission, Wellington realized that the time was not right for any such move. At any rate, China was quickly divorced from the general issue of the UN’s membership by the Moratorium policy and, for the most

---

8 McIntosh to Munro, 6 August 1953, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
9 Mr Webb’s Speech on the Admission of Communist China, July 1954, Munro Papers, MS 2230/6.
11 Note for File, 1955, Munro Papers, MS 2230/66.
13 ibid.
part, was not considered important in the resolution of the UN’s membership problems in the 1950s.

New Zealand’s approach to the membership question during the 1940s was strongly related to its policy on the veto. New Zealand joined the chorus of states frequently attacking the Soviet Union’s veto which prevented new members joining the UN, and it supported a number of General Assembly resolutions aimed at solving the problem. Despite the continuing deadlock, New Zealand’s profile on the membership issue did not decrease. After 1950 its role in the membership debate was enlarged significantly. In 1952-3 it participated in a special committee set up to study the membership issue and, late in 1955, New Zealand’s position on the Security Council placed it at the centre of efforts to break the deadlock.

For New Zealand the membership issue had always been one strongly related to concern for the UN’s prestige and universal authority in world affairs. It followed that the UN could not have a decisive role in world affairs unless all independent nations were members and were bound by its Charter. New Zealand’s position during the 1940s had been influenced by the desire to remove the veto power from the permanent members of the Security Council, thus increasing the organization’s effectiveness. The UN’s authority and prestige were enhanced by its claim to be a world organization aimed at obtaining a universal membership and, therefore, universal jurisdiction in peace and security issues. That authority and prestige was damaged when, in practice, applicants meeting the conditions specified in Article 4 were prevented from joining because of the Soviet Union’s veto. The Soviet Union’s insistence on a ‘package deal’, the en bloc admission of an agreed number of Eastern and Western bloc nations, was something for which no justification existed in the UN Charter and, therefore, its acceptance was considered likely to harm the UN.

New Zealand’s approach to the problem was complicated by the fact that an increase in membership would inevitably weaken its position. As a minor power, New Zealand’s influence in the UN was enhanced by the relatively small size of the
organization. It had a total of 60 members in the period 1950-55, only one-third of the UN's membership in 1994. Any increase in the its membership would automatically cause New Zealand's influence to decline. Furthermore, the nations applying to join the UN in 1955 were predominantly from the Third World, newly independent, non-aligned, anti-colonial, and unsympathetic to the West. Their entry posed significant problems for New Zealand, which drew its economic and military security from the major Western nations and benefited from the latter's dominance in the UN. An increase in Third World membership threatened this dominance and would bring a greater anti-colonial sway to General Assembly proceedings. This did not bode well for New Zealand, both as a trusteeship power, and as a nation desiring to preserve the UN's security emphasis.14

Despite this, New Zealand saw its own interests best served by not opposing measures to break the deadlock. In fact, it was a major player contributing to the success of these measures. Preventing Third World nations from joining the UN was considered as being a greater handicap for New Zealand in the long term, than their exclusion. The traditional concern for the prestige of the UN was also fundamental in this decision. As the events of late 1955 indicated, the importance of the UN as an authoritative world organization with universal jurisdiction remained a high priority in New Zealand security policy.

In 1946 the Security Council resolved to treat applications for membership as matters of substance, rather than of procedure. The difference was crucial. Article 27 of the UN Charter specified that the rule of unanimity did not apply to procedural matters handled by the Security Council.15 Therefore, the permanent members could not veto procedural Security Council decisions. On all other matters, generally referred to as matters of substance, the rule of unanimity did apply, and the veto could be exercised. Article 27 did not define the difference between procedural and substantial matters, and it was left to the Security Council itself to decide on this.

14 Admission of New Members: Record of Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

15 Appendix 1.
Soviet intransigence resulted in applications for membership being treated as matters of substance and therefore subject to the veto.

In 1947 the Soviet Union announced it would only support the admission of Italy and Finland, which applied for admission in that year, if Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were also admitted by the Security Council.\(^\text{16}\) This was an attitude which was soon extended to all states considered as pro-West and came to be known as the ‘package deal’ concept. This proposal met with considerable hostility in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Many nations considered that Article 4 of the Charter contained the basis upon which nations should be admitted to the UN. To impose other conditions, or make a given nation’s admission conditional on that of another, was thought to be completely at odds with the Charter, a position supported by an International Court of Justice finding in 1948.\(^\text{17}\) In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union continued to propose draft resolutions in the Security Council for the admission of approximately fifteen applicants, a mix of American- and Soviet-sponsored countries. This proved unsuccessful, and the Soviet Union subsequently vetoed all individual applications, declaring that they would ‘continue to do so until the “package deal” was accepted’\(^\text{18}\).

The membership issue initially saw little progress in the early 1950s. General Assembly resolutions calling on the Security Council to reconsider outstanding applications were passed with overwhelming majorities, but went unheeded. It was not until 1952 that some progress was made in the creation of a special committee to study the problem of the admission of new members.\(^\text{19}\) The New Members

---

\(^{16}\) EAR, 3:7 (1953), p.33.

\(^{17}\) AJHR, A-2 (1949), p.64.

\(^{18}\) EAR, 3:7 (1953), p.35.

\(^{19}\) AJHR, A-2 (1953), p.79.
Committee (NMC)\textsuperscript{20} consisted of nineteen nations, including New Zealand, and convened between 31 March and 15 June 1953.\textsuperscript{21} The NMC concluded that the previous proposals to break the deadlock were, in fact, less than satisfactory. It confined itself to a study of the strengths and weakness of those proposals and made no specific recommendations. Considerable emphasis was, however, placed on the need for a negotiated political solution.

New Zealand’s position during this time was to uphold the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. The necessity of the Security Council’s recommendation prior to General Assembly approval was endorsed, and the former’s right to decide on whether a given issue was procedural or substantive was defended. The willingness among some members to assert the General Assembly’s authority over, or to advocate circumvention of, the Security Council was opposed by New Zealand. In New Zealand’s view, the essence of the problem was political, and a political solution was the only way to bring the issue to a satisfactory conclusion. Any such solution, however, had to be within the limits of the Charter and a package deal was considered unacceptable.\textsuperscript{22} Also rejected by New Zealand were attempts to circumvent the Security Council’s role in the admission process. Fraser had sought sole power for the Assembly over the admission of new members in 1945, but this position was not sustained after 1950. The New Zealand came to view circumvention of the Security Council as a clear breach of the provisions of Article 4(2), in which the involvement of both Security Council and the Assembly was specified, and would, therefore, be harmful to the UN in setting a precedent for the non-observance of other Charter Articles.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} The special committee established to study the membership issue was a temporary committee and was only ever referred as the ‘special committee’. It was not formally called the New Members Committee, this title, and its initials NMC, are completely artificial. They have been used here in order to avoid confusion with the Ad Hoc Committee which discussed the Special Committee’s report during the Eight Assembly Session in 1953, and with the Committee of Good Offices subsequently established to continue work on the problem.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{EAR}, 3:7 (1953), p.36.

\textsuperscript{22} ibid, p.42.

\textsuperscript{23} Appendix 1.
Progress on the issue was seemingly more significant than the lack of recommendations from the NMC suggested. During discussions on the NMC’s report in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the Peruvian delegate proposed the establishment of a Committee of Good Offices (CGO) ‘empowered to consult with members of the Security Council with the object of...reaching an understanding which would facilitate the admission of qualified new members’. This proposal was supported by a majority, including New Zealand, in the Ad Hoc Committee, and was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly. Almost immediately it seemed to produce an easing in the differences between the Soviet Union and other General Assembly members. In the Ad Hoc Committee, the Soviet Delegation decided not to press its usual draft-resolution for an en bloc admission of all applicants to a vote. Instead the Soviet Union produced a modified list, containing a smaller number of nations, which could be accepted as a first step toward a solution. While this still called for a package deal, it was designed to make the concept more acceptable to the General Assembly as a whole. After mooting this proposal, the Soviet Delegation again indicated it would not press for a vote until the CGO reported back to the Assembly the following year.

The suggestion that differences were easing initially proved deceptive. The CGO reported to the General Assembly the following year, having achieved little to overcome the divergence between the Soviet Union and other members on the issue. New Zealand’s position reflected the attitude of the majority in the General Assembly, that the Soviet persistence in using the veto and insistence on a package deal were responsible for the deadlock. Foss Shanahan told the Ad Hoc Committee in November 1954 that

The international Court of Justice has declared that the Charter does not permit a member to make its support of one applicant conditional upon the admission of another applicant. The results of the imposition


25 ibid, p.59.

26 ibid.
of this condition by the Soviet Union are both harmful to the prestige of the United Nations and frustrating of its purposes.\textsuperscript{27}

New Zealand refused to accept that the CGO had failed and endorsed a proposal for it to continue working on the problem.\textsuperscript{28} New Zealand also supported a proposal for the Security Council to apply itself to finding a solution to the problem.

Significant developments occurred between the depressing prospects for a solution revealed in late 1954, and mid-1955, when a number of General Assembly members began a concerted effort toward a solution. Many in the General Assembly had accepted the need for a political solution. This immediately implied a realization that compromise would be necessary. During Ad Hoc Committee discussions in 1953, a number of nations had demonstrated a preparedness to support the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{29} Knowing that their influence in the General Assembly would be strengthened by the admission of outstanding applicants, Arab and Asian states looked on the Soviet proposal favourably. By this time even a few European nations were prepared to go along with the Soviet plan.\textsuperscript{30} The problem had become drawn out and some nations were clearly impatient to have it resolved. Even New Zealand was beginning to accept that the only way a solution would be found was to accept 'some sort of package deal'.\textsuperscript{31}

As late as July 1955, the New Zealand Delegation in New York saw little prospect of any solution.\textsuperscript{32} But in August circumstances began to change. The Bandung Conference had overwhelmingly supported the admission of applicants and

\textsuperscript{27} EAR, 4:11 (1954), p.22.

\textsuperscript{28} ibid, p.23.

\textsuperscript{29} AJHR, A-2 (1955), p.59. The support of 'some Asian delegations' and specifically the Philippines was mentioned.

\textsuperscript{30} ibid, p.59. Specifically mentioned were Denmark and Norway.

\textsuperscript{31} MEA, Wellington, to NZPRUN, New York, No.74., 16 May 1955, PM 115/S/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{32} Memorandum for SecEA, Wellington, 1 July 1955, PM 115/S/33/1, Part 1.
Nehru subsequently visited Moscow to express this view. The result was a softening in the Soviet attitude over admissions. The Soviet Union was reported to be agreeable to seventeen of the outstanding twenty-one applicants being admitted to the UN. Only the divided states of Korea and Vietnam were not included.

Canada was the first to move on the issue, and its representatives approached New Zealand in mid-August to seek support for a UN initiative to have the list of seventeen admitted. This prompted a rapid reappraisal of New Zealand policy. Since 1946 New Zealand had rigidly adhered to the position that each state should be considered individually and on merit in accordance with Article 4. In recent years, however, the realization that a political solution was necessary had begun to permeate, though by mid-1955 little consideration had been given to what such a solution might involve. The acceptance of a list of seventeen new members, as proposed by Canada, was effectively a package deal, a concept previously opposed by New Zealand. A meeting held among officials of the Department of External Affairs on 18 August 1955 concluded that the Canadian proposal would ‘oblige New Zealand to examine the situation for the first time in political terms’.

A departmental report prepared for the pending General Assembly Session in November outlined the effects the acceptance of the Canadian proposal would have on New Zealand. The proposal was identified as a package deal and this New Zealand had always opposed. As a member of the Security Council, New Zealand was in an exposed position and a renunciation of previous policy could not be

---

33 Those seventeen nations were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Laos, Libya, Japan, Jordan, Nepal, Outer Mongolia, Portugal, Rumania. Spain was added to the list later.

34 Record of Interview Between Mr. Norman (Canada) and J.V. Wilson, 16 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

35 Admission of New Members: Record of a Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

36 Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item No. 21., Admission of New Members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
effected overnight. At any rate, Great Power agreement on the issue was considered unlikely.

The admission of seventeen new members clearly presented some major difficulties for New Zealand’s own position in the UN. The West had maintained considerable dominance in the Assembly for a decade and could certainly block resolutions which it considered objectionable. New Zealand drew comfort from Western dominance, with its general objectives being roughly in accord with Western policy. Departmental officials considered that of seventeen possible new members, five would definitely be anti-Western or anti-colonial, the support of a further eight was considered at best doubtful, leaving only three as possible supporters of the West. The result of this would be an ‘appreciable diminution’ in Western voting strength. The Western position would be significantly weakened and the General Assembly would be less representative of the interests of New Zealand.

There were also important implications for New Zealand’s position on issues of trusteeship and decolonization. The new applicants would considerably boost the power of the anti-colonial nations in the General Assembly. New Zealand, as the administering nation of Western Samoa, had reason to be concerned, especially as it was already often in minority positions on trusteeship and decolonization issues. From the 1940s, the policies of many anti-colonial states had been characterized by New Zealand as radical, mischievous and irresponsible. The prospect of more anti-colonialists presented the possibility of conditions worsening. ‘There is a danger that the Assembly would become unruly and irresponsible’, officials concluded, and

37 ibid, p.3.

38 Admission of New Members: Record of Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

39 ibid.

40 Record of Interview Between Mr Norman (Canada), and J.V. Wilson, 16 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

41 Memorandum: for MEA, Wellington, August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
members of the Delegation in New York agreed.42 'Certainly the Assembly will be even more unwieldy and less manageable than before.'43 The danger of the UN being dominated by the United States 'now belongs to the past', a comment hardly disguising the fear that the anti-colonial bloc threatened to become dominant.44

A case could have been made for opposing the Canadian proposal as detrimental to New Zealand's interests. It appears from departmental files, however, that, while the advantages and disadvantages were carefully weighed, opposition to the Canadian initiative was never seriously considered. It was realized that, while New Zealand's position would be adversely affected by the admissions, it could be worse if New Zealand was seen to oppose them. A departmental officer concluded in August that sooner or later the wider membership of the UN had to be faced,

and perhaps to be responsible for excluding these countries from a world organisation may react ultimately on our position more unfortunately than anything they can do within the organisation, subject as it is to certain procedures and restraints, however imperfectly observed.45

Munro was also partial to this view. Many of the nations listed among the seventeen were states which were clearly under the influence of the Soviet Union. Others, it was assumed, would quickly contribute to radical elements in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, Munro told the Ad Hoc Committee that the entry of any state to the UN would 'strengthen its sense of international responsibility and, at the very least, impose upon it the discipline inherent in membership'.46

The well-established objective of extending the prestige and authority of the UN also militated against opposing the Canadian compromise proposal. The

42 Admission of New Members: Record of Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
43 Memorandum for SecEA, 11 January 1956, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
44 Admission of New Members: Record of Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
45 Memorandum for MEA, August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
advantage of accepting, and going some length toward achieving, the aim of universality of membership was recognized in Wellington as desirable.\textsuperscript{47} This was seen as one of the positive results of the exercise, as it would effect ‘the elevation of the prestige of the United Nations as a true world organization’.\textsuperscript{48} A larger membership was also considered desirable to further enable ‘the United Nations to carry out its function of Pacific settlement’, a function which New Zealand had come to value highly during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{49} The Formosa and Offshore Islands Crisis, less than a year earlier, had emphasized the importance to New Zealand’s security of this aspect of the UN’s role.

During the General Assembly session of 1955 and the proceedings of the Security Council, Munro expressed openly what departmental reports had observed, that the prestige of the organization was the fundamental motive in New Zealand’s policy on this issue. He described the membership deadlock during Ad Hoc Committee discussions as an ‘abscess’ which threatened ‘to poison the United Nations’.\textsuperscript{50} In a public broadcast in mid-December, he claimed that the UN had lost a lot of prestige through not accepting new members.\textsuperscript{51} Munro enthusiastically supported the Canadian plan, which he characterized as an instrument which would ‘lance’ the ‘abscess’ which had haunted the UN for so long.\textsuperscript{52} As President of the Security Council in December, Munro declared that the membership issue urgently required a solution because the prestige of the Council was at stake.\textsuperscript{53} He had stated previously that in accepting the seventeen,

\textsuperscript{47} Admission of New Members: Record of Meeting, 18 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{48} Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item No.21., Admission of New Members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{49} ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} EAR, 5:12 (1956), p.10.

\textsuperscript{51} Broadcast by Munro, 16 December 1955, PM 115/4/6/1, Part 5.

\textsuperscript{52} EAR, 5:12 (1956), p.10.

we shall increase the ability of this organization to perform its role as
the arbiter of international peace and security; we shall make this
Assembly more truly the "town meeting of the world"; and we shall
have revitalized the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of our common ends.54

New Zealand faced a considerable dilemma over the membership issue, and
the disadvantages of accepting outstanding members were realized. The conclusion
to support their admission reflected the long-running belief that the prestige and
authority of the UN was ultimately in New Zealand's interests, and it was prepared
to accept less desirable consequences in pursuit of this end. It was concluded,
therefore, that New Zealand would not allow issues of colonialism to inhibit its
attitude on new members.55

Nor would the previous opposition to a package deal be an obstacle to a
solution if the Canadian plan was to prove successful. There was some reluctance in
accepting such a deal, but ways were suggested which could aid in overcoming this.
It was postulated that the proposal should 'not be viewed as a "package deal" but as
a "workable scheme to achieve the admission of all outstanding applicants"'.56 It
was decided that New Zealand would continue to vote on the merits of each
application, but would accept a more liberal interpretation of Article 4 than
previously, and would not allow its opposition go further than an abstention.57

The fundamental change in New Zealand policy, from opposition to
acquiesence, had been carefully worked out. There was little practical difference
between a 'package deal' and a 'workable scheme', but the desire to make
distinctions where there were hardly any reflected a readiness to compromise. The

54 EAR, 5:12 (1955), p.11.

55 Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item
No.21., Admission of New Members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

56 Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item
No.21., Admission of New Members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

57 ibid.
determination to see the prestige of the UN enhanced, the underlying reason for initial opposition to the package deal, was also the impetus for the policy change. New Zealand’s objective had, in fact, undergone no change at all.

The Canadian proposal gradually solidified, and by the end of October Munro reported that the ‘movement in favour of the admission of new members appears to be gaining momentum'. The Canadian draft prepared for the Ad Hoc Committee discussions called for the admission of all seventeen applicants. An eighteenth nation, Spain, applied at the commencement of the General Assembly session in September, and was subsequently added to the number seeking admission. The Canadian Delegation put together ‘an almost unprecedentedly large team of co-sponsors’, a total of twenty-eight nations to bring the draft resolution forward in the General Assembly in December.

Despite the tremendous support the Canadians had gained, there were continuing difficulties. A move to have the situation in Algeria, where the French were fighting local rebels, discussed by the General Assembly had gained considerable support in 1955. The issue was inscribed onto the General Assembly’s agenda in September. The French walked out of the General Assembly in protest and threatened to veto a number of new Afro-Asian applicants in retaliation for the role that group had played in the Algerian issue. Furthermore, the permanent members had not themselves agreed, prior to the General Assembly convening, on a possible formula for admission. The CGO had reported no progress in its attempts to find common ground on the issue and there were discrepancies over the number of applicants which were to be admitted. The original seventeen had included all but the four states of divided Korea and Vietnam, but the Soviet Union subsequently expressed a desire to exclude Japan as well. Later, however, with Spain’s application having made the number up to eighteen, the Soviet Union declared it was ‘eighteen or nothing’. The Western nations had serious doubts over the credentials of Outer

59 Memorandum for SecEA, 11 January 1956, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.
Mongolia, as did Nationalist China.

In order to force the permanent members to at least declare their positions, Canada indicated its intention in November to take the lead in the Ad Hoc Committee. The positions of the United Kingdom and the United States were found to be encouraging, although some doubt over the acceptability of Outer Mongolia remained. The Canadian Delegation circulated its draft among delegations it hoped would co-sponsor it on 15 November, including New Zealand. The draft called for the Security Council to consider all applicants 'about which no problem of unification arose', and to report back to the General Assembly in the current session. The applicants were not named. Debate in the Ad Hoc Committee began in 1 December and Canada introduced its draft-resolution, supported by the co-sponsors.

New Zealand's co-sponsorship of the Canadian draft departed from the policy concluded in Wellington prior to the issue being discussed in the UN. It had been pointed out to Munro that New Zealand was in an exposed position, had no time with which to prepare the New Zealand public for a change in policy and, therefore, while not opposing a package deal, it would not actively support it. Munro was not given the authority to co-sponsor the draft, but did so anyway. Co-sponsorship allowed Munro to speak early in the debate and put forward what was recognized as one of the best cases for the acceptance of the Canadian proposal. New Zealand was also the first member of the Security Council to speak on the draft and Munro's strong appeals to the permanent members to cooperate were influential. New Zealand, therefore, was seen as one of the main supporters of the draft, and later took up the lead in the Security Council on the issue. Munro left no doubt about the nature of what New Zealand was supporting in his address to the Ad Hoc Committee on 2 December:

---

60 Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of the Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item No.21., Admission of New members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

61 Perry to McIntosh, 28 December 1955, McIntosh Papers.

It has in the past been New Zealand's position that applications should be considered each upon its merits. It is still our view that this is the proper procedure to follow in normal circumstances. But circumstances - and surely this is apparent - are no longer normal.... Therefore, if the permanent members of the Security Council are willing so to circumscribe their special voting rights as to avoid rejecting any of the applicants within the scope of the 28-power resolution, we, for our part, as a member of the Security Council, are prepared to facilitate a favourable recommendation in each case.63

Munro had indeed placed New Zealand as a supporter of the admission of outstanding members, by whatever expedient, and regardless of previous policy. Munro's statement did reflect the basis of New Zealand policy on the issue - it had been decided to cooperate in a compromise solution. But New Zealand's cooperation was based on the premise of not preventing any successful solution - openly advocating such a solution was not a part of the decision to cooperate. Munro's position, therefore, ran contrary to the policy outlined in Wellington and his 'eager co-sponsorship' of the Canadian draft was in direct contravention of specific instructions not to do so.64

It was not the first time Munro had acted in this way. He had acted independently over the Suez issue in 1954 and, against instructions, had maintained a busy public schedule in the United States. His reputation had grown significantly since 1952, and he had gained considerable international press coverage for his activities in the UN. With his term on the Security Council coming to an end, he consciously sought to make the most of the limelight while it lasted. He had decided on a political career in New Zealand and was pressing Holland to nominate him for a seat in the 1957 election. Over the membership issue, however, Munro's actions evoked a great deal of hostility in Wellington, especially in the Department of External Affairs. Several senior departmental officials wanted Munro disciplined, or, if possible, completely removed from his post.65 Munro survived this challenge as

64 McIntosh to Quentin-Baxter, 23 November 1955, McIntosh Papers.
65 ibid.
the political will to remove him was not forthcoming from Holland, Macdonald or Algie, the latter acting as Minister for a short period in November and December. While New Zealand policy prior to Munro’s action had not been in favour of a strong public profile on the issue, it subsequently embraced his position and accepted Munro’s decision to initiate Security Council proceedings. Despite considerable reluctance on the part of the Government, Munro’s actions were praised by Macdonald in December:

I should like to offer you the sincere congratulations of the Government on your most able conduct of these highly critical and difficult proceedings in the Security Council and their gratification that, if confirmed by the Assembly, the admission of a number of worthy candidates will now be attained.  

When the Canadian draft was brought to a vote in the Ad Hoc Committee it was adopted by 52, including New Zealand, to 2 (China and Cuba), with Belgium, France, Israel, Greece and the United States abstaining. The Assembly adopted the resolution by the same vote on 8 December.

While the resolution had received overwhelming General Assembly support, only two permanent members of the Security Council had been favourable, China had voted against, with France and the United States abstaining. When Munro, as President, called the Security Council into session on 10 December, the permanent members were still deeply divided. Nor did the problems end there; on 8 December only four Security Council members had come out in favour of admitting the eighteen applicants, as called for by the General Assembly’s resolution. Brazil, New Zealand, Peru and the Soviet Union were openly supportive. Iran was thought to be probably supportive, but Turkey’s position was unknown, the United Kingdom’s support was ‘out of the question’, as was that of Belgium, France, China and the United States. Frustrating the situation further was the 29 November announcement

68 ibid.
by Nationalist China that it would not allow Outer Mongolia’s admission and would veto it if necessary.\textsuperscript{69}

Despite the tremendous difficulties which clearly existed, Munro decided to press on with the attempt to bring the General Assembly’s resolution into force. Munro’s opening address to the Security Council was a strong appeal for its members to take heed of the General Assembly resolution of two days before and of the overwhelming majority with which it had been adopted.\textsuperscript{70} Having concluded his address as President, Munro then spoke to the Security Council as the representative of New Zealand. He introduced a draft resolution co-sponsored by Brazil, calling for the admission of the eighteen applicants by a process which attempted to mesh the package deal idea with the voting procedure of Article 4.\textsuperscript{71} It was proposed each applicant be voted on individually, and then all applicants would be voted on as a group. Each applicant would thereby be recommended for membership to the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{72} It was, technically, not a package deal, but rather a ‘workable solution’. However, as Munro went on to explain the plan more completely, there was little doubt that, in effect, it was a package deal. He pointed out that the General Assembly had shown overwhelmingly its desire to see eighteen applicants accepted:

Therefore, while the procedure my delegation contemplates is a separate vote on each applicant, we believe that there must also be a vote on the group. If after separate voting on individual states the group comprises fewer than eighteen states, we shall have disregarded the views of an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations.... It follows also that our chances of success would be destroyed as soon as one applicant failed to secure the necessary votes.... I am however not prepared to contemplate failure in this matter. I believe that it is possible for every government represented here to exercise its judgement on each application, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter, with sufficient tolerance and flexibility to

\textsuperscript{69} ibid, p.92.

\textsuperscript{70} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.P62., 10 December 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, part 1.

\textsuperscript{71} AJHR, A-2 (1957), p.100.

\textsuperscript{72} ibid.
ensure that failure does not occur.\textsuperscript{73}

The New Zealand position of earlier months, of not accepting a package deal, had been abandoned in all but name. Even with what was in essence a package deal, the Soviet Union still declared its opposition the Brazil-New Zealand proposal. They immediately proposed a counter-draft, offering a procedure whereby the Security Council and General Assembly would meet concurrently. Each applicant would be recommended by the Security Council and then voted on (and accepted) in the General Assembly before the next applicant was considered.\textsuperscript{74} No agreement was reached on which of these two voting procedures should be used, and the Security Council adjourned.\textsuperscript{75}

On 13 December the Security Council met again, and the Soviet Union immediately indicated its support for the joint Brazilian-New Zealand draft.\textsuperscript{76} Having achieved this success, the applicants were subsequently voted on, but the result was not at all what Munro had sought. Nationalist China, true to its word, vetoed the application of Outer Mongolia.\textsuperscript{77} Thereafter the plan fell apart. The Soviet Union responded by vetoing 'all thirteen non-communist candidates' and the joint Brazilian-New Zealand initiative was set back.\textsuperscript{78} The Security Council adjourned yet again, having failed to implement the General Assembly’s resolution of 8 December.

The following day, however, the Soviet Union called an emergency meeting of the Security Council and put forward a proposal for the acceptance of sixteen

\textsuperscript{73} NZPRUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.P62., 10 December 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{74} ibid.


\textsuperscript{76} ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} ibid.
applicants, excluding Outer Mongolia and Japan. Using the Brazilian-New Zealand voting formula, the sixteen states were successfully recommended by the Security Council. Munro subsequently announced to the General Assembly that the recommendations had been made. The same day the General Assembly adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by forty-one delegations, including New Zealand, accepting the sixteen new members into the United Nations. The deadlock had been broken.

The membership problem was the last of the major issues to face New Zealand as a member of the Security Council, its term ending on 31 December 1955. It was an issue which witnessed a continuing New Zealand commitment to the UN and a desire to see its prestige enhanced. Difficulties were posed by what was essentially a package deal, and by the nature of the countries seeking admission, but New Zealand nevertheless saw its interests being best served by assisting the proposed solution. New Zealand had historically always opposed a package deal, believing it would ultimately damage the UN. However, the situation in the later half of 1955 was different from preceding years and it was perceived that more damage would have been done to the UN by rejecting the Canadian proposal. It was, therefore, accepted by New Zealand that no obstacle should be placed in the way of a solution. New Zealand’s major concern, the prestige of the UN, had not changed and it had been the key feature in both the initial opposition to, and eventual acceptance of, the package deal.

The end of the deadlock brought with it a large influx of anti-colonial members, identified before and after 1955 as largely opposed to New Zealand’s interests. But New Zealand’s opposition to a package deal had never been based on a determination to exclude these nations. While New Zealand was certainly aware of the disadvantages, the increase in the UN’s prestige and authority in world affairs was considered worth the cost.

New Zealand’s profile on the issue was enhanced, particularly by Munro who, not for the first time in his diplomatic career, exceeded his instructions. However, the most significant decision was the undertaking to acquiesce in a
solution. Munro’s decision to play a significantly larger role in the Ad Hoc Committee was not a policy issue of the same degree. It was something Wellington was attempting to avoid because of the strong *volte face* which was, outwardly at least, involved in the sudden acceptance of the package deal. Had Wellington wished to remove him, there was sufficient justification for such a move. But instead it was decided to embrace Munro’s action and his role in the Security Council operation became critical to its success. A decade after the UN Charter was signed, New Zealand was still prepared to take an active role in enhancing the prestige of the UN and pursuing a universal membership, as envisaged by its founders.
CHAPTER 14

THE SUEZ CRISIS
JULY-NOVEMBER 1956

Until the Suez Crisis of 1956, two of the most powerful influences in the formulation of New Zealand security policy, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, had not proved incompatible, the Palestine question notwithstanding. There had been a history of disagreements between New Zealand and the United Kingdom at the UN over a number of issues, but the assumption remained strong that the basic interests of the world organization and the Mother Country were largely identical. The Suez Crisis destroyed any real foundation for this assumption, although it did not destroy the assumption itself. Rather, it precipitated a major New Zealand effort to restore a commonality between the United Kingdom and the UN.

It has been argued that under the National Government, in power for most of the 1950s, New Zealand’s interest in the UN declined.¹ If this had been the case, the Suez Crisis provided an opportunity for the National Government, quite publicly and popularly, to scale down its commitments to the UN.² New Zealand faced the UN’s overwhelming disapproval for siding with the United Kingdom over Anglo-French military action against Egypt three months after it nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. Furthermore, troops offered by New Zealand to the UN for peace-keeping purposes along the Sinai border were rejected. The reason was well publicized - New Zealand soldiers were unacceptable to Egypt’s President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser was widely perceived in New Zealand as another Adolf


Hitler and press comment was indignant that he could reject a country which saw itself as profoundly 'noble'.3 Had the National Government seized upon what was an intensely critical attitude toward the UN following the Suez affair, it could quite successfully have marginalized the organization in New Zealand security policy.

This was, however, far from what occurred. The UN had survived throughout the first half of the 1950s as a major component of New Zealand's security policy. At the time of the Suez Crisis it retained that status. New Zealand was unsure, but not opposed, to the idea of pursuing through the UN some solution to the problems presented by the nationalization of the Canal in July 1956. The difficulties seemed immense: the Soviet veto in the Security Council, and the Arab Bloc's influence in the General Assembly, appeared to offer little opportunity for a solution acceptable to all concerned through the UN. This was, however, a reaction caused by the specific circumstances of the problem, not a general attitude that the UN was no longer useful in world affairs. The tremendous strain between the United Kingdom and the UN arising from events later in the year could have caused such a general hostility to emerge. Yet New Zealand moved quickly to rescue its own position within the UN, and November 1956 saw a series of unprecedented moves by New Zealand in the UN. These moves would not have been undertaken if New Zealand had been no longer interested in the world organization.

Neither the UN's position in New Zealand security policy, nor New Zealand's position in the UN, was in any significant way altered as a result of the Suez Crisis. Between nationalization and the Anglo-French intervention, New Zealand policy was determined largely by the overwhelming public support for Britain and the expectation that, despite British preparedness to use force, a peaceful solution would be seriously sought. While New Zealand maintained a somewhat ambivalent attitude to the Suez problem being referred to the UN after 26 July, New Zealand never advocated, or showed any support for, a solution which contravened the UN Charter. When the Anglo-French intervention occurred and New Zealand

---

3 New Zealand Herald, 27 November 1956; Dominion, 28 November 1956; McIntosh to Macdonald, 20 August 1956, McIntosh Papers.
supported the United Kingdom, New Zealand successfully sought, in very difficult conditions, to reconcile its action with its traditional commitment to the UN. New Zealand’s policy was essentially pro-British, not anti-UN. Despite support for the United Kingdom, the year 1956 did not see any abandonment of the UN by New Zealand, but rather witnessed compelling evidence of a genuine commitment to it.

The Suez Crisis began when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, following the withdrawal of British and American financial support for the proposed Aswan Dam project earlier in the month.4 The Suez Canal was on Egyptian territory, but the Canal company was an international enterprise, run in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention. This Convention guaranteed all countries the freedom to use the Canal. Many nations relied on the Canal for trade and it was the route through which a large proportion of Western Europe’s oil supplies flowed. Egypt’s control of the Canal’s operation was seen by many countries to have grave implications for the future of the universal freedom to use it. Nasser had already breached the freedom of navigation by imposing restrictions on Israel’s use of the Canal as early as 1950. His subsequent non-observance of a Security Council resolution demanding the restrictions be lifted did not soothe concern, while the suddenness of the act of nationalization was a testament to his unpredictability. While many states in the Middle East supported nationalization, some were suspicious of Nasser’s power and not averse to measures being taken to reintroduce some form of international control.5 France and the United Kingdom in particular strongly advocated international control. Both still had colonial territories in Africa and the Far East, and the Canal was considered vital to their communications. They were adamant that Nasser not be left in a position to hinder Anglo-French use of the Canal.

---

4 Templeton, p.55.

Nasser had long been a thorn in the side of the declining British Empire, and in recent times, of the French as well. He had brought about the removal of British troops from Egypt and had continued to agitate against residual British influence there. Through propaganda and political pressure, he attempted to discredit pro-Western Arab governments in the Middle East and set out to undermine the newly-established Baghdad Pact. Nasser had also supported rebels fighting the French in Algeria. His nationalization of a company in which France and the United Kingdom were major shareholders was a further attack on their prestige in the area. It was one which both nations decided must not go unpunished. The desire to teach Nasser a lesson and, if possible, to remove him from power, was as strong a motive as any for the Anglo-French action which followed.

On 28 July 1956 British Prime Minister, former Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, sent a telegram to Holland stating emphatically that a firm stand must be taken against Nasser, and international control of the Canal re-established by political pressure, or, in the last resort, by force. Holland replied the same day, assuring Eden of New Zealand’s support for any measures Britain felt obliged to take. Holland’s message did not refer specifically to the possible use of force, although certainly New Zealand support for it was implicit in his statement.

Holland had, however, apparently given no thought to what the use of force might entail, or under what circumstances it might eventuate. Eden had stated that force would be used only in the last resort, implying that other means of re-establishing international control would be exhausted first, and that force was not an immediate prospect. Furthermore, there was no indication as to exactly who was going to be using force. While British armed forces would obviously be involved, whether they would be acting alone or with others, and in what context, was simply not defined. Eden’s message of 28 July could just as easily be interpreted as

---

6 Eden to Holland, 28 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

referring to UN collective action as the Anglo-French operation which eventuated some months later. When Webb noted early in August that the United Kingdom might be seen as an aggressor if it used force, he was bemused. ‘This may be technically true, but it strikes me as being entirely unrealistic.’\(^8\) Few in New Zealand would have disagreed - it was almost inconceivable that the United Kingdom would act in a manner which contravened the UN Charter. There is a danger, therefore, in considering subsequent events, of reading more into Holland’s immediate message of support than circumstances warranted in July 1956.\(^9\) New Zealand was committing itself to the support of the United Kingdom, not to a breach of the UN Charter.

Despite the broad-based political and public support for the British stand, New Zealand was not directly affected by the events at Suez. The first of a number of departmental study and summary papers was produced on 30 July and revealed the curious position New Zealand was in.\(^10\) There would be a number of indirect consequences for New Zealand should Suez traffic be disrupted, emanating chiefly from problems faced in the United Kingdom.\(^11\) But the report concluded that the importance of the Suez Canal as a trade-link was small and that any closure of the Canal would not significantly affect New Zealand.\(^12\) This conclusion was supported by the fact that only twelve ships sailing from New Zealand had passed through Suez in the previous six months.\(^13\) The public outcry in New Zealand at Nasser’s action, and support for the United Kingdom’s position, did not reflect economic realities.

---

\(^8\) Webb to Macdonald, 3 August 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

\(^9\) Templeton, p.57.


\(^11\) ibid.

\(^12\) ibid.

\(^13\) ibid.
Cabinet met the following day and recognized the limited nature of any direct economic impact on New Zealand of a crisis over the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{14} However, Cabinet felt the situation to be serious. It determined that New Zealand could not fail to be affected where the United Kingdom’s economic and military power was placed ‘at mercy of Nasser’s caprice’.\textsuperscript{15} Cabinet further asserted that New Zealand did have ‘a very real concern with the broader implications of Nasser’s action’.\textsuperscript{16} It was decided that while New Zealand could not possibly assert an interest on maritime trading grounds, the Government still wanted to be consulted on any developments.\textsuperscript{17} Cabinet expressed particular interest in American policy on the issue, believing ultimately that the United Kingdom would not act without United States support.\textsuperscript{18} In line with Holland’s previous position,\textsuperscript{19} Cabinet appeared certain that New Zealand’s policy on the Suez issue should be entirely in accord with that of the United Kingdom. The possible use of force was not discussed, and Cabinet found comfort in the assumption that it would be consulted by the United Kingdom prior to any action directly involving New Zealand.\textsuperscript{20} While aware of United Kingdom reservations about the issue being taken to the UN,\textsuperscript{21} Cabinet indicated that support should be given to any referral of the matter to the Security Council. The Soviet Union would be likely to veto any action favourable to the United Kingdom, but Cabinet felt that this on its own should not prevent the issue being discussed in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{22}

On learning of Cabinet’s preparedness to accept a UN solution, should one be

\textsuperscript{14} MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, No.956., 31 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{15} ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} ibid; CROSEC, London, to all UKHC’s, No.299., 28 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

proposed, both Munro and Webb, the latter then High Commissioner in London, reacted negatively. Munro could see no useful purpose in Security Council debate, predicting that the Soviet Union would use it as a forum for propaganda and would veto anything favourable to the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{22} Webb thought similarly, and felt that any progress would be 'stultified by inevitable delay'.\textsuperscript{23} The official departmental view mirrored the positions of Munro and Webb, although not all shared it.\textsuperscript{24} Wilson in particular was strongly in favour of UN action: 'I always thought, apparently contrary to our official view, that there was an alternative, namely, to take the initiative in the United Nations, pulling out all the stops, from the very beginning when the Canal was seized.'\textsuperscript{25}

While few in the Department could see anything favourable to the United Kingdom coming immediately from UN action, they did not object when eventually the Suez issue was brought to the Security Council in October. Cabinet could not see much benefit in UN discussion either, but were nevertheless prepared to endorse any reference of the issue to the Security Council. New Zealand, therefore, did not advocate that the UN should be by-passed and had no objection to the problem being referred to the Security Council. New Zealand was not demonstrating any general lack of confidence in the UN, merely an awareness that it did not offer much to the United Kingdom on this issue. This reflected previous positions over Burma and Indochina, where little value was initially seen in UN debate, yet subsequently New Zealand took high profiles in UN action on these issues.

In the meantime, more ominous developments had occurred. Unknown to New Zealand, the United Kingdom and France had decided on the possible use of force very soon after nationalization. Military preparations were already under way on 31 July, when Frank Corner, Webb's deputy in London, was informed that the

\textsuperscript{22} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.223, 31 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{23} Webb to Macdonald, 3 August 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.


\textsuperscript{25} Wilson to McIntosh, 7 January 1957, McIntosh Papers.
United Kingdom intended to use force if necessary to bring about international control of the Canal.\textsuperscript{26} Webb's initial reaction was cautious. The United Kingdom, he felt, appeared to have committed itself to a policy which, like the American united action proposal of 1954, could not be carried out because of a lack of support from major allies.\textsuperscript{27} The United States had been unable to follow through with united action and was unwilling to act on its own in Indochina despite its acute perception that a French withdrawal from Vietnam would be detrimental to Western security. Implicit in Webb's reasoning, therefore, was the belief that unless allied support was forthcoming, the United Kingdom could not take military action.

On 2 August representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced that a conference of maritime powers would meet in London on 16 August, to discuss the Suez problem. Webb noted the following day that the attempt to find a negotiated solution would 'cool the wrath and weaken the inclination to draw the sword'.\textsuperscript{28} The announcement of a conference for mid-August indicated to New Zealand that there was certainly no immediate prospect of force being used.

Holland was a strong believer in showing a united front in a crisis, a belief clearly demonstrated during the Korean War. With the public mood apparently strongly pro-British, he could see the benefits of openly declaring New Zealand solidarity with the United Kingdom. He therefore announced to the nation what it wanted to hear, free of any risk of committing New Zealand to war in the process. In a speech in Parliament on 7 August Holland invoked Savage's emotional dictum 'Where Britain stands, we stand'.\textsuperscript{29} He presented New Zealand's position as being unconditionally that of the United Kingdom: 'The natural question arises, what does our support involve? I am not prepared at this stage to go further than to say that that means exactly what it says.' This statement implied that Holland had committed

\textsuperscript{26} Webb to Macdonald, 31 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{27} ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} Webb to Macdonald, 3 August 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{29} Pfeiffer, p.129.
New Zealand to whatever the United Kingdom chose to do. But Holland had no idea what it was prepared to do and, no need therefore, to place conditions on New Zealand support. This position was similar to New Zealand’s approach to Palestine in August 1947, when a departmental report noted New Zealand’s only priority was to support British policy. As far as Holland was aware, British military preparations were precautionary only, and it would be some time before any military action could be carried out. Furthermore, such action as there might be, would be taken only in the last resort and New Zealand would be kept fully consulted before it occurred.

On 3 August Webb had noted that if force was used, it was likely to be by France, the United Kingdom and other nations which were willing to ‘stand up and be counted’. He suspected the latter group would not be large in number and it was evident that there was not much Western support for the use of force to re-establish international control. Nasser’s act of nationalization was not a breach of international law, and compensation had been offered to shareholders of the Suez Canal Company. Even so, the prospect seemed not to cause any immediate alarm in Wellington. Departmental files reveal no evidence that anyone had seriously asked the question what if force really was used? This is a further consideration to be taken into account when considering Holland’s previous expressions of support.

It was not until the London Conference met that the implications of the use of force were studied seriously in New Zealand. Upon arriving in London, Macdonald became convinced that the United Kingdom would use force if it felt the

---

30 Templeton (p.67) interprets this statement as declaring New Zealand support ‘of any military action Britain might decide to take’.


32 Templeton, p.126.

33 ibid, p.127.

34 Webb to Macdonald, 3 August 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1.

35 ibid.
situation demanded it. He suggested immediately that consideration be given to what New Zealand would do in such an event. On 16 August, Ronald Algie, acting as Minister of External Affairs in Wellington in Macdonald’s absence, passed these concerns on to Munro. Munro was informed that it would ‘probably not be possible to reconcile direct Anglo[-]-French action against Egypt with [the] United Nations Charter’. Munro was asked for his opinion on the ‘implications for New Zealand (especially within United Nations) of military action taking place, and on the possibility of such action being ‘brought before [the] Security Council as an act of aggression’. This prospect had not been considered previously, reflecting the prevailing assumption until mid-August that any use of force by the United Kingdom would not contravene the UN Charter.

Munro replied the following day with a remarkably pragmatic situational appraisal. He identified two major issues at the heart of the Suez problem; ‘first, the use of power to protect a vital interest, and secondly, the consideration of legal questions under the Charter of the United Nations’. Munro had little difficulty in distinguishing which of the two was the more important:

So far as a Great Power is concerned, legality is subordinate to the maintenance of vital interests and can be accommodated to it. This was revealed in the Guatemalan dispute, where New Zealand took a stand on a point of principle and Churchill pointed out to Pierson Dixon at that time that principle was subordinate to the duty to help a friend. New Zealand, as a friend of the United Kingdom and a country so dependent on the United Kingdom in matters of affection and interest, may have to accommodate principle to interest and friendship, especially as the interests of New Zealand in the Middle East are at one with those of the United Kingdom.

Munro may not have been an advocate of the actual use of force, for some

---


37 ibid.


39 ibid.
time later he expressed doubt about it to Webb.  Nevertheless the message was clear - if force was used by the United Kingdom, rightly or wrongly, New Zealand's own interests dictated that New Zealand should support it. Legality, and the UN Charter, were clearly secondary considerations. This view found no support in Wellington and an outraged Alister McIntosh wrote to Macdonald a few days later:

I think Munro's reply is as monstrous as it is typical. His dictum that, so far as a great power is concerned, legality is subordinate to the maintenance of vital interests and can be accommodated to it, is a consideration to which I hope New Zealand will never subscribe....It is one thing for the Kaiser to immortalize the phrase "a scrap of paper", and another for a self-respecting little country like New Zealand. If the United Kingdom does resort to force, and we support her, for Heaven's sake don't let us try and justify our action in standing by our friends by any distortion of moral principle. Let us be honest and admit that it is contrary to the Charter which is working against vital interests so we have therefore decided to abandon our adherence to its terms along with the United Kingdom - that is, if we wish to commit international suicide, for that, in my opinion, is what it would mean.41

McIntosh was clearly not convinced that the United Kingdom would use force, still less that New Zealand would support it in doing so. He felt that either event would be simply suicidal. At any rate it was impossible, McIntosh wrote,

in the face of the Egyptian refusal to accept international control, a compromise...will have to be swallowed because the use of force will not be permitted by the unholy alliance of USA, USSR, India and supported by the majority of the other nations of the world....42

This belief was in accord with Webb's earlier reference to the united action proposal, that the use of force could not be effective unless applied collectively. If a significant level of international support could not be gained, the use of force by the United Kingdom was an unrealistic proposition.

40 Pfeiffer believes that Munro clearly was advocating force, but Munro was critical of the Anglo-French intervention after November. Munro to Webb, 3 December 1956, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.

41 McIntosh to Macdonald, 20 August 1956, McIntosh Papers.

42 ibid.
Meanwhile, the London Conference issued a declaration ‘recognizing Egypt’s sovereign right to a fair return on the use of the Canal’, while ‘insisting on international control of the waterway’. It was decided in London that a delegation led by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies would be sent to put the views of the Conference to Nasser in September. A period of tentative unease followed in which it seemed impossible to determine whether the Suez issue would be peacefully resolved or not. It was recognized by Webb that the London Conference and the Menzies mission were being treated by France and the United Kingdom as a possible pretext for the use of force. If peaceful methods failed, the British and French Governments could argue that force was the only option and claim the ‘moral backing’ of the Conference members in undertaking military operations.

The Menzies mission had been undertaken on the understanding that, if it failed, France, the United Kingdom and the United States would use force to impose international control, and it was on this that Menzies placed his hope of success. But, Macdonald observed that should the Menzies’ mission fail, what appeared as ‘heartwarming support’ of the Conference for international control, imposed if necessary by force, ‘would wither away’. Furthermore, Macdonald was not sure that the United States would support the use of force, despite apparently convincing the United Kingdom that it would. He had little time to wait before his suspicions were proved correct. On 2 September, the day of Menzies arrival in Cairo, Eisenhower informed Eden that the United States would not back the use of force. Subsequently, and while Menzies was still in Cairo, Eisenhower stated

---

45 ibid.
46 ibid.
47 ibid.
48 Thomas, p.76.
publicly that the United States was committed to finding a peaceful solution.\(^{49}\)

The situation following Eisenhower's announcement was far from clear. While Menzies had been sent to Cairo backed by the threat of force, Macdonald was not convinced even before Menzies left about how real the threat was. In a telegram of 23 August, Macdonald stated that no decision to use force had been made, and there would be no automatic resort to military action if Menzies failed.\(^{50}\) Macdonald believed that if Nasser rejected the Conference proposals, the situation would 'be back at the position as it was three weeks ago with all the pros and cons of using force to be balanced'.\(^{51}\) The Conference and the Menzies mission were understood by Macdonald to reflect a decision to try to avoid the use of force.

The Menzies mission failed, and a paradoxical situation resulted. Macdonald thought the use of force more likely because of the threat by the British and French Governments to resort to it if Nasser rejected the proposals.\(^{52}\) The absence of a solution also pointed to the possibility of force in order to obtain one. However, Eisenhower had made it plain in September that he would not back any decision to use force and the prospect that France and the United Kingdom would act alone was thought most unlikely in New Zealand. To complicate the situation further, Dulles had come up with a proposal for a Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). It was proposed that SCUA would be an international body charged with operating the Canal and collecting fees.\(^{53}\) Dulles suggested that, if Nasser rejected the SCUA regime, the United States would be prepared to use force to impose it.\(^{54}\) But the United States had already once dismissed supporting the use of force and the new

---

\(^{49}\) ibid, p.78.

\(^{50}\) NZHC, London, to MEA, Wellington, No.1155., 23 August 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 5.

\(^{51}\) ibid.

\(^{52}\) ibid.

\(^{53}\) Pfeiffer, p.134.

\(^{54}\) Thomas, p.83; Webb to Macdonald, 21 September 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 6.
willingness to endorse such a solution was hardly convincing. On 21 September Webb reported that, whether or not the United States had initially intended using force in relation to SCUA, it was clear that 'no such idea is now entertained'.\(^{55}\)

Webb's intimation reflected the widely felt assumption in mid-September that tension over Suez was declining.\(^{56}\) New Zealand learned on 18 September that the United Kingdom and France had advised the President of the Security Council of the Suez problem.\(^{57}\) This was done, according to the British High Commissioner in Wellington, in order to facilitate rapid Council discussion of the problem, should the political situation deteriorate.\(^{58}\) This appeared to signal a new commitment by the United Kingdom to a peaceful solution, or at least a desire to avoid any hasty resort to force without UN approval. The second Suez Conference met a day later and an atmosphere of peace immediately replaced the antagonism prevalent as recently as a week before. Webb wrote to Macdonald of the new atmosphere:

> Every speaker, including Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, at the resumed Suez Canal Conference now sitting, eschewed all thought of by-passing the United Nations and the principal object of the Canal Users' Association now seems to be to strengthen our hands with that organisation.\(^{59}\)

The use of force had become a possibility so remote that Webb concluded it had never seriously been contemplated. It could now be 'dismissed from mind', he confidently told Macdonald.\(^{60}\) One of the greatest dilemmas in the history of New Zealand foreign policy appeared to be over.

---

\(^{55}\) Webb to Macdonald, 21 September 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 6.

\(^{56}\) Thomas, p.88.

\(^{57}\) Cleary, to McIntosh, No.C.35/121/3, 18 September 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 6.

\(^{58}\) ibid.

\(^{59}\) Webb to Macdonald, 21 September 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 6.

\(^{60}\) ibid.
Throughout the period of the initial crisis, from late July to late-September, a New Zealand warship, Royalist, was in the Mediterranean on exercises with the Royal Navy. Early in August Eden asked Holland if the Royalist could be included in British operational planning concerning the crisis over the Suez Canal. Eden insisted at this time that force would be used only after other means had failed, and that preparations in the Mediterranean were precautionary only. Holland gave an immediate affirmative reply and did not even bother to consult Cabinet.

In mid-September a further message was sent by the United Kingdom requesting that Royalist remain in the Mediterranean beyond its scheduled departure date of 4 October. Despite Holland’s previous indications of total support, and considerable Cabinet sympathy, there was some unease about possible New Zealand involvement in any military intervention should the Royalist be left with the British fleet. As New Zealand had no direct interest in the Suez Canal, the risk of military involvement was not thought justified, and the United Kingdom was informed of New Zealand’s preference that the ship should leave as expected on 4 October. The United Kingdom was unimpressed and claimed that the warship’s withdrawal would be seen as weakening political support on the part of New Zealand for the United Kingdom’s position on the Suez issue. New Zealand did not immediately respond to this. It was not until the more peaceful atmosphere arising in the later half of September that the Cabinet decided it would extend the Royalist’s tour beyond 4 October. Concerns about New Zealand’s UN position were clear and the need for consultation should conditions change was stressed to the British.

The impression that the Crisis was over gained strength during October. The British and French Delegations had brought the Suez issue to the Security Council

---

61 Pfeiffer (p.135.) gives this date as 15 August, while Templeton (p.126) gives this a week earlier on 6 August.

62 Templeton, p.126.

63 ibid, p.128; Pfeiffer, p.136.

64 Pfeiffer, p.136.
on 5 October. This marked not only a reversal of earlier policy, but a move toward the New Zealand Cabinet’s position of 31 July. While the first few meetings of the Security Council on 5, 8 and 9 October appeared to make little progress, an agreement between Egypt, France and the United Kingdom followed soon after. This included six points of concurrence, among which were free and open transit through the Canal and respect for Egyptian sovereignty. These were later accepted by the Security Council. On 19 October Webb again expressed his confidence that the tide to war had ebbed and was now ‘set fair toward a settlement by negotiation, which, in my view, was always inevitable anyway’. McIntosh was inclined to agree.

The belief that a peaceful solution would be found proved over-optimistic, formulated as it was in ignorance of what had actually been occurring during October. New Zealand did know the British had threatened to use force, but this threat was complemented consistently with the qualification that force would be used only ‘if necessary’, or ‘in an emergency’. New Zealand therefore assumed that if force was ‘unnecessary’ it would not be used. There was no clear New Zealand view of what might constitute an emergency or what conditions would warrant the use of force. It certainly seemed to New Zealand throughout the period leading up to the actual intervention, that the decision to use force had still to be made. That the United Kingdom and France would actually join in collusion with Israel to fabricate a pretext for military action was simply inconceivable to ministers and officials of

66 EAR, 6:10 (1956), pp.34-6.
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
69 Webb to McIntosh, 19 October 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 7.
70 McIntosh to Webb, 7 November 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 7.
the Department of External Affairs, even after evidence began to emerge that this had been the case. Wilson noted in January 1957 that collusion seemed obvious, but he could not believe that Eden, who had publicly denied it, would actually lie.73 Earlier suggestions of this had been so much at odds with other information that officials had not even brought them to Holland's attention. New Zealand's ignorance of the true nature of the situation in October meant inevitably that it had put itself unwittingly in the position it had endeavoured to avoid.

On 29 October Israel unleashed the first phase of an offensive against Egypt. Between 29 October and 5 November Israeli forces penetrated deep into the Sinai Peninsula and traversed the length of the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez to reach the Red Sea. In the northern Sinai, Israeli forces captured the Gaza strip and stopped only miles from the Suez Canal itself. In New York, the Israeli attack evoked harsh repudiation and the United States introduced a Security Council draft-resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt.74 As had been predetermined, however, the Israeli move had given the British and French Governments the pretext to use force against Egypt. While the Security Council was dealing with the Israeli assault, France and the United Kingdom issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel demanding each side withdraw their forces ten miles from the Canal. A period of twelve hours was given for compliance before Anglo-French force would be used. The ultimatum predictably expired and British and French warplanes bombed military targets in Egypt. Subsequent moves in the Security Council to call on foreign forces in Egypt to withdraw were vetoed by France and the United Kingdom and, on 1 November, the General Assembly was called into emergency session under the provisions of the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950.

While General Assembly resolutions calling for a cessation of hostilities were being adopted almost daily, Israeli forces continued to advance through the Sinai

73 Wilson to McIntosh, 2 January 1957, PM 217/1/6, Part 7.

74 NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.(p)60., 30 October 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.
Peninsula during the first week of November. On 5-6 November British and French troops landed around Port Said and proceeded to fight their way toward the Suez Canal. However, it was not long before Israel, having achieved its objectives, decided to cease hostilities. With the pretext of separating the combatants now gone, the British and French Governments had little choice but to order their own forces to cease fire.

Holland was critical of the Israeli action of 29 October. His information on the assault was limited and it had not become evident that a full-scale attack was under way. Holland therefore treated the Israeli action as yet another reprisal attack against Egypt. He stated publicly on 30 October that New Zealand had never agreed with the policy of reprisals followed by Israel, expressed concern over the disregard of armistice conditions, and stated that acts of aggression could not be condoned.75

The subsequent British action caught him completely by surprise, and he was annoyed that the United Kingdom had not consulted New Zealand and other Commonwealth governments prior to taking action.76 Cabinet had assumed for some months that consultation would be a prerequisite to any action the United Kingdom took which directly affected New Zealand.77 New Zealand had thus stumbled into an explosive situation unawarn.

Responding to the new crisis on 1 November, Holland announced that he had full confidence that the Anglo-French intervention was a police-action designed to protect the Suez Canal from the warring sides.78 He could hardly have done otherwise, as his own sympathy, that of his Cabinet, the press and the public were strongly in favour of supporting the United Kingdom. McIntosh observed on 6

---

75 EAR, 6:10 (1956), p.2.

76 MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, No. 1358., 1 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 7.

77 MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, No.956., 31 July 1956, PM 217/1/6, Part 1; MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, unnumbered, 1 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.

November that the Cabinet’s position throughout the crisis was one of 'intense...loyalty to the mother country and determined to stand by Britain through thick and thin. the more so if she is wrong which, however, they do not believe'.

'It has been a case of, "Where Britain goes, we go with a vengeance"', he wrote two days later. In December, he noted that the public and Government 'were never in any doubt that the proper course was to go where Britain goes. Such, indeed, is the strength and fervour of ancestor worship in this country'. Instructions sent to Munro on 2 November reflected the pro-British line, stating explicitly that he should oppose resolutions 'condemnatory or critical' of the Anglo-French action.

When the General Assembly convened on 1 November, the United States introduced the draft resolution which had been vetoed in the Security Council. This called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind armistice lines and called on all members to refrain from the use of force. It met with considerable support and was adopted the following day with only 5 (including New Zealand) voting against, and 6 abstentions. On 4 November, with fighting still continuing in the Sinai, a further draft-resolution was put forward in the General Assembly. It noted that the 2 November resolution had not been complied with and called for a cease-fire to be arranged immediately. This resolution was adopted, with 59 votes in favour, the same 5 voting against, and 12 abstentions. For the second time in two days, New Zealand was in a minority of less than half a dozen voting against a resolution which had overwhelming Assembly support.

Also on 4 November, a draft-resolution calling for the establishment of a

---

79 Draft Telegram - McIntosh to Corner, Unnumbered, 6 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.

80 McIntosh to Shanahan, 8 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.

81 McIntosh to Powles, 13 December 1956, McIntosh Papers.

82 MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, No.205., 2 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.

83 A total of 64 voted in favour. Those which voted against were Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Those which abstained were Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa.
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was introduced by the Canadians. This too met with overwhelming General Assembly support and was adopted 57-0. Interestingly New Zealand, which had already announced its readiness to contribute, was among the 19 members which abstained. Munro pointed out in an explanation of his vote that New Zealand could not support the resolution because it called for the compliance of the 2 November resolution which New Zealand had opposed. New Zealand abstained again the following day on a resolution allowing the Secretary-General to begin recruiting observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) for service with the UNEF. This was the day Anglo-French troops landed at Port Said.

It was not until 7 November, when fighting had ceased in the Sinai-Suez area, that New Zealand voted in support of a resolution relating to the UNEF. This established an advisory body, presided over by the Secretary-General, to deal with certain aspects of planning for the new force. A further resolution on the same day, calling on the British and French forces to withdraw, was adopted with 65 votes in favour, Israel against, and 10 abstentions, including Australia, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

However, New Zealand policy after 31 October did not consist of a full endorsement of British policy. The realization that the British action had adversely affected New Zealand's interests was among the reasons for the gradual modification of the policy expounded prior to 31 October. New Zealand's relationship with the United States had been placed in difficulty because of the British action and New Zealand's position in the United Nations had suffered.

Munro, who had initially and confidently formulated the rationale for intervention, was not impressed when it came, and indeed seemed critical of it. He

84 The Canadians had mentioned this in general debate on 2 November and New Zealand had announced its preparedness to contribute on 3 November. The formal resolution establishing UNEF was produced, as stated, on 4 November.

wrote on 31 October that ‘the Anglo-French ultimatum delivered in the course of Security Council proceedings must impair the authority of the United Nations to which New Zealand has always subscribed’. The upholding of the UN’s authority was a central tenet of New Zealand policy in the 1950s. Munro’s comment suggested concern that it had been unexpectedly compromised and that New Zealand’s interests had been damaged as a result. ‘Sooner or later’, he wrote, ‘our countrymen will perceive that in following Eden we followed a weak man who broke off in its mid-career an ill-conceived venture’. He also later wrote of the damage to New Zealand’s prestige within the UN inflicted by the Suez affair, and complained at the use of Savage’s dictum.

Munro’s concern about New Zealand’s position in the UN was mirrored in Wellington. Even Holland agreed. On 31 October the British made a direct request to New Zealand for the Royalist to participate in active operations in the Mediterranean. This was declined. British interest in the cruiser persisted, however, and, although there was considerable sympathy in the Cabinet for its operational deployment, New Zealand refrained from agreeing. Holland, bending to the wishes of his advisers rather than the Cabinet, asked the United Kingdom a few days later not to make a further request for the Royalist. In replying to the British request for the warship, he said the fact that the United Kingdom and France have taken direct action without the approval of the Security Council is of special significance to New Zealand, which has always paid the utmost attention to its United

---

87 Munro to Webb, 3 December 1956, Munro Papers, MS 2230/4.
88 Memorandum on Recent Proceedings of the Assembly, 27 December 1956, Munro Papers, MS 2230/3.
89 MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, No.205., 2 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.
90 MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, Unnumbered, 1 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.
91 ibid.
92 McIntosh to Corner, No.56/7, 12 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.
Nations obligations. Moreover the prospect that New Zealand might... even be charged before the Security Council or the General Assembly in the role of the aggressor if 'Royalist' takes part in active operations, is one which we must view with considerable apprehension.\textsuperscript{93}

The decision pertaining to the Royalist appears to have been influenced solely by UN considerations. A departmental report a week later pointed out the rationale behind the denial of the British request:

New Zealand’s situation has been complicated by the presence of our ship in the Mediterranean. We did not want to withdraw it, but, equally, we did not want to put ourselves in the position of taking part in an operation which ran counter to our United Nations obligations.\textsuperscript{94}

Political support, then, was the limit of New Zealand’s endorsement of British policy. This support was extended, according to the same departmental report, on the basis that it was considered a ‘duty to support the United Kingdom, believing this reflected the attitude of the New Zealand people’.\textsuperscript{95} Even so, this support did weaken and was given in a way which suggested that New Zealand had no desire to forsake the UN. New Zealand did not want its relationship with the UN permanently damaged and immediately sought to repair it.

New Zealand had followed the United Kingdom into the disaster over Suez, making the position of the United Kingdom in the UN relevant to New Zealand’s. Therefore if British policy could be brought into line with the UN, New Zealand’s position would also be perceived as such. This was no new connection. Ever since the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals first became known, New Zealand had assumed a basic commonality between the fundamental interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth on the one hand, and the UN on the other. New Zealand’s proposed contributions to Commonwealth and to UN security systems were closely related.

\textsuperscript{93} MEA, Wellington, to NZHC, London, No.1358., 1 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{94} Middle East Crisis, 6 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{95} ibid.
Even in 1955, by which time the Commonwealth had proven itself an inconsequential bloc in the UN, great satisfaction was taken when a number of Commonwealth countries had acted in unison in the UN interest over the membership issue. In attempting to recover its prestige in the UN late in 1956, New Zealand moved to re-found the basis for this assumption after the events of 31 October - 5 November had so comprehensively damaged it. An open abandonment of support for either the UN or the United Kingdom was not considered an option.

The proposal for a Special Assembly to be convened on 1 November was opposed by the United Kingdom, but not by New Zealand, which abstained. In expressing New Zealand’s opposition to the United States draft-resolution on the same day, Munro spoke as ‘a representative of a country which has always given devoted support to the objectives of the United Nations Charter’. He gave New Zealand’s reasons for opposing the draft. It took no account of what was to be done to restore the flow of traffic through the Canal - several ships had been sunk by Egypt to block it after 29 October. Furthermore, Munro pointed out that no proposal existed to solve the whole Arab-Israeli question which was at the heart of the problem. These statements enlisted the support of Canada the following day.

Canada was in fact extremely significant in the direction New Zealand policy took after 29 October. The Canadian proposal of 2 November for the establishment of the UNEF gave New Zealand the opportunity to orient itself back toward the UN. The opportunity was not missed, and New Zealand offered forces for the UNEF the following evening - the first nation to do so. ‘I am sure’, wrote Munro on 4 November, ‘that our offer last night to contribute towards international force created

---

96 Memorandum for SecEA, 11 January 1956, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

97 EAR, 6:11 (1956), p.60.

98 ibid.

99 ibid. p.61.

100 NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Washington, No.P78, 4 November 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1.
a very favourable reaction in United Nations'. Munro noted also that New Zealand’s position had been respected, ‘to some extent if I may say so on account of my own prestige’. The General Assembly’s acceptance that the UNEF was necessary to separate the Egyptians and Israelis allowed New Zealand to argue that the Anglo-French intervention had been vindicated. These two nations had not acted so much in contravention of the UN, as ahead of it. New Zealand gradually became aware of Anglo-French collusion with Israel, but maintained publicly that the intervention had occurred with the objective of separating Egyptian and Israeli forces. New Zealand had good reason to believe that the British had acted in good faith. Eden constantly sent messages to Holland during November reiterating the need to keep the Egyptians and Israelis separate and protect the Suez Canal. The extent of the collusion was unknown in New Zealand for some time. In New Zealand’s view, the United Kingdom had conducted a police action, leading the way for slower UN machinery to react to the Crisis. On announcing New Zealand’s offer to participate in the UNEF during 3 November, Holland advanced this idea:

it might well be found, if and when an international police force was organized, that its task in the Middle East had been made manageable and possible by the speedy action of Britain and France in separating

---


102 ibid; This comment reflected Munro’s typical egoism, but was nevertheless probably accurate. Munro had won tremendous kudos over his role in the membership issue less than year before, and he became President of the General Assembly in 1957, less than a year after the events at Suez. Munro’s personal prestige was undoubtedly a factor which assisted New Zealand through the period of the Suez Crisis.

103 EAR, 6:11 (1956), p.3.

104 The New Zealand Minister in Paris reported in November 1956 that the French were not bothering to deny the charge of collusion. NZLeg, Paris, to MEA, Wellington, No.10., 9 November 1956, PM 217/1/15, Part 1; J.V. Wilson concluded in January 1957 that collusion must have occurred and that British denials were of a nature which increased, rather than allayed, suspicion that the Anglo-French action had occurred with the cooperation with Israel. Wilson to McIntosh, 21 January 1957, PM 217/1/6, Part 7.

105 Eden to Holland, 30 October 1956, PM 217/1/12, Part 1; Eden to Holland, 5 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 1.
the Egyptian and Israeli forces and in protecting the Suez Canal. In this case, as was the case when the United States intervened in the Korean invasion, there had been forces available in the immediate vicinity of trouble.\textsuperscript{106}

It was again used later in November by Macdonald in the General Assembly:

\begin{quote}
It is a gain that the situation should have provided the stimulus for the creation of a United Nations Force, perhaps the first step towards investing the United Nations with the practical means to make its decisions effective.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

New Zealand justified its opposition to resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the Anglo-French task-force on this basis. It argued that, until an effective UN force could be deployed, there would be little point in withdrawing the buffer provided by British and French forces.\textsuperscript{108} The Egyptians and Israelis would simply renew hostilities.

Also useful to New Zealand internationally was the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary on 4 November.\textsuperscript{109} The General Assembly continued to sit in special session until 12 November, when its regular session was scheduled to begin. Both Suez and Hungary had been discussed extensively during this time. In transferring the agenda of the special session to the regular session, it was decided to discuss the Hungarian issue first. Discussion on the Suez problem was therefore not recommenced until 23 November. The Hungarian issue had already served to divert General Assembly attention from Suez and after 12 November it served this purpose again. The attention given to Hungary also gave New Zealand an opportunity to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[106] EAR, 6:11 (1956), p.4.
\item[107] ibid, p.44.
\item[109] The situation in Hungary had been seen as deteriorating in October and Soviet efforts to repress the Hungarian revolt had been brought to the attention of the UN prior to the Soviet invasion. In fact, the General Assembly had been called into special session to discuss Hungary on 2 November. Thus, the first and last times in which the Uniting for Peace resolution was used following a veto in the Security Council occurred within a day of each other.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to the UN Charter.

New Zealand saw the Hungarian situation as providing something of a yardstick by which to measure the Anglo-French intervention at Suez. On 4 November Munro told the General Assembly that British and French forces had acted with 'the announced intention of stopping conflict between two combatant nations close to a vital international waterway'. On the other hand, Munro argued, the Soviet Union had no such noble motive and merely wished to suppress Hungary’s independence. Munro referred also to the number of nations which had been ‘all too ready to speak against Anglo-French intervention’, but were not disposed to act similarly toward the Soviet Union. Munro was able to use this argument on subsequent occasions. During this period New Zealand actively participated in the UN reaction to the Hungarian problem. It voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions condemning the Soviet use of force and gave a grant of £10,000 to the New Zealand Red Cross for Hungarian relief on 6 November. It was subsequently announced that New Zealand would accept 500 Hungarian refugees.

It was, however, the UNEF which was proving most valuable in the recovery of New Zealand’s position. Its rapid inception and development immediately allowed New Zealand to alter the focus of its own military policy in relation to the Suez problem. Hitherto the presence of the Royalist in the Mediterranean had seemed to place New Zealand militarily, as well as politically, beside France and the United Kingdom. New Zealand now had the opportunity to demonstrate a closer military

---

11. ibid.
12. ibid.
affinity with the UN. Holland had initially considered offering Royalist as a contribution to the UN force, but this proved impractical.115 New Zealand subsequently concentrated on offering troops to the UNEF.

As the momentum of the UNEF picked up, it became evident that nations contributing to it would have to be acceptable to Egypt, as the force would be deployed on Egyptian territory. Australia had been hesitant to make any offer to the UNEF, suspecting that it would be rejected. With Egypt having already severed diplomatic relations with Australia, Canberra was reluctant to risk a further rebuff and eventually decided not to make any offer of troops.116 New Zealand, however, pressed on with its offer. On 8 November, Cabinet recommended that plans be prepared for a force of 320 personnel to be raised for deployment with the UNEF.117 Indications began to surface a few days later that the Egyptians might not accept New Zealand troops, but the Government continued to prepare its proposed contribution.118 New Zealand’s offer had been well received in the General Assembly,119 and its willingness to press on regardless of the difficulties emanated, as was pointed out to the Secretary-General, partially from the fact that the

difficulties which have faced the New Zealand representative in the United Nations, following recent New Zealand support for United Kingdom intervention, have been somewhat lessened by the offer to participate in the Emergency Force.120

---

115 McIntosh to Corner, No.56/7, 12 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.


120 Emergency International United Nations Force, Memorandum from McIntosh to Fraser, 13 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 2.
Recruiting for the UNEF began in New Zealand on 15 November, with 350 volunteers signing that day.\textsuperscript{121} The following day the Egyptians publicly declared that forces from British Commonwealth nations would not be acceptable in the UN force.\textsuperscript{122} The New Zealand Government was undeterred. The Secretary-General had undertaken previously to facilitate New Zealand’s participation in the UNEF by allowing some time to lapse before New Zealand troops were deployed.\textsuperscript{123} Some comfort was also drawn from Nasser making an exception for Indian troops. This did not please Pakistan and, after some tense discussion between representatives of the latter and Egypt, Pakistani troops were accepted.\textsuperscript{124} Canadian participation was also eventually accepted. Recruitment in New Zealand continued, with the number of volunteers reaching 816 on 19 November.\textsuperscript{125} It had by this time become clear that Nasser would not accept New Zealand forces. This posed a new problem; should New Zealand’s offer be rejected, there could be a considerable public reaction against the UN. This was identified in Wellington as a major concern.\textsuperscript{126}

A considerable effort was therefore made to minimize any adverse public reaction against the UN. For some time the Government tried to keep New Zealand’s offer ‘alive’. Rumours in mid-November that a rejection of New Zealand’s offer was imminent were not officially confirmed and recruitment continued. It was not until 26 November, ten days after it had first become evident that New Zealand troops

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Dominion}, 15 & 16 November 1956.

\textsuperscript{122} NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.259., 16 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{123} NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.247., 10 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{124} NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.259., 16 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Dominion}, 20 November 1956.

\textsuperscript{126} MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, No.249., 22 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 2.
would not be accepted, that Cabinet finally suspended recruitment.¹²⁷ Even then, medical examinations of those who had already volunteered continued. Press statements emphasized that New Zealand's offer had not been rejected, merely not accepted, and the possibility of a contribution being required in the new year was raised. New Zealand did not withdraw the offer of troops for the UNEF and Holland subsequently repeated that New Zealand's offer still stood.¹²⁸ It was not until January, the following year, that the Government conceded that New Zealand troops were unlikely to be sent to the Middle East.¹²⁹ Even then it was made clear that the offer had not been withdrawn.

Despite the effort to contain the public reaction, the UN was severely criticized in the New Zealand press around the end of November. New Zealanders seem to have remained convinced that the United Kingdom and the New Zealand Government had acted correctly. Amidst the criticism of the UN's attention to Nasser, and the UN's diplomatic snub of New Zealand, a familiar theme was evident in press comment. The impression that the United Kingdom did not act in a way contrary to the UN Charter remained:

In this Middle Eastern Affair the New Zealand Government proclaimed from the outset its faith in the honesty of British motives. But it was also the first Government to offer a contribution to the international force which British realism had prodded the United Nations into organising.¹³⁰

With an actual force contribution to the UNEF no longer a focus, New Zealand had to find an alternative policy direction to make good its recovery in the UN. It fell back on the necessity of finding a lasting solution to Middle Eastern problems. Since 1 November New Zealand had stressed the need to eliminate the


¹²⁸ Press Statement, 3 December 1956; Press Statement, 5 December 1956; PM 217/1/13, Part 2.

¹²⁹ MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, No.2., 3 January 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 3.

¹³⁰ New Zealand Herald, 27 November 1956; this was also implied in the Dominion editorial of the following day.
source of conflict between Egypt and Israel, and it continued to emphasize this into 1957.

It was, however, still the existence of the UNEF which gave New Zealand its most successful means of recovery, despite the 'non-acceptance' of its troops. The new force had to be funded and this problem brought New Zealand policy over the Suez issue back into line with positions it had taken historically at the UN. Soviet attempts to have France, Israel and the United Kingdom pay the costs of the UNEF did not meet with sufficient support. New Zealand in particular fought hard to defeat these proposals. The position of early November, when New Zealand had found itself in minorities of around half a dozen, was superseded by considerably less isolation.

On the issue of funding, New Zealand invoked its previous advocacy of equitable sharing of the costs of all UN operations and this subsequently became a general line of policy over the Suez issue. This had been a proposal made by New Zealand to the Collective Measures Committee in the early 1950s and had received considerable support, particularly among member-nations with UN forces in Korea. After considering the proposal, the CMC had endorsed in two reports the responsibility of all members to pay for operations carried out under the auspices of the UN. The General Assembly had voted to accept these reports.

In late November and early December Munro once again called for a system of equitable sharing to be established for the UNEF. His arguments strongly reflected previous stances by New Zealand on the equitable sharing issue, including the establishment of an assessment scale and the need for this principle to be accepted if collective security was to be successful. Instructions from Wellington late in November evoked the old relationship between equitable sharing and the UN's prestige.\footnote{MEA, Wellington, to NZPMUN, New York, No.267., 29 November 1956, PM 217/1/13, Part 2.} Despite the General Assembly's overwhelming distaste for New Zealand's support for the United Kingdom, and Nasser's rejection of New Zealand
troops in the UNEF, New Zealand consistently paid its share of the costs involved in maintaining the UN force. Later in 1957 New Zealand criticized nations which had not paid their share of the UNEF budget.\textsuperscript{132}

The Suez issue precipitated probably the most severe test for New Zealand foreign policy since the Department of External Affairs had been established in 1943, by bringing New Zealand's traditional support of the United Kingdom and its adherence to the UN Charter into open conflict. The United Kingdom's use of force, and the General Assembly's overwhelming reaction against it, caused a period of intense isolation for New Zealand. It could very well have brought about major changes in the way New Zealand approached the UN, at least a significant weakening in the position of the UN in New Zealand's security policy. In periods of similar isolation, other nations, France, South Africa and the Soviet Union had walked out of the General Assembly or Security Council and adopted policies of suspicion and even antagonism toward the UN.\textsuperscript{133} The possibility at least existed that the National Government of New Zealand, supposedly with a tradition of disinterest in foreign affairs and the UN, would have used the aftermath of the Anglo-French intervention to demonstrate its dislike for the organization. Any number of avenues were open to do this, including a withdrawal of financial support, non-involvement in subsequent UN activities, or public expressions of criticism. Yet none of these options was taken. The Suez Crisis of 1956 did not alter the nature of New Zealand's commitment to the UN.

The Soviet action in Hungary after 4 November significantly diminished the effect of Soviet criticism of Anglo-French policy.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, while little separated the blatancy of the use of force in contravention of the Charter in each

\footnote{132 Untitled Address to General Debate, 12 September 1957, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 5.}

\footnote{133 In 1950 the Soviets boycotted the Security Council in protest at Communist China not being admitted to the UN, the French delegation walked out of the General Assembly in 1955 when it voted to discuss problems in Algeria, and South Africa frequently had occasion to walk out over the Assembly's handling of its Apartheid policy.}

\footnote{134 Memorandum for SecEA, from NZCom, Singapore, 19 November 1956, PM 217/1/16, Part 1.}
case, as time passed the two came to appear to contrast rather remarkably. The Anglo-French intervention was not condemned by the UN, the Soviet invasion of Hungary was. British and French forces did cease hostilities and did withdraw from Egypt, Soviet forces did not withdraw from Hungary until the revolution there had been suppressed. The British and French Governments abided by UN resolutions, if a little belatedly, whereas the Soviet Union did not. The Suez Crisis passed relatively quickly and dropped from UN attention, whereas the situation in Hungary continued to occupy the UN for several years. On leaving his post as New Zealand’s UN representative and Ambassador to the United States in 1958, Sir Leslie Munro became the UN’s special envoy on the Hungarian issue.

The continued advocacy of international control of the Suez Canal remained a generally acceptable principle even after the Anglo-French use of force. SCUA continued to exist and for some six to eight months after the Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt, members of SCUA boycotted the Suez Canal in protest at nationalization. SCUA’s position was assisted by Nasser’s deliberate sinking of ships to block the Suez Canal after 29 October. The one issue which Western nations held in common with many Afro-Asian states was the desire to see unobstructed passage through the Canal maintained. The rapid British undertaking to assist in the clearance of these obstacles contributed to the soothing in its own relationship with the UN. McIntosh noted as early as 19 November that the British had ‘managed to climb out of the bottom of the pit to which they had flung themselves’.135

Damage was sustained to New Zealand’s position in the UN, but this was minimized and eventually repaired by Anglo-French cooperation with the UN, and the circumstances which were seen to divide their action from that of the Soviet Union. Anglo-French foreign policy was brought back into line with the UN before the end of 1956. In addition, New Zealand put in a major effort of its own in re-affirming its commitment to the UN. Even though it was not accepted, New Zealand’s offer to contribute to the UNEF was a political success in the UN.

135 McIntosh to Reid, No.56/3., 19 November 1956, McIntosh Papers.
Significant monetary outlay was involved in assistance given to Hungarian refugees, contributions to the UNEF, and the initial recruiting in New Zealand for the UN force. By August 1957 New Zealand had voluntarily given well in excess of its assessed share for the maintenance of the UNEF, and was rated as the third highest contributor.\textsuperscript{136} For a Government so often noted for attention to financial considerations, and which had its own force offer rebuffed, the significance of this cannot be underrated. Despite the tremendous pro-British sentiment of the New Zealand Government and people, the UN had retained its importance to New Zealand in the wake of the Suez Crisis. Between the end of July and mid-November 1956, New Zealand had followed a pro-British policy, not an anti-UN policy.

That New Zealand did fully recover in the UN cannot be doubted either. Late in 1957 Munro ran for the prestigious post of President of the General Assembly. He was challenged by an Arab representative, indicating residual resentment towards New Zealand's policy from late 1956. However, Munro won with overwhelming support. The damage done during the Suez Crisis had been largely repaired. The major effort put into attaining Munro's presidency testified to the fact that the importance of the UN in New Zealand policy had not declined and New Zealand's significance to the UN had in no way lessened.

\textsuperscript{136} NZDeIUN, New York, to SecEA, Wellington, 22 August 1957, PM 217/1/13, Part 3.
CHAPTER 15

THE SECOND OFFSHORE ISLANDS CRISIS

AUGUST-OCTOBER 1958

Late in 1957 the National Government was defeated and Labour returned to power. Walter Nash became Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. He had a strong interest in foreign policy and was openly enthusiastic about the United Nations. But New Zealand’s approach to the UN was not affected by the change of government or the enthusiasm of Nash. The UN had been a strong focus of foreign policy throughout the 1950s and was a key part of New Zealand’s approach to regional and world security. Under Nash, the importance of the UN in New Zealand’s security policy continued along the lines it had followed since 1945. New Zealand’s commitment to the overriding importance of the UN in world affairs remained. The emphasis on regionalism in New Zealand security policy continued to grow in a manner consistent with previous years. Regional organizations did not become a substitute for the UN and regional security continued to be a vital part of New Zealand’s approach to the UN.

The continuing importance of the UN, particularly to regional security, was demonstrated in the recurrence of a crisis in which New Zealand had previously played a significant role, that over Formosa and the Offshore Islands. The dispute had not been resolved, despite the efforts of New Zealand and other countries in the mid-1950s. The continuing Nationalist occupation of the Offshore Islands remained unacceptable to Peking and artillery exchanges occurred during 1956-57. In August 1958 tension in the area precipitated a new crisis and the world was once again faced with possibility of a major Sino-American conflict. For New Zealand, the regional and global security concerns of 1954-55 resurfaced and consequently the need for a peaceful solution to the problem again became imperative. As before, the UN was the major focal point of New Zealand policy on the issue.
New Zealand was no longer a Security Council member in 1958 and the United States did not demonstrate the same preparedness to utilize UN machinery as it had done in 1954-55. These factors had a marked effect on the role New Zealand was able to play in the issue, and its degree of influence over events was less. Even so, New Zealand policy was almost identical, expressed at times even in the same words, as it had been in 1954-55. Despite the change of government and a new Prime Minister notably more enthusiastic about international affairs, New Zealand’s approach to the Offshore Islands remained consistent with previous policy. The role of the UN, and the relationship between it and regional organizations, were central concerns and they were dealt with in the same way as they had been previously. This consistency demonstrates that the perceived differences between Labour and National approaches to external affairs were simply not significant to the conduct of New Zealand foreign policy as it related to the UN and the pursuit of security in the 1950s.

The basic problems at the heart of the dispute between the Communist and Nationalist Chinese had changed very little in the years between the two Crises. Nationalist forces still occupied outlying islands off the coast of mainland China. Communist China continued to see their presence as a major security threat and retained the desire to bring the islands under the control of Peking. Some changes had occurred in the area, but these only exacerbated the problem. The Communists had put considerable effort into construction of airfields, railroads and highways after the first Crisis died down, and, as a result, troops, equipment and logistics could be moved more readily to coastal areas close to the nationalist-held islands. In February 1956 it was observed that the Communists were in a position to exert pressure on the Offshore Islands ‘without engaging in large-scale hostilities that would be likely to draw a reaction from the Americans’. The Nationalists, on the other hand, had reinforced Matsu and Quemoy, and other islands. By 1958 a third of the Nationalists’ total infantry strength was deployed on islands of limited military

---

2 Formosa and the Offshore Islands, 2 February 1956, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.
value and of little strategic importance in terms of the defence of Formosa.\textsuperscript{3}

The Nationalist reinforcement of these islands had brought about a fundamental change in the position of the United States. In 1954-55 the United States had had little doubt about the indefensibility of many islands and had even convinced the Nationalists to abandon the northern Tachen group. The United States proposal for a provisional guarantee of Quemoy had been stalled, and American commitments in the area remained confined to Formosa and the Pescadores under the terms of the Mutual Defence Treaty of late 1954. In 1958 the United States still considered that islands other than Formosa and the Pescadores were militarily unimportant. But the increased Nationalist presence on some islands caused the United States to concede that a closer relationship now existed between these islands and the defence of Formosa.\textsuperscript{4} Political considerations were also a factor. Munro was told by a State Department official in late August that the loss of troops and equipment deployed on the Offshore Islands would have serious consequences:

\begin{quote}
With the heart of military strength lost, [Nationalist] prestige and morale would be weakened. Relations with United States would be strained, followed by danger of elements coming to power disposed to weaken ties with free world. Overseas [Nationalist] Chinese supporters would be disillusioned.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

It seemed clear that the United States would find it much more difficult to avoid assisting in the defence of the Offshore Islands in 1958 than previously had been the case.\textsuperscript{6}

The new crisis broke out on 22-23 August, with heavy shelling of Nationalist

\textsuperscript{3} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.222., 27 August 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.

\textsuperscript{4} ibid.

\textsuperscript{5} NZAmb, Washington, MEA, Wellington, No.223., 27 August 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.

\textsuperscript{6} ibid.
positions which continued unabated in following months. On 27 August a senior Communist military commander publicly declared that the Red Army intended invading Formosa. The spectre of American involvement in the Offshore Islands arose immediately. The United States Seventh Fleet was ordered to intervene if an invasion of the Offshore Islands was attempted. Communist China’s relations with India and the United Kingdom were at a low-point and it was evident that the restraining role both countries had played in 1954-55 was unlikely to be repeated. The world came close to the brink of war once again.

The security implications for New Zealand of any large-scale conflict were immense. The link between global peace and security remained an important part of New Zealand’s security outlook. The consequences of a conflict over the Offshore Islands for New Zealand’s regional security were just as serious. These two problems remained entwined in New Zealand’s approach to the second Offshore Islands Crisis. World war had obvious consequences and these would be made worse if the conflict was centred in the Pacific region. Therefore the maintenance of peace was perceived as urgent in terms of New Zealand security within the global context, and Nash’s first reaction was to stress the role of the UN. But also evident was a clear concern for New Zealand’s regional security if a Communist attack took place. In 1955 it had been believed in Wellington that the island chain of non-Communist countries running down the Pacific was essential to the security of New Zealand. This perception remained strong, and Nash was aware of the necessity of honouring certain treaty obligations in the event of the island chain being compromised. Again, a peaceful solution would prevent that occurring and New Zealand’s regional security was seen to be intimately related to international efforts to ease tension in the Offshore Islands. Regional obligations were therefore taken seriously, but they

---

7 Secretary’s [of State] Meeting with the SEATO Heads of Mission: The Situation in the Taiwan Straits, 3 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.


9 McIntosh to Nash, 1 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.

10 ibid.
did not interfere with the importance of the UN. On 3 September Munro attended a SEATO Chiefs of Mission meeting in Washington. He stressed to Dulles New Zealand’s desire for consideration to be given to Security Council action and the necessity for restraint on all sides.\textsuperscript{11}

Nash had already begun outlining New Zealand policy. On 2 September he issued a press statement reflecting his concern for regional and global security. Nash declared that Formosa and the Offshore Islands lay outside the SEATO area.\textsuperscript{12} He noted, however, that ANZUS obligations could be invoked ‘if an armed attack took place in the Pacific area against the metropolitan or island territories of any of the Parties or their armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft’.\textsuperscript{13} Then, before referring to New Zealand’s Security Council initiative of 1954-5, he stated that

\begin{quote}
The ANZUS Treaty did not, of course, affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under the United Nations Charter, nor did it affect the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

With this statement Nash publicly ruled out SEATO, but not ANZUS, as a possible means by which New Zealand might be drawn into a conflict. While he did not confirm that New Zealand would involve itself over the Offshore Islands, he recognized the existence of obligations arising under ANZUS. Most significantly, he stressed the role of the UN and outlined New Zealand’s action on the Security Council in 1954-5, which was indicative of his interest in a new UN initiative. Nash noted that the New Zealand item was still on the Security Council’s agenda and that Council discussion could therefore be renewed at any time.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.231., 3 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, part 7.
\textsuperscript{12} EAR, 8:9 (1958), p.11.
\textsuperscript{13} ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} ibid.
The United States was not enthusiastic about the issue being taken up in the UN. Dulles pointed out to Munro that the United States would probably be isolated in the UN and subject to considerable hostility from the Soviet Union.  

A member of the public wrote to Nash in early September asking why the Offshore Islands question was not being dealt with 'by the organization created to deal with such issues'. The letter highlighted the new conditions in which New Zealand faced an old problem. Nash’s reply explained that New Zealand had once attempted a solution on the Security Council, but was no longer a member of it and could not, therefore, initiate such action again. Nash said that he would put New Zealand’s views forward during his opening address at the forthcoming General Assembly session, but he could promise little more as the issue was not on General Assembly agenda.

Nash had already expressed considerable dissatisfaction at the UN not being involved. On 11 September, during a parliamentary debate on external affairs, Nash emphasized the need for the issue to be referred to the UN. The formula Nash advanced for the solution to the crisis was for Formosa to be neutralized and demilitarized and placed under a UN guarantee. The UN guarantee had been proposed in 1955 and New Zealand, under the Holland National Government, had supported the idea. Nash opposed any handing over of Formosa to the Communists and was concerned that its independence be maintained. He considered that the

---

17 Titman to Nash, 7 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.
18 Nash to Titman, 19 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 8.
19 ibid.
20 EAR 8:9 (1958), p.16.
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
UN could arrange Formosa’s neutralization in a way which would protect this.\textsuperscript{23} The Offshore Islands, however, Nash stated emphatically belonged to mainland China and the solution to the crisis was recognition of this.\textsuperscript{24} His approach was strongly supported by the National Opposition. Keith Holyoake, Holland’s successor as National’s Leader, stressed the importance of the UN to a solution in the Offshore Islands, and in world affairs generally.\textsuperscript{25} Ron Algie, the only MP not to vote for ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, unequivocally endorsed Nash’s approach to the Crisis in 1958.\textsuperscript{26}

Nash’s statement, and the reporting of it in the American press, prompted a stiff United States reaction. Dulles described Nash’s statement to Munro the following day as ‘difficult and embarrassing’.\textsuperscript{27} He went on to criticize the simplicity of Nash’s proposed ‘amputation’ of the Offshore Islands from Formosa, an exercise which would allegedly leave it in an isolated and critical defensive situation.\textsuperscript{28} The United States was convinced that Communist China would not be content until they had taken Formosa itself and were not impressed with the proposal for demilitarization.\textsuperscript{29} Dulles then went on to express dissatisfaction at opinions of allied countries keeping the United States from taking the action it felt necessary for general Western security.\textsuperscript{30} Dulles mentioned that a lack of allied support would result in a reconsideration of American strategic policy, which had implications for the future of ANZUS.\textsuperscript{31} ‘This attitude can only force the United States back into

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{23} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} NZPD, 318 (1958), pp.1724-26.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} ibid, p.1730.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} NZAmb, Washington, to MEA, Wellington, No.241., 12 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} ibid.
\end{itemize}
isolationism which would not be good for New Zealand.¹³² Dulles reiterated the importance of the island chain to Pacific security.³³

Nash's statement had angered Dulles, and it had prompted veiled threats of an American withdrawal from its current position in the Pacific. But Nash's statement had signalled no change from previous New Zealand policy on Formosa and the Offshore Islands. New Zealand had no interest in the Offshore Islands and had maintained since 1954 that they were an integral part of mainland China. Departmental officials in Wellington had confirmed this policy when intermittent artillery exchanges broke out in 1956.³⁴ Dulles told Munro that there were three courses of action unsatisfactory to the Americans which had to that time been avoided; Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore islands, a Nationalist defeat there and American involvement in a major war.³⁵ In Wellington it was observed:

From New Zealand's point of view, and that of most other Commonwealth countries, the situation in the Offshore Islands has, in fact, deteriorated in that one of the "unsatisfactory courses" which have been avoided - getting the Nationalist Chinese forces to withdraw from the Offshore Islands - is the one which we have all along advocated.³⁶

Nash merely reiterated this long-standing view, along with a strong emphasis on UN involvement, which was also a central tenet of previous policy. Nash had, therefore, said nothing which the Americans had not been told before. On 14 September McIntosh sent Munro the text of Nash's statement and explained its implications:

³² ibid.

³³ ibid.

³⁴ Extract from Observation by Mr Dulles on International Affairs, 7 April 1956, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.


³⁶ Extract from Observation by Mr Dulles on International Affairs, 7 April 1956, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 7.
[The] Prime Minister at no time suggested (as we suspect press reports may have implied) that [the] offshore islands should be handed over to Communist China. What he did say was that these islands (in clear distinction from Formosa) are an integral part of the Chinese mainland.... He went on to say that in [the] present dangerous situation where bombardment could lead to more widespread hostilities, military measures could not solve the problem. What was needed was a truce or ceasefire whereby each side could stop fighting without giving up its claims. This could be achieved either through [the] continuation of Sino-American talks or through [the] United Nations. A final solution could only come about in [the] natural course of political developments. You will note that this attitude is precisely the same as that adopted by the previous government in response to Anglo-American suggestions in the Security Council in 1955.37

The telegram went on to state that the island chain was a concern and that New Zealand had joined ANZUS and SEATO to see that it was protected.38 This was hardly the case. Of the many original New Zealand motives for participation in ANZUS and SEATO, the defence of the island chain was of little significance. This assertion, however, reflected the evolving nature of New Zealand defence concerns. In 1955 New Zealand had accepted the necessity for the island chain to be maintained and ANZUS and SEATO, along with certain Commonwealth initiatives, subsequently became important to New Zealand’s approach to the defence of non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia. Despite this development, the UN remained central to New Zealand’s pursuit of security. The telegram also stated that Nash did not want any attempt made to defend the Offshore Islands and looked forward ultimately to the neutralization and demilitarization of Formosa under a UN guarantee.39 The pacification of the dispute was by far the most important objective and the UN featured strongly in Nash’s views on how this could be brought about. On 16 September an aide memoire, expressing his views, was handed to the


38 ibid.

39 ibid.
The following month the ANZUS Council was scheduled to meet in Washington and the Offshore Islands was inevitably a major topic of discussion. In preparing a brief for Nash, departmental officials outlined New Zealand policy in familiar terms. Dulles harsh criticism had had no effect and did not alter the belief that the Offshore Islands were part of mainland China. The islands were not worth fighting over and it was observed that New Zealand’s ‘purpose in initiating the [earlier] Security Council exercise was to try to create conditions which would allow the Americans to disentangle themselves’. This objective remained a high priority in 1958. It was noted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee that New Zealand involvement in hostilities could arise ‘under Commonwealth, SEATO or United Nations obligations’. ANZUS was also mentioned, but they added that obligations under this treaty could only be invoked if American territory or armed forces were attacked.

By the time the ANZUS representatives met, bilateral talks between the Communist China and the United States had been arranged. Australian and New Zealand representatives at the ANZUS Council meeting on 1 October praised this development and reaffirmed the need for a peaceful solution. The following day

---

40 NZPMUN, New York, to MEA, Wellington, No.197., 16 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 8.

41 ANZUS Council Meeting, 1 October 1958: Summary - The Offshore Island Question, 19 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 8

42 ibid.

43 ibid.

44 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Joint Intelligence Committee: Possible Consequences Should Hostilities Break Out Between Communist China and the United States in the Formosa Straits Area, JIC(58)20, 19 September 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 8.

45 ibid.

Nash outlined New Zealand policy at length. He responded affirmatively to the American emphasis on the need to preserve the island chain, and noted that New Zealand security would be far more difficult to maintain without the United States. 'It was good for New Zealand that the United States was in Formosa.' The Offshore Islands were, however, a different question, and Nash indicated his desire to see American policy change on the question of their defence. This bore a remarkable similarity to Macdonald’s expression of New Zealand policy in 1955. Nash then put several proposals to Dulles. He hoped that a way to give the Offshore Islands back to mainland China could be found and asked Dulles if Matsu could be given up. Dulles responded ‘firmly in the negative’. Nash then asked if the issue could be taken to the International Court, to which Dulles again replied negatively, stating that the Communists had never accepted its authority. Finally Nash enquired about the possibility of referring the issue to the UN. Dulles stated that the Communists were against such a move, which was at least half correct - the United States was equally opposed to UN involvement.

Despite Nash’s efforts, therefore, American policy did not change and the issue was not brought before the UN. The Sino-American talks were in difficulty as early as 2 October and prospects for a solution were not promising. In mid-

---

48 Memorandum for SecEA, from White, 2 October 1958, PM 264/3/2/1, Part 9.
49 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
October the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee considered that the situation had deteriorated and that the consequences of hostilities should be reviewed. In terms of the security implications for New Zealand of a war over the Offshore Islands, their appraisal was more far-reaching than previous studies. They considered that conflict between China and the United States could spill over to Formosa, Hong Kong and Korea and lead to a general global war. This inevitably affected New Zealand. While Formosa and Hong Kong were outside the SEATO area, conflict in the region would probably soon reach it. The Chiefs went on:

In addition to other specific interests, New Zealand has interests within the United Nations. Although Security Council action may be sought[,] agreement is unlikely through the application of the veto by the Soviet Union. However, the General Assembly "Uniting for Peace Procedure" should not be discounted. Further, should hostilities recur in Korea, and a recent report suggests this possibility, New Zealand obligations to the United Nations Command should not be overlooked.

Without doubt, the second Offshore Islands Crisis produced a major security dilemma for New Zealand. Compared to 1954-55, New Zealand’s role in the second crisis was hardly significant. New Zealand was no longer on the Security Council and the issue was not taken to the UN. As with the earlier Crisis, the issue simmered down without any real solution being found. Despite this, New Zealand remained fundamentally attached to a solution through the UN, which utilized UN machinery to ensure peace was maintained. Constantly reiterated was the need for the UN to deal with the problem and, despite American resistance and criticism, Nash remained committed to his suggestion for demilitarization and neutralization of Formosa under

57 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Joint Planning Committee: Possible Consequences of Hostilities in the Formosa Strait Area and Hong Kong: Annex to JPC(58)61 (Revise), 15 October 1958.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 ibid.
a UN guarantee.  

As in 1955, the basic tenets of American strategic policy, especially the maintenance of the island chain, were accepted by New Zealand. Communism in Asia was perceived as a genuine threat and New Zealand therefore readily accepted the necessity for a strong American and allied presence in East Asia. ANZUS, initially sought to guard against Japan, and SEATO, only half-heartedly pursued by New Zealand, became increasingly significant to this policy in the late 1950s. But, as in 1955, when National was in power, the acceptance of American strategic priorities in 1958 did not cause any diminution in the role of the UN. Throughout the Crisis New Zealand perceived that its participation in ANZUS, SEATO and the Commonwealth could lead to its involvement in a war. Yet at no time did any military or diplomatic official, or Nash himself, ever argue that action taken in relation to these alliances would be contrary to the UN Charter. Indeed the UN was tightly entwined with such action, it being made clear on a number of occasions that New Zealand might be involved in war because of its UN obligations. UN support and consistency with the UN Charter was implicit in New Zealand’s policy projections concerning a possible worsening of the Crisis.

If anything, the presence of ANZUS and SEATO increased the significance of the UN. Neither alliance placed any specific obligation on New Zealand if Communist China attacked the Offshore Islands. SEATO was initially ruled out by Nash and considered relevant subsequently by the Chiefs of Staff only if the conflict spread. ANZUS was recognized early as a concern, but as Nash stated and the Chiefs later endorsed, it committed New Zealand to act only if American territory or armed forces were attacked. There was never any recognition that New Zealand would be involved automatically in a conflict, and considerable ambiguity over what events might precipitate such involvement. The existence of the alliances did, however, suggest the need to act in support of American policy if the situation deteriorated into war. This factor reinforced the necessity for New Zealand to seek a

---

peaceful solution to the Crisis and led to the persistent attempts by Nash and others to have the UN deal with the issue. A pacification of the situation was urgent, and thereafter a solution to the problem which would prevent a further Crisis developing. This created the impetus for the continuation of New Zealand policy along the lines established in 1954-5, advocating the return of the Offshore Islands to mainland China and the extension of a UN guarantee to a neutral Formosa.

Furthermore, this policy, with its strong emphasis on the UN, was expressed at meetings of the SEATO Heads of Mission on 3 September and at the ANZUS Council meeting a month later. The existence of these alliances facilitated a significantly higher degree of New Zealand policy expression on the issue than would otherwise have been the case. The close, at times inseparable, relationship between New Zealand’s approach to regional security organizations and to the UN was just as evident in 1958 as it was in the mid-1940s.

New Zealand was unable to match its profile of 1954-55. It was no longer on the Security Council and, despite watching the Crisis develop with deep concern, it was unable to exert a major influence on events. The United States, contrary to its position of 1954-55, did not want the UN involved and resisted pressure for that course to be taken. All of this was beyond New Zealand’s control. Nevertheless, New Zealand pressed for a peaceful solution to the Crisis and continually advocated UN involvement in a solution. As in previous years the UN was perceived as an essential component of New Zealand’s regional security apparatus, and the existence of regional organizations did not cause any diminution in its role.
CHAPTER 16

THE END OF AN ERA

The argument advanced in this thesis has been that the United Nations retained its significance in New Zealand's pursuit of security from 1945 until 1960, when major changes within the UN itself altered the way New Zealand approached it. Regional developments in the 1940s and 1950s were not detrimental to the role of the UN in New Zealand security policy and changes of government did not interfere with policy consistency. New Zealand continued throughout to advocate the UN's ultimate authority in international peace and security issues, and to seek more direct security objectives through it.

By 1960 the UN's membership had doubled and the character of the organization had changed as a consequence. This caused the UN to move away from the traditional objectives New Zealand had sought through it, and the overwhelming African and Asian membership after 1960 destroyed the dominance of the West in the organization. The UN became much more concerned with anti-colonial issues and less reflective of the security interests of the old Commonwealth and Western alliance powers. This impacted directly on the role of the organization in New Zealand security policy. The year 1960 marked roughly the end of a period characterized by the importance of the UN in New Zealand security policy and of the remarkably close relationship between regional and global security objectives.

In the closing years of the 1950s New Zealand policy strongly reflected that of previous years. The Offshore Islands situation simmered on without perceptible progress toward a solution. In 1959 Nash emphasized the need for a solution to the problem, but he made little impression. New Zealand also retained a strong interest in the UNEF and stoutly defended the policy of equitable sharing of costs. New Zealand criticized France, the Soviet Union and other countries for not providing

their share of the required funds. Satisfaction was expressed at the precedent the UNEF had established, and that its permanence had been confirmed. New Zealand looked with favour on an American proposal for an international police force based on the UNEF. In 1959 a New Zealand officer serving with UNTSO was transferred to the UNEF, at last establishing some form of New Zealand participation in it. Nash praised the UNEF in 1958, stating that it demonstrated the UN's ability to maintain peace in disputed areas. He hoped it would be an example followed in relation to the Offshore Islands Crisis.

In May 1958 Lebanon appealed to the Security Council for assistance against alleged infiltration from Syria. A United Nations Observer Group was despatched to the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Group quickly began observation operations, but reported only small-scale infiltrations and a limited traffic of arms from Syria to Lebanon. Convinced that the threat was significantly greater, the Lebanese Government requested the United States to deploy troops in Lebanon. This evoked intense Soviet criticism and most Western countries felt it prudent that United States troops be withdrawn as soon as possible. The problem was complicated by a coup in Iraq, which caused fears in Jordan that a similar conspiracy was likely there. Jordan requested support from the United Kingdom and British troops were sent.

Throughout May, June and July, the Security Council grappled with the problem of Lebanon and Jordan but, despite the quick agreement to deploy an Observer Group, Lebanon was not satisfied with either its size or its findings. The problem facing the Security Council then became one of facilitating the withdrawal

---

2 Untitled Address to General Debate, 12 September 1957, PM 115/4/6/7, Part 5.

3 Corner to McIntosh, 26 July 1957, PM 217/1/13, Part 3.


5 ibid.


7 ibid, p. 150.
of United States troops and taking measures sufficiently strong to convince Lebanon that its territorial integrity would not be compromised. The difficulty of achieving this was demonstrated by constant disagreements in the Security Council and a final decision by Council members early in August to call an emergency session of the General Assembly. The Assembly initiated a solution whereby American forces could be withdrawn without loss of face and the UN presence in Lebanon strengthened. Limited UN initiatives were also undertaken in Jordan, by which time the crises facing both countries had simmered down, and American and British troops were removed.

In mid-July Nash endorsed the American troop deployment in Lebanon. He made clear that he accepted its legality and that it did not contravene the UN Charter. Nevertheless, Nash was anxious that the UN take more assertive action regarding Lebanon. His concern stemmed from traditional New Zealand concerns:

In situations of this nature the position of the New Zealand Government has always been clear. We are prepared to support action by the United Nations designed to protect the independence and territorial integrity of its members.

Lebanon is a small country whose actions have threatened no one. We would consider it a sad day if such a country, considering itself menaced from without, were unable to receive effective assistance from an organisation recognising as one of its basic principles the sovereign equality of its members.

Nash subsequently informed both Dulles and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that New Zealand supported moves to protect the territorial integrity of Lebanon. He considered that the UN was the proper framework through which

---

8 ibid, p.152.


10 ibid.

11 ibid.

12 ibid, p.16.
Initiatives to this end should be made. On 24 July Nash told Parliament that the Government would 'give urgent consideration to any request' for a New Zealand contribution to the UN Observation Group in Lebanon.

Following the Security Council's decision to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly, the New Zealand representative reiterated Nash's concern that the UN take immediate measures to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Jordan and Lebanon. He told the Assembly on 15 August that New Zealand considered that it was imperative 'that the Assembly look beyond these immediate issues. It must, if its work is to have full meaning, endeavour to elaborate measures which will provide small States with effective protection against indirect aggression'.

On 21 August the General Assembly unanimously adopted a vaguely worded resolution empowering the Secretary-General to take what action he considered necessary to bring about a solution. Tension in Lebanon and Jordan had already declined and Anglo-American forces were withdrawn. The need for UN observers also lessened and they were removed before the end of the year.

New Zealand's policy over the 1958 Middle East crisis closely imitated its reaction to many other problems which had arisen during the 1950s. A strong concern for the security of small states was demonstrated and a genuine desire expressed for effective and dependable UN machinery to be created. Emphasis was constantly placed on the duty of the Security Council to act and open endorsement

---

13 ibid.
14 ibid.
16 ibid.
18 ibid, p.36.
given to measures taken by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly when the Council failed to do so. As with the Suez Crisis in 1956, New Zealand support for policies carried out by the major powers did not detract from a strong UN policy. The UN was still considered an imperfect, but potentially effective, organ for security purposes, and in 1958 it had demonstrated again that Security Council paralysis did not necessarily mean the UN was ineffective. New Zealand assessments of the early 1950s, that the UN was an organization which was capable of acting to meet the needs of small states, continued to be held at the end of the decade.  

In 1960 the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to create a peace-keeping force for the Congo, where a serious internal crisis had broken out. As with UNEF, New Zealand supported the Secretary-General’s efforts and contributed financially to the force established in the Congo. Security Council consensus did not last, however, and the General Assembly took control of the Congo operation under the Uniting for Peace resolution. While the Jordan/Lebanon incident did not see the Uniting for Peace procedures invoked, the process it introduced was nevertheless used. Up until 1960, therefore, the General Assembly asserted itself on major issues when the Security Council proved unable to do so, exerting its influence in the political sphere. Fraser had sought this type of General Assembly influence in 1945, and New Zealand subsequently considered progress in this area to have been made by the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950, and subsequent events during the decade. This assisted in the retention of the UN as a major focus in New Zealand security policy.

After 1960, however, the UN swiftly developed into a very different organization. While New Zealand’s approach remained constant in the late 1950s, the UN itself had already entered a period of fundamental change. This was subdued at first and allowed the main lines of New Zealand’s approach to continue, but after 1960 the changes had a significant impact.

---

New Zealand's part in the membership operation of late 1955 enhanced its reputation in the UN, particularly among the nations which entered in that year. Furthermore, New Zealand's rapport with Third World countries in the UN after 1955 was generally good, despite its often tense relationship with India and its ambivalent position on apartheid. The success of the membership operation, however, had profound implications for New Zealand's position in the UN. The membership deadlock had kept the UN a relatively small organization, though large enough to be significant in world affairs. This granted those nations which were members of the UN a disproportionate level of influence over major world events. New Zealand was a small nation of no economic, militarily or political significance, but by virtue of its UN membership, it was ‘enabled to play a part in world affairs almost certainly greater than what might be expected of a country of its size’.\(^{20}\)

New Zealand had a vested interest in maintaining the UN as a small organization and this had led to considerable debate in the Department of External Affairs over how to approach the membership issue.\(^{21}\) It was eventually decided that it would not be in New Zealand’s interests to oppose a solution, but this did not mean the difficulties disappeared.\(^{22}\) Once the UN’s membership increased, New Zealand became a smaller part of the organization and, therefore, a less influential member of it. This was noted immediately on the success of the membership solution in 1955 by a member of New Zealand’s UN Delegation, ‘the physical job of canvassing the increased membership will be beyond the resources of all but a few delegations’.\(^{23}\) The implications of this for New Zealand, which had always had problems with resources at the UN, were clear. With a further influx of new members in 1960 and the rapid growth of the UN subsequently, New Zealand’s position was comprehensively altered.

---

\(^{20}\) New Zealand and International Affairs: A Survey, 24 November 1954, McIntosh Papers.

\(^{21}\) Summary Brief: Provisional Agenda of the Tenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Item No.21., Admission of New Members, undated, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\(^{22}\) Memorandum for MEA, August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

\(^{23}\) Perry to McIntosh, 28 December 1955, McIntosh Papers.
The increase in new members and the consequences it had on the nature of the organization prompted moves in the 1960s to have the Security Council expanded. With no Asian or African seat, the Council rapidly became unrepresentative of a significant portion of the UN. New Zealand initially opposed any attempt to increase the size of the Security Council, fearing for the future of the Commonwealth seat. In the early 1950s, New Zealand had suspected that India desired to turn the Commonwealth seat into an Asian seat. With the Commonwealth seat gone, New Zealand would have little chance of representation on the Council. In 1965 the Security Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members, the Commonwealth seat was eliminated, and New Zealand was included in the Western European group. New Zealand served a one-year term in 1966, failed to gain a seat in the early 1980s and was elected to only its second full term for 1993-94. Other nations in the UN have served on the Security Council on a greater number of occasions, indicative of the changed position New Zealand has been in since 1960.

Other problems emanating from the UN’s increasing membership were more serious. The admission of sixteen new members in 1955 destroyed the dominance of the West. Between 1945 and 1955 the UN consisted of twenty members from Latin America, twelve from Western Europe, sixteen from Arab and Asian countries and, apart from South Africa, no African countries. Geographically, much of the world was excluded and the UN was predominantly centred around the nations which had fought and won the Second World War. On some issues the West could muster a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, due to American influence over Latin American countries. Soviet attempts to discredit NATO in the UN were roundly defeated, the Korean War effort was well supported by most UN members, and the Anglo-French intervention at Suez, while criticized, was not

---


25 Record of Interview Between Mr Norman (Canada) and J.V. Wilson, 16 August 1955, PM 115/5/33/1, Part 1.

26 Prospects of the United Nations Following the Admission of Sixteen Members, 9 January 1956, Munro Papers, MS 2230/49.
condemned by the UN. The Soviet Union was generally isolated and forced to use its veto at a rate which won it little favour in the UN, and the United States easily managed to exclude Communist China from membership. It was possible even on non-security issues for the West to dominate. Resolutions on apartheid were mild in 1950s and the issue was not dealt with by the Security Council. UN discussions on Algeria and Cyprus were tense but inconclusive.

New Zealand benefited directly from Western dominance. As a small state, concerned since 1945 with the UN's ability to act with authority against aggression, New Zealand fully endorsed the UN intervention in the Korean War. The Korean War was predominantly supported by Western powers and gave New Zealand the precedent it was looking for - a collective action in defence of a small state. Over Indochina and Formosa, New Zealand's old Commonwealth partners proved influential in moderating American policy when it appeared too extreme. While the UN initiatives were not themselves successful, it is impossible to discount their value in preventing the United States from taking more aggressive action, which might have resulted in war. UN initiatives always recognized, however, certain basic strategic interests essential to New Zealand and Western security in the Pacific and Asia. This emanated primarily from the overlapping security interests which New Zealand shared with other Western powers and the influence they had in the UN.

Following the admission of new members late in 1955, the West lost its dominance in the UN. It retained the ability to muster a one-third blocking minority on some issues, but in 1960, when another large influx occurred, this could no longer be relied on. Other nations, particularly the Third World group, assumed greater importance and this completely changed the character of the organization. The new membership destroyed the UN as a forum in which conservative Western interests could be pursued. The anti-colonial group grew and the position of Western powers administering colonies and trust territories became more difficult. New Zealand perceived the new African members as radical and irresponsible, knowing little about restraint and therefore a dangerous element. Frank Corner noted during an Assembly session in 1961:
Here I am thoroughly in the rat race....The Africans are an interesting lot - the wild men, swept by gusts of emotion, caring nothing for the Charter or precedents; many of them speaking like children out of grown men’s bodies.27

Reflecting the weight of the new African membership, African problems became the dominant feature of the Assembly’s agenda after 1960. General Assembly resolutions began endorsing the use of force to overthrow apartheid. From an organization which New Zealand perceived should protect the national sovereignty of states, and particularly those in the Commonwealth, the General Assembly had shown itself capable of being an open threat to them. New Zealand’s position toward Africa remained an uneasy one. The traditional position on Article 2(7), the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter, had to be abandoned and replaced by limited endorsement of General Assembly initiatives. But New Zealand remained reluctant to cooperate with the new majority opinion. As if to demonstrate this, New Zealand cast the sole negative vote on a Security Council resolution in 1966 against the white Smith regime in Rhodesia which had seized power the year before.

The African states also bolstered the anti-colonial group in the UN, prompting Nash to observe on 9 October that the campaign to eliminate colonialism was reaching new heights.28 This group had always caused concern for New Zealand. India and the Soviet Union had been critical of the trusteeship administration in Samoa and opposed New Zealand over the domestic policies of South Africa in 1940s and 1950s. Even in security-related issues New Zealand was frequently out of step with India, as was evident over Formosa and the Offshore Islands, Indochina and Suez. After 1956 the influence of India in the UN rose, due in part to its strong anti-colonial policy and to the personality of its UN representative, Krishna Menon. Menon had an immense reputation and a quick temper, which he used to impress and intimidate the Asian members of the

27 Corner to McIntosh, McIntosh papers, 20 October 1961.

Assembly. On several occasions he successfully cajoled unwilling nations within the Asian group to support various initiatives they otherwise would not have. These were seldom favourable to New Zealand. In the next decade the influence of India and the anti-colonial group strongly hindered the success of New Zealand policy at the UN. Nash was made explicitly aware of this during the regular session of the Assembly in 1960. McIntosh related the experience later:

The Prime Minister himself did quite well at the U.N. but unfortunately the impact of his speech, which we beamed at the Afro-Asian group, failed in its objective because they chose that particular moment to go away to a full Afro-Asian Caucus meeting to listen to Sukarno and Nehru.30

The Cold War continued and this had always been a problem which interfered with the UN as a security provider for New Zealand. But after 1960 the Soviet Union was never as isolated as it had been previously and major Western security issues were increasingly pursued outside the UN as a result. In 1954 New Zealand had been among a number of nations which had encouraged the United States not to take measures outside the UN over Vietnam. The UN did provide other ways, such as the proposed deployment of the POC, to achieve American objectives. In the early 1960s, however, the UN simply offered no alternative and the United States intervened directly in Indochina. With the Americans acting outside the UN, New Zealand could not use the organization to moderate United States policy as it had done previously.

In 1963 the Indonesian/Malaysian Confrontation broke out and the United Kingdom requested military assistance from New Zealand for its effort in Malaysia. Prime Minister Holyoake suggested at the time that Confrontation be approached through the UN, but the British Government quickly rejected this proposal and it was not mentioned again. New Zealand troops were eventually committed to

29 Memorandum on Recent Proceedings in the Assembly, 27 December 1956, Munro Papers, MS 2230/3.

30 McIntosh to Powles, undated, McIntosh Papers.
operations on the Malay Peninsula in August 1964 and to Borneo in January 1965. It was this conflict, not the UN, as in 1954, which featured predominantly in New Zealand efforts to avoid a commitment to Vietnam in the 1960s.\(^{31}\)

United States attempts to have Vietnam discussed in the Security Council in 1966 were vigorously opposed by the Soviets.\(^{32}\) In contrast with the 1950s, therefore, the most pressing security issue facing New Zealand had to be dealt with entirely outside the UN. In 1968 Bruce Brown summed up the role of the Security Council:

> it is only rarely in recent years that the Council has been able to respond effectively to a crisis involving international peace and security - in too many situations it has been rendered inoperative by Great Power divisions. It must be recognised frankly that in most foreseeable circumstances involving Western security and especially in situations likely to be of more immediate relevance for New Zealand, this division will almost certainly persist. It follows that the Security Council is unlikely to be of any real protective value in such a situation either to New Zealand or to our friends.\(^{33}\)

While in the period 1954-55 the Security Council was constantly overshadowed by the division between East and West, it nevertheless played a significant role in the pursuit of New Zealand security objectives. As a means of preventing United States involvement in Indochina in 1954, and a restraining influence over Formosa and the Offshore Islands, the Council had demonstrated real protective value in terms of New Zealand's interests. When it failed to operate, the Uniting for Peace procedure, or action similar to it, had encouraged New Zealand to believe that the General Assembly also had a significant security role. By 1966 these possibilities had diminished.


\(^{33}\) ibid, p.24.
New Zealand endorsed the Security Council’s decision in 1960 to send a UN force to re-establish peace in the Congolese civil war. All five permanent members concurred in the decision to despatch the force but, after it suffered reverses and the Congolese situation became more complex, the Soviet Union opposed further Security Council initiatives. The United States then proposed that an emergency session of the General Assembly be convened under the provisions of the United for Peace resolution. This was successful and the Assembly subsequently controlled the Congo operation.

But this decision, welcomed by New Zealand, precipitated a major crisis in the UN itself. Since 1945 New Zealand had openly endorsed a significant role for the General Assembly in world affairs, and, after the Korean War, the Uniting for Peace procedures. From this time too, New Zealand successfully advocated the equitable sharing of costs of UN operations. This concept was applied to the UNEF and the Congo force. When the General Assembly took responsibility for the Congo operation, against the wishes of the Soviet Union, the latter refused to pay its share of the costs. This was not a new component of Soviet policy, as it had never contributed to the UNEF, despite the equitable sharing policy being adopted. The Soviet Union was not alone, other nations also did not pay their assessed share of the costs in the Congo and France had also decided by 1960 to cease contributing to the UNEF. As the cost of Congo operation spiralled in the early 1960s, the UN moved rapidly toward a major financial crisis which threatened the organization with bankruptcy. Despite various initiatives, such as the sale of UN bonds, the organization was in deep financial trouble by 1964-5.

Under Article 19 of the Charter, a UN member more than two years in arrears in its financial commitments could have its right to vote in the General Assembly nullified until the debt was paid. The possibility of bringing a draft-resolution to the General Assembly suspending the Soviet right to vote was seriously

---

34 Luard, p.249.

35 Appendix 1.
entertained by a number of Western nations, including New Zealand. But the Soviet Union was not the only one in arrears, nor alone in refusing to pay for specific UN operations. If broadly applied, any resolution which punished the Soviet Union for non-payment could potentially set a precedent for the disenfranchisement of a significant portion of the General Assembly.

Being unable to bring any change to Soviet policy, the UN was faced with having to adjust its own. In the wake of the Congo crisis, the equitable sharing of costs concept was abandoned and future operations were to be funded by voluntary contributions only. The Congolese situation developed into a political quagmire, with the UN force making no progress toward settling the situation, and in fact its presence exacerbated the problem. The failure of Congo operation, and the financial crisis which came with it, damaged the confidence of the General Assembly in collective operations. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was not revoked, but was rendered impotent by the Congo crisis. The will of the General Assembly to act in lieu of Security Council was extinguished, and most UN members accepted that no further operations would be carried out unless agreement in the Council could be maintained.

This decision was a major blow to New Zealand’s pursuit of security through the UN and marked off the period prior to 1960 as distinctive. From 1945 to 1960 New Zealanders involved with the UN could claim that while the UN had fallen short of 1945 objectives, it was nevertheless progressing in various ways toward them. Berendsen hailed the creation of the Little Assembly in 1947, both he and Fraser were elated at the UN’s response in Korea in 1950, and Doidge was encouraged by the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the same year. Uniting for Peace was used after 1950 and continued to be regarded by New Zealand as an effective part of the UN’s security machinery. After the Congo this impression of progress could no longer be sustained.

By 1965 the General Assembly was less powerful in areas which meant most to New Zealand, and the significance of the Security Council, which had been a vital
part of New Zealand's security policy in 1954-55, was much reduced by 1966. By this time the concept of universal collective security was no longer seriously pursued and the veto was seen as one of the few instruments capable of curbing the excesses of the UN's new membership. After 1960 the UN was far less significant in New Zealand's pursuit of security.

In the 1990s New Zealand's relationship with the UN has altered yet again. As in the early 1960s, changes in the UN itself proved to be important elements defining New Zealand's approach to it. Decolonization has largely run its course, white minority rule has ended in South Africa, the Cold War is apparently over and the major powers have agreed, for the meantime at least, not to use the veto. With a seat on the Security Council for 1993-94, and unprecedented levels of troops on UN peacekeeping operations, it does seem that the UN is now playing a larger role in New Zealand's security policy than it has for some time.
CONCLUSION

The period 1945 to 1960 is one distinguished by the strong position of the United Nations in New Zealand security policy and a similarly strong New Zealand position in the world organization. The latter years of the 1950s began to see this change, particularly because of the changing membership of the UN, but it was not until the new decade that it was comprehensively altered. Certainly the years 1945-60 witnessed a remarkable level of consistency in New Zealand's approach to the UN.

The reason for this lay in policy objectives established by Peter Fraser in planning and effecting New Zealand's participation in the UN in the mid-1940s. This policy was primarily security-oriented and deeply influenced by the Second World War. It sought some particularly distinctive objectives, among them universal collective security, a strong General Assembly and complete protection for the independence and sovereignty of small states. The UN fell far short of this, but New Zealand joined it regardless - a defective world organization was better than none. It was a step in the direction of an international security system and it gave New Zealand an influence over world affairs denied it during the Second World War.

From the outset, the problem of New Zealand's regional security had been encompassed in its approach to the UN and to regionalism generally. Both the world organization and more limited micro-regional arrangements had important benefits for New Zealand. New Zealand enthusiastically pursued a world organization and, equally determinedly, sought a regional security arrangement with the Commonwealth and the United States for the South and Southwest Pacific. New Zealand's most likely security threat was perceived as coming from the Pacific and, therefore, regional protection was sought from the UN. Similarly, in considering UN security machinery, New Zealand's contribution was envisaged as being made chiefly in the Pacific and through Commonwealth and regional arrangements. The two were compatible due to their fundamental orientation toward New Zealand
security objectives.

New Zealand policy in 1945 opposed the development of macro-regionalism because of its implications for the success of the UN. But here too, New Zealand policy proved flexible. Despite attempts to subordinate regional arrangements to the UN, New Zealand accepted the Act of Chapultepec in 1945, the OAS and the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, and NATO in 1949.

There was, however, another aspect of New Zealand's regional policy which was less flexible and more enduring in its approach to security. Strong emphasis was placed on the UN's authority over regionally inclusive arrangements because New Zealand did not want to be submerged into an extensive regional association with Asia. Strong fears of a resurgent Japan, an acute perception of remoteness and vulnerability, a powerful affinity with the United Kingdom and the old dominions in the Commonwealth, an inherent reliance on the United States for security, a pride in New Zealand's Europeanness, made macro-regionalism completely undesirable. These factors dominated New Zealand's approach to regionalism under the Fraser Labour Government and were equally strong under its successors. ANZUS was a micro-regional alliance and National declined the possibility of British involvement solely because of the American desire to make it contingent on Asian participation. The asserted right of regional bodies to supersede the Security Council over the invasion of Guatemala was challenged and New Zealand's approach to SEATO was ad hoc and unremarkable. The ultimate authority of the UN in world affairs was a concept stoutly asserted by New Zealand throughout the period.

During the 1950s, therefore, the same policy of pursuing security through both the UN and micro-regional arrangements persisted. There was an unmistakable preference during the 1950s for major regional issues, including Burma, Indochina, and Formosa and the Offshore Islands, to be dealt with through the UN. New Zealand's willingness to become actively associated with these issues in the UN contrasted with its tremendous reluctance to become involved outside the world body. The UN in Korea had shown that it could react in defence of smaller powers
in a limited but effective manner, and the role of the organization in the pacific settlement of disputes was a major contribution to New Zealand regional security in the mid-1950s.

Dominant in New Zealand's commitment to the UN between 1945 and 1960 was a strong security emphasis based on objectives established by the Fraser Government and continued by its successors. That commitment led to the UN remaining a major component in New Zealand's pursuit of security and this was unaffected by the development of regionalism or changes of government during the period.
APPENDIX 1

EXTRACTS FROM THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945

CHAPTER I

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER IV

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the
maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council, and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 14

Subject to the Provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

CHAPTER V

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.
Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of the State which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
CHAPTER VII

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the States concerned or by references to the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional organizations or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy State, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such State, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a State.

2. The term "enemy State" as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to
any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER XVII

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII

Article 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.
APPENDIX 2

TRIPARTITE SECURITY TREATY, 1951

(ANZUS)

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (Entry into force 29 April 1952).

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article VI, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.
Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratification of the signatories have been deposited.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

For Australia: Percy C. Spender.

For New Zealand: C. A. Berendsen.

For the United States of America:

Dean Acheson John Foster Dulles
Alexander Wiley John J. Sparkman
APPENDIX 3

SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY, 1954
(MANILA PACT)

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognising the sovereign equality of all Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed
attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to co-operate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of government toward these ends.

Article IV

1. Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned.

Article V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international
engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party
is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any
international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article VII

Any other State in a position to further the objective of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be
invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the
Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia,
including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the
southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes
North latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to
include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in
accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that
Government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of
ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such
deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter force between the States which have ratified it as
soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have
been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the
date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be
a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other
Parties of the deposit of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
Article XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition to the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia: R.G. Casey
For France: G. La Chambre
For New Zealand: T. Clifton Webb

For Pakistan: Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.
Zafrulla Khan

For the Republic of the Philippines: Carlos P. Garcia
Francisco A. Delgado
Tomas L. Cabili
Lorenzo M. Tanada
Cornelio T. Villareal

For the Kingdom of Thailand:
Wan Waihayakon
Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Reading

For the United States of America: John Foster Dulles
H. Alexander Smith
Michael J. Mansfield
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRIMARY SOURCES

OFFICIAL ARCHIVES

New Zealand National Archives

Series:

- PM 56 External Affairs Committee
- PM 59 Visits (US Warships and Aircraft)
- PM 87 New Zealand Forces
- PM 101 International Organization
- PM 111 Security, Pacific Pact
- PM 115 United Nations
- PM 153 Prime Ministers Conferences
- PM 156 Defence
- PM 217 Suez Canal
- PM 222 Burma
- PM 264 China
- PM 277 Palestine

Cabinet Papers, 1950-60.

Australian Archives

Series:

- A1838 Correspondence: Foreign Affairs and Trade
- A4534 Correspondence: Australian High Commission, (Wellington)
- A6717 Correspondence: Prime Minister's Department
PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS


OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

*Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives*, 1945-60.


*New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, 1945-60.

PRIVATE PAPERS

Fraser Papers, National Archives, Wellington.

Munro Papers, National Library, Wellington.

McIntosh Papers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington.

Reminiscences of an Ambassador, Berendsen Papers, Victoria University Library, Wellington.

INTERVIEWS

Mr Bruce Brown 1 September 1993
1 December 1993

Mr Frank Corner, CMG 17 June 1993

Sir George Laking 8 December 1993

Mr Malcolm Templeton 30 November 1993

Mr Terence O'Brien 26 April 1994

NEWSPAPERS


ARTICLES


BOOKS


---


---


---


___


___


Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand's Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57 (Auckland, 1994).

Top Hats are not Being Taken: A Short History of the New Zealand Legation in Moscow, 1944-1950 (Wellington, 1989).

Thakur, Ramesh, In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in a Nuclear Age (Buckler, 1988).


Thorn, James, Peter Fraser: New Zealand's Wartime Prime Minister (London, 1952).


Woodward, Mary, SEATO: No Place for New Zealand (Christchurch, 1968).
UNPUBLISHED THESES


RESEARCH ESSAYS

