Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
SOCIAL PRACTICE WITHIN A CAPITALIST STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Massey University

IAN F. SHIRLEY

1986
This thesis set aside conventional occupational distinctions between scientists, administrators and managers, in an examination of social practice within a capitalist State. It explored both the limits of State power and the capacity of State practitioners for transformative action. The central proposition being examined, suggested that State practitioners inevitably engage in forms of action which tend to perpetuate existing social and economic relationships.

The epistemology of Jurgen Habermas provided the framework for this analysis in which distinctions were made between different forms of scientific enquiry and corresponding modes of social action. These distinctions equated the empirical-analytic tradition with strategic action, the historical-hermeneutic tradition with communicative action, and the critical tradition with emancipatory action.

Distinctions were also made between two alternative but related levels of practice; namely, interaction, defined as the communicative and strategic actions of knowledgeable participating subjects, and societal action which emanates out of the forces and relations of production and which represents the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole.

In an examination of the social indicators movement it was revealed that crucial questions relating to economic and political structures interest group manoeuvrings, and social conflict in general, had been omitted. Practitioners appeared to exclude the possibility of
political motivation from both the design and construction of social indicator systems. By accepting the structural limitations imposed by capitalist economic and social relations and by agreeing to operate within the selective limitations established by the dominant class, practitioners inadvertently aligned themselves with the empirical tradition and with strategic action.

Although the Habermasian distinctions between different scientific traditions proved adequate in evaluating the outcome of practice, it was necessary to reappraise the theoretical logic of class so as to account for those locations within the State which could not be defined by ownership of the means of production. This reappraisal identified practitioners as members of the auxiliary class occupying contradictory locations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Whereas bourgeois and proletarian locations are occupied by classes which are diametrically opposed, the auxiliary class draws its characteristics from a simultaneous and partial location in two classes. As a consequence, the class actions of State practitioners are infused with ambiguities.

These ambiguities became evident when the examination focussed on strategic and communicative action. Although the cognitive interests of the auxiliary class seemed to coincide with the values and interests of the bourgeoisie any instrumental association between the actions of State practitioners and the dominant class was rendered problematic. Whereas the cognitive interests of State practitioners exemplified the distinctive characteristics of different forms of knowledge, the class practices in which they engaged stemmed from their structural locations
within the State, their contradictory class interests, and their mediating capacities.

These mediating capacities were examined by analysing the practices of an N.R.A.C. Working Party which was commissioned to report on unemployment. Although the Working Party demonstrated the potential of the critical tradition for transformative practice, the expression of this theorem in action was less than conclusive. Whilst the Working Party displayed a primary interest in the emancipation of those disadvantaged by unemployment, the contradictions identified in the report were displaced by the dominant class and by State managers around the boundary of the bourgeoisie. Although the cognitive interests of the Working Party were consistent with the critical tradition, there was no evidence to suggest that the practices of the Working Party promoted either personal or political emancipation. Thus any instrumental association between the critical tradition and emancipatory action could not be sustained. As a consequence of these examinations it became apparent that the central reality for practitioners within the State was the contradictory nature of practice. Habermasian theory was then extended in an attempt to resolve the problematic relationship between theory and practice.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The pursuit of knowledge is a process which is conditioned by many factors ranging from the symbols and language individuals use in unveiling 'reality', through to the historical and cultural development of society itself. When it comes to isolating the most significant factors in this process the task is rather daunting because the final product of any scientific enterprise is simply the culmination of events beyond the capacity or experience of any one individual. This is certainly true of this dissertation.

In experiential terms it draws on development initiatives in the Third World, whilst the theoretical traditions which inform the work emanate from European interpretations of science and Western models of 'progress' and 'development.' The contradictions inherent in fusing these domains were evident before the study even began, but because of the insights provided by members of both the auxiliary and proletarian classes, these contradictions became potential avenues for change and symbols of hope rather than despair.

I cannot adequately thank everyone involved in this process but I do want to record my gratitude and continuing commitment to the work of the INODEP Development Institute in Paris and to the Director of that Institute my colleague and friend Philippe Fanchette. I am also indebted to Zsuzsa Ferge of the Hungarian Academy of Science and to development agents with whom I have been associated in the Asian and Pacific region. Agencies such as ESOD, and colleagues within State Departments, such as Social Welfare, Statistics, Justice, and Maori Affairs, supported this project both in substance and in kind. In drawing this work together I am grateful to my supervisors Professor Graeme Fraser, Dr Chris Wilkes and Mervyn Hancock, and I want to record
a valued association with colleagues in social policy, both in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom.

Glennis Fairley typed this manuscript, and over many months she not only displayed a high level of expertise, but considerable tolerance and good humour. Those same qualities were also exhibited by my extended family, who will no doubt breathe a sigh of relief that the dissertation is "finished." Mary, Tony, Mark and David know better - they know that this work is not an end product in itself, but rather a small contribution to a new endeavour, involving what Zsuzsa Ferge has called, 'shared commitments to a society in the making.'
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Outline</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER ONE: CRITICAL THEORY IN THE TRADITION OF JURGEN HABERMAS</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Scientific Traditions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Problematics Underlying the Habermasian Position.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Theorem of Knowledge and Cognitive Interests</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Organisation of the Processes of Enlightenment</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Problematic Relationship between Theory and Practice.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ideological Components of Practice</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State and Class Practices</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Thesis</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes: Chapter One.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL INDICATORS - INTERNATIONAL</strong></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Indicators Movement</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social Indicator Systems

1. Programmatic Development
2. Development By Social Goal Area
3. Development By Life Cycle

The Theoretical Basis of Social Indicators
Structuralism Versus Voluntarism
Theories of the State

Notes: Chapter Two

CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL INDICATORS - NEW ZEALAND

A National Survey of Social Indicators
The National Development Conference
The Social and Cultural Committee of N.D.C.
The Social Council of the National Development Council
Social Indicators Sub-Committee of N.D.C.
Social Science Research Initiatives Within the N.D.C.
The Dwindling Influence of the Social Development Council
The Department of Statistics and Social Indicators
The Epistemology and Methodology of the Statistics Department Approach

A Summary of Social Indicator Development in New Zealand

Notes: Chapter Three

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SPECIFICITY OF SOCIAL PRACTICE

Class and Class Practices
Class Practices Within the National Development Conference

Three Spheres of Social Practice
1. The Specification of Social Goals 234
2. Social Practice in the Department of Statistics 245
3. Proposals to Reorganise Social Research in New Zealand. 256
The Ideology of Social Scientific Practice 264
The Cognitive Interests of the Auxiliary Class 271
Summary 275
Notes: Chapter Four. 279

Chapter FIVE: THE AMBIGUITIES OF SOCIAL PRACTICE. 288
The National Research Advisory Council Working Party 291
Submissions and Discussions 295
1) Submissions in the Empirical-Analytic Tradition 299
2) Submissions in the Historical-Hermeneutic Tradition 306
3) Submissions in the Critical-Emancipatory Tradition 309
The Format and Preparation of the Draft Report 313
The Report of the Working Party 319
Summary of Responses to N.R.A.C. Draft Report 325
The Working Party Replies 333
Political Practices Arising Out of the N.R.A.C. Report 336
The Three Functions of Critical Theory 345
Notes: Chapter Five. 353

CHAPTER SIX: TOWARD CRITICAL PRACTICE 364
The Reformulation of Class and the Significance of
Contradictory Locations 372
The Critical Tradition and Emancipation 381
The Ambiguity of Epistemology and Practice 389
APPENDICES

Appendix I  Historical Sources of Statistics  411

Appendix II (i)  Social Objectives for New Zealand  419

Appendix II (ii)  Social Development Council Goal and Objectives for New Zealand  423

Appendix III  The Organisation of Social Science Research:
Comparative Analysis of Institutional Structure  426

Appendix IV  Methodology  430

Bibliography: Texts and Major Articles  443

Documents, Reports, Papers  458
TABLES

Table I  Distribution of National Income  73

Table II  N.D.C. Assumptions, Targets and Outcome, 1970-1975.  146

Table III  Net Overseas Borrowing (1950-1982)  149

Table IV  Expenditure on Social Sciences in New Zealand  177
           1971-78

Table V  N.R.A.C. Science Budget Allocations 1971-78  178

Table VI  Proposals for the Reorganisation of Social Scientific Research  261
The critical tradition from Hegel through Habermas has always been concerned with the power of ideas. What ideas are produced, by whom, and for whose benefit, constitute the fundamental problematics in any ‘critical’ (1) examination of the relationship between science and human development. Those who produce ideas possess the power of ideology which might be used as a sophisticated weapon of propaganda and manipulation, or as a humanising and liberating force offering the possibility of transformation (2).

This thesis directly confronts the contradictory relationship between social scientific thought and human development. It examines social practice within a capitalist State, and thus it is concerned not only with the social and political context from which we draw knowledge, but also with how this knowledge is used.

The genesis of this study is to be found in the early nineteen seventies when the writer was employed as Community Adviser to the Auckland City Council. This position was established after the urban renewal programmes of the nineteen fifties had spawned the creation of new housing suburbs on the periphery of the Auckland isthmus. Residents who had occupied the inner city suburbs of Auckland for most of their lives were relocated during the fifties and sixties to districts where there were inadequate amenities, high transportation costs, and little choice of housing type or location. Friendship patterns, social networks and citizen rights were set aside in these planning decisions as the New Zealand advocates of urban renewal placed
implicit faith in the nineteenth century theory that if slum dwellers were relocated to new environments they would give up their lower class ways and the outcome would be a reduction of social pathologies thought to 'breed' in the slums. The Council implied that by physical reconstruction the social ills of the city would be cured. Yet within twenty years of implementing this social plan, many of these same residents relocated to new housing environments found themselves designated once again as 'social problems' requiring treatment. The Councils' remedy in the nineteen seventies was the establishment of a Community Advisory Service (3).

The Advisory Service was to have two main functions - first, to establish Advice Centres (based on the British Citizens Advice Bureaux model) and secondly, to assist the involvement of local people in community activities of their own choice. In theory the Community Adviser set out to foster a developmental approach to planning but in practice the role was fraught with contradictions. These contradictions appeared to emanate from the ambivalent nature of social work practice within the context of the local State. Whereas the practitioner might assign priority to the alleviation of human and social ills, the employing agency was primarily concerned with social order and control. Hence localities which had a profusion of 'pressing social problems' and districts that 'lacked a sense of community' were targeted for community work intervention. When this form of intervention was evaluated at the close of the nineteen seventies the impact of practice was assessed in predominantly negative terms.

Practitioners were accused of treating the individual as the locus of
all difficulties and they were berated for ignoring those social and political institutions which condition both the context and form of intervention. By analysing the outcome of practice it seemed logical to suggest that these practitioners regarded social problems as an inherent, inevitable and ineffaceable part of the human condition.

They assumed as did many group work and casework practitioners before them, that the process itself would suffice as a 'cure'. They emphasised means rather than ends, and so preoccupied were they with individual pathology, that when they moved into a communal context, they merely treated 'the community' as the sum total of individual adjustments ... Even where attempts [were] made to deal with the notion of society, these ... tended to represent extrapolations from a theory or experience gained in dealing with individuals. (4)

At the time these conclusions seemed to represent a reasonable assessment of social and community work practice within the context of the local State. In historical terms the upsurge of interest in community work was seen by some as an alternative to the planning profession's preoccupation with architectural determinism. Practitioners, especially those working with marginal groups, contrasted community work's emphasis on reform with the planning profession's pursuit of order and control, and in making these distinctions they aligned themselves with what was described as social work's scorned heritage of activism and advocacy. They challenged their fellow practitioners to choose sides in the confrontation between privilege and helplessness, while international advocates such as Pusic exhorted them to become allies 'against the rich man's contumacy, the insolence of office.' (5) It was a debate over the ends and means of practice which was to be taken further in 1979, during a Symposium on
Despite the fact that the social responsibility debate was prominent in international forums during the nineteen fifties and sixties, issues such as the impact of science on the global food crisis, genetic engineering, racism and sexism, appeared to be less contentious in Australasia than elsewhere. Indeed the 1979 ANZAAS Symposium provided the first New Zealand forum for a public examination of the relationship between scientific theory and practice. Within the context of this Symposium the scientific establishment was portrayed as a hierarchical male priesthood intent on protecting their power and influence behind mystifying jargon - 'a sort of plastic language without content.' Practitioners were accused of monastic attitudes of non-involvement, resulting in a celibacy of the intellect divorced from concrete reality, and they were reminded of Berger's observation that there was 'something obscene about the scientist who claims that [he or she] is not responsible for the uses to which science is put.' Berger did not deny the right of individuals to live the theoretical life or to abstain from political engagement. He simply stressed that science was 'too much linked to the agonising dilemmas of our time to permit most of its practitioners to pursue their theoretical interests in detachment from the ongoing struggles of their fellowman.'(6)

These issues are not new. Indeed they reflect the various crises and debates which have plagued the history of science in general and the development of the social sciences in particular. As each social scientific discipline has sought to become more precise in the mould of the natural sciences, so they have become preoccupied with technique.
The result is evidenced in fragmented and disillusioned professions, trapped within the confines of a seemingly affluent oasis (capitalism) and within the parochial chambers of their respective disciplines (7). Economics provides a good illustration.

Since the days of Adam Smith (8), the most fertile minds in economics have been engaged in refining processes, such as the allocation of resources, the distribution of income, increasing economic growth, and regulating the volume of production and employment. As a discipline economics has clearly demonstrated considerable technical skills in handling the narrow range of questions for which its tools gave it a marked advantage. But the types of questions about our social and political life which might be called fundamental or radical lie, for the most part, outside the recognised boundaries of economics, given its intellectual traditions (9).

When an economist studies unemployment, he/she takes as given an institutional structure which can itself be questioned. When he/she asks how to improve social security and welfare programmes, a wages system is taken as given. In the promotion of international free trading agreements, it is assumed that there exists a multiplicity of sovereign states. And when questions are asked about controlling pollution or conserving energy, private enterprise as a system of social organisation is taken as given. As a consequence, "mainstream economists"(10) seem to avoid questions aimed at examining fundamental features of our social and political system.

Obviously, this form of scientific practice is not only confined to
economists. Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and educationalists (11), have often treated knowledge as a politically neutral commodity, in the belief that the scientific method alone might somehow lead to the production of knowledge in the interests of all. This interpretation of science is based on the belief that increased systematic empirical understanding of how society works, will naturally lead to the intelligent formulation of policies, and the amelioration of social inequities and injustices. It is an altruistic view of science, which argues that public, as opposed to private, interests are served in conditions of political neutrality, and simply by the employment of a rational technical expertise, over which only scientists have professional mastery.

Such a view is obviously naive. In adopting this stance, social scientists have not maintained a politically neutral approach as claimed. Instead, a fundamental trend has been towards the adoption of an implicit conservative ideology, which accepts existing social and political relationships without question. Thus arguments have centred around technical problems, when the issues demanded social and political alternatives.

As an epistemological debate it takes us to the heart of our understanding of social reality. Inevitably it revives the argument which was engaged by Kuhn(12) when he advanced his notion of a scientific paradigm. In the Kuhnian vision of science, political differences are eliminated and a consensus reached on both the Weltanschauung and methodological components of any paradigm. The Weltanschauung component includes beliefs about the nature of social
reality and the way the world should be, as well as scientific attitudes and values that practitioners bring to their work. The technical component includes the tools, methodologies, and approaches, that scientists use in the pursuit of knowledge.

Although Kuhn's interpretation of science has been appropriated by social scientists seeking to claim hegemony for their respective traditions, (13) the distinction he makes between belief and technique is useful in discriminating between two major schools of social scientific thought. The first is characterised by those social scientists who believe that values obscure facts, and thus they emphasise scientific objectivity in the tradition of the natural sciences. The second group comprise those who argue that it is the belief system which structures the focus and execution of any research programme, and thus they emphasise fusion between weltanschauung and technique.

The first school of thought emphasises the empirical and natural sciences, and endorses formal disciplines such as logic and mathematics. This "mainstream tradition" (14) is typified by middle-range theorists, such as Robert Merton, who bases his hypothetical-deductive model upon logically interrelated propositions which have empirical consequences. (15) In Merton's terminology this means systematic middle-range theories, where connections are made between scientific explanation, precision, testability and prediction. Merton does not endorse a view of science which simply espouses the collection of data as the basis of statistically significant correlations from which one might then formulate empirical
generalisations. Nor does he endorse grand theories such as functionalism, although he clearly belongs to this tradition. Indeed, he devotes his energies toward codifying functional theory, because in his view such grand conceptions only fall apart when confronted with empirical tests. (16) Ultimately, he aligns himself with the natural sciences and with empiricism. He is interested in "theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the day to day routines of science", and from which one might eventually derive "empirically observed uniformities of social behaviour." (17)

The alternative school of thought, characterised by Jurgen Habermas (18), maintains that it is epistemologically impossible to distinguish between "fact and value" in analysing and describing human development. In contrast to the mainstream tradition which holds that technical language is devoid of value imputations, "critical" theorists argue that all language is socially constructed. This means that the very categories by which we describe and interpret human behaviour arise out of specific social and political situations, and even where we use a technical language we are fabricating categories which are rooted in values and beliefs.

There are of course many variants within these two schools of thought but for the purposes of this study, based as it is upon a Habermasian interpretation, (19) it seems appropriate to distinguish between the 'mainstream' and 'critical' traditions on three fundamental grounds. First, they differ both in terms of purpose and application. Whereas mainstream theories are primarily concerned with the provision of
'facts', the critical tradition seeks to enlighten human agents so that they are able to determine where their true interests lie.

Secondly, mainstream and critical theories differ in terms of their cognitive structure. Whereas mainstream theories are objectifying, critical theories are always part of the object domain which is being subjected to analysis. In other words critical theories are said to be reflective and thus they are always in part self referential. Thirdly, mainstream and critical theories require different kinds of confirmation. Whereas mainstream theories require empirical confirmation by means of observation and experiment, critical theories must survive a more complicated process of evaluation. A critical theory must not only investigate social reality but also social knowledge which is part of that reality. Thus a central element in the confirmation of a critical theory is its ability to demonstrate reflective acceptance.

Thesis

The major conclusion which might be drawn from the discussion so far is that a very clear distinction has been made between two scientific traditions, and this argument will be expanded later in the development of a comprehensive theorem for critical practice. At the same time the term "practitioner" has been used to encompass a diverse group of agents engaged in social action. Although the practice domains of science and community development seem relatively unconnected, it can be argued that practice represents the dualism of agency and structure.
Whether we refer to social scientific practice or social work intervention, we are inevitably fusing the epistemology and methodology of social action. If we accept the argument that practice is the outcome of agency and structural factors, then we are inevitably concerned with the relationship between individual and institutional action. Whereas conventional studies usually distinguish between different forms of action and between distinctive groups of practitioners, this thesis goes beyond such distinctions so that we might examine that body of beliefs, values, ideas, laws and theories which constitute the media of practice.

Bryson leads us into this examination in her critical analysis of scientific practice. She maintains that few people today would openly claim science is value free and yet 'researchers seem to be doing much the same as they were before.' (20) The reason for this, she argues, is that scientists enjoy a relatively privileged position in terms of income, prestige and power, and thus the perpetuation of current social arrangements is broadly in their own interests. A similar argument seems valid for other groups of practitioners whether they be planners, administrators or social workers. Within the context of the capitalist State the actions of these "practitioners" seem to support dominant group interests and on the surface at least the logical explanation for this merging of interests points to the shared ideological perspectives held by practitioners and members of the dominant class. It is this apparent merging of interests which is of primary concern in the current study and thus it seems appropriate to set aside the less significant distinctions between different groups of practitioners so that we might examine the outcome of practice and 'the basic interests
The most appropriate framework for this type of analysis is provided by Habermas who identifies three major forms of scientific enquiry. These forms of science are conceived as the empirical-analytic, the historical-hermeneutic and the critical-emancipatory traditions. Each tradition is supposedly governed by a particular kind of 'interest' which shapes and determines what we consider to be knowledge as well as prescribing alternative methods of scientific enquiry. The empirical-analytic tradition is said to be governed by a technical interest in control, the hermeneutic tradition by a practical interest in understanding, and the critical tradition by an interest in emancipation. According to Habermas these interests emanate from the reproductive processes of social life and as such they are considered fundamental characteristics of the human species.

It will be argued in this study that within the context of the capitalist State, these three forms of science correspond with three modes of practice. The empirical-analytic tradition, which can be equated with mainstream orthodoxy, suggests that practice will centre around accurately describing 'what is' so that 'the State' can take remedial action. The hermeneutic tradition argues for an insider's view of the world so that the patterns of injustice and inequity can be understood. Practice in this tradition is supposedly more in tune with the subject's world because the practitioner is an empathetic participant rather than a 'disinterested observer.' The critical tradition goes even further. Within this form of science the practitioner is said to be guided by an emancipatory interest and thus
he/she is not only concerned with describing and understanding particular social situations but also with changing them. With its emphasis on power the critical tradition anticipates the conduct of a political struggle in any movement toward emancipation.

If we accept this analysis of the respective scientific traditions as an adequate theorem for evaluating practice, then this study confronts two major tasks. The first centres around Bryson's thesis that in a capitalist society it is difficult to escape from holding ideologies which support dominant group interests. This does not mean that social practitioners within the capitalist State are merely incidental participants in a predetermined plan. To promote such a thesis one would need to adopt a deterministic view of social action which automatically disconnects the human agent from being an active, knowledgeable participant in life. This is not what Bryson inferred because practice, irrespective of the form it takes, is grounded in a particular social and economic system, and whilst this total system conditions the nature and outcome of intervention, the practitioner can act either positively in terms of effecting certain events, or negatively in terms of forebearance. (25) Both constitute forms of action which produce certain results and thus the first assignment for this study is to examine the outcome or impact of practice. If that examination reveals that dominant group or class interests have been the beneficiaries of intervention then we can reasonably conclude that these practitioners engaged in a form of action which reinforced the ideological reproduction of the capitalist formation and in the active repression of alternatives.
The second task, which is a corollary to the first, is to gauge the degree of voluntarism and determinism involved in the interaction between agency and structure. One way in which it might be feasible to analyse this interaction is through the eyes of participants themselves and thus the focus in this second phase of the research will centre on identifying the basic interests of practitioners. This would seem to be consistent with the Habermasian interpretation of ideology as a form of practice which draws its significance from meanings that individuals ascribe to themselves, their actions, and their historical situation.

Thesis outline

In order to execute these tasks this study has been divided into six chapters. Chapter One outlines a theorem for critical practice based on the work of Jurgen Habermas. Chapters Two to Five examine the outcome of practice and the basic interests of practitioners. These examples are drawn from two areas of practice. In the first instance the examination centres on research practitioners engaged in the construction of social indicators, whilst the second focusses on the actions of a National Research Advisory Council Working Party which was asked to report on the social phenomenon of unemployment.

Chapter Two analyses documentary material relating to the International Social Indicators Movement. The emphasis in this chapter is on the outcome of practice. Chapter Three focusses attention on the social indicators movement within New Zealand. Documentary evidence from the Social Development Council and from the Departments of Social Welfare
and Statistics provides the empirical data for this evaluation which also deals essentially with the outcome of practice. These documentary records provided the names of practitioners who could be described as key personnel involved in the social indicators movement within New Zealand. Unstructured interviews were conducted with these practitioners in order to verify documentary evidence and as a means of identifying the basic interests of practitioners. This material is summarised in Chapter Four.

Chapter Five provides an alternative case study of social practice in New Zealand. This study centres on the National Research Advisory Council's Working Party of which the writer was a member. All documents collected by the working party, including written and oral submissions, were available to participants and thus this second case study presents an 'insiders view' of social practice within the context of a capitalist State. Chapter Six then provides a summary of social practice based on Habermasian theory and on the empirical evidence contained in the case studies (The methodological issues involved in conducting this examination are outlined in Appendix IV).

The task before us now is to set out a comprehensive theorem of critical practice based on the writings of Habermas. This task is addressed in Chapter One.
NOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. The term "critical" is used in the context of the critical scientific tradition. As such it emanates from the philosophical speculation and empiricism of the Frankfurt School which, in its earlier years, brought together a diverse group of German scholars with interests ranging from philosophy, psychoanalysis, phenomenology and Marxism to music, literature, the law and political economy. The organised programme which subsequently emerged found its paradigm in Marx's Critique of Political Economy and the Hegelian-Marxist concept of "totality" - that is, the belief that no partial aspect of social life and no isolated phenomenon can be understood unless it is related to the historical whole (to the social structure conceived as a global entity). The dominant figure of the Critical Tradition in more recent times has been Jurgen Habermas, whose work ranges over three interconnecting spheres: the methodology of the social sciences; the connection between the development of the natural sciences and the interest in instrumental control; and the relationship between science, politics and public opinion in advanced capitalist societies.

2. The definition attributed to Erik Wright is the one adopted in this study. Thus:

"Transformation refers to a mode of determination by which class struggle practices directly affect the processes of structural limitation, selection and reproduction/non-reproduction."


3. A full account of the urban renewal programme initiated by the Auckland City Council and an evaluation of the Community Advisory Service established in the nineteen seventies is to be found in, Ian Shirley, Planning For Community: The Mythology of Community Development and Social Planning. Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1979, Reprinted 1984.


6. "Focus on Social Responsibility in Science", edited by Wren Green and published by the New Zealand Association of Scientists. This publication contained the proceedings of the General Symposium which was held at the 49th Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Auckland,

7. In a seminar at Massey University, 17 June 1977, Johan Galtung referred to the way in which the various academic disciplines had developed self-images and languages which differentiated their approaches to the exploration of common problems. He went on to suggest that these barriers, reflected too in the dichotomy between theory and practice, were intentionally constructed so as to ensure the maintenance of status, power and prestige which accrues to those who have exclusive possession of knowledge.


9. Economics as practised in the western world tends to fall predominantly within the functionalist social tradition. This means that despite variations in both epistemology and methodology it is a discipline which accepts the structural limitations imposed by the capitalist mode of production, and in the terminology of Talcott Parsons it is concerned primarily with pattern maintenance, integration, goal attainment and adaptation. It is not always framed explicitly in those terms but its overriding concern to be apolitical, non-ideological and consensual clearly identifies it with this tradition. One example of this approach is evident in the social policy text by Culyer. He writes: "I have studiously tried to avoid 'politicing' the subject ... indeed, it is the belief that social scientists ... should abstain from such partisanship that underlies the whole of this book".


10. I have used the term "mainstream economists" in the same way that Bernstein refers to social scientists belonging to the "mainstream tradition". Cf note 14.

11. In discussing the different interpretations of knowledge the social sciences are usually perceived as a set of disciplines united by an interest in the relationship between human beings and their world. It is feasible to consider these disciplines on their own however and detail ways in which they have distorted knowledge. Economics has been examined in this study. Anthropology also provides a good illustration. In 1953 Kennard and MacGregor reported that Alexander Leighton (employed by the U.S. Government throughout World War II) was suggesting that social scientists should gather intelligence on trends in foreign countries with regard to detecting situations of tension and conflict before they were manifested in national or international violence. As late as 1962 another anthropologist, Ward Goodenough, was recommending that "the army is another potential
market for the ethnographic skills of anthropologists. The success of modern guerrilla warfare obviously requires extensive and intensive ethnographic intelligence!" This complicity of anthropologists and the State reached new heights when in 1965 the involvement of anthropologists in Project Camelot finally presented a moral conflict which the discipline could no longer afford to ignore. The Fellows of the American Anthropological Association meeting in 1966 passed a controversial resolution reflecting moral indignation and ethical confusion regarding the activities of some of its members.


For a critique of sociological neutrality see Lois Bryson’s: How do we proceed now we know Science is not Value Free, in Wren Green (ibid) 1979 : 87-106. A similar interpretation of psychology as it has been applied to community work practice is contained in Ian Shirley, Planning For Community : The Mythology of Community Development and Social Planning, Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1979.


13. The appropriation of Kuhn’s interpretation of science was particularly evident during the early 1960’s when paradigmatic divisions in Sociology were commonplace. Becker referred to these divisions as "a war of sociological religions, characterised by faith rather than reason?" Becker quoted by Chris Wilkes, Sociological Battles : Kuhn and the Divisions in Sociology, unpublished, 1978.

14. Bernstein refers to mainstream social scientists as those who conceive of their discipline as one that differs in degree and not in kind from the well-established natural sciences. They are also said to be convinced that the greatest success is to be found in emulating, modifying and adapting techniques that have been successful in our scientific understanding of nature. At the same time one must not think that the mainstream tradition is more monolithic or homogeneous than it really is. R.J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Methuen, Great Britain, 1979.

and 1968).

16. Robert K. Merton, (ibid) especially pages 4-5

17. Robert K. Merton, (ibid) page 5

18. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests. Translated by J.J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971

Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. Translated by T. McCarthy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1975

Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice. Translated by J. Viertel, Beacon Press, Boston, 1973

Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Translated by J.J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1970

Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, in Theory and Society, 2, 1975: 287-300

Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, in Inquiry, 13, 1970: 360-75


23. Interest is a literal translation of the German 'Interesse'. In the terminology of Habermas, interesse refers to 'cognitive' or 'Knowledge-constitutive' interests.

24. The notion of the 'disinterested observer' as one who explains, understands, interprets or simply describes what is, characterises the mainstream understanding of social and political enquiry.

CHAPTER ONE

CRITICAL THEORY IN THE TRADITION OF JURGEN HABERMAS

Habermas identifies three functions of a 'critical' theory, each of which is measured in terms of different criteria. (1) First, the formation and extension of a critical theorem which can stand up to scientific discourse. Secondly, the application of such a theory to specific groups by means of a reflective process. And thirdly, the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of political struggle. The second and third functions will be addressed in later chapters in an examination of social practice within a capitalist State. This chapter, which draws essentially from the writings of Habermas, aims to establish a framework for a detailed empirical analysis of social practice.

The writings of Habermas embrace a range of disciplines from politics and sociology, to philosophy, psychology and linguistics. In addition to his detailed critique of positivist epistemology and methodology, and his meticulous examination of the systems approach to social enquiry, he has fashioned theories of language, action and evolution. (2) It is obvious that this one chapter cannot do justice to his encyclopaedic analytic work, but it can isolate some of the central elements in his theoretical repertoire and in so doing it can keep faith with the Habermasian pursuit of a synthetic yet critical understanding of human social life.

The basic elements used by Habermas in his analysis of societal change
derive from Marx whose interpretation of liberal capitalism is accepted as largely correct. In agreeing with the fundamental tenets of Marxism as a critique of capitalist development in the nineteenth century, Habermas identifies two historical tendencies which have radically altered contemporary forms of advanced capitalism. These tendencies are the escalating power of the State and the transformation of science and technology. Habermas addresses both issues by tracing the origins of capitalism from its philosophic base through to the systematic use of science as an ideological instrument of the State. (3) His examination identifies four social formations. (4)

The first of these formations is defined as 'primitive' in that familial and tribal structures play a crucial role as the major determinants of both social intercourse and system integration. Change is related to demographic and ecological factors, with interethic dependency subject to economic exchange, war and conquest. World views and norms which are difficult to differentiate within primitive societies are integrated with rituals and taboos and thus independent sanctions are not required. Organisational roles in this formation are determined by age and sex, with the satisfaction of basic needs defined as the 'motivating factor' in the production of goods.

With the advent of traditional societies (5) there is a shift from familial forms of organisation in the production and distribution of social wealth, to private ownership of the means of production. The kinship system surrenders its central functions of power and control to the State. In the course of this transfer, the family loses all of its economic functions and some of its socialising functions. Social
integration, legal and moral authority, are usurped by subsystems within the State structure and legitimised by traditional ideologies. With private ownership of the means of production, a power relationship is institutionalised in which the privileged class appropriates the socially produced wealth. This appropriation is heightened by the exploitation of labour power, and as a consequence of class repression the legitimacy of the social and political order is threatened. It leads eventually to a transformation of the political system and to new foundations of legitimation.

The new social formation to emerge is liberal capitalism(6), with the State and the marketplace exercising relatively autonomous yet complementary roles. Economic exchange, and therefore the relationship of wage labour and capital becomes the dominant steering medium, with the State providing the conditions under which the market economy can be expanded and sustained. The actions of the State in the liberal capitalist phase are seen as superstructural – that is, they serve ideological ends. The State, in the hands of capital, receives its power from the economy, and in turn the polity uses knowledge to extend the interests of capital. These interests advance the notion of "fair exchange" between capital and labour in the marketplace as the epitome of individual freedom and competition, but the accumulation process eventually falters (in a series of depressions), and the State re-engages the economy. This re-engagement by the State signifies the advent of advanced capitalism.

Within advanced capitalism, knowledge and ideology (formerly under the control of capital) are transferred to the expanding State apparatus.
In the international arena, global States such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, create and improve conditions for the utilisation of accumulated capital, whilst at the national level the State actually replaces the market in non-profitable sectors, thus creating and improving conditions for the realisation of capital.

The State executes this replacement by economic restructuring, unproductive government consumption, improvements to the material and immaterial infrastructures, a heightening of human productivity and by relieving the social and material costs of private production. At the same time, increasing State involvement brings with it a depoliticisation of the relations of production, and as a consequence Government creates an increased need for legitimation. As the State is now actively engaged in the reproductive process, the contradictions arising out of a conflict of interests between socialised production and private appropriation means that the State must find an alternative way of legitimising its actions. This legitimating function is achieved by citizen depoliticisation, which induces mass loyalty but avoids participation. Citizens "enjoy the status of passive (subjects) with only the right to withhold acclamation".(7)

The process of depoliticisation is legitimated in two ways. In the first instance it stems from what Habermas refers to as civic privatism, which is political abstinence combined with an orientation to career, leisure and consumptive pursuits.(8) Secondly, it is reinforced by a bourgeois form of social science which allows the State to replace myth with scientific rational action to which all reasonable people will accede.(9) By utilising the scientific and technological
innovations of advanced capitalism, the State assumes an ever increasing capacity to control the environment. These controls not only relate to the natural environment but they extend to the State’s active engagement in production and reproduction, and to the consequential fusion of economic and political issues. The old ideology of market forces is replaced by an interventionist State representing the interests of the "public", and thus politics is portrayed as being largely irrelevant in the light of such a "benign" administration. Questions which were regarded as political matters in previous historical conjunctures are redefined as technical issues, requiring objective, scientific analysis and resolution. It is science which provides the ideological foundation for State control of our social and political lives, and in this sense it is science which becomes the ideological instrument of the State.

In equating science with ideology, Habermas refers to a form of science which treats knowledge as a politically neutral commodity, devoid of value imputations. In essence it corresponds with the mainstream social scientific tradition which regards the natural sciences as paradigmatic. It is based on a belief that increased systematic empirical understanding of how society works will naturally lead to the resolution of social problems. It follows that the scientific practitioners who have a mandate to resolve such problems are the technicians of the State who have successfully isolated the requisite "facts". In accepting this mandate social scientists claim that they have assumed a politically neutral approach, but as Habermas among others has illustrated, they have opted instead for an implicit conservative ideology which accepts existing social and political
relationships without question. (10) Within the context of the capitalist State they automatically align themselves with the technical rational tradition, and in practice this results in an unexpressed form of social and political domination.

The Scientific Traditions

To appreciate what is basically a critique of the mainstream position, it is necessary to examine the way in which Habermas distinguishes between alternative scientific traditions, their relative cognitive interests, and their corresponding dimensions of human social existence. (11) He identifies three primary cognitive interests which are said to correspond with three forms of science. These forms are categorised as the empirical-analytic sciences which incorporate a technical cognitive interest - the historical-hermeneutic sciences which incorporate a practical interest - and the critically oriented sciences which incorporate an emancipatory interest. Each of these cognitive interests is grounded in one dimension of human social existence, with "work" guiding the empirical-analytic tradition, "interaction" the historical-hermeneutic tradition, and "power" the critical-emancipatory tradition. These traditions, their relative cognitive interests, and their corresponding dimensions of human social existence, may be modelled as in Figure I.
By "work", Habermas means that dynamic social process by which individuals shape and control their environment in order to survive. This instrumental-rational action is governed by technical rules which in turn are based on empirical knowledge. Within Habermas' terminology, this empirical form of knowledge demands the isolation of objects and events into dependent and independent variables, with any investigation focussing on regularities between them. The deduction of empirical generalisations under controlled conditions leads to the eventual confirmation or falsification of hypotheses. "This is the cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes". (12)

In defining "interaction", Habermas is referring to communicative action, governed by consensual norms and leading to description,
explanation, and understanding. Within this tradition, individuals shape and control their lives through work, and through communicative action and language. The methodological framework is based upon a practical interest which has as its aim the clarification and "interpretation of texts"(13) as opposed to technical control and manipulation. Access to these facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation.

By emancipation, Habermas refers to a form and process of knowledge which is "empowering". That is, it leads participants to seek a self-conscious understanding of the contradictions implicit in their material existence, so that these contradictions might be appropriated and transformed. By penetrating the ideological mystifications and forms of false consciousness that distort the meaning of social and political life, critical theorists seek a genuine unity of belief and fact, theory and practice. They view any artificial division, such as the mainstream distinction between belief and fact, as an ideological reflection of a society in which scientific practice serves the status quo.

In differentiating between these three scientific traditions, Habermas emphasises the need to comprehend the distinctive characteristics of these non-reducible media and cognitive interests.(14) His emphasis lies, not in denigrating any particular tradition, but in exploring the interrelationships and dynamics between them. His ultimate pursuit is a dialectical synthesis which implicates empirical correlations, the interpretation of social and political reality, and any critique of that "reality", as three internal moments of theorising about social
and political life. (15)

A central component in the pursuit of this dialectical synthesis is the notion of critique. Modelled on Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Marx's critique of ideology, and Freud's psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School have assimilated the Enlightenment understanding of critique as oppositional thinking and expanded the concept to comprise both reconstruction and criticism. (16) This reinterpretation has been anchored in historical conditions and reflected in four major theoretical developments:

1. a switch from the infra-structure to the superstructure and the concomitant merging of public and private interests;
2. the replacement of a critique of political economy by the critique of instrumental rationality;
3. the assimilation of Freud and the subsequent reinterpretation of the system of needs;
4. a revision of Marx's philosophical anthropology by drawing on the Hermeneutic tradition.

For Habermas, the notion of critique, guided by an emancipatory interest, finds its fullest expression in the psychoanalytic model of therapeutic interpretation. This interpretation goes beyond the act of hermeneutics insofar as it must identify not only a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself. (17) In contrast to the "theorist as disinterested observer", (18) the analyst in Freudian terms is concerned with, and guided by, his/her interest in helping the patient overcome any suffering, as well as any debilitating symptoms
that are being exhibited. This is achieved by means of reconstruction and interpretation, with these processes leading ultimately to self reflection within the patient/subject him/(her)self.

The need for reconstruction and interpretation emanates from meanings that individuals ascribe to their actions, as well as from the historical situations in which they are immersed. Sometimes these pathological factors are rooted in inner resistances based on false beliefs or systematically distorted misconceptions individuals have of themselves. The task of treatment lies in combating these resistances both cognitively and affectively. A successful outcome is not ultimately dependent upon the analysts understanding of the patient, but rather it rests on the extent to which the patient by self-reflection can appropriate this analytic understanding and effect a transformation which is liberating and emancipatory.(19) Thus it is "critique in the sense that the analytic power to dissolve dogmatic attitudes inheres in analytic insight."(20)

In relating psychoanalysis to critical theory, Habermas is not only sensitive to the distortions that can result when the analyst/theorist imposes his/her own values on the social actors he/she is studying, but he is equally sensitive to the distortions that result when theories reflect the biases of those investigated. Both positions endorse a concept of theory which is simply an ideological reflection of prejudices and false beliefs. It is the element of critique which exposes this consequence, leading eventually to the interpretation of a case which can only be corroborated "by the successful continuation of a self-formative process." That is, "by the completion of
self-reflection, and not in any unmistakable way, by what the patient says, or how he behaves". (21)

Self reflection, is identified as that dialectic experience whereby the participants confront the existential contradictions implicit in their situation, and thus discriminate between their initial "certitude" and the "truth". In this process, involving cognitive, affective and practical transformation, there is a movement toward emancipation and autonomy, and thus for Habermas there is an irreducible yet dependent relationship between notions such as "truth", "freedom" and "justice". (22)

The nature of this irreducible yet dependent relationship emanates from a critique of both Hegel and Marx. In his all-embracing dialectic of Geist, Hegel reduces successive forms of consciousness into a single story. He isolates the process of self-formation from the concrete historical ways in which human beings form themselves through labour, and he fails to acknowledge that the process of "self reflection is systematically distorted by these historical material conditions of production". (23) Marx by contrast succumbs to an inverted form of reductionism – he interprets the self formation of the human species exclusively through the dialectic of labour. (24)

For Habermas, neither analyses of the economic "basis" nor analyses of the socio-cultural superstructure are adequate in themselves to comprehend the dynamics of advanced-capitalist societies. His emphasis centres on their dialectical interdependence, and thus he reaffirms the inseparability of truth and goodness, of facts and values, of theory
and practice. He therefore reformulates and defends some of the central components within classical philosophy, but he links these convincingly "with the precisely rendered fundamental assumptions of historical materialism". (25) In this dialectical process he proposes a critical theory of society with a practical intention: the self emancipation of human beings from the constraints of all unnecessary domination.

Three problematics underlying the Habermasian position.

In outlining his practical theory Habermas raises three fundamental problems which have been the subject of much debate, and which need to be clarified if we are to establish a theorem for analysing social practice.

In relation to the theorem of knowledge, the major problematic centres around the status of cognitive interests, whilst in the application of this theorem we are asked to consider the notion of an 'ideal speech situation' - a central problematic in organising the processes of enlightenment. Finally, if the critical tradition is to fulfill the practical claim of emancipation as suggested by Habermas, then we must address the problematic relationship between theory and practice. We turn first to the critical theorem of knowledge.
1. The Theorem of Knowledge and Cognitive Interests

One of the major problematics in the theses of science and knowledge, as promoted by Habermas, centres around the concept of cognitive interests. According to Bernstein (26), Habermas does not succeed in validating the 'precise epistemological status' of these interests, whilst Ottman (27), argues that they are unstable concepts threatening constantly to collapse into one sphere or the other, and failing to do justice to either. The first point which must be made is that Habermas uses the term 'interest' in two ways. In Knowledge and Human Interests (28) he uses the term in a quasi-transcendental sense to refer to the 'interest bound' character of different forms of knowledge. At other times he refers to 'interest' in the more conventional sense, to mean the particular interests of specific human agents or groups (29).

In the former sense of the term 'interest', Habermas seeks to recover a potential for reason which he believes to have been 'detached' within the capitalist social formation. By tracing the origins of capitalism from its philosophic base, Habermas argues that knowledge and human interests have always been intimately related. Within the Aristotelian tradition, politics was conceived both as the 'doctrine of the good and just life,' and as the medium of character formation: "It proceeded pedagogically...not technically" (30). But with the advent of the modern era, the formal structures of reason were detached from the semantic contents of traditional world interpretations. Science, morality and art were fractured and shed from those traditions of understanding which are an integral part of everyday life. No longer was any attempt made to attain a rational consensus of citizens
concerned with the practical control of their destiny. In place of consensus social engineers sought technical mastery over history by perfecting the administration of society (31). The social philosophy of these engineers was succinctly expounded by Hobbes:

The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of wellbeing within a correctly instituted order (32).

The consequences of this form of development are identified by Habermas as the destruction of traditional forms of life and the depletion of natural and cultural resources. At the centre of this legacy of development stand the sciences, which have established a monopoly over the interpretation of both outer and inner nature. By using the same conceptual apparatus in analysing both inanimate and animate nature, the social sciences abstracted reason from its critical role in the pursuit of truth, and as a consequence knowledge was reduced to the elucidation of a scientific methodology. In this "dissolution of epistemology" (33) the Kantian notion of critique was abandoned, and in its place social practitioners institutionalised rationality, using the same procedures of testing, validating and rejecting hypotheses which had been paradigmatic for the natural sciences.

While Habermas acknowledges that the natural sciences have to deal with hermeneutic problems on a theoretical plane, they do not have to gain access to their object domain through hermeneutic means. Access to a
physically measurable object domain (in the tradition of the disinterested observer), and access to a symbolically structured domain by a participant in communication, require different research techniques, and these techniques deeply affect the logic of investigation (34). Within the positivist tradition this logic insists on a separation of subject and object, life and knowledge, science and practice. By contrast the critical tradition emphasises the participation of the subject in the constitution of the objective world, the logical relationship between human interests and knowledge, and the historical connection between science and its practical application (35).

Although these distinctions are drawn in somewhat abstract terms, the concerns of which Habermas speaks are motivated by his quest for a truly rational society in which human beings might make their own history with will and consciousness (36). He has a practical interest in radically improving human existence and he pursues this interest by isolating the major historical moments in the transformation of politics and science. The growth of the interventionist State, the progressive rationalisation and bureaucratisation of social institutions, the increasing interdependence of science and technology, and the reification of a technocratic consciousness — these elements are identified by Habermas as aspects of a new social formation in which "the social potential of science [has been] reduced to the powers of technical control" (37).

In order to recover this potential and simultaneously promote the "promise of practical politics" (38), Habermas isolates three primary
cognitive interests each of which correspond with a form of scientific practice. (39) These cognitive or knowledge constitutive interests, are supposedly rooted in the reproductive processes of the human species" (40), and thus they shape the very categories by which we both define 'knowledge', and validate knowledge claims.

Habermas initiates his examination of science with the pragmatism of Pierce, and here he identifies the cognitive interest of natural science as a technical concern to master natural phenomena. Whereas labour mediated pre-scientific relations between humanity and nature, the technical interest exhibited by individuals in controlling and manipulating their environment in order to survive was extended historically to include the natural sciences. As the domain of objectivity, this instrumental action was governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge. Not only did this interest in technical mastery determine the meaning of nomological statements, but it dominated the context of application within which propositions were correctly or incorrectly deduced. In other words, it resulted in a form of knowledge which was based upon the development of hypothetical-deductive theories. These in turn permitted the extrapolation of empirical generalisations based on lawlike hypotheses which were then subjected to examination under controlled conditions.

Habermas equates the empirical-analytic sciences with this interest in "technically utilisable knowledge" (41), but the interest-in-itself is not the subject of his critique. The fact that it is grounded in human action aimed at survival is acknowledged, but when this form of science claims to be the standard by which all knowledge is to be measured,
then it displays a "cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes" (42). By reducing the social potential of science to the powers of technical control, the social and political lives of human actors are replaced with a technocratic consciousness. It is this technocratic consciousness which promotes a "fatalistic attitude to the status quo" (43), and disconnects the human agent from an active role in the production and reproduction of social and political life.

Habermas then distinguishes purposive-rational action and the empirical-analytic sciences from communicative action and the historical-hermeneutic tradition. In an appraisal of Dilthey's historicism, he demonstrates how individuals shape and determine patterns of living through work and through communicative action and language. This latter form of action is identified with a "practical interest" in understanding, which has its pre-scientific genesis in interaction and communication, effected through the use of symbols (44). It is this practical interest in understanding which determines the meaning of symbolic utterances and simultaneously provides the context of application within which past and present utterances are subjected to interpretation. As a form of scientific practice it penetrates the humanities, in that it constitutes the domain of 'objectivity' as the domain of persons seeking to communicate with one another. This domain of symbolic interaction is governed by consensual norms which define reciprocal expectations of behaviour, and thus for Habermas interaction is a non reducible (45) type of action requiring a distinctive set of categories as a means of facilitating description, explanation and understanding. By interaction Habermas means
communicative action governed by consensual norms which establish both the context of discovery and the means of validation. Whereas the context of discovery requires reciprocal expectations about behaviour which must be understood and recognised by at least two acting subjects, the validity of the hermeneutic tradition is based on social norms which are grounded in mutual understanding and obligations.

Habermas does not dispute the validity of the historical-hermeneutic sciences (46) to provide a form of knowledge based on a practical interest in understanding. What he does dispute are the universal claims made by scientists in this tradition which exceed the limits of validity established by such an interest. In other words, to claim that the hermeneutic tradition is capable of effecting a cultural regeneration through linguistic analysis, is to overlook the fact that language itself is a medium of domination and social force (47). Whereas the empirical tradition fails to acknowledge a level of action (symbolic interaction) which presupposes a claim to understanding, the hermeneutic sciences isolate symbolic interaction from historical forms of work, and thus they deny that labour exerts a powerful influence on the nature and quality of interaction. Practitioners in this tradition assume that knowledge generated through understanding will eventually lead to a transformation of human social existence, but in failing to prescribe how this transformation might be effected, they have limited their methodology to the structured reality of a given theoretical attitude.

Whereas the empirical and hermeneutic sciences fail to provide a rational account of themselves because of a primary interest in
producing nomological knowledge, the critical tradition by definition is self referential. It is concerned with going beyond the production of nomological knowledge "to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed" (48). This critical interest in emancipation is identified by Habermas in his examination of Freud and Marx.

In psychoanalysis (as a methodological exemplar of critical theory) the patient is encouraged to reflect upon the hidden sources of repression so that he/she as a knowledgable, active, human being can be released from conditions of dependency. Such conditions are rooted in inner resistances based on false beliefs and on systematically distorted misconceptions individuals have of themselves, their actions, and their historical situation. The task of treatment lies in combating these resistances by means of reconstruction and interpretation (49). This entails confronting 'patients' with the existential conflicts and contradictions implicit in their situation so that by self reflection they can appropriate this analytic understanding and effect a transformation which is liberating and emancipatory. In this process of liberation the patient is not only confronting inner resistances, but distortions which arise out of the historical material conditions of production (50). Thus Habermas refers to a dialectical interdependence between individual emancipation and the circumstances within which non-alienating work and free interaction can be manifested.
2. The Organisation of the Processes of Enlightenment

In seeking to recover the "potential for reason encapsulated in the very forms of social reproduction" (51), Habermas further clarifies his notion of 'interests,' by reformulating the basic assumptions of historical materialism, and by introducing a categorical distinction between labour and interaction (52). In Habermasian terms the mechanisation of the labour process over time has effected a qualitative change in the mode of creating surplus value which stems no longer from labour power alone, but also from the scientific development of the technical forces of production. As a consequence of this transformation of science and technology into a leading productive force, the tendency within capitalism for the rate of profit to fall is capable of being averted. When this fact is combined with the increasing power of the State and the concomitant merging of economic and political interests, then for Habermas a critical theory of society can no longer be construed exclusively as "a critique of political economy" (53).

The alternative interpretation of historical materialism as proposed by Habermas begins with the Marxian notion of praxis as the dialectic through which the human species is formed, but in contrast to Marx, categorical distinctions are made between labour and interaction (54). Whereas Marx established a dialectic of alienated labour and critical revolutionary activity, Habermas differentiates between work according to technical rules and interaction according to valid norms. One of the ways in which these distinctions are made is by means of a theory of social evolution.
According to Habermas, the forces of production determine the level of control over the objectified processes of both nature and society. These forces are bound by rules of purposive-rational action which govern the activity of human agents in labour. It is the relations of production which regulate access to the means of production and thereby to the distribution of social wealth. Whilst social systems are able to exert control over nature by means of the forces of production, this control can only be maintained over time by the appropriation of science and technology. This requires the reification of science as the source of knowledge and the exemplar of truth.

Whereas 'outer nature' is bound by rules of purposive-rational action, 'inner nature' can only be adapted to society with the assistance of normative structures in which needs are interpreted and actions are sanctioned (55). This process of justification is sustained at the level of language and governed by rules of communicative action. In this way the growth in productive forces and technological control is distinguished from communicative action free from domination. The former is based upon a concept of work according to technical rules and the latter upon interaction according to valid norms. By making these distinctions Habermas reconstructs the development of the human species as an historical process of technological and cultural development. He does not abandon the critical meaning of alienated labour as intimated by Heller (56) and Giddens (57), but rather he offers an alternative explanation of alienation. This alternative explanation emanates from Habermas' theory of communicative action (58).

In a linguistic reformulation of the philosophical foundations of
historical materialism, Habermas identifies language as a universal medium through which the social lives of human agents unfold. Language is not only a fundamental element in the formation of consciousness, but a basic construct in both the notion and application of critique. At the same time language is also the medium of ideology qua systematically distorted communication, and thus for Habermas the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem of consciousness. To provide an adequate conception of communicative action he proposes a programme of 'universal pragmatics' which demonstrates the normative basis of non-distorted communication and simultaneously explains how communication can be subject to distortion (59).

Four different types of validity claims are identified as universal elements involved in exchanging speech acts. These claims are:

1. that the utterance is understandable;
2. that its propositional content is true;
3. that the speaker is sincere in making the utterance;
4. that it is appropriate for the speaker to be performing the act of speech (60).

Whilst these universal claims are accepted in normal interaction, situations arise in which one or more of the elements become problematic. When this occurs the underlying consensus is called into question. To restore consensus the participants enter into discursive action where the primary purpose of communication is a grounded agreement based on the force of the better argument (61).
The notion of discourse is advanced by Habermas as the most appropriate form of argumentation. The act of participating in any discourse carries with it the supposition that there is a community of inquirers and furthermore, that a genuine agreement or consensus among the participants is possible. If we did not suppose that a grounded consensus were possible and could in some way be distinguished from a false consensus, then the very meaning of discourse would be called into question. In attempting to arrive at a rationally motivated understanding we assume that everyone who speaks a natural language is intuitively familiar with it and trust him or herself to distinguish a true from a false consensus (62). To come to a rational decision about such matters we must presume that the outcome of discourse will rest on the force of the better argument and not upon accidental or systematic constraints on discussion. Habermas maintains that the structure of communication is free from constraint when all participants have the same opportunity to select and employ speech acts, and when there is an effective equality in the assumption of dialogical roles (63). It is this commitment to consider all individuals as potential participants in discourse which presupposes a universal commitment to the inherent equality, autonomy, and rationality, of human beings.

To the extent that communication serves mutual understanding, it expresses an idea that is implicitly posited with the concept of truth - an idea that can be actualised only as a perspective bound to particular situations and therefore an idea which is asserted "each in its place and at its time" (64). The speech act must therefore take into account not only discursive elements such as utterance, speaker and hearer, but the life world shared by speaker and hearer, and thus
the culturally transmitted background knowledge from which participants in communication draw their interpretations. This does not mean simply equating truth with an achieved consensus but rather acknowledging that at all times and in any place a consensus can be realised. The question then becomes, how do we discriminate between a 'true' as opposed to a 'false' consensus. Habermas responds to this question by connecting the conditions for ideal discourse with those conditions considered conducive to an ideal form of life. He proposes an ideal speech situation in which he refers to the inseparability of truth, goodness, freedom, and justice. In this ideal situation he anticipates not only unlimited discussion but discourse that is free from all constraints of domination.

I would therefore prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation ... This anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realised consensus can be called into question and tested (65).

Truth is not tied to particular methods or strategies for arriving at true statements, but rather to "universal pragmatic relations between speech acts, to speakers and to speech situations" (66). Truth is therefore a validity claim that we make when we assert that the statements are true and then justify this claim discursively by means of argumentation.

No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of potential speech, since all
speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented toward the idea of truth. This idea can only be analysed in unrestrained and universal discourse. In so far as we master the means for the construction of the ideal speech situation, we can conceive the ideas of truth, freedom, and justice, which interpret each other - although of course as ideas. On the strength of communicative competence alone, however, and independent of the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong, we are quite unable to realise the ideal speech situation; we can only anticipate it. (67)

In this somewhat abstract way Habermas argues that in analysing the speech act we can demonstrate that it is oriented toward the idea of truth. In analysing truth we are led to the notion of discursively achieved consensus. In appraising this consensus we find it involves a normative dimension - namely, that everyone who speaks a natural language is intuitively familiar with it and trusts him or herself to distinguish a 'true' from a 'false' consensus. In analysing the notion of a grounded consensus we discover it is tied to a speech situation which is free from all constraints and therefore the resulting consensus is due to the force of the better argument. In appraising the ideal speech situation we find it involves assumptions about the context of the speech act, and this leads inevitably to anticipate a form of life in which autonomy and responsibility are possible.

It is this 'possibility' which the critical theory of society takes as its point of departure. The emancipated form of life, which is the goal of critical theory, is at the same time inherent in notions of 'discourse' and 'truth' - it is anticipated in every act of communication. Its normative foundation is not arbitrary (as in the case of the positivist tradition), but an integral component within the
very structure of social action which it analyses. Viewed from the perspective of the participants, communicative action serves to establish interpersonal relations - from the perspective of social science, it is the medium through which the life world shared by the participants is reproduced.

3. The Problematic Relationship between Theory and Practice

The concept of communicative action as postulated by Habermas requires further explication if we are to address the third problematic raised in this chapter – namely, the relationship between theory and practice. In his more recent writings, Habermas differentiates between strategic and communicative action (68). He identifies communicative action as social interaction coordinated through the cooperative achievements of understanding among participants, whereas strategic action is based on purposive-rational activity oriented toward success. Actions oriented toward success can be evaluated according to their effectiveness in influencing the decisions of rational opponents. Actions oriented toward success can be termed instrumental when they follow technical rules and can be evaluated according to the efficiency of intervening in the physical world.

Strategic action can be further expanded by identifying two variants, namely action which is openly strategic and that which is covert. When action is covertly strategic it is manifested in two forms. The first is referred to as manipulation and arises when at least one of the participants deceives other(s) regarding the non-fulfillment of the
conditions of communicative action and this deception is apparently accepted. The second is referred to as systematically distorted communication and arises when at least one of the participants deceives him or herself regarding the fact that he/she is behaving strategically, when in reality he/she has adopted an attitude oriented toward reaching understanding.

In order to further clarify these alternative types of action, we must separate concepts of interaction (such as those delineated above) from societal action as conditioned by the forces and relations of production. These forms of practice lie at different conceptual levels, with interaction dependent upon the communicative or strategic acts of the subjects themselves, whilst the forces and relations of production refer to institutional patterns established by society as a whole. The interactive level presumes that the subjects themselves are capable of harmonising their activities and producing alternative patterns of social action. As communicative action (i.e. action orientated toward reaching understanding), it becomes the medium through which the symbolic structures of the life world are reproduced. As instrumental action (i.e. action orientated toward intervening in the physical world), it becomes the medium through which the life world develops processes of exchange with external nature (69). Whereas these forms of social action are dependent upon the communicative or strategic acts of knowledgeable, participating subjects, the forces and relations of production represent the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole. These institutionalised patterns of action represent the processes of production used by society in its exchange with external nature, as
well as the relations of production which ultimately establish the interest structure of society, and thereby create a differential pattern of possibilities for the socially recognisable satisfaction of needs.

Now whilst Habermas distinguishes between social interaction and patterns of action which emanate from, and are conditioned by, the forces and relations of production, he asserts that there is an 'analytically explicable connection' between the two (70). The connection between productive forces and purposive-rational action is illustrated by the way in which knowledge, implemented in the forces of production, and as embodied in technologies, organisations, and competencies, is designed to improve the purposive-rational application of means in gaining control over nature and over co-operating human beings. Similarly, the relations of production (as institutions designed to regulate legitimate access to the means of production) make up the political, legal and social order which provides the context for action orientated toward reaching understanding. It is this dialectical interdependence between different levels of action which distinguishes the Habermasian approach to critical theory (71).

Simply stated, the Habermasian approach identifies the emancipated form of life (the goal of critical theory) as inherent in the notion of truth. The pursuit of truth, and the concomitant drive for self emancipation from the constraint of unnecessary domination, is anticipated in every act of communication, and these acts are 'linked convincingly with the precisely rendered fundamental assumptions of historical materialism' (72). Neither analyses of the economic base
nor analyses of the socio-cultural superstructure are adequate in themselves if we are to comprehend the dynamics of the modern era and somehow put our fragmented world back together again. Only a form of science which is simultaneously historical, empirical, and critical, can hope to capture the dynamic relationship between human beings as they are, and what they might yet become (73). To meet these requirements, which in essence are the requirements of critical practice, Habermas attempts to distinguish between the logic and dynamics of development whilst providing a critique of ideology. His primary aim is to establish a critical consciousness of revolutionary practice and this is where his interpretation of ideology is of considerable significance.

The Ideological Components of Practice.

In Habermasian terms ideology draws its significance from meanings that individuals ascribe to their actions, and from the historical situations in which they find themselves. This dialectical interdependence between different spheres of society must be reflected in categorical and methodological terms if critical theory is to avoid the extremes of economism and neo-idealism. Habermas sets out to do this by making certain distinctions - the first is between ideology in the descriptive and pejorative sense. (74)

An ideology in the descriptive sense includes such things as the beliefs members of a group hold, the concepts they use, the attitudes and psychological dispositions they exhibit, their motives, desires,
values, predilections, works of art, religious rituals, and gestures. It is purely descriptive, and as such, it is characteristic of every human group. In identifying this descriptive form of ideology, the critical tradition distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive elements. By discursive or conceptual elements is meant such things as concepts, ideas, and beliefs, and by non-discursive elements the reference is to characteristic gestures, rituals, attitudes, and forms of artistic activity.

Habermas (75) uses ideology in this descriptive sense when he refers to the beliefs agents in a society hold, but he distinguishes between their manifest and functional content. By manifest content, he refers to differences in what the beliefs are beliefs about. A set of beliefs about superhuman entities who are thought to supervise and enforce standards of human behaviour may be called a religious ideology, whilst a set of concepts for talking about economic transactions could be termed an economic ideology. By functional properties, Habermas means the way in which the elements of ideology influence action. Thus, in the first sense of the term ideology he is interested in what kinds of beliefs, of what kind of manifest content, function as ideologies, for what domains of action.

Whereas ideology in the descriptive sense is said to constitute a form of consciousness, the notion of ideology in the pejorative sense is equated with false consciousness. A form of consciousness is ideologically false by virtue of its epistemic, functional, or genetic properties. By epistemic properties is meant, whether or not the descriptive beliefs contained in the form of consciousness are
supported by empirical evidence, or whether or not the form of consciousness is one in which beliefs of different epistemic type are confused. This form of ideology is confirmed, if value judgements are presented as statements of fact, or human agents falsely objectify their own activity. It is also confirmed when the particular interest of some subgroup is generalised to represent the interests of the group as a whole.

By functional properties is meant the role an ideology plays in supporting, stabilising, or legitimating, certain kinds of social institutions or practices. Habermas often refers to an ideology as a world picture which stabilises or legitimises surplus herrschaft. (76) An ideology is distinguished by its functional properties, if it hinders or obstructs the maximal development of the forces of material production, or is identified as masking social contradictions. Since masking social contradictions might include such things as diverting attention from them, a form of consciousness could successfully mask social contradictions without containing any false beliefs.

By the genetic properties of ideology is meant the causal history of a form of consciousness. In Mannheim's (77) terminology this means, their origin can be traced to the particular experiences of a particular class in society, with its characteristic perceptions, interests, and values. In a similar vein Habermas draws an analogy between psychoanalysis and social theory, when he suggests that ideologies might be construed as collective rationalisations - that is, as systems of beliefs and attitudes, accepted by human agents, for reasons which they are unable to acknowledge. Hence one must distinguish the context
of discovery from the context of justification.

A central theme to emerge from the notion of ideology as advanced by Habermas is the connection between interests and domination. This connection is ultimately rooted in historical materialism (78) as a theory of evolution, for it is the contradictory relationship between the forces and relations of production which determines the level of control over objectified processes of both nature and society. These relations of production not only regulate access to the means of production, but they bind the rules of purposive-rational action which govern the activities of individual agents. As class relations, they crystallise around an institutional core, which secures a specific form of social integration. This form of integration is governed by rules of communicative action and sustained in discourse. Thus the forces of production are linked with the development of particular organisational forms which enhance the steering capacity of capitalist societies, and these in turn are critical to our understanding of legitimating interpretive systems.

The State and Class Practices

In sketching his historical interpretation of the relationship between theory and practice, Habermas conceives of society as the symbolic structures of the life world (79) reproduced in cultural traditions, social integration and socialisation. Whereas these symbolic structures were once perceived as interdependent in that they synthesised social and system integration, in the modern era two
subsystems have been differentiated out through the media of money and power. These subsystems (namely State capitalism and State socialism) are connected with the life world through the institutionalisation of 'public' and 'private' households, and as a consequence the life world is subject to the limitations of material production within the framework of existing productive relations (80). At the same time the economic and political spheres are dependent upon the symbolic reproduction of the life world for individual development, motivation and legitimation. When disturbances develop in the interaction between life world and system, the resultant crises are manifested both as personal troubles and public issues.

For the purposes of this study we have chosen to focus on those crises which are generated in interaction between the life world and the subsystem of State capitalism. At the centre of this interaction lies the State which is perceived as an essential element in bourgeois reproduction. It is not simply an arm of capital (as conceived within the Marxist-Leninist tradition), but a relatively autonomous site of class conflict.

In the political realm these conflicts emanate from the relationship between social classes and the structuring of power through the State. Although the capitalist mode of production structurally defines the boundaries of the State and therefore the boundaries of State practice, the political-administrative realm facilitates certain selective and mediating mechanisms which support, maintain and reproduce the capitalist social formation. These mechanisms include the maintenance of a rational administrative State bureaucracy which organises and
unifies class fractions and which ultimately benefits the long term interests of the bourgeoisie.

It is the relations of production which regulate access to the means of production and thereby to the distribution of social wealth. This relationship between wage labour and capital is identified as the fundamental contradiction of capitalism. It is manifested as social production for the enhancement of particular interests and in the overall maintenance of this relationship the State plays a significant role. It is the State which secures the social preconditions for capitalism by bringing together the disparate classes and class fractions under the umbrella of the political-administrative apparatus. This means that in securing and regulating the conflict between capital and wage labour, the State attempts to perform two basic and mutually contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimation. Not only must the State ensure increasing levels of private capital accumulation, but it must legitimate its actions by appearing to be a neutral instrument of organisation representing the public interest and the common good.

This is where the socio-cultural apparatus of the State becomes particularly significant. As the working class becomes institutionalised into the structure of the State, overt coercion and force is increasingly replaced by what Gramsci has referred to as hegemony. This involves the active consent of the dominated groups by the intellectual, moral and political leadership of the ruling class. It is a systematic orchestration of popular demands, mediated through the ideological apparatus of the State, the private organisations of civil society, and the activities and practices of State officials who
play an important role in securing class domination. In the securing of class domination, political questions are redefined as technical issues requiring objective scientific analysis and resolution, and it is this form of reductionism which allows science to become the ideological instrument of the State.

In this interpretation of capitalism, the State is conceived as being relatively autonomous as it performs a unifying and cohesive role in a class divided society. This does not mean that a single functional ideology pervades the capitalist formation and simply reduces human beings to the status of relatively unproblematic agents of their political and economic masters. Whilst the capitalist mode of production imposes certain structural limitations on the State and thus on State practices, human beings are also relatively autonomous and capable therefore of engaging in hegemonic or counter hegemonic practices. These practices relate to basic class relations arising out of the capitalist mode of production.

Although Habermas defines the relationship between classes and the actual constellations of power as an empirical question, it is feasible for the purposes of this study to identify three classes which might be defined by reference to economic relationships. First, a dominating or bourgeois class which owns the means of production and distribution. Secondly, an oppressed class comprised of the 'silent culture' of society who have only their labour to sell in order to survive. And thirdly, a middle class which participates in the economy both as wage or salary earners in service industries and as consumers. Whereas the dominating class occupies bourgeois positions which involve
the effective control, creation and execution of capital interests, the
oppressed are confined to 'proletarian-type' positions which exclude
any direct involvement in production. The middle class occupies those
zones between and is characterised by limited participation in economic
ownership. In other words, the contradictory location of the middle
class stems from its ability to exercise minimal control over what is
produced and minimal authority over how it is produced. As a general
rule this encourages the middle class to espouse the values and
interests of the bourgeoisie, and thus there is some credence to
Bryson's thesis, that in a capitalist society it is peculiarly
difficult for social scientists to escape from holding ideologies which
support dominant group interests.

Summary and Thesis

In order to subject this thesis to a detailed empirical analysis,
distinctions have been drawn between alternative scientific traditions,
their relative cognitive interests, and their corresponding dimensions
of human social existence. These traditions have been categorised as
the empirical-analytic sciences incorporating a technical interest -
the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporating a practical interest
- and the critical sciences incorporating an emancipatory interest. In
making these distinctions, Habermas argues that we can not only
discriminate between alternative forms of science, but also between
different modes of scientific practice.

Within the empirical-analytic tradition, which comprises the mainstream
of orthodox social science, the aims of practice centre around
organising the life world into categories as a means of accurately
describing 'what is.' These aims coincide with the requirements of the
State which needs factual information on any 'disturbances' which
develop between the life world and the subsystem of State capitalism,
so that remedial action can be taken to protect the long term interests
of the bourgeoisie. Practitioners in this tradition accept existing
economic and political relationships as given, and thus questions which
might have been regarded as political matters in previous historical
conjunctures are redefined as technical issues, requiring objective
scientific analysis and resolution. By aligning themselves with this
form of science, practitioners inadvertently engage in a reductionist
activity, in that knowledge is treated as a politically neutral
commodity devoid of value imputations. In this alignment these
practitioners allow science to become an ideological instrument of the
State, and thus as a mode of practice it can best be described as a
variant of strategic action.

The historical-hermeneutic tradition, guided by a practical interest in
portraying the world as it really is, identifies the social
practitioner as a participant in, and observer of, the inner collective
life of human beings. Within this tradition, the practitioner becomes
immersed in the 'private troubles' of individuals, as well as the
families, groups and social networks of which these individuals are
members. While this emphasis on interaction signifies a greater
potentiality for change than that which is evident within the
empirical-analytic tradition, any transformation is limited to the
constituent group. As a mode of practice it can best be described as
communicative action.

Whereas the empirical and hermeneutic traditions implicitly limit any transformation to change within existing structures, the critical tradition proposes social structural change as the means of furthering human emancipation. By virtue of its primary concern with the distribution of power, the critical-emancipatory tradition anticipates a transformation in individuals, in the groups of which they are members, and in the structures and institutions of society which condition such malfunctioning. The social practitioner therefore seeks to establish 'a dynamic unity with the oppressed class so that his [her] presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change.' (81) In contrast to the empirical and hermeneutic sciences which fail to provide a rational account of themselves because of a primary interest in producing nomological knowledge, the critical tradition by definition is self referential. It is concerned with going beyond the production of nomological knowledge so as 'to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed'. (82) These modes of social practice, the scientific traditions by which they are informed, and the concomitant levels of change, may be modelled as in Figure II.
Although the distinctions drawn by Habermas relate to scientific practices, in the context of this study it is reasonable to classify State servants (whether they be social scientists, administrators, planners or social workers), as social practitioners within the State apparatus who belong to the middle-class, occupying contradictory zones between the bourgeoisie and the oppressed. This suggests that these practitioners will be somewhat ambivalent in mediating between the respective classes, and thus their actions are likely to be contradictory. By analysing the outcome of practice we should be able to see whether or not it is possible for practitioners to avoid aligning themselves with dominant class interests, and thus the first proposition to be examined, questions the rather simplistic correlation between the cognitive interests of social practitioners and the values and interests of the bourgeoisie. If these interests do coincide, then
we can reasonably assume that practitioners have adopted an implicit conservative ideology which accepts existing social and political relationships without question. This means that within the context of the capitalist State, these practitioners will inadvertently align themselves with the mainstream tradition and with a fatalistic attitude to the status quo. If they do adopt a technocratic consciousness as suggested by the empirical-analytic tradition, then they inevitably disconnect themselves from the critical tradition and from any practical interest in improving human existence.

Another way in which we might explore this relationship between the interests of practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant class, is to accept the broad distinction between the 'mainstream' and 'critical' traditions as outlined in the Introduction. In contrast to the first proposition we might then suggest, that if practitioners explicitly adopt the critical tradition as a framework for social practice, they will inevitably engage in counter hegemonic practices based on a primary interest in the emancipation of the oppressed. In direct contrast to the technical reductionism of moral and political questions as evidenced in the mainstream tradition, the critical practitioner will seek to reverse these tendencies so that the underlying contradictions of capitalism are exposed to critique. Again, the suggested coincidence between theory and practice (in this case critical theory and emancipatory practice) seems overly deterministic. However, it is a proposition that is clearly suggested by the Habermasian distinction between different modes of practice, and as such it should be the subject of empirical examination.
In order to examine these two contradictory propositions, two case studies of social practice have been selected. The first study analyses the practices of social scientists involved in the establishment of social indicator systems. Chapter Two examines the international dimensions of the social indicators movement whilst Chapters Three and Four focus specifically on the social indicators movement within New Zealand. Whereas Chapters Two and Three concentrate on the outcome or impact of practice by evaluating documentary evidence, Chapter Four examines the ideological components of practice and thus the connection between 'interests' and domination.

The second proposition is subjected to examination in Chapter Five. This study focusses on the activities of social practitioners engaged in a National Research Advisory Council Working Party which was commissioned to examine the social phenomenon of unemployment. The writer was a participant in that Committee's deliberations and it is his interpretation of critical practice which will be subjected to analysis in Chapter Five.

We turn first to examine the practice of social scientists engaged in the establishment of social indicator systems. In Chapter Two we are interested in the 'International Movement' and the implications of that movement for social practice in New Zealand.
NOTES: CHAPTER ONE: CRITICAL THEORY IN THE TRADITION OF JURGEN HABERMAS


   J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests. Translated by J.J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.


4. In examining these social formations Habermas identifies the determining principle of organisation, indicating the possibilities for social evolution and inferring the type of crisis likely to emerge at each stage of development.

5. The principle of organisation in traditional societies is identified as class domination in political form. Habermas uses the term "Herrschaft" which associates the exercise of power with some kind of "claim" to legitimacy. R. Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Cambridge
6. In this social formation civil society is differentiated out from the political-economic system and this signifies the depoliticisation of class relationships. At the same time the State ensures the territorial integrity and competitiveness of the domestic economy by protecting commerce and the market place (justice and labour legislation) by ensuring the prerequisites of economic production (education/transportation) and by adapting a system of civil law to offset the side effects of accumulation (tax, banking and business law).


8. Civic privatism corresponds to the structures of a depoliticised public realm. It consists of a family orientation with interests in consumption and leisure on the one hand and career orientation on the other. Thus privatism corresponds with the educational and occupational structures in that they are regulated by competition through achievement.

9. It is a bourgeois form of science in that it equates the capitalist economic system with "naturalness". In historical terms it performs a similar function to that which was performed by the classical doctrine of political economy.

10. By accepting existing systems and institutional structures without question these technicians of science are unable to address the political and ideological issues which emanate from advanced capitalism as a particular social formation. Habermas addresses some of these issues in "Legitimation Crisis". He includes, ecological balance, alienation, anthropological balance and the self-destructive dangers in international relations. J. Habermas (ibid), 1975 : 41-44.

11. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Translated by J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.


15. In "The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory", Bernstein emphasises that social scientists are not confronted with exclusive choices between empirical, interpretive or critical theory. In the final analysis any adequate social and political theory must simultaneously comprise empirical understanding, interpretation and critique - thus they are three internal moments of theorising about social and political life. R. Bernstein (ibid) 1976 : 235.

17. Habermas is referring here to the technique of dream interpretation which emanates from the work of Freud. J. Habermas, *(ibid)* 1971: 220-221.

18. The theorist as "disinterested observer" has its origins in Weber but if we accept the trilogy of scientific traditions as differentiated by Habermas, then it finds its fullest expression within the empirical-analytic tradition.

19. This sensitive understanding of the relationship between analyst and patient, practitioner and client, emanates from Freud, but it is reaffirmed by Habermas who stresses that the "act of understanding to which it leads is self-reflection". J. Habermas, *(ibid)*, 1971: 228.


22. Habermas wants to avoid that conception of theory which is merely an ideological reflection of prejudice and false beliefs. Thus his expectation is, that ultimately, the subjects themselves must appropriate and interpret their own actions. This is why he refers to a continuation of a self-formative process. This self-formative process is inherent within the notion of ideal discourse which in turn anticipates an ideal form of life. J. Habermas, 1971. Appendix to *Knowledge and Human Interests*, 301-317.

23. Habermas’ criticisms of Hegel are contained in *Theory and Practice* (1973), and in *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1971). See also, R. Bernstein, *(ibid)* 1976 especially 203-205.


29. Human interests, literally translated, means the 'being-in-between' (interesse). In *Knowledge and Human
Interests, Habermas uses the term to demonstrate the connection between the pre-scientific forms of life, science, and the application of scientific knowledge. Human interests are perceived therefore as mediators between life and knowledge.

30. J. Habermas (ibid) 1973: 42.

31. In Theory and Practice Habermas identifies the legacy of industrially advanced societies as an "escalating scale of continually expanded technical control over nature and a continually refined administration of human beings and their relations to each other by means of social organisation..... No attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical". J. Habermas (ibid) 1973: 254-255.


33. J. Habermas (ibid) 1971: 3-4.


35. The logic of investigation to which Habermas refers is ultimately 'rooted in specific fundamental conditions of possible reproduction and self constitution of the human species' (J. Habermas, ibid 1971:196). In other words, it is a logic based on knowledge constitutive interests which shape and determine what counts as knowledge and what warrants the claim of scientific validation. Thus 'knowledge is neither a mere instrument of an organism’s adaptation to a changing environment nor the act of a pure rational being removed from the context of life in contemplation' (J.Habermas, ibid, 1971: 197).

36. In replying to his critics Habermas writes: 'My intention is to renew a critical social theory that secures its normative foundations by taking in the experience of thought gained along the way from Kant through Hegel to Marx, and from Marx through Pierce and Dilthey to Max Weber and George Herbert Mead, and by working them up into a theory of rationality. This is a matter of explicating a concept of reason that falls prey neither to historicism nor to the sociology of knowledge, and that does not stand abstractly out against history and the complex social life'. J. Habermas (ibid) 1982:232.


38. J. Habermas (ibid) 1973: 44.

39. In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas conducted an exercise
in self-reflection based on idealistic (Kant, Hegel) and materialist (Marx) theories of knowledge, and upon an examination of the prehistory of positivism (Comte, Mach), pragmatism (Pierce), historicism (Dilthey), psychoanalysis (Freud) and perspectivism (Nietzsche).

40. J. Habermas (ibid) 1971: 196.

41. J. Habermas (ibid) 1975: 9.

42. J. Habermas (ibid) 1971: 309


44. J. Habermas (ibid) 1971: 309.

45. In Habermasian terms we cannot investigate the dynamic relationship between life and knowledge unless we comprehend cognitive interests as mediums that are autonomous and not reducible. Thus Habermas is critical of positivists and Marxists who understand social life exclusively in terms of concepts shaped by a technical cognitive interest and he is equally critical of the idealistic tendency to bracket symbolic interaction and isolate it from historical forms of work and labour.

46. Habermas does not accept a hierarchy of sciences but rather several forms of scientific inquiry, each of which is governed by a particular kind of ‘interest’. He therefore seeks to critique the ideological claim that there is only one type of legitimate knowledge and thus one form of ‘science’ by which all knowledge is to be measured.


49. In Freudian terms the analyst comes to understand the way in which the patients behaviour is related to unconscious processes by engaging in therapeutic practices which contain elements of both interpretation and reconstruction.

50. In the introduction to Theory and Practice, Habermas asserts that communicative action must be linked with the ‘precisely rendered fundamental assumptions of historical materialism’. J. Habermas, (ibid) 1973: 12.

51. In seeking to recover this ‘potential for reason’, Habermas associates himself with Marx, who sought to capture the embodiment of reason in his critique of capitalism. At the same
time he dissociates himself from 'revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical self-certainty', for as Habermas demonstrates, neither have validity in the modern era. J. Habermas (ibid) 1982: 221-222.

52. Refer in particular to Knowledge and Human Interests and to the chapter entitled 'Technology and Science as Ideology' in Toward a Rational Society translated by J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1970: 81-122.


54. Habermas develops the distinction between labour and interaction at several different levels. At a methodological level he argues for a logical distinction between the empirical-analytic sciences that aim at technically exploitable nomological knowledge, the historical-hermeneutic sciences that aim at promoting understanding and the critical sciences that aim at self-reflective emancipation from personal and political domination. At the sociological level he distinguishes between subsystems of purposive-rational action and the institutional framework in which the subsystems are embedded. At the level of social evolution he differentiates the growth in productive forces and technical control from the extension of communication free from domination. And at the 'quasi-transcendental' level the theory of cognitive interests distinguishes the technical interest in prediction and control of objectified processes from a practical interest in maintaining communication free from distortion. Refer in particular to 'Technology and Science as Ideology' in J. Habermas Toward a Rational Society (ibid) 1970: 81-122.


59. The theory of communicative competence as advanced by Habermas rests on the relation between communicative action and discourse,
the consensus theory of truth, and the supposition of the ideal speech situation. A succinct summary of the relationship between these three elements of communicative competence is contained in T. McCarthy's 'Translators Introduction' to Legitimation Crisis (ibid) 1975: VII-XXIV.

60. The speech act is not a symbol, word or sentence, but rather the 'production or issuance of a sentence taken under certain conditions' cf T. McCarthy, A Theory of Communicative Competence (ibid) 1973: 137.

61. To restore consensus, the claim to understandability must be either factually redeemed in the course of further interaction or some agreement about linguistic usage must be worked out. The claim to veracity can also be redeemed in the course of further interaction as it becomes apparent that the 'other side' is really cooperating or that he/she is merely pretending to communicate while in fact he/she is acting strategically. By contrast, the validity of problematic truth claims or of problematic norms can only be redeemed discursively. This entails entering into discourse, which has the sole purpose of judging the truth of the problematic opinion or the correctness of the problematic norm.

62. In Habermasian terms understanding is a normative concept for everyone who speaks a natural language is intuitively familiar with it.

63. The conditions of the 'ideal speech situation' should ensure unlimited discussion free from all constraints of domination whether the source of these constraints be strategic behaviour or communicative barriers secured in ideology and neurosis.

64. J. Habermas (ibid) 1982: 277

65. J. Habermas (ibid) 1975: XVIII


68. Habermas makes these distinctions in responding to Giddens, who claims that the critique of domination as enunciated by Habermas rests upon 'freedom of communication or dialogue rather than upon material transformations of power relations' (Refer to A. Giddens, 'Labour and Interaction', ibid, 1982: 159). The extensive response from Habermas can be found in the same 1982 publication edited by Thompson and Held. Refer in particular to pages 263-269.

69. Habermas identifies communicative and instrumental action as mediums of reproduction. In the case of communicative action it
becomes the medium through which the symbolic structures of the life world are reproduced. And in the case of instrumental action it becomes the reproductive medium of the life world's material substratum.

70. J. Habermas (ibid) 1982: 267

71. The contrast between rules governing purposive-rational action and those governing communicative action can be illustrated by differentiating between the character of sanctions involved in each case. Non compliance with technical rules or strategies is sanctioned by the likelihood of failure in achieving goals - non compliance with consensual norms is sanctioned by the disapproval of, or punishment by, the members of the social community.

72. J. Habermas (ibid) 1973: 12.

73. Bernstein examines the relationship between science and human development in his treatise on the restructuring of social and political theory. Refer R. Bernstein (ibid) 1979.


79. The life world as conceived by Habermas constitutes that everyday form of communicative practice which is nourished by traditions, embedded in cultural forms of life and enmeshed in the life histories of individual human beings.

80. The terms public and private households are used in this study to signify interconnected institutions linking the symbolically structured life world with the framework of productive relations as established under capitalism. These corresponding institutions are subject to reductionism in that the term private household denotes the pre-eminence of the nuclear family with an interest in familial-vocational privatisation whereas the public household refers to 'the State' and signifies an interest in civil privatism.

82. J. Habermas, (ibid) 1971: 310.
CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL INDICATORS — INTERNATIONAL

Introduction

In order to examine the first proposition outlined in Chapter One, the concept of practice in the following three chapters will be confined to a particular group of social scientists and State administrators involved in the construction of social indicators. The Habermasian distinction between different scientific traditions and alternative modes of practice provides the analytic framework for this examination, but each chapter begins with an empirical analysis of both the context and specificity of social practice. This empirical and documentary record of the social indicators movement is then critiqued in the final section of each chapter, so that an assessment can be made of that somewhat tenuous relationship which is proposed, between the cognitive interests of social practitioners and the values and interests of the bourgeoisie. We begin with the international dimensions of the social indicators movement.

The Social Indicators Movement

When Bertram Gross(1) asked, 'how can we best appraise the state of a nation', he accurately summarised the "intentions" of what is now described as the social indicators "movement".(2) The genesis of this
movement is not clear. Whilst human societies throughout history have been concerned with notions of 'welfare' and 'social wellbeing', interest in the measurement of these conditions can be equated with census enumerations documented since biblical times and encouraged by investigations into the cost of living and poverty going back several hundred years.(3)

In the 17th century, mercantilists developed a system of economic indicators by positing a direct correlation between economic growth and community wellbeing, and in making this connection they used the balance of precious metals flowing into and out of the national economy as the major indicator of growth. Two centuries later neo-Keynesian economists were drawing similar conclusions.(4) By giving priority to optimal economic growth, these practitioners asserted that any increase in national productivity as mediated by the market would automatically lead to a new level or stage of development.(5) The statistical indicators constructed by economists reinforced these assertions. Gross National Product (or G.N.P. as it is known) serves as one such example.

G.N.P. is an economic construct representing production, income derived from production, and expenditure of income. As an indicator of the state of the economy, it can be linked with variables such as consumption, investment, foreign trade, and government revenue and expenditure. As a composite statistic however, G.N.P. contains certain valuation problems that cannot be resolved even by elaborate pricing methods — these are ultimately structural limitations. While the G.N.P. system of measurement allows for self-adjustment, it
provides no proof of completeness of coverage, nor of equilibrium beyond an arithmetic balance. The system omits certain transactions such as production from unpaid work (housework), and production costs incurred by workers (investment in education and travel time). G.N.P. does not spread the cost of consumer goods over their useful life, nor does it allocate benefits derived from public goods to individuals. As a measure, G.N.P. is unable to assess 'costs' (such as pollution and congestion) or 'benefits' (such as leisure or the quality of life in general). Yet despite these limitations, G.N.P. has been widely used by politicians and social scientists alike, because in practice it has been able to provide a convenient technical explanation for somewhat more complex and intractable problems.

The inherent inadequacies of these 'economistic' interpretations of 'welfare' became most apparent in the nineteen sixties, when questions of personal and social utility surfaced in both national and international arenas. In the international arena the United Nations launched its Developmental Decade, with the long term objective defined as greater parity between rich and poor worlds based on increased economic growth. However, at the end of that decade, 80 per cent of the world’s increased wealth went to the industrialised nations of the North, whilst the living situations of an estimated 40 per cent of the population in Third World countries noticeably deteriorated.(6) Whereas the "benefactors" of this development strategy directed their attention at improving the instruments of distribution, Third World nations were demanding a New International Economic Order.(7)
well. It was not designed to serve them well, or to serve them at all. And the fault lies not in its workings, but in the system itself. The system promised order, stability, and growth for the industrialised countries, for those who already wielded economic power; but it implied disorder, insecurity and deprivation for Third World countries who are relegated as subordinate players and suppliers of goods and cheap labour in the system. The developing world is convinced by hard experience that international poverty is not a mere aberration of international economic relations which minor adjustments can correct, but the unspoken promise of the old economic order. (8)

Similar conflicts were also apparent within the national arena, although these disputes centred around the environmental and civil rights movements, and they were manifested in the defense of welfare provisions, as these services were threatened by Governmental action taken in response to the fiscal crisis of the State. Although nation States in the industrialised world remained committed to the generation of increased economic growth as the mechanism by which the welfare of a nation or subpopulation might be promoted, the high degree of structural inequality between nations, and the rediscovery of poverty within the First World (see Table I) (9), led to criticisms of economic accounting as a distorted or one dimensional view of development. (10) As Eugen Pusic assessed the situation, humanity was now suffering as much from the contradictions of its success as from the consequences of its failures.
TABLE I  Distribution of National Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THIRD WORLD</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>(1968)</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>(1967)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>(1964/65)</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>(1976)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>(1977)</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>(1970/71)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>(1974)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>(1969/70)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WESTERN WORLD</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>(1966/67)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>(1969)</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>(1967)</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>(1973)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The struggle against ignorance has resulted in the triumphs of science, but these are becoming a major threat to existence. The battle against want led to miracles of productivity, but its fruits are so unequally distributed among classes and regions that they have become a source of oppression. The fight against loneliness, for human association, led to wonders of organisational engineering and complex co-operative systems, but the largest among them have remained instruments of domination and are engaged in potentially destructive mutual competition. As far as our main efforts have been successful, they have also led into impasses where the very survival of the species is now at stake.(11)

Although there was no apparent consensus on either the cause or extent of the crisis facing humanity, individuals,(12) groups,(13) and even nations(14) believed it was feasible to build 'welfare' states unmarred by conflicts such as gender, class and race, and beyond ideological or political differences. The post war economic boom had made it possible for Western States to develop a concern with distribution as well as production, and with social wellbeing as well as material progress. Thus policy makers sought to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and its impact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined ends. 'It was a process in which Governments were actively engaged on a highly conscious basis.'(15)

The international manifestations of this consciousness were apparent in a United Nation's document which listed twenty-nine countries with publications which concentrated specifically on major areas of "social" concern.(16) The content of these publications varied from the simple presentation of statistical series, graphs and charts, with some disaggregation by population groups, to others which included explanatory comment. These publications were confined in the main to
national and subnational contexts, but international agencies too
initiated programmes aimed at developing sets of statistics which might
measure economic and social trends. Although these projects adopted
different priorities and varying approaches, as suggested by the use of
such terms as "social accounts", "net national welfare measurement",
and "systems of social and demographic statistics", they were all part
of what is now referred to as "the social indicators movement."(17)

In the nineteen sixties, 'disciples' of this 'movement' sought to
appraise the state of nations so that they might assess where they
stood and where they were going with respect to values and goals.(18)
To practitioners like Galtung, social indicators would eventually be
capable of reflecting the human condition in a social setting(19) but
to others (notably Stone), they were simply a means of identifying
areas of social concern for the purposes of 'understanding and
action.'(20) The optimism of factions within the "movement", and the
self confidence of its adherents knew no bounds, as evidenced from
Hauser's declaration in 1969:

It is my judgement that had this nation possessed a
Council of Social Advisors since 1947, along with
the Council of Economic Advisors, and had the
recommendations by such a Council been heeded by
the Administration, and the Congress, the "urban
crisis" which sorely affects us would not have
reached its present acute state.(21)

Bernstein dismissed this statement as "dangerous arrogance"(22) and
Zapf described the "movement" as curious, non-ideological and with no
popular base. In a content analysis of nine alternative approaches to
social reporting Zapf revealed serious shortcomings.(23) In his view
social reports could not be defended against the reproach of showing an establishment perspective. He found crucial questions relating to economic and political structures, interest group manoeuvrings, elite recruitment, economic concentrations and monopolisation, armaments, ghetto riots, and social conflicts in general had been omitted.

In a similar critique Nathan Caplan focused on the credibility of social scientists. He drew attention to the widespread and often desultory collection of data compiled with implicit hope that somehow, from this pragmatic effort there would evolve some notions about what constitutes the "good life" and how "responsible" Government might help to achieve it:

> In short, the idea of social indicators and all of the activity currently associated with it is desirable and will probably result in a considerable amount of useful information. But it really cannot be considered to be an efficient activity simply because it started as and continues to be an activity where the "facts" are expected to provide answers to larger, essentially non empirical issues.(24)

What began as essentially an academic crusade, became muted and routinised in the reporting procedures of State agencies. Some of the "movements" most ambitious projects and some of its major concerns were incorporated into the mainstream of academic social science on the one hand and into the machinery of bureaucracies on the other.(25) The initial optimism, self confidence and rhetoric gave way to the development of organised groups, or systems of social indicators.
Social Indicator Systems

In order to address the first proposition outlined in Chapter One, it is essential that we examine the major social indicator systems which were established in the nineteen sixties and seventies in response to the crisis of international capitalism. It is not the nature of the crisis which is of empirical concern, but rather the way in which social practitioners chose to respond. Thus our examination centres on the activities of social practitioners and it asks whose interests did they ultimately serve? In establishing social indicator systems during the nineteen sixties did social practitioners align themselves with any particular scientific tradition, and if so, how was knowledge perceived, how was it utilised, and for what ends?

To address these questions within international capitalism necessitates a retrospective analysis of the three main approaches which have been adopted in the construction of social indicator systems. (26) These approaches are as follows:

1. Programmatically developed indicator systems which are organised by means of the arbitrary breakdowns provided by the institutional arrangements of society;

2. Indicator systems structured by identifying goals, sub goals or objectives, and then establishing indicators of those objectives;

3. Indicator systems utilising the life cycle of an individual, inter-actions with institutions during this life cycle and
achievements in terms of societal norms and self-actualisation.

In reviewing these systems we are particularly interested in the theoretical constructs which informed practice, because the proposition being examined is, that these practitioners engaged in a mode of practice which reinforced the ideological reproduction of the capitalist formation and in the active repression of alternatives. We turn first to programmatic systems.

1. Programmatic Development

The impetus for programmatic systems of social indicators has come primarily from nation States in the form of social trend documents and social reports. The indicator sets are divided according to the institutional arrangements of society; hence education, housing, health, employment, income, welfare, law and transport, tend to be the major programmes for which data is sought. These indicators are assembled from existing statistical series collected through official sources with the addition of primary data as the system is extended and refined.

The Social Economic Accounts System (SEAS) developed within the North American context by Fitzsimmons and Lavey is an example of a community based programmatic system.(27) The authors have identified fifteen programme areas or sectors and within these categories they have selected 477 indicators. The indicators within each programme area are organised into "state" variables (i.e. data describing people's lives
at one point in time), "systems" variables (i.e. data describing the operations of institutions which affect peoples lives), and "relevant condition" variables (i.e. data describing external variables which effect the state and system characteristics).

Attitudinal variables, obtained by surveys of residents, are contained within the state and system variables. In the Employment and Income sphere(28), by way of example, a "state" variable is the "percentage of employed population 16 years and over by occupational category in school district in 1970" - a "sector" variable is the "number of full time equivalent employment counsellors and job placement officers in school district in 1970" - and (within the "state" sector) an "attitudinal" variable is "personal satisfaction with the services or benefits residents receive from employment and income":

The S:E.A.S. system is said by its authors to meet five major concerns:

1. it provides a community wide coverage enabling the analysis of dynamic interactions among the various sectors of the community, both with one another and with the outside world;

2. it is sensitive to the presence, magnitude and forces of change;

3. it is able to detect particular social needs and distinguishing characteristics of a site;

4. it can be applied in time series to record and analyse patterns of
5. it facilitates comparison with other communities.

The S.E.A.S. system is described as "comprehensive" in that it is an organised, structural scheme of categories covering the many diverse aspects of community life. In conceptual terms it is closely related to the community studies tradition within sociology. The basic concept of the S.E.A.S. model is that the community is composed of identifiable subsystems which are appropriate units for the analysis of community status and dynamics. These subsystems must be reasonably exhaustive of activities and functions of community life, while at the same time they must also be conceptually distinct, if not mutually exclusive, in order to avoid redundancy. The overriding emphasis is on a system designed,

... to enable social scientists, program developers, and public policy officials, to better understand the effects of various types of public investments upon the quality of life of individuals, the relative social position of groups of people, and the social wellbeing of the community.(29)

As a statement of intent there is clearly some disjunction between the authors' aspirations and the S.E.A.S. system in operation. Despite the emphasis on "quality of life", the S.E.A.S. system does not convey an explicit notion of what should constitute "welfare" or social "wellbeing". The absence of both an integrated theory of human behaviour and a causal model of change means that indicators are organised programatically, and whilst they may be "relevant to resource
allocation questions", (30) one must assume that the authors are operating within a given social and political system. More recently, attempts have been made to integrate this indicator system into a causal model. The authors present a paradigm (31) which conceptualises community as:

.. persons living in a defined locality over a period of time, functioning as individuals, in families, and in groups, as consumers and producers of resources, goods and services, to satisfy various life needs existing in a context of generally shared values, beliefs, customs, laws and culture, through a variety of organised economic, social and institutional settings, with methods for sanctioning behaviours and adjudicating conflicts, all of which, in turn, is subject to various economic, cultural, political and social influences from the outside world, thereby constituting a social system. (32)

Based on this formal definition, and on what the researchers describe as a "thorough review" of community studies and public policy literature, Fitzsimmons and Lavey operationalise their concept of community by selecting fifteen programmatic indicator categories (33), five concept categories (34), and eight potential research objectives. (35) They then derive a series of investment evaluation questions from the concept categories and research objectives, and they operationalise the relationship between investment programmes and the community by distinguishing between "three generic perspectives". The first defines community as an independent variable, which means that "community factors" are examined to determine if they account for significant differences in the character and outcome of the investment programme. In the second instance the community is defined as a dependent variable to determine if investment projects account for
significant differences in the character of the community. Thirdly, the community may be defined as a mediating variable. In this case investment programmes may produce changes, while at the same time community changes are occurring (or fail to occur), and these two phenomena interact to influence the impact of the programme.

By their own admission Fitzsimmons and Lavey have followed "experimental convention", and that appears to include the retrospective provision of a theoretical rationale for the collection of data and the advancement of empirical generalisations. Based on the work of Polyani and Homans, Fitzsimmons and Lavey have stressed the importance of formulating general propositions and enumerating logical steps leading to empirical verification. In this approach, successive approximations are said to progressively produce increasingly more precise statements about investment policy, which the researchers describe as "a major need of both domestic and international agencies making investments in the ... public good."(36) However, they do not define what constitutes the "public good", and whilst the S.E.A.S. system is primarily concerned with investment policies, the programme ignores the role of the State.

2. Development by Social Goal Area

The social goals approach to an organised system of social indicators is similar in some respects to the programmatic system. Following the identification of social goals and then refinement of subgoals or objectives, indicators are established in categories which broadly
correspond to those formulated under the programmatic system. The major distinction between these two systems lies in the stated intention of the social goals approach to relate any indicator back to some objective specified by members of society or their political representatives. In Carley's(37) view this facilitates the construction of a causal model and ensures that the goals/objectives are exposed for public examination. As any critical examination of the goal to indicator approach will show, Carley's views are somewhat romantic. Indeed this approach inevitably leads to the rejection of statistics which are politically contentious.(38)

The social indicator programme promoted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) exemplifies the social goals approach.(39) By means of a deductive process which starts out with a list of social concerns(40) as specified by State officials representing the member nations of O.E.C.D., it has been possible to standardise definitions of the social goal areas for which systematic data is then supplied by member governments. The exclusive derivation of indicators from existing statistics was rejected because of deficiencies in established data banks.

The social concerns which form the framework of the O.E.C.D. system have been related to human aspirations and wellbeing; that is, to individuals and the differences between them, rather than to structural or institutional conditions.(41) The O.E.C.D. secretariat, commissioned experts and "government officers" seem to have made this distinction for two reasons. First, because of the difficulties inherent in establishing a causal relationship between changes in
structures and institutions and changes in the level of individual wellbeing. And secondly, the pragmatic "political" decision that the needs of the twenty-four member governments might best be served by establishing "consensus" on a framework for social indicators, leaving the task of evaluation to respective governments. (42)

Once "a set of social concerns of fundamental and direct importance to human wellbeing" have been established, goal areas are delineated, and these in turn are divided into subconcerns so that valid indicators might be selected as a means of monitoring levels of wellbeing. (43) By establishing a scheme that allows for comparison over time (diachronic) and comparison with other countries (synchronous) the O.E.C.D. aims to:

1. provide guidelines for the development of measures to fill the gaps in existing knowledge about socio-economic conditions;

2. link various measures so as to provide a picture not only of the relevant phenomena, but also of the relationship between them; and

3. reduce information overload through concentration on relevant indicators and supporting data. (44)

According to the O.E.C.D., these aims are common to all indicator systems (45) and to all reports derived from such systems. The O.E.C.D. programme goes further however, because it is concerned not only with the acquisition of information but also with its application. The overriding objective endorsed by member nations of the O.E.C.D. is that:
...increased attention...be given to the qualitative aspects of growth and to the formulation of policies with respect to the broad economic and social choices involved in the allocation of growing resources.(46)

As Zapf has suggested, this policy represents a commitment to qualitative growth employing whatever means O.E.C.D. member countries deem legitimate for the purpose.(47) The scheme is said to be "sufficiently elastic to accommodate different views about desired structures and change".(48) Nevertheless, the purpose of this programme is clearly for the information of governments concentrating on those aspects of life in which authorities are able and likely to intervene. The list of social concerns amount to a catalogue of difficulties confronting capitalist States, and what is being measured therefore is not people's satisfaction with their living standards, but how far, within certain specified boundaries, the conditions for satisfaction exist. The judgement as to what constitutes social wellbeing is made by State representatives, and the values underlying the specification of social concerns are those of the statistical suppliers and not the service recipients. The unit of study is the individual and the approach psychological. No attempt has been made to aggregate indicators by assigning relative weights to different elements of wellbeing, and it does not address institutional and structural change. It is not surprising therefore that the O.E.C.D. programme had some difficulty accommodating concerns such as accessibility and social opportunity, when it is recognised that the social concerns were not formulated on the basis of particular theories or surveys of need, but on political criteria by the judgements of State officials.
3. Development by Life Cycle

The System of Social and Demographic Statistics (S.S.D.S.)(49) developed by the United Nations exemplifies the life cycle approach to the establishment of social indicators. It is defined as a:

... statistical system (containing) an aggregation or assemblage of objectives united by some form of regular interactions or independence ... the essence lies in the idea of connectedness.(50)

To effect these linkages, the S.S.D.S. practitioners have developed a stocks-and-flows matrix of individuals or groups of individuals, where a "stock" is the state of an individual/group at one point in time, and a "flow" is perceived as changes in these states. In practice this matrix selects the population at the beginning of the year in categories of pre-school, education, employment/unemployment, and then examines the subsequent flow from births, deaths, migration and movements between categories. Similarly, it can select the learning-earning transition flows of specified population cohorts over longer periods from basic and higher education to employment and income experience.

The system includes information on demographic structure, learning, earning, income distribution, consumption, health, social security, housing, public order, use of time and social mobility. This information is arranged under four broad categories designated as
economic, socio-demographic, distribution and time-budget, and these in turn lead to a number of subsystems such as health and delinquency. The fact that the demographic accounts can be linked with items comprising Government expenditure in the form of an input-output model means that social processes and policy can be converted into indices of per capita expenditure. Thus the S.S.D.S. is an attempt to express the socio-economic state of a given population as a set of demographic accounts. (51)

The long term objective of S.S.D.S. is to develop a comprehensive social statistics accounting system for world wide use. In pursuit of this objective the United Nations has encouraged a universal standardised form of data collection, classification and display, as a means of assisting in policy formulation at the international and national levels. (52) Such a system clearly requires a sophisticated statistical organisation, including a system of identification files for cohort analysis that would be far more complex than conventional census or sample enumerations. In practice, this lack of data has severely restricted the construction of such a comprehensive system.

Criticism of the S.S.D.S. system has focussed on the limitations of the quantitative assumptions (53) - namely, that social factors can be expressed in a calculus that corresponds to the monetary units of the system of National Accounts, and that social change moves along constant vectors. Whilst Land admits that the technical and data problems for such macrodynamic transformation models will hold back their application, especially in developing countries, he maintains that the important function of social indicator systems is their
ability to demonstrate structural inter-dependencies and second-order social change. Such a system is considered fundamental for the policy-maker if he/she is to understand changes in social conditions as a pre-requisite to the formulation of social policy. (54)

The S.S.D.S. systems aims to provide a development profile for each country, demonstrating change over time, and allowing for an "objective", comparative analysis between countries on the basis of "social wellbeing". However, a general increase in the quality of life or wellbeing as signaled by various indicators tells us little about how that increase has been spread over society as a whole. Even where a given increase in material wellbeing ostensibly benefits the poor, this may not necessarily lessen the existing distributive inequality. Similarly, where an improvement in the quality of life appears to have been all pervasive - such as an increase in literacy or a drop in the incidence of contagious diseases - how do we identify who benefits most from these "improvements"? These same comments can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to two countries with different income levels that experience comparable increases in well being.

As a criticism of international indicator systems it is similar to that which is levelled at any composite index, namely, such an index carries inherent contradictions which are masked by elaborate methodologies. (55) If components of such an index are highly correlated then any one of the indicators would serve as an adequate index, but if the components move in different directions then averaging only conceals significant points of conflict.
The Theoretical Basis of Social Indicators

As a general rule, systems of social indicators do not consciously derive their characteristics from theoretical constructs, even though they are of course theoretically inspired. Within the Western world a small number of explicit theoretical systems have subsequently been developed, by relating sequences of social events with data, and by quantifying relationships between theoretically specified variables. One of the most comprehensive systems in this respect is the Total Income Model advanced by Karl Fox.(56)

This system is based on an integration of Talcott Parson’s(57) concept of generalised media of social interchange, and Roger Barker’s(58) concept of behaviour settings. It draws on, and attempts to accommodate, tested concepts/models from all social sciences and from neighbouring fields such as psychiatry and social philosophy. Parsons, in his theory of social interchange, provides a series of "things" which change hands between individuals, such as influence, money, power, value commitments, ideology and reputation, and Barker puts forward an elaborate classification system for identifying, describing and measuring the environments in which human behaviour takes place. Fox integrates these two conceptual frameworks into a total income model which postulates that an individual’s time can be organised as occurring in behaviour settings, and that a person will allocate his/her time, possible roles, and media among behaviour settings to maximise total utility. All such allocations and rewards are converted into monetary values by way of determining opportunity costs of non-participation in behaviour settings. Fox translates this into the
form of a mathematical programming model which incorporates methodology for converting media of interchange into monetary units. He maintains that total income is a more reliable measure of quality of life than economic income, and postulates that an aggregation of total incomes could measure changes in life quality for families, communities, cities, regions and nations. The Total Income Model is said to provide a boundary within which the relationships of various social indicators or subsystems might be tested. Although the model has yet to be operationalised (59), its proponents believe that it might provide a means for choosing between alternative socio-economic programmes.

Apart from the methodological problems involved (60), theoretically based systems of indicators, such as that advanced by Fox, have been subjected to criticism by middle range theorists who maintain that such a comprehensive attempt at social theory is premature. As a consequence, social scientists have been encouraged to work on establishing causal links between individual indicators and social phenomena. (61) Carley is in this tradition when he suggests that whilst complex social models of the scale of macro-economic models may have some value, "progress will mainly be made by concentration ... on explanatory models which are at a low level of generalisation and thus close enough to reality to allow empirical testing to take place". (62) The work of Land in the sphere of health is illustrated as the type of social indicator research which moves away from simple description to explanatory models useful for social prediction.

In proposing this alternative approach to the development of social indicators, middle range theorists have ignored an even more
fundamental criticism which might have been levelled at the Total Income Model — namely, the way in which non-economic activities are reduced and converted into monetary units. This transformation is guided by a Utilitarian approach which assumes that the budgeting of time and money are convertible. (63) It can be argued that whilst money and time are sometimes interchangeable, they are not universally so, and thus a major criticism centres on the underlying assumptions of the model itself. Questions relating to belief and value are treated as technical problems requiring a mathematical modelling response which is deemed to be value-free. Science and knowledge are perceived as being synonymous, and thus a sophisticated methodology is advocated as the "emancipatory mechanism", differentiating between the superstition of the past and providing a rational basis for policy and planning.

Whilst the Total Income Model does provide a rigorous framework for establishing causal links between individual indicators and social phenomena (and in that sense it is technically proficient), it ultimately shares the same uncritical and therefore atheoretical assumptions of the prevailing ideology, and thus it falls (as do the middle range theorists), within the mainstream tradition. (64)

This tradition is shaped by the fundamental belief that increased, systematic, empirical understanding of how society and politics work, will naturally lead to the intelligent formulation of policies, the amelioration of social inequities and injustices, and ultimately enable us to solve the multifarious problems of society. It is based on a form of social science which attempts to emulate, modify and adapt techniques that have proven successful in our scientific understanding
of nature. At the core of this naturalistic understanding of social and political life is the demand for empirical, explanatory theories of human behaviour. (65) Yet when we examine the empirical theories that have been advanced, we discover that they are neither neutral nor value-free. Instead they reflect deep ideological biases and they secrete controversial value positions. It is a fiction to think that we can neatly distinguish the descriptive from the evaluative components of these theories, especially since tacit evaluations are built into their very frameworks. This applies, whether we are referring to theoretically explicit systems such as the Total Income Model advanced by Fox, or to systems of indicators where the "facts" are expected to provide answers to larger, essentially non empirical questions. It is this form of science which appears to have influenced the international development of social indicators.

Structuralism versus Voluntarism

To understand how a particular form of science (namely empiricism) came to dominate the construction and use of social indicators, we need to examine two alternative interpretations of social practice. The first is prompted by a predominantly structuralist position which emphasises determination and ideology, whilst the second emanates from a voluntaristic approach which stresses agency and experience.

The structural limitations of social indicator systems can be related in the first instance to the social formation of advanced capitalism which emerged most graphically in the aftermath of World War II. It
was this particular formation which directly involved 'the State' in the dual process of accumulation and legitimation. Not only did capitalist States develop coherent programmes which ultimately advanced the long term interests of capital, but they simultaneously promoted a 'welfare' ideology. This ideology was evident in both the national and international arenas. Despite considerable evidence of structural inequality between and within nations, the economic and social crises of class divided societies were reinterpreted by 'benign' administrations as shortcomings of democratic decision-making. The social indicators movement was a central element in this reinterpretation as it gave 'social problems' an entirely new quality. As a consequence, the locus of conflict shifted from the realm of private production to the realm of the State itself.

The O.E.C.D. programme exemplified this approach.(66) Its boundaries were established, first by Ministers of representative States when they declared that economic growth was the instrument by which nations might promote economic and social wellbeing. This initiative was then followed by technicians of representative States, when they identified a "set of social concerns" common to the twenty four member nations. These social concerns focussed the attention of social scientists on improving the instruments of production and distribution, for by implication the problems facing the world economy were not structural problems, but technical impediments to a finely tuned system. The judgement as to what constituted social wellbeing was made by State representatives, who identified the agents of production as individual "subjects" without a class or group based membership. These "subjects" of the State were not involved in establishing the political boundaries
of wellbeing — nor were they involved in identifying areas of social concern. These judgements were made by representative States as personified in political representatives and technicians. It was the political realm which set the structural limitations upon the type of "knowledge" required, and the use to which this "knowledge" should be put. And it was the rational, logical, administrative systems of these States which set out to produce this knowledge in its requisite form.

In the production of "knowledge" the notion of social welfare and social wellbeing was closely linked with rationality. It was argued that new technology was capable of creating unlimited economic growth, but to ensure that the conditions for the generation of such growth existed, and any side effects were ameliorated, States needed information so that they could make rational decisions in the public interest. This information was required in two forms:

1. information which facilitated control over the natural or material world; and

2. social scientific information which was capable of identifying areas of social concern for the purposes of understanding and action.

In pursuit of this information questions which might have been regarded as political matters in previous historical conjunctures were redefined as technical issues requiring objective scientific analysis and resolution. As Habermas(67) has argued, we can equate this form of science with the empirical-analytic tradition in that it takes the
social formation as given, and thus within the context of the
capitalist State, this means that science acts as the legitimating
instrument of State practices.

The strength of a structuralist interpretation of social indicators
lies in the way that it argues against the economistic tendencies of a
Marxist-Leninist analysis. It replaces any simple reductionist
argument over the relationship between consciousness and "base" with a
Poulantzian interpretation of the autonomous State as the site of class
conflict. Its major deficiency centres around a tendency to abstract
social relations beyond human activity. This ultimately negates human
conflict and leads to a functionalist interpretation of the production
of meaning in the social formation.

A voluntaristic interpretation of social indicators derives from the
experiential world of practice. In this study, based as it is upon the
work of Habermas, we are primarily concerned with three modes of action
-namely strategic action which is based on a purposive rational
activity oriented toward success - communicative action based on
understanding - and critical practice which has a cognitive interest in
emancipation. If we classify these forms of practice according to the
literature on social indicators, then practitioners within the
international movement seem to have been preoccupied with technique.

Issues such as aggregation, weighting and correlation, dominate the
international literature, and associated with these preoccupations is
the implication that these matters do not involve value judgements.
Even at the mechanistic level of indicator construction however,
concepts such as correlation involve the interpretation of causal relationships, whilst weighting requires judgements as to the relative significance of variables. Aggregation is also problematic as studies of income distribution and poverty testify. On an epistemological plane this form of practice is evident in declarations of neutrality, objectivity, and the production of "facts". Even Zapf in a moment of uncharacteristic "subjectivity" declared:

Good indicators are not only informative, they might even be "beautiful". (68)

The significance of these declarations is the way in which they align practice with a clearly identifiable theoretical tradition. In political terms this orientation can be described as "liberal incrementalism" or the "emerging politics of relevance". Etzioni's "active society" (69) provides the epistemological rationale for this relevancy by specifying the preconditions for "consensus". These preconditions are the satisfaction of basic human needs such as affection, recognition, gratification and stability, and consensus formation through effective decision-making and the availability of knowledge. Effective decision-making addresses questions such as "participation", while the provision of knowledge involves gathering, processing and implementing information. Knowledge is thereby equated with information and scientific practice with the empirical analytic tradition.

The allegiance of social scientists to the empirical tradition is evidenced in the rational, apolitical approach to indicator
construction typified by the O.E.C.D., and in the apparent commitment of these practitioners to the ostensible separation of values from facts. It is an allegiance which is evident too, in the United Nations System of Social and Demographic Statistics(70), in the programme initiated by the World Bank(71), and in a German equivalent to the British Social Trends publication which was produced in 1971. The "Materialen zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation"(72) compared "areas of living" in the German Federal and Democratic Republics, and in this comparison it focussed exclusively on quantitative description. Despite the fact that this comparative measurement of "living" was being conducted between two diverse sovereign States, it was considered a "feasible" undertaking because apart from "all the political and ideological differences", both States were conceived as being "achievement-, growth-, and technology-oriented".(73) Empiricism it seems is untainted by politics or ideology!

If we move from these modes of practice to examine the social theories which informed the social indicators movement, then there appears to be a strong emphasis on functionalist interpretations. International (O.E.C.D. programme/United Nations S.S.D.S.) national (Social Trend Documents) and theoretically explicit systems, (Total Income Model), accept the structural limitations imposed by the economic mode of production and as a consequence they align themselves with political pluralism, and with the generation of data which might ensure the maintenance and continuity of capitalist social relationships. These functionalist underpinnings both inform and socially legitimate practice.
Bertram Gross (74), one of the most significant writers on social indicators within the United States, exemplifies this functionalist approach. Gross conceives the task of "societal guidance" using accounting systems as a way of effecting compromises between conflicting political practices. To operationalise this process of compromisation he builds a Structure-Performance-Model of society analogous to a system of national economic accounts. Structure and performance are regarded as aspects of a process which might be translated into the balance sheet language of businessmen. Thus performance analysis parallels profit-and-loss accounting - structure analysis parallels balance accounts - and capital changes or structure changes influence performance (profit and loss). In analysing the structural dimension of action-guiding values, Gross uses the notion of "pattern variables" as defined by Talcott Parsons.

Similarly Sheldon and Moore (75) promote a form of indicator construction which is guided by a structural functional interpretation of North American society of the nineteen sixties.

We have proposed four major rubrics for examining structural changes in American society and its constituent features: 1) the demographic base, giving an indication of aggregative population trends, its changing composition and distribution across the nation's surface; 2) major structural components of the society, examining the functionally distinct ways in which a society produces goods, organises its knowledge and technology, reproduces itself, and maintains order; 3) distributive features of the society, looking at how the products of the society - people, goods, services, knowledge, values, and order - are allocated across the several sectors of the American population; 4) aggregative features of the society, suggesting how the system as a whole
changes with respect to its inequalities and variable opportunities and in terms of its social welfare.(76)

Even those impassioned critics of social accounting systems, such as Duncan and Olson, associate themselves with middle range theories, and thus with the functionalist tradition. Duncan(77) suggests that the systems approach to social indicators should be replaced by a problem solving model. And Olson takes an intermediate position, combining the "better logic and policy-orientation of the problem solving approach, with the broader perspective and sensitivity to softer variables of structural-functional analysis."(78)

This functionalist emphasis is also evident within the S.E.A.S. system developed by Fitzsimmons and Lavey. Their "integrative" model of community is based on the research of Lynd and Lynd, Warren, Sanders, and Clark.(79) The community is perceived as a social system composed of identifiable components or subsystems. By studying the forces of interaction and change between these subsystems, researchers, theoreticians, evaluators, and public policymakers are provided with a common analytic framework, so that they might analyse "communities and investments designed to improve them."(80) While the S.E.A.S. system is based on the notion of locale, both the United Nations and the World Bank have expanded this functional approach to community wellbeing, by measuring the direct and indirect effects of investment programmes sponsored by their respective organisations in the international arena. The overriding concern in all cases has been to ensure the effective functioning and maintenance of the established system whether conceived as a local or global community, while the methodological and practical
emphasis on cost-benefit analysis provides the mechanism by which States might improve their policymaking. Thus the functionalist frameworks which have informed these practices and conditioned the outcome or results of such programmes are clearly identified. By contrast, the significance of specific actors in the construction of social indicators is unknown. One example from within the North American context will serve as an illustration.

The National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress(81) which was established in 1964, was charged with assessing the pace and impact of technological change on production, employment, and community needs. When it reported in 1966, this Commission recommended that the United States Government should establish a system of social accounts, which would facilitate a cost benefit analysis of human resources. The Commission was established by the North American State, and thus in structuralist terms it seems logical to conclude that this instrument of the State would endorse an approach to social indicators which would be consistent with the long term interests of capitalism.

An alternative interpretation based on voluntarism, would highlight the significance of Commission members and the theories and ideologies which informed practice. In the case of this national Commission one of its members was Daniel Bell. It was Bell who apparently lobbied for a system of social accounts(82), and thus his practice as a member of this Commission was consistent with his theoretical declaration of the "post-industrial society". What is not known is the degree of voluntarism or determinism involved in this interaction between agency
and structure. Yet it is a relationship which is fundamentally significant in any analysis of, or prescription for, social action. For that reason it remains as one of the contradictions to be held in tension throughout this study.

Theories of the State

The functionalist preoccupation of social indicator systems as identified in the international movement, not only conditioned practice - it also provided legitimation for a particular form of social science which was manifested as empiricism. This legitimating role of science was intimately connected with functionalist interpretations of the State. Whereas Marxist analyses concentrate on the way in which the capitalist State sustains and reproduces a system of inequality, functionalist interpretations focus on the administrative machinery of government, and the way in which it serves the "national interest".

Marxist epistemology:

In analysing the capitalist State, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories confront three inter-related problematics. These problematics are, the persistence of political inequality, the structural limitations imposed by the economic mode of production, and the origin and power of ideology. Whereas political and economic inequalities reflect class differences in the State, the ideological apparatus is perceived as the means by which these inequalities are legitimated and masked from the 'popular masses'. All three emanate from the same fundamental relationship between the class struggle and the State, and all
eventually manifest themselves in State policy and practice.

The problematic of political inequality concentrates primarily on the relationship between social classes and the structuring of power through the State. For those within the Marxist tradition the central question has always been, who controls the State. Yet the precise relationship between each class and the State, and the degree of autonomy exercised by the State structure, are obvious points of contention.

Instrumental interpretations can be found in the writings of Marx,(83) Lenin,(84) and Miliband.(85) In Marxian terms the State is portrayed as the 'instrument of the ruling class', maintaining inequality by furthering the interests of the bourgeoisie, whilst at the same time perpetuating the 'social slavery' of the masses. Similarly, Lenin saw the capitalist State as a bourgeois apparatus within which parliament performed an ideological role, leading the common people to believe their interests were being represented, when in fact the structure of political inequality remained intact. Both interpretations identify inequality with the capitalist mode of production, and both illustrate how this unequal relationship is maintained and managed by the State apparatus. They differ, however, when they come to consider the question of transformation. Whereas Marx believed that the State contained the 'seeds of its own destruction', Lenin held out little hope for political emancipation. He argued that the State apparatus would structurally limit any significant change for the oppressed, and thus the proletarian cause could only be advanced by smashing the State.
Ralph Miliband, a contemporary Marxist in the instrumentalist tradition, portrays the State as the apparatus by which the capitalist mode of production is sustained, reproduced, and expanded by the bourgeoisie. Combining the work of C. Wright Mills with the Marxist tradition, Miliband argues that the dominant class has been able to sustain elite groups within the State structure as a means of furthering their class interests. The power of these elite groups lies in the strategic positions that they hold within the State apparatus, and in the way that they are able to utilise these positions in the service of the bourgeoisie. However, in Miliband's terminology the State performs its highest service for an exploiting class when it acts on behalf of that class rather than at its behest. (86) In this respect he appears to support the concept of relative autonomy systematically advanced by Poulantzas. (87) It is this work, based substantially on the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which has become significant for those within the Marxist tradition wanting to address the question of, who controls the State?

Poulantzas identifies three distinctive systems within the State. The juridico-political realm, the economic substructure, and the ideological realm of legitimation. In the classical Marxist tradition he argues that it is the economic mode of production which ultimately determines the other realms. Thus contemporary State structures operate as mechanisms of the bourgeoisie in supporting, maintaining, and reproducing private production. This is executed by State intervention into key sectors of the economy, and it results in the social costs of capital being born collectively whereas surplus profits are privately appropriated.
The major significance in Poulantzas' work lies in the way that he has recast the general relationship between the State and the economy within capitalism, thus accommodating the emergence of the Welfare State. (88) In Poulantzian terms, the State cannot be viewed as the instrument of the economically dominant class, but rather, as the condensation of classes, and the arena for modern class conflict. State activity cannot be conceived simply as the expressed interests of the capitalist class. Instead, one must distinguish between the long term interests of capitalism and the more immediate interests of the capitalist class, and/or class fractions. As reformulated by Poulantzas, the State maintains a relative autonomy from both the economic substructure and the capitalist classes. It is characterised therefore as the popular class State, resting its legitimacy upon the 'democratic' representation of a free and equal citizenry. By means of parliamentary representation, universal suffrage, and welfare interventions, the capitalist State is perceived as representing the public interest (89) and the common good, and this allows it in the long term to maintain the structural unity of capitalism.

Poulantzas draws on Gramsci's notion of hegemony (90) to demonstrate how advanced capitalism unifies the dominant class fractions into a coherent power block and simultaneously secures the active consent of the dominated classes. In this analysis the State is not defined by reference to specific institutions, but rather by its unifying and cohesive role in a class divided society. The locus of conflict is therefore shifted from the realm of private production and private exploitation, to the realm of the State itself, because the State reflects and condenses all contradictions within a class divided social
formation. As a consequence, political practices are always class practices, and State power corresponds with the interests of a particular class.\(^{(91)}\)

Poulantzas identifies the juridico-political, economic, and ideological spheres of State activity, as regions through which hegemonic control is exercised. These regional differences are reinforced by what he refers to as the 'isolation effect'\(^{(92)}\) which emanates from specific juridico-political and ideological practices mediated through the State. The juridico-political realm identifies the agents of production as individual subjects without a class based membership, and this effectively results in 'isolation'. In other words, economic agents experience capitalist relations as competition among mutually isolated individuals, and class relations as a consequence are atomised. This is replicated in the political realm in that the law and juridico-political ideology duplicates the fracturing of the private sphere, and political classes as a result are thereby reduced to mutually isolated individual citizens. This tendency toward reductionism in the private sphere is simultaneously coupled with a rational-legal administration of the State in the form of bureaucracy.\(^{(93)}\) Thus the internal functioning and organisation of the State, exemplifying universal and codified rational norms, presents itself as a neutral institution, representing the general interests of individual citizens. In this way the State disorganises elements of the working class by a process of 'isolation', and at the same time it organises and unifies class fractions in order to maintain cohesion. This dual political task results in an 'unstable equilibrium of compromise'.\(^{(94)}\)
According to Poulantzas, the mediation of contradictions within the political realm is dependent upon the formal institutional structure of the State\(^{95}\) and on specific political practices.\(^{96}\) These practices involve dominant classes and class fractions, political representatives, organic intellectuals, and managers of the State apparatus whose function is the neutral and impartial representation of the public interest. As this concept of neutrality is central to the present study of social practice, the Marxian distinction between a class-for-itself and in-itself is particularly significant. Poulantzas re-works this Marxian distinction and concludes that the notion of a class can only be used when a given social group has developed distinct political, ideological, and economic interests, separate from those of other classes. In the case of State managers therefore, it is more appropriate to classify them as members of a class fraction (class-in-itself), rather than as a class-for-itself.

In relating the notion of hegemony to the institutional structure of the State, Poulantzas argues that a particular form of State will impose limits on the composition of the power bloc, and on the nature of class-State relations. And conversely, changes in either of these realms will necessitate a re-organisation of the State structure. Whilst it is feasible to suggest a certain form of State is capable of securing political domination, different fractions of capital are able to influence the course of capitalism in certain social formations. The notion of hegemony therefore, can be exercised by fractions of capital either within or without the sovereign State.\(^{97}\)

Class alliances are also considered significant in securing hegemony
through the capitalist State. This relates back to political practices (as discussed above), and ideological domination. In Poulantzian terms however, ideological domination is not the exclusive preserve of the dominant class. In a class divided society one can discern ideological elements of both the dominant and the dominated, and this is evident in the structures and practices of the State. The trade union movement and its legitimate pursuit of working class interests is one such example. At the same time, there are certain structural limitations imposed on working class organisations and practices, and these limitations are conditioned by the ideology of the dominant class. This ideology permeates the subordinate classes to such an extent that it even structures the possible range and forms of popular resistance. In this way the dominant fractions within the State are able to manage contradictory situations even where these contradictions appear to be outside their sphere of influence.(98)

A similar argument is advanced by Block.(99) He maintains that insufficient attention has been paid to the ideological role of the State in substantiating the legitimacy of the capitalist social formation. In pursuing this argument he differentiates between the short term and long term interests of capital, demonstrating that whereas capital is generally preoccupied with short term results, the managers of the State are primarily concerned with system maintenance. It is a relationship which is mutually reinforcing, with the State providing the right environment for private investment, whilst business activity and economic growth ensures a satisfactory level of taxation. This mutually dependent relationship between the State and capital interests, ensures the long term security of the capitalist mode of
production. Where working class action threatens system maintenance, the managers of the State will make concessions in a manner that will 'least offend business confidence', but at the same time these concessions will ensure the expansion of State power. In this way the State plays a significant role in balancing class interests, and incorporating the working class into the structure of the State. This incorporation of the working class does not negate Block's assertion of a relatively autonomous State, because ultimately those who run the State apparatus will reject modes of thought and behaviour "that conflict with the logic of capitalism."(100)

A second set of problems confronting neo-Marxist interpretations of the State, relate to the processes of economic production and distribution. One of the most significant contributions in this respect emanates from the new German School of State derivationists. In contrast to the Poulantzian emphasis on relative autonomy these writers have anchored themselves in the classic Marxist concept of surplus value and capital accumulation, and as a consequence, they stress the logical necessity for capitalism of an 'autonomised' State.(101)

The general premise underlying the State-derivationist position is enunciated by Altvater. He distinguishes between 'particular capitals' and 'capital in general'. As a mode of production, capitalism is said to exist only in the form of individual or particular capital interests. This results in an anarchy of production which is incapable of securing the reproduction of capital in general. Thus an institution is required to compliment and modify the role of competition in capitalist production. This institution, the
'autonomised' State, must be 'outside and above bourgeois society', and as such it is charged with securing the social pre-conditions for capitalism. These pre-conditions are identified as the implementation of the general material conditions of production, the creation and enforcement of a bourgeois legal order, the regulation of conflict between capital and wage labour, and the promotion of national capital within a capitalist world market. (102)

The economic functions of the State in the general interests of capitalism are also examined by Muller and Neususs. In a critique of the Welfare State and revisionism in general, (103) Muller and Neususs maintain that State intervention is not just a secondary activity as suggested by the Keynesian notion of demand management, but an essential component in the operation of capitalist production. As individual capitals act in their own immediate self-interest, some outside force is required to advance the interests of capital in general. In advancing capital interests the State must also ensure continuing commodity production, and thus working class organisations and protective laws are necessary otherwise unrestrained capital could destroy its foundations in labour power. The State therefore becomes involved on both sides of capital-labour relations, as a means of resolving 'social problems' confronting capital in general. This suggests a certain independence or neutrality (104) on the part of the State, but as Muller and Neususs argue, there are limits to this autonomy, and these limits are imposed by the requirements of capital accumulation. At a very fundamental level, these requirements mean that commodities must be produced first, before they can be distributed through market or political forces. In other words, the State must
ensure that the conditions exist for capital accumulation, as this is a pre-requisite for re-distribution. This emphasis on the relationship between the State and production has implications for social practice in the political realm. It suggests, in contrast to the revisionist pre-occupation with redistribution, that the working class should confront capital directly at the point of production.

An alternative approach, and one that is distinctive among members of the new German school, is evident in the work of Joachim Hirsch. He argues that class societies require some degree of force to underwrite class exploitation, and it is only the form of this force which varies from one mode of production to another. As the relations of production and exchange are formerly established as free under capitalism, any coercive force must be located in an external apparatus. The State is perceived therefore as an independent, neutral body, capable of exercising coercive power in the interests of capital reproduction. These ends are pursued in three principle ways. First, by providing the appropriate external environment for capitalist accumulation where the market place is unable to guarantee production. Second, by controlling revenue redistribution as a means of reproducing labour and protecting individual capitals. And three, by promoting productive forces through State sponsored research and development programmes.

Hirsch’s account of economic exploitation and political domination emanates from the way in which he fuses a political economy interpretation of capitalism with a sociological account of class domination. He describes how the capitalist State must perform its general economic functions in securing the collective interests of
capital, while it simultaneously resists any penetration of anti-capitalist forces and demands. These functions are executed by a range of coercive, concessive, and ideological strategies, and by formulating policies which unify dominant class fractions. At the same time there are certain structural constraints which shape State policy. These constraints are rooted in the historical development of capitalism, and in the inherent tendency for the rate of profit to fall. It is this falling rate of profit, reflected politically as a fiscal crisis, which threatens the dominant classes, stimulates demands for action, and imposes new priorities on the State. (106)

The class bias of the capitalist State results from the merging of deterministic and voluntaristic tendencies. Whereas the deterministic tendencies emanate from the State's structural selectivity, (107) the voluntaristic elements arise out of what Hirsch describes as 'situational logic'. That is, the predisposition of governing groups to secure capital accumulation and bourgeois political domination as the means of ensuring their own status and power. In furthering their own interests however, these State officials are forced to acknowledge certain working class demands, and it is the merging of these contradictory forces which results in an 'unstable equilibrium of compromise'.

It is a compromise which also arises out of the State's structural constraints. Hirsch refers to this instability in his recent analysis of West Germany (108) where despite extensive constraints, the reformist mode of mass integration has been confronted with industrial and political anarchy. The State has responded by suppressing political
movements operating outside the 'legitimate' State apparatus, and at the same time it has set out to control potential subversives within. This has resulted in a policy of endorsement for responsible unions and parties operating within the legitimate frameworks which have been established, a more active role for security forces, and the disenfranchisement of marginal groups. By utilising the situational logic of governing bodies, and by reordering its structural constraints, the German State has been able to mediate change, and so ensure the maintenance of economic and political inequality.

Whereas Muller and Neususs emphasise the relationship between the State and production, a recent interpretation by O'Connor(109) focuses primarily on distribution. O'Connor argues that the capitalist State must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimation. This means that the State must provide the appropriate social environment by minimising class conflict and by assuring increasing levels of private capital accumulation. Accordingly, there are two mechanisms used by the State in respect of expenditure. These mechanisms are delineated as social capital and social expenses. By social capital O'Connor refers to State expenditure in aid of private capital accumulation. This type of State expenditure is evident in two forms. The first is social investment in projects and services which increase the productivity of a given labour force and as a consequence increase the rate of profit. And the second, is social consumption, which consists of projects and services aimed at lowering the costs of labour reproduction, and which likewise results in an increasing rate of profit. By social expenses O'Connor refers to projects and services which are designed to fulfill
the State's legitimating function in the provision of welfare services and in the maintenance of coercive institutions such as the Police. Although these expenses are incurred in the interests of capital accumulation they are not even indirectly related to production.

The capitalist State is therefore highly interventionist in that it performs a primary role in both accumulation and distribution. Indeed, State intervention is considered a necessary pre-requisite for the expansion of private industry and private capital accumulation. As the State intervenes however, it incurs increasing costs, while any social surplus continues to be privately appropriated. With social expenditure increasing more rapidly than revenue generation, the State's legitimacy is called into question by a range of disparate groups representing both taxpayers and beneficiaries. This disenchantment is accompanied by declining productivity and a consequential deterioration in revenue from which the State might meet its increasing liabilities. The outcome is what O'Connor refers to as the fiscal crisis of the State.

A third problematic confronting neo-Marxist interpretations of the State relates to the role of ideology. By focussing on this realm connections are made between the dialectical interdependence of the forces of production, the steering capacity of capitalist societies, and the development of legitimating interpretive systems. Attention is drawn therefore to the dialectic of coercion and consent, the specificity of political and State crises, and the mediation of ideological practices. In addressing these issues the studies of Gramsci and Habermas have been particularly significant.
The contribution of Gramsci to neo-Marxist studies of the State is usually conveyed by thematic notions such as hegemony, the role of intellectuals, and the relationship between political and civil society. These notions stem from his primary interest in political practice within specific nation States in certain historical conjunctures. In the first instance Gramsci is indebted to Marxian economic theory in that he accepts capitalism as a contradictory and historically limited mode of production based on the exploitation of wage-labour by capital interests. At the same time, he refutes the historicist and positivist trends of the Second International, and he rejects those interpretations of the State which reduce questions of political practice to fundamental economic relations. (110)

Gramsci emphasises the organic relationship between the governmental apparatus and civil society and in this analysis he gives historical primacy to the class struggle over the institutional and 'technical' structures of the State apparatus. In analysing the use of power as the major factor in stability under capitalism, Gramsci identifies two modes of State action. Force, (111) which involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of people into conformity and compliance with the requirements of a specific mode of production. And the process of hegemony (112) which involves the 'active consent' of dominated groups by the intellectual, moral, and political leadership of the ruling class. As Jessop has suggested, this should not be misconstrued as indoctrination or false consciousness, but rather the systematic orchestration of popular demands in the long term interests of capital. (113)
These two modes of control by which one class exerts power over another are institutionalised throughout the social formation. This means that force is made manifest through governmental institutions and civil society. As a consequence, any examination of force must take cognizance of the complex relationship between coercive institutions, their social bases in civil society, and the significance of ideological factors in determining these relationships. Similarly, hegemonic control is mediated through the ideological apparatus of the State, the 'private' organisations of civil society, and the activities of intellectuals, whose function it is to secure class domination. (114)

In examining capitalist systems, Gramsci concludes that those modern States which have been most successful in securing class domination are those that have articulated their control by consent rather than force. It is this hegemonic securing of class domination which has important implications for social practice.

The first implication arises out of the dichotomy between revolutionary and revisionary means of transformation. Whereas the revisionists seek transformation exclusively through the arena of social democratic politics, those committed to revolution retreat into idealist and utopian alternatives. The outcome is evidenced in a political leadership isolated from the masses, and in a utopian call-to-action which is divorced from the social and political realities of everyday life. By contrast, Gramsci implies the need for a revolutionary strategy which disaggregates the social bases of ruling class hegemony and establishes intellectual and moral leadership. (115) The main protagonists in this transformation are the working class who must construct their own organs of political unity and State power. These
organs have two primary aims. The first is to disarticulate the consensual basis of the bourgeois State and paralyse the legal government of the masses. And the second, is to establish links between the working class and the masses as a means of building a socialist society. Thus, the organic relationship between State and civil society is emphasised not only in theory, but also in political practice.

Another implication arising out of Gramsci’s historical analysis of class power, relates to the role of intellectuals. He contrasts two types of intellectualism - traditional and organic. (116) Whereas traditionalists are seen as bearers of culture apparently removed from political practice, organicism refers to those intellectuals intimately related to a particular class and organically involved in class practices. Intellectuals cannot be identified therefore as a class for themselves, but rather as an essential component of political practice. And intellectualism cannot be reduced to a neutral activity removed from social and political life, because ultimately this results in mediation between the dominant ideology of the governing class, and the generation of consent among the masses. The alternative position advocated by Gramsci is an organic intellectual fraction of the working class dispersed throughout the social formation and engaged in counter hegemonic practices.

Functionalist theories of the State:

Functionalist interpretations of the State find their genesis in the western liberal tradition based on the economic theories of Adam Smith(117), and the philosophical writings of John Stuart Mill(118).
The essence of liberalism is identified as individual freedom, both as a human preference and as an ethical value in itself. To develop one’s human potential, individuals must have the capacity to choose, and thus coercion can only be justified as an instrument for resolving conflict. In the interests of both political and economic freedom, liberalism propounds the doctrine of individual rights and ‘limited government’. It is the market place which supposedly differentiates between political and economic power, and ensures innovative forms of production and distribution.

Milton Friedman(119), a modern proponent of liberalism, conceives of individuals as irrational yet responsible beings, interacting in competition with others and ultimately producing results in excess of their individual capacities. The role of the State is therefore limited to the provision of a legal framework, to minor modifications within the market place, and to minimal financial aid for the destitute. State responsibility for social security is deplored within monetarism, as an undermining of individual responsibility and a negation of competitive private enterprise.

During the nineteen sixties this "liberal" tradition found expression in paradigms of representative government.(120) Emphasis centred on differentiating between political parties and individual representatives, as they advanced policies in the public interest, and legislated for the common good. The public interest was initially defined as majority rule, but within classical pluralism this concept was eventually extended by the end of the decade to include minority rights. These rights were supposedly expressed in interest group
manoeuvrings” allowing decision-makers to weight preferences, not just count them.”(121)

Classical pluralism, which provided for increasing State intervention, portrayed the political process as an engagement between competing interest groups holding differential preference intensities. These preferences were always defined as individual rather than class or group based interests, and this effectively removed any tension between individual and social need. By equating individual and social need, and by separating economic and political power, the pluralist tradition(122) was able to advocate governmental neutrality. Civil servants were perceived as "administrators" or "bureaucrats", subject to administrative rather than economic or political control, whilst elected representatives were portrayed as career politicians, untainted by business or other elitist influences. This perceived neutrality of the capitalist State, and its ability to govern for all, was exemplified in welfare legislation and in social policy provisions. These initiatives demonstrated the adjudicating role and consensual nature of the State, as it ensured the integration and maintenance of the societal system.(123)

Within sociology, the integrative role of the State and its theoretical underpinnings can be traced back to the writings of Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim(124) was primarily concerned with moral questions arising out of industrialisation, and thus his basic interest was in demonstrating how social agreement could be reached and social order maintained. He characterised modern industrial societies as complex and structurally differentiated systems, and in contrast to the monetarists he argued
for State intervention to ensure the wellbeing of society.

Weber(125) concentrated on the rational nature of State development, portraying the bureaucracy as a technically superior system to any other form in the administration of large scale industrial societies. Those writing in this tradition argue that the State acts as the administrative arm of a democratic political system. In contrast to the Marxian emphasis on the State’s role in maintaining and reproducing inequality, the Weberian tradition argues that the State plays a positive role in re-allocating resources to those groups and individuals disadvantaged in the market place. In this way the democratically elected polity represents and acts in the public interest.

Whilst there are variants within functionalist interpretations of the State (126), certain fundamental elements are common to all. In general, society is perceived as a functionally integrated organism composed of various subsystems and institutions which are based on consensus. The individual is linked to these institutions and their value systems through a process of socialisation, with the political component of this process responsible for explaining democracy and its modus operandi. Within the functionalist tradition the State performs an integrating and adjudicating role, mediating personal and social needs, and promoting the economic and social wellbeing of the nation.

To promote both economic and social wellbeing, the pluralistic States of the nineteen sixties required two forms of knowledge. The first was knowledge which would assist policy makers generate increased economic
growth as the basis of revenue accumulation. The second was knowledge or information which would provide policy makers with alternative strategies for dealing with or ameliorating the detrimental consequences of economic growth. In both instances the requirement was for technically utilisable knowledge which might be "useful in clarifying policy choices". (127) The production of this knowledge was the responsibility of the social sciences in general and the social indicators movement in particular.

Social scientists concentrated on preparing performance budgets and social accounts, and they attempted to measure social problems and catalogue the difficulties confronting nation States. In this process they acquired considerable technical skills as they codified empirical data for "public" consumption. (128) At the same time they aligned themselves with a particular form of social science which might be described as mainstream orthodoxy. This tradition, which equates with the empirical-analytic sciences as classified by Habermas, accepts the structural limitations imposed by the capitalist mode of production. The world is taken as given and the critical component of science is reduced to the categorisation of society into constituent parts for the purposes of description. Thus, "in spite of all the political and ideological differences", social indicator systems could be promoted by conservative and social democratic parties alike (129), and they could be used to compare first and third worlds as well as Eastern and Western States. By reducing social and political questions to technical matters the possibility of political motivation was excluded from State action, and thus the State was able to utilise science as the instrument of reason. (130) Even those indicator systems which
attempted to measure satisfaction and happiness as indicies of social wellbeing, could only produce a form of knowledge which would lead ultimately to domination and control. (131) Whilst these systems may have concentrated more specifically on understanding as opposed to technical information, they simply provided a different set of facts which could then be manipulated by the polity.

Both forms of science (that is empiricism and understanding) (132), illustrate how knowledge is able to be treated as a politically neutral commodity devoid of political or ideological imputations. Science and knowledge are perceived as being synonymous, and thus the only emancipatory element evident in the international movement centred around 'methodology.' This was apparent in the type of science legitimated by nation States in the production of social trend documents and social reports. In these reports, as in the construction of social indicator systems, questions relating to belief and value were treated as technical problems requiring a mathematical modelling response which was deemed to be value free. The science of legitimation, corresponding with mainstream orthodoxy, saw the natural sciences as paradigmatic and social scientific practice as a consequence was reduced to the systematic provision of empirical data so that the State could make a political judgement. Thus the evidence from the international arena of the social indicators movement suggests that there is some credence to that rather instrumental proposition which assumes congruence between the cognitive interests of social practitioners and the values and interests of the bourgeoisie.

What remains unclear is the degree of voluntarism and determinism
involved in the interaction between agency and structure. Whilst declarations of neutrality, objectivity and the production of facts permeate the international literature on social indicators, these writings simply record the outcome or impact of a policy process. They tell us little about the disputes and conflicts which in theory at least should have characterised the contradictory positions of social practitioners within the State.

To explore these issues further we turn our attention in Chapter's Three and Four on the social indicators movement of New Zealand. Chapter Three analyses the development of social indicators within the New Zealand State, and Chapter Four identifies key actors in this movement as we attempt to classify the basic interests of practitioners.


3. See 'Historical Sources of Statistics,' Appendix I.


12. W. Zapf, identifies individuals within the American context who were significant in the promotion of social indicators. (W.J. Cohen, J.W. Gardner, B. Gross, D. Moynihan, M. Olsen). He also alludes to their mixed careers in teaching, research, Government administration and politics.


13. The Club of Rome, a body concerned with the wellbeing of mankind commissioned a series of reports throughout the 1960's/70's under the general title, "The Predicament of Mankind".

14. One of the most "successful" national indicator systems emerged in Germany. The Sozialpolitisches Entscheidungs (S.P.E.S) is similar to the O.E.C.D. programme in that it ascribes to the formulation of national goals. The S.P.E.S. system does not rely on consensus however, but derives goal dimensions and goal values from German laws, regulations, and programmatic statements of government, major political parties, trade unions and employers' associations.

Such a system is possible in Germany where social intentions are specifically stated within the law - thus there could be some difficulty in translating the S.P.E.S. system into alternative social and political contexts.

Sozialpolitisches entscheidungs und indikatoren - system fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.


26. Michael Carley identifies four major systems but he includes a theoretically based model which is yet to be implemented in practice.


34. The five "concept" categories are: Status, Change Interaction, Duality of Interaction and Change, and Viability.

35. The paradigm is based on a simple linkage between community and school which is systematically expanded to include the five concept categories and eight evaluation objectives as they apply across the fifteen sectors comprising the operational definition of community.


S. Johansson, "Towards a Theory of Social Reporting", a paper
presented to the Nordic Research Symposium on social policy, Hanasaari, Finland, September 26-29. (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm.) 1976.

39. The major documents published by the O.E.C.D. are:

"List of Social Concerns Common to Most O.E.C.D. Countries" (1973);

"Measuring Social Wellbeing: A progress Report on the Development of Social Indicators" (1976); and,


40. "It is useful to distinguish between a concern which defines what to measure, an indicator which defines how to measure it, and the actual measure of the indicator." O.E.C.D. Sector Group on the Urban Environment: Urban Environmental Indicators - Concepts and Methods for the Development of Urban Environmental Indicators - Paris 18 August 1975 (Restricted) U/ENV/75.7 (First Revision)

41. "The heart of the problem is the wellbeing of individual human beings and the way in which it is affected by their relations with other human beings and the physical environment. Institutions such as the political system are considered important only to the extent that they influence the wellbeing of individuals and not as subjects as themselves." in "Measuring Social Wellbeing: A Progress Report on the Development of Social Indicators", O.E.C.D., Paris, 1976: 12.


48. R.V. Horn, Indicators for Socio-Economic Planning. A paper
presented at the 49th Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the advancement of science. Auckland, January 1979: 23.


53. R.J. Horn, "Indicators for Socio-Economic Planning" (ibid), 1979: 22.


55. A comprehensive survey of aggregate indicators is contained in, N. Hicks and P. Streeten, Indicators of Development: The Search for a Basic Needs Yardstick, World Bank, Policy, Planning and Program Review, April 1978.


59. The Total Income Model as proposed by Fox has advanced an accounting framework for selecting and "operationalising" indicators but the system has yet to be implemented in practice. It is justified to claim therefore, that the model has yet to be operationalised.

60. Some of these methodological problems are canvassed by Zapf, who poses questions such as; How are we to establish conventions as to the main dimensions of a system of social indicators? How are we to develop transformation algorithms for the conversion of data into theoretically meaningful indicators? How are we to cope with such technical problems as multi-collinearity?


63. Fox assumes that individuals budget time as they would money and that the two are convertible. A system of social accounts based on this assumption ignores the segmentation of life into different sets of non-competing activities and furthermore it discounts the sequential and perishable nature of time. See K.A. Fox, 1974 (ibid).

64. The term "mainstream tradition" is utilised here in the same sense as it is used by Bernstein. Thus we include those scientists who seem convinced that if the social disciplines are to be "properly" understood as the genuine natural sciences of individuals in society, then they should differ in degree but not in kind from the well established natural sciences.


65. If operationalised this idea requires that we discover basic invariants, structures or laws which might serve as a basis for
theoretical explanations. These explanations would then take a deductive form and eventually we might derive from them counter-factual claims about relations of independent and dependent variables.


67. J. Habermas, (ibid), 1971 : 308.


86. R. Miliband, Political Forms and Historical Materialism, Socialist Register, Merlin Press, London, 1975: 316. This argument is repeated in R. Miliband, Marxism and Politics, Oxford University Press, London 1977: 74. O'Connor's argument is similar - in discussing the States dilemma in promoting both accumulation and legitimation he describes how it must "either mystify its policies by calling them something that they are not, or it must try to conceal them." J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1973: 6.

in Milib and and Laclau, New Left Review, 95, 1976(a). N. Poulantzas, The Crisis of the Dictatorships, (English translation), New Left Books, London, 1976(b). N. Poulantzas, Les transformations actuelles de l'etat, la crise politique, et 'a crise de l'etat, in La Crise de l'Etat, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1976(c). N. Poulantzas, (ibid) 1978. In these writings two different interpretations of the relative autonomy of the State is evident. The first is a "structuralist" interpretation which derives from Althusser and the second might be described as "conjunctural" in that it suggests specific forms and degrees of relative autonomy depend on the precise conjuncture of the class struggle. The later writings of Poulantzas stress the primacy of class struggle over structural causation and that is the sense in which relative autonomy will be used in this study.


89. In a recent text we argue that social policy analysis involves an examination of the assumptions people use in their policy actions, what kinds of theories and methods they bring into play, and in the final instance, what interests, public or private, are being served. Chris Wilkes and Ian Shirley (editors), In the Public Interest, Benton/Ross Publishers, Auckland, 1984. A case study of public versus private interests in New Zealand is contained in Ian Shirley (editor), Development Tracks, Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1982: 275-280.

90. Gramsci's notion of hegemony and coercion are institutionalised throughout the social formation and manifested in governmental institutions and civil society. Whilst Poulantzas draws on this Gramscian notion of hegemony, he relates its use to the separation between the public sphere of politics and the private sphere of civil society.

91. The implication of this correspondence between State power and the interests of a particular class should not be misconstrued as instrumentalism. Poulantzas simply implies that the successful management of class contradictions by the State ensures the maintenance of political conditions which are a necessary pre-requisite and co-requisite for capitalist reproduction. N. Poulantzas, (ibid), 1968: 54 and 137.


93. The organisation and internal functioning of the State Bureaucracy projects a neutral, rational form, by virtue of its economically grounded monopoly of force and by the way in which it seemingly avoids political class domination.
94. The dual political task of the capitalist State is evident in labour legislation and arbitration and in the setting and controlling of wages and prices. It includes, and indeed requires, certain material concessions to the dominated classes. However, such compromises only produce temporary stability.

95. The non-interventionist State is considered by Poulantzas to be the best form for securing political domination of competitive capital whereas monopoly capital requires an interventionist State. He further distinguishes between normal and exceptional States where the former corresponds to conjunctures in which bourgeois hegemony is stable and the latter is equated with a hegemonic crisis.

96. These practices include the filtering of policy implementation, "non" decisions, and the by passing of "normal" decision making processes. Wolfe is another to have examined the issue of non-decisions within capitalism. His particular contribution is to extend the economic concept of extraction of surplus value from production to extraction of political power from citizens of the State. A. Wolfe, New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics, in Politics and Society, 4, 2, 1974.

97. Commercial, banking and industrial interests are identified as being exemplary of fractions of capital "within" the State. Examples of "outside" interests include North American oriented fractions of monopoly capital as represented by transnational corporations and global agencies such as the Trilateral Commission.

98. The management of contradictory situations indicates an active rather than passive State. Thus the State is not only the arena for class struggles but the embodiment of class conflict.


100. F. Block (ibid) 1977: 13.

101. The State derivationists emerged out of specific historical situations existing in West Germany following the economic crises of 1966/67 and 1974/75. In the initial stages they concentrated on attacking the "illusory benefits" of the welfare State and thus they aligned themselves with a "capital" rather than "class theoretical" perspective.


103. The attack on revisionism by Muller and Neususs was also directed at the Frankfurt school and in particular at Habermas and Offe. The subsequent exchange of views are recorded in two publications. W. Muller and C. Neususs, The Social State

104. Muller and Neususs distinguish between the "appearance of class neutrality" and the "essential class character" of the bourgeois State.

105. Although Hirsch stresses the need for an apparatus that is external to production and exchange, it must be capable of securing social relations and maintaining the long term interests of the dominant class.

106. Hirsch's account of the falling rate of profit is drawn substantially from Das Kapital. In Hirsch's analysis however, the State assumes a more significant role than that designated by Marx, in balancing class forces at different levels of the capitalist formation. J. Hirsh (ibid) 1973: 208-255. J. Hirsch (ibid) 1974: 67-97.

107. Among the constraints emphasised by Hirsch are the separation of public and private interests, the tying of State expenditure to revenue generation, the controlled management of the State ideological apparatus, and the complex forces involved in reaching bureaucratic decisions and non-decisions. J. Hirsch, (ibid) 1973: 263. J. Hirsch (ibid) 1974: 100-101.


111. A. Gramsci (ibid) 1971: 56.

112. A. Gramsci (ibid) 1971: 12, 52-80.

113. The orchestration of demands involves compromises, alliances and the pursuit of national goals which ultimately serve capital interests. B. Jessop (ibid) 1982: 148.

114. These intellectual functions are ideological in that they are aimed at educating, organising and unifying social forces in the interests of bourgeois hegemony.

115. Gramsci argues that any revolutionary movement committed to the creation of a new socialist order must link the political, economic, and ideological domains in the struggle for State power. In this sense he goes beyond the instrumentalist tradition which locates class conflict exclusively within the economic domain.
116. Gramsci’s discourse on intellectualism is clearly opposed to the notion of a vanguard elite. He argues that all members of a society are engaged in intellectual activities and thus "traditionalists" and "organicists" are dispersed throughout the social formation.


126. Wilkes suggests that Weberian interpretations of the State can be
categorised on the basis of two questions - namely - what does the State do, (which is essentially a normative tradition) - and who controls the State (with the emphasis here on interest groups and elites)? In this study I have grouped the various functionalist interpretations under one heading without any such distinctions because in the final analysis they discount the question of social class and this is what sets them apart from neo-marxist interpretations. C. Wilkes, In the Best Interest: the Incorporation of Working Class Interests in European States 1930-1970. Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1980.


128. Whilst most social indicator systems and reports emanating from such systems stress the public utility of data collection, the increasingly technical character of such information ultimately restricts its availability and use.

129. In West Germany the governing Social Democrats made quality of life an important issue in the 1972 election campaign - in Austria it was the conservative opposition party which first explored this topic in a 1975 Social Indicators report entitled, Daten zur Lebensqualität.

130. C. Wilkes, Development as Practice: The Instrument of Reason, in Ian Shirley (editor) (ibid) 1982: 117-134.


132. Empiricism and understanding correspond with the empirical, analytic and the historical hermeneutic traditions as defined by Habermas.
CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL INDICATORS - NEW ZEALAND

In moving from the arena of international capitalism to the context of the New Zealand State, the Habermasian distinction between different scientific traditions and alternative modes of practice has been retained. Chapter Three takes these distinctions further by differentiating between two levels of action, namely societal action and interaction. These distinctions, which emanate from Habermasian theory, are consistent with the structure/agency dichotomy which was first raised in the Introduction.

Before we engage in any critical analysis of social practice, it is essential that we provide an empirical and documentary record of the social indicators movement in New Zealand. This record does not canvass the 'Quality of Life' studies conducted by the Social Science Research Bureau in the nineteen thirties and forties. Instead, it concentrates on the period 1960 to 1980 as the historical conjuncture corresponding with the general thrust and direction of the international movement. The generation of data which might measure the nation's 'quality of life' emerged as a by-product of the National Development Conference in 1968, and this chapter will trace these developments by providing a detailed documentary review of the Conference, the Council which was subsequently formed, and the central actors involved in constructing social indicators. This detailed review begins with a brief summary of the first national survey of social indicators which was launched by the Department of Statistics in
1980. The survey can be described as the culmination of the social indicators movement in New Zealand, and as such it represents the outcome of social practices conducted over a period of almost twenty years. These practices will be subjected to critique in the concluding pages of Chapters Three and Four.

A National Survey of Social Indicators

In October 1980, the Department of Statistics launched New Zealand’s first social indicator’s survey. (2) Utilising a Household Survey Facility, the Department interviewed 6,891 respondents selected to provide a representative cross section of New Zealanders (fifteen years of age and over) living in private households. The survey was conducted over a twelve month period with the first results becoming available early in 1982. (3) The pragmatic deductive approach adopted by the Department replicated the social goals approach of the O.E.C.D. Indicators were specifically designed to measure a set of agreed objectives about the social wellbeing of individuals, and the criteria which served to guide the selection of these indicators conformed with the six characteristics of indicator construction identified by the O.E.C.D. (4) Thus, indicators were designed to be output orientated, policy relevant, and have a standard validity across time and between countries. They were to be comprehensive in their coverage of social concerns, correspond closely with those concerns, and internally consistent in terms of specifications and definitions.

The New Zealand programme adopted the definition of social indicators
originally advanced by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. A social indicator was defined therein as:

a statistic of direct normative interest which facilitates concise, comprehensive and balanced judgements about the conditions of major aspects of a society. It is in all cases a direct measure of welfare and is subject to the interpretation that, if it changes in the "right" direction, while other things remain equal, things have gotten better, or people are "better off". (5)

To operationalise the New Zealand programme, the Social Indicators Unit of the Department identified a list of eight concerns. These concerns (employment, health, housing, education, income, personal safety and justice, leisure, and social participation), were identified as "practical rather than theoretical" divisions. (6)

Within each of these sections respondents were asked to provide 'factual' information based on personal experience, and at the same time they were questioned about 'qualitative' aspects of life such as job satisfaction and their perceived standard of living.

Results released to date from this first national survey indicate that the New Zealand State will generate additional social statistics which are likely to be more specific than the existing data banks which have simply devolved from the record keeping functions of State departments. (7) In the sphere of employment by way of example, the eleven indicators identified by the New Zealand programme are designed to provide a time series which should indicate whether or not national employment conditions have improved or deteriorated. In particular,
the notion of a "discouraged workers rate" will facilitate a more accurate reading of unemployment than the current Labour Department registration rate. Whilst the sample size of the national programme does not allow for disaggregation at the regional or local level, the programme can be implemented in part or in full by the "local state", or by those agencies with the resources to mount such a survey. (8) Although an assessment of the New Zealand programme may be considered somewhat premature given the fact that the generation of data from this first national survey is still being processed, the similarity between the New Zealand and O.E.C.D. systems allows one to draw a number of general conclusions.

As with the O.E.C.D. goals to indicator approach, the New Zealand system of social indicators did not derive its characteristics from theoretical constructs even though it is of course theoretically inspired. This inspiration appears to emanate from functionalist theory (9), in that it unconditionally assumes the maintenance of capitalist economic and social relations, a continuing commitment to political pluralism, and the generation of data which might be used to ensure system continuity and integration. The purpose of this programme is identified as the provision of information (10) for the State, concentrating on those aspects of life in which authorities are able and likely to intervene. The judgement as to what constitutes social wellbeing is made by State representatives, whilst the values underlying the specification of social concerns appear to be those of the statistical suppliers. (11) What is being measured therefore is not people's satisfaction with their living standards, but how far, within certain specified boundaries, the conditions for satisfaction exist.
On the surface at least, practitioners within the New Zealand State appear to have specified the type of "knowledge" required and the use to which this knowledge should be put. The individual, divorced from any class or group based membership is identified as the unit of study, and this effectively equates individual with social need. (12) By fusing these two domains, and by assuming the Social Development Council's goals represent a consensus on national development (See Appendix II), the New Zealand State and its practitioners have adopted O.E.C.D. guidelines by organising society into constituent parts for the purposes of description. In this process, social and political questions appear to have been removed from both the setting of national goals and the selection of social concerns. By replacing social and political questions with what are essentially 'technical matters,' the possibility of political motivation is thereby excluded from State practices and thus, as Habermas has illustrated, the way is cleared for the State to use science as an ideological instrument of control. (13)

Whilst the Habermasian interpretation of advanced capitalism has been accepted in this study as essentially correct, the apparent congruence between the O.E.C.D. and New Zealand systems remains an empirical question. Did social practitioners in New Zealand consciously or unconsciously align themselves with a particular form of science which treated knowledge as a political neutral commodity devoid of value imputations? Did they inadvertently subscribe to the mainstream tradition and thus adopt a fatalistic attitude toward the status quo, or did they systematically disconnect themselves from the critical tradition and from any practical interest in improving human existence?
In order to address these questions it is essential that we examine two alternative forms of action. These forms have been defined as concepts of interaction (which are dependent upon the communicative and strategic acts of knowledgeable participating subjects), and societal action which represents the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole. In this chapter we will examine these different levels of action by analysing documentary evidence from the National Development Council and its subsidiaries. It was the National Development Conference which first provided the institutional framework for the development of social indicators within New Zealand, and it was the social formation of the nineteen sixties and seventies which conditioned the interest structure of that society, and the pattern of State practices which lie at the centre of this critical analysis.

The National Development Conference

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century the New Zealand State has played a central role in matters of economic management. Whilst there have been various interpretations of the State's role in New Zealand's social development(14), it was the historical conjuncture of the nineteen sixties which provided the impetus for the development of social indicators. Throughout this period Government departments assumed increasing responsibilities for forward planning. In 1962 these "plans" were centralised in Treasury. All Government departments and agencies were required from that year on to submit to Treasury estimates of their revenue and expenditure, based on policies
enunciated by the political realm of the State. To coincide with this form of planned management the State initiated a series of national conferences, culminating in what has been described as "a venture into indicative planning".(15)

In 1968, in the wake of a deteriorating world economy, the Government convened a National Development Conference, with the objectives of this Conference defined by political representatives of the State.

To outline a programme and set targets for national development which over the next decade will give the necessary guidance and stimulus and provide the fullest opportunities and facilities for all sections in the community to develop and direct their resources, skills, "Know-how", and productive effort into those channels which can best promote economic growth and social development. In these ways to achieve a rate of economic progress which will ensure adequate employment opportunities for a growing population, maintain high levels of social welfare, and promote a rising standard of living.(16)

The N.D.C. was formed by the political realm of the State, to redress a "critical balance of payments deficit at a time of record export earnings".(17) The overseas exchange transactions for the year to June 1967 were in deficit by over $130 million dollars (which was equivalent to approximately 3.3% of G.N.P.), and it was this shortfall in foreign exchange which was associated with "overfull employment and an excessive level of economic activity."(18) To rectify these "socioeconomic rigidities", the State and its capital interests proposed increasing productivity, not only in the traditional area of primary production, but in manufactured exports. The economic wellbeing of the community was said to be dependent upon the productive
capacity of the economy, and this meant making New Zealand manufacturing, in particular, internationally competitive.

Economic growth was identified both as a major objective of "development" and as the mechanism by which a rising standard of living might be achieved. At the centre of this mechanistic approach to development was an economic model developed by Professor Philpott of Lincoln College. (19) This Keynesian model was used "to assess where the economy was heading" and "what it could feasibly or optimally achieve", and then on the basis of these "facts" determine "the policy implications of the optimum blueprint". (20) In essence this model simply identified interdependencies between various sectors of the economy, and then allowed for alternative assumptions to be made, based on factors such as the terms of trade, possible trends in productivity, and the ratio of savings to national income.

Economists were set the task of devising growth targets, and executives from both the public and private sectors were formed into councils to produce a planning consensus on objectives for development, along with strategies for implementation. In economic terms, the motivating force of the Conference lay in New Zealand’s agriculturally based dependency. It was assumed, that if previous trends continued (as envisaged by the Agricultural Development Conference of 1963), then the expansion of traditional exports would be insufficient to maintain import levels, per capital incomes, savings and investment. The answer, as conceived by the N.D.C., lay in increasing productivity, and in making New Zealand manufacturing internationally competitive. Based on these assumptions the Conference approved over six hundred recommendations,
including the Targets Committee estimate that manufactured exports alone should increase by $182 million (i.e. 700%) over a period of ten years, and the Minister of Finance described such targets as realistic and attainable:

We believe that these targets are realistic, we believe that they can be reached, and we accept the responsibility of reaching them... This... is the basis of our economic planning for the 1970's.(21)

The fallacy of establishing economic indicators in a social and political vacuum, can be gauged by comparing targets and outcome. (Table II)(22)

Although consumption grew one and a half times faster than was planned with both imports and investments expanding because of international borrowing, the productive capacity of the various sectors fell far below the targets set, and in some instances performances actually declined. Whereas the basis of planning was stated as being indicative - that is, economic goals were established for each sector, blending persuasion and self interest with fiscal measures (incentives and deterrents)(23) - the international and national environments which gave meaning to these indicators had changed. In 1957 the United Kingdom began negotiations with the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), and although British entry was not sealed until 1971, it was apparent that the traditional "open door" for New Zealand exports to the British market would be closed by the Common Market's Agricultural Policy.
### TABLE II (22) NDC Assumptions, Targets and Outcome 1970-1975

(Average % per annum growth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NDC Assumptions or Targets</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970-76</td>
<td>1970-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Population</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Labour Force</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Real Output per Labour Force Member</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Volume of Export:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) All Goods and Services</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Agricultural Products</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Manufactured Products</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Forestry Products</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Services</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Volume of Imports of Goods and Services</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Volume of Consumption</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Real Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Investment/GDP ratio</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Imports/GDP ratio</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Money Incomes per person employed (corrected for productivity)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Import Prices</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Price Level (Gross Domestic Expenditure Deflator)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Terms of Trade</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The N.D.C. rates of growth are effective rates based on targets for the subperiods 1970-73 and 1974-76. The outcome rates represent continuous growth rather than compound growth.
The traditional source of capital for Government borrowing also changed from colonial to international dependency, and this was signified by New Zealand's enrolment into the International Monetary Fund, and by the activities of transnational companies which increased their share-holding in New Zealand during the 1960's by four hundred percent. (24) In global terms the crisis of the world economy was reflected in the alliance between oil producing and exporting countries (O.P.E.C.), and in the subsequent escalation of oil and petroleum prices.

By contrast with the world economy the national environment appeared relatively stable and secure. During the nineteen fifties and sixties, full employment, consensus politics, and economic indices of productivity and growth, fueled the colonial dream. New Zealand continued to be portrayed as:

A place where race did not matter in any harmful way, where class divisions did not exist as barriers, where the old and young, equally, were looked after, and where the family and woman as its cornerstone were kept secure and protected. (25)

Two decades later it is reasonable to conclude that this view of New Zealand life did not equate with reality. (26) Agriculture, the nation's major source of foreign exchange levelled out in productive terms, despite heavy subsidisation, and land accumulation increased as the economic viability of the family farm declined. (27) In industry, a growing concentration of economic power promoted by State protectionism, resulted in private as opposed to national profitability. (28) Increased State expenditure in support of primary
and secondary industry, could not be sustained at a time when the terms of trade for agricultural products declined. With up to 25% of the nations income (as measured by Gross National Product (G.N.P.)(29) dependent upon a limited range of primary products, it was inevitable that the State and its economic managers would jettison indicative planning. With inflation rising to record levels(30), a deteriorating balance of payments deficit, (See Table III) and unemployment affecting an estimated 8% of the Labour force(31), the National government supported a restructuring of capital interests.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Private Borrowing</th>
<th>Net Government Borrowing</th>
<th>Balance of Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>-32.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>-71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>-28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>-39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-35.2</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-109.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961/62</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-112.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>-46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/64</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/65</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-186.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>109.9</td>
<td>-174.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>-109.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>-54.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>-113.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>220.2</td>
<td>-26.9</td>
<td>225.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>195.8</td>
<td>-21.2</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>309.3</td>
<td>-129.2</td>
<td>138.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>-91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>537.8</td>
<td>607.9</td>
<td>-1364.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>304.0</td>
<td>777.7</td>
<td>-1015.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>390.0</td>
<td>442.3</td>
<td>-825.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>471.1</td>
<td>323.2</td>
<td>-712.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>-144.6</td>
<td>552.5</td>
<td>-469.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>478.4</td>
<td>406.7</td>
<td>-831.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>129.9</td>
<td>613.4</td>
<td>-822.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>253.4</td>
<td>1453.1</td>
<td>-1650.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Balance of Payments Statistics
This restructuring programme became most evident in the nineteen seventies, with the merging of large monopolies and the associated interlocking of directorships. (32) It was evident too in the number of factory closures, especially in remote regions of the country (33), and in the direct investment of the State in an energy-based development programme. (34)

The State's development strategy was based on generating increased economic growth by utilising the nation's resources in land, capital and labour. To promote this strategy the State proposed a simultaneous upweighting of borrowed capital in an economy with surplus labour - an economic argument which Van Moeseke among others has described as 'straining commonsense' (35) However, it is not the economic argument which is of primary interest in the context of this study, but rather the actions of the State as it initiated and then sought to legitimate its practices.

The most explicit illustration of State practices designed to further capital interests came with the introduction of the National Development Act in 1979. In that year, the political-administrative realm of the State introduced a Bill into Parliament designed to streamline the planning process for works of national importance. (36)

Under the proposed National Development Bill, two parallel planning procedures were initiated. The first conferred upon the executive branch of government the ultimate power to bypass constitutional and procedural safeguards established in planning over time and enacted in legislation. Clause 4 (1) authorised the Governor General by Order in
Council and on the advice of the Minister, to apply the "fast track" for any major Government or private work the Minister deemed to be in the national interest, and so long as he considered it essential for the purposes of:

(a) The orderly production, development or utilisation of New Zealand's resources; or

(b) The development of New Zealand's self sufficiency in energy; or

(c) The major expansion of exports or of import substitution; or

(d) The development of significant opportunities for employment.

The "national interest" and works of "national importance" as defined by the first and second orders in Council respectively, imposed no effective limits on the State and gave final discretion to the Governor General. Within the context of this legislation the national interest was seen to be coincidental with private capital interests, and as a consequence the notion of "intresse"(37) was reduced to an economic construct.

The second procedure proposed by the legislation was aimed at streamlining and curtailing public participation. Apart from the ritualistic acceptance of a Planning Tribunal report before announcing his final decision, the Minister could virtually ignore the Tribunal findings and override twenty-eight existing statutes.(38)
After considering the report and recommendations of the Tribunal, the Governor General may by Order in Council, on the advice of the Minister, declare the Government work or private work to be a work of national importance, authorise it to proceed, and impose such conditions and restrictions as he thinks necessary or desirable in relation to its construction, undertaking or operation.

The legislation contained no effective rights of appeal and only limited provision was made for a judicial review. The ultimate authority was the Minister for according to Section 4 (3) and 15, the validity of the Minister's Orders in Council:

shall not be challenged or called in question in any court.

When reintroduced into Parliament on the 5th of December 1979 after consideration by the Statutes Revision Committee, the Parliamentary opposition claimed major changes in principle had been effected, whereas the Government maintained any alterations were merely peripheral. Criticism of the legislation emerged from within the Government itself.

This is unparalleled, not merely in New Zealand, but in the Commonwealth... It takes away the power of decision making from a tribunal and substitutes for it the decision-making power of the Government.(39)

The significance of substituting State for judicial power became apparent in December 1979, when it was revealed during Parliamentary debate, that the multi-national oil company British Petroleum (BP) had secretly advanced proposals for the drafting of the National
Development Bill. In a letter dated 10 August 1979, a representative of BP wrote to the Under-Secretary of Energy, concerning "discussions we had on your suggestions for a separate planning procedure for matters of national importance." (40) The development company pointed out that "safeguards automatically slow progress to a decision", and they suggested a single public hearing should be held limited to "technical issues". Basic questions such as whether or not a project should proceed, and who would benefit from such a scheme, would be dealt with by Government and "developer" prior to any public hearing, with the latter being restricted to conditional use of land. A suggested planning procedure attached to the letter revealed that the development company saw the public hearing as an exercise in cosmetics. They proposed a planning procedure:

which, while tacitly accepting that the proposal must be proceeded with in the national interest sets up a system whereby all those involved or affected can audit the application and work towards any necessary amendments or constraints by a process of conciliation rather than an adversary atmosphere. (41)

These amendments would be incidental to the major development decisions, because:

The likelihood of a decision which is not compatible with the proposal, can result in difficulties in gaining commitments for potential investors, lost market opportunities and substantial cost increases.

The procedure which is put forward below could result not only in reducing considerably the time span involved in obtaining administrative consents, but also in controlling the procedures to a degree
which would greatly assist in overcoming all these problems. (42)

Thus two months before local authorities, statutory bodies and members of the public had the opportunity to comment on the National Development Bill, the State was consulting a multi-national oil company on how to reform New Zealand planning. As BP at this time had proposals before the Government for a Methanol Ammonia and Urea complex in the Taranaki region, the question of "public" versus "private" interests emerged as a constitutional issue. By removing any judicial review as a monitoring device, capable of differentiating between public and private interests, the Government effectively bypassed all constitutional safeguards. Whereas previous planning procedures had been designed in theory to protect individuals from the activities of development companies and the State, this legislation was designed to protect the State and private company interests from aggrieved citizens. (43)

The economic disadvantages of the State's "restructuring" programme became the subject of academic debate, but the associated social and political implications were largely ignored. The National Development Act concentrated power in the hands of the Executive, relegated the judiciary to an Executive rubber stamp, and in politicising the Queen's representative, the National Government effectively removed those checks and balances which were originally designed in the "national interest". Collectively, these actions represented a considerable transformation from support of public to support of private interests.
To achieve this transformation the citizenry must firmly believe in an ideology which tells them that in the end public and private interests are synonymous. At one level this function was performed by advertising agencies acting on behalf of capital interests. One million dollars is the reported budget which Fletchers allocated its advertising agency to sell the aluminium smelter which was the central plank in the State's capital intensive development programme. (44) On their own however, advertising campaigns cannot execute this ideological function - "development" companies need the backing of the State, and this occurred in New Zealand with the systematic use of State departments to advance private interests.

One of the most obvious conflicts of interest arising out of the aluminium smelter proposal, was the appointment of a Fletcher executive as industrial development and business adviser to the Prime Minister's Department. (45) This appointment was made at a time when the State, (representing the public interest) and Fletchers, (the private interest) were negotiating over the second aluminium smelter. Despite assurances that "there had been no conflict of interest", Fletchers won the contract, and whilst private interests remained relatively immune from risk, the New Zealand public would be forced to bear a disproportionately large share of any deficit. (46)

At the same time the public were effectively excluded from participating in any debate over optional paths of development. The State replaced "independent" audits of industrial programmes with public statements issued by the private interests themselves. This first occurred in January of 1981 when the Government released an
environmental statement from the multi-national company Comalco, which concluded that the third smelter potline to be built by Comalco would have no serious environmental effects. (47) Apart from these "independent" reports legitimating the "fast track" strategy as being in the national interest, the obvious conflict between public and private interests was sidetracked by development companies and the State, intent on promoting national planning as a "process of conciliation". Public involvement in this process as defined by legislation was confined to technological modifications, (as requested by British Petroleum) and the more basic social and political questions were ignored.

Similar practices were evident in other aspects of New Zealand life, as the ideological apparatus of the State produced a range of documents and reports, which isolated the restructuring of capital from the social formation of New Zealand Society of the nineteen seventies and eighties.

Thus unemployment became an economic variable to be "traded off" against a balance of payments deficit and inflation. (48) Restructuring became the mechanism by which manufacturing and industrial sectors of society might improve their "viability and export performance", unimpeded or diverted by the "short term, transitional" problems of unemployment and regional underdevelopment. (49) The productive potential of New Zealand society, according to a government report, lay in a capital intensive development programme, but it was a form of development in which the nations greatest resource, its people, did not rate a single paragraph. (50)
By reducing the human prospect (51) to this form of economic determinism, fundamental policy and planning considerations were ignored. Questions such as, who plans and who benefits, were diverted by Keynesian managerialists advocating a concept of development which was "above politics", and which ultimately served the "public" interest and the "common" good. What is of primary concern within the context of this study, is the role played by social indicators in the legitimization of this form of development.

The Social and Cultural Committee of N.D.C.

In order to appraise the role of social practitioners within the social indicator's movement, it is essential that we move from the institutionalised pattern of action evident in the social formation of the nineteen sixties and seventies, to the level of interaction and thus to the communicative and strategic acts of the participating subjects. This movement toward the development of social indicators can be traced back to the proceedings of the first session of the N.D.C. which records a suggestion made by the Conference Steering Committee, that additional working parties be established to deal with the physical and social environments. (52) As a result of this suggestion the Social and Cultural Committee was set up with three major terms of reference:

1. to consider the concept of "quality of life", and those elements conducive to the attainment of a fuller social and cultural environment, complementary to the material and economic targets;
2. to identify problems associated with attaining this "desirable social and cultural environment", taking into account the limitations imposed by cost and the availability of resources;

3. to examine the measures required and organisational machinery necessary for dealing with such problems.

The Social and Cultural Committee duly reported to the National Development Conference in May 1969. The thirty-two page report traversed the nation's "quality of life", and focussed in particular on minority groups, youth, women, health, social welfare, cultural facilities, education, mass-media, and the relationship between State and community. The major recommendations of the Committee proposed further research, institutional changes in the delivery of social services, and the co-ordination of cultural activities. Under the rubric of further research, the Committee recommended that studies be carried out to determine "how a better quality of life could be achieved and maintained." They proposed investigations into a compulsory savings scheme for young people and a detailed survey to find ways in which women might play a greater part in the development of the economy. The Committee also recommended an independent penetrating examination of the social security system and an intensive study into the allocation of financial resources.

Two institutional changes were proposed. The first recommended the amalgamation of Government social service departments into one unit responsible for all aspects of welfare. The second proposed the establishment of a coordinating committee for cultural activities to
survey the arts and the cultural aspects of adult education and recreation. The report, as presented to Conference, accepted without question the economic indicators established by the Targets Committee of the N.D.C. The Committee was aware that if the national income grew "as predicted by the Targets Committee", there would be scope for additional spending on social services and cultural development.

Modest though this extra investment may be in relation to our total national expenditure, the benefits for our nation in terms of what makes life worthwhile will be considerable. (54)

Increased expenditure on social services and cultural activities was associated with a qualitative improvement in national life. It followed that the role of the State was to "encourage initiative and enterprise", with the State and the community:

... in partnership, each understanding the other in a harmonious blending of function. (55)

The appropriate environment was one in which 'man' was free to develop to 'his' full capacity, whilst at the same time, guarding "against a life which will be too soft and easy".

Already too many of our people are bored and seem uncommitted to any full satisfactory purpose in life. A wider range of goals than are at present available and the incentives to strive for these must be offered the individual. As the struggle for material wellbeing becomes less acute with the development of the welfare state and increasing affluence, New Zealand has the opportunity to show that a whole nation can find spiritual and cultural goals as important as its quest for security. (56)
New Zealanders were encouraged to save for the future, and at the same time the Committee expressed concern at an employment situation which enabled some young people to leave school early, earn high wages, and "spend foolishly".

More effort should be made to teach these young people the sensible management of their earnings. They should be taught quite early in life how to budget and we should consider what incentives would encourage young people to be wise in the use of money. Some members urged the introduction of compulsory saving for young people and the committee recommends that the desirability of this be investigated.(57)

Although the Social and Cultural Committee recommended the expansion and better use of existing resources, it did not propose the establishment of a Conference Sector Council with ongoing responsibility for the social and cultural aspects of development. Instead, it suggested a coordinating committee for cultural activities, and an independent study of the social security system. With these recommendations in mind, and aware too that an Arts Conference and Physical Environment Conference would be convened in 1970, the National Development Council(58) decided to hold "informal discussions" and "invite submissions from interested parties". These investigations would be aimed at gauging public opinion on the constitution of a Council within the N.D.C. structure, "to consider leisure time activities and social questions".

A public advertisement was subsequently placed in national newspapers on 20 September 1969, calling for submissions on the form and scope of possible social and cultural councils. On 17 December 1969, the
National Development Council established a subcommittee of three with power to co-opt, for the purpose of considering these submissions in detail. (59)

Of the thirty-nine submissions received by the council, two were referred to the Physical Environment Committee, twenty were referred to the Arts Council, and the remaining seventeen were referred to the newly constituted subcommittee. Under the convenership of Dr. H. Holland this subcommittee held four meetings, and conducted individual interviews with the permanent heads (or their nominees) of six Government departments and thirteen other agencies. In its July 1970 report, the subcommittee recommended against a single sector council for social, cultural and recreational activities. Instead it suggested that the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council be invited to act as a sector council for cultural affairs, and it recommended the establishment of a Council for Social Welfare. The subcommittee also set out a preferred membership for this Council and it suggested a detailed terms of reference. (60)

These terms of reference might be summarised under the following headings:

1. to review policies aimed at achieving a desirable quality of life;

2. to assist in the assessment and promotion of research;

3. to advise appropriate Ministers and the N.D.C. on social aspects of development;
4. to cooperate with the N.D.C. in ensuring consistency between economic and social objectives.

On 31 August 1970, Cabinet approved the establishment of a Social Council within the N.D.C. framework, and agreed in substance with the suggested membership and terms of reference as defined by the subcommittee. Eleven months later (20 July 1971), the Deputy Prime Minister announced that an eighteen member Social Council had been appointed with its main purpose being:

.. to promote a high quality of life by focussing attention on social aspects of development in the interests of achieving a balance between social and economic development.(62)

The Social Council of the National Development Council

The Social Council, which met for the first time on 19 August 1971, was the last of the N.D.C. sector councils to be formed. Within two months of its inaugural meeting the Social Council reported(63) to its parent body, drawing the attention of N.D.C. members to its first major project which was entitled, the "Social Aspects of Productivity". Stressing the interdependence of economic and social development, the Social Council identified two avenues open to it in investigating the question of productivity.

The first avenue proposed was a multi-disciplinary research project aimed at identifying the social and economic factors involved in
"productivity", and the extent to which these factors might be related.
The second proposal centred around the compilation of a set of social
objectives which could be defined in precise terms and subject to
measurement. It was envisaged that this second option could lead to
the establishment of a set or system of social statistics which might
proffer comparison with economic indicators. By establishing such a
system the Social Council believed it might be feasible to measure
progress towards clearly defined social objectives and if necessary
initiate appropriate corrective programmes. The Social Council
declared that this second avenue was the approach which could most
"profitably be employed". (64)

A Secretariat to service the Social Council was established in the Head
Office of the Social Security Department (65), and in 1971 this
Secretariat wrote a paper on the "Social Aspects of Productivity". (66)
Drawing attention to New Zealand's comparatively low growth rate, and
the significance of productivity in the process of economic
development, the Secretariat recommended the setting up of a working
party to examine the relationship between social and economic factors
in development, with particular regard to productivity. They also
suggested that the Secretariat be asked to furnish a further report.
This report would consider the possibility of establishing social
objectives which might equate with the nation's "quality of life". The
secretariat saw these objectives as "supplementary" to the economic
targets established by N.D.C. They were interested therefore in
compiling a set of social statistics and indicators which might measure
"performance", and "progress" toward "specified objectives". (67)
The Social Council fused the Secretariat’s suggestions and established a Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators. (68) The Standing Committee was asked to elaborate the values agreed on by the Council into "statements of objectives" which would be acceptable to the Council - to draw up possible social indicators which would enable progress toward these objectives to be measured - and to report to Council on the research required to develop a set of social indicators.

Although unsolicited, the Social Council’s Secretariat prepared background documents on social objectives and social indicators for the Standing Committee. (69) Following debate and refinement within the context of both the Standing Committee and the Social Council a list of social objectives for national development was approved. (Appendix II). These social objectives were incorporated into a manifesto of the Social Council and distributed with a questionnaire (70) which sought comments from interested parties and organisations. (71) A Secretariat paper (72) prepared for the Social Council estimated that between thirty and forty copies of this manifesto were distributed, but secretariat files list only twenty organisations and individuals who were sent copies of the questionnaire. (73) Fourteen replies to this questionnaire were received by the Secretariat who processed the responses and recommended, that the Social Council’s Standing Committee should be reconvened to consider the suggestions that had been made, and at the same time the Secretariat sought Council approval to release the objectives for public discussion. (74)

This approval was apparently given although no record of the decision
is evident. The Social Council’s annual report to the National Development Council in August 1973, merely indicates that the Social Objectives document was distributed widely throughout the community. (75) The results were processed by the Heylen Research Centre which had approached the Social Council, indicating "its willingness to cooperate in social research". (76) There is no record of the Heylen Research Centre’s summary of submissions, but two factors indicate the entire exercise was largely irrelevant. First, the annual report of the Social Council suggested that few people could disagree with the social objectives as proposed because of the level of generality. (77) And secondly, the social objectives document was not altered. Ten years after it was first drafted the social objectives document remained substantially intact - it still stood as the only explication of goals for national development.

On 11 September 1973 the National Development Council met with representatives of the Social Council to discuss future developments. (78) Discussions centred around the development of social objectives and indicators, social welfare problems, social research and regional development. Two major areas of contention emerged. The first issue centred on the proposal to establish a New Zealand Council for Social Welfare. This proposal was advanced by Professor McCreary as a mechanism for reorganising the national welfare structure but it was questioned (79), on the grounds that it represented duplication and proliferation of organisations in the field. The second issue emanated out of the division of work in the development of social indicators, and it was raised by the Government Statistician as an area in need of clarification. (80) In a closed session of the National Development
Council following this meeting, the question of a proposal to establish a New Zealand Council of Social Welfare was referred to the Minister, with the corollary that the Minister be requested to withhold his decision until a subcommittee of the National Development Council reported on the matter. (81) On the question of social indicators, the National Development Council set up a subcommittee of its own, comprising Professor Duncan (82) and Mr. Lewin, "to assist and liaise with the Social Council." (83)

Social Indicators Sub-Committee of N.D.C.

The social indicators subcommittee of the National Development Council reported on 6 November 1973. (84) The subcommittee identified 300 completed questionnaires on Social Objectives out of an issue of 6,000, and noted that whilst the information was from widely representative groups, "the findings were inconclusive". (85) The subcommittee observed that it would take "very much longer" to design statistics and indicators which could evaluate movements and trends, and they suggested that some attempt be made to evaluate existing data. In a summary of action following their October meeting (86), the subcommittee noted that a Joint Working Party of Officials had been established, and they recommended the setting up of a full-time task force in order to produce worthwhile results by July 1974. (87) The subcommittee stressed that there was a need to clarify the roles of the Social Council and the various Government departments involved in the development of social indicators.
At its meeting on 13 November 1973, the N.D.C. accepted their subcommittee's report, and they recommended that Government establish a unit (the Task Force) within the Department of Statistics, to develop by July 1974, "a provisional set of social indicators", which might be used in the "N.D.C. targets revision exercise". Although the Council had been asked by its subcommittee to clarify the organisational framework for social indicator development, their recommendations in this respect led to even greater administrative confusion. They suggested that the taskforce should operate under the guidance of the Social Council or its appropriate standing committee, and under the direction of a person appointed by the Council or its Standing Committee. This appointee would be required at all times to liaise with the Government Statistician and the Director General of Social Welfare. The Standing Committee of the Social Council (Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Indicators were both required to oversee the work of the Task Force which was located within the Statistics Department. Whilst members of the Social Council's Secretariat produced organisational charts reaffirming the central role of the Social Council in social indicator construction, the location and membership of the Task Force ensured the transfer of responsibility from Council to the Department of Statistics.

In the development of social indicators, and in defining the form of data required, the subcommittee of N.D.C. and the Council itself concurred. The development of social indicators was viewed as a three stage process beginning with the development of "informative statistics" which would indicate the "social state" of the nation. The
second stage was seen as the production of indicators which would enable the "evaluation of social programmes and policies". The third stage was defined as the production of "predictive indicators" which might allow possible social changes to be forecast, and thus taken into account in indicative planning.

The overriding concern of the subcommittee and the National Development Council was for the provision of "as much social data as possible, with comment on statistical validity, value as social indicators, and trends, as a guide in the revision of economic targets". (89) Because of the time factor involved the Council acknowledged that they would need to rely on "considered judgement" as opposed to "scientifically established validity in those areas of social concern where there was already a reasonable consensus of opinion". (90) And they indicated that output rather than input data should be selected on the basis of national rather than regionally generated statistics. The National Development Council sent their recommendations to Government (91), and they simultaneously asked the Social Development Council (92) to report by mid-1974 on trends in social statistics, and any consequential changes in the quality of life. The Social Development Council was asked to make recommendations for "changes in policy and action" in the light of these trends, and to suggest how the social objectives specified by the council could be best met in the Planning Advisory Group targets exercise. (93)

The Social Development Council did not respond to these requests. With the establishment of a task force within the Department of Statistics the Social Development Council was becoming increasingly irrelevant.
It did not have the technical expertise required to construct social indicators, and with the N.D.C.'s recommendation to Government that any task force established be situated in the Department of Statistics, the administrative base of social indicators was officially transferred. Government approved the N.D.C. recommendations and the Social Statistics Task Force commenced work in February 1974.

Oversight of this task force was provided by an interdepartmental committee, which included representatives of the Departments of Statistics and Social Welfare, the Planning Advisory Group of N.D.C., and the Social Development Council Secretariat. The composition of the interdepartmental committee emanated from an initiative by the Department of Social Welfare in the person of J. Grant, who chaired a meeting of officials on 12 September 1973. The officials present included members of the Departments of Social Welfare and Statistics, and representatives of the National Development and Social Development Council Secretariats.

There were obvious similarities between the terms of reference established for the subcommittee of N.D.C., and the meeting objectives identified by Grant. Both centred on examining the development of social indicators thus far, and both recommended a rationalisation of procedures and administrative arrangements for the further construction of social indicators. Mr Grant's meeting recommended that a working party of officials on social indicators should be established and this working party be asked to prepare a tentative "Social Report", covering the more appropriate and "revealing Social Statistics." These statistics were required to complement the economic indicators in the
Targets Advisory Group report. With the report date set down for July 1974, the task force had approximately 9 months to complete its assignment. The meeting also confirmed the members of the working party, agreed that it should have the power to co-opt from other Government Departments, placed the convenorship in the hands of the Social Council Secretariat, and recommended that the working party "report back to those present if this was found to be necessary." (95)

There is no evidence to suggest that the working party found any need to report back, because the Government Statistician (who had prior notice of the officials meeting on 12 September 1973), moved on 11 September to "clarify" the state of social indicator development in New Zealand. It was this initiative which subsequently led to the N.D.C. subcommittee, the establishment of a Task Force on social indicators, and the eventual confirmation of this Task Force as a Social Indicators Unit of the Department of Statistics.

Social Science Research Initiatives within the N.D.C.

Another initiative related to the development of social indicators, surfaced at the second plenary session of the National Development Conference held in May 1969. At this conference two recommendations relating to social research were approved. The first, (Recommendation 22(e)), originated from the Social and Cultural Committee and recommended, that studies be undertaken to determine how "a better quality of life" could be achieved and maintained, "in the face of the possible adverse affects of industrial development." The second
recommendation (617) was submitted by the Education, Training and Research Committee. This recommendation asked the National Research Advisory Council to arrange an urgent and comprehensive survey of social science research services and make suggestions for necessary action. (96)

The N.D.C. actioned these recommendations by inviting Professor Duncan to organise a meeting of interested parties to define areas of social research in terms of resolution 22(e). Professor Duncan’s committee reported back to the Council four months later, recommending that the National Research Advisory Council be invited to set up a Social Sciences Research Committee. (97) N.R.A.C. dealt with this ad hoc Committee’s report and N.D.C. recommendation 617 by seconding R. Gibson, a research officer with the Justice Department, to carry out a survey into research services in the social sciences. (98) Gibson presented his report through N.R.A.C. to the N.D.C. in March 1971, but the report was referred back to N.R.A.C. for critical evaluation and public comment.

N.R.A.C. appointed a Committee to critically evaluate the Gibson report as recommended by the National Development Council, and after two meetings this Committee suggested that a modified version of the report be published. (100) Dr. Spiller of the N.R.A.C. Secretariat indicated at this second meeting that it was envisaged the Working Party would eventually become the Social Sciences Committee, and this would mean in effect the establishment of a Standing Subcommittee of N.R.A.C. The Working Party accordingly recommended that N.R.A.C. establish a Social Sciences Research Committee to advise on the needs
and priorities of Social Scientific Research, and they advised N.R.A.C. to establish a Working Party to deal with the immediate questions raised by the Gibson report. In December 1971 the Council of N.R.A.C. resolved to set up a social sciences working party, and this decision was endorsed by the N.D.C. in April 1972. After Cabinet approval N.R.A.C. established a six member working party to consider the most appropriate organisation for social science research, and the role of government in stimulating and financing this research.

The working party met on four occasions between 25 October 1972 and 8 March 1973. They interviewed personnel from the Social Research Divisions of Government Departments, and they held discussions with the Director of the New Zealand Council for Educational Research and the Professor of Education at the University of Canterbury. The working party also met representatives of a working group on educational research services, and they received submissions from the New Zealand Sociological Association and the Social Council's subcommittee on social research.

In preparation for these meetings with personnel from the social research divisions of Government Departments, the working party sent out memoranda asking these divisions to prepare a short report on their modus operandi. In particular the working party sought details on research priorities, the allocation of resources, staff training, staff turnover and salaries. The divisional directors addressed these questions in the main and in a content analysis of these reports the working party identified two major characteristics. First, the recency of social science research initiatives within the context of Government
Departments, and secondly, the ad hoc way in which social research priorities were established. These 'deficiencies' were associated in the report with the lack of coordination among the Government Social Research Divisions, and with the absence of any permanent body to oversee and advise government as to the organisation of, and priorities for, social research. The working party concluded that the most appropriate and effective solution was to expand the membership of the N.R.A.C. to include social science representatives, and they accordingly recommended that the government amend the N.R.A.C. Act (1963), "in order to expand the appointed membership of the N.R.A.C. by two members representing the social sciences."(105)

To provide the N.R.A.C. with greater depth on social research activities, the working party also recommended that N.R.A.C. should establish a fourth standing advisory committee with responsibility for the social sciences. The two new members of N.R.A.C. representing the social sciences would automatically become member's of the Council's Standing Committee. In response to shortcomings in training and in the allocation of staff time as identified by the Government Research Divisions, the working party recommended the provision of an adequate career structure for social researchers with comparability between the respective research domains. They suggested that internships should be provided for graduates as a way of entry into research divisions, and they identified the need for research divisions to separate out, that research which was "a legitimate part of the science budget", from any "associated clerical and administrative functions".(106)

The Working Party devoted one paragraph to "social research and the
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research", and without any background material or apparent rationale, they recommended the establishment of a social science section within the D.S.I.R. At the same time considerable attention was devoted in this report to the establishment of a Social Research Institute. In advocating the setting up of this institute, the Working Party stressed the value of "independence".

Government social science research divisions are mainly concerned with research in a limited area of direct concern to their own departments, and are unable to undertake research in politically sensitive areas. On the other hand, University research is frequently limited by theoretical concern. The working party agreed that an independent organisation would not only fulfill the need for an organisation able to undertake research of a wide nature but also stimulate social research in government and the universities.(107)

To meet the logistic requirements of such an Institute, the Working Party suggested that the new body should be established by statute and funded by government, with initial funds of not less than $100,000 per annum. The principal functions of the Institute would be in the stimulation and development of social research - in liaison with and between research workers in both public and private sectors - in conducting social research both of the Institute's own volition, and at the request of Government and other bodies - and in the collection and publication of data relating to research in the social sciences.(108)

In July 1973 the working party's proposal was discussed by the N.R.A.C., the Director-General of Social Welfare and Professor McCreary. It was then referred to Committee C of N.R.A.C. which did
not consider it until 28 February 1974. The delay was said to be due
to the difficulty in finding a date suitable to Professor McCreary who
resigned before the February meeting. (109) It seems evident however,
that there was considerable debate as to the nature and form of social
scientific research in New Zealand, the direction in which it should
proceed, and the most appropriate organisational structure for
translating any objectives into practice.

The Research Subcommittee of the Social Council sent a proposal to the
N.R.A.C. Working Party advocating the setting up of an independent
Institute. (110) The Social Council proposal was obviously used by the
N.R.A.C. working party in compiling its final report, but when
N.R.A.C. submitted its annual report for the year ending 31 March
1974 (111), there were some notable differences. N.R.A.C. decided
against establishing a fourth standing committee, but chose to
strengthen Committee C by the appointment of Professor McCreary. The
rationale for this decision was based on "the awareness that [N.R.A.C.]
members were not appointed to represent particular interest groups."
The Council also recommended the setting up of a Social Science
Division within the D.S.I.R., but the question of a independent social
research institute was apparently "still being considered". Although
the case for an independent Institute was briefly canvassed in their
annual report, N.R.A.C. either did not understand, or misread, at
least one of the principle functions of the proposed Institute. (112)

In June 1974, N.R.A.C. reported to the Minister of Science on the
organisation of social science research. They recommended that he
decline the establishment of an independent Institute, and explore
instead the desirability and feasibility of setting up a Social Science Unit within the D.S.I.R. These proposals were apparently made without reference to, or discussion with, social scientists. (113)

The Social Development Council's standing committee on social research was clearly upset by the N.R.A.C. report, and on 10 September 1974, the Chairman of S.D.C. wrote to the Minister of Social Welfare expressing "very strong disagreement with the N.R.A.C. recommendations", and he asked for a deferment of the N.R.A.C. report by Cabinet until the Council had had the opportunity to comment. (114) Professor Robb, the Chairman of the Social Development Council's Standing Committee on social research prepared a background paper on the nature of social research, and this was considered at the Standing Committee's meeting on October 10. This paper was used as the draft document for the Social Development Council's submissions to the Ministers' of Social Welfare and Science, and represented the Council's position on the N.R.A.C. report. (115)

Although this report was forwarded to the Ministers concerned, it was merely one proposal out of at least six alternatives being considered by Government at that time. (See Appendix III). There is no evidence to suggest that these proposals had any impact on State policy in relation to the social sciences. By 1975/76 only 1.8% of total Government research expenditure of $58 million was being allocated to the social sciences. (116) (See Tables IV and V) And by 1977 the lack of progress toward the establishment of a co-ordinating body for social research was being blamed specifically on the "divergent advice" that had been "received by Government". (117) The contribution of the Social
Development Council's Standing Committee on Social Research obviously concluded with their proposal to Government, and in 1977 this committee was amalgamated with the Council's Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators.

**TABLE IV Expenditure on Social Sciences in New Zealand — 1971-1978 (000's $)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>1,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori Affairs</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science Total</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>2,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science as % of Total Science</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,404</td>
<td>29,508</td>
<td>35,459</td>
<td>41,894</td>
<td>48,028</td>
<td>58,138</td>
<td>63,593</td>
<td>77,232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE V  N.R.A.C. Science Budget Allocations 1971-78 (000's $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Fisheries</td>
<td>6,025</td>
<td>7,546</td>
<td>10,712</td>
<td>15,473</td>
<td>20,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>1,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>1,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Service</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>3,333</td>
<td>5,217</td>
<td>6,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Affairs</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands and Survey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori and Island Affairs</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.S.I.R.</td>
<td>10,356</td>
<td>13,390</td>
<td>18,924</td>
<td>26,721</td>
<td>35,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Services Commission</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>4,094</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>6,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>2,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1,568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>24,144</td>
<td>30,724</td>
<td>41,894</td>
<td>58,138</td>
<td>76,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Dwindling Influence of the Social Development Council

The dwindling influence of the Social Development Council in the construction of social indicators was apparent by 1974, when the Social Indicators Unit was established within the Department of Statistics. In August 1975 this Unit reported to the Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators. Their report canvassed three major approaches to the establishment of International Indicator Systems and summarised "progress" within New Zealand. In discussion, Mrs. Shields saw the priorities of the Unit being set largely by what could be "practically managed" rather than what was "theoretically possible", and in agreeing with the New Zealand approach, the meeting considered that "goals should be politically neutral." There was also general agreement that Unit publications should be aimed "at the public at large", although it was acknowledged that different individuals and organisations might want information in different forms. The Unit's short term plans revealed that the department would be concentrating on two areas of concern to be selected from the categories of health, education, labour, income and leisure, and these priorities were unanimously endorsed. A further meeting of the Standing Committee was scheduled for March 1976.

Although the actual date of this proposed meeting is not known, the S.D.C. meeting of 4 June 1976 carried a report from the Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators. The executive officer reported on "a recent meeting between Dr Irvine and Mrs. M. Shields, Senior Research Officer with the Social Indicators Unit." The executive officer noted that the Social Indicators Unit was now
established as a separate section within the Department of Statistics and whilst "the Unit had originally chosen to focus on two areas of concern - health and employment" - they had now "decided on an across the board approach after seeing a Phillipine's publication on social indicators". Dr Irvine (Chairman of the S.D.C.'s Standing Committee) expressed his disappointment with this plan, as he would have preferred an approach which focussed on "one particular area of concern" at a time. (121)

Similar expressions of dissatisfaction emerged over the Council's goals for social development. The Chairman, in a memorandum to Standing Committee members wrote:

I wonder if we shouldn't be more radical in our thinking and carry out a more extensive revision. I am inclined to support Mr Latimer's view that our goals and objectives are too "philosophical" and too far removed from reality and the level at which operational decisions are made. (122)

Some members of the Standing Committee obviously agreed. One member suggested that "all charters" inevitably "finish up by sounding facile"(123), while another wondered "if the Council's objectives were fashioned too much by people relatively cushioned from those tensions."(124) These expressions of dissatisfaction did not go any further than the minutes of the S.D.C., and the Standing Committee on Social Indicators and Social Research became little more than a clearing house for reports and programmes prepared and conducted elsewhere.
In August 1977 the Chairman of the S.D.C. noted that a new statement of goals and objectives for social development had been drawn up and approved by the S.D.C., and the Statistics Department reported that the first draft specification of 57 behavioural and attitudinal indicators had been prepared. The statement of goals and objectives was aired once again within the context of the Council meeting, and the minutes of this meeting confirm the Council’s view that these objectives were to be seen as "planning", rather than "political, statements – if possible party political considerations in Government’s assessment of the statements should be avoided!" (125)

The only other document in S.D.C. files refers to a 1978 seminar on social indicators jointly organised by the S.D.C. and the New Zealand National Commission for UNESCO. A member of the S.D.C. attended this seminar and reported back to the Council. In her conclusion she wrote that "very little practical progress had been made especially in measuring values and intangibles." (126) This uncertainty and pessimism after years of promise reflected not only the state of the art, but the winding down of the Social Development Council impetus in the construction of social indicators.

The Department of Statistics and Social Indicators

Although the influence of the Department of Statistics in social indicator construction only became apparent in the latter part of 1973, an in house paper by Mullins in 1970 proposed a departmental publication as a "guide to New Zealand social statistics." Entitled,
"Measurable Concepts in Social Statistics", the Mullins paper not only made administrative recommendations, but it espoused a clear theoretical position, in that it identified the individual as the basic unit of measurement. (127) That same year (1970), a Social Statistics Unit was established within the Department to develop data in various fields, whilst in Britain the first social trends document was published. The establishment of the Social Statistics Unit and the publication of the British social trends document provided the department with a framework for collecting and linking social statistics in New Zealand. Thus by 1973, progress toward a social trends publication in New Zealand was already well underway.

Despite these initiatives, the major motivation in the development of social indicators for New Zealand remained with the Social Council until 11 September 1973, when the N.D.C. and Social Council met to discuss future developments. At this meeting the Government Statistician (Mr Lewin) suggested that the areas of responsibility in respect of social indicators were in need of clarification, and in a closed session of the N.D.C. following this joint meeting a special Subcommittee was established. It was this Subcommittee of two (comprising Mr Levin and Professor Duncan), which later recommended the establishment of a task force on social indicators to be housed within the Department of Statistics.

The following day (September 12) two members of the Statistics Department attended an inter-departmental meeting, convened by Grant of the Social Council Secretariat, for the purpose of establishing a working party on social indicators. When this Working Party
subsequently met on 21 September, it was agreed that officers from the Departments of Statistics and Social Welfare, would prepare a report for presentation to the Social Council's subcommittee on Social Objectives and to the appropriate Government Departments by October/November 1973.(128)

There was considerable confusion however over the administrative arrangements of the Working Party, and when telephone calls between and within Departments failed to clarify how the Working Party should function, the Statistics Department representative wrote a report seeking clarification from her senior officers on the following points:

(1) How does the Department of Statistics view the role of the Working Party?

(2) What are the duties and responsibilities of the Departmental officers serving the Working Party?

(3) To whom are the Department's officers on the Working Party ultimately responsible? In other words for which organisation is the Working Party working - the Social Council? If so can the Working Party reach any agreement without the approval of the senior officers of their respective Departments?

(4) Which organisation decides the approach to be taken? This question is extremely important. The reasons will be elaborated upon in the following paragraphs.

(5) Is a Working Party the most satisfactory working arrangement? The Social Welfare officers and Mr Gallen think not, but that the initial work should be undertaken by the Department of Statistics. Mr Barr and I share this view."(129)
This report went on to seek clarification of New Zealand's "official" approach to the development of social indicators. Two alternative systems were identified. The first approach outlined was that adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission, which was then developing a system of demographic, manpower, and social statistics. This system conceived of social indicators as "a summary data series", similar to the statistics which were being prepared at that time by the Statistics Department, for publication as "Social Trends in New Zealand". It was described by the departmental officer as being "descriptive of actual social conditions", and therefore consistent with the modus operandi of the Department of Statistics. The alternative system outlined was the social goals approach adopted by the O.E.C.D. This system was regarded as containing "evaluative" indicators and therefore at a "higher level of generality" than the U.N. system. The official New Zealand position (as typified by the Statistical Commission), was quoted as favouring the United Nations descriptive approach, but the Social Council's endorsement of the goals to indicator system was noted.

The Social Council along with a number of European and Scandinavian countries and the U.S. have been working along the general lines suggested by the O.E.C.D. The question is whether the Department of Statistics will be prepared to work also in the general area of the O.E.C.D.'s recommendations.(130)

The conclusion of this report pointed out that the value of the Working Party was being questioned, because a particular approach had already been decided upon by the Social Council, and yet this approach had not been evaluated by the Department of Statistics.
The acting Assistant Government Statistician replied to the departmental representative on the working party late in November 1973, and indicated that he had delayed comment because of "developments" within the National Development Council.(131) He indicated that the Council had been concerned with ways and means of achieving the production of a report on social indicators and social objectives, and as a consequence had appointed Mr Levin and Professor Duncan to liaise with the Social Council and make appropriate recommendations. According to Mr Latimer this subcommittee would recommend to Government that staff be made available from the Departments of Statistics and Social Welfare, so that they might work fulltime on the preparation of a social indicators report, for presentation to the Target's Advisory Group of N.D.C. As this work would be supervised by the Social Council or a committee of the Social Council, the Interdepartmental Committee was regarded as being "in recess". In the meantime departmental officers were instructed to proceed with the social trends document, so that copies could be made available for use by "whoever [was] given the responsibility for developing social indicators."(132)

When the report of the N.D.C.'s subcommittee was eventually submitted, it identified the evaluation of existing data as the only practical way to proceed in view of the economic target setting exercise set down for July 1974. It was apparently the constraints of this time frame which influenced the subcommittee to suggest, that indicators would need to "be based more on intuitive judgement than on scientifically established validity."(133)

The subcommittee used its report to summarise the programmes and
research priorities of other groups working in this field. They referred in particular to the working party established by the Standing Committee of the Social Council on social objectives and social indicators and they concurred with the Working Party's three stage plan for the development of social indicators. The subcommittee believed that if social indicators were to be of any value in the target setting exercise defined by the N.D.C., then they would need to go beyond stage one, because the provision of "informative statistics" would be largely accomplished with the release of the Department's social trends publication. At the same time the subcommittee acknowledged that much of this data would be in a "raw state" and not directly usable as a measure of social wellbeing. Further qualitative evaluation would be necessary to produce where possible the type of indicators needed for the target setting exercise.(134)

The subcommittee then argued for an immediate allocation of resources in the form of three staff members so that the social significance of existing statistics might be evaluated. In defining the lines of responsibility, they saw it as appropriate that other departments in the field be made responsible for certain aspects of the programme (unspecified), although "the collection, technical evaluation, and publication of social statistics should, as in the past, mainly be the responsibility of the Government Statistician."(135) The subcommittee not only established the transfer of primary responsibility for social indicators from Social Council to Statistics Department, but they recommended the appointment of a senior departmental representative to the Social Council subcommittee, and thus they ensured that any work going on under the auspices of the Social Council would be monitored by
The subcommittee's report was duly accepted by the National Development Council at its November meeting. The recommendations of the subcommittee were approved, and on 21 December 1973 the Acting Government Statistician wrote to the Minister in Charge of the Department of Statistics requesting, that a "unit of appropriate size and skills located in the Department of Statistics be appointed to develop by July 1974 in consultation with the Social Council a provisional set of social indicators to the point where they can be used." The Minister concerned, the Hon, W. Rowling, approved the establishment of such a unit on 4 January 1974 and work officially commenced in February.(136)

The Epistemology and Methodology of the Statistics Department Approach

The philosophy and approach to social indicator construction as conceived by the Department of Statistics, can be identified from a series of papers and reports prepared by members of the Department throughout the 1970's.(137) While these documents demonstrate a refinement and development of ideas over the course of this decade, the institutional structure of the New Zealand programme was determined before the Social Indicators Unit came into being. By 1974 departmental officers had assessed various approaches to the development of social indicators and despite some methodological reservations, they committed themselves (and the Department), to the Policy Goals approach. To appreciate the Department's stance on social
indicatоrs, it is еssential that we review their evaluation of alternative systems, their commitment to the policy goals approach, and the еpistemological and methodological underpinnings of the social indicator’s programme in New Zealand.

In reviewing international social indicator systems the Department of Statistics identified four main approaches. These were alternatively defined as quality of life, social statistics, social systems, and social goals. The quality of life approach, with a primary emphasis on the measurement of change, was considered inappropriate because different groups within the community would have widely differing views on what constituted the "good life". The researchers therefore doubted the "likelihood of consensus", and they considered that such an approach would be "too ephemeral and value laden to have utility for New Zealand". (138)

The social statistics approach, based on the collection of data gathered as a by-product of other studies, was said to be exemplified in the Departmental publication "Social Trends". It was considered "basically atheoretical", and rarely attempted to interrelate different series or demonstrate causal relationships. In the Department’s view the limitations of the social trends approach emanated from the lack of selectivity in the build-up of social statistics, data deficiencies, and the absence of explicit and coherent statements of values. (139)

The third alternative considered involved the building of a systems model and the measurement of cause and effect relationships resulting from observed changes in components of the system. Although the social
systems approach was seen as likely to yield valuable insights at the macro level, it was "unlikely to be immediately profitable", in that it would not produce "specific information necessary for day to day or even year to year political decision-making". Because of these practical limitations on immediate use it was considered "inappropriate for the proposed development programme within Government."(140)

The fourth alternative reviewed by Departmental officers was identified as the most appropriate approach to social indicator construction in New Zealand. This was described, alternatively, as the social goals and the policy goals approach. Within this system, principle goals were expressed in "empirical terms" so that they could be open to "inspection, evaluation and change", and thus social indicators were perceived as "measures of progress .. towards stated goals."(141)

In validating the choice of a policy goals approach, Departmental publications stressed the relevance and utility of information which would be useful in policy making. The way to achieve relevance in the application of social indicators, was to place concepts such as social wellbeing and the quality of life, within the context of government objectives and actions.

The prime concern of any Government at least in general terms is to maintain and to enhance the "social wellbeing" and "quality of life" of its citizens. Stated government policy goals can therefore be used as a starting point for developing a framework under the "monitoring" scheme.(142)

Judgements by social scientists were ruled out as being both
"presumptuous and arrogant as well as methodologically unsound." (143) Similarly, a survey approach designed to ascertain preferred social goals was said to have valuation problems, for in the act of supplying alternatives for the questionnaire, the researcher was determining the choices available, and "ipso facto introducing a bias into the specification of goals." Pressure groups were not considered a feasible source of expression on current issues, because such groups were "not representative of the total public and different groups frequently express opposing views." (144) These groups were only accountable to their own membership, and thus, the Department favoured an approach which would ensure that final decisions on societal goals rested with those who could be held publicly accountable.

The statistical development staff in no way assign priorities to the different social objectives. Their task is only to develop measures for all objectives. The policy makers acting on behalf of the community - assert priorities between objectives. It is the policy makers responding to public judgement who may assert that a 5 per cent improvement in one measure of one objective is less important than, say, a 2 per cent improvement in another measure for another objective. (145)

In committing themselves to the policy goals approach, the Departmental officers reaffirmed their confidence in a pragmatic deductive approach to social indicator construction. The aim of the policy goals approach was to "describe" social conditions within a normative context, so that conclusions could be drawn as to whether things were "better, worse or the same." (146) While the Department agreed that a rigorous, systemic theory or model of society was desirable, the absence of an explicit theoretical base did not preclude the development of social indicators.
Instead, researchers emphasised the articulation of social concerns relevant to policy, and from which a theory or model might later emerge. As a consequence, they saw no difference between a social indicator and any other variable used in a scientific context. It was simply an "operational concept", and thus the construction of indicators did not involve any radically new activity. Rather, it was said to be consistent with established scientific procedure - "that is, the conceptualisation of goals and the operationalisation of those conceptualisations in the form of indicators."(147)

Although members of the Social Indicators Unit acknowledged that decisions in the process of policy making emerged "from a mosaic of inputs including valuational and political as well as technical components", they saw their own contribution as social scientists solely within the technical realm.

The present aim of the Department of Statistics then is to provide as much as is possible the technical components of this input information for decisions. This will involve the further specification and definition of indicators; and the design and planning of the sources and procedures for the collection of the required data.(148)

In advocating the policy goals approach to indicator construction, Departmental officers identified a series of developmental stages. (These stages are set out in Figure III).
FIGURE III  Stages in the development of social indicators based on a policy goals approach

STAGE I
DEFINITION

STAGE II
ARTICULATION

STAGE III
CONCEPTUALISATION

STAGE IV
OPERATIONALISATION

DEFINITION OF SOCIAL INDICATORS

ARTICULATION OF POLICY GOALS

CONCEPTUALISATION OF INDICATORS

SOCIAL TRENDS

OTHER AVAILABLE DATA

PROCEDURE TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS FOR WHICH DATA ARE AVAILABLE

ASSESS DEFICIENCIES

ASSESS TIMING AND REQUIRED RESOURCES

DEVELOPMENT OF DATA SOURCES FOR REMAINING INDICATORS

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INDICATORS SET AND INFORMATION OUTPUT
While the Department was intimately involved in both the definition of social indicators and in the selection of policy goals, all Departmental publications began with stage three, the conceptualisation of indicators. Conceptualisation was perceived as the extraction of variables to be measured from specified areas of social concern and policy statements. Although the social goals adopted by the Department of Statistics were originally constructed by the Social Council, these objectives were considered too vague for the purposes of measurement, and thus members of the Social Indicators Unit wrote to the Council suggesting a review of the goals and objectives for social development. They wanted objectives "expressed in empirically manageable terms amenable to the application of quantitative measurement." (149) In this process of redefinition, the broadly based social goals and objectives for national development were reduced to correspond with the programmatic categories identified by the O.E.C.D.

The specification of categories coincided with the next two stages of development which were subsumed within the notion of operationalisation. (150) This required the redefinition of indicators in measurable terms and was achieved by dividing the general area of social wellbeing into eight functional categories. These categories were: employment, health, housing, education, income and expenditure, public safety, leisure, community and political participation. The statistical techniques and manipulations required to derive adequate measurements of the selected variables also had to be specified, and this proved particularly difficult with satisfaction type indicators. (151) Whereas in the initial stages of the Department's programme the conceptualisation of indicators was undertaken "without
consideration of the limitations of existing data", as the programme proceeded the obvious deficiencies in the available stock of social statistics became apparent.

The body of statistics appears to have grown like a city without a plan - while there are many good and desirable aspects the whole does not operate very well. Certain vital amenities are missing while others are still present which are no longer necessary or relevant. In data gathering as in many other fields it appears easier to maintain or add to an existing series than it is to terminate it. (The continuing enumeration of household poultry in the New Zealand census would be a case in point!).

When the Department first produced its provisional list of indicators(153), it estimated that only ten per cent of the indicators specified could be generated by a further processing of existing data. Another fifty per cent could become available if minor modifications were made to existing collections, but the remaining forty per cent would require new sources of data. The Unit's senior research officer recommended that these new sources of data should be generated by means of a general household survey, and Ministerial approval of this request was granted in 1979.(154) With approval obtained for a general household survey, the social indicators pilot questionnaire was operationalised. This involved the selection of some thirty indicators suitable for measurement and capable of being extracted from a structured questionnaire. It also required the production of two documents, one for household information and the other for personal data.(155) When the results of this pilot survey were processed only minor modifications were required, and the first national survey of social indicators for New Zealand was officially launched in 1980.(156)
A Summary of Social Indicator Development in New Zealand

The New Zealand approach to the development of social indicators closely resembles the O.E.C.D. programme. Although the New Zealand system is defined as a "policy" goals approach in contrast to the "social" goals as defined by the O.E.C.D., both systems list "areas of concern" which are almost identical. The indicators specified within these areas of concern show many points of congruence with more than twenty indicators on the two lists concurring. Similarly, when one examines the pilot survey of 1979 and the national survey of 1980/81, it is obvious that the New Zealand programme has adopted questions which were used in the comprehensive survey established by the O.E.C.D. Thus on face value it is feasible to conclude that the New Zealand approach to social indicators simply followed the prescriptions laid down by the O.E.C.D. (157)

While such an explanation may be adequate at a mechanistic level in explaining the transfer of "knowledge" between technicians involved in social indicator construction, it divorces the theory and practice of social indicators from the social formation in which they were conceived and developed. When the National Development Conference was convened in 1968, certain structural limitations were imposed by the economic realm on the form of social information required, and these constraints seemed to concur with the expectations and aspirations of the participants. The economic mode of production and relations between capital and labour were treated as constant, and the entire
proceedings as a consequence concentrated on adjustments which might be made within the context of these wider constraints. With the State providing the "right economic climate" for private enterprise, the major objectives of the conference centred around the setting of economic targets and the means by which these targets could be reached.

Although the economic realm established certain structural constraints on the Conference proceedings, these limitations were reinforced by the political-administrative realm in its commitment to an economistic model of development. This commitment was evident in the conference objectives, in the priority accorded economic targets, and in explicit ideological statements, such as that delivered by the Prime Minister to the second plenary session in 1969.

We must make the best possible use of our resources of labour and capital equipment. Making the best use of labour and capital equipment implies, in turn, greater efforts in education, training and retraining. Making the best use of capital equipment involves us in thinking of ways of improving productivity. This leads to a consideration of shift work and many other methods of increasing efficiency and productivity. (158)

At a technical level, Keynesian economic theory provided a set of postulates which linked the various components of the economic system and provided a policy model which was perceived as a "blueprint" for development. In economic terms this blueprint was based on assessing the rate of optimum economic output, the level of imports and exports which would be needed to sustain growth, and the contribution which different sectors should make to the increased exports required. In social terms the Conference was concerned with the nature of exchange
between the functional components of the social system. New Zealand society was perceived to be in a moving equilibrium, and the purpose of intervention lay, therefore, in balancing the various system components so that congruence between the subsystems could be maintained. To this end, the N.D.C. brought together six hundred individuals "in a non-political forum", to achieve a policy consensus "in the best interests of New Zealand as a whole."(159)

The various committees of the N.D.C. accepted these structural and organisational constraints, and each played a significant part in pattern maintenance and integration. The Social and Cultural Committee set its recommendations within the framework provided by the N.D.C.'s "economic growth targets", and it explored ways in which young people and women might contribute to the nation's economic life. Emphasising the "harmonious blending of function" between State and community, the Social and Cultural Committee encouraged "individual initiative and enterprise", and it extolled the young "to be wise in the management of their money." At the same time the Committee warned young people not to "spend foolishly", and it cautioned all New Zealanders against a life of comfort and ease.(160)

Within the institutional framework of the N.D.C., the interest in social indicators was merely a by-product of the economic realm. Studies were recommended to determine how a better quality of life could be achieved and maintained "in the face of ... industrial development,"(161) and the various social mechanisms devised merely provided the means by which the negative consequences of such development could be redressed. Within the State's economic realm the
slump of 1967/68 was reinterpreted as a fluctuation "in the rate of growth and the rate of economic activity". As a consequence there was general "agreement that international cost competitiveness" was essential "for the future progress of [the] economy."(162)

The only impediment to a "better quality of life" seemed to be in the attainment of economic targets, and in gaining the acceptance and support of the community at large for the Government's development strategy. New technology seemed capable of creating unlimited economic growth, but to ensure that the conditions for the generation of this growth existed and any side effects were ameliorated, information was required. In the first instance the requirement was for economic information relating to factors such as the terms of trade, possible trends in productivity, and the ratio of savings to national income. But after establishing these targets it became patently clear that for a national plan to be successful, it required "the interest, enthusiasm, and cooperation of an informed workforce."(163) This necessitated two further forms of information.

The first was information which legitimated the State's economic strategy and convinced the workforce that their interests would ultimately be served by increased economic growth. The second was information on the side effects of "development" in areas such as employment, and in relation to specific groups such as women and minorities. These informatory and legitimating functions were performed by State agencies such as the Social Development Council in establishing goals for all New Zealanders, and by the Social and Cultural Committee of the N.D.C. in its demonstrative reinforcement of
the State's development strategy. These functions were further endorsed by social scientists and State practitioners engaged in the development of social indicators.

The social goals and objectives established by the Social Development Council were redefined by State technicians so that they could be expressed in "empirically manageable terms amenable to the application of quantitative measurement."(164) Concepts such as social wellbeing and the quality of life were subjected to measurement within the limitations imposed by "Government objectives and actions". Thus social indicators were conceived as statistics which might describe social conditions within a normative context, so that conclusions could be drawn by politicians as to whether things were "better, worse or the same".(165)

In adopting this approach, the State and its technicians avoided any fundamental debate over the means by which the nation's social objectives might be achieved. Whilst the dominant goal defined by the Social Council promoted the notion of an egalitarian society how was equity to be defined? Was it the absence of poverty, distress and social squalor, the provision of a minimum standard of wellbeing, or was it to be measured on the basis of 'treatment' or 'results'? Can we assume a direct correlation between increased economic growth and national wellbeing and as a corollary to that question can we be assured that the generation of additional national income inevitably results in its equitable distribution?

Although social scientists deemed the answers to these questions to be
the prerogative of politicians, they made value judgements themselves
which inevitably conditioned the type of data to be collected and the
form in which this data should be used. In constructing a national
social indicators programme, social scientists provided "the technical
components" of information, so that "policymakers" could "assert
priorities between objectives." (166) Whilst they may have made these
decisions for a variety of reasons, they inadvertently treated
knowledge as a politically neutral commodity devoid of value
imputations, and as a consequence "practice" was reduced to the
systematic provision of empirical data so that the State could make a
political judgement.

Within the political realm of the State, class or group interests were
reduced to six hundred "individuals" whose ideas, motives and interests
were "thought to be irreconcilable". By reaching a consensus these
individuals provided the State with "the means" (legitimacy) by which
it might serve its capital interests. (167) The Social and Cultural
Committee took part in this reinterpretation by defining social
problems as the inbuilt, inevitable and ineffaceable part of the human
condition. Thus "the elderly, the handicapped, the social misfits and
the families" suffered "because of their own failings." (168)

In redefining the economic and social crises of New Zealand society as
a combination of individual failings and incongruence between the
various subsystems of society, the locus of any conflict was shifted
from the realm of private production and exploitation to the realm of
the State itself. By implication the problems facing New Zealand
society were not structural problems, but technical impediments to a
finely tuned system. At the individual level these failings were countered by encouragement, incentives and motivation, whilst in institutional terms the remedies proposed centred around improving the instruments of production and the mechanisms of democratic government. Thus the State was able to legitimate its actions by appearing to be a neutral instrument and arbiter representing the interests of all.

As previously illustrated this process of legitimation is effected by redefining political questions as technical issues, requiring objective, scientific analysis and resolution. It is this form of reductionism which allows science to become the ideological instrument of the State. It ensures the ideological reproduction of the capitalist formation and it results in the active repression of alternatives.

Although the outcome of these practices (both interactive and societal), suggests that social practitioners within the New Zealand context consciously disconnected themselves from the critical tradition, and from any practical interest in improving human existence, it is a proposition which requires further examination. Whilst there does appear to be a considerable degree of congruence between the system of social indicators established in New Zealand and the fatalistic attitude to the status quo which seemed to permeate the international movement, we have yet to distinguish between different modes of practice.

What can be said to this point, is that there did appear to be some correlation between the interests of these practitioners and the values
and interests of the bourgeoisie. At the same time the precise nature of this relationship has not been adequately explained. Nor have we addressed the fundamental association proposed by Habermas between the cognitive interests of practitioners and the manifestation of these interests in practice. These tasks are to be pursued in Chapter Four.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL INDICATORS – NEW ZEALAND


8. An example of the social indicators approach as mounted by the local State, utilising the framework established by the O.E.C.D. and the Department of Statistics (New Zealand), is to be found in the Auckland City Council publication, Social Indicators: A Pilot Survey, Data and Research Section, Auckland City Council, July 1979.


13. Habermas identifies the aim of the empirical-analytic sciences as the production of technically exploitable nomological knowledge. (See Legitimation Crisis, ibid) 1975 : XXIII) Within the N.Z. context a series of papers produced by the Dept. of Statistics clearly aligns the State and its practitioners with "technically utilisable knowledge".


19. The Model developed by Philpott has been refined since the 1960's and is now referred to as the Project on Economic Planning. It is a computer model which uses the technique of linear programming to explore alternative budgets based on different export mixes. "Differing emphasis on export increases compared with import substitution; different emphasis on capital-intensive compared with labour-intensive methods of production." B. Philpott, The Administration of the Economy. Invitation Research Lecture, Institute of Chartered Secretaries


26. A series of studies and publications during the 1970’s/80’s addressed the central themes of class, race and gender. These studies all questioned the ideology of egalitarianism referred to by Oliver and referenced in Note 25. See, by way of example, the following:


36. The National Development Bill was introduced into Parliament on October 5, 1979.

37. The Habermasian term "interesse" refers to "cognitive" or "knowledge-constitutive" interests.


42. British Petroleum (ibid) 1979.


44. This information was provided by M. McCabe, a director of Colenso the advertising agency handling the Fletcher account.


48. See the N.R.A.C. Case study in Chapter 5 of this thesis for an explication of Governments' policy of unemployment.


52. National Development Council Secretariat. Background to the Establishment of the Social Council, SCP 71/7. Proceedings of


56. Social and Cultural Committee (ibid) Quality of Life, 1969: 11.


65. Although the N.D.C. subcommittee believed that the Department of Social Welfare would provide the most suitable location for the Secretariat of any committee dealing with Social Welfare, some of those interviewed by the subcommittee would have preferred a more independent location and suggested Internal Affairs or Treasury.


67. Social Aspects of Productivity. SCP/71/11. Attached to this report were tables giving a comparative listing of G.N.P. per capita for 17 selected countries (for the years 1960-69-75) and the annual compound growth rate for these same nations (using 1960-69 as the base). Table A revealed that New Zealand’s relative position (G.N.P. per capita) vis a vis the countries listed, had declined from fifth to fourteenth position. Table B revealed a compound growth rate for New Zealand of 2.5 (the lowest growth rate recorded).

68 Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators:


70. A questionnaire from the Social Council of the N.D.C. for people and organisations interested in the Quality of Life, June 1972 (Draft). The final document was entitled; "Have your say in drafting Social Objectives", Wellington, November 1972.

71. In response to a question from N.D.C. about consulting minority opinion, the Social Council replied; "The tentative social objectives which have been drawn up by the Social Council are being distributed to as wide a cross-section of the community as possible. In considering the response to the Objectives, Council will take into account the views of all sections of the community." A list of questions arising from the Report to which the N.D.C. has requested a written reply, 2 October 1972 : 4.


73. Organisations and Individuals to whom Questionnaire on Social Objectives sent, July 1972.


75. Social Council. Report to the National Development Council, August 1973. The Questionnaire did receive considerable coverage in the New Zealand press as evidenced from the following;

Christchurch Press, Tuesday March 20 1973. "How do you Measure the Quality of Life?"


Te Awamutu Courier, 28 February 1973. Questionnaire on the Quality of Life.


78. Consultation with Representatives of the Social Council, NDCL/73/57, NDCL/73/57/1 page 5.

79. The establishment of such a Council was questioned by H. Lang (Secretary of Treasury and Chairman of the Steering Committee of NDC), J. Levin (Government Statistician), J. Ross (Executive Officer Dept. of Education) and Mrs Dell.


81. The suggestion that the Minister be requested to withhold his decision pending publication of the NDC report was made in a closed session. Advocates of the Council of Social Welfare were not members of the NDC Secretariat whereas opponents of the Council were represented by H. Lang.

82. Professor Duncan suggested the composition of such a committee during the meeting with Social Council representatives. NDCL/73/57, NDCL/73/57/1, page 6.

83. NDCL/73/57, NDCL/73/57/1, page 8.


85. Social Indicators, (ibid) 1973: 1. The apparent conflict over the number of submissions received from individuals and organisations on the S.D.C.'s Social Objectives, arise from two separate attempts at "participation". The first was operationalised along the lines of a pilot survey and simply aimed at selective feedback before releasing the objectives for public discussion. The second attempt was accompanied by considerable media coverage, but the low return rate and the abstract nature of the objectives resulted in "inconclusive findings".

86. Social Indicators, (ibid) 1973: 2. The meeting referred to was a regular session of the NDC.

87. The subcommittee identified July 1974 as the date when all initial work toward developing a comprehensive set of social indicators would be completed. Social Indicators, (ibid) 1973: 4.


89. Social Council, Development of Social Indicators, page 2.


94. Social Council, Notes of the Meeting to Establish a Working Party on Social Indicators, held at 10 a.m., Wednesday 12 September 1973, at the Head Office of the Department of Social Welfare.


100. Social Sciences Committee, NRAC. Second meeting, Wellington, 27 October 1971.


103. NRAC Social Sciences Working Party. Minutes first meeting 25/10/72. Minutes second meeting 5/12/72. Minutes third meeting 6/2/73. Minutes fourth meeting 8/3/73.


109. Social Council, Background Notes for Proposal to establish an Independent Social Science Research Institute, SC 7-1, SCP 74/3 1974 : 4-5.


111. NRAC Report for the Year ended 31 March 1974.

112. Function (b) as set out by the Working Party had stated: "To develop and maintain liaison with and between the research workers employed in Universities, Government departments and any other organisations involved in the field." In the NRAC Annual Report this function read: "To develop and maintain liaison with and between the social workers employed at Universities, Government departments and any other organisations involved in the field."

113. Social Development Council - Draft submission prepared by the Standing Committee on Social Research. SDCA/74/5, SDCP 74/15.

114. Letter from Dr J. Robson, Chairman Social Development Council to Hon. N. King, Minister of Social Welfare, 10 September 1974.


117. Recorded comments of Mr Callahan at a Meeting of the Standing Committee on Social Objectives, Social Indicators and Social Research on 1 July 1977. S.D.C. File Rep 7 -1, Minutes Ref. SDC M 77/3 No. 7.

118. Social Indicator Unit, Social Research and Development Section, Department of Statistics. Report of the Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators, 8 August 1975.

119. Notes on a meeting of the Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators, SDC 6-11, 1975 : 3.

120. Report of the Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators (Agenda item 7) Note 13, SDC 9-1, SDCM 76/1, 4 June 1976.

122. Memorandum from Dr R. Irvine to Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators. Review of Goals and Objectives for Social Development, November 2, 1976.


124. T. Dyce, letter to Dr Irvine, Social Development Council, 3 November 1976.


129. Working Party on Social Indicators (ibid) 1973: 2-3


136. Approval was also sought from the Minister of Social Welfare because of the Social Council's involvement in social indicator construction. The approval of both Ministers was promptly given in January 1974. Establishment of Unit for Development of Social Indicators, Dept. of Statistics, 32/1/16, 1974.

137. This analysis of the approach and philosophy of the Department of Statistics draws primarily on the following papers: W. Barr and M. Shields, Suggestions For the Development of Social Indicators, December 1973. Social Indicator Unit, Report to the Standing Committee on Social Objectives of the Social Development


152. W. Barr and M. Shields (ibid) 1973 : 3.


166. B. Dickinson (ibid) 1979 : 3.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SPECIFICITY OF SOCIAL PRACTICE

This chapter focuses more specifically on social practice and it addresses two major tasks. The first priority is to examine the degree of consciousness involved as social practitioners formulated and then operationalised a New Zealand system of social indicators. The second task is to define more precisely the relationship between the cognitive interests of these practitioners and their actions. The latter task will be approached by examining three spheres of social practice, whereas the degree of consciousness involved will be assessed by analysing the ideological components of practice. The empirical data for these examinations comes from documentary material canvassed in Chapter Three, and from interviews which were conducted with practitioners in 1979 and 1980. The format and structure of these interviews is outlined in Appendix IV: Methodology.

Class and Class Practices

Before embarking on the first task which centres around an examination of social practice, it is essential that we reappraise the theoretical logic of class as outlined in Chapter One. Class was defined therein by reference to economic relationships and according to the delineation of three distinct classes:

1. A bourgeois class defined by its ownership of the means of
production and distribution;

2. An oppressed class comprised of the 'silent culture' of society who neither own the means of production nor control their work activities;

3. A middle class defined by its limited participation in economic ownership and occupying a contradictory zone between the bourgeoisie and the oppressed.

This typology, based as it is in the Neo-Marxian tradition, now requires further clarification. By aligning the delineation of classes with the Marxist tradition alternative interpretations of class, stratification and inequality, have been set aside. (1) These alternative explanations include the Weberian tradition which conceives of classes as groups of people with common economic life chances determined primarily by market relations, and Dahrendorf's conception of class as common position within authority hierarchies. Although Dahrendorf's interpretation seems to be consistent with the Habermasian assertion that class domination within advanced capitalism depends on actual constellations of power, it is inadequate in analysing practice because it ultimately reduces power to a personal construct. Dahrendorf (2) portrays authority as the sole criterion for the designation of classes, and he then loosely defines the concept of authority according to the social relations of any organisation.

Neo-Marxists by contrast, have consistently defined class in terms of common structural positions within the social organisation of
production. This means that a particular class can only be understood in relation to other classes, and thus a central element in any 'critical' analysis is the delineation of the class structure within a particular social formation.

A recent survey of the New Zealand class structure (3) based on the work of Erik Olin Wright proposes three basic class locations. The first location is assigned to the bourgeois class which owns the means of production within a system of appropriation. Ownership in this context constitutes a complex system of social relationships, of enforceable rights and claims to the apparatus of production. As a consequence of ownership the bourgeoisie are able to exploit workers through a system of domination, and at the same time control the activities of workers within production. A second location is assigned to the petty bourgeoisie who own the means of production, control their own labour activities but do not exploit labour. A third location is defined by membership of the working class who neither own the means of production nor control their work activities. The working class has little or no autonomy, does not provide any real supervisory function, and thus it is frequently classified as the 'proletariat' or the 'oppressed.' The reason for this classification emanates from polarities established within the dual system of domination and appropriation.

Whilst this threefold typology of class may have been adequate in analysing capitalism in the nineteenth century, the advent of advanced capitalism has necessitated important extensions to the way in which we both conceive of class and understand class practices. The growth of
the interventionist State, the progressive rationalisation and bureaucratization of social institutions, and the increasing interdependence of science and technology has prompted a partial separation of ownership and control. Thus in Habermasian terms:

Class domination can no longer take the anonymous form of the law of value. Instead it now depends on factual constellations of power whether, and how, production of surplus value can be guaranteed through the public sector, and how the terms of the class compromise look. (4)

Wright’s response to this partial differentiation between ownership and control is to extend the typology of class to define a new social category of ‘manager.’ (5) This category is distinguished by the ‘managers’ simultaneous and partial location in two classes and it is the structural position of the new class which might be defined as contradictory. (6) By extending the typology of class in this way the Neo-Marxian emphasis on the system of ownership and private property is reaffirmed.

The term ‘property’ refers not only to the ownership of land, but private ownership in general, and especially the private ownership of all those commodities and processes that go into making the goods and services that underpin our social lives; in other words, ownership of the ‘means of production.’ Thus property, the system of employment that emanates from it, and the accumulation of capital in the hands of the dominant class, collectively represent the institutions and processes that constitute the core of the class system. These ‘struggles’ produce and reproduce systematic divisions of power, along with the benefits and constraints that flow from such power. As a consequence,
advanced capitalism might be described as a system of power organised in the form of property.

At the centre of these struggles over power lies the State, which has been theorised in this study as a relatively autonomous, yet essential element, in bourgeois reproduction. Whilst Marxist interpretations of the State emphasise the interdependence of the political, economic and ideological realms, it is possible to model the particular relationship between each of these domains, and the way in which they impact on State structure and State power. Based on the work of E.O. Wright, three different types of relationships can be identified in the exchange between classes and the State. These relationships are identified as mediation, selection and structural limitation.

Structural limitation refers to the way in which 'some social structure establishes limits within which some other structure or process can vary, and establishes probabilities for the specific structures or processes that are within these limits'. In other words, if we are talking about the State under capitalism, then we can assume that it is only capable of taking on certain specific forms. The State structure has institutional limits imposed on it by virtue of its commitment to capitalism as a mode of production. The economic system of capitalism can thus be said to structurally limit the State, and this pattern of determination can be modelled as in Figure IV.

**FIGURE IV** Structural limitation
Selection refers to a lower order of influence between institutions, than that conveyed by structural limitation. While structural limitation sets the outer boundaries in that, the capitalist mode of economic production sets limits on what form the capitalist State can take, selection influences the choices made within those parameters. It provides a way of describing a relationship of lesser influence. Thus, while the economic may determine the State structure in the last instance, the ideological and political realms may influence the State structure within more confined boundaries. The notion of welfare provides a useful illustration.

While the general nature of the capitalist State is prescribed by the economic sphere, the emphasis which State structure places on welfare activity as opposed to capital accumulation is still subject to a selection process. This selection process is evident in the debate currently being engaged in respect of supplementary minimum prices for primary products. Here, taxation revenue is being dispensed to farmers as a means of subsidising income, and as such, it corresponds with similar monetary transfers to 'welfare' beneficiaries. The boundaries which prescribe revenue accumulation by the State have already been set, but whether or not these particular payments should be made, and if so, at what level, are ultimately selection questions. The large question of what broad form the State will take is structurally determined by economic relations, whereas these 'limits within limits' can be said to be selected by other forces. Selection can therefore be modelled as in Figure V

FIGURE V  Selection

![Diagram showing the relationship between Political Class Conflict, Selection, and State Structure.]

POLITICAL CLASS CONFLICT  SELECTION  STATE STRUCTURE
Mediation, a third form of determination, is particularly important in analysing the relationship between class action and State power. By State power is meant the action of the State on behalf of certain classes or class fractions. By State apparatus is meant the structure of the State itself – its agents, its organisation, its physical structure, its expenditure. This does not mean that it should be viewed as an instrument or a ‘thing’, but rather in Poulantzian terms, it is a form determined field of social relations which has definite effects on the political class struggle.

When class struggles are external to the institutions of the State, then the ‘bureaucracy’ may effectively select policies which serve the interests of capital. When these struggles take place inside the State apparatus, then both the form and execution of these policies are likely to be substantially different. However, it is not only the outcome which is likely to be effected by mediation, but also the very relationship between State structure and State policy. A current example within the context of the New Zealand State will illustrate this pattern of determination.

The Maori Loans Affair surfaced in 1986 as an issue of Ministerial propriety. It was alleged by a National Party Member of Parliament that the Minister of Maori Affairs had given approval for a six hundred million dollar loan to be raised overseas for the benefit and development of the Maori people. Although approval was formally withheld, the Minister was somewhat confused over the details of the proposal and there was also considerable debate and uncertainty surrounding the actions of top civil servants.
At one level this affair could be perceived as a partisan political conflict between the National and Labour Parties in the lead up to the 1987 election campaign. However, there were also class and racial components to this conflict with anti-Maori attitudes surfacing in the media and an orchestrated campaign by the Maori community designed to protect the positions of the Minister of Maori Affairs and his Departmental Secretary and Deputy-Secretary.

The outcome of this mediation process resulted in the Minister securing his position in Cabinet, but losing some credibility in the process. Similarly, the Departmental officials retained their jobs, but the State Services Commission appointed a former Secretary of Justice to advise and counsel the Secretary for Maori Affairs. While this ideological crisis wrought logistic changes in both State structure and State policy, legitimacy was maintained by the selective practices of the State Services Commission and the Cabinet. These selective practices in turn were conditioned by the structural limitations of capitalism as a mode of production. In the case of mediation, these practices can be modelled as in Figure VI
If we take these modes of determination together, then the relationship between mediation, selection and structural limitations can be modelled as in Figure VII. Whereas this model charts the three modes of determination as defined by Wright, the central concern of this dissertation is to examine the actions of practitioners within the State, particularly those whose positions are not directly defined by ownership of the means of production. Thus we need to examine the mediating and selective practices of State practitioners who occupy those political and ideological positions which have traditionally been referred to as 'superstructural'.

It is not the delineation of different locations within the State superstructure which is of major importance to the present study, but rather the relationship between the class structure and class practices. This relationship ultimately stems from the fundamental interests of the capitalist and working classes which are diametrically
FIGURE VII  Model of determination of the bureaucratic structure of the State apparatuses

Socio-economic structure
(Structure of class relations)

Forms of political class struggle

Political organisational capacities of classes
(Parliment, political parties)

Structure of the State administrative apparatuses
(Bureaucratic form of state)

Reproduction

Transformation

Selection

Structural limitation
opposed. Whereas the interests of the working class centre around the pursuit of State power and ideological hegemony, the capitalist class seeks to prevent working class domination. These antagonistic class interests can be expressed in the following positions:

1. **bourgeois positions**, which involve control over the creation of State policies and the production of ideology;

2. **contradictory locations**, which involve the execution of State policies and the dissemination of ideology; and

3. **proletarian positions**, which result in exclusion from either the creation or execution of State policies and ideology.

In practice these three locations within the State superstructure can be equated with the expanded typology of economic class relations as developed by Wright(7). This meant that the political and ideological realms of the State can be conceived as sites of class conflict in the same way that the economic base is characterised by struggles over power. At the same time this typology needs to be qualified lest it should be interpreted as representing discrete categories of individuals within clearly defined locations. In reality the distinctions which have been made are infused with ambiguity. This ambiguity is particularly evident within contradictory locations, wherein some individuals (as members of what will now be referred to as the **auxiliary class**) (8), occupy the boundary of the bourgeoisie, whereas others can be located along the boundary of the proletariat.
Whilst these distinctions are significant and will be noted in the present study, the overriding interest in contradictory locations stems from the institutionalisation of power and the way in which power relationships are mediated and legitimated within the State superstructure. Within the context of institutionalised action this means that we must distinguish between the interests and capacities of respective classes - at the interactive level it means concentrating on the institutionalisation of power within contradictory locations and the way in which power is used by members of the auxiliary class.

Class Practices within the National Development Conference

If we pursue this interest in power in relation to the development of social indicators within New Zealand, and in particular within the context of the National Development Conference, then we have a partial explanation for the proposed relationship which has been asserted, between the values and interests of State practitioners as members of the auxiliary class, and the bourgeoisie.

In establishing the machinery for the National Development Conference a Steering Committee was formed(9) chaired by the Secretary of Treasury, and comprising a membership which contained two permanent heads of State departments, a manager of an insurance company, the Dominion President of Federated Farmers, the Chief Accountant for Woolworths, and the Managing Director of the Auckland Knitting Mills. These practitioners can be theorised as occupying contradictory locations 'around the boundary of the bourgeoisie', with the only other member of
the Steering Committee (the research officer for the Federation of Labour) occupying a position 'around the boundary of the proletariat.' Similar patterns of selection and representation can be identified mutatis mutandis within each sector council and standing committee established under the auspices of the N.D.C.

The Manufacturing Committee(10) was chaired by the Permanent Head of the Department of Industries and Commerce. Its membership included Lang (Secretary of Treasury and Chairman of N.D.C.), seven Managing Directors, representatives of the Manufacturers Federation, the Federation of Labour and Federated Farmers, the Assistant General Manager of the National Bank and a Professor of Economics from Victoria University. Similarly, the Forestry Committee(11) was chaired by a Departmental Head, in this case the Director-General of Forests. Its membership included Lang (Secretary of Treasury), the Permanent Head of the Department of Industries and Commerce, two senior representatives of New Zealand Forest Products, a representative of Fletchers, and a Professor of Management Accounting at Victoria University. Even the Social and Cultural Committee(12) when eventually formed was chaired by the Permanent Head of a Government Department (the Secretary of Justice) and four further Departmental heads were represented in the committee membership. It was this weighting of committee membership in favour of capital, and the vesting of strategic conference positions in the hands of the bourgeois class, which ensured direct control over the creation and execution of State policies.

However, it was not only the effective control exercised by the bourgeoisie over the creation of State policies which meant that
economic restructuring would ultimately favour the long term interests of capital. The bourgeoisie reinforced the thrust and direction of this restructuring programme by means of political and ideological practices. These practices were expressed in the Conference philosophy, in the terms of reference for sector councils, and in the ideology of 'restructuring' which equated social well-being with social investment. During the conference notions such as 'welfare' and the nation's 'quality of life', were consistently linked with social investment as a "painless way of redistributing from one existing group to another". (13) Without increased economic growth any redistribution was considered "extremely difficult politically".

If you have no growth at all ... well you've got to take a hell of a lot from some people who will be worse off absolutely as a result. (14)

The N.D.C. Conference was actively promoted by the bourgeoisie as a way of "organising society" so that the bulk of growth generated by the State's economic policy would be distributed to "key groups". If New Zealand manufacturing was to become internationally competitive, then the nation would have to accept an "open type economy", and this would precipitate changes in the country's economic and social life. When conference strategists referred therefore to "die hard manufacturers and business people" being concerned with "social" as well as economic development, they were talking about the social implications of a clearly defined economic programme. (15) The means and ends of this programme were apparently never in question.

Whilst this predominantly structuralist interpretation of the process
and outcome of the N.D.C. avoids the economistic tendencies of the more traditional elements of Marxist-Leninism, it tends to abstract social relations beyond human activity, and in this process the dynamic of class interaction is removed.

The stage is set, the scripts written, the roles established, but the performers are curiously absent from the scene. (16)

The conduct of the conference is explained merely as the outcome of social or institutional causes. The ramifications of abstracting social relations in this way can be demonstrated by reference to the first conference session of 1968.

Although the framework and conference objectives were clearly defined by the dominant class with assistance from practitioners occupying contradictory locations around the borders of the bourgeoisie, social scientists and civil servants occupying contradictory locations along the boundary of the proletariat, expressed dissatisfaction with a national conference on development which "only seemed to be concerned with economic things."(17) They set out to "persuade the N.D.C. organisation that they ought to take account of both social and environmental factors."(18) They orchestrated this persuasion by arranging a series of submissions under the auspices of their own Departments, and in this way they created a wide spectrum of interest in "social" development. These class practices were clearly significant in negotiating broader terms of reference for the Conference, and it prompted the secretariat into establishing a Social and Cultural Committee which ultimately led to the development of
social indicators.

Yet accounts of both the conference proceedings and outcome exclude these essential components of practice. The complex and dynamic struggle between classes and class fractions are negated by abstraction. The subjects of this struggle seem almost incidental participants in a predetermined plan, and as a consequence they are either regarded as "cultural dopes" or passive "bearers of a mode of production" (19), with no worthwhile understanding of their surroundings or of the circumstances of their action. This is clearly at variance with the way in which social practice has been theorised in this study.

In order to examine the practices of social scientists and the cognitive interests underlying their actions, human beings have been conceived as relatively autonomous agents engaged in a continuous flow of action. This continuous flow of action is manifested both as concepts of interaction (which are dependent upon the communicative and strategic acts of the subjects themselves), and as institutionalised patterns of practice established by society as a whole.

As Habermas has illustrated, these levels of action are dialectically interdependent, and thus in this chapter the predominantly structuralist interpretation of Chapters Two and Three will be related to an agency perspective. To effect this dialectic of control between agency and structure, three spheres of social practice will be examined, and in this examination particular attention will be focussed on the ideological components of practice. This is consistent with the Habermasian assertion that ideology draws its significance from
meanings that individuals ascribe to their actions and from the historical situations in which they are immersed.

Three Spheres of Social Practice

The three spheres of social practice to be examined are:

1. the construction of social goals as undertaken by the Social Council, a subsidiary of the National Development Council.

2. the social indicators approach fashioned by the Department of Statistics;

3. the wave of proposals to establish an independent social research institute in New Zealand;

In each of these spheres the textual examination initiated in Chapter Three provides the empirical base for this analysis. It identifies members of the auxiliary class who were involved in the New Zealand equivalent of the social indicators movement, and in structural terms it confirms these actors as social practitioners occupying contradictory locations within the State. By focussing on the specificity of social practice the emphasis now changes to an agency interpretation, where the aim is to clarify and interpret the actions of social scientists in order to establish their textual significance. Thus taped interviews with members of the auxiliary class, counters the
structuralist tendency to abstract social relations beyond human activity. At the same time the voluntaristic tendency to describe but not explain will be addressed in the latter sections of this chapter, so that the dualism of agency and structure might be retained. We turn first to the construction of social goals, which is assumed to be the foundation upon which the New Zealand system of social indicators was based.

1. The Specification of Social Goals

The construction of social goals as the first step in measuring social wellbeing, emanated from a paper(20) prepared by Gardner, a member of the Social Council secretariat. This paper was not requested by the Council, but "it most certainly influenced" their thinking and direction.

Public servants play a significant part in every government committee I've been on. The papers are usually prepared by them. We were influenced at quite an early stage in this.(21)

Gardner's interest in social indicators devolved from his practice as Senior Research Officer with the Department of Social Security. He first heard the term social indicators mentioned in relation to the American Space Programme, and "it happened to coincide" with a Royal Commission on Social Security, which was set the task of examining the somewhat contentious field of income maintenance.
We had to think about what precisely the Income Maintenance scheme was trying to achieve, and it was in the process of doing that or thinking about that, that I looked at Suchman's book on effectiveness. He discussed the whole issue of social indicators in the context of overall evaluation of programme effectiveness. (22)

Based on this psychological text, Gardner wrote the philosophical background papers for the Royal Commission. It was a question of "simply stepping through Suchman's work,"(23) identifying certain values, and then translating these values into specific objectives. "A literary type exercise rather than an empirical scientific one."(24) The results of this "literary type" exercise are evident in two major background papers to the Royal Commission.(25) The first examined the values and objectives of income maintenance programmes, and suggested that objectives should be "stated in terms which [could] be measured."(26) This paper drew directly from the framework established by Suchman, and it identified "effectiveness in achieving intended objectives" as the criterion of success for any social programme.(27) In the second paper, Gardner set out to identify those values which appeared to be most central to programmes directed at the enhancement of "economic wellbeing". In this process he identified four central values and associated sub-objectives.

Life and health is good. To ensure for all individuals access to a level of economic wellbeing sufficient to maintain life and health.

Belonging and participating is good. To ensure for all individuals access to a level of economic wellbeing not in essence below that which is most normal in the community in which they live.

Equality of economic wellbeing is good. To ensure
for all individuals access to a level of economic wellbeing not in essence different from any other person in the community in which they live.

Security of status is good. To ensure access to a level of economic wellbeing not significantly different from that which an individual previously had, and to maintain that level relative to all other individuals.(28)

These values and objectives represented a "synthesis" of ideas which came from both national and international literature on income maintenance programmes, but whereas other papers prepared for the Royal Commission lacked an explicit framework, Gardner’s papers were structured by the Suchman emphasis on enumerating social objectives. The final format of these papers represented his initiative and work "gotten at by an editorial committee".(29) Twelve months later, as a member of the Social Council’s secretariat, Gardner expanded the concepts synthesised in the Royal Commission’s papers, and presented an unsolicited paper to the Social Council on "Deriving Social Objectives and Constructing Social Indicators".(30)

The primary concern of this paper was with the nature of constructs out of which objectives are derived. The notion "quality of life" was defined as, "that collection of situations, objects or events which are held to be good for the individuals living in a community having been realised (where the avoidance of the bad is taken as being implicit in the meaning of "good")."(31) Gardner identified three important elements in this definition. The first referred to the words, "for the individuals", where "any assumption of democratic principle [was] avoided, thus leaving the definition neutral as to political process."(32) The implication was, that the "method of political
process" was a matter devolving from values subsumed to, and not implicit in, the definition of quality of life, and thus requiring enumeration.

The second implication of the definition adopted by Gardner, related to the notion of communal responsibility. In evaluating the merits of adopting any particular value, Gardner wanted the states of all individuals living in community to be considered. It followed from this, that any values adopted on behalf of the community automatically became a community responsibility. Both the judgement and realisation of the values adopted devolved "on the governing body of the community"(33), and whilst Gardner believed the executive branch of Government was usually given a programme to administer and not a set of objectives, he was pragmatic enough to assert that the realisation of certain values might "only be possible" through "the organs of the State".

Having established a definition which equated individual and social wellbeing, Gardner encouraged the Social Council to enumerate social objectives, by beginning with "what things they could all agree on would be worth pursuing in their own right."(34) The Social Council was considered to be in a rather more fortunate position than administrators or evaluators of particular programmes, because they might use sources other than State programmes in their search for relevant values and objectives. Once the objectives were enumerated it might be possible to see to what extent the programmes in operation influenced their attainment.
Explicit statement of values and objectives has a central role to play in the objectification of the decision-making process. Unless the goal is capable of being translated into measurable terms and is in fact so translated, it is neither possible to carry out the appropriate research to determine goal achieving processes and factors, nor to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of a programme in achieving its goals.(35)

Because of the complexity of constructing "measuring instruments for objective states", Gardner suggested that the Social Council might need to "rely on personal and expert experience and knowledge."(36) The employment of sophisticated simulation and delphi techniques, in combination with forecasting models based on empirically determined relationships between sub- and super-ordinate values, was one approach which might identify the reciprocal influence of technological change and community values. While members of the Social Council appreciated the depth of this background paper, they were not prepared "to be pushed around too much by officers of the department"(37), and they set about trying to define "a single goal to which everybody could subscribe." These discussions clearly engendered considerable argument and debate.

I remember someone saying, well family integration and integrity is probably the most valuable of all the social indicators, and the argument immediately being thrown up to counter this, that may be in fact one of the unhealthy aspects of our society is an overdemanding and constricting family relationship and we need a freer family. That's when Bill Herewini came in with Whanaungatanga as an acceptable objective.(38)

The goals and objectives were "tediously argued"(39) around the table, and the secretariat was then given the responsibility of drawing up a
draft statement. Gardner was again the person primarily responsible for the initial draft, and thus, there is considerable congruence evident, between the values and sub-objectives as set out in the Social Security documents, and the statement of goals and objectives prepared under the auspices of the Social Council. The emphasis on individual wellbeing was clearly enunciated.

What I was interested in doing was providing a framework within which those ends could be talked about sensibly. If anything would distinguish those objectives from the set of objectives of a Communist society it would be that everything is done in terms of the good of the individual, and even the social things, groups, have an individual basis to it. (40)

Gardner's individualistic philosophy was strongly reinforced by the Chairman of the Social Council, Dr Robson. Robson was "sceptical of economic man", and thus he "struggled for the preservation of the dignity of the human-being." (41) Whilst a general consensus eventually emerged from these discussions on the goals and objectives for national development, the attempt to measure these objectives resulted in a cleavage between the Social Council and some members of the secretariat. Whereas Council members subscribed to a set of goals for all New Zealanders, Gardner in particular believed the notion of a single goal to which everybody could subscribe was "nonsense", for "in a pluralistic society you could only have a single goal as a slogan." (42) He would have preferred a simple listing of objectives which might relate to "valued ends", and which might eventually be subject to measurement.
I thought it was important that they be put in such a way that they were most meaningful, so that people that had to do the measurements would get the right meaning. (43)

McCreary suggested an alternative methodology. He favoured a "factor analysis of massive intercorrelations between all the variables that were available" to see what would come out "as the predominant factor." (44) These methodological considerations were put aside however, and the Council focussed instead on sending out a list of tentative objectives for community discussion and debate. The response rate was "appallingly low" (45) and the entire exercise foundered. The only contribution by the Social Council to the development of social indicators after 10 years, was a set of "motherhood type statements" (46) which "were not translatable into sensible measurable terms." (47)

Different interpretations are placed on the declining role of the Social Council in the development of social indicators. The first explanation places emphasis on interdepartmental jealousies and parochialism. Certainly the respective departments had a 'vested interest' (48) in retaining control of the secretariat responsible for securing the development of social indicators, because they could see possible "spin offs" for their own administrations in resources and status. This explains to some extent the initiatives of the Government Statistician (Lewin), in pushing for the Task Force to be located within the Department of Statistics. (49) It also accounts for the reaction to Professor Duncan's paper.
The N.D.C. gave Duncan responsibility for negotiating between these two Departments, "each of which wanted to home in on the thing and have it for themselves."(50) Duncan thought both had a legitimate claim to be involved, but the Statistics Department thought otherwise. Representatives of the Department perceived Duncan as a "physical scientist trying to apply physical science methods to a social science area", and Shields in particular did not think "he understood the nature of the material".(51) These comments did not appear in "official" documents however. Instead, the department criticised the N.D.C. and its subsidiaries (Social Council), for ignoring the Department of Statistics on information relating to social indicators, and they pointedly referred to the fact that the Social Council subcommittee was not the only agency concerned with evaluating social indicators.(52)

An alternative explanation for the declining impact of the Social Council, and the transfer of responsibility to the Department of Statistics, relates to the epistemology of social indicators. Whereas Shields maintains that any tension "certainly wasn't based on different theoretical perspectives, because at that stage there was damn all theory even talked about",(53) the differing expectations of social indicators stemmed ultimately from alternative epistemological positions. These differences surfaced within the N.D.C. and certain subsidiaries such as the Task Force, which led eventually to the Social Indicator's Unit of the Department of Statistics.

Within the framework of the N.D.C., policy administrators tended to equate social indicators with programme evaluation. This interest in
programme evaluation originated in North America, and it was picked up by administrators and accountants within the New Zealand State. These administrators expressed concern at the "vast amounts of money" being spent "on unnecessary facilities that weren't actually achieving anything." (54) In the sphere of health for example, questions were being raised about the emphasis on medical intervention as opposed to prevention. Similarly, in other "welfare" fields such as education, and income support systems, substantial criticisms emerged over the effectiveness of public programmes, and whether or not the public sector was "giving value for money." (55) From the programme evaluation point of view, the question then became, "what sorts of additional information in statistical terms did you need to enable you to assess the effectiveness of government programmes." (56) In policy terms, the emphasis on programme evaluation resulted in a review of the government accounting system, and in the establishment of a computer based system monitored by Treasury. Departmental estimates were recast in programme form, so that the activities of all departments were broken down into various categories, and in turn, these categories were subdivided into separate activities.

In theory the set up provided for precise definition of goals by departments. They could specify their programmes and activities within the constraints imposed by Treasury. (57)

The emphasis on programme evaluation as an accounting concept provided the New Zealand State with a framework for assessing the cost base of social programmes. Treasury provided the "technical assessment" and the "specialist information" required, as the basis upon which
priorities might be established.(58) Once priorities were established they became important elements in preparing the annual budget, and thus from an administrative point of view, the notion of indicators was viewed as an empirical guide for advice to government.

Similar sentiments were expressed by members of the Social Council. Dr Irvine(59) (Chairman of the Social Indicators Subcommittee), favoured economic type indicators because they transferred data and ideas into policy and decisions. He would like to have seen social indicators develop in the same way, so that concrete arguments could be made for additional resources. Similarly, Gardner and Grant of the Social Council secretariat, were in favour of "meaningful indicators", and neither were satisfied with the global objectives eventually approved by the Social Council.(60) Grant wanted to monitor State expenditure, especially where large sums of money were being utilised by voluntary welfare agencies.

We really don't have a monitoring of what they are doing and whether or not they are doing it better than we could or anybody else. In short, we don't have a quality control over them. If we had that information, we'd have a better idea of value for money.(61)

Other members of the Social Council were opposed to this emphasis on programme evaluation. Robson (Chairman of the Council), believed the statement of objectives, and the emphasis on social indicators in general, reflected "organisational man". "Things economic were coming through too strongly"(62), and thus, he remained sceptical that the human dimensions of development could ever be expressed in statistical
terms. Despite his suggestion that the secretariat consider a factor analysis of various indicators, McCreary was also concerned with the ambiguity of quantifying social factors in empirical terms. A falling birth rate, for example, could mean "either a country coming to terms with over-population, or a country that had lost faith in the future." Similarly, divorce statistics could be interpreted, "either as a greater degree of freedom in marriage, or an indicator of breakdown in marriage and therefore disintegration of family life." (63) Thus, McCreary viewed "social indicators", as "a way of injecting the social element into national thinking and national planning", which was "so heavily economically based and biased." (64)

Whereas Gardner, among others, wanted the community to accept final responsibility for the specification and maintenance of social goals and objectives, Shields maintained that the only persons who could set social goals were people who were politically accountable - the politicians. As a senior member of the social indicators task force established within the Department of Statistics, Shields argued with the Social Council for a higher level of specificity in their list of social objectives, but "representatives of government departments didn’t want a greater level of specificity and Robson himself did not want to politicise it." (65) In the belief that the only way a statistician could stay out of politics was to produce irrelevant statistics, Shields and the small task force within the Department of Statistics changed the goals themselves. As it seemed they were only going to be encouraged to produce non-controversial statistics that would avoid "central issues", they identified areas in which there was a possibility of developing social statistics. (66) This resulted in the
establishment of parameters which closely resembled the O.E.C.D. goals to indicator approach. Having changed the objectives of the Social council to suit these programmatic categories, the Task Force then simply went along to the Council "and explained" why they did it. According to Shields it was accepted without question, because the people on this "nothing committee" were "not researchers and would never be researchers."(67) The construction of social indicators from this time on became the responsibility of the Department of Statistics.

2. Social Practice in the Department of Statistics

The involvement of the Department of Statistics in social indicators was a gradual process, beginning with the collection of data for a Social Trends publication, and with the N.D.C. sub-committee report prepared by Lewin and Duncan. This report placed operational constraints on the Task Force, by setting social indicators within the context of economic targets established by the N.D.C., and by encouraging the further processing of existing social statistics.

Within the Task Force itself these constraints created tensions, which were manifested as differing interpretations of social indicators, and differing expectations of what might be achieved in the time allocated. Whereas the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Indicators (Grant), defined the objectives of the Task Force as the production of a "report on the social state of the nation",(68) the Task Force itself expressed the view, that the social report would contain less information, and be less comprehensive, than the annual
reports of respective government departments from whom they were gathering information. (69) There were two reasons for this - first, the "serious deficiencies" in the existing body of statistics collected by various government departments meant, that the Task Force would simply furnish a report which would be a virtual facsimile of the Social Trends publication, and therefore of little additional value. (70) And secondly, within government departments, "everybody was in favour of social indicators to measure progress in everybody else's area, but when you get to their area", it becomes "too complicated" for "only they [have] knowledge." (71) Some concern was also expressed at a "non-policy department getting into a policy area."

Institutional changes taking place in the early 1970's, also had an impact on the social indicators movement in New Zealand. In the sphere of welfare, a broadly based concern with the delivery of social services, was manifested in reports from various pressure groups, (72) in a Royal Commission on Social Security, (73) and in the merging of the Child Welfare Division of the Department of Education with the Department of Social Security. These institutional changes were given impetus by the election of a Labour Government in 1972. The Labour Prime Minister had previously described indicative planning as "an expensive farce" if not accompanied by "appropriate action" (74), and when Labour became the government the National Development Council was abolished. Those sector councils retained were made directly accountable to appropriate Ministers, and the Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities assumed direct responsibility for coordination and planning. The formation of a Department of Social Welfare resulted in the merging of advisory and research services, and in an expansion
of the development and policy functions of the department. A range of services was activated by these institutional movements, including, additional courses in social work education and the establishment of a New Zealand Council of Social Services. At the same time the Government Statistician (Lewin) was rapidly moving "Statistics" from simply providing clerical survey type facilities, into "a modern, technological, professional department."(75) This included the setting up of a social division which was seen by its director designate as a "development section". (76) It was within this section, and within the wider institutional changes taking place in the bureaucracy of the State, that the Social Indicators Unit of the Department of Statistics was formed.

Among the documents and reports which were used in shaping State policy in the early 1970's, were a series of monographs entitled, "New Approaches to Community in New Zealand." (77) These monographs were prepared by a Policy Study Group of the New Zealand Labour Party, with the two most influential members of this study group being Shields and Levett. Both became involved in this group because of a concern with welfare services. While the monographs presented welfare policy in a positive and developmental framework, the underlying motivation stemmed from extreme concern with the amount of money that was being spent with the best of intentions on social welfare, without any effective evaluation of either past or proposed expenditure. (78) They were perturbed by the sparcity of information about the performance of welfare in the country, and a "larger concern with the growth of expenditure in social welfare to the point where it was diminishing the opportunities for actual development."(79) Shields believed that Social
Welfare was becoming so distorted, that it was creating dependency rather than promoting independence, and thus social indicators were first conceived as a way of improving social research for evaluative monitoring purposes.

Shields joined the social indicator's task force at a time when there was considerable "tension", not only between competing departments, but between public servants within departments who had different views on the nature and potential of social indicators. Departmental representatives attended joint meetings on social indicators under the standing committees of the Social Council, but these meetings were described as a "waste of time". "We went along ready to out-wit them, and to defend the department, and nothing happened." (80)

There were difficulties too within the Department of Statistics. Although the technical side of indicator construction proceeded, staffing levels were inadequate, and departmental approval for a social indicators' survey had to be extracted by pressure applied both from inside, and outside, the department. The serious morale problem within the small social indicator's unit was taken up by Dr Irvine as Chairman of the Social Council's Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators,(81) whilst inside the department, Shields applied pressure by performing "tantrums" such as threatening to recommend the disbanding of the Unit if official support was not more forthcoming.(82) The resistance to, and scepticism about, social indicators came from "empiricists" within the Department, and from the Assistant Government Statistician, who resisted consultation with policy-making departments of State.(83) Whereas the Assistant
Government Statistician wanted to "distance" the Department so that it was "above politics", social scientists in the Department were concerned at the "arrogance of public servants", especially in areas of policy formulation, and they expressed these concerns in papers on the development of social indicators.(84)

Although scientists and administrators outside the immediate sphere of social indicator construction were sceptical, those intimately connected with its development were unified as to the system's potential. In the early stages of development this commitment was accompanied by a certain degree of euphoria. While some of this was attributable to the International movement, and the Department's involvement in the O.E.C.D. programme, the scale of New Zealand administration and the recency of social scientific appointments within Departments of State, resulted in a very small homogeneous group of "technicians", who could be identified as proponents of social indicators. Two of these proponents, Gardner and Dickinson, had worked together on the small research team at Social Security, and both were colleagues of Grant and Jenson. In the initial phase they were all reading the same material, predominantly from North America, and in Dickinson's terms "it was like discovering a new religion."(85) Although he moved out of this environment for almost two years (1972-1974), Dickinson came into the Department of Statistics when the social statistics section began to expand.

When I arrived here I discovered that in that 18 months to two years, that things had moved from what had been a gleam in our eyes to a situation where a task force was already in existence. And
of course me coming here and knowing the people over there was definitely an advantage.(86)

The closeness of this working relationship, between those committed to the concept and development of social indicators, was evident in the papers and reports which were prepared, and in the assumptions upon which these documents were based. The first of these assumptions related to the role of public servants. Shields defined this role as the production of options upon which politicians could decide. As a social scientist employed by the State, she perceived her role as "a servant of the government." (87) This meant divorcing her political views from her skills as a researcher. Although social scientists "found it harder and harder to write neutral material", she believed it possible to separate these two roles. "When it becomes impossible I'll have to get out." (88) These sentiments seemed to be universally held by social scientists involved in the social indicator's movement.

A second assumption follows from this conception of neutrality. It relates to the notion of "technicism". While proponents of social indicators reject being associated with "technocratic solutions to social problems", they acknowledge that the original purpose of the social indicator's movement was the provision of information which might be utilised in assessing and evaluating policies. (89) The aim was to "comprehend a rapidly changing world and control it," and thus they believed in the efficacy of social engineering based on improved social knowledge. Social indicators were "instruments" designed to provide "useful information" for government, with social scientists furnishing "the technical" components of this decision-making process. (90)
In justifying a technocratic approach to social indicators, proponents stressed the nature of democracy, and the distribution of "knowledge" for general public consumption. (91) Without a reasonable information system democracy could not work, as there would not be an informed political debate. This implied that information generated by social indicator research should be distributed in different arenas. The academic arena as a means of improving social theory - the political arena for politicians and administrators involved in decision-making - and the public arena for use by "the people" who were perceived as both the final sponsors of research (by way of taxation), and the consumers ("on whom the decisions are going to be enacted"). (92)

Although this approach to the public distribution of information suggests that the indicators generated by the department were conceived as being neutral, proponents conceded that there was a relationship between the emergence of social indicators and the crisis in the world economy. (93) In international terms it was acknowledged that the declining economic fortunes of nations and their relative ratings in international forums might be countered by other positive measures which would show their performance in a better light. "There might be some other way in which we could be top nation. " (94) While these comments were made in relation to the international social indicator's movement, the same emphasis on the "positive" use of social indicators was also promulgated in New Zealand. Dickinson viewed social information as being "on the whole rather gloomy". (95) It tended to look at the negative side of life, searching out the problems of society, when in fact "for the majority of people life isn't too bad".
Our social indicator programme has to monitor how things are getting better. It should be feeding information into government, saying to the government, this is the way the country is going, this is what peoples needs are, not in terms of a negative sense but in a positive sense. Not in the negative sense that there are 5 per cent unemployed and we must focus on that five per cent, but in terms of that other 95 per cent who are not unemployed.(96)

In advocating this approach, Dickinson was simply extending the rationale for social indicator construction advanced by those who equated social indicators with programme evaluation. The collection of information, and the setting of priorities, was defined by the context in which these decisions were made, and in New Zealand this was almost exclusively within the apparatus of the State. The emphasis on "positive information" however, negated the predominant view held by social scientists involved in the social indicator's movement - namely, that the indicators themselves were neutral and conflicts arose only when you came to differentiate between the objectives which the indicators were supposedly measuring.(97) These conflicts were identified with the political realm and not with the technical provision of data. Thus social scientists were able to contend that, "regardless of changes of Government", the indicators themselves would remain constant.(98) Hence the department's endorsement of a policy goals approach.

In the production of this information, and in their decision to choose a policy goals approach, proponents of social indicators openly identified a series of restraints.(99) First, "practical" restraints, which related to the position and purpose of social scientists in
Government research. Secondly, the "theoretical" restraints of social indicators in a scientific context. And thirdly, "resource" restraints on the existence of adequate data collecting mechanisms, and the availability of finance for the purposes of implementation.

The practical restraints of social indicator construction were associated with problems emanating from the concepts of "social wellbeing" and the nation's "quality of life". While it was acknowledged that this posed "theoretical as well as practical problems", it was the practical issues which became "a major determinant in shaping [the department's] approach."(100) Although the policy goals approach adopted by the department was identified as being "one step removed from monitoring actual quality of life",(101) it provided "legitimacy" for the categories selected, and for the indicators which would monitor these areas of concern.(102) This inevitably ensured legitimacy for the departmental approach to social indicators, and for those social scientists who had been appointed to perform this task. The adoption of the policy goals approach ultimately reinforced that notion of democracy, wherein information is provided by neutral, objective, servants of the State, so that the elected representatives of the people might make a political judgement. In this process, social scientists excluded their own involvement in "determining the choices available", as this would introduce "bias into the specification of goals."(103)

The theoretical restraints referred to by the department, were associated with the "absence of an adequate social theory"(104) which might facilitate the inductive derivation of indicators. While a
rigorous systemic theory or model of society was identified as being "ideally desirable", the absence of such a theory did "not preclude the development of social indicators."(105) Any major advances which had been made in "theoretical fields", were equated with "quantitative empirical research", aided by "improvements in data collection and analysis techniques".(106) Because of the inadequacies of social theory an alternative approach had to be adopted. This resulted in a deductive methodology, starting from the articulation of social concerns relevant to policy, and leading on to a description of social conditions, so that the State might draw conclusions as to whether things were "better, worse, or the same".

While the relationships pertaining between the various goals are not explicitly stated, it is assumed such relationships do exist, and are amenable to discovery and validation within a scientific context.(107)

The scientific context was framed by constraints imposed on social scientists as servants of the State, and by the selective decisions made by social scientists when they aligned themselves with a pragmatic deductive approach to indicator construction. The purpose of social indicators was defined for social scientists "by virtue of the fact that [they] were asked to assess a set of social goals and objectives."(108) They therefore identified with the O.E.C.D. programme because it conformed with what the Department of Statistics was asked to do. It did not presume "any great social theory of society", but simply set out to "construct", "apply", and "validate" hypotheses between various aspects of the policy goals.(109) In the development of this monitoring programme it was envisaged a theory or
model might later emerge.

In operationalising their monitoring programme, proponents of social indicators identified certain resource constraints. These related primarily to the inadequacies of existing social statistics, and thus they identified "objective studies", such as a comprehensive income and expenditure survey, and a social sciences survey for all government departments, as two ways in which an adequate data base might be established. (110) They wanted a collection of statistics which might be "standardised", and in the initial stages of indicator construction the major constraints on an institutionalised system were identified as methodological issues. (111) As the economic situation of the country deteriorated however, and with government imposing three per cent reductions in State expenditure across departments, they were forced to consider "money-saving approaches". (112) This meant a re-examination of existing collections of data to see if a certain number of indicators could be extracted and used as complementary data to the household survey facility.

These resource constraints explain in part why O.E.C.D. documents were particularly relevant to the department's programme. (113) The lists of social concerns and subconcerns produced by the O.E.C.D. were accompanied by detailed and systematic documentation, and this reduced some of the technical demands of constructing indicators in New Zealand with a small team of technicians and limited resources. It also explains why the Department of Statistics decided "to go out" in 1979 and encourage the active involvement of other government agencies. (114) At one level it was important to consult social scientists in their
areas of speciality - at the same time the department needed legitimacy to proceed, especially when it appeared to be encroaching on the policy domains of other departments.

Within the limitations imposed by these series of restraints the Department of Statistics committed itself to the development of a pragmatic system of indicators which might provide information "pertinent to policy formulation". (115) From a departmental point of view the programme would be judged "a success" if (regardless of changes of government) there remained some level of consensus and consistency in the information provided. (116) The goals and objectives of the Social Development Council were used to illustrate this argument. It was suggested that while the specification of goals might differ, the underlying sentiments were "universally approved". (117) Indicators were categorised therefore according to their different uses and applications. The emphasis was on relevance, measurability, validity, and standardisation. It was this sense of "realism" which replaced the early euphoria of the social indicator's movement, as social scientists concentrated on producing "useful social statistics, which might inform social planning, and add to the sum of scientific knowledge." (118)

3. Proposals to Reorganise Social Research in New Zealand

The production of knowledge which might be relevant to the policymaking process was not only confined to members of the auxiliary class within the State bureaucracy. In 1971 Levett, (119) a sociologist at Victoria
University and Chairman of a Labour Party branch, convened a seminar on Politics and Research. Social indicators were discussed at this seminar within the context of evaluating public programmes, but the Labour Party was "leary on academics" and there was "little interest" in social research until the production of monographs as background material for the Labour Party in the run up to the 1972 Parliamentary elections.

Levett's interest in evaluating public programmes can be traced back to the 1950's when he was involved, first as a youth club leader, and then subsequently as a social worker in Dunedin.(120) His "clients" were predominantly 17 and 18 year olds "out of work and out of prison." As well as being clients in the welfare sense of that term, these young people provided Levett with case records and empirical data for his master's thesis. Twenty years later he became personally involved with these families again. By this stage they were in their late 30's and early 40's, as "battered women from broken marriages" and "alcoholic men drifting through Wellington". He became involved with the children of these marriages who "were as badly off if not worse than their parents had been." Levett was disturbed at the "failure" of the Welfare State to alter these patterns of dependency, and thus he was "keen on evaluation" as a way of assessing "what we were doing" and "why it wasn't working". Levett was never really "interested in contributing to theory as such", and held the view, "that the greatest advances in social science theory" had historically come in response "to problems".(121) He perceived these problems as organisational impediments to the aims and objectives of the Welfare State.
The Labour Party monographs prepared in 1972 all reflect this emphasis on institutional malfunctioning. It was the third monograph on Administration and Research for Community Development which contained implications for social scientific practice. (122) Levett and Shields, the authors of this publication, wanted social research to be "promoted concurrently in different parts and at different levels of society", and they suggested that "the knowledge so acquired be made publicly available." They wanted an expanded and varied programme of social research as a means of promoting a "more adequate society" in the face of increasing social dislocation. To meet these requirements they identified five major elements for the reorganisation and expansion of social research in New Zealand. (123)

The first element proposed was a Social Science Research Council to be set up alongside the N.R.A.C. (124) This Council would be responsible for administering funds made available by government as a means of promoting, facilitating and co-ordinating social research. Secondly, (125) they suggested the establishment of an independent Social Research Institute funded by government, and charged with developing a unit capable of carrying out both short term and long term research. The third element suggested was the strengthening of government social research. (126) The two social scientists wanted government to give a new impetus to social research within State departments, by expanding staff and by concentrating more on the evaluation of existing and proposed programmes. The fourth element in their programme suggested that Universities and Technical Institutes be further encouraged to undertake social research by the establishment of fulltime research positions in relevant departments. (127) Their fifth
element encouraged the sponsorship of research by private groups and individuals, and they requested that monies be made available specifically for this purpose.(128)

Although the Levett and Shields proposal linked social research with reforming action, scientific practice was identified within the boundaries provided by the parliamentary system and the bureaucracy of State. Whilst Levett and Shields were both involved in a political party, and therefore engaged in a form of practice which clearly influenced their attitude toward social research, neither envisaged a political transformation of the social, economic, and moral order, which ultimately conditioned the parliamentary system. They were interested in the type of social scientific research which would give policymakers information that might be debated in a public arena. Only the organisational structure of social scientific research was considered problematic, and the proposal therefore concentrated on the physical location of respective research endeavours, the extent of State control by way of funding, and career prospects for social scientists, both inside and outside the State.

Six other proposals for the reorganisation of social research in New Zealand surfaced at this time. A summary of these six proposals, based on a comparative analysis of their institutional features, is set out in Appendix III. The categories used to compare these proposals came from a secretariat paper prepared by the Social Development Council, and as such, they tend to reflect the secretariat's preoccupation with "bureaucracy" as the framework for practice. There are two major limitations with this approach. First, the institutional structure of
practice is presented as a consensual backdrop or static organisational form, against which action is negotiated and the meaning of practice is formed. As a consequence, practice is separated from its environment, and agency is abstracted from the day-to-day conduct of bureaucratic life. Secondly, the functionalist interpretation of social scientific practice establishes normative expectations of both agency and structure. Practitioners are identified according to the roles they perform within the social system, and thus notions, such as power and change, are treated as dichotomous categories, based on either psychological or sociological interpretations of events. Neither are adequate in themselves as explanations of practice, as they fail to situate action in time and space as a continuous flow of conduct. The Habermasian interpretation of action is preferred because it emphasises a dialectical relationship wherein agency and structure presuppose one another. This dialectical relationship is rooted in alternative scientific traditions, the cognitive interests of practitioners and their corresponding dimensions of human social existence. Thus, when we refer to structure we are identifying those institutionalised patterns of action which emanate from the productive and reproductive practices of participants. Practice as a consequence becomes the point of articulation between agency and structure.

The significance of this interpretation becomes evident if we use an alternative typology as a way of classifying the six social research proposals set out in Appendix III. (See Table VI). By confronting the purpose of social research and its supposed beneficiaries, it becomes evident that all proposals failed to address questions such as, who was to decide on research priorities, on what basis, and whose interests
TABLE VI: PROPOSALS FOR THE REORGANISATION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PURPOSE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH</th>
<th>COMMENT ON NRAC REPORT BY DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE</th>
<th>PROPOSAL BY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL</th>
<th>PROPOSAL BY EASTON</th>
<th>PROPOSAL BY FOUGERE AND O'REILLY</th>
<th>PROPOSAL BY RITCHIE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a contributing factor to New Zealand's quality of life</td>
<td>Not defined, although paper focussed on relationship between social research and social welfare. Emphasis on resolution of institutional problems.</td>
<td>Provision of factual information for responsible decision making. Research seen as an 'aid to informed social policy'.</td>
<td>Easton supported the general tenor of the S.D.C. proposal. He goes further than the Council in discussing the purpose of such research by noting that 'research can be useful without being policy oriented'.</td>
<td>A centre is proposed as a means of stimulating organising and directing social research toward the resolution of social problems.</td>
<td>To inform public policy - 'the avoidance of political anxiety and needless public controversy when decisions are made'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Zealand people in general and the stimulation of social scientific research within Government and the Universities in particular.</td>
<td>Agencies and individuals engaged in activities related to social welfare - by implication the people of New Zealand would be the beneficiaries.</td>
<td>All New Zealanders through improvement to the quality of life.</td>
<td>New Zealand society in general. Considerable emphasis in all Easton's documents on the social scientific profession in particular.</td>
<td>The New Zealand people and 'not a particular Government.'</td>
<td>The public of New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government perceived as a neutral institution although the working party acknowledged that Government departements were sometimes 'unable to undertake research in politically sensitive areas.'</td>
<td>State reduced to departmental divisions and therefore emphasis on coordination and orderly development. The State is therefore perceived as neutral.</td>
<td>'Government research can be attacked probably unfairly, by other interested parties, as lacking objectivity and credibility merely because the Government has been responsible for it. Thus an independent institute was proposed but a critical role was not implied.</td>
<td>Government funding and support. The provision of an 'appropriate environment' which is defined as independent yet sustained by agreed funding and contract research from Government.</td>
<td>The Government is perceived as representing the people of New Zealand.</td>
<td>Coordination and funding role on behalf of the common good. The State is seen as a neutral institution and is equated with Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specifically defined. However, emphasis on information, coordination and analysis of social science data as basis of knowledge.</td>
<td>An emphasis on the dissemination of information.</td>
<td>'Research involves the selection of the areas which are relevant to an understanding of the issue under study and which are to be focussed on for the collection of data. It also involves assessment and evaluation of the patterns emerging from the collected data.'</td>
<td>Strong emphasis on quantitative methods 'without sound quantitative analysis much of our social science research will continue to be ineffective.'</td>
<td>Provision of 'information' and 'understanding'.</td>
<td>'We believe that it is from the techniques of social research that critical answers to social questions may derive.'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were ultimately being served? To suggest that the purpose of social research is designed to ameliorate institutional and social problems, is to advocate a form of science which accepts the existing institutional and structural arrangements of society as constant factors, beyond scientific critique and above transformative action. Policy decisions are isolated in the political realm of the State which is equated with representative government. By contrast the bureaucracy becomes an ordered, regulated system, which supposedly has "expectations" of its own. These "expectations" are usually framed in terms of neutrality, balance, and the provision of "pure knowledge", which is guaranteed by the independence of social scientists as servants of the State. Two sets of implications arise out of these interpretations. The first relates to social scientific research and the second to social practice.

By advancing science as a neutral, objective, informative operation, social scientists adopt a normative methodology which takes on the appearance of being context free. That is, science is carried out "by non people in non places"(129) and research is abstracted from its location in time and from its setting of interaction. Class interests as a consequence are isolated from the scientific enterprise. Scientists are perceived as having no "interests" or class alignments of their own. Their research is informed by the "established" rules of science and by the "rational" expectations of the State bureaucracy. Both conform with a view of research which emphasises impartiality and objectivity in the presentation of "facts".
If one compares this interpretation of social research with the outcome of research practice, then there is considerable disjuncture between the philosophy of neutrality and the social reality of scientific "interests". During the 1970's, social science research in New Zealand adopted functionalism either explicitly or implicitly, in the choice of topics studied, the methodologies employed, and by the way in which results were both presented and used. This research fostered an optimistic image of New Zealand Society as a system whose major problems were deemed soluble within existent master institutions. Research emphasised the colonised rather than the coloniser, the powerless rather than the powerful, and the culture of poverty rather than the culture of affluence. Whilst interpretations of "studying down" might describe the results of such research as "harmless", the preoccupation with information relating to "deviants" could only serve dominant class and group interests. By identifying structure as a constant factor, social scientists inadvertently concluded that any ameliorative action would come about either as a consequence of improved institutional functioning, or in the reformation of deviant behaviour.

Practitioners by contrast would benefit directly from such research. In accepting the conventional practices of science and bureaucracy, social scientists ensured legitimacy as technicians and security as civil servants. This does not mean that we can assume a single functional ideology pervaded the entire social formation and thus reduced social scientists to relatively unproblematic agents of their political and economic masters. Nor can we assume that social research occurred within an environment which placed impossible constraints upon
the practice of social scientists. As theorised previously, to conceive of structure as both the medium and outcome of practice is to say that social practice involves a choice, either to intervene or to refrain from intervening. It is not simply the outcome of social causes - nor is it simply the result of individual interests (in this case the interests of social scientists) - rather, it emanates from the dialectical relationship between agency and structure, and in this sense the alignment of social practice with the empirical-analytic tradition reflects a dialectic of control. The outcome of these practices as revealed in the proposal to reorganise social research, inadvertently favoured dominant class interests.

The Ideology of Social Scientific Practice

In order to understand how this outcome was effected and legitimated in social scientific practice means addressing the question of ideology. Two forms of ideology have been previously identified as having significance for the development of practice. First, that which demonstrates contrivance or manipulation by the dominant class in furthering its sectional interests - an action focus. And secondly, that which demonstrates how domination is sustained in the context of everyday life - an institutional focus.

In the sphere of action, the first ideological construct of significance relates to the equation of individual and social wellbeing. In international terms the O.E.C.D. produced a list of social concerns "pertinent to human wellbeing",(132) and within the
Department of Statistics, members of the auxiliary class found this objective "appealing", because it focussed "on individual rather than societal wellbeing", and it was concerned with the "output of social policy rather than inputs." (133) This does not mean that the O.E.C.D. programme was simply transplanted in New Zealand. Although politicians and technicians from New Zealand took part in the O.E.C.D. exercise, the emphasis on individualism was confirmed by institutions and practitioners within this country. The National Development Conference with its emphasis on increased economic growth, viewed social indicators both as a way of evaluating State welfare, and as a means of monitoring the social implications of "development". The distribution of resources to individuals was assumed to be dependent upon the generation of increased economic growth, and the reports of the Council's various "social subsidiaries" were all framed within the constraints conditioned by this dependency. In its report to Conference, the Social and Cultural Committee emphasised "the positive human attribute of striving as an essential element in the individual's life and work," (134) and the Social Council defined social wellbeing as "the maximum opportunity for each person to achieve happiness." (135)

This emphasis on individualism was also evident in other spheres of social practice. When Gardner wrote background material for the Royal Commission on Social Security, and presented his unsolicited paper on the derivation of social objectives and the construction of social indicators, he used a psychological text as his framework. This book by Suchman (136) was aimed at evaluating public service and social action programmes, but it reduced evaluation to the "process whereby man attempts to check upon his own ability to influence other men or
his environment." (137) Even practitioners, who considered themselves culturally sensitive to alternative interpretations of social reality, reached a consensus on development goals which were clearly conditioned by a cultural framework committed to individual wellbeing.

I remember thinking at the end, that these were probably not the cultural values of Polynesian society. The only thing that sounds vaguely Polynesian is Whanaungatanga, and nobody could pronounce it. When they were reading out the things, the Chairman would turn to me if Bill [Herewini] wasn't there and say, would you mind reading out these objectives. And I knew damn well that I was reading them out because I could pronounce Whanaungatanga and he couldn't. (138)

The epistemological basis of this commitment to individualism can be identified with the mainstream tradition as exemplified in the work of Popper. (139) He portrays all social phenomena, "especially the functioning of social institutions", as the outcome of "individual" decisions, and thus assumes that the individual stands in need of no explication. As a description of action it is clearly inadequate, in that it reduces class and cultural differences to a unitary system of analysis, and as such it favours dominant class interests. It was a bias which was retrospectively identified by social practitioners themselves.

If you're talking about the ideology or the values which sets out the system, I guess you could say for a start that its very middle class. It assumes that you've got dominant social goals in society, and you can come up with a set of goals that everyone can agree on. It doesn't really take account of a multi-cultural society as such. (140)
Whilst the context in which the social indicator’s movement was formed clearly had a significant influence on the approach adopted, members of the auxiliary class espoused an individualistic interpretation of social reality themselves.

A member of society becomes a member of many groups. I don’t believe there is cohesion among groups. We talk about Maoris, or Polynesians, or women, or teenagers, or whatever. I have very grave doubts about the usefulness of that sort of analysis. Because Maoris, women, they’re all people. (141)

This unconditional acceptance of individualism as an appropriate base for social indicator construction assumed a certain form of development.

It assumes we live in a post-industrial society where it’s not possible to make changes on a local level. Where we have big government, where we’ve got to make important decisions, and where you need all the best information to do it. (142)

It also assumed that there existed some set of national goals and objectives to which all New Zealanders subscribed. In such a society there could be no serious questions about political ends or values, only empirical ones about the most effective means.

All governments believe that all persons should be able to attain their fullest intellectual and productive potential and enjoy equal access to the means of developing that potential. (143)

With "consensus" between State and State agencies on the goals of
development any differences were largely irrelevant.

All these Councils have not a hellish strong political flavour. They've got a few sure, but if there was a change of government next year I don't think there would be too much change - just a normal turnover. The plans are acceptable to all parties. (144)

As a consequence, the policy and practice of social indicators was reduced to choosing "the most effective system", on the assumption that the process of indicator construction might somehow provide answers to larger non-empirical questions.

We shall never develop our understanding of how society works without more basic facts about where we are now and where we are going. (145)

To construct a system which would measure social wellbeing,

...you needed some kind of index, some kind of measure. That meant making it numerical. (146)

When it came to the interpretation of these indicators,

...well, that's politics, and depends ultimately on your value judgements, which is really nothing to do with indicators. (147)

The indicators themselves are value-free if you like, until you come to the conflicts between the different objectives which the indicators are measures of. (148)

Practitioners involved in the social indicator's movement espoused a
pragmatic deductive approach to indicator construction, from which a social theory might eventually be derived.

The first thing you do is to try and find out the facts. So you find out the facts. That leads to numeracy of social indicators, in the hope that in finding out what goes on you can then do something about it. (149)

In most cases practitioners denied that any theoretical construct informed practice.

I haven't got any particular theory of society that underlies it. I think you or I would probably differ on social theory. We would have different political value judgements perhaps. I don't know. But I think these indicators would be valuable to anybody, no matter what his judgement on what the state of society might be, or what the right political system and social policies ought to be. (150)

In some cases those delegated to construct social indicators were specifically asked to "describe what the indicators represented without making value judgements." (151) On other occasions administrators cynically attacked any moves to establish a system of social statistics which might go beyond economic constructs such as those defined by a Keynesian model of the economy. (152) Although isolated, there were instances when social scientists reacted against these prescriptions and guidelines established by departments or quasi agencies of the State.

The situation was memorable for John McCreary getting redder and redder. Then standing up,
thumping the table and shouting passionately at Hugh Watt that something had better bloody well be done about this soon because he was going to resign if it wasn't.(153)

But these occasions were rare. Social practitioners accepted without question the structural limitations imposed by the economic mode of production. They accepted the reduction of class conflict to differences between individuals, and they reinforced this reductionist action by the State when they equated individual with social wellbeing. By differentiating between value judgements and technical skills, they reduced social scientific practice to the provision of information which might be utilised by the State. Although these practitioners emphasised that the data produced by the social indicator's system would be aimed at public consumption, their actions ensured that the selection of social concerns, the goals for development, and the output of data, would be presented in a form which was most acceptable to the dominant class. By emphasising neutrality, and by following the precepts and practices laid down by the natural sciences, these social scientists believed their practice was beyond ideology. As previously illustrated, this notion of neutrality, when couched in the "factual language" of empiricism, is the most pervasive ideology of all. Its pervasiveness lies in the way in which it legitimates the capitalist formation and actively represses any alternative.
The Cognitive Interests of the Auxiliary Class

To appreciate the way in which ideological elements of action function to support, stabilise, and legitimate, certain kinds of institutions or practices, requires an examination of those epistemic, functional and genetic properties, which lead to false consciousness. In the construction of social indicators, the epistemic properties of false consciousness were evident in the way that social practitioners objectified their own activity. Value judgements as to the purpose, design, and execution of social indicators, were reported as statements of fact. The equation of individual with social wellbeing, the perceived consensus on goals for national development, and the portrayal of government as being representative of the public interest, involved judgements based on beliefs and values which could not be substantiated by empirical evidence. Yet members of the auxiliary class believed that indicators would remain constant irrespective of political judgements, and in the process they objectified decision-making. Theoretical advances in indicator construction were equated with quantitative empirical research, and the standardisation of a New Zealand system was proposed as the means of validation. By equating empiricism with scientific validation, social practitioners aligned themselves with the mainstream tradition, in which the natural sciences were perceived to be paradigmatic. It was this form of false consciousness which lead social scientists to confuse the provision of information with "scientific knowledge".

In providing information to the State, practitioners accepted existing economic and political relationships as immutable factors of the New
Zealand social formation. Capitalism as a mode of production, representative government as the basis of democracy, and scientific practice as a civil service, were all firmly held beliefs of those engaged in social practice. They accepted a Keynesian framework as the basis of economic development, and they perceived increased economic growth as the most painless way of effecting income redistribution. They produced reports and proposed social programmes within the constraints of economic targets, and they promoted programme evaluation and societal monitoring as the basis on which the nation might measure its "quality of life".

While these practices and assumptions involved individuals in argument and debate, the conflicts occurred almost exclusively within the zone of contradictory locations. As such they could be categorised as petty bourgeois disputes between members of the auxiliary class. Whilst there is some evidence to suggest that social scientists engaged in counter hegemonic practices, the wider structural limitations imposed by capitalist social relations remained largely unchallenged.

Indeed, some proponents of social indicators went as far as actively fostering an optimistic image of New Zealand society, in the belief that social information tended to be "rather gloomy". (154) Although such action was not characteristic of social scientific practice as a whole, members of the auxiliary class who were engaged in the construction of social indicators, supported the resolution of economic and political crises within existent social institutions. These actions were not directly exploitative as suggested in the context of the international movement, wherein science was cast as the ideological
instrument of the State. Nevertheless, the outcome of practice resulted in a system of social indicators which would directly serve the interests of the dominant class. Social scientists reified these interests by accepting forms of signification which naturalised existing social and economic relations, and in this reproductive action their practices could be classified as ideological.

In institutional terms, the boundaries of the social indicators movement in New Zealand, were established by the political realm of the State, when it convened the National Development Conference, and identified the economic constructs, which became the Conference objectives and the terms of reference for sector councils and standing committees. Social interpretations of reality were thereby focussed on improving the instruments of production and distribution for, by implication, the problems confronting New Zealand society were not structurally based, but rather technical impediments to an otherwise satisfactory system. Whereas the political realm secured hegemonic control by setting structural limitations upon the type of knowledge required, and the use to which this knowledge should be put, the rational, logical, administrative system of bureaucracy, set out to produce this knowledge in an appropriate form.

In the production of knowledge the question of social wellbeing was closely linked with rationality. It was argued that new technology was capable of creating unlimited economic growth, and as a result of this growth, increasing affluence was predicted for the nation as a whole. New Zealand would be "an association of people united in a peaceful sharing of the things they cherish[ed]."(155) To ensure that the
conditions for the generation of such growth existed, and any side effects were ameliorated, the State required information so that rational decisions could be made in the public interest. By conceiving of the State as "representative" government, and by creating a "non-political forum"(156) to establish economic targets, the fundamental contradiction between private appropriation and socialised production was denied. Class conflict was institutionalised within the framework of the State, and as a consequence the sectional interests of hegemonic groups were represented as being in the interests of all. Questions which might have been regarded as political matters in previous historical conjectures, were redefined as technical issues, requiring objective, scientific analysis and resolution.

These "requirements" necessitated a particular form of science and an appropriate code of behaviour for scientific practitioners. To receive collegial approval and State legitimation, social scientists were required to follow the historical precedents established by the natural sciences, and thus they attempted to emulate, modify, and adapt techniques, which had proven successful in the scientific understanding of nature. In the case of social indicators this meant distinguishing between belief and technique so that empirical, explanatory indicators might provide answers to larger, essentially non-empirical questions. It was appropriate therefore, to establish a system of social indicators within the Department of Statistics, because it was conceived as a "non-policy" Department of State.(157) This reinforced the "apolitical" nature of statistics, and equated social indicators with "neutral data", which might then be subject to alternative interpretations. The State backed system of social indicators was
"naturalised", providing legitimation for the scientific practitioners involved, and for existing institutional and structural arrangements of the New Zealand social formation. Class interests were reduced to individual needs and aspirations, and the power of capital was concealed by an autonomous State representing the public interest and the common good. These institutional practices were ultimately ideological, because they reified existing social relations, and disguised the fact, that the interests of the dominant class were intimately connected with the preservation of the status quo. Thus the origins and purpose of social indicators were disguised within the apparatus of the State and it was this structure which provided, both the context of discovery and the context of justification.

Summary

In analysing the development of social indicators within New Zealand, particular significance has been attached to the social formation from which social indicators emerged, and to a highly interventionist State which was relatively autonomous from both capital and labour interests. The autonomous nature of the New Zealand State was also reflected in practice. In the construction of social indicators, social scientists were perceived as knowledgeable participating subjects, capable of playing an active role in the production and reproduction of social and political life. As members of the auxiliary class occupying simultaneous and partial locations within two classes, the structural position of these practitioners suggested that their actions would be imbued with contradictions. However, there is little evidence to
suggest that these practitioners aligned themselves in any way with the proletariat. On the contrary, empirical evidence tends to support the Bryson proposition, that the practices in which social scientists engage, ultimately coincide with the values and interests of the dominant class.

A structuralist interpretation of social scientific practice indicates that the auxiliary class, as identified in this study, implicitly accepted the contradictions of the capitalist State and the structural limitations imposed by the economic mode of production. These practitioners actively assisted in the securing of dominant class interests, by allowing political questions to be redefined as technical issues, requiring objective scientific analysis and resolution. By engaging in this form of reductionism, the auxiliary class treated knowledge as a politically neutral commodity devoid of value imputations. They inadvertently aligned themselves with the empirical-analytic tradition, and in this process the social potential of science to improve human existence was inevitably reduced to the provision of technical information as the basis of State decision-making.

In adopting this position, practitioners promoted a bourgeois form of "knowledge", which ensured an ever increasing capacity on the part of the dominant class to control its environment. These controls not only related to the natural environment, but they extended to the State's active engagement in production and reproduction, and to the consequential fusion of economic and political issues. By eliminating the 'critical' dimension of science from the theory and practice of
social indicators, these practitioners exhibited what Habermas has described as 'ideologically frozen relations of dependence.' (158) It seems reasonable to conclude therefore, that the cognitive interests of practitioners within the New Zealand State, produced a form of action which reinforced the ideological reproduction of the capitalist formation, and the active repression of any alternative.

If we move from this structuralist interpretation to one which places greater emphasis on agency, then the merging of interests between the dominant class and 'managers' within the State becomes more problematic. Arguments were evident between members of the auxiliary class over both the construction and measurement of social goals. There were differences in emphasis between the various Departments of State, and there was considerable freedom for independent action by those occupying contradictory locations. This freedom was apparent in background documents written by members of the auxiliary class as position papers out of which the social indicators programme was fashioned. It was also apparent in the actions of practitioners within the Social Indicators Unit when they changed the objectives of the Social Council to suit a set of programmatic categories which closely resembled the O.E.C.D. 'goals to indicator' approach. Thus despite apparent congruence between the cognitive interests of social practitioners and the values and interests of the bourgeoisie, the central reality for members of the auxiliary class within the context of a capitalist State is the ambivalent and contradictory nature of practice.

This means that whilst it may be difficult for social practitioners to
escape from holding an ideological position which supports dominant class interests, the merging of class and cognitive interests is not automatic. As illustrated previously, practice is the point of articulation between agency and structure, and thus the alignment of the auxiliary class with the bourgeoisie reflects a dialectic of control. If this proposition has any validity then it should be just as feasible for members of the auxiliary class to engage in a form of practice which coincides with the interests of the proletariat. As practitioners occupying simultaneous and partial locations in two classes, social scientists have the capacity, either by default or by design, to influence some elements of State policy. The central question then becomes, how do they use this capacity and in respect of which class? It has been suggested that the answer to this question is determined, at least in part, by the auxiliary class itself. This is the proposition which will be explored in Chapter Five.
NOTES : CHAPTER IV: THE SPECIFICITY OF SOCIAL PRACTICE


6. In the New Zealand class study (note 3 above) contradictory locations were identified both within and between modes of production. These contradictory class locations were estimated to account for 39.2% of the population, with managers comprising 17.6%, advisor managers 8.5% and supervisors 13.1%.

7. E. O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (ibid) 1979 especially note 82 page 96.

8. The term 'auxiliary class' has been utilised in a project sponsored by the INODEP Development Institute in Paris under the direction of Ian Shirley. It conveys the contradictory nature of what Wright refers to as the 'new middle class' which takes its characteristics from both proletarian and bourgeois locations. INODEP, Structural Conjunctural Analysis : Seminar Module on Ideology, Paris 1982.


For the purposes of these classifications, the Deputy Director General of Health has been identified as a permanent head.

13. Interview with H. Lang, Victoria University, 13 February 1980:

3. At the time of the National Development Conference Lang was Chairman of the Steering Committee, Secretary of Treasury, and an ex officio member of all sector councils.


15. Interview with H. Lang, 1980: 1-15. Interview with Sir Frank Holmes, Wellington, 20 February 1980. At the time of the National Development Conference Holmes was the Economics Manager of the Tasman Pulp and Paper Co., and he was a member of the N.D.C. Forestry Committee. He later became Professor of Money and Finance at Victoria University and the first Chairman of the New Zealand Planning Council.


34. Interview with W. Gardner, 1980 : 5.


39. Interview with Professor J. McCreaey, 1980 : 3.


41. Interview with Dr. J. Robson, Chairman of Social Council, Wellington, 30 November 1979 : 13 and 22.

42. Interview with W. Gardner, 1980 : 5-7.


44. Interview with Professor J. McCreaey, 1980 : 9.


50. Interview with Professor J. Duncan, Victoria University,


52. Comments on First Part of Professor Duncan’s Paper on Social Indicators, Department of Statistics publication, not dated and not signed.


56. Interview with D. Preston, 21 February 1980 : 3.


60. Interview with W. Gardner, 1980 : 7, and 10
   Interview with J. Grant, 13 February 1980 : 2.


62. Interview with Dr. J. Robson, 30 November 1979 : 13 and 17.

63. Interview with Professor J. McCreary, 11 February 1980 : 2.

64. Interview with Professor J. McCreary, 11 February 1980 : 11.


66. Interview with M. Shields, 14 February 1980 : 7-9


71. Interview with M. Shields, 14 February 1980 : 7 and 4.


74. Address by Mr. N. Kirk, Leader of the Opposition to the Second Plenary Session of the National Development Conference, May 1969: 141-145.

75. Interview with B. Dickinson, 14 February 1980: 2.

76. Interview with B. Dickinson, 14 February 1980: 2.


82. Interview with M. Shields, 14 February 1980: 11.

83. These issues surfaced at a seminar on Social Indicators sponsored by the Department of Statistics in 1979. Shirley was a participant in this seminar although it was primarily designed for social scientists within the research units of State departments. Wellington, 28 March 1979.


86. Interview with B. Dickinson, 14 February 1980: 2.


95. Interview with B. Dickinson, 14 February 1980: 12.

96. Interview with B. Dickinson, 14 February 1980: 12, and 17.


114. Interview with M. Shields, 14 February 1980 : 12.


119. Interview with Dr. A. Levett, Wellington 16 September 1980.

120. Interview with Dr. A. Levett, 16 September 1980 : 7-8.

121. Interview with Dr. A. Levett, 16 September 1980 : 18-19


130. L. Bryson, How do we Proceed Now We Know Science is not Value Free? in W. Green (editor) Focus on Social Responsibility in Science, New Zealand Association of Scientists, Wellington 1979: 87-106.

In a 1977 study Campbell analysed the content of the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology for the period 1973 to 1977. Of 96 research projects reported, 50% used a questionnaire or structured interview approach, approximately 20% used participant observation or indepth interviews, and approximately 20% relied on official statistics and documents. The subjects of the research tended to be "captive" or "deviant" populations and thus there was a strong tendency to "study down". The Journal published 34 social/political commentaries and in most instances these commentaries were concerned with the processes of exploitation. The overall results demonstrated a preoccupation with empirical data which tended to be collected from relatively powerless sources. F. Campbell, A Critique of Australian Sociological research and theory. Paper presented to ANZASS 48th Congress, Melbourne, 1977.


135. Social Councils Goals and Objectives as set out in Appendix IV (ii).


146. Interview with Professor J. Duncan, Victoria University, 17 September 1980 : 2.
151. R. Laking, paper on Social Indicators setting out the Tasks of the Standing Committee. Not dated, page 2.
158. See J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (ibid) 1971 : 310.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE AMBIGUITIES OF SOCIAL PRACTICE

The proposition to be examined in this chapter has now been modified from that instrumental relationship introduced in Chapter One, which assumed a positive correlation between the cognitive interests of State practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant class. In Chapter Four, the Marxian logic of class was reappraised to take account of certain historical tendencies which have radically altered contemporary forms of advanced capitalism. These tendencies have been identified as the escalating power of the State, the progressive rationalisation and bureaucratisation of social institutions, and the transformation of science and technology. By extending the typology of class to cater specifically for those political and ideological positions which have traditionally been referred to as "superstructural", an auxiliary class has been identified. The contradictory nature of this class stems, it will be argued, from its simultaneous and partial location in two classes. Thus State practitioners, who have been defined herein as members of the auxiliary class, take their characteristics from both proletarian and bourgeois positions. As a consequence, the practices of the auxiliary class are infused with ambiguities.

Whilst the arguments advanced in first three chapters of this dissertation tended to support the Bryson proposition, that it is peculiarly difficult for social scientists to escape from holding ideologies which support dominant class interests, the automatic
alignment of class and cognitive interests is problematic. If practice is the point of articulation between agency and structure, then State practitioners can be theorised as relatively autonomous agents, capable of playing an active role in the production and reproduction of social and political life. The central question which needs to be addressed therefore, is how does the auxiliary class use this capacity and in respect of which class?

In order to examine this proposition, an alternative case study has been selected. This case study examines the actions of a National Research Advisory Council (N.R.A.C.) Working Party, which was established in 1979 to report on the relationship between social scientific research and unemployment. In analysing this material, the conceptual boundaries drawn by Habermas between different forms of practice is retained. The Habermasian distinction is between interaction, which is said to be dependent upon the communicative and strategic acts of the subjects themselves, and societal action which arises out of the forces and relations of production, and which represents the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole. These forms of practice lie at different conceptual levels, with societal action establishing what Wright has termed "structural limitations"(1) on practice, whereas the interactive level presumes that subjects engaged in communicative and strategic acts are capable of harmonizing their activities and producing alternative patterns of social action.

Because we are now examining how the auxiliary class uses its mediating capacity (2), it is the second level of practice, interaction, which is
crucial to the present analysis. To facilitate this examination, it is essential that we consider first the framework of the N.R.A.C. Working Party. The assumption being made, is that the Council was part of the State apparatus and the members of the Working Party were operating therefore, within the structural limitations of advanced capitalism as practiced in New Zealand. These assumptions can be verified by reference to the statutory responsibilities of the Council.

The National Research Advisory Council is a statutory body which was established in 1963 to advise the Minister of Science and Technology on the promotion and co-ordination of scientific research and services in New Zealand. The Council reports annually to the Minister of Science on manpower requirements for scientific activity within Departments of State, and it evaluates all departmental proposals involving the establishment of new scientific activities or major changes in existing activities. The Council and its activities, are subject therefore, to Ministerial responsibility. Although the Minister was not directly involved in establishing the N.R.A.C. Working Party on unemployment, the Council was ultimately accountable to the Minister, and its actions were conditioned therefore, by the New Zealand State. As illustrated previously, the capitalist State operates within the structural limitations imposed by the forces and relations of production and thus, in Habermasian terms, it is reasonable to conclude that N.R.A.C. plays an integral role in supporting, maintaining, and reproducing capitalist social relationships. This does not mean that the capitalist mode of production determines political and ideological relations — rather it implies that the form of capitalism which has developed in New Zealand predisposes State agencies such as the N.R.A.C. to operate in the long
term interests of the dominant class.

The purpose of this Chapter is to examine whether or not these dependent relationships are capable of being transformed. The focus centres therefore on the N.R.A.C. Working Party, the cognitive interests of its participants, and the practices in which they engaged.

The National Research Advisory Council Working Party

The establishment of a working party on 'Youth Unemployment' was first mooted on 30 October 1978 under the agenda item 'plans for future activities' (3). At a meeting of the National Research Advisory Council's Social Sciences Committee, it was agreed (with Council approval), to establish two working parties. "One would be concerned with youth unemployment and the other with industrial relations" (4). In identifying two areas of 'social' concern, the committee was operating within the Council's overall programme objectives, and these centred around 'identifying opportunities for economic growth and ... obstacles to such growth.' (5) Given the N.R.A.C. objectives, and the Habermasian interpretation of the role of science within advanced capitalism, it seems reasonable to suggest that the 'social concerns' identified by the Council were raising legitimation problems for the New Zealand State in 1978. These problems emanated from a downturn in economic activity and a dramatic increase in domestic unemployment. As illustrated in Chapter Three, such 'disturbances' can be linked with the restructuring of capital interests which was taking place in the 1970's.
On 11 December 1978, the terms of reference for the working party on youth unemployment were discussed and it was agreed that a meeting should be held with 'interested groups' before proceeding further. This exploratory meeting was held on 12 December 1978 (6) and, as a consequence, letters were sent to twelve departments and organisations requesting comments on the terms of reference and suggestions for membership of the working party (7).

A paper to Council dated 2 April 1979 from the N.R.A.C. Secretariat set out the proposed membership of the working party, with the interim terms of reference. This memorandum suggested that members of the working party should meet in Wellington for two days to consider the terms of reference, the comments from organisations and individuals previously canvassed by the Council, and the future strategy of the working party (8). At its meeting on the 3 April 1979, the Council of N.R.A.C. approved the Secretariat paper, and the six individuals selected were invited to the inaugural meeting which was set down for 23 and 24 April 1979 (9).

Although the six appointees to the Working Party might be described as members of the auxiliary class, they displayed a diverse range of beliefs and attitudes. This diversity was manifested in the ambivalence expressed by individual members at the nature of the task the Working Party had been asked to perform. In order to resolve these ambiguities, the two preliminary meetings of the Working Party were primarily concerned with establishing boundaries and specifying the essential elements which would need to be considered in writing the final report.(10)
The terms of reference as suggested by N.R.A.C. focussed specifically on youth unemployment(11), but these terms were subsequently redrawn by the Working Party to reflect a broader interpretation of the labour market, causes of unemployment, and alternative avenues for research.(12) By means of what might be described as communicative action, the Working Party set out to establish a framework which would be useful in clarifying the assumptions which lay behind the theoretical models and data banks assembled to describe and analyse employment/unemployment in New Zealand. A consensus emerged from members of the Working Party that they did not want to be confined by any one discipline which would limit their individual and collective capacities to undertake a 'critical' examination, and thus two procedures were initiated as a means of activating these decisions.

The first procedure was a questionnaire designed by the working party to investigate the extent and kind of research being undertaken, and further data desired. This questionnaire was distributed by the N.R.A.C. Secretariat to all government and non-government agencies associated in any way with employment/unemployment. The results were compiled by members of the Working Party and attached to the final report (13).

The second procedure centred around the development of a conceptual model (14) showing the life cycle of a worker from pre to post employment and retirement, taking into consideration such factors as socio-economic status, education, emigration and immigration, alternative definitions of work and non-work, and incorporating the population flows between employment and unemployment. The working
party developed this conceptual framework so that it might come to terms with alternative theoretical traditions and differing perspectives on cause and effect (15). Working Party members wanted a mechanism for critically evaluating the various interpretations of employment/unemployment as perceived by key actors in the field. It was assumed that there would be alternative interpretations of unemployment as a social phenomenon, and the Working Party believed that these different perspectives would be a reflection of the values and beliefs held by vested interest groups.

At its second meeting the Working Party decided to invite these groups to make submissions in person so that they might discuss more fully the basis of their approach (16). The rationale for this invitation stemmed from a desire to present a report which would represent a comprehensive interpretation of employment/unemployment within New Zealand, along with the research effort needed to provide adequate knowledge and understanding for informed decision-making. Members did not want to present a report which dealt merely with the symptoms of unemployment - they ultimately wanted to address the question of causation. To agree on this rationale two meetings were spent setting out the assumptions and value judgements made by the Working Party itself. Four fundamental assumptions were identified (17):

1. the causes of unemployment were structural in origin;

2. the unemployed were therefore not primarily responsible for their condition;
3. to burden the unemployed with consequences of their unemployment was unjust;

4. economic and social restructuring might therefore be necessary in order to restore social justice.

These assumptions were set out in the working party's resume and highlighted in the final report (18).

Submissions and discussions

The N.R.A.C. Secretariat set up meetings (19) with the interest groups involved by writing to the Permanent Heads of major Government Departments, employer and employee organisations, and groups or individuals considered "significant" in the employment/unemployment arena (20). Most of these meetings were held in Wellington but the working party also held two regional meetings in Auckland and Christchurch.

The committee decided to adopt a particular format in these interviews and discussions (21). The chairman introduced members of the Working Party to each group or individual making submissions, and he then repeated a standard explanation of the committee's task. The relationship between research and social policy was noted, but particular emphasis was placed on the analysis of employment/unemployment as held by respective departments and organisations. Each group was asked in broad terms to spell out their
analysis of employment and unemployment, and as they responded to this question, members of the working party probed for the organisation's philosophy, and the underlying assumptions on which their analytical model was based. Members of the Working Party selected particular departments or organisations in whom they had a special interest, and they framed questions for those organisations on the basis of their responses to the circulated questionnaire (22). However, this delegation of responsibility did not work in practice and all members of the Working Party entered randomly into discussion and debate. Points were recorded by individual members of the Working Party, and a shorthand typist from the N.R.A.C. Secretariat took notes which were later transcribed. These submissions, when fused with the questionnaire results, constituted the basis of the Working Party's empirical evidence.

In order to analyse the evidence received by the Working Party, the submissions have been divided into three broad groups (23) so that they correspond with the alternative forms of science and different modes of practice as identified in Chapter One.

These scientific traditions have been categorised as the empirical-analytic sciences incorporating a technical interest - the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporating a practical interest - and the critical sciences incorporating an emancipatory interest. In making these distinctions, it has been argued that one cannot only discriminate between alternative forms of science, but also between different modes of practice.
Within the empirical-analytic tradition, which comprises the mainstream of orthodox social science, the aims of practice centre around organising the life world into categories as a means of accurately describing "what is". These aims coincide with the requirements of the State, which needs factual information on any "disturbances" which develop between the life world and the sub-system of State Capitalism, so that remedial action can be taken to protect the long term interests of the dominant class. Practitioners in this tradition accept existing economic and political relationships as given, and thus questions which might have been regarded as political matters in previous historical conjunctures, are redefined as technical issues requiring objective scientific analysis and resolution. By aligning themselves with this form of science, practitioners inadvertently engage in a reductionist activity, in that knowledge is treated as a politically neutral commodity devoid of value imputations. In this alignment, these practitioners allow science to become an ideological instrument of the State, and thus, as a mode of practice, it can best be described as a variant of strategic action.

The historical-hermeneutic tradition is governed by a practical interest in portraying the world as it is, in the belief that description, explanation, and understanding, will eventually lead to transformation. Within this tradition, individuals shape and control their lives through work and through communicative action. The scientific aim of this tradition centres around the clarification and interpretation of texts, as opposed to technical control and manipulation. The social practitioner in this tradition, is both a participant in, and observer of, the inner collective lives of human
beings. He/she becomes immersed in the "private troubles" of individuals, as well as the families, groups, and social networks of which these individuals are members. While this emphasis on interaction signifies a greater potentiality for change than that which is evident within the empirical-analytic tradition, any transformation is limited to the constituent group. As a mode of practice, it can best be described as communicative action.

Whereas the empirical and hermeneutic traditions implicitly limit any transformation to change within existing structures, the critical tradition proposes social structural change as a means of furthering human emancipation. By virtue of its primary concern with the distribution of power, the critical emancipatory tradition anticipates a transformation in individuals, in the groups of which they are members, and in the structures and institutions of society which condition such malfunctioning. The social practitioner therefore, seeks to establish "a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his (her) presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation, but also a force within to stimulate change." (24) In contrast to the empirical and hermeneutic sciences which fail to provide a rational account of themselves because of a primary interest in producing nomological knowledge, the critical tradition by definition is self-referential. It is concerned with going beyond the production of nomological knowledge, so as "to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such, and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed." (25) These modes of social practice, the scientific
traditions by which they are informed, and the concomitant levels of change are modelled in Figure II of Chapter One. These classifications will be used to categorise the submissions which were received by the Working Party, and at a later stage in this examination, they will be referred to again as we attempt to define the cognitive interests of the Working Party itself.

1. Submissions in the Empirical-Analytic Tradition

The first group of submissions classified within the empirical-analytic tradition, came from Departments of State such as Labour, Social Welfare, Education and Internal Affairs, as well as from quasi-State agencies such as the New Zealand Planning Council. These organisations, and the practitioners presenting submissions on their behalf, concentrated on the need for additional factual information, so that any malfunctioning within the labour market could be adequately redressed. The type of factual information requested ranged from suggestions for a more adequate data base aimed at revealing the true level and composition of unemployment, through to research which might reveal the 'historical truth' about the State's employment policy in the 1970's.

"As far as research was concerned, the Department was interested in statistical information which might be used for administrative rather than research purposes. With a better statistical base of beneficiaries, the Department believed it would be in a position to identify disadvantaged groups and draw these 'facts' to the attention of those allocating resources."(26)
"The Auckland Office sought a more accurate data base so that they might distinguish between various groups such as prospective school leavers or married women wanting to return to the workforce." (27)

"Longitudinal studies, attitudinal research and the evaluation of current training programmes were identified as research priorities." (28)

"The two main areas of research identified, were a data base to reveal the composition of the young unemployed and how they saw their place and role in society." (29)

"The Department favoured studies which would show where the economy could be stimulated, but they stressed that the main criteria should not be to "sop up the unemployed". (30)

In requesting more adequate information on the "temporary" phenomenon of unemployment, these practitioners endorsed a form of science which focussed on a clearly identified "disturbance" within the sub-system of State capitalism operating in New Zealand, and in this process, they espoused a commitment to private enterprise, market forces, and State intervention in "setting the scene for private industrial development." (31)

"The question of employment or unemployment was not a major concern for the Department of Trade and Industries. Its primary aim was stated as being the expansion of imports and the development of industry – employment was a concern only in as much as it affected these priorities. To increase the volume of New Zealand’s export trade, the Department sought to restructure industry, improving its efficiency, and this would ultimately mean the shedding of some employment positions. Increasing efficiency meant tighter profits which would in turn generate higher revenue. Efficient industries were those which had seized opportunities to increase productivity, widen export opportunities, and retain employment." (32)

"Treasury officials indicated that if the emphasis on private enterprise and a return to market forces resulted in increased unemployment, then there would be a continuing role for the State in the provision of temporary work and training programmes." (33)
"Manufacturers believed that if New Zealand was to survive, there would need to be increased productivity and export led economic growth." (34)

The economic arguments advanced by practitioners representing State organisations such as Treasury, the Trade and Industries Department and the Reserve Bank, were remarkably similar to the policies promulgated during the National Development Conference of the 1960's. Economic growth was identified both as a major objective of "development" and as the mechanism by which a rising standard of living might be achieved. (35) Capital intensive development, based on natural resources and utilising overseas funds and skilled labour, was specified as the industrial strategy likely to bring about increased economic growth. (36)

"Treasury officials stressed the need for export led economic growth and competitive international industries. According to Treasury, the Government and some Government Ministers in particular, were pressing for a return to private enterprise and market forces and Treasury agreed with this changing emphasis." (37)

The employment policy generally supported by these practitioners, was based on an estimated G.N.P. growth rate of 2 1/2 - 3% per annum, and when the Working Party asked those making submissions to compare these predictions with the reality of zero growth, they were referred to the Keynesian model of the economy as developed by Professor Philpott. (38) As with traditional Keynesian policies, the Philpott model was based on stimulating economic growth in order to provide greater employment through the market. In contrast to Say's Law of Markets, which does
not provide for State action in regulating supply and demand, Keynesian policies have relied on increased State expenditure as a means of stimulating aggregate demand and thus avoiding an under-consumption crisis. Over the past 40 years, these policies have been important in conditioning the form of advanced capitalism which has emerged, wherein global States, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have created and improved conditions for the utilisation of accumulated capital, whilst at the national level, the State has been able to replace the market in non-profitable sectors, thus creating and improving conditions for the realisation of capital.

The State has executed this replacement by economic restructuring, unproductive Government consumption (armourments and space exploration), improvements to the material (transportation, urban and regional planning) and immaterial (science and research) infrastructures, a heightening of human productivity (vocational education and re-training), and by relieving the social and material costs of private production (unemployment compensation, welfare, and the amelioration of ecological damage.) Whereas these policies were initially "successful" in stimulating demand and countering the unemployment crisis of the 1930's Depression, the level of aggregate demand could not be sustained. In response to what O'Connor has called the 'Fiscal Crisis of the State' (39), Keynesian alternatives in the 1970's concentrated on technical adjustments to the so-called 'dependent' relationship between inflation and unemployment. (40) The Reserve Bank exemplified this approach in its submissions, describing unemployment as "underutilised capital arising out of a low growth economy." (41)
The Head of the Prime Minister's Department translated this theory into practice, when he referred to rising unemployment as a "trade-off" against other economic priorities. Working Party members in response to this submission asked the Departmental Head what level of unemployment would be acceptable, and Mr Galvin replied:

"If unemployment becomes a worry - if the level of conflict or violence becomes intolerable - then Government will create more work." (42)

The Working Party Chairman then suggested that if that was the case, it was a political gamble to allow unemployment to grow to the stage where the public became concerned or the unemployed themselves became dissatisfied, and he referred to the fact that there was an undercurrent of opinion which was revolutionary.

"The Head of the Prime Minister's Department acknowledged that the rising unemployment level was a gamble and the Government was concerned about Marxist elements within the system. These elements presented a greater threat than Marxists who had opted out, and thus the aim of the Government was to divide this Marxist element." (43)

Although there were obvious similarities between the respective 'mainstream' agencies making submissions, there were also variations in focus, with some concentrating more on economic indicators, whilst others centred their examination on institutional malfunctioning. Whereas some agencies focussed on the "restructuring of industry", and the concomitant "shedding of labour" (44), others levelled criticism at a school system which "tended to be obsessed with academic attainment." (45)
The Education System was identified as a major factor in the escalation of unemployment. Unemployment was described as an education mis-match. Irrelevant policies were made by middle-aged wasps and opposed by professional stirrers. A two-tiered system of education was advocated as a possible solution with streaming beginning in the primary sector. Those academically inclined would be selected out and these students would advance through a special system leaving the others to be prepared for specific tasks in the labour market. 

"Departmental officers indicated that there was a feeling of helplessness over economic factors and a generally held belief that the unemployment situation could not be changed." (47)

"In the Department's view, unemployment was a by-product of the economic system which was not functioning normally." (48)

In line with the alternative definitions of science and practice as advanced by Habermas, it can be said that organisations classified within the empirical tradition displayed a pre-occupation with technical interests, and this was evident in the Labour Department's concern with its "negative image" (49), and in submissions from employers who noted that the labour problem was good for companies. The so-called advantages of unemployment were identified by employers as a drop in absenteeism rates and increased productivity from fewer workers. (50)

"Federated Farmers considered the labour problem was bad for the community, but good for companies. In times of over-employment, employers had greater flexibility in the choice of their workforce and the situation facing apprentices was illustrated as an example of changing company policy. Companies were now looking for people with lesser qualifications than School Certificate or University Entrance who would be prepared to stay with the Company once they had completed their apprenticeship." (51).
Even those agencies of the State which might have been expected to 
display a broader social interpretation, reduced the social phenomenon 
of unemployment to a question of individual pathology. This tendency 
was taken to its ultimate conclusion by a representative of the 
Department of Social Welfare.

"The Regional Director of the D.S.W. concluded that from 
his personal observations of the unemployment benefit area, 
it was evident that the majority of people concerned, were 
not conducting themselves favourably or dressing 
appropriately. He maintained that 'we've always had with 
us the drifter and I see them, surfboards propped up 
against the benefit counter'. Under further questioning, 
the Regional Director acknowledged that there were 'some 
intelligent drop-outs,' but he qualified this by stating it 
was easier to obtain an Unemployment Benefit than either 
Sickness or Emergency Relief."(52)

Although this pathological interpretation of unemployment was not 
explicitly identified by all of those who have been placed within the 
empirical-analytic tradition, these organisations of the State and 
their representatives accepted existing economic and political 
relationships as given. The social and cultural characteristics of 
employment and unemployment as conveyed by notions such as class, 
gender and race, together with alternative definitions of work and 
non-work, were reduced to either narrow economic constructs provided by 
a Keynesian model of the economy or alternatively, to the personal 
inadequacies of the unemployed.

"According to the Manufacturers Association, the majority 
of the unemployed lacked adequate skills and some of the 
older ones were lazy and lacked motivation. They 
maintained that Polynesians and Refugees were prepared to 
do shift-work and it was hoped that their example might act 
as a spur to New Zealanders."(53)
As a consequence, the critical dimension of science was eliminated as agencies sought research which would be 'politically acceptable' (54), and in this interpretation of knowledge, they aligned themselves with the empirical tradition and with strategic action.

2. Submissions in the Historical-Hermeneutic Tradition

A second group of submissions from bodies such as Trade Unions, The National Youth Council, the Ministry of Maori Affairs, the Commission for the Future, the Society for Research on Women, and representatives of the unemployed themselves, appeared to be guided by a practical interest in understanding the nature of employment/unemployment in New Zealand, and thus these submissions have been classified within the historical-hermeneutic tradition. These groups, some of whom were totally immersed in the social and political realities of unemployment, concentrated their submissions on clarifying and interpreting the rapid escalation in New Zealand's unemployment figures as a means of understanding cause and effect. In this respect, their submissions go beyond the reductionist tendencies evident among those from within the empirical-analytic tradition.

In the economic sphere, these agencies tended to be critical of the State's capital intensive development programme and they linked the apparent failure of this programme to global economic and political factors, such as overseas control, cheap energy resources, a low wage regime, and the inevitable shedding of labour.
"A representative of the Inter-church Trade and Industry Commission maintained that the National Government was leading New Zealand toward a third world type of economy with a wealthy powerful elite. The mass of people would be unemployed with the only distinction between New Zealand's unemployed and those in third world countries, being their level of formal education." (55)

"Instead of importing foreign control, New Zealand should buy technical skills and develop their own products. This could be done through existing technical skills and organisations such as the D.S.I.R. Instead of exporting raw products, the Trades Councils suggested that an examination of the Country's natural resources should be undertaken and they proposed research into how these resources could be converted into manufactured products. These proposals would require national planning and a philosophical shift from the private enterprise philosophy which stated 'the market would take care of everything.' It was this type of thinking which had led to a contraction in the number of jobs with a narrow productive sector supporting a large number of unproductive enterprises and unemployed persons." (56)

The inadequacies of narrow economic interpretations of unemployment were highlighted by the National Youth Council, when it critiqued the goal of economic growth. The Council noted, that whilst a growth strategy had been the primary economic objective of successive governments for over 20 years, the circumstances of the most disadvantaged groups in society had remained relatively unchanged. (57)

"The National Youth Council representatives rejected the export led economic growth scenario advanced by the Department of Trade and Industries as an unacceptable analysis of, and response to, rising unemployment. Representatives considered the inadequacies of official responses to unemployment stemmed from seeing such social issues as short-term problems, and whilst the Council did not accept unemployment as a permanent state, it believed it was endemic to the current system. Although it was council policy to pursue full employment as a social and economic objective, representatives considered that a broader definition and interpretation of work was required." (58)
Similar concerns were advanced by the Commission for the Future.

"Although New Zealand's major goal appeared to be the maximisation of economic growth, the Commission believed that there were considerable social constraints militating against such a strategy. These constraints included ambivalence and uncertainty over the introduction of new technology, inflexibility and rigidity in the selection of goals and strategies, and a reluctance among decision makers and the public at large to explore alternatives." (59)

The social and economic situation of women was of particular concern to those classified within the hermeneutic tradition. Studies undertaken by the Society for Research on Women (S.R.O.W.) indicated that women constituted a pool of under-utilised talent and potential, and the Society found it difficult therefore, to separate the issue of unemployment from the issue of sexism. (60) This interpretation was reinforced by other practitioners in discussing the social implications of unemployment. Particular reference was made to the isolation of young unemployed women whose only option, evidenced from case study material, was to remain at home and perform unpaid domestic tasks. (61) Although groups within the hermeneutic tradition defined full employment as a social and economic objective, they believed that a broader definition and interpretation of work was required. In particular, they identified studies aimed at exploring alternative patterns of employment, attitudinal surveys, co-operative and part-time ventures, and a re-definition of work, as priority areas for any research programme.
3. Submissions in the Critical-Emancipatory Tradition

Although submissions from bodies such as the Trade Unions, the National Youth Council, the Ministry of Maori Affairs, S.R.O.W., the Commission for the Future and organisations representing the unemployed, have been classified herein as hermeneutic, they also contained 'critical' elements, in that they identified the distribution of power as evidence of structural inequality and hence, as being in need of structural reform. This critical perspective was most evident in submissions from the Department of Maori Affairs, the Society for Research on Women, and the Taua Mahi Trust representing the views of the unemployed.

In their submissions, the Department of Maori Affairs advanced its Tu Tangata Programme as an alternative to the State's capital intensive development strategy. The transformation of land from a social unit with spiritual meaning into an economic unit of private consumption, and the amalgamation of the Maori people into an individualised, privatised, social and political system, has always been rejected by certain elements within Maoridom who oppose cultural invasion. The notion of Tu Tangata was aimed at taking this resistance further, by drawing on the unique social and cultural resources of the Maori people, and by insisting on respect for their cultural identity in the face of ethnocentrism.

"In social and cultural terms, this meant co-operation rather than competition, labour intensive rather than capital intensive industries, and societal rather than private development. In economic terms, it meant pooling the capital assets of the Maori people and using these resources for women in the home, elders in the tribe, and
children at school, all of whom were seen as productive members of society contributing to their own development and the development of their people. In political terms, it meant being primarily concerned with the distribution of power and having defined the power of Maori Society as its cultural milieu, the way was cleared to re-define terms such as work and non-work, progress and development according to Maori values and Maori criteria."(62)

In a similar vein, the Society for Research on Women in linking unemployment with sexism, was delivering a critique of patriarchal power not only in familial terms, but also in the way that women in general are subordinated to capital interests. The significance of this critical interpretation was most graphically demonstrated by a young Maori woman who was a member of the Taua Mahi Trust. This young woman issued a strong challenge to the Working Party to present a report which could be read by the unemployed themselves, and she then went on to interrogate the Chairman of the Working Party.

"What do you earn a week Professor? Have you ever been made redundant or unemployed? How is it that your Working Party is white, whereas we, the unemployed are predominantly black? Does that not suggest why the unemployed are largely the less powerful groups in the market place? Who are you writing this report for Professor - the Government, the multi-national companies, or the unemployed?"(63)

When the convenor of the Working Party emerged from this interrogation, he was moved to comment:

"This is a side of unemployment I have not experienced before. It is a reality we cannot ignore when we come to write our final report."(64)

These critical interpretations were not confined to those within the
hermeneutic tradition. Even organisations and practitioners, classified in this study within the empirical-analytic tradition, occasionally displayed a critical perspective. This perspective was evident in submissions from a Planning Council spokesman who confessed that he was 'pessimistic about the prospect of the present Government changing its attitude', (65) and it emerged again in submissions from a representative of the Employers Federation who asserted that New Zealand suffered from a 'lack of leadership and the lack of a national plan'. (66)

"Because of stop go policies of the Government and the lack of long term planning, the Working Party was informed that business confidence was low, and no one was prepared to invest under such circumstances."(67)

Conversely, these same representatives believed there was a tendency in New Zealand to,

"expect the Government to do everything and consequently there was too much Government involvement and interference."(68)

Despite these elements of critique, it seems logical to confirm the classifications suggested in this chapter, because the submissions did not meet the requirements of a critical theorem as established in Chapter One. The Tu Tangata programme, whilst promoting a strategy which seemed to be in economic and political conflict with the restructuring of capital interests, ultimately advanced Maori Capitalism as an alternative to Pakeha Capitalism. If a critical theorem implies structural transformation, then that was clearly
beyond the scope of the Tu Tangata Programme as presented to the Working Party.

Similarly, the Society for Research on Women provided a powerful critique of the patriarchal system, but their alternative political strategy was limited to "exploring ways in which research might contribute to decision making and to the monitoring of policy consequences."(69) Perhaps the Taua Mahi Trust best exemplified the critical tradition, in that members of the Trust were obviously developing a theorem which was relevant to their own situation as members of a marginalised group. However, by virtue of their proletarian positions, this fraction of the working class was structurally excluded, from either the creation or execution of State policies, and from the production of ideology. It seems appropriate therefore, to assign these submissions to the hermeneutic tradition and to communicative action. In classifying these submissions in this way, it must also be acknowledged that on occasions the actions of those within the empirical and hermeneutic traditions displayed the capacity of class fractions to engage in critical practice. It is this potential for transformative action which the critical tradition takes as its point of departure, and thus it is a possibility to which we must eventually return. In the meantime, it is necessary to focus attention once again on the Working Party, and its actions in preparing the draft report.
The Format and Preparation of the Draft Report

The format and preparation of the draft report was a frequent topic of conversation between members of the Working Party throughout 1979. Some of these discussions were recorded by the N.R.A.C. Secretariat, but other informal conversations did not appear in resumes of the Working Party’s deliberations. At the third meeting (70) of the Working Party on June 28 and 29, members agreed that the report should be brief and that any points requiring clarification or justification should be attached as appendices. A social science undergraduate was employed under the Government’s Temporary Employment Programme to produce an annotated bibliography of the New Zealand literature, and David Imray (a member of the Working Party), undertook to produce a summary of the international literature considered relevant by the Planning Division of the Labour Department. In order to deal with the varied responses to the questionnaire, members of the Working Party were assigned specific questions for the purposes of collation, and these summaries were sent to the Chairman for inclusion in the final report.

The most contentious discussions between members of the Working Party centred around social versus economic interpretations of unemployment. A consensus was eventually reached when Working Party members agreed that they should ‘break out’ of traditional models and write a document "in simple language spelling out the dimensions of the problem." (71)
There was agreement that ‘the problem’ could not be confined to economic constructs, and although the framework devised by the Working Party might be described as a ‘systems approach’, the language used to define the parameters of employment and unemployment required members
of the Working Party to go beyond the technical constraints of alternative economistic interpretations. As a consequence, the final report addressed the social and political determinants of gender, race and class.

Several discussions focussed on the political sensitivity of unemployment as an electoral issue and early in 1979, members of the Working Party concluded that irrespective of their final conclusions, the report would be used by competing factions for political purposes. Although the Working Party accepted that they were in a 'no win situation', there was unanimous agreement that the problem should not be 'defined away', and this was considered particularly relevant in a document exploring the parameters for research. The Working Party decided that they were not simply reviewing existing research, but rather the structure of knowledge in respect of employment and unemployment, and the extent to which that knowledge might be relevant in policy formulation and evaluation.

At the December meeting of the Working Party, Snively and Kirk were assigned the economic arguments of the report, with Snively concentrating on macro and Kirk on micro economics. Shirley was assigned social policy, McDonald the cultural aspects of employment, Imray the interface between research and policy, and Adams the sphere of education and training. It was agreed that all members of the Working Party would send this material to the Chairman in a two-page summary, and Adams would then prepare a draft of the report.

The first draft of the report was considered at the ninth meeting of
the Working Party, which was held in Wellington on 27 March 1980 (47). The thrust and direction of this draft report highlighted the inconsistencies in the questionnaire results, and it illustrated the confusion and conflict which marked the submissions the Working Party had received during the course of its deliberations. After agreement with the overall tenor of the report, the Working Party set about reviewing the first draft section by section. Minor changes were made during the course of this meeting, but where paragraphs required extensive rewriting, individual members assumed responsibility for these tasks on the understanding that this material would be reviewed again when a second draft of the report had been prepared. Working Party members were asked to forward their rewritten sections to the Chairman so that he could incorporate these proposed changes in the second draft. It was agreed too, that throughout the text of the report, certain sections would be highlighted by ‘boxing’ key sentences, and it was considered important to include in the appendices of the final report, details of the Working Party’s membership, its method of operation, and details of discussions with key personnel.

The second draft of the report was considered by the Working Party on 17 and 18 April 1980 with relatively minor adjustments being made. This draft was left with the N.R.A.C. Secretariat so that it might be sent to committee ‘D’ and ultimately the Research Advisory Council. The Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C. first considered the draft report on 21 July 1980 but discussion was deferred until its September meeting. At this meeting (15 September 1980) the Committee unanimously endorsed the report and referred it to the National Research Advisory Council for its October meeting (75). The Chairman of the Social
Sciences Committee wrote at this time to members of the Working Party congratulating them on their work and noting its unanimous endorsement by Committee 'D'. He stated moreover, that "all members commented very favourably on the quality and content of the report", and he expressed the Committee's view that eventually it "should be distributed as widely as possible" (76).

On 7 October 1980 (50) the report was considered by the National Research Advisory Council, but the Deputy-Secretary of Treasury (a member of the Council), vehemently opposed the tenor of the draft report, and after considerable debate and acrimony, the Council decided to send the document on a confidential basis to 16 organisations for comment. These comments would then be considered at the next meeting of Council when a decision would be made about N.R.A.C.'s attitude towards the report.

Comments (78) on the draft report were sent to the Working Party Chairman by Committee 'D', and a further meeting of the Working Party to consider these 'reactions' was requested. This meeting was subsequently approved and the N.R.A.C. Secretariat sent a letter to members of the Working Party from its Chairman, Professor Adams, enclosing agency responses (79). In his letter Adams proposed that each member of the Working Party review the responses carefully before the final meeting on 20 and 21 February 1981. Adams indicated that he was inclined to respond to Committee 'D' pointing out why it was important to write a 'readable report', and at the same time he proposed responding to the criticisms, rejecting their 'perceptual myopia' and their vested interests in defining unemployment
'exclusively in economic terms'. He concluded; "Frankly I find only a few of the criticisms valid and some even unprincipled - the accusation of 'superficiality' is a case in point. Of course the report is superficial in some respects, it must be so in a report of twenty or so pages. The Planning Council, of all groups, might be aware of that" (80).

On 20 and 21 February 1981 (81) the Working Party met to consider the comments from the organisations canvassed by N.R.A.C., and if necessary to revise sections of the report. Discussion centred around three major issues. First the Working Party's commitment to its theoretical stance and the consequential tenor of the report. This stance provided the rationale for a broad interpretation of employment/unemployment, and the Working Party's desire to present a document which was not solely confined to an economic analysis. Secondly, the need to present a credible argument which would be self-contained. Although the Working Party was convinced a short, succinct and easily read document was needed, they wanted to ensure that any criticisms identified by State practitioners, were either incorporated into the final document or consciously rejected with an accompanying explanation. The question of sourcing material and footnoting was therefore canvassed once again, with the Working Party deciding that the inclusion of such material in the appendices would suffice, and this would avoid accepting the usual academic conventions simply to give the document an air of pseudo respectability. Thirdly, the possible political implications of the report were discussed at length. There had already been two "leakings" of the report and given the sensitive nature of unemployment as a political issue it was evident to members of the Working Party that the
report would have its critics. Despite this conclusion the Working Party reaffirmed its commitment not to "define the problem away", and those present agreed to push N.R.A.C. for its eventual publication. During the course of this discussion, Imray indicated that he had been subjected to considerable political pressure from within his own Department, and he advised that he was now unable to stand by some of the statements in the report (82).

On the basis of these discussions it was agreed that members of the Working Party would go through the report and make recommendations in the light of their own position. These summaries and recommendations would then be sent to the Chairman who would incorporate these points as far as possible into a new draft. This new draft would be discussed at a further meeting of the Working Party on 6 March. It was also agreed that the Working Party would write a letter to the Chairman of N.R.A.C. commenting on the various criticisms of the draft report. This letter would be circulated in the first instance to members of Committee 'D' who were to meet on 9 March, and then forwarded to Council for their scheduled meeting on March 12. When the Working Party reassembled for their final meeting on 6 March this proposal was actioned, and whilst no minutes were taken of this meeting, the amended report and an eleven page letter to the Chairman and Council members of N.R.A.C. constitute a record of the Working Party's deliberations (83).

The final report produced by the N.R.A.C. Working Party consisted of two parts. The first, comprising 38 pages, contained the report proper and set out the Working Party's analysis and its recommendations. The second section contained a survey of New Zealand literature and a summary of results from the questionnaire which had been constructed by the Working Party. In the introduction the Working Party spelt out its purpose.

"The purpose of this report is to evaluate the current capability of the nation to generate knowledge and information about employment and more particularly unemployment. It is not a review of existing research knowledge. Rather it is an examination of the structure of our knowledge base and the extent to which that knowledge base can be regarded as appropriate for dealing with the employment needs and concerns of the present day" (85).

The inadequacies of the existing knowledge base were established.

"As the report will show our current knowledge foundation is inadequate. The statistical base on which decisions have to be made is both flawed and incomplete. Neither the causes nor the effects of unemployment have yet been clearly established let alone understood" (86).

As the basis of its 'critical' analysis the Working Party took a particular value position.

**Unemployment** is unjust, in that one segment of the community (the young, women, ethnic minorities, the disabled and people who have benefitted least from the education system) suffer the consequences while the remainder of the community enjoys relative prosperity.
Unemployment is divisive in that it makes the differences between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' more stark and thus increases the likelihood of resentment, bitterness and even sectional violence. Unemployment threatens our national identity in that it violates what was hitherto a fundamental national value. A belief cherished in New Zealand is that everyone gets a "fair go" and those experiencing misfortune are helped not handicapped further" (87).

The introduction concluded with an explanation setting out the rationale for the tenor and style of the report.

"It has been written with regard to the range and diversity of people concerned with employment and unemployment. As a consequence we do not accept those arguments which credit economics, sociology, education or any other single scientific discipline with having a monopoly on relevant knowledge. Rather we have adopted a holistic approach which we believe reflects most accurately the submissions made to the Working Party by public and private sectors, institutional representatives and individuals, 'planners', and those most affected by their plans" (88).

The report reviewed the rapid rise in unemployment registrations since 1977, significant demographic statistics, such as emigration as well as sex and ethnic variations, and in a summary of the current situation concluded: "We do not know what the real situation is in New Zealand either with respect to the unemployed or the job market." (89).

A major section of the report focused on causation. This section dealt with deteriorating economic conditions as revealed by economic indicators such as the G.N.P. growth rate, the rapid rate of labour force growth with particular reference to school leavers and female participation rates, and it critiqued those interpretations of unemployment which reduced the question of causation to one of
individual inadequacy, deviancy or ignorance. As a means of
illustrating the structural basis of unemployment, and the symptomatic
response of policy makers, the Working Party posed a series of
questions:

"Why are young Maori people over-represented in
unemployment statistics while white middle class males with
a background in higher education are largely shielded from
unemployment? Why do we distinguish between paid and
unpaid work? Why under certain macro economic conditions
should one group in society (the unemployed) be denied the
opportunity for job satisfaction while others are not? Why
do we talk so often about the economic costs (in terms of
economic growth or inflation and of the unemployment
benefit) while we avoid measuring the real and invisible
costs of unemployment? Why do we assume that a growth
policy is best without examining what would happen if a
policy of full employment were given first priority? What
would be the consequences for employment of a slower rate
of economic growth or of a lower average standard of
living?" (90).

These questions were designed to be critically demonstrative of the
narrow economic frameworks within which current policy options were
posed. Then followed a brief review of the alternative economic models
broadly encompassing the Keynesian and Monetarist traditions, and the
inadequacies of both as explanatory frameworks for understanding the
nature of, and possible responses to, unemployment.

The report dwelt at length on State policy and the assumptions upon
which these policies appeared to be based.

"It is not clear how current economic policies will achieve
the full employment goal. In practice Government
Departments dealing in any way with unemployment have
interpreted both the nature of the problem and the desired
treatment in different ways. These different
interpretations seem to stem both from how each Department defines its role and, (in the absence of any clear guidelines) what each Department thinks the political definition of full employment is.

"Secondly - it is assumed that the benefits of increased economic growth will 'trickle down' from the top and so benefit all sections of New Zealand society including the unemployed. The failure of two 'development decades' gives good reason to doubt the viability of the 'trickle down' theory. Furthermore even if the economic growth rate increases how that will change the nature or extent of unemployment or how the 'benefits' will be distributed are two important questions that may reasonably be asked.

"Thirdly - it is assumed that industrialisation holds the key to New Zealand's future. Investment in energy, forestry, fishing and horticulture and the injection of foreign capital and technology are the instruments by which this new course is being chartered. Are these the most appropriate instruments? Are we travelling in the right direction? Will an influx of foreign capital and technology reduce unemployment? If so how and to what extent and with what costs? To what ends and to whose advantage should the 'benefits' of growth and development be put? Is increased economic growth a viable objective and the only viable objective and if so then how much is desirable and what are the associated social costs? We received no evidence to suggest that these questions have been addressed with any degree of clarity" (91).

The absence of any coherent policy on employment, as evidenced by the considerable confusion which existed among the various sectors and interest groups concerned in any way with employment and unemployment, and exacerbated further by an unreliable and flawed data base for both decision making and evaluation, led the Working Party to make one structural recommendation. They suggested that a special Task Force be established with direct links to the policy makers, and they recommended that this Task Force be charged with the development of an employment policy, and the monitoring and overall direction of research policy and practice (65). Apart from this one structural recommendation supporting the establishment of a Task Force, the
Working Party identified three broad strategies or categories for research.

(1) Research into the conditions of the employed/unemployed with a view to alleviating the impact of adverse conditions - a compensatory strategy.

(2) Research into the existing labour market with a view to reversing undesirable tendencies - a curative strategy.

(3) Research into the causes of unemployment with a view to eliminating them - a preventative strategy." (93).

The Working Party clearly identified its research priorities.

"Consistently with the desirability of finding preventative effects the recommendations have as their origin a concern that decisions governing the directions of New Zealand's economic and social development are being taken without adequate research into the assumptions upon which the decisions are based. Without such a fundamental questioning research into other aspects of the employment/unemployment scene must be largely cosmetic. Our recommendations for research therefore are based on the following notions:

(1) That the prime causes of unemployment cannot be found among the population suffering from it;

(2) That information and data which could explain the characteristics and dynamics of employment and unemployment within New Zealand is inadequate;

(3) That highest priority should be accorded to research that deals with causes of unemployment.

Accordingly the recommendations have been put into three parts and in descending order of priority. Part A emphasises policy, (and includes the labour market and education). Part B focuses on the ramifications of and for the unemployed whilst Part C deals specifically with research and methods" (94).

Twentysix recommendations were made in all, setting broad parameters for a research programme which encompassed public and private views of
the national destiny, decision making, resource analysis, the structural conditions of the employment market, and the relationship between policy formulation and implementation. Within the context of the labour market, the Working Party recommended an expanded data base by means of a household labour force survey and the further development of social indicators. Attention was drawn to the need for research into the employment consequences of resource development, new technology and labour market adjustments, with special emphasis on the demographic characteristics of the market and the role of education (95).

In Part B the Working Party focused on the unemployed, and stressed again the difference between policy oriented research and a compensatory programme.

"The over-riding concern of research into the conditions and circumstances of the unemployed themselves can only be a compensatory one. The prime purpose is to reduce and remove the ill effects of unemployment and to compensate for the damage done to its victims. Research is needed to improve the conditions of the unemployed by discovering what human needs are not being met and whether alternative policies and practices might alleviate the conditions (96).

Part C recommendations stressed the need for a variety of research designs and techniques, and it paid particular attention to 'grass roots' research by volunteers, as well as the need for open access to any data and information generated. The Working Party suggested that one of the main functions of any Task Force would be to ensure open access to information, in addition to fulfilling its monitoring and evaluation functions (70).
Summary of Responses to N.R.A.C. Draft Report (71).

On 20 and 21 February, 1981 the Working Party considered the selected responses from the representatives of 16 organisations canvassed by N.R.A.C. These responses fell into two major categories - those which reinforced the overall direction and tenor of the report (8 submissions) - and those which were highly critical (5 submissions). The three remaining responses could not be classified. One was from the National Council of Women which stated that it could not make useful comment at the time, whilst the other two responses from the Prime Minister's department and the Vocational Training Council were phoned comments taken down by the N.R.A.C. Secretariat. The Prime Minister's Department believed the purpose of the report required clarification before it could be produced as a research document, and the Vocational Training Council described it as "interesting, well written and sympathetic to employment in ways not usually seen", but at the same time in the Council's judgement the report was "lacking in economic considerations" (99).

The responses which could generally be described as supportive came from the Departments of Statistics, Education, Justice, Maori Affairs and Social Welfare, from the Commission for the Future, the Federation of Labour, and the National Council of the Y.M.C.A.

"The report gives a comprehensive and detailed treatment of the subject and ... the authors are to be commended for
their effort" (73).

"The report has confirmed our own experience in trying to pin down the nature and extent of unemployment among Maoris in general and Maori Youth in particular. The data either does not exist or is of such poor quality to be of little use in policy making" (101).

"The Working Party is to be congratulated on its attempt to cover its terms of reference comprehensively and to consult widely. It has shown clearly in relation to its first four terms of reference the inadequacies of existing data bases, of the present state of knowledge about causes and effects of unemployment, and of the evaluation of existing programmes relevant to the labour market. The appendix to the report is a useful contribution to N.Z. literature on unemployment" (102).

"The Federation supports the broad approach taken by the Working Party to the question of what research is needed into employment and in particular the present state of knowledge on the 'causes' and 'effects' of unemployment" (103).

"I first congratulate you on the thrust of this paper. It displays a forward looking approach not typical of most Government agencies" (104).

"Could we ... take the opportunity of commending the Working Party for its enlightened approach to this whole vexed issue and the breath and fresh air perception it brings to it" (105).

The responses which were highly critical of the report all focused on the economic domain.

"I was ... surprised at the approach which the N.R.A.C. has adopted in the report. There is superficial commentary on the Government’s economic policies and the assumptions and attitudes on which they are based. By implication these are criticised in the report" (106).

"It is accepted that unemployment issues are not solely economic in nature, but we could argue strongly that they are not entirely sociological as seems to be implied in the paper. It is therefore felt that any research programme would require an important emphasis on economic aspects and linkages which in our view are only cavalierly discussed in the report" (107).
"With little in the private sector employment arena the members probably found themselves handicapped in producing a balanced and positive report and restricted themselves more to a social analysis rather than credible economic argument" (108).

"The report as a whole reflects no understanding of either the historic trend and circumstances or of the economic and other mechanisms which cause or are associated with the present unemployment situation" (109).

The political and ideological positions of these organisations were clearly enunciated, by their 'managerial' personnel.

"In fact the Council seems to have a clear bias against current Government policies which seems uncalled for until more rigorous research is available or until better strategies can be suggested" (110).

"We have serious misgivings about the contents of the report primarily on the grounds of lack of balance and the absence of supporting analysis for many of the views and assertions put forward" (111).

"We believe --- that it is likely to further reduce the likelihood of the report receiving serious consideration from policy makers" (112).

"It gives us no joy at all to see the acceptance of a 'free market philosophy' questioned? --- we are concerned about the national proliferation of negative statements and wonder whether the National Research Advisory Council should associate itself uncritically with some of the statements in the introduction as the news media will feed upon any divisive statements that they pick up --- your Council may care to balance some of their statements against some of the anti-establishment exaggerations in the introduction" (113).

"I suggest that only a very small number of economists would advocate an increase in real wages and that they would be fairly well to the left in political outlook and associated with the Trade Union Movement. Their advocacy of higher real wages would reflect a philosophical/political perspective rather than an analytic one" (114).
These political and ideological positions were also expressed in action. In the case of the Department of Labour, two examples of strategic action were initiated. First, the Director of Planning was asked to modify his stance on the Working Party and so represent a 'Departmental perspective' - and secondly a private consultancy firm was hired to write an alternative report. The Department had received a copy of the N.R.A.C. draft report in October 1980, and upon receipt of this document, 'managers' within the State subjected their Director of Planning to criticism for the part he played in compiling the N.R.A.C. report. This form of strategic action was revealed at a meeting of the Working Party, when the Director of Planning indicated that he could no longer stand by statements in the report (115). Then in November 1980, these same 'managerial' interests, hired Link Consultants Limited to produce a report which focused in particular on Government policy, the area which had come in for greatest criticism in the N.R.A.C. document. Link Consultants were paid $37,125 for producing this report, which was released after twenty-seven revisions as a glossy publication endorsing Government policy (116). It was released by the National Government five months before the 1981 election and before the N.R.A.C. document was released by the Minister. It was described by groups outside of Government as a "snow job" concealing the real situation, but the most interesting facet of this publication was its ideological function aimed at legitimating the State's restructuring programme, while the costs of such an exercise were met out of public revenue.

Treasury's ideology, in the person of its Deputy-Secretary, was set out in a paper prepared for one of the Working Parties of the Employment
Conference in February 1979 (117). This paper, prepared by Mr McKenzie’s unit in Treasury, examined the underlying medium term trends in both the population structure and the economy. It revealed that if G.N.P. rose at the rate allowed by the trend in exports, there would be an absolute fall in the total number of jobs available, and when this tendency was coupled with the projected rise in the potential labour force, then the total number of people unemployed by 1985 could be as high as 300,000 (118). Although this prediction was later refuted by Treasury officials as being overly pessimistic, the Working Party used the projection to demonstrate that the statistical base on which decisions had to be made was both flawed and incomplete. Mr McKenzie attacked the use of such figures at an N.R.A.C. meeting on 6th October.

"He viewed the report as at best superficial, at worst unbalanced, and in any event dynamite" (119).

Two days later he sent a confidential assessment of the report (120) to the Acting Minister of Finance and the Minister of National Development, Mr Birch, who was also the Minister of Science and Technology, and therefore the Minister ultimately responsible for the National Research Advisory Council. As a result of this action the Minister planned to contact the Chairman of N.R.A.C. and indicate that there was no further need to proceed with the report (121). However, before the Minister could act, the N.R.A.C. Secretariat under direction from Council, despatched 16 copies of the report to Departments and organisations for comment - had this not happened it is doubtful if the report would have gone further. At the same time as
Treasury 'managers' commented negatively on the N.R.A.C. report because of its "sociological" rather than "economic" arguments, these same practitioners commented favourably on a Planning Council interpretation because it "broadly accords with Government economic policy" (122).

"The Planning Council's document Employment is a timely survey of New Zealand's employment prospects and a compendium of concrete proposals for an active employment policy. Treasury concurs in the Council's assessment that unemployment is likely to remain relatively high for some time and that there is limited immediate scope for demand, stimulating counter measures. The removal of structural impediments to growth is a pre-requisite to restoring high employment levels, and this is the present emphasis of Government policies" (123).

The Planning Council report gave legitimacy and reinforcement to the exclusive economic interpretation of employment pursued by Treasury, whereas the N.R.A.C. document stated explicitly, that "economic models alone (had) not been able to provide a comprehensive explanation of the causes and cures of unemployment". It asserted that economic and social objectives had not been clearly defined by Government, and in a direct comment aimed at critiquing Government's development programme it asked, "are we travelling in the right direction?" (124). Treasury had a vested interest in endorsing a Planning Council document which inferred that Government was travelling in the right direction, because in essence that was an endorsement of Treasury as Government's principal economic adviser.

The mutual endorsement of Planning Council and Treasury interpretations of policy stemmed not only from the patterned practices of their respective institutions, but also from the actions of their
'managerial' personnel. The Planning Council's Sir Frank Holmes and Mr John Martin, Chairman and Director respectively, could both be described as conservative economists who consistently espoused a 'mainstream' position, differentiating between economic and social life, and promoting 'the economy' as having 'a logic of its own'(125). Treasury's managers were Secretary Bernard Galvin, former head of the Prime Minister's Department, and therefore intimately involved in establishing the National Government's economic priorities throughout the 1970's, and Deputy Secretary McKenzie, a member of the N.R.A.C. Council and the person in Treasury responsible for assessing the Working Party's "critique" of Government policy. Because of their structural locations within the State, these practitioners were situated around the boundary of the dominant class. As a consequence, they had a cognitive interest in maintaining the status quo, and in essence that meant pursuing economic and social policies which favoured the long term interests of the dominant class. These interests were clearly expressed by the Executive Director of the Employers Federation.

"It gives us no joy at all to see the acceptance of a "free market philosophy" questioned or the 300,000 unemployment bogey floated again after the Treasury initiator of the figure admits that it has been disproved by events - or that cold water is thrown on large scale resource development and on technology. Is the National Research Advisory Council to help usher in a 'peasant economy'?"(126).

Similar 'interests' were expressed by the Director of the Institute of Economic Research. McDonald attacked the "vague, imprecise, superficial and subjective" nature of the Working Party's report, and
he then devoted a considerable section of his own document to berating the N.R.A.C. for failing to allocate funds to his Institute instead.

"The N.R.A.C. approach to the question of unemployment strikes me as ad hoc and unsystematic and reflects the inappropriate criteria that has generally been used in the past to allocate research funds. N.R.A.C. members have been aware for some time from approaches by the Institute that there was a need for resources to research major policy related issues. Our efforts in this direction have been completely unsuccessful with the N.R.A.C. although we have been able to secure some funding from Treasury from time to time.

... members will recall that I wrote to N.R.A.C. several years ago proposing the establishment of an index of economic research at a cost of several thousand dollars. We had already established a mechanism for this index and undertaken preliminary survey work and only needed this small financial contribution to establish this. N.R.A.C. was unwilling to make the financial contribution (127).

The conflicts apparent in McDonald's statement exemplified the contradictory nature of the submissions and comments to which the Working Party was expected to respond. These conflicts had been anticipated by members of the Working Party when they first gathered to establish a modus operandi. At that time the different interpretations of unemployment by those groups who had a vested interest in the phenomenon were noted, and these interpretations were eventually confirmed and extended as a consequence of the submissions received. However, the strategic significance of State departments such as Treasury, and the weighting accorded economic interpretations, only became apparent after the production of the draft report. Upon receipt of the draft report, the dominant class and members of the auxiliary class around the boundary of the bourgeoisie, used their 'managerial' power to displace the fundamental contradictions of capitalism into
conflicts over immediate interests, and this process of displacement became apparent as the Working Party responded to the negative criticisms of the draft report.


The N.R.A.C. Working Party considered the written responses to its draft report at meetings on 20 and 21 February, and 6 March 1981. Most attention focused on those comments which were critical of the report, but in its detailed letter to N.R.A.C. the Working Party wrote:

"It will not have escaped the notice of either Council or Committee 'D' that the comments vary considerably — some are commendatory others critical — sometimes over the same issue. However, in the present document main attention will be given to the critical comments made and either (1) details will be provided on the manner in which the report has been modified accordingly, or (2) explanations will be given for our rejecting the criticism " (129).

The criticisms levelled at the Working Party report were rejected in the main and thus only minor modifications were made to the draft report. In rejecting these criticisms the Working Party went to considerable lengths to spell out the rationale underlying such judgements.

"In a very real sense the comments when taken collectively reflect the very phenomenon to which the report draws attention — the marked tendency for any agency in expressing concern for the unemployed to take a particular stance or perspective. This single-mindedness of vision apparently makes it difficult for some to appreciate perspectives taken by others. Nowhere is this better
illustrated than in the comments from the three agencies predominantly economic in perspective - Treasury, the Planning Council and the N.Z.I.E.R. We reiterate emphatically that employment/unemployment is not solely an economic matter. There are personal and social ramifications of employment/unemployment that go beyond economics and in our view cannot be dismissed" (130).

The taking of a particular value stance was explicitly reiterated.

"The Working Party took a value position with respect to unemployment. It considered unemployment to be bad. It is bad at the personal level because of the debilitating effects on the unemployed themselves, their friends and relatives and for that matter on the (selectively) employed themselves. It is bad at the industrial level because of the effect of wasted resources (manpower if you prefer). It is bad at the societal level because of the social effects of unemployment on the morale, effective operation and unity of society. It may be that others would not subscribe to such a value position. And indeed arguments have been advanced elsewhere to justify unemployment as a necessary (though unfortunate) corollary of the pursuit of other (higher) benefits. We did not consider it either right or proper to act as apologists for unemployment" (131).

Similarly, the Working Party responded directly to criticisms which emanated from the expectations some people held about the format and style of the report.

"We gave considerable attention to this matter and having concluded that no particular format or style had any proprietary rights, we chose because of the diversity of people affected by unemployment, to write a report that would be short, readable and to the point. To this extent we did not resort to several academic conventions regarding them as unduly pretentious in the circumstances. Thus we omitted elaborate referencing and as far as possible the use of more archaic academic language. In forsaking the comfort of such academic artifacts we recognised that others seeing an argument presented simply might mistakenly consider the argument itself to be simple. The basic argument is not simple. In contrast with the single minded
perspectives and conceptual restrictiveness of the various uni-dimensional explanations of unemployment our multi-dimensional one is considerably more complex and comprehensive" (132).

The Working Party also reacted strongly to the criticism of superficiality.

"We would be less than responsible to the Council if we failed to comment on this apparently serious allegation. First we should point out that because neither critic explained or justified the comment, the comment can only be regarded itself as "superficial". Second in a very real sense any 27 page report that deals with a subject as complex as unemployment and does so with reference to psychological, medical, criminal, educational, industrial, economic and policy dimensions must with respect to any of these be superficial. If that is what the critics meant the comment is trite, even gratuitous. Third lacking evidence (because they did not give it) we suspect the critics were merely saying that the report did not confine itself to their (specialised) perspectives or follow the scholastic conventions peculiar to their own persuasion. Finally, we were not unaware that vested interests enter into any discussion on unemployment. The unemployed have a vested interest in becoming employed, the Unions have a vested interest in protecting jobs, employers have a vested interest in profitability, Government Departments have vested interest in the extent to which blame or responsibility might be attributed to them and economists have a vested interest in the credibility of their own positions and theories. Now at a time when unemployment is increasing it is reasonable to ask the question why? In doing so it is inevitable that some 'vested interests' may feel the necessity to become defensive. But there are two ways to deal with the question 'why'. One way is prevent its being asked. The other is to answer it. The report assumed that the alternative available in democratic New Zealand was, and still is, the latter" (133).

The detailed letter to the National Research Advisory Council then took each criticism in turn and indicated the Working Party's response. In most instances these responses merely elaborated upon points made in the draft report, and throughout the Working Party focussed on
fundamental as opposed to immediate interests. Even in the case of Mr McDonald and the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research the Working Party New Zealand simply stated;

"We have not seen fit to comment on Mr McDonald’s misconceptions about the role of N.R.A.C. (as a funding agency) nor his apparent concern that he was not commissioned to undertake the Working Party’s task" (134).

Apart from this comment the eleven page letter to N.R.A.C. dealt directly and succinctly with the criticisms raised, and the report (with minor changes) was left with the Secretariat for submission to Committee ‘D’ and the Council of N.R.A.C.


The political nature of the N.R.A.C. report was evident soon after the first draft had been prepared in April 1980. Oliver Riddell, a reporter for the Christchurch Press, obtained a copy of the draft report from the N.R.A.C. Secretariat, and he wrote an article which was subsequently published on 12 July (135). This article prompted questions in the House of Representatives (136) and a letter from the Chairman of N.R.A.C.’s Social Sciences Committee to the then Minister of Science and Technology, Mr Birch. In this letter the Chairman of Committee ‘D’ wrote;

"I wish to make it clear that all members of the Working Party had strictly observed complete confidentiality on the substance of the report. I have no reason to believe that this confidentiality was infringed in any way by members of
The draft report was used again in October 1980 as background material for an Eye Witness documentary on unemployment. This coincided with the distribution of the draft report to sixteen organisations for comment. On this occasion there was no comment from the Government nor any record of explanatory letters. A third "leak" occurred in March 1981 (138), when the National Business Review carried a summary of the draft report with comments from the papers prepared by Treasury, by McDonald of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, and by the Employers' Federation. The only comment on this article was a letter from McKenzie of Treasury to the Executive Director of N.R.A.C. noting that "already there has been comment in the press about the report and a summary was recently published in the National Business Review. If the Council believes that publication is unavoidable given the press attention that it has already received then I am firmly of the view that the Council should not endorse the report either in whole or in part and therefore cannot agree to the arrangement you propose in your note of 2 April" (139).

In his letter of 2 April, the Executive Director of N.R.A.C. had proposed that the Council refer the report to the Minister of Science and Technology without waiting for a further Council discussion. The Director also suggested that a covering note be sent endorsing the
On the 14 April 1981, the report was forwarded to the Minister of Science and Technology (Dr I. Shearer) with a covering letter from the Chairman of the National Research Advisory Council. In this letter the Chairman of N.R.A.C. set out his interpretations of the Council’s view.

He noted that whilst the Council believed that the report had value, the ‘entire content and recommendations’ would ‘not be endorsed by all Council members.’ The Council chairman suggested the report could be referred to the Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology. He concluded;

In view of the importance of the subject and the publicity which the report has attracted (Christchurch Press article of 12.7.80 and National Business Review of 23.3.81 indicate possession of unauthorised copies of the report); the undertaking by the previous Minister in response to a question in the House (Hansard 16 October 1980: 4250; ‘all Council reports were made public’); and because of repeated requests to N.R.A.C. for copies of the report I am of the view that the report should be released to interested parties accompanied by this memorandum" (14).
contacted some members of the N.R.A.C. Working Party in February 1981. They wanted to meet with the Working Party so that they might discuss the draft N.R.A.C. report, but when they revealed they already had a copy of this "confidential report", members of the Working Party reacted with considerable anger and refused to discuss the issue until Government honoured its commitment to release the N.R.A.C. report. Many other groups which had been prepared to meet with the N.R.A.C. Working Party also refused to cooperate with Link or its sponsoring body. When the sanitised Link report was finally released in June 1981 the response was predictable.

It was described as "facile and expensive", a glossy publication "punctured ironically by pictures of people working" (115). Its purpose was clearly aimed at explaining Government's approach to unemployment, and thus despite the fact that it was promoted as a policy document, it was ultimately an ideological instrument aimed at legitimating the National Government's development programme in the lead up to the 1981 Parliamentary elections - in this case the ideological action of State practitioners was underwritten by the taxpayer.

On 4 July 1981 the Auckland Star published a review of the N.R.A.C. report although it was still a confidential document. The Star report stated that;

"An advance copy was made available to the Star yesterday following days of criticism of the Government's Jobs and People booklet released this week. It is understood the Working Party report predictions were so alarming and the
criticisms of Government policies so far reaching it was shelved. Instead the services of Link Consultants were involved by the Labour Department to produce a more palatable document" (143).

Two days later in the wake of this new round of publicity the Prime Minister hit out at his Press Conference. He labelled the N.R.A.C. report as "garbage" and said that Mr J. McKenzie, a senior Treasury official on the Working Party had disassociated himself from the report. (In fact Mr McKenzie was not on the Working Party.) Mr Muldoon went on to say;

"It's noted that among those involved in bringing it together was the great Alf Kirk, the economist for the Federation of Labour who many of you will know, and a fellow named Shirley who has politicised himself from as far back as one can recall. I think he these days works at Massey University. That is the background to it and one of these people is leaking this report all over the place with the idea of embarrassing the Government and its no more than that" (144).

The Prime Minister made these comments after the usual Monday morning Cabinet meeting, and given the background letter which had been sent to the former Minister of Science and Technology, Mr Birch, Muldoon should have been aware that the confidential report had not been released by any member of the Working Party.(145) To denigrate members of the Working Party however was an effective strategy for dismissing the political implications of the report itself.

In response to these allegations Shirley asked for a retraction and when the Prime Minister failed to apologise, litigation proceedings were initiated. These proceedings were eventually settled in the High
Court two years later when the Prime Minister withdrew his allegations and expressed regret. (146) In the meantime, the National Party continued its campaign of denigration. In an adjournment debate in the House of Representatives on 7 July 1981, the Minister of Energy, Mr Birch stated:

"It is worth noting the members of this much vaunted Working Party. One was a fellow called Kirk, employed by the Federation of Labour and said to be author of Mr Knox’s address at Geneva. He was certainly one of the authors, one of those who would sell New Zealand down the drain. Another member was Mr Ian Shirley, who will be well remembered by members for his anti-Government comments in Auckland some years ago; he is now a lecturer at Massey University. Another member is Ms Susanne Snively, wife of a well known television commentator, Ian Fraser" (147).

Using similar words on 10 July, the Prime Minister replying to a question in the House of Representatives from the Labour Party’s spokesman on employment, stated:

"The people I can recall are a Professor Adams from Massey University who has not been prepared to defend his report in public; Alf Kirk, an economist with the Federation of Labour; a man named Shirley from Massey University who is well known for his anti-Government political comments; a woman named Snively, who is the wife of a fellow called Ian Fraser" (148).

Whereas the Working Party refrained from commenting in public because the report had not been released officially by Government, it did not prevent others from entering into the debate. McDonald of the Institute of Economic Research released his comments on the report and McKenzie’s statements taken from confidential Treasury reports, were widely quoted by National Party politicians. Those assessments of the
report which had been complimentary did not see the light of day, because they were not available to the Parliamentary opposition, and thus the Ministers involved were able to selectively control the flow of information.

The political practices of the news media were much more even handed. On 13 July, the National Business Review wrote an article on "those two job reports", and devoted its editorial comment in this same edition to the N.R.A.C. report.

"Prime Minister, Rob Muldoon, described it as 'a load of garbage' and a 'thoroughly bad report' whose estimates of unemployment "have no validity whatsoever'. Labour Minister, Jim Bolger, dismissed it as an 'alarmist scenario' and said the figures could not be substantiated. He places his confidence in the Government's method of measuring unemployment levels by counting the number of people 'sufficiently concerned about their unemployment' to register with his Department.

"The resultant figures no doubt are more acceptable to Bolger because they ignore the thousands of people who are seeking jobs but who do not register as unemployed. Some are too young to register, some are on the Domestic Purposes Benefit not the dole. Some are reluctant to register least they be considered bludgers. Many women because they are married do not qualify for the dole. And the Departmental figure does not include people on special work who (the point is arguable) can be considered technically unemployed.

"Bolger said as recently as March it was 'important' to establish who are the unemployed and how many there are. This underlines what the N.R.A.C. report says - we do not know. And our shaky knowledge foundation has implications for the quality of our economic policies because 'the statistical base on which decisions are continually being made is both flawed and incomplete'.

"One of the aims of the State sanitized Jobs and People (which Bolger urges us to read) is to "provide a constructive and positive basis for the continuing public discussion on what more needs to be done to deal with New Zealand's employment problem". To make an effective
contribution to that debate the Government should have been prepared to give its own honest assessment of unemployment figures. It should also have provided us with the arguments for and against a number of development options that might create jobs. It did not. It served only to present the Government’s growth strategy in election year as the single solution to creating employment opportunities. There will be full employment when the economy is rejuvenated according to the magic National formula and when we make better use of the job and training schemes which a beneficent State has provided for the unemployed.

"So on the one hand we are expected to put our faith in the Government’s expectation that 410,000 new jobs will fortuitously result from its growth strategy. On the other we must muse on the admission in March of Associate Finance Minister, Warren Cooper, that the Government would be "less than honest" to claim it had policies that would provide full employment because there is no simple remedy.

"The Government seems intent on ensuring we do not untangle the truth from these inconsistencies; and when Bolger said earlier this year he welcomed the increasing debate on the subject provided it was well informed and constructive, we now know what he means. We are expected to debate what the Government gives us to debate. We are patronised and told we may not read a report (presumably politically embarrassing) because Muldoon labels it "garbage". The same Government cynically trumpets a concern to protect individual rights and freedoms in justifying its stance on the Springbok Tour. But not the right to make up our own minds about the worthiness of the N.R.A.C. on unemployment" (149).

A similar assessment of the N.R.A.C. report was made by Oliver Riddell in a Christchurch Press article on 16 July, 1981.

"The way the Government reacted to the ... report will have long term repercussions on the unemployed and on the tight little group of only a few hundred people (at most) nationwide who influence decision making on unemployment. Many of these are public servants who will do what they are told but many others are employers, union officials and academics who retain a greater independence. These people whether within or without the public service have been given a clear message. They have been told that no matter how genuine their work the Government reserves the right to savage it (and them) and also to bury their work if it can
when that work is unpalatable" (150).

Mr Mackney, Chairman of N.R.A.C. wrote to the Chairman of the Working Party on 10 August 1981.

"I can first of all assure you that the Council firmly believes that the Working Party has acted in good faith throughout and should be commended on their restraint in a very difficult situation. The leaking of the report to the media (for which the Working Party was in no way responsible) taking place as it did before the Government had considered the report resulted in some extreme political reactions. During this period the Council appreciated the control exercised by the Working Party in the face of severe criticism and was pleased at the outcome in that the report has now been released" (151).

Cabinet agreed that N.R.A.C. should release the report on July 20, five days after representatives of the Working Party attended the Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology. However the official publication of the report did nothing to dissipate the conflict which had surrounded the contents of the document, or the political arguments which were generated as a consequence of its premature release. Whereas proletarian fractions such as the unemployed coalition which leaked the report continued to use it as a legitimate critique of the State's employment strategy, those representing capital interests attacked its superficiality and the lack of any credible economic analysis. The National Government continued to denigrate individual members of the Working Party and the Labour Opposition used the document to raise questions about Government Policy in general, and the ability of the "Think Big" Programme in particular, to generate an additional 410,000 employment positions.
These practices appeared to be consistent with the political and ideological interests of the respective parties, and with the structural locations of the proletarian and bourgeois classes as theorised in Chapter Four. However, the central question posed at the outset of this Chapter remains - did the Working Party as a fraction of the auxiliary class use its simultaneous and partial location in two classes in accordance with the critical tradition and in line with the functions of a critical theorem as outlined in Chapter One? How did these members of the auxiliary class use their structural and organisational capacities, and in respect of which class? The answers to these questions may assist in clarifying whether or not members of the auxiliary class are able to fulfill the practical aim of transformation as proposed by the critical-emancipatory tradition.

The Three Functions of Critical Theory

In order to assess the N.R.A.C. Working Party according to the parameters of the critical tradition, it is essential that we examine the three functions of critical theory as identified by Habermas. (152) These functions are as follows:

1. The formation and extension of a critical theorem which can stand up to scientific discourse.

2. The application of such a theorem to specific groups by means of a reflective process.
3. The selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions and the conduct of political struggle.

The critical theorem of science as identified by the N.R.A.C. Working Party, was reflected in the final report, which sought to examine the structure of knowledge in respect of employment and unemployment. In undertaking this examination, the Working Party took a particular value position which was explicitly enunciated in the report's introduction, and in a detailed response to written criticisms. (153) Whilst members of the Working Party held divergent world views, the process of communicative action in which they engaged resulted in a grounded consensus which identified unemployment as an issue of distributive justice. The fact that unemployment discriminated against certain sectors of society whilst others enjoyed relative prosperity was considered unjust, in that the affliction itself was not perceived as being the result of individual inadequacy or ignorance. It was conceived instead as a social phenomenon emanating from the political economy of the New Zealand social formation and thus, the Working Party focussed its critique on State practices, and upon the narrow range of economic models within which policy options were framed. (154)

Although few members of the Working Party would subscribe to the critical tradition as theorised in this study, the final report linked unemployment with a class analysis of society. At the interactive level, this analysis questioned the over-representation of Maoris in unemployment statistics as opposed to the under-representation of white middle-class males with a background in higher education. (155) At the
in institutional level, it questioned the States capital intensive development programme, the influx of foreign capital, and the inequitable dispersement of benefits.(156)

This interpretation of unemployment found reflective acceptance among fractions of the working class as evidenced from actions surrounding the reports publication, and in line with the requirements of strategic action, the report was endorsed for its "enlightened approach" by practitioners representing organisations of both the State and civil society.(158)

In organising these "processes of enlightenment", the Working Party engaged in communicative action with a range of parties and class fractions who had a vested interest in unemployment. Questionnaires, prepared documents, written as well as oral submissions, and open meetings, were mechanisms employed by the Working Party in order to appreciate the range of alternative views and explanations held by the participants. This meant accepting the validity claims associated with universal pragmatics,(159) as well as the life world shared by speaker and hearer, and thus the culturally transmitted background knowledge from which the participants in communication drew their interpretations. The pursuit of truth was not tied to particular methods or strategies, but rather to 'universal pragmatic relations' between speech acts, participants, and speech situations. In asserting that certain interpretations and facts relating to unemployment were true, those making submissions were required to justify these claims discursively by means of argumentation. In some cases (as for instance with the arguments advanced by the Department of Maori Affairs), these
claims found acceptance with the Working Party, but in other instances (namely the submissions made by McDonald of the Institute of Economic Research), the claims were rejected. Arguments were not dismissed out of hand, but in all cases they were subjected to discussion and debate within the context of the Working Party, and then either accepted or rejected in writing once a grounded consensus had been reached. Representatives of the Working Party justified their report before the Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology(160), and once the report was officially released they defended its approach and conclusions in public. At all times the Working Party relied on the force of the better argument as the basis of communicative action, so that even when personal abuse was directed at individual members, the Working Party refrained from comment.

The practices of the Working Party were structurally limited by virtue of its constitution as an agency of the New Zealand State. Within this relatively autonomous site of class conflict, the Working Party was presented with a range of contradictory submissions which were selectively interpreted and weighted in favour of the dominant class. As a consequence, unemployment was defined by bourgeois interests as a temporary phenomenon resulting from an imbalance between supply and demand. This empirical definition reaffirmed Keynesian economic theory as the standard by which all other interpretations should be measured. On the basis of this universal claim, the dominant class could then render alternative interpretations "as at best superficial, at worst unbalanced, and in any event dynamite."(161)

It was not the dominant class itself which made these universal claims,
but rather members of the auxiliary class situated around the boundary of the bourgeoisie. These 'managers' within the State played a central role in securing class domination, by reducing class, gender and racial perspectives on unemployment to either economic or pathological constructs. As members of the auxiliary class, these 'managers' performed an important ideological function on behalf of the dominant class, as they referred to the 'superficiality', 'lack of balance', proliferation of 'negative statements', and 'anti-establishment exaggerations', contained in the report. Furthermore, they translated these pronouncements into covert strategic action by commissioning an alternative report as a means of refuting the N.R.A.C. interpretation. They applied political pressure to a State servant who was also a member of the N.R.A.C. Working Party, and they sought to have the Working Party's report withheld from public scrutiny and debate.

As instrumental actions by members of the auxiliary class, these practices were endorsed by the polity. The Minister of Science and Technology attempted to have the report withheld after receiving a confidential assessment from a Treasury official, and the Prime Minister engaged in personal denigration and abuse, by asserting that one of two Working Party members was responsible for breaching confidentiality and releasing the document to the media. In making these claims, the Prime Minister knew that the propositional content of his utterance was untrue(162), and thus the primary motivation for making the allegations that he did stemmed from a desire to mask the social contradictions indentified in the report. By denigrating members of the Working Party, the Prime Minister was able to direct attention away from the contents of the report. These combined
practices by ‘managers’ and politicians within the State, represented a form of instrumental action which was intended to systematically distort the truth in the interests of social and political domination.

The Working Party was unable to challenge these hegemonic practices, because its own legitimacy was dependent upon its constitution as a quasi agency of the State. It was constrained by the way in which it collectively interpreted its own actions, as well as by the historical situation in which it was immersed. Given these structural limitations on practice, the Working Party sought to pursue the notion of truth based on the force of the better argument. As an alternative to economic reductionism and personal abuse (as manifestations of empiricism), the Working Party chose to enter into discursive action. The reductionist economic argument over unemployment was countered in a television debate with the Minister of Labour and in a detailed response to criticisms of the report, whereas the distortion of truth arising out of the Prime Minister’s personal attack was refuted by means of legal action. In this latter respect, the aim was to restore the conditions of an ‘ideal speech situation’ (163) by changing the context of the discussion so that the allegations could be rationally resolved. Thus one might reasonably argue that the Working Party demonstrated the potential of the critical tradition for emancipatory action.

It was this potential or capacity of the working party to engage in critical practice which was demonstrated in other ways. As a quasi State agency, the Working Party used its structural power when it requested that the Permanent Heads of State Departments should make
submissions in writing and then justify these statements by means of
discursive action. Because of its structural location within a
relatively autonomous State, the Working Party gained access to
information and knowledge usually controlled by the dominant class.
Having gained this information, the Working Party then had the capacity
to use its power through the medium of a report, and the evidence from
this examination suggests that this mediating capacity favoured
proletarian class interests. By using their organisational capacities
in this way, the Working Party demonstrated that it was possible for
members of the auxiliary class to align themselves with proletarian
interests in the same way that they are capable of reaffirming dominant
class interests. This means that members of the auxiliary class have
the structural capacity to choose how they might use their mediating
capacities and in respect of which class. By virtue of their
contradictory locations, members of the auxiliary class are relatively
autonomous agents who draw their characteristics from both proletarian
and bourgeois positions. As a consequence, the automatic alignment of
class and cognitive interests is clearly untenable. We cannot assume
that there is a dependent relationship between the cognitive interests
of State practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant
class, any more than we can assume a positive correlation between the
critical tradition and proletarian emancipation.

Although it might be theoretically possible to assert that the N.R.A.C.
Working Party displayed a primary interest in the emancipation of those
disadvantaged by unemployment, it did not forge a dynamic unity with
the proletarian class. Indeed, the report itself constituted the only
expression of personal and political emancipation, and thus the
practices in which the Working Party engaged, appear to be based on the Habermasian assumption, that the application of a critical theorem would inevitably lead to critical consciousness and transformative action.

In making these assumptions, the Working Party defined its cognitive interests as hermeneutic, because it failed to prescribe how any transformation might be effected, and in so doing it limited its methodology to the structured reality of a given theoretical attitude. There is no evidence to suggest that these practices promoted either personal or political emancipation, and we must therefore acknowledge the gap which has always existed, between a critical theorem of knowledge and its practical realisation. Although Habermas sketches the possibility of transformative action, it is a possibility which is not illuminated in practical terms.
1. Structural limitation refers to the way in which 'some social structure establishes limits within which some other structure or process can vary, and establishes probabilities for the specific structures or processes that are within these limits.' E.O. Wright, Class, Crisis and The State, New Left Books, Verso Edition, London, 1979. See also, C. Wilkes and I. Shirley, Studies of the State: An Introduction To a Research Program, Massey University, April 1981.

2. By mediating capacity is meant the potential ability of a particular class (in this case the auxiliary class) to influence the class formation and thus create the possibility of a socialist society.


5. N.R.A.C. 3/41

6. The exploratory meeting of interested groups was held on 12 December 1978. Those present were:

   Mr. L.A. Cameron (Chairman N.R.A.C.) Professor G. Fraser (Chairman N.R.A.C. Committee D) Professor J. Scott (Chairman N.R.A.C. Manufacturing and Processing Committee) Mr P. Lorimer (Department of Labour) Mr D. Martin (Department of Labour) Mr R. Tanner (National Youth Council) Professor J. Young (Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University) Mrs J. Burns (Secretary N.R.A.C.) Also in attendance were: Ms C. Baxter (National Youth Council Research Officer) Mr H. Wakelin (N.R.A.C. Secretariat)

7. Letters were sent to: New Zealand University Students Association; The Departments of Internal Affairs, Education, Social Welfare, Labour and Maori Affairs. Dr Allan Levett, Consultant Sociologist; Mr Michael Smith, Director of the Inner City Ministry; Mr John Latimer, Community Volunteers, Mr Stuart Ransom, Reader in Personnel Management at Massey University, and the National Youth Council. N.R.A.C. 81/187/D.


9. Letter from Professor R. Adams, Convenor of the Working Party dated April 6, 1979. The six individuals invited to the first meeting of the working party were; Professor R. Adams, Alf Kirk (F.O.L.), David Imray (Department of Labour), Ian Shirley (Massey University), Professor C. Blythe (Auckland University) and Stewart Ransom (Massey University).
The working party met 12 times over a period of 22 months. A calendar of these meetings is as follows:

i. First meeting of the working party held in Wellington on 23 and 24 April, 1979.
iii. Third meeting, Wellington, 28 and 29 June, 1979.
v. Fifth meeting, Wellington, 5, 6 and 7 September, 1979.
vii. Sixth meeting, Auckland, 8, 9 and 10 October, 1979.
x. Tenth meeting, Wellington, 17 and 18 April, 1980.
xii. Twelfth meeting, Wellington, 6 March, 1981.

Draft reports were considered by the Social Sciences Committee on 21 July, 1980, and 15 September, 1980. The report was discussed at Council meetings on 7 October, 1980, 6 November, 1980, and 12 March, 1981.

10. N.R.A.C. Working Party on Employment/Youth Unemployment. Resume, 28 June, 1979, 79/159. See also Minutes of first and second meetings of the working party. 79/118/YE and 79/158/YE.


12. The terms of reference as drawn by the working party and subsequently approved by Council were as follows;

a) to assess the data base currently available to measure the characteristics and dynamics of the labour market with particular reference to unemployment and longer term employment options;

b) to consider the nature, extent and adequacy of the existing data base and interpretations it permits;

c) to review the present state of knowledge on the 'causes' and 'effects' of unemployment;

d) to evaluate the state of evaluation of programmes relevant to the labour market, particularly unemployment prevention strategies and unemployment remediation projects;
e) in the light of a, b, c and d above, to identify research needed, to determine priorities and comment on the conditions thought necessary to undertake it.


15. The Working Party in the resume wrote, 'clearly the kind of research recommended depends on (i) how the situation is perceived (defined), (ii) what are thought to be the 'causes' of unemployment, and (iii) what might be thought to be the 'cures'. N.R.A.C. Working Party Resume (ibid) 79/159, page 2.


19. The first meeting with key actors took place in Wellington on 5, 6, and 7 September, 1979. This was followed by meetings in Auckland (8, 9 and 10 October), Christchurch (26 and 27 November) and Wellington (11 and 12 December, 1979). The nineth, tenth and eleventh meetings of the Working Party were devoted to the writing and redrafting of the final report.

20. A full list of the individuals and organisations consulted was set out in the Appendices to the final report.


22. N.R.A.C. Minutes of 4th meeting of the working party (79/219/YE) pages 4 and 5.

Wellington Notes I and IV, and Christchurch Notes III. Summary of Submissions, Massey University, Palmerston North, 1984.


27. Summary of submissions, Department of Labour, 6.2, page 11.


29. Summary of Submission, Prime Ministers Department, 6.10, page 18.

30. Summary of Submissions, Department of Trade and Industries, 6.5, page 17.


32. Summary of Submissions, Department of Trade and Industries, 6.5, page 15.


34. Summary of Submissions, Employers Representatives, 6.13, page 32.


41. Reserve Bank, N.R.A.C. Minutes of 5th Meeting (ibid) pages 9-10.

42. Summary of Submissions, Prime Ministers Department, 6.10, page 27.
43. Summary of Submissions, Prime Ministers Department, 6.10, page 28.


47. Summary of Submissions, Department of Education, 6.3, page 12.

48. Summary of Submissions, Department of Internal Affairs, 6.6, page 18.


51. Summary of Submissions, Employers Representatives, 6.13, page 34.


54. N.R.A.C. Minutes of 5th Meeting (ibid) pages 2-4.

55. Summary of Submissions, Inter-Church Trade and Industry Commission, pages 16-17.


60. Society for Research on Women, N.R.A.C. Minutes of 5th Meeting (ibid) pages 10-13, 17. Also Shirley, Wellington Notes I, page
4.


62. Summary of Submissions, Department of Maori Affairs, 6.4, pages 13-14.

63. Summary of Submissions, Regional Meetings, 6.17 pages 40-41.


70. N.R.A.C. Minutes of 3rd Meeting of Working Party, Wellington. 28, 29 June 1979, 79/159


72. The relationship between 'systems theory' and the critical tradition is explored by Habermas in part I of Legitimation Crisis (ibid) 1975.


76. Letter from Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C. to members of Working Party, 16 September 1980.

77. Minutes of the 109th Meeting of the National Research Advisory Council held in Wellington on 7 October 1980. 80/272 pages 5-7.

N.R.A.C. Secretariat document, accompanied by agency comments.


80. Letter from Professor Adams to members of Working Party sent by Secretary of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C. with accompanying letter and agency comments. No date.


82. N.R.A.C. Minutes of 11th Meeting (ibid) page 1.


87. N.R.A.C. Report 81/40 (ibid) Section 1, page 6 and Introduction page 2.


89. N.R.A.C. Report 81/40 (ibid) Section 1, page 9.

90. N.R.A.C. Report 81/40 (ibid) Section 1, pages 11-12.

91. N.R.A.C. Report 81/40 (ibid) Section 1, pages 15-17.


95. N.R.A.C. Report 81/40 (ibid) Section II, pages 26-34.


110. Department of Labour (ibid) page 1.

111. The Treasury (ibid) page 1.


113. N.Z. Employers Federation (Inc) (ibid) pages 1 and 2.

114. N.Z. Institute of Economic Research (Inc) (ibid) page 7.


116. Letter from Link Consultants Ltd to Professor G. Fraser 9 July 1981.


118. Economic Briefing (ibid) page 8.


121. Letter from Judy Whitcombe N.R.A.C. Secretariat to Professor G. Fraser, 16 October 1980.


123. The Treasury T.50/310, T.62/21/5. 9 October 1980 (ibid) page 8.


126. N.Z. Employers Federation (Inc.), (ibid), page 1.

127. N.Z. Institute of Economic Research (Inc), (ibid) pages 2-3.


130. Letter to Chairman and Members of N.R.A.C. (ibid) 81/40, pages 1 and 2.


133. Letter to Chairman and Members of N.R.A.C. (ibid) 81/40, pages 2 and 3.


139. Letter to the Executive Director of N.R.A.C. 8 April 1981, from the Treasury, signed by J. McKenzie, Deputy Secretary to the Treasury.


142. National Business Review, 'Those two job reports: not to be confused', page 5. Also; Transcript of news item, Television One, 6.30 pm Wednesday 1 July 1981.


144. R.D. Muldoon, Television News 6 pm and 6.30 pm 6 July 1981.

145. The report was released to the Auckland Star by the Auckland Committee on Unemployment a fact noted in a later edition of that newspaper.

146. Memorandum of Settlement - Shirley versus Muldoon, A.No 195/81.


152. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (ibid) 1973:32.


156. N.R.A.C. report 81/40 (ibid) Section I pages 15-17.
157. The report was ‘leaked’ to the newsmedia by members of the Auckland Committee on Unemployment. This Committee and the groups with which they were aligned, endorsed the report publicly and indicated that they had made it available to the newsmedia because the State was attempting to suppress the contents of the report.

158. Although five agencies were critical of the report, eight organisations reinforced the general tenor and analysis of the document praising its ‘comprehensive and detailed treatment of the subject,’ its ‘forward looking approach,’ and its ‘enlightened’ analysis. These agencies of both the State and civil society had a vested interest in unemployment either in policy terms or in response to its escalation. The N.R.A.C. report can be credited therefore with ‘effectiveness in influencing the decisions of rational opponents’ and in that sense it was exemplary of strategic action.

159. Four different types of validity claims are identified in this study as universal elements involved in exchanging speech acts. These claims are; first, that the utterance is understandable. Secondly, that its propositional content is true. Thirdly, that the speaker is sincere in making the utterance. And fourthly, that it is appropriate for the speaker to be performing the act of speech.

160. Adams, Snively and Shirley represented the working party before the Cabinet Committee on Science and Technology.


162. The Prime Minister acknowledged that the propositional content of his allegations were untrue when he replied to Shirley’s solicitors on 9 July 1981 – ‘if your client says that he is not the person concerned then I must accept his statement’ (Plaintiff’s reply to statement of defence, page 3). In knowing that the propositional content of his allegations were untrue the Prime Minister invalidated one of the universal elements involved in exchanging speech acts.

163. When forces outside ‘the ideal speech situation’ distort the validity claims of universal pragmatics they call the underlying consensus into question. The only way that this consensus can be restored (within the parameters established by the critical tradition) is for the participants to enter into discursive action where the primary purpose of communication is a grounded agreement based on the force of the better argument.
CHAPTER SIX

TOWARD CRITICAL PRACTICE

This study has sought to examine social practice within a capitalist State and as such, it is concerned not only with the social and political context from which knowledge is drawn, but also with how knowledge is used. The proposition which first motivated this examination was Bryson's assertion, that in a capitalist society it is particularly difficult for social scientists to escape from engaging in forms of practice which ultimately serve the long term interests of the dominant class. The explanation she offers for this apparent merging of interests, is that scientists enjoy relatively privileged positions within the advanced industrial societies, and thus they tend to perpetuate existing social arrangements in order to protect their income, status and power. There are a number of ways in which scientists protect their relatively privileged positions, ranging from the choice of research topic through to the manner in which results are presented and used. If scientists do choose to conduct research which endorses current economic and political relationships, then as far as the social sciences are concerned this will tend to be reflected in an obsession with 'captive' populations. Scientific practice will focus on the colonised rather than the coloniser and on the culture of powerlessness rather than the culture of power.(1)

Whereas colonisation is traditionally associated with the annexation of foreign territory and the domination of weaker by stronger powers, this dissertation critically examined the boundaries of State power within
advanced capitalism and the role of science in the "colonisation" of our social and political lives. This colonial process appears to have reached its zenith in the modern era with the shedding of science, morality and art, from those traditions of understanding which have historically been an integral part of everyday life. In place of consensus, social 'engineers' have sought technical mastery over the course and direction of social and economic development, but these powers have resulted in the destruction of traditional forms of life and in the depletion of natural and cultural resources. At the centre of this legacy of development stand the sciences which have established a monopoly over "knowledge" by institutionalising procedures and methodologies which deeply affect both the logic and purpose of investigation.

These philosophical and epistemological concerns, are addressed by Habermas when he refers to the growth of the interventionist State, the progressive rationalisation and bureaucratisation of social institutions, the increasing interdependence of science and technology and the reification of a technocratic consciousness. As elements of advanced capitalism they represent a social formation in which "the social potential of science (has been) reduced to the powers of technical control."(2)

In order to understand the nature of these powers and simultaneously recover "the promise of practical politics"(3), this study set aside conventional occupational distinctions between scientists, administrators and planners, so that the limits of State power and the capacity of State practitioners for transformative action might be
explored. Based on the epistemology of Jurgen Habermas, three forms of scientific enquiry were identified, each of which was said to be governed by a particular kind of interest. These traditions were categorised as (i) the empirical-analytic sciences incorporating a technical interest, (ii) the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporating a practical interest and (iii) the critical sciences incorporating an emancipatory interest. By using these different forms of science in an examination of the social indicators movement, it was suggested that one might be able to demonstrate a connection between the cognitive interests of social practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant class. This connection could be asserted if practitioners inadvertently aligned themselves with the empirical-analytic tradition by adopting a technocratic consciousness and a fatalistic attitude to the status-quo. Although phrased as a proposition to be examined, any alignment between State practitioners and the empirical tradition inevitably suggests that these relatively autonomous agents have disconnected themselves from critical science and from any 'practical' interest in improving human existence.

In order to test this proposition, we examined the international dimensions of the Social Indicators Movement and the three main systems of indicators which have been established within the industrialised world. This examination identified the 1960's as the historical conjuncture out of which the Social Indicators Movement emerged. During a period that was marked by structural inequality both within and between nations, social indicator systems were established so that nation States might anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and impact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined
ends. In Bell’s terminology it was "a process in which Governments were actively engaged on a highly conscious basis."(4)

The outcome of this process as demonstrated by the systems of indicators which were established, revealed that crucial questions relating to economic and political structures, interest group manoeuvrings and social conflict in general had been omitted. The O.E.C.D. Programme exemplified this approach. Its boundaries were established by Ministers of member nations when they defined economic growth as the instrument by which sovereign States might promote economic and social wellbeing. In selectively limiting the type of knowledge required and the use to which this knowledge should be put, political representatives then asked their ‘technicians’ to identify a set of social concerns common to the twenty-four member nations. The isolation of social concerns inadvertently focussed the attention of ‘practitioners’ on improving the instruments of production and distribution, for by implication, the problems facing the world economy were not structural, but technical impediments to ‘growth’ and ‘development’. By using a deductive process which began with a list of social concerns, State practitioners standardised definitions and specified the types of data which were to be supplied by member governments. In drawing up these specifications, the individual was identified as the unit of assessment and in this process practitioners equated individual and social wellbeing. By concentrating on individuals and the differences between them, the O.E.C.D. Programme avoided politically contentious data relating to structural or institutional conditions.
The epistemological assumptions which appeared to permeate the O.E.C.D. approach, seemed to be characteristic of the Social Indicators Movement as a whole. Science and knowledge were regarded as being 'synonymous' as practitioners generated data so that member States "might improve their policy making."(5) The functionalist frameworks which conditioned these practices were implicitly defined. The Social Economic Accounts System (S.E.A.S.) developed by Fitzsimmons and Lavey identified the community as a functionally integrated social system comprised of individuals, families and groups, linked to the various sub-systems of society by the process of socialisation. Based on the notion of locale, the S.E.A.S. System was designed so that practitioners might better understand the effects of various types of public investments upon the quality of individual lives, and in this cumulative measurement of individual welfare, the authors assumed that they were estimating the "social wellbeing of the community."(6)

In a similar manner, the United Nations System of Social and Demographic Statistics (S.S.D.S.) emphasised "connectedness" as it attempted to express the socioeconomic state of a given population as a set of demographic accounts.(7) By advancing a calculus which expressed social factors in monetary units, the S.S.D.S. System sought to demonstrate structural interdependencies and second order social change. The concept of change was standardised and then monitored as it moved along constant vectors within a given social and political system. As with any composite index, significant points of conflict were inevitably concealed.

These reductionist tendencies seemed to permeate the major systems of
indicators examined in this study. As a consequence, these systems could be promoted by conservative and social democratic parties alike, whilst in practice the indicators were used to compare First and Third Worlds as well as Eastern and Western States. By excluding the possibility of political motivation from the construction of social indicator systems, social and political questions were treated as technical problems requiring a mathematical modelling response which was deemed to be value free. Even the Total Income Model as advanced by Fox (8), seemed to be shaped by the fundamental belief that increased systematic empirical understanding of how society and politics work, would naturally lead to the intelligent formulation of policies and the amelioration of social inequities and injustices.

Whilst this examination of the international movement was dependent upon a predominantly structuralist interpretation, practitioners appeared to be preoccupied with the preparation of performance budgets and social accounts, as they measured social problems and catalogued the difficulties confronting nation States. In this process, they obviously acquired considerable technical skills as they codified empirical data and dealt with issues such as aggregation and weighting. As a consequence, declarations of neutrality, objectivity and the production of "facts" dominated the international literature and, on the surface at least, it seemed reasonable to conclude that practitioners had aligned themselves with the empirical-analytic tradition as defined by Habermas. Their primary aims centred around organising the life-world into categories as a means of accurately describing social and political "disturbances", and these aims seemed to coincide with the requirements of the dominant class which needed
factual information on social concerns such as unemployment, so that remedial action could be taken to protect the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie.

When the focus of this study shifted in Chapter Three to an analysis of the social indicators movement within New Zealand, the association between State practitioners and the empirical-analytic tradition seemed to be reaffirmed. The social formation from which the national movement evolved, was characterised by a restructuring of capital interests in the wake of a deteriorating world economy. One expression of this economic crisis was New Zealand's critical balance of payments deficit at a time of record export earnings. In order to rectify these fluctuations "in the rate of growth and the rate of economic activity"(9), a National Development Conference was convened and within this institutional structure members of the dominant class, with assistance from State practitioners, established a set of economic indicators as targets for national development. A Keynesian model of the economy developed by Professor Philpott provided the technical means by which the Conference was able to assess the level of imports and exports needed to sustain economic growth and generate optimum economic output. A composite statistical measure in the form of G.N.P. was identified, both as a major objective of development and as the mechanism by which a rising standard of living might be achieved. With the State providing the "right economic climate"(10) for private enterprise, the social and political aspects of national development were selectively limited to ancillary factors or by-products of the economic realm. These selective practices were expressed not only in the conference philosophy, but also in the terms of reference for
sector councils, and in the ideology of restructuring which equated social wellbeing with social investment. Social data was sought only in as much as it assisted in "the revision of economic targets"(11), and thus social indicators were conceived as statistics which might describe social conditions within a normative context, so that conclusions could be drawn by politicians as to whether things were "better, worse or the same."(12)

Given the structural limitations of capitalism and the selective actions of the dominant class in promoting the Social Indicators Movement, it was not surprising to discover a close resemblance between the O.E.C.D. approach, and the New Zealand system of social indicators, which was officially launched in 1980. Both systems identified similar areas of social concern and it was evident that the New Zealand System had adopted questions which were originally devised by the O.E.C.D. Data was specifically designed to measure the social wellbeing of individuals and there was obvious agreement as to the criteria which guided both the selection and construction of indicators. By examining the outcomes of practice, one could reasonably conclude that both systems accepted the structural limitations imposed by the capitalist mode of production, and having accepted these limitations, practitioners could then reduce social "disturbances" to either economic or biological malfunctioning. The Social and Cultural Committee of the National Development Conference exemplified this approach when it declared:

"The elderly, the handicapped, the social misfits and the families (suffered) because of their own
failings."(13)

These perceptions of the social indicators movement, as conveyed by a predominantly structuralist interpretation were useful in defining the institutionalised patterns of action established by society as a whole. As practices which emanate out of the processes and relations of production, these patterns represent the interest structure of society and the composition of the class structure within a particular social formation. What these patterns do not define, are the strategic and communicative practices between classes and class fractions. Accordingly, the theoretical logic of class was reappraised in Chapter Four, in order to examine the dynamic interaction between State practitioners and the cognitive interests which informed their practice.

The Reformulation of Class and the Significance of Contradictory Locations

The State was theorised in this study as a relatively autonomous yet essential element in bourgeois reproduction. Although the economic mode of production establishes structural limitations on the State, the political and ideological realms play an important role in supporting the maintenance and reproduction of the capitalist social formation. These political and ideological realms can be conceived as sites of class conflict in the same way that the economic base is characterised by struggles over power. However, the concept of ownership required major distinctions to be made between base and superstructure. Whereas
control in the economic sphere arises out of ownership of the means of production, ownership within the State superstructure was defined as control over the creation of State policies and the production of ideology. The level of control, and the manner in which power relationships are mediated and legitimated within the State, ultimately stems from antagonistic class interests. These interests, which can be expressed as class locations, were equated with the typology of economic class relations as theorised by Wright.(14) Whereas bourgeois and proletarian locations are occupied by classes which are diametrically opposed, the auxiliary class comprised of State practitioners is distinguished by its simultaneous and partial location in two classes. It is this structural position of the auxiliary class which might be defined as contradictory. This reappraisal of class was designed to take account of those structural locations within the State which were not directly defined by ownership of the means of production. Having provided a more substantial theoretical explanation for State practice, the focus of this analysis then shifted to the interactive level of action.

Interaction was defined as the strategic and communicative actions of the auxiliary class as it devised social objectives for national development, proposed alternative research structures for the production of knowledge, and translated these reports into a national system of social indicators. Although these practices were conducted within the structural limitations imposed by State capitalism in New Zealand, members of the auxiliary class were able to exert varying degrees of control over the processes which eventually led to the development of social indicators. State "managers" such as Lang and
Lewin were responsible for drafting the terms of reference for the National Development Conference and because they also occupied strategic positions on the Council once it was established, they were able to initiate policies of their own, as well as exercise some control over the initiatives of others. These controls not only related to the flow of submissions, but also to the promotion of an economic programme which favoured capital interests.

Whereas managerial personnel exercised control over the creation of State policies and the production of ideology, those occupying contradictory locations at a lower order of influence, were able to exert some impact on the execution of policy and the dissemination of ideology. As a research officer in Social Security, Gardner wrote a background document for the Social Council on "Deriving Social Objectives and Constructing Social Indicators," (15) and he subsequently drafted the goals and objectives which set the parameters for social indicator construction in New Zealand. Similarly, Shields and Brown both played central roles in the construction of social indicators, in that they were responsible for modifying the goals and objectives of the Social Council, so that these goals coincided with the programmatic categories established by the O.E.C.D. Although these practices were imbued with contradictions, the outcome of practice tended to support Bryson’s proposition, that the actions of State practitioners ultimately coincide with the values and interests of the dominant class.

Capitalism as a mode of production, representative Government as the basis of democracy, and an apparent 'harmony of interests' between
State and community, were facets of New Zealand life which received endorsement from members of the auxiliary class. (16) Practitioners appeared to accept a Keynesian framework as the basis of economic development and accordingly they produced reports and proposed social programmes within the selective limitations of these economic targets. As State technicians, they accepted the implicit argument advanced by the National Development Conference that new technology was capable of creating unlimited economic growth. Practitioners on the Social and Cultural Committee of the N.D.C. endorsed this growth strategy as the appropriate pathway to 'development', and they predicted that New Zealand would be "an association of people united in a peaceful sharing of the things they cherished." (17)

By conceiving of the State as representative Government, and by endorsing the economic targets established by the N.D.C. as a "non-political forum" (18), the fundamental contradiction between socialised production and private appropriation was denied. Class interests were reduced to individual needs and aspirations and the power of capital was concealed by an autonomous State which purported to represent the 'public interest' and the 'common good'. Questions such as who plans and who benefits, were to be the prerogative of politicians, whereas the technical requirements of indicator construction, were the legitimate responsibility of State practitioners.

In accepting these 'technical' responsibilities, State practitioners followed the historical precedents and practices established by the natural sciences. They attempted to emulate, modify and adapt
techniques which had been successful in the scientific understanding of nature. In the case of social indicators, this meant distinguishing between belief and technique so that empirical explanatory indicators might provide answers to larger, essentially non-empirical questions. Establishing a system of social indicators within the Department of Statistics, seemed appropriate because it was defined as a 'non-policy' Department of State. (19) This supposedly neutral location could only reinforce the 'apolitical' nature of statistics and legitimate the social indicators programme as the standard by which the nation might measure its quality of life.

Taken collectively, these actions ensured that the selection of social concerns, the goals for development, and the output of data, would be presented in a form which was most acceptable to the dominant class. By emphasising neutrality, and by following the precepts and practices laid down by the natural sciences, these members of the auxiliary class believed their actions were beyond ideology. As previously illustrated, this notion of neutrality when couched in the factual language of empiricism is the most pervasive ideology of all. Its pervasiveness lies in the way in which it legitimizes the capitalist formation and actively represses any alternative.

Whilst it may be reasonable to suggest, on the basis of this evidence, a strong correlation between the values and interests of the dominant class and the outcome of State practices as summarised here, the instrumental overtones evident in this merging of interests cannot be substantiated. Practitioners, as members of the auxiliary class, occupying contradictory locations within the State, are relatively
autonomous agents engaged in a continuous flow of action. As any critical examination will show, this flow of action is the point of articulation between agency and structure. In other words, practice not only reflects those institutionalised patterns of action which emanate from the forces and relations of production, but also the strategic and communicative practices of the subjects themselves. Thus when Gardner wrote background papers for the Social Council and drafted the set of goals and objectives for the Social Indicators Programme, he chose to use a psychological text as his framework because it emphasised individual wellbeing. (20) When Shields was confronted with a set of 'motherhood-type statements' as approved by the Social Council, she and her colleagues changed the objectives to suit the programmatic categories devised by the O.E.C.D., because the documents produced by that Organisation reduced the technical demands of trying to construct indicators in New Zealand with a small team of technicians and limited resources. (21) When Grant wanted data which might assess whether or not Government was getting value for money, (22) and Dickinson advocated social indicators in order to foster an optimistic image of New Zealand society, (23) they made these decisions in accordance with their own cognitive and class interests. Whereas the cognitive interests of these practitioners seemed to coincide with the maintenance of existing economic and social relations, the structural location of the auxiliary class meant that their strategic and communicative actions were imbued with contradictions.

These contradictions were apparent both within and between class locations. Within the auxiliary class conflict was apparent between practitioners as they attended meetings aimed at 'outwitting' their
opponents and 'defending their own departments.' (24) These arguments were not limited to technical matters as evidenced by the 'tedious debates' (25) which were generated over the goals and objectives for national development. Whereas Gardner believed it was nonsense to suggest that a pluralistic society like New Zealand could agree on a set of economic and social objectives, Social Council representatives were not prepared 'to be pushed around too much by officers of the department', and they set about trying to define "a single goal to which everybody could subscribe." (26)

Conflict was also apparent between different Departments of State as the social indicators programme was transferred from one secretariat to another. State practitioners wrote memoranda seeking to clarify the status of the programme (27), whereas others made technical decisions to change the approach to indicator construction because they were dissatisfied with the performance of the Social Council. (28) These conflicts were ultimately expressed in epistemology, although this was vehemently denied by one practitioner who maintained that tensions were not based on different theoretical perspectives 'because at that stage there was damn all theory even talked about.' (29) Whereas some defined the absence of an adequate social theory as a deficiency in indicator construction (30), others denied that theory had any relevance.

I haven't got any particular theory of society that underlies it. I think you or I would probably differ on social theory. We would have different political value judgements perhaps? I don't know. But I think these indicators would be valuable to anybody, no matter what his judgement on what the state of society might be, or what the right political system and social policies ought to
These ambiguities permeated the practices of the auxiliary class as they engaged in strategic action based on their cognitive and class interests. In some respects, the expression of these ambiguities allowed bourgeois interests within the State to selectively control and influence the direction of policy. These practices were evident when members of the auxiliary class seemed to be ambivalent over the control of social indicators. The Departments of Statistics and Social Welfare, as well as the Social Council and its Standing Committees, all demonstrated an interest in the development of social indicators. However, in the initial stages at least, they could not reach a consensus on the direction or control of the programme. In the wake of this ambivalence, State managers on the National Development Council established their own committee, and they used this mechanism to transfer oversight of social indicators from the Social Council to the Department of Statistics. These managers then conditioned the way in which social indicators were perceived by requiring their Standing Committees to answer written questions and report regularly on progress. By controlling the policy process in this way, State managers were able to recommend that a provisional set of social indicators be developed so that they could be used in the 'N.D.C. Targets Revision Exercise.'(32) This recommendation effectively relegated social indicators to a secondary status within the economic realm, thereby ensuring that whenever the Social Council reported, it did so within the context of these economic targets.

Conversely, there were occasions when these ambiguities were used by
the auxiliary class to alter the selective practices of the dominant class. One such example emanates from the first conference session of the National Development Conference in 1968. Some members of the auxiliary class who were not satisfied with the economic bias of the Conference, decided to persuade the organising committee that they should take account of social and environmental factors. They orchestrated this persuasion by forwarding submissions under the auspices of their own State Departments and in this way they created a wide spectrum of interest in social development. These class practices were influential in negotiating the establishment of a social and cultural sub-committee which ultimately led to the development of social indicators.

In summary, these examples not only served to illustrate the ambivalent and contradictory nature of practice but they also rendered problematic any instrumental association between the actions of State practitioners and the dominant class. Although the cognitive interests of the auxiliary class seemed to coincide with the values and interests of the bourgeoisie, the class actions of State practitioners were infused with ambiguity. This ambiguity, which is said to stem from the simultaneous and partial location of practitioners in two classes, means that the auxiliary class takes its characteristics from both proletarian and bourgeois positions. State practitioners have the relative autonomy to decide how they should influence State policy, and accordingly they have the capacity to play an active role in the production and reproduction of social and political life.

Although it may be difficult for practitioners to avoid forms of
knowledge which support dominant class interests, any automatic alignment between class and cognitive interests is denied. Whereas the cognitive interests of State practitioners exemplify the interest bound character of different forms of knowledge, the class practices in which they engage stem from their structural locations within the State, their contradictory class interests, and their mediating capacities. This means in effect that if practitioners adopt the critical tradition as a framework for social action, they will inevitably engage in counter hegemonic practices based on a primary interest in the emancipation of the proletarian class. In direct contrast to the technical reductionism of moral and political questions as evidenced in the 'mainstream' tradition, the 'critical' practitioner will seek to reverse these tendencies so that the underlying contradictions of capitalism are exposed to critique. By reformulating the proposition in this way, emphasis is placed on the mediating capacity of the auxiliary class and its potential for transformative action.

The Critical Tradition and Emancipation

In order to examine this modified proposition an alternative group of State practitioners was identified. These practitioners were members of an N.R.A.C. Working Party, which was asked to formulate an agenda for research, in response to unemployment as a social phenomenon. The Working Party, as a subsidiary of a State agency, operated within the same structural limitations which confronted State practitioners during the development of a national system of social indicators. These structural limitations predispose State agencies such as N.R.A.C. to
operate in the long term interests of the dominant class. At the same time the contradictory locations occupied by practitioners suggest that they that they should be capable of harmonising their activities and producing alternative patterns of social action.

In order to establish whether or not the Working Party was capable of transforming 'ideologically frozen relations of dependence'(33) it seemed appropriate to review the empirical evidence according to the three functions of critical theory as identified by Habermas.(34) These functions were defined as (i) the formation and extension of a critical theorem, (ii) the application of this theorem by means of a reflective process, and (iii) the conduct of political struggle.

The critical theorem as developed by the Working Party was initially reflected in the draft report. Although Working Party members held divergent world views, the process of communicative action in which they engaged resulted in a grounded consensus which identified unemployment as an issue of distributive justice. By enunciating a particular value position, the Working Party was able to critique those reductionist interpretations which attributed unemployment to either economic malfunctioning or pathological behaviour. In its report, the Working Party discussed the political economy of the New Zealand social formation and focused its analysis on State practices, and upon the narrow range of economic models within which policy options were formed.

In organising these 'processes of enlightenment,' the Working Party used questionnaires, prepared documents, written and oral submissions
as well as public meetings so that members of the committee might appreciate the range of alternative views held by those who had a vested interest in the subject. The submissions presented to the Working Party ranged from the traditional Keynesian argument for increased State expenditure as a means of stimulating aggregate demand, through to social and political perspectives which linked unemployment with sexism, racism and international capitalism. Whereas some submissions, notably Treasury, advocated a return to private enterprise and market forces as a means of stimulating economic growth,(35) others rejected the export-led growth scenario, identifying unemployment as an endemic characteristic of 'the current system.'(36) Those making submissions were required to justify these claims discursively with members of the Working Party and whereas some arguments found acceptance, others did not. These arguments were subjected to discussion and debate within the context of the Working Party and then either accepted or rejected in writing once a grounded consensus had been reached.

In order to appreciate the basis on which the Working Party either accepted or rejected arguments advanced by various interest groups, submissions were classified according to the alternative forms of science and modes of practice as set out in Chapter One. In making these distinctions it was assumed that there was likely to be a strong correlation between the 'critical' perspective adopted by the Working Party and those submissions classified within the critical-emancipatory tradition.(37) When the treatment accorded those submissions defined as 'empirical' was compared to those identified as 'critical', then that proposition appeared to have some validity. The Working Party was
particularly critical of reductionist arguments, such as those advanced by the Department of Social Welfare and the Manufacturers Association, because these submissions focussed on the behaviour and attitudes of the unemployed divorced from the economic and political realities of a contracting labour market. Similarly, those 'mainstream' arguments as advanced by Treasury and the Institute of Economic Research, which discriminated between belief and technique in the tradition of the natural sciences, were harshly treated in the report. By contrast, the views of the Trade Unions and the National Youth Council, the Tu Tangata Programme as advanced by Maori Affairs, and the issue of sexism as presented by the Society for Research on Women, were accepted at least in part, and integrated into the Working Party's overall argument.

Although these classifications supported the general theorem as advanced by Habermas, there were obvious inconsistencies in the arguments presented to the Working Party, and these ambiguities were reflected in the critical perspectives which were sometimes advanced by those classified as 'empirical' or 'hermeneutic'. The Department of Maori Affairs, the Society for Research on Women, and even organisations such as the Employers Federation, expressed ambivalence in thought and ambiguity in practice. The point to be illustrated by these inconsistencies relates to the Habermasian assertion, that 'interests' are non-reducible characteristics which exemplify categorically different forms of knowledge. Although we may agree with Habermas that theoretical distinctions need to be made between these 'non-reducible media', in practice we must acknowledge their interdependency.
The significance of these interdependent relationships only became apparent during what might be described as the **reflective process**. This process involved the presentation of the draft report, the criticisms of this report by selected organisations, the Working Party's response, and the political and ideological practices in which class fractions engaged. Although more than half of the respondents canvassed by N.R.A.C. supported both the tenor and findings of the report, the 'critical' minority were all strategically significant in terms of the New Zealand economy. It gave these organisations 'no joy at all to see the acceptance of a free market philosophy questioned.' (39) They did not approve of the 'clear bias against current Government policies' (40) because as one respondent indicated some of the suggestions were 'fairly well to the left in political outlook and associated with the Trade Union Movement. (41) As a consequence the report was:

'at best superficial, at worst unbalanced and in any event dynamite.' (42)

It was not the dominant class which made these universal claims, but rather members of the auxiliary class situated around the boundary of the bourgeoisie. These 'managers' within the State played a central political role by seeking to define the report as an unbalanced commentary on the Government’s economic policies. These pronouncements were subsequently translated into action by applying political pressure to a member of the Working Party to dissociate himself from the report. State managers also performed an important ideological function by referring to the 'superficiality', the 'lack of balance', and the
'anti-establishment exaggerations' contained in the Introduction. After viewing a copy of the draft report the Polity, acting on advice from its managers, commissioned Link Consultants to write an alternative, as a means of refuting the N.R.A.C. interpretation. These managers also provided the Polity with confidential critiques of the Working Party position, and these criticisms led to political intervention which was designed to prevent N.R.A.C. from releasing the Working Party's report. When that strategic action failed, personal abuse was directed at members of the Working Party. These combined practices by 'managers' and politicians within the State, represented a form of instrumental action which was intended to systematically distort the truth, as a means of protecting the long term interests of the dominant class.

The Working Party was selectively limited in challenging these hegemonic practices (43), because its own legitimacy was dependent upon its constitution as an agency of the State. It was constrained by the way in which it collectively interpreted its own actions, as well as by the historical situation in which it was immersed. Given these structural and selective limitations on practice, the Working Party chose to enter into discursive action. The reductionist economic argument over unemployment was countered in a television debate with the Minister of Labour and in a detailed response to criticisms of the report. The distortion of truth arising out of the Prime Minister's personal attack was refuted by means of legal action. In this latter respect the aim was to restore the conditions of an ideal speech situation by changing the context of the discussion so that the allegations could be rationally resolved. In theoretical terms one
might reasonably argue that the Working Party demonstrated the potential of the critical tradition for emancipatory action.

Although it may be reasonable to assert that the N.R.A.C. Working Party demonstrated the potential of the critical tradition by adopting a theorem which would meet the requirements of scientific discourse and reflection, the expression of this theorem in practice was less than conclusive. The potential of the auxiliary class to engage the dominant class and its managerial personnel was exemplified by the Working Party when it requested that the Permanent Heads of State Departments should make submissions in writing and then justify these statements by means of discursive action. Because of its structural location within the relatively autonomous State, the Working Party had access to State managers and to information and knowledge which was normally controlled by the dominant class and by those members of the auxiliary class around the boundary of the bourgeoisie. Having gained this information the Working Party then had the capacity to use its power through the medium of a report. On the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter Five it seems reasonable to conclude that the cognitive interests of the Working Party were consistent with the critical tradition and proletarian emancipation.

However, we cannot assume that there is a dependent relationship between the critical tradition and proletarian emancipation any more than we can assume a direct correlation between the cognitive interests of State practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant class. Although the N.R.A.C. Working Party displayed a primary interest in the emancipation of those disadvantaged by unemployment, it
did not forge a dynamic unity with the oppressed; moreover, the report itself was the only expression of personal or political emancipation. Indeed the practices in which the Working Party engaged appeared to be based on the 'hermeneutic' assumption(44) that the application of a critical theorem would inevitably lead to critical consciousness and transformative action.

Whilst the publication of the report did provide proletarian fractions with a legitimate critique of the State's employment strategy, these contradictions were displaced by the dominant class, as it focussed on the format and 'anti establishment' arguments in the report as well as the personal characteristics of the Working Party itself. In this way, the fundamental contradictions highlighted in the report were reduced to conflicts over immediate interests, and any impact on the New Zealand class formation was systematically displaced.

The Working Party demonstrated that State practitioners are potentially capable of aligning themselves with proletarian interests in the same way that they are capable of reaffirming dominant class interests. This means that members of the auxiliary class have the structural capacity to decide how they might intervene and in respect of which class. If they do adopt the critical tradition as a framework for practice, then they are likely to espouse proletarian class interests and engage in counter hegemonic practices. However, the automatic alignment of class and cognitive interests is untenable. There is no evidence to suggest that the practices of the Working Party promoted either personal or political emancipation and we must therefore acknowledge the gap which has always existed between a critical theorem
of knowledge and its practical realisation. Although Habermas sketches the possibility of transformative action, it is a possibility which is not demonstrated in practical terms. How should one go about organising the processes of enlightenment? To whom should critical theory be addressed? How should it be applied? A preliminary response to these questions is necessary if the critical theorem advanced in this study is to fulfill the practical claim of emancipation.

The Ambiguity of Epistemology and Practice

In order to advance a methodology for transformative action, it is essential that we address the ambiguities in epistemology and practice, which emanate from the programmatic quality of Habermasian theory. These ambiguities centre around the categorical distinction that Habermas draws between different scientific traditions, the cognitive interests by which these traditions are formed, and the relationship between theory and practice.

The first ambiguity arises out of the epistemological status of cognitive interests. In response to Ottman's criticism that cognitive interests are unstable concepts(45), Habermas asserts that they constitute different forms of knowledge, which are simultaneously distinctive, yet related. As 'knowledge constitutive' interests these 'non-reducible' media are rooted in the specific fundamental conditions of production and reproduction,(46) which perforce both define knowledge and validate knowledge claims. These different forms of scientific enquiry must be inextricably related, because if we are to
capture the dynamic relationship between human beings as they are, and what they might yet become, then science must be simultaneously historical, empirical and critical. (47)

There are two reasons why Habermas makes categorical distinctions when his ultimate objective is continuity. In the first instance he wants to dispute the universal claims made by ‘practitioners’ who fail to understand the logical relationship between human interests and knowledge, and the historical connection between science and its practical application. These universal claims were evidenced in the earlier chapters of this study as practitioners advanced value judgements as statements of fact and then reinforced these claims by falsely objectifying their actions.

A second factor which motivates Habermas to promote this apparent ambiguity, is his desire to preserve the unity of rational discourse and recover that potential for reason which he believes to have been detached from those traditions of understanding which are an integral part of everyday life. In contrast to those forms of science which have facilitated the ‘dissolution of epistemology’, Habermas wants to put our fragmented world back together again, a task which he attempts to achieve by emphasising the dialectical interdependence between different forms of knowledge and different levels of action.

In pursuit of knowledge, Habermas asks us to accept the notion of ‘rationality’ as an ‘anticipated’ state in much the same way that we are asked to anticipate an ideal speech situation. McCarthy summarises the Habermasian position in this way:
The analysis of speech shows it is oriented toward the idea of truth. The analysis of 'truth' leads to the notion of a discursively achieved consensus. The analysis of 'consensus' shows this concept to involve a normative dimension. The analysis of the notion of a grounded consensus ties it to a speech situation which is free from all external and internal constraints, that is, in which the resulting consensus is due simply to the force of the better argument. Finally, the analysis of the ideal speech situation shows it to involve assumptions about the context of interaction in which speech is located. The end result of this chain of argument is that the very structure of speech involves the anticipation of a form of life in which autonomy and responsibility are possible.(48)

The notion of discourse as advanced by Habermas carries with it the supposition that a genuine agreement or consensus among the participants is possible. In attempting to arrive at a rationally motivated understanding, we assume that everyone who speaks a natural language is intuitively familiar with it and he/she is trusted to distinguish a true from a false consensus. To achieve a rational decision about such matters we must presume that the outcome of discourse will rest on the force of the better argument and not upon accidental or systematic constraints on discussion. As Habermas explains, the structure of communication is free from constraint when all participants have the same opportunity to select and employ speech acts and when there is an effective equality in the assumption of dialogical roles. It is this agreement to consider all individuals as potential participants in discourse which presupposes a universal commitment to the inherent equality, autonomy and rationality of human beings.

Whilst this universal commitment to the inherent equality, autonomy and
rationality of human beings is consistent with the class interests of scientific socialism, Habermas undermines this possibility when he uses Freud as the methodological exemplar of critical practice.

Not only does he interpret psychoanalysis in a romantic way (49), but as Heller suggests he disregards 'the sensuous, the needing, the feeling human being.' (50) Habermas presents an interpretation of psychoanalysis which encourages the 'patient' to reflect upon hidden sources of repression so that he/she can effect a transformation which is liberating and emancipatory. Admittedly these conditions of dependency are linked both to inner resistances based on false beliefs and to those systematically distorted misconceptions individuals have of themselves, their actions, and their historical situation.

However, it is not the interpretation of psychoanalysis which needs to be critiqued here, but rather the way in which Habermas generalises from this psychoanalytic base to encompass a universal subject. By defining human reason as the addressee of critical theory, Habermas universalises the individual and in the process replaces class conflict with rational argumentation. This inevitably leads to what Heller describes as the concept of 'Habermasian man' with no body, no feelings, and no real appreciation of human progress through suffering. (51)

It is perhaps in this sphere more than in any other that Habermas needs to re-establish his links with Marx. It can be argued that this association may be achieved without altering the basic integrity of Habermasian theory. The point at issue here is the ambiguous
relationship between dialogue and action. By using psychoanalysis as the exemplar of critical theory Habermas promotes two reductionist tendencies. The first directs our attention at the 'patients' past history through the medium of dialogue, with the outcome of this engagement said to be the self-emancipation of the patient him/herself. In this process the past is separated from the future and dialogue is disconnected from action. The second form of reductionism arises out of the way in which psychoanalysis focuses on individual pathology, by reducing characteristics such as class, gender, and ethnicity, to an individual construct. Thus there is logic to the argument that this reductionist approach leads inevitably to 'Habermasian man.'

In order to reverse these reductionist tendencies, the theoretical logic of class has been reappraised so as to provide an epistemology for State 'practitioners.' In this reappraisal, the State was defined as a relatively autonomous yet essential element in bourgeois reproduction. Although the structural limitations of the State are defined by the capitalist mode of production, it is the State superstructure which ensures increasing levels of private capital accumulation, whilst simultaneously legitimating these practices as being in the 'public interest' and for the 'common good.' The level of control, and the manner in which power relationships are mediated within the State superstructure, ultimately stems from antagonistic class interests.

Whereas the bourgeois and proletarian classes are diametrically opposed, State practitioners occupy contradictory locations within the State and they are distinguished therefore by their simultaneous and
partial location in two classes. This means that State practitioners constitute an 'auxiliary class', in that they derive their characteristics from both bourgeois and proletarian positions. As a consequence their practices are infused with ambiguities. Sometimes these ambiguities can be used by the dominant class to selectively limit the potential of the auxiliary class for transformative action. In this study, these selective practices were evident in two forms. In the first instance, the bourgeois class established economic parameters for the social indicators movement, by ensuring that social interpretations would be related to economic targets, and in this way they placed selective limitations on practice. In the second case, the dominant class and its 'managerial' technicians, selectively limited the potential of the N.R.A.C. Working Party's report by the process of displacement. The fundamental contradictions of capitalism as identified by the Working Party were strategically displaced by immediate interests, and these centred around the anti-establishment label which was attached to the report and the assertion that Working Party members had breached positions of trust by 'leaking' the document to the media.

Although these structural and selective limitations on the practices of the auxiliary class are acknowledged, the contradictory location of 'practitioners' within the State gives them a certain degree of control over the process of policy making and the dissemination of ideology. Whereas the class interests of State practitioners are infused with contradictions, the auxiliary class does have the organisational capacity to mediate the selective practices of those in bourgeois and proletarian locations.
autonomous agents within a relatively autonomous State, these practitioners have the capacity to influence the policy making process, and they have the potential to advocate practices which may ultimately benefit the oppressed. The relationship between these respective classes, arising as they do out of the economic mode of production, can be illustrated as in Figure VIII.(54)

Although it is theoretically possible to assert that the auxiliary class is capable of advocating the emancipation of the oppressed, the application of a critical theorem does not lead inevitably to critical consciousness and transformative action. As previously illustrated we cannot assume that there is a dependent relationship between the critical tradition and proletarian emancipation, any more than we can assume a direct correlation between the cognitive interests of State practitioners and the values and interests of the dominant class. What the present research has demonstrated is that practitioners are ambivalent because of their structural locations within the State, and accordingly their actions are fused with contradictions. If we accept these contradictions as an expression of antagonistic class interests, then it seems reasonable to propose a methodology for critical practice. This methodology would be designed to advance the practical aims of the critical tradition whose class interests may be expressed as the pursuit of a socialist society. A preliminary formulation of 'critical methodology' is the final task for this dissertation.
FIGURE VIII Class relations arising out of economic mode of production
Practice in the Critical Tradition

Throughout this study society has been portrayed as the symbolic structures of the life-world reproduced in cultural traditions, social integration and socialisation. Where once these symbolic structures were perceived as being interdependent, the modern era has produced a form of advanced capitalism in which the citizenry have been depoliticised by the separation of knowledge and human interests. Science is identified as a key element in this process of separation, because its positivistic tendencies have allowed the State to replace myth with scientific rational action, to which all reasonable people will accede. By utilising the scientific and technological innovations of advanced capitalism, the State has assumed an ever increasing capacity to control the environment. These controls not only relate to the natural environment, but they extend to the States active engagement in production and reproduction, and to the consequential fusion of economic and political issues. The old ideology of market forces has been replaced by an interventionist State representing the interests of 'the public', and thus politics are portrayed as being largely irrelevant in the light of such a benign administration. This does not mean that the State is simply an arm of capital (as perceived by those instrumental elements within Marxism), but rather a relatively autonomous site of class conflict. Although the State is an essential element in bourgeois reproduction, it exhibits the same basic contradictions which prevail in any class divided society.

The relative autonomy of the State is also evident in practice. The auxiliary class, as relatively autonomous agents, are capable of
engaging in hegemonic or counter hegemonic practices. These practices represent the point of articulation between agency and structure, and thus practice in the critical tradition must address the interdependency between two levels of action. The first is described as societal action which emanates from the forces and relations of production and which represents the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole. This level of action establishes the structural limitations of capitalist economic and social relations and it defines the class interests of State practitioners as the pursuit of a socialist society. The second level of action comprises the communicative and strategic practices of the auxiliary class and it assumes that State practitioners are capable of harmonising their activities and producing alternative patterns of social action. These practices are aimed at identifying those crises which are generated as a consequence of interaction between life-world and system. By isolating these disturbances the auxiliary class should be able to facilitate a clearer perception of the world and of the crises, both personal and political, which dominate their individual and collective consciousness.

The process of mediation involves the auxiliary class in expressing, analysing, and transforming their situation. Crises, both personal and political are identified by means of communicative action and these ‘alienating phenomena’ are then subjected to analysis so that the underlying contradictions giving rise to these disturbances can be named. In this process aimed at reaching understanding, the participants differentiate between the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist social formation,(55) the dominant contradiction evident at
a particular period of historical time, and the form in which the
dominant contradiction is expressed. (56) By identifying the nature and
form of the dominant contradiction as expressed within a particular
historical and cultural context, the participants are able to engage in
strategic action based on a rational choice of strategies which are
ultimately aimed at influencing the decisions of rational opponents.

To facilitate strategic action within the framework of the critical
tradition, participants are required to isolate the parties and forces
engaged in manufacturing the dominant contradiction. This usually
means selecting a principal aspect of the dominant contradiction so
that class interests can be isolated, and the cognitive interests
motivating the practices of these respective parties can be named.
Once the parties and interests have been isolated by means of
communicative action, the participants can then decide on the selection
of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the
conduct of political struggle.

It is the fusion of communicative and strategic action which converts
the principle aspect of the dominant contradiction into explicit
conflict between specific actors motivated by different class and
cognitive interests. (57) The process by which interests are
transformed into goals is referred to as consciousness formation and as
such it is based on communicative action designed to achieve
understanding. The process by which parties are converted into actors
is effected through mobilisation which emanates out of strategic action
based on a purposive-rational activity orientated toward success. Both
processes coalesce in united reflection and action which is identified
as the methodology of transformative or critical practice (the methodology and process of critical practice as proposed in this study is illustrated in Figures XIX and X)(58).

The methodology of transformative practice can obviously be expressed in a variety of ways. For example if State practice refers to community workers or planners situated around the boundary of the proletariat, then these practitioners are likely to identify with proletarian fractions by means of dialogue and action. Members of the auxiliary class who engage in this form of practice select those themes which are most meaningful to the proletariat, so that the participants can be challenged to analyse their actions as well as their historical
situation. By utilising the basic contradictions in each situation the oppressed are challenged to respond, not only in intellectual terms but also in action. This reflective process cannot be achieved by imposing one's ideas on another, nor can it be effected by distorting truth. Rather, subjects involved in this form of practice have the task of unveiling reality and thereby coming to know it critically. By engaging in this process, the focus of the disturbance is shifted away from the proletariat, and toward those institutions and structures which are oppressive.

Another way in which critical practice might be expressed is through what was previously described as scientific practice. In an earlier critique of the social indicators movement, scientists were accused of adopting a neutral, objective, normative methodology which took on the appearance of being context free. That is, scientific practice was performed 'by non people in non places'(59) and research as a consequence was abstracted from its location in time and from its setting in interaction. Class interests as a consequence were isolated from the scientific enterprise.
FIGURE X  The process of critical practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of group standpoint based on analysis of life worlds and upon reflection of individual, group, and class action.</td>
<td>Naming of crises. Collation of data and classification of group according to bourgeois, auxiliary and proletarian class positions.</td>
<td>Summary of individual, group, and class situation.</td>
<td>Analysis of life world as reproduced in cultural traditions. Social integration and socialisation. Examination of state capitalism as a sub-system and identification of underlying contradictions.</td>
<td>Structural analysis of particular social formation, based on examination of economic, juridico-political, and ideological domains and according to local, national, and international interpretations. Identification of fundamental and dominant contradictions.</td>
<td>Form in which dominant contradiction is expressed. Isolation of parties and forces engaged in manufacturing the dominant contradiction.</td>
<td>Selection of strategies in line with principal contradiction. Solution of tactical questions and conduct of political struggle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FORMS OF ACTION

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION — CONSCIENTIZATION

STRATEGIC ACTION — MOBILISATION

DIALOGICAL ACTION — PRAXIS

SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE WITHIN THE CRITICAL TRADITION
Scientific practice in the critical tradition would be designed in dialogue with proletarian fractions and in accordance with their class interests. In the case of social indicators this might mean concentrating on those mechanisms and practices which have facilitated capital accumulation and provided for their legitimation. Instead of composite indicators which conceal inequities and conflicts, the critical practitioner could emphasise power differentials, as reflected in income disparities, the ownership of the means of production, and the disbursement of benefits. This does not mean using critical theory to justify political action. Theory used in this way simply becomes the technical application of theoretical knowledge, a form of reductionism which ultimately distorts social and political life.

Decisions for the political struggle cannot at the outset be justified theoretically and then be carried out organisationally. The sole possible justification at this level is consensus, aimed at in practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the consciousness of their common interests and their knowledge of circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations. There can be no theory which at the outset can assume a worldwide historical mission in return for the potential sacrifices. (60)

Although the critical tradition is engaged in the pursuit of a new social and political order, it seeks to build this new society out of existing elements. Whereas intellectuals in the bourgeois tradition (both pluralist and Marxist) (61) emphasise the institutional and technical structures of the State in any analysis of the capitalist social formation, critical practitioners accord historical primacy to those class, gender, and racial struggles, by which any one class or
class fraction in society exerts power over another.

The critical tradition distinguishes therefore between two variants of strategic action. First, action orientated toward success which follows technical rules and is evaluated according to the efficiency of intervention. Action of this kind can be termed instrumental and equates therefore with the empirical-analytic tradition. Secondly, actions orientated toward success, which are defined as strategic if they follow rules of rational choice and can be evaluated according to their effectiveness in influencing the decisions of rational opponents. This latter form of action is consistent with critical practice in that it emanates from the relationship between classes and the structuring of power through the State. Within the context of the critical tradition the purpose of strategic action is to be counter hegemonic.

As previously theorised, practice is the point of articulation between agency and structure and thus the alignment of social practice with a particular tradition reflects a dialectic of control. It is this dialectical relationship which conditions the ambivalent nature of social action and that is why practice cannot be perceived as a neutral activity in the tradition of the 'disinterested observer.' To engage in the practice of 'neutrality' is to mediate between the dominant ideology of the dominant class and the generation of consent among the masses. This mode of practice should be recognised for what it is: a form of ideology which legitimates the sectional interests of hegemonic groups.

The alternative methodology for critical practice which has been
proposed accepts the contradictions of capitalism and the ambivalent nature of practice as the basis of social action. In direct contrast to the technical reductionism of moral and political questions as evidenced within the empirical tradition, the critical practitioner will seek to reverse these tendencies so that the underlying contradictions are exposed to critique. Whereas distinctions are made between different forms of action, emphasis centres on synthesising communicative and strategic action in practice. Thus the 'practitioner' establishes links with the oppressed as they engage in dialogical action and he/she simultaneously disarticulates the false consensus manufactured by the bourgeoisie through the process of counter hegemonic action. It is this fusion of communicative and strategic action which mediates the contradictions and conflicts of capitalism, and establishes the possibility of personal and political transformation. Whether or not this possibility is able to be realised in practice is ultimately an empirical question. To the oppressed it represents the possibility of creating their own history with will and consciousness. To the practitioner who remains ambivalent in the face of oppression, it suggests that he or she will surely become, less than fully human.
1. Bryson, among others, has referred to the way in which social research studies down on what might be described as captive populations (viz, the poor and the deviant). Nader attacked the same tendency by suggesting that anthropologists should consider ‘studying up.’ L. Bryson (ibid) 1979: 87-106. L. Nader, Up the Anthropologists - perspectives gained from studying up, in D. Hymes (Editor) Rethinking Anthropology, Random House, New York, 1974: 289.


3. J. Habermas, (ibid) 1973: 44.


14. E.O. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State, (ibid) 1979, especially note 82 page 96.


25. Interview with Professor J. McCready, Otaki, 11 February 1980 : 3.
37. Refer to Chapter Five for a textual analysis of the submissions presented to the N.R.A.C. Working party.
38. J. Habermas, Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, in Theory and Society, 2, 1975(b); 287-300.


40. Department of Labour, G.L. Jackson, Secretary of Labour, 22 October, 1980.


43. The term hegemony emanates from Gramsci who refers to the way in which the dominant class is able to replace overt coercion and force with a form of intellectual, moral and political leadership that has the active consent of dominated groups.

44. The interpretation of ‘hermeneutic’ as used in the context of the N.R.A.C. Working Party is consistent with the Habermasian argument that a cognitive interest in ‘understanding’ does not in itself lead to transformation.


46. J. Habermas, (ibid) 1971 : 196

47. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (ibid) 1973, especially Labour and Interaction : Remarks on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind.


49. See R.J. Bernstein (ibid) 1976, especially pages 200-225. See also C. Nichols, Science or Reflection : Habermas on Freud, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2) 1972:261-270

50. A. Heller, Habermas and Marxism, in J.B. Thompson and D. Held (editors), Habermas : Critical Debates (ibid), 1982 : 21-41

51. A. Heller (ibid) 1982:22

52. While the structural limitations of the capitalist mode of economic production predisposes the State to operate in the long term interests of the dominant class, selective practices refer to patterns of action within those broadly conceived structural limits. In Wrights’ terminology selection refers to the ‘setting of limits within limits.’ Habermas uses different terminology when he refers to forms of practice at different conceptual levels. He identifies these forms as societal action which emanates from the
forces and relations of production and which represents the institutionalisation of behavioural patterns established by society as a whole. (This form of action obviously equates with Wrights notion of strucational limitations). Habermas then refers to interaction which is dependent upon the communicative and strategic acts of knowledgeable participating subjects (This level of action would appear to include Wrights' notion of selection). E.O. Wright (ibid) 1979, especially pages 15-26.

53. By mediating capacity is meant the potential ability of the auxiliary class to influence the class formation and thus create the possibility of a socialist society. Mediation is a dynamic concept in that it impacts on a relationship (i.e. class relationship) rather than on one specific party to that relationship.

54. The schema on class relations (Figure VIII) was adapted from a working paper prepared at the INODEP Institute. (I.O.C.) refers to intellectuals of the dominating class - (I.D.C.) to intellectuals of the oppressed, and (I.A.C.) to intellectuals of the auxiliary class. INODEP, Structural - Conjunctural Analysis: Seminar Module on Ideology, Paris, 1982.

55. The fundamental contradiction within the capitalist social formation is identified as the relationship between capital and wage labour. It is manifested as social production for the enhancement of particular interests. As Habermas suggests; 'We can speak of the fundamental contradiction of a social formation, when and only when its organisational principle necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly confront one another with claims and intentions that are in the long run incompatible. In class societies this is the case.' J. Habermas Legitimation Crisis (ibid) 1975:27

56. Whilst advanced capitalism has been relatively successful at displacing the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist social formation, the process of displacement has created other crisis tendencies and thus the 'dominant' contradiction refers to the form in which these crises are manifested within a particular period of historical time.

57. It is only when incompatibility becomes conscious that conflict becomes manifest and irreconcilable interests are recognised as antagonistic interests. The process by which these conflicts become manifest begins by identifying an aspect of the dominant contradiction so that the interested parties can be isolated and the cognitive interests motivating their practices can be named.

58. Figure X is a synthetic representation of critical practice. It fuses social practice in development (as represented in the work of INODEP) with the critical scientific tradition and the theory of Habermas in particular. The detailed steps in this process and its applicability for both first and third world situations is currently the subject of a joint project between Ian Shirley and
the INODEP Institute in Paris.


60. J. Habermas (ibid) 1973:33.

61. 'Bourgeois ideology' conceives that all belief systems or world views ultimately have the same epistemological status and that all are equally unjustifiable. This distorted interpretation obscures the fact that ideologies are based upon beliefs and interpretations which are themselves subject to critique. In defining ideology in this way attention is drawn to the fact that the adoption of bourgeois ideology is not limited to exponents within the mainstream tradition - it also includes Marxists who claim that their science is opposed to all forms of ideology and thus when 'correctly' interpreted their theoretical impression of social and political reality provides conclusive evidence as to what should be done. This interpretation reduces science to a form of ideology which is open to manipulation and control. To avoid categorisation as 'bourgeois ideology' we must therefore decipher how ideology both reflects and distorts the historical material conditions of social and political life, and furthermore we must identify those factors which influence and sustain acceptance.
APPENDIX ONE

HISTORICAL SOURCES OF STATISTICS

The early development of official statistics was closely related to the process of State formation. The attempts of the absolutist State to mobilise resources for sustaining an army and civil service in the context of a mercantilist economic policy, continuously increased the need for statistical information. With the extension of suffrage and the institutionalisation of democracy, State intervention in the economy and society grew even more rapidly. These new areas of State activity required statistical information as a means of detecting problems, designing improvements, and controlling their implementation.

Three historical phases in the development of official statistics have been identified.

1. The proto-statistical era (17th and 18th Centuries) which dates from the foundation of the English office of Inspector-General of Imports and Exports in 1696. In promoting economic growth for political ends, the European Governments collected masses of data, but their efforts were unsystematic and the results rarely published.

2. The first statistical era which started before the middle of the 19th Century and was characterised by the introduction of systematic and regular statistical programmes, and by the establishment of special statistical offices to collect, process
and publish data.

3. The second statistical era which began essentially after the First World War with the introduction of systematic national income accounting. This emphasis on data processing coupled with increasing State intervention lead to the development of integrated indicator systems.

The development of specialised statistical services in the early nineteenth century represented a decisive breakthrough in the history of official statistics. It was characterised by six distinctive elements.

1. Institutionalisation. Formerly, statistics had been a casual by-product of State or church agencies, but with the advent of statistical offices and commissions the process of data collection became professionalised.

2. Nationalisation. Formerly, statistics had only been collected for parts of a State, for villages, cities, provinces or population groups, but the expansion of statistical activities resulted in State collections and data concerning the population as a whole.

3. Standardization. Formerly, statistics consisted of unspecified reports but with the development of national collections came uniform methods, comparable tables and consistent criteria for the purposes of classification.
4. **Continuity.** Formerly, major investigations had assumed the form of sporadic inquiries but after the 1850's statistical collections and the compilation of data was regularised.

5. **Coverage.** Formerly, the collection of statistics was limited to demographic and economic data, but with the expanded activities of the State came "moral" statistics, data on public activities and social and labour statistics in the wake of welfare interventions.

6. **Publicity.** Formerly, statistics were kept in archives and guarded as State secrets, but the establishment of official data banks resulted in more statistics being published for use by State agencies, Parliament and interested sectors of the population.

The development of official statistics can be distinguished by the following stages:

1. **Demographic statistics.** Statistics on vital events derived from ecclesiastical and, later, civil registers - statistics on the structure of the population derived from counts and, later, censuses.

2. **Economic statistics.** Earlier statistics concentrated on trade and shipping - after the development of agricultural and industrial censuses came statistics on products, farms and factories.

3. **"Moral" statistics.** Statistics on deviant behaviour (illegitimate
births, criminality) and its control (sentences, prisons), anomie (suicides), and later, family instability (divorces).

4. Welfare statistics. Statistics on State activities in relation to epidemics and sickness (public hygiene, hospitals), poverty (poor relief), and later, education (public schools).

5. Political statistics. Electoral statistics since the introduction and extension of suffrage and statistics on public finance usually postdating the parliamentary control of governments.

6. Public Utility statistics. Statistics on public transportation systems (roads, railways) communication systems (postal services, telegraphy) and public works in general.

7. Labour and Social statistics. Statistics on labour conditions since labour legislation, on social security since social legislation, and later on strikes and collective agreements.

The development of international statistics emerged in the early 1800's following and accompanying the development of organised national collections in most European countries. With the progress of national official statistics in the first half of the 19th century, (especially between 1830 and 1850), and the growing accumulation of statistical materials, more and more statisticians became interested in comparing the results from various countries. Three phases in the development of international statistics can be identified;
1. The period of the International Statistical Congress between 1853 and 1876. The Congress (founded in 1851) had as its major objective the promotion and organisation of official statistics and the unification of different statistical institutions in order to make them comparable.

2. The period dominated by the International Statistical Institute between 1885 and the First World War. The International Statistical Institute was founded in 1885 at the Jubilee Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society in London. Its chief objective was to support the progress of administrative and scientific statistics and to promote the international comparability of statistics. Although it was created as a private and autonomous organisation of scientists, the Institute had the standing of an inter-governmental organisation. The Institute covered a wide range of statistics, but its primary efforts were related to demographic and municipal statistics, and to the development of the first nomenclatures of causes of death, professions, and industries.

3. The period from the First World War on, when the development of international statistics essentially became a task of the League of Nations, (later the United Nations), and other more specialised international organisations. The twenty years from 1919 to 1939 were characterised by an immense extension of the statistical work of international organisations, a loose cooperation between them, and a changing relationship between national and international statistics. Whilst before the war the needs of national governments predominated, after the war the League of Nations and
other international organisations developed their own objectives, and since they depended on the data collected by national bureaus, they in turn became promoters of official national statistics.

This close cooperation between nation states in data collection and international agencies became even more significant following World War II. It was secured primarily by the United Nations Organisation which incorporated many important international organisations and cooperated with others through agreement. The most influential event identified in this respect was the 1947 International Statistical Conference.

Within the framework of the United Nations the following statistical agencies can be identified:

a) The Statistical Commission of the Economic and Social Council whose tasks are to develop international standards, to encourage the progress of national statistics and to make suggestions for the coordination of statistical work.

b) The Statistical Office within the UN secretariat, one of whose main tasks consists in publishing international statistics collected by questionnaires sent to national statistical offices.

c) The four Regional Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia and the Far East, Latin America, and Africa.

d) The twelve specialised agencies, especially the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) founded or associated in 1945, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nation's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) associated in 1946, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), associated in 1947.

For Europe, in particular, the following organisations collect, discuss, standardise and publish statistics which are predominantly economic in nature;

a) The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (EEC), that is, the statistical division within the Department of Research and Planning, and the Conference of European Statisticians which first met in 1947.

b) The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) founded in 1948 by 18 Western European Countries, transformed in 1960 into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and which now includes a number of States outside of Western Europe (e.g. United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand).

c) The European Community (EC) that is, its statistical office which was established in 1958.

For a more comprehensive overview of historical sources of data (including the development of private collections), see: Peter Flora, Historical Sources of Statistics, in Current Sociology, Volume XXIII,
APPENDIX TWO (i)

SOCIAL OBJECTIVES FOR NEW ZEALAND

Goal: A social, cultural, physical and economic environment which provides the maximum opportunity for each person now and in the future to achieve self-fulfilment in a community which shares a generous concern for the rights and wellbeing of all.

Objectives:

(A) To strengthen the spirit of community by ensuring each person has the maximum opportunity to:

(i) Create and belong to social groups based on mutual cooperation and responsibility, affection, whanaungatanga and aroha.

(ii) Participate in community decision-making.

(iii) Contribute towards the generation of community objectives.

(iv) Contribute his or her unique qualities towards the achievement of community objectives.

(v) Share in the benefits of attaining community objectives.

(B) To share resources fairly by ensuring each person has:
(i) The opportunity of a material standard of living at a level which enables him or her to enjoy a sense of belonging to the community.

(ii) The opportunity to own and enjoy property.

(iii) Access to the knowledge and skills which will lead to the development of the individual and wellbeing of the community.

(iv) Vocational opportunities which are satisfying and within his or her capabilities.

(v) Ready access to leisure time activities.

(vi) Ready access to the community social welfare services.

(C) To preserve life and promote health by ensuring that:

(i) Each person is as physically healthy and fit and emotionally healthy and stable as their potential allows.

(ii) Public health services are promoted.

(iii) Ready access is provided to all necessary health services.

(iv) The hazards of injury, accident and crime are kept to a
minimum.

(D) To enhance the dignity, freedom and independence of the individual by ensuring that:

(i) Each person is regarded as having dignity and as being worthy of respect.

(ii) Each person has the maximum freedom of choice and action without endangering the rights of others.

(iii) Decisions relating to community objectives take account of the views and situations of all persons living in the community.

(iv) Each person is encouraged to understand and appreciate the views and religious, political, ethnic and cultural differences of other persons and groups.

(v) Each person has adequate access to processes of law and equal rights before the law.

(E) To enhance man's environment by:

(i) Ensuring the ecological balance between man and his environment is such that his use and enjoyment of the environment does not endanger the quality of life of future generations.
(ii) Preserving community access to and enjoyment of the country's physical endowment and attractions.

(iii) Promoting the social, intellectual, artistic and creative and physical pursuits which enrich people's lives.

(iv) Helping people in other parts of the world to strive for a better life.

(v) Promoting world peace and justice and international understanding.
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL GOAL AND OBJECTIVES FOR NEW ZEALAND
(as approved by SDC 3.12.76)

Goal

A society in which the direction of development and social change is towards providing the maximum opportunity for each person to achieve happiness, and thus a society in which:

(i) each person is able to create and belong to family or other intimate groups where a secure and happy environment is provided for children and dependent adults;

(ii) each person is regarded as having dignity and being worthy of respect, has the maximum freedom of choice and action without encroaching upon the rights of others, and is not discriminated against by reason of sex, race, culture or other distinguishing characteristics; and in which

(iii) each person is able to contribute towards the identification and achievement of objectives for a multicultural community and is encouraged to understand and appreciate the religious, political and cultural attitudes, beliefs and customs of other persons and groups and to act responsibly within the community.
Objectives

The following more specific objectives are considered to be important at the present time for helping progress towards the above goal, and are suggested with the knowledge that the extent to which they are achieved can be measured by data available or obtainable:

(i) Each person has access to employment and vocational opportunities which are satisfying and within his or her capabilities.

(ii) Each person has the maximum opportunity to be as physically and emotionally healthy and fit as his or her potential allows, and has ready and adequate access to necessary health and social welfare services.

(iii) Each person has equal and effective access to opportunities to learn knowledge, skills and attitudes, which will enable the development of the person and of his or her contribution to the well being of the community.

(iv) Each person or family group is housed adequately according to their needs in keeping with currently accepted standards.

(v) Each person does not have his or her participation and enjoyment in the community restricted by an inadequate income.
(vi) The hazards of injury, accident and crime are kept to a minimum; and each person has adequate access to processes of law and equal rights before the law, is aware of his or her obligations under the law, and does not experience any avoidable hardship through being the victim of injury, accident or crime.

(vii) Each person has the right to leisure and the opportunity to participate in leisure-time activities including social, intellectual, artistic, cultural and physical pursuits.

(viii) Each person has the opportunity to participate in community decision-making and is encouraged to accept his or her responsibilities to the community.
## APPENDIX III

### THE ORGANISATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

#### Comparative Analysis of Institutional Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of the research centre</th>
<th>Controlling council membership</th>
<th>The extent of Government control</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A unit attached to the Applied Mathematics division of the DSIR, and later the Department of Social Welfare.</td>
<td>No controlling council mentioned.</td>
<td>Unit incorporated within the Government, first attached to the DSIR and later to the Department of Social Welfare.</td>
<td>Not specified, but since the unit is envisaged as a Government agency, presumably it will be completely funded by the Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit with work directed by a controlling committee or council.</td>
<td>Members to come from Government Departments and universities.</td>
<td>Independent.</td>
<td>Not specified, but since the unit would be largely a Government agency, presumably the majority of the funds will come from Government sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An institute with a controlling council.</td>
<td>Members to have a broad understanding of social problems and some technical knowledge of social research.</td>
<td>Not specified. However, since some council members will come from universities, the unit is unlikely to be completely controlled by the Government.</td>
<td>The majority of funds will come from Government sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An institute located in a university centre; governed by a Board of Trustees, which includes the Director, who would be responsible for the running of the Institute.</td>
<td>Board members to come from Social Development and National Research Advisory Councils; Government Departments; universities; local community (appointed by Governor-General).</td>
<td>Independent.</td>
<td>The majority of funds will come from Government sources. Other funds from royalties, fees, contract work, grants for projects from research foundations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A unit incorporated within an existing university, with a chairman in charge of administration.</td>
<td>No controlling council mentioned.</td>
<td>Not specified, but if only some of the Board members will be public servants, presumably Government control will be minimal.</td>
<td>Not specified, but since the unit will be part of a university, presumably it will be funded like any other university departments, through Government grants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An independent institute.</td>
<td>Not specified but Medical Research Council referred to as possible model. Emphasis on Social Scientists as members of controlling body.</td>
<td>Extent of government control and level of commitment would be determined by the Council itself after it was formally established.</td>
<td>$200,000 per annum from Government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REPORT OF NATIONAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL

#### COMMENT ON NRAC REPORT BY DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE

- **Structure of the research centre**
  - A unit attached to the Applied Mathematics division of the DSIR, and later the Department of Social Welfare.
  - A unit with work directed by a controlling committee or council.
- **Controlling council membership**
  - No controlling council mentioned.
  - Members to come from Government Departments and universities.
- **The extent of Government control**
  - Unit incorporated within the Government, first attached to the DSIR and later to the Department of Social Welfare.
  - Independent.
- **Funding**
  - Not specified, but since the unit is envisaged as a Government agency, presumably it will be completely funded by the Government.
  - Not specified, but since the unit would be largely a Government agency, presumably the majority of the funds will come from Government sources.
  - The majority of funds will come from Government sources. Other funds from royalties, fees, contract work, grants for projects from research foundations.
  - Not specified, but since the unit will be part of a university, presumably it will be funded like any other university departments, through Government grants.
  - $200,000 per annum from Government.
| **Facilities** | **Not specified, but presumably those of the department to which the unit is attached.** | **Access to resources of Government departments and universities which are represented on the controlling council. Own facilities to be developed later.** | **Independent facilities.** | **Access to university facilities, including computer and library.** | **Not specified, but presumably those of the university in which the unit is located.** | **Institute would operate as a Bureau with small administrative staff.** |
| **Functions: coordination** | **The unit would stimulate the co-ordination of social science research within certain specified areas.** | **The unit would coordinate social research activity both within and outside of Government agencies.** | **The institute would coordinate research at present being undertaken by universities, Government departments, and any other organisations.** | **Not specified.** | **Not specified.** | **Its role would be supportive, facilitating the establishment of priorities and generally coordinating social science research, between universities, Government departments and voluntary agencies.** |
| **Functions: conducting research projects** | **Not discussed.** | **At first the unit would service other research workers and organisations. Later it would develop the capacity to do its own research as well (the content is not specified).** | **Projects would cover areas of social concern not adequately dealt with by existing research facilities. They would be of use in the formation of social policies.** | **Projects would consist of problem and policy orientated research, which is related to the social development of New Zealand.** | **Projects would focus on the problems of New Zealand society and in particular on the consequences of present and alternative social processes.** | **The Institute would not undertake direct research itself, but rather provide the administrative framework to release researchers from their current positions for a period to complete a specific project. Emphasis on a facilitative role.** |
| **Functions: servicing other organisations** | **Not discussed.** | **The unit would service other organisations and groups, both before and after it develops the capacity to undertake its own research.** | **The institute would maintain contact with and furnish information, advice and assistance (which may include funds if necessary) to persons and organisations engaged in research.** | **The institute would be involved in the provision of advice to Government departments and agencies. It would do contract work where asked and financed.** | **Not specified.** | **The emphasis would be on servicing social science research in both the public and voluntary sectors. A monitoring function was ruled out as that should be a Governmental function.** |
| Functions: the stimulation of research | The unit would stimulate the development of social research within certain specified areas, and formulate an active policy regarding research contracts. | The unit would stimulate the development of research, and would make grants for approved studies. Projects could also be contracted out, where appropriate. | A scheme would enable public servants to take time off to pursue research interests, under the institute. Research projects would be used to train graduates into research workers. | Research projects would be used to train graduates in inter-disciplinary social research. The existence of the institute would cause more social scientists to turn to research. |
| Functions: publishing | Not discussed. | Not discussed. | The institute would prepare and publish such reports on social research as it considers of value; and produce an annual report on the state of social well-being in New Zealand. | Not specified. | Not discussed. |
| Functions: teaching | Not discussed. | Not discussed. | Not specified. | University students would be taught by staff. The graduate students would be trained into research workers through the projects. Residential courses on specific topics would be provided. | Graduate students would work with the projects and would thus be given practical training in research. | Not specified. |
| Staff recruitment: the controlling council | No controlling council mentioned. | Not discussed. | Appointments made by electoral college whose members would come from social science departments of universities; Government departments; professional associations; other research practitioner organisations. | Not specified. | No controlling council mentioned. | Should comprise predominantly of social scientists. Implied that Government would make these appointments. |
| Staff recruitment: the research staff | Not discussed. | Not discussed. | The controlling council would appoint the research staff, who would be professional researchers of a high standard. | The research staff would be university graduates with interdisciplinary backgrounds, who have experience of New Zealand social research. | Research staff would be known and proven scholars recruited from universities, government departments or the voluntary sector. |
| Positions: general | Not discussed. | Not discussed. | Career opportunities would be provided for a limited number of research officers. Opportunity would be provided for persons to join or be seconded to the organisation for short-term employment in intensive research. | There should be 12 members of the Board of Trustees, about 12 senior institute members, and about 12 other staff members. | An administrative staff with secretarial and service support. A small administrative staff of 3 plus a coordinating Council. |
This study examines social practice within a capitalist State and thus it is concerned not only with the social and political context from which knowledge is drawn but also with how this knowledge is used. It is a thesis in the "critical" tradition, and as such it identifies technique and belief as being in an irreducible yet dependent relationship. In contrast to those social scientists who seek to separate value from fact, I argue that belief permeates technique, and thus the concept of weltanschauung inclues the personal values and attitudes that scientists bring to their work.

By aligning this study with the "critical" tradition I am not suggesting that there is only one correct form of science. Rather, I am acknowledgeing (in Habermasian terms), several forms of scientific enquiry, each of which is governed by a particular kind of "interest". These "technical", "practical", and "emancipatory" interests, are identified as fundamental characteristics of the human species, and as such, they link scientific knowledge with the reproductive processes of social and economic life.

The empirical-analytic tradition which incorporates a technical interest, is grounded in that process by which individuals shape and control their environment in order to survive. In methodological terms this form of knowledge corresponds with the mainstream of orthodox social science, in that practitioners believe values obscure facts and
thus they emphasize scientific objectivity in the tradition of the natural sciences. The aims of the empirical-analytic sciences centre around organising the life world into categories as a means of accurately describing 'what is.' In adopting this approach, these 'practitioners' inevitably display a 'fatalistic' attitude to the status quo and to existing economic and political relationships. As a consequence the potential of science is thereby limited to the powers of technical control.

An alternative tradition, based on a practical interest in understanding how individuals shape and control their lives, is characterised as the historical-hermeneutic sciences. The methodological framework of this tradition emanates out of a reaction to the positivism of the empirical-analytic sciences, and in this sense it is usually aligned with "methodological schools" such as phenomenology, participant observation, symbolic interaction, and ethnomethods. The primary aim of this tradition centres around the clarification and interpretation of texts, as opposed to technical control and manipulation. Whilst the methodological advantages of "getting inside" the subject's world are acknowledged, practitioners within the historical-hermeneutic tradition have tended to raise universal claims which exceed any practical interest in intersubjective understanding. Thus, the claim by Gadamer(1) that the interpretation of symbolic formations presupposes "a deep common accord" is refuted, because ultimately language itself is dependent upon social processes which are not only linguistic in nature. Language, which is constitutive of social and historical phenomena, is also subject to distortion and manipulation, and a missing element therefore in the
Whereas the empirical and hermeneutic sciences fail to provide a rational account of themselves because of a primary interest in producing nomological knowledge, the critical tradition by definition is self-referential. As an empowering form of science, the critical tradition leads participants to seek a self-conscious understanding of the contradictions implicit in their material existence, so that these contradictions might be appropriated and transformed. By penetrating the ideological mystifications and forms of false consciousness that distort the meaning of social and political life, critical theorists seek a genuine unity of belief and fact, theory and practice. Artificial divisions, (such as the mainstream distinction between weltanschauung and technique) are viewed as ideological reflections of a society in which scientific practice serves the status quo. Ultimately, the critical tradition aims at a dialectical synthesis which implicates empirical correlations, the interpretation of social and political reality, and any critique of that "reality", as three internal moments of theorising about social and political life.

Whilst the critical social sciences are interested in a dialectical synthesis between empirical facts, understanding, and emancipation, a sharp distinction is drawn in this study between the mainstream and critical traditions. It has been argued that these traditions differ in terms of purpose and application - they differ on the basis of their cognitive structures - and they require different kinds of confirmation. It is this latter distinction which is most interesting from a methodological point of view. Whereas mainstream theories
require connections to be made between scientific explanation, precision, testability and prediction, critical theories must not only investigate social reality, but also social knowledge which is part of that reality. Thus a central element in the confirmation of a critical theory is its ability to demonstrate reflective acceptance.

In order to meet these methodological requirements, this dissertation was divided into two sections. The first section (Chapters Two - Four), centred on State 'practitioners' involved in the social indicators movement. Habermasian theory as outlined in Chapter One provided the framework for this analysis and in the case of the international movement the examination was restricted to a textual analysis of documentary evidence. The documentary records used in this examination are identified in the detailed notes at the conclusion of Chapter Two.

Secondary data was also important in defining the social formation out of which the New Zealand movement emerged. The entire records of the Social Development Council were made available by the Development Section of the Department of Social Welfare, and a miscellaneous collection of S.D.C. papers was obtained from W.M. Hancock, a former member of the Council.

The Head Office of the Department of Social Welfare made their Secretariat records available, and these included minutes of S.D.C. meetings, ministerial papers, and position documents prepared by members of the Secretariat. A full set of social security documents prepared by the Department of Social Welfare as background papers for
the Royal Commission on Social Security was also supplied. Similarly, the Head Office of the Department of Statistics made their files on social indicators available, but these records were checked and filtered by members of the Social Indicator’s Unit before being released. These checks were made under the auspices of the Director of Social Statistics. In-house documents critical of the Department or potentially "political" were difficult to obtain, but staff within the social indicator’s section of the Department either released these documents themselves or indicated precisely what material had been excluded. The documentary records used in this examination of the New Zealand ‘movement’ are identified in the extensive notes at the conclusion of chapters Three and Four.

The sheer volume of documents generated during the course of this examination required a careful historical and contextual record of departmental procedures and practices and on the basis of these records it was possible to identify State ‘practitioners’ who played an important role in the construction of social indicators. A series of unstructured interviews were conducted with these practitioners. The interviews were taped and these tapes later transcribed. Over 300 pages of typed notes were produced as a consequence of these interviews and again it was the Habermasian emphasis on different forms of knowledge and modes of practice which guided the textual analysis. The purpose of these interviews was aimed at examining the relationship which had been proposed between State ‘practitioners’ and the values and interests of the dominant class. These interviews were problematic on two counts:
1. Because of the homogeneity and scale of social research in New Zealand, these practitioners were known to the researcher and vice versa. However, practitioners did not appear to be reticent in the interview situation even though tapes and microphones were used;

2. The technical equipment being used created other difficulties however as evidenced during the course of Lewin’s interview when he dislodged the connection to the tape deck and this necessitated going back over issues which had already been canvassed.

Despite these limitations, the primary data generated as a consequence of these interviews was invaluable in reformulating the central proposition. The element of instrumentalism as implied in the merging of interests between ‘practitioners’ and the dominant class was refuted and as a consequence the modified proposition highlighted the contradictory nature of social practice within a capitalist State.

The second section of this dissertation examined the reformulated proportion by analysing a National Research Advisory Council (N.R.A.C.) Working Party which was established to outline research proposals in response to the social phenomenon of unemployment. All documents collected by the Working Party, including written and oral submissions, were available to me as a participant. These documents included stenographers notes taken down during the course of the Working Party’s deliberations, and detailed notes which I recorded during the course of meetings with the Permanent Heads of State Departments and their delegated representatives.
Some elements of the second case study were also problematic. As a member of the Working Party I was intimately involved in the actions and reactions which surrounded the reports publication. It was not possible therefore to separate my own cognitive interests from events both inside and outside the Working Party. However I did impose certain controls on myself such as the detailed taking of notes and the verification of these notes against the records of N.R.A.C. and the relevant Departments of State. The purpose of this record was to provide a systematic account of the Working Party's actions. The case study material therefore represents a documentary record of the Working Party and an interpretation of practice at the symbolic level at which it was expressed. A detailed account of the documentary evidence used in analysing the N.R.A.C. Working Party is set out in the notes to chapter Five.

In methodological terms, this study should be conceived as a totality, and in the Hegelian-Marxist sense of that term, the methodological components cannot be treated in isolation. To do so would be a distortion of the critical tradition, and it would simply exemplify those forms of science which this thesis sets out to critique. I have not claimed neutrality by separating questions of belief and fact, but in the spirit of science I have sought to discover and uncover ways in which social practitioners understood themselves, and interpreted what they were doing. I investigated regularities and inconsistencies in human action, and I attempted to identify distortions and ideological mystifications. My primary objective, in line with the critical tradition, was to propose a critical theory of society with a practical intention: the self-emancipation of human beings from the constraints
of all unnecessary domination. I stand therefore in the tradition of those who believe in the unity of socialism and liberty.

NOTES


The State practitioners interviewed during the course of this research are as follows:

Department of Statistics:

1. Mrs Margaret Shields - in the development of social indicators

Shields was the Senior Research Officer of the Department of Statistics, responsible for the operation of the Task Force on Social Indicators, and the first senior appointee to be charged with the overall direction of the Social Indicators Unit when formally established. A member of the N.Z. Labour Party, Shields was elected to Parliament in 1981. Interviewed 14 February 1980.

2. Mr Paul Brown - was an associate of Shields as a member of the Social Indicators Unit in the late 1970's. Appointed to succeed Shields as Senior Research Officer in charge of the Social Indicators Unit and took part in discussions between social indicator technicians from O.E.C.D. countries. Interviewed 21 February 1980.
3. Mr Bruce Dickinson - was first involved in social indicators through his work with the Department of Social Security. Appointed to the Department of Statistics in 1974 when the development section of the Department began to expand under Lewin, the Government Statistician. Now the Director of Social Statistics. Interviewed 14 February 1980.

Department of Social Welfare:

1. Mr John Grant - a member of the S.D.C. secretariat during that period when social goals were being formulated by the Council. Grant was responsible for chairing the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Indicators when negotiations were taking place between the Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Statistics. He is currently the Director-General of Social Welfare. Interviewed 13 February 1980.

2. Mr Raoul Ketko - a member of the S.D.C. secretariat during the period when social goals were being formulated and a secretariat representative on the interdepartmental committee on social indicators. He is currently the Director of Social Work Services for the Department of Social Welfare. Interviewed 29 February 1980.

3. Mr John Jenson - a member of the research section of the Department of Social Welfare during the period when social goals were being formulated. Represented the Department of Social Welfare on the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Indicators - currently the

Social Development Council:

1. Mr Vin Gardner - a member of the Department of Social Security at the time of the Royal Commission and personally responsible for preparing two position papers for that Commission. Gardner also drafted the first set of social goals for the Social Development Council as a member of the secretariat. He is currently the senior research officer in the Ministry of Works and Development. Interviewed 28 March 1980.

2. Professor Jim Robb - appointed to the Social Development Council following the resignation of Professor McCready. Chairman of the Council's Social Research Committee and prepared the background paper which became (with minor alterations) the Council's formal proposal for the organisation of social research in New Zealand. Currently Professor of Sociology at Victoria University. Interviewed 29 November 1979.

3. Dr John Robson - Chairman of the social Development Council and a former Director of Criminology at Victoria University. A former Secretary of Justice credited with innovative prison reform when the Ministerial portfolio for Justice was held by the Hon. R. Hannan. Robson is now retired. Interviewed 30 November 1979.

4. Dr Robin Irvine - Chairman of the S.D.C.'s working party on Social
Objectives and Chairman of the Council's Standing Committee on social indicators. Currently the Vice Chancellor of Otago University. A former member of the New Zealand Planning Council. Interviewed 27 March 1980.

National Development Council:

1. Professor Henry Lang - a former secretary of Treasury and now Professor of Economics at Victoria University. Chairman of the N.D.C. Steering Committee, Chairman of the National Development Conference and an ex officio member of all N.D.C. Sector Councils. Interviewed 13 February 1980.

2. Professor James Duncan - a participant in the National Development Conference appointed by the N.D.C. to negotiate between the Departments' of Social Welfare and Statistics during the developmental phase of social indicators. The first chairman of the Commission For the Future - a Professor of Chemistry at Victoria University. Interviewed 17 September 1980.

3. Mr Jack Lewin - a former Government statistician appointed by the N.D.C. (along with Duncan) to write a report on the development of social indicators. This report led to the formal constitution of a Task Force on Social Indicators. Lewin was responsible for expanding the collection and utilisation of social statistics during that period when social indicators were first being formulated. He is currently practising as a barrister specialising in Public Service appeals. Interviewed 20 February 1980.


Social Research:

1. Dr Allan Levett - a former youth club leader, social worker, and Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Victoria University. Chairman of a Labour Party Branch and key protagonist in the Labour Party Policy Group responsible for producing the 1972 Monographs, including the proposal for the reorganisation of social research. Currently a free lance sociologist. Interviewed 16 September 1980.

2. Professor John McCreary - a former Professor of Social Work at Victoria University. Participant in the National Development Conference, a member of the Social Development Council and Chairman of the Council's Standing Committee on Social Research - now retired. Interviewed 11 February 1980.

3. Dr. Charles Crothers - a former social scientist employed by the


    Massachusetts, 1966.

17. Bauer, R.A., *Space Exploration and Social Indicators*, in Bauer,

    Auckland, 1980.


    Volume 15, Spring, 1969: 72-84.


theun, Great Britain, 1979.

25. Birch, A., *Representative and Responsible Government*, Allen and

    1976.


32. Bryson, L., How do we Proceed Now We Know Science is not Value Free?, in Green, W., (editor), Focus on Social Responsibility in Science, New Zealand Association of Scientists, Wellington, 1979: 87-106.


42. Connolly, W., (editor), The Bias of Pluralism, Atherton, Chicago, 1969.


60. Fox, K., Social Indicators and Social Theory: Elements of an Operational System, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974.


82. Gross, B.M., The Social State of the Union, in Trans-action,
November-December, 1965: 14-17.


88. Habermas, J., Knowledge and Human Interests, Translated by J.J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971.


98. Hankiss, E., Cross Cultural Quality of Life Research, in Quality


129. Lenin, V.I., *Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution*, L.C.W.,
24, 1917 (b).


139. McCarthy, T., Translator’s Introduction, in Habermas, J., Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press, Boston, 1975: VII-XXIV.


146. Martin, J., State Papers, Department of Sociology, Massey University, Palmerston North, 1981.


195. Roth, H., Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, A.H.


Bibliography: Documents, Reports, Papers

Adams, R., Letter to Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C., 28 October, 1980.


Auckland City Council, Social Indicators: A Pilot Survey, Data and Research Section, Auckland City Council, July 1979.


Birch, Hon. W., Letter to Professor G. Fraser, Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C., 29 July, 1980.


Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities. Social Development Council, 1 May, 1974.


Coalition for Open Government. We Conclude: An Analysis of Electricity in New Zealand, Wellington, 1980.


Department of Statistics. Comments on first Part of Professor Duncan's paper on Social Indicators. Department of Statistics publication, not dated and not signed.

Department of Statistics. Establishment of Unit for Development of Social Indicators, 32/7/16, 1974.


Department of Statistics, 1982-83.


Department of Statistics. Social Indicators Unit. Report to the Standing Committee on Social Objectives of the Social Development Council, 8 August, 1975.


Dickinson, B., The Development of the Department of Statistics Social
Indicators Programme, Department of Statistics Seminar, 28 March, 1979.


Dyce, T., Letter to Dr Irvine, Social Development Council, 3 November, 1976.


Fogelberg, G., and Laurent, C., Board of Directors in New Zealand Companies, Research Paper No.1, Department of Business Administration, Victoria University, Wellington, 1974.

Fraser, G., Letter from Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C. to members of Working Party, 16 September, 1980.

Fraser, G., Letter from Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C. to Chairman of N.R.A.C., 24 September, 1980.

Fraser, G., Letter to Hon. I. Shearer, Minister of Science and Technology, from Chairman of Social Sciences Committee of N.R.A.C., 21 July, 1981.


IBASE. Instituto Brasileiro De Analises Sociais E Economicas, Program Description, Rio de Janeiro, 8 May, 1981.


Irvine, R., Memorandum to Standing Committee on Social Objectives and Social Indicators. Review of Goals and Objectives for Social Development, November 2, 1976.


Laking, R., Paper on Social Indicators setting out the tasks of the Standing Committee. Not dated.


Link Consultants Ltd. Letter to Professor G. Fraser, 9 July, 1981.


Materialen Zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation, Bundesministerium fur Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Germany, 1971.


Measuring the Quality of Life: Philippines Social Indicators, Development Academy of the Philippines, Taqaytay City, 1975.


National Research Advisory Council. Minutes of the eighth meeting of


National Research Advisory Council. 79/57, N.R.A.C., Wellington, 2
April, 1979.


Oliver, W., Some Past Social Problems, in National Research Advisory


Panoramica Social, National Statistical Institute, Madrid, 1975.

Philpott, B., The Administration of the Economy. Invitation Research


Robb, J., _Notes on Social Research_. S.D.C. Standing Committee on Social Research, 9 October, 1974.


North, November, 1976.


Social Council. Background Notes for Proposal to Establish an Independent Social Science Research Institute, SC 7-1, SCF 74/3, 1974.


Social Council. Organisations and Individuals to whom Questionnaire on Social Objectives sent, July 1972.

Social Council. Social Objectives for New Zealand. Refer to Appendix II (i).


The Treasury. Letter to the Executive Director of N.R.A.C. J. MacKenzie, Deputy Secretary to Treasury, 8 April, 1981.


United Nations. Financial Flows to and from Developing Countries.


Van Moeseke, P., Aluminium Smelting in New Zealand: An Economic Appraisal (with addendum) No.8008, University of Otago, Dunedin, 1980.


Wilkes, C., In the Best Interest: The Incorporation of Working Class Interests in European States 1930-1970. Ph.D.


Note:

Newspaper articles and reports have not been listed in this bibliography but they are identified in the relevant notes at the conclusion of each chapter. Those persons interviewed during the course of this study, the institutional frameworks within which they operated and the dates on which they were interviewed, are set out in Appendix IV Methodology.