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Gender, Security, and Development: A Bougainville case study

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Development Studies at Massey University, Palmerston North

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2012
Abstract

Research on contemporary alignments of development and security agendas has paid limited attention to how gender relations, roles and issues of equality are constructed and experienced within post-conflict contexts. While practices like gender mainstreaming have been committed to in principle and in policy by organisations and countries heavily involved in development and security interventions, more research is required into actual practices and outcomes.

This thesis utilises a case study, the Bougainville Community Policing Project, to examine the efficacy of gender approaches practiced within a merged security-development intervention. The research highlights how increased participation of women within such interventions, while important for meeting practical gender needs, is not in itself enough to enable more strategic gender needs to be met. In seeking to understand more fully the gendered impacts of such interventions on communities the prioritising of particular development issues over others, including gender equality, becomes visible.
Acknowledgements

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To everyone in Bougainville who participated in this research and shared their stories and experiences with me, a stranger from far away, with such openness and warmth – thank you.

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABG</td>
<td>Autonomous Bougainville Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AROB</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Bougainville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCL</td>
<td>Bougainville Copper Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPP</td>
<td>Bougainville Community Policing Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Bougainville Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRF</td>
<td>Bougainville Resistance Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Auxiliary Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Complex Political Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZPOL</td>
<td>New Zealand Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGK</td>
<td>Papua New Guinean Kina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Peace Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGDF</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPNGC</td>
<td>Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR1325</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution 1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMG</td>
<td>Truce Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMB</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville</td>
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1. Introduction

This thesis seeks to use a gender lens to explore the practical impacts that alignments of development and security agendas have within post-conflict intervention contexts. Contemporary framings of both development as a security issue and security as a development issue have increased since the 1990s to the point where lines between humanitarianism and securitisation have become blurred. This merging of development and security (Duffield, 2001) has become so commonplace that it is rarely questioned why military or police personnel are utilised for humanitarian purposes. The boundaries between not only humanitarianism and securitisation but also crisis management, reconstruction, peace-building, and conflict prevention are fluid and inconsistent, and the discourse that is utilised in discussing these issues is also often lacking precision and clarity (Duffield, 2001, pp. 16-17). Far more questioning of why development is being securitised, for what purpose, and to what end is required. This thesis, therefore, aims to bring into focus how theories and practices of security, development, and gender intersect and are experienced, at the community level.

In examining the literature that is currently available concerning merged security-development interventions, and also security sector reform (SSR) more generally and within post-conflict contexts, what becomes clear is the wide availability of accounts and experiences of security personnel being deployed for these forms of interventions. While there is research available that uncovers the experiences of those who are the audience for these merged security-development interventions, there is a definite imbalance favouring the examination of the experiences, understandings, and preferred discourses (particularly in policy and documentation) of the interveners
rather than those within the communities and security services being ‘intervened on’ and reshaped into Western ideals of what an ordered and policed society should be.

In deciding to analyse one specific case study for this thesis, it is my aim to highlight and bring focus to the different and changing experiences of women and men at the receiving end of blurred security-development interventions. The Bougainville Community Policing Project (BCPP) was selected as it allows for the examination of a long-term intervention within a post-conflict context, a context in which theories and practices of not only development and security, but also gender, can be situated and explored. The main tool within the BCPP are the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) who work on an as-required basis within their own communities to assist both the village-level law and order structures, centred around the village courts and chiefs, the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), and the formal law and justice sector of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). Interviewing a number of CAPs from various parts of Bougainville, as well as community members and others from Bougainville society who are engaged at some level with the law and justice sector of the region, has enabled the focus of this research to truly be centred on those who experience the merged security-development intervention that is the BCPP.

The research site’s location within Melanesia also enables this thesis to highlight the significance of issues relating to security, development and gender for our Pacific region. While there is a large amount of research available on Australian interventions within the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the experiences of Australian personnel (see Dinnen, 2008; Dinnen & McLeod, 2008 & 2009; Goldsmith, 2009; Wehner & Denoon, 2001), examinations of New Zealand-led or managed interventions are, with
obvious reason, far sparser. As both New Zealand and Australia have, over the last 15 years in particular, come to utilise their police and militaries as vehicles for official development assistance (ODA) there should be far more examination of the motivations behind this and the actual outcomes that occur, not simply assessments of whether or not project goals have been met. What do these interventions do in practice, and in particular what impacts do they have on gender relations and gender equality? These questions are the main motivations that underlie this thesis, and are questions that will be discussed as we proceed.

When looking at the BCPP and reflecting on how issues of security, development and gender intersect within it, a key theme that emerges is that of how effective the participation of female personnel is in terms of improving the project’s ability to make effective, positive contributions to gender equality for Bougainville. In assessing the literature that surrounds the topic of gender mainstreaming, two primary strategies emerge – the ‘integrationist’ or gender balancing approach and the more strategically feminist ‘agenda-setting’ approach (Jahan, 1995). The BCPP has an open strategy of attempting to improve gender balance by increasing the number of female CAPs participating in the project. This case study has therefore additionally allowed for an examination of that strategy and how effective it has been in Bougainville in terms of not only gender equality but also empowerment.

Situating this thesis within a Melanesian context has also allowed for the examination of another issue central to development studies – the significance of indigenous systems and structures, and their interaction with Western-led and designed interventions (Dinnen & Braithwaite, 2009; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). Assessing this
from a gender perspective is also important, as this has been lacking in the literature surrounding the issue of ‘multi-choice policing’ in Melanesia (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009, p. 335). Within Asia-Pacific, and indeed internationally, SSR and police capacity development programmes have an underlying focus on reforming law and order agencies to model Western best-practice policing styles and systems. In Melanesia this reformation is intensely complex due to the significance and strength of village-level law and order systems that continue to be the most widely accessible ways for people within rural communities (which is most of the population in Melanesia) to access some form of security assistance or justice. Within the Bougainville context the BCPP was founded to not ‘reform’ the indigenous village practices, but to actually utilise them to strengthen not only peace-building processes that continue to this day, but also to assist with aligning or bringing them into cooperation with the more formal law and justice providers. As shall be explored in this thesis, positioning and highlighting the gendered effects of this mediation between traditional and Westernised systems should play an essential part of any analysis of securitised development interventions be it in Melanesia or other areas where indigenous traditional systems interact with imported governing institutions.

This research therefore explored four primary research questions, which aimed at establishing not only the gendered effects of the merging of development and security, but also whether or not interventions like the BCPP are able to effect any sort of improvement in gender equality and women’s empowerment: Papua New Guinea after all ranked 140th (out of the 146 countries ranked) in the 2011 Gender Inequality Index (UNDP, 2011).
1.1 Research questions

The three primary research questions of this thesis, and their associated research aims are as follows:

**Research Question One:** What strategies are currently being employed within the Bougainville Community Policing Project to address gendered inequalities and how effective are they?

- Interview participants and stakeholders to assess how gender is conceptualised, approached and mediated within the BCPP and its location, Bougainville.
- Critically assess the gender mainstreaming strategies employed by the BCPP and their outcomes.

**Research Question Two:** What are the gendered effects of the increased alignment of official development assistance with security agendas?

- Interview participants to identify and analyse the different ways that the men and women of Bougainville, individually and collectively, experience the BCPP intervention.
- Contribute to filling the gap that exists in academic research on the differences and inequalities that exist in men’s and women’s security needs and wants.

**Research Question Three:** Can security sector reform and police capacity development interventions be used to foster improved gender relations and increased equality and empowerment?

- Identify strategies and approaches being used by the BCPP and CAPs that support women and men to meet their practical and strategic security needs.
- Discuss the benefits and risks that the increasing alignment of security and development agendas has for gender relations.
While my research questions and aims obviously have a central focus on women and derive from a feminist perspective, it is important to state that this does not mean that I am ignoring men and masculinities. Gender cannot be examined in some sort of female-only vacuum (Kabeer, 2010, p. 107), and this is particularly significant when exploring issues relating to security and development, especially in post-conflict societies. ‘Security’ and the associated masculinities that are tied up within it are framed in very specific and complex ways. While there is an increasing prominence of research seeking to examine security and masculinities, particularly from a post-conflict viewpoint (see Bevan, 2011; Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002; Parpart, 2010; Whitworth, 2004), it is an area deserving of far more attention than it receives, particularly as positive change in the area of gender relations and inequality cannot be achieved without men. I will touch on masculinities in *Chapter Three* and *Chapter Six*, but the primary focus throughout the thesis remains on women and the marginalisation they experience within the merged security-development nexus.

### 1.2 Thesis structure

What is included in this thesis reflects my attempt to understand the gendered effects of the merged security-development paradigm and the relationship that exists, theoretically and practically, between gender, security and development. The first four chapters seek to introduce the context of the research and position it within existing academic literature. The second half of the thesis outlines the research that was conducted over a five-week period in November and December 2011 in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. Key themes that emerged are discussed before conclusions are offered.
Chapter Two reviews the literature that is available on not only the contemporary merging of development and security, but also of traditional theories of development and security, and feminist critiques of these theories and discourse. Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 is discussed before the literature surrounding SSR and international policing interventions, particularly within Asia-Pacific, is outlined. Chapter Three outlines what theoretical approaches have been significant in formulating my understandings of gender, which have relevance for security and development also, as well as exploring the strategy of gender mainstreaming in more depth.

The methodological approach that was employed during the research is detailed in Chapter Four. An outline of the fieldwork is also provided, giving the reader an indication of how my research was conducted and how findings emerged. Chapter Five focuses on bringing context to the research location – Bougainville. While it is important to briefly outline the Bougainville conflict, the majority of this chapter highlights the key aspects of contemporary and historical Bougainville culture and society that relate to gender, development and security. Therefore I address the role of women and Bougainville’s matrilineal systems, the legacies of colonialism and Christianity, and the continuing strength and resilience of ‘kastom’\(^1\) and traditional, restorative justice practices. Chapter Five concludes with a look at the origins and history of the BCPP, the intervention being utilised as a case study.

Research findings are then detailed in Chapter Six, with discussions expanding on several key themes. Community perceptions and understandings of development and

\(^1\) ‘Kastom’ is the Tok Pisin term for cultural beliefs, traditions and practices.
security are explored, as are the gendered effects of CAPs’ policing strategies. Gender roles and the changes that are occurring within Bougainvillean communities are highlighted, as is the importance of traditional law and order structures and how, in practice, communities mediate Melanesia’s unique ‘multi-choice’ law and justice situation. The Bougainville Police Service is also discussed here, and is particularly relevant as they are set to inherit the BCPP from the New Zealand police at some point in the future.

Concluding the thesis in Chapter Seven, I attempt to make sense of the research findings within the wider context of the merging of development and security. Benefits and risks associated with interventions like the BCPP are summarised, as are the practical, gendered impacts experienced by the communities experiencing the BCPP intervention. Suggestions for further study are outlined before some concluding thoughts are offered to readers.

1.3 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to offer readers an introduction to my research and the aims underlying it. In summation this thesis provides an overview of how global political trends have gendered impacts on very vulnerable, post-conflict communities. The merging of development and security is often viewed as some sort of abstract or theoretical idea. There is a need, therefore, to take a closer look at individual case studies. It is here that we are able to see the practical effects of interventions and explore how communities experience, resist and incorporate these effects into their sometimes disturbingly insecure lives. In the following chapter I shall move on and
begin to examine the relevant academic literature that surrounds the issues of
development, security and gender.
2. The merging of development and security

This purpose of this chapter is to position the research that I conducted in Bougainville within the wider literature available concerning security-development interventions. I also aim to provide some focus on the key components and constructions within the security-development paradigm. While sections 1 and 2 briefly analyse understandings of development and security, the later sections build on these understandings to examine how security and development have come to be so closely connected and how international policing and security sector reform fit into this merged arena. In examining how security-development interventions actually impact on the communities they are deployed in I have found using Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti-politics’ framework useful. The final section in this chapter therefore looks at this more closely to show how this approach is of value when examining the key research findings in later chapters.

2.1 Understandings of development

To start, let us look briefly at recent, key understandings of development. This is important as understanding the ways in which development has and continues to be constructed sheds light on how it has come to be conceptually and practically entwined with ‘security’.

Post-development theorists like Escobar and Esteva have paid much attention to the ‘era of development’ (Esteva, 1992, p. 6) that was spawned by Truman’s 1949 inauguration speech (ibid., pp. 6-7; Escobar, 1988, pp. 429-430). Truman’s ‘doctrine’ of American intervention and thus problem-solving of world poverty originated from the successes of post-war reconstruction attempts in Europe and Japan, and continued
throughout the Cold War (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pp. 222, 234-235). Western ideals of ‘progress’ and ‘modernisation’, as exemplified Rostow’s (1956) *The Take-off into Sustained Growth*, dominated understandings of development throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, p. 234) and came to shape thinking about those societies who did not meet the Western standard of ‘modern’. While I concur that this era, and it’s ‘development project’ (McMichael, 1981, p. 44) led by the United States, is a key point in the history of the idea of ‘development’, I would also like to draw attention to the thinking that ‘development’, as it is understood today, emerged much earlier than 1949.

Rather than focusing on Truman’s speech as an originating point in the history of the conceptualisation of development as ‘progress’, Cowen and Shenton (1995) argue that the concept of development emerged as a reaction to and attempt to ‘impose order’ on nineteenth century industrialisation and the economic and social changes that this phenomenon brought forth (p. 31). Viewing development as intentional, actively constructed attempts to impose order and shape societies’ ‘progress’ following rapid industrialisation, rather than as some sort of natural, immanent occurrence (Cowen & Shenton, 1995; Duffield, 2007, p. 9), holds relevance for contemporary constructions of development, particularly in light of its ‘radicalisation’ or ‘securitisation’ (Duffield, 2001). Merged security-development interventions can also be seen as active attempts to control disorder and chaos, as we shall explore in later sections of this chapter.

The interventions that were undertaken as part of the US-led ‘development project’ of the Cold War can also, rather obviously, be compared to more contemporary security-
development interventions, hence it is important to highlight the significance of the post-development critiques of ‘development’ that are as relevant now as ever. Esteva’s statement that ‘two billion people became ‘underdeveloped’ upon Truman delivering his 1949 inauguration speech (1992, p. 7), encapsulates the post-development view that ‘development’ is a wholly ‘fictitious’ (Escobar, 1988, p. 429) construction, determined by the needs and agendas of the West rather than those of the societies now represented as ‘underdeveloped’. A further point of interest within post-development writing is the emphasis placed on the control and management of ‘development’ by the West. Escobar, for example, critiques how the ‘professionalization and institutionalization’ of the development industry has both created and sustained power imbalances that favour the West, and indeed work to restrict access to development knowledge (1988, p. 430).

This technicalisation of development, and utilisation of language as a controlling and ‘normalizing mechanism’ (Escobar, 1988, p. 438) can not only be seen in the technical development assistance that was exported from the West during the Cold War. As we now move to look at contemporary conceptions and constructions of ‘security’ we can apply the same post-structuralist thinking that emerged alongside post-development and other forms of post-modernism from the late 1970s, and see how ‘security’ policymakers, providers and experts technicalise their ‘industry’ and retain discursive control of security ‘knowledge’.

2.2 Understandings of security

Understandings and constructions of security vary greatly, even within academic disciplines such as security or strategic studies and international relations. One
person’s ‘security’ is another’s ‘peace’ or ‘stability’. Trends have emerged however, which I shall attempt to briefly outline now.

Within the context of the Cold War the entity of the state truly dominated thinking about security. National security was prioritised and states depended heavily on external threats (be it communism or capitalism) for their very identity (Hansen, 2006, p. 34). The period since the end of the Cold War has also seen interesting developments in the framing of security. Duffield views the post-Cold War era as one of ‘securitization’ (2007, p. 3), and the move in the 1980s from using the term ‘peace’ to favouring the term ‘security’ has also been noted (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 135). Another development in the 1990s was the broadening of ‘security’ to include ‘human security’, representing a move away from the military-centric definition of security as a lack of conflict (Duffield, 2007, pp. 3 & 111-131; Leckie, 2009, pp. 15-18; Sen, 1999; Thakur, 2006). But it is the emergence of representations of the ‘new wars’ and of ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states that is of particular interest to us here.

2.2.1 ‘Failing states’ and the ‘new wars’

The relative neglect of ineffective states in the 1990s changed post-9/11, with terrorism becoming the ‘pivotal’ focus for Western security policy, replacing communism as the ‘bogey’ (Duffield, 2007, pp. 126-127; see also Greener-Barcham & Barcham, 2006, p. 74). Within this focus, many states that were struggling to maintain their often prescribed and imported Westernised social and economic governance structures became labelled as fragile, failing or even failed states (Brown, 2007a & b; Duffield, 2007, pp. 156-183; Henderson, 2005, p. 80; Kandiyoti, 2004, p. 134; Greener-Barcham & Barcham, 2006, pp. 73-74). Duffield asserts that
‘addressing the ungoverned space of failed and fragile states’ has now become the pre-eminent security concern of the West (Duffield, 2007, p. 126). Duffield emphasises this notion of ‘the threat of ungoverned space’ (2007, p. 170) when discussing fragile states and the discourse surrounding them. A key part of this is, of course, the rhetoric and policy of ‘good governance’ (Darby & MacGinty, 2008, p. 5; Murray & Storey, 2003, p. 222; Unwin, 2008, p. 451). Combined with the increased Western interventionism that has occurred since the end of the Cold War, we have what is commonly referred to as the ‘liberal peace’ (Duffield, 2001, pp. 11-20; Richmond, 2008a, p. 257; Shaw, 2008, p. 471). Following on from interventions in the Balkans and Timor Leste, Western-led ‘peace’ interventions have nominally possessing humanitarian goals aimed at halting conflict, restoring stability and installing the (Western-styled) governance structures deemed necessary for preventing future conflict (Ayson, 2006, p. 20; Dupont, 2006, Hansen, 2006, pp. 123-126). On the whole these liberal peace interventions have ignored or deprioritised indigenous cultures and sought to impose democratic political and neo-liberal economic systems (Darby & MacGinty, 2008, p. 5; Pupavac, 2010; Richmond, 2008, pp. 257-258).

The constructions of failing states that abound within not only the media but also within security policy and analysis are therefore troubling, particularly with the emphasis that is placed on the relevance and universal applicability of not only Western conflict intervention, but also the institutions that are subsequently constructed or reformed during the ‘state-building’ efforts that occur in post-conflict contexts (Darby & MacGinty, 2006, p. 5; Dinnen, 2008, p. 2). Indigenous systems and social structures, and their potential for improving security and decreasing
‘terrorist’ risk (Brown, 2007a, pp. 9-10; Greener-Barcham & Barcham, 2006, p. 74), are relegated to be almost invisible within this ‘failing states’ discourse, as is the social ‘resilience’ and adaptability of Pacific societies generally (Brown, 2007a). Brown also dislikes the term ‘failing’ when applied to Pacific states, preferring ‘emerging’ (Brown, 2007a, p. 9).

A further area of complexity when applied to the Pacific is that of the ‘new wars’, which signify an attempt at conceptually separating out pre-Cold War inter-state conflicts with the post-Cold War rise in intra-state conflict and ethnically-aligned uprisings (Duffield, 2001; Dupont, 2006; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007, p. 9; Hammond, 2011; Kaldor, 2001; Leckie, 2009, pp. 9-11; Parpart, 2010, pp. 674-676). When thinking specifically about Bougainville, Hammond counts that conflict as a ‘new war’ due to the combination of ‘modern’ and ‘indigenous’ factors that were at play (2011, no pagination). In any case Bougainville was, and is still at risk of being, what is described as a ‘complex emergency’ or ‘complex political emergency’ (CPE) (Duffield, 2001; Apthorpe, 1998, pp. 3-4; Unwin, 2008, p. 450). Duffield defines a CPE as ‘denoting a conflict-related humanitarian disaster involving a high degree of breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this condition, requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community’ (Duffield, 2001, p. 12). This new terminology at least gives an indication of attempts being made to detail the very real complexities of these ‘new wars’.

2.2.2 The ‘arc of instability’

In thinking about the failing states discourse from an Australian and New Zealand perspective, there is a very active example of this that continues to be played out in
security and strategic studies – the ‘arc of instability’ (Ayson, 2007; Murray & Storey, 2003, pp. 216-217; Dinnen & McLeod, 2008, p. 23). The rhetoric associated with this ‘arc of instability’ (the area to the north and north-east of Australia comprising, Timor Leste, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Fiji) is primarily linked to fears about Australia’s (and to a much lesser degree New Zealand’s) security (Brown, 2007b, p. 35; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009, p. 333). It is these fears, linked to the alignment of fragile states with terrorism and the potential for ‘Balkanisation’ or ‘Africanisation’ of the region (Fraenkel, 2003; Henderson, 2003, p. 225; Maclellan, 2004, p. 258), that are played up within the discourse rather than the associated causes for the instability that does exist within the region. This ‘over-securitisation’ (Greener-Barcham & Barcham, 2006) of the region is of concern, as instability is not actually rife throughout the entire Pacific region, and certainly there has yet to be inter-state conflict as in Africa (Fraenkel, 2003, p. 2). Of more concern is the question of whether this focus on ‘potential’ for terrorism actually diverts attention from the many developmental problems that do exist within the ‘arc’ and are at the foundation of the instability that is so worrying to Australia and New Zealand. These include not only internal conflicts as witnessed in Solomon Islands, Bougainville and Fiji, but also problems associated with the region’s growing population, the ‘youth bulge’, increasing levels of inequality, lack of educational and employment opportunities, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, resource disputes and gendered violence (Brown, 2007a, pp. 6-7; Hegarty & Powles, 2006, pp. 260-261; Henderson, 2003, p. 15).

The negative connotations associated with this framing of a large portion of, particularly, Melanesia also is troubling to many who see it as constructing an ‘overly
bleak’ picture of the region (Hegarty & Powles, 2006, p. 263). Brown notes how this negativity renders invisible the ‘many ways in which Papua New Guineans are working to find solutions’ (2007b, p. 33). This focus on local solutions is lacking not only in the writing surrounding the Asian-Pacific ‘arc of instability’, but also throughout security analysis more widely. Rubinstein sees this ignorance of the local as deriving from the prioritisation international security gives to not only the state as a security subject, but also technical approaches and models, which often have a tendency to represent ‘social and cultural realities’ in generic and essentialised ways (Rubinstein, 1988, p. 18). In this respect he argues for more value to be placed on anthropological approaches to security analysis, which he sees as having potential to bring into focus local-level socio-cultural complexities and dynamics (ibid., p. 30), an argument that is supported elsewhere (Banks, 2008, p. 31; Scheyvens & Storey, 2003, p. 7) and an approach which would certainly work to counter the state-centric approach that dominated analysis of conflict for so long.

How much relevance does the Australasian-centric discourse concerning the ‘arc of instability’ and ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ states actually have for people within Melanesia therefore? The neglect of the local, insider viewpoint certainly needs to be addressed, not in the least because Pacific Islanders themselves see it as ‘derogatory’ and misleading – constructing Papua New Guinea as a ‘failing’ state implies that at one point it was a functioning state, which is actually rather inaccurate given its colonial and post-colonial history (Brown, 2007b, p. 59). Even today in Melanesia the relevance of the ‘state’ and state-managed institutions for most of the region’s rural-residing peoples is very limited, with most not knowing what state structures existed
let alone whether they were failing or not (Brown, 2007b, p. 55; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009, p. 334).

2.3 The merging of development and security

With the increased interventionism that has occurred in the post-Cold War period, there has been much alignment between security and humanitarianism. Hansen’s work examining the Bosnian War with a post-structuralist lens highlights one example of this. Here Hansen argues that a ‘humanitarian responsibility’ was constructed and used to legitimise the Western intervention, and Western ‘civilization’ was framed as ‘having a moral responsibility for the suffering and backwardness of the Other’ (Hansen, 2006, pp. 123-126). Further ‘humanitarian’ interventions followed, in Kosovo, Timor-Leste for example, and continue to this day in Afghanistan and elsewhere, with international soldiers and police commonly involved in what would be considered humanitarian work (Duffield, 2007, p. 130). Many are uneasy with this, particularly where the military is concerned. Unwin is one academic who argues that the United States’ ‘three block war model’, which seeks to combine humanitarian aid delivery with ‘peace support operations and high intensity fighting’ is deeply flawed. He asks, how is it possible to simultaneously fight and build peace (Unwin, 2008, p. 452)? Increasingly however, and in particular within the discourse that surrounds failing states and links to terrorism, we see security personnel linked with not only emergency humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, but also with more development and poverty reduction-related goals.

While Dinnen and McLeod term the integration of development with security agendas as ‘the new interventionism’ (2008, p. 23), the relationship between development and
security is not a new one (Duffield, 2007, p. 4; Pupavac, 2010, 696). The development approach advocated by Rostow in the 1960s saw the United States engaging strategically in development interventions to suit American security and economic interests (Pupavac, 2010, p. 696). This history, and the contemporary ‘policy mantra’ that ‘security and development are inextricably linked’ (Dinnen & McLeod, 2008, p. 24), may actually aid in obscuring the complexities and ‘practical difficulties’ that emerge when two very different policies and agendas are connected (ibid.). Rubinstein (2008) illustrates the different interpretations of ‘security’ that military and humanitarian organisations possessed during his fieldwork in Somalia. Whilst he witnessed both sectors agreeing to the need for better security, how this was operationalised varied remarkably. Aid organisations strived to improve their security by moving deeper into communities and strengthening ties, whereas military personnel withdrew and weakened links with the community, as they ‘understood security to derive from control and separation’ (Rubinstein, 2008, p. 38).

Perhaps instead of focusing on the ‘merging’ of development and security, it is more appropriate to examine the securitising of development and the developmentalising of security (which Pupavac notes is commonly overlooked [Pupavac, 2010, p. 692], I would suggest because the securitising of development is far more ethically troubling). Duffield argues that the radicalisation/securitisation of development, that is the utilisation of development practices and apparatus for not only humanitarian but also Western security objectives, is fundamentally concerned with changing whole societies, and the ‘behaviour and attitudes of the people within them’ (2001, p. 42). But this is not a new assertion, as post-development theorists have long critiqued ‘development’ as a neo-colonial Trojan Horse of sorts. What has become an almost
universally accepted truth, or ‘moral logic’, is the equation that ‘because development reduces poverty and hence the risk of future instability, it also improves our own security’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 2).

The criticism that as a result of the securitisation of development ‘aid flows [are] determined by Northern security interests rather than Southern concerns about mal-development (Wright, 2009, p. 796) challenges those who would view aid or even security as neutral and based solely on humanitarian needs. If that were the case then donors would take up the multitude of opportunities to reduce poverty and deprivation in the most fragile states. Instead we see aid orphans existing outside of donor areas of strategic interest and the prioritisation of ‘unstable states central to their [donor] foreign and security agendas’ (Oxfam, 2011, p. 6). Added to this is concern about whether in fact the ‘privileging of military and police forces’ that we see within merged security-development interventions intentionally or not subdues ‘internal resistance to development projects’ (Alexander, 2009, p. 116). Parpart goes as far as to suggest that within the securitised development environment, ‘development has become a new type of riot control’ (2010, p. 676).

### 2.4 Security sector reform and international policing

The state-building and governance reforms that are carried out under the ‘liberal peace’ agenda are wide-ranging and, particularly in post-conflict societies include disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). While police have increasingly been utilised in peacekeeping forces (Greener, 2011; Grabosky, 2009) they continue to play substantial roles in official development assistance (ODA) in the form of police capacity development programmes that aim to
rebuild or construct from scratch police forces in fragile or post-conflict states that adhere to Western best practice policing models that draw much from Peel’s (1829) London Metropolitan Police (Dinnen & Braithwaite, 2009, p. 162; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007, p. 15). In this respect ‘postconflict societies are treated as though they are blank slates upon which the international community can inscribe these Western-style governance structures’ at will (Rubinstein, 2008, p. 139).

Unfortunately SSR ‘inscription’ continues to be critiqued for its failure to incorporate, or often even acknowledge, the complexities and social realities that exist within post-conflict societies (Rubinstein, 1988; Stanley & Call, 2008, p. 301). When we look at some examples of SSR that has occurred within Melanesia we are able to examine this failure, and attempts to redress it, in more detail.

2.4.1 SSR in Melanesia

The existing interdisciplinary academic literature examining the use of police capacity development and SSR programmes within the Pacific is predominately from an Australian perspective (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009; Goldsmith, 2009; McLeod, 2009), and with a focus on operational or state-building aspects of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) (Dinnen & Firth, 2008; Dinnen & McLeod, 2008; Greener, 2009, p. 2; Hameiri, 2009, p. 37; Maclellan, 2004, p. 536). While unrest in the Solomon Islands was initially viewed as a humanitarian emergency, Henderson asserts that the Australian-led RAMSI resulted not from humanitarianism, but rather was a ‘consequence’ of heightened Australian and New Zealand security concerns following the 2002 Bali bombings. Henderson notes that an earlier request for assistance (in 2000) was declined by Australia and New Zealand (Henderson,
...In any case the resulting mission can be classified as an example of liberal state-building in action, as can the police capacity development that has occurred in Timor-Leste (Greener, 2011, p. 190; Harris, 2010, p. 79; McLeod, 2009, p. 149).

When analysing SSR within the Melanesian context, the importance of local ownership and partnership with any intervention should not be underestimated (Mobekk, 2010, p. 279; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). This is despite the fact that local and external SSR agendas differ markedly, not just in Melanesia, but also globally (Mobekk, 2010, pp. 282-283). Much of the available research has looked at how SSR initiatives have failed to grasp the significance and plurality of non-state order and justice providers that operate in the Melanesian context (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009; McLeod, 2009). McLeod and Dinnen (ibid.) lead the call for Western interventions that aim to reform and stabilise Pacific police forces to engage more with non-state justice providers and learn how to incorporate local practices into their policing reforms and capacity development approaches. While these authors focus on the Australian approaches, others back their calls for more engagement with non-state policing entities within more global contexts (Baker, 2009, pp. 329-331; Bayley, 2011, pp. 52-54; Greener, 2011, pp. 184, 187 & 191-192; Greener, Fish & Tekulu, 2011, pp. 23-25). Indeed, Baker’s call to ‘strengthen what comes naturally, rather than trying to establish what has not existed before outside of the West’ (2009, p. 331) is particularly relevant to the Melanesian context, and embodies a central aim of the BCPP (see Chapter Five).
That communities at the receiving end of SSR and security-development interventions receive such ‘little attention’ (Wright, 2009, p. 793) does not bode well for interventions being able to counter the local distrust that is often a major challenge to police reform programmes (Baker, 2009, p. 329). Indeed gaining local trust and ensuring any SSR attempts are ‘sustainable and meaningful to those who will be required to utilize them’ (McLeod, 2009, p. 87) is essential within the Melanesian context of very limited interaction between the state and general population and much higher relevance and utilisation of local law and order structures (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009, p. 336).

Significantly, in addition to the state’s lack of involvement in most law and order proceedings in Melanesia, security threats within the region are also far from ‘traditional’ in the Western sense, as noted in Section 2.2.2. Is a lack of attention paid to the local context the reason that the AUD$540 million provided by Australia since 1975 to strengthen Papua New Guinea’s law and justice sector has failed to have an impact on the performance of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) (Dinnen & Braithwaite, 2009, p. 164; Dinnen & McLeod, 2008, p. 26; McLeod, 2007, p. 72)? Interestingly McLeod also notes that after decades of capacity development programmes, advisors, monitoring, and reporting senior personnel within the RPNGC are in fact rather donor savvy and know exactly what donors want to hear and see reported on (2009, p. 85). This again brings up the question of relevance and meaningfulness of policing reforms within the local context, and Baker is wise to note that ‘policing reform that is so self-evidently necessary to outsiders may actually be regarded as irrelevant to the local population’ (Baker, 2009, p. 329).
Rubinstein (2010), and to a lesser degree Bayley (2011, p. 61), have warned that international peacekeeping and policing efforts can easily be seen as neo-colonialism and a return to imperial policing, whereby the agendas of those in power dominate over local communities. Richmond also views the ‘liberal peace’ as a ‘quasi-colonial framework’ whereby Western systems are imported and installed over local ones (2008a, p. 261). To ignore this dominance and reproduction of ‘earlier colonial relations’ that policing interventions embody is to contribute to the ‘disenfranchisement’ of communities (Rubinstein, 1988, p. 140). This thesis therefore represents an attempt to add to the accounts of policing interventions not from the point of view of the interveners, but from those being intervened ‘on’ – both the personnel who are represented as requiring transformation, along with their institutions, and the communities who are being policed. In attempting to achieve this, particular attention has been paid not to discourses, policy and documentation, but to actual outcomes and experiences that have resulted from the BCPP intervention. How the people in Bougainville have mediated and experienced this intervention has been prioritized, and this has been assisted by Ferguson’s (1990 & 1994) ‘anti-politics’ framework.

2.5 Anti-politics

In looking at how we can usefully approach thinking about how the development-security nexus works in practice, one framework, that grounds itself in the realities of development interventions, is particularly valuable when addressing the lived experiences of merged security-development interventions, and their gendered outcomes: James Ferguson’s (1990 & 1994) ‘anti-politics’ approach.
Ferguson’s work looked at development interventions in Lesotho with a focus on not what was supposed to happen, but rather on what actually happened, on how supposedly simple, ‘technical’ reforms led to ‘a whole range of actors using the reforms for their own ends’ (1994, p. 178). What Ferguson saw happening was that development, in practice, ‘acts to disguise what are, in fact, highly partial and interested interventions as universal, disinterested and inherently benevolent’ (ibid., p. 181). Development actors, be they agencies or the state, were being portrayed as not political, even neutral, with interventions being constructed as ‘technical’, in spite of the social changes they brought with them. Ferguson argues that what was in fact happening was the bureaucratisation and prioritisation of development according to specific agendas. We can easily identify this same ‘anti-politicisation’ within merged security-development projects with the representation of peace-building as a technical endeavour, the prioritising and securitising of men within post-conflict contexts, and the bureaucratisation of not only security and development, but also approaches to gender.

The technicalisation of development and security can be seen not only from the military influences inherent in SSR, peacekeeping and international policing approaches, but also is evident in the conceptualisation by the United Nations of suffering as ‘a technical issue’ (Raven-Roberts, 2005, p. 45), with disasters and crises presented in rather homogenous terms, and stripped of their political contexts (ibid., pp. 45-46). It is this silencing of political analysis (Raven-Roberts, 2005; Whitworth, 2004, p. 4) that in effect marginalises certain groups within societies and privileges others. This privileging or prioritising of certain values and questions over others is profoundly important when considering the gendered effects of interventions. While it
may be obvious and natural to some that military voices should lead discussions, policy formations and implementations of security interventions, this assumption needs to be unpacked and challenged. This is where an anti-politics approach aligns itself with a feminist one, as we will see in Chapter Six when the gendered effects of the BCPP that are experienced by the men and women of Bougainville are discussed.

2.6 Conclusion

It is essential to remember that development almost certainly involves change, and often very rapid and unequal change. While I agree with Chambers that the aim of development should be ‘good change’ (1997, p. xiv) and believe that effective development can relieve the conditions that often lead to conflict, it is also important to recognise that maldevelopment can and does ‘intensify patterns of inequity or marginalization’ by creating ‘new winners and losers’ (Brown, 2007a, p. 1). This appears to be overlooked in literature surrounding the merging of development and security, as does the local viewpoint in general.

The aim of this chapter was to outline the dominant perceptions of development and security, and highlight the literature that is available on the merging of the two. It is time now to move onto a more thorough assessment of how gender fits into this paradigm.
3. Gender, development and security: Theories and practices

This chapter aims to outline the theoretical practical approaches to gender that I will draw on when discussing my research findings in Chapter Six. This chapter will examine the ways in which issues of gender, development, and security intersect theoretically. Particular attention will be paid to examining how concepts like empowerment, agency, and practical and strategic gender needs relate to the discourses and practices that surround security, development, and gender. In terms of security practices, both Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR1325) and gender mainstreaming will be analysed. As a practical strategy utilised within SSR, gender mainstreaming offers both potential and challenges that need to be highlighted, particularly when addressing Research Question Three (can SSR and police capacity development interventions be used to foster improved gender relations, increase equality and empowerment?).

In choosing to adopt a feminist approach to this research, there was a conscious prioritisation of seeking to understand the lived experiences of men and women whose communities are the location for the merged security-development interventions discussed in Chapter Two. Critical feminism usefully allows for ‘the exploration of the ideational and material manifestations of gendered identity and gendered power in world politics (Sjoberg, 2010, p. 3). Therefore, in seeking to understand how the effects of the merging of security and development are played out and mediated within communities, using the research lens of critical feminism holds
immense value. This is especially significant when thinking about gender in post-structuralist terms, as being socially constructed, manipulated, enforced and resisted by people and groups. It is also important to recognise that there are many different oppressions experienced by men and women within their lives (Mohanty, 2001), such as class, race or disability, gender cannot be separated out from these, and all oppressions are 'operationalized, in and through each other' (Cockburn, 2007, p. 255).

3.1 Introduction: Gender, development and security

Gender has been consistently marginalized within SSR, in both policy and practice, often treated as an afterthought, or something that is less urgent and thus can wait, especially when compared to need to restore immediate stability (Mobekk, 2010, pp. 278 & 282; Timothy, 2007, p. 49; Whitworth, 2004, p. 140; Willett, 2010). This is in spite of the rhetoric that is commonly expressed by international agencies when addressing women and post-conflict contexts, and the dangers of excluding groups from reconstruction efforts (UNIFEM, 2006, p. 25).

This deprioritisation of gender is common within post-conflict interventions and a good example of how militarization can even persist after war, and how it serves to 're-entrench the privileging of masculinity – in both private and public life' (Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002, p. 22). MacKenzie (2009) demonstrates this even further. In conducting interviews with over 50 female former soldiers in Sierra Leone MacKenzie argues that development agencies and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process as a whole securitised men and desecuritised women. In spite of women being involved in active combat roles in the Sierra Leone
conflict (see also Cockburn, 2007, pp 35-43), MacKenzie brings to light how not only the various UN agencies, but also NGOs and donor country development agencies actively prioritised issues they constructed as security concerns, leading to the deprioritisation of women within the DDR process. Female former soldiers were pushed to return to their ‘normal’, pre-conflict roles that are within the domestic sphere; and they were constructed not as soldiers but as passive victims of the conflict (‘camp followers’ for example), in stark contrast to the male former soldiers who were constructed as a security threat, and in dire need of DDR resources (Mackenzie, 2009). This is relevant not just because the DDR process in Sierra Leone has been held up as one of the more successful international DDR processes (ibid., p. 244), but also due to the fact that the CAPs (within the BCPP) were originally formed as a way of reintegrating former (male) combatants post-crisis (see Chapters Five and Six).

Within the context of development the deprioritising of gender is also encountered as a result of the difficulty that exists in aligning the individualistic focus on human rights that is generally embodied within Western-led interventions with indigenous cultures which have a more community–oriented interpretation of human rights (Ibhawoh, 2000; Tsikata, 2007). This is significant for policing interventions in particular, as the rights of certain individuals and groups to seeking justice can be marginalised within communities, including within Melanesia where the ‘bigmen’ dominate village life and restorative justice systems (Howley, 2002, p. 140). Mobekk asserts that ‘raising [human rights] awareness in the police forces is thus insufficient, but must be set within the fuller picture of justice and access to justice’ (2010, pp. 288-289), despite how difficult, complex, resisted and long-term justice reform often is. This is especially significant within the post-conflict context of merged security-
development approaches, including within Bougainville, as we shall examine in later chapters. Security for women cannot simply be separated out from other, often cultural, issues that may also act to disempower women, such as property rights or lack of access to healthcare and education (Timothy, 2007, p. 53).

3.2 Feminist criticisms of International Relations

A focus on gender, and indeed examinations of different experiences of security, is still a ‘niche’ within security reform analysis and international relations generally (Henry, 2007, p. 67; Willett, 2010, p. 146). There are of course exceptions, the work of Cynthia Enloe (2000, for example) being a prominent one. Enloe’s work is noted for having drawn ‘attention to the way in which security, militarism, and conflict impacted on men and women in different ways’ (Willett, 2010, p. 146). Tickner’s 1996 booklet *You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists* and Enloe’s 2000 work *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, are two examples of feminist scholarship from within the IR discipline that laid bare the gender bias within not only IR and security studies, but also the mainstream constructions of security, peace, conflict and war. Sjoberg (2010) notes the ‘unsatisfactory encounters’ between feminists and IR theorists (p. 1) that have followed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and how the above scholars call for ‘redefinition in light of that bias’ (Sjoberg, 2010, p. 4).

Sjoberg (2010) notes that ‘International security practice often relies on the invisibility of women … and gender’, however we need to remember that ‘the omission of gender from work on international security does not make that work gender-neutral or unproblematic’ (p. 5). Feminist criticisms of the male dominance
within security studies have allowed a reformulation of concepts to be more inclusive and ‘empowers those who have previously been invisible in security discourse and practice’ (Willett, 2010, p. 145). Insecurity comes not just from war and conflict, but also from threats on a more personal level, not limited to but including rape, domestic violence, child abuse, economic deprivation and insecurity, overcrowding and overpopulation, and competition for resources and ecological damage (Sjoberg, 2010, p. 4).

Conventional concepts of security, which have ignored the particular security issues affecting women and girls, became ‘disrupted’ when considering gendered violence and broader human development goals (Leckie, 2009, pp. 4 & 16). Feminist critiques of traditional International Relations and Security Studies definitions and constructions were crucial to unfolding this broadening (Timothy, 2007; Willett, 2010, pp. 144-146). The focus began to shift from states to people, and through this ‘security’ became a more inclusive concept. Tickner drew attention to this early in the 1990s and highlighted the significance of attaining more equitable power and gender relations for human security: ‘genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations’ (1992, p. 128).

There is now mounting literature on the participation of women in security interventions, with a lot of it focusing on women’s agency as opposed to victimisation (see Alvarez & Treiber, 2007; Carreiras, 2010; Enloe, 2000; Fitzsimmons, 2005; Harris & Goldsmith, 2010; Mazurana, 2003; Raven-Roberts, 2005). In addition, there has been some work and references to how conflict has been noted to actually open up space and opportunities for women that they were previously excluded from.
as well as the opportunity during reconstruction to ‘build back better’ (United Nations, 2010, p. 4). Fitzsimmons goes further in arguing that it is sometimes in fact peace and ‘security’ that can bring increased violence and personal and economic insecurity.

3.3 Gendered discourse

Before moving on to look at the relevance of Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR1325) to this research, it is firstly appropriate to elaborate on the nature of language, knowledge and discourse and how representations can marginalise and ignore the multitude of experiences and different oppressions faced by women and men (Mohanty, 1991). The work of Mohanty (1991), Tuhiwai Smith (1999) and other post-colonial feminists act as a reminder about the dangers of not only universalising, but also seeking to represent the experiences of women and men in research. According to Kabeer power ‘derives from control over resources and control over ideas, each form of control reinforcing the other’ (1994, p. 70). Within UN documents (including SCR1325) we commonly see women represented as victims first and foremost, and most commonly as vulnerable, as mothers and as civilians (Puechguirbal, 2010, p. 172; Whitworth, 2004, p. 125). The agency of most women is completely erased within these gendered constructions.

Language and the discourse associated with women and gender has, however, been more recently adapted within international and national development and security organisations to be more inclusive. This is enough to argue that progress has, in a general sense, been made (Butler, Mader & Kean, 2010; Parpart, 2009; Puechguirbal,
2010), but exactly how much and to what practical effects needs further analysis and discussion. Both Puechguirbal (2010) and Parpart (2009) note that progress in discourse and in making language more inclusive does not necessarily equate to progress in practice. Puechguirbal’s work in particular, deconstructing the language used within United Nations documents, highlights how ignoring women’s agency and focusing instead on women as in need of protection ‘has been translated into operational practices that perpetuates a vision of gender roles that reinforces inequalities and … prevent women from playing a more dynamic role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution’ (2010, p. 173). This is also a significant obstacle when considering gender mainstreaming in that the language chosen works to mainstream traditional gendered roles rather than more dynamic ones. Raven-Roberts (2005) and Mazurana (2002) also both note the favouring by UN recruitment of ex-military personnel for humanitarian positions, particularly logistical-focused roles: ‘jobs within emergency and especially militarized environments are seen as being “naturally male”’ (Raven-Roberts, 2005, p. 54).

Gendered constructions can negatively affect men as much as women. Most victims in armed conflict are after all young men, not women. Constructing men as the aggressors therefore ignores the oppression and victimisation experienced by many men and boys (Potter, 2008, p. 109; Willett, 2010, p. 155). Representing women as peaceful, men as aggressive is essentialist – it ignores that women are aggressor and men victims also (Mobekk, 2010, p. 286). Addressing gender relations is not possible without a consistent inclusion and exploration of masculinities. While the limited attention paid to masculinities research is generally seen as a very real failure of GAD approaches (Laurie & Calla, 2004, p. 104), there is increasing attention being slowly
paid to the area. This is important, as involving men makes gender interventions more ‘relevant’ to people and thus more likely to have positive and sustainable outcomes (Chant & Gutmann, 2002, p. 276).

When formulating ways SSR might be used to improve gender equality, particularly within post-conflict interventions, obviously analysis of ‘the role played by male culture’ is necessary, if unfortunately often overlooked (Mobekk, 2010, p. 286). There is a definite need to also look at subversive masculinities and the marginalisation of them within security contexts (Connell, 2002, p. 35; Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002, p. 13). Unfortunately it has been far too easy for gender discourse to be ‘submerged into the dominant epistemology of hegemonic masculinity, militarism and war’ (Willett, 2010, p. 144).

I do not think we should follow the model of gender reform that demands men must adopt a new character, that they instantly become ‘the new man’. Such hero-making agendas deny what we already know about the multiplicity and the internal complexity of masculinities. Rather, strategy for peace needs to be embedded in a practicable strategy of change in gender relations. The goal should be to develop gender practices for men that shift gender relations in a democratic direction.

(Connell, 2002, p. 39)

3.4 Security Council Resolution 1325

SCR1325 (United Nations Security Council, 2000) represents ‘the first time that the UN had fully identified women as constructive agents of peace, security and post-conflict reconstruction’ (Willett, 2010, p. 142). It was passed in 2000 and ‘widened’ concepts of security by recognising the roles played by women in conflict and in
peace-building (Leckie, 2009, p. 18). Admittedly the roles focused on were more on the passive rather than active side, but it was a step forward nonetheless, evidence of the international community’s attempts to address concerns about gender violence and women’s insecurity (Alexander, 2009, p. 118). SCR1325 recognises the different experiences of men and women in conflict and the need for women, and indeed all sections of society, to be involved in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. SCR1325, and also the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), both in essence aim to ‘broaden, strengthen and operationalise gender equality in the context of conflict, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction’ (UNIFEM, 2006, p. 5). CEDAW, an international human rights treaty (now ratified by 187 countries, many with reservations [United Nations, 2012]), requires governments to put in place the necessary conditions to achieve women’s rights in practice as well as in theory, while SCR1325 requires member states to purposefully include women in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities (UNIFEM, 2006, p. 5).

However, criticisms of SCR1325 and its implementation are widespread, mainly due to the fact that ‘Ten years on, Security Council Resolution 1325 remains more of a rhetorical than practical commitment’ (Willett, 2010, p. 156). Even the Security Council itself has acknowledged progress in operationalising SCR1325 has been ‘slow’ and that now ‘diagnosis is not enough; remedial action is necessary’ (United Nations, 2010, p. 8). Exactly what this ‘remedial action’ should consist of is not precisely detailed, but would include ‘robust implementation’ of mainstreaming and ‘concentrated funding for targeted interventions’ in post-conflict locations (ibid., pp. 2 & 12). It is safe to assert that in regards to SCR1325, and gender mainstreaming as
one of its implementing strategies, more progress has been made in policy and language than in practice and outcomes (Carreiras, 2010, pp. 477-479; Mobekk, 2010, p. 288; Raven-Roberts, 2005). Indeed, as of 2010 only 16 countries had enacted National Action Plans for SCR1325’s implementation (Carreiras, 2010, p. 478).

Alexander sees the problem with SCR1325 and other remedial solutions is that they ‘seek to find solutions in increasing the number of women involved rather than changing structures, which adversely affect women’ (2009, p. 118). This argument, that participation does not always equate to improved gender relations, is explored further in Chapter Six.

When thinking about this in relation to SCR1325, CEDAW and even the MDGs, it can be argued that although it has opened up institutional and political space for women, SCR1325 remains primarily a technical tool. It is not transformative in and of itself. Simply put, SCR1325 follows Jahan’s (1995) ‘integrationist’ approach to addressing gender needs whereby women are simply added to existing structures and systems. It can be seen as a technicalisation of conflict and post-conflict – a technical tool conceived as a remedy, ignoring complexities and variations. The technical tools SCR1325 suggests include gender mainstreaming, increased participation of women, participation of women’s groups and civil society and establishment of gender units within security interventions – gender is employed therefore as a ‘fix’ or ‘instrument for problem-solving goals’ (Whitworth, 2004, p. 120). However, it is important to note that SCR1325 doesn’t actually provide specific operational guidance (UNIFEM, 2006, p. 9) nor does it offer a gendered analysis of conflict or post-conflict interventions, although that is not its purpose. Enloe for one sees SCR1325 as being
hard to ‘operationalise’ due to the underlying feminist analysis that lies at its foundation being ignored: ‘that patriarchy … is a principal cause both of the outbreak of violent societal conflicts and of the international community’s frequent failures in providing long-term resolutions’ (2005, p. 281). The fact that it doesn’t deal adequately with masculinities (Cockburn, 2007, p. 148) is also reason to argue that operationalising it would encounter obstacles.

3.5 Gender mainstreaming: participation versus transformation

[Development discourse on gender mainstreaming, women’s empowerment and gender equality has focused on women’s (and marginalized men’s) ability to make choices, to speak out and to challenge established social, political and economic structures. This rather triumphalist discourse has presented empowerment and gender mainstreaming as a doable, technical problem that can be overcome with sufficient determination and commitment.

(Parpart, 2009, p. 59)

In discussing issues associated with the implementation of SCR1325, analysis of gender mainstreaming is essential. Gender mainstreaming was endorsed with the Beijing Platform for Action as the strategy for institutions to commit to in order to achieve change in equality levels:

The advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and should not be seen in isolation as a women's issue. They are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society. Empowerment of women and equality between women and men are prerequisites for achieving political, social, economic, cultural and environmental security among all peoples.

(Beijing Platform for Action, United Nations, 1995, Section 41)
Within SSR, when considering how ‘gender’ is approached, there are two strategies that clearly dominate – mainstreaming and balancing, that is, increased recruitment of female personnel, often referred to as participation. Gender mainstreaming, as a ‘transformative process’ (Mobekk, 2010, p. 279), is obviously more complex and challenging to implement than simply increasing numbers of female staff. While the inclusion of women in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is now ‘conventional wisdom’ (Kandiyoti, 2004, p. 134), the motivations and even tensions around the actual practices of gender mainstreaming, as a strategic, sometimes even instrumental, gender ‘tool’, are not so clear cut. Implementing gender mainstreaming strategies in practice is challenging and can add further complexities to security interventions. A good example of this is how while both NZAID’s Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands country strategies carefully include acknowledgement of the importance of addressing gender through ‘proactive integration’ (NZAID, 2009a, p. 31) across programmes as a whole (NZAID, 2008, p. 20; NZAID, 2009a, pp. 8 & 31), the need for something more than this is acknowledged by also calling for specific initiatives to ‘ensure these issues are not ‘lost’ as a result of mainstreaming’ (NZAID, 2009a, p. 31).

In practice mainstreaming approaches are dominated by a focus on participation, which can often involve simply adding women to the mix and expecting change to flow or gender equality to improve as a result. This is of concern as an approach that equates to merely an increased number of women participants without attempts to address or consider how transformative change can be achieved ‘may conversely reinforce the reproduction of traditional gender roles and inequalities’ (Leckie, 2009, p. 14). Moser and Moser agree, pointing out that ‘gender mainstreaming should not be
concerned with simply increasing women’s participation, but with the terms of their participation’ (Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 19). Although it is important to recognise that increased female personnel numbers does aid in meeting women’s security concerns and access to policing (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, Parpart & Lautze, 2005, p. 14), simply adding women to peacekeeping or police mentoring deployments has in practice simply confined female personnel to quite specific roles, often seen as ‘sexual violence problem solving forces’ (Simic cited in Willett, 2010, p. 152). This is not mainstreaming at all, but is an example of how an instrumentalist approach may be used to validate inadequate gender mainstreaming efforts.

The focus on participation and simply adding women to deployments aligns with what Jahan (1995) called the ‘integrationist’ approach to mainstreaming. Jahan sees an ‘integrationist’ approach as one which incorporates and accepts the status quo, it ‘builds gender issues into existing development paradigms’ (Jahan, 1995, p. 13). This contrasts with her advocated ‘agenda-setting’ approach, which would entail purposefully setting out to seek change throughout organisations with regards to how gender is conceptualised and approached: ‘women not only become a part of the mainstream, they also reorient the nature of the mainstream’ (ibid.). How to achieve effective ‘agenda-setting’ implementation is a very real challenge faced within the security-development nexus.

It is important to remember that the often-cited target of female participation within police ranks of 30 percent has not even been reached by New Zealand or Australia, although Australia is at 29 percent (Mobekk, 2010, p. 185). Increased participation does take time, commitment and consistency. The 30 percent mark is often touted as
what is necessary in order to achieve some sort of ‘critical mass’ (Chant & Gutmann, 2002, p. 278; Kabeer, 2010) for actually achieving tangible and sustainable improvements in gender relations and equality (INSTRAW, 2005, p. 7). UN statements and documents have recognised the need for ‘creating a “critical mass” of women officials’ (United Nations, 2010, p. 7), for example in CEDAW (Art. 8 / Gen. Rec. 23: ‘Ensure the presence of a critical mass of women at all levels and in all areas on international affairs’ [UNIFEM, 2006, p. 29]). How this is being implemented in practice however is not obviously visible, in part due the ‘tendency for policy commitment to gender equity to be lost, reinterpreted or heavily watered down as they move through… the bureaucracy’ (Standing, 2004, p. 82).

An important question surrounding the efficacy of gender mainstreaming as a strategy, in practice, is whether the approach itself simply adapts to the existing patriarchal structures of large, global institutions, or if it is able to strategically transform them (Eyben, 2010, p. 55). Eyben (2010) sees current gender mainstreaming approaches as focused on changing ‘procedures and introduce incentives’: approaches are not, however, seeking a way to ‘change discourse, values and power relations’ (p. 56). Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead (2004) also lament the current practical approaches to gender mainstreaming, labelling them ‘diluted, denatured, depoliticised’ (p. 1). A further critique is that gender mainstreaming as a practice has merely been ‘grafted onto existing power structures’ thus negating all transformatory promise it had in theory (Willett, 2010, p. 143). As Jahan points out, and which is in evidence in mainstreaming approaches that focus on increasing female participation (like the BCPP), ‘the distinction between ends (e.g. gender
equality) and means (e.g. mainstreaming) were not clarified. In donor agencies, concerns over means often took precedence over ends’ (Jahan, 1995, p. 113).

But is the expectation for large institutions to be able to adapt with flexibility and speed completely unrealistic? Subrahmanian makes a valid point in stating that people ‘who expect bureaucracies to effect miraculous impacts on women’s gender identities and their relationships with men are invariably confronted with the disappointing realisation that this is not what bureaucracies do’ (Subrahmanian, 2004, p. 93). In addition, many within large organisations and within interventions do struggle and progress and actually achieve perhaps small, but positive outcomes (Eyben, 2010, p. 60; Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead, 2004, p. 4; Jaquette & Staudt, 2006, p. 40) – their efforts should not be dismissed. This is especially significant when considering that small, practical improvements can be linked, or used as a foundation for broader, more systemic changes later (Dawson, 2005, p. 81; Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 18; Standing, 2004, pp. 86-87).

While there has been a strong policy commitment within development institutions in the post-Beijing (1995) period (Marchand, 2009, p. 922; Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 11), actual ‘outcomes of gender mainstreaming remain to be critically evaluated and determined’ (Henry, 2007, p. 63). The fact that implementation of gender mainstreaming has not been as successful as initially hoped for has led to much disillusionment on the part of feminists (Cornwall, Harrison & Whitehead, 2004, p. 1; Subrahmanian 2004; Jacquette & Staudt, 2006; Chant & Gutmann, 2002). Assessing whether gender mainstreaming attempts within the BCPP are actually a viable technique for improving gender equality (Research Question 3), or just tokenism and

Cockburn and Zakrov (2002) make a valuable point when noting the practice of using gender in an instrumentalist, problem-solving, technical tool way – within this approach attention is moved ‘away from the people who are affected by peacemaking missions and toward those who conduct those missions’ (p. 121). The concerns and voices of the more marginalised groups being, therefore, deprioritised. Instrumentalist approaches to gender mainstreaming are those which construct gender as a technical tool and utilise it to achieve non-gender-related outcomes (Eyben, 2010, p. 55; Moser & Moser, 2005, pp. 14-15; Puechguirbal, 2010, p44), for example programmes focusing on women because that is ‘smart economics’ (World Bank, 2006). Instrumentalist approaches depoliticise gender equality by avoiding any objective of strategic transformation or change and focusing instead on more practical outcomes that do not challenge conventional power structures (Eyben & Napier-Moore, 2009, p. 285). They persist precisely because instrumentalist techniques to gender are ‘easier’ to implement due to their depoliticised nature and give the appearance of catering to different sections of society (Jahan, 1995, p. 126; Mobekk, 2010, p. 279). Willett (2010) points forward a related argument when describing how some practical
examples of gender mainstreaming actually ‘acts to accommodate tokenistic ‘spaces’ … claiming inclusiveness, when in fact it operates to compromise dissent, and renders women’s actions and voices invalid’ (p. 144). Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti-politics’ approach (see Chapter 2) to analysing gender mainstreaming is therefore valuable and under-utilised, and would seek to bring to light examples of what gender mainstreaming and related gender strategies that are utilised in post-conflict environments actually does in practice.

While much progress has been made toward gender mainstreaming in policy, the reality of obstacles preventing effective implementation is both widespread and persistent (Potter, 2008, p. 105; Mazurana, 2002, pp. 42-45; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, Parpart & Lautze, 2005, pp. 12-17; Whitworth, 2004, p. 120; Willett, 2010, pp. 142 & 148-149). Possible causes for unsuccessful implementation could include: ill-trained or unsupported staff; resistant institutional culture or relegation of gender to ‘specialist’ territory; lack of commitment and accountability within management; conceptual ambiguity or inconsistencies; undefined goals; and ineffective evaluation (Mazurana, 2002, p. 42; Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 15; Puechguirbal, 2010, p. 181; Raven-Roberts, 2005, pp. 43-44). Whitworth also notes that an obvious lack of resources have been committed for gender mainstreaming to succeed within the UN system (2004, pp. 120 & 132). A further obstacle is the presence of ‘backlash’ from unsensitised staff (Momsen, 2001; Parpart, 2010, p. 677; Raven-Roberts, 2005, p. 53). ‘Efforts to destabilize gender hierarchies and empower women from within established structures have not lived up to their promises … transforming gender relations requires attention to how systemic blockages to gender equality and women’s empowerment operate and maintain their grip on power’ (Parpart, 2009, p.
60). This is ignored in BCPP and security interventions generally and there’s very little evidence to suggest much assessment of ‘blockages’ takes place.

As noted in Chapter Two, there is now more literature available on the participation of women in security interventions, with many examples focusing on women’s agency as opposed to victimisation (see Alvarez & Treiber, 2007; Carreiras, 2010; Enloe, 2000; Fitzsimmons, 2005; Harris & Goldsmith 2010; Mazurana, 2003; Raven-Roberts, 2005). Harris and Goldsmith (2010) write of how Australian male police officers, when deployed to post-conflict locations such as Timor Leste or the Solomon Islands, revert to or embrace a very ‘macho’ policing style. This is despite the presence of a number of female Australian officers also deployed. Indeed, the presence of female officers among UN and NATO personnel deployed to the Balkans also did not prevent a number of male personnel becoming involved in the trafficking of girls and women (Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002; Willett, 2010, pp. 152-153). One positive outcome of having female personnel deployed alongside male officers that has been noted by many researchers, is that while women’s participation in interventions does not necessarily change the ‘macho’ or patriarchal culture present within security interventions, it seems to help locals engage with and trust the intervention to a greater degree (Alvarez & Treiber, 2007; Fitzsimmons, 2005, p. 190; Harris & Goldsmith, 2010, p. 295; Mazurana, 2003; Mazurana, 2005, p. 70; Willett, 2010, p. 152). Mazurana notes however that this engagement is based on quite traditional constructions of women as less threatening than men, and ‘more willing to listen, and better able to diffuse potentially violent situations’ (2003, p. 68). Mobekk also draws on the utilisation of women personnel for these very instrumentalist purposes, citing, like Mazurana, the construction of women as more trustworthy and
more agile at diffusing situations verbally as common examples of this instrumentalisation (Mobekk, 2010, p. 281).

When thinking about these kinds of quite instrumentalist approaches Moser’s (1989) clarification and differentiation between practical and strategic gender needs becomes very valuable. It encourages a focus on what is actually happening in practice, much like Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics’ does, and whether or not what is happening enforces or challenges gendered inequalities.

3.6 Practical and strategic gender needs

Strategic gender needs are those that seek to challenge the subordination of women and seek out ‘an alternative, more equal and satisfactory organization of society’ (Moser, 1989, p. 1803). They are most readily identified as ‘feminist’. Practical gender needs, in contrast, arise from the experiences and conditions of women’s lives, more focused on ‘interests for human survival’ (ibid.). Meeting strategic gender needs is essential for any merged security-development intervention. It is the most appropriate way of ensuring attempts to redress gendered inequalities actually embody some form of transformative change, rather than just adding in women to institutions and expecting improvements in gender relations to occur simply from this participation.

Kabeer notes that practical and strategic gender needs are not separate, exclusive categories, but rather can be viewed as linked (1994, p. 261). Moser also notes how the more successful organisations start their work in addressing women’s practical gender needs, and utilising this work ‘as a means to reach specific strategic gender
needs identified by women in particular socio-political contexts’ (Moser, 1989, p. 1817). While the participation of women within the CAPs programme in Bougainville could be seen as a start to addressing women’s practical security needs, for this participation to actually meet strategic needs this participation of women would need to be progressed to include greater autonomy, and access to and equal control over decision-making processes.

Addressing practical gender needs can be ‘responsible for preserving and reinforcing (even if unconsciously) the sexual division of labor’ (Moser, 1989, p. 1804). It is very easy for development agencies, and those that work within the security sector, to conflate practical gender needs with their own agencies’ goals and consider themselves to be addressing the concerns of women, and gender more broadly. Being less challenging to those with power and control, NGOs and community groups seeking funding can also find it easier to interest donors.

In seeking to meet strategic gender needs, an essential ingredient, and one that is has become rather over-used and co-opted in recent times, is that of ‘empowerment’ (Eyben & Napier-Moore, 2009).

3.7 Empowerment

The concept of empowerment, and the rhetoric we often hear associated with it, grew in popularity in the 1970s thanks to the work of Freire (1972), an educationalist whose work on the significance of conscientisation for the well-being and development of marginalised peoples. Contemporary constructions of ‘empowerment’ tend to employ associated terms like choice, decision-making, agency,
conscientisation, and individualism – particularly within the dominant neo-liberal political economy (Eyben & Napier-Moore, 2009, p. 291). Moser (1989) sees empowerment approaches as useful in that they recognise women’s ‘triple roles’ and ‘seeks through bottom-up women’s organizations to raise women’s consciousness to challenge their subordination’ (p. 1816).

When thinking about empowerment as choice, the concept of agency, the exercising of choice (Kabeer, 2003, p. 171), is particularly important, especially when analysing how democratic or participatory development interventions are. Even interventions that are imbued with ‘empowerment’ rhetoric can still actually see women as passive victims waiting to benefit from whichever intervention comes along. Kabeer sees as distinction between passive and active agency, active agency reflecting ‘more purposeful behaviour’ (Kabeer, 2003, p. 174). There are examples of both passive and active agency within this research, as will be noted in Chapter Six. Kabeer also notes that ‘agency… is not exercised in the abstract but through the mobilisation of resources. Resources are the medium of power’ (ibid., p. 172). In thinking about how resources and decision-making another framework is also very useful to consider, that of access versus control (Longwe, 1994). To be clear, when referring to ‘control’, the objective, in Longwe’s view, is an ‘equality of control … so that neither side is put into a position of dominance or subordination’ (Longwe, 1994, p. 293).

Subtle strategies are also an important element for successful empowerment, especially when seeking to avoid confrontation. Scheyvens (1998), Eyben (2010) and Leckie (2009, p. 15) all discuss the benefits of subtlety and, to an extent, pragmatism, when seeking change, empowerment and conscientisation. Eyben particularly sees the
advantages of small, pragmatic steps being sought within bureaucracies, especially when considering the risks associated with backlash (Momsen, 2001; Leach & Sitaram, 2002). Always it must be remembered that ‘Projects which seek to help the poorest and the most vulnerable are making interventions in very fragile livelihoods’ (Leach & Sitaram, 2002, p. 587). It seems that many security interventions don’t take this into consideration, especially those interventions that privilege military knowledge and experience:

Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping means changing the relationships between masculinized protectors and the feminized protected. It means challenging the influence of those who claim insider military knowledge that privileges their status as experts on security. Ultimately it requires a profound transformation and reordering of the international structures that promote peace and security.

(Willett, 2010, p. 147)

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on outlining significant theories and practices relevant within the merged security-development nexus. Specific attention was paid to the strategy of gender mainstreaming, how it is commonly implemented and criticisms surrounding it. The literature has highlighted how participation of female personnel does not automatically equate to increased levels of empowerment or equality within securitised development interventions. In Chapter Six this will be explored further, utilising findings from the fieldwork conducted in Bougainville.

To reiterate an earlier point, this research seeks to focus not on those managing the intervention, but rather on those men and women who are being intervened ‘on’. This emphasis on the actual, practical gendered effects of a merged security-development
intervention draws, therefore, on not only Ferguson’s (1990) ‘anti-politics’ approach, but also on Moser’s (1989) analysis of strategic and practical gender needs, Longwe’s (1994) differentiation of access and control, and Kabeer’s (1994) emphasis on agency. In utilising these analytical approaches when discussing the research findings in Chapter Six, it is my aim to make more visible how the people in Bougainville have mediated and experienced this BCPP intervention, and how it does, in practice, have gendered effects.
4. Methodology

‘Case studies stimulate and inform more than statistics’

(Chambers, 1983, p. 64)

My aim in conducting fieldwork in Bougainville was to uncover and highlight gendered outcomes and experiences of not only the BCPP intervention but of development and security more broadly from within a post-conflict society. In focusing on the people being policed and ‘capacity developed’, I hoped to contribute in a small way to countering the focus that international personnel involved in these sorts of merged security-development interventions have received, even if that focus has at times been from a gendered viewpoint (Bevan, 2011; Carreiras, 2010; Dinnen & Braithwaite, 2009; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009; Goldsmith, 2009; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Grabosky, 2011; Greener, 2009; Harris, 2010; Harris & Goldsmith, 2010; Mazurana, 2003; McLeod, 2009; Potter, 2008; Regan, 2010; Rubinstein, 2010; Stanley & Call, 2008; Wehner, 2001; Whitworth, 2004). This chapter therefore seeks to elaborate how I conducted and approached my research.

4.1 The fieldwork

From 4 November to 3 December 2011, I conducted interviews with 58 participants in five different locations in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (AROB), including the main towns of Buka and Arawa, and three villages. A plan to go to a sixth location (Siwai) near the end of my fieldwork was aborted due to safety concerns. I had arranged accommodation and a local guide for the few days I would

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2 The names of the villages have been confidentialised to protect the privacy of the CAPs located in or around those areas.
have spent there, and had already negotiated access through the roadblock near the Panguna mine site, on the road to Siwai. Unfortunately my transport was cancelled at the last minute and attempts to find alternatives did not result in a safe and trustworthy option being found.

Figure 1: Map of Bougainville

Source: Australian National University, EPress, Division of Information
The interviews I conducted were qualitative in nature, attempting to get participants to
tell of their thoughts and experiences rather than answering simple, short response
questions. In choosing a qualitative approach I hoped that the experiences of people
would be highlighted and prioritised (Chambers, 1993 & 1997; Cornwall, 2003), as
would their understandings of not only the BCPP but also of development, security
and gender more generally. The interviews were semi-structured, comprising of a
number of key questions but with open room for movement within the conversation
depending on the participant’s area of expertise, experience or just general interest in
a particular line of questioning and subject area. While most participants were happy
to discuss most subjects I broached, there were times when participants declined to
answer a question or were visibly uncomfortable (in which case I would try to alter
the subject, having informed participants at the start of interviews that they did not
have to answer any question they did not want to and to let me know if they did not
like what I was asking). The most obvious case I encountered of this was with one ex-
combatant who told me at the start of the interview that he would not talk about the
crisis and to please not ask about it. Most participants, however, would simply give
quite short simple answers to questions they perhaps found a little disconcerting. I
perceived that within Bougainvillean culture straight-out denial of a request is
considered bad manners, rather it was considered more appropriate to make attempts
to avoid or change the subject.

While the majority of interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis (36
participants), six interviews were conducted as joint interviews, involving two
participants (12 participants), and three interviews were group interviews with either
three or four participants (10 participants). The group interviews were all conducted
in the villages with the assistance of a local translator. While some of the participants in the group interviews spoke English and answered me directly, I conversed with others via the translator.

In addition to the interviews I was also fortunate enough to be invited by the New Zealand Police to observe two CAP training sessions, one in the north of Buka Island (on emergency preparedness) and the other in central Bougainville Island (on intelligence-led policing). This was insightful in that it provided me with an idea of not only how the New Zealand Police interacted with the CAPs and vice versa, but also how CAPs interacted with each other and with the training that was being provided. It also allowed me to have a number of informal conversations with CAPs present which, although not ‘interviews’, did contribute to my understanding of the role of CAPs and how their experiences and were noted in my fieldwork diary.

4.1.1 Ethical considerations

Prior to the fieldwork being carried out I sought ethical clearance from Massey University. An in-house ethics review process was conducted involving a panel of academics questioning me about my fieldwork plan and methodological approach. A ‘Notification of ‘low risk’ research involving human participants’ was then submitted, and the project was evaluated as ‘low risk’. Approval for access to New Zealand Police personnel and data was also provided through their Research and Evaluation Steering Committee (RESC), and the National Research Institute in Port Moresby approved and sponsored my research visa for Papua New Guinea.
In terms of participants’ rights the following principles were prioritised throughout my interactions in Bougainville:

- **Voluntary participation:** Participation was entirely voluntary, and participants had the right to withdraw at any point or request that certain information given not be used in the final thesis. Participants were asked if they would like to receive a research summary, and this was sent to them in February 2012.

- **Informed consent:** Before seeking agreement for interviews to commence, all participants were provided with an explanation of the research, its aims and how it would be disseminated. This information was provided both orally and in a printed information sheet (Appendix II). The voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdraw at any point was explained as part of this process.

- **Confidentiality:** Participants have the right to privacy and this right was explained as part of the process to obtain informed consent. Participants were asked how they wished to be identified in the research, with the default identification being a category (‘police officer’ or ‘NGO worker’). All identifying information has been confidentialised unless agreement for the use of that information was gained from the participant.

### 4.1.2 The participants

Interviews were conducted with a cross-section of Bougainville society, and included interviews with 8 New Zealanders and Australians currently based in Bougainville and broadly working within the policing, law and justice sector. The other 50 participants were Bougainvillean or Papua New Guinea nationals. I endeavoured to
interview a reasonably even number of both male and female participants and this resulted in a fairly even split of 28 females to 30 males. The fact that women make up only 20 percent of the CAP service meant that my ratio of male to female interviews of CAPs (of 2:1) was below what I had hoped for. There is also a certain element of ‘tarmac bias’ (Chambers, 1983) involved, as I only went to villages that were easily reachable from either Arawa or Buka towns. A small number of participants were from far more remote areas however, and had travelled to my fieldwork locations for the interviews, or I heard of them being in the same place I was and recruited them for interviews before they returned to their homes. The 58 interview participants can be categorized as coming from the following occupational sectors (both paid and unpaid work is included):

Table 1: Participant categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Auxiliary Police (CAPs)</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society representatives (community workers &amp; NGOs)</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leaders (elders, village magistrates, peace officers, village administrators)</td>
<td>VL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development professionals (working for international agencies)</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Police personnel</td>
<td>NZP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougainville Police Service personnel</td>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AROB public servants</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Theoretical influences

My decision to focus on understandings and experiences of the people on the receiving end of the BCPP intervention, rather than simply analyzing the New Zealand Police’s approach and policy, arises from my belief that feminist research needs to maintain a focus on the ‘lived realities’ of gender and theory should be ‘built from these lived experiences’ (Pillow & Mayo, 2007, p. 161). I am also very
conscious of the criticisms directed at feminist research for its perceived over-reliance on textual and discursive analysis rather than on women’s actual experiences of empowerment and marginalization (McEwan, 2001, p. 103). In thinking about the theorists who have influenced my feminist understandings the most, they predominantly are those who have sought to not only uncover and explain inequalities and marginalisations, but also showcase examples of resistance and empowerment and seek ways of moving the gender agenda forward. Benería’s efforts to account for women’s work (1992), Longwe’s (1994) access versus control framework; Moser’s (1989) work on practical and strategic gender needs; Jahan’s (1995) analysis on gender mainstreaming and suggestions for helping it lead to transformative change; Enloe’s (2000) accounts of the differing ways militarization impacts on the lives of women and men; and Kabeer’s (1994) work to highlight gender and power relations within development, have all been particularly significant in contributing towards my understandings of gender, development, and to a lesser degree, security.

Coming from an undergraduate background in social anthropology, anthropological approaches are particularly attractive to me when seeking to analyse social change issues and trends. I concur with Rubinstein’s call that a more anthropological approach within security studies would allow for more cultural complexities to be incorporated into studies (1988, p. 30). Ethnographic research holds value therefore not just in researching communities at the receiving end of security-development interventions, but also in examining and building a more comprehensive picture about the motivations and behaviours of development and security personnel and institutions. In line with this, I attempted to be reflexive in terms of my positionality.
4.3 Making myself visible

As a privileged, Western, educated outsider going to a remote location to do ‘fieldwork’, there needs to be acknowledgement of the very real power relations that are at play in this situation. I appreciate that researching people can be in itself a form of epistemological oppression or colonisation (Harding, 2007, pp. 52-53; hooks, 2004; Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). In attempting to make the research process as ethical as possible an approach focused on engagement, rather than just ‘taking’ data, is important. In taking a feminist approach to this research I necessarily incorporated a commitment to ‘issues of reciprocity, representation, and voice’, which are all at the foundation of feminist research approaches (Pillow & Mayo, 2007, p. 163). Engagement, interaction, and seeking a ‘multiplicity of perspectives’ (Scheyvens & Storey, 2003, p. 7) were priorities within my research and interviewing approach.

In terms of who benefited the most from this research, it was myself. As a Masters student seeking to conducted fieldwork for my own educational benefit I gained much more than any one of my participants did. I am very grateful for the time that they all gave me, very willingly, and continue to be surprised by how receptive most people I approached in Bougainville were to discussing often very personal and private matters with me. Participants gave their time freely and with enthusiasm, often referring me to others they knew of who would be either very interested to talk to me, or who they thought could help me with certain parts of the research that they were not able to discuss knowledgably about themselves.

Even when attempting to be ‘ethical’ however, as the questioner and researcher I maintained power within the research environment. I constructed the questions, I
chose which words to use, which subjects to cover, when to dig for more elaborate responses and so on. Even in choosing to use a term like ‘domestic violence’ I was conscious that I would be constructing something quite negatively that was not always viewed as a crime or unacceptable in Bougainville. As much as I might have thought I was being ‘objective’, I do believe the subjectivities of the researcher will come through, and indeed, it was obvious to all participants that I did not approve of corporal discipline within the family. In terms of my understanding of local interpretations of domestic violence, I do believe that my questions and avoidance of seeking elaboration on topics that produced some degree of discomfort in participants did prevent me from developing an accurate picture of how prevalent family violence in Bougainville was, and the degree to which it is accepted within the home. It was only toward the end of my time in Bougainville that I think I came to understand the complexities and pervasiveness of this issue.

I also wonder if, knowing I was researching something to do with women’s empowerment, some participants would just tell me what they thought I would want to hear. Bougainvillians have been subjected to often quite numerous and extensive development and peace-building interventions in the years since the peace accord. Those participants who are engaged, professionally or voluntarily, in government, NGO or law and justice-related activities also have very high levels of cognizance regarding ‘development’ jargon and trends. An awareness of what donors want to hear was obvious with some of the participants, and some also discussed the politics involved in getting funding for projects. Knowing how to align their agendas with those of donors to achieve funding was discussed in depth with two participants in particular (although not included in the findings that are discussed in Chapter Six).
As an outsider however, whilst not able to discuss certain things with all participants, there were times when I felt that people actually felt freer talking about things with me, precisely because I was not Bougainvillean. For example, discussion about any matter relating to sexual activity is prohibited between men and women due to local ‘kastom’. Whilst some of the men I interviewed were slightly uncomfortable when discussing, for example, sexual crime, most talked rather openly to me about it, and on a number of occasion explained that they can’t talk to local women about these matters due to ‘kastom’. In this sense, certain restrictions were lifted due to my outsider status.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided clarity on a number of things: my methodological approach and justifications for it, who I am as a researcher and what my main theoretical influences are, and who the research participants are. In the following chapter I discuss the research location, Bougainville, particularly cultural and historical issues that are of significance. I hope the analysis of my research approach that has been provided in this chapter allows the reader to be more aware of my subjectivities and agendas that lie at the foundation of this research.
5. Bougainville: Conflict, peace and justice

This chapter will briefly outline the research location and context – post-conflict Bougainville. It will discuss the conflict and peace processes, and the role women played within these, the relevance of local customs and restorative justice practices, and finally an introduction to the Bougainville Community Policing Project will be provided.

5.1 The conflict and the peace process

Accounts of the Bougainville ‘Crisis’, as it is commonly referred to, are widely available from both outsider and insider perspectives. Outsider accounts have tended to focus on providing an ‘objective’ account of the crisis, its causes and the peace process, particularly from an operational point of view (see Hegarty, 2003; Ninnes, 2006; Regan, 2001 & 2010; Rimoldi, 2011; Vernon, 2005). Insider accounts, in contrast, have offered up far more personal experiences of the conflict (see Böge & Garasu, 2004; Hakena, Ninnes & Jenkins, 2006; Havini 2004a & b; Howley, 2002; Mirinka 1994; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003; Sirivi & Havini, 2004). While I believe the term ‘conflict’ is a far more appropriate term to describe what was in effect a decade-long civil war, many Bougainvilleans choose to use the term ‘crisis’ when discussing the events, at least to an outsider such as myself. Due to the availability of literature detailing events of the crisis, I shall only provide a short outline now.

The conflict that crippled the island of Bougainville in the 1990s began with community landowner protests about the Panguna copper mine and its owner Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) from as early as the 1970s (Hegarty, 2003, p. 3).
While secessionist claims came to dominate representations and understandings of the conflict, the origins of grievances actually lie with land shortages, lease disagreements, economic disenfranchisement, and environmental degradation (Banks, 2008, p. 27; Regan, 2001, pp.2-3; Vernon, 2005). From 1989 the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) riot squads and Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) harshly suppressed the growing dissent, with a situation of complete collapse of government services and law quickly followed from 1990, particularly when the PNG security forces withdrew from Bougainville in 1990 (Banks, 2008, p. 27; Regan, 2001, pp. 2-4). While many label the Panguna mine as the instigator for the devastation that occurred, it is important to not focus entirely on the mine itself, but rather broaden the picture to include the disenfranchisement and inequality that this ‘development’ brought with it. While the benefits of the mine (it was the ‘backbone’ of PNG’s economy, accounting for about 44% of the country’s exports) were obviously of enormous importance to the PNG government, and to many in Bougainville also (Vernon notes that during the mine’s operation life expectancy in Bougainville increased from 47 years to 60 years [Vernon, 2005, p. 262]), ultimately more Bougainvilleans perceived of it as a socially, economically and environmentally destructive force (Böge & Garasu, 2004; Howley, 2002; Regan, 2001; Rimoldi, 2011).

Between 1990 and 1997 more than 60,000 Bougainvilleans were displaced to PNGDF ‘care centres’, and countless numbers forced into the jungle for refuge from the fighting occurring between the Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) fighters and either local PNG-supporting militia (Bougainville Resistance Forces [BRF]) or the PNGDF, who had returned in September 1990 after requests from some Bougainville
communities (Regan, 2001; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 208). Thousands died, perhaps up to 15,000, either as a direct result of the conflicts, or due to the increased disease and almost total lack of medical care that resulted from the island’s blockaded status (Hegarty, 2003, p. 3; Mirinka, 1994b; Regan, 2001, p. 5; Rimoldi, 2011, p. 184). By 1997 Bougainville was ‘deeply wounded, physically, mentally, socially, and spiritually’ (Böge & Garasu, 2004, p. 568), and this war-weariness not doubt contributed to the Burnham Accord truce that was reached in 1997 (Böge & Garasu, 2004, p. 568; Regan, 2001, pp. 6-9; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 198).

A full peace agreement, which after intense negotiations included autonomy arrangements was signed in 2001 and came into effect in 2003 (Hegarty, 2003, p. 3; Regan, 2010, p. 109; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, pp. 209-210). Between 1997 and 2003 various international security personnel were deployed to Bougainville to assist with the New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), or from 1998 the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) (Hegarty, 2003; Regan, 2001 & 2010). Demobilisation and weapons disposal was a major focus during this time, with the United Nations Observer Mission to Bougainville (UNOMB) reporting in 2005 that their weapons disposal mission had been completed (Regan, 2010, p. 107). This ‘completion’ was very much timeline based however, as thousands of weapons remain to this day in Bougainville (Capie, 2011).

5.2 The role of women in conflict and peace

In turning now to assess the conflict with a gender lens, it is immediately noticeable from the varying accounts of the conflict how uniformly gendered constructions fall
into two main categories: men as fighters, women as peacemakers. This is consistent throughout both the insider and outsider accounts that are available (see Section 5.1).

While women played significant, well documented roles in the peace process, as mediators, messengers, carers and influencers (Dinnen, Porter & Sage, 2010, p. 20; Hakena, Ninnes & Jenkins, 2006; Havini, 2004a & 2004b; John, 2004; Mirinka, 1994b; Miriori, 2004; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003), these roles predominately stem from the traditional roles expected of women within Bougainvillean culture. As we shall examine further in this section, many societies within Bougainville have matrilineal descent structures which provides women with a particular status and space for contributing to community decision-making. Within the context of the conflict women were far more easily able to slip into negotiating and mediating roles, being perceived of as ‘neutral’ in comparison to male ‘fighters’ (Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 204). Indeed, as well as mediating between the multiple factions active at various times during the conflict, women were also utilised by the PNGDF to go into the mountains and jungle and persuade families hiding there to return to the coast and its care centres, away from the fighting (ibid.). While the motivations for this were probably more strategic than humanitarian (the removal of civilians from mountainous areas gave the PNGDF freedom to fight the BRA as they saw fit), it highlights the respect and access women maintained to all sides as well as the cultural contexts in which they were able to exercise power (ibid., pp. 203-204).

Less well documented than women’s roles in the peace process are the roles women have played in Bougainville society since the Burnham Accord and in the Autonomous Bougainville Government since its establishment after elections in 2005.
Sepoe notes that the Bougainville Constitution (adopted in late 2004) rewarded women for their part in establishing peace, guaranteeing three parliamentary seats for female candidates and establishing the ‘principles of fair representation for women on all key government bodies’ (Sepoe, 2007, pp. 69-70). What needs further examination is how in practice has this been operationalised, aside from the three reserved parliamentary seats. While Bougainville’s women took up the spaces created for them to act during the crisis, exactly how much space were they allowed or encouraged to operate in since peace? There has been much silence regarding this within academic literature and aid agency documentation which continually refers to the enhanced status Bougainville women have due to matrilinealism, as if this alone equates to empowerment and equality even when it is used only in quite symbolic ways (Rimoldi, 2001, p. 182).

A brief explanation of Bougainville’s matrilineal structures is useful at this point. While not all of Bougainville’s many communities and language groups (of these there are about 19) are matrilineal, the majority are. The most notable exceptions are the Buin area in southern Bougainville Islands and the Nissan Islands (Rimoldi, 2011, pp. 181-182). Matrilinealism strongly centres around the land – the Bougainvillean phrase ‘mothers of the land’ is an often cited one when referring to women (Rimoldi, 2011, p. 181; Sirivi & Havini, 2004). It is interesting that matrilineal rights do not equate to female ownership of the land, but rather confer a special status on women as they are responsible for the continuation of the clan, which owns the land communally (Oxfam Australia, 2008; Regan, 2005, p. 420; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 204). Traditionally male rights to land were limited by the custom of always gaining the permission (‘tok orait’) of the female relatives with regards to anything involving
the land or use of it (Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 204). It is important to note therefore that in seeking to solely negotiate with male community leaders in Panguna, BCL consciously or not stripped women of their matrilineal rights to participate in decision-making about the land (Oxfam Australia, 2008). While matrilineal structures do differ between Bougainville’s communities (Ogan, 2005, p. 51), what is central is that women traditionally would have involvement in decisions about land and this status provide them with not only a voice within the community, but also some security, socially and economically.

The fact that matrilineal land and descent structures remain in place in Bougainville, admitedly to a lesser degree than in pre-contact times (Ninnes, 2006, p. 3), indicates the cultural importance placed on this, despite the changes wrought by colonialism, World War II, and ‘development’ interventions (Rimoldi, 2011, p. 182). Howley sees Bougainville society as having started to ‘breakdown’ during colonial times, and that this disintegration was merely ‘accelerated’ by changes brought by BCL and the Panguna mine (2002, p. 31). Although I concur that colonialism did break down many traditional structures and altered gender relations considerably, it is important to note that within Bougainville traditional justice systems ‘remained largely beyond the remit of the state law’ (Dinnen, Porter & Sage, 2010, pp. 2-3). This is particularly true for the more isolated, rural areas. However, due to the particularly strong influence of the Catholic Church in Bougainville, missionaries did have much success in restructuring gender relations to be more aligned with European, Christian models. Not only was women’s reproductive and subsistence work devalued, but marriage came to be conceptualized throughout the Pacific as being between ‘a dominant providing husband and a submissive dependent wife’ (Jolly & Macintyre, 1989, p. 8).
Additionally, the changes to the economy brought with colonialism have resulted in considerable social upheaval, especially when considering practices such as ‘blackbirding’ (Firth, 1997, p. 265; Howley, 2002, p. 21). It is therefore important to not disregard that Bougainville, and Oceania in general, is still in transition to a post-colonial state, and in which ‘new challenges are being superimposed’ onto already existing and ‘damaging colonial legacies’ (Murray & Storey, 2003, p. 221).

5.3 Kastom and restorative justice

That traditional structures like matrilinealism and restorative justice practices have not been eroded away entirely by colonialism and war is a testament to their strength and the importance placed on them by communities. For Bougainville communities the clan is the ‘fundamental social group’ (Regan, 2005, p. 420) and its cohesion and harmony a contributing factor to the social well-being of all.

Restorative and traditional justice practices in Bougainville differ markedly from those practices embodied within the formal, western-styled law and justice sector. A focus within village life when problems arise is mediation and forgiveness, with the main goal being ‘building a more cohesive society’ (Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 195). Indeed it is thought in Bougainville that without forgiveness ‘life is damaged’ for both the person who commits the offence and the person who cannot forgive (Howley, 2002, p. 113).

Tombot (2003) explains that while there is an unfamiliarity with Westernised justice practices, restorative justice within villages ‘is what our ancestors used for thousands
of years to resolve minor and major disputes, up until colonial times’ (p. 259). Helpfully he also provides a description of a village ritual:

The major sources of conflict in those [pre-colonial] times were pigs eating from gardens and domestic violence. The chief asked the disputing people to meet and to come to an agreement. When they did, the chief prepared a betel nut with lime and mustard on his thumb and asked them to take their share and chew it. While they chewed, the chief dug a hole and then told the chewing people to spit into the hole. Then he covered the hole. He told them to have courage and shake hands. Their anger and hate was now in the covered hole.

(Tombot, 2003, p. 256)

What is considered a major advantage by many who have written about restorative justice is the fact that both offended and offending parties are invited to contribute and have their say, it ‘allows a sense of communal responsibility’ (Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 195). Whereas Western criminal systems focus on establishing the facts and what is true, restorative justice relies on the ‘active participation’ of the community (Jolly, 2003, p. 269).

While the issue of monetary compensation is a relatively recent phenomenon, and one that not everyone in Bougainville is happy about (Saovana-Spriggs, 2003, p. 195), a more worrying criticism of traditional justice practices concerns the marginalization of women and young people. Both Jolly and Macintyre (2003) and Howley (2002) note that due to kastom surrounding sexual violence and abuse (it is totally forbidden to discuss according to Howley [p. 120]) women are prevented from accessing and receiving actually ‘restorative’ justice for sexual crimes committed against them. The
fact that village justice structures are dominated by the ‘bigmen’ of the village also skewers the perspective of the village magistrates to the detriment of younger men and women (Howley, 2002, p. 140).

It is therefore in opening up alternative avenues for women and others seeking justice that the BCPP and its CAPs hold particular significance within Bougainville society.

5.4 The Bougainville Community Policing Project

The New Zealand Aid Programme (formerly NZAID) has funded, through the New Zealand Police (NZP)-led BCPP, the development of the CAPs in varying levels in Bougainville from 1998-2001 and then ongoing 2005 (NZAID, 2006, p. 1). The main aim of the project is to help to ‘develop indigenous law and justice systems’ (New Zealand Police, n.d.) and enable greater access for people to these and the more formal justice practices (NZAID, 2005, p. 11). A 2006 NZAID evaluation of the BCPP reviewed it as having ‘substantially achieved’ its primary goal: ‘To establish community-based policing on Bougainville as an essential contribution to restoration of effective civil authority and to reduce the incidence of crime and the fear of crime throughout the communities of Bougainville’ (NZAID, 2006, p. 2). Howley noted as early as 2002 that the CAPs were having an impact and were receiving positive reviews from communities within which they were based. Many people he had spoken to appreciated the ‘balance’ of male and female CAPs, perceiving it as helping to address domestic violence, incest and rape (Howley, 2002, p. 199).

The BCPP represents an attempt to improve law and order by balancing the customary law, order and justice practices that are present within villages, and the
strengths of these more indigenous systems, with the basic principles and practices of a state-managed ‘police’ service. The role of CAPs within communities is, in practice, rather fluid and ad hoc. It is a part-time, on-call type of position, and is carried out in different ways in different communities, and to differing extents between CAPs. As one aspect of their role is to work with their Council of Elders (CoEs) and Chiefs, the responsibilities some CAPs take on depends to a large extent on the direction given to them by their CoEs and Chiefs, not just on the direction provided by their BCPP superiors.

CAPs are utilised by their communities as and when necessary. As CAPs are chosen from their own communities and remain a part of them, CAPs are required to simultaneously negotiate the requirements of the BCPP and its aims as well as those of their community. This makes for a markedly different policing environment when compared to policing in New Zealand. Many CAPs therefore remain, from a New Zealand or western policing perspective, quite passive in their duties, and for the most part they perform their role in a reactionary manner, responding to requests when approached directly. Within villages people have the choice of seeking assistance from either the CAPs (and subsequently the Bougainville Police Service [BPS] and state-managed law and justice system), or the village-based mediation and court systems, which draw on various customary, and often restorative and compensatory, practices.

As an outsider it is easy to assume that people would opt to pursue their grievance through whichever system would provide them with the outcome that is in their best interests. However, in reality there is considerable societal pressure on community
members to resolve ‘sensitive’ complaints quietly and quickly by customary negotiation practices or within the village court system. While some cases may actually be better served through the state-managed system, especially if there is the need for a perpetrator to be removed from contact with a victim, the reputation of the state-managed policing service for slow, ineffectual results is sometimes an obstacle to people actively seeking resolution through this system.

While the BCPP has been successful in increasing the number of female CAPs over the years to just over 18% in 2009 (Bougainville Community Policing Project, 2009), it is still a primary concern of this research that reviews of the BCPP have failed to include much substantive evaluation of how gender equality issues have been addressed by the project. The only gender assessment outlined in the 2006 report is the inclusion of numbers of female police recruits (between 2000 and 2002 the number of female CAP recruits trained was 26/168) (NZAID, 2006, p. 2). While one report notes that more women CAPs are needed, and that the ‘poor’ retention of female officers needs to be addressed, this does not alter the evaluation’s quite glowing review of the project, which is ‘being highlighted as a model for other parts of Papua New Guinea’ (NZAID, 2006, p. 3). If the BCPP is being held up as an example to follow, then a gender analysis of its practices and impacts is long overdue.

5.5 Conclusion

Chapter Five has provided some historical context for the research location. The information provided is but a brief sketch of some of the more relevant historical events that have shaped contemporary Bougainville. To follow, in Chapter Six, the
key findings from the research conducted in this post-conflict Bougainville will be outlined and discussed with regards to how they relate to the research aims.
6. Key findings: The gendered effects of current strategies

This chapter explores the key themes and findings that emerged from the interviews conducted in Bougainville. I will look at how the concepts of development, security and gender are understood, constructed and mediated by participants recruited from a number of communities from within Bougainville. Their reflections on the BCPP and the activities of the CAPs will be examined as a way of grounding the rather abstract concepts involved in this research within a specific case study. Understanding how constructions of the concepts of gender, security and development play out practically is significant if we are to address the gendered effects of merged development-security interventions and potentially make improvements to this and similar interventions. The strategy of using female CAPs to address the practical policing needs of Bougainville women will be further explored, as will be the impacts of the BCPP on gender relations and equality. I will examine the issue of domestic violence in Bougainville as a specific example of how gender, development and security intersect.

6.1 Practical gender needs: Female CAPs addressing women’s practical security needs

The BCPP actively promotes and tries to recruit increased numbers of female CAPs. The programme has been successful in increasing the number of female CAPs over the years, and the female participation rate within the CAPs programme now stands at just over 18%, with the aim of bringing that up to 20%. This is a significant
achievement, especially when compared to the current female participation rate of only 10% within the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), and the sometimes extremely persistent resistance to female CAPs that has been present within some communities and Council of Elders (CoEs). It has been through the consistent negotiation on the part of specific NZP personnel that many female recruits have been accepted into the CAPs programme and allowed to work as CAPs in their villages.

In examining the role that the BCPP, and their strategy of increasing rates of female participation in the CAPs programme, I will seek to answer Research Question One (what strategies are currently being employed within the Bougainville Community Policing Project to address gendered inequalities and how effective are they?). As noted, the BCPP has been successful in increasing the number of female CAPs over the years to just over 18% in 2009 (Bougainville Community Policing Project, 2009). In comparison, the current female participation rate of the BPS stands at 10% (18/179) (DP-M5\(^3\)). With higher numbers of female CAPs now present in Bougainville’s villages, many women (depending on their location) have greater access to more gender sensitive policing in the form of a female CAP or a male CAP who has been trained (to a very basic level) about domestic violence and victims’ rights. But what does female participation and the active encouragement for higher numbers of female CAPs actually mean for gender relations and gender equality in the communities serviced by CAPs?

\(^3\) Participants are coded according to their occupational category (see Table 1) and sex. DP-M5 is therefore ‘Development Professional male participant 5’.
While NZP deployed to Bougainville do push for more female CAPs, that was the only real attention to ‘gender’ observed during fieldwork. Both BPS and NZP personnel have what they regard as ‘more important’ things that need their attention and focus than dealing with gender inequalities. Planning for and addressing gender issues has therefore slipped as a priority. In talking about what was important for the NZP advisors to be doing, participants commonly discussed the capacity building of the BPS as being the most urgent priority.

6.1.1 Female CAPs primarily dealing with ‘women’s issues’

As there exist strong cultural pressures preventing men from talking to women about issues deemed inappropriate or private, many accounts (PS-F3, NZP-M1, BPS-M2, CAPs F4, F5, M1, M3, M8 & M9) were provided during interviews of male CAPs sending female complainants either to see a female CAP in another village, or getting an untrained local women (for example the male CAP’s wife or sister) to talk to the complainant in lieu of themselves. This results in victims perhaps not getting correct advice regarding the options available to them, and also it prevents male CAPs from gaining valuable experience in dealing with ‘sensitive’ cases such as sexual assaults.

Female CAPs within many villages are seen as ‘useful’ only for dealing with ‘women’s problems’ or ‘women’s issues’ and are at times overlooked in favour of male CAPs when any other policing issues arise. As we shall see, there is a widely expressed belief that a woman can only talk to another woman about any sort of sexual crime, and that female CAPs are ‘good’ in this regard as a women victim won’t tell a man, even a police officer, about everything that happened for cultural reasons.
Sex is not talked about here, so most of the time people don’t even know if what’s happened to them is a sexual offence. So lots of times it doesn’t go to court because they can’t actually explain what’s happened.

(DP-F3)

At the very least having female CAPs is a starting point in dealing with women’s practical security needs, which aren’t necessarily being met by customary practices – it gives women victims another choice of who to turn to for assistance, especially if they feel marginalised or disempowered within the village system. But, just as some village magistrates (of both sexes) actively support patriarchy and tell women to go back to abusive husbands and be a better wife (as cited by CS-F2), some CAPs, even female ones, may also sustain disempowering and unequal practices. This is especially important to consider as CAPs were originally prescribed to work with the village systems and chiefs. This leads to the question of whether the greater female participation rate within the CAPs programme has enabled women to gain greater influence or control over policing practices and policies. This is a very complex question and will be discussed in some depth.

In terms of thinking about attempts to meet the practical gender needs of Bougainville’s women, it is essential to take into account the role of ‘kastom’ or local cultural practices and traditions. Within Bougainville ‘kastom’ underpins gender relations very broadly – how men and women interact with each other is culturally prescribed and societal pressures to behave within the boundaries set by ‘kastom’ are strong. When I interviewed CAPs-F4 and F5 together it was explained to me how it was not ‘kastom’ for women to talk to men about sex, it was forbidden. They explained how a woman has to talk to a woman CAP, and if there is no female CAP
in the area, then ‘maybe they’ll go to the Chief, he will help’. Upon asking some further questions I was told that the reason for a woman not talking to a man about things like this was because the man would ‘try’ to have sex with the woman.

There were two participants who indicated that it would actually be ‘OK’ for a woman to go to a male CAP to discuss sexual crimes, unless of course the CAP was a close relative of her, say a brother-in-law (PS-F3 and CAP-M9). While PS-F3 elaborated that it would be a reluctance on the part of the woman to discuss such matters with a close relative, the male CAP reiterated that it was kastom that restricted this: ‘Because kastom, sometimes it’s your sister or something, you can’t ask your sister things like that, so we then take them to a woman… if there’s a Chief woman’ (CAP-M9). A male CAP spoke of how he ‘needs’ female CAPs:

> A man cannot talk to a female, I mean he can talk but she won’t disclose every detail … like if there’s been a case on rape or incest or anything like that in regards to sexual, yeah, they can’t disclose a full report … [And if there are no female CAPs] we provide a female from the village so that that victim will have to talk to that woman … Actually she should be a Chief, a prominent lady.

(CAP-M3)

He also explained that kastom differs depending on what area you are in, and so he was in favour of CAPs being recruited from their own areas ‘so any one female CAP knows and understands their own customary values’ (CAP-M3). Even a BPS officer noted that ‘it’s quite dangerous for a man to talk to a woman’, and that before there were female CAPs a Chief or female elder from the village was used to talk to female victims of sexual assaults (BPS-M2).
Some perceive that a lot of the population still believe that rape is the fault of the woman, and thus admitting you have been raped brings shame to you and your family. So even though female CAPs have certainly made it easier for a rape victim to discuss what happened, many still do not approach even the female CAPs for fear of bringing shame on themselves and their family. This is magnified by the fact that confidentiality in small communities is not practiced and reporting to a female rather than a male CAP does not alleviate this (DP-F3).

That gender relations and gender constructions are fluid and changing does warrant a mention here. In thinking of the ways in which sexual assaults have been approached by the New Zealand Police over the last fifty years, there have been significant changes. This was mentioned by NZP-M1 and is useful to reflect on here:

> We’ve been through that years ago in New Zealand you know, women want to speak to a female officer and stuff. But it’s a load of rubbish in New Zealand – that’s used as an excuse for a bloke [officer] not to talk to a woman, but it wouldn’t be the case at all … I’ve no problem with a female interviewing a female rape victim, but then there’s no reason at all why that file can’t then be given to a male BPS officer … but the sexual offence unit here is only females.

(NZP-M1)

This statement is interesting as it reminds us that often in police forces, and also in peacekeeping operations, female personnel are utilised in this very instrumentalist way – to deal with issues that are culturally easier or more appropriate to segregate into the domain of ‘women’ and, more worryingly, to act as a ‘sexual violence problem-solving force’ (Simic cited in Willett, 2010, p. 152). CAP-M1, M6 and CAP-M8 all talked about how female CAPs are ‘used’ when rape and domestic violence
cases arise. CAP-M1 explained that ‘women CAPs help us solve the problems, like married women [adultery], rape. With rape cases, they don’t tell us everything, so it’s better that we have CAP women’. He also confirmed that when dealing with female rape and sexual abuse victims he gets a woman from the village, sometimes his wife, to assist, as other CAPs also do. Interestingly, some female village leaders (F3 and 4) interviewed also advanced the view that using female CAPs was a good idea for addressing practical gendered security needs. Although they didn’t know why there weren’t any female CAPs in their area, they both agreed that it’s ‘a good job for the women CAPs to work in the community, because when we have some sorts of incidents in the bush or at the beach, women can save us, they can be like our security’ (VL-F3 and 4).

Segregating female personnel out in order that they focus on dealing with women only not only prevents them from gaining experience in broader policing, but also prevents male personnel for gaining experience and confidence in dealing with, for example, sexual crimes. NZP-M1 noted that the sexual offences unit in Buka BPS was all female staff. This I found significant, especially when considering that there are only 18 female officers in the BPS (out of 179 personnel). This acts to segregate sexual crime as an area of female expertise, rather than a crime that all officers should be knowledgeable about and experienced in dealing with. The confidence and skills that male officers need when taking statements from victims of sexual crimes is not going to eventuate if none, or a very limited number, ever get to deal directly and consistently with victims. Even if male CAPs assisted female CAPs in interviewing or dealing with these sensitive cases, that would allow for all parties to feel comfortable and supported: the victim would have the female CAP present, the female CAP would
have her male colleague to assist and the male CAP would, also, feel more comfortable and actually be gaining valuable experience.

To reiterate an important point, it is the way and manner in which female personnel participate in policing and post-conflict reconstruction, not their mere presence within deployments, that is significant (Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 19). Utilising female personnel to interact with female victims, offenders and witnesses, or to deal solely with culturally sensitive sexual crimes, does not enable or contribute to any sort of transformative ‘agenda setting’ mainstreaming (Jahan, 1995) taking place. Rather the female personnel are added in for instrumentalist motivations, a gender problem-solving tool enabling existing systems, approaches and structures to remain unchanged and unchallenged – Jahan’s (1995) ‘integrationist’ approach embodied. This lack of questioning about the terms of female participation within the BCPP can, therefore, be viewed as a ‘systemic blockage’, to borrow from Parpart (2009, p. 60). ‘Systemic blockages’ prevent gender empowerment and gender equality from being realised and generally remain unanalysed and ignored within post-conflict reconstruction interventions worldwide (ibid.). Within the BCPP operations generally there is a recognised, and valuable, focus on increasing female participation. My argument is not that this is without purpose, but rather that it is not enough. Focusing on participation alone, without examination of the nature of that participation and its gendered impacts, is common practice, but one that could be easily remedied with some commitment and attention. Even providing more specific training for CAPs around dealing with sexual crimes, and facilitating an increase in the confidence of male CAPs in taking statements from females, would be valuable in this respect. Indications are that further training would be welcomed. Both NZP-M1 and DP-M5,
who are experienced in training both CAPs and BPS personnel, described in their interviews how enthusiastically gender training has been received in the past. Both noted that discussions within the training environment around sexual offending were open and robust, with cultural restraints around talking about such topics being put aside in favour of open discussions and questions.

6.1.2 Examining a specific security-development issue: Domestic violence

Another, perhaps more obvious, issue when analysing gender relations and the also practical security and development needs of men and women is that of domestic violence. It was only towards the end of my time in Bougainville that I began to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the extent to which domestic violence is tolerated and often left unchallenged within most Bougainville communities that I visited. While much work is being undertaken within the law and justice sector and by Bougainville NGOs on increasing awareness about the damage done by domestic violence and child abuse, and providing greater support to victims of domestic violence, many participants were still uncomfortable when asked about their views on this subject. In a number of cases I knew that this was because they were aware of my views about this form of gender based violence and did not agree. Of course, not knowing me and not wanting to offend me by disagreeing with me meant that a number of responses were probably not entirely accurate of the participants’ actual views. On the other hand I was also surprised by the openness with which some other participants approached their interview with, sharing many different thoughts on domestic violence with me.
I have chosen to refer to it here as ‘domestic violence’ rather than ‘gender based violence’ as that is how participants chose to label the violence that occurs within the home between partners and also children. It is not only a security issue, and a gendered one at that, but also a development issue. For some who I talked to domestic violence represented the apex of female insecurity, while for others it was more a manifestation of underdevelopment. One social worker I interviewed was talking to me about the numerous development issues her village needed to address: access to clean water and sanitation, self-sufficient food production, and improved and more plentiful housing. For her the growing population and resultant overcrowding that was now prevalent in hers and other nearby villages was obviously contributing to increased incidences of domestic violence: ‘Pre-crisis, when you got married you moved into your own homes. But now lots of married children tend to still live with their parents’ (CS-F4) and this increases tensions. Alcohol consumption was another cause of domestic violence that was readily put forward by participants, many also noting that it increased fighting amongst men not only between partners (CAPs F2, F3, M1, M7 & M10; VLs M2, M3, M4, M5, M9, F3 & F4; CSs F2, F3 & F6; PSs M2, F2 & F3).

Women were consistently presented as either the victim or trigger of domestic violence, with only two CAPs stating that sometimes in cases they dealt with, it was the wives who were the perpetrators and were physically violent towards their husband (CAP-M2 and CAP-M3). One CAP in particular saw women’s behaviour as the underlying cause or trigger for their husbands to assault them, telling me that he would often advise women that ‘when your husband is talking too much, you just step
down and you listen to him and if he’s [still] talking too much, you just go to your parents’ (CAP-M9).

While all participants acknowledged the physical and emotional damage that can occur within families as a result of domestic violence, opinions were spilt over the extent to which it should be considered a criminal matter or a family matter. In two interviews I was advised that by far the most common view within Bougainville society was that hitting your partner was not ‘domestic violence’ but rather that it is believed to be a sign of love – ‘I hit you because I love you’ being a commonly heard excuse (CS-M1 and DP-F3). DP-F3 also noted that because this domestic violence is generally ‘condoned by cultural and religious philosophies’ in Bougainville, it was very difficult to make any inroads when trying to change society’s views on behaviour that is generally considered to be a valid discipline tool within a family. Another participant voiced a similar worry, and when asked about her work to foster positive change she stated that ‘it’s better to educate people so they reduce family violence themselves, so that at least security is their issue’ (CS-F4).

Development professionals, civil society workers and volunteers, and New Zealand Police personnel I interviewed all expressed resignation regarding the fact, that proportionally, not a lot of domestic violence gets reported to the BPS. There was also some frustration evident in the lack of intervention by CAPs to domestic violence cases within villages: ‘they’re leaving domestic violence to the couples to try and solve. I don’t think that’s very good’ (CS-M2). Why this was the case was made evident in the interviews I conducted with village leaders, village magistrates, BPS and CAPs personnel. I also heard of many (unverified) reports of BPS and CAPs
beating their wives and children, and when asked about whether a victim would be better off reporting domestic violence to the CAPs or Chief within the village, or to go the BPS (if that was possible), I was told the response from either would be ‘the same’ (CS-M1). One development professional I spoke to relayed to me how one of her colleagues hit his wife so badly she was hospitalised, but the BPS still declined to investigate (in spite of requests from the wife’s supporters) labelling it as a ‘family matter’ (DP-F3).

While many CAPs did talk about their work in ‘mediating’ domestic issues, and acknowledged that violence within the home was widespread within their communities, most did not see it as reason to intervene unless it happened either too often, or too seriously (and an injury occurred). One male CAP, when describing what his role entailed, described how he was responsible for ‘sorting out’ many things, including what he termed ‘normal disputes’ (CAP-M3). Upon clarification this turned out to be domestic violence incidents. In a New Zealand Police Memorandum (2010) it is also noted that there have been discrepancies in the reporting of domestic violence by some CAPs (CAPs report on ‘domestic violence’ and ‘family matter’ offences, with some listing the former as the latter).

Interestingly, another male CAP I interviewed did not seem to have a hesitation with referring some domestic violence incidents to the BPS immediately (CAP-M11). Most CAPs, however, explained how they would work with the Chiefs to decide how to resolve particular incidents (as is their primary function). While cases involving injury would be referred to the BPS, ‘usually… Chiefs would make a decision’ and a
compensation penalty would be applied to one of the parties, with compensation varying according to the type of offence and severity (CAP-M2).

In spite of a lack of proactive intervention on the part of CAPs to the issue of domestic violence, the mere presence of CAPs in many villages means that people, and in particular women, are able to access a justice system that was often unavailable to them before. For many, the CAPs represent ‘our first contact to access justice. For women to access justice they are the first contact. When women are not dealt with properly there, they don’t access justice [at all]’ (CS-F1). For women in Bougainville’s rural communities the CAP programme represents access to assistance, protection and justice that they may be culturally denied elsewhere. It is an essential component in meeting women’s security needs.

6.1.3 Access and control

The fact that female CAPs enhance access to security for female members of communities, in terms of reporting crimes and seeking advice relating to security issues, was evident in many interviews conducted not only with CAPs, but with non-police participants also. One development professional even went as far as stating that ‘without women officers, women here wouldn’t report sexual crimes’ (DP-M5), and this view was backed up by other participants. CS-M1 and F1 agree that without CAPs a lot of women in rural areas wouldn’t find it very difficult to access any form of justice. Indeed one male CAP I interviewed (CAP-M7) explained how he would send any woman who came to him to make a complaint about a sexual crime directly to the Chief. CAP-F2 asserted that women do not go and seek assistance from male CAPs with issues of domestic violence ‘because they might create more problem’,
suggesting that the male CAP might just go and talk to the offender who would then seek revenge on the complainant. The mere presence of female CAPs has therefore brought a new level of accessibility to security and justice to women. PS-M2, talking about seeing female CAPs working in villages observed that ‘it’s quite acceptable now. A lot of cases I’ve experienced in the village the womenfolk are free to talk to the women CAPs’. She goes on to note that most women wouldn’t talk to male CAPs. This was backed up by CAP-F3 who spoke of how women find it very easy to talk to her: ‘They are opening themselves to me’ and would often travel from other villages some distance away specifically to speak to her, a female CAP. She was not the only female CAP to observe this:

[Women in the village] really respect me … When they have complaints they run to me to attend to their complaints … Sometimes female, they hardly talk to men, especially with family abuse matters … [Before female CAPs] women were always silent at that time … only when there’s a big problem they will come to the police station … Now I’ve become a bridge to the women out there.

(CAP-F1)

The fact that many male CAPs seemed to lack the confidence, or felt culturally unable to take statements from or advise women who come to them is a concern still. The fact that some male CAPs are happy to talk with women, or do so when there is no other option indicates some level of flexibility does exist regarding ‘kastom’ or rather how CAPs choose to mediate their role within their cultural context.

So, while the BCPP does provide women with access to policing services they otherwise would not be able to access due to cultural or location reasons, women CAPs and women in communities still have limited access and, more significantly,
control over decision-making and resources. In *Chapter Three* I briefly touched on Kabeer’s argument that power ‘derives from control over resources and control over ideas’ (1994, p. 70). From discussions with participants it would therefore seem to be the case that female CAPs, as a concept, is controlled by not by the women of the community or the female CAPs themselves, but still by the male elders and male CAPs, who seek to control the idea by carefully constructing female CAPs into the role of CAPs for women’s problems. So, whilst women can now participate in village level discussions in Bougainville (as was noted in *Chapter Five*), ‘it’s still men who have the final say’ (PS-F1). ‘Women are custodians of the land. Men just have this *overall power* to look after the land’ (CAP-M3; my emphasis).

When talking about ‘control’, it needs to be highlighted that I am drawing from Longwe’s analysis of the concept. For Longwe, ‘equality of control’ was important and that equates to finding a balance and achieving gender equality within decision-making processes – neither subordination nor dominance (Longwe, 1994, p. 293). And, while ‘access’ is not as immediately transformative as control, it is still an important step in challenging traditional gender roles and perceptions of who can and can’t provide security. It is very interesting to note that of the 59 participants I interviewed, there were 15 who believed that the CAPs were male-only, they did not realise that women were allowed to and in fact were already CAPs. A further 12 participants knew that women could be CAPs, but had not ever encountered or heard stories about any. One participant, who had worked with female CAPs but still talked about how ‘I’m really surprised that women feel they are free to be a police officer’ (DP-F1), so entrenched in her view of Bougainville society was the idea that policing was a man’s role. As noted in *Chapter Four* that my participant selection did contain
an element of ‘tarmac bias’ (Chambers, 1997), as the majority of my time was spent in the two largest towns of Buka and Arawa, whereas CAPs are only located in villages. However, as stated in Chapter Four, 33 of my 59 participants lived in rural areas, with 26 being based in either Buka, Arawa or in the surrounding areas.

At the very least having female CAPs is a starting point in dealing with women’s practical security needs, which aren’t necessarily being met by customary practices: it gives women victims another choice of who to turn to for assistance, especially if they feel marginalised or disempowered within the village system. But, just as some village magistrates (of both sexes) actively support patriarchy and tell women to go back to abusive husbands and be a better wife (CS-F2), some CAPs, even female ones, may also sustain disempowering and unequal practices. This is especially important to consider as CAPs were originally prescribed to work with the village systems and chiefs. This leads to the question of whether the greater female participation rate within the CAPs programme has had an empowering effect and possibly enabled women to gain greater influence or control over policing practices and policies. This is a very complex question and I will attempt to address it now.

6.2 Empowerment and transformative change

While the focus on participation is not enough, it does lay a good, solid foundation, and is changing attitudes and assumptions about gender roles and responsibilities. It is certainly a good position to build on from. It shows communities that women and men can make non-traditional contributions to policing and security, and also empowers women in seeking out non-traditional employment and volunteering opportunities. As was noted in Chapter Three, it is often small, practical steps, such as increasing
female participation rates in post-conflict state-building, that are valuable for building on from and enabling more systemic changes to be made later (Dawson, 2005, p. 81; Moser & Moser, 2005, p. 18; Standing, 2004, pp. 86-87). Any attempt to utilize increased access to and participation in policing for more strategic, agenda-setting gender goals (Jahan, 1995; Moser, 1989) is, I believe, a good, pragmatic step in the right direction. While I did not hear any accounts of any such attempts taking place within the BCPP during my time in Bougainville, this is not to say that they aren’t occurring, or that the foundation for them to occur has not been laid. In the case of the female CAPs I interviewed, they certainly projected and embodied a sense of empowerment and self-worth from the work they do for their communities as auxiliary police officers, and many of them, along with some of their male colleagues, were conscious of the impacts of not only socially constructed gender roles on their work, but how their work reinforces and at times resists these constructions.

CAP-F2 was one participant who obviously gains both satisfaction and confidence from being a CAP, enthusiastically stating that she wants to remain a CAP for ‘as long as it lasts’, in part because her children are very proud of her. I found her story interesting when thinking about Kabeer’s conceptualisation of active versus passive agency (2003, p. 174). Initially CAP-F2 did not want to become a CAP and only agreed to her recruitment due to family pressure. Although now enjoying her role, her behaviour appeared to conform to Kabeer’s notion of passive agency (ibid.). Significantly she also noted that there had initially been resistance on the part of the Chiefs to her appointment and thought that the New Zealand Police had insisted on a female CAP being recruited for her village. In all likelihood her assumption about this local resistance was correct.
I joined a women’s collective earlier and they chose me to be their spokesperson … and my uncle told me better to be a CAP than going out with women’s issues … Maybe he saw how I was carrying out my work … I was always talking about rights, so maybe that’s why they wanted me to take up this position, being a CAP … I’m proud that I’m being a police … I’m the only one looking after almost 6,500 people out there … The first time it was a little bit hard for me because they [the Chiefs and elders] couldn’t even listen to me, and then it took most of half a year for them to listen to me … It was like, them seeing me as one of the X4 Women’s Collective, saying maybe she was against us men … They’ve changed their minds, they respect me being police … We’re working well together.

(CAP-F2)

In an example of what Kabeer would term to be ‘active’ agency, behaviour that exhibits very purposeful intent (Kabeer, 2003, p. 174), CAP-F3 actively petitioned both her local CAP NCO and the BCPP headquarters in Buka to be recruited as a CAP.

While she liked ‘dealing with problems and talking to people’…‘the best thing about being a CAP is arresting the criminals’, which she finds exciting. The excitement of the role and arresting people was also mentioned by CAP-F2, and with both women there was a sense of appreciation for the power and respect that they were afforded due to being a CAP. Both CAP-F3 and CAP-F6 remarked about the ‘respect’ they received in their CAP role, with CAP-F6 finding it particularly empowering when people comment to her that ‘they also want to be a CAP’. This sense of accomplishment was important for the women, particularly for those with children (of which five of the female CAP participants did), as they all commented on how hard it

4 Name of collective has been confidentialised.
was being both a mother and a fulfilling their on-call CAP duties. CAP-F3 summed up the response nicely when she stated that although being both a mother and CAP was a ‘struggle’, that it was ultimately ‘good for me’ and also her children, especially in that she felt she was now able to ‘teach them about peaceful resolutions’.

A question does remain as to how much of the respect the female CAPs get is due to their being associated with both the New Zealand Police and the BPS. While change is evident, as mentioned by PS-M1, with ‘more and more women are being accepted into positions of authority with within the village’, he did stress that communities accept female CAPs and their authority ‘because they are identified with the formal system’ – how much of an impact have female CAPs had on improving gender equality within village-level decision-making processes? As discussed in Section 6.1.2, not much change is evident in this area, yet. This is partly due to the entrenched nature of gendered roles and the value placed on ‘kastom’ by Bougainvilleans. Although culture, much like gender, is dynamic and changing, resistance is employed by those not wanting to disrupt the status quo with regards to power relations (Leach & Sitaram, 2002; Momsen, 2001; Parpart, 2009, p. 60). I shall, however, return to address the issue of resistance a little later. For now it is important to recognise that change within gendered constructions of people’s roles and responsibilities is changing, as are gender relations in Bougainville.

In thinking about the impact of the conflict on gender relations within Bougainville society and on what participants were eager to discuss and analyse, it is relevant to refer back to the notion that conflict and post-conflict contexts can create ‘opportunities’ for women, as was mentioned in Chapter Three (Cockburn & Zarkov,
The fact that Bougainville’s women played a large part in bringing about the peace process is readily noted in academic literature and within Bougainville itself (see Mirinka, 1994a & b; Saovana-Spriggs, 2003; Sirivi & Havini, 2004; Regan, 2010; Rimoldi, 2011). Within interviews the representation of women as the ‘peacemakers’ of the conflict was very common. I found it significant that construction of women as peacemakers was so solid and unchallenged when referring to the conflict, and yet when discussing the present-day ‘peacemaking’ roles of women within communities, there was much inconsistency, doubt, and frustration on the part of participants. When considering issues of development and security, this is very important to highlight. As one participant stated, ‘If you’re a woman leader, you’re more accepted in times of war … I think it’s a natural role, a traditional role’, for example, women used to be exchanged by warring clans as symbols of peace (CS-M1). However, the fact that women in Bougainville find it ‘difficult’ to be accepted as politicians is very disappointing for him. DP-F1 also expressed frustration that there haven’t been many activities for women’s empowerment in the post-crisis times. She suggested that maybe this is because women are expected to already be ‘empowered’ as Bougainville is (mostly) matrilineal. However, in reality DP-F1 felt that Bougainvillean women have forgotten how to build on and use their strengths, particularly the strength they have with regards to their matrilineal rights. She also, therefore, finds the lack of women participating in the political arena worrying:

Women played a big role in brokering peace … but after the government was established women were kept out of not really included … I don’t think it was anything drastic, but it was noticeable … Women did want to be involved, but they thought it was coming into a man’s area of authority, so they would doubt their capacity … Women in Bougainville, when it comes to traditional activities,
to kastom activities, they are very confident because they know all the nitty gritty

... But when it comes to politics, or to bureaucracy or business, I only find a few

women coming out.

(DP-F1)

Is this perhaps a case of ‘backlash’, that is active resistance to gender equality
initiatives, (Momsen, 2001) in practice? While PS-F3 sees that men in Bougainville
are ‘beginning’ to ‘acknowledge’ the contribution of women, she also stated how she
has encountered some resistance related to gender awareness programmes in a
number of villages: ‘they think “oh that’s for women, they want to come up over us.”’

While a few other participants noted similar perceptions within communities when
asked for examples there were none forthcoming other than a general feeling that
some men felt ‘threatened’ by not only women’s increased leadership during the crisis
(DP-F3) but also that women ‘know their rights now too’ and were increasingly
willing to seek assistance from the formal law and order system (BPS-M2).

Traditional gender roles and constructions, and societal enforcement of them, still
play a large part in explaining why the women of Bougainville have not been able to
fully realise the potential that was seen in their increased leadership during the
conflict. Many participants discussed how certain roles within the community were
gendered, even specific tasks. For example, CS-F2, when explaining village peace-
building activities and meetings, mentioned how ‘men at the moment are really
supportive with the peace-building. They prepare the dialogues, do the groundwork –
women facilitate the dialogues’. This view of women as ‘better’ listeners and
negotiators is a common one, and was mentioned in Chapter Three when discussing
the use of female personnel in post-conflict interventions for quite instrumentalist
purposes on account of their perceived ‘listening’ or ‘negotiating’ skills (Mazurana, 2003, p. 68; Mobekk, 2010, p. 281). Within the interviews the idea of women being ‘better’ at diffusing situations also arose. CAP-M3 asserted that female CAPs are of value due to women being ‘better at talking.’ Others also talked about the involvement of women elders in village mediation practices, with women being good at dealing with conflicting parties ‘face to face’, and that this is primarily why ‘Chiefs see women as being the peacemakers in the community’ (CS-F2). DP-M1 was another who stated that women are better at mediation, better at ‘coming up with solutions … Women’s nature is in mediating, in encouraging … Women talk, people listen’. Another development professional, working for a large international agency, described a situation in her village:

In Bougainville, more than in other parts of Papua New Guinea, men can listen to a woman when she gives orders … I don’t think women would be allowed to order anyone around in another part as much as here … My grandmother, in the village she acts like security, she puts people in line … I think that’s natural for communities to accept a woman in authority.’

(DP-F1)

This view of women a ‘natural’ peacemakers draws heavily from the roles considered appropriate for women – specifically nurturing and mothering roles. That women would intervene to stop conflict is seen as appropriate because it does not challenge their traditional mothering roles. This construction of women as peacemakers contrasts sharply with the construction of men as fighters, another common gendered construction that ignores the different experiences and roles that are taken on by men and women in conflict and post-conflict contexts (Mobekk, 2010, p. 286; Porter, 2008, p. 109; Puechguirbal, 2010, p. 173; Willett, 2010, p. 155; Whitworth, 2004, p. 125; Sirivi & Havini, 2004). These constructions also work to ‘perpetuate
inequalities’ and prevent men and women from taking up more dynamic of non-conforming roles within post-conflict rebuilding (Puechguirbal, 2010, p. 173). Indeed, as has been seen in Bougainville, women have found it challenging to enter the political sphere, in spite of the ease with which they were accepted as peacemakers within the Bougainville peace process.

Other participants touched on the realities and resistances that are present within their communities when considering women in leadership roles. The idea presented earlier, that although nominally a matrilineal society, women in Bougainville still tend to be excluded from decision-making within communities, is relevant when thinking about this issue. CS-M2 explained to me how men make the decisions in Bougainville society:

[B]ut I don’t think they really consider what the youth may be thinking, or what the women may be thinking … Although we are a matrilineal society, women don’t play very much, very significant roles. They are more or less used as a rubber stamp in a lot of cases by men.

(CS-M2)

VL-M8 was another who highlighted how even though Bougainvillean women may contribute to law and order, in specific circumstances, overall they are excluded from taking charge or powerful roles:

I’m not saying that women are not contributing to law and order – they are. But as I say, our culture seems to see women as, her place is in the kitchen … At the moment it is always the men who are making the decisions in the community and are running law and order. It’s always the men.

(VL-M8)
6.2.1 Masculinities

One participant I spoke with, CS-M1, works with men to challenge gender assumptions, re-learn and practice different, non-violent behaviours. He described for me how men from the villages actively seek out and fully engage with the anti-violence training workshops he runs and has heard of them taking back the information, skills and questions to discuss with other men in their villages. The most significant part of the training for him is that it encourages men to question assumptions and behaviours they have always thought of as ‘natural’. He talked of how ‘confused’ men were with regards to power, and the value of discussing and questioning gendered assumptions:

Some of the things men learn as they are growing up are they are more powerful than women, they are more important than women … they are stronger … these are the things that men use to demand from women in our society … In the past I used to really suppress my wife … today, if she’s angry with me … we discuss. It’s a healthy way to deal with things.

(CS-M1)

While it is significant for both development and security to consider the impact of gender constructions and roles within village-level decision-making processes, it is also important to look more closely at how roles and responsibilities are constructed within both the BCPP intervention itself and within local law and order practices. Thinking about gender relations within this framework is necessary if any analysis of Parpart’s ‘systemic blockages’ (2009, p. 60) is to be achieved.
6.3 Externally driven interventions and local law and order practices

One concern that arises when examining externally designed, staffed and managed post-conflict interventions is that it is very easy to focus analysis on the technical tools and operational mechanisms utilised, which turns attention away from the communities and people who should be benefitting from the intervention and puts the personnel involved in the intervention in the spotlight (Whitworth, 2004, p. 121). While this is valuable for very important reasons (see Rubinstein, 1988) it is not a research goal of this thesis. Instead, a focus on what actually happens in practice, and how that is mediated by communities, is the focus here. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine briefly how both communities and CAPs themselves regard and embody the BCPP intervention.

Within the context of post-conflict Bougainville, all policing, be it by the BPS and CAPs or within villages, is bound by the Bougainville Constitution (Appendix I) needs to recognise the ‘roles and responsibilities of traditional chiefs’ and the customary law and order practices in the villages (Section 51). This was very evident in the fieldwork conducted, especially when talking to CAPs and village elders about how their contributions to law and order within their communities. What was less evident was how the general population within communities understood the role of CAPs to be and how they understood the CAP-Chiefs relationship to work. With regards to the recruitment of CAPs, most participants had a solid awareness that CAPs came from their own communities and that they had been around in a few different guises since the peace process started.
Ex-combatants were encouraged to join the CAPs programme after the crisis, including by Chiefs, as it was perceived as a way of demobilising combatants and reintegrating them into communities (see Chapter Five). Three of the CAPs I interviewed readily identified themselves as ex-combatants (CAP-M7, M8 and M11), while others I spoke to either declined to talk about the crisis outright or were obviously uncomfortable and so my line of questioning was altered. In those latter cases I simply questioned them about their current CAP role, which they were all happy and proud to discuss. One CAP who was recruited by his Chiefs explained how the Chiefs ‘knew’ he had been a combatant who had ‘fought the Papua New Guinea Defence Force’, and he believed that that was why they requested that he ‘come and try to keep the law and order’ (CAP-M8). CAP-M11, another ex-combatant, requested to join the CAPs, motivated by wanting to help bring his community’s people out of the bush and back to the villages after the crisis. Not all within Bougainville were happy about the recruitment of ex-combatants however, with one BPS officer (BPS-M1) recounting how worried he was originally about this approach. He explained how he thought that by recruiting former fighters they ‘might be training a bunch of raskols’ who would actually rebel against the region’s emerging leadership. This fear was never realised and he now values the work that CAPs do. While initially ex-combatants numbered about 50 percent of CAP recruits, that rate is dropping as younger CAPs are recruited and the older ones retire (BPS-M2).

In thinking about this prioritisation of ex-combatants into CAP roles we are drawn to recall both MacKenzie’s analysis of DDR in Sierra Leone (2009) and Duffield’s representation of the securitisation of development (2001). Much like in Sierra Leonie, the prioritisation given to reintegrating men who had been involved in the
conflict into the CAPs programme and political life also, was due to the framing of these men as a potential security risk (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 259; Regan, 2011, pp. 60-61 & 97-99). Women, seen as ‘peacemakers’ (see Section 6.2), were not framed in such a manner and therefore ‘deprioritised’ and given no or very limited attention with regards to reintegration in the post-conflict context (MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 257-258). MacKenzie discusses the assumption that women in post-conflict Sierra Leone would simply return to their pre-conflict roles, and this assumption is also evident within Bougainville post-conflict society: ‘The reintegration process for men has been emphasized as vital to the transition from war to peace while the reintegration process for females has been deemed a social concern and has been moralized as a return to normal’ (ibid., p. 259). Duffield (2001) argues that the merging of development and security since the 1990s, and the intense urgency that has as a result been given to the problem and threat of underdevelopment, has created a global political environment in which social transformation interventions (state-building) have become the modus operandi in post-conflict societies. While these interventions aim to ‘change indigenous values and modes of organisation and replace them with liberal ones’ (Duffield, 2001, p. 42) in Bougainville this hasn’t been a straightforward process due to a recognition, by outsiders as well as locals, of the importance and entrenchment of traditional governance mechanisms and the redundancy of attempting to implement Western forms of governance on remote and isolated communities (see Chapter Five).

In the conversations I had with participants about the Crisis, it became clear that people in Bougainville have great respect for the leadership of the Chiefs during that time. It was often the leadership of the Chiefs that held communities together during
the crisis and maintained any form of law and order. PS-M1 explained that after Papua New Guinea’s independence (1975) the authority of the Chiefs was legally diminished (see also Tombot, 2003, p. 259) – they were ‘sidelined’ and not commonly appointed as village magistrates. He supposed this was because many were not well educated, and this had become the main criteria for appointment post-independence. What he saw happen during the crisis was that the Chiefs took the opportunity to ‘reassert’ their influence, they ‘stepped up’ and assumed responsibility for maintaining order, particularly once the PNGDF was withdrawn and the BRA got ‘out of control’. He therefore sees the CAPs programme as coming ‘at the right time’, as was successful because it built on the Chiefs’ leadership. ‘People in Bougainville had a hard time accepting formal law and order agencies, because the police were identified with PNG’s security forces … The community police is a good idea because it is something they identify with’ (PS-M1). PS-F2 offered a different view in noting that in a lot of villages the CAPs are actually the only symbol of government that people encounter on a day to day basis – ‘they’re the ones people will look up to and think “they’re the government”’. As made clear in Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics’ framework, while ‘development’ often fails to meet stated project objectives, it does ‘succeed in expanding the field of bureaucratic state power in people’s everyday lives’ (Ferguson, 1994, p. 176). In thinking about the BCPP and the access that its CAPs have provided to policing and justice, we are able to see this idea of a development intervention acting as bureaucratisation mechanism in practice, even though in the BCPP’s case this is perhaps not intentional.
In any case, people do associate CAPs with not only the formal but also the indigenous law and order system, and have recounted how they see CAPs working with the Chiefs and within traditional practices:

I see him [village CAP] working with the traditional, say with the Chiefs on the ground, with the men and women in trying to bring peace and good order … in the traditional manner. I find him mediating often. He doesn’t, I’ve not seen him come with force … He doesn’t yell at people … He’s usually facilitating between clans, he’s helping the Chief.

(DP-F1)

When talking about their current roles, most of the CAPs described themselves as some sort of ‘middleperson’ in that they worked together with the Chiefs and also liaising with the BPS, linking the two. Mediation was the most common task they talked about when asked to describe what sorts of things they do as a CAP: ‘We carry out general law and order … Not arresting … but mediating … Like most of the troubles arising in the village, we get the parties involved to talk about peace in the village’ (CAP-M2). However, one concern that arose during interviews was the high number of participants who reported some level of confusion with the role of the CAPs and the distinctions between the CAPs, village Chiefs and magistrates and the BPS. Particular uncertainty surrounded when exactly CAPs should intervene in situations in the village, with respondents often saying they were confused by CAPs not being proactive at all and only intervening when they were asked to (CS-F1, CS-M1, CS-M2, CS-F3, VL-M8 and PS-M2): ‘They sit and wait for people to come and ask them to deal with problems … They should encourage people, women, to come forward to seek justice. At the moment they are very silent, mute in a sense’ (CS-F1).
Throughout the fieldwork I also questioned whether women were better served by one system over the other. Do the more ‘traditional’, male dominated village law and order systems marginalize women and other vulnerable members of the community, when compared with the option of seeking assistance from the CAPs? Would, for example, a domestic violence victim be better assisted by a CAP than by entering into a negotiation with the assaulter, which is a common customary dispute resolution practice in villages, or not? Research participants had different opinions on these questions. Overall however, in the communities I visited and in talking to participants about their village life, it is evident that the village justice systems remain extraordinarily strong. DP-M5 suggests that 90 to 95 percent of issues are handled within the village, and this rate would be even higher in more remote locations such as the Nissan Islands. Even murders, which by law must be referred to the BPS, are sometimes dealt with within communities (DP-M1). There were many reasons voiced as to why one form of law or justice was chosen, rather than the other, exemplifying the ‘multi-choice’ Melanesian policing environment outlined by Dinnen and McLeod (2009, p. 35).

It is important to remember not to romanticise indigenous knowledges and societal systems. This diminishes the value they do have in providing alternative, locally-specific approaches to development and ‘progress’. Briggs (2008) warns of how romantic notions of traditional or indigenous development approaches can be co-opted and used as a tool of Western-centric development agencies (he gives the example of the World Bank). This co-option renders the traditional knowledge useless at offering a ‘fundamental challenge to development’ (Briggs, 2008, p. 108), which is the objective for many who advocate the significance of indigenous epistemologies.
Instead he sees far more value and use coming from a viewing of indigenous knowledges and practices as ‘complementary, not competing’ with Western development approaches (ibid.). This idea of finding a balance is significant here, as the BCPP consistently advocates that this ‘balance’ of traditional and Western is not only achieved within the project, but is also a contributing factor to its success and a ‘selling point’ of the project:

The CAPs, in eight years, have developed into a highly functional community policing system, which is a culturally and situationally appropriate system of law enforcement that complements and supports formal law and justice sector processes.

(NZAID, 2006, p. 13)

Meanwhile, predictably, the village leaders I interviewed were generally quite adamant that they were better able to and suited to handle problems within the village (VLs F1, F2, M1 & M2), and this value of their role was backed up by other participants also. ‘Traditional forms of leadership and control will probably never, can never be removed from us. And that is a good thing’ (PS-M1). While some village leaders did acknowledge that at times support was needed, there was a firm desire to retain control of law and order and other development-related processes: ‘Leaders in the community solve things by themselves. Districts get funding, but they should fund the villages. Villages can manage by themselves’ (VL-F1).

When discussing obstacles preventing people from accessing the more formal law and justice systems, for example the BPS and district courts, there was an awareness among participants that if cases are reported to the BPS little will happen: ‘people
know it probably won’t be investigated and won’t be prosecuted’ (DP-F3). NZP-M2 acknowledges that people doubt the BPS and favour village mediation:

If they turn up here at the counter and want to report something, it’s reported, sometimes a statement is taken and then it just sits. And I think that’s the problem, as X [a BPS officer] said, “We’re very good at taking statements from witnesses and complainants, we don’t take statements from offenders”. It’s almost like we collect – come and report whatever you want … I’m not saying that things don’t go to [district] court, but a lot don’t.

(NZP-M2)

VL-M9 confirmed that when cases are referred to the BPS it is a ‘very slow process … some defendants, they are still waiting for their cases to be sorted out.’ CAP-F1 agreed with this argument and this highlighted how sometimes CAPs are put in an uncomfortable position, lacking the authority of the Chiefs, but wanting to adhere to the ideals of the CAPs programme and Bougainville Constitution by making sure certain ‘serious’ cases are referred appropriately to the BPS. CAP-M1 was another who told of some frustration he experiences with his Chiefs: ‘Some of them, when rape cases appear, they want to solve it I the village with compensation – I advise them this is now a new Bougainville’. Sometimes he is able to get cases referred to BPS, but sometimes not. It is not always the Chiefs or magistrates that are resistant however:

When it’s a rape case that’s happened within a family some of them don’t want to have that brought up with the police station [BPS] because they feel it is going to bring shame … Sometimes with the village magistrates, it’s the victim’s family that pressure them to deal with it in the village.

(DP-F2)
The idea that the BPS was a ‘last resort’ for communities arose in interviews also, but CS-F5 noted that this is true for ‘any government service’, including hospitals. People access government services when all other avenues have been exhausted. Other participants discouraged using the formal justice systems for different reasons: ‘People who are perpetrators, when they go to the police they always come back [with] negative thinking about the people who brought them there … They have grudges’ (CS-M2). CS-F5 felt that the CAPs approach, which focuses on mediation, is far better than involving BPS overly, as they are ‘just arresting and locking up’. One of the greatest strengths of traditional and restorative justice in CS-F5’s opinion is that it doesn’t focus on shaming the offender, which she sees as doing so much damage to offenders who are dealt with through the formal court system. As was outlined in Chapter Five, traditional justice in Bougainville focuses on restoration of harmony, with both parties invited to talk (Howley, 2002; Regan, 2000; Tombot, 2003). BPS-M1 also acknowledges that people ‘chose the village system because they get a bit of talking of what they want … If they brought the case to us [BPS] they would be left out’. That everyone involved can ‘have their say’ was an important factor in CAP-M10’s promotion of local mediation practices and active discouragement of people who come to him wanting cases referred to the BPS from doing so. Rather he tells them that ‘we can sort it out amongst ourselves’.

That CAPs do in practice exercise agency and flexibility bodes well for their own personal empowerment and sense of worth. It is of concern however that men and women may be discouraged from seeking appropriate resolution by their families, the CAPs and village magistrates. It is important that access to the formal system is only restricted by location (distance from the nearest CAP, and provided they are willing to
refer the victim to BPS) and education about options available to complainants, rather than by the cultural restrictions that accompany the village court system. PS-M2 states that women are often not assisted within the village mediation and court system (as was also mentioned by CS-F2 in Section 6.1.2) – he says this is why more and more women are seeking protection orders and support or help through the formal system.

When considering access to policing and justice, and the valuable role that the CAPs play in providing this access, particularly to women, the long-term sustainability of the BCPP project becomes very significant. A commonly held view that came out in many interviews from a broad cross-section of participants was the concern that the BPS do not have the capacity or the will to maintain the BCPP, and that the CAPs project would collapse if the NZP personnel were to leave Bougainville. Indeed, CAP-M3 advised that he had had conversations with a number of other CAPs who have spoken of resigning if the programme management is taken over by the BPS. Indeed, there was a belief among participants in a pervasive lack of accountability within the BPS. Few BPS officers appear to be held to account if they take leave without absence. NZP-M1 told how if an officer doesn’t show up to work for three days, he is not questioned about it when he does return. The Melanesian cultural avoidance of confrontation is believed to add to this lack of accountability professionally. It was also noted that BPS management are not actually permitted to dismiss staff for underperformance – this is not the case with the CAPs. This avoidance of confrontation and lack of accountability was also talked about by NZP-M3, so is a common frustration among deployed New Zealand officers.

They’re so under-resourced and there’s always reports coming in and there’s not enough staff at that level, and there are no vehicles to go and speak to witnesses,
so you have to wait for witnesses to come in here. And if you’re up against it …

and you get disillusioned and disheartened. (NZP-M3)

The very nature of the BCPP, that it is a community policing project, has allowed for a reputation and respect for the CAPs to have developed within villages, which the BPS is lacking. DP-M5’s description of the BPS was not an isolated one. He spoke of how the BPS are seen as ‘somewhat lazy … drunkeds … they don’t follow up very well’ and are not exemplars of how to include civil society in policing. Of more common concern with participants was the general isolation of the BPS from rural areas and their perceived (and very real) ‘tarmac bias’ (Chambers, 1997). As one village leader put it, ‘they stick to the towns and highway. We never see them here. Only if it’s a big problem, a killing’ (VL-F1; confirmed later by VLs M3, M4 and M5). This was backed up by other participants also, including CAPs themselves (CAPs M1 & M3).

There was also some cynicism noted by a few participants when talking about this tarmac bias: ‘BPS can’t get out there for whatever reason. They say it’s transport, I say it’s motivation, but CAPs are there’ (DP-F3). In practice, however, this disconnect from the BPS has probably been of benefit to the CAPs in terms of their ability to differentiate themselves from BPS and become a respected, albeit auxiliary, police service for Bougainvilleans. Even one BPS participants acknowledged this, stating that ‘CAPs actually know what’s happening and what needs to be done to bring about law and order … We’re [BPS] a bit isolated’ (BPS-M1). CAP-M3: ‘Villages have come to rely much on CAPs … the BPS, they’re OK, but normally they spend a lot of time at the station.’

When thinking about the possible integration of the CAPs project into the BPS, or to come under BPS management, I perceive the greatest risk to be that the attempts
already taken to improve gender equality within policing in Bougainville will suffer the most. While I have within this thesis criticised the strategy of increasing female participation for not being built on with more strategic gender goals, I do not mean to belittle the value that this increased female participation has very evidently had within communities. As noted in Chapter Three, it has often been the subtle strategies of empowerment, the small pragmatic steps, that have slowly but steadily resulted in longer-term transformative change (Eyben, 2010; Leckie, 2009, p. 15; Scheyvens, 1998). That there is an open acknowledgement within many communities in Bougainville that the female CAPs have been of value to them, and that communities that do not currently have a female CAP have indicated that they want one (VLs F1, F2, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6 & M7), has the potential to at least see the number of female CAPs maintained. How other development and security needs and desires effect this remains to be seen, especially considering the complexity of addressing issues of underdevelopment in practice and the need for sector-wide approaches that acknowledge this complexity and interconnection between not only development and security, but also education, underemployment, livelihoods, and more specific concerns to Bougainville like the ‘youth bulge’ (see Chapter Five).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the key findings and themes that emerged from the fieldwork that was conducted in Bougainville. In interviewing 59 participants many different views were expressed and stories and experiences shared. What emerged was a recognition that the BCPP is having a positive impact in terms of not only providing increasing numbers of men and women with access to law and justice and the possibility of engaging with government policing and justice services, but also in
showing communities that women can hold non-traditional roles within society and that this can have benefits for the community as a whole. While a clear theme emerged relating to the BCPP primarily addressing women’s practical security needs, rather than more strategic ones, there were also clear indications that a solid foundation had been laid from which it would be possible to build on from and move towards a move transformative form of addressing gender within a merged security-development intervention. Why this hasn’t happened in the decade that the BCPP has been in operation is a complex question that deserves further attention, as do the complexities involved in approaching gender within an intervention that attempts to merge indigenous and Western-styled policing systems.

As well as looking at what hasn’t happened, it is essential to also look closely at what has actually happened within this intervention, intentional or not. This is where Ferguson’s approach has been useful, in allowing for the actual impacts of interventions on people’s lives to be highlighted and showing how ‘development’ acts to technicalise and render neutral quite politically-invested actions such as the bureaucratisation of communities (Ferguson, 1994, pp. 176, 178 & 181). When thinking about the key findings discussed in this chapter, we can see how important this focus on practice is, for example when analysing female participation rates it is the nature of participation and the practical effects of it that are of significance if attempts are to be made to improve how security-development interventions address gender inequalities. Therefore, in the next chapter, the concluding chapter, I shall not only relate the key findings to the three main research questions but also put forward some recommendations that have arisen from this research.
7. Conclusion

The three key research questions provide the foundation for this conclusion chapter:

- Research Question One: What strategies are currently being employed within the Bougainville Community Policing Project to address gendered inequalities and how effective are they?
- Research Question Two: What are the gendered effects of the increased alignment of official development assistance with security agendas?
- Research Question Three: Can security sector reform and police capacity development interventions be used to foster improved gender relations and increased equality and empowerment?

Starting with Research Question One, I will comment on the primary gender strategy by the BCPP, female participation, and how effective it is in addressing gendered inequalities. After answering Research Questions Two and Three I will briefly outline the practical applications of this research and indicate a number of areas that would benefit from further attention and research.

7.1 Research questions and answers

7.1.1 Research Question One: What strategies are currently being employed within the Bougainville Community Policing Project to address gendered inequalities and how effective are they?

While there is a small amount of gender-related training that is provided to the CAPs, the primary strategy that has been utilised in practice by the BCPP to address gender inequality is increased female participation rates. Women are encouraged to not only access but also to participate in the BCPP as CAPs. As was noted in Chapters Five
and Six, the BCPP successfully increased female CAP numbers from just 4% in April 2008 to just over 18% in 2009 (Bougainville Community Policing Project, 2009). This increase highlights how successful a concerted effort to achieving a specific gender-related goal can be in practice, when it is prioritised and budgeted for. It is the reality of post-conflict reconstruction efforts that this prioritisation is not commonly afforded to gender-related goals, which are seen as less urgent than more securitised priorities like restoring stability or conflict prevention (Mobekk, 2010, pp. 278 & 282; Timothy, 2007, p. 49; Whitworth, 2004, p. 140; Willett, 2010). The realities of prioritising resources within the BCPP, including budgetary constraints regarding the actual number of CAPs allowable, has resulted in the commitment to increased female participation (that was evident in the 2008-2009 period) not being consistently sustained and gender not being mainstreamed throughout the project as a whole. I shall return to these criticisms later, but first, in order to answer Research Question One, it is appropriate to reiterate the actual practical effects that the strategy of increased female participation within the BCPP has had within Bougainville’s communities.

Female CAPs are recruited from strategically located villages so as to ensure a relatively even distribution of female officers throughout Bougainville’s rural areas. The intention is to have a female CAP located no more than about four hours away from any village, and this aim has resulted in far easier access to a female CAP than was previously available. Access to female CAPs within the Bougainville cultural context is important due to the constraints that exist around men and women talking about sex and sexual matters. As was explained in Chapter Six, most men and women are highly uncomfortable and tend to avoid discussing such things with each other,
even to the point that the male CAPs who were interviewed would normally either get a nearby female CAP or a female village elder to take statements about sexual crimes from female witnesses and victims. The female participants, including the female CAPs, also acknowledged that women were very reluctant to discuss such matters with a male. Female CAPs therefore play a key role in women being able to, in a culturally acceptable manner, access a policing service and subsequently, justice.

When thinking about this improved access to policing and its gendered effects, Moser’s (1989) discussion of practical versus strategic gender needs is highly relevant. Within the Bougainville context, access to policing services, in the form of female CAPs, does indeed meet practical gender needs of women. They are not only able to discuss certain crimes and events more freely with female CAPs, but they also see women taking an active role in policing their communities – they are included not excluded. However, the fact that female CAPs do, in practice, meet the gendered practical policing needs of women has also in a way contributed to further, more strategically transformative gender needs being sidelined. As Moser has highlighted, addressing practical gender needs can be ‘responsible for preserving and reinforcing (even if unconsciously) the sexual division of labor’ (Moser, 1989, p. 1804). While some female CAPs do act as auxiliary police officers for their entire of their community in practice there is pressure and an expectation on female CAPs to fully meet the policing needs of women first and foremost. In effect, female CAPs are called on by their communities and by many fellow male CAPs to act almost as a specialised gender unit, attending to female victims of crime, in particular domestic violence and sexual assault. For strategic gender needs (Moser, 1989) to be met, this ‘specialisation’ of female CAPs would need to be addressed so that CAPs of either
sex can freely and confidently attend to any case. This would be a more transformative and equalising outcome in terms of gender relations. It would also involve women more comprehensively in all aspects of policing, moving the focus from merely the act of participation to the nature of that participation (Moser & Moser, 2005). Encouraging and supporting both male CAPs and women within communities to more freely approach each other about all crimes, regardless of nature, would also contribute to more equal policing from the viewpoint of male CAPs, who currently meet cultural resistance when attending to certain crimes.

7.1.2 Research Question Two: What are the gendered effects of the increased alignment of official development assistance with security agendas?

As argued by Duffield (2001), the increased alignment of official development with security agendas has resulted in an environment whereby increased international interventions in fragile or ‘failing’ states undertake broad state-building or post-conflict reconstruction (see Chapter Two). In practice this has resulted in a securitisation of underdevelopment and poverty whereby certain issues are prioritised according to national security agendas and perceived threats, particularly surrounding the framing of underdevelopment as a cause of terrorism (Duffield, 2001, pp. 113-114). In practice this has also resulted in the deprioritisation of other development concerns, including those related to gender equality (Mobekk, 2010, pp. 278 & 282; Timothy, 2007, p. 49; Whitworth, 2004, p. 140; Willett, 2010).

The BCPP is an interesting case study in that it’s focus is not national or regional stability or security, but rather community policing. Much more than other police capacity development or SSR interventions its effects are experienced directly by the
communities in which CAPs work. As explained in Chapters Five and Six, CAPs work with a degree of flexibility not associated with ‘official’ police officers and assist with seeing cases progress through both formal, Westernised justice systems, and also within traditional village-level systems. This, in practice, means that how their role and responsibilities are prioritised are controlled in part by BCPP management, but also by village Chiefs and elders, generally the village ‘bigmen’ (Howley, 2002, p. 140). When Enloe asked in 2007 ‘What if patriarchy is the big picture?’ the issue of control and power were of concern to her. Looking at the BCPP as a merged security-development intervention and attempting to assess the outcomes of the alignment of these two concepts, we are faced with the question of who controls the prioritisation of the merged security-development agenda? In practice therefore, the patriarchal structures of villages and police services play a significant part in the gendered effects created by this merged intervention.

7.1.3 Research Question Three: Can security sector reform and police capacity development interventions be used to foster improved gender relations and increased equality and empowerment?

In order to successfully improve gender relations and increase levels of gender equality and women’s empowerment there needs to be a shift from the far more common ‘integrationist’ to an ‘agenda-setting’ approach to gender mainstreaming (Jahan, 1995). What has been seen in many post-conflict situations, and within Bougainville also, is the utilisation of female personnel within peacekeeping or police forces for instrumentalist purposes, whereby the addition of women is framed as a ‘fix’ for all gender-related issues and a strategy that can be used to enable the intervention to be labelled gender-aware (Whitworth, 2004, p. 120).
That the BCPP, in practice, focuses solely on the strategy of increasing female participation rates for CAPs is, while instrumentalist, a good foundation upon which further strategies and initiatives could be built. A purposeful and strategic positioning of gender concerns throughout the entire BCPP, from not only recruitment policy, but also within each and every CAP training module, would be beneficial to achieving better gender equality outcomes. For this to occur though decision-making structures need to themselves be gender mainstreamed (Jahan, 1995, p. 126). As mentioned earlier, access is a good initial step, but it does not allow for the challenging or relinquishing of decision-making power, which needs to occur if a balance of control is to be achieved within interventions (Kabeer, 1994, p. 70; Longwe, 1994, p. 293).

Access and participation are also good initial steps when thinking about how to contribute to women’s empowerment, and this is evident within the BCPP. Although there has been resistance from some communities regarding increased female participation in the CAP programme, the strategy was persisted with and, while not reaching the ‘critical mass' level of 30 percent of personnel considered necessary for women to have a substantive impact on decision-making within an organisation (INSTRAW, 2005, p. 7), most people in Bougainville are at least aware of the fact that there are female CAPs, even if there isn’t one immediately near their village. This is important for challenging gendered assumptions about not only policing but also gender roles and responsibilities. Female CAP participants in this research spoke of their pride and sense of self-worth that came from being a CAP: they are being empowered by their role. That other female and male participants also spoke of their
appreciation for female CAPs indicates that a policing intervention can have an impact on improving gender relations.

7.2 Recommendations

This research has highlighted the value that female participation has within security-development interventions, especially as an initial step in attempts to improve gender relations and gender equality. Associated risks have also been highlighted, in particular how the instrumentalist use of female personnel to deal primarily with ‘women’s issues’ and female victims and offenders inhibits the path towards more transformative and equalising change taking place within both police services (auxiliary or professional) and within the communities. Possible ways past this could include more intensive and widespread training of CAPs, both male and female, to deal with all cases they encounter, but particularly the cases that they may be uncomfortable dealing with due to a lack of experience and familiarity. An early observation I made during fieldwork and in interviews with CAPs was the obvious need for more training for male CAPs to increase their confidence in taking statements from and assisting female complainants. Broader training and awareness activities around gender constructions and how gendering roles and particular tasks places limitations on both male and female CAPs would also be valuable.

Opinions put forward by participants in interviews indicate that there is an appreciation and enthusiasm for training opportunities that a number of people I spoke to discussed. CAPs F1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 all stated that the training they received as CAPs on a regular basis was one of the highlights of their role. The two CAPs training sessions I attended whilst in Bougainville did provide evidence for me that
the CAPs who attended, for the most part, were engaged and appreciate of the training being provided. In addition, BPS personnel are also reported to ‘love doing training’ (NZP-M1). Education and awareness building among communities about the role and responsibilities of CAPs would also be beneficial. If it was known that all CAPs were available and able to deal with all cases then resistance to approach them with particular complaints may diminish as public confidence in them grows.

Admittedly the ability to facilitate further training requires prioritisation and substantial budgetary support, which is unlikely to eventuate considering not only the widespread deprioritising of gender within merged development-security contexts but also the current fiscal and political climate. A more pragmatic approach of consistently weaving gender awareness in amongst all existing training modules may, therefore, be more realistic. Although this approach, of mixing ‘gender’ into existing structures, aligns with Jahan’s (1995) integrationist model of mainstreaming, if conducted in a focused manner throughout the entire intervention, has potential for gradually increasing gender equality and empowerment within the BCPP.

7.3 Areas for further study

Within this thesis there were two areas that I particularly wanted to explore further:

1. Why were the women of Bougainville, who played such a vital role in ending the conflict, not able to expand on those peacemaking roles and more successfully be included in the post-conflict political arena? As outlined in Chapter Four, women have a very specific status within Bougainville’s matrilineal societies. Their strength as ‘the mothers of the land’ (Sirivi &
Havini, 2004) is widely reported in both the villages of Bougainville and in academic texts. But to what extent is this merely rhetoric?

2. After over a decade of ‘intervening’ in Bougainville the BCPP has made some progress in terms of gender equality. Mostly this has been in terms of the participation of women. What has prevented further, more transformative change from taking place – what are the ‘systemic blockages’ (Parpart, 2009, p. 60)?

In addition, this thesis has not focused on masculinities within merged security-development interventions, but that is a area that should be prioritised for further research – examining how men can be empowered to improve gender relations and equality would prove to be very valuable when attempting to improve the efficacy of interventions generally. Further analysis of indigenous law and justice practices, particularly interactions between customary and Westernised practices would also be very valuable, particularly within a Melanesian context. Finally, exploring the gendered dimensions of indigenous Melanesian law and justice would make for fascinating research.

**7.4 Concluding thoughts**

This thesis represents an attempt to add to the accounts of policing interventions not from the point of view of the interveners, but from those on the receiving end of police-led ‘development’ projects. In attempting to achieve this, particular attention has been paid not to discourses, policy and documentation, but to practical approaches and the outcomes and experiences that have resulted from them. How people in Bougainville have mediated and experienced the BCPP intervention has been
prioritised with the aim of understanding the practical and gendered effects that have resulted from the merging of development and security agendas.

What this research has highlighted is that when thinking about ways to improve gender equality and levels of empowerment, the increased participation of female personnel within interventions, while allowing for increased access to policing for women and therefore helping to address practical gender needs, is not enough on its own to achieve sustainable and transformative change in terms of gender relations. In examining the nature of women’s engagement with the BCPP, we have seen how the instrumentalist use of female personnel to deal primarily with ‘women’s issues’ has actually worked to sustain gender inequalities within societies for both men and women. While female participation has started to increase levels of empowerment for the female CAPs and the women in communities who access them, a broader and more purposeful approach to gender mainstreaming that is not limited to a focus on participation rates would aid in allowing for merged security-development interventions to, in practice, improve gender relations and levels of equality and empowerment among both the communities in which the interventions are situated and within the institutions that manage and implement the interventions.
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Appendix I. Bougainville Constitution (selected parts)

PART III. – BOUGAINVILLE OBJECTIVES AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES.

13. STRENGTHENING OF CUSTOMARY AUTHORITY.
   (1) The clan structure and customary leadership of Bougainvillean communities shall be recognized and strengthened.
   (2) The roles, responsibilities and authority of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders shall be recognized at all levels of government.
   (3) The family and the clan shall be recognized as the natural and basic units of Bougainville society.
   (4) The customary system of justice in Bougainville based on the restoration of peace through the restoration of harmony in relationships between people shall be recognised and reinforced to the extent not contrary to Christian principles.

15. PURSUIT OF PEACE, REHABILITATION, RECONCILIATION AND HARMONY.
   (1) In order to achieve and maintain peace at all times, mediation, reconciliation and harmony shall at all times be pursued as means of resolving disputes, and the use of violence shall be avoided.
   (2) There shall be established and encouraged institutions and procedures for the promotion of mediation, reconciliation and harmony and the avoidance and resolution of conflicts.
   (3) All people in Bougainville –
      (a) shall not be involved in any para-military activities; and
      (b) shall work towards ensuring that Bougainville is free of all firearms and of crime.
   (4) The Autonomous Bougainville Government shall strive to ensure that Bougainville is not used in any way to support terrorism or money-laundering or other trans-national crimes and no people in Bougainville should support or assist terrorism or money-laundering or other trans-national crimes.
   (5) Rehabilitation for persons who suffered from injuries and trauma and dislocation during the Bougainville conflict shall be encouraged.
   (6) When planning their activities in Bougainville, Bougainville governmental bodies and non-governmental bodies and investors shall be encouraged to take account of the need for rehabilitation of persons
who suffered from injuries and trauma and dislocation during the Bougainville conflict.

19. **FAIR REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AND MARGINALIZED GROUPS.**

There shall be fair representation of women and marginalized groups on all constitutional and other bodies.

24. **DEVELOPMENT.**

(1) In order to facilitate development, private initiative and self-reliance shall be encouraged.

(2) The Autonomous Bougainville Government and all other levels of government, formal and informal, shall take all necessary steps to involve all people in Bougainville in the identification of their real development needs and the formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes which affect them, and all people in Bougainville shall support such plans and programmes and shall, where necessary, make land available for the provision of services and other development purposes.

(3) The Autonomous Bougainville Government shall –

(a) adopt an integrated and co-ordinated planning approach to development; and

(b) take necessary measures to bring about appropriate balanced development of the different areas of Bougainville; and

(c) take special measures in favour of the development of the least developed areas.

(4) The Autonomous Bougainville Government shall –

(a) give priority to the enactment of legislation to establish measures to protect and enhance the quality of opportunity for all people in Bougainville to equal opportunities in development; and

(b) adopt policies to stimulate appropriate development.

(5) The Autonomous Bougainville Government shall develop procedures to enable Bougainvilleans likely to be affected by a proposed major development project to be consulted by the Autonomous Bougainville Government and by the developer before a decision on the establishment of the project is made.

28. **RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN BOUGAINVILLE SOCIETY.**

The role and welfare of women in traditional and modern Bougainville society shall be recognized and encouraged and shall be developed to take account of changing circumstances.
45. CRIMINAL LAW.

(1) The Autonomous Bougainville Government may develop a criminal law policy for Bougainville and in this regard shall, as far as is practicable –

(a) take full account of and encourage continued reliance on the roles of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders in resolving disputes and criminal matters at the village or local level; and

(b) incorporate customary practices and norms into the development and implementation of criminal law in Bougainville.

(2) In accordance with Paragraphs 128 to 130 of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, the Autonomous Bougainville Government and the National Government shall establish a joint commission to examine and report on the issues involved in giving the Autonomous Bougainville Government power to make laws permitting courts or Councils of Elders to require clan-groups, to which persons convicted of criminal offences belong, to meet customary non-custodial obligations, and such commission shall have full regard for –

(a) the aspiration of Bougainvillians for the integration of custom and introduced law; and

(b) the national human rights regime; and

(c) the justice system in Bougainville and in Papua New Guinea as a whole; and

(d) the international human rights system and other relevant aspects of international law.

51. TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT.

(1) Traditional systems of government and the roles and responsibilities of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders and of the clan system, as custodians of custom and tradition and in matters relating to the governance of their communities generally, shall be recognized, wherever practicable and possible, by all levels of government in Bougainville.

(2) The roles and responsibilities of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders referred to in Subsection (1) include matters relating to customary land, preservation of the environment, family matters, dispute resolution and the maintenance of peace and good order.

(3) The Autonomous Bougainville Government shall support and assist traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders in developing understanding of their roles, responsibilities and powers and the skills necessary for effective and responsible exercise of those roles, responsibilities and powers in the interest of their communities.

(4) The Autonomous Bougainville Government, in consultation with representatives of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders, shall assist traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders in identifying their
powers and obligations and by making laws in that regard to the extent that such matters need to be dealt with by law.

148. BOUGAINVILLE POLICE SERVICE.
(1) The primary functions of the Bougainville Police Service are, in accordance with this Constitution, the Bougainville Peace Agreement as implemented in Part XIV (Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum) of the National Constitution and Bougainville laws –
   (a) to serve the community and to preserve peace and good order in Bougainville; and
   (b) to maintain and, as necessary, enforce all laws that apply in Bougainville in an impartial and objective manner; and
   (c) to co-operate fully in the co-operative policing arrangements as set out in Paragraphs 226, 227 and 228 of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

(2) In carrying out its functions under Subsection (1), the Bougainville Police Service shall at all times –
   (a) have respect for human rights; and
   (b) develop rehabilitatory and reconciliatory concepts of policing; and
   (c) work in harmony and partnership with communities and encourage community participation in its activities; and
   (d) support and work with traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders to resolve disputes and maintain law and order in communities.

(3) The Minister responsible for Bougainville Police Service has no power of command within the Bougainville Police Service except as provided for by this Constitution or a Bougainville law.

(4) In so far as it is a function of the Bougainville Police Service to lay, prosecute or withdraw charges in respect of offences, the members of the Bougainville Police Service are not subject to direction or control by –
   (a) any person outside the Bougainville Police Service; or
   (b) where acting under any arrangement with the National Police Force, any person outside the National Police Force.

149. CHIEF OF BOUGAINVILLE POLICE.
(1) At such time as is considered suitable by the House of Representatives, there shall be established an office of Head of the Bougainville Police Service, the holder of which office shall be called the Chief of Bougainville Police.

(2) The Chief of Bougainville Police shall be appointed (and may be suspended or removed from office for just cause) by the Bougainville Senior Appointments Committee, which for the purpose shall include the National Commissioner of Police or his representative and one
other representative of the National Government appointed by the National Executive Council.

(3) A Bougainville law shall make provision for the period of appointment, terms and conditions of employment, rank and other matters relating to the Chief of Bougainville Police.

(4) The Chief of Bougainville Police shall be responsible to the Bougainville Executive Council in accordance with Section 140 (responsibility of Heads of Bougainville Government Services to the Bougainville Executive Council).

150. FURTHER PROVISIONS RELATING TO BOUGAINVILLE POLICE SERVICE.

Subject to this Constitution, Bougainville laws shall make provision for all matters relating to the Bougainville Police Service and in particular relating to –

(a) the structures and organization of the Bougainville Police Service; and

(b) the terms and conditions of service of the Bougainville Police Service; and

(c) the core training and personnel development arrangements for the Bougainville Police Service; and

(d) such other matters relating to the Bougainville Police Service as are necessary,

consistent with those of the National Police Force.
Appendix II. Participant information sheet

Security, development and gender: A Bougainville case study

INFORMATION SHEET

Researcher Introduction
My name is Sharon Cuddy and I am studying toward a Masters degree in Development Studies at Massey University, New Zealand. I have come to Bougainville to conduct a research project for this degree. My research focuses on the connections that exist between development, security and gender, and how men and women experience security-development interventions like the Bougainville Community Policing Project (which I am using as a case study). I will examine how the increased framing of security as a development issue (and vice versa) plays out in practice and is experienced by women and men.

I am inviting you to participate in this research project. Participation will involve being interviewed for between 45 minutes to one hour. Questions about the themes associated with this research will be asked, but the interview will be quite conversational. Questions will not be strictly adhered to, and you may chose what to answer and what not to answer. You may also end the interview at any time, or request that the voice recorder be stopped, and are free to ask any questions at any time before, during or after the interview. You may withdraw from this research at any stage, even after the interview has finished.

Confidentiality
You have the right to privacy and this right is valued and will be strictly adhered to should you choose to participate in this research. Whilst your comments may be included in the thesis that will be produced in July 2012, your identity will remain protected. At the start of the interview you will be asked how you would like to be described in the thesis, but normally categories will be used like ‘police officer’, or ‘community worker’. Your interview will not be discussed with anyone other than the researcher’s academic supervisors.

Protecting your information
All of the information you provide in the interview will be securely protected. If you agree to the interview being recorded, the sound recording will be deleted after the final thesis is finished. Transcriptions may be retained by the researcher, but will be coded so that you cannot be identified in them, and they will remain confidential.
Contact information
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Academic Supervisors:
Prof Regina Scheyvens
Development Studies Programme
Massey University

Dr Beth Greener
Politics Programme
Massey University

This project has adhered to Massey University’s Human Ethics Committee procedures. It has been evaluated by peer review and judged to be low risk. Consequently, it has not been reviewed by one of the University’s Human Ethics Committees. The researcher named above is responsible for the ethical conduct of this research.
Appendix III. Oath of Community Auxiliary Constables

I, ……… , do swear that I will well and truly serve the independent state of Papua New Guinea and its people in the office of Community Auxiliary Constable of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary without favour or affection, malice or ill-will, from this day until I am discharged from that office, and that I will seek and cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and that I will prevent, to the best of my power, all offences against the peace whilst I am acting in that office, and that, while I continue to hold that office, I will to the best of mu skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties of it faithfully and according to the law.

Source: BCPP.