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THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA:  
THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE AND THE EXTREME RIGHT IN NEW ZEALAND

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## ABSTRACT

From the early 1970s, extreme right-wing groups began to proliferate in New Zealand and to contribute to public debate. These groups represent one response to the growing politicisation of racial and gender issues, a discontent at the trends in modern capitalism and a nostalgia for the unity and certainty that is seen as epitomising the immediate post-war period. Poulantzas identifies these groups as primarily petty-bourgeois in origin and this class link constitutes a central focus of this thesis.

It is argued that the old or traditional petty-bourgeoisie are a declining class fraction who exhibit reactionary tendencies. Their form of petty-commodity production, both rural and urban, is threatened by the development of the corporate economy, exemplified by the interventionist state and the growing size and centralisation of monopoly capital. The resulting decrease in petty-bourgeois positions produces a crisis of confidence as the reproduction of small-scale production is no longer guaranteed. The marginal position of the old petty-bourgeoisie is further confirmed by the absence of political influence. They feel unable to halt the growing 'moral decadence' of recent decades because they lack the political power of capital or labour, or that of expanding class fractions such as the new petty-bourgeoisie. Radical right-wing groups are an expression of these class concerns.

The old petty-bourgeoisie have not always identified with reactionary political organisations. Their support was an important factor in the election of the Labour Government in 1935. But during the 1930s, they articulated an ideology that perceived speculative capital, and Jews, as an important cause in financial decline. This world-view was reproduced intact into the 1970s. At this point, a general economic recession emphasised the problems faced by petty-commodity production and the contribution of the old petty-bourgeoisie to moral debates on 'race', gender and peace issues was increasingly superseded by post-war generations and movements. Also, the

traditional party of this fraction, Social Credit, experienced a change in leadership in 1972 that marked a rejection of 1930s arguments. Extreme right-wing groups were established to articulate petty-bourgeois concerns and to counter weak representational links with conservative political parties.

The ideology and political style of these groups is described in detail. Case studies of the League of Rights, the Country Party and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement/Zenith Applied Philosophy are provided, along with profiles of key activists. The class base of these organisations is confirmed by the contrast with working class neo-fascism and forms of conservatism such as the New Zealand Party. An international comparison involving the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada identifies the specific tendencies of the New Zealand situation.

The final section discusses the prognosis for extreme right-wing groups in a situation of crisis. The analysis centres on three questions: (1) in order to widen its constituency, are alliances with other classes or fractions possible; (2) is mass fascism a possibility; (3) are the old petty-bourgeoisie a significant or authentic social force. The thesis concludes that extreme right-wing groups are an expression of petty-bourgeois revolt and they constitute one of the most important examples of reactionary politics with an impact on contemporary social relations and debates.

## PREFACE

Some brief preparatory comments need to be made before proceeding to the body of the text. The first concerns the generation of a data base. Throughout the thesis, there are extensive references to secondary sources such as newspaper items or articles. It may not be immediately obvious that a considerable amount of the data came from primary sources, especially contact with members of the extreme right, interviews with them and attendance at meetings. Material from these sources has been woven into the analysis and the origin is often not identified or clear. Secondly, although this thesis addresses the question of the class bases of extremism in New Zealand, class is taken as read. There is no intention of exploring class in its own right. That was beyond the scope of this project. And finally, my personal attitude towards the subject matter, right-wing extremism, may be gauged indirectly from the analysis but it is very seldom explicit. The extreme right represents a tradition that diverges in its values and beliefs from social democratic culture, and from the liberal values of sociology. The opposed positions of sociologist and extreme right has often meant that the latter have been caricatured in sociology. By that I mean that the complexity and commitment of extreme right-wing politics has been inaccurately portrayed. The aim here was to convey something of the intricacies and richness of this tradition, and to acknowledge the integrity of the people involved. This integrity is acknowledged by simply being accurate and not misrepresenting individuals or events. But 'tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner' is not my attitude. I reject totally the validity of extreme right-wing interpellations and believe them to constitute an impediment to the practice of a liberal democratic system. Equally, however, I do not share the 'bleak pessimism' (Bottomore, 1984: 37) that characterised the Frankfurt School on this same subject, and if sociology can add anything it is to create positive options through competent analysis.

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## DIAGRAMS

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

*If history has a meaning, it is as a lesson for the present. To be wrong now, and to fail to see the reality of a future rise of fascism, would not be excusable however much it might have been in the past.*

Poulantzas (1979: 358)

*[There is a tendency to see]...fascism as a kind of bacterial disease, now provably curable but with the regrettable tendency to flare up again, in minor epidemics, in the less wholesome quarters of the body politic.*

Edgar (1981: 20)

It is the possibility of fascism, and the presence of extreme right-wing ideologies and groups, which constitute the central concern of this thesis. To begin by talking about fascism in the context of New Zealand politics might be viewed as starting on an hysterical and exaggerated note. But developments of the 1970s and 1980s justify such a focus. Hannah Arendt (see Beiner, 1982: 14) described politics as the disclosure, in a public space of appearances, of what we are and what we are capable of. In the first instance, the bulk of the thesis is given over to an examination of those groups that constitute the reactionary pole of the political spectrum and to locate their class base, the 'what we are'. This then provides a basis for an analysis of the collective tendencies and possibilities, the 'what we are capable of', or specifically the prognosis for extreme right-wing and fascist movements in New Zealand's political and ideological struggles. These tasks are only possible with an adequate theorisation.

The theoretical framework which will inform the empirical analysis is significantly influenced by Poulantzas (1979) and Laclau (1979). Poulantzas offers a problematic which directs attention to the petty-bourgeois character and origins of fascism. This line of analysis is developed here in an effort to establish more precisely the nature of the relationship between the groupings that constitute fascist and extreme right-wing politics and their class base. The thesis is that the dominant expression of reactionary politics in New Zealand, extreme right-wing organisations, represent the 'regressive dispositions' (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 346) of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The latter, a declining fraction in terms of their material position as well as politically and ideologically, are profoundly critical of political elites, dominant hegemony and trends in contemporary capitalism. It is argued here that the articulation of this political fundamentalism and the mobilisation of petty-bourgeois discontent, especially in a period of crisis, provides the class base for extremism. In order to sustain such a thesis, Poulantzian understanding needs to be extended and modified.

A particular issue concerns the need to explicate the nature of ideology and especially to offer a theoretically adequate account of interpellations that construct people as a 'race'. Poulantzas acknowledges the effect of ideology in terms of its relative autonomy but he is reluctant to accept that there are any struggles in a capitalist society other than class struggles (see Urry, 1981: 16). Laclau (1979) is more willing to acknowledge the significance of these alternative struggles and to theorise accordingly. He argues that the position of the old petty-bourgeoisie outside the dominant relations of production results in a concern with the relations of domination and a struggle that is expressed in ideological and political terms. The political representatives of reactionary sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie, extreme right-wing organisations, proffer an interpellation based on notions of a popular-democratic reaction involving 'the people' rather than classes. This interpellation and the revolt it represents is termed petty-bourgeois Jacobinism.

*What is petty-bourgeois - and here lies the essence of Jacobinism - is the conviction that the struggle against the dominant bloc can be carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle, apart from classes*  
(Laclau, 1979: 116).

In this way, the reaction of the petty-bourgeoisie to their declining class position is expressed in support for right-wing interpellations and organisations and a struggle that centres on ideological and political concerns. The analysis offered here argues that these concerns illustrate the importance of ideology in understanding the ethos of the petty-bourgeoisie and extremist politics. Their epistemology relies on the reification of ideological elements, notably 'race' and gender. Thus 'race' and gender as non-economic factors (although articulated in material relations of production) can be shown to have, it will be argued, an independent influence on social relations and struggles.

Another departure from the Poulantzian approach are the arguments concerning the relationship between the new and old petty-bourgeoisie. Poulantzas distinguishes between the old petty-bourgeoisie or those involved with petty-commodity production, and the

new petty-bourgeoisie, which includes non-productive salaried employees in the civil service or those involved in the circulation of capital. Nevertheless, his argument that these two fractions are relatively unified on ideological and political planes is contradicted by the present study. The old petty-bourgeoisie are the class fraction that provides the base for right-wing extremism. Their opposition to monopoly capital, the interventionist state and social democratic collectivism combine with their decline in material and political relations to provide the preconditions for this representative link. In contrast, the positions of the new petty-bourgeoisie have expanded under the patronage of monopoly capital and the state. In political and ideological struggles, they represent a morally progressive fraction that differs markedly in its orientation from the secular and religious fundamentalism of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

*It [the new petty-bourgeoisie] is opposed on almost every point to the repressive morality of the declining [old] petite bourgeoisie whose religious and political conservatism often centres on moral indignation at moral disorder and especially the disorder of sexual mores (Bourdieu, 1984: 367).*

A third key element of this thesis is the now well-rehearsed debate of agency versus structure. In the analysis of fascism, Marxists like Poulantzas have either been reluctant to address issues such as charismatic political leadership or individual motivations and goals, or dismissed these issues as insignificant. Abrams (1982: xiv) notes that insofar as the 'dilemma of agency is a practical dilemma of individuals in society we should not expect it to be resolved by the human sciences'. In spite of this admonition, Abrams does in fact attempt a solution by insisting upon an historical dimension and the incorporation of research into 'small-scale social settings' (Abrams, 1982: 2). He contends that the history of a particular group and the political career of an individual locates patterns of freedom and constraint and helps achieve a balance between the relative importance of agency and structure. This approach is adopted here in order to explore answers to key questions: for example, how do extreme right-wing groups continue to maintain group membership and reproduce a critical interpellation when the chance of gaining effective power may

be minimal; or what organisational structures and procedures sustain this form of political activity? The emphasis on agency and an historical dimension is designed to redress certain weaknesses in the study of extremism (Billig, 1978: 94). Firstly, if an historical dimension is ignored then often an illusion of permanence is created. The careers of individuals and groups change dramatically amongst the extreme right and these trajectories need to be recorded. But also, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism is not something that was suddenly triggered by the antagonisms and crises of the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the present research will argue that its origins lie in struggles of the 1880s and 1930s in New Zealand. The historical location and evolution of this interpellation is an important aspect of the present work. Secondly, Billig (1978: 94) notes the tendency to study movements in isolation to the neglect of any comparative dimension. This element is addressed here in several ways. Within the New Zealand context, comparisons are drawn between the various manifestations of old petty-bourgeois extremism, and with other political expressions. Thus, there are comparisons with working class neo-fascism, new forms of conservative mobilisation, both secular and religious, and with the new petty-bourgeoisie. Internationally, New Zealand struggles and examples of right-wing extremism are compared with those of Britain, Canada and Australia. These comparisons provide a basis for establishing what commonalities exist, notably in terms of overlaps in ideological discourse and organisational structures and ambitions, as well as critical differences.

Finally, the research would be incomplete without assessing the potential for fascism in New Zealand. The presence and proliferation of sectarian groups on the extreme right reflects not only the tensions of their class base, but also raises the question of the extreme right's potential and their ability to represent the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie and to strengthen existing representative links. But the extreme right also needs to establish alliances with other political and class groupings in order to gain any substantial impetus or influence. Clearly, there are historical precedents for such a development, at least in other capitalist countries, and these concrete examples, as Poulantzas (1979: 11) reminds us, provide a

powerful tool for assessing the potential of fascism. This understanding needs to be applied to the New Zealand situation in order to evaluate whether the small numbers involved in local extreme right-wing and neo-fascist groups really do have any political significance, now and in the future.

The academic literature available for a study of this sort is sparse. In terms of contemporary right-wing extremism in New Zealand, the major work has been an MA thesis on the League of Rights (see Buchman, 1983). It is a competent examination of the ideological concerns of the League and its political connections with both similar Australian organisations and the New Zealand Social Credit Political League. But no substantial publications have resulted from this analysis. Other material of some relevance includes a thesis on the tensions inside Social Credit between reactionary and liberal fractions (Beetham, 1972) and research on working class authoritarianism in New Zealand (Bedggood, 1976). But analyses which deal with the extreme right and racist organisations are noticeably absent. Non-academic sources, notably certain sections of the media and anti-racist groups, have contributed a lot more material (see, for example, Stratford, 1980) although it is inevitably descriptive rather than explicitly analytical or theoretical. This is not meant as a criticism but simply an observation on the likely contribution of such material to an academic study. In the end, this material was used extensively as a source base. There is rather more material available from academic sources on anti-feminist and morality issues (see, for example, Openshaw, n.d.; Ryan, 1984; Vodanovich, 1985) but it is far from complete in its coverage. Therefore, what follows is intended to try and redress some of these 'silences'. No doubt, it will be followed by further research which will increase the understanding of that part of the hitherto ignored pole of the political spectrum.

CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICS OF THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE :  
A THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

*The people conquered him in time, but let  
no one rejoice too early at his fall -  
The womb is fruitful still from which he crept.*

B. Brecht (1941)  
The Resistable Rise of Arturo Ui

*As for fascism's 'irrationality' it is,  
in reality, not so much a revolt against  
reason as a revolt against liberalism  
which liberals have found unreasonable.*

(Weiss, 1967:10)

This chapter sets out the theoretical argument that informs the subsequent empirical analysis. The argument draws initially on the analysis offered by Poulantzas (1979) but necessarily extends it. Poulantzas devoted considerable time to the mass fascist party and the fascist state. Neither are immediate concerns here although the possibility of either in the context of New Zealand politics is a question that needs to be assessed and will be in the latter part of the thesis. Rather the substantive issue is the situation and character of extreme right-wing organisations as fragmented sectarian groups. Thus the focus is different from the issues which preoccupied Poulantzas. But his argument that there is a representational tie between fascist parties in the early stages of development and a specific class base, the petty-bourgeoisie, is tested here. It is argued that this tie is explicit and that the political experiences of the petty-bourgeoisie provides the basis for the establishment of extreme right-wing political organisations in New Zealand.

Apart from the fact that he concentrated on issues that are different from those covered by this thesis, there are other limitations to the understanding offered by Poulantzas. The concentration on structural factors proves a problem in the present context because there is insufficient attention given to agency, and specifically the organisational (leadership) aspects of the extreme right and the personal experiences which result in political activism. Abrams' (1982) essentially methodological response is to extend analysis to cover small-scale social settings and to consider individual motivations and goals, and to invest these with an historical dimension. Poulantzas has, of course, contributed substantially to an historical understanding of fascism but the effect of including the approach suggested by Abrams is to produce a very different analysis. It considers the recruitment of individuals to an extreme right-wing organisation and the way in which political careers are formed by similar political experiences. One result is that matters of organisation and ideology receive somewhat more emphasis in the present work than would be the case in a traditional structural analysis. Thus ideology is seen as a defining feature of extreme right-wing groups

and it is argued that there is a close association between the experiences of the petty-bourgeoisie and their articulation of particular world views. It is insufficient to argue that these views are simply the result of hegemonic processes and that they essentially reveal the views of dominant class fractions imposed upon a dependent stratum. Elements are undoubtedly reproduced in this way but extreme right-wing interpellations also represent a profoundly critical view of the activities of these dominant fractions. And in this sense, they occupy a radical position albeit constrained in other ways and areas. With regard to organisational style, the experiences of the petty-bourgeoisie also lead to a particular form that represents their political and religious fundamentalism. At this stage of their development, extreme right-wing organisations can be described as political sects, a character that they share at a fundamental level with other groupings. This factor has implications for their political future and specifically in their ability to establish alliances with other classes. This style combines with ideology and structural factors to produce a very particular form that contrasts with the political organisations that represent other classes in the New Zealand political spectrum, and correspondingly, their contribution to the political agenda and struggles is unique. It is a form that has received little attention in analyses of the New Zealand social structure.

#### Fascism and the Extreme Right: A Definition

The problems of terminology are well-documented with regard to fascism or the extreme right. The charge of psittacism (Miller, 1981:12) is frequent as is the acknowledgement that it is difficult to use many of the labels/concepts without also employing their pejorative meanings. The dilemma is not easily solved as phenomenologically, terms such as left and right, or fascism, are embedded in Western political culture, and as such they represent generally accepted distinctions. New terms add to the congestion of sociology and represent a barrier in the communication of an argument to a wider audience. The traditional terms will be employed here after

specifying what is meant. It does, however, need to be acknowledged that the political spectrum implied in labels such as left and right may be circular rather than linear with extremes 'occupying simultaneously adjacent and distant positions' (Rees, 1979:8). The other caveat relates to the tendency to import concepts which have an explicit historical meaning in one context but may indeed be a problem when applied in another social context. Traditional European political signifiers which condense congruences of class and ideology may be misleading in the South Pacific (cf. Davis, 1981:32).

Fascism is descriptive of movements that seek mass support and the establishment of a particular form of the state. Typically these movements expand during social and economic crises when individuals are prepared to adopt a politically active position and are more likely to see the state as incapable of resolving the crises. The ideology of fascism is dominated by reactionary and usually well-established themes, although they also tend to encompass populist and socialist arguments in an attempt to broaden appeal and to sustain a unity amongst the disparate groups who provide their base.

*As counter-revolutionaries, Fascists denounce liberalism and democracy; as populists, they pronounce themselves anti-plutocrat and promise national unity and class cooperation under the aegis of a state aspiring to be more or less total. All Fascists assert the principle of Authority and the notion of hierarchy as necessary to the social order (Aron, 1980:35).*

In these matters, fascism differs little from the other groups within the spectrum of the extreme right. The important distinction is the fascist conception of the state and its commitment to the corporate state. In this sense, fascism will be used here to refer to specific groups within the broader generic category of the extreme right. The extensive literature and use of the term fascism reflects the development of specific state forms, especially in Europe. The fascist state gave the concept new meaning for both left and right. The excesses of fascist governments provided an empirical basis for the pejorative use of the term and even extreme right-wing groups have sought to distance themselves from the term to avoid contamination. In Italy,

for example, the extreme right does not extol fascism partly because it lost the war, but also because it failed to create the true fascist state (De Felice, 1976:55).

The presence of fascist states has meant that explanations have stressed the difference between twentieth century extreme right-wing groups and those of previous centuries. Fascism has been related directly to the development of modern nationalism and mass politics. Mosse (1981) describes fascism as an attempt to integrate the masses and the state. Weiss (1967) argues that fascism is the twentieth century response of conservative groups to the rapid liberalisation of the social system in which they had previously enjoyed a privileged place. From different perspectives, Gregor (1969) and Arendt (1951) emphasise the alienating influences of modernity and the development of totalitarianism of both left and right. This raises the conceptual problem of whether it is possible to talk of left and right-wing fascism as a single phenomenon.

It was noted earlier that radical positions on the right and left can be considered similar with regard to specific defining characteristics. As Robbins (1981:33) has noted, the small sectarian groups of the left that are committed to a programme of violence have 'liberated themselves from coherent class politics and systematic social theory and seem to exist for the ecstasy of confrontation'. In this, left and right, or elements of both, are similar. The hyper-national church of Marxism and the irrational church of National Socialism, as Aron (1980:32) calls them, can produce activity aimed at a unity either based on 'race'/nation or class which is justified, however violent, in these terms. For these reasons, Gregor (1969:57) suggests that labels such as 'progressive' and 'reactionary' or 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' are irrelevant given the significance and commonality that both operate as totalitarian mass movements. A more provocative analysis is provided by Horowitz (1981) who contends that left-wing politics have changed in recent decades to the point where the term left-wing fascist<sup>1</sup> is applicable. Left-wing fascism is identified by its revolutionary mysticism, nationalism, an elitist

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1. A term that is borrowed from Lenin.

vision of the world and anti-Semitism. Horowitz (1981: 20) notes that the original Frankfurt School was corrupted by Adorno and has provided a point of departure for the 'avant-garde of left-wing fascism'.

*The unitary character of anti-Semitism draws fascist and communist elements together in a new social climate. Anti-Semitism is the essential motor of left-wing fascism (Horowitz, 1981: 22).*

He concludes by arguing that it will be as left-wing fascism that fascism will arrive in the United States.

The nature of left and right-wing extremist movements, however, deny this simplistic reductionism. The left has traditionally, and continues to be, identified as a contentious dissenting sect, a role that has been internalised, while the right is not consigned to a marginal political position (Robbins, 1981: 35). The extreme right benefit from a degree of complicity with the state and a juxtaposition with various forms of dominant ideology. The ideological heritage of the extreme right is based on notions of individualism and nationalism, and opposition is defined as originating in the ideology and practice of communism, a point noted by Horowitz (1981). Politically then, the left and right do not share a common position and the possibilities are quite different.

Ideologically, there are further differences. The activities of the right focus on national issues and sentiments while the left, with some exceptions, has developed an ideology and a political programme that is internationalist and materialist. Equally, to attribute a qualitatively similar anti-Semitism to both left and right is misleading. The anti-Semitism of fascist parties in power is a matter for historical record. The thrust of anti-Jewish feeling of the left is more accurately recorded as anti-Zionism and is a reflection of the post-war establishment of the state of Israel. Anti-Zionism does not cement left-wing groups in the way that it does for the right. Anti-Zionism is not critical to the class ideology of the left whereas it is for the nationalistic and racist ideologies of the right. Care needs to be taken, especially as it is easy to condemn fascism (the 'extreme right') for the wicked things it does while excusing communism

(the 'extreme left') for the wonderful things it aspires to (Joes, 1981:32). But the attempt in some quarters to equate left and right-wing extremism is dismissed and a clear distinction is made between the two traditions. To help underline these points and to include a number of extreme right-wing groups that are not fascist, the preferred generic label used here is 'extreme right'.

The use of the term 'extreme' encompasses elements of both style and ideology. Lipset and Raab (1978:4-6) identify two characteristics. The first relies upon their particular conception of democracy: extremism is defined by the tendency to go to the poles of the ideological scale, to go beyond the 'limits of normative procedures which define the democratic process'. This conception does not make much sense unless the ideological scale is specified and even then it still relies on a rather naive and pluralistic conception of the democratic process, i.e. that democratic institutions embody a certain level of political participation and that views can be recorded on some unilinear scale. The second characteristic is more appropriate. Monism is defined as the tendency to treat cleavage and ambivalence as illegitimate. The effect, in most cases, is a profound disillusionment with the normal processes of a democracy and subsequently, a commitment to a programme to replace the institutions of the liberal democratic state. The contrast between groups that espouse this sort of political position and the bulk of the population in a country like New Zealand is that the latter show remarkable loyalty to the traditional forms of political representation even when direct experience does not endorse that support. The intent of radical groups in the political arena is to restrict the possibility of political cleavage and argument by invoking absolutist doctrines and procedures which are not subject to debate. Thus the term extreme becomes descriptive of absolutism and intransigence. This is not to argue that the right has any monopoly on radicalism nor that all right-wing groups are necessarily extremist.

*...it does not follow deductively that those who occupy the extremes of a lineal model...must perforce be extremists in the pejorative sense, nor does it follow that those who occupy the center of any political spectrum are thereby incapable of the kind of brutal, repressive, destructive, intransigent actions usually associated with fascist extremists (Parenti, 1972:6, 8).*

Apart from the style of its politics, the extreme right is identified by the content of its ideology, and New Zealand groups adopt the social and political ideologies of the extreme right that are traditional in the Western world (Spoonley, 1981:100). The exact content of that ideology is discussed in detail below and only the essential elements are identified here.

A primary and enduring characteristic of the ideology of the extreme right is the commitment to nationalist and racist arguments. Different groups give varying weight to these arguments but all use similar elements as the basic unit of their particular world view in contrast to left-wing groups that employ materialist analyses which revolve around the concept of class. The left relies on this materialist analysis while the right expresses a view that sees 'race' or nation as a natural (cf. biological) basis for division and an analogy is drawn with animal species to emphasise that such divisions are inviolate.

A second characteristic of the ideology of the right is that they are elitist in contrast with the left which assumes or aims for egalitarianism (Bennet, King and Nugent, 1977:8-9). The conservatism of the right results in the defence of certain traditional values against what are perceived as the anomic forces of modern industrial society and the liberal democratic state. The extreme right differs from other conservatives in that the former distrust traditional elites believing that they are committed to established patterns of wealth and power. It is the promotion of a new elite and the critique of the institutions of the democratic liberal state that gives the extreme right a revolutionary thrust to its ideology and policy. The other elements of both ideology and style that identify the extreme right follow from analysis, and the next section examines the major analyses that have been advanced. Many of these, for obvious reasons, concentrate on fascism. Thus while the aim is to use the term extreme right as circumscribing the field of study, in any discussion there are necessarily going to be extensive references to fascism simply because it has attracted so much attention.

## Analyses Of The Extreme Right And Fascism

### (i) The Authoritarian Personality

One of the most influential arguments concerning the membership of the extreme right originated with members of the Frankfurt School, notably Adorno and Horkheimer. In response to the question as to why some individuals have fascist leanings while others do not, it was argued that the presence of a personality syndrome that included an ego weakness and was characterised by rigid, dogmatic and prejudiced thinking, was a critical factor. The approach relies on the assumption that there is a definite character structure amongst supporters of fascism, and the search for meaning and security produces an identification with strong external authorities. This argument is set out in the Authoritarian Personality (1950). Later Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) adopted a very different approach in their analysis of anti-Semitism. Here they advanced a materialist explanation arguing that the concealment of domination in production and the difficulty of understanding how structural inequality is generated, leads to the identification of scapegoats:

*...scapegoating cloaks...the real nature of the labour contract and the grasping character of the economic system (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972:174).*

Despite the promise of these later arguments, the dominance of the earlier conception based on a particular personality structure remains along with its attendant problems. Aside from their failure to investigate the actual as opposed to the potential fascist, they also neglected to combine the studies of individual psychology and consciousness with their understanding of the political economy, although the later work on anti-Semitism does begin this task. Without this sort of synthesis, the Authoritarian Personality remains reductionist and narrow. It is also misleading. Apart from the methodological problems (e.g. the response bias in the questionnaire and the fact that the F-scale is not necessarily correlated with ethnocentrism), the personality syndrome that Adorno and the others identified as the basis for support for fascism is also found amongst supporters of other groups. Authoritarian personalities may support groups or solutions other than those offered by the extreme right (see

Bluhm, 1974:272-273). The correlation of a specific personality with support of one part of the political spectrum is simply not sustained.

*It appears...that one of the Frankfurt School's bases for explaining authoritarianism is problematic: the reach of society into the individual may not depend directly on the socio-economic position of the father and particular parental practices (Held, 1980:372).*

Similar criticisms can be made of others in the same tradition, notably Fromm and Reich. The latter, who focused on the authoritarian and fascist tendencies of the petty-bourgeoisie in the Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) took the reductionism to extremes by drawing on Freudian arguments to develop an explanation based on genital sexuality.

*The mind boggles at the project of measuring the mental health of an entire people or class by its rates of suicide, alcoholism or motor accidents. To compare patriotic feeling to a form of neurosis presupposes, to say the least, a quite narrow concept of psychological normality....The whole history of states and of warfare is converted into the work of the mentally deranged (Aron, 1980:39).*

#### (ii) Alienation and Modern Society

Another tradition has identified the nature of modern society as a critical factor in the growth and support for extreme right-wing groups. The fragmentation of society with a corresponding isolation of the individual from previous forms of association and the disruption of status configurations is seen as generating a status defence and the promotion of groups that champion traditional social values and structures. A variant on this is Lipset's (1959) thesis that the presence of the extreme right represents extremism of the centre. He uses a simplistic tripartite system to link upper class political activity with authoritarianism, the middle class with fascism and the working class with communism. According to Lipset, the middle class is committed to the democratic system so long as it furthers its specific class interests but the middle class turns to populist

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2. See Laclau (1979:84,86) for a discussion on reductionist psychological theories concerning fascism, or more precisely, the fascist character.

extremism when it is threatened by an economic crisis. Apart from the unnatural symmetry and exclusivity of Lipset's model, there is little in his analysis to suggest why extreme right-wing groups occur in one industrial country while they do not appear in another.

Lipset and Raab (1978) alter the argument in later formulations and identify status frustrations and discrepancies as the basis of support for the extreme right. The discrepancy between personal aspirations and the individual's own sense of worth compared with the actual achievement level and social esteem produces a dispossessed and frustrated group (Lipset and Raab, 1978:306-307). The presence of a Quondam Complex (i.e. they have more at stake in the past than in the present) provides the basis for support for extreme groups. There are still elements of Lipset's original thesis in that the group most likely to be affected is the 'old' middle class.

Apart from the problems already identified with regard to this argument, there are a series of other problems. The argument is very difficult to test, particularly the notion that those who support the extreme right are more prone to status threat or crises than non-supporters. As Wallis (1979:4-5) points out, those who experience some form of relative deprivation exceeds in size those who join extremist groups, or indeed, those who join social and religious movements generally. Wallis's (1976) own research into the Church of Scientology indicates that membership is not drawn from the traditionally dispossessed and while members may feel alienated and anxious, they tend to come from the more privileged and socially secure groups. Another issue in the Lipset and Raab thesis is the notion of unreason explicit in their arguments. Support for the extreme right is referred to as 'unreason' and yet the world view and arguments offered by the extreme right may be perfectly reasonable given the circumstances of their potential and actual audience. The most deprived may not be the most radical, and the relationship is confounded by the approach of social science research to the issue. Relative deprivation relies extensively on the actor's interpretation and yet most research concentrates in a positivistic way on factors external to the actor

(Wallis, 1979:4). Perception and experience are both critical.<sup>3</sup> Wallis (1979:5) also points out that it is assumed that the appeal of the extreme right (or other groups) acts on all the deprived in the same way. Individuals are capable of interpreting the same social situation and the same social movement in very different ways.

In spite of these criticisms, it would be misplaced to dismiss as unimportant the relationship between status and support for the extreme right. The threat is the product of social and economic change and it is necessary to specify why change threatens particular groups and why this is then translated into support for a certain type of political activity or ideology.

*imp.*  
The changes which accompany modernisation have been identified as a critical factor by writers such as Arendt (see Bluhm, 1974:265-267) who see industrialisation and the accompanying migration as destroying a particular system of social relations. Dahrendorf and Shoenbaum talk of the status revolution that accompanies modernisation. The development of capitalism and new state forms is clearly going to threaten groups who will try to retain or restore their status. The pre-capitalist and conservative groups will be likely to reject modernity in most forms, especially if mass participation in political decision-making, however minor, is likely. This bypasses older forms of consultation and reduces the level of integration or the effective influence of specific groups. An important argument of this thesis is that an obvious group that conforms to this description is the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie, both rural and urban. Their ambivalent position under new forms of capitalism and their willingness to embrace and articulate utopian and anti-modernist arguments provide essential preconditions for the support of extreme right-wing groups.

The petty-bourgeoisie feel threatened by the participation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in liberal forms of the democratic state. The petty-bourgeoisie lack unity and as a result their political

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3. The acknowledgement that both objective deprivation and consciousness are important is obviously not confined to authors such as Wallis; such considerations have attracted Marxist and non-Marxist alike.

representation is marginal and ineffectual. They have shown a marked reluctance to align with other political or economic groupings. The petty-bourgeoisie are acutely aware of their loss of moral hegemony and political representation, especially as the transformation has taken place during adverse economic circumstances, most recently in the 1970s and 1980s. For the petty-commodity producer, the cost of living, inflation and the decline of fixed incomes have reduced marginal profit levels and they lack adequate means of collective bargaining to alter this decline. The increase in the non-productive spheres (e.g. unemployed, state administration) is viewed as a drain on capital and the traditional suspicion of finance capital adds to the feeling of powerlessness for the petty-bourgeoisie. In this situation, single issue politics (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-tax) can act as a catalyst to encourage participation in extreme right-wing politics of a more enduring kind. And the nature of this type of political activity, that is its intimate and exclusive nature, reflect the character of petty-bourgeois politics in contrast to the larger mass political parties which characterise the anonymity that threatens them. In circumstances which undercut their position, the extreme right provides the petty-bourgeoisie with a means of moral entrepreneurialism that seeks a public reaffirmation of particular values and social hierarchy (Wallis and Bland, 1979:189).

### (iii) Marxist Explanations

The various Marxist explanations tend to focus on fascism and its appearance in state form. Although this is not a critical aspect of this thesis, it does not make sense to discuss Marxist analysis without also talking about this exceptional state form.

An early and pioneering analysis of fascism was provided by the Frankfurt School. They were primarily concerned to explore hypotheses relating to the authoritarian personality in the context of bourgeois morality (see above) and the transformation of competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism. The general conclusion on the second argument was that the fascist state represented an inevitable and culminating phase of capitalism although there are different versions of this proposal (see Held, 1980:52-53). Firstly, there were those such as Marcuse, Kirchheimer, Neumann and Gurlund, who maintained that

authoritarianism and the fascist state represented a political structure that was compatible with the conditions created by advanced capitalism. Secondly, there were those who accepted that since the transition from competitive into monopoly capitalism was critical for the development of the authoritarian state, the social order could not simply be referred to as monopoly capitalism. Adorno referred to post-competitive capitalism and Pollock to state-capitalism. The essential feature was that in a situation where crises and uneven development occurred, state intervention was one of the few measures open to the bourgeoisie to guarantee capitalism, and subsequent state intervention took one of two forms, democratic or totalitarian. Pollock (1941) identified the totalitarian form by the merger of business, the state bureaucrats and the leading members of the party organisations. This occurred within a situation of state interventionism which had restricted market competition.

One of the most impressive products of the Frankfurt tradition is F. Neumann's Behemoth: The Structure of National Socialism (1942). Neumann's argument was that Nazism constituted a reaction by monopoly capitalists against democracy and social progress. The National Socialists were committed to imperial conquest as a means of extending monopoly capitalism. The problems of production that occurred in a situation of expanding capitalism could be solved by the exceptional state but not within the framework of capitalist society. The problem with Neumann as with many others within the Frankfurt School is to discover why some countries that could be classed as having made the transition to monopoly capitalism should find it necessary to seek the solution via the fascist state while others did not consider this alternative. Thalheimer (1930) questioned why fascism took place in the less advanced capitalist countries such as Italy and Spain. He concluded that fascism rigidly corresponded to a specific stage of economic development, an analysis that was to be proved wrong by the quite different circumstances of Nazi Germany. Later writers such as Poulantzas offer a more convincing analysis as to why fascism appears in particular countries.

Poulantzas draws on the ideas advanced by Gramsci although the latter's discussion of fascism tends to be fragmentary and at times

contradictory. Gramsci<sup>4</sup> only indirectly discusses the way in which fascism as a party and as a state provided a mode of organisation for the Italian masses (Sassoon, 1980:56). He identified fascism as an organisational product of the petty-bourgeoisie that succeeds through a passive revolution and then proceeds to promote the interests of finance capital. Poulantzas is critical of many of these arguments and yet much of his work builds on and responds to Gramsci's conceptualisation of fascism.

Poulantzas's discussion of the fascist form of the exceptional state (Etat d'exception) takes place primarily in the context of an assessment of the Comintern's analysis of events in Italy and Germany prior to the establishment of the fascist state. He acknowledges that he is responding to Gramsci's arguments (Poulantzas, 1979:61) and he especially takes issue with the Frankfurt School's interpretation (see Poulantzas, 1979:52) that fascism was the necessary realisation of the essence of capitalism. Poulantzas also wants to warn the PCF (French Communist Party) against working for an alliance between the working class and petty-bourgeoisie. Poulantzas (1979:57) characterises fascism as a form of state which is at the extreme limits of the capitalist state. It is seen as resulting from the particular conjuncture of the class struggle and a crisis. This is not the specific political crisis (hegemonic crisis or the crisis of catastrophic equilibrium) that Gramsci discusses but a crisis that is apparent in a number of arenas. Poulantzas (1979:76) identifies these as contradictions between dominant classes and dominant fractions of classes; a crisis in hegemony to the extent that no dominant class or fraction is able to impose 'leadership'; modifications in hegemony and specifically the hegemony of finance capital; the break-up of representational ties and political parties with a resulting political disorientation; an ideological crisis both in the dominant and general ideologies; and an offensive by big capital and the power bloc. The crises occur because of a lack of national unity (both in terms of enclaves in the social formation and uneven economic development); the systematic intervention

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4. It is somewhat ironic that Gramsci should use the term 'fordism' to identify the ideology that prevailed in the advanced sectors of American industry in the early decades of the twentieth century as Ford wrote an anti-Semitic book, The International Jew, which was and is used by fascists, including Hitler and the extreme right.

of the state; an unevenness between rural and urban sectors (a lack of agrarian reform retards primitive capital accumulation); the weakness of the bourgeoisie, especially their inability to maintain a fragile unity; and the transition to monopoly capitalism. These are characteristics that Poulantzas identifies in both Italy and Germany although there are differences between the two. In brief, the main contradiction in Germany occurred because there was an absence of a politically powerful bourgeoisie so that while there was strength in economic terms, it was not paralleled by equal strength in political or ideological terms. In Italy, the crisis was associated with contradictions between classes and fractions of capital.

Poulantzas (1979:83) is critical of the Comintern's analysis because it allows the state no relative autonomy from the power bloc and its hegemonic fraction. He also dismisses the idea that fascism is the result of an equilibrium (cf. Gramsci) because he argues that the working class had been thoroughly defeated in both Italy and Germany and the bourgeoisie did not have to pay for defeat with a 'catastrophic equilibrium'. Equally, he does not accept that fascism is the political dictatorship of the petty-bourgeoisie although he does acknowledge the close relationship between fascism and this class.

Poulantzas's concern is with the development of the exceptional state and less with the origin of fascist movements. However, he identifies the basic characteristics of fascist movements and this will be explored in some detail. A central lesson from Poulantzas's analysis is the relationship between fascism and class, and that it makes little sense to abstract ideologies from their class base. The class that is most important is the petty-bourgeoisie. Poulantzas (1979:244) argues that while the petty-bourgeoisie does not have a class position of its own, this does not prevent it from 'constituting and playing the part of an authentic social force...' especially as a distinctive position in the relations of production produces a common effect for the petty-bourgeoisie on the political and ideological plane. Gramsci (1971), and Poulantzas and Laclau, discuss the way in which traditional allegiances between class and political party are disrupted under conditions of hegemonic crisis. At this point, new political parties may evolve to represent the new partyless classes

or fractions (see Gramsci, 1971:211).<sup>5</sup> This provides the basis for a representational tie between the petty-bourgeoisie and the fascist party, and initially, the programme of the party represents a catalogue of petty-bourgeois grievances (Poulantzas, 1979:249-250). Later, the fascist party becomes representative of and linked to quite different forces and fractions. But it is the initial class base of fascist movements that requires further elaboration.

### The Petty-Bourgeoisie

A consistent theme in the literature is the relationship between the petty-bourgeoisie and extreme right-wing movements. The reactionary elements of the petty-bourgeoisie have provided the basic membership of the extreme right while the ideology and programme of extreme right-wing groups has been seen as a reflection of the specific class interests of the petty-bourgeoisie, at least while the extreme right is still at the stage of being a movement.

Wright and Perrone (1977:33) define the petty-bourgeoisie as those who do not sell their own labour power or purchase, except in a very limited way, the labour of others but they do 'own' their own production unit. The small-scale production of goods and the provision of services characterises petty-bourgeois enterprises and is an important aspect of capital accumulation. It provides a channel of mobility for those unable to gain entry to salaried middle class occupations,

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5. Both Abercrombie et al (1976) and Johnson (1977) criticise Poulantzas for not showing how classes are represented politically. This criticism does not seem justified in the context of Poulantzas's discussion of the petty-bourgeoisie and its political organisations. Urry (1981:16) makes a different and perhaps valid criticism:

*...classes are not precisely theorised since no explanation is provided of why and how the political and ideological may in certain cases produce class positions which diverge from their structural class determination.*

Abercrombie and Urry (1983) discuss the matter further although they seem to accept the Poulantzian reasons for distinctive places within the economic, political and ideological structures which are non-proletarian and non-bourgeois.

and is located in those sectors of the economy where sub-contracting is important or where the production process is relatively small and labour intensive (cf. Scase, 1982:157-159). Wright and Perrone go on to point out that the petty-bourgeoisie employ the labour of others so that the criterion, 'employs labour', is limited in its discretionary power, especially in differentiating between the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. Technically correct, in practice the size of the workforce employed by the petty-bourgeoisie, where labour is employed, is very different from that employed by the bourgeoisie.<sup>6</sup> The petty-bourgeoisie typically employ non-contractual labour that works part-time, is either poorly unionised or does not belong to any union, is poorly paid, often comes from the family and constitutes a minor form of employment (albeit important in certain sectors) in the overall economy. Although the petty-bourgeoisie is often described according to its technically defined functions, it also constitutes a class position in the means of production. It is a class position that Wright (1978:97) describes as contradictory because of its intermediate role in the social relations of production.<sup>7</sup>

A problem with the term petty-bourgeoisie lies in its occasional past use as a residual category in theoretical explanation that has been invoked to account for counter-revolutionary elements in society. As Maier (1976:517) comments, both Marx and Engels developed the concept to explain the setbacks of 1848 and it has retained this role as deus ex machina to identify counter-revolutionary forces. The contribution of Poulantzas has been to regard the class as something more substantial with a serious potential in ideological and political relations, although

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6. The scale of the business activity is obviously important. If the owner cannot perform the functions of supervision and control and it becomes necessary to delegate and sub-divide various tasks, the creation of administrative structures means that they are then part of the bourgeoisie rather than the petty-bourgeoisie (Scase, 1982:160).
  7. Bechhofer and Elliot (1981) define the petty-bourgeoisie in terms of its dependent position but the notion of dependence is a complex one and it is questionable whether dependence is a sufficient basis on which to elaborate a theory of the petty-bourgeoisie as a distinct stratum (Winter, 1982:143).

still minor given the dichotomous class structure of capitalism. The petty-bourgeoisie are not politically impotent nor economically trivial and outmoded (Bechhofer and Elliot, 1981:184) but do play a part in the economic, ideological and political relations of contemporary capitalism. Indeed, some authors (see Scase, 1982) suggest that the scale of monopoly capitalism may encourage the growth of petty-bourgeois enterprises because the latter offer autonomy and satisfaction.

Poulantzas (1979:237-239) argues that the petty-bourgeoisie occupy two distinct places in the relations of production although there is a unity on political and ideological planes. The first group in the petty-bourgeoisie are those who are involved in small-scale production, that is artisan work or small family businesses in which the same person is both owner and controller of the means of production, and small-scale ownership mainly involved with the circulation of capital. This traditional petty-bourgeois group can be contrasted with a newer group, the non-productive salaried employees who are involved with the circulation of capital or who work as civil servants. The growth of the latter group is directly linked to the expansion in the use of technology. Both groups, it is argued by Poulantzas, exhibit similar political and ideological tendencies.

This theorisation of fractions within the petty-bourgeoisie emphasises the importance Poulantzas places on the division between mental and manual labour. The new petty-bourgeoisie are defined in terms of the monopolisation of knowledge and by the processes of exclusion and inclusion that control access to that knowledge (see Abercrombie and Urry, 1983:71). Thus the differences between mental and manual labour are used to differentiate waged labour from the petty-bourgeoisie, and to distinguish the two major fractions in the petty-bourgeoisie.

But while the Poulantzian distinction between new and old petty-bourgeoisie is retained here, the argument that they share political and ideological tendencies is contested. He acknowledges certain differences (e.g. the new petty-bourgeoisie's commitment to the cult of efficiency and technological neutrality) but these can be extended with quite different political implications. This thesis is primarily

concerned with the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, and the principal argument centres on the representational tie between this fraction and the extreme right. In contrast, the new petty-bourgeoisie, or non-productive salaried employees, do not share the economic circumstances of the small commodity producer, or the same political and ideological consciousness and struggles, especially with regard to the interventionist state. As Abercrombie and Urry (1983:72) point out, the new petty-bourgeoisie are directly involved with the expansion of the state and the growth of monopoly capital while the traditional petty-bourgeoisie are concerned with the contraction of both. In Caplan's (1977) words, there is a tension between service and status, between the civil service who serve the state and the status of those petty-bourgeoisie whose interests are seen as contradictory to the state. This tension is represented in Poulantzas's 'failure to consider the contradictory tendencies in petty-bourgeois ideology towards both statolatry and violent individualism' (Caplan, 1977:93).

*In concrete terms, the common ideology of the civil service will encompass statolatry (idolisation of the state) and, more specifically, a tendency to see the state as the necessarily powerful but still neutral executant of 'the common good' (Caplan, 1977:92).*

Thus, there is an important distinction between those members of the new petty-bourgeoisie who are involved with the state, and the old petty-bourgeoisie whose commitment to property ownership and the market produces a suspicion of the motives and activities of the state. Those members of the new petty-bourgeoisie who are not part of the state share some of this commitment to a conception of the market and ownership and an opposition to the power of the state and the bureaucratic mode it operates with. Here there is rather more potential for a unified ideological and political position although it tends to be limited for two principal reasons. The first, and most important, is the involvement of these members of the new petty-bourgeoisie in monopoly capital so that they do not necessarily share the opposition of the old petty-bourgeoisie to monopolies. This is emphasised by their growing unionisation which, while not always producing alliances with the working class, certainly moderates the anti-proletarianism of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The second difference arises from the location of the new petty-bourgeoisie in large urban centres and the exposure to a variety of liberating influences. As will be shown below, the

new petty-bourgeoisie are noticeably more liberal on political and social issues than the old petty-bourgeoisie. These differences have obvious implications for the subsequent articulation of material interests in political and ideological relations. Leaving aside these differences between petty-bourgeois fractions for the moment, Poulantzas's conceptualisation of the petty-bourgeois requires further elaboration.

Laclau (1979) offers a theorisation that elucidates certain aspects of Poulantzas's analysis. Laclau (1979:114) notes that the petty-bourgeoisie are separated from the dominant relations of production in society, and thus the contradictions between them and the dominant bloc are posed not at the level of the relations of production but at the level of ideological and political relations which constitute the system of domination. He argues that these contradictions are not class contradictions, although every contradiction is over-determined by the class struggle, but reflect an interpellation that derives from popular-democratic struggles.<sup>8</sup> A contradiction at the level of the mode of production is expressed at an ideological level in the interpellation of the agents as a class while a contradiction expressed in terms of domination, and specifically as the 'underdog', is expressed through the interpellation of the agents as the people (Laclau, 1979:107).

*The first contradiction is the sphere of class struggle; the second, that of popular-democratic struggle (Laclau, 1979:107).*

The effect for the petty-bourgeoisie of their particular interpellation is a concentration on ideological concerns. The dominant contradiction is one 'whose intelligibility depends on the ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination and not just relations of production' (Laclau, 1979:108). The unity of the petty-bourgeoisie does not reflect a class orientation but an ideological unity based

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8. Laclau (1979:109) argues that every class struggles at the ideological level as both class and people simultaneously. The petty-bourgeoisie however differs to the extent that the major interpellation is that derived from popular-democratic struggle to the exclusion of a class interpellation.

on popular-democratic struggles. The latter struggle only takes place at an ideological and political level. Thus Poulantzas is correct in asserting that the petty-bourgeoisie display special political and ideological tendencies but he does not identify the source of this determination.<sup>9</sup> Laclau identifies this as the position of the petty-bourgeoisie outside the dominant relations of production, their subsequent concern with relations of domination and an interpellation based on a popular-democratic struggle. Their struggle is solely at a political and ideological level as the nature of this struggle explains the particular concerns expressed in petty-bourgeois ideology.

The elements of petty-bourgeois ideology include power fetishism, aggressive nationalism, corporatism and authoritarianism (Poulantzas, 1979:252). Poulantzas does identify certain differences between the old and new petty-bourgeoisie: the latter because of their proximity to technology are responsive to the cult of efficiency and technological neutrality. Similarities tend also to be refracted by the dispersed nature of the petty-bourgeoisie and the concern with regional issues. Poulantzas (1979:254-256) lists the ideological elements that characterise the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole as:

- (i) anti-capitalist, especially those fractions (loan capital, banking fraction of big capital) whose interests are harmful to the petty-bourgeoisie;
- (ii) statolatry or the cult of the state;
- (iii) anti-judicial aspect embodied in the themes of honour and duty and the cult of the leader;
- (iv) elitist aspect that derives from coveting the position of the bourgeoisie;

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9. Abercrombie and Urry (1983:73) comment that whatever the stated intentions of Poulantzas's analysis, the focus is almost entirely on determination within the sphere of production while the political dimension is hardly seen as relevant and the ideological is reduced to the difference between mental and manual labour to the neglect of other ideological determinations (of nationality, racism and sexism). This ignores Poulantzas's intentions (although the end product may be open to the above criticism) and the complexity of the theorisation and empirical material. Poulantzas's case is certainly not helped by his formalism.

- (v) anti-semitic, racist appeal which Poulantzas argues is an important part of the mystified anti-capitalist side of petty-bourgeois ideology;
- (vi) a nationalist aspect or the cult of the mystical entity of the nation;
- (vii) militarism which combines nationalism with the leader-cult aspect;
- (viii) anti-clericalism;
- (ix) the role of the 'family' characterised by a search for a social unit immune to the class struggle;
- (x) the particular role given to education as a means of social mobility;
- (xi) obscuratism and anti-intellectualism; and
- (xii) corporatism which is based on the utopia of the guild era and relies on the petty-bourgeoisie as a mediator of every social construction under the state.

Politically, Poulantzas argues that while the petty-bourgeoisie does not have an explicit long term position of its own, it is nevertheless capable of acting as a social force (Poulantzas, 1979:244). The petty-bourgeoisie, because of its nature, has difficulty in organising into a specific party organisation but instead tends to support those state forms that oppose the bourgeoisie while agreeing with the ideological position of the petty-bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeoisie '...aspires to "participate" in the "distribution" of political power, without wanting a radical transformation of it' (Poulantzas, 1979:241). One expression of this political desire is the fascist party which in membership and ideology is initially based on the petty-bourgeoisie.<sup>10</sup> Not all the petty-bourgeoisie are drawn to this particular political form however, and Poulantzas points out that the rural petty-bourgeoisie were deeply divided over fascism in the 1930s and 1940s and that the

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10. One argument (see Billig, 1978:98) holds that fascist and Nazi groups have politicised the ideologies of earlier and forgotten traditions, and that these have been reproduced within isolated and generally neglected coteries. This may be true of elements of twentieth century fascist and extreme right-wing views but contemporary interpellations juxtapose these traditional elements with more recent imagery and arguments, and these interpellations are necessarily based upon the material and ideological struggles of modern capitalism.

petty-bourgeoisie as a whole can be both drawn to democratic radicalism and to 'Bonapartist forms of the state' (Poulantzas, 1979:281).

In contemporary terms, the political and ideological characteristics of the petty-bourgeoisie reflect the changes in the capitalist mode of production and the state. The expansion of free-enterprise capitalism and the liberal state seriously challenge the position of the old petty-bourgeoisie and modernisation has placed a great deal of pressure on the small producer to adapt, particularly in the use of technology and of labour. The traditional use of non-contractual labour, often family labour, differs markedly from the dominant form of social organisation where family and work are separated. The expansion of the free market adds to the feeling of siege by reducing the profits of the petty-bourgeois enterprise. As Scase (1982:158, 160) notes, the old petty-bourgeoisie stress the importance of market forces, of property ownership and petty-commodity production as a means of rationally distributing societal resources. But the nature of modern capitalism with increasingly large-scale corporate dominance and the interventionist state set the parameters within which small-scale capital accumulation occurs. Financial institutions and monopoly capital are seen as curtailing the control of petty-commodity producers over their investments and resources (Scase, 1982:153), and of undermining 'market forces'. The old petty-bourgeoisie have felt that they are in a situation which has:

*...all the vices of a 'free market' - insecurity, price fluctuations, high production costs, speculation - and none of the virtues - windfall profits, high reward for the entrepreneurial function, good return on investments (Conway, 1981:4).*

The result is a crisis of confidence in the 'natural' or 'automatic' reproduction of the system, and this crisis of ideology is necessarily transformed into an identity crisis for the petty-bourgeoisie (see Laclau, 1979:103). One response is to seek support for their position from the state. Their position in the forces of production, however, means that they fall outside the major axis which inevitably results in ineffectual alliances or a lack of concessions when the petty-bourgeoisie do align themselves with the state. They are rarely

represented in the major political forms of state practice or politics and the state itself is the cause for suspicion because of its promotion of interests opposed to those of the petty-bourgeoisie, notably those of finance capital and the proletariat. There is a strong sense of injustice at the profits made by finance capital while the 'real producers of the wealth, who...proceed to do the work and to take the risks for marginal and insecure profits' (Conway, 1981:29), are felt to be inadequately rewarded. The expansion of monopoly capital places pressures on the old petty-bourgeoisie. In order to retain a sufficient profit margin, they need to expand. The alternative may be to become wage labourers (see Conway, 1981:1). Thus, while they support those elements of capitalism that are considered fundamental for petty-commodity production, the petty-bourgeoisie retain a profound suspicion of monopoly capital and production. This, combined with their position outside the politics of the dichotomous class struggle of capitalism, means that the traditional petty-bourgeoisie are simultaneously hostile to and supportive of aspects of capitalism, and this explains their tendency to vacillate between political positions that are respectively progressive and reactionary (cf. Conway, 1981:5).

From below, the petty-bourgeoisie feel threatened by the power guaranteed to the proletariat and its organisations by the state and the possibility, however distant, that production may be socialised. Thus the petty-bourgeoisie generally does not feel inclined to affiliate with the major power groupings of politics, and as a result their access to elite structures and central institutions is circumscribed by this reluctance. Their main contribution to the political agenda comes in the form of a moral ideology and advocacy that is fiercely committed to private property and petty-commodity production. Their separation from the dominant relations of production and the diffuse 'objective' interests of the petty-bourgeoisie, means that the resolution of the crises they face will be interpellated not in terms of class but as a popular-democratic struggle on an ideological level (Laclau, 1979: 104). Their position on questions such as state power and its operations, nation or 'race' is capable of generating support and the traditional stance of the petty-bourgeoisie on these issues has gained new sponsorship from incongruous sources. The criticism of finance and monopoly capital has attracted some support as a 'way of "remoralising capitalism"

and what the petit-bourgeois organisations are beginning to offer is a vision of capitalism as a moral system which they [capitalists] can use' (Bechhofer and Elliot, 1981:192). This support, by the very nature of capitalism, would appear to be transient. One aspect that may sustain the petty-bourgeois attack on the state and ensure some degree of support would be the effect of state intervention itself which has resulted in the transfer of power from parliaments and parties to the executive and administration. The growing concentration and centralisation of power and the exclusion of many groups from the elaboration of state policy (Jessop, 1980:114) does provide a degree of discourse overlap between the petty-bourgeoisie and other fractions and classes.

### Ideology

Although we have referred to Poulantzas's description of the main elements of petty-bourgeois ideology, his discussion is generally disappointing. The major criticism is a standard one: that Marxist analyses of ideology are inevitably reductionist. Laclau (see above) has pointed out that petty-bourgeois ideology is a reflection of their specific position and it does not represent a class struggle as such. Urry contributes a similar comment in that there is a presupposition that:

*...there is only one kind of struggle in capitalist societies, namely class struggle....It is therefore reductionist, treating gender, racial and generational struggles as derivative from class struggle. The fact that someone who is a member of one particular grouping of gender, race or generation has also a particular class membership, does not mean that the struggles of that grouping are entirely structured by class struggle (Urry, 1981:16).*

Urry's (1981) discussion on the reductionist and autonomist conceptualisations of ideology is interesting although his own theorisation is inadequate. Firstly, he argues that ideology is an effect which seeks to conceal the causes and consequences of practice (Urry, 1981:7). Thus ideology is:

*(i)...embodied within such a practice is a concealment of the causes, nature and consequences of that practice or of some other practice; and (ii) that this concealment is in the interests of one or more of the dominant social forces in society (Urry, 1981:45).*

Laclau (1979:101) criticises Althusser for describing ideology as self-subjection to the dominance of the system because it means that all ideology is therefore dominant ideology. Urry can be criticised for exactly the same reason. His definition would apply to hegemonic ideology but by definition it excludes deviant and revolutionary ideologies. Secondly, Urry (1981:72) argues that the interpellations of ethnicity, class, religion and politics can only be understood in terms of two primary interpellations, spatio-temporal location and gender. This in its own way seems as reductionist as the analysis offered by Poulantzas and which Urry has criticised. But it equally seems difficult to sustain an argument that suggests dominant interpellations but then excludes class from being one of these. In the present context, an interpellation based on 'race' would seem to be as important as either of the primary characteristics identified by Urry. This, when combined with gender, is critical. Interpellations that centre on 'race' are linked through a unified discourse with views about the family, about the respective positions and roles of women and men (e.g. male dominance, and women's role as allies and breeders of 'race') and to issues such as contraception and lesbianism/homosexuality. Racial determinism invokes gender determinism, and vice versa.

Laclau (1979:93 ff) is also critical of the Poulantzian definition of ideology but offers more in response than Urry. Laclau argues that Poulantzas has an ambiguous and limited conception of ideology.

*Poulantzas has the tendency to dissolve fascist ideological discourse into its component elements to such extremes as to simply deny its unity: fascism then has a distinct political discourse for each social sector (Laclau, 1979:95).*

If these elements are separated out, then it becomes impossible to

identify the ideological elements as characteristic of a particular class. Specific elements can be attached to a number of classes, and something like nationalism, racism or sexism can be representative of part of the ideology of quite disparate classes. Therefore it is clearly important to identify the unity of an ideological discourse (cf. Laclau, 1979:100), and particularly the relationship of elements and the way in which the ideology is interpellated. In Laclau's (1979: 101) terminology, the unity of ideology comes from a specific interpellation which is governed by certain organising principles. The unity does not imply a logical consistency but rather the way in which an interpellation evokes others to produce a package.

*...what constitutes the unifying principle of an ideological discourse is the 'subject' interpellated and thus constituted through this discourse (Laclau, 1979:101).*

This Althusserian conceptualisation avoids the problems inherent in Poulantzas's approach and allows the interpellation as constitutive of ideology to operate in the same way for the ideology of dominant fractions and for revolutionary ideologies equally (see Laclau, 1979: 101). It also helps overcome the reductionism of many Marxist analyses which are reluctant to attribute ideology a central role.<sup>11</sup> As Laclau (1979) has argued, the petty-bourgeoisie are separated from the dominant relations of production and thus their concerns are expressed at the level of political and ideological relations and reflect the relations of dominance. Popular-democratic interpellations are much more important than class interpellations and an ideological struggle dominates the existence of the petty-bourgeoisie.

Ideology is defined as a totality of social and moral ideas that encapsulate political goals. Rootes (1981:440) identifies three levels of ideological crystallization:

1. *...the level of more or less systematic coherent and well-articulated world views...*

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11. It should be acknowledged that there are obvious exceptions to this sweeping statement. In the present context, Habermas (see Held, 1980) has played an important role and Poulantzas defers to Habermas on certain questions concerning ideology.

2. *...the level of 'para-ideology' at which a variety of ideological elements, components of, for example, possessive individualism or, in late capitalism, technical rationality, are articulated or respected in practice but rarely systematically or fully consciously...*
3. *...a level of ideology directly relevant to practice, directly influenced by experience and unreflectively uttered as 'common-sense'.*

Rootes points out that further down the rank, the more inconsistent the ideology becomes because it is not constrained by conscious articulation and it is more inclined to reflect the contradictions of practical experience. In the case of the groups analysed here, a great deal of the ideology which is examined falls into the first category because it is prepared for public consumption and to confirm the world-views of existing members. Thus we will deal mainly with ideologies that are:

*...integrated, symbolic world views that reflect particular social motives, simplify political and social environments, and are legitimised through ultimate sources of causation and order. Ideologies not only represent false consciousness and group interests; they involve particular definitions of reality (Kinloch, 1981:9).*

Ideologies both represent and influence the economic and political position of the group in question as they attempt to maintain or reassert a particular social order or reflect 'bases and dimensions of resistance' (Urry, 1981:64). The inherent political nature of the ideology implies action, even if there is inconsistency between elaborated principles and social action. Indeed inconsistency may be an advantage as it allows for flexibility and greater coverage. As Therborn (1980:46) notes, logical consistency is very often of secondary significance compared with social efficacy.

For Gramsci (cf. Rootes, 1981:441), the problem was to get the working class to think systematically against a background of imposed ideas that originate in the mass media and the ideological apparatus of the state, and which encourage a certain form of ideological reproduction. There are groups within the working class who are capable

of articulating alternative ideologies with varying degrees of success, and in a similar way, the extreme right offer a competing theory of social reality, helped by their suspicion of the motives and message of both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeoisie deny all other interpellations and present their own ideology as a critique of the system and at the same time, as a basis for reconstruction of the entire ideological domain (Laclau, 1979:103). Typical of this suspicion and central to the ideologies of the extreme right are conspiracy theories.

The conspiracy theory is a convenient method of endowing competing ideologies with a threatening or negative status. It makes the world immediately self-evident without contradictions (Coward and Ellis, 1977:27). It equates alternative ideologies with opposition, a device which is common. Lipset and Raab (1978:17) argue that a conspiracy theory is an extension of 'historical moralism' which defines competing ideologies as illegal. By definition, these ideologies are classified as deviant and, given their illegitimacy and the threat that they offer, it is permissible to seek their destruction. This millennial perspective provides for the possibility of correcting social and economic problems through the simple removal of those said to be the cause of the trouble.

*The themes of a cataclysmic battle between the forces of good and evil, despair preceding utopian redemption and the complete triumph of goodness through violence are the hallmarks of millennial thinking...the desire to transcend the present sequence of historical time by a complete rupture with present actualities (Billig, 1978:327).*

The personification of evil in racial terms means that the cleansing is genocide (Billig, 1978:343), or its equivalent, for example, repatriation.

The main and enduring elements of the conspiracy theory include its global nature and the power of a small group (cf. Lipset and Raab, 1978:15). A fear is generated that the forces of evil are not confined to a particular period or location but are global and enduring. The

second element is based on the view that this power resides with a small group of people who through their economic and political control are able to influence most people in many societies. It is the exercise of this power which explains why good does not prevail.

*...(the) chief technical problem of conspiracy theories: how to identify a corps of conspirators who are esoteric and mysterious enough to make their comprehensive power credible and yet concrete enough to make their existence visible to a mass audience (Lipset and Raab, 1978:251-252).*

There are three broad groups who provide the bulk of conspirators. The first and major group are those who control capital, nationally and internationally. From the perspective of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, capital is divided into good (productive) and bad (financial, speculative) capital (see Edgar, 1977:113, 117). The petty-bourgeoisie directly link their interests and identity with productive capital while the conspirators are identified with finance capital. Thus finance capital is seen in an endless variety of areas and is personified in political groups (e.g. Illuminati), Jewish groups (e.g. The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion), political forums (e.g. United Nations) and international organisations (e.g. Bilderburgers). The second group, rather less specific, are intellectuals. The petty-bourgeoisie have an historical mistrust of intellectuals because of their 'esoteric' interests and privileged position. The extreme right reflect this hostility and their programmes inevitably refer to policies that are designed to remove the intellectuals lodged in universities and in the institutions of finance capital. The third group are constituted of those who oppose the two important characteristics of society, its Christian and capitalist nature. In the undermining of these elements the ideological opposition comes from Jews and the communists, both of whom are seen as anti-Christian and anti-capitalist.

Another important element in the ideology of the extreme right that follows on from their conspiracy view of power and finance capital is a profound distrust of democracy. The suspicion generated by the belief in a conspiracy is linked in a contradictory way with a political

fundamentalism that centres on elitist conceptions of government. For the old petty-bourgeoisie, the modern state is required to maintain a unity of contradictory class and regional interests and in this task, it fails. The apparent unity of earlier social systems is lacking and the modern state resorts to rational-legal means with the result that it is seen as impersonal, it denies common-sense solutions and it relies on extensive state machinery to promote particular interests. The extreme right looks to earlier forms of government, premodern, as a model for social organisation.

*In a society in which public selves are highly differentiated from private identities, there is a premium on movements and mystiques which offer holistic self-conceptions which enable participants to view themselves as conscious goal-oriented beings whose various specific involvements and relationships are integrated into a meaningful overall pattern (Robbins, 1981: 35).*

The goal of a highly integrated society is seen as possible in extra-parliamentary changes and is partially based on a nostalgia for a past tradition that firmly anchors groups to a particular social status and reduces change to acceptable levels. The usually non-specific past alluded to by the extreme right is characterised by the position of the petty-bourgeoisie in intermediary and often influential positions. The radicalism comes from the implementation of this structure in the future, and especially the installation of sharply differentiated hierarchies based on class and 'race'. The justification for this restructuring is by reference to exclusionary ideologies.

The monism (cf. Lipset and Raab, 1978) that would be put in place by a pre-emptive minority derives from a line of argument that is based on the acceptance of elites as a counter to the egalitarianism of nineteenth and twentieth century European systems. This tradition has combined the individualism of private property ownership with a belief in the rights and exclusivity of certain groups. The most apparent expression of this is to be found in nationalism and racism. Another element of this exclusiveness is the glorification of aggression and competition and the linking of these to 'manly' virtues. Smith

(1979:53) has referred to this as 'darwinian vitalism'. To sustain the purity of either nation or 'race', the role of women is to produce suitable off-spring and to follow an ordained role in the system of production, notably in domestic production. The employment of women in paid production is seen as diverting them from their 'natural' roles in biological reproduction, socialisation and domestic care, and this represents a threat to traditional virtues concerning the respective roles of male and female. This perception of the female role automatically excludes them from leading positions in the movements of the extreme right or eventually from positions in the state. Thus there is an important sexual exclusivism in the ideology.

The expression of their ideology is marked by a characteristic fundamentalism of both a political and religious sort. The search for fundamental and external truths of a biblical or secular nature marks a great deal of the arguments and expressions of the ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie in general and the extreme right in particular, and there is a belief that the extreme right has an exclusive hold on morality and the historical task of showing western man to the path of redemption (O'Toole, 1977:67). The challenge to this position comes from those who comprise the conspiracy discussed earlier, and in particular finance capital. Allied to this economic threat of Zinsknechtsschaft (usurious enslavement) is a religious threat (principally from the ideologies of communism and Judaism). The response is to reassert a fundamental and often medieval form of Christianity that encompasses the ideals of small commodity production with racial and sexual exclusivism.

### Racism, Nationalism and Sexism

The politics of racism, and particularly its ideological role, have been inadequately explained in Marxist analysis. Explanations of racism have been weak and most Marxist analyses can be criticised for their reductionism and instrumentalism on this issue. The reductionism derives from the reluctance to consider racial arguments and structures except as a product of class relations, despite the autonomy granted to ideology by authors such as Poulantzas. The

instrumentalism reflects the willingness to attribute the production and reproduction of racism to the state or ruling fractions.<sup>12</sup> The following is typical of this form of instrumentalism:

*Its [National Front] function, and that of similar groups, is to organize and vocalize the fears of the most racist elements of the lower middle and working class, and thus maintain and deepen existing racial divisions within the working class on behalf of the state (MacDonald, 1974-75:303).*

Leaving aside the question of its initial production (which may involve the ruling fraction to a considerable extent), the reproduction of racism to the point where it is accepted as a central element of ideological relations does not rely on the active intervention of the ruling fraction or the state. The ideology has its own autonomy with a very real effect on material relations. It can modify or displace class relations by establishing cleavages across class lines. These cleavages become articulated with sectional class interests and are transparently constructed to reflect specific interests. Agencies outside the group, including those of the state, do contribute to the process but the racial structuring of relationships is not dependent on direct intervention or manipulation.

In the case of the petty-bourgeoisie, the tradition of racist ideology is both different from and more explicit than most other contemporary forms of racism. In a society like New Zealand's, the dominant classes are able to express their position on various matters in a way that avoids their complicity in racist structures or arguments. The working class differ: racism, in a fairly crude ideological form, is apparent amongst the working class and 'race' provides a means of radicalising them, for example, support for the National Front in Britain. But the working class expression of racism falls principally in the third level of Rootes' categorisation ('directly relevant to

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12. As Laclau (1979:96-97) notes, Poulantzas has a very narrow definition of nationalism. It is described as an element of bourgeois ideology and there is little acknowledgement that nationalism is susceptible to transformation in a socialist direction.

practice, directly influenced by experience, and unreflectively uttered as common-sense'), located within a particular social and economic environment and seldom constrained by the need to express the arguments in a form suitable for mass public consumption. The petty-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, have developed explicit and coherent forms of racist ideology for political consumption more in the form of level one of Rootes' categorisation. Their ideology reflects both their distrust of minority groups and the operations of the state. Their interpellation incorporates a variety of spheres and is based on a logic internal to the ideology and capable of explaining most events.

The arguments of the petty-bourgeoisie and specifically the extreme right come from a tradition that is some centuries old. Without this resource, it would be difficult for the extreme right to have developed such an extensive ideology on this question and certainly could not have provided a 'scientific explanation' for their arguments. The origins of this tradition are well-documented (see Banton, 1977; Poliakov, 1974). As Poliakov (1974:2) notes, many of the arguments come from an episode in the history of anthropology which was badly warped by European ethnical egotism. Writers such as Gobineau helped popularise arguments concerning racial difference and their inherited base with the aid of the knowledge created by the new biological sciences. This was built onto an earlier tradition that can be traced to the Middle Ages and racial views that were associated with Jews.<sup>13</sup> This element of the racist ideology of the extreme right is still very important and gives their ideology a particular character.

The medieval conception of the Jew was based on the twin beliefs of the Jew as a sorcerer and the Jew as usurer (Thurlow, 1980:44).

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13. Racism is a critical characteristic of the extreme right but not all fascist groups are anti-Semitic. One example is the Italian fascist party. This has led to a debate on the differences between Nazism (which is by definition anti-Semitic) and Fascism (which is not necessarily anti-Semitic). Authors such as Nolte and Kitchen minimise any difference while Mosse, Ledeen, de Felice and Thurlow maximise the differences (see Thurlow, 1980).

Typical is the use of the forgery, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, first published in 1903 in Russia. The Protocols are a good illustration of the ethnocentric and conspiratorial medieval view of the Jew. They are offered as proof that there is a world wide conspiracy by Jews to undermine the racial and Christian purity of western societies and to develop a new world order. The Protocols provide evidence for the evil of Jewish intentions.

*Anti-Semitism is thus seen to be at bottom a form of Manichaeism. It explains the course of the world by the struggle of the principle of Good with the principle of Evil. Between these two principles no reconciliation is conceivable; one of them must triumph and the other be annihilated (Sartre, 1948:4-41).*

For a group like the petty-bourgeoisie who feel their economic and social position threatened, anti-Semitism forms part of the racist ideology that explains why they should be so vulnerable. The medieval imagery concerning the Jew is combined with nineteenth century racism to provide an ideological framework and the identification of an enemy. A further layer or element has been the twentieth century labelling of communism as another enemy, and the threat of communism and Jewish financial power have been combined to provide a single powerful image, especially as both elements are viewed as anti-Christian and to an only slightly lesser extent, anti-capitalist. The international presence of the Jew and their role in 'bad' finance contributes to the interpretation that they are in an ideal position to promote their particular interests on a world scene. This internationalism identifies them with the parallel international threat of communism and is repeated when both groups are seen as a similar threat within a national context. The suspicion towards unproductive capital was noted above, and the belief is common that Jews control such spheres...

*...in representing the Jews as robber, they put themselves in the enviable position of people who could be robbed (Sartre, 1948:25).*

The Holocaust had the effect of reducing the credibility of anti-Semitic arguments for a period but the effect has not been permanent (Beloff, 1979). Hobsbawm (1980:503-504) identifies four factors in the resurgence of anti-Semitism in the 1970s. Firstly,

the recoil effect of the Holocaust has been lost particularly for the post-war generations who have not been sympathetic to the position of Jews during the war. Secondly, the existence of Israel has given anti-Semites new arguments. Thirdly, there has been a new target group for racism in many western countries in the post-war context thus diverting attention away from Jews for a period. And finally, the prosperity associated with economic expansion after the war blunted the resentment that normally underlies anti-Semitism.

One residual effect of the post-war retreat from anti-Semitism was to force the extreme right to alter the expression of their traditional ideological arguments, at least in the way they identified Jews. Thus Jews might be referred to obliquely as 'International Finance' or the arguments might be couched in 'anti-Zionist' terms to avoid the more damning label of anti-Semitic. To aid in this deflection as well as to couch the public expression of arguments in populist terms, there is an identification of Jewish interests with those of communist countries. The threat of communism which is an important part of the political agenda in most western countries is imbued with anti-Semitic arguments to gain wider currency for the latter. The problem for extreme right-wing groups in New Zealand is to create an audience for these anti-Semitic beliefs. The local Jewish population is small and has tended to underplay its ethnic identity. This lack of a popular base for anti-Semitism is reflected in the public comments and imagery of many extreme right-wing groups in New Zealand who tend to stress other aspects of their Volkisch interpellation.

Nationalism is often an accompaniment to racism. It is a development of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as part of the evolution of the nation-state and based on notions of autonomy, unity and historical identity (cf. Smith, 1979:48). It typically identifies national boundaries with racial boundaries or with specific 'racial interests' so that nationalism and racism become part of the same argument. The appeal to national interests is synonymous with racial concerns. It can also be adapted to counter the internationalism of class analysis. The notion of an international elite of 'blood' and 'race' can be seen as an attempt to establish an equivalent for

the rhetoric and appeal of international working class solidarity (Rogger quoted in Biddiss, 1968-69:253). This is paralleled at a national level. An interpellation that centres on 'the people', constituted as either a 'race' or a 'nation', eliminates the possibility of the class struggle (see Laclau, 1979:120). Class interpellations are rejected or subordinated to an interpellation that focusses on 'race', or 'nation', and a conception of society as a whole (Laclau, 1979:136).

Finally, while racism may be a central identifying element in discussing the extreme right, it necessarily invokes a constellation of parallel elements. One critical element are perceptions of gender. This has been an important omission, especially the consideration of the position of women and sexual politics in fascism and extreme right-wing politics (see Women and Fascism Study Group, n.d.; Stephenson, 1981). The focus on material relations and the relationship of class to political group has meant that the '...specific relation of women to fascism - as potential supporters or opponents - is not simply forgotten: it is excluded by the way the argument is posed' (Women and Fascism Study Group, n.d.:3). In fact, a central tenet is the assumption of male superiority and supremacy, and beliefs about gender-specific roles confirm the confinement of women to caring and breeding functions. Deviation from these latter functions, even to joining fascist parties (see Stephenson, 1981), is seen as weakening the organisational and biological principles of western society. Further, it is held to seriously weaken the breeding programme that is critical to fascist beliefs; 'race' and 'sex' provide the basis for the centrality of 'racially pure breeding' in fascist theory (Women and Fascism Study Group, n.d.:13). Motherhood is, therefore, granted a high status to encourage positive attitudes, and anything that limits fertility (e.g. contraception, abortion, lesbianism/homosexuality) is held to be a threat to purity and 'racial vitality'.

#### Ideology: A Reformulation

The starting point for the above discussion on ideology was the analysis offered by Poulantzas. But his analysis has been

criticised on certain points, and to reflect these departures, a typology is offered which reflects these additions or alterations. Therefore, aspects of Poulantzas's inventory of key elements of petty-bourgeois ideology are retained. Others are new in recognition of the importance placed on ideology, of the ideological and political differences between old and new petty-bourgeoisie and to reflect the importance given to elements such as racism and sexism. The typology represents a minimum listing of elements of petty-bourgeois ideological concerns. It is divided into positive elements, that is issues that the petty-bourgeois would seek to assert and encourage, and negations. Commentators inevitably refer to the negative elements of fascist and extreme right-wing beliefs, and these are based on the opposition of the petty-bourgeoisie to the progressive and liberal tendencies of modern democracies, or to the threat seen to be posed by collectivist (both monopoly capital and socialist) groups and racial groups.

#### Key Elements of Petty-Bourgeois Ideology: A Typology

- (a) Positive:
  - (i) in favour of petty-commodity production and property ownership; this is usually associated with a strong sympathy for individualism and voluntarism;
  - (ii) pro-market as an efficient mechanism for production and distribution (this almost inevitably refers to a 'free marketplace' which is devoid of monopoly capital, of an interventionist state and of representative bargaining organisations such as trade unions);
  - (iii) a restricted state with only limited functions, one of which would be to ensure a political and economic environment that would protect the interests of petty-commodity production;
  - (iv) the corporate reorganisation of political power that would enable the petty-bourgeoisie to be a key participant and mediator in the production of dominant hegemony;

- (v) an elitist orientation that derives from coveting the position of the bourgeoisie and an acceptance of the competitive ethic that governs the marketplace, and which grants status and rewards as an acknowledgement of success;
  - (vi) racism which combines with nationalism to provide the basis for the ideological construction of 'the people' and which denies the validity of class interpellations;
  - (vii) nationalism, or the belief in the mystical entity of the nation which combines racial pedigree with geopolitical boundaries;
  - (viii) a commitment to 'the family' which combines beliefs about the importance of the nuclear family to social organisation with assumptions about the role of women; 'the family' is held to represent a social unit immune to the class struggle;
  - (ix) the institution of education as an avenue of social mobility although this is accompanied by opposition to a liberal syllabus and an insistence that education be governed by market requirements;
  - (x) militarism which combines beliefs about the need for strong leadership with a chauvinistic nationalism, and encompasses remnants of the belief in Empire;
- (b) Negative:
- (i) anti-capitalist, specifically those elements of monopoly capital that are seen as limiting the profitability and influence of small-commodity production;
  - (ii) anti-interventionist state which the petty-bourgeoisie regard as granting legitimacy and resources to monopoly groups, both capital and labour, in the marketplace;
  - (iii) anti-Semitism, as a critical element of the conspiracy theory, which explains social and economic events; Jews are Volksschadling (enemy of 'the people');

- (iv) sexism, or the reaffirmation of 'traditional' views of the role of women, and the denial of sexual equality; the stress on male dominance with prior political and economic rights;
- (v) anti-clericalism, or suspicion of the established churches (fundamentalist religious groups are viewed differently) and clergy for their liberalism, political activity and power;
- (vi) anti-intellectualism, as intellectuals are seen as pursuing irrelevant (i.e. non-productive) concerns or as involved with the conspiracy;
- (vii) anti-liberal, or petty-bourgeois opposition to progressive political and economic policies or to the granting of political power to 'undeserving' minority groups; opposition to wealth redistribution; and opposition to democratic forms of government or aspects of democracy;
- (viii) anti-communism because communism is seen to represent a major ideological threat, and this element is combined with anti-Semitic beliefs and an anti-socialist position.

This typology encapsulates the principal ideological concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie, and the political representatives of this class, notably extreme right-wing groups, who advance an interpellation that parallels these elements and concerns. But certain distinctions need to be acknowledged. The first is the different emphases of fascist interpellations. Whereas the petty-bourgeoisie, in a general sense, look to the state in reasserting the political importance of their form of production and moral position, fascism, as a specific interpellation, regards the state as the embodiment of 'the people', an expression of popular will that has a mandate to transform social relations and to which all sector interests would be subservient. The state is portrayed as part of a corporate authoritarian form of social organisation that would regulate an integrated national system. The style would also differentiate traditional fascism from petty-bourgeois extreme right-wing groups. Alliances with the working class are actively sought by fascist groups and the public expression of ideology

would self-consciously utilise socialist arguments and images, albeit within a framework that centres on 'race', nation and gender. The command structure would be authoritarian and the commitment to violence readily apparent. These aspects are present in both the group or mass party stages of fascism. In short, fascism is the most radical form of petty-bourgeois political activity, committed to corporatism and dictatorship.

The second distinction is that between the ideological and political concerns of the old and new petty-bourgeoisie. The typology lists ideological concerns common to both fractions but the emphasis on property ownership and small-scale capital clearly reflects the material position of the old petty-bourgeoisie. They seek support for those aspects of capitalism which provide an environment for petty-commodity production. In opposition are monopolies whether they arise from the state, trade unions or large capital, and these material concerns are reflected at the political and ideological level by the threat seen as represented in collectivism, social democratic or economic (cf. Scase, 1982:160). The new petty-bourgeoisie, involved as they are in the state or in large capitalist enterprises, diverge from the old petty-bourgeoisie on these matters, and as will be shown later in the thesis, these result in different representational ties. Thus, the typology, with regard to certain items, reflects the specific ideological position of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

### Politics

In this section, the political style of the petty-bourgeoisie and extreme right-wing groups are discussed, but prior to this, the issue of agency versus structure requires some comment. A principal difficulty of the structuralist position of Poulantzas and others is the emphasis on the determination of behaviour by structural processes. The effect is the denial of the influence of agency and the product is a '...world of determinism, which eliminates the conscious activities of real life individuals and social groups from the scheme of exploration...' (Femia, 1981:251). The issue of why individuals act in the way they do, and why they choose to act in a particular way,

needs to be incorporated into analysis although a voluntarist position which accepts and emphasises the intentionality of a free subject is too simplistic.

Analysis which asserts the priority of structure over thought undervalues the Hegelian conception of 'ideality' or of Marx's 'revolutionising practice'. Both Marx and Hegel acknowledged that external conditions can be transformed by conscious human thought and action. Poulantzas allows for this possibility in his theorisation, but in practice, his analysis views classes not in terms of the individual agents of which they are composed but as objective places in a social division (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983:70).

*...in our view, Poulantzas is incorrect in seeing the characteristics of persons as being irrelevant to the analysis of classes. Thus, although classes are being constituted as places, class practices are partly determined by the character of persons who fill those places (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983:109).*

Abrams (1982) adds a plea for the examination of small-scale social settings so that the meanings and actions of individuals are accorded attention although within the context of the constraining environment of society. Thus both agency and structure become part of the same analysis; if the analysis '...allows us to understand them collectively (it) will also allow us to understand them singly...' (Abrams, 1982:281). And '...the analysis of any career...is at root an analysis of the conditions governing recruitment to it, exclusion from it and especially success or failure within it' (Abrams, 1982:281-282). In the case of the petty-bourgeoisie, Scase (1982:148) has criticised the tendency to concentrate on positions because it has meant the neglect of the way in which actors create opportunities for small-scale production and, hence, sustain the reproduction of positions. There is a 'neglect of the empirical dynamics whereby the petty-bourgeoisie are reproduced under the conditions of monopoly capitalism' (Scase, 1982:154).

The structuralist approach does not allow a consideration of factors such as these and as a result it poses problems for the analysis of extreme right-wing groups and fascism. One important area is the

analysis of the leadership, and in particular, charismatic political leadership. In both Italy and Germany, the fascist parties in the 1930s were influenced by a particular form of leadership that became even more important with the formation of the fascist state, and yet Poulantzas (1979) largely ignores this issue. Structural analysts are correct when they assert that fractions of monopoly capital were able to influence state policy through Hitler.

*But there were many other critical occasions when there was no evidence that the politics of personal dictatorship worked in this manner (Mason, 1981:206).*

The power of an individual or collective leadership to direct policy, to create an image, to establish political alliances and to maintain an effective party organisation all play a role and need to be incorporated into analysis. Poulantzas (1979) provides an illustration of the way in which structural factors and processes can be included but does little to develop an approach that addresses the question of agency.

A related area that is also dealt with inadequately by structural analysis is the motivation of the rank and file of the organisation. As Mason (1981:208) points out, membership involves a sustained and substantial commitment of time and energy which has a variety of risks attached. Therefore the factors that produce commitment and activism are critical to understanding any organisational attachment. Abrams (1982:7) suggests that an examination of individual life-histories will locate patterns of freedom and constraint. In the case of a sociological generation (see Abrams, 1982:256), politically relevant experiences translate via structural considerations into specific allegiances. The sociological generation is in a position to negotiate new images and identities with attendant political and social arrangements. The analysis should begin with a focus on the careers and motivation of involved individuals. These have received attention from conservative and liberal historians but they are seldom considered in materialist critiques (Mason, 1981:209).

## Political Style and Social Organisation

Apart from ideology, the style of the extreme right is one of its defining features. The political style of the extreme right is in part a reflection of the beliefs held. Thus the reductionism of their arguments, notably the identification of specific groups as a cause of problems, and the belief in a conspiracy theory, influences the way in which the group operates. In other respects, the organisation of the extreme right is very similar to the type of organisation found amongst a variety of political and religious fundamentalist groups.

Implicit in the establishment of an organisation is the intent to effect change and to communicate ideas to a wider audience with the aim of convincing that audience of the truth and accuracy of the claims made. Most groups possess an enrolment economy, a strategy to market their ideas and to gain finance and adherents (ideologues). In the case of groups that are particularly radical whose arguments compete with practically every commonly accepted view, the enrolment economy may be underplayed. But even here the group is engaged in a particular moral enterprise (Wallis, 1976:210). All of the groups can be best categorised as political sects in this respect.

*The political sect is defined as a small, distinct, exclusive political group in conflict with the wider society and composed of men and women who, entering its ranks on a voluntary basis, have been selectively chosen as guardians or carriers of some specific variant of political truth (O'Toole, 1977:11).<sup>14</sup>*

The sect is different from a political party or a cult by the exclusivity of the first compared with the inclusivity of both the party and the cult. Wallis (1976:14-15) identifies the cult by its

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14. One criticism made of O'Toole's approach is that he is theorising by analogy, and an argument that links political to religious activity is basically an exercise in labelling (Barrett, pers. comm., 1984). In part, this is true, although the concept of political sect is used here to describe the organisational style of the extreme right in the midst of other theoretical arguments. It is both a conceptual and methodological tool.

'epistemological individualism', the fact that there is no clear locus of final authority with the result that doctrinally, the group is precarious and boundaries tend to be difficult to establish and maintain. By contrast, the sect is 'epistemologically authoritarian' (Wallis, 1976:17) in that they claim unique and privileged access to the truth or salvation. Other explanations are suspect and alternative ideologies are denigrated. To maintain purity, the sect may prefer to lose membership rather than compromise its position or beliefs. To do this, the sect can isolate itself from society completely or withdraw from that interaction which threatens the sect's purity, especially as the sect can not 'tolerate reservations or hesitations from within its own ranks' (O'Toole, 1977:9). A cult may become a sect by a 'prior process of expropriation of authority' (Wallis, 1975: 43), just as a sect may become a political party by compromising the exclusivity of doctrine and membership and relaxing its authority structure. Despite the exclusivity of sects, the ultimate aim is invariably to install a single ideological standard that governs the behaviour of everyone in the diffuse areas of modern society, a 'corporatist reorganisation' as Robbins (1981:35) calls it. In the case of the petty-bourgeoisie, there is a rejection of class interpellations and the promotion of an interpellation based on 'race' or nationalism reflecting the commitment to popular-democratic politics.

The idea of a non-religious sect would appear to be a contradiction in terms but it aptly describes the organisational structure and the approach to moral and political issues adopted by the extreme right. In the case of groups that are formed to operate on single-issue politics, it is very difficult to maintain a structure and central belief system without expanding the ideological framework and encompassing new issues. Many of these groups are less likely to be a sect in approach or structure, particularly as they are highly unstable and have to appeal to as wide an audience as possible during the period the issue on which they are founded has the greatest impact. The group which seeks moral clarification on a range of issues and arenas tends to be more stable and is much more likely to exhibit the traditional qualities of a sect.

The problem for any political sect is to maintain commitment in the face of the conventional world which either does not accept the sect's beliefs as valid or may seriously challenge them. The dominant relations of society are not organised on the principles derived from the sect's belief system and so society always presents a potential challenge (Wallis, 1976:326).

*The member may therefore minimize any challenge to the validity of his [sic] unconventional beliefs by simply not exposing them in conventional domains. He [sic] compartmentalizes and segregates his [sic] beliefs and behaviour (Wallis, 1976:277).*

Outside agencies compete with those of the sect as sources of information and issue-interpretation. In these cases, an important alternative for the sect is to reject the values of the surrounding society to reduce the challenge to its authority, that is, a world-rejecting sect. In contrast are those sects that attempt to offer an understanding of the world and withdrawal is not an acknowledged strategy. Wallis (1978:6-8) describes these sects as world-affirming. Membership is a means of obtaining better understanding and mastery. This type of sect may seek to legitimise certain central social institutions rather than to see them as a threat, principally because these institutions share and affirm values of the sect. In both cases, there is an attempt to monopolise the loyalties of followers and to develop a total commitment to the world view of the sect with the effect in some cases of an introverted view of the relationship between the sect and the surrounding society. This can result in a range of behaviours designed to preserve the group's purity rather than to produce new members.

O'Toole (1975) examined two Marxist groups as examples of sects that were more concerned with purity than with proselytisation. The groups were concerned to ensure exclusivity and even activities that were ostensibly designed to attract new members, actually minimised this possibility. For example, O'Toole (1977) talks about pseudo-proselytisation in the case of mass-leafletting in situations that were likely to be unproductive. These groups provided an alternative

to the world rather than a means of changing it. But this is not the view of the group, nor of its efficacy, held by group members. As O'Toole (1977) noted, the groups described everything as going according to plan and prophecies, rather than being proved wrong because of their lack of accuracy, were seen as having 'renewable application'. The group presents

*...a picture of itself as a thriving group whose members are earnestly and systematically engaged in a full schedule of tasks (O'Toole, 1975:173).*

And the predictions involve an imminent collapse that is always potential, a crisis that never occurs. The activities are imbued with a sense of urgency and of impatience. Equally, the smallness of the group is not viewed as an indication of the irrelevance of its views, but as a reflection of its elite status and the dedication to doctrinal purity (O'Toole, 1977:62). It is also seen as the result of persecution by agencies of the state or other powerful groups, thereby confirming the conspiratorial nature of its ideology.

The epistemological authoritarianism of the political sect is underlined by the authority structure of the group. Wallis (1979) hypothesises that the more centralised the group, the less likely it is that there will be challenges to the basis of legitimation and thus the propensity to schism is reduced. The challenge may come from those who seek alternative sources of legitimation to those held by group members or they might employ the same sources to challenge the authority structure. Thus local practitioners can establish a reputation for a new interpretation of existing ideology. The counter is to centralise authority so that only a small number of people can claim authority derived from the ideological basis of legitimation. Nyomarky (1967) adds another dimension to this understanding when he argues that schism is more likely to occur in an ideological movement as opposed to a charismatic movement. In the case of most Marxist movements, the focus of group cohesion is ideological and schisms constantly occur as this ideology is redefined and reinterpreted. Nyomarky (1967) compares these groups with those movements such as fascism which are based on charismatic legitimacy. The source of

authority is the leadership and they are not constrained by ideology. More importantly, factions compete for and attain legitimacy by identifying themselves with the source of authority, the leadership.

The exclusive nature of the political sect, while it may maintain purity, nevertheless inhibits communication of the sect's message to a wider audience. For those political sects who do seek to have an impact in this way, a common strategy is to reserve ideologically pure comment for the membership while promoting its concerns to a wider audience by using a language and style that will appeal. Thus the rhetoric of science or religion is used and appropriate authors and commentators employed, albeit unknowingly or unwillingly, to legitimate their arguments. To undermine the challenges of critics and to acquire a more acceptable image, the sect will employ the terminology of science to give it validity. The appeal to respectability has problems: the fact that a scientific elite so completely determines the 'nature of the orthodox consensus that the possibility of institutionalised deviate elite science is almost a conceptual contradiction' (Dolby, 1979:14) is a major obstacle. The rejection of the sect's claims by this elite may simply confirm their deviant status. Again, this merely serves to convince the sect members that there is a conspiracy. The problem that remains is how far should a sect accommodate to accepted views. If the political sect is concerned to promote an alternative perspective on a problem, then accommodation simply weakens the testable empirical content of their claims. It may also undermine the faith of supporters. The historic moral task of showing society that its analysis in certain areas is wrong begins to dissipate. Thus ideological accommodation presents major difficulties for sects.

The origin of the alternative world views held by the sects have been discussed earlier. The extreme right sustains an ideological tradition that challenges orthodoxy in many fields and this provides a means to evaluate interpretations of various phenomena that are offered through agencies such as the media or which circulate as part of 'commonsense' Campbell (see Wallis, 1976:13) refers to a cultic milieu which embodies the idea of a pool of alternative belief

systems and practices.<sup>15</sup>

*We may regard it as a repository of rejected knowledge in which alternatives to current orthodoxy are kept alive, perhaps to re-emerge when the demands of orthodoxy have changed (Dolby, 1979: 26).*

Poulantzas (1979:76) talks of ideological sub-groupings which may be construed in a similar way. Poulantzas argues that these sub-groupings 'exist by virtue of the dominance within them of ideologies belonging to classes other than the dominant class'. To use the phrase suggested by Campbell, the cultic milieu reproduces many of the ideologies that we have discussed here and these ideologies are kept alive and 'practised' in the political sects of the extreme right in a form of political or cultural underground. A major hypothesis is that this cultic milieu is mostly (although not only) associated with the petty-bourgeoisie.<sup>16</sup> The political sects that draw upon this cultic milieu require a commitment and level of activism from its members that suggests that outcast or apathetic sections of the population are not going to be attracted to these groups, especially when they operate as small movements. The commitment needs to be high because of the very obstacles faced by such groups and their limited resources. It also requires a willingness to suspend or treat critically otherwise commonly held views. The petty-bourgeoisie, through their relationship to the bourgeoisie and working class, are already suspicious of the views expressed by other major groupings in society and therefore constitute the cultic milieu for extreme right-wing interpellations.

The following list summarises the key characteristics of the style and organisational aspects of extreme right-wing groups as political representatives of the old petty-bourgeoisie:

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15. These alternative belief systems and practices might be described as non-hegemonic interpellations that can include elements from the ideology of dominant fractions but as a unity they are critical of other interpellations and indeed dismiss them and seek to institute a new ideological discourse.
  16. As Urry (1981:64) points out, it is difficult to demonstrate that a particular class structure is in fact completely discrete and tightly bound.

- (i) epistemological authoritarianism, that is the claim that the group has a unique and privileged access to the truth and salvation;
- (ii) exclusiveness, or the restriction of membership to those committed to their interpellation, and a rejection of any attempt to be inclusive in terms of group membership;
- (iii) a suspicion of outside/dominant agencies and their beliefs and the use of a conspiracy theory to create disbelief about alternative sources of information and interpretation;
- (iv) the group is organisationally highly centralised and the authority structure is based on an identified leadership (often charismatic);
- (v) the use of a symbolic code that employs its own sources, symbols and logic, and which suppresses or resists alternative readings of a text; this code typically utilises its own mystical elements and is derived from specific ideological traditions;
- (vi) the group derives its ideology and membership from a cultic milieu, here based principally within the petty-bourgeoisie, and this cultic milieu is responsible for reproducing this ideological tradition.

### The Potential For Fascism In New Zealand

The development of a mass fascist movement and a fascist or exceptional state are matters for speculation in the New Zealand context because there is no historical precedent for such a situation. However, it is possible to identify objective historical categories and congruences in the development of fascism elsewhere and to apply this understanding to New Zealand. This assumes that fascism is not an aberration but a possibility in any context where specific events occur and that New Zealand society, like any capitalist society, embodies the potential for mass fascism and the fascist state.

Following Laclau (1979) and Poulantzas (1979), the progression to a fascist state is the product of a dual crisis. One side to this crisis is a 'crisis of the power bloc which was [is] unable to absorb and neutralize its contradictions with the popular sectors through traditional channels' (Laclau, 1979:115). There is an accumulation of contradictions and the dominant fraction or class is unable to deny the intrusion of alternative interpellations, and most notably the interpellation offered by the petty-bourgeoisie.<sup>17</sup> Poulantzas (1979:76) identifies these contradictions precisely as: the contradiction between dominant classes and fractions; a crisis to the extent that no dominant class or fraction is able to impose leadership; modifications to hegemony and especially the hegemony of finance capital; the breakup of representational ties and a subsequent political disorientation; an ideological crisis in dominant and general ideologies; and an offensive by big capital and the power bloc. These crises derive from a lack of national unity; the systematic intervention of the state; an unevenness between rural and urban areas; the weakness of the bourgeoisie; and the transition to monopoly capitalism. Clearly different combinations or congruences will be influential in particular circumstances. The critical factor in the growth of fascism is the accumulation of these contradictions.

The other aspect of the dual crisis is the failure of the working class and its representative organisations to respond to the situation. Laclau (1979:115) describes the working class as being unable to 'hegemonise popular struggles and fuse popular-democratic ideology and its revolutionary class objectives into a coherent political and ideological practice'. Working class organisations, especially those that are revolutionary in some sense, experience an ideological crisis that parallels the more general ideological crisis. Like other representational ties which are broken in the crises, those between the working class and its political representatives are severed. The working class in both its revolutionary and reformist sectors

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17. These arguments can be traced to Gramsci's (1971) theorisation on the breakdown of representational ties between class and party. Such a crisis sees the transformation of groups from a state of political passivity to activity (Gramsci, 1971:210).

abandons the arena of popular-democratic struggles (Laclau, 1979:124) and thus presents an opportunity for other interpellations to attract working class support.

The vacuum created by these crises leaves the way clear for alternative political organisations, and the gap is filled by the petty-bourgeoisie and the interpellations offered by extreme right-wing groups. The extreme right is acceptable to the dominant fraction or class because (i) it is radical and therefore does offer a real alternative in a period of crisis; and (ii) the extreme right offers an interpellation which excludes any possibility of an alliance between radical popular objectives and socialist objectives (Laclau, 1979:119). An autonomous political grouping that centres on an interpellation of 'the people' and which constitutes an organised alternative to the existing system is labelled Jacobinism by Laclau (1979:116) and Poulantzas (1979:32).

*What is petty-bourgeoisie - and here lies the essence of jacobinism - is the conviction that the struggle against the dominant bloc can be carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle, apart from classes (Laclau, 1979:116).*

The development of a mass fascist movement which necessarily involves alliances with other classes inevitably alters the petty-bourgeois concerns of the existing ideology. Poulantzas (1979:252-253) notes that there is a bourgeois aspect that is basically imperialist. This element may correspond to petty-bourgeois ideology, but as Poulantzas (1979:253) argues, the internal contradictions of fascist ideology stem from the contradictions between the interests of big capital and those of the petty-bourgeoisie. The establishment of the exceptional state extends the adaptation of fascism and of fascist ideology, and further alters the petty-bourgeois content until the point is reached where it is difficult to identify fascism (in government) as petty-bourgeois. But this does not deny the petty-bourgeois origins of fascism. Even during stable periods when the dominant fractions neutralise the contradictions of society (cf. Laclau, 1979:117), the petty-bourgeoisie provide a cultic milieu in which

interpellations based on the notion of 'the people' and which reject dominant interpellations, are reproduced. During hegemonic crises, support for these alternative interpellations is mobilised and they represent powerful alternatives that may become attractive to both capital and labour.

### The Theoretical Framework: A Formal Statement

#### (a) The Politics of the Old Petty-Bourgeoisie

- (1) The petty-bourgeoisie, and notably the old petty-bourgeoisie, provide the base (vanguard) for a form of political organisation that can be generically identified as extreme right and which contains explicitly fascist elements or possibilities. These political groupings are representative of significant elements of the petty-bourgeoisie and it is through these organisations that the petty-bourgeoisie can act as an authentic social force.
- (2) The petty-bourgeoisie are defined by their contradictory class position and therefore do not identify completely with either the bourgeoisie and its institutions or the working class. The petty-bourgeoisie occupy two distinct places in the relations of production:
  - i. small scale production
  - ii. non-productive salaried employees.
- (3) Because of their position outside the major or dominant relations of production, the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie are more closely related to the relations of domination and an interpellation that corresponds to popular-democratic struggles (as opposed to class struggles). The development of new state forms and the accompanying alliances are seen as a major threat while the petty-bourgeoisie are especially aware of a loss of moral hegemony. Thus their political interests are most apparent in the spheres of politics and ideology and this class interest is reflected in the representative political organisations of the extreme right.

(b) The Ideology of the Extreme Right

(1) The ideology of the extreme right shares certain elements with the ideology of dominant fractions but is characteristically critical of other ideologies, including those that originate with hegemonic interests. In the sense that this interpellation would seek to deny the validity of other interpellations and to reconstitute ideological relations according to its own interpellation, it is revolutionary.

(2) The ideology of extreme right-wing political groups corresponds to the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie.

The principal elements include:

- (i) monism, or the treatment of cleavage as illegitimate because of the petty-bourgeois concern to establish moral absolutes;
- (ii) anti-democracy because democracy implies an alliance between dominant fractions and other classes to the exclusion of the petty-bourgeoisie or a reduction in their influence;
- (iii) nationalism, racism and sexism as these elements indicate who constitutes an elite and provides a biological (cf. scientific) justification for this world view;
- (iv) and a conspiracy theory that extends racial and national arguments to encompass communism, reinforces monism and provides an explanation of why this interpellation is not supreme.

The ideology is couched in terms of a political and religious fundamentalism.

(3) Even in periods of stability when the dominant fraction is able to contain major societal contradictions, the petty-bourgeoisie is capable of sustaining a radical and critical ideological position. This is the basis for a cultic milieu which provides the reproductive base for extreme right-wing organisations and ensures a continuity in ideological tradition and activist support.

- (4) A critical part of this tradition is their nationalistic and racist arguments, including anti-Semitism, which marks the extreme right from most other interpellations, particularly from those of the extreme left.

(c) The Organisational Structure and Style of the Extreme Right

- (1) The class base and ideological commitment of the petty-bourgeoisie produce a specific organisational structure and style in extreme right-wing organisations. In organisational terms, they are a form of political sect which is characterised by epistemological authoritarianism.
- (2) The extreme right practise a moral entrepreneurialism that seeks a public reaffirmation of the tenets of petty-bourgeois ideology. The strategies to attain this reaffirmation are drawn from the history of struggle of the petty-bourgeoisie.
- (3) The concern with maintaining a purity of ideological argument and of preserving a reactionary world view require strategies that circumscribe any contact that may contaminate the traditions of the extreme right.
- (4) Internally, the strength of the political sect depends on the centralisation of the group (the more centralised, the fewer challenges to the unity of the group), the reliance on ideology as opposed to charismatic leadership (an emphasis on ideology provides more opportunity for challenges to the leadership) and whether the group is concerned with a single issue or a variety of matters (the former means it is more difficult to sustain commitment).

(d) The Potential for Fascism in New Zealand

- (1) A mass fascist movement and a fascist state only become a possibility with the development of a crisis that takes a specific form. This includes the ideological defeat and the withdrawal from popular-democratic struggle of the working class and its representative

political organisations, and the lack of hegemonic control by the dominant fraction.

- (2) This crisis results from an accumulation of contradictions. These contradictions include: a crisis among the dominant fractions and dominant classes; a crisis in hegemony because no class is able to impose its leadership; modifications in hegemony and especially the hegemony of finance capital; a breakdown of the representational ties and political parties; an ideological crisis in both dominant and general ideologies; and an offensive by big capital and the power bloc.
- (3) These contradictions are produced by a lack of national unity; the systematic intervention of the state; an unevenness between rural and urban areas; the weakness of the bourgeoisie; and the transition to monopoly capitalism.
- (4) The crisis provides the opportunity for the petty-bourgeois (or fractions of it) and the extreme right-wing political organisations that represent its interests to be co-opted into the power bloc. Alliances are created with the dominant fractions on one hand and the working class on the other and this provides the basis for a mass fascist party and ultimately the fascist state.

This framework provides the basis for an examination of petty-bourgeois struggles and the articulation of extreme right-wing interpellations in New Zealand.

CHAPTER THREE: THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS OF  
PETTY-BOURGEOIS INTERPELLATIONS  
IN NEW ZEALAND, 1890-1972

*The Jewish question is the most important question in the world today...it is the root of many other problems. All economic literature, for example, which ignores the Jewishness of international finance and the Jewishness of Socialism and Communism is a mere beating of the air.*

A.N. Field (1938)  
Today's Greatest Problem

*The Douglas crusade is fundamentally a Crusade of Christian idealists against the crime of usury.*

Dominion (12/2/34)

*They said my country had been sold  
To faceless rich men far away  
They said my people were in want  
While a few grew richer every day.*

Social Credit campaign song (1981)

This chapter sketches the historical development of Jacobinism and of parallel struggles in New Zealand. In particular, the latter part of the chapter identifies the origins of petty-bourgeois interpellations, locating these origins in the economic, political and ideological struggles of the 1890s initially but much more profoundly in the 1930s. A characteristic of these periods is the struggle of the petty-bourgeoisie against the dominant bloc, a struggle which Laclau (1979) terms Jacobinism. It can be both progressive and reactionary although fundamentally it involves a rejection of the ideological discourse of the dominant classes. Jacobinism, in advancing an alternative, strives for change but does so within the institutions of the democratic state. This alternative is articulated as the struggle of 'the people' and thus the interpellation explicitly excludes a class analysis. Nevertheless, Jacobinism reflects the class concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie, and in New Zealand, specifically the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie.

The old petty-bourgeoisie in nineteenth and early twentieth century New Zealand were located primarily in the rural sector. Refrigeration had improved the profitability of small farms and the establishment of dairy farming in large areas of the North Island provided a critical core for the old petty-bourgeoisie. Units were typically small (16 hectares/40 acres), and capital or labour intensive. If labour was required, it was provided by members of the family so in 1926, 60 percent of New Zealand farms hired no outside labour. In contrast, the large farmers in areas such as Hawkes Bay and Canterbury hired labour on both a seasonal and permanent basis and were involved in meat and wool production. They were politically dominant and had established a number of elite institutions such as schools based on the British public school tradition. As a result, the interests of the landowning oligarchy and the rural petty-bourgeoisie were opposed. The material position of the latter, especially their low profit margins and high level of debt, produced a deep and abiding suspicion of financial institutions. In periods of crisis, the petty-bourgeoisie objected to what they saw as the unfair appropriation of surplus value from their production. They opposed collectivism, as their role in the 'smashing' of the Federation of

Labour in 1912-13 indicated (Martin, 1981: 28), and viewed petty-commodity production as the core of productive capitalism.

*[The]...heavily mortgaged small holder dairy farmers...saw themselves as yeomen and pioneers conquering the wilderness. Their struggles were certainly heroic (and so were those of their wives and children used as cheap labour) but they were often isolated from cities and resented the civilized ways of urban people (Gibbons, 1981: 314).*


It is this material position and the resulting ideological and political concerns which constitutes the base for the revolt of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

Petty-bourgeoisie Jacobinism has been most forcefully articulated during major periods of crisis in the New Zealand social formation. The conditions of the late 1880s and early 1930s were perceived as a threat to the material and ideological reproduction of this fraction, and the response created a political generation that supplied activists and supporters. In the nature of Jacobinism, they mobilised in order to contest the political and ideological terrain in opposition to the hegemony of the dominant bloc. But the response in both cases was mediated by alliances with other classes and their political representatives. The alliance in the 1880s included the working class and manufacturers, and the political representative was the Liberal Party. In the 1930s, Jacobinism was seen by the old petty-bourgeoisie as being contained within the programme of the Labour Party. In contrast with formations such as Britain, Canada and Australia, the ideological crisis and major economic contradictions of the 1930s failed to produce a fascist movement in New Zealand. In this absence, the reactionary elements of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism were diverted by a tenuous alliance with the working class and a representational tie with a liberal political organisation, the Labour Party. Thus, for the 1930s, petty-bourgeoisie revolt was channelled into support for a progressive option unlike similar rebellions against the dominant bloc in some other countries.

However, this alliance and representational link rapidly

weakened as key petty-bourgeoisie concerns were not addressed by the 1935 Labour Government. The peripheral position of the petty-bourgeoisie to the dominant relationship between capital and labour was again obvious, and the anti-proletarian tendencies of this fraction were re-asserted. But equally, the Jacobinism of the petty-bourgeoisie had retreated during the 1940s in a period of relative acquiescence. The disquiet was still present although muted by the war and the affluence of the post-war period. It was manifested again in the establishment of Social Credit in 1953, thus finally ending the alliances and ties of the 1930s. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Social Credit as the political representative of the old petty-bourgeoisie continued to articulate the concerns of petty-commodity production without a great deal of impact. By the late 1960s, tensions had developed between the political generation created in the 1930s, or those sympathetic to the ideology offered by this generation, and those who sought to update the imagery and arguments of Social Credit. This tension produced major schisms, reflecting the different modes of ideological authority. So from the 1930s, when the petty-bourgeoisie had ties with the Labour Party, this fraction developed its own representative party in the 1950s only to experience fragmentation as reactionary ('purist') and 'liberal' ('pragmatist') struggled over what constituted the appropriate orthodoxy.

DIAGRAM 1: Schematic Development of Petty-Bourgeois Interpellations and Representational Ties



This trajectory represents the major focus of the chapter but there are two further aspects covered. One of these is the contribution of A.N. Field to petty-bourgeois interpellations. This is included for two particular reasons. One is to indicate how critical texts, in this case written by Field, accomplish ideological work through construction of the subject. He invests the concerns of petty-commodity producers with a racial causality, specifically to suggest that Jews are synonymous with speculative or unproductive capital. This Volkisch interpretation of material and political relations has provided an indigenous tradition with one of its most important ideologists. The second reason for analysing a specific agent is a methodological one: it locates, albeit descriptively, activism and leadership in identifiable individuals. If a key issue is the reproduction of the petty-bourgeoisie within a capitalist formation, then evidence needs to be derived from actors as well as relations and positions (cf. Scase, 1982: 154) if the product is to avoid being excessively abstract.

The other aspect referred to is the politicisation of 'race' in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Ideological, political and economic relations were racialised, and certain 'races', notably the Chinese, Yugoslavs and Indians, were portrayed as a 'threat'. This was an important issue in national political institutions and relations, and one that was episodically at the centre of political debate. In this respect, it was different from petty-bourgeois interpellations which were mostly marginal in terms of dominant political and ideological relations, and the links between the two were tenuous. But both share the characteristic of articulating 'the people' as a 'race'.<sup>1</sup> The

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1. There is an obvious 'gap' in comments made here and subsequently: there is no reference to ideological and political relations between Pakeha and Maori historically. It needs to be acknowledged that Pakeha colonisers utilised racism in the economic, political and ideological domination of the Maori, and therefore relations were explicitly conceived of as being between two 'races', one superior, one inferior. But the historical development of this dominant ideology and of relations between the two groups followed a different trajectory from the relations discussed here. Between the Land Wars and World War II, the Maori were seldom perceived as a direct 'threat' (see Miles and Spoonley, 1985) and thus there were no equivalent organisations to the Anti-Chinese League which were concerned with the Maori. It is not until the 1960s that organisations and ideologies appear which are directly predicated on the assumption that the Maori represents a 'threat'.

racialisation of particular relations provides a contextual detail for petty-bourgeois struggles, and in the absence of an identifiable tradition of 1930s fascism, the anti-Asian and anti-Yugoslav campaigns provide an important historical antecedent for contemporary fascist and extreme right-wing activities.

### Racism: Ideological Struggles 1890s-1930s

Between the 1890s and the 1930s, there were a number of political groupings that articulated populist Volkisch ideologies. The dominance of British colonial links, along with the moral order that this was seen to entail, reproduced explicit ideologies concerning ruler and ruled in the New Zealand context. Interpellations which focussed on 'the people' constituted as a 'race' were dominant. Typically, they encompassed notions about the suitability of the British to rule over others, of the inherent superiority of British customs and institutions and of the necessity of preserving these advantages by maintaining 'racial purity'. The struggle was primarily conducted at an ideological level although it did reflect certain material concerns. One included the desire of New Zealand governments from the 1890s to create their own version of a colonial empire in the Pacific. The second derived from the competition for resources internally. Chinese, Yugoslav and Indian migrants were variously seen to be competing unfairly in the areas of gold, gum and market garden production respectively. The 'competition' was confined to a few geographical areas and the numbers of migrants from the three groups were small in number. But the issue of entry to New Zealand and the subsequent 'threat' posed were sufficient to generate and reinforce interpellations which centred on notions of 'race'. Effectively, such interpellations were critical parts of the political agenda from the 1870s (see Sedgwick, 1984, on the Chinese experience in New Zealand) through to the Second World War. Proponents for such views covered the broad spectrum of political opinion, from liberal politicians such as Reeves and trade unions through to conservatives like Massey. The involvement of elites ensured the support of the state and resulted in harsh political measures against the Chinese

(see Sedgwick, 1984), the Yugoslavs (see Trlin, 1979) and the Samoans (see Field, 1984). These views were clearly not confined to the petty-bourgeoisie but were articulated and reproduced by most Pakeha groups from working class to elites. They mark the migration of certain ideological traditions to the New Zealand context, and their reproduction in local struggles.

As one example, the anti-Asian sentiments of the Pakeha community provided the base for a variety of political groupings in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Such organisations as the White Race League and the Palmerston North-based Anti-Asiatic League, together with politicians and the media (see Fair Play, 1/10/84), were instrumental in producing a series of discriminatory parliamentary acts. In one case, an anti-Chinese alliance between the Returned Serviceman's Association and the Anti-Chinese League led to the introduction of an Act in 1920 that required all immigrants not of British parentage or birth to obtain a permit from the Minister of Customs before entering New Zealand (Sedgwick, 1984:52). This was in addition to other measures which heavily taxed the Chinese on entry. The popularity of such views and policies is exemplified by public support for the White New Zealand League. In May 1926, the White New Zealand League sent a statement to local bodies throughout New Zealand deploring the continued immigration of Chinese and Indians. In April 1926, another pamphlet was published that referred to the 'low moral position' of Asians and this was followed by a further pamphlet in March 1927 urging that New Zealand be kept a 'white man's [sic] country'. This position reflected popular beliefs. Massey and Coates were supportive, and others such as Fuller (director of Fuller's Theatres) made their support public (see Herald, 11/6/24). The White New Zealand League contacted 200 local bodies and asked them to pass a resolution supporting the objectives of the League and to forward the outcome to the Prime Minister. They were then invited to approach the local Member of Parliament for support in presenting their case. The League received positive replies from 160 local bodies representing 670,000 people, and all endorsed the concept of a 'white New Zealand' (see Tiwari, 1980). Editorial opinion was positive (see Herald, 22/12/25; Auckland Star, 23/1/26; Franklin Times, 18/1/26). These activities unified and legitimated Pakeha attitudes towards Asians, and the effect was seen in the attitudes

and behaviour towards both Chinese and Indian residents.<sup>2</sup> There was explicit discrimination both at the local level (see Spoonley, 1982: 272) and by the state.

This concern with racial purity did not embrace anti-Semitism nor did it seek a radical solution to other aspects of the political system. Such initiatives were left to groups like the New Zealand Legion. The racism of the 1920s, however, did have a parallel in the 1930s. For example, the Sunlight League along with agencies such as Plunket were predicated on certain views of racial superiority and purity, in part generated by the fears aroused by Asian immigration but more importantly, inspired by the decline in Pakeha fertility (see Olssen, 1981: 258-259). The founder of the Sunlight League, Cora Wilding, was impressed with Mussolini's arguments and others in the League were attracted to Hitler's programme (see Fleming, 1981). Both the Sunlight League and Plunket adopted various arguments and assumptions from the eugenics position, and there was influential support for this approach (e.g. Chancellor of the University of New Zealand, Professor John Macmillan Brown). In the pre-war years, the League quietly folded and Plunket moved away from its more racist assumptions. An interesting point is that both organisations were part of that tradition of benevolence and charity that characterised the 'good works' of the upper and middle classes. There was very little overlap in personnel or ideology between the popular-democratic interpellation of the petty-bourgeoisie and the middle class attempts at 'public health'. For a while, the latter were attracted to some elements of European fascism but that was the extent of any common interest. The Jacobinism of the old petty-bourgeoisie arose from very different material conditions and struggle

#### Social Credit and the Petty-Bourgeoisie: Jacobinism in New Zealand Politics

In the 1890s, when the politics of class were beginning to coalesce in New Zealand, the petty-bourgeoisie, principally comprising small

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2. Ironically, one of the justifications given for the 'race purity' campaign in the late 1920s was the 'supposed Chinese exploitation of and intermarriage with female Maori labour on the market gardens' (Sedgwick, 1984: 52). This produced an alliance between anti-Asian and Maori groups and a Commission of Inquiry that provides ample evidence of the racism of the period.

farmers, were involved in a 'loose coalition of interests' with the working class (Martin, 1981:9). The increased profitability of small commodity production in the rural areas 'caused this group (temporarily) to become a progressive force against the entrenched interests of large landowners' (Martin, 1981:10). The political beneficiaries of this coalition were the Liberal Party in the election of 1890. Petty-bourgeois rural support was rewarded by land reform between 1891 and 1893, notably the new leasehold tenure introduced by J. MacKenzie, the Minister of Lands. It effectively gave those leasing land the same rights as freehold, and was therefore well-received by the small farmer (see Richardson, 1981:200-202). This and other land-related measures encouraged rural support for the Liberals and they doubled their rural MPs in the 1893 general election. In the late 1890s, the subdivision of land and refrigeration was 'responsible for the transformation of large parts of the North Island into dairy farms' (Richardson, 1981:204). But petty-bourgeois support for the Liberals began to dissipate at the turn of the century. Demands were made for an improved rural infrastructure and for freehold land. The first indications of the disenchantment with the Liberals came in 1899 when the New Zealand Farmer's Union was formed from dairy farmers from Taranaki and North Auckland. An important element of this new political alignment was the explicit conservatism, previously held in abeyance by the commitment to progressive land reform. This conservatism was characterised by the increasing advocacy of property ownership and capitalism, and the opposition to trade unions and socialism. The Farmer's Union was influential in redirecting rural political support, especially that of the petty-bourgeoisie, from the Liberals to the Reform Party. The 1911 election of Massey and the Reform Party marked the final stage in this shift.

The political support of the petty-bourgeoisie again changed in the 1920s. The small farmers in the early 1920s were seeking more liberal lending policies to bring land into dairy production. As Richardson (1981:216-217) notes, North Auckland and Auckland dairy farmers provided the base for a growing agrarian radicalism, and although farmers were seriously divided along a number of cleavages (regionalism, small farmers versus large landowners, dairy farmers versus others), this dissatisfaction produced the Country Party. The economic insecurity of the late 1920s (export prices fell by 40% between 1928 and 1931,

Martin, 1981:36) encouraged rural groups to consider political alternatives, and the Labour Party responded from 1927 onwards by moderating its policies on land ownership and promoting the concept of state assistance to farmers (Richardson, 1981:218). But the response was not sufficient to produce a Labour Government, and in fact, the United Government that followed the 1928 election, because of the distribution of seats among three parties (Liberal/United, 34 seats [including independents]; Reform, 25 seats; Labour, 19 seats), exacerbated the crisis in political representation. The links between class and political party were confused, and it was this crisis that led to the establishment of Social Credit in New Zealand.

The inheritor of petty-bourgeois support for the Liberal and Reform parties, and the political grouping that most resembled an indigenous form of Jacobinism, was the Social Credit movement. The economic and ideological crisis that characterised the late 1920s and 1930s produced a petty-bourgeois political platform that sought to oppose the dominant bloc. Social Credit grew rapidly: in 1931, it had six branches; by 1935, it had two hundred and twenty five. Social Credit was not the only expression of this developing ideological and political expression. There were groups such as the New Zealand Legion along with a number of monetary reform organisations including the Stable Money League, the Single Taxers and the New Zealand Political Federation but none continued for more than a year or two.<sup>3</sup> The Social Credit movement was the only enduring organisation to directly reflect the ideological and economic hopes of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Its initial base was within the Auckland Farmers' Union and the two groups began their joint national political career by campaigning against the Government's Reserve Bank Bill in 1932-33. It received further impetus from an extensive tour by Major C.H. Douglas in January-March 1934. And then links established with the Labour Party confirmed the legitimacy and the future of Social Credit. The Labour Party expressed support for Social Credit in 1933 (see Clifton, 1961)<sup>4</sup> and Clifton

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3. Six former members of the New Zealand Legion stood for the reactionary Democratic Party in the 1935 election, but all they did was help boost the Labour vote (Richardson, 1981:221).
  4. This was no doubt prompted in part by the adoption of Douglas Credit as the official policy of the Farmers Union in 1932 (see Richardson, 1981:222).

comments that about half of the parliamentary Labour Party supported (or tolerated) Social Credit monetary reform prior to the 1935 election. However, voting in 1933 indicated that something over half of the Labour Party affiliates (i.e. those associated with the Labour Party but outside the parliamentary wing) rejected Social Credit (Clifton, 1961: 219). But for their part, the rural petty-bourgeoisie were committed to Labour. Reminiscent of the coalition between the working class and the petty-bourgeoisie which supported the Liberals in the 1890s, the 1930s saw much the same alliance as the base for Labour. The rural petty-bourgeoisie suspended their traditional opposition to labour organisations and were prepared to endorse certain progressive programmes. The result was the 1935 Labour Government.

*The continued crucial importance of rural votes in New Zealand politics was demonstrated by the fact that Labour's sweeping victory rested upon its novel rural support, largely from North Island dairy farming (Martin, 1981:54).*

Labour based its appeal on a mixture of class and popular-democratic interpellations, and the latter, which included a rhetoric that placed 'the people' in an antagonistic relationship to the dominant classes, paralleled the ideological position of the petty-bourgeoisie. Further, Labour were seeking change, in a reformist way, in the political institutions of the democratic state and this too was in accordance with petty-bourgeois and Social Credit aspirations. But the reality of the Labour Party in power did not match the promise. The petty-bourgeoisie became disillusioned, and this was sealed by Savage's death in 1940. He had epitomised the political commitment of Labour to monetary reform. But prior to this, the Labour Party had variously rejected Social Credit support. The affiliates (see above) had indicated as much in 1933, and by September 1936, the Labour Party had served notice that the unofficial alliance was at an end (see Clifton, 1961), although individual Labour parliamentarians including Lee, Langstone, Jordan and Nash were all supportive of Social Credit policy to varying degrees. Langstone went from being a Labour Cabinet Minister (Lands, State Forests, 1935-40; Lands, Forests, External Affairs, Native Affairs, 1940-42) to a Social Credit candidate in 1957. For its part, Social Credit began to contemplate alternatives. There was obvious disquiet with Labour by the late 1940s and 'electoral contracts' were used to bring pressure to bear on candidates. For example, the Wanganui

Electors Association (see New Zealand Social Creditor, 31/7/45; 31/1/46) sought to get a formal undertaking from the parliamentary candidates that they would respect the will of electors. The lack of success of such options encouraged Social Credit to consider becoming more directly involved in electoral contests despite Major Douglas's admonition that Social Credit would lose its effectiveness because it would become co-opted into the very political and economic institutions it was opposed to. The Social Credit Annual Conference in 1952 took the final step and supported a motion that direct action should be taken to elect a Social Credit government. The Social Credit Association formed a political party in 1953 and the New Zealand Social Credit Political League fought its first election in 1954. The alliance of the working class and the petty-bourgeoisie was finally dismantled and the petty-bourgeoisie were now committed to their own political organisation.

Commentators and researchers from the 1930s through to the 1980s, have consistently identified the petty-bourgeoisie as the class base for Social Credit (see Strachey, 1936; Clifton, 1961; Dickson, 1969; Zavos, 1981; Bryant, 1981; Sheppard, 1981). But this representational tie was particularly apparent between the old petty-bourgeoisie, notably the rural sector, and Social Credit. Support for Social Credit from the 1930s onwards was strongest in those areas that contained significant numbers of small landowners. These included North Auckland, Auckland, Waikato, Rotorua, Morrinsville, Manawatu, Taranaki and Christchurch. Clifton notes that:

*Maps showing the distribution of Douglas Credit branches to the pattern of dairy-fat lamb farming show a striking correlation between the two (Clifton, 1961:102).*

Small farmers comprised a critical base for Social Credit. A second group included those involved in simple commodity production, especially in provincial towns in the areas mentioned above. Proprietors of small businesses and tradespeople working on their own account provided urban provincial support for Social Credit. Both groups were economically vulnerable, and were very suspicious of financial institutions. This was a critical factor in Social Credit's appeal: a popular-democratic interpellation that perceived capital as having interests that were injurious to 'the people'.

*Douglas Credit offered an excellent rationale to tap the rural mortgagors hatred of financial institutions and particularly the bank (Clifton, 1961: 138).*

Although production was high in the 1930s, finance was either hard to obtain, or if finance was obtained, the surplus value was seen as being appropriated by the banks. Conspiracy theories were one ideological response to this struggle.

The readiness to attribute economic and social difficulties to the activities of a small coterie of faceless financiers was not confined to Social Creditors and the petty-bourgeoisie. Many in the working class and the Labour Party were also prepared to support such an analysis, as John A. Lee's discussion of 'gangster finance' (see Socialism in New Zealand) indicated. But there were differences. Firstly, petty-bourgeois interpellations centred on 'the people' to the exclusion of a class analysis. Secondly, for the petty-bourgeoisie, the concern with financial control was paramount and constituted the principal site of ideological and political struggle. The working class was interested in a variety of different issues such as the conditions of waged employment and the provision of health and welfare services. And finally, petty-bourgeois and Social Credit interpellations centred on Volkisch arguments, notably in the form of anti-Semitism, in a way that was largely absent from working class interpellations.

Examples of Social Credit's anti-Semitism from 1933 to 1984 are given in Appendix 1. The various Social Credit organisations and their respective publications<sup>5</sup> published anti-Semitic material during the 1930s and 1940s, and it was clearly part of a general perception

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5. The New Zealand Social Credit Association, and then the New Zealand Social Credit Political League after 1953, are the main organisations in Social Credit history in New Zealand although the New Zealand Douglas Credit Movement was influential through its close relationships with both the Farmers' Union and the Labour Party. The early publications included the New Zealand Social Creditor (published by the NZ Social Credit Association, 1945-1964) and Democracy (1941-1949). More recently, the publications have included the New Zealand Guardian (NZ Social Credit Political League, 1959-), Concept (Auckland Association of Young Social Creditors, 1968-71) and the New Zealand Social Credit News (NZ Social Credit Political League, 1954-55) (see Maitland, 1979).

that financial control, or speculative capital, was primarily associated with Jews. There are continual references to the 'Jewish problem' and to material such as The Protocols that encourages a conspiracy view of financial and political links. Not all commentators, however, were prepared to acknowledge the importance of anti-Semitism to this interpellation.

*Little open reference was made to Jews....Why [17/5/35] once published an article on Hitler by 'Pro-Nazi', but this did not mention Jews at all. Public displays of anti-semitism were frowned upon, and Farming First [10/3/33] had occasion to rebuke another New Zealand Douglas Credit paper Plain Talk for a brief lapse into anti-semitism. The existence of a 'Jewish plot' was nevertheless widely discussed in this period... (Clifton, 1961:58).*

Clifton is incorrect on various matters. For instance, Plain Talk has already been referred to as one of the most important publishers and distributors of anti-Semitic material in New Zealand. They were responsible for tracts such as Is There a Jewish Peril? The Hidden Hand Revealed and many others on The Protocols. Further evidence on Social Credit's willingness to advance anti-Semitic views is contained in Appendix 1, although it has been a contested element.

The presence of anti-Semitic beliefs within the Social Credit movement has been a subject of debate with the constant possibility of schism. The primary division has been between the orthodox Douglasites who, in varying degrees, hold that Jews are the principal group in a financial, and racial, conspiracy and those more liberal members who see anti-Semitic arguments as a barrier to political acceptance from groups other than the petty-bourgeoisie. The tension was reflected in events during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. The first issue was the contraction of Social Credit's political base amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie. The traditional areas of support were declining. Dairy farmers, for example, numbered 40,000 in 1950 but this had dropped to 17,000 in 1976. This was the result of accelerating prices for rural land (a doubling in the 1950s, and then again in the 1960s) and the increasing size of agricultural units to ensure profitability (Dunstall, 1981:409). A second group, small proprietors, experienced a long term decline between 1951 and 1971 of 8,000, although there

were still 140,000 in 1971. But in the latter part of this period (i.e. between 1968 and 1973), dairy-groceries fell by 10% (557) and between 1964 and 1968, building contractors declined by a fifth (Dunstall, 1981:411).<sup>6</sup> The old petty-bourgeoisie was contracting in size. But it was paralleled by a second issue: the rapid expansion of the new petty-bourgeoisie. The 1935 Labour Government was responsible for the growth of the state sector. Between 1935 and 1949, state spending expanded by 400%, and the public servants who in 1935 numbered 8,000, included 34,000 by 1954 (Martin, 1981:48). This expansion continued until by 1971, Franklin (1978:79-80) estimates that 213,000 people were employed in bureaucracies (or one in five of the labour force), and another 202,000 were employed in private sector bureaucracies giving an overall total of 37% of the labour force. Many of the new petty-bourgeoisie owed their existence to the Labour Government, to the expansion of state power or to the concentration of economic power in the private sector. The traditional antagonisms of the old petty-bourgeoisie to state and financial power, to bureaucracies and to trade unions were not shared by the new fraction. The final factor for Social Credit was the relative affluence of the 1950s and 1960s. The economic stability of these decades, and the high return for agricultural exports, produced a subdued political climate with few political crises or major ideological struggles. Throughout these decades, support for Social Credit remained below 10 percent of the popular vote with the exceptions provided by the 1954 and 1966 elections. The 1954 election was the first contested by Social Credit. The 1966 election contained a high protest vote against both National and Labour, either through abstentions (up 3.5%) or via support for Social Credit (up 5.31%) (see Chapman, 1981:366). But these were exceptions, and by 1972, Social Credit had fallen to its lowest level in percentage support. This highlighted the changing class base of Social Credit and prompted attempts within the organisation to accommodate to these changes. An internal ideological struggle ensued.

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6. The decline was confined to the latter part of the period and did not extend to the main centres. Between 1953 and 1973, the number of retail stores in the four main centres grew by two-thirds, and in the building industry, the number of working proprietors almost doubled in the ten years to 1964 (Dunstall, 1981:411).

TABLE 1: Political Support for Social Credit, 1954-1972

Year of Election	No. of Votes Cast for Social Credit Candidates	% of Total Vote
1954	122,068	11.13
1957	83,498	7.21
1960	100,905	8.62
1963	95,176	7.94
1966	174,515	14.48
1969	121,576	9.07
1972	93,231	6.65

Source: Lambert and Palenski, 1982:106

The old petty-bourgeoisie with their commitment to Douglasite theories of financial conspiracy were still well represented in the party in the late 1960s but they were increasingly opposed by another group who saw the need to encompass the political concerns of urban groups, and the new petty-bourgeoisie. Beetham (1972) has labelled the two groups the 'purists' and the 'pragmatists'. While he denies that he is a member of either (see Beetham, 1981:2), he clearly falls into the pragmatist 'camp', and Bryant (1981:23) records his attempts to initiate progressive changes within Social Credit from 1970.

*...Beetham felt the League needed a broader, more liberal base to fulfill its promise as a progressive force (Bryant, 1981:23).*

In effect, Beetham sought to reduce the influence of the Douglasite arguments, especially where they invoked conspiracy and anti-Semitic sentiments. The purists were defined by Davidson (see Beetham, 1972) as committed to the original teachings of Douglas while the pragmatists reinterpreted Douglas and incorporated arguments from such diverse sources as Abraham Lincoln and M. Friedman. Beetham defines the purists as opposed to the 'ballot box democracy' although he does concede that both groups share a belief in the influence of 'international finance interests' (Beetham, 1972:67). There is also reference to 'minor schismatic sects' including Utopians, Owenites, John Birchers,

socialists, anti-Jewish elements (see Beetham, 1972:61).

The division between pragmatist and purist was apparent in the struggle for the leadership in the early 1970s, a struggle that is recorded in Beetham's (1972) thesis. The outcome of the struggle inside Social Credit was that Cracknell, Beetham and Hunter gained prominence, while O'Brien, T.K. Weal and a third of the 1972 conference left to form the New Democrat Party. The latter began legal action against Social Credit who retaliated with their own legal proceedings and matters were not settled until November 1983. An indication of the respective ideological position of the two groups is the way in which they were each perceived by the other group. Beetham saw the New Democrats as reactionary and extremist while O'Brien saw Beetham as a socialist and Social Credit as infiltrated by left-wingers (Bryant, 1981:42). In fact, the description of Beetham is inaccurate. He has expressed some sympathy for the first Labour Government and Savage<sup>7</sup> (Auckland Star, 16/9/80) but he also advances arguments that are not too far removed from traditional purist beliefs. He has, for instance, strongly attacked the apparent intrusion of left-wing politics into the New Zealand social studies curriculum and in particular the promotion of 'one-worldism' (Concerned Parents Association Newsletter, August-September 1978). Social Credit's manifesto for the 1966 election described the then monetary system as un-Christian, dishonest and unjust. The 1978 ('Beetham') manifesto updates the expression but not the sentiment:

*...people are being hurt by an unjust system which promotes profiteering ahead of the quality of individual living.*

The departure of purists to form the New Democratic Party in 1972 did not, however, remove the tension within the organisation. There were still many purists left inside Social Credit. One of Beetham's

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7. This orientation is very much a part of Social Credit mythology. Savage was to implement Social Credit monetary policy and there was a sense of being let down when this development failed to eventuate. In announcing that Social Credit would contest the 1954 election, the President, Marks, commented:

Many people believe that if Savage had lived longer, Social Credit principles would have been introduced into New Zealand's economy (The New Zealand Social Creditor, 5/10/54).

major opponents, for example, was W.A. Ross, and he stayed on in Social Credit although he lost his former powerful position (see the material below on the League of Rights and the discussion of Ross). The struggle has continued in other ways and it was seen in the conflict in the Bay of Islands electorate prior to the 1981 general election. An independent Social Credit candidate (W. Holt) stood in opposition to Social Credit's L. Hunter because of the latter's dismissal of Douglas's arguments (Auckland Star, 5/9/81). This ongoing battle for ideological supremacy and textual accuracy is also revealed in the struggle between Social Credit, the political party, and the League of Rights, the inheritor of the purist tradition of the old petty-bourgeois politics and a critical pressure group (see Appendix 1).

#### A.N. Field

As a productive writer and publicist in the 1930s, A.N. Field's material provides a comprehensive introduction to the ideological concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie in this period. As an important Jacobin theorist, he assembles a remarkably complete ideological package which includes key elements, such as anti-Semitism, applied to a New Zealand context. It is the presence of this 1930s interpellation which continues to reflect a tension inside Social Credit between the early and more recent political generations.

Field came from an 'old Nelson' family, and he was an author and activist who was particularly interested in monetary reform, and through this, with the 'Jewish problem'. The result can be seen in his many publications on the subject and in a very comprehensive collection of fascist reactionary material (see Appendix 2 for details of both).<sup>8</sup> Field began his publishing career with the Citizen when he was 28 (1906). He used the Citizen to promote 'Motherhood' and to attack 'Maori obstructionists', but his main interest was in the

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8. The literature collection which Field bequeathed to the Alexander Turnbull Library contains 650 items dating from the 1890s to the 1960s, although the bulk of the material comes from the late 1920s and the 1930s.

promotion of arguments concerning monetary reform and the creation of a conspiracy theory. In the Truth About the Slump (1931, reprinted in 1936 and in 1963, the last under the title All These Things), he referred obliquely to 'Jewish control' over New Zealand and more openly recommended material from The Fascist, The Patriot, Le Fasciste Canadien and The Britons.<sup>9</sup> By 1934 when The World's Conundrum was printed, Field was not so circumspect and he directed attention to the establishment of a '...universal Jewish despotism over the entire world' (p.11). He referred to The Protocols and supported the analysis offered by interpreters of their importance. His 1938 book, Today's Greatest Problem, was almost totally concerned with the 'Jewish question' and advocated a similar position to that contained in his earlier submission to the Government Monetary Committee in 1934. The importance of Field lies in the fact that he was responsible for the articulation, in a systematic fashion, of a world view that was to provide part of the base for petty-bourgeois interpellations in New Zealand. His application of fascist and anti-Semitic arguments to a New Zealand context means that he fulfilled the role of pioneer in the establishment of an indigenous tradition.<sup>10</sup>

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9. The Britons, or more correctly, the Britons Patriotic Society, were founded in July 1919 by Captain Henry Hamilton Beamish with the object of eradicating 'Alien influences from our Politics and Industries' and to 'assist white patriotic organisations all over the world with information on the Communists, World Government and Multi-Racial conspiracy...'. They were anti-Semitic and have been the main publishers of The Protocols in English in Western countries.
10. This role is acknowledged both within Australasia and internationally. A.N. Field is first referred to in New Times in 1935 (see New Times, 12/7/35). Butler reviewed The Truth About New Zealand in 1939 (New Times, 17/11/39) and there are extensive references to Field elsewhere (for example, see E.J. Jones, Hitler, The Jews and the Communists, 1933). All these early references cite Field as an 'authority' on 'Jewish control'. Internationally, Field's books have been circulated widely. Why Colleges Breed Communists (1941) has been republished by two American companies (Hawthorne, 1971 and Tan, 1971) for worldwide distribution. In New Zealand, these books are currently available through the Conservative Book Shop (League of Rights), Auckland, and Western Destiny Publications, Christchurch. In the United States, organisations such as the New Christian Crusade Church promote the material extensively.

Field was not the only propagandist for these arguments. There were a series of minor groups such as the Loyalty League (established in Wellington in 1925) and publishing companies such as Plain Talk which produced pamphlets like M.F. Coty's Is There a Jewish Peril? The Hidden Hand Revealed and The Jewish Peril. Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion in the early 1930s. Indeed, Plain Talk was one of the few New Zealand groups that was openly supportive of the policies of Hitler and the German Nazis. Less extreme were authors such as H.J. Kelliher who produced the Mirror in Auckland during the 1930s. Although the Mirror and Kelliher were sympathetic to the Labour Party (see Clifton, 1961:122-123; New Zealand at the Crossroads; Mirror, June 1936), there was also a primary concern with monetary reform and with 'a deliberate and unplanned conspiracy' (Kelliher, Mirror, June 1936:86). Kelliher's other publications (New Zealand at the Crossroads; Despotic Money Control. Man's Greatest Inhumanity to Man) repeat this interest. All represent a popular-democratic perception of political relations which was focussed on the machinations of 'big capital' and was fundamentally anti-capitalist at least to the extent that the problem was perceived in terms of the concentration of economic power. This ideological discourse was represented in the Labour Party but it was particularly characteristic of the Social Credit movement. Here Jacobinism found its most coherent expression.

### Conclusion

The origins of contemporary petty-bourgeois interpellations, and especially their Jacobinist content, can be located in the material conditions of the late nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century. Petty-commodity production provided an important element in the rural sector, and was typified by the small dairy farms of Taranaki, Wanganui, Waikato and Northland. They characterised the petty-bourgeois enterprise: small productive units with labour provided by the family; low profit margins and yet requiring significant debt levels to maintain production. An economic crisis inevitably threatened the reproduction of petty-commodity production, and given the self-defined importance of this sector in sustaining capitalism, material uncertainty was paralleled by an ideological crisis. In this way, the crises of the late 1880s and the 1920s/1930s were

critical in creating political generations who articulated petty-bourgeois concerns in the political arena.

The 1880s crisis resulted in alliances, a strategy that was to be repeated in the 1930s. Petty-bourgeois support was an important factor in the election of the Liberal Government in 1890, and in the election of the 1935 Labour Government. But it is the latter situation which is the more important of the two in terms of articulating an independent petty-bourgeois interpellation for a number of reasons. Firstly, the nature of the 1930s crisis encouraged a much more elaborate articulation of petty-bourgeois ideological concerns. For instance, it solidified the anti-monopoly capital elements of the interpellation. Political institutions such as parliament were viewed as dominated by the concerns of big capital. The aim was, therefore, to 'ritually cleanse' these institutions of those who were said to oppose the interests of 'the people'. Thus the interpellation was expressed as the struggle of 'the people' against financial (unproductive/monopoly) capital. In addition, a degree of racial mysticism was included in this world view. A key element was the belief that Jews were synonymous with financial capital, and theorists such as A.N. Field constructed a coherent ideological package which incorporated these elements. For this reason, the 1930s represented a significant stage in the development of a distinctive petty-bourgeois interpellation.

Secondly, the impact of petty-bourgeois revolt was contained by key class alliances. The Labour Party in the 1930s appeared to the petty-bourgeoisie to offer a political programme that would protect the interests of the small commodity producer, especially those in rural production, and rhetoric that was antagonistic to the dominant bloc. As in the 1880s/1890s, the reactionary concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie, notably its anti-proletarian sentiments, were superseded by an alliance with the working class and support for a liberal political party. The expression of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism was undoubtedly 'compromised' by these alliances, but these periods represented influential moments for the petty-bourgeoisie as they became briefly involved with political elites. But the alliance was fragile and the

influence minor, and the 1930s were important in a third sense: they confirmed the necessity for establishing an autonomous political representative for the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The Labour Government was perceived as failing to fulfill its 'contract' with the petty-bourgeoisie. Monetary reform policies were abandoned and instead, the Government began to systematically establish a corporate state with a major investment in welfare programmes. The representational tie between the Labour Party and the petty-bourgeoisie dissolved, and a new political party, Social Credit, was formed as a replacement. Social Credit had been an expression of petty-bourgeois concerns since the 1930s, but as a pressure group. From 1953, it represented the attempt to gain political power independent of alliances. It formalised the ideological orthodoxy that had developed during the 1930s and deified the arguments of C.H. Douglas. It was the end point in a realisation that the political parties of labour or capital were unlikely to reflect the material and political concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie.

However, the cycles of protest and acquiescence had created an important tension amongst the petty-bourgeoisie, and this was apparent inside Social Credit in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The 1930s resulted in a political generation that was committed to the orthodoxy of Douglas, including its conspiratorial and anti-Semitic components. The contraction of the old petty-bourgeoisie during the 1950s and 1960s convinced a new generation to expand the political appeal of Social Credit by liberalising certain arguments and discarding others. The traditionalists (or 'purists') resented the accommodation, and the result was apparent in the ideological schisms and internal struggles which marked the 1970s. It was epitomised in 1972 when Beetham was elected, and many left to form the New Democrat Party. Later chapters explore the importance of this tension. This, in brief, is the historical expression of Jacobinism in New Zealand. Even when the crisis has dissipated and major contradictions have been neutralised, there is still a 'marginal sector' amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie who will attempt to maintain the integrity of a Jacobinist programme

despite the dominance of a bourgeois hegemony. The next chapter identifies and describes in some depth the way in which such interpellations are currently reproduced and articulated.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONTEMPORARY PETTY-BOURGEOIS INTERPELLATIONS:  
EXTREME RIGHT-WING GROUPS AS AN EXPRESSION OF  
POLITICAL REVOLT

*The [Country] Party has no confidence in present  
[National] Government policies. These put too  
much power into union and monopoly hands.*

1972 Country Party election  
pamphlet

*The crisis consists precisely in the fact that  
the old is dying and the new cannot be born;  
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid  
symptoms appear.*

Gramsci (1971:276)

*The unions are the biggest and most glaring  
example of an individual's rights being taken  
away...*

The Individual's Fight for  
Freedom, Tribune (21/10/79)

This chapter describes the development of extreme right-wing political organisations and their ideologies in the post-war period. Immediately after World War II and up until the early 1960s, these interpellations were not systematically or prominently articulated. They were confined to very specific cultic milieux and reproduced via a cultural underground. That is, they were articulated within a private sphere by key activists and did not exist as part of the public struggles surrounding ideology and politics. But the events of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged the petty-bourgeoisie, and others, to contest the political and ideological terrain. The affluent hour of the 1950s which was marked by a hegemonic unity and economic well-being was displaced by the different conditions of the next two decades and a growing sense of crisis amongst both urban and rural fractions of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

A general crisis in the New Zealand social formation dates from the early 1970s, but the crisis for the old petty-bourgeoisie predated this general crisis and was associated with the decline of petty-commodity production in New Zealand. The most profound decline occurred in the rural sector. By the mid-1950s, the farming sector had begun to shrink. Dairy farmers fell from 40,000 in 1950 to 17,000 in 1976 (Dunstall, 1981: 409) and the contribution of this form of production to the overall economy fell correspondingly (see Perry, 1985). In the urban sector, the old petty-bourgeoisie such as small proprietors grew in number for periods in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, but overall experienced a long-term decline of 8000 between 1951 and 1971 (Dunstall, 1981: 411). The census category, 'self-employed, not employing labour', provides a crude measure of the decline. In 1911, 14.6 percent of all those actively engaged in the labour force fell into this category. By 1951, the figure was 10.6 percent falling to a low of 6.5 percent in 1971. (It had increased to 7.0 percent in the 1981 Census; Department of Statistics). The greatest decline occurred between 1951 and 1961 when the category contracted by 3.1 percent. (Using this census material, Steven [1978] concludes that 6.58 percent of the labour force are petty-bourgeois although Wilkes et al [1985] give a higher figure of 9 percent). In comparison, professional groups, those employed in bureaucracies, both state and

private, and the new petty-bourgeoisie, grew substantially. This accompanied the development of New Zealand capitalism, notably the concentration and centralisation of capital (see Perry, 1982). For the old petty-bourgeoisie, the reproduction of petty-commodity production was seriously threatened and this was transformed into an ideological and political crisis.

The post-war hegemony, which the old petty-bourgeoisie identified as embodying their values, was replaced by the dominance of new values articulated by new political groups. The bureaucratic mode and the ideology of corporatism constituted part of the orthodoxy agreed to by both liberal and conservative political representatives. The petty-bourgeoisie were caught between the ideologies of large capital and the state enterprise on the one hand and those of the organisations of a mass wage-earning proletariat on the other, and their irrelevance was confirmed by the growing strength of the new petty-bourgeoisie. The new petty-bourgeoisie are characterised by an investment in cultural capital derived from the education system, and are represented in relatively new occupations, both within the purview of the state and outside (see Bourdieu, 1984, for examples). This new petty-bourgeoisie has played a key role in struggles over morality in the 1960s and after, especially with regard to gender relations and biological reproduction, and the liberalism of this fraction is directly opposed to the ideological position adopted by the old petty-bourgeoisie (Bourdieu, 1984: 366-367). It was incumbent, therefore, on the old petty-bourgeoisie to go on the political and ideological offensive if it was to oppose the devaluation of its ideological and material position.

The manifestations of that offensive are detailed here (see Appendices 4 and 5). The early examples from the 1960s included two different sorts of groups. The first group had as their focus the threat of communism. The second group was concerned at the global decline of Anglo-Saxon culture and the need to support white supremacy in places such as southern Africa. The moral indignation of the old petty-bourgeoisie, fuelled by the conditions faced by petty-commodity production, encouraged the establishment of a variety of new political

representatives. The millennial ideologies of the reactionary elements gained support and a veritable flood of organisations followed on from the vanguard groups of the 1960s (see Appendix 4). Most were political sects that sought to appropriate certain symbols of legitimacy ('the family', 'productive capitalism', 'Christianity', 'patriotism') in order to restore an ideological authority to old petty-bourgeois discourse. It is not possible to examine more than a few examples, so this chapter focusses on two groups, Zenith Applied Philosophy and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement, as examples of urban petty-bourgeois concerns, and a third group, the Country Party, as a representative of the rural fraction. In the next chapter, a further group, the League of Rights, is examined.

The distinction between rural and urban interests needs to be made explicit. It should be prefaced by an acknowledgement that there are substantial commonalities between the ideological and political concerns of the urban and rural fractions of the old petty-bourgeoisie. These include opposition to a strong state, socialism, proletarian organisations, monopoly and speculative capital and the glorification of private property ownership, competition, the marketplace and certain moral virtues. But there are differences of emphasis and of matters of immediate concern. The interests of the rural fraction, represented by the Country Party, are particularly concerned with the decline in the profitability and centrality of rural production. This is combined with a moral outlook that is distinctly anti-urban in its assumptions and assertions. It reflects an intuitive belief in the simplicity and purity of rural life in contrast with the decadence and pollution of industrialised urban areas. The section on Emeny provides a methodological device for looking at the trajectory of an activist in this tradition, and the attempt to offer an alternative to dominant hegemony.

The urban groups, Zenith Applied Philosophy and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement, emphasise different issues. They are equally committed to 'free enterprise' and private ownership, but in an urban setting, they confront three particular issues: taxation, the state and the unions. All are seen as contrary to the operations of a particular conception of

capitalism, and both groups have contested the necessity of all three in New Zealand in a direct and provocative way. The Tax Reduction Integrity Movement has operated as a participant in the national political arena while Zenith Applied Philosophy has established a network of petty-bourgeois enterprises that apply the group's ideological beliefs. The latter is somewhat unusual in New Zealand because of the wealth generated by the network and a charismatic leadership. It also combines Scientology methods and mysticism with the techniques of individual motivation and self-improvement in a very idiosyncratic style. All three groups, representing urban and rural fractions, constitute some of the more successful expressions of old petty-bourgeois extreme right-wing groups. They have attracted significant numbers to their respective organisations and they have contributed to public debates. They best represent the role of the old petty-bourgeoisie in political and ideological struggles in New Zealand from the late 1960s.

#### The Post-War Development of Extreme Right-Wing Groups

In the 1950s and 1960s, extreme right-wing interpellations were confined to the cultural underground. The economic expansion of the period meant high returns for the rural economy and the certainty that rural production was the key to New Zealand's well-being conferred an authority on the views of the rural population and its political representatives. There were few material reasons for the old petty-bourgeoisie to challenge the dominant bloc. The war against fascism had also undercut the legitimacy of some of the key elements of petty-bourgeois thought in the 1930s. The anti-Semitism of Douglasite interpretations was displaced by the 'recoil effect' of the Holocaust. In this social climate, extreme right-wing groups, whether based within the fascist tradition or representing, in a more general sense, the reactionary concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie, found it difficult to establish any sort of political base. There was still an oppositional sub-culture, or cultic milieu, based within the petty-bourgeoisie but it was fragmented and its ideology was not systematically or completely articulated. Of the examples that did exist, most tended to trade

on the war mentality and jingoism to create a moral enterprise that would attract support. They were also often simply outposts of British groups. Hence the League of Empire Loyalists,<sup>1</sup> who were moderately active in Auckland and Christchurch, encouraged its British leader, A.K. Chesterton, to tour and promote views about the need for Britain and its 'racial' satellites, such as New Zealand, to re-establish political and economic supremacy. In agreement were groups such as the White Army Foundation (1950) whose aims included the promotion of a white Commonwealth and the use of the Christian faith to combat the 'financial hierarchy'. A publisher in New Plymouth, G.P.S. Smith, produced an anti-Semitic publication (K. Goff, This Is My Story, New Plymouth, G.P.S. Smith, 1948) and there was a politician or two who were prepared to support these interpretations of economic and social events. One example was C.J. Carrington, a member of the Legislative Council from 1926 to 1940, and a borough and city councillor in Tauranga. His booklet New Zealand's Greatest Need (1957), expresses views very similar to A.N. Field. He acknowledges a debt to Field along with C.H. Douglas and fascists such as A.K. Chesterton, Colin Jordan, George-Henri Levesque, Fr Denis Fahey and the Duke of Bedford. The only other organisation that incorporated the reactionary elements of petty-bourgeois ideology was Social Credit which by 1953 was a political party. By and large, these groups with the exception of Social Credit were minor and had very little impact on political and ideological debate. There were few material, political or ideological threats to those involved in petty-commodity production.

The late 1950s began to mark a change from the post-war boom period, a change reflected in the 1958 'Black Budget'. The 1957 Labour Government was required to respond to a downturn in the terms of trade, the worst since the Depression (see Chapman, 1981: 363-364). The deficit was to be offset by increased prices and taxation. The austerity was not well-received. There were also changes internationally. Any sympathy for communism that had continued in the

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1. The League in its world-wide career has alternated between being explicitly fascist and moderating its views to appeal to broader petty-bourgeois concerns. In New Zealand during the period discussed here, it is more accurately portrayed as being extreme right-wing rather than explicitly fascist, although it would be difficult to sustain such a classification in the United Kingdom.

post-war years in recognition of the alliances during the War rapidly dissipated with the onset of the Cold War. Global communism was increasingly portrayed as a major threat to western capitalism, and the shift of power was endorsed by the entry of the newly independent states, notably in Africa and Asia, into international forums such as the United Nations. The number of independent countries in Africa and Asia went from 12 in 1945 to 57 in 1964. By 1960, it was obvious that the balance of power had changed, and speeches such as Harold Macmillan's to the South African Parliament on the 'winds of change' in that year recognised the decline of British influence and the need to acknowledge the interests of the new nations, most of whom were non-white and highly critical of their former colonial masters.

These developments produced quite specific political initiatives in New Zealand. The concern with communism and the threat it was held to present produced the Anti-Communist League (1961), the Democratic Society (1965) and Western Destiny Publications (1965). The last-named reproduced the arguments of American anti-communism and it was the vehicle for material from groups such as the John Birch Society. The others were particularly concerned with the internal threat of communist infiltration and the 'domino theory' of international communist expansion, especially in South East Asia. Their activists tended to include many from mainstream conservative political groupings who maintained their participation in both areas. There was nothing incongruous with this as the expression of anti-communism, even in its extreme forms, was perfectly acceptable given the public debates and the legitimacy of anti-communist arguments.

A second group of organisations was formed in response to the global decline of British influence. A critical part of the ideology of these groups was the belief that the British were racially 'superior' and therefore British colonial control was 'natural' and a force for good in world politics. The intention was to preserve what was left of British dominance, especially in southern Africa, and to encourage links between members of the 'white' Commonwealth. The first in this tradition in New Zealand after World War Two was the League of Empire Loyalists, but the formation of the New Zealand-

Rhodesia Society (1962) marks the beginning of a growth period for such organisations. Others included the Aid Rhodesia Movement, the Friends of South Africa, the Southern Africa Friends Association as well as organisations such as the League of Rights (see Appendices 4 and 5).

In this same period, a quite different tradition developed although there were extensive areas of ideological overlap with the above. For the first time in the history of twentieth century New Zealand, explicitly fascist groupings were established. The National Socialist Party of New Zealand was formed in 1964, followed by a more substantial version in 1967, and the National Front in the same year. They were joined by groups such as White Lightning Ideology (1965). In the case of both sorts of groups, that is neo-fascist and 'pro-British', there were explicit factors that produced their appearance. The first is the decline of Britain and what was seen as the corresponding growth of communism and the influence of third world (non-white) countries. The second factor is the arrival in New Zealand of migrants from Britain or other parts of the British Empire who were seeking a refuge from 'racial problems', usually political equality in the new nations or the 'intrusion' of black migrants in the case of Britain. The so-called 'Notting Hill Riots' in 1958 mark the beginning of domestic violence in Britain while the 1950s and 1960s see growing calls for majority government and the rejection of white minority control in former colonies. Thus groups such as the National Front and the New Zealand-Rhodesia Society were influenced by these recent arrivals to New Zealand (see below for further material) and international events. The third factor was the political maturation of New Zealanders who were scarcely touched by the 'recoil effect' of the lessons of the Second World War. A young group (born since World War Two) had little understanding of the issues of Nazism and their perception of Jews was largely influenced by the actions of Israel, resulting in a view of Jews as aggressors rather than as victims. A small number in this younger generation proved to be sympathetic to the ideology of fascism, and they were active in the neo-fascist groups that were established in the late 1960s (see the chapter on 'racial revolutionaries'). There were different ideological and political traditions

depending on the class origin of their membership. This is explored in some depth below but for the moment, it is important to acknowledge the meaning shifts which were taking place and the increasing politicisation of racist ideologies. A variety of discourses were invested with a racist content in an important departure from previous post-war political and ideological struggles.

The 1960s mark the beginning of an ideological crisis that was influential in the formation of extreme right-wing political groupings and interpellations. This crisis paralleled the developing economic recession which had major implications for the economic viability of petty-commodity production. But the 1960s were not a major growth period for extreme right-wing groups; that came in the 1970s (see Appendix 4). Rather, events in the 1960s, especially ideological struggles, laid the foundation for the later proliferation of organisations. The tensions encouraged the petty-bourgeoisie, and sections of the working class, to contemplate support for interpellations that were antagonistic to the dominant bloc to a degree reminiscent of similar circumstances in the 1930s. In particular, the failure of a conservative government to reflect petty-bourgeois concerns was a major factor. In terms of the old petty-bourgeoisie's anti-communism, the expectation was that New Zealand would commit itself to solid opposition to communism, however it was manifested. In relation to beliefs about 'race', the hope was that New Zealand would support British (white) rule, notably in countries such as Rhodesia and South Africa. On both issues, the National Government was less than fully committed.<sup>2</sup> The fact that the major

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2. The National Government did commit troops to Vietnam to fulfill its treaty obligations but as Chapman (1981: 366) comments:

Characteristically the Prime Minister  
[K. Holyoake] kept the commitment small  
and avoided the conscription undertaken  
in Australia.

Chapman also notes that Holyoake in responding to calls for an end to compulsory unionism, managed to change the formal requirement for unqualified preference while retaining it in practice. On matters of 'race', the fact that Holyoake did little was itself cause for complaint and the decade ended with the New Zealand Government doing little to try and dissuade Britain from joining the EEC, a step seen as exemplifying Britain's racial decline.

conservative organisation failed to endorse what the old petty-bourgeoisie would consider as the central canons of conservatism was compounded by other developments, most notably new forms of protest politics. The post-war baby boom produced a generation of critical and seemingly radical activists who had begun to dominate many political debates by the late 1960s (see Stone, 1977; Levine, 1979; Greenland, 1984). Young people increasingly identified with various sub-cultures that expressed different values. The critical nature of some of these beliefs and the willingness of this generation to initiate public demonstrations constituted an important departure in political relations. This contribution, and the accompanying changes in sexual morality, confirmed the petty-bourgeois belief that New Zealand was experiencing a moral decline. This fraction felt that their viewpoint was not represented or listened to, and petty-bourgeois indignation was transformed into political action. The rapid growth of extreme right-wing groups from the early 1970s was a manifestation of petty-bourgeois reaction to the events of the 1960s and later.

The period from 1966 to 1975 is critical in the growing 'revolt' of the petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand. The existing major political groupings of National and Labour were seen as advocating policies that were contrary to the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie; National was held to represent the interests of large capital, urban and rural, while Labour was viewed as liberal, urban-based and union-aligned. For groups such as the Country Party, National, Labour and Social Credit were all defined as 'socialist'. The ideological crisis characterised by the growing lack of hegemonic control by the dominant bloc and the accompanying confusion of links between class and political representatives, encouraged the proliferation of ideological

sub-groupings representing petty-bourgeois interests, many of whom exhibit the traditional concerns of Jacobinism. From 1970, there was a steady growth in the number of groupings and they took part in many public debates. At the beginning of the 1970s, the groups were primarily concerned in supporting the cause of anti-communism and involvement in the Vietnam war. In the mid-1970s, there was a resurgence of interest (similar to the mid-1960s) in the preservation of the British Empire and the maintenance of white rule in southern Africa. As the decade drew to a close, the focus was much more on the financial system and specifically issues such as 'state intervention', the relationship between taxation and communist initiatives and the power of centralised monopolies, both of organised labour and large business. Thus in the early 1970s, groups such as the League of Rights, Friends of South Africa and the Association Defending South African Tours were established. At the end of the decade, the new groupings were the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement, The Individual's Fight for Freedom and the Association for the Survival of Free Enterprise. The sheer number of groupings grows as does the rate of their appearance. Between 1960 and 1963, two new extreme right-wing groups appeared. For the same period at the beginning of the 1970s, 11 groups appeared and 28 in the same period in the 1980s (see Appendix 4 for full details). At the end of the 1970s, these groupings encompassed a broad range of political issues and they involved many more people than 10 years before. Their style ranged from the tactics of imported neo-fascism to traditional conservative pressure group politics. They attracted different generations and depending on the groups in question, they had different class bases. The next three chapters seek to categorise and analyse these groupings and to describe their representational ties. The critical concern is with those that articulate the concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie, but for the purposes of comparison and demarcation, it is also important to discuss those groups that represent other classes.

#### The Rural Petty-Bourgeoisie and an Extreme Right-Wing Group: The Country Party

The rural petty-bourgeoisie have played a critical role in New Zealand politics, notably on those occasions when an alliance has been forged with the working class. The chapter on historical

developments traverses this role. Since World War Two, the rural petty-bourgeoisie's strongest political tie has been with Social Credit although from the late 1960s, there have been tensions in this relationship as the conflict between pragmatist and purist inside Social Credit indicates. This struggle over ideology has also produced other political organisations that have competed directly with Social Credit for rural petty-bourgeois support. These alternatives have included the League of Rights and the Country Party. The latter is the focus of attention here.

There was a Country Party in New Zealand in the 1920s. It was formed in Auckland in 1924 and it stood five candidates in the 1925 elections. It did poorly but one of its members, Captain H.M. Rushworth, was elected to the Bay of Islands seat in 1928. He held the seat for the next 10 years, initially in an informal alliance with the Liberals and then as a pro-Labour independent. Rushworth is generally claimed to be the first Social Credit parliamentarian and his stance and policies are viewed by many ideologues amongst the contemporary extreme-right as something of a model. The Country Party was based on a strong antagonism towards trade unionism and large capitalism and was representative of the traditional ideological concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The more recent version of the Country Party revived these same ideological concerns in the late 1960s. The Party was formed after a meeting in 1968 called under the auspices of the New Zealand Free Enterprise Party and its president, Cliff Emeny. An early statement indicated the concerns of the group.

*...our policies are based on the most modern studies of free enterprise, studies that have so far not penetrated the hide-bound socialist researches, teachings and actions of the New Zealand bureaucracy and political leadership (Dominion, 14/12/68).*

The suspicion of trade unionism and capitalism of the earlier Country Party is repeated. Both are included within the label of socialism, and the first is opposed for its rhetoric and solidarity and the latter because of its power and increasing centralisation. The label of

socialist is justified because of the power wielded by large, centralised enterprises that have extensive economic resources. The other element that is found in both 1920s and 1960s versions of the Country Party is a millennial philosophy that predicts dire results for the rural community from current economic trends.

*We are against concentration and centralisation of power by Government or big business. It will lead to either fascism or communism (T.F. Taylor, Country Party President, Herald, 15/6/70).*

The Country Party quickly reached a peak in 1969 and then began to disintegrate when it failed to establish a sizeable constituency. The product was factionalism within the organisation and the principal activist and theoretician, Cliff Emeny (see below), failed to restore unity.

The Country Party held its first national convention in mid-1969 in Hamilton. The recurring theme was the need for a 'free enterprise party' for the rural sector and the Country Party was seen as the 'only anti-socialist force in New Zealand politics'. Emeny made the claim that:

*The newly formed Country Party would inevitably attract the attention of the security services in its attempts to combat the socialist policies of the National and Labour Parties and the Social Credit League (Herald, 30/6/69).*

The intention at this first meeting was to make arrangements for contesting 25 rural constituencies in the 1969 election, 16 in the North Island and nine in the South Island. In the event, they failed to achieve this goal despite the fact that Emeny stood in four electorates. The Country Party managed to obtain a lot of publicity for its activities, especially as it offered a view on moral issues that was forcefully expressed. In particular, it had as one of its major platforms support for white rule in Rhodesia. It opposed sanctions against the white minority government and sought to gain official recognition for them. In comparing the situation with New Zealand's involvement in Vietnam, Emeny argued:

*For here [Rhodesia] our kinsmen...  
are desperately defending their lives  
and nation against the same communist  
terrorism and infiltration [as in  
Vietnam] (Herald, 22/1/69).*

In expressing these sentiments and policies, the Country Party became the recipient of extreme right-wing support. Alliances developed in this period between groups that held similar ideologies, at least with regard to racial matters. Thus, the Country Party held a public meeting in Christchurch to express its views and the guest speaker was Eric Butler. The chairperson was the president of the Party and he failed to maintain order. Interjections began as soon as Emeny started to speak and in the end the police had to be called (see Herald, 11/3/69; Australian On Target, 21/3/69).

In the 1969 election, five candidates stood in eight electorates: Stratford, Waimarino, New Plymouth, Egmont, Hamilton West, Waikato, Rodney and Ashburton. Most of the candidates were farmers and the candidate for Waikato was a typical representative. He was a retired farmer, a returned serviceman and a former official of the National Party. In terms of election material, the emphasis was on the 'forgotten sectors of the New Zealand economy, or as Emeny stated (four times) during his television address prior to the election, they sought to represent the 'forgotten people' who were not politically represented by any of the other political parties. They advocated tax reductions, appealed for an upper house, they opposed centralised government, bureaucracies and unions. But above all, they sought to argue that the small rural producer was ignored and that:

*...the Government and private monopoly  
are closing in...everywhere, squeezing  
out the freedom of small efficient  
businessmen to compete for consumer  
support (1969 election speech broadcast  
on television).*

The election was not a success. Most candidates received only a few hundred votes. Emeny top-pollled with 1100 votes in Stratford. The Party's response was to try and alter their image. At the second national convention in 1970, again in Hamilton, they argued that the image of the Party, especially its association with rural interests and extreme right-wing arguments, had to be squashed (Herald, 15/6/70). The group was renamed the New Zealand Liberal Reform Party by the

30 people present with its first objective being to restore the 'swiftly-declining profitability of farming' and then to deal with the 'dictatorial power of unionism, freedom of competitive enterprise [and the] replacement of graduated income tax...' (Auckland Star, 15/6/70). Then in 1970, a split occurred between North and South Island members ostensibly over finance accompanied by an attempt to wrest the leadership from the north, a dispute that Emeny denied took place (see Auckland Star, 25/1/71). But Emeny effectively ran the Party from this point as it began to decline quite rapidly. The 1972 convention was in New Plymouth and the stated aim was to contest 40 seats, although only a small number stood for the Party in the election. The media did not take the Party seriously and one newspaper dismissed them as a 'poor white's party' (Sunday Times, 18/6/72). Its policies during this election concentrated on law and order (e.g. they advocated the withdrawal of civil and political rights from the criminal), union activity (e.g. 10% of union funds were to go into a special fund for the payment of fines), abortion (e.g. against liberal abortion laws and they argued for the need to 'preserve the structure of family life'), South Africa (e.g. support for continued sporting contact between South Africa and New Zealand) and television (e.g. they saw a need to control television because of the 'uninformed distorted versions' broadcast). There was also condemnation of party politics. But the political presence of the Party was minor by this time and support for Emeny and Liberal Reform had virtually disappeared.

The Country Party represents a misplaced attempt by the rural petty-bourgeoisie to establish a political organisation. It was premature because there had been little to threaten and hence displace the traditional political ties of rural interests and their political groupings. Certain moral issues, notably the 'threat' of communism and the liberalism of the modern democratic state, had been seen as a threat to petty-bourgeois concerns. The debates over the Vietnam War and sporting contacts with South Africa provided issues for a political organisation such as the Country Party to exploit. But they were not sufficient in themselves. The rural petty-bourgeoisie, or sections of it, certainly felt threatened by some ideological debates but they were hardly of the intensity or magnitude to warrant an alternative form of political expression. Also, the economic contradictions that were to characterise the 1970s, and had been present

in the 1930s, were not apparent in the late 1960s. The ideological position advanced by the Country Party was to be repeated by petty-bourgeois groups ten years later but they were offered in material conditions, and political and ideological struggles, that had very different implications for the petty-bourgeoisie. In 1968, these were not as evocative. As a result, the Country Party failed to establish a constituency. It was a forerunner of the Jacobinist activities to follow but it lacked the discontent, the petty-bourgeoisie in revolt, that would provide a political base.

### Cliff Emeny: A Profile

The career of the Country Party's leading activist and ideologist provides an example of the background, political ambitions and affiliations of this organisation's leadership. It concludes the section on the Country Party by tracing the career trajectory of one of its key members, and offers a profile of a custodian of the cultural underground of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. He is typical of those responsible for the reproduction of this particular oppositional sub-culture, and indeed, imparted a particular orientation to the tradition of extreme right-wing interpellations in New Zealand. It should also be acknowledged that while he was critical to the maintenance of an ideological tradition and mounted an interesting political and moral campaign, he failed to unify the reactionary elements of the rural petty-bourgeoisie or to appeal to other classes, even in the rural sector.

Emeny was born in 1920 and spent a depression childhood on a Taranaki farm. After the Second World War, he operated a market garden/orchard. Since then, he has been an agricultural contractor, a representative for an insurance company (Emeny was dismissed by what he calls 'subtle political pressure', Herald, 23/4/69), a distributor for a company and finally a director of a business. He has been involved in a variety of political organisations. One of the first groups was the Free Enterprise Society in Hamilton. He then joined the National Party and became active on their behalf in the 1949 election. He left in 1954 because of his opposition to the Town and Country Planning Act. He joined the Constitutional Society while

in Whangarei and was one of the first people to join. He was on the executive of the Society and from 1959, became a lecturer and organiser for them. But he also had other ambitions. In 1959, he held a political meeting in Riverton (Southland) to form a 'liberal' political movement. The meeting was significant for the proposal that Stewart Island should be made the national home for Jews, a variation on the argument popular in the 1930s that Madagascar should become the homeland for Jews (see the discussion on Eric Butler in the next chapter). In 1963, Emeny formed the Southland-based Liberal Party and he made an opening speech in Invercargill. He stood in Hauraki for the Party and received 500 votes. He moved to Stratford in 1964 and became involved in the Free Enterprise Party. He was President and it was under the auspices of the Free Enterprise Party that the Country Party was launched in 1968. As Emeny says:

*The free enterprise movement decided that it would have to get into politics again. We decided to become a country party specifically to pinpoint the growing agricultural crisis (New Zealand Weekly News, 31/5/71).*

He stood in four electorates for the Country Party in 1969. He was then instrumental in getting the name changed to Liberal Reform and he stood for the Party in a 1970 by-election for Marlborough. As the Party receded from attention, so did Emeny. Since then, his involvement in petty-bourgeois politics has been minimal, and is largely confined to issues such as opposing the name change of Mount Taranaki.

Emeny represents the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie of Poulantzian sociology. He has been involved in small-scale production and ownership and his interests have reflected the issues of the rural areas or the small provincial towns where he has resided. His political involvement has been unstable in terms of the political parties and groupings with which he has been active. But the views of those groupings, with few exceptions, illustrate the ideological elements of petty-bourgeois interpellations: their strongly anti-capitalist and anti-socialist nature, the attempt to impose a moral viewpoint on issues, the attempt to reduce critical debate and the advocacy of small-scale rural ownership and petty capitalism. His activism is critical to the historical trajectory of petty-bourgeois ideology.

Even during periods of relative stability, he has sought to establish a political expression of this ideological discourse, and he represents, in Laclau's (1979) terms, part of the marginal sector who try to maintain the integrity of the Jacobin programme. He has been committed to an ideological struggle with most other political positions within New Zealand but he has continued to pursue this struggle via democratic institutions despite his mistrust of these institutions and the existing political parties.

### The Urban Petty-Bourgeoisie and Extreme Right-Wing Groups

The urban petty-bourgeoisie, during the 1970s, began to exert a major influence on certain debates by developing political organisations and advancing an ideological position. This was epitomised by the concern with taxation and the role of government. The economic position of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and specifically the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie of Poulantzas's definition, was affected by the economic recession of the 1970s. For the petty-bourgeoisie, it was obvious that the loss of profitability was not shared equally by the business community and that certain types of enterprise, notably those that were larger, expanded and retained profit margins as the recession proceeded. They were seen as being aided in this by central and local government and by the vested interests that were part of the major political parties. The state and large capitalists restricted the control that the small commodity producer was able to exert over their own resources and investment (cf. Scase, 1982:153). The modern state, along with monopoly capitalists, was believed to be fundamentally altering the basis of petty-commodity capitalism. The economic contradictions translated into an ideological crisis. The conservative parties, both National and Social Credit, were held to have abrogated their responsibility in defending the interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie, specifically in not preserving the old petty-bourgeoisie's role as custodians of the core values of capitalism. This was articulated as the defence of free enterprise and the preservation of the rights of the 'businessman' to maintain autonomy both within the sphere of ownership, that is in terms of the specific enterprise, and within the marketplace. In the latter, the major issues were the role of government in 'undue' regulation and the suspicion that the developments

that took place during the 1970s were moving New Zealand towards some form of communism/socialism, albeit under the guise of conservative capitalism that was encouraging the development of large-scale, centralised enterprises. These concerns and their articulation within the polity was not the sole prerogative of the old petty-bourgeoisie as major ideological debates within both Social Credit and the National Party indicated. The growth of the New Zealand Party (not to be confused with an extreme right-wing group of the same name) in the 1980s is further testimony to the willingness of conservative sections of the community to align themselves with new political organisations although the specific concerns and policies of the New Zealand Party differ from those of petty-bourgeois groups in many ways. The New Zealand Party offers a relatively liberal platform on moral issues (e.g. defence, relations with communist countries, abortion, education) that departs significantly from the petty-bourgeois aim of imposing a rigid and anti-libertarian programme in these areas. There is also less reliance on conspiracy theories in explaining economic and political events in New Zealand and on a world basis. However, the New Zealand Party would obviously appeal to certain sectors of the urban petty-bourgeoisie as it parallels aspects of their ideological concerns<sup>3</sup> although Social

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3. The new petty-bourgeoisie, especially those involved in the circulation of capital and/or employed in bureaucracies in the private sector, are an important group in the New Zealand Party. Well-educated, urban-based, relatively liberal and yet still committed to a notion of capitalism and meritocracy, their position has been reflected in the Party's image and policies. The fact that the New Zealand Party, prior to the 1984 election, attracted the new petty-bourgeoisie, and other groups, from the National and Social Credit parties is reflected in a poll (New Zealand Herald-NRB) in April (14-18) 1984. The allegiances of New Zealand Party supporters for the 1981 election were 24% Labour, 24% National and 28% Social Credit. In terms of the overall shift in support, the table below indicates a loss from Social Credit and National to the New Zealand Party and to Labour.

	September 1983	April 1984
New Zealand Party	6%	14%
Social Credit	11%	6%
National	45%	38%
Labour	37%	41%

(New Zealand Herald-NRB poll, April 1984)

Credit competes for this support in the provincial towns and rural areas.

The growth of organisations that represented old urban petty-bourgeois concerns was most apparent in the late 1970s. The early expressions were anti-union groups, including the League of Rights, Strike Free and The Individual's Fight for Freedom (TIFF). These were followed by others that sought to contradict the analysis offered by the National Government, and instead, to interpret their actions as a major cause of the problem. Mr I.R. Sampson and the Association for the Survival of Free Enterprise defined the National Party and its policies as a form of invidious socialism. The New Zealand Ruralist Party, despite its name, was an urban-based (Auckland) group that was formed in 1983 to campaign against 'massive state intervention' because it represented socialism and produced 'dependence'. Another variation on this theme is provided by those groups that have a religious base. The Unification Church was involved in the formation and the funding of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, an organisation that campaigned in the late 1970s against the 'infiltration' of communism into New Zealand and especially against communist influences in the trade union movement. These were accompanied by groups that expressed concern about communism internationally. The World Anti-Communist League, based in Seoul, had supporters in New Zealand including some parliamentarians<sup>4</sup> but lacked an effective organisation. The target was international communism and the way in which 'Marxism/Leninism' was advanced in various forums and spheres. Prior to WACL, there were a number of similar groupings including the Anti-Communist League. Finally, there were groups that concentrated on taxation, and by extension, opposed the 'right' of government to appropriate the returns to the individual wage earner or businessperson. These groups tended to be heavily influenced by American arguments and right-wing groups. The Tax Revolt Association of New Zealand (1980) was modelled on the Californian tax revolt although its impact in New Zealand was minimal.

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4. Members of Parliament who have attended WACL meetings as either speakers or participants include J. Elliot (speaker, 1980); B. MacDonnell (speaker, 1983); P. Hunt (1984, 1985, after leaving Parliament); R.L. Bailey (signatory to WACL advertisement, New York Times, 10/22/71).

Two organisations that articulate the concerns of the urban fraction of the old petty-bourgeoisie are the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement and Zenith Applied Philosophy. The latter offers an example of an authoritarian sect that is committed to the defence of urban petty-commodity production but does so in an unusual way by incorporating an idiosyncratic mysticism into its complex symbolic code.

(a) Zenith Applied Philosophy

Zenith Applied Philosophy (ZAP) was the invention of John Dahloff (born in 1944).<sup>5</sup> He was initially attracted to the Church of Scientology while he was at Massey University during the 1960s, and in 1965 he went to Saint Hill Manor Scientology Centre in Britain and returned to New Zealand as a fulltime Scientology worker. He was expelled from the Church of Scientology in 1972 for a 'failure to comply with the ethical codes of the Church of Scientology' (letter from Church of Scientology, Auckland, 19/2/77). In August 1974, he declared that he had reached the 'Ultimate State' and on 7 September, he announced publicly that he was 'John Ultimate' and that his address in Clyde Road was the 'centre of the Universe'. ZAP members rang world leaders to tell them of the fact and to invite them to New Zealand. Dahloff and another member of ZAP, A. Hunt,<sup>6</sup> sought to tell passersby and were charged with obstructing a roadway. The defence included a claim that they 'did not drink or use drugs as they practised mental discipline and applied philosophy' (Christchurch Press, 8/10/74; Herald, 8/10/74). Since then, Dahloff has been instrumental in building

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5. The focus on an individual is deliberate. In this context, the person not only imparts a distinctive 'flavour' to ZAP, via his Scientology background, but his charismatic leadership is responsible for the energy and direction of the organisation (see New Zealand Times, 16/12/84; 23/12/84; 30/12/84).
  6. L.A. Hunt died on 30 December 1980 while undergoing a ZAP 'decontamination programme' (based on a similar Scientology programme). He, along with five other ZAP members, had been ordered to undertake the programme by Dahloff. He was 32 when he died, and the circumstances of his death were the subject of concern in an extensive newspaper article (New Zealand Times, 16/12/84).


up an extensive commercial operation that extends and is an expression of the philosophy of ZAP and the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement (see Diagram 2 for commercial and ideological links with other businesses). The income is generated in the first instance by course fees (see Appendix 6 ) and by 'donations'. Dahloff receives income from the various ZAP businesses, and ZAP people pay a percentage of their wages. Hunt paid over 60% of his wages and when another ZAP member died in 1984, he was in credit to ZAP for \$25,000.00 (New Zealand Times, 16/12/84). Dahloff also receives income from penalties imposed on ZAP members. A bounced cheque means that Dahloff will receive two-thirds the value of the cheque as a 'fine' while the contravention of rules produces ethic points which have attached to them a financial penalty or work at a ZAP-operated farm. One newspaper estimates that these sources of income have led to Dahloff enjoying some \$5 million in personal wealth (New Zealand Times, 16/12/84). Dahloff bases his operation at his home in Clyde Road, Christchurch, and a number of those who are members of ZAP live in close proximity (see Diagram 2 ). Twelve ZAP households lived within 800 metres in 1984 (New Zealand Times, 23/12/84). He identifies himself as 'John Ultimate':

*I am above nothing or below nothing.  
I am not god, and I have no wish to  
go down to that state (Herald, 14/1/82).*

In the meantime, the Church of Scientology has placed ZAP out of bounds to its members.

The business base of ZAP is extensive (see Diagram 2) and there is an overlap with the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement (TRIM). For example, one of the most successful enterprises was a franchise chain called Sandwich Factories. (It went into receivership owing \$70,000). These began in 1976 and they were fastfood concerns. There were, by the early 1980s, a number of Sandwich Factories in Christchurch, and they were to be found in other centres (e.g. Wellington, Dunedin). Some were owned by the parent organisation while a number had been sold through the franchising system. The directors of the Sandwich Factory, a husband and wife team, the Hendersons, lived in the same street as Dahloff and have undertaken ZAP courses. Mr Henderson was also a founder

DIAGRAM 2: COMPANIES LINKED WITH ZENITH APPLIED PHILOSOPHY AND TAX REDUCTION INTEGRITY MOVEMENT, EARLY 1980s, CHRISTCHURCH



This diagram indicates some of the links but not all by any means. Nor does it reflect the turnover in personnel or companies. Some supporters have been 'deregistered' by Dahloff. They include D. Sloane (involved with Doghouse Burger Bar), G. Russell (D.N. Russell Ltd.) and R. Hyndman (Granny's Health Food Ltd., Doghouse Ltd., Rand Foods Ltd., Quality Pizzas Ltd). Other companies linked to ZAP have gone into receivership. They include Sandwich Factories, Rand Foods Ltd., Kanz Clothing and Limited Editions. P. Hutchinson (New Zealand Times 23/12/84) noted that 19 ZAP companies had gone into receivership between 1979 and 1984. But they listed other ZAP-linked companies that are not included in the diagram:

American Burger Bar (S.J. Dawe)  
 Zorro's Mexican Takeaways (S.J. Dawe)  
 Farmer Johns  
 Super Sober Man (I Kerr)  
 Nutrimetics (N. & B. Lyons, P. Nicholson)  
 5th Avenue Furnishings (B. Wilson)  
 'The Bag Shop' (B. Wilson)  
 London Markets  
 Paddy's Food Market  
 Daytona Park Speedway  
Sunday Miracle (D. Henderson)  
 Wizards  
 Copenhagen Cones (J. & D. Henderson)

It is suggested that in 1984, there were some 30 companies associated with ZAP (New Zealand Times, 23/12/84).

of TRIM. When the Sandwich Factory was taken to court by the Canterbury Hotel, Restaurant and Related Trades Unions over award breaches, a critical fact in the case was the influence of ZAP philosophy on the way in which the business was run. The complaints were that award rates were not paid or that award conditions were not adhered to and that staff were pressured into taking ZAP courses (Christchurch Press, 18/4/80). Eventually (in 1981) claims of \$21,152 were made against the Sandwich Factory by the union on behalf of six employees (\$11,500 in penalties and \$4205 in arrears). The Arbitration Court ruled that the company had committed 15 breaches of the award and imposed a penalty of \$930 and ordered it to pay \$4205 to the employees. The Court commented in relation to Henderson's beliefs about 'coercive unions' that 'this is apparently part of the philosophy of an organisation known as Zenith Applied Philosophy (Z.A.P.) but with such metaphysical concepts we are not concerned' (Christchurch Press, 4/11/81). The dispute continued because of the failure of the company to abide by the Court's decision, specifically to pay the union a fine and to subsequently supply the names of employees.

Similar complaints were made against Luigi's Pizzas, Dog House, Farmer John's Chicken House, American Burger Bar and Roasters Restaurant (see Christchurch Press, 18/4/80). The Director of Dog House, R.F. Hyndman, acknowledged his involvement with ZAP and it was part of the union's case against F.R. Sloane (Farmyard Restaurant) that his failure to 'observe the terms of the award was due to his connections with the Zenith Applied Philosophy (Z.A.P.) organisation'. Soon after this (May 1980), a number of food bars and restaurants were spraypainted with the slogan, 'ZAP poison'.

The disputes arise from the ZAP belief that unionism is based on coercion and that it constitutes a basic violation of individual freedom. The employer should 'enjoy' the right to determine and negotiate with his/her employees the conditions of employment that prevail within his or her business. But there are further elements in this ideological position, and these are indicated by the questions put to customers at ZAP businesses. They are also asked by ZAP people who operate on the streets in Christchurch by approaching the public. The questions include:

Are you interested in world affairs?

Are you worried about creeping communism/socialism?

A positive reply is followed by an invitation to buy material, most commonly John Birch Society publications such as None Dare Call It Conspiracy. The person might then be invited to visit the Dahloff house to take a personality test. They are also encouraged to read 'appropriate material' (e.g. from TRIM) or to support the activities of groups with similar aims (e.g. in 1980 the anti-union petition from TIFF was being circulated by ZAP people in Christchurch). The open soliciting in Cathedral Square attracted the attention of the Christchurch City Council and began a debate in the Christchurch newspapers (see letters in the Christchurch newspapers in May 1980).

The above indicates a willingness to engage in public debate, to put into practice the philosophies of the organisation and to proselytise. For these reasons, ZAP has attracted a lot of publicity in Christchurch and has gained a degree of support that belies its size. Its views are expressed in an idiosyncratic style that both articulates many petty-bourgeois concerns and at the same time, expresses them in a novel and very different way. The world view is a combination of mysticism, mainly Eastern, Church of Scientology and John Birch Society arguments. The mysticism, typically expressed by Dahloff, comes in passages such as the following:

*...Jesus talked about being the son of God but no-one has talked about attaining the ultimate state. This has been obtained here at the centre of the universe...I am the Ultimate now. I have talked to many people recently in other places through different means (e.g. in their dreams, on their telephones). Many people from other places are now on their way to the centre of the universe...*  
(General Letter, November 1978).

The techniques used and many of the terms employed in the courses come from the Church of Scientology. The Church has agreed that the purpose of the courses, the selling methods used and the course outlines are similar (Christchurch Press, 14/5/80). Young Pakeha males who are seen as 'achievers' or 'high-tone' people are approached and invited to take personality tests. The person may be then invited

and/or encouraged to take other courses costing from \$160 to \$680 (1979) (see Appendix 6). There is a particular vocabulary (low tone, low awareness, fast flow, training routine, toughness formula, present time) and the emphasis is on self-control and self-improvement, although it is done in a particular style that owes as much to psychological motivation techniques as to mysticism. Thus the aim of one course is given as taking the student from 'where they are now' to the 'ultimate' or 'anywhere that they want to be'. If the emotions are not controlled, then the state is described as 'mis-emotion'. To overcome this, a 'toughness formula' allows a person to handle situations, the 'cycle of control' encourages mastery of a situation and 'fast flow' refers to doing something that you want to as fast as you can. Success is described as being able to be what you want to be and happiness is seen as a by-product of success. Then there are various laws and 'dynamics'. The 'Expansion Law' states that if you are not part of the solution then you are part of the problem, and the 'Third Party Law' sees a third party in any conflict, a 'behind-the-scenes stirrer'. The media are cited as a good example of 'third-partying'. Indications are that about 30 people will attend a course (see Christchurch Star, 2/11/77) and that there are as many as 4000-5000 ZAP students (Christchurch Press, 14/5/80).<sup>7</sup>

John Birch Society material and arguments also penetrate ZAP course material and they are combined with other 'free enterprise' and conspiracy arguments. The courses are designed to impart an aggression to the pursuit of material success but within the environs of a particular type of free market economy. For example, one of the principal texts of ZAP courses is F. Bastiat's book, The Law, which advocates that government should be restricted to the operation of law and order in society, and that the redistribution of wealth should not be contemplated. Further, only males should have suffrage. They also believe that:

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7. The New Zealand Times (16/12/84) estimates that there were 5000-6000 students in the first 10 years of ZAP's operations (i.e. 1974-1984).

*...those who are not 'achievers' to be merely 'low-tone' people or 'the masses' who exist solely for the benefit of and exploitation by the achievers. ZAP believes that 'the masses' should not be able to vote and that the elite class should govern (Caclin, 13/6/83).*

From this position, ZAP then goes on to assert that Christianity panders to the poor and is a religion for the weak and liberal. All these elements conform to the traditional components that go to defining a particular ideological position as extreme right-wing. There is a strong suspicion of government, especially as the state is seen as the repository of communism even though the government referred to is conservative. The level of taxation and the degree of centralisation and power are seen as the important criteria in defining the intention as socialist. ZAP also contends that the current operation of the market economy in New Zealand is contrary to the best interests of the 'people', effectively the businessperson. The goal is to see a major reduction in the power of the unions and the right to decide conditions of work within the individual enterprise. Also, elements of the ZAP style are racist, at least in an implicit sense (e.g. Pakehas are typically seen as 'high tone'), while the sexism of the organisation's beliefs and practices are readily apparent. Political rights and privileges are assigned to males but not females. This ideology is garnered with a terminology and style that is particular to ZAP. There is no intention of conforming to normal political niceties in terms of the operation of the organisation, and instead, acolytes must learn a new terminology that substantially departs from most other expressions, even of extreme right-wing ideology, in New Zealand. It is complex and the logic must be learnt along with a new set of concepts. A commitment to ZAP may result in an extensive financial commitment and stress (see New Zealand Times, 30/12/84). And yet, ZAP has been reasonably successful. It encourages students and over the years has managed to attract many people to its courses despite adverse publicity from time to time and scepticism from the media and public figures. But basic to its success is the fact that it has been instrumental in establishing an important commercial basis for its operations. This produces money, even if there is quite a rapid turnover (because of dismissal from ZAP or bankruptcies by ZAP firms or individual

and provides something of a role model for its philosophy. It is an important point of contact with the public; it allows access to people who are not members of ZAP and it presents a practical example of the ideology at work. The fact that it has attracted the opposition of politicians, the unions and the media reinforces some of the basic tenets of its worldview; that is, there is an intention to put into place a communist/socialist order and that anything which opposes this development will face public condemnation.

(b) Tax Reduction Integrity Movement

The Tax Reduction Integrity Movement (TRIM) was formed in 1979. Eric Butler spoke at a League of Rights meeting in Christchurch of a 'tax revolt' and this produced a subsequent meeting which established TRIM. The founders were J. Kelly, D.L. Henderson, G.N. Russell, B. Smith and three ZAP students. About 40 people attended this inaugural meeting. It was initially called the Tax Reduction Movement and it only became known as TRIM in July 1981. A visit from an activist from the John Birch Society, Alan Stang, was used to launch the new name.<sup>8</sup> In fact, the imagery and the ideology is largely based upon a similar campaign, Tax Reform Immediately (also TRIM) run by the John Birch Society in the United States. The groups share a slogan, 'Lower Taxes Through Less Government', and most of TRIM's supportive publications come from the John Birch Society's American Opinion Press.

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8. Typical of Stang's viewpoint, of the John Birch Society's and TRIM's, are the following comments that were part of his New Zealand speeches:

Communism is an international conspiracy and one of its instruments is the United Nations.... Communism...uses the most bestial, ruthless methods to arrive at its goal which is the complete and utter subjugation of every nation and every individual on Earth by means of a total world government....The New International Economic Order [is] further proof of the communist involvement in the United Nations....The idea had its origins in the writings of Karl Marx....Sensible government funded by reasonable taxation would provide a military force to protect the country from foreign invasion and to protect the people from insurrection. Other services such as education and health should be completely private...(Stang, Christchurch Press, 1/10/81).

These excerpts neatly encapsulate the central arguments and the logic of the ideology of both American and New Zealand organisations.

The fundamental concern is with the advancement of their conception of free enterprise and the advocacy of a world view that 'explains' social events and economic developments. TRIM members have expressed interest in Social Credit views, especially on financial matters (see the Christchurch Star, 15/7/81), and they have voiced their disappointment that the National Party does not adhere to what is deemed to be its philosophical base and traditions. Russell has said: 'Somewhere between the National Party supporter in the street, and Wellington, the Party's philosophy takes a great veer to the left' (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81). Instead, the activists who constitute the core of TRIM have invested their political activity in pressure group politics and those organisations which best express their world view. Russell and Henderson have been involved with both TRIM and ZAP, and in 1982, Russell commented that there are 'strong connections' between TRIM and the League of Rights and ZAP, and that TRIM's public campaigns were influenced by the ideas of these groups (Christchurch Press, 18/2/82). The common link was seen as the commitment to 'freedom and free enterprise'. Russell has described the League of Rights as 'like a voice in the wilderness making a lot of sense in a lot of areas' and that TRIM was able to 'draw support from a large number of people who do ZAP courses' (Straight Furrow, 18/12/81). Thus there are strong links, at least amongst the activists, between TRIM, ZAP and the League of Rights, especially in Christchurch. They seek support from each other for their world view, despite the fact that there are ideological differences between them, and the recruitment of supporters occurs through all three groups but is 'shared' in the sense that there is a flow from one organisation to another without major tensions occurring.

The activists put their ideology into practice within the sphere of petty-commodity capitalism, mainly in the retail and service areas. Alan Stang provided his own view of them (see Under Socialism It is Uphill All the Way. New Zealand, n.d.). Henderson is described as a 'young businessman' who has been faced by 'union goons' who have 'been trying to take over his labour force without success'. I. Kerr, who owns Warners Hotel, has 'an excellent version of an American Opinion Bookstore'. Kerr, who was secretary of TRIM in 1981, owns a number of businesses in Christchurch, including Western Destiny Publications

which is in Warners Hotel. Western Destiny Publications which began in 1965 in Hamilton was principally a mail order bookshop that specialised in John Birch Society material, although a variety of literature, including British National Front publications, was also sold. In 1980, it moved to Christchurch where it retained a similar emphasis but added a subtitle, 'The Ayn Rand Bookshop', to its claims. In 1980, the bookshop was the subject of a complaint that it was selling copies of The Protocols.

To promote its views, TRIM has adopted a high profile through various campaigns. It has, along with the League of Rights, held public meetings to try and establish public pressure for tax reform. When Stang spoke throughout New Zealand, it was claimed that relatively large numbers attended his meetings. Stang (see Under Socialism...) says that 200 attended his Invercargill meeting and 600 attended in Christchurch '...including three National Party candidates'. They have also sought to put their policies into practice within TRIM/ZAP businesses with the result that some employees have become involved in TRIM and ZAP political activities, while other employees have, via union action, sought to oppose such involvement. These have been discussed above in the section on ZAP, but further cases require mention. In 1983, court action was taken against a TRIM/ZAP concern, D.N. Russell and Co., for wrongful dismissal. During the case, the employee stated that:

*I had not endeared myself to him [G. Russell] as I was reluctant to get involved with his pet projects, namely ZAP, TRIM, SPIR and all his South African propaganda. I also refused to add my signatures to the telegram he sent to the Springboks (Christchurch Press, 17/11/83).*

Although Russell denied the above, he did say that he spoke to his employees about TRIM. After the Arbitration Court had ruled against D.N. Russell and Co., Russell dismissed the Court as a 'kangaroo court' arguing that employers had a right to hire and fire whom they wished (Truth, 20/7/83). These activities gain TRIM regular publicity, but they have also conducted a more 'positive' campaign to gain public support.

Prior to the 1981 election, TRIM invested a lot of time and money into a campaign to try and get parliamentary candidates to sign 'integrity pledges'. In October 1981, all candidates received a letter indicating that they would be getting material from TRIM. Then a few days later, they received a two page letter and material concerning the integrity pledge. Russell described these pledges as an example of ZAP (Straight Furrow, 18/12/81) although they are very similar to the pledges sought by the League of Rights in Australia from political candidates (see the material on the League of Rights). This method of pressure group politics originates with Social Credit (see the previous chapter and reference to Social Credit tactics in the 1940s in New Zealand). In essence the pledges sought to obtain an agreement from the candidates that they would consult their electorate on major political issues and that they would seek to reduce central government control and taxation levels. Some 292 candidates received the material but only 20 candidates signed any of the pledges (there were five pledges and only one candidate, a Social Credit candidate who subsequently left the Party because of his association with the League of Rights, signed all five pledges). The figure of 20 comes from a full page advertisement (Christchurch Star, 27/11/81) by TRIM although figures presented elsewhere differ. The Christchurch Press (18/2/82) puts the figure at 22 candidates while Straight Furrow (18/12/81) says that 21 candidates signed and that three signed all five pledges. The latter estimates that these candidates polled less than 3% of the total vote. The three major parties urged their candidates not to sign and only a few exceptions, almost all of whom were Social Credit candidates, signed.

As a follow up to the above, literature explaining the aims of TRIM along with details about the integrity pledges was sent to most homes in New Zealand. One million copies were printed and of these, 260,000 were distributed in Auckland. One intention was to report back to individual electorates on how their Member of Parliament voted on various issues before the House. This would be provided by a newsletter that would appear at regular intervals. In fact, this part of the programme never eventuated after the election. The literature was supported by extensive advertising in the media (see the whole page advertisement in the Christchurch Press, 10/11/81, 'A Demand for

Integrity'). In all, Russell claimed that TRIM spent \$140,000 on this campaign in 1981 (Truth, 24/11/81). Some \$100,000 was spent on newspaper advertising, postage and publishing the newsletter. The expenditure does not stop in 1981 however. In 1983, most voters throughout New Zealand received further material from TRIM while the media advertising has continued. Full page advertisements regularly appear in the New Zealand Listener (for example, every issue in January 1983 carried one of these ads). And in 1983-84, TRIM again mounted a campaign urging voters to support an 'Integrity pledged candidate'. It was claimed that one million cards were sent to voters in this period, and the results of this 'survey' (the actual numbers who responded to TRIM's invitation to indicate their attitude on each of the five pledges is not provided) were published in large advertisements in several newspapers (see the two page ad in the New Zealand Times, 24/6/84). The finance for these operations comes from a variety of sources. The membership consists of six committee members, about 100 active financial supporters and some 2000 other supporters (see Christchurch Star, 15/7/81; Christchurch Press, 21/4/80). The links with ZAP are very important in this context. The ability of ZAP, and Dahloff in particular, to generate income play an important role in providing financial resources for TRIM operations. Many of the business people are in fact ZAP members. A number of these are business people who have financial resources at their disposal. TRIM also generates some income from the sale of material, principally through soliciting on Christchurch streets. People are asked to support the campaign by buying books, posters or bumper stickers. The latter sell for \$1 and it is claimed that 20,000 have been sold. Stang also claims that TRIM, and others, have sold 20,000 copies of None Dare Call It Conspiracy.

Finally, TRIM has been part of a campaign that uses the letters columns of the newspapers to try and encourage support for their position. The Christchurch newspapers were inundated with letters during late 1981 and early 1982, and the situation reached a point in 1982 that the Christchurch Press issued the following warning:

*Recently we have found that a number of letters on the subject of taxation, most of them supporting turnover tax, have been written over fictitious names and addresses. We do not wish to offer to readers such letters from writers who exhibit a lack of integrity (Christchurch Press, 10/3/82).*

TRIM was one of the major groups involved in the campaign for turnover tax although not the only one, nor the only group to use this style of trying to influence public opinion. One other organisation that was involved in a very similar campaign was the League of Rights, and the style may well have been borrowed from this source.

The various advertisements paid for by TRIM centre on promoting the rights of employers and the political rights that accompany the ownership of property. And a critical part of the campaigns that TRIM has been involved in focus on taxation. On one level, taxation is seen as undercutting petty-commodity capitalism because the state unfairly takes profits from petty-bourgeois enterprises. Thus, via the reduction of taxation, the power of the state is effectively reduced and the autonomy and 'freedom' of the businessperson substantially increased. The original intention was to reduce tax levels by 10 percent along the same lines as the Californian 'tax revolt'. They have also argued for turnover tax to alter the tax base. In their view, such an alteration would mean that 'high unemployment, high inflation and economic problems' would be alleviated because the fundamental cause lies in the level of taxation and the power of central government. The petty-bourgeois conviction that the market, private ownership and profit are the best means for rationally distributing resources are reflected in this world view. It is accompanied by an opposition to large centralised organisations (anti-state, anti-large capitalism) and collective organisations, especially those that represent any form of proletarian ambition or intervention. But there is another level, or aspect to their world view. The tax system is held to be a critical strategy in the advancement of socialism/communism. The current levels of tax have been described as part of a 'marxist progressive tax system' and that opposition to turnover tax reflected a loyalty to international politics and Marxism (Straight Furrow, 18/12/81). As an adjunct to this argument, a major part of the public campaign immediately prior to the 1981 election, and subsequently, has focussed on the 'danger of party politics'. The bumper stickers read 'I pledge to vote for an integrity pledged candidate' and 'Lower Taxes Through Less Government' while the newspaper advertisements in the major daily papers or in the New Zealand Listener or Time had titles such as 'Liberty or Slavery?', 'Tax Plunder', 'The Parable of the Modern Little Red Hen' and

'Abraham Lincoln and Property'. All seek to establish a logical continuity between taxation, a dominant and centralised state, party politics and the advancement of a new 'socialist order'. The 'people' and specifically those who are responsible for the economic prosperity of the community and who operate for the common good, are denied what is 'naturally' theirs. This 'right' derives from the competitiveness of the marketplace and is responsible for its own moral order and equity. The marketplace is the arbiter and is seen to represent the most progressive factor in the establishment of a better community. Thus the campaigns conducted by TRIM have been interpreted as an obvious expression (and marshalling) of common feeling, as distinct from the intentions of big business, the state and politicians.

This ideology is somewhat different from others in the old petty-bourgeois tradition in New Zealand because conceptions of 'race' are not a prominent feature. Individuals such as Russell have publicly expressed their aversion to anti-Semitic arguments.

*I don't have any hangups about  
Jews. I don't go along with any  
tales of Jewish conspiracies.*

And concerning 'race':

*My decisions are not motivated by  
race. I don't think many of the  
people in TRIM are either (Christchurch  
Star, 7/11/81; see also Straight  
Furrow, 18/12/81).*

There is certainly a commitment to a conspiracy theory, and this at times comes close to incorporating arguments about 'race', especially with the use of the often-used shorthand for Jews, 'international finance'. Stang, admittedly an outsider, concentrated on 'international finance' during his 1981 speaking tour, and he subsequently wrote:

*The Fabian purpose from the beginning  
has been to impose the principles of  
the Communist Manifesto on the peoples  
of the English-speaking world...it  
[New Zealand] will become the property  
of international bankers... (Stang, n.d.).*

He goes on to argue:

*Even more dangerous to New Zealand than its Communist union goons is the fact that National Party leaders vigorously endorse the Trilateral Commission's scheme to redistribute the world's wealth through the pro-Communist UN...the Big Kiwi is trying to keep them in the dark about the connection between Communism and the New International Economic Order. Truth is the only substantial element of the mass media that will touch it (Stang, n.d.).*

The material that TRIM and ZAP, along with the Western Destiny Bookshop, promote is primarily intended to substantiate this conspiracy view of the world. Gary Allen's book, None Dare Call It Conspiracy, examines the 'nexus between communism and world financiers'. It has been the basis for a John Birch Society campaign in the United States ('Operation Counterattack') and in Australia in 1973 by the League of Rights ('Operation Exposure') to expose 'the conspiracy'. Allen also wrote Kissinger. The Secret Side of the Secretary of State, another book promoted by TRIM. This book argues that Kissinger helped the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority over the United States as well as aiding the 'Rockefellers and their allies' to make billions on a 'fake oil shortage'. The basic contention is that Kissinger was an espionage agent for the Soviet Union in a classic example of the triangulation of Jewish-Capitalist-Communist.

All of this literature is imported and it could be argued that it represents a non-indigenous ideology that bears little relation to the activities of the New Zealand petty-bourgeoisie. Certainly, a number of the leading activists in TRIM have distanced themselves from any commitment to the anti-Semitic and racist elements of the imported conspiracy theory. Nevertheless, there is an acceptance of the broad details of the conspiracy theory and rather than articulate the racist content, there is simply greater emphasis placed on other aspects, notably taxation, the state and party politics. The racist content is not discarded altogether; it is simply not as explicit as is the case in other ideologies in the petty-bourgeois tradition. The other point to be made about the reliance on imported material, speakers and ideology is that the Californian tax revolt provides the strategies for TRIM while the economic model that many TRIM members aspire to is represented in certain states and sectors of the American economy.

The goal is represented by the supposed economic freedom of California and the power and activities of a group such as the John Birch Society. The fact that the terminology and the content of some of the arguments is incongruous in a New Zealand setting is irrelevant. The goal is felt to be the same.

TRIM are not only different in their explicit use of American models and ideology (most other groups use British arguments and symbols), but they also differ in that they have a definite financial base (see Diagram 2). Their location in urban petty-bourgeois enterprises in Christchurch provides them with the funds to conduct major public campaigns, a policy that would not otherwise be possible because their numbers are not much larger than other major extreme right-wing groupings. This source of finance has enabled them to 'buy' a relatively high profile. Their success, however, has been limited. The attempt to reduce tax levels and to gain greater 'freedom' for petty-commodity production is a platform that has a significant degree of support. But they also over-anticipated the degree of crisis in political representation. The activities in 1981, and since, assumed that there would be public support for a move to break party loyalties, and more inaccurately, that parliamentary candidates would be prepared to acknowledge the diminution of such loyalties. Support for groups such as TRIM in this period indicated that there was some sympathy for such a strategy, but this was probably confined to a relatively small part of the electorate, notably the old petty-bourgeoisie that was involved in petty-commodity capitalism. The 'new petty-bourgeoisie' or those involved in the circulation of capital and the state sector, were not attracted by the attack on the state and party politics. Nor were other classes who were quite prepared to stick with traditional political loyalties and democratic conventions, albeit with major support going to Social Credit. Thus the old and new petty-bourgeoisie did not coalesce and the 'revolt' of the new petty-bourgeoisie, represented by the New Zealand Party in particular, did not share the ideological assumptions and arguments of political organisations such as TRIM. TRIM correctly anticipated a crisis in political representation but the success of their political campaign foundered on the assumption that the crisis, combined with the 'appeal' of their rhetoric, would be sufficient to unite old and new petty-bourgeoisie. In spite of considerable publicity and

'investment', TRIM still only represents the old petty-bourgeoisie, and then only a section of this class. It has not transcended this narrow base, nor has it successfully operated beyond the confines of Christchurch. Its impact is circumscribed by geography and class.

### Conclusion

This chapter has recorded, albeit in a circumscribed way, the growth of extreme right-wing interpellations from the mid-1960s onwards. The sheer number of groups who fall into this generic category by the mid-1980s means that only a brief survey is possible. But it would also be misleading to analyse many of the groups separately and in depth simply because most are politically insignificant and transitory. Schisms and coalitions occur constantly and while the groups have proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, these political organisations just as rapidly die more often than not. It is easy enough to record their foundation but their demise normally goes unannounced and so attempts to record the lifespan of many groups are unlikely to succeed. Thus Appendix 5 notes their geographical location and year of formation. In this way, the growth of the extreme right can be acknowledged, and from this base, this chapter has sought to analyse a select group of the more substantial extreme right-wing groups, and to identify the material conditions and the political and ideological struggles which produced them. A key argument here is that these groups, with some notable exceptions (see the chapter on 'racial revolutionaries') reflect petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. They share, as the examples chosen show, certain basic ideological elements. They have a strong commitment to an individualistic/voluntarist mode, both personally and as a foundation of society, which is focussed on an advocacy of private property, the primacy of the market in social relations and petty-commodity capitalism, both rural and urban. There is unequivocal opposition to the organisations of labour and large capital, and to any tendency towards centralisation or monopoly status. These central elements are accompanied by the belief in the need to preserve 'the (nuclear) family', partly because it is a social institution that is deemed to encapsulate the values of capitalism (e.g. individualism, self-sacrifice, independence) but also because it serves to reinforce the traditional

(cf. 'natural') roles of male and female. The Country Party especially characterises this constellation of value orientations. And finally, these extreme right-wing groups offer an interpellation that constitutes 'the people' in an antagonistic relationship to the dominant bloc. There are differences amongst the groups as to who is included in the dominant bloc but universally, the agreed features include speculative capital, an interventionist state and some form of alliance between the state, large capital and the collective organisations of labour. There are also differences in the way that 'the people' are conceived. The 1960s and beyond mark the growing tendency to politicise racism, and hence for interpellations to explicitly identify 'the people' as a 'race'. The nature of ideological struggles in the 1970s and 1980s has encouraged many extreme right-wing groups to invest a variety of discourses with a racist content. The Country Party and the League of Rights exemplify this development. A minority of organisations, including TRIM and ZAP, employ an interpellation that is popular-democratic in nature but which does not utilise 'race' to the same extent. Admittedly, recruitment of members is principally directed at Pakehas, they refer to 'international finance' (part of the symbolic code used universally amongst the extreme right to refer to Jews), they support the state racism of South Africa and members such as Ian Kerr (Western Destiny Bookshop) sell racist and anti-Semitic material. But they are still less likely to employ notions of 'race' in the public expressions of their ideology. In this, TRIM and ZAP are an exception. Other extreme right-wing groups articulate their views through an interpretation of social and economic relations that centres on 'race'.

Despite the above qualification, TRIM and ZAP are still an important aspect of developments among the extreme right in the 1970s. They share an extensive financial base, unlike most other groups, and they have a high profile in pressure group politics. The two organisations have close links and for analytical purposes, can be seen as part of a confederation. ZAP is the founding organisation and it conforms closely to the definition of a political sect. It is epistemologically authoritarian with a highly centralised leadership structure and exclusive membership. It is charismatically led by John Dahloff in an autocratic manner. ZAP offers a very individualistic understanding of the world, largely derived from Dahloff, and members are required to learn a complex symbolic code that has little

value outside of the organisation's activities. Because of the sectarian nature of this code and the authority structure, ZAP tends to draw its membership almost solely from Christchurch. In other centres, few have heard of ZAP.

TRIM was founded by ZAP students and it has links with groups such as the League of Rights. If ZAP offers a unique world view and shares this only in an exclusive organisation, then TRIM is the political arm that involves itself in public debate and scrutiny and in so doing, communicates some aspects of ZAP philosophy to a wider audience. It has a high profile in certain ideological struggles, specifically those concerning the state and taxation. The intent is to create more 'favourable' opportunities for small-scale capital accumulation in order to sustain the reproduction of petty-bourgeois positions (cf. Scase, 1982). TRIM argues for a less interventionist state and for rewards to be distributed through the marketplace rather than to be redistributed by taxation. In arguing these, TRIM could be representative of the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole. But the differences between old and new petty-bourgeoisie are seen in a comparison between TRIM and the New Zealand Party. The latter is liberal on a variety of moral and political issues; the former is reactionary. The New Zealand Party, while critical of the state in certain aspects, would also seek to expand its operations or expenditure in areas such as education. TRIM believes that the state should be limited in its functions to areas such as defence and law and order. The New Zealand Party does not share the suspicion and opposition of TRIM to modern corporate capitalism or trade unions. And fundamentally, they do not share TRIM's reliance on conspiracy theories and devout anti-communism. The divergence in ideology parallels the fundamental divisions between the old and new petty-bourgeoisie. Ideologically and politically, they do not act in a unified way.

The other case study was provided by the Country Party. This political organisation has been one of few major contemporary expressions of rural petty-bourgeois feeling. It sought to unify the reactionary elements in the rural sector in the late 1960s but the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful for several reasons. The first was noted in an earlier chapter. From the mid-1950s, the farming sector began to shrink in terms of the numbers involved as the economies of scale required

larger and larger productive units. One of the most spectacular decreases was amongst the rural petty-bourgeoisie; the core of this group, the dairy farmers, declined substantially (57.5 percent) between 1950 and 1976 (Dunstall, 1981: 409). The decline placed a very obvious constraint on the potential of a party which intended to reflect the views of this stratum. The second factor in their failure was the formation of the Country Party at the beginning of the political and ideological struggles that were to cause so much distress to the moral sensibilities of the petty-bourgeoisie in the 1970s. Debates on racism, sexism, militarism, state intervention, political rights, and to a lesser extent, communism, gathered in intensity during the 1970s, after the Country Party ceased to have any political impact. It anticipated many of these debates but failed to exploit them. Further, the Country Party predated the economic recession that became apparent from the mid-1970s. The Country Party had to manufacture a crisis before it really occurred and its apocalyptic imagery and millennial arguments only attracted a limited audience. Its message, that the rural petty-bourgeoisie were the custodians of all that was good in capitalism, was powerful but premature. Their interpretation of a corrupted past and present had yet to accord with the material, political and ideological struggles of the rural petty-bourgeoisie. The third factor was their attempt to be a relatively inclusive political party. The Country Party, unlike practically every other example of extreme right-wing activity, was not a political sect except perhaps in the sense that it claimed unique access to the truth. The appeal of the Party's ideology had to attract supporters, but it also had to cement the organisation internally. It did not seek to be exclusive nor could it ever be epistemologically authoritarian, whatever the intention, because it lacked an appropriate authority structure and/or charismatic leadership. As Nyomarky (1967) noted, the reliance on an emergent ideology and its interpretation and application leads to schisms, and the Country Party fragmented within a few years of its formation. But others took over its mantle, albeit as pressure groups and political sects, and the next chapter examines one of the most important of these, the League of Rights.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONTEMPORARY PETTY-BOURGEOIS JACOBINISM:  
THE NEW ZEALAND LEAGUE OF RIGHTS

*...there is an "undeclared war" against South Africa, with the forces of International Communism, International Finance and Western governments all allied against that country. South Africa is in the front line against the Communist totalitarian advance...*

On Target (29/10/84)

*...the early development of Communism, including most of those who seized power in Russia and imposed it upon the peoples of Russia, were distinctly Jewish. Another little-known facet of Communism is its relationship with the Zionist Movement.*

On Target (5/12/83)

This chapter examines the New Zealand League of Rights as an example of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. The economic difficulties faced by the old petty-bourgeoisie during the 1970s and 1980s has been accompanied by ideological and political struggles. The petty-bourgeoisie feared that their form of production would continue to decline and that petty-bourgeois positions would not be automatically reproduced. Sections of the petty-bourgeoisie sought to articulate and communicate these concerns, some through traditional representational ties with organisations such as Social Credit, but also increasingly, by participating in new political organisations such as the League of Rights. In this fashion, they have sought to convince others of the nature of the crisis, and to mount a 'moral enterprise' (Wallis, 1976: 210) that would unify and mobilise the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The struggle, while determined by economic conditions and relations, has been perceived essentially in political and ideological terms. In accordance with the definition of Jacobinism, the impetus for their position comes from an antagonistic relationship to the dominant bloc, endorsed by their marginality to the capital/labour relation. The old petty-bourgeoisie are fundamentally opposed to many aspects of a liberal democracy and monopoly capitalism, and they identify financial and political elites as culpable. In this regard, they can be contrasted with the new petty-bourgeoisie who have increasingly played a vanguard role in liberal developments surrounding such issues as gender relations and whose interests are often directly linked to the corporate economy. The conflict between the two fractions, old and new petty-bourgeoisie, constitutes an important antagonism in contemporary New Zealand society, and the League of Rights exemplifies the reactionary position of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The organisation offers a systematic and coherent interpellation that attempts to advance the interests of this class fraction in opposition to the dominant bloc, the proletariat and the new petty-bourgeoisie.

The League's ideology expresses the traditional concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie: a determined defence of petty-commodity

production, both rural and urban, and a rejection of expressions of collectivism or corporatism. The content and structure of the ideology owes substantially to petty-bourgeois struggles and interpellations of the 1930s, and the League reproduces early Social Credit arguments and continues to deify C.H. Douglas and his views. It is elements from this tradition that confirm the Jacobinist stance of the League and impart a distinctive character. Three elements in particular are worth mentioning. As befits a popular-democratic interpellation, the subject is addressed as 'the people', but this is, in turn, constructed as a 'race'. Racism is a central organising concept that determines the League's views and policies on practically every matter, although it is often mediated by sectarian signs that have a racist meaning for an insider, but are relatively devoid of such meaning to an outsider. The role of 'race' in this interpellation eliminates the very possibility of class struggle or the appropriateness of the concept 'class'. The second characteristic element is the use of a conspiracy theory in explaining the social world. Economic and social events are immediately explainable by the machinations of this conspiracy, and hegemony is maintained by the influence of the conspirators. And thirdly, a key aspect is the role of Jews in the conspiracy. The devout commitment to anti-Semitic arguments is unmatched in New Zealand politics, with the exception of the working class neo-fascist groups (see Chapter Five). The uniqueness of these particular elements, and of the ideology as a whole, can be credited to the reactionary tendencies of a declining class fraction and to the role of the political generation who gained their political understanding in the 1930s. To illustrate the second point, two of the three people profiled, Eric Butler and W.A. Ross, span the petty-bourgeois activism of the 1930s and 1970s/1980s. They are key agents in the transference of 1930s interpellations to the present, Ross in a relatively passive way while Butler has been responsible in both periods for the production of important ideological texts. They also represent the links with Social Credit organisations.

The League of Rights and Social Credit share a class base and an ideological heritage. But the relationship between the two organisations is a tense one and they compete over various issues.

Ideologically, the League of Rights claims the mantle of Social Credit because the group adheres to the Douglasite arguments of the 1930s. Social Credit rejects aspects of this interpellation as inappropriate to the situation of the 1970s and 1980s. The question of strategy reveals another important antagonism. The League of Rights endorses Douglas's view that participation in electoral politics diverts a group from its role and ambitions. Alternatively, Social Credit as a political party reflects a realisation amongst sections of the old petty-bourgeoisie that representative organisations are an effective means of articulating central concerns. This then leaves a third area of tension, and a fundamental antagonism, concerning agency: which organisation has the strongest representational ties with the old petty-bourgeoisie, and therefore, more accurately represents their interests? The degree of intersection between the two organisations is outlined in this chapter, and the profiles of Ross and Clapham provide specific examples of the relationship. Both transferred their loyalties in the 1970s from Social Credit to the League of Rights, as did others (Howie, Stewart-Menzies, Moody), and illustrate the competition for members. Ross represents the political generation of the 1930s and he was part of the Social Credit leadership until 1972. Clapham comes from the political generation mobilised in the 1970s. She combines political with religious fundamentalism, and was prompted to become active in reactionary politics by liberal developments in the 1970s. These actors illustrate the political careers of key activists amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie, and their trajectory towards more extreme political forms.

Organisationally, the League operates as a political sect. The group is epistemologically authoritarian with little opportunity for negotiation on ideological interpretation and organisational power is highly centralised. Initial circulation of the group's ideology, and key group activities, are confined to an intimate core of insiders, although the interpellation is efficiently distributed to a larger group of supporters numbering approximately one thousand. The centralised power structure and the way in which key texts and arguments are constructed and communicated greatly reduce the possibility of schism. The leadership has yet to be challenged on its

ideological authority. For their part, acolytes must learn a complex system of logic and signs which gives them unique access to the 'truth' in contrast with most people who, because of complicity or naivety, are seen as misled. League members are thus:

*...custodians of those truths and values  
which must be the basis of all successful  
effort to defeat the enemies of human  
dignity and freedom (League of Rights'  
pamphlet, 1985).*

These custodians convey their message via a range of covert and overt means. A favoured covert strategy is to organise action groups who then attempt to influence public opinion through such channels as the letter columns of the newspapers, without identifying their League membership. Public campaigns include lecture tours and petitions. The League's use of such strategies and its articulation of a complete and systematic ideology means that it provides an excellent model of the reactionary Jacobinism of the old petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand in the 1970s and 1980s.

### The Establishment of the League of Rights

The impetus for the formation of the League of Rights was to be found in the politics of the Social Credit organisation in the Australian State of Victoria. The League was based in the Social Credit movement and specifically around the publication, New Times (founded in Melbourne in 1935). The political initiative came from the 'Vote No Campaign' which was conducted in Australia against referendums in 1944 and 1946. The opposition was directed at 'Dr Evatt's proposal to centralise power' (Intelligence Survey, April 1972). The claim was that the proposals to levy taxes were illegal. Evatt had also been responsible for instigating an inquiry against activists. Butler, who had been a director of New Times since 1938 (with a gap of four years during the war), founded the League of Rights around the above campaigns. The Victoria League began in 1946, and was followed by Queensland in 1949, Western Australia in 1951. The national body, the Australian League of Rights, was formed in 1960.

The first reports that a New Zealand group was contemplated came in 1968 (Australian On Target, 5/7/68), although an earlier article actually claimed that the League was already established here (Australian On Target, 30/6/67). The latter was contradicted by Butler's report on League activities to a conference of the League's Action Groups held in Melbourne, 1968, when there was no mention of a New Zealand League (Intelligence Survey, October 1968). There was simply a local coordinator, Ern Moss of Kaikohe (Intelligence Survey, April 1967) but no organisation as such. The announcement that a League had been formed came after an address by Butler in Tauranga in February 1970.<sup>1</sup> Sidney Wood reported the formation of an ad hoc committee of the New Zealand League of Rights (Australian On Target, 27/2/70). In fact, Butler had toured New Zealand since 1967 with the intention of establishing the League organisationally here (see Intelligence Survey, April 1967), although ostensibly the aim of the visits was to seek support for the Smith Government in Rhodesia.

The Canadian League of Rights was established in 1964 while the British League was formed in 1967. The Crown Commonwealth League of Rights, the coordinating organisation at an international level, came into being in 1972 but its role has been strictly limited. The Leagues in the various countries, while in close touch, tend to operate quite independently. The Crown Commonwealth League has simply provided a forum for activists from the Leagues to come together, so far only occasionally. The first Crown Commonwealth Conference was held in Melbourne in 1979, the second in Auckland in 1981, the third in Canada in 1983, and the fourth in London in 1985. The principal and original reason for the establishment of the Crown Commonwealth League of Rights was that the League was offered membership of the World Anti-Communist League but they required a representative and international organisation.

Between 1970 and 1979, the New Zealand League of Rights maintained a low profile and was essentially a small pressure group

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1. League of Rights' material usually cites 1971 as the year of formation.

that achieved little outside those communities (e.g. Tauranga) where activists were located (see Appendix 7). One of the few events of any note was the use of a League meeting in Tauranga in 1972 by the then Minister of Energy, Mr G. Gair, to attack anti-Springbok protestors, an attack that led to a successful libel case against the Minister. However, the situation began to change with the arrival in 1979 of an Australian League member, David Thompson, who was appointed National Director of the League. He was 23 and he promptly injected a new vitality into the ageing leadership. He moved the centre of operations from Tauranga to Auckland, and by 1981, he claimed an increased membership of 550 (Christchurch Press, 20/3/81), two full-time employees, a bookshop in Queen Street and a printing firm. The bookshop is Conservative Books and it shares an address with the League. Thompson also established On Target, a fortnightly publication that communicated matters of concern from the Auckland office to supporters throughout New Zealand. Conservative Books reinforced the League's message by supplying tapes and mail order books and pamphlets (220 on the 1981 booklist, 166 on the 1983 list; see Buchman, 1983: 8, and Appendix 8). Thompson also encouraged a more enterprising and aggressive publicity campaign that presented the League and its views to a wider public. As if to confirm the success of this revitalisation, the media took a greater interest in the League and its activities. The organisation was the subject of a current affairs programme (Eyewitness) in 1979 and an extensive Listener article in 1980 (see Stratford).

### The New Zealand League of Rights and Social Credit

One of the reasons for this media interest was the relationship between the League and Social Credit. In Australia, the League of Rights had attempted to influence political policy by getting members involved in major political parties. In the mid-1960s, a move was made to infiltrate the Liberal and Country parties, and when this was discovered, the parties reacted with a public campaign to discredit the League of Rights. By 1980, the Australian League of Rights was

largely irrelevant as a political force in that country with the possible exception of parts of Queensland and New South Wales.

In New Zealand, the obvious political party for the League to align itself with was, and is, Social Credit. Both organisations claim Major C.H. Douglas as part of their ideological heritage. But the relationship has been a vexed one (see Appendix 2). Sometimes, the links have been open and valued. For instance, New Zealand Social Credit sent the following message to the New Times Annual Dinner in 1962:

*Best wishes to New Times and  
appreciation of splendid effort  
in England [refers to Butler's tour].*

But four years later, New Times (October 1966) was openly critical of Social Credit and its MP, Vern Cracknell. The specific criticism was that Social Credit failed to provide a lead on the Rhodesian civil war, and more generally that Social Credit had perverted 'Social Credit' philosophy. During the 1981 election year, the League of Rights commented that:

*Douglas is the author of Social  
Credit and if you are taking his  
name they [Social Credit] should  
be content to adhere to his policy,  
not rejecting it altogether as they  
have done (Thompson, Personal Interview,  
30/7/81).*

New Times (May 1981) repeated the criticism in Australia when they said that Social Credit have 'studiously ignored' Social Credit principles of financial management. Butler (Evening Standard, 17/4/82) accused Social Credit of being 'socialist' and Thompson (Evening Post, 3/8/81) said they were dishonest in using the name of Social Credit. To this end, the League brought Gostick from the Canadian League of Rights to New Zealand on a speaking tour in 1981 as a 'service to voters who are thinking of voting Social Credit' (Evening Standard, 29/4/81).

But there was also support. Thompson said Social Credit had made the 'right noises about small businesses and small farmers' (Christchurch Press, 16/3/81) and there was approval for aspects of Social Credit's

fiscal reform (see 8 O'Clock, 9/5/81).

*The Social Credit League, despite our criticisms at times, is the only political party to come forward with positive suggestions in this critical field [inflation] (On Target, 2/5/80).*

Thus in terms of policies that would reproduce and strengthen small-scale commodity production, there is a measure of agreement between the League and Social Credit, at least from the League's viewpoint. They share aspects of the Jacobinist tradition that connotes petty-commodity producers as the custodians of the 'core' values of capitalism. But the League argues that involvement in party politics compromises the advocacy of this position. Thus:

*The League of Rights has always maintained that genuine economic answers would not be provided by the political parties (On Target, 12/11/84).*

This necessarily includes Social Credit (see 'The Continual Betrayal of Social Credit in New Zealand', New Times, September 1984).

The degree of overlap between the discourses, the common interest in articulating the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie and the claims of ideological authority are reflected in the migration of activists between the two organisations. The tendency is for the political generation, created in the 1930s and concerned to maintain the ideological purity of Douglasite arguments, to transfer from Social Credit to the League of Rights. For example, W.A. Ross, a Glaswegian-educated builder, who has been a secretary for the League of Rights in Auckland, was a national office holder in Social Credit. In 1972, he was Vice-President of Social Credit and a chairperson of the technical committee. He had contested six elections and one by-election (in Grey Lynn and Ponsonby) for Social Credit. Conflict between Ross and Beetham is documented in the latter's thesis (Beetham, 1972). After this, he was quite active on behalf of the League of Rights. Press releases or letters over his name appeared regularly, and he was usually described as 'acting-secretary', even after Thompson arrived in New Zealand in 1979 (see Herald, 26/5/80; there is further discussion of Ross in the Herald, 21/8/78 and National Business Review, 2/3/81). Also involved in the struggle between Ross and Beetham within Social Credit was Howie (aligned with Ross) and he subsequently went on to become President of the League of Rights.

Other links also became apparent in the late 1970s. In 1979, Michael Sheppard, a Social Credit candidate and the national spokesperson on regional development, resigned because of alleged anti-Semitism amongst some Otago members of Social Credit (Sheppard, 1982). The National Council of Social Credit declared in August 1979 that League of Rights members were not welcome in Social Credit and they could not be members of both organisations. Joy Clapham, a Social Credit candidate for Dunedin North (1972) and St. Kilda (1975, 1978) was expelled for this reason. Social Credit advised its members not to have anything to do with League activities and Beetham, in the aftermath of the expulsion, claimed that the League was financed by an important financial institution and had infiltrated the National Party (Otago Daily Times, 13/11/79). Neither claim was supported by any further evidence. In 1980, the media discovered that a supply address for Social Credit material was the Institute for Economic Democracy, a Queensland-based front for the League of Rights and run in New Zealand by the League of Rights' President from Tauranga (see Auckland Star, 28/8/80). These and other matters encouraged the Labour Party to use the links for electioneering purposes. Anderton, in his first Labour Party Presidential address, referred to the links and a pamphlet was circulated to homes during the East Coast Bays by-election (September 1980). The successful Social Credit candidate laid a complaint with the Race Relations Conciliator who subsequently ruled that the complaint was beyond the jurisdiction of the Act. In 1981, some Social Creditors were asked to indicate whether they supported the League of Rights as they renewed their membership in Social Credit. But the problem was not easily solved. The Social Credit candidate for Clutha in 1981 and a Dominion Councillor, S. Moody, was disowned by the Party's leadership when it was publicly reported that he had attended a League meeting and had said that League policies were similar to those of Social Credit (Herald, 30/4/82). Also as the election campaign proceeded, the Voters Association sent out questionnaires and these were predominantly answered by Social Credit candidates (31 Social Credit, 8 Labour, 3 National) and the results were reported in the League of Rights publication, New Zealand First. Beetham promptly called the Voters Association a 'front' for the League of Rights which was designed to embarrass Social Credit (Herald, 21/11/81). The next year, he also

successfully argued for the word 'League' to be dropped from the Party's title because of the 'links some political opponents attempt to draw between Social Credit and the extreme right-wing League of Rights' (Evening Post, 30/8/82). After losing a significant percentage vote in the 1984 election, the Social Credit conference devoted attention to its image. Again, the association with the League was referred to by the leadership (Knapp, Beetham; see Evening Post, 27/8/84) and it was made clear that they did not share the anti-Semitic assumptions of either the League or C.H. Douglas. In confirmation of this, the title 'Social Credit' was dropped altogether in 1985 and the organisation became known as the New Zealand Democratic Party. These associations and the resulting tensions, both within Social Credit and between the two organisations, reflect the struggle over who best represents the interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The struggles occur over a number of matters. As some of the above incidents have indicated, the matter of agency had evolved into a critical issue by the late 1970s. There was direct competition for membership and Social Credit responded by ruling that dual membership was unacceptable despite the fact that some prominent members and candidates (Ross, Clapham, Howie, Moody) were also involved in the League of Rights. Contradictory messages emanated from Social Credit's leadership over the effect and intentions of the League presence. The League was described as trying to undermine 'confidence in the Sacred movement' (see Evening Post, 16/11/81), but Beetham argued that 'infiltration' had not taken place (Evening Post, 21/11/81).<sup>2</sup> There is also a major difference over what is considered to be the appropriate strategy for achieving political power or ideological dominance. The League of Rights, in accordance with Douglasite arguments, is sceptical of pluralist party politics and argues that a political party is inevitably compromised by involvement in parliamentary democracy. This has been confirmed for this fraction by the

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2. The League of Rights had sought to 'infiltrate' the Country and Liberal parties in Australia, and the screening of an Eyewitness television programme was justified on the grounds that Social Credit was being 'infiltrated' in New Zealand (see Letter from the Executive Producer, Listener, 15/12/79). But there is little evidence to support the latter contention. Rather, the overlap in membership derives from the presence of those committed to the interpellation that dates from the 1930s, and this overlap has diminished as members of this political generation die or as they have been expelled from Social Credit.

relative liberalism of the Social Credit leadership since 1972, and the ongoing attempts by the Party to expand its class base to include the new petty-bourgeoisie. Given the opposing material, political and ideological interests of the two fractions, the old and new petty-bourgeoisie, the League has argued that the attempt to establish representational ties with the new petty-bourgeoisie inevitably means the abandonment of the interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie. This provides the League with evidence for its views on the way political programmes are diverted by an involvement in electoral politics. It also provides the League with the opportunity to claim that it has remained faithful to the original Douglasite traditions, and its commitment to Social Credit philosophy means that it best represents the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. This provides a third area of tension: what constitutes the most appropriate political paradigm and whether ideological purity with the traditions of the 1930s is important.

Social Credit, in appealing to the new petty-bourgeoisie, has sought to distance the party from the more problematic aspects of the Douglasite position. The League of Rights faithfully reproduces and articulates an interpellation that has direct links with the 1930s. The struggle over ideology can be illustrated by the differing attitudes to a popular-democratic interpellation that constructs 'the people' as a 'race'. The League of Rights has continually sought to invest overlapping discourses with racist interpretations, and has complained that Social Credit's leaders 'do not want their members hearing our views on race' (Christchurch Press, 19/11/79). The Social Credit leadership responded by repeatedly attacking the racism of the League and of Douglas: 'New Zealand Social Credit has never [sic] accepted the racial views that the early Socred doctrinist Major Douglas developed' (Evening Post, 22/8/80). But this does not alter the dilemma for the relatively liberal leadership. In adopting this ideological position, they face the possibility of alienating the old petty-bourgeoisie by dismissing some of their key ideological assumptions while still not appealing to other fractions and classes, notably the new petty-bourgeoisie. The formation of new political representatives, the weakening of ties with traditional constituencies

and the distribution of votes in the 1984 election (see Chapter Eight) illustrate the problems for Social Credit.

Thus, Social Credit and the League of Rights continue to compete as to who most successfully represents the material and ideological interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The League of Rights articulates the grievances of those rural areas and provincial towns that have a tradition of political conservatism. Thompson, when he was National Director of the League, claimed that the League represented the spectrum of political views but then contradicted this by stressing their concern for 'small business and small farmers' (Christchurch Press, 16/3/81). The League combines this with a world view that centres on 'race' as a central explanatory variable. For their part, many Social Crediters sympathise with this interpretation even if the public expression of support is contained by the political liability of such a move. In a dated research project, Higgs (1967: 98) found in a survey of Social Credit supporters that 78.8% agreed with the statement that 'There is a conspiracy of international financiers to control the world.' It is also apparent that the League of Rights gains its support from those areas that have traditionally been the strongest Social Credit electorates. These include towns (leaving aside Auckland) such as Tauranga, Matamata, Rotorua, Ashburton, Timaru, Wanganui and parts of Wellington and Dunedin, and rural support comes from the Bay of Plenty/Waikato, South Taranaki, South Canterbury/North Otago and North Auckland with additional pockets in Southland and the Wairarapa.

#### Supporters of the League of Rights

The League of Rights provides a good example of a political sect: it is an exclusive group focussed around an intimate core of activists. Ideological orthodoxy emanates from a central authority, is concerned with doctrinal purity and conflicts with dominant ideologies. Organisational power resides with the National Director, although it is constrained by the authority that lies with Butler and

by the noticeably weaker leadership provided by Daly in contrast with his predecessor, Thompson. The sectarian message is communicated via meetings and publications such as On Target to local activists and action groups, contrary to the perception of itself as a 'grass-roots' movement guided by the 'will of the people' (cf. Samuel, 1972: 249). As Wallis (1979) indicates, the centralised nature of the group greatly reduces the propensity to schism. There have been no major attacks from within the organisation. The exclusivity is maintained by restricting full membership to somewhere between 20 and 35 people. The reason given is the fear of infiltration (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81) although it is also obviously part of a strategy to enable those who regularly receive League material and perhaps take part in its activities to distance themselves from 'official' involvement with the group. They are not members according to the definition used by the League. The size of the core membership of the League has varied according to the spokesperson. Thompson has stated that there are 35 full members (Radio Pacific, 1981) with nine on the formal executive. Nearly all in recent years have been from Auckland or Tauranga, and the first President, and co-founder of the League in New Zealand, was Sidney Wood who was replaced in 1982 by R.W. Howie. But the Executive meeting (28/8/81) prior to the Crown Commonwealth League Conference in Auckland involved only seven people, including the President and the National Director. The figures of 20 (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81) and 40 (MacGregor, National Secretary, Herald, 1/2/82) have also been mentioned.

In terms of the wider support base, which effectively means those who pay a yearly subscription and who receive material from the League, the figure has varied enormously. The original figure was given as 200 in 1972. In 1980, Stratford gave the figure of 150-200 (also given in the Christchurch Press, 19/11/79), although membership lists of the period actually name 550 people. It appears that a number of these (approximately 130-150) withdrew their subscription and support following the adverse publicity of the Listener (1980) and Eyewitness programme (1979). But the League also regained this membership in the years that followed with the result that by the early 1980s, there was reasonably universal agreement that the League

numbered about 1000 in the broad category of supporters. Thompson coyly put the figure as 'below 2000' (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81), but others in the League put the figure at 1000 (MacGregor, Herald, 1/2/82; and Stewart Menzies, Auckland Star, 15/1/79), and this has been supported by observers (Kelsey, 1982; Jesson, 1982; Herald, 23/1/82).

The gains made by the League despite some critical publicity can be attributed to the public debates in the early 1980s and the League's advocacy of certain interpellations within these debates. For example, the 1981 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in which the League both supported the continued contact between New Zealand and white South Africans and argued that the anti-tour groups were part of a conspiracy to undermine law and order in New Zealand. Or the debates over Maori language and land where again the League has sought to represent the views of Pakehas by asserting that civilisation is represented by European culture and that the insistence on giving Maori values and practices a much higher priority are an infringement of individual rights, are divisive and a backward move. In this period, both informal and formal links were established with a variety of political and religious groups who share certain basic assumptions, even if the exact content of their world views is not identical.

These early contacts between the League and other groups tended to involve mainstream organisations. For instance, Butler in the 1960s and early 1970s had access to a range of service organisations such as Rotary and Lions, and to parliamentarians in the National Party. In 1974, he reported:

*I had a long discussion at Wellington with a group of National Opposition Members, finding most of them also dominated by the current myths about the plight of the world. But one new member...had done his homework. He had read None Dare Call It Conspiracy and The Naked Capitalist...[and] knew Sutton's new work National Suicide (Australian On Target, 22/3/74).*

On previous visits, he had met with Prime Minister Holyoake and certain Cabinet Ministers to put his case. In return, prominent MPs such as Gair and Walsh deemed it appropriate to use a League meeting as a forum for a political speech in 1972. This acceptability begins to decline in the late 1970s although there are still certain contacts between the League and the National Party. The Party's candidate for Napier in 1978 listed his membership of the League as part of his biography for the campaign, and the Minister of Police, B. Couch, attended a League meeting featuring Butler in 1982. His donation became the focus of media attention (see Herald, 21/4/82; 22/4/82). Couch for his part said that he had offered the vote of thanks to Butler for 'having the guts to stand up against those who rail against him with the usual verbal garbage' and referred to a 'racialist weapon that the communists use against us' (Evening Post, 19/4/82). In the latter statement, there is an acceptance of the League's interpellation on 'race relations', especially the conspiratorial assumptions as to who is 'responsible' for racial tension and debate. In the same period, other National Party members were distancing themselves from the League of Rights. In 1983, when the League used the National Party rooms in New Plymouth for another Butler tour, the local MP disavowed any support or affiliation to the group.

In terms of associations with other groups, the League forged links with groups in the 1960s that were seeking similar policies. The main domestic issues revolved around ensuring support for white governments in southern Africa and the identification of communism as a major threat. On the first issue, the Country Party helped organise a public meeting in Christchurch (1969) as a platform for Butler to talk on Smith's Government in Rhodesia. On the latter, the New Zealand Democratic Society held a Wellington meeting so that Butler and Gostick could discuss communism. A Democratic Society member and a National Party candidate (1960, 1963, 1969), F. Curry, chaired the meeting. This League concern has been extended through new associations. They have been active within the World Anti-Communist League internationally. Butler presented a report on communist infiltration

in Brazil, and Donald Martin (British League of Rights) chaired the important Committee on Political Affairs. In 1977, WACL formally adopted the League's programme for stopping financial aid to communists (see British On Target, 9/9/78 and 23/9/78 for an interesting analysis). Locally, this concern has been expressed through the promotion of material that attributes political debates to communist influence. For example, the League has continued to promote and sell Fenton's book Sinners at the Stadium, long after its publication and in both Australia and New Zealand (see Australian On Target, 11/4/75). Similarly, J. Calder and the International Christian Network (ICN) received publicity (see On Target, 4/5/79; and Australian On Target, 11/5/79). In this case, the League recommends the ICN newsletter, they offer reprints of Calder's publications and they print Calder's material in On Target (see Calder's comments on communism in the contemporary church, On Target, 29/10/84 and 12/11/84).

When it comes to debate about financial matters and economic trends, then the League has explicit links with the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement in Christchurch and with Social Credit (see above discussion and Appendix 2). It also has direct contact with certain fundamentalist religious groups. N. Rush of the Christchurch Integrity Centre has helped organise League visits to Christchurch and he has publicly stated that the Centre 'has a lot in common with the League of Rights' (Auckland Star, 30/7/81). But in many cases, the links come through supporters and activists who are involved in both the League and other organisations. This type of link is clearly important although it is problematic for the observer to the extent that it is difficult to establish the style and degree of influence that can be asserted via individual members of an organisation.

Typical is Mies Oomen, an inhabitant of Eketahuna who migrated to New Zealand from the Netherlands in the early 1950s. She disclaims membership of the League ('I don't want to be on the end of the sort of vicious campaign Ben Couch got...') but does agree that she organises the visits of League speakers to the Wairarapa (Dasler, 1982:17). Thus she issues press releases publicising the content of these talks and the League's views. She is a devout Roman Catholic and involved with the Concerned Parents' Association (she has been secretary of the

Wairarapa branch), SPUC and the Educational Standards Association. She was active in the National Party until she announced her withdrawal from the Eketahuna Branch Committee in On Target (15/8/83), in part on the grounds that support for the Human Rights Commission was support for a 'Godless, classless [sic] and sexless society of a collectivist, humanist and totalitarian state...'. She also uses League tactics, specifically the strategy of trying to influence opinion through the letter columns of newspapers. She covers a broad range of publications and topics: anti-feminism (Challenge Weekly, 21/12/79); sex education (Truth, 9/9/80); Marxism and human rights legislation (Evening Standard, 5/5/81) are some examples.

Another activist in the League of Rights and founder of the group is John Stewart-Menzies. He was educated in Scotland and South Africa before coming to New Zealand. He was involved with the League of Rights in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. He was also a candidate for Social Credit in 1969 (Tauranga) but resigned from the Tauranga Branch Council in 1970. In 1978, on a visit to South Africa, he received publicity for his advocacy of an anti-communist pact between South Africa, Australia and New Zealand (South African Digest, 26/5/78). He has since been involved with the Voters' Association (at this point he claimed he was no longer with the League of Rights) and then it was announced in Attack (October-November-December 1982) that he was the Bay of Plenty organiser for New Force (Nationalist Workers Party).

### The Activities of the League of Rights

The League conducts its campaigns in a variety of ways. In some instances, it adopts a high profile approach with large amounts of money being spent on publicity. Or it may seek to use a request for a politician to adopt a particular stance on policy as the basis for a press release. But the bulk of the activity is done rather more quietly and specifically around small groups or cells called Action Groups. The intention of these is to influence opinion and opinion-makers, primarily through letter-writing campaigns. The strategy of relying upon small groups dates from the Social Credit 'electoral campaigns' in Australia in the 1930s (see Richmond, 1977:70):

*[The]...propagation of the gospel depends upon the activities of enthusiasts working in cell groups, applying pressure on politicians and other influentials via the use of 'front' organisations...*

This type of strategy was outlined by Douglas in 1935 and put into practice by the New Times group, including Butler, soon afterwards. The philosophy centres around the intimacy of a small group. It is relatively easy to reinforce a particular world view and to sustain it against criticism from other sources. Hence these groups provide a cultic milieu which enables the reproduction of old petty-bourgeois interpellations in a private ideological domain.

A number of small groups are active throughout New Zealand, and they meet to draft letters (Stratford, 1980). Letter-writing is seen as one of the most effective strategies for an individual and a 'valuable method of spreading information' (On Target, 23/4/84). Guidelines exist to help the groups, advising them as to the most effective approach and format. 'Social Dynamics' courses are conducted from time to time, or else courses are supplied by correspondence, and these provide members with certain skills. On Target suggests topics and the format for the Action Groups every second week. For example, one On Target (26/4/83) suggested that Action Groups might like to promote the pamphlet, New Zealand Needs the Royal Family, they should offer support to the Pahiataua Branch of the National Party for its remit calling for the abolition of the Human Rights Commission and its legislation and the Geraldine Branch of the same party for its opposition to taxation. In addition, there are excerpts ('models') from letters published by League activists in newspapers around the country. There were two letters from the Dominion (disarmament, HART), a letter from the Christchurch Press (on Zimbabwe and 'tribal conflict') and two letters from the Taranaki Herald (attacking New Zealand's welcome to the Chinese Premier).

The strategy of conducting campaigns via the letter columns of newspapers derives from the 1930s, but it was more extensively used in Australia in the 1960s, and subsequently refined in both Australia and New Zealand. It allows opinions to be expressed publicly without

indicating their source or the political attachment of the writer. It appears that independent citizens are expressing commonly felt views, even on matters relating to the League. Thus after attacks on the League, letters to the Oamaru Mail (see letters by Tyson and Martin, Oamaru Mail, 15/1/81 and 16/1/81) defended the League from a seemingly objective or non-affiliated stance. And newspaper editors are usually unaware that their paper is being used in this way (see the response of the editor of the Taranaki Daily News, Herald, 25/5/81). One observer, himself a newspaper reporter (see McLoughlin, Radio Pacific, 1981), checked the origin of these letters. He took all letters relating to taxation, Human Rights Commission, unions and the New International Economic Order. There were 50 letters and he checked the names given against the telephone book and electoral roll. Only four of the names and addresses were real, and he concluded that a few people were writing numerous letters with false names.

An indication of the key target groups is provided in a circular (14/11/81) that preceded the distribution of copies of New Zealand First to League supporters. The suggestion is that the following groups should receive material:

- (1) *local churchmen [sic] (ministers, 'key people in the congregation')*
- (2) *local media (see Editor or chief reporter)*
- (3) *party (political) officials*
- (4) *key members of the community (mayor, city councillors, service clubs - Rotary, Lyons [sic], leaders of industry groups and trade union officials)*

*And don't forget the most important women's groups - the potential here is amazing.*

These groups are the focus for letters, pamphlets and calls, as League members attempt to put their point of view, but without identifying their affiliation, at least with the League. The letters published in the local newspaper help reinforce the image that their interpretation is supported by a significant number of people.

The League also operates via 'access organisations' which camouflage the group's involvement in issue-politics. For example, the League of Rights has been directly involved in the establishment

of the Institute for Alternative Energy, the South Africa Friendship Foundation and the Council for a Free New Zealand since 1980, but the organisation that has had one of the highest profiles is the Voters' Association. The Voters' Associations are one means whereby the League attempts to influence the formal political (electoral) process. The Voters' Association, or Voters' Policy Associations (VPA) as they were known in Australia, first appeared in 1964 (see Richards and Edwards, 1972 and Nation Review, 16-22/12/72). The VPA was based on cells of six members and coordinated at state, regional and district level by a chairperson (Grassby, 1979). The more sophisticated organisation and approach began in Murray in 1971, and by 1977 was firmly established throughout Victoria. A central part of their operation was the attempt to get candidates to sign a contract on issues such as taxation and relations with South Africa. New Zealand's Voters' Association was formed in mid-1981 in Tauranga. One of the prime movers was John Stewart-Menzies (although he immediately denied that he was a member of the League of Rights any longer - see Herald, 20/7/81). The expressed aim was to try and establish a 'more direct democracy' and to express a concern with party politics. The links with the League were the subject of media comment (Herald, 20/7/81) and the association was confirmed by the fact that the League promoted the Voters' Association questionnaire (Circular, 14/11/81) and the results were published in the League of Rights' New Zealand First (the first issue promoted the questionnaire while the second actually spent considerable space on reporting the results).

The Council for a Free New Zealand illustrated a slightly different approach in that this 'front' organisation not only sought to exploit public concerns but to do so via alliances with cultural symbols and organisations that possess a relatively high legitimacy. The public concern centred during the early 1980s on the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Many religious and morals groups opposed its ratification in a campaign throughout 1984, culminating in organised opposition during a series of public meetings held by the newly-elected Labour Government. The League was one organisation that sought to mobilise public concern and it began by offering a strategy that Butler had picked up in Manitoba, to petition the Governor-General on the grounds that ratification contravened sovereignty (see On Target, 15/10/84). The Council for

a Free New Zealand was the organisational front for the distribution of the petition and supportive material, beginning in September-October 1984. (There was a parallel organisation active in Australia at the same time called Council for a Free Australia). The campaign also involved Christians for Life and individuals such as B. Buckley, pastor at the North Shore Faith and Bible Centre. Legitimacy was sought by identifying with Christian organisations and symbols, although most were fundamentalist. The League's publications, including the petition and its supporting arguments, were widely distributed through the network provided by fundamentalist churches in New Zealand, and letter-writing campaigns were also used. One sympathetic MP, G.E. Lee (Hauraki) stated that he had received 5000 letters or telegrams opposing the Convention. He denied contact with the League although he commented that the Convention was a 'socialist document' echoing the League's ideological position (Evening Post, 4/12/84). The moral indignation of the League was matched in this instance by that of other groups, and alliances were established, at least for the duration of the public debate.

But not all the League's activities are covert. The League of Rights has conducted a number of surveys on various issues. These have been based on inviting a response to newspaper advertisements and the results have been presented in media releases. For instance, in 1980, the League invited a response to a suggestion that the Soviet Union should be the subject of boycotts as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan. The first advertisement appeared in Truth (26/2/80) and was followed by large advertisements in the Herald, Dominion, Christchurch Press and the Otago Daily Times. The advertisements included a brief description of the aims of the League of Rights. They have also produced material such as New Zealand First to publicise their views. This publication was printed in 1981 and there were two separate editions. Two hundred and fifty thousand were published (production costs were 3.3 cents per copy). The idea for this came initially from Australia where it was tried in the Senate elections in Queensland (Age, 7/10/80). Some 100,000 copies of Queensland First were distributed in support of Flo Bjelke-Peterson's candidature. These publications provide a direct channel to the public, not mediated by the often critical media, and the League has offered an image of

an organisation committed to Christian precepts, the Monarchy and patriotism, and has underplayed its apocalyptic and racist position.

The final public activity that the League engages in has been speaking tours. Butler is the most frequent speaker, and he has toured New Zealand since 1960 in 1962, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981. During the 1960s, he commanded quite a lot of uncritical attention, and he was able to get access to PM Holyoake (1962) and in 1963, his tour included 35 lectures and three radio programmes. When he spoke to the New Zealand Constitutional Society, the vote of thanks was given by Sir Mathew Oram, former speaker of the House. On his 1966 tour, he met with Government members including Sir Leslie Munro, and in Christchurch, he spoke to Rotary, the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the Christchurch Officers Club, mainly on the topic of Rhodesia. A typical tour would include speeches in Whangarei (in 1976, the chair was taken by the then MP, J. Elliot), Wellington, Oamaru, Timaru, Ashburton, Dunedin, Christchurch, Palmerston North, Tauranga and Auckland. This was his 1976 tour itinerary. His topics have included 'Behind the Scenes of World Unrest - Background to the Establishment of a One World Government' (Auckland, December 1979), 'Can Ronald Reagan Halt the Communist Advance? The Causes of the Collapse of Civilisation' (Dargaville, April 1981) and 'Breaking the Monopoly of Party Politics' (Whangarei, April 1981). But in talking in a public context, Butler invites public debate and opposition. He first faced protesters in New Zealand in 1963 at the University of Canterbury. By 1967, he had to contend with protesters in Dunedin and Wellington, and anti-apartheid groups provided opposition during his 1969 and 1970 tours. By the late 1970s, it was only in the smaller centres that he could hope for trouble-free meetings. The League adopted a slightly different policy in the face of this opposition. It was still important that Butler continue to tour because he ensured publicity - as well as notoriety. But the meetings at which the world view and faith of the supporters is reinforced takes place with other speakers at separate meetings. Thus, in 1981, Thompson, Gostick and Lee all toured in addition to Butler. These tours were relatively low key and involved small meetings with League supporters. And the League used other means for the discussion of in-group matters. From the mid-1970s on, Social Dynamics Courses or Anti-Subversion Schools were one such means. They allow the development of skills in a non-critical

environment, especially skills in pressuring groups and individuals. These are settings which rely on intensive work by the participants. An Anti-Subversion School in Christchurch in 1982 involved 30 League members in a 7 hour course. In fact the bulk of the League's activities are conducted within the confines of the group. This allows the relatively free expression of ideas in private, and when the League does expose its views in a public forum, usually some care is taken in deciding how this should take place and what benefits will result.

All these activities require financing, and an important part of the League's operations is devoted to ensuring some regular income. Finance tends to come from two obvious sources. The sale of books and published material provides an income while the second source involves donations. Typically, the League has a target for the latter (\$10,000 in 1979/80, \$12,000 in 1980/81, \$10,000 in 1981/82) and supporters are constantly reminded through On Target of the amount set and the amount reached as donations come in. This annual appeal is said to pay for the National Director's salary and to subsidise the bookshop and library. But in 1980, the public campaign of the League required a considerable amount of money. The advertisements in the newspapers cost \$4932.50. The League claimed that these advertisements attracted large donations '...amounting to about \$20,000' (Evening Post, 30/3/81). Thompson has said that book sales, national appeals and collections at meetings make up the difference between the money collected from the yearly basic fund and this expenditure. But one estimate put the League's expenditure at \$50,000 per year (Herald, 23/1/81), and even allowing for substantial income from these additional sources, there still seems to be a gap. There are few clues as to where else money could come from although there are occasional indications of help.

*We wish to make this a very special occasion so, through the kindness of Sir Henry Kelliher, a Conference Room of the Royal International Hotel... has been reserved for us [League of Rights]... (Pointing Right, 14, 1976).*

### Ideology and the New Zealand League of Rights

For the casual reader, the use of 'race' as probably the central concept in the League's ideology is not immediately apparent from its

publications. The bulk of On Target, for instance, will deal with economic and social matters of the moment with perhaps some suggestions concerning reading. The comments are seemingly innocuous and defy any immediate classification as radical or racist. The point is that the expression of their argument is codified by taking words that have a common meaning and giving them a different ideological sense. The second level of meaning which is shared by the League's supporters employs certain cue words, and the juxtaposition of these reduces the possibility of alternative explanations. The ideology of the League of Rights can be understood once it is accepted that 'race' constitutes one of the key concepts. It has extensive explanatory power and a series of arguments or ideological positions develop from this central concept.

The League's conception of 'race' derives from a number of nineteenth and twentieth century sources but its direct lineage can be traced through Major C.H. Douglas and Eric Butler. The work of Douglas offers the high text of the League's ideology and is treated as an interpretation of the social world of almost religious standing. The low text, or interpretative material is provided by Butler who expands upon the original Douglasite arguments and incorporates recent material into the world view. This interpretative function is carried a stage further by local writers such as Thompson or Daly who apply Butler's material to the New Zealand situation.

The League's view on 'race' develops from certain central themes. The essential assumption is that 'races' are not equal. They have consistently asserted that racial equality is a myth.

*One of the most dangerous of the many dangerous myths in the world today is that "all races are equal" (Australian On Target, 14/7/72).*

The League employs any supportive scientific literature and uses examples freely to prove its point. They develop this argument to show that there is a 'natural preference' for one's own 'race' and that the mixing of 'races' inevitably produces conflict.

*[It is the]... "Natural way" to prefer [one's] own race... a biologically serviceable myth designed by nature to secure group unity and cohesion and to nourish a culture which will give the individuals concerned a spiritual home (British On Target, 23/9/78).*

Thus a group that does not discriminate in favour of itself and 'of its own traditions and culture, is engaged in committing suicide' (Australian On Target, 4/6/76). Racism is therefore something natural and positive.

*A "racist" is a person who observes that not only are there basic differences between individuals, but even greater basic differences between races. The materialistic levellers, including the Marxists, insist that all human beings are basically the same... (Australian On Target, 22/12/72).*

And:

*On the subject of what is loosely termed 'racism', we accept the reality of the diverse characteristics and attributes of races... We believe that every nation has the natural right to preserve its own characteristics (Thompson in Stratford, 1980:12).*

If 'races' do come into contact, then conflict is inevitable. Butler has argued that 'race relations' have 'deteriorated rapidly' with the arrival of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand (Australian On Target, 5/11/76) and that this produces friction that will develop into a violent explosion if 'races' 'are forced against each other' (Australian On Target, 5/10/73). They endorse this view by using the imagery of contamination and of invasion. For example, Pacific Islanders have been said to be responsible for an increase in hookworm, leprosy and TB in New Zealand (Australian On Target, 22/3/74).

Apart from the association of 'race' with nation and the beliefs concerning equality and contact, 'race' is also believed to be the source of the creative and material achievements of a group. Civilisation is a direct reflection of racial characteristics and therefore New Zealand has achieved what it has because it was 'explored and developed by people of predominantly British stock - English, Scots,

Irish and Welsh' (Australian On Target, 24/12/70). Matters of government, of values, law and language are all related to 'race' and there are obvious benefits for those of 'British stock' to have access to this racial heritage. And it is this 'British stock' which is defined as being a 'race' (although usage is often vague and relies on shared assumptions). In emphasising its own racial mythology, the League seeks to invalidate other claims to political rights. The use of Aotearoa to refer to New Zealand has been said to be part of a 'Marxist-Revolutionary' plan and:

*The term is a denial of true history, because it attempts to portray the pre-European New Zealand population as a single united group, which of course it is not (On Target, 29/10/84).*

Establishing the 'racial pedigree' of the British is critical to the League's interests as is the denial of claims concerning 'competing' racial groups.

Black Africa is used as a contrast on these points. A survey of On Targets for a three month period shows that between 20 and 25% of each issue was given over to articles on Africa or Africa was used in the discussion to make some point. The League's position is quite unambiguous: stories of torture and death are used to characterise the civilisation of Black Africa, with its 'tribal' politics and lack of civilisation per se, while South Africa indicates the civilising influence of white rule. Ironically, a recurrent theme is the lack of freedom and democracy in Black Africa which contrasts with the League's cynicism about democratic institutions and its support for the South African right to practise apartheid. But the League also views separate development as one effective means of preserving 'race' and nation.

*Jewish leaders are much more realistic about this question of separate development than most. They make it quite clear that indiscriminate integration is the major threat to the preservation of the Jewish identity....The European in South Africa holds the same view realising that separate development is the only way in which he can preserve his identity and culture (Australian On Target, 22/3/74).*

The League is fully aware of the literature and feelings of its opponents but tends to view the advocacy of racial equality as part of a communist conspiracy. One of the major addresses at the Crown Commonwealth League Conference in Auckland (1981) was concerned with the 'manipulation of racial minorities to promote revolution, and eventually Soviet control, of free countries like Australia and New Zealand' (Christchurch Press, 2/11/82). And the Springbok rugby tour opponents were described as revolutionaries in training undertaking what Trotsky called dry runs or invisible manoeuvres. But the League has also modified its arguments in light of recent developments, and has specifically used liberal notions and logic concerning collective justice to support its own position. In recent decades, it has been acceptable to defend the cultural practices and traditions of minority ethnic groups on the grounds that this autonomy and self-determination is a critical part of social justice. The League now employs similar arguments to justify white separatism and autonomy and to argue the case for those institutions and practices that are held to represent 'white' interests. The preservation of the dominance of these institutions and practices in New Zealand is considered essential to the maintenance of 'white' (or Anglo-Saxon, or British) civilisation.

The League's explicit advocacy of various racist arguments has meant that they have accepted the label of racist although they reject any notion that they are fascist (Letter, Listener, 24/11/79). Their commitment to doctrines of racial division and biological determinism is undoubted and they seek an ideal world order of separate racial structures either within nations or preferably between nations. But there are various lacunae. They have difficulty establishing a racial pedigree for New Zealand and of finding a suitable label to identify what they regard as being the local 'white race'. There is also very little material to indicate what they would like to see done about Maori and Pacific Island communities. There are frequent attacks on those agencies such as the National Council of Churches or the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator who are seen as promoting racial equality, but conversely there are few examples of the institutional

arrangements that the League would put into place given the chance.<sup>3</sup> They support the South African system of apartheid with some qualifications but it is not clear that they would like to see the adoption of a similar approach in New Zealand.

### Anti-Semitism and the League of Rights

The League has consistently included in its analysis of events comment on the role of Jews. This derives historically from the writings of Douglas and of Butler (for a discussion of Douglas's anti-Semitism, see Buchman, 1983, Chapter 5). Butler expanded on Douglas's arguments, most notably in a book published in 1946, The International Jew. The book attributes most of the world's major conflicts and problems to the machinations of Jews (see Spoonley, 1981). Butler is often reminded of the virulence of the views expressed in the book and his normal response is to say that they do not represent the views of the League of Rights. But the arguments can still be identified in the contemporary material available from the New Zealand League of Rights. As Thompson commented in 1979:

*...although the 'Protocols' were said to be a forgery Mr Butler had looked at the points made in them and set out to show how they had predicted 'with uncanny accuracy' the actual course of events. Mr Thompson alleged this included Zionist control of the news media and international finance... 'there's an international Zionist conspiracy, hand in hand with other international financial organisations' (Christchurch Press, 19/11/79).*

The fundamental analysis offered by Douglas and Butler has been retained while the expression of it has been updated. Lexical substitution softens the message for public consumption while the meaning is the

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3. These 'oversights' might well be deliberate as the disclosure of policies of 'separate development' or its equivalent for the New Zealand setting would be politically damaging. The political and institutional products of the League's ideological position might profitably be left vague.

same for those who understand the system of signs. 'Jew' is often replaced by 'International Finance', 'Zionist' or 'financial orthodoxy' (depending on the context in the last case), while other 'conspirators' are identified as 'One Worlders', 'Internationalists', 'Integrationist' or 'Aliens'. In this way, the League hopes to avoid the political liability that comes with being identified as anti-Semitic. In fact, they would deny that they are anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish.

*The League of Rights has never expressed any view which could accurately be described as anti-Jewish, and we have always maintained that the rank-and-file Jews have been more exploited for propaganda and subversive purposes than non-Jews. The League is opposed to Zionism for the same reason it opposes Communism - it is totalitarian (On Target, 5/12/83).*

The arguments that initially came from Douglas concerned the financial control that the Jews were said to exert internationally and locally, and through this domination, a concern to institute a new world order.

*The essence of the 'Jewish problem' is the 'Chosen Race' claim undergirded by a collectivist philosophy which elevates the group over the individual. As Douglas said in Social Credit, the first requirement for resolving the problem is to break up the dominance of the group. This requires financial and economic policies which effectively decentralise power.... Jewish opposition to Social Credit is as Eric D. Butler shows in his Releasing Reality, a logical result of the Judaic philosophy (New Times, March 1981).*

Originally, and in line with interpretations of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, Jews were said to exercise this financial control independent of other groups. But as the twentieth century has advanced the League, along with other groups in this tradition, has incorporated new elements and arguments. One is the notion that there is collusion between Jew and communist. Anti-communist sentiments have a currency that has been denied anti-Semitism since the 'recoil effect of the Holocaust' (Hobsbawm, 1980). Thus evidence is sought of Jewish

support for communism and vice versa. On Target (5/12/83) summarises some of the key arguments. It is claimed that the early communists were Jewish (the reference is to D. Fahey's book, The Rulers of Russia, 1938); that there is a relationship between communism and Zionism and that both are backed by the same group (D. Reed's book, The Controversy of Zion is recommended); and that the Soviet Union was the most vocal group supporting the establishment of the State of Israel. The focus on Jewish nationalist sentiments, in particular Zionism, has also marked more recent expressions of the anti-Semitic arguments of the League. Israel has provided the League with an example of the 'power of Jews to obtain what they want', in this case a homeland, and has also allowed them a lexical sidestep. The preferred description of Jews is now Zionist as it avoids the criticism that the League is anti-Jewish per se. Indeed, the League uses books such as Koestler's The Thirteenth Tribe to argue that there is no such thing as a Semitic 'race' because Jews are in fact descended from Khazars. It is thereby impossible to be racist against a group that is not a 'race' (see On Target, 5/12/83). They also complain that Zionism (and the 'race question') are no-go areas in public debate and this 'illustrates' the influence of mass conditioning (see British On Target, 23/9/78). One 'example' of this conditioning and of the power to remove issues from public debate is the view that the Holocaust is a post-war myth that is designed to encourage sympathy for Jewish concerns, and specifically for the State of Israel. The material for this argument comes from contemporary campaigns conducted in the USA (Institute for Historical Research) or Europe (National Front, Verral, Irving). League supporters recommend such books as Harwood's (a pseudonym for Verral of the British National Front) Did Six Million Really Die?

*We rate Harwood's book on the Six Million as interesting but recommend Dr Butz's work, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century as the most valuable yet produced. The subject of the Six Million is not merely an academic one, it relates to the question of international power politics and the role of propaganda (Thompson, Listener, 19/4/80).*

As W.A. Ross (Listener, 5/4/80) commented, these books are 'well-researched and documented refutations of such an extermination programme'.

The following quotation brings together many of the elements contained in the League's beliefs about Jews and their power and purpose.

*...the Zionists have expanded, multiplied and sublimated and projected their wartime dead as a weapon of psycho-political warfare never before experienced in history... [This has produced] feelings of guilt and responsibility, for what was done, or supposed to have been done, to the Jews... This conditioning of the minds of millions has been made to serve two apparently contradictory purposes: to advance a chauvinist Zionist nationalism by shielding it from examination and criticism and simultaneously to advance one world ambitions which require the obliteration of every manifestation of genuine national sovereignty except only one, of course, the Zionist! (British On Target, 23/9/78).*

The destruction of this national sovereignty is possible with the destruction of racial purity and strength; 'deracialising' as the League describes it. This is done in various ways, including the advocacy of multiculturalism, which the League believes can not work, and by undermining the major institutions and traditions of racial groups. Jews are said to be helped in this by various organisations that are either Jewish or communist controlled. These include: the United Nations, the World Council of Churches, the Illuminati, the Bilderbergers and the Trilateral Commission. For most people, many of these groups have little political significance but for the League of Rights, and other radical right-wing groups, they indicate the obvious advance of a new world order, or the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Butler has even commented that the National Government in New Zealand was committed in the late 1970s to the 'new international order in line with "Zionist" aims'. Behind this conspiracy were '2000 years of experience to back the assertion that a group of people had got together to formulate such policies' (Christchurch Press, 21/11/79).

### Conspiracy and the League of Rights

The concern of the League with Jews and communists also encapsulates the reliance on a conspiracy theory. Buchman (1983, Chapter 4) argues

that it is a conspiratorial conception of politics and history that distinguishes the League of Rights from other political parties and pressure groups in New Zealand. The nature of this conspiracy has already been referred to in many of the quotations and comments made above and it is certainly a critical feature of the League's world view, although there are other aspects, including an explicit anti-Semitism, that mark it as being different from other political organisations. The conspiracy is held to involve Jews, communists and fellow-travellers. It is always a matter of concern to the League that many otherwise well-intentioned people are helping these conspirators. And they see evidence of this conspiracy in quite disparate phenomena.

*Anyone who helps further the idea that the world is threatened with a revival of Nazism, is consciously or unconsciously, serving the cause of International Communism. The philosophy of the National Socialists in Germany was very similar to that of the Communists... (Intelligence Survey, January 1960).*

The many books and pamphlets either published or promoted by the League of Rights attest to the importance they place on the conspiracy and indicate its nature (see Appendix 8). The evidence is to be found in the opposition to apartheid, which the League sees as benefitting communists and certain Jews (see 8 O'Clock, 7/4/81), the activities of organisations such as the United Nations, the World Council of Churches or the World Bank (see Thompson, Media Times, August 1981), the anti-national nature of capitalism (Intelligence Survey, March 1981) or the activities of a group like the Parliamentarians for World Order (see Herald, 23/1/82; 23/5/83). The 'undermining of the family' provides direct evidence of the actions of the conspiracy.

The League sees, along with groups such as Credo and Concerned Parents Association, attacks on 'the family' as an important strategy in the subversion of Christian values and the advocacy of 'one-worldism'. The education system and the media are two critical institutions in this process. An article by Mrs B. Faithfull (of Credo), published by the League of Rights (see New Zealand's Sex Education Scandal. The Facts, n.d.), sums up the argument:

*...this plan for social change involves the imposing upon the people of the West an alien belief system, and without their knowledge and consent. [They are]...won over to the man-centred [sic], atheistic, anti-authority philosophy of Secular Humanism.*

She then goes on to discuss the way in which 'neo-Marxists' in Germany are using sexuality to destroy the 'moral order of Germans'.

*Many believe that we are victims of a secret totalitarian world wide conspiracy to destabilize nations of the West and overthrow Western democracy...*

Elsewhere, the League (Thompson, Personal Interview, 30/7/81) has identified Fabian socialism as the group responsible for sex education and an identifying characteristic is the 'reluctance' to admit to a supernatural being. Similarly on issues such as taxation or South Africa, parallel motives and machinations are seen. Butler has argued that taxation is one of the greatest 'weapons used by this "conspiracy" [i.e. the Zionist conspiracy] to achieve its aims...' (Christchurch Press, 21/11/79). Equally, South Africa and formerly Rhodesia were seen as important bastions against the communist advance. The League has maintained links with groups in South Africa (Butler made thirteen trips between 1963 and 1981) and the Crown Commonwealth League Conference (Auckland, 1981) agreed to encourage the establishment of South Africa Friendship organisations to support the continuation of white government in the face of African 'savagery and communist ambitions'. Thus the League constructs an interpretation of world history that can place most activities and events in a systematic analysis and behind these developments are certain groups. Everything can be related to this analysis, as Butler has commented (Interview with Radio New Zealand, not broadcast, March 1981):

*...either what is happening in the world is a result of sheer chance, in other words what I call the village idiot theory of history so that means no one is responsible for anything, or some individuals are trying to consciously make history.*

Butler, and the League, are firmly of the latter opinion. And for these reasons, they adopt very specific political positions on a range of social and economic issues.

These positions include opposition to compulsory unionism (Central Leader, 2/5/78), a commitment to 'free-enterprise' principles and opposition to the activities of the state and of big business. It also includes a cynicism about democracy and about the central institutions of the modern democratic state. Butler, for instance, has consistently raised questions about the efficacy of democracy, and has argued that at its worst, democracy leads to the 'anti-Christian policy of collectivism and centralisation' (Butler in Levesque, n.d.:5). A major threat is seen as coming from the fact that 'so-called political parties have continued to move further and further towards the socialists' (Radio New Zealand interview with Butler, 1981, not broadcast).

*Wisdom never has - except in small decentralised groups - resided in majorities. The egalitarian cry of "one man, one vote" will never produce sane government... (Intelligence Survey, June-July 1966).*

Richards and Edwards (1972:105) argue that the League was constrained by this view of politics because involvement in the democratic electoral process contradicted its philosophy.

*The conspiratorial world-view which infects much of the League's ideology extends to the party system of government, which it disdains, and the parliamentary system, which it distrusts (Richards and Edwards, 1972:105).*

Butler's preferred system is a society ruled by an aristocracy of 'experts and officials' (Stratford, 1980:21) while Thompson has stated a preference for the constitutional monarchy that characterised Britain over 100 years ago, and he argues that non-party politics existed perfectly well for 500-600 years (Personal Interview, 30/7/81). In practical terms, the League has attempted to alter the nature of politics in New Zealand and Australia for some time, and the strategy has revolved around altering the party basis of politics. The suggested

system would be run on the understanding that members of parliament would be guided by loyalty to the wishes of their electorate. This assumes that people will be united on basic issues, for example taxation, rather than split on party lines (Thompson, Personal Interview, 30/7/81). The League sees itself as a critical factor in ensuring that this change comes about, and they are helped by groups such as the Voters Association and TRIM, both of whom have conducted campaigns on a similar platform, the Voters Association in 1981, and TRIM in two expensive and far-reaching campaigns in 1981 and 1984 (see the previous chapter). The League perceives itself as articulating the concerns of 'the people' and as representing the 'small person' against the major power blocs in society. They are 'independent', motivated by the highest possible interests, and they seek to restore decency and participation in politics.

*...we [League of Rights] are free to take the best and worst of all political parties and hold them up to public view, as well as introducing new elements that you are going to see a lot more of in the future like exposing international power movements....We are rather unique in the sense that our power base is not the popular vote and therefore we are our own masters (Thompson, Personal Interview, 30/7/81).*

The League goes on to state that it can not be 'bought or intimidated', that reality is not a 'matter of opinion to be decided by counting heads', or that the League seeks power or popularity (Australian on Target, 24/12/70). If opposition does occur then it is likely to be a 'Communist-inspired ploy' to discredit them (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81) and it is further evidence of the effectiveness of the League's campaign (Australian On Target, 3/3/72).

#### Eric Butler: A Profile

Butler has been critical to both the establishment and continued activities of the League of Rights in New Zealand. He is the mentor of New Zealand League activists and the single most important propagandist in the continuing reinterpretation of League ideology. Plus his

repeated tours to New Zealand and the circulation of his analyses of local events to supporters warrant the inclusion of his profile.

Butler first became involved in the Australian Social Credit movement when he was 21. In the 1930s, he was a speaker and a writer (under the name John Clifford) for New Times (see, for example, New Times, 26/6/42). By the late 1930s, he was a major speaker and travelling extensively to carry the Social Credit message throughout Victoria and other parts of Australia. After the Second World War, and an enquiry into his propaganda role during the War, Butler was instrumental in forming the League. In addition, he continued his association with New Times as a director. In the early 1950s, he took a more direct role in Australian politics. He stood for Deakin in the 1951 Federal election and received 2400 votes out of a total of 48,500. For most of the 1950s, the League gathered support, but this began to change as the decade proceeded especially as opposition mounted to the League's ideology and political involvement. The first major attack against Butler came in 1959 (Nation, 26/9/59) in an article titled 'The Secret Life of Eric Butler'. It explicitly identified him as anti-Semitic, although the article itself was factually wrong on a number of matters. (For example, The International Jew was said to have been published in 1955, whereas it was probably published in either 1946 or 1947). One effect was a falling away of support as a result of such critical comment. New Times lost 351 Pounds on its operations in 1956-57, and only made a profit of 91 Pounds in 1957-58 because of donations amounting to 286 Pounds. Butler was able to mount a counter-attack, especially as he had support in the media. For instance, an invitation to appear on a television talk show (see Australian, 6/8/65) allowed him to defend his views and actions without critical questioning.

During the 1960s, Butler worked to establish the League in New Zealand, as well as in Canada and Britain. He travelled extensively and journeyed to New Zealand almost yearly during the decade. The other issue that occupied him was ensuring support for white rule in southern Africa. The Die Vaderland (27/6/64) described Butler as 'one of the Republic's [of South Africa] greatest champions overseas'.

When the Rand Daily Mail (4/7/64) described Butler as having little impact in Australia (the story was titled 'Anti-Jew Aussie is Small Beer'), the Afrikaner press immediately rallied to his defence. Dagbreek en Sondagnuus (5/7/64) said the charges were 'communist-inspired' while the Sunday Express (5/7/64) gave him space to answer the charges (Butler suggested they were 'communist smear' tactics). In the late 1960s, Butler arranged for a petrol tanker of oil to be given to the white Rhodesian Government of Ian Smith in contravention of the United Nations ban. It was presented on 'behalf' of the people of Australia and New Zealand. He toured New Zealand in 1967 and 1968 promoting white rule in Rhodesia and talked principally to schools and service clubs. He also faced opposition. A meeting in Auckland in 1968, arranged by the New Zealand-Rhodesia Society, was disturbed by protestors as Butler offered such comments as the following:

*The African idea of democracy...was  
to slit the throat of the opposition  
(Herald, 28/2/68).*

The late 1960s and early 1970s mark an intense campaign in Australia against Butler and the League of Rights. The Liberal and Country parties were concerned that the League was trying to infiltrate them, and they sought to publicly discredit the League. This reaction did not influence the response Butler met when he came to New Zealand on his still frequent trips. He had ready access to National Party Members of Parliament, and even to the Prime Minister. He tended to receive uncritical media coverage, and the Herald (26/11/74) gave him extensive space and described him as an 'Australian economics lecturer and author'. This began to alter by the late 1970s and his tours to New Zealand in the 1980s were marked by major protests. When he toured in 1982, he often had as many protestors as supporters listening to him.

#### E. Butler's 1982 Tour of New Zealand

Dunedin	70 people attended, 60 ejected
Blenheim	15 people, no protestors
Auckland	100 people attended: 50 protestors, 30 people left
Masterton	55 people: 30 League supporters, 3 people removed
Lower Hutt	35 supporters, 35 opponents, hall cleared and 20 allowed to return
Christchurch	130 people: 7 escorted from meeting, 30 protestors outside

A great deal of the interest in Butler stems from his consistent advocacy of anti-Semitic arguments. Butler wrote The International Jew in 1945, and it was probably published in 1946. The book argues that Jews controlled the Russian royal family via Rasputin (p.105), they are said to have organised the Russian Revolution in 1917 and to have controlled the Nazi movement in Germany (pp.86-87), that Hitler was the bastard son of a Rothschild (p.88), that Jews controlled the Luftwaffe (p.89), that they had founded the Jesuit order and that Christ was not a Jew. The suggested solution to the 'Jewish problem' according to Butler was to send Jews to Madagascar. He is still consistently asked about The International Jew and whether he accepts the arguments set out there. Usually, he turns the questions aside although on occasions he has conceded an ongoing commitment.

*The views expressed in the book at the time were my views....The views basically are still my views (Sun, 7/10/66).*

The book was still being sold in Australia in the late 1960s but copies are now difficult to obtain although the League has considered republishing it (see Campbell, 1979). When it first appeared, New Times gave it extensive publicity under the title 'Is there a Jewish menace?' (New Times, 12/11/48). It goes on to say 'Mr Butler takes extract after extract from [The Protocols] and compares with actual events. The result is frightening'. The defence of the book continues (see Intelligence Survey, April 1972), although the arguments have been updated and altered in other publications (see, for instance, Butler's Social Credit and the Kingdom of God, 1979).

Butler's contemporary anti-Semitism is focussed on particular themes. They still rely on certain traditional images of Jews. Jews are seen as opposed to Christianity in an extension of the image of Jews as Christ-killers. At the Crown Commonwealth League Conference in Auckland, Butler referred to Shakespeare's Shylock taking the pound of flesh to undermine the Christian basis of society. He sees a fundamental conflict between Judaism and Christianity. On Newsmakers (15/3/81), Butler said:

*...I would say I am anti-Judaic.  
As a Christian, I reject the philosophy  
of Judaism.*

And:

*Ever since their active participation in the crucifixion of Christ, Jewish leaders have worked ceaselessly to undermine and destroy the Christian faith. They have always believed and still believe...that the Jewish leaders are destined to rule the world (Butler, quoted in Richards, 1972).*

Thus he argues that the present 'crisis for Christianity' is the result of a persistent campaign to subvert Christianity (New Times, July 1983), and he dismisses Ayn Rand, an important theorist for other radical right-wing groups in New Zealand, because she is a 'Russian/Jew' who criticises Christianity (Nation Review, 17/10/75).

His second concern is with establishment of the State of Israel and the political philosophy of Zionism, and as a corollary, what is referred to as the 'myth of the Holocaust'. Sympathy for Zionism has been engineered by 'revelations' about the Holocaust (see the article 'Political Zionism and the Gas Chamber Hoax', New Times, June 1983).

*What is denied is that there was a deliberate German policy of systematic extermination of Jews (New Times, June 1983).*

Instead, Butler argues that Zionists collaborated with 'Hitler's Germany' in a campaign to drive the British out of Palestine. A third theme is the opposition of Jews to political movements such as Social Credit. Despite protestations that he is really anti-Zionist, Butler explicitly identifies Jews in a generic sense as the opposition.

*From the beginning of the Social Credit revelation...Jewish influence everywhere was organised against Social Credit (New Times, July 1983).*

Although he does still 'soften' the message on occasions.

*I have got the greatest sympathy for the rank and file of the Jewish people. I think they have been...the most manipulated group and in the main by their own leaders (Newsmakers, 15/3/81).*

And the final and enduring message is the Jewish role in the conspiracy. Jew, Zionist and communist are linked in a conspiracy that seeks to

ensure financial and political control. Butler first surfaced these ideas in New Times in the 1930s, and they received an extended treatment in The International Jew. They continue to be argued in various forums and in various ways. (See the following articles for Butler's anti-Semitic material: New Times, 14/4/38, 'Will Youth Submit to War?'; New Times, 8/12/39 to 5/1/40, 'International Finance and Its Fight for World Dominion'; New Times, 14/12/56, 'The Last Days of the British Empire. Zionist-Communist Plot Nears Fruition'; New Times, June and July 1983, 'Who Lifted Hitler into the Saddle?'; and Social Credit and the Kingdom of God, 1979). The following quotation encapsulates many of the central arguments.

*The Second World War achieved a number of objectives by those international groups whose policies made the war inevitable, including the eventual liquidation of the British Empire, the expansion of the Empire of International Communism, the establishment in the Middle East of the Zionist State of Israel, and the establishment of the foundations for the eventual creation of a World State (New Times, June 1983).*

Finally, Butler's arguments are normally expressed in a style which conveys his concern with an imminent apocalypse. The above quotation indicates the scope of what he considers to be a conspiracy and the use of capital letters identifies the major threats. He seeks to defend the 'Christian/British world' against these groups. In an article he wrote for the British On Target (18/8/73) 'How has the present plight of a world of increasing convulsions and crises come about?', he begins by arguing that history does not consist of unconnected events but is the effect of specific policies. These include an attempt to 'liquidate' the British Empire and Commonwealth and to undermine Christianity and civilisation. Thus most major events and conflicts can be attributed to the activities of the groups who comprise the conspiracy, and the major obstacle to this new world order is the presence of the 'British world'. Only immediate and substantial action can preserve what is left. The tone of the analysis is urgent and fearful, and the intent is obviously to encourage concerted opposition. It is this tone and stance that has set the standard for local analysis, and Butler's world view and interpretations

of current political events guide the New Zealand League of Rights for as long as he continues to write and tour.

Joy Clapham: A Profile<sup>4</sup>

Joy Clapham came to New Zealand from South Africa in 1966 and settled in Dunedin. She is one of the few females active in the predominantly male leadership of extreme right-wing groups. Clapham is an example of the political generation that was mobilised in the 1970s to contest dominance in the ideological terrain on matters of gender relations, sexuality and biological reproduction in opposition to the liberalism of the new petty-bourgeoisie. Her initial involvement came in response to the publication of the Little Red School Book, and her particular concerns were pornography and abortion. Her reactionary views were expanded and confirmed by exposure to the interpellations of the old petty-bourgeoisie dating from the 1930s. A speaker from Denmark mentioned None Dare Call It Conspiracy, and after reading it, she took a greater interest in the arguments of C.H. Douglas. These and the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion had a major impact. The Protocols reinforced the Douglasite arguments concerning financial control and the direction of world events.

*...I could see the outlines of the plan  
and it clicked and it made some sense  
of course as far as Social Credit is  
concerned with the subject of bankers...  
(J. Clapham, Personal Interview, 9/3/81).*

Sometime in this period, between 1972 and 1974, Clapham joined the League of Rights. But her membership of the League is pre-dated by involvement with Social Credit. She joined Social Credit in 1967 and stood in Dunedin North (1972) and St. Kilda (1975, 1978). In 1978, she received 2440 votes (Labour received 9328, National 6406). She aroused interest and controversy when she accepted a paid advertisement from the League of Rights for a Social Credit publication she was editing. And her membership of the League was mentioned in her election publicity for the 1978 election. The Social Credit leadership eventually moved to exclude her from the Party, and her membership

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4. A lot of the following material comes from a personal interview completed in 1981 and subsequent correspondence.

was declared annulled under clause 11c of Social Credit's constitution on the grounds that her membership of the League of Rights represented support for an alternative political party.

Politically, she has been involved in a variety of groups. She has stood twice for the Dunedin City Council, once as an independent, the second time for Rates Reform. In the latter case, she tried to institute the League of Rights' strategy of getting city councillors to respond to 10 questions but she failed to gain support. She is involved in groups concerned with fluoridation and moral standards and has been a delegate for the Society for the Promotion of Community Standards. Clapham took part in a Social Dynamics course run by the League of Rights in July 1980, and in response to the suggested strategy of concentrating on one topic, she has focussed on finance.

*Basically what I do is write letters to the press as often as I can find time.... The more you become involved or you come before the public the more I feel that you have got to prepare to stand up and be counted. So I dropped using nom-de-plumes [long ago]...when the Communists finally take over I know exactly what my fate is going to be...since 1972 I have been writing letters to the Pope, I've written to Truth, I've written to the Listener, to our local papers, Christchurch papers, Wellington papers...(Joy Clapham, Personal Interview, 19/3/81).*

In relation to the League of Rights, she has been an organiser for League meetings and a contact person for Dunedin. She has avoided a high profile as there is little more to do than to arrange a couple of public meetings yearly, and these might involve her in a 'week or two weeks' work'. The League operates in Dunedin on an informal basis and mostly consists of relatively elderly people. Contact is usually by word of mouth and involves meetings and the distribution of literature. She is committed to the League and its views and now feels that Social Credit have altered the original Douglasite philosophies to such an extent they have 'no right to use the term Social Credit anymore' (Joy Clapham, Personal Interview, 19/3/81).

Another major influence has been religious. Her background was with the Presbyterian Church but after the arrival of her children,

she decided to return to church but was 'sick and tired of...pink parsons'. She firstly went to the Baptist Church and then to the Reform Church. In 1979, after her confrontation with Social Credit, she allowed a daughter to become a Mormon and this produced conflict with the Reform Church. She also began to question her religious beliefs, and her new interest led her to read The Controversy of Zion which substantially affected her subsequent religious views. She now no longer believes that Jesus was crucified for example. She combines these views with a commitment to British Israelite views (e.g. the idea of a chosen 'race'), although she also has major points of difference with them (she believes in reincarnation, they do not). Thus her religious beliefs are a mixture of fundamentalist and British Israelite views without being totally committed to any specific position. And she combines these with certain political analyses. The authors and books that have been most influential are those that either combine political beliefs with the defence of Christianity (e.g. Douglas, The Controversy of Zion, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion) or those that have a religious fervour in their advocacy of political and economic beliefs (e.g. Ayn Rand).

She identifies with the major ideological views of League orthodoxy. In particular, she accepts the absolute importance of 'race'. Every 'race', she argues, should have the right to maintain a separate existence that indicates their pride in their own 'race'. Hence, intermarriage between 'races' simply 'produces' many problems. The basis for this faith in separatism is confirmed for her in what she sees as the 'reluctance' of Maori people to live near her, and similarly, in her reluctance to live in proximity to them. She also supports the notion of a separatist educational system.

*You have got to learn to be selfish in such a way that you don't injure other people... I get very annoyed with people when they call me racist because I am the one who wants to preserve other people's cultures, they want to destroy them... (Joy Clapham, Personal Interview, 19/3/81).*

She accepts the view that the influence of communism is being extended and that Jews are a critical factor in world and local events. She describes New Zealand as '...about 90% under Communist control...The

actual mechanisms for a Communist takeover are already there' (Joy Clapham, Personal Interview, 19/3/81). She argues that 'the Communists and Zionists are the same people' and that the intent is to control the world. This is seen in the 'anti-Christian trends', in the fact that the United Nations is 'communist' in its support for certain causes and in the way that South Africa and Taiwan are excluded. She also interprets parts of the Bible (cf. Deuteronomy) as an indication of the 'right of Jews' to kill off those that do not 'worship the one true God'. This is reinforced by the belief that Jesus was not Jewish but a Gallilean or a Nazarene. These beliefs are well-documented in the many letters she has written (see for example, the Listener, 24/5/80; 21/6/80; 16/8/80; 27/9/80). She believes that Jews receive favoured treatment primarily because they control the media.

*...why does the newspaper run for cover if you want to say anything rude about a Jew?....Why is he whiter than white because he is a Jew...?*  
(Joy Clapham, Personal Interview, 19/3/81).

As a corollary, she does not accept that there were six million Jews in Europe that could be killed during the Second World War or that the German government could have killed that many. Her solution is to not allow 'persons who profess Judaism' to hold power in Parliament or as advisors 'in greater proportion than the percentage of the total Jewish population that they represent', to free the economic system from 'international control', not to allow religious groups to 'conspire to destroy other religious groups' and to adopt a selective immigration policy. She has also argued (Truth, 13/11/79) that the Israelites, that is, the 'caucasian races, particularly those that come from the United Kingdom' should not intermarry with other 'races'.

#### W.A. Ross: A Profile

Ross was born in 1898, educated in Glasgow and died in Auckland in 1984. He was a builder. His early political commitment in New Zealand was to Social Credit and he was a founding member of both

the New Zealand Social Credit Association and the New Zealand Social Credit Political League. He stood as a candidate for Social Credit seven times between 1954 and 1972 in the Ponsonby and Grey Lynn seats. In 1972, he was involved in the struggle between the 'purists' and the 'pragmatists' inside Social Credit. Beetham identifies him as a purist, that is, someone committed to the original Douglasite philosophies. In 1972, he was Vice-President of the Party and chairperson of the Technical Committee. In the end, Beetham and the pragmatists won out and Ross lost his central position inside Social Credit. But during the 1970s, he also became publicly identified with the League of Rights. Press releases on the unions (Herald, 1/10/79) and a dispute at Kawerau (Central Leader, 2/5/78) describe him as secretary of the League of Rights. A statement inviting MPs to declare their attitudes to the interim government in Zimbabwe gives him the title of honorary secretary and a press release from the League concerning sanctions against the Soviet Union indicated that he was 'acting secretary' (Herald, 26/5/80; Auckland Star, 10/6/80).

But there was an attempt to maintain Ross's legitimacy by distancing him from the League. The National Secretary of the League of Rights said that Ross was never a member of the League and while he organised an Auckland branch 'this was something not possible under League rules' (Herald, 1/2/82). In a letter (25/1/82), the National Secretary stated that Ross '...is not, and has never been, an executive member of the League of Rights...though he is a supporter...it is of concern to him that it [membership of the League of Rights] may prejudice his membership of Social Credit'. In fact, his frequent public comments have paralleled the views of the League and he has been publicly identified with them. He has been critical of black African states (Listener, 22/9/79), he has defended the League (Listener, 2/2/80) and he has questioned whether the Nazis sought to exterminate Jews (Listener, 5/4/80), as well as having been involved in the publicity of various national campaigns conducted by the League. He was a frequent letter writer under the pseudonym 'Fair Comment' and was accorded an obituary in On Target (1/10/84). He was also, along with Thompson, a founding member of the Tax Revolt Association of New Zealand and a member of the Save New Zealand Committee (an

anti-communist group sponsored by the Moonist Unification Church). Thus Ross was central to League activities and was part of the network that extended the League's influence. He was characteristically (as was Clapham) part of the generation that was simultaneously involved in Social Credit in an important capacity and with the League of Rights. He and Clapham are typical of the transference of loyalty from Social Credit to the League. Clapham made a complete break; Ross sought to retain links with Social Credit. Ross too, was part of the early Social Credit activism in New Zealand, and he characterises the development of new representational ties between the old petty-bourgeoisie (in this case, a self-employed builder) and new political forms, that is, the League of Rights.

### Conclusion

The League of Rights represents perhaps the most explicit expression of the Jacobinist tradition amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand. Despite the fact that the organisation is not local in origin (it derives from an Australian base and its principal leader and ideologist is Australian) and that it articulates, in part, ideological views that have traditionally held little currency in New Zealand (e.g. anti-Semitism), it nevertheless plays an important role in reproducing an ideological tradition and in mobilising activism in sectors of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The key ideological concern of the League of Rights is Zinsknechtsschaft (usurious enslavement) and the key signifiers in supplying evidence for this interpretation include Jews, communists and speculative capital. In terms of the list of ideological concerns offered in the theoretical chapter, the League tends to emphasise the financial and social control of the conspiracy, and their advocacy of petty-commodity production and property ownership plays a supportive, albeit still critical, role. Their predominant interest is in the nature of the conspiracy and in material that offers evidence of its operations. The logic of this ideological position requires that attention be paid to moves that are deemed to extend or consolidate the power of speculative capital, the state or representative organisations, or the trade unions, whatever the origin of such moves.

(Conservative governments and representatives are as suspect as liberal or left-wing groups). In this sense, they seek to represent the enduring suspicions of the old petty-bourgeoisie although they are less explicit in what they would institute as an alternative to the present situation. Thus the elitism and corporate reorganisation mentioned in the theoretical chapter tend to remain as implicit assumptions in the ideological interpretations offered by the League of Rights. Only occasionally are these elements addressed directly.

The League also attempts to politicise racism by investing its own ideology, and overlapping discourses, with racist arguments. 'Race' is a central concept in identifying and explaining the 'conspiracy'. Jews as Volksschadling (enemy of 'the people') is part of this argument but they also positively seek to generate public concern and interest in the position of the British 'race'. Supporters of the League are motivated by the certainty that they have a unique historical role in preserving New Zealand as a bastion of British (and Christian) 'civilisation'. 'Race' becomes a metaphor for nation, and the good of one is indivisible from the good of the other. New Zealand is especially important as it is seen as preserving British traditions to a far greater extent than any other of the 'old' Commonwealth countries and because of this, New Zealand offers the League possibilities that do not exist elsewhere:

*...there is a fair period there where in New Zealand not very much was done as far as active work is concerned and it was not until I arrived and we started producing certain programmes, started producing newsletters and that kind of thing that we really started making an impact....I think it just demonstrates the potential there is for this kind of movement in a country like New Zealand which is quite unique really (Thompson, Personal Interview, 30/7/81).*

These predominant concerns are then reiterated and extended through the League's attention to a multiplicity of other issues. The League's involvement in these debates rounds off the interpellation and provides an opportunity for recruitment and alliances that would not otherwise be possible. Key ideological debates include the role of the clergy in social and political issues; the articulation of

fundamentalist religious views on matters of morality; advocacy of the 'sanctity' of marriage and support for the nuclear form of family; and views about the role and form that education should take. The League exhibits the traditional petty-bourgeois antagonism towards intellectuals or, more broadly, 'experts' and educational institutions become a critical site in the struggle to restore and ensure the reproduction of the political viewpoint and the standards of morality held by the League. In all these debates, the League attempts to link the organisation to 'cultural symbols already possessing high legitimacy' (Shupe and Bromley, 1980:236) and these typically include a particular form of Christianity, private property ownership and small commodity production, British 'civilisation' as a force for good and certain conceptions of morality. These values and institutions encapsulate the key ideological concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Inevitably, the League finds itself competing with Social Credit to represent these views politically while the distinction between the politics of the old and new petty-bourgeoisie are made obvious in the expression of such an interpellation.

The new petty-bourgeoisie, located as they are in the bureaucracies of the private and state sectors, diverge sharply in their political world view from the central concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie and the League of Rights. They do not share the opposition to centralisation, to the power of the state or to monopoly capitalism. Their interests are directly linked to such developments. Further, they tend to be overwhelmingly located in urban areas, more educated and with quite different career paths from the old petty-bourgeoisie. Their size and political strength are growing. Hence they exhibit few of the reactionary tendencies of the old petty-bourgeoisie, or at least they express them in a different form. Specifically, the moral enterprise that provides the impetus for the political manifestations of the old petty-bourgeoisie, such as that represented in the activities of the League of Rights, is relatively insignificant for the new petty-bourgeoisie. The anti-liberal, anti-communist/socialist and anti-monopoly positions of the old petty-bourgeoisie are not reflected to anything like the same degree in the political concerns of the new petty-bourgeoisie, nor is the style of politics the same. The apocalyptic imagery, the use of a conspiracy theory and the moral indignation are absent from the political views of the new petty-bourgeoisie (see Bourdieu, 1984).

However, the League of Rights is not the only political organisation that lays claim to a representational tie to the old petty-bourgeoisie. Social Credit has historically been an important manifestation of petty-bourgeois concerns. The leadership battle in Social Credit in the early 1970s has been of critical importance to the League of Rights because it heralded a relatively liberal leadership that sought to establish representational ties with fractions other than the old petty-bourgeoisie. The League of Rights was provided with an opportunity to claim ideological purity with the 1930s, and therefore as the inheritor of the loyalty of the old petty-bourgeoisie in the face of an 'abrogation' by Social Credit to represent such views. In fact, both organisations represent the views of the old petty-bourgeoisie. In some cases, they represent different groups within the fraction while in others, there is an explicit overlap in membership. Both continue to express an antagonistic attitude towards the dominant bloc although specific aspects of this oppositional position are expressed differently. The League of Rights explicitly politicises racism; Social Credit acknowledges the political problems in such a position. As in the past, the League and Social Credit will continue to claim that each is the true representative of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

Finally, it is worth reiterating a characteristic of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism: it unifies reactionary elements in an oppositional political sub-culture. Those holding the beliefs of the League, and others, are required to adopt a critical approach to commonly-held views and are expected to articulate divergent world views in a public context. Supporters need to be highly motivated and well-versed in a sectarian ideology, and thus disenchantment is by itself insufficient to produce recruits. The apathetic, however disillusioned, are unlikely to be attracted to a sustained and involved programme such as that offered by the League, and an organisation that effectively monopolises the loyalties of its followers. For their part, League supporters are not apathetic or unread:

*Rather they are often self-made and successful. The problem lies in their perception, via their education and knowledge, of their lack of resources to change a societal situation (Richmond, 1977:74).*

The events of the late 1970s and early 1980s enhanced this feeling of inadequacy. Political issues which have canvassed matters such as contact with white South Africans, Maori political assertiveness, liberal education especially in the area of sex education and economic trends such as diminished profits and political influence for small producers, both rural and urban, have all contributed to the 'relevancy' of the League's interpellation. The League has been encouraged to assert its antagonism to the state and the dominant fractions more publicly. They offer a political programme that is fundamentally opposed to powerful interests whether they are seen as residing in a centralised state bureaucracy, major pressure groups such as Federated Farmers, organised trade unions or dominant financial concerns. It is the opposition to these groups, the reasons they impute to their activities and the alternatives offered that places the League of Rights in the category of radical. It also provides them with their constituency amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie and restricts any potential alliance with other classes or fractions.

CHAPTER SIX: RACIAL REVOLUTIONARY INTERPELLATIONS:  
NEO-FASCISM AND THE WORKING CLASS

*We believe that our Anglo-Saxon racial group, through its genetic inheritance, possesses some of the most important gifts which have been bestowed on mankind. We believe that if we intermix our race with another, it dilutes and will eventually destroy these gifts.*

(D. Crawford, Chairperson,  
National Front, Christchurch  
Press, 13/9/77)

*...I mean the Labour Party and the Socialist Workers Party...which pretend to be for the working class, they don't stick up for the White working man anyway. They're made up of middle-class trendies.*

(Ian Stewart, Skrewdriver,  
Bulldog, No.32, March 1983)

*This country is a country of a majority of white British stock and not just another Pacific wog Island.*

('White person', Chaff,  
14/9/83)

*...we're anti-Jew because Jews are communists.*

(C. King-Ansell, Salient,  
6/5/70)

*He was only a poor little skinhead  
He wandered alone in the night  
Now he's joined the National Front  
And he's found a reason to fight.*

(UK neo-fascist street song)

The subject of this chapter, the self-styled 'racial revolutionaries', is by way of contrast with the old petty-bourgeois Jacobinist groups discussed in earlier chapters. The intention is to illustrate the points of departure, and at times of similarity, between the two traditions in contemporary reactionary politics. The similarities are predictable. In both cases, the ideologies focus on 'race' and 'nation' with accompanying beliefs concerning the role of outgroups in Zinsknechtsschaft (usurious enslavement) and as racial threats. These arguments are expressed with the use of apocalyptic imagery where conflict is dramatised and a 'racial crisis' is always imminent. To this extent, the interpellations of the two traditions overlap. Both seek to invest public debate and consciousness with racist arguments, and they both contest hegemonic control of information interpretation and dissemination. Together they represent an intellectual tradition that is separate from those of social democratic culture (Billig, 1978:96). But they are also quite fundamentally different and the divergences elucidate the thesis advanced here.

The 'racial revolutionaries' are essentially an expression of working class racism. The key activists not only come from the working class but they also continue to reflect working class sentiments. They consciously seek to influence and to attract a working class membership although they have had little success in New Zealand. Thus the representational ties, such as they are, are between sections of the working class and neo-fascist groups. The title neo-fascist is employed because the groups discussed here share an allegiance to traditional forms of fascism and they continue to identify with the texts (Mein Kampf) and activists (Hitler, Yockey) that have contributed to fascist developments. There are, however, important differences among these groups. There are some that are labelled National Socialist because they relate to European fascism of the 1930s, notably German National Socialism. They reproduce the images and arguments of this form in New Zealand of the 1970s and 1980s with minor alterations. The alternative, identified as National Front below, are more concerned to replicate the success of contemporary British fascism, specifically the British National Front and its impact of the mid-1970s. This subgroup attempts to distance itself from pre-war fascism and to articulate

views that stress a variant of British racial nationalism. A result of these different allegiances is strong competition and fragmentation frequently results. This combined with the small numbers involved means that they have little impact on public debate except as an object of 'novelty' or 'threat' value. Thus their potential, especially as the representational tie to the class base is weak, would seem to be substantially different from that of petty-bourgeois reactionary groups. But the most obvious difference between the petty-bourgeoisie and working class groups is apparent in their respective use of ideological elements.

The old petty-bourgeoisie seek to encourage the dominance of petty-commodity capitalism, they are deeply suspicious of institutions that seek to represent collective power such as trade unions, they reject 'class' as a concept appropriate to capitalist society and they oppose a strong state except as a means of preserving their interests. Neo-fascists differ fundamentally with them on each of these points reflecting their working class empathies. They deliberately and systematically employ the concept of class although they would see class as necessarily subservient to 'race'/nation. They acknowledge the right of trade unions to represent working class interests and they advocate their co-option into national institutions. In several cases, neo-fascist groups have sought to develop trade union links in New Zealand. They also argue for a strong corporate state that inhibits the power of the capitalists and which unifies the nation and 'race'. And finally, neo-fascist groups reject the assumption that the market is an effective or even appropriate means of distributing resources. So while the two traditions, old petty-bourgeois Jacobinism and working class neo-fascism, share certain key elements, they diverge in an even more fundamental way. They value different institutions and precepts, and they adopt different strategies and policies as a result. The neo-fascists, with some exceptions, do not accept the petty-bourgeois conviction that the struggle against the dominant bloc can be carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle (cf. Laclau, 1979:116). Whatever the political reality, the neo-fascists base their interpellation on mobilising the working class, and through mass action to transform a 'racially perilous' situation into one of national/racial pride and unity, and to do so through confrontation and a 'strategy of tension'.

The extremism of such strategies, even apart from the different structural positions and material concerns of old petty-bourgeois and working class groups, reduces the possibility of effective alliances amongst neo-fascist and reactionary organisations. The reactionary groups representing the interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie have faced opposition and condemnation in political struggles but they have sought to identify with culturally acceptable institutions and beliefs (patriotism, Christianity, free enterprise). In this way, they have managed to contain the public perception of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism as illegitimate or a 'threat'. The neo-fascists, by comparison, face major problems of acceptability. Their willingness to assert theories of racial purity and 'contamination', and to offend most groups, including the sensitivities of major working class fractions (for example, Polynesians) and organisations (trade unions), places them on the margins of political and ideological struggles. The old petty-bourgeois groups recognise the implications of this and are careful to avoid damaging associations. So alliances even within reactionary politics are unlikely because of structural, political and ideological considerations.

Some final points need to be made before proceeding to the discussion of neo-fascist groups. The number of people involved in this form of political activity in New Zealand has been very small. When the social scientist is dealing with such small numbers, it is, as Billig (1978: 235) notes, legitimate and unavoidable to focus almost exclusively on agency. There is little alternative. This emphasis pursues a point made in the theoretical chapter; that the formalism and economism of Poulantzas requires compensation, specifically in focussing on the way in which agents are critical to the continuation of an ideological lineage. In this chapter, this emphasis may appear to be overdone but it reflects the constrained and intimate nature of neo-fascism in New Zealand. But structural factors are not ignored. The central thesis is that neo-fascism is working class in both membership and ideological sympathies, and that structural considerations inhibit the actualisation of this working class fraction in becoming an authentic political force.

The other matter also needs prior comment. The historical dimension is encompassed although briefly. But the discussion on contemporary groups might distort an important aspect. The absence or insufficient discussion of historical developments may create an illusion of permanence. A group is described as having a defined ideology and membership 'neither of which are seen to be in a process of historical development' (Billig, 1978: 94-95). The groups discussed in this chapter, and elsewhere, tend to change continuously and often quite dramatically. Many do not exist for very long. They have a propensity for schism and for expanding or declining according to an external political agenda. This needs to be borne in mind and the discussion is not intended to convey a sense of permanence - none exists.

### Post-War Developments

The articulation of fascist and reactionary interpellations was constrained in post-war Britain (see Chapter Seven) because of the illegitimacy of such beliefs after a war against fascism. One of the initial manifestations of a resurgence in such interpellations, the League of Empire Loyalists, was a confusion of old petty-bourgeois and working class influences. The organisation began its career in Britain as primarily an old petty-bourgeois pressure group affiliated to the Conservative Party. But then, faced <sup>with</sup> opprobrium <sup>it</sup> and changed character to adopt a much more identifiably neo-fascist and working class character, albeit retaining the old petty-bourgeois leadership. In New Zealand, influenced by British events, the League of Empire Loyalists similarly encompassed a divergent (old petty-bourgeois, urban fraction, and working class) membership and ideology. It is significant that in both social formations, the League was instrumental in the formation of the National Front.

Neo-fascism arrived in New Zealand via British influences and activists. The major group in the immediate post-war period was the League of Empire Loyalists. The organisation was British-based and a number of its leaders and activists had come to it from the British Union of Fascists. In the mid-1950s, the League enjoyed a high public profile in Britain by protesting against such matters as

'the betrayal of British interests' and the anti-apartheid Bishop of Johannesburg. Taylor (1982:12-13) describes the group prior to 1959 as comprising right-wing conservatives but after 1960 as an 'extreme right-wing' movement. The event that changed their status was the League's disruption of the 1958 Conservative Party Conference. Soon after, the Conservative Party leadership vigorously condemned the League. As a result, the League's membership dropped from 3000 in 1957 to 300 in 1961, and those that stayed transformed the League into an extreme organisation that concentrated on racial issues.

The New Zealand branch of the League of Empire Loyalists was quite small although it had certain political connections that gave it more power than its size would indicate. The League's views were unique in the 1950s in New Zealand in that they were explicitly anti-Semitic. Less extreme was their concern with the 'British race'. Their objectives included:

- (i) The maintenance and, where necessary, the recovery of the sovereign independence of the British Peoples throughout the world.
- (ii) The strengthening of the spiritual and material bonds between the British Peoples throughout the world.

The organisation was run by an executive of 12 elected members and they were guided by a policy committee that was London-based and which was effectively focussed around A.K. Chesterton and Candour. The New Zealand committee included Sir Ernest H. Andrews and Canon E. Blackwood Moore, while in Australia, Eric Butler was active in League activities. Another member of the national council was J.F.L. Hartley who wrote a pamphlet, New Zealand's Asian Destiny, which is virulently anti-Asian and racist. It was distributed by the League throughout New Zealand, and later by the National Front.


The League had little impact on political debate apart from a flurry in 1955-56. In May-June 1955, the Christchurch Press published a series of letters from League members on the 'Jewish plot'. The letter-writers were also members of Social Credit, and one executive member announced his resignation to avoid discrediting Social Credit. In December 1955, League members founded the World Federalists Inc.

and claimed the support of four MPs. Two repudiated any such association while a third pointed out that he had only agreed to act in an advisory capacity. Then in May 1956, the League of Empire Loyalists stated that there was a 'Jewish plot to destroy the British Empire' and attacked the Presbyterian Church calling it disloyal. Reverend M.W. Wilson responded by attacking the League and was supported by an editorial in the Christchurch Press. The League then again referred to the 'Jewish nature of international finance and the Communist plot that was destroying the Empire'. There were also circulars, 'Expose the Enemy', distributed in Christchurch (see Appendix 2).

In Britain, the League became absorbed into the National Front as the League's mentor, A.K. Chesterton, used his skills to form the National Front in 1966-67. A similar progression took place in New Zealand, and when a local National Front began informally after 1967, it was based loosely on local League activists. The League had been a minor grouping in New Zealand politics that had failed to establish a political base, largely because of its anti-Semitism. This ideological element was imported from its more powerful British parent, but was at odds with attitudes in New Zealand in the 1950s and early 1960s (cf. the strong response from the Presbyterian Church in 1955/1956). It was also this element that cancelled out any appeal that the pro-British sentiments of the League might have had. Its role, therefore, was to establish a small group of activists who were familiar with traditional fascist sentiments and ideology. It provided a base for later groups, although in this early period, the interpellation was less clearly categorised as working class, that is, as expressing anti-capitalist sentiments while employing a class analysis to do so.

The early activists involved in the League of Empire Loyalists were instrumental in recruiting younger sympathisers, and in this way, a new generation of 'believers' reproduced the ideology of fascism. The numbers were and are small and therefore any analysis must inevitably deal with individuals (cf. Billig, 1978). This focus is further encouraged by the sectarianisation of fascist ideology, notably its arrogation and centralisation (see Wallis, 1976:100), and the fragmentation of groups. Diagram 3 indicates the main groups that fall within

DIAGRAM 3: LINEAGE AND ASSOCIATIONS OF NEO-FASCIST GROUPS IN NEW ZEALAND



this tradition since 1964. The discussion here will centre on three of these: (1) the lineage beginning (e) National Socialist White People's Party which will be referred to as the National Socialists; (2) the National Front; and (3) the Christchurch groups.

(a) National Socialism

This interpellation which is marked by an explicit identification with German National Socialism of the 1930s began to appear in post-war New Zealand in the early 1960s. Alan McKechnie, a 28 year-old market gardener (although he was a welfare beneficiary at this time) began a Nazi fan club in 1961. A 22 year-old began a National Socialist group in Rotorua in 1967. The police confiscated his collection of Nazi memorabilia and this group seems to have become absorbed into the most prominent group which centred around Colin King-Ansell. King-Ansell joined the National Socialists in 1967 but it was not until his release from prison in 1969 that the Party became organised and active.

By the early 1970s, the Party met once a month in Queen Street, Auckland. King-Ansell was national organiser and he had an advisory committee of four. A membership of 150 was claimed (Sunday Times, 20/2/72); the same figure was claimed 10 years later (Truth, 15/6/82). A 1973 membership list indicates, however, that there were 39 members of whom 15 were in Auckland, 16 in Wellington, four in Christchurch and one each in Masterton, Westland, Nelson and North Canterbury. There were at least two journalists on the list (and one of these definitely had no sympathies with National Socialism). Three of the 39 were female.<sup>1</sup>

The National Socialists maintained a high public profile throughout the 1970s. This was due to a variety of factors, an important one being the explicit advocacy of traditional National Socialist arguments. The emphasis was on the maintenance of a 'homogeneous NATION

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1. A membership list of the parallel organisation in Australia, the Australian Nationalist Workers Party, included three New Zealand addresses, one of which was the New Zealand Intelligence Service.

moulded from European stock' (see the Manifesto, n.d.). This was to be achieved by ending all 'coloured immigration' and the repatriation of 'coloured people' resident in New Zealand, plus legislative moves to make inter-marriage illegal. In Race Problems. A National Socialist Viewpoint and Solution (n.d.), it is argued that the two major events since 1945 in New Zealand have been the increased crime rate because of the presence of coloured immigrants and the passing of the Race Relations Act. Election and publicity material from the organisation was equally as explicit. Election pamphlets (1972 and 1975 general elections) asked the white voter Have You Had Enough? in what they describe as 'overburdened and slum ridden areas' which have 'coloured immigrants'. Their publication, The Observer, discussed the arrival of lepers in New Zealand from the Pacific along with articles about 'coon hunting' (USA), Britain's 'race catastrophe' (from the United Kingdom's National Front publication), the 'myth of the six million' and the advocacy of certain books including material from Eric Butler and W.B. Sutch.<sup>2</sup> They combined these racist arguments with a classic conspiracy theory:

*We see capitalism as just one of the twin forces of evil - both anti-national in nature, both desiring the ultimate enslavement of all mankind [communism is seen as the other]... it is not surprising that both Communism and capitalism are of Jewish origin. Both are systems which envisage the ultimate enslavement of all mankind for the benefit of a few (King-Ansell, Truth, 19/1/71).*

The National Socialists saw (and see) themselves as 'racial revolutionaries' who sought total geographical separation of racial groups and who were quite open about their loyalty to Hitler (their 'spiritual leader') and German National Socialism (see Questions and Answers for National Socialists, n.d.). The expression of such arguments and their commitment to what was commonly perceived by others as an illegitimate philosophy and political group were bound to ensure a level of media attention that was out of all proportion to their

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2. The Sutch material is seen as echoing the National Socialist position on the need for political and financial independence for New Zealand, in the latter case from what is regarded as Zinsknechtsschaft (usurious enslavement). Sutch's arguments are also seen as supporting the neo-fascist case for the re-organisation of capitalism.

size and potential. But in expressing an imported ideology, they were faced by various tensions in trying to accommodate to local circumstances.

The first problem was the use of appropriate labels of 'race'. Pakehas are variously described as Aryan, Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, whites or Westerners. Many of these labels would be meaningless as political signifiers in New Zealand (cf. Aryan, Nordic) and the National Socialists have found it difficult to resolve this 'problem' of nomenclature, especially as they seek to recruit a mass following among the working class in New Zealand. The second 'problem' is the presence of an indigenous group, the Maori, who can not be ignored in expressing political policies. The National Socialists acknowledge the Maori as a 'New Zealander' who is entitled to the return of Maori land and to their resources and institutions, albeit within certain conditions (e.g. they are to be educated but only to the 'level of his [sic] own development'). This 'leniency' towards the Maori is out of character with the rest of National Socialist ideology on minority 'coloured' groups, and can best be explained by the presence of significant numbers of Maori in working class occupations and residential areas. A stronger stand on this issue might well invite a response (and indeed has done on a number of occasions) from working class representative organisations such as trade unions.

Party activists and supporters are typically quite young, from unskilled or unemployed occupational categories and nearly all come from post-war generations. Some such as King-Ansell are aging with the Party but normally, involvement is for a limited period. One example is E.J. Silvester who was appointed the South Island organiser for the National Socialists. He was 23 and an unemployed farm worker but he lasted no more than a few months before resigning from the Party. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the imagery and arguments of the National Socialists have found new favour amongst groups usually in their late teens, unemployed or in manual occupations, and mostly Pakeha.<sup>3</sup> This support is apparent in the main centres and in certain

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3. Ironically, there are cases of Polynesians who are committed to National Socialist politics although the number is very small. One activist, a Samoan, argued that his (slight) German ancestry predominated over his Polynesian 'race', and that this gave him an association and legitimacy that could not be claimed by 'British' National Socialists.

provincial towns such as Palmerston North, Hastings and Timaru.

In Palmerston North, for example, a group of 'boot boys'<sup>4</sup> made their presence felt during 1983 and 1984. Their uniform was British (i.e. boots, braces, rolled-up jeans, black jackets or t-shirts, very short hair) and their ideology comes directly from traditional National Socialism. Organisationally, they were linked to King-Ansell's Auckland-based National Socialists in preference to other groups such as New Force. The members came from Palmerston North and some of the surrounding small towns (e.g. Hunterville), and there was a core of 6-8 members although this number expands and declines according to the event and recruitment. Public expressions of their ideology (see Chaff, 30/3/83; 14/9/83) incorporate racist and anti-Semitic arguments as central to their world view. The Bible is 'Jewish propaganda', Mein Kampf is a 'brilliant book' and Hitler a 'beautiful guy'. The aim is to preserve the 'white European way of life' in New Zealand, a country of 'white British stock':

*Though it seems where there is no hope for  
the extreme right in New Zealand's present  
political system, the best way to achieve our  
aim is by violence unless the aryan's of  
New Zealand awake (Chaff, 14/9/83).*

Thus they deliberately offer a posture of violence (which is carried through into physical violence on occasions) and have adopted a political 'strategy of tension' very like the British Movement in Britain. A powerful image is provided by a particular form of music called 'Oi' which originally used 'swastika chic' to shock but which has now become central to the message of this section of punk culture and music. The importance of punk for the National Socialists lies in the fact that it is seen as primarily white in origin in contrast to most popular music forms that are black-dominated (see Contemporary Affairs Briefing, 1981). The Palmerston North boot boys identify with groups such as Flesh D-vice, Foreskins, Last Resort, Cockney Rejects and local Nazi

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4. Otherwise known as 'skins' or 'skinheads'. These titles indicate the wearing of 'bovver boots', which are designed to be of use in street fighting, or in the case of 'skins', to the wearing of very short hair or having a shaved head. This can mean that there is no hair that can be grabbed in a fight although symbolically, it indicates the typical 'short back and sides' haircut of the British working class taken to extreme. New Zealand skins are a direct imitation of their British counterpart, although not all are necessarily fascist or working class.

music groups such as The Knives of West Eleven. Their slogan is 'Oi is fascism' (Chaff, 30/3/83).<sup>5</sup>

Not all expressions of National Socialism centre around punk culture. An Auckland group of about 20 led by a 24 year-old met monthly in the early 1980s and paid a \$10 subscription to form a White Power Movement. Their aim was the deportation of all Pacific Islanders, and when their leader was interviewed on Radio Pacific, he acknowledged that they also sought the geographical separation of Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand. This was justified on the grounds that the Maori 'lacked the ability to operate in a European situation'. In Wellington, another group, the White Power gang, was involved in the throwing of a molotov cocktail into an Indian-owned shop. The three who were charged, 17, 18 and 20 years respectively, claimed that they were dedicated to 'getting rid of coloured people in New Zealand' and one told the police that 'curries are just like Jews' (Sunday Times, 30/9/79).

There are many groups and incidents such as the above. Most groups only exist for a short period and are amorphous alliances that centre on the scapegoating of one minority group or another. Many of the incidents that accompany their presence go unreported in the media, either because the media are ill-informed to begin with or because the police deny that there is a racial element to the incident, or perhaps are not aware that it has been the product of an organised racist group. The only consistent and well-organised group is the King-Ansell National Socialist Party in Auckland, and its publicity derives from the combination of fascination and revulsion felt towards the group (see Roberts, Walsh and Sullivan, n.d., for survey material on public attitudes towards Nazis). Perhaps James K. Baxter also had a point:

*...Mr King-Ansell did not know the temper of any minds of his fellow-countrymen. They would only follow a respectable Fascist. He was too flamboyant, too obvious, too naive* (Baxter, Sunday Times, 21/6/70).

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5. As with all expressions of working class neo-fascism in New Zealand (and Britain, see Chapter Seven), the sentiments and membership are male-dominated. Male supremacy and aggression are central themes, if sometimes only rhetorically presented. This contrasts with major political groups (Labour, National, Social Credit) where women are organisationally and ideologically represented (however adequately). The major representative of the new petty-bourgeoisie, the New Zealand Party, adopts a similar position. Even the reactionary organisations of the old petty-bourgeoisie such as the League of Rights reserve a role for females, albeit a minor and passive one that reflects their anti-feminism.

### Colin King-Ansell: A Profile

King-Ansell was born in 1946 in Otahuhu but grew up in the King Country and Central Auckland. His parents were committed Labour supporters who split up when he was 20. He left school at 16 and enlisted in the army although he soon transferred to a civilian job in the Defence Department. This was followed by work as a barman. In December 1967, he was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for causing malicious damage to a synagogue and he was released from prison in January 1969. Until 1971, when he left for Australia, King-Ansell had difficulty retaining a job because of union opposition to his politics. He formed a new National Socialist group in June 1969 and advertised this fact in the Herald and Dominion. He had read Mein Kampf as a schoolboy and his interest was aroused. He formed a Deutchesbund and then became involved in anti-Jewish activities in 1967. He commented:

*In those days I wasn't a National Socialist. I was just anti-Jew (Salient, 6/5/70).*

In May 1970, Salient interviewed King-Ansell and the media took up the interest and his views and activities were given wide publicity. He was interviewed on the Gallery programme by Brian Edwards and a lot of attention was focussed on his claim that 10 Auckland police were members of the National Socialists. In 1971, he went to Australia where he worked as a warehouse manager and opened a militaria shop in Sydney with \$6000 he won in a lottery. He returned to New Zealand in late 1971 and the following year, he stood for the National Socialists in the general election. He organised his campaign with the help of a member of the Australian National Socialist Party but he attracted few votes. He stood again for Mt. Eden in 1975 (he received 19 votes out of the 19,142 votes cast) and 1978. His campaigning during the 1970s was focussed on Mt. Eden while he was residentially based in Otahuhu. He married, in 1973, one of the few women members of the Party, J. Neville, the Wellington branch secretary. By 1978, he had separated. In the same year, he was sentenced to three months imprisonment for breaching the Race Relations Act (reduced to a fine of \$400 in appeal). In 1981, he faced certain financial difficulties (see Herald, 17/10/81).

King-Ansell has been concerned to represent working-class nationalist sentiments, and he has used both an electoral platform and sought to become involved in trade union politics. In 1982, he was chapel father for Hallmark (an Auckland printing firm) and he contested the presidency of the Auckland Printers Union. He polled 725 votes less than the sitting president. He has also used other forums to convey his views. For example, he was a prominent member of many of the pro-Springbok rugby tour demonstrations held in Auckland in 1981. Through this participation, he maintains links with a variety of other extreme right-wing groups although many of these are wary of being categorised as supporting or sympathising with National Socialism, and they are aware of the political liability that this represents. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which King-Ansell is something of a martyr for extreme right-wing campaigns. When King-Ansell and Hughes were convicted under the Race Relations Act (the only people to be accorded this 'honour' up to 1984), the actions of the Race Relations Conciliator, the police and the Courts were seen by many from the reactionary part of the political spectrum as providing evidence of the 'anti-white intent' of those in power. Publicly, many groups used the occasion to mount an attack on the 'restriction of free speech'. Thus his activities and the response they engender from agencies of the state and institutions such as the media provide supportive material for the arguments of extreme right-wing groups even if few explicitly agree with his views and policies.

King-Ansell's views deviate little from those held by German National Socialists. His early influences are German. These have been expanded by contact with American National Socialist groups (notably, Christian Vanguard and publications such as the National Socialist Digest) and his admiration for George Lincoln Rockwell. The Observer, the local publication which he has edited, draws most of its overseas material from the publications of the American Nazi Party, regardless of the appropriateness of this to the local context. He is anti-Jew because 'Jews are communists' (Salient, 6/5/70) and the main threat internationally is held to be 'Jewish-Zionism' (8 O'Clock, 15/1/72). 'Atheist Jews' are interpreted as being communist while orthodox Jewry are viewed as capitalists, both important enemies. Most world events

are the product of the machinations of these two groups, either in an alliance or independently of one another. He defends the policy of Nazi Germany towards Jews and suggests that the 'talk of extermination camps is nonsense' (8 O'Clock, 15/1/72). He has a well-rehearsed and systematic ideological interpretation of social and political events on everything from feminine domesticity (he talks of motherhood as a 'trade' and how 'girls should learn the arts of how to run a home') to media 'conspiracies'. Since his first involvement in National Socialism in the 1960s, his commitment and views have changed remarkably little. In the 1980s, his expressed aim was still the 'salvation of the white race' (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81). And this is combined with a strong anti-capitalist stance that differs fundamentally from a similar stance adopted by old petty-bourgeois groups. King-Ansell uses the rhetoric and organisations (such as the trade union) of the working class, and rather than the revitalisation of capitalism through the promotion of small commodity production, King-Ansell advocates a collective response that strengthens the position of the working class. That this position should be interpellated through 'race' and 'nation' is not atypical of the working class to whom he intends to appeal, but that he should also expressly identify with an anti-Semitic Manichean view of finance and politics, and with the imagery and arguments of a dated German National Socialism, makes him an irrelevance to the agenda of working class politics in New Zealand in the 1970s and 1980s. The illegitimacy associated with this latter position has always encouraged opposition to him from the very organisations that he requires to establish an organisational alliance, the trade unions.

(b)(i) National Front

The National Front share, both in Britain and New Zealand, certain characteristics with the National Socialists discussed above. Their ideological tradition dates from a common source in late 19th century and early 20th century fascism, so that key signifiers are very similar. But there is an important dimension that separates the

two expressions of neo-fascism. The National Front stress two factors: they seek the preservation of the 'British race' and the main outgroup are blacks in Britain or Polynesians in New Zealand. And they are careful to avoid comparison with the fascisms of the 1930s. The effect is to give them a contemporary and explicitly 'British' image that minimises the association with earlier forms of fascism. Yet they retain the elements of 'race' and 'nation', and the subsequent emphasis on genocidal ('racial cleansing') policies. They also both recruit and seek to appeal to the working class of which they are part.

The National Front appeared in New Zealand in 1967. It began with local recruits such as B.B. Thompson (see Profiles) and other sympathisers from the League of Empire Loyalists. They were joined by migrants from Britain and elsewhere who had already been politicised by their experiences with fascist groups in Britain or by independence in former British colonies. New Zealand immigration policy during the 1950s and 1960s was relatively liberal, and a number of working class migrants came seeking to escape the growing racial tension of inner city areas in Britain. A typical example was Roger Clare (see Searchlight, May 1983). He was recruited to Mosley's Union Movement (the continuation of the British Union of Fascists) in Britain in the early 1960s. The Union Movement attempted to incite opposition to the immigration of West Indians. Clare left Britain and went to South Africa before coming on to New Zealand. Once here, he was instrumental in getting the National Front known and active. But by the early 1970s, he was back in Britain and active in the League of St. George and Column 88.<sup>6</sup> But it was the League of Empire Loyalists that provided the organisational base, albeit somewhat limited, for the formation of the National Front.

*Now in New Zealand, the League of Empire Loyalists has merged with other interested patriots to form the New Zealand National Front (Salient, 6/5/70).*

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6. The League of St. George and Column 88 are British neo-fascist groups who adopt paramilitary strategies in making their opposition to Asian and Afro-Caribbean groups known. They have extensive links with similar neo-fascist paramilitary groups in Europe and have helped hide European terrorists in Britain.

The aims in this period were to work with the British parent body, to eradicate 'liberal internationalism', to preserve the British 'way of life' and to prevent 'the emergence of a race problem'. There were branches in Ashburton and Auckland and they produced the occasional pamphlet (see New Zealand Monthly Review, 9/7/68). Their main publication, Counter-Attack, was shortlived.

The 'official' formation of the New Zealand National Front (NZNF) took place in 1977. Between the low key and informal grouping in 1967 and the more formal organisation, many of the future activists were occupied in other organisations. Kerry Bolton was secretary of the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party which was formed in 1975 (see the British extreme right-wing press on the period, e.g. League Review, 9/6/76, and Spearhead, 9/2/76).<sup>7</sup> Bastian Zandbergen was also involved in this group. Their activities covered such things as support for South African participation in the World Softball Championships in the Hutt Valley in 1976 (see letters to the editor, 8 o'clock, 21/2/76; Truth, 28/9/76), and the publication of several pamphlets and a well-printed manifesto. These groups and activities mark an important stage in the articulation of radical neo-fascist interpellations in defiance of hegemonic control and the presence of dominant political representatives. The New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party went into recess with the formation of the NZNF and was briefly reactivated in October 1980 (see League Review, February 1981).

Another of the key people in the formation of the NZNF was David Crawford. He was active as a co-editor of Pointing Right (in 1974) and Heed (in 1975). Crawford's involvement came about after a meeting in central Canterbury in 1974. He describes this in an article published in the British National Front's publication Spearhead (March 1978). Crawford was a member of the National Party (see Dominion, 2/3/77), and part of a group which debated whether or not to stay within the National Party. The alternative was to form a nationalist group. The emergence of Muldoon with 'his clearly

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7. The logo and slogan of New Force (see below) which was to be formed later and grew out of the New Zealand National Front were the same as the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party.

hardline conservative outlook' was seen to make political activity outside the National Party a waste of time. But after the 1975 general election, Crawford was 'horrified' by the continuing immigration of Pacific Islanders and by the anti-apartheid sentiments surfacing. It was this concern about 'anti-white propaganda' that was instrumental in the formation of the New Zealand National Front on 15 March 1977 with Crawford as the chairperson. Prior to this, the strategy had been to try and:

*...infiltrate the National Party in the hope that some headway would be made towards capturing the administration of local branches. However it was quickly pointed out that such a course of action had been pursued with no success since the 1950s (Spearhead, March 1978).*

Bolton had attempted to become involved in the National Party's Western Hutt branch and the Auckland area organiser for the National Front, George Moir, was involved in the electorate administration of Mt. Eden. When this was discovered, the National Party quickly moved to publicly condemn the National Front (Truth, 29/3/77; Herald, 9/4/77) with the Party President indicating that members of the National Front would be automatically disqualified from membership of the National Party.

The NZNF was chaired by Crawford, then 29 and a clerk with the Christchurch City Council. The three directors were Crawford, Bolton and Thompson. The intention was to tap the 'growing wave of fear amongst the White community' (Spearhead, March 1978). To this end, Crawford wrote letters arguing that the tribalism of Africa 'means a growing affinity for Communism' (Truth, 26/7/77), that Anglo-Saxons, via their genetic inheritance, 'possess some of the most important gifts which have been bestowed on mankind' and he argued for the separation of Maori and Anglo-Saxons in the interests of 'racial purity' (Christchurch Pres 13/9/77). He threatened Jews with cancellation of their New Zealand passports if they continued 'this policy of harassment or misrepresentation' (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81), and he also publicly argued that there was never any attempt by Hitler to exterminate Jews (Canta, June 1977).

The British parent body received news of these activities with

delight. Spearhead (May 1977) published an article on the NZNF and reported a 'startling upsurge in support'. Tyndall, chairperson of the British National Front, (Spearhead, January 1978) noted that the NF had activists in many countries but New Zealand was the only country to have a formal organisation. In fact, he was somewhat over-optimistic as the NZNF had collapsed by mid-1978 when Crawford resigned as chairperson and nobody was prepared to take over the position. Some activities continued. The Australian NF was formed in June 1978, and a magazine was established, Frontline, as the representative publication of the New Zealand and Australian organisations. Crawford was assistant editor until September 1978 (Issue no. 4) and then B.B. Thompson took his place. There was also an attempt to establish an NF branch at Victoria University of Wellington in 1981. The Students' Association declined to allow them to affiliate (see Salient, 13/4/81; Evening Post, 31/3/81; 27/4/81; 1/5/81). Crawford and Bolton went on to establish the Church of Odin and New Force. They felt that the NF had served a useful function.

*...Kerry Bolton and myself were discussing this very issue [the public impact of the NF] with close associates the other week and it was generally agreed that we had an enormous public impact; and a positive one at that. The NF has served as one of the most successful building blocks we have utilized... (Personal communication, D. Crawford, 15/4/81).*

In a sense, this assessment is reasonably accurate. While the numbers involved in the NZNF were never large, the organisation encouraged the formation of a network of activists throughout New Zealand who actioned such strategies as the 'infiltration' of the National Party. They also succeeded in attracting considerable media attention and in reinforcing links with similar British groups. In each case the NZNF continued the work of the League of Empire Loyalists but with more impact, both in terms of their own supporters and in the public domain. But contrary to Nyomarkey's (1967; see also Wallis, 1979: 180-184) assertion that schism is more likely to occur in Marxist groups because authority and legitimation derive from an ideology as opposed to Nazi groups where they derive from the leader's charisma, neo-fascist groups in New Zealand have a recent history of fragmenting or reforming soon after their establishment. The NZNF was really only active in a national sense for less than two year

before the formation of new groups. The continued absence of charismatic leadership (King-Ansell coming the closest) means that New Zealand neo-fascism corresponds more to the characteristics and careers of Marxist groups in Nyomarky's (1967) analysis rather than Nazi groups. The weak ideological coherence, reliant as it is on imported arguments and signs, combines with a small activist core and weak representational ties with the working class to encourage ideological, and hence organisational, fragmentation.

#### B.B. Thompson: A Profile

Thompson lives in Ashburton where he is a schoolteacher. His first political activity was as secretary of the National Front in 1969. In that capacity, he wrote to the Sunday Times (19/10/69) concerning the 'malaise of liberalism with its "gospel" of sickly and dangerous internationalism, poisonous denials of racial differences'. He also indicated a hope to field candidates in future elections. He produced NZNF's first newsletter, Counter-Attack (1970). He then became involved in trying to ensure continued contacts between white South Africa and New Zealand. By 1972, he had formed the Association Defending South African Tours (ADSAT). He still acknowledged his position as secretary of the NF (see Wallace, 1972). Activity in support of apartheid continued for most of the decade. In 1977, as chairperson of ADSAT, he was critical of the National Government for giving aid to 'Marxist Mozambique' (Ashburton Guardian, 10/5/77). His other major initiative in this period was to form the Friends of Chile in 1976 (see Pointing Right, no.14, 1976; Heed, February/March 1976). On these issues, there was an intimate network of activists. Thompson served on Elderton's Southern Africa Friends Association, he contributed to Elderton's magazine Pointing Right (see, for example, his article 'Kirk Kicks Our Kinfolk', Pointing Right, no.4, 1974), while Elderton was the Christchurch representative of the Friends of Chile.

Throughout, he retained contact with the NZNF and when the organisation became officially organised in the late 1970s, he played a major role. He spent eight months as the official guest of the Enfield branch of the British NF in 1977. He marched as the New Zealand representative at Lewisham in August 1977 and as one of the colour party

holding the New Zealand flag at the Cenotaph in London. League Review (no.24, 1979) described him erroneously as the chairperson of the NZNF. From September 1978, he became associate-editor of Frontline.

He believes 'rigidly in apartheid, the threat of world communism and the Jewish conspiracy and the evils of the modern black emerging nations' (Wallace, 1972). He is a Protestant who does not attend church because of the National Council of Churches' support for 'terrorist groups' and who is firmly convinced that the presence of 'coloureds' from the Pacific Islands and Asia will turn 'our streets into a stage for...riots' (Christchurch Star, 17/8/77). In terms of these views, he might well be a member of one of the extreme right-wing groups representing the old petty-bourgeoisie. His occupation as school teacher would encourage such affiliations, as would his location in a provincial centre. But from his initial political activity, he has consistently expressed views in a way that identifies him as part of the core of neo-fascists in New Zealand. He is explicit in articulating the extreme nature of his views; he invests his world views, and attempts to influence that of others, with a fundamentalist racism and rejects the niceties and assumptions of social democratic culture (cf. Billig, 1978:96). His associations are with working class activists (Bolton, Crawford) in New Zealand and parallel British groups, notably the National Front.

## 2.(ii) New Force/Nationalist Workers Party

New Force was founded on 1 March 1981 from the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party, and from those activists who had formed the core of the National Front. There were also some members from Viking Youth involved. The founding members were Michael Curry, Kerry Bolton, Ron Zandbergen and Bastianus Zandbergen. The directorate included Bolton, David Crawford (Christchurch), Grant Smith (Hutt Valley), Michael Curry (Auckland) and Dave Stormer (Wellington). Crawford was given the title of 'southern director' of New Force although he had resigned from the position by September 1981.

The objective of New Force was the building of a 'cadre of well-trained, disciplined and highly motivated activists', to educate and to 'covertly establish cells of the Movement in political parties, pressure groups', etc. and to disrupt organisations 'antagonistic to the national interest' (New Force Manifesto, n.d.). The Manifesto sets these aims out in detail and provides information on the strategies to be adopted. There is a major attack on the 'false assumptions of multi-racialism' and it is dismissive of the 'liberal guilt complex'. New Force would seek instead, to create a separate Maori parliament and to establish autonomous Maori states. The organisation would not recognise the rights of Pacific Islanders to hold New Zealand citizenship (citizenship would be revoked if a Pacific Islander had already been granted it) and they would classify all children born to a Pacific Islander as such and everything would be done to repatriate them.<sup>8</sup>

In mid-1983, New Force underwent a change of name. It became the Nationalist Workers Party, and a number of 'elements' were ejected from membership. The 'subversive factions' included a 'juvenile Nazi element' with a fetish for German militaria and 'free market capitalists' (Press Release, 13/6/83). Apparently, the former were youths from the New Zealand National Socialist Party who were giving New Force 'a bad name' (Herald, 20/6/83). The second group was described as TRIM/ZAP supporters who were 'anti-union, anti-working class', an attitude that 'genuine nationalists find to be odious' (Press Release, 13/6/83). The hope was that the expulsion of the 'extreme right elements would help to make New Force more respectable' (Herald, 20/6/83). The membership was described as being well over 100 with less than a third being expelled during the reorganisation (Evening Post, 20/8/83).

The reorganisation of the group and the accompanying comments illustrate how key activists perceive themselves. Their ideology of 'racial nationalism' allows for no compromises. They reject the presence of skin-heads who are explicitly National Socialist on the grounds that their support would engender public opposition. In fact,

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8. This is an interesting ideological position because it explicitly utilises a classification system that categorises an individual as Pacific Islander if there is any Pacific Island Polynesian ancestry. Implicit in this is the notion of 'racial contamination'; the 'superior white ancestry' is held to be 'contaminated' by miscegenation. Even amongst the extreme right, few others publicly acknowledge that they hold such views.

the leadership of New Force/Nationalist Workers Party accept that they are already viewed in a negative light and that public acceptance of them is a major problem (see comments elsewhere). The dispute with the National Socialists, primarily skin-heads, is over the issue of whether allegiance is to a traditional German-influenced National Socialism as opposed to a more contemporary nationalism which is British-oriented. Bolton and the others firmly rejected the former in favour of the latter, and hence the dismissal of the skin-heads. But they also rejected the possibility of another alliance. The reference to 'free market capitalists' encompasses petty-bourgeois expressions of extreme right-wing activity, and New Force/National Workers Party were explicit in their dismissal of key assumptions in such interpellations. They obviously share a commitment to the nation/'race' and to opposing socialism and communism. But working class groups such as New Force reject the old petty-bourgeois concern with restoring 'free market capitalism'. They also explicitly employ the concept of class, albeit in the context of an interpellation that stresses the nation/'race', whereas petty-bourgeois Jacobinism is emphatic in its denial that class is an appropriate political signifier or slogan to use in capitalist society. Thus New Force/National Workers Party, reflecting their working class orientation, are dismissive of these key aspects of petty-bourgeois interpellations.

There are other aspects that separate the two approaches, and which underline the arguments made above. Firstly, New Force exhibit little of the ambiguity displayed by petty-bourgeois reactionary groups on the matter of the presence of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand. They offer clear policies that are more 'extreme' in what they seek to do. For instance, the Nationalist Workers Party began its publicity with comments on Pacific Islanders, which included arguing for the deportation of any Pacific Islander who is on a welfare benefit and those who are 'socially undesirable' (Evening Post, 20/8/83). Previously, New Force had been explicit in its advocacy of 'separate development' or apartheid for Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand, and in denying Pacific Islanders political and civil rights, including citizenship. There was concern that Pacific Islanders would become a political force that would demand cultural recognition and lead to the 'further bastardisation and eventual demise of the white New Zealander' (Evening Post, 20/8/83).

Secondly, New Force/Nationalist Workers Party expresses a statolatry quite different from that offered by old petty-bourgeois Jacobinism which opposes the corporate state and would simply see the state in an instrumental role as protecting petty-commodity capitalism. The following statement comes from Perseverance (15/3/82), the Australian publication of the Hungarian National Socialist Party.

*The New Force rejects the Liberal-Democratic ideology that conceives the State as being nothing but the regulator of relations between individuals and their "rights".*

*....Each individual is an organic part of the whole social organisation - the Nation - with an assigned function in keeping with the individual's capacity, and fulfilling that function to the best of his ability of the whole. Each social class has its place and function within the nation and should therefore by no means be in conflict with the others.*

*The basic foundation from which the People-Nation-State idea is formed is the family.... It is because the family is the base from which the Nation grows that Marxism seeks to destroy it.*

*...the People-Nation-State idea arises from members of a common stock or species, its political-social-cultural aspirations are therefore necessarily its unique property. Such aspirations are the people's inherent soul or psyche made visible and are therefore unable to be felt or shared by a people of unrelated stock...(Perseverance, 15/3/82).*

The philosophy articulates the major elements of traditional National Socialism. The state as the organisational wing of the nation is the all-important unit. Nation and state come together to represent the reason for individual existence, and they are the manifestation of the racial basis of a particular nation. This racial element is critical because it governs behaviour. It is also something mystical that can not be positively identified and described, and therefore is unique and non-transferable. Classes are recognised as existing, and an earlier reference to the 'anti-union, anti-working class' attitudes of other extreme right groups indicates a fundamental ideological difference between this working class tradition of political thought and activism, and other extreme right-wing groups that would

deny that the concept of class is appropriate to an understanding of society.

These views are extensively expressed through the publications of New Force: Attack, Spark and Nationalist News. In response to an attack on them by Jesson (see Republican, March 1982), New Force responded with an extensive statement on their philosophy (Attack, October/November/December 1982). It concentrated on the biological 'reality of racial differentiation', 'the territorial imperative as the basis of the nation-forming process' and 'the anti-national, anti-racial character of capitalism'. New Force is described as the 'antithesis of capitalism while the Left has traditionally played the lackey'.

In terms of links, New Force has acknowledged its association with the British National Front although New Force tried to disassociate itself from the NZNF. In a letter to the Herald (26/6/83), Bolton claims there was no connection between New Force and the NZNF despite his own presence and role in both organisations. The ideology and the focus of both groups are very similar. Early in New Force's existence, there was an attempt to influence the National Party but later the interest switched to Social Credit. In 1981, Zandbergen claimed that New Force had a 'similar economic policy to that of Social Credit' (Evening Post, 27/10/81). Six months later, an article in Attack (February/March 1982) described Social Credit as New Zealand's 'Great White Hope' for many on the right, although it was also pointed out that they saw a move to the left by Social Credit culminating in the campaign against the League of Rights and repudiation of the 'racial views' of C.H. Douglas. But like most of the groups in this particular ideological tradition, New Force is suspicious of democracy and of the role of political parties.

*The New Force...excludes the possibility of collaboration with the old parties because the psychology of those parties is irreconcilable with our revolutionary nationalist creed (Perseverance, 15/3/82).*

Thus the interest in the National Party or Social Credit reflects an instrumental concern in becoming involved in a political organisation that is legitimate and has access to power rather than any similarity

in views. Other links come through the activities of members of New Force. Bolton has been involved in the NZNF, the League of Rights and the New Zealand Rhodesia Society as well as being the producer of Counter-Attack and Nationalist News. Zandbergen was involved with the National Front while Crawford has been active in Pointing Right, Heed and the Church of Odin. John Stewart-Menzies, a founder of the League of Rights in New Zealand and formerly a Social Credit candidate and a member of the New Democratic Party, became the Bay of Plenty organiser for New Force in 1982 (see Attack, October/November/December 1982).

Despite being suspicious of the democratic political system New Force became involved in the formal electoral process in 1981. They announced the candidacy of B. Zandbergen for the Western Hutt seat. This appears contradictory to their beliefs, and it required commitments that were against the group's philosophy. New Force, for example, sought to avoid their classification as a reactionary or right-wing group. Zandbergen (Evening Post, 16/5/81) rejected the label 'nazi' and then later (Evening Post, 4/6/81) argued that New Force were anything but reactionary because they sought 'cultural self-determination for all peoples as opposed to Marxism and capitalism that seek to continue the age of materialism'. Nevertheless, once the campaign got underway (the announcement of the candidate took place on 20/9/81), Zandbergen faced a campaign that revolved around identifying him as a 'nazi' or 'fascist'. A combined candidates meeting was disrupted in early November and a New Force meeting in late November attracted an audience of 8 plus 30 protestors. He persevered with a public platform that focussed on the preservation of 'European culture'. On election night, he received 30 votes out of a total of 19,487 votes cast in the electorate.

On this occasion, New Force gained little and in private discussions indicated that they were embarrassed by the result. It compromised their ideological and political position. On another public matter, they deem themselves to have been more successful. New Force is opposed to the legislation and the organisation that exists on human rights in New Zealand. They argue that the Race Relations Act (1971)

discriminates against Pakehas, it limits free speech and maintains the privileges of non-whites. New Force came in for attention from the Race Relations Conciliator's Office after the election because of complaints made about election material. The Conciliator asked for a legal opinion and in early 1982 told Zandbergen of the complaints and invited his comments. Zandbergen asked for a definition of racist and what section of the Race Relations Act New Force were supposed to have breached. There was no reply from the Conciliator and on 2 February, New Force complained to the Ombudsman. On 9 February, the Human Rights Commission ruled that section 9A of the Act had not been breached.

*Although expressed political viewpoints concerning matters of race may be unpalatable or unsound this is not sufficient cause for the publication of those views to be circumscribed (Human Rights Commission, 16/2/82).*

They went on to note that the electorate should determine the merit or value of proposals. This decision was greeted with approval by some editorial opinion (see Evening Post, 24/2/82) on the grounds that the freedom of expression had been preserved. New Force were jubilant. Attack (February/March 1982) declared that the 'Race Act [had been] Defeated'. They claimed success over the Conciliator, they enjoyed the favourable publicity and interpreted the events as a vindication for 'pro-white groups'.

The Nationalist Workers Party were the object of attention on a similar issue in 1984. On 4 September 1984, the police seized 4000 Nationalist Workers Party pamphlets from O. Bree's Auckland home. The police seized them on the grounds that their distribution 'would have caused breaches of the peace and incited criminal acts' (Herald, 13/10/84). The warrant for their seizure was obtained under Section 198 1c of the Summary Proceedings Act. The pamphlets were returned when the Nationalist Workers Party agreed not to pass them out on the street or to put them in letterboxes. In the meantime, a considerable debate ensued concerning the implications of such a seizure for a democratic system, and the dispute amongst members of the New Zealand Civil Liberties Union (see Herald, 13/10/84) epitomised the dimensions of the debate (see Chapter Eight).

The debate again provided the Nationalist Workers Party with access to the national media and a degree of implicit legitimacy as their 'rights' were defended by members of the social and political elite. This legitimacy was confirmed for the Nationalist Workers Party when Mana Motuhake invited representatives to a discussion on a Wellington marae in October 1984. Bolton used the opportunity to reiterate the anti-capitalist rhetoric of their interpellation (the 'real enemy was the "stinking face of capitalism"'; see Evening Post, 29/10/84). But the extremism of aspects of their interpellation rules out any sort of influential role for neo-fascist organisations like the Nationalist Workers Party in political and ideological struggles. Their class location means that they are part of the relationship between capital and a wage-earning proletariat, unlike the old petty-bourgeoisie, but their racial radicalism is self-defeating given the presence of a substantial Polynesian segment in the working class. The proletarian sympathies of neo-fascist interpellations are therefore negated by the centrality of racism to their ideology, and by the readiness to explicitly articulate motions such as racial contamination. Their irrelevance is confirmed by periodic schisms (cf. Nyomarky, 1967) and the size of the neo-fascist following in New Zealand. Bolton reflects the extremism of this interpellation and the complex career trajectory of activists.

#### Kerry Bolton: A Profile

Bolton is one of the young activists born in the 1950s who has a strong commitment to neo-fascist views. His interest began at school, Hutt Valley Memorial Technical College. As he describes it:

*...during college when I first had an interest in politics...I tended towards the left, but the materialistic ethic didn't really appeal. There seemed to be something more to life than the strictly material basis to it and I suppose as an extreme reaction from the former left wing views of the time, I had an interest in national socialism and I put an alternative point of view to the college...(Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

He was 14, and he confesses that his views on 'race' were greeted with some concern at the school. His name appears on the membership list

of the National Socialist Party in this period. He left school at 17 and his next political association was with the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party in Lower Hutt, a group that he describes as a radical Social Credit group. A letter to Truth (28/9/76) identifies him as secretary. A year later, further letters indicate that he was now also North Island director of the National Front (see Truth, 21/6/77; 26/7/77). He was intimately involved with the organisation of the NZNF and he and Crawford were key figures. It was also in this period that Bolton became a member of the National Party as part of the NZNF strategy to try and influence that Party's approach to the issue of immigration, amongst other matters. Bolton joined the Young Nationals but he was not in the Party long enough to be contacted or to attend any meetings. Instead, he was expelled after a Dominion Council meeting of the National Party in 1977, along with David Crawford and George Moira. Bolton was quite open about the intent of this strategy:

*...the National Party has pledged to keep immigration flow to about 5000 annually but "as far as we are concerned that's 5000 too many" (Dominion, 2/3/77).*

He also argued for the geographical separation of 'races' to prevent 'inter-breeding' and that the 'white race' had been solely responsible for 'advanced civilisation'. Bolton defines a race as 'a specific biological sub-group within a species' (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81). The exact detail or emphasis of his comment does alter when it comes to public expressions of racism. Some of the policy statements that Bolton has been responsible for are blunt (see Auckland Star, 7/11/81; Dominion, 2/3/77). He favours a form of apartheid on the grounds that 'people of "unrelated stock" cannot feel or share the same political-social-cultural aspirations' (Auckland Star, 7/11/81). In other situations, his position appears less dogmatic.

*...we want to see a reduction in the number of Pacific Islanders here. We don't go for outright wholesale repatriation...we view it as a case of business interests bringing them over here in the sixties...they still don't understand our ways really...anymore than we could understand if we were over there, and to say "right you've worked your guts out for big business etc., now get the hell*

*back to your own islands". We don't go for policy like that at all. We want to see a reduction, not through compulsion, but through encouragement like financial incentives etc. (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

On the role of Jews, Bolton is not reticent. In statements for both public and private consumption, he identifies Jews as an enemy although he seeks to draw certain semantic differences.

*Well, New Force policy is that we're not anti-Jew any more than we are against anyone on account of their race, or religion. You know you have had certain aspects of political Zionism combining together against the interests of the West (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

This ideological position is made clearer with his comments on what he calls 'the conspiracy angle'.

*We know there is in existence an international capitalist cartel which includes people like the Rothschilds and the Rockfellers etc. and they do have as their ambition a world collective state...you can actually go back to the use of communism by the international financiers (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

And with reference to New Zealand and this conspiracy:

*It is damned hard to find out about it specifically, but as a member of the International Monetary Fund etc. we are subject to their control, and of course we are in debt to the international bankers because we follow orthodox financial policy. The bankers set up this debt finance system to bring about financial control (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

Bolton cites the relationship between Oppenheimer in South Africa and the Rothschilds, and the opposition of Oppenheimer to apartheid, as evidence of the nature of this conspiracy. He also refers to Jacob Schiff's alleged support for Bolshevism as another indication of the operations of this conspiracy. The examples nearly always refer to Jews.

After the NZNF, Bolton went on to form New Force with David Crawford. The name of the group is symbolically meant to refer

to the opposition to both capitalism and communism, to left and right, hence a 'new force'. Although he does admit '....In terms of convenience, I often use the term right wing myself'. New Force received a high profile for reasons already discussed. Bolton readily admits that while they received some support, the number of votes cast for New Force was a disaster.

*...to get the lowest score around the country was a bit humiliating in some respects....The only way I can explain it really is that every time the public saw the term New Force, they also saw the word fascist (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

He noted that it could have been worse.

*...really the reporting by the media hasn't been too unfair or too unreasonable by and large...they could have done a lot worse and come out with real smears trying to associate us with Nazism deliberately (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

In fact, the imagery and arguments of New Force were very much within the tradition of neo-fascism, although the emphasis firmly linked them to British neo-fascism. A major New Force poster takes its picture from a 1933 election poster for Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party in Germany. The Manifesto draws directly on the racial typological arguments of the German National Socialist, especially the emphasis on 'race' being the basis for a nation. On economic issues, New Force have updated the terminology and some arguments (e.g. reference to the New International Economic Order, or the use of A.N. Field material and references) although the traditional reliance on a conspiracy theory including elements such as Jewish-communist-capitalist alliances are retained.

In the same period that he helped form New Force, Bolton also began the Church of Odin (along with Crawford). He had been involved with the Mormon Church (he held the Aaronic priesthood for 6 months) but he left because of the amount of 'inter-racial marriage'. Odinism seeks to avoid 'the destructive creed of Judeo-Christianity' and to restore the gods of Norse legend to religious pre-eminence. The Church of Odin was launched with a publication and Bolton wrote one of the

articles, 'The Bible is not a racist book' (in fact, meaning that the Bible was not sufficiently racist in its orientation and tenets). He accepts the religious interpretation offered by the British Israelites, and the attraction of the Church of Odin lay in its emphasis on nature as opposed to materialism and industrialisation. But it was not a successful enterprise.

*Me and David [Crawford] had a bit of a debate over the pros and cons of starting a Church of Odin something along the religious line and I could never quite see what the use of it would be to tell you the truth...how the hell do you get rid of this stigma in the public mind that something called the Church of Odin is automatically going to be associated with a pack of idiots, because it seems a bit strange calling yourself High Godi (Kerry Bolton, Personal Interview, 18/12/81).*

The Church really did very little and Bolton is undoubtedly correct in his assessment of its reception. It seemed to fragment the organisational base of New Force and helped to do little other than divert the energies and attention of the small number of activists.

Bolton can offer a realistic and intelligent assessment of the role and impact of the groups with which he has been involved. His activism spans the 1970s, from an early involvement with the National Socialist Party, the New Zealand Rhodesia Society and the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party, through the NZNF to New Force and the Nationalist Workers Party. He subscribes to League of Rights material and has been involved in many public campaigns. But he accepts that these groups are seen as part of the 'lunatic fringe' by commentators and the media, and while expressing disappointment that it is not otherwise, he shares few illusions about the minimal impact that these groups have. He represents a post-war generation of activists in the fascist tradition. He, like others, is well-versed in the literature and history of this tradition, and he is also well-read with regard to left-wing literature. He is able to articulate the principal arguments of a variety of positions, and ignorance is not something for which he can be criticised. And yet, his background is Labour and he comes from a working class area, he received his schooling within a 'working class' school and his occupation is skilled manual. This aspect is apparent in his strong anti-capitalist beliefs and his acceptance of working class institutions such as the trade unions,

albeit as subservient to the nation/state. Unlike petty-bourgeois groups, with whom he often shares little in common, he is tolerant of the rights of the working class to organise and express certain views. His regret is that they don't express racist arguments more often and support groups that articulate such ideologies.

(c) Christchurch Groups

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Christchurch spawned a number of groups that fell within the particular tradition described here. The European Liberation Front (ELF) made a brief appearance in 1980. League Review (no.27, 1980) reported that the ELF were going to produce a broadsheet, Take Heed, and they also indicated that there was no link between the Christchurch group and a British group of the same name (League Review, no.28, 1980). Another Christchurch group, Viking Youth, was formed in mid-February 1979. A request came from Paul Jarvis, the leader of the United Kingdom Viking Youth to initiate a group in New Zealand and Alan Smith responded. It was also the hope that a NSDAP-Auslandorganisation would be established but there is no evidence to suggest that it ever got underway. Viking Youth, however, were active and they included 'Special Members' from 11 to 17 years who circulated anti-Semitic material. Did Six Million Die?, The Naked Capitalist and Putnam's Race and Reason were placed in libraries and circulated amongst members of a Christchurch war-gaming club. There were also claims that some of this material was read to school classes in Christchurch.

Viking Youth and the European Liberation Front along with the White Defence League, New Order, the National Socialist Movement and the KKK, all Christchurch-based, formed the White People's Alliance (WPA) in 1979. A member of the League of St. George (UK) reported after visiting them that they were 'keen, serious, well-organised' (League Review, no.29, 1980). The WPA subsequently produced a very comprehensive manifesto in 1980 titled Our Survival (White People's Alliance, 1980). It was submitted to the Race Relations Conciliator in support of their views on race relations in New Zealand. The

Manifesto is a complex document that takes material from a number of neo-fascist sources in Europe and the United States.

The main themes concern the importance of 'race' and the identification of 'the enemy'. The main enemies are seen as the ideologies of Marxism and international finance while the groups involved include Jews, capitalists and financiers. The manifesto makes a detailed case for the importance of 'race'. It states that 'there is nothing whatever in science which supports the view that all races of men are equal and alike' and 'the denial that serious harm can result from racial integration and mongrelization is clearly immoral'. Acknowledgement is made to Francis Parker Yockey, a fascist who founded the European Liberation Front in 1948 and who died in prison in 1960. Despite the inclusion of names and an address, the WPA has refused to acknowledge correspondence and activity has been largely non-existent since 1980. One of the few incidents involved a WPA member in the stabbing of a Maori in Auckland in 1981 (see Auckland Star, 7/11/81). Crawford (see above) acknowledged their existence but said he was not a member.

The other Christchurch-based groups revolved around Crawford. These included NZNF, New Force and the Church of Odin. There did not appear to be much overlap in the membership of the WPA and those groups involving Crawford although they shared the same philosophical and political approach to issues. The Church of Odin began in Christchurch in 1980. Odinism is based in Florida and it centres on a particular conception of 'man' and earth which refers to a complex set of gods (Babler, Freyja, Odin Allfather, Thor the Godslayer). Odin the god is said to have brought the whole universe into existence while Odin the man is believed to have led the Goths to northern lands, to have invented the runic alphabet and to have established religion and civilisation. Odinism was established in New Zealand after a conference held on 13 and 14 December 1980. The two founders were Crawford and Bolton. Crawford (Christchurch Star, 7/11/81) pointed out that the Church of Odin is exclusively for whites (in fact, the entry form specifies a 'white of non-Jewish descent') and that the main Odinic law requires loyalty to 'race'. One of the few activities of the Church was the celebration of the summer solstice (mid-June, i.e. the northern solstice) in Christchurch in 1980 and 1981. Bolton withdrew

'when it became obvious that the Odinists were merely going to be a cult without any relevance to New Zealand politics' (letter to the editor, Herald, 26/6/83).

These Christchurch groups indicate the very narrow base of working class fascism in New Zealand, and the tendency of such groups to fragment and reform in a constant process. Even within the same centre (i.e. Christchurch) where there are similar groups competing for the same potential or actual group of activists, they have not been able to come together to organise around a single organisation. They share a suspicion not only of the identified 'enemy' but also of each other, and this is compounded by the desire to establish various permutations of the same political/ideological tradition with power accorded to one individual or another. Their history is one of ever-changing organisations and allegiances that are only occasionally observed by the public. This reflects the absence of an appropriate leadership, notably charismatic (cf. Nyomarky, 1967) and the reliance on an insecure ideological tradition. The alternative is provided by reactionary representatives of the old petty-bourgeoisie in Christchurch, Zenith Applied Philosophy and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement. The charismatic leadership (Dahloff) provides an authority structure and an ideological cohesion, despite a sectarian mysticism and a very complex sign system, that creates an enduring organisational base for the reproduction of ZAP and TRIM ideology. Commercial enterprises provide the finance to engage in political and ideological struggles, and the performance of ZAP in particular over a period of more than ten years gives it a permanence and influence, in spite of disaffection by some ideologues, that is very different from the experience of neo-fascism in the same locale.

### Conclusion

The distinctions between the ideological emphasis and representational ties of the old petty-bourgeois and working class groups are now explicated. The reactionary groups of the old petty-bourgeoisie are committed to defending the interests of petty-commodity production. For them, the market, 'competition' and 'risk' are supreme adjudicators

in organising social and economic relations under capitalism. Centralised or monopoly control, whether proletarian or capital in origin, distorts the 'natural' operations of free enterprise. On all these points, working class neo-fascist groups part company with old petty-bourgeois interpellations. The market is negatively seen as an extension of capitalist control, and as a necessary corrective, the state and working class collectivism must ensure that national considerations are given precedence. The state is the structural embodiment of a nation, which in turn is the territorial manifestation of a 'race'. Capitalism is seen as an unacceptable means of production and ownership because it does not reflect these assumptions. Economic relations and structures are perceived quite differently by old petty-bourgeois and neo-fascist groups.

Common perceptions about 'race' provide a degree of discourse overlap but even here, there are important distinctions which affect the political potential of the two traditions. Neo-fascist groups are indeed racial revolutionaries as their interpellation and political strategies attest. As with the old petty-bourgeoisie, neo-fascist groups attempt to invest public debate with racist arguments, and 'the people' are constructed as a 'race'. But the reticence of old petty-bourgeois groups concerning the implications of this ideological construction are dispensed with. Neo-fascist groups are unequivocal and direct in their articulation of racist arguments. There is no hesitation in suggesting that Maori and Pacific Island groups should have political and social rights withdrawn. And whereas petty-bourgeois groups are often guarded when discussing why 'race' is so important, neo-fascist groups are forthright in asserting that racial contamination via intermarriage dissipates the 'self-evident' virtues and hereditary achievements of the Anglo-Saxon. Any mixed ancestry is regarded as contamination, so that the person in question is automatically classified as a member of the 'lower' category, non-white. The directness of this world-view is both a characteristic and a major obstacle in gaining legitimacy. The historical importance of an indigenous Polynesian group and their contemporary significance in working class struggles clearly limits an interpellation that defines them as the critical enemy. Various neo-fascist groups have tried to soften the ideological message by stressing the anti-capitalist content or by

employing the logic of ethnic nationalism. That is, the arguments that are currently used to argue for societal resources for minority ethnic groups (greater autonomy, the preservation of ethnic traditions) are applied to Pakehas. But such transparent attempts at constructing an acceptable racism have universally failed, and the interpellations of neo-fascist groups are universally perceived as unacceptably extreme (see survey material by Roberts, Walsh and Sullivan, n.d., for details).

The revolutionary label applies to the political style of neo-fascism as well as to its ideological expressions. Neo-fascist groups do not accept the petty-bourgeois conviction that the struggle against hegemonic control and the dominant bloc can be carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle. Both traditions agree that political systems of the liberal democratic state have been corrupted, but the neo-fascist response is to advocate the development of an authoritarian corporate state which would mould a national unity and system around the interests of the 'white race'. The old petty-bourgeoisie vehemently reject such a role for the state. But the radicalism of neo-fascist groups extends further. Most groups dispense with the mechanisms of a parliamentary democracy and participate in a strategy of tension. They threaten violence or they actually harass the target groups of their ideology. This does not exclude them from competing for votes in an election (King-Ansell in 1972, 1975, 1978; Zandbergen in 1981) but this aspect is considerably less important than the verbal or physical offensive against 'opposing' groups or ideologies. This emphasis reflects the male mateship and glorification of male aggression that is a particular characteristic of neo-fascism in New Zealand.

A commitment to the politics of violence tends to be confined to a period of activism during the late teens or early twenties of most followers. The members of neo-fascist groups are nearly all from post-war generations and are usually Pakeha working class youths who identify with an Anglo or German nazism. But the numbers attracted to this expression of rebellion and radicalism are small, and the tenuous reproduction of the tradition is further threatened by the continual sectarian fragmentation. As Nyomarky (1967) observes, the reliance on

the authority of an ideology to ensure group unity is problematic and the propensity for schism amongst such groups is high. With the possible exception of King-Ansell, New Zealand neo-fascism has lacked charismatic leaders and instead they have had to rely on the persuasiveness of key texts and the appeal of 'swastika chic'. The result has been the formation of new groups at frequent intervals and the dissolution of others. The tradition is really only sustained by key activists (King-Ansell, Thompson, Bolton) whose political careers illustrate the convolutions and changing allegiances of neo-fascists. This factor, when combined with the limited representational ties to a working class base, means that neo-fascism does not represent a major force, even potentially, in political and ideological struggles in New Zealand.

CHAPTER SEVEN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FASCIST  
AND EXTREME RIGHT-WING INTERPELLATIONS:  
BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND  
NEW ZEALAND

*In the light of history it will ever be  
regarded as a curious and temporary  
aberration of the human mind that great  
nations should elect a Government to do  
a job and should then elect an Opposition  
to stop them doing it.*

Oswald Mosley (1938)

Tomorrow We Live

*Blair Peach was not an Englishman  
Him come from New Zealand  
Now they kill him and him dead and gone  
But his memory lingers on...*

*Blair Peach was an ordinary man  
Blair Beach took a simple stand  
Agains di fashists and dem wickid plans  
So deh beat im till his life was down.*

Linton Kwesi Johnson

Bass Culture

This chapter analyses the differences and similarities between extreme right-wing political and ideological struggles in New Zealand, Britain, Australia and Canada. Britain is included because it represents the cultural and material origin of the dominant relations of production in the three settler societies. But political and ideological relations differ significantly between Britain and the other formations. A reactionary working class fraction with some bourgeois involvement has provided a base for fascist interpellations since the early years of this century in Britain. In contrast, this form of working class radicalism has played a minor role in the other three societies where petty-bourgeois extremism has been much more dominant. Here the relative immaturity of capitalism, in the sense that its development has been recent, combined with the importance of rurally-based production, has given the old petty-bourgeoisie a limited space in national political and ideological relations. The three settler societies provide a comparison with Britain in this regard.

In addition, it is argued that New Zealand significantly differs from Australia and Canada. One of the most important differences is the co-option of petty-bourgeois concerns into New Zealand's dominant political discourse via support for the Labour Party in the 1930s. Petty-bourgeois struggles were thus neutralised by being encompassed in a liberal political movement. This contrasts with Australia where alliances were with conservative and reactionary political representatives. In Canada, where provincial considerations were more important, petty-bourgeois political representatives in the form of Social Credit, gained power, but in doing so the oppositional elements of petty-bourgeois struggles were neutralised. New Zealand was also different to the extent that it lacked significant German, Italian and French migrant communities, and therefore a base for imported fascism in the 1930s. An ethnic nationalism which served to unify the migrant community across class lines was a feature of this form of fascism. Equally, the appeal of anti-Semitism was minor in New Zealand compared with its resonance in Canada, Australia or Britain. It is only in recent history that this element has become noticeable in New Zealand's political and ideological relations.

These comparisons are elaborated here. The intent is to indicate, albeit briefly and descriptively, the way in which New Zealand developments differ from the trajectory of extreme right-wing interpellations in these other countries. But there are also points of similarity. Traditionally, Britain has supplied both activists and ideology for New Zealand groups, despite the contradiction posed by the transference of urban, often working class interpellations to a New Zealand dominated by different political agendas and class struggles. More recently, the internationalisation of political groups such as the League of Rights has seen a transference of political programmes, strategies and ideologies between New Zealand, Australia and Canada. The derivative nature of contemporary petty-bourgeois interpellations in New Zealand is also explored.

#### (A) BRITAIN

Britain, in contrast with the ideological and political relations of New Zealand, has seen the articulation of fascist interpellations from the opening decades of this century, and in two periods of exceptional crisis, the 1930s and 1970s, this expression has threatened to become a mass class action in a struggle against the dominant bloc. The trajectory and potential of this political form in Britain differs markedly from its articulation in New Zealand, although it is clearly episodic in Britain and has crumbled into factional fragmentation after both periods. But the other contrast derives from the class base in the two contexts and the implications of this for the articulation of fascist interpellations. In Britain, an important component of fascism has been a working class membership. As Husbands (1981) notes, racially exclusionist movements penetrated the politics of the English working class in the 1930s in a manner that is different even from the other industrial societies of Europe. Husbands argues that the parochialism and the 'corresponding sensitivity to apparent threats to its integrity' of the English working class is not found in the politics of the French working class


for example (see Husbands, 1981: 93). Thus, in comparison with the role of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism in providing a focus for reactionary interpellations in New Zealand, British fascism has contained an exoteric appeal to a mass working class membership that has important anti-bourgeois, and anti-petty-bourgeois, elements to reinforce the representational tie to the working class.

These politics were first articulated in 1902 when the British Brothers League was established, at least in a form that approximates contemporary examples of right-wing extremism. The first explicitly fascist organisation was Beamish's The Britons (1919),<sup>1</sup> and it was followed by the British Fascists (1923), the Imperial Fascist League (1929), the National Workers Party (1933) and the New Party (1931) (see Diagram 4). The last named was later to become the British Union of Fascists. While the membership of these groups was predominantly working class, individuals from the bourgeoisie played an important role in the hierarchy of British fascism. The leadership for this manifestation of political expression was derived from the 'ruling or opinion-forming classes' who were accustomed to making themselves heard and felt (Pryce-Jones, 1980). They included representatives from still powerful bourgeois fractions who were part of a political and economic elite (e.g. Mosley) while others represented less powerful (e.g. Catholics) or declining fractions (e.g. Chesterton). European fascism was held to provide a model for Britain, and it attracted two different groups according to Griffiths (1983). One group was attracted by the leadership model and the corporatist theories of European fascism. It sought a return to primitive virtues and a move away from twentieth-century materialism (Griffiths, 1983: 18-19). The second group was derived from a section of English catholicism:

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1. The Britons' Patriotic Society was founded in July 1919 by Captain Henry Hamilton Beamish with the object of eradicating 'Alien influences from our Politics and Industries.' They published material such as Why Are the Jews Hated (1936) and in 1952 claimed that '...nearly all that is known today concerning the Jewish question throughout the English-speaking world is... due to the pioneering work of the Britons Society'. Beamish presided over the Britons' until 1947 after internment in Zimbabwe during the war. The Britons' specialised in publishing The Protocols, even during the war (1500 copies in 1941, 1000 in 1943). After Beamish left, Beamish House was acquired by Colin Jordan (see Diagram 4).

DIAGRAM 4: MAJOR TRADITIONS IN BRITISH RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM, 1923-1982



Sources: Scott, 1972; Troyna, 1982; Searchlight, various

*It was a Catholic movement, nostalgic for an imaginary time when the Church had been central to life, when all had been stable, ordered, hierarchical and traditional. This idyll had, in their view, been destroyed by the industrial revolution which was the cause of all social evil, including the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few powerful capitalists. The answer was the return to the medieval concepts of property, and a form of guild system (Griffiths, 1983: 59).*

Both positions contained elements that appealed to the anti-bourgeois sentiments of the working class. Equally, they shared a common characteristic by 'sectoralizing all class interpretations and subordinating it to interpellations conceived in terms of society as a whole' (Laclau, 1979: 136). Evil was personified in racial terms (cf. Billig, 1978) and prejudice, notably anti-Semitism, became part of the central doctrine of British fascism.

Typical of those who articulated and led this ideological development was A.K. Chesterton. He was born in Witwatersrand, South Africa and educated in South Africa and Britain. He came to Britain as a reporter in 1924 and joined Mosley and the British Union of Fascists in the early 1930s. He left in 1938, and after the War was involved in a range of reactionary groups. He helped found two of these: the League of Empire Loyalists (1954) and the National Front (1967).<sup>2</sup> He toured New Zealand and Australia on a number of occasions and he shared an Australian speaking tour with Butler (see New Times, 6/5/60). Apart from his involvement in the above organisations, he played an instrumental role in popularising certain world views and in acting as caretaker for these views in the interval between the 1930s and the 1960s. A coterie (a group devoted to keeping alive a particular tradition; see Billig, 1978) was built around the leadership of Chesterton, and ensured the preservation of key ideological elements of 1930s fascist interpellations. Candour, which began in 1953, had as a byline: Founded by A.K. Chesterton to defend

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2. The National Front will often be referred to as the NF in this chapter.

National Sovereignty against the menace of International Finance. It provided a vehicle for his theories on the international conspiracy that surrounded finance and credit. His writing focussed on Jews as an essential element in this financial conspiracy (see Candour, nos. 262-371, 31/10/58-2/2/59), and the importance of racial cleansing to 'restore' a British Volksgemeinschaft was one of the enduring themes of his world view.<sup>3</sup>

Chesterton became involved in a very different form of political expression in the post-war years. His League of Empire Loyalists was based on old petty-bourgeois concerns at the contraction of the British Empire and the influence of monopoly capital. The main thrust of this group's activities was to seek the restoration of the might of the British Empire and sovereignty, and the relations of domination and influence that accompanied it. The petty-bourgeois base and ideology meant that the League was attached to the Conservative Party. But by the late 1950s, the Party sought to distance itself from the more extreme views and actions of the League of Empire Loyalists, especially after it disrupted a Conservative Party conference. With the breaking of this representational tie and a migration of old petty-bourgeois support from the League to the Conservative Party, the League adopted a more reactionary position as a coterie identifying with the core values of traditional fascism. When Chesterton helped form the National Front (NF) in 1967, he was accorded status as an important figure in the ideological tradition of the extreme right (although this status did not save him from being ousted in the early 1970s). His contribution had been to preserve the arguments of this tradition during a period when they were out of favour. Billig and Bell (1980: 4) also observe that the League of Empire Loyalists prepared the ground for a new generation of fascist activists, notably Jordan, Tyndall, Webster and Bean (see Diagram 4).

Chesterton's ideological model and orientation was firmly nationalist. The other leader of the 1930s who also reappeared in the

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3. The nature of his beliefs never really changed much between the 1930s and 1973 when he died (for examples see Candour; Rand Daily Mail, 28/6/65). He was especially influenced by the New Zealander A.N. Field (see A.K. Chesterton, The Menace of the Money Power. An Analysis of World Government by Finance, 1946), Major C.H. Douglas (Douglas was complimentary about Candour) and Denis Fahey.

1950s, although he too was rejected in the 1970s, was Oswald Mosley. Mosley was influenced by those who wanted the British Union of Fascists to imitate Italian and German fascism, and this produced a move away from a fascism that was uniquely British, to an adoption of the principal elements of international (European) fascism.<sup>4</sup>

*...the emphasis on philosophical ideas, which saw British fascism as a pragmatic problem-solving movement based on contemplative action leading to the creative evolution of mankind, was superseded by a dismal anti-Semitism...a dreary conspiracy theory which blamed the Jews for all the supposed ills of the world and slavishly justified Italian and German foreign policy objectives after 1935 (Thurlow, 1981:11).*

Thurlow, and Billig and Bell (1980), argue that Mosley's brand of European fascism was rejected by post-war groups as the National Front and others opted for a 'pseudo-scientific racism' that eschewed international concerns and sentiments in favour of a profound chauvinism. Certainly, the association with Europe was anathema to Chesterton and the League of Empire Loyalists (Billig and Bell, 1980: 19).

Another element that underwent a change was anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitism of the early fascist groups was a reaction to the threat held to be posed by Jewish migrants from Eastern Europe who began to arrive in Britain in relatively large numbers in the late nineteenth century. The working class communities of areas such as East London where these migrants settled, responded by racialising political and ideological relations. That is, the ideological response was constructed around the material and cultural threat that the Jewish 'race' was said to present to the English working class in an immediate sense, and to the racial purity and financial integrity of the English community in a national sense. And it was groups such as

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4. Mosley gained financially from this orientation. Home Office papers released in 1984 (see *Guardian*, 18/10/84; *Daily Telegraph*, 18/10/84) show that large sums were paid to the British Union of Fascists in German, Swiss, French and American currency. It is estimated that Mussolini, for example, gave £40,000 per year to the British Union of Fascists. The links with the German National Socialists, however, were less cordial.

the Britons' Patriotic Society that articulated these world views. The 'Britons' not only offered a political expression of this racism but they also added important ideological layers to commonsense beliefs. Their publication of The Protocols provided 'factual substance' to casually held views and rounded out the reasons for seeing the Jews as a 'threat'.<sup>5</sup> In the 1970s, anti-Semitism was still present but it was secondary to the interpretation of Afro-Caribbean and Asian migrants as 'the problem'. The location of these latter migrants in the working class parallels events in the early part of this century in England, and for similar reasons (material competition, racialisation, scapegoating), the decline of urban industrial economies and the scarcity of resources are attributed to the arrival of 'coloured immigrants'. Jews are still the enemy but in a Manichean sense of controlling events as 'international financiers'.

Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning one final ideologist who had little influence in Britain, but was part of this early attempt to interpret political and economic events as the product of Jewish control and motives. Major C.H. Douglas had an important influence on political initiatives and interpretations in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and on some British activists such as A.K. Chesterton. Douglas began his analysis with the issue of how to alter the rate at which incomes were distributed so that it was greater than the costs of producing goods. He suggested that dividends should be distributed to citizens in line with any increase in output (see Jordan and Drakeford, 1980: 167), and to alter the concept of credit. He felt that the opposition to his analysis and the suggested solutions came from highly centralised financial power, and in one of his most important books, Social Credit (1924), this power is characterically Jewish, or as Douglas expresses it, part of the 'Jewish Question'. He invests his theory with a primitive racial determinism arguing that Jews are the 'protagonists of collectivism' (Douglas, 1924: 30), that they exhibit the 'race-conscious idea to an

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5. The 'Britons', while they were particularly active in the 1930s, continue their propaganda role. In 1961, they despatched a quarter of a million books and pamphlets around the world.

extent unapproached elsewhere' (Douglas, 1924: 29) and that the 'Anglo-Saxon character probably remains the greatest bulwark against tyranny' (Douglas, 1924: 147). Other books expand upon these arguments. The Nature of Democracy (1934) argued that there was a world-wide attempt to discredit democracy, while The Monopolistic Idea (1934) discussed the 'financial hegemony' of the world. Douglas's cosmic understanding exhibits many of the elements (suspicion of democracy, anti-bourgeois, anti-Semitic, racism, anti-collectivism) that characterise petty-bourgeois reactionary interpellations, and this is an important factor in his influence on political movements in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, and his relative unimportance for the main political movements of the right in Britain.

Leaving Douglas aside (although his role in codifying reactionary arguments and providing others with a systematically constructed ideology should not be overlooked), Mosley and Chesterton indicate the often bourgeois origins of 1930s fascist leadership. But the mass membership drew significant numbers from the English working class. Husbands (1982) argues that an important reason for this support was the spatial connotations of racial exclusionism amongst working class communities. Areas in East London, especially Bethnal Green, Shoreditch and Hoxton, have had a history of small scale manufacturing units, poverty and economic casualism which when combined with a homogeneous native-born population, have produced a territoriality or defended neighbourhood that has directed animosity towards any 'threat' to local integrity. Hence in the 1970s, less than five percent of residents in these areas were born in the New Commonwealth and there was still a 'firm territorial core of white, working-class East Enders...' (Husbands, 1982: 6). The result is apparent in terms of support for fascist groups. The British Brothers League gained support from Limehouse and Stepney between 1901 and 1906, and the British Union of Fascists was strong in the same area between 1934 and 1938. This was continued for the Union Movement from 1949 to 1973, and for the National Front from 1969 to 1980. In the case of the latter group, Husbands (1982: 19) differentiates between activism and the readiness to engage in overt racist violence, which is characteristic of Stepney, Bethnal Green and some areas of

Spitalfields and Whitechapel, and voting support for the National Front which is apparent in Shoreditch and Bethnal Green. In the former case, he explains it as:

*...the existence of some form of very locally based and socially transmitted vigilantist culture whose origins go back at least to the anti-Semitic agitation that occurred at the turn of the century (Husbands, 1982: 21).*

This spatial parochialism is not sufficient in itself, even though it does mean that some communities have a history of supporting and advancing extreme right-wing views. In the three periods of extreme right-wing activity in Britain, the early 1900s, the 1930s and the 1970s, the racialisation of some migrant groups and the perception of them as an economic and social threat has been a feature. The reinterpretation of ideological relations was a manifestation of changes to the material conditions of the working class brought about by the transformation or crisis of British capitalism. Fascism, while it may appear to be backward looking, in fact uses a '...radical rhetoric to appeal to the insecurities of the working class' (Billig, 1978: 254). It readily identifies, in a populist manner, the 'cause' of the economic and social crisis in terms of a racially deterministic interpretation. The excision of the offending group will eliminate in a single move the reason for the crisis. In these characteristics the factors that produced pre-war and post-war extreme right-wing groups were fundamentally the same. The differences came in the outgroup identified as the 'problem'.

The growth of post-war fascism, or neo-fascism, dates from the 1950s with the so-called 'race riots' in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958. Small neo-fascist working class groups promoted the conflict, and the Union Movement (Mosley) and the National Labour Party (a fascist group) contested the 1959 election. This indeed has been a feature of many post-war movements, both in Britain and elsewhere. But post-war groups such as the Union Movement were hampered by the centrality of anti-Semitism in their exoteric appeal. The fact that Britain had fought a war which was 'legitimated in terms of a struggle against fascism' (Miles, 1983: 2) and therefore the mass resonance of anti-Semitism was limited, was not fully grasped by the

leaders. The situation only changed with the politicisation of 'race'. The political economy of labour migration, which combined a large influx of coloured immigrants (74,000 in 1954, 1.5 million in 1971; see Nugent, 1976: 302) with the urban decay of industrial Britain, was the basis for a reconstruction of political and ideological relations (see Miles, 1982). The racialisation of relations was legitimated and extended by the activities of the media and the state, especially in the tendency for major political organisations to accept that the primary 'cause' and/or 'problem' was one of coloured immigration. The National Front was an important beneficiary (and initiator) in these struggles, and exemplifies the working class character of this tradition.

(i) National Front

A National Front party was first formed in 1953 by Andrew Fountaine but it soon collapsed for lack of support. It wasn't until 1967, and the concern of A.K. Chesterton and others, that the National Front was reformed. The trigger for this concern was the 1966 General Election in which it appeared to the extreme right that the Conservative and Labour parties were abrogating their responsibility on the question of coloured immigration. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Conservative Party leadership made a 'non-decision' (cf. Taylor, 1982: 11) on immigration and this was perceived by reactionary sectors as an abandonment of white voters. The representational tie between the Conservative Party and part of its constituency was weakened, and as Gramsci (1971: 276) comments, the morbid symptoms of an interregnum appeared. The number of political organisations seeking to capitalise on the crisis generated by the interregnum escalated and a coalition of existing extreme right-wing groups produced the National Front (see Diagram 4). An important facet of this group's activities was an involvement in electoral contests, and by 1973, when the National Front received a significant share (16 percent) of the vote in a by-election at Bromwich, it appeared to be attracting support and legitimacy with this strategy. It was reflected in the rapidly growing organisational strength of the party. There were 32 branches in July 1973, and 110 in February 1974. The

membership peaked in 1975 at 21,000 after the 1972-73 debate on whether Ugandan Asians should be allowed entry to Britain. But as the ideological terrain of racism was increasingly contested by fractions of the Conservative Party, including the leadership, the tenuous representational links between the National Front and certain working class and petty-bourgeois communities diminished. The membership declined to 12,500 in 1976 after the breakaway National Party was formed, and by 1984, there was a membership of barely 1000 (Ludmer, 1985). By this time, the fragile political unity of the coalition that was the base of the organisational National Front had broken up, exposing the contradictory working class and petty-bourgeois tendencies.

One of the key tensions occurred between the petty-bourgeois leadership, with their commitment to political respectability (e.g. an aversion to the label of Nazi or fascist) and the strategy of contesting elections, and the working class membership, or sections of it, who were much less convinced of the suitability of such aims. The latter were cynical about the gains that would result from an alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie or through using the ballot box. They were much more committed to traditional fascist ideology and strategies. These included the strategy of targeting the coloured community as the 'problem' and the willingness to use direct violence, and a strong conception of nation and national (racial) sovereignty. The tension between the two factions was apparent from the beginning and can be seen in the differences between the petty-bourgeois League of Empire Loyalists and the working class British National Party. Both agreed on the centrality of British sovereignty, but Chesterton's views on petty commodity production and the desired political system were at variance with the working class notions of collective action, of statolatry and attempts at immediate and direct 'racial cleansing'. These latter strategies and perceptions were not dependent upon the need to seek political support through the ballot box. Later Tyndall and Webster were to represent the ideological and political differences contained in the coalition. In 1983, the latter adopted a

Strasserite position<sup>6</sup> that was radically anti-capitalist as well as anti-Communist while Tyndall and the British National Party sought to maintain an organisation which was viewed as a legitimate political representative by the petty-bourgeoisie (see Ludmer, 1985: 93-94).

(a) Ideology

The National Front developed its ideological package from a number of elements and traditions (see Spoonley, 1980, for a detailed analysis). As Thurlow (1981) points out, the economic aspects are taken from the British Union of Fascists while its racism comes from Arnold Spencer Leese (from the Imperial Fascist League,<sup>7</sup> see Gorman, 1975) and ideologists like Chesterton. Onto this racism, authors such as Richard Verrall have added pseudo-scientific arguments to provide a degree of contemporary legitimacy. Taylor (1982: 72-73) argues that the central elements of this world view derive from Tudor, specifically Elizabethan England, and it revolves around the notions of a 'homogeneous stock', 'eugenic consciousness' and the rejection of the liberal state. There is certainly a commitment to these elements but it is somewhat tenuous to describe them as linked to Tudor England in any meaningful way. As Scott (1972: 409-410) notes in his study of a branch of the National Front, only a few NF members understood the theology that required a familiarity with the terminology of racism and conspiracy; the mass membership got by on 'superstition and dogma' after they had been attracted by single issues. The National

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6. The so-called Strasserite position (identified as such by both commentators and neo-fascists) is an interesting tradition in British fascism. Essentially it seeks to integrate socialist elements (recently support for the striking miners, anti-missile protests and social ecology) with nationalism. It is an extension of working class fascism that combines notions of fraternity and class solidarity with racial mysticism and devout nationalism. An echo of this position can be found in New Zealand groups such as the National Front and the Nationalist Workers Party.
  7. The Imperial Fascist League was founded in 1928 by Arnold Spencer Leese. Leese was born in 1878 and was a major and early activist in British fascism. He was arrested in 1936 for slander against Jews and imprisoned during World War II. See Gorman (1975) for further information.

Front literature existed, for the main, to reinforce notions about the threat posed by coloured immigration and the competence of traditional dominant institutions to remedy the situation. Thus many of the detailed anti-Semitic and conspiracy elements of the interpellation were really only understood by insiders (see Scott, 1972; Fielding, 1982). Taylor (1979: 127), using Almond, talks of an 'esoteric' appeal to intellectual insiders and a simplified 'exoteric' appeal to a mass membership or electorate.

This qualification aside, the appeal of the National Front lay in the conceptual primacy given to 'race', so that its ideology and policies were constrained by this central idea-element. Racial homogeneity was seen as the defining characteristic of a nation and nationalism represented racial consciousness (Spoonley, 1980: 60). Therefore, multi-racialism was biologically and culturally impossible to obtain, and a racially exclusionary policy the only possible salvation. Confirmation for a conspiracy theory was most commonly seen in the denial and obfuscation of these self-evident truths by agencies such as the media. Thus 'race' had total, or near total, explanatory power and the aim was to return to some mythical past when a racially pure community (Volksgemeinschaft) was said to exist (Spoonley, 1980).

Inevitably, the fundamentalism of 'race' in the National Front's ideology tends to overshadow other elements. Whatever the issue - housing, employment, education, welfare services or crime - racist arguments are brought to bear. Complex social and economic processes are reduced to an explanation which poses the central problem as the presence of Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities in Britain. But the traditional concerns of working class fascism are also there, if somewhat obscured. Four principal elements can be identified although there are many others and arguments cover the whole gamut of political and economic issues. Firstly, and in very obvious contrast with petty-bourgeois interpellations, the National Front glorifies the state. This statolatry is not the same as the instrumentalism of the old petty-bourgeoisie (i.e. the state as the protector of petty-commodity production with little responsibility for

much else). Rather, the state becomes the repository of power and the arbiter of social worth. The National Front believes that individual rights and preferences should be subordinate to the interests of the state. Secondly, the organisation opposes both laissez-faire capitalism and international free trade (see Fielding, 1981: 67), and believes that private enterprise should be tolerated so long as it does not impinge upon the authority and autonomy of the state (Spoonley, 1980: 63). Thirdly, the National Front believes that unions should be stronger, not weaker (Fielding, 1981: 67). They are seen as an important factor in social change and control, but unions are also viewed by the National Front as protecting working class interests in a way that no other agency, including political parties, has done. And finally, they reject the liberal-democratic state and parliamentary processes. The state envisaged by the National Front is authoritarian and makes democracy irrelevant. The disdain for debate and tolerance is reflected in the National Front's attempts to control the streets by confrontation and violence. These elements, in brief, are the central ideological concerns of the National Front. The interpellation has changed in important respects from fascist interpellations of the 1930s. For instance in the choice of primary target group. But the commitment to an authoritarian, corporate state is reproduced and the ideological concern for the working class is readily apparent.

#### (b) Support

There has already been some discussion on the support for the NF. The historical willingness of some working class areas to support extreme right-wing views, or as Husbands (1983: 26) refers to it, 'local-level vulnerability', is an important factor. It produces a commitment to racial exclusiveness that Husbands contends is unlike Italian, French and German movements. Another characteristic is the appeal of the National Front for younger Britons. Its support has been highest amongst 18-21 year olds, in spite of the fact (or because of it) that many of the NF supporters (47%) and sympathisers (73%) acknowledge the Nazi characteristics of the group, while 49% and 69% agreed that the NF wanted a dictatorship, not a democracy (Husbands

and England, 1979).<sup>8</sup> In an NF area (South Hackney/Shoreditch), 1 in 3 of the 16-20 year olds were prepared to admit to racial hostility while 1 in 4 were supporters or prepared to support the NF (Weir, 1978: 189). Thus the profile of the NF supporter was that of a young male, unskilled, who was likely to have left school without qualifications. Billig and Cochrane (1981: 11) have shown that a commitment to the NF differs from political involvement in a conventional sense. They describe it as a cultural style particularly characteristic of working class males which revolves around the conscious rejection of the conventional school ethos, an admiration for toughness combined with sexism and racism. Certainly, marches and political meetings are dominated by young white males, with few females in evidence. It is only at the formal organisational meetings, such as an annual general meeting or the election of officers, that the median age increases and women are involved in any number. Support for the National Front is concentrated in certain urban, working class areas and it is poorly supported in rural areas, the smaller cities and towns, and rejected in the Celtic fringe. In 1974, for example, the NF received 3.2% mean vote in urban England, 1.8% in the rest of England and .4% in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (see Layton-Henry, 1978: 292). In local body elections, the NF received 7.7% on average in 1973, and 5.0% in the Greater London Council elections. They did best in the safe Labour seats where there was a below average turnout. But in terms of political support, the National Front never came close to winning a seat, and contrary to public opinion, their support declined as the decade proceeded. In 1970, they received 3.8% (on average) of the vote in the General Election, 3.2% in 1974 and 1.3% in 1979 (Miles, 1983: 3). The NF was certainly more ambitious towards the end of the decade, which may account for part of the decline in support. In 1979, the NF offered 303 candidates and as a result lost 45,450 pounds in electoral

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8. The willingness to identify with radical reactionary groups/philosophies (or indeed left-wing groups) appears to reflect the lack of political loyalty to traditional political representatives amongst the younger British. And it appears to be true for both the 1930s and the 1970s. In the 1930s, 56 percent of those asked to make a choice between fascism and communism chose fascism, while 70 percent of those under 30 years of age chose fascism (Brewer, 1980: 543).

deposits. In fact, the NF put up the largest number of candidates from an insurgent party and got the smallest vote per candidate on record (see Taylor, 1981: 538). It was this massive defeat that confirmed for the working class factions the inappropriateness of an electoral strategy, and which led to the fragmentation of the NF and a retrenchment of support to the strongholds in East London, West Yorkshire (e.g. Bradford) and the Midlands.

The decline in electoral support for the National Front can be attributed to a number of factors. The strategy of gaining power through the ballot box or at least the attempt to influence the national political agenda, was always constrained by the cynicism of the NF and its supporters on the efficacy and morality of parliamentary democracy. It was also contradicted by the political practices of the NF, and specifically its investment in street politics rather than the more refined and acceptable political campaigns waged through the media and controlled political meetings. The NF's street marches which were designed to reinforce solidarity and to encourage membership, gained extensive publicity for the NF initially. The image was one of the NF confronting the forces of anarchy and socialism in street battles as they sought to exercise their democratic right of public expression. They were also expressing, in an apparently representative way, the views of the English towards coloured immigrants in a style that more moderate political parties were disinclined to do. Miles (1983: 8) describes the 1977 Lewisham march as a symbolic act of territorial reoccupation. But while this may have attracted some, the resulting image was viewed unfavourably by many in Britain even if they shared the NF's sentiments about coloured immigrants.

Another factor was the initial gain in support for the NF as the state granted them a degree of legitimacy only to see this support dissipate as the Conservative Party successfully attracted the anti-immigrant vote in 1979. The NF exploited those:

*...feelings and opinions already aroused by the Powellite-inspired abandonment of restraint in the public debate on immigration as well as by the daily practices of the state and by the mass media's negative reinforcement of the image of black people* (Ben-Tovim and Gabriel, 1982: 161).

Both Labour and Conservative Parties came to equate coloured immigration with the problems of domestic race relations, so that politicians and the state accepted that the presence of coloured immigrants in Britain was problematic and undesirable (cf. Miles, 1983). This was reflected in public perceptions, and 24 percent of the white electorate favoured repatriation of coloured 'immigrants' (Husbands and England, 1979). The Conservative Party sought to re-establish representational ties with this constituency, and to supplant the NF's inroads. They explicitly took over some of the imagery and sentiments of the National Front, and by the 1979 election, they had undermined the Front's claim that it was the major representative of this ideological position. Two further factors played a part. One was the impact of the opposition to the NF, especially the Anti-Nazi League. As the name indicates, the purpose was to identify the National Front with the perjorative label 'Nazi' in the public arena. This challenged NF supporters, and potential supporters, on their willingness to back an organisation designated 'Nazi'. Many preferred more traditional political organisations that offered similar policies. The second factor was the transformism (Laclau, 1979: 115) practised by the Conservative Party. Laclau describes transformism as the political neutralisation of opposition by co-option into the power bloc. A number of neo-fascist and extreme right-wing activists were banned from the list of acceptable Conservative candidates by the Edward Heath administration. By the late 1970s, many of these people were allowed onto the list, and individuals such as Harvey Proctor went from being unacceptable because of their extremism to Members of Parliament. Similar co-option took place organisationally.<sup>9</sup> Thus

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9. The presence of 'extremists' ultimately had to be faced by the Conservative Party. The Young Conservatives played an important role with the publication of a report in September 1983 titled 'Draft Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Infiltration by the Extreme Right Into the Conservative Party, and the Level of Collaboration With the Right Wing of the Conservative Party'. The report took 15 months and provides 50 names of extreme activists involved in the Party. In March 1984, the Conservative Party reviewed its list of 1000 approved candidates and concluded that 30 extreme right-wing people had applied to be put on the lists. Another 9 already on the list had extreme right connections (see Guardian, 12/3/84; Sunday Times, 25/3/84).

popular-democratic interpellations which centred on 'race' and nation were prevented from becoming disarticulated from the dominant ideological discourse (cf. Laclau, 1979: 115).

The National Front was unable to respond to these developments, and the fragile unity of reactionary forces broke down from 1979. The NF continued with 4000 supporters (declining more recently to 1000), while the other major factions were encompassed in the New National Front (750 members), the British Democratic Party (500-600 members), the National Front Constitutional Movement, or NFCM (700-800 members) and the British Movement (see Taylor, 1981: 539) (see Diagram 4). The NFCM encapsulates the petty-bourgeois elements of the NF. It seeks political respectability and attempts to distance itself from the negative anti-Semitic and Nazi imagery of neo-fascism. It continues in the tradition of the early League of Empire Loyalists, both in ideology and ambition, and it aims to represent the same constituency. The NF and New NF reflect working class radical racism, and they are much more ready than in the 1970s to advocate racism publicly. They reject political respectability as inappropriate. The most extreme position in this part of the spectrum is occupied by the British Movement along with a number of small groups such as Column 88.

The British Movement, or BM, is based on an association with a primarily working class sub-culture known as skinheads. The skinheads made an appearance in the early 1970s, and then diminished in importance until their comeback in 1978-79. They brought with them a cultural style that focussed on 'Oi' music and bands such as Cockney Rejects, the Four-skins, Infa-Riot and Skrewdriver articulated the anarchistic and hedonistic ideology of the working class males who constituted their following. The clothing was explicitly intended as a preparation for violence in that it did not allow a handhold for opponents as well as providing the weapons of attack. The shaved head has been interpreted as 'not merely the anti-hippie [but as] the paradigmatic short-back-and-sides working man...' (North, 1981). The violence of the skinheads is displayed on the football terraces and street violence that is directed at coloured minority group members.

In 1977, there were 840 white assaults, robberies or violent thefts on blacks, and 1136 in 1980. Between 1979 and 1981 there were 68 BM/NF members convicted (Klug, 1982).

The BM experienced a very rapid growth in membership between 1979 and 1981 as the NF collapsed. The NF had helped create a climate that made it permissible to attack minority group members on the basis that they were coloured, aided by a refusal by state agencies such as the police to designate attacks as racially motivated or to respond in many cases to such attacks (see Searchlight for details). Another factor was the economic recession. Between April 1979 and October 1980, the unemployment figures for 16-17 year olds went from 9% to 19.9%, and for 18-19 year olds, from 9.4% to 15.2% (Taylor and Layton-Henry, 1981: 103). In these years, the BM went from 1000 in 1979 to 3000 in 1981. In the mid-1970s, there had been less than 300 members. Cochrane and Billig (1984: 255) show that in the West Midlands, support for the BM/NF had doubled amongst 15-16 year olds alone. The imagery centres on expelling non-whites, albeit by street terror, while in other respects their political understanding is poor. They lack a commitment to the institutions of a liberal-democratic state, as illustrated in 'an outwardly aggressive strategy of political demonstrations and political violence' (Miles, 1983: 15). In this case, hegemony has collapsed and the radical (violent) strategy adopted by the British Movement provides a site of resistance for working class youth. The state has begun to respond, primarily through the targeting of football 'hooliganism' which has long been a favoured venue for the British Movement, but the reaction has been generated on addressing the political implications of mass violence rather than the lower level violence directed at coloured Britons or the racist ideology of the groups. Reactionary groups of the old petty-bourgeoisie reject the violent option chosen by groups such as the British Movement. But the contribution of the old petty-bourgeoisie to political and ideological struggles in Britain has been constrained by the strength of working class neo-fascism and the development of new forces such as the New Right.

## (ii) Petty-Bourgeois Expressions of Right-Wing Radicalism

Separate from the above developments, there were also political expressions of petty-bourgeois discontent in Britain in the 1970s. Political conflict was not centred on the issue of 'race' but was articulated as an ideological response to state activities, and specifically what was determined as state socialism and the corporatism of the Heath administration (see Edgar, 1983). In this respect, there are parallels with New Zealand ideological and political struggles in the late 1970s and 1980s. This growth took place from 1974-75, and a variety of different groups were either spawned or encouraged. Some focussed on economic issues and the promotion of market liberalism. These included the Aims of Industry (1942), the Institute for Economic Affairs (1957) and the Centre for Policy Studies (1974). There were others that were instrumentally-oriented pressure groups such as the Middle Class Association (1974), the National Federation of Self Employed and the Income Tax Payers Association. Thirdly, there were those that were concerned at the advance of communism/socialism, although many within this category initially appeared in the 1950s during the Cold War. The Freedom Group (1955), the League for the Defence of Freedom (1956) and the Anti-Socialist Front (1958) were typical examples. And finally, there were those groups that had a moral or religious focus such as the Viewers and Listeners Association.

But 'race' was not altogether ignored, and like New Zealand, the politicisation of racial debates was an important impetus to the mobilisation of petty-bourgeois forces. The International Christian Network, for example, combined certain religious views with concerns about the traditions of the 'white British'. It was South African-funded and designed to oppose the World Council of Churches' campaign against South Africa. The Christian League of South Africa, run by F. Shaw, and the Rhodesian Christian Group, led by A. Lewis, joined the British-based Christian Affirmation Campaign (B. Smith) to form the International Christian Network in 1978 (see Knight, 1982). This concern with events in Southern Africa is a recurring theme in the conservative political associations of the petty-bourgeoisie. It is reflected in the formation of the Monday Club which began in 1960 in

opposition to Macmillan's 'winds of change' speech given in South Africa. The Monday Club was associated with the Conservative Party and was also allied with The South African Society, the Anglo-Rhodesian Society, Support the 70s Tour Campaign and The British and South African Forum. The Monday Club reached a peak in 1972 with 2000 members, 35 MPs and 55 university groups. After 1972, when the NF became involved with the Monday Club, Heath closed down branches. By 1977, Thatcher had re-established links (cf. transformism, see discussion above) and by 1981 a Monday Club report featured support for a 'constructive repatriation programme' (Klug and Gordon, 1983). But the alliance with these elements was again a matter of concern during 1983 and 1984 when there were resignations from the Monday Club because of 'infiltration by extremists' and a report by the Young Conservatives was highly critical of the Club. In many respects, the issue was irrelevant to the restoration of hegemonic control over petty-bourgeois right-wing activism. The Conservative Party had successfully renegotiated its image as the custodian of petty-bourgeois values and petty-commodity production. In this response, and the ability to consolidate representational ties, the New Right became embodied in the Conservative Party and reflected in its leadership. This differs substantially from political and ideological relations in New Zealand where such links have yet to be forged.

The origins of the New Right are to be found in the petty-bourgeois groups listed above but a major impetus came from its intellectualisation by academics and others, and its avowal by a Conservative Government. For example, the establishment of the Salisbury Group in 1977 at Peterhouse College, Cambridge and later (1982) the publication of the Salisbury Review provided an important ideological forum, which is now articulated in a variety of public mediums. And then so-called 'Thatcherism' revolved around an advocacy of the market as a key mechanism in the distribution of societal resources and the reduction of state responsibility and involvement, both traditional petty-bourgeois ideological positions. These notions were integrated with an authoritarian populism which endorsed the concepts of nationalism and racism. The latter differed from that offered by many on the extreme right in that it 'does not require the

hypothesis of innate superiority, only that of cultural difference' (Seidel, 1985: 11).

In fact, the New Right encompasses two strands, economic liberalism and political authoritarianism, and it

*...is by no means clear that the New Right is a single entity, either socially or ideologically; nor is it clear that the two strands identifiable within it, neo-liberalism and authoritarianism, are complementary rather than contradictory...*  
(Levitas, 1985: 2).

This aside, the New Right has effectively challenged the post-war liberal and social democratic consensus (Seidel, 1985: 1), and has helped coalesce conservative and reactionary groups around the Conservative Party. It has colonised and dominated the debates over economic policy, education, national identity and policy and 'race' although not in the crude biological terms of the neo-fascists. Petty-bourgeois Jacobinism, or the embryonic forms that did appear in the 1970s, have been countered by the contribution of the New Right to political and ideological relations. The discourse on 'race' has altered, although it is still a critical item on the political agenda. The hegemonic crisis that groups like the National Front represented has now passed. The development of the New Right, the reflection of their values in the operations of the state and policy, and the nationally articulated debates about 'race' have no parallel in New Zealand, and as a result, the petty-bourgeoisie, specifically the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie, is faced with quite different possibilities in the two formations.


There were still some petty-bourgeois groups who contested the new social construction of 'nation' and 'race'. Tory Action (1979) provided a forum for 20 Conservative MPs to campaign on immigration and WISE (Welsh, Irish, Scottish, English) which began in 1974, was reactivated in 1981 to pressure for changes in government policy. It brought together key national figures including some MPs with more extreme organisations such as the Immigration Control Association. It is within this minor petty-bourgeois rump that the British League of

Rights is located.

(iii) British League of Rights

It is useful to outline the group's activities to provide a comparison with the organisational and ideological characteristics of other League groups, and to reinforce the thesis that such petty-bourgeois groups are insignificant in Britain in contrast with their role in New Zealand. The British League of Rights (see Diagram 5) is a very small group that is maintained organisationally by Don Martin. Martin was President of the Queensland Young Liberals who in 1962, were criticised for being associated with the League of Rights, and in April 1963 Martin stepped down from his position with the Liberals. Soon afterwards, his name appeared on the State Council for the League of Rights and later that year, he was appointed State Director. In 1970, he left for the United Kingdom and became involved with the British League of Rights. He reorganised the League and greatly extended its sphere of activities. By 1975, he had established an association with the Britons Publishing Company whereby the latter published On Target. More recently, the League has used Bloomfield Books to publish a wide range of periodicals. They include On Target (fortnightly), Housewives Today (monthly), New Times (monthly, actually produced initially in Australia) and News (occasional publication). Bloomfield Books also handle (since 1980) K.P.P. Publications, the book distributing company of the Social Credit Secretariat, U.K. At the same address as the League of Rights are the Anti-Dear Food Campaign, the British League for European Freedom, Keep Britain Out of Federal Europe, British Commonwealth Alliance and the British Housewives League. The most important association has been with the World Anti-Communist League (WACL). Martin and Lady J. Birdwood became joint leaders of the British chapter in 1973 (Diagram 5). Birdwood was given the title of General-Secretary of the League for European Freedom, the name under which the League of Rights is known inside WACL. One other major figure involved in the League is Air Vice-Marshall D. Bennett. He has been involved in anti-communist groups such as the New Liberal Party, the anti-EEC Safeguard Britain Campaign and the British Independence Movement. In 1979, he stood for

DIAGRAM 5: THE BRITISH LEAGUE OF RIGHTS AND ASSOCIATIONS WITH OTHER EXTREME RIGHT-WING GROUPS



the European Parliament for the United Anti-Community Market Party.

Martin has increased the membership (he claims from 123 members in 1970 to over 1000) but the League is largely irrelevant to major political debates in Britain. It is most active in opposing the E.E.C. (it is seen as diminishing British national sovereignty) and providing support for white South Africans. Its only significant political alliance is with WACL, and while it may not be reciprocated, Tyndall (British National Party) has identified the League (the British Group and the Crown Commonwealth League of Rights) as 'allies and friends' (Searchlight, February 1984). In organisational terms, it looks very similar to the League groups in Australia and New Zealand. It uses similar strategies (regular briefing publications, Social Dynamics courses, front organisations) and seeks to represent a similar petty-bourgeois constituency. But it lacks representational ties and an equivalent to the strength of the Australian and New Zealand rural (old) petty-bourgeoisie. There is no intent to form an alliance with working class fascist groups (the association with the Britons Publishing Company is one of the few exceptions), nor to align with the New Right and the Conservative Party.

On the radical right, British neo-fascism represents an enduring tradition that evolved in the opening years of this century and has been reproduced since. It has expanded and become an important force in political and ideological relations in two particular periods: the 1930s and the 1970s. In the first period, the major fascist organisation, the British Union of Fascists, comprised a working class mass membership and a bourgeois leadership. It articulated the territorial defensiveness of the working class against Jews and sought an answer in the policies and examples offered by European fascism. In the 1970s, the working class membership remained but the bourgeois contribution to the hierarchy of fascist organisations was less apparent. Chesterton was one of the few exceptions. Neo-fascism was also different in other respects: it was assertively and nationalistically British and rejected the imagery and models offered by European fascism, and the principal target groups were now the Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in Britain. But the contributing factors,

an economic and social crisis, and the defence of territory, were much the same for the 1930s and 1970s, and major aspects of the ideology of the 1930s were also reproduced. A further similarity was the mobilisation of support amongst specific working class communities so it appeared as though fascism would challenge dominant ideologies. In the end, the challenge collapsed. In the 1930s, the response of the state (the 1936 Public Order Act in particular) and the war diminished the appeal of fascism. In the 1970s, the Conservative Party appropriated certain key National Front positions on the issue of immigrants and the 'threat' they posed. The National Front's failure in elections was the catalyst in the fragmentation of reactionary elements. For its part, petty-bourgeois reactionary expressions were minor and appeared in a variety of sectarian organisations. Some petty-bourgeois fractions did become involved with neo-fascism as the National Front Constitutional Movement illustrated. But rather more important was the domination of the conservative terrain of national politics by the New Right and the Conservative Party, and they had re-established strong ties with the old petty-bourgeoisie by the late 1970s. The British League of Rights is irrelevant in such a context.

#### (B) AUSTRALIA

The political organisations and traditions of the extreme right in Australia were essentially founded in the 1930s. The important parallels are with Canada rather than New Zealand or Britain, to the extent that many of the early extreme right-wing groupings were fascist and based within the immigrant communities. In Australia, the Italian, Serbo-Croatian and German communities all provided support for fascist groups with the strongest group based within the Italian community (Cresciani, 1980). Even the British Union of Fascists was active. Branches were formed in Melbourne and Hobart in 1926, and in Adelaide in 1927. In contrast with Britain, however, where fascism was a response to the arrival of immigrants, in Australia and Canada, immigrants provided the membership for an imported fascism. These groups disappeared once the war began although the tradition was re-established after the war in some of these communities. In the latter period, the concern was a vehement anti-communism although there were

also vestiges of the pre-war fascism, including the expression of sexism, racism and anti-Semitism.

The other major tradition is similar to petty-bourgeois politics in New Zealand. It grew out of ideological divisions within the Australian Social Credit Movement in the 1930s. One major group to emerge was focussed on Melbourne's New Times and included Eric Butler.

*Butler's group advocated the "electoral campaign" method which Douglas outlined in 1935. That is, the movement is based on cell-like study groups which act as a stimulating environment for the propagation of the gospel (Richmond, 1975: 37).*

The League of Rights developed from this group, and they perceive themselves as the spiritual caretakers of Social Credit in Australia. The League is, in many respects, identical to its New Zealand counterpart. It runs its campaigns through a variety of front organisations including Voter Policy Associations. Right from the 1930s, the intention was to establish cells that would put pressure on individuals who were in positions of power. But the Voter Policy Associations had little impact, as did their attempts to institute a system of contracts in the early 1970s between political candidates and League activists. Their views are publicised through a number of publications: On Target (published in Melbourne); Heritage (Perth); Electors Voice (Perth/Melbourne); Ladies Line (Queensland) and New Times (set in Melbourne and printed in Canada for Canadian, American and British editions).

The Australian League of Rights also has a similar class base to the New Zealand League. It has with varying degrees of success helped formulate and mobilise petty-bourgeois political support, principally in certain rural areas of Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia. Research has shown that these supporters enjoy a reasonably high standard of living, and are 'the more articulate of the repressed fringe of the rural sector' (Richmond, 1975: 50). Richmond (1977: 74) indicates that they are not apathetic or unread but they feel that they lack the resources to change a social

situation. Ideologically, unions, financiers and monopolies are seen as epitomising those groups with 'too much' power whereas the 'average man' and certain world views are seen as poorly represented. The latter are likely to be generically described as 'Christian' and characteristically 'old' petty-bourgeois in their concerns. The League is an example of a popular-democratic interpellation based on petty-bourgeois interests.

They differ from the New Zealand League of Rights in their emphasis on anti-Semitism. In Australia, the League has always employed anti-Semitic arguments as a critical feature of its world view, an orientation that began with Butler's publications and New Times in the 1930s, and which have continued to the present.<sup>10</sup> Butler has consistently argued that Jews are anti-Christian and collectivist in their political views. Their intentions are seen as reflected in all the major European revolutions and conflicts. The crudest example of this argument is contained in Butler's The International Jew which was still being sold to League members in the late 1960s (see Campbell, Nation Review, 8/2/79), although much of this sort of ideology is confined to an elite or inner circle who offer a repository for the more complex elements of the League's ideology. Anti-Semitism reaches the mass membership in an easily

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10. This anti-Semitism has various themes. Collaboration with Hitler (Australian On Target, 4/5/84) dates from The International Jew and the ideological position of the 1930s and 1940s. Also reproduced from this period are the arguments that Jews are parasites (New Times, September 1983) and that communism (Bolshevism, collectivism) is Jewish in origin (New Times, June 1983; Australian On Target, 29/6/84). Attached to the latter is the notion that Jews (Zionists) and socialists/communists are in alliance (the 'anti-Christ', see Intelligence Survey, June 1984) in particular to oppose the League (Australian On Target, 22/6/84). Finally, there is the traditional theme that Jews/Zionists seek to break up 'homogeneous' societies (New Times, May 1984). More recent ideological arguments include the belief that there is Israeli and Soviet collaboration to destabilise the Middle East (Intelligence Digest, February 1984), that the League is anti-Zionist, not anti-Semitic (letter, The Age, 17/4/84; Australian On Target, 8/6/84), and the denial of the Holocaust (see Briefing, Australia-Israel Publications, 14/12/79 and 13/6/80).

understood form that is not detailed, although it is still much more explicit than in the New Zealand situation.

The Australian League is also different to the extent that it has faced major opposition to its activities. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Liberal and Country Parties became concerned at the influence of League members within their respective organisations, or at least within certain rural branches. The Country Party's national secretariat considered the effect of this in a confidential report in July 1971, and D. Anthony, the Federal leader of the Party described the League as anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi. The Liberal Party had also examined the infiltration of the League via an appointed committee in 1968. In 1969, the Party's state executive declared that 'membership of the League of Rights is inconsistent with membership of the Liberal Party'. The League's activities were then critically publicised in four articles written for The Age by Richmond (see The Age, 26/2/72; 28/2/72; 29/2/72 and 1/3/72). The League of Rights was shown to be committed to certain racist and anti-Semitic philosophies and to have influence within the Liberal and Country parties, especially in the resolutions brought forward from a number of branches. The League responded by questioning Richmond's accuracy (Australian On Target, 2/6/72; 25/8/72), by suggesting that the League had made gains from the publicity (Australian On Target, 7/7/72) and that Richmond had been financially supported by the Jewish Board of Deputies (Australian On Target, 20/10/72; see also Intelligence Survey, October 1971 and April 1972). The final stage in the adverse publicity of this period came with the publication of an Australian Security Intelligence Organisation report which was originally published in The Bulletin. The reason for the report was concern at the infiltration of the Liberal Party by the League of Rights. The report commented:

*The League of Rights is a case-book example of a private semi-clandestine populist-type organisation working at the grassroots level among discontented sections of the community where people feel they are being exploited by local and international financial political forces* (The Age, 27/6/74).

The League still either competes with the Liberal and Country parties as the representative of the rural petty-bourgeoisie, or tries to ally

itself with factions within these parties. In June 1984, the Victorian Liberal Party shared a platform with Butler in Warrnambool. But equally the leadership of the major political parties seeks to reject such an association. Kennett, after meeting with members of the Jewish community, issued a statement ordering members of the Liberal Party not to attend any League meetings (see Herald, 7/6/84; Australia, 14/6/84; The Age, 14/6/84). The overlap in ideological position on questions such as the power of central government or Aboriginal land rights between the League and rural petty-bourgeois elements in the Liberal Party produces an ongoing contest for ideological supremacy.

The League does, however, retain links with sections of Australia's political elite. The Premier of Queensland, Joh Bjelke-Peterson, has continued to support them in public. He has said that there was a 'host of good solid people across Australia' who supported the League and he was not interested in comments that the League was extreme right-wing, racist, anti-Semitic or pro-Nazi (Australian Jewish News, 22/8/80). His wife, Flo Bjelke-Peterson, was supported in her candidacy in 1980 for the Senate by the League of Rights (they circulated 100,000 copies of Queensland First in Brisbane, and part of the publication was devoted to support for her election), and she has been a speaker at League meetings (see The Age, 25/8/80) and received Ladies Line in the early 1970s (Nation Review, 9-15/9/72). As a senator, she sent a message of support to the Commonwealth League conference in Calgary although as a result she had to deny that she accepted their anti-Semitism (see Queensland Hansard, 8/3/84). Previously, the League had been able to call upon the support of other prominent Australians such as the somewhat eccentric Sir Raphael Cilento. He was a League supporter and a key speaker when the Heritage Society was launched. His argument was that migrants should be examined for disease and purity of blood as they entered Australia in the same way that cattle were tested (see Sun, 20/9/71). But other links, especially with sectors of the Liberal and Country parties were effectively (although not totally) cut during the critical attention paid to the League in the early 1970s. The League of Rights reached a peak prior to this with about 2000 members and

another 10,000 sympathisers, 60-100 branches and six full-time staff (Samuel, 1972: 246). The numbers and activities declined, and by the late 1970s, it was estimated that the League had approximately 750 supporters (see Briefing, Australia-Israel Publications, 13/6/80 and 23/5/80).

The Australian League of Rights is one of the most enduring expressions of extreme right-wing activity. Through Eric Butler and a handful of other activists, it has maintained a link with the interpellations of the 1930s and 1940s. Like the New Zealand League, it occupies part of the ideological territory of the Social Credit Movement and it seeks to represent the views of the old petty-bourgeoisie, notably rural fractions. In Australia, support for the League is confined to parts of Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia, and while it has some tenuous links with political elites (cf. J. and F. Bjelke-Peterson), it has had little political impact since the early 1970s even in the areas where it does retain support. The group's main contribution to political debate has been episodic and localised. For instance, the League has campaigned vigorously in opposition to the granting of land rights to Aborigines and in support of New Right policies on the position of women. But they lack the alliances and class base to mount an effective campaign, especially in the face of a critical media and opposing politicians. The Australian Labor Party identifies the League with extremism, and even political organisations ideologically closest to the League such as the Liberal Party have actively sought to diminish any overlaps or alliances. The most likely option for the League is involvement with other extra-parliamentary pressure groups that are part of the New Right (see Sawyer, 1980). The anti-feminism of Women Who Want to be Women, for example, parallels that of the League, but while the former has a quasi-conspiratorial view of political trends, they do not share the extensive conspiratorial views of the League, especially with regard to Jews. Such ideological differences combined with the perceived extremism of the League make alliances problematic.

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11. This figure can not be accurately identified because the League will not disclose specific membership figures, and another estimate gives a much higher figure, 1500 members (Sunday Observer, 17/6/84).

Finally, it is worth noting that the fascism based on support from the immigrant communities in Australia in the 1930s and 1940s, does have a contemporary equivalent. There are two forms of neo-fascism. The first has moved away from a base in the immigrant communities, but like the 'racial revolutionaries' in New Zealand, it traces its origins to German and Italian fascism of the 1930s and it is based within the working class. The first post-war Nazi party was the Australian National Socialist Party (1963) and it was followed by groups such as the White Australia Movement (1979), National Resistance (1977) and National Action (1982). But the small membership and organisational and ideological weaknesses of this tradition result in a high propensity for schism. Somewhat different are the neo-fascist groups based on ethnic/nationalist politics, although there are links between the two forms (see Freney, 1985). These groups are no longer based in the Italian or German communities but are epitomised by the Croatian Ustasha and the Hungarian Arrow Cross. Their main concern is communism, but they retain important elements of anti-Semitism and racism in their ideological world view. They employ violence as a major strategy (the Ustasha was involved in nine major bombings between 1967 and 1982; see Freney, 1985: 35), and they have developed links with groups like the World Anti-Communist League. But like the League of Rights, major political organisations have rejected their members as the debate inside the New South Wales Liberal Party in the late 1970s illustrates. Thus both forms of neo-fascism are highly factionalised and lack established political alliances. Their 'contribution' has been limited to violent acts and the expression of extremist, and dated, beliefs that are often constrained by their sectarian nature.

In summary, the major reactionary interpellations in Australia reflect two quite different traditions. The first is class based and epitomises the historical importance of the petty-bourgeoisie, especially the rural fraction, in the Australian social formation. From the 1930s, the old petty-bourgeoisie has experienced a decline and a manifestation of the crisis facing this fraction has been the articulation of a petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. In the 1930s, the

organisational representative was Social Credit which evolved into the League of Rights. But the representational links between the League and its class base have been contested by conservative political parties, the Liberal and Country parties. The latter can mount a challenge to the interpellations offered by the League of Rights from a position of strength: they are part of the political elite; they express traditional conservatism without recourse to politically suspect philosophies such as anti-Semitism; and, unlike New Zealand's Social Credit party, the Liberal and Country parties do not share an ideological tradition with the League of Rights. For all this, the League continues to reproduce petty-bourgeois Jacobinism and to claim some space in ideological and political struggles for this interpellation. The second major tradition is not class based but unites migrant communities across class lines with reference to the nationalism of their origin societies. Fascism has been imported as part of the ideological baggage of migrants, and during periods of crisis (at times specific to that migrant community as in the case of the Croatians in Australia), nationalism unifies the community. But inevitably, the commitment is most obvious in the first and second generations and so Italian and German fascism of the 1930s has not been reproduced in Australia. Rather, new communities, notably the Hungarian and Croatian, have articulated fascism in the post-war period. This form of ethnic or national fascism occurs periodically as tensions within the migrant community accumulate, or events in the origin country encourage a response amongst expatriate communities. Similar observations apply to Canada.

### (C) CANADA

Canada, with regard to political, ideological and economic relations, shares a number of similarities with New Zealand. The material conditions of parts of Canada in the first three decades of this century, the ethos of a settler society and a strong rural petty-bourgeoisie produced ideological and political responses similar to those found in New Zealand.

*The agrarian petite bourgeoisie dominated the political debates in Canada during the first decades of the twentieth century. Their domination was ephemeral and extended only to setting the agenda for the debates since, although they won some concessions, they proved unable to change the course of the development of Canadian capitalism in ways congenial to them (Conway, 1981: 1).*

This advocacy of petty-commodity production and a suspicion of monopoly capital led to the establishment of representational ties with an emergent Social Credit political organisation. Support was sufficient to produce electoral success whereas in New Zealand, Social Credit sympathisers backed the Labour Party. In both societies, the 1930s represent something of a high point in the articulation of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism that has waned with the contraction of the old petty-bourgeois base and the changed nature of capitalism generally. But in other ways, Canada parallels Australian political relations to the extent that large European migrant communities provided a base for imported fascism and their historical presence has no parallel in New Zealand. These fascist groups have influenced Canadian petty-bourgeois interpellations, and for periods, alliances have been established between petty-bourgeois groups such as Social Credit organisations and the Canadian League of Rights, and fascist groups representing various forms of European nationalism.

As in Australia, the Italian and German communities were critical to the establishment of fascism. The Italian community, especially in Montreal, was pro-Mussolini while the German communities, notably the German Mennonites, were receptive to Hitler and National Socialism. Another influence, unlike Australia in this respect, was the anti-Semitism of many French-Canadians (see Betcherman, 1975). The products were organisations such as the Parti National Social Chrétien, a Quebec group who supported Hitler because of his anti-Semitism. Other fascist groupings included Les Jeune-Canada and the Fédération des Clubs Ouvriers. German fascism produced the Deutsche Bund, while elsewhere there was the Canadian Union of Fascists (see Barrett, n.d.). Some of these groups were able to

attract considerable support especially when they were ethnically based. It is estimated that 90% of the Italians who lived in Montreal were sympathetic to fascism (Betcherman, 1975: 7). Ethnicity unified these communities across class lines, so that material considerations and class distinctions were displaced temporarily.

These interpellations found a resonance in the powerful Social Credit movements, both prior to and after the war. Independent of the discourse overlap between European fascist groups and petty-bourgeois interpellations, Social Credit was already committed to an interpretation that identified Jews as a major social and political problem because of the financial power they were believed to exercise. This was encouraged and extended by the similar sorts of arguments advanced by fascist groupings. In the post-war period when the recoil effect of the Holocaust made such views less tenable, and in most cases, a political liability, Social Crediters tended in many cases to remain committed to them.<sup>12</sup> Social Credit MPs such as N. Jacques and John Blackmore offered an analysis that employed anti-Semitic arguments, and the National Social Credit leader, S.E. Low, provided the following comments in a radio broadcast (18/12/46):

*...the same group of international gangsters who are today scheming for world revolution are the same people who promoted the world war. Do you know that these same men promoted and financed the Russian revolution?...for financing Hitler to power, for promoting World War II with its tragic carnage? Do you know there is a close tie-up between international Communism, international finance and international political Zionism?*

These associations and expressions continued and provided the liberal elements of Social Credit with some concern. In the 1952 provincial elections in British Columbia, there was a debate over anti-Semitism (see Trail Times, 17/4/52; Comment, October 1952). Such debates occur repeatedly especially as the 'autonomous Social Credit Parties

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12. There are notable exceptions. Premiers in the Social Credit Government in Alberta, W. Aberhart (1935-43) and E. Manning (1943-68) resisted an anti-Semitic interpretation. Both refused to endorse C.H. Douglas's views on Jews and Manning purged the party of the Douglasite (hence anti-Semitic) elements in 1947 (see Donnelly, 1984).

in Canada have long been accused of harbouring anti-Semitic and fascist beliefs' (Barrett, n.d.: 14). Extreme right-wing groups such as the Edmund Burke Society gained control of Social Credit in the 1970s, in this case in Ontario, and Taylor of the neo-fascist Western Guard holds the patent for the Ontario Social Credit Association. Confirmation of the presence of traditional anti-Semitic petty-bourgeois elements was provided by the publicity over a teacher, Keegstra, in Eckville. An active Social Crediter, Keegstra was dismissed from his job in 1982 because of his anti-Semitism. When he was suspended from the Social Credit Party (Alberta) in 1983 by the President, 15 people including executive council members, petitioned on Keegstra's behalf and he was reinstated at the Party's convention (see Donnelly, 1984).<sup>13</sup> The dominance of such a Douglasite (i.e. conventional financial conspiracy ideology) element in Social Credit has been one reason for the Movement's decline in Canadian politics. It continues to retain a rural petty-bourgeois base but the decline of this base, both numerically and in political importance, has effectively relegated petty-bourgeois Jacobinism and Social Credit to the political fringe. This has been endorsed by the recent support for conservative parties in the national political arena of Canada.

The tension between political legitimacy and the articulation of traditional extremist and fascist arguments was encouraged by the resurgence of fascist organisations in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. This paralleled events in New Zealand, except that there was no prior political tradition of these groups in the case of New Zealand. The White Canada Party contested elections in the 1950s, but the major growth came later with the Nazis (1963), the Edmund Burke Society (1967), Western Guard (1972), the Nationalist Party (1977) and the KKK (1980) (Barrett, n.d.).<sup>14</sup> Many of these were based, albeit somewhat

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13. Keegstra was a keynote speaker at the Third Crown Commonwealth League of Rights Conference, Calgary, Alberta in 1983. In 1985, after a 67 day trial, he was convicted of having wilfully promoted hatred against Jews, fined \$5000 and had his collection of anti-Semitic literature seized. A similar case involved Ernst Zundel who was convicted in a Toronto court also in 1985 for 'spreading false news' about the Holocaust. He was sentenced to 15 months jail and prohibited from discussing the Holocaust for three years.
  14. Minor organisations in this tradition included the Canadian National Socialist Party, the Concerned Parents of German Descent and the Canadian Anti-Soviet Action Committee.

tentatively, on earlier groupings active in the 1930s. The KKK was active in British Columbia and Montreal in the 1920s and 1930s, and it began a new lease of life in the 1970s based around three separate Klan organisations (Barrett, n.d.). For most of these groups, whether in the 1930s, or the 1970s, the key element in their respective interpellations is anti-Semitism, with the possible exception of groups in British Columbia where the attention is directed at migrant Asians (Barrett, n.d.). Somewhere between these fascist groups and the more acceptable Social Credit movements is the League of Rights, a minor political grouping that has forged alliances with some of the groups already mentioned.<sup>15</sup>

The Canadian League of Rights has two main activists, R. Gostick and P. Walsh. Given the importance of these two for the continued operations of the Canadian League of Rights, plus the fact that their respective political careers illustrate their recruitment and ideological universe, it is worth providing details. Gostick was a Social Credit activist in the 1940s but was expelled. Since the late 1940s, he has published the Canadian Intelligence Service and more recently, On Target. The former began with an explicitly anti-Semitic interest which was moderated in the 1950s although the concern is still present. Other concerns include trade union activities, coloured immigration, Protestant churches, financial control and the fluoridation of water; all universal themes of the League's interpellation. He has toured Australia and New Zealand on several occasions under the auspices of the League of Rights. In terms of major links with other political organisations, he is President of the North American Regional Council of WACL (while Walsh has been the Acting Chairperson). WACL operates under the title of the Freedom Council of Canada. Walsh was born in 1916 and grew up in a French-speaking community in Quebec. He became involved in anti-union (synonymous with anti-communist) activities as the founder of the Young Catholic Workers. In 1953, he testified as a voluntary witness

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15. The Canadian League claims a membership of 10,000 with 40 percent in Alberta (Donnelly, 1984: 21), but most observers suggest a much lower figure although there appears to be little consensus on what that figure actually is.

before the House of Un-American Activities Committee. He claims to have worked as an undercover agent for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and to have 'penetrated' such 'communist fronts' as the Canadian Peace Congress, the League for Democratic Rights and the Canadian Friends of the Soviet Union (Christchurch Press, 2/11/82).<sup>16</sup> He is research director of the Canadian League of Rights/Canadian Intelligence Publications, chairperson of the Canadian Friends of Free China, acting chairperson of the North American Regional Council of WACL, and assistant to Gostick, the Director of the Canadian League of Rights. He tours regularly throughout Canada and to countries such as New Zealand. Both, therefore, attempt to link the League to other political organisations and to reinforce the League world view by articulating it in a variety of forums.

The focus of the League of Rights in Canada is broadly similar to those of its sister organisations in Australia and New Zealand, although there are some differences in emphasis. The Australian and Canadian organisations are more explicitly anti-Semitic. Given the importance of anti-Semitism within the extreme right-wing tradition in Canada and the appeal that it has for ethnic communities, this emphasis is hardly surprising. In other ways, the reaction to the League is similar to their experiences in New Zealand. There has been little media attention and one of the few issues to attract interest is the possibility that there are links between Social Credit and the League of Rights. For instance, in 1965, R.N. Thompson, an MP and the Social Credit national leader, had to deny that he had any sympathy for Eric Butler or his associates: 'I must emphatically disavow any link or association with the Canadian Intelligence Service or the Christian Action Movement' (letter, 8/1/65) (see also the case of Keegstra above which gained a lot of media coverage). This aside, the Canadian League has had little political impact and is peripheral to either the dominant political interpellations of Canada or to the activities and views of the fascist tradition. It is a minor grouping that articulates a world view that is largely

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16. The strategy of claiming intimate knowledge of 'communist' organisations and strategies is repeated by G. MacDonald in Australia, the obvious intention to claim legitimacy for the claims made about communism, internationally and domestically.

superseded by Social Credit movements, that have, in the last decade, reverted to articulating elements of traditional (1930s) Douglasite arguments. This representational tie between the rural petty-bourgeoisie and Social Credit diminishes possibilities for the League, whereas in New Zealand a 'liberal' Social Credit party makes the League of Rights a more credible option for reactionary sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie.

As in the case of Australia, the two major reactionary interpellations are associated with an ethnic nationalism (fascism) based within migrant communities and the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie, especially the rural fraction. But unlike Australia, the reactionary feelings and intentions of the second tradition have been moderated by political success. Social Credit in Canada has consistently had elected political representatives since the 1930s, and has been the government at state level. The traditional antagonism of the old petty-bourgeoisie towards the dominant bloc has been diverted by the penetration of the institutions of political power. Sections of the petty-bourgeoisie have repeatedly voiced reservations about the success of Social Credit in representing their interests but nevertheless, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism has been contained by such links. However, and here the similarity is with New Zealand struggles, the practice of political power has allowed reactionary groups to claim that Social Credit has failed to defend petty-commodity production or to remain true to the arguments of Douglas. A major antagonism from 1935 onwards has been between Social Credit political parties and the reactionary representatives of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Evidence is provided by the tensions inside Social Credit and the competition between Social Credit and groups like the League of Rights for ideological and political supremacy. Alongside this tradition in the 1930s existed a fascism based in the French, German and Italian communities. It attained a peak in this period but this form of fascism has been reproduced in Canada, and it was an important factor in the growth of organisations in the 1970s. But the groups in this latter period are relatively minor and are similar to the 'racial revolutionaries' in New Zealand.

## CONCLUSION

The periods of relative acquiescence in the articulation of reactionary and fascist interpellations have been punctuated by two critical periods of crisis, the 1930s and 1970s, in all four countries. New political generations were created by changes in the respective class structures of the social formations and the engagement of particular class fractions in political and ideological struggles. A major distinction can be drawn between Britain and the remaining societies, New Zealand, Australia and Canada. In the former, in both periods of crisis, the dominant extreme right-wing expression was working class in its primary class link although it contained a significant bourgeois element. The defence of working class territory, among other influences, constituted a major impetus in the growth of fascist interpellations. The contrast is provided by the ideological and political relations in Canada, Australia and New Zealand where petty-bourgeois interpellations were particularly influential in the 1930s, and were still a dominant reactionary interpellation in the 1970s. Here the concerns were typically those of a declining fraction involved with petty-commodity production. The summary provided in Table 2 indicates the differences in major ideological elements between working class neo-fascism in Britain, and petty-bourgeois Jacobinism in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. The difference in emphasis provides an explanation for the importance of C.H. Douglas in the latter societies, and explains why he was largely ignored in Britain. His advocacy of petty-commodity production and his anti-proletarian and anti-state arguments conflict with the ideological concerns of British fascism. It also needs to be acknowledged that there are differences amongst the three settler societies. The most obvious include the role of anti-Semitism, the political tendencies and alliances of the old petty-bourgeoisie in the 1930s and the presence of ethnic nationalism, or fascism, based within migrant communities and cutting across class lines.

New Zealand, until the 1960s, gained nearly all of its migrants from Britain. It lacked large migrant communities from those

TABLE 2: MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS OF PETTY-BOURGEOIS JACOBINISM AND WORKING CLASS NEO-FASCISM IN THE 1970s

United Kingdom	New Zealand/Australia/Canada
Working Class Neo-Fascism	Petty-Bourgeois Jacobinism
For:	For:
nation/'race' interventionist state authoritarian state proletarian collectivism	petty-commodity production free enterprise/free market moral authoritarianism 'the family' 'race'
Against:	Against:
Blacks/Jews free enterprise capitalism multiculturalism liberalism monopoly capital parliamentary democracy	interventionist state monopoly capital multiculturalism Jews/Jewish 'control' proletarian collectivism communism/socialism liberalism parliamentary democracy

countries that experienced mass fascist movements in the 1930s. In Canada and Australia, the German, Italian and French migrant communities constituted a critical factor in the transmission and establishment of outposts of European fascism. Within these communities, if not always in the wider society, fascism enjoyed a period of support and activity, at times without major opposition and criticism. This certainly came but only as conflict became inevitable and the propaganda process denigrated fascism as a prior condition to war. The presence of this early form of fascism provided a base for later movements in the 1970s, especially as they glorified the nationalistic arguments and philosophies of the early 'pioneers'. The earlier activists also provided a cultural underground, small groups of committed ideologues who ensured some semblance of continuity during the war and up to the 1950s when their world view was dismissed as irrelevant and/or offensive for most. New Zealand lacked an equivalent articulation of fascist and extreme right-wing views. They were not entirely absent because many of the key elements were to be found in such movements as Social Credit. But even here there was a critical difference between New Zealand and Canada and Australia.

In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, Social Credit movements encapsulated the perceptions and concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie, notably the rural petty-bourgeoisie but whereas in Australia, and to a lesser extent, Canada,<sup>17</sup> Social Credit aligned itself with conservative forces, in New Zealand it moved in a different and more liberal direction. The movement became tied to liberal/left-wing political representatives via support for the Labour Party and later the Labour Government. This attachment arrested some of the racist tendencies of the New Zealand petty-bourgeoisie and softened the reactionary elements of their interpellation. It co-opted a popular-democratic

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17. Although Canada and Australia are linked in this analysis, there were obvious differences between the two. The Canadian Social Credit movement became a political force in a way that never eventuated in Australia. But in Canada, Social Credit attracted support from classes and fractions other than the petty-bourgeoisie, and in power, this was reflected in the diminishing importance of petty-bourgeois concerns. In Australia the Labor Party attracted the rural petty-bourgeois vote in Victoria (see Castles, 1985) in the 1930s and 1940s although not elsewhere. There were other conservative parties such as the Country and Liberal parties who attracted the support of this fraction.

interpellation into a dominant ideological discourse, and the Jacobinism of the petty-bourgeoisie was inhibited from its declared course of opposing the dominant bloc (although, of course, Labour Party philosophy encompassed a degree of opposition to elements of the dominant bloc). Such a representational tie was lacking in Canada and Australia with different implications for the 1930s. By the 1970s, the differences between the three countries had diminished as once again the 'old' petty-bourgeoisie sought to express its popular-democratic interpellation. New Zealand's rural petty-bourgeoisie, in particular, had dissolved its links with the Labour Party in the 1940s and 1950s, and to a certain extent, with the Social Credit Party in a latter period, and was therefore prepared to sponsor alternative forms of political ideology.

A similar difference can be observed in terms of anti-Semitic arguments. Again, the European migrant communities brought with them firm views on the role of Jewish people in society. The rural petty-bourgeoisie held similar views, and the two combined effectively in Canada and Australia to provide a base for extreme right-wing groups. In New Zealand, there was no such overlapping discourse. The rural petty-bourgeoisie and its political organisation, Social Credit, certainly articulated anti-Semitic arguments but these arguments had a narrow resonance which was effectively confined to the petty-bourgeoisie. It lacked any populist appeal, and there were no equivalent migrant communities to provide a broader base. Thus anti-Semitism remains a minor aspect of the general New Zealand political agenda, and it did not make an appearance in any meaningful way until the late 1970s when it was a young generation that expressed it without, in the main, much acknowledgement to any anti-Semitic arguments that might have made an appearance earlier in the century in New Zealand. But even in this period, the resonance of anti-Semitism is limited because of a social context which does not differentiate Jews phenotypically and has never racialised them in the way that other Western societies have.

In summary, the dominant form of right-wing political activity in Britain relies upon a working class constituency with members of

the bourgeoisie providing an important leadership role. This tradition of extremist political activity began at the turn of the century in working class areas such as parts of the east end of London where there was a reaction to the arrival of Jewish immigrants in a period of declining material conditions. Fractions of the working class supported liberal/left-wing political parties; others abandoned traditional political parties in favour of political organisations that personified problems in racial terms and codified prejudice in policy. These organisations incorporated anti-bourgeois and anti-petty-bourgeois arguments to reflect the representational tie with the working class. The site of ideological and political struggle was in the workplace and local communities, and this tradition has sponsored and given voice to forms of working class radicalism at various times in Britain. Petty-bourgeois concerns, in comparison, have been incorporated into dominant bourgeois political forms and have rarely provided an antagonistic popular-democratic interpellation.

In contrast, migrants provided an ethnic base for fascism in the 1930s in Canada and Australia. They imported a European fascism that existed alongside and sometimes allied to a more indigenous popular-democratic struggle that was based on the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The mobilisation of this latter fraction reflects their importance in societies that were still influenced by provincial and rural struggles. In Australia this articulation of petty-bourgeois concerns did not act as an effective political form, principally because it did not exist independent of dominant bourgeois political organisations. In Canada during the early decades of this century, petty-bourgeois interpellations did engage in a struggle against the dominant bloc but their political representatives were constrained by the necessity of establishing a wider electoral base and the practice of power. More recently, the reactionary petty-bourgeoisie have regained control in Social Credit in Canada but this is at a time when the organisations have declined in political importance.

Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand lacks an historical equivalent to the working class fascism of Britain, at least in any

major political form. In all three dominion societies, it is the old petty-bourgeoisie that has provided the class base for extreme right-wing interpellations. But New Zealand differs from Australia and Canada. The petty-bourgeoisie in the 1930s established a representational tie with a progressive political organisation in New Zealand, an organisation that eventually became the Labour Government for a period of fifteen years. Petty-bourgeois Jacobinism was therefore diverted from its expected opposition to the dominant bloc in important respects. Equally, this petty-bourgeois struggle was not accompanied in New Zealand by fascist interpellations emanating from migrant European communities. More recently, the old petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand has faced somewhat different possibilities as a social force to the situation of the petty-bourgeoisie in Australia, and to a lesser extent, Canada. Whereas the Australian petty-bourgeoisie maintain representational ties with organisations such as the Liberal and Country parties,<sup>18</sup> the New Zealand petty-bourgeoisie, and particularly the rural and provincial fractions, have been prepared to abandon traditional links with the Social Credit Party and to express themselves more radically via support for a range of political groups. There is no single voice for their Jacobinism but they are expressing their struggle against the dominant bloc and as custodians of the 'core' values of capitalism separate from the dominant political struggles and representatives of New Zealand society.

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18. The New Right, as a contemporary expression of conservatism in Australia, is an important factor in these political relations and there are important differences (as well as similarities) with the equivalent movement in New Zealand (see Sawyer, 1982).

CHAPTER EIGHT: PETTY-BOURGEOIS JACOBINISM AS A  
POLITICAL FORCE: POTENTIALITIES

*"Multi-culturalism" is a contradiction in terms. There is no such thing as the successful "multi-cultural" society. No society has ever been able to survive where there has not been a system of cohesive moral and social standards... "Multi-cultural" education is an attack on European heritage which is the greatest barrier to the advancement of the Marxist revolutionary programme for New Zealand.*

On Target (15/7/85)

*New Zealanders, irrespective of whether they profess a Christian faith or not, must assess their heritage and decide which is the system under which they would rather live: the Westminster system with its predominantly Christian influence, or the Fabian system dominated by the Humanists, in which man [sic] is the final authority and the final arbiter. It is a war to the 'death'. We are not concerning ourselves with 'conspiracies'; the programme is more of the nature of tyranny.*

J Massam, address to the  
Annual Seminar, League of  
Rights, reprinted in  
On Target (23/9/85)

*It cannot be doubted that the proliferation of new antagonisms and of 'new rights' is leading to a crisis of the hegemonic formation of the post-war period (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 168).*

This chapter outlines the elements of this crisis in the New Zealand formation and the potential for the extreme right in the 'antagonisms' of the 1980s. Poulantzas (1979) identifies the origins of fascism with regard to the 1930s in a crisis that occurred because of certain features: the lack of a national unity (which includes enclaves in the social formation and uneven economic development); the systematic intervention of the state; an unevenness between the rural and urban sectors (specifically that a lack of agrarian reform retards primitive capital accumulation); the weakness of the bourgeoisie (an inability to maintain a fragile unity); and the transition to monopoly capitalism. Thus fascist organisations developed in the crisis generated by the accumulation of the above contradictions and they flourished in a formation where the dominant fraction or fractions of the power bloc are unable to neutralise the hegemonic crisis while the working class and its representatives fail to respond adequately and to effectively oppose the unification of reactionary forces. Most of the above features are present in New Zealand in the mid-1980s, but the thesis advanced here is that their accumulation is retarded by changes in political representation, dominant ideologies and the operations of the state.

In essence, it is argued that the Labour Government after 1984 has usurped part of the traditional ideological terrain of conservatism. In particular, its commitment to economic liberalism has served to remoralise both capitalism and the state enterprise by submitting them to 'market forces'. In this sense, hegemony is restored with some notable exceptions. The economic crisis for the petty-bourgeoisie is not alleviated by such moves, and rural production in general is experiencing an economic decline. The crisis for these groups is exacerbated by the absence of a viable political party that represents conservative interests. The National and Social Credit parties have both experienced major internal conflict, and both have problems in

maintaining strong links with their respective class bases. The commitment of the previous National Government to an interventionist state has been an important reason for the difficulties of this party, and has led to alternative political options, notably the New Zealand Party. Others may be expected to appear as part of a reformulated conservatism, or New Right, and in this context, the politically marginal old petty-bourgeoisie may have the opportunity to establish a sufficiently large political base or crucial alliances.

The opportunity is enhanced by the 'discursive continuities and overlaps' (cf. Seidel, 1985: 11) amongst the positions and movements on the right concerning moral issues. The moral authoritarians provide a constituency and moral indignation in ideological struggles. But in spite of this, there are barriers to such an alliance. Firstly, the old petty-bourgeoisie face very different material conditions to other groups, notably those connected with monopoly capital, the state or work-based collectivist organisations. Ideologically, therefore, there are major differences on issues from morality to economic relations. In the case of the moral authoritarians of the New Right, there are common ideological concerns but the commitment of the old petty-bourgeoisie to traditional elements of their interpellation, especially a conspiratorial racism and anti-Semitism, proves problematic. In my judgement, it is largely the irrelevance of these elements to political and ideological struggles, indeed the current liability they represent, which will hinder possible alliances. In spite of the crisis, will the old petty-bourgeoisie and their political representatives fail to exploit the potential offered by the present antagonisms?

### The Crisis in Political and Economic Relations

This crisis centres on two key elements: one is the way in which capitalist relations are conceptualised, and as an adjunct to this, the role of the state in a capitalist formation, and the second is the relationship between political representatives and their constituencies.

## (a) The State and Capitalism

Poulantzas (1979) argues that the lack of a national unity, the systematic intervention of the state and the transition to monopoly capital are aspects of a crisis that occurs in advanced capitalist societies. The first two are underlined by 'authoritarian statism', the shift of power and decision-making away from parliaments and parties towards the executive and administration. Laclau and Mouffe pose the crisis in a slightly different way: the crisis is said to develop from the 'imposition of multiple forms of vigilance and regulation in social relations which had previously been conceived as forming part of the private domain' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 162). These were factors in a tension that developed during the 1970s with a conservative government that adopted an interventionist or statist<sup>1</sup> stance which was seen by diverse sectors (monopoly capital, rural producers) as inappropriate. By the early 1980s, there was substantial hostility to this intervention and to the way in which political power was exercised. Increasingly, national leadership, the nature of the interventionist state and the departure from the 'influence' of the marketplace all became central themes in public comment and debate. Ironically, it was a Labour Government that fundamentally altered the nature of these debates.

The Labour Government, in the short time it has been in office, has 'remoralised' capitalism in a situation where monopoly capital is increasingly dominant. The corporate mergers in 1981 of Fletcher-Challenge on the one hand and New Zealand Insurance-South British on the other confirmed the trend towards the centralisation of capital (see Perry, 1982, for evidence of the concentration of capital and the density of corporate interlocks). Between 1971 and 1981, the total real assets for the largest ten public companies increased by 40 per cent, whereas those companies ranked 41-50 increased their assets by

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1. Perry (1985) describes this as statism, or a top-down variety of corporatism compared with societal (i.e. civil society) variants.

only 18 percent (Gallagher and Swainson, 1985). Finance capital expanded, and policies such as the Think Big consolidated ties between large New Zealand firms and the state, and encouraged the participation of transnational corporations (Perry, 1985: 21). But the economic climate was difficult for those involved with petty commodity production, and while insolvencies ran at 75 per annum in the 1970s, there were 250 per annum in the 1980s. Businesses that wound up voluntarily or by court order numbered 355 in 1970, and 728 in 1980 (see Gallagher and Swainson, 1985). In this same economic climate, some sectors appeared to be protected. Rural production, by the late 1970s, had had its economic support system, both direct and indirect, substantially improved and it was epitomised in the Subsidised Minimum Price Scheme (SMPs) for sheep meat production. State employees were also seen as privileged. Despite a 'sinking lid policy' in the 1970s and 1980s, state employees grew from 213,000 in 1971 (19.2 percent of the workforce) to 276,000 in 1982 (21 percent of the workforce<sup>2</sup>), an increase of 30 percent when the total population had grown by less than 12 percent. The size of the state enterprise, and the fact that both services and benefits, and the expectations of state service delivery, had increased became another point of criticism from those held to be responsible for the productive wealth in the economy, the private or capitalist sector. The election of a Labour Government in 1984 significantly altered these antagonisms.

The Labour Government has incorporated the rhetoric of economic liberalism into policy changes (see Perry, 1985, for further comment). Key signifiers include the notions of 'market forces' and 'protectionism'. The former is viewed as desirable because it results in more efficient production, the latter as the reverse. Thus rural production was very rapidly divested of major elements of state support; the urban economic sector rather less hurriedly. Equally, the state has been encouraged to become more 'efficient' in the

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2. Wilkes et al (1985: 16) suggest a higher figure of 22.5 percent of the paid working population are central state employees.

'marketplace'.<sup>3</sup> For example, taxpayers' money in 'state trading activities must be subjected to the same disciplines as the use of shareholders' money in private sector companies' (D. Hunn, State Services Commissioner, Evening Post, 7/11/85). In important areas, the state has relinquished control so that, for example, the value of the New Zealand dollar has become a matter for 'market forces'. In this way, the Labour Government is addressing the crisis of authority and of economic relations. Through an essentially monetarist approach, it is seeking to invest capitalist relations with a legitimacy ('productive', 'efficient') and to reconcile the embattled positions of capital and labour. The state is also given a new legitimacy as it withdraws from involvement in some spheres and 'conforms' to market principles in others. In the process, the Labour administration is creating other tensions. The expectations of fractions of the Labour Party constituency have been displaced and there are critical rural/urban differences that are being exacerbated. These are especially pertinent to political struggles and are discussed in the section on the crisis of representational ties.

These adaptations achieve a number of results, not the least of which is the restoration of hegemony. The crisis that derived from the activities of the interventionist state and the power located in the executive is diminished as attention is deflected from institutional performance to the capacity of sectors to compete in an 'unregulated economy'. The fundamentals of capitalism - competition, capitalist accumulation - are endorsed by political rhetoric and legislative change, and those who have advocated such principles in the past, and who face declining returns as the state withdraws its support, are compromised by a reformist, and monetarist, Labour

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3. There are a number of government departments such as the Post Office, State Insurance Office and the Public Trust, which conform to private sector practice, albeit in a monopoly situation in some instances. Others are even more like private companies as they practice as limited liability companies or as statutory corporations. They include the Bank of New Zealand, Air New Zealand, Petrocorp, the Development Finance Corporation, Tourist Hotel Corporation and the New Zealand Shipping Company. Other statutory corporations such as the New Zealand Railways, the Broadcasting Corporation, the Rural Bank and the Housing Corporation, do face considerable changes, often through deregulation which reduces their monopoly position. But changes are often contradictory. The Housing Corporation has initiated a new service a cheap form of conveyancing, that will consolidate its role in the housing market rather than diminish it.

Government. The nature of the crisis is thus fundamentally altered. A degree of ideological unity is encouraged by the restoration of capitalist relations in response to demands from various sectors. The systematic intervention of the state is diminished in some areas, but more often it is required to perform as a private sector enterprise, thus undermining some of the arguments of its critics. And the tension between fractions of the bourgeoisie, notably the political leadership and monopoly capital, has altered as the new political elite endorses policies that are supportive of the interests of this fraction of capital.

In spite of the above arguments, however, antagonisms will continue or new ones develop, and some contradictions will accumulate. A major element is the reduction in the income and equity of rural production, which results in an unevenness between rural and urban production. The importance of the farm sector in export income has been declining for some time. In 1963/64, wool, dairy and meat production provided 86 percent of total export values and manufacturing, a mere 4 percent. By 1983/84, manufacturing supplied 30 percent, and wool, dairy and meat production, 51 percent (based on Perry, 1985). But productive capacity and the accumulation of capital in the rural sector has been seriously reduced by the withdrawal of state-based support.<sup>4</sup> Perry (1985: 16) points to the end of fertiliser subsidies, loans from the Rural Bank at commercial rates, the producer boards' loss of borrowing and credit privileges and market-determined transport costs as evidence of the changed position of farming. The altered material conditions of many in this sector inevitably lead to a new political potential, especially as the post-war hegemony which assumed the centrality of rural production, declines and is replaced. Thus the unevenness of capital accumulation and the new dominant hegemony of the social formation diminishes the political importance of rural producers and their representative organisations, and it is in their interests to redress this

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4. There are important exceptions. Horticulture is a growth sector that offers high returns and has attracted urban elites. Also in contrast with traditional farming are the monopoly farms which have grown in number in crisis conditions. They are large agribusiness units that typically maintain complex linkages with services and secondary production.

transformation. But there are other sectors that will also express suspicion and opposition to the new hegemony.

The Labour Party began as the political wing of the trade union movement, but the stance of the 1984 Labour Government makes that relationship tenuous. The Labour Government from 1935-49 was the strongest of its tradition in the English-speaking world because it achieved 55.9 percent of the popular vote (1938) and at 67 percent of the non-agricultural workforce, the trade union membership was higher than in any comparable democracy (Castles, 1985: 25-26). This dominance was based on a strong extra-parliamentary labour movement. But as with socialist (labour, social democratic) parties elsewhere in the western world, the Labour Party no longer embodies a radical opposition to existing relations in society, but largely accepts its fundamental elements and principles (Bottomore, 1984: 47). In the 1980s, the achievement of power by the Labour Party was broadly based on a number of constituencies in addition to the traditional working class base: state sector employees, main urban and provincial centre support and professional groups.

The fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie, which has been labelled 'new' above, and which Bourdieu identifies as rich in cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984: 333), has been an important factor in contemporary political and ideological struggles in New Zealand. This new petty-bourgeoisie has expanded as:

*...social work, adult education, cultural organisations or advice on childrearing and sexuality have moved in the space of a generation from the enthusiastic uncertainty of voluntary evangelism to the security of quasi-civil-servant status (Bourdieu, 1984: 369).*

This 'public service' role, often state-financed, inevitably differentiates this fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie from the old fraction in terms of sympathy for state interventionism or monopolies per se. The new petty-bourgeoisie, as Bordieu points out, is defined by its deployment of cultural capital and thus its perception of education differs from the traditional conservatism and suspicion of

the old petty-bourgeoisie towards such non-economic resources. These ideological differences are confirmed by the vanguard role of the new petty-bourgeoisie in articulating new conceptions of social and political relations, and in the fact that they populate many of the pressure groups at the liberal end of the spectrum. They invent new life-styles and redefine social coordinates (Bourdieu, 1984: 359-360), and thus directly challenge the moral conservatism of groups like the old petty-bourgeoisie. Politically, they have developed new forms of social democratic collectivism, which parallel working class trade union organisations but which are fundamentally different in strategy and style. Thus representative organisations like the Post Primary Teachers Association or the Public Service Association have become as politically powerful as many of the traditional trade unions. For their part, the trade union movement is fragmented and as Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 19, 84) make very clear, it is important to discard any notions of there being a unified working class. The fragmentation derives from the presence of a labour aristocracy, unionised versus non-unionised labour, the counterposing interests of different wage categories (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 19, 84), and in New Zealand, by major structural differences faced by women and Polynesians (for detail on these distinctions in New Zealand, see Steven, 1978; Perry, 1985). The presence of university-educated union officials, the structural significance of a handful of large unions which is enhanced by the expansion of the large firm system, and differing attitudes towards the state-sponsored conciliation and arbitration system (Perry, 1985: 6) are factors in the New Zealand context.

These differences within the working class, and between the representative organisations of the new petty-bourgeoisie and the working class, have not, however, led to another aspect of the crisis identified by Poulantzas as a crucial aspect in the rise of fascism: the failure of the working class and its organisations to adequately respond. The alliance between the trade union movement and the Labour Party has weakened, but the association is maintained and on occasions, is important, as the influence of the large unions indicates (see the debates concerning compulsory unionism). The new unions representing state employees and professional groups have

used their collective power on work-related matters, but they have also been a critical force in a number of political and ideological struggles. Sometimes in combination with working class unions, but also independently, these new collectivist organisations have played a key role in debates on education, multiculturalism and sporting links with South Africa. They have contributed directly to hegemonic struggles, and their growing strength has been an important response to reactionary expressions.

This then leaves the old petty-bourgeoisie. The location of this fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie outside dominant relations of production has been confirmed by political and ideological struggles of the 1970s and 1980s. The post-war ideological hegemony, which the old petty-bourgeoisie took to be a continuation of their own, had been radically altered by the 1970s. The apparently unified moral framework of the New Zealand social formation was now marked by cleavage and dissension on many issues including contraception, religious beliefs, defence and 'race'. The central antagonism was perceived as being between 'the people' or:

*...all those who define traditional values and freedom of enterprise, and [their] adversaries - [the] state and subversives (feminists, blacks, young people and 'permissives' of every type) (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 170).*

Equally, the marginal position of the old petty-bourgeoisie in economic relations had been confirmed. The Labour Government since 1984 has endorsed the principles of 'economic opportunity' and the notion that the 'marketplace' is an arbiter, both important tenets of petty-bourgeois ideology, but in a corporate economy where petty commodity production is peripheral. Capital is increasingly centralised and the various monopolies continue (see Perry, 1982). Further, the state interventionist mode, while altered, remains. The debt levels and functions of petty-commodity producers are still set by the state and monopoly capital (Perry, 1985, talks of an elective affinity between centralised state bureaucracies and big business), and thus the rhetoric of free enterprise employed by the government does not equate with the understanding of the old petty-bourgeoisie and its representative groups.

*Roger Douglas' economic "reforms" are alleged to be taking us away from the "controlled economy" towards a more free enterprise position. This is mere propaganda. Genuine free or private enterprise can only operate in an economic environment that provides a reasonable degree of security for the small and medium sized business and family farm (On Target, 14-21/10/85).*

One effect is that the old petty-bourgeoisie is experiencing a crisis of confidence as the natural or automatic reproduction of petty-commodity production is not assured (cf. Laclau, 1979: 103). In this, it is joined by the rural sector generally, and for both, there is a crisis of identity (cf. ideology) which parallels their material insecurity. This aspect of the crisis, and the antagonisms which it generates, are influential in the formation of a 'new' generation. The rupture is most apparent in, as well as encouraged by, the crisis in representational ties.

#### (b) The Crisis in Representational Ties

The crisis of the 1980s is epitomised in the breakdown of ties between representative political organisations and their respective class bases. The Labour Party has gained most as the upwardly mobile new petty-bourgeoisie has supported them. Both Social Credit and the National Party have faced major internal conflict and new conservative parties have provided the political vehicle for discontent. The factional fragmentation within the parties and the generation of political alternatives offer a real possibility for the old petty-bourgeoisie, and the extreme right, especially as the traditional representatives fail to articulate the concerns of conservatism.

Social Credit has been the traditional repository of petty-bourgeois discontent. In the late 1960s, Dickson (1969: 40), the research officer for Social Credit, concluded that the bulk of the party's vote was protest in nature, and the League represented the small farmers and businessmen, 'reminiscent of the Poujadists in France'. This was confirmed by Clark (1974) for the rural areas where

the dairy farmer was much more likely to opt for Social Credit (16.67 percent) than sheep farmers (6.12 percent). But by this time, there was a realisation by some within the party that this old petty-bourgeoisie was an insufficient class base to achieve even minimal penetration of the political system, an analysis that was compounded by the declining class position and size of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The desire amongst this group was for a more liberal image, and it was identified as such by members (see Bryant, 1981), and early discussion by Beetham, Hunter and Bryant discussed the possibility in 1971 of a new party (see Bryant, 1981: 30). In fact, this group sought and gained the leadership of Social Credit in 1972 which led to the first of many departures (the New Democrats led by O'Brien) in response to this new 'liberalism'. Over the next twelve years, this change in direction was consolidated and by the 1984 party conference, the liberal urban fraction (Knapp, Morrison - the two MPs; Beetham; Davis - research officer; Walsh - head of the youth section) dominated proceedings. An obvious aspect of this dominance was the disassociation from traditional petty-bourgeois theorists (cf. Douglas) and conspiratorial world views,<sup>5</sup> although the concern for the position faced by petty-commodity producers was emphatically retained. The party's image was perceived as a major problem (as it had been for much of the preceding decade), and the leadership responded by advocating an updated 'theology' of petty capitalism (cf. J.S. Albus, People's Capitalism-The Economics of the Robot Revolution). Further, the membership was urged not to become involved with the League of Rights (see Evening Post, 27/8/84). The matter of image was addressed again at the 1985 conference when a name change to Democratic Party was achieved.

Despite these changes, the core of party support is still petty-bourgeois, principally from the old petty-bourgeoisie. Vowles (1985) in surveying the 1983 conference delegates, found that a third less than either the delegates for the Labour or National parties were

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5. The leadership is still aware of the importance of Douglas in party mythology and Knapp commented that there were Douglas arguments that could be retained or rejuvenated.

likely to have tertiary training or experience (62.1 percent and 62.5 percent for Labour and National respectively as against 40.2 percent for Social Credit). The new petty-bourgeoisie who belong to the other two parties are richer in cultural capital (educational qualifications) than the old petty-bourgeoisie of Social Credit. On another dimension, the suspicion of social democratic collectivism meant that Social Crediters were less likely to join work-based representative organisations (13.1 percent of Social Credit described themselves as union members compared with 44.4 percent for Labour and 4.6 percent for National), even when the organisations were politically conservative (all National Party farmer delegates had joined Federated Farmers, only half of Social Credit farmers had joined). In summary, Vowles commented:

*Social Credit delegates tend not to belong to associations of wage and salary earners, and among them is a disproportionate number of the self-employed, although not quite of the proportion of that of all National delegates....On the whole Social Credit delegates have lower incomes and educational levels than those of the other two parties.... It is tempting therefore to depict Social Credit as a sort of National Party for the less financially successful. Such an image conforms to a recognisable Social Credit ethos and in addition to some of the specific appeals of Social Credit to the small person dwarfed and exploited by big Capital, big Finance, and big Labour (Vowles, 1985: 15).*

But while the petty-bourgeois representational ties with Social Credit are still apparent, support is at times ambivalent and problematic. Official party candidates have been faced by independents in electorates such as the Bay of Islands because of rural petty-bourgeois hostility towards a liberal candidate (L. Hunter). The declining popular electoral support for the party has been paralleled by a reduction of those involved with the party in an organisational sense. From a membership level in 1984 of 11,000, the membership in mid-1985 was approximately 4000 (see Evening Post, 1/11/85), with less than 50 percent renewing their membership compared with 80 percent in past years. Thus while the party has more members in parliament than ever before in its history, and as it seeks to gain new constituencies

to add to its primarily petty-bourgeois base, it is in fact failing to either gain new representational ties or to retain strong links with the old petty-bourgeoisie. Despite its political representatives, it is increasingly marginal in terms of national politics, especially as it faces major obstacles in a political system that does not practise proportional representation.

Some of Social Credit's political support has gone to the other two major political parties (Labour attracts two former Social Credit voters to National's one according to polls in the 1980s, see NRB-Herald poll, 14-18 April 1984), while other Social Credit supporters are attracted by new political parties such as the New Zealand Party. On 1981 political preferences, 28 percent of New Zealand Party supporters in election year had come from Social Credit compared with 24 percent from Labour and National respectively. Others transfer their loyalties to pressure groups, including those on the extreme right. Chapters Four and Five provide evidence for this movement in political affiliation. Bob Howie is typical of the career loyalties of the old petty-bourgeoisie, and notably that generation which was politicised in the 1930s. He spent his early career as an activist and supporter of Social Credit, and as a candidate between 1963 and 1969. With the change in party leadership in 1972, he left to help form the New Democratic Party, and then became involved in the League of Rights. When he died in 1985, he had been President of the League since 1982 and an office holder for a lot longer. He, and others, believed that the League was faithful to the original petty-bourgeois Jacobinism of Social Credit.

*The League of Rights is now the only source of genuine Social Credit material....It is obvious in the developing crisis it is the League of Rights which has acted as the faithful custodian of the Social Credit idea (On Target, 3/6/85).*

The political options, apart from extra-parliamentary groups such as the League of Rights, are limited for this petty-bourgeois fraction. Neither Labour nor National are seen as entirely appropriate as both are linked to collectivist organisations and both have done little while in power to curb the development of monopoly

capital or the interventionist state. The downwardly mobile old petty-bourgeoisie lack effective political representation, and as the reproduction of their positions is threatened, the crisis takes on cataclysmic implications, and for groups like the League of Rights, a racial dimension.

*But no one can deny that the world is fast entering a period of rapid decay, and moral, social and financial collapse. The crisis New Zealand is now in the grip of has not developed overnight. It is the end result of deliberate political policies and programme which have been applied over a long period of time. These have followed a set pattern - the centralisation of power...New Zealand's present government is committed to a revolutionary programme of subversion designed to radically alter the structure of our society. The pedigree of this subversion goes back to the ideas formed by Karl Marx and the early Communist revolution in Russia.... There is no disputing that the forces of totalitarianism are in the ascendant (On Target, 21/10/85).*

The representational crisis, however, is not confined to Social Credit and the old petty-bourgeoisie. The other major force in conservative politics in New Zealand, the National Party, has experienced major tensions within the party and between the organisation and its traditional constituencies. The development of the New Zealand Party epitomised an aspect of this tension: the debate between the corporatist (i.e. statist) and neo-libertarian factions. The New Zealand Party represented a neo-libertarian, principally urban, group that was reacting to the extensive use of interventionist policies by a National Government. This cleavage is paralleled by a division between the rural and urban sections of the party, as the former has lost much of its dominant position within the party organisation. (Although, as Vowles, 1985, demonstrates, the National Party still includes farmers, or some types of farmers, amongst its activists in a much higher proportion than the other parties). The antagonisms, as yet unresolved, have affected the membership base of the National Party. In opposition in 1973, the membership was 93,000 and it reached a peak of 200,000 in 1975. In 1985, again in opposition, the actual size of the membership is a matter of dispute

but it has declined substantially from its high in the 1970s.<sup>6</sup> Resolution of these antagonisms is difficult given the opposed interests of fractions, especially rural and urban and the uneven development between these sectors of the New Zealand economy. Part of the difficulty in regaining ideological and political hegemony as the 'natural' government of New Zealand is the adoption of conservative elements in the rhetoric and practice of the Labour Government elected in 1984.

The monetarist approach to economic matters of the Labour Government aligns the party in important respects with elite interests, and seriously challenges the representational ties between these bourgeois groups and the National Party. In addition, the Labour Party has forged links with the urban petty-bourgeoisie, now an increasingly politicised and unionised fraction (see Vowles, 1985). The Labour Party has modified aspects of its welfarist tradition, asserted liberal policies on issues of morality and been an advocate of 'deregulation' in the interests of certain capitalist sectors. In this, the Labour Government has represented the urban capitalist and state services sector but opposed the interests of rural and old petty-bourgeois groups. The two obvious difficulties are whether the Labour Party's new representational ties can be assured, and equally whether the traditional working class/organised labour constituency will remain a strong link. Within the party, antagonisms can be expected around these opposing interests.

While the Labour Government has 'colonised' part of the ideological terrain of conservatism, it nevertheless is unacceptable to conservatives for other reasons, notably the willingness to adopt a liberal position on moral issues, to preserve certain union interests (e.g. compulsory unionism) and to maintain welfare programmes albeit modified. To those such as the old petty-bourgeoisie who are opposed to a large state, trade unions and business monopolies, the Labour

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6. The Party President in late 1985 gave the membership as just under 100,000, but the debate is over whether this includes the previous year's registrations. One report suggests membership is actually 68,000 (New Zealand Times, 10/11/85).

Party fails to represent their interests on such matters. But there are few viable options amongst the political parties of the right. The traditional conservative parties, National and Social Credit, are both experiencing a crisis in their articulation of conservative philosophy and in maintaining representational ties with their respective class bases. The emergence of new political alternatives can be expected, and if developments in other western capitalist societies are a guide, then a major force will be the appearance of a New Right. It is this crisis of parliamentary representation and the articulation of conservative interests that provides the opportunity for new political forms, and an increased potential for a popular democratic interpellation emanating from the old petty-bourgeoisie.

### The New Right

The lack of acceptable conservative representatives in a pluralist political system creates the opportunity for new organisations or the articulation of conservatism in new ways. A development in many Western countries has been the appearance of the so-called New Right, although there are critical differences amongst the New Right within countries and between countries. If there is a common feature, it has been to displace the 'post-war liberal and social democratic consensus' (Seidel, 1985: 1) and to replace it with certain conservative values and systems (economic, moral).

The New Right (Nouvelle Droite) in France has sought to provide a philosophical and scientific legitimation for inegalitarianism in stated opposition to the principles of the French Revolution.<sup>7</sup> Its exponents are to be found in national and local politics, the national media and the state bureaucracy. In Britain, the New Right clusters around the power base offered by a sympathetic leadership in the Conservative Government (see Gordon and Klug, 1985). A central theme

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7. It is interesting to note that one of the critical institutions of the New Right in France, Groupement de Recherche et d'Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE), identifies its objectives and strategies as 'grascisme de droite' (right-wing gramscism) (see Seidel, 1985).

is the advocacy of market capitalism unrestrained by state involvement or regulation. The market forces are an axiom of faith and state operations, including welfare programmes, are anathema. The cultivation of individualism and competition extends to gender and ethnic relations, so that group allegiances are seen as contradictory in the context of free-market capitalism. In spite of this, a central notion of the New Right is support for 'national homogeneity' as Enoch Powell's ideology indicates:

*The significance of Powell's appeal to nationalism lay in its forming the third and binding element within three strands of his political thought: that of corporate philanthropy in the tradition of "one Nation" Conservatism, economic neo-liberalism and the limitation of the state's role to regulate and non intervention of the capitalist market process and that of national homogeneity (Rich, 1984: 9).*

Although the comment does not apply in the case of Powell, racism is seldom expressed as an explicit ideological belief but rather implied in the generous employment of nationalism. 'Race' and nation are implicitly synonymous, and thus the explicit racist rhetoric of neo-fascism is redundant (see Rich, 1984).

The final element in identifying the New Right is the mobilisation of conservative moralism. If monetarism is a faith in the market to differentiate efficiency and productivity from the reverse, then the opposite applies to the moralism of the New Right which insists that a single moral standard be adopted and enforced. The USA contains one of the most advanced and politically powerful examples of this development. It has been commonly (and erroneously) identified as the Moral Majority, although this ignores major strategic and ideological differences in the politicisation of religious conservatism. While economic neo-liberalism assumes rationality on the part of individual actors, moral conservatism seldom expects such rationality but relies on notions such as 'intuition' and 'nature' (Levitas, 1985: 7). And with regard to this, the point made above that the New Right contains fundamental cleavages needs to be re-emphasised. For instance, in the USA, the New Right can be divided into four major groups: the GOP establishment, the religious right,

the libertarian right and the neo-conservatives (or the ex-Democrat right) (see Miller, 1981). The GOP establishment, East Coast and located in professional groups and commercially powerful institutions, can be contrasted with the libertarian right that is basically West Coast and based in a sector of capitalism that has grown rapidly in the last few decades. The latter is characterised by an opposition to government, however conceived. Equally, neo-conservatives remain opposed to the political strategies and objectives of the religious right (Miller, 1981). Differences can be seen in the contrasting attitudes of these groups on abortion or defence. Therefore in the USA, and in other formations, an important distinction needs to be made between those whose primary concern is the practice of capitalism and those whose focus is morality. Following Gordon and Klug (1985), the former are labelled libertarians, because of the links with the free market philosophy of nineteenth century liberalism, and the latter, social or moral authoritarians because of their monism on matters of morality. We now turn to the situation in New Zealand and the way in which the New Right is manifested in political and ideological struggles.

### New Zealand and the New Right

#### (a) Libertarian Right

From 1975 to 1984, the practice of political conservatism in New Zealand included extensive use of an interventionist state.<sup>8</sup> This included applying restrictions to inhibit inflation, diverting financial resources to subsidise primary production and to develop the Think Big projects, an extensive debt to pay for government expenditure and a substantial growth in expenditure on social

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8. As Perry (1985) illustrates, there has been an interventionist state since the establishment of capitalism in New Zealand. The nature of the interventionism and its extent were at issue.

services. Thus between 1973 and 1982, external debt rose from 16 to 38 percent of the total public debt, the social service expenditure rose from 22.7 percent of government net expenditure in 1976 to 29.5 percent in 1983 (largely due to the growth of National Superannuation benefits), and for 1981-82 alone, the Supplementary Minimum Price Scheme provided \$223 million for farmers (Franklin, 1985: 91, 97-98). The location of power and the use of the interventionist state, or statism (see Perry, 1985), in this way alienated important sectors of the conservative community from their political representatives, the National Party. Libertarian groups were formed as an alternative.

On the extreme right, the obvious examples of this libertarian position were the Christchurch groups, Zenith Applied Philosophy (ZAP) and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement (TRIM). At one level, they were groups whose appeal lay in providing techniques of self-motivation and material advancement. This was done, in the case of ZAP, in a structure that was epistemologically authoritarian and exclusive. But they also sought to influence wider political debates and structures, and hence their campaigns against 'over-regulation', taxation and 'state interference'. But they lacked equivalents in any more inclusive or populist sense until the 1980s when the New Zealand Party was established.

The New Zealand Party articulated an economic libertarianism as an alternative to the statism of the National Party. A central tenet was unrestrained economic opportunity, unimpeded by state involvement, which was considered to be a precondition for the generation of wealth, both in terms of the nation and the individual. However, unlike the New Right in Britain or the USA, policy on moral issues was liberal rather than authoritarian or populist. On matters such as defence, education or contraception and abortion, the Party actually articulated the position of the upwardly mobile urban petty-bourgeoisie. For example, defence capabilities were to be reduced and the leadership of the New Zealand Party rejected the notion that one of New Zealand's major trading partners, the Soviet Union, was also a military threat. Equally, in line with the new petty-bourgeois investment in cultural capital, the New Zealand Party argued for

greater state expenditure in education and for more status to be accorded to the credentials of the education system and to those who worked within it.

In the year prior to the 1984 election, the New Zealand Party attracted a considerable constituency as a viable political alternative. Undoubtedly, a substantial proportion of those who voted for the party did so as a protest. Between September 1983 and April 1984, the party went from 6 percent in the public opinion polls to 14 percent, a growth of 8 percent compared with a growth in the same period for Labour of 4 percent, and a decline in Social Credit and National support of 5 percent and 7 percent respectively (NZ Herald-NRB Poll, 14-18 April 1984). After the election, however, the New Zealand Party suffered major internal debates and subsequently a decline in public support. By late 1985 the party was receiving 3 percent in public opinion polls. In part, this was due to the ambivalence of the party membership towards the policies of the new Labour Government; the applied monetarism was not philosophically different from that of the New Zealand Party.

As the major political expression of the libertarian right, the New Zealand Party is unlike similar groups of the New Right in other countries. The liberalism of the party's policies on morality has already been the subject of comment. But there are also other obvious differences. The 'new racism' that is indelibly part of a reformulated and remoralised British conservatism (Rich, 1984) has no parallel in the New Zealand Party. The racism that is expressed is relatively benign by comparison with British expressions, and is principally confined to opposition to the institutional structures that are designed to service the Maori and Pacific Island communities. But arguments that rely on genetic or cultural difference, and indeed on any form of racial nationalism, are noticeably absent. Such ideological views remain the political prerogative of the extreme right. Thus, while the old petty-bourgeoisie find their anti-statism and advocacy of the market paralleled by the economic doctrines of the New Zealand Party, their moral indignation and politics of gender and 'race' are either excluded or opposed. If the New Zealand Party

remains as the single most important expression of the libertarian right, then it departs in important respects from equivalent expressions in other social formations and it fails to represent the interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

(b) Moral Authoritarians

A distinction can be made between the moral right and the religious right in New Zealand on the grounds that religious arguments and the use of an organisational base offered by certain fundamentalist churches differentiate the former from the latter. The moral right have traditionally been pressure groups that seek to include a variety of groups, and their religious motivation or content has been moderated by this enrolment economy, or the need to avoid alienating major religious denominations and secular organisations. Alternatively, the religious right has been based upon the concerns and organisations of Christian fundamentalism, and has been particularly active in the 1980s.<sup>9</sup> The imagery is stridently religious, specifically from the New Testament, and its strategies have revolved around mobilising sympathetic religious groups in an attempt to influence national political processes. However, the differences between the two identified categories should not be over-emphasised as both share activists and the objective of establishing a specific moral code. They are equally motivated by religious convictions and seek a moral austerity that is derived from religious precepts (see Vodanovich, 1985).

The moral right includes such pressure groups as the Concerned Parents Association (hereafter referred to as the CPA), the Society

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9. Between 1976 and 1981, the membership of the institutional churches declined by 7.27 percent while that of the pentecostal churches grew by 127.3 percent. But the largest pentecostal church, the Assembly of God, accounted for only 0.4 percent of New Zealand's population (Vodanovich, 1985: 70-71).

for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), the Family Rights Association, Save Our Homes Campaign, Credo and the Educational Standards Association. Many were formed in the early 1970s as part of the moral panic generated by the impact of feminism, the liberalisation of contraceptive and abortion practices, and by a more general concern with 'the family', morality and education. Some had quite specific foci: SPUC which had extensive links with the Roman Catholic Church and certain fundamentalist groups was active in the abortion debate; the CPA focussed on 'secular humanism' in education. The latter made submissions to a wide range of educational and parliamentary groups throughout the 1970s (see Openshaw, n.d.) because it feared:

*...first, that changes in sex roles may prove harmful to both individuals, and to society; second, that such changes are contradicted by biological evidence of sexual specialisation (Openshaw, n.d.: 8; see also Ryan, 1984).*

The politics of feminism and sexuality and various demographic changes altered the nature of such institutions as the family and education in a way that disturbed the moral authoritarians, and religiously-based beliefs provided a catalyst in their mobilisation. They addressed women as breeders, and such trends as the post-war involvement of women in the labour force (a growth from 1945 when 7.7 percent of married women were in the full-time labour force, to 1981 when the figure was 35.8 percent; New Zealand Year Book, 1984: 870) challenged this orthodoxy. It was confirmed by the liberalism of post-war generations on matters of sexuality and gender, and the new petty-bourgeoisie helped construct new value structures and policies.

*[The new petty-bourgeoisie] is opposed on almost every point to the repressive morality of the declining [old] petite-bourgeoisie whose religious and political conservatism often centres on moral indignation at moral disorder and especially the disorder of sexual mores... (Bourdieu, 1984: 367).*

The conflict between old and new petty-bourgeoisie is an important element in the political and ideological struggles surrounding gender and sexuality.

This conflict escalated in the late 1970s, and the religious right made an appearance in a much more obvious way. The development was heralded by the establishment in the 1970s of organisations such as the Integrity Centre and the International Christian Network (hereafter referred to as the ICN). The Christchurch-based Integrity Centre (motto: Honesty, Faithfulness, Self Respect, Loyalty, Purity, Chastity) is run by N. Rush, a Church of Christ member, who seeks to oppose 'socialism' and 'moral decay'. His conspiratorial views replicate those of the League of Rights, and he identifies existing ideological and political links with the League as important (see Dasler, 1982; Christchurch Star, 11/11/81). Rush and the Integrity Centre have been especially active on the promotion of 'the family', in opposing the liberalising of contraceptive use and in favour of continued sporting links with white South Africans. The ICN shared similar concerns although it articulated them in a different way. In particular, concern was directed at the 'anti-Christian currents both inside and outside the churches...' (What is ICN? - pamphlet, n.d.). Calder, the head of ICN, received a lot more publicity than Rush (for example, a Radio New Zealand interview by J. Weddell, 4/4/81; Wright, 1981) but both groups were very small. They were part of a reaction that signalled the concern with what they regarded as the decline in the sanctity of moral virtues, and a dissatisfaction with the theology and guidance offered by major denominational churches. Church involvement with the debate over apartheid or gender equality was unacceptable to these groups. The ratification of the United Nations Convention concerning the elimination of discrimination against women encouraged the disquiet, and the election of the Labour Government provided a catalyst for the mobilisation of this religious conservatism. The signing of the United Nations Convention, the involvement of religious conservatives in the Women's Forums held by the Minister of Women's Affairs in 1984, and the liberalising of legislation relating to homosexuals in 1985, all intensified fundamentalist discontent.

The Women's Forums were one of the first indications of the preparedness of the religious right to escalate their involvement in

political debate. The presentation of a major petition to Parliament in 1985 opposing the law changes concerning homosexuality was an important development in the articulation of the views of this sector within the community. The intention was not simply to develop a pressure group but to provide a political alternative that would lead the return to moral absolutism.

*It [a 'Moral Majority-type Movement' in New Zealand] will be a church-led, Right Wing voice with a charismatic minister as the lead figure of an organisation that will encompass a number of businessmen, organisers and maybe some politicians (Auckland minister indicating what he thought would happen; Pardon, 1982: 96).*

The focus for this absolutism amongst both moral and religious right has been sexuality and gender. The moral offensive began with issues such as abortion, and has now extended to all aspects of sexual freedom and alternatives to traditional patriarchal family life (cf. Petchesky, 1981: 208). 'The family' is a central element, as Credo's statement of principles indicates:

*We hold that the family is a cornerstone of society, marriage a necessary institution, with the home for the nurture of children as the heart of the nation.*

The alternative is said to be promoted by socialists/Marxists/communists in order to subvert capitalist-Christian societies (see, for example, On Target, 14-21/10/85; Credo's statement of principles, etc., 13/1/81; Pardon, 1982: 94). The real fear is that 'feminists' have succeeded in influencing political decision-making and policy, and moral authoritarians in reply seek to restrict this elite access and influence.

The moral authoritarians are an important contribution to the reformulation of conservatism in that they articulate a nostalgia and indignation that has an appeal far beyond the relatively small constituency provided by the fundamentalist groups and conservative sections of the churches. But their activities, while influential, remain to one side of the political parties and parliamentary

institutions.<sup>10</sup> They lack an organisational base in a strictly political sense, and an interpellation that includes an explicit position on economic and political issues to accompany their moral absolutism. For this manifestation of the New Right, their long-term future remains unclear as they seek to maintain the momentum sustained in single-issue campaigns and to extend their constituency. An obvious need is to establish alliances and to broaden their political base.

#### Political Representatives of the Right: Alliances and Debates

Although the New Right, either libertarian or moral authoritarian, are still in an embryonic form, they provide the opportunity for alliances and the establishment of new representative organisations and links. The crisis in existing political relationships, the uneven development between rural and urban sectors and ideological struggles over morality have, and will, produce a 'new' generation. The representational crisis is a major dynamic which dissolves traditional alliances and creates the opportunity for more radical groups to establish a constituency. The question is therefore whether the new and old right can coalesce in representative political organisations, and whether class alliances can be initiated and solidified. To begin, the major groupings and differences on the right are briefly identified.

Diagram 6 employs understandings that have been rehearsed in this chapter and earlier parts of the thesis. The Conservative Establishment designates the bourgeoisie, both rural and urban, within the National Party and important pressure groups. This relationship is rather more complicated than is suggested here, and major corporations

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10. Moral authoritarians have cross-party support in Parliament, although it is limited to those who are prepared to indicate their opposition to liberalisation and to do so in terms of the conspiratorial arguments of the moral right. See comments by N. Jones during the 1982 debate on the 'eight cardinal rules that communists follow', including subversion by sex to disrupt the 'moral fibre of the nation' (Evening Standard, 20/8/82).

DIAGRAM 6: CONSERVATIVE AND REACTIONARY POLITICAL GROUPS IN NEW ZEALAND POLITICS, 1970s AND 1980s<sup>1</sup>

	Conservative Establishment	Political Party	Pressure Group
1.		National Party (rural, business elite fractions)	Federated Farmers Employers Federation
2.	Neo-Conservative/Libertarian	National Party (urban fraction) Labour Party (monetarists) New Zealand Party	Zenith Applied Philosophy Tax Reduction Integrity Movement Strike Free World Anti-Communist League Society for the Protection of Individual Rights Free Nation New Zealand League of Rights
3.	Old Petty-Bourgeois Conservative/Reactionary	Democratic Party/Social Credit Country Party	
4.	Moral Authoritarians (i) Religious Right <sup>2</sup>	National Party/Labour Party (small alliance from both parties)	Coalition of Concerned Citizens Integrity Centre International Christian Network
	(ii) Moral Right <sup>2</sup>		Concerned Parents Association Credo Family Rights Association Feminists for Life Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child Council of Organisations for Moral Education
5.	Neo-Fascism	National Socialist Party Nationalist Workers Party	White People's Alliance National Front Ku Klux Klan

Notes: 1. This is intended as a guide to major groups and is not exhaustive.  
 2. To repeat a comment from the text, this division is difficult to sustain in some cases, and amongst the pressure groups are some who could be justifiably reclassified as being part of the other category.

and their controlling elites may have ties with the Labour Party (e.g. Fletcher-Challenge). The Neo-Conservative/Libertarian groups have already been the subject of discussion. An observation not explicitly noted above however, is the fact that factions of the Labour Party, the monetarists, are part of this neo-conservative expression, and the translation of this position into government policy has blurred traditional allegiances. Thus there is qualified support from traditional opponents of Labour; for example, Quigley (National Party) or R. Jones (New Zealand Party) have both been supportive of initiatives coming from this fraction in the Labour Government. It should also be noted that this classification omits a third group, the statist conservatives such as Muldoon. There exist major tensions within the National Party between the conservative establishment and this expression, and equally between statist and libertarian (see disputes between Muldoon and Marshall, and Muldoon and Quigley or R. Jones). The Old Petty-Bourgeois category requires little comment although cross-referencing of pressure groups does. While the class base of nearly all of the pressure groups listed is old petty-bourgeois, both rural and urban, they have equally been committed to libertarian arguments on economic issues and this needs to be acknowledged. They also share important interests and characteristics with the moral authoritarians, and this is the subject of further discussion below. The Moral Authoritarians require little comment except to observe that there is a small group of parliamentarians (Braybrooke, Tirikatene-Sullivan [Labour] and Jones, Lee [National]) who articulate religious conservative politics within their respective parties, and across party lines. And the last, and politically insignificant expression of reactionary politics, is neo-fascism. Again, it has been the subject of comment and does not require further elaboration here. The issue is whether there is sufficient commonality for these different forms of conservatism (leaving aside the neo-fascists) to unite around particular issues, or whether the popular-democratic interpellation of the old petty-bourgeoisie is unable to transcend the political and ideological differences to establish effective alliances.

There are important cleavages that reflect the differing material, political and ideological circumstances of the classes or

class fractions, and their political representatives, on the right. The first and important distinction is the contrasting material interests of the right. All four major groups identified in Diagram 6 share a concern about the interventionist state and the bureaucratic mode that accompanies it, but the differences between them are substantially more important and centre on the desired form of capitalism. The libertarian right represents two class positions: that of monopoly capital which seeks a climate which permits the continuation and extension of its interests, and that of the new petty-bourgeoisie who accept the rationale for libertarian economics but who are also part of either monopoly capital or the service sector, often within the state. In this latter case, the expansion of the state, at least in the public service, or social service, area is directly aligned to their interests. In direct contrast, the old petty-bourgeoisie seek to reproduce the position of petty-capital, and to challenge the state and monopoly capital on the basis that they should not be allowed to circumscribe the nature of simple commodity production or to set the debt levels and conditions for the small independent producer. The one factor that might increase the constituency of the old petty-bourgeois political representatives is the crisis of rural production, and the tendency to perceive this crisis as the product of the machinations of monopoly capital and/or the state. The subsequent result may be a rural anti-capitalism, specifically anti-monopoly capitalism, that approximates that of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Thus their potential constituency would expand from the small rural producer and service sectors in rural towns to encompass a greater proportion of rural production.<sup>11</sup> In the meantime, the major political representatives of the rural sector, the National Party and producer groups such as Federated Farmers, would have to be seen by sufficient numbers as inadequate to the task of protecting these interests. Finally, the moral authoritarians have a poorly defined notion of their desired economic system, and it often

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11. There are important corporatist tendencies in rural production and these may be a factor in inhibiting this development. Equally, they may confirm existing antagonisms between the large farm owners and Federated Farmers, and other sectors of rural production, as the issue of legal limits to farm amalgamation confirmed (see Perry, 1985: 12).

remains implicit in their arguments on moral issues. Thus in terms of the above cleavage between the old petty-bourgeoisie and other conservative and reactionary groups, the moral authoritarians exist as a third indeterminate group who are peripheral to explicitly economic struggles and debates.

The second major cleavage occurs on the debates surrounding morality. The conservative establishment and the libertarians do not express the self-righteous certainty and moral indignation of the old petty-bourgeoisie and the moral authoritarians. Attitudes to questions of morality are likely to be expressed in a relatively liberal way, as the Labour Party monetarists or the New Zealand Party positions on defence, abortion or education indicate. As noted before, the new and old petty-bourgeoisie are opposed on matters such as sexual politics or an issue such as rugby tours with South Africa. The new petty-bourgeoisie, including even conservative elements, is likely to support, albeit nominally, anti-tour groups such as HART. The old petty-bourgeoisie has links with the early generation of pro-apartheid/pro-tour groups (Association Defending South African Tours, New Zealand-Rhodesia Society, Friends of South Africa Association) or the later (1980s) generation (Society for the Protection of Individual Rights, Free Nation NZ). The latter groups are more likely to articulate their arguments in terms of 'freedom', specifically the freedom of association and rights of individuals, so they combine ideological elements of the old petty-bourgeoisie with libertarian arguments.

The greatest discourse overlap is between the old petty-bourgeoisie and the moral authoritarians on issues of morality.<sup>12</sup> Both ideological stances can be characterised as the politics of nostalgia in an attempt to reassert a moral (and often religious) fundamentalism in contrast to the liberal trends of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The similarities can be seen in the position adopted on education, relations with South Africa, the moral decadence of urban cultural values

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12. This could be anticipated given the presence of the old petty-bourgeoisie amongst moral authoritarian groups.

and the critical issues of family and feminism. And the ideological overlap is paralleled by political associations. For example, the League of Rights has extensively promoted and distributed Concerned Parents Association material (see On Target, 20/5/84; 14/1/85; 17/6/85), International Christian Network material (see On Target, 29/10/84; 12/11/84) and has played a role in anti-feminist campaigns. The Council for a Free New Zealand, a copy of a League of Rights group in Australia, combined with Christians for Life to present a petition opposing the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to the Governor-General.<sup>13</sup> The campaign was conducted with ministers of fundamentalist churches (North Shore Faith and Bible Centre, North Shore First Reformed Presbyterian Church; see On Target, 15/10/84; 14/1/85; 25/2/85). The League of Rights has also been instrumental in other campaigns opposing liberalisation of laws and policies.<sup>14</sup> Part of the strategy has been to target sympathetic MPs, and one MP (G. Lee, Hauraki) expressed surprise at the 5000 letters and telegrams he received opposing the United Nations Convention. And although Lee denied contact with the League, his interpretation of the origins of the Convention paralleled the conspiratorial arguments of the League.<sup>15</sup> But while there is extensive discourse overlap and political links on matters such as the origin of the United Nations Convention and its undesirability, the unity is not complete between old petty-

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13. E. Butler made this suggestion during a League of Rights speaking tour in early 1984.
  14. They arranged the 1985 tour by Mrs J. Butler (Australia) and have promoted the Coalition of Concerned Citizens' material (see On Target, 6/5/85; 12/8/85).
  15. The League believes that the Convention is a 'major part of the Marxist-Humanist programme to shatter the foundations of the traditional family' (On Target, 15/10/85). Lee believes the Convention to be a 'socialist document' (see Evening Post, 4/12/84), and a childcare service for civil servants was deemed to be a policy that 'had been lifted from the Communist Socialist Action League' (New Zealand Times, 3/11/85).

bourgeoisie and the moral authoritarians. In terms of ideological struggles, issues such as multiculturalism or racism provide an important distinction, especially with regard to anti-Semitism.

### Racism and Anti-Semitism

The 1970s mark an important shift in the centrality of racism to political discourse in New Zealand. An early indication was the establishment in 1970 of Nga Tamatoa, followed by major public protests such as the Land March in 1975 and the occupation of Bastion Point from 1977. The post-war, urban-born and educated Maori played a critical role in this mobilisation, and by 1981, when the term Maori Sovereignty was first used, the mobilisation was largely complete. Action over the Treaty of Waitangi in the 1980s was characterised by alliances between traditional tribal organisations and new political (protest) movements. It was accompanied by concessions from the state. The development of the Tu Tangata philosophy from 1977 in the Department of Maori Affairs, new programmes in the Department of Justice and the growing inclusion of taha Maori and te reo Maori in the education system all provided evidence of the growing autonomy and expectations of the Maori (see Greenland, 1984).

Pakehas have reacted in various ways to this politicisation. Some, notably from the new urban petty-bourgeoisie, have reacted favourably and an organisation such as HART has progressed from a single issue group to one that now focusses on domestic racism as well as sporting relations with South Africa. Other similar groups include CARE and the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination. Inside the state, the public sector union, the Public Service Association, and the State Services Commission have been supportive, along with groups like the Post-Primary Teachers Association. On the right, there was ambivalence and typically opposition to both existing institutional structures and practices and to the new developments. Some such as the conservative establishment or libertarians were racist in a relatively benign way by opposing separate Maori representation or the existence of the Department of Maori Affairs. Others

notably the old petty-bourgeois groups and the neo-fascists were explicitly racist. They actively opposed multiculturalism as untenable.

Between these two poles is a large group from all sections of the community who clearly continue to support the mythology of 'harmonious' relations but who equally feel threatened by the assertiveness of the new ethnic nationalism and are prejudiced in various ways. For example, 67.4 percent of a survey agreed or strongly agreed that Maoris get a fair go 'in this country' compared with 11.9 percent who disagreed or strongly disagreed (Webster et al, 1985). In the same survey, 80.1 percent believed that Maori should have the same rights as other New Zealanders, thereby discounting their particular position as *tangata whenua*. There is a resistance to claims of a special status, and to specific policies and considerations based on an acknowledgement of this. This is allied to a history of state racism. In the early part of this century, the Chinese, Indians and Yugoslavs all faced discrimination as public attitudes were codified in legislation. Since the Second World War, a major period of state racism was directed at Pacific Islanders in the mid-1970s when first a Labour Government and then a National Government deployed agencies of the state (police, immigration) against 'overstayers'. This was based upon public perceptions that construct Polynesians, both Maori and Pacific Islander, as a 'problem' in various ways. A police survey in South Auckland found that 30 percent of the Europeans surveyed felt that Pacific Islanders were not treated 'hard enough' by the police, but equally, 21 percent felt that Maori were not treated 'hard enough' (New Zealand Police, 1984, Vol.II: 31).<sup>16</sup> Europeans were much more likely to stress that racial

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16. It should be noted that Maori were much more likely to say that they were treated 'too hard' by the police (23 percent of Maori respondents) than not 'hard enough' (14 percent), but they concurred with the European respondents about police treatment or lack of it, of Pacific Islanders: 33 percent of the Maori contacted felt that they were not treated 'hard enough'. The Pacific Island respondents reversed the order: 21 percent felt that the police treated Pacific Islanders 'too hard', 16 percent not 'hard enough', while the similar responses concerning treatment of the Maori were 15 percent ('too hard'), and 21 percent ('not hard enough'). Respondents were not asked about police treatment of Europeans.

differences produced problems between groups (30 percent) as against the Maori and Pacific Island respondents (16 percent and 18 percent respectively). And in a national survey, 18 percent of the respondents viewed Polynesians (Pacific Islanders) as 'undesirable neighbours' while 11.9 percent saw Maori and 7.8 percent saw 'immigrants and foreign workers' in the same light (Webster et al, 1985). But the articulation of these sentiments at a national political level has been intermittent. The state's action against 'overstayers' or the occupants at Bastion Point, and the use in 1975 of advertising by the National Party which portrayed Pacific Islanders as 'troublesome' are obvious examples. And political representatives such as P. Hunt, a National Party MP for six years, have contributed towards the politicisation of racism.<sup>17</sup> However, there are still no major political parties that systematically articulate policies that both negatively perceive Polynesians and seek to institute policies that suspend their political and social rights. Nor is nationalism an important theme, principally because of the problem of constructing a racial pedigree in a situation where the dominant group are themselves relatively recent migrants. The rhetoric of the British New Right in which 'we' constructs the nation relies upon assumptions about rootedness and a continuity with the past (Seidel, 1985: 4). Such a connotation remains difficult in New Zealand.

In these respects, central ideological elements of both the old petty-bourgeoisie and the extreme right are relatively immature or incomplete in terms of their articulation in national political institutions and debates. The ethnic nationalism of the Maori, and in the future, of Pacific Island groups, may well engender a Pakeha response

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17. For example, his comment about 'send them (Pacific Islanders) back to the Islands' was widely reported in 1982 and he subsequently (1983) urged the government to stop immigration from Western Samoa. He supported the Springbok rugby tour in 1980/1981, and visited South Africa in 1983 with fellow MP, N. Jones (see *Auckland Star*, 13/10/84). He has attended WACL meetings (Hawaii, 1984; Dallas, 1985) and since leaving parliament has become a national spokesperson for the Society for the Protection of Individual Rights, a group concerned to ensure continued access for sportspeople to countries such as South Africa. This latter group should not be confused with an anti-censorship group with a similar name.

as communal tensions intensify. And it is the possibility that interpellations which construct 'the people' as a 'race' or nation may become more politically viable which sustains the extreme right. In the meantime, they continue to defend the dominance of Pakeha, specifically Anglo-Saxon, values and institutions and to investigate new strategies that will mobilise Pakeha opinion. One such recent strategy was the attempt to locate multiculturalism and Maori sovereignty as communist or socialist in origin. The League of Rights developed this approach in Australia, and in 1984 mounted a campaign in rural areas to convince farmers that their land was in immediate danger of being taken away and given to Aborigines. It was referred to as the 'Marxist-promoted and manipulated Aboriginal land claims programme'. Key justificatory texts were two books by G. McDonald, Red Over Black and The Evidence. He toured Australia under the auspices of the League. An identical campaign has since been mounted in New Zealand. McDonald has written Shadows Over New Zealand (1985) which transfers the logic of Australian League arguments to New Zealand. McDonald has toured New Zealand promoting the analysis that Maori sovereignty arguments and campaigns are Marxist-inspired, and has disclaimed any contemporary political affiliations, a position which the New Zealand media have generally respected. His past as a communist has been used to legitimise an 'insider's' analysis. The conspiratorial nature of his arguments, and the language used to express them, parallel the League of Rights' analysis. The identification of the enemy as a relatively ill-defined communism or Marxism does have a resonance amongst conservative parliamentary representatives (see comments above from Jones and Lee on the communist origin of campaigns that seek liberalisation on moral issues). The National Party spokesperson on Maori Affairs (W. Peters) has offered an analysis that centres on 'Marxist exploitation' of Maori issues (see Herald, 21/9/85). There is an overlap in the social construction of the way in which Maori 'protest' is perceived, but it is a minor element in the ideological concerns of the central political parties and their constituencies, and it is really more of a whispering campaign amongst some to discredit the motives of those active in Maori sovereignty issues. Political representatives of the extreme right such as the League remain, for the moment, peripheral to

the central debates surrounding multiculturalism. They have had an impact, but only spasmodically as issues such as sporting links with South Africa have permitted temporary alliances and legitimacy. Their interpellation which constructs 'the people' as a 'race' or nation remains a minor ideological contribution, despite increased antagonisms involving a racial or ethnic dimension. This marginality is confirmed by the inclusion of anti-Semitic arguments in their interpellation.

Fractions of the old petty-bourgeoisie, notably reactionary elements and their political representatives, continue to reproduce anti-Semitic arguments as a central element of their world view. Evil has been consistently personified as Jewish or Zionist. In the New Zealand context, this produces a major problem. The smallness of the local Jewish community and the fact that they have not been identified with pariah (unproductive, exploitative) finance in New Zealand has meant a very restricted base for the construction of a political anti-Semitism. The extent to which identification with anti-Semitism, or anti-Semitic groups, is considered a political liability is evidenced by the actions of the Social Credit Party to dissociate themselves from their past or links with groups like the League of Rights (see Chapters Four and Five). But equally, groups such as the League of Rights continue to be committed to the explanatory power of anti-Semitic arguments because key ideologists (Douglas, Butler) utilise such explanations and because it also represents the views of the old petty-bourgeoisie, especially that generation politicised in the 1930s. The League of Rights has attempted to increase the resonance of its anti-Semitism in three particular ways.

The first has been to avoid identifying the local Jewish community as a 'threat' or 'enemy' but to direct comments to Jews in a global sense.<sup>18</sup> They have been prepared to articulate their anti-Semitism in a very public way (see Christchurch Press, 19/11/79,

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18. The Keegstra case in Canada which revolved around his anti-Semitism has been seen by the League and others as important evidence of the truth of their conspiracy theories and the influence of Jews in protecting their contrary objectives (see On Target, 14/1/85; 4/2/85; 15/4/85; 15/7/85; 26/8/85).

'Right League Leader Spells Out Views on "Jewish Plot"'), but with general referents rather than specifying members of New Zealand's Jewish community. The second adaptation has been to employ the arguments and terminology of anti-Zionism. The establishment of the state of Israel and the continuing conflict surrounding its presence has permitted groups like the League to identify Israelis as the aggressors rather than as the victims. Anti-Zionism has thus become a 'legitimate' issue for a range of political groups, left and right-wing (see the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism in 1975), and the League has utilised this by emphatically describing themselves as anti-Zionist, and denying that they are anti-Jew in any sense. But despite this semantic obfuscation, opposition to the League in both Australia and New Zealand is most often generated by what is publicly described as the group's anti-Semitism. This is a major factor in denying the League alliances with other groups who share many of the ideological views espoused by the League. The perjorative connotations of being labelled anti-Semitic, even by association, are considered by many groups to be politically damaging. There are exceptions, notably among the neo-fascist groups and some religious fundamentalists. B. Smith, an ordained Congregational minister from Whangarei, preaches on the 'Second Coming' preceded by a 'time of hell' which is described as control by a world dictator, 'probably...Jewish (see South Waikato News, 8/7/80; Challenge, 5/9/80). This, however, contrasts with most religious fundamentalists in New Zealand who see Israel in a very positive light because of its religious significance. So the use of anti-Zionism may provide a counter to questions put to the League by the media or opponents, but it does little to enlarge the potential membership catchment for the group. And the 'problem' of legitimacy is compounded by the third change, the League's endorsement of the historical revisionist's position.

Historical revisionism became focussed with the establishment in 1978 of the Institute of Historical Review in Torrance, California, and their publication, the Journal of Historical Review, has intellectualised arguments which deny the Holocaust. The League publication, New Times (August 1983) offers a summary of the Historical

Revisionist's stance:

*First, the Revisionists argue that six million Jews did not die in the war; the true number being less than one million. Second, the Revisionists argue that there were no gas chambers, so the number of Jews exterminated in gas chambers was precisely zero. Third, the Revisionists maintain that there is no solid evidence that the Nazis ever had an extermination programme per se.*

The League and Western Destiny Publications have been the main sources for this material in New Zealand. But again, the audience is small (a small section of the old petty-bourgeoisie and the small group of working class neo-fascists), and even with post-war generations who do not accept responsibility in any sense for the Holocaust, they still do not evince an interest in an active or political anti-Semitism (as opposed to a relatively low-level prejudice, or folk anti-Semitism). This relatively new element in the League's ideological package simply endorses the prevailing image that the League is anti-Semitic. The three strategic adaptations do nothing to reduce the liability of this ideological element, and one, historical revisionism, simply adds to opponents' arguments that the League has done little in the years since World War II to eliminate or reduce the importance of anti-Semitism in its world view.

In summary, the nature of the League's interpellation confirms the earlier descriptions of 'extreme'. Its articulation of racist and nationalist arguments rely on concepts and a logic that seldom appear in political debates in New Zealand. The continuing struggle over ethnic autonomy and rights may provide a new political generation who will be more sympathetic to the League's interpellation, and that of other extreme right-wing groups, but for the moment, these groups remain as the ideological representatives of a narrow class base and on the periphery of public discourse. What discourse overlap does exist is minor and usually negated by the general perception of the League as an extreme group because of its explicit racism and anti-Semitism. There is obviously a degree of overlap on issues such as economic liberalism or morality between the League and other powerful

coalitions and groups in the New Zealand polity. But the particular constellation of views that constitute the League's interpellation and the unacceptability of some very specific elements mean that the alliances that could be expected to eventuate are unlikely. The political damage that would result from such an association is usually considered too great.

### The Response of Agencies to the Extreme Right

In terms of public acceptability, the extreme right not only has to contend with political parties and groups in a pluralist electoral system but it must also gain sympathetic access to the means of information interpretation and dissemination, the mass media, and to operate within an environment that is controlled by state agencies such as the police. The parameters and conditions of debate are set, to a considerable degree, by these agencies and the transgression of conditions can seriously reduce a group's legitimacy or involve the group in costly conflict with authorities. This section briefly reviews the relationship between the extreme right and the three most important agencies, the media, the police and the Human Rights Commission/Race Relations Conciliator.

#### (a) The Media

The media's coverage and analysis of extreme-right wing groups has been sporadic and uneven in quality. There has been considerable negative comment and coverage although it has been confined to a few publications such as Auckland Metro (for example, see Legat, 1985; Pardon, 1982) or the Listener (see Stratford, 1980; Wright, 1981; Ansley, 1985), and the contribution of a very small number of academics (Buchman, 1983). Television coverage has been less, and a group like the League of Rights has been the subject of a television documentary (1979) and a lengthy interview with Butler (Newsmakers, 15/3/81). The latter was by no means problematic for the League leader who is well versed in the sorts of questions asked by the media

the Commission for Community Relations (see Commission for Community Relations Report, 1980, as an example) who have identified the League of Rights as a major threat to good community relations in Australia. By comparison, the New Zealand media has provided considerably less coverage and it has not been as informed or as consistently critical. And the New Zealand Race Relations Conciliator or the Human Rights Commission have not adopted the assertive position taken by the Commission for Community Relations in Australia.

(b) Human Rights Commission/Race Relations Conciliator

The extreme right has opposed the presence of the Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator because they are seen as key state agencies in the attempt to achieve a multi-cultural society. The most extensive statement outlining a common position amongst extreme right-wing groups is the pamphlet Perversion of the Law. Why the Human Rights Commission Must Go! (n.d.) by D. Thompson from the League of Rights. In it, he claims that the legislation is based on the Soviet Constitution and is part of the United Nations' drive towards a world state. The law is seen as derived from humanism, an 'alternative religion' with vast powers not subject to legal process. Much less polite are groups like New Force who express their opposition in very direct language (see Attack, February/March 1982).

For their part, the Commission and the Conciliator have done little to use the powers available to them in the legislation (see Trlin, 1982) or to offer comment on the activities of extreme right-wing groups. A case in point involved complaints concerning material published by New Force. The complaints were not handled according to the procedures dictated by the legislation, but more importantly, the ruling in the end centred on the importance of freedom of speech.

*...section 9a must be looked at in the light  
of the importance of freedom of expression*

*in our society. Although expressed political views concerning matters of race may be unpalatable or unsound this is not sufficient cause for the publication of those views to be circumscribed (Ruling by Human Rights Commission, 16/2/82).*

Editorial opinion (see Evening Post, 24/2/82) was supportive and thought that the Commission was right to rule that New Force did not 'excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule', any group or persons in New Zealand. New Force claimed that the 'Race Act' had been defeated. In this sense, the media, the Commission and Conciliator and groups like New Force agree that the freedom of expression should include a free market in prejudice, although the philosophies and assumptions that provide the base for the attitudes of the three groups are fundamentally different. Since then, the Conciliator has ruled that the National Workers Party (previously New Force) was in breach of section 9a, and has referred the complaints to the Equal Opportunities Tribunal,<sup>19</sup> but the opprobrium attached to the decision is minor. The Conciliator and Commission lack the moral support from both the public and political elites, at least in acting with some force against racist comment. There is also a lack of commitment within the agency. Trlin's (1982) analysis indicates that complaints under sections 25 (incitement of racial disharmony) and 9a (racial disharmony) have grown substantially and now account for more than half of the complaints laid. But equally, while the completion rate is now much higher, the use of the categories, 'Terminated', 'Referred', 'Outside Jurisdiction' and 'Rectified - no decision' are of concern and complainants are less likely to receive an outcome that is 'favourable'. Nine complaints concerning anti-Semitic material distributed by the League of Rights

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19. A decision was made in August 1985 by the Proceedings Commissioner that material from the National Workers Party had contravened section 9a and that the matter should proceed to the Equal Opportunities Tribunal, in part because the National Director of the Nationalist Workers Party disagreed with the opinion of the Conciliator.

Conservative Book Shop and the Western Destiny Bookshop were laid prior to March 1984. These were still being processed in December 1985 long after the event.

If the role of the Human Rights Commission and Race Relations Conciliator was to provide an opportunity for target groups to gain redress against racist groups, then the interpretation of the legislation and its application has not permitted this, with very few exceptions. The two most notable cases involving the limitation of racist comment have involved the police.

### (c) The Police

Until the 1971 Race Relations Act was amended, the provisions dealing with racial incitement required that the police prosecute if the Attorney General should rule that there was sufficient grounds. In 1977, two members of the National Socialist Party were successfully prosecuted for distributing anti-Semitic pamphlets, although in one case, the sentence was reduced on appeal. In other cases, where there has been violence against property or people, the police have not always been so successful. Desecration of the Jewish section of the Karori cemetery in 1979 and damage to the Wellington schul in 1981, both of which included offensive signs and slogans, did not lead to prosecutions. Otherwise, a great deal of the activity, especially abusive telephone calls and graffiti, is difficult for the police to deal with. The other major incident involving the police reactivated the debate concerning free speech.

In September 1984, the police seized 4000 pamphlets from the Auckland home of a member of the Nationalist Workers Party.<sup>20</sup> The seizure was justified on the grounds that the distribution of the

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20. Reported in the British neo-fascist magazine, Nationalism Today (March 1985) as 'persecution under the terms of anti-White "race relations" legislation'. The seizure was described as 'state oppression' and the role of the Auckland Council of Civil Liberties in defending free speech lauded.

pamphlets would have 'caused breaches of the peace and incited criminal acts' (Herald, 13/10/84), and the warrant was obtained under section 198 1c of the Summary Proceedings Act. This led to an extensive public debate (see Herald, 13/10/84), and some cited the police action as an unacceptable limitation on the 'freedom of speech' (see comments of Hodge, Auckland Council for Civil Liberties; Herald, 13/10/84). The police action which produced this debate was unusual and quite a departure from normal procedure. It was certainly much more direct, and effective, than anything possible or contemplated by the Human Rights Commission or Race Relations Conciliator.

With the exception of the two cases cited above, the police have generally not played a major role in limiting the activities and comments of extreme right-wing groups in New Zealand. The powers that are available to them as a coercive agency of the state have only rarely been used, and this agency's contact with the extreme right is much more likely to occur when activists become involved with violence against a person or property. The Human Rights Commission and Race Relations Conciliator do have some repressive strategies available to them, but these also have been seldom used. The role of these agencies has been primarily a co-optive one, and considerations such as the 'freedom of speech' have dominated their activities. When they have been prepared to act against the extreme right (1977 with the National Socialist Party, 1985 against the Nationalist Workers Party), it is against the very radical groups and their comments. So as a state agency with responsibility for mediating comment on racial issues, the Commission and Conciliator have done little in restricting the actions of the extreme right, or in drawing public attention to their extremism. Finally, the media as a key agency in ideological production and reproduction, has displayed two very different tendencies. Prior to 1979, media comment on groups like the League of Rights had been respectful. The Herald (see 26/11/74) described Butler as an 'Australian economics lecturer and author'. But with the Listener article (Stratford, 1980) and a television programme in the same year, combined with increasing opposition at League functions, the media became much more critical of the activities of groups like the League from 1979. Extreme right-wing groups found that they were

the subject of media attention, on occasions, and that the coverage was often negative. But this has tended to come from liberal print media (Listener, Auckland Metro) and isolated journalists with a particular interest (D. McLoughlin, previously at the Herald). Radio and television have contributed little to an increased public awareness of the intentions and views of the extreme right. Overall, the media coverage has been sporadic and often ill-prepared to comment on reactionary politics. If nothing else, the reporting is usually critical and the extreme right must contest the hegemonic control of the media and the way in which they are portrayed publicly.

### Conclusion

New Zealand in the 1970s and 1980s is experiencing a crisis which includes a number of elements identified by Poulantzas (1979) as some of the preconditions for fascism. In particular, they include the systematic intervention of the state, the loss of hegemonic control and the uneven development of rural and urban production. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the statism of the conservative government was a key factor in the crisis, and led to strains in both the economy and civil society. The argument here is that the Labour Government of 1984 has deflected some of these developments so that the accumulation of contradictions has been simultaneously accelerated in important respects but also neutralised.

In two important respects, the Labour Government, with the help of monopoly capital and the state, is attempting to redirect major political and ideological struggles. Firstly, capitalism has been granted a new legitimacy to the extent that the requirements of a 'free' market have been given political prominence. The defence of capitalism, specifically monopoly capitalism, has been vigorously pursued. This has been accompanied by the second change, an altered role for the state. There has always been an interventionist state in New Zealand capitalism, but the use of state control with respect to the economy has been reduced and the state itself is increasingly

required to operate as though it were part of the private sector. In both changes, the criteria of 'efficiency' and 'market forces' have been extensively used. In this way, important antagonisms have been defused but others have been exacerbated.

The rural sector has lost an important degree of state protection, and the process of capital accumulation has been made much more difficult. Both equity and income have been reduced, and in this sense, a new political generation is currently being formed with the potential to adopt a reactionary political position. The other group who feels that its ideological and economic position has been devalued is the old petty-bourgeoisie. A declining fraction, their position on the periphery of relations and struggles has been confirmed by the advocacy of monopoly capitalism and the influence of monopoly capitalists. The defence of capitalism referred to above is not the capitalism of the old petty-bourgeoisie. For both these groups, the antagonisms of the social formation are manifested in a major aspect of the crisis, the breakdown of traditional representational ties.

The reduction in the strength of links between political representatives and class bases applies to all parties. Labour has gained ties with the new petty-bourgeoisie and now has a weaker association with the trade union movement. But the most apparent dislocation is amongst conservative parties and their constituencies. The attempt by Social Credit to increase its class affiliations, primarily by adopting a more liberal position and distancing itself from ideological positions derived from the 1930s, has failed to develop new constituencies and has diminished the links with the reactionary old petty-bourgeoisie. The National Party representational crisis encapsulates the major tensions of the New Zealand social formation. These include major differences between rural and urban interests, between a commitment to an urban liberalism and a traditional moral conservatism, and the difference between those committed to a statism (or the use of the interventionist state) and the economic libertarians. The party has experienced a drop in support, difficulties over leadership and ideology, and schisms that led to the establishment of the New Zealand Party. It is this representational

crisis and the relatively weak expressions of conservatism that provide the opportunity for the articulation of new forms of conservatism.

The New Right, so-called because it represents the recent mobilisation of conservative forces to unsettle and displace the dominant ideology which constructed the post-war liberal and social-democratic consensus (Seidel, 1985), has been an important development in the United Kingdom, the United States and France. It is a possibility in New Zealand given the displacement and weak position of traditional conservative parties. And to some extent, it has appeared locally. The New Zealand Party represents the economic libertarian strand of the New Right, and the moral authoritarians are present in the groups that constitute the religious and moral right. But these expressions are relatively immature, and their differences and respective weaknesses may be rather more important than the potential they exhibit. For example, the New Zealand Party combines economic libertarianism with a liberality on a series of moral issues, quite unlike the New Right of Thatcher or Reagan. And on this, they differ markedly from the moral authoritarians who have focussed on single issue politics and whose organisational base, if not its support, derives from small religious denominations who profess a religious fundamentalism and sections of the major churches. This is not to suggest that they lack an important constituency. The moral authoritarians transcend sectarian differences and express a widespread concern about changes in morality. But they lack effective representatives in national political institutions, as well as a comprehensive programme that encompasses the spectrum of economic and social issues.

Therefore, the New Right in New Zealand includes groups whose differences are greater than their similarities. Indeed, a generic term like 'New Right' does not adequately reflect the differences within neo-conservative and reactionary politics in New Zealand or, more especially, the differences with the New Right of other capitalist societies. Unlike the United Kingdom or the USA where interlocking directorships link secular conservatives with religious conservatives, albeit in a fragile unity, there is no common

leadership or common organisational base in New Zealand. There are relatively few local pressure groups who bridge the various forms of conservatism in a style that has occurred elsewhere (see Gordon and Klug, 1985, for details on Britain, and Miller, 1981, for the USA). And neo-conservatism has yet to be intellectualised and legitimated as it has in France (Alain de Benoist and Nouvelle Ecole), Britain (R. Scruton, Salisbury Review) and the USA (N. Podhoretz, W. Buckley). The different material and political interests of the economic libertarians and the moral authoritarians, combined with the lack of organisational links, make the development of a 'New Right' a doubtful proposition in New Zealand in the immediate future. And these differences extend to the extreme right and the old petty-bourgeoisie.

The extreme right and old petty-bourgeoisie share certain ideological concerns with both major strands of the new conservatism in New Zealand. They agree with the commitment to 'risk' and 'free competition' of the economic libertarians and the concern with the 'moral decay' of New Zealand of the moral authoritarians. But there are also critical differences. The advocacy by the New Zealand Party of the interests of monopoly capital directly opposes the material concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The ideology of the New Zealand Party also reflects the position of the new petty-bourgeoisie. The location of this fraction in the state, or state-sponsored employment, or in large capitalist enterprises results in very different material and ideological interests from those of petty-commodity producers. And the differences are confirmed by their respective positions on matters of morality. In contrast, the old petty-bourgeoisie and extreme right are considerably closer to the moral authoritarians of neo-conservatism. Both derive from a similar New Zealand heartland which mourns the passing of the post-war hegemony that is seen as representing the sanctity of moral virtues. Both seek to appropriate certain symbols such as 'the family' to restore a form of moral absolutism in opposition to the liberal trends of the 1970s and 1980s. But there are also ideological distinctions that need to be acknowledged. In essence, thematic analysis indicates that there are important elements that confirm the peripheral position of the extreme right because of the unacceptability of some of their world

views. Moral authoritarians often express a quasi-conspiratorial causality but they do not employ the usually much more extensive conspiratorial arguments of extreme right-wing groups like the League of Rights. Nor do they identify with the explicit Gleichschaltung (cultural uniformity) arguments of the extreme right. In this sense, the racism and anti-Semitism of the extreme right, and the centrality of these elements to their interpellation, distinguish them from other forms of conservatism. In terms of dominant ideologies, there have been few in the post-war period that have systematically argued for inequality on racial grounds. Such a world view has yet to sustain a political party like the National Front in Britain or the Parti des Forces Nouvelles in France.

Given the above conclusions, fascism becomes a remote possibility in the New Zealand context. Important antagonisms and contradictions will continue and accumulate, but hegemony has been restored and a degree of balance achieved. That it has been done at the expense of rural production or the old petty-bourgeoisie is an insufficient base on which to generate a popular fascism. The old petty-bourgeoisie, and its political representatives amongst the extreme right, might be able to enlarge their constituency to include more fractions in rural production but central tenets of their ideology remain a liability. Further, they are opposed by powerful political forces. Monopoly capital is part of the dominant hegemonic forces, and it has aggressively represented its own interests in national political struggles. Despite the relative weakness of state agencies such as the Human Rights Commission or Race Relations Conciliator, the presence of the new petty-bourgeoisie in ideological struggles provides an effective counter to the reactionary politics of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Indeed, the penetration of political elites by post-war generations has been responsible for liberal changes; the old petty-bourgeoisie has been much less influential. And the collectivism of the new petty-bourgeoisie has enhanced the position of the working class representatives, the trade unions. While the latter have become more fragmented, they have certainly not abdicated from a responsibility in articulating their concerns, and they are now paralleled by powerful work-based unions representing

different class interests. Fascism would only become a possibility if the system of electoral democracy looked like collapsing, and the forces opposing fascism withdrew or experienced their own crisis, and neither is indicated in the immediate future.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION : THE OLD PETTY-BOURGEOISIE  
AND THE EXTREME RIGHT

*How many sincere militants are there who have experienced and fought against the nightmare of fascism, and become so obsessed by it that their automatic reflex is to see the spectre on every side.*

Poulantzas (1979: 358)

*The debilitating danger of sloganised anti-fascism cannot be overstated, for it so devalues the cogent criticism against the real fascists, the real nazis, the real racists and their activities as severely to inhibit the fulfillment of the most basic necessity in political combat, that of identifying the enemy.*

Tomlinson (1981: 26)

This thesis has sought to describe the nature of right-wing extremism in New Zealand, and in so doing to offer a theorisation of the class base of such extremism. In summarising various conclusions about theoretical and empirical issues that have emerged in the course of the analysis, this chapter also provides a final statement on the relationship between the old petty-bourgeoisie and extreme right-wing organisations, and the impact of this political manifestation of nostalgia on political and ideological struggles. With regard to the analytical frameworks of Poulantzas and Laclau, particular issues which are addressed here include specifying the relationship between the old and new petty-bourgeoisie, the need to develop adequate accounts of ideology and to incorporate matters of both agency and structure in analysis. The chapter concludes with some observations directed at Poulantzian understanding.

#### Crisis and Petty-Bourgeois Extremism

Since the arrival of capitalism in nineteenth century New Zealand, the old petty-bourgeoisie have been an important political force. The dominance of rural production, the small size of the population and its dispersed nature, and the absence of an established class structure have all meant that the petty-bourgeoisie, especially the rural fraction, have been able to exert considerable influence. Most recently, this fraction has provided the class base for reactionary political organisations. But the old petty-bourgeoisie have not always been identified with this form of political expression. The first indication of collective political intent occurred in the 1880s, when the rural petty-bourgeoisie combined with the working class and manufacturers to influence events. Bourgeois dominance of political institutions was diminished by a developing democracy. The outcome was the election of the Liberal Government in 1890 and although an influential and progressive period of government followed, by 1908, the rural petty-bourgeoisie had withdrawn their support. This was an important factor in the collapse of the Liberal Government after 1911. The situation was paralleled in the 1930s when the old petty-bourgeoisie asserted their political influence by identifying with the liberal intentions of first the Labour Party (petty-bourgeois support was apparent from 1927 onwards) and then the

Labour Government. This mobilisation was also expressed in the formation and rapid growth of Social Credit in the early 1930s. The sympathy for the Labour Government declined as proletariat interests were seen to be given priority over the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. In 1953, Social Credit was constituted as an independent political party and the old petty-bourgeoisie could now claim a political representative that was an explicit expression of their interests. But the involvement in pluralist politics created new tensions which were exacerbated by events in the late 1960s and 1970s. This latter period marked a generalised economic and social crisis in New Zealand and other western capitalist countries, which had very specific implications for the old petty-bourgeoisie.

Throughout the 1950s and the early part of the 1960s, the expansion of capitalism produced affluent years. For the old petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand, the post-war hegemony was held to be a continuation of their own. The struggles around such issues as gender, 'race' and defence were yet to come, and the decline of British dominance internationally was only just becoming apparent. Although petty-commodity production was contracting in this period, there were few indications that the old petty-bourgeoisie were concerned. But the 1960s marked a transition period and the beginning of an explicit revolt. To begin with, petty-bourgeois extremism focussed on international issues. In the 1960s, the formation of anti-communist groups like the Democratic Society (1965) were accompanied by other organisations who were reacting to the global decline of British and/or 'white' dominance such as the New Zealand-Rhodesia Society (1962). For both sorts of groups, the growing uneasiness of the petty-bourgeoisie was engendered by specific debates although the articulation of philosophy contained a variety of other petty-bourgeois concerns: the moral decadence of western and New Zealand society, opposition to trends in the state and pluralist politics, and indignation at the marginalisation of the petty-bourgeoisie in economic, political and ideological relations. At the same time, the first expression of working class neo-fascism, the National Socialist Party (1964, 1967), also appeared. Petty-bourgeois extremist groups began to proliferate, and throughout the 1970s, a new political generation of activists was created and the number of organisations increased dramatically.

The major periods of crisis in New Zealand in the 1880s, 1930s and 1970s, have therefore been important catalysts in the creation of petty-bourgeois activism. In each period of protest, political generations have appeared who comprised the active leadership and membership of representative groups. In the intervening periods of acquiescence, these activists worked to reproduce the ideological traditions within a cultic milieu until the ideology again appears legitimate and applicable. In terms of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism, an interpellation which centres around 'the people' and is antagonistic to the dominant bloc, the two critical periods in the development of appropriate political generations were the 1930s and 1970s. Even though petty-bourgeois links in the 1930s were with the Labour Party, many of the characteristics of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism were solidified or formed in this period. These included the conviction that Jews were responsible for unfavourable economic conditions, that monopoly capital and proletarian collectivism were contrary to the interests of 'the people' and an interpellation that constructed 'the people' as a 'race'. The latter was not unique. Interpellations which revolved around the notion of a racial threat had played a critical role in ideological struggles in New Zealand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These included anti-Asian and anti-Yugoslav campaigns, but petty-bourgeois interpellations were fundamentally different. Their employment of a conspiracy theory and anti-Semitism were important departures, and the logic of their interpellation which centred on 'race' provided a meaning shift from similar struggles. The interpellation was best exemplified in the publications of A.N. Field, and it was faithfully reproduced by key ideologists (e.g. E. Butler) between the explicit petty-bourgeois Jacobinism of the 1930s and its revival in the 1970s. This Jacobinism was contained in the 1930s by the representative link with the Labour Party. By the 1970s, the commitment to Jacobinism was evident in key antagonisms inside Social Credit.

The 1970s produced a new political generation similar to that of the 1930s. This earlier generation was still a critical factor. It was politically experienced and provided the cultic milieu for the reproduction of Jacobinism. The decisive movement came in 1972 when a relatively liberal leadership (Beetham, Hunter) gained control of

Social Credit. The traditional Jacobinism adhered to by some people conflicted with the ambitions and political sensibilities of this new dominant fraction, and many were convinced that their political future lay elsewhere. Long time Social Credit supporters and officials such as Ross and Howe transferred their allegiances to groups like the League of Rights. They were joined by the new generation of the 1970s. Daly, who had not been involved with Social Credit, was an example. Young and relatively inexperienced, this element balanced the aging 1930s generation. Others were recruited. J. Clapham, active in Social Credit during the 1970s before being expelled in 1979 because of her involvement with the League of Rights, was motivated by her commitment to a combined religious and political fundamentalism. Both generations articulated this fundamentalism and did so via the medium of political sects. The 1970s mark a general proliferation in antagonisms and a crisis in social identity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 136), which is recorded in the growth of extreme right-wing organisations. The reasons for this growth and its expression in extremist forms can be identified in a number of changes and their resulting tensions.

The primary factor reflected alterations to the class structure. Petty-commodity production, both rural and urban, had been declining in absolute size and relative importance since the beginning of the century. But the most obvious decline had come in the post-war period when developments in New Zealand capitalism altered the viability of small-scale production. In the rural sector, this was recorded in the decline in the number of dairy farmers. In the urban sector, the increasing size of enterprises, especially in retailing, and the economies of scale reduced the profitability of smaller single units. An obvious example was the corner store. Clearly, the reproduction of petty-commodity production was inhibited, and, as a fraction that was declining both in membership and material base, the tendency was to articulate reactionary sentiments and philosophies (cf. Bourdieu, 1984).

A second factor involved changes to the power structure of New Zealand capitalism. There were three particular aspects which were important for the old petty-bourgeoisie. The first was the growth in monopoly capital, specifically its centralisation and concentration

(see Perry, 1982). In a corporate economy, the operations of petty-commodity production were at an obvious disadvantage. The overwhelming concern was the self-evident fact that private ownership and the operations of a free market were subjugated by this trend towards monopoly capital. This was confirmed for the old petty-bourgeoisie by a second aspect, the interventionist state. This had always been a major political presence in New Zealand; however since 1935, the degree of intervention and the size of the bureaucracy had been steadily increasing. The perceived undue interference in economic relations and the use of tax income to sustain an 'unproductive' bureaucracy confirmed the old petty-bourgeoisie's commitment to actively oppose the state and its bureaucratic mode. The opposition was further fuelled by a conservative government's use of an interventionist state during the 1970s and early 1980s. The third change in the power structure was revealed in the growing influence of a morally progressive fraction, the new petty-bourgeoisie. The new petty-bourgeoisie are defined by their relationship to cultural capital and their occupations include presentation and representation (e.g. advertising) or the provision of symbolic goods and services (e.g. social work or cultural production) (Bourdieu, 1984: 359). The expansion in size and importance of the occupations of the new petty-bourgeoisie combined with their 'vanguard' role (cf. Bourdieu, 1984: 366) in struggles concerning social relations were all seen as threatening to the old petty-bourgeoisie. The two fractions provided a contrast: the old petty-bourgeoisie were facing a decline in petty-commodity production and were increasingly inconsequential to moral hegemony, while the new petty-bourgeoisie were experiencing the opposite. The relations of domination were of growing importance to the old petty-bourgeoisie who reacted by opposing liberalism and nostalgically asserting the sanctity of traditional moral virtues. Their moral entrepreneurialism often took extreme forms. New representative organisations and links were established and contributed to the intensification of antagonisms.

A third factor in the mobilisation of petty-bourgeois extremism was the confusion surrounding the articulation of conservatism in major political institutions from the mid-1970s. Contrary to the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie, the leadership of the National Party was committed to the interests of monopoly capital and the

interventionist state. The resulting tensions within the National Party between rural and urban fractions, and between the economic libertarians and the statist, did nothing to resolve the question of ideological dominance or to strengthen party-class ties. At the same time, the alternative for the old petty-bourgeoisie, the Social Credit Party, had been consciously guided in a liberal direction since 1972, and had sought to reject major aspects of traditional Social Credit dogma. For example, any ideological or membership overlap with groups like the League of Rights was discouraged; moreover, compared with the secular and religious conservatism of earlier Social Credit generations, the younger, progressive leadership (often incorporating members of the new petty-bourgeoisie) was unacceptably liberal. The growth in antagonisms generally and within the established conservative parties encouraged many sectors of the old petty-bourgeoisie to contemplate new representational links and political organisations.

The period 1965-1975 was critical in the growth of right-wing extremism, although the proliferation of groups has continued throughout the 1980s. The events in this period confirmed a growing realisation amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie that their interests were not going to be represented by major political parties. So by 1975, or soon after, the major alternative extremist organisations such as the League of Rights or Zenith Applied Philosophy had been established. Secondly the debates that disturbed petty-bourgeois sensibilities in the 1960s, the 'threat' of communism and the decline of 'white supremacy' continued into the 1970s but were expanded by additional concerns and gained in importance. The ambivalence about becoming involved in the Vietnam War followed by withdrawal along with the debate about New Zealand links with southern Africa were prime issues. Maori protest added to the perceived threat, and the growing politicisation of 'race' represented a critical matter that had to be opposed. Of equal importance were political and ideological struggles surrounding gender, morality and biological reproduction. From single issues, extreme right-wing organisations expanded and developed new skills and ideologies to oppose changes on a wider front. And this was possible with another development, the mobilisation of a growing number of activists. The indignation of the old petty-bourgeoisie at the marginalisation of their form of production and beliefs provided a new political generation who expressed an ideology born of nostalgia.

### Petty-Bourgeois Extremism: Organisations and Ideology

Some of the new organisations represented particular fractions of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The major expression of rural petty-bourgeois concerns was the Country Party. Its ideology encompassed all the major elements of petty-bourgeois interpellations: it was anti-state, anti-feminist, anti-proletariat, anti-socialist and pro-free enterprise with a particular fear that rural petty-commodity production was under threat. It interpellated 'the people' as a 'race' and sought to offer an alternative to dominant bloc representatives and hegemony. But the Country Party faced two major obstacles. The first was that it was constituted too early in the period of crisis. It began in 1968 and by 1972 had lost all impetus. It predated the intense antagonisms and material crisis of the 1970s. The second problem was that the Country Party sought to be an inclusive organisation rather than an exclusive political sect. In the latter, the centralisation of authority and its intimate nature provide a cohesive structure that is less likely to fragment. In attempting to become a traditional political party however, this unity and control was compromised and within two years of its formation, the Country Party experienced a major schism (1970).

The specifically urban expressions of the old petty-bourgeoisie were epitomised in the organisations, Zenith Applied Philosophy and Tax Reduction Integrity Movement. The general ideological concerns differ little from those of the Country Party but the specific focus centres on taxation and the role of the state in relation to small-scale urban business, especially in the retail and service sectors. Zenith Applied Philosophy was a charismatically-led political sect that required a prospective member to negotiate a detailed and financially costly procedure before being granted insider status. The ideology contains a complex symbolic code that must be internalised by an extensive study programme. The motivation is personal material advancement, although the combined power of ZAP members is impressive, given the extensive financial network affiliated to this particular sectarian ideology. The political representative of ZAP beliefs, and of the League of Rights, is the Tax Reduction Integrity Movement

(TRIM). It effectively operates as a committee that draws upon two sources of support: ZAP for financial help and ideology, and public soliciting for low-level financial and ideological support. From this base, TRIM has mounted a number of high profile campaigns that centre on expanding the political rights related to private property ownership and restoring the marketplace as the basis for the rational distribution of resources and rewards. Conversely, TRIM seeks to drastically limit the operations of the state, and argues for the reduction in levels of taxation because tax is viewed as the unfair appropriation of legitimate profit. ZAP and TRIM represent an important aspect of the urban petty-bourgeois offensive against the corporate economy, both state and capital, and against proletarian collectivism. The two organisations have distributed key justificatory texts, mainly through proselytisation and a bookshop, and they have sent literature to most households in urban New Zealand. This literature was concerned with the operations of a pluralist democracy and it sought to diminish the importance of the political party by promoting a traditional (1930s) Social Credit strategy of a contract between a political representative and a constituency. A minor role has been the participation of ZAP and TRIM members in such debates as the ongoing links with white South Africans. As custodians of the 'core' values of capitalism (cf. Scase, 1982: 149), these two organisations have been relatively successful in articulating urban petty-bourgeois concerns, even if their public campaigns have not always had the desired effect.

Another key organisation that encompasses both rural and urban fractions of the old petty-bourgeoisie is the League of Rights. The League, one of the more enduring and successful petty-bourgeois organisations, represents a coherent and remarkably complete expression of Jacobinism. It contains within its ranks both rural and urban fractions, and the political generations of the 1930s and 1970s. W.A. Ross and Eric Butler span both periods of crisis and have been responsible for reproducing petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. Clapham and Daly represent those recruited in the 1970s. Both types of activist have been attracted away from Social Credit (e.g. Ross, Howie, Clapham, Moody), many from important positions inside the

political party, and they have contributed an expertise to the League's many campaigns. The group is epistemologically authoritarian with a strong commitment to an ideology that dates from the 1930s. The interpellation is restated to accord with present struggles but retains long-standing elements such as anti-Semitism. 'Race' is a central ideological notion and the logic and content of the interpellation is derived from two primary ideologists, Douglas and Butler (see Buchman, 1983). In this interpellation, New Zealand is seen as a bastion of British values and supremacy, and the unique historical mission of the League is to preserve this character and to oppose speculative capital monopolies and 'the conspiracy'. The importance of 'race' and the manner in which it is combined with other ideological elements is provided by publications like G. McDonald's Shadows Over New Zealand (1985). And the League's views are conveyed to a membership of approximately 1000 by regular publications and high profile activities such as speaking tours by Butler. Equally important is the contribution by the League's much smaller exclusive core which conducts low key, covert campaigns via front organisations or letter-writing. This core sustains and reproduces the complex sectarian logic and symbolic code, and is loyal to the interpellation consolidated in the 1930s. The articulation of this ideology requires skills and a commitment that is a testimony to the indignation and self-righteous certainty of reactionary sections of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The League of Rights exemplifies the critical and radical nature of contemporary Jacobinism.

Jacobinism of the old petty-bourgeoisie is characterised by the particular assemblage of ideological elements, although the emphasis differs between groups, and the description 'extreme' is justified by the presence of core ideological values and aspects of political style. The ideology is more than commonsense and with most Jacobinist groups, the structure is systematic and coherent in terms of its own logic. The unity derives from a hierarchy of arguments that revolve around key values such as 'race'. The subject is interpellated as a 'race', and arguments of scientific and popular racism are interwoven with an anti-Semitism that has evolved since the Middle Ages in Europe. By definition, therefore, the ideology is elitist and this

racism combines with nationalism and sexism to provide a perception of social relations necessarily structured by biologically derived hierarchies. Even nationalism assumes that a racial pedigree is contiguous with geo-political boundaries. In this way, class interpellations are displaced, and even international considerations are accommodated by the perceived sphere of influence of British culture and the internationalisation of Anglo-Saxon blood lines. The racial exclusivity of petty-bourgeois extremism is extended by other elements: monism, or the belief that cleavage and debate are illegitimate; anti-democratic and anti-liberal sentiments which oppose mass political rights, and the redistribution of wealth or power to 'undeserving groups'; and a conspiracy theory which personifies evil in racial terms and imputes a global power and ambitions to a small group. This latter element makes the world immediately self-evident for the old petty-bourgeoisie. It identifies 'the enemy' and means that this fraction's interpellation has renewable application. If events do not turn out as prophesied, then the machinations of the conspiracy provide the answer.

Other elements of petty-bourgeois interpellations are not, in themselves, extreme. The defence of petty-commodity production, the suspicion of trade unions, monopoly capital and the state are ideological elements that overlap with the concerns of other conservative groups. But the core assumptions surrounding 'race', hierarchy and 'the conspiracy' also structure these elements and transform them so that each is given a radical emphasis. Monopoly capital is seen to be inhabited and guided by Jews and is linked to communist aims. The state extends the power of the conspiracy and in promoting policies such as multiculturalism is denying the rights and interests of 'the people', that is Anglo-Saxons. This is variously described as deliberate because of the penetration of the state by radicals or members of the conspiracy, or it may be seen as unwitting because of naivety on the part of politicians or the bureaucrats. Collectivism, especially proletarian collectivism, contravenes the radical voluntarist position of the old petty-bourgeoisie. This constellation of world views and their permeation by beliefs about causality and structure define the interpellation as extreme and specify the

relations of domination for this fraction.

During periods of relative acquiescence, this interpellation is sustained in a cultic milieu amongst the old petty-bourgeoisie. Scattered individuals or small groups remain convinced of the accuracy and explanatory power of the interpellation, and their loyalty ensures that it remains one option that can be reactivated. In periods of crisis, particularly in the 1970s, this interpellation was articulated primarily in political sects: exclusive groups that are epistemologically authoritarian and who believe that they are the guardians of the eternal truths of petty-bourgeois radicalism (cf. Wallis, 1976: 17). Some have attempted to operate as inclusive political parties (e.g. Country Party) but the highly centralised nature of the political sect greatly reduces the possibility of schism or debate, and is a more conducive environment in maintaining the ideological purity and commitment to complex symbolic codes. In this way, the nature of the political sects reinforces certain arguments, notably the belief that cleavage and dissent are undesirable or that the conspiracy is all-powerful and therefore an intimate organisation is one of the few ways of countering this influence. But even given the exclusivity of these organisations, the moral entrepreneurialism of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism requires that others be persuaded of the truth of their views. Very few of the New Zealand extreme right-wing political sects are world-rejecting (Zenith Applied Philosophy exhibits some intention of rejecting civil society but this is more than negated by other activities and beliefs) and most are world-affirming (cf. Wallis, 1976) in that they seek society-transforming change as well as endorsing particular traditional values and institutions. In order to preserve the integrity and purity of the sect's interpellation while attempting to convince a wider audience of its accuracy, the enrolment economy of groups like the League of Rights is carefully controlled. The political sect is based on a relatively small number of activists who are known to each other and who have demonstrated their knowledge and commitment to the group's interpellation. Next there are 'supporters' who identify with the group and its philosophy, and who receive publications. They are less likely to be privy to some group activities or to be as conversant with the more complex aspects of the interpellation, but these supporters are important because they

provide a financial and activist base. And then there is the broader public who can be divided according to whether they are likely to be sympathetic to any particular aspect of the interpellation (such as members of moral authoritarian groups or Social Credit), or whether they are informed but opposed, or whether they are simply uninterested. The enrolment economy, or recruitment of ideologues, tends to proceed in steps from a sympathetic public group, through simply being a supporter to involvement in the intimate core. Acceptance is carefully considered so that the intimacy and unity of the sect is not challenged by new members. Outsiders are encouraged to believe in the interpretation offered by the sect but group involvement and membership is based on different considerations. The political sect as an organisational form reflects petty-bourgeois beliefs and is an important strategy of ensuring control, both organisationally and ideologically.

### Comparisons

The distinctive character of old petty-bourgeois Jacobinism is best illustrated by a comparison with the new fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie and with reactionary expressions based in the working class. As Caplan (1977: 93) suggests, the essential ideological difference between old and new petty-bourgeoisie can be summarised as statolatry versus violent individualism. The imagery is expressive although exaggerated in the case of the new petty-bourgeoisie. This fraction is represented amongst the non-productive salaried employees who are either involved with the circulation of capital or are civil servants (cf. Poulantzas, 1979). The new petty-bourgeoisie are rich in cultural capital (cf. education) and have expanded as cultural reproduction and social service have been given legitimacy and a base by the state and monopoly capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). Their statolatry is related to this state patronage and the fact that the interests of the new petty-bourgeoisie are linked to developments in the corporate economy. But some in the private sector are antagonistic to the state, so statolatry is not characteristic of all

new petty-bourgeois fractions.

Whereas the old petty-bourgeoisie are separated from the dominant relations of production and the state, the new petty-bourgeoisie are involved in both. The latter, therefore, do not share an opposition to corporatism, nor do they share the interest in defending petty-commodity production. Secondly, the new petty-bourgeoisie is:

*...predisposed to play a vanguard role in the struggles over everything concerned with the art of living, in particular domestic life and consumption, relations between the sexes and the generations, the reproduction of the family and its values (Bourdieu, 1984: 366-367).*

In the debates surrounding morality in the 1970s and early 1980s, the new and old petty-bourgeoisie were opposed. The new petty-bourgeoisie comprised a morally progressive fraction in contrast with the reactionary position adopted by the old petty-bourgeoisie. And the new petty-bourgeoisie were increasingly involved with social democratic collectivism such as trade unions, liberal pressure groups such as HART or political parties like the New Zealand Party which constitutes a further distinction. Interpellations of the old petty-bourgeoisie were and are predicated on denying such collectivism an opportunity to exist and operate in New Zealand. Thus the activities of a group like the Public Service Association, particularly their growing role in issues only marginally connected to work-based concerns, is seen as representing competition by the old petty-bourgeoisie. And finally, an interpellation which constructs the subject as a 'race' and relies on anti-Semitism to explain economic and political relations is irrelevant to the ideological inclinations or beliefs of the new petty-bourgeoisie. It emphasises the difference between a declining fraction that derives important aspects of its interpellation from the 1930s and expresses it in a reactionary and extremist style, and the expanding new petty-bourgeoisie who reject the anti-corporatism, anti-collectivist and voluntarist elements in favour of a relatively liberal position that positively identifies with many of the developments in monopoly capitalism.

Petty-bourgeois Jacobinism can also be contrasted with another reactionary expression of contemporary politics, working class neo-fascism. This expression has developed in the crisis of the 1970s, and like the old petty-bourgeoisie, 'the people' are interpellated as a 'race' and both contest hegemonic interpretations and control. But there are substantial differences that reflect the respective class bases of petty-bourgeois extremism and neo-fascism. The latter is a minor expression of working class radicalism which attracts young urban working class male support. The result is that unlike the old petty-bourgeoisie, neo-fascists utilise the concept 'class'; they acknowledge the rights of the working class to be represented by trade unions; they support the notion of a corporatist, authoritarian state, particularly as a means of reorganising capitalism; and they reject arguments that the struggle against the dominant bloc can be carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle (they opt for a 'strategy of tension' and confrontation); or that the market is a suitable mechanism in governing social and economic relations. Working class neo-fascists are even more explicit than petty-bourgeois extremists on the nature of 'racial contamination' and they have no hesitation in calling for the withdrawal of political and civil rights from minorities. But neo-fascist organisations are very small and tend to fragment because they lack a strong leadership or class links. They are largely irrelevant to political and ideological struggles in New Zealand, and this is emphasised by the derivative nature of neo-fascism, and the fact that central ideological concerns (anti-Semitism, anti-Polynesian arguments) are peripheral to working class struggles.

New Zealand working class neo-fascism is modelled on similar expressions in Britain where its relative importance during periods of crisis contrasts with the situation in New Zealand and that in other British settler societies. In Australia and Canada, as in New Zealand, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism was an important element in the 1930s. It reflected the relative importance of petty-commodity production, especially rural production, in these developing formations, although alliances were different in all three societies. Social Credit gained provincial power in Canada but failed to reflect

petty-bourgeois concerns at decision-making level. In Australia, Social Credit was relatively weak because of petty-bourgeois representative links with other conservative parties. But dissatisfaction with these links prompted a lot of activity during the 1930s and led to the formation of the League of Rights immediately after the Second World War. In New Zealand, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism was contained by ties with a progressive political party, the Labour Party. Australia and Canada differed from New Zealand in at least two other ways. Both had an imported fascism that was based on the ethnic nationalism of European migrant communities. This fascism superseded class considerations within these communities, and provided a reactionary form of politics that paralleled the extremism of petty-bourgeois interpellations. And secondly, partly as a result of this, and partly because of the different modes of articulating racism, anti-Semitism played a much more historically important role in Canada and Australia than in New Zealand. But for all these differences, the three countries experienced a petty-bourgeois Jacobinism during periods of crisis that differs from political and ideological relations in Britain.

In New Zealand, Australia and Canada, Major C.H. Douglas was a critical theoretician in petty-bourgeois interpellations of the 1930s. In the United Kingdom where the petty-bourgeoisie was much more peripheral to dominant struggles, the major reactionary interpellations reflected working class activism. In this context, Douglas was relatively unimportant. In the 1930s in Britain, the working class in particular localities responded to an economic crisis and the presence of migrants in working class areas by racialising relations. This spatial parochialism was expressed in mass support for a fascism led by members of the bourgeoisie (e.g. Mosley) and based upon similar European forms of fascism. The same working class areas provided a mass base for neo-fascism during a period of crisis in the 1970s, although this time, it was firmly an Anglo-fascism. The localism of working class communities reacted to an Afro-Caribbean and Asian presence, and the historically derived vigilantist culture constituted an important dynamic in the growth of the National Front. But hegemony was restored in the late 1970s by a rejuvenated

conservatism that was articulated by the New Right and reflected in Thatcherism. The New Right intervened to ensure that the rate of accumulation was maintained and that traditional (conservative) hegemonic interests were protected. The fragile unity of neo-fascism collapsed, but not before it had threatened to become a mass class (working class) action. This raises the question of whether the old petty-bourgeoisie in New Zealand are capable of replicating this degree of success under the conditions of a crisis.

### Contemporary Crisis and the Prognosis for Petty Bourgeois Extremism

The accumulation of contradictions and the presence of a crisis provides an opportunity for the old petty-bourgeoisie to establish alliances and to find a constituency for its reactionary interpellation. The issues can be summarised in a series of questions: (a) what constitutes the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s in New Zealand?; (b) what is the likelihood of the old petty-bourgeoisie establishing the necessary alliances?; (c) is fascism a possibility?; and (d) do the old petty-bourgeoisie constitute an authentic social force? In some respects, the answers are speculative because the crisis has yet to pass but empirical analysis can provide a number of justifiable conclusions.

With regard to the crisis of the 1930s which resulted in the evolution of mass fascism in many formations and led to the establishment of the fascist state in some European countries, Poulantzas (1979) identifies the relevant contradictions and the nature of the crisis. To briefly summarise, the contradictions include antagonisms amongst the dominant classes to the extent that no dominant class or fraction is able to impose leadership; modifications to hegemony; the breakup of representational ties; an ideological crisis; and an offensive by big capital and the power bloc. There is a lack of national unity; the state systematically intervenes; there is an unevenness between rural and urban sectors; the bourgeoisie are weak; and there is a transition to monopoly capitalism. Thus the crisis reflects the inability of the power bloc

to absorb and neutralise these contradictions and the failure of the working class and its representatives to offer a satisfactory alternative, politically or ideologically (cf. Laclau, 1979: 115; see also Poulantzas, 1979: 76). Bearing in mind that this analysis specifies the conjuncture in the 1930s that encouraged fascism, a number of these factors are nonetheless present in the crisis in New Zealand in the 1970s and 1980s.

The interventionist state has become both a site and a focus of struggle. The size of the state, its financial requirements and the way in which it has been used to structure capitalism in New Zealand have all been matters of contention. The antagonisms surrounding the operations of the state were heightened by a statist conservatism that was dominant in national political institutions between 1975 and 1984. This exacerbated the concerns of those opposed to the corporate state and produced tensions for the ruling conservative National Party. By the 1980s, this crisis in representation had escalated and the tensions had become much more pronounced. Within the major conservative party, dominant antagonisms have centred on the issue of statism versus libertarian economics, and rural versus urban fractions. This disorientation has been paralleled by tensions in Social Credit about the articulation of petty-bourgeois concerns and an overall decline in support. The Labour Party gained support during the 1970s by extending links to urban-based liberal groups, including the new petty-bourgeoisie, although these new representational links and their effect on policy and party image had also produced tensions with regard to a traditional working class constituency. The other major contradiction was between urban and rural production. The latter experienced a decline during the 1970s (with some fluctuations in this period due to support from the state) and this was confirmed by the policies of the Labour Government after 1984. The accumulation of capital in traditional rural production was retarded and the ability to adequately respond has been inhibited by the reduced political influence of the rural producers, even dominant fractions.

Hegemony was modified throughout the 1970s, guided by struggles over moral issues and the development of monopoly capital and the

interventionist state. Rapid social change and intense public debate all contributed to the perception held by some conservative and reactionary fractions that dominant hegemony was being transformed. For the old petty-bourgeoisie, the development of a hegemony that more directly reflected monopoly capital and the state was a major threat, and such change was endorsed by the growing influence of the new petty-bourgeoisie, feminism and ethnic groups. These groups were represented in the state and the polity by an elite who voiced the demand for increased resources and autonomy. These provided some of the parameters and dynamics of the crisis that dates from the early 1970s. They reflected the adaptation of capitalism in New Zealand, a changing class structure with some fractions in decline (rural production, petty-commodity production) while other classes or fractions expanded (new petty-bourgeoisie), altered international relations and dependencies, and an economic recession. Major political and ideological struggles punctuated the crisis and reflected the increasing influence of post-war generations and the migration of Polynesians, both Maori and Pacific Islanders, to the major urban centres. Many of the preconditions for the development of fascism exist but either a working class or petty-bourgeois fascism is unlikely for the moment.

The necessary accumulation of contradictions has been modified by struggles and relations specific to New Zealand capitalism in the 1980s. A primary factor was the election of a Labour Government in 1984 that was prepared to remoralise both monopoly capitalism and the interventionist state. It sought a new legitimacy by usurping part of the ideological terrain of conservatism and adopted a libertarian approach to economic control. Essentially, this has meant, in the short time of the fourth Labour Government, a liberalising of state control over financial and large capital management, and an insistence that the state conform to the requirements of a 'free market'. Some of the antagonisms that threatened dominant hegemony have thus been neutralised by these developments. For example, those opposed to the interventionist state or monopoly capital have been compromised by the above events, at least in the meantime. Similarly, the difficulties faced by rural production are counterbalanced by traditional support

in this sector for the 'free market'. The dissonance between reduced profitability for rural production and free market ideologies hamper criticism from this quarter and reduce the impact of the unevenness between rural and urban production. In this way, dominant hegemony has been restored.

In other respects, important contradictions or antagonisms have been defused or have yet to develop. Although there has been a mobilisation of conservative and reactionary elements, they have failed to unify. Thus the economic libertarians of the New Zealand Party have little in common with the moral authoritarians of the Coalition for Concerned Citizens. The New Zealand Party represents an agency that is critical of the statist policies of the National Party. But unlike the New Right of other countries, its policies on social and political issues have been liberal. It has crystallised libertarianism on economic issues but has avoided the populist authoritarianism of other New Rights on social issues. But, given changes in other major political parties, it may not be an enduring political force. Equally, the moral authoritarians, while representing a religious conservatism, lack an organisational base (in a party political sense) or an ideological holism that they need to compete as an alternative in national politics. Their main role to date has been to intensify opposition to expressions of liberal morality and to try and engineer the compliance of those Members of Parliament in marginal electorates. Their influence amongst certain fractions is unquestioned but the impact of the moral authoritarians is confined to specific issues.

Finally, a critical requirement for the evolution of a mass fascism, the inability of the working class and its representatives to counter fascism, is unlikely. Fascism in any form has yet to become an important interpellation in political and ideological struggles in New Zealand, and as the few examples of contemporary working class neo-fascism indicate, it is a minor political alternative. Unlike the United Kingdom where working class culture exhibits a significant localism and nationalism, and has been prepared to support fascism during a crisis, the New Zealand working class lacks the historical

development of a distinctive and localised class culture. Further, from the limited empirical evidence available (see Bedggood, 1976), even a low-level proto-fascism as characterised by authoritarianism is not a particular element of working class culture in New Zealand. The representative links with the Labour Party continue, and while weaker in recent decades, there is no indication that they will be displaced thus producing the disorientation necessary for fascism to become a viable option. Working class organisations such as trade unions remain an important political force, and they have been supplemented by trade unions representing the new petty-bourgeoisie in the 1970s and 1980s. The strength of the latter and their willingness to enter political and ideological debate in favour of liberal initiatives has provided a major counterpoint to reactionary interpellations and organisations. In these circumstances, mass fascism is not a likely possibility.

In a situation of crisis, whatever its parameters, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism provides a vehicle for discontent and nostalgia. Jacobinism constitutes an alternative for two reasons. It offers a non-class interpellation and therefore is attractive to those fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie who wish to exclude class interpellations. And it constitutes a radical alternative in a period of crisis (cf. Laclau, 1979: 119). In the contemporary crisis in New Zealand, however, it represents a revolt by a declining fraction that is constrained for various reasons. The discussion above has indicated some of the factors that have retarded the accumulation of contradictions. The remoralisation of the hegemony which legitimates the activities of the interventionist state and monopoly capital, restricts the opportunity for petty-bourgeois interpellations to provide the catalyst for conservatism. Petty-commodity production is unable to compete with monopoly capitalism for hegemonic control, especially as it lacks the defence of technological rationality or corporate efficiency. The old petty-bourgeoisie is also opposed by working class and new petty-bourgeois groups, and this opposition in whatever form is a major barrier in trying to articulate their reactionary concerns. The only possibility exists if this fraction was able to establish alliances, as it did in the 1880s and 1930s, with

other sympathetic class fractions and organisations. But again it is constrained.

The first constraint is an obvious one. The material interests of the old petty-bourgeoisie are quite different from those of practically every other sector, with the possible exception of certain dominant class fractions in rural production. The discussion above indicates the differences between the material position of the new and old petty-bourgeoisie, and similar differences exist between the old petty-bourgeoisie and the working class. This is confirmed by a second factor. The ideological assemblages of petty-bourgeois extremism differ in important regards from other conservative interpellations. There is some discourse overlap with the economic libertarians on the nature of the state and unions, and there is rather more in common between the extreme right and the moral authoritarians. But it is negated by the extremism of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. Their loyalty to ideological elements from the 1930s, notably anti-Semitism, consigns them to the periphery of the political scale. This position is endorsed by the adoption of more recent ideological positions such as historical revisionism, and by the willingness to attribute most events to a conspiracy. These elements make Jacobinism a political liability for other groups, and severely restricts alliances. In this way, the marginal position of the old petty-bourgeoisie to dominant relations, economic, political and ideological, is confirmed. But despite this prognosis, this form of petty-bourgeois mobilisation has been an authentic social (class) force in New Zealand (cf. Poulantzas, 1979: 244) It has provided a significant dimension in an historical sense, and the events after 1890 and 1935 illustrate the effect of their mobilisation and alliances. Their interpellation has been independently reproduced between the 1930s and 1970s, and its autonomy and coherence can not be doubted. It is an important critical tradition of thought. But its rhetorical promise is reduced by the faithfulness with which 1930s interpellations have been reproduced to deny critical alliances and by the decline in the material base of this fraction. For all this, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism represents a powerful vision of how relations in New Zealand might be constructed, and is a vehicle for

revolt and nostalgia. It constitutes one of the major expressions of reactionary politics in New Zealand.

### Theoretical and Methodological Implications

In addition to the preceding theoretical and empirical conclusions, the thesis has sought to address two further issues, one theoretical and the other methodological. The analysis took as its starting point the theorisation advanced by Poulantzas but there are a number of Poulantzian arguments that require clarification. A central issue is identified by Abercrombie and Urry:

*...he [Poulantzas] provides us with the beginning and end of an explanation but not with the substance in between. He shows that, on the one hand, there are distinctive places within the economic, political and ideological structure, places which are neither bourgeois nor proletarian; and on the other hand, that there are political/ideological positions taken up which are not assimilable to bourgeois or proletarian interests. However, he does not indicate the mechanisms which link these together, in particular through the process of class formation and struggle (Abercrombie and Urry, 1983: 69).*

Abercrombie and Urry are referring here to Poulantzas's understanding of the new petty-bourgeoisie but the comment applies equally to his analysis of the old petty-bourgeoisie. Poulantzas fails to fully illustrate the critical importance of ideological struggles to the old petty-bourgeoisie despite the fact that he acknowledges the problems of structural analysis and creates a theoretical space for ideological struggles around issues such as gender or 'race'. It has been shown here, with the help of Laclau, that the old petty-bourgeoisie are concerned with, and structured by, the relations of domination. Their marginal position in a corporate economy with few shared interests with either large capital and the state or the mass wage-earning proletariat, and the difficulty of reproducing petty-commodity positions within monopoly capitalism, crystallises the activities of this fraction around political and ideological relations. The contradiction between the old petty-bourgeoisie and the dominant bloc

is 'posed not in terms of the relations of production but at the level of political and ideological relations which constitute the system of domination' (Laclau, 1979: 114). The fact that Poulantzas does not fully respect the importance of ideology and ideological struggles for this fraction can be illustrated in three ways.

Firstly, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that all ideology is not dominant ideology or self-subjection to the ideological dominance of a particular system. Poulantzas does acknowledge ideological autonomy but fails to appreciate the critical nature of petty-bourgeois interpellations with regard to both capital and labour. In the list of ideological elements that characterise the petty-bourgeoisie (see Chapter Two), Poulantzas refers to an anti-capitalist orientation but does not record the intensely anti-proletarian nature of old petty-bourgeois interpellations. Not only is this fraction critical of the dominant bloc and prepared to contest hegemony, most obviously during a period of crisis, but they are equally opposed to the interests and interpellations of the proletariat. Animosity is directed equally against capital and labour. Poulantzas discusses the first but not the second. In support of the criticism that he does not adequately represent the critical nature of the old petty-bourgeoisie, Poulantzas mistakenly suggests that statolatry is a characteristic ideological element. The evidence provided here indicates the reverse: petty-bourgeois Jacobinism in New Zealand is intensely anti-state and has gone on the political and ideological offensive against the interventionist state and its bureaucratic mode. The extent of ideological autonomy of the old petty-bourgeoisie is therefore much greater than that suggested by Poulantzas and it highlights a second and major weakness in his analysis, the obfuscation of differences between the old and new petty-bourgeoisie.

Poulantzas recognised that there are ideological differences between these two petty-bourgeois fractions: the new petty-bourgeoisie are more responsive to the cult of efficiency and technological neutrality because of their proximity to technology (see Poulantzas, 1979: 252 ff). But he also went on to argue that the two

fractions are basically unified on political and ideological issues. This thesis indicates the reverse. The material, ideological and political positions of old and new petty-bourgeoisie are opposed. The new petty-bourgeoisie identify with elements of monopoly capitalism and the state, are characterised by cultural capital and liberal ideology, and are increasingly involved with social democratic collectivism. The old petty-bourgeoisie are critical of monopoly capital, the state and collectivism, are regressive in ideological struggles and are characterised by their capital investment in petty-commodity production. In contemporary New Zealand, these two fractions often directly contest ideological and political issues from opposing sides. Thus contrary to Poulantzas's assertion that the two fractions display a unity on political and ideological planes, quite the opposite has been shown to be the case.

The third major criticism of Poulantzas concerns his understanding of the ideological struggles around 'race'. He identifies the anti-Semitism and racism of the petty-bourgeoisie as part of the mystified anti-capitalism of their position but the text of his analysis does not explicate this argument. In the present context, racism has been identified as a critical defining characteristic of old petty-bourgeois ideology and a constant concern in political struggles. The articulation of a coherent and encompassing racism and the reproduction of arguments deriving from the historical past structure petty-bourgeois ideology in a distinctive fashion. It is a significant feature which deserves scrutiny, in part because it is central to the logic and semantic codes of this fraction's ideology, and in part because it defines the radicalism of the old petty-bourgeois position. Further to this point, it is unusual to find an analysis of fascism that has only minor references to anti-Semitism. And yet Poulantzas has very few comments on this ideological element, or on the fact that the exceptional state may deserve the description of 'exceptional' for the programmatic genocide practised in Europe by fascist governments. Anti-Semitism has been given considerable space here because of the role it plays in the conspiratorial and racist elements of petty-bourgeois Jacobinism. But it is also important for reasons that Poulantzas could not anticipate. In the specificity of

the New Zealand social formation, the reproduction of an anti-Semitism grounded in political struggles of the 1930s is an important defining characteristic but it also has major implications for the influence of petty-bourgeois interpellations. The thesis has indicated the liability this element represents because of its irrelevancy in contemporary political and ideological struggles. Hence, in the decoding of old petty-bourgeois interpellations and in assessing the possibility of alliances, anti-Semitism deserves attention.

Apart from the theoretical issues relating to Poulantzas's conceptual framework, this thesis has also sought to provide an essentially methodological alternative to the '...excessively abstract analyses which focus exclusively upon positions rather than actors' (Scase, 1982: 154). Structural analysis has tended to treat agents as passive. Poulantzas in his later work avoided such an assumption although his formalism tended to negate this sensitivity. In his analysis of fascism, matters such as leadership or motivation were seldom explored and the style of analysis did not record the specific reality of fascism. It was seldom portrayed as the product of human consciousness or involving specific actors. In order to understand why a fraction should provide the class base for radical interpellations and how petty-bourgeois positions and ideology are reproduced in a situation of monopoly capitalism, the approach adopted here included a detailed examination of key activists and the trajectory of their political careers. The formation of specific political generations in the 1930s and 1970s indicated how individuals were recruited and motivated to remain loyal to an interpellation that was different from dominant ideologies. The examples chosen provided information on the circumstances that encouraged a consideration of radical alternatives and showed how their allegiances were guided by political and ideological struggles. Similarly, the focus on small group politics and especially the notion of a political sect produced an analysis that helped define the organisational base of petty-bourgeois politics and explained the mechanisms whereby an interpellation was reproduced, disseminated and protected against dissonance or criticism. It provides a degree of depth to the analysis of extremism and attempts to balance both agency and structure. Description is employed to

convey the intimacy and richness of lived experience although a wholly voluntarist approach is rejected. Matters of leadership, the motivation of members, the constellation of personal beliefs and the congruence with organisational ideology, the involvement with particular organisations and individual careers were all intended as contributing to the understanding of agency. The approach offered by Poulantzas is not replaced but simply extended.

What then is the future for the politics of nostalgia? For the moment, whatever the radical intentions, petty-bourgeois Jacobinism does not seriously threaten the structural stability of democracy in New Zealand although the critical and exclusionary aspects of their interpellation make the practice of democracy that much more difficult. The extreme right are not well-represented in the nodal points of power, and they continue to face difficulties in establishing alliances or legitimacy for their claims. This observation is of little comfort to those groups who are targeted by the racism, nationalism and sexism of extreme right-wing ideology. The extreme right do not abide by the conventions of democratic process. But the marginality of their present position may not always be the case, and this possibility has to be acknowledged. Petty-bourgeois reactionary interpellations are now well-established, and given the intensification of communal tensions, the ability to evoke resonances of a (racial) past may prove to be increasingly attractive. After all, nostalgia is not the prerogative of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

APPENDIX 1: Methodology and Research Ethics

*The publication of the results of research almost always contains a potential threat to the public rhetoric or the private self-image of those who have been studied. If components of that rhetoric or self-image are matters of public dispute or debate, the work of the sociologist will inevitably mobilize or criticize in justification or support of one or another contending party. A great deal of sociology is therefore, in a sense, subversive (Wallis, 1977:149).*

## (a) History and Methods of the Research

The original research began with a dissertation at the University of Bristol in 1976-77. The British National Front were, at the time, competing reasonably successfully for votes and media attention, and as someone who had not experienced explicit and organised fascism, the temptation was to understand. I approached the Bristol branch of the National Front in 1977 and asked if I had their permission to conduct research on their members. They agreed but the national office declined, and so I conducted the research from afar by completing a study of the semiotics of National Front and National Party publications. This research was reinforced by attendance at National Front marches in Bristol and London. As the research proceeded, there was often mention of New Zealand. Firstly, it was a favoured country in that migration was predominantly from Britain and therefore 'white New Zealanders' were a relatively 'pure strain', unlike Australia or Canada who had received large numbers of people from Mediterranean countries. And secondly, it was announced with obvious delight in

1977 that a New Zealand National Front had been formed.<sup>1</sup> There were periodic reports of New Zealanders who expressed NF views in New Zealand, and many of these were in contact with the British body. But the formation of an organisation was seen as especially important. Other publications, such as the League Review,<sup>1</sup> carried information on the activities of a number of extreme right-wing groups in New Zealand.

When I returned, I asked various individuals and agencies about the groups (e.g. National Front, National Socialists, New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party) that I knew existed. All had heard of the British National Front but few thought that there was a National Front in New Zealand despite recent publicity. A number of people flatly denied that such groups could ever exist in New Zealand. So from 1978, I began to collect material on these groups as a matter of course. The problem was that there were few reporters in any media that were interested in such issues. Those who did produce material were few and far between; Warwick Roger and David Harcourt stand out in the late 1960s and early 1970s as exceptions. And there were no systematic collections in libraries, etc. But there were sources of information, and by the time a more extensive research project was mooted in 1981, I had a considerable amount of material. The need was to order the collected material, to identify gaps and to extend the fieldwork.

The next matter was the choice of methodology. Traditional surveys of group membership were inappropriate, partly because many of the groups were so small, but also because access to membership lists was problematic. The groups by nature were insular and secretive about such matters. Covert participation and immersion in group activity as a member was also inappropriate. The first reason related to the ethics of research and this issue is discussed below. New Zealand is also a relatively intimate community and it was impossible

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Spearhead, May 1977, and National Front News, June 1977 for announcements on the New Zealand National Front, and League Review, no.9, 1976, for a report on the New Zealand Democratic Nationalist Party and New Zealand Commonwealth Alliance.

for me to fake a commitment to extreme right-wing groups and their world views, mainly because my interests were already publicly known. Finally, rigorous hypothesis testing and statistical techniques were inappropriate given the diversity of the groups and the nature of the material sought. Flexibility and insight were most likely to be provided by the domain of methods referred to as ethnographic research.

Ethnography is not a single method but

*...refers to a characteristic blend or combination of methods and techniques that is employed in studying certain types of subject matter...[It] involves some amount of social interaction in the field with the subject of study, some direct observation of relevant events, some formal and a good deal of informal interviewing, some systematic counting, some collection of documents and artifacts, and openendedness in the directions the study takes (McCall and Simmons, 1969: 1).*

Inevitably some of the questions which direct ethnographic research tend to look trivial and sometimes the conclusions self-evident. But the nature of the groups leaves little option and the portrait that is offered by this approach provides rich pickings. It supplies the detail and depth that is an important part of the sociological enterprise and is a valuable corrective view to the stereotypes that are normally held about such politically 'deviant' groups. It is also a suitable response to the concern expressed in Chapter 2 about the need to respond to questions of agency as well as structure.

## 1. Documentary Research

### (i) Secondary Sources

The research relied on a variety of avenues for its material. The first task was to collect as complete a coverage of documentary material as possible. This took various forms. Firstly, it meant published material from secondary sources: newspapers, radio reports and interviews, television programmes and academic articles and comment. I spent considerable time

visiting journalists and reading back copies of papers to gain a comprehensive coverage, and then I went to the visual and audio media when I had identified public comment that had led to debate or interest. The main newspapers and journals consulted included:

Auckland Metro	New Zealand Herald
Auckland Star	New Zealand Jewish Chronicle
Christchurch Press	New Zealand Listener
Christchurch Star	New Zealand Monthly Review
Comment	New Zealand Times
Dominion	Otago Daily Times
Evening Post	Truth
National Business Review	

Some newspapers had cuttings files, and I did extensive searches of these files for the New Zealand Herald, the Auckland Star and the Otago Daily Times. Bert Roth, at the time (1978) deputy-librarian at the University of Auckland, had one of the few systematic private collections of the extreme right and this provided me with names and dates. I began these searches with a list of groups, the names of those active in these groups and critical incidents. Usually the newspaper's cutting files only provided fragmentary information as the coverage really depended upon the inclinations and judgement of the librarian. And so it required a further search of the newspapers for the period during which the group was active or when they had attracted public attention for one reason or another. The main television and radio programmes used are listed at the end of this appendix. Thus the search began with some names and dates and expanded as further material came to light. Inevitably, return visits to the newspaper files were required as new information was gathered. With cross-checking between the information gained from primary sources and the media, a reliable and comprehensive picture of the public activities of extreme-right wing groups was obtained. It was an essential base for other work, especially in assessing the comments made by members of extreme right-wing groups.

The next avenue was archival material, such as that held in the Alexander Turnbull Library, to fill out the historical sections. These proved to be interesting if not always directly useful. But there were some notable exceptions. In the Alexander Turnbull Library was a collection donated by A.N. Field which proved to be a wide ranging collection of fascist/extreme right-wing/Social Credit material from the 1920s through to the 1950s. It provided a lot of information on groups, individuals and views in the 1920s and 1930s, both in New Zealand and elsewhere, and it contained such rare items as Eric Butler's booklet, The International Jew. This aspect of the research took up a lot of time, and usually with few results. But the occasional finds such as the A.N. Field collection were essential to the research. A list of the main libraries used, both archival and for other purposes, are listed at the end of this appendix.

Further library research was undertaken in Melbourne in 1981 and in London in 1983. Various collections in Melbourne, specifically those held in the State Library and by Australia/Israel Publications, the Jewish Board of Deputies, Victoria, and The Age provided extensive collections of primary and secondary material. Two authors who had published on the League of Rights, Ken Gott (Voices of Hate, 1965) and M. Richards (various academic articles and the four articles in The Age, 26 February - 1 March 1972) were also prepared to let me have material that was extremely useful. In London, the very impressive collections contained in the Wiener Library, and the reference collections of the Institute for Jewish Affairs and the Board of Deputies of British Jews expanded the material on the British groups and their links with New Zealand counterparts. They also provided information on New Zealand groups and activities that was not available in New Zealand. This reflects the origins and continuing dependency of many New Zealand groups on their parent bodies in the United Kingdom. This is reinforced by the migration of sympathisers from Britain to New Zealand. But it also reflects the fact that New Zealand groups, especially the smaller ones, lacked their own publications

and so they supplied material to British journals such as Candour or League Review. It was apparent from some of these reports that the authors were released from the constraints that accompanied writing for a local audience. They provided information that they would not release in the New Zealand context. Thus the material was often very intimate or at other times, exaggerated.

(ii) Primary Sources

The second source of material was primary material from extreme right-wing groups. Donations from individuals who had the odd copy lying around, the photocopying of unobtainable publications and the provision of material from the groups themselves provided a virtually complete set of most publications, including manifestos, publicity material, journals and items such as press releases. In this regard, individuals from extreme right-wing groups were very helpful and offered material of their own accord or they responded readily to specific requests. There was an enormous amount of primary material, especially when it is considered that the League of Rights produces two publications regularly in New Zealand, and that one of them comes out every second week. The fragmentation of groups and the desire to publicise their views contributed regular and diverse publications. The main publications (journals that is, not articles, pamphlets or books) consulted included:

New Zealand:

<u>On Target</u>	<u>Attack</u>
<u>New Times</u>	<u>Spark</u>
<u>Pointing Right</u>	<u>Observer</u>
<u>Heed</u>	<u>Nationalist News</u>

Australia:

<u>On Target</u>	<u>Front Line</u>
<u>Intelligence Survey</u>	<u>Perseverance</u>
<u>New Times</u>	

Britain:

On Target

Candour

League Review

Spearhead

National Front News

Beacon

## 2. Observation and Interviews

The next major avenue of information came from contact with extreme right-wing groups. This meant attending meetings, talking with individuals informally and then interviewing them on a formal basis. In all of this, the research was conducted openly and without any attempt to hide the researcher's status or aims. This was done for reasons that will be discussed later. With respect to interviews, the respondents were contacted in writing and the nature of the research was explained; that is, it was a research project to look at right-wing groups in New Zealand for a thesis. If the respondent agreed to the interview, then a written undertaking was given on various points:

- (i) the respondent was invited to ask further questions about the research or the researcher;
- (ii) they were reminded that they had the right to refuse to answer any questions;
- (iii) if they wished information to remain confidential, then they had to indicate as much and that status would be observed;
- (iv) they were told that a gap of two years would elapse before the interview material would be made public, explicitly in terms of the media using it;
- (v) and they received a transcribed copy of the interview which they could alter.

A typical letter is included at the end of this appendix. The respondents were asked whether the interview could be taped (there were no refusals) and whether they wanted to be identified as the author of the interview publicly. On the latter point, there were four respondents (out of 10 formal interviews) who asked that their identity be kept confidential. In fact, the material from these interviews was

not really used in the thesis. It provided a point of confirmation on several occasions, and it led to certain matters being followed up elsewhere. Unfortunately, a lot of the informal interviewing produced material that was also unuseable. Much of it was fascinating and it contributed inestimably to my knowledge of the dynamics of interaction and the level of commitment of members of extreme right-wing groups. But the material could not be used directly. I attended various meetings held by groups, especially by the League of Rights. Because they were public meetings, I felt no need to identify myself to the meeting as a whole. I would, however, declare my position when talking to particular individuals.

I also contacted certain opposition groups such as HART and individual anti-racist activists. I discovered that many of these people had an intimate understanding of aspects of the activities of extreme right-wing groups and that they were the most likely to have collected the material on or from these groups. The insights from these individuals proved to be very important to the research, and it was surprising how often the conclusions reached about the nature of the extreme right and the importance of their activities were similar to those of members of the extreme right themselves. Finally, I would echo a comment of Wallis's (1976). These individuals were hostile to the extreme right and their views, but this does not condemn their analysis. It tells me that their information may be biased but not that it is (Wallis, 1976:vii). Indeed, I have respect for the accuracy and insight of their views.

The contact with members of the extreme right and involvement in their activities took place principally in the period from late 1981 to early 1984. During this time, I formally interviewed 10 key activists, and these often required several visits and correspondence, and I had informal contact with another 17 individuals. This informal contact varied from regular correspondence and meeting at gatherings to relatively minor interaction that occurred on one or two occasions. I used these contacts to provide confirmation for data gathered elsewhere as well as to increase my understanding of the qualitative dimensions of membership of the extreme right. It was certainly one of the most interesting parts of the research.

Inevitably with ethnographic research, the question arises of the accuracy and representativeness of the data gathered. The debate that ensues as a result of the positivistic assumptions that underlie such a question do not need to be rehearsed here. I think it sufficient to simply note that positivistic methodologies, specifically questionnaire surveys, would have been both inappropriate and impractical. Inappropriate because the world of many of these groups and the individuals who inhabit them is guarded; their political motives, if made public, would be a liability. Therefore a methodology that employs a variety of strategies designed to penetrate this barrier is necessary. A composite analysis is only possible by drawing information from a variety of sources and then cross-checking. A questionnaire would not necessarily have provided this detail and the format may have allowed them to preserve many of the fictions that they hold about themselves or which they wish outsiders to believe. Finally, access to a survey population via membership lists would have been denied. This was confirmed by the groups very early on in the research project.

Perhaps one of the few problems of the research was ensuring that a good regional coverage was obtained. The geographical spread of membership and the corresponding isolation of certain meetings and individuals made it extremely difficult for me to make contact or to observe them. Most of the research was done in the bottom half of the North Island and in Auckland. There was also research (library research, interviews, attendance at meetings) in Christchurch and Dunedin. The rest of New Zealand was covered by private collections of material, and interviews that were carried out by the media. But there was, in terms of personal contact, a distinct urban bias and one that tended to favour the North Island. Within these limitations, I am still confident that the coverage is systematic and accurate.

#### (b) The Research Role and Stress

A discussion of the methodology employed would be incomplete without some reference to the value orientation of the researcher,

especially when by their nature, extreme-right wing groups attract opposition and disgust. Perhaps inevitably, my values are not the values of those attracted to the extreme right. In most respects, the views of the extreme right are diametrically opposed to my own. But as long as these differences are clear to the researcher, then allowances can be made during the research and the subsequent analysis. I do not accept that researcher and subject must share a common value stance; indeed, most research would be declared null and void by such a requirement. Instead, there is an imperative in the sociological enterprise which requires the sociologist to understand, and make understandable, the life situations of individuals and groups who are on the fringes of social life. And it was this need to understand that was a critical guideline in the current research. It does not imply acceptance, nor is the research invalidated by differences between the researcher and researched.

As the research proceeded, the reaction of colleagues often focussed on two matters. Firstly, how did I retain a perspective and humour in dealing with often offensive and crude expressions of opinion? At times it was difficult, but by and large, activists amongst these groups, in a person to person situation, were welcoming and friendly. Most were intelligent people who were well able to articulate their views and who knew the contempt and questions that were prompted by such views. I did not always feel comfortable in their presence, especially when they described their position, but there were relatively few occasions when I felt directly threatened. The second matter focussed on how I could get access to these groups when my opposition to their views was known. It is something that has puzzled me, and the most reasonable explanation I can advance is to suggest that publicity was critical to their purpose and even negative publicity was seen as helping their cause. I doubt that they ever thought I could be converted but all were convinced of the logic and appropriateness of their world views, and that these views would be more widely accepted at some future point. With one exception, I was never declined an interview, a request for information or material, or access to gatherings (admittedly, most of these were public anyway). This interaction was critical to the research process, and it provided an insight to a world that is normally hidden or different from the one I inhabit.

This world was built around beliefs of a conspiracy, of racial and gender determinism and superiority, and of political ambitions and intrigue. And it was the acceptance and advocacy of these views that I had to explain, however different they were from mine.

Another problem that arose from the research, and one which I found stressful at various points, was the attention of the media. The media often came with requests for interviews and information, but frequently they did not want to acknowledge in their reporting the complexity and nuances of extreme right-wing activity in New Zealand. Mostly, their interests were in the spectacular, and the extreme right by their very nature were seen to provide such material. This contact increased substantially when a public issue focussed attention on one or more groups. During September 1984, for example, when pamphlets from the Nationalist Workers Party were impounded by the Auckland police, I received up to six calls a day for just over a week. Mostly, the people calling were ill-informed about the issues and the background of the groups so the first expectation was to be given an appropriate briefing. They then required material that fitted into their expectations, specifically assumptions about the 'threat' of the groups. The agenda and terminology of researcher and reporter were quite different. and normally it was simply impossible to achieve a balance that would be fair to both the research and to the groups who were the subject of attention. Radio and television reporters in particular were reluctant to accept judgements by me about the activities and importance of various groups. For example, while uninformed about anti-Semitism in New Zealand, one Radio New Zealand reporter refused to accept that it either existed or represented a threat to the Jewish community. In another instance, a story was written by a senior newspaper reporter on the Nationalist Workers Party for a major New Zealand daily only for the story to be rejected at editorial level, not for the first time and without any obvious reason. It was instructive to be given insight to the otherwise hidden processes of news creation, but it was also time consuming, often counterproductive to the research process and I was doubtful as to the end product, in terms of informing the public. I have always regarded the communication of research findings and material to a wider audience as essential to research and part of the responsibility of the social scientist

to the community. But most attempts to do so through the media proved to be problematic and it really requires skills and understanding in approaching and dealing with the media that are not part of any book on sociological research.

The stress of being researched and of having to deal with the media was also a serious factor for the extreme right. Some sought and enjoyed the publicity; many felt uncomfortable as it exposed them to derision and threats. Others would argue that the extreme right initiated this process by threatening directly or encouraging people to harass minority ethnic groups, and therefore opposition of this kind was deserved and essential in limiting their activities. But members of the extreme right also had certain mechanisms that helped them deal with negative public perceptions. For example, they might be untruthful to themselves and others. On a number of occasions, I came across people who simply denied the obvious and exaggerated the importance of themselves and their views. If media comment was critical, then they said it did not represent public opinion. Another defence mechanism was to define the person or group who were critical of them as a member of the enemy who were already part of the 'conspiracy', that is, involved or affiliated to a group typically made up of communists/socialists, Jews and certain monopoly capitalists who sought to control economic power and understanding. It followed logically for the extreme right that by their very nature these critics were inaccurate and motivated by the aims of the 'conspiracy'. It was argued that others would see this also. One of the few times when this attention had implications for me was the reaction of some of the more youthful members of the extreme right who when faced with negative publicity identified the researcher as part of the problem. These groups were already involved in street politics of a violent and aggressive nature and they focussed some of this attention on me. It was unpleasant, and made worse by the fact that it was impossible to anticipate their behaviour - and still is. Certainly this factor has been one reason why this type of research has been abandoned in the past. In Britain, for example, the intimidation of researchers by groups such as the British Movement or the National Front has restricted or forced the abandonment of research (see Fielding, 1982, for discussion of some of these issues).

(c) Ethics

Ethical problems are endemic to social research and their resolution requires careful and serious consideration. These problems typically revolve around conflict or misunderstandings between a sponsoring agency and the researcher, or between the subjects of the research and the researcher. The issues of the present research focussed on the latter and required at an early stage in the research process the identification of ethical principles. With the exception of one or two authors, notably Wallis and Bulmer, I found the sociological literature curiously unhelpful. Curious because a lot of time and energy has been devoted to discussing the relationship between researched and researcher, and yet very little of it is concerned with studying members of the same ethnic group as the researcher who, however, hold very different views.

The first step in the research process was to identify my own values and to decide how they would impinge upon the research activity. I accepted the standpoint adopted by the American Sociological Association's Committee on Professional Ethics (1964) that sociologists inevitably intervene in the situations that they study, that research is always framed from a particular perspective and the results will reflect that perspective. The research in this thesis was guided by the desire to generate material on groups that had not received the attention of social scientists in New Zealand before. The situation offered the opportunity to test arguments about the nature of ideological relations in New Zealand with specific attention to 'race relations', class relations, micro-political activity and extremism. The research was to be based on the collection of verifiable material and to be as free as possible from error. The arbiter of whether this has been achieved is the sociological community in the first instance, and the broader community once it is published. I certainly share none of the views expressed by the groups under study, and would take the opportunity at some time in the future (and have already done so) to publicly oppose their views. This raises the epistemological question of whether sociologists can develop an acceptable and intelligible account of human behaviour that is generally seen by the social science community as 'irrational' (although obviously it is regarded as rational by the participants). One researcher identified

his task as the need:

*...to examine processes by which otherwise rational individuals can come to collectively distort their perceptions of certain social groups, racial or otherwise (Biddiss, 1968-69: 264).*

Robbins has observed that the language of the social sciences has emerged as the solvent of traditional moral culture (in America) 'which has grounded notions of civil liberties and human rights in an increasingly problematic presumption of individual rationality and authority' (Robbins, 1981:34). Social science reflects this in its concern to examine the successful of society, or its victims, the articulate and those for whom sociology seeks to articulate. Those groups that are ephemeral because they do not persist, are unstable or are marginal because of their current lack of political acceptance tended to be ignored or treated differently by the social scientist. As Wallis (1979:103) notes, the tendency is to disbelieve the explanations offered by those who do not belong to groups that share the assumptions of social science and to question the integrity of these individuals and groups.

*Only for conservative groups do we need to ignore their own statements of motivation and look elsewhere for the real reasons (Wallis, 1979:103).*

I assumed that the groups under study had a system of logic which was internal to their ideology and that in terms of the assumptions which formed the basis for their position, that there was a rational relationship between assumption and world view. The aim then was to identify the fundamental assumptions of the group member, and to develop an understanding of their world view given these assumptions. In this sense, racism can become rational for the racist. The researcher is not required to accept the assumptions and what follows from them but they do need to acknowledge the different starting points of researcher and extreme right-wing activist, and to provide an analysis of why the views of the latter are genuinely held. This necessarily accepts that for some racism is rational.

A critical ethical issue was the rights of the researched and subsequent to that the relationship between researcher and researched.

Robb put the matter in the following way:

*If the Maori, the poor, the victims of violence have rights in relation to being researched, what about anti-Semites, rich capitalists or criminals? Do they have the same rights, different rights or no rights at all? (Robb, 1980:4).*

Wallis (1979:193) has observed that sociology by its very nature is subversive because it exposes the beliefs and practices of a group to public gaze and the research material can clearly be used to criticise or attack the groups concerned. The integrity of the sociologist can be justified in the first instance if the information gathered and published is related to the central questions of the research. But the second requirement is a stated position on the rights of the researched. In this instance, it was felt from the beginning that there was no ethical position that allowed the researcher to depart from the rights normally accorded the subject of research, and every endeavour has been made to guarantee those rights in writing to the person being interviewed or to observe them where the research relies upon intermediate sources. In short, the groups are treated as a researcher would (or should) treat any subject group knowing that the information is going to be provided to a wider audience.

Probably the most important issue on the matter of the rights of the researched, at least in the present context, was the way in which information was gathered. Specifically, the issue was whether material should be gathered by covert means, and certainly throughout the research the opportunity was presented to me to do so. This was dismissed as inappropriate and unethical. My research role from the beginning was that of an outsider and the intention of the research and my activities were overt. There were a variety of reasons for adopting this approach. Firstly, with regard to the rights of individuals and especially those interviewed during the research, informed consent was essential and covert research can not fulfill this condition. The notion of informed consent has developed from the use of questionable techniques in biomedical programmes, and it has been suggested that it is appropriate to the social sciences. It may, in some circumstances, be contrary to the interests of the research. The intention of a specific task may need to be hidden from the subject in order to obtain a natural and unreflexive response.

But these are surely exceptions to the general ethical requirements of research and need to be justified on an individual basis on specific grounds. In most cases, it is in the interests of both researcher and researched to ensure consent, and this is a right that should be considered for those who are providing personal details and views, especially as this will be conveyed to a public audience at a later date. The way in which this was obtained and the rights provided in the interview situation have been detailed earlier. However, there were occasions on which it was not possible to obtain consent. If material had already been published either in the media generally or in the public documents of the group, then it clearly did not apply. I also assumed that when the media had interviewed a member of one of the groups who were studied here, and they provided me with material from that interview even though it had not been published, I took it that a form of consent had already been granted. The assumption was that the material had originally been obtained on the basis that it would be broadcast or printed, and the comments were made by those interviewed with this in mind. It was therefore part of the public domain. This situation arose on very few occasions. I also attended a small number of meetings when it was inappropriate to gain consent. But by the time that I began to attend these meetings, I was known to a number of the people involved and I was identified by them. For instance, at one public meeting featuring Eric Butler in Palmerston North, the person chairing the meeting knew me and spoke to me during the meeting. So my presence was not covert in any traditional sense. Indeed, on this occasion, I was the subject of very critical comment in a subsequent On Target as having been 'responsible' for the conflict that erupted as the meeting proceeded, even though I took no part in the arguments. A number of university students took the opportunity in the answer and question period to make their dislike of Butler's views known, and one of the students was forcefully ejected from the meeting by the chairperson. It was assumed by the League's reporter that I had 'orchestrated' this disturbance.

Covert research was not considered for other reasons. One concern was the harm that it might result for sociology and social science research (see Bulmer, 1982:229). Sociology is a relative newcomer to New Zealand and it is still viewed somewhat sceptically

by public and policymaker alike. Covert research, unless seen as acceptable and justified, would surely endanger any public standing that has so far been established. Examples such as the 'tea-room trade' research (see Bulmer, 1982) would have a deleterious effect. They would raise the fear of being subjected to the attention of researchers without being warned and without knowing that your activities were going to be described to a wider audience. This applies even though the groups concerned have taken their activities into a public arena and possibly have sought to proselytise their aims and beliefs. Wallis (1982) suggests that all subjects should be treated with 'reasonable humanity', even though the groups might not extend such a courtesy to others, and as a broad principle for social scientists, I think this is a useful one. I also agree with Bulmer (1982:250) that the need for covert research is exaggerated. He argues that open entry can more often be negotiated than is commonly supposed. Indeed, as I have already mentioned, the cooperation and access that I received was a matter of amazement for colleagues. There was a willingness, albeit a guarded one at times, to provide answers to my questions and I took this to be a response to the fact that I was open and explicit in my intentions and activities. It also avoided the ethical problems that would have inevitably arisen if I had acted covertly. This openness of course affected the research in other ways. Informed consent influences interaction and the information gained. But equally, it is not really clear whether those who conduct covert research actually succeed in becoming fully accepted, and if this is not established, then the rationale of the method falls away (see Bulmer, 1982:10).

Despite the time and attention given to methodology and the ethical dilemmas it has raised, I have still not completely resolved the concern that surrounds the action of describing a primarily private world to a public audience. The effect of inflicting harm, however unintentional or deserved, is still a concern and realistically may always be the case. It is one of the matters that has altered my perceptions as a sociologist and it has meant that I now closely examine the infringement of the rights of the researched whoever they are. An important consideration here and elsewhere is the intention of the groups themselves, and frequently I have proceeded with comment and research on the grounds that these groups are seeking to influence

public debate and conditions and to gain public support, and in these circumstances, it is possible to justify public examination, and critical examination at that (see Wallis, 1982). We are still left with the impact of the research on the subject groups. In the case of minority ethnic groups, the expectation, not unreasonably, is that the researcher should identify with members of the group and the research process should reflect a partnership. Another expectation is that there should be obvious returns to the community (see Whittaker, 1984). In the case of the extreme right, none of these conditions apply. The research was done by an outsider who did not even begin to approach the value positions and assumptions of the subject groups, and the research is unlikely to bring any benefits to these groups. The research can only be justified as increasing the knowledge of the wider community and perhaps therefore of focussing more critical attention on the presence of extreme right-wing groups and their views. I return to the principle provided by Wallis (1977:160) of 'undeserved harm'. My conclusion can therefore only be that the sociologist should not cause undeserved harm, whoever the research subjects.

#### Radio and Television Programmes Consulted

- (i) Television:
- a) Eyewitness, October 1979 (New Zealand League of Rights).
  - b) Monday Conference (Australian Broadcasting Commission), June 1982 (Eric Butler interview).
  - c) Newsmakers, March 1981 (Eric Butler interview).
  - d) Sunday, September 1984 (B. Zandbergen, Nationalist Workers Party interview).
- (ii) Radio:
- a) Radio Pacific, March 1981 (Peter, White Power Movement, interviewed by Felix Donnelly).
  - b) Radio New Zealand, March 1981 (Eric Butler, League of Rights, interviewed by John Blumsky - not broadcast).
  - c) Radio Pacific, August 1981 (Don Martin, League of Rights, interviewed by Gordon Dryden).
  - d) Radio Pacific, 1981 (Alan Stang, John Birch Society, interviewed by Gordon Dryden).

- e) Radio Pacific, November 1981 (David Thompson, League of Rights, interviewed by Graeme Coleman).
- f) Radio New Zealand, October 1981 (Alan Stang, John Birch Society, interviewed by Jessica Weddell).
- g) Radio Pacific, October 1981 (League of Rights and Social Credit).
- h) Radio New Zealand, 1982 (New Force on Tangata Atua Motu).
- i) Checkpoint (Radio New Zealand), April 1982 (Eric Butler interview).
- j) Insight '84, October 1984 (Nationalist Workers Party).

#### Main Libraries or Reference Collections Consulted

##### New Zealand:

Alexander Turnbull Library	Dan Long Memorial Librai
General Assembly Library	Auckland Public Library
Serials Section, National Library	Dunedin Public Library
University of Auckland Library	Hocken Library
Massey University Library	
Victoria University of Wellington Library	

##### Britain:

Wiener Library  
 University of Birmingham Library  
 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham  
 Glasgow University Library  
 University of Bristol Library  
 University of London Library  
 Board of Deputies of British Jews Reference Collection  
 Institute for Jewish Affairs Library  
 SSRC, Research Unit on Ethnic Relations Reference Library,  
 University of Aston  
 Runnymede Trust

##### Australia:

State Library of Victoria  
 Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies  
 Australia/Israel Publications  
 Monash University Library

##### USA:

Simon Wiesenthal Centre for Holocaust Studies, Los Angeles  
 University of California Irvine Library  
 University of Utah Library

## Department of Sociology

Dear

I am currently doing some research on right wing political groups in New Zealand, and because of your involvement in ..... group as indicated by ....., I wondered if I could interview you as part of the research project. I am especially interested in talking to you about .....

If you agree to the interview, then there are certain principles that need to be spelt out. I would adhere to these and then provide a framework for the interview. They are set out below. If you have any objections or wish to raise further matters, would you please let me know as soon as possible.

- \* You should feel free to refuse to answer any particular question or to discuss particular topics. You are able to impose conditions on the interview that are acceptable to you.
- \* The consent of the people being interviewed must be obtained. They should be informed of the nature of the research and shall be given the opportunity to withdraw from the interview at any time.
- \* The researcher will respect all guarantees of confidentiality.
- \* The sociologist must not use their role to obtain information for other than professional purposes.

The present research is part of an academic project that is expected to take another ... years. Any material collected would not normally become available to anyone other than the researcher until a suitable time has elapsed. In this instance, I would suggest a year/two years. Even then, specific requests concerning the confidentiality of information would still be respected.

You will have the opportunity to see a transcript of the interview and to alter the content. If there is anything further you wish to know about me or the research before you come to your decision, then please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours faithfully,

Paul Spoonley  
Lecturer in Sociology

## Department of Sociology

Dear

Enclosed is a typed transcript of my interview with you. Could you go through it and make sure that the typist has recorded what you said accurately. You might like to consider whether there is anything that you would like to delete.

Once you have done that, I would suggest that you take a copy of the transcript together with your alterations and then send me back the original. This means that you then have a record of both the interview and any changes you might have made.

Thank you for your co-operation.

Yours faithfully,

Paul Spoonley  
Lecturer in Sociology

These are typical letters, and individual letters do not conform exactly to the above for obvious reasons. Different circumstances prevailed and the letter was altered accordingly. But the fundamental conditions were set out in much the same way in all the letters.

APPENDIX 2 : Social Credit and Anti-Semitism in New Zealand:  
A Brief Chronology (1933-1984)

1. Farming First (10/3/33) attacks Plain Talk for anti-Semitic sentiments.
2. Why (17/5/35) contains an article on Hitler by 'Pro-Nazi'.
3. New Zealand Social Credit News (28/11/41) denies that Social Credit is involved in anti-Semitic activities in response to a claim made in The Standard (a Labour Party newspaper).
4. New Zealand Social Credit News (16/1/42 and 30/1/42) contain articles on the 'dictatorship of finance' and the activities of Jewish bankers.
5. New Zealand Social Creditor (31/7/45) quotes from Eric Butler and refers to Butler's publications. G. Hinton Knowles ('The Alien Question') refers to RSA resolution urging deportation of 'aliens' and concentrates on response of Jewish community. Argues that land and businesses bought by 'aliens' during war should be returned to New Zealanders.
6. New Zealand Social Creditor (31/8/45 and 29/9/45). Editor supports sentiments of above article in response to a critical letter.
7. New Zealand Social Creditor (30/11/45). An anti-Zionist article is published: 'Zionism in New Zealand' by Scrutator.
8. New Zealand Social Creditor (31/1/46). A letter from F.C. Jordan, President of Social Credit, is critical of the article. The editor replies: '...there exists a secret and powerful Jewish organisation in Europe [that has]...permitted Jews to "migrate" out of the place that they were all reported to have been massacred in - Poland and Germany.'
9. New Zealand Social Creditor (28/2/47). References to whether the appointment of Bishops in England is the result of 'Judaic policy'.
10. New Zealand Social Creditor (29/9/47) publishes 'The Menace of Jewish Policy'. Refers to Protocols extensively and 'International Finance' is said to be controlled by a 'hierarchy which is predominantly Jewish'.
11. New Zealand Social Creditor (29/9/47). 'Discovered in Typewriter' written by 'Uncle Shylock' bases a discussion on the 'Elders of Zion' and The Protocols.
12. New Zealand Social Creditor (27/11/47). 'Taxation and Servitude' repeats Douglas's arguments concerning The Protocols. Editorial comment adds: 'There is more boldness these days in pursuit of the aims outlined in the Protocols'.

13. New Zealand Social Creditor 1/6/48). 'The New World Order' discusses International Financiers and anti-Christians although there is no reference explicitly to Jews.
14. New Zealand Social Creditor (1/7/48) publishes 'What and Who Is Behind World Unrest', the answer being the '...anti-Christian Forces of Judaism'.
15. New Zealand Social Creditor (November 1948) publishes 'Systems, Saints and Sinners' which discusses the Zionist demand for 'power and more power'.
16. New Zealand Social Creditor (December 1948) publishes Eric Butler's 'The Answer to Communism'.
17. New Zealand Social Creditor (April 1949) publishes 'Operation Zion'.
18. New Zealand Social Creditor (June 1949). G. Hinton Knowles ('The Real Enemies') discusses the 'concentrated hatred of International Jewry' against the British because the latter are not 'subservient'. The Protocols are cited.
19. New Zealand Social Creditor (August 1949). Questions whether Sir Michael Myers (former Chief Justice) owed his loyalty to the 'religious laws of Israel or civil laws of Christianity'.
20. New Zealand Social Creditor (December-January 1949-50). The editorial ('Christians Awake') written by the editor, J.E. Collechin, urges Social Creditors to be awake to the 'grave menace of resurgent Judaism'.
21. New Zealand Social Creditor (November-December 1950). 'Communism and the International Jew' sees a link between communism, international Jewry and The Protocols. The goal is said to be a 'Jewish One-World State'.
22. New Zealand Social Creditor (June 1951) publishes 'The Invisible Government': a conspiracy theory that is said to explain why Social Credit is kept out of power.
23. New Zealand Social Creditor (October, November, December 1951, January 1952). A series of articles under the title 'The Anti-British Conspiracy' are published. They contain anti-Semitic arguments with the article published in January 1952 the most explicit.
24. New Zealand Social Creditor (October 1951) publishes extracts from The Protocols.
25. New Zealand Social Creditor (March 1952). 'UNO - Failure or Fraud?' argues that there are links between Jews, financial institutions and world control. Refers to Douglas:

The establishment of a Zionist State...  
as a geographical centre of world control  
with New York as the centre of World  
Financial Control.

26. New Zealand Social Creditor (June 1952). 'New Zealanders in Deadly Peril Through the World Bank' is concerned with the 'centralisation of financial policy in the hands of alien manipulators'. The article refers explicitly to the Jewish origins of the 'alien manipulators'.
27. New Zealand Social Creditor (2/7/52). An article on Social Credit sees the movement as being in opposition to Masons and Jews.
28. New Zealand Social Creditor (4/8/52). Discusses 'Protocol Fourteen' as an explanation for the presence of 'filthy literature' in New Zealand.
29. New Zealand Jewish Chronicle (June 1955). Refers to pamphlets being circulated in Christchurch. Titled 'Jews Undermine Commonwealth by Capitalism and Communism', they are linked by the Chronicle to Social Credit. A circular, titled 'Expose the Enemy', states that Social Credit has 'always been alive to the International Conspiracy' and then goes on to warn that the Social Credit Political League 'must not let itself be publicly identified with the work of informing these electors of the Jewish threat'.
30. New Zealand Social Creditor (15/8/55). The Executive of the New Zealand Social Credit Party states:  
     [that they are]...no way a party to or  
     identified with the activities of an  
     anti-Jew movement that is at present  
     asserting itself.
31. New Zealand Jewish Chronicle (September 1955). Young, Vice-President of Social Credit, has a letter published that denies any association between them and anti-Semitic arguments. It goes on to say:  
     The action of certain people in Christchurch  
     has caused us considerable concern.  
     Representations have been made to them and we  
     hope there will be no further cause for  
     complaint.
32. New Zealand Jewish Chronicle (May 1956). A leading member of Social Credit resigns in Christchurch because he was perturbed at 'Zionist elements of control' present in Social Credit. Party leader, Owen, says that the party is not anti-Semitic.
33. New Zealand Social Creditor (15/3/57). In the literature advertised for sale in the New Zealand Social Creditor, there are a number of books and pamphlets that are anti-Semitic, e.g. Butler's The Enemy Within the Empire and Money Power Versus Democracy, and J. Guthrie's The Anti-British Conspiracy.
34. New Zealand Social Creditor (11/11/57). An article, 'Pirates of Finance (No.4)' refers to A.N. Field and the 'communist involvement' in Bretton Woods.

35. New Zealand Social Creditor (19/9/60). The editorial, 'Satanic Forces at Work', talks about the way in which 'financiers' established communism in the Soviet Union. There is also reference to 'The Real Plotters', or international finance domiciled in New York.
36. New Zealand Social Creditor (17/10/60) publishes an article called 'The World's Chaotic State'.
37. New Zealand Social Creditor (11/5/61). An article, 'Apartheid and Segregation', advances pro-apartheid arguments.
38. At the 1962 New Times Dinner (Australian League of Rights) in Australia, a message of good will and appreciation is read out from New Zealand Social Credit.
39. Beetham (1972) records some of the anti-Jewish feelings and arguments that reflected fundamental ideological differences within Social Credit in the early 1970s and which led to his election as party leader.
40. Michael Sheppard, candidate and spokesperson for Social Credit, resigns in 1979 because of anti-Semitism, specifically because of those who view 'economics in ethnic terms' (Sheppard, 1981). Joy Clapham, Social Credit candidate is expelled from Social Credit because of her membership of the League of Rights. In November, a 'Special Urgent Message' asks that Social Creditors have nothing to do with the League of Rights.
41. Labour Party pamphlet refers to the 'fascist' origins of Social Credit in a 1980 by-election in East Coast Bays. Auckland Jewish community expresses concern about Social Credit policy. Beetham denies that it is anti-Semitic (Christchurch Press, 8/11/80).
42. An amendment preventing members from holding joint League of Rights and Social Credit membership is added to the Social Credit Constitution. There is further debate over the links between Social Credit and the League (Evening Post, 16/11/81 and 21/11/81). Beetham accuses the League of Rights of using the Voters' Association to embarrass Social Credit.
43. A Social Credit candidate (Clutha, 1981) argues during 1982 that the League of Rights and Social Credit policies are similar. Beetham urges Social Credit to drop the word League from their title because some political opponents attempt to draw links between Social Credit and the League of Rights (Evening Post, 30/8/82).
44. Social Credit annual conference (1984) is warned to distance itself from anti-Semitic ideas. Knapp dismisses the anti-Jewish arguments of Douglas and Beetham urges members not to be associated with League of Rights (Evening Post, 27/8/84).

APPENDIX 3 : A.N. Field's Major Publications and Examples of His  
Collection of Fascist and Extreme Right-Wing Literature

- (a) The following are Field's major publications:
1. Medical Marriages Certificates: A Suggestion From New Zealand.  
London, Eugenics Education Society, 1912.
  2. Defence Department's Failure: What a Search of Available Records Reveals.  
Wellington, Wellington Pub. Coy., 1915.
  3. A New Zealand Soldier's Guide to the British Isles.  
London, National Council of the Young Men's Christian Association of New Zealand, 1917.
  4. The Truth About the Slump. What the News Never Tells.  
Nelson, The Author, 1931. (Reprinted 3 times in 1931, 4 times in 1932, and reprinted in 1963 by Omni Publications, California).
  5. The Money Spider and the Way Out of His Web.  
Auckland, Dawson Printing Coy., 1933.
  6. Protocols.  
Nelson, The Author, 1934. (Reprinted by A.G. Betts, Nelson).
  7. Stabilization of Money: Proposals and Evidence Submitted to the Government Monetary Committee.  
Nelson, The Author, 1934.
  8. The World's Conundrum.  
Nelson, The Author, 1934.
  9. Socialism Unmasked: Who Propagated It, How and Why.  
Nelson, The Author, 1938.
  10. Untaught History of Money.  
Nelson, The Author, 1938.
  11. The Truth About New Zealand.  
Nelson, The Author, 1939.
  12. Why Colleges Breed Communists.  
Nelson, The Author, 1941.
  13. Nelson Province 1642-1842.  
Nelson, A.G. Betts, 1942.
  14. The Underside of Current Events.  
Auckland, Dawson Printing Coy., 1950.
  15. The Sinister Influence of Men Who Shaped the Post-War World.  
Auckland, Dawson Printing Coy., 1953.
  16. The Bretton Woods Plot.  
Nelson, The Author, 1957.

17. All These Things.  
Nelson, The Author, 1963 (Reprinted from 1931). (Reprinted by Omni Publications, California, 1963).
18. Today's Greatest Problem.  
Nelson, The Author. (Reprinted from Examiner where it appeared on 7 June 1938 as 'Jews as Scapegoats').
19. God's Own Country (And the Devil's Own Mess).  
Nelson, The Author, n.d.
20. Citizen, 15 January 1909 +  
Edited and owned by Field, 23 numbers.
21. Examiner.  
Bulletin, edited and available from Field.

(b) Field's Literature Collection (Held by the Alexander Turnbull Library). Examples held in the collection include:

- A.K. Chesterton, 1935. Creed of a Fascist Revolutionary.
- E. Butler, 1947. The International Jew.
- Ku Klux Klan, 1939. A Warning...The 'Chosen People' Have Invaded Shanghai.
- N. Rogers, 1940. Are All Jews Liars?
- Fr Denis Fahey, 1938. The Rulers of Russia.
- P. Charles, 1938. Les Protocoles des Sages de Sion.
- Pseud, 1931. For Thinking Men...A Tentative Study of the Protocols.  
(Includes a version by Plain Talk, Auckland).

Other authors in the collection include:

H.H. Beamish, Duke of Bedford (29 pamphlets from the 1940s on finance), A.K. Chesterton (both as a member of the British Union of Fascists and after), Father Coughlin, J. Goebbels, William Joyce, Arnold Leese, O. Mosley, and publications from the Imperial Fascist League, British Israel Publications and the Dearborn Independent (Henry Ford's anti-Semitic publication).

The Field Collection is the most extensive of its sort in New Zealand. It contains primary material from a variety of fascist and anti-Semitic groups and activists from the 1930s and 1940s, including some very rare publications. It contains one of the very few copies of Eric Butler's The International Jew to be found in New Zealand.

APPENDIX 4: Growth of Extreme Right-Wing Groups and Related  
Social/Economic Events

Year	Extreme Right-Wing Group	Social/Economic Events
1954	League of Empire Loyalists	Social Credit contests election: 122,000 votes, 11%
1957		Labour Government elected, downturn in farm export prices
1958		'Black budget', PAYE taxation on incomes
1960		National Government elected
1961	Anti-Communist League	
1962	New Zealand-Rhodesia Society	2 Soviet diplomats expelled
1964	National Socialist Party	N.Z. Troops sent to Vietnam
1965	Co-Resistance Democratic Society Western Destiny Publications White Lightning Ideology	
1966	Aid Rhodesia Movement	National Government re-elected, Social Credit M.P.
1968	Country Party	
1969	K.K.K. National Socialist White People's Party	National re-elected, S.C. lost seat
1970	Counter Attack Friends of South Africa Association Informed Christian Patriots Association League of Rights Southern Africa Friends Association	
1971		Britain to join E.E.C. in 1973
1972	Association Defending South African Tours Observer Patriotic Books War Against Recreational Disruption	Third Labour Government, N.Z. troops withdrawn from Vietnam
1973	<u>Pointing Right</u> <u>Springbok</u>	Government sends frigates to Mururoa Atoll
1974	Christian Democratic Union Consolidated New Zealand Party New Zealand Commonwealth Alliance	

Year	Extreme Right Wing Group	Social/Economic Events
1975	Alpha Party Democratic National Party Heed Preservation of European Traditions and Cultures Selective Immigration Association United Movement Against Communism White Preservation Society	Campaign against Pacific Island 'overstayers' begins, National Government elected, N.Z. terms of trade lowest since World War II.
1976	Friends of Chile Imperial British Conservative Party	Olympic Games (Montreal) boycott because of rugby contacts with South Africa, subsidies on basic commodities abolished.
1977	National Front	Gleneagles signed
1978	Front Line International Christian Network	Beetham secures seat, National re-elected.
1979	Reform Party Tax Reduction Integrity Movement The Individual's Fight for Freedom Viking Youth White Power Gang	Energy development plans announced
1980	Association for the Survival of Free Enterprise Church of Odin European Liberation Front Institute for Alternative Energy New Zealand Phalanx Patriotic New Zealanders Organisation Tax Reform Movement Tax Revolt Association White People's Alliance	Fletcher, Challenge and Tasman merge, \$600m. expansion of N.Z. Steel.
1981	Credo Free Nation New Zealand I'm fed up Knives of West Eleven Nationalist News New Force New Zealand Party SPIR Speak Up for Righteousness Voters' Association White Power Movement	Springbok rugby tour of N.Z., purchase of U.S. butter surplus, Marsden Point Refinery dispute, farm prices increase by 40%, Kraft buys 49% of Butland Industries, National re-elected, massive defic announced.
1982	Attack Free Nation New Zealand Patriots Voice Society of Patriots	Increased postal, telephone, coal, road use charges, 12 month wage freeze, protests over Waitangi.

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Year	Extreme Right Wing Group	Social/Economic Events
1983	Auckland Political Cooperative Nationalist Workers Party Private Enterprise Party Ruralist Party	

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APPENDIX 5: List of New Zealand Groups That Have Associations  
With Or Are Part of the Extreme Right, 1960-1983

Group	Main Base	Year Fndd	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Assoc- iations
1. Aid Rhodesia Movement	Christchurch/ New Plymouth	1966	**	**		**					25
2. Alliance of Baltic States	Paremata	?		**							
3. Alpha Party	Auckland	1975	*	*	**						
4. Anti- Communist League	Auckland/ Wellington	1961		**							19
5. Association Defending South African Tours	Auckland/ Ashburton	1972	**	**		**					24, 40
6. Association for the Survival of Free Enterprise	Auckland	1980		*	**		*				39, 77
7. Assembly of Captive European Nations	Auckland	1960s		**							
8. Auckland Political Co-operative	Auckland	1983						**			
9. Attack*	Petone	1982	*	**		**	*	**	*	*	43,44,45
10. Christian Democratic Union	Auckland	1974		*					**	**	
11. Church of Odin	Christchurch/ Lower Hutt	1980	**	**		**	**				40,43,44, 45
12. Concerned Parents Association	Christchurch?			**			*		**		
13. Consolidated New Zealand Party	Auckland	1974	**	**		**					46

Group	Main Base	Year Fndd	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Assoc- iation
14. Co-resistance	Dunedin	1965					*		**		30
15. Counter Attack*	Ashburton	1970	*	*	**			*			5,24,25
16. Country Party	Taranaki	1968	**	*	*	*					
17. Credo	Auckland	1981					*		**		
18. Democratic Nationalist Party	Lower Hutt	1975	*	*	**						9,40,43,44,45
19. Democratic Society	Wellington	1965	*	**		*	**				
20. European Liberation Front	Christchurch	1980	**		**			*			73,79
21. For All Rugby Tours	Wellington	1970s	*	*							
22. Free Nation New Zealand*	Auckland	1981	*	**			*				23,63
23. Free Nation New Zealand	Auckland	1982	*	**			*				22,63
24. Friends of Chile	Ashburton	1976		**							5,40
25. Friends of South Africa Association	Auckland	1970	**	**	**	*					1,57
26. Freedom Leadership Foundation	Auckland	1970s		**					**		
27. Front Line*	Ashburton/ Christchurch	1978	**	**	**	*	**			*	40
28. Heed*	Auckland	1975	*	**	*	**	*				40,83
29. Imperial British Conservative Party	Christchurch	1976	**	**	**						
30. Informed Christian Patriots Association	Dunedin	1970					*		**		12

Group	Main Base	Year Fndd	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Assoc- iation
31. I'm fed up	Auckland	1981	**	*			*				22,23,63
32. Institute of Alternative Energy	Auckland	1980				**					39
33. Integrity Centre	Christchurch	1980s		**			*		**		39
34. International Christian Network	Wellington	1978	**	**		*					
35. K.K.K.	Timaru	1984				**					
36. K.K.K.	Christchurch	1969		**		**					
37. Knives of West Eleven	Wellington	1981?		*				**			
38. League of Empire Loyalists	Christchurch	1950s	*	**		**		*			13,46
39. League of Rights	Auckland	1970	**	**	*	**	*	*		**	6,33,68, 69,75
40. National Front	Christchurch	1977	**	**	*	**	*	*		**	5,9,18, 27,44,45, 57
41. National Socialist Party	Rotorua	1964				**		**			
42. National Socialist White Peoples Party	Auckland	1969	**	**		**		**		*	51,52
43. Nationalist News*	Petone	1981	*	*		**	*	*		*	9,44,45
44. Nationalist Workers Party	Petone	1983	**	*		**	*	**		**	9,40,45
45. New Force	Petone	1981	**	*		**	*	**		**	9,40,43, 44
46. New Zealand Commonwealth Alliance	Auckland	1974	**	**		**					



Group	Main Base	Year Fndd	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Assoc-iations
62. Society of Patriots (or Society for the Promotion of Patriotism)	Christchurch	1982	*	**		*	*		**		53,54
63. Society for the Protection of Individual Rights (SPIR)	Christchurch	1981	**	*		*					22,23
64. Southern Africa Friends Association	Christchurch	1970	**	**		**					5,66
65. Speak up for Righteousness	Auckland	1981							**		
66. Springbok*	Christchurch	1973	**	**		**					64
67. Springbok Tour Association	Auckland	1970s	**	*		*					
68. Tax Reduction Integrity Movement	Christchurch	1979		**			*				39,77
69. Tax Reform Movement	Christchurch	1980		**							39
70. Tax Revolt Association of New Zealand	Auckland	1980		**							13,39
71. The Individual's Fight for Freedom (TIFF)	Palmerston North	1979		**							84
72. The United Movement Against Communism	Arrowtown	1975		**							40,57
73. Viking Youth - N.Z.	Christchurch	1979	**			**		*	*		20,79
74. Voice of the Martyrs	Auckland	1970s	**						**		

Group	Main Base	Year Fndd	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Assoc-iations
75. Voters Association	Tauranga	1981					*	**	*		39
76. War Against Disruption	Hastings	1972	*	**							
77. Western Destiny Publications	Hamilton	1965		**	**		*	*	*		68,84
78. White Lightning Ideology	Wellington	1965		**	**						
79. White People's Alliance	Christchurch	1980	**	**	**	*	*				20,73
80. White Power Gang	Wellington	1979			**						
81. White Power Movement	Auckland	1981			**						
82. White Preservation Society	Auckland	1975			**						55
83. World Anti-Communist League	Wellington/ Auckland	?	**				*				31
84. Zenith Applied Philosophy	Christchurch	early-1970s	**	**				**			68,69,71

\* next to name in the group column indicates a journal.

Supplementary Listing of Other Extreme Right Groups, 1960-1983.

Essential Books

Kiwi Ranch

Liberal Reform Party

New Order

New Zealand Social Credit Association

Save New Zealand Committee

Social Reform Party

Victor Filmer Political Party

White Defence League

White Power (not the same group as those listed in the main table)

N.B. Not all groups are listed. Some are synonymous with listed parties while in other cases, insufficient was known about the group (e.g. Economic Euthenics Party). Others, notably morals groups, are reactionary but do not share the traditional interests (e.g. racism) of extreme right-wing groups.

### Explanation of Table

- (1) Main Base/Year Founded: The main base describes the location of the group's establishment or where they are currently based. For example, the League of Rights was founded in Tauranga but it is now based in Auckland. The latter centre is listed in the table. It should not be assumed that the group's activities in any particular case are confined to the area listed as their main base. The year founded gives the year in which the organisation was formally begun. If the year given is in doubt then a question mark has been placed alongside the date. In a few cases, the actual year is unclear so that an estimation is given (e.g. 1970s) while a gap indicates that the date is not known.
- (2) Principal Concerns: This section of the table shows the principal concerns or policy issues of the respective group. One asterisk represents an interest while two indicates a major concern.
1. Pro-South African (and formerly pro-Rhodesian), and generally in favour of apartheid and/or 'white' rule. Nearly all favour continued contacts between New Zealanders and white South Africans.
  2. Anti-communist, either in a local or international sense. These groups tend to extend their analysis to organisations like trade unions, the United Nations and the World Council of Churches as part of the 'communist threat' because of their supposed support for or promotion of communist objectives.
  3. Anti-tax, either because of the level of taxation or because it is collected by central government.
  4. Pro-white/Anglo-Saxon/White Commonwealth, usually in order to preserve racial purity, cultural traditions or racial supremacy.
  5. Opposed to what are seen as attempts to install a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Held to be a move towards world government associated with communist and/or Jewish intentions.
  6. Suspicious or antagonistic towards Jews/Zionists. They are seen to be involved in NIEO and/or communism.
  7. Concerned with moral issues, notably gender relations and education. Opposed to liberalisation or changes to traditional western power relationship between sexes.

8. Opposed or suspicious towards democratic or liberal political systems, generally because of 'abuse' or 'collectivism'.

(3) Associations: The numbers indicate links with other listed groups. It usually refers to open support, joint activities or common membership.

APPENDIX 6 : Zenith Applied Courses, August/September 1979

(A) Course Schedule:

1. Basics of Success and Happiness Course (\$160.00) - 1 and 2 August, 4 and 5 September  
Prerequisite: Personality Analysis Evaluation
2. How to Study and Memorise Course (\$160.00) - 3 August, 6 September  
Prerequisite: Basics of Success and Happiness Course
3. Communication Abilities Course (\$680.00) - 6, 7, 8 and 9 August, 11, 12, 13 and 14 September  
Prerequisite: How to Study and Memorise Course
4. Applying Basics Courses - 14 and 15 August, 17 and 18 September  
Prerequisite: Economics Responsibilities Classes
5. Business Expansion Executive Course - 16 and 17 August, 27 and 28 September  
Prerequisite: Sales Expert Course
6. Personal Certainty and Awareness Class - 21, 22 and 23 August  
Prerequisite: Methods of Advancement Course
7. Mastery of Control Course - 25 August  
Prerequisite: Future of Man Course
8. Sales Expert Course: 28, 29 and 30 August, 24, 25 and 26 September  
Prerequisite: O.T.P.U. Course
9. Fast Flow Class - 31 August, 21 September  
Prerequisite: B.E.E.
10. Zenith Applied Philosophy Annual Exams - 1 September
11. Senior Alignment Specialist Course - 3 September  
Prerequisite: Fast Flow Class
12. Basic Assists Course - 7 September  
Prerequisite: Senior Alignment Specialist Course
13. Friendship and Marriage Course - 19 September  
Prerequisite: Personal Certainty and Awareness Class
14. Basics of Truth Course - 20 September  
Prerequisite: Friendship and Marriage Course
15. Communication Specialist Class - 22 September  
Prerequisite: Mastery of Control Course

N.B. By the mid-1980s, a 'personality test' cost \$200.00 while the 'communication course' cost \$4000.00. A programme known as 'sequence principals' could cost as much as \$50,000.00.

(B) Selected Material Taught:(i) Tone Scale (numbers relate to oscilloscope or E-meter readings)

0.0	Death	
0.05	Apathy	
0.5	Grief	(whinger, lives in the past)
0.8	Propitiation	(crawler, gives in to things)
0.9	Sympathy	
1.0	Fear	
1.1	Covert hostility	(two-faced, hypocritical, stirre)
1.5	Anger	(blaming others)
1.8	Pain	(emotional pain)
2.0	Antagonism	(likes challenging world-views)
2.5	Boredom	(a spectator)
3.0	Conservatism	(willing to take responsibility but not seeking it)
4.0	Enthusiasm	(seeking responsibility)
8.0	Exhilaration	
20.0	Action	(a shaker and mover)
40.0	Serenity of Beingness	(the ultimate)

(ii) Success and Happiness

1. Success - being able to be what you want to be; total success predicates total choice; maximisation of options.
2. Happiness - by-product of success; creativity is doing what you find to be interesting; happiness is not pleasure but victory.

(iii) Expansion Law

If you don't act or plan to expand, you contract. If you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem. You must actively expand, you can not just hold. Life is a process.

This law applies in all areas and like the Toughness Principle should apply all the time and not just in emergencies.

(iv) Third Party Law

Any continuing conflict is guaranteed to involve a third party in the background; a behind the scenes stirrer. Beware of third parties.

## Solution:

1. Don't accept second-hand information from a third party without at least checking it out.
2. Don't react blindly to it; keep control of your emotions and communicate with the second party.

APPENDIX 7 : Brief Chronology of the League of Rights  
in New Zealand, 1970-1984

- 1970 Formation of the League in February by Wood and Stewart-Menzies. Formation announced in Australia by Butler in Sydney in February.\*
- 1972 Minister of Energy held to have libelled Dr Pat Hohepa and Mr Tom Newnham at League meeting in Tauranga. Herald (6/5/72) reports that League has 200 members. Its meetings attract about 45. Most recent speaker, retiring Government Member of Parliament for Tauranga, spoke on his trip to South Africa.
- 1974 Tour by Butler.
- 1977 Walsh, on way home to Canada from WACL conference (Taiwan), speaks at Royal International Hotel in Auckland.
- 1978 Stewart-Menzies suggests an anti-communist pact involving South Africa, New Zealand and Australia in South Africa.
- 1979 D. Thompson, 23 years of age, arrives to take up post of first National Director. Moves HQ to Auckland, establishes On Target. Eyewitness programme on League of Rights, extensive correspondence in Listener columns throughout 1979 and 1980. Butler tours in November. J. Clapham ousted from Social Credit, Sheppard resigns.
- 1980 Tour by Butler in February. Article in New Zealand Listener on League of Rights. Social Credit pamphlets sent to League address in Tauranga. Survey on support for economic sanctions against Soviet Union. Labour Party pamphlet used in East Coast Bays by-election links Social Credit with fascist/anti-Semitic views. MP Isbey asks whether SIS interested in League in the House.
- 1981 Two editions of New Zealand First printed and 250,000 copies distributed prior to the General Election. Candidates asked to sign contracts. Gostick visits to 'campaign' against Social Credit. Tour by Butler. Second Crown Commonwealth League of Rights Conference held in Royal International Hotel in Auckland.
- 1982 Tour by Butler. Minister, Couch, attends Butler meeting and offers vote of thanks - said that Butler's remedy was on right track (Dominion, 19/4/82).
- 1984 Involved in formation of Council for a Free New Zealand. Death of W.A. Ross.

\* Although the formation of the New Zealand League of Rights was announced in 1970 after a meeting in Tauranga, contemporary League material gives 1971 as the year of formation.

## APPENDIX 8 : Conservative Books Catalogue, 1983

The Conservative Books Catalogue gives an indication of the concerns of the League of Rights. The Catalogue (1983) begins with the following statement:

*The mass media has promoted mass confusion concerning the basic aspects of the world crises. There is a policy of failing to present vital knowledge required for New Zealanders to make intelligent decisions about their future. The enclosed is a selection of books and booklets available to those who wish to obtain the knowledge necessary for self preservation.*

Of the 166 books/pamphlets listed, they can be categorised as having particular concerns or subjects. The categories are listed, followed by the numbers in each category, and an example. They are listed in descending order of importance.

1. Conspiracies - 39 items.  
G. Allen, None Dare Call It Conspiracy  
E. Butler, The Enemy Within the Empire
2. Communism, Soviet Union, Socialism - 24 items.  
E. Butler, The Fabian Socialist Contribution to the Communist Advance  
I. Benson, Behind Communism in Africa
3. Social Credit - 19 items.  
L.D. Byrne, Social Credit and Party Politics - A Warning  
C.H. Douglas, Social Credit
4. Politics - 16 items.  
C.H. Douglas, The Nature of Democracy
5. Holocaust, Zionism, Jews - 14 items.  
P. Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide Myth  
D. Reed, The Controversy of Zion
6. Financial Issues - 14 items.  
J.S. Albus, People's Capitalism
7. Religion - 11 items.  
H. Pike, Religion, Red and Rotten
8. South Africa - 10 items.  
I. Benson, Undeclared War. The Battle for South Africa

9. Education - 7 items.  
S. Huck, Secular Humanism
10. New Zealand - 5 items.  
R. Fenton, Sinners at the Stadium
11. Miscellaneous - "Race" - 4 items; Hitler, World War II - 3 items.

In addition to these books, the available League of Rights' publications include:

1. On Target (fortnightly)
2. Intelligence Survey (monthly; published by Australian League of Rights)
3. New Times (monthly; includes Enterprise quarterly)
4. Ladies Line (bi-monthly; published by Australian League of Rights)
5. Heritage (quarterly)

The League of Rights also has a catalogue of cassette and video tapes.

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