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Globalisation and the Spread of Terrorism in
Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa: causes and
consequences

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Synopsis

The problems of Africa have for so long seemingly been ignored or played down. Poverty, political corruption and the adverse effects of globalisation have taken their toll. This can lead people to a feeling of desperation which leads to a willingness to do anything to escape their fate. A surplus in failed states means an increase in terrorism, transnational crime, and piracy. This work explores the preconditions of terrorism to flourish, and the conditions that are prevalent in regions of Africa.



Figure 1: Showing the Boko Haram bombing in Nigeria, downloaded from <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/category/terrorism-2/> on the 16 February 2012

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Introduction

Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa have been plagued for decades by terrorism which has roots in the region due to mass poverty and underdevelopment. The region has been under the yolk of restrictive political regimes for many years. The governments have not only been repressive but also corrupt. Surprisingly, these governments have tended to have sound relationships with the West due to their strategic value and in particular because of the region's current or potential oil wealth. Unfortunately, significant amounts of each country's wealth have been funnelled to fanatical groups. These groups are only interested in the continuing their religious fanaticism.

The preconditions for terrorism to exist are explored in this work to begin with, first this thesis defines terrorism and explores why people turn to terrorism. Then there is a chapter on Al Qaeda including their aims and goals and their influence in Northern Africa and their spreading influence to the Sub-Saharan region. Thirdly, there is a chapter on the underlying causes for many of the grievances that populations feel namely: issues from previous colonization, the problems caused by globalization and poverty. This thesis goes into current territory when addressing the rising ideals brought by the Arab Spring. Case studies that illustrate the circumstances in which terrorism emerges as a threat across the region are next.

First, the three countries of Northern Africa in which during the Arab Spring resulted in regime change. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Ben Ali of Tunisia did not actually realise that their populations did not care about their relationship with the West. The people cared about rising food prices, high unemployment, and low standards of living that seemed to be dropping further even though the countries are inherently and obviously resource-rich. This was evident across the countries examined in the subsequent chapters. Tunisia, for example, had a benefit of foreign investment in the country but this investment created unequal areas of development which

was disproportional to southern and central regions which still suffered massive unemployment.

This work then explores countries in North-Western Africa, including Morocco, which is very different as it relies heavily on its trade relationship with the European Union. On the other hand, Algeria has suffered more from the adverse effects of colonialism from France but now is a base for the Al Qaeda franchise called Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb.

The thesis then explores countries in Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia with its lawlessness, piracy and collapse of government. Its neighbour, Kenya, has recently also been the target of Al Shabab, the terrorist organisation located within Somalia that has links to Al Qaeda. The examination includes Yemen in the Middle East, which is home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; while not part of Africa, it is relevant to this study due to its proximity to the Gulf of Aden and its close proximity to Somalia.

Then the thesis shifts to the central Sub-Saharan region with the Sudan who has suffered years of civil war but clings to the ideal of sharia law. Sudan still has disruption within the Darfur province and other provinces loyal to the newest nation, Southern Sudan. After the Sudanese civil war Southern Sudan was created. Further to the central south-west, Nigeria has had the most recent examples of violence and terrorism occur in their nation, as the terrorist group Boko Haram seeks to have strict sharia law across the entire country including the predominantly Christian areas.

This thesis determines the preconditions for terrorism to thrive, and the threat that is emerging from Al Qaeda and other fanatical aligned groups. The case studies also show the spread of poverty and the resulting grievances making terrorism a viable option. It is important that Western nations have a developed knowledge of the increasing problems facing African nations in transnational terrorism and criminal activities.

Chapter 1

Terrorism

A definition of a terrorist is that "the terrorist is fundamentally an *altruist*: he believes that he is serving a 'good' cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency- whether real or imagined- which the terrorist or organization purport to represent".¹ Violence can occur without terrorism yet terrorism cannot occur without violence or the threat and fear of violence. The terrorism needs certain preconditions in order to survive. These conditions are the political suppression of people within a society: underdevelopment, poverty and poor effects of globalisation which can lead to people wanting a new way of life; weak governments which are powerless to stop terrorism thriving; and inherently corrupt governments where large amounts of money can be funnelled away from the populace. This vicious cycle of poverty and desperation leads to the preconditions for violence to erupt: grievances, deprivations, and rank, class and society changes in expectations. The combination of poor governance, ethnic separatism and/or a tradition of criminal activity result in a situation that is most likely to support crime or terror activities.² It is evident that "crime and terror connections are more likely to occur in areas of the world where the state has the least presence and means of control – that is, areas with large shadow economies".³

Governments are institutions and where they are ineffective most people do not actually react to this ineffectiveness.⁴ In order for terrorism to flourish there

¹ David J. Whittaker, ed. *The Terrorism Reader*, Third ed. (London Routledge, 2007), 9.

² Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, "Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism," *Trends in Organized Crime* 9, no. No 2 (2005): 53.

³ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴ Christine Sixta Rinehart, "Volatile Breeding Grounds: The Radicalization of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 11 (2009): 956.

must be more reasons than simple lack of effective government. There are preconditions for terrorism to exist which are: modernisation, urbanisation and a weaker government which lacks the ability to fight or prevent terrorism.⁵ Prevailing factors within a society must exist in order for terrorism and violence to flourish. Those factors are the sense of grievance, depravation, rank disequilibrium, and changes in attainments or expectations being beyond the control or acceptability of the people.⁶ The Arab Spring movement which will be discussed in this thesis is an example of violence beginning with a grievance. Grievances can come from a small group of people who lack an opportunity for political participation.⁷ Terrorism is often used by a movement in order to protest while the movement is still unknown or little known to the public at large; terrorism can bring the grievance or social movement to the public eye.⁸

Conflict can be caused by ethnic differences but sometimes there is an underlying cause that can be attributed to another reason for the ethnic division.⁹ An African example is Rwanda where colonialism socially divided the Hutu and Tutsi tribes with merely the introduction of identity cards by the Belgian colonists. Before the 1920s and the introduction of identity cards, movement between the tribes was fluid as most cattle owners were Tutsi and most farmers were Hutu.¹⁰ A person could move from one tribe into another as he became more prosperous and bought cattle instead of raising it. Once colonialism interfered with the previously natural order, the situation deteriorated and developed into a cultural grievance. The introduction of identity cards meant that you could not change your tribe. However there were also other reasons for the conflict which eventually occurred, including the economic over-production of a single commodity, coffee. The country also has a crippling national debt in order to pay back to the World Bank and International

⁵ Ibid., 957.

⁶ Ibid., 955.

⁷ Ibid., 957.

⁸ Ibid., 955.

⁹ Ibid., 956.

¹⁰ K. R. White, "Scourge of racism: Genocide in Rwanda," *Journal of Black Studies* 39, no. 3 (2009): 473.

Monetary Fund loans. Political corruption and mismanagement of resources added to the population's grievances.

Terrorism also requires a specific personality type to emerge as an effective leader. Often moderates in a social movement are expelled by others within the movement who have the required personality, including a tendency towards extremism; and when extremists take over; social movements can become terrorist organisations.¹¹ Terrorists are people who seek excitement and stimulation and they are aggressive, action-orientated and are narcissistic with borderline personalities.¹² They often come from broken homes and have hostile relationships with their fathers, and juvenile criminal records. Often terrorists have failed in their educational, vocational and personal lives.¹³ One other personality trait that sets them apart is that they seek fame and notoriety, both for their cause and for themselves through the brutal actions that they have taken.¹⁴ Terrorists often do not see themselves as terrorists but actually harbour a romantic notion of freedom fighters.

A successful terrorist group will be led by a charismatic leader who must constantly be able to maintain his control often by using six different strategies: "1. Shifting doctrines and policies, 2. Escalating demands for service and recruitment from followers, 3. Playing on a group's fears or persecuting by creating new and more powerful enemies, 4. Dissent may be quieted through the public ridicule of rising leaders within the group, 5. Testing loyalty by separating members from each other, 6. Changing the physical environment of the group".¹⁵ Terrorism can be categorised into eight causes: psychological, millenarian, religious and or cultural, ideological, social, economic, political, strategic and instrumental.¹⁶

¹¹ Rinehart, "Volatile Breeding Grounds: The Radicalization of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," 957.

¹² *Ibid.*, 958.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 959.

¹⁶ Katerina Dalacoura, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31.

1. Psychological: a consequence of a disturbed personality
2. Millenarian: a consequence of an apocalyptic worldview
3. Religious and cultural: a specific worldview
4. Ideological: a set of ideas for reforming society
5. Social: an outcome of marginalisation and alienation
6. Economic: an outcome of economic deprivation leading to a feeling of desperation and ultimately poverty
7. Political: an outcome of political exclusion and repression
8. Strategic and instrumental: an outcome of personal calculation that this is the only way to achieve their goals¹⁷




Figure 2: Map of the Northern African region. Downloaded from <http://www.freeworldacademy.com/globalleader/great.htm> on 15 January 2012. Note that this map does not show the newest nation called Southern Sudan which gained independence from Sudan in July 2011.

Northern Africa (see Figure 2) is one area where the strategic, cultural and economic conditions are 'right' for the emergence of a terrorist threat. The region is strategically important as it borders the Gulf of Aden with the Strait of Hormuz, the most important shipping lane in the world. The Gulf is where the majority of the world's oil supply is shipped through. The countries that border this area are actually some of the most volatile in the world. The areas of

¹⁷ Ibid.

particular interest in North Africa are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, with and added element from the Middle East, Yemen; and in Sub-Saharan Africa are Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Southern Sudan and Nigeria. It is impossible to discuss about the problems of this region without digging deeper into the Sub-Saharan region of Africa and the associated shipping areas with the Gulf, Yemen and Somalia, particularly when it comes to piracy.

The governments of developing African nations and their politicians are commonly thought of as corrupt. Citizens cannot have the faith that their government will act swiftly and fairly if the government itself is thought to be inherently corrupt; citizens must be able to trust their own government. The effects of tribalism on countries in North Africa and parts of the Sub-Saharan Africa are interestingly diverse as some tribes support the governments and some choose to actively defy them. The tribes will often have links to terrorist organizations including with groups like Al Qaeda.

The United States is seen as the hegemony for the Middle East and North Africa region; its influence has been vast and unfortunately often it has supported oppressive regimes in order to achieve its goals. The goals of the United States are to protect America from terrorist elements like Al Qaeda but also to achieve simple goals like an American military base placed strategically in the area or gaining a valuable resource trading partner to secure commodities such as oil. The election of US President Barack Obama brought "hope in abundance to the wider Middle East. He has promised 'tough and principled diplomacy' in place of the bungling and bad faith that marked George W. Bush's catastrophic eight years of misadventure in the region".¹⁸ There was a significant amount of international goodwill that the Bush administration had eroded.

President Obama felt that America had lost its way in its dealings with the Middle East and Africa. After the terrorists' attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States traced the terrorists back to training camps in Afghanistan. The

¹⁸ David. Gardner, *Last Chance: The Middle East in the Balance* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), xiii.

Taliban regime was soon driven into the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, but the Americans then shifted their focus away from Afghanistan and began to focus on Iraq. The Bush Administration seemed to have taken a detour in pursuit of Al Qaeda and had fixated an obsession upon Saddam Hussein and the regime he ruled in Iraq. This signalled a change to the region, for "President Bush declared them part of the 'Axis of Evil' which became a central feature in the war on terrorism, and introduced a policy of pre-emption".¹⁹ Iraq became the central focus of the Bush Administration's foreign policy: "it cannot be denied that over the issue of Iraq... world politics witnessed the opening moves towards the possible creation of an anti-American, which is to say an anti-hegemonic, coalition".²⁰

President Obama has since withdrawn combat troops from Iraq in order to concentrate on the mission in Afghanistan. Developments include the deployment of unmanned but armed drones to strike at suspected terror leaders in Pakistan airspace and also in countries with a large Al Qaeda presence such as Yemen. The new direction of the United States had one long term benefit when it managed to follow one of the personal couriers of Osama bin Laden back to his base of operations. The operation and the death of Osama bin Laden did not completely destroy the organisation but it and the unmanned drone attacks have taken their toll.

For decades the US Department of Defense has split the designation of the African continent into three separate strategic regions: Europe, Middle East and Asia. This reflects the main deployment of the American overseas-based forces, and sets areas of responsibility for those forces. As a result, in strategic planning documentation, the Americans have tended to never look at Africa as one continent or one defined strategic area. However the Obama Administration and the Department of Defense then began to open an African Strategic Command Centre. For all its faults, America appears to provide the

¹⁹ Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 150.

²⁰ Colin S Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*. (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 88.

best chance for the stability of the region for “if Americans should decline the honour and responsibility of protecting world order, there is no one, and nothing, else capable of attempting the mission, at least not for many decades to come”.²¹ For decades the American foreign policymakers have tried to make their reasons for doing things to be moralistically correct but there is nothing wrong with a President being honest with his citizens that “the United States is serving its own national interest. This is nothing to be ashamed of; indeed, it could not be concealed even if desired. Critics of American statecraft often seem to inhabit a fictitious world wherein foreign policy is, or should be, a form of missionary activity, undertaken simply because it is virtuous”.²² While the European Union is also committing military aid and assistance to Africa, the simple fact is that America remains the only country with the apparent will, the money and the influence to be the world's policeman. After the terror attacks of September 11, “it was prudent for the country to adopt a strategy that was distinctly proactive”.²³

Africa by the very nature of its rich resource area should be inherently wealthy, however Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa are not, and poverty is of epic proportions. These countries have suffered from years of political subversion and corruption where the resources of the nations are funnelled away from the populace into the hands of a few families. For decades the plight of Sub-Saharan Africa has gone under reported and their poverty has grown. The nature of the global market was a bold concept which was thought to readdress forms of inequality. It has failed to address any the fundamental changes in political corruption and it has failed workers as local labour and safety laws are insufficient to provide any protection. People have had major grievances and a few individuals have turned to violence to bring their grievance in to the public eye.

²¹ Ibid., 153.

²² Ibid., 61.

²³ Ibid., 84.

Populations in this region of the world have a large sense of injustice. They see the West as supporting their oppressive governments. These countries should be inherently rich due to their natural resources but due to their governments ignoring white collar crime and the diversification of crops, the countries' economies have suffered. The populations have a great number of grievances and the people become susceptible to leaders who have another agenda. This thesis demonstrates that these conditions have given rise to a credible terrorist threat across Central and Northern Africa, and that inaction by Western nations has contributed to the extending of that threat.

Chapter 2

Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda has been active in northern Africa for some years and it has spread its franchise to adjacent areas including Algeria and Mali, where the franchise is called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In Yemen, another franchise, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula operates, while in southern Somalia and the border region with Kenya and Uganda a further franchise, Al Shabab operates. Al Qaeda is a non-hierarchical adaptive movement that was started in Afghanistan and which is motivated by ultimate goals. This focus on ultimate goals influences both the strategy and the structure of Al Qaeda across the region. In this chapter, recent developments are assessed to explain the evolution of Al Qaeda doctrine and operations and the threat to regional security.

The goal of Al Qaeda during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was to remove the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was at that time funded by the United States government and received Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training. In retrospect, this turned out to be an error on the part of the United States as the planners of the operation did not truly understand that Al Qaeda actually wanted all foreigners and non-believers out of traditionally Muslim lands. At the present time, the first and foremost goal is to remove what Al Qaeda believes is an evil influence on the areas of the world where the largest numbers of Muslims live including southern Asia, the Middle East and northern Africa. The organisation considers the epitome of the evil influence to be America, which is regarded as a threat to the Muslim way of life. In addition, Al Qaeda considers the Americans to be funding and supporting corrupt monarchies and hierarchical governments of the Middle East and North Africa, and the ultimate goal therefore is to remove the United States as the central

ally of these countries. Al Qaeda also intends for the hierarchal governments and monarchies of these nations to be overthrown so that these states would return to Islamic rule similar to the former rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan based on strict sharia law.

There is a strong argument that Al Qaeda would not be likely to achieve its end goal even if the United States left the region. They would never be truly satisfied, as "war is a violent conflict between adversaries trying to impose their will on each other".¹ Unfortunately for Al Qaeda, the group's attempt to impose its will has not always been successful; an example of this has been the support of the Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a franchise that in Iraq in particular became extremely unpopular. Al Qaeda is not likely to ever achieve its aim due to the rivalry and deeply distinctive history of bloodshed between the Shi'ites and the Sunni Muslims there. This is a detail that Al Qaeda has appeared to ignore but once America was removed from the equation this detail would then undermine the efforts of Al Qaeda, at the cost of considerable instability in the region. Each nation in the Muslim world has major leanings to one side or the other in this debate and even Al Qaeda itself is a Sunni Muslim organization. The emphasis of the organization is on extremism, as "leaders of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups wanted to overthrow the Afghan government and replace it with one grounded in an extremist interpretation to Sunni Islam".² Al Qaeda had a different view from its ally, the Taliban, as it was "motivated by a similar extremist Sunni ideology, though they had more grandiose visions of spreading it to the Middle East"³.

Al Qaeda based its ideology on beliefs evident during the Ottoman Empire in which one of its rulers declared that "without an army there is no power, without revenue there is no army, without productive subjects there is no

¹ Demetrios J. Nicholson, "Seeing the other side of the hill: The art of battle command, decisionmaking, uncertainty, and the information superiority complex," *Military Review* Nov-Dec(2005): 61.

² Seth Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 9.

³ *Ibid.*, 28.

revenue, and without justice there are no productive subjects".⁴ Al Qaeda has taken this ideology to heart as its founder and long-time leader, Osama bin Laden, came from Saudi Arabia, a theocratic monarchy where until 1992 there was no formal constitution apart from reliance on the Quran and the Sharia, or the Islamic Code.⁵ Al Qaeda established a long-term strategic plan through to the year 2020, which included wanting to secure the wellbeing and faithfulness of the devoted which he called the *umma*. To members of Al Qaeda, all the populations of the former Ottoman Empire and the Islamic converts in south-east Asia are a part of the *umma* and, "the global community of Muslims, is of symbolic importance to Al Qaeda's case for war"⁶.

Al Qaeda's full name is *Al Qaeda al Askariya*, or the military base.⁷ The group's leaders intend for the group to be the military base for the transformation of the Islamic world into their vision of a new strict Sharia law-based society. The intent has been to have a strategic base in Iraq. The first stage of their plan for this began back in as early as 1998 when a plan was made to entice the United States to invade the Islamic lands.⁸ It was well known that Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, was still viewed as a potential enemy. Then in the second stage Al Qaeda wanted to awaken the *umma* to the invasion of the sacred lands and to enrage the Islamic populace into a crusade escalating into a bloody insurgency.⁹

The insurgency planned or envisaged by Al Qaeda did happen in Iraq after the American-led invasion of 2003, but it was not the result that Al Qaeda intended. The group known as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia became hated amongst the

⁴ Michael Gasper, "The Making of the Middle East," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 5.

⁵ Valentine M. Moghadam and Tabitha Decker, "Social Change in the Middle East," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 66.

⁶ Alia Brahim, "Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 2 (2010): 64.

⁷ Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, *Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 46.

⁸ Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of Al Qaeda* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 221.

⁹ Ibid.

main Iraqi population, which is divided along ethnic lines. Critically the Iraqi people preferred to not have Al Qaeda's foreign fighters in the country, due to their part in the insurgency led to the killing of many Iraqi civilians and also mass casualties within the large Shiia population. Al Qaeda's plan for a new base in Iraq therefore did not eventuate as the American military surge forced the security situation in Iraq to change. Also the Americans applied a new policy of working in co-operation with ethnic and local groups within Iraq including tribal leaders. The third stage then of Al Qaeda's plan was to enlarge the conflict and make America fight a prolonged war, which was the war then conducted in Afghanistan.¹⁰

The third stage of this plan involves both fighting in Afghanistan and also encouraging the Pakistani government to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda within its borders. The intention is to destabilise the region. The fourth stage is then for Al Qaeda to become a global franchise by converting those groups already set on the same ideological path to join with Al Qaeda but to have full autonomy over planning terror attacks and choice of targets.¹¹ The plan is already in the beginning stages of the fourth stage as the group encourages more and more groups from Muslim countries and also Muslims in Western nations to fight a terrorist action and to call for the spreading of Sharia Law. Within predominantly Muslim countries, this is mainly happening in Nigeria and the Sudan but also affecting Kenya. The fifth stage planned is then to see the United States and its allies stretched beyond the capability for war-fighting, and perhaps even bankrupting it which may in turn lead to the threatening of Israel as there would be no means of America providing practical support to Israel.¹² One of the Republican candidates for the 2012 US Presidential election, Ron Paul, actually called for America to stop all foreign aid including the yearly estimated three billion dollars that is provided to Israel. While it was never likely that he would win the Republican nomination, his message gained support

¹⁰ Ibid., 222.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

amongst struggling working class Americans who were hit hardest during the recent world economic crisis and recession.

Al Qaeda has been highly effective in spreading its message using modern media techniques and despite losses of numbers in the on-going operations against American and Coalition forces in Afghanistan the group has sustained operational capabilities. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda continues to spread its message through the internet, television and local mosques. The group has been uniquely able to spread its message through the openness of the internet and inspire those who see the message as their saviour especially in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa which for years have suffered corrupt governments and mass poverty. The idea of Sharia law appeals to the faithful and the downtrodden populace who have been suffering under government corruption for too long.

Al Qaeda has now spread its web across the world like a franchise. It has links with other dissent groups that share its ideals of strict Islamic law. It has links with groups in Africa such as Al Shabaab in Somalia and Asia with Jamal Islamiyah in Indonesia and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. It also has fund-raising capabilities in South America as many Muslims fled the conflict in Lebanon in the mid-1970s and settled in South America. Al Qaeda itself is centred in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area but has major recruitment areas and activities across the Middle East, Northern Africa, Asia and Europe. The group also has links with disenfranchised Muslim youths in parts of Europe and especially Turkey, Germany, Spain and the UK. Significant numbers of Muslim youths of these nations are disenfranchised as they and their parents fled to Western European countries in order to seek a better life for themselves and their families, although unfortunately many have not attained the desired better life. Often a lack of education and poor employment prospects mean they do not fare well in their new homelands and only gain minimum wage jobs.

Al Qaeda has endeavoured to exploit the ill-feeling of the Islamic youth in these countries. There are increasing numbers of Muslim youth potentially feeling alienated within their new countries such as Australia, Canada, and the USA as the populations of Arab countries have moved due to factors including political oppression, economic instability and war to become immigrants and refugees in non-Islamic countries. They often feel that they are not welcome. Al Qaeda has attempted to recruit "poor, unemployed, angry people. The number of former convicts or asylum seekers among recently recruited Islamic militants is striking".¹³ How one is perceived is an important factor but the social and economic conditions which create resentment are pre-conditions to radicalisation.¹⁴

In several countries in the region, there are an ever increasing large youth population – for example, half of all Pakistanis and Iranians are under 20 years old¹⁵ – with high unemployment, including amongst graduates, in countries with failing economies such as in Morocco and Indonesia.¹⁶ This creates an atmosphere where for "hundreds of millions of people in the Islamic world, housing and sanitation are grossly inadequate ... everywhere the gulf between rich and poor is increasing".¹⁷ These conditions create broad areas that radical groups can exploit. The vulnerable or easily led youths are "recruited and deployed usually on idealistic one-way missions to die as martyrs and to kill as many Americans as possible".¹⁸ There has also been a rise in home-grown terrorists: those individuals who are native-born and/or converted to Islam and have been radicalised. An example of this is Richard Reid, the 'shoe-bomber', who was a resident of the UK who attempted to blow up an airliner over the Atlantic.

¹³ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The Story of Radical Islam* (London: Penguin, 2007), 304.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 307.

¹⁸ Magnus Ranstorp, "Al-Qa'ida- An Expanded Global Network of Terror," *RUSI: Royal United Services Institute* 150, no. 3 (2005): 41.

The threat posed by Al Qaeda has not always been well understood. For example, in June 2005, British intelligence agencies made some disastrous errors in underestimating Al Qaeda's ability to attack within the UK and actually downgraded the threat level.¹⁹ The agencies assumed that even though suicide bombing had spread to South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and even to Spain, that such attacks would not become normal in Europe.²⁰ They viewed Al Qaeda as no longer seriously consequential.²¹ However, Al Qaeda was not only actively planning attacks, but planning, training for, and directing domestic terrorism.²² After the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the British intelligence agencies discovered that the suicide bombers had visited Pakistan, stayed with jihadist terrorists, trained at Al Qaeda camps in Pakistan's North-West Frontier province, and planned the attack prior to their return from Pakistan. All the cell members were in contact with extremists and terrorists in Pakistan and also radicals in Britain right up to and during the attack.²³ This trend was also observed in investigation of the 2006 plot by a group of eight British Muslims to bring down trans-Atlantic flights using liquid explosives "concocted from a mixture of hydrogen peroxide and other commercially available ingredients long favoured by Al Qaeda bombers, [which] would be dyed to look like the popular British energy drinks Lucozade and Oasis".²⁴ These are examples of not only the requirement for vigilance but of Al Qaeda's ability to adapt operations to different societies and to use a country's own disenfranchised population against that country and its people.

After the devastating floods of early 2010 in Pakistan, Al Qaeda wanted to discourage foreign aid and development as they see this as an alternative to their rule and also the group does not want legitimate opposition to their views: "foreign aid is to be discouraged because it can increase economic potential

¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman, "Radicalisation and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 12 (2009): 1101.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 1102.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 1105.

and help alleviate the major sources of internal discontent".²⁵ This is a common tactic of terrorist groups in North Africa as well; Al Shabab used this excuse in 2011 to deny access to the drought-stricken area of South and Central Somalia. The drought caused widespread starvation and a mass exodus of civilians to neighbouring Kenya.

Al Qaeda would seek to dictate how all terrorist events linked to its organisation take place but in truth it does not always have control over other, linked terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. There has been an ever growing dissatisfaction with Al Qaeda's operating model and the group's responsibility for a significant number of Muslim deaths in Islamic nations, which has resulted in a marked decline in its popularity and image throughout Muslim countries.²⁶ Muslims have seen how Al Qaeda was more interested in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan due to the fact this is where the American military and NATO forces are located. Al Qaeda was also more interested in Saudi Arabia and Egypt due to the fact that these are the homelands of its previous and current leaders, including bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri.²⁷ It appeared that Al Qaeda had was more highly influenced by personal hatred of the United States and personal connections with certain countries, and there was a perception that its doctrine was not to target those countries with oil wealth (unless occupied or influenced by the Americans) "as it represented great Islamic wealth, which would be needed for the soon to be established Islamic state".²⁸ During 2003 to 2007 there were at least three hundred and sixt-six recorded attacks on Iraqi oil pipelines, but rather than representing a sustained campaign against oil assets, this demonstrates how little Al Qaeda had control over its operatives in Iraq, as attacks against those oil assets appear not to have been sanctioned.²⁹

²⁵ Matthew Hunt, "Bleed to Bankruptcy: Economic targeting tactics in the global jihad," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 19, no. 1 (2007): 15.

²⁶ Barak Mendelsohn, "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem," *Survival* 51, no. 4 (2009): 71.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

²⁸ Hunt, "Bleed to Bankruptcy: Economic targeting tactics in the global jihad," 16.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

Al Qaeda's strategy to take over Iraq failed badly and went close to ruining the group's reputation in the Islamic world. The United States finally took notice of the tribal strategy that had worked so well in the past in the region in order to control the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. The Americans enlisted the help of the various Iraqi tribes. These had been used successfully before by the British in the 1920s when the country was occupied, and exploited for oil, and then again by Saddam Hussein to ensure the continuity of his rule.³⁰ The tribes in Iraq consist of "various smaller clans, in turn composed of extended families."³¹

Al Qaeda in Iraq called itself Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia with its brutal leader Zarqawi, who specifically targeted Shiia populations. He also used brutal tactics against the Sunni populations in certain areas like Anbar in order to coerce the local people back into allegiance with the insurgents.³² Even Al Qaeda used the carrot and stick method to get tribes to co-operate and "was able to turn clans and families from the same tribe against one another with a combination of carrots (money and other patronage) and sticks (threats of assassination)".³³ By the middle of 2007 Saddam Hussein's tribal strategy had been copied by the coalition forces, and was proving more successful than Al Qaeda's attempted tribal strategy.³⁴ However by joining with the tribes, the American-led forces may have undermined their own efforts at creating a stable, democratic Iraq. The tribes are not democratic but rely on only traditions when it comes to who is in charge. Even now, the situation has not settled down and there has been some deterioration in the security situation. The terrorist groups tend to use the tribes to ensure their dominance, and they work within established clan or tribe systems. This is important, because many of the Northern African and Sub-Saharan countries also take advantage of the tribal system and the destabilisation in Iraq could inspire destabilisation activities there also.

³⁰ Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening," *Survival* 50, no. 2 (2008): 67.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

³² *Ibid.*, 78.

³³ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

A further point of consideration is that Al Qaeda's support for the Palestine issue was noticeably missing and the group began to become involved there, but only succeeded in damaging their reputation. The Palestine issue is very popular amongst the wider Islamic world and Hamas are popular within their borders for the social reforms they have created. Al Qaeda began a campaign of criticising Israel's surrounding neighbours whose governments actually are not in favour of Al Qaeda, as they are not motivated by regime change. Al Qaeda on the other hand blamed the "puppet Arab regimes that block its access to the Palestinian front".³⁵ However the group then began to also criticise Hamas, blaming Hamas for engaging with Israel when Al Qaeda believes that Israel should not be recognised and should not exist. Al Qaeda demanded that Hamas install strict sharia law, which was not popular in the region.³⁶ The group also wanted access to Israel and wanted the Palestinians to host their terrorist cells.³⁷ Al Qaeda further angered the Hamas leadership to the extent that "Fatah and Hamas... view al-Qaeda's presence as a threat and will not welcome the new arrivals".³⁸ Unfortunately for Al Qaeda, the chances of operating in Palestine without help from Hamas are slim due to the "tight clan-based nature of the strip would make it virtually impossible to operate without being detected by Hamas".³⁹

On 2 May 2011, the United States armed forces undertook a risky mission to capture or kill Osama bin Laden by flying combat helicopters illegally into Pakistani airspace to the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan. Abbottabad is well known for housing the military academy for the Pakistanis. It was a surprise to the Americans that Bin Laden's compound could be so well hidden seemingly in plain sight and close to such a prestigious component of Pakistan's military forces. Nonetheless, the mission was successful, and with their leader killed in

³⁵ Mendelsohn, "Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem," 74.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 80.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

the raid, Al Qaeda vowed to continue Bin Laden's work and that their *shura* or leadership council would remain the supreme authority.⁴⁰

The evidence left behind by Bin Laden showed that he had continued to be more operationally involved than had previously been thought, which made filling his position harder than if he was strictly a figurehead or a symbolic rallying cry for sympathisers.⁴¹ The new leader would need to be a charismatic symbol for the franchises that Al Qaeda has inspired and would also need to be approved by key allies especially in Pakistan and with the Afghan Taliban faction known as the Haqqani Network.⁴²

Al Qaeda is an adaptive movement, which has learnt from its and from others' mistakes of the past. They learnt from the first attempt at bombing the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 that terrorist action against a major Western target was not truly achievable with a relatively small device such as a car bomb. The group undertook significant intelligence operations in preparation for the 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Center, and it was "detached objectivity that allowed it to form and respond to accurate and highly detailed assessments of its operating environment".⁴³

The attacks against the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the Yemen bombing of the USS *Cole* in October 2000 began the pattern of behaviour against American targets.⁴⁴ Al Qaeda had learnt a great deal from its past errors and small-scale terrorist strikes and concentrated on uncovering "as much detail as possible about their targets and operating environment to optimize the likelihood of success".⁴⁵ Seeing themselves as a vanguard movement of a small number of 'knights' who seek the enlightenment of true sharia law for Muslim countries, the group's operatives realised that they were

⁴⁰ Jeremy Binnie, "Dead man's shoes: Al Qaeda looks to a future without Bin Laden," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 23, no. 6 (2011): 9.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴³ Gaetano Joe Ilardi, "The 9/11 Attacks- A Study of Al Qaeda's Use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, no. 3 (2009): 178.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 172.

not altogether unpopular in the Muslim world and after a decade they are still not even close to achieving the objective, but are still focussed on trying to bring America down or at least remove its influence in the Middle East.⁴⁶ At the same time, the United States has made little progress in order to move opinion away from Al Qaeda, as the Americans have continued their support of some unpopular regimes in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Jason Burke has noted that:

the sad truth is that the world is a far more radicalized place now than it was prior to 11 September. Helped by a powerful surge of anti-Americanism, Washington's incredible failure to stem the haemorrhaging of support and sympathy, and by modern communications, the language of Bin Laden and his concept of the cosmic struggle have spread among tens of millions of people, particularly the young and angry, around the world.⁴⁷

There remain three major Al Qaeda franchises in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria and Mali, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and Al Shabab in Somalia. The leader of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is Abdelmalik Droukdel, alias Abu Musab Abd-al-Wadud; he did not fight in Afghanistan, which was rare for a leader in the group, but instead he rose through the ranks of the Algerian Islamist rebels.⁴⁸ The leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is Nashir Abd-al-Karim Abdullah al-Wuhayshi, alias Abu Basir, who served as Bin Laden's secretary and then once the Americans invaded Afghanistan fled to Iran.⁴⁹ In Iran he was detained and sent back to his home country, Yemen, where he was imprisoned until he escaped with twenty-two others in February 2006.⁵⁰ He then formed the group originally called Al Qaeda in Yemen but then changed the name to Al Qaeda in

⁴⁶ Bruce Riedel, *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 121.

⁴⁷ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda: the true story of radical Islam* (London: Penguin, 2007), 295.

⁴⁸ Binnie, "Dead man's shoes: Al Qaeda looks to a future without Bin Laden," 11.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

the Arabian Peninsula, demonstrating the broader ambitions of the group.⁵¹ His deputy leader is Said bin Ali Jabir al-Shihri, alias Abu Sufyan, who after September 11 left his homeland in Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan but was then wounded in intense fighting, he was captured and sent to Pakistan for imprisonment.⁵² From there he was sent to Guantanamo Bay until November 2007 when he was sent to Saudi Arabia to go through the Saudis' jihadist rehabilitation programme, from which he graduated and was released, but then travelled to Yemen and helped form Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.⁵³

The continued efforts of Al Qaeda to battle the American presence in the Middle East and Africa, and to extend its reach into Europe, North America and Asia, shows that Al Qaeda does not truly care that it has not achieved popular status in Muslim countries. The leaders see themselves as setting out on a new crusade to save the *umma* from tyrants and the West. However the group continues to pose a serious threat and to generate a hearts and minds campaign within the Muslim world for the United States and its allies. Continued hard work is required to change people's minds about the West, such as consistent charity after natural disasters and the boosting of the economies of Islamic countries to reduce poverty, illiteracy and improve general sanitation and standards of living. These initiatives may help to conquer the movement towards radicalisation, but in the meantime Al Qaeda has continued to evolve and attempts to make progress in Muslim regions.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Chapter 3

The Impact of Colonialism, Globalisation and Poverty

Colonialism, globalisation and extreme poverty can create conditions that can lead to terrorism and radicalisation. Countries in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa have suffered from corruption but also crippling foreign debt. In order to repay these debts the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) interfered in the way in which each economy had worked. Previously most rural workers in these regions had lived in a subsistence farming community where products were grown locally for the local market, although this did not contribute to the paying off their national debt. Then each country was encouraged by the World Bank and the IMF to grow a commodity crop that could be sold on the international global market. This idea took hold and many countries transitioned to international crop trade and initially they profited. Unfortunately there are now too many countries where the local conditions are right to grow the commodity crops, causing a flood into the global market and making the long term price of the chosen commodities plummet. Globalisation and anti-poverty initiatives have generally not been effective in addressing all forms of inequality and this has adversely affected people's livelihoods, leading to more poverty and to potentially dangerous discontent. Growers are forced to produce and harvest commodities for the global market and are often badly paid; therefore these countries are at threat of terrorism.

Globalisation began with a bold new idea to bring individual markets together in order to create a new frontier for the world's producers. The idea was for a global market where goods could be traded easily. It was a bold concept to create this interdependence; it signalled a new age which created new business relationships between countries and was ultimately supposed to promote free trade, heralding the path for countries' economies to be so intertwined it could (in theory) lead to the end of regional wars over resources and commodities.

However the reality has not lived up to expectations. Globalisation has created unexpected consequences including poverty in regions that had never seen it before; for example, high unemployment in highly Westernized nations including even the United States.¹ It has also created long-term environmental damage to areas, such as extensive deforestation in Brazil, where coffee growers and cattle farmers are producing product for the global market.² The land is the producers' only means of economic sustenance and survival and after having been worked as successful subsistence farms for generations the prime land for agriculture is now failing. Crop growers and farmers are forced to produce and harvest commodities for the global market even though they are often not well paid. African examples include large coffee producers such as Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, and Rwanda. Coffee is one of the world's most demanded commodities and employs approximately twenty-five million people around the world, and therefore the potential for damage to the environment and living conditions is large.³

Economist.com rankings

Biggest coffee producers
'000 tonnes, 2006-07

1	Brazil	2,553
2	Vietnam	1,107
3	Colombia	767
4	Indonesia	399
5	India	285
6	Ethiopia	278
7	Mexico	252
8	Guatemala	237
9	Honduras	208
10	Côte d'Ivoire	171

Source: "Pocket World in Figures", based on data from the International Coffee Organisation

Figure 3: Shows the highest producers of coffee per thousand tonnes, many countries can grow the same commodity, downloaded on 16 August 2011 from http://www.economist.com/node/12758794?story_id=12758794

The situation made worse by financial mismanagement in several countries. In order for the World Bank and the IMF to secure the return of money loaned to developing nations, they pursued often dramatic policies of changing the way

¹ J.H. Bodley, "Chapter 2," in *Victims of Progress* (Lanham: Alta Mira Press, 2008), 15.

² K. Watson and M. L. Achinelli, "Context and contingency: The coffee crisis for conventional small-scale coffee farmers in Brazil," *Geographical Journal* 174, no. 3 (2008): 230.

³ *Ibid.*, 223.

these developing nations had developed their economies. First, the IMF and World Bank wanted countries owing large sums of money to change their formerly subsistence farming and locally grown food crops for the local good into crops grown exclusively for cash generation. These commodities could then fund repayments to creditors. However development of the crops meant there were often less food crops in the country, resulting in the price of local food climbing ever higher.

The late Professor James Tobin, an economist, was a key thinker in the field of global development and proposed a Measure of Economic Welfare that would be better than measures of Gross National Product (GNP) and income per head alone.⁴ He argued that traditional methods of calculating economic outputs and economic wealth failed to adequately address noneconomic social indicators such as literacy rates, education levels, health, and housing standards.⁵ His argument was that development is not just the process through which people are able to meet their basic needs but is also encompassing of social, economic and political progress. These other non-financial factors can also lead towards a progression in life and a progression towards national prosperity. The previous ideal of developed success was created by Westernized powers that measured a country's success through only the economic factors by calculating a country's GNP and income per capita.⁶

In a newer form of economic outlook, sustenance includes the ability to meet needs of the people such as food, shelter and health, instead of just financial-economic factors.⁷ The idea is that self-esteem is a sense not only of financial wellbeing but of personal and societal worth, respect and value, and that these should be factored into the national measure of worth and wellbeing.⁸ A final value is freedom to progress, so that poverty is not a pre-destination and that the populace may instead aspire to a society that features security and rule of

⁴ R. Potter et al., "Chapter 4: Globalisation, development and underdevelopment," in *Geographies of Development* (Pearson, Harlow, 2008), 170.

⁵ M. Todaro and S. Smith, *Economic Development* (Pearson Education Ltd, 2003), 15.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 21.

⁸ Ibid., 21/22.

law.⁹ Economically successful countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, Malaysia and Indonesia are not always successful in this freedom value and do not score highly on the list compiled by the United Nations showing the Human Freedom Index.¹⁰ Other countries like Bhutan measure their success not through just the means of social, economic and political progress but also through happiness; primarily this is achieved through means of a census in order to gauge whether the populace are happy.¹¹

In North and Sub-Saharan Africa, populations have become increasingly more divided on ethnic, religious and affluence lines. These regions are also more aware of 'the outside' than in the past. The world has become more accessible through the telephone and the introduction of the internet, although in much of the developing world the cost of a computer means the latter is still inaccessible. For example, whereas the United States is estimated to possess thirty-five computers per one hundred people, and South Korea nine per one hundred people, in Ghana only 0.11 per one hundred people has access to a computer, let alone the internet.¹² In another example it is said "there are more telephone lines in Manhattan than there are in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa".¹³

Many African nations, including sub-Saharan nations, suffer the legacy of colonialism, which imposed economic constraints on the region. Colonialism caused massive disruption to these countries, and imposed new orders and new economic systems that unfortunately were not often successfully adapted. The colonised countries were supposed to not only provide wealth for European countries but also to benefit from the association with Europe, however the disruption to the traditional ways often had negative impact. For example, in Rwanda before colonisation the Tutsi were the cattle owners and the Hutu were the farmers and the "social boundaries between the Hutus and the Tutsis were

⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dean Nelson, "More and more world leaders want happy nations, not just rich ones," *The Telegraph*(2011).

¹² Potter et al., "Chapter 4:Globalisation, development and underdevelopment," 143.

¹³ Ibid., 140.

fluid".¹⁴ During colonisation first by Germany and later Belgium the Tutsi had gained enormous power especially over the Hutu, and a new hierarchal structure was formed with the Europeans on top, the Tutsis in the middle, the majority Hutus at the bottom, while the Twa (an ethnic minority) were on the outside.¹⁵ The economic position of each tribal group was changed during this process. The European colonists had essentially consolidated the position of the dominant ethnic group, the Tutsi, which proved to be unsettling to the country, and to the region after colonisation had ended.¹⁶

One of the key negative effects of globalisation has been the increase of poverty, which has in turn contributed further to the destabilisation of the region that is the subject of this thesis. Due to globalisation many industries in developed nations have outsourced their production sites to overseas; supporters of globalisation would say that this is addressing poverty and inequality. Globalisation was supposed to help people overcome poverty by creating new jobs in those places where they would not otherwise exist. Businesses in these areas have tended to take advantage of labour laws in order to have a cheap workforce. Due to globalisation people have moved from the traditional subsistence farming that their families have been practising for years and instead they have moved to urban areas to work. This is the same process that occurred in Europe several hundred years earlier. Increased urbanisation has led to the creation of 'megacities' where a large population is crammed into a relatively small area which enables the spread of local, national and transnational crime, as well as the seeding of terrorism.

Potter et. Al. states that megacities will lead to uneven development in the developing countries as the cities are where innovation generally occurs. Therefore there are two options for a nation with these developing megacities: to slow growth and innovation in the city to enable the rest of the nation to catch up, or allow the megacity to advance ahead of development in the rural

¹⁴ White, "Scourge of racism: Genocide in Rwanda," 472.

¹⁵ Ibid., 473.

¹⁶ R.J. May, "Introduction: The Ethnic Factor in Politics " *Pacific Viewpoint* 31, no. 2 (1990): 2.

areas.¹⁷ Adverse environmental effects can occur with the rapid increase of population between affluent and poor within the same region as the megacity begins to encroach on the surrounding rural community. When the city calls for more water supplies and efficient sewerage systems to sustain the urban populace and the large industrial factories, often the scarce water resources are extracted from the surrounding rural areas which can leave them as dry, barren wastelands.¹⁸ Local farmers also have to contend with contaminated water supplies from industrial waste and untreated sewerage leading to widespread environmental degradation.¹⁹ This is not always permanent, as the Asian Economic Crisis saw many urban workers in the “wannabe” tiger economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand returned to work in their rural home villages, temporarily reversing migration to the cities.²⁰

Most of the poor in urban areas in Third World cities tend to live in homes that are without adequate sanitation, irregular electricity supply if any, and without adequate security.²¹ Often these settlements are originally poorly planned but with time these settlements can progress, however it is up to the drive of the individual communities and the support from local governments. Squatter settlements are the result of underdevelopment in rural areas. They can be a strain on the income of a government or otherwise a government can determine to slowly assist the affected residents.²² In areas where the latter has been the case, such as in Lima, Peru, settlements have come about gradually and as the inhabitants can afford each stage. Governments would find it easier and less of a strain to help in placing facilities like water, sewerage and electricity in existing squatter settlements rather than go to large exorbitant costs of knocking down and replacing settlements with new low cost housing.

¹⁷ Potter et al., "Chapter 4: Globalisation, development and underdevelopment," 158.

¹⁸ Brian J. Shaw, "Agriculture, development and Southeast Asian megacities," in *Globalisation, Agriculture and Development: Perspectives from Asia-Pacific*, ed. Matthew Tonts and M.A.B. Siddique (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 169.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 171.

²¹ A. Gilbert, "Housing the Urban Poor," in *The Companion to Development Studies*, ed. V. Desai and R. B. Potter (London: Arnold, 2002), 257.

²² B. Chambers, "The Barriadas of Lima: Slums of Hope or Despair? Problems or Solutions?," *Geography* 90, no. 3 (2005): 212-18.

A Northern African example of informal settlements is Egypt, which has had a rapid increase in urbanisation. A steadily increasing number of these informal settlements are located in Cairo; they reflect the reality of steady migration to an area that is not ready in infrastructure for such a rapid rise in population.²³ These areas lack access to government services and are poverty stricken, and as a result they also are sources of periodic unrest.²⁴

In developing economies, businesses and corporations often take advantage of insufficient labour laws and environmental practices. Distance has become less important to global corporations that frequently subcontract to branch plants in far distant regions, effectively creating a 'borderless' world.²⁵ Enclave industrialization began in the 1960s in developing nations as a means of light industrialization with Free Trade Zones (FTZ) and Export Processing Zones (EPZ).²⁶ Companies that are in EPZs pay no tax or duties and sometimes are exempt from certain aspects of government legislation.²⁷ The popularity of these zones has created an atmosphere in which large, multinational companies search for cost-saving locations, particularly in relation to wages.²⁸ In these developing nations they often lack the presence of trade unions, a minimum wage and legislation in relation to how many hours a person can work.²⁹ Consequently, factory workers often have to work long hours, and for minimal wages. In one instance Chinese authorities became concerned that in the Kader factory workers were required to work fourteen hours a day, seven days a week, and when they objected the company replied that it could move the

²³ Tarek Masoud, "Egypt," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 392.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Potter et al., "Chapter 4: Globalisation, development and underdevelopment," 129.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 146/7.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 147.

²⁸ R. N. Gwyne, "Export Processing and Free Trade Zones," in *The Companion to Development Studies*, ed. V. Desai and R. B. Potter (London: Arnold, 2002), 201.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 202.

factory to Thailand, with employment threatened, the Chinese authorities backed down.³⁰

The massive spread of industrialisation to the developing world has created new employment opportunities. However developing nations often lack sufficient labour and safety laws in order to protect their own citizens. Globalisation was supposed to help people overcome poverty by creating new jobs in places where they would not otherwise exist. Businesses in these areas tend to take advantage of labour laws in order to have a cheap workforce. In developing economies businesses and corporations often take advantage of local insufficient labour laws and environmental practices. Distance has become less important to global corporations that frequently subcontract to branch plants in far distant regions, effectively creating, as noted, a 'borderless' world, in which the conditions are right for a terrorist base and terrorist activities.³¹

Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa are riddled with poverty and political suppression and are considered unstable by many businesses. South Africa is politically stable but "agriculture is the biggest user of water in southern Africa".³² Africa is known for its dry climate and periods of drought activity, and so there is constantly a danger of failure of the agricultural industries. The threat to a region is demonstrated with consideration of sugar production in the region of the Incomati Basin, which is located in the Mpumalanga province, sitting between South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. Sugar is the single most important economic activity within the local economy, and "its direct and indirect effects are estimated to involve some 70% of the local economy".³³ Sugar has contributed to the ability of post-apartheid South Africa to promote black farmers and their small holdings and has guaranteed an outlet for their

³⁰ S. Cunningham and J. Atkinson, *Trade-offs: The Impact of the New Trade Rules on Developing Countries* (Victoria: Community Aid Abroad, 1994), 36.

³¹ Potter et al., "Chapter 4: Globalisation, development and underdevelopment," 129.

³² Jo Lorentzen, "Global sugar, regional water, and local people: EU sugar regime liberalisation, rural livelihoods, and the environment in the Incomati River Basin," *South African Journal of Science* 105, no. 1/2 (2009): 49.

³³ Ibid.

crops.³⁴ However unemployment and poverty are high with less than two-thirds the households of the region having access to piped water and less than half having adequate sanitation; life expectancy in the 1980s was at age sixty-two but dropped to fifty-three in 2001 due to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS.³⁵ Sugar farming and other industrial processes use what little valuable resource is available and have had little impact on the massive poverty in the area.

Globalisation was heralded as a new way to make the world equal and reverse poverty in developing countries, however reality has not lived up to the promise. Simply put, people lived for generations from subsistence farming then the world market opened up and farmers began to change their crops to meet the world demand. However with the promotion of globalization by the Western financial organisations, so many markets opened up at once that the world prices for commodities began to change rapidly, and in some cases an oversupply of an individual commodity happened and the price for that commodity dropped. The significant drops in prices for coffee, sugar and cocoa beans in recent years provide examples of what can happen to growers. Often farmers are forced to keep producing this crop despite the drop in value. They must therefore keep seeking out more fertile soil, and so they invade and destroy parts of virgin forest land, which is long-term unsustainable growth. In order to supplement their incomes, more and more people are forced to move into urban areas, generating megacities. The growth of inequality between the affluent and the poor in these regions provides the environment necessary for the growth of terrorism in these regions. The problems associated with previous colonisation, current globalisation and the negative effects of poverty rates helps to understand some of the underlying pressures on a population. When a population reaches a certain crisis point of grievances and a sense of injustice then they can turn to criminal activities initially in order to supplement their income and later in order to express their grievances in the form of terrorism.

³⁴ Ibid., 50.

³⁵ Ibid.

Chapter 4

The Arab Spring and North Africa

Northern African nations have for decades experienced – and, to an extent, suffered from – large and increasing populations, government mismanagement and corruption, and vast poverty. The existence of large numbers of young people suffering from high rates of unemployment and dissatisfaction means they may “engage in social protest either for jobs, housing, and income or for cultural change and freedoms; young men also may constitute a recruiting base for Islamist movements or radical campaigns”.¹ This situation contributed to the Arab Spring Revolt which began in North Africa and rapidly spread to the Middle East. After beginning in Tunisia and spreading to Egypt and then on to Libya, the revolt spread outside the region to Bahrain and Qatar and finally to Syria. This chapter explores the revolts in the first three countries, as case studies as they demonstrate the consequences of decades of neglect and deprivation each suffered and the apparent ease with which regime change and the terrorism threat can emerge.

Often countries in the region in which a terrorist threat is apparent suffer from a strong military which dominates a weaker government and tends to interfere in that government’s progress. Militaries in the region tend to have comparatively large budgets and the generals are reluctant to give up these budgets for any reason; an example of this is Egypt’s military which, despite regime change, has been reluctant to give up power to the people. All of the Arab Spring’s ousted leaders: Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gadhafi and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came from the armed forces of their nations. The situation was different in Syria, which had been ruled by one family, the al-Assads, for decades, although with the support of the armed

¹ Moghadam and Decker, "Social Change in the Middle East," 77.

forces.² This chapter concentrates on illustrating the problems with the three North African nations: Tunisia, Libya and Egypt where the Arab Spring demonstrations first occurred.

Tunisia



Figure 4: Map of Tunisia showing the capital Tunis; take note of the cities in the north and east downloaded from <http://www.mapsofworld.com/tunisia/> on 15th January 2012

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ran an authoritarian-privatising government. Tunisia had suffered from the detrimental effects of colonisation and by using foreign investment, mainly from France (its former colonial master). The authoritarian government of Tunisia hoped to achieve prosperity, but this was limited by unequal investment and opportunity between regions of the country. Tunisia is a prime example of regional disparity of development: the north and east became prosperous with significant economic development but the central and southern areas were largely neglected.

Tunisia had been one of the least developed countries in Africa in the 1960s; it had a large child mortality rate of 159 per one thousand children, and its under-five infant child mortality rate was even higher, at 255 per thousand. The regime that was ousted had not been all negative for the population, and the

² Mohammed Najib, "Egypt's military seeks say in future foreign policy," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 49, no. 01 (2012): 16.

child mortality rate is one example; by the 1980s, the mortality rates for children and infants had declined to 58 and 83, respectively, and by 2000 the rate of infant mortality had dropped to 30. Also, since the 1960s Tunisia had increased its population, especially the working age population or labour force, and despite this the primary school enrolment reached over ninety per cent.³

There were three main sectors to Tunisia's economy: the agricultural, the private small and medium business, and finally large private businesses and public administration.⁴ The agricultural labour force was (and remains) low-skilled and unorganised but the government during the years of 1971 to 1983 raised the minimum agricultural wage in real terms so that it was on average with the rest of the country.⁵ However, private small and medium businesses owners tended to keep workers as apprentices for many years and to not pay overtime.⁶ In comparison, the larger businesses and public administration had a higher labour ratio and paid higher wages but also with higher productivity as a result of the better working conditions in these sectors.⁷

In 1969 Tunisia entered into an economic period called the *infitah*, which was a change to economic liberalism, basically the pursuit of private enterprise. However, Tunisia, like neighbouring Morocco, became dependent on Europe for the bulk of its international trade.⁸ The economic idea developed that Tunisia could take advantage of its close proximity to Europe and establish an industry base catering to Europe. The country began in the early 1970s promoting itself especially to French industries as it had twenty five per cent lower labour costs

³ Moghadam and Decker, "Social Change in the Middle East," 74. Christian Morrisson and Bechir Talbi, *Long Term Growth in Tunisia*, OECD Long-Term Growth Series (Paris: Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), 36.

⁴ Christian Morrisson and Bechir Talbi, *Long Term Growth in Tunisia*, ed. OECD, Long-Term Growth Series (Paris: Development Centre: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), 37.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Gregory White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco: On the Outside of Europe Looking In* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 91.

than the Western European nations.⁹ To encourage more foreign investment it gave concessions to businesses, including that for the first ten years income tax was waived or reduced by ten per cent, while other fees and duties such as customs tax and registration fees were waived for twenty years in order for these businesses to import raw materials, machinery and goods into Tunisia without additional expense.¹⁰

Tunisia had a strong labour force that was relatively skilled due in part to colonialism. France had bestowed an educational legacy and when Tunisia had gained independence it had a head start over other African nations as it was relatively open and possessed a well skilled, comparatively well-educated labour force.¹¹ The government did not hesitate to promote its skilled labour force over other countries in Northern Africa, however foreign investors tended to invest in northern and eastern urban centres only, causing a severe regional imbalance within Tunisia.¹²

The southern regions, where agriculture is the main industry, were massively underdeveloped. In 1986 the country suffered a severe drought, putting many agricultural workers into unemployment. The southern region also became an area of massive grievances as more and more of its population became long-term unemployed. From 1977 labour strikes began, and in 1977 in Ksar-Hellal the army was compelled to intervene to put down a riot.¹³ The problems got progressively worse and on 28 January 1978 two hundred protesters were killed in the first general strike, as the army clashed with protestors. Discontent led to armed insurrection, and in 1981 Libyan-trained Tunisian rebels took over the town of Gafsa.¹⁴ In 1983, the state's decision to remove food subsidies sparked further riots, which began in the troubled south but quickly spread to the rest of the country; one hundred and twenty people were killed in riots and clashes

⁹ Ibid., 92.

¹⁰ Ibid., 93.

¹¹ Ibid., 104.

¹² Ibid., 117.

¹³ Ibid., 118.

¹⁴ Ibid.

before the government backed down on the removal of food subsidies.¹⁵ This period demonstrated the vulnerability of the country to uprising and terrorism.

Throughout the 1980s the Movement of the Islamic Way, or MTI, continued to grow sharply.¹⁶ The state's inability to deal with the movement's popularity led to the palace coup which put Ben Ali in to power in November 1987.¹⁷ Ben Ali promptly solidified the political position of the military and security forces in the Tunisian government and society. He suppressed the Islamists and in the 1990s the regime became increasingly repressive, utilising the state police (called *une système de quadrillage*).¹⁸ Critics state that the families closest to Ben Ali benefited from Tunisia's economic transformation whereas the rest of the population met with repression, including prolonged imprisonment and torture for regime opponents.¹⁹

By the 2000s, Tunisia had a mixed, oil-based economy, with strong working class movements and trade unions. However due to the political corruption and oppression, and the fact that investment was not uniform across the country, there was strong grievance in the population, which in turn led to increasing dissatisfaction and ultimately violence. The disparity of opportunity provided the grounds for revolt. The political movement of change and the Arab Spring Revolt began in early January 2011 when a young man, Mohammed Bouazizi, was harassed by police and in protest set himself on fire on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, a farming town in central Tunisia.²⁰ Bouazizi was well educated but, due to high unemployment, he had manned a fruit stall. He was the symbol of the lack of opportunity for many workers in the country, and his action became a rallying cry for the youth of Tunisia to protest against the serious issues of the country including corruption and high unemployment.

¹⁵ Ibid., 119.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 169.

¹⁹ Jeffrey A. Coupe, "Tunisia," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 728.

²⁰ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 48, no. 50 (2011): 42.

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was ousted within weeks of the reformist movement beginning. The movement was aided by the security forces that refused to fire on protesters, and as the protests gathered momentum Ben Ali and his entourage fled the capital, Tunis.²¹ By November, in a free and fair election, the people elected an Islamist Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, who had spent fifteen years imprisoned by the ousted regime before he fled into exile.²²

Libya



Figure 5: Map of Libya; note the city of Benghazi the new capital of the Transitional Government Council and the town of Bani Walid where Gadhafi loyalists still exist downloaded from <http://www.topactsmar.com/map.htm> on 15th January 2012

Libya is a contradiction: a country ruled for years by a repressive dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, and yet also remaining very tribal. Gaddafi came to power in a coup in 1969, and at the time he was the world's youngest leader (at age 27) and promoted himself to the rank of colonel.²³ On 1 September 1969, when Gaddafi seized power, Libya was the fourth largest country in Africa and it was strategically important both because of its location on the edge of the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ John Wright, *A History of Libya* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 199.

Mediterranean and significant oil reserves that in 1969 prices was producing income of US\$3 million per day.²⁴ Libya was also one of the least populous countries, which gave Gaddafi, who controlled the military, the opportunity to exert close control over the people. He immediately eliminated symbols of Western culture: churches, cathedrals, nightclubs, the production and sale of alcohol, and the use of Latin script; and he also had the Western banks nationalised.²⁵ Gaddafi then expelled the remaining Italian community of 12,000 people who lived in Tripoli – Libya had been an Italian colony before the Second World War – and seized their assets, and he also threw out the last few hundred of the Jewish community.²⁶ The Jewish community had been a presence in Libya for the past two and a half thousand years, and Jews were regarded as a moneyed class, but Gaddafi's leadership bought their presence and influence to an end.²⁷

From 1973 to 1986, Gaddafi further implemented his ideal of revolutionary change with the suspension of all existing laws, the destruction of bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, the arming of the people in order that they could defend their revolution in the event of external or internal threat, purging of political opponents and undesirables, and the rejection of everything that was deemed to be contrary to the Koran.²⁸ At times, Gaddafi took ideas to extremes as he also wanted to abolish wages and eventually money itself and replace it with a share scheme that would see workers have a share of the profits of industrial and agricultural enterprises.²⁹ He also imposed controls on property law as he believed a house or housing estate belongs to its residents and not an individual.³⁰ In 1978, the government also seized and closed down more than 40,000 private businesses, forcing Libyans to do their shopping at one of one

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 200.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 206.

²⁹ Ibid., 208.

³⁰ Ibid.

hundred and eighty state supermarkets, which had periodic shortages and oversupplies of basic necessities and unwanted goods.³¹

By the early 1980s, more than one thirtieth of the Libyan population had left and also during 1983 to 1988 their gross domestic product fell forty-two per cent, meaning that Libyans' standard of living had by this time dropped dramatically.³² It was evident to many that the country's vast oil revenues were being misspent on dubious, big budget internal projects that had little effectiveness like the Misurata Steel Works, which was a costly industrial complex designed principally to provide for Libya's military and oil industry steel demands. Other expensive undertakings were vast arms purchasing for the armed forces, a long and costly war with Chad, and funding of terrorist groups worldwide.³³

In December 1988 the defining moment in Libya's relationship with the West occurred when Libyan terrorists blew up a Pan Am flight from London to New York over Lockerbie, Scotland.³⁴ From 1992, the regime suffered international sanctions that further cost the country US\$24 billion. There had already been a failed coup in 1975 but in 1993 a more dangerous and alarming coup occurred when the Orfella tribe supported an attempt to depose of Gaddafi. The Orfella are from south-eastern Tripolitania and were historically close to Gaddafi's own tribe, the Gadadfa.³⁵ Then in a significant move in an area where the oil is predominantly located, the regime failed to stop an Islamic insurgency in Cyrenaica, and despite the massive investment in arms and the recruiting of foreign (mostly African) mercenaries to boost the Libyan army, Gaddafi was not able to completely suppress this insurgency.³⁶

Most of Libya is desert which means Libya is only capable of limited residential areas; Libya remains one of the world's most sparsely populated countries. By

³¹ *Ibid.*, 209.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 209/10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 214.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 219.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

2009, its population was 6.3 million people, but with steadily increasing urbanization along the coastline the populace was concentrated in several key centres. While there are still roaming nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes across the country, over eighty per cent of the people lived in urban areas.³⁷

Libya is a country that should be inherently rich due to its vast oil resources but and also its largely untapped natural gas fields. Its proximity to southern Europe gave the country a distinct advantage, especially once sanctions started to be eased, as the natural gas could potentially be piped across the Mediterranean to European customers including Italy.³⁸ However for many years, this potential realisation was not possible, as the Libyan regime had been a keen supporter of international terrorist organisations. Whittaker has observed that Gaddafi was “able to spend considerable sums sponsoring terrorist activities abroad and on the construction of factories to produce poison gas and other chemical weapons. Support was given primarily to Arab terrorists groups, but also to a variety of Central and West African groups, and eventually to terrorists from Ireland to the Philippines”.³⁹ Gaddafi’s support and funding of terrorists put him against the West, but Gaddafi appeared not to realise or care about how his support of terrorism was perceived internationally. He was often puzzled by the reaction of Western governments who criticised his policies and condemned him as a lunatic, because it was apparent that some countries and businesses were still prepared to do business with him.⁴⁰

While Gaddafi had on occasion faced threat from the international community, including narrowly surviving an air raid on Tripoli, a more serious threat began to emerge from within the country. An increasingly dissatisfied and vocal populace resulted in strong demand for democracy. The end of the regime began with a series of public demonstrations on 17 February 2011, aligning also with the civic actions in Tunisia and Egypt. By 20-21 February, the unrest had

³⁷ Luis Martinez, "Libya," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 557.

³⁸ Wright, *A History of Libya*: 229.

³⁹ Whittaker, *The Terrorism Reader*, 85.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

spread across Tripoli. The effect on the region was seen to be leading to temporary instability in the short-term but with hopes that a new transitional council could bring about significant change to the country. Regime change in Libya was perceived as a positive, both internally and internationally, having the potential to stabilize the region where much of the world's oil supply is located. For that reason, the rebel uprising against Muammar Gaddafi was supported by Western nations, including the insertion of Special Forces reconnaissance and training teams. After weeks of fighting, a significant moment occurred on 20 October 2011 when Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed. Also, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the oldest son of Muammar Gaddafi, and a potential successor to his father, was captured trying to flee into neighbouring Niger on 20 November 2011.

The Obama Administration had tested a new foreign policy and strategy in Libya by "leading from behind" with the objective of overthrowing Gaddafi.⁴¹ The United Nations Security Council surprised many with its decisive action and after the uprising began took just over four weeks to pass a resolution imposing a no-fly zone and an international mandate for military action.⁴² In the initial three weeks, the United States took the military lead and contributed over ninety per cent of the sorties flown over the country. However, the Americans then allowed its NATO allies, the UK and France, to take over the majority of sorties, as this enabled the action to be seen as 'international' rather than 'American'. The Americans continued to maintain the lead in intelligence gathering and negotiations with rebel groups.

One problem in this period was that the switch to NATO Armed Force exposed a weakness inside NATO when several of the NATO forces ran out of ordinance and their fighter jets' capabilities were put under strain. Basically, the NATO allies could not keep pace with the Americans and their enormous military technology expenditure. The divisions within NATO were exposed when Britain and France used their as yet untested new fighter aircraft, rather than a

⁴¹ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 43.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 44.

combat proven aircraft, and Germany balked at the cost of the conflict and declined to participate; in addition, both Italy and Spain, while supportive of the regime change, were facing budgetary crises and feared an influx of refugees, which shaped the extent to which they were prepared to contribute.⁴³

The military-technical issue was especially telling, as it showed that NATO countries were finding it too expensive to keep up with the expensive American military technology and ability to project force. One observer noted that this showed that there was still an expectation that the Americans would play the lead in crises, and "if we assume that the United States will play the role of sheriff for many decades to come, we must also assume that the identity and character of the dominant contemporary threat to order will likely shift several times during America's watch".⁴⁴ The problem essentially is that modern militaries need to be adaptable but their governments cannot always spend the required money on new technology or the projection of force that is required. Fortunately, the NATO airstrikes were not a long-term requirement, as they were no longer needed after the death of Gaddafi in October 2011.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, freedom did not result in immediate stability for Libya, as the vacuum created by the removal of the regime resulted in jockeying for political power. There were riots in Benghazi on 22 January 2012 as protestors objected to the Provisional Ruling Councils announcing that it did not plan to pay men who had fought in the recent uprising. Also there was unrest about the need for disarmament and demobilisation of the large numbers of militias used to fight Gaddafi's loyalist and African mercenary armies, but there was also the pressing need to ensure disarmament before the militias turned on each other and plunged Libya into prolonged civil unrest.⁴⁶ The Western nations and Libya's neighbours became increasingly concerned about the unsecured vast arsenals of Gaddafi's armies, which were being looted, with the potential for weapons caches to end up in the hands of insurgent groups and terrorists

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Gray, *The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order*. : 99.

⁴⁵ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 44.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

internationally, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.⁴⁷ There was a sense that Western nations should rapidly unfreeze Libya's overseas assets, which "amounts to billions of dollars of oil wealth", as this would go a long way to helping the new government rebuild confidence.⁴⁸

Egypt



Figure 6: Showing a map of Egypt in relation to its border with Israel downloaded from <http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/egypt.html> on the 15th January 2012

Days after the protests in Tunisia began the Arab Spring demonstrations, the general revolt in the region had spread to Egypt. There were large protest marches and occupations of the main square in Cairo, Tahrir Square, against President Hosni Mubarak. The revolution that developed was bloodier than the one in Tunisia, and it took months instead of days for the long-ruling Mubarak to be overthrown.

Over many years, Mubarak and his family had reaped the benefits denied to the majority of the Egyptian population. Mubarak's government was an authoritarian-privatizing government that saw wealth concentrated among the favoured and political allies.⁴⁹ Mubarak was not the first dictator to rule Egypt. The most important dictator was Nasser, who ruled from 1952 to 1970 but who

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 42.

was also “the only ruler of Egypt who did anything for the mass of the population, notably the poorer, working classes. He created a welfare state that raised the standard of living of millions of Egyptians”.⁵⁰ In spite of this perception of Nasser, he was a dictator, and in reality he frequently used police files, telephone taps and other repressive measures to ensure he remained in power for eighteen years.⁵¹ Three years before he died from a heart attack in 1970, Nasser was involved in the escalating tension with Israel over their occupation of the Sinai following the disastrous war between the two countries. After his death, Anwar al-Sadat, his Vice-President, assumed control of the country, but “few expected him to last long for he had the reputation of being a lightweight with no backing who was not to be taken seriously”.⁵²

Anwar al-Sadat did put the country on the path to war. In October 1973, on a holy day for both Muslims and Jews; Egyptian and Syrian forces struck at Israel simultaneously and quickly overran Israeli positions: “an incredulous world witnessed early Arab victories and an Israeli army in disarray.”⁵³ Eventually, Israel prevailed but the image of Sadat as a lightweight had been changed. However the war did not accomplish any of its goals because after the Israeli counter-attacks and eventual victory in the war, the Sinai was still occupied.⁵⁴ Sadat then turned his attention inwards, in a quest to increase his control of the country. In 1977, he tried to remove food subsidies, which resulted in food riots on the streets of Cairo.⁵⁵ The United States, which perceived Egypt as strategically significant, began to provide Egypt with an annual subsidy US\$2 billion, “all of which subsidized staple food to avoid a recurrence of the riots of 1977”.⁵⁶ Oil was discovered within Egypt borders and the country became an oil

⁵⁰ Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *A History of Egypt From the Arab Conquest to the Present*, Second ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 154.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 154/55.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 157.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 159.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

producer who could satisfy its own market and export to other nations as well⁵⁷.

The International community viewed Sadat as a man of power but who had soon lost touch with his people. He saw himself as the 'father of Egypt', and would not stand for any opposition or open discussion of his decision-making and actions.⁵⁸ He made the Assembly pass a law making it illegal to criticise him, his family or associates, and he passed the Law of Shame making it "illegal for Egyptians abroad to voice opposition to the government".⁵⁹

During this time two major movements began within the country's Islamic communities; one sought to stop corruption through the political process and the other rejected the value system and sought to destroy it.⁶⁰ Sadat refused to countenance these groups even though they were an internal matter and spurred on by internal issues to do with the perceived inequalities under his regime.⁶¹ His security forces arrested more than one thousand five hundred people, and Sadat stated that he had a list of another fifteen thousand names; this shocked the nation, and was rightly perceived as a threat to the people.⁶² In spite of mounting discontent, Sadat remained in power, and in 1981 he chose his successor, Hosni Mubarak, "an air force officer with a reputation for efficiency and integrity".⁶³ Sadat appointed him Vice-President, but he was to soon assume the control of the country. During a military parade when for a moment attention was on an air display, radicals broke through Sadat's security ring, rushed the grandstand and shot him.⁶⁴ Mubarak remained in power, with him and his cronies becoming extremely wealthy with the diversion of the country's wealth, until the Arab Spring.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 163.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 165.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 163.

⁶³ Ibid., 170.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 165/66.

Egypt is a mixed oil economy, but with its sizeable population also has other commercial assets including extensive agricultural lands. One challenge is that for centuries it has relied on the Nile to irrigate crops, but neighbouring Ethiopia, through which the river runs, has learnt from its own mistakes of agricultural mismanagement, which resulted in crippling famine and drought in the 1980s. Ethiopia has built a major dam in order to make use of the resources of the Nile with Chinese backing. There is awareness that if Ethiopia continues to build dams across the Nile, it will significantly reduce the amount of water that will flow into Egypt and flow through to irrigate its now fertile plains. Egypt has previously avoided the drought conditions that have plagued southern countries, such as the Sudan, but the agricultural system has been adversely affected by the damming of the river by Ethiopia.⁶⁵ This generates a significant commercial challenge, and threatens long-term viability of the farming lands. The loss of silt expected from the less frequent flooding of the Nile Delta is resulting in land loss along the coast and diminishing of the local fishing industry.⁶⁶ This could result in regional instability in the longer term.

In the short term, the major hurdle for Egypt is unemployment, especially amongst its young people, and inflation.⁶⁷ The rapid and escalating problems of urbanisation also are putting a strain on Egypt's infrastructure. Rural inhabitants flock to the cities for work only to find that there is no work as "unemployment has been endemic for decades".⁶⁸ Women have to work in the fields due to a lack of manpower, and men often work elsewhere including other countries in order to send money back home.⁶⁹ Since there is no old age pension, no social security and no medical insurance, families continue to have large numbers of children in order to ensure the elderly will be looked after in their old age; over one million babies are born every eight months.⁷⁰ Egypt's large and increasing

⁶⁵ Ibid., 167.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Masoud, "Egypt," 401.

⁶⁸ Marsot, *A History of Egypt From the Arab Conquest to the Present*: 168.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

population of over eighty million people have put increasing strain on the infrastructure and government services.⁷¹

Whereas Tunisia had a military that played a critical role in the removal of the previous regime and yet did not exploit the power vacuum, Egypt's military junta stepped in order to form and lead an interim government.⁷² One of the reasons that the military has been unwilling to surrender power is that under Mubarak the military were well compensated, including developing a large military industrial complex and commercial empire separate from the regime. Senior officers who benefitted from this have been reluctant to part with these lucrative benefits.⁷³

The United States and European Union are the largest trading partners that Egypt has and stability, even if enforced by the military is perceived as positive.⁷⁴ While the continued power of the military junta is not universally well received, the stability it delivers has been welcomed by the United States as there is a fragile balance in the region: Egypt has a long-standing sound relationship with Israel and also long term suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷⁵ Unfortunately for the people, the junta have failed to separate themselves from the actions of the Mubarak regime, as senior officers are inclined to respond to dissent actions with an iron fist.⁷⁶ The junta first announced that they would take over only for six months but this was then extended that to 2013.⁷⁷ Then Egypt's military announced that it would be changing the law so that political leaders would no longer be able to go to war without consulting the military. The real motivation behind this new law was to prevent any Islamic group elected to power to go to war against Israel.⁷⁸

⁷¹ Masoud, "Egypt," 391.

⁷² "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 42.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁷⁴ ———, "Egypt," 400.

⁷⁵ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 42.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Najib, "Egypt's military seeks say in future foreign policy."

The Arab Spring case studies illustrate that after many years of dictatorship, Northern African nations have made movement towards democracy. However the conditions within these nations are still dangerously close to those that have enabled the seeding and spread of terrorist organisations across the region. The willingness of Western nations – in particular, the United States and NATO countries – to support regime change and to then work with the new, interim rulers of the countries, in spite of their shortcomings, shows that the international relations are driven by concern for stability and for countering the terrorist threat. While Al Qaeda has not been universally successful in gathering support for its causes across the region, the conditions that exist in the Arab Spring countries could lead to increased success for Al Qaeda, unless there is a huge commitment within these nations for economic and social change, promoting social security and enforcing laws preventing corruption.

Chapter 5

North-West Africa

The Arab Spring changed the 'face' of the Middle East and Northern Africa; however Al Qaeda has been active across a much wider front. This chapter explores the situation in North-West Africa and threats in this region. While it is not close to the Middle East, where Al Qaeda's main support base is located, this region is important and strategically significant because of its proximity to Europe. Morocco, for example, is across the short strait at the entrance of the Mediterranean Sea, and there is illegal immigration and people smuggling across the strait, as well as the potential for arms trade and the drug trade that help to finance terrorism. This chapter will therefore explore the conditions that are prevailing in the two countries of significance: Morocco and Algeria.

Morocco



Figure 7: Map of Morocco showing how close it is located to Spain and the rest of Europe; please note the location of Western Sahara in the southern regions downloaded from <http://www.mapsofworld.com/morocco/morocco-political-map.html> on the 15th January 2012

Morocco is a country of shifting needs, particularly in terms of economic needs. It is different from the rest of North Africa in the fact that it is ethnically and linguistically diverse. However the people of Morocco have for the last century suffered from severely low incomes and they have needed to export their labour to nearby countries. Adding to the economic strain is the fact that Morocco is a non-oil economy, with a patriarchal conservative government, which limits the potential for economic wellbeing. The government of Morocco is a monarchy and the "parliament remains weak and subordinate to the executive".¹

Morocco has a large percentage of their female workforce involved in industrial manufacturing. Workers, including women, within Morocco are feeling increasingly alienated as there is no minimum wage, no maximum working hours, limited benefits, and a lack of regulations to support the basic labour rights.² Morocco has vast earnings from phosphate mining, but Morocco's fortunes have declined over the decades, despite its economic relationship with the European Union.³ This is due to the fact that the country has been economically mismanaged to rely on only a few industries solely developed for trade with the European Union.⁴ In 1987, Morocco actually applied for membership to the European Union but was denied, in part because of the economic mismanagement and in part because of the technicality that it is not within Europe. This is despite the fact that there is a common European culture or experience, with Spain (a current European Union member) having more in common and more trade with Morocco than it does with Sweden.⁵

Morocco's agricultural greenhouse businesses provide Europe with fresh tomatoes, bananas and cut flowers during winter.⁶ Most of the elite class in the country were educated in European countries, especially France, and they

¹ Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, "Morocco," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 587.

² Ibid., 584.

³ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco: On the Outside of Europe Looking In*: 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 140.

⁶ Ibid., 139.

maintain close ties with their European contacts.⁷ Morocco's economic crisis began in the late 1970s as the global price of phosphate fell and at the same time the government pursued a costly war in the Western Sahara. Oil shocks at the end of the 1970s did not help matters, and neither did a severe drought in 1981 that damaged the emerging agricultural industries.⁸ The long-running war in the Western Sahara, which did not end until 1991, continued to drain the economy, with estimates of approximately one billion dollars per year being spent on the military action, inflicting long-term damage to the economy and the economic wellbeing of the people.⁹

Morocco's second largest commodity after phosphate is labour. Moroccans tend to migrate, if possible, to Europe: France followed by Spain, then the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.¹⁰ These migrants many of who are illegal 'aliens' in the European countries send money home to their families. The government relies heavily on these remittances as they bring in more cash than even phosphate mining.¹¹ Unfortunately most of the migrants are in low paid, menial positions, because another problem is the country's low standard of education. Adult literacy rates are climbing but by 2001 they were still only at 49.1 per cent and rates for women only 37.2 per cent.¹² This further adds to the senses of frustration and poverty of the people. This feeling of frustration makes the alienated young people ripe for recruitment by Al Qaeda and other affiliated organisations within the European countries.

One of the main challenges for countering the emerging terrorist threat in Morocco is the location and condition of urban areas. Many cities in Morocco have extensive shantytowns called *bidonvilles* which have existed ever since colonial and possibly even pre-colonial times. Due to urbanisation, these shantytowns have continued to grow, with increasing numbers of people drifting from agricultural areas to the shantytowns or moving between

⁷ Ibid., 140.

⁸ Ibid., 133.

⁹ Ibid., 132.

¹⁰ Maghraoui and Zerhouni, "Morocco," 583.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 581.

shantytowns.¹³ The *bidonvilles* are denied basic infrastructure such as water and sewerage, plus health issues like the spread of tuberculosis are common.¹⁴ The economic poverty and poor conditions in the *bidonvilles* have meant that traditionally they have been breeding grounds for Islamic extremists. For example, Sidi Mimoun, which is the largest *bidonville* in Casablanca, was the home of the majority of youths involved in the 16 May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca.¹⁵ The challenge in this country therefore is that the conditions are right for the growth of terrorist organisations, with many of the people poorly educated, suffering from poverty, and dissatisfied with the ruling elite.

Algeria



Figure 8: Showing a map of Algeria with the capital Algiers in the top northwest of the country close to Spain, downloaded from http://worldmap-and-information.blogspot.com/2007_09_01_archive.html on the 15th January 2012

Algeria has had a long struggle with fundamental terrorism since its fight against the French colonial power following the end of the Second World War. During the 1960s a fundamental policy shift by French President Charles de Gaulle to allow Algeria its freedom resulted in the country becoming an independent, but still troubled nation sits on the edge of the strategically

¹³ Ibid., 582.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

important Mediterranean. Algeria has a mixed oil economy with an authoritarian-socialist government. For many years, its main exports were citrus fruits, wines, iron ore and phosphate, but in the mid-1950s to early 1960s oil was discovered across several regions of the country.¹⁶ This gave the newly independent nation the opportunity for economic wealth, but as with many of the mismanaged and autocratic nations of the region, this economic wealth did not flow to the majority of the people.

During the 1990s, the government pursued a particularly strange policy of devaluing the Algerian currency by five hundred per cent. Due to this action, the government increased the state's supply of local currency and reduced demand for imported goods through massive price increases, which impacted especially on the impoverished working class.¹⁷ From 1999, oil revenues increased but the government still showed no intention of revaluing the Algerian dinar.¹⁸ The government has instead used approximately one-third of its financial surplus to fund infrastructure improvements including roads, railways, urban transportation, and the distribution of drinking water, agriculture and social housing.¹⁹ All of these are significant improvements, but they do not necessarily help the population that has been impoverished by the devaluation of their currency. The simple point is that if the people cannot afford the likes of public transport, no matter how good it is, then these improvements are a waste of time and money.

Algeria has multiple political parties but in reality these parties are marginalised by the fact that the ruling elite manipulate elections, including the 'stuffing' of the ballot boxes to favour the several parties of the administration. This lack of true democracy makes the population feel incapable of influencing social and economic policies.²⁰ Unemployment is high, being around twenty-seven per cent, and youth unemployment is especially high, being approximately forty per

¹⁶ Lahouari Addi, "Algeria," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 371.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 381.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 379.

cent. This explains why young Algerians are especially inclined to try and reach Spain and Italy in small boats, called *harraga*, which often they have made themselves.²¹

The real problems in Algeria are that the political figures have had a significant stake in government businesses and the legal system is not independent enough to end corruption.²² France has a very high level of investment in the country but growth from this is likely to be limited due to Algeria's feeble justice system, predatory practices and widespread corruption.²³ In January 2007, the Algerian terrorist group known as Group Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat decided to recognise Osama bin Laden as their emir and changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known as AQIM.²⁴ The roots of the current Islamic terrorism threat within Algeria stem back to its colonial past with France, and therefore the organisation is long-established and very hard to combat.²⁵ During Algeria's struggle with France for independence (1954-1962), the Islamists chose not to rival the FLN or *Front de Libération Nationale* as their aims were broad enough to cooperate with each other.

Until the late 1970s Islam was considered in line with the government socialist agenda but it was not the dominant feature: politics within Algeria became secular, conservative, authoritarian, and dominated by the army.²⁶ In 1979, Chadli Bendjedid became President and socialism was gradually abandoned; he turned to the agenda of the Arab tribes but this was to the dismay of the Kabyle or Berber minority who became restive.²⁷ During the 1980s, as the Algerian economy deteriorated, the Islamic movement gained in popularity.²⁸ The movement had about three main tendencies: the Salafi, the Algerianists-Muslim brotherhood variant, and the small guerrilla group called the MIA - *Mouvement Islamique Armé* who between 1982 and 1987 in the hinterland of

²¹ Ibid., 382.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Binnie, "Dead man's shoes: Al Qaeda looks to a future without Bin Laden," 8.

²⁵ Dalacoura, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. 99.

²⁶ Ibid., 100.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 101.

Algiers led a revolt.²⁹ In 1988, social tensions due to the collapsing economy led to riots on the streets, which the Islamic groups were able to take advantage of.³⁰ In the late 1980s, a new political movement started called FIS- Islamic Salvation Front.³¹ Therefore in Algeria, there existed and continues to exist, the social and economic conditions that may lead to a terrorist threat and strong support for Islamic political parties and policies.

In North-Western Africa, there are significant threats of terrorist organisations. The conditions of political mismanagement and high level corruption, poverty and the presence of Islamic movements generate possibilities for extremists. These nations at the North-western most tip of Africa are too dependent on trade with their former colonial masters. Their trade with the European Union makes them vulnerable to the recent fluctuations of the unstable European economies. Basically if these nations are to prosper in the long term they need to trade with more diverse markets in order to stabilise their economies. The Arab Spring demonstrated that countries such as these can experience sudden regime change due to the grievances of the local population like high food prices and large unemployment. The region remains one of concern and of ripe recruitment opportunities for Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorist organisations.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

Chapter 6

Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East

Northern Africa is strategically important as it borders the Gulf of Aden with the Strait of Hormuz, the most important shipping lane in the world. The Gulf is where the majority of the world's oil supply is shipped through. The countries that border this area are actually some of the most volatile in the world. The threat represented by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations is known to exist across this region of Africa. Eastern Sub-Saharan Africa, with its relative proximity to the Middle East and with significant Islamic populations, would appear to be especially vulnerable to the recruitment processes of terrorist organisations. The areas of interest in Eastern Africa are Somalia and its neighbour Kenya, with an added element from neighbouring Yemen in the Middle East which borders the Gulf of Aden. Across this region there is rising concern in the West about the amount of lawlessness, transnational criminal activity and piracy. Though Yemen is not strictly part of North Africa it is impossible to talk about the problems of this region without digging deeper into the Sub-Saharan region of Africa to discuss the problems associated with the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and therefore Yemen and Somalia particularly when it comes to piracy.

Somalia



Figure 9: Map of Somalia showing the capital, Mogadishu on the south eastern corner and the northern cities of Garowe and Bosaso where piracy has improved the economy of these cities, downloaded from <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/so.htm> on the 15th January 2012

Somalia is a failure among failed states; as a result of long-term internal conflict, the government has lost control over the north and southern parts of the nation, and it only exercises control in the central area.¹ The collapse of the state has created conditions for outbreaks of armed conflict but also for opportunistic crime.² Piracy has become a main source of income for many terrorists and transnational criminal gangs based in Somalia who have taken advantage of the lawlessness within this nation.

There is also mounting concern regarding the terrorist group in Somalia called Al Shabab (The Youth) and how they are recruiting through modern technology including the internet. They have links to Al Qaeda with operational, training, and sanctuary bases. Al Shabab also has a common message and battle experience from fighting abroad. Al Shabab has a fractured leadership, with some of the senior leadership wanting only control of Somalia, but of concern is the fact that the other main faction wishes to cement ties with other jihadist

¹ Ken Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 17.

² *Ibid.*, 31.

movement and to spread influence across a wider area.³ The famine that has recently struck the country displayed that even in a severe crisis; Al Shabab is not willing to work with the West, as it would not allow foreign aid workers into the worst affected areas. Al Shabab is primarily located in the southern region of Somalia, and it feels threatened by the African Union Forces that hold the capital, Mogadishu, where the Transitional Federal Government is based.

The African Union forces, comprising about nine thousand troops, mainly from Uganda and Burundi, took control of Mogadishu after four years of trying in 2011.⁴ The garrison was then joined by reinforcements from Djibouti (the closest northern neighbour of Somalia) and these troops will bring the total mission strength to ten thousand five hundred.⁵ In September 2011, the United Kingdom also inserted a team of twenty personnel to provide strategic advice for the African Union Mission in Somalia (called AMISOM).⁶ Although in 2009 the British Special Forces tried to mount a rescue operation to free British citizens from Somali pirates, this is officially the first time that the United Kingdom has openly acknowledged that it has troops on the ground in Somalia.⁷ In the latest carving up of Somali territory, Ethiopia has sent in troops to pursue Al Shabab but also to watch Kenya's efforts carefully. Ethiopia is concerned that Kenya may seek to extend influence and commandeer territory.⁸

The piracy and transnational crime in Somalia has developed a surprising mini-industry in London as "once a ship owner knows that a ship from their fleet has been captured, the first thing he or she does is to contact a law firm that specializes in ransoms at sea and kidnapping".⁹ Securing and negotiating the

³ Lauren Gelfand, "Shabab Terror to continue, warns Human Rights Watch," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 48, no. 34 (2011): 16.

⁴ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 46.

⁵ "Djibouti deploys troops to Somalia," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 49, no. 01 (2012): 16.

⁶ Tim Ripley, "UK military team on the ground in Somalia," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 48, no. 39 (2011): 17.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 46.

⁹ Graham A. Thomas, *Pirate Killers: The Royal Navy and the African Pirates* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2011), 157.

release of the captives are “batteries of negotiators, security teams and lawyers, all based in London, the world’s capital for maritime industry”.¹⁰ Over the years of lawlessness and increasing piracy attacks, this has actually increased the value of piracy, although at the same time “the response from the international community to the increased attacks on merchant shipping has been to send warships into the area to patrol”.¹¹ Piracy is a threat to all nations as the Gulf of Aden sees more than twenty five thousand ships a year pass through this area carrying trade goods and most importantly, oil.¹² Most of the pirates’ activity is centred in the southern part of the Indian Ocean known as the Somali Basin.¹³ There has also been a significant rise of suspected pirates held in jails in Kenya and the Seychelles but there is still an appetite for piracy.¹⁴ Theoretically, it is possible to project greater international force into Somalia to counter the transnational crime activities, however the international community believes that sending a force into Somalia in order to prevent the piracy would prove to be a disaster and force them into a long protracted guerrilla war.¹⁵

The cities of Garowe and Bosasso are unofficial capitals for the pirates. Anja Shortland has shown that the coastal towns and areas have not benefitted from piracy but the increase in electricity usage and demand in Garowe and Bosasso for workers means that there is a flow-on benefit to the communities.¹⁶ According to her report, the pirates in 2009 received five times the amount of the Puntland economy.¹⁷ Puntland is the semi-autonomous region in the north-eastern corner of Somalia, and satellite imagery from the past decade shows that there has been sizeable development which is due primarily to the funds from piracy.¹⁸ Garowe also doubled in area due to economic development with

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 158.

¹² Ibid., 161.

¹³ Ibid., 165.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 166.

¹⁶ World News Africa BBC, "Somali piracy "boosts Puntland economy", " BBC, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16534293>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the introduction of commercial, industrial and housing developments in large part funded by piracy and other transnational crime activities.¹⁹

Kidnapping is another boom industry within Somalia. The most common form of kidnapping is for profit, particularly from international agencies working within Somalia. Kidnapping occurs mostly in Mogadishu but can occur elsewhere within the country or in the countries bordering Somalia.²⁰ The United Nations agencies have been a particular target but also vulnerable are Somalis from minority or weaker clans.²¹

Clans are a powerful tool in the effort to control the security situation but minority and lower caste clans often do not have the protection of customary law and often need to seek out an alliance with a more powerful clan.²² Clans seek a balance of power in order to not be overrun.²³ There is still lawless behaviour in the southern regions which includes inciting communal violence for political reasons, the embezzlement of foreign aid funds, the introduction of counterfeit currency, land grabs, the export of charcoal and involvement in piracy.²⁴ The counterfeit currency tends to make the lives of everyday citizens worse as it creates hyperinflation and robs average people of most of their savings.²⁵

The collapse of the central government in Somalia created conditions ripe for the lawless behaviour and opportunistic crime.²⁶ However, Somali communities have, in spite of the challenges, managed to maintain a surprisingly high level of lawful behaviour and personal security through two different processes: clan law and sharia law.²⁷ The two processes include application of clan customary law, called *xeer*, and the enforcement of blood payments, called *diya*, for any wrongs committed, or otherwise the application of sharia law by local sharia

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*: 33.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 32.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 33.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 31.

²⁷ Ibid.

courts²⁸. Prior to the late 1980s Somalis often took their legal disputes to a local sheikh or an elder for mediation.²⁹ The result of the increasing reliance on customary law and sharia law is that there has been, during this period of disturbance, a naturally increased reliance on traditional and Muslim law-making, has made an increased opportunity for Islamic groups.

The greatest threat to Somalia is its own lack of law; if the transitional government cannot gain control over more areas other than just the capital then the future for Somalia to exist as it is may end. Somalia's nearest neighbours have each sent in forces to control parts of Somalia in order to stop the violence spreading into their own nations and to keep an eye on their neighbours. However the long term cost of deploying troops will be a huge burden to these nations and each nation will eventually pull back to a section of Somalia near their own borders. The future is unpredictable but eventually parts of Somalia may then be joined with these neighbouring nations and become part of them. This would be a disaster for the Somali government but may not be for the populace in these areas as law and order would be restored. As long as the local populace is treated fairly and its voice heard; then grievances are less likely to be formed and terrorist activity will be a thing of the past. However this is one eventuality and even the neighbouring nations around Somalia have not always listened to their own minorities, so therefore the future for Somalia is still too difficult to predict.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 33.

Kenya



Figure 10: Map of Kenya showing the close bordering nations of Uganda and Somalia, downloaded from <http://www.mapsofworld.com/kenya/kenya-political-map.html> on 15th January 2012

Although Kenya is technically located in Southern Sub-Saharan Africa it is in this chapter due to its close proximity to and the terrorist exploits done within its borders which stem from neighbouring Somalia. During the World Soccer Cup on 11 July 2010, supporters watched the games in an Ethiopian restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, near the border with Kenya. The Al Shabab movement exploded a bomb, killing seventy-four Ethiopian, Kenyan and Ugandan soccer fans. Al Shabab wanted to hit back at Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya for having troops join the African Union forces in Somalia. This was of course not the first terrorist activity in Kenya, where previously attacks had been made on Western, including American, diplomatic offices. Unfortunately, the threat of Al Shabab has not disappeared but strengthened.

On 6 December 2011, the Kenyan Cabinet approved a request by the African Union for Kenyan armed forces to join in the African Union Mission in Somalia

to combat Al Shabab in Somalia.³⁰ President Mwai Kibaki and his Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Watengula stated that they were prepared to send up to three army battalions to support AMISOM's mission and to help the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.³¹ This was a serious commitment, because a few days after the announcement the rebels in Mogadishu launched a demonstration, with some of the fiercest fighting in months.³² In October 2011, the Kenyan forces launched Operation "Linda Nchi" (Protect the Nation) in which four thousand troops crossed into southern Somalia, supported by attack helicopters, and with Kenyan naval vessels securing the waters.³³ The objective was the southern Somali port city of Kismayo which was a reported base for Al Shabab's attacks into Kenya; the strategic goal was to provide a buffer zone for Kenya's vital tourist trade, damaged by kidnappings from Kenyan resorts.³⁴

Somali commentators have often pointed out that although their government has little control, there is also significant criminality and armed conflict on the Kenyan side of the border.³⁵ Recently, six Kenyans, including four prominent politicians, were put on trial at the International Criminal Court in The Hague over their involvement in orchestrating post-election violence after the 2007-08 election. Two of the prominent Kenyans were former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and former Higher Education Minister William Samoei Ruto, who are both from Kenya's dominant Kikuyu tribe and which enjoys significant governmental support.³⁶ These show that even in a relatively stable nation, such as Kenya, there are conditions for disharmony and the potential for further criminal activities.

Kenya's loss of development can be attributed to its colonial history. When Kenya gained independence in 1963 the first government inherited a boundary

³⁰ Russell Jones, "Kenya agrees to join AMISOM to fight Al-Shabab," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 48, no. 50 (2011): 15.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Menkhaus, *Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*: 17.

³⁶ Mike Pflanz, "Senior Kenyan figures facing International Criminal Court trial," *The Telegraph*, 23 Jan 2012.

dispute with Somalia and in its Northern Province a guerrilla war was fought.³⁷ From its colonial inheritance, the Kenyan population were alienated from the most fertile plains called the 'White Highlands' due to it being the area where European farmers had settled, and which retained the farms; the local labour force was exploited with the native workers being taxed, forcing the country into a cash economy and the development of cash crops, mainly tea and coffee.³⁸ This colonial inheritance or interference has led Kenya into more than forty years of being unable to rectify its economic problems and diversify and still today the vast amount of imported products come from Britain rather than its neighbouring nations.³⁹

Kenya's power production is insufficient, with weak transmission and distribution due to a lack of investment in its infrastructure it has led to a loss of productivity.⁴⁰ China, which has invested heavily in the region, as a means of gaining influence in Africa, has hoped to create a three acre factory in Nairobi to locally manufacture solar panels to harness solar energy.⁴¹ However, local labour laws are insufficient and "the existing legal and regulatory frameworks governing energy sub-sectors are inadequate and there is no specific law to regulate the management of renewable energy sub-sectors".⁴²

Kenya is a nation with problems from its colonial past but it also has a very unstable neighbour, Somalia. Problems in Somalia tend to flow into Kenya, for example when the recent drought occurred in Somalia the refugees fled to Kenya. However Kenya itself needs to invest in new infrastructure like solar energy in order to keep its population employed and its economy growing. However it does need to work on creating new labour laws to protect its

³⁷ Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* Second ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), 25.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Peter Draper, Tsidiso Disenyana, and Gilberto Biacuana, "Chinese investment in African network industries: case studies from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya," in *The Rise of China and India in Africa*, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books, 2010), 115.

⁴¹ Ibid., 117.

⁴² Ibid., 118.

workers and strengthen laws to prevent white collar crime so that all foreign aid money goes to the population.

Yemen



Figure 11: Map of Yemen showing the position of Yemen in relation to the prized Gulf of Aden route for shipping, downloaded from <http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/yemen.html> on 15th January 2012

Although Yemen is not strictly in Africa, it forms part of this study due to its location on the edge of the Gulf of Aden and its recent political trouble with removing its longstanding dictator from power. Yemen is on the brink where the rule of law is wavering or does not exist outside the capital. There is the potential for the same situation as exists in Somalia.

Yemen has been an ally to the Americans in their 'War on Terror'. It has a non-oil economy, as its oil exports are diminishing rapidly.⁴³ Unfortunately the government, which is ruled by an elite, has failed to invest sufficiently in the development of the country and as a result a "significant portion of the country's oil wealth has been squandered through corruption, and modernization has been inconsistent".⁴⁴ For the Yemenis who live outside the urban centres, tribes remain "an extremely important social, political and

⁴³ Sarah Phillips, "Yemen," in *The Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), 761.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 768.

economic institution".⁴⁵ The government has used the tribes to secure its power, having "absorbed the most politically significant tribal leaders increasing their wealth and power and the state's access to tribal areas".⁴⁶

Yemen was originally united in May 1990 when the Northern and Southern areas joined together, however the two regions could never come to agreement on how to share power; they descended into a two-month civil war in April 1994.⁴⁷ Yemen remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with the on-going tensions, and lack of government investment in much of the country. Life expectancy is lower than surrounding countries at only sixty years.⁴⁸ The current literacy rate is very low at only fifty per cent, with at least seventy per cent of women illiterate.⁴⁹ Yemen ranks lowest on the Human Development Index on any Arab country due to the fact that education and employment have not kept pace with the rapidly growing population.⁵⁰ The urban centres are where education and health are confined to, with the rural areas virtually ignored.⁵¹ In the southern regions and in Tihama there is a serious lack of basic services and facilities, although malnutrition and poverty are evident across all regions.⁵² Until 1991, Yemen had exported labour, with funds flowing back to family members, but then Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expelled Yemeni workers. Yemen's economy relied on the income sent into the country by these workers. This was a further economic impact for working class Yemenis, and especially outside of the urban centres.⁵³

President Ali Abdullah Salih has used "physical coercion to stay in power".⁵⁴ Yemen spends more than seven per cent of its Gross Domestic Product on the military and almost all the key military positions are held by Salih's son, half-

⁴⁵ Ibid., 769.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 761.

⁴⁸ Moghadam and Decker, "Social Change in the Middle East," 77.

⁴⁹ Phillips, "Yemen," 768.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 769/70.

⁵¹ Ibid., 768.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 770.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

brothers, cousins and nephews.⁵⁵ The 'elected' government has little real power and as the oil revenues reduce, the Salih regime "has had increasing difficulty containing dissent".⁵⁶ The outcome is that the country has provided the ideal environment for terrorism to flourish. The weak and corrupt government appears to be powerless to stop the country – in particular, rural areas – serving as a recruitment and operational base for terrorism.

The region is a 'hot bed' for terrorist activity, and naturally this is of concern to the West. Each of the countries highlighted has an actual threat of terrorism from either internal or neighbouring groups. These case studies demonstrate that a lack of democracy and/or weak government and the lack of meaningful investment in the infrastructure to make people's lives easier provide the situations in which terrorist groups can flourish. As illustrated with Somalia, linkages with transnational crime can provide the terrorist groups with the funding to support their activities and to widen their areas of operations. For groups such as Al Qaeda, and its aligned terrorist organisations, it is possible to exploit this situation. In Somalia the transitional government has very little power outside the capital. This should be of concern to all nations as lawlessness means that the piracy in the Gulf of Aden will continue in the long term. Yemen is another hot bed where the government has very little power outside the capital meaning that the people are vulnerable due to: law only provided by tribal law, illiteracy and lack of incorrupt investment in infrastructure. These vulnerabilities make the populace ready to be exploited by terrorist groups. The economic weakness and widespread discontent in the region means both change and terrorist threats are possible. In Kenya the government is stable but internal corruption, lack of development in infrastructure and the constant threat of terrorism from neighbouring Somalia, makes Kenya's economic future unstable.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 771.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 770.

Chapter 7

Central Sub-Saharan Africa

The region of Central Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the poorest in the world. Government corruption is so widespread here, there are very few laws preventing white collar crime therefore any foreign aid is unlikely to benefit the large numbers of the population. The areas of interest are the Sudan and its newest neighbour and the youngest country in the world, Southern Sudan and Nigeria.

The Sudan is a nation that for decades has been ravaged by long periods of drought which in turn cause the population to seek out more fertile land. However the way the population has sought out new land is cause for concern as they disrupt the original native population. This can lead to long periods of resentment.

Neighbouring Southern Sudan is an interesting case study as it displays how a country can become so segregated on religious, education and affluent grounds that eventually separates and becomes an individual nation but one with the looming threat of destruction from its larger neighbour.

Finally the resource-rich nation of Nigeria is another nation that is the grips of terrorism. Especially terrorism threats over religious differences between the highly educated Christians and the poorer but yet more populace uneducated Muslim communities.

The Sudan is where a split and formation of a new country was born out of religious differences; Nigeria is a country in the grips of religious intolerance and recent terrorist activity.

The Sudan




Figure 12: Map of Sudan. Also shows the previous traditional border between north and south Sudan beginning on the border of Central African Republic. The new oil resources are mainly on the southern side of this older border. Downloaded from <http://my.opera.com/nielsol/blog/2010/11/16/splitting-sudan-and-oil>

The Sudan has experienced decades of civil unrest and war which has left millions dead. However in 2005, Northern Sudan, which is predominantly Muslim, abandoned its civil war with the forces in the South. This enabled the separation of the two areas and both to focus on the re-establishment of civil order. In the North, there is strong support among the Muslim populace for a stricter Sharia law-based society, while in the South, the populace is primarily Christian based; there is demand for freedom and security from the Northern aggression. In 2011, the Christian South formally broke away to create Southern Sudan; the formal announcement came after eighteen months of gruelling negotiations in Doha, Qatar.¹

The Darfur region in the south-west of the new smaller Sudan is still hotly contested and the regime there has engaged in what the United States has formally labelled as genocide.² The Darfur region is home to eighty different ethnic groups, with nomadic Arabs primarily in the northern areas of Darfur and agricultural African ethnic groups in the central and southern areas.³ During the early 1970s, there was a severe drought which drove the Arab tribes from the northern areas of Darfur and from neighbouring countries like Chad to move into the central and southern parts of Darfur, increasing the population from three million to six million.⁴ This sudden and severe increase in population combined with the famine and the collapse of the fragile ecosystem contributed to the conflicts over land and water.⁵ The Arab militias known as the Janjaweed tend to travel on horseback with rifles and swords and they terrify the local populace in order to make them move. The Janjaweed began to brutally murder anyone who was opposed to them and their ideals.⁶ The conflicts over land and water were exacerbated by the deliberate exclusion of the Christian Southern Sudanese by the Northern Muslim-dominated government in

¹ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 45.

² Ibid., 46.

³ He Wenping, "The Darfur Issue: a new test for China's Africa policy," in *The rise of China and India in Africa*, ed. Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (London: Zed Books, 2010), 156.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Khartoum which wanted the strict imposition of sharia law across the whole of Sudan.⁷

The Sudan has had a rather notorious past when it comes to terrorists and has been known as a safe haven. In 1994 after the failed assassination attempt of President Mubarak, the terrorist 'Carlos the Jackal' namely Ilich Ramirez Sanchez arrived for sanctuary in Khartoum.⁸ Unfortunately Sanchez was not discreet and embarrassed the Khartoum government with his ill-disguised fornication and drunken behaviour in a strict Muslim society; therefore they came to an agreement with the French who had been chasing him since 1974.⁹ Hoping to dispel its image as a terrorist haven the regime allowed on the night of 13 August 1994 French DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure) agents to abduct the Jackal.¹⁰ By 1996 the Khartoum government became weary of the presence of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda within its borders. They first offered to extradite Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia however the Saudis declined due to their fear of domestic repercussions.¹¹ The representatives of the Sudanese government met with the CIA in Rosslyn, Virginia in February 1996 and offered to seize Bin Laden and deliver him to Jidda where the Saudi's could then turn him over to the Americans.¹² The Americans deeply distrusted the Sudanese to keep their word and also it was during that time against American law to kidnap a foreign national.¹³ In one of the pre September 11 failings was the inability of American agencies to share intelligence with one another, and during 1996 the State Department's ambassador to the Sudan, Tim Carney was, against his will, preparing to close the American Embassy due security concerns over the *mujahidin jihadists* in terrorist training camps surrounding the capital.¹⁴ Eventually in May of 1996 the Khartoum government

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 218.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 220.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

managed to convince Bin Laden to return to Afghanistan where he described the Sudanese government and complained that he had spent over one hundred and sixty million in a country where the government was a mixture of religion and organised crime.¹⁵

In 1992 to 1999 marked a boom for the nation in the form of oil exploration; it also gave the Khartoum government a new ally, China, who was looking for new sources of oil for its own growing needs.¹⁶ In 1994 America added Sudan to its list of states sponsoring terrorism and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid ended.¹⁷ By 1997 the United States had imposed sanctions on the Khartoum government with one exception; Sudan is a primary producer of gum arabic, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of soft drinks and adhesives.¹⁸ Even during a period of sanctions Sudan was able to freely export its main crop of gum arabic and ship oil to China.

However the Sudan remains an inherently poor and mismanaged economy in part due to its large loans with the World Bank. The Sudanese government have also gone on a large spending spree on military armaments during its civil war. There is widespread prevalent corruption that even Bin Laden complained about. The problems of the Sudan are also due to the impact of natural disasters like drought. Basically the country lacks water or major forms of infrastructure to provide irrigation like large amounts of dams and subsequent canals and channels to irrigate the land even in the dry years. These major projects have been successful in Egypt and have been started in Ethiopia as a means to combat drought in the long term. China has invested in one dam project however the Khartoum government is unlikely to invest in more large scale infrastructure projects like these.

¹⁵ Ibid., 221.

¹⁶ Ibid., 231.

¹⁷ Ibid., 235.

¹⁸ Ibid., 239.

Southern Sudan



Figure 13: Showing the newest nation South Sudan, downloaded from <http://zolengthe.net/2011/07/09/south-sudan-becomes-worlds-newest-nation/south-sudan-map/> on the 15th January 2012

Southern Sudan was created after decades of civil war with Sudan. However this has not meant that the Sudan or Southern Sudan is stable. Reforms and clarifying property rights have helped Southern Sudan to initially set up to attract businesses to open in Southern Sudan but unfortunately the cost of starting a business is two hundred and fifty per cent per capita income more than twice the average cost in sub-Saharan Africa¹⁹. Completely under the control of the Juba government is billions of dollars in assistance it received for maintaining peace and stability in the territory it now holds. The Juba government have backed down from war as they are aware of the billions of dollars they have received in aid depends on their ability to maintain peace and stability.²⁰ However both the Sudan and Southern Sudan are developing a militaristic means that could mean a possible outbreak of near future hostilities²¹.

¹⁹ Bunmi Akpata-Ohohe, "Southern Sudan:the new nation is open for business," *Africa Today* 17, no. 6/7 (2011): 7.

²⁰ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 46.

²¹ Ibid.

Sudan and its newest neighbour, Southern Sudan, are still contesting several areas. The disputed state of Abyei with its oil wealth plus rich grazing land and water resources has been a major point of contention between the two nations.²² Border regions on the Sudan side have experienced gun battles backed by air strikes.²³ Recent fighting has broken out in the Sudan's southern province called Kordofan and the American envoy to the Sudan has warned that it is probable that the fighting could spread into Southern Sudan in the near future²⁴. Rebels in Kordofan and in the western region of Darfur in Sudan are loosely allied together against the Sudanese government²⁵. Fighting also continues in the regions of Jonglei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile²⁶. The reasons behind the fighting are unclear but the regions are within the older southern border (as shown in figure 12). In general the number of civilian casualties and the size of the catastrophe amongst civilians whose loyalties may remain with the South, despite being well within Northern borders, suggest there may be an older, insidious motive behind the attacks similar to the genocide motive in Darfur.²⁷ However northern Jonglei, southern Blue Nile and south Kordofan are near the historic traditional border between north and south Sudan and they also contain the new oil wealth.

Southern Sudan is new as a stable country, however in its fear from the past makes it vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups. Basically if the population feel afraid of being invaded by their northern neighbour then the people may be easier to recruit into terrorist groups. Unfortunately recent news from the region in 2012 cites that both the Sudan and Southern Sudan are increasing their arsenals in preparation for war.²⁸

²² Ibid., 45.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Brooks Tigner, "Kordofan conflict liable to spill into South Sudan," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 48, no. 33 (2011): 16.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "Annual Defence Report- The Middle East and Africa," 45.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 46.

Nigeria



Figure14: Map of Nigeria showing the Northern city of Kano downloaded from <http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-565237.0.html> on the 15th January 2012

Nigeria is a country that is in crisis. It is a country is divided ethnically, with a Muslim majority in the north and Christian minority in the south. The government admits that it has been infiltrated by the terrorist organisation seeking regime change and responsible for the bombings in the north of the country during the Christmas period of 2011. The coordinated attacks on 22 January killed over one hundred and fifty people.

As with most countries in Africa, Nigeria has a colonial past, and part of its ethnic problem is that Nigeria was forcibly amalgamated by the British in 1914, when the Nigerian Northern and Southern Protectorates were merged into the one colony, which subsequently became the nation.²⁹ Nigeria has suffered from a constant level of political corruption and waste as the nation's wealth has

²⁹ Biodun Omojola, "The Task Before Jonathan," *Africa Today* 17, no. 6/7 (2011): 9.

been squandered of riches and stashed away in foreign banks by the ruling elite.³⁰ On 29 May 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in and shattered all preconceptions in the country, proving that a person could come from anywhere in Nigeria to become President. Previously, the rule would have had to have come from one of the three main ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. This nation has more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups, sharing eight hundred languages amongst one hundred and fifty million people before 1999 the leader was always chosen from the Northern tribe the Hausa/Fulani.³¹ However, President Jonathan is from the fourth major tribe, Ijaw.³² Therefore it can be said that the situation in Nigeria is not fixed, but there are still major challenges to overcome. Nigerians are clear about what they want from their new president-they want a country where hospitals work, where school are running efficiently as they use to, where roads are good and not the death traps, and where they have a constant supply of electricity.³³

Nigeria is the fourth highest producer of cocoa beans after Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Indonesia.³⁴ Cocoa beans are used to produce cocoa powder and chocolate which is primarily consumed in westernized, fully developed economies that drive the demand for this product. This product bonds together "some of the most affluent parts of the world with some of the poorest".³⁵ There is a huge discrepancy in producing the cocoa product, with more than ninety per cent of all cocoa beans grown globally produced by small-hold farmers who cultivate a few hectares at most and use family labour to harvest the crop.³⁶ However, five companies control nearly sixty per cent of the global market: Mars Incorporated, Nestle, Kraft (which took over Cadbury on early 2010), Hershey and Ferrero. In the United States, three companies (Hershey, Mars and Nestle)

³⁰ Kayode Soyinka, "Nigerians can dream again," *Africa Today* 17, no. 6/7 (2011): 4.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Omojula, "The Task Before Jonathan," 9.

³³ Soyinka, "Nigerians can dream again," 4.

³⁴ Jeff Neilson, "Chocolate: A Global Value Chain Of A Tropical Commodity," *Geodate* 23, no. 2 (2010): 7.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

account for a eighty per cent of that country's chocolate market.³⁷ These branded manufacturers "increasingly determine the conditions in which cocoa farmers cultivate and manage their farms".³⁸ There is concern that cocoa farmers "barely receive a subsistence-level income".³⁹

The environment is affected due to over-production of cocoa; basically the farmer grows the cocoa bean plants for a peak ten years but after this production will decline, especially after twenty-five years when the "ageing trees are most susceptible such that old cocoa plots are frequently abandoned and new farms established (often virgin forest land where farmers initially benefit from fertile soils and low levels of pests and disease)".⁴⁰ Often farmers in these areas are forced to keep producing this crop in order to survive. They must keep seeking out more fertile soil so they invade and destroy parts of virgin forest; this is long term unsustainable growth. Nigeria suffers from the drop in the world price for cocoa beans. The economic stability of the country rises and falls with the price of cocoa beans.

Boko Haram means "no western education" and is a Sunni Muslim organisation located in the Muslim half of the country.⁴¹ The organisation was formed and led by a charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed in 2009.⁴² This was part of a power struggle to control the Muslim organisations within the country, and which has seen an increase in political violence and terrorism in Nigeria. As with other nations in which Islamic movements are promoted by economic poverty and lack of progress, Nigeria is threatened by terrorism, which is emerging as a significant threat in the region, especially with urban terrorism from Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb.

³⁷ Ibid., 9.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁴¹ Jason Burke, "Boko Haram: a local phenomenon, not a global threat," *The Guardian*, 27th January 2012.

⁴² Ibid.

These case studies demonstrate how these nations are vulnerable to the threat brought by terrorist organisations. In these nations there are not enough laws to prevent and prosecute white collar crime. Both the Sudan and Nigeria have been given millions of dollars in aid money but yet often these funds never reach their destination instead the ex-government officials from each country are often to be found living in wealthy mansions in London or Paris. The Sudan is in a state of flux and when the next drought hits the increasing large population then the people will seek out new fertile plains. The Janjaweed will seek out new areas to terrorise including in the new country of Southern Sudan. They may threaten violence to different tribes and minorities as they did in Darfur the threat of war with Southern Sudan will increase. The fortunes of millions in the Sudan will live or die dependent on weather conditions as the government has yet to implement large scale infrastructure projects to create larger fertile lands by creating dams in lakes and rivers and developing canals and channels to spread across the previously barren landscape. However the government would rather not spend money on these large scale infrastructure projects unlike Ethiopia; the government would rather spend money on its military in preparation for more conflict with the South. Both the Sudan and Nigeria are examples of religious ethnic violence created by seemly unfair education systems; basically the Christian minority is seen as literate and well educated whereas the increasingly large Muslim populations are often illiterate and under-educated. This disparity leads to the perception that the minority are trying to take over the country whereas educated people are just trying to get better jobs so that they can provide a better life for their children. The Sudan has for years suffered from a civil war due to this perception of disparity in the local communities. Nigeria has recently suffered from ethnic violence due to the same perception of disparity.

Conclusion

The problems occurring in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa have been ignored or misunderstood for far too long. The broader region has suffered from the adverse effects of interference from colonialism and the problems of inadequate government since their colonial times. The preconditions for terrorism to exist are modernisation, urbanisation and a weak or inadequate government with little or no true power or will to bring about the rule of law to control terrorist activities. An individual must have the ability to realise that their fate is not predestined otherwise they will fight to have the right to choose a future.

The factors that cause a populace to defer to terrorism are a sense of grievance, deprivation including poverty and other adverse effects of globalisation, rank disequilibrium including class and tribal alterations, and changes in attainments or expectations. Basically, the sense of injustice contributes to the emergence of a terrorist base and threat. The feeling of grievance can be exploited by narcissistic leaders with borderline personalities, and also by groups that are opposed to them. The sense of injustice can also make individuals turn to terrorism in order for the mass population at large to hear of their suffering and sense of injustice. This is evident across the nations that have been discussed; Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa have endured decades of political suppression which can lead the populace of the nation to feel the sense of grievance that should be of concern to the West.

Most of the Northern and Sub-Saharan countries are primary producers. They produce a commodity that is surplus to their requirements and they need to be able to sell the commodity, or commodities, on the global market. Unfortunately primary commodities can be grown in a wide variety of countries, resulting in stronger competition and reduced payments for the commodities. Political suppression has meant that many of these nations see little benefit for the profits from these crops marketed to the West (Europe/North America) or to

the East (Middle East/Asia). Most of these countries have neglected to diversify their crops and also because of they cannot benefit from reinvestment as their nations suffer from abject white collar corruption by their leaders and their supporters, corruption and mismanagement. They have not been able to take their profits and reinvest the money in new equipment, new disease resistant plants, and other means of progress.

Due to political corruption, most of the income from commodities such as oil or cocoa beans has been siphoned off, often to promote causes that are not to the benefit of the populace; generally, a dictator or his supporters can pocket the profits or funnel funds to other causes which may include fundamental Islamist activities for example in Libya. Politicians in this area of Africa have neglected to change their laws to discourage financial abuse and still continue to neglect the damage caused by white collar crime. Often ex-government officials in the region siphon off foreign aid money meant for the populace then they retire to live in London or Paris.

Terrorism in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa is the result of a vicious cycle of abuse. First an individual country has changed from a subsistence farming-based economy to a primary commodity-based economy in order to repay loans to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Secondly, the country neglects to diversify commodities and the initial boom of profit from production is siphoned away from the population by political corruption and white collar crime. In the next stage, the economy suffers a blow; generally due to the large expansion of the global market place where too many countries begin to produce a commodity for the world market. At the same time the country may suffer from a natural disaster like a drought where the crops fail to produce enough of the commodity, and further there is increasing migration to cities. Then the population suffers from high unemployment, rising food prices and a lowering of their standard of living. This creates an atmosphere for individuals who feel a grievance and sense of injustice.

Ethnic groups and individuals suffering from oppression, poverty and/or a change in the feeling of attainment or expectations will begin to look for options to change their circumstances. In most of the Northern and Sub-Saharan African nations, the populations have been politically suppressed. There is little room where an individual can voice their discontent. While it is the minority who become involved in terrorism, the important point is that the conditions explain and provide the incentive and opportunity for the minority to choose this course of action. Individuals can turn to violence as a means of exposing to the rest of the population the result of their circumstances and to bring widespread public attention to their cause.

Through the introduction of violence they may hope that their circumstances will change. Realising that your own poverty is not predestined and that you can rise above your situation in life through education and work free from servitude, and to have your own personal feeling of security and the rule of law upheld is possibly the real meaning of freedom. Citizens cannot have the faith that their government will act swiftly and fairly if the government itself is thought to be inherently corrupt; citizens must be able to trust their own government. Unfortunately, for nations in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, the people generally have little trust in their governments and the feeling of injustice is prevalent.

Development is not just the process through which people are able to meet their basic needs; it is an idea of social, economic and political progress through which can lead to a more enhanced way of life. Unfortunately for the nations in these regions, development has not necessarily meant progress. In Tunisia, for example, the authoritarian government sought to bring foreign investment into the country with the thought that jobs and development would soon follow. They were only partly right: the development took place but it was located in certain regions and because of shortcomings in the political regimes the benefits did not flow to all the people. In order for a brighter future for the country the government needs to invest in the southern and western regions of Tunisia.

Libya was ruled for forty years by Muammar Gaddafi who at some moments seemed close to insane, with flamboyant clothing, decadent lifestyle, and ranting especially in the last few years. He spent Libya's oil profits on enriching himself, his family and his supporters. He was also indiscriminate and funnelled large amounts of money to terrorist causes around the world. Libya now needs to spend its declining oil wealth on its people, encouraging small businesses to open (previously banned under Gaddafi) and it also should reinstate property ownership. This would bring a measure of stability to its economy and allow for foreign investment.

Egypt was ruled by a dictator, Mubarak, but one which was supported by Washington as he ensured the support of his government in the fight against Al Qaeda after September 11. However, rising food prices and the cost of living rose, and high unemployment meant that Egyptians were not happy with his leadership. In fact, they were only satisfied with his leadership at the beginning when he made reforms loosening the previous strict regime's policies. Egypt desperately needs social and economic reforms especially the introduction of social security and healthcare in an effort to curb the population's need for large families to take care of them in their old age. It also needs to work with and not against Ethiopia in creating long term sustainable management of the Nile's resources. Ethiopia is only trying to stop its own population from dying in drought years but Egypt also relies on the Nile's valuable water supplies to irrigate its fertile plains.

Morocco was entirely dependent on its commodity, phosphate and trading this on the global market. Unfortunately the price of phosphate dropped. Morocco has become too dependent on trade with the European Union and rises and falls with the European economies' highs and lows. Morocco also needs to slowly bring infrastructure like water, sewerage and electricity into the *bidonvilles* communities and not to go to the large and costly expense of knocking them down and rebuilding low cost housing. Morocco simply cannot afford to make mistakes with its limited resources.

Algeria suffered under colonialism and its Islamic terrorist activity problems stem from this time. Also the government has been inherently corrupt and incredibly poor at managing Algeria's wealth. Both Morocco and Algeria need to diversify their markets away from Europe alone. Europe has shown that it is not infallible; the European market at the present time is very volatile. Morocco and Algeria could start to diversify their markets by opening trade with their newly free neighbours in North Africa: Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

Somalia is a state in virtual collapse. The transitional government has only control of the north-western region. The southern area is controlled by the terrorist group Al Shabab, with ties to Al Qaeda. The breakdown in law and order has resulted in transnational and regional crime groups becoming prevalent. In particular, piracy is run from the northern cities. If this state of lawlessness continues then it is likely that each of Somalia's neighbours will slowly absorb parts of this nation into their own.

Kenya is also a nation under threat from the Al Shabab movement. Kenya has sent in large numbers of troops to try to restore law in Somalia but also to try to curb Al Shabab from activities within Kenya. It will need to keep law and order control in its own country but it also needs to strengthen its laws preventing white collar crime and create labour laws to protect its workers from unscrupulous global companies. It also is necessary for it to invest in more stable infrastructure like solar energy to replace its ageing electricity grid.

Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world, and suffers from political corruption and Islamic terrorism, which is of particular concern as it is centred in one of the most strategically important areas of the world, the Gulf of Aden. Somalia and Yemen have hard tasks ahead of them they must be able to exercise law and order outside the capital. It would be best and easiest to work with the tribal leaders who are the only form of law that the population will currently trust. Countries like Yemen and Morocco which rely on income derived from exporting their labour force need to concentrate on literacy and education reforms. Yemen like Morocco must stop relying on exporting its labour force.

Otherwise the economy is too susceptible when countries like Saudi Arabia expel their workers. Also the illegal immigration rates into Europe will not continue for long as there are growing calls within Europe to expel illegal immigrants. In basic terms they may not be able to export their labour to Europe or the Middle East for much longer. These workers would then return home to uncertain futures and plunge their economies further downwards.

The Sudan has been in a bitter civil war for years, which resulted in the southern Christian dominated area becoming a separate nation. The western region within Sudan, Darfur has experienced the brunt of ethnic and religion-based conflict, including genocide by the Arab militias known as the Janjaweed. Sudan's government is pursuing a policy of punishing any region or area that was allied with Southern Sudan, which has seen recent attacks as a warning that the conflict between the two nations may not be over. The Sudan needs to stop spending large amounts of money on weapons and military manpower and instead should be spending its new oil wealth on creating more large scale infrastructure projects like more dams with channels and waterways to irrigate fields even in dry years the impact of drought would be less severe if these projects were in place. Southern Sudan should be concentrating reducing fees so that small businesses would start and the economy would grow. Both countries need to stop spending there limited resources on arsenals and concentrate on economic concerns otherwise internal discontent will mean that they will be plagued by terrorism for decades to come.

Nigeria has suffered from the most recent terrorist activity due to the fact this is a country that has a large northern Muslim population and a smaller primarily Southern based Christian population. Most of the country's presidents have come from one of the three major tribes which were Northern and Muslim. Due to the assassination of the last President, a new Southern and Christian President is in power and in protest, the terrorist group Boko Haram, has begun a terror campaign. Nigeria needs to strengthen its laws to prevent and prosecute white collar crime. It also needs to keep law and order with the new threats from the Boko Haram group. It also needs to diversify its crops away

from just cocoa beans alone otherwise the long term impact for the environment and farmers is not sustainable.

The Arab Spring demonstrated the vulnerabilities of these nations to regime change and collapse. The young populations of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, armed with social media networking sites, started the Arab Spring, which moved onto armed uprisings when required. The current desperate situations in these case study countries provide the foundation for terrorist recruitment and expansion of terrorist activities. Al Qaeda and aligned organisations have taken advantage of these situations in these nations to promote their own causes, including engaging in a 'war' with the West. While not universally successful, these groups have benefitted from the corruption and mismanagement of the African nations, and, more importantly, they have been able to recruit from militant minorities in these countries. The manner in which the terrorist groups operate, and the situations that prevail in the largely Muslim regions, should be of concern to Western nations. It is apparent that without dealing with the political, economic and social circumstances in these countries, the terrorist groups will continue to flourish.

Each nation needs to concentrate on creating and strengthening laws to combat, prosecute and pursue white collar crime. This would mean that foreign aid money would actually be more likely to end up helping to create a stable infrastructure for each nation. Also each nation should be concentrating on social policy reforms like the introduction of social security in countries like Egypt where the population is rapidly expanding due to the fact that without social security families rely on their children to take care of them in their old age; with more children the burden is spread more evenly. In the long term, the introduction of social security will bring out a reduction in the size of families and less of a burden on the already failing infrastructure. The nations of this region also need to diversify their crops so that when one price of a commodity crop on the world market falls the nation is not reliant on that crop alone. This would cushion the farmers from the impact of the volatile world market. Also countries like Morocco and Algeria need to diversify their markets,

relying on Europe alone is a mistake, they should open their economies to new markets so that when Europe's economy is in chaos it does not impact their country disastrously. Countries like Morocco and Yemen need to concentrate on education reform and their habit of exporting their labour force may not last much longer. It may be strange to discuss laws and social policy in a thesis on terrorism but these small changes could bring simple economic stability changes to the countries in the case studies. This grasp on prosperity could then limit the amount of grievance and sense of injustice a population feels. If an individual feels as if there is a way out and forward from their reduced economic circumstance then the individual is less likely to turn to criminal or terrorist activity.

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