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THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

1986 - 1988

A dissertation presented in partial fulfillment for the requirements of a Doctorate in Philosophy at Massey University

Angeline Barretta-Herman
1990
ABSTRACT

This exploratory study analysed changes in the practice of social work in the Department of Social Welfare which occurred as a consequence of the Department's restructuring in 1986. This restructuring introduced major changes in management, service delivery, and the provision of culturally appropriate social services.

It was proposed that changes in the practice of social work were related to wider economic, political and social debates regarding the viability and effectiveness of New Zealand's social services. These debates were interpreted as indicating a significant shift from policies derived from a welfare state model of provision to a welfare society model of social service delivery. A multi-leveled analytical framework was used to examine issues of policy, organization and professional practice.

Three qualitative techniques were used to generate the data reported in the dissertation: documents published during the period 1969 - 1988; a structured interview schedule completed with both managers and social workers; and, finally, participant observation in two District Offices of the Department.

Findings from this exploratory study provided general support for the shift in policy from a state funded, centrally directed model of service provision, to a pluralistic model that altered the role of the state and was intended to increase the involvement of community-based voluntary services. Within this shift, it was shown that during the 1986 - 1988 period, the Department's role became increasingly concerned with funding, monitoring and evaluating services. Biculturalism and the needs of Maori were shown to be critical factors in these shifts.

The practice of social work within the Department of Social Welfare also became more limited and more specialised and its professional identity was altered by the changed organizational emphasis and the requirements of the Department. Several avenues for further research were delineated. Prospects for the future practice of social work sketched in the context of ongoing change within the Department were identified.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is a synthesis of twenty years experience as a social work practitioner. For ten of those years, I have been a social work educator while completing a Masters in Business Administration and embarking on the doctorate. My teaching of administration, management, professional and organizational issues in social work has a practitioner's perspective.

My commitment to understanding the interrelationship between social work and its organizational setting began with my first awareness of the dissonance between the social work values, skills and knowledge I gained as a masters student and the harsh realities of practice in an agency. I became acutely aware of that dissonance for social workers in New Zealand's Department of Social Work through my teaching responsibilities with extramural students who leave their work place for periodic classroom instruction at the university. They were struggling to make sense of social work in what they saw was a threatening environment in the middle 1980's and which, after 1986, became a rapidly changing, and sometimes openly hostile, environment filled with contradictions, inconsistencies, and uncertainties about the role and practice of social work within statutory agencies. Changes in the Department of Social Welfare had direct implications for the practice of social work in other statutory agencies and in the voluntary sector as well, since the Department was a key actor in the organizational infrastructure of social services funding and provision in New Zealand.

It was the extramural students who drew my attention to the developments occurring in the Department and the implications for social work practice. As work on this project progressed, I presented the material to them. It was their enthusiasm, their feedback and their confirmation of the analytical framework that sustained me throughout the years devoted to the completion of the dissertation. It is to those students, as social work practitioners, that this dissertation is dedicated.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of a dissertation requires the cooperation and support of many in the academic, professional and personal lives of the researcher. This dissertation is no exception. Throughout my academic career the critical feedback and consistent encouragement to excel from Professor Graeme Fraser was crucial to my continuing effort and to the completion of this dissertation. To Dr. Chris Wilkes, who was most closely involved in the early stages of the development of the thesis, the field work and the numerable drafts and redrafts, I am indebted for his timely, prompt, consistent support. In addition to her critical comments on the numerous drafts during the final stages of the dissertation, Dr. Nancy Kinross expressed her understanding of the research process on the personal life of the researcher and helped me achieve the necessary perspective for survival. As well, there are many others in the University who have been supportive including Dr. Ian Watson and the Massey University Research Fund, Dr. Cheleen Mahar, David Burns, my first Head of Department and mentor Mervyn Hancock, and my colleagues in the Department of Social Policy and Social Work, Mary Nash, Mary Ann Baskerville, and Mark Tisdall. A special thanks to Ephra Garrett whose constant support and encouragement was greatly valued.

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Over the five years of the research, my children, Christopher and Amanda, and my friends, including Barbara, Pam, Jane and Terry have contributed their support, encouragement and editing skills unselfishly. In particular, I wish to express my deepest appreciation of my dear colleague, friend and spouse, Randy, who never faltered in his support for my academic pursuits despite the constraints to his own career and personal needs.
CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION FOR RESPONDENTS

The author expects that those who read this dissertation will respect the confidentiality of the respondents to insure that they are not harmed in any way by their willingness to participate in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality Protection for Respondents</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures and Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Terms and Spelling Conventions</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One</strong> Introduction</td>
<td>1 - 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Context of the Restructuring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theoretical Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Department of Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Work in New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Form of the Thesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two</strong> The Analytical Framework</td>
<td>17 - 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Welfare State toward Welfare Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Welfare State Crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Models of Social Service Delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Welfare State Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Welfare Society Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization and Decentralization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalization of Social Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Work Task</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Three Methodology 61 - 84

Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques
The Document Review
The Interview Schedule
Confidentiality
The Entry Process
The Minister of Social Welfare
Negotiating for the Interviews with the REOs
Collation of Interview Data
Feedback and Verification Sessions
Data Collection with the Social Work Teams
The Field Work Methodology
The Napier District Office: Community Development Team
The Porirua District Office: Generic Social Work Team
Limitations of the Methodology
Summary

Chapter Four The New Zealand Debates 85 - 148

Period I: 1969-1974 The Amalgamation

The Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Service Delivery
Social Work

Period II: 1975-1979 The Beginnings of Disquiet

The Growing Bureaucratization and Professionalization of Social Work
The Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Social Work

Period III: 1979-1982 The Turning Point

The Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Social Work
Biculturalism
Period IV: 1983-1986 The Convergence of Events Leading to the Restructuring

The Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Service Delivery
Social Work
Biculturalism


The Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Service Delivery
Social Work
Biculturalism
Summary

Chapter Five: The Interview with the Regional Executive Officers 149 - 170

Characteristics of the Respondents
Service Delivery
Regionalization
Decentralization
Devolution
Partnership with the Community
Management Style
Social Work
Biculturalism
Summary

Chapter Six: The Napier District Office: The Community Development Team 171 - 192

History of the Community Development Team
The Community Development Team
Statutory - Voluntary Balance
Service Delivery
Regionalization and Decentralization
Devolution and Partnership with the Community
Management Style
Social Work
Biculturalism
Summary
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure One: The Organization Chart of the Department of Social Welfare: Head Office, Prior to 1986 Page 14

Figure Two: Key Considerations in Designing Organizations 37

Figure Three: Napier District Office Structure 172

Figure Four: Porirua District Office Structure 196

LIST OF TABLES

Table I: Characteristics of Social Service Organizations in Bureaucratic and Participatory Systems Page 30

Table II: The Five Periods for Analysis 1969-1988 88

Table III: Significant Events and Documents
   Period I: 1969-1974 The Amalgamation 89

Table IV: Significant Events and Documents
   Period II: 1975-1979 The Beginnings of Disquiet 95

Table V: Significant Events and Documents
   Period III: 1979-1982 The Turning Point 103

Table VI: Significant Events and Documents
   Period IV: 1983-1986 The Convergence of Events Leading to the Restructuring 112

Table VII: Significant Events and Documents
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AD: Assistant Director - District Office Managerial position, in this thesis referred to as Assistant Director of Social Services.

Administrative Style of Management: Used by Administrative Review Committee to describe a style of management characterized by "administration of instruction top-down communication, emphasis on inputs" (See Chapter Five).

Alternative Care: Designation given to the development of community care programmes for pre-adolescents as an alternative to institutionalization.

Biculturalism: Puao-Te-Ata-Tu interprets biculturalism within the Department of Social Welfare as "the sharing of responsibility and authority for decisions with appropriate Maori people" (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986:19:50).


COGS: Community Organisation Grant Scheme. A joint funding scheme of the Departments of Labour and Social Welfare for community programmes.

Community Services Funding: The funding allocation for community groups and programmes distributed by the Department. In 1987 over 60 million dollars was distributed (Administrative Review Committee, 1987).

DSW: Department of Social Welfare.

EMG: Executive Management Group. Established in the restructuring of 1986 to include the Director-General, the two Deputy Directors-General and the four Assistant Director Generals. In 1988, the Regional Directors were redesignated Assistant Directors-Gens: Region and included in the membership.

hui: Meeting, usually on a Marae and conducted according to Maori protocol.

Institutional Principal: - The senior administrative position in the Department's residential institutions.

iwi: Tribe.
$iwi$: Tribe.

*Kaumatau*: Respected Maori elder.

*Kaupapa*: Purpose, objective.

*Komiti*: Committee.

*Korero*: Talk, conversations, interviews.

*Kuia*: Maori women elders.

*Maatua Whangai*: A programme established in 1983 by joint effort of Department of Social Welfare Services and Maori Affairs to stem tide of young Maori into care.

*NZASW*: New Zealand Association of Social Workers.

*NZCAB*: New Zealand Citizens Advice Bureau.

*NZCSS*: New Zealand Council of Social Services.

*NZFVWO*: New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations.

*NZPC*: New Zealand Planning Council.

*Pakeha*: White New Zealanders of European ancestry.

*Powhiri*: Formal ceremonial welcome conducted in accordance with Maori protocol.

*PSA*: Public Service Association.

*REOs*: Regional Executive Officers. The middle management positions in the newly established regional structure. In this thesis, REOs refer to those positions designated for Social Services and Alternative Care.

*RMT*: The Regional Management Team. It was comprised of the District Directors, the Institutional Principals, the Regional Director and selected REOs.
SSDs: Social Service Departments. The centralized local authority structure in Britain changed with the provision of social services following the recommendations of the 1968 Seebohm Report.

SAC: Social Advisory Council.

Social Welfare Commission: The major advisory body to the Department established in 1986 comprised of four officers of the Department, two people nominated by Minister of Maori Affairs and two persons nominated by the Minister of Women's Affairs. Replaced the Social Security Commission created in Social Welfare Act 1971.

SSSW: Supervising Senior Social Worker.

SSW: Senior Social Worker, the first line field social work supervisor usually with staff of 3-5 direct line practitioners.

SW: Social worker, used here to designate the direct line or front-line practitioner whose responsibilities are direct practice with clients.


Tangata whenua: Literally 'people of the land', refers to the indigenous population of New Zealand.

VOTP: Voluntary Organisation Grant Scheme - a Labour Department training programme that provided paid positions for voluntary organizations.

Whanau: Extended family group.

SPELLING CONVENTIONS

Americanized spellings are used for selected words such as organization and professionalization throughout the text with the following exceptions: when the term appears in a title or direct quote that uses the British spelling and when the term appears in a quote from the respondents who used the preferred British spelling.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This thesis sets out to explore changes in field social work practice within New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare during the eighteen months following the restructuring of the Department which was formally announced in the Department's Management Plan 1986 (DSW, 1986a). The Plan outlined substantial changes in the Department's organizational strategy, its design and performance objectives. Significantly, the plan also pledged a commitment to the provision of "culturally appropriate" services (DSW, 1986a). This thesis argues that the changes that occurred in field social work practice within the Department as a result of the new policies can best be understood through an examination of the shift from a welfare state to a welfare society model of social service delivery. This shift toward a welfare society occurred as New Zealand experienced massive social, political, and economic change under the Fourth Labour Government elected in 1984 (Boston, 1990). The Labour Government initiated major reviews of the social services including the Reports of Ministerial Review Committee (1985); Ministerial Advisory Committee (1986), and the Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services (1986). Their recommendations signalled sweeping changes for New Zealand's social services. This researcher recognized the proposed changes as a prime opportunity to examine the relationship between social work practice and its organizational setting.

In the mid-1980s, New Zealand was experiencing low economic growth, high inflation rates, a rising unemployment level, a drop in export demand and a rising balance of payments deficit. "The structure of the economy was still geared . . . towards exporting bulk farm products to Britain . . . while servicing a protected domestic market at home" (Collins, 1989:188). Changes in world wide economic relations, including Britain's entry into the European Economic Market in 1972, placed New Zealand in the position of exploring new trade partnerships in Far East, Asia and the Pacific Rim. New Zealanders were increasingly aware that "the overall picture of New Zealand's economic performance since the 1950s [was] one of long-
term deterioration" (NZPC, 1989:13) and that "In the ten years up to 1983, New Zealand's national income and living standards grew by less than half the average of those in other Western countries" (Collins, 1989:188). Economic change was perceived as inevitable and the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984 marked the beginning of rapid and radical change in economic policies based on "market liberalisation, with the removal or reduction of external and internal protection" (Easton, 1989:8). What this represented was a rejection of the previously tightly controlled economy and an acceptance of monetarist policies through exposing the economy to 'market forces.' Under Roger Douglas as Finance Minister, and Rogernomics as his economic package was known, the economy of New Zealand experienced a metamorphosis that not only radically changed the economic relationships of New Zealand with the rest of the world, but also changed the economic relationships among New Zealanders as well (Easton, 1989; NZPC, 1989).

The political scene in New Zealand was also undergoing change. The election of the Fourth Labour Government promised relief from what many perceived as an unresponsive National Government led by the strong, irascible Robert Muldoon. After their election, the Fourth Labour Government launched a massive consultation process on governmental departments and services (Boston, 1990). There was a high level of activity as organizations, agencies and individuals responded to the calls for participation through written and oral submissions. A sense of optimism ensued in the New Zealand people who hoped the consultation process would result in a viable set of solutions to the problems facing the country and mitigate the growing sense of pessimism about New Zealand's future.

Socially, several of New Zealand's self-perceptions were under threat. The lack of economic growth and the policies of the previous fifteen years had contributed to a steady rise in unemployment, a fall in the standard of living relative to other western nations, a growing polarization between the rich and the poor and a realization that the 'good life' for all New Zealanders was far from a reality. In particular, the Pakeha (European) New Zealander's view of racial harmony was seriously challenged when Maori activists presented empirical evidence to the contrary. The data showed that the indigenous people of New Zealand, the tangata whenua (people of the land), were disproportionately over-represented in the lower socio-economic groups; in measures of ill-health, such as infant mortality and low life expectancy; and in the institutions of welfare and justice (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986:15). As a consequence, social workers (and social work
educators) were increasingly under challenge to respond to Maori welfare needs. The social work community initiated practice and programme responses to the challenges, including a proliferation of anti-racism workshops to address the criticisms of personal and professional racism.

It was against this background that this research project was formulated. The challenges presented to New Zealand social work were pervasive and questioned the very assumptions upon which social work had been based. Social workers reassessed their personal and professional attitudes toward racism, the validity of Pakehas' working with Maori people; and the glaring absence of Maori social workers in social service agencies, government departments and teaching institutions. They also recognized their lack of even a basic knowledge of Maori people, Maori language, customs and the demands of Maori formal protocol (DSW, 1985b).

This time of pervasive change in social work was seen by the author as an excellent opportunity to explore the motivation, form, process and content of the changes taking place. Social workers were trying to make sense of the diverse challenges to their practice by reassessing current practice and developing models of practice to meet New Zealand's changing environment and the challenges of the Maori people.

There were several reasons why it was decided to explore changes in social work practice within the Department of Social Welfare. First of all, the Department of Social Welfare was the largest single employer of social workers in the country (Rochford & Robb, 1981) and several of its staff had leadership roles in the field. Secondly, since the creation of the Department as legislated by the Social Welfare Act, 1971, the Department had become a dominant influence in the provision of services in the statutory sector and, through its various funding schemes, in the voluntary sector as well. The Social Work Training Council, an accrediting body, had been established under the Department's auspices in 1973 and the Department, through its training institutions and various study programmes, had been a major actor in the social work training infrastructure. Lastly, much of the criticism of social service provision during the 1970's and early 1980's, had been directed at the Department as the centralized, bureaucratized and mandated government department responsible for social services (NZPC, 1978, 1981; Davey and Dwyer, 1984). These criticisms were addressed in the recommendations of the reviews commissioned by the Government and the reviews initiated by the Department itself. As a result the Department embarked on a process of change that
would be referred to as a 'restructuring'. It was this process of restructuring and its impact on field social work practice within the Department that this research project set out to explore.

While the primary focus was the intra-organizational relationship between the Department of Social Welfare as the statutory organization and social work, this thesis sets this relationship within the larger social, economic and political context. The restructuring marked a turning point in social welfare policy with the Fourth Labour Government's rejection of the existing social service delivery model based on a centralized, bureaucratized government department as the main funder and provider of service. It is argued that social work, as the major identifiable occupational category responsible for implementing government social service policy in statutory agencies, consequently underwent significant change.

This chapter begins with an overview of the social, political and economic context of New Zealand at the time of the restructuring. The features of this context will be extended and elaborated throughout the thesis as the context is interwoven with the analysis of debates on social service delivery models and the analysis of changes in social work practice during the period 1969 to 1988. Broad features of the theoretical framework are presented before the chapter then defines several terms as they are used in this thesis. A brief description of the Department of Social Welfare and social work in New Zealand follows. Finally, the reader will be alerted to the structure of the thesis.

**THE CONTEXT OF THE RESTRUCTURING**

New Zealand had long been heralded as the social laboratory of the South Pacific (Tennant, 1989) with a comprehensive welfare system based on government provision beginning with the Old-age Pensions Act in 1898, through to the Social Security Act 1938, the Social Security Act of 1971, and the Superannuation Act of 1975.

The advent of social security added a powerful component to the liberal-progressive model of welfare, and social security rapidly became the welfare apotheosis against which all provision was based (Tennant, 1989:6).

The Social Welfare Act, 1971 amalgamated the Social Security Department and the Child Welfare Division of the Department of Education to create the Department of
Social Welfare with wide responsibilities for the funding, provision and support of social services. The Department, as a centralized government agency, was charged with the responsibility to:

Encourage co-operation and co-ordination among organisations and individuals (including Departments of State and other agents of the Crown) engaged in social welfare activities (Social Welfare Act, 1971, Section 4(2)(d)).

The Department was to accomplish these goals through a combination of direct service provision and indirect services to the voluntary sector including systems of funding, advice and administrative support. The 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security reaffirmed the responsibility of the community to give the dependent a standard of living "consistent with human dignity" relative to that enjoyed by the majority through a comprehensive system of benefits that would allow all to "feel a sense of participation in [sic] and belonging to [sic] the community" while supporting the need for co-ordination of all services contributing to the welfare of the nation (Royal Commission on Social Security, 1972, Section 42:65). The Royal Commission, therefore reaffirmed the central role of the state in social welfare activities and established a social service delivery model based on the key role of government as funder and provider.

With the state as the main funder and provider of service, it was assumed that equality, accessibility and continuity of a quality universal service would prevail. Theoretical support for this view was found in the work of Richard Titmuss, Professor of Social Administration at the London School of Economics from 1951-1973. Titmuss articulated the application of Keynesian economic policies to social services. He clearly distrusted the 'market place' and emphasized the central role of the state in the social services (George and Wilding, 1987). Titmuss defined the role of the voluntary sector as innovator and supplemental to state provision. It was this welfare state model of social service delivery that guided social policy decisions in New Zealand up to 1986 (Easton, 1980; Oliver, W., 1977, 1988).

One objective of the thesis is to explore possible explanations for the rejection of the existing social service delivery model based on the principles articulated by Titmuss (1974, 1976). The welfare state model, with its assumption of a high degree of collective responsibility, had dominated New Zealand social service policy for forty years. This thesis argues that the government adopted an alternative model, based on the principles of a 'welfare society' model as promulgated by Roger Hadley and his associates at the University of Lancaster (Hadley and Hatch, 1981;
Hadley and McGrath, 1981; Hadley, Dale and Sills, 1984). The model represents an application of monetarist economic policies to a social service delivery system. It is argued that the Hadley and Hatch Participatory Model of Social Service Delivery (1981) was adopted because it provided an alternative to the welfare state model of collective responsibility by emphasizing the responsibilities of the individual and the community; because it provided a theoretical rationale for reassessing welfare expenditure; and because it used the terminology of the proponents of a 'welfare society' model of service delivery voiced by New Zealand social policy analysts (New Zealand Planning Council, 1978; 1979).

The Hadley and Hatch model (1981) depends on a pluralist system of providers, focuses on a localized 'patch system' of integrated community based services, acknowledges informal care givers and prescribes a limited role for the state in direct service provision (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). There were strong indications at the time this research project was initiated that the Hadley model (1981) was being implemented. This thesis attempted to trace the influence of the Hadley and Hatch model by analysing the social policy debates in the official publications and reports that set the stage for its implementation. Its adoption led to sweeping changes in the organizational infrastructure of social services and consequently to significant modifications in social work practice.

Under the welfare state model of service delivery, the Department had grown into a highly centralized, bureaucratized government agency. To implement the alternative model of social service delivery, radical change was required in the form of a 'restructuring' of the Department. For the purposes of analysis, the restructuring processes were grouped under four principles: regionalization, decentralization, devolution and partnership with the community. Although some features of the restructuring had been planned, piloted, or at least discussed, prior to July 1986, the restructuring process was to be altered by the commitment to biculturalism made following the release of the Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, known as Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

It was the task of the Department's social work staff to implement the model and the principles of what was later to be referred to as 'the new way of working' (DSW, 1988c). The Department of Social Welfare, had been supportive of the slow but steady growth of qualified social workers. It is argued that the Department played a major role in social work professionalization during the 1970s not only
because it was the largest employer but because of the key role the Department assumed in the provision and resourcing of education and training of social workers in the statutory and voluntary sectors under the Social Welfare Act of 1971. Equally important was the establishment of the Social Work Training Council in 1973 as an accrediting and standard setting body under the auspices of the Department.

As the Department became more professionalized, social work received increasing criticisms of elitism, non-accessibility and over-emphasis on individualized casework methods to the exclusion of preventative methodologies such as community work and community development (NZASW, 1976, 1978, 1982). To these criticisms was later added the charge of mono-culturalism (Johnston, 1982; DSW, 1985b). This thesis analyses the debates on social work professionalism and definitions of the social work task within the Department of Social Welfare. It draws on data collected in interviews with the Regional Executive Officers of Social Services and Alternative Care (REO's) and in field research with two social work teams. It is in the comments of the respondents that the dilemmas of practice are brought into sharp relief. The researcher was aware that some of the social workers within the Department had a commitment to many of the principles espoused as characteristics of Hadley & Hatch's Participatory Model of Social Service Delivery (1981) prior to the restructuring. The question was, did the social workers perceive the new policy directives as a legitimation of good social work practices and was the adoption of the principles of 'the new way of working' (DSW, 1988c) based on a commitment to biculturalism, actually taking place at the interface of social work services with clients? There were indications that with the apparent adoption of the alternative model, the Department's support for social work professionalization had reversed and a deliberate strategy of depersonalization of social work initiated. The research set out to explore these issues.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework argues that a multi-level approach is required to analyse the relationship between the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare and changes in field social work practice. First, consideration must be given to the broad social, political and economic context which provides the framework in which the relationship takes place. During times of change, and certainly the 1980s
in New Zealand were a time of change, the influence of events in the broad context on intra-organizational relationships is highlighted (Lincoln, 1985). Second, despite views of bureaucracies as stable and rather impervious to external forces (Weiner, 1982), contemporary analysis of organizational functioning confirms that the organization is dependent on a complex set of interrelationships with its immediate environment for its symbolic and tangible exchanges (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Third, social work practice in an organization is affected by the unique characteristics of the specific organization in which that practice takes place. The interrelationships between changes at the macro-level, conceptualized in this thesis as a change from a Welfare State to a Welfare Society, and the organizational changes in the Department which subsequently resulted in changes in field social work practice are analysed using Pearce & Robinson's Strategy - Organizational Design - Performance Model (1989).

TERMINOLOGY

There are several terms utilized in this thesis that require clarification. The terms 'social policy', 'social welfare policy', 'social welfare', 'social welfare services', 'social services' and 'social work' have distinct meanings. Because the boundaries between them are blurred, they are often used interchangeably, thereby creating confusion and inaccuracies. Social Policy has multiple meanings but usually refers to all the governmental activity that impact on the quality of life in a society. Thus, it includes housing, education, conservation/environment, health, as well as social welfare policies of income, benefits, and social services (Gilbert and Specht, 1986). Borchardt (1977) distinguishes between social policy and public policy by defining public policy as a generic term referring to all government actions concerned with the governance of a nation: defense, public works, taxation, etc., while social policy is:

A deliberate government sponsored programme of action designed to ensure reasonable access for all to conditions which will lead to an improved quality of life (Borchardt, 1977:vii).

The term 'social policy' or 'social welfare policy' as it is used in this thesis refers to the policies covering the six major social services provided by the state: education, employment, health, housing, income maintenance benefits and social welfare services thus reflecting the definition and usage in Departmental documents (e.g. in the Report of the Ministerial Task Force, 1986).
The Resource Book prepared by the Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services (1986) defined social welfare services as "services provided by the welfare state intended to improve people's social welfare-[they] can be developmental, rehabilitative, or remedial [sic]" (Ministerial Task Force, 1986:43). The Task Force noted that social welfare services refer to the full range of formally organized social welfare activities provided by local and central government agencies and by non-government agencies. The Task Force acknowledged that the boundaries between social welfare services and other social services are often indistinct, making it difficult to categorize services as a 'social service' or as a 'social welfare service.' There is a tendency in the literature to refer to 'social welfare services' as simply 'social services' without regard to the site of those services in education, health, or welfare. In this thesis, the term social services refers to social welfare services and utilizes the following distinctions.

Social Services has a wider connotation and may include both direct and indirect service or resource provision that enhances quality of life: groups, community and social activities, i.e., domiciliary care, day care, child care, rest homes, meals on wheels, old age centres, etc... Social Work has a more specific nature that depends on actions that are change focussed; they may be indirect or direct but depend on a degree of personal interaction (Timms and Timms, 1982: 182-183)

The clarification of the terms 'social services' and 'social work' as articulated by Timms and Timms (1982) is crucial to understanding the dilemmas, the resistance and the implications of the redesignation of division and job titles from 'social work' to 'social services' that took place in the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare in 1986.

The process of change in government departments, services and benefits initiated by the Fourth Labour Government was labelled a 'restructuring'. The term was widely used to refer to all change processes in government and reflects a particular perspective.

Restructuring implies that the way to carry out successful, effective organisational change [is] to alter the organization's structure (McLennan, Inkson, Dakin, Dewe, and Elkin, 1987:298)

These authors point out that such a perspective ignores the complex realities of organizational dynamics. Nevertheless, the restructuring process embarked on by the Department assumed this perspective and initiated the fundamental structural changes which are described in Chapters Two and Five.
Because the four principles of the restructuring (regionalization, decentralization, devolution and partnership with the community) will receive thorough examination in the next chapter, it is necessary at this point to only briefly define the terms. Robbins (1983) defines regionalization as an administrative structure that permits an organization to operate in different geographical localities without substantial changes in the hierarchical authority structure. Decentralization, usually viewed on a continuum with centralization, is a multi-dimensional concept that refers to the degree of distribution of power and authority among the actors in a social system (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984:7). It is important to note that regionalization and decentralization are distinct processes which can occur independently of each other. Likewise, decentralization of responsibility can occur without decentralization of power and authority. Both issues will be elaborated further in Chapter Two.

Devolution, the third principle of the restructuring, is an imprecise term. Boston (1988) defines devolution as:

Refering to the transfer of political power from the central government level to a sub-national government. ... Hence, if a central government department were to transfer many of its functions from head office to district offices this would be a case of organisational decentralisation. If, however, the primary responsibility for those functions -in terms of programme design, funding, implementation and evaluation-were to be transferred to sub-national governments ... [it is] devolution (Boston, 1988:3).

Boston's definition refers to the two processes central to the understanding of devolution: power and responsibility. Boston (1988) refers to the transfer of political power and the primary responsibility for programme design, funding, implementation and evaluation. It was these two features that were to become the focus of the devolution debate. Levett, Keelan and McClellan (1988) defined devolution as:

A mechanism for allocating public money to groups providing social services in local communities. It involves an operational partnership between community and government. ... It resulted from both a call for greater inclusion in political life by excluded or under-represented groups and a decision by government. ... Devolution is an act of government to share decision-making on some function with affected citizens. ... It is not a movement of decentralisation whereby decision-making is shifted from head office to district office (Levett, Keelen and McClennan, 1988:1, 11).
Devolution, as used within the Department of Social Welfare, included the notion of transfer of political power and of primary responsibility. Devolution was most often discussed with reference to the transfer of primary responsibility of services for Maori children and their whanau (extended family) to iwi (tribal) authorities. The issue of accountability in devolution has proved to be problematic. With a high degree of primary accountability to the Department, it was difficult to distinguish a 'devolved' programme from the more traditional contractual agreements the Department had with voluntary agencies, such as Open Home Foundation or the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped, for the provision of services to special populations. A low degree of accountability could make the programme vulnerable to claims of 'misappropriation' of public monies. Such issues delayed the implementation of devolution. During the period of the research, the Community Organisation Grants Scheme (COGS) was the only devolved programme within the Department of Social Welfare in operation (Levett, et al., 1988).

The fourth principle, 'partnership with the community', had two major implications. First, partnership was an indication from government that the provision of social welfare services was a joint responsibility of government and 'the community'. The meaning of 'the community', although vaguely defined, was generally accepted to refer to voluntary agencies, community groups and iwi authorities. It was an acknowledgement of the shift from the pursuit of a 'welfare state' towards a 'welfare society' that reflected acceptance of the New Zealand Planning Council's call for a community-based approach to social welfare service provision (NZPC, 1979, 1981; Davey and Dwyer 1984) and the New Zealand Council of Social Services promotion of the "sharing of social responsibility" through the promotion of community self-sufficiency (NZCSS, 1978:27). Second, partnership with the community included an expectation of a partnership in decision-making, as well as of provision. The government, as the review of the documentation in Chapter Four will show, embarked on an exhaustive consultative process with 'the community' through the establishment of ministerial reviews and the Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988). As well, organizational design changes within the Department created a Social Welfare Commission with community members and community monitoring groups for each of the Department's District Offices and Institutions. These committees, while not conferred with direct decision making power, were expected to significantly influence the operation of districts and the institutions through their direct linkage to the Social Welfare Commission (See Appendix IV for the Departmental Organizational Chart of 1986).
Field social work practice is differentiated from residential social work by setting. Residential social workers in the Department were based in the Department's residential institutions and homes for children and youth, while field social workers are:

Based in district and area welfare offices to carry out statutory tasks, offer personal and family services and respond to changing community needs (DSW, 1988c:65).

In 1988, of the Department's 1300 social workers, 850 were field social workers and the remaining 450 were residential social workers.

In the 1970's the number of field and residential social workers was approximately equal. The present ratio reflects the gradual reduction in the use of residential care which has occurred and is continuing (DSW, 1988c:65).

This shift in the ratio of field social workers to residential social workers reflects the Department's deinstitutionalization policy begun in the early 1980's and accelerated as part of the restructuring. The term 'Social Worker' when used in this thesis to designate social workers in the Department refers to field Social Workers.

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

The Social Welfare Act of 1971 legislated the amalgamation of the Child Welfare Division of the Department of Education and the Department of Social Security to create the Department of Social Welfare. As a government department, the Department of Social Welfare was responsible to Parliament as representative of the people of New Zealand through the Minister of Social Welfare. Ann Hercus, now Dame Ann Hercus, was appointed the Minister of Social Welfare when the Fourth Labour Government was elected in 1984. She was replaced by the Honourable Michael Cullen in 1987.

The Department of Social Welfare budget grew from 7.0% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1971, to 10.1% in 1980, and to 10.71% in 1985 while Social Work Services expenditure lost ground as a percentage of Departmental budget, (2.2% in 1975 compared with 2.1% in 1980). By 1985, the Social Work Division had gained only slightly on its 1975 percentage by representing 2.22% of the budget (Ministerial Task Force, 1986:66). For the fiscal year 1986/87, the Department spent $6,175 million, the largest single vote in the Budget, employed a staff of
6,200, allocated benefits to one and one half million citizens of New Zealand's 3.4 million people, operated 19 institutions and 170 children's homes. Less than 3% of the budget was allocated to social work services (DSW, Briefing Papers, 1987a). The expenditure on Social Work Services was approximately .03% of the total expenditure for fiscal year 1986-1987. The total expenditure in Vote: Social Welfare was 11.7% of the Gross Domestic Product (DSW, 1988c:108). These figures demonstrate the small percentage of the Department of Social Welfare budget allocated to social services as compared to the budget allocation for benefits, pensions, and administration.

Prior to the restructuring, the Department of Social Welfare had a traditional bureaucratic structure headed by a Director-General and three Assistant Director-Generals responsible for Administration, Social Work, and Benefits and Pensions. The Head Office, located in the nation's capital, Wellington, had direct line authority over the Department's 73 District Offices and Area Welfare Offices and the Department's 19 Institutions (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). (See Figure One). By 1987, five of the nineteen institutions were closed "in favour of community based care" (DSW, 1988c:15). Other changes in the Department following the restructuring, and discussed in the Introduction to Chapter Five, include the establishment of a regional office structure, the abolition of the Social Security Commission and the reorganization of Head Office. (See Appendix IV).
Social work in New Zealand is a relatively young occupation, without a well established professional identity. The first tertiary social work educational programme for over twenty five years had been established at Victoria University in 1949 (University Grants Committee, 1982). In 1964, a professional association for social workers was established by workers in the health and child welfare fields. (NZASW 1971). The formation of the Social Work Training Council in 1973 led to the establishment of three additional tertiary educational programmes for social workers: Massey University, 1975; Auckland University, 1975; Canterbury University, 1976, (Brook, 1988). As a result of the Brownlie Committee recommendation (University Grants Committee, 1981), a fifth programme was established at the Auckland Teachers College (now the Auckland College of Education) in 1983. The only nationwide study of social work in New Zealand was completed in 1981 (Rochford and Robb, 1981) and involved a sample of over 5,700 social service positions of which approximately 2,500 were paid positions (Rochford and Robb, 1981:8). It was estimated that 80% of those were in the statutory sector. Of those in paid employment, only 12% held a professional degree in social work.

The professionalization of social work during the last twenty years has been neither consistent nor unchallenged (NZASW, 1976, 1978, 1982). The parallel development of community work practitioners forced periodic reassessment of the role of social work vis a vis community work (Aotearoa Community Workers Association, 1989). Proposals for professionalization through the establishment of minimum standards, membership restrictions and competency measures, has been a consistent call from health social workers in particular (e.g., Daniels, 1989). These proposals generated heated debates in social work ranks (Flowers, 1981; Hessey, 1982, 1984).

The New Zealand Association of Social Workers was strongest in the mid-1970s but struggled for support and membership throughout the 1980s (Fraser, 1988). The Association's debates on the social work task and on professionalization are discussed as part of Chapter Four.

A study of social work practice in New Zealand completed by Sheafor, Teare, Hancock and Gauthier (1985) reconfirmed that the key tasks of social work activity
among the 358 social workers surveyed were counselling and problem solving as direct practice interventions. The traditions of community work as a separate activity distinct from social work and the concentration of social workers in the statutory sectors of welfare and health may help to explain why casework has characterized social work in New Zealand during the period under study.

FORM OF THE THESIS

This first chapter has set out the central argument of the thesis, provides an overview of New Zealand in the mid-1980s, defines terms and has given brief descriptions of the Department of Social Welfare and Social Work in New Zealand. Chapter Two develops the theoretical framework used to analyse social work and its organizational setting. The methodology utilized in the research is described in Chapter Three, which also includes a summary of the demographic characteristics of the research respondents. The analysis of the publications, reviews, papers and reports that document the debates on the aspects of social service delivery systems germane to this thesis makes up Chapter Four. Chapter Five reports the perceptions of the restructuring of the Department by the eleven Regional Executive Officers who held nationwide responsibility for implementation of an alternative model of service delivery within the newly named Social Service Divisions. It is in Chapters Six and Seven that the responses and observations of the social work teams, as the front-line workers with the responsibility of interfacing with clients and the community are reported. Chapter Eight, 'Processes and Prospects', presents an analysis of the findings of the project, implications for further research, and prospects for the future.
CHAPTER TWO
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter sets out the framework developed for analysing field social work practice in the Department of Social Welfare. It begins with an examination of the concepts 'welfare state' and 'welfare society' and reviews the explanations offered in the literature for the crisis of the welfare state in contemporary Western societies (Easton 1980; Mishra, 1984; Kaufman, 1985). This thesis argues that the broad directions of state responsibility guide statutory organisational strategies for social service funding and provision. Hence, the second major section of this chapter examines models of social service delivery by comparing and contrasting the features of the welfare state model as articulated by Titmuss (Titmuss, 1974, 1976; Reisman, 1977) with the features of the welfare society model promulgated by Hadley and his colleagues (Hadley and Hatch, 1981; Hadley and McGrath, 1981 and 1984; Hadley, Dale and Sills, 1984). Issues of organizational design are considered in this second section which proposes that the welfare state model of social service delivery led to the development of a centralized, bureaucratic state system. Conversely, the welfare society model demands an organizational design characterized by a decentralized delivery system, pluralism in service providers and participation of the community in planning and service provision. The thesis goes on to argue, that just as there is a relationship between the strategies of service provision and the characteristics of the organization designed to implement the model of social service delivery, these two elements are related to organizational performance. Performance, in this instance considers both the tasks to be accomplished by social workers and the qualifications required to perform those tasks. The last section of this chapter, analyses these critical social work performance issues as the professionalization of social work, and the definition of the social work task (Stevenson, 1986).

Although the relationship between strategy, design and performance is conceptualized as sequential for the purposes of explanation in the Pearce and Robinson model (1989) utilized here, the relationship is more complex and dynamic. Pearce and Robinson (1989) acknowledge the significance of the environment especially in times of change.
It is this extra organizational environment that contemporary organizational theorists argue has been insufficiently considered in the study of organizations.

The analytical framework presented and the research methodology used in the present research reflects the influence of the contemporary organizational theorists who contend that a paradigm shift is occurring which fundamentally alters both the 'world view' of organizational analysis and organizational research (Lincoln, 1985; Guba, 1985; Weick, 1985; Reed, 1985). Advocates of the 'naturalist' paradigm reject the positivist emphasis on rationality, planning and linear causality. The naturalists' view of the world is one of complexity, indetermination and mutual causality. They argue for an organizational analysis that adopts a 'holistic' approach and addresses the major criticism of system theories approaches which have dominated organizational analysis for thirty years. This criticism is exemplified in the comments of Scott (1983a,b) who contends that open systems theories have not been adequately utilized to examine the relationship between:

'Internal' features and 'external' forces. . . to analyse how societal events push, pull and permeate organizational structures and processes (Scott, 1983b:100).

Lincoln (1985) reiterates this perspective when she calls for an organizational analysis that expands the boundaries of the organization and recognizes the organization in its immediate task environment and considers the organization within its broadest societal context. Such an analysis includes what she terms both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' organizational relationships (Lincoln, 1985:9). The naturalists dismiss the 'retrospective rationality' of the positivist paradigm which they argue is "rare in organizations" (Weick, 1985:109) and the deliberation assumed in the planning function as "fostered for public consumption while a different set of procedures is used to get the work done" (Weick, 1985: 111).

The influence of this emerging paradigm is evident in the analytical framework used in this present research. This framework considers societal or vertical relationships in the examination of social work within a particular organizational context, as well as the internal and external horizontal relationships of the organization.
WELFARE STATE TO WELFARE SOCIETY

Two views of the welfare state dominate the literature: the ideological view, which focuses on the welfare state as a set of beliefs and values, and the programmatic view, which examines the benefits and services provided by the state (Kaufman: 1985). Ideologically, the term welfare state connotes an assumption of 'collective responsibility' (Titmuss: 1974). The term conveys a benevolent state attitude toward the well-being of all its citizens (Robson: 1976:175) and denotes "universal entitlement of a number of welfare provisions as a matter of right for the members of a nation state" (Siddiqui, 1987:23).

Kaufman (1985) proposes four dimensions for comparison of welfare states: (a) the ideological dimension which addresses the scope and limits of state responsibility for individual and collective welfare; (b) the institutional dimension which addresses the degree of state influence in the provision of services and in the redistribution of wealth; (c) the organizational dimension which examines the organized forms and the degree of centralization; and (d) the performance dimension which analyses the kind and amount of resources allocated to different public programmes. Furniss and Tilton (1977), on the other hand, contend that it is state intervention in economic and social policy which is the central feature of welfare states. Their view encompasses the ideological and organizational dimensions in Kaufman's schema (1985). Furniss and Tilton (1977) argue that it is the form and goals of state interventionist policies along a continuum from minimalist to pervasive that provides the primary criteria for distinguishing one welfare state from another. Halsey (1981) in his discussion of the rise of welfare state policies in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, describes these policies as 'interferences':

The rise of the Welfare State constitutes what was originally called 'interference' in the exchanges between the family and the economy. . . . The more elaborate these 'interferences,' the more developed the Welfare State (Halsey, 1981:21).

The description 'Welfare State,' then, can describe quite different perspectives and quite different patterns of social welfare policies and programmes provided by a particular government. It does not necessarily denote pervasive government intervention. It may not even accurately reflect the spirit of collective responsibility
and altruism so often ascribed to it (Titmuss, 1974; Kaufman, 1985; Oliver, W., 1988; Tennant, 1989). William Oliver (1988) suggests that the welfare provisions established in New Zealand were more a response to economic depression that threatened national stability than a commitment to social justice. In New Zealand, however, the term 'welfare state' is generally accepted as referring to a benevolent state attitude and to the comprehensive system of government-provided benefits and services as originally formulated in the Social Security Act provisions of 1938, codified by the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security and reconfirmed by the Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy released in April of 1988 (Easton, 1989).

Initial formulations of the term 'Welfare Society' (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965) referred to industrial societies with highly developed universal, services with few "distinctions between welfare and other types of social institutions" (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965:147). The 'Welfare Society' as envisaged by Wilensky and Lebeaux was the culmination of the development of extensive institutionalized welfare programmes. More recent formulations of the term, (OECD, 1981; George and Wilding 1987; Johnson, 1987) stand in direct contrast to this early conceptualization. Now the concept of welfare society includes notions of individual and community responsibility and rejects notions of collective responsibility, particularly as exemplified in state provided services and benefits. The term Welfare Society as it is used by 'anti-collectivists (George and Wilding 1987) and welfare pluralists (Johnson, 1987) emphasizes the responsibilities of primary social institutions such as the family (including the extended family network) and the community in providing care. Proponents of a Welfare Society reject state provision of universal services because such services foster dependency and inefficiency. They propose welfare pluralism as the means for encouraging and supporting the provision of services in both the voluntary and commercial sectors. From this perspective, the state is seen as providing only services of last resort, that is, services that can not be offered by the other sectors.

This conception of welfare society gained acceptance among both the political left, who were arguing for decentralized, responsive and localized services, and the political right, who sought both a justification for, and a way of circumventing the growth of welfare state expenditure.
THE WELFARE STATE CRISIS

The OECD in the preface to their report of the 1980 conference proceedings contended that it was the lower growth performance of the OECD economies since the 1970s that led to the disruption of the "continuing extension of programmes and the growth of benefits" and, consequently, to the crisis in the Welfare State (OECD, 1981:5). The economic frailties of the post-industrial Western World were highlighted in the oil crises of 1973 and 1979; in the growing deficit and trade imbalances which meant that these countries were buying more and exporting less; the rising unemployment which threatened the creation of the permanently unemployed, and high inflation rates which threatened fiscal security (Easton, 1980, 1989; OECD, 1981: Mishra, 1984; Kaufman, 1985). Robson (1976) argued that the difficulties Britain was facing with the Welfare State in the mid-1970s was a reflection of the absence of widespread popular support for the basic assumptions of the Welfare State. "Britain is trying to have a welfare state without a welfare society" (Robson, 1976:15). To Robson, the welfare state was based on the assumption of:

A devotion to the well-being of the whole society; it is as much concerned with maintaining or improving conditions for those who enjoy a good life style as with raising the standard of living of those who fall below an acceptable national minimum (Robson, 1976:175).

To Robson (1976), a welfare society embodied heartfelt notions of caring among all members of society and was a precondition of welfare state policies. (Note how the concept of a 'welfare society' has taken on quite contrary connotations).

Robson (1976) lamented the centralizing trend, the growth in the state bureaucracy and the increasing alienation of both the general public and the consumers from state provided social services. It was these ideological and economic factors that prompted Mishra to declare "the Welfare State throughout the industrialized West is in disarray" (Mishra: 1984:xiii). New Zealand, like other Western nations in the economic recessions of the 1970s, vigorously questioned the assumptions of Keynesian economics and whether the country could any longer afford the welfare state (Easton, 1980). Brodkin argues:

With the emergence of the welfare crises in the 1970's, there began a transition from a prevailing concern with poverty's
cause s and cures to an overriding concern with welfare costs and mismanagement (Brodkin, 1986:24).

The challenges to the Welfare State were not solely economic. Eisenstadt (1985) declared that the major if not the primary objective of the welfare state was the assumption that:

Each individual is entitled to a decent standard of living, to education, housing medical care and welfare services. . . [and that] through universal services would come elimination of poverty, the advancement of underprivileged groups and narrowing gaps in income, education and employment (Eisenstadt, 1985:2).

This view was challenged by Abel-Smith (1985), Kaufman (1985) and George and Wilding (1987) who contended that the objective of the Welfare State was much narrower: it was to establish a minimum level of rights and services. It was the expansion of this basic objective that gave rise to expectations among many groups in society for the constant improvement in and the extension of welfare services that, in turn, exacerbated the fiscal shortage during the economic stagnation of the last twenty years (Barclay Report, 1982). These rising expectations led to criticisms of the welfare state as failing to meet the ever expanding needs of society (Kaufman, 1985). As well, challenges to the provisions of the welfare state arose in the alleged efficiency gaps that distributed benefits to the middle and wealthy classes (Titmuss, 1974; Kaufman, 1985) and the secondary negative side effects of service provisions, e.g. encouraging dependency on the state services or benefits (OECD, 1981; Eisenstadt, 1985).

The concept of a welfare society was, on the other hand, associated with notions of welfare pluralism, decentralized systems responsive to local needs, community participation in service planning and provision, family responsibility and, particularly in New Zealand, the rights and ability of the indigenous peoples to 'take care of their own' (OECD, 1981; NZPC, 1981, 1982; Flora, 1985). One objective of the 1980 OECD Conference was to stimulate discussion on the emerging trend to reasserting the social roles of primary institutions, such as the family and the local community, as providers of social caring. The OECD discussions focused on providing commentary in answer to the question "Are we moving from a Welfare State to a Welfare Society?" (OECD, 1981). The Secretary General of the OECD argued in his opening address that the major changes occurring in Welfare State policies deserved acknowledgement and encouragement:
The emerging social needs and aspirations in contemporary post-industrial society [seek] new relationships between state and private action. . . new agents for welfare and well-being. . .[new emphasis on] the responsibilities of individuals for themselves and others. . . the emergence of the Welfare Society is both inevitable and desirable [italics added] (OECD, 1981:12).

The concept of a welfare society was seen to emphasize individual and familial responsibility rather than the collective responsibility implied in a welfare state, thus it was a better fit with the monetarist policies in Western societies and their efforts to curtail state welfare expenditure. A number of economists and politicians began to consider liberal economic philosophy and monetarist principles as providing a strategy for future development (Mohan, 1988; Easton, 1989). Political support for monetarist policies was evident in the landslide victory elections of Ronald Reagan (1981 and 1985) in the United States and in Margaret Thatcher's hold as Prime Minister in Britain since 1979.

Reagan and Thatcher. . . offer an export package of resurgent pro-capitalist economic policies shrouded under the ideological cloak of diehard conservatism that rejects the Keynesian foundation of the welfare state and espouses deregulation, privatization, tax reform and 'cash limit' financing. . . Both Reagan and Thatcher have attempted to transform society according to their ideological convictions and visions (Mohan, 1988:82).

In New Zealand, the reassessment of economic and social policy led to economic debate at the political level. The major issues of the 1984 election addressed the ways in which public expenditures might be curtailed, particularly how the escalating costs of the welfare state might be contained (Oliver, H., 1989). Dalziel (1989) contends that the adoption of liberal economic philosophy and a monetarist perspective by the New Zealand Treasury occurred in the early 1980's and was clearly evident in the briefing papers to the incoming Minister of Finance in 1984. Rogernomics, as a variant of 'monetarist macroeconomics and commercialist microeconomics' (Easton, 1989) was set into place after the Fourth Labour Government took office. It was the intention of Roger Douglas to apply Rogernomics to both the economic and social policy arenas. A crucial debate erupted over which of the two policy areas should be New Zealand's first consideration. The 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy argued that there can not be any separation of the two policy arenas. Roger Douglas, as the first Finance Minister
of the Fourth Labour Government was seen to agree "except he argues that economic policy drives social policy rather than the reverse" (Easton, 1989:182).

MODELS OF SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY

The Welfare State Model

The concept of a 'welfare state' with its emphasis on collective responsibility and the provision of a minimum level of benefit and services is contrasted with the concept of a 'welfare society' which places a heavier emphasis on individual and community responsibility and notions of welfare pluralism (Johnson, 1987). These concepts have strong parallels in the institutional and residual models of welfare as conceptualized by Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965). The welfare state and the welfare society perspectives on social services have direct implications for the model of social service delivery implemented. It is not to be assumed that during the period of welfare state dominance that aspects of a welfare society were not evident. On the contrary, individual examples of social services reflective of a welfare society can be noted, for example in dependence on the voluntary sector for specific programmes. (Specific examples in New Zealand will be referred to in Chapter Four.) Services reflecting welfare society characteristics grew in scope, number and influence as the shift from a welfare state towards a welfare society model of service delivery gained momentum in New Zealand.

In a welfare state model of social service delivery, the state plays the key role as both funder and provider. As Mohan (1988) points out, international comparisons between welfare states reveals wide variations in the application of the key role of the state as "State intervention in human affairs has always been a source of strain among conflicting ideologies and interests" (Mohan, 1988:40). Richard Titmuss was a vigorous proponent of the view that the state had the primary responsibility in the provision of social services as an expression of collectivism and in the interests of social justice (Reisman, 1977). Although Titmuss was not the architect of the British welfare state "he soon made himself its ideologue" (Reismann, 1977:1). Titmuss argued that the market place was unable to fulfil the ideals of social justice (Titmuss, 1974).

[Titmuss had] a profound mistrust of the market and [urged] use of the state to redistribute resources in favour of equality. The state, he argued, should play a strongly integrative role, in particular compensating for the adverse effects of social and economic change (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:1).
Titmuss supported the view that benefits and services should be universal, provided as of right and based on need not on an individual's ability to pay. He rejected a dual system of welfare based on means testing because he was convinced that a dual system would stigmatize recipients (Reisman, 1977) and because means testing would both deter people from applying for services and would operate to restrict demand (George and Wilding, 1987).

Reisman (1977) claimed that Titmuss had "a sincere faith in the efficacy of centralized decision making" and the state bureaucracy for the delivery of social services.

Titmuss believed that social policy is social action in accordance with widely held social values and had particular confidence in the sensitivity of politicians and administrators to the wish of the majority...[he] overestimated the accountability of politicians to public opinion and underestimated the extent to which they see themselves, once elected into office, as an independent estate in the 'land' (Reisman, 1977:38).

Titmuss argued that if services were to be available universally and without stigma, the state was essential. State provided social services recognized the failure of the market in the provision of services (Reisman, 1977:175). Titmuss supported the role of professionals in the provision of social services, describing professions as "repositories of a very special kind of knowledge" and with whom the state must negotiate a "proper relationship" to insure the future of quality social services (Titmuss, 1976:27).

While the state would be the primary funder and provider of social services, there is no indication in the writings of Titmuss that he rejected voluntary service provision. On the contrary, Titmuss acknowledged the role of the voluntary sector in providing specialist services and innovative responses to needs that the more cumbersome state funded services were less able to provide. For Titmuss, voluntary organizations had a 'vanguard' role in the identification of a response to unmet needs. Once the voluntary sector had developed a viable programme the state could take over provision. In this regard, Titmuss viewed the role of voluntary organizations as supplementary to, not a substitute for, state provided social services (Titmuss 1974, 1976). Indeed, Titmuss, and the Fabian socialists with whom he was associated, took the view that the development of extensive private services would increase inequality in service
provision, undermine altruism, weaken the public service, concentrate power in private hands and through direct and indirect methods, drain the public purse (George and Wilding 1987:90-91). It is this philosophy, exemplified in the work of Titmuss, that is the 'welfare state model of social service delivery' which dominated the pattern of service delivery in Britain and New Zealand from post World War II until the 1980s.

Given the secondary role relegated to the voluntary sector under the welfare state model, precisely establishing the contribution of the voluntary sector is problematic (Ostrander, Langton and Van Til, 1987). While there was a parallel contribution to social service provision by the voluntary sector in the 'welfare states' which developed after World War II, the contribution of the voluntary sector remains largely unresearched. This was because of the preoccupation with state provision and the lack of comprehensive documentation that could substantiate the contribution made by the voluntary sector despite the contribution of voluntary organisation research bodies (Ostrander, et al., 1987). This has been noted to be particularly true in New Zealand (Oliver, W., 1988; Tennant, 1989).

The Welfare Society Model

Alternatives to state dominated social service delivery models were offered by the 'anti-collectivists', exemplified by advocates such as F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman (George and Wilding, 1987) and by the welfare pluralists, such as Hadley, Hatch, and Mocroft (Johnson, 1987). The anti-collectivists:

See welfare state policies as threatening or damaging to central social values and institutions--the family, work incentives, economic development, individual freedom, for example -- and in general they are opposed to provision which is more than minimal (George and Wilding, 1987:35).

Other conceptualizations of a social service system not dominated by the state refer to 'mixed economy of welfare' (Gilbert and Specht, 1986:35) or to welfare pluralism (Johnson, 1985). Both conceptualizations refer to statutory, voluntary, profit-oriented and informal service providers involved at varying levels in the financing and delivery of benefits and services (Spicker, 1988; Johnson, 1987). The concept of a
mixed economy of welfare attempted to draw attention to existing providers other than the state. A mixed economy of welfare emphasizes not only the existence of other providers but their potential for further development and utilization. Welfare pluralism refers to the provision of social services from the four sectors: statutory, voluntary, commercial and informal but "implies a less dominant role of the state" (Johnson, 1987:55). Johnson (1987) contends that the lack of precision in definition of both the notion of a mixed economy of welfare and welfare pluralism hides its underlying 'anti-statist' philosophy:

Welfare pluralism, as presently propounded [sic], is anti-statist; it wishes to see a substantial shift in the balance of provision from the state to the other three sectors (Johnson, 1987:199)

Johnson (1987) describes welfare pluralism as basically anti-bureaucratic and anti-professional and reliant on notions of decentralization and participation. Because Johnson (1987) does not assess welfare pluralism as neutral, he fears that welfare pluralists and their models (for example Hadley and Hatch, 1981), "will serve to legitimate cuts in public expenditure and the development of market provision" to the detriment of comprehensive universal services (Johnson, 1987:200).

As welfare pluralists, Hadley and Hatch (1981) proposed recognition and support of the contribution of the four sectors in service provision (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). Within their model, pluralism and decentralization formed the two pronged strategy for "a reappraisal of the role of the state in social welfare" (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:vi).

It is important to note that Black, Bowl, Burns, Critcher, Grant and Stockford (1983) argued that in Britain throughout the 1970's, a high priority was placed on raising levels of social services provision and providing a minimum stock of statutory service provision. This contributed to an apparent disregard for the voluntary sector. These authors went on to suggest that:

This thrust seems to have permeated the very heart of social work practice ideology... [it] seemed rarely to take account of wider conceptions of welfare pluralism (Black, et al., 1983:206).
The analysis undertaken in Chapter Four aims to show that the criticisms of the welfare state model of social service delivery as outlined previously were reflected in New Zealand. Indeed, when Roger Hadley was invited to New Zealand in 1982 to discuss his ideas on the delivery of social services, he articulated an alternative model that addressed the perceived shortcomings and disadvantages of the centralized, bureaucratized welfare state model.

Hadley and Hatch had been closely associated with the voluntary social services in Britain: Roger Hadley as a Professor of Social Administration at the University of Lancaster, Stephen Hatch as a Senior Research Fellow in the Policy Studies Institute and Head of its Voluntary Organisations Research Unit. This association began in 1977 when Hadley and Hatch contributed to the Wolfenden Report on The Future of Voluntary Organisations (1977) in Britain. Hadley & Hatch argued that the Committee had not gone far enough in its critique of the way social policy had evolved since 1945 and subsequently called for a re-evaluation of the role of the state (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). Hadley and Hatch (1981) asserted that the state's dominance in provision of social services had resulted in poor performance in the highly centralized, bureaucratised, and heavily funded state services. They argued for a pluralist, decentralized and participatory pattern of services which would be more accessible and more responsive to local needs. Such a restructuring of services would implement the aspirations for community development and "the promotion of reciprocal relationships and mutual aid within the community" advocated in the 1968 Seebohm Report (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:45). Hadley and Hatch asserted that the recommendations of the Seebohm Report went unheeded because they were stifled by the centralization and bureaucratization of local authority departments.

What seems to be needed now is a pluralist strategy which looks beyond the conflict over the commercial sector and seeks to develop roles for each of the sectors and, in particular, to maximize the voluntary and informal contributions (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:101).

Such a strategy would require an alternative to the prevailing system of social service organization which Hadley and Hatch (1981) describe as a representative form of government. In such a form of government, the elected minister is seen as responsible for the design and implementation of social services through civil servants advised by professional 'experts.' The client is assumed to have a largely passive role, and is expected to accept the services provided.
Representative systems of government in which all power is vested in the elected members of parliament or local authority logically exclude the right of the citizen to participate directly in the management and delivery of public services. . . [social services] are designed to carry out policies determined by [the Minister]. . . Administration and professionals are. . . servants of the representative assembly (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:29, 146-147).

In Hadley and Hatch's participatory model of democracy, the general directions of social policy would still be determined by the elected members of government but:

The ways in which the policies are developed and applied are open to discussion and amendment by both social services staff and clients, for their involvement is regarded as indispensable if available resources are to be maximized and variations in need/demand are to be recognized (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:147).

Instead of bureaucratized social service organizations offering predetermined services to well-defined targeted groups, a participatory model of democracy would result in social service agencies with much wider terms of reference that would, in turn, encourage a co-operative and entrepreneurial approach. Such an approach, Hadley & Hatch (1981) asserted, would confine professional authority to areas where their expertise is a legitimate claim while affording opportunity for others (e.g., families, neighbourhood groups and volunteers) to participate in a meaningful way in the provision of formal and informal caring. The state would continue to play a central role in policy development, program monitoring and evaluation but would share service delivery with other sectors.

The model proposed by Hadley and Hatch (1981) retains the role of the state as central in funding, planning and evaluation but emphasizes provision of services in the voluntary, private and informal care systems. Table 1 sets out a comparison of selected aspects of the social service organizational characteristics of the bureaucratic and participatory systems (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). Broadly speaking, the bureaucratic system approximates the principles and characteristics of the welfare state model discussed previously whereas, the participatory system approximates the features of a welfare society model for the delivery of social services.
### Table I

**Characteristics of social services organisation in bureaucratic and participatory systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Bureaucratic</th>
<th>Participatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Function of system</td>
<td>Delivery of predetermined service to clearly defined client groups</td>
<td>Facilitation of best feasible service in collaboration with staff, clients and the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main source(s) of authority</td>
<td>The organisation; training - expertise of individual staff</td>
<td>The organisation; the expertise of the team; negotiated relationships with the users/ community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical, large units</td>
<td>Flat organisations, small units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of decision-making</td>
<td>By individual, pressure to pass up the hierarchy</td>
<td>By team, pressures to push down to front line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of worker/staff</td>
<td>Clearly defined and bounded</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of ancillary, volunteers</td>
<td>Segregated</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of client/user</td>
<td>Expected to be passive</td>
<td>Encouraged to be active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of relationships between staff and user</td>
<td>Strives to be neutral, disinterested</td>
<td>Strives to be empathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting work out to non-statutory agencies, volunteers, etc.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation in management of the organisation from within the agency</td>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal indicators of performance</td>
<td>Input indicators (e.g. buildings, hospital beds, meals delivered)</td>
<td>Output indicators - user satisfaction, as defined by user</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Upwards, to chief officer and representative body</td>
<td>Two-way: upwards (as representative); down-wards - to users and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of professionalism</td>
<td>Mastery of body of knowledge; application to individual cases</td>
<td>Expert knowledge plus capacity to recognise/work with 'non-expert' in team, etc., to maximise effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adapted from Roger Hadley and Stephen Hatch, 1981
According to Hadley and Hatch, three strategic changes are required if their approach to service delivery is to be implemented. First, strategy must be developed for creating rights that give individuals and community groups the power to take initiative in the development of service delivery programmes. To ensure a degree of success, these initiatives must be supported by resources, staff, finances and information from the state welfare bureaucracies. Second, and parallel to the development of the right to take initiatives outside statutory organizations, must be the recognition of the right of clients, whom Hadley and Hatch refer to as 'users', to have voice in the management of the statutory services themselves. Not only do they advocate the participation of users in decision making of statutory organizations, but they propose that participatory mechanisms must also be introduced for staff.

The creation of rights for users should be matched with opportunities for staff of the social services to share in the management of their organisation (Hadley and Hatch, 1981:163-164).

The issue of staff participation was addressed by George and Wilding (1987) who noted that experiments in participation in social services have shown that participation is costly, problematic in its implementation and leads to systemic organizational and personnel issues.

For example, if users of services are to participate in their organisation and management, this raises very sharply the question of staff participation, which in turn raises questions about traditional patterns of authority in bureaucratic organisations (George and Wilding, 1987:144).

The third essential change recommended by Hadley & Hatch (1981) was directed at the infrastructure of service delivery and required the extensive decentralization of social services with local control. Such decentralization was based on geographical 'patches' with relatively small population groupings of 5 - 10,000 people. The patch system was designed to maximize organizational responsiveness and support of informal care systems (Hadley and Hatch, 1981).

The model proposed by Hadley and Hatch addressed the criticisms of the welfare state from both the political right and the political left (Easton, 1980; OECD, 1981; Mishra, 1984; George and Wilding, 1987). Indeed, features of this alternative model paralleled the key elements of a welfare society model of social service delivery.
Moreover, it is a model which appears to exemplify the four principles of the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare in New Zealand as conceptualized in this thesis.

The first structural feature Hadley and Hatch delineated involved plural provision of social services by voluntary, private, for-profit agencies, groups and individuals. Such an approach is the antithesis of the welfare state model with its state funded and provided centralized services. According to this feature, predetermined centrally mandated services are replaced with community initiatives focusing on local services for local needs. Plural provision also implies a redressing of the alleged imbalance in the statutory-voluntary service provision and in so doing explicitly acknowledges the role of non-statutory service providers in the planning and delivery of social services.

The decentralization and community orientation of statutory services is the second feature of the Hadley and Hatch model (1981). These two interrelated features were intended to create responsive, integrated services predicated on a high degree of community input in both the planning and delivery of services. Such input is only possible, Hadley and Hatch argue, in decentralized structures. When essential services are provided by the state (one has to assume Hadley and Hatch are referring to child protective services), the predominant mode would be a community-oriented system characterized by a policy of reinforcement as opposed to replacement of informal sources of care. That is statutory services provide support, referral and tangible services (e.g., finances, equipment, professional expertise) to supplement, not substitute for, community-based voluntary or informal care.

The third structural feature entailed contractual accountability to replace hierarchical accountability through the funding and contracting out of services to the voluntary sector. Accountability would be achieved through the use of negotiated contracts requiring explicit evaluation criteria. This contractual accountability would replace the hierarchical accountability that, Hadley and Hatch claimed, led to the gross inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the welfare state models of social service delivery. A significant consequence of this new system of accountability was predicted to be an increased role for statutory agencies in monitoring and inspection.
The last feature the Hadley and Hatch model emphasized was the creation, development and support of participatory mechanisms designed to involve users and all providers in planning, decision-making and evaluation of statutory services to ensure their responsiveness and effectiveness in meeting social needs.

Critics of Hadley and Hatch (Graycar, 1985; Pinker, 1984; Johnson, 1987) attacked their reliance on informal helping systems. Feminists contended this reliance would further prohibit women from taking their place in the economic life of society (Graycar, 1983) and would contribute to the “redomestication of women” (George and Wilding, 1987:144). Other critics contended that Hadley and Hatch's model used the liberal values of participation and community in an attempt to make the dismantling of the welfare state palatable to social work (Pinker, 1983). And more damaging, it offered a model that could be utilized by monetarists to further reduce the role of the state in providing care for its people (Johnson, 1987).

[Community oriented models] can also be seen as a cheap alternative, a means by which families can provide at little or no cost to the state, services otherwise financed by taxpayers (Graycar, 1983:383).

Pinker (1984) also questioned how the revised responsibilities of central government for funding and monitoring could be reconciled with "increased delegation of power to local authorities and increased devolution to the neighbourhoods" (Pinker, 1984:92). Rowe (1982) questioned how community social work models addressed the issues of continuity of care during "those many periods when the enthusiasm or skills of its supporters ebb away or prove inadequate" (Rowe, 1982:556). Others attacked what they termed as 'gross generalities' of the model. For example:

One of the major dilemmas that confronts the 'patch' protagonists is that the participatory experiments have emerged from the self same 'inflexible' bureaucracies which they condemn (Billis, 1984:53).

Other critics focused on the assumption of a caring community of informal systems that would be both willing and able to assume more responsibility for caring. They pointed out that formal services were created because informal care systems were not operating or were non-existent (Graycar, 1983). The realities of contemporary urban life and the prevailing patterns of family living suggest that systems of family support are
neither as universal nor as extensive as the proponents of the welfare pluralism such as Hadley and Hatch would have us believe (Pinker, 1982, 1984).

A revitalization of community spirit and consequent care for the disadvantaged via informal caring networks seems an unlikely occurrence in a society whose economics emphasize individualism and competitiveness; whose politics emphasize duality and conflict; whose history shows division; and whose society provides little evidence of the ability to mobilize beyond particular campaigns or single self-interested issues (Small, 1984:155).

Commentary on the model proposed by Hadley and Hatch soon became intertwined with critiques of the Barclay Report with which Hadley served as a Working Party Member (1982). The Barclay Report's recommendations for a decentralized, localized and a community oriented social work that seeks to "tap into, support, enable and underpin the local networks of formal and informal relationships" (Barclay Report, 1982: xvii) reflected the principles of the patch approach which Hadley and Hatch advocated. These ideas were encapsulated in Barclay Report's call for "community social work" (Barclay Report, 1982:198-218)

Hadley responded to criticism of the participatory approach to social service delivery in his co-authored report of a large scale study of community-centred teams (Hadley and McGrath, 1984). Hadley contended that the approach was not compatible with the proposals of the political right to dismantle the welfare state and shift service provision to voluntary organizations and the market place.

On the contrary, the community-centred approach is built on the assumption of the continuation of large-scale investment by local and central government in the welfare services. . . Nor is the practitioner of community-centred methods likely to accept the view that his [sic] approach is bound to reinforce the traditional role of women as carers. . . [the] principle concern [is] to optimise the use of resources in a manner which is more equitable than the existing system (Hadley and McGrath, 1984:15-17).

Hadley argued that the approach maximized the use of local resources by emphasizing a team approach that extended beyond the statutory agency's door. The cooperative, collaborative principle of the community-centred approach or patch system, was reflected in the three central organizational features: localization; integration of
services within the team and integration within the 'patch' to ensure continuity of care. Emphasis is placed on the:

Development of methods and roles which reflect the stress laid on working with the local community and understanding the problems of the area (Hadley and Hatch, 1984:252).

Workers were expected to work closely with voluntary and informal helping systems with the aim of strengthening, not usurping, those systems. Hadley, Dale and Sills (1984) provides a detailed evaluation of the implementation of the patch system in practice.

As previously noted the four structural features of the community-centred approach advocated by Hadley and Hatch (1981) bear striking similarity to the to the four principles of the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare analysed in the present research: regionalization, decentralization, devolution and partnership with the community. The essential point is then that the Hadley and Hatch model appears to have provided the rationale for the changes proposed in the social service delivery system that were initiated under the Fourth Labour Government.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

The complexity of organizations as a phenomena is reflected in the proliferation of theories, models and approaches to organizational analysis (Perrow, 1973; Sarri and Hasenfeld, 1978; Smith, 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Weiner, 1982; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Robbins, 1983; Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984). Early organizational analysis focused on the features, characteristics and interrelationships internal to the organization and assumed the organization could be understood as a self-contained entity (Handy, 1978; Weiner, 1982). Later theoretical developments in organizational analysis followed two traditions. The British organizational analysts concentrated on organizational structure and processes while their American counterparts were more interested in the affect of informal and workgroup relationships on productivity (Weiner, 1982; Reed, 1985). Organization analysts of the 1960s and 1970s applied an open-systems approach that demanded organizations be viewed through their interrelationships with their 'environment' (Morgan, 1986). Environment was defined generally as the complex of exchanges an organization has.
with those outside their organization for the acquisition of raw materials, for the sanction or license to operate, and for distribution of their outputs or products in both competing and complementary relationships (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1978; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Pearce and Robinson, 1989). Contemporary organizational analysts (Meyer and Scott, 1983; Lincoln, 1985) have extended the concept of environment to include a consideration of the broad societal context in an attempt to show a relationship between the macro-environmental and characteristics of the organization (Scott, 1983a). It is such a perspective that is utilized in this thesis through the consideration of the macro-environmental shift from a welfare state toward a welfare society.

Contemporary models for incorporating the multiple perspectives of organizational analysis draw on the broad systems approach tradition of organizational analysis and the development of the contingency theory of organizations which attempt "to specify the appropriate functional 'fit' between environmental settings and the internal organizational structures" they require (Reed, 1985:100). The Pearce and Robinson (1989) model is one such example. Using a management perspective, Pearce and Robinson (1989) argue for planned 'fit' between the strategy of an organization, its design and desired performance. Strategy is defined as the desired objectives or outcomes of the organization. The design of an organization is conceptualized as the interrelationship between five key elements: structure, decision and reward systems, tasks, people and informal organization and culture (Pearce & Robinson, 1989). It is these five key factors which are of paramount importance in shaping the organization's design. The essential point (Pearce and Robinson, 1989) is that an optimal 'fit' is essential for maximum performance. In addition, Pearce and Robinson postulate that not only are all of the elements interrelated but also "it is important that a match be achieved between each pair of elements" (Pearce and Robinson, 1989:346). Structural alternatives in shaping organizations are contingent on the organizational environment, the technology utilized by the organization and the size of the organization. Pearce and Robinson (1989) postulate that organizational design is dynamic, i.e., for optimal 'fit' organizational designs must change over time. As well, distinct organizational designs may be required in different parts of the organization. Their schema is shown in Figure Two.
Figure Two: Key Considerations In Organizational Design

Organisational Strategy

The changes from a welfare state toward a welfare society (strategy), from a centralized bureaucracy to a decentralized organization (design), from professional social work services to a pluralist system of providers (performance), can be explored using the Pearce and Robinson model (1989). As the discussion of the models of service delivery demonstrated, each model is associated with specific organizational arrangements designed to facilitate its implementation. The welfare state model was associated with a centralized state bureaucracy. Statutory and non-statutory providers were in a unequal balance of state domination in service provision with a reliance on 'expert' professional workers. Pearce and Robinson (1989) postulate that "organizational design must be consistent with strategy" (Pearce and Robinson, 1989:341). A strategy of centralized, standardized services based on the principles of equality and universality demands an organizational design exemplified by centralized decision making systems, formalized and standarized task expectations, professional staff and an organizational culture characterized by deference to bureaucratic authority and a service ethic for optimum fit.

Likewise, if the strategy is for a decentralized, locally responsive, flexible organization, Pearce and Robinson (1989) would argue that the elements of organizational design must reflect the principles of the strategy to support maximum performance. Hence, since the welfare society model is associated with decentralized systems, pluralism of providers and participation of the community in decision making and service provision, the elements of the organizational design must offer support to this 'strategy' to ensure maximum performance. Therefore, a decentralized structure, is indicated with delegated decision making, participatory systems, complexity in staff composition (i.e. staff with wide variations in training, expertise and professional affiliation), and an organizational culture and reward system that encourages personal initiative and creativity. The model acknowledges that the establishment of an organizational design to support a particular strategy is seldom an exclusively rational, planned activity; an acknowledgement with which the proponents of the naturalist paradigm would concur. Pearce and Robinson (1989) contend that changes in organizational design may occur either through an evolutionary process that takes place in a political, economic, cultural and social environment over time or a radical response to crisis in the organization's internal or external environment.

Four elements of the Peace and Robinson model (1989) are specifically addressed in this thesis. The first is organizational structure: the formal patterns of authority,
task responsibility and coordinating relationships. The second is decision-making systems conceptualized in the present research as the dilemmas of centralization/decentralization and management style. Participation is addressed as an aspect of both structure and the decision-making system and is given more emphasis and a wider conceptualization in this thesis than in Pearce and Robinson (1989). Pearce and Robinson, however, do point out that design elements are "interrelated [their relationship] should emphasize consistency and reinforcement" (Pearce and Robinson, 1989:344). The concept of participation, as already indicated, may refer to a plurality of service providers or to systems of involvement by clients, the wider community and/or staff in planning, decision making and monitoring of services. Participation is dependent on the styles of management in an organization and on the decision making systems established as part of the organization (Litwak, 1978).

The third and fourth elements of the model, 'tasks' and 'people', are considered in the discussion of the tasks of social work within the Department and the desired level of professionalism. The fit between these two elements and performance reflects the dynamic interrelationship conveyed in the model.

The next section will address organizational structure and decision making systems through an exploration of structure, the centralization/decentralization dilemma, management style and participation. Then the discussion will proceed to explore the relationship between performance and social work task and professionalism.

**Structure**

The structure of organizational patterns of authority, task responsibilities and coordinating relationships is most often depicted in an organizational chart. The chart denotes formal power centres in the organization, the status of the various positions and the title designations of each position. The organizational structural chart is often the first consideration in analysing an organization because it provides a wealth of information about the organization at a glance (Smith, 1979) and because it is "a major manifestation of the organization's design" (Pearce and Robinson, 1989:345). Of the various conceptualizations of organizational structure (Smith, 1979; Robbins, 1983; Pearce and Robinson, 1989), two types are outlined here. They have specific relevance
for understanding New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare: the functional structure and the divisional structure.

An organization with a functional structure groups similar tasks or activities as separate units within the organization (Robbins, 1983; Pearce and Robinson, 1989). This type of structure permits the development of specialized expertise. Functional structures are prevalent in many of the welfare services such as schools (primary, elementary, secondary), hospitals (coronary care, paediatrics, rehabilitation) and social services (child protection, services to the elderly, family services). The functional structure, while delegating operational, day to day decision making to the units, nevertheless retains centralized policy making in the chief executive manager or in the management group (Robbins, 1983). Functional structures can, however, promote narrow specialization, rivalry and conflict between the functions for clients and resources, and create problems of coordination and integration across the functional divisions (Pearce and Robinson, 1989).

A divisional structure can be a preferred pattern when the organizational strategy is to provide distinct services to a particular locale or when the organization serves a large geographical area. The divisional structure provides the organization with several distinct sub-units with considerable autonomy. This structural type allows for rapid and differentiated response to local environmental demands, focuses accountability and retains a degree of functional specialization. Because the divisions are semi-autonomous and can be made clearly accountable for expenditure and performance; however, competition, rivalry and dysfunctional jealousies can develop between divisions. Also, because each division must obtain selected resources from central office and accept central management costs (e.g., research and development), the negotiation processes can become inefficient and acrimonious. Most importantly semi-autonomous divisions may lead to policy inconsistencies (Pearce and Robinson, 1989) which are particularly problematic for social service organizations.

Centralization and Decentralization

In common with other authors, Pearce and Robinson (1989) postulate that decision making systems must reflect the goals, tasks, staff, and culture of the organization (Litwak, 1978; Smith, 1979; Pearce and Robinson, 1989). Hence, if the organization
aims at accomplishing large scale tasks of a relatively uniform nature, then this should be reflected in the organization's design. Weber saw the centralized decision making characteristics of bureaucracy as ideally suited to the completion of large scale tasks with an assurance of equality of outcome and stability over time (Weiner, 1982). The growth of welfare services following World War II was characterized by the growth of welfare bureaucracies, as the organizational form of choice (Billis, 1984; Howe, 1986). The bureaucratic organizational form became prevalent in twentieth century industrialization because:

Bureaucracy, as a form of organization, enabled enterprises to transcend the limits of direct, extensive and formal control in commerce and business either by paternalistic owners, or, in governance more specifically political, the role of traditional or charismatic persons (Weiner, 1982:76).

With the growth of welfare services and the legislation enacted to provide universal, integrated and comprehensive services (Seebohm Report [Britain], 1968; Social Welfare Act [New Zealand], 1971) centralized bureaucracies grew as the organizational form best suited to accomplish large scale tasks in a spirit of equality and impartiality (Smith, 1979: Billis, 1984; Howe, 1986).

One of the key characteristics of bureaucracy is its centralization of power and authority. Centralization refers to the "distribution of power among the actors in a social system" (Hollingsworth and Hanneman 1984:17-18) and involves four separate but related issues: who participates in the decision making process, how widespread is the participation, at what level in the system are the decision makers and how concentrated is the distribution of authority to make decisions (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984). In social service organizations, decentralization, the distribution of authority to the lowest level required for accountability, is argued to be imperative to ensure responsive service delivery.

Decentralized units would be far more likely to develop routines consistent with responsive and efficient client treatment, than authorities removed from the scene, particularly if outside audits are continually able to draw attention to issues of service quality (Lipsky, 1980:207).

Wineman (1984) offered additional support for decentralized social service systems by postulating that centralization, with its tendency to homogenize and to produce mass
culture, was "unresponsive to local indigenous cultures and community life" (Wineman, 1984:3) in comparison to more decentralized systems.

A high degree of decentralization, however, can weaken commitment to organizational goals as the decentralized units emphasize their sub-unit goals. If the sub-units are expected by the organization to be responsive to the needs of their local clientele, the sub-units are subject to the demands of strong interest groups or influential individuals to the detriment of other legitimate groups. Personnel in sub-units can become so specialized that their contribution to the parent organization becomes limited (Pearce and Robinson, 1989). In the delivery of social services, decentralization gains in responsiveness to local needs what it loses in universality and standardization of services (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984).

When delegation occurs in organizations this tends to increase the amount of training in specialized competencies. Also delegation increases the difference between organizational goals and achievement and thereby allows for more delegation. . . . [This] can lead to increased conflict among the sub-units of the organization so that the content of decisions depends upon internal strategy. Even greater differences arise then between the goals of the organization and achievement so that there is further delegation (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:188).

An important task of organizational managers in social service agencies is to achieve the best balance between centralized and decentralized features to meet the changing goals of the organization (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984; Pearce and Robinson, 1989). Managers of public welfare organizations are cognizant of the conflicting goals of equality and equity and notions of responsiveness to special group or individual needs. Hollingsworth and Hanneman (1984) in their international study postulated that:

Centralization has strong effects on distributional equality. More centralized systems . . . tend to generate more equal outcomes than less centralized structures. . . [because] centralized systems tend to treat social groups in a standardized manner for reasons of administrative 'rationality' and 'efficiency'. . . [they] tend to distribute resources across regions more equitably than decentralized systems. . . [they] have a far greater capacity to redistribute resources than less centralized ones. . . . This 'relative autonomy' gives centralized systems a capacity to distribute resources and rewards according to policy preference, rather than in response to 'market' pressures (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984:5).
Hollingsworth and Hanneman (1984) contend that with a high degree of centralization both increased bureaucratization and professionalism occur. As a consequence of these two processes, Hollingsworth and Hanneman observed a decline of broad participation in the governing process, a view which is consistent with Hadley & Hatch’s assertions (1981) regarding participation in representative systems discussed earlier. In centralized and bureaucratized systems, highly specialized and influential interest groups, e.g., professional associations and specialist experts are the participants in the governing process, rather than clients or the community.

**Management Style**

Decision making systems and participation are linked through the exercise of management style. This can be defined as the way in which managers spend their time, what they do and how they go about doing it (Waterman, Peters and Phillips, 1980). Scientific Management Theory placed decision making in the hands of the designated managers. Clegg and Dunkerly (1980) argued the rationality of bureaucracy was embodied in Scientific Management Theory because:

> This system was the apotheosis of the modern system of capitalism. . . the bearer of the underlying and defining spirit (geist) of modernity: rational organization (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980:81).

Scientific Management Theory, as developed by Taylor early in the 20th century, emphasized the division of labour, work measurement, individualized work, the development of management thinking, managerial control of the work process and the separation of manual and non-manual labour. It was a theory of management well suited to the bureaucratic form of organization. Scientific Management Theory also emphasized the role of the manager as distinct from the worker. It was the manager's responsibility to discover the 'one best way' to accomplish a task to maximize work efficiency. The theoretical development of Scientific Management and related theories was guided by the view of people as an economic one, motivated primarily by economic incentives. The role of management was seen as concerned with efficiency and motivating the worker through monetary reward and coercive power.
The Administrative Management School, as a splinter school of Scientific Management, further developed the conceptualizations of the functions of the executive (referred to in the acronym POSDCORB) and designated three types of personnel in organizations: line, staff and support. 'Line personnel' are employees with the authority and responsibility to carry out the main objective of the organization. Staff personnel advise, counsel and provide technical expertise to line personnel and top executives. Support staff provide the housekeeping or auxiliary service required by the organization (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1978; Weiner, 1982). The distinction between 'line' and 'staff' positions was to be problematic in the new administrative structure in the Department of Social Welfare which established the Regional Offices and their Executive Officers as staff positions (DSW, 1986).

An opposing view of the role of management, although little heeded until after the period of the classical theory development (1900s-1920s), was promulgated by the Human Relations Movement whose emphasis:

Shifted from the formal structure to the informal patterns of behavior caused by the physical and social conditions surrounding the participants in the work situation (Weiner, 1982:45).

The Human Relations Movement drew attention to the organization as a social entity comprised of individuals with their own needs and desires, of individuals as members of informal groups, and as individuals as members of groups with intergroup relationships. Human Relations Theory postulated that management styles and leadership patterns must be conceptualized so as to include democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, styles of management. In particular, Human Relations Theory, emphasized the importance of employee participation in work planning and design within an effective communication/feedback system. These two major schools of management which provide the base source material for contemporary theories of management, were heavily debated within the Department of Social Welfare, particularly following the release of the Report of the Administrative Review Committee (1987) which recommended the Department move from an 'administrative' to a 'participatory' style of management (See Chapter Five for explanation of these terms as used by the Department).
Hollingsworth and Hanneman (1984) argued that centralization and participation should be conceptualized as distinct and independent approaches to the study of power in organizations. They contend that although centralized systems may limit direct participation of individuals outside the organization in decision making, they do not necessarily limit the influence and pressure that groups are able to bring to bear on decision makers. They argue that participation in decentralized systems may not be what it seems because of the four elements they delineated: who participates in the decision making process, how widespread is the participation, at what level in the system are the decision makers and how concentrated is the distribution of authority to make decisions. The answer to each element must be thoroughly considered before the degree of participation in decision making by individuals both inside and outside the organization can be evaluated.

Thus, once higher levels of decision making exist in a delivery system, the capacity of groups to participate effectively in the decision-making process is inversely proportional to system size, the degree of social heterogeneity in the society, and the degree of technological complexity in the system (Hollingsworth and Hanneman, 1984:100).

Decentralization can then effectively decrease participation in decision making as the level of participation increases. This occurs when the scope of the decision is narrowed (e.g., for only a small spatial segment of the society at the local level), or when the parameters of the decision are so limited as to render the degree of choice minimal.

Barber (1984) argues that one fundamental characteristic of strong democracy is broad participation. Democracy is:

Politics in the participatory mode: literally, it is self government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens. . . Self government is carried on through institutions designed to facilitate on-going civic participation in agenda-setting, deliberation, legislation and policy implementation (Barber, 1984:151).

This offers a possible explanation for the unprecedented growth of participatory mechanisms created in New Zealand (discussed in Chapter Four) and pledged as part of
the platform for the Labour Party Campaign in 1984. This followed years of strong leadership by the National Party Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon and the dominance of expert opinion exemplified in the passage of the National Development Bill (Shirley, 1982). This Act effectively curtailed public participation and increased the power of the executive in decision making in the planning process for works of national importance while relegating the judiciary to an advisory role (Shirley, 1982).

Another perspective on participation is offered by Gilbert and Specht (1986). They contend that participation, leadership and expertise compete for governance in the management of community affairs. Gilbert and Specht (1986) argue that the essential relationship between participation, leadership and expertise is competition; this is because the ascendancy of one of the three is inversely related to the other two. Deference to strong leaders or professional 'experts' will over time lead to a sense of alienation from government and social agencies followed by demands for greater participation. A high degree of participation over a period of time will lead to the identification of a leader or a growing reliance on experts particularly if the issues being dealt with are perceived to be 'technical' or 'intractable'.

Participation becomes the primary value in community governance when leadership or expertise are perceived to be unresponsive to those being led or served (Gilbert and Specht, 1986: 213).

The resistance to the decentralization of services and participation by clients, client groups and the wider community has been based in part on the deference given to expert professional social service workers in planning for the provision of services. It is also based on the assumption that standards and universality of service are inherent in centralized social services.

The assumption behind post-war welfare policy has been that uniform models of administration will produce equitable access to services. There has been an inherent resistance to any great decentralization or diversity in administering state benefits and services (Black, et al., 1983:5).

Bamford (1982) reflects this resistance to decentralization in his work on social service management by arguing for the retention of centralized planning and policy making in the name of equality and accessibility (Bamford, 1982). In the Hadley and Hatch Participatory Model of Social Service Delivery (1981), the client is seen having
an active role in the social service delivery system as a recipient, planner and provider. The role of the professional as 'expert' is limited to the professionals' immediate area of expertise. The professional is seen as part, but only one part, of the team.

Hadley and Hatch (1981) argue for participation in decision-making for staff (See the discussion of the Hadley Hatch model earlier in this chapter). For Hadley and Hatch (1981) it is only through participatory mechanisms that creative, innovative, effective and efficient service delivery can be assured. However, staff participation within organizations can have multiple meanings:

To the workers, it may suggest increased autonomy, more control over resources and greater collaboration with peers in designing work activities. To the manager, participation may mean nothing more than consultation on matters of minor importance, or from the workers perspective, co-optation and tokenism (Weatherley, 1983:45-46).

Weatherley (1983) places responsibility on the manager to clarify the meaning and exercise of participation with staff to avoid worker dissatisfaction and the lowering morale.

These issues of the organizational design will be discussed in the New Zealand context in Chapter Four. The final section of the present chapter examines the two issues of social work practice addressed in the analytical framework and conceptualized in the Pearce & Robinson Model as interrelated to organizational performance: social work professionalism and the social work task.

**SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE**

This thesis argues that it is social workers as the identified occupational group within the social service system who are charged with the responsibility of implementing the models of social service delivery. This is not to diminish their role in formulating and implementing models of social service delivery but, to emphasize that social service delivery is accomplished primarily through the efforts of social workers at the front line and subsequently through the efforts of other human service or social service personnel. The nature of the relationship between professional social workers
and their employing agency has consistently been an issue in the social work literature (e.g., Smalley, 1967; Bailey and Brake, 1975; Specht and Vickery, 1977; Finch, 1976; Black, et al., 1983; Howe, 1986).

From this extensive literature, two aspects of the nature of the relationship between social workers and their employing organizations were deemed to be central to the present analysis: the professionalisation of social work and the definition of the social work task. This latter issue is concerned with the balance of social work activity devoted to individualized casework interventions (considered as primarily ameliorative or remedial) and those activities devoted to community work, community development and social action (considered as primarily preventative). A review of social work literature revealed ongoing, and frequently acrimonious, debates about the professionalization of social work, on 'the purpose of social work' and the predominence of casework or community work as the focus of social work practice (e.g., Timms and Timms, 1977; Webb, 1981; Barclay Report, 1982). In these debates, radical social work theorists were prompted to contend that social work had become 'an arm of the state' (Galper, 1980). The following discussion will examine these two issues.

Professionalization of Social Work

The terms profession, professional, and professionalization have multiple and indistinct meanings. Profession refers to an occupational group and professional to either an individual in that occupational group or work performed competently, to at least a minimum standard (Jones, 1978). Professionalization may be viewed as the process through which an occupation acquires the traits associated with the status of a profession or "the socialisation process by which individuals are drawn into the institutional context of a particular occupation" (Jones, et. al, 1978:61).

Initially academic debate concerned itself with establishing the meaning of the term 'profession' and attempts to delineate the traits or characteristics of a profession in order to determine whether or not a given occupation could be rightly described as a profession (Johnson, 1972; Jones, 1978; Wilding, 1982). Such endeavours led to a confusing array of lists, claims and counterclaims about the validity of the claim to professional status. The trait approach assumed that professional work could be
deemed substantially different from other work; that an archetypal or ideal type exists; and that the status of traits can be clarified. However, no empirical work could substantiate the assumptions (Wilding, 1982).

The trait model of professionalism and its application to social work can be traced to a 1915 conference paper by Flexner who contended that social work was not a profession (Wilding, 1982). Fifty years later, Ernest Greenwood (1965 in Mohan, 1988) argued on the basis of the five distinguishing attributes of a profession that he assembled (systematic theory, community sanction, authority, an ethical code and a professional culture) that social work had acquired professional standing in society. But, he warned:

The attainment of professional prestige, authority and monopoly by social workers will undoubtedly carry disturbing implications for the social action and social reform components of social work philosophy (Greenwood, 1965:54-55 in Mohan, 1988:65).

Greenwood recognized that the professionalization of social work through the acquisition of those traits associated with professions, would have secondary effects on the pursuit of social work's dual commitment to individual and social change.

Wilding (1982) argues that the trait approach fails to consider the "the essential reality of professionalism-privilege and power" (Wilding, 1982:5). It is this reality that lies at the heart of the critical perspective of professions.

The critical perspective on professions, exemplified by theorists such as Friedson (1970), Johnson (1972), and Wilding (1982) addressed the questions of why an occupational group aspires to achieve professional recognition, why a particular occupation group gains or is granted special privileges by the state and what effect that recognition has on the relationships of the occupational group with recipients of services, with society and with other professions. The authority granted to professions by the state enable the more powerful professions to establish institutionalized forms of control over both their members and their clients. Professions represent to Friedson (1970) the winners in a societal conflict struggle for power and control. He argues that professions by virtue of their expertise can seek to gain control of their own terms of work, entry into the profession, regulation of their members and sole evaluation of their performance (Friedson, 1970).
Johnson (1972) proposed a typology for the critical analysis of professions based on the power and control dynamic between the producer and the consumer. The first type of producer-consumer relationship rests on collegiate control and is most similar to what is termed 'traditional' professionalism. In this relationship it is the producer, who along with the professional association, who defines the needs of the consumer and the manner in which these needs are met. The consumer is viewed as passive and considered to be virtually ignorant of the service provided.

Under patronage, it is the consumers who define their needs and the manner in which they are to be met. The consumer is seen as holding the power and control over the type of service to be provided and under what conditions the provision will take place. The producer provides the service or product directly to the consumer. The consumer can be a community or a corporation. In the third type of producer-consumer relationship, a third party mediates the relationship between the producer and the consumer, often assuming wide powers in defining needs and the manner in which they can be and are to be met. Johnson (1972) argues state mediation in the social services has led to the establishment of universal benefits and services regardless of means.

The effect of state mediation has been to extend services to consumers who are defined on the basis of 'citizenship' rather than social origin or the ability to pay fees (Johnson, 1972:77).

Johnson (1972) acknowledged that it was possible for the mediated relationship to acquire the characteristics described in a patronage or in a 'traditional' professional relationships. Such an acknowledgement he argued, demonstrates the dynamic quality of power and control relationships. He argued that within social work, the power relationship existing between practitioner and client:

May be such... as to enable the practitioner to increase social distance and his [sic] own autonomy and control over practice by engaging in a process of 'mystification' (Johnson, 1972:42).

Johnson's typology offers a method of analyzing changes in the professional relationship between social workers as 'producers' and their clients as 'consumers' in the two models of social service delivery discussed here. In the welfare state model, the centralized bureaucracies fostered the growth of social work professionalism through its reliance on experts and by encouraging a more traditional professional relationship
between social workers and their clients. Conversely, the welfare society model emphasizes (a) negotiated relationships between the social worker and the clients, (b) participation in service planning and (c) client evaluation and monitoring of services. Characteristics of this relationship between social workers and their clients in the welfare society model approaches the patronage type of relationship Johnson (1972) delineated.

Wilding extends the power and control arguments of Friedson (1970) and Johnson (1972) by contending that a state does not permit the transfer of power to a professional group, which he describes as basically a self-interest group, without assurances.

Professionals have to show that, by their social standing or through their work, they help to support and maintain and strengthen the existing economic, social and political order (Wilding, 1982:12).

Hence, Wilding (1982) argues that the privileges of professional status are the result of an alliance between the state and the profession in which the profession performs important social functions for the state. These functions include standing as an expression of state concern for private troubles which have been accepted as public issues, legitimizing state action, and providing status jobs for the elite and middle classes. The state in turn enforces both licensing and monopoly. The reciprocity of the relationship is clear in the medical profession (Illich, et. al., 1977). The tenuousness of this relationship is evident in the case of social work (Toren, 1972). Because of social work's commitment to social action, justice, equity and equality, social work has not consistently supported dominant state interests. This both helps to explain why social work has not received universal acceptance of its claim to professional status and why the state has been reluctant to establish and enforce licensing of social workers (Ings, 1986).

Because the professions stand as an expression of state concern for private troubles, Wilding (1982) argues that the expansion of welfare state policies have played a major role in corresponding growth in the welfare professions of medicine/health, education and social services/social work.

The professions are not an unimportant part of the state machine. They operate essentially as a force for social control in its
broadest sense... to locate the causes of delinquency and deviance safely within the individual rather than in the economic and social system (Wilding, 1982:16).

For social work, the implications are profound since the concentration on the private troubles of individuals is seen to lead "to a narrow view of the professional task and a neglect of what are equally proper professional responsibilities" (Wilding, 1982:97). The task of social work (which will be discussed in the next sub-section) has always been seen as two-fold: individual and social change (Middleman and Goldberg, 1974; Timms and Timms, 1977; Morales and Sheafor, 1983; Compton and Galaway, 1987). It is the practice of social change responsibilities that has generated heated debate within social work exemplified in the work of the radical social work theorists (e.g., Galper, 1980; Bailey and Brake, 1975).

Radical social work theorists (Bailey & Brake, 1975, Corrigan & Leonard, 1978, Brake & Bailey 1980, Galper 1980) criticize the growth of professionalism in social work as deflecting social work from its commitment to social action by emphasizing singular interventions based on individual pathological explanations for social problems. Galper (1980) defines radical social as social work that:

Contributes to building a movement for the transformation to socialism in and through the social services (Galper, 1980:10).

Thus, to Galper radical social work is inherently socialist and critical of what is seen as an alliance with the dominant interest of the state as a precondition of professional status. However, as Timms and Timms (1982) point out:

Radical social workers share neither the same political philosophy nor the same vision of an altered social work practice. (Timms & Timms, 1982:156).

Radical social workers also criticise self-imposed strictures on professional relationships with clients, colleagues and society that accompany professional training (Timms & Timms, 1982). It is those parameters on client-worker relationships that the radical social work theorists argue constrain effective participation of clients.

The participation of the client in the helping process is problematic for social work professionalization because professionalism is built on the assumption of expertise, monopoly, and confidentiality. Social work has as one of its basic values that of self-
determination which implies that the client has a central role in determining the form, content and outcome of social work intervention. Timms and Timms (1977) drew on the work of Keith-Lucas in their discussion of the principle of self determination. They defined self-determination as containing two distinct principles: client participation in the solutions of problems and the non-interference of the social worker except in essentials. Such a value, Timms and Timms argue (1977) compromises professionalism in its traditional sense making problematic social work's continued pursuit of professional status while attempting to retain the dual commitment of social work practice.

Efforts to promote social work professionalism may be further impeded by the organizational base in which social work typically is practiced. Black, et. al (1983) argue that rather than conceptualizing social service organizations as bureaucratic where formal authority, backed by well-defined rules and procedures, is vested higher up the managerial hierarchy, "social service departments appear to have more in common with matrix organizations" (Black, et al., 1983:200). In matrix organizations the normal vertical hierarchy is overlayed by lateral authority, in this case professional discretion, which gives workers necessary decision making authority. Whilst the literature suggests matrix organizations are appropriate in managing situations of uncertainty or rapid change typical in the personal social services, Black, et.al. (1983) raise the caution that where executive decision-making is decentralized to workers in front-line units, uncertainties and conflict may arise from imbalances between professional and bureaucratic authority. (See earlier discussion on centralization and decentralization in this chapter.)

Moreover, whilst social workers have a considerable measure of professional autonomy, they are at the very periphery of their employing organizations and distant from the source of bureaucratic power (Black, et. al, 1983:201).

The debate is carried further in the work of Lipsky who argued that even with a high degree of centralization:

The decisions of street-level bureaucrats [e.g., social workers], the routines they establish and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become [sic] the public policies they carry out (Lipsky, 1980:xii).
Lipsky (1980) asserts the existence of a discrepancy between policy declaration and policy implementation at the interface of the practitioner, whom he describes as the 'street level bureaucrat', and the client. This discrepancy has its roots not only in the contradictory value system of the bureaucracy and the professional but in the "contradictory impulses of the society the agency serves" (Lipsky, 1980:164). Lipsky contends that "it is easier to change articulated policy from the top than to change practice from below" (Lipsky, 1980:187). Practice is rooted in a professional value system and in defense mechanisms developed to ensure survival on the job (Lipsky, 1980). This is further compounded in times of 'fiscal crisis' when employees are faced with revenue limitations and/or hiring freezes which result in the distribution of tasks among those remaining without reducing responsibilities they currently hold or without increased compensation.

If qualitative aspects of service delivery are neglected, cost reductions and volume receive more attention as workers and managers accommodate their behavior to agency signals of priorities. This contributes to the self-fulfilling prophecy of the ineffectiveness and ultimate irrelevance of social services, even though the human needs for nurturing, protection, support, and assistance remain unanswered. Thus the tones of the fiscal crisis may linger, even if the budgetary alarms of the current period are eventually quieted (Lipsky, 1980:179).

Howe's work (1986) led him to the conclusion that the critical characteristics of social work practice are generated within welfare bureaucracies and do not derive from the prescriptions of professional social workers.

It is clear from this review that a direct relationship between articulated policy from the top and practice at the front line is far from assured. Practitioners at the front line are ultimately responsible for the implementation of policy but their performance is subject to many forces including professional values and the realities of their workload.

As was discussed earlier in the chapter in the section on models of social service delivery, the welfare state model is associated with the increasing social work professionalization. The welfare society envisions a role for the professional social worker as an input but that role is strictly confined. The professional social worker is seen as only as one member of the team. This positioning implies minimizing the power differential between client and worker through recognition and utilization of the client in service planning and provision.
The Social Work Task

Morales and Sheafor (1983) entitled their text on social work, *Social Work: A Profession of Many Faces*, to exemplify the range of social science knowledge involved in the diverse tasks, skills, and competencies encompassed by the term social work. Despite the problems surrounding the definition of social work, social work theorists do agree that its practice is concerned with individuals in their social environment. Social work is seen as a process of planned change that requires intervention in the personal, familial and societal spheres of a person's life (Reynolds, 1942; Middleman and Goldberg, 1974; Compton and Galaway, 1989; Skidmore, et.al., 1988). The balance of emphasis on individual change efforts and change efforts aimed at the social environment varies in the definitions and in practice over time. Note the differences in emphasis evident in the following two widely quoted definitions:

Social work seeks to enhance the social functioning of individuals, singly and in groups, by activities focused upon their social relationships which constitute the interaction between man [sic] and his environment. These activities can be grouped into three functions: restoration of impaired capacity, provision of individual and social resources and prevention of social dysfunction. (Boehm, 1959:54 in Skidmore, Thackery and Farley, 1988:29).

Social Work is concerned with the interaction between people and their social environment which affects the ability of people to accomplish their life tasks, alleviate distress and realize their aspirations and values. The purpose of social work, therefore, is to (1) enhance the problem-solving and coping capacities of people, (2) link people with systems that provide them with resources, services and opportunities, (3) provide the effective and human operation of these systems, and (4) contribute to the development and improvement of social policy (Pincus and Minahan, 1973:9).

Although the shift in balance may be subtle, it is none the less significant because of its implications for social work practice and the tasks that constitute that practice. The second definition lays responsibility on social work to both consider, and to engage in changing, social policy as it affects on a client's life. It is the lack of social action that lead Hunt (1978) to argue, as do the radical social work theorists, that:
Traditional social work is about adaptations, it is a form of social control rather than social change, it is manipulative, profoundly conservative, it colludes with the injustice of a divided and profoundly unequal society (Hunt, 1978:10).

Yet, social work historically has a firm base in social action and social change. Social work traces its beginnings back to the Settlement House Movement which was essentially a social change movement aimed at the amelioration of the poverty and unemployment made prevalent in the cycles of economic recession associated with early twentieth century industrialization (Morales and Sheafor, 1983; Zastrow, 1985). The emphasis in social work shifts periodically to emphasise on the individual as the system of intervention. The shift to individual interventions in the 1940s and 1950s was due in part to the relative prosperity in the West and to the development of empirically tested, scientific theories of intervention with the individual and small groups. However, social work theorists maintained their theoretical commitment to social change.

Social work is in danger... of failing to make its proper, distinctive and appropriate contribution to the alleviation and prevention of social ills through participating in the formulation of social policy, the development and modification of social welfare programs and through the distinctive methods conceived as ways of implementing social agency programs (Smalley, 1967: xi).

Middleman and Goldberg (1974) were specific in their conceptualization of the dual focus of the social work task when they contended that social workers had the responsibility as practitioners to address themselves to changing oppressive economic and social structures (Middleman and Goldberg, 1974). Heated debate within social work centred on how to fulfill the dual commitment of social work. This is exemplified in Chambers' directive that the client's surroundings demand "every bit as much care and attention from the working professional as family, community, psychological and work factors" (Chambers, 1986:2) and in the call for radical social change evident in the writings of Corrigan and Leonard (1978), Galper (1980) and Brake and Bailey (1980).

The crisis of social work in the 1970's was a reflection of the imbalance evident by the dominance of casework as the social work method of choice and of the empirical studies that questioned the effectiveness of social work (Fischer, 1973).
Thus, not only has professional casework failed to demonstrate that it is effective, but lack of effectiveness appears to be the rule rather than the exception across several categories of client problems, situations, and types of casework (Fischer, 1973:13-14).

One extensive study into the practice of social work in statutory agencies was completed by Black, Bowl, Burns, Critcher, Grant and Stockford in Britain (1983). They found that not only did social workers feel ambivalent about community work and social action as an integral part of social work, but only one of the trained social workers in their study felt equipped to engage in this level of intervention. Thus raising questions about the professional training of social workers emphasizing individual interventions at the expense of social action skills knowledge. Furthermore, Black, et al. concluded that social worker’s function in the political context as employees in large state bureaucracies with defined, statutory duties.

Thus, the reluctance of social workers to depart from a relatively narrow interpretation of their role simply reflects the occupational mandate they have been given and their accountability to their employer. . . The management system and the workload pressures meant social workers neither had the time nor were given the encouragement to innovate or challenge policy or practice (Black, et. al, 1983:222-223).

The constraints of the agency (e.g., Smalley, 1967; Compton and Galaway, 1989) and the limitations imposed on social work practice in statutory agencies has been noted repeatedly (e.g, Hardiker and Barker, 1981; Howe, 1986). It was these constraints that Black, et al. (1983) argued contributed to a case-by-case approach with clients.

Hadley and McGrath (1984) in the introduction to their study of community-centred teams lamented the dominant ‘client-centred’ philosophy of most of Britain’s Social Service Departments. Hadley & McGrath (1984) contend that the client-centred approach reflects three main factors:

The social worker’s view of the individual user’s web of personal relationships in contemporary society; the second concerns the dominant models of professionalism in social work and other social services occupations and related attitudes to the job; the third is the effect of the legislative framework of the personal social services and the character of the political system of which they form a part (Hadley and McGrath, 1984:8).
Stein (1974), in her discussion of the efforts to build a unified social work theory in the late 1960s into the 1970s, concluded:

This conceptual framework was expected to advance and unify social work theory and practice resulting in the dissolution of traditional method compartmentalizations (Stein, 1974:34).

Such efforts continued throughout the 1970's. Siporin, in the introduction to his text, *Introduction to Social Work Practice* (1975), which was widely use in the United States (Ephross and Reisch, 1982) and in New Zealand articulated:

A generic framework for the scientific practice of social work . . . . It offers bridges between social work, clinical and therapeutic orientations and activities, and those of community planning, social policy and administration and social action (Siporin, 1975:vii).

Despite professional and theoretical commitment to the dual focus of social work, despite the fervent calls for re-evaluation of casework and implementation of radical social work,

Professionalism, epitomized by individually focused case-work and its principles and methods, remains at the heart of social work practice (Black, et. al, 1983:231).

Black, et. al. (1983) contend that social work practice is constrained by the statutory organization's power of legitimizing practice modalities and the entrenched accountability system of the state bureaucracies. This situation will worsen, they argue, because of the increasing implementation of quantitative managerial systems which will further entrench quantitative individualistic interventions. There is some contrary empirical evidence to support the proposition that social workers in small, voluntary agencies are more likely to engage in community work and social action than their counterparts in the statutory sector (Sheafor, 1982).

The function of organizational strategic policy is to set the goals, objectives, standards, and methods of practice within broad guidelines. The degree of specification in the guidelines differ from agency to agency, and in fact may differ within agency programmes. Those programmes delivering services mandated by legislation/statute are governed more closely by detailed policies and procedures, e.g. child protective services as compared with services to the elderly. Lipsky (1980) argues that "street-
level bureaucrats," defined as "public service workers who interact with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work" (Lipsky, 1980:3), are not passive functionaries to agency policy.

Not only do street-level bureaucrats exercise discretion to such an extent that they are not easily affected by policy articulation from the top. . . . The character of worker-client and worker-supervisor relations, no matter what the articulated organizational policy, is likely to reflect the dominant bureaucratic relations of the society, no matter what the administrative guide-lines provide (Lipsky, 1980:188).

This theme is repeated by Gilbert and Specht (1986) in their discussion of the relevance of policy for practitioners:

Experienced practitioners often exercise considerable discretion in executing broad directives and so shape as well as discharge the requirements of organizational policies. . . . The importance of the direct-service practitioner's discretion for policy interpretation increases as organizations grow larger and more complex (Gilbert and Specht, 1986:15).

These observations highlight the centrality of the relationship between strategy (i.e. policy) and performance (in this instance the social work task) as postulated in the Pearce & Robinson model (1989). It is at the interface between the practitioner and the client in the final analysis that policy is articulated. In this regard it is anticipated that there will be a measure of congruence between the overall strategy as set out in the organizations goals and the objectives pursued by practitioners.

**SUMMARY**

The influence of the 'emerging paradigm' in organizational analysis (Lincoln, 1985; Guba, 1985; Reed, 1985) is evident in the emphasis of the analytical framework on vertical and horizontal contexts and in the qualitative research techniques that form the research methodology to be described in Chapter Three. The analytic framework utilized the multi-level explanatory model developed by Pearce & Robinson (1989) to explore the relationship between organizational strategy, design and performance. The first level analyses the meanings of welfare state and welfare society and proposes that a shift has taken place. Several factors that contributed to the shift were explored. The proposed shift was explored through the debates on the crisis of the welfare state
and in the consideration of alternative models of social service delivery that purported to address the criticisms and fiscal constraints affecting welfare state policies.

Two models of social service delivery were compared: the welfare state model as articulated by Titmuss (1974; 1976; Reisman, 1977) and a welfare society model promulgated by Hadley and his colleagues (1981; 1984; 1987). The role of the state in service provision and role of the voluntary sector in each of the models was examined. Characteristics of organizational design were discussed in the second level of analysis which addressed aspects of organizational design including organizational structure, the dilemmas of centralization/decentralization, management style and participation.

It has been argued that a strategy designed to implement a welfare state model of social service delivery would demand an organizational design based on centralized services and a professionally trained staff responsible for the provision of services. Staff performance would focus on pre-determined services with minimal participation of clients in the planning and provision of services: moreover the definition of the social work task would be clearly aligned with organizational expectations. Although, aspects of performance in social work are not as clearly articulated in the welfare society model, social workers were expected to alter their performance by addressing issues of responsiveness to client needs, promoting higher levels of client participation and to redefining professionalism with a view to reducing the power differential between client and worker. These issues of performance will be discussed as the implementation of the welfare state strategy and New Zealand is explored.

The next chapter will outline the research design and the techniques utilized to examine the impact of these changes in the New Zealand context and in the Department of Social Welfare in particular.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter addresses issues of research methodology, presents the rationale for the research design, and describes the three research strategies utilized in this thesis. The first strategy utilized was an analysis of the documents published during the period 1969 - 1988. These documents set out the debates regarding the statutory - voluntary balance in social service delivery; the appropriate model of service delivery; social work professionalization and task; and the issues of biculturalism. The analytical framework presented in Chapter Two addressed these four themes as central to an understanding of social work practice within the Department. The second strategy employed in-depth interviews with the eleven middle-management staff responsible for social work and social services in the six newly established Regional Offices of the Department of Social Welfare. Several research techniques for gathering data from two social work teams comprised the third strategy. The objective in the design of the multi-level research methodology was to provide a means of examining the links between the theory discussed in Chapter Two, the content of the social services debates as outlined in the document analysis in Chapter Four, and practice, as described by the social workers reported in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. This chapter, in addition to addressing the issues of research methodology, also offers a brief description of the two groups of social work respondents: the Regional Executive Officers (REOs) and the District Office social work respondents.

Social scientists categorize research designs as either exploratory or descriptive. The categories are not mutually exclusive (Bailey, 1978; Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985; Rubin and Babbie, 1989). The purpose of exploratory research is "to seek out new insights, ask questions, [and] assess phenomena in a different perspective" (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985:103) with the ultimate aim of generating theory (Rubin and Babbie, 1989). Although exploratory research is not locked into a rigid design or ultimate outcome, e.g., hypothesis testing, it nevertheless is a planned approach with a high degree of flexibility and an emphasis on seeking contrary evidence or innovative
conceptualizations. Exploratory designs are less structured than descriptive designs and are utilized in the pursuit of less developed research areas.

They are essential whenever a researcher is breaking new ground, and they can almost always yield new insights into a topic for research (Rubin and Babbie, 1989:86).

Because of the lack of representativeness, adherents of the positivist tradition in research view exploratory studies as seldom providing definitive answers to research questions and as having limited generalizability of the insights they do provide (Rubin and Babbie, 1989).

This study utilized an exploratory research design but did, however, address the issues of reliability and validity that confront qualitative researchers within the naturalistic paradigm (Hinds, Scandrett-Hibden and McAulay, 1990). Thus, it is proposed that the two research designs are best conceptualized on a continuum rather than as distinct types. The research questions of this thesis were to explore and identify the events leading up to the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare in 1986; to gain an understanding of why and how it occurred; to delineate the changes in the social service organizational infrastructure; and to understand the significance of those changes for social work practice within the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare. Although the research design for data collection was not strictly formulated, neither was it as loosely formulated as, for example, an anthropological ethnographical study might be.

It is in the case studies of the two social work teams that the exploratory nature of the research design is most clear. The field work with the teams was conducted with a minimum of pre-determined approaches. In case studies:

Bias might be manifest in the very cases that were selected for study, as well as the open-ended nature of the case approach, which may allow the investigator to influence the nature of the case under study (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985:114).

In response to such criticisms, the process of choosing the teams to be studied was conducted so as to permit a degree of representativeness and several methods of verification and feedback were built into the research design to minimize researcher bias.
QUALITATIVE and QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES

The basic reason for the choice of a qualitative method was the exploratory nature of the study which relegated matters of representativeness as less important. In 1988 the social services were undergoing rapid and pervasive change and social workers, like many others, were striving to make sense of a changing world. Secondly, the changes, once set in motion, were continuing with increasing momentum and few indications of abatement. The social work community was eager for an opportunity to make sense of their work environment. Qualitative techniques, particularly, in-depth interviews and participant observation promised the best opportunity to understand the complexities of the relationship between broad based economic, political and social changes and changes in the Department and in social work practice.

Qualitative methods... [are] more suitable when we seek to gain insight into the subjective meanings of complex phenomena in order to advance our conceptualizations of them and formulate hypothesis (Rubin and Babbie, 1989:365).

Data was obtained from several sources to provide a holistic view through the "gradual synthesis [to enable] a grasp of relationships" that might not as readily emerge from a fragmented quantitative analyses (Reid and Smith, 1981:90).

Because the process of restructuring was in its initial stages, ambivalence about the form and structure of changes and their implications was at a high level. There were control processes in operation that were judged might make potential respondents resistant to participation in a research project. For example, it had been rumoured that the sudden retirement of the highest ranking social worker at the request of top management of the Department occurred because of his alleged resistance to the proposed changes. This rumour had the effect of stifling critical comment from other social workers and confirmed the view of many social workers that the position of social work in the Department was particularly tenuous. In addition, it was expected by the researcher that many of the respondents would feel under threat due to the proposed changes in practice and job expectations. As well, there was a high level of uncertainty within the entire state service structure due to the passage of the State Sector Act of 1987 which altered the relationship between the government and its employees. These factors lent additional support to the choice of a qualitative research methodology.
Qualitative research methodology is highly dependent on the establishment of a personal contract between the potential respondents and the researcher. A qualitative methodology, it was assumed, would help to minimize respondent resistance and elicit responses with a high degree of validity. Moreover, the key respondents were all social service personnel, the majority of whom were social workers whose main medium of communication was oral and whose primary structure for oral communication was the interview. (See Forrest and Williams, 1987 for a discussion of this point.) In addition, the researcher was a social work educator. It is important to note that no selected respondents refused to be interviewed, in fact, they were surprisingly frank and candid in their remarks.

Rubin and Babbie (1989) argue that quantitative research techniques may be more appropriate:

> When we already know much, when we have a relatively high degree of control of the research situation or when we seek to verify an hypothesis or describe the characteristics of a population (Rubin and Babbie, 1989:365).

Such was not the situation in this case. And, in fact, there were strong contraindications to the potential success of quantitative techniques. The understanding sought was complex, contradictory and vulnerable to misinterpretation. As well, considerable disquiet had been expressed by the proposed target social work respondents about frequent consultations and requests for reports, data and policy submissions with no opportunity for feedback and no apparent effect on policy directives (Driver and Robinson, 1986). The design of the qualitative research was interactive to ensure timely feedback through the planned verbal and written feedback and verification systems discussed below.

Rubin and Babbie (1989) argue that quantitative and qualitative methods are complementary and they advocate research designs that include characteristics of both. They acknowledge that some social workers, perhaps in response to the proliferation of quantitative studies since the application of computer technology to research, have labelled qualitative research methods as obsolete. Several leading social work researchers implore the profession to favour qualitative methods (Reid and Smith, 1981; Wechsler, Reinherz and Dobbin, 1981; Rubin and Babbie, 1989). Advocates of the 'naturalist' paradigm shift in organizational research also favour qualitative methods.
Qualitative methods particularly interviewing and observation... can accommodate and explicate multiple, conflicting and, often unaggregatable realities, and they are sensitive to and, indeed, depend on the interaction or exchange between the researcher and the objects or respondents of the study (Lincoln, 1985:143).

This research design utilized qualitative research techniques supported by the utilization of varying data collection techniques and verification systems designed to increase reliability (the repeatability of observations) and validity (findings accurately reflecting reality and data accurately interpreted) (Hinds, Scandrett-Hibden and McAuley, 1990).

**THE DOCUMENT REVIEW**

The first method of data collection was an analysis of the debates on social service policy and delivery systems as documented in the reports, reviews, publications and conference papers published between 1969 and 1988. Over 120 major documents were reviewed. These documents were published by policy advisory groups (e.g., the New Zealand Planning Council and the Social Advisory Council); by the voluntary sector (e.g., New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations); by government appointed review committees and task forces (e.g., Ministerial Advisory Committee [1986], Ministerial Task Force [1986]); by the social work association (e.g., biennial conference papers of NZASW); and by the Department itself (e.g., Review of the Social Work Division [1982], *Institutional Racism*, [1986]). Every attempt was made to examine all the documents published by the bodies, committees and organizations listed above. A system of cross-referencing led to the identification of additional relevant documents within the public sector and to documents published by the Department itself.

The documents were drawn from University Libraries, the Department of Social Welfare Library and the Government Printing Office. Cross-referencing methods were applied to the documents to identify publications under separate authorship and documents not previously examined. The effort made to locate and examine all publications referenced in the documents was successful with the exception of the Ministerial documents (discussed under a separate section below). Some of the papers from the NZASW conferences were incomplete but only one document authored by the Social Advisory Council in 1973 and mentioned in Wilson (1976) could not be located.
Extensive notes were taken on the contents of the documents setting out the main argument or focus, the supporting rationale and the specific recommendations advocated. Throughout the document data gathering, this process was sustained as essential to minimize bias. As the document review progressed, themes began to develop but the exploratory process was maintained to "enable seeing what isn't there and looking for patterns" (Carney, 1972:38). The preliminary framework based on the research questions was an overall guide and was employed for reflection, but was not applied to the document data gathering phase. Such a strategy permits "unexpected finds [to] occur because this approach reveals otherwise undetectable patterns and gaps in the data" (Carney, 1972:65) and reinforces the need for document analysis to be systematic (Rosengren, 1981).

THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The interview schedule was comprised of twenty structured open-ended questions organized in four sections. The first section of eight questions under the heading 'Philosophy' asked respondents to comment on the objectives of regionalization as an organizational strategy. The recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) were specifically addressed. The second and third sets of questions under the headings 'Organisational Changes' and 'Managerial Supports' were directed at eliciting their perceptions of changes in decision-making systems and managerial styles as aspects of organizational design. The last set of three questions under the heading 'Social Work Services' was designed to gather information on performance, expectations and objectives of social work. (See Appendix I for a copy of the interview schedule.)

All respondents were sent a copy of the interview schedule prior to their interview along with an introductory letter and an appointment time. All respondents received the same interview schedule, a copy of the research proposal and request for demographic information which is discussed below.
CONFIDENTIALITY

The level of confidentiality that could be offered to the two groups of respondents was minimal because of the nature of the research design. The Regional Executive Officers (REOs) held highly visible organizational positions and were few in number. Six of the eleven REOs were responsible for 'Social Services' which included social work services. The other five REOs were responsible for 'Alternative Care' which covered residential care and the transitional or deinstitutionalization programmes for children and youth. The REOs are not mentioned by name in this thesis but are referred to by number to distinguish one REO from another. The REOs of Social Services are not distinguished from the REOs of Alternative Care to offer as much confidentiality as possible. As well, identifying characteristics were omitted from their responses. This was not always possible, since in some cases, the removal of the characteristic would make the comment meaningless. The respondents were aware of the level of confidentiality that could be given to their interviews in the research process. They were offered the option of asking that specific comments not be used. In the two incidences when such a request was made, their wishes were respected. As well, the researcher asked each REO if they wished to view the draft. Only one REO asked to exercise this option.

In the case of the District Office respondents, minimum confidentiality has even clearer implications for the social work management staff and the team members are readily identifiable. Drafts of the chapters were sent to each District Office, read and commented on by both the Assistant Director: Social Services and the senior social workers as team leaders. The chapters were also made available to all the team members. Although the Assistant Directors and the team leaders made comments and corrected technical inaccuracies, they did not request any material be deleted and expressed verification, if not total agreement, with the descriptions as presented in Chapters Six and Seven.

The issues of confidentiality in qualitative research projects are always complex. However, because of New Zealand's population of just over three million, the social work community is so small as to make respondents in a project like this very easily identifiable. It is only their professional commitment to improved practice that made the project possible.
It is expected that all readers will respect the integrity of this thesis by handling the material contained herein judiciously to insure that the respondents are not harmed in any way by their willingness to participate in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding.

THE ENTRY PROCESS

It is characteristic of organizations undergoing change to be resistant to efforts to track the change process and, in particular, to individuals outside the organization doing the tracking. Bailey (1978) notes that gaining entry to organizations is difficult at the best of times because administrators often feel they have everything to loose and nothing to gain.

Many times the study will yield few benefits for the Administration. . . . The presence of an outside observer can disrupt or slow the daily routine of work activities and can damage morale if employees think that the observer is a management spy. Further, the observer can hurt the administrator's career by making allegations of waste, inefficiency, discrimination, or scandal within the organization (Bailey, 1978:223).

This is particularly relevant to the present study because, as the document analysis in the next chapter will demonstrate, the Department had been under criticism by social policy analysts and minority interest groups for several years. Additional outside scrutiny in a major research project was not viewed favourably. Initial efforts to gain permission to conduct research within the Department had met with polite inaction. The change occurred when the researcher received a nomination in a public forum of social service groups to serve on the Palmerston North District Executive Committee. The District Executive Committees (DECs) were created as District Office monitoring bodies during the restructuring as part of the Department's commitment to a 'partnership with the community' in fulfilment of the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). (See Appendix VII for the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu)

When the researcher's nomination was confirmed with an appointment by the Minister of Social Welfare, support from and access to the Department for research purposes
became possible. This entree was further supported by the researcher's educative role with many Departmental staff as students in the various university programmes and seminars sponsored by the researcher's university. An additional crucial factor in gaining access to the Department was the support for the research from the Central Office Regional Director (who was subsequently to become an Assistant Director-General Region serving on the Head Office Executive Management Team). This individual, with whom I had previously had only limited professional contact, was aware of my previous research in the Department (on computer utilization in 1982) and commented on the ethical standards employed and adhered to in that research project. It was he who "walked it through" (Johnson, 1975) the administrative hurdles.

The request was not delivered through regular channels such as mail, messenger, or chain of command, but instead was carried personally to the administrator's desk by the contact or middleman (Bailey, 1978:223).

Bailey (1978) noted the critical role a contact within the organization can perform as an advocate within the system for the researcher. In a repeat approach in February, 1988 to the Central Regional Director, full documentation of research objectives, proposed research design, demographic information sheet and interview schedule was presented (Appendix I). The Central Regional Director took the full research request to Head Office of the Department of Social Welfare and in the July meeting of the Executive Management Team and Regional Directors, it received full endorsement. A formal letter from the Deputy Director-General to all Regional Directors in late July of 1988 noted the endorsement of top management and asked all staff for full cooperation. This approval was almost simultaneous with the confirmation of the researcher's appointment to the District Executive Committee by the Minister of Social Welfare.

**THE MINISTER OF SOCIAL WELFARE**

As the research progressed it became clear that a key informant would be the Minister of Social Welfare during the initial years of the restructuring: Ann Hercus, later conferred by Queen Elizabeth as Dame. During her stewardship as Minister of Social Welfare from October 1984 until mid-1987, several key decisions were made
regarding social service delivery and social work. Library searches of both the University and National Library systems, however, revealed no authored materials. A copy of one speech, delivered to the New Zealand Association of Social Workers prior to the 1984 election in which Dame Hercus became a Minister of Parliament was found in the Department of Social Welfare Library. Efforts to locate published ministerial papers were unsuccessful although, as the document review in Chapter Four demonstrates her philosophy and directives were evident through the secondary resource material which was available. Key examples are the decision to disestablish the Social Work Training Council in 1984 and the creation of the New Zealand Council on Training and Education in the Social Services in 1986. A direct request was made to Dame Hercus in 1989, as Permanent Representative for the New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, for resource material and/or an interview. Both were denied. In her letter Dame Hercus explained she had made a decision "not to give interviews about my previous positions as a Cabinet Minister when I retired from politics (this includes academic interviews) and this is a firm decision..." (See Appendix III).

NEGOTIATING FOR THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

The 1986 restructuring of the Department created six Regional Offices each with several regional executive officer positions to support the various programmes and functions of the Department (See Appendix IV for the 1986 Organizational Chart). Two of the Regional Executive Officer positions in each office were directly involved with the provision of social services and/or social work services. The positions of Regional Executive Officers of Alternative Care and of Social Services were staff not line positions and as such were to exemplify the new philosophy of participatory management and decentralized decision making. That is, the position holders were to advise, counsel and support District staff but not make decisions which were the perogative of either the local District or of top management (DSW, 1986a, 1987c, 1988b).

The REOs, then, were key personnel in the new organizational structure since they held a pivotal position between the new policies and their implementation. As a group the responsibilities of the REOs covered the entire nation and hence, as respondents they provided a national perspective.
The next step in gaining access to the Regional Executive Officers was to approach the Principal Social Worker in Head Office, Wellington, further confirming Schatzman and Strauss's (1973) contention that:

Negotiation, articulation and permission seeking are parts of a process, not events to be accomplished just one time. Entry to the field is, in fact, a 'continuous process' (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973:22).

The Principal Social Worker's position had been newly created as a staff position, apparently in response to the dissatisfaction of social work staff at the disestablishment of the line social work position in Head Office. The position was not filled with a Departmental career social worker, but by an appointment of an experienced social work administrator from the health sector. Because of her staff position status, she could only offer her support of the proposed research project and arrange for me to meet with the REOs at their regularly scheduled meeting to request their cooperation. At that meeting, a formal presentation of the research proposal was made with the commitment to present preliminary impressions and a verification session following the completion of the field work at the end of 1988. In addition, the REOs were offered the opportunity to comment on the draft of the chapter dealing with their responses. Only one of the REOs was to exercise this option. At the close of this meeting, all of the Regional Executive Officers agreed to take part in the research.

The assistance of the Central Regional Director was indispensable in arranging interviews with each of the REOs. Prior to the interviews, each REO was sent a personal letter, thanking them for their willingness to participate and confirming the interview appointment. This letter included a brief description of the research, a 'Demographic Information' sheet and the structured interview schedule of twenty open-ended questions (See Appendix I). The mailing was designed to alert the respondents to the specific objectives of the research and to focus the interview by removing the necessity of obtaining factual information during interview time. This worked particularly well in that little of the precious interview time was spent on eliciting or confirming factual details.

The Demographic Information Sheet (Appendix I) asked for factual data about the respondent, e.g., work history, qualifications, professional affiliation, and included a
request to list significant events and reports in the restructuring process. This modest request for written data was particularly illuminating. Despite the fact that there had been a number of reports and reviews only four of the respondents listed more than one 'significant event or report'. The respondent's hesitation to provide complete written data provided further support for the qualitative research methodologies chosen. What was noteworthy was that Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) was listed by eight of the eleven respondents as a significant report, reconfirming the perceived importance of this report in the restructuring of the Department.

Eleven of the twelve REO positions in Social Services and Alternative Care were filled during the field research period. Nine of the eleven appointments were permanent; the remaining three were filled by 'acting' appointments of varying duration. All interviews with the REOs were completed between September and November 1988 to minimize distortion due to subsequent events. Eight of the interviews took place in the Regional Offices. Two took place in mutually agreed venues, one at a half way point that required a three hour drive into the remote southern reaches of the Central North Region. The last interview utilized tele-conferencing technology. Most interviews were an hour and a half long although one was nearly three hours. One interviewee requested the tape be turned off during the discussion of an example which included a specific staff issue. Eight of the interviewees were well prepared for the interview, having completed the demographic information sheet, reviewed the interview schedule, and made marginal notes on the questionnaire.

In December 1988 at the completion of the field work, the feedback and verification session was held with the REOs at the office of the Principal Social Worker, Head Office, Wellington. This opportunity for exchange lent valuable insights and confirmation to the broad based preliminary findings. The feedback and verification session was significant to the researcher because it demanded the preparation of an oral presentation on the development of a tentative framework and preliminary findings of the research. (See Appendix XV for outline of the presentation.) The presentation fulfilled the commitment to a research philosophy that research should be promptly reported to the participants and they should have an opportunity to critique preliminary findings. These points are explored further in the section below on the feedback and verification sessions.
COLLATION OF INTERVIEW DATA

Brief notes were taken during the interviews on large notecards for each respondent. Following the interview, the researcher jotted down the main points the respondent made during the interview, the new information or insights provided, and noted comments that were said with high emotional content or confidence (Opie, 1989). As well, all interviews were audio taped and subsequently analysed using a multi-step process. Firstly, all taped interviews were reviewed in their entirety by the researcher who noted and categorized the sections for transcribing under the four headings used in the questionnaire itself: Philosophy, Organisational Changes, Managerial Supports and Social Work Services. In listening again to the interview, the researcher used the criteria set out by Opie (1989) to highlight selected comments based on (a) "the intensity of the speaking voice," (b) "the contradictory moment" defined here as alerting the researcher to apparent rationalizations by the respondent in comments linked by the term 'but', (c) the emotional content or tone of the statements, and (d) "the extent to which the participant uses whole sentences, rather than the more usual recursive speech patterns" (Opie, 1989:7-8).

The respondents' comments were then compared with the brief notes taken during the interview and the summary prepared after the interview. Special note was taken of comments that reappeared in subsequent interviews and those comments which reflected a unique insight or perspective. After the initial draft of the interviews was prepared, the transcribed tapes were reviewed several times for further verification purposes. This procedure was repeated with the interviews of the two social work teams and the corollary interviews with the District Office respondents.

FEEDBACK AND VERIFICATION SESSIONS

Three factors motivated the commitment to the follow-up meetings with both groups of respondents: the REOs and the social work teams. First of all, the feedback and verification sessions provided the opportunity to present timely preliminary impressions to the respondents as an acknowledgement of their participation. This was deemed important in a research project of this kind since the formal summary at the completion of the project could be expected to take two to three years. Second, the feedback sessions presented an ideal time for the respondents to critique the developing
analytical framework and to verify or to modify the preliminary impressions at a critical stage in the research process (See Appendix XV for the outline of the presentation). The preliminary feedback provided the researcher with an opportunity to "test the validity of [the] emerging propositions" (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973:31). Lincoln refers to this as a 'member check':

Member check is an old sociological term that refers to the process of checking findings with members of relevant groups of those who provided the original information (Lincoln, 1985:153).

Lastly, the feedback session was initiated by the researcher as part of her commitment to an non-exploitative relationship with research respondents (Roberts, 1981). The feedback sessions provided confirmation of the developing analytical framework and preliminary findings.

The data from the respondents was subjected to yet another validity check. As has already been noted, drafts of the relevant chapters were sent to the respondents to read and comment on the chapters prior to their completion. The respondents did comment and correct factual inaccuracies but did not request the deletion of any material.

DATA COLLECTION WITH THE SOCIAL WORK TEAMS

The next stage of the data collection was designed to provide an in-depth examination of practice within two social work teams. The Hadley and Hatch (1980), Hadley and McGrath (1984) and Black, et al. (1983) publications provided models of team examination. However, their methodologies required an expenditure of time and resources outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, their models did provide valuable ideas and insights for consideration, many of which were incorporated, albeit on a smaller scale. For example, the strategies of reviewing District Office memos and observing social work interventions and team interaction were drawn from their studies.

The challenge was to create a research design for this phase of the project that would both meet the objectives of the inquiry and the limits of time and resources. The combination of team and individual social worker observation, examination of team and District Office documentation, and in-depth individual team member interviews seemed
to provide the best mix of data collection techniques to meet research objectives. "In-depth interviewing is a logical partner with participant observation" (Grinnell, 1980:350). It was important to present a research design for this part of the field work that would have the best chance of eliciting full cooperation of the respondents and providing different perspectives of social work practice. Hence, the selection of the teams was purposeful (Patton, 1980).

It was decided that several steps be taken in the process of identifying, selecting and negotiating with the social work teams who were attempting to implement the new policy directives. Informal discussions were held with Departmental staff, colleagues and former students about possible suitable teams. Here care had to be taken to lay the ground work for negotiation of possible teams in such a way as to minimize any potential resistance while still identifying possible suitable teams before any commitments were made. The organizational climate of the Department was so stressful that considerable effort was made to avoid any semblance of a 'rejection' by the researcher that could be interpreted negatively by either social work staff or management.

The Central Regional District Director was most helpful in describing the District Offices and suggesting teams that were actively attempting to implement the new practice directives. The difficulties were immense and the possible teams few despite the Region's six District Offices and approximately twenty social work teams. The changes in the Department had created a sense of turmoil for many of the teams. High rate of turnover and the hiring of Maori and Polynesian staff, under Equal Employment Opportunity commitments, meant that many teams had been or were in the process of redeployment. Frequent changes in supervisors and administrative staff that meant that several offices or teams were not available for research purposes.

Finally, four teams were identified as possibilities, only two within the Central Regional District: the Palmerston North District Office team covering the city itself and the Community Development team of the Napier District Office. The other two teams were in the Central South Region: the Child Protection Team of the Lower Hutt District Office and the Generic Team of the Porirua District Office. Cooperation from the latter teams would require the support of the Director of the South Central Regional Office.
Formal approaches to the District Offices were made first through the District Office Directors who had responsibility for all functions in the District (administration, benefits and pensions, and social services) and subsequently, through the Assistant Director: Social Services (who were responsible for social work services and a growing number of social service functions, e.g., licensing of community care homes). The reader needs to recall that the Director of the South Central Region was already in possession of a letter from the Deputy Director General pledging Departmental support for the research project. The researcher made an in-person informal approach to the District Director and then to the Assistant Director: Social Services. In the case of the Lower Hutt District Office, the Director delegated the decision to the Assistant Director: Social Services. If the Assistant Director of Social Services approved, then a third, formal meeting was arranged with the supervising social worker and the identified team. The research process was explained, time commitment requirements discussed and a commitment was made by the researcher to present the preliminary impression and verification session following completion of the field work as was done with the REOs.

At this point the decision was made to include the Assistant Directors: Social Services as key respondents. As well, provision was made for corollary interviews with selected social work staff. The basis of the selection of corollary interviews is discussed below.

Of the four teams with whom discussions reached the third, formal meeting stage, one team was deemed unsuitable by the researcher because the team was about to be redeployed due to staff changes and a second team had to be turned down because a firm commitment had already been made for the two teams required within the research design. Once a team had agreed to participate, the researcher then met with all District Social Services staff in a regularly scheduled staff meeting to explain the purpose of the research and the research process. The cooperation of all staff was requested and the possibility that a few others might be asked for an interview was mentioned. This proved to be extremely valuable because during the on-site field work week, several staff approached the researcher to give their perceptions of the restructuring and the impact it was having on their practice. Formal interviews were held with selected staff outside the teams when it became apparent that supportive information was required based on the researcher's assessment of the unique perspective the particular respondent could provide to an understanding. The choices in each District are explained further in the chapters below on each of the selected teams. Only one request for an
interview of a staff person outside the selected team was not completed and that was because a crisis in a child abuse case intervened and the interview could not be rescheduled. A further example of cooperation of staff outside the teams was exemplified by the willingness of staff members to come early to discuss their work or to stay late, when the scheduled interviews with the selected team precluded discussions with other staff members during regular office hours.

The field work period with both teams was a full week which was extended beyond the normal working hours to enable completion of the task. In each case a minimum of a half a day was spent with each team member in the course of their normal duties. Unscheduled decision making meetings, formal staff meetings, home visits with clients, interdisciplinary case conferences and a hui (meetings following Maori protocol) were all part of the week-long experiences. (See Appendix X for a summary of research activities in the Napier District Office and Appendix XIII for a summary of research activities in the Porirua District Office.)

The first team chosen had a five year history as a 'Community Development Team' although the Napier District Office had a reputation within the Department as community oriented District since the early 1970s. The Departmental hierarchy recognized the work of this team and used it as an example of a team already functioning in the way that represented the new philosophy of community orientation. This team was in a stable district office with relatively low turnover at the direct line practitioner level and had experienced administrative and supervisory staff. The District Office was in a small seaside town, Napier, on the east coast of the North Island and served a large geographical district.

The second team chosen was in a District whose Assistant Director: Social Services acknowledged his support of the Hadley and Hatch 'patch system' (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). A modified patch system with participatory management had been implemented in his District and his supervising social workers had worked with him to apply the principles to the New Zealand situation. The directives about 'the new way of working,' as the social work practice philosophy of the restructuring was to be called (DSW, 1988c), were well known to the staff of this District. Although the Assistant Director: Social Services and the Senior Supervising Social Work were long service District employees, the office was characterized by high turnover at the direct-line practitioner level. This team was located in an urban centre, Porirua, a heavily
populated, multi-cultural community which included one of the oldest, and largest, government housing tracts in the country.

The two teams chosen presented contrasts in philosophy, structure, purpose and gender makeup. The Napier Team had a male supervisor with an equal gender split in staff and equal Maori-Pakeha members. The Porirua team had a female supervisor with all female Pakeha staff. The Napier team had a community development focus and was struggling to maintain that focus and function in the light of a redefinition of the Departmental social work task. The Porirua team had a geographically based 'patch' philosophy but was moving to a 'generic' social work focus (working with the entire range of presenting problems and client groups) within a culturally based team structure. However, both teams were attempting to retain and/or implement those practices and functions that were consistent with the redefined agency goals and directives.

THE FIELD WORK METHODOLOGY

Following the explanation of the research, the specifics of the team observation and interview process were discussed with each team. In addition to the scheduled formal interview utilizing the structured questionnaire, the team members were asked to show the researcher a piece of their work that they felt demonstrated the work they were doing and their efforts to incorporate 'the new way of working' (DSW, 1988c) being implemented by the Department. As much as possible, this piece of work was to be a part of their normal working pattern rather than something arranged specifically, and should take up at least half a day. The supervising social worker or senior social worker received the same instruction with the additional task of planning the week with the staff prior to researcher's arrival. The team leaders and the teams were asked to remain flexible to permit the researcher to fully experience the work place. This permitted the researcher to participate in the routine of the office, e.g., in emergency decision-making meetings and to accompany staff on a child-abuse referral investigation. The planning task of the social work team supervisor was essential because of the distances involved. The success of this phase of the project was due in part to the high calibre of assistance the researcher received from each of the team leaders.
Each of the team members received the same packet of materials prior to commencement of the field work as was sent to the REOs: a personalized letter of request to participate with the summary of the research proposal, the structured questionnaire schedule and the Demographic Information sheet. As with the REOs, the social workers in the District demonstrated an effort to consider the objectives of the research prior to the interview (one arriving with several pages of handwritten notes) and several commented on the helpfulness of having the schedule beforehand in alerting them to the specific focus of the research (See Appendix I). They were less likely to have completed the demographic information sheet before the interview than the REOs. All, except two, completed the Demographic Questionnaire before the end of the research period in the first week of November 1988. The last two were received by mid-November.

THE NAPIER DISTRICT OFFICE AND THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM

The Napier District Office had the reputation of a strong commitment to a broad based definition of the social work task. The office had a long history of social worker staff who argued for community based activities and involvements. In the mid 1970s, the Napier Office Assistant Director of Social Work prepared a paper in which he attempted to document their efforts to implement the principles of the 1971 amalgamation. The District had established a District Volunteer Scheme in the early 1970s in which volunteers worked along side Departmental staff. The volunteers were offered both training opportunities and supervision. This volunteer programme continued throughout the seventies and continued as an active part of the District's services at the time of the research. An outreach programme was developed in the schools by a member of the Preventative Team shortly after the amalgamation. The schools programme was basically an early identification programme centred around group discussion of 'issues of living' (Wilson, 1976). The involvement of the District Office in this programme was phased out in the early 1980s when the school guidance counsellors assumed responsibility for the programme. The District continued its commitment to community development activities through it support, advice and training for the established voluntary agencies and the emerging community groups.

It was this five member Community Development Team that was the main focus of this phase of the research. Three corollary interviews were held to ensure comprehensive
data collection. The Assistant Director: Social Services who had held that position since 1977, was instrumental in supporting the preventative/supportive services functions of the community development team. This administrative post took on distinctive managerial features after the restructuring with decentralization of decision making which gave the Assistant Directors responsibility but limited discretion in budget allocation. For example, the staff position allocation system was replaced with a salary allocation system that gave the Assistant Director's discretionary powers in salary increases for staff and the ability to hire part-time or contract staff which was not possible under the old system. The Senior Social Worker in charge of child protective services was seen as essential in providing relevant observations on the implementation of the 'new way of working' (D.S.W., 1988c) since the community development team's focus was only one aspect of community-oriented social work. The qualified social worker recently appointed to the Alternative Care position in the District was seen as an important respondent in examining the operationalization of the community care emphasis. In addition to these formal interviews, numerous interchanges took place with other staff, some initiated by the researcher but most initiated by staff who wanted to contribute their impressions and experiences to the research.

THE PORIRUA DISTRICT OFFICE AND THE GENERIC TEAM

The Porirua Office, under its Assistant Director: Social Work, had a reputation for innovation and creativity. The Social Work Service had adopted a modified 'patch system' as its method of service delivery shortly after the visit of Roger Hadley to New Zealand in 1982 in an attempt to move away from the individualized, casework approach and to find a more effective method of dealing with the constant pressure of crisis cases. The efforts of this District Office to apply the 'patch system' were widely known and emulated in several District Offices. In 1985, the Assistant Director experimented with a model of participatory management which involved all social work staff in decision making. This experiment was abandoned after nearly a year as unworkable in an office with the constant pressure of client service and staff with widely varying levels of expertise, experience and commitment to the project. Both of these efforts, however, continued to have an effect on the philosophy of service delivery and management of the office.
This generic team of four social workers was headed by a Supervising Senior Social Worker. Two weeks prior to the field work, a Senior Social Worker joined the team. She would assume full responsibility for the team over the following few months as the Supervising Senior Social Work assumed higher level management tasks. The composition of this particular team was a result of a District social work staff decision in 1987 to reconstitute the teams along cultural lines. i.e., Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Island, a process that was not yet complete. This basis for the teams represented a move from the geographically based patch system. It had been a recommendation of a staff development day to reorganize the teams on a cultural basis to meet the needs of Porirua's multi-cultural community and to attempt to relieve the stress in staff relationships due in part to the attempts to implement Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

Only one formal corollary interviews was held in the Porirua District Office. The Assistant Director: Social Services had held this position since late 1978. He had led the country in the application of Hadley and Hatch's patch system (1981) and was attempting to apply the best of that experience to the demands for a culturally appropriate office structure. Informal discussions were held with several members of staff including the Senior Social Workers of the Court Team, the Pacific Island Team and the Maori Team. But, the volume of informal discussions was considerably less than in the Napier Office. Two factors may account for this: the pace of the work day in this office; and the tension between cultural groups in the office.

The Porirua Office because of its urban nature and its location on the third floor of the Housing Corporation presented a psychological, although not physical, barrier to access. Entry to the office was restricted to one door on the north side of the six story building leading to a small lobby and two elevators. It was however, close to both the main highways and to the bus centre. If psychologically inaccessible to clients, the Porirua Office was relatively accessible to the Head Office who routinely seconded the Porirua staff to Head Office working parties. This became an issue for all staff but, in particular, for the small number of Maori and Polynesian staff who were asked to work on special projects, to participate in formal powhiri (ceremonial welcomes) at the Head Office, Wellington, and to attend hui as Departmental Staff representatives.

Although this pressure was felt to some degree by the Maori staff at the Napier office, their distance from Head Office, over five hours by car, reduced the possibilities for
secondment. The Napier Office was more accessible to clients, in the sense the Department was located in a low rise, three floor, complex of governmental building in the centre of town. However, many staff, particularly the Community Development staff felt the current building with its formal lobby, its social work services on the third floor requiring elevator access and the receptionist behind a glass enclosure, was far inferior to their previous quarters which were on the first floor of a homely building where community workers and clients could gain ready access to the team through a back door.

LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY

Qualitative research provides a rich and comprehensive insight into complex phenomena. It seldom offers definitive answers to research questions and is limited in its generalizability (Rubin and Babbie, 1989). The structure of this research design attempted to minimize these methodological weaknesses by utilizing several data collection and verification strategies. The document review drew on the all publications on the debates on the issues of social service provision addressed in this thesis. All the Regional Executive Officers of Social Services and Alternative Care within the Department were interviewed. Their collective responsibilities covered the nation. The choice of teams in different regions and in different settings, urban and rural, provided contrasting experiences to bring a depth to the research that more similar teams, or teams in the same region, would not provide. The feedback sessions with the REOs and with each of the teams provided a valuable verification of preliminary framework and findings. This was further strengthened by the opportunity taken up by the respondents to read and comment on drafts of the relevant chapters in late 1989 and early 1990.

The impact of a research process on respondents was first highlighted in the Hawthorne Studies of the 1920s (Drucker, 1981). This researcher gained access to the organization based on her previous involvement with the Department, on her recent appointment to a Departmental monitoring committee and on the strengths of the many professional relationships she enjoyed with Departmental staff. Nachimas and Nachimas (1981) consider that no research effort can be 'non-intrusive' therefore, researchers have a responsibility to consider the impact of the research process on the respondents. The commitment to the feedback and verification sessions and to the presentation to the
respondents of the drafts was in partial recognition of the potential for greater understanding that the research process could bring to the respondents in their work as professional social workers.

**SUMMARY**

This chapter addressed issues of methodology by discussing the two main research designs used in social science: exploratory and descriptive. Drawing on the work of research theoreticians, the two research designs are conceptualized on a continuum rather than as polarities. This research project was described as fundamentally exploratory. Exploratory studies utilize primarily qualitative techniques while descriptive studies tend to utilize quantitative techniques. Comments on the debate between the two were explored but their complementarity was emphasized. Although qualitative techniques are used in all three strategies employed in the research design including the document review, the methodology was informed by an appreciation of the strengths and weakness of each research design. The three research strategies were constructed to provide data from multiple sources using distinct data collection techniques and several verification strategies to increase reliability and validity.

The field work was supported by detailed analysis of formal, public documentation dealing with social welfare services policy commencing just prior to the creation of the Department of Social Welfare until eighteen months after the restructuring, December 1988. The findings of the document analysis is reported in Chapter Four. A structured questionnaire schedule of twenty open-ended questions was administered to all the Regional Executive Officers of Social Services and Alternative Care within the Department. These positions were key pivotal positions in the implementation of the new policy in the Districts. All the incumbents, except one, were career departmental social workers able to provide insightful commentary on changes within the Department based on through knowledge of the Department.

The second set of respondents were the two social work teams, one urban and one rural. One team had a community development focus, served a small town and a large sparsely populated, horticultural area. The second team served a densely populated multi-cultural urban community contingent to the nation's capital. The team had recently moved from a patch system to culturally based teams. Participatory research
techniques, observation, document analysis and in-depth interviews using the developed structured questionnaire were utilized as consistent with the research methodologies favoured by proponents of the naturalists' paradigm (Lincoln, 1985; Guba, 1985; Hinds, et al, 1990)

The research design, then, was constructed to provide a comprehensive examination of a complex phenomena by utilizing a variety of data collection techniques within an exploratory design framework and applying qualitative analysis. The results of the field work are reported in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
Chapter Two delineated the theoretical framework for analysing the context and implications of the move from a welfare state toward a welfare society for models of service delivery and social work practice. This chapter examines the New Zealand context to analyse how this shift occurred as New Zealand moved from a welfare state toward a welfare society during the period 1969 - 1988. The focus of the analysis is the Department of Social Welfare as the major statutory organization responsible for social service delivery. The documents which formed the basis of this analysis included the publications of the Department of Social Welfare, the New Zealand Planning Council (NZPC), the Social Advisory Council (SAC) and the New Zealand Association of Social Workers (NZASW). Additional materials were drawn from the reports of working parties and task forces established by the government; from the 1988 Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy; and from publications of voluntary agencies and social service councils such as, the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations (NZFVWO) and the New Zealand Council of Social Services (NZCSS). Over hundred and twenty documents and numerous associated memoranda were analysed. These materials reflect the formal, public debates on the provision of social services in New Zealand.

The document analysis confirms that the amalgamation creating the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare followed a similar development in Britain subsequent to the release of the Seebohm Report in 1968. As a result of the Seebohm Report, the British Government created the Social Service Departments (SSDs) as centralized social service agencies with the responsibility of consolidating services and achieving coordination and efficiency (Howe, 1986). Similarly, the objectives of the New Zealand amalgamation were aimed at increasing coordination and centralizing services; but, the features of the amalgamation had three significant differences. First, the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare did not assume responsibility for health social
work services which in Britain included services to the elderly. Second, the New Zealand Department was not based on a local authority structure as was its British counterpart. And third, the New Zealand Department was charged by the Social Welfare Act, 1971 with responsibility for the provision of direct social services and supportive services to the voluntary sector and other government agency providers (Social Welfare Act, 1971, Section 4 (2)(d)).

Four themes were traced in the analysis of the documents (See Chapter Three for a discussion on the process of identifying the four themes). Graycar (1983) delineated the debates on the present and future operations of the Welfare State as "revolving around arguments about the degree of state intervention and the public/private split" (Graycar, 1983:380). The public/private split was one theme that emerged from the analysis and was considered under the heading 'Statutory-Voluntary Balance'. This debate centred on the extent of state responsibility for social services as the New Zealand moved toward a welfare society. The second theme that emerged, discussed under the heading 'Service Delivery', traced commentary on the four principles that were to become the cornerstones of the 1986 restructuring: regionalization, decentralization, devolution, and partnership with the community. Management style, as the remaining aspect of organizational design discussed in the analytic framework chapter, was included under this heading. Billis (1984) observed the constant attention given in social work literature to social work professionalism and definitions of the social work task. Debates on these two topics appear under the heading 'Social Work'. These three themes are obviously interrelated and interdependent as the document analysis will attempt to demonstrate.

The last theme traced was that of biculturalism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a sociological analysis of biculturalism. This analysis focuses on the development of biculturalism as it impacted on the social services during the period under study. The Department of Social Welfare embraced a commitment to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and bicultural practice as part of the restructuring process begun in 1986. Although there are a few references to Maori-Pakeha relationships in the earlier documentation (e.g., in one of the conference papers presented at the 1976 Biennial New Zealand Association of Social Workers), it is not until the 1982 that references to cultural issues begin to appear with regularity in the documentation analysed. Because the move to biculturalism would become a significant
factor in the form and content of the restructuring, analysis of biculturalism was added as a major thematic heading in the document analysis after 1982.

The purpose of the document analysis was to explore the debates on social service policy through the four themes that emerged: the statutory-voluntary balance, social service delivery issues, social work and biculturalism. It was not to present a detailed historical account of the period 1969 - 1988. The emergence and re-emergence of the themes may appear repetitious to the reader, but the repetition illustrates the growing strength and increasing acceptance of particular conceptualizations of each of the themes. A second issue for the researcher in the presentation of the document analysis was the proliferation of government reports and reviews commencing with the Labour Party assuming power in 1984. The sheer number of the reports and reviews was overwhelming. This reflected the objective of the Labour Party upon coming into office that "a considerable reorganisation of the new Zealand economy [and consequently all government activity] was necessary, and that this would involve considerable social dislocation" (Oliver, H., 1989:11). The numerous reports and reviews comprehensively examined social service policy and practice. Many of the reports and reviews overlapped, were contradictory and had far-reaching implications for other actors in the social service delivery system. What was notable in the reports was the use of a common terminology (e.g., community, volunteers, partnership, biculturalism) without clarification of the meaning of the terms. A second notable characteristic of the documents was found in the apparent consensus on welfare pluralism, decentralization, and partnership with the community as the solutions to the problems facing the social services.

For the purposes of analysis, the period 1969 to 1988 was divided into five periods as briefly outlined below in Table II (See Chapter Three for a discussion of the process that culminated in the development of these five periods for analysis). Each of the periods, though distinct, contains remnants of the past and the seeds of future developments and debates. Despite the interrelatedness of the five periods, each has a distinct character which provided the basis for its designation. The significant documents and events for each period appear in a table following the general introduction to each of the periods as a further guide in the analysis. The documents and events are listed chronologically within each year.

I. 1969 - 1974 The Amalgamation
There was not universal support for the creation of a central government bureaucracy with far reaching responsibilities over both the statutory and voluntary sector. Some felt the new department's responsibilities were too broad and others argued that the authorities were not broad enough to insure comprehensive and coordinated services.

II. 1975 - 1979 The Beginnings of Disquiet
During this period both the New Zealand Planning Council and the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations published documents expressing their concerns that the increasing bureaucratization and professionalization of social services was disempowering individuals and communities.

III. 1979 - 1981 The Turning Point
The influence of monetarism and Thatcherism paralleled increasingly vocal social pressures for change in the delivery of social services. Toward the end of this period the Maori community's awareness of the disproportionate numbers of Maori people in government welfare and penal institutions became a rallying point for action.

IV. 1982 - 1985 The Convergence of Events
It is during this period that political, economic, social, cultural and intraorganizational factors converged. The newly elected Fourth Labour Government commissioned several reviews of the social services, two of which led to the decision to place the Social Work Training Council in recession and to restructure the Department of Social Welfare.

V. 1986 -1988 The Implementation of the Restructuring
The Director-General of Social Welfare announced in the release of the 1986 Management Plan a new administrative structure and style of management. The four principles of the restructuring were implemented simultaneously with the commitment to biculturalism. The Department accepted the recommendations of the Ministerial Task Force on a Maori Perspective, Puao-Te-Ata Tu, to demonstrate the Department's commitment to biculturalism. It is during this implementation period that the field work was initiated and completed by mid-December 1988.
PERIOD I: 1969 - 1974
THE AMALGAMATION CREATING
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

By the late 1960's western nations faced the need to re-examine their welfare systems over which criticisms of duplication, lack of coordination and absence of consultation had been leveled. One solution was the development of centralized government agencies with responsibility for social services and a wide range of benefit programmes. The 1968 Seebohm Report in Britain led to the creation of the Social Service Departments (SSDs) whose responsibilities included services to children and their families, the elderly and the intellectually handicapped (Black, Boel, Burns, Critcher, Grant and Stockford, 1983; Howe, 1986). This British development was to be emulated in New Zealand by the creation of the Department of Social Welfare under the provisions of the Social Welfare Act, 1971.

Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>Period I: 1969-1974</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE AMALGAMATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969 Royal Commission on Social Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Agencies</td>
<td>formed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970 First Citizen Advice Bureau established in Ponsonby,</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972 Department of Social Welfare established</td>
<td>Community Volunteers Programme launched</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973 New Zealand Social Work Training Council established</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974 Children and Young Person's Act making provision for</td>
<td>preventative and social work services for children and young persons requiring care, protection and control</td>
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</table>
THE STATUTORY - VOLUNTARY BALANCE

The trend toward amalgamation and centralization was evident outside the government sector, in the 1969 creation of the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations and in the establishment of the first Citizen's Advice Bureau in Ponsonby, Auckland a year later. The objective of the Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations was:

To help to end one of the weaknesses of New Zealand welfare agencies, both governmental and voluntary [which is] the lack of coordination (NZASW, 1970: unnumbered).

Membership in the Federation was limited to those voluntary organizations with a national structure and, consequently, tended to be dominated by the larger, more formalized agencies such as the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped, Crippled Children Society and Young Men's Christian Association. By 1971, its members employed over 2,500 people with an annual budget of $10 million. Seventy-five percent of the operating budgets of the Federation's membership came from voluntary sources (Oliver, W., 1988: 41).

The objectives of the New Zealand Citizens Advice Bureaux (NZCAB) were similar:

To coordinate, encourage minimum standards for training, record keeping and confidentiality and provide at a national level consultation and cooperation between associations, government agencies and voluntary organisations (NZCAB, 1977: 36).

By the mid-1970's a National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux had been formed with thirty-eight offices in operation throughout the country working to encourage cooperation and coordination of services in both the statutory and non-statutory sectors.

SERVICE DELIVERY

Support for a centralized government agency charged with the responsibility for coordinating social services was voiced in New Zealand as early as the 1950's:

During the 1950's concern was increasingly expressed at the fragmentation of social welfare services within government and in 1956, the Cabinet established an interdepartmental committee under the chairpersonship of Professor W. G. Minn, to look at
ways to improve coordination and administration of government social welfare activities. The committee reporting to the Minister of Social Security in 1958 suggested the integration of social welfare services under a single government department but this did not eventuate (Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services, 1986:8).

Jack and Robb (1977) cited the establishment of a Social Welfare Advisory Board as the only outcome of the Minn Report. The subject of a comprehensive Department of Social Welfare was set aside as requiring further study by the 1962 Royal Commission. Several years later a report was prepared for the State Services Commission (Bagnell, 1968) recommending the establishment of a centralized social work service within a department of social welfare to replace the services spread over several governmental departments. Such a department would offer economic assistance as part of a comprehensive service.

The uniformity of provision and standard of provision . . . would actually be increased were the services to be dispensed by a Social Welfare Department (Bagnall, 1968:57).

The creation of a comprehensive department of social welfare was discussed at the 1969 National Development Conference and became an election campaign issue (Jack and Robb, 1977). Indeed, the National Party election manifesto for 1969 pledged amalgamation:

Following the recommendations of the National Development Conference on the Coordination of Social Services, the National Government will give further consideration to bringing other areas of state welfare activity into the new department (DSW, 1970:2).

Very early in the term of the National Government this recommendation was given approval in principle by Cabinet and a feasibility report was requested. The report supported the recommendation for amalgamation. Shortly afterward, legislation creating the Department of Social Welfare with broad and sweeping responsibilities over the delivery of services and the providers of service both statutory and non-statutory, was passed into law:

The Department shall maintain close liaison with and encourage co-operation and co-ordination among any organisations and individuals (including Departments of State and other agents of the Crown) engaged in social welfare activities (Social Welfare Act, 1971: Section 4:2:d).
It is important to note, however, that the Act provided only for the amalgamation of child welfare and social security, not all of the social services. The New Zealand Association of Social Workers opposed the creation of the new department on the basis that it represented a "partial [response]. . . inadequate for both present and future needs. . . [and] implies further piecemeal development" (NZASW, 1971:1).

**SOCIAL WORK**

The New Zealand Association of Social Workers (NZASW), established in 1964 (NZASW, 1971), attempted to expand its membership to meet the needs of the growing number of people in social work positions (NZASW, 1972). The creation of the Department of Social Welfare reclassified the Child Welfare Officers as social workers and contributed to a growing tendency to use the term 'social worker' to describe and classify social service positions in a number of agencies. This reflected similar theoretical developments in social work (refer to Chapter Two) which were aimed at developing a model which would provide a 'common base' for social work practice (Pincus and Minahan, 1973; Siporin, 1975; Morales and Sheafor, 1983).

The NZASW conferences of this period (NZASW, 1972, 1974) were characterized by heated debates over the growing professionalization of social workers and the association’s liberal membership criteria. The membership criteria classified anyone holding a social work position as eligible for association membership. Some argued that without restricted entry the association would not be in a position to promote the profession effectively. Others responded that a restricted entry would be elitist, effectively limiting the association membership to the chosen few with academic qualifications and severely narrow the association's base of support (NZASW, 1970, 1972).

The attention of NZASW during this period was not solely on increasing membership and establishing membership criteria. Considerable effort was expended in maximising the expressed support of the National Government for the establishment of an organization with responsibility for education and training in social work. Despite the political stresses the Labour Government was facing with the upcoming election, the Social Work
Work Training Council (SWTC) was established in 1973 (SWTC, 1986; Brook, 1988). In its terms of reference, the SWTC was responsible for assessing the need for and the development of education and training in social work, establishing standards for social work practice and supporting social work research (SWTC, 1986; Brook, 1988). The Council was created under the auspices of the Department of Social Welfare using the mandate of the Social Welfare Act, 1971. This move further consolidated the Department's central role in social service delivery. The Department had been required under the law to:

Provide for the training of such persons as the Minister may direct (whether employed in the service of Her Majesty or by any agencies of the Crown or by any other organisations) to undertake social welfare activities (Social Welfare Act 1971: Section 4:2:C).

The Social Work Training Council did not have a budget of its own nor the power to publish. This dependency on the Department of Social Welfare severely limited the SWTC's role (Brook, 1988). Allocation of funds to the SWTC had to compete with the Department's multiple interests and such competition was often based on the principle of compensatory savings, i.e., expenditure of funds to the SWTC had to be matched with savings or cuts in other programmes (Brook, 1988:80). The SWTC was dependent on Departmental administrative support, seconded staff, voluntary effort of educators, administrators and social workers in the field to service the committee. Many in the New Zealand Association of Social Workers (NZASW) objected to this lack of independent status. For example, NZASW had to make a formal written request to DSW to be kept informed of the SWTC's recommendations and actions (NZASW, 1974).

The Department of Social Welfare was created, then, with the clear intention of bringing about a coordinated and comprehensive social service system. The state was to be the main provider and resourcer of social services. The voluntary sector was to fulfil a secondary role, complementary to state provided services. (See Chapter Two for discussion of the features of the welfare state model of social service delivery). The trend toward centralized systems was evident not only in the statutory sector but in the voluntary and professional sectors as well. It was during this period the Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations was formed as was a national network of Citizen Advice Bureaux. The New Zealand Association of Social Workers established in the decade before, expanded its membership and cemented its foundations as it grappled with substantive professional and educational issues.
PERIOD II: 1975 - 1979
THE BEGINNINGS OF DISQUIET:
THE GROWING BUREAUCRATIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK

The impact of a centralized government department was soon to be apparent. Child welfare officers resisted their transfer in a government department that was largely devoted to the distribution of monetary resources. They felt their specialized services to children and families had been better supported in the Department of Education. The disproportionate balance between the financial benefits and personal social work services expenditure of the Department was further exacerbated by the National Superannuation Acts of 1976 and 1977. These Acts were primarily responsible for the dramatic budgetary growth of the Department during the 1970's.

In a paper in 1973, a Working Party on Social Welfare (DSW, 1973 in Wilson, 1976) argued that the objectives of the newly created Department for preventative social work utilizing community oriented approaches, were not being met in the continuing focus on child welfare services and the casework method. The Working Party urged all agencies to:

Shift the emphasis from casework to family-oriented counsel and welfare services. . . . to develop close consultation and coordination with the community . . . . [and] to develop school social work programmes and a family service (DSW, 1973 in Wilson, 1976).

Despite the objectives of the Department, there was rising concern voiced as shown in the documentation analysed below, that individualized, specialized service provision was proving intractable to efforts for a more coordinated and comprehensive service delivery.
### SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS

**PERIOD II: 1975 - 1979**

**THE BEGINNINGS OF DISQUIET: THE GROWING BUREAUCRATIZATION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Superannuation Scheme introduced contributory scheme of employers and employees. New Zealand Council of Social Services established by Minister of Social Welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td><em>New Zealand at the Turning Point</em>, Report of the Task Force on Economic and Social Planning, also known as 'The Holmes Report'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>National Superannuation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td><em>Sharing Social Responsibility</em> published by New Zealand Council of Social Services. NZASW Conference with Ivan Illich on &quot;The Disabling Professions&quot;</td>
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### THE STATUTORY - VOLUNTARY BALANCE

By 1975, it was apparent that the mandate of the Department of Social Welfare to encourage cooperation and coordination among organizations and individuals engaged in social welfare activities (Social Welfare Act, 1971) had not occurred as an inevitable consequence of the centralization of statutory welfare activities. In 1976, the New Zealand Council of Social Service (NZCSS) representing local district councils of social services was set up with the objective of supporting and coordinating the efforts of the district councils on a national level. The NZCSS encouraged the establishment of additional local district councils with wide non-traditional membership to provide linkage between local and national government (NZCSS, 1976). The Council received financial and administrative support through the Department of Social Welfare because...
of the Department's legislative mandate to encourage cooperation across the broad spectrum of service providers. The support offered by the Department to groups such as NZCSS had the paradoxical effect of further consolidating the central role of the Department in the non-statutory welfare sector development. Departmental support created dependency. Thus, weakening the very sector the mandate was intended to strengthen. For example, the New Zealand Council of Social Services was never able to firmly establish itself as a viable part of the social service infrastructure.

The public contribution to voluntary agencies quickly eroded, allegedly because New Zealanders viewed the state as both the primary funder and provider of social services. In 1971, seventy five percent of the voluntary agencies operating budget came from voluntary sources (Oliver, W., 1988:41). By the 1975-1976 financial year, voluntary contributions had shrunk to 50% of operating budget expenditures prompting major concerns about the increasing dependence of voluntary agencies on governmental funding sources (NZCSS, 1978) despite the emergence of nation wide fund-raising efforts such as the biennial Telethon event.

Another example of the growing dominance of the Department was demonstrated in the growth of children under the Department's care following its establishment:

Despite the higher levels of prosperity in the 1950's and 1960's, foster children under the care of the state increased from 2,400 in 1950 to 4,585 in 1975. However, in the voluntary sector, children in foster care decreased from 2,400 in 1950 to 1,284 in 1975 (Papesch and Stevens, 1985:6).

Such figures further confirm the consolidation of services within the statutory sector with a subsequent weakening of the voluntary sector through loss of service volume to the state.

The New Zealand Planning Council (NZPC) publications during this period (1976, 1978, 1979) contained mounting critical analysis of the dominance of statutory departments in all aspects of welfare and social services. These reports warned that excessive centralization and standardization of services could create alienation from authority in those receiving the service. Whereas, "a more relaxed approach to the development of local answers to local problems would be desirable for the social fabric and for the economy" (NZPC, 1976:156). The NZPC's 1976 recommendations were more strongly stated in their publication two years later when they argued that
greater variations could provide substantial economic and social benefits and facilitate the better use of all resources (NZPC, 1978).

Early in 1978, New Zealand Council of Social Services published their first major report. This body, established in November 1975 by the Minister of Social Welfare, has been instructed by the Minister to undertake a study and present recommendations concerning the roles of central government, local authorities and voluntary organizations in the provision of social services. The report contended that, with the establishment of the Department of Social Welfare, the government had an agency with comprehensive responsibility for social welfare:

To a substantial degree this meant that the state assumed responsibility for widespread social welfare services . . . Its establishment created a much greater demand for service in social and community welfare than had been anticipated . . . with the widening of government welfare responsibilities . . . there has been an increasing tendency for organisations and individuals to look to central government for financial support or action. . . Here is a risk that the development of major national organisations [statutory and non-statutory] could be seen as absolving local communities from their welfare responsibilities (NZCSS, 1978:6-21).

The NZCSS strongly criticized the national social welfare organizations (such as the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations) whom the NZCSS felt had not contributed to the overall distribution of resources according to need at the local level but had through political influence and emotional appeal, gained significantly in national terms (NZCSS, 1978). The NZCSS noted that both the Social Welfare Act of 1971 and the Children and Young Person's Act of 1974 provided for financial support of voluntary agencies engaged in the promotion of community, family and personal well being and in providing facilities and services for the community welfare of the disabled but "the implied allocation of resources has not taken place" (NZCSS, 1978:7). This view paralleled comments made earlier in the Holmes Report (NZPC, 1976) which reported general disillusionment with centrally determined services.

The call for community involvement in social service policy formulation and in the provision of social services, is seen as a reaction against traditionally centrally determined services developed in New Zealand and the fact that such approaches have not been entirely effective in coping with the social problems facing New Zealand. It is considered important that . . . in future
there be more systematic development of community solutions to social problems within a community setting (NZPC, 1976:110).

The New Zealand Council of Social Services recommended the government "adopt a general policy of involving consumers and the general public as far as practicable [italics added] in all aspects of social service provision" (NZCSS, 1978:45-46). The caveat was based on the NZPC's assessment of regional and local government's limited capability to assume social welfare tasks.

A further difficulty with the decentralisation or devolution of social service activity is the current state of local and regional government. . . . There is unlikely to be substantial development in the direction of decentralisation without the development of a more rational structure of local and regional government able to assume greater responsibility in the allocation of resources (NZPC, 1976:112).

The New Zealand Planning Council concluded by arguing for a deliberate promotion of desirable trends which they contended were: (a) the strengthening of local communities and their ability to respond to their own needs, and (b) a change in emphasis from ameliorative or curative services to prevention and the promotion of general well-being. These objectives, it was argued, could be achieved by greater use of voluntary agencies, by central government moving from service provision to monitoring and promotional functions, by devolving responsibility for allocation of resources to the local level, and by channeling resources to promotion and prevention (NZPC, 1976).

The New Zealand Planning Council repeated similar sentiments three years later when it argued that:

Public participation in decision making and the devolution of some responsibility to the regional level are seen by many as essential techniques to bring about improved planning and delivery of services (NZPC, 1979:28).

Moreover, the NZPC specifically noted that the design and delivery of services "should spread the burden of care and responsibility more widely within society" (NZPC, 1979:29). These views, then, reiterated the sentiments expressed the previous year by the New Zealand Council of Social Services (NZCSS, 1978).
Toward the later end of this period, the New Zealand Planning Council became more adamant in its support for a "bottom up" approach to social policy decision making and provision.

The real need, if the welfare state is to find new directions in the 1980s, is for the state to do less and at the same time assist people to do more for themselves. This will involve a shift in emphasis from the "top down" approach and the reliance on institutions, toward greater involvement and responsibility on the part of all citizens, i.e., a reinforcement of the "bottom up" participatory approach (NZPC, 1979:28).

This advocacy was predicated on the assertions that (a) increased spending by the state does not necessarily produce better results or meet people's expectation, (b) there are both rigidities and anomalies in the system as it developed and (c) a great many individuals support the need for alternative or additional forms of social service delivery (NZPC, 1979). The proliferation of unemployment committees, Women's Refuges and Rape Crisis Centres, alternative health care facilities and alternative schools during this period were cited as examples of the dissatisfaction with the system (NZPC, 1979). Economic concerns were evident in the NZPC's 1979 publication by the numerous references to tax-payers, cost effectiveness and the tax burden. This reflected the growing dominance of economic policy concerns in government and the deepening economic recession in New Zealand.

SOCIAL WORK

For social work, the two biennial conferences of their professional association held during this period were significant. An unauthored paper presented at the 1976 conference delineated six major dilemmas facing social work in New Zealand (NZASW, 1976). The dilemmas addressed in the conference paper are detailed here because they crystallized the major debates in social work during this period. The first three of the dilemmas focused on definitions of social work and the social work task that resulted from the assumption that the designation 'social worker' was applicable to anyone engaged in social service activities. The paper cited the existence of a small, but vocal group of community workers, who objected to being classified as social workers. These community workers saw their practice as distinct from social work. Many of these community workers were part of the Community Volunteer Programme. This
programme had taken on a clearly community development/social action approach by the mid-late 1970's (Kilmister, 1987). Other community workers, some of whom were employees of local government involved in youth work and recreation, rejected social work and its emphasis on casework as social control. The Association, which had grown from a child welfare and health social work base, faced the dilemma of how to meet the needs of an increasingly vocal and diverse membership while maintaining some standards in training and orientation.

The fourth dilemma addressed in the conference paper was that of the growing professionalization of social work. By the time of the 1976 conference, the efforts of many including the Social Work Training Council, to support the establishment of training opportunities had materialized. University based training programmes had been established at Canterbury, Massey and Auckland Universities. (The Auckland programme was subsequently dis-established in 1981.) As well, there was growing resistance to the use of volunteers in the statutory sector as part of the social service delivery system. Those supporting professionalism saw the use of volunteers as undermining the professionalization of social work. The practice of social work, it was argued, required trained social workers. Community workers, it was asserted in this paper, saw such a move as being contrary to the principles of community development and community work which emphasized participation of community groups and individuals in service provision. Community workers' viewed the move toward professionalisation as distancing workers from clients and disempowering clients by increasing their dependency on experts for problem resolution.

The last two dilemmas addressed in the conference paper were the developments in generic social work theory and the cultural dilemma. This last dilemma addressed the unease many Pakeha social workers were reporting in attempting to work effectively with the growing number of Maori and Polynesian clients. The absence of Maori and Polynesian social workers in the Association ranks was noted. This was not the first time that issues of culture had been raised at a Social Work Conference (e.g., NAZSW, 1970 and 1972) but it did reflect a developing sophistication with the complexities of cultural issues by acknowledging that there might be added considerations in cross-cultural social work then the ones currently being addressed.

Unfortunately, the conference papers on the 1978 Biennial Conference which was held at Massey University were incomplete. However, this does not deny the significance of
this conference in the debates about social work professionalism and the social work task. The keynote address was given by Ivan Illich who presented material from his jointly authored 1977 publication on *The Disabling Professions*. Illich's views were well received by the anti-professional lobby in the social work and community work ranks. Rather than a challenge to guard against the excesses evident in traditional professions, the Illich critique was regarded as confirmation that social work professionalization was in danger of becoming an elitist monopoly guilty of all the worst excesses of the privileged, established professions. The Illich critique added a further dimension to the work of the radical social work theorists (e.g., Bailey and Brake, 1975) who contended that the casework focus of social work had relegated the social work task to a social control function in society.

This second period (1975 - 1979), then, witnessed heated debates about social service delivery models and social work. Two major bodies argued increasingly adamantly in their publications for a shift from a service delivery model which was centrally resourced and provided to a model that would both recognize and assist local community development and service provision. The New Zealand Planning Council and the New Zealand Council of Social Services were not unaware of the potential difficulties in the approach they were advocating, but both councils emphasized the advantages of a preventative, community based approach over a curative, professionally provided centralized social service delivery system. The professionalization of social work experienced great strides through the development of university based training programmes and in the growth of association membership. At the same time, these developments were heavily criticized by supporters of radical social work theory and by the critics of professionalisation of social work. It is in the documents of this period that the seeds of the restructuring are clearly evident. The features of an alternative delivery system discussed during this period would become incorporated in the principles of the 1986 restructuring.

**PERIOD III: 1979 - 1982**

**THE TURNING POINT**

Analysis of the documents of this period reflected the expectation of imminent political and social change. No longer was change at issue, for change was seen as inevitable (Easton, 1980). It was only the timing, the form and content of the changes that was yet to be determined. Social service debates during this period were dominated by
events in Auckland. This city, with a population of nearly one-third of New Zealand's population, was beset with the problems of rapid urbanization, disproportionate unemployment in the Maori and Pacific Island communities, a strengthening of the Maori activist movement (e.g., Bastion Point and Maori Land Rights demonstrations) and signs of increasing racial strife between Pakeha and Maori, and Maori and Pacific Islanders.

Two developments in Auckland set the scene for the initial phase of this period. The first was the decision in 1978 to implement a plan "for decentralizing the Department's operations in the Auckland area" (DSW, 1984:98.15) with the goal of dealing more efficiently with this concentration of the Department of Social Welfare services. Administration of the Auckland area had become problematic because of its sheer size, the proliferation of district offices and its geographical distance from Head Office, Wellington. The creation of the Auckland Region in 1980 was regionalization in its pure form because it was administrative only because it involved few delegations of authority (Robbins, 1983). It did however, provide the opportunity for the Department to debate, experiment and evaluate selected issues of regionalization as a precursor to the deliberations and decisions that were to take place later.

The second development was the decision by the Human Rights Commission under Section 5 (1)(3) of the Human Rights Commission Act of 1977 to receive and resolve the complaints laid before the Commission by the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD). This decision was made on the 6th of April 1979 and the enquiry was set to commence in Auckland, 11 February to 13 February, 1980. There was, however, an additional two years before the report was sent to the Minister of Justice on 30 August 1982 (Johnston, 1982). ACORD made complaints about the treatment of young Maori in the six Department of Social Welfare institutions for young people in and around the Auckland area. The significance of the ACORD Report was not only in its attention to the treatment of Maori youth in the institutions, in particular about the alleged indiscriminate use of the isolation in the secure units, but in drawing attention to the alarmingly disproportionate numbers of Maori in the nation's institutions of both the Departments of Justice and Social Welfare. This situation became a central issue in Maoridom's claim to assume responsibility and control for their own people (Nairn and Sutherland, 1985). The heading of 'Biculturalism' was added to the document thematic analysis from this period forward to reflect its significance as a major concern for the Department of Social Welfare.
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS
Period II: 1979 - 1982
THE TURNING POINT

1979 Human Rights Commission accepts the complaints laid by the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination

1980 Auckland Region created

1981 Directions, New Zealand Planning Council report advocating a shift of responsibility for social programmes to non-government providers

1982 Ann Hercus Keynote Speaker at the NASW Conference "applauding the virtues of a mixed economy with a diversity of institutions and many power centres"


University Grants Committee, Review Committee (The Brownlie Report), Social Work Education in New Zealand Universities


Community Development Unit established in Head Office

Roger Hadley described his model of community oriented practice to Head Office staff and District Directors

THE STATUTORY - VOLUNTARY BALANCE

The arguments for an alternative to state dominated, centralized services was gaining widespread support with the New Zealand Planning Council’s further clarification and strengthening of their preference for community based services. By the time Directions (1981) was published, the NZPC was clearly advocating a shift of responsibility for social programmes to non-governmental providers. The NZPC argued for community participation, better coordination, a preventative approach to the delivery of social services, a devolution of governmental responsibility, decentralization and support for self-help groups and community initiatives (NZPC,
1981). It was these characteristics which were conceptualized as features of the welfare society model discussed in Chapter Two.

Three developments provided additional support to the New Zealand Planning Council's view. The first was widespread support for Thatcherism and monetarist policies in Britain which influenced New Zealand political and economic thinking. Brian Easton, the New Zealand economist, noting the changes occurring in New Zealand's political and business centres, argued:

The welfare state evolved in New Zealand as a consequence of the unregulated private market's failure to attain social goals in social welfare... In particular, there is no certainty that in a private market economy, the distribution of goods and services to individuals will be socially acceptable (Easton, 1980:7).

He concluded his thesis with a warning that some would later argue went unheeded:

What the people of New Zealand want could be subverted by others in the name of the dominance of the economy... The Welfare State has been a community response to historical change. To go against this historical thrust would be to abandon New Zealand as a community (Easton, 1980:177).

Monetarist economic theory, with its emphasis on the free market and individual responsibility, began to dominate the thinking of the political and business communities. Concerns about cost effectiveness, advanced management techniques, inputs and outcomes became prevalent as views about the continued viability of the welfare state dominated the political and economic scene.

The second major influence was the development of a model for community social work in Britain by Roger Hadley and his associates (1981, 1984, 1987) set out in Chapter Two. To recapitulate, Hadley with Stephen Hatch (1981) argued for redressing the imbalance between state and non-statutory provision of social services. The argument was based on a conceptualization of social work in close interaction with a geographical community or 'patch' in which the social work task would be broadly defined to encompass the full range of financial and psychological supports to comprehensive and specialized services utilizing both informal and formal networks. The two cornerstones of the model, participation and the use of volunteers, had received attention in a New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organizations publication (1981) although based on an earlier conceptualization of the model. The Federation's publication
acknowledged the Minister of Social Welfare's support for the 'patch system' (NZFVWO, 1981:2) and noted that under successive National Party governments, the growth of financial support to voluntary agencies from vote Social Welfare had grown from $4,837,000 in 1975/6 financial year to $15,984,382 in the 1980/1981 financial year (NZFVWO, 1981:8). The Federation cited the special financial programmes for the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped and Plunket Society that had been introduced. These funding arrangements further established these voluntary organizations as quasi-government agencies because of their dependency on government funding and exemplified the growing trend by government to use the voluntary sector as a significant provider of social services for identified groups.

Support for the Hadley and Hatch model (1981) was further promulgated by a highly respected social worker on his return from a year in Britain as the recipient of the Nuffield Scholarship. In mid-1982, Raoul Ketko published his report, Social Work Developments in England, 1981/1982. Ketko was a top ranking career social worker in Head Office with a responsibility for social work policy. His report, which was mainly descriptive, reflected a dissatisfaction with the dominance of centralized, bureaucratized social service provision and advocated the adoption of a community-centred approach to social service delivery. His preference for the community-centred approach of Hadley and Hatch (1981) was based on two critical features:

1. The strengthening of informally and formally organized voluntary support systems so that the need to turn to the statutory sector is reduced

2. The establishment of programmes to increase the effectiveness of direct intervention by the social services when this remains necessary through seeking earlier identification of those at risk and by deploying a larger proportion of personnel in front-line positions with the ability to provide help (Ketko, 1982:7).

Such an approach, Ketko argued, would increase the capacity of communities to assume and/or extend their caring capacities by funding and resourcing programmes designed to support community efforts. The approach would rely heavily on early identification and intervention by informal care-givers with minimum training and expertise but backed up by a small cadre of specialists. Ketko's support was a decisive factor in the promulgation of the ideas of Hadley and Hatch (1981). Roger Hadley came to New Zealand to discuss the model with Head Office and District Directors at their annual conference in 1982.
The growing influence of the community-centred approach was evident in the Department's report of the *Review of the Social Work Division* (1982). This review had been set up as a joint exercise between the Department of Social Welfare and the State Services Commission (DSW, 1982). It was the brief of the Review Team to respond to concerns about recruitment for managerial and training positions in Head Office and to address the appropriateness of social work staffing at the middle management levels in District Offices. The Review Team, however, assumed a much wider brief. The Review Team emphasized the need for a statement of values, principles and commitments encompassing all areas of its work be formulated by the Department and recommended that "urgency be given to developing goals and objectives for the Social Work Division" (DSW, 1982:123). It could be argued that these recommendations implied a lack of direction, criticism of the social work service and a demand for leadership from the Department despite explicit reference in the document to these issues.

It is imperative to note that the *Review of the Social Work Division* (1982) made no specific reference to the ethnic issues addressed in the Johnston Report (1982) on Maori youth in Department institutions issued a few months earlier. The Review did address the issues of the Auckland Region by rejecting the concept of a region as a separate management structure. The Review recommended that a regional director's role be one of leadership, not authority, and recommended delegations of authority be passed directly to District Offices.

We consider it is time that the Department made a conscious policy move towards a more decentralised system of management and that an early step in implementing this is to review the social work delegations with a view to retaining the absolute minimum of decision making within Head Office. The Working Party is divided on the extent to which major casework decisions relating especially to children in care, should be delegated to Directors specifically (DSW, 1982:38).

Further recommendations of the *Review of the Social Work Division* (DSW, 1982) included the establishment of a Senior Practitioner Grade in an effort to reward and retain practitioners at the front-line and the development of a comprehensive training programme for practice and supervision including a Certificate of Proficiency offered internally by the Department. The Review quoted the Social Work Training Council statistics (Rochford and Robb, 1981) which showed that only 17% of all social
workers had a qualification appropriate to their task and only 3% of the Department's front-line workers held a social work qualification. Despite the discussion on the needs of training and the specific types of training that were required, there was no mention made of training needs in cultural sensitivity or bicultural practice. The recommendation for a departmental certificate may have been a reaction against the strong support in the Brownlie Report (University Grants Committee, 1982) for university based social work training programmes and the growing frustration with the apparent inability of the Social Work Training Council to develop social work training opportunities for youth and community workers (Brook, 1988). The Review recommended that departmental policy recognize social welfare volunteers as part of the Department's services. There was considerable variation from district to district in the use and support of volunteers and considerable variation over time within a particular district, as well (DSW, 1986c). The recommendations of the Review acknowledged the marginality of volunteers in the Department and recommended the volunteer programmes be regarded as an integral feature of the Department's activities.

As well the Review expressed scepticism with community development activities as a statutory responsibility and drew once again from the British experience.

In the present state of limited resources [the Review] tends to agree with Professor Pinker's minority view [in the Barclay Report, 1981] that a statutory social work service must be selective in its approach to community work and that '... it has neither the capacity, the resources nor the mandate to go looking for needs in the community at large' (DSW, 1982:56).

The scepticism with statutory based community development activities, evident in the Review, ran contrary to the expressed support of a community-centred social work approach utilizing community development activities evident in other departmental documents and in the establishment of a Community Development Unit in 1982 based in Head Office. The purpose of the Community Development Unit was "to assist field and residential social work services to respond effectively to new and changing community needs and expectations" (DSW, 1984:45). (See Chapter Six for a discussion of how the establishment of the Community Development Team was viewed in the Napier District). The recommendations of the Review of the Social Work Division (DSW, 1982) proposing the delegation of social work decision making to the District Offices and supporting a community social work model utilizing volunteers, voluntary agencies and
informal networks would feature in the restructuring of 1986. Few of its other recommendations were implemented.

**SOCIAL WORK**

The University Grants Committee (1982) instructed a review of social work training opportunities be undertaken. The Brownlie Report which was published in May of 1982 noted that of the 2,500 surveyed full-time paid employees in social work, only 14.3% held a social work qualification although the percentage was substantially higher (32.5%) for those in supervisory or administrative positions (University Grants Committee, 1982). The Brownlie Report strongly argued for the university as the appropriate site for social work training while acknowledging the issues of access and equity. Recognition of the needs for training and education for social workers in the Auckland Region was noted as was the political reality of ever being able to resurrect a social work programme at the University of Auckland following the demise of their programme in 1981. The Brownlie Report (University Grants Committee, 1982) urged the establishment of a social work training programme in the Auckland Teachers College, as a tertiary institution with the capability and willingness to support a programme tailored to meet the needs of the large multi-racial population of Auckland. The Brownlie Report (University Grants Committee, 1982) was supportive of social work professionalization and of expanding access initiatives in certificate and extramural programmes.

The debates of the 1982 NZASW Conference, entitled "Social Justice: A Social Work Concern for the 80s," acknowledged that the features of the welfare state were undergoing a metaphorosis. Ann Hercus, Labour Minister of Parliament, gave the keynote address at the Conference in which she set out her assumptions about the welfare state and social policy:

> I applaud the virtues of a mixed economy. I want an economy which is market based. . . because the alternative (monolithic state control) would destroy our pluralistic democracy. . . . I want an open, pluralist, participatory democracy, with a *diversity* [sic] of institutions, *many* [sic] power centres. But I can see that even the value of majority rule cannot be accepted as an absolute principle; it has to be restricted by the principle of inalienable rights of individuals, which no majority verdict may abrogate. . . . Social justice in a democracy must involve the synthesis of those
two great values—the rights of the individual and the rights of the community (NZASW, 1982:10-12).

Ranganui Walker, a noted Maori leader and academic, contended in his reply to the keynote speech that a pluralistic democracy did not exist in New Zealand's centralized, bureaucratic governmental system:

The linkages between freedom and individualism on the one hand and equality and collectivism on the other are complex and often involve competing and equally valid rights. . . . [the keynote speaker] advocates a pluralistic democracy with many power centres. . . . we have in the last decade drifted into the power of the superstate which threatens to subjugate us all. . . . You, as social workers. . . . have a responsibility to assist in the development of community groups as alternative power centres to moderate the influence of the superstate (NZASW, 1982:24).

An attack on the supremacy of economic theory in determining the goals of New Zealand was the focus of the second response to the keynote address given by Alf Kirk of the Federation of Labour. Rather than the development of many power centres his view of the last decade of New Zealand was further "concentration of power in the hands of a few. . . . a growing gap between the rich and the poor" (NZASW, 1982:26). Kirk's criticism extended to social workers in their professional role.

The point that is important to bear in mind is that many of the poor and the oppressed in our society are victims of the options taken by professionals; can social workers, committed to 'professionalism,' really be an authentic voice for social justice to those people? (NZASW, 1982:28).

This conference further deepened the crisis of confidence in New Zealand's social workers. This crisis was to become more acute as radical social work literature proliferated, as the split between social workers and community workers grew, and as the Maori demands for Maori social workers for Maori clients became more vocal.

**BICULTURALISM**

acknowledged in his report, which was prepared in six weeks and issued on the 29th of October, 1982:

Many, if not all, the practices and procedures which formed the basis of the representations by ACORD have been eradicated and the Department has embarked on a programme of innovative change (Johnston, 1982:123).

The recommendations in the Johnston Report (1982) emphasized the need for pre-entry, in-service and advanced training at every level of staffing and noted that the Department's scheme for training for newly appointed residential social workers had never been implemented. While recommending measures to prevent institutionalization of Maori youth, the Johnston Report (1982) addressed the monoculturalism of institutions under the heading of 'Cultural Practice':

With the large proportion of Maori and Polynesian young people in the Homes, the Committee of Enquiry was interested to learn to what extent it was possible for them to become involved in the expression of their own culture and to what extent cultural values were evident on shaping the general policy of the institutions (Johnston, 1982:50).

Johnston (1982), however, did not make clear recommendations. Although Johnston's discussion of cultural issues consumed only three pages of the sixty-three page report, it is significant because it was the first time that a report from the Department specifically addressed the issues of monoculturalism.

The Johnston Report (1982) strongly recommended that "every effort should be made to find alternative care within the community" (Johnston, 1982:42). [The term 'alternative care' would later be used in the restructuring to designate the programmes aimed at developing community care arrangements for pre-adolescent youth.] The Report strongly supported policies that would stem the tide of Maori youth into welfare and penal institutions.

That policy will demand much of the local Maori communities. But if those communities are willing, in one way or another, according to their own traditions, to provide the necessary shelter and nurture for Tu-Tangata, then they may rightly expect financial resources put at their disposal for such a purpose (Johnston, 1982:52).
This quote referred to the request by Maori people 'to care for our own' and clearly stated the expectation of a subsequent transfer of resources from the state for that purpose. Transfer of resources for community provided social services would come to characterize Government-Maori relations in the following years (Nairn and Sutherland, 1985). The Johnston Report (1982) pointed to two programmes as examples of efforts to utilize and develop community efforts to prevent young people coming into care. The first was the Community Care Unit of the Department in South Auckland that utilized social workers with extensive knowledge of and commitment to the identified local community. The second was a West Auckland cooperative scheme involving the Departments of Social Welfare, Maori Affairs, Justice, the local schools and Police Youth Aid Officers.

A highly important adjunct to this scheme is the acceptance of responsibility by the local Maori Community for dealing with offenders in a manner springing out of the Maori culture and centred upon the Hoani Waititi Marae. The Marae has at its disposal a whole network of community groups scattered throughout the area available for involvement in this community responsibility for its own people (Johnston, 1982:49).

The joint efforts exemplified in these two examples were indicative of a growing awareness of the interrelationships of social problems and of the imperative to assume the holistic approach as integral to the Maori world view.

It is essential to note that the debates concerning community involvement and decentralization during this period had unique characteristics. Community involvement had a vague and generalized meaning. While implying participation of a wider representation, community involvement was not couched in terms of representations of gender, race, or users of the service as was to be the case later in the 1980's. Decentralization had a classic definition of delegation of authority and responsibility down the hierarchy, in this case to lower levels in the government departments or a decentralization from central to local government but did not include notions of power sharing with Maori or disadvantaged groups. Devolution was used interchangeably with decentralization although at times it referred to transfers of responsibility for various tasks between government departments, from one level of government to another, i.e., from national to regional or local government, or from government departments to non-statutory agencies. Focused consideration of racial or cultural issues, i.e., the role of iwi authorities had not yet emerged.
PERIOD IV: 1983 - 1985
THE CONVERGENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE RESTRUCTURING

The impetus for the changes that were about to converge had their origins in the previous period. There were four main sources of the gaining momentum for change. In the political arena, the National Government was facing serious threats to its political supremacy which it would lose in the election of 1984. Policy analysts were vocally decrying the bureaucratization and professionalization of the social services. Maori activists were clamouring to assume responsibility for their own people, disproportionately represented in welfare and penal institutions. Social workers, community workers and social policy makers were continuing to debates the virtues of alternative social service delivery systems.

This turmoil was reflected in the accelerated pace with which working parties and reviews were initiated, the extensive community consultations, the repeated calls for submissions on various proposals and the reports published during the years leading up to the restructuring. Biculturalism, as a major factor to be considered in the planning and delivery of social services, gains significant momentum during this period.

Table VI

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<tr>
<th>SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND DOCUMENTS</th>
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<td>Period IV: 1983 - 1985</td>
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<td>THE CONVERGENCE OF EVENTS</td>
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1983

Maori Advisory Unit established in Auckland

State Services Commission booklet on "Public Service in Multi-Cultural Society" recommended that (1) there be equal employment representation in relation to ethnic populations and (2) government departments maintain records of staff ethnic composition

Maatua Whangai programme established as a joint effort of Department of Justice, Maori Affairs, and Social Welfare
The first two years of this period were dominated by increasingly caustic political debates about social and economic policies and by the 1984 snap election which brought about the fall of the National Government, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, and the "Think Big" capital investment development projects. The Labour Party Caucus chose David Lange as Prime Minister and Roger Douglas as Finance Minister as leaders committed more to a rejection of the past than with a vision of the future. Easton (1989) argued that Labour visualized a restructuring option which:

Involved liberalisation, with the removal of external and internal protection. . . . There is no indication in the Labour Opposition debates of the monetarist macroeconomic strategy that was finally adopted. . . . Rather, the restructurers were led, step by step, down the monetarist commercialist path, probably for much of the time not fully aware where that path was leading (Easton, 1989:8).

Pervasive social and economic changes were promulgated through the numerous working parties and review committees commissioned shortly after the Labour Government assumed power.

Issues of biculturalism and the major public consultation efforts of the government in several areas of government activity dominated 1985 and 1986. The social services were no exception. A complex consultation process was established for a benefit and tax review and for public submissions on the proposed changes to the Children and Young
Person's Act of 1974. What was significant about these consultations was the process that was utilized which was based on the government coming to the people to accept formal and informal submissions, in written or oral form, in public meetings and on marae. The Maori voice was increasingly more vocal, more organized and more focused. The submissions of the Maori community on the proposed changes to the Children and Young Person's Act clearly stated their desire to take responsibility for their own and their insistence that if a Maori child were taken into care the process of that care must respect Taha Maori (Nairn and Sutherland, 1985).

**THE STATUTORY - VOLUNTARY BALANCE**

The briefing papers to the incoming Minister of Social Welfare in 1984 emphasized the pressure on the Department due to the sharp rise in the level of unemployment and in particular the stress in the social work division in response to the increased referrals of family dysfunction and family violence. Departmental social work staff were under considerable strain from:

> The demands for them to become more involved in and supportive of community initiatives while at the same time coping with a growing workload of statutory duties. . . despite attempts at community care and the Maatua Whangai programme, admission figures in institutions have reached new highs this year (DSW, 1984:147).

The Briefing Papers, however, contended that "in recent years, the Department has sought to scale down its costly institutional programme" (DSW, 1984:84) in favour of community care. The Briefing Papers encouraged increased Departmental support for community based initiatives.

The Minister of Social Welfare in her conference address reconfirmed support for the continued existence of the Social Advisory Council (1984b). This was interpreted by the Council as approval for its efforts to support the networking tasks of the District Councils of Social Services at the local level. The purpose of the District Councils was to encourage coordination and cooperation among local community groups and voluntary interests. The Conference proposed a Federation of the thirty seven district councils as essential to carry out their task (Social Advisory Council, 1984b).
Additional support for the voluntary sector was heard from two sources within the Department of Social Welfare. Helen Wyn (1984) of the Department's Social Programme Evaluation Unit authored a paper on the Department's voluntary funding schemes and concluded that:

Presently, virtually everything has to be approved through Head Office . . . [the need for] ministerial approval for most funding decisions tends to be labour intensive and slow. This was seen as inconsistent with the desire to gain from the innovation and flexibility of the voluntary sector (Wyn, 1984:24, 26).

Wyn (1984) called for a streamlining of the voluntary funding process and noted that voluntary agencies tended to be more responsive to community needs and to provide a more cost-efficient service than government. Her colleagues, Carson and Hennessey (1984) in their interim report on the allocation of social work resources, argued that their research demonstrated that the existing workload formula only included intervention cases that have already come to notice. Within the formula there was no mechanism for accounting for preventative or alternative social work activities such as community work or coordination with volunteers and voluntary organizations or groups. Their data demonstrated that:

In the 1975 caseload formula weights 75.6% of time was to be allocated to casework compared to now 67% . . . due to the changing nature of departmental casework (Carson and Hennessey, 1984:32).

In addition, basic graders had increased their allocation to coordination with voluntary organizations from 15% in 1983 to 18.4% in 1984. Such an increase, Carson and Hennessey (1984) postulated, reflected a willingness to engage in more community oriented activities. Yet, strict use of the workload formula could mean social workers would be disadvantaged in evaluation and promotion rounds despite current policy directives. Carson and Hennessey (1984) recommended that the workload formula be changed to allocate a minimum of 18% of basic grade time social work time to non-casework community oriented activities.

Outside the Department, the New Zealand Planning Council in their publication, *Meeting Needs in the Community*, (Davey and Dwyer, 1984) called for community-based alternatives with a "devolution of government responsibility and decentralisation of services" (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:1). The publication offered a critical analysis on
the role of the state in the provision of social services delineating the potential weaknesses of provision in the voluntary sector. Davey and Dwyer (1984) offered a description of existing community based programmes in Health, Social Welfare, Maori Affairs and Justice as examples of the support and potential of community based programmes. *Meeting Needs in the Community* (Davey and Dwyer, 1984) asserted that a community oriented approach was supported nationally by the New Zealand Council of Social Services (NZCSS, 1978) and internationally by the OECD (OECD, 1981). In the introduction to this publication, the Chairman of the Planning Council expressed the view of the Council as supporting:

The ideal of a 'welfare society' replacing the 'welfare state.' Internationally, the OECD was prominent in advocating such a shift (Davey and Dwyer, 1984: vii).

Moreover, it was significant that this same agency had in an earlier review of the New Zealand economy explicitly advocated such a shift (NZPC, 1979).

It was the view of Davey and Dwyer that "indications are that the encouragement of 'community' rather than 'state' services is becoming clearer as a policy objective" (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:37). They supported the conclusions of the Barclay Report on the roles and tasks of British social workers (Barclay Report, 1982) which advocated for governmental support of family based informal caring networks. Such support was seen to reduce the breakdown of family care and the subsequent need for formal services. Davey and Dwyer, in their recommendations for community-based services, warned that:

(a) All sectors have a role to play in meeting needs and that the government cannot be reduced to a residual role in service delivery

(b) Despite the attractiveness of flexible, market-based services, their growth may perpetuate inequalities of access

(c) It cannot be assumed that an increased role of the voluntary sector in service provision will, on its own, lead to better, more effective or more participatory services, and

(d) If emphasis is laid on encouraging families and non-governmental groups to provide increasing amounts of care, thus reducing dependence on central government, then this suggests that the state's role is residual or a
Davey and Dwyer (1984) cautioned that, "Some suggest the thrust for community-based services is motivated by a desire to reduce government responsibility for providing care" (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:2). It was worth noting that "Despite widespread support for the idea of 'community services,' the funds available do not appear to have increased in real terms" (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:38).

Although there were indications that the government was giving signals of a shift to heavier reliance on the voluntary sector, the message was ambivalent. In mid-1985, the Minister of Labour announced his intention to phase-out the Voluntary Organisation Training Programme (VOTP). This scheme provided support for staff salaries in voluntary organizations. Many organizations were solely dependent on VOTP monies for staff salaries. The outcry was so strong that by December of 1985, a new scheme of support to the voluntary sector was proposed: the Community Organisation Grant Scheme (COGS). The establishment money of $20 million was to come from existing grants in the Departments of Labour and Social Welfare. Whether or not it truly reflected existing levels of allocation was impossible to determine but many felt it was substantially lower than the VOTP budget. The scheme was innovative in its administrative structure and was to become the prime example of devolution in practice (Levett, Keelan and McClellan, 1988).

COGS had a two tier funding system: (1) An allocation of $11.5 million to national organizations such as Rape Crisis Centres and Te Kohanga Reo (i.e., 'language nests' for the teaching of Maori language and culture to children under five years old), and (2) The remaining allocation to be distributed through a system of COGS allocation committees for 'essential social services' as determined by locally based committees responding to local needs. A national structure was created with eleven field workers whose responsibility was to support the local committees with two national coordinators with overall responsibility and accountability to the Minister of Social Welfare (Driver and Robinson, 1986). The administrative structure, however, was for advice and support only, the allocation of resources was the responsibility of the committees who were charged with the responsibility of protecting their allocation carefully by resisting any pressure to conform to government expectations for allocations (Levett, Keelan and McClellan, 1988). The COGS programme was the first
and virtually the only truly devolved program in the Department before 1988 and, hence, was used repeatedly by the government as a prime example of government policy and of the ability of the community to take responsibility for its own needs. It must be noted, however, the COGS program, despite its community emphasis, continued its reliance on the state as the sole funder.

**SERVICE DELIVERY**

In proposing a shift to decentralized services and more dependency on voluntary groups to provide service, Davey and Dwyer (1984) warned that although such policy objectives include increased flexibility, participation of consumers, and responsiveness to diversity, "Shifting the base of a service is not sufficient to ensure the participation of, let alone accountability to, clients or to 'the wider Community' " (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:39).

Davey and Dwyer (1984) noted that such a shift in New Zealand would be complicated by two factors. Firstly, they argued, there are indications of definite limits to the ability and the willingness of families and volunteers to provide more care. This was partly because New Zealand has an historical dependency on the state for social provision as a "comprehensive welfare state where centralisation and universality are emphasized, and the needs of individuals, families and households are defined for them by government " (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:46-47).

Secondly, effective decentralization and devolution was seen as dependent on a strong local governmental infrastructure to promote community development and services. Such an infrastructure was not evident in New Zealand. Davey and Dwyer (1984) concurred with an earlier observation of the New Zealand Planning Council.

In the area of social services, as in other aspects of national development, there is unlikely to be substantial development in the direction of decentralisation without the development of a stronger and more rational structure of local and regional government able to assume greater responsibility in the allocation of resources (NZPC, 1976: 112).
Moves to develop a stronger local government were under discussion and the debates about that process, e.g., on revenue sharing alternatives, would come to play a dominant role in the political arena in the following years (See Boston, 1988).

One of the major arguments in favour of decentralization and devolution was the demand for meaningful partnership with the community, broadly conceptualized during this period as contribution to social service planning. Large bureaucracies were seen as alienating and unresponsive to local needs. The research of Davey and Dwyer (1984) led them to the significance of two aspects of participation which do not necessarily occur simultaneously: participation in decision making and participation in provision. Davey and Dwyer (1984) noted that "the greater the amount of participation, the more complex and time-consuming the process of decision-making tends to be" (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:10). Yet,

Consumer involvement should be encouraged for ideological reasons, as a recognition of people's right to participate and to be in control of their own living and as an antidote to dependency (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:58).

While acknowledging that instances of both types of participation are part of New Zealand's social fabric, participation was not assessed as equal or equitable when examining the realities of representativeness on decision making bodies:

More participation and self-help require greater input from clients, however, the lower income, less educated groups generally have less time and fewer influential contacts to ensure their particular needs are met. The possibility of greater inequality with more 'community based' services is very real (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:51).

SOCIAL WORK

Davey and Dwyer (1984) viewed professionalism and participation as mutually exclusive. Social service professionals in health, justice and social welfare:

Work on applying expert knowledge on the analysis and treatment of an individuals problem and see themselves as able to make the best decision (Davey and Dwyer, 1984:11).
The emphasis on the employment of educated professionals not only led to higher socio-economic status for these groups but had accentuated the class differences between professions and clients. Davey and Dwyer (1984) asserted that anti-welfarism and anti-professionalism was evident in the growth of alternative health care facilities, advocacy groups and self-help groups.

The newly appointed Minister of Social Welfare, aware of these contrary views, embarked on a programme of change by initiating a series of ministerial reviews of existing structures and programmes. Among the initial reviews commissioned was a review of the Social Work Training Council (Ministerial Review Committee, 1985). When the Minister appointed a Ministerial Review Committee, she simultaneously requested that the Social Work Training Council prepare its own review of its activities. The self evaluation provided the Council with an opportunity to summarize its accomplishments during its ten year history, to comment on its inability to develop an extensive 'mosaic of educational opportunities,' and to acknowledge the voluntary contributions of its members over the years (SWTC, 1985). The Council noted its lack of funds, its dependency on Departmental staff secondments and the inadequacy of Department administrative support as major constraints in its achieving the objectives set out in its terms of reference. Despite these constraints, the SWTC had been supportive of the establishment of four university-based social work programmes; had established programme standards and completed a round of accreditation of the university based programmes; had brought New Zealand Social Work into the international social work network; and had completed a number of research projects, the most notable of which was the Rochford and Robb (1981) nationwide survey of social service personnel (SWTC, 1985).

The Ministerial Review Committee (1985) was extremely critical of the Council's emphasis on university based programmes and attacked the Council for its preoccupation with professional education at the expense of pre-entry and specialized training programmes for youth and community workers (Ministerial Review Committee, 1985). The Committee called for the replacement of the Training Council with an Aotearoa Training Council that would emphasize the bicultural needs of New Zealand society and the training needs of voluntary workers (Ministerial Review Committee, 1985).
The Ministerial Review Committee Report stimulated fierce debate for its perceived anti-professional bias and its explicit emphasis on biculturalism. Both Reports were submitted to the Minister in June 1985. The Minister placed the Social Work Training Council in remission while she considered an alternative. This decision dealt a devastating blow to the social work professional community already under strong criticism for its inability to meet the social problems plaguing New Zealand society. It effectively curtailed the university accreditation processes and the Certificate of Qualification in Social Work for individual social workers and threatened the significant formal link with the international social work community (Brook, 1988).

It would be nearly two years before the Council on Education and Training in the Social Services (CETSS) would be officially established in late 1986 (CETSS, 1988) and nearly four years before the new Council leadership officially presented the work of the CETSS to a major social worker's forum. In July of 1989, CETSS presented a major proposal for programme accreditation and validation to the New Zealand Social Workers Conference held in Palmerston North.

**BICULTURALISM**

The joint efforts of government departments to deal with the problem of disproportionate Maori youth in government institutions led to the creation of the Maatua Whangai programme in 1983. The *Hui Whakatauira*, held in 1981, had urged the Department of Maori Affairs to promote a programme to address this issue (Maori Economic Development Conference, 1984). The Departments of Maori Affairs and Social Welfare urged cooperation with the Department of Justice for a comprehensive approach. The objective of the programme was to stem the tide of Maori young into government institutions through the development of whanau (extended family) support systems and whanau placements. The programme was funded by the three departments for an initial period, although the administrative responsibility was held by the Department of Social Welfare. The eight Maatua Whangai workers were sited in elected Department of Social Welfare District Offices.

The same year the Maori Advisory Unit was established in the Auckland Regional Office charged with the responsibility to advise the Department of policies, changes and needs relating to Maori people with "a view to making changes and taking action" on all
matters regarding Maori people including the staffing, recruitment and function of the
department and to consult with "the Maori community" (DSW, 1985d:3). The
establishment of the Maori Advisory Unit was significant because it signalled the
beginning of the Department's explicit commitment to Maori people; a commitment that
was later subsumed under a commitment to 'biculturalism.'

Ian Douglas noted the changes taking place in Pakeha-Maori relations in New Zealand
society in the mid-1980's:

As late as the 1960's government policy towards the Maori people
was very much predicated on the perceived need to fuse the two
races; not just economically and socially, but physically. . . [we
have] begun to perceive a different vision of a radically mixed
society based not on absorption of one race by the other, but on a
relationship of mutual respect, enabling each race to make its
distinctive contribution to a community which would be the richer
for upholding such distinctiveness (Douglas, 1985:105).

The growing support for biculturalism demanded re-evaluation of Pakeha-Maori
relationships in every sphere of life. In 1985 the Department of Social Welfare was
confronted with two internal reports that questioned the validity of its service
provision. The first was the publication of the Report on Institutional Racism in the
Department of Social Welfare: Tamaki-Makau-Rau (DSW,1985b). This report had
been officially in process for nearly two years, with a draft presented to the Maori
community in November 1984 and the revised edition circulated in May of 1985. The
report was prepared by nine women social workers in the Auckland Region who used the
mandate of the State Services Commission's 1983 recommendation that "Government
Departments gather data on the ethnic composition of their staff" (quoted in DSW,
1985b) to legitimize their research. They shared a concern:

About racism in Aotearoa [New Zealand] and in our Department. . . .
The Department practices institutional racism. . . . We have a
responsibility to work for change within our organisation. . . . This
group is committed to a bicultural society. . . . We believe that Maori
people as the indigenous people of Aotearoa have a right to power and
resources (DSW, 1985b:1-2).

The Report offered a comprehensive set of recommendations to the Department. It called
for the establishment of an anti-racism training programme, monitored by Maori
people as part of a request to the Maori people of Tamaki-Makau-Rau (Auckland) to
develop their bicultural vision for the Department. It rejected the recommendation of
the State Services Commission for proportional staff representation on a national basis. Instead, the Report recommended an ethnic composition of staffing in each work unit that reflected the consumer group being served. The Report cited the low number of Maori staff within the Department and called for an active Affirmative Action Programme for Maori people based on accurate personnel data, training, and support systems. For such systems to be effective, the Report recommended job advertisements be bilingual and changes be made to the State Services Commission criteria for 'merit selection' that would recognize biculturalism as equal in value to work experience, personal qualities and educational qualifications (DSW, 1985b).

These recommendations were based on data that showed an inverse relationship between Pakeha/Maori staff to consumers and dominance of decision-making positions in the Department by Pakeha staff. The Report on Institutional Racism in the Department of Social Welfare (1985b) asserted that the services provided by the Department were fundamentally racist in nature and concluded:

The Department must become bicultural. To do this it [the Department of Social Welfare] must return power and resources to Maori people so that they may be equal participants in policy and decision making (DSW, 1985b:38).

The recommendations of the Report on Institutional Racism in the Department of Social Welfare were echoed in the Maori Advisory Unit Report (DSW, 1985d) issued shortly afterwards. The Maori Advisory Unit had been established in 1984 in response to the recommendations of the Human Rights Commission and the Johnston Report (1982) about the Department's policies in residential care. The Unit was commissioned by the Director-General to comment on the Department's capacity to meet the needs of the Maori people in relation to service delivery. The Unit viewed its task as bringing a bicultural perspective to the Department. In their report, the Unit supported biculturalism "as the only process towards a truly multi-cultural society" (DSW, 1985d:5). The Unit's Report noted the feeling of powerlessness in the bureaucracy and urged a process to 'humanize' the institution:

Humanity must be practised internally before it can be implemented through services offered to the public. Low wages in the clerical system, high staff turnover in parts of the Department's operations, a feeling of powerlessness and an inability, or lack of encouragement to contribute ideas or feedback on Departmental policies and procedures which are perceived as unjust or unrealistic, rank high as part of the response we
received from our korero [talks] with Department employees (DSW, 1985d:12).

This feeling of powerlessness was particularly acute with Maori staff who felt they had to "leave their Maoriness at home. . . . Being a Maori should be considered an asset, not a hindrance to one's work and opportunities within the Department" (DSW, 1985c:12-13).

The Maori Advisory Unit Report (DSW, 1985c) dealt with the meaning and central importance of whanau in Maori society and its implications for Departmental policy and practice in benefit and service provision. The Report lamented:

The practice of placing Maori children in Pakeha foster homes has been shown to be inappropriate but still occurs. This situation is being addressed in the Maatua Whangai concept, but unfortunately instead of being allowed to grow and develop is generally floundering because it has been slotted into the presently existing structure as 'Maori fostering' (DSW, 1985c:14).

The stated primary objective was the development of a whanau which would "cater for all Maori children" (DSW,1985d:15). The Report asserted that the continued institutionalization of Maori children and the nonrespect of Taha Maori and whanau in welfare institutions was racist.

The Maori Advisory Unit Report (DSW, 1985d) concluded by restating its commitment: (1) To the concept of Maatua Whangai as an alternative model of welfare, (2) To the role of community development in ensuring that the responsibility for providing care returns to the whanau, the hapu and iwi, (3) To decentralization of power and resources to whanau and community linked groups, and (4) To the participation of community members in the recruitment and selection of staff supported by adequate training programmes (DSW, 1985d).

These two reports were discussed at the Assistant Directors of Social Work Conference in October, 1985. That Conference resolved to "to develop a viable, community-based social work service that is responsive, accountable, bicultural and sustainable" (DSW, 1986b:25). The Assistant Directors asserted that four principles were integral to the interpretation of the Department's mission: (1) Welfare: being able to establish and sustain, social and cultural identity, (2) Biculturalism: including the recognition of the rights of the Tangata Whenua, (3) Community based services, and (4) Minimum
effective intervention, provided in the least intrusive form and at the lowest intensity necessary (DSW, 1986b).

This period, then, saw the convergence of the themes advocating a shift away from state provision towards the provision of service in the voluntary and informal sectors. Decentralization and devolution were seen as two mechanisms that could offer an alternative to centralized, bureaucratized services. The strength of the Maori community in demanding a voice and a role in the care of Maori youth was equalled only by an apparent willingness of the Department to respond to minority requests. There was, as well, some cynicism expressed that the 'buzz' words of participation community, biculturalism, etc., and the numerous calls for consultations in the reviews were a smoke screen for a systematic dismantling of the welfare state (Davey & Dwyer, 1984).

PERIOD V:
1986 - 1988
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESTRUCTURING

By the beginning of 1986 the pace of change was further accelerated by the Fourth Labour Government's announcement of plans for several additional reviews in the coming year. Government departments under review initiated extensive internal organizational, management, personnel and service delivery changes in response to draft previews of the task force or review committee recommendations in an apparent attempt to maintain organizational integrity and credibility. The stresses associated with sweeping change were apparent throughout the government service. The widespread adoption of corporate terminology, business management practices and short-term financially based evaluation systems meant that government departments which had been operating under a long-term service ethic were now attempting to embrace a results oriented strategy in the struggle for organizational survival. The terminology was in marked contrast to the liberal language of previous years. It is also important to note the high degree of similarity in the recommendations of the various reports and reviews which indicated a consensus on the solutions, real or assumed, to the issues and problems under consideration.
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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*Management Plan*  
Social Advisory Council, *Partnership: The Delivery of Social and Community Services*  
Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu: The Daybreak Report*  
Ministerial Task Force publication, *Social Welfare Services: A Resource Book*  
Driver and Robinson, *Voluntary Social Services*, New Zealand Planning Council  
DSW funding to Community Volunteers cease  
*"New Direction in Management: Communication, Formal Systems for Briefing and Consulting,"* |
| 1987 | Social Security Act Amendment established the Social Welfare Commission  
Department of Social Welfare: *Corporate Management Plan*  
The budget announces review of defence, education, housing and social welfare adding to reviews in health and tertiary education already underway  
*Social Welfare Services: The Way Ahead*  
Council on Education and Training in the Social Services established, reporting to Departments of Education and Social Welfare.  
National Community Workers Association formed with $15,000 grant from Department of Internal Affairs |
In early 1986, the Minister of Social Welfare established a Task Force on Social Welfare Services. This Task Force prepared a document, *Social Welfare Services: A Resource Book*, which was circulated in July. The Task Force called for public submissions in a consultation process to be completed by 30 September of the same year. In the foreword to the Task Force’s discussion document, the Minister of Social Welfare stated:

> I have received many requests for a total review of social welfare services... This government is committed to public consultation before [italics added] embarking on reforms (*Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services, 1986:iv*).

Yet, both the *Management Plan* (DSW, 1986a) and the report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (1986) had been published within the previous two month period.
Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, released the 8th of July 1986, recommended sweeping changes in policy, structure and practice within the Department. This report, which became central to the restructuring strategies of the Department, was almost immediately referred to exclusively by its Maori title to symbolize the Department’s commitment to biculturalism. Many of its recommendations had already been initiated as part of the Management Plan (DSW, 1986a) released by the Department a few weeks prior to the release of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu. It appeared the consultation process initiated by the Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services had been pre-empted by the major policy, structure and practice changes announced in the Management Plan (DSW 1986a) and recommended by Puao-Te-Ata-Tu. (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

The implementation of the 1986 Departmental Management Plan and Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) created multiple stresses for all levels of staff as they attempted to cope with the operationalizing the recommendations. Extensive personnel changes were implemented in Head Office including the reorganization into programme directorates with extensive staff redeployment and redundancies. (See Appendix IV.) The pressures on the Department were compounded by a change in Minister in mid-1987 and the announcement of an Administrative Review Committee set up by Cabinet in July 1987 to report directly to the Ministers of Social Welfare, Finance and State Services by the end of the year. The brief of the Administrative Review Committee was to recommend changes in management systems and “changes in the means of delivery of department services which would improve efficiency” (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:v).

The first months of 1988 were filled with speculations of the recommendations to be made by the Royal Commission on Social Policy set up the year before. Controversy reigned when the Minister asked for the Commission, originally scheduled to report in September, to report in April. Some argued that the Report was meaningless because major policies affecting social policy had already been set in place. The credibility of the Government and its stated policy of consultation was under serious question and its actions would add to the serious rift in the Labour Party ranks over Roger Douglas’s monetarist economic policies (Easton, 1989).

The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) was a massive undertaking which utilized the community consultation process developed and refined during the numerous
previous reviews and task forces commissioned by the Fourth Labour Government. The five commissioners sat for eighteen months aided by full time and seconded staff from central and local government. The five volume report, though comprehensive and comprised of major discussion and research papers drawing on the extensive statistical data available, suffered by the Minister's demand for an early report. Without sufficient time to debate and crystalize a clear framework of recommendations, The April Report, as it came to be known, was a muddle of conflicting ideas and belaboured discussion that reflected the ambivalence and diversity of New Zealand society. The Royal Commission did, however, clearly support the responsibility of the state in social service delivery and funding (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988, Vol II:659).

THE STATUTORY-VOLUNTARY BALANCE

A departmental Working Party Report on the Organisation of Social Work Services at the District Level (DSW, 1986b), offered that in their opinion that:

The Department does not necessarily have to take a provision of service role in every instance as at times it may be more appropriate to take a facilitative role enabling community groups, non-statutory organisations, etc., to provide the service, with the Department providing the necessary resources [italics added] (DSW, 1986b:10).

The Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services prepared the Resource Book (1986) to facilitate their public consultation process on the complex issues of the role of the state in service provision. The Task Force invited comment on "desirable relationships between different sectors providing welfare services" (Ministerial Task Force, 1986:34:7:1).

The Task Force asserted that there was no longer a consensus that central government should provide social services directly but foresaw a role for central government in overall national planning and coordination of services; in research, monitoring and evaluation; and in establishing regulations, standards, legal remedies and procedures.

While further shifting of funds and decision-making power may be desirable, it can have disadvantages. Local prejudices may deny some people the social welfare services they need; there is a lack
of personnel with planning and research skills at local levels; there is no agreement about what size populations should be served or what the boundaries of local areas should be (Ministerial Task Force, 1986:26:6:18).

The New Zealand Planning Council, however, continued its strong support for the shift of responsibility toward individual and community responsibility in its recommendations for:

A collective approach at the community level with the state not as a provider but as a supporter and funder of services. The emphasis differs from a welfare approach in advocating shared responsibility for caring (Davey, 1987:42).

But Davey (1987), writing under the auspices of the Planning Council, went on to argue that the Planning Council’s position did not suggest a wholesale shifting of service provision to the voluntary sector. Instead, she insisted that the Planning Council supported a differential approach that would assess the appropriateness of the type of delivery system or administrative structure, dependent on the desired outcome. A differential approach would produce the maximize efficiency and effectiveness within the principles of social service practice (Davey, 1987). This was a clearly a cautionary note issued by the Planning Council in response to rising expectations for voluntary sector provision.

The state, according to Davey, would also be responsible for setting minimum standards and a minimum level acceptable in service provision. She argued that: “There is evidence of some movement towards this goal over recent years” (Davey, 1987:49) and that the resistance to the shift came from the paternalistic and self-perpetuating approach of most government services.

While the advantages of the shift may be small gains to a lot of people, the losses are concentrated and felt by influential and articulate groups. The attitudes of professionals who have a vested interest in welfarism and fear a lowering of standards produce significant barriers, e.g. mental health professionals who oppose the use of funds for ‘drop in’ centres and preventative programmes, teachers who fear radical changes in curriculum (Davey, 1987: 43).

The major role of the state, Davey contended, was in the setting of objectives for social policy. This involved ensuring adequate income through some system of income distribution, the promotion of national growth through macro-economic policies and the
provision of a 'safety net' for income support. Social objectives could be met through a
differential approach that included sharing costs of service between the state, the
community and the user:

It can no longer be assumed, however, that central government
will itself provide the full range of services, or that it will fully
fund them even if other agencies deliver them. . . . This will mean
using the resources of central government, local government, the
voluntary sector, geographical communities and communities of
interest, the commercial sector, households, families and
individuals (Davey, 1987:53).

Such an argument demonstrated strong support of welfare pluralism and of Hadley and
Hatch's Participatory Model (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). Consider that for the fiscal
year 1986/87, the Department was allocated the largest single vote in the Budget, and
distributed benefits to one and one half million citizens of New Zealand's 3.4 million
people. Yet, less than 3% of the total of $6,175 million was allocated to social work
services (DSW, 1987a). Of that $110 million, $60 million was allocated to
community agencies (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:52). This meant that
$1 of every $3 in the social services/social work budget was distributed through non-
statutory groups and organisations. This indicated the existence of a strong commitment
to the voluntary sector. The contribution of the voluntary sector to service provision
has been insufficiently chartered and acknowledged (Oliver, W., 1988; Tennant,
1989).

Rob Laking, as the incumbent Deputy Director-General: Policy and Services of the
Department of Social Welfare during this period presented a paper in which he argued
that, despite the criticisms of government department's alleged internal rigidity, lack
of responsiveness to client demands and the allegations that the private sector can do
better, the state has a role to play "when the state is acting to redistribute income or
protect individual and community rights" (Laking, 1987:138).

While at the beginning of 1987, Davey (1987) was arguing that it could no longer be
assumed the state would provide full range of services, The Ministerial Task Force in
its July publication, Social Welfare Services: The Way Ahead, asserted:

There appears to be no widespread consensus at present on the
appropriate degree of collective responsibility. . . . [the Task Force
view is] that a high degree of collective responsibility is
appropriate. . . . We believe that government should undertake a
pro-active role in directing social policy toward the ends of equity and the pursuit of well-being for all its citizens (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:4).

Despite this view, the Task Force asserted that a mixed system of welfare provision was "a long-established part of our heritage" and urged central government's continuance as "funder, provider, planner and regulator of services" (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:40:6:4). The Task Force visualized the direct provision role of the state would be limited to statutory and social control functions.

We recommend that the government sector continue to play a substantial role in service delivery . . . in the direct supply of service for social control purposes. . . and in providing what we described as essential services (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:42:6:6).

Although, the Task Force defined essential services rather broadly, the term, essential services, was interpreted as referring to child protective services and youth justice as the primary focus for Departmental direct service provision.

The Task Force reaffirmed the role of non-statutory providers, specifying that the voluntary sector had a significant role in complementary or supplementary services, e.g., self-realization services, personal counselling, personal development of individuals, groups, iwi, or communities but certainly did not whole-heartedly endorse the community-care or even the community based services to the extent expressed in the Planning Council documents. The Task Force expressed concern about the possible abuse of informal care giving:

Informal care should be an option only when it is voluntarily entered into, when informal caregivers are comprehensively supported and where some of the costs of giving care are offset (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:47:6:27).

The Ministerial Task Force of Social Welfare Services (1987), then, was clearly apprehensive of the wholesale transfer of service provision and care responsibilities to voluntary agencies and informal care givers although generally supportive of welfare pluralism.
The February publication of the New Zealand Planning Council (Davey, 1987) restated the Planning Council's support for a shift to community-based services with an even stronger support for community-care and informal caring systems:

Studies in New Zealand show that kinship systems are still strong and probably more flexible than state programmes. They are also more appropriate in the supply of emotional and cultural support. The largest amount of caring and personal services is still carried out informally by families and kin, often with little back up or relief from social service agencies (Davey, 1987:21).

Davey (1987) once again stressed the growth in locally-based programmes and community care programmes such as rape crisis centres, women's refuges and Maori training and employment initiatives, as reflective of the ability and desire of communities to define their own needs and plan their own services (Davey and Dwyer, 1984). (Note that in the 1986/87 fiscal year the forty-seven refuges affiliated to the National Collective of Independent Women's Refuges formed in 1979/80, received $1.8 million from the Department [DSW, 1987a]).

Although the government seemed to be shifting the balance of the burden of direct services provision to the voluntary sector, the government signalled its intention to remove the tax deduction of contributions to charities and to tax income from the investments of voluntary agencies. This proposal drew a sharp outcry from a sector already pressured by reductions in income and increased requests for service. Max Abbot in his Editorial to the Mental Health Foundations publication (Abbott, 1988) argued that such a move would be the death of the struggling voluntary sector. The government delayed action on the proposal but the legacy of the threat contributed to the cynicism of the voluntary sector about the motives of the government with regard to the funding and provision of social services. The Royal Commission strongly supported the central role of the state in the provision of social services while offering a clear acknowledgement of the contribution and the continuing role for the voluntary in the provision of services (RCSP,1988,Vol.II:659).

**SERVICE DELIVERY**

The Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services (1986) noted that there were many other consumer concerns (e.g., the inflexibility of government services and funding, the availability of casework services to the exclusion of group and community
work), some of which were being addressed by other task forces such as those on income maintenance, health benefits and accident compensation. "Considerable effort is being made to ensure coordination and consistency [italics added] of approach between the task forces" (Ministerial Task Force, 1986:3:1:12). The effect of such efforts to ensure coordination and consistency may have stifled critical debate on proposed solutions to the issues facing the social services.

The coordination efforts were evident in the interlocking task force and review committee memberships and the similarity of recommendations. For example, in the Department of Social Welfare's 1986 Management Plan, the first such formal management plan issued for the fiscal year 1986-1987, the Director-General stated that in his attempt to meet the organizational goal of the Department he had been:

Grasping with two sets of problems: (1) how to create a structure for the organisation that will make major improvement to the delivery of service possible and, (2) how to develop the Department as an organisation (DSW, 1986a:1).

The decisions he took were to regionalize the Department based on the guiding principle of bringing the decision making closer to clients and staff (DSW, 1986a). This was to be accomplished by delegations of authority to District Offices for maximum autonomy and a programme of consultation with staff on organizational detail. The second set of decisions, grouped under the heading of 'Organisational Development' and utilizing business management terminology, indicated the adoption of management performance criteria, the creation of a corporate (italics added) identity, a formal system of briefing and consulting and a renewed commitment to training (DSW, 1986a). These initiatives parallel the recommendations of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (1986), which was released just weeks later, in June, and on which the Director-General of Social Welfare sat as a member.

The May 1986 Departmental report, The Organisation of Social Work Services at the District Level, recommended that programmes and activities of the Department be community-based and established in partnership with the client and client group. The same month, the Social Advisory Council (SAC), under the auspices of the Department of Social Welfare, published their report on Partnership: The Delivery of Social and
Community Services, which attempted a balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of community-based services.

It has often been argued that the provision of services through non-statutory organisations is both cheaper and more effective than through Government departments. . . . It is far from obvious that these generalisations are justified. Dedication, innovation and flexibility are evident in many statutory agencies, as are restriction on financial resources, dependence on the quality of personnel available, and unevenness of provision from one locality to another. Nor are all non-statutory agencies free of bureaucracy or of inflexible commitment to established ways (SAC, 1986:10).

The Social Advisory Council concluded its report by acknowledging that "the welfare state is simply not able by itself to provide all the social and community services" (SAC, 1986:89) for the people of New Zealand and urged recognition of the contribution of the non-statutory sector and the development of a "more equitable and productive partnership in the delivery of social and community services" (SAC, 1986:89). This theme of unequal partnership was further developed in the research carried out under contract to the New Zealand Planning Council by Driver and Robinson (1986). The Driver and Robinson report suggested that:

Voluntary agencies and informal groups usually take on the difficult developmental, preventative and non-institutional social service activities while being denied the on-going funding and other forms of assistance that are necessary for this to be done effectively. It seems that 'cost saving' has often replaced 'cost effectiveness' in government's relationship with the voluntary sector and this has been counter-productive in providing a genuine alternative to institutional social services (Driver and Robinson, 1986:55).

Driver and Robinson (1986) recommended that field staff move to a supportive and advisory role and establish consumer involvement with the community group as a criteria for funding. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this recommendation assumed the continued responsibility of government for funding of social services. This is a key point, for in all of the discussions regarding decentralized, community based services, it was assumed that central government would continue its historic role as the funder of social services. For example, in the foreword to the Driver and Robinson report (1986), the Chairman of the Planning Council stated the Council's support for decentralized social services "matched by appropriate funding and support systems" (italics added)(Driver and Robinson, 1986: Foreward). The Council, the Chairman
stated, asked the authors of the report to study "the ways in which resources from taxpayers are made available to voluntary and community groups" without commenting on the fundamental question of the extent of government funding which he contended was an issue for public debate on social policy (Driver and Robinson, 1986: Foreward). The Chairman, however, reiterated the Council's support for an alternative model of social service delivery.

The traditional welfare state model of services designed, funded and delivered by central government departments is only one of these ways. Particularly in a society undergoing considerable change and increasing its cultural and regional diversity, there is clearly a useful role for a more flexible and decentralized approach through local groups (Driver and Robinson, 1986, Forward).

Driver and Robinson (1986) reviewed several decentralized and/or devolved funding schemes in existence (the Community Organisation Grants Scheme being the only one in the Department of Social Welfare) and noted that governmental departments have been responsive to calls for decentralized funding and community participation. They noted, however, that the proliferation of these schemes without interdepartmental cooperation may have negative secondary effects:

Already there are signs of consultation 'overload' and the prospect of setting up and servicing a variety of local advisory and funding allocation committees, each relating to a different department, is unlikely to be welcomed . . . . The most crucial factor in any consultation is that it be honest [sic] . . . Many groups felt that policy directions had been decided in advance. . . Real consultation must begin with a question requiring a response, not with a decision requiring confirmation (Driver and Robinson, 1986:27,53).

Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) was to have a pervasive impact on service delivery in the Department. Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) recommended major organizational changes within the Department of Social Welfare to provide a direct mechanism for the community in general, and Maori people in particular, to participate in policy making. These goals were reflected in the key recommendations of the report which became the criteria for evaluating and implementing subsequent changes in the Department.
Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) recommended abolishing the Social Security Commission and replacing it with a Social Welfare Commission whose membership would be composed of four principal officers of the Department, two people nominated by the Minister of Maori Affairs after consultation with tribal authorities, and two people nominated by the Minister of Women's Affairs. The Commission was to have a broad based advisory and consultative role. Secondly, it recommended the establishment of locally based District Executive Committees (DECs) and Institutional Management Committees (IMCs) comprised of community nominated members appointed by the Minister. The responsibilities of these community committees would be to assess community welfare projects and to monitor and review the Department's services. These local committees would report directly to the Social Welfare Commission (For a summary of the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu see Appendix VII). Yet these recommendations had been proposed in the Management Plan (DSW, 1986a), and the implementation of decentralization and regionalization initiated prior to the release of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

Davey (1987), in her report published under the auspices of the New Zealand Planning Council, argued that decentralization would not necessarily guarantee better democracy or better services. While noting that several government departmental initiatives could be examples of decentralization:

Real change must involve devolution, which is defined as the transfer of powers and resources from one agency to another. It goes further than delegation and envisages a real shift of power and a considerable increase of autonomy at lower or outlying levels (Davey, 1987:48-49).

Davey points to the moves to devolve functions to the iwi authorities as a positive step toward this goal.

The Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services (1987) advocated the retention of national funding where the monitoring and control of resources was important for reasons of equity and efficiency.

However, even where national programmes are required, most of them need to be administered locally (delegated) so as to take advantage of local knowledge and be more accountable to the community (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:36:5:25).
The Task Force did endorse a two-tier funding system by the Department with the first tier to national programmes providing essential service. Second tier funding was a block allocation to districts on a modified population basis. The disbursement of second tier funds was dependent on local decision making for local needs. Second tier funding would be for programmes, not agencies, and was to be aimed at encouraging maximum flexibility and responsiveness to local needs. The Task Force comment that effective devolution would be dependent on "a knowledgeable, skilled, interested and committed community" (Ministerial Task Force, 1987:53:7.9) would seem to imply uncertainty of its existence. Driver and Robinson (1986) in their review of voluntary funding had raised similar questions about the capability of the community to meet the expected demands.

The Administrative Review Committee (1987) argued for the "greater provision of services in the community with the Department acting mainly as funder or regulator" (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:9:9:1). The Administrative Review Committee endorsed the two tier approach of the Ministerial Task Force (1987) but called for a sharper demarcation of functions. As well, the Administrative Review Committee:

Clearly distinguished the separate roles of funder and provider [which] avoids the conflict of interest and the rigidities and confusions that occur when the two are combined (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:55:9.2.8).

The Department would be responsible for funding both providers and consumers; for evaluation, monitoring and setting of standards; for coordination of services/planning, policy planning; and for direct services such as child protection and court related work. Direct service responsibilities would fall to the state only under specific conditions.

Only where improved financial costing methods recommended in this report show that direct provision would clearly be more cost effective than contracting to the non-governmental sector. The Department would also need to retain direct service provision where there are no community providers available (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:54:9.2.6).

The Permanent Heads of Social Service Departments (Internal Affairs, Social Welfare, Labour, Women's Affairs Justice, Maori Affairs, Education, Health, and National Library) requested the State Services Commission establish a task group to examine the
issues of devolution under the mandate of Recommendation 13 (c) of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). The Task Group on Devolution was established in May 1987 and presented its report in February 1988. The Task Group concluded that:

Power sharing through devolution is only one of a number of means of better meeting clients' needs and it should not [italics added] be automatically considered to be the preferred way of achieving this aim (Task Group on Devolution, 1988:4).

The Task Group expressed the opinion that the emphasis on money in power sharing negotiations was proving a distraction from the more substantive policy issues. "The process of sharing power with clients... might actually increase (sic) social disadvantage" of minority interests and the Task Group noted a growing disenchantment with implementing policies without direct community input (Task Group on Devolution, 1988). Furthermore, the Task Group explored the multiple motives underlying support of devolution and cautioned that devolution could be an 'easy way out' for unresponsive organisations. The Group cautioned that devolution could be used as a cost-saving device, as a means to discredit participation in service delivery, or as a way of government saving overheads by using volunteer community labour rather than salaried government staff (Task Group on Devolution, 1988).

The view of the Royal Commission (1988) concurred with that of the Task Force on Devolution and offered a clarification of the concept by warning that devolution is too often used:

To refer to the transfer of responsibility for social services to the community, rather than to community participation in decision making about social policies (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988:844).

The Royal Commission expressed concern that those groups that reflected communities of interest rather than geographical communities would be disadvantaged in local decision making because their numbers in any one locality might be insufficient to insure representation in local decision making.

The Administrative Review Committee (1987) viewed the replacement of the Social Work Division and the Benefits and Pensions Division by the Programme and Services Divisions (DSW, 1987c) as reflecting a "consumer orientation" (See Appendix XIII for
a copy of the 1987 Organisational Chart). The Administrative Review Committee supported the implementation of the recommendations of *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) in the creation of the Social Welfare Commission, the District Executive Committees, the Institutional Management Committees and regionalization as attempts to provide mechanisms for the participation of the community in the departments policy and service delivery. The Administrative Review Committee, however, argued against dual accountability:

> While we agree that there are a number of areas where individual employees and the Department as a whole have important obligations to consumers, we do not feel they can or should be directed by or accountable to consumers (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:71:10.3.7).

Instead, the Administrative Review Committee argued for a clear distinction between *accountability within the organization* and *responsiveness to consumers* [italics added] to avoid the conflict of interest and reduced efficiency that results from dual accountability systems (Administrative Review Committee, 1987). It urged the adoption of participatory management throughout the Department to replace what the Administrative Review Committee referred to as an administrative management model prevalent in the government service (Administrative Review Committee, 1987). (The Review Committee's definition of the administrative management model is discussed in Chapter Five). They recommended a team approach with maximization of the delegation of authority already to enhance effectiveness at every level of the Department. Such changes would require attention to improve the level of managerial skills and support participation through training and recruitment initiatives.

The Task Group on Devolution (1988) considered participation with the community in terms of responsiveness. The term 'responsiveness' was used throughout the Department's documents of this period as distinct from 'accountability'. The Task Force cited the OECD's public management concept of 'responsiveness' which defined the concept as possessing four key dimensions: (a) comprehensibility of policies and programmes to clients, (b) access of clients to services that meet their needs, (c) relevance of policies and programmes to clients, and (d) the ability of clients to participate in the design, delivery and evaluation of programmes (Task Force on Devolution, 1988:6).
In order for the responsiveness of the existing social services to be increased, The Task Group suggested four specific actions. The Task Group recommended the enhancement of information and advocacy services targeted at disadvantaged clients. Secondly, it suggested the establishment of 'user groups' at the local level whose role would be to monitor and report on local and national social service programme delivery and recommended the development of agency networking mechanisms with local level data sharing. And, lastly, the Task Group suggested the introduction of a "responsiveness development programmes" across government (Task Group on Devolution, 1988:7).

When the Department of Social Welfare's Director General wrote the Management Plan for 1988, he signed it for the first time as 'Chief Executive'. This action reflected his status change under the State Sector Act of 1988 indicating that he no longer enjoyed the full protections of a state servant but had entered into a contractual agreement with the government as employer. In the 1988 Management Plan, he accepted the directives of the Administrative Review Committee by reiterating:

The Department of Social Welfare is accountable [sic] to its Minister for the efficient performance of its Mission. . .[and is to] be responsive [sic] to its clients (DSW, 1988d:8).

The task facing the Department was how to be both accountable and responsive when the two objectives met in inevitable conflict. The Task Force on Devolution drew on the concepts of representative and participatory systems of democracy advanced by Hadley and Hatch (1981) to urge a shift toward more participatory forms of policy making.

**SOCIAL WORK**

The Department's Working Party on the *Organisation of Social Work at the District Level* had issued their report in May of 1986. The Working Party acknowledged awareness of the proposed regional structure, the intended policy move toward maximum delegation of authority to the districts, and the intention to develop a planning capacity that distinguishes between resourcing and provision. The report however, pointed out that:

The unannounced arrival of CM [Circular Memo] 1986/82 on Regional Office Staffing at the end of this exercise created
confusion. . . There was insufficient explanation to make sense out of the lines of accountability (DSW, 1986b:6).

To add to the unsettled feeling among the social work staff:

It is perhaps relevant to note that while many recommendations identified in the Review of the Social Work Division in December, 1982 have been met, the underlying issues relating to clarity of purpose and direction remain and have been intensified in the intervening years. Staff are feeling increasingly undervalued (DSW, 1986b:2).

The Working Party described itself as welcoming the proposed changes in the role of Head Office from Operations to Policy Development. This move was seen as a strategy to mitigate the high levels of stress in the District Office level decision making process by increasing District autonomy, through removing Head Office's direct involvement in District Office functions.

It was the opinion of the Working Party (DSW, 1986b) that social work resources were being progressively redirected toward preventative work using community development processes (a trend that was to be reversed in the withdrawal of funding for community development activities in the budget directives issued in 1988). The Working Party cautioned, however, that organizational structure and procedures inhibit community development activities (a phenomenon noted by Black, et al., 1983) because that type of work was not accounted for in workload allocations. Also, the results of community development activities were difficult to assess in the quantitative terms characteristic of the newly adopted management evaluation systems. Driver and Robinson (1986) contended that their extensive community consultation revealed a remarkably high level of agreement for a more community oriented and supportive role for statutory agencies:

What was surprising was the degree to which departmental staff agreed with the criticism. . . Nonetheless, there was a feeling of uncertainty as to whether involvement in the local community was approved by Head Office and a fear of raising community expectations too high. The lack of funds and other resources and the statutory responsibility for assessing programmes and policing standards has limited the move toward a supportive role (Driver and Robinson, 1986:42).
These observations add confirmation to the findings of Black, et al. (1983) on the dominance of individual casework and the resistance to implementing other social work intervention strategies in statutory agencies.

The recommendations of the Administrative Review Committee (1987) included sweeping reforms for Departmental social workers. The Administrative Review Committee urged a steady, extensive reorientation of resources to a community services model. The Committee recommended a service delivery model which would be:

Staffed with people who have the appropriate skills, rather than the large social work operation that exists at present... rather than the present predominance of casework skills, a shift [in] skill areas will be required (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:65:9.9.2).

Such a shift would require social workers to acquire (a) liaison skills with Pakeha agencies, the Maori community and iwi authorities, (b) service and programme planning and development expertise and (c) experience in contract development and administration of funding. The combination of the recommendations of the Ministerial Task Force and the Administrative Review Committee had the effect of further deepening the crisis of confidence in statutory social workers, who had since 1982 been under serious criticism from the Maori community for their monocultural practice and their emphasis on direct practice of individualized casework.

The Principal Social Worker, in an attempt to provide leadership and restore a sense of direction and purpose with the social workers in the Department, presented a discussion booklet to the Assistant Directors (Social Work) Conference in August 1988 (See Appendix XVI). In the introduction to the document, she acknowledged that:

The practice of social work is undergoing a radical change. Acceptance of the principles of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu implies that every familiar role and activity needs to be re-examined in light of a partnership of decision making and resource sharing with the community, and in particular with Maori whanau, hapu and iwi (DSW, 1988c:1).

The Principal Social Worker made a clear challenge to her department to acknowledge that the task of fixing perceived shortcomings in social work was a dual responsibility.

Social Worker's strive for excellence in their practice, but they depend on managers to provide adequate supervision, training and
resource allocation and good social work practice can be effective only when it is supported by good management and informed by clear policy (DSW, 1988c:1)

The Principal Social Worker noted that many changes had occurred in social work practice including the development of culturally sensitive practice models, the establishment of Maori and Pacific Island teams, the involvement of local iwi in recruitment and selection of staff, and the development of strong links with the Maori community through Maatua Whangai.

The increasing pattern in service delivery is to promote and fund preventative community-based services. Department policy on funding of local service is for decisions to be made locally, with guidelines set nationally to ensure comprehensiveness and equitable provision. . . The Department's social workers will need new skills in coordinating the development of local resources and . . . in setting and maintaining standards in training, practice and accountability (DSW, 1988c, Appendix B:2,8-9).

During this period the social work profession was still suffering by the Ministerial decision to place the Social Work Training Council in remission in 1985 and then to replace it with a new council which took years to establish. Meanwhile, certification of individual social workers and accrediting of training programmes were left in a state of uncertainty. As well, the New Zealand Association of Social Workers was struggling with demands that it respond to the calls for the development of a bicultural code of practice. The years 1984-1988 were years of struggle for the Association, with few funds, no full-time administrative staff seconded from the Department, and a diminishing membership accelerated by the loss of two identifiable groups. The community workers formed their own association in 1987. With funds provided by the Department of Internal Affairs, the Community Workers Association held a national community workers hui and established localized modular training programmes (Aotearoa Community Workers Association, 1989).

Also, there was predictably, growing support for a Maori Caucus within the Association of Social Workers. Although initially formed within the Association, the Maori Caucus formally left the Association in late 1987. The Maori Caucus retained a loose affiliation with the New Zealand Association of Social Workers (NZASW, 1986b). NZASW did continue to provide the Journal, newsletters and leadership to the general membership during this period. The Association was to experience a resurgence of membership and strength in 1989 with the licensing proposals of the the Council for
Education and Training in the Social Services; with their own initiative of a Certificate in Competency; and with the renewed interest in clinical practice in the voluntary and the developing private sectors. But 1988 was a depressing year for the association with minimal investment in its activities by its members and a very uncertain future.

**BICULTURALISM**

The Department of Social Welfare's Management Plan, 1986, was the first formally publicized plan in the Department's history and included in its Mission Statement a commitment to:

Maintain a department which is efficient and flexible in operation, ethical and sensitive to the needs of clientele and staff, and which provides services which are culturally appropriate (DSW, 1986a:5).

The particular needs of Maori people were recognized not only as a goal in service delivery but as part of the overall plan for the Department. Biculturalism, however, as a specific goal within the Department was not explicitly endorsed in the 1986 Management Plan.

The Working Party on *The Organisation of Social Work Services at the District Level* rendered the opinion, in their report issued in May of 1986, that "the principle of bicultural practice has been adopted" by the Department's social workers and recommended that the Department's top management officially adopt the principle of cultural appropriateness of service. The Working Party also recommended that a Maori Advisory Unit be established in each regional office "to enhance the cultural sensitivity in staff and provide a Maori perspective on policy, programmes and procedures" (DSW, 1986b:17).

The Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare had been established by the Minister of Social Welfare in July of 1985 with the expectation that it would use the community consultation process and report within six months. In fact, the report, *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) was not to be published until June 1986 after the Working Party Report on "The Organisation of Social Work Services" (1986b) and after the DSW,
Management Plan, 1986 was released. The Ministerial Advisory Committee had seven members including John Grant, the Director-General of Social Welfare. Between 17 August 1985 and 7 April 1986, the committee held a total of sixty-nine meetings, thirty-nine of which were on marae or in community venues. One-thousand-twenty-four verbal submissions were heard and 267 written submissions received (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986: Appendix:40)

In their report, the Ministerial Advisory Committee (1986) stated their view that although they were reporting on the Department of Social Welfare, their comments were equally valid for all government departments.

A main thrust of our report is therefore to do with co-ordination of resources among departments and the transfer of authority over the use of those resources to the consumer (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986:24:79).

The appendix to the Report offered brief background comments which mirror the primary Maori concerns of the day: the disproportionate number of Maori in welfare institutions and the courts, a highly centralised bureaucracy insensitive to the needs of its clients, the institutional racism of the Department, the low socio-economic status of Maori in the community, and the central importance of Biculturalism, as the policy direction for race relations in New Zealand (See Appendix VIII). Biculturalism was defined within Departmental functions as "the sharing of responsibility and authority for decisions with appropriate Maori people" (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986:19:50).

The recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) were consistent with the recommendations made earlier in Institutional Racism (DSW, 1985b). Moreover, the recommendations reflected strong support for the principles of decentralization, devolution and greater participation by the community in policy and provision of social services. These were the principles repeatedly voiced earlier by the New Zealand Planning Council (1979, 1981) and by voluntary groups in the consultations with Davey and Dwyer (1984) and Driver and Robinson (1986). The first recommendation of Ministerial Advisory Committee's Report, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (1986) was for the endorsement by the Government of the social policy objective to:

Attack all forms of cultural racism . . . by providing leadership . . . [and] incorporating, the values, cultures and beliefs of the
Maori people in all policies developed for the future of New Zealand (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986:9).

The second recommendation addressed the allocation of the necessary resources and power and authority over their use (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). Other recommendations requested changes in recruitment, staffing, and training which would provide affirmative action policies for Maori people and implement the principles of biculturalism within the Department and the structural changes to the Department discussed earlier (See Appendices IV, V, VI). Implementation of the recommendations Ministerial Advisory Committee’s report, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (1986) became the criteria against which all actions within the Department were to be measured.

SUMMARY

This analysis of the public and departmental documents set out the debates, concerns and issues that characterized the social service policy discussions in New Zealand from 1969 - 1988. The Department of Social Welfare was created out of the optimism associated with a welfare state model of social service delivery that emphasized the benefits of centralized control for efficiency and equality. A centralized government department with widely ranging responsibility and funding promised a higher level of coordination, co-operation, comprehensiveness, accessibility and continuity than was evident in the splintered, uncoordinated pattern of services that characterized the social welfare field prior to the creation of the the Department of Social Welfare in 1971. The growth of social work professionalism, evident particularly in the establishment of tertiary education for social work and in the commitment of the Department to training and development paralleled the growth of the Department as a centralized government bureaucracy.

The documentation illustrated the dominance of the Department of Social Welfare in both the statutory and voluntary sectors through its funding policies, its assumption of responsibility for service provision, its central role in training and education through its role with the Social Work Training Council and hence, because of its pervasive power, its influence on social work practice.
This analysis demonstrated the diversity of views and the ambivalence toward the government policy of shifting the burden of service provision to the non-statutory sector, a policy that was fundamental to the 1986 restructuring. During the early 1980's, and particularly during the early years of the Fourth Labour Government, there was a sense of inevitability about the shift, as the documents of the period demonstrated. By the end of the period, in the documents of 1987-1988, there are a few cautions issued and clear challenges made to the government to move more slowly, cautions issued by professionals, the community, voluntary agencies and Maori people. However, the strategy had changed and the infrastructure already set in place to accomplish the shift in statutory - voluntary service provision. It is important to note that in all of the debates on the statutory-voluntary balance, there was always the assumption of central government responsibility in funding. There was considerable debate about how that funding should be allocated or distributed but little discussion of the fundamental question of government responsibility for the provision of resources. Notable exceptions were the comments of the Chairman of the Planning Council in his Foreword to the Driver and Robinson 1987 publication and of Davey in her 1987 report. Within economic circles, the debate focused on the means of limiting, curtailing or containing the costs of the welfare state. Yet, the basic assumption of continued central governmental responsibility was maintained.

The most influential force during the two periods of analysis, was the rise of biculturalism and the commitment to bicultural social work practice. The decisions to implement the recommendations of the report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (1986) resulted in sweeping structural changes within the Department and subsequently in social work practice.

The next chapters contain data obtained in the third level of analysis. They report the perceptions of the Regional Executive Officers and the social work teams in the Napier and Porirua District Offices on the impact of the restructuring of social work practice within the Departments field social work service. These next chapters will provide the links between the first level of analysis, the theory, and the second level of analysis (the New Zealand) debates on the statutory - voluntary balance, service delivery, social work and biculturalism) by linking both with the practice of field social work within the Department. They demonstrate the interrelationship of strategy, organizational design and performance as postulated in the Pearce and Robinson Model (1989).
CHAPTER FIVE

THE INTERVIEWS WITH THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

This chapter reports the results of the interviews with the Regional Executive Officers (REOs) of Social Services and Alternative Care. It was the responsibility of the REOs to facilitate the principles of the restructuring: regionalization, decentralization, devolution, and partnership with the community. Hence, their role was crucial in the implementation of the new policies within the Department. The chapter begins with a description of the Department that places the REO positions in context by comparing the aspects of the organizational design of the Department prior to the 1986 restructuring with the organizational design announced in the Management Plan (DSW, 1986a).

Before reporting the results of the interviews, several terms used by the respondents are defined as used in the departmental documents, the issues that confronted the REOs in their relationship with the Districts are discussed, and the demographic characteristics of the REOs are summarized.

Prior to the restructuring in 1986, the formal design of the Department of Social Welfare closely approximated an ideal bureaucracy (See Figure One, for the Head Office organizational chart prior to 1986). The Department was a tall hierarchy with three major divisions: Benefits and Pensions, Social Work, and Administration. There was a clear chain of command. Authority was vested in the Director General and vertically delegated through the Assistant Directors-General to Head Office staff and subsequently to the District Directors and Institutional Principals. The District Offices were similarly designed using the tripartite system. Over the fifteen years of the Department's operations, a comprehensive and detailed set of rules, regulations and procedures had been developed for carrying out the Department's activities. For example, the Social Work Division had a two volume set of rules and regulations, each over a hundred pages long with an appendix for regulation and procedural changes. There were job descriptions delineating the rights and responsibilities of each position and staff were hired and promoted on the basis of their qualifications and ability to
handle the job. Staff interests were promoted through formal relationships with the State Services Commission and the Public Service Association which represented all government employees. As was reported in Chapter Four, the Department was accused by its critics of displaying the negative characteristics of a bureaucracy including undue rigidity in the application of rules and regulations, alienation from its client group, unresponsiveness to local needs and the assumption of the right and responsibility to make decisions for their client group which, the critics argued, further intensified feelings of powerlessness in the individuals and communities served by the Department (NZPC, 1979, 1981; NZCSS, 1978; Davey and Dwyer, 1984).

The restructuring announced in the Management Plan (DSW, 1986a) indicated the Director General's decision to make extensive changes in the Department's organizational design. Several major design changes were set into place. The Department was to be regionalized and authority was delegated "to match responsibility so that District Offices can have the necessary autonomy" (DSW, 1986a:1). A Directorate-General committee structure (referred to as the Executive Management Group, EMG) was set into place with a membership of the Director-General, the two newly created Deputy Directors-Generals and the four Assistant Deputy Directors-General (See Appendix IV). In 1987, the program directorates were introduced as a refinement of the structure which effectively eliminated a social work identity in Head Office formal structures (See Appendix V). In 1988, the membership of EMG was expanded to include the six Regional Directors, who were reclassified as Assistant Director-Generals (Regions). At the Regional level, a Regional Management Team (RMT) structure was established consisting of at least the Regional Directors, District Directors and Institutional Principals whose responsibility was to manage the region. The composition of the RMTs varied between Regions and over time within the Regions.

As well, the Social Security Commission (See Glossary for composition) was replaced by a Social Welfare Commission mandated with responsibility for co-ordinating "the implementation of policy and management issues across all divisions of the Department" (DSW, 1986a:1). These moves significantly expanded the top management staff in the Department at two management levels: Head Office and Region.

The Regional Executive Officer (REO) positions were established as part of the Regional Office structure. These positions were designed to offer support, advice and consultative services to the districts. The REO positions were staff positions and therefore were not
to carry line or administrative authority. It was the stated intent that the REOs would further the objectives of the decentralization by offering services to the districts to assist them to assume maximum autonomy in the operations of Departmental functions (DSW, 1986a). Because regionalization and decentralization occurred simultaneously, the role of the REOs was often unclear. Role ambiguity led to misunderstandings, conflict and inappropriate task expectations by Head Office, the Districts and the REOs themselves (Administrative Review Committee, 1987).

The role ambiguity of the Regional Offices was depicted in the organizational chart included in the first formal Management Plan (DSW, 1986a) (See Appendix IV). In the 1986 organizational chart, the District Director was directly linked to the Regional Director and subsequently to the Deputy Director-General and the Director General, implying a line of administrative responsibility from the Districts to the Regions and up through the hierarchy. Such a relationship seemed to contradict the announced decentralization to the Districts by implying another layer of management between the Districts and Head Office. This relationship was clarified somewhat in the organizational chart appearing in the Management Plan of 1987, if only because the chart does not imply direct accountability from the District to the Region in the way it was drawn (See Appendix V). A implied direct authority relationship between the District Directors and the Assistant Director-General (Regions) in the organisational chart which appeared in the 1988 Management Plan (See Appendix VI). Despite the directives to the contrary, in practice, the Regions were perceived by many direct line staff as another link in the chain of command. The REOs often 'advised' the Districts on policy guidelines or operations in such a way as the Districts felt they were more accurately being 'directed.' Head Office was perceived as pressuring REOs if their districts were not 'coming on board' with new policy. (These perceptions were reconfirmed in reviews of the regional office structure subsequent to this research. See Barretta-Herman, Dougal and Spierling, 1989; DSW, 1990).

It must be recognized that the field work research phase of this research was initiated just two years after the restructuring was formally announced in this large, previously highly formalized, stable bureaucratic structure. As already discussed, the Department had functioned for fifteen years with basically the same organizational structure despite tremendous growth in staff, function and budget. Hence, all staff were required to unlearn old assumptions and administrative behaviours and learn a new set of developing and changing managerial relationships. Clarification of roles and the
establishment of working relationships were still in its initial stages at the time of the field work.

New terminology permeated the management plans and directives issued in the restructuring and in the Administrative Review of the Department completed in 1987 (Administrative Review Committee, 1987). These new terms had distinct meanings within the Department. The Director-General in his first Management Plan indicated his desire to "create a sense of corporate identity" [italics added] (DSW, 1986a:2) through a process of making Departmental administrators managers and accountable for:

Achieving tasks, building teams . . . promoting the interests of the organisation. . . [and developing] a spirit of co-operation and a sense of common purpose (DSW, 1986a:2).

The Administrative Review Committee (1987) characterized the Department as having 'an administrative style of management.' Such a style, the Committee contended was characterized by 'administration of instruction', top-down communication, emphasis on inputs not outcomes and a "reactive mode of operation" that directed resources to "demands and problems as they arise" (Administrative Review Committee, 1987:18). The Administrative Review Committee supported the briefing and consultation system announced by the Director General in the Management Plan of 1986 and outlined in the circular memorandum of 29 October 1986 (See Appendix IX) as exemplifying the 'participatory management' style, they recommended. Such a style, the Administrative Review Committee contended, would encourage good management of resources, make managers more accountable, would more completely utilize the knowledge of staff members, and permit a system of rewarding performance not previously possible under the existing employee relationships. These concepts and terminology, more associated with the profit-oriented business world, reflected the pervasive nature of the restructuring of the government sector.

With the restructuring, the Director-General advised the participatory style of management was to be adopted throughout the Department within a 'corporate structure' that would make staff in administrative positions 'managers' with control and discretion over resources within their jurisdiction (DSW, 1986a). District level staff were to assume responsibility for management and decision-making functions within the broad policy guidelines established by Head Office. It was to be the role of the
Regions and the Regional Executive Officers to facilitate the change. However, it must be appreciated that most of the Regional Executive Officers were career state servants with long working histories under the 'administrative management style' characterized by the Administrative Review Committee (1987). Their successful performance under that system had been rewarded by advancement. It was ironic that it was these same managers who were now being asked to facilitate the change to a participatory and corporate management system. However, it could be argued that the management culture of the Social Services Division was predisposed to, and in varying degrees practised, a participatory style of management. The Social Services Division had a professional staff orientation and provided non-routine services, the division's social work value base supported a participatory, cooperative approach to decision making.

There is a second aspect of the relationship between the Districts and their Regional Offices that was important in the analysing of the comments of the Regional Executive Officers. Since 1984, The Department of Social Welfare, in common with other state funded agencies had experienced several budget cuts. These cuts included a hiring freeze, a slow down in capital resource allocation, and demands for increased reporting and financial accountability. Yet, the allocation of staff and capital necessary for the creation of the Regional Offices and the establishment of addition regional office positions, was seen to be accomplished outside the established budgetary justification process. Many District Office staff felt that Head Office expenditure did not substantially decrease in the restructuring process. They assumed therefore, that Regional Office had been created at the expense of the Districts, whose operating budgets did reduce during the period in both real and inflationary terms (A perception which was subsequently verified in the review of Barretta-Herman, Dougal and Spierling, 1989). In addition, some staff would suggest not only did Head Office expenditure not reduce as a result of the restructuring but in fact the salary allocation increased in the period 1986-1988 placing a further restriction on District Office expenditures. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the Regional Executive Officers felt little security in their positions. One REO clearly stated "that it's very hard now to come in with a significant variation of opinion" (REO:7).

The staff complement of the Regional Offices was a continuing issue of debate in the Districts. Regional Office positions were more often added then deleted during the period but considerable movement was evident in the addition of the Equal Employment Opportunities Officers in 1988 and in the establishment, and then subsequent
disestablishment, of training positions within the regional structure. Toward the end of the research period in late 1988, the training function was further decentralized to the individual Districts. The staff size of each Region varied but the projected maximum size of fifteen positions including the clerical support staff was far exceeded in the regional offices (DSW, 1990).

Initially, the research design included interviews with only the REOs of Social Services. The REOs of Social Services were clearly linked to the District's Social Service Divisions and the provision of field social work services; all had come up through the ranks of field social work. But as the REOs of Alternative Care were appointed, it became clear that their inclusion was imperative to provide additional essential information on social work practice. The Alternative Care positions were linked to residential services. These positions were created to co-ordinate efforts to provide community and iwi based services to adolescents. Six of the Department's nineteen institutions were scheduled for closure between September 1987 and March 1988 as were ten of the Department's 170 family homes. Substantial reductions were to be made in available placements in residential institutions for adolescents (DSW, 1987b).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Each region was to have an REO of Social Services and an REO of Alternative Care. At the time of the research, eleven of the twelve REO positions were filled, nine with permanent appointments. Some of the REOs viewed the Alternative Care positions as time-limited because of the position's focus on de-institutionalization. They predicted that once the de-institutionalization process was completed and community based services in place, the REOs of Social Service could provide the necessary services to the Districts for both Social Services and Alternative Care.

Eight of the Regional Executive Officers were men, six of whom had entered the Department early in their careers and had spent a minimum of fifteen years with the Department. One REO had begun his career as a teacher before coming to the Department in the late 1970's as a trainer and, hence had only ten years in the Department. The remaining male REO had the least seniority having come into the Department in 1983 through the Maori Advisory Unit in the Auckland Region. This Unit had been set up in response to the concerns about the disproportionate number of Maori
children in care (see Chapter Four). The three women Regional Executive Officers were all REOs of Social Services, had a minimum of 13 years sonority in the Department and had begun their careers as direct line practitioner positions and worked their way up through the hierarchy.

Eight of the REOs had a Certificate of Qualification in Social Work. Four of them were promoted to their first supervisory position after completing a qualification in social work. Only one held current membership in the New Zealand Association of Social Workers although four described their professional affiliation as Social Worker or Residential Social Worker. Of the remaining responses to the question of professional affiliation, five described themselves as Social Service Administrator/Manager, one as a Transitional Change Agent and one did not answer the question. (See Appendix I for a copy of the Demographic Information sheet.)

Because the REO positions had been created as part of the restructuring, the respondents were relatively new to the positions, although seven of the eleven had held top level district office positions prior to their appointment as REO's. Three appointments to the REO positions were made between November 1986 and January 1987 with two more by mid-year 1987. At the end of 1987, another two permanent appointments were made followed by two more by April 1988. The two acting appointments had been made in mid-1988 in an attempt to ensure the offices in those regions could function.

It is against these introductory comments and the demographic characteristics of the REOs that the analysis of the interviews with the Regional Executive Officers was considered. The structured interview of twenty open ended questions asked the REOs for comment on their perspectives of the objectives of the regionalization, why it occurred when it did and how regionalization reflected the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986), the move toward community, community development, devolution and 'community-oriented social work'. These issues were addressed in the eight questions that appeared under the heading 'Philosophy'. Three questions were included under each of the headings 'Organizational Changes', Managerial Supports' and 'Social Work Services. (See Appendix I for copy of Interview Schedule). A non-directive style of interviewing was assumed by the researcher during the interviews to facilitate exploration and permit the respondent to present their perspectives and understandings as completely as possible. (For a full description of the methodology see Chapter Three.)
Several of the REOs cautioned against overemphasis on regionalization of the Department. They viewed regionalization as part of an overall restructuring strategy to apply corporate management principles, particularly greater financial accountability, to the Department.

The Director-General saw the potential in a regional structure for effectiveness and the efficiency Treasury was arguing for. Because [Treasury] wanted to go in that direction and if the Department could be a front runner... then [the Director-General figured] we might be better off going for it (REO:6).

Regionalization was described as Treasury-driven since staff from Treasury had been seconded to the Department to assist in the planning (REO:6,7,8). As twoREOs expressed it:

I’ve always interpreted regionalisation as perhaps the most significant strategy to ensure the survival of the organisation. It followed a period of great pressure [from] continuing public criticism of the institution, internal criticism relating to racism and sexism. . . . [The Director General] was facing the prospect of the organisation becoming unmanageable. . .

Regionalisation was a very astute and successful move to regain control of the organisation (REO:8).

Only one REO specifically mentioned the role of Ann Hercus, as the Minister of Social Welfare during the period immediately preceding the restructuring:

If it had not been for Ann Hercus, the fact that she was also Minister of Women’s Affairs, we definitely would not have had the development and eventual outcome of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu. I believe that it was very much driven by her and the women’s movement. . . . Her involvement can be linked to the way the Maori movement has developed within our Department (REO:2).

The REOs felt that social work had increasingly been overshadowed by the exponential growth in size and function of the benefits and pensions division. This was particularly
true since 1975 when unemployment continued to rise and the Department assumed a new benefit programme as a consequence of the passage of the Superannuation Act.

There is a major philosophical difference between the two major cultures in the Department . . . the culture of income maintenance and benefits, and the culture of social work and social justice (REO:6).

They expressed concern that the relabelling of the the Social Work Division to the Social Services Division was indicative of a further decrease in the influence of professional social work within the Department.

A degree of cynicism was expressed about the effect of regionalization on service delivery. Ten of the eleven REOs felt that regionalization was a costly exercise initiated during a period of financial constraint and more an attempt to regain administrative control of the organization than to decentralize authority and increase responsiveness to clients.

The idea of the regions was to be there to support the Districts so they could do their job. That's how I understood it. But what happened . . . is we're supporting Head Office and the big Executive Management Group, the super powers. Because I am finding now they are wanting more and more information in order that they can do their monitoring (REO:7).

So despite the stated intent of regionalization to provide more autonomy to the Districts with support of the Regional Office, the REOs felt their jobs were increasingly focused on servicing Head Office. This sentiment was shared by District staff as the analysis of the interviews with the social work teams reported in Chapters Six and Seven will concur. Two of the REOs contended that regionalization "hasn't brought about any clear change in the role of the Head Office," and "certainly has not brought a reduction in its size" (REO:8, 5). At the same time, REOs acknowledged the positive effect of efforts to clarify the role of Head Office as policy making, the Regional Office as monitoring and supporting, and the District Office as operations. "Practice has not yet caught up with policy, but it is beginning to shift" (REO:10).

Decentralization

The two Auckland REOs felt the decision to create the Auckland Regional Office in 1980 provided an opportunity for the Department to experiment with decentralization and to
evaluate its potential. Establishment of the Auckland Region involved the minimum delegation and was not intended to mitigate the central role of Head Office. However, with the existence of the Auckland Region, the REOs felt that Maori activists were more able to demand a role in developing local policies governing care of Maori children in the Auckland Region. They cited as evidence the Department's responses to the ACORD complaint laid before the Human Rights Commission in 1979, the Johnston Report in 1982, and the creation of the Maori Advisory Unit in the Auckland Region in 1983. (These reports and events were described in Chapter Four).

The decision to regionalize and decentralize the Department in 1986 provided an opportunity to meet the needs of the organization for a more efficient management system while appearing to be "meeting the demands of the Maori community for local decision making" (REO:6).

The central core of the demands on the Department in the Auckland Region as a result of the investigations and reviews of custodial and secure care in Departmental institutions was on deinstitutionalizing pre-adolescent care. Referring specifically to the policy on deinstitutionalizing pre-adolescent institutional care, an REO argued:

Now, history tells me that a racist institution does not listen to ethnic groups that quickly... It was because it was part and parcel of their own policy... I don't believe that Maori people can claim that they were the only ones who were thinking this way anyway [of the benefits of restructuring and deinstitutionalization].... I believe that Pakehas had already through their research really believed that the institutions weren't working... they were very expensive (REO:1).

REO:1 contended that the high cost of residential care was incurred because of national under-utilization of the Department's institutions and group homes while another REO contended that it was the overcrowding, the misuse of secure care and the over-representation of Maori children in care in Auckland institutions highlighted in the ACORD submissions (Johnston, 1982) that forced the Department to respond to Maori demands for deinstitutionalization and community based care (REO:9).

Two REOs saw decentralization as an outcome of regionalization and demands by Maori people to 'care for their own.' REO:1 further argued that the Maatua Whangai programme was initially not driven from a Maori perspective but was an attempt to get "brown faced foster parents." The REO:1 indicated that the Maatua Whangai programme
had come subsequently to embrace a more Maori philosophy than was evident in its initial development.

There was recognition that the 'delegations' of authority to districts had "succeeded in making some problems manageable" (REO:8). The Regional Management Teams (RMTs) with responsibility for managing the region were:

Small enough to develop trust and understanding between themselves so that the anomalies don't become big issues, so that things are not attributed to conspiracy and all the things that you tend to get when it was Districts playing off each other against Head Office (REO:8).

Three REOs emphasized the potential under the restructuring for each region to set its own direction and to devolve to community groups in response to community needs (REO:2,5,9) but two expressed concern that overall policy guidelines so limited regional autonomy as to make it substantially meaningless.

Some of the people in Head Office are not keen to decentralise. . . . We are now free to go our own direction (sic) in responding to regional needs, as long as it follows the government policy, that is the catch [italics added] (REO:9).

It has been extremely difficult for some people in Head Office to give away the sort of decision making power they previously had (REO:10).

Their comments reflect the apparent paradox of the decentralization process in the desire of the Head Office to effectively retain organizational control.

**Devolution**

The REOs pointed out that the Department had a long history of devolved services to non-governmental agencies such as Presbyterian Support Services and the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped. The issues of accountability and monitoring of those services had been raised several times but:

What regionalisation has done is provide the Districts with the option of doing similar things in the local community . . . [and] with a more holistic approach then we've done in the past (REO:6).
However, most of the REOs contended that:

There are [tasks] that can be done by the community itself or some community group. And if it can be then that’s the best place for it . . . but there are some things you can’t give away because the law wouldn’t allow us to. But there are certain things which really never can be given away to the community . . . [the services] need to be independent such as child protection (REO:6).

For some, the issue of devolution of services to the community did not accurately reflect the services provided by the Department:

Eighty percent of the time of social workers is spent doing twenty percent of the work [statutory social work tasks] and that’s the work we can’t really step away from. . . . All the tasks . . . that we could give away quite readily we don’t do much of anyway, such as inspecting and registering children’s homes (REO:6).

The REOs of Alternative Care were critical of the proposed decentralization of community services funding, one describing it as "chaotic" (REO:2). All were hopeful that the decision to decentralize the funding initially to the regions planned for late 1988 or early 1989 would have the positive effect of encouraging community based programmes. Under this proposal it would be the responsibility of the REOs to oversee this first step in the decentralization process from the District Offices to local community groups and iwi authorities.

**Partnership With The Community**

In their description of social work practice within the Department, it was the opinion of several of the REOs that social workers had always worked closely with the community in the provision of services, particularly in rural areas:

If you were going to have to drive eighty or one-hundred miles to deal with a case . . . you had to have some other structure to assist you. . . . So you got to know people in the community . . . the local cop, the headmaster of the high school, the ministers. . . . So rural workers have always had a community component in their work and a lot of social workers realized you just can’t help a family in isolation (REO:6).

The view that working with the community and family networks had always been a part of social work in the Department was voiced by all the REOs, with the exception of one. The majority viewed practice as preceding policy and noted districts with community
work/development teams, active volunteer programmes, and a number community oriented programmes. They cited the neighbourhood support centres, whanau group schemes, and the redefinitions of the residential social worker role to include family work as examples of practice that pre-dated policies urging community involvement (REO:4, 6, 7, 9). The problem they noted was the lack of any effective method of recording the community development work done so that top management was either unaware of the work or chose to ignore it. Even now, they argued, when community work/development is actioned as a policy directive, "stats don't show the effort that went into actually stopping kids coming into care" (REO:9). Concern was expressed that the decreasing number of children in care being recorded around the country would be interpreted by top management as indicating that the need for social workers was less since a primary factor in the allocation of social work positions had been the number of children in care.

The number of children in care has reduced drastically but the time and effort in achieving that is not recognized, is not taken into account. . . . The statisticians in Treasury see that in 1985 we had 5,000 children in care and in 1987, we have 3,000. . . So they'll figure we don't need so many social workers. . . what they don't recognize is the time and effort that goes into keeping those children out of care (REO:9).

The emphasis on community, coupled with the push toward district autonomy, was seen as forcing Districts to look to their communities as their reference group, since they are accountable to them in ways they have not been in the past. "Districts have got very close to their community groups" (REO:7).

There is a real hope that districts would be in a better position to collaborate with other groups, cooperate and get feedback from their communities and be more responsive to clients. That's what we mean by community orientation (REO:8).

There was some variance of opinion, however. A few of the REOs considered that the Department was tending toward specialization in child protection and youth work while others saw the community orientation as:

Interpreted in some places as a broadening of the client base. . . that community development and communities could make a claim on the Department and its resources. . . But I do not think that it was ever the intention of the most senior management [that the Department would pursue an active community development
programme] ... despite the establishment of a Community Development Unit in Head Office (REO:8).

The REO:10 questioned the role of the Department in what she termed a 'community approach':

I have trouble with the community approach in terms of whether it is this Department's job in these rather stringent times. . . . It may be totally appropriate for us to support, for example, the Help Foundation to work in the area of child abuse. . . . [the question is] what should be the parameters of that involvement (REO:10).

However, she was not supportive of a major shift of service provision to the community since, she argued, the community has never really shown a willingness to take care of its own:

The community alienates those it doesn't like or approve. Now how in God's name are we going to say they [the community] will take care of their own. . . . If the state doesn't assume [responsibility] what is going to happen to battered women, to sexually abused girls and boys, to those with AIDS? (REO:10).

She acknowledged that the efforts to establish closer relationships with the community were because the delegation of community services funding to the districts was seen as imminent. This meant that local groups and agencies would be negotiating, contracting and seeking assistance from their local district for services that were previously provided and administered by Head Office.

**MANAGEMENT STYLE**

One REO argued that a change in management style was necessitated by the growth in size and function in the Department which made continuation of the centralized administrative management system unsustainable. "The management styles being used [by departmental administrative staff] were those that were applicable to a much smaller organisation. . . . [those styles] were dependent on informal control" (REO:8).

It was clear from the comments of the REOs that they felt the regionalization and decentralization, particularly when considered along with the policy of participatory management, had positive outcomes. The restructuring has "allowed us . . . to involve
district operational managers in managing the region the way they could never manage the country” (REO:8). But there were negative outcomes noted, as well:

Since the Regional Director has become the Assistant-Director General: Region [in July of 1988] and part of the Executive Management Group, he is in Head Office two to three days a week, We now have to consider a regional office director! (REO:11).

Consideration of the establishment of yet another top level regional office position was an additional source of tension between the regional offices and the districts who saw the proposed salary expenditure as excessive and was later to be a central factor in District initiated reviews of the regional structure. (See Barretta-Herman, et al., 1989; DSW 1990).

Four of the REOs contended that those in executive positions in social work had always operated as managers rather than administrators because of the unpredictable nature of the social work task and the values upon which the social work is based. They did acknowledge that social work managers had not previously done the long-term planning that was now required as part of their job description (REO:2, 6, 7, 8). One of the REOs was more cynical about participatory management when considered in relationship to Head Office management:

Participatory means tapping a few people on the shoulder and getting them to work out this issue which is not too different from the old method of working parties (REO:7).

Another REO was even more critical of the style of management in the Regional Office saying she was more likely to hear of developments in her area of responsibility from other regions since her Assistant Director-General: Region had stopped circulating copies of the documents and minutes from Head Office meetings for ‘cost cutting’ reasons. She questioned her ability to ‘participate’ if she was not well informed.

**SOCIAL WORK**

In the 1986 restructuring, the newly appointed Deputy Director-Generals were made responsible for resource management, and services and policy which included income security and social work services (See Appendix IX). By 1987, Head Office had been organized into two ‘directorates’ of Policy Development, and Programmes and Services.
Then suddenly you could see that social workers were disappearing from Head Office and when you saw the matrix there was no case for social work. . . . It was pepper-potted all through the different programmes. . . people were cut off from their reference group (REO:7).

The move to smaller offices, such as the growing proliferation of Area Welfare Offices as sub-components of District Offices, while moving services closer to the people and making them more accessible was seen as:

Weakening the Social Services Division because it is harder to get a critical mass of expertise under those conditions. So the interests and trends within the Social Services Division are at odds with the general trends in the Department (REO:8).

One REO predicted a "withering of the identification with the social work profession as an identifiable professional group" within the Department (REO:3).

The reasons for the attack on social work in the Department were seen to be complex:

The precise role of social work in the current service delivery of the Department, in fact even in policy, is not well understood by the drivers of the change. . . . Neither [the Director-General] who came up through the ranks of Benefits and Pensions nor [the Deputy Director-General] who was seconded from Treasury have ever had time for social workers. . . . Their ideas come straight out of the Chicago School of Management, all you hear is programmes and money and restructuring and redundancies and PSA meetings and packages (REO:8).

The role of the social work administrator was seen to have changed from one of professional leadership to one of financial management, "which means for many of them they do not want their jobs anymore" (REO:8). The task of professional leadership was delegated further down the hierarchy to the first-line supervisors.

The impact of the anti-racism activity and training in the Department was loss of confidence of many Pakeha social workers whose sense of "legitimacy of what they're doing was thoroughly shaken" (REO:10) and a sense of "immobilization in prioritizing the multitude of perspectives all claiming validity and a few claiming priority status" (REO:8). Several REOs noted that the move to biculturalism and Equal Employment Opportunity policies meant that many Maori people were hired into social work positions without a social work orientation, without social work training or education
and without a commitment to social work tasks. Changes in the orientation and in-service training provisions within the Department meant that these staff came into the districts unprepared to assume their role as social work staff and often remained unskilled because the training responsibility was delegated to the first-line supervisors who were already fully committed.

The hidden hope of most of the managers... is that we will some day get through this experience of being the Department of Social Welfare. This is not a properly set up organisation, it is neither one thing or another. It doesn't provide an integrated social welfare service because there are so many functions outside our orbit. ... It has forced child and family services in with the income maintenance services in an unnatural and overmanaged way (REO:8).

The major dilemmas the REOs expressed revolved around the tasks of field social work in a statutory organization and of the Department in social service provision. All the REOs commented on the Assistant Directors of Social Service Conference held in August 1988 as clearly signalling the intention of the Department to retain few direct service responsibilities and devolve and/or contract out everything possible to 'the community.'

We would pick up only the major responsibilities for child protection and youth. ... And almost all other responsibilities could be devolved out. That was certainly the thrust of the Hamilton Conference (REO:2).

It was at the Hamilton Conference that the publication, *Future Directions for Social Work* (DSW, 1988c), prepared by the Principal Social Worker and her Head Office staff was discussed (See Appendix XVI).

One of the REOs commented that the tasks of social work had expanded since the Department was formed in 1971. He contrasted it with the directives for social work tasks in 1988 which are to prevent children coming into care, to maintain children with their own parents first, then within their whanau/extended family and with the provision of resources to enable that goal before statutory action is taken.

Once the Department of Social Welfare had been established, [social workers] picked up other work [in addition to child welfare] because of the broader operation of the benefit section. ... There was a dissonance in that social work was being used to assess eligibility for income rather than to assist people. ... We widened our service so that virtually anybody who knocked on our door with a human problem, we were bound to respond. ... But the bulk
of our work was still in that child welfare area, now some are proposing child welfare again be our specialty. . . . The method was by and large to remove the children, put them in a different environment, generally an environment which excluded the natural family, and then to return them after a sort of basic standardised period of time in the hope that something had happened. Not a lot of work was done with the family. . . . What it did was to alienate them from their families and they often wanted to drift back. By the late 1970's, we began to change that and look for an inclusive type of situation where we also would work with the parents (REO:6).

The predominance of a case work model that did not emphasize work with the community except on a case-by-case basis was acknowledged by most of the REOs. They argued the prevalence of casework was (a) more a reflection of the demand for crisis intervention, (b) a reflection of the expectation that social workers should and would respond to all requests for service, (c) a consequence of the high rate of statutory child protection referrals in proportion to trained staff, and (d) a result of understaffing and rapid turnover.

The case work model really means that the social worker has got to deal with every individual that approaches and the goal of the Department in the Act is very broad. They [social workers] can't deal with social problems in a broad area because they are so tied up with dealing with individual approaches. . . . There is no time to address commonalities and draw those private problems into public issues (REO:9).

The differences between social work as practised and the ideals of community based approaches was confirmed by the REOs. The REOs pointed out, however, that several districts had implemented a modified patch system approach. These innovations in service delivery did not become institutionalized partly because of the factors outlined above, but in particular, because of the sheer volume of statutory work which demanded immediate individualized casework intervention.

Restructuring was seen as having a paradoxical effect on community development and community work:

Patch is going. It was very fashionable with community development. . . . Everybody wanted to do it and the offices were structured [into geographical patches]. This idea about using your community resources and that [it] could only be done by doing a patch [is] all gone by the way side now. The term is gone and now its into specialisation (REO:7).
One REO noted many social workers were resistant to abandoning the patch approach because the patch system implied a wide definition of the social work task demanding the full range of interventions to meet the social problems in a particular geographical area. Another REO did not lament its passing because she felt the patch system was ill-suited to the New Zealand context where families/whanau were not geographically based nor were agencies, decisions, or helping networks. Most of the REOs saw the Department moving toward specialities with community work and development activities devolved outside the Department to community workers, voluntary groups and iwi authorities (REO:2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10). There were considerable differences in the opinions of the REOs on the question of the social work task within the Department, although all the REOs viewed the primary task of statutory social work as child protection and services to youth. This was one of the directions clearly being indicated for statutory social work by departmental directives and the document from the Principal Social Worker (DSW, 1988c). Ten of the eleven REOs saw a role for the Department in community development and community work. Some felt that departmental social workers would need to be involved “because the community did not have the resources” (REO:7). Others felt that the Department was already actively involved in community development activities demonstrating the role was part of statutory social work and should remain so (REO:6, 9). A few REOs pointed to the soon to be decentralized community services function in funding and assisting community groups as the role for statutory social workers in community development (REO:10).

REO:1 voiced the opinion that the trend towards specialisms in District offices would mean that:

Every case, every Maori case, will become an abuse case so that the specialists teams will now deal with them rather than those workers assigned to family or whanau community work (REO:1).

This would occur, he contended, because of the deference awarded to specialist teams with their highly trained workers. This REO saw specialisation developing at the expense of community work or development teams.

The REOs made it clear that fundamental changes had taken place in the practice of social work with the clear directives emitting from implementation of the principles of the restructuring and the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).
We see now that social workers working closely with the whanau is having a flow on effect to other children in the whanau. ...They don't come into care. ... But it is not just with Maori families, for the principles of family decision making are being applied to Pakeha families as well with just as positive an effect (REO:11).

**BICULTURALISM**

The impact of biculturalism was seen by the REOs as pervasive. All agreed that social workers, in fact all workers, in the Department had to consider their actions in light of the *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) recommendations. (See Appendix for a summary of the recommendations.) The REOs emphasized the influence of the Maatua Whangai programme and the Report on Institutional Racism (1985b) as raising awareness among all workers in the Department but with social workers in particular.

Social workers have been really positive and are trying to work out ways [to implement bicultural practice]. But the hesitation comes in the 'how to'... when it comes to whanau decision making ... that brings up the most concern because of ensuring the safety of the child (REO:7).

The REOs acknowledged cultural differences regarding the primacy of the child over the primacy of the family/whanau while clearly recognizing the conflicts inherent in attempting to apply cultural guidelines within the existing legislation.

It is very easy to incorporate the statement [of a commitment to biculturalism] in all sorts of written material, to employ more brown faces, but to expect everybody to continue to operate in the same way... or to almost hope things might change when you're not quite sure what the changes might be (REO:10).

The REOs acknowledged that the new hiring practices and affirmative action policies had brought many untrained workers in as field social workers without providing them adequate orientation to the Department and appropriate skill development training. Consequently, whether it was because they did not know how to go about the tasks or because they did not feel the tasks were culturally appropriate, many of the newly hired workers were resistant to performing their statutory responsibilities. One REO felt that since many Maori staff were hired with the support of the whanau and/or at the recommendation of an iwi authority, they felt more accountable to their whanau than to
the Department. “They are not actually putting their efforts into DSW work and that is creating real problems” (REO:9).

**SUMMARY**

The views of the REOs reflect the pivotal position they held between top management (Head Office) and practice in the District Offices. Their responses indicate that they were very sensitive to Head Office directives, even when those directives were vague, open to wide interpretation, or in some cases, contradictory. The REOs were aware on a personal level of their vulnerability. The loss of a powerful social work advocate in Head Office was noted repeatedly.

However, the REOs were more than career bureaucrats, nine of the eleven clearly identify themselves as professional social workers or residential social workers. Their commitment to social work ethics was evident in their continuing attempts to analyse developments in the Department and to evaluate the rationale for the various policy directives in terms of 'good social work practice' and 'benefits to clients.'

Regionalization, despite the REOs cynicism about its being motivated by a concern to regain control of the organization, was perceived as offering the potential of making the organization more manageable and more responsive to both staff and clients. Decentralization of 'delegations' had made a difference in their view but the delegations came down with so many guidelines some of the REOs felt they were virtually meaningless. Yet, the REOs were optimistic that with decentralization there was the potential of differential district development, genuinely responding to local community needs.

The issues of devolution seemed more remote to the REOs than was expected. This may be due in part to the pace of change in devolving services to community and iwi groups which had slowed considerably despite initial activity in the devolution of funds to COGS and a few iwi authorities. The REOs of Alternative Care were anticipating renewed activity with the decentralization of Community Services funding to the districts.

It was in the area of participation with the community that the most debate was evident. There was considerable argument made that policy followed practice with strong
examples given of community oriented efforts in community development teams, volunteer programmes, joint projects with voluntary agencies and community groups, specialized community work initiatives funded by the Department, etc. Still, all the REOs recognized the predominance of casework and offered quite comprehensive explanations, many with strong parallels to the findings of Black, et al. (1983).

The impact of biculturalism on social work practice was seen by all the REOs as pervasive and intrinsically intertwined with all four principles of the restructuring. Social work within the Department had embraced biculturalism. Intervention was focused on whanau decision-making, support of existing family networks, preventing children coming into care, into moving children out of residential institutions to community placements, and releasing funds to local programmes rather than agencies. But it was clear that the REOs were attempting to reframe these changes in terms of good social work practice, and some fitted very well. Yet, the REOs expressed concern that because they perceived cost-cutting was a major motivator, further reductions in allocations would occur further pressuring Departmental social workers to retreat into casework just to cope with the demands for mandated statutory services in child protection and youth justice.

Only one REO saw no future for social work within the Department. The remainder felt the Assistant Director's Conference in Hamilton in August 1988 clearly indicated that social work within the Department would focus on child protection and youth justice work. Despite this generalized view, many of the REOs still considered the community work and development role of departmental social workers under discussion. It was unclear whether the Department's monitoring, funding and servicing role to community agencies would be defined as a social work role. Only one REO addressed this debate.

Thus, the REOs saw the Departmental policy with regard to the social work task as in flux but with clear signals that the role of social work within the Department was heading toward primarily child protection and youth justice roles. The REOs were quite knowledgeable about the debates, the conflicting views, and the implications of the conflicting directives. It was clear that they were well aware of difficulties in practice and were willing to assist Head Office and Districts to find 'new ways of working' that better served clients.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NAPIER DISTRICT OFFICE
THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM

This chapter reports the findings of the field work research with the Community Development Team in the Napier District Office. The chapter begins with a sketch of the Napier District and the Napier District Office. Before reporting the findings, the members of the team are briefly described and the data collection techniques employed are reviewed (Refer to Chapter Three: Methodology for more detail).

The Napier District Office serves the seaside city of Napier and the eastern half of the Hawkes Bay Region. The tangata whenua are Ngati Kahungunu. Economically the region, which has been a traditionally wealthy area, has suffered over the past five years with droughts, the national rural downturn, and seasonal high unemployment levels. This District Office had a national reputation of receptivity to innovation and a community orientation which was traced to the early seventies (Wilson, 1976). The Napier Office was characterized by its Director as having a highly trained and experienced staff with relatively low turnover.

The office had the typical district office structure. The District Director had responsibility for the District's overall operation and its three Assistant Directors: Social Services (previous to the restructuring, Social Work), Corporate Services (previous to the restructuring, Administration) and Benefits and Pensions and their staffs. The Assistant Director: Social Services, as the only Assistant Director interviewed in this research will be hereafter refered to as the 'Assistant Director.'

The Napier District Office's Social Services Division at the time of the research had 30 positions: four clerical staff, seventeen basic grade social workers occupying sixteen full-time positions, seven senior social workers, two supervising social workers and one assistant director. The Division was broadly divided into two teams. The Personal and Family Services Team provided supportive, child protection, adoptions and court services to youth. The Community Development Team was responsible for community
work, development activities including support to community organizations, Maatua Whangai, the volunteer programme, and the budget service. At the Staff Development Day in April 1987, the staff had agreed to adopt in principle the Head Office recommended social service division structure with two exceptions. The staff group suggested a further division of the Personal and Family Services Team into a Casework and Court Work team. Secondly, they rejected the 'Community Welfare Services' team label and suggested retention of the 'Community Development Team' as more accurately reflecting the philosophy of the Napier District Office. The structure of Social Service Division appears in the figure below.

Figure Three

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<th>Napier District Office</th>
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<td>Social Services Division Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Assistant Director:</strong> Social Services (AD)</td>
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<td>Personal and Family Services</td>
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<td>Children in Care</td>
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<td>SSW:SW:CD</td>
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<td>4.5 SWs</td>
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Key: SSW=Senior Social Worker
SW=Social Worker
Respondents in Bold

The field work objectives were to elicit from the respondents their perceptions of changes in social work practice subsequent to the implementation of the principles of the restructuring. As was explained in Chapter Two: Methodology, this team was purposefully chosen because it reputedly had a community focus exemplified by their support of existing voluntary agencies and support of community initiatives. Briefly, (see Chapter Two for more detail on selection and data analysis techniques utilized), data was drawn on the Community Development Team utilizing several methods. Each
member of the team was interviewed using the structured questionnaire. The tapes were transcribed, the content analyzed and reported below.

As well, each team member was asked to present a piece of their work that they felt demonstrated their way of working and were asked how this piece of work reflected the new practice principles defined as 'the new way of working' (DSW, 1988c). The Senior Social Worker: Community Development (SSW:1) presented his process of negotiating with a community agency's request for support. The researcher accompanied the Budget Liaison Worker as he set up a community awareness project on credit with volunteer helpers. The community social worker planned a visit to the Women's Health Centre she was instrumental in establishing and the volunteer collective that managed the centre. The Maatua Whangai worker arranged for the researcher to meet with the twelve kuia (Maori women elders) who were the core of a developing whanau support group in a large state housing district. The Employment Related Social Worker obtained permission for the researcher to accompany him to an all day hui on the Petane Marae where Regional Employment Action Committee Training Programmes for Maori unemployed were the focus of discussion.

In addition, the researcher participated in the life of the agency during the week-long research period. This included a District Management Team meeting, a staff meeting and a special social work meeting to discuss the reports of the National Assistant-Directors' Meeting on the future of social work. District documents, i.e., circular memos, practice reports, statistical reports, organizational documents, etc., were examined for relevant material. Corollary interviews, using the structured questionnaire, were held with the Assistant-Director: (AD:1), and the Senior Social Workers of Alternative Care and Casework (SSW-2; SSW-3). Following in the initial approach to the Napier Office, the researcher presented the proposal to the entire staff and invited any staff who wanted to comment on the restructuring to meet with the researcher during the research period. Several staff and the Executive Director of the District Executive Committee utilized the opportunity providing valuable verifying data. (See Appendix X for the Schedule of Research Activities in the Napier District Office.)
The Senior Social Worker of the Community Development Team (SSW-1) gave the following brief history of the team which was supplemented by comments from the Assistant Director and the District documents made available to the researcher. The Senior Social Worker traced the beginnings of the team to a 1969 church sponsored city-wide initiative called 'Helping Your Neighbour.' This initiative included government agencies and voluntary agencies working together to provide community based preventative and support services on a formal and informal basis. The District responded by deciding in 1970 to extend the voluntary social work scheme and allocated resources for recruitment, training and support services. The volunteer scheme was only one of several preventative community based programmes put in place in the early 1970s.

In 1976, the Napier District Office Assistant Director wrote a paper describing the preventative social work activities in his division in response to a 1973 Social Advisory Council's Working Party Report on Social Welfare (Wilson, 1976). Wilson outlined the argument presented by the Report for shifting the emphasis of social work from case work to family-oriented counseling and welfare services supported by close consultation and coordination with community agencies, especially schools. Wilson (1976) then demonstrated that such a practice model was functioning in the Napier Office. The active volunteer programme with over ninety volunteers had been in place for over five years:

The utilizing of volunteer personnel as suggested by the Working Party has proven to be a most worthwhile addition to the existing Departmental staff, as much of the grassroots family-oriented work could be taken over by these skilled workers... training and support through group supervision and the sharing of experiences for such volunteers, is seen as being essential in the Napier Office and this is an ongoing regular activity (Wilson, 1976:6).

The second preventative welfare programme Wilson described was the joint effort of the schools, the justice system and the Department. The 'Discussion in Schools' programme was aimed at early identification of 'at risk' children, at coordinating early prevention efforts through information: at providing counselling and supportive
services in the community, and at increasing cooperation and consultation among the various government departments to improve service delivery.

In 1978, the Napier Office set up the 'Contact Centre' as a multi-purpose community drop-in centre with a primary focus on unemployed youth. The programme included information referral, job-readiness and training programmes. The Centre by 1988 was a community run and sponsored enterprise funded through the Community Organisation Grant Scheme (COGS). Five years after the Contact Centre was first established, the Napier Office set up KNEECAP (Kids Needing Educational, Environmental, Cultural Activities Programme). This community based trust was providing activities for pre-adolescent 'at risk' youth. These programmes were four of the initiatives sponsored in part or wholly by the Napier District Office that contributed to its national reputation as a community oriented district.

In 1984, a report prepared by a Napier District Office Community Worker noted that:

> It is apparent that Napier is one of only a few offices that has set up Community Development Teams with social workers released from casework. ...There are a group of people at Head Office who are committed to the concept of community development and who will endeavour to see this area of work further develop (Napier District Office, 1984:2).

In 1988 the community development programmes the team was involved with included the development of the Social Work Community Resource Manual, the Home Liaison Programme at a local school, Parent Effectiveness Training, a social skills programme, and supportive services to community groups. Individual social workers with a community orientation, recruited and supported by the management were the two factors that insured continuation of this community orientation despite contrary national trends and the adoption of the unsupportive workload formula discussed earlier (See Chapter Four). The two directors during the period were committed to the community work/community development function as an integral part of statutory social work services.

These two directors hired and a number of social workers with a community orientation. The Senior Social Worker, with responsibility for the Community Development Team at the time of the research, had been granted a bursary to earn his
qualification in social work and upon completion assumed supervision of the Community Development Team in 1983.

THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TEAM

The Community Development Team of five members included a senior social worker (SSW-1) and four social work positions filled by a Budget Liaison Officer (SW:1), a Community Worker (SW:2), an Employment Related Social Worker (SW:3) and a Maatua Whangai worker (SW:4) (See Figure Eight). The Senior Social Worker of this team had been continuously with the Department since 1975 except for his two years at Victoria University to obtain his qualification. He had been the senior of this team for five years. The Budget Liaison Worker joined the Department in February, 1984. The community worker had a qualification in social work and a work history in psychiatric social work. She was appointed to the team in March, 1987. The Employment Related Social Worker, appointed in November 1987 after twelve years as a union representative in the meat industry and came with the support of his whanau. The Maatua Whangai worker had been appointed with the support of her whanau in February 1987 after five years as a volunteer with her iwi. The team had recently lost two part-time positions, a Volunteer Coordinator’s position, a wage worker and a Budget Advisory Service Coordinator’s positions. Both wage worker positions were lost in the budget cuts of late 1987 and early 1988.

There are several notable characteristics of this particular Community Development Team. Except for the team senior, the team members were relatively new to the Department and to social work. The team was a team with clearly designated specialisms. Three of the four positions on the team had been established with targeted funding from Head Office initiated programmes. Two of the team members had strong links with with their whanau who had supported their appointment to the Department.

During the six years the Senior Social Worker had responsibility for the Community Development Team, he felt that the the team had had to deal with recurring internal cohesion issues and constant threats to its continued existence. Despite the support of the Assistant Director over its seventeen year history, the Community Development Team had never been a particularly large or strong team. The size of the team fluctuated
between four and six positions. The function of the team and its composition had been less a result of planning than of expediency. For example, when Head Office established the employment related social work positions in the early 1980's, this position was attached to the Community Development Team. The same process occurred with the the Budget Liaison Officer in 1984 and subsequently with the establishment of a Maatua Whangai position. Although a strong argument could be been made for the appropriateness of these assignments to the Community Development Team, they were management 'top down' decisions that brought together individuals from diverse backgrounds with quite distinct tasks and very different orientations to their work. The establishment of a team approach had became increasingly problematic. Each individual had been employed for a specific task, with little, if any, interchangeability of skills, common professional orientation, nor Departmental work history.

We are a 'team' in name only, each job has a specific focus. . . . We hardly see each other except for scheduled supervision and team meetings. . . . Our work is not interdependent and is mainly 'out there' in the community (SSW-1).

The one common task was support, advice and development services to community groups and agencies. The Senior Social Worker had developed a four category schema to describe the services the team members offered to community agencies and groups:

TRUSTEE RELATIONSHIPS: the team member had a legal and/or management responsibility for the group or agency

ADVISORY RELATIONSHIP: the team member had coaching, supervisory, education, specialist input role, etc.

LIAISON RELATIONSHIP: the team member had a facilitating role as the main contact person with the Department for the group, often for a specific reason

COMMITTEE MEMBER: the team member had a developmental/supportive role (SSW-1)[See Appendix XI for a listing of the agencies].

Each of the four categories of service had a visiting standard that specified the frequency and the level of skill the intervention required. The senior social worker used this scheme in workload allocation and as an evaluative tool. The expectation was for the team member to gradually play a less integral role with the community group or agency as the group assumed increasingly more responsibility for itself. In addition the team provided one-off funding information and general information/referral services
to emerging groups and community organizations with whom it did not have a more formal role.

The Senior Social Worker viewed the continued existence of the community development team as tenuous. Another Senior Social Worker in the District (SSW-3) reinforced this view by explaining that there was less of an assumption that the positions on the Community Development Team would be automatically filled when vacated by transfer or resignations than was the situation with casework positions.

While staff feel community development is important, when it comes down to positions, the attitude of most management and practitioners is that if there's going to be cuts, community development is where the cuts should be. . . .The statutory work, the cases are priority (SSW-3).

Filling each vacancy in the Community Development Team required strong justification and was subject to delays. In the budget cuts of 1987-1988, Department policy was to avoid competition between teams. The alternative chosen, to discontinue the wage worker positions, only affected the Community Development Team since it was the only team with wage workers. One of those wage workers was the volunteer coordinator. This occurred despite Department policy expressing support of a community social work model and encouraging volunteer programmes. Allocation to preventative social work activities had to compete with allocations to casework services fulfilling statutory requirements. The team had difficulties recruiting team members because its social work activities were considered by many as 'fringe' because career prospects were not seen to be enhanced by community work/development experience. It was this non-support, and, at times the thinly veiled hostility expressed by the rest of the staff towards the Community Development Team, that presented a periodic threat to its continued existence.

It has been a constant struggle to explain our role to the rest of the staff. . . .We have not been able to clearly show how we can make their job [the casework job] easier. . . .They want our staff allocation. . . .They think we have [it easy] and just go to meetings (SSW-1).

People can understand casework and they can also see the figures. . . . This team can't really play the numbers game and that seems the way a lot of people judge things (SW-1).
The Senior Social Worker: Community Development Team reflected on his work in the Tamatea suburb of Napier prior to his training. There he applied a 'community casework' model which included many features of the 'patch approach' (Hadley and Hatch, 1981) to the social work he would become familiar with in his training. He made himself available to the agencies and volunteers in his area, was part of the "Discussion in Schools" programmes operating in his area, and demonstrated his commitment to this particular geographical community.

I would regularly go to the local drop-in centre a half day a week and stay there, visiting the solo mums or getting the solo mother's group together, just the little basic things. . . . I'd liaison with the local medical centre and follow-up on any concerns. . . . I set up the liaison system between the school, the school principals, the district health nurses, and the Plunket Society to identify possible problems early (SSW:1).

These activities contributed to the development of his philosophy of community work while in University. Basic to this philosophy was a belief in self-determination and the ability of individuals and communities to help themselves:

While I believe in the importance of the welfare state, in the government taking responsibility, I also think there has been an aspect of people being relieved of their responsibilities. . . . So it is a sort of awakening people to the possibilities they have in their own fingertips. . . . It is empowerment (SSW:1).

He addressed himself to the difference between community work and community development, a difference, he argued, was both in emphasis and in degree.

They differ in terms of the percentage of time the worker is emeshed in the project or community. The worker is much less directly involved in community development and much more involved in community work. My team could do more community development if the caseworkers adopted a more 'community casework' perspective (SSW:1).

He contended that Departmental policy had not been explicit: "the term community development [sic] is used frequently but the intent is for community work [sic] that is directly serving our existing clients" (SSW:1). The Senior Social Worker: Community Development felt that community activities must increasingly be capable of demonstrating their direct relevance to reducing referrals to the Department, to mitigating the seriousness of the referrals made or to establishing resources for
existing clients clearly "within the boundaries of our statutory obligations" (SSW:1). Such guidelines he saw as a double bind since reduction in referrals might be used to justify further budget cuts. The guidelines represented a narrowing of the operationalization of the Departmental mission as it had been interpreted before the restructuring. The Napier District Office Assistant Director (AD:1) was quite clear on this point:

We really do need to look at our areas of responsibility, our goals, our result areas and try and get our services and our community development to fit in with the results we are expected to achieve as a Department. And those results need to be tied in very closely with the clientele. We're achieving results for our clients (AD:1).

The implication was that community development activities for the general well-being of the community was not justifiable. Activities were to be clearly linked to clients. That was assumed to mean current clients, not potential or "at risk" of becoming clients.

I think we were almost at the stage where if something was happening in the community, we had some how to be involved. . . . I don't think we will become the 'trash can' agency, where everything that the other agencies didn't want to do gets dumped onto Social Welfare, because we have such a wide mandate. I do think we are going to be far more selective (AD:1).

The Assistant Director predicted that the size of the Community Development Team would continue to shrink as community work and development activities were 'contracted out' or devolved to the community.

I think we'll have at least one, possibly two positions in the office. One responsible for funding decisions and one position for the inspection of facilities and the monitoring for effectiveness of service (AD:1).

She pointed to the policy directive indicating the intention to eventually shift ultimate responsibility for Maatua Whangai to the iwi and the readiness of the local iwi in Napier to have the Department Maatua Whangai worker sited in their Roopu-a-lwi premises.
STATUTORY - VOLUNTARY BALANCE

The Community Development Team's Senior Social Worker expressed an ambivalence about the shift of provision of services to the voluntary sector.

While the Department is fully responsible for these services, there is some semblance of commitment to their continuation. Once they are devolved to the 'community,' whoever and whatever the 'community' is, that commitment is weakened if not eliminated... This team is being threatened by devolution and I am in conflict. While being philosophically supportive of the move to do things differently, I fear transfer of service provision to the community makes those services vulnerable to fluctuations in community support and funding (SSW-1).

For example, he and the Budget Liaison Worker were supportive of the budgeting service being devolved to the community. They recognized that the involvement of the Department and paid staff may have a negative effect on voluntary involvement:

Hastings [A neighbouring District Office] has an autonomous budgeting service, they have the same sort of team, but they have a committee that runs it. So I think the fact that I have have been here and am available, has made me more involved with the day-to-day operations and the volunteers less involved (SW-1).

Discussion was underway for the transfer of the Budget Advisory Service to the community although the Senior Social Worker was attempting to slow down the process until adequate funding for a coordinator and administrative costs could be guaranteed through local or Departmental funding.

SERVICE DELIVERY

Regionalization and Decentralization

The Community Development Team members had little comment in response to the questions on regionalization and decentralization. (See Chapter Two for discussion of the principles of the restructuring and Appendix I for a copy of the interview schedule) In fact, the team members expressed little interest in these processes since they did not perceive any effect on their work. Three of the respondents holding management
positions (AD:1; SSW-1; SSW-3), however, felt themselves directly effected by both regionalization and decentralization. It was the Assistant Director's opinion that the restructuring of the Department was initiated by the Labour Government to:

Bring services closer to the people who need the services. . . . They went in with the ideas of getting decision making closer, doing more briefing and consulting, and implementing management by consensus. . . . They had the view that there are resources people didn't use effectively and would continue to use ineffectively if they were controlled from a remote point (AD:1).

She felt the Auckland Region had provided a opportunity to examine the implications of a regionalization process. The Assistant Director reported an assistant director's meeting in the early-1980's expressed strong objections to a regionalization plan that created another layer of hierarchy.

However, in 1985, it seemed very clear that we were going to go to regionalisation and that was, I think, when the decision was made but there certainly was discussion before then. . . . I think Puao-Te-Ata-Tu was the final push that was required to make it happen. . . People did see the Department as being a bureaucracy that was remote (AD:1).

The Assistant Director lamented the loss of specialized services, such as legal and international adoption services, that occurred under regionalization. These highly specialized services were infrequently utilized by the districts. To maintain professionals on a regional basis to provide these services would be financially prohibitive to the regions in her opinion. These services would have been better retained as centralized services.

A national perspective on issues like foster care and adoptions is gone. It really has not been well replaced in the Regions. . . . There's nobody that has replaced the programme side, there's just this broad overview, but nobody who is a specialist in the region (AD:1).

Her view was echoed by the Senior Social Worker: Casework:

I'm not at all impressed by regionalisation. . . . For adoptions it has meant chaos. . . . I don't know who is responsible. . . . Two and a half months ago we were told to do a job which included temporary workers and to use them to do it properly and now without an explanation, the money is not there for those workers. Head Office apparently issued a press release that despite the cuts, we would be offering the same service. Now how can we possibly
do that? How can you have any respect for people who have said that? (SSW-2).

The Assistant Director expressed concern that the Regional Office staff, who characterized themselves at one point as a 'courier between the Districts and Head Office,' were in fact operating in that manner:

They [the REO's] have no line authority. If we want to find out something or clarify a policy, we have to write to them and they [sic] will write to Head Office. We are worse off in this regard than we were under the old system when we could contact Head Office directly (AD: 1).

The Assistant Director acknowledged that under the decentralization policies, the District Offices had been granted delegations that meant managers had more direct control over their operation.

In relation to staff, I can decide how many social workers I'm going to have. I can decide the grading of the social workers--with approval of my director. I have to satisfy the director I can do it within the budget and the reason for those particular gradings . . . I am managing the division but I am only managing the division so long as my management fits the district management plan [italics added] (AD:1).

She noted the limits of management in centrally determined budget expenditures and the realities that, not only, was the district budget function added on to an already full-time job it was assumed by individuals without skills in financial management:

It has become quite stressful because we [middle managers] don't have terribly much training in financial management. . . and the money allocated is less than adequate to provide the standard level of service we have had up to now. So a lot of the anger, the reaction against the curtailment of service comes against the local person [sic] (AD:1).

The increase in workload for the Assistant Director was noted by all three Senior Social Workers who felt that the new management tasks delegated through decentralization to the AD's position meant that either those tasks had to be done along with the already full-time job, or some tasks of the AD's job would not be done or, as was already happening, some tasks would be delegated further down the hierarchy, i.e., to the Seniors, increasing the workload for everyone:
At a time when all of us are being asked to work differently, learn different skills and save expenditure, at the same time our jobs are expanded. . . . Innovation is balanced against the constraints of time, money and the rising demand for services (SSW-1).

The delegations to the District Office were initially in the area of casework decisions so the Seniors over the Casework Team and Alternative Care were more directly affected by increased workload. The Community Development Team had few delegations passed to them as district officers but the plan to decentralize community services funding in the next year was expected to alter the Team's responsibilities dramatically.

Devolution and Participation

The proposed decentralization of community funding to the Districts (DSW, 1988d) was expected to bring problematic issues to the District Office. Despite the stated Head Office support of community services, the Assistant Director did not foresee additional funds being made available for community initiatives nor an increase in the transfer of funds for devolution that many community groups expected (NZASW, 1986). She expected that the amount of funds available to community groups would be reduced at least by the costs of the administrative structures created for monitoring and evaluation of the expenditure. As well, the District Office would be expected to play a more prominent role in the funding process:

We are going to be responsible for recommending certain services not be funded in the future and others are. . . . So although we are expecting the community to take initiatives, we are also going to monitor their performance (AD:1).

The Executive Secretary for the District Executive Committee (a structure set up under restructuring to increase the role of the community in decision making, see Appendix IV) was of the opinion that decentralization actually decreased the ability of the community to influence decision making.

While the Department was centralised you could go down to Wellington and make a 'big stink.' Now you have to make one here and you don't really know what the avenues are to get to those in power- it isn't the District Director. You really are not much further ahead (Executive Secretary, District Executive Committee).
The June 1988 statement of the Napier District Management Team Standards defined the aim of the Management Team as operating in a way that "provides for participation by all members" and "where possible, the method of decision making will be by consensus" (Appendix XII). It was important to note that the management team had wide membership. It was composed of the District Director; the Assistant Directors of Social Services, Corporate Services and Benefits and Pensions; two Whanau Group representatives, a Public Service Association representative and the Director's Secretary, The District Executive Committee Secretary was also present at the Management Team meetings in an apparent attempt to open the process to the community but did not apparently have permanent membership.

Management Style

The management philosophy of the Assistant Director was consistent with the District Management Team philosophy.

I have always really liked the idea of participatory management. . .
It is important to listen, to brief and to consult staff . . . but [as management], we reserve the right to make the final decision. . . .  
The process depends as well, on the level of staff experience (AD: 1).

The principle mechanisms for staff participation the Assistant Director outlined were the monthly staff meeting and the individual weekly team meetings. The senior social workers were charged with the liaison responsibility between basic grade staff and management. As well, written memos, comments, reports, etc., were periodically utilized as information exchange methods. The Assistant Director maintained what she described as an 'open door policy' but insisted that issues be dealt with within the chain of command first. She felt that the recommendations of the Administrative Review (1987) and the Departmental Plans urging a participatory style of management only confirmed the style of management already operating in her division. This view was confirmed by the respondents holding management positions (SSW-1,2,3).

Within the Community Development Team, the Senior Social Worker characterized his role as a coordinator rather than as a supervisor with control and monitoring functions. Each of his team members had a specialized function and had been recruited to perform that specialized task. The only exception was the Community Worker who
because of her qualification in social work and her commitment to community development, functioned in a more traditional supervisor-supervisee relationship with the Senior Social Worker. The other workers, particularly the Maatua Whangai worker and the Employee Related Social Worker, felt a dual accountability to their whanau and iwi. This dual accountability redefined their relationship with their Senior and increased their autonomy in task planning and performance. The modified participatory management model utilized in this team reflected these team realities.

SOCIAL WORK

All those interviewed acknowledged that social work practice in the Department had undergone radical changes and more change was still to come.

I think there were some staff with no involvement at all in the community development initiative. They now are beginning to work to deflect children away from the services traditionally provided. ... 'the new way of working' does require new skills and brings with it new stresses (AD:1).

The Assistant Director acknowledged that despite the acceptance of change as inevitable, some social workers remained resistant to the shift to a community oriented service model because of the need to respond to the daily demands for care, protection, supportive services. She acknowledged her own resistance to the name change from Social Work Division to Social Services Division that occurred with the restructuring:

I think with 'Social Services' the Department services were being given a wider perspective and involved more of a community sort of view and a community role. ... [It implied] the expectation of a generic sort of approach to families. ... But I was not involved in the decision, my opinion wasn't even asked. ... There was a feeling almost of betrayal. ... For awhile I even refused to sign [my new title]. ... The acronym AD:SS was distasteful. ... Social Work had had its own line structure and several strong managers [in Head Office who] were made redundant and with them clear identification of social work in Head Office disappeared (AD:1).

Social work practice was seen to have changed: not only in the demand for a bicultural model of practice but in requiring a true power-sharing in decision making with the family in whanau decision making. The Maatua Whangai worker was explicit in setting her priorities: "I don't look at the rights of the mother, I look at the rights of the baby
and its bloodline* (SW-4). The implementation of this model was just beginning and faced complex subtle dilemmas:

We're trying to work in a bicultural way, to involve the whanau, yet people refuse to respond. We thought it was perfectly acceptable to invite the Departmental kaumatua to comment on a particular case but it was not with the particular family. . . . There is a lot of confusion about the proper protocol and how you are to go about unraveling it (AD:1).

The kaumatua group that the Maatua Whangai worker arranged for the researcher to meet felt that the Department was changing and that there were concrete examples of the Department's commitment to Maori people. They pointed out the work of the Maatua Whangai worker with the families in the housing suburb and particularly expressed their appreciation of her in bringing them together to share their cultural heritage. The Maatua Whangai worker explained that she had been encouraged by Departmental policy to engage in community development of her iwi. Her work with the kaumatua group was an example.

The Maatua Whangai worker was both optimistic about Departmental policy regarding iwi development and pessimistic about implementation of true partnership. She felt that trained social workers were more hesitant to implement power sharing in whanau decision making, yet the newly trained social workers were less hesitant to embrace biculturalism. The Pakeha community worker expressed a reluctance to practice bicultural social work because she felt that it was inappropriate for her as a Pakeha to offer support to the Maori community. In her work with a community agency, it was her responsibility to link with the Pakeha community and her Maori colleague's responsibility to link with the Maori community:

That's how we work at the Centre. . . . The Maori women come to her [the Maori worker], not to the Women's Health Centre. . . . I recognized that pretty early on. . . . I was white in the Department like everybody else and it was inappropriate for me to approach the Maori community (SW:2).

The Senior Social Worker: Community Development felt strongly that social work philosophy has always supported getting:
People together to try to decide their own destiny rather than making decisions for them. . . . The knowledge has been there and the desire to work that way has always been there. . . . Now it is supported by policy if not by resources, the workload formula, or training [italics added] (SSW:1).

Three of the team members including their senior felt that the initial Departmental policies issued as part of the restructuring indicated the Department was taking a broad view of the social work task in which community development and community work were seen as integral to the Department's social work services. They felt those initial policy statements supported and legitimized the work of the team. The senior had assumed that the policies were a reflection that the work of the Community Development Unit, established in Head Office in 1984, had influenced policy.

It was only when the second wave of directives began to flow, that we realized that the intention was to devolve community development activities to agencies, groups and iwi authorities outside the department (SSW-1).

The Community Worker spoke of her work with the Women's Health Collective as being initially supported by the new policy statements and now clearly she was being told she must pull back from active involvement in community development activities and from community and work activities not clearly linked to the department's clients. Not only was her work with the collective seen as community development and better done 'in the community by the community' but it was clearly seen by the Assistant Director: Social Services as a health related service not a social welfare service. The community worker felt that the task of social work was being expanded in the general sense but, for social work in the Department, restricted to a very narrow range of statutory tasks.

**BICULTURALISM**

The Institutional Racism Report (DSW, 1985b) "was quite a shock, really, to people in top management" (AD:1). The result has been "an all out effort to try and recruit people who have got a very definite knowledge of Maoritanga" (AD:1). The recruitment of Maori people for social work positions brought new dilemmas:

I'm not sure if they are really quite clear in their own minds as to their Departmental responsibilities, and what is essentially a personal responsibility to their iwi and whanau. . . . Some think they should be able to do almost anything, even though they are employed here to do a specific job (AD: 1).
The Assistant Director asserted that the Department had a higher profile with Maori clients and the Maori community as a result of the implementation of a bicultural perspective and the establishment of positions in the Department aimed at improving relationships with the Maori community such as a Departmental Kaumatua and a Maatua Whangai worker. Such efforts have produced a Pakeha backlash:

Some of the Pakeha clients haven’t got that sort of intermediate link that the Maori people are now having through the Maatua Whangai volunteers and staff. . . . European clients do not feel they’ve got a bridge between them and the Department (AD:1).

As far as casework services are concerned it is clear that “before you go anywhere about a Maori child, you must consult Maatua Whangai” (SSW:1). The increase in Maori staff as a result of affirmative action policies was seen to be having significant impact on the implementation of a bicultural perspective:

I’ve found it started before Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, with the Permanency Planning Programme. It’s been a gradual process that has speeded up in the last eighteen months. I mean policy has initiated the increase in Maori staff and just having these people amongst us has made a difference to the service (SSW:2).

A Maatua Whangai position was allocated to the Napier District in 1983. The worker at time of the research, had only been with the Department officially less than a year but had been a volunteer with her iwi for many years, was a respected member of her tribe, and was mature, i.e., old enough to command an acceptable level of respect from her people to perform her tasks. She was strongly supportive of the Maatua Whangai kaupapa (purpose) and expressed acceptance of the policy changes that emphasized iwi development rather than placement of Maori children. She did however, acknowledge that because of the present capabilities of her iwi, the simultaneous implementation of both policy objectives was not problematic. Other iwi who were not as well established were in need of iwi development resources and activities before attention could be given to the placement of Maori children.

We hold families responsible for their own and let them know we are here with support. . . . We are collating a register of all Maori, of all the marae and the whanau, hapu and iwi that are attached [to Departmental clients]. . . . Our aim is to make sure that the social workers are able to make the contacts themselves. This is part of biculturalism (SW:4).
The Maatua Whangai worker described significant changes within the Department:

> Twelve months ago social workers were not prepared, it was not in the manual, they were suspicious, it was quite new to them. . . but now we can sit and discuss Maori/Pakeha issues quite comfortably. It's also good for those in the iwi to remember that the Department has an obligation. If a child has been abused the Department has a role to play and they are responsible. . . . But there is no reason why as a whanau you can't make the decision as to where the child is going to be. . . . with the Department having a monitoring role (SW:4).

Although she believed that the Department has taken a "a big step forward in biculturalism," (SW:4), she expressed concern that some Maori traditions were inappropriately usurped in the desire to embrace a bicultural perspective. She gave as an example the use of the title, 'Rangitira' (chief) by district administrators who assumed the title by right of their position rather than recognizing it was a title only to be conferred by the iwi.

The Employment Related Social Worker pointed to his work with the training programmes and the Contact Centre as examples of the Department's commitment to both the community and to Maori people, in this case the Maori unemployed. He acknowledged that the District Office had a long-standing commitment to the Centre but current policies reconfirmed the importance of that work. He was disheartened about the more recent policy directives that seemed to indicate that positions like his would be devolved to the community for he did not believe that there would be community resources to support the work he and the other employment related social workers were doing.

**SUMMARY**

Despite the long history of a Community Development Team in the Napier District and the continued support of the Assistant Directors: Social Services for its continued existence, the Team members perceived the team as precariously linked to the District Office and under constant threat. The support the Team felt when the Department established a Community Development Team in Head Office in 1984 did not materialize as anticipated following the restructuring of the Department in 1986. Initially, Community Development activities were supported but further refinement of the
restructuring policies clearly recommended such activities be more properly sited outside the Department. This was clearly indicated in the policy directives to site the Maatua Whangai worker in the iwi as the first step in devolving the Maatua Whangai programme.

The reported inability of the Community Development Team to establish itself as an integral part of the District's infrastructure of services, equal in importance and in claims for District resources, supports the findings of Black, et. al. (1983). The Team perceived itself as 'marginal' in the views of the staff in the Social Services Division and perceived casework with children and families as the core of Departmental service provision. The stated support of preventative activities in the initial restructuring directives did not materialize in resources or staffing support. The restructuring policy of 'partnership with the community' meant that what support there was for community development and community work in the Department and in the District was defined as support for moving preventative services out of the Department to voluntary agencies, groups and the iwi and restricting the team to funding and monitoring roles. At the time of the research, the funding role at the Districts was minimal and consisted of allocations on a pre-determined schedule. This would change in 1989, when community services funding was to be delegated to the districts for allocation according to local needs rather than by the previous system of pre-set priorities.

The management plans advocating a participatory management style (DSW, 1986a, 1987c, 1988b) was perceived as emphasizing the briefing and consultation mechanisms already in place. However, it must be noted that the smallness of the Social Services Division, the relative staff stability, the new building with its common tea room and the management philosophy of the Assistant Director and the District Director were all factors that minimized the impact of this policy directive. That is not meant to imply that staff perceived themselves as possessing real power in decision making. Rather the respondents perceived management as approachable. It also must be said that some team members did not want to participate in management decisions feeling that was the manager's job. Some expressed resentment with the constant requests for consultation meetings when no resources were offered to deal with the work that was delayed. For example, when the Assistant Director suggested further discussion on the social work plan, some staff offered their apologies saying they had too much work to do and could not afford to be away from their desk yet another hour.
There was no doubt that the policy of biculturalism had had a profound effect on all social services and social work provided in the Napier District. Two of the Community Development's five member team were strong in Maoritanga and committed to Maori development. The Maatua Whangai worker, in particular, was in constant consultation with the social work teams to assist in the development of a bi-cultural model of practice. The District's whanau group brought a Maori perspective to the District's operations with support of a whanau consultant, the District Kaumatua and the District Executive Committee which was charged to monitor implementation of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu. (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) The 'new way of working' (DSW, 1988c) included a heightened awareness of Maoridom and institutional racism:

We are now aware that everyone is not the same; there are different cultures and by treating everyone the same, you're treating them as Pakehas... that sort of awareness affects everything you do (SW:1).

The adoption of bicultural social work in the Napier District Office, although perceived by the respondents as consistent with social work values, was seen as requiring immense effort in the development of new skills and expertise at a time of diminishing resources. Some of the respondents expressed concern with the recruitment policies recommended by both the Institutional Racism Report (DSW, 1985b) and Puao-Te-Ata-Tu. (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). The recommendations were aimed at encouraging the hiring of personnel into social work positions without a social work orientation, without knowledge or understanding of the tasks to be performed and without a viable orientation and on-going training programme within the District. The result was that the statutory work (referrals of child abuse, family disruption, youth court proceedings) which was on the rise, had to be handled by fewer and fewer staff as the casework positions were filled with Maori people knowledgeable in Maoritanga but not necessarily in social work skills. Paradoxically, these policies had a negative effect on race relations since the decreasing number of experienced, social work staff were predominantly Pakeha. This was to be a much more serious source of tension in the Porirua District Office then it was in the Napier District Office as will be shown in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

PORIRUA DISTRICT OFFICE

THE GENERIC TEAM

The same procedures for collecting data were utilized with this second team. Each member of the team, the Senior Social Worker (SSW:4) and the four social workers, (SW:5-8) plus the Supervising Senior Social Worker (SSSW, a middle management position with administrative responsibility for the team) and Assistant Director Social Services (AD:2) were interviewed using the interview schedule. Each of the team members was asked to present a piece of their work which demonstrated 'the new way of working.' The researcher took part in a multi-disciplinary conference at a short-term stay group home regarding permanency planning for an adolescent. A second worker had the researcher accompany her in the provision of preventative services to a mother under stress. The worker had helped the mother plan for day-care services in a community based childcare centre. We transported the child on his first day while the social worker assisted in settling him in to the centre. The researcher participated in the planning of an intervention in a reported child abuse case where the child was 'at risk'. The decision-making aimed at answering the safety of the child was complicated by contrary wishes of two factions within the whanau who disagreed on the placement of the child. (See Appendix XIII for a summary of the research activities in the Porirua District Office).

One corollary interview was conducted with the Assistant Director:Social Services, hereafter referred to as the 'Assistant Director' (AD:2). Informal discussions were held with the Seniors in the Court and The Coast Teams, with The District Director and the Senior in charge of the Pacific Island Team. Members of the Maori Team and the Youth Aid Officer approached the researcher to present their views on the restructuring.

During the week long research period the researcher took part in the life of the agency including a team meeting, a seniors' intake allocation meeting and the management meeting. As well, the researcher was provided with District Office documents/memos,
statistical reports, circular memos (Head Office or Regional Office generated), the 1987 planning day notes and the staff meeting minutes available from 1987 and 1988.

In the negotiation process prior to the team agreeing to participate in the research, the researcher made a presentation to the entire staff and requested their support (See Chapter Three: Methodology for more detail). There was less spontaneous comment from staff not directly involved in the research than in the Napier District Office. Several explanations can be offered. The office was visibly under more pressure with the demands of the workload in this urban environment. Tensions around the new team structure and its implications for workload and staff cooperation were high, making people reluctant to discuss matters with an outsider. The office, because of its proximity to Head Office felt it was often 'studied' and the research was conducted with Head Office endorsement. Lastly, there were a few staff who expressed thinly veiled hostility to a Pakeha professional social work educator with a non-New Zealand accent.

THE PORIRUA DISTRICT OFFICE

The District Office serves Porirua, a suburban community of 83,000 people, contiguous with Wellington, New Zealand's capital city. It was the site of one of the first state housing projects following World War II and continues to support substantial state housing tracts within its boundaries. The District itself stretches for 44 kilometres along the west coast of the North Island from Waikanae to Tawa, encompassing quite distinct communities in terms of class and race. It has a significant multi-cultural mix of Maori, Samoan, Cook Island, Tongan, Tokelauan and European peoples. The District crosses the tribal boundaries of Ngati Toa, Te Atiawa and Ngati Raukawa, each with their unique customs and protocol.

In 1988, the District was struggling with fast growing unemployment. The estimated unemployment rate of 15% was reflected in the increasing rate of applications for unemployment benefits, growing awareness of domestic violence, increasing referrals for child protection, and the multiple needs of its relatively young population. For example, applications for domestic purposes benefits had reportedly increased 7.1% over the previous year.
The Porirua District had a typical district office organizational structure set out in Figure Four. The Porirua District Office had one satellite office, the Paraparaumu Area Welfare Office which provided a limited range of social work services by a small team of a senior and three social workers.

THE SOCIAL SERVICE DIVISION

The Social Services Division had 26 full-time occupied social work positions, including the Assistant Director. In contrast to the Napier office, clerical staff were 'pooled' and, hence were not considered part of the Social Services establishment. There were six teams, five based in the Porirua Office and the sixth working up the coast at the Paraparaumu Area Welfare Office. In 1985, the division had one Maori and two Pacific Island social workers. By 1988, six Maori and three Pacific Islanders were on staff as a result of affirmative action efforts. In late 1987, the Social Work Division made the decision to change the structure of the division's teams based in Porirua from teams based on the patch system to ethnicity-based teams. The redeployment of staff was nearly complete at the time of the research. Staff had been reorganized into a Maori Team with Maori staff, a Pacific Island Team with Pacific Island Staff, and two Generic Teams with all Pakeha Staff except one. The generic team under study included one Maori staff who objected to the concept of ethnic based teams. She was however, supportive of biculturalism and argued for racially and culturally mixed team composition. The fifth team, the Court Team was also ethnically mixed.
The Porirua District Office, prior to 1983 was organized along specialist lines with teams for adoption, court work, long term foster care and generic social work with children and families. The Assistant Director (AD:2) described himself as dissatisfied with the ability of the specialist teams to provide a comprehensive service. This concern was raised in Britain's Barclay Report on Social Work Services (1982) and debated in the Assistant Directors Conference that year. The debate was one factor that led to the invitation to Roger Hadley to come as a consultant to the Department and address the Assistant Directors' Conference in September, 1982. It was after these discussions and presentations that the Porirua Assistant Director embarked on a plan to introduce a modified patch system (Hadley and Hatch, 1981) into the Porirua office structure.
The implementation was difficult... The notion of a 'patch system' is not exactly comparable to our [geographically] large, comparatively sparsely populated district... We decided to abandon specialization, which had a number of advantages, in terms of training and extent of expertise required [and move] to a community based social work model based on a geographical community in which the social worker would know the neighbourhood, the life of the people there and be able to use community resources... and we were successful (AD:2).

In the Assistant Director's view the patch system brought a renewed awareness to social workers and to the clients, themselves, that they could be effective in dealing with their own problems, that common problems were affecting people in their geographical patches, and that "some forms of lower order social action responses could be more effective than dealing with them individually" (AD:2). The principles of the patch system as implemented in the Porirua District Office were:

1. Identification of the helping capacities in lay people, kith and kin, etc., to provide care or self-care
2. A proactive, not a reactive, response to need and hence a preventative rather the curative role
3. A focus on teamwork utilizing professional and community people rather than individual casework
4. Workers gaining detailed knowledge of their patch, its history, characteristics, its formal and informal helping networks, agencies, groups and individuals
5. Localized services both highly visible and accessible
6. Participative services, rather than alienating services (SSSW).

All social workers were assigned to teams designated to provide social work services to a geographical patch. Characteristics of the different patches resulted in quite different service provision. The patch in a lower socio-economic area with extensive state housing was overloaded with child protection referrals and, consequently, did less community based networking than the team in an area with a more mixed socio-economic composition which also had more helping agencies and groups.

For us, the patch system, was a bit of a dream... We did get to know the local helpers, like the Plunket Nurse and the schools, teachers, youth aid officers... We were able to get some good relationships going and pitched in for some training... but the press of child protection work slowly eroded our efforts till we were basically doing casework (SW:5).
The patch system would have continued to be the team structure of the office if "we had not been forced by the the requirements of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu to consider other options" (AD:2).

In 1987, the Maori social workers in the District Office put forth a proposal for a Maori team and a client allocation system based on ethnicity. The proposal recommended joint responsibility with Pakeha social workers for existing Maori clients. All new clients were to be allocated on the basis of ethnicity. The proposal was discussed at the District's planning day in October of 1987 and implemented incrementally. The Maori team, Nga Kaitiaki, was set up in late October and the Pacific Island Team, in early 1988. There were three interrelated factors which made the implementation problematic. The first was the tension over "the performance levels of the Maori team" (SSW:4). Many Maori staff were hired to conform with the recommendations of the Institutional Racism Report (1985) and Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) That is, their employment was based on their cultural knowledge as a major criteria. Because of the fragmentation of the training function in the Department and its disestablishment of the training institutions as part of the restructuring, it was the perception of many staff that these workers were not adequately inducted into the Department nor trained to assume the statutory responsibilities of a Departmental social worker.

[There has been] a frustration with the slowness with which some of the culturally appropriate client groups have been able to be shifted to culturally appropriate workers and the lack of preparation of those culturally appropriate workers in terms of training to take up their new work load (AD:2)

As well, Maori staff were often in double-binds with the Department and their whanau or iwi. The Department was often unclear in their expectations for the newly hired Maori staff, telling them on one hand their role was to 'bring a Maori perspective to the Department' and at the same time expecting them to carry traditional caseload responsibilities. The Maori team, for example, refused to be rostered for front desk duty. This decision further deepened the resentment of some Pakeha social workers who felt they were carrying the District's workload with an ever decreasing social work establishment. Maori staff expressed their conflict with the expectations of their whanau to be involved in iwi development activities, some of which were not sanctioned by the Department. There was some resentment about Maori staff attendance at hui, particularly if they were frequent or lasting several days. Their absence further
highlighted the perceived disparity between Maori and Pakeha staff because the responsibility to deal with day-to-day client requests fell to the mostly Pakeha social workers left in the office. Lastly, when Maori staff assumed a community/iwi development role, they refused to carry caseload responsibilities. Such moves were seen as effectively overloading the Pakeha social workers who remained responsible for meeting statutory requirements of timely service particularly in response to reported child abuse and youth justice cases.

They [Maori social work staff] occupy a social work positions in a fixed establishment but do not perform social work tasks—that means more work for the rest of us (SW:6).

At the 1987 October staff Planning Day in an effort to respond positively to some of these difficulties, staff created a Bicultural Development Komiti (Committee) within the District Office with the following terms of reference:

(1) To promote and monitor bi-cultural development within the office

(2) To provide a forum for the discussion of issues, for the exchange of ideas and increase of understanding to facilitate the implementation of biculturalism

(3) To insure a gap does not develop between Nga Kaitiaki and the rest of the social work staff (Porirua Office Memo, 1987: Oct).

The meetings of the Komiti were to be open to all staff and to have decision making powers based on power sharing and consensus principles. This group was torn by strife and conflict and was all but dysfunctional by the time of the research period in November 1988.

THE GENERIC TEAM

This team had been the responsibility of the supervising Senior Social Worker (SSSW) until her promotion in July 1988. She had been with the Department since 1966 but was in University earning her Diploma in Social Work during the critical 1985-1986 period. The Senior Social Worker (SSW:4) was appointed to her position in October just two weeks before the research commenced. This senior social worker, who qualified with an advanced degree in social work in 1982, had been with the Department for less than four years with two breaks in her work with the Department. One of her
team members had been with the Department since 1979. Two joined the Department in 1983 and 1985 respectively. The fourth team member had been with the Department since 1981 but absent from the Department during 1986 and 1987 while on bursary earning her degree. The team was so new that it did not have a shared identity and each team member called the team by a different name, i.e., child protection team, the generic team or Sara's team (the newly appointed SSW:4). However, they did perceive their team as distinct from the ethnically based Maori and Pacific Island teams and as possessing its own philosophy of practice based on generic social work principles of working across the full range of activities and modes of practice. The entire team expressed concern that their generic team was under increasing pressure to become a specialist child protective services team.

The team evolved by bringing together three Pakeha social workers and one Maori worker who had expressed a commitment to utilizing their experience with the patch system and/or were committed to implementing the 'new way of working' with clients (DSW 1988c). The Senior Social Worker had been recruited to head up this team with these particular individuals:

I feel quite confident about these people [the team members]. . . . But if I was switched to another team and asked to supervise different people . . . I would find it very difficult (SSW:4).

She expressed concern that the intention for her team was that it would move away from a generic focus to a specialization in child protection issues only, and only if the child were clearly, presently at risk:

I'm worried if we have to categorize [a referral] every time as being child protection. . . . Now either we are involved in a statutory way or we can't be involved. . . . that is pretty dangerous (SSW:4).

There was a general feeling of uncertainty regarding the stability of the team, its philosophy and its membership. The structure of the teams in the Porirua District Office had been unsettled since the staff development day in late 1987 and seemed to the team to be still vulnerable to more change.

I do not agree with the decision for ethnically based teams. It has intensified the tension between the teams and made some working relationships impossible. . . . I don't expect these teams to last. . . .
What about our clients, some of them do not want to be forced to see a Maori social worker just because they're Maori (SSW:4).

The newly appointed senior social worker was just beginning to formulate her goals for the team but first she had to familiarize herself with the dramatic changes that had occurred with during the year of her absence from the Department. She expressed concern that the focus of her team was quickly being confined to child protection investigation. She noted that the referral rate of one crisis case a day observed during the research week was not unusual. These cases required immediate attention and decisions about protection and usually intensive intervention over a minimum of two to three weeks for each case. She lamented that preventative services and community development was either being devolved to the community or limited to designated occupants of social work positions, such as the Maori community worker. "The 'cop type' jobs are the only ones left to Departmental social workers" (SSW:4).

The team membership was under constant threat from staff reorganizing efforts further complicating team-building efforts. The most experienced team member was considering tendering her resignation due in part to changing role of social workers in the Department.

When we were structured into patches I felt as if I was able to use formal and informal helpers in response to my clients needs. I knew the other helping professionals in my area, I knew the families that I worked with, and I knew several of the church leaders, that is so important when you work with Samoan people, particularly. . . I am not saying it was the perfect system. . . The patch system was not adequately resourced or staffed, but at least I knew more about my clients and their lives, now, I am working in a vacuum. . . I hate it. I know I am not doing the best job for my clients (SW:5).

Two of the other five team members expressed concern that District management wanted the team to specialize in child protection. Neither of them wanted to do child abuse work exclusively and would consider leaving the Department if that became the sole focus of the team. "I don't actually see a future for me with the Department" (SW:6). Another team member felt constantly under pressure to join the ethnically based team, a pressure she felt as much from Pakehas as from her own people. She, however, contended that her contribution was best made to a generic based team that acknowledged cultural differences. Hence, she resisted any attempts to transfer her to an ethnically based team.
SERVICE DELIVERY

Regionalization

The Assistant Director offered several explanations for the 1986 regionalization. He felt that the Department had grown so large in both number of employees and functions that:

Regionalisation was a realisation of Head Offices’ need to retain, and in some cases reclaim, control of the Department and the Districts that had grown so large (AD:2).

Regionalization would not have occurred unless the State Services Commission had determined it would approve the establishment of the management structures to support regionalization.

The technical thing that happened, as I understand it, was that the Department, because of its overall size, was regraded to a class that allowed the department to have two additional deputy directors. . . State Services did the regrading in the early 1980’s but it had to wait until the wage freeze was lifted (AD:2).

The third factor in his explanation was a new management philosophy that utilized a tripartite framework for management with the Head Office controlling policy, regional offices controlling resources, and district office responsible for operations. Implementing this management structure was problematic:

There has been a general struggle with those three roles. . . . Mainly the struggle has been going on between the Head Office and Regional. . . . Head Office has retained operational control over community services funding for instance, but that is going to change (AD:2).

He did acknowledge struggles between the districts for resources and programmes, commenting that in the South Central Region where three districts service metropolitan Wellington, duplication of specialist services would be neither cost effective nor efficient. Yet coordination of effort or service was seen by some as contrary to the stated goals of the restructuring effort in general and the regionalization principle in particular. The Supervising Senior Social Worker was more cynical about the Assistant Director’s struggles in the two-monthly regional meetings:
[The Assistant Director] has to go and scrap with the other AD's about who gets what in an ever diminishing resource allocation. . . . It's competitive not cooperative. . . . it is conspiracy theory, making the workers fight each other to use up their their discontent [sic] . . . . It is part of the new management philosophy (SSSW).

The Supervising Senior Social Worker returned to the Department in late 1986 after her study leave to learn of the restructuring and the establishment of the Regional Offices as a result of regionalization.

I had heard of the Pink Palace over there [the description given to the South Central Regional Office because of its comparatively lavish pink and grey furnishings] but did not know just what effect it would have on my job. . . . I soon became aware that the decisions that had previously gone to Head Office, were to go there. So on the face of it it looked as though decision making was moving closer . . . Really, [it] just became another link in the chain . . . . Decisions made in Head Office used to come directly. . . . now it seemed like something stuck in the middle there and it happened to be in Lower Hutt [the Regional Office] (SSSW).

It was the Supervising Senior Social Worker who voiced the discontent about the resource expenditures in the creation of the Regional Office and its highly graded staff with no noticeable decrease in the size of Head Office:

The most galling thing for me was the fact the Head Office and Regional Office was forever making requests for us to do work they couldn't do and they wanted. . . . They were easily establishing positions [in the regional offices] and they were paid heaps. . . . Meanwhile we have to struggle to increase the social work establishment (SSSW).

Her complaints were echoed by both her team and her supervisees who noted that the office's proximity to Wellington meant that they were frequently asked to second a worker to the Head Office for preparation of discussion or policy documents without any payback in staff allocation hence, effectively increasing the workload of the social workers left behind.

**Decentralization**

There was clear acknowledgement, from the three district social work managers (AD:2, SSSW; SSW:4) interviewed, that delegations of authority to make decisions about administrative and practice matters had taken place. "Things happen more quickly
definitely. . . . You don't have have to rush off to Head Office" (SSW:4). There was
equally, however, acknowledgement that the delegations had resulted in an increased
workload for the managers at every district office level because although the delegations
brought decision making power down the hierarchy, support systems and additional
staff allocations had not accompanied the delegations.

This whole money thing is what is the biggest change, I think. Having an office budget . . . . It was like money was a vulgar thing
and you never really talked about it before, it was like this endless
resource that you had . . . . Now we've got to work out where our
priorities are and we are on our own [sic] (SSW:4).

The expectation that the district's assistant-directors assume a management role over
their divisions placed heavy demands on the Assistant Directors of Social Services:

The significant changes for me are being called upon to manage the
resources that we had, where as previously that had been
something that had been done by Head Office. . . . I drew my
satisfaction from giving direct support to operational staff
activities and almost a direct involvement with them (AD:2).

The new role for the Assistant Director meant a move from a practice or clinical
director's role to a manager role with an emphasis on financial management and
accountability:

The expectations of being a manager, a financial manager, isn't
something I particularly relish. . . . I'm being expected to manage
a budget and be accountable for it when my ability to control that
budget, is in my view, limited. [It is] manifestly unfair [sic]
(AD:2).

The Assistant Director was referring to his ability to predict the demand for special
needs grants, foster-care placements, clothing allowances, koha payments, etc. The
demand for these benefits are linked to the rate of unemployment and whanau conference
expenditures. These expenditures are difficult to predict.

The Department is saying to give as much power to basic grade
social workers to get their job done as well as they can and encourage delegation of authorities down to them. A lot of those
authorities relate to expenditure. Yet, as Assistant Director, I am
responsible to management for those expenditures. The only way I
can actually get a firm grip is to undo that, to draw the
expenditures back up to me (AD:2).
The Assistant Director, then clearly outlined the paradox in the delegations of authority when coupled with the demands for financial accountability. He saw his ability to manage effectively as further hampered by an archaic reporting and computer system which "if we're lucky can tell you what happened a month ago. . . . It's like remote steering with a motor car" (AD:2).

Devolution

The structure and responsibilities of this team did not directly expose them to issues of devolution. They were aware of the implications of the closure of the pre-adolescent care facilities in their region and the alternative care report (MacDonald and Moffatt, 1988). The report conveyed the concern of community groups that care of these children would be left to "the community with 'armies of non-existent volunteers'" (MacDonald and Moffatt, 1988). The MacDonald and Moffatt report listed ten Maori groups in Porirua offering services to adolescents and called for the transfer of resources from the closure of the Departmental facilities to these groups for payment of staff and expenditures in providing care.

Participation

The team was aware of the myriad implications of the policy demand for partnership to the community. They acknowledged their skepticism, "when anyone talks about community involvement, they mean cutting resources" (SSW:4). They raised questions about the ethics and the standards of involving community people in aspects of the Department's work. One team member described an application of the principles of 'community involvement' and 'keeping a child out of care' in which those questions were raised for her. She had been called in to investigate an alleged child abuse case. The plan had to be made for monitoring and protection over the weekend for the child. Prior to 1986, in this situation, the child would have been taken into care to insure their safety. In 1988, alternatives for care in the community had to be thoroughly investigated before a child was to be brought into care. In this particular case, the Senior Social Worker arranged monitoring through the Department's industrial chaplain. The chaplain knew a young couple with children who would be willing to support this family over the weekend by visiting and being available by phone, hence
providing a safeguard that was acceptable to the parents in question. This type of community monitoring would not have been acceptable practice prior to the new directives for partnership with the community.

I wouldn't have thought that it was appropriate to go out and ask complete strangers to do this very sensitive task. . . I would have thought that it challenged confidentiality and privacy principles but it is a new practice being tried in other offices . . . . It challenges the reluctance a lot of social workers have to using community workers and volunteers (SSW:4).

The Senior Social Worker had a second example of community involvement that contrasted with the success of her first example. This involved the support of a 16 year-old Maori boy brought before the court for offending. A newly formed Maori group made a forceful plea in front of the judge to be granted supervision responsibility and was successful. Two months later, the group had disbanded and the boy was reoffending. Such an example, she argued, highlighted the need for evaluation and monitoring to ensure quality and continuity of care.

One of the social workers saw partnership with the community as a requirement to utilize community resources first. Community resources being defined as informal caregivers and individuals, as well as, professional caregivers and formal helping agencies. She pointed out the process in the multi-disciplinary meeting regarding permanency care for the adolescent that she and the researcher attended. She explained that in the 'new way of working', she was compelled to explore, and at times develop community based alternatives.

Before I may have assumed responsibility within Departmental resources; now use of Departmental alternatives is last of the options (SW:6).

A second social worker argued that true partnership is "a long way from community development or community work" (SW:7). She questioned the community development efforts of the designated community workers in her office saying they defined their efforts long term but did not even know the resources in the community now:

I had a young couple that needed housing and I called [the community worker]. His reply went like this: 'I am working in the community at the moment to develop a number of initiatives, a number of resources for people in the situation you describe,' and he went on to say it wasn't here yet and if I would like to put their
name on a waiting list. . . . Well, it was all in the never, never, that was totally unhelpful to me and my clients (SW:7).

Her anger was based both on her perceived impression that the worker didn't have any idea of the community resources available and that his well-formulated statement was a cover-up for inactivity. Meanwhile, she was left without resources for her clients. This lack of mutual appreciation of the time constraints of both the caseworker and the community development worker was noted in the responses of the Napier Office respondents as well.

There was recognition by the team and the managers that the restructuring of 1986 did open many avenues for community based participation in Departmental activities through the District Executive Committee, the Regions' Institutional Management Committees, the appointment of non-professionals and community agency personnel to the child protection team.

The Porirua Office had abandoned their fledgling social work volunteer service in the early 1980's under pressure that the use of volunteers with the Department was exploitative. By the mid-1980's, with the demands of *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (1986), the practice of requesting cultural advice and consultation was well established. There were clear indications that all the members of the team were actively initiating contacts with community groups and individuals in the provision of services to their clients, but much of this effort was clearly individual case related. The team felt they had become increasingly unsupported because since the Maatua Whangai position had been vacant for over a year. Their relationship with the community workers in Nga Kaitiaki was often strained and they felt isolated and uninformed of that team's community development activities. The team felt that the increase in child abuse referrals, and their severity, greatly limited their ability to work in any effective way with the community despite policy directives and the efforts being made by others in the office.

**Management Style**

In 1987, the Assistant Director introduced a participatory management style in the Social Services Division of the Porirua District Office. The principles of equal power and consensus making were the cornerstones of the model based on empowerment. Comments on the year long experiment from the respondents were mixed. Some saw it
as a complete waste of time and an abdication of responsibility by management. Others saw it as an opportunity to participate actively in the management of the office but felt that the process was not well managed. They expressed concern that the meetings were time-consuming and emotionally draining with few tangible results. Yet, all expressed some support for the principles of participatory management.

We try to operate a participatory management system, and I think it works quite well, at our level [the Senior Social Work level]. But there is still a lot that comes down to us that we are just told to do. I wonder if it's possible to be truly participative in a bureaucracy. It probably isn't (SSSW).

She contended that the office and the management team are relatively non-hierarchical and share a commitment to joint decision making while recognizing that "sometimes there are decisions when its simply not feasible" (SSSW).

The Senior Social Worker had just joined the team, characterized herself as having a "collegial, participatory management style" (SSW). The social workers agreed that the social work division's stated goals of participatory management were, by and large, put into practice down to the first line supervisory level. They also felt the policy of briefing and consulting followed practice as far as their office was concerned (See Appendix IX).

SOCIAL WORK

The Assistant Director's view was that social workers at the management level regard community development and community work "as a natural part of social work, just another social work role"(AD:2). He viewed the name change to Social Services as unnecessary if the intent was to reflect that perspective. He acknowledged that social work in the Department, while embracing individual casework, group work and community work as equal methods in social work, did not transfer equally to practice for two reasons. First, the demands of statutory responsibilities took precedence in the allocation of time and staffing levels. Second, these levels are often inadequate to permit preventative work and the development of the competencies required to fulfill statutory responsibilities. He offered the following example:
The Senior Social Worker prior to me led a team focused on benefit related social work. She saw it as a valuable preventative social work task. I agreed with her theoretically, but I knew and I think she did, that pressure to supply staff resources to meet the need for children would go on--to the point now, I would say that we contribute less than one staff member's time to benefit related social work, and most of that is client initiated, people coming with hardship problems to the social worker at the duty desk (AD:2).

A contrary view was expressed by the Supervising Senior Social Worker who did not see community development or community work as part of the task of social work in the Department.

I don't see much evidence of community work or community development in the day-to-day work of the social workers. . . . they [community work and community development] are not office sanctioned or promoted types of activities (SSSW).

The community development positions in the office were seen by the Supervising Senior Social Worker as having a specialized function with the Maori community for the development of resources for Maori clients that did not generalize to the entire client community.

The tensions in social work came from two other sources in the view of the Assistant Director. The first was the retention of Community Services Funding in Head Office, particularly in their mandated allocations to national organizations, such as to the New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped and Women's Refuge Centres. The Assistant Directors wanted the funding decentralized and argued that the delegation to the Districts would decrease the demand for community service funding positions in Head Office. The second tension stemmed from the disestablishment or alleged forced retirement of the social work hierarchy in Head Office in 1986-1987 period. The Head Office social work hierarchy had lent a social work identity and professional leadership to the department's social workers. His view was echoed by the Supervising Senior Social Worker who expressed a degree of despair with the future of social work in a Department who with apparent ease "disposed of the social work hierarchy and in its place created the administratively isolated position of the Principal Social Worker" (SSSW). The name change to social services was to the Supervising Senior Social Worker indicative of the place of social work in the Department. She saw the Department as moving from direct practice to indirect practice with selected
specializations. The second aspect of this change was the reclassification of all management positions in Head Office to the Clerical-Executive Class, effectively curtailing the career ladder of social workers at the middle management level.

To the team members the most significant change to their practice beside biculturalism and participation with the community was the shift in emphasis and resources from working with a child after being given a formal 'status' such as being made a ward of the court to working with a child and the whanau or family prior to the declaration of a formal departmental 'status'.

Before the only way we could claim resources, such as payment for temporary care, was after bringing the child 'into care.' Now we can access the resources of the department to keep children out of care (SW:5).

Yet, they expressed some concerns as to the long term effect of this change in policy because allocation of resources was based on a quantitative management information system.

If we work really hard, keep children in the community, with their whanau and out of care, will our resources be cut? Contacting whanau, arranging planning meetings is very time consuming. . . but is not counted anywhere (SW:5).

**BICULTURALISM**

All the respondents acknowledged the significance of the Ministerial Advisory Committee Report on a Maori Perspective in the Department of Social Welfare: *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) as critical to the Department's commitment to biculturalism. They noted that awareness of ethnicity issues had been developing in the Department since the early 1980's. The Porirua District Office had been granted a Maatua Whangai worker in the original establishment. That worker had been instrumental in effectively linking Maatua Whangai groups with the Departmental social workers. The Senior Social Worker who had had a period of time away from the Department and then returned to the Department in late 1986 was struck with the change:

Maatua Whangai groups had really grown. . . . When I came back I learned that there were all these people out there that we were
answerable to . . . Before I left it felt like there was just Maatua Whangai and we were just trying to get involved with groups and when I came back it felt like everybody was expected to be doing it (SSW).

The work of the Maatua Whangai came to a halt when the incumbent went on parental leave. At the time of the research, the position had been vacant for over a year due in part to a proposed transfer that did not eventuate and partly to a new Maatua Whangai policy that recommended the resource be devolved to the local iwi.

Application of the principles of *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) placed a heavy burden on district resources:

> No funds came with the directive to implement *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu*
> No clear policy guidelines came either. . . . For example, we were told to familiarize our staff with Maori protocol, to seek invitations to marae but koha payments are culturally appropriate. Nobody knew where you were to get the money and yet we were told to get on with it (SSSW).

Although money was now clearly allocated for koha payments to marae for hosting hui, to volunteers and to cultural consultants, the Supervising Senior Social Worker thought that the “payment is a pittance and inhibits the social workers from getting into full swing” (SSSW). This is a clear example of the inconsistencies in the community partnership philosophy as perceived by these social workers. The social workers voiced a commitment to the principle of partnership but in their conceptualization it involved non-exploitation of volunteers and community groups. They expressed frustration with the lack of support, and discussion of its implications prior to directives expecting partnership be implemented. Governmental policy emphasized community responsibility and the ability of people to take care of their own, but did not consider including provisions for payment for service.

The Senior Social Worker described the apprehension with the shift in relationship from one of professional/bureaucratic power with a relatively powerless client and community to sharing power with clients and the community in a partnership.

> At first I found it daunting. . . . fancy me having to justify what I am doing to these people and after a little while I felt like it was a relief to say to the whanau and iwi, ‘Can you help?’ . . . and then I could say ‘that hasn't worked, we need to get together again (SSW:4).
The change to a bicultural model of practice was exemplified in the use of Maori language in the informal every day life of the agency and in formal documentation.

I just remember some of the forms that we used to have for kids coming into care. They had race and tribal affiliation on it but no one filled it in. . . . That started to be done and now there are family trees on the file and where so and so's mother's people come from (SSW:4).

The more fundamental change was the demand for whanau based decision-making which was expected to be given further impetus in the proposed Children and Young Person's Act under Parliamentary discussion at the time of the research. The Supervising Senior Social Worker saw the adoption of whanau decision making as a top-down process that has received qualified support by direct-line practitioners. Here again, she contended, that the lack of resource allocation hindered its full implementation:

There should have been a fund to support whanau decision making: money for travel, koha, accommodation. The whole question of extra time required by social workers [to find, contact, and arrange for whanau to attend the decision making meeting] should have been looked at . . . two or three positions [should have been created] to accommodate the extra and time-consuming tasks that result (SSSW).

She also noted that no funds were allocated for training in the new skills that are required to arrange and plan a whanau decision meeting which would be bicultural and in many cases multi-cultural.

[Departmental Social Workers] don't have a tradition of group work. . . . We are required to do it without knowing about the dynamics. . . . skill is required in knowing what and how to lay out the facts, the responsibilities, possible alternatives, how to be firm, [and] knowledgeable without either abdicating our responsibilities or retaining control that is contrary to the purpose of the process in the first place (SSSW).

The Senior Social Worker noted that in her university social work training, community work wasn't seen as an integral part of social work in a statutory agency. Community work was seen rather as a skill that would be practised by a worker in local government or by a detached youth worker in an programme sponsored by the Department of Internal Affairs. Hence, she felt a whole new set of skills had to be acquired by the social worker in the statutory setting:
What has changed is the requirement to be knowledgeable about how to get families involved, to make links with children's families... how to trace families, convene meetings for decision making... Whereas before you planned a desired outcome, now you take one step at a time and you take a back-seat quite often but you have a very important job in laying the ground work for the decision making (SSW)

The Senior Social Worker felt the whanau decision making meetings require a high degree of skill and knowledge.

The social worker feels great responsibility to these meetings... but then you actually have to sit back and let it go... Let the process go... It is not easy (SSW:4).

Such an perspective is contrary to social work practice principles which although they provide a feedback loop for altering an intervention plan, demand that an intervention be planned, even if within broad parameters and, hence, conflicts with the traditional expectations in the role of the professional as expert. Secondly, the social worker has statutory responsibilities to uphold as clearly outlined in the 1987 report of the Independent Inquiry Team on the Ailini case (Pilalis, Opal and Mamea, 1987). The impact of that report on Departmental policy and resourcing was unclear. The Report was under embargo in late 1988 because of an injunction laid by the mother's lawyers. As well, the Children and Young Persons' Act was still under consideration in Parliament and no clear indication was given of the social workers' responsibilities and consequent liability in the proposed legislation.

SUMMARY

The issues and dilemmas of implementing the principles of the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare were well reflected in this urban district office. The diversity of views, and the of intensity with which they were expressed, reflect the multiple tensions and strains that the Social Work Division, as an organizational entity and the social workers as professionals, were experiencing. The strains in implementing a bicultural approach to practice during this crucial transition period were clearly evident. The team members expressed restrained optimism about the 'new way of working' not because of philosophical differences, in fact, they welcomed an opportunity to explore a potentially more effective model. Their hesitation stemmed
from their questions of the motives of the government and their fears that the demands of their statutory requirements would relegate them to a specialized and limited social work practice with child abuse cases. Their Supervising Senior Social Worker viewed the changes in the Department as:

Reflecting a serious erosion of the concept of universality . . . which has created enormous disparities in what is done, by whom, and with whom and who has access, reflecting a shift away from ideas of the welfare state by which people have access to services by virtue of citizenship to one based on the ability to pay (SSSW).

She expressed a degree of despair with the Department's ability to provide a quality service with increasing number of untrained workers with poor or non-existing training programmes. Her fear was that incidents similar to the Ailini case (Pilalis, Opal and Mamea, 1987) would increase as the ability to provide competent service in the Department was eroded.
CHAPTER EIGHT

PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS

In 1986, the Department of Social Welfare underwent a pervasive restructuring process that marked probably the most dramatic shift in social service policy since the advent of the welfare state during the first half of this century. This dissertation reports the findings of an exploratory study of the changes in social work within the Department of Social Welfare which occurred as a consequence of the restructuring processes outlined in the Management Plan (DSW, 1986a). This plan proposed sweeping reforms in the Department's service delivery through the regionalization of its activities, decentralization of delegated authorities to the Districts, changes in management style and the provision of "culturally appropriate social services" (DSW, 1986:1). This final chapter sets out an analysis of the findings reported in Chapters Four to Seven using the theoretical framework articulated in Chapter Two. The underlying patterns are identified, implications for further research are delineated, and the prospects for social work practice within the Department of Social Welfare are also discussed.

This thesis proposed that the challenges to welfare state policies made in the 1970s and early 1980s succeeded in shifting social service policy from a welfare state model as articulated by Richard Titmuss (1974, 1976; Reisman, 1977) toward a welfare society model of social service delivery as promulgated by Roger Hadley and his colleagues (1981, 1984, 1987). The Hadley model was reflected in the principles of the 1986 restructuring: regionalization, decentralization, devolution and partnership with the community. In this thesis, the change in social policy strategy from a welfare state toward a welfare society was linked to subsequent changes in the organizational design of the Department as exemplified in the implementation of the principles of the restructuring and, consequently, to the performance of social work as exemplified in the definition of the social work task and issues of professionalization. Theoretical explanation for these interrelationships was found within the model proposed by Pearce and Robinson (1989) discussed in Chapter Two.
In the process of exploring these interrelationships, the five research questions of the study led to the development of the four organizing themes of the thesis. The first theme, 'statutory-voluntary balance,' addressed the broad direction of social policy, that is, 'strategy' as it is used in the Pearce and Robinson model (1989). To reiterate the central point made in Chapter Two: in the welfare state model, the key to the statutory-voluntary balance is government funding and provision of social services, whereas in the welfare society model the predominant feature is the provision of services by the voluntary and commercial sector and informal care givers. The second organizing theme, 'service delivery,' incorporates the principles of the restructuring and management style as components of organizational design as delineated in the Pearce and Robinson model (1989). The third element of the model, performance, was explored under the thematic heading 'social work'. Consideration was given to the definition of the social work task, i.e., the role of social work in the provision of casework or community work services, and to debates on the professionalization of social work. The fourth theme, that of biculturalism, was to have a decisive influence on the entire process. The Department had responded to the Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective: *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (1986) by pledging a commitment to culturally appropriate services (DSW, 1986a). This commitment was explicitly stated in the 1987 Management Plan as a commitment to biculturalism within the Department (DSW, 1987c).

**THE METHODOLOGY**

The formulation of a research methodology to explore these themes within the conceptualized interrelationships was problematic. Finally, three methods of data collection were selected with the objective of gathering data at the policy, organizational and practice levels. Documents relating to the debates on social service policy and delivery systems from 1969 to 1988 were analysed. These documents included publications by policy advisory groups; by the voluntary sector; by government appointed review committees, task forces and commissions; by the New Zealand Social Work Association; and by the Department itself. The document review set out in Chapter Four analysed this data under the four themes.
An interview schedule consisting of twenty open-ended questions was used to examine the perceptions of the Regional Executive Managers as middle-management social workers in the newly designed organizational structure. Two District teams of social workers, one in a rural area, the other in an urban area were interviewed using the same questionnaire. Participant observation techniques supplemented the interviews in the District Offices as each team member demonstrated an example of their work that reflected the 'new way of working' (DSW, 1988c). (Refer to Chapter Three for detailed description of the methodology.) The discussion of the findings in relation to these themes and research questions is reported below.

PATTERNS

Discussion of the patterns discerned in the findings reported in Chapters Four - Seven is ordered according to the four thematic headings. Interrelationships among them are also examined.

The Statutory - Voluntary Balance

It was the combined effects of four developments that provided the impetus to alter the welfare state provisions that had characterized New Zealand's social policy for over forty years. Each development supported the challenge that a welfare state model of social service delivery was no longer sustainable nor desirable in the 1980s. These four developments challenged welfare state policies, albeit for quite different reasons. However, it was the converging force of these developments in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres that combined to provide the impetus for the shift toward a welfare society model of social service delivery.

During the 1970s New Zealand faced a series of fiscal crises, including two major oil crises, an increasing overseas trade imbalance, and growing unemployment (Easton and Thompson, 1982; Birks and Chatterjee, 1988). By the early 1980s there was growing support among economic advisors in Treasury (Dalziel, 1989) for monetarist economic policies that emphasized the 'market place' and the responsibilities of the individual. The influence of monetarism became evident in the policies of the Fourth
Labour Government, referred to as 'Rogernomics,' which reflected a major shift away from Keynesian economics (Easton, 1989; Oliver, 1989).

Under the National Party and Robert Muldoon, as Prime Minister and Finance Minister from 1978 to 1984, New Zealand had experienced growth in government centralization and executive power (Boston, 1988). Critics of the National Development Act, 1979 contended it had been designed to "speed up the planning process and restrict public participation" (Wilkes, 1982:117). The highly centralized bureaucratic character of government departments contributed to a sense of powerlessness that fueled increasingly vocal demands for participation in, if not control over, social welfare service provision by the voluntary sector and community groups in the years preceding the decision to restructure (NZPC, 1981, 1984; Ministerial Task Force on Social Welfare Services, 1986, 1987; Driver and Robinson, 1986; Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988; Task Force on Devolution, 1988).

The document review traced the debates on the role of the state in social welfare services and confirmed growing support during the pre-1986 period for a welfare society model of social service delivery characterized by the decentralization of service provision, a broader role for the voluntary sector and participation of the wider community in service planning (New Zealand Council of Social Services, 1976, 1978; New Zealand Planning Council, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1981; Easton, 1980; Davey and Dwyer, 1984; Douglas, 1985; Davey, 1987). It was the welfare society model as articulated by Hadley and Hatch (1981) that was implemented in the 1986 restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare. This restructuring represented the change in strategy from welfare state policies to the adoption of welfare society policies. In the welfare state model of social service delivery the state is viewed as the key funder and provider of social services with the voluntary sector and other non-statutory providers offering services complementary to, but not a substitute for, state provision (Titmuss, 1974, 1976; Reisman, 1977).

Support for a welfare society model of service delivery, with its emphasis on service provision by voluntary agencies and community groups (Hadley and Hatch, 1981), was based on a long history of dissatisfaction with the Department of Social Welfare and with the continued emphasis of social work on individualized casework. Throughout the fifteen years of the Department's history to 1986, queries were consistently raised about the ability of the Department to be responsive to local needs, the bias of the
Department's services toward casework services of an ameliorative nature, and the dominance of the state sector in service delivery. The document analysis confirmed that the New Zealand Planning Council, as a major social policy advisory body, became increasingly committed to a policy that established a more significant role for the voluntary agencies in service provision throughout the period under study (NZPC, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1981; Davey and Dwyer, 1984; Davey, 1987).

Finally, considerable pressure was exerted by the Maori community for the Department to respond more effectively to the needs of Maori through less reliance on state provided services. Their demands dovetailed with the sentiments expressed by voluntary agencies, community groups and the New Zealand Planning Council for a change from the state as the primary provider of service toward embracing the welfare society notions of 'community care,' 'self-help,' 'community based initiatives,' 'whanau support' and 'community oriented social services' (OECD, 1981; Hadley and Hatch, 1981; NZPC, 1981; Davey and Dwyer, 1984; Davey, 1987).

Despite the exploratory nature of the present research, it seems reasonable to argue that the decision to restructure marked a significant redirection of governmental social service policy strategy from the pursuit of a welfare state to that of a welfare society. In order to implement this strategy, the Department launched the multi-pronged processes of regionalization, decentralization, devolution and partnership with the community. All four processes were designed to realign the role of the state vis-a-vis the voluntary sector. The strategy was couched in carefully chosen terms intended to imply governmental responsiveness to the criticisms of social services delivery (as discussed in Chapter Four) and hence, veiled government's intention to move toward containment of social service expenditure through adoption of a welfare society model of social service delivery. Implementation of the welfare society model was to be accomplished, in part, through a partnership in service provision with voluntary agencies and the community, particularly the Maori community who were disproportionately clients of social services. The Maatua Whangai programme, Departmental support of iwi development, and the encouragement of community initiatives were examples of these partnership initiatives. Not only was support of these programmes consistent with the welfare society strategy, but they had the potential of operating completely outside the statutory sector in the future.
The restructuring of the Department was, then, part of a broader thrust toward monetarist policies, cost containment and promotion of notions of individual responsibility. Thus, this analysis lends support to the propositions of Scott (1983a), Lincoln (1985), and Weick (1985) that organizational analysis must consider the organization in its widest social, political and economic contexts.

SERVICE DELIVERY

Pearce and Robinson (1989) argue that for a change to be effective the three components of strategy, design and performance must be congruent. This proposition suggests, then, that changes in one component of the model will entail corresponding changes in the other two elements if congruence is to be optimized. Hence, changes in strategy must be reflected in changes in organizational design to support the strategy and ensure the desired performance. From an application of the model, therefore, it was possible to predict that the changes in the strategy discussed above as the change from a welfare state to a welfare society should be reflected in changes in organizational design to support the new strategy. This appears to have occurred with the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare in 1986. The principles of the restructuring exemplified the desired characteristics of a welfare society strategy. In this section on service delivery, the implementation of the principles of the restructuring are analysed in terms of the changes to the components of organizational design discussed in Chapter Two as part of the Pearce and Robinson model (1989). The principles of regionalization and decentralization are analysed together because they were inextricably linked in the restructuring process.

Regionalization and Decentralization

Initiation of the restructuring efforts was assisted by a long-standing proposal within the Department to regionalize. The Regional Executive Officers (REOs) noted that the Department had experimented with regionalization with the creation of a Regional Office in Auckland in 1980 and had made an application to the State Services Commission for a reclassification that would permit the establishment of Deputy Director-General positions. Although the reclassification was approved in principle,
allocation of funding for regionalization was not approved due to the wage and price freezes imposed by the National Government during the period 1981 - 1984.

Although regionalization did take place in the restructuring through the establishment of the six regions, its effect was confounded by the decentralization process that was initiated concurrently. The establishment of Regional Offices as an administrative structure was seen by the District Office respondents as a costly exercise that drained resources from service provision at the District level and placed another layer of management between the Districts and Head Office (REO: 3, 6, 11; SSW-1, 3; SSSW). The role ambiguity of the Regional Officers was depicted in the organizational chart included in the first Management Plan (DSW, 1986a; Appendix IV). It was the stated intent that the REOs would further the objectives of the decentralization by assisting the Districts to develop as much autonomy as possible in the operations of Departmental functions (DSW, 1986a).

However, all of the REOs questioned the underlying motivation for the regionalization and decentralization processes. Ten of the eleven REOs saw the processes as an attempt by top management to regain control of the organization rather than to decentralize authority despite the formal statements in the Management Plans and Departmental directives to the contrary. There were several justifications for their perception.

The REOs cited examples of Head Office pressuring them if their districts were not 'coming on board' with new policy despite the fact that the REO positions were established as advisory staff positions without line authority. The REOs, themselves, perceived their role as untenable and ambiguous. They pointed to the conflicting messages they were receiving from Head Office about their roles and responsibilities. The role ambiguity led to misunderstandings, conflict and inappropriate task expectations by Head Office, the Districts and the REOs themselves.

The reluctance of Head Office to relinquish power to the Districts was revealed in the organizational structures depicted in the organizational charts and in the designation of positions to reflect changes in Departmental strategy (Appendices IV, V, VI). Change in structure, Pearce and Robinson (1989) argue, is necessary to ensure the optimum fit between strategy and organizational design. However, the structural changes as depicted in the organizational charts reflect Head Office's ambivalence in the regionalization and decentralization processes by indicating hierarchical direct line authority
relationships between Head Office and the regions. Hence, there was a lack of 'fit' between the strategy of decentralization and the organizational structure as established.

As well, the reorganization of Head Office staff into five directorates (Older People and People with Disabilities; Youth and Employment; Maori, Community and Pacific Island Programmes; Families in Special Circumstances; and Family Development and Support) was intended to:

Emphasize the complementary nature of income support and social work services [and provide] the structure for an integrated approach to social welfare policy development and monitoring (DSW, 1988e:20).

The present analysis argues that the reorganization of Head Office appeared to follow the characteristics of a functional organizational structure as defined by Pearce and Robinson (1989) and Robbins (1983) and discussed in Chapter Two. Head Office was no longer organized by a combination of professional (social work) and task (benefits and administration) groupings but along functional lines as delineated in the directorates.

However, the reorganization of Head Office realigned working relationships and effectively weakened well established leadership patterns. For example, the label 'social work' or 'social services' did not appear on the organizational charts of 1987 or 1988 beyond the District level (DSW. 1987c, 1988e) and was seen by several of the respondents as indicative of the trend away from direct social work services in the Department (REO:5, 9, 10, 11; AD:1; AD:2). It also meant the individuals assuming responsibility for those programmes were not identified by their professional affiliation. De-emphasis on professionals in service delivery is consistent with the welfare society model of service delivery and represents a depersonalization of social work within the Department of Social Welfare. This point will be elaborated further under the theme 'Social Work.'

The respondents contended that the creation of the regional structure was promulgated on the premise that Head Office staff establishment would be substantially reduced. None of the Regional Executive Officers nor the management staff in the Districts perceived that the staff establishment had reduced substantially despite the initial disestablishment of positions in Head Office during the 1986 - 1987 period. In fact, several of the respondents contended that staff establishment in Head Office had grown both in number of staff positions and total personnel expenditure as a result of staff
promotions, the creation of new positions, and payment to consultants (REO:2, 3, 6; AD:1; SSW:2; AD:2; SSSW). This was to be confirmed in reviews of the regional structure subsequent to this research (Barretta-Herman, Dougal and Spearling, 1989; DSW, 1990a). The regionalization, then, not only created another layer of management during a time when the stated objective was to delegate more authority to the districts, but apparently created that layer of management at the expense of the Districts Office allocation since the District Offices did experience both allocation cuts and hiring freezes during the 1986 - 1988 period.

Furthermore, as part of the restructuring, the major responsibility of each layer of management was delineated. Head Office and the Executive Management Group were responsible for policy development and overall leadership. The Districts were responsible for the 'operations' of Departmental functions. It was the designated role of the Regional Office staff to provide the vital link between the two. The split of policy and practice threatened to further alienate Head Office from the Districts who questioned how the policy makers could make good policy without clear integrative links to the service providers. Pearce and Robinson (1989) warn that in a divisional structure the development of sub-unit autonomy and the consequent distancing of top policy makers from performance can be a major disadvantage. This was seen to be particularly true in the fast-changing and politically sensitive area of social services.

The comments of the respondents indicated support for decentralization of selected 'delegated authorities' such as eligibility for specific benefits and changes in status categories. They expressed concern with the effectiveness of decentralization of specialized services, such as international adoptions and legal services, and with the realities of exercising the delegated authorities without additional support services and budget allocations.

Considered together, these findings point to an apparent 'paradox of decentralization'. Decentralization processes, such as the delegation of authority to the Districts, masked a more pervasive concentration of decisive control at the centre through the simultaneous implementation of accountability and control mechanisms which effectively limited the exercise of the decentralized authority. For example, the decentralization of the Department occurred simultaneously with major policy changes accompanied by policy directives and a shrinking budget allocation causing the AD:1 to comment that her plan must fit within the parameter of the District plan which in turn
must fit within the Region's plan, etc. Her point was that the scope and range of her
decision making was so closely circumscribed that her flexibility in creative and
innovative response to local needs was more limited than under the previous
centralized system.

Secondly, the stated objective of decentralization was to increase District autonomy.
But, because the decentralization process was initiated at a time of budgetary
constraint, the scope for decision making was limited by shrinking resources. As the
AD:1 explained, the diminishing budget only served to further restrict the District's
service responsiveness. Furthermore, because she was responsible for expenditure
as the local manager, she was responsible for cutting or restricting service to ensure a
balanced budget. Hence, it was the District staff that had to face client dissatisfaction
with service cuts rather than top management. The strategy of decentralizing during
economic constraints so as to displace negative reaction to service cuts on to local
government officials was described in the work by Lowi and Ginsberg (1976).

This paradox of decentralization was also revealed in the comments of the Regional
Executive Officers who argued that much of their time was spent in servicing Head
Office needs rather than supporting district operations (REO:6, 10, 11). The Assistant
Directors in the Districts perceived their own jobs as expanding in part because the
their District Directors were drawn on to participate in the management of the Region.
Hence, each layer of the hierarchy was being drawn up to the next layer of the
hierarchy to assist in the higher level management task. This brought into serious
question the substance of the decentralization. Although the 'delegations' might indicate
the transfer of decision making power to lower levels in the hierarchy, the
development of the Regional Executive Management Teams to manage the Regions and
the Executive Management Group to manage the Department nationally, had the
perceived effect of further centralizing decision making rather than decentralizing
decision making within the Department despite formalized statements to the contrary.

The present analysis also highlighted two disadvantages of decentralization noted by
theorists: an increase in specialized competencies and an increase in competition
between sub-units (Clegg and Dankerley, 1980; Robbins, 1983; Pearce and Robinson,
1989). The increase in competition between regions and among Districts has already
been noted (Chapter Five, Six and Seven) and was expected to continue and intensify as
loyalty to the Department shifted to loyalty to the region or district; as the career
prospects of staff become more confined to their region and linked to their knowledge of the local community and its needs; and as, at both the regional and the district level, resource allocation became more dependent on the skill of the individual manager to 'present and argue' the case for resources (REO:6; SSSW).

An increase in specialized competencies in response to local needs was encouraged at the District level. However, because the allocation for District social welfare services was cut twice in 1988, an increase in resource allocation was perceived by the respondents as highly unlikely. Both Districts in this study were experiencing exponential growth in statutory child abuse case referrals, the sheer volume of which precluded the development of additional specialisms in response to local demands. Similarly, the Black, Bowl, Burns, Critcher, Grant and Stockford study of statutory social work in Britain (1983) found the demands of meeting statutory child protection requirements and the limitations of resources, precluded the development of a range of specialisms in statutory social work.

The results of the document review also provided support for Wineman's argument (1984) that "centralization, with its tendency to homogenize and to produce mass culture, is equally opposed to indigenous culture and community life" (Wineman, 1984:3). Critiques of the Department had emphasized its inability to respond to minority needs (Johnston, 1982; DSW, 1985; Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). Theorists, policy analysts, the Maori activists and the respondents alike, were optimistic that decentralization had the potential of promoting a high degree of responsiveness to community needs (Hadley and Hatch, 1981; Barclay Report, 1982; NZPC, 1979, 1981; AD:1,2; SSW:1, 4). Nevertheless, some of the respondents were pessimistic about the Department's capacity to respond at the local level. These respondents viewed decentralization as part of a 'conspiracy theory' to promote competition among the lower level managers for diminishing funds (REO:6; SSSW). Five of the District Office management respondents explained that the decentralization effectively further limited the ability of the District to respond to community needs because these changes diverted financial resources to service another level of management (SSSW; SSW:3).

Findings from this exploratory study provide support for the contention that if the welfare society model was adopted as proposed, then the strengthening of Head Office staffing to assume a policy, development and monitoring role was consistent with the
welfare society strategy. As well, the financial constraints imposed on the Districts would limit their service responsiveness capability and encourage the development of service providers outside the state sector.

**Devolution**

The analysis of the documents and the interviews with the respondents revealed little commentary on the implementation of the third principle of the restructuring. At the time of this research, the only example of devolution, in the sense of a "movement of mutually agreed power (i.e., authority plus responsibility) for programme design/delivery/evaluation from a government to a group outside government" (Task Group on Devolution, 1988:11), was the Community Organisation Grants Scheme (COGS). This scheme was established in 1985 to replace a number of subsidized employment programmes (Levett, Keelan and McClellan, 1988:3.1). Thus, it was established prior to the 1986 restructuring.

The Regional Executive Officers had little information about devolution, its meaning or implications, and expressed the opinion that devolution had stopped. Certainly, the Task Force on Devolution (1988) which consisted of Permanent Heads of the nine government departments providing social services, was not supportive of full-scale devolution in their report:

> A client centred approach does not, however, automatically favour devolution through power-sharing as being the best means of meeting client's needs (Task Group on Devolution, 1988:8).

The District Office respondents were unclear about the distinctions between devolution and the proposals for the contracting out of services. The effect of the Department's intention to expand the contracting for service provisions announced in July, 1988 (DSW, 1988c) were as yet unclear. The expansion of the contracting out capability clearly reflected the adoption of the Hadley and Hatch (1981) model which emphasized high levels of contractual arrangements with voluntary organizations and individuals for service provision (See Table One). The REOs who commented on the contracting out policies noted the difficulty in distinguishing between devolution and contracts, questioned whether they were two distinct processes in practice, and expressed concern
that the contracting out policies were designed to further deplete statutory service provision.

**Partnership With the Community**

The initiatives implementing the fourth principle of the restructuring, partnership with the community, further reflected the adoption of welfare society principles as espoused in the Hadley and Hatch model (1981). The creation of the District Executive Committees and the Institutional Management Committees (See Appendix IV) provided mechanisms for the community to participate in service planning and for the Department to exercise the accountability to the community explicitly demanded for in the Hadley and Hatch model (1981). When the REOs were asked if the Department had become more 'community oriented,' none of the REOs mentioned the District Executive or Institutional Management Committees as examples of a community orientation or partnership. This may have been because the REOs were once removed from direct involvement in the Districts and Institutions since a similar structure was not in place for the Regional Offices, or because many of these committees had been in operation for less than a year and, as newly created committees, had not yet made their influence felt beyond the District level. However, the District staff referred positively to the work of the District Executive Committees in bringing community representatives into the District Office. They were seen as a resource for culturally appropriate programme development; as an aid in recruitment and selection, particularly of Maori staff; and as providing a forum for discussions between the community and the Department on matters of policy and practice (SSSW; SSW:1,3,4; SW:1,3,4,6).

As well, a majority of the respondents remarked on an increased openness of the Department to scrutiny by community representatives on the monitoring committees; to increased willingness and support by the Department management and practitioners for participation in community forums and hui; to informing the community of developments in the Department and to responding to the advice and counsel of Maori kaumatua and Samoan elders. These developments were a result of the commitment to implement the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu by involving cultural advisors in Departmental activities (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).
The moves toward partnership in service provision were also clear in the restructuring principle of devolution and the moves toward contracting out services just discussed. The respondents noted directives from Head Office to utilize community supports, including voluntary agencies and informal caregivers (particularly the whanau and the iwi) in service provision.

The picture regarding participation in the provision of service was complex. All of the respondents providing casework services acknowledged significant changes in the planning process and in social work decision making. This was encouraged through the involvement of the whanau/extended family initiated in anticipation of the mandate expected to be part of the Children's and Young Person's Act awaiting Parliamentary confirmation. Both teams indicated that the restructuring policies legitimated coordinating service provision with community groups and agencies in a more explicit manner than had been true in the past. For the Napier Community Team, these policies meant a confirmation of their efforts that pre-dated the restructuring (SSW:1). For the Porirua team, it meant further legitimation for their pre-1986 efforts to implement the Hadley and Hatch 'patch system' (1981) and their current efforts to utilize both formal community agencies and informal caregivers in service provision (SSSW; SSW:4).

Thus, these initiatives established mechanisms for involving the community in a partnership for service planning in the Districts. They represented a clear application of the Hadley and Hatch (1981) participatory model that demands mechanisms for involvement of the community in service planning and provision.

Partnership with the community in service provision was expected to be given further impetus in the Department's intention to complete the decentralization of community services funding to the Regions and the Districts by March 1989 (DSW, 1986b). Although the decentralization of community service funding was not yet officially in place at the time of this research, the respondents voiced concern about the implications of this process for the local districts. While there was considerable philosophical support for the decentralization of the community grants voiced, the SSW:1, for example, expressed concern that the process of decision making at the local level might not be equitable, the competition for resources might negatively effect coordination of services and threaten lack of continuity in services and the maintenance of service standards (SSW:1).
The uncritically positive view of the role of the voluntary sector in service provision and of the benefits of competition for funding has been heavily criticized by Pinker (1982, 1984), Greycar (1983), Kramer (1985) and Flora (1985). As Pinker (1982, 1984) argued localized decision making does not guarantee equity or responsiveness and may in fact, further disadvantage the disadvantaged by removing centrally mandated universal services. The realities of decentralized funding was appreciated by the District management respondents who expressed skepticism about their ability to equitably allocate what they expected would be diminishing funds at the district level.

Furthermore, a majority of the REOs were concerned with the splitting of the funder and provider roles germane to the decentralization of community services funding. They feared that the role split was a further step in reducing government responsibility for service provision and for containment of social service expenditure. They expressed concern that diminishing the role of the state in provision through contracting out and funding of community based services might result in a diminishing sense of state responsibility to social service funding. Events subsequent to this study are instructive. For example, the revised regulations regarding Special Needs Benefits, the staff hiring freeze of 1990, and the restrictions imposed on community services funding not only appear to justify this concern in the New Zealand context, but corroborate Johnson's (1987) claim that in Britain, where the changes associated with the separation of the funding and provider roles are more advanced, the government's sense of responsibility for social services has been undermined.

Management Style

The Department's management plans (DSW, 1986a, 1987c, 1988e) had given high priority to 'participatory management' as exemplified in the establishment of a formal system of two-way communication (Appendix IX). In the Department's Management Plan, 1986 (DSW, 1986a), the Director General announced his intention to "create a sense of corporate identity" through managerial accountability for "achieving tasks, building teams and developing individuals" (DSW, 1986a:2). He acknowledged that staff had been inadequately briefed and consulted in the past and pledged the development of formal systems "backed by the kind of informal system that is generated by a
willingness to co-operate in the work-place" (DSW, 1986a:2). The Management Plan (1986b) pledged management to:

Brief (and check understanding) and to consult (and report back on outcomes) both within a formal system and informally as a normal feature of working relationships (DSW, 1986a:7).

These commitments reflected the expectation of staff participation inherent in the Hadley and Hatch model (1981) which views the involvement of staff as "indispensable if available resources are to be maximized and variations in need/demand are to be recognized" (Hadley and Hatch 1981:147). The Management Plan stated the themes to be emphasized in the 1987-1988 year:

Policy review and development based on effective use of community and departmental collaboration in Districts, Regions and nationally (DSW, 1987c:3).

Although, the respondents gave mixed evaluations of that commitment, they were particularly negative about the 'briefing and consulting' policies (See Appendix IX). The policies were seen as time consuming and unproductive; moreover, they created further pressures on the effective provision of service to clients (SSW:1, 2, 4; SW:3). The net effect appeared to be ever increasing levels of stress on both practitioners and clients.

The majority of the respondents reported participatory management styles emphasizing joint decision-making between management and staff on policy interpretation, practice procedures and workload management were more prevalent in their work setting. They argued that social workers have a commitment to participation in decision making with clients which should also apply to decision making in their work setting. One REO commented "we are professionally supportive of joint decision making, even if it doesn't always happen" (REO:8).

The District social worker's assessment of participatory management was less positive. Although they were aware of a more developed briefing and consultation process, they perceived themselves as less a part of it. Three of the district office social workers reported that they felt either that decisions were had made prior to the consultations or they were drawn into making managerial decisions that the manager was being paid to make, for example, on staff allocation expenditure. The Assistant Directors and the
Regional Executive Officers expressed concern that the meeting time requirements of the Regional Executive Team Meetings on District Directors and the demands of the Executive Management Group on the Regional Assistant Director-Generals were removing them for several days a month from their responsibilities in the Districts and Regions placing further burden on the remaining staff. All the respondents acknowledged the time commitment required for a participatory management style to be implemented while expressing concern with its effectiveness and efficiency (e.g., see Chapter Six for discussion on the application of a participatory management model in the Porirua Office). Thorough investigation of the effectiveness of the participatory management policies requires specific research analysis.

SOCIAL WORK

The restructuring which occurred in 1986 had a profound effect on the definition of the social work task within the Department and on the course of social work professionalization. It was clear from the analysis of the documents and the interviews that despite the Department's references to community development and community oriented practice, the social work task in the Department became restricted to direct service provision in the two areas of child protective service and youth justice. As a step toward the narrowing of the definition of the social work task within the Department, social workers were being encouraged to utilize community, whanau and immediate family resources as a means of involving the community in service provision and limiting the provision of service by the Department. Five of the respondents expressed the opinion that the Department was rapidly becoming an 'agency of last resort,' that is, referrals would come to the Department only if no community resource was available or all community resources were expended (REO:3, 6, 9, 11; SSSW).

Utilization of whanau (extended family) and community resources as the first course of action was established as a practice principle (DSW, 1988d). For example, rather than bringing children into care, social workers were authorized to expend financial resources and social work services in support of children in their whanau or family setting utilizing the support of community agencies and informal care givers. Social
workers were to utilize Departmental based services only after all efforts to retain children in their community had been expended.

The community development role which had been supported in the initial restructuring directives was rapidly being relegated by the Department to the voluntary sector and community groups or iwi authorities. These moves clearly reflected the adoption of a welfare society model of social service delivery which places more emphasis on non-statutory providers and limits the role of the state. These developments further confirm the findings reported in the section on the statutory-voluntary balance discussed early in this chapter.

It was during the period of centralization, beginning with creation of the Department through to the decision to restructure in 1986 that the Department of Social Welfare became increasingly more bureaucratized and social work in the Department become professionally oriented. The professionalization of social work within the Department was reflected in personnel practices that rewarded social work qualifications; in policies that supported social work training within the Department and in tertiary educational institutions; and in the opportunities provided for in-service social work training programmes to those employed in voluntary agencies through the Department's three training centres. The professionalization of social work was further evidenced by the creation of the Social Work Training Council in 1973 under the Department's auspices. These findings support the hypothesis of Hollingsworth and Hanneman (1984) which proposed a positive relationship between bureaucratization and professionalization.

Decentralization, combined with demands to meet the recommendations of Puao-te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986), marked a trend away from social work professionalization. New policies were introduced that lessened emphasis on tertiary qualifications and emphasized cultural sensitivity and knowledge as a, and in some cases the, primary qualification for hiring and promotion. In addition, policies were implemented that aimed to change the role of the social worker from one of 'expert' and direct service provider to one of coordinator of whanau (extended family) based decision making and broker, that is, offering skilled assessment and referral services (Administrative Review Committee, 1987; DSW, 1988c).
These policies effectively undermined the professional authority of the social worker. According to Hadley and Hatch (1981) in bureaucratic social service organizations there are two sources of authority: the organization and the training and expertise of individual staff. In the present research, the Department's support for professionalization was evidenced in the various training programmes and bursary schemes of the Department already noted. The restructuring had crucial consequences for these historical commitments. The loss of support for social work professionalization was perceived by the respondents as a loss of support for social work in the Department. This loss of support would eventually circumscribe the scope for professional judgement as the demand for compliance with the organizational requirements increased and the professional expertise of social work within the Department decreased.

The District staff members, particularly those on the Porirua team providing direct services, felt their legitimised authority had also altered character with the implementation of a partnership relationship with clients and the community. The teams did feel a degree of legitimated authority in their negotiated relationships with the community. The Porirua team reported individually negotiated relationships with community groups and individuals for specific cases but not the established networks envisioned by the Hadley and Hatch model (1981). It was evident that there were several positive relationships in existence, many predating the policy directives but there was little evidence of district wide negotiations presented and few formalized, consistent relationships with community groups or agencies.

In the Napier office, the Community Development Team was designated with the responsibility for negotiating relationships. As discussed in Chapter Six, the team had formal negotiated relationships with over one-hundred community groups and agencies. However, further research would be required to determine to what extent these agencies provided services immediately supportive to the other social workers in the District Office and between service providers in the community. The Napier Community Development Team complained of the lack of understanding of their task by the rest of the social workers whom they felt they could better serve if there was a stronger working relationship between social workers providing casework services and the Community Development Team members.
It is important to note that despite the long history of a community development team in the Napier District Office and well developed negotiated relationships with community groups, the team never felt well integrated into the service delivery infrastructure of the District Office and reported feeling periodically under threat and dispensable. This raises serious questions as to whether a statutory social work service can have a broad based approach to its practice as part of a statutory organization.

In the Hadley and Hatch model (1981), expert knowledge is acknowledged; however, for this to be truly effective the practitioner must also have the capacity to recognize, and work with the non-expert (Hadley and Hatch, 1981). The Napier Team’s close involvement with non-experts in community groups and agencies pre-dated the restructuring as does the Porirua Office’s efforts with implementing the patch system. However the extent, depth and consistent involvement with non-experts, except in the case of Maatua Whangai worker and cultural advisers, was not clearly discernible. All the members of the Porirua Team claimed involvement with community non-experts that pre-dated policy directives but pointed out that under the ‘new way of working’ (DSW, 1988c) work with non-experts outside the Department was at last clearly legitimated by top management policy.

The moves toward negotiated relationships between the social workers as providers of service and the community as consumers is consistent with the patronage type of profession conceptualized by Johnson (1972). It seems reasonable to argue that the state mediated professional relationship which characterized social work under the centralized system could be expected to assume features of the patronage type of profession as a result of the implementation of the policies advocating accountability and responsiveness to the community. Such moves are in direct opposition to the characteristics of the traditional professions as conceptualized by Johnson (1971) and toward which social work in the Department had been heading prior to the 1986 restructuring.

The professionalization of social work had been intricately intertwined with Departmental policy and became increasingly dependent on the Department during the 1969 - 1988 period under study. In the Social Welfare Act creating the Department in 1971, the Department was charged with the responsibility of supporting and providing social work training to both the public and voluntary sector. As a result of its direct and indirect support of social work training, the Department was very influential in
setting the direction for social work professional development. When the Minister of Social Welfare placed the Social Work Training Council in remission and then set in its place the Council of Education and Training in the Social Services (See Chapter Four), not only was social work professionalization dealt a strong setback but the term social work was superseded in the Department by the more amorphous, generalized, non-occupationally linked, designation: 'social services.' The debates on social work effectiveness of the 1970s and the criticisms by radical social workers (Bailey and Brake, 1975; Corrigan and Leonard, 1978; Brake and Bailey, 1980) contributed to a 'crisis of confidence' among social workers.

This 'crisis of confidence' had been intensified by the critique of professionalism offered by Illich at the 1978 NZASW Biennial Conference (NZASW, 1978). Findings from the present research provides support for the claim that the critiques of social work from divergent sources were particularly devastating because its hold on professionalism was so tenuous. This vulnerability was deepened by the ACORD and Johnston Reports (Johnston, 1982) which heavily criticized social work as racist in its practice. Social work training institutions and the New Zealand Association of Social Workers, as well as individual social workers in practice, were challenged to re-examine the basic assumptions of their practice. Many social workers engaged in the personally demanding exploration of personal racism along with an examination of social and institutional racism. For example, eight social workers authored the Report on Institutional Racism (DSW, 1985b) that recommended sweeping reforms within the Department of Social Welfare. Their recommendations were later echoed in the Ministerial Advisory Committee Report (1986) and subsequently accepted by the Department.

The pressure from social work to respond to Maori and minority interests may be an important contributing factor to its loss of power within the Department as evidenced by the deprofessionalization processes initiated by the loss of social work professional leadership and social work identity in Head Office and by the disestablishment of the training centres. In Chapter Two, Wilding (1972) is quoted as proposing that the privileges of professional status are the result of an alliance between the state and the profession. It could be argued that social work within the Department violated the alliance by advocating for minority interest and hence, lost their hold on professional status within the Department.
As discussed earlier, the moves which the Department made to regionalize training were perceived as deleterious by the respondents because they effectively suspended training opportunities during the 1986 - 1988 period. These moves within the Department were significant because of the leadership, funding and influence the Department had traditionally exercised in social work professional development. This loss of what might have been perceived as a dependent relationship, was to lead to a resurgence of social work professionalism that was independent of Departmental sanction and support. This resurgence was evident in the increasing membership in the New Zealand Association of Social Work which began in late 1988. The NZASW moves toward the development of certificates of competency generated a new sense of commitment to the professional association (Fraser, 1988). It is ironic that the loss of support for social work professionalization within the Department led to support for social work professionalization in the Association. To what extent this was a paradoxical effect to the loss of Departmental support resulting in a growth of independence or another example of a reactive response to the Departmental policies on accountability and contracting out to approved service providers, demands further study.

**BICULTURALISM**

Partnership with the community as it was defined within the Department included a commitment to biculturalism and to the development of models of bicultural social work practice. In the wide sweeping reforms recommended by the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective: *Puao-Te-Aota-Tu* (1986), social workers were advised to give due regard to maintaining Maori children within their whanau/extended family or hapu/tribe; to make inquiries as to the child's heritage and family links; to undergo training with regard to customary cultural preferences, Maori circumstances, and Maori aspirations; and to consult with whanau and hapu regarding the care and protection of Maori children. All of the respondents acknowledged major changes in social work practice in the Department. They all reported a heightened awareness of Maori culture and some had acquired specific cultural knowledge and language skills. Social workers in both District Offices acknowledged that their approach to every social work task was now evaluated in terms of cultural appropriateness. It was expected that every social worker would develop and maintain contacts with the Maori community, consider the implications of whanau and whanau decision making with each client, and invest the bulk of resources in maintaining a child with the whanau prior to the child.
coming into care (SSSW; SSW:3,4; SW:5, 6, 7). The changes were seen as implementing the commitment to biculturalism and hence, to the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986).

However, it must be noted that the Director-General announced key changes to the Department's organizational design prior to the release of the recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). It could be argued that because the Director-General was a member of the Advisory Committee and aware of the recommendations, he was able to pre-empt the recommendations of the Committee by announcing the changes from his position as Director-General in an apparent effort to retain organizational integrity. Alternatively, the dynamic may have been the reverse. Perhaps, it was the intention of the Department to regionalize, to decentralize, to devolve and to enter into a partnership with the community as part of the strategy for the adoption of a welfare society model of social service delivery and hence, the changes were merely confirmed by the Ministerial Advisory Committee's recommendations as one of the REOs contended (See Chapter Five).

Both Districts reported on-going relationships with local kaumatua who were consulted on Maori protocol issues. The Districts had paid positions for Maatua Whangai workers and for Maori Advisory Officers who offered a range of consultative services from translations to cultural training for staff. Both offices had a cultural group who were given release time in return for their commitment to participation in Departmental powhiri. There were reportedly similar developments in District offices nationwide.

For the social workers the commitment to biculturalism meant they had to examine the basic assumptions of their practice not only in relation to Maori clients, but to all clients (DSW, 1988c). All of the direct-line practitioners were daily confronting issues of race and culture as they attempted to reconcile their practice with professional and cultural demands. The major changes they identified in their practice were: a move toward recognizing cultural identification as a factor in planning; legitimation of resource expenditure before a child came into care rather than having to bring a child into care before expenditures, such as board payments, could be authorized; sharing decision making with whanau/extended family regarding planning for the care and protection for a child in a child abuse case; taking a coordinator's role in family conferencing; and the legitimation of involving informal care givers, volunteers, and voluntary agencies and groups in service planning and provision.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Given the immediacy of the changes enacted under the Fourth Labour Government, it is too soon to expect a significant volume of sustained research on the origins and effects of these changes. The present study represents a modest beginning in one crucial area. Nevertheless, findings from this exploratory study suggest several potentially fruitful areas for further research.

First, replication and extension of the analysis undertaken in this study is imperative in order to corroborate the patterns in service delivery and social work practice delineated. The collection of data for this research was completed in December 1988. Since then, the pace of change within the Department has continued, unabated. Perhaps, the most significant development was the decision in July of 1990 to disestablish the six regions and their two hundred and forty staff and to replace them with four operational units with the major responsibility of providing information for policy and development to the Head Office of the Department (DSW, 1990a). Pearce and Robinson (1989) suggest that a change in organizational design may signal a change in strategy regarding the delivery of social services.

Another related avenue of research could address a key assumption of the welfare society model. This model is predicated on the assumption that the voluntary sector and other non-statutory providers can and will provide services previously provided by the state. Johnson (1987) noted growth in the commercial sector as a result of welfare pluralism in Britain, but no significant growth in the voluntary sector. Careful analysis of the impact of the implementation of welfare society principles on the growth of voluntary social service agencies would help to discover whether this key assumption of the proponents of the welfare society is valid in the New Zealand context.

The third area for potential research is related to management. The designation of the function of Head Office as policy and development and of the Districts as 'operations' has some similarities to a hypothesis of Meyer and Scott (1983). In their study of educational institutions, they describe a 'decoupling' process whereby top management in educational institutions distanced itself from the controversial realities of service delivery in the classroom. Study of developments in the Department of Social Welfare,
given subsequent restructurings since 1988, might reveal a similar process as Head Office re-establishes its position as policy development and the Districts are expected to deal in a semi-autonomous fashion with the demands of service delivery.

A crucial area, already highlighted in the previous discussion, is the promotion of research designed to shed further light on the development of social policy by studying key power holders in government and management. An associated line of research could focus on analysis of the interlocking committee memberships on the various reviews, committees and task forces of this period. It has already been noted that such interlocking memberships may have contributed to the apparent consensus of approach so evident in the many of the reports of the period 1984 - 1988. Also, an analysis of expenditure associated with financial costs of the 1986 and subsequent restructurings, including associated personnel costs such as retraining and redundancy options offered to staff deemed 'surplus to requirement,' would generate the data that would be required to validate the claim that the restructuring occurred at the cost of service provision in the Districts.

The principles and procedures applied in the restructuring of the Department of Social Welfare were also applied to education and health. In education, schools were decentralized into semi-autonomous Boards of Trustees responsible for the overall management of the school. In the health sector, Area Health Boards replaced the old Hospital Board system. The restructuring which occurred in these two crucial sectors warrants careful research in its own right; moreover, such research would provide an excellent opportunity to explore similarities and differences on the effects of the restructuring.

Finally, the restructuring of New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare and its redefinition of the statutory social work task into child protection services and youth justice parallels trends elsewhere, particularly in Britain. Comparative research, with reference to the impact of decentralization on service provision would provide a fruitful source of data for both an understanding of how social policy is developed and implemented but also about the interface between practitioner and client.
PROSPECTS

The late 1930s witnessed the enactment by the First Labour Government of the progressive legislation that was the foundation of what came to be termed the Welfare State. Some forty years later, the Fourth Labour Government initiated sweeping policies of economic deregulation and social restructuring that dismembered both the frameworks and provisions that had evolved over the previous decades. By focusing on a segment of social reality that was circumscribed both temporally and organizationally, the Social Welfare Department in the period 1986 - 1988, this research has attempted to theorize and analyse some of the consequences of these changes. The explanatory nature of this research and the immediacy of the changes which were its focus require that any generalizations arising from it are drawn with care. The final section of this dissertation attempts to do just this.

When the Fourth Labour Government was elected to office in 1984, New Zealanders had acknowledged to varying degrees, that change was inevitable. They were aware of the country's deteriorating economy. But once the changes began, they seemed to come so quickly and from so many directions that many felt the country was out of control. Easton (1989) for example argued, perhaps somewhat extravagantly, that changes in economic policy gained their own momentum without anyone, even the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, quite knowing what the objectives were, let alone how to get there!

This sense of pervasive change without time to reflect on its possible implications was evident in many sectors, including the social services. It was obvious that the Treasury espoused cuts in government spending as a way of stimulating the weak economy. But, the initial directives from the Department of Social Welfare, targeting as they did long standing criticisms of the Department's bureaucratic structures and highly centralized style of management did seem to be progressive harbingers of better things to come. Indeed, the initiatives were hailed as such by diverse groups. Voluntary agencies and community groups welcomed the apparent willingness of the Department to acknowledge and more fully utilize their contribution to service provision. Social workers within the Department welcomed the establishment of a Community Development Unit in Head
Office because it was perceived as recognition of the community development role as facet of the social work task. Maori also responded favorably because the introduction of anti-racism training in the Department, the creation of the Maatua Whangai programme, the acceptance of the Report on *Institutional Racism* (DSW, 1985b) and the establishment of a Maori Advisory Unit in the Auckland Region were seen as major steps toward dealing with their critique of the Department's mono-cultural service delivery. These initial responses were strengthened when the Department accepted the recommendations of *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986) and made a commitment to biculturalism in the 1987 Management Plan (DSW, 1987c).

Even if one assumes that the Director General was able to engage in a significant face saving operation by announcing the changes recommended in *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* as part of the Department's management plan prior to the release of *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu* (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986), there appeared to be meagre grounds for accepting these sweeping recommendations. There are several possible explanations. First, the acceptance of the recommendations permitted the regionalization the Director General had been trying to implement since 1980. Second, the acceptance of the recommendations could be seen as a way of curtailing social service spending without generating a political backlash by appearing to respond to requests by Maori to take care of their own. This possibility was particularly significant since research findings and official information confirmed the dire circumstances of Maori in New Zealand with respect to health, welfare and justice (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1986). Any scaling down of care in welfare institutions would, consequently, remove a resource which had over time become disproportionately utilized by Maori. This does not address the appropriateness of institutional or residential care for Maori children and youth, but serves to alert the reader to a convenient match between efforts to curtail governmental spending and the requests of Maori people to care for their own.

Within the management of these restructured services, the policies of the Department of Social Welfare were intended to foster 'participatory management' and create structures that would encourage community participation in social service planning and provision. As has already been suggested, Johnson's (1989) assessment of welfare pluralism in Britain pointed to more growth in the commercial rather then in the voluntary sector as a result of the adoption of welfare society principles. These trends could be precursors of similar developments here as evidenced by the expansion of the Department's contracting out policies (DSW, 1988c), the development of a certificate
of competency for social workers (Fraser, 1988), and the growth in the number of private practitioners. And, these developments appeared to provide not only their own legitimation, that is, they are at once responsive and progressive, but they seem to open up attractive alternatives to those most affected by them. However, there were darker underpinnings that are now becoming apparent. Most of these centre in the availability of already scarce human and economic resources. Just what are the limits to the capability of voluntary agencies and community groups to plan and provide services that were once almost the sole responsibility of the Department?

In a similar vein, it seems important to try and establish just how much participation is possible, let alone desirable at the interface between the community and Department. Will increased levels of participation result in, for example, services that are based on strong interest groups or local prejudices. Certainly, it seems reasonable to argue that the demands for community participation in the whole range of social services in New Zealand from education to health and welfare are already showing signs of disadvantaging minority interests.

The effects of the restructuring that was the focus of this present research, exposed yet again the incompatibility between the major functions of the Department: financial benefits and personal social services. This incompatibility was inherent in the amalgamation which was the birth of the Department of Social Welfare and has haunted the Department throughout its history. The implementation of the principles of the restructuring only served to exacerbate the differences between the two functions. This tension is exposed in telling fashion by one of the respondents:

The hidden hope of most of the managers... is that we will one day get through this experience of being a department of social welfare. This is not a properly set up organisation, that is it is neither one nor another. It doesn't provide an integrated social welfare service because so many functions lie outside our orbit and it has forced the child and family services in with the income maintenance services in an unnaturally overmanaged kind of way (REO:8).

This incompatibility of the two major functions of the Department was emphasized by so many of the respondents that it raised the question of the appropriateness of the placement of social work services within this government department. The history of tensions and dilemmas faced by social work services within the Department would
strongly support the separation of the provision of financial services from the provision of social work services.

The trends evident in the period immediately after 1986-1988, suggest that the accountability and control systems now in place have continued to inhibit the development of social work by pushing its practice into ever narrower specializations, specifically in child protection and youth work. If social work is to effectively enact its dual commitment to individual and social change, the potential for integration of that commitment must exist in the work setting. Clearly that potential was denied by the policies following the 1986 restructuring since the changes did not create an organizational environment supportive of this dual focus in social work. The policies explicitly stated that community development and community work—the social change interventions—were to be tasks of voluntary agencies, community groups and the iwi authorities. Social work without community work/development is not social work. It might be counseling or therapy, but it is not social work. The prospect for the proper practice of social work within the restructured Department of Social Welfare appear to be, at best, poor.

What of the efforts made to deflect or ameliorate these changes? One can only speculate about the possible effect of criticism from social workers in the Department. Social work staff in their various reports and reviews during the years immediately preceding the restructuring (DSW, 1982, 1985b, 1985b; Ketko, 1982) had recommended changes in social work services. Perhaps the most controversial of their efforts was the Report on Institutional Racism Within the Department of Social Welfare (DSW, 1985b) which was authored by eight social work staff. The respondents characterized top management's response to the report as an 'embarrassment' that generated in some a feeling of a betrayal of organizational loyalty. There is sufficient evidence in the findings to suggest that several of the initiatives in the restructuring process effectively curtailed the power base of social work within the Department. To what extend this might have been a reaction to social workers efforts for change is impossible to assess. However, it is reasonable to assume that the actions of social workers to advocate for minority interests worked against their own professional self-interest in the Department.
The processes of decentralization progressively began to separate social workers into smaller and smaller groups eliminating the 'critical mass' of social workers that is deemed to be necessary for professional development and growth. Social workers also lost their professional reference group within the Department. This was compounded by the removal of the line social work management position in Head Office and the redesignation of the Social Work Division to Social Services Division, a step which effectively eliminated an identifiable social work presence at the top management level in the Department.

Regardless of the motivation for the restructuring, changes in social work practice were clearly indicated in the findings: the emphasis on using community support networks, expenditure of resources prior to a child coming into care rather than after the fact, whenau or family oriented decision-making, the emphasis on biculturalism, the reorganization of teams along cultural lines, and the redefinition of the social work task in the Department to the specializations in child protection and youth justice. These changes demonstrate Howe's contention that:

The critical characteristics of social work practice are generated within welfare bureaucracies and do not derive from the prescriptions of professional social work (Howe, 1986:2).

It was through these changes in strategy and design that the changes in social work practice within the Department occurred. The analysis of the findings suggest that the Department was dominant in the social service system because it exercised control over training and evaluative bodies; and hence, was in a powerful position to dictate practice directives as Howe (1986) observed. The present analysis of the Department of Social Welfare has provided a further demonstration of the interrelationship between organizational setting and professional social work. Without a strong independent professional identity, social work was vulnerable to the demands of the organization.

If social work is to retain its commitment to the goals of social justice for disadvantaged groups in society, it can not afford to be unduly dependent on one governmental structure. The uncoupling of their dependent relationship could lead to the development of professional social work in New Zealand; a professional social work that can more completely pursue its commitment to individual and social change. Furthermore, the findings provide support for the claim that a strong independent social work lobby, such as the New Zealand Association of Social Work, is imperative if
social work in New Zealand is to achieve the degree of autonomy necessary for it to pursue the dual commitment of social work.

The First Labour Government introduced progressive social legislation motivated by a genuine concern for the well-being of all New Zealanders. Such a concern is much less apparent in the policies of the Fourth Labour Government. Given these circumstances the practice of social work is inevitably more diminished. The musings of a practitioner who was part of the restructuring captures that sentiment:

On my cynical days, I really think that the welfare system as we know it has been dismantled under our very eyes, the community are going to be overwhelmed with a sort of do more on less ideology. . . there will be no role for social work in the Department (REO:5).
## Appendix Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I</th>
<th>Research materials: Proposal, Demographic Information and Interview Schedule.</th>
<th>248</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Sample Letter of Negotiation</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Correspondence with Dame Ann Hercus</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Excerpts from Management Plan, 1986</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Excerpts from Management Plan, 1987</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Excerpts from Corporate Management Plan, 1988</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Summary of Recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>'Faces of Racism' and Treaty of Waitangi from Puao-Te-Ata-Tu</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Circular Memo 1986/240: New Direction in Management</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Summary of research activities: Napier District Office</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>List of client groups and Organisations Served by Napier Community Development Team</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Napier District Management Team Standards.</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>Summary of Research Activities : Porirua District Office</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>Sample letter confirming feedback and verification session</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Outline of feedback and verification sessions</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Excerpts from 'Future Directions in Social Work'</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PhD PROPOSAL
THE IMPACT OF REGIONALIZATION OF THE STATUTORY SOCIAL SERVICES ON SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

AIM OF THE STUDY
The policy decision to regionalize statutory social services was a response to criticisms of the centralized, bureaucratized statutory services and of the individualized "case-oriented" practice that was seen to be unsuccessful in dealing with the social problems of contemporary New Zealand. This study will examine the move to regionalization, analyse its philosophy and its implementation in relationship to its impact on shifting social work practice from a "case-oriented" to a "community-centered" approach. Of necessity such an investigation will demand an examination of the infrastructure (i.e., organizational structure, management styles and delivery systems) supporting social work practice.

IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
The move to regionalization is based, in part, on the assumption that the clients of social services will be better served in terms of the eight desirable features of a social welfare system outlined by the Ministerial Task Force in their 1986 publication, Social Welfare Services. An essential part of this move to a more responsive decentralized system is a community-centered approach to the delivery of social work services. Since this represents a fundamental change in the philosophy and the delivery of social services, it offers a timely opportunity for research.

Theoretical Framework
Roger Hadley, Professor of Social Administration at Lancaster University, has led the field in the development of the theoretical framework for "community-centered" social work. The influence of his visit to New Zealand and the Department in early 1980's is apparent in current discussions and debates on social work practice. In Social Welfare and the Failure of the State, 1981, Hadley and his co-author Stephen Hatch argue that the adoption of non-traditional organisational structures and management styles is mandatory to support a move to "community-centered" social work practice.

METHODOLOGY
Two methods of data collection are proposed. Interviews with twelve Regional Executive Officers (Social Services and Alternative Care) will provide essential information on philosophy, organisational structures and management systems, proposed or in-place, to support the changes. The second source of data proposed is two, self-selected, social work teams who are implementing a "community-centered" approach to social work practice. The research design of this phase would parallel closely Hadley and co-research Morag McGrath's work, When Social Services are Local (1984) and involves the researcher "living with" the teams for a designated period of at least one week.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Although the confidentiality possible is limited because of the easily identifiability of the respondents in this proposed research, the researcher is committed to assuring the highest level of confidentiality possible. In the thesis, comments will be anonymous. Every respondent will have the right to ask that a comment not be used in the final document.

It is proposed that the interviews will be "semi-structured," that is a combination of set and open-ended questions. If permission is granted by the respondent the interview would be audio-taped. If approval is gained for this project, the interviews could take place in late August/early September.

COMMITMENT OF THE RESEARCHER
The aim of this research project is to explore this significant historical period in social work, while it is "in process." As the researcher, I adhere to the highest standard of ethical conduct. The intention is to work beside the women and men of the Department as they work toward the attainment of their goals in the delivery of service not to cast them in a negative light. In a previous research project with the Department (on computer utilization, 1981), similar commitments were made and stand.

CONCLUSION
This proposal represents the result of two years preparatory study and analysis. Regionalization in New Zealand is forcing far-reaching changes in the delivery of social work services. This is an opportune time for study and for the development of social work practice.

It is my hope that the Regional Directors consider my proposal favorably.

abh
**DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

1988 Research Project  
Angie Barretta-Herman  
Massey University

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Acting</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
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**Employment History**

1. Please list below your social services employment history prior to joining the department:

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<tr>
<th>From - to (in years)</th>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Brief description of responsibilities including number of supervisees</th>
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2. Please list below your employment history with the Department by position and listing the District Office

<table>
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<th>From - to (in years)</th>
<th>District Office</th>
<th>Brief description of responsibilities including number of supervisees</th>
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3. How do you describe your professional affiliation?

Administrator, Social Services Administrator, Social Worker, Community Worker, Residential Social Worker, other?  

__________________________________
4. List any professional organisations to which you belong:

________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Do you hold a CQSW? yes no If yes, year awarded

6. List below any academic qualifications or training or certifications you have acquired

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<th>Qualification</th>
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7. List below the meetings, conferences, seminars, or reports you see as significant in the development of decisions within the department about regionalisation, bi-culturalism, community approaches, etc.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Meeting, conference, seminar, report etc.</th>
<th>How were you involved?</th>
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Please complete and return to me prior to your scheduled interview if possible. Allow 5-7 days transit time.

Thank you for your cooperation

abh
INTerview SCHEDULE

JUNE 1988

Below is the schedule of open-ended questions to be addressed to the Regional Directors of Alternative Care and Social Services. The interviews will be taped (if permission is obtained) and transcribed. Content analysis of the interviews will followed accepted methodological procedures. Confidentiality, of course, is an objective but is limited because of the small number of individuals involved and their position.

The interviews are part of the research project on the impact of regionalization on social work services. The objective is to gain an understanding of the process of organizational change as outlined in the reviews, reports and plans published by the Department over the past two-three years which outline the philosophy and operationalization of the move to regionalization as part of the implementation of Puau-te-Ata-tu recommendations, the move to "community"/community development activities and devolution or responsibility for social services.

The interviews with the REOs are preceeded by a questionnaire to elicit statistical and demographic information. This is done to facilitate the interview by removing the necessity to obtain basic factual information during the interview itself.

The interview will focus on "public" information but of necessity will elicit attitudes, comments and evaluations that might be considered by the interviewee as "private". Throughout the interview, the interviewee is as in control and able to ask not to be quoted, etc. As well the researcher is bound by professional ethics to insure that any quotes are not identifiable. As well, any interviewee can request to view the draft of the interviews for vetting.

The Questions

PHILOSOPHY

1. What do you see as the objectives of regionalization? Why was it proposed at that particular time?

2. How does regionalisation reflect the recommendations of Pua-te-Ata-tu? the move to community/community development? devolution?

3. What do you think are the essential aspects of the move from a "case-oriented" social work to a "community oriented" social work?

4. What changes have been implemented in your region as a result of these initiatives?

5. What has been the positive reactions of the social work staff to the implemented changes? the proposed changes?

6. What has been the negative reactions of the social work staff to the implemented changes? the proposed changes?

7. How has the philosophy guiding the provision of social services and particularly social work services changed? changing?
8. What do you see as the objectives for social work services that were proposed at the A.D.'s August Conference in Hamilton on "Future Directions for Social Work"?

ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES
1. What impacts has the regionalization made on the delivery of social work services?

2. In what areas do you think regionalization has moved the departments services closer to being more responsible? accessible? community oriented?

3. What types of accountability mechanisms have been put in place to reflect the community focus? What is being planned?

MANAGERIAL SUPPORTS
1. Participatory Management has been seen as an essential ingredient of this process. How is this change from an administrative management style to a participatory one being planned?

2. What reactions to this style have been encountered?

3. How available is in-service training &/or support for outside training?

SOCIAL WORK SERVICES
1. How would you characterize the approach to social work services in place in this department? and how do you see it changing?

2. There has been a substantial increase in trained social workers at the direct service level in DSW over the past six-eight years. Do you think this is influencing the acceptance of a more community based approach to social work services.

3. The "patch system" has been utilized in DSW social work for years. What are its basic principles? Is a "community based approach" different? How?

That is all the questions that I have for you. Are there some points you would like to make that would further my understanding of the issues, dilemmas or conflicts that are facing statutory social work services during this period of major reorganization?

abh
Appendix II - Letters of Negotiation

This appendix contains sample copies of letters utilized during the negotiations phase with Department of Social Welfare Head Office, the Regional Offices and the Districts. Samples of the following letters are included:

1. Letter to Regional Director at initial stage.
2. Confirmation from Regional Director that research project received approval.
3. Letters to District Office setting out the timetable and requirements of the research week.
4. Letter to team leaders - confirming details of the research week.
5. Personal note of thanks.
Dear

The discussion with you two weeks ago was most encouraging. I have been able to discuss your comments with my PhD supervisors who are in agreement to expanding the proposed interviews with the Executive Officers to both those responsible for Social Services and for Alternative Care.

I appreciate your willingness to take my proposal to the Regional Directors Meeting on the 26th of July. For that meeting I have enclosed a brief summary of the research proposal with a selected bibliography. The brief is not quite as concise (one page) as desired but is well short of two! As well, I have enclosed a copy of the extended proposal. You will note that the location of the teams has been specified for the purposes of the proposal. This could well change if the proposal is approved. You mentioned a couple of teams you thought would be most appropriate. I look forward to exploring this aspect of the research more thoroughly with you.

You will note, in the summary of the proposal, I have commented on both the confidentiality aspects of the research and my intentions to examine the efforts of the Department to implement a community based approach in a manner that is supportive. I would point out the work I have done in the past with the Department (also mentioned in the summary) which confirms my integrity. You can be assured the department's interests will be respected.

I was unable to arrange to meet with the Principal Social Worker when I was in Wellington last week at the NZIPA Conference. My work load at Massey is particularly heavy this month but I am trying to clear a day to meet with her before the month is out. I was however able to meet with several people from Head Office and the Central South Regional Office. The DSW presentations at the Conference were particularly pertinent.

If there is any further documentation you require for the meeting, I will provide it.

I appreciate your willingness to take this proposal forward. I trust that it will receive approval and anxiously await the result.

Sincerely

Angeline Barretta-Herman
Lecturer in Social Work.
29 July 1988

Ms Angie Baretta-Herman  
Lecturer in Social Work  
Department of Social Policy and Social Work  
Massey University  
Private Bag  
PALMERSTON NORTH

Dear Angie,

To confirm my telephone message of last Monday.

Rob Laking has replied stating that he has no objection to your research proposals and as none of the Regional Assistant Director Generals raised the matter on Tuesday – you have the all clear.

Would you please liaise with Alan Birrell in this office to make final arrangements to do the interviews.

Regards,

[Signature]

John Scott
Dear

Thank you for your warm response to my research proposal. This is to confirm the choice of your office and the community development team as one of the teams for the research. I am particularly pleased because the other team I am negotiating with has a geographical rather than functional approach. The differences will be very important to bring a diversity to the project.

I will be in Napier for the staff meeting on Tuesday the 13th of September at 9am. At that time I will introduce the project to the staff and answer any questions. I would estimate that would take 15-20 minutes. After the staff meeting, I would like to meet with the team senior and the team for a more detailed explanation and to begin the planning for the data collection.

The team senior asked for a copy of the proposal and I am sending that to him under separate cover. If you wish a copy as well please let me know and I will forward one to you.

Again, thank you for your support. I look forward to meeting you and your staff next month.

Sincerely

Angie Barretta-Herman
Dear

Enclosed you will find a copy of the research proposal and the selected bibliography. Your interest in the project and willingness to consider you and your staff participating in the research is most appreciated particularly because of your interest in Hadley's theories. From our discussion Tuesday it is clear to me that you and your staff could provide valuable insights into a community approach to social work practice.

The format of the participant observation phase would include semi-structured interviews with you as the director, the senior social worker and each of the team members, as well as with key members of staff critical to the team's operation. These interviews would be audio-taped if permission is granted by the interviewee and conventional confidentiality guidelines would be observed in the handling, transcription and summaries of the tapes.

The format of the participation with the individual team members would be by negotiation. The focus of the participation would be to provide for research purposes an opportunity to see “practice in action.”

Also, a review of relevant documents, such as monthly reports, reports to special meetings, case notes, etc. would be necessary. You mentioned some reports on the implementation of a “patch system”/community approach that you felt would be relevant as well.

Because of work responsibilities at the university, it would be preferable if the week I was there with you was the first week in November (beginning with October 31st). If this is not possible, a split week would have to be arranged to coincide as much as possible with the first two weeks in November.

I appreciate the consideration you and your staff are giving to this request which I am certain can contribute to the field of social work. I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Angie Barretta-Herman
22 September 1988

Dear

I will be in Auckland all next week to interview five REO's but before I go I wanted to continue the planning for my week with you and your team. I will be there from Monday until Friday the 10th of October. Since I will be coming over on Sunday, I will be there first thing Monday morning.

The format of the week will include semi-structured interviews with the District Director, with you and with each of your team and any key members of staff that are critical to the functioning of your team. (As an indication of the types of questions I will be asking, I am including the interview schedule I am using with the REO's. Essentially, I will be following through those issues to the practice level.)

It will be necessary for each of the team members to consider what pieces of work or activities they would suggest I accompany them on or review that would provide an opportunity to demonstrate their practice. Since I will be there for only a week, tight scheduling will be necessary to insure coverage. I raised this point with the team when I met with them a few weeks ago.

As well, I will review all relevant records and data. We discussed the monthly reports from both your team and the office and any others that are important.

It would be most helpful if you could discuss this with your team and draw up a tentative schedule. I would suggest a team meeting early Monday to clarify any questions and review the week's schedule. Then, the semi-structured interviews with you and the Assistant Director on the Monday. I would then be available to the staff as assigned with any free time devoted to reviewing records.

On the Friday afternoon, I would appreciate time to feedback tentative impressions and arrange for any follow-up that seems necessary.

I will call you mid-week before my arrival (Wednesday, 5th October) to answer any questions and confirm.

Sincerely,

Angie Barretta-Herman
A personal note of appreciation for your time and hospitality in participating in the interview for my research project. Your comments and insights were most helpful in the process of building a firm and comprehensive understanding of the impact of the various policy directives over the recent period. My hope is that the interview provided you time to reflect and evaluate aspects of the process as well.

I have completed eight of the eleven interviews with MPs so far and am scheduled to complete two more in the coming weeks. The week of field work in the Nauru Office was done the week of 10 Oct – I will be in Honiara next week. In both cases, I will return for a feedback/verification session by early December.

Again, thank you for your time and assistance. If you have any further comments or documentation, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
Appendix III - Correspondence with Dame Ann Hercus

Dame Ann Hercus
New Zealand Ambassador to the United Nations
United Nations Building
New York, New York

7 August 1989

Dear Dame Hercus,

I am writing to you at the request of Professor Graeme Fraser, who is my main PhD supervisor. We have met on occasion when you visited the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at Massey where I have been on staff as a social work lecturer since 1980. Currently, I am on sabbatical for six months in affiliation with the Department of Social Work at the University of Central Florida.

One of the objectives of my sabbatical is to complete my thesis which focuses on the restructuring to the Department of Social Welfare and its impact on social work practice. My field work, which was completed in December 1988, included in-depth interviews with each of the Regional Executive Officers of Alternative Care and Social Services supported by a three-phase examination of two social work teams, one in Napier and the other in Porirua.

You played a key role in the restructuring, yet, I have been unable to sufficiently access direct resource materials. Your influence as the Minister of Social Welfare during the period is pervasive. Graeme suggested I contact you to see if you would be willing to be interviewed and/or provide me with resource materials, such as copies of your speeches, directives, ministerial papers, etc.

An interview would be particularly helpful. I could come to New York, or as an alternative because of time and financial constraints, arrange a telephone interview through the University of Central Florida's conference call facility.

Copies of the REO interview schedule, drafts of the thesis argument and abstract are enclosed for your information.

I look forward to hearing from you. Graeme asked me to extend his warm regards to you.

Sincerely,

Angeline Barretta Herman, MSW, MBA
Lecturer in Social Work

Department of Social Work
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida 32816-0358
Phone 407-275-2114
(or home 407-628-9792)
22 September 1989

Ms Angeline Barretta Herman, MSW MBA
Lecturer in Social Work
Massey University
PALMERSTON NORTH

Dear Ms Barretta Herman

Thank you for your letter of 7 August 1989. I regret that I am unable to assist you with an interview; nor (in part because I am not in New Zealand) can I give you copies of speeches, etc., or access to my archives. I made a decision not to give interviews about my previous positions as a Cabinet Minister when I retired from politics (this includes academic interviews) and this is a firm decision to which I am holding, certainly for as long as I am the UN Ambassador, and possibly longer. I hope you understand.

My kind regards to Graeme Fraser.

Yours sincerely

Ann Hercus
Permanent Representative
Appendix IV - Excerpts from Management Plan, 1986

MANAGEMENT PLAN 1986
This is the Department of Social Welfare’s first formal Management Plan. I have decided to produce the plan to provide both management and staff with a single statement of the extensive changes which are being made in the Department’s administrative structure and style of management. The issuing of the plan is one of the new developments planned for the year ahead.

It may be helpful for me to introduce this first plan by describing the challenges which confront the Department, and the rationale for the developments I have set in train.

The Department of Social Welfare was formed in 1972 to bring together the Child Welfare Division of the Department of Education and the Social Security Department. This was a complex operation — and while much progress has been made in forming a new entity, some of the early and inevitable tensions are not yet fully resolved.

Further, the Department has had to cope with the effects of a period of major social change, the rapidity of which is without precedent. It is hardly surprising then, that the Department has come under increasing fire for inadequate performance of its mission and inadequate feeling for its clients and staff.

I accept that the Department is seen as bureaucratic, impersonal and mono-cultural — and that communication is a problem. But, though such an image does not do justice to dedicated staff who have coped with heavy work demands under very difficult conditions, we must make substantial changes.

We need a positive, action-oriented organisation, an organisation more flexible in operation, and more sensitive to clientele and staff.

To achieve this goal I have been grappling with two sets of problems: (1) how to create a structure for the organisation that will make major improvement to the delivery of service possible and, (2) how to develop the Department as an organisation.

Structural Change: The Six Regions
I had to accept responsibility for making an urgent decision about what the department’s basic structure should be. The principle guiding my decision was one that surfaced in many criticisms of our performance. This was that decision-making had to be taken closer to clients and staff — hence the establishment of the six regions.

The structure being implemented now will allow delegation of authority to match responsibility so that District Offices can have the necessary autonomy. It will permit a much clearer definition of function and give substance to the management of people as a firm commitment. It will also allow for management reappraisals, and for consultation with staff on the organisation detail.
Organisation Development

In December last the Department began a programme to impress on all senior management the practical implications of our Mission Statement. All management will be made aware of the goals that all Divisions of the Department have in common; all management will develop a common vocabulary — and thus common expectations of managerial performance. And the change is from the "top" down.

As part of the new direction in management, managers will not only be accountable for achieving tasks, building teams, and developing the individual, but will also be accountable for promoting the interests of the organisation. Not the least of their concerns, then, will be to develop a spirit of co-operation and a sense of common purpose. High priority will be given to remove sources of tension and to create a sense of corporate identity.

Staff have been inadequately briefed and consulted in the past. We will develop formal systems of briefing and consulting backed by the kind of informal system that is generated by a willingness to co-operate in the work-place.

There are other improvements that must be made if there is to be better delivery of service to clients and greater job satisfaction for staff. Those that have been accorded greatest priority feature in the timetable of this Management Plan.

The achievement of all these changes will require a special commitment to training throughout the organisation. Training needs created by the new directions in management will be met. Induction and specialist training will be improved. Training throughout the Department will be co-ordinated.

Finally, the Department will be making a commitment to forward planning based on sound research.

For the staff of the Department, the changes set out in this plan will alter the familiar organisational framework and familiar ways of doing things. Inevitably this will produce some discomfort and even feelings of threat — but it will also pose a challenge. The commitment of staff, at all levels of the Department, will be necessary for that challenge to be met and the purposes of the change to be achieved.

J. W. Grant
Director-General
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE STRUCTURE
(The regional grouping of social welfare districts and associated facilities)

NOTE:
This is a provisional grouping for Regions until the Regional Directors take up their appointments and final decisions can be made.

**HEAD OFFICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whangarei</td>
<td>Special Purpose Offices (3)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takapuna</td>
<td>Community Care Assessment Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>Staff Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South West Auckland Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henderson</td>
<td>Papakura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Lynn</td>
<td>Special Purpose Office**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manukau</td>
<td>Child Care Institutions (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otahuhu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central North Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>Whakatane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taumararui</td>
<td>Rotorua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paeroa</td>
<td>Gisborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauranga</td>
<td>Child Care Institutions (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wairoa</td>
<td>Wanganui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier</td>
<td>Palmerston North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings</td>
<td>Child Care Institutions (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Plymouth</td>
<td>Staff Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central South Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Masterton</td>
<td>Blenheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Nelson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porirua</td>
<td>Child Care Institutions (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Hutt</td>
<td>Staff Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern Region</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greymouth</td>
<td>Dunedin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>Invercargill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timaru</td>
<td>Child Care Institutions (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Serving Greater Auckland in respect of Family Benefits, Family Care, and Social Work Services

**Serving Greater Auckland in respect of National Superannuation**
Our mission is to provide a service which gives best effect to the social welfare policies of Government.

**Our Commitment**
Our commitment is to maintain a Department which is efficient and flexible in operation, ethical and sensitive to the needs of clientele and staff, and which provides services which are culturally appropriate.

**Our Approach**
Our approach to this mission will be a “people approach”.

We believe that our organisation will work best when it is suitably organised, well managed and adequately staffed:
— to give good service to clients.
— to enhance the chance that each member of the staff will grow in his or her job.
Our goals are:—

**Service**
- To administer effectively the income security services and related programmes.
- To provide appropriate and effective social work services for communities, families and individuals.
- To respond effectively where there is a need for support or intervention in terms of the Acts administered by the Department.
- To meet the particular needs of Maori people in policy, planning and service delivery while giving due attention to the needs of other ethnic groups.

**Management**
- To accept the managerial obligation to achieve tasks, build teams, develop individuals and promote the interests of the organisation.
- To promote and maintain an administration which provides fair and even-handed decisions and treatment.
- To develop and maintain effective and harmonious relationships with the union representing staff.

**Policy**
- To provide soundly based and well informed advice to government on the development and impact of social policy.
The Management approach we have adopted is—

- To provide leadership:
  - which demonstrates a commitment to the maintenance of good morale.
  - in the development of a Department that is flexible, and sensitive and responsive to the needs of clientele and staff.
  - which helps develop a staff in which managers meet the obligation to achieve tasks, build teams, develop individuals and promote the interests of the organisation.

- To brief (and check understanding) and to consult (and report back on outcomes) both within a formal system and informally as a normal feature of working relationships.

- To monitor and evaluate the performance of tasks, and of compliance with the goals and objectives of the Department, balancing this against the need to give personal support to individuals and groups.

- To accept the responsibility to ensure that the training needs of personnel are met.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOALS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Service</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Management</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULT AREAS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING TIMETABLE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT

This is the second Management Plan for the Department of Social Welfare. It sets out how we intend to meet the continuing challenge of the major changes within the social welfare field. The main issues we are responding to are the:

- assertion and recognition of cultural identity,
- acknowledgement of changing roles of women in the community,
- wider debate about and redefinition of the Department's role in relation to 'the community',
- greater reliance on community based care for children and young persons previously admitted to institutions, and
- increase in demand for services associated with unemployment.

This plan concentrates on the specific tasks required to get an immediate improvement in the Department’s ability to function as a responsive and accountable social service agency; it does not include the activities required to continue our 'business as usual'.

To promote and monitor the changes required, four themes are to be emphasised over the next year. These are:

- A shift in power from the centre to local offices so each unit can fulfil its obligation to the public,
- Management performance, in particular clear statements of intent and reports on results,
- Service planning and accountability, as operational units shape their services to respond to users' needs and priorities, with improved internal and external monitoring,
- Policy review and development based on effective use of community and departmental collaboration in Districts, Regions and nationally.

In bringing these changes about we share an unqualified commitment to:

- creating a bicultural agency,
- equality of access to career opportunities for all staff, and
- improved industrial and staff relations.

We will give full support to those who are responsible for reflecting this commitment throughout the Department.

J. W. Grant  
Director-General

J. Yuill  
Deputy Director-General  
(Management Resources)

R. G. Laking  
Deputy Director-General  
(Policy and Services)
MISSION

Our mission is to provide a service which gives best effect to the Social Welfare policies of Government.

Our Commitment

Our commitment is to maintain a Department which is effective and flexible in operation, ethical and sensitive to the needs of clientele and staff, and which provides services which are culturally appropriate.

Our Approach

We believe that our organisation will work best when it is suitably organised, well managed and appropriately staffed:

— to give good service to clients, and
— to enable each member of the staff to grow in his or her job.
GOALS

Policy

• To provide soundly based and well informed advice to Government on the development and impact of social policy.

Service

• To administer effectively social security benefits, war pensions and related programmes.
• To provide appropriate and effective social work and other social services for communities, families and individuals.
• To respond effectively where there is a need for support or intervention in terms of the Acts administered by the Department.

Management

• To accept the managerial obligation to achieve tasks, build teams, develop individuals and promote the interests of the organisation.
• To promote and maintain an administration which provides fair and even-handed decisions and treatment.
• To develop and maintain effective and harmonious relationships with the union representing staff and with professional organisations.
• To provide leadership:
  — which demonstrates a commitment to the maintenance of good morale.
  — in the development of a Department which is flexible, sensitive and responsive to the needs of clientele and staff.
  — which eliminates discriminatory practices based on gender, race, ethnic origin, sexual preference or disability.
• To brief (and check understanding) and to consult (and report back on outcomes) both within the formal system and informally as a normal feature of working relationships.
• To monitor and evaluate the performance of tasks, and compliance with the goals and objectives of the Department, balancing this against the need to give personal support to individuals and groups.
• To accept the responsibility to ensure that the training, developmental and welfare needs of all our staff are met.

The achievement of these goals is underpinned by the main objectives of Puao-te-Ata-tu

• To attack all forms of cultural racism in New Zealand that result in the values and lifestyle of the dominant group being regarded as superior to those of other groups, especially Maori, by:
  (a) Providing leadership and programmes which help develop a society in which the values of all groups are of central importance to its enhancement: and
  (b) Incorporating the values, culture and beliefs of the Maori people in all policies developed for the future of New Zealand.
• To attack and eliminate deprivation and alienation by:
  (a) Allocating an equitable share of resources.
  (b) Sharing power and authority over the use of resources:
  (c) Ensuring legislation which recognises social, cultural and economic values of all cultural groups and especially Maori people: and
  (d) Developing strategies and initiatives which harness the potential of all people, and especially Maori people, to advance.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1988

FOREWORD 2
INTRODUCTION 3
MANAGEMENT PLAN 1988 4
Background 4
Planning Terms 4
Planning Roles 5
Planning Time Horizon 5
ENVIRONMENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE DEPARTMENT 6
Demographic 6
Economic 6
Government Policy 6
Service Delivery 7
Management of Change 7
MISSION 8
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 8
ORGANISATION 9
RESULT AREAS AND GOALS 10
Service Delivery 10
Policy Development 11
Human Resources 12
Resource Management 14
Organisation Development 15
The Department of Social Welfare exists to achieve the Social Welfare policy objectives of Government. Its corporate plan is part of its accountability for this mission to me and through me to Cabinet and Parliament.

This plan concentrates on the Department's change objectives. It accurately reflects the priorities for change that I have placed on the Department. Future plans will consolidate this strategic planning with the operational planning now mainly achieved through the Department's expenditure forecasting and budgeting procedures.

In constitutional terms I am responsible for the operations of the Department. It must therefore account to me for its performance. It is however also required to be responsive to its clients and open with its staff. The plan is therefore a valuable means of communicating the Department's goals and tasks to its staff and the people it serves.

Michael Cullen
Minister of Social Welfare
THE 1988 MANAGEMENT PLAN marks two important firsts for DSW. It is the first to be prepared with the direct involvement of our new Social Welfare Commission. In future years community participation in our planning will be at many levels, with the Commission’s guidance. It is also the first which I sign in my capacity as Chief Executive in terms of the State Sector Act. This underlines our direct responsibility to manage our business efficiently and effectively.

Once again, there are many themes of change in the Plan. From them can be drawn three main challenges for all of us.

1 In a time of rapid change and social stress, we are going to have to find ways to be more efficient and to operate under tight budgets: not to work harder, but to work better.

1 We have to be particularly careful to protect and strengthen the rights of our clients to a quality service. We need to be more specific about the standards of that service so that the people we serve know what to expect from us.

1 We can serve communities better if we work in partnership with them. We have a special responsibility to build these partnerships with Maori and other ethnic communities because of the gap we must bridge between different cultures.

There are also two specific commitments that the senior management team must make to the staff of the Department if we are to meet these challenges successfully.

1 We are committed to be fair to our staff in their efforts, to support them in their work and to give them opportunities to develop in the job.

1 We are committed to keeping managers and staff informed about the process of change and to be sensitive when managing change. This is so that people understand why change is necessary and how changes will affect them in their work.

The Corporate Plan is only the first step in our planning cycle. It calls for specific responses from management and staff at all levels if we are to achieve our objectives. I hope you will help me in this endeavour. For this reason I commend the Plan to all staff.

W Grant
DIRECTOR GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
BACKGROUND

THIS PLAN is the third in the series of annual Management Plans for the Department. Like the previous plans, it concentrates on priorities for change which will improve the Department's performance. In future, this annual statement of corporate strategies will be linked more closely with strategic and operational planning throughout the Department.

Three major forces drive the change priorities for this Plan:

1. government policy for the Department and the resources available to carry it out;
2. the society and economy which the department inhabits and particularly the clients and communities it serves;
3. the Department's own internal organisation, systems and staff.

An Administrative Review of the Department completed in December 1987 and the Department's own analysis have helped us identify issues to be included in this Plan. In March 1988, as a preliminary planning step we published a draft position statement identifying some key change priorities. The draft statement was considered by the Social Welfare Commission and circulated to the staff of the Department.

The main issues identified by these processes are spelled out in the relevant sections of the Plan.

PLANNING TERMS

AT THE CORE OF THE PLAN are five results areas: service delivery, policy development, human resources, resource management and organisation development. An overall goal has been defined for each result area.

In line with the main issues identified for the area, the Plan then identifies a set of key strategies necessary to achieve the goal. Units of the Department are expected to respond to these strategies in preparing their own plans.

For each strategy the Executive Management Group (EMG) of the Department has also agreed on specific corporate tasks to contribute to the achievement of the corporate strategies. Each one of these tasks is the responsibility of a member or members of the EMG. Each corporate task has a specific time frame for completion and an indicator of a successful result.
PLANNING ROLES

THE CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PLAN is intended to be a guide to corporate priorities for all units of the Department — Regional Offices, District Offices, Institutions and Head Office Divisions — in preparing their own operational plans. Members of the Department's Executive Management Group are accountable to the Director-General for planning in the units under their control.

The strategies set out in this plan are for the guidance of all units in the Department, Regional and District Offices and Institutions, while continuing their "business as usual", are asked to show in their plans how they are going to give effect to these strategies.

The Executive Management Group has listed the specific tasks that it must be responsible for at the corporate level: many of them specifically require a response from the Department as a whole. Regions, Districts and Institutions should however take all the key strategies as guides to corporate priorities and use them to develop their own initiatives.

PLANNING TIME HORIZON

THE TIME HORIZON of this Plan is to June 1990. The planning timetable for that period is as follows:

1 September 1988 Issue Corporate Plan
1 October 1988 Unit Management Plans completed
1 November 1988 Regional and Head Office Plans completed
1 June 1989 Mid-Course review of Plan
1 June 1990 Final review and preparation of new Plan
This section of the Plan sets out factors and trends in the world DSW works in which affect our ability to achieve our mission.

### DEMOGRAPHIC

**An increasing proportion** of older people in the community initially puts pressure on services for the very old and later, on the financing of retirement income for older people.

The lagged impact of a lower birth rate and increasing net emigration may eventually have their effect on demand for care and protection services for children and young persons and on the incidence of unemployment in the community.

Ethnic composition of the population is changing. The proportion of New Zealanders identifying themselves as of Maori descent has risen from around 6% after the Second World War to 12% today, while the population of Pacific Island descent has risen to close to 4% of the total population.

These changes affect our view of ourselves as a multicultural society — we have to address the imperative needs and expectations of Maori while we must also recognize and become accountable to clients of all races, for meeting their particular welfare needs.

Continuing drift from the south to the north and from rural to urban centres affects the distribution of required social services. The accelerating provincial decline has added problems of rural adjustment to growing pains in urban areas.

### ECONOMIC

**The shorter term consequences** of restructuring and lower inflation imply that high levels of unemployment will be a problem for the Department for a number of years ahead. The Department has mainly experienced the economic difficulties in the form of rapid increases in unemployment benefit numbers.

The rural downturn increases risk of family breakdown and domestic violence.

As income distributions have shifted, there has been a need to provide new forms of income support for low income youth and low income families.

### GOVERNMENT POLICY

We are entering a period in which there is likely to be continuing downward pressure on our budgets, as the government seeks more urgently to contain growth in public spending.
The State Sector Act (and the philosophy behind it) require government departments to act more like autonomous agencies both in their general management and their relations with their employees. Chief executives are accountable for results.

The new children and young persons' legislation will require significant changes in our care and protection practice, particularly in our relations with family, community and management of young offenders.

Benefit reforms already announced or likely may require major changes in procedures or organisation.

The current debate on partnership with Maoridom may lead to new roles for the Department in "mainstreaming" services for Maori people and devolving functions to the iwi, as defined in He Tirohanga Rangapu (Partnership Perspectives, Department of Maori Affairs, April 1988).

The establishment of the Social Welfare Commission and the various local committees requires a new openness in development of policy and practice.

**SERVICE DELIVERY**

There are increasing expectations for delivery of services to be provided in partnership with local community groups and tribal bases, rather than from large bureaucracies.

There is an increasing community awareness and debate on sensitive issues, such as devolution of services to iwi Maori, and the possible contracting out of services.

The Department is under constant pressure to do more to recognise clients' rights and to tailor services to better meet cultural, race, gender and age differences and disabilities.

We have an emerging commitment to developing a partnership with iwi Maori.

**MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE**

The number of changes the Department has had to carry out (as well as maintaining business as usual) have not been achieved without difficulty. To better manage future demands and changes we will have to improve our ability to forecast and plan.

The management of change has become the central challenge for all managers. The major changes require a continuing shift in power from the centre to district offices where decision making can be quicker, responsive to needs and mindful of the demands and stresses on staff.
OUR MISSION is to provide a quality service to clients which gives best effect to the social welfare policy objectives of the government.

The Department of Social Welfare is accountable to its Minister for the efficient performance of its mission.

To provide a quality service the Department is required to be responsive to its clients by:

- ensuring that client needs are understood and met;
- involving local communities in the planning and delivery of services.

The Department is committed to assist staff to achieve their potential by training and development and reward them appropriately for their effort and performance.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

THE ACHIEVEMENT of our mission is guided by two principles:

PUAO-TE-ATA-TU

1 To attack all forms of cultural racism in New Zealand that result in the values and lifestyle of the dominant group being regarded as superior to those of other groups, especially Maori. by:
   (a) Providing leadership and programmes which help develop a society in which the values of all groups are of central importance to its enhancement; and
   (b) Incorporating the values, culture and beliefs of the Maori people in all policies developed for the future of New Zealand.

2 To attack and eliminate deprivation and alienation by:
   (a) Allocating an equitable share of resources;
   (b) Sharing power and authority over the use of resources;
   (c) Ensuring legislation which recognises social, cultural and economic values of all cultural groups and especially Maori people; and
   (d) Developing strategies and initiatives which harness the potential of all people, and especially Maori people, to advance.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

1 Eliminate all discriminatory practices, based on gender, race, ethnic origin, sexual preference, disability or age.
ORGANISATION

SOCIAL WELFARE COMMISSION

Director-General
- Deputy Director-General
- Assistant Director-General
  Programmes and Services
    National Directors:
      Older People and People with Disability
      Youth and Employment
      Maori, Pacific and Community
      Families in Special Circumstances
      Family Development and Support

- Assistant Director-General
  Policy Development
    Directors:
      Research
      Monitoring and Evaluation
      Policy
      Administrator, Social Science

- Assistant Director-General
  Resource Management
    Directors:
      Finance
      Data Processing Centre
      Operations

- Assistant Director-General
  Human Resources
    Directors:
      Personnel
      Training
      EEO
      Secretariat
      Administration

- Inspector-General and National Auditor

- Assistant Director-Generals (Regions)

District Director

District Executive Committees

Area Welfare Executive Committees

Institutional Management Committees
Appendix VII - Summary of Recommendations of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu

Recommendation 1 (Guiding Principles and Objectives)

We recommend that the following social policy objective be endorsed by the Government for the development of Social Welfare policy in New Zealand:

"Objective
To attack all forms of cultural racism in New Zealand that result in the values and lifestyle of the dominant group being regarded as superior to those of other groups, especially Maori, by:
(a) Providing leadership and programmes which help develop a society in which the values of all groups are of central importance to its enhancement; and
(b) Incorporating the values, cultures and beliefs of the Maori people in all policies developed for the future of New Zealand."

Recommendation 2

We recommend that the following operational objective be endorsed:

"To attack and eliminate deprivation and alienation by:
(a) Allocating an equitable share of resources.
(b) Sharing power and authority over the use of resources.
(c) Ensuring legislation which recognises social, cultural and economic values of all cultural groups and especially Maori people.
(d) Developing strategies and initiatives which harness the potential of all of its people, and especially Maori people, to advance."

Recommendation 3 (Accountability)

We recommend that:
(a) The Social Security Commission be abolished and be replaced by a Social Welfare Commission. The new Commission shall consist of four principal officers of the department, two persons nominated by the Minister of Maori Affairs after consultation with the tribal authorities, and two persons nominated by the Minister of Women's Affairs. The Minister of Social Welfare may wish to consult the Minister of Pacific Island Affairs on the desirability of a ninth appointee.
(b) The Social Welfare Commission, either at the request of the Minister or on its own motion shall:
   (i) advise the Minister on the development and changes in policy and scope relating to social security, child and family welfare, community welfare of disabled persons and other functions of the Department of Social Welfare;
   (ii) advise the Minister on the co-operation and co-ordination of social welfare activities among any organisations, including Departments of State and other agencies of the Crown or by any other organisations or tribal authority; and
   (iii) consult at least once a year with representatives of tribal authorities in a national hui;
(iv) recommend to the Minister the appointment of and oversee the work of District Executive Committees for each Social Welfare District Office, and Management Committees for each Social Welfare Institution, and allocate appropriate budgets according to priorities set by these Committees.

(c) District Executive Committees should be formed in each Social Welfare department district. Each Committee shall consist of up to 9 persons appointed from the community on the nomination of the Maori tribal authorities and the nominations of other community interests. The Director of Social Welfare (in person) and the Director of Maori Affairs are to be members. The Chairperson shall be one of the non-public service members. Members are to be paid in the normal way.

(d) The District Executive Committees shall be appointed by the Minister of Social Welfare under S13 of the Department of Social Welfare Act 1971, and shall report to the Social Welfare Commission and be responsible for assessing and setting priorities in consultation with the various tribal authorities for the funding of specific family and community welfare projects and initiatives in their areas; for preparing draft budgets for these projects for final approval by the Social Welfare Commission; and for monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of such projects and initiatives and the appropriateness and quality of the Department's range of services to the district it serves.

Recommendation 4 (Deficiencies in Law and Practice)

We recommend the following amendments to legislation:


(b) The Social Security Act 1964 be amended to provide for the following:

(i) Abolition of the Social Security Commission.
(ii) Clarify the law so that there is no impediment to verification of age and marital status being established from Marae or tribal records and that a Maori custom marriage is recognised for the purposes of the Social Security Act.
(iii) Restructuring of the unemployment benefit so that it can provide greater incentive to work, whether part time or full time, training or entrepreneurial initiative and to provide the flexibility through discretion for the Social Welfare Commission to develop variations of or alternatives to the unemployment benefit that are tailored to the needs of the individual.
(iv) Social Security benefit child supplements be made more readily available where the care of Maori children is transferred from natural parents to the grandparents or other relatives.
(v) Eligibility to orphans benefit provisions be extended to include the claims of unsupported children, so that payment can be made to whanau members who are looking after these children.

(c) The Children and Young Persons Act 1974 be reviewed having regard to the following principles:

(i) That in the consideration of the welfare of a Maori child,
regard must be had to the desirability of maintaining the child within the child’s hapu;
(ii) that the whanau/hapu/iwi must be consulted and may be heard in Court of appropriate jurisdiction on the placement of a Maori child;
(iii) that Court officers, social workers, or any other person dealing with a Maori child should be required to make inquiries as to the child’s heritage and family links;
(iv) that the process of law must enable the kinds of skills and experience required for dealing with Maori children and young persons hapu members to be demonstrated, understood and constantly applied.
The approach in recommendation (iv) will require appropriate training mechanisms for all people involved with regard to customary cultural preferences and current Maori circumstances and aspirations;
(v) that prior to any sentence or determination of a placement the Court of appropriate jurisdiction should where practicable consult, and be seen to be consulting with, members of the child’s hapu or with persons active in tribal affairs with a sound knowledge of the hapu concerned;
(vi) that the child or the child’s family should be empowered to select Kai tiaki or members of the hapu with a right to speak for them;
(vii) that authority should be given for the diversion of negative forms of expenditure towards programmes for positive Maori development through tribal authorities; these programmes to be aimed at improving Maori community service to the care of children and the relief of parents under stress.

Recommendation 5
We recommend that the Social Security Act be reviewed by the Social Welfare Commission with a view to removing complexity of conditions of eligibility and achieving rationalisation of benefit rates.

Recommendation 6 (Institutions)
We recommend that:
(a) Management Committees drawn from local communities be established for each Social Welfare institution;
(b) The Committees shall be appointed by the Minister of Social Welfare under S13 Department of Social Welfare Act 1971 and shall be responsible to the Social Welfare Commission for the direction of policy governing individual institutions, allocating resources, making recommendations on the selection of staff and for ensuring that programmes are related to needs of children and young persons and are culturally appropriate;
(c) Each Committee shall consist of up to 9 persons appointed to represent the community on the nomination of the Maori tribal authorities and on the nomination of other community interests and with one member to represent the Director-General of Social Welfare and one to represent the Secretary of Maori Affairs. The
Chairperson will be a non-public servant member. Members are to be paid in the normal way;

(d) As a priority the Committees shall address the question of alternative community care utilising the extended family;

(e) The Committees shall have the right to report to the Social Welfare Commission on matters of departmental policy affecting the institutions.

(f) Funds be provided to enable children from institutions to be taken back to their tribal areas for short periods to give them knowledge of the history and nature of the areas and to teach them Maori language and culture;

(g) Provision be made to enable young people to be discharged to home or community care and to continue to attend schools attached to Social Welfare institutions.

Recommendation 7 (Maatua Whangai)

We recommend that:

(a) The Maatua Whangai programme in respect of children return to its original focus of nurturing children within the family group;

(b) Additional funding be allocated by the Department to the programme for board payments and grants to tribal trusts for tribal authorities to strengthen whanau/hapu/iwi development;

(c) The funding mechanism be through the tribal authorities and be governed by the principle that board payments should follow the child and be paid direct to the family of placement, quickly and accurately and accounted for to the Department in respect of each child. The programmes should be monitored for suitability of placement and quality of care;

(d) The level of the reimbursement grant for volunteers be increased to a realistic level.

Recommendation 8 (Funding Initiatives)

We recommend that:

(a) The Departments of Social Welfare, Education, Labour and Maori Affairs in consultation with tribal authorities promote and develop initiatives aimed at improving the skill and work experience of the young long term unemployed;

(b) The proposed Social Welfare Commission meet with Maori authorities to consider areas of needed investment in urban and rural districts to promote the social and cultural skills of young Maori people and to promote training and employment opportunities for them.

Recommendation 9 (Recruitment and Staffing)

We recommend that:

(a) Job descriptions for all staff acknowledge where appropriate the requirements necessary for the officer to relate to the community including the needs of Maori and Maori community;

(b) Interview panels should include a person or persons knowledgeable in Maoritanga;

(c) The Department provide additional training programmes to develop understanding and awareness of Maori and cultural issues among departmental staff;
(d) Additional training positions be established for training in Maoritanga;
(e) Provision be made for the employment of staff to provide temporary relief while other staff attend training;
(f) Assistance be provided to local Maori groups offering Maoritanga programmes for staff; and
(g) The Department accredit appropriate Maori people to assist in field and reception work.

Recommendation 10 (Training)

We recommend that:
(a) The Department take urgent steps to improve its training performance in all aspects of its work;
(b) The State Services Commission undertake an analysis of the training needs of all departments which deliver social services;
(c) The State Services Commission assess the extent to which tertiary social work courses are meeting cultural needs for those public servants seconded as students to the courses;
(d) The Department in consultation with the Department of Maori Affairs identify suitable people to institute training programmes to provide a Maori perspective for training courses more directly related to the needs of the Maori people;
(e) (i) additional training positions be established for training in Maoritanga at the district level;
(ii) provision be made for the employment of staff to provide temporary relief while other staff attend training;
(iii) assistance be provided to local Maori groups offering Maoritanga programmes.

Recommendation 11 (Communication)

(a) The Department ensure appropriate advice to its information staff on the specific public relations and information needs of particular ethnic groups, and to assist with interpretation and translation into Maori;
(b) Immediate steps be taken to continue to improve the design and function of public reception areas;
(c) An immediate review be undertaken by an appropriate firm of consultants of the range of all application forms to reduce their complexity;
(d) That funds be allocated to Social Welfare district offices with a high Maori population to provide some remuneration to Maori people who provide assistance to Social Welfare staff in dealing with Maori clients;
(e) A toll free calling service to Social Welfare district offices be installed to enable all Social Welfare clients living outside toll-free calling areas to ring the Department free-of-charge (rural areas);
(f) A general funding programme be established which could be drawn on by rural areas for community self-help projects. These funds could be used for example, to employ a community worker, or to provide back-up funds for voluntary work.
Recommendation 12 (Interdepartmental Co-ordination)

We recommend that:
(a) The Terms of Reference for the intended Royal Commission on Social Policy take account of the issues raised in this Committee’s report;
(b) The State Services Commission take immediate action to ensure that more effective co-ordination of the State Social Service agencies occurs.

Recommendation 13 (Comprehensive Approach)

We recommend that:
(a) Immediate action be taken to address in a comprehensive manner across a broad front of central Government, local Government, Maori tribal authorities and the community at large, the cultural, economic and social problems that are creating serious tensions in our major cities and in certain other outlying areas;
(b) The aim of this approach be to create the opportunity for community effort to:
   (i) plan, direct, control and co-ordinate the effort of central Government, local Government, tribal authorities and structures, other cultural structures, business community and Maoridom;
   (ii) harness the initiatives of the Maori people and the community at large to help address the problems;
(c) The Cabinet Committee on Social Equity and their Permanent Heads be responsible for planning and directing the co-ordination of resources, knowledge and experience required to promote and sustain community responses and invite representatives of commerce, business, Maoridom, local Government and community leaders to share in this task.

Committee Comment

Change of the order contemplated in these recommendations will place quite extreme demands on the human resources of the Department of Social Welfare and the Department of Maori Affairs.

This report contemplates that the social and cultural insights available to the Department of Maori Affairs will be central to the development of strategies that cannot afford to fail.

The Department of Maori Affairs can bring experience and skill in the social dimensions of the Maori world in a measure greater than that available from any other agency of Government. Combined with Social Welfare’s depth of practical experience in dealing with the social situation of Maori people these two departments together face the greatest single social and cultural challenge of our times.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

THE ROOTS OF DEPENDENCY

In the Maori perspective of our history since 1840 the dominating theme is the interaction of our two cultures. In the early stages of that relationship Maori society transformed itself with enthusiasm. It exploded with innovation and change. In some areas the adaptation of Pakeha technology to Maori communal enterprise was so successful that Pakeha migrants could scarcely compete.

At this stage Maori tribes controlled their own transformation, managed their own economy and set about the development of their own institutions. There were all sorts of negative effects but we don’t complain about them. They were things we did to ourselves in a world we controlled. They were part of the toll which any change exacts.

The development of Pakeha institutions, in the 1850s especially, those of “Responsible” Government, transformed our own transformation. The Maori experience, since those institutions became dominant, has been one of recurring cycles of conflict and tension against a backdrop of ongoing deprivation. This has drained the Maori spiritually and physically. It finds expression today in our atrocious levels of social dependency.

At the heart of our experience of Pakeha institutions has been the alienation of our lands. It was the primary, driving motive for the development of “Responsible” Government in Aotearoa, it was the take that brought us into armed conflict with the Pakeha and remains a primary source of tension between us today. It is the issue that betrayed that first great transformation. It is the taproot of our modern dependency.

That dependency has other roots as well. Pakeha institutions blend a number of elements in the Pakeha ethos which have combined to serve Pakeha culture well but which, although sometimes well meaning, have been destructive of the cultural fabric of the Maori.

As the deprivation of the Maori became unacceptably obvious, solutions were sought in the “modernisation” of a backward people in need of “development”. Policies aimed at redefining land ownership, converting a communal culture to an individualistic one, fostering new forms of leadership and educating Maori children out of their essential Maoriness were rooted in the concept of “assimilation”. The underlying idea of assimilation was that Pakeha culture and ways were “modern” and “forward-looking” and therefore superior as compared with “traditional” Maori ways which were no longer “relevant”.

Modern Maori commentators have argued that the aim of these assimilation policies was to “domesticate” Maori people and Maori culture.
It is a view that is difficult to argue with. It is certainly clear that virtually all policies concerning Maori welfare and development have been founded on Pakeha cultural prescriptions of what was best for the Maori. It is equally clear that virtually all Maori attempts to direct and shape the Maori future in ways reflecting Maori values and institutions were resisted either militarily, legislatively or by ignoring them.

The example of that first transformation in which an autonomous Maori culture reshaped itself with the new technology had been too successful, too threatening, to the dominance of the Settler culture to be allowed to happen again.

“BEASTLY COMMUNISM”

Those early Pakeha power-brokers understood very clearly what they were doing. It was summed up by the distinguished 19th century politician, Sir Francis Dillon-Bell, when he said, “The first plank of public policy must be to stamp out the beastly communism of the Maori!”

Since the 1850’s when Maori and Pakeha first began to shape up to each other in cultural terms right down to the present tribalism has been the focus of Pakeha hostility. It was early identified as the primary source of Maori social strength, the thing which stiffened resistance to settler ambition.

In later times it was seen as an obstacle to development policies and it has continued to be viewed as a barrier to the kind of Maori “unity” seen as desirable by planners and policy-makers. Yet, when our tribal communities want to co-operate they have never seemed to find it difficult to do so. When the need for unity derives from within Maoridom and is not some need prescribed by the dominant culture we seem, historically and in the present, to find little difficulty in dealing with each other. It may be that “Maori tribal factionalism” is more a Pakeha myth nourished to meet the interests of the dominant culture.

In fact tribal identity and cohesion is the very thing which enables Maori people confidently to deal with each other. It provides a format in which Maori people can undertake their political relations enriched by their traditions and strengthened by their sense of tribal identity. When the tribal element is not present there is insecurity, tension and distrust and relations don’t happen.

It must also be remembered that every major Maori thrust in our history since 1840 has had a tribal basis for its success. In the cases where the thrust has collapsed it has been because the central element of tribal autonomy and tribal recognition has been ignored or subverted.

What then is this “beast” that Dillon-Bell railed against?

The traditional Maori system, based on decentralised tribal autonomy and the organic solidarity of kinship, consisted of four organisational levels, all linked to a greater or lesser degree by a common ancestor or event. Forming the largest sociopolitical unit, the waka consisted of a group of tribes whose ancestors reached New Zealand on the same canoe; no co-operative form of government, however, existed among them. Members of a tribe, or iwi, on the other hand, were linked by descent from a common ancestor who was on one of the canoes and whose name they took. Tribal feeling was
strong and each tribe formed an independent, self-sufficient and self-governing set of groups under the leadership of the ariki. The tribes were divided into a smaller organisation, the hapu. Since members of the hapu could trace their heritage to an ancestor several generations back, it comprised an even closer kin group than the iwi. The hapu took the name of their common ancestor and built their society around their respect for their ancestors. Although they readily joined other hapu in times of war or ceremonial occasions, each hapu was responsible for its own government; autonomy was fundamental. The hapu were led by rangatira, the hereditary chiefstains and leaders, who were expected to act wisely and with dignity. The basic social unit of Maori society, however, was the extended family or whanau. This consisted of up to about thirty people, under the direction or guidance of the kaumatua, the respected elder of the family. Children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren with their spouses made up the whanau, which was responsible for making the basic day to day decisions.

In all matters of concern to the tribe or hapu, there was discussion among the heads of each unit—that is, the kaumatua represented each whanau, and rangatira represented each hapu—before a decision was made. In this way all members of the society were able to contribute through their representative to the organisation of their lifestyle. Most decisions, however, were local decisions made by the whanau on the basis of kinship.

It must be remembered, though, that this social system was not set in cement! From our furthest histories our tribes have mixed and divided and migrated and formed fresh relationships. The division and blending of our tribes are what Maori tradition is all about. These are processes however which can only be controlled from within Maoridom, responding to Maori needs on a Maori timetable. They are not processes which can be undertaken because the dominant culture believes it might be good for us. On the contrary, the only appropriately Maori way in which they can be approached is from the security of tribal identity.

TEARING THE NET

In destructive contrast to the local autonomy and kinship solidarity of traditional Maori politics, the process of modernisation in New Zealand, as elsewhere in the world, followed a general pattern that centralised the state and differentiated institutions.

This means that the central state’s chosen administrators supplant traditional leaders; the state’s agents impose new structure; legal-judicial processes replace the traditional tribal law; and most significantly, permanent government forces enforce the new rules.

For tribal peoples, however, the process directly involves them with a greater number and variety of government agents: the various department administrators, the law enforcers, the judicial agents, the postal service, educational agents and, of course, the social and welfare services. Weaving a fine bureaucratic net about traditional society, they impose new regulations, restrictions and obligations upon the people. The do’s, don’ts and musts of the central state are thus enforced by an array of strangers who, in their ignorance and arrogance, compromise traditional law and local custom.
The Pakeha government, with its central decision-making, and the various ministries and government departments as the specialised institutional arms, forged a modern state that universally enforced a novel system of law. This new system conflicted with the traditional Maori legal system by ignoring the social framework of land-ownership and developing a maze of bewildering legal processes that all Maoris had to confront to secure any standing in the new state.

For the Maori, political modernisation resulted in a systematic and unrelenting assault on their traditional society.

The assault can also be clearly seen in the conflict between Maori economy and Pakeha economy and the difference in the symbolic value of land in each system. Underlining the Maori-Pakeha economic contrast was the universal contradiction of our traditional collective-obligation economy versus modern capitalist-market economy.

As we have seen, though, it was a contradiction we coped pretty well with—when we were in control of ourselves. And we have continued to do so in those areas where we have managed to regain some measure of control.

Our tribal trusts, incorporations and Trust Boards have managed—despite controlling legislation—to reassert many of our traditional economic values at the same time as they function actively in the modern capitalist world.

They’re really just repeating the example of our tupuna, the ones who engineered that first great Maori transformation prior to the 1860's.

The more important lesson we have learned, however, is that there are levels of personal and community interaction where we can fruitfully continue to practise our traditional collective-obligation economy. We do so in our marae, within our whanau and within our hapu.

Despite the fact that there is nothing in the social institutions which have grown around us which is supportive of our traditional economic and social systems, they have survived and continue to sustain many of us.

THE GREY DAWN

The standard Pakeha view of our history places much stress on Ngata and Carroll as the heralds of a new Maori dawn but from where we now stand we can see them as fighting what was essentially a rear guard action—action to preserve Maoriland and culture and insist upon equality. In their world the Maori population was still rural and the central question was still land.

Land was the cornerstone of society upon which the Maori political, economic, and social system depended. Thus, Maori tribal society was alienated by the mere fact of giving titles through the Native Land Court system. When Pakeha acquired Maori land through the combination of a modern system of profit oriented economics and centralised politics, Maoris were devastated. In one sweep, they were stripped of autonomous government, their legal basis of communal solidarity, their social and their spiritual being. As Eric Schwimmer has commented, “It was the fragmentation of the land that finally destroyed traditional Maori social structure, for the chief's mana now no longer ran over the whole of his territories, individuals henceforth stood on their own, even though a sentimental tribal cohesion continued.
At the close of the nineteenth century, modernisation and internal colonialism continued to cause Maori misery, suffering and deprivation. The Maori, in Pakeha eyes, were a dispirited and broken people whose decline in numbers demonstrated that they were a dying race. Between 1895 and the late 1940’s, government for Maoris, vacillated between assimilation and attempts to retain a measure of independence.

On the one hand, government policy tried to assimilate Maoris fully into the benefits of Pakeha education, health and culture. On the other hand, it incorporated Maoris into Pakeha economic, legal and political life, regulating their participation and emphasising that Maori incorporation was on Pakeha terms. To the New Zealand government, the terms resonated humane justice. But the Native Land Courts, the unemployment inequities and the land policies that opened the way for alienation suggest more an insidious paternalism. No matter how one chooses to interpret government action, and to an extent justice and exploitation are both accurate, Maori participation in Pakeha economic, legal and political life was regulated.

Apirana Ngata, James Carroll and the Young Maori Party co-operated with Pakeha. They were conciliatory towards them and adopted many of their ways because they believed some adaptation was necessary for Maori physical survival as a race. In political and economic spheres, the goal was assimilation. Thus, they adapted their politics to Pakeha politics and accepted conditions that were imposed upon them as the price for becoming a part of the Pakeha system. For example, Ngata, though always working for the economic progress of Maoris, was willing to co-operate with Pakehas and accept their conditions—recognising that the Pakeha conditions were pre-requisites for Pakeha concessions.

From 1895 through the 1930s, the broad parameters of structural strain and relative deprivation were very much at work. Maoris were being deprived by modernisation and internal colonialism. Land continued to be alienated. It seemed, moreover, that their options were limited. If Maoris tried to farm commercially, lack of technical skills, marketing expertise and legal advice were crippling. The issue of clear land title which underlay credit and capital availability in the Pakeha financial system was a crucial one. Combined with an overall lack of government support these things prevented Maori from successfully competing with Pakeha. At the same time, Maori were increasingly integrated into a cash economy. Where they could previously barter for food, clothing or luxury items, they were now forced to pay cash. In contrast to this situation was that of the Maori, where the traditional base was maintained. But even they needed cash for health services, for land rates, to pay for district schools, perhaps for a land survey and, of course, for the dog tax. This, too, forced them into the Pakeha economy.

The government approach to the Maori in the 20th century was one of increasing institutionalisation. The decade of the 1900’s saw Maori Councils and Maori Land Councils (later Maori Land Boards) established (1900) and a decision taken not to abolish the Native Land Court or Maori Parliamentary representation. The Department of Native Affairs was also established in 1906.

A further series of institutions were created in the 1920’s. Thus were the Native Trustee (1920), the Maori Purposes Fund Board (1924) and several tribal Trust Boards.

These were all Pakeha created institutions designed to reduce Maori deprivation and mediate Maori demands. These institutionalised channels
provided an accommodation of sorts and enticed Maoris to become incorporated into the Pakeha system.

The gradual improvement in Maori legal status lent an aura of legitimacy to Pakeha government and its Maori institutions. However, the legitimacy was more convincing to the Pakeha than to the Maori.

Between 1895 and the late 1930's, the government's Maori policy was a curious blend of assimilation, paternalism, integration and exploitation. Most legislation included institutionalised improvements for Maori—the legitimising and institutionalising aspects. But the legislation also contained special restrictions that reinforced the Maori’s unequal status.

It was during the period from the 1890's to the 1930's that the structural strain on Maori society and the levels of deprivation revealed themselves at their worst. At the end of the period the Maori population reached its lowest levels since Pakeha contact and possibly the lowest levels in 500 years. Modernisation and internal colonialism had wrought their effects.

Land continued to be alienated and attempts to farm commercially were frustrated by lack of technological skill, marketing expertise and capital. The Pakeha financial system with its notions of farming credit based on clear land title struck at the very heart of Maori communal land ownership. Combined with the lack of Government support for Maori development these prevented any successful competition within the Pakeha controlled economy.

Previously Maori had enjoyed an economy largely based on barter. Now they were compressed into the cash economy and they had little of it. Food, clothing, health charges, the cost of schools, rates and, of course, the Dog Tax, all needed cash.

It is important to note that this dependency had not always existed. In the 1820's there had been a dramatic turn to a market economy. Huge areas had been turned to cultivation for trade in the Bay of Islands and important trade in food had developed as far south as Foveaux Strait. In the 1840's the Wanganui River had thriving cultivations and flour mills. In 1846 a fair acreage of wheat was grown in the Manawatu, and in 1847 two flour mills were built in Taranaki and paid for in pigs. At Rangiaowhia a mill costing £200 was erected in 1847 and the money subscribed by the local Waikato people was put up in £1 shares. The system was Maori but the crops and the agricultural methods were Pakeha. The expansion demanded new implements and created new needs. Before long the local Pakeha markets were supplied and the Maori producers were trading farther afield.

The coastal tribes took to the shipping business. In 1844 the Opotiki people owned two small vessels and the Whakatane people another. In the same period the southern chief Tuhawaiki began trading his produce in his own ships to New South Wales. By the 1850's Maori tribes owned and operated most of the coastal shipping in the North Island. By 1858 there were 53 Maori vessels of more than 14 tons registered in Auckland alone. They supplied the local market with almost all its produce and maintained a considerable export trade to Australia and the Pacific. The cargoes they carried were Maori grown.

In 1857 the Bay of Plenty, Taupo and Rotorua tribes numbering about 8000 people had several thousand acres in wheat, potatoes, maize and kumara. They owned nearly 1000 horses, 200 head of cattle, 5000 pigs, 4 water-powered mills and 96 ploughs. On top of this they owned 43 coastal vessels of around 20 tons each and more than 900 canoes. The scale of
Maori trading can be gauged from the example of one tribe Ngati Porou of the East Coast. In 1857 Pakeha traders paid them £13,000 for 46,000 bushels of wheat.

In a single year 1,792 canoes entered Auckland harbour laden with produce, firewood and kauri gum. The tribes around Auckland supplied the town with nearly all its requirements of fruit, pumpkins, maize, potatoes, kumara and pigs, as well as most of the fish for the town.

This Maori enterprise was so successful that it could, ultimately, only be defeated by war, defeat and the imposition of Pakeha institutional structures. Those Land Wars are seen by Maori as a conscious attempt to exclude the Maori from the emerging Pakeha economy. "Rebellion" was merely the pretext.

An important attempt to institutionalise Maoris and lend an aura of legitimacy to Pakeha government came in 1867 when Maoris were allotted four parliamentary seats. This definitely improved Maori political status, but it neither altered the fact that four seats vastly under-represented Maoris nor masked the expectation that Maori MPs would be subservient to the ruling party.

In 1895, the Urewera District Native Reserve Act was passed, closely followed by the Maori Lands Administration Act and the Maori Councils Act of 1900. This legislation attempted to improve Maori political status and reduce alienation of their land. It granted Maoris some local autonomy and some legal power over their land. As in all other Maori legislation, however, special conditions restricted the gains. In the case of these bills, the Native Land Court still maintained overall jurisdiction and Maori local government received no economic support. Moreover, Maori local government, unlike Pakeha local government, which had considerable autonomy along with full representation in national government, was tightly regulated by the Native Minister. Thus, while the Acts appeared to grant Maoris the political autonomy Pakeha communities already had, it actually doomed Maori self-government by failing to grant the Maori Councils any real power.
THE TREATY

The Treaty of Waitangi is very much to the forefront of current Maori thinking.

The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi had created a document which was to be held by Maori movements for many generations as setting the basis for relationships between the two races. It is clear that the exact status, meaning and consequences of the document were not clear to those signing the Treaty. While achieving for the Europeans the justification for claiming sovereignty over New Zealand, the clauses apparently protecting the interests of the Maoris carried little weight in the designing of legislation and procedures regarding Maori land and political participation.

The Treaty contained three main activities and conditions, which were to have set the relationship between the Maori and the Government of the new settlers:

Article the First

The chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual chiefs respectfully exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.

Article the Second

Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates. Forests, Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession, but the chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Pre-emption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them on that behalf.

Article the Third

In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand her Royal Protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British subjects.

Other legislation that helped institutionalise Maoris and legitimise Pakeha government involved support for Maori land development. In this context, a longstanding Maori grievance, as Ngata said, that “many schemes had been put into operation whereby the state places its financial resources at the disposal of European farmers, who were also served by financial institutions, but Maori landowners received no such assistance.” Though
leading to considerable alienation of Maori land (a Pakeha condition for passing the Maori Councils’ Act 1900) this kind of legislation allowed Maoris to incorporate or consolidate their land. Essentially, it enabled Maoris to own land and, during this period Native Trust Boards, Native Land Purchase Boards, various Royal Commissions for investigating compensation claims, Maori Land Boards and the Maori Purposes Fund were established. Through these structural channels and the already established Ministry of Native Affairs, Maoris were slowly institutionalised into Pakeha government.

Ngata and Carroll strove to resist the bureaucratic and cultural domination implicit in these processes.

Pakeha government further legitimised itself by active attempts in the 1920’s to improve Maori economic status by the Native Trustee Act (1920), an amendment of the 1909 Native Land Act in 1926 to allow Maori Land Boards to lend money to Maori farmers, and a further amendment in 1929 permitting the Boards to develop Maori land.

When power was finally consolidated in the Ministry of Native Affairs, the Minister was empowered to use government funds to develop Maori lands. By 1931 the Native Affairs Department had become the ultimate corporate entity for regulating and controlling Maori affairs. From a Government standpoint the Maori was now fully institutionalised into Pakeha government.

But Maori people were still deprived. Right through to the 1950’s the deprivation continued, although the Maori standard of living was gradually improving. The Maori was trapped in a structure of internal colonialism—a process by which majority culture systems reinforce and maintain social and cultural deprivation.

The Ratana movement came into being against the failure of earlier political and government systems to cope with Maori needs; the movement was active from 1919.

The Ratana movement was willing to co-operate closely with the first Labour government on an overall basis, but there was no absorption and no willingness to have conditions imposed upon them. Thus, although the Ratana movement used the Labour Party as a vehicle, agreeing to certain organisational restrictions in return for support of Maori issues, they still needed certain changes and retained as the basis of their politics the protest symbol of the Treaty of Waitangi.

In essence the Ratana Party’s goal was to reach an accommodation with Pakehas, but on Maori terms.

The Treaty gave sovereign rights over all the Territory occupied by Maoris, and alienation was only to be in cases where the owners gave approval. It appeared to give Maoris all the rights and privileges of British citizens, presumably total equality, in the social, cultural, economic and political spheres of the community.

The Treaty provisions, though used as a basis by the Government to obtain land from the Maoris, never provided the protection or rights for the Maori it so solemnly promised.

The importance of the Treaty as a driving force in contemporary Maori protest cannot be overemphasised. As our people have, in this generation, sought to find a philosophical base for relating to the Pakeha society, the Treaty has become both a symbol and a charter.

Although Ratana brought the Treaty out of the cupboard and used it as a powerful political symbol in the 1920’s and 1930’s it is only in our time
that it has come to be seen as a potentially relevant document for the Maori future. Although there is still much understandable cynicism amongst our people about the willingness of Pakeha culture to effectively confront the issues the Treaty raises, it must be granted that giant steps have recently been made.

The Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal Act 1975 and the Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 have given Maori people—for the first time in our history—a proper constitutional base for the redress of grievance over land and other matters. We now have a forum in which we can stand as of right and have our people's case heard.

Historians might well see the 1985 Act as the most significant single action of the New Zealand Parliament. It may not do much directly for the social and economic deprivation of our people but it could well do much for Maori feelings about living in Aotearoa. The increased attention to the third article of the Treaty which provides Maoris with "all the rights and privileges of British subjects" may yet prove an important factor in the struggle for a more culturally and economically equitable society.
NEW DIRECTION IN MANAGEMENT: COMUNICATION: FORMAL SYSTEMS FOR BRIEFING AND CONSULTING

INTRODUCTION

1 The DSW 1986 Management Plan states that the new management approach would be to brief (and check understanding) and to consult (and report back on outcomes) both within formal systems and informally as a normal feature of working relationships. The Department is committed to develop the briefing and consulting processes.

2 This circular sets out how the department's formal systems for briefing and consulting are to operate.

2.1 The purpose of briefing is to ensure that information moves "downwards" in the organisation so that staff are informed in advance of forthcoming changes and that they understand what, if anything, is expected of them.

2.2 The purpose of consulting is to ensure movement of information "upwards", thus enabling the advice and opinion of staff to be sought as a guide to decision making.

2.3 Formal briefing and consulting systems are designed to cause the least possible interference with the very effective systems which exist in some offices.

2.4 Staff will be consulted before 30 June 1987 on how to improve briefing and consulting throughout the Department.

2.5 Some offices which accord high priority to the new direction in management already operate in a manner similar to the expectations below. In these offices the following requirements will not generate additional meetings.

2.6 Briefing and consulting are two distinct processes with different purposes. All staff need to be clear which process is being followed on any occasion. If the distinction is blurred, the systems for briefing and consulting will quickly fall into disrepute.

Classification of Circulars and Memoranda

3 Circulars and memoranda issued under the authority of the Director-General, Regional Directors and Directors and Principals will be classified in one of three categories which will designate the manner of communication to staff.
WHEN WILL CONSULTATION OCCUR?

6 Consultation will occur when there are events of major significance such as proposed changes in departmental policy or administration which, if implemented, will lead to significant changes in the working environment for departmental staff.

When this is to happen, staff will, wherever possible, be given the opportunity to comment on the implications of the proposals and plans before final decisions are made thus enabling departmental management to be better informed about staff views of likely consequences if a certain policy or administrative change is implemented. Sometimes for reasons such as timing, consultation will occur after a decision has been taken. In this instance consultation becomes the seeking of advice or information on the outcome of the original decision so that changes can be made, if appropriate.

7 The process of consultation is ongoing and takes place at various levels in the department. Sometimes everyone in the department is consulted, on other occasions only group(s) which have a direct interest will be consulted. The decision on who is to be consulted and at what level has, of necessity, to be left to the judgement of Head Office management which will only use the consultative process for major discussion papers. It is expected that all managers will have a consulting process for issues which are confined to their own region, office or institution.

WHEN CONSULTATION WILL NOT OCCUR

8 There will be occasions (e.g. a major change in Government policy) when consultation will not occur because advice from staff will not be able to alter the outcome. In these circumstances, there is no point in asking for advice when the die is cast.

WHAT CONSULTATION DOES NOT OFFER

9 It is important for staff to appreciate that consultation provides a means for their views to be heard. Those views will be considered as an input in the decision-making process, but there can be no assurance they will be implemented. Ultimately managers are accountable and sometimes it will be necessary for them to take decisions which do not coincide with the views of many of the staff who have been consulted.

THE SYSTEM OF CONSULTATION IN OPERATION

Category B

10 (i) Distribution

Policies and proposals on which staff are to be consulted will be issued as draft discussion papers through Regional Directors together with a distribution list.
Monitoring

Regional Directors will be responsible for monitoring both the system of briefing and the system of consulting at regular intervals.

13 The Briefing and Consulting Processes are to be introduced and practised as soon as possible in accordance with the instructions and expectations set out in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this circular. Unresolved concerns of staff and any questions of elaboration should be communicated to Regional Directors within 6 weeks.

J W Grant
Director-General
### Appendix X - Summary of Research Activities: Napier District Office

**NAPIER DISTRICT OFFICE**  
**COMMUNITY SERVICES TEAM**

**MONDAY 10 October 1988**

- **8.30 - 9.45**  
  Meeting with Community Development Team Members regarding planning the week's programme

- **9:45 - 10:30**  
  Informal discussion with community worker from Napier City Council about Napier Cadet Programme

- **10:30 - 11:30**  
  Informal interview with Executive Officer, Napier DEC

- **11:45 - 12:15**  
  Discussion with Community Development Senior Social Worker regarding history of team and community development in Napier District Office

- **1:00 - 2:30**  
  Accompany Budget Liaison Officer who was setting up a community display and booth on consumer credit information

- **3:00 - 3:30**  
  Discussion with District Director about the research project and its possible implications

- **3:30 - 5:30**  
  Formal interview with Assistant Director: Social Services

**Evening Write up**

**TUESDAY 11 October 1988**

- **9:00 - 12:00**  
  Staff Meeting and special meeting as follow up to the Assistant Director's Conference and the implications of the working paper entitled "Future Directions for Social Work" (DSW, 1988c)

- **12:00 - 1:00**  
  Informal lunch discussion with Assistant Director: Social Work

- **1:00 - 2:00**  
  Informal discussion with Intake Team supervisor regarding proposed Children and Young Person's Act

- **2:30 - 3:30**  
  Formal Interview with Social Worker on Community Development Team

- **3:30 - 5:30**  
  On-site visit with social worker to Women's Health Centre and meeting with Pakeha and Maori coordinators

**Evening Write Up and review memos and documentation**
Wednesday 12 October 1988

8:30 - 9:00  On-site visit to Contact Centre for the unemployed
9:00 - 2:30  Petane Marae for a hut regarding the Joint Marae Enterprises project with 65 trainees and their 8 programme tutors
2:30 - 3:30  Return to Contact Centre to meet with work coordinator, two youths on Napier Cadet Programme, the Men Against Violence Coordinator and volunteers regarding the Centre and its functions
4:00 - 5:30  Corollary formal interview with Acting Senior Social Worker for Child Abuse Team

Evening  Write Up

Thursday 13 October 1988

9:00 - 10:30  Accompany Maatua Whangai Mokai to hui with kaumatua of the Maraenui suburban development from several tribes
10:30 - 12:00  Formal interview with Senior Social Worker, Community Development Team
1:00 - 2:30  Formal interview with Senior Social Worker, Alternative Care
3:00 - 4:15  Formal interview with Maatua Whangai Mokai

Evening  Write Up and review District documentation on Maatua Whangai

Friday 14 October 1988

8:30 - 10:00  Attended the District Management Team
10:30 - 11:30  Formal interview with Budget Liason Worker
11:00 - 12:00  Informal discussion with staff members
1:00 - 3:00  Write Up and review notes
Appendix XI - List of Client Groups and Organisations
Served by Napier Community
Development Team.

COMMUNITY SERVICES TEAM

LIST OF CLIENT GROUPS/ORGANISATIONS AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM

RELATIONSHIP IS DEFINED BY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:

1. TRUSTEE - having a legal and management responsibility for a group.
2. ADVISOR - includes coach, supervisor, educator, specialist input, etc.
3. LIAISON PERSON - a facilitatory role as the main contact person within the department for a group, often for a specific reason.
4. COMMITTEE MEMBER - a developmental/supportive role.

A team member may have more than one relationship with any given group/organisation. The category serves to indicate the type of input a team member has.

A * indicates that another team, or indeed, staff member, also has a role to play in the group indicated - for example, two liaison people but for different reasons.

All team members act as supportive visitors to those groups/organisations listed and a growing number of unlisted 'others' with whom the contact is irregular, one-off or more casual.

* * * * *

John Dawson
Tuterangi Apatu
Christine Hemopo
Jeannette Troon
Ian Jennings
Elaine Crichton
Jill Robinson

Senior Social Worker
Employment Related Social Worker
Maatua Whangai Worker
Community Worker
Budget Liaison Worker
Social Welfare Budget Advisory Service Co-ordinator
Social Welfare Volunteers' Co-ordinator
## SUPERVISOR - COMMUNITY TEAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF GROUP/ORGANISATION</th>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>VISITING STD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alzheimers Support Group (ADARDS) +</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Annual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arohanui * Child Care Subsidies</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>On demand</td>
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<td>Arthritis Foundation</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Annual</td>
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<td>Barnardo's - Child Care Subsidies</td>
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<td>On demand</td>
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<td>Birthright Inc</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centrecare</td>
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<td>On demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Earth Gardens</td>
<td>Trustee and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilepsy Society</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Annual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding Liaison Group</td>
<td>Committee Member, Advisor and Liaison Person</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good Samaritan Trust</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Camps Committee</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>HB Community Enterprises</td>
<td>Trustee and Advisor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hohepa Homes Trust</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHC</td>
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<td>Annual</td>
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<td>Men Against Violence</td>
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<td>Annual</td>
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<td>Multiple Sclerosis Society</td>
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<td>Annual</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ Association of Deaf</td>
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<td>NZ Crippled Children's Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Napier City Council Community Grants Com</td>
<td>Committee Member and Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Support Group</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re Hao Ora (YFC)</td>
<td>Committee Member and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taihau Education Project Inc</td>
<td>Trustee and Advisor and Liaison Person</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
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Refer also to John Dawson for details on decentralised community services programmes and other funding related matters.

Relationship exists mainly because of annual funding applications and reviews.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>VISITING STD</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arapaepae Centre</td>
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<td>Contact Centre for Unemployed</td>
<td>Trustee, Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
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<td>Hayseed Trust*</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hokio</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>As required</td>
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<td>Jay Em Trust</td>
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<td>Joint Marae Enterprises *</td>
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<td>Kneecap Trust</td>
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<td>Kohitere</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
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<td>Napier Cadets' Scheme</td>
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<td>Prisons</td>
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<td>Rununga Nui *</td>
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<td>Taiwhenua *</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
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<td>Te Kohunga Reo Trust Training Branch</td>
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<td>Te Haroto Training Scheme</td>
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<td>Te Poho Training Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA * Training Scheme</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
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<tr>
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<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
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<td>HB Association of Therapeutic and Community Houses (HBATCH)</td>
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<td>HB Comm Council for Substance Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>'Ka Hao Te Rangitahi *</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier Community Workers' Collective</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier Council of Social Services</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>2 monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier Pilot City Trust *</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parentline HB</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond Fellowship</td>
<td>Committee Member, Advisor and Liaison Person</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Aporo Nui</td>
<td>Trustee, Advisor, Liaison Person and Steering Comm Member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Community Workers</td>
<td>Committee member and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women's Activities Centre/Woman Web</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>2 monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Health Collective</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Refuge (Napier)</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMCA * Board</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Committee</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu Tangata Programme</td>
<td>Committee Member and Advisor</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME OF GROUP/ORGANISATION</td>
<td>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td>VISITING STD</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitoa Budget Advisory Service</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier Family Centre BAS</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Education Team</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier DSW BAS +</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings BAS +</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHB/Waipukurau BAS</td>
<td>Liaison Person/Advisor</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napir Combined Services Training Gps</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>2 monthly</td>
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**Other Napier Involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen's Advice Bureau *</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayseed Trust *</td>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB Housing Group</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assists Elaine Crichton, Social Welfare Budget Advisory Service Co-ordinator Worker & ordination of this group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF GROUP/ORGANISATION</th>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>VISITING STD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglican Maori Mission</td>
<td>Committee Member and Liaison Person</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Organisations Grants Committee</td>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Corporation</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka Hao Te Rangitahi *</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaumatua Roopu</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori Affairs</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mw Volunteers - Individual</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maatua Whangai Rununga (Board)</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>2 monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maatua Whangai Volunteers Group</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maraenui Trust</td>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maraenui Co-ordinating Group</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parentline</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roopu-a-Iwi</td>
<td>Committee member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runungu Nui</td>
<td>Liaison Person</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Attendance Meeting</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwhenu</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
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</table>

S0007
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF GROUP/ORGANISATION</th>
<th>TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>VISITING STD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Education Team</td>
<td>Committee Member/Advisor</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services Budgeting Intake Person</td>
<td>Liaison Person and Advisor</td>
<td>On demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor of Volunteer Team</td>
<td>Advisor and Liaison Person</td>
<td>On demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Budgetor</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor Combined Services Training Group</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>2 monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0007
NAME OF GROUP/ORGANISATION | TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP | VISITING STD
--- | --- | ---
Age Concern | Liaison Person | 2 monthly
Case Work Teams (4) | Liaison Person | Monthly
Case Workers (as appropriate) | Liaison Person | Weekly
Faraday House | Liaison Person | Monthly
Volunteer Meetings (3 teams) | Liaison Person and Advisor | Monthly
Volunteers - Personal visits in home | Liaison Person and Advisor | Annual
Volunteer Training - whole group | Liaison Person and Advisor | Monthly
DISTRICT MANAGEMENT TEAM STANDARDS

The aim of the District Management Team will be to manage the district of Napier in a way that provides for participation by all members of the Team on an equal basis, with the proviso that the Director retains the right to make decisions when deadlock or indecision prevails.

The District Management Team's structure will facilitate monitoring and co-ordination of services without the need for direct involvement in day to day operations.

Where possible, the method of decision making will be by consensus. Decisions taken will be promulgated as committee decisions, and are binding on all members.

The Team shall consist of the Director, Assistant Directors - Social Services, Benefits & Pensions and Corporate Services, 2 Whanau Group representatives, a PSA representative, and the Director's Secretary who will have the right to contribute where she feels it appropriate.

The Director's Secretary shall record the meeting.

The following guidelines are divided into two sections -

(a) standards pertaining to general management of the district; and
(b) standards pertaining to the conduct of the corporate meetings.

GENERAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

1. Matters of policy impacting upon all divisions shall be issued by the District Management Team.

2. For all Category A and B Briefing Circulars, the method of briefing shall be determined by the District Management Team.

3. The District Office Management Plan will be reviewed annually and published by 30 September.

4. The allocation or re-allocation of district resources shall be determined by the District Management Team.

5. Accommodation Briefs and final plans are to be ratified by the District Management Team.
6. The following annual programmes are to be approved by the District Management Team:

* Public Relations
* Furniture and Equipment
* Capital Works
* Vehicles
* Industrial Relations
* Priorities for Review of Salaries

7. Sharing and consultation on individual objectives.

8. The District Management Team will monitor resource utilisation, the performance of divisions, and internal control.

9. Members may refer any relevant item to the committee for decision or consultation.

CONDUCT OF MEETINGS

1. Weekly meetings will be held on Fridays from 8.30 a.m. to 10.00 a.m.

2. Agenda items, with attachments, are to be provided to the Director's Secretary no later than 12.00 noon on the Wednesday before the meeting. Agenda to be in the hands of members by 4.00 p.m. Wednesday.

3. By negotiation, essential 'Information Only' items can be dictated at the conclusion of the meeting with any supporting papers handed to the Director's Secretary at that time.

4. Items for consultation and decision making shall be supported by a background paper, clearly outlining the result required of the meeting, ie decision or type of consultation, and recommendations or possible options.

5. The name of the initiator should be shown on the Agenda with the reason for referral (outcome) clearly stated.

6. Members are to familiarise themselves with any background papers issued to facilitate an efficient decision making process, ie time should be spent debating not explaining an issue.

7. The following Agenda items shall be standard and start every meeting:

* Staff
* Matters From Previous Meeting or Action Sheet

8. Meetings will be conducted in the Executive Resource Room.

(a) Detailed or lengthy items shall be subject to a special meeting, the time, date and place to be negotiated at the weekly meeting.
(b) The duration of the meeting shall be 90 minutes (maximum) and decision making items will be dealt with first.
9. The person responsible for the particular topic dictates the conclusions for the minutes.

10. No other discussions shall commence until the previous item's notes have been dictated.

11. Clear dictation shall be given in a concise and informal manner which will be easily understood by all staff.

12. Where desirable, there is an opportunity for the group to audit/vet notes dictated.

13. Where tasks are allocated, they are to be recorded on the Action Sheet.

14. Minutes are to be typed, ready for distribution on the day of the meeting.

15. Copies of the minutes are to be sent to at least all supervisory staff.

16.6.88 :LD
Appendix XIII - Summary of Research Activities:
Porirua District Office.

**DAY ONE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>Negotiate week’s schedule with Senior Social Worker-105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>Formal Interview with Assistant Director: Social Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>Team Meeting regarding planning child abuse intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>Discussion of the research week with team</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>Lunch with team members, discuss foster care provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>Informal discussion with Maori Social Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>Formal Interview with Senior Social Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>Informal discussion with Pacific Island Social Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>Travel to the court with team social worker to register warrant with the court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>Informal interview with Senior Social Worker: Court Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Evening Write up</strong></td>
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**DAY TWO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>Informal interview with Senior Social Worker: Coast Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>Multi-disciplinary meeting in Family Home regarding children in care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>Informal discussion with team member re. outcome of warrant</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>Informal discussion with Youth Aid Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Allocation Meeting with Senior Social Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>Management Team Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Evening Write up</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DAY THREE
8.30 - 9.00  Review of embargoed Ailini Report
9.00 - 9.15  Informal discussion with Senior Social Worker re. child protection procedures
9.15 - 10.00 Home visit with team social worker and transfer of pre-schooler to community child care centre
10.30 - 12.00 Formal Interview with team member-1
12.00 - 1.00 Lunch with District Director
1.00 - 2.15 Formal Interview with team member-2
2.15 - 3.30 Team Meeting
3.30 - 4.00 Informal discussion with Pacific Island Senior Social Worker re District's Cultural Club
4.00 - 5.00 Review of district documentation

Evening  Write up

DAY FOUR
8.30 - 9.30 Informal discussion with Pacific Island Team member
9.30 - 11.30 Formal Interview with Senior Social Worker-l05
11.30 - 1.30 Informal discussion with District Director
1.30 - 2.30 Review of district documentation
2.30 - 4.00 Formal Interview with team member-3

Evening  Write up

DAY FIVE
9.30 - 9.30 Review of district documentation
9.30 - 11.00 Formal Interview with team member-4
11.00 - 12.00 Review of district documentation
1.00 - 2.30 Informal discussion with Senior Social Worker-l05
2.30 - 3.30 Informal discussion with team member
3.30 - 5.30 Write up
Appendix XIV - Sample Letter Confirming Feedback and Verification Session.

28 November 1988

Dear

I am writing to confirm the date of the feedback session on the preliminary impressions of my research. The purpose of the session will be both to provide you and your staff with my initial impressions closely following the data collections (since the final report will be much further down the track) and to obtain verification for those initial impressions. In qualitative research, and in particular in the use of the data collection procedures utilized, verification sessions are essential.

Because I was unable to reach you directly on the day I called, I discussed a tentative date with the team senior and would like to confirm the day as Monday the 12th of December at 9am. The session is planned to take about an hour to an hour and a half. I do not plan to discuss specific since by the time I will not have transcribed any tapes nor analysed the written material I collected. The discussion will be general and, hence, open to all of the staff.

I would like to take this opportunity to formally thank you and your staff for the cooperation and hospitality prior to and during the data collection exercise. That openness and willingness to participate was essential to the success of the field work.

A special thank you to your staff who took such care to provide me with a realistic and comprehensive view of their work in all its facets.

I look forward to meeting with you and your staff again.

Sincerely,

Angie Barretta-Herman
Outline of Feedback and Verification Sessions with REOs and Social Work Teams in December 1988

A. Basic Assumptions of the Research

- social work is an organizationally based profession
- organizational characteristics impact on practice
- social work practice theory focuses on the interaction between the individual and the environment, i.e., linking personal troubles and public issues

B. Three Major Changes

- decentralized regional structure with delegations to Districts
- social work now social services, implications of a shift in focus
- partnership with the community includes contracting out services, utilization of voluntary agencies, implementation of Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, affirmative action means more Maori and Polynesian staff, iwi development a goal for eventual iwi taking responsibility for their own'

C. Changes in Social Work Practice

- two tier approach with the state providing the framework for service provision
- emphasis on statutory social work tasks of child abuse and youth offending
- separation of community development and community work activities from social work responsibility for eventual move to non-statutory agencies and groups
- support, real and illusionary for involving the community and the whanau in decision-making: who is the client? who
decides? who is ultimately responsible?
- more Maori and Pacific Island people in social work positions with limited formal training and support, and in some cases limited commitment to traditional social work tasks
- emphasis on the whanau, not the individual
- partnership with community groups and voluntary agencies which means utilizing the resources of non-statutory groups first raising the question of: is the state the agency of last resort?
Appendix XVI - Excerpts from 'Future Directions in Social Work.'

DISCUSSION PAPERS

CONTENTS:

1. Future Directions - Overview papers
2. Appendices:
   A. Draft Statement of Principles
   B. Additional Notes:
      * Puao-te-Ata-tu
      * Direct and indirect services
      * Roles and tasks
      * Practice standards
      * Workload management and resource allocation
      * Training directions
   C. A Framework for Practice Standards
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SOCIAL WORK

INTRODUCTION

1. Social work in the department is in a time of change and new directions. This is an overview paper to identify policy issues to do with support for frontline staff, and to outline a process for action.

2. First it is important to affirm the dedication to the point of burn-out of social workers whose role is to intervene in situations that society would like to ignore. This work is done under the pressure of the seriousness and complexity of the new cases continually presenting at the door. The countless times when long hard hours go into preventing tragedy are seldom recognised. It is the occasions when systems and practice break down which hit the headlines.

3. Secondly is the fact that the practice of social work is undergoing a radical change. Acceptance of the principles of Puao-te-Ata-tu implies that every familiar role and activity needs to be re-examined in the light of a partnership of decision-making and resource sharing with the community and in particular with Maori whanau, hapu and iwi.

4. Thirdly, the department must acknowledge that the task of fixing perceived shortcomings in social work is a dual responsibility. Social workers strive for excellence in their practice but they depend on managers to provide adequate supervision, training and resource allocation.

THE CYCLE OF POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE

5. Social work practice can be effective only when it is supported by good management and informed by clear policy. Good policy arises from a sensitive practice response to client needs.
6. Restructuring and the challenge of new directions has meant that there has been a lack of policy statements for social work on:

(a) The implications of Puao-te-Ata-tu;
(b) goals and values for bicultural social work services;
(c) priorities for service delivery;
(d) knowledge and skills requirements;
(e) training;
(f) roles and tasks; and
(g) workload management and resource allocation.

7. A lack of policy direction has had consequences for all levels of social work. For social work practitioners these deficiencies have led to a high turnover of staff in both frontline and senior positions, workload stress, new and inexperienced staff having to cope with crisis situations, uncertainty about what is expected of them and feelings of being unsupported and unsure about the future.

8. Social work managers have had little guidance on how to meet new expectations placed on them. These expectations include developing partnership models with the community; new approaches to staff recruitment; balancing the needs for professional and cultural skills; deciding priorities for resource allocation; and clarifying the respective roles of social work managers and supervisors.

9. District directors faced with bulk allocations and the prospect of zero-based budgeting recognise that the trend to devolution may have an impact on planning social work resources. They also recognise their responsibility to provide skilled bicultural social work services and to support their managers with adequate resources for social work supervision and training. These tasks are compounded because at this point in the department's development it is impossible to foresee what the future shape of social work will be.

10. We need to establish a set of goals and values for bicultural social work services and then use the experience of frontline social work staff as the basis for practice-based policies.

11. The outcome will be a set of policy guidelines to clarify the mutual expectations which social workers and the department have of each other. These will also provide tools for management planning and will assist decisions about service priorities and equitable resource allocation for district and regional planning.

THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE

12. Positive things are happening. Many districts have already accepted the challenge of developing bicultural social work services. This includes new practice models, the establishment of Maori and Pacific Island social work teams, the involvement of local iwi in the recruitment and selection of social work staff, and the development of strong links with the Maori community through the Maatua Whangai programme.
13. The Maori, Pacific Island and Community Services Directorate in Head Office is preparing a position paper on bicultural services and for developing partnership with iwi.

14. The Residential Services Management Plan has provided the opportunity to develop planning to move resources and responsibility to a community base.

15. Head Office restructuring targeted to client groups will provide goals for specific programme outcomes and encourage further initiatives to develop preventive community-based services.

16. Once the new C & Y P Bill is finalised and enacted there will be clear models and procedures for work in areas of child protection and youth offending.

17. Numbers of children in care are reducing. This reflects increased and intense work to achieve goals of supporting children in their families in spite of the fact that child abuse referrals are increasing.

18. Decentralisation and the process of placing accountability for services at district level invite social workers to take a more proactive role in client advocacy. These include supporting work with iwi structures and re-examining direct services to determine when preventive community based services would better meet client needs.

CONSULTATION FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS

19. As part of this change there are generic issues for social work as a service. The fundamental issue is that the department must develop truly bicultural social work services. Our services must be examined to give answers to the question:

What are the practical implications of Puao-te-Aata-tu for providing appropriate social work services?

20. Developing policy for the future will mean finding answers to some other hard questions:

What is the best mix of indirect and direct social services?

What tasks require a social worker to do them?

What skills and training will social workers need for the future?

What standards are required for culturally sensitive, effective and ethical social work practice both within the department and in contracted organisations?
21. During 1988/89 the Principal Social Worker will consult with social work staff and prepare a Social Work Policy Development Plan. The aims of this process are to provide:

(a) policies that support frontline staff;
(b) tools for planning for social work managers; and
(c) a basis for social work input to next year's Corporate Management Plan.

22. The consultation will include:

(a) Goals and values for a bilingual social work service;
(b) general guidelines for service priorities;
(c) standards for knowledge, skills and practice;
(d) definitions of roles and tasks;
(e) training directions; and
(f) workload management and resource allocation.

23. The outcome of the consultation will be guidelines which will be specific about expectations and will help inform managers in their planning.

24. Appendices to this paper give some starting points for consultation. They are intended as discussion drafts only and you are invited to scribble constructively all over them and pass on your thoughts to your A.D. They are:

(a) Draft statement of goals and values;
(b) additional notes on future directions; and
(c) a framework for the development of practice standards.

25. Stages in the consultation process will include a national workshop for A.D.'s, Principals and interested parties from Head and Regional Offices in August to ensure national co-ordination, and set specific goals and time-frames. We will need practitioner working groups to develop the more detailed papers.

26. The Principal Social Worker team will take an active leadership role and will consult social work staff in every office and institution during July through October.

27. The development of policy papers will be overseen by a small steering committee chaired by the Principal Social Worker and including representative staff from local and regional levels, Head Office Units and the PSA. This process will include co-ordination with programme goals of the Programmes and Services Directorates and integration of social work development into the department's corporate management planning.

28. The development of policy papers will be overseen by a small steering committee chaired by the Principal Social Worker and including representative staff from local and regional levels, Head Office Units and the PSA. This process will include co-ordination with programme goals of the Programmes and Services Directorates and integration of social work development into the department's corporate management planning.
CONCLUSION

29. The department's social workers have always been in the forefront of change and have a long tradition of advocacy for their clients. The department's new directions provide a renewed opportunity to shape policies that will help frontline staff achieve the best interests of clients and develop new structures and processes. Your input to this debate and planning will be crucial for determining the social work roles and tasks for the future.

Beverley Keall
Principal Social Worker
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