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**WHAT EFFECT HAS THE TRAGEDY THAT OCCURRED ON
SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001 HAD ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
MEASURES AT THE UNITED NATIONS?**

Catherine M. Gilbert

October 2006

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Abstract

The tragedy of 11th September 2001 (9/11), took place on United States soil, and deeply affected the psyche of American people. Many other countries and organisations based within those countries, suddenly felt much more vulnerable from terrorist attacks. One such organisation was the United Nations (UN).

Furthermore, in August 2003, the UN suffered its own major security disaster, "*Some officials called it the UN's own version of 9/11*" (D. Pitt, 2004); with the bombing of its Baghdad office in Iraq and loss of twenty two UN staff members' lives.

For the UN, with offices all around the world, ensuring that its buildings are secure and its staff members are safe is a complicated business as it is usually reliant on the Host Government to assist with the security and safety of its staff, which can create complications in war torn and beleaguered countries.

The UN therefore has the difficult task of ensuring security needs are being achieved in its locations worldwide; whilst still achieving the following efforts in those locations:

"to prevent violent conflict, resolve conflicts that have erupted, protect civilians and deliver humanitarian assistance, keep the peace when combatants have reached a truce, and build lasting peace in the aftermath of war". (Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 2004).

This thesis therefore seeks to explore the ongoing effects that the 9/11 tragedy has had on international security measures in the UN. It will explore internal (to the UN) and external documents, newspaper articles, books, web articles and other material to present a comprehensive document on these measures. This thesis will also discuss the issues that have hampered the UN's endeavors to counter terrorism through a number of UN conventions, which address specific factions and acts, but with no international agreed definition of terrorism.

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Background

Overview on UN International Security Measures Prior to 11th September 2001

The UN recognized the importance of international security measures long before the 9/11 tragedy and took action to develop an international infrastructure to combat terrorism, as a tool to prevent security disasters.

The UN began developing this infrastructure as early as 1963, when the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the Civil Aviation agency of the United Nations, passed a convention¹ relating to aircraft hijackings – “*Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft*”, as a consequence of the “*hijacking epidemic of the 1960s*” (E. Preston, 2005).

In the 1970s, conventions were signed² dealing with security and safety topics regarding aircraft, including the “*Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft*” and “*Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation*”. Crimes against diplomats were covered by a convention in December 1973³ and crimes against hostage-taking were covered in a 1979 treaty⁴. Additional protocols were signed to further complete the conventions: the “*Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation*”, signed at Montreal on 24th February 1988; and the “*Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf*”, signed in Rome on the 10th March 1988 (UN Treaty Collection).

Also in 1988, a convention⁵ on violence at airports “*Acts of Violence at Airports*” was passed. This was complemented in 1991⁶ by the

¹ Tokyo Convention 14 September, 1963. ICAO Document 8364

² The Hague Convention 16 December 1970. ICAO Document 8920; Montreal Convention 23 September 1971. ICAO Document 8966

³ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973

⁴ Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 December 1979

⁵ Montreal Convention 1 March 1991. ICAO Document 9571

convention on the "*Marking of Plastic Explosives*". In all, 12 conventions were signed. These conventions were all security measures aimed at assisting to capture terrorists and stop their financing. [**Annex B**]

The Security Council is the UN body with the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁷ It has the "*primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security*" (UN Charter, Article 24.). The UN Charter requires all 191 member states to carry out the Security Council's decisions (Article 25). Whilst the Security Council had, since its inception, been concerned about acts of terrorism; the stimulus for the Security Council to become actively involved in the prevention of terrorism were the terrorist acts against aviation in 1988 and 1989, involving the Pan American and UTA aircraft, respectively. According to an article in the Summer 2005 Disarmament Times, it was as a result of these acts that the Security Council was urged by the United States and the United Kingdom to enforce economic sanctions on Libya, which was the country blamed for the attacks. (NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Volume XXVIII, Number 3. 2005)

Interestingly enough, on the 13th January 1994, at the Forty-eighth session of the General Assembly⁸ (GA), the following statement was included⁹:

Welcoming the relaxation of global tensions and the emergence of a new spirit in relations among **nations** as a result of the end of the cold war and of bipolar confrontation, expressing its serious concern over new threats to **international** peace and **security**, the persistence of tensions in some regions and the emergence of new conflicts, reaffirms that, with the end of the

⁶ Montreal Convention 24 February 1988. ICAO Document 9518

⁷ The Security Council is a body of 15-members- 5 permanent members and 10 are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms

⁸ The GA is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. It is composed of representatives of all member states, each of which has one vote. Decisions on important questions, such as those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority. Decisions on other questions are by simple majority.

⁹ Agenda item 80, "Maintenance of International Security" Report of the GA

cold war and of bipolar confrontation, the **United Nations** faces new tasks in the area of maintaining **international** peace and **security** (A/48/685, January 1994).

However in 1985 the then Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar declared that condemnation of acts of terrorism was not enough, that resolutions and conventions had been adopted, but action was now required:

New, multilaterally coordinated efforts are urgently required to deal with this terrible phenomenon, which is beyond the capacity of any one country to handle alone. (M. Finger, 1990).

The "*new, multilaterally coordinated efforts*", were not forthcoming and it was not until 17th December 1996, that the GA took the additional step to strongly condemn "*all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed*". (Resolution 51/210¹⁰, December 1996) and on the recommendation of the Sixth Committee¹¹ declared that Member States must:

Take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations. (Resolution 51/210, December 1996)

These additional steps were finally taken due to a rise in deaths from 163 in 1995 to 311 in 1996 due to specific acts of international terrorism; in all there were a total of 296 recognised international terrorist incidents. In addition, the terrorist acts in 1996 were purportedly more brutal and focussed more toward deliberate mass civilian targets and the use of more forceful bomb blasts, than in prior years. (www.usembassy-israel.org. 1996)

Consequently, Member States were called upon to accelerate research and development of methods of detecting explosives and other harmful substances; develop, if necessary, mutual legal

¹⁰ General Assembly. "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", 88th plenary meeting. 17 December 1996

¹¹ The Sixth Committee advises on all legal matters

assistance procedures to facilitate speedy investigations and evidence collection, as well as encourage cooperation between law enforcement agencies so as to aid the detection and prevention of terrorist acts; to employ domestic measures to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations; to intensify the exchange of information on facts related to terrorism; and refrain from financing, encouraging, training or otherwise supporting terrorist activities. (Resolution 51/210, 1996)

Annexed to the resolution was a "Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism¹²", which stated that Member States should take appropriate measures, before granting refugee status, "*for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts*" (Resolution 49/60, 1996).

The GA then established an ad hoc committee to further develop international conventions for the suppression of terrorist bombings "*Measures to Eliminate Terrorism*¹³" and for the "*Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*¹⁴".

On the 16th December 1996, the International Law Commission completed the final draft articles of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the provisional draft articles on State responsibility (Resolution 51/160¹⁵, 1996).

In 1999, the Security Council's "historic"¹⁶ Resolution 1269 was decided upon, which unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, and called on Member States to implement specific measures to prevent terrorism from within. (K. Koufa, 2001). In addition, it called on states to refuse asylum to terrorists and to prevent people's means of financing terrorist

¹² A/C.6/52/L.21, 9 December 1994

¹³ 51st Session of the Sixth Committee, 27 November 1996, Resolution 49/60. A/C.6/51/L.23

¹⁴ 9th Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, A/AC.252/L.13, 1996

¹⁵ 51st Session of the Sixth Committee, 30 January 1997,

¹⁶ The Security Council's first resolution to address the matter of terrorism in general.

operations. According to Lavrov¹⁷, Resolution 1269 “*set the goal of eradicating terrorism on a global scale*” (S. Lavrov, June 2004).

Resolution 1269 was agreed to following a special debate on international terrorism organized by Russia, which held the council presidency during that month of October 1999. This resolution was propelled, in part, by the dramatic increase in acts of terror, perpetuated by Islamic radicals. In fact, in the six month period from January 1st – June 30th 1999, there were 26 acts of terror claimed by Islamists, alone. (Terrorism Update, 1999).

In the United States, during 1999, there had been a steady increase in acts of terrorism over the 1990s, from “*two known or suspected terrorist acts recorded in the United States in 1995, three in 1996, four in 1997, five in 1998, and 12 in 1999*”. (L. J. Freeh, May 2001)

Prior to this resolution, the Security Council had only considered specific cases related to terrorism, as in the case of sanctions against the Taliban. In this particular resolution, the Security Council stated how it was “*deeply concerned*” with the increase in international terrorism. (Resolution 1269, 1999)

Some felt it was rather ironic that the resolution was proposed by Russia. The Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) Executive Director, Dr. Boaz Ganor made the following statement about the irony of resolution 1269 being proposed by Russia “*the very country that once (in its communist phase) defended nearly every major terrorist organization in the world*”. (Dr B. Ganor, October 1999)

That same year of 1999, Resolution 1267 was also adopted, which demanded that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden to appropriate authorities, so that he could be brought to justice. This Resolution was as a consequence of the bombings at two American

¹⁷ Sergey V. Lavrov was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in March 2004. He had served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1994.

embassies in Africa on 7th August 1998, which killed 224 people and wounded thousands. Soon after the bombings, the U.S. government claimed that Osama bin Laden was responsible and it was then that he was then placed on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list (CNN, September 2001).

In 2000, The Security Council specifically focused on potential terrorists being trained in camps in Afghanistan. Resolution 1333 was passed on 19th December 2000, which demanded that the Taliban authorities close the training camps.


Whilst terrorism is regularly the subject of discourse at the UN and a variety of conventions and protocols have been signed; to date (June 2006) there is no all-inclusive international convention or methodology for dealing with terrorism. As already written, there is a combination of international and regional covenants that each address specific aspects of crimes related to acts of terrorism. There have also been GA resolutions and declarations on "*measures to eliminate international terrorism*", and a variety of resolutions by other UN Councils and Commissions.

According to authors Almeida and Lipsett, the reasons why attempts to agree on an all-inclusive international convention on terrorism have not succeeded, are two-fold: the difficulty in finding an acceptable definition of terrorism; and questions about the accountability of non-state actors in terms of international human rights law. (I. Almeida, L. Lipsett. May 2002)

Specific Security Measures at UN Offices Away From Headquarters, Prior to 11th September 2001

For almost fifty years, prior to 9/11, whilst the UN was aware of new threats to international security, it still tended to regard itself as relatively secure from acts of terrorism against itself, as a specific potential target. *“For the first half-century of its existence, the United Nations felt protected by its flag and the perception that it was a neutral, benevolent actor in world events”*. (GA Report A/59/365¹⁸, October 2004). The Secretary General himself acknowledged this in an interview for the first issue of the Fifth Committee newsletter, when he asserted the UN’s complacency regarding security with *“the long-held perception that we were protected by our flag and by our status as an impartial, benevolent actor”* (N. Talwar quoting Kofi Annan, 2005).

At the time of 9/11, international security, for the UN organisation, was delivered by three sections: 1) UN Security and Safety Services (responsible for security at the UN HQ in New York, as well as each of the 8 Headquarter locations – also known as “Offices Away from Headquarters” [OAHs]); 2) The security component of UN missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] (responsible for security on UN peacekeeping missions); 3) Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator [UNSECOORD] (responsible for security in the field, covering humanitarian and development activities).



UN Security System in 2001

¹⁸ Report of the Secretary General. “Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations”. 11th October 2004

The Safety and Security Services were free-standing organisations “*with no common governance structure*” (GA A/59/365, September 2004). The Security and Safety Service Chiefs in each location reported to their Director General or Executive Secretary, through their Chiefs of Administration.

For example, the Security and Safety Service (SSS) at the New York headquarters reported to the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services in the Department of Management.

In the 1990s there was an increase in the deaths and harm on UN staff members. Very rarely was this due to a deliberate act of terrorism against UN staff, but was more likely to be due to exceptional circumstances, such as simply being in a high risk environment on more unsafe and insecure missions, at the wrong time. (N. R. Currier, 2000)

However in 2000, the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) coordinated a convention specifically on the safety of UN and associated personnel. A report of the convention notes their deep concern over the “*growing number of deaths and injuries resulting from deliberate attacks against United Nations and associated personnel*”. They continued to appeal to all States in which UN staff members and associates are working to “*provide comprehensive support aimed at facilitating the conduct and fulfilling the mandate of United Nations operations*” (OLA¹⁹, May 2000)

The UN had, and still has, a formal agreement with the host Governments of UN missions to bear the primary responsibility for the security and safety of UN staff members on those missions.

¹⁹ Report of the Convention of the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel

Specific Security Measures at the UN Headquarters in New York, Prior to 11 September 2001

For a two-year period, from the inception of the UN in June 1945 until January 1947, the UN's security function was maintained by the United States Marine Corps. In 1947, it was decided that the UN should have its own security force for reasons explained in the Security and Safety Service Magazine 2003/4: "*In keeping with the international inviolability of the Organization it was necessary that an independent security apparatus be commissioned to serve the needs of the staff and delegates.*" (Security and Safety Service, 2004)

The Security and Safety Service (SSS) was established to oversee the security and safety of the UN Headquarters in New York on 15th January 1947.

In 2001, prior to the 9/11 tragedy, Security Officers at the SSS, were made up of three platoons, consisting of a Conference Platoon, A Squad and C Squad; there were 5 Professional staff members, 190 Uniformed Security Officers and 9 General Service staff members.

Officers were, and still are, authorized to function as agents of the Secretary General to "*Preserve order and to protect persons and property within the Headquarters area.*" (SSS Annual Report, 2001)

Whilst New York had a relatively low level of crime in 2001, (Federal Bureau of Investigation document "*Crime in the United States*", December 2002), the significance of the UN Headquarters, and the Secretary General, has meant a continual threat category of "high".

Introduction – The UN as a Terrorist Target

UN staff members and buildings, as potential targets, were not a new phenomenon in September 2001, even though the UN regarded itself as relatively secure from terrorist attacks against the organisation itself. For years, specific individuals working for the UN, have been prospective targets.

The first significant example was in 1948 when the UN's Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden, was assassinated in Jerusalem. Since then, over 1,800 peacekeeping personnel have lost their lives (D. Pitt, 2006)

Past Threats Against the UN Headquarters in New York

The UN Headquarters, located in mid-town Manhattan, New York City has historically been the focus of terrorist threats and "*recent intelligence suggest continued terrorist interest in targeting the UN complex.*" (Joint Threat Assessment, August 2005). The UN Headquarters site covers 18 acres of land, including the Secretariat Building and a number of annex buildings. The New York region and City is serviced by three major international airports: John F. Kennedy International, Newark Liberty International and La Guardia. Annually, these airports handle a combined number of more than 80 million air passengers and air cargo of over 2½ million tons²⁰. Since 9/11, there has been a concern that, despite security upgrades at all three airports, the use of an aircraft as a weapon could still be a feasible threat.

The first confirmation of the UN Headquarters being a potential terrorist target was in 1993, the year of the New York City Landmark Bomb Plot, which was planned to follow up the first World Trade Centre bombing of 26th February 1993. In fact, the

²⁰ Joint Threat Assessment by Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Defence. P9. August 2005

first target in the plot was to have been the United Nations Headquarters building. The bomb plot was devised by Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman²¹ and was meant to target the UN Headquarters on 4th July 1993. (R. Gunaratna, 2002).



Nine years later, on the 3rd October 2002, a Korean man, Steven Kim, a United States postal worker from Illinois "apparently protesting the state of human rights in North Korea" (CNN, 3 October 2002) fired seven shots at the UN HQ building with a .357 Magnum revolver.

U.N. Security Officers take the suspected shooter, Steven Kim, into custody.

Mr Kim described himself as a "citizen of the U.N" and carried with him leaflets

addressed "to all people who love freedom and justice", which contained information about the troubles faced by North Koreans. (Roth, October 2002). Fortunately no-one was hurt, but two windows were struck by bullets.

Mr. Kim was charged with violating Title 18, United States Code, Sections 112(a) and 924(c), which makes it a federal crime to assault, strike, or offer violence against a foreign official or premises and to discharge a firearm during a crime of violence.

There are regular demonstrations at the UN, such as the one conducted by 13 university students, on the 21st October 2002; who staged a demonstration in the 4th balcony of the General Assembly Hall by chanting slogans such as "NO BLOOD FOR OIL". The students refused to disperse and were detained. They had gained access to the General Assembly Hall whilst on a guided tour. They were transferred to NYPD and were charged with Criminal Trespass and Disorderly Conduct.

²¹ Sheikh Abdel-Rahman was convicted in 1996 with several others for masterminding the plot. He was the center of a terrorist cell in New York during the early 1990s.

Current Threats Against the UN Headquarters, New York

Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, a senior terrorism analyst at the Washington-based Investigative Project, stated that "*Both the United Nations and New York City's tunnels are identified terrorist targets*" (Krueger, 2005). Mr. Gartenstein-Ross refers to the thwarted New York City Landmark Bomb Plot, mentioned earlier, and the UN as a continuing security threat. (Krueger²², 19th January 2005).

The executive director of the Manhattan Institute's Centre for Tactical Counter-terrorism, R. Eddy, also confirmed that some terrorists consider the United Nations as "*a high-value target.*" (The New York Sun, 19th January 2005).

Interviewed by The New York Sun correspondent Meghan Clynne, Mr. Eddy, who was senior policy officer to Secretary-General Annan, mentioned threats against Mr. Annan by Osama bin Laden, including a May 2004 audio recording in which the leader of Al Qaeda offered a bounty of \$125,000 in gold for the Secretary General's murder (Frontline, 24th September 2004). As the Secretary General is based at the UN Headquarters in New York, this obviously can make the UN Secretariat Building a target.

On 22nd July 2005, a Sudanese man was arrested for immigration fraud. During the arrest, federal authorities discovered a video with what was regarded as "*suspicious footage*" of the UN Headquarters. (Joint Threat Assessment, August 2005)

Events conducted at the UN HQ; such as the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly and the 2005 World Summit, (the largest gathering of world leaders in history with almost 200 heads of state and government) are a magnet for any person wishing to do harm to any of those heads of state and government, or simply to draw attention to a cause "*an opportunity to capitalize on the publicity an act of terrorism would generate.*" (Joint Threat Assessment, August 2005).

²² On the website of Liz Krueger the Democratic state legislator,

Current Threats Against the UN Organisation, in General

The US Department of Homeland Security has uncovered a number of Islamic militant websites targeting the UN. These websites show that the Secretary General is perceived, by some, as having submitted to US pressure in Iraq. *"In one of his videotapes, Osama bin-Laden condemns the United Nations and brands Secretary General Kofi Annan as "a criminal."* (Schoenberg, November 2003).

These negative comments about the Secretary General were specifically remarked upon in November 2001, by the President of the United States, George W. Bush, in his first address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City. In that address he read *"They called our Secretary General a criminal and condemned all Arab nations here as traitors to Islam"*. (George W. Bush, November 2001).

On the World Wide Web some of the titles of articles containing threats against the UN include such rallying calls as *"A call to the militants: an additional hitting of the UN and will leave from Iraq God Willing"*, penned by someone going by the Nome de plume "The Herald" (Homeland Security, September 2003). In addition, a website authored by a person using the title "The Post", comprises a list of points to be accomplished, with the second as: *"The targeting of the United Nations building in New York that considers a symbol of each injustice befell the Muslims and a breakage of last idols that stuck to her"*. (The Post, 2003) The article continues in the same manner, stating that the UN is just an instrument of the superpowers: *"A loss by that to all a blind the United Nations are not except a tool the superpowers for the achievement of their purposes. And he has watched all how she dealt with the occupation of Iraq of Kuwait and how she dealt with the occupation of America to Iraq..!"* (The [New York] Post, August 2003)

A member of the Fifth Committee, Mari Skaare of Norway, was quoted in a Budget Committee Press Release of May 2004 stating

that, as a result of recent incidents, it was clear that the UN was no longer a random victim, but was now "*a target for terrorist attacks by some groups*". (Press Release GA/AB/3615, 12th May 2004.)

Regular threats further emphasise that the UN is regarded as a target. For example, on the 10th October 2005, the Security Office of the UN in Geneva, (UNOG), notified the Security and Safety Service of the UNHQ New York that they had been informed of a plot consisting of three terrorists who planned to attack the UN Office in Geneva. The Swiss Government raised the alert level and additional security measures were put in place at UNOG. At the time, the UN Secretary General was conducting a meeting at The Palis, Geneva. (Internal UN Security Memo, 10th October 2005)

In addition, on 14th September 2005, during the 60th General Summit, an anonymous telephone caller made a bomb threat from a public telephone booth at Times Square, against the UN Headquarters in New York. Two months later, at 2 am on the 11th November 2005, the Control Centre of the Security and Safety Service at the UN received a telephone threat from an unidentified male, who sounded intoxicated, stating that "*you have two impacts coming towards the UN. You have two hours to get out. Get out now*". (Priority notifier message CHAIN-EMN, sent to Security and Safety Service management 11th November 2005).

Most recently, in the aftermath of the Danish cartoons depicting Mohammed, and following a bomb explosion in the sacred shrine of Imam Askari in Samera, Iraq, university students staged a demonstration in front of UNHCR in Mashhad. The students warned that if the UN keeps silent against such terrorist acts, it "*stands against the will of Moslems and it would be responsible for its unjust and irresponsible policies*". (Khorassan Daily, 23rd February 2006).

Whilst some of these threats may be hoaxes or little more than idle threats, obviously all still have to be taken seriously.

Rationales Given for the Resentment Against the UN

The UN role, particularly in peace-keeping, has developed rapidly since the end of the Cold War.

Following its establishment after the end of World War Two, until the middle of the 1980s, the UN did not get true independent responsibility in dealing with conflict situations and peace-keeping operations. The UN customarily dealt with conflict situations under Chapters VI²³ and VII²⁴ of its Charter²⁵, whenever the Security Council was made aware of a potential or ongoing conflict situation occurring.

At the time of its establishment, if a decision was made to commence any formal involvement by the UN, it was always done with a full consensus in the Security Council. During the Cold War, the effects of the War revealed itself through the veto power of one or other of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. This meant that decisions for intervention by the UN were not always independently made, or even completely connected to the issue at hand.

Incidentally, in 1995, New Zealand's Ambassador to the UN, Colin Keating, made a comment to the Global Policy Forum at that time, reminding them that the New Zealand government's position has always been the same - New Zealand had disagreed with the veto at the original Charter Conference in 1945 and it is still opposed it now. (J. A. Paul, February 1995)

After the end of the Cold War, this situation changed again, with the United States becoming the principal political and military power in the UN. This has resulted in some accusations, as stated prior, of the UN being "*a tool*" of the United States (The [New York] Post, 20th August 2003).

²³ Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Articles 33 - 38 of the UN Charter

²⁴ Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. Articles 39 - 51 of the UN Charter

²⁵ Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. First signed on 26 June 1945.

The majority of peace-keeping operations, over the last decade, have been led by the United States and Western countries. When one looks at the locations of these operations, most of them have been in states or countries with Muslim populations, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Cyprus, the Middle East, Golan and Lebanon, Iran/Iraq, Yemen, Iraq/Kuwait, Bosnia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad/Libya.

In line with the fact that many of these operations are in Muslim-populated countries, a number of websites include or highlight accusations, such as "The Militants Way Map"²⁶ which, in an article referring to policies in effect in Afghanistan, Iraq, Philippines, Kashmir and Bosnia, writes that "*The United Nations is the big stick, which the United States uses to punish whoever opposes its policy*" (The International Islamic Media Centre, July 2004). In addition, a statement by the Abu Al Masri Brigades agreed that "*The UN is used by America as a stick to discipline those who do not follow its policy towards the countries of the world.*" (Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigade. "Jihad Against UN", 15th March 2004)

An Islamic "blog"²⁷ posted by Mohammad Abdalhmud, writes in the same fervent journalistic vein as the "Militants Way Map", against the policies of the United Nations:

In Nigeria a Christian militia moves that kills in one day 630 Muslims, and the secretary-general to the Islam support group mentioned what he happened is an organized genocide and that the United Nations are the peace herald and the international security did not move an army and no condemns literally and the reverse is what happened in Sudan an organization or any authority did not prove that there are an extermination of the verses of human kind and a non known high speed Kofi Annan threatening with fast intervention to the United Nations in Sudan for the support of the wronged there, not to this is

²⁶ Found on the website of US Homeland Security: www.homelandsecurity.us

²⁷ The expression given to a shared on-line journal where people can post diary entries about their personal experiences and hobbies (www.askjeeves.com)

theoretical violated blood that does the strong of the evil in our countries what wants beyond measure and no punishment! (M. Abdalhmud, May 2004)

Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, an Al Qaeda leader, also voiced his frustration by perceived double standards when, on the 19th September 2005, he stated:

"The United Nations maintains a double standard in its relationship with Muslim countries vis-à-vis other populations. The United Nations which certified the election in Afghanistan is a hypocrite for their crying and weeping for the people killed in Darfur as they remain silent when one Million Iraqi children died because of sanctions on Iraq." (Dr. A. Al-Zawahiri. Reported by Al-Jazeera, September 2005)

Professor Nasr, Islamic Scholar, addressing a UN Seminar explained, "*Resentment is fed by the unresolved conflicts in the Middle East, by the situation in Chechnya, and by atrocities committed against Muslims in the former Yugoslavia*". (Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary General, December 2004).

This is reiterated further in Mr. Abdalhmud's blog, where he emphasizes how "*UN maintains silence over Russian crimes in Chechnya in return for Russian silence over US crimes in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Palestine*" and further "*The United Nations is hostage to the Bush administration and its Zionist gang*". (The International Islamic Media Centre, July 2004).

Not all the negativity against the UN comes from overseas or Islamic sources. There are some United States websites which journal anti-UN sentiment; such as a website run by Burt Prelutsky, who describes himself as a "*humorist, movie reviewer, writer for television series and movies, and author.*" (Prelutsky, 2004) He comments in his website, under an article named "Time to Evict the United Nations":

Understand, the U.N., while going ballistic over America's rescuing Iraq from Saddam Hussein's iron grip, did nothing about genocide in Rwanda and the Sudan. The U.N., while taking every opportunity to chastise Israel, treats Yasir Arafat as if he were another Mother Teresa and his gang of suicide bombers were just so many good Samaritans going about their business. (Prelutsky, December 2004)

The Awakening News publishes anti-UN articles, such as "The UN is **NOT** Your Friend", where William Norman Grigg asserts:

Behind the mask of peace, brotherhood, and universal understanding, the United Nations promotes terror and tyranny in order to achieve its real objective: world government. (Grigg, 2005).

He continues his tirade in a more personal attack upon the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan:

Clearly, Annan is very comfortable in the company of terrorists, both subversives who have seized power through terror, and tyrants who rule through terror. But this is to be expected, since UN Headquarters in New York City would more accurately be called "Terror Central." (Grigg, 2005).

Whether fair or unfair, there is no doubt that resentment continues against the United Nations for its well documented scandals and abuses ranging from the inconsistencies found in the Iraqi oil-for-food programme, conducted by the UN, to sexual misbehavior by UN peace-keepers at MONUC, the Congo relief effort.

It has also been criticized for allowing human rights abusers, such as representatives from Zimbabwe, to head its human rights commission.

How the 9/11 Tragedy Directly Affected the UN



Photo/Robert Clark/AURORA

Secretary-General's Statement

On 11 September, the United Nations International Day of Peace, a terrible calamity struck. Great structures have fallen. Our souls have been shaken. We are astonished by the evil in our midst; stunned at the scale of the tragedy; dazed by the disregard for human life; overwhelmed by the wound that has been inflicted - on this city, on this country, and on us all.

But we are also in awe at the nobility of the human spirit that this disaster has revealed; the extraordinary courage and self-sacrifice shown by the firemen, the police, the health workers, and all the others who have given, or risked, their lives; the generosity and goodwill poured out by the entire community; and the solidarity expressed around the world by people of all nations and their Governments who-both individually and collectively, through unanimous condemnation in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly-have recognized in this despicable act a common threat to shared freedoms and ideals.

This tragedy has united us. We must not let its aftermath divide us. Let us take care not to blame an entire people, an entire region, or an entire religion for the unspeakable acts of few individuals. Our response to these attacks must be such that it unites us in global action against the scourge of terrorism, and does not bring new divisions within and between nations.

Terrorism is a global menace. It calls for a united, global response. To defeat it, all nations must take counsel together, and act in unison.

That is why we have the United Nations.

-Kofi Annan 2001

Chronology of Events at the UNHQ on 11th September, 2001

The tragedy of 11th September 2001 (9/11) took the lives of more than 3,000 people from over 80 nations.

At 10.13am on that morning, the UN Secretariat Building and the UN Annex buildings in New York were evacuated, in response to the very real concern that the UN Headquarters buildings could also be targets for terrorist wishing to wreak havoc; as they had reportedly been with their attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and another undisclosed location.

The following day, the 12th September, the news channel CNN stated the following news communication regarding the 11th September at the UN HQ:

10:13 a.m.: The United Nations building evacuates, including 4,700 people from the headquarters building and 7,000 total from UNICEF and U.N. development programs. (CNN. 12 September 2001)


The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on 11th September and acknowledged the attack as being "*a tragedy for, and a challenge to, all humanity.*" They further stated that "*there can be no excuse or justification for these acts and any terrorist act.*" (UN Press Release, 11th September 2001)

According to the UN Security and Safety Service 2001 Report, immediately after 9/11, "*the Security Service went into a state of heightened security after the attack.*" (SSS Report, 2001) Additional security staff were placed on external posts, vehicles were searched to a higher security standard and visitors to the UN were additionally security screened.

Later on the 12th September, both the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council adopted Resolution 56/1 a "Condemnation of terrorist attacks in the United States of America"²⁸, which "*unequivocally*" condemned the "*heinous acts of terrorism*" and

vowed to "*bring to justice*" the perpetrators and their sponsors²⁹. (UN Chronicle Volume XXXVIII, September 2001)

A week after the tragedy, on the 18th September, the UN Secretary General made a visit to "Ground Zero", the site where the World Trade Centre Towers collapsed.



US President, George W. Bush addressing the United Nations

Almost a month after 9/11, on the 10th November, the United States President, George W. Bush, addressed the United Nations for the first time in his presidency.

He stated, "*Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization.*" He went to declare, "*We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence.*" He stressed the point that, "*The United Nations was founded in this cause.*" (G. Bush, 10th November 2001.)

In the Secretary General's 2001 Report on the work of the UN Organisation, delivered in August 2002, the SG also noted:

The terrorist attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001 dramatized the global threat of terrorism and highlighted the need for a broad strategy to combat it. (GA Official Records, A/57/1, August 2002³⁰)

²⁸ GA Resolution 56/1, 12th September 2001

²⁹ Security Council Resolution 1368. Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th Meeting. 12th September 2001

³⁰ Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1. 28 August 2002

The Immediate Effect on Security at the UN Headquarters in New York, as a Direct Result of 9/11

Redeployment of Resources

Directly after 9/11, the Security and Safety Service (SSS) immediately redeployed resources so as to increase the security coverage on the exterior posts. Security Officers (SOs) were directly placed on existing posts, in addition to the placement of SOs on newly created additional security posts, such as on the 3rd floor of the conference building (during business hours) who could electronically manage restricted access points on the floor. According to an article written in the Security Update this gave them "*the ability to respond quickly to incidents as well as increase our surveillance capabilities*". (Security Update, 18th November 2002). The additional posts and manpower resource requirements obviously created a strain on the staffing table. SSS therefore hired temporary staff members to perform vehicle inspections, magnetometer and x-ray inspections, as well as an additional externally hired canine team, to perform this function whilst SSS developed their own canine resource.

NYPD Threat and Risk Assessment

Shortly following the 9/11 disaster, a Threat and Risk Assessment was conducted by the New York Police Department (NYPD) on the UN Headquarters and annex buildings. This report made a number of recommendations pertaining to both procedural and physical improvements.

As a result of this assessment report, a number of additional security measures were agreed upon after October 2001 and implemented and constructed a year later, throughout October 2002, such as additional security doors, security locks, installation of security fences in the UN gardens, installation of bomb-blast

protective film on windows and glass fittings throughout the UN complex.

In addition, during October 2001, as a consequence of 9/11, a better defined liaison and coordination system was coordinated with the United States (the host country of the UN headquarters in New York) law enforcement agencies. This system created clearer channels of command and protocols for responding to emergencies at the UN, than had been in place prior to 9/11.

In a security update memorandum on the UN's internal website the Security and Safety Service stated that:

"We are constantly in contact with law enforcement agencies who share information on individuals or groups who may pose a threat to the United Nations". (18th November 2002)

Security Measures Regarding Incoming Post

After 9/11, additional security measures were implemented at the incoming mail sorting rooms of the UN; this included the testing of air quality to detect anthrax, or other biological substances. Training was also delivered to the Security Officers who work in the incoming mail sorting room, to further develop the security screening capability of the mail sorting.

Emergency Command Centre

An Emergency Command Centre (ECC) was instigated at the UN, shortly following 9/11, to assist in ensuring that the UN is prepared for and can cope with an emergency. The ECC was established to deal with the immediate administrative and operational actions in the event of a crisis or other similar tragedy. In addition a Crisis Management Plan was developed; this plan has been updated a number of times since its inception in late September 2001. Incident Command System (ICS) training was delivered to all of the SSS staff members. This ICS training is delivered on an annual

Source ?

basis and the ICS system was included in the Daily Orders Bulletins, received by all SSS staff members.

Pedestrian Access to the UN Headquarters

Further measures implemented shortly after 9/11 were the security enhancement of pedestrian access control to the UN HQ Building and Annexes. This included the use of metal detectors to screen pedestrians and also included the relocation of the visitor screening operation from where it had been located at the main UN Headquarters building, to an exterior marquee tent on the General Assembly promenade.



Exterior marquee tent on the promenade, used for visitor screening after 9/11

Whilst some metal detector and X-Ray screening was utilized to a certain extent prior to 9/11, it was as a consequence of 9/11 that the screening standards were considerably raised. The upgrading of pedestrian access system is still ongoing in June 2006 and is on target to be completed in September 2006. This access system will include the addition of holograms onto personnel ID cards and swipe card systems for all UN staff members to utilize in order to enter the main UN Secretariat Building.

Emergency Response Team

In October 2001, an Emergency Response Unit (ERU) was created. The ERU was made up of a team of specially trained Security Officers, working for the Security and Safety Service of the UN. This team has responsibility for responding to emergencies, for Surveillance Detection and other first responder duties, such as

basic First Aid and Cardiac Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR). The ERU contains a rapid mobile response team, trained in order to be deployed to an emergency occurrence in a timely manner. According to the Security Update article, SSS established a rapid mobile response team that can be deployed to an incident quickly, so as to complement their static exterior SO posts and to also “*perform visual surveillance of the inside perimeter as well as foot patrols*”. (Security Update, November 2002)

Vehicle Access to the UN Headquarters

In addition to pedestrian access control enhancement, vehicle access control was also upgraded for additional security. The UN HQ building car parks are under the main UN building, and were therefore a security concern. In addition, UN Annex building car parks are in the basements of their respective buildings, so also need to be secure, to ensure that no one carries an explosive device under the building in their vehicle.

The security screening of vehicles entering the UN car parks was instigated shortly after 9/11. This includes checking the underside of vehicles with a mirror, the use of canines to ascertain if improvised explosives are being carried and the need for vehicles using the UN car park, to have decals. Additional training has been received by Security Officers to assist them in their vehicle search techniques.

Decision-Making and Response Capacity Immediately Instigated At The UN HQ, After 9/11

Senior Emergency Policy Team

The Senior Emergency Policy Team (SEPT) was set up on the 27th September 2001. The rationale for establishing SEPT was "to deal with major emergency situations at United Nations Headquarters that may arise in the future"³¹. (Emergency Task Force, February 2005).

Members of SEPT include six Under Secretary Generals, and two Assistant Secretary Generals. Each member of SEPT has an alternate person authorized to stand in for them should the primary designated person be unavailable; they carry text paging systems, which are also carried by security staff, to enable immediate communication.

The composition of SEPT was further updated and revised in February 2005. Currently, SEPT reports to and provides advice directly to the Secretary General; it reviews recommendations made by the UN Emergency Task Force; authorizes allocation of resources; communicates with the Crisis Operations Group; and meets quarterly to review assessments and discuss security issues.

Senior Emergency Management Group

The Senior ~~Management~~ ^{Emergency} Group (SEMG) had been originally created in 1997 to serve as the Secretary General's cabinet and the central policy planning body of the United Nations. SEMG is a group of senior UN managers that serves as the Secretary General's cabinet and the UN central policy planning unit. The group is made up of heads of the departments and offices of the Secretariat that would be responsible and/or involved in an emergency. Its objective is to "ensure strategic coherence and direction in the work of the Organization". (Public Information UN, 2005.

www.un.org/News/ossq/sg/pages/seniorstaff) The SEMG is ultimately responsible for the evaluation of threats and ascertaining the most appropriate manner of dealing with those threats. They are responsible for the decision making regarding safety and security of UN staff and visitors to the UN and for dealing with any major emergency situation at the UN Headquarters. They are also responsible for the evacuation of the building and decisions on cancellation of meetings, arising from threats to the UN. Furthermore, the SEMG give advice to the Secretary General on issues that occur as a consequence of an emergency.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, SEMG worked behind the scenes with the international community to focus their attention on the reconstruction of weak or collapsed States, like Afghanistan, which could serve as breeding grounds for terrorism. (A/57/1³², 28th August 2002)

Offices Away from Headquarters and Duty Stations were duly instructed to follow the same format regarding the development of a SEMG in their own respective locations.

Crisis Operations Group

In October 2001, a group was put in place to better deal with a specific crisis situation. This group was called the Crisis Operations Group (COG). Members of COG include representatives from at least ten UN Offices and Agencies. Depending on the nature and severity of a particular crisis, different agencies can be appointed as members to address specific aspects.

Restricted working areas have been allocated for SEPT and COG to meet, both individually in their groups, and jointly. Areas include facilities internal to the UN Headquarters building; external to the UN Headquarters building, in New York City; and also at the ICAO Headquarters, in Montreal, should an evacuation from New York be

³¹ ETF/TT/2002/3/Rev.5. Crisis Management Plan, UN Headquarters.

³² Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Supplement No. 1

required. It is worth mentioning that the work of the COG is supported and assisted by the Crisis Management Unit of the Security and Safety Service. This assistance and support includes ensuring that the specified meeting locations are ready for use; maintaining currency of operational plans and training relevant staff for preparedness.

Incident Command System

The attacks of 9/11 proved that even well-prepared crisis response resources can become overwhelmed in a large crisis; such as documented by the situation which occurred as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the surrounding area in October 2005. Planning, communication, and cooperation are critical to a successful response. In the 9/11 Commission Report, one of the key recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, was:

Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command. Both are proven frameworks for emergency response. (9/11 Commission Report, 2004)

The Security and Safety Service (SSS) of the United Nations installed an ICS shortly after 9/11 and trained all security staff in the new system. The ICS is designed to ensure that major strategic decision makers, the ones who would oversee an effective response to a crisis or emergency, are represented at the command level. They work collaboratively to affect a collective response to a crisis and ensure that resources are being utilised both expeditiously and efficiently, and that external organisations are being liaised with. Training at all levels of staffing is conducted, so that the people who would be involved in an emergency or crisis are aware of who is responsible for what. The entire staff of SSS were trained and then new recruits are now trained during their Induction training, with a refresher programme repeated before each annual General Debate, in September of each year.

Development of Upgraded Evacuation System

SSS reviewed the evacuation process to raise awareness of it to UN staff members, as it was obvious during the evacuation which took place on the 11th September that there was some confusion. The Evacuation and Fire and Safety Plan was modified and recommendations arising from the evacuation on 9/11 were put into place.

The Fire and Safety Unit also developed a training plan and immediately moved to designate and subsequently train staff designated as fire wardens, on each floor of the UN Secretariat building. Staff were trained as fire wardens, deputy fire wardens and searchers, to ensure that in the event of another evacuation, the UN would be more effective in its evacuation process. The 9/11 evacuation also highlighted the need for able-bodied staff members to be assigned as helpers for physically challenged staff. In addition, each floor was given an evacuation kit³³, to be used in the event of an evacuation, or similar event.

Glow-in-the-dark signs were placed in strategic locations around the UN Secretariat building so as to guide staff should electricity fail, as during the 9/11 evacuation it became obvious that this was required.

To better ensure clear communications during a future evacuation, the public address and fire alarm systems were upgraded; this included the installation of a Public Announcement (PA) system accessed at the Office of the Chief of the Security and Safety Service and a PA system throughout the UN buildings.

³³ These included bull horns, whistles, torches, basic first aid kits and easily identifiable clothing for the wardens.

Inter-Organizational Security Measures Initiated Immediately After 9/11

"Ladies and gentlemen, we have entered the third millennium through a gate of fire."

STATEMENT BY UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN
WHEN ACCEPTING THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR PEACE ON DEC 11, 2001.

A security report of the Secretary General, dated 15th October 2001, was circulated, which raised a number of issues on the subject of inter-organizational security measures (A/56/469³⁴ and Corr.1 and 2). The report contained a number of recommendations for UN organizational reforms necessary to better deal with the growing security danger to UN staff members.

A review presented to the Secretary General at the end of 2001, due to the events of 11th September of that year, in addition to other additional threats against UN and humanitarian personnel, was to conclude that to better meet the additional security and safety requirements of the UN, the strengthening of the office of the UN Security Coordinator must be achieved. In the Report of the Secretary General to the Fifty-Sixth Session of the GA, the Secretary General states *"Of particular concern to me is the appointment of a full-time Security Coordinator, an issue which I urge the Assembly to consider favorably as it is the cornerstone of the United Nations security Management system."* (A/56/384³⁵) The GA thereby *"authorized the creation of a full-time United Nations Security Coordinator at the level of Assistant Secretary-General."* (A/59/365³⁶)

The New Zealand Representative to the UN, Felicity Buchanan, affirmed: *"The urgency of this issue is reflected in the decision taken during the General Assembly's 55th session to approve 32*

³⁴ Report of the Secretary General. Agenda Item 123. Interorganizational security measures: implementation of section II of General Assembly resolution 55/238, "Safety and security of United Nations personnel". 23rd December 2000

³⁵ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Sixth Session. Item 20 (a), "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel". 20th September 2001.

³⁶ Report of the Secretary General, Fifty-Ninth Session, Item 108, "Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations". 11th October 2004

additional posts for the office of the UN Security Coordinator as an interim measure, pending submission of a more comprehensive proposal". (F. Buchanan, November 2001)

This was subsequently authorized. In addition, a review was initiated, based on the current security and safety management, at that time and was undertaken to identify "*the most immediate short-term specific needs required to be addressed on an urgent basis*" (A/56/848³⁷, 28th February 2002). The intention of the review was to ascertain the exact status of current security and safety at the UN and to further ascertain potential vulnerabilities in the management of security and safety systems.

The review thoroughly gauged the existing security management system at the UN, in conjunction with potential security threats and safety risks. The review also undertook to evaluate a variety of potential scenarios and to include both short-term and long-term measures.

In addition, the review raised the financial implications of security and safety conditions and suggested a plan for clear coordination and communication in an emergency. Although triggered by 9/11, the review was not purely focused on the UN HQ in New York, but was also contributed to by the UN Offices Away from Headquarters (OAHs), including Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and other regional commissions. In addition, these OAHs and the UN HQ were also requested to ascertain the security measures necessary for the future security and safety of their offices. Furthermore, the results of security measures from the OAHs were also assessed by UNSECOORD and the UN Security and Safety Service.

Minimum Operational Security Standards

Results of these collaborations were concluded and proposals for the long-term needs of security and safety were presented to the

³⁷ Report of the Secretary General. 56th Session, Agenda Item 123. *Strengthening the Security and Safety of United Nations Premises*.

General Assembly. These proposals included the security and safety measures that were required to ensure that these OAHs were up to the Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS).

UNSECOORD ascertained that a global "minimum standard of security" needed to be established, developed from information received from missions and duty stations. MOSS were:

"designed to determine a minimum requirement for the field security management system, provide a mechanism to increase the security consciousness of personnel, to reduce risk, and establish standard field-based criteria to assume responsibility and accountability." (UNSECOORD Newsletter, October 2002)

www.reliefweb.int/appeals).

MOSS were consequently designed to assist in establishing an agreed minimum requirement for the field security management system. MOSS also affords a system to assist in raising the security awareness of UN staff members in the field, ideally diminishing the likelihood of threats and developing standardized security measures tailor-made to each mission, and/or situation. MOSS are also designed to increase personal responsibility.

MOSS can be loosely compared to ICAO's Annex 17³⁸; however unlike Annex 17, MOSS documents are mission/country-specific written materials which denote the minimum security requirements expected to be established in a duty station, as opposed to a universal document for all missions or countries. Each MOSS is unique; customized according to the state of affairs and specific security issues of that country. The MOSS documents are developed through the assessment of the potential threats facing UN staff at each duty station and mission.

Each duty station undertakes a security and risk assessment of its own mission/country-specific threats and risks. It achieves this assessment by means of a UN standardized threat and risk

³⁸ International Standards and Recommended Practices, Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference

assessment system, entitled "Security Risk Management Assessment". The results of the assessment establish the security and safety systems, procedures and measures that need to be installed in that particular duty station to better ensure that safety and security of UN staff members who work there.

Basically, MOSS is separated into four segments: staff training, security planning, security equipment and communications.

Responsibility for the provision of the necessary resources to support the implementation of MOSS lies with individual UN agencies; however UNSECOORD assisted each agency in its implementation, providing expert security advice and other support.

MOSS was positively embraced by the UN agencies and was found to have additional constructive outcomes. For example, a positive by-product of MOSS are increased cooperation and open communication the effective implementation of MOSS requires between the UN organization, its inter-governmental organizations³⁹ (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations⁴⁰ (NGOs). Prior to the introduction of MOSS, NGOs could potentially overlook security measures, which could result in a lower level of security for their staff members. To assist in preventing security vulnerabilities a booklet entitled "UN/NGO Security Collaboration"⁴¹ was written and developed at the end of 2001 and promulgated to relevant agencies in February 2002. The guideline booklet outlines a framework incorporating guidelines on security measures and expected security standards.

The booklet's intent is described in the guideline document's introduction:

As the organizations of the United Nations are increasingly working closely with Inter- and Non-Governmental Organization in hostile environments, there is a need to provide a framework

³⁹ Such as NATO and the EU

⁴⁰ Such as Amnesty International

⁴¹ Annex C

for security collaboration. (Office of UN Security Coordinator, February 2002).

In addition, the guidelines cover recommended training and best practice techniques for dealing with emergencies. In less than half a year from its inception, most Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)⁴² countries reported compliance with 70 – 80% of the Security Collaboration's recommendations. (UNSECOORD newsletter, October 2002).

In his address to the Fifty-Sixth General Assembly, the Secretary General stated that "*Non-compliance with MOSS will constitute one of the criteria which could lead to the suspension of United Nations operations*". (A/56/384⁴³, 20th September 2001)

Budgetary Considerations

An increased security system at the UN meant an increased expense. The overall expense of this upgraded system is contributed to by all UN agencies, programmes and funds. Since 2001, in particular, operational security has become a fundamental function of the UN and an essential part of the UN's humanitarian aid. The security system includes all facets of staff security management, including monitoring of new security arrangements, budgetary matters both in field offices and at Headquarters, issues of accountability, implementation of MOSS, telecommunication standards, security training, field security officers, malicious acts insurance policy, minimum air safety and security standards, transportation of cash, security entitlements for locally-recruited staff, residential security measures, use of military/armed escorts and investigations into the death of staff members.

⁴² Consolidated Appeal Process is the mechanism through which the UN and its humanitarian partners work together to develop, carry out and, if necessary, revise plans for addressing humanitarian crises in particular countries.

⁴³ General Assembly. Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Sixth Session. Item 20 (a). "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel.", 20th September 2001

Implementing MOSS placed a financial burden upon UN agencies and some agencies found it difficult to finance additional security needs within their regular budgets.

After 9/11 it was agreed that field security requirements be incorporated in the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for countries in crisis. (UNSECOORD Newsletter, October 2002). An article in the UNSECOORD newsletter explains how UNSECOORD manages the extra-budgetary contributions in a consultative manner:

UNSECOORD coordinates with the respective UN agencies, to ensure funds are utilized expeditiously; this includes deploying additional Field Security Officers and meeting MOSS requirements for countries included in CAPs.⁴⁴ (UNSECOORD Newsletter, October 2002)

The identified short-term security and safety needs, budgeted at \$3,573,600, were absorbed into the 2000/1 budget. (A/56/674⁴⁵, December 2001).

⁴⁴ Consolidated Appeals Process

⁴⁵ General Assembly. Report of the Secretary-General. Second performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2000-2001.

Conventions to Support International Security Measures as a Result of 9/11

It is worth noting that on 9/11; only the United Kingdom and Botswana had ratified all twelve of the UN conventions related to terrorism. After 9/11 the UN Member States' commitments to the anti-terrorism treaties increased dramatically. Additional ratifications of the twelve key anti-terrorism conventions have risen by 15 per cent since July 2000 (Daily News, October 2002). Fourteen countries, including New Zealand, have now ratified all twelve treaties⁴⁶, and the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism⁴⁷ has entered into force faster than any convention before it. This convention states the United Nations deep concern "*about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations*" (1999)

Adoption of Resolution 1373

After 9/11, the U.N. Security Council acted immediately to unanimously adopt the anti-terrorism Resolution 1373⁴⁸, on the 28th September 2001, which declared terrorism a "*threat to international peace and security*"⁴⁹ and obligated states to take measures to stop and punish it. (Resolution 1373, September 2001).

In Resolution 1373, the Security Council imposed a compulsory commitment on Member States to suppress and prevent terrorism. In this Resolution, the Security Council emphasizes:

The key role to be played by international, regional and subregional organizations in supporting Government capacity

⁴⁶ Annex A

⁴⁷ Resolution 54/109, 9th December 1999

⁴⁸ Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting on 28th September 2001

⁴⁹ Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001

strengthening on counter-terrorism and in furthering the implementation of resolution. (Resolution 1373, 2001).

To better support States in the international prevention of terrorism, Resolution 1373 enforces that Member States renounce financial support for terrorist groups; control safe havens, or support for terrorists; distribute information with other governments on groups practicing or planning terrorist acts; assist other governments in the investigation and prosecution of those involved in such acts; criminalize backing for terrorism in domestic laws; put into practice relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Creation of The Counter Terrorism Committee

Resolution 1373 necessitated the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in order to "*monitor implementation of this resolution with the assistance of appropriate expertise*" (Resolution 1373). The Resolution specifies how the Security Council:

Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council. (Resolution 1373 Para 6. P3, September 2001)

The CTC which, working in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, works to provide technical and legal assistance to countries to improve their counter-terrorism work, and to develop the international cooperation necessary to stop terrorists.

The CTC is made up of all 15 members of the Security Council and was established as a means to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. Based in New York, the CTC observes the implementation of Resolution 1373 by all States and endeavours to increase the capability of States to fight terrorism by a number of measures, such as establishing a foundation for ongoing communication between the Security Council and Member States on the most effective means to support national capability to better

prevent terrorism. The CTC was first placed under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock⁵⁰, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations.

Unlike the Security Council, the Member States of the CTC have no veto power during the voting procedures with all CTC Members having equal voting rights. Every UN Member State is expected to take responsibility to obtain the requirements of the resolution, based on their State's own particular situation. In paragraph 6 of Resolution 1373, the CTC has asked all States to report to the CTC on the measures they have instigated or which they plan to implement (Resolution 1373).

The CTC has three sub-committees. These are advised on the technical aspects of Member States' reports by a group of independent expert advisers appointed to support the work of the CTC.

The CTC analyses the Member States' reports to assess each State's compliance with Resolution 1373. A letter is sent from the CTC to each State to seek further clarification and to give feedback on their implementation of the Resolution. States are required to reply to the CTC within three months. This is similar to the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP).

Request from the General Assembly for Evaluation of UN Security

The GA decided in a meeting conducted during on the 16th December 2001, that as a consequence of 9/11 and the ensuing security report A/56/469⁵¹ of the Secretary General, dated the 15th October, security in UN headquarters and missions needed to be raised⁵². The GA called upon the Secretary General to "*take the necessary measures to ensure that security matters were an*

⁵⁰ Sir Jeremy Greenstock became the UK's Special Representative to Iraq in September 2003.

⁵¹ Report of the Secretary General. Inter-organizational security measures: implementation of section II of General Assembly resolution 55/238 of 23 December 2000 entitled "Safety and security of United Nations personnel"

integral part of the planning for existing and newly mandated United Nations operations.” The GA also acknowledged the requirement for a *“strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, at both the headquarters and field levels.”* (A/56/469, October 2001).

In addition, two months later, the GA also stated their concern with the *“lack of an accountability and responsibility mechanism in the area of field security”*. (GA Report 56/255⁵³, 24 December 2001). In section VIII of the above Resolution, the GA additionally requested the Secretary General to conduct an evaluation of the UN security system and requested that a report be undertaken and presented to the General Assembly on recommendations regarding a thorough system of accountability and responsibility.

⁵² Resolution 57/155 16 December 2002

⁵³ GA Resolution On the Report of the Fifth Committee (A/56/756). Special subjects relating to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002–2003. Agenda Item 123. 14 February 2002

Safety and Security for UN Staff in The Field

"We are waiting for the enemy. We sit here like bait, unarmed, waiting for the wave ... while waiting for the militia to do what they have to do ... I have to go now. I hear screaming outside."
(Carlos Caceres⁵⁴, 6th September 2000).

Whilst Host Governments have the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of the UN staff members operating in their territory, unfortunately, the most unsafe and insecure locations for UN staff members to be located are inclined to be those where host governments have the least control over the safety and security of people working in those countries.

It has even been purported that local UN staff belonging to particular ethnic groups can be targeted simply for being part of that faction irregardless of whether they are UN staff members or not.

Amnesty International issues regular reports on hostage taking of UN staff. Between January 1994 and October 2002, there were seventy four hostage-taking or kidnapping incidents; these incidents involved 262 UN staff members. There are additional occurrences of rape, armed robbery, car-jacking, and other such attacks on UN staff members. (www.amnesty.org/library). In 2005, 124 UN peacekeepers "*lost their lives to violence, disease and accidents*". From the period 1st January to the 31st May 2006, a further 32 had died. (UN Department of Public Information, 31st May 2006)

In addition, an article in the Financial Times describes how, in an eleven year period, from 1992 to 2003, 214 civilian UN staff members had died "*by malicious acts*" (Financial Times, July 2003). The New Zealand Representative, Felicity Buchanan stated that "*United Nations personnel operating in the field face*

⁵⁴ One of three UN staff murdered in Atambua, West Timor

increased danger in the execution of their duty. The latest figures are grim testimony to this escalating trend." (F. Buchanan, 28th November 2001)

From the period 1st July 2005 – 30th June 2006, 26 civilian personnel lost their lives "*as a result of malicious acts*". In addition, during this period, there were 215 violent incidents on UN personnel, 120 incidents of threatening verbal abuse and 93 cases of armed robberies of significant United Nations assets. There were also 5 incidents of rape and 9 cases of sexual assault. (draft Report of the Secretary General, September 2006)

Three and a half years *before* the tragic events of 9/11, Sean Greenaway and Dr. Andrew J. Harris gave a presentation entitled "*Humanitarian Security: Challenges and Responses*" to the Forging Peace Conference at Harvard University in March 1998. In it they referred to four categories of threats for UN staff members: criminality, banditry, targeting and accidents. They stated in their presentation that anecdotal evidence established a connection between increased risk, in safety and security, and "*a number of factors which characterise present-day conflicts*". According to Greenaway and Harris, these factors included:

the economic value of relief supplies; the impact of relief on the dynamics of conflict; the potential political capital which aggressions against relief workers may attract; the possibility of collecting significant ransom money; and collateral killing as a result of the intrinsically anti-humanitarian character of the war goals of parties to internal conflict. (Greenaway and Harris, 1998)

The UN has a responsibility to its staff to ensure that three of those four categories are inhibited and that the fourth (accidents) are averted as much as possible. Felicity Buchanan, the UN Representative for New Zealand, further elaborated in her statement that:

The urgency of this issue is reflected in the decision taken during the General Assembly's 55th session to approve 32 additional posts for the office of the UN Security Coordinator as an interim measure, pending submission of a more comprehensive proposal. We have that proposal before us today. Our delegations welcome it, and generally endorse its conclusions and the recommendations contained in the report of the ACABQ⁵⁵. (F. Buchanan, November 2001)

In the Secretary General's Report to the Fifty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the Secretary General notes the increase in the danger to the lives and security of UN personnel is essentially due to the "*multiplication and enlargement of irregular armed groups.*" He goes on to state that this is a fairly recent trait in conflict areas around the world and that these groups often "*do not respect the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian and/or reject international agreements designed to provide such personnel.*" (A/56/384⁵⁶, 20th September 2001)

Training in Security and Safety for UN Staff Members in The Field

In 2000, Ms. Catherine Bertini, the Secretary-General's Personal Humanitarian Envoy to the Occupied Territories stated the need for security training for UN staff members:⁵⁷

"All humanitarian workers must be equipped for dangerous work through security training, so they could read warning signs in volatile settings, deal with armed marauders, spot hidden landmines, extricate themselves from trouble and deal with forced confinement". (C. Bertini, UN Press Release, February 2000)

As a consequence of Ms. Bertini's instruction, shortly thereafter, UNSECOORD started to develop its own security training modules.

⁵⁵ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

⁵⁶ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Sixth Session. Item 20 (a). "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel, 20th September 2001

⁵⁷ Security Council Press Release SC/680, 4100th Meeting, 9 February 2000

In 2001 and 2002 UNSECOORD conducted Personal Security Awareness training, at UN duty stations, of approximately 5,000 UN staff. The training included understanding the UN security management system and taking responsibility for personal security awareness.

This training was deemed mandatory and was considered part of the UN security management system. Two years later, the following observations were made in the Threat & Risk Assessment on the UN headquarters by NYPD Counter Terrorism Unit conducted in 2002.

"The training program will ultimately provide for more flexibility and increased physical protection, while taking less time to learn duties. The training establishes systematic and uniform work habits, requiring personnel to accomplish the same goal" (NYPD Assessment Report 2002)

Other staff development measures include instructing field security officers to train other UN and local staff members in MOSS, distributing security periodicals and developing a security awareness CD-ROM.

The security training is not a standardized generic package. The training has been designed to be tailored for the higher risk missions and duty stations and more emphasis is placed on those staff members who maintain, or are involved in, the MOSS in these duty stations. To ensure that security training skills are maintained in-house, UN Field Security Officers attend a train-the-trainer's workshop and are then responsible for presenting the programme to their colleagues in that duty station. They are also responsible for ensuring that the training has been tailored to include the MOSS of that particular duty station.

In the Secretary General's Report to the Fifty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the Secretary General also specifically commented on the security and stress management training: "*The Office of the United Nations security Coordinator continues to*

present its comprehensive security and stress management training programme to United Nations system staff around the world." (A/56/384⁵⁸, 20th September 2001). He further added the need to complement the "one-time" training with "sustainment training" every three years. Furthermore, the Secretary General instructed senior officials that "security training and awareness must be provided to every staff member. This is the single most effective means of minimizing risk". (A/56/384, 20th September 2001)

Nobel Peace Prize

The award of the centennial Nobel Peace Prize to the United Nations was a fitting conclusion to the year and recognized the UN's role during a stressful period and its part as an instrument for making and maintaining peace, and promoting human rights. As the Nobel Committee put it "*the only negotiable route to global peace and cooperation goes by way of the United Nations*". In receiving the prize, Kofi Annan, the SG, stated "Peace must be sought, above all, because it is the condition for every member of the human family to live a life of dignity and security," (UN News Centre, 10th December 2001)



⁵⁸ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Sixth Session. Item 20 (a). "Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel. 20th September 2001

Security Measures Implemented During 2002

UNHQ Security Structural Improvements During 2002

In 2002, the cost of the UN HQ security improvements was estimated to be almost \$37 million; of this amount, \$28 million was a one-off expense for infrastructure improvements and purchase of equipment.

In the UN Headquarters New York, staff numbers of the Office of the UN Security Coordinator increased from 9 Professional staff and 10 General Service staff to 24 Professionals and 14 General Service staff members. This budgetary amount was mainly funded by the regular UN budget, with some field support budgetary items shared on a UN organizational system cost-sharing basis. Those not covered by the above two budgetary systems were financed from the peacekeeping support account budget.

Approval For Additional Security Developments

The Fifth Committee is the UN body responsible for considering and approving financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies. In addition, the Fifth Committee "*monitors United Nations activities as diverse as reviewing human resources management policies and establishing strengthened security management systems to protect UN staff members worldwide*" Committee Chairman Don MacKay of New Zealand told the UN Chronicle (reported by N. Talwar of the UN Chronicle, December 2005).

As a consequence, the Fifth Committee was given the responsibility to oversee the establishment of the strengthened security management system; set up to protect UN staff members worldwide. As such, the Fifth Committee approved the strengthening of security and safety of the UN premises⁵⁹ in June 2002. It subsequently gave approval for the hiring of additional

security personnel, the purchase of materials and a number of key projects, such as access control; construction of a Security Control Centre; establishment of a back-up Command Centre at an off-site location; installation of ballistic partitions and film; additional physical security; improvement and updating of technological communications and lighting, securing of electric vaults and upgrading the security of the perimeter fences.

Additional Structural Security Improvements Implemented

Exactly one year after 9/11, in September 2002, the purchase and installation of security containment and monitoring systems were achieved, in addition to the installation of additional equipment designed to enhance access security and to tighten access control procedures on the critical 2nd floor of the UN Headquarters Conference Building, which houses the General Assembly Hall.

Ballistic bullet-proof partitions were installed at the General Assembly Hall, the Trusteeship Council chambers, the Economic and Social Council chambers and the Security Council, to afford additional security protection to the delegates. In addition, all the windows of the UN HQ building have been protected, since 9/11, with ballistic sheeting.

A purpose-built marquee tent was constructed specifically for the security screening of visitors to the UN HQ building. It was erected external to the main building to ensure that only security screened visitors were permitted to enter the building. Additional x-ray screening equipment was purchased and installed for both visitors, staff (where necessary, such as during the high-level summits) and for the security screening of post arriving at the UN.


⁵⁹ UN document A/56/736, Addendum 2, 2001

Evacuation Plans

In January 2002 a UN Headquarters and Annex Building evacuation plan was developed and shortly thereafter, annual evacuation drills were instigated. In June 2002, a fire operations exercise was conducted in cooperation with the New York City Fire Department. Also during June, an emergency procedure booklet was distributed to all UN staff members. This booklet is entitled "Emergency Preparedness" and now serves as a guide for UN staff in New York, to assist them in knowing what to do in an emergency. The booklet was developed by the Department of Management and covers types of emergencies, organizational responsibilities and resources, the manager's and the staff member's responsibility, stress management and a section on information and resources for emergency planning and recovery. (Emergency Preparedness Booklet, 2002).

In the following month of March 2002, emergency evacuation equipment was installed throughout the UN Headquarters, this equipment included emergency kits and evacuation chairs on each floor of the UN Headquarters building; hazardous materials masks and gloves distributed to all security and mail room personnel. A comprehensive programme of training in the use of the equipment and expected procedures and behaviors in the event of an emergency were given to all Security and Safety personnel.

Security Developments Instigated at the UN Annex Buildings, New York, During 2002



The UN Headquarters and Annexes New York District

The Annex buildings⁶⁰ to the United Nations ("Annex buildings") house a number of UN organizations, offices and, of course UN staff members. The buildings are being used as the Secretariat building could no longer house all of the staff members that were required to work in the UN Secretariat, due to the Headquarters operation increasing in size since the original HQ building was constructed in 1947.

Working committees were established in 2002, with the Building Managers of the UN Annex buildings, specifically to address security and emergency issues; including the creation of a system for the efficient transmission of emergency messages through hotlines specifically designed to link up with designated officials and staff members at the UN Annex buildings. These hotlines were established to increase the flow of information during a crisis.

In November 2002, a Security Update acknowledged that there were some issues needing to be overcome in order to increase the level of security in the Annex buildings:

⁶⁰ The UN Annex buildings include UNDC 1, UNDC 2, UNICEF House, Uganda House, Nigeria House and offices in the Daily News Building, FF Building, Chrysler Building, Alcoa Building and some smaller satellite buildings housing UN offices.

While we face certain hurdles, due to proprietary concerns when attempting to implement security measures in these buildings, we are confident that our efforts will be fruitful. We are meeting with the building management for all of the annex buildings to build cooperation in strengthening security at these sites. (Security Update, 18th November 2002).

Shortly thereafter, the Annex Buildings also established Annex Building Task Forces and rehearsed evacuation plans, which were promulgated to the relevant host country agencies, such as NYPD, Fire Services and Ambulance Services. Quarterly meetings were also instigated with the Emergency Task Force and relevant agencies.

Strengthening the Security and Safety of United Nations Premises, During 2002

By February 2002, most of the short-term security measures had been instigated. During this year, an accountability framework was instigated to meet the request raised by the Secretary General in his report on "*Inter-organisational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system*" (A/57/365⁶¹, 28th August 2002).

On the 28th February 2002, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)⁶² gave approval for the strengthening of the overall UN security budget to provide for increases in both human and material resources. This approval was a direct result of the Secretary General's security report the preceding year, and outlined a number of necessary measures

⁶¹ General Assembly. Report of the Secretary-General. Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system, Fifty-seventh session.

⁶² ACABQ is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, consisting of 16 members appointed by the Assembly. The major functions of the Advisory Committee are: (a) to examine and report on the budget submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly; (b) to advise the General Assembly concerning any administrative and budgetary matters referred to it; (c) to examine on behalf of the General Assembly the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies and proposals for financial arrangements with such agencies; and (d) to consider and report to the General Assembly on the auditors' reports on the accounts of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies. (UN Website)

implemented to strengthen security and safety of the United Nations. (A/56/848⁶³, 28th February 2002)

The estimates of what the total cost would be for long-term security and safety measures at the UN, were stated as \$57,785,300 (A/56/848, 2002). This amount included once-off expenses for the improvement of physical construction/infrastructure and the purchase of security and safety equipment. Additionally, the number of professional security officer posts in the field was also increased. These additional posts were funded through the sharing of expenditures by country contributions, by charity and humanitarian appeals or by other contributions to a specifically set-up trust fund⁶⁴ (A/58/344⁶⁵. P3, 5th September 2003)

Supplementing these numbers were further staff member increases, consisting of both security and support staff, to include 100 Professional staff and 200 locally recruited posts in the field, which are paid for on a UN organisational system cost-sharing basis.

It must be noted that in September 2001, three of the UN's Economic Missions, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), based in Bangkok; the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), based in Beirut; and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based in Santiago; had all out-sourced their security requirements⁶⁶. In the Report of the Secretary General, it was proposed that outsourcing should cease and that the Commissions must employ 60 of their own UN Security Officers.

The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator's (UNSECOORD) role was focussed on "*Supporting the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, made up primarily of*

⁶³ General Assembly. Report of the Secretary General. "Strengthening the security and safety of United Nations premises". Fifty-sixth session.

⁶⁴ Trust Fund for Security of Staff Members of the United Nations System.

⁶⁵ Report of the Secretary General. "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel", Item 41, Fifty-eighth session.

representatives of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds" and to also direct its attention on:

Detailed performance reviews as well as on a number of special projects aimed at validating and adjusting procedures and practices so as to implement fully the initiatives and objectives of the Secretary-General and the executive heads of agencies in reinforcing staff security and safety. (General Assembly Report⁶⁷, 5th September 2003).

As a consequence, over the period 2002 and 2003, UNSECOORD made a concerted effort to improve the professionalism of security at the UN by improving both the recruitment and training of staff, to raise their security awareness throughout the organisation, including both UN agencies and UN programmes.

Nuchhi Currier, writing for the UN Chronicle⁶⁸, reported positively in 2003 how training programmes for staff, serving at high-risk duty stations, had been developed incorporating *"specific security situations and has proven to be more effective than the previous generic initiatives"*. (N. Currier, 2003).

At the end of June 2002, a Resolution 56/286⁶⁹ was adopted by the General Assembly, entitled *"Strengthening the Security and Safety of United Nations Premises"*. In this Resolution it was agreed to appropriate the afore-mentioned amount of almost US \$58 million for the *"implementation of the measures contained in the report of the Secretary General to strengthen the security and safety of United Nations premises."* The amount was broken down into specifics to be shared in the United Nations premises around the world.

Establishment of Crisis Management Centre

In July 2002, the COG⁷⁰ was further progressed with the establishment of a Crisis Management Centre in the basement of

⁶⁶ General Assembly. Resolution 55/232. Outsourcing Practices, 23rd December 2000

⁶⁷ Item 12. General Assembly Report, Fifty-eighth session

⁶⁸ Volume XL, Number 2, 2003

⁶⁹ 105th Plenary Meeting, 56th Session of the GA, Agenda Item 123, 27th June 2002

the UN Headquarters building. This centre was equipped to deal with a crisis. Partly due to the well promulgated communications problems that hampered emergency teams during 9/11 crisis, an emphasis was put on ensuring a high standard of communications for the COG and SEPT. As a consequence, UHF/VHF radio and cellular telephones, satellite telephones and dedicated lines for voice and facsimile communications were acquired. In addition, television and radio sets were strategically placed for use by COG and SEPT in the event of a crisis.

Framework For Accountability in UN Field Security Management

The report requested of the Secretary General by the GA at the conclusion of 2001, on the security management accountability framework in order to establish a "*clear mechanism of accountability and responsibility*" (56/255⁷¹) was completed and presented to the GA on 28th August 2002. The report was entitled "Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system".

The report covered security at UN Headquarters locations in addition to field locations. It included mechanisms to implement accountability and identified those in charge and/or accountable for specific areas of responsibility. The report also included a provision for the monitoring of security and evaluating the effectiveness of security. Throughout, the report stressed the importance of the role of UNSECOORD for the coordination of security throughout the UN system. It stated the goal of the UN security management system as "*to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security and safety of staff as a high priority.*" (A/57/365⁷²) In addition, the report states the need for

⁷⁰ Crisis Management Group described earlier (insert #30)

⁷¹ General Assembly Resolution On the Report of the Fifth Committee (A/56/756). Special subjects relating to the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003. Agenda Item 123. 14th February 2002

⁷² Report of the Secretary General. "Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system". 28th August 2002

the provision of support to the UN field representatives to establish and maintain MOSS.

At the end of 2002, the GA, in its Resolution 57/155⁷³ requested the Secretary General to *"take the necessary measures to ensure that security matters were an integral part of the planning for existing and newly mandated United Nations operations."* In the same Resolution, the GA acknowledged the need for a *"strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, at both the headquarters and field levels"*, and requested the UN system, as well as Member States, to take all appropriate measures to that end. (57/155, 2002)

UN Measures to Address Terrorism

The UN Secretary General's Policy Working Group on Terrorism developed Reports A/57/273⁷⁴ and S/2002/875⁷⁵ during 2002, all in all containing thirty one recommendations. The report stated that the primary deterrents to terrorism should not be a reliance on counter-terrorism measures. This was due to the concern, by the UN, that counter-terrorism measures have a tendency to result in further inflaming future terrorism. This can be especially true where there is a perception of human rights being violated by the measures that escalate support for terrorism causes. For example, *"it has been argued that the counter measures employed by Israel against Palestinian terrorist groups has actually increased attempts of terrorist attacks on Israeli targets"* (UN documents, September 2002). The recommendation of the Group was that *"counterterrorism measures must be rooted in international law"* (A/57/273, September 2002).

⁷³ Fifty-Seventh Session, Item 21. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel. 3rd March 2003

⁷⁴ Fifty-Seventh Session of the GA. Item 162. Identical letters dated 1 August 2002 from the Secretary general addressed to the President of the General Assembly and President of the Security Council. 6 August 2002

⁷⁵ Fifty-Seventh Session, Item 162. Letters dated 1st August 2002 from the Secretary General to the President of the GA and the President of the Security Council on "Report of the Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism"

Three years later this conundrum was highlighted once again when US President George W. Bush stated in his 18th June 2005 radio address, *"Our troops are fighting these terrorists in Iraq so you will not have to face them here at home."* (R. Parry, July 2005); however after the 7th July 2005 London bombings, Ayman al-Zawahiri⁷⁶, claimed Al-Qaida was responsible for the bombings *"in retaliation for the policies of UN President George W Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair."* (Al-Jazeera News, September 2005). In addition, an article placed in the New York Times announced how 7th July bombers were inflamed by the invasion of Iraq. (New York Times, 14th July 2005)

Edward C. Luck, Professor and Director Center on International Organization Columbia University advised:

"Since 9/11, a few initiatives, including collaborative efforts by Columbia University and the International Peace Academy to support the Policy Working Group, have been undertaken to begin to narrow this gap in analysis and understanding. But much, much more needs to be done in this regard." (E. Luck, 1999)

Furthermore, in his book, *"Shake Hands With the Devil"*, the author, Romeo Dallaire⁷⁷, writes of his experience working for the UN in Rwanda. He comments that if we are to learn anything from 9/11, we should focus on immediately addressing the underlying causes of rage. He states *"We have to take concrete steps to remove the causes of their rage, or we have to be prepared to suffer the consequences."* (R. Dallaire, 2004). He goes on to state that if we are unable to provide hope, then the future will be nothing but a repeat of Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Congo and 9/11.

The responsibility for the UN to play a focal role in addressing the challenge of international terrorism and to encourage the world to *"do much, much more"* (E. Luck) or to be *"prepared to suffer the*

⁷⁶ Al-Qaida's declared (by US authorities) #2

⁷⁷ Lieutenant General (retired) was the Force Commander of the UN Mission to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.

consequences" (R. Dallaire), is outlined by Michael Sonnenfeldt, the co-Chair of the "Humpty Dumpty Institute"⁷⁸, in a paper published by the UN Chronicle wrote:

The tragic events of September 11 bring home the challenge of keeping deadly options from terrorist groups, who may have weaker capabilities than States, but have less compunction about using such weapons. The possibility of terrorist threats cannot be met with panic. It requires serious and deliberate disciplined efforts and the effective cooperation of the international community. Strong leadership by the United Nations and other global institutions will be critical to effectively confront these frightening risks. (Sonnenfeldt. UN Chronicle Volume 39. Number 2, 2002)

Other Security Council partners remain committed to their efforts against terrorism. On 16th January 2002, the Council extended the mandate of a special committee⁷⁹ it established in 1999 to monitor sanctions against Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Press Release SC/7274, January 2002). On the 5th September 2002, the Committee further updated its United Nations Watch List of prohibited organizations (Press briefing, 5th September 2002), further limiting their ability to access the means to carry out terrorist acts.

Michael Chandler, Chairman of the Monitoring Group on sanctions against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associates stated:

Working together, the international community had made great strides in dealing with Al Qaeda -- cutting off their economic sources, freezing assets and rounding up their operatives and preventing terrorist attacks. There had indeed been victories in this war, he said, but there was much that still needed to be done and some things that could and should be done better. (UN Press Briefing, 5th September 2002)

⁷⁸ A private New York-based non-governmental organization dedicated to building effective public/private partnerships to enhance the United States-United Nations relationship.

⁷⁹ Resolution 1390

Concurring with the need that the international community could do much more to target terrorism and that, at this stage, the approach was still piecemeal was an article by Almeida and Lipsett which stated "*the international efforts to combat terrorism have not yet yielded a comprehensive international covenant or approach to terrorism*". (I. Almeida and L. Lipsett, 30th May 2002).

This criticism was leveled at the UN due to the 19 international and regional covenants directed at the prevention of terrorism, 2 General Assembly declarations and a number of Resolutions all targeting causes of terrorism.

Security Developments at Other UN Agencies Commencing in 2002, as a Consequence of 9/11

Instigation of ICAO Safety and Security Audit Programmes

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is a Specialised Agency of the UN. An important measure ICAO implemented, as a consequence of the tragedy of 9/11, was the international safety and security audits.

To assist in ensuring the effectiveness of these audits, ICAO developed its Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP), based on the voluntary programme already being co-ordinated by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).

In November 2002, ICAO launched the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). The objective of the programme was to *"Promote global aviation security through the auditing of Contracting States on a regular basis to determine the status of implementation of ICAO security Standards"* (stated ICAO USAP objective). The first audit took place shortly thereafter, with audits planned for all ICAO member States on a rotating basis of one every five years. The aviation security audits are conducted on a selective basis.⁸⁰

Whilst audits in the aviation industry have been a common occurrence for decades, the ICAO and International Aviation Transport Association (IATA) models are based on international, (as opposed to national), models and standards.

The 7th edition of ICAO's Annex 17⁸¹, effective from 1st July 2002, promoted the Strategic Objective and Recommended Practice of Comprehensive Hold Stow Screening, to a specific Standard to be implemented internationally as of the 1st January 2006:

Standard 4.4.8: Each Contracting State should establish measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to

⁸⁰ Volume 58, ICAO Journal. P39

⁸¹ Annex 17 covers Aviation Security issues

be carried in an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is screened prior to being loaded into an aircraft.⁸²
(Annex 17, ICAO, 2002)

Security Screening of Hold-Stow Baggage

Amendment 10 of ICAO's Annex 17 expected all Contracting States to have security systems up and running to administer the screening of hold-stow baggage by 1st January 2006. This is something that the airline industry has been lobbying for since the 1980s.

⁸² The ICAO definition of screening set out in the ICAO Annex 17 is "The application of technical or other means which are intended to detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference." This is the definition which is used by the Aviation Security Service of New Zealand.

Security Measures Implemented During 2003

Status of Security and Safety in the UN System in 2003

In May 2003, a meeting of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASM)⁸³ and UNSECOORD was conducted. It was acknowledged that *"over 95% of the recommendations made by the Secretary General had been implemented or were in the process of being implemented."* (HLCM⁸⁴ Meeting Minutes, 30th June 2003). Those implemented included UNSECOORD recruitment, MOSS being applied at Duty Stations, security training, including on-line courses and the framework of accountability being put into practise. Most importantly of all, fatalities amongst staff members were down. However, it was also agreed that there were recommendations which still had not been achieved. It was further acknowledged that Member States were dissatisfied with the current level of security: *"IASM considered that much still remained to be done. This was also the view of Member States."* (HLCM Meeting Minutes).

At this stage, two years after September 2001, two General Assembly resolutions on safety and security had been adopted. First of all was Resolution 56/255⁸⁵ dated 14th February 2002, whereby the General Assembly formally requested that the Secretary General conduct a full evaluation of the UN security management system. Second, was Resolution 57/155⁸⁶ dated 3rd March 2003, whereby the General Assembly called for all Member States, in conjunction with the UN organisation to take *"all appropriate measures to achieve a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, both at*

⁸³ Inter-Agency Security Management Network addresses all issues relating to the safety and security of UN system personnel as an ad hoc body and reports to the High-Level Committee on Management. It meets annually and is chaired by the United Nations Security Coordinator.

⁸⁴ High Level Committee on Management. The main inter-agency body for coordination in the administration and management areas, including staff security within the UN system

⁸⁵ General Assembly 56th Session. Special Subjects Related to the Proposed Programme Budget For the Biennium 2002/03

headquarters and at the field level." (CEB/2003/3, 13th August 2003). In the March Resolution, the General Assembly noted the need to improve the current UN security management system so as to improve the safety and security of UN staff members. As a consequence of the requests and conclusions included in the two Resolutions, 56/255 and 57/155, a further detailed review was instigated by an evaluation team. A report was requested to be submitted by the evaluation team to a steering group headed by the Deputy Secretary General.

Further UN Headquarters Security Upgrades in 2003

In May 2003, the security of pedestrian access was further enhanced with the introduction of an upgraded UN identification card system. This security project is still ongoing in May 2006 and is due to be completed by July 2006.

Specific vehicle security measures were implemented in October 2003; which included the fitting of bollards across the pavement outside the main UN building to prevent any vehicles being able to forcefully enter onto the UN complex grounds. Vehicle barriers were also erected at all vehicular entrances and exits.

Additionally in 2003, biohazard equipment was purchased and training conducted to UN staff as to what to do in the event of a chemical, biological or radioactive emergency. All Security Officers were issued with biohazard face masks, which they are instructed to carry at all times, in case of a biohazard emergency. (SSS Standard Operating Procedures)

COG Table-Top Exercise

On the 8th September 2003, a tabletop exercise was conducted for COG members to ascertain preparedness and train further for a security emergency situation.

⁸⁶ General Assembly 57th Session. Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of

The 2003 Attack on the UN Office in Baghdad

On the 19th August 2003, the UN office in Baghdad, which was located in the Canal Hotel, suffered a terrorist attack. A truck full of explosives drove up to the hotel, where it exploded, killing 22 people, including UN staff members and Sergio Vieira de Mello, the top UN envoy in Iraq.

Clever truck!

On learning of the attack in Baghdad, Secretary-General Kofi Annan denounced the attack as an *"act of unprovoked and murderous violence"* and mourned the death of Sergio Vieira de Mello, as *"a bitter blow for the United Nations and for me personally."* (UN News Centre, August 2003).



On 19 August 2003, an attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad killed 22 people. (UN News Centre, Aug 2005)

The attack was deemed to be an act of aggression against the United Nations itself as it was executed on an office of the UN, which was operating in a non military role, being solely involved in reconstruction and rehabilitation. The UN was not involved in any military action; it was in Iraq as a Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Mission. Established in 1992, DPA is the main UN department for peacemaking and preventive diplomacy. In August 2003, this work was being carried out in support of US Ambassador Paul Bremer's administration in Iraq. The fact that the work was being carried out under a US Ambassador, could have reinforced

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the theory of Al Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups that the UN is a "tool"⁸⁷ of the US.

The targeted devastation of the UN office in Baghdad and the subsequent death of Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other staff members, assisted in highlighting the fact that terrorist operations are exploiting this perception of the UN being a "tool" and they are consequently determined to target the UN. The sadness of this tragedy was still evidently deeply etched two years later when Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General reiterated that the *"19th of August will always be a date laden with sorrow for the United Nations"* (K. Annan, 18 August 2005).

Level of Security for UN Staff in Iraq

Prior to the bombing, there had been some concerns about the level of security in Iraq, and efforts made to address some of the security issues. Nevertheless, the suicide truck-bomb attack on the United Nations headquarters came as a surprise. In addition to the 22 UN staff members that were killed, over 150 more were injured. This was the first time that the UN, as an organisation, was specifically a terrorist target by people who deliberately wanted to cause as much damage as possible.

In addition, a few weeks after the 19th August attack, a second strike was made against the UN again, at the Canal Street Hotel location; this time the outcome was more carnage, with deaths and casualties to the Iraqi police.

Salim Lone, a spokesman for the UN mission in Iraq, who was himself injured in the original Canal Street Hotel attack, was interviewed by Russell Taylor of the UN Chronicle:

"Given the viciousness of the attack, I don't see what could have deterred it. It was a difficult role for the UN and, you know, what the UN was being asked to do in this phase was not

⁸⁷ Term used by "The Post". (www.homelandsecurityus.net. August 2003)

easy to implement. It was a very, very tough assignment for Sergio". (Issue 3 UN Chronicle, 2003)

Of course, deterring such vicious attacks from ever occurring again became and continues to be an important focus of the United Nations. Whilst the attack on the UN office in Baghdad was a terrible blow to the organization, it was certainly not the first time UN civilian staff members had lost their lives whilst going about their work. Indeed, between January 1992 and April 2003, 220 civilian UN staff members were killed due to the intentional actions of the people responsible.

The UN has long been aware of the risk to staff members working for the organization, however it is also aware that in order to develop, security must also be in place. The UN Secretary General's 2005 Report states:

"We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed". (UN *"In Larger Freedom"*. Point 17. P6, 2005).

Review of Security Procedures

An independent panel of experts did a thorough review of the UN security procedures that were in place in Baghdad, at the time of the bombing. This review included an internal investigation of the bombing conducted by an independent panel supervised by UN Special Envoy, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari,⁸⁸ and a panel of experts under the direction of a retired UN official, Mr. Gerald Waltzer.

Marti Ahtisaari's Panel's Executive Summary is attached as **Appendix E**.

⁸⁸ Former President of Finland from 1994 to 2000. Founder and Chairman, Crisis Management Initiative

The report was scathing and highlighted the lack of adequate security. *“Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to prevent the attack against the Canal Hotel perimeter, but would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of casualties caused by the attack”*. (M. Ahtisaari, 1st November 2003). The report further described the security management system as *“dysfunctional”*.

Furthermore, Martii Ahtisaari made the additional remark *“The United Nations could in theory be the target of attacks anywhere at any time, from Baghdad to Kabul, Nairobi, Jakarta, Geneva or New York. There are no indications that the perpetrators of the attacks in Baghdad would refrain from attacking other UN targets worldwide.”* (M. Kilmer. New York Times, October 2003). His somber comment highlight the fact that the UN could be vulnerable to further attacks and securing it is of great importance.

The core conclusion Of the Ahtisaari Report was not just that the security management was dysfunctional, but that any future security system *“should have a clear chain of command, an audit trail, extensive information management capabilities and clear division of labour and coordination”*. (M. Ahtisaari’s Panel Summary, 1st November 2003)

The Secretary General addressed the report findings in a letter, in which he wrote *“The Panel’s report reveals serious shortcomings in our provision of security to UN staff in Iraq”*, he elaborated further to note that he would be taking *“Immediate action to implement the Panel’s recommendations”*. He then stated how he would be *“reviewing the serious weaknesses that have been revealed in the management of our security system”*. (K. Annan, 31st October 2003)

As a consequence of the report, Tun Myat of Myanmar, the UN’s top Security Coordinator was singled out as being culpable overall for the poor security, which resulted in such a tragic loss of lives. The report concluded that Tun Myat and other UN top security staff members *“appeared to be blinded by the conviction that UN*

personnel and installations would not become a target of attack, despite the clear warning to the contrary". (Morning Sentinel, 30th March 2004) The report also surmised that, due to international pressure to assist in alleviating Iraq's escalating humanitarian needs, the UN returned to Iraq without performing an effective security and safety assessment. (Tun Myat accepted the blame and tendered his resignation shortly after the report was published).

Other staff members were disciplined for their role in the tragedy; for example two officials were specifically singled out and blamed for their failure to place anti-blast film on the windows of the UN premises. This relatively simple measure could have prevented the deaths and injury caused by the explosion of glass shards from the windows.

In an article by CNN on the review of the attack by an independent panel; titled "UN Iraq security 'dysfunctional'", CNN stated "*While admitting the attack may not have been preventable, the panel's report said: "Adequate security arrangements ... would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of casualties caused by the attack."* The report continued to accuse the UN of failing to observe minimum security standards and further elaborated that "*security awareness ... did not match the hostile environment.*" (CNN, 22nd October 2003)

The security lapses resulting in the awful tragedy in August 2003, further supplemented the security consciousness brought to light due to additional international security awareness after 9/11. All of the studies, reports and reviews concluded that better minimum operating security standards, and enhanced security structures must be implemented. They further emphasised the need to combine UN security operations into one improved, specialized security system.

To assist in the prevention of another tragedy, a full evaluation of the UN security management system was undertaken by

independent security experts in August 2003 (A/59/365⁸⁹ and Corr. 1⁹⁰), to ascertain the current status of the management of security and safety in the UN system. This evaluation was requested by the Secretary General and was promulgated to all UN staff in his October letter:

On 20 August I instructed the Office of the Security Coordinator and the whole security apparatus of the UN system, including all the Funds, Programmes and Agencies, to conduct an in-depth review of all our security systems and measures needed to ensure that we have the rules, procedures, equipment, training, and above all the capacity that will allow us to be much better prepared, in future, to meet the new kinds of threats that we have to face. In completing this review we will seek the advice of independent experts. (K. Annan, 31st October 2003)

This evaluation was completed and reported on in October 2004. In part due to the recommendations of the Ahtisaari's report that "*adequate financial resources for the UN security management to act in a timely and effective manner should be available*" in December 2003, the Fifth Committee approved an overall two-year regular budget of \$3.16 billion for the biennium 2004-2005. (A/58/820⁹¹, 8th June 2004)

⁸⁹ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Ninth Session. Agenda Item 108. Strengthened and unified security management system of the United Nations, 11th October 2004

⁹⁰ Report of the Secretary General, Fifty-Ninth Session, Item 108, Corr. 1 "Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations", 28th October 2004

⁹¹ Budgetary Report of the Fifth Committee

Security Measures Implemented During 2004

Strengthening of Security Project

In April 2004, the GA was presented with a report from the Secretary General to inform Member States of the achievements that had now been made to upgrade safety and security in the UN system. In this report, he also requested additional resources for the *"first phase of implementation of urgently needed new measures worldwide"*. (A/58/756⁹², April 2004).

Furthermore, in a Press Release the following month, the Secretary General stated to the General Assembly that *"The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the **security, safety and well-being of staff** as a high priority."* (A/58/365⁹³, 12th May 2004).

The objective of this goal was reiterated by Catherine Bertini, the Under Secretary General of the UN Department of Management, in her presentation to the Fifth Committee on the same day, when she stated the need for an *"enhanced culture of security awareness and compliance"* as the UN now had to manage with the threat of a *"deliberate direct attack that could appear with little warning"*. She further emphasized the need for monitoring the security environment and planning to manage any security occurrences. She further urged the Fifth Committee to include her proposals for heightened security functional capabilities *"into the structure and procedures of United Nations security arrangements"*. (UN Press Release GA/AB/3615, 12th May 2004)

The full evaluation of the UN security management system, initiated in August 2003 and undertaken by a team of independent

⁹² Report of the Secretary General. Strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises. 5th April 2004

⁹³ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Eighth Session. Item 10. Interim report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict. 12th May 2004

security experts, was completed in 2004. The team had studied and evaluated the current provision of security within the UN. Their report concluded that the development and implementation of the overall security accountability framework would lead to a strengthened and unified security management system, which *"in turn would lead to greater safety, security and protection of United Nations personnel"*. (A/59/365⁹⁴, 11th October 2004.)

In the report, the experts agreed that the current security system was inappropriate and dealt with security in a "compartmentalized" manner. They further suggested that the current security system encouraged "doubt" for those working in a stressful environment. They further pointed out that mistakes are likely to occur when doubt is present and that mistakes could lead to deaths and injury.

It was noted that there were additional challenges in the areas of logistics and human resource management. For example, each UN Security and Safety Service (SSS) had their own recruiting and promotional standards and systems; in addition each SSS was also responsible for their own procurement. This had resulted in differing human resource practices, different equipment, and imbalances between staff members executing comparable roles in different headquarters and duty stations.

The Ahtissari panel raised concern at the fact that there was no specific UN agency to conduct threat and risk assessments for UN personnel. They specifically noted that the UN security apparatus in the field and at Headquarters *"was unable to collect and analyze information on potential threats and recommended that this deficiency be remedied"*. (A/59/365). It was further remarked in the Secretary General's Report of September 2004, that there was a requirement for a full-time security threat and risk assessment team (A/59/365).

⁹⁴ Report of the Secretary General. Fifty-Ninth Session. Item 108. Strengthened and Unified Security Management System for the United Nations. 11th October 2004

It must be noted that whilst security and safety at the UN was being assessed, there were also some voices of concern being raised. Specifically, that whilst the UN needed to protect its' headquarters, its missions and all of the staff contained therein; however, the global expectancy is that the UN should go about its role in the world without giving the impressions of being a fortress.

In addition, whilst being aware of the need for additional security measures, some people had apprehension about the UN becoming inaccessible to the very people that it is there to assist. Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette explained this to the eighth United Nations Senior Management Seminar (UNSMAS) in New York⁹⁵:

The United Nations will have to be careful not to succumb to a "siege mentality". People around the world have high expectations of the United Nations and its partners. Our collective raison d'être is to be there: We must be present in the lives of peoples and their communities -- to understand their needs and aspirations. We must work with them to nurture hope, peace and better standards of living. You can't fulfil that mission from inside a bunker. (UN Press Release, 7th June 2004)

The new Department of Safety and Security would therefore need to deliver the required security and safety to staff members, whilst ensuring that those staff could still go about their work unimpeded by those new security and safety measures and structures.

⁹⁵ Press Release DSG/SM/22607/06/2004

Creation of the Department of Safety and Security

The far reaching security reports, such as the Report of the Security General⁹⁶, the Ahtisaari panel and USG Brahimi's report⁹⁷, resulted in a decision being made by the GA for the three former separate sections responsible for staff security and safety; the Office of the Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), UN Security and Safety Services (SSS), and the security section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to be amalgamated into a new directorate of security, with 383 posts.

(Annex G Organizational structure of DSS)

This strengthening of security project, was deemed to be such a priority that Denisa Hutanova⁹⁸, was quoted in the UN Chronicle as commenting that *"in spite of it being an off-budget year, the Committee gave priority consideration to financing on the question of a strengthened and unified United Nations security system"*. The Fifth Committee continued to recommend 40 draft proposals to the General Assembly, which unanimously adopted 24 resolutions during its fifty-ninth session in 2004.

On the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, the GA therefore added \$53.63 million to the UN regular budget to establish DSS. *"This was a very substantive discussion, which together with human resources dominated our main session"*, Ambassador MacKay was quoted as stating (N. Talwar reporting for the UN Chronicle, 2004).

The General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/295⁹⁹ "Strengthening the Security and Safety of United Nations Operations, Staff and Premises" at its Fifty-Eighth Session and further requested the Secretary General to present to the GA, at its Fifty-Ninth Session, a

⁹⁶ A/59/365. Agenda Item 108, 11th October 2004

⁹⁷ Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, is the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General

⁹⁸ Third Secretary, 5th Committee, from the Slovak Republic

⁹⁹ Fifty-Eighth Session. Agenda Item 121 - 147. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises, 21st July 2004

comprehensive report on *"further strengthening the safety and security of United Nations operations, staff and premises"*. (58/295¹⁰⁰, 21st July 2004)

As a consequence, the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) was created by the General Assembly in section XI of its Resolution 59/276¹⁰¹ of 23rd December 2004. DSS was to be a consolidation of the current security and safety organizations: the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator at UN Headquarters in New York and the Security and Safety Service (SSS) organizations at all other UN Headquarters locations and regional commissions. The overall purpose of the new Department of DSS was to be the effective conduit, *"in a safe and secure environment, of the activities mandated by the United Nations system organizations"*. (A/60/6¹⁰², 10th May 2005)

The global objectives of DSS were:

- (a) To support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies;
- (e) To ensure the most cost-effective provision and employment of security personnel by taking advantage of economies of scale and through centrally directed recruitment, selection, training, deployment and career development. (A/59/365)

DSS was to comprise of three main operational components: the Division of Safety and Security Services, the Division of Regional Operations and the Field Support Service. The Mission Statement of DSS was to be:

¹⁰⁰ Report of the Fifth Committee. Questions relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2004–2005

¹⁰¹ Fifty-Ninth Session. Agenda Item 108. Resolution adopted by the general Assembly. Questions relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2004–2005, 17 January 2005

¹⁰² General Assembly. Sixtieth session Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006–2007* Part XII Safety and security Section 33 Safety and security

The Department of Safety and Security is responsible for providing leadership, operational support and oversight of the security management system to enable the safest and most efficient conduct of the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. A/60/6, 10th May 2005.

The Position of Under Secretary-General of DSS

The decision to assign a USG as the head of the new Department was formalized by the Fifth Committee in its programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005, where in its report the Fifth Committee decided *"on an exceptional basis, and without setting any precedent, that the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security shall serve for one term non-renewable and not exceeding 5 years"*. (A/56/384¹⁰³) It was agreed that the USG would be accountable for all actions of DSS, including the responsibility of the safety and security of over 150 duty stations, which includes more than 100,000 UN staff members and their dependants, (approximately an additional 300,000) and would support the Secretary General in security and safety associated subjects. In addition, the large increase in the number of DSS staff, their support frameworks, including human resources, increased budgetary resources and the additional responsibility expected of the position, all aided in the decision to appoint the director of DSS at the level of USG. Furthermore, the person selected for the role would be expected to already have a large amount of *"expertise and experience"*. The Report of the Secretary General additionally points out that this position would also *"allow him/her to speak with authority across the United Nations system and with representatives of Member States at the most senior levels"*. (A/59/365, 11th October 2004).

The USG would also be in charge of the development, dissemination and execution of UN security and safety policies and

procedures. The USG would also be responsible for ensuring that all UN organizations were in compliance with the policies and procedures. It was also decided that the USG would report directly to the Secretary General and would be assisted by an Assistant Secretary-General for Security Operations, with three operational divisions, each headed at the D-2 level, a Director of Regional Operations, a Director of Administration and Field Support and a Director of Headquarters Security and Safety Services (A/59/365) all of whom would report directly to the USG DSS, Sir David Veness¹⁰⁴. This was subsequently changed to no longer include an Assistant Secretary-General role.

Establishment of Director of Security and Safety Services

To further assist the USG in the achievement of DSS' stated objectives, a Director of Security and Safety Services position was created. This role reports directly to the USG and is responsible for policy advice, operational control and supervision of the Security and Safety Services in New York, Vienna, Geneva, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut and Santiago.

The Security and Safety Services at the other UN locations would maintain their day-to-day operational responsibility and report to their respective Directors-General or Executive Secretaries, who will serve as Designated Officials (DOs).

The Director would also be responsible for a new Protection Coordination Unit to be developed and located in the office of the Director, so as to better cope with the increasing requests for UN Personal Protection Details.

To assist in the achievement of some of the objectives of DSS, the Director would be supported by a Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU) and a Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU).

¹⁰³ Report of the Fifth Committee. Fifty-ninth Session. Programme Budget for the Biennium 2004 – 2005. Agenda Item 108. Point #22, 22nd December 2004

¹⁰⁴ Former Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Operations of the London Metropolitan Police.

Development of Policy, Planning and Coordination Capabilities

The Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit (PPCU), reporting directly to the USG, was established to develop and circulate common policies and standards for all aspects of the security management system and for the revising and updating of the UN's "Field Security Handbook", issued to UN staff operating in the field, and for any security directives. Furthermore, obtaining a PPCU within the proposed structure of DSS would assist in achieving the following stated objective:

- (c) To develop high-quality, best-practice security policies, standards and operational procedures across the United Nations system, including the appropriate degree of standardization; (A/59/365)

The PPCU has the additional role of administering the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN).

The IASMN is responsible for the overall UN security and safety policies and procedures. It includes senior managers who are responsible for the security in their particular area or unit. They are the ones who would be held accountable for ensuring that policies and procedures are implemented and for monitoring their maintenance. The IASMN can make recommendations to the USG on security issues in their respective areas of responsibility, which can include threat levels as well as whether staff members should be evacuated.

Development of Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Capabilities

The Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU), also reporting directly to the USG, would be responsible for conducting inspections and compliance reviews of security policies and standards at all United Nations entities, including headquarters

locations and the field missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). (A/60/6)

The Ahtisaari panel had also called for a strong security management system with firm disciplinary measures to respond to non-compliance; this would also include, once again, accountability at the management level for the implementation and maintenance of security measures. (SIAP, 3rd March 2004)

In the October report of the Secretary General, presented at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, it was explained that DSS would include a "*dedicated inspection and compliance review capability, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General*" (A/59/365). These reviews would incorporate the entire UN system, including headquarters and DPKO missions and would be carried out by specially trained and experienced teams. The teams would not be there to merely audit compliance, but would work collaboratively with duty stations to assist them in achieving compliance with the minimum operating security standards (MOSS), with security clearances, training and human resource issues and so on. The Secretary General's report also stated the need for DSS to "*enforce standards and to recommend action in the event of non-compliance.*" (A/59/365). The October report of the Secretary General went on to further stress the point that:

Security, like accident prevention, is only as good as the weakest link in an interdependent chain of well-designed systems and strict compliance. Despite the experiences of last year, security lapses in the field continue to be a serious and widespread problem. For this reason, a much stronger central monitoring and evaluation capacity, with a body reporting directly to the senior United Nations security official, is essential in order to be able to identify security problems without further delay and to work in a more vigorous, targeted and effective manner towards their earliest possible solution. (A/59/365. Point 33)

Development of Threat and Risk Assessment Capabilities

Up until this period, UNSECOORD utilized a security risk management methodology, but this methodology did not involve a dedicated risk management force.

The Ahtisaari panel had deemed it essential that professional assessment tools were being utilized for the collection of information on potential threats and for the analysis of risk for United Nations operations worldwide. The panel suggested that a team or unit of security risk and threat assessment staff be instigated. This team would work in cooperation with regional desks to gather, analyse and evaluate threat and risk information; they would then be responsible for the distribution of the relevant information. This unit would glean the information from the field, from UN agencies, UN departments, host countries own sources, and other threat and risk networks. (Report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel [SIAP], 3rd March 2004)

Consequently, the Report of the Secretary-General on a Strengthened and Unified Security Management System for the United Nations noted the lack of a *"dedicated capacity with the necessary resources in Headquarter for security risk assessment."* (A/59/365, 17th September 2004). The GA directed that DSS should acquire *"significant new capabilities in the areas of security threat and risk assessment"*; to assist in the mitigation of the increased threats to the UN as *"the level of threat against United Nations operations has increased exponentially"*. This was to include operational support in the field, the development of organisational security policies and standards, compliance and evaluation of those standards, and more effective human resources management of security staff, including development, training and career management. (A/59/365, 17th September 2004)

Furthermore, obtaining an internal threat and risk assessment capability within the proposed structure of DSS would assist in achieving the following stated objective:

- (b) To ensure effective risk mitigation through the establishment of a coordinated security threat and risk assessment mechanism within the framework of a common, system-wide methodology; (A/59/365)

Consequently, a UN Security Risk Management model was adopted as the primary tool for all UN Designated Officials and Security Focal Points to identify emerging threats, to determine areas of vulnerabilities through the assessment of programme requirements and evaluation of associated risks.

UN Organizations Responsible for Field Safety and Security

Even with the installation of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), it was agreed that the Executive Heads of UN funds, programmes and other agencies would remain responsible for the security management in their own organizations. This would be done in consultation and with the support of DSS. The Executive Heads would be responsible for selecting a senior manager to be in charge and to act as a focal point on issues of their organization's safety and security.

Designated Officials

In countries with a UN presence, the most senior UN official would generally be assigned the role as the Designated Official (DO) for Security. The DO is directly accountable to the Secretary General and would be expected to readily consult with the USG of DSS on all safety and security matters.

Country Representatives

UN agencies, programmes and funds, which are a part of the UN security management system, are expected to select a Country

Representative who would be accountable to the Security General, with guidance from the USG of DSS on all safety and security matters.

Area Security Coordinator

Area Security Coordinators are UN staff members appointed by the DO, who report to the DO, but have responsibility for advising on safety and security matters. A DO would usually be appointed in a larger country, where the DO would find it difficult to be aware of all the security and safety needs of UN staff members.

Chief Security Advisor and Security Advisor

These are professional security UN staff members, appointed and recruited by the USG of DSS to act as security and safety advisors for the DO and Area Security Coordinators. They report to the DO, but act in consultation with, and are trained by, DSS.

Field Security Coordination Officers

These are also professional security UN staff members, appointed and recruited by the USG of DSS. They report to the CSA/SA and through to the DO. They would be employed in countries with a larger UN presence, or a higher level of threat and risk.

Budgeting For the New Department

Up until this point, the financing of UN security and safety was done on a cost-sharing basis. This had been established under GA Resolution 56/255. The reason for the cost-sharing was that the UN field security management would be responsible for the safety and security of its field security staff and thereupon the associated costs. Therefore, these field costs were being shared on a proportional basis (A/58/756¹⁰⁵).

The formula for the cost sharing was worked out according to the number of UN staff members working in countries where they require protection from UN security. Information regarding these numbers was assembled bi-annually.

The problem with the above formula was that the cost sharing agreement meant that the contributing UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes relied on voluntary contributions, for their share of the cost sharing arrangement, from UN Member States. These voluntary contributions tended to be unreliable and made it difficult to ensure continuous long-term funding, which would allow for future security developments.

Consequently, the Secretary General proposed that this cost-sharing system be slowly phased out and stressed:

Security is a prerequisite to programme delivery and a core responsibility of Member States. It is recommended that security be provided to the fullest extent possible through a single system funded centrally from the regular budget. (A/59/365. Point 63)

He further impressed how "*security costs should be centrally funded from the assessed resources of the Organization.*"

The Secretary-General submitted to the GA a report informing Member States of the measures that had been taken to enhance safety and security and requesting resources for the

first phase of implementation of urgently needed new measures worldwide (A/58/756). Those measures consisted of security infrastructure enhancements and new security posts for high-risk duty stations. As a consequence the GA, in June 2004, authorized additional expenditures of \$85.9 million. The largest amount of the funds was for infrastructure at UN headquarters locations (A/59/365).

It is worth mentioning here that the gross total expenses of the proposed strengthening of security and safety measures were estimated at \$92,433,500. This included a onetime expense of \$71,193,900 for the improvement of physical security infrastructures. As the UN headquarters in Vienna (located at the Vienna International Centre) are shared with other organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, amongst others, it was agreed to cost-share security improvement expenses with the Vienna-based organizations, which totaled an amount of \$6,467,700. As a consequence, the gross total expenses of the proposed strengthening of security and safety measures were re-estimated at \$85,965,800.

The formula for sharing the expense of DSS was to be based on three main areas:

1. Central main expenses would be the financial responsibility of UN Headquarters. These would include administrative support, management of security operations and so on.
2. Operational field expenses would be the financial responsibility of UN field office operations and participating organizations. The exact amount to be charged to the

¹⁰⁵ Report of the Secretary General. Strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises. 5th April 2004

participating organizations would be calculated based on numbers of staff.

3. Agency expenses by those organizations with only a few field staff, but are still expected to contribute a minimum amount, (between \$25,000 - \$100,000 depending on staff numbers being covered by the UN security management system.

On the 5th August, 2006 it was agreed that as DSS was going to provide for the safety and security of staff, delegates and visitors at the main locations of the United Nations, in addition to also providing for the safety and security of the United Nations operations in the field, the Department would continue to be financed both from the regular budget. It was also noted that some degree of cost-sharing would continue, with other UN organizations being covered financially by the security management system in the field. With these other UN organizations in the field, the financial responsibility of each participating organization would continue to be based on its proportional share of the personnel operating in the field.

It was also agreed that all discussions relating to costing and expenses, specifically:

The substantive aspects of field-related security is being held in the context of the Inter-agency Security Management Network, including consultations on the strategic direction and operational requirements of security arrangements for the field. (Para 24, A/61/223, 5th August 2006)

(Annex F Distribution of Costs)

Security Infrastructure Upgrades Achieved in 2004

Security Construction 2004

As part of the strengthening of security project, during May 2004, a major development - the construction of a more secure perimeter fence outside of the UN Headquarters began. The UN HQ's entire perimeter fence was replaced by a taller fence fitted with a comprehensive detection system, including intrusion alarms and close circuit TV. Intrusion alarm devices were also mounted on external grilles, vents and other outlets, such as manhole covers. The lighting system along the perimeter fence was completely replaced during 2005. This development project was concluded right before the 60th General Assembly, in September 2005.

In March 2004, the Chief of the Security and Safety Service in New York gave a presentation in Lyon, France on the Capital Master Plan¹⁰⁶. He stated how the design concept of the Strengthening of Security projects at the main UN Headquarters locations is of secure perimeter protection supported by an electronic access control system. He further reported how security measures recommended for access controls have followed a clear and standard process based on "*Threat and vulnerability assessment to determine the viable threats; a security strategy predicated on a set of recognized standards; feedback from the Security Experts Conference, UNSSSNET meeting in June 2003, and site visits*". He continued to comment that the access control recommendations were based on recognized standards and fit in with the UN Emergency Preparedness Plan. (UNSSSNET Summary Report, 5th March 2004).

At this UNSSSNET meeting in France, the Chiefs of Security and Safety agreed on the common requirements they would have for a Global ID System, as part of the upgrading of Access Controls. These included the following:

¹⁰⁶ The capital master plan, a programme to refurbish UN Headquarters in New York was proposed to the General Assembly as an approach to resolving unacceptable deterioration, building and fire code

- A secure credential resistant to counterfeiting.
- Speed of throughput at key entry portals such as turnstiles.
- A recognizable credential, worldwide.
- ID capable of application at all main HQ duty stations.

Security Control Centre

A major renovation began in August 2004, to completely revamp and elevate the security level of the Security and Safety Service's Security Control Centre in the UN Secretariat Building, New York. This was another major development, only recently completed in early 2006. The Control Centre was overhauled in order to have CCTV coverage of the entire perimeter of the UN HQ fence and to also have coverage of other key areas of the UN complex and areas immediately adjacent to the UN complex.

Ongoing Progress of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC)

In Resolution 1535¹⁰⁷, dated the 26th March 2004, the Security Council commended the progress made by the Counter-terrorism Committee in "*discharging its important responsibility*" and called upon Member States to "*continue to cooperate fully with the Committee*" (Resolution 1535).

Since its inception shortly after 9/11, the CTC has been able to identify areas where States can improve their legislation and government administration to enhance their efforts/ability to tackle the issue of the financing of terrorism. The Committee has also set up a roster of States who are prepared to offer technical assistance to those other States who request assistance in their compliance of the resolution.

deficiencies, deficiencies in modern security requirements and standards and environmental problems in the seven buildings and 17-plus acres of the complex (A/60/550, 11th November 2005).

¹⁰⁷ Adopted by the Security Council at its 4936th Meeting. 2004

Canine Unit

A major security measure established in May 2004, as part of the strengthening of security project, was the establishment of a UN Security and Safety Service Canine Unit, consisting of eight dog and handler teams. This was the first time the UN had its own Canine Unit, trained to detect explosives, as up until that time they had contracted in dog handler teams. The Canine Unit is a part of the Security and Safety Service (SSS) and the dog handlers are all SSS Officers.

Safety and Security for UN Staff Members Around the World

As noted earlier in this paper, the Host Governments of UN missions have the primary responsibility for the security and safety of UN staff members on those missions:

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of staff members, their spouses, dependants and property rests with the Host Government. (Report of the Fifth Committee, 22nd December 2004¹⁰⁸).

In December 2004, the GA further emphasized that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of UN staff and premises: *"rest with the host country and also emphasizes the role of the relevant host country agreements in defining this responsibility"*

However, The Secretary-General, on the advice of the USG DSS and designated officials, has the final decision as to each security arrangement to be made by the UN and the degree it is to be established, based on the risk and threat analysis of any given situation. The UN does try to facilitate the duty of the host Government in the execution of their responsibility to safety and security and consults with them, as appropriate, on security and safety matters concerning UN staff.

Paradoxically, UN staff members can have their safety and security actually endangered by comments made by Host Country officials or the national and international media. The UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) specifically stated the lack of support from the mass media was a major obstacle in the achievement of a *"culture of peace"*. (UN News article, 29th September 2005).

¹⁰⁸ A/59/448/Add.2. 59th Session of the Fifth Committee. Agenda Item 108. Programme Budget for the Biennium 2004 – 2005. 22nd December 2004

Whilst undertaking the very role they are there to perform, UN staff members can find themselves in danger. For example, BBC News, World Edition, reported that "*Protesters gathered outside a key UN building in Khartoum, waving banners criticizing the UN, the US and its allies*", after the UN gave documents containing alleged war crimes to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. (BBC World News, 5th April 2005). Another similar incident, one of many, was reported by Al Jazeera News: "*Hundreds of Afghan refugees have attacked a United Nations refugee agency office in northwest Pakistan in protest at delays in repatriating them, police and officials said*". (Al Jazeera News, 8th September 2005)

As a consequence, DSS would be expected to provide common security and safety policies and standards; in addition to providing its duty stations and headquarters with a central threat and risk assessment capability, additional monitoring and compliance, standardized training and other support, the day-to-day decision-making on security and safety topics would remain decentralized and would be undertaken by the Designated Official (DO). The DO, however, would be advised by the security management team in the country, including professional security staff, which in turn would be trained and advised by DSS.

Upgrading of MOSS

In an address by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette to the eighth UN Senior Management Seminar (UNSMAS) in New York¹⁰⁹, Ms Fréchette stated:

Today the United Nations is being targeted -- in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere -- because it is the United Nations. The attacks may not be isolated events, but rather part of a deliberate strategy. Whatever the aim of those assaulting us -- to sow chaos, to undermine our political efforts, to retaliate for a perceived grievance, or something else -- we have in some

¹⁰⁹ Press Release DSG/SM/22607/06/2004

places become a primary target. This implies a quantum, rather than incremental, increase in the strain on our security systems. (UN Press Release, 7 June 2004)

As a consequence, UNMAS worked collaboratively with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) to address a range of security-related issues, including the upgrading of MOSS; this incorporated the improvement of standards and plans for an enhanced medical system to “*respond to critical incidents involving mass casualties, in coordination with the medical services of the United Nations system*” were also adopted. (A/59/365, 11th October 2004). In addition, further advances in aviation safety and security on UN flights were also made.

Whilst MOSS had been in place for sometime at UN missions, it was only in March 2004, at a UN security meeting hosted by INTERPOL at Lyon, France that the concept of MOSS for UN headquarters (H-MOSS) was deliberated by the UN security and safety network group (UNSSNET¹¹⁰). The group was told that, after the attack on the UN in Baghdad, “*the UN Secretariat concluded that it was necessary to establish minimum operating security standards for all its headquarters locations*”. The concept of H-MOSS was first raised by the Secretariat Chiefs in a meeting on Security conducted in December 2003 in Vienna. The objective of H-MOSS was to “*professionalize the United Nations security services and make United Nations staff and premises more secure*”. (UNSSNET Summary Report, 5th March 2004)

DSS Training Section

In the 2004 Report of the Secretary General it was noted that the new Directorate of Safety and Security:

must embark on an ambitious, sustained, and coherent security training program aimed at multiple clients: the security officers

¹¹⁰ UNSSNET is comprised of all UN Security and Safety Services, including both headquarters and away-from-headquarters locations

in headquarters and field duty stations, the Designated Officials, the Security Management Teams, and United Nations staff in general (A/59/365, 17th September 2004).

The report further states the need for regulation by a "*training section in the Directorate of Security*" and goes on to state that the training section would be made up of a small section of curriculum managers and support staff to develop and distribute training packages. The section would also incorporate instructors to deliver the training courses that should be centrally managed. These courses would be either delivered in New York, or in the respective duty stations. The report specifically notes that "*Mobile training teams from the Directorate of Security would also stage major incident management exercises in high-risk locations*". These Mobile Teams would train UN staff members in subject matter such as disaster management, dealing with hostage crises, fire safety, and evacuation procedures and so on. Other training requirements noted in the report included Induction and Orientation training for new field security officers, Chief Security Advisor (CSA) training, personal protection training, and other specialized skills. The report specifically states the need to manage training more professionally using a "*needs-based, performance-oriented, systems approach*". (A/59/365)

It was agreed that DSS would have five Mobile training teams, consisting of two Professional staff to a team and, as recommended in the Secretary General's Report A/59/365, they are to have responsibility for Induction and Orientation training for new Field Security Officers, Security Advisors training and specialized security skills. It was also agreed that there be a Training Standards capacity and that all the training roles would be within the new Training Standardized (changed to Training and Development) Section, within DSS.

Security Measures Implemented During 2005

On the 17th January 2005, Resolution 59/276¹¹¹ was adopted by the General Assembly (GA) in which it was affirmed that *"Threat and risk assessments should be prepared by country offices and other components of the United Nations system, on an objective basis and in full cooperation with nations authorities of host countries"*.

The GA also requested the Secretary General to *"apply available measures for disciplinary action to be taken at all levels, especially at the managerial level, in all departments for non-compliance with security standards, norms and procedures"*. (Point 15)

In addition, the GA further requested the Secretary General to recommend to the executive heads of Agencies, Funds and Programmes that contribute to the UN security management system that *"they apply available measures for disciplinary action to be taken at all levels for non-compliance with security standards, norms and procedures"*. (Point 16)

In this Resolution, the GA agreed to establish a Threat and Risk Assessment component, which would be located in the Office of the Director of Regional Operations, within DSS. The GA also requested that the Secretary General strengthen the procedures for assessing threats and risks *"so as to enable timely, systematic and periodic review of the phases"*. (Point 38)

The Secretary-General gave a keynote address in Madrid, Spain on the 10th March to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security - "A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism", in which he stated the UN's promotion of a anti-terrorism strategy. The main five elements of the strategy, outlined by the Secretary General were:

¹¹¹ Fifty-Ninth Session. Agenda Item 108. "Questions relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005"

- First, to dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals;
- Second, to deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks;
- Third, to deter states from supporting terrorists;
- Fourth, to develop state capacity to prevent terrorism;
- Fifth, to defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.

(K. Annan, 10th March 2005).

Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force

During this keynote address the Secretary General announced the new Counter-Terrorism Directorate, who would be responsible for assessing the needs of poor countries and to assist them in developing a comprehensive approach to technical assistance; therefore decreasing the likelihood of them being exploited by terrorists. The Secretary General further stated how "*Upholding human right is not merely compatible with successful counter-terrorism strategy. It is an essential element*" (K. Annan, March 2005).

The Secretary General further announced in this address, how he would be creating an implementation task force, which would meet regularly to review the handling of terrorism and related issues throughout the UN system and make sure that all parts play their proper role.

In the Fifth Committee meeting of May 2005, presenters further depicted a dire security environment for UN staff members, over the last four years, in which "*the United Nations had become a target of choice*". (Press Release GA/AB/3615¹¹², 12th May 2004)

The Committee further stated the need to review current safety and security and voiced concern over the completion and implementation of security improvements already approved. At this stage, in 2005, a large amount of the additional funding approved by the GA had still not been utilized.

¹¹² Fifth Committee, 42nd Meeting. Fifty-eighth General Assembly

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1611 (2005), at its 52223rd meeting, which was held on the 7th July 2005. This Resolution, reaffirmed Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004) and re-stressed the need to combat threats to *"international peace and security caused by terrorist acts"* (Resolution 1611). It condemned the 7th July 2005 terrorist attacks on London and urged all States to cooperate to *"bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors"* of the bombing. Additionally, the resolution expressed its *"utmost determination to combat terrorism"* (Resolution 1611, 2005)

In The Fifth Committee's first issue of their newsletter in 2005, the Secretary General, when presenting his proposal for the strengthening of security, said that there were an *"extraordinary number of people we have to protect: 100,000 international and national staff, plus 300,000 of their family members and dependents, serving the world at more than 140 field locations and Headquarters duty stations"*. He then noted that the UN, and other traditional UN partners, such as humanitarian organizations, had become targets of political violence since 1992, *"challenging the long-held perception that we were protected by our flag and by our status as an impartial, benevolent actor"*. (Namrita Talwar reporting for Issue 1, 5th Committee. 2005)

This viewpoint was further confirmed when, on the 19th September, Dr. Amman Al-Zawahiri, ranked as number two in Al Qaeda, condemned the United Nations asserting *"The United Nations maintains a double standard in its relationship with Muslim countries vis-à-vis other populations"*. He went on to maintain that:

"The United Nations which certified the election in Afghanistan, is a hypocrite for their crying and weeping for the people killed in Darfur as they remain silent when one Million Iraqi children died because of sanctions on Iraq". (Reported in internal DSS Memo, September 2005)

Strengthened and unified security management system for the UN

A report¹¹³ was presented by the Secretary General, to the General Assembly, on the progress that had been made in the implementation of the GA Resolution 59/276. The report outlined the improvements achieved in establishing a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, both in the field and at Headquarters.

The report noted that since the implementation of GA Resolution 59/276, new UN deployments, continual security issues and other necessities in a number of hazardous locations around the world", *"has drawn heavily on the resources of the newly created Department of Safety and Security"*. The report also noted that a substantial amount had been achieved by the new department. *"Considerable visible progress has already been achieved in developing an integrated system-wide security management system that ensures consistency, efficiency and effectiveness in safeguarding our staff so that they can continue their vital tasks worldwide"*. (A/60/424. Point 56, page 15. October 2005)

In paragraph 29 of Resolution 60/123, "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel", at the 63rd Plenary meeting conducted on 15 December 2005, the President of the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to develop a comprehensive and updated report for the GA on *"the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel and on the implementation of the present resolution"*¹¹⁴.

¹¹³ 60th Session, Agenda Item 124. "Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations" A/60/424. 11th October 2005

¹¹⁴ 60th Session, Agenda Item 73. "Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel". A/60/123. 15th December 2005

The Current Status of Security Measures at The UN

At the end of January 2006 the UN Development Programme conducted a Global Management Team (GMT) meeting in The Hague. Sir David Veness, the USG of DSS, stated in his presentation that he accepted that "*The trends are going in the wrong direction and we need to do much, much more across the globe*" (A. Davis, February 2006)

At the GMT meeting, it was acknowledged that the UN could do much more to aid the security of UN staff members. In particular, six areas were highlighted: planning, funding, training, discretion, vehicle safety and the security of national UN staff.

This was impressed upon the organization when on the 1st March; a militia group kidnapped two foreign UN staff members reportedly because the UN refugee agency owes their leader money, according to reports from southeastern Somalia. (Internal Memo. SSS NY, 1st March 2006)

The General Assembly expressed their concern in March 2006 by stating in their Resolution paper 123 how they were:

Deeply concerned by the dangers and security risks faced by humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated personnel at the field level, as they operate in increasingly complex contexts, as well as the continuous erosion, in many cases, of respect for the principles and rules of international law, in particular international humanitarian law. (A/Res/60/123, 24th March 2006)

They further stated the need to ensure adequate levels of safety and security for United Nations personnel and the need to additional promotion of a security culture and consciousness, with accountability at all levels.

Establishment of a Threat and Risk Assessment Unit

The establishment of a Threat and Risk Assessment Unit in DSS and the years of additional experience and lessons learnt from the security and safety situations faced by the UN, along with the recent establishment, in May 2006, of an inter-agency development group on Security Threat and Risk Assessments have all aided to further *“refine the strategic direction, taking stock of achievements, identifying areas for improvement and delineating the way forward.”* (DSS Presentation, 20th April 2006).

Another area highlighted to be addressed in the near future is the training of security focal points in the UN agencies. This is planned to be undertaken for all levels of staff, as it is critical for the efficient process of any threat and risk assessments. In a presentation delivered by Mr. Igor Mitrokhin, the Senior Security Coordination Officer of the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit at DSS in April 2006, he stated that although these issues have been recently addressed by DSS in their recent training programmes, *“an expended and standardized training curriculum should be further developed to address all of the above elements.”* (DSS Presentation, 20th April 2006)

In the Report of the Secretary General 27th April¹¹⁵, Kofi Annan surprised Member States by making the further announcement:

The Department of Safety and Security is developing counter-terrorism expertise and has undertaken security support operations in 150 States. The Department, Interpol and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs are also working together to develop emergency response capacity for security threats, including terrorism. (K. Annan, April 2006)

This statement took many people by surprise, as the Member States were not aware that the UN had intended to develop its own *“counter-terrorism expertise”*. Following the Secretary General’s

¹¹⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, Sixtieth session, Agenda items 46 and 120, uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy. A/60/825, 27th April 2006

comments, at the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) meeting, the report of the meeting pointedly states:

The IASMN recalls that the purpose of the security risk management model was primarily to facilitate the delivery of programmes and not to focus solely on counter-terrorism. (IASMN. Point 59, May 2006)

Funding Issues for DSS

At this IASMN meeting, DSS requested that further funds be made available in order to achieve its goals. The IASMN response was muted and the report of the meeting acknowledged:

The IASMN unanimously states that for 2006 – 2007, there are no additional funds available from the cost-shared budget for further enhancement of DSS, and expect that DSS will utilize the resources effectively and efficiently and for the purpose for which they were provided. (IASMN. Point 7, May 2006)

Consequently, in the programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 recognition was given to the practical problems that cost-sharing presented to the operational running of safety and security. However, no suggestions for change were made, but a decision to submit a report on how to improve the "operational administration of existing cost-sharing arrangements" was made. (A/61/123. Item 115)

Security and Safety Situation for UN Staff in 2006

During late 2005 and 2006, the security of UN staff members deteriorated in Afghanistan, Somalia and especially Sudan. The Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia and the Israeli Authorities continued to detain UN staff and to refuse the UN right of protection in violation of agreed international conventions. From 1st July 2005 to 30th June 2006, 15 UN staff members lost their lives

as result of malicious acts. (This number does not include uniformed peacekeepers).

During the same period, 215 staff were violently attacked, 93 were victims of robbery, 5 were raped and 9 were sexually assaulted. On the 27th May, 7 peacekeepers from Nepal, based in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo were kidnapped, only being released on the 8th July; there were also 4 kidnapping incidents involving UN staff members in Haiti. (Draft of report to be presented to the General Assembly, "*Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel*", 61st Session, Agenda Item 69. September 2006)

During 2006, further steps were taken at the UN Headquarters to further improve UN staff members' awareness of security and safety. These steps included adding a security and safety component to the UN's 2-day Induction training component, developing an additional one-day workshop for new DSS staff members and enhancing methods for critical incident stress management.

Additional Training and Development Initiatives During 2006

DSS developed and started to train Resident Coordinator Training Programmes to further develop Resident Coordinators in their duties and responsibilities. In conjunction with these programmes, training was also provided to Security Management Teams in the field. This training not only included security and safety subject matter, but was also designed to inform field staff about the conditions under which they would be working and living; in particular raising their cultural awareness of the country in which they were located.

A three-week induction training programme for Chief Security Advisers (CSA) was conducted in January 2006 with 16 newly appointed CSAs. This training included a wide range of operational security, briefings on agency and departmental mandates and

security coordination. In addition, four three-week induction training programmes were conducted for newly appointed Field Security Officers (FSCOs) and Security Advisors (SAs). In all, this resulted in over 80 FSCO/SAs successfully achieving the training during 2006. This training included learning the knowledge and skills to provide essential security support to the Designated Official, Security Management Team and UN personnel at the assigned duty station.

On 16 – 20th October an Advanced Hostage Incident Management Course is being run in New York, for UN staff members who have already attended Hostage Incident Management training. This training was deemed critical for UN Security staff members working in high incident hostage-taking countries.

The “Advanced Security in the Field” CD-Rom was developed during 2006 to follow on to the “Security in the Field” CD-Rom. This has been deemed, by the Secretary General to be mandatory for all personnel working in or travelling to travel to security and safety

risk areas (Security Phase I or above). It was released on 9th October 2006 in the six official UN languages. The United Nations Intranet “i-see”, posted a story on the 11th October, which stated how the course had been designed to:



The USG for DSS, Mr. David Venes, presented a copy of the course to Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Educate UN personnel on how best to avoid or minimize potential threats and risks, and

indicate what they can do if they find themselves faced with conditions of insecurity. This programme directly addresses the imperative of enabling the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities, while helping to ensure the safety and security of staff as a high priority. (i-see article, October 2006)

Conclusion

“The terrorists who attacked the United States on Sept 11, aimed at one nation but wounded an entire world.”

Kofi Annan, reported by The New York Times, 21st September 2001.

At the time of the World Trade Centre attack on 9/11, security and safety services for the UN were provided by way of four separate UN entities: 1) the Office of the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD); 2) the various Security and Safety Service (SSS) organizations based in New York, Vienna, Geneva, the Regional Commissions and the International Tribunals; 3) the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) security section; and 4) the UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes own security sections. All of these entities managed their operations separately from one another.

Each of the UN SSS organizations provided security and safety protection for UN headquarters staff members and for the UN premises and resources in each of their locations. This was sometimes provided by uniformed UN staff members and sometimes by contractors to the UN.

After the 9/11 attack, the Secretary General recommended that short-term security measures be installed to strengthen the security and safety of the United Nations and its staff members. This was approved by the General Assembly (GA). The GA also improved the Secretary General’s further request for additional long-term security measures to be installed.

In August 2003, the UN security management system was evaluated; the findings of the evaluation, plus the findings of the comprehensive investigation into the attack on the Canal Hotel, Baghdad of the same year, were combined together. These combined results all identified the same core weaknesses in the overall United Nations security management system: that of insufficient resources; inefficient

centralized control of those resources; security responsibility spread out over diverse and uncoordinated structures; an increased security workload without a corresponding increase in resources resulting in an understaffing of all security elements; deficient security risk assessment capability; insufficient training capacity and lack of career development of security officers. In addition, the conclusions of the reports showed that whilst the functions of the SSS organizations at the UN headquarters around the world were alike, the Standard Operating Procedures, measures for recruitment and development, performance standards and so on, had evolved to be quite dissimilar in each location.

The findings of the reports also showed that whilst the SSS organizations had set up the United Nations Security and Safety Services Network (UNSSNet) to harmonize operational standards; there was still a distinct operational disparity between the locations.

The overall findings of the reports therefore resulted in the major project of the overall strengthening of the security and safety of UN operations, staff and premises. This project entailed the amalgamating of the four UN security entities - the Office of UNSECOORD, the various SSS organizations and the security component of DPKO into one organizational structure known as the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). DSS was therefore established on 1st January 2005.

This thesis has discussed the project and the additional factors that the UN faces in regards to meeting both its short-term and long-term security needs. The global security environment has become more threatening; UN duty stations and missions around the world must now be alert to appropriate security measures, and to additionally future-proof themselves.

The UN has to think strategically about what its staff members expect and want, and also work in conjunction with what the General Assembly expects and wants regarding security and safety. In addition, there is always the issue of what the different host countries (who have overall responsibility of the safety and security of the UN

staff members working in their countries) are insisting for present, short-term and for long-term security measures. To assist in dealing with this particular issue the USG of DSS, Sir David Veness, has increased his communication with Host Country Authorities in order to improve the lines of communication and better ensure the necessary support.

This thesis has also given a brief overview of the now routine security measures that are being employed overall by the UN, as well as some of the security measures in use in specific UN headquarters and/or missions.

As the threats against the UN have become more complex and lethal and now necessitate the requirement for a more professional security management system that can respond flexibly, based on continuous quality analysis. This in turn requires well-trained staffing and technical guidance. For the UN to achieve its goals in many part of the world, a robust security system is necessary. Unfortunately, if the security provided is not robust enough, the UN may have to choose between either discontinuing its work, in that area, or else allowing its staff to operate under levels of intolerable risk and threat, which of course would not be acceptable.

Therefore, as DSS moves from the embryonic to the developmental phase, its focus needs to be on operational effectiveness, to ensure that it is doing all it can to *"enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority"* (K. Annan, A/58/365). Whilst this will be managed from the UN Headquarters, it is the end result, in the field that is the most visible. Whilst we are unable to predict what risks, such as floods, earthquakes and global pandemics lie ahead over the next few years; neither can we predict how international terrorism may evolve; we can however do what we are able to mitigate them through a better understanding of emerging threats.

DSS needs to now ensure that it is indeed able to better support the UN's required activities in countries around the world, by standardizing security and safety functions to offer the same high-quality security service no matter where the location. This would include superior risk and threat assessments for monitoring the security environment and recommending a course of action for managing potential security occurrences, ensuring compliance with Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS), training staff to be capable to offer timely responses to emergencies, and having standardized policies and procedures and being able to offer additional security support, such as personal protection, when necessary.

There is now a specific UN agency to conduct threat and risk assessments for UN personnel, a section to develop and encourage consistently high standard of policies; a compliance facility to assist in ensuring that these policies are being maintained. For the recommended development, training and career management there is now a Training and Development Section, including a Training Standardisation facility and five Mobile Training teams.

Finally, for UN security to be truly effective, the responsible factions should employ a series of combined security measures that work in affiliation with one another and together form an overall deterrent – both proactive (such as risk and threat assessments) and reactive (such as a comprehensive crisis management system). The potentially positive development of a “one stop shop” for security, with the establishment of DSS, whilst still in its’ developmental stage, will assist in better managing a security and safety system that is able to more quickly evolve in response to the changing environment it finds itself in and respond to the various security and safety predicaments of the UN. This combined with the reaction of the UN Security Council to oppose and prevent terrorism after 9/11, a perfect example of global criminal justice-making, now handled through the Counter Terrorism Committee.

Whilst security for many UN staff members has deteriorated, there is no doubt that the enhancements to the United Nations Security

Management System undertaken by the General Assembly since 2001 have played a major role in saving UN staff members' lives. Moreover, it is evident that enhanced risk assessment skills, ongoing security training and improved adherence to MOSS have instilled a greater confidence and capacity to operate safely in areas of higher risk.

The UN, through DSS, is now moving forward and making productive steps in developing the quality and capitalizing on opportunities in its security management. This in turn will improve the UN's ability to accomplish its activities effectively whilst better guaranteeing the safety and security of its staff carrying out its role around the world.

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Annex A

A Basic Overview of The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) was established in San Francisco on 24th October 1945 by 51 countries. The current membership, in February 2006, stands at a total of 191 countries. (<http://www.un.org/members/index.html>)

The UN Charter is the founding instrument of the United Nations. It states the rights and obligations of Member States, and explains the Organization's organs and procedures. (Basic Facts About the United Nations, United Nations Publication.P3) (<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>)

The United Nations has six main organs:

1. The General Assembly

- All UN Member States are represented in the General Assembly which meets to consider the world's most pressing problems. Each member has one vote. Decisions on key issues are decided by two thirds majority; other matters by simple majority.
- Meets for its regular annual session from September to December. It may resume its session or hold a special or emergency session on subjects of particular concern. When not meeting, its work is carried out by its six main committees, other subsidiary bodies and the UN Secretariat.
(Basic Facts About the United Nations, United Nations Publication. December 2003. P6 and <http://www.un.org/ga/59/>)

2. The Security Council

- Primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It may convene at any time, whenever peace is threatened. It is made up of 15 members, 5 permanent members and 10 are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Decisions require 9 "yes" votes. Except for votes on procedural matters, a decision cannot be taken if there is a no vote or veto by a permanent member.
- Under the UN Charter, all Member States are obligated to carry out the Council's decisions. Makes recommendations to the General Assembly on the appointment of a new Secretary-General and on admission of new members.
(Basic Facts About the United Nations, United Nations Publication. December 2003. P68 and <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>)

3. The Economic and Social Council

- Has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. Five regional commissions promote economic development and cooperation in their respective regions.
- Coordinates the economic and social work of the UN and the UN family of organizations. Meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July. Its subsidiary bodies meet regularly and report back to it.
(Basic Facts About the United Nations, United Nations Publication. December 2003. P139 and <http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/>)

5. The UN Secretariat

- Carries out the substantive and administrative work of the UN as directed by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the other organs. It is headed by the Secretary-General who provides overall administrative guidance.
- Consists of departments and offices with a total staff of some 7,500, from some 170 countries, under the regular budget and about an equal number under special funding.
- Duty stations include the UN Headquarters in New York, and offices in Geneva which also include the Economic Commission for Europe, Vienna, Nairobi and the Economic Commissions in Beirut, Addis Ababa, Santiago and Bangkok.
(Basic Facts About the United Nations, United Nations Publication. December 2003. P14 and <http://www.un.org/documents/st.htm>)


The UN System

1. Specialized agencies:

- Autonomous bodies created by intergovernmental agreements, who have cooperative agreements with the United Nations. They include bodies such as the World Bank, WHO, ILO, ICAO, etc.
(<http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/unagencies.html>)

2. UN Programmes and Funds:

- Made up of such organizations as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), etc. They report to the GA or the Economic and Social Council. These organizations have their own governing bodies, budgets and secretariats. Together with the United Nations, they are known as the UN Family or the UN System.
(<http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/unagencies.html>)



Annex B

United Nations Treaty Collection

Conventions on Terrorism

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973

Adopted by the General Assembly in 1973; 107 States parties

This treaty outlaws attacks on State officials and representatives. It: * defines an internationally protected person as a Head of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representative or official of a State or an international organization who is entitled to special protection from attack under international law;

* requires each party to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties, which take into account their grave nature": the intentional murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person; a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an accomplice".

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979

Adopted by the General Assembly in 1979; 96 States parties

Known as the "Hostages Convention", this treaty combats the unlawful taking of hostages. It:

* provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages within the meaning of this Convention".

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997

Adopted by the General Assembly in 1997; 26 States parties

This treaty seeks to deny "safe havens" to persons wanted for terrorist bombings. It:

* creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or to cause extensive destruction of a public place.

* obligates States parties to prosecute such terrorists if it does not extradite them to another State that has issued an extradition request.

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999

Adopted by the General Assembly in 1999; 4 States parties; will enter into force when ratified by 22 States

This treaty obligates States parties either to prosecute or extradite persons accused of funding terrorist activities, and requires banks to enact measures to identify suspicious transactions. It:

- * requires States parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether directly or indirectly, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gunrunning;
 - * commits States parties to hold those who finance terrorism liable-criminally, civilly or administratively-for such acts;
 - * provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy will no longer be a justification for refusing to cooperate.
-

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS DEPOSITED WITH OTHER DEPOSITARIES

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization)*

Developed by ICAO and adopted in Tokyo in 1963; 171 States parties as of 17 September 2001

Known as the "Tokyo Convention", this treaty applies to acts affecting in-flight safety. It:

- * authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, which are necessary, to protect the safety of the aircraft;
- * requires contracting States to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970. *(Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America)*

Developed by ICAO and adopted in The Hague in 1970; 174 States parties

Known as the "Hague Convention", this treaty combats aircraft hijackings. It:

- * makes it an offence for any person who board an aircraft in flight, "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation, seizes or exercises control of that aircraft", or attempts to do so;
- * requires parties to the Convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties";
- * requires parties that have custody of an alleged offender to either extradite him or submit the case for prosecution;
- * requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the Convention.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971. *(Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America)*

Developed by ICAO and adopted in Montreal in 1971; 175 States parties

Known as the "Montreal Convention", this treaty applies to acts of aviation sabotage, such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight. It:

- * makes it an offence for any person, unlawfully and intentionally: to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; and to attempt such acts or be an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;
- * requires parties to the Convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties";
- * requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on 3 March 1980. *(Deposited with the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency)*

Developed by IAEA and adopted in Vienna in 1980; 68 States parties

Known as the "Nuclear Materials Convention", this treaty combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material. It:

* criminalizes the unlawful possession, use and transfer of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage.

Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988. *(Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization)*

Adopted in Montreal in 1988; 107 States parties:

This protocol extends and supplements the provisions of the Montreal Convention to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization)*

Developed by IMO and adopted in Rome in 1988; 52 States parties

This treaty applies to terrorist activities on ships. It:
* establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation;

* makes it an offence for a person to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat or intimidation; to perform an act of violence on board a ship that endangers the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships.

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization)*

Adopted in Rome in 1988; 48 States parties

This protocol extends the Rome Convention on maritime navigation and applies to terrorist activities on fixed offshore platforms. It:

* establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established for international aviation.

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization)*

Developed by ICAO and adopted in Montreal in 1991; 67 States parties

This treaty provides for chemical marking to facilitate detection of plastic explosives to combat aircraft sabotage. It obligates States parties to:

- * take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture and use of unmarked plastic explosives and prevent their movement into or out of their respective territories;
- * exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry-into-force of the Convention;
- * ensure that all stocks of such unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within three years;
- * ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police, are destroyed or consumed, marked or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years;
- * ensure the destruction as soon as possible of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date of entry into force of the Convention for that State.

REGIONAL CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM

Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed at a meeting held at the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 22 April 1998. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States)*

Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, adopted at Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference)*

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, concluded at Strasbourg on 27 January 1977. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe)*

OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, concluded at Washington, D.C. on 2 February 1971. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States)*

OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted at Algiers on 14 July 1999. *(Deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity)*

SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, signed at Kathmandu on 4 November 1987. *(Deposited with the Secretary-General of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)*

Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, done at Minsk on 4 June 1999. *(Deposited with the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States)*

Excerpts taken from the United Nations Chronicle, Volume XXXVIII, Number 3, 2001. Department of Public Information

Annex C

Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO security collaboration Office of the U.N. Security Coordinator 14 February 2002

INTRODUCTION

As the organizations of the United Nations are increasingly working closely with Inter- and Non-Governmental Organization in hostile environments, there is a need to provide a framework for security collaboration. The Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration provide Designated Officials, Security Management Teams and Security Focal Points with practical options for enabling and maintaining security collaboration with NGO/IGOs.

UNSECOORD Guideline on UN/NGO Security Collaboration

The Designated Official (DO) shall undertake every effort to create and maintain an environment conducive to inter-Agency Security collaboration. The following guidelines provide a number of practical means of achieving this objective, some or all of which may be applicable to the particular circumstances of the duty station or area of operation. The DO, in consultation with the Security Management Team, must determine the most appropriate options. As the guidelines are the result of extensive consultation including NGOs, some of the guidelines describe actions to be undertaken voluntarily by non-UN bodies.

A. Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team

1. That IGOs, NGOs, and the Red Cross Movement may participate in the UN Security Management Team (SMT) on an ex officio, representative basis;
2. That, where appropriate, the DO should coordinate security decisions with non-UN humanitarian actors.
3. That IGO/NGO partners to UN organizations in specific humanitarian operations select among themselves one or a limited number of field security focal points

B. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration

That fora for practical security collaboration among all humanitarian actors at area, country and sub-office level be convened, at regular intervals, in order to address practical security issues of common concern. The fora may include the following regular participants: DO/FSO/Area Security Coordinator or other DO Designee; members of the SMT as appropriate; NGO field security focal point(s); representatives of IGOs; representatives of the Red Cross Movement.

C. Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals

That the CAPs include a project to cover the additional resources potentially required by enhanced collaboration on staff security by UN Agencies and NGO/IGOs, such as telecommunications and security training.

D. Meeting common, security-related needs

That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners, committed to security collaboration in each specific humanitarian operation participate, to the extent feasible, in meeting the uncovered, security-related needs of the humanitarian community, including costs, according to the scope of their respective involvement.

E. Sharing resources

That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners cooperating in humanitarian field operations develop a local inventory for the sharing of their specialized, security-related human and material resources.

F. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication

That telecommunication among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at field level be facilitated by:

1. The DO advocating with the relevant authorities for the use of telecommunication equipment within the framework of existing international agreements;
2. The relevant UN body negotiating with the authorities a common frequency for security collaboration for UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners operating in the same area;

G. Collaborating and consulting in security training

That all UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners at HQ and at field level:

1. Carry out security training in collaboration and/or consultation with other agencies to the extent possible;
2. Seek to increase their capacity for security training at all levels.

H. Sharing information

That security-related information is shared among UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners while respecting the humanitarian character of the participants as well as the confidentiality required when dealing with sensitive information.

I. Identifying minimum security standards

That UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners jointly identify and agree how to apply minimum security standards adapted to local circumstances. In so doing, humanitarian actors will take into consideration already existing standards, for example the UN M.O.S.S. (minimum operational security standards) that are binding for the members of the UN system.

J. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules

That the security collaboration of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in specific field operations, to the extent possible, rest on respect for common, locally developed ground-rules for humanitarian action

Annex D

Survey on the Implementation of the Guidelines for UN/NGO/IGO Security Collaboration

IASC Security Task Force, December 2004

Implementing the Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration

Where does the humanitarian community stand?

This survey is being distributed to members of the humanitarian community in an attempt to get a better understanding of the extent to which the Guidelines are being used, what approaches to its implementations have worked, and which have not. While we appreciate ANY time you may have to complete this survey, your thoughtful and reflective answers are greatly appreciated **prior to close of business Friday, December 17th, 2004.**

1. Are you aware of the *Guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO Security Collaboration*? If your response to this question is NO, we encourage you to respond to question number two below for any collaborative actions taken within the humanitarian community to address security.
2. Below are the ten guidelines for UN / NGO / IGO collaboration. Please take a moment to comment on the extent to which options (detailed on the attached [Guidelines \[Menu of Options\]](#)) for each of the Guidelines below has been considered and/or implemented at your current or past field posting. *Your comments on what has worked and what has not worked when implementing the Guidelines are very important to us and will be shared with the entire community, without individual attribution, once compiled.*
 - a. Enhancing collaboration in the UN Security Management Team:
 - b. Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration: Including staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals:
 - c. Meeting common, security-related needs: Sharing resources:
 - d. Facilitating inter-agency telecommunications:
 - e. Collaborating and consulting in security training:
 - f. Sharing information:
 - g. Identifying minimum security standards:
 - h. Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules:

Best practice in Security Management: As part of its effort to promote effective security collaboration, the IASC Working Group is particularly interested in fostering efforts which promote a common understanding of the situation and the factors that affect security as well as common efforts to promote acceptance of humanitarian action and the security of humanitarian actors.

3. Has the humanitarian community undertaken collective efforts to develop a common understanding of the situation in terms of the political and security context, humanitarian needs, local communities/ power structures and national/ local perceptions of humanitarian actors and their work? If so, what particular approaches and methods have been utilized to do so?
-

Annex E

Marti Ahtisaari's Panel's Executive Summary

1. In the view of the Panel, the UN security management system failed in its mission to provide adequate security to UN staff in Iraq. The failure of UN management and staff to comply with standard security regulations and directives left the UN open and vulnerable to the type of attack that was perpetrated on 19 August 2003. In particular, the UN security system failed adequately to analyse and utilize information made available to the system on threats against UN staff and premises. The security awareness within the country team did not match the hostile environment. The observance and implementation of security regulations and procedures were sloppy and non-compliance with security rules commonplace. Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to prevent the attack against the Canal Hotel perimeter, but would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of casualties caused by the attack.

2. The main conclusion of the Panel is that the current security management system is dysfunctional. It provides little guarantee of security to UN staff in Iraq or other high-risk environments and needs to be reformed. The challenge of security of UN staff in crisis zones in the current world requires the highest level of professionalism and expertise from the security management. The current system is not able to provide this expertise. The new system should have a clear chain of command, an audit trail, extensive information management capabilities and clear division of labour and coordination. Adequate financial resources for the UN security management to act in a timely and effective manner should be available.

3. A major deficiency identified by the Panel is the lack of accountability for the decisions and positions taken by UN managers with regard to the security of UN staff. The United Nations needs a new culture of accountability in security management. Personal accountability of those entrusted with the safety of personnel as well as all staff in the field for their compliance with security rules should be paramount. In the case of Iraq, the Panel is of the view that the seriousness of the breaches in the UN security rules and procedures in the field and at Headquarters warrants a separate and independent audit process.

4. There is no place without risk in Iraq. A new security approach is needed in order to ensure staff security in such a high-risk environment. The key objective for the UN system in these circumstances is to reach and maintain an acceptable balance between UN operational objectives in Iraq and the security and protection of its staff and assets, both national and international. Before the decision to resume the activities in Iraq is made, a thorough and professional security assessment should be undertaken in order to determine whether the return of international staff is possible and, if so, under what kind of security arrangements. These arrangements should be set in place prior to the return of UN staff.

Annex F

Distribution of field-related jointly financed resource requirements for the Department of Safety and Security for the biennium 2006-2007^a

<i>Organization</i>	<i>New number of staff (revised^b Census 2003, including 25 per cent of staff on mission)</i>	<i>New percentage of staff</i>	<i>Distribution of 2006-2007 indicative field-related security costs based on adopted cost-sharing formula</i>	<i>Effective percentage share of costs</i>
Asian Development Bank	101	0.14	240 318	0.14
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	78	0.11	185 592	0.11
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2 693	3.79	6 407 678	3.79
International Atomic Energy Agency	40	0.06	95 175	0.06
International Civil Aviation Organization	198	0.28	471 118	0.28
International Fund for Agricultural Development	0	0.00	75 000	0.04
International Labour Organization	1 562	2.20	3 716 596	2.20
International Monetary Fund	315	0.44	749 506	0.44
International Maritime Organization	51	0.07	121 349	0.07
International Organization for Migration	1 966	2.77	4 677 866	2.77
International Trade Centre	21	0.03	75 000	0.04
International Telecommunication Union	64	0.09	152 280	0.09
Pan American Health Organization	328	0.46	780 438	0.46
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS	133	0.19	316 458	0.19
United Nations Development Programme	11 010	15.51	26 197 003	15.49
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	1 505	2.12	3 580 971	2.12
United Nations Population Fund	1 331	1.88	3 166 958	1.87
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4 513	6.36	10 738 154	6.35
United Nations Children's Fund	7 429	10.47	17 676 434	10.45
United Nations Industrial Development Organization	125	0.18	297 423	0.18
United Nations Office for Project Services	932	1.31	2 217 585	1.31

<i>Organization</i>	<i>New number of staff (revised^b Census 2003, including 25 per cent of staff on mission)</i>	<i>New percentage of staff</i>	<i>Distribution of 2006-2007 indicative field-related security costs based on adopted cost-sharing formula</i>	<i>Effective percentage share of costs</i>
United Nations University	42	0.06	99 934	0.06
United Nations Volunteers	462	0.65	1 099 275	0.65
Universal Postal Union	7	0.01	75 000	0.04
World Food Programme ^c	9 230	13.01	21 961 702	12.99
World Health Organization	6 301	8.88	14 992 490	8.86
World Intellectual Property Organization	0	0.00	75 000	0.04
World Meteorological Organization	18	0.03	75 000	0.04
World Bank	4 347	6.13	10 343 177	6.12
United Nations total^d	16 165	22.78	38 462 721	22.74
Total	70 967	100.00	169 123 200	100.0

^a As per CEB/2005/HLCM/R.14, annex IV (actual percentage of staff as per revised Census of 18 July 2003; minimum contribution of \$75,000; indicative 2006-2007 costs, excluding Malicious Acts Insurance costs).

^b As of 20 September 2005, all organizations except IOM, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UNHCR, UNICEF, UNV, WFP and the World Bank had confirmed or corrected originally submitted Census 2003 staff figures.


^c WFP provided revised field staff figures on 26 October 2005.

^d United Nations total includes peacekeeping, United Nations Environment Programme and 697 UNRWA staff reported in the original Census 2003 exercise.

A/61/223 5th August 2006

Annex G

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