Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
HE MOANA PUKEPUKE E EKENGIA E TE WAKA

PERSEVERING WITH CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

IN AOTEAROA

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

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Abstract

This thesis examines citizenship education in Aotearoa New Zealand. In particular, it reviews what education there is in the New Zealand curriculum about Aotearoa’s democratic arrangements, including the provisions for the political voices of Māori. Recent political debate suggested the reform of these provisions through a citizens-initiated referendum. This thesis sought to identify what formal education is provided to citizens to inform their response in such a referendum. Critical discourse analysis and a content analysis method were utilised to analyse data. A review of the social studies curriculum revealed some citizenship education material in education, but a distinct neglect of issues about the Māori-Pākehā relationship as they relate to Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy. For example, there is an absence of material about the Māori Electoral Option. This thesis contributes to the calls for the strengthening of citizenship education in Aotearoa. It does so by affirming the benefits of such education to Aotearoa’s democracy, through the empowerment of citizens to engage in democratic society. Such a citizenship education is posed through the concepts of presence, freedom, and critical consciousness from a Māori world-view (Te Ao Mārama).
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the important contributions made to this thesis by my academic supervisors, Professor Arohia Durie and Dr. Christine Cheyne, my friends, especially Miss Te Rina Warren, Miss Ani Gray and Miss Carol Osborne, and my mother, Mrs Pamela Tawhai.

No reira, tēnā koutou, tēnā tātou katoa.
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Citizenship education in Aotearoa New Zealand in the past has been the focus of much negative assessment. One criticism is that the primary and secondary school curriculum is silent on issues about race relations and indigenous political rights. Past analysis attributes this silence to the controversial nature of these issues. Recently, public, academic and government-led discussion has called for the strengthening of citizenship education in Aotearoa. However, heightened controversy over race relation issues preceding the 2005 General Election had widespread effects on government policy. This included the further silencing of these issues in the new draft curriculum for schools.

This thesis explores citizenship education in Aotearoa. In particular, it examines what education the curriculum imparts to citizens about the provisions for the political voices of Aotearoa’s indigenous people. It affirms the role of citizenship education in facilitating dialogue amongst citizens about these issues. It affirms the benefits the understandings born from such dialogue would have for race relations and the health of Aotearoa’s democracy.

Chapter One outlines the research. It introduces the contexts in which the research problem formed, followed by the research questions, key concepts, and the thesis structure.

1.1 THE TURBULENT WATERS OF AOTEAROA
The research topic formed in the interweaving of three threads. Each thread is a context contributing to the research question. Kāwanatanga refers to issues about the state. Mārautanga is the location of this research and past research on the curriculum. Te Ara

1 A rough sea can be navigated. The message is to persevere.
depicts the solutions suggested to address the research question, which this thesis hopes to build on.

**Kāwanatanga: the State**

In 2004 the Minister of Race Relations Hon. Trevor Mallard proclaimed Pākehā, or New Zealanders of European descent, as indigenous. His speech, about race relations in Aotearoa, was titled “We are all New Zealanders now” (Mallard, 2004). In Aotearoa, sentiments of unity have long alluded to homogeneity (sameness). At the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 a unity was agreed to based on a partnership between representatives of the British Crown and the indigenous people, hapū and iwi Māori. Expressions of unity appeared through the words “He iwi kotahi tātou”, meaning “We are now one people” (see Orange, 1987, p. 55). The Treaty signalled the potential for the ensuing “bi-political state” (see Durie, 2004, pp. 1-4); where the political authority of Māori and Pākehā would co-exist. Under the auspices of this unity, however, the Crown employed its political right of kāwanatanga (to govern) to pursue a Crown-dictated homogeneity of the partners, hegemony. While Maori desires for autonomy and cultural well-being have prevailed (Durie, 2002), a distinction has remained in the political status of the partners. Current counter-claims to the distinctive status of Māori as the indigenous political partner reflect new and further attempts by the Crown at homogeneity. As a result, the goals of the Crown and those of Māori are “diametrically opposed” (ibid, p. 8). This reflects an ongoing conflict in Aotearoa’s race relations.

In a practical sense, the appeal for unity through homogeneity suggests much for our democratic arrangements. During the 2005 election there was a focus upon the provisions for the indigenous political voice. This included the case to abolish the Māori parliamentary seats, which one major political party promised to do if elected to government (Brash, 2005). There has been subsequent and widespread discussion in the political arena that such a decision should only be made by a citizens-initiated referendum. This thesis identifies what formal education is provided to citizens to inform their response in such a referendum.

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2 For example, see Leaders Debate TVONE 8/9/05 [http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0509/S00119.htm](http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0509/S00119.htm).

3 A referendum is a specific question put to electors. A Citizens Initiated Referendum (CIR) is done as a result of a successful petition (signed by 10% of all enrolled electors) to parliament to hold the referendum. The results are not binding on parliament. See New Zealand Electoral Commission, 2005. Referendum. [http://www.elections.org.nz/voting/referendums.html](http://www.elections.org.nz/voting/referendums.html).
Mārautanga: The Curriculum

In 1992 Judith Simon examined what education was provided to New Zealand school children about Māori and Pākehā race relations. Her findings revealed a neglect of these issues in education. Roger Openshaw (1996) added to this by arguing that the curriculum was ill-prepared to educate school children about the Treaty of Waitangi, race relations, equity and social relationships. Simon’s (1992) concern about the curriculum was:

The New Zealand school curriculum represents one of the means by which ‘social amnesia’ is cultivated in New Zealand. (p. 254)

Recent evaluations of the curriculum claim the situation remains unchanged. Openshaw (2004), for example, claims reinforcement over the last decade of what he considered in 1996 “existing tendencies towards the creation of a passive citizenry” (p. 1). In addition, Openshaw (2004) alleges that the continued neglect of these issues in education is due to the controversy they embody. As stated earlier, the intensity of these issues increased in the lead up to the 2005 General Election. Subsequently, there is concern over the recent release of the draft curriculum and the further withdrawal of these issues in education. This research furthers such analysis by examining the current curriculum and the recently released draft curriculum. It addresses the issue of controversy as integral to paving a way forward for citizenship education in Aotearoa.

Te Ara: A Way Forward


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⁴ For example, see Mazza, 2005, p. 3 concerning the Council of Europe declaration of 2005 as Year of Citizenship through Education.
As emphasized in the *Maastricht Global Education Declaration* (2002, p. 3),
democratic decision-making cannot occur unless dialogue is engaged in by “informed
and empowered citizens”. An essential role of education is therefore to produce an
informed and empowered citizenry. Only informed citizens are empowered to engage
democratically. Understanding their democratic context is the basis upon which
citizens can do so. In democracies adhering to majority-rule, understanding by the
numerically dominant of the minority is necessary. In nations founded on treaties,
understanding by all citizens of the treaty terms is necessary. In Aotearoa, this requires
understanding by all New Zealanders about the guarantees for the continued self-
determination and authority of Māori, and the subsequent bi-political nature of
Aotearoa’s democracy. It is essential that citizens of Aotearoa be provided with an
education that enables them to form such understandings, and further debate them.
Those understandings will be the basis upon which they can engage as empowered
citizens in democratic society. This thesis contributes to the current calls for the
strengthening of citizenship education, by conveying the benefits of such education to
positive race relations and the health of Aotearoa’s democracy.

1.2 THE RESEARCH

Particular to this research was the methodology employed, the research questions, the
key concepts shaping the research focus, and the research limitations.

Methodology

Māori centred (Durie, et al., 1995), Kaupapa Māori (Smith, 1999), and Ngākau Māori
(Durie, 2002) research methodologies emanate an agenda of rangatiratanga, or Māori
self-determination\(^5\). It implies research for the purposes of Māori development, based
on Māori thought and values (Durie, 2002). Linda Smith (1999) argues when a research
has an agenda of self-determination:

\[\ldots\text{it becomes a goal of social justice}\ldots\text{the processes of transformation, of}
decolonization, of healing and of mobilization as peoples. (p. 116)\]

\(^5\) Rangatiratanga has been translated in various ways. For the purpose of this thesis it will refer to Māori
self-determination, or the right of Māori to self-determined development from the basis of tikanga
Māori (Māori ways of doing things based on Māori values) and Māori aspirations.
This thesis is shaped by such a goal. It calls for a revitalised approach to citizenship education to transform race relations in Aotearoa. It sees improving race relations as a cycle of healing in which citizenship education can be a driver. Improvements come when greater understandings about the nature of unity, beyond homogeneity, are formed. Improvements are furthered when citizens are mobilised to rearrange their democratic structures to reflect those understandings. This is the social justice citizenship education provides. Citizens of Aotearoa will enjoy greater social justice when our democracy reflects a greater understanding of our relationships. Citizenship education in Aotearoa must impart citizens the tools to form understandings, and enlist their creativity and zeal to the task of replicating them in our democracy.

The research questions
The research poses the question: what education does the New Zealand curriculum provide about the nature of New Zealand’s bi-political democracy? The Māori Electoral Option was chosen as an example topic to investigate what citizenship education is imparted to citizens about this democratic context. This led to several secondary questions:

► How does the Māori Electoral Option give substance to Aotearoa as a bi-political state?
► What is the history of the Option?
► What are the debates about the Option?
► What is the role of citizenship education in the curriculum in facilitating understanding about elements of this debate?
► Is the curriculum fulfilling this role?

These questions framed the research process, and the format to present of the research findings. An initial literature review explored how the arrangements for political power-sharing have evolved in the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. The current Curriculum Framework, the Social Studies Curriculum Statement, it’s achievement objectives and units, and the Draft Curriculum Framework were reviewed, focusing upon what presence the topic has in the curriculum. Working within an agenda of rangatiratanga, critical discourse analysis was employed to do this.
Key Concepts

Five concepts essential in the shaping of the research focus were ‘indigenous’, ‘political participation’, ‘democratic arrangements’, ‘bi-political democracy’, and ‘citizenship education’. The definition of indigenous used in this research is that referred to by the United Nations. The United Nations acknowledges Article 1 of the 1989 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169, and refers to the working definition given by the Special Rapporteur Jose R. Martinez Cobo (1986):

379. Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories. . . and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity. (para. 379–382)

In the context of Aotearoa, ‘indigenous’ is expressed through the term ‘tangata whenua’ (people from the land), otherwise referred to herein as hapū and iwi Māori.

This research acknowledges the various ways Māori participate politically. It acknowledges as political participation Māori involvement in traditional cultural systems (whānau, hapū, iwi, rūnanga), non-voting, protest action, hui, submissions and voting. The particular focus of political participation in this thesis is upon the provisions for the political voices of Māori within New Zealand’s democratic arrangements, such as the Māori parliamentary seats.

The term ‘democratic arrangements’ is used in this thesis to refer to the state and it’s structures, such as parliament, government, the executive and public service. It embodies what has been established by the Crown in the right of kāwanatanga. It is referred to this way to emphasise certain aspects of the state. First, citizens arranged,

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6 In most instances the United Nations does not consider a definition necessary, but for practical purposes refers to the following material.
8 Special Rapporteur of the Sub–Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
established, and continue to maintain these structures and systems. Second, citizens can rearrange them. This thesis explores the education provided to citizens about those arrangements and their ability to maintain or change them.

There are many types of democracy used to describe a political system of rule representative of citizens (Heywood, 2002). The term ‘pluralist democracy’ is used to describe a system where different groups are able to articulate their interests and ensure a level of government responsiveness (ibid). The term “bi-political democracy” (Durie, 2004, pp. 1–4) is used in this thesis to refer to the form of democracy in Aotearoa resulting from the provision of both General electorate and Māori electorate parliamentary, and in some instances local government, seats. The term reflects the bi-political state provided through the Treaty of Waitangi, where it was agreed the political authority of Māori, rangatiratanga, and the political authority of Pākehā, kāwanatanga, would co-exist.

Citizenship education in this thesis refers to education about the matters of citizenship. Ruth Lister (1997) defines citizenship as both the status of being a citizen, involving a range of rights, and the practice of being a citizen, involving obligations and participation in democratic society. Citizenship education therefore would provide learners with education about their rights, obligations and participation in their democracy. There are and have been many non-government run citizenship education programmes in Aotearoa, for example Project Waitangi and Te Pumaomao. This thesis also acknowledges many forms of citizenship education, for example, theatrical plays in the 1980s were a popular medium to educate the wider public about Maori and Pākehā race relations issues (Walker, 1996). This thesis argues that these initiatives largely emerged from the failure of the education system to provide citizens with a critical understanding on these matters. The particular focus of this thesis is on the formal citizenship education provided to citizens at compulsory-level schooling in New Zealand (Year 1 to Year 13).

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10 A two day course examining Treaty of Waitangi issues, with a focus on the cultural safety and awareness of course participants. See Murphy, 2004.

Limitations
There are limitations to this research. They relate to the research focus. First, it could be argued the focus of this research is contradictory to rangatiratanga as it concentrates on kāwanatanga. However, indigenous peoples have had little choice but to pursue their well-being through the state’s framework (Maaka and Fleras, 2005; Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999). Improved race relations can be measured when an equitable level of political power is afforded to Māori in that framework, to realise self-determination. This thesis stems from rangatiratanga in that it focuses upon how education can help citizens of Aotearoa achieve such a relationship.

Second, due to size restrictions, there are issues that were not explored in depth. Issues for further consideration are the origins of the concept of citizenship and of citizenship education. Also for further investigation are how these concepts have evolved globally, and how they relate to the experiences and priorities of indigenous peoples. What this research does explore is how citizenship has evolved for Māori through the Treaty partnership, and how education can be used to improve the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

Third, the focus upon the social studies curriculum achievement objectives and units may have limited the study. In particular, the units provided by the Ministry of Education are to support, not entirely constitute, the delivery of the social studies curriculum. Teachers are able and expected to amend the units to better suit the needs of their students, and to further develop their own. The units therefore are not intended as the ‘be all and end all’ for delivery of the social studies curriculum. What this thesis argues, however, is that the Statement’s objectives and units are the primary directives for teachers in the delivery of that curriculum. In particular, units are the ‘examples’ for social studies education. They therefore are an important point of review and development.

1.3 THE THESIS STRUCTURE
Following this chapter, chapter two reviews literature on the democratic arrangements that have evolved in the Maori-Pākehā relationship. Research on how the relationship was formed, and subsequently evolved, illustrate how the arrangements for Māori-Pākehā power-sharing are still to be fully realised. The multiple pathways pursued by Māori in response to this convey a continued commitment of Māori to the relationship
terms. A review of the current suggestions for citizenship education in Aotearoa highlights new opportunities within which the arrangements for this relationship can be understood and debated.

Chapter three describes the theory drawn upon in this research. It examines theories about indigeneity in Aotearoa, which challenge who is indigenous and the rights to self-determination indigeneity affords. Developing trends in Aotearoa’s schools reveal the tensions this debate causes in education. An examination of domesticating education concepts to produce the ‘good’ citizen, and notions of liberating education to engage citizens in the practice of freedom, presents a dichotomy in citizenship education models. Models of liberating education embody concepts such as critical consciousness, which are present in Māori world-views. An education that honours Māori self-determination therefore would uphold learners’ rights to critical consciousness.

Chapter four describes the methodology used in this research. An agenda of rangatiratanga requires in research a methodology which reinforces citizens’ rights to critical consciousness. When reviewing texts, the notion of presence and silence in critical discourse analyses assists this agenda. In line with past research, the review of citizenship education focused upon the curriculum, in particular social studies. Content analysis then provided a systematic means in which to measure presence of the research topics within the social studies curriculum. Durie’s (2000) framework of mana was drawn upon to address the ethical issues in the research, and provided an appropriate ethical foundation for the researcher.

Chapter five presents the findings of this research. A review of social studies strand achievement objectives and the social studies units, provided to support delivery of those objectives, show that citizenship education has a moderate presence in the social studies curriculum. However, issues about the Māori-Pākehā relationship are given minimal attention, focusing on historical contact instead of the provisions for that relationship. In particular, material on the Māori Electoral Option is absent from the current curriculum units. A further analysis of citizenship education in the draft curriculum revealed the strengthening of some citizenship education aspects and failure to develop others, such as the Option.
Chapter six discusses the implications of a weak citizenship education agenda in Aotearoa. In particular, it discusses the silence of the curriculum about the Māori Electoral Option, and the implications that silence has for our democracy. Continued neglect of these issues in education will cause further misunderstanding in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and to future citizens coming to live in Aotearoa. Based on Te Ao Mārama, a new model for citizenship education is suggested that would serve both Māori and Pākehā needs in continuing the relationship, and engaging in our nation. Chapter seven then concludes by reviewing the thesis material, and suggesting a path from here.

**Conclusion**

This thesis explores what citizenship education in provided through the curriculum to New Zealand citizens. In particular, it reports on what education is provided about Māori rights to a political voice and how those rights feature in our democratic arrangements. The outcome allows conclusions to be drawn as to how equipped citizens are to engage in society about improving race relations and the democratic arrangements which would reflect that relationship. This research contributes to the call for the strengthening of citizenship education by arguing a continued detriment to race relations should education not begin to take a revitalised, critical approach to facilitating this debate. He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka – although wrought with controversy, persevering with citizenship education is necessary to improving our race relations and the health of our democracy. The next chapter reviews the literature about the democratic arrangements that have evolved in the Māori-Pākehā relationship.
This chapter reviews literature on the democratic arrangements that have evolved in the Maori-Pākehā relationship. Research on how the relationship was formed, and subsequently evolved, illustrate how the arrangements for Māori-Pākehā power-sharing are still to be fully realised. The multiple pathways pursued by Māori in response to this convey a continued commitment of Māori to the relationship terms. A review of the current suggestions for citizenship education in Aotearoa highlights new opportunities within which the arrangements for this relationship can be understood and debated.

The first section of the literature review explores the terms of the Māori-Pākehā relationship. It reviews the conditions leading to the formation of the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. An examination of the Treaty of Waitangi texts outlines the provisions for that relationship. This includes the perceived relationship between Māori and Pākehā through the concepts of kāwanatanga, rangatiratanga and citizenship.

The second section describes the arrangements for power-sharing that have evolved in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. An investigation of electoral legislation illustrates its role in determining these arrangements. This includes the overextension of kāwanatanga, and the subsequent undermining of rangatiratanga. In particular, it observes the changing status of the relationship after devolution of power to a settler government and subsequent minimisation of the Māori political voice.

The third section describes responses from Māori to the undermining of rangatiratanga, and through it, the right to a Māori political voice. It investigates the ways Māori have tried to uphold the terms of the relationship. The efforts of Māori for a Māori Electoral Option illustrate one path taken by Māori to realise a bi-political democracy.

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12 Meaning ‘We are one people’. This term has come to represent many aspects of the Māori-Pākehā relationship, including the tensions about equality through homogeneity. See Orange, 1987, p. 55.
Section Four reviews recent suggestions as to how citizens can develop a better understanding of electoral matters in New Zealand. These suggestions present an opportunity to improve citizens’ understandings about the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and ability to deliberate further on Aotearoa’s democratic arrangements.

2.1 THE RELATIONSHIP TERMS
The recent challenges to indigeneity and indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa highlight the importance of understanding the terms of the Māori-Pākehā relationship. It raises the need to again revisit how that relationship was formed, and the terms upon which it was intended to evolve.

Building a relationship
By the mid 1830s Aotearoa was a South Pacific hub of international trade and labour. As described by Claudia Orange (1987), Māori had quickly reorganised their resources to respond to trade demands. Profits were then committed to advancing the traditional interests of hapū, such as infrastructure and hapū activities (Parsonson, 1981). For trade purposes, many hapū actively sought Pākehā to make residence amongst them: “It is the Pākehā we want here . . . we can only expect to become prosperous through him” (cited in Parsonson, p. 149).

Settlers mutually welcomed this, as they required hapū protection for safe trading with Māori (Orange, 1987). Missionaries were also initially welcomed by Māori for trade opportunities, and later, for literacy (ibid). Conversion to the religious teachings Missionaries brought was initially unconsidered by Māori. As the missionary James Kemp noted in 1824, “Their [Māori] object in letting us live amongst them is to get all they can from us” (cited in Orange, 1990, p. 32). Hongi Hika is further reported as suggesting “Christianity might be suited to a nation of slaves but was irrelevant for one of warriors” (ibid). Foreigners also offered to Māori a unique opportunity to ally in warfare, and the trade of muskets. This offered a means for hapū to pursue their interests of inter-iwi competition or utu (revenge). Thus, many Māori viewed relationships with foreigners as ones of exchange and mutual benefit. Paramount to Māori was the opportunity to advance hapū interests (Parsonson, 1981).
A formal relationship was eventually sought with Britain over rising inter-nation conflict. Māori first petitioned the British King for protection against French aggression after the Marion du Fresne event. The petition confirmed a special trade relationship with Britain, asking the King to become a “friend and the guardian of these islands” (Orange, 1987, p. 11). Concerns were also raised by Māori about the unwanted involvement of British following the Elizabeth affair. In 1835, the Declaration of Independence by hapū and iwi Māori representatives formalised this relationship. It called upon King William IV to protect the independence of Māori and Aotearoa (ibid).

During the 1830s there was strong humanitarian sentiment in British government. Proposals to annex New Zealand were viewed unfavourably given previous calamities caused to indigenous peoples through British colonisation (Symondson, 1975). There was also a reluctance to invest economically in establishing another colony after the loss of the Americas (Tapp, 1958). However, there was a need to protect British economic interests, especially from competing foreign nations. Britain resolved this by acknowledging and advocating Māori sovereignty. This first transpired in 1834 when the Crown recognised the trading flag adopted by an alliance of Northern iwi (Orange, 1987). King William IV accepted the following 1835 Declaration of Independence, organised by British Resident James Busby for this purpose. To monitor the situation, Busby was appointed Race Relations Conciliator and authority of Britons residing in Aotearoa (ibid).

By the late 1830s, however, the British favoured a more formal intervention. In 1837 the Aboriginal Report had formally called upon the British government to act as a protector of Māori independence. This it was to do while delivering the benefits of Christianity and civilization to Māori. The report concluded Britain had “been especially chosen and equipped by Providence to do this” (Symondson, 1975, p. 9). Missionaries had originally been opposed to government involvement. However, they now pressured government to protect Māori from lawless settlers. The criminal activities of escaped convicts, ship deserters and visiting crew were the cause of increasing conflict (Adams, 1970). Concerns about competing foreign interests had also deepened through the appointment of an American consul and the establishment of

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13 For further details see Orange, 1987, p. 11.

14 For further details see Orange, 1987, p. 12.
Bishop Pompallier's Roman Catholic mission (Orange, 1987). Britain wished to keep New Zealand available as a solution to its domestic problems of poverty, unemployment and declining colonial profits (Belich, 1986). The New Zealand Company posed a further threat as new British immigrants expected a social equivalent to Britian. It was expected they would have little respect for Māori rights (Belich, 1986). Without means of law enforcement, Busby’s authority soon proved inadequate. Captain Hobson’s dispatch in 1839 as Consul indicated Britain’s changed policy:

To protect the natives, to avert a war of races, and to rescue the emigrants themselves from the evils of a lawless state of society, it was now resolved “to adopt the most effectual measures for establishing amongst them a settled form of Civil Government”\(^\text{15}\). (Swainson, 1859, p. 79)

**Kāwanatanga, Rangatiratanga and Citizenship**

By 1840, four themes had evolved in the relationship between Māori and the British Crown. Both parties sought an agreement to secure control of British settlers, recognise Māori sovereignty, and protect Māori rights and well-being. Britain further wished to secure its economic interests over competing foreign interests. As suggested by the 1837 Report, this agreement would come in the form of a Treaty. As shown by Lord Normanby’s instructions to Hobson, however, in binding these themes together there was “difficulty in reconciling conflicting principles” (Orange, 1987, p. 30). In particular, the need for Britain to recognise Māori sovereignty, but then ask it be ceded to the Queen, was an issue that proved irreconcilable. In the Treaty texts, this appeared in the fundamental differences between sovereignty, kāwanatanga, and rangatiratanga.

In the Māori text, and some of the English text, the Treaty formed an agreeable joining of the relationship themes. Kāwanatanga, or the right to establish government, was afforded to the British Crown in the preamble and article one of the Māori text. In both sections, Māori were invited to agree to the Queen’s exercise of kāwanatanga over their lands. As Orange (ibid) argues, the word kāwanatanga was readily identified by the many Māori now familiar with biblical scripture. Kāwana featured in the Māori translations of scripture, to mean governor. Kāwanatanga was understood by Māori as

\(^{15}\) Excerpt by Swainson from the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed in 1844 to inquire into the proceedings of the New Zealand Company. For further information on this report see Swainson, 1859, pp. 74–79.
an expression of governorship. The law and order provided through kāwanatanga was promoted by Hobson as “primarily for Europeans, or Pākehā as they were called” (ibid, p. 33). The continued exercise of rangatiratanga, or Māori authority over Māori affairs, was guaranteed by the Crown in the article two texts. In the Māori text, this is referred to as “tino rangatiratanga”\(^\text{16}\). In the English text, it appears as “full, exclusive and undisturbed possession”. In exchange for the guarantee of rangatiratanga, the texts of article two stipulated the Crown be afforded the sole right to purchase Māori land. Article three of both texts gave Māori the rights of British citizenship under the Crown. In the English text this appeared as “all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects”, in the Māori text as “nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani”. The words “all Rights and Privileges” and “nga tikanga katoa rite tahi” indicate the equality promised in the relationship.

Parts of the English text, however, changed the meaning of the Treaty and the status of the relationship entirely. In both the preamble and article one, kāwanatanga or the right to govern was referred to as sovereignty. In the English text, Māori were asked to cede to the Queen “absolutely and without reservation all the Rights and Powers of Sovereignty”. As noted by Orange (ibid, p. 40), when translating sovereignty the missionary Henry Williams wrote: “it was necessary to avoid all expressions of the English to which there was no expressive term in the Māori”. Like Kāwana for Governor, however, a translation for sovereignty had featured previously in a document recognised by the Crown. The word mana had been used in the 1835 Declaration of Independence to mean sovereignty (Moon, 2002; Walker, 1990). The English text bore fundamental differences to the nature of the Māori-Pākehā relationship as it had developed. Māori, nearly all of who had understood and agreed to the Māori Treaty text, initially did not realise the shift of power assumed by the Crown. As suggested by Orange (1987), there is no question, however, as to the Crown’s intentions:

No longer were they considering a Māori New Zealand in which a place had to be found for British intruders, but a settler New Zealand in which a place had to be found for the Māori. (p. 31)

Citizenship unrealised

Equal status as citizens of the Crown was a binding clause in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. For Māori, it consolidated the alliance between Māori and the Crown developed over the early years of contact. An example of Māori commitment to the alliance was substantiated through participation in New Zealand’s deployments to the world wars. In *The Price of Citizenship*, Apirana Ngata (1943) reflected on the sacrifices made by Māori in World War Two. He asked:

In this war he [Māori] asked to take his full share in the front line, and in this he has fully been indulged. Has he proved a claim to be an asset to his country? If so, he asks to be dealt with as such. An asset discovered in the crucible of war should have value in the coming peace. (Ngata, 1943, p. 18)

Expectations of Māori that equal citizenship with Pākehā would be honoured were consolidated in this contribution, what Ngata (ibid) acclaimed the “greatest demonstration of the highest citizenship”. The significance of Crown failure to do so has not been lost upon Māori, and other citizens of Aotearoa. When reviewing the government’s fiscal envelope proposal\(^\text{17}\), Sir Charles Bennett stated he would advise Māori not to fight another war for New Zealand (King, 2005). The make-up of kāwanatanga ensured Pākehā power of veto\(^\text{18}\) over citizenship, as well as Māori rights to rangatiratanga. This power lay in legislation.

2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP IN LEGISLATION

The evolution of Aotearoa’s democratic arrangements through electoral legislation illustrates how the Māori-Pākehā relationship changed. In particular, it illustrates the effect minimising the Māori political voice had in entrenching Pākehā political power.

New Zealand Constitution Act 1846 and 1852

An immediate tension between kāwanatanga and rangatiratanga arose in Aotearoa’s early legislation. The very first electoral law, passed by the British Parliament to establish representative government in Aotearoa, was suspended on Governor Grey’s

\(^{17}\) The proposal of the National Government in 1994 to settle Treaty claims by direct negotiation within a total fiscal cap of $1 billion. See Walker, 1996, pp. 111-124.

insistence it would undermine Māori influence (Atkinson, 2003; Richie and Hoffman, 1986). The recent wars in the north\(^{19}\) lay at the root of Grey’s concerns for the New Zealand Constitution Act 1846:

> At present, the natives are quite satisfied with the form of Government now existing. . . the Chiefs have always ready access to the Governor. . . but under the proposed constitution they would lose their power. (Cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 9)

The constitutional associations’ views were nevertheless coloured by their determination to establish settler government. Grey’s concerns were largely ridiculed, Members reportedly jeering at:

> . . . the ‘Hobgoblin argument’, by parading *in terrorem* the perils which might result from the colonists ‘arousing the natives’, bringing on wars, or otherwise ill treating them. (Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 11)

This debate indicates the immediate difficulty encountered by the Crown in ensuring its members would uphold the terms of the relationship with Māori. Grey managed to pass the 1851 Provincial Councils Ordinance, giving both European and Māori the same terms for the vote in electoral areas (Richie and Hoffman, 1986). The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, however, quickly replaced the 1851 Ordinance\(^{20}\). As it introduced a requirement of individual land title for electoral franchise, the majority of Māori were excluded. Ultimately, this breached the Treaty provisions by removing the Māori political voice.

The Act did detail a prohibition of parliamentary involvement in Māori affairs, including the passing of laws about land, or imposing “disabilities or restrictions” (Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 14) on Māori. Nonetheless, laws about Māori land were already in existence to the benefit of settlers\(^ {21}\). Section 71 also provided for the proclamation of

\(^{19}\) See Belich, 1998, pp. 29–70.

\(^{20}\) It established a governing system of six provincial councils and national government, consisting of a nominated Upper House and elected Lower House (Atkinson, 2003).

\(^{21}\) This included the Lands Ordinance Act 1841, which detailed the ‘wasteland’ clause, which was not repealed by the 1852 Act. See Walker, 1996, p. 68.
districts under Māori self-government (Sorrenson, 1986). However, with no Māori voice in Parliament, provisions to realise Māori self-government never eventuated (Durie, 2002).

According to Walker (1990), Māori actively sought to partner with Parliament after the first election in July 1853. In 1855, Māori approached Parliament seeking membership in the House of Representatives and a Māori Council of Chiefs. Seemingly, because of section 71, these approaches were ignored. The series of electoral statutes that followed\(^{22}\) made no provision for Māori participation (Richie and Hoffman, 1986).

### 1860s Native Lands Acts

In 1860 a hui was convened by Governor Browne at Kohimarama\(^{23}\). There Māori and the Governor reconfirmed the Treaty of Waitangi, including further iwi who were not Treaty signatories, and reconfirmed “mana Māori” and Māori-Pākehā racial equality (Orange, 2004, pp. 64–67). In 1862 Parliament responded by launching a Native Lands Act “designed to give better effect to the Treaty” (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 17). It sought to individualise Māori land title, through a Native Land Court, to facilitate Māori qualification for electoral franchise (Walker, 1990). Electoral franchise based on individual land title affirmed, however, to share in decision-making, Māori had to conform to British law. Later resolutions for fair representation, including representation of Māori across all branches of government, were unsuccessful (Atkinson, 2003). Raised again the following year by the 1863 Report of the Select Committee on Representation, recommendations about fair representation were rejected. Further suggestions in 1865, when changes were made to accommodate the growing South Island population, were also rejected (Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 27). Instead, the Native Lands Act 1865 sped up the process\(^{24}\) of Māori land title individualisation (Durie, 2005). A Native Commission Act sought a process for temporary franchise to all Māori. However, a new government in the following election never implemented the Act (Atkinson, 2003). As argued by Sorrenson (1986), failure to

\(^{22}\) Including, for example, the Electoral Districts Act 1858. See Atkinson, 2003, p. 41.

\(^{23}\) To address the escalating tension in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, including the break out of war in Taranaki. For information on the conflict in Taranaki see Belich, 1998, pp. 73–116.

\(^{24}\) By allowing for ten title-holders, and providing for the Native Land Court, stated by never established in the 1862 Act (Durie, 2005).
ensure Māori representation proved Parliament’s reluctance to concede Māori any political influence. Māori exclusion from governance ensured that Māori concerns were not heard, and Parliament could facilitate continued land acquisition.

**Māori Representation Act 1867**

When provisions for the political voices of Māori were finally made, rangatiratanga remained minimalised through the restricting of Māori representation to only four Members of Parliament, despite the size of the Māori population. The Māori Representation Act 1867, which provided franchise to all Māori males over the age of 21 without individual land title, outlined only four Māori electoral districts, North, South, East and West (Atkinson, 2003). It was considered a temporary measure while Māori proceeded to gain proper franchise. As stated by Shaw (2005), guaranteed representation of particular population groups was common in early electoral law. Also, the seats provided an easy means to both relieve pressure from the Aborigines Protection Society in Britain, and stabilise the unsteady relationship with Māori that had resurfaced in the Waikato land wars. As the Member McLean stated:

> It therefore devolved upon this House to use the means at its disposal for allaying any of the angry feeling or excitement that might still remain... a measure that would direct the minds of the Natives in the proper channel. (Cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 28)

Members’ comments about “cannibals” and uncivilised “natives” (cited in Durie, 2002, p. 15) reveal the extent to which Māori political entitlements were challenged. Māori rights to representation, however, played on other members’ consciences. Representation was argued to be a “bare act of justice” (Atkinson, 2003, p. 50) as Māori contributed considerably to Parliament through taxes on Māori land. Arguments against “special representation” were also dismissed, as the Māori seats numbered four for the

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25 The Native Lands Act 1862. For other Acts alienating Māori land around this time see; the Native Reserves Act 1864, the Native Lands Administration Act 1886, and the Native Lands Act 1887. See Walker, 1996, p. 69.

26 Special electorates were also set aside for Otago goldminers, a Pensioners Settlement electorate in Auckland, and Westland goldminers. See Shaw, 2005, p. 2.

27 The Society had been urging for the return of all confiscated lands, recognition of the Kingitanga, and the establishment of an autonomous Māori council. As states Sorrenson (1986, p. 20) “it was easier to concede four Māori seats in the House”.

50,000 population of Māori\textsuperscript{29} to the 72 seats for 250,000 Pākehā (Sorrenson, 1986). The seats were eventually accepted on the basis there was no Māori threat to Pākehā veto.

Section 6 of the Act, specifying candidates were not to have been “attainted or convicted of any treason felony of infamous offence” (ibid, p. 21), represented further control of Māori influence. It prevented rebellious Māori from gaining representation, and rewarded those who had abstained from anti-Crown activity (Richie and Hoffman, 1986; Sorrenson, 1986). In addressing Māori resistance, it provided additional support to the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 and the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863\textsuperscript{30}. This ensured Māori were unable to engage on their own terms. Māori who resisted the over-extension of kāwanatanga were punished, while Crown attacks on rangatiratanga were validated through Crown law.

According to Sorrenson (ibid), section 11 of the Act also provided for Māori representation at the local government level of Provincial Councils. Like the Constitution Act 1852, however, lack of Pākehā political will saw that this provision was never realised over the following 8 years that the provincial system was in existence.

**Māori Representation Amendment and Continuance Act 1872**

Rejection of the attempts by the first elected Māori Members of Parliament to expand Māori representation\textsuperscript{31} revealed the extent of Crown fear of Māori political influence. As Sorrenson states, the four seats were retained as the peace-keeping role of the seats was still seen as necessary, to “bring Māori fully into the political process” (ibid, p. 58). The Native Affairs Committee was also established specifically to “handle the flood of Māori petitions that poured into the House” (ibid, p. 25). Invariably, the seats were another way to manage growing pressure of Māori on Parliament. The attempt by Māori

\textsuperscript{29} For the purposes of the Act, a definition of ‘Māori’ was introduced. This included the concept of ‘half castes’ (Atkinson, 2003). That the Crown freely defined Māori again indicates the mindset underpinning the Act.

\textsuperscript{30} See Durie, 1998, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{31} Takamoana and Taiaroa both suggested resolutions and drafted provisions for expansion of representation across Parliament. Some minor suggestions were accepted, such as the appointment of two Māori representatives on Legislative Council, which continued until its abolition in 1950. See Atkinson, 2003, pp. 59–60.
Members to address Māori concerns, however, was described by Sorrenson (ibid) as one of:

... despair and despondency... very often ignored or ridiculed when they did speak on important Māori matters, the Māori members were little more than a token representation that enabled pakeha members to salve their conscience while also relieving the Māori of much of their remaining land and autonomy. (p. 26)

Thus, the provisions for a Māori political voice were not in fact about honouring the Māori-Pākehā relationship. Instead, they gave an illusion of power-sharing while the terms of the relationship were further undermined. Nevertheless, the Māori seats were unique in providing indigenous political participation in a Westminster style government. These provisions were the beginning of the bi-political state.

1870 and 1890 Electoral Acts

The tenuous nature of Māori representation was again shown in the 1875 establishment of an electoral roll excluding Māori, the rejection of further proposals to increase the seats, and the proposal in the 1879 Qualification of Electors Bill to exclude Māori from the electoral system. To this, Māori Members reminded the House of the rights “vested in us by the Treaty of Waitangi” (cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 37). According to Sorrenson (1986, p. 24), however, the seats were never under threat “lest the resulting flood of Māori voters onto the European roll put too many North Island seats in jeopardy”. The Māori seats, in this manner, acted to suppress potential Māori influence in Parliament. The Act passed also included Māori enrolment upon a ratepayers’ roll. Māori political power was reduced through withdrawal of Māori universal franchise given in the 1867 Act, while giving European males universal franchise. As Sorrenson (1986) notes, to Pākehā it was assumed the seats would remain until Māori no longer proved a threat. Amongst Māori, however, Māori representation came to be seen as the “only guarantee” they would be represented at all (Atkinson, 2003, p. 78).
The Electoral Act 1893, which replaced several electoral law statutes including the Māori Representation Act\textsuperscript{32}, tried to sway Māori focus on the Māori seats. As well as introducing franchise to women, eligible Māori were given the option to be placed on the European roll. According to Atkinson (2003, p. 102), the act “effectively completed the democratisation of New Zealand’s electoral franchise”. This democracy, despite its bi-political foundation, was however not yet one that would provide for genuine power-sharing in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. The Māori Members of Parliament tried vainly to oppose land sales, while also trying to gain support for Māori initiatives. As argued by Durie (2005), the Native Rights Bill 1894 is an example of this. Introduced by the Member Ngapua, the Bill sought to balance kāwanatanga with rangatiratanga by recognising and supporting the Parematat Māori\textsuperscript{33}. In response, the European Members forced an adjournment of the House by walking out and causing a loss of quorum (Durie, 2005; Sorrenson, 1986; Walker, 1990). As stated by Walker (1996):

This rejection made it clear that Parliament was not interested in sharing power with authentic Māori authorities. . . The very thing that the chiefs had feared in 1840 had, in the short space of sixty years, come to pass. Rangatiratanga was subordinate to Kāwanatanga. (p. 67)

1890s and early 1900s legislation

A new era in politics entered with the election of James Carroll\textsuperscript{34} to Parliament in 1893. Carroll’s Māori Lands Administration Act 1900\textsuperscript{35} and Māori Councils Act 1900\textsuperscript{36} managed to secure a degree of Māori authority over Māori affairs. According to Durie (2005, p. 212), Carroll showed that “Parliament could provide an effective forum for the advancement of Māori interests”. Parliament later forced an amendment to the Administration Act so that the Māori land boards were European controlled (Sorrenson,\textsuperscript{32})

\textsuperscript{32} Including the Qualification of Electors Act, the Registration of Electors Act, and the Regulations of Electors Act. See Atkinson, 2003, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{33} The purpose of the Parematat was to deal with the myriad of unjust laws oppressing Māori. See Durie, 2005, p. 209; Sorrenson, 1986, p. 38; Walker, 1990, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{34} Of Māori and Irish descent, and thereby able to stand for both electorates, he is considered one of the most successful Māori MP’s in history. See Durie, 2005, pp. 211–212.

\textsuperscript{35} The Māori Lands Administration Act established Māori controlled land boards to develop what was left of Māori land and stop any further government purchases. See Durie, 2005, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{36} The Māori Councils Act provided for a local form of Māori governance by establishing tribal councils with the authority to impose sanitation, control liquor, promote health reform and education. See Sorrenson, 1986, p. 30.
1986). However, the Acts were an advancement on Māori authority over Māori affairs, and threatened the notion of the seats as uninfluential.

When the Electoral Act 1902 again consolidated a series of previous legislation\(^3^7\), debate on the seats supported their disestablishment on the basis they were an “anomaly”, “absurdity” and “something that cannot possibly be defended” (Richie and Hoffman, 1986, pp. 49–50). Māori Members also argued against the seats, though on the basis that the restriction to four was inadequate and marginalised Māori issues (Atkinson, 2003). As stated by Carroll (cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986):

> Allowing the Natives to be placed on the general roll, you will have the Native interests, especially in the North Island, represented by every member for the districts in which there are Māori constituents. (p. 50)

Retention of the seats to control Māori influence was well recognised by Māori, as highlighted by the Member Ngapua (cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986):

> The Europeans recognise the Native population is a large one, and they fear, according to their ways of looking at things, that there is a danger – that instead of having a European Parliament there is a possibility in the near future of the Europeans being controlled by a Native Parliament. (p. 15)

Again the provisions for a Māori political voice concerned more what best protected European interests, not Māori involvement in political decision-making. Further debate on the Legislative Amendment Act 1910 suggested that the Māori seats were a convenient means of representation while administrative matters were deferred\(^3^8\). As reported by Atkinson (2003, pp. 121–123), between 1911 and 1916 Parliament

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\(^3^7\) Including the Representation Acts, the Corrupt Practises Prevention Act and the Election Petitions Act (Atkinson, 2003).

\(^3^8\) For example, voting by show of hands was replaced by declaration in Māori electorates (Shaw, 2005), but a Census roll was established excluding Māori (Richie and Hoffman, 1986).
deliberated over more representative forms of government, but eventually dismissed the idea\(^{39}\).

The Military Service Act 1917 gave further insight into the perceived role of the Māori seats. When the Kingitanga movement launched opposition to conscription, Māori Member’s attempts to secure their participation highlighted the seats as intermediaries for the will of government, not Māori self-determination\(^{40}\).

1930s consolidation of the seats

In 1934, when an inquiry led to Ngata’s resignation as Minister of Native Affairs, criticism quickly concluded Māori “should never be in charge of Māori Affairs again” (Durie, 2005, p. 212). As Durie (ibid) commented, this proved a Pākehā backlash was always pending if Māori advanced too far. The actions of Ngata, Buck and Pomare, under Carroll’s guidance, did help consolidate the Māori seats. Yet, even so, it was a tenuous existence, more about Pākehā benefit then Māori advancement. As Sorrenson (1986) argues:

> Their success allowed Europeans a little reflected glory, since the Young Māori party, helping to foster a Māori renaissance, were also giving pakeha New Zealanders an opportunity to claim success in race relations. All provided, of course, that those Māori did not overstep the limits, as Ngata unfortunately did. (p. 36)

Carroll at this point still advocated for abolition of the seats, as did the majority of European MPs, albeit for different reasons. This however required enrolment of Māori onto the electoral roll, a task no government was prepared to tackle (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 37). As shown by the suppression of Rua Kenana’s movement at Hiruharama Hou\(^{41}\), Parliament would make no concession to Māori autonomy. The only provision was for Māori representation within its system.

\(^{39}\) The Local Elections (Proportional Representation) Act 1914 was never implemented, and the Legislative Amendment Act 1914, which allowed for the registration of Māori voters, was never acted upon (Richie and Hoffman, 1986, pp. 53–57).

\(^{40}\) In particular, Walker (1990, p. 181) speaks of how Pomare, chair of the Māori Recruiting Board, when visiting the Waikato in an attempt to diffuse opposition, was subjected to gross Māori disapproval.

\(^{41}\) See Walker, 1990, p. 183.
As shown by the Ratana-Labour alliance, Māori were wont but to take full advantage of what Parliament would provide for Māori interests. Through this alliance, Māori managed to renegotiate the importance of the Treaty relationship. Savage confirmed he would address the issues in accordance with “the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi’, the guarantee of Māori well-being” (Walker, 1990, p. 184). The Māori seats were further entrenched as they came to symbolise the promised relationship between Māori and the government, and the Crown’s promise to protect Māori interests. During the 1930s this included improvements to the mechanisms for Māori political participation, “with the object of placing the Māori people on the same electoral footing as the Pākehā” (Tirikatene, 1937, cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986, p. 60). This included the Electoral Amendment Act 1953, which did not increase the seats, but provided for alteration of the Māori electorate boundaries according to the Māori roll (Richie and Hoffman, 1986).

In the 1946 General Election, that Labour’s win resulted from the four Māori seats further confirmed the importance of the seats to party politics. Sorrenson (1986, p. 58) observes that “Labour was beholden to its Māori ‘mandate’ and there was little chance that it could abolish the seats without endangering its hold on office”. Again, the importance of the seats lay in securing Pākehā interests rather than affording Māori political power. Nonetheless, recognition of their importance was emphasised through the launching of several initiatives for Māori development. This included the Electoral Amendment Act 1948 that, after years of delay, provided for Māori electoral rolls (Atkinson, 2003).

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42 See Durie, 2005, p. 213.

43 This was emphasized by the quick response of government to the welfare needs of Māori; for example, ensuring equal unemployment benefits in 1936 and eligibility for child benefit in 1938 (Sorrenson, 1986).

44 The Electoral Amendment Act 1937 introduced the secret ballot for Māori (Shaw, 2005), which for Pākehā had been in place since the Regulation of Elections Act 1870 (Sorrenson, 1986). The Electoral Amendment Act 1948 established a Māori electoral roll (Richie and Hoffman, 1986). Māori were also soon after given the right to vote in national referenda (Shaw, 2005) and their elections made the same time as general election (Sorrenson, 1986).


46 Including ‘Māori’ replacing the word ‘Native’; commissions to examine land grievances; the first Māori, Tipi Ropiha, appointed as Under Secretary to Department of Māori Affairs, and further initiatives in housing and welfare (Sorrenson, 1986).
1950s and 60s legislative amendments

A new significance to the seats was consolidated with their continuance under the National government. As advocates for abolition, the seats assumedly should have been under threat. However, by the 1950s even Pākehā politicians agreed that abolition of the Māori seats would very likely result in no Māori representation (Atkinson, 2003). As Sorrenson (1986) notes, the Minister of Māori Affairs Corbett suggested:

Rather than place the responsibility on the Government to arbitrarily abolish the electorates, it would be better for the Māori people themselves to decide the issue. (p. 47)

Provisions to afford Māori a degree of determination over their political voice stemmed from suggestions for an electoral roll option. It was suggested that Māori have the choice to enrol on the Māori roll or European roll, with the Māori seats to be abolished if Māori roll enrolments fell below a set minimum (Atkinson, 2003). Yet, that determination was to remain confined by the four seats themselves, an inadequate provision for rangatiratanga. This inadequacy was mentioned after the 1957 election, when Labour’s narrow win again depended on the four Māori seats. The Māori Advisory Council asked for Māori representation to be made proportional to the Māori population (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 48). The seats were clearly a party interest, as shown through Labours wins, but it was feared government could not advance Māori political power “without causing a Pakeha backlash at the polls” (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 46). Propaganda in the papers, including a cartoon of Minister Fraser “pandering to a grass skirted Māori ‘mandate’” (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 46), indicated the contempt of wider society for Māori political representation.

That guaranteed representation of Māori was still questionable was further conveyed in the 1960 Report by Hunn, Acting Head of Māori Affairs. As well as proposing the policy of integration, the report listed “instances of differentiation” (Hunn, 1960, cited in Sorrenson, 1986, p. 49) in the legislation providing for Māori political participation. He recommended these differentiations should not “endure indefinitely by default” but be reviewed with “sceptical scrutiny” (ibid). This was discussed in the Electoral Amendment Act 1965, which increased the European electorate seats but rejected the
bid to proportionally increase the Māori seats. Holyoake, Prime Minister of the National
government (cited in Richie and Hoffman, 1986), confirmed:

Māori representation had never been regarded as being on a population
basis; that it was a special kind of representation introduced at a time when
the right to vote was based largely on property qualifications . . . the
general understanding in the House has been that the next step in Māori
representation would be complete integration. (p. 82)

The claim by Holyoake (cited in Sorrenson, 1986, p. 50) that the seats were “a form of
apartheid” illustrate the nature of Pākehā challenges to Māori rights to a political voice.
No action, however, was taken by Holyoake to abolish the seats. Instead, the Electoral
Amendment Act 1967 allowed for Māori to stand as candidates for European
electorates, and vice versa (Richie and Hoffman, 1986; Shaw, 2005). As Durie (2005)
argues, this was a first step toward abolition of the Māori seats. It indicated the
continued desire of Pākehā to remove a distinctive Māori political voice, and the status
of Māori as a political partner.

Introduction of a Māori Electoral Option

Despite Labour being less dependent on the Māori seats in the 1972 election, initiatives
under Prime Minister Kirk afforded Māori a greater political voice. This included Māori
Members in Cabinet, and Rata as Minister of Māori Affairs - the first Māori since
Ngata’s appointment in 1928 (Durie, 2005). Waitangi Day was also made a national
holiday 47, indicating recognition of the Treaty as the foundation of Aotearoa 48.
According to Durie (2005, p. 213), as had Carroll and Ngata before him, “Rata
demonstrated a capacity to influence Cabinet and to successfully promote legislation for
Māori advancement”. Two examples, resulting from an increased Māori political
presence, were the Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 and the Treaty of Waitangi Act
1975 49. Another was the recommendations of the Electoral Select Committee for a
proportional increase in the Māori seats to the number of Māori roll enrolments

47 In 1960 this was made a national day of thanksgiving, but not a holiday. See Walker, 1990, p. 152.
48 The government also cancelled the Springbok tour, and hosted the Commonwealth games attended by
athletes from Black Africa, both significant milestone for local race relations (Sorrenson, 1986).
49 Established the Waitangi Tribunal to inquire into grievances from Māori against Crown. It was a major
(Sorrenson, 1986). That this recommendation was incorporated in section 8 of the Electoral Amendment Act 1975 reflected a significant advancement in the provisions for a Māori political voice. Through the roll, the Act formally established the Māori Electoral Option (Atkinson, 2003). It gave Māori, as defined in the Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1974, the choice as to which roll they enrolled upon\textsuperscript{50}, and the right to transfer at every census\textsuperscript{51}.

The leader of the succeeding National government\textsuperscript{52}, Muldoon (cited in Sorrenson, 1986, p. 53), confirmed National Party policy for retaining the Māori seats “until such time as the Māori people indicate their desire to be on a common roll with no special Māori seats”. An Electoral Amendment Act, however, repealed the section of the 1975 Act concerning proportional representation, to instead keep the Māori seats at four (Atkinson, 2003). That the adjustment of Māori electorate boundaries was returned to the Governor General, then transferred again to the Representation Commission (Richie and Hoffman, 1986), reflects the confusion over who is responsible in the relationship with Māori, the Crown or the government.


The Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985\textsuperscript{53} gave the Treaty renewed constitutional significance (Walker, 1996). This was continued in the Report of the 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, where Māori were confirmed a “special constitutional status” (p. 81) on the basis of their indigeneity, the Crown’s Treaty promises to protect their rights, and their guaranteed representation since 1867. Particularly significant was the description of the Commission (1986, p. 86) that the political interests of Māori maybe “more appropriately described as ‘rights’”. This included mana Māori motuhake, recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, protection of the rights therein, and cultural survival.

\textsuperscript{50} The act also redefined ‘Māori’ as including any person descendent from a Māori. The European seats and European roll also changed to the ‘General’ seats and roll. See Shaw, 2005, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{51} The Electoral Amendment Act 1980 further confirmed the Māori Electoral Option to be held the same year, but not at the same time, as the Census, except for the year of a general election in which case it would be postponed for a year. See Atkinson, 2003, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{52} Who, for the first time, have two Māori MPs, won in General seats: B. Couch of Wairarapa and R. Austin in Awarua. See Sorrenson, 1986, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{53} Which put the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal back to 1840, and saw an increase in the Tribunal from three to seven, to sixteen to allow for an increase in sittings. See Durie, 2005, p. 214.
The final recommendation of the report (p. 110) was to abolish the Māori seats on the basis that their “tenuous nature” made them “an unsatisfactory means of recognising the constitutional rights of Māori”. According to the Commission (1986), adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system would be most effective in providing Māori representation. It also recommended that government engage with Māori to define and protect Māori rights, and recognise their constitutional position under the Treaty of Waitangi. In this respect, the report clarified the seats as a principal expression of the Māori constitutional position under the Treaty, and:

. . . a base for a continuing search for more appropriate constitutional and political forms through which Māori rights (mana Māori in particular) might be given effect. (p. 86)

The following principles offered by the Commission (1986) were the most significant in the history of electoral policy in their recognition of Māori rights to a political voice:

a. Māori interests should be represented in Parliament by Māori Members of Parliament.
b. Māori electors ought to have an effective vote competed for by all political parties.
c. All MPs should be accountable in some degree to Māori electors.
d. Māori MPs ought to be democratically accountable to Māori electors.
e. Candidate selection procedures of the political parties should be organised in such a way as to permit the Māori people a voice in the decision of who candidates are to be. (p. 88)

Seemingly, despite long-term recommendations for abolition, the debate over the seats was solidified in favour of retention. This was through the reaffirmation of the special constitutional status of Māori, and the need for democratic arrangements that would provide accordingly.

54 For the full list of Report’s recommendations see List of Recommendation, pp. 295–301 of the Report.
55 As a response to pressure over the entire report, Prime Minister Lange stated a national binding referendum on the electoral system would be held sometime in the future (Atkinson, 2003).
That Māori rights to a political voice were further endorsed in the following 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy confirmed a shift in the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. The Commission’s terms of reference included reporting on the Treaty of Waitangi and its application to policy, confirming the Treaty as at the “foundation” of New Zealand society (Royal Commission on Social Policy, 1988, vol. 2, p. 27). The Commission (ibid) identified three Treaty principles “crucial to an understanding of social policy and upon which the Treaty of Waitangi impacts” (p. 49): partnership, protection and participation. Of particular importance, the Commission (ibid) confirmed that the rights of individual citizenship conferred to Māori in the Treaty did not extinguish any collective rights of Māori recognised in Article 2. As a strategy to give the Treaty greater constitutional recognition, the Commission (ibid) identified both electoral reform, with a view to increasing the Māori seats on a pro rata basis, and a Senate with equal Māori and non-Māori representation. It further described the themes of effective participatory democracy as participation, transparency, and representativeness (ibid).

Over this time the Treaty was accorded new meaning across wider society; in legislation, for example the State Owned Enterprise Act 1986; in case law, with the Court of Appeal case New Zealand Māori Council v. Attorney General; and in government policy, such as the Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi 1988.

In contrast to these advancements, the Local Government Amendment (No 3) Act 1988, which set the parameters for the reforms of local government, made no reference to the Treaty (Hayward, 2003). The notion of a Māori-Pākehā partnership, largely revived through the Royal Commission reports, was disrupted as the reforms:

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\ldots \text{allowed central government to relinquish its Treaty obligations at the local level, without making adequate provisions for local government to take up that responsibility. (Hayward, 2003, p. 4)}
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57 See Durie, 2005, pp. 198–199.
59 Although these were limited. See Orange, 2004, p. 196.
In response to the criticism, the Māori Local Government Reform Consultative Group was formed to provide the Officials Coordinating Committee on Local Government (OCCLG) with a Māori perspective on the reforms. Several recommendations were made, including a recommendation that local government affairs be carried out in a manner consistent with the Treaty, and fifty per cent mana whenua (local iwi) membership. Claiming that they were undemocratic, these recommendations were rejected by the OCCLG (Hayward, 2003). A Bill for the establishment of local government Māori Advisory Committees was drafted, but never passed (ibid). The issues remained a matter for debate and indicated, despite the Royal Commissions’ Reports and further recommendations, the unwillingness of the Pākehā majority to concede Māori rights to political power.

1993 Introduction of Proportional Representation for Parliament
A national referendum in 1992 favoured a MMP system over the present First Past the Post (FPP), or the proposed Single Transferable Vote (STV), Preferential Vote (PV) or Supplementary Member (SM) systems (Atkinson, 2003). The new Electoral Act 1993 introduced MMP, as well as finally providing for a proportionate number of Māori seats as dictated by the size of the Māori roll (Shaw, 2005). When the Bill was first drafted it proposed the abolishment of the seats, based on the Royal Commissions recommendations that MMP would provide to Māori sufficient representation. The Commission predicted that Māori issue-specific parties would emerge, and recommended that they should not have to meet the usual 5% threshold (Orange, 2004). However, as stated by Durie (2005, p. 216), removal of the seats was viewed by Māori as “an erosion of an established constitutional convention”. Subsequently, instead the Act once again introduced the growth of Māori electorates based on enrolments upon the Māori Roll (ibid).

Government refusal to fund an information campaign for the 1994 Option hindered the reintroduction of the Māori Electoral Option. The Waitangi Tribunal (1994, p. 37), in addressing the claim brought against the government, confirmed the Crown was

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60 See Hayward, 2003, pp. 7–8 for all recommendations.
62 A resolution of the hui held in Turangawaewae, January 1994, to discuss the Option and government’s refusal to commit further funding. See Waitangi Tribunal, 1994, p. 1.
“under a Treaty obligation actively to protect Māori citizenship rights and in particular existing Māori rights to political representation”. The Tribunal (ibid) concluded that funding should increase urgently to achieve a maximum amount of Māori enrolments, through adequate promotion and information about the Option, through both traditional Māori and conventional methods of communication. The government chose to ignore the Tribunal’s recommendations. The 1994 Option resulted in an additional 32,294 electors joining the Māori roll, an increase of just one seat, argued a result of the campaign being poorly resourced (see Atkinson, 2003). In light of its poor promotion, the importance of the Option was reflected in the increased turnout of Māori voters (Durie, 2005).

In 2001, preceding the introduction of STV for District Health Boards in the Public Health and Disability Bill, the review of local government legislation expanded proportional representation for Māori to local government level. In addition to a Local Electoral Act giving local authorities the option to switch to STV, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Māori Constituency Empowering) Act 2001 introduced Māori wards in the region for electors on the Māori parliamentary roll (Hayward, 2003). The ensuing debates strengthened the argument for guaranteed Māori representation, in particular raising the concern that the Pākehā majority could veto Māori interests. Sullivan (2003, p. 40) argued that “collective identity and representation of collectives is also a valid interpretation of democratic representation”. The Parliamentary Review Committee for the Electoral Act 1993, whose terms of reference included reviewing the Māori seats, could also reach no consensus to implement any substantial changes to the current system (Atkinson, 2003).

2000 and 2006 Māori Electoral Option

The outcome of the next Option, held in 2000, increased the number of seats once again to seven, seeing a record number of Māori (22) Members of Parliament in Parliament after the 2002 election. MMP better served participation by Māori, but only those seven seats could be claimed as representing Māori citizens; others represented either general electorates or a party. As stated by Durie (2005), MMP and the seven seats had further cemented guaranteed Māori representation as:
All political parties realised the Māori vote had assued a new strategic importance . . . the seven Māori seats could make the necessary difference to having the numbers to form a government. Whoever held them might well hold a political advantage. (p. 221)

The outcome of the 2005 General Election saw a Māori issue-specific party, as previously predicted, secure four of the seven Māori seats, introducing three new Members to Parliament. Shaw’s (2005) comments about the outcome of the 2005 election, and suggestions the Māori seats should be abolished, noted:

The number of Māori MPs stands at 18, which is more or less in proportion to the presence of Māori in the wider population. However if . . . the Māori electorates were to be abolished and the occupants sent home, Māori would constitute under 10 percent of all MPs. (p. 2)

Thus, despite increased participation by Māori as voters and candidates for Parliament, representation proportionate to the Māori population remains secured only through the Māori seats. In addition, it is argued that only these seats truly represent Māori interests, the Māori Members elected in general electorates representing the interests of the electorate, and list Members representing their party position.

The last Māori Electoral Option, held from May to August 2006, required another 14,000 enrolments on the Māori electoral roll to secure another Māori seat. Whether or not the Option resulted in an additional seat will be reported in mid-2007, when the Representation Commission redraws electorate boundaries. The rationale for the Māori seats as given in the 2006 Electoral Option information from the Electoral Commission was entirely historical in nature. Specifically the Commission (2005) commented:

The Māori electoral system ‘stumbled into being’ in the 1860s as a solution to a supposedly temporary ‘problem’. Its appropriateness and effectiveness have been the subject of debate ever since. Nevertheless, the Māori seats have

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63 For example, the Māori MP Georgina Beyer publicly commented she did not personally agree with the Foreshore and Seabed legislation, however her electorate did and her job is to represent her electorate. See: Beyer switches to vote for Government on foreshore. New Zealand Herald 19/04/04.
survived to become one of the most distinctive features of New Zealand’s electoral system. (p. 5)

That the Parliamentary seats were accidental conveys the unsatisfactory nature of shared political power in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. In contrast to the terms agreed to in the Treaty of Waitangi, Pākehā have control of political decision-making. As discussed by Durie (2002), Māori have not stopped questioning the legitimacy of the overextension of kāwanatanga. Māori affirmation of Māori rights to a measure of political power has taken multiple pathways, in the form of both resistance and engagement.

2.3 RESPONSES FROM MĀORI

Māori resistance to the overextension of kāwanatanga in the early decades after the Treaty signing often took the form of physical warfare. Physical resistance also took the form of pacifism, joined by a bid for separatism and initiatives aimed at reclaiming Māori autonomy and authority.

Resistance

Beginning with the felling of the flag pole at Kororareka, the war in the North that ensued between Hone Heke, Kawiti, and the Governor ended only when “having tested the strength and power of the enemy, and satisfied his own sense of honour in relation to the Governor” (Walker, 1990, p. 104) Heke agreed to peace. The mediation of peace by Waka Nene and, joined by Te Wherowhero, the later negotiation of Te Rauparaha’s release, assured Māori of Crown recognition of rangatiratanga (Walker, 1990).

In 1859 the overextension of kāwanatanga in land policy, however, soon led to wars in Taranaki (see Belich, 1998). Governor Browne’s land sales policy accepted any individual Māori offer of land without the consent of others from the land. This was met with resistance by paramount Te Atiawa chief Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake, who asserted rangatiratanga by disrupting unlawful land surveying. Only in 1863 did physical conflict end after East Coast chiefs petitioned the Queen for an inquiry and Governor Grey made an investigation, concluded Browne’s purchase illegal, and withdrew troops from Taranaki (Walker, 1990).
In 1858 the paramount Ngāti Mahuta chief Te Wherowhero’s acceptance of the Kingship represented a new attempt at asserting the relationship terms with the Crown. The Kingitanga was a symbol of mana whenua (sovereignty of the land), envisaged as a “conjoint administrator” (Durie, 2005, p. 17) with the Governor. Perceived as a threat to kāwanatanga, this initiative also led to war as the Crown attempted to subdue the movement. In 1863 when General Cameron invaded the Waikato, supposedly to punish them for support given to Wiremu Kingi in Taranaki, war ensued. The same occurred later in the Bay of Plenty, where Ngai Te Rangi had given their support to the Kingitanga (Walker, 1990).

Physical challenges continued to be made from Māori leaders against the unlawful expansion of kāwanatanga. The Ringatu people led by the Mataatua prophet Te Kooti, and the Hauhau people led by the Taranaki prophet Te Ua Haumene and then the military leader Titokowaru, continued to wage war against the Crown up until the 1880s (see Belich, 1998, pp. 203–288). Physical resistance to kāwanatanga also continued through passive means with the Taranaki prophet Te Whiti o Rongomai. Te Whiti preached pacifism and peaceful separation of Māori and Pākehā, disrupting Crown attempts to settle West Coast lands occupied by Māori. Such physical resistance by Māori only stopped when extreme “heavy handed demonstration” (Sorrenson, 1986, p. 27) of Crown force, including the 1881 storm of 1,500 armed constabulary on the 2,200 unarmed population of Parihaka, the Māori Prisoners Trial Act 1879 and West Coast Peace Preservation Act 1879⁶⁴, ensured Māori capacity for resistance was decimated.

In 1904 the declaration of Rua Kenana as successor to Te Kooti saw the establishment of Hiruharama Hou at Maunga Pohatu (Walker, 1990). Again, the Crown was noted for its severe reaction to Māori forms of autonomy when, in 1916, Hiruharama Hou was stormed. Extreme unjust punishment by the Crown was responsible for the movement’s collapse, when Rua Kenana’s people were held financially accountable for the costs of the raid and Rua Kenana’s trial (ibid). This reportedly was the last case of armed resistance by Māori (Belich, 1998).

Resistance also arose in the form of inter-tribal initiatives. Failure of the 1882 and 1884 visits to the Queen confirmed to Māori that the overextension of kāwanatanga would remain a local matter requiring local solutions. Opposition was embarked upon by King Tawhiao and the Waikato, Hauraki and Maniapoto tribes with the Kauhanganui (Great Council), and other tribes with the Te Kotahitanga Mo Te Tiriti (Unity for the Treaty) (Walker, 1990). Te Kotahitanga held its first general assembly, Te Paremati Māori, at Waipatu in 1892. It concluded that, under section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, the Paremati was lawful. The rebalance of rangatiratanga with kāwanatanga lay in the purpose of the Paremati, to deal with the myriad of unjust laws oppressing Māori through kāwanatanga (Durie, 2005). Despite being defeated in the wars, the Kingitanga also maintained opposition to the overextension of kāwanatanga. Although bereft of land after mass confiscation, Princess Te Puea’s fundraising ventures enabled the establishment of Turangawaewae in 1922, and a continued stronghold for the Kingitanga as a national symbol of Māori autonomy (Walker, 1996).

**Engagement with the State**

In the early 1880s attempts to visit the British Queen, Māori were instructed that Māori affairs had long been transferred to the New Zealand Parliament. Māori have thus continued to engage with kāwanatanga as a means to realise the balance promised with rangatiratanga. Accounts of the first Māori representatives in Parliament explain the attempts of Māori to reassert rangatiratanga with the Crown. New Māori Members fiercely opposed assumptions they were agents of the Crown, or could be bought as such (Sorrenson, 1986). For example, the Member Takamoana, in his first term, launched a submission criticising the Māori Land Court and its associated land dealings (Walker, 1990). By the second election there was an increased interest by Māori in the seats, evident in the increased number of candidates and involvement of iwi (Atkinson, 2003; Sorrenson, 1986).

Desire to engage with kāwanatanga was also expressed through Māori desire for an increase in the Māori parliamentary seats. According to Sorrenson (1986), the first substantial effort from outside the House was launched by Ngāti Kahungungu in 1876 when they presented Parliament with a petition signed by 395 iwi members. Walker (1990) also records two national hui held on the East Coast, which requested the repeal

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65 In 1822, led by Parore Te Awha, and in 1884, led by King Tawhiao (Walker, 1990).
of the Māori Representation Act, to be replaced by one which provided for parliamentary representation of Māori proportional to the Māori population.

The Parliamentary terms of Carroll and Ngata has been called the period of “Accommodation” by Durie (2005, p. 15), where Māori again shifted to seek greater levels of engagement through kāwanatanga. The Young Māori Party is evidence of such a shift; Ngata, Buck and Pomare were the first of the Māori university graduates “reclaimed and validated” by their people as political leaders (Walker, 1996, p. 80). These members advanced Māori development schemes and a cultural renaissance that entrenched the new meaning of the seats first introduced by Carroll (Walker, 1990, p. 194). Ngata in particular tousled to hold onto what Māori land was left. Although nearly decimated, it continued to come under attack from legislation. According to Sorrenson (1986, p. 40), the term Māoritanga was invented by Carroll in the 1920s to express the role of Māori Members of Parliament. It was later elaborated upon by Ngata (cited in Sorrenson, 1986, p. 40) as “pride in Māori history and traditions”, including “the continuous attempt to interpret the Māori point of view to the pakeha in power”.

As mentioned earlier, engagement with the state was a path taken by the Ratana movement. Following his unsuccessful attempt in 1924 to visit the British Queen, in 1932 Ratana turned to the leader of the Labour party Holland, proposing an alliance. In exchange for support from the 38,000 Morehu, Ratana asked Labour to take up their cause. According to Walker (1990), this included recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi; mana motuhake; grievances over land confiscations in Taranaki, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, East Coast, Ngai Tahu; imposition of rates and tax; and gratuities for Māori soldiers. The Member Tirikatene also tabled in the House a petition from Ratana, holding 30,128 signatures, calling for ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi (Walker, 1990, pp. 195–196). Holland supposedly agreed to this, however passed away the following year. When Labour became the government in 1935, Ratana sought out Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage to honour the agreement entered into with Holland (Durie, 2005). The four symbols placed before Savage by Ratana, three huia feathers, a

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66 Some of these ‘developments’ were however highly contentious. See the Suppression of Tohunga Act 1907 in Walker, 1990, p. 174.
67 See, for example, the Lands Settlement Act 1904 in Walker, 1990, p. 139.
68 The founding prophet, Wiremu Tahupotiki Ratana, sought a new direction for rangatiratanga, calling for unity of Māori across tribal lines. His followers took the name morehu, “survivors of the ancestors from the trauma of colonisation” (Walker, 1990, p. 183).
potato and kumara, a greenstone and a broken watch, detailed the history of the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and the subsequent demise of Māori well-being. Ratana also gave Savage the pin of Ratana, Te Tohu o te Māramatanga (Symbol of Enlightenment), a gesture of Ratana placing his 40,000 followers under the care of Savage. The two Māori seats already held by Ratana-Labour candidates (Western and Southern Māori) were subsequently joined by the other two in 1938 (Northern Māori) and 1943 (Eastern Māori) (Walker, 1990). The alliance between Ratana and Labour remains an example of successful engagement by a Māori collective with the state.

During the 1960s and 70s there was renewed action from movements asserting Māori rights to rangatiratanga, and the rising of new urban-based groups. In 1968 the Kotahitanga movement held a national hui at Otiria marae in Kawakawa, proposing initiatives for Māori self determination, unity, and ratification of the Treaty (Walker, 1996). Several other new groups, including the Māori Organisation for Human Rights, Te Matakite, and Ngā Tama Toa, were making similar demands concerning the rights of Māori (ibid). In particular the 1975 Land March, and later land occupations at Takaparawha (Bastion Point) and Raglan, personified a renewed engagement of Māori with the state to demand justice. The Land March, for example, saw 30,000 Māori, led by Whina Cooper, march to Parliament to demand a moratorium on the alienation of the last three million acres of Māori land (see Walker, 1996, p. 70). Māori newspapers, such as Te Hikioi and MOOHR served to advance widespread awareness of the issues (Walker, 1990). According to Walker (1996):

Urbanisation gave the Māori increased knowledge of the nature and alienating power structures of urban society. Politicisation by urban-educated radicals saw widespread Māori engagement in transforming action. (p. 143)

Heightened pressure from these movements on government subsequently saw the evolution of the role of Māori Members of Parliament, as Māori sought a higher level of engagement with and responsiveness from the state. Sorrenson (1986) observed that Māori MPs in the community:
... tended to follow and even to moderate the demands coming from Māori organisations. But they had also to lend their weight to the growing cultural renaissance ... they had to embody and promote Māoritanga. (p. 52)

Thus, Sorrenson (ibid) inadvertently suggests a catch-22 role to the growing importance of the Māori Members of Parliament. They were important to Māori to advance measures of rangatiratanga, whilst being important to Parliament to maintain the credence of kāwanatanga. Yet, outside of Parliament, Māori Members of Parliament had additional social responsibilities to that of other Members. Sorrenson (1986) explains how:

Māori Members were expected to attend numerous important, though time consuming, Māori functions, like the annual hui of Ratana or King movements, or tangihanga, and when there to perform political functions ... . So far as Māori constituents were concerned, performance in Parliament had still to be accounted for and matched by performance on the marae. (pp. 56–57)

Sorrenson (1986) comments that right into the 1980s the practices of Māori politics changed little. Candidates continued to be offered on marae (p. 55), and were often a family affair of second generations or spouses replacing first generations (p. 55). The role of Māori Members of Parliament as Members of Parliament, and their responsibilities to traditional Māori life, was clearly amalgamated. Sorrenson (1986) offers this amalgamation as a sign of how Māori have adopted the parliamentary system in the daily flow of traditional political activity:

To pakeha separate Māori representation was a constitutional oddity, a hangover from the nineteenth century, but Māori had made it something of their own. It had been indigenised. (p. 57, emphasis added)

In 1980 when Rata resigned from Labour, it was shown that Māori Members of Parliament were still serious about rangatiratanga and the guarantees made in the Treaty. He did so as he felt Māori issues were not being addressed sufficiently. The forming of the Mana Motuhake party (Walker, 1996) represented a form of Māori
resistance within the context of kāwanatanga. Despite Rata being defeated in the 1981 election for the Northern Māori seat, a party specific to addressing the concerns of Māori had been introduced to the electoral system. Mana Motuhake, in addition to giving a strong challenge to other parties in both Māori and general seats (Sorrenson, 1986), entrenched the notion of a particular Māori voice in Parliament.

By pressuring kāwanatanga, Māori managed to coordinate themselves for the purposes of rangatiratanga. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1985 stemmed from a recommendation made at a hui at Ngaruawahia, convened by Te Roopu Whakawhanaunga i Ngā Hahi (The Māori Ecumenical Council of Churches). A paper on alternative governance structures, drawn up by Whatarangi Winiata, was also circulated (Walker, 1996). It represented continued Māori commitment to exploring democratic arrangements that better reflect a bi-political state, and honour the agreement made in the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

Meanwhile, Māori engagement with the state through the convention of the Māori seats continued with renewed importance. The importance of the seats under MMP was cemented in the first MMP election when one party, New Zealand First, led by a Māori Winston Peters, along with another Māori list member, won all five Māori electorate seats. With fifteen Members total, the party secured four Māori Members in Cabinet (Durie, 2005) and a place of considerable influence in Parliament. Again, in the 1999 Election which resulted in the Labour-Alliance coalition, Labour won all six Māori seats (Durie, 2005). Three Māori were placed in Cabinet and considerable policy gains made. Despite unstable government during these early MMP elections, the advent of the Mana Māori, Mauri Pacific and the Mana Wahine parties saw a strengthened Māori position. Māori engagement with the state saw Māori test several Maori political collectives as part of the new system (Durie, 2005), as predicted by the 1986 Commission.

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69 This move by Rata coincided with escalated protest and political activity by Māori. See Walker, 1990, p. 227.

70 Resulting in, for example, the lifting of the Fiscal Envelope cap and the Ngai Tahu Settlement. See Durie, 2005. p. 218.

71 See, for example, the decision in relation to the radio spectrum frequencies in Durie, 2005, p. 218.
As mentioned earlier, in 2004 another significant Māori political collective was formed, the Māori Party (Pati Māori), by Co-Leaders Tariana Turia and Dr. Pita Sharples, and President Professor Whatarangi Winiata (Durie, 2005). Like Rata, Turia resigned from the Labour Party over failure of the Labour government to honour rangatiratanga, this time through the Foreshore and Seabed legislation. Turia’s resignation over the issue in 2004 and the proceeding protest march of 50,000 Māori to Parliament against the Bill conveyed the might of Māori political will to mobilise against unjust legislation. It represented the continued quest of Māori to have rangatiratanga honoured in the relationship with the Crown. The Māori Party, whilst being an initiative that engages kāwanatanga, is a path of resistance and continued rejection of the overextension of kāwanatanga. The Māori Party constitution details in its kaupapa the pursuit of rangatiratanga, including expression of mana atua, mana whenua, and mana tipuna (Māori Party, 2005), which validates Māori rights and ways of being. The win by the Māori Party of four of the seven seats in their first election in 2005 conveys the rigour in which Māori continue to seek transformations in the Māori-Pākehā relationship.

Thus, provisions for the Māori political voice have developed considerably since the four parliamentary seats were created. Yet, even so, the nature of Māori attempts to rebalance rangatiratanga remains restricted by the current democratic arrangements. As Arohia Durie states (2002):

As a minority population, and in the face of out-dated concepts of democracy that confuse the ballot box with fairness, Māori efforts at reform have yet reached fulfilment. (p. 7)

There is much yet to be developed for Aotearoa to fully realise power-sharing between Māori and Pākehā in a bi-political democracy. The knowledge of citizens of this history, and their subsequent ability to continue to debate and further these arrangements in an informed manner, will be critical to the continued progression of Aotearoa as a democratic society. Therefore, how this knowledge can be imparted, and informed

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73 Can mean purpose, objectives, and underpinning values.
debate enabled, is an increasingly important question for Aotearoa’s constitutional development.

2.4 CONTINUING THE DEBATE

Mason Durie (2003) argues that for constitutional development there is a need to reconcile three issues: (1) the issue of citizenship, concerning equality, democratic rights, and participation in society; (2) indigeneity, or the rights that indigenous peoples might still expect to exercise currently; and (3) the Treaty of Waitangi, in particular the partnership between Māori and the Crown. Any successful reconciliation of these issues will embrace and value all three (ibid). As Durie (2002, p. 13) states, there is a role for education as “The question of rights expected to flow from the Treaty and their legitimacy, has become a major question for legal and educational debate”. Durie (2003, p. 267) also argues reconciliation of the above issues will largely “depend on the capacity to educate future generations”. The role of education in facilitating citizens’ debate on these issues has also arisen in recent proposals for citizenship education in Aotearoa.

Proposal for citizenship education

In August 2005, two select committee reports stressed the importance of citizenship education to ensuring a healthy democracy for Aotearoa. The first, the Report of the Justice and Electoral Committee74, recommended government fund an agency to be responsible for improving voter turnout and awareness, and encourage the Ministry of Education to strengthen the place of citizenship education in the curriculum. These sentiments were echoed in the New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights 2005 – 2010 - Mana ki te Tangata (Human Rights Commission, 2005). A report by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission on the status of human rights in Aotearoa expressed concerns over New Zealanders’ political participation. The Commission’s (2005, p. 27) findings included “significant gaps in public awareness and understanding about constitutional structures and democratic rights and responsibilities”. Low voter turnout undermines the legitimacy of representative democracy (Lijphart, 1997). The Commission’s (2005, p. 27) findings noted there is a “risk that confidence in the benefits of democratic participation is waning”. A declining voter participation rate indicates future risks to the health of Aotearoa’s democracy. The Commission (ibid) has

subsequently deemed a curriculum that includes democratic rights and responsibilities, and the role of schools as human rights communities, a priority action point for human rights development in Aotearoa over the next five years.

The second Select Committee Report, the Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee, detailed the review of New Zealand’s existing constitutional arrangements. It included the processes that would be appropriate for New Zealand to follow if significant constitutional reforms were to be considered in future. Of the four recommendations made to government, two concerned citizenship education. First, to foster greater understanding of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, the Committee (2004, p. 5) recommended an increased effort by government to “improve civics and citizenship education in schools to provide young people with the knowledge needed to become responsible and engaged citizens”. Second, the Committee recommended the government consider whether an independent institute could better foster public understanding and informed debate about Aotearoa’s constitutional arrangements. With regard to this, the Committee (2004, p. 26) recommended that prior to the commencement of the institute “a negotiated engagement model is formulated, appropriate to the needs and expectations of tangata whenua and Pākehā”. That such a model be suggested for discussions about citizenship education represents a revitalisation in the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. It indicates another move for ensuring the place of rangatiratanga alongside kāwanatanga.

Conclusion

The history of the relationship between Māori and Pākehā paints a picture of intentions largely unfulfilled. In particular, electoral legislation has failed to afford Māori political power for both the realisation of rangatiratanga and equal citizenship in our democratic arrangements. Māori resistance to the undermining of Māori authority over Māori affairs has taken many forms, including forming a place for Māori within the structures of kāwanatanga. Recently, the Māori Electoral Option and an MMP electoral system have provided Māori with an opportunity to renew the strength of a guaranteed Māori voice in Parliament. Nonetheless, the situation remains where Māori authority, and the will to realise Māori aspirations, is at the whim of the Pākehā majority who hold power. This weaves a complicated context within which the proposals for citizenship education are considered. The next chapter will further explore the theoretical role of education, specifically in advancing citizen’s agency in democratic change.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORY
EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

Theory is not inherently healing, liberatory, or revolutionary. It fulfils this function only when we ask that it do so.  

This chapter describes the theory drawn upon in this research. It examines theories about indigeneity in Aotearoa, which challenge who is indigenous and the rights to self-determination indigeneity affords. Developing trends in Aotearoa’s schools reveal the tensions this debate causes in education. An examination of concepts in domesticating education to produce the ‘good’ citizen, and liberating education to engage citizens in the practice of freedom, presents a dichotomy in citizenship education models. Models of liberating education embody concepts such as critical consciousness, which are present in Māori world-views. An education that honours Māori self-determination therefore would uphold learners’ rights to critical consciousness.

The first section of this chapter examines the growing politics of indigeneity, and issues about indigenousness in Aotearoa. This includes the counter-claims and arguments against indigeneity and indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination. It investigates the tensions this debate has for education in Aotearoa.

The second section discusses concepts about domesticating education. Foucault’s analyses perceive power as a triangulation of power, right and truth. Freire’s review of pedagogy warns about cultures of silence. This section explores how these concepts in educational practice lead to the creation of citizens as subjects, and ensures their silence.

The third section investigates notions about liberating education. The notions of presence and dialogue in education illustrate what is considered ‘democratic’ education. It also explores the addressing of conflict as a basis for critical citizenship education.

75 hooks, b. 1994, p. 61.
The last section reviews critical consciousness and praxis within the Māori world-view, drawing on stories of the world’s creation and the development of critical consciousness within Te Ao Mārama.

3.1 INDIGENEITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION


Indigenous people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. (para. 23)

Maaka and Fleras (2005) elaborate on indigeneity as a discourse for transforming indigenous-coloniser relationships. It seeks to decolonise the impoverished constitutional status experienced by indigenous peoples. It is thereby associated with political resistance and challenge, as indigenous peoples mobilise to advance societal change. In the context of Aotearoa, this definition of indigeneity excludes Pākehā, “who may naturally belong to New Zealand but as a group are neither oppressed nor mobilised” (ibid, p. 31). As conveys Maaka and Fleras (ibid), indigeneity therefore challenges unity through homogeneity. It seeks understandings for “a new social
contract for living together differently in partnership” (ibid, p. 13). The principle of indigeneity, conveyed by Durie (2003) in the goals, principles, and pathways for Māori development, highlights the tension perceived between the democratic rights of all citizens and the rights of Māori as tangata whenua. It threatens unity through homogeneity by promoting the rights indigenous peoples “might reasonably expect to exercise in modern times” (ibid, p. 204). Maaka and Fleras (2005) argue indigeneity requires formulation of a citizenship based on difference. On this basis unity through homogeneity is challenged, as conventional beliefs about citizens as subjects of the state-Crown are challenged. Indigeneity conveys indigenous peoples as political communities in partnership with, rather than subjects of, the state. Again, as Durie (2003) argues, the challenge in Aotearoa is reconciliation of the three issues of citizenship, indigeneity, and the Māori-Pākehā partnership stipulated by the Treaty of Waitangi.

The purpose of recognising citizenship based on difference is to allow indigenous peoples to continue to live and flourish as distinct peoples. As expressed by James Youngblood Henderson (2000), identities imposed through homogeneity unbalance indigenous capabilities. Indigenous peoples struggle to realise their creative and spiritual potential as “colonial scripts” (ibid, p. 164) separate them from their world-views. In the classroom, Marie Battiste (2000) calls this “cognitive imperialism”. It denies the learner cultural integrity by asserting the “legitimacy of only one language, one culture, and one frame of reference” (ibid, p. 198). The discourse of indigeneity asks this be overcome so indigenous peoples can live authentically. In Aotearoa, Durie (2003, p. 211) cites “to live as Māori” as one of three development goals sought by Māori. In education, Arohia Durie (2002) speaks of the fundamental aspirations of Māori for identity and autonomy. Bishop (2003, p. 223) describes Kaupapa Māori theory as embodying a “reassertion of indigenous Māori cultural aspirations, preferences and practices”. This notion of cultural integrity is also central in the Special Rapporteur76 Jose R. Martinez Cobo’s (1986) definition of indigenous peoples. He (ibid) emphasises that indigenous peoples should expect to be able to:

\[
\text{. . . preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence}
\]

76 Of the Sub–Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. (para. 379 – 382)

As highlighted by the New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986), guaranteed political representation is seen by Māori as one forum to promote cultural integrity and well-being. As a pathway for Māori development, guaranteed Māori seats provide some expression of political will. Sullivan (2003) argues that they provide a democratic forum within which Māori collective interests can be heard within a majority-rule setting. In particular, Durie (2002) argues:

Without designated Māori electorates tangata whenua are reduced in their homeland, to becoming one of a number of minorities dependent upon assimilation for representation. Tangata whenua seats are one of the few ways that Māori can be represented by Māori. (p. 10)

The Royal Commission (1986) stated that the seats are the forum through which Māori seek to realise the arrangements that provide for exercise of rangatiratanga. As Māori argue, realisation of those arrangements requires constitutional change. Indigeneity as discussed by Maaka and Fleras (2005) does not advocate separatism. Rather it suggests a new understanding of citizenship and difference, which requires transformation of the arrangements in the indigenous-state relationship. To date, as highlighted by Maaka and Fleras (ibid), rearranging indigenous-Crown relations in Aotearoa and Canada has involved addressing the overt expressions of colonialism, for example land confiscations. In Aotearoa, Treaty of Waitangi Settlements have focused upon retrieving or receiving compensation for stolen resources\(^\text{77}\), but are yet to venture into rearranging the state to retrieve lost political power. That the political provisions for the political voices of Māori serve to protect Pākehā interests, not Māori participation, needs to be addressed. Posing questions about constitutional arrangements, as emphasised by Maaka and Fleras (2003), is the next step.

The purpose of instruments such as the Draft Declaration, Henderson (2000, p. 169), claims, is “to begin a belated design for post-colonial nation building”. In Aotearoa, according to Durie (2002, p. 6), “maximum gains for Māori are dependent upon

\(^{77}\) For example, see Durie, 2005, p. 68.
effective constitutional change to bring about a bi-national state”. Indigeneity in Aotearoa asks that the Māori-Pākehā relationship be transformed through providing a greater place for Māori self-determination in our democratic arrangements. It asks that this transformation, as a process and outcome, abandon constitutional orders that conceptualise unity through homogeneity. Our democratic arrangements must provide for indigenous peoples a space to engage from a place of authenticity. As stated by Henderson (2000, p. 170), “We need to dream and realise new visions in the old ways”.

**Counter arguments to indigeneity**

As stated earlier, indigeneity and who is indigenous is a matter of debate in Aotearoa. The debate was largely spurred by historian Michael King’s work about Pākehā in New Zealand. For example, King (2004) commented:

> I regard Pakeha culture now as a second indigenous culture. Although it has its origins in Europe, it’s vastly changed in the 150 years or so that Pakeha have been in New Zealand. It’s changed in interaction with Maori culture and in interaction with the land. (p. 1)

King’s discussion about the indigenousness of the concept Pākehā concerned the development of the non-Māori aspects of modern New Zealand society, such as mainstream New Zealand culture (King, 2004). His ideas have been somewhat extended by supporters of unity through homogeneity. For example, Mallard (2004) declared Pākehā, and other New Zealanders of foreign descent, indigenous peoples in New Zealand. On this basis he argues a unity between Māori, Pākehā, and other ethnic groups in New Zealand, and the need to move on from our “British imperial past” (Mallard, ibid, p. 1). The implications of these claims are clear for the indigenous culture and its place in society. For example, Mallard’s attacks on powhiri (Māori welcoming ceremonies) suggest the use of alternative processes from ‘equally indigenous’ cultures. Comments from past National Leader Brash that powhiri are “uncivilised”, a handshake being “all that’s appropriate”, are clear propositions for Pākehātanga (Pākehā ways of being) as more suitable for Aotearoa.

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78 Mallard Hits at ‘sexist’ Māori ritual. *New Zealand Herald* 25/09/05.
79 Too Much Culture, Says Brash. *New Zealand Herald* 04/09/05.
Brash (2004), reviving anti-indigenous debate with his Nationhood speech in Orewa, recognised Māori as the indigenous people, but argued against provisions for rangatiratanga. Brash (ibid, p. 1) considered provisions for a Māori political voice a “dangerous drift towards racial separatism”, reflecting “two standards of citizenship” in Aotearoa. National’s election manifesto policies included commitments to abolish the Māori seats, and a range of agencies whose policies are Māori-targeted. This included Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development), Te Māngai Pāho (Māori Broadcasting Agency) and the Waitangi Tribunal. National’s policy also included ending what Brash (ibid, p. 2) labelled the “Treaty processes and associated grievance industry”. The 2005 General Election resulted in a very slim majority of seats for Labour over National (50 and 49 respectively), indicating a level of citizens approval of these policies. According to Brash (2005b), citizens in Aotearoa have:

. . . put up far too long with a Treaty process that is undermining the essential notion in our democratic society of one rule for all in a single nation state. (p. 1)

Brash (ibid, p. 1) also claimed that Māori today have “little tribal affiliation or identification”. He further stated that Māori who claim rangatiratanga, on the basis that sovereignty was not ceded in the te reo Māori Treaty text, are a “few radicals. . . living in a fantasy world” (Brash, 2004, p. 3). This defining of who Māori are and what Māori believe also has featured strongly in academic debate. Rata (2004a, p. 2), a Pākehā academic, proposed that Kaupapa Māori is the intellectual expression of a “neo traditionalist ideology” used by a “neotribal capitalist elite”. She claimed kaupapa Māori has been used by this elite group to acquire “considerable power” (ibid, 2005, p. 1) in education. According to Rata (2004b, p. 1), inclusion of kaupapa Māori in education “subverts democracy in its heartland”. Consequently, Rata (2004c) considered the use of “race categories” in government policy to reflect:

. . . brokerage of neotribalism and its race ideology into government institutions (which) is destabilising New Zealand democracy. (p. 1)

Brash turns sights on Māori agencies. *Dominion Post* 29/08/05; Brash’s knife hovers over Māori offices. *New Zealand Herald* 29/08/05.
The Labour government led by Clark, though initially condemning Brash’s claims, ultimately responded with an investigation into ‘race-based’ funding. This resulted in cuts to a range of Māori health and education programmes in excess of $130 million. Differentiation of rights from needs now characterises the approach to Māori development policy and provisions. This needs-based approach reflects a revival in the new-right approach in government policy, which fails to acknowledge the effects of structural inequalities based upon ethnicity (Cheyne, et. al., 2000).

Rejection of the Draft Declaration on the Rights if Indigenous Peoples further reflects the growing anti-Māori policy of the Clark government. The government rejected the Draft on the basis that it supports “two classes of citizenship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005, p. 1). The focus on equality had previously been on Māori achieving equality outcomes with Pākehā. An ideological shift has occurred where the focus of equality is now upon the rights of Pākehā to equal treatment with, and ensuring their opportunities are equal to those of, Māori. Subsequently, this move is underpinned by a shift in government policy from race-based to needs-based provision. Deputy Prime Minister Cullen (2005) summarised this in his statement:

> The Government is committed to an inclusive society. This means there is only one standard of citizenship, but there are instances where it is important to recognise the needs of particular groups in law or policy. (p. 1)

As indicated by the funding cuts, this shift from rights to needs is evident in education policy. It includes removal of the Treaty of Waitangi from the 2006 *New Zealand Curriculum: draft for consultation* (Ministry of Education, 2006a) and *Tertiary Education Strategy 2007-2012* (Ministry of Education 2006b). As Durie (2002, p. 20) states, when considering the educational policies of past governments, “it is reasonable to assume that it [education] is still an agent for the dissemination of government ideologies of all kind”. At the time of his claims about indigeneity, the Minister of Race

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81 Prime Minister warns of return to despair. *The Dominion Post* 05/03/04.
82 Race Based Programmes Slashed. *The Press* 24/06/05. For further details see Cabinet Minutes (05) 22/10 Review of Ethnically Targeted Policies in Tertiary Education.
Relations was also the Minister of Education\(^{84}\). This raised concerns that current and future education policy of the current government may reflect a view supporting unity through homogeneity. It indicates further tension in the debates about indigeneity and race relations in education.

**Addressing this debate in education**

Concerns have long been raised about the minimal amount of history about the Māori-Pākehā relationship being taught to children in Aotearoa (see, for example, Simon, 1992). In particular, there is a concern that issues about Māori-Pākehā contact and race relations are avoided and neglected any meaningful depth. Simon utilised Jacoby’s (1979) notion of “social amnesia” to explain the phenomenon she believed was occurring in Aotearoa classrooms. This concept refers to:

\[
\ldots \text{a forgetting and repression of the human and social activity that makes and remake society} \ldots \\
\text{repression of remembrance - society’s own past.} \\
(\text{Simon, 1992, p. 253})
\]

In the 1980s the government, because of the controversy it raised, actively discouraged the addressing of race relation issues. For example, in 1980 the Minister of Education Wellington banned the play *Maranga Mai*, which focused on Māori land grievances, from performing at schools on the basis it disrupted “race feelings” (Walker, 1996, p. 145). This approach to soothing race relations controversy remains today, as shown, for example, in the introduction of the New Zealand Day Bill\(^{85}\) to change Waitangi Day to New Zealand Day. According to United Future party leader Dunne (2005, p. 1), who introduced the Bill, citizens “have had a gutsful” of the protests on Waitangi Day. The Bill represents further suggestions of ‘moving on’ as a way to resolve race relations conflict.

This reluctance to address controversy about race relations is also present in education. Openshaw (2004) argues that policy-writers and educators tend to avoid controversy by providing broad but un-detailed and uncritical accounts of race relations history:

\[^{84}\text{See http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Minister.aspx?MinisterID=3}\]

\[^{85}\text{New Zealand Day Bill ‘sell out’ for Māori. New Zealand Herald 07/04/05.}\]
Anxious to avoid trouble from any section of the community, the end result, then, is likely to be an intellectually sterile curriculum that places a premium on well – meaning platitudes. (p. 273)

These platitudes, as Openshaw (2004) states, include education about the Treaty without meaningful exploration or debate about what it implies. This is evident in Simon’s (1992) findings twelve years earlier that teachers chose to focus upon:

. . . creating social harmony because of its emphasis on ‘sharing and caring’, ‘accepting differences and getting on together’ and ‘understanding each other’. (p. 259)

As Openshaw (2004) claims, this uncritical stance is unacceptable to both ‘left wing cultural relativists’ and ‘right wing educational conservatives’. Some believe omissions reflect government’s failure to acknowledge the issues, while others feel it reflects political correctness and bias. Simon (1992, p. 259) claimed the trend of educators to avoid controversy would be increasingly problematic, as it reinforces “an uncritical focus on social harmony”. Instead, there is a need for education to facilitate recognition and reconciliation of race relations issues. However, this requires reconciliation within education itself of conflicting models that respond to controversy. These models are now examined in the following discussion on two types of education: domesticating education and liberating education.

3.2 EDUCATING FOR THE ‘GOOD’ CITIZEN

Citizenship education in the era of globalisation is characterised by four themes. These are (1) citizenship education for human rights (Enslin, 2003; Hebert, 1997; Tomasevski, 2004), (2) sustainable development (Davies, et. al., 2002; Hicks, 2001; Williams, 2004), (3) cultural pluralism (Metzger, 2002; Osler and Starkey, 2002; Parker, 1997; Wilkins, 2001), and (4) social and political literacy (Hoge, 2002; Kerr, McCarthy and Smith, 2002; Lawson, 2001; Mendel-Reyes, 1998). Underlying these themes are tensions about identity and agency. Discussions about domesticating education reveal how citizens’ agency can be restricted.

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86 In comparison to the traditional focus of citizenship education on consolidating the nation-state.
Creating subjects
According to Michel Foucault (1976), traditional analyses of power, contract-oppression\(^8^7\) and war-repression\(^8^8\), focus on the overt abuse of power by a sovereign or state-like entity. These approaches are evident in analyses on the oppression-repression of Māori. The Crown’s overextension beyond the terms of the Treaty and the continued repression of Māori authority in education are such examples. The objective of Foucault’s (1982, p. 208) research on power, however, is not on the overt exercise of power, but rather “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subject”. What Foucault names biopower\(^8^9\) is understood not through its oppressive-repressive nature, but its productivity. It examines how power constitutes individuals and populations to form a society. Biopower, when exercised by a sovereign or state entity\(^9^0\), begins with the notion of governmentality (Foucault, 1978). It describes the art of government in bringing together citizens in ways to assure maximum benefit to society as a whole\(^9^1\). As comments Debbie Hill (2002, p. 1), its purpose includes securing “political obedience” from citizens so they may form a “docile and useful workforce”. How such a relationship is secured between the state and citizens, Foucault (1976) suggests, is through a triangulation of power, right and truth:

\[
\text{\ldots the rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of power \ldots (and)}
\]
\[
\text{the effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in}
\]
\[
\text{their turn reproduces this power. (p. 93)}
\]

The establishment of a discourse about sovereign-state rights, rights to power and the right to discipline, locate the sovereign-state as caretaker of citizens. Superimposed by the sovereign-state on citizens are public rights guaranteed to them in the relationship. Based on the sovereign-state right to be caretaker, citizens’ rights are then protected through a “grid of disciplinary coercions” (Foucault, 1976, p. 105), for example, police.

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87 Views power as a commodity that is possessed, and can be transferred and exchanged via contract. Oppression occurs through over-extension beyond the terms of the contract. See Foucault, 1976, p. 88.
88 Perceives power as it is exercised, or exists in action. It exists in relationships of asserting and opposing repression, the “effect and continuation of a relation of dominance”. See Foucault, 1976, p. 92.
89 First elaborated upon by Foucault in 1980, The History of Sexuality, vol 1.
90 Foucault’s research is also not on the sovereign, but the techniques used to entrench the role of the sovereign-state as caretaker.
91 Foucault described the origins of governmentality with churches and their role in governing “souls and lives” (1978, p. 202).
Indigenous peoples’ acceptance of the rights and entitlements of citizenship and civilisation have worldwide seen the establishment of “administration designed to continue exploitation of indigenous peoples through legal means” (Bodley, 1999, p. 60). Conferring the rights of citizenship upon Māori was the means by which the British government assumed full power in Aotearoa. The guarantee of rangatiratanga and all the rights and privileges of British citizens to Māori (see Orange, 1986) saw the establishment of an administrative and disciplinary system, including education, to assert Crown control. Foucault’s (1976) research thus illuminates how:

An essential function of the discourse and techniques of ‘right’ has been to efface the domination intrinsic to power. (p. 95)

In the triangulation between power, right and truth, the sovereign-state right to power is established through a discourse, or a created ‘truth’. The indigenous realities buried in the creation and fortifying of truth is what Foucault (1976, p. 82) terms “subjugated knowledges”. According to Foucault (1976, p. 83), these knowledges are subjugated as they are “concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles . . . the memory of hostile encounters” that challenge unequal power relations. An alternative truth is created to ensure the sovereign-state has “knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it” (Foucault, 1982, p. 214). In education, this is supported by Michael Apple (1979, p. 63), who speaks of “legitimate knowledge”. Through inclusion in the curriculum, “cultural legitimacy” is afforded to “the knowledge of specific groups” and not others (ibid). In the indigenous experience, as stated above, Battiste (2003, p. 198) identifies this as “cognitive imperialism”: “a form of cognitive manipulation used to disclaim others’ knowledge bases”. This was employed to assure Crown power in Aotearoa, as conveyed by Walker (1996):

Although the Māori stoutly resisted colonial despoliation by defending their land against invasion, by guerrilla warfare, petitions to the Queen for a Royal Commission to look into their grievances, and the formation of a Māori parliaments, these efforts are not part of the psyche and collective memory of the Pākehā New Zealander. . . they are confined to the dustbin of ‘non-history’. (p. 142)
The Native Schools Act 1858, Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, and early 20th century prohibition of Māori language use within schools (see Mead, 1996) are examples of the attempt to eliminate Māori knowledge and knowledge transmission. In particular, Battiste (2000) identifies language as critical to the political integrity of peoples. The place of Māori as obedient Crown subjects is more secure when education assures Māori language and memories about resistance are subjugated. It domesticates Māori by removing what would inform and grow their agency to challenge unequal power in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. The suppression of Māori agency reflects the extent to which education serves the perpetuation of Crown rights to power, at the expense of rangatiratanga and the right of Māori to pursue their well-being from their own cultural framework.

**Creating silence**

Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony92 emphasises the role of education in producing good, obedient or docile citizens. Hegemony describes the maintenance of dominant group control as through not only coercive force, but a form of subordinate group consent (Darder, 1991). This consent is secured through common sense, or a common consciousness that conveys the dominant-subordinate relationship as “unchallengeable, part of the natural order of things” (Boggs, 1976, p. 39). Hegemony is an abuse of power as it is mediated through education and the ability to “produce and channel the diffusion of ideologies” (Simon, 1990, p. 21). The sovereign-state thus controls education so that it can ensure controllable, governable subjects. In Aotearoa, Openshaw, et al. (1993, p. 40) highlight that the early Parliamentary considerations for education were about education for “the express purpose of social control”. Parliamentary debates to establish universal education93 in Aotearoa were won based on four main arguments; social control and reduction of the crime rate, the production of a discerning electorate, the enhancement of economic productivity, and individual ‘rights’ to education (Harker, 1985). According to Harker (ibid):

92 Hegemony is a form of control operating within oppressor-oppressed societal relationships that involves the ability of the dominant group to get other groups in society to submit to their ideological leadership. See Coben, 1995, p. 38.

93 To replace the education provided by provinces, 1876.
The kind of education to be made available was to be kept under close control by those in power. This control aspect is much more explicit in the debates on the education of the Māori population. (p. 60)

The role of education as a means of control is expanded upon by Paulo Freire in his analyses of curriculum, teaching methods and learning processes. Like Foucault, Freire and Shor (1987, p. 99) observes the selection of curriculum to confirm an “inherited official shape of knowledge”. Freire (1970b) further notes a depository model of education, which scripts passive roles to learners. The use of education in this manner is considered by Freire (1970a, pp. 476–477) a form of violence, as it imposes a “culture of silence” upon learners. This silence results from:

... alienation of the thought language of the oppressed group, or the thought and language which constituting a whole is the reality of the thinking subject. (Freire, 1970a, p. 476)

As a result, learners cannot manifest an authentic voice of their own. In this way, a culture of silence robs citizens of their agency. Through schooling, it creates a future where citizens will act in a way that serves the interests of those in power. It is an ultimate form of violence, as it removes potential challenges to power by attempting to determine the future through control of citizens’ minds.

The violence of such an eduction is often concealed through the arguing of its benefits, including the silence it imposes. For example, the purpose of early education in Aotearoa aimed at Māori learners adopting the Pākehā “more desirable mode of life” (Simon, 1994, p. 61). As Durie (2002, p. 287) states, because Māori were perceived as inferior, there was no question as to “the benefits for Māori replacing their heritage culture with a Pākehā English one”. The concept of education ‘for the benefit of the learner’, in contrast to ‘for the purposes of social control’, is conveyed in John Dewey’s (1938) notion of traditional education:

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94 The depository or ‘banking’ concept of education describes an education where students are conceptualised as empty vessels who, through education, receive depositories of knowledge from the teacher. See Freire, 1970b, p. 53.
. . . to prepare the young for future responsibilities and or success in life, by means of acquisition of the organised bodies of information and prepared forms of skill. (p. 3)

Dewey (1938, p. 3) goes further in saying, in order to receive those benefits, the learner should adopt a demeanour of “docility, receptivity, and obedience”. Thus, the role of the school in developing an obedient citizenry has long been the focus of many educationalists. Apple (1979, p. 63) expands the focus on curriculum and method to the rules and routines of schools that reinforce the “formal corpus of school knowledge” that become “a form of social and economic control”. Herbert George Wells’ (1895) *The Wonderful Visit* portrays similar concerns about education through the conversation between the characters the Angel and the Tramp. The monologue of the Tramp conveys a belief that education:

. . . fills children’s heads with facts, makes them memorise those facts without understanding, and conditions them to obey orders. The pupils graduate ready to take their place as cogs in the British industrial economy. Well schooled but largely uneducated, they are the docile workers required in the work force. (Smith, 1998, p. 231)

Openshaw (2004) expresses similar concerns for citizenship education in Aotearoa. In 1992, despite beliefs that education in Aotearoa has moved beyond the “bad old days of indoctrinative school history” (Archer and Openshaw, 1992, p. 19), Archer and Openshaw (ibid) claimed the process of selecting valuable citizenship attributes remained unchanged. They were concerned for the “uncritical transmission of values” to citizens (ibid). Fourteen years later, that commentators such as Openshaw have the same apprehensions indicates nothing much has changed. As stated earlier, Openshaw’s (2004) synopsis of citizenship education development over this time confirms what he identified in 1996 (p. 1) as an “existing tendencies towards the creation of a passive citizenry”. For citizens of Aotearoa, Openshaw (2004) predicts:

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95 In the story an Angel has fallen to earth, and is confused about present day society. The Tramp is explaining to him about the education system, which the Tramp refuses to participate in so that he may remain a free thinker. For further analyses see Smith, 1998, p. 231.
If they do challenge authority it will be from the standpoint of a predefined framework that will not threaten existing societal structures. (p. 267)

Again, the agency of citizens is threatened by education that is domesticating. Specifically, it does so in the creation of citizens as subjects, and their subsequent silencing. Importantly, as a site for citizens’ domestication, education too has been employed as a site of struggle for liberation.

3.3 EDUCATING FOR FREEDOM

As argued by Plato, Aristotle, and more recently Rousseau, a viable politics depends on education (see Fennel, 1997; Johnston, 1997); that “if the founding of the regime is a problem of education, so too is its preservation” (Fennel, 1997, p. 97). Similarly, in his time Gramsci never ceased to argue “revolution was essentially a task of education” (Hill, 1996, p. 47). In the development of citizens, a revolutionary education would emphasise the notion of ‘presence’ and the embracing of struggle in education.

Presence and the practice of freedom

In progressing change, Gramsci (see Boggs, 1976) advocated for a ‘revolution of the mind’, or a rise in the consciousness of the group. The mind is believed to be the keystone to revolution, as it awakens citizens’ awareness of their ability to advance change. The potency of Gramsci’s view is further developed in Freire’s perception of conscientisation. Critical consciousness indicates people grasping with their minds the truth of reality. Similar to a ‘revolution of the mind’, conscientisation describes the process whereby transition between stages of consciousness takes place. It aim is for people:

... as knowing subjects [to] achieve a deepening awareness of both the socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives, and of their capacity to transform reality through their action upon it. (Elías, 1994, p. 123)

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96 Freire describes three stages of consciousness. Each stage reflects a certain level of comprehension of the group to their reality. The first two stages, ‘semi intransitive consciousness’ and ‘naive transitive consciousness’ represent fragmented levels of consciousness where citizens are prevented from knowing they can “participate consciously in the socio – historical transformation of their society”. See Freire, 1970a, p. 486.
Freire and Shor (1987) argue that education is essential in facilitating the process of conscientisation. Through education, students are given the tools to “envisage a different destiny” (ibid, p. 24). As argued by Freire (1970b, p. 26), learners engage in the pursuit of “humanisation”: the natural vocation of becoming more fully human. According to Freire (ibid) humanisation is:

. . . affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity. (p. 26)

Smith (1999, p. 23) supports this notion in her statement about the desire of indigenous peoples to “claim a space in which to develop a sense of authentic humanity”. International instruments, such as the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, which pursues for indigenous peoples such a space, further supports this. Moana Jackson (2003, p. 1) describes the Draft Declaration as intended to “reaffirm the humanness of all the world’s indigenous peoples” oppressed through the colonisation process. An education that reaffirms the humanity of the learner therefore requires a shift from domesticating education to a liberatory one.

As described by Freire (1985, p. 102), liberatory education allows the creating and recreating of knowledge, and is thus “education for freedom”. Dewey (in Petruzzi, 1997, p. 112) also argues that education emerges through questioning “inflexible dictates” of social existence. Education becomes the practice of freedom as citizens are free to reinvent understandings about their situation, and how it could change (Petruzzi, 1997). bell hooks (1994, p. 12) describes this impression of education in her notion of “transgressions”. Transgressions involve moving beyond domesticating education to one characterised by excitement. It begins with the notion of “presence” (ibid, p. 8); that learners’ knowledge and experiences form the resources for learning. This further supports Freire’s notion of “dialogical learning” (see Freire and Shor, 1987, p. 99), where together the learner and teacher share their knowledge to form new understandings. As hooks (1994) argues:

Any radical pedagogy must insist that everyone’s presence is acknowledged.
. . must genuinely value everyone’s presence. (p. 8)
This notion of presence is central in educational aspirations of Māori. This is emphasised in Durie’s (2003, p. 211) goal “to live as Māori”, Durie’s (2002) conceptualisation of identity and autonomy, and Bishop’s (2003, p. 223) assertion of Kaupapa Māori “cultural aspirations, preferences and practices”. As Māori educational theory and initiatives allow for the growth of Māori learners as Māori, education emerges as the practice of freedom. The presence of Māori educational initiatives indicates a level of democracy in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. Such would be argued by Dewey (1916, cited in Berding and Miedema, 1998), who measures democracy in terms of presence. Presence is measured through the “numerous and varied” (Berding and Miedema, 1998, p. 285) shared interests in society, and how present or free the dialogue between these groups are. According to Freire (in Friere and Shor, 1987, p. 138), as dialogical education “contradicts the logic of domination” between teacher and learners, state and citizens, it therefore challenges the aspects of education that “inhibit democracy”.

Seeking out dialogue and discourse are valuable characteristics of educational democracy (Arthur and Davison, 2000; Feinberg, Fields and Roberts, 1997). In particular, the interconnection between dialogue and discourse is essential in citizenship education as:

Critical awareness of alternative discourses allows the possibility of choice among them. To be enabled to critically choose among discourses rather than simply to acquire or to reject discourses without such learning and understanding is to be empowered – and it is the essence of powerful social literacy. It is also the essence of the education of free citizens. (Arthur and Davison, 2000, p. 19)

Facing adversity / embracing struggle

Addressing conflicting discourses is therefore a core element in education that provides for the practice of freedom. As expressed in Wells’ (1895) *The Time Machine*, addressing adversity is essential to the continued progression of humankind. In his description of the Eloi and Morlocks, society’s pseudo-peace has led to citizens’ degeneration:

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97 Eloi are upperworld beings, living in paradise while the Morlocks are underworld slaves who work to provide for the Eloi; a metaphor for the upper and lower classes. For further analyses see Smith, 1988, p. 230.

Only through addressing diversity, not concealing it, addressing differences, not portraying a false unity, will civilisation continue to progress. The connection between education and addressing conflict is essential in citizenship education models. This is encapsulated in Freire’s (1970b, p. 33) notion of “praxis”: action and reflection upon the world for change. It is experimentation with the dialectic between the imagination-consciousness and reality. Through education that embodies praxis, learners are propelled into action and perceive their responsibility to do so. As hooks (1994, p. 22) states, they are provided with “ways of knowing that enhance their capacity to live fully and deeply”. In education, praxis has seen Māori mobilise to pursue policies and initiatives that reaffirm their identity and cultural well-being (Durie, 2002). An underlying theme of citizenship education models therefore must be the notion of agency. It reaffirms Croce’s vision of citizens as the primary agents of social change (Hill, 1996).

The notion of praxis would seemingly resolve what Openshaw (2004) states as the central dilemma for citizenship educators. This dilemma asks whether to educate for citizens who are “highly adaptable” to the fast changing political climate, or for those who would “challenge existing structures” (ibid, p. 266). Citizenship education must focus upon imparting to citizens the tools to form their own understandings, and empower them to re-arrange society to better reflect those understandings. As proposed by Arthur and Davison (2000), citizenship education would imbue in citizens, in addition to knowledge about democracy;

... levels of criticality in order that they might question, critique, debate and even take a leadership role in proposing alternative models of the structures and processes of democracy. (p. 11)

98 See also: Hursh and Orss, 2000; Ross, 1997; White, 1999.
The task of challenging existing structures therefore shifts to the task of imagining alternative futures. In this task, Freire (1970b, p. 60) offers the notion of “problem-posing” education. Educators abandon domesticating education, and replace it with “the posing of the problems of human beings in relation to the world” (ibid). Learners, in the practice of freedom, imagine alternatives and then engage with society to realise them. Petruzzi (1997, pp. 111–113) similarly regards values and knowledge as not fixed, but rather emerging from “critical inquiry into existing problematic or limiting situations”. Problem-posing education about existing structures and relationships is also a model argued for by hooks (1994). She (ibid) embraces struggle as the crux of learning:

We must embrace struggle and sacrifice. We cannot be easily discouraged. We cannot despair when there is conflict. Our solidarity must be affirmed by shared belief in a spirit of intellectual openness that celebrates diversity, welcomes dissent, and rejoices in collective dedication to truth. (p. 33)

Freire (1998, p. 91) argues education cannot ever be neutral: it acts to either reproduce the status quo or interrogate it in creation of new possibilities. Education that acts to domesticate learners puts the critical citizenship education agenda at risk. Education must place the development of critical thinking and ‘presence’ as its core. Only this form of education will enable learners to explore possibilities for societal change as the practice of freedom. This change includes moving beyond structures and relationships that do not meet citizens’ understandings. Citizenship education is therefore essential in facilitating critical consciousness, and the changes to society that accompany it. In Aotearoa, this view stems from indigenous understandings of critical consciousness and being within the world.

3.4 CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TE AO MĀRAMA
Critical consciousness and the will to transform the world is a central aspect of a Māori world-view. In particular, these concepts arise in stories about the Creation and Te Ao Mārama.

The Creation
In Te Pakaka Tawhai’s (1988) writings on kōrero tahito (ancient explanations), the Creation is thought of by Māori as having a genealogical structure. This genealogy
maps the development of consciousness and humankind. Te Kore, described as “‘The Nothing’ or ‘Not The Nothing’”\textsuperscript{99}, evolved through aeons into Te Po, “The never-ending beginning” (Arnold Reedy, 1966, recalled\textsuperscript{100} by Tawhai, 1988, p. 857). Within Te Po an intuitive level of consciousness developed, and at this level, reproduction occurred. Rangi and Papa, in close embrace, conceived tamariki (children) between them. These tamariki bore the development of sensory consciousness, as they felt cramped in between their parent’s bodies. Emotional terms to consciousness were born as the tamariki longed for light and space. In the debate and subsequent separation of their parents, notions such as aroha (love and sympathy) and the desire for revenge came into existence (Tawhai, ibid). Now emerged within Te Ao Mārama, a world of light, the tamariki set about their posts: agriculture, war, forestry, marine development and so forth (Reedy, 1966, in Tawhai, 1988, p. 856). Tane, in addressing the “generative power” (ibid, p. 860) lacked by the tamariki, created from the earth the first woman, Hineahuone. She possessed this generative power, and passed it onto their daughter Hinetitama. Hinetitama eventually descended back into Te Po\textsuperscript{101}, becoming Hinenui Te Po, to welcome their descendants there once their life within Te Ao Mārama had passed (ibid).

A next significant step in the development of consciousness, as derived from Tawhai’s (ibid) writings, involves knowledge in the objective sense. Tane, overcoming harassment from other atua (gods), successfully reached Neherangi (the eleventh heaven) and retrieved the Baskets of Knowledge\textsuperscript{102}. The willingness of Tane, despite the hardships encountered, to retrieve these sources of knowledge are indicative of the great value with which knowledge should be regarded (ibid, p. 861).

The many writings on the ancestor Maui are then the example of how humankind can use knowledge to intervene in the world for the purposes of change. The circumstances around the birth, and subsequent upbringing, of Maui rendered him unusual. As accounted for by Reedy (1966, in Tawhai, 1988), he was thus allowed to delve into the

\textsuperscript{99} The word Te, depending on the emphasis of the ‘e’ can have both positive and negative meaning. As explained by Tawhai (1988, p. 857), ambiguity is a trait of super-beings and considered a norm.

\textsuperscript{100} Information is ‘recalled’ as definition was given in a speech by Arnold Reedy.

\textsuperscript{101} For a description of the events leading to Hinetitama’s retreat to Te Po, see Tawhai, 1988, p. 860.

\textsuperscript{102} Referred to in Māori lore as Ngā Kete o Te Wānanga, or Ngā Kete Mātauranga. See, for example, Best, 1924, p. 397.
baskets of knowledge. Some of the developments Maui is then remembered for include
the lengthening of the day and ensuring access to fire (see, for example, Grey, 1855,
1961). Maui is also an example of the limits humankind can take in one’s consciousness
and deeds to change the world. This is shown when, in an attempt to obtain immortality
for humankind, Maui is killed by Hinenui te Po (Tawhai, 1988, p. 860).

Te Ao Mārama

Consciousness, its stages of development, and its limits within Te Ao Mārama are thus
central aspects of a Māori world-view. In particular, they are evident in mana atua: that
Māori knowing and ways of being are descended genealogically from our gods. From a
Māori perspective, Friere’s expressions about consciousness and conscientisation are
readily grasped. Critical consciousness indicates an understanding of reality and that
one has the “capacity to transform reality through their action upon it” (Elias, 1994, p.
123). Drawing upon Tawhai’s (1988) explanation, this is a central aspect of the Creation
and Te Ao Mārama. Stories of the tamariki, of Tane, and then Maui all emphasis the
application of knowledge and will upon the world for the purposes of change. As
explained by Tawhai (ibid), once in Te Ao Mārama, wilful change was begun by the
tamariki, such as Tane, and continued by humankind, as expounded in the stories of
Maui. As part of mana atua, critical consciousness is therefore a right of Māori. It is an
integral aspect of Te Ao Mārama.

Rangatiratanga - upholding our rights

In Māori world-views, the act of upholding these rights is therefore a right in itself.
Upholding mana atua within Te Ao Mārama is an act of rangatiratanga. Rose Pere
(2006), in explaining her model of total well-being, emphasises self-determination
based on mana atua. Her rights to self-determination, she claims, derive from:

Knowing my whakapapa / genealogy and the vested authority I have within
that. I have Mana Atua / Divine Right. . . I have a direct line to the Source
of Life, and I do not need anyone to mediate on my behalf. (2006, p. 3)

Pere (2006, p. 1) emphasises well-being as a right to all humankind through the term
“rangatira”. Pere believes we are all “esteemed beings” descendant from the divine

source. As expressed by Pere (ibid), total well-being is one of the Divine Rights. It therefore is not a state of being to attain, but one individuals are born with and honour by upholding the traditions by which they can do so. Freire’s (1970b) notion of humanisation is similar. In his observations of the oppressed he notes their yearning for, not the attainment, but restoration of “their lost humanity” (Freire, 1970b, p. 26). The concept of humankind yearning for development is inherent in Tawhai’s (1978) writings on mana104. According to Tawhai (ibid), progressions of mana, tupu, as opposed to its regression (mate), are the terms within which members of his iwi:

\[ \ldots \text{see birth and death, night and day, this life and the next, and his innate urge is for tupu. (p. 16)} \]

As also indicated by Tawhai (ibid), tupu may require agreement or resistance depending on the circumstances. As he states, “a clear grasp of one’s contexts is therefore vital in order to know how best to act” (ibid, pp. 16–17). Tawhai thus inextricably links critical consciousness and the notion of tupu in human development. Arohia Durie (1992), in discussing the role of research in Māori development, emphasises both the need to advance consciousness and tupu:

\[ \text{Research should make a positive contribution to Māori needs, aims and aspirations as defined by Māori, a question of māramatanga or enlightenment through explanation and the enhancement of mana. (p. 293)} \]

Critical consciousness, and ‘a clear grasp of one’s context’, is therefore a pre-requisite to positive self-determinative action. It is our critical consciousness that enables citizens to act powerfully within the world, and continue to develop the world for the ongoing benefits of our uri whakaheke (descendants).

**Conclusion**

The politics of indigeneity in Aotearoa have increasingly a focus on the rights of self-determination. Certainly, the counter-claims and attacks on indigeneity have focused upon neutralising this right. That this tension manifests in education through the

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104 There is no definition given by Tawhai, thus the author is reluctant to provide one. However, for the purposes of providing a translation, Māori Marsden (2003) briefly defines mana as spiritual authority and power. See Marsden, 2003, p. 4.
silencing of these issues represents the challenges faced in forming an education which empower citizens to engage in this debate. Particularly, analyses such as Foucault’s view of power, and Freire’s culture of silence, illustrate the dangers of education in creating silent, obedient citizens. The notion of presence and dialogue in education emphasise the requirements of an education that can foster citizens’ ability to form their own understandings and debate them further. The embracing of diverse views and struggle, in particular, is argued an essential element of critical citizenship education. From a Māori world-view, critical consciousness ensures the ability for self-determinative action. As a project of rangatiratanga, the right to critical consciousness must be upheld. The following chapter looks further at these themes as they apply to this research.
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH FOR RANGATIRATANGA

Whoever you are, wherever you are... there are always ways to
gear your work towards progressive radical transformation\(^\text{105}\)

This chapter describes the methodology used in this research. An agenda of rangatiratanga requires in research a methodology that reinforces citizens’ rights to critical consciousness. When reviewing texts, the notion of presence and silence in critical discourse analyses assists this agenda. In line with past research, this thesis’ review of citizenship education focused upon the curriculum, in particular social studies. Content analysis then provided a systematic means in which to measure presence of the research topics within the social studies curriculum. Durie’s (2000) framework of mana was drawn upon to address the ethical issues in the research, and provide an appropriate ethical foundation for the researcher.

The first section of this chapter summarises the theoretical approach underpinning the methodology. Rangatiratanga, or self-determination, is affirmed as a research agenda. It asserts the role of citizenship education in improving race relations, and the health of Aotearoa’s democracy. The concepts of silence and silencing in critical discourse analysis contribute further to the methodology. These are considered from the Te Ao Mārama world-view.

The second section describes the research design. Because of its importance to efforts for rangatiratanga, the Māori Electoral Option was chosen as the example topic for investigation. A purpose of social studies, as identified in the Social Studies Curriculum Statement, is to deliver citizenship education. In particular, the topics of New Zealand settings and bicultural perspectives indicate a place for education about the Option.

The third section describes the content analysis method used to review the texts. A predictive content analysis approach served to answer the research question. The choice

\(^{105}\) Davis, 2000, 2 mins. 50 secs.
of categories is derived from the themes in this research, the variables being identified from the primary text (the Social Studies Curriculum Statement). The formulation of a coding book and form was part of this process, to ensure reliability and content validity.

The last section describes the ethical issues and limitations of the research undertaken. The notion of mana is revisited as an ethical basis for the researcher. The limitations of this research involved the research focus.

4.1 RANGATIRATANGA: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

Māori centered (Durie, et al., 1995), Kaupapa Māori (Smith, 1999), and Ngākau Māori (Durie, 2002) research methodologies emanate an agenda of rangatiratanga, or self-determination. It implies research for the purposes of Māori development, based on Māori thought and values (Durie, 2002). From this basis, these methodologies embody the discourse of indigeneity (Maaka and Fleras, 2005), which seeks to transform indigenous-state relations in the process of reclaiming for indigenous peoples their right to self-determination. Smith (1999) argues when a research has an agenda of self-determination;

\[
\ldots \text{it becomes a goal of social justice} \ldots \text{the processes of transformation, of decolonization, of healing and of mobilization as peoples. (p. 116)}
\]

This research is shaped by such a goal. It calls for a revitalised approach to citizenship education to transform race relations in Aotearoa. It sees improving race relations as a cycle of healing in which citizenship education can be a driver. Improvements come when greater understandings about the nature of unity, beyond homogeneity, are formed. Improvements are furthered when citizens are mobilised to rearrange their democratic structures to reflect those understandings. This is the social justice citizenship education provides. Citizens of Aotearoa will enjoy greater social justice when our democratic arrangements reflect a greater understanding of our relationships. Citizenship education in Aotearoa must therefore provide citizens with the tools to form understandings, and enlist their creativity and zeal to the task of replicating them in our democracy. Rangatiratanga seeks the means by which such understandings, and the changes led by those understandings, can be achieved. In research, it seeks out methods
and approaches that assist the agenda of self-determination. One approach that assists this research agenda is critical discourse analysis.

**Critical Discourse Analysis**

As summarised by Locke (2004), critical discourse analysis views reality as mediated textually, or through texts, and intertextually, or the through the way texts build upon each other and each other’s discourses. It views text as sites for the flow of discourse. On this basis, it views the analysis of texts as a way to reveal how discourse consolidates power. As a research method, it is described as “a political intervention with its own socially transformative agenda” (Locke, 2004, p. 2). As argued by Fairclough (1995), critical discourse analysis focuses on three interrelated dimension; texts, discourse practise and socio-cultural practise. Across these dimensions, texts are explored in three ways. First, discourse analysis examines texts for patterns made up of language and style. Second, it explores the way texts operates, the way it formes, is disseminated, interpreted, and its relationship to other texts. Third, it observes the ways texts reflect social-cultural practises. In this way, critical discourse analysis provides an analysis on whether a text subscribes to a particular discourse, and whether the text perpetuates hegemony or is counter-hegemonic (Locke, 2004). As described by Locke (ibid, p. 38), as a research approach, critical discourse analysis is “concerned with the ways in which power relations produced by discourses are maintained and / or challenged through texts”. As part of its interrogation of power, critical discourse analysis examines the absence or silence of discourse within texts.

**Silence**

Thiesmeyer (2003, p. 4) describes silencing as an “active and socially constructed practise” of undermining or removing discourse in language (verbal and textual). Suppression of the right to freedom of speech is an example of silencing in the overt sense. However, silencing also operates as a concealed process. This is achieved when it replaces one discourse with another, or filters one discourse through the language of another. Silencing as a process is most effective when it conceals itself, thereby concealing the very existence of the silenced discourse. By doing so, it contributes to the perpetuation of social structures and relations by suppressing the praxis that would act to transform those relations. This is because, by selecting which discourses will appear in text, it “constructs and edits our knowledge, which in turn shapes our choices

Some of the questions about silencing that critical discourse analysis asks are: what meaning is attributed to the silencing of certain discourses? What is its purpose? (Johnston, 2002). Questions arising in this research are: is there an intertextuality to silence? To what extent does this contribute to the continued employment of silencing? If yes, what are the ways in which the intertextuality of silence is woven across society? As accounted for by Thiesmeyer (2003, p. 4), silencing is not naturally perpetuated (as in, is not naturally intertextual) but “is subject to shifts, and constantly participates in the creation of new relations”. Because silencing is not self-perpetuating, but needs to be constantly re-employed in its regulation of discourse, as a process it is evident of unequal power relations. Subsequently, the theory of silencing has been utilised in the analysis of the oppression of women (Towns, Adams and Gavey, 2003), ethnic groups (Wodak, 2003) and political opposition (Galasinski, 2003).

The silencing of diversity is a particular concern when exploring models of education that intend to prepare citizens to engage in democracy. To reiterate, diversity of discourses and world-views is essential to democracy (Arthur and Davison, 2000; Berding and Miedema, 1998; Dewey, 1918; Feinberg, Fields and Roberts, 1997). To the learner, as stated by Arthur and Davison (2000, p. 19): “Critical awareness of alternative discourses allows the possibility of choice among them. . . It is also the essence of the education of free citizens”. The silencing of some discourses nullifies diversity, and thereby inhibits democracy. The consequent fragmentation of knowledge, in contrast to a full consideration of all discourses present, again reflects Freire’s notion of a fragmented consciousness and the inability of citizens to be free in their engagement with the world.

Silence and Te Ao Mārama

Te Ao Mārama does not indicate guaranteed access to all knowledge, or all forms of knowledge. From a Māori world-view, specialised knowledge in many instances is
reserved for specialists (tohunga). Discourse, however, implies something different from knowledge alone. It is also awareness and belief about the way things are and can be in society (Abercrombie, et. al., 2000). Belief about what is possible is how citizens will engage with the world, and rearrange the world to realise those possibilities. This is how critical consciousness empowers citizens in the practise of freedom. Drawing back to Tawhai’s (1988) explanations, the creation stories tell us this is part of mana atua, or rights genealogically descended within Te Ao Mārama. As expressed by Pere (2006, p. 1), this genealogy embodies our existence as “rangatira” and the ability to “mediate” on our own behalf. The employing of silence, and the subjugation of some realities to promote others, therefore is an attack upon citizens’ “clear grasp of one’s contexts” (Tawhai, 1978, pp. 16–17) and the ability to live freely.

An agenda of rangatiratanga in research thus requires a methodology whose purpose is to uphold our rights in Te Ao Mārama, including the right to critical consciousness. It enlists research to function in a way that unveils the factors that would undermine those rights, and identifies those that would affirm them. The effects of presence and silence upon the right to critical consciousness therefore frame the examination of the research data in this thesis.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The text reviewed by this research was the current Ministry of Education’s New Zealand Curriculum Framework for schools, the Statement Social Studies in the New Zealand Curriculum and its units, and the New Zealand Curriculum: draft for consultation. The review focused upon what presence citizenship education had in the social studies curriculum, in particular Aotearoa’s bi-political context and the provisions for the Māori political voice. A content analysis method was employed for this.

Identification of topic

The Māori Electoral Option was chosen as an example topic to investigate what citizenship education is imparted to citizens about Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy. As states the Electoral Commission (2005), the Māori parliamentary seats are a unique and distinctive feature of New Zealand’s electoral system. For Māori, the seats are a primary expression of rangatiratanga in engagement with kāwanatanga. They act to advance Māori collective rights in the face of Pākehā majority interests (Sullivan,
2003). They serve as a forum to promote Māori rights to cultural integrity, and the avenue through which greater levels of rangatiratanga can be realised (Royal Commission, 1986). Indigeneity advocates a space for Māori to manifest an authentic voice, requiring the transformation of repressive indigenous-Crown relations (Maaka and Fleras, 2005). The seats provide such a space, and challenge the current arrangements for power-sharing in the Māori-Pākehā relationship. They reject assertions of unity through homogeneity, through providing a place for difference. They express Māori engagement as citizens of political communities in partnership with the state, instead of as subjects of it. In this way, the seats empower Māori citizens in an ultimate expression of rangatiratanga, and provide the foundation for visions of how to better realise our bi-political democracy. Subsequently, the seats are also the most contested feature of Aotearoa’s democratic arrangements, on the basis they are undemocratic and undermine the principle of equality of citizens (for example, see Brash, 2004). As the most distinctive feature of New Zealand’s electoral system, any citizenship education in New Zealand schools would include the Māori Parliamentary seats. Because of its significance in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, the presence of the Māori Electoral Option in education is important to critical consciousness.

Selection of data

Citizenship education is education about matters regarding citizenship, or education about ‘the status and practice of being a citizen’ (Lister 1997). Past research about citizenship education in New Zealand has focused on the curriculum, the practices of schools and educators with the curriculum, and in particular, the area of social studies (Simon, 1992; Openshaw, 1996; O’Neil, et. al., 2004). The New Zealand curriculum consists of a Curriculum Framework and seven National Curriculum Statements, one for each of the seven essential learning area: Language and Languages, Mathematics, Science, Technology, The Arts, Health and Physical Well-being, and Social Studies. Citizenship education is delivered through the social studies curriculum, as outlined in the Social Studies Curriculum Statement: “to enable students to participate in a changing society as informed, confident, and responsible citizens” (Ministry of Education, 1997, p. 8). This aim is achieved through learners developing knowledge and understandings of five social studies strands (social organisation; culture and heritage; place and environment; time, continuity and change, and; resources and economic activities), and developing skills in three social studies processes (inquiry,
values exploration, and social decision-making). Content for delivery of these knowledges and skills, as stipulated by the Statement, is to be drawn from six settings (New Zealand, the Pacific, Europe, Asia, other settings, and global settings), and five perspectives (bicultural perspectives, multicultural perspectives, gender perspectives, perspectives on current issues, and perspectives about the future). A summary of essential learning about New Zealand society and bicultural perspectives include:

- The nature of biculturalism and the partnership between Māori and Pākehā (p. 21)
- The bicultural heritage of New Zealand society (p. 21)
- The effects of colonization for Māori and Pākehā (p. 23)
- Māori culture and heritage and the influence on New Zealand’s social, cultural, political and religious beliefs and systems (p. 23)
- European culture and heritage and the influence on New Zealand’s social, cultural, political and religious beliefs and systems (p. 23)
- Perspectives of tangata whenua as these affect contemporary systems, policies, and events (p. 23)
- The Treaty of Waitangi, its significance as the founding document of New Zealand, how it has been interpreted over time, and how it is applied to current systems, policies and events (p. 23)
- The origins, development, and operation of systems of government and law, of the franchise, and of local and national democratic institutions (p. 23)
- Current events and issues within New Zealand (p. 23)

As these aspects indicate, citizenship education focusing on New Zealand society and biculturalism intertwine two distinct topics; society’s democratic arrangements, and the Māori-Pākehā relationship. It also indicates a third topic, which intertwines the two: the affects of difference on systems and policies. Through these topics, the social studies curriculum provides a place for education about the Māori Electoral Option.

**Gathering of data**

For each of the five social studies strands, the Social Studies Curriculum Statement stipulates two achievement aims, and two achievement objectives derived from those
aims at each of the eight achievement levels. Units are then provided by the Ministry of Education to support the delivery of the curriculum at each achievement level. These are provided through the Ministry’s Social Studies Online, Tikanga-a-Iwi-ā-Ipurangi site. Teachers are expected to develop their own units; the provided units are for support purposes only. However, they are the primary examples provided by the Ministry to teachers to work from. The objectives and units of each achievement level will identify the place of citizenship education, and Māori Electoral Option content.

4.3 DATA ANALYSIS
As defined by Krippendorff (1980, p. 21), content analysis is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their content”. Content analysis when employed in the analysis of texts concentrates on word usage (Neuendorf, 2002). It embodies a quantitative approach by producing a count of variables present in the text, and the emphasis on topics (categories) they represent. The measure of different categories and variables indicate the characteristics of the text, for example, through the extent to which a category or certain variables are given attention in a text (Suvedi, et. al., 1999). Predictive content analysis then infers outcomes or effects of the text’s characteristics on audiences (Neuendorf, 2002).

Research question
This research produces a count of the Māori Electoral Option variable within citizenship education categories of social studies curriculum texts. Drawing upon the theoretical basis of this thesis, inferences can then be drawn regarding what extent the curriculum prepares citizens to deliberate on citizenship matters, in particular the Māori Electoral Option. This will answer the research question: what education does the New Zealand curriculum provide about the nature of New Zealand’s bi-political democracy?

Coding
An inductive method for coding variables was used, drawing upon the above aspects from the social studies curriculum. Because the variables are coded from content

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106 Levels 1 to 8, which span across teaching Years 1 to 13. See Ministry of Education, 1997, p. 9.
107 Unit development was contracted externally by the Ministry of Education. See Social studies Online, www.tki.org.nz/r/socialscience/curriculum/SSOL/about_e.php
108 The review of units focuses on the assessment material, not the introductory outline as it reiterates the achievement objectives. This was so the data was exclusive to that reviewed in the objectives section.
indictors given in the primary text (the Curriculum Statement), the variables should provide a high degree of reliability (consistency) in relation to all texts (for example, the units designed to deliver that curriculum). The topics identified in the primary text categorised the variables. Category 1 captures the concepts regarding democratic arrangements: governance, electoral system, rights. More specific, closely defined variables were chosen for category 2 (the Māori-Pākehā relationship): biculturalism, indigeneity, Treaty of Waitangi. Category 3, specifically about ‘providing for difference’, consists of the two variables ‘learning about identity’ and ‘change for diversity’. The variable ‘Māori Electoral Option’ was then included. The Māori Electoral Option represents the interface between all categories.

To ensure content validity, a dictionary (index) was created for each variable. This involved testing and amending the variables list to ensure the variables were mutually exclusive. For example, the dictionary for the Māori Electoral Option variable is: Māori Parliamentary seats, Māori Electoral seats, Māori Electorates, Māori Electoral Option, Māori political representation. Wider concepts such as ‘Māori political rights’ were omitted from the Option variable. This was to ensure high content validity when measuring for this more specific variable. As the variables were to become more specific, it was expected they would appear less. This is in line with the research objective to, first, identify the broad place of citizenship education, and second, more specifically the presence of the Māori Electoral Option. To further identify that place within citizenship education, the topics ‘Māori-Pākehā relationship’ and ‘providing for difference’ were included. This research focus is expressed in figure 1:

![Figure 1: The research focus – seeking the Māori Electoral Option](image)

109 See Appendix 2.
Analysis

The data analysis was twofold. The presence of citizenship education was measured, first, in the Social Studies Curriculum Statement, second, in the units for delivery of that curriculum\textsuperscript{110}. This involved a count of variables belonging to categories 1 (democratic arrangements), 2 (Māori-Pākehā relationship) and 3 (providing for difference), including the Māori Electoral Option variable. Analysis of the text’s characteristics then provided an answer to the research question.

The initial review of the Social Studies Statement identified which achievement objectives of the five strands and eight teaching levels include citizenship education in the categories under review (democratic arrangements, the Māori-Pākehā relationship, providing for differences). The outcome of the initial review indicated which units are appropriate to measure. The way the social studies curriculum delivery is structured, a single unit can cover several achievement objectives, teaching levels, blend across different social studies strands, and incorporate several settings and perspectives. Units that incorporated any one of the relevant achievement objectives (where variables are present) were included. The coding form for units was slightly more complex in order to include all texts characteristics, such as strands, for analysis\textsuperscript{111}.

4.4 ETHICS AND LIMITS

The ethical issues of this study concerned the membership of the researcher to the relationship under observation. This was resolved by returning to discussions about the research purpose, and exploring mana as an ethical foundation for the researcher in this work. The limitations concerned the scope of the research focus.

Ethics

This research does not involve human participants, but rather the review of texts by a researcher. The ethical issues relating to this project therefore concerned the researcher; first, the membership of the researcher to the Māori-Pākehā relationship under discussion, and second, the need for validity in the content analysis process in consideration of the role the text under analysis has in the maintenance of that

\textsuperscript{110} See Coding Book and Form, Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{111} See Unit Coding form, Appendix 2.
relationship. These issues were brought back to the world-view of the researcher about Te Ao Mārama and the concept of mana.

As states Durie (2000, p. 15), research concerning Māori is “ethically appropriate” when drawing “upon Māori cultural values for guidance, upon Māori systems of ethicality and cultural imperatives”. Durie (1998) draws upon the notion of mana to explain ethics from a Māori world-view. These are mana tangata, the dignity and safety of researchers and participants; mana whakahaere, Māori authority and control in decision-making; mana a iwi, the fostering of outcomes which benefit Māori, and; and mana whenua, acknowledging the rights of tangata whenua. In this framework, Durie (2000, p. 19) emphasises the need for “acknowledgement that research and processes have the potency to shape meaning and foster action, so outcomes should benefit Māori aspirations”. The concept of mana therefore provides an appropriate ethical basis for the researcher. It is in line with discourse of indigeneity, and the social justice goal of rangatiratanga, central to this thesis.

Limitations
There are limitations to this research. These limitations relate to the research focus. First, it could be argued that the focus of this research is contradictory to rangatiratanga as it concentrates on kāwanatanga. However, as notes Maaka and Fleras (2005), Battiste (2000), and Smith (1999), indigenous peoples have had little choice but to pursue their well-being through the state’s framework. It represents a paradox in indigenous peoples’ efforts: challenging the legitimacy of the state, while seemingly endorsing it through engagement. Maaka and Fleras (2005, p. 28) clarify engagement by indigenous peoples as not one of subjects of the state, but rather “to endorse the principled relationship based on a nation-to-nation arrangement”. Improved race relations in Aotearoa can be measured when an equitable level of political power is afforded to Māori in its democratic arrangements. This thesis stems from rangatiratanga in that it focuses upon how education can help citizens of Aotearoa achieve such a relationship.

Second, due to size restrictions, there are issues that were not included in the research focus. Issues for further consideration are the origins of the concept of citizenship and of citizenship education. Also for further investigation are how these concepts have evolved globally, and how they relate to the experiences and priorities of indigenous
peoples. What this research does explore is how citizenship has evolved for Māori through the Treaty partnership, and how education has and can be used in this relationship.

Third, the focus upon the social studies curriculum achievement objectives and units may have limited the study. In particular, the units provided by the Ministry of Education are intended to support, not entirely constitute, the delivery of the social studies curriculum. Teachers are free and expected to amend the units to better suit the needs of their students, and to further develop their own. The units therefore are not intended as the ‘be all and end all’ for delivery of the social studies curriculum. What this thesis argues, however, is that the Statement’s objectives and units are the primary directives for teachers in the delivery of that curriculum. In particular, units are the ‘examples’ for social studies education. They therefore are an important point of review and development.

Conclusion

A research agenda of rangatiratanga is strengthened through the affirmation of citizenship education as a means to improve the Māori-Pākehā relationship. Critical discourse analysis assists this agenda by interrogating the power of those controlling education to silence discourses and promote others. The act of silencing is seen to undermine the right of citizens to critical consciousness within Te Ao Mārama. Because of its significance in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, the presence of Māori Electoral Option material in education is seen as important to critical consciousness. The purpose of social studies, as outlined in Social Studies Curriculum Statement, is to provide citizenship education. It is therefore reasonable to expect that this includes a place for the Māori Electoral Option. Content analysis can produce a count of the Māori Electoral Option within citizenship education material, in social studies curriculum texts, and is therefore an strong tool for measuring research data. Within this research, the notion of mana provides an appropriate ethical basis. The next chapter describes the research findings.
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS
CITIZENSHIP IN THE CURRICULUM

The classroom does not exist outside the historical and political climates of the wider society

This chapter presents the findings of this research. The presence of citizenship education in New Zealand’s social studies curriculum for schools is measured, based upon a review of social studies statement, strand achievement objectives and the social studies units provided to support delivery of those objectives. The possible presence of citizenship education in the future is derived from an analysis of the recently released draft curriculum.

The first section of this chapter describes what presence the Māori Electoral Option has in New Zealand’s current curriculum. A review of the Ministry of Education’s Statement Social Studies in the Curriculum identified which achievement objectives included citizenship education in the research categories (democratic arrangements, the Māori-Pākehā relationship, providing for differences). The units appropriate to those objectives were then also measured. A review of the data revealed a strong focus on cultural identity, a moderate focus on democratic arrangements, and a neglect of issues about the Māori-Pākehā relationship, including the Māori Electoral Option.

The second section of this chapter explores the potential presence of the Māori Electoral Option in future social studies education, based on an initial review of the new draft curriculum. It compares the contents of the previous curriculum framework to the draft, as a means to measure change and infer future direction.

5.1 PRESENCE
A review of the curriculum looked for three distinct citizenship education categories: democratic arrangements, the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and providing for difference. It searched for material on the Māori Electoral Option as part of each category. The variables sought were: governance, electoral system, rights; biculturalism, indigeneity,

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112 Durie, 2002, p .3.
‘Treaty of Waitangi’; ‘learning about identity’ and ‘change for diversity’; and ‘Māori Electoral Option’.

Achievement Objectives
The Social Studies Statement outlines five strands; social organisation; culture and heritage; place and environment; time, continuity and change, and; resources and economic activities. Each of the five social studies strands has two achievement objectives at each of the eight achievement levels. A review of all achievement objectives summarises the place of the research categories within the curriculum. The numbers in brackets beside the bottom number of total variables are the total number of achievement objective indicators within a strand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Variables (abbreviated)</th>
<th>Achievement Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social organism.</td>
<td>culture &amp; heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic arrangement Governance</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori–Pākehā relationship Biculturalism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing for difference Identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Social Studies Statement: the number and type of variables present.

Several initial observations about social studies can be made from the above table. First, citizenship education about democratic arrangements has a moderate place in New Zealand’s curriculum, not a strong place. It appears in three out of five social studies strands, and reasonably strongly in the social organisation strand where it would most likely appear. This education about democratic arrangements appears to emphasise citizens’ rights, however is weak about what form those arrangements take. Second, citizenship education in New Zealand has a strong focus on cultural identity, and understanding other cultures. This includes learning about cultural practices and interaction between different cultural groups. All strands made some mention of culture
and identity. The large bulk of this was in the Culture and Heritage strand (36 out of 52 indicators). The next largest, but fairly modest, grouping of that variable appeared in Time, Continuity and Change (16 out of 53).

Third, it is clear from this table that there is a gap between the Curriculum Framework, the essential learning summary in the Social Studies Statement, and the achievement objectives of that Statement. First, the Curriculum (2000, p. 8) expresses the “significance of the Treaty of Waitangi” and the “unique position of Māori in New Zealand society”. The Statement then highlights as essential learning in the social studies curriculum; the nature of biculturalism and the partnership between Māori and Pākehā (p. 21); the bicultural heritage of New Zealand society (p. 21); perspectives of tangata whenua (p. 23); as well as the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi (p. 23). However, the variables ‘Treaty of Waitangi’ and partnership are not mentioned in the achievement objectives; neither are the concepts ‘bicultural heritage’ and ‘tangata whenua’. Biculturalism is mentioned once as a concept for study, along with others such as multiculturalism; however, it is not specified in the Māori-Pākehā relationship context. Lastly, although the essential learning areas of the Statement indicate a place for education about the Māori Electoral Option, it did not appear across the 258 achievement objective indicators.

One reason why the Māori Electoral Option variable did not appear may be because achievement objectives and their indicators highlight general topics, not specificities. For example, the word biculturalism appeared once, but not in regard to New Zealand’s ‘bicultural heritage’. If specificities are to be expected, it is from the units.

**Units**

The review of the achievement objectives by achievement level indicates which units at which levels were appropriate to measure. The outcome revealed a majority of achievement levels (38 out of 45) had variables in their achievement objectives. In addition, the structure of the social studies units can mean a single unit can blend across different social studies strands. On gathering units with the relevant objective levels, 68 out of the total 77 units were included. Because of the small number of units excluded, the remaining 9 were also checked for relevant variables within the material. This led to a further 2 units being included.
Of the 70 units reviewed, most focused upon delivery of a particular social studies strands (65), a few across several strands (5). Units were evenly mixed between focusing on one setting (32) and multiple settings (38). Some incorporated one perspective (22), while most incorporated multiple perspectives (48). 28 units included multiple variables, while 22 units included singular variables. Despite the appropriate reference in their achievement objectives, 20 units had no variables present. The following table indicates which variables appeared, and across what strands\textsuperscript{113}. The first column shows how many units belonging to that strand included a particular variable. The second column shows how many times that variable appeared across the given units in that strand.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Variables} & \textbf{Social organisation} & \textbf{culture & heritage} & \textbf{Place & environment} & \textbf{time, cont. & change.} & \textbf{Resources & economics.} & \textbf{Total variables} \\
\hline
\textbf{Governance} & 9 (61) & 0 (0) & 3 (8) & 3 (11) & 4 (6) & 19 (86) \\
\hline
\textbf{Electoral system} & 2 (7) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 1 (1) & 0 (0) & 3 (8) \\
\hline
\textbf{Rights} & 8 (25) & 1 (1) & 0 (0) & 3 (26) & 4 (14) & 16 (66) \\
\hline
\textbf{Biculturalism} & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) \\
\hline
\textbf{Indigeneity} & 3 (17) & 4 (55) & 6 (81) & 7 (44) & 1 (3) & 21 (200) \\
\hline
\textbf{Treaty of Waitangi} & 3 (51) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 7 (47) & 0 (0) & 10 (98) \\
\hline
\textbf{Learning about Identity} & 6 (37) & 11 (145) & 4 (12) & 6 (24) & 1 (4) & 28 (222) \\
\hline
\textbf{Change for Diversity} & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) \\
\hline
\textbf{Māori Electoral Option} & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) & 0 (0) \\
\hline
\textbf{Total variables} & 31 (198) & 16 (201) & 13 (101) & 27 (153) & 10 (27) & 97 (680) \\
\hline
\textbf{Total number of units} & 18 & 11 & 17 & 13 & 11 & 70 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Social Studies Units: the number of variables present per strand.}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{113} For the 5 units that stated two strands, for example a supporting strand, the first strand was counted.
The results of Table 2 show that in the 18 units that deliver achievement objectives for the Social Organisation strand, different variables appear across units 31 times, at a total of 198 times. For example, the variable ‘learning about identity’ appears in 6 different units, 37 times across those 6 units. In the 11 units for the Culture and Heritage strand, different variables appear across units 16 times, a total of 201 times. In the 17 units for the Place and Environment strand, different variables appear across units 13 times, a total of 101 times. In the 13 units for Time, Continuity and Change, different variables appear 27 times, a total of 153 times. In the 11 units for Resources and Economic Activities, different variables appear 10 times, a total of 27 times. Several characteristics about citizenship education in New Zealand can be drawn from Table 2:

- Citizenship education currently has a moderate place in the social studies curriculum. The probability of social studies units featuring citizenship education variables is 1.38 (97 times across 70 units).

- Learning about culture, heritage, and the identity of different cultural groups has an important place in citizenship education in New Zealand. It features in approximately 40% of all social studies units. This includes discussion on how cultures change over time and through interaction with other cultures. There is no discussion, however, on systems and institutions changing to accommodate cultural diversity. This is despite the topic of ‘providing for diversity’ being stipulated in the Social Studies Curriculum Statement.

- Of the variables being measured, Māori content arose in 21% of all variables, and a total of 30% across all units. Most prominent was the significance of Māori terms and heritage to places and environments.

- Issues to do with governance, including parliament, government, legislation and institutions, appear across 27% of all units. These primarily appear in the units concerning how we are organised as a society (61 out of a total 86).

- After issues about governance, learning about rights and responsibilities is the next most important aspect in citizenship education. It appears across 22% of all units, or 16% of the time when compared with other variables. There is a strong
focus on human rights. These units also include education about the right to vote. Information about the Suffragettes and the movement for the women’s vote features in this material.

- The Treaty of Waitangi is mentioned 98 times in the 70 units. This, however, arises mainly out of a few units that concentrate solely on the Treaty. It appears 10% of the time. There is no mention at any time of “New Zealand’s bicultural heritage” or the Māori-Pākehā “partnership” as stipulated in the Social Studies Statement. Save for one unit about Māori protest, issues about the Māori-Pākehā relationship focus on historical contact.

- The place of education about New Zealand’s electoral system and types of electoral systems is poor in the social studies curriculum. It appears 4% of the time across the 70 units, or 3% out of all variables.

- The Māori Electoral Option does not feature once across the 70 units. This is a further reflection of the poor place of education about the electoral system in the curriculum. A further search of all units and additional resources on the units’ website, using the websites search tool, found no presence of Māori Electoral option material.

Education about democratic arrangements, as it relates to citizens rights, or example, therefore has a moderate place in social studies education in New Zealand. Certain aspects, though, such as a thorough examination of New Zealand’s electoral system, are absent. Māori culture and perspectives feature in the curriculum, concerning Māori as the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa, with a history that precedes European arrival, and customs and knowledge associated to the landscape. This accompanies the strong focus on culture, heritage, and the cultural identity of different groups. There is, however, no presence in the curriculum of material about providing for differences in society’s structures. Similarly, there is no material about the relationship between Māori and Pākehā as it relates to society today. Instead, the focus is upon the historical relationship and Māori grievances. There is no mention of the current provisions for power-sharing in that relationship, such as the Māori Electoral Option. Thus, there is no education about the nature of Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy.
5.2 POSSIBILITIES

To reiterate, the current Curriculum Framework further outlines foundation principles to guide teaching and learning in all New Zealand schools, including recognition of “the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi”, and “the unique position of Māori in New Zealand society” (Ministry of Education, 2000, p. 8). There are obviously some significant gaps between the Curriculum Framework, the Social Studies Statement, and what actually appears in the achievement objectives and units. There is major development needed in the units to meet the principles and objectives set in the curriculum policy documents. Comparison of the current Framework to the Draft Curriculum Framework\(^{114}\) provides further indication of the changing direction of social studies education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Current Framework</th>
<th>Draft curriculum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic arrangement</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori-Pākehā relationship</td>
<td>Biculturalism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigeneity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Waitangi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing for difference</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Māori Electoral Option</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total variables</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Variables present in curriculum statements – current and draft.

As it appears, the Draft focuses on the strengths of the previous Curriculum and builds on them. The importance of understanding diverse cultures and identity is further advanced. The areas of neglect, however, are left still. The Draft Curriculum states, at the senior secondary level, students will be able to learn about specialised areas of social studies. Education about our democratic arrangements and electoral system, however, is not on the list of those mentioned (see Ministry of Education, 2006, p. 22). The next considerable difference between the two frameworks is the Draft does not mention the Treaty of Waitangi, as a principle or in any other context. The proposed

\(^{114}\) Specifically the texts of each stipulating the curriculum content.
principle of ‘Cultural Heritage’ states all New Zealanders will “experience a curriculum that reflects New Zealand’s bicultural heritage” (ibid, p. 9). This again suggests a focus on how Māori and Pākehā cultural aspects contribute to the national ‘New Zealand identity’, with a minor note on early Māori-Pākehā interaction. It does nothing to address the Māori-Pākehā relationship as it is currently in play. In regards to ‘tangata whenua perspectives’, students who “identify as Māori” are promised “the opportunity to experience a curriculum that reflects te ao Māori” (ibid, p. 9). That statement is problematic for several reasons. First, ‘opportunity’ indicates an aspect of choice for school children with regard to the aspects of the curriculum the teacher chooses to deliver. Second, the shift from all students learning about Māori perspectives to the individual student ‘who identifies as Māori’ being able to receive such an education is worrying. This analysis will be further elaborated upon in the next chapter.

Conclusion
In conclusion, a review of the current material for the delivery of the social studies curriculum raises some concerns for citizenship education in Aotearoa. It is clear from the review that there is a variance between the Framework, the essential learning summary in the Statement, and the actual achievement objectives and units. In particular, there is a distinct neglect of the Māori-Pākehā relationship as it relates to Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy. For example, all social studies material is silent about the Māori Electoral Option. Instead of addressing current weaknesses, the Draft Curriculum focuses upon strengthening already strong areas, while further weakening others. The withdrawal of the Treaty is a primary example, and suggests a further weakening of education about the Māori-Pākehā relationship. The next chapter discusses the implications of a weak citizenship education agenda in Aotearoa.
This chapter discusses the implications of limited citizenship education in Aotearoa. In particular, it discusses the silence of citizenship education material about the Māori Electoral Option, and the implications that this silence has for our democracy. The continued neglect of these issues in education will cause further misunderstandings in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and among future citizens coming to live in Aotearoa. Based on Te Ao Mārama, a new model for citizenship education is suggested, that would serve both Māori and Pākehā needs in continuing the relationship, and engaging in our nation.

The first section of this chapter describes the dilemmas silencing has for democracy in Aotearoa. It revisits diversity as the basis for democracy, and the need for representation of diverse needs, interests and perspectives in education preparing citizens to engage in a democracy. The presence of these diverse interests in education allows citizens to dialogue and debate about them in the development of society. Therefore, presence is directly linked to societal progression.

The second section examines the effects of silence on the Māori-Pākehā relationship. It reviews the frustrations of ‘mainstream New Zealand’ based on understandings of equality, and perceptions about privilege. A review of the frustrations of Māori focuses upon the inability of an uninformed citizenry to consider alternatives to the present power-sharing arrangements. In effect, Māori are ‘captured in consent’ in the current provisions for Māori representation.

The last section explores how a strong citizenship education programme could benefit Aotearoa. It reviews how citizenship education can reconcile the issues of democracy

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115 The face not seen: to be unseen is to not exist.
and misunderstanding about the Māori-Pākehā relationship. Understandings about Te Ao Mārama provide a path for future consideration of such an education.

6.1 DEMOCRACY IN DILEMMA

As the analysis of the social studies curriculum in the previous chapter has shown, citizenship education in Aotearoa has a strong focus on diversity of cultures, heritage and identity. It also focuses on how cultures change and adapt over time, and in interaction with others. The contribution of each culture to New Zealand’s national identity is explored and acknowledged. Education about diversity in New Zealand, however, goes no further than describing the different cultures that nationally, and globally, co-exist. There is no exploration of how societies change and are rearranged to provide for diversity, or how society currently provides for diversity. There is no education on the fundamental structures for difference in our democratic arrangements, such as the Māori Electoral Option. As a purpose of education is “to enable students to participate in a changing society as informed, confident, and responsible citizens” (Ministry of Education, 1997, p. 8), this poses some problems for the future of Aotearoa’s democracy.

Democracy and diversity

Diversity is central to models of education that intend to prepare citizens for democracy. The articulation of needs, interests and perspectives that are “numerous and varied” (Berding and Miedema, 1998, p. 285) indicate how healthy a democracy is. Learning about different discourses is therefore a valuable characteristic of education for democracy (Arthur and Davison, 2000; Feinberg, Fields and Roberts, 1997). In education for democracy in Aotearoa, the diverse needs, interests and perspectives of Māori should be acknowledged. Māori aspirations and models for development offer perspectives indigenous to Aotearoa, based on Māori world-views and values. They are born from diverse Māori experiences, and encapsulate urban, pan-tribal, hapū and iwi Māori interests. The silence of education about fundamental expressions of Māori interests through the Māori parliamentary seats is therefore harmful to democracy in Aotearoa. It represents the silencing of Māori needs and perspectives. It negates Māori visions for the future by not giving them room to be acknowledged. Relegating Māori issues and perspectives to the category of history, and historical claims, negates the currency of Māori interests and aspirations. If awareness of Māori interests is weakened, democracy is weakened. Citizens will be disempowered as knowledge about Māori
needs and interests will be absent in the education they draw from to inform their engagement. Without diversity, citizens cannot realise the democracy meant to drive our society.

**Progression and presence**

The presence of varied needs, interests and perspectives therefore does not stifle, but is essential, to the progression of democracy in society. Presence ensures citizens can develop informed perspectives about society, appreciate others’ interests, and debate society’s development. This is the “essence of the education of free citizens” (Arthur and Davison, 2000, p. 19). An education void of needs, interests, and perspectives of society’s diverse groups traps citizens in their ignorance. In Aotearoa, the silence of education about the Māori Electoral Option means citizens are trapped in their inability to enter into dialogue and informed debate. Citizens’ awareness of options and the ability to assume progressive action is stifled. Education is the practice of freedom when citizens debate understandings about their situation, and how it could change (Petruzzi, 1997). The futures citizens envisage cannot incorporate benefits for all, when based on the views of some. Unity in homogeneity stagnates progression, as it limits future possibilities. Omission of the Māori Electoral Option in education silences the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and the visions where society’s structures are developed and shaped to better reflect that relationship. To revisit Arthur and Davison (2000, p. 11), citizenship education would see citizens “question, critique, debate, and even take a leadership role in proposing alternative models of the structures and processes of democracy”. Only the presence of aspects such as the Māori Electoral Option will enable citizens to debate and envision Aotearoa’s progression.

6.2 **A RELATIONSHIP UNDER STRAIN**

Accompanying the focus on culture and heritage in Aotearoa’s citizenship education is a focus on the Treaty of Waitangi, and the Māori and Pākehā aspects of culture and interaction. Māori culture and perspectives are explored with acknowledgement of Māori life preceding European arrival, and ongoing customs and knowledge associated to the land and other natural resources. Kaumatua are highlighted in the curriculum as educational resources in the community, who can share Māori cultural history and perspectives. The history of the Treaty of Waitangi is examined, as is major Treaty breeches and the efforts to have grievances addressed. There is, however, no education
about the relationship between Māori and Pākehā as it relates to society today. There is an absence of curriculum content about providing for Māori rights to self-determination in decision-making. There is no mention of the current provisions for power-sharing in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, such as the Māori Electoral Option. This absence creates a void in citizens’ understanding of, and thereby their ability to continue to progress this relationship.

The angry face of ‘mainstream New Zealand’

Frustrations of ‘mainstream New Zealand’ over Māori claims to rangatiratanga, and provisions such as the Māori Electoral Option, are underpinned by claims that this affords Māori privilege. These frustrations arise from wider society’s need to guard ‘equality of opportunity’, and maintain a sense of a ‘level playing field’. Brash (2004) claims Māori targeted policies are harmful to Māori, as they have developed in Māori a culture of dependency. Without an understanding of the Māori-Pākehā relationship, such concerns are expected to surface. A lack of understanding arises from educational silence about provisions such as the Māori Electoral Option. There is no collective memory about the social position of privilege created for Pākehā through colonisation. Thus, there is no sense of social justice that is the goal of Māori-targeted policies. As highlighted following Brash’s Nationhood speech\textsuperscript{116}, Māori-targeted policies have seen profound changes to the statistical measures of Māori well-being. Through Māori-targeted policies, Māori seek measures to achieve an equality of outcome with non-Māori. Due to a lack of understanding about the Māori-Pākehā relationship, however, this sense of equality is rejected. The Treaty of Waitangi, and its points of reference such as Waitangi Day, are seen as points of division, rather than a basis for building unity. This is no surprise, as the Treaty provisions envisage a unity based on difference, and different rights. An understanding limited to equality based on homogeneity will inevitably promote unity solely through sameness. Mainstream New Zealanders, who desire harmony in their communities and for their children, become increasingly frustrated at claims to anything else on the basis these claims offend the equality of citizens and the possibility for unity amongst them.

\textsuperscript{116} For example, see Moving On Up, \textit{The Listener, March 2004}, pp. 17–20.
The angry face of Māori

The ‘truth’ about Māori, as found in official political discourse from governments, has long been that Māori well-being is restricted by a poor socio-economic status. A Foucaltian analysis would argue that, by focusing on economic / monetary problems, governments have been able to provide economic and monetary solutions. Economic support to Rūnanga, monetary Treaty settlements, and Māori development schemes all aim at addressing this truth. In part they are successful, as socio-economic factors are fundamental to Māori well-being; however, poor socio-economic status is more a symptom of the problem for Māori, not the problem itself. The decimation of the Māori economic base, through land confiscations, resulted from the repression of Māori political power. The construction of Māori as second-class citizens, through a discriminatory education, health and justice system, resulted from the repression of Māori political power. This truth is repressed, as the solution it bears calls for government to share not only resources, but political power. MMP, the Māori Electoral Option, and the growing number of Māori policy advisors are examples of a strengthened Māori presence in governance. Each has had a degree of success in implementing progress towards Māori development. However, with control largely in the hands of Pākehā, Māori representation is limited to the opportunity for and ability of Māori to have input into policies, not decision-making. The arrangements for Māori political voices therefore serve more to protect Pākehā interests then Māori advancement. It is difficult to call these arrangements the fulfilment of rangatiratanga. That constitutional reform has never appeared on the government agenda, or been a point of Treaty settlement policy, exacerbates the issue. While government continue to define Māori needs and formulate government-suited solutions, Māori are “captured in consent” (Tawhai, 2003). They have powers only to accept or consent to, rather than veto, unfavourable government decisions. In this way, Māori are captured by the current democratic arrangements in consenting to government control; to majority-Pākehā determination over Māori futures. That citizens are not equipped with a sufficient understanding to debate and consider different democratic arrangements is an ongoing frustration to Māori. It constitutes the real restriction to the realising of Māori well-being for themselves and their tamariki mokopuna.
6.3 RECONCILIATION THROUGH EDUCATION

The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988, p. 78) emphasised “responsible citizenship requires that New Zealanders be well informed about the Treaty”. Education about the Treaty, however, requires the challenge of developing citizens’ understandings about unity through difference. Te Ao Mārama provides such a framework, which can deliver for both Māori and Pākehā a satisfactory approach to citizenship education in Aotearoa.

Embracing unity through difference

The connection between education and addressing the problem of perceived conflict is essential in citizenship education. Citizens, through the very nature of democracy, will encounter conflicting views. Again, hooks (1994, p. 33) proposes the embracing of conflict as an element of democracy: “We cannot despair when there is conflict. Our solidarity must be affirmed by shared belief in a spirit of intellectual openness that celebrates diversity”. Education that addresses conflict by avoiding it consequently exacerbates conflict through growing misconceptions and misunderstandings about those views. In Aotearoa, avoiding these issues in education has bred misconceptions about the Māori-Pākehā relationship. Its neglect in educational issues has led to misconceptions about Māori claims to power / rangatiratanga, and by providing no alternative views, has perpetuated Pākehā power and the path of unity through homogeneity. Instead, problem-posing education liberates learners as they pose problems “in relation to the world” (Freire, 1970b, p. 60). Difference can be seen as both a reality and a right. Instead of how to assimilate citizens into society, together citizens can explore how society can provide for their differences. Education about the Māori Electoral Option would provide an example of how democratic arrangements can be rearranged for this purpose. It is an example of difference for the purposes of equality in the political arena. Through the diversity and the equality the Māori parliamentary seats promote, they deliver a greater degree of democracy to Aotearoa. In education, Te Ao Mārama can provide the common foundation in which citizens come together in this task.

Self-determination and Te Ao Mārama

Governments across the globe reject the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, or try to limit its scope. They are fearful of independence movements,
and the disintegration of one nation, governed by one government. The United Nations Charter and the global human rights instruments, however, state self-determination as a right of all peoples. Māori and indigenous peoples have had to make demands for self-determination, due to its oppression. By abandoning an oppressive relationship, Pākehā can join Māori in mutual pursuit of self-determination. Together Māori and Pākehā can explore the possibilities of a society where pathways are found for the pursuit of both, through their different approaches and aspirations. This is what was envisaged by the Treaty of Waitangi. This would infer the pursuit of democratic arrangements that afford each group the political power to do so. The focus of Te Ao Mārama on critical consciousness as the basis for self-determined development provides a framework for a citizenship education model acceptable to both Māori and Pākehā. It respects the right of all peoples to awareness, to form their own understandings, and thereby mediate (Pere, 2006) on their own behalf. It stipulates the right of all peoples to “a clear grasp of one’s contexts” (Tawhai, 1978, pp. 16–17) in order to pursue positive self-determinative action. This would infer an education in which citizens explore all needs, interests, and perspectives of all peoples to deliver “māramatanga or enlightenment” (Durie, 1992). This education would enable citizens to pose problems as to how society can embrace difference, address past injustices, and constructively embrace conflict. This is the realisation of critical consciousness, where citizens would pursue a society that better reflects their understandings. Such an education would foster unity through the reality of difference, and unity through an equality based on the right to self-determination, and critical consciousness to inform self-determined development. In this way, such an educational model would be acceptable to both Māori, Pākehā, and embrace future visitors to our shores. Doubly, Te Ao Mārama is an appropriate model as it is indigenous to Aotearoa, fostering the imagining of local solutions to addressing local problems.

**Conclusion**

Citizenship education must place diversity and presence at its core. It must encourage learners to explore problems arising from conflicting views, and develop in them an imagination quick to explore solutions. Only this form of education will enable learners to explore the possibilities for societal change as the practice of freedom. Current citizenship education in Aotearoa poses a threat to New Zealand citizens’ ability to engage in such practice. Unity through homogeneity and the undermining of democracy
is echoed in the silencing of diversity. The Māori-Pākehā relationship remains one of strain as ‘mainstream New Zealand’ claim Māori are privileged, while the democratic arrangements ensure Māori remain captured in consent to Pākehā decision-making. The neglect of education about the Māori Electoral Option means power-sharing in the Māori-Pākehā relationship remains outside of much needed dialogue and debate. What is required is a reconciliation of unity, equality and difference through education. The understandings about self-determination from Te Ao Mārama provide such a model: where unity is felt through the reality of difference, and through an equality based on all peoples’ right to self-determination, and critical consciousness as the basis for self-determined development.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
KIA EKE TE WAKA

Made free in communion with others, . . .
we have to make our freedom together

This thesis explored what citizenship education is provided through the curriculum to citizens of Aotearoa. In particular, it examined what education is provided about the rights of Māori to a political voice, and how those rights feature in our democratic arrangements. It offers new knowledge about the extent to which education in Aotearoa prepares citizens to better understand the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and engage in improving Aotearoa’s democratic arrangements to better reflect those understanding.

An examination of the history of the relationship between Māori and Pākehā reveals the power-sharing intended for Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy is still to be fully realised. In particular, electoral legislation has failed to afford Māori political power for both the realisation of rangatiratanga and equal citizenship in our democratic arrangements. Māori resistance to the undermining of Māori authority over Māori affairs has taken many forms, including forming a place for Māori within the structures of kāwanatanga. Recently, the Māori Electoral Option and the MMP electoral system have provided Māori with an opportunity to renew the strength of a guaranteed Māori voice in Parliament. However, the arrangements continue to capture Māori authority, and the will to realise Māori aspirations, with the Pākehā majority who hold power.

With the power of Pākehā veto in mind, it is a concern that the politics of indigeneity in Aotearoa are increasingly focused upon neutralising Māori rights to self-determination. That this focus manifests in education through the silencing of issues about Māori-Pākehā race relations poses a challenge for citizenship education. In particular, theoretical contributions such as Foucault’s analyses of power, and Freire’s culture of silence, illustrate the dangers of education in creating silent, obedient citizens. In contrast, the notions of presence and dialogue in education emphasise the requirements

of an education that can facilitate understanding and debate about the Māori-Pākehā relationship and power-sharing. Grounded in the concept of rangatiratanga, this research therefore demonstrates that citizenship education is potentially a means to improve the Māori-Pākehā relationship, and improve the arrangements for our bi-political democracy. From a Māori world-view, critical consciousness fosters citizens’ awareness of possibilities for change, and the ability for self-determinative action based on that awareness. This thesis argues, therefore, that any citizenship education in Aotearoa would be based on the notions of presence, freedom, and critical consciousness.

In exploring what citizenship education in provided to citizens of Aotearoa, critical discourse analysis was used to show that the formal school curriculum excludes some topics, and prioritises others. This act of silencing is seen to undermine the right of critical consciousness within Te Ao Mārama. Because of its significance in the Māori-Pākehā relationship, the presence of Māori Electoral Option material in education is seen as important to critical consciousness. The purpose of social studies, as outlined in the curriculum statements, is to provide citizenship education. Therefore, it was reasonable to expect that the curriculum would include content about the Māori Electoral Option. Content analysis provided an appropriate method by producing a count of the Māori Electoral Option variable within citizenship education material, which revealed its absence.

Overall, the review of the current material for delivery of the social studies curriculum revealed citizenship education is poor in New Zealand. There are some major differences between the Curriculum Framework, the Social Studies Statement, and the actual achievement objectives and units for that curriculum. In particular, there is a distinct neglect of the Māori-Pākehā relationship as it relates to current Māori efforts for rangatiratanga and Aotearoa’s bi-political democracy. For example, all social studies material is silent about the Māori Electoral Option. Instead of addressing current weaknesses, a review of the Draft Curriculum reveals a continued focus upon areas already strong, while further weakening others. The withdrawal of the Treaty of Waitangi is a primary example, and indicates a further withdrawal in the curriculum of education about the Māori-Pākehā relationship and intended power-sharing.
The focus upon the social studies curriculum achievement objectives and units may have limited this study. In particular, the units provided by the Ministry of Education are not expected to entirely constitute teachers’ delivery of the social studies curriculum. Instead, teachers are to amend and further develop units to suit the needs of their students. What this thesis argues, however, is that the statement objectives and units are the primary directives for teachers in the delivery of that curriculum. In particular, units are the examples for social studies education. They therefore are an important and valid point of review and development.

The new knowledge contributed by this thesis is that the current provision of citizenship education in Aotearoa is restricting New Zealand citizens’ ability to engage in moulding their future. Consequently, the Māori-Pākehā relationship remains one of strain as Pākehā argue Māori are afforded privileged, while the democratic arrangements ensure Māori remain captured in consent to Pākehā decision-making. The neglect of education about the Māori Electoral Option means power-sharing in the Māori-Pākehā relationship remains outside of much needed dialogue and debate. What is required is a reconciliation of unity, equality and difference through education. Te Ao Mārama provides such a framework. It infers the pursuit of democratic arrangements that afford each group the political power to do so. It suggests an education in which citizens explore the needs, interests, and perspectives of all peoples to deliver māramatanga or enlightenment. Such an education fosters unity through the reality of difference, and unity through an equality based on the right to self-determination, critical consciousness, and self-determined developed based on such consciousness. In this way, such an educational model would be acceptable to both Māori, Pākehā, and future visitors to our shores. Te Ao Mārama provides an appropriate model, indigenous to Aotearoa, fostering the imagining of local solutions to addressing local problems.

In conclusion, educational policy in Aotearoa must strengthen the place of citizenship education within its schools. It must place the development of presence, the ability to embrace diversity and address conflict at the core of citizens’ training for engagement in society. Only this form of education will enables learners to explore possibilities for change as the practice of freedom. This change includes moving beyond structures and relationships that do not meet citizens’ understandings. Citizenship education is essential in facilitating critical consciousness, and the changes to society that accompany it. Te Ao
Mārama presents a world-view for all New Zealand citizens to perceive the importance of critical consciousness to our continued development. Together Māori, Pākehā, and others choosing to reside in Aotearoa, can better understand their relationships and proceed to imagine and shape the arrangements that will deliver a better future for us all.
Bibliography


