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The Terrorist Cell: An Historical and Evolutionary Study of Irish Terrorist Cells c. 1881 – 1896

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Abstract

Within the field of terrorism studies little is understood as to how and why terrorist cells change over time and place. This is a complex question, which has evolutionary implications. That is, where do terror cells come from and why, once formed, do some succeed and some fail. To answer these questions this study uses an evolutionary methodology to analyse Victorian-era terror cells between 1881 and 1896. This was done by taking specific concepts of evolution including evolutionary variations, inheritance, diversity and selection, to model the evolutionary history of terrorist cells over time and place. In deriving this model six main evolutionary concepts were found, which were instrumental in both the planned and unplanned evolution of terrorist cells. This included, identifying adaptive characteristics that were crucial in a cell’s ability to survive and operate within a multifaceted landscape. Additional findings from this study uncovered the complex inter-dependent relationships that exist between terror cells and actors in the landscape, which resulted in uncovering sources that facilitated the evolution of cells. Ultimately, the evolutionary history model is a useful tool for understanding the evolvability of a cell and building historical and comparative reference points to better understand a terror cell’s place within the landscape.
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This thesis adheres to the Massey University policy on research practices as set out in MOPPS 3.3.4.
‘The Phoenix rose from the ashes which might account for the fire in the Irishman’s eyes.’

Seen and Heard Rambles in Dublin
List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Adaption of a cladogram to map the evolution of terror cells.................................18
Figure 3.1: Portrait of Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa after 1900...................................................38
Figure 3.2: Map of Exchange Court and surrounding area from 1893........................................52
Figure 3.3: Cartoon showing police sensitivity to a suspected infernal machine.......................65
Figure 3.4: An 1892 caricature from Vanity Fair of Col. V.D. Majendie holding a ‘device’...........66
Figure 3.5: Linkages between bombings as identified by the Inspectors Office of Explosives, from 1881 to 1896..................................................................................69
Figure 3.6: Selection of bomb components used in the February 1884 London railway station attacks. Top left is a Peep-O-Day clock, middle is a Victorian-era portmanteau with lock and straps, and lower right is a British Bulldog .45 calibre pistol..............70
Figure 3.7: The Irish Jaunting Car ................................................................................................86
Figure 4.1: Salford Barracks bombing on 14 January 1881 showing damage to the meat shed from the barrack’s side.............................................................................................94
Figure 4.2: Reward notice for Victoria Station bombing and other London railway station plots on 26 February 1884.................................................................................................................122
Figure 4.3: Map of three dynamite attacks on 30 May 1884................................................................124
Figure 5.1: Link Diagram of novice cells from Rossa’s first bombing campaign..........................161
Figure 5.2: Link Diagram of support and advanced cells from Rossa’s second bombing campaign................................................................................................................162
Figure 5.3: Link Diagram of Sullivan Cells from the third and attempted fourth bombing campaigns.................................................................................................................................163
Figure 5.4: Link Diagram of the Lyman Support Cell from the attempted fifth bombing campaign.................................................................................................................................164
Figure 5.5: Summary Feedback Diagram of evolutionary variations for terrorist cells during the bombing campaigns.........................................................................................................................171
Figure 5.6: Cladogram showing the evolutionary history of Rossa and Clan terrorist cells between 1881 and 1896......................................................................................................................173
Figure 5.7: Cladogram showing the evolutionary history of the Irish National Invincibles Cell.................................................................................................................................202
Figure 5.8: Summary of high-level concepts for the evolution of a terrorist cell..........................220
Figure 7.3: Summary of the more detailed concepts that trigger the evolution of a terrorist cell.................................................................222
Figure A1: H.M.S. Doterel ...................................................................................................................................................230

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Plots during the first and second bombing campaigns.................................113
Table 4.2: Plots during the third bombing campaign ......................................................131

Abbreviations

C3 Command, Control and Communications
C.I.D. Criminal Investigation Department
D.M.P. Dublin Metropolitan Police
HO Home Office
I.N.I. Irish National Invincibles
I. N.R.S.I. Irish National Revolutionary Society of Invincibles
I.N.L. Irish National League
I.N.L.A Irish National League of America
I.O.E. Her Majesties Inspector of Explosives Office
I.R.B. Irish Republican Brotherhood
INA Irish National Archives
INL Irish National Library
L.M.P. London Metropolitan Police
R.I.C. Royal Irish Constabulary
TNA The British National Archives at Kew Gardens
Chapter 1

Introduction

Ireland and Great Britain during the last two decades of the nineteenth century erupted into landscapes of violence as land issues and demands for limited self-government provoked Irish nationalists into action. From 1881 to 1887, from 1891 to 1893 and then in 1896 terrorism and land agitation were the strategies applied across several countries and numerous cities including Dublin, New York, London and Glasgow. Land agitators or Irish extremists frequently in reference to opinion pieces on the Irish crisis or the latest dynamite plot in Britain filled newspapers with articles detailing attacks. Headlines were rife with disturbing and descriptive captions such as ‘Emulating Guy Fawkes’, ‘All England Frightened’ and ‘Dreading more Dynamite’, which projected the fears of the British people during this period.

Yet again the question was asked, ‘What is to be done with Ireland’, a question that had perplexed generations before and ‘troubled the conscience of the British Nation.’ Ever since the 1801 Act of the Union had been enacted over Ireland, establishing the rule of Westminster as the supreme governing authority, nationalist movements to regain Ireland’s independence had in one form or another existed. These movements over time and place manifested into constitutional and physical force movements whose varying degrees of intransigence became catalysts for violence.

The conscience of the physical force movement was a product of the decade’s long conflict in Ireland. Townsend terms this, ‘the tradition of violence’ which is singularly important as it had become ‘an acceptable supplement to, if not an actual substitute for, political dialogue.’ In this tradition, revolutionary terrorism had played an enormous role in re-aligning the operational landscape asymmetrically to counter the superior power and resources of the Imperial forces. This was possible by using terror to affect the emotional states on both sides of this conflict. On the one hand, recalling what has been lost while on the other, elucidating fear. Stated more succinctly, terror was used to both inspire and terrify. Subsequently, terrorism has been used by the Irishman as an equaliser to re-balance the force of British power in order to affect minds.
and achieve political change. As such, it is a complex strategy to apply because if one terrorises but does not inspire the terrorist is left empty of any popular support whereas if one inspires but does not terrorise then political change might be unattainable. This idea will be used as the underlying definition of terrorism for the purposes of this research study.

The terrorist cell has been a routine fighting formation by Irish revolutionary organisations throughout Irish history. However, organised ‘modern political terrorism’ did not truly begin until the early 1880s when the Dynamite Party, the Clan na Gael and the Irish National Invincibles used terror cells both locally and trans-nationally to influence the course of British rule over Ireland.

The concept of a traditional terrorist cell between 1881 and 1896 can be defined as a small-organised irregular fighting formation, affiliated to a parent Irish revolutionary organisation, and structured to carry out a single form of terrorist attack within an urban area. As such, these cells were both semi-autonomous and specialised ranging in size from two to twelve Irishmen, with each cell engaging a cell leader to conduct day-to-day operations. Cells operated according to the behavioural and structural principles laid out in Chapter 2, equating to their overall effectiveness. Victorian era terrorist cells were ultimately symbolised by their capacity to operate discretely within urban environments as well as innovate, and adapt as the landscape around them changed.

Trans-national terrorism during this period originated from America. Over the course of two decades, Irish Americans were recruited and sent to England to form seemingly traditional looking terrorist cells. Their mission was to engage in an unyielding war against British cities by setting them alight with dynamite. In contrast, organised local terrorist cells in Ireland operated from secret organisations such as the Irish National Invincibles, employing assassinations as well as bombings to affect visceral and high profile attacks. Regardless of the means, the ends resulting from an act of terror and its impact on the individual conscience was still the same.

From the perspective of the terrorist cell, the act is intended to cause a reaction in the operational landscape that would advance its organisation’s cause. This landscape can be thought of as a reconstruction of the operational context through which cells interacted with
external actors such as a cell’s relationship with its parent organisation. These interrelationships help pinpoint events in the landscape, sometimes referred to as disturbances, which affect the operability and survivability of the cell.

Based on this statement, if terrorist cells generally aim to disturb the landscape, why then are they so diverse in how they organise and operate, with some succeeding and some failing. Realistically speaking, terrorist cells are incendiary formations continuously interacting with the landscape, so to understand their diversity we must ask another question. That is, how and why do terrorist cells change over time and place? Furthermore, is the terrorist cell being continually re-invented or is there some kind of evolutionary effect, which shapes it? This is a fundamental question, which still requires further study within the field of terrorism studies. Consequently, the lack of information in this area is indicative of a larger problem.

The study of terrorist cells as a specialised area of terrorism studies is lacking thorough examination within the academic realm. Studies such as Hart’s historical study of the violence committed by the I.R.A. in Cork between 1916 and 1923⁶, and Feldman’s anthropological narrative of terror in modern Northern Ireland⁷ perhaps come the closest to peeling back the organisational layers of a secret organisation to reveal the complex underbelly in which terrorist cells exist. Arguably, the best studies so far to analyse the socio-cultural layer in which terrorists and terrorist cells operate and survive have anthropological leanings.

Anthropological techniques using either observational methods or actual eyewitness accounts help to generate layers of detailed information that can be used to form low-level interpretations of the terrorist cell. However, rather than produce more of these anthropological type studies to better understand terrorist cells, researchers have instead tended to focus on the landscape surrounding these formations such as the security organisations, government policy and the higher operational levels of the terrorist organisation itself. This is of course easier to accomplish because information is more freely available in these areas then those associated to terrorist cells. There are of course some individual studies of terrorist cells and the psychological study of terrorists: the latter has been studied to no end. However, what is missing, are on-going comparative studies using anthropological leaning data
that can provide, with more accuracy, concepts of origin, commonality, and trends between terrorist cells.

The limited nature of academic research in this specialised area leaves an enormous void in our understanding of one of the most fundamental aspects of the terrorist organisation: the cell itself. For example, we know little of how, why and to what extent the compartmentalisation of terrorist cells has changed over time and even less, from where terrorist organisations adopted their organisational structures and their operational practices. Ultimately, the existing literature on terrorism is lacking well-researched studies analysing the historical and evolutionary timelines of terrorist cells.

Without historical and evolutionary timelines, there are no baselines for contrasting terrorist cells. That is, one should be able to look back into history and compare cells to identify evolutionary trends, which caused cells to evolve into new forms. This evolutionary history when mapped forward may help project developmental trends for contemporary terrorist cells. In this sense, without evolutionary timelines, analytical flaws might creep into either civilian or military intelligence analyses that have been used to interpret current patterns of terrorism or project future growth patterns and practices of terrorist organisations and their cells. Ultimately, these weaknesses may translate into less than effective counter-terrorism strategies to interdict terrorist cells as they form, dissipate, and then re-form over time and place.

The purpose of this thesis is to carry out an historical and evolutionary study of Irish terrorist cells belonging to late nineteenth-century revolutionary organisations. The intent is to understand how and why these terrorist cells evolved over time and place. As such, finding answers to the following four empirical questions will form the principal objectives of this research study:

- What sources influenced the development of terrorist cells?
- How and to what extent were terrorist cells utilised?
- How did security organisations respond to terrorist cells?
- How, why and to what extent did terrorist cells evolve?
These questions address where terrorist cells come from, what they did, how they did it, how they were countered, and finally, how and to what extent they evolved between 1881 and 1896. This period of study was selected based on the extensive use of organised terrorism by Irish and Irish Americans during this fifteen-year period and the availability of archival sources, which document this era with detailed accounts of terrorist cells in action. What will become more obvious later in this research study is the order in which these research questions have been asked as a means to iteratively accumulate the information necessary to ultimately understand how terrorist cells evolve.

The boundaries and limitations of this study consist of a single historical timeline between January 1881 and September 1896 in which organised Irish political terrorism was prevalent. The first part of this study is limited to only the terrorist cells that participated in the five organised bombing campaigns within Great Britain. These campaigns were signified by the translocation of terrorism to the British mainland from America. The second part of the study will examine the Irish National Invincibles’ Organisation that because of the Phoenix Park Murders in 1882 played a significant role in the operational landscape. Another series of attacks by Irish extremists, which occurred in Dublin between 1891 and 1893 are analysed separately in Chapter 3 of this study. These cells were not included as study participants because the police investigations into these attacks produced limited data regarding the perpetrators and their links to Fenian agencies.

The period from 1896 onwards is not included in this study primarily because organised terror literally disappears from the Irish landscape until the 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War. The main reason for the reduction in violence was the popularity of Home Rule in addition to the significant infiltration of British spies to the highest levels of the Clan na Gael leadership. This and many more aspects of the landscape are documented in Chapter 3 of this research study.

The 1881-1896 research timeframe provided three main benefits. First, the social and political landscape during this period was extremely unstable laying the revolutionary foundations from which organised terrorism originated. Second, the number of cells generated during this timeframe provided for the comparative analysis of terror cells across time and place. Third, the Victorian aspect of this research study ensured that there was an adequate supply of available
literature and archival sources to support this study. The last benefit in particular was crucial in executing the research methodology developed for this study.

The methods of research for this thesis were exploratory, descriptive, and evolutionary. This involved first, undertaking literature reviews of Irish revolutionary organisations to identify study participants and evolutionary material in order to define a conceptual framework and evolutionary methodology. Next, it required completing archival research at several institutions across Ireland and England.

The descriptive and exploratory components of this research broadly investigated the political, socio-cultural, and technological contexts of the period. More specifically, it investigated the organisational and operational practices of terrorist cells, the interactions of key revolutionary organisations that influenced cell formations as well as governmental security strategies used to suppress them. This literature and archival review identified key actors, their interactions, as well as major events from the late nineteenth-century landscape, identified terror cell participants, and recognized some key evolutionary concepts that were judged to have special meaning to terrorist cells.

This research spanned Ireland and Great Britain between 1881 and 1896. The primary archival sources used in this research study were retrieved from three different locations. These were the Irish National Archives (INA) and the Irish National Library (INL) in Dublin, and The National Archives Kew (TNA) in London. Of importance and referred to consistently throughout this study, are the Home Office files (HO) from The National Archives Kew and the A-Files and Phoenix Park Folders from the Irish National Archives.

The Clan na Gael was the dominant organisation during this period and as such, incorporates a substantive array of references. *TNA CAB 37/14/4* is a memorandum written by the Foreign Office during 1885 that describes the organisation in the United States between 1875 and 1885. *TNA PRO/30/60/13/2* contains three files one of which describes the Clan na Gael between 1887 and 1896. Additionally, this period is pertinent to researching William Lyman’s leadership of the ‘Sullivante’ faction of the Clan, which during 1896 wanted to reignite the earlier bombing campaigns.
The various INA A-Files provided police reports on the activities of secret organisations and suspected agents between 1880 and 1883. Many of these A-Files contained details of O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party such as INA A-Files, Box 5, A663. Moreover, operations carried out by Rossa’s cells are provided in police accounts of crime scenes such as INA A-Files, Box 5, A670, which details the attempt on the Mansion House by a Rossa Cell during 1881. However, the bulk of information relating to bombings between 1881 and 1885 are provided by the INA A-Files and TNA Home Office files, the latter of which, included records from the Criminal Court, Foreign Office and Cabinet Office.

The Home Office files contain many of the investigative reports from the bombing campaigns on the British mainland between 1881 and 1896 and additionally, several of the dynamite plots that occurred in Dublin between 1891 and 1893. Each report contains a detailed description of the crime scene and any further investigative work that might have occurred including in most cases, an explosive’s analysis by H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.). These files are essential in describing the low-level activities of terrorist cells between 1881 and 1896.

British Cabinet reports were the primary sources used in describing the I.R.B. and operations of the Land League. TNA CAB 37/14/5 in particular, provided a detailed organisational structure of the I.R.B. during the bombing campaigns. Home Office reports such as TNA HO/144/72/A19 and records from the Public Records Office such as TNA PRO/30/60/12 were used to include detailed accounts of Land League operations in the Castleisland District of Co, Kerry, which was considered the most active district during the land war.

Helpful in gaining personal insights in to the Clan na Gael and I.R.B. are Witness Statements (WS) from the Dublin National Archives. These documents offered a unique archive of nearly 1,800 first-hand accounts of members of the I.R.B, Clan na Gael, Irish Volunteers, I.R.A. and British military from the late nineteenth century thru the first two decades of the twentieth century. This information provides some insightful member experiences of the Clan na Gael and I.R.B. prior to the turn of the twentieth century including activists such as William Kelly (INA WS226), who was a member of the Dungannon I.R.B. during 1880. However, personal accounts taken after a period of time are prone to inaccuracies and incomplete recollections as memories fade.
As such, additional secondary sources to corroborate Witness Statements were used in this study.

While the Clan is best known for its terrorist bombings on the British mainland, perhaps the most notorious terrorist organisation during the late nineteenth century was the Irish National Invincibles (I.N.I.). There were two central archival sources referenced in describing the Phoenix Park operation and subsequent assassination plots by the I.N.I. The first were the six Phoenix Park Folders containing police reports from the murder investigation (*INA Phoenix Park Files*). These folders, while containing many false leads and ancillary communications, provided reports of the murder scene and statements from the informer James Carey. The second was the Curran Report (*INL MS5449*) written by Justice John Adye Curran describing I.N.I. operations after the Phoenix Park operation. In particular, the assassination attempt on the Juror, Dennis J. Field, during November 1882.

Finally, most of the data concerning security organisations was retrieved from the records of H.M. Treasury, the Home Office, and the Labour Department, which provided many detailed reports and correspondence between police commissioners and Home Office personnel. Reports, which were reviewed, included the re-organisation of the police force in Ireland, the employment of anti-terrorism methods and finally detailed explosive reports filed each year by the I.O.E from 1881 to 1890. The latter provided a wealth of information describing legislative enforcement, civilian dynamite activities including some military accidents, and reports of terrorist bombings, which provide insight into early explosive forensic techniques.

While this study was centred on primary sources, many secondary sources were also referenced to build out and support archival material. The first part of this study involved understanding the cell’s operational landscape. This involved identifying and then positioning external actors in the landscape using the Clan as the focal point of power based on it being a major initiator and leader during the bombing campaign period.

Many important works contributed to defining the cell’s operational space. The main texts referenced include, Jackson’s history of Home Rule between 1800 and 2000\(^8\), Foster’s *Modern Ireland* between 1600 and 1972\(^9\), Walker’s *The Fenian Movement*\(^10\), Newsinger’s *Fenianism in
Mid-Victorian Britain and the essays within Graham and Proudfoot’s, An Historical Geography of Ireland. Additionally, Comerford’s The Fenians in Context: Irish Politics & Society 1848–82 and English’s Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland complemented the above references and then more, to reconstruct the factionalism that existed within the Clan na Gael and I.R.B.

Jackson lays out an important interpretation of the history of the Home Rule movement, which provided some clarity to the tangled mess of the Parnell years (1879–1890). Particularly, how Home Rule contributed to the on-going anti-British message in the landscape, along with an extremely useful chapter on ‘The Politics of Parnellism’. The latter clearly illustrates the conciliatory tones used by Parnell to engender cooperation among the disparate revolutionary organisations. The ‘new departure’ is a key turning point during this period in which Comerford and Foster describe Parnell’s political manoeuvring with John Devoy and Michael Davitt to combine land agitation, Fenianism and Home Rule under a united front to address landlordism.

Walker provides an extensive history of the Fenian Movement between 1850 and 1870 from an Irish-American perspective. This book helps identify the influence of Fenianism in the landscape as a precursor to the bombing campaigns, including Fenian incursions into Canada and the 1867 Fenian Rising. More importantly, it examines how the Fenian Brotherhood was formed and then its decreasing influence in the landscape after the formation of the Clan na Gael in America. In contrast, Newsinger and Comerford specifically address the Fenian Movement in America within the context of Irish politics; fully examining its relationship with the I.R.B. Comerford in particular contains an extensive recounting of the interactions between the Clan, I.R.B, Land League and Irish Parliamentary Party up to 1882 amid the growing influence of Home Rule.

Graham and Proudfoot’s various perspectives of Irish history are explored in part to address historical revisionism. These essays examine a broad range of topics including spatial transformations, industrialisation, immigration and the Irish Diaspora during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Other literature and archival sources that contributed specifically to the landscape are many and varied, and add aspects of human and physical geography including, descriptions of both security and secret revolutionary organisations.
Lees’s *Exiles of Erin* provides a detailed and systematic look at the impact of Irish immigrants on the City of London during the nineteenth century. Lee’s analysis presents some searching statistics on the distribution of the immigrant Irish in London such as where and how Irish immigrants lived, and the state of their mobility up to 1901. Other books such as Hoppen’s *Ireland Since 1800*, Salami’s *Nineteenth-Century Europe* and Fry’s *London in 1880*, each contributed to constructing a rudimentary physical and human geographical portrait of Ireland and Great Britain during the late nineteenth century. These texts helped to gain a better understanding for how cells navigated within the operational landscape.

Herlihy’s *The Dublin Metropolitan Police*, McCracken’s *Inspector Mallon* and Cook’s *MI5’s First Spymaster* were the main literature sources providing descriptions of security organisations between 1881 and 1896. Both Herlihy and McCracken shine additional light on the Dublin Metropolitan’s Police (D.M.P.) “G” Division, which was a unit of Special Branch assigned to political investigations in Ireland. Herlihy’s book provides an historical background of the D.M.P. whereas McCracken’s book is an autobiography of the committed and hard driving Inspector and later Superintendent of “G” Division, John Mallon, who ultimately dismantled the Irish National Invincible organisation. Cook in contrast, offers insights into Scotland Yard’s fight against terror on the British mainland, providing some significant information on the operations of the British Special (Irish) Branch and the counter-terrorism methods they used in tracking down dynamiters at the end of the nineteenth century.

As can be seen, the list of resources used to develop the operational landscape was extensive and diverse. The next component of exploratory research reviewed specific revolutionary organisations to support archival sources and further build up the landscape. In so doing, the terrorist cells that would become the core formations to be analysed for evolutionary change were identified.

The Irish struggle against British rule between 1881 and 1896 revolved around three central organisations that utilised terrorist cells. These were the American Clan na Gael organisation (est. 1869), the Dynamite Party (est. 1879) and the Irish National Invincibles (1881-1883). The Irish Republican Brotherhood (1858-1924) and the Land League (1879-1882) are also studied, but more as influential actors in the landscape.
From 1881 to 1921, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) was a continued presence in both Ireland and Great Britain supplying a veritable source of ideologically conditioned and willing activists to the revolutionary cause. O’Broin’s *Revolutionary Underground*, Pollard’s *Secret Societies of Ireland*, Townsend’s *Political Violence in Ireland since 1848*, Whelehan’s *The Dynamiters* and Corfe’s *The Phoenix Park Murders* provided a backdrop for the I.R.B.

Corfe describes the organisational structure of the I.R.B as does Pollard, whereas O’Broin provides an exceedingly useful chronology of the organisation, which clearly shows its gradual decline. Townsend highlights the intransigence of the I.R.B, whereas O’Broin stresses an important schism within the organisation during the 1870s. This transpired between the physical force element in the party and those who favoured a combination of constitutional means and fair open warfare.

Finally, Whelehan describes the I.R.B. within the context of the bombing campaigns, identifying this organisation as being most representative of ‘intergenerational continuity’ within the Irish operational landscape. Since it was established in 1858 and as it continued into the twentieth century, although much reduced in size, it remained focused on achieving Irish self-determination through insurrectionary means. While the I.R.B. played mostly an ideological and supporting role from 1881 onwards, the Land League in contrast was an active force in Ireland between 1879 and 1882 as anti-British sentiment against landlordism reached its peak.

Foster, Townsend, Jackson, Comerford and Corfe detail the Land League connection to Parnell and Home Rule in addition to the rule of fear this organisation generated through land agitation. Eventually, the Land League was suppressed bringing the Clan na Gael back to the forefront with its financial purse strings stretching across the Atlantic into both Ireland and Great Britain influencing many of the subsequent acts of terror.

The American based Clan na Gael organisation compared to the Land League was well organised and well-funded, professing to use similar principles of secrecy as the I.R.B but falling far short. Short’s book *The Dynamite War: Irish American Bombers in Victorian London*, Kelly’s text *The Fenianism Ideal and Irish Nationalism*, Newsinger’s *Fenianism in Mid-Victorian Britain* along with
Pollard, Walker, Kelly, Foster and Whelehan provided the principle literature sources for the Clan.

Newsinger and Walker describe the origins and history of the Fenian Brotherhood, which was the forerunner to the Clan na Gael organisation. Kelly, Foster, Pollard and Short provided background information leading to a description of its historical timeline between 1881 and 1896. Pollard re-prints a copy of the rituals of the Clan including, procedures for electing officers and initiation rituals, which provides a unique insight into the secret world of this organisation.

Kelly provides additional clarifications to Clan history specifically, Alexander Sullivan’s influence on the organisation as Clan President between 1881 and 1884 during a key period of dynamite activity on the British mainland. Short describes the origins and make-up of the organisation, including its Fenian origins and membership, the latter made up of Irish Americans, many of whom had been forced to emigrate from Ireland. Moreover, he is one of few authors to detail many of the attacks that took place on the British mainland between 1881 and 1885. Both Pollard and Short’s description of the Clan, link the organisation’s ability to raise money for the funding of trans-national terror operations, which Pollard claimed to be the ‘inauguration of scientific warfare’, a shadowy phrase used in no uncertain terms to describe dynamite warfare.

Finally, Whelehan uses a trans-national approach to analyse political violence at a macro level during the bombing campaign period. He mostly focuses on the Skirmishing Fund, the science of dynamite warfare and the supporters of the dynamiters rather than delving into the weeds of actual bombings. Whelehan disappointedly fails to sufficiently analyse actual attacks but instead comments that Short and several other authors have adequately explored the bombing campaigns. However, this is somewhat perplexing based on comments he makes regarding Short’s, less than scholarly text and as such, its quality as a reliable literature reference.

While Short’s text is both entertaining and detailed, it sacrifices academic rigor such as the comprehensive use of references to tell a story that reads at times, as a non-fiction novel. It has inaccuracies that ultimately devalue its contribution to this period. This includes an incomplete and inaccurate description of the Phoenix Park Murders and questionable judgements regarding the start of the third bombing campaign and Lomasney’s leadership role.
during it. In the latter case, this research will show that the command and control of cells was decentralised over time so Lomasney’s overall leadership role by the third bombing campaign is not as clear-cut as Short believes it to be. Nevertheless, Short’s book while frustrating is still useful in places so accordingly, when referenced in this study, is corroborated using a combination of other sources. Moreover, reliance on Short by other authors for his interpretation of the bombing campaigns such as Townsend’s book *Political Violence in Ireland,* must in some cases be carefully reviewed based on this examination of Short’s work.

The principle literature sources for the I.N.I. are Corfe, Molony’s *The Phoenix Park Murders: Conspiracy, Betrayal & Retribution* and P.J. Tynan’s 1894 autobiographical depiction of the I.N.I. in *The Irish National Invincibles and their Times.* Corfe and Molony write in detail about the I.N.I. from its beginnings in 1881 to its greatest triumph, the Phoenix Park Murders in May 1882. In contrast, Patrick Tynan, the Invincibles’ leader otherwise known as ‘No. 1’, wrote a complete history of the I.N.I. that included a depiction of the political landscape from around 1868 to 1886.

*The Irish National Invincibles and their Times* is a complex book written from a first person narrative in a language that at times is tautological and difficult to comprehend unless one attempts to understand Tynan’s rationale. Tynan was fervently anti-British and an advocate of force, with his attacks directed at Prime Minister Gladstone and Westminster’s policies of coercion and false hope such as Home Rule. As such, this book amounts to a defence of both the physical force movement and the Invincibles, which correspondingly creates bias in various forms throughout the text.

Much of the language in *The Irish National Invincibles and their Times* is in the form of vivid and colourful language that denigrates the British and glorifies the accomplishments of Irish resistance, especially the physical force movement. In some cases, he offers questionable historical and political accounts such as his description of the bombing campaigns in which he describes them within the context of giving Irish coercion back to the British. Tynan ultimately provides an overstated view of the impact, bombings had on the British mainland at both, an individual and commercial level. Much of this is intentional to bolster the accomplishments of the physical force movement and the Invincibles. The combination of hyperbole and
inaccuracies was considered so extreme in the English text that an appendix was added with print media sources in an effort to remedy his extremist viewpoint\textsuperscript{41}.

Nevertheless, Tynan’s leadership position in the organisation does bring some credibility to his recollections, at least from a planning perspective surrounding the early attempts on Forster in which he seems to have participated in at least one plot\textsuperscript{42}. The chapter surrounding the Phoenix Park Murders clearly indicates his planning role but needs to be corroborated when it comes to the actual field operation, as he was not a participant. For example, James Carey who was a member of the Phoenix Park Cell provided many corroborating facts regarding the actual murder after turning Queen’s evidence\textsuperscript{43}. The appendices as such provide a source of newspaper references including the \textit{Irish Times} and texts such as, \textit{The Life of the Right Hon. W.E. Forster}\textsuperscript{44}. In many ways, the appendices are a valuable source of information in their own right. Overall, Tynan’s autobiography is a useful reference when one accounts for its self-serving nature. It represents an actual agent account of someone who interacted intimately with Invincible cells from their beginning, which makes it a unique and irreproducible source during a crucial period of Irish history.

In addition to archival and principle literature sources, newsprint and internet sources were referenced to further support the operational landscape and the cells that operated within it. In particular, the \textit{New York Times} between 1881 and 1894 was used to bolster the organisational and operational characteristics of the I.N.I, the construction and transportation of explosive devices, and accounts of Irish-American agents sent to carry out bombings on the British mainland. Newsprint sources were also used to support and bolster archival materials used to describe the bombings in London between 1891 and 1893. Various other newspaper sources including, \textit{The Times} and the \textit{Freeman’s Journal} provided additional information surrounding conspirator plots that were not recorded in police reports including, first-hand accounts of the bombings. Finally, the website ‘\textit{The Proceedings of the Old Bailey 1674-1913}’\textsuperscript{45} was extremely valuable in accessing digitised copies of trial transcripts from conspirator trials, as a means to corroborate other sources. Transcripts were reviewed for the Gallagher Cell (1882-1883), the Burton Cell (1884-1885) and members of the Cohen Cell from the 1887 Queen’s Jubilee plot.
Finally, an evolutionary framework to analyse the interrelationships between the operational landscapes and terror cells was developed. This process involved taking some central evolutionary concepts from select sources from the academic literature and building a methodology around them. This included Williams *Adaption and Natural Selection*[^46], Pigliucci and Muller’s (eds) *Evolution, The Extended Synthesis*[^47], Page’s *Diversity and Complexity*[^48], Miller’s *Complex Adaptive Systems*[^49] and Sterelny’s *The Evolved Apprentice*[^50].

The essays in Pigliucci and Muller’s (eds) book provided concepts of variation, diversity and selection which were used to anchor the framework. Page and Miller supplemented these base concepts by introducing important concepts of complexity and adaption within systems including, the interrelationships between diversity, productivity, and innovation. Williams’s adds to the framework through his seminal text that introduces some of the fundamental concepts of natural selection and adaption in support of Darwinism. He additionally explains concepts of cell fitness and feedback loops, particularly how developments in a loop are usually worth the cost to engender some form of positive benefit to the system. Sterelny takes feedback loops a step further as a means to picture how evolution depends on stable positive loops comprised of co-evolutionary interactions between certain capacities. These interactions are examined with some important ideas developed as to how information is passed between generations and the importance of individual behavioural interactions such as cooperation and commitment, within this process.

Finally, fundamental concepts of cell organisation and operation were taken from Osborne’s unpublished thesis, *The Terrorist Cell: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis of Interconnectedness between the P.I.R.A., ETA and Hamas Cellular Systems*[^51]. Some of these concepts were added to the evolutionary framework to better understand behavioural interactions between cell members while others were used to help better define terrorist cells within the framework.

In conclusion, an extensive array of data was collected during the exploratory and descriptive review of literature and archival materials. As such, analysing this information to arrive at an evolutionary history of cells required developing a conceptual framework and methodology. The next chapter will bundle together elements of evolutionary theory along with concepts of
adaption and complexity, and re-orientate them to address the evolutionary history of terrorist cells.
Chapter 2

The Evolutionary Framework

The conceptual framework for this thesis is based on evolution as a means to model how terrorist cells change across time and place. The use of biological metaphors such as ‘evolution’ and ‘cells’ should be viewed not as direct analogues to what happened to the evolution of political violence between 1881 and 1896 but as a heuristic device – in other words, a new way of looking at a phenomenon that allows us to interrogate it more deeply.

For the purposes of this study, the fundamental concepts used to understand evolution are variation, inheritance and some form of planned or unplanned selection, all of which determines the ‘evolvability’ of a terrorist cell. That is, its ability to adapt, and subsequently, pass this adaption on to the next generation. More succinctly, this represents the cell’s design for survival.

The process of inheritance occurs when new variations of adaptions ‘resulting from environmental effects are transmitted to the next generation’ of terrorist cells. A terrorist cell through inheritance will mostly receive characteristics from a previous generation, which are them adapted for use in the current environment. It should be noted that this transference occurs at a cognitive level, which Sterelny calls the ‘intergenerational transmission of cognitive capital.’ For example, bomb making innovations being passed to a new generation of cell. It is also possible a terrorist cell could adopt adaptions unrelated to a prior generation because of new actors in the landscape. For example, the introduction of new bomb timer technologies might lead to a cell developing a characteristic to carry out near-simultaneous attacks, which might be inherited by a future generation of a cell.

One more factor that should be considered within the process of inheritance is that it might sometimes occur at a higher rate than would be considered normal when under stress. In this case, cell members might be pushed into operation before they are ready, decreasing their chances of survival. For example, authorities cutting of the local supply of dynamite might
require a cell to hurriedly set up a local bomb factory, activating new cell members before they are fully trained. Inheritance is therefore an evolutionary process that transfers adaptions from one generation to the next, which in effect, represents the evolutionary history of a terrorist cell.

Cladograms are a useful tool in which to describe evolutionary history in an easy to read tree like format. Figure 2.1 shows a cladogram that has been modified for this study to document the evolutionary history of terrorist cells within a particular time and place.

Figure 2.1 theorises a roadmap for the evolutionary history of terror cells over a particular time and place. Cells are formed from events and then either develop or inherit adaptive characteristics that are required for them to operate in the landscape. Primary nodes are represented by splits from the main trunk into branches based on some disturbance in the landscape such as a schism within an organisation. In Figure 2.1, the branches are represented
by the formation of Cell#1, with Cell#2 formed as a result of Event#2. Each cell is composed of a grouping of inherited and non-inherited adaptive characteristics. Inter-Nodes can represent adaptive characteristics, historical events, or innovations. For example, Historical Event#1 and Adaptive Characteristic#1 are both inherited by Cell#1 and Cell#2. As can be seen, inheritance in the context of terror cells happens because of some kind of disruption in the operational landscape. To understand how these disruptions lead to a cell evolving, the concept of evolutionary variations is examined.

For a cell to evolve there must be some change in their operational environment. Planned or unplanned selection represents a cell evolving based on the difference between planned events in the environment versus those that are unplanned. For example, a planned change in strategy, which requires operational tempo to be increased, might result in leadership transitioning a part-time terrorist cell into one that is full-time. Alternatively, an unplanned event such as an unexpected surge of security forces into a unit’s area of operations, might force leadership to break up cells into smaller formations in order to reduce their operational signature so as to increase survivability. These changes can happen via an external source outside of the cell such as a legislative change to increase police powers or an internal source such as a change in cell strategy. This may unknowingly change a cell’s ability to function and in doing so, change ‘selection pressures’ that impact the evolvability of the cell. Evolutionary variations are used to describe this effect.

These variations are caused by disturbances in the landscape that require a cell to evolve in order to survive and remain operationally effective. Evolutionary variations are inherently complex so in order to understand how they manifest, they must be first understood in terms of diversity, innovation and productivity.

Variations are driven by diversity, which contributes to the survivability of a terrorist cell. Diversity can occur within a cell, between cells and between environments in which cells exist. It can boost robustness, generate common knowledge, kickstart innovations, increase productivity, create redundancy, and finally, be the cause of more diversity. As such, ‘Diversity across types creates synergies. It allows the whole to be more than the parts.’ However, diversity can also be destructive. For example, mistakes by terrorist cells that initiate
evolutionary variations in the landscape, might force cells to evolve in order to survive with
differences that threaten other cells\textsuperscript{15}. A case in point might be a cell that evolves with fewer
members with specialisations, requiring support from other cells, which consequently risks
operational security\textsuperscript{16}. Ultimately, when examining diversity, especially in the human world,
complex systems are naturally associated to it such that, ‘resulting complexity is based on the
amount of diversity’\textsuperscript{17}.

First, what is a complex system? Page states a complex system is made up of ‘collections of
diverse, connected, inter-dependent entities whose behaviour is determined by rules, which
may adapt, but need not.’\textsuperscript{18} A complex system can adapt to the environment whereas a
complicated system cannot\textsuperscript{19}. For example, a terror cell is a complex system as it is made up of
many diverse mechanisms such as compartmentalisation, which can adapt to the environment.
However, the revolver a terrorist might use is complicated, not complex, as its diverse parts
cannot respond to the environment. Rather, how the revolver is used can be complex based on
the target, the location, and the presence of security forces. Complex systems are however
prone to destruction if for example, a key component of the system is compromised such as
secrecy\textsuperscript{20}. Inherently, complex systems and diversity can interact in various ways affecting the
functionality of terrorist cells. Two such interactions are described.

First, the ability to maintain effectiveness within a complex system is often strengthened by
diversity\textsuperscript{21}. Page uses the example of the Irish potato famine between 1845 and 1849 to
highlight this point. The famine transpired due to a lack of genetic variation based on only two
types of potatoes being grown making them susceptible to potato blight\textsuperscript{22}. If genetic variation
had been more diverse, the Irish system of potato farming would have been more robust.

Second, diversity can boost ‘innovation and productivity’\textsuperscript{23}. Subsequently, variety and
experimentation can lead to innovation\textsuperscript{24}. For example, a terror cell undertaking different forms
of attack may experiment with newer weapons technologies that allow for even greater attack
varieties that as a result, increase its productivity. However, if a complex system is becoming
less productive this can indicate sameness or little diversity. Page states ‘having more of the
same produces diminishing productivity’\textsuperscript{25}. Intrinsically, one can then correlate diversity to
productivity through interrelationships within the landscape, which are in themselves quite complex\textsuperscript{26}.

Complex systems overall are difficult to ‘anticipate and harness’ primarily because they are so diverse and adaptive, and can consist of many inter-dependencies\textsuperscript{27}. This makes them challenging to predict long term. As such, predicting how they might react in the short term is much less formidable\textsuperscript{28}. The challenge in understanding interrelationships between terror cells and the operational landscape comes in trying to learn how human connectedness can trigger reactions. For example, how a relatively small event such as the Phoenix Park Murders could trigger such a large disturbance in the landscape in the form of international outrage and legislative changes.

Miller and Page highlight the complexity of some basic social interactions, in terms of understanding complex social systems\textsuperscript{29}. For example, introducing new technologies or innovations can influence the outcome of a cell’s organisation and operation. As such, ‘social agents react/act to actions and predictions of other agents.’\textsuperscript{30} Subsequently, improvements in bomb timer technologies might allow cells to better coordinate bombings, which in turn spur a new division of labour in order to achieve near-simultaneous attacks. Feedback loops as such, help to reduce the complexity of inter-dependent relationships.

Sterelny states humans are ‘creatures of feedback.’\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, he comments that evolution is driven by stable positive feedback loops\textsuperscript{32}. They work by showing how a particular system can change outcomes through the introduction of new variables, such as changes in technology or in divisions of labour\textsuperscript{33}. These outcomes if negative could cause severe impairments to the system whereas if positive, drive its evolution. Within the context of terror cells, feedback loops highlight inter-dependent and cross-generational transmissions between the evolutionary variations in the landscape and the adaptive characteristics of the terrorist cell\textsuperscript{34}.

Ultimately, evolutionary variations and their links to diversity, innovation and productivity can be thought of as the ‘fuel’ for planned or unplanned selection, where ‘selection does the creating’ of the terrorist cell\textsuperscript{35}. As such, to generate synergies within a cell in order to promote its evolution, individuals must have the capacity to cooperate and share information.
Sterelny comments that cooperation is a key behavioural capacity to ensure ‘information sharing at and across generations’\textsuperscript{36} As such, a cell to carry out operations mostly depends on ‘technology and expertise’\textsuperscript{37}. The most effective of these capacities creates what can be termed ‘surpluses’ such as improved survival and operational capabilities\textsuperscript{38}. This can lead to the development of better technologies and more learned experiences in future generations, through inheritance and the fine-tuning of these capabilities\textsuperscript{39}. In effect, ‘they inherit essential cognitive capital’\textsuperscript{40}. Accordingly, to share information requires cooperation.

Many essential tasks of a cell cannot be completed by a single member acting alone but rather requires a collective, coordinated response that incorporates a division of labour\textsuperscript{41}. Subsequently, for a cell to carry out essential tasks cooperation must be stable, which as Sterelny states, is most effective in ‘small, homogenous groups’\textsuperscript{42}. The stable cooperative environment can of course change, especially as disturbances transpire in the landscape.

Generally, cooperation can be threatened by four kinds of disruptions. The first one is the ‘free rider’\textsuperscript{43}. That is, someone who does not contribute but still shares in the benefits of ‘pooled’ resources while not paying any of the costs\textsuperscript{44}. The second is where an agent uses the cell’s resources but does not share their unique expertise with the cell, which is termed ‘exploitation’\textsuperscript{45}. In these two cases, the first has the cell member removing themselves from operations altogether, while the other has cell members only partly invested in actions by purposely not sharing their specialisations in order to reduce risk to themselves\textsuperscript{46}.

The third cooperative disruption is caused by environmental interactions with cell members\textsuperscript{47}. Cooperation in this sense can be maintained through ‘partner choice’, ‘incentives to invest in reputation’ and ‘the enforcement of norms’\textsuperscript{48}. An example of this form of cooperative disruption might be where cell norms such as secrecy or compartmentalisation, are not enforced. The fourth and final disruption involves informational resources where there is a failure to share information or where information is shared deceptively\textsuperscript{49}. In the latter case, the agent relays information to alter the behaviour of the receiver in a way that benefits the sender to the extent; it affects the evolvability of the terrorist cell\textsuperscript{50}. 
Cooperative failures can however, be avoided. As member specialisations become important and cell members together face ‘success and failure’, the division of the cell becomes less likely as they more easily associate improved success to collective versus individual action. Like hunting, the work of a cell is often ‘collective and cooperative rather than individual.’ In this sense, one can think of targeting by a cell in terms of small versus big game hunting in which, as the complexity of targets increases, the activity becomes more costly making success based on the cooperative synergies within the cell. Consequently, other factors including trustworthiness, commitment, and learning aid in generating synergies. A study by Osborne is used as a basis to describe these capacities as well as defining other aspects of a cell.

Osborne in a 2003 unpublished study undertakes a comparative examination of terrorist cells to define the constituent components of a cell as a means to measure cell effectiveness. The term ‘cell capital’ is used to describe how specific ‘qualitative’ components can influence a terrorist cell. For the purposes of this study, these components are divided into behavioural and structural capacities.

Behavioural components include commitment and organisational formation consisting of recruitment and training. Structural components comprise compartmentalisation, leadership, operational patterns including popular support, logistics, intelligence and attacks, and the effects of counter-terrorism. These capacities were primarily based on Tarrow’s 1994 text, *Power in Movement*, which describes a behavioural theory for organisations based on cultural, organisational, and personal sources. Each of these capacities will be summarised below but in addition, will be extended in places by evolutionary concepts for the purposes of this research study.

Osborne comments that commitment is one of the harder components to measure. It represents the ability of a cell member to ‘attribute meaning to the act’, which essentially means that as more acts are carried out it becomes ‘self-supporting’. That is, the more freedom a cell member has to act along with a belief that the act is important, the more it contributes to the self-supporting nature of the cell increasing the commitment of cell members. Accordingly, each act by the cell further distances the cell member from the ‘norms of society’. Eventually, the cell member can only succeed in the cell with its cooperation.
Sterelny accordingly uses this type of mutual experience to engender trust and trustworthiness within a group that ‘incrementally’ increases their ‘psychological bonds’.

The organisation of a terrorist cell employs two key concepts that strengthen its organisational bonds. First, a form of filtering is used to identify the commitment levels of potential recruits using character judgements in which the appeal of the terrorist’s strategy is critical. Second, some form of training whether formal, informal or by trial and error is crucial to maintaining the forms of attack required by the terrorist strategy. Trial and error can be thought of as learning plus observational learning. As such, cooperation is crucial to learning as is the means the agent uses to read and transmit events to other agents.

Furthermore, to trust the information one receives, receiving it from a variety of sources provides a more reliable information source then information received from a single source. This kind of information redundancy creates information pools that are more accurate allowing the cell member to make better decisions in the face of operational disturbances. For example, the capability to read the operational landscape is critical for a cell member. Without being able ‘to take advantage of what others know’ through some cooperative enterprise, the cell will find it extremely difficult to operate jointly and manoeuvre within the landscape anonymously. The way information is received and transmitted by an agent is therefore critical as, ‘information about threats and opportunities can determine the course of one’s life.’

In addition to the above evolutionary concepts, a fundamental understanding of how a terrorist cell operates must also be understood. For example, the Dynamite Party operated cells that were sometimes no larger than two men, whereas other cells contained as many as five agents. Subsequently, the idea of a terrorist cell needs to be given some basic concepts that distinguish it from other irregular formations.

Compartmentalisation is one of the most important operational components of a terrorist cell. Conceptually, it is characterised by the minimisation of contact. That is, by passing only necessary information between internal and external actors at the territorial (area of operations), operational, and internal levels in order to maintain the operability of the cell. This minimisation of contact contributes to the secrecy of a cell and solidarity of its members.
Ultimately, compartmentalisation is a protective mechanism that enhances the survivability of a cell.

Leadership within an organisation that uses terrorism, whether terrorism is its only strategy or is part of a larger plan plays a critical role in many of the other components of a cell. Osborne comments that strategy and decentralisation of control are two important features managed by leadership\textsuperscript{73}. That is, strategy defines the form of engagements in which terrorism will be used whereas decentralisation of control is used to balance too much or too little organisation to maintain a terrorist cell’s feeling of empowerment\textsuperscript{74}. Leadership is critical to the long-term survivability of a cell.

Operationally, there are four components required for a cell to function. First, the cell uses popular support as ‘camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.’\textsuperscript{75} This is self-explanatory and is one of the keys to the survivability of the operational cell. Second, is that the terrorist cell is supplied and that it maintains a secure logistics’ network\textsuperscript{76}. This capacity is crucial to on-going operations, as is the third concept, the use of intelligence gathering mechanisms to supply the cells with reliable actionable intelligence, which can then be customised for operational use\textsuperscript{77}. The fourth and final concept is the tactical variety undertaken by cells, which helps decrease the risk of sameness, which can contribute to an organisation becoming stale and losing support\textsuperscript{78}.

The last component counter-terrorism represents the offensive measures taken against terrorist cells through various means such as prevention, deterrents and responsiveness based on actionable intelligence\textsuperscript{79}. As such, intelligence gathering by government organisations is essential in tracking down terrorists and their cells, and subsequently, represents a vital part of any counter-terrorism strategy.

By taking from established concepts of evolution and incorporating a fundamental definition of cells, this conceptual framework provides a basis for researching the evolution of terrorist cells. As such, a methodology was developed from this framework to derive the evolutionary history of terror cells during the 1881-1896 bombing campaigns and the plots of the Irish National Invincibles in 1882.
The evolutionary methodology employed in this study detailed descriptions of both the operational landscape and terrorist cells to discover the forming events and adaptive characteristics of cells. Evolutionary variations were next uncovered by examining and comparing the cell’s characteristics using evolutionary markers. These markers comprised identifying a cell’s simple to complex development, changes in its operational disposition, and changes in its presentation of operations. Each of these markers was used to uncover disturbances in the operational landscape from which, the terrorist cell had evolved or had the potential to evolve.

First, simple to complex development refers to organisational and operational shifts that increased the complexity of a cell’s operation over time and place. For example, the adoption of new technologies such as dynamite required specialised skills to manufacture nitroglycerin, weaponize it, and then deploy it. Subsequently, the changing divisions of labour associated to these job specialisations could lead to an increasing diversity of cells, which signals a change in complexity.

Second, a change in operational disposition reflects variations in the arrangement and control of cells, and cell members. By studying dispositions, it can be ascertained whether the robustness of cells grows over time and place. For example, introducing factory cells locally to manufacture nitroglycerin, reduces the need for an operational cell to acquire explosive devices from other sources. Thus, this change signals an improvement in the cell’s level of operational compartmentalisation, which would in turn, improves its robustness.

Third, the presentation of operations compares events during and between operations to evaluate whether a cell’s productivity increased over time and place. For example, the improving readiness of a cell to take part in operations could be the result of the part-time unpaid terrorist evolving into a full-time professional who is supported financially. In this case, the productivity of the cell increases as agents are now available for operations twenty-four seven rather than being pressured to carry out plots at the end of a workday.

In addition to identifying evolutionary variations, it is also particularly important to discover the blueprint(s) used to organise and operate terrorist cells. That is, cells are not just put together...
haphazardly. For example, somebody had to stop and think about how an organisation could strike a government to affect political change while remaining organisationally and operationally viable in the face of inevitable counter-terrorism responses. In this case, Nechaev’s Revolutionary Catechism described an organisational blueprint for Russian revolutionary organisations during the 1870s. How the blueprints for terrorist cells came about within the Irish context will provide an important starting point for understanding the reasons why they evolved in the way they did.

In conclusion, the evolutionary methodology necessitated the creation of an operational landscape along with detailed narratives of cells that operated within it. This construct was then used to identify events that caused cells to form, as well as detailing the various adaptive characteristics that were required for them to operate and survive. These characteristics were then analysed to show how terrorist cells evolved due to disturbances in the landscape, by using evolutionary markers to identify evolutionary variations. A feedback loop diagram was then put together to essentially show how cells evolved through the interactions of evolutionary variations and adaptive characteristics. Finally, the cells forming events along with their adaptive characteristics were developed into cladograms to present the evolutionary history of terrorist cells for a particular time and place.

This thesis has set out in Chapter’s 1 and 2 the objectives of this study and an evolutionary based research framework and methodology. Chapter 3 will be used to construct the operational landscape of the cell between 1881 and 1896 followed by Chapter 4, which will describe in detail the terrorist cells deployed during the bombing campaigns. This information will then be analysed in Chapter 5 to produce a cell level feedback loop and the evolutionary history of the dynamite cells between 1881 and 1896. Chapter 6 will describe and analyse the terrorist cells of the Irish National Invincibles from which an evolutionary history will be produced. Chapter 7 will answer the research questions and carry out an analysis of linkages between the evolutionary framework, and findings found in Chapter’s 5 and 6. Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude with an examination of the framework, specifically its limitations and possibilities for future use in mapping the evolutionary history of contemporary cells.
Chapter 3

The Operational Landscape of Victorian-Era Terror Cells in Ireland and Great Britain, c. 1881-1896

Between 1881 and 1896, the United Kingdom was inundated by ‘mass Irish Nationalism’ threatening to shatter ‘the structure of established politics’. It was feared, political continuity such as economic affairs would be disrupted, as democracy was curtailed by the introduction of restrictive policies to address Irish violence and constitutional obstructionism. In particular, the physical force movement was of primary concern, especially those that elicited an anti-Imperial sentiment of which the most extreme, advocated the destruction of British cities.

At the core of many of these early organisations was Fenianism, a term associated by Newsinger to ‘the staging of an armed rebellion against British rule and to the establishment of an Irish Republic.’ Comerford states that Fenianism in the 1860s, 70s and 80s acted ‘as a refuge and base of operations for individuals and interests within the Irish Catholic community who for one reason or another felt excluded from their proper place in, or by that community’s establishment.’ These feelings of exclusion as Foster discusses eventually became a Fenian ‘mentality’ due to the publicity and mystery surrounding it, which ‘appealed strongly to Irish imagination.’ For example, failures including the 1866 and 1870 incursions into Canada by the Fenian Brotherhood, and the Fenian Rising of 1867 publicised a strong link to Fenianism, which was intensified by the trials and imprisonment of the perpetrators. English calls the Fenian in this context the ‘mental revolutionary’. As such, the required backdrop for Fenianism to flourish was an anti-British atmosphere, which sustained an Irish tradition of armed rebellion. It is this tradition that separated Fenians from other nationalists. However, there was another dominant force that helped generate anti-British sentiment, which was the counter-weight to physical force. This was the Home Rule movement, which was inaugurated by Isaac Butt in 1870 to address Irish independence, subsequently dominating Irish politics until 1918.
The Home Rule movement was formed following disenchantment with the 1870 Land Bill. Butt formed the initial Home Government Association offering a manifesto he believed would provide a path to alliance with Prime Minister Gladstone’s liberal party. Subsequently, while Home Rule ‘articulated a longstanding Irish desire for the repeal of the Act of Union of 1801’ the more realistic demand pursued was to gain some amount of autonomy through a form of ‘limited self-government’.

Butt had stated that devolved government ‘would satisfy Irish nationalist dignity while allowing Ireland the benefits of imperial partnership with Britain.’ Within this context, the first resolution of the Home Rule movement encompassed Irish autonomy by re-establishing the Irish Legislature with simply, full control over domestic affairs and revenues while still bowing to the authority of Westminster for defence and foreign affairs. That is, Ireland while granted the right to self-govern would still be subject to the Queen.

The Home Rule movement inevitably became intertwined with the Fenians. This came about through an initial alliance formed with the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) in 1870 giving the association between the Home Rulers and Gladstone’s liberals an opportunity to flourish. At this time, the I.R.B. had no concerns with mixing constitutional and physical force policies. Consequently, as Comerford states ‘Home Rule quickly became a powerful vote puller’. Its appeal was demonstrated in the early 1870s by several by-elections in which Home Rule candidates won their races of which one of the biggest names was Charles Stewart Parnell who was elected M.P. for Meath in 1875.

Charles Stewart Parnell became the undisputed leader of the movement, gaining notoriety in the House of Commons as the M.P. for Meath and then later Cork City, President of the Land League in 1879 and Chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1880. Parnell was ironically a landlord and protestant who was able through skilful politics to form a union with revolutionary Fenianism. His goal came under an umbrella policy of conciliation, which was based on resolving the land issue and in doing so uniting ‘ landlord and tenant, and Protestant and Catholic’ towards a goal of an ‘independent Ireland’. This was a reversal of Fenian priorities, which had originally placed achieving national independence first, as a means to resolve the land question.
Accordingly, Parnell employed anti-union obstructionism against bills believed detrimental to the Irish cause while pushing for his own flavour of Home Rule\textsuperscript{24}. In essence, Parnell modified the original demands of the movement to bring them in line with ‘British opinion’\textsuperscript{25}. This included retaining Westminster as the ‘supreme legislative authority’, abolishing the Lord Lieutenants office and all Crown offices that ran domestic affairs, ensuring any laws passed by the Irish chamber were approved by the Crown, gaining control of Customs Duties and maintaining a separate police force\textsuperscript{26}. This was attempted while balancing the agitation of the Land League and physical force demands of the Fenians with his constitutional approach\textsuperscript{27}. In fact, the link between Home Rule and the Land League became crucial in Parnell’s demands, creating a new political grouping that included an alliance with Fenianism\textsuperscript{28}. Ultimately, Parnellism between 1879 and 1891 ‘was a coalition between radical agrarians, constitutional nationalists, and Fenians.’\textsuperscript{29}

Subsequently, the politics of Home Rule playing out in the background during the 1880s and 1890s including, attempts to pass Home Rule bills in both 1886 and 1893, reinforced anti-British sentiment in some camps. With Fenianism and Home Rule always present and then other major events inserting themselves into the landscape such as the 1879-1882 land war, the operational space of the cell was invariably predisposed for instability.

This chapter endeavours to map out the operational landscape of cells between 1881 and 1896 under the shadow of Home Rule and Fenianism. It will first explore several revolutionary organisations including the American based Clan na Gael, the United Irishmen otherwise known as the Dynamite Party, the Land League and Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) to determine how each contributed to the development of terror cells on the British mainland and in Ireland\textsuperscript{30}. Next, the Metropolitan Police forces in both Dublin and London are reviewed to show how they represented an on-going threat to terrorist cells within the cell’s operational landscape. This leads into describing new and existing technologies, particularly bomb making techniques to determine their impact on the cells. Finally, the geography of both Dublin and London are briefly described to lay out a backdrop of the urban environments in which many of the cells operated. This includes an examination of personal histories from a small selection of terrorists as a means to provide some insight into the level of common experiences, which is an important element of group dynamics.
The following section will concentrate on revolutionary organisations, which played major roles in the bombing campaigns. These organisations will be described using the timeline of the Clan na Gael as a main focus for examination beginning in 1881 and ending in 1896. Branching off from the Clan are important interactions between the Dynamite Party, the I.R.B, Land League and Home Rule movement.

The Clan na Gael (family of the Irish), known internally as the United Brotherhood (V.C.) was a secret American oath based organisation formed along Masonic lines in 1869. Masonic in this sense means the use of rituals such as oaths, ciphers, passwords and the swearing of obligations prevalent in Lodge Masonry to ensure secrecy. Members were initiated into the organisation through an elaborate ceremony in which candidates swore to be bound by the oaths and obligations of the society. Part of the ceremony included using a sword as a symbolic token representing the belief that only force alone could free Ireland, which was impressed upon new members as the ‘single cause that should ever be in their minds’. As such, the object of the organisation was to first free Ireland through force and then establish a republican form of government.

The origins of the Clan derive from an organisation called the Fenian Brotherhood, which was a sister organisation of ‘The Brotherhood’ launched in March 1858 by James Stephens.

General J.W. Sweeney, the Secretary of War for the Fenian Brotherhood, provided the following central reason for its establishment: ‘The Fenian Brotherhood was established for the liberation of Ireland from a state of foreign misrule and subjugation which, for the continuation and intensity of its persecution, has no parallel in history.’ The organisation was originally tasked to support and build-up Irish revolutionary movements in Ireland such as the I.R.B. It eventually became the ‘senior partner’ among revolutionary societies, acting as a foreign base in Fenian efforts to overthrow ‘British power in Ireland’.

While the Fenian Brotherhood started as a secret society, over time the organisation became more overt as it openly advertised its meetings and made known its goals such as the invasion of Canada. Subsequently, following the failures of the 1867 Fenian Rising and raids into Canada the organisation morphed into a ‘loosely governed body, weakened and disorganised by never
ending feuds and discussions. These feuds led to a schism within the organisation resulting in some of the leadership splitting off and forming the Clan na Gael.

The Clan has been described as a ‘sort of mutual benefit society with strong Fenian proclivities’ that had its roots in Irish communities in the United States. That is, it was a principle actor in developing the landscape so that the Clan, I.R.B, Land League and Home Rule movement were to some degree dependent on one another. In this sense, the Clan can be thought of as an initiator and leader among these organisations based on how it proceeded to use its financial and supporter base to leverage its power. Foster describes the Clan’s core Fenian beliefs as revolving around ‘the view of England as a satanic power upon earth, a mystic commitment to Ireland, and a belief that an independent Irish republic, ‘virtually’ established in the hearts of men, possessed a superior moral authority.’ Foremost in the minds of the executive leading up to 1881 was to formulate and enact ‘revolutionary projects in Ireland’ in the hopes of creating revolutionary opportunities.

An Executive Bureau (F.C.) oversaw the Clan’s business, which was responsible for writing and implementing policy. Conventions were held in America biennially to continually maintain and update the policy and direction of the organisation. Policy was based on the belief that any open uprising was unlikely to succeed. Subsequently, revolutionary activities were carried out under the umbrella of secrecy, which for example included funding secret organisations and promoting agitation.

The Clan was organised into districts, of which there were sixteen, with each district made up of several states. Districts were then split into camps with each camp run by senior and junior guardians, and comprised of members who were only familiar with the officers in their camp. This element of secrecy ensured that: ‘The management and inner working of the Society are a secret to ninety five percent of its members.’ Members paid initiation fees and weekly subscriptions, which accounted for much of the financing of the Clan. Subordinate to the Executive was the Revolutionary Directory.

The Revolutionary Directory, also known as the Revolutionary Board (S.C.), was formed in 1876 with authority over both the Clan na Gael and I.R.B. This Directory was responsible for
organising all ‘active work’ in the United Kingdom. An 1885 Foreign Office report describes the S.C. ‘as the supreme authority in all Irish revolutionary matters, directing the policy of the whole movement, must be obeyed so long as in the judgement of the F.C. [Executive Bureau] and the S.C. [Revolutionary Board] its action is directed solely to the attainment of the complete independence of Ireland.’ The S.C. comprised three men from the United States and three from the United Kingdom who implemented the organisation’s policy through the planning and execution of operations, and the selection of leading conspirators to carry out the work.

Oversight of the I.R.B. by the Revolutionary Directory reflected its early relationship with the Clan na Gael. The I.R.B. was divided into seven electoral divisions within the United Kingdom. This included Leinster, Munster, Ulster, Connaught, Northern England, Southern England, and Scotland. It was run by an eleven member Supreme Council, also known as the executive and had a membership in 1885 of approximately 47,000. Members of the executive were distributed throughout Ireland, England and Scotland. Divisional representatives grouped towns into districts within which, circles were used to organise members.

Each circle was made up of an executive consisting of a centre or leader, secretary and treasurer, and no more than thirty members. The centre acted as the conduit for all information going in and out of a circle. A centre would oversee the circle being responsible for purchasing and storing war materials, settling member disputes and expelling members if called upon to do so. The centres passed reports to district centres who would then report up the chain to divisional representatives. Members engaged with the organisation on a part-time basis, were expected to pay a subscription, and were responsible for purchasing their own weapons. Circles were ideal organisations for fermenting revolutionary thought and action, and as such became conduits for entry into more extremist organisations as the example of William Kelly and Tom Clarke indicates below.

William Kelly was initiated into the Dungannon Circle in Co. Cork during 1880. Tom Clarke the centre of this circle and ‘future leader of the 1916 Dublin rising’ later became a member of one of Rossa’s dynamite cells in London during 1883. There were twenty-three members enrolled in his circle. During Kelly’s time in the Dungannon Circle he was introduced to Michael Davitt and John Daly, the latter who gave a lecture on taking military action against the Royal Irish
Constabulary (R.I.C.). In fact, on 16 August 1880 six members of the circle ambushed an eleven-man R.I.C. patrol, all of which, escaped without injury. Kelly during September 1880 was transferred to Camp No. 1 of the Clan na Gael where along with Clarke he received explosives training from Dr Thomas Gallagher. Clarke was involved in running guns for the Irish Volunteers during 1915 and was subsequently executed for his involvement in the 1916 Easter Uprising.

Between 1876 and 1877, the I.R.B. became divided over the use of physical force alongside constitutional means. Two factions had materialised one in which only Home Rule was viewed as the way forward and another that supported action ranging from ‘Home Rule politics to terrorism’. The Supreme Council was intransigent in its support of action and subsequently decided to purge the organisation of Home Rule supporters with backing from the American Fenians. The Clan supported this order, which in their eyes made the I.R.B. more manageable by removing members who were considered ‘less amenable to manipulation’. This short-sighted action flew in the face of the growing popularity of Home Rule forcing the organisation into decline and subsequently, to rely on the Clan for funding and leadership.

Around June 1876 the Clan’s membership comprised over 6,900 associates with funds of US$45,421. The funding of work carried out in Ireland, England and Scotland came from the Clan’s Skirmishing Fund, described by Whelehan as the very first ‘public revolutionary fund’. The idea for the fund came from O’Donovan Rossa, Patrick Crowe and John McCafferty. It was established in 1876 by Patrick and Augustine Ford, who edited the Irish World Journal and used it to campaign for funds. Patrick Ford was a lead proponent of scientific warfare, which was a term he coined in an 1877 editorial to in effect define dynamite warfare. He had stated that dynamite in the hands of an inferior force, ‘could do as much damage as 100,000 trained troops could in open warfare.’ This shift from the strategy of armed rebellions was an acknowledgement by elements within Irish revolutionary societies that they could not compete against the British military, so turning to skirmishing was a natural way to level the playing field.

Initially, the fund was organised by O’Donovan Rossa, who intended to use it to support strikes against England (see Figure 2.2). Rossa who was born in Cork, Ireland in 1830, was both a
powerful voice for attacking the British mainland and the use of dynamite. His anti-English views originated from an early relationship with the rebellious ‘Phoenix National and Literary Society’ in Ireland and then several brutal years in a British run prison after which, he was forced to leave Ireland to live in America.

By 1879 the Skirmishing Fund had been renamed the National Fund and its management transferred to a seven man committee after Rossa had a falling out with John Devoy, the current President of the Clan, over how the funds should be spent. Rossa had fallen sick during this period giving Devoy an opportunity to bring the US$23,000 fund under the full control of the Clan na Gael to be used as they saw fit. Devoy’s ploy forced Rossa to retire from his position within the fund late in 1878.

From 1878 onwards, efforts were made to extend the Clan into other countries including England and Europe. During this early period of revolutionary activity, the Clan raised and supplied money to the Land League to help spread their organisation and support families impacted by landlordism. Underlying this financial support was the intent ‘to harness the energy of the land agitation for nationalist separatism’. However, as Townsend states, there was ‘no mechanism for controlling the use of violent sanctions on which much of its coercive power rested.’ It was around this time that Dr. William Caroll, a high-ranking leader of the Clan, toured the I.R.B. in both Ireland and Britain re-organising it after the loss of crucial support following the ouster of Home Rulers. This left little doubt that the I.R.B. at this time was subordinated to the Clan, which placed it at least on the surface in a lead role going into the 1879 convention.

With the popularity of Home Rule increasing, the support of the I.R.B. rank and file began to be undermined. This in turn threatened the well-being of the organisation in Ireland and Great Britain, and accordingly the power of the Clan within the nationalist movement. The Home Rule movement was particularly strong in England and Scotland where Fenianism was ‘inextricably identified with the Home Rule Confederation of Great Britain’. As such, Parnell’s obstructionism in parliament provided John Devoy with an opportunity to move away from the Clan’s inflexibility to Home Rule and reach out to Parnell with an offer of support.
Devoy and Michael Davitt, the future leader of the Land League, together sent Parnell a ‘new departure’ telegram, which included a call for ‘self-government’, ‘vigorous agitation for peasant proprietorship’ and ‘disciplined and energetic action by M.P.s at Westminster.’ The emphasis on both land agitation and constitutionalism was meant to appease all sides, particularly the Irish-American audience. However, the Supreme Council rejected the ‘new departure’ in early 1879, many of whose members were then drawn into the agrarian struggle. Devoy as a result did not have the Fenian support needed to negotiate with Parnell although Parnell still regarded the financial strength of the Clan valuable. Subsequently, Parnell did not disregard Devoy but rather, continued discussions, the results of which became apparent during the August 1879 convention. This reaction by Parnell pretty much characterised his political instinct. That is, he was ‘an agrarian agitator when the Irish people were agrarian agitators, a constitutionalist when the Irish people were constitutionalist, a Fenian when the Irish people were Fenian.’

By the August 1879 convention in Philadelphia Clan membership was up to 11,539. This convention was prominent for John Devoy publically calling for a ‘new departure’ in order to break the uncompromising nature of hard-line Fenianism. It was proposed as a new strategy that addressed both the land question and Home Rule. The ‘new departure’ was a policy enacted by the Clan under which John Devoy wanted to establish a ‘broad nationalist coalition’. It was in a sense a call to bring together under a single front the land agitators and constitutionalists of Ireland. The Supreme Council of the I.R.B. immediately rejected this new strategy based on its uncompromising Fenian commitment to armed rebellion. However, this position was at odds with current thought after Parnell had combined Home Rule, agrarian agitation and Fenianism into one political force, provoking ‘a crisis of authority within the ruling circles of the IRB’, prompting a shift towards cooperation between the various organisations. As such, over the next decade the I.R.B. was to ebb and flow between Home Rule and Physical Force as it tried to maintain its supporter base and remain relevant.

Not unexpectedly, Rossa who was still stung by his removal from the Skirmishing Fund used this opportunity to attack Devoy by arguing it was a re-direction of effort away from violent means. Rossa was essentially ignored and the course of action which was ‘loosely’ agreed upon by Devoy, Davitt and Parnell included, ‘endorsing full legislative autonomy for Ireland, compulsory land purchase (official compulsion on landlords to sell out to their tenants), and a
thoroughly independent Home Rule party at Westminster. Additionally, it was to support the on-going ‘armed strategies’ of the Fenian movement although this was not advertised. The immediate outcome of the 1879 convention was the formation of the Land League by Michael Davitt creating a union between ‘land agitation and nationalist political advance’.

While Devoy was considered the ‘apostle’ of the ‘new departure’, Michael Davitt was to become its ‘prophet’. Parnell became the Land League’s first president leading what was to become a ‘front organization’ that combined the two popular causes of the day, Home Rule and landlordism. However, the ‘new departure’ in Irish politics was not a ‘blueprint’ for the 1879-1882 land war but rather as Townsend postulates, an ‘idea’ that generated a broad base of supporters, which lessened the influence of ‘Fenian orthodoxy’. These same supporters were additionally influenced by the views of James Fintan Lalor who in the late 1840s ‘had cast agrarian agitation in the form of guerrilla warfare’ as means to mobilise the nation towards independence.

Comerford states that the ‘new departure’ in fact had little to do with the start of land agitation. Rather, the primary unifying force behind land agitation was the hostility towards property owners. A host of local conditions together with resident Fenians, the latter who had nothing to lose, generally determined the level of hostility. In due course, as Comerford states, the ‘new departure’ of 1878 was invariably eclipsed by ‘another spearheaded by Davitt’ in the form of land agitation. The result as Comerford aptly points out was that ‘Davitt fell in love with agrarian agitation and began to cultivate it for his own sake, Parnell subordinated it to a political movement of his own liking, and Devoy was left high and dry.’

Parnell’s treatment of Devoy in keeping the Clan at arm’s length is indicative of the growing popularity of Home Rule, which was especially apparent after the overwhelming election of Home Rulers during the 1880 General Election. The physical force element of the Clan was a hot potato and not conducive to retaining the focus on the agrarian plight and a relationship with the Gladstone government. Nonetheless, Devoy was still at the helm of a powerful organisation whose deep pockets were crucial to the financial support of agrarian agitation and dynamite warfare.
Funds collected by the Clan during this early period were redirected towards the Land League with the committee controlling the purse strings and in this sense, having some degree of control over activities carried out in Ireland such as authorising the assassination of ‘obnoxious landlords’\textsuperscript{117}. In fact, Comerford states that without the monetary support coming from America the land war would have been unsustainable\textsuperscript{118}. The Clan’s alliance with Parnell ultimately set off a chain of events, which ultimately led to the start of bombing campaigns on the British mainland.

Rossa dissatisfied by his treatment following the Clan’s support for land agitation and believing there was no chance for armed rebellion, split from the organisation in 1879 and along with other associates, formed the United Irishmen (herein known as the Dynamite Party)\textsuperscript{119}.

![Figure 3.1: Portrait of Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa after 1900\textsuperscript{120}.](image)

The Dynamite Party was based out of Brooklyn, New York and completely independent of the Clan. It was backed by Advanced Nationalists, the *United Irishmen* newspaper, the old Fenian Brotherhood and the I.R.B. of New York. The Advanced Nationalists were a powerful group of politicians and wealthy Irishmen from New York whose aspirations exceeded those of the Irish Parliamentary Party\textsuperscript{121}. They had felt marginalised by the lack of focus on an ‘urban movement for social reform’ in favour of agrarian issues and subsequently had aligned themselves with Rossa\textsuperscript{122}. Rossa had as a result set up a new fund called the ‘United Irish Reserve Fund’ to raise money for his own operations\textsuperscript{123}. Based on statements he made in the *Irish World* newspaper on 16 April 1881 this fund was to be used “to lay the big cities of England in ashes” and to destroy
by dynamite the property of England both on land and sea. Consequently, Rossa believed his dynamite policy would cripple England if carried out aggressively enough.

The mouthpiece of the Dynamite Party was the *Dynamite Monthly*, which was published in New York and used to advance the ideals and plans of the organisation. One of its articles commented on the strategy to be used in its war against the British stating:

> It must be carried on in a very special way, under new rules suited to the peculiarities of the case. A regular war is not to be thought of. It must be a “scientific war,” preferable in any case to a regular war, and in the present state of affairs between the contending parties the only war that can be waged with plausibility of success.

A lecture by P.J. Sheridan to members of the Dynamite Party had further elaborated, that ‘a few carefully-selected men, armed with the means that civilization furnishes, can do more than the work of armies of old times.’ This form of warfare was termed ‘skirmishing’, which was announced as ‘the shortest, swiftest, and cheapest warfare – That which does the greatest material damage to the enemy with the least loss of life to either side’. It was believed each attack would give additional ‘strength and prestige’ to the Irish cause. In other words, dynamite deployed by terrorist cells would become the principle means of attack although the use of other weapons such as guns and even knives could not be discounted. The first bombing campaign was inaugurated in 1881 after funds were raised from subscriptions and donations collected in America.

The Dynamite Party instigated all of the early terror bombings in Britain from January 1881 up to the spring of 1883. Rossa had pretty much concluded that by 1881 the Land League was a failure. As such, his organisation had used its fund’s to put into action a ‘Dynamite Policy’ in direct contradiction to the Clan’s limited policy at the time of affecting land agitation. While the Clan had discussed carrying out attacks in England, it had not yet approved this strategy so was vexed upon Rossa starting his own campaign. There is little doubt that both the Clan and Land League, the latter of which was particularly active at this time, disapproved of Rossa’s rogue bombing campaigns.
The Dynamite Party maintained an executive of sorts consisting of O’Donovan Rossa, Edward J. Rowe and Joseph Comien. A Captain Spearman acted as the treasurer although it was Rossa who controlled the purse strings of the organisation. The operational ringleader of the Dynamite Party was believed to be Thomas Bracken who lived in Dublin. Bracken was a Fenian who had been arrested in 1865 and was said to have arranged all the preliminaries for Rossa’s agents upon their arrival on the English mainland, although no further record of his involvement was found.

Rossa recruited Irish-American agents in America, who he named ‘Missioners’ and sent them to England during 1881. These men organised terror cells that were to plan and carry out bombings against various targets. Rossa utilised intermediaries in Cork, Glasgow, and London to coordinate his parties’ efforts. His cells were also active between 1882 and 1883 carrying out bombings in Glasgow and preparing cells for additional attacks in London. This latter campaign effectively fell apart following the arrest of Dennis Deasy in Liverpool on 28 March 1883 for the illegal possession of an ‘infernal machine’. Deasy turned Queen’s evidence helping bring down Rossa’s remaining cells. Meanwhile while Rossa was attacking the British mainland, the land war had taken off, which by 1881 was moving into a new violent phase.

The Land League by 1881 had established branches throughout Ireland such as in Co. Kerry, Co. Mayo and Co. Sligo. O’Donovan Rossa even though he opposed the Clan’s funding of the League still attempted to influence it indirectly by using the Ireland based United Ireland newspaper to espouse his views. The United Ireland newspaper first started printing in August 1881 and was used by Rossa as his mouthpiece. Through this newspaper, he expressed his views on Land League issues in addition to providing news and periodic updates on its activities. His message went out to a wide base of followers such that at the time the United Ireland was shut down by police, it had a circulation of approximately 44,000 people. In many ways, this newspaper became a means for him to influence the activities of land leaguers. For example, the following warning to landlords was posted in the United Ireland newspaper on 13 August 1881 by Rossa:

O’Donovan Rossa’s Warning to Landlords. “Every Irish landlord who exercises the power of eviction is warned that a record will be kept, and for every eviction ‘a death sentence will be recorded by the Irish race against the murderer’s house, and the Irish race all
over the world will give encouragement to the avenging angel..... We ask Irish-men and
women to send in the names of families evicted after August 1881, and the names and
residences in England, Ireland, or Scotland, of the evicting landlords."148

The actions of the Land League inspired Irishmen to take up arms against the British as noted in
a report by the Foreign Office from April 1882. This report commented that the on-going actions
of Irish organisations whether for revolution or murder were ‘taking hold of young men’ and in
this sense were becoming magnets for those inclined towards such activities149.

Terrorism as such during the land war was often carefully calibrated at a local level but lacked
coordination at a national level, as there was no single strategy under a common banner to unify
efforts150. This was exacerbated after Parnell along with other well-known leaders were arrested
in October 1881 in which Comerford comments that afterwards, the Land League became even
more disorganised151. While verbal attacks against landlordism emanated from Davitt at a
platform level these did nothing to bring the disparate groups together in a coordinated
fashion152.

Townsend comments that the rate of attacks varied by area, due primarily to how the Land
League manifested locally based on certain conditions such as the local economy153. Local
factors subsequently resulted in what Townsend terms a questionable ‘collective action’ at the
national level154. These types of local attacks involved a ‘substratum of intimidation’ that was
‘hard to quantify and apprehend.’155 As such, ‘enforcement’ terrorism became a common way to
gain support156. Overall, the success of the League was at the local level where it brought
together a ‘sense of natural and communal identity of Irish Catholics’157. Reports on the Land
League in the Castleisland District, Co. Kerry between 1881 and 1882, paint a picture of a local
organisation that utilised many acts of disorganised terror.

The Castleisland district had the greatest Landowner – Tenant tensions in all of Ireland between
1881 and 1882 being described as ‘one of the “worst” of all districts158. This district had little
connection to the Land League until around October 1880, but from 1881 to 1882, there were
262 outrages with the majority occurring during 1882. For example, during 1881 there were
seventeen murders, five cases of manslaughter and sixty-six cases of firing at persons159. Physical
terror occurred in the form of beatings, shootings, attacks against farm stock, the burning of
properties and in some cases murder\textsuperscript{160}. However, the majority of actions linked to agrarian violence were made through threatening letters and to some extent boycotting where individuals, families, businesses, or even commodities were embargoed. For example, the school attended by the daughter of a Bailiff, involved in tenant evictions, was boycotted until she had been removed\textsuperscript{161}. In a report detailing agrarian lawlessness in Co. Kerry between 1881 and 1882, it was stated that, ‘these men are the leaders of a lawless party in this locality, and have established a state of terrorism in their neighbourhood.’\textsuperscript{162}

The past existence of a Fenian secret society (est. 1863-1864) in the village of Castleisland (pop. 2,000) arguably made its villagers more susceptible to joining the Land League. The Castleisland Land League appears to have had Fenian links to O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party in America, which became to some degree, instrumental in influencing the activities of the Land League\textsuperscript{163}. It was believed that one of the Fenians in Castleisland went to America to receive instruction, although for what purpose is not described\textsuperscript{164}. However, instruction in the use of explosives is suspected based on representatives from America visiting Castleisland during February 1882 including P.J. Sheridan who was a proponent of dynamite as a means of revolution\textsuperscript{165}.

A local Roman Catholic priest best describes the operational policy of the Land League. He stated ‘that they should not kill anyone who went against the doctrines of the Land League, but to injure them in their arms, legs, properties, and means of living.’\textsuperscript{166} This kind of inflammatory language encouraged men who attended local Land League meetings to raid for arms and carry out violent attacks against landlords, their property and tenants who continued to pay rent in direct violation of local Land League policy. These attacks comprised local people, generally labourers and farmers coming together at night in gangs and then in many cases, carrying out terror attacks against local people or their property\textsuperscript{167}. For example, during March 1881 Land League gangs carried out raids on houses to collect guns\textsuperscript{168}. During April 1881, a Michael Dennehy had his ears cut off as a warning to those who disobeyed Land League policy\textsuperscript{169}. Finally, during June 1881 men broke into a house and fired on its residents\textsuperscript{170}. These types of violent encounters also extended to the targeting of police where from May 1882 to December 1882 shooting attacks were carried out against them\textsuperscript{171}. In many cases, the victims knew the attackers but were too scared to identify them. This filtered down into jury pools, which often refused to
convict suspected land leaguers for fear of being targeted later. This knowledge empowered the land leaguers where, ‘the intended murderer has little or no fear of punishment.’

As such, the British government responded to this crisis by arresting Parnell in October 1881 and officially banning the Land League. It was at around the same time a new extremist group called the Irish National Invincibles was formed in Ireland. The Invincibles comprised a mix of land leaguers and members of the I.R.B. who were motivated to carry out immediate work. The core of the organisation was formed in Dublin where they remained active until early 1883 after assassinating the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish and Under Secretary, Thomas H. Burke in Phoenix Park on 6 May 1882. It was the brutality and audacity of this murder that created an enormous backlash in the operational landscape that Townsend comments was greater than any other act during this period.

These assassinations gave rise to a return to coercion through the introduction of the Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act 1882. This as Townsend puts it resulted from the Phoenix Park Murders invalidating the Kilmainham ‘treaty’. This treaty was actually a verbal agreement between Parnell and Prime Minister Gladstone asking Parnell to discourage Irish Parliamentary Party members from encouraging violence and instead, ‘co-operate with the liberals in the cause for reform’. Gladstone’s preference for ‘conciliation’ rather than ‘coercion’ was generally based on his own personal beliefs for creating a more flexible empire, which provided a context for an alliance with Parnell. He opted for ‘gradual change’ that was ‘organic rather than revolutionary historical shifts.’

Parnell agreed to the treaty on 5 May 1882 and was as a result released from prison. The murders occurred the next day, the timing of which is addressed in Chapter 6. Subsequently, coercion became a disturbance in the landscape that induced further attacks by Irish extremists as well as, driving more Irishmen to the Home Rule movement as the Land League was gradually subdued.

Following the banning of the Land League and its on-going suppression Parnell replaced it in October 1882 with the Irish National League (I.N.L.), an organisation that supported the Irish Parliamentary Party. By May 1883, the strict application of the Prevention of Crimes (Ireland)
Act 1882 by the police had effectively made the Land League incapable of organising any kind of on-going effective resistance. Even though it had been suppressed, it was still considered by many to have been a successful campaign with the introduction of the ground-breaking Land Act of 1881 along with the renewal of small town Fenianism. This act, in which rents were to be set by tribunal, where statutory tenure was recognised and tenants were granted the right of free sale was revolutionary for the time. However, land issues were on going and did in fact continue through to the end of the century particularly as numerous land purchase acts were introduced between 1885 and 1896 creating the conditions for additional agitation.

During this period of increasing agrarian agitation in Ireland and dynamite warfare in Britain, the Clan na Gael was deciding policy and ultimately, whether they were ready to undertake their own bombing campaign on the British mainland. As early as May 1880 British authorities considered the Clan a dangerous organisation. It was determined that by ‘its systematic proceedings in America and the secrecy which attends its projects, and correspondence with its agents in the United Kingdom and Australia it has proved itself to be a more formidable organisation then any of its predecessors.’ In fact, Devoy during this period had announced that in response to any coercive tactics directed at land agitators, ‘reprisals would be taken against cabinet minister’s lives and against English cities.’ Compared to the later Devoy who rejected dynamite warfare and embraced constitutional methods this Devoy was suggesting the use of physical force. As such, his threat was not an empty one based on the Clan’s ability to mine its membership for money and resources to undertake work overseas.

During the August 1881 convention in Chicago, some significant policy decisions were made regarding the Clans stance on physical force. Convention discussions concerning control over the National Fund dominated the event. Primarily, the dynamite and anti-dynamite factions quarrelled over how funds were being spent, with the dynamite faction as a result pushing for the re-organisation or break up of the Clan. In an attempt to placate the extremists, the conservative majority made sure ‘a comprehensive and vigorous programme was adopted for an active, but regular revolutionary movement against England, and that the British soldier will have to soon show his worth.’ This included passing a series of resolutions to support the Land League both morally and financially advocating a ‘no rent policy’ until the rule of England was broken. However, while the Clan would back public agitation in Ireland they were not yet fully
supportive of an active ground campaign on the British mainland. In the end, most of the radical delegates came back into line with the final policy decisions, although the most radical such as O’Donovan Rossa remained opposed to the direction of the organisation\textsuperscript{196}.

During this convention, the Clan formally adopted the following revolutionary constitution. Its objective was to achieve ‘complete political independence of Ireland under a republican form of government, with full civil and religious liberty guaranteed to all her inhabitants; and the only policy which it believes will attain this end is by force of arms.’\textsuperscript{197} This constitution is significant for its commitment to physical force, whatever that might have been. Finally, Alexander Sullivan was added to the Clan’s executive superseding Devoy as its president whose influence had been gradually declining on par with the weakening of the Land League\textsuperscript{198}.

Sullivan was a lawyer from Chicago with deep conviction. He had shot and killed a Superintendent of Schools over objections to bibles in the classrooms during his early days\textsuperscript{199}. He had been subsequently acquitted in the courts on a technicality but his convictions and ruthlessness almost certainly influenced his associations with the physical force element of the Clan\textsuperscript{200}. There is little doubt he was a proponent of violence, which was in direct conflict with Devoy’s alignment to a combined approach of constitutionalism mixed with land agitation.

As of the January 1882 convention in Chicago, the Clan’s membership had increased to 38,181\textsuperscript{201}. Additionally, an accounting of the National Fund as of 28 September 1882 included a torpedo boat for US$14,000; US$1,500 to Michael Davitt’s Land League; a second torpedo boat for US$23,000; a loan to the Irish World Newspaper for US$12,000; and finally US$2,500 to J.J. Breslin\textsuperscript{202} for torpedo boats\textsuperscript{203}. The torpedo boat, nicknamed the ‘Fenian Ram’ was a miniature submarine intended for use against British warships but due to operational issues was never deployed. These vessels were yet another sore point for Rossa who considered them a waste of money and a re-direction of effort away from where the real action should be, on the British mainland\textsuperscript{204}. The failure of the submarines according to Whelehan may have prompted the Clan to bring their plots back on shore following along the same lines as Rossa’s 1881 campaign\textsuperscript{205}.

The April 1883 convention in Philadelphia was a pivotal turning point in the history of the Clan na Gael. During this convention, it was decided to ‘abolish’ the Land League and form a new organisation to coordinate the remaining revolutionary organisations under one strategy\textsuperscript{206}. As
such, the Irish National League of America (I.N.L.A) was formed as the ‘the public face of the movement’ comprising the Clan, I.R.B, and what remained of the Land League\(^\text{207}\). The I.N.L.A was to be the dominant society representing all Irishmen united under ‘one banner’\(^\text{208}\). It was intended this new organisation would support Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party although Parnell was noticeably absent from this convention. This was in line with his arm’s length relationship with the Clan although he did send a communication requesting the framework of the organisation be developed so that he could still receive support from America\(^\text{209}\). Alexander Sullivan became the I.N.L.A’s first president with most members of the Executive originating from the Clan, symbolising the financial strength of the organisation and its continued dominance in decision-making\(^\text{210}\).

During the Philadelphia convention, meetings were also held behind closed doors to discuss the organisation’s dynamite policy where it was finally agreed to divert funds to support a bombing campaign in Great Britain\(^\text{211}\). This was a heated discussion with Home Rulers creating divisions within the organisation. The more conservative leaders wanted to affirm their faith in Parnell by rejecting dynamite, while other leaders wanted to make an open declaration upholding its use\(^\text{212}\). In reality, the Clan was the deciding force behind the scenes and did not believe in work being carried out by other independent organisations or individuals\(^\text{213}\). Instead, it wanted all efforts centralised and conforming to the general policy of the I.N.L.A\(^\text{214}\). This was accomplished by controlling the purse strings and as such, funding to the I.R.B\(^\text{215}\). If the I.R.B, which had always struggled financially was to remain a viable organisation it had to accept the funding of the Clan and in so doing, its policies\(^\text{216}\).

For the I.R.B. to exist under the umbrella of the Clan na Gael, it meant being involved in active operations against the British so as to keep the organisation relevant. A circular published in May 1883 by the Clan requesting additional monies from districts had ultimately increased the Clan’s funds to US$89,000 by October 1884\(^\text{217}\). A short time later US$40,000 was sent to the I.R.B\(^\text{218}\). Short indicates that the attitude of the I.R.B. towards supporting dynamite warfare changed around this time, which was likely attributed to its subordination to the Clan\(^\text{219}\). As such, a British Foreign Office report from January 1885 observed:
We thus see clearly what an important position is held by the V.C. [United Brotherhood otherwise known as the Clan na Gael] in the movement against England, and how, having the command of the finances, it is able to support and control the action of the sister secret organisation in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{220}

While the I.R.B. remained viable as a result of financial backing from the Clan it gradually became less effective as an active resistance movement over the last two decades of the nineteenth century. To some degree, it lost prominence due to the activities of the Land League during the 1879-1882 land war, even though it had helped organise it\textsuperscript{221}. The League as a result split the I.R.B. supporter base with many of the small holder Fenians shifting to the Land League while the Dublin supporters tended to stay with the organisation\textsuperscript{222}.

However, the I.R.B.s major failing was as Townsend states, its intransigence where ‘doctrinaire rigidity was increasingly unsatisfactory to the more practical minded members of the brotherhood’\textsuperscript{223}. This rigidity eventually affected its relationships with other organisations including the Clan who cut links with the I.R.B. sometime in 1884 over the I.R.B.’s opposition to its on-going bombing campaign\textsuperscript{224}. John Devoy, a moderate voice in the Clan was against this decision as he regarded the I.R.B. Supreme Council as the ‘provisional government of Ireland and consequently the rightful determinant of actions against the British’\textsuperscript{225}. Consequently, the I.R.B. was never again fully supportive of the Clan until after 1887 when it aligned itself with the moderate wing of the organisation\textsuperscript{226}.

By the end of 1883, the Clan had split into two factions following a schism over the organisation’s physical force policy. A majority faction, operating under the initials ‘U.S.’\textsuperscript{227} continued under an executive branch of three men dubbed the ‘Triangle’\textsuperscript{228}. These men had no qualms in using terrorism to challenge British rule. In resistance to the ‘Triangle’, a faction led by John Devoy was formed, favouring a more moderate policy that opposed dynamite warfare in favour of open warfare and constitutionalism\textsuperscript{229}. Ultimately, this division would continue through the 1890s destabilizing Irish-American unity and the underlying principles of Fenianism\textsuperscript{230}. However, Devoy’s wing of the Clan was a minority and did not control the finances of the organisation. As such, the ‘Triangle’ controlled the Clan from late 1883 until 1885.
The ‘Triangle’ as of 1884 was made up of Alexander Sullivan (President of the Clan and the I.N.L.A), Michael Boland and Michael Feely\(^{231}\). However, Sullivan was forced to resign his posts during the August 1884 convention after being found guilty of misusing the I.N.L.A and Clan for personal electioneering efforts\(^{232}\). He and the ‘Triangle’ leadership were subsequently accused during the Clan’s 1886 convention of embezzlement, illegally breaking links with the I.R.B. in 1884 and not supporting the families of agents killed during dynamite operations\(^{233}\). The lead accusers were Dr Patrick H. Cronin and John Devoy of the moderate faction\(^{234}\). This accusation resulted in an internal Clan investigation and trial during November 1888, in which Cronin was one of the ‘Trial Committee’, resulting in the censure of Sullivan’s executive\(^{235}\). Not soon after on 4 May 1889 members of Sullivan’s camp allegedly, murdered Dr Cronin\(^{236}\). This led to a court trial in which Sullivan and three others were eventually released with all charges dropped\(^{237}\).

Other members of the executive were Michael Tracey, James Reynolds and J.D. Carrol the treasurer\(^{238}\). The Revolutionary Directory was comprised of four men, which included Captain Michael Kerwin, Captain W. Mackey Lomasney, J.J. Breslin and Francis Agnew\(^{239}\). The chief agent of the ‘Triangle’ was Michael Kerwin, who was responsible for recruiting agents and ‘mapping out’ the bombing campaign in Great Britain\(^{240}\). He had originally opposed Rossa’s dynamite policy and was considered a ‘restraining influence’ in the ‘Triangle’\(^{241}\). Kerwin’s secret and secure approach to the campaign including, always communicating to agents through an intermediary, ensured suspicion was not brought to bear on the organisation\(^{242}\). Ultimately, it was the Revolutionary Directory that orchestrated and for some, took part in, dynamite attacks on the British mainland from late 1883 until January 1885\(^{243}\). These attacks are laid out in more detail in Chapter 4. Throughout this period, approximately US$100,000 was spent on ‘active work’ in Ireland and Great Britain\(^{244}\).

Why dynamite warfare came to an abrupt halt in early 1885 is somewhat unclear. Townsend implies it was the death of the dynamiter and Clan insider William Lomasney during the 13 December 1884 attack on London Bridge, which caused the bombing campaigns to die away ‘of their own accord.’\(^{245}\) This vague statement can be revised by examining a combination of factors such as the overall ineffectiveness of the bombings, likened to ‘pinpricks’ by Whelehan, and the unpopularity of dynamite warfare within the secret organisations of the Clan and I.R.B\(^{246}\). Most
likely, it was pressure coming from the Home Rule movement and the dangling carrot of a Home Rule Bill that was introduced, just over a year after the last dynamite attack.\footnote{247}

Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party had gained some measure of ‘importance’ in the House of Commons following the 1885 General Election.\footnote{248} His party had won eighty-six seats, enough to prompt the new Gladstonian government to introduce a Home Rule Bill into parliament in April 1886.\footnote{249} The Bill was promptly defeated in the House of Commons; leading Gladstone to call a new election in 1886 after many of his M.Ps defected.\footnote{250} This resulted in the election of a Conservative/Unionist coalition with Lord Salisbury as Prime minister.\footnote{251}

The tide it seems had turned against the dynamiters, which makes a final plot in 1887 at loggerheads with current nationalist thinking. However, the reintroduction of coercion during 1887 following another flare up of land agitation, and a growing despondence with Home Rule was likely an influence in initiating the 1887 plot.\footnote{252} Subsequently, the tumultuous instability of the early to mid-1880s came to an abrupt end with a second hiatus from dynamite warfare occurring between 1887 and 1890.

The Clan na Gael from 1890 onwards made something of an attempt to return to the successful terrorist attacks of the 1880s. At this time, the organisation was still divided into two wings but changes had taken place within the more extreme wing of the party. While Devoy still remained the leader of the moderates, the Irish-American William Lyman had taken over Alexander Sullivan’s wing of the party.\footnote{253}

Lyman controlled executives in America, Ireland, and Great Britain. His executive in America in addition to himself consisted of J.F. Keating, J.J Judge Holyoke, O’Neil Ryan, Patrick O’Neil and Con Reilly.\footnote{254} His executive in London consisted of three men including, John O’Mahony, John McBride and Patrick Tobin.\footnote{255} In Dublin, it was made up of Dr Mark Ryan, Dr McBride and Dr McDonnell.\footnote{256} The I.R.B. during this period was convinced their organisation could not be kept together unless attacks against the British were carried out. They knew that ‘something must be done. If they did not do it the others would.’\footnote{257} Subsequently, Lyman it seems visited Ireland several times between 1893 and 1896 to discuss plots with I.R.B. Leaders.
Lyman at this point in the Clan’s history was in charge of the Revolutionary Fund (previously known as the National Fund and Skirmishing Fund), which totalled approximately US$55,000. This was a cause for consternation for the British as in the past, the Revolutionary Directory had been responsible for these monies, providing oversight for how it was to be distributed. As such, if Lyman were to send men to England to engage in a new bombing campaign then no one else would know about it, particularly British spies, if all maintained secrecy. Of this money, US$11,000 was eventually sent to Ireland for revolutionary activities.

In December 1893, the Clan sent two operatives named John Nolan and John Merna to Dublin to carry out terror operations against the British. However, their attempts failed and both men instead ended up being involved in a shooting on 27 November 1893 of a fellow terrorist called Patrick Reid who they suspected was about to inform on them. This confluence of events occurred after a series of dynamite attacks in Dublin during the early 1890s.

The following 1891 to 1893 bombing campaign serves as a useful reminder that the evolution of Irish Republican terrorist campaigns and their cells did not follow any necessarily linear direction. Ultimately, it will be shown that this campaign was aberrational, which unlike all the other bombings, occurred in Dublin rather than a British city. As such, since little is known about the operators, this could indicate some success on their part by operating within an Irish environment in contrast to the inhospitable landscape of the British mainland. Overall, this campaign was marked by the sporadic nature and marked amateurishness of the attacks, which contrasts powerfully with the earlier British bombing campaigns.

Between 1891 and 1893, five dynamite plots were carried out in Dublin breaking a peace that at the time was attributed to the hope of Home Rule. It was in August 1892 that Prime Minister Gladstone introduced another Home Rule Bill into parliament. He had believed that the English people would accept Irish self-government as long as both ‘English and Imperial’ interests were protected. However, instability reigned within the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1891 after Parnell had been exposed having an extramarital affair and the party had split into three factions: the Parnellites, the anti-Parnellites and the Healyites. Moreover, members of the I.R.B. who had attended as delegates during the 1891 Dublin Convention, which was used to prepare for upcoming elections, had infiltrated the party. As Kelly comments, the split
revealed the violently contradictory forces that had structured Home Rule’s support base." As such, there was a general fear by the Home Rule movement that ‘squabbles’ within the Irish Party might generate actions that would create ‘a most sinister impression in England and would put the cause of Home Rule in serious danger.’ While this division did disrupt on-going land agitation, it was a new wave of dynamite plots, which increased fears extremists were trying to derail the process.

A series of somewhat unexplained dynamite bombings occurred in Dublin between 1891 and 1893 bringing back memories of the earlier dynamite attacks. Explosions were recorded at the National Press Office on 26 October 1891, Dublin Castle on 31 December 1891, the Exchange Court on 24 December 1892 and Four Courts on 6 May 1893, while a failed attempt was made at the Aldborough Barracks on 26 November 1893.

The bombing at the National Press Office occurred on 26 October 1891 at 8:15 pm after a bomb was thrown from the street into the basement of the building. This explosion wrecked much of the surrounding area as well as shattering windows and street lamps on the road. Several groups of men had been seen in the street at the time as well as there being some speculation that constables guarding the Press Office might have been purposely diverted to a local Public House to allow the attack to take place. Constables had been assigned to protect the National Press Office following Parnell’s death in 1891.

Two months later, Dublin Castle was attacked on the afternoon of 31 December 1891. An explosion emanating from a basement below the Privy Council’s Chamber blew out windows and ruined the floor inside the office. The chamber was located on the east side quadrangle of Dublin Castle where renovations were going on, in which workers had been engaged. Based on an analysis of the explosion, the attack had targeted an arch support between the lower and upper castle in order to bring down the Privy Council building. The device was housed in a metal envelope, the design of which was ultimately connected to later attacks. It was thought the envelope contained dynamite cartridges packed in gunpowder although this could not be verified. This would have been a significant attack if the Privy Council had been in session, which had been scheduled for later that evening. Moreover, Mr. Frederick J. Cullinan, a principal
clerk for the Chief Secretary had an office right above the explosion and just barely missed being caught up in it\textsuperscript{279}.

In contrast to the Press Office and Dublin Castle bombings, the explosion at the Exchange Court near Dublin Castle, just before midnight on 24 December 1892 was a much more serious affair\textsuperscript{280}. The Exchange Court was a cul-de-sac around forty yards in length on the perimeter of Dublin Castle (see Figure 3.2)\textsuperscript{281}. The end was closed off by buildings that housed on the ground level, a mess area for the detective’s force and on the upper level, the Library of the Chief Secretary\textsuperscript{282}. Detective offices and private residences predominantly took up one side of the road while the other side comprised the offices of City Hall\textsuperscript{283}. This was a busy area that was used by people needing to access the Detective Offices and sometimes as a makeshift urinal by the public\textsuperscript{284}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map}
\caption{Map of Exchange Court and surrounding area from 1893\textsuperscript{285}.}
\end{figure}
An explosive device was placed approximately eighteen feet from the door of the Detective Offices. It appears an attempt had been made to draw away the constable protecting the entrance to Dublin Castle, which had been a similar tactic employed in the National Press Office attack. The explosion killed a passing detective named Patrick Sinnott, blowing out all the windows in the street along with some doors but doing little other damage. A detective who had passed the area four to five minutes beforehand had noticed a small brown package the size of a small book, close to the wall from which a small glowing light emanated. The fatal injuries suffered by Sinnott gave clues to his interactions with the device. One side of his body was completely ‘mangled’ in addition to part of his finger being found in the Chief Secretary’s library suggesting that he had been closely examining the suspicious package when it exploded.

It was believed the bomb was made up of around two pounds of dynamite or guncotton that had been placed in a tin envelop with most likely a slow match fuse to initiate the detonator. It was determined this attack had some similarities to the bombing at Dublin Castle on New Year’s Eve 1891. The same type of tin envelope was used, as was an inadequate amount of explosive. Moreover, it was concluded that the agents were inexperienced in the use of nitroglycerin based products in part due to the amount of explosive used and how the device had been placed. In the latter case, this type of explosive is more effective when placed in the interior of a room or right up against a wall.

The next explosion occurred at Four Courts on 6 May 1893 at 10:40 pm. Four Courts was a block of buildings containing the Law Courts of Ireland located on the north banks of the River Liffey with a paved road separating the riverbank from the buildings. The explosion occurred behind Queen’s Bench Court #2, in a courtyard, with frontage along the river. A man was seen sprinting away from the scene preceding the explosion and was assumed to have been the perpetrator responsible. Damage was minimal consisting of 349 broken windows facing onto the courtyard.

Based on an analysis of the crime scene, it was believed either dynamite or guncotton amounting to no more than one pound was used. This explosive charge was contained within a tin canister, which was thrown from the roadway into the courtyard. Based on the small amount of damage and believed trajectory of the thrown device, it was determined a lit fuse
was likely used versus a percussion fuse, with the device rebounding of a wall and detonating prematurely around six inches from the building and twelve inches from the ground\textsuperscript{303}. This attack had many similarities to both the Dublin Castle and Exchange Court explosions\textsuperscript{304}. It occurred at a late hour, a tin canister was used, the ‘point of application’ of the device was ineffective, a nitroglycerin product was used and finally an ineffectual amount of explosive was deployed\textsuperscript{305}. This plot once more suggested the perpetrators were inexperienced in the use of nitroglycerin products although the agents were as in the previous attacks, familiar with the location and schedules of the constables on duty\textsuperscript{306}. The conclusion in the Explosive’s Report for this plot was that at a minimum, the same perpetrators who carried out the Exchange Court bombing also carried out the Four Courts’ attack\textsuperscript{307}.

Prior to the next attack Prime Minster Gladstone’s Home Rule Bill was passed by the House of Commons but rejected in the House of Lords during September 1893\textsuperscript{308}. Bardon notes that ‘no bill in the 19th Century occupied so much parliamentary time.’\textsuperscript{309} By passing in the House of Commons, it was considered in some quarters the ‘greatest achievement of constitutional agitation’\textsuperscript{310}. The defeat was spun mainly as a benefit to the Irish cause in effect, uniting both the English and Irish people behind Prime Minister Gladstone’s Liberal Party in the face of determined opposition from the aristocracy\textsuperscript{311}. However, The I.N.L. issued a manifesto believing that the Irish had been fooled into supporting a bill that was being used to increase the liberal majority\textsuperscript{312}. Bardon sums up the operational landscape following the failure of the 1893 Home Rule Bill by commenting that, ‘Parnell was dead, Gladstone was out of the political arena, the Liberals had shelved Home Rule, the Irish Parliamentary Party remained bitterly divided, and Ireland was calm.’\textsuperscript{313} As such, it is possible that the failure of the bill to pass influenced the next dynamite plot.

The Aldborough Barracks attempt occurred on 26 November 1893\textsuperscript{314}. It appears a device had been thrown over the wall of the barracks and then found by a soldier with the fuse burned out\textsuperscript{315}. The device was wrapped in brown paper and after analysis was found to contain around two pounds of homemade dynamite, a commercial fuse of which around three inches had burned, and a detonator filled with fulminate of mercury, and chlorate of potash\textsuperscript{316}. The dynamite, while still powerful, had been mixed in such a way that suggested the perpetrators
were inexperienced\(^{317}\). Coincidentally, the day following this attempt a Walter Sheridan had been picked up by the police for intoxication along with an accomplice called Patrick Reid\(^{318}\). Sheridan was found with six detonators one of which was found to be identical to the detonator used in the Aldborough attempt\(^{319}\). These detonators were then compared with a detonator found at the Four Courts explosion and were found to all have diameters of .23 of an inch\(^{320}\). While this is not hard evidence, it does seem to suggest that Sheridan was linked to the Aldborough attempt and possibly the Four Courts’ explosion.

Reid who had been released for lack of evidence was later found shot through the neck the same evening\(^{321}\). Subsequently, the two operatives John Nolan and John Merna, who after being sent by the Clan to carry out other operations, appear to have shot Reid on the suspicion he was about to inform\(^{322}\). Police linked Reid to the Aldborough Barracks bombing attempt after police found remnants of dynamite in a house he had been working in on the day he was shot\(^{323}\). Moreover, it appeared he had been burning documents in an attempt to ‘destroy any evidence of a compromising nature in his possession.’\(^{324}\) Nolan and Merna were arrested, interrogated and eventually discharged on 12 January 1894 after police could not produce enough evidence to convict them\(^{325}\). Sheridan was meanwhile tried three times, each time the jury disagreeing on his guilt eventually resulting in his discharge\(^{326}\). Ultimately, the release of these agents established that the police investigation into these series of bombings had been inconclusive.

There was some speculation that the perpetrators were a single cell of Irish extremists, which were not directly linked to any Fenian organisation\(^{327}\). There seems to be some substance to this assertion based on the established consistencies and linkages between each plot such as the mode of attack and the types of fuses and detonators used. The small amounts of dynamite used in each attack, the cell’s inexperience in manufacturing it along with an operational ignorance of how to deploy it effectively suggests the group was inexperienced in this type of work. As to the reason for these plots, several media outlets played up the disruption of Home Rule as a reason.

These attacks did occur during an unspoken amnesty between Irish nationalists and Prime Minister Gladstone who were in the midst of gathering support for another vote on the Home Rule Bill. However, the targets seem to be arbitrary with various reasons other than Home Rule able to be speculated for most of the attacks. First, The National Press Office printed an anti-
Parnellite newspaper and was attacked soon after Parnell’s death. Second, The Privy Council in Dublin Castle may have been chosen after it presented itself as a target based on renovations taking place in Dublin Castle. Third, The Exchange Court headquartered the Detective Offices and may have been attacked as a political protest against the refusal to free John Daly, a dynamiter who had been imprisoned following a plot to blow up the House of Commons in 1884. Fourth, Four Courts was the main court’s building for Ireland with the explosion occurring on the eleventh anniversary of the Phoenix Park Murders. Finally, while Aldborough Barracks was the most well-known of military depots in Dublin, the only reason that can be postulated for this attack is the failure of the 1893 Home Rule Bill two months prior. Unfortunately, not enough information is available to pinpoint the source of the attacks to determine if there was an overarching strategy.

How Sheridan, Reid, Merna and Nolan are linked to the extremist cell is open to speculation. Sheridan seemed to be acting as a courier and Reid as a rudimentary chemist in the manufacture of dynamite to which end was most likely the homemade manufacture of explosive devices. If links to the Aldborough Barrack’s attempt and Four Courts bombing had been proven, their involvement in the other plots could have been ascertained. In the end, it might only have been a two-man cell carrying out these operations between 1891 and 1893 since once Reid had been murdered and Sheridan arrested the attacks came to an abrupt halt. Ultimately, the police may have gotten the ringleader Sheridan and the Clan may have assisted by dispatching the bomb maker. As the evidence is so thin, the true culprits of this series of attacks may never be known.

The Merna and Nolan debacle was followed by another Clan conspiracy prior to 1896, to blow up part of the Welland Canal between Canada and America. This scheme failed after the agent involved, apparently ‘lost his nerve’. The final large-scale dynamite plot of the decade occurred in September 1896 after Lyman authorised a plan to launch a new bombing campaign on the British mainland. The disappointment of the 1893 Home Rule Bill, much like the earlier 1886 failure, more than likely played a role in the Clan’s decision to return to dynamite. However, rather than a long drawn out campaign, the perpetrators of this operation were quickly arrested during preparation’s due to extensive infiltration by British spies into the highest levels of the Clan na Gael.
After 1896, there was little violence, which can be attributed to the continued popularity of Home Rule over physical force. In addition, it appears that both the I.R.B. and Clan na Gael became less influential near the end of the nineteenth century due to falling memberships and infiltration by British agents. Broin commented that in 1898 the I.R.B. had 513 circles alongside 8,500 other members who were up to date on their dues in addition to many others who were not, for a total membership of 225,000. However, by 1904 the I.R.B. had been reduced to three circles. This is a significant decline and an indication of their inaction during this period, until the Irish Volunteers were formed in 1913. In the case of the Clan, British agents had significantly compromised the leadership body in 1896, which had likely reduced its capabilities to deploy agents abroad.

Because of repeated terrorist attacks and attempted plots by Irish revolutionary organisations between 1881 and 1896, an immense pressure was put on the police in both Ireland and Great Britain to interrupt, investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism.

The security environment in the United Kingdom during the last two decades of the nineteenth century was extensive. For example, by 1882, Ireland had at least eighty-one resident magistrates, 14,500 members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 30,000 British soldiers, the D.M.P, and a sub-unit within the Special Branch of the D.M.P. called “G” Division, which primarily investigated political crimes.

Between 1881 and 1885, Great Britain experienced a rapid rise in terror attacks against public and prominent structures, primarily in Scotland, Northern England and London. These attacks were formulated by both the American based Clan na Gael organisation and a breakaway faction of the Clan called the Dynamite Party, both of which, carried out trans-national terror campaigns in Great Britain. The threat of terrorism became so great in England during this period that additional police were brought in from Ireland and the British countryside to protect prominent structures in London. As such, the following section addresses legislative acts used to address political conspiracies along with the organisation and operation of the London and Dublin Metropolitan Police Forces, and the use of H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.) during investigations of bombing conspiracies.
Various legislative acts supported law enforcement agencies in their investigations of suspected terrorists. These acts enhanced preventative measures by increasing investigative authority and arrest powers. Many of these acts written by the British government were further amended for use in Ireland and Great Britain, some of which were coercive in nature. Campbell has noted that British combinations of ‘coercion and conciliation’ legislation were enacted as a means to respond to Irish violence:\(^\text{340}\). For example, the House of Commons introduced the coercive Peace Preservation Act in 1881 and then following it with the Land Act in the same year. This appears to have been a strategy applied up to 1900 by the British government:\(^\text{341}\).

In Ireland, the Protection of Person and Property Act of Ireland 1881, the coercive Peace Preservation Act of Ireland 1881 and Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act 1882 increased police powers in the suppression of the growing agrarian crime problem in Ireland. The Peace Preservation Act restricted the importation of firearms into Ireland and gave the Viceroy of Ireland powers to suspend *Habeas Corpus* and in effect, arrest and imprison persons for indefinite periods:\(^\text{342}\).

The Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Act 1882 while restoring *Habeas Corpus*, gave police the authority to impose curfews, summon witnesses, prohibit meetings deemed dangerous to public peace and safety, suppress the press based on articles deemed to be treasonous or intimidating and to inflict short-term summary punishments:\(^\text{343}\). These powers ultimately led to the suppression of the Land League by May 1883:\(^\text{344}\). A clause in the act allowing police to enforce crimes of wrongful intimidation reduced Land League terror severely damaging the primary means the organisation had used to paralyse farmers and shopkeepers:\(^\text{345}\). While coercion was used as a means to suppress land agitation in Ireland, additional acts were used to primarily address terrorism in Great Britain.

The Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 provided law enforcement agencies in Great Britain with multiple enactments to help fight terrorism. These included the registering and photographing of criminals, the punishment of certain offences including assaults on police, and increasing the scope of investigative activities such as search and seizure:\(^\text{346}\).
The Explosives Act of 1875 and the Explosives Substance Act of 1883 buttressed The Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871. They were designed to operate together to better assist local authorities and Scotland Yard in the early arrest of perpetrators involved in the purchase of chemicals as well as the manufacturing, possessing, transporting and using of explosives for unlawful purposes. The latter act was rapidly put into law following the arrest of the Gallagher Cell and a supporting dynamite factory during April 1883. These acts increased police powers to the extent, they were able to enter premises without permission, and issue warrants for carrying out searches on suspected agents.

The Chief Secretary of Ireland oversaw the general business of the police in Ireland. The British military in contrast were commanded from the British War Office. During the bombing campaign period there were numerous Chief Secretaries beginning with W.E. Forster, followed briefly by Lord Frederick Cavendish and then ten more up until the turn of the century. The police in Ireland were divided into the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.), which was a paramilitary police force that patrolled all of Ireland except Dublin. Dublin was patrolled by the D.M.P, which had been formed under the Dublin Police Act of 1836. The headquarters for the R.I.C. and D.M.P. were co-located in Dublin Castle. As of July 1882, the R.I.C. consisted of approximately 14,000 men and the D.M.P. around 790 men. The difference in force size reflects various factors that determined the amount of work estimated for an area including, population, the characteristics of the people, agrarian agitation and secret societies. Up to December 1881, the police force in Ireland was one of ‘extreme’ centralisation.

Both the R.I.C. and D.M.P. were extensively micro-managed from Dublin Castle where even the smallest issues were brought to the attention of authorities. As a result, local authority broke down during the land war due to inefficiency and too few police being available to protect persons and property. For example, the Castleisland district, Co. Kerry had around nine policemen to patrol 396 square miles, so were only able to control the town of Castleisland. In effect, centralisation had failed to stand up to the pressure of agrarian agitation during 1880 and 1881 so consequently was judged an utter failure.

Subsequently, the Land League gained control of the Irish countryside. That is, the ‘Land League gained the ascendancy. The power of the government was broken, loyal subjects were left without adequate protection, and outrages were committed without fear of detection and
punishment. During December 1881, the Irish Home Secretary instituted a re-organisation of the judiciary and police force in order to make it more effective. The idea behind the re-organisation was to replace a command and control structure based on a central headquarters that issued all orders. Instead, a central authority would be utilised to create general policies under which, the judiciary and constabulary could work.

Chief Secretary Forster appointed six special resident magistrates to control the judiciary and constabulary in divisional areas. Subsequently, twenty counties were included in these new regions with the remainder remaining unchanged. Additionally, a superintendent was appointed to oversee the R.I.C. and D.M.P.

The types of general policies transmitted to the divisions are represented in a Home Office memorandum from 9 April 1882. This document provides both general and specific guidelines for safe patrolling. For example, three types of patrol formations are suggested. The first was a combined military/police patrol made up of three horse drawn cars, in which the route, start and stop times were secret and in which, every second car patrol would contain an extra fourth car that would be used for ambush purposes. The second type of patrol was a police patrol of two men in a car and two on foot that went out at nights. The last type of patrol was an ordinary police patrol made up of a constable and four sub-constables. This patrol could also follow a police patrol on foot to carry out ambushes.

One criticism of the police re-organisation was that not all officers involved in a single case worked under a single authority. Instead, as a case progressed different departments would complete their step in the investigation and submit a report to their department rather than a single authority for the case. Ultimately, the police organisations within a division were running under a divided authority, which would have eventually caused disharmony and ultimately a loss of the organisation’s esprit-de-corp. The new system as it stood had become too decentralised. Subsequently, the re-organisation of the constabulary continued into 1883 during which a better balance between centralisation and decentralisation was achieved.

A Chief Commissioner was appointed as the executive officer over both the R.I.C. and D.M.P. However, both organisations remained separate, with each maintaining direct contact to the Chief Secretary. The Chief Commissioner was in charge of a combined finance department for
the D.M.P, R.I.C. and the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.), while another commissioner was responsible for heading the D.M.P. and managing their discipline.

The D.M.P’s C.I.D. represented ‘the organ of Government for dealing with all cases of crime and for collecting information relating to secret and illegal societies and organisations.’ The C.I.D. was split into two branches, each controlled by a sub-inspector. The Ordinary Branch was responsible for normal crimes, such as fraud and theft, and the Special Branch was responsible for investigating other crimes such as political violence, and for collecting ‘secret’ information on Fenians. Part of the duties of the C.I.D. involved assisting the R.I.C. who did not have a detective’s branch. Special Branch additionally included an elite unit of detectives called “G” Division, which had been established in 1843 and was, previous to 1883, a separate ‘Detectives’ division within the D.M.P.

The D.M.P’s “G” Division, in addition to investigating political crimes in Ireland, also assisted Scotland Yard in domestic political investigations involving Irish terrorism. A superintendent was in charge of “G” Division, which was as of 1889 made up of forty-four plain clothed officers, a new concept for this period. “G” Division Headquarters was located in the Exchange Court at Dublin Castle and from September 1874 to November 1883 was run by Chief Inspector John Mallon, renowned for neutralising the Irish National Invincibles’ Organisation during January 1883 and bringing the agents responsible for the Phoenix Park Murders to trial. In cases of a political or agrarian nature, the Superintendent of “G” Division would report directly to the Chief Commissioner.

Outside of Dublin, the policing system was reduced to only five divisions for all of Ireland. Each divisional area was made up of counties with each area being run by an R.I.C. Divisional Commissioner. The resulting number of divisions meant it was easier to manage discipline and establish an esprit-de-corps, as there were fewer divisions for men to transfer too. Each division had a sub-inspector of Special Branch attached to it who would assist in the investigations of serious acts of terror. The sub-inspector controlled several head constables who would assist in collecting ‘secret’ information.

London in comparison to Dublin was divided into two police forces. The City Police, which patrolled the inner areas of London, maintained as of 1878, a force of approximately 830 men
and was commanded by a commissioner who oversaw both uniformed and detective branches. The London Metropolitan Police force (L.M.P.) patrolled the rest of London maintaining a force of 10,474 men during the same time period under the command of a commissioner with headquarters located at Scotland Yard. By 1882, the L.M.P. had increased its strength to around 14,200 and by the turn of the century was at 16,000 men. The commissioner oversaw a uniformed branch of eighteen divisions and a C.I.D. Branch that included Divisional Detectives, Scotland Yard and by 1883 a Special (Irish) Branch ('Irish' was later dropped).

Special Branch operated out of Whitehall Place and was specifically made up of Irish detectives to deal with Irish political threats including, the monitoring of Fenian activities in Great Britain and abroad. Even though the Special Branch in London was a different organisation then the Special Branch located in Dublin, collaboration still occurred between the two groups including, working together to identify illegal nitroglycerin factories in Cork, Ireland.

Following an attack on the Salford Military Barracks in Salford, England on 14 January 1881 and the attempted bombing of the Mansion House in London on 16 March 1881, the police were tasked to reinforce the protection of public structures. By March 1883, 313 constables had been assigned to protect public buildings. An additional request for up to 500 more constables, inspectors, and sergeants was made to ensure the safety of royal palaces, public buildings and ministries. This included the Horse Guards Parade, Whitehall, the Admiralty, and the National Gallery. A request was also made for a direct phone line between Scotland Yard, the Horse Guards, and Wellington Barracks.

The protection of high-profile structures became something of a specialisation for those assigned to that duty. Police constables in this role became experts in reading persons entering public buildings with ‘parcels or other luggage’, becoming active in identifying suspicious objects and being trained to put out incendiary explosions otherwise known as ‘Greek or Fenian Fire’. Ultimately, alert police were responsible for foiling several bombing plots including, attempts on the Mansion House on 16 March 1881 and the Liverpool Town Hall on 10 June 1881.
Detectives from the D.M.P’s “G” Division and Scotland Yard’s Special (Irish) Branch carried out investigations of agrarian and political outrages in Ireland, Scotland, and England. The use of spies, informants, and agent provocateurs during this period provided extensive intelligence concerning the command and control structures of secret Irish revolutionary organisations, their agents, technologies, and future plans in the United Kingdom. Human intelligence sources were recruited across most of the Irish revolutionary organisations including the Clan and the I.R.B. For example, detailed information from Clan conventions held in America was provided to the British authorities by spies who had infiltrated the organisation including, Major Henri Le Caron who detailed his exploits with Sullivan and other high-ranking members of the Clan in an autobiography.

Once a suspected terrorist had been located by the authorities, surveillance was usually initiated on the individual. This had become a perfected practice over time that had been vital in undoing several dynamite cells and bringing down the Invincibles’ Organisation. Closely watching Fenian agents was a dangerous affair as they were usually wary individuals that watched for tails and were often armed with revolvers. Police surveillance went as far as the police disguising themselves to avoid detection such as dressing up as organ grinders, and using new camera and communication technologies to track conspirators.

The flexible roll film invented in 1883 gradually phased out the old glass plate cameras. This invention resulted in a more portable camera that was eventually sold for twenty-five (U.S.) dollars in 1888 by Eastman Kodak as a fixed focus camera. An R.I.C. report dated 3 January 1885 stated that, ‘Photographs for rapid identification should be figure photographs - taken instantaneously – A man may disguise his face – but the expressions of his figure and carriage can never be changed. Studio portraits are of use for after comparisons and identification.’ This report suggests that the instantaneous camera at least by 1885 had been integrated into police surveillance procedures but to what extent is unknown.

Exchange connected telephones allowed information to be transmitted more rapidly than telegraph. Local telegraph exchanges were converted for use as telephone exchanges during the early 1880s. However, long distance communications in England were not established until 1890 when the first long distance trunk circuits, between London and the midlands, were opened up. Ultimately, the introduction of local telephone exchanges in the main cities might
have provided some assistance to detective offices. However, it was most likely limited, as it was not until 1890 when a direct line was hooked up between Scotland Yard and the Home Office. Subsequently, the telegraph appears to have remained the established means of communication within the police force during the bombing campaigns of the 1880s. It was found to be quite a useful technology during surveillance as it was installed in most police stations.

While informants were a vital component of police work to prevent bombings, the agents upon carrying out terror operations were in many cases tripped up by their own mistakes. For example, the smuggling of bomb components into Great Britain and the interception of letters each lead to the arrest of cell members and the breakup of cells. Moreover, cell members because of poor planning revealed themselves during operations resulting in their capture. A prime example of this lapse was during the Liverpool bombings of June 1881, where Rossa agents were arrested after being spotted leaving a satchel of dynamite on the steps of the Liverpool Town Hall.

Regardless of the incompetence of the terrorists, the fear and terror generated by the bombings in Great Britain led the public and police throughout the United Kingdom to become highly alert to any kind of suspicious activity. For example, Figure 3.3 shows a cartoon from the period that symbolises the psyche of the police in Dublin at this time. In this case, the testing of an instantaneous camera is misconstrued as an explosive device resulting in the arrest of the operator. As such, the excitement of the public worked to the police’s advantage by providing willing witnesses to bombings, making the work of the terrorist ever more difficult to complete. For example, depositions from witnesses during the trials of terror cells in England between 1883 and 1887 demonstrated the willingness of members of the British public to assist the police in building cases.

Since the majority of conspiracies, even those that failed, utilised explosive devices, mostly consisting of some form of gunpowder or dynamite, explosive forensics or a form of it became a critical part of terrorism investigations. Explosive forensics not only helped to convict terrorists but was also used to trace the components of bombs back to their manufacturers and link them to earlier terrorist acts.
Figure 3.3: Cartoon showing police sensitivity to a suspected infernal machine[^408].

Oversight of explosives in the United Kingdom was carried out by H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.), which was appointed under the Explosives Act of 1875[^409]. This act regulated the manufacture, storage, and importation of explosives. The I.O.E. was additionally responsible for enforcing the Explosives Substance Act of 1883, which was passed to make illegal the possession or manufacturer of substances knowingly used in the making of explosives for unlawful
purposes. Substances in the context of this act additionally included components that could be used in the manufacture of explosive devices.

A license was required to import dynamite into the United Kingdom in stark contrast to gunpowder, which was imported without any real controls. Subsequently, most of the dynamite used to make explosive devices was smuggled into England and Ireland by couriers, hidden amongst shipping goods, or locally made in agent controlled nitroglycerin factories. In contrast to dynamite, gunpowder could be purchased locally from a seller who was only required to record the amount purchased along with the buyers name and address in a ledger. As such, cell members would buy gunpowder in quarter pound lots from various dealers to avoid suspicion. Even though gunpowder was relatively easy to purchase, the explosive characteristics of dynamite justified the risks in acquiring it. Consequently, the I.O.E. became a crucial investigative instrument in the fight against terrorism.

The I.O.E. was a small department led by a Chief Inspector of Explosives named Colonel V.D. Majendie. Majendie, a former member of the Navy and Royal Artillery was an extremely experienced investigator that ran the Explosives Office from its formation in 1875 until the late 1890s (see Figure 3.4).

The Chief Inspector had several other inspectors working for him whose expertise in explosives had been attained while officers of the Royal Artillery. Additionally the explosive’s office utilised the services of other scientists such as the eminent Dr Dupree in a chemical advisor role.
analysing, assessing and experimenting with explosives. The I.O.E. was responsible for the inspection of explosive’s factories and magazines, monitoring the importation of explosives, the analysis of explosives, overseeing the Explosives Act by local authorities, the tracking of accidents caused by explosives, both domestic and foreign, and special explosives investigations. As a consequence, the I.O.E. could be called in by police from anywhere within the United Kingdom whenever it was suspected the Explosives Act of 1875 or the Explosives Substance Act of 1883 had been violated. This usually involved assisting in the investigation of terrorist bombings. As a result, Majendie and his team of inspectors between 1881 and 1896 became experts in an early form of explosive forensics.

Figure 3.5 shows some examples for how these early investigative explosive techniques helped police connect the dots during terrorism investigations in the form of linking components of an explosive device to an agent or bombing. The first diagram on the left in Figure 2.5 links the suspected conspirator Walter Sheridan and the detonators he had in his possession upon his arrest to the Aldborough Barracks conspiracy in Dublin during 1893. The middle diagram links the explosive profile of the Exchange Court bombing in Dublin during 1892 to the Victoria Station bombing in London during 1884. Finally, the diagram on the right links the agent Henry Dalton and the dynamite he had in his possession upon his arrest in England during 1883 to both the Glasgow Possil Bridge and the London Times Office bombings also during 1883.

Explosives investigations by the I.O.E. fell into the following two broad categories: crime scene analysis and explosive’s analysis. Crime scene analysis could involve investigating intact explosive components from captured terrorists or the investigation of a crime scene following the aftermath of a bombing. The first step of crime scene analysis was to have police secure the scene of the incident until the explosive inspectors arrived in order to avoid contamination of the site. For example, at the Exchange Court explosion outside Dublin Castle on 24 December 1892 both nitrate and chlorate were found amongst debris at the scene, which are chemicals found in both dynamite and human urine. Police believed that the secluded Exchange Court area where the explosion took place was being used by the public as an unofficial convenience. As such, if a crime scene area was not well guarded comparable forms of contamination could occur, leading to among other things a misidentification of the type of explosive used.
The next step was to examine the crime scene to determine the placement, type and size of the bomb. Initially, this involved completing a damage assessment of the area impacted by the explosion. This might include, the investigator using his sense of smell to detect either gunpowder or dynamite as the primary explosive. Next, samples of explosive residue would be taken to try to identify the explosive compound. This might be followed by examining the debris for the bomb casing to help determine the size of the bomb. Finally, the investigator might analyse the pitting caused by the explosion in the surrounding surfaces and then compare the damage to the local and adjoining spaces if the explosion occurred in the interior. For example, the explosives assessment of the bombing at the Local Government Board Offices in London on 15 March 1883 determined that the bomb was placed on the windowsill of a room and a nitroglycerin compound was used. Moreover, based on the pitting of the walls, the discovery of pieces of metal casing and the minimal damage done to the local and adjoining rooms, it was estimated that no more than fifteen pounds of dynamite was used. Following the examination and collection of evidence from a crime scene a deeper analysis of the explosive device was undertaken to in effect, reconstruct the bomb in order to link it to conspirators and/or past bombings.

The analysis of a complete or partial explosive device found at a crime scene involved attempting to identify the type of detonator and explosive compound used. The analysis of a bomb’s detonator could provide a mountain of information about the device including where it came from, whether the detonator was homemade or commercially constructed, and whether it was a timed or percussion device.

Detonators were generally difficult and dangerous to build. Subsequently, factory made detonators were preferred by terrorist cells, as long as a manufacturer could be found. Commercially made detonators used standard diameters, which as one might expect made it somewhat easier in determining their source. For example, the detonator used in the Four Courts explosion in Dublin on 6 May 1893 had a diameter of .23 inches, which indicated it was commercially manufactured outside of England as ordinary detonators manufactured in England had diameters of .25 inches.
Figure 3.5: Linkages between bombings as identified by the Inspectors Office of Explosives between 1881 and 1896.
A timed device had the option of several types of timers. For example, it might include a basic slow burning fuse that had been cut short to guarantee a specific burn time, the use of acid to slowly eat through a special paper that covered the explosive or a more sophisticated clockwork mechanism. In the latter case, similarly designed timed bombs were used on 26 February 1884 in the Victoria Street Railway Station bombing and other failed attempts at Charing Cross, Ludgate Hill and Paddington Railway Stations. It was found that all four bombs had similar detonator mechanisms. That is, each bomb was housed in a portmanteau and had a rather sophisticated timer system comprising part of an Ansonia Clock Company’s Peep-O-Day Clock with a pistol attached to a copper wire (see Figure 3.6)\textsuperscript{425}.

The winder of the clock was tied down with wire so that when the alarm was triggered it would release the trigger of the pistol shooting a powder only cartridge into a detonator to explode the bomb\textsuperscript{426}. However, three of the timed devices failed because the cartridge failed to explode in two of the cases and in the other case, the trigger mechanism became fouled\textsuperscript{427}.

![Figure 3.6: Selection of bomb components used in the February 1884 London railway station attacks. Top left is a Peep-O-Day clock, middle is a Victorian-era portmanteau with lock and straps, and lower right is a British Bulldog .45 calibre pistol\textsuperscript{428}.](image)

A percussion device in contrast to a timed bomb contained two chemicals that upon coming into contact, after some form of impact, would initiate detonation. This type of impact bomb was found on the agent John Daly who was arrested on 11 April 1884\textsuperscript{429}. Upon this bomb being
thrown, its impact would cause a lead cylinder to break a glass container of sulphuric acid, which would then come into contact with a chlorate mixture resulting in detonation. Once the detonator had been analysed, the next step in the investigation was to determine the composition of the explosive to help pinpoint how it was manufactured. By examining the composition of a nitroglycerin compound, its stability could be ascertained along with its origins. The degree of stability of dynamite had implications for how it should be cared for during storage and transportation. To make dynamite stable, the compound had to be cleansed of acids to improve its purity. A complete removal of all acids from the compound correlated to the greatest degree of stability. For example, an analysis of a homemade nitroglycerin compound found on the premises of a cell’s nitroglycerin factory in Birmingham, England on 5 April 1883 was found to be dangerously impure and very difficult to keep. Moreover, the explosives inspectors assigned to this case were able to inspect receipts for chemicals found at the crime scene and determine that the purchase of sulphuric and nitric acid as well as glycerin implied the premises were being used as a dynamite factory. In this case, to confirm that the compound found was in fact nitroglycerin an experiment was carried out by the I.O.E. in which, it was turned into dynamite and then detonated. Moreover, the purity of chemicals found on suspected terrorists could also be used to determine whether they might be used for the manufacturing of nitroglycerin compounds. In one case, chemicals found on a terrorist during April 1883 were found to be very pure, which implied some efficacy in making a highly stable nitroglycerin compound. The purity of dynamite could also help determine whether the dynamite was homemade or factory made and subsequently, where it came from.

The bombing of Victoria Station and attempts at three other railway stations around London on 26 February 1884 provided the I.O.E. with three unexploded, almost identical explosive devices that were examined in detail. The nitroglycerin compound in each of these bombs was identified as Atlas Powder A, which was American-made dynamite not licensed for importation into the United Kingdom. Each of these bombs was housed in a trunk with forty-five cakes of Atlas Powder A weighing from twenty to twenty-one pounds.
Atlas Powder A was composed of nitroglycerin, wood fibre, sodium nitrate, and magnesium carbonate\textsuperscript{437}. It was distinguished from other nitroglycerin compounds in that it used a wood pulp to absorb nitroglycerin rather than the standard \textit{Kieselguhr} silica\textsuperscript{438}. Wood pulp allowed the dynamite to be more easily frozen and therefore more stable when storing or transporting it\textsuperscript{439}. Subsequently, Atlas Powder A had the advantage of being cheaper to make compared to dynamite that used \textit{Kieselguhr}, and easier to conceal when transporting it in a frozen cake form\textsuperscript{440}.

The I.O.E. was as such, capable of carrying out fairly sophisticated experiments. The results from these experiments were used to build cases against conspirators, to confirm hypothesis’ regarding alleged or actual bombings and to facilitate the knowledge base of the explosive’s office. The case against the agent John Daly, who was arrested transporting three hand-made shells and components that when put together made percussion devices, was buttressed by an experiment in which the shells were exploded in a test chamber with twelve dummies\textsuperscript{441}. It was found that each dummy received no less than fourteen strikes indicating, that these bombs were extremely efficient at maiming and killing\textsuperscript{442}. Subsequently, Daly was linked to a possible attempt to throw the hand shells onto the Treasury Bench in the House of Commons\textsuperscript{443}.

Another inquiry, which had a high profile at the time, was the investigation into the sinking of the British warship H.M.S. \textit{Doterel} at Sandy Point in the Straits of Magellan on 26 April 1881. Experiments were carried out by the I.O.E. to prove that the explosion that sank the warship was an accident and not a terrorist act carried out by O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party. Experiments on a similar warship, the H.M.S. \textit{Bullfinch} concluded that air mixing with vapour from Xerotine Siccative, ‘a highly volatile patent drier employed as a solvent instead of turpentine’ most likely caused the initial explosion. The Xerotine Siccative had been stored under the forward powder magazine in an unventilated space\textsuperscript{444}. It was most likely ignited accidently by a crewmember causing an initial explosion, which resulted in a secondary explosion that detonated the forward powder magazine containing five to six tons of gunpowder\textsuperscript{445}. Additional experiments were next carried out to see if explosive devices could actually sink a warship.

It was found that the sinking of a ship by placing explosive devices within it was extremely difficult. It was concluded that a warship could only be sunk ‘through the skilful and calculated..."
application of small charges in actual contact with selected spots, or by the use of very much larger charges than it would be reasonable to believe could be surreptitiously introduced on board a well ordered vessel.\textsuperscript{446} Finally, the fact that similar occurrences had occurred on the H.M.S. Hercules in 1870 and on the H.M.S. Triumph on 22 November 1881 helped conclude that the explosion on the H.M.S. Doterel was an accident and not a terrorist bombing\textsuperscript{447}. Nevertheless, the amount of ‘chatter’ coming from Rossa following the sinking of the Doterel does warrant some further analysis (see Appendix I).

These types of experiments added to the growing knowledge base of the I.O.E. creating a database of sorts containing real world and simulated explosive profiles. Experiments such as testing the damage done to an interior room and adjoining spaces by various dynamite configurations based on distance, and the testing of detonators with other than fulminate of mercury mixtures provided the I.O.E. with accurate data to assist in the diagnosing of crime scenes. This knowledge was put to good use in protecting explosive factories, floating magazines, public buildings and structures such as London Bridge during the height of the bombing campaigns\textsuperscript{448}.

Overall, this early form of explosives forensics practiced by the I.O.E. was effective enough to create explosive fingerprints. These fingerprints could be matched to previously collected bomb components whether partial or complete, to link them to their originating sources. That is, linking the bomb components to dynamite factories, the factories to cell members and finally the cell members to cells. This is in fact how the Gallagher Cell was eventually captured in April 1883.

As dynamite became the preferred explosive used by both the Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael during the bombing campaigns, technological advances and innovations of both dynamite and explosive devices between 1881 and 1885 contributed to the effectiveness of cell operations on the British mainland.

The Clan na Gael was an organisation with some exceedingly innovative inventors in military technology\textsuperscript{449}. For example, one of these forward thinking men was Thomas Bullen, a leading innovator in the Clan during the late 1870s who designed a torpedo boat, which allowed a man to stay under water for up to three hours\textsuperscript{450}. According to financial statements from 1882, the
Clan had built one torpedo boat and was financing the construction of another. This innate ability to innovate was subsequently applied to dynamite. The Clans decision to engage in transnational terrorism, through several bombing campaigns on the British mainland between 1881 and 1896, introduced various forms of explosive devices, predominantly utilising nitroglycerin compounds in various configurations.

Alfred Nobel invented and then patented dynamite in 1867 following the invention of nitroglycerin in 1847 by the Italian Chemist Ascanio Sobrero. Nitroglycerin as a liquid was extremely volatile so Kieselguhr silica was used to absorb nitroglycerin making it insensitive to shock and high temperatures until triggered by a detonator where it ‘retains most of the explosive properties of nitroglycerin.’ Nobel mixed liquid nitroglycerin with silica to create a safe malleable paste that could be wrapped in paper and then exploded by fuse, which ultimately became known as dynamite.

As the availability of dynamite increased, it was re-orientated throughout the continent and various other countries for malicious purposes by persons such as despondent individuals, anarchists, and terrorists. Dynamite use as such began to change as it was repurposed in a variety of new roles including using dynamite to assassinate union dissenters, using it to commit suicide and finally to blow-up public structures.

Personal, trade or political disputes might lead to individuals so inclined, to use dynamite to commit the destruction of property or injury of individuals. For example, despondent individuals sometimes used dynamite to commit suicide, which according to reports of dynamite accidents published between 1881 and 1890 led to several deaths a year in the United Kingdom and abroad. For example, the 1883 Dynamite Report describes a case in which a despondent husband in Dunedin, New Zealand committed homicide by holding dynamite to both his and his wife’s head and then exploding it.

Anarchists on the other hand utilised dynamite much like the terrorists of the bombing campaigns to inflict damage to persons or property in order to forward their nihilist policies. A famous case was the killing of seven police officers and injuring of many more by anarchists using a single dynamite pipe bomb with approximately half a pound of explosive after police attempted to break up a socialist meeting being held in Chicago during May 1886. This led to
the arrest of seven anarchists and eventually the execution of four of them, the sentencing of two others to life, with the remaining anarchist committing suicide ironically, by exploding a detonator in his mouth\textsuperscript{457}.

Terrorists outside the United Kingdom were also involved in high profile and influential attacks involving dynamite. This included the assassination of the Russian Czar Alexander II on 13 March 1881 and an attempt by ‘dynamitards’ to assassinate the German Emperor during September 1883\textsuperscript{458}. Along with dynamite bombings came hoaxes of which several occurred each year during the bombing campaigns sucking up police resources and playing on the fears of the British public, and into the strategy of the terrorists\textsuperscript{459}. In this regard, the Annual Explosives Report for 1885 had stated:

‘The number of public and false public alarms which we have occasionally to note bears doubtless a more or less direct relation to the number of outrages and malicious attempts, and to the exaggerated importance which is too often given to the same by indiscrete and highly coloured paragraphs in the newspapers. When the public mind is wrought into a highly sensitive condition the temptation to silly and mischievous persons to perpetrate hoaxes, and the opportunities to their successful perpetration become of course greater.’\textsuperscript{460}

For example, during 1881 a tin box placed inside the Town Hall of Eccles just outside of Manchester, England with the words ‘Dynamite’ written across it along with, ‘For the new Town Hall, Eccles. Blow the cursed place up. O’Donovan Rossa’ caused quite a stir. This turned out to be a hoax, with only white sand found inside the box\textsuperscript{461}.

Subsequently, one can see how the widespread use of dynamite throughout the continent and other countries made it the preferred explosive to carry out terrorist bombings during the 1880s and 1890s. However, prior to the adoption of dynamite, a transition period ensued during the first bombing campaign in 1881 where gunpowder was for a short time the explosive of choice.

Gunpowder was considered a low substance explosive meaning the temperatures and pressures produced were less than a high explosive substance such as dynamite\textsuperscript{462}. That is, gunpowder was not ignited like dynamite, but rather, exploded through a process called deflagration\textsuperscript{463}. To detonate an explosive device made with gunpowder required the explosive material being decomposed by heat. The heat wave propagated slowly through the gunpowder, increasing the
rate of reaction eventually leading to a ‘self-sustained reaction’ called deflagration. As this process occurs, the reacted materials flow away from the unexploded gunpowder creating an explosion\(^465\). In contrast to deflagration, detonation occurs through the decomposition of the explosive material as a rapidly moving high pressure and high temperature ‘shock front’, which reacts with the explosive’s substance\(^466\). During detonation, the reacted materials flow towards the unexploded dynamite with greater speed, creating increased pressures and temperatures causing the explosion to be more instantaneous and powerful than gunpowder\(^467\).

Compared to dynamite, gunpowder tends to act along the path of least resistance while dynamite, because the explosion is nearly instantaneous, is ‘exerted in all directions, and upon every part of the containing body’\(^468\). As such, while gunpowder was preferred in certain circumstances, more often than not when dynamite was not available, dynamite was the better explosive to inflict damage on structures and was also safer to handle during transportation and storage as long as it was prepared correctly\(^469\). However, dynamite did have its disadvantages one of them being, it was much more dangerous to manufacture, either by commercial or agent factories due to the volatility of the chemicals used to produce nitroglycerin\(^470\). Moreover, detonators could be dangerous and blow up unexpectedly if not handled correctly, causing severe injuries.

A lecture by Russian Chemist, the self-styled Professor Horgan Mezzerhoff, reported on by New York’s \textit{Sun} Newspaper on March 20 1880, painted a troubling picture of upcoming threats by Irish revolutionaries. Mezzerhoff, whose real name was Richard Rogers was a chemical’s expert who professed himself a Russian nihilist\(^471\). Rossa had recruited him to bring some legitimacy to his skirmishers ‘who were commonly portrayed in the press as bunglers and swindlers of no real threat to anyone’\(^472\). In Mezzerhoff’s lecture, he emphasised the power of dynamite to attack high-profile targets. That is, how at a cost of only one hundred and fifty dollars, a device could be built to sink an eleven million dollar British warship ‘covered in armour twenty-two inches thick.’\(^473\) Moreover, how it would take only twenty men carrying parcels of dynamite to destroy a major city such as London\(^474\). Mezzerhoff went on to teach many of the Clan’s agents such as Thomas Mooney and Edward O’Donnell in the manufacture and use of dynamite through dynamite schools in Brooklyn, New York\(^475\).
Explosive devices were made up with the following four components or combinations of them thereof: a timer, one or more detonators, the explosive, and some kind of casing to house the device. Putting together a bomb was a simple matter of attaching the detonator to a fuse and then the detonator to an explosive charge\textsuperscript{476}.

The timer was used to initiate an energy source to set off a detonator. From 1880 through to around April 1881 safety fuses, quick and slow match fuses, sometimes with touch paper, and acid-paper timers were used to control the detonation of a device. Impact fuses were also introduced during this period to create what can be described as an early version of the impact grenade. From April 1881 onwards, clockwork timers, an important innovation at the time, began to be incorporated into explosive devices and were used alongside fuses as the preferred bomb timer until the end of the bombing campaigns\textsuperscript{477}.

There were several gunpowder fuses available to the agent when preparing a device. These were presented in various waterproof and non-waterproof configurations each with their own formulas to calculate burn rates. A safety or normal fuse had a standard burn rate on average of two minutes per metre, which tended to be the preferred fuse used during operations\textsuperscript{478}. In contrast, a slow match fuse had an average burn rate of one minute per metre\textsuperscript{479}. Sometimes these fuses were combined into a dual fuse system where the slow match fuse would be cut and attached to a safety fuse to provide a longer burn\textsuperscript{480}. Either type of fuse was ignited using a heat source that sometimes involved using touch paper, which was a slow burning paper soaked in a chemical substance called saltpeter.

Fuses could accordingly be cut to burn for specific time periods. For example, the attempted bombing of the Mansion House in London on 16 March 1881 used touch paper to ignite a safety fuse connected to approximately fifteen pounds of coarse gunpowder that together were timed to burn for four minutes\textsuperscript{481}. The time delay had been based on observing patrolling members of the constabulary who would take six minutes to make one circuit of the building\textsuperscript{482}. The advantage in deploying these types of gunpowder fuses is that they required little specialised knowledge to use. An Explosive’s Report of the Exchange Court explosion in Dublin on 24 December 1892 emphasises how easy it was for someone with little bomb making knowledge to put one together. The report stated, it ‘requires neither knowledge nor skill to introduce a few blasting cartridges of dynamite or guncotton into a tin box, and affix a detonator and a piece of
slow match. The end of a lighted cigar or a lighted pipe would readily serve to ignite the slow match, and the whole affair would have been one that anybody could carry out. However, the use of a fuse or touch paper resulted in smoke, which on multiple occasions led to the discovery of the device prior to it exploding. Subsequently, the acid-paper bomb timer offered an alternative and a unique solution in keeping the device undetected.

The following description from the 1883 Annual Explosives Report describes the acid-paper timer used to detonate a dynamite charge. This report was based on two, mostly intact bombs captured after the breakup of a terror cell during March-April 1883:

Sulphuric acid was to be introduced into the upper part of the tube, and by turning the tap was to be allowed to flow down into the lower part, which contained two holes, these holes were covered with folds of paper, and it would take the sulphuric acid sometime to eat through them (the time being regulated by the number of folds); when finally the acid got through the paper it would run down to a small charge of chlorate of potash and sugar (with or without red orpiment), and this charge on being ignited would fire a detonator fitted in the end of the tube.

During this same period, impact bombs were introduced. However, these types of devices were designed to injure individuals rather than blow-up structures.

The first type of impact bomb was a primitive device comprising a canister of gunpowder with a fuse stuck into it. The fuse was lit and the canister then thrown, which only sometimes worked and at other times caused the fuse to detach from the charge during flight or upon impact. This happened in an attempted bombing at Castlebar Barracks, Co. Mayo during early September 1881 in which the fuse fell out of a canister packed with gunpowder, after it was thrown over a wall adjacent to the magazine.

From around April 1881 onwards the manufacturer of devices with clockwork timers became a common technique employed by bomb makers in America. A New York police report from 6 April 1881 stated that the manufacture of ‘bombs, as with clock-work arrangements is now a very simple matter, and could be carried readily and quite as secretly perhaps in England as in this country.’ During June and July of 1881, ten infernal machines were discovered being smuggled into England on board the steamships Malta and Bavarian. This discovery of devices with clock timers was the first time this type of timer had been captured in one piece during the bombing campaign period.
The clock timer sat in the upper portion of the metal bomb casing and was designed so that upon the turning of a disc in the clock component ‘a spring would be released, and would strike a percussion cap on a nipple which communicated by means of an iron tube with the charge in the interior.’ A similar mechanism was used during the bombing of London’s Victoria Station on 26 February 1884 and in the attempts on Charing Cross, Ludgate Hill and Paddington Railway Stations on the same day. However, the failure of the latter three attempts was attributed to the timer mechanism, which suggests this technology had yet to reach maturity.

From around 1884 onwards, a much more sophisticated fuse was used in the construction of percussion devices. The sophistication lay in a percussion fuse being used to initiate the detonator upon impact. This consisted of a vial filled with sulphuric acid that upon impact would be broken by a lead cylinder allowing the sulphuric acid to mix with a ‘red’ chlorate mixture made up of chlorate of potassium, sugar, and realgar. Upon these two mixtures coming into contact, there would be instant ignition setting off the detonator. These types of percussion fuses were found on the terrorist John Daly after his arrest on 11 April 1884. Col. Majendie of the I.O.E. after having these impact bombs tested in an explosive’s chamber determined, it ‘is clear that these shells would not be effective instruments for the purposes of destroying or injuring buildings….But for the purpose of killing or injuring persons they would be most formidable.’ Majendie considered these bombs ‘remarkably efficient’ and extremely deadly, which had already been proven by a similar type of device being used in the assassination of the Russian Czar on 13 March 1881. While percussion technology existed as early as March 1881 the strategy of the bombing campaign at this time focused on the destruction of high-profile public structures making a timed fuse the preferred bomb timer. Another key component of the explosive device was the detonator, which was the catalyst the timer initiated to set off the dynamite charge.

In 1864, prior to the invention of dynamite, Alfred Noble invented a blasting cap that employed a fulminate of mercury mixture to detonate an explosive charge. Fulminate of mercury is a chemical compound that will explode violently through percussion or the application of heat. Throughout the bombing campaign period, fulminate of mercury was the preferred detonator used in explosive devices. However, agents did at times experiment with alternative forms of detonators, such as detonators charged with explosives and electric fuses.
Electric fuses had been around since Noble’s invention of fulminate of mercury during which time he had introduced the first electric blasting cap with a spark gap-igniter. However, the electric fuse was used very little, if at all by terrorists, probably because logistically this was a more complex operation to execute in contrast to a device that had the fuse built in. To set up a device with an electric fuse required an electrical source, which could be easily and safely connected to the explosive device through conducting wires. This required running wires from the device to a safe distance and attaching them to an electrical source such as a voltaic battery, increasing the chances of both the bomb and cell member being detected. While public buildings did contain electrical devices to power lighting, it would have required a skilled agent to set up the device and connect it in some way to the lighting circuit without prematurely exploding the device. Subsequently, the primary form of detonation remained fulminate of mercury, which became a staple and known quantity in bomb making that could be applied to accommodate the different kinds of dynamite mixtures used by conspirators.

Dynamite during this period also varied in quality. It was either homemade or smuggled into Great Britain from Ireland and America. Dynamite development went through some subtle changes that were reflected in Rossa’s second bombing campaign between 1882 and 1883. This campaign was dominated by homemade lignin dynamite manufactured by agent factories in Cork, Ireland and Birmingham, England.

Lignin dynamite was a nitroglycerin preparation with a wood pulp or sawdust absorbent and some nitrate of sodium. Its differentiating feature compared to regular dynamite was that instead of using the normal silica absorbent Kieselguhr, it used a wood pulp mixed with nitrate of sodium to form an explosive base. Advantages to using wood pulp over Kieselguhr were that it was easy to come by, the dynamite was less sensitive to percussion, it was cheaper to make, it was resistant to water for up to thirty-six hours, and it created an explosive base that made for a more economical explosive compared to regular dynamite. Rossa’s agents in at least four bombings during 1883 used lignin dynamite.

One problem with manufacturing dynamite was ensuring a level of purity of the nitroglycerin compound. This was important for when it was handled and stored, and to ensure it maintained a superior explosive quality. An explosives level of purity was based on the contributing chemicals, the degree of moisture and ability of the agent chemist to remove impurities from
the nitroglycerin mixture. For example, the interception of ten infernal machines being smuggled into Great Britain from America on 30 June and 2 July 1881 found that the lignin dynamite used in the devices had varying degrees of moisture content. Consequently, testing found that some devices were not able to explode by percussion whereas others did, but only with some difficulty. These devices revealed that even dynamite imported from America was not always of the highest quality.

While impurities could be the culprit for a failed or unstable device, the proportions used to make dynamite were not always accurate resulting in an inferior explosive. For example, the Possil Bridge explosion in Glasgow on 21 January 1883 used what was described as ‘feeble lignin dynamite’ that had been manufactured by bomb makers in Cork and was composed of only nineteen percent nitroglycerin. Lignin dynamite to be considered a superior explosive required at least thirty percent nitroglycerin.

A popular form of dynamite used by agents was a lignin dynamite called Atlas Powder A. This type of dynamite also contained magnesium carbonate in addition to the regular lignin mixtures. Magnesium Carbonate is considered a better absorbent than Kieselguhr and also works to intensify the explosion. Atlas Powder A was a high quality blasting dynamite manufactured in the Repauno Chemical Factory in Philadelphia by the Atlas Company. It was not licensed for importation into the United Kingdom so was smuggled by couriers into England on steamships that travelled the waters between America and the United Kingdom. Atlas Powder A was graded from ‘A’ to ‘O’ representing a superior to inferior scale of quality. It had the advantage of being freeze dryable into slabs making it easy to conceal under an agent’s coat. It was used in several bombings between 1884 and 1885 such as the Tower of London plot on 24 January 1885.

While dynamite was the preferred explosive of choice during the bombing campaigns, the use of incendiary devices became another possible option for terrorists as early as 1883. This danger became a reality in 1887 after a terrorist was arrested following an incendiary device being thrown onto the deck of a British ship docked in New York. This type of device was called Greek or Fenian Fire. In fact, Fenian Fire was well known prior to 1887 when during July 1883 a lead agent called Henry Dalton was arrested with a pocket book that contained instructions on how to manufacture it. Based on a British Metropolitan Police memo dated 20 April 1887 it
was composed of a very ‘volatile bi-sulphide of Carbon’ mixture that once applied to a surface, evaporates and leaves phosphorous\textsuperscript{512}. Subsequently, when phosphorous is exposed to oxygen for a few minutes it self-ignites\textsuperscript{513}. The ensuing phosphorous fire then creates additional problems, requiring special methods to extinguish it such as applying lime, earth, or sand to the fire\textsuperscript{514}.

The last phase of bomb construction required a casing to house the final product. The housing varied based on the type of target and the placement of the explosive. In most cases, a tin box sufficed although portmanteaus, piping, and even satchels were used. For example, the ten infernal machines discovered on the Malta and Bavarian during late June and early July 1881 each contained around two to three pounds of lignin dynamite and measured only twelve inches long by six inches wide by six inches high\textsuperscript{515}. The small size of these devices allowed them to be placed inconspicuously on a windowsill or at some other location in the targeted building. When larger bombs were required such as during the London railway station terror attacks on 26 February 1884, portmanteaus were used to house the explosive devices, which additionally blended into the targeted areas\textsuperscript{516}.

Largely, changes in bomb making technologies evolved during the bombing campaigns. Through the early Rossa campaign period, fuses went from safety, slow and fast match fuses to paper/acid timers, both becoming favourites of the Rossa Cells. These were followed by the mainstream use of clockwork timers, which became a favourite of the Clan’s bombing campaign as did percussion fuses used in impact bombs, which aligned nicely with the targeting strategy of the latter bombing campaigns. However, fulminate of mercury detonators remained a constant presence in most devices, which allowed the bomb makers to more easily match the number of detonators to the type and quality of dynamite used. Finally, dynamite did change to some extent, primarily as the Kieselguhr absorbent was replaced by wood pulp or saw dust to form lignin dynamite. One other observation was the improving stability and purity of dynamite, as agents reverted from homemade factories used during Rossa’s campaign period to acquiring commercially made dynamite from abroad such as the United States.

The next section will examine the spaces in which cell operatives carried out their work. This is done by providing a cursory examination of the human and physical geography of the key cities
and the technologies within them in order to better understand the physical and social context in which agents inserted themselves.

Nineteenth-century Europe became the birthplace of the industrial age with England considered ‘ground zero for industrialization.’ Factories and new technologies such as the steam engine dominated the landscapes of many major cities throughout the continent during this period. Growth was so dramatic that by 1881 there were twenty-nine European cities with populations over 100,000, compared to eight European cities with populations over 50,000 in 1801. In fact, by 1851 over half of the population of England were now living in cities such that by 1881 most people had migrated to these metropolises.

Ward has described Victorian cities as being a mix of ‘extremes of wealth and destitution’. These extremes can be attributed to industrialisation, which had a significant influence on the layout and growth of Victorian cities. Accordingly, within the central city was located an industrial hub of factories surrounded by enclaves of the poor who were generally clustered by occupation and immigrant class, and mostly lived in slums.

Immigrants became a key part of the working class during this period of industrialisation. Of the Irish that migrated between 1876 and 1921, eighty-four percent of them immigrated to America while eight percent immigrated to Great Britain. Foster states, that by 1890 the Irish Diaspora numbered approximately three million. Of those Irish that immigrated to Great Britain, settlement areas were focused in South-West Scotland, North-West England, and London. For example, by 1851, 25 percent of Liverpool’s population was made up of Irish emigrants and over 18 percent of the Glasgow population were Irish born. While the rate of migration affected population growth, it additionally acted as a ‘safety valve’ as Foster puts it, ‘draining off an element that might have created political and social disruption at home’. In fact, the alleged number of Fenians in Great Britain by 1865 was 80,000 and can attributed to creating a ‘culture’ that produced personalities such as Michael Davitt who established the Land League, sister organisations of secret societies and revivalist organisations.

Foster comments that the large numbers of new migrants to Great Britain were packed into primarily tenements, boarding houses and row houses where in many cases whole families
shared a single room. These areas were made up from a maze of narrow back streets crowded with people in whom Lees’s has stated, ‘served as an extension of compact interiors.’ For example, between 1841 and 1861 around 60,000 Irish moved to the centre of London. Irish immigrants in effect became a people of the urban space clustered into three separate and central enclaves within London these being, Whitechapel, St Giles and Southwark.

The population of London in 1881 was approximately 3.8 million covering an area of 122 square miles in a city that at this time was considered, the largest modern city in the world. Considering that Ireland had a population of only around five million during the same period, it demonstrates how dominating London was at this time. By 1891, the city had grown to approximately 4.2 million highlighting its rapid growth. Lees’s stated that in 1841 London had around twenty-five-persons per acre. By 1901, there were 148 persons per acre reflecting a six-fold increase mostly due to industrial growth. However, in more poverty stricken areas the density of people was much higher such as in the southern half of the Irish enclave of St Giles made up of sixty-eight acres, where in 1851, there were 300 people per acre implying slum-like conditions. Workshop trades such as carpenter, shoemaker, and bag maker dominated the jobs of the working class during this period. By 1881 settlement patterns in the United Kingdom had generally shifted, where a majority of people were now living on the outskirts of cities as manufacturing moved out of city centres and were replaced by commercial areas. However, those who could not afford to move were still stuck in slum like enclaves in the centre of the city.

Dublin in contrast to London was not industrialised during the same period although it did have some major factories such as the Guinness Brewery, which was its largest employer. The population of Ireland had been decimated by both the Great Potato Famine and mass migration making it unattractive to investors. However, Dublin’s population had recovered to over 300,000 by the turn of the century. Royle indicated that Dublin did urbanize but not because of industrialisation but rather because Dublin was a commercial, banking and administrative centre. Nevertheless, by 1881 fifty-five percent of the labour force in Dublin worked in industry, which along with many tradesmen made the city mostly working class.
As cities were rapidly expanding, some existing Victorian-era technologies were becoming more commonplace such as electricity while other newer technologies, such as the photographic dry plate process, were just being introduced and revolutionising industries. While it is acknowledged that the Victorian era was a boom time for technological innovation, only those technologies believed relevant to this study are examined below.

Gas and coal were the predominant means for power during 1880 with over a million gas lamps used to light the 7,400 London streets. However, in 1881 electric lights for the first time lit the House of Commons. By 1882, electricity was beginning to become more commonplace with Chesterfield becoming the first British city in which electricity was adapted to power its street lighting. This was accomplished by running fifteen miles of overhead wire to a central station containing two ‘dynamo machines’.

The primary forms of communication and transportation during the Victorian era were telegraph, horse cab, steam train and steam ship. Salami states that, ‘The telegraph, the railroad, and the steamship became the first building blocks of the European information society.’ That is, these technologies helped unify cities and countries, and to spread information more rapidly between them than in the past. For example, the telegraph had been installed in all Dublin Police stations by 1881, which was particularly useful when undertaking surveillance. In the same sense, the growing London Underground system, which became a target for terrorists between 1883 and 1885, connected Londoners in the suburbs with the central city while at the same time alleviating above ground traffic congestion.

Underground steam trains had been running on several limited routes in London since 1863 bringing in people from the suburbs to work in the city centre. These were special variants of steam trains, which used condensing units when operating underground. Small openings were placed along their routes where the trains would stop and vent steam. From 1890 onwards, these trains were slowly phased out as electrically powered trains replaced them. However, both above and belowground railways during the 1880s were still limited to their rail networks, leaving horse drawn cabs as the main means of surface transportation.
Cab growth tended to match population growth in Victorian cities. For example, by 1894 there was one cab for every five hundred persons in London\textsuperscript{554}. In fact by 1898 there were 11,547 cabs operating in London with the cab trade being a fairly easy occupation to enter into as most cabbies could purchase their own horse and cab\textsuperscript{555}. London cabs were usually drawn by one horse with the primary types of cabs being Hansom cabs, designed more for style and comfort, whereas the four wheel growlers were the work horses of the cab world\textsuperscript{556}. Dublin introduced its own version of the cab called the Irish Jaunting car in the early 1800s, which was light and fast and could carry up to four persons, with two people on each side sitting facing outwards (see Figure 3.7)\textsuperscript{557}. The Irish National Invincibles in the assassinations of the Chief Secretary and Under Secretary of Ireland on 6 May 1882 had in fact used this same type of cab to transport the cell.

![Figure 3.7: The Irish Jaunting Car\textsuperscript{558}.](image)

However, public transportation was too expensive for many poor urbanites, which to some extent enforced the enclaves of poverty-stricken immigrants. Lees’s stated the ‘London transportation system imposed geographic and financial limits on those moving out of the city centre.’\textsuperscript{559} Cabs operated all the way into the twentieth century and by 1923 had been mostly phased out in both London and Dublin\textsuperscript{560}. In addition to the above transportation technologies, innovations in photography also contributed to the spread of information through the en masse circulation of photographic images in newspapers.
Photography dramatically advanced during this period with the introduction of the dry plate process in 1871\textsuperscript{561}. This allowed photos to be taken with negatives and then exposed at the leisure of the picture taker\textsuperscript{562}. Prior to the dry plate process, newspaper images were hand drawn and were based on how the event was described to the drawer. The industrial production of this type of photography began during 1880, so by the end of the nineteenth-century newspapers began to include photographic pictures in their pages allowing actual images to be circulated among the public\textsuperscript{563}.

The above descriptions of the Victorian landscape helps one to visualise its complexities and in a sense, gain some rudimentary understanding of how the terrorist used the environment to their advantage. Primarily, the rapid growth of cities due to industrialisation followed by the subsequent congestion of urban centres with mazes of narrow streets enclosing enclaves of slums filled with people that worked in factories or supported the area, usually divided by immigrant class. These centres of poverty gradually evolved into commercial centres as factories moved outwards along with the workers who re-settled on the city’s outskirts. Technologies during this period were central to industrial advances. Electricity was becoming more predominant and information was transmitted quicker by telegraph, and further and faster by train and steamship. Photography in a similar sense became more portable with pictures able to be taken in real-time versus in a portrait setting. Subsequently, the human and physical geographies of the Victorian cities became the spaces in which cells operated with anonymity, utilising improved communications and transportation options to navigate the landscape more effectively. However, to understand better the human geography of the terrorists we need some sense of their personal histories to gain some understanding of their mind-set.

The following three personal histories examine the backgrounds of some of the more well-known ‘dynamitards’ who participated in the bombing campaigns. The intent is to identify some of the common experiences that contributed to the internal stability of Irish-American terrorist cells. The decades leading up to the beginning of the bombing campaigns were shaped by several factors including, forced emigration due to the Great Potato Famine (1845-1849), the Fenian uprising of 1867 and links to Fenianism and secret societies. The personal histories of cell leaders Dr Thomas Gallagher and John Daly, and cell member William Joseph Lynch, together represent a unique sampling of pathways into the Clan-na-Gael through which, eventual entry
into terrorist cells resulted. These personal experiences, which are in no way extensive, help to understand the context for developing bonds of solidarity within Irish-American terrorist cells.

Dr Thomas Gallagher, the leader of an Irish-American dynamite cell between 1882 and 1883, was born in Glasgow of Irish parents in 1851. When Gallagher was around sixteen, he left for America where he picked up a foundry job. However, during this period he discovered an aptitude for medicine attending the Second Avenue Medical School in New York where he graduated as a Medical Practitioner. Dr Gallagher and his brother James both became at some point, associated to a secret branch of the Clan na Gael called the Emerald Club, which met regularly in Brooklyn, New York. Dr Gallagher became known to J.J. Breslin, a prominent figure in the Clan, and a member of the Revolutionary Directory, which was under the influence of Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party at this time.

Gallagher was subsequently recruited by the Revolutionary Directory to lead a dynamite cell on the British mainland possibly because of his knowledge in bomb making. He does not appear to have attended Mezzeroff’s Dynamite School so was apparently self-taught carrying out his own experiments with dynamite. Dr Gallagher left his medical practice and headed for England on 14 March 1883 along with another brother, Bernard Gallagher. His practice was taken over by the Irish extremist Dr Hamilton Williams who would eventually replace Rossa’s position in the Clan, after the later was expelled. Dr Gallagher was arrested at the age of thirty-three along with his brother Bernard on 5 April 1883 before his cell could complete any act of terrorism. He was tried and sentenced to a life term in England on 28 May 1883. His brother Bernard was released from prison due to lack of evidence and returned to America, whereas his other brother James later became a leading and prominent figure in the Clan.

John Daly, the leader of a dynamite cell during 1884, was active in the Fenian Rising of 1867 and was suspected of involvement in the Tubbercurry murder conspiracy during December 1881. The Tubbercurry murder conspiracy involved plots to murder a clerk on 22 December 1881 and a police sub-inspector on 10 January 1882. While quite a complicated case it was claimed by an informer that the eleven suspects arrested, which did not include Daly, were a branch of the Irish National Invincibles, although they never admitted to this. Moreover, the group’s actions were allegedly instigated by an agent provocateur who was a head constable, and had been set
The spy seems to have acted as the leader of the gang, helping to acquire weapons and swearing in members. All suspects were eventually freed after being acquitted in court. Daly most likely fearing further police interest into his activities left Ireland for America in September 1882, joining the Clan na Gael in New York and working with John Devoy and J.J. Breslin who were 'trustees' of the organisation's National Fund. At this time, he was considered one of the leading men of the Clan. Daly was sent to England in July 1883 to meet with leading Fenians in Glasgow, Liverpool, Belfast, and London. He was subsequently involved in a plot to blow up the House of Commons in London and was as a result arrested for smuggling bomb components into England during April 1884.

Finally, William Joseph Lynch, a member of Gallagher’s dynamite cell who later turned Queen’s evidence, was introduced to the Fenian Brotherhood in America by a fellow workmate and Fenian, Daniel O’Conner. O’Conner took Lynch to a secret meeting in Brooklyn, NY where he was introduced to the organisation. Upon agreeing to join during August 1881, O’Conner took him to a meeting place in which thirty anonymous men were gathered. Lynch followed O’Conner into a hall where he was given a book upon which to read an oath. The oath required Lynch to follow all orders given by superior officers, to stand by the watchword and preserve the funds of the brotherhood. Upon kissing the book, he was declared a member of the Clan na Gael. Lynch subsequently became a member of the Emerald Club, the same one attended by Dr Thomas Gallagher, attending meetings twice a week. He only knew the name of the president as all other members were known only by numbers.

Lynch also had links to O’Donovan Rossa, probably resulting from their British prison experiences as the following statement suggests. ‘Rossa said Lynch was a man who, like himself, had suffered at the hands of the English Government and who would risk his life for Ireland.’ As result, Rossa had taken Lynch to other Clan branch meetings in New York and had vouched for him. Lynch it seems, attended the Clan’s New York school of explosives run by Dr Mezzeroff but to what extent is unknown. It was here where he gained some knowledge of dynamite and learnt to construct pipe bombs all under conditions of great secrecy. Unbeknown to Lynch he was being prepared for a mission. Dr Thomas Gallagher eventually asked him whether he would like to go to London for an assignment. He accepted and left his job on 8 March 1882 and travelled to London where on 5 April 1882 he was arrested as part of the Gallagher Cell.
These short histories show that these agents were either first or second generation Irish immigrants to America and were either gradually radicalized as in the case of Gallagher or arrived in the Clan na Gael already somewhat radicalized as in the cases of Daly and Lynch. The experiences of Daly and Lynch were defined by their exposure in Ireland to the oppressive methods of British rule. These experiences created common themes of suffering that through Clan meetings were intensified to further radicalize them to the point of carrying out dynamite attacks in England. Gallagher’s early experiences seemed to have bypassed these same themes, being a second-generation Irish immigrant raised in Great Britain and then becoming a doctor in New York. This suggests his radicalization occurred while in America, which ultimately resulted in him teaching training classes in explosives and becoming the leader of the unfortunate Gallagher Cell in England.

In conclusion, between 1881 and 1896 the operational landscape of the cell was impacted by numerous competing forces, which generated varying degrees of instability. The politics of land agitation precipitated relationships between the Land League, the Home Rule movement, and Fenianism. These interactions mainly between competing mixes of constitutionalism, land agitation, armed rebellion, and dynamite warfare manifested as factions within the Clan, I.R.B, and Irish Parliamentary Party creating an initial layer of instability. This disparity originated from the ‘independence of thought’ emanating from each organisation creating disturbances ranging from the creation of Rossa’s Dynamite Party in 1879 to the ending of the 1883-1885 bombing campaign593.

The several personal histories of cell members show that the Clan na Gael became a collection point for Irish revolutionaries, most of which, already had pre-conceived ideas for challenging British rule. In many ways, this refugee base opened up organisations to more schisms and eventual organisational instability. As such, English’s comment that these factions were as important as the conflict itself rings true as these unstable elements in the landscape became primary initiators for revolutionary change594.

In addition to factional instability other interactions originating from government legislation, law enforcement organisations and secret revolutionary groups threatened the operability and
survivability of cells. These sources added another layer of instability into the operational landscape particularly through government legislation such as coercion and the failed Home Rule Bills. These particular cases spawned extremist organisations including the Irish National Invincibles who created additional disturbances in the cell’s operational space. Overall, there is little doubt the operational landscape between 1881 and 1896 was comprised of factionalised disparate revolutionary groups that were primed for terrorism.

Chapter 4 will next, describe in detail, the terrorist cells that operated within this operational landscape during the bombing campaigns. These same cells will be analysed for evolutionary change in Chapter 5. The Irish National Invincibles will be described in a separate chapter even though they fall under this same operational landscape. The fact that the Invincibles operated in Ireland itself and used a different *modus-operandi* means that their cells should be described and analysed separately. As such, the Invincibles are addressed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4

Victorian-Era Terror Cells during the Bombing Campaign Period, C. 1881 – 1896

Between the years, 1881 and 1896 Great Britain weathered three organised periods of terrorism led by Irish-American protagonists living in the United States. The first period, comprising one gunpowder and one dynamite campaign, was controlled from America by the Irish-American dynamite advocate O’Donovan Rossa and members of his United Irishmen (herein the Dynamite Party). Rossa oversaw the operations of five known terrorist cells on the British mainland between January 1881 and April 1883.

The second period consisted of a single dynamite campaign overseen by the Clan na Gael in America under the leadership of Alexander Sullivan. Under Sullivan’s leadership, the Clan instigated numerous conspiracies in England between October 1883 and January 1885, using three confirmed terrorist cells for what was to be an extremely provocative and productive campaign. The organisation then deployed a single terrorist cell in England between June and November 1887 for one more final ill-fated campaign attempt. The third and final period of organised dynamite terror occurred in 1896 and was an attempted resurgence of the earlier campaigns, again fuelled by the Clan na Gael in America, which at this time, was under the leadership of William Lyman.

This chapter will describe the Irish-American run terrorist cells in Great Britain as they went through various organisational and operational developments between 1881 and 1896. Comprehensive descriptions of cell organisation and operation will expose the internal workings of these Victorian-era cells in order to better understand and classify them to determine their evolutionary history. The describing of cells within the construct of the operational landscape will ultimately open them up to analysis and comparison in subsequent chapters.

The first period of organised terrorism was signified by cells that gradually became more advanced over time. The executive of Rossa’s Dynamite Party were all in favour of a bombing campaign on the British mainland. Edward J. Rowe a member of this executive had stated, ‘I am a believer in the dynamite policy. The Land League having failed, after an enormous expenditure of money and four years incessant agitation, to better the condition of Ireland, I think it is about time to try more revolutionary methods.’ While the New Jersey Branch of the Clan was in agreement with Rossa’s committee, the Clan’s executive and the Land League were adamantly opposed. Some members of the Clan who supported Rossa’s...
dynamite policy such as William Joseph Lynch, who later became a conspirator on the British mainland, were subsequently expelled from the organisation. Rossa and his faction of dynamite supporters disregarding these objections went ahead and undertook two bombing campaigns between January 1881 and March 1883, deploying several cells on the British mainland. Rossa’s first bombing campaign began on 14 January 1881 with the Salford Barracks bombing and ended with explosions at the Loanhead Police Station in Edinburgh on 12 June 1881. The plots of the first bombing campaign compared to latter ones used both gunpowder and dynamite where gunpowder tended to be the preferred explosive agent.

On 14 January 1881 at around 5:30 pm, an explosion ripped through the meat store of the Salford Infantry Barracks West of Manchester. On this particular evening, a dense fog had formed over the Salford area providing a perfect cover alongside darkness and heavy snow for the cell to carry out its work. From the police report of the Salford Barracks explosion two men had entered a local Beer House the day before the explosion on 13 January at 8 pm, talking like ‘Yankee-Irishmen’ and wanting to leave two packages with the landlord. One of these men was later suspected of being the ringleader of a local I.R.B. circle based on descriptions provided by witnesses. After the men had left, the property owner grew suspicious and one of his employees opened both packages finding what seemed like a canister in one and wet mortar in the other. The men re-appeared between 4:30 and 5 pm the following day and picked up both packages with no mention of the packages having been opened. They were then seen walking along Tatton Street parallel to the barracks at around 5:25 pm, where they stopped, were seen to light an object, and then turn back towards Oxford Street. Approximately three to four minutes later an explosion occurred, causing significant damage to the meat store building as shown in Figure 4.1.
Following a police investigation, it was suspected that a device containing an explosive charge of
dynamite had been used. This was based on how the floor around the breach in the wall had been
broken into pieces and driven downwards, while the surrounding stonework did not show any sign of
blackening, which is a characteristic of gunpowder. The charge was placed in a tin cylinder with an
attached fuse and positioned in a shed located on the outer boundary wall alongside the road. This
required removing a grill facing the road and then lowering the device approximately eighteen inches
through a gap, onto the floor of the building, using twine wrapped around the cylinder. This was made
easier due to the thick fog, darkness, and extreme cold reducing the foot traffic that was usually about
at this time of the evening. The explosion caused a hole in the meat shed facing Tatton Street large
enough for a man to enter. Moreover, it broke most of the windows in Darley Street, which ran at right
gles to Tatton Street. An unintended consequence of the explosion was the life of a young seven-year-
old boy who was walking nearby with his mother, at the time of the explosion. This was the only
fatality of a collateral nature during the Rossa led bombing campaigns and resulted during the boy’s
inquest in a ruling of, ‘wilful murder against some person or persons unknown.’

This attack had symbolic undertones, as Salford Barracks was located on the site of the old Salford
Prison where the Manchester martyrs had been executed in 1867. The force of the explosion implied it
was in no way designed to destroy Salford Barracks, although, there was some speculation that the
bomb was meant for the armoury shed which contained up to 4000 rifles\textsuperscript{23}. Within the context of all bombing campaigns, this act represented the initiation of terrorist attacks on the British mainland between 1881 and 1896, which as a result spurred law enforcement into deploying more constables in the protection of public structures\textsuperscript{24}.

This bombing is representative of an early-unsophisticated Rossa Cell. Based on the location of the device, conspirators would have had to perform some limited form of scouting of the Salford Barracks in order to deduce where best to plant the device. The elapsed time from when the packages were dropped off at the Beer House to the time they were picked up by the agents was approximately twenty hours which would have been plenty of time to carry out some surveillance during daylight hours but probably not enough to properly identify the armoury building. The device was simple and the dynamite if this was indeed the explosive charge used, probably smuggled into England from Ireland or America. There is no mention in the police report of a detonator to set off the dynamite, which raises questions as to the type of charge used. Rather, the charge might have been compacted gunpowder, which would have been easier for the agents to obtain locally and would have only needed a fuse to set off the bomb. However, this cannot be proven and the assumption at this time is that it was a dynamite charge based on the investigation of the explosive used.

This Rossa Cell carrying out this attack was small, consisting of only two men. One of the men appears to have been a local I.R.B. leader working alongside an Irish-American believed to be Edward McDonnell\textsuperscript{25}. McDonnell was most likely the cell leader based on his links to O’Donovan Rossa. He was a deserter from the United States Army and had been sent to England in early 1881 by the Dynamite Party along with another agent, John McGrath\textsuperscript{26}. No one was ever arrested for the Salford Barracks bombing, which cannot be said for latter plots. In many ways, the Salford Barracks bombing in its utter simplicity along with favourable weather conditions made it more successful than many of the other attacks carried out during 1881.

Bombing attempts on the Mansion House in London during March 1881 and the Liverpool Town Hall during June 1881 followed along the same organisational and operational lines as the Salford Barracks plot. The Mansion House, as the official residence of the Mayor of London, and the Liverpool Town Hall each signified an escalation in the symbolic value of the structures being targeted. However, the increased police presence in and around public buildings following Salford meant these attempts would be more challenging.
On 16 March 1881 at 10 pm, a bomb exploded outside the Mansion House in London. This operation was carried out by a small three man Rossa Cell using a wooden box filled with fifteen pounds of coarse gunpowder and fitted with a safety fuse on the side of the box, and touch paper at the ends. Compressed gunpowder rather than dynamite was used, as dynamite had become exceptionally difficult to obtain in England. Ed O'Donnell, one of the terrorists involved in this attack, had stated on 17 April 1881, ‘an ounce of dynamite could not have been purchased “for love or money” in all London or England for the matter of that.’

The cell was funded by Rossa’s ‘United Irish Reserve Fund’ and was additionally supported by Rossa associate Peter H. Foye a liquor store owner, although it is unclear to what extent. The cell was made up of Ed O’Donnell (alias Patrick Coleman), Thomas Mooney, and Patrick Moore. Moore after living in London for fourteen years had become well known to the police so was reduced to a support role in the cell. Mooney, considered a professional ‘dynamitard’, was suspected of being involved in several conspiracies in England following this operation including, the bombings in Glasgow on 20 June and 21 June 1883. Mooney, who was coming from Manchester, met up with O’Donnell and Moore in London, the Saturday prior to the job. Both O’Donnell and Mooney ended up buying gunpowder in quarter pound quantities from various outlets to defer suspicion and then compressing it to make the charge.

Rossa had picked the Mansion House because it was located in the heart of London and this bombing would ‘make the despots feel we were in their midst’. It was found after watching the building that the police guarding it took on average six minutes to patrol its entirety. The fuse for the explosive device was therefore reduced to four minutes giving the bombers an extra minute to escape after placing the bomb. This attempt was carried out by Mooney and O’Donnell who placed the bomb on a windowsill of the Mansion House facing George Street, which was close to the living quarters of the Lord Mayor, and used a cigar to light the touch paper. However, a constable patrolling the area saw the fuse burning and reactively pulled the touch paper from the device.

Following the operation, the agents had planned to meet up at a railway shed and then leave England. However, they decided to separate with O’Donnell and Mooney heading to Paris and Moore staying on in London. As a result, police found a piece of paper in the unexploded device with Moore’s name and address on it resulting in his arrest. An examination of the bomb by H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.) found that, ‘It is improbable that the explosion would have inflicted any structural injury upon
the very substantially built Mansion House but windows would have been broken, great public alarm excited, and any person who had chanced to be passing would probably have been more or less seriously injured.45

The Mansion House attempt shows several notable features of the early Rossa Cell. First, Moore, who was well known to the police, was replaced by Mooney for the operational phase of the operation. This shows the executive was well aware of a cell’s operational security and was willing to insert other operatives into the cell at the last minute to avoid raising undue suspicion during an operation. Second, the cell members as in the Salford Barracks bombing had some bomb making expertise that is, enough to compact gunpowder and put together a rudimentary bomb using a fuse and touch paper. Finally, the cell demonstrated some degree of forethought in planning the operation in which the timing of the bomb’s placement was well defined and a rudimentary escape plan was built into the operational plan. However, as in the Salford Barracks bombing mistakes were made, which in many ways reflects the bomb making technology used.

The burning fuse in the Mansion House attempt was observed, which stood out even more during the evening hours. This allowed the entire device to be recovered by the police for analysis resulting in the arrest of Moore46. This cell’s technological weaknesses compounded by operational failures, termed ‘clumsy’ by Townsend, allowed the authorities to utilise explosives forensics and paper trails to rapidly arrest cell members47. These types of mistakes while not always resulting in an operational failure begin to show a pattern of behaviour of early Rossa Cells that suggest some degree of inexperience and ill-discipline.

On 10 June 1881 at 4:10 am, a bomb exploded on the steps of the Liverpool Town Hall causing minor damage and resulting in the capture of the terrorists involved48. A small Rossa Cell made up of two Fenians residing in Liverpool was responsible for the detonation. James McKevitt (alias Lynch) a native of Ireland and James McGrath (alias Barton) an Irish-American received their instructions directly from Rossa and other leaders in the Dynamite Party, the names of which are unknown49. McGrath had been sent over to England in early 1881 with Ed McDonnell the latter of which, had been involved in the Mansion House bombing.

McGrath had already been involved in the Liverpool Police Barracks’ bombing attempt on 16 May 1881, in which a similar type of pipe bomb construction had been deployed but in that case, gunpowder had
been used. McKevitt appears to have also been a member of the Liverpool I.R.B, as probably was McGrath who frequented their meetings. Moreover, McKevitt had written for Rossa’s *United Irishmen* newspaper, which suggests he might have had some connection to Rossa although this cannot be verified. Nevertheless, it was confirmed the device was put together in the boarding house McGrath was lodging in after police found bomb-making components in his room. Witnesses testified they had seen McKevitt visiting McGrath and had heard knocking sounds coming from the room, and at some point a revolver going off. A week prior to the bombing, they had bought a length of water pipe and hidden it under McGrath’s bed.

The pipe bomb was five inches in diameter and filled with three packages of American-made dynamite, most likely Atlas Powder A, and pieces of iron. It had been hidden in a large sailor’s canvas bag. The bombers initially attempted to detonate the bomb on the steps of the Customs House but were dissuaded by police guarding the premises. The cell members then walked five minutes to the west side of the Liverpool Town Hall where they left the explosive device on steps against a side door leading into the building. At this time they were seen by a cabman sitting on the steps on the Westside of the Town Hall with what the cabbie later claimed, appeared to be a sailor’s bag. He later became a witness for the prosecution helping to convict McGrath and McKevitt. After lighting the fuse, a policeman in the area saw smoke coming out of the bag and subsequently initiated a foot pursuit of the bombers that lasted for half a mile. Another constable in the meantime attempted to drag the bomb away but after it began to fizz threw it about five yards into the middle of Exchange Street where it detonated causing some damage to the building but not injuring anyone.

Unarmed constables gave chase to the bombers for half an hour both of which were carrying a .44 calibre eight round British ‘bulldog’ revolver. McKevitt who had thrown away his revolver was run down first followed by McGrath who was disarmed by police. McKevitt was found with a dynamite cap and documents listing the addresses of leading Fenians in England and America. As such, the capture of both men ‘established beyond all doubt’ a link to Fenianism in America. Moreover, a Home Office report of this incident indicated that both men did not seem to have an escape route planned as they ran into a narrow passageway where the only exits were gated coal yards. McKevitt helped McGrath over one of the gates but could not make it over himself and was quickly caught. McGrath ended up on a sand flat in the Leeds and Liverpool canal where he too was ultimately caught.
Experiments later carried out by the I.O.E. on the type of explosive device used in this bombing determined that if a device with several pounds of explosive was placed in contact with the outside structure of a building, rather than within it, the damage caused ‘would be structurally insignificant.’ As such, there was a lack of knowledge in where to actually place the device for maximum explosive effect, which suggests an element of ignorance in the deployment of dynamite. The bombing of the Liverpool Town Hall presents quite a clear picture of the amateurism of the Rossa Cells at this time.

The Freeman’s Journal lamented this ill planned act stating, ‘Its agents would not be clumsy stupid, who wait till daylight to do their work, and then attempt it under the nose of a policeman and after having caught the eye of a speculating cabby.’ Both McKevitt and McGrath’s primary target had been the Customs House and when this appeared well protected rather than aborting the mission they went to a secondary target, which to penetrate was just as difficult. The whole affair shows there was minimal planning, especially in preparing an escape plan and in placing the bomb in both an exposed and ineffective location. Although the plot was attempted early morning with few people on the streets, the timing of the attempt nevertheless made the bombers stand out more. This, without an escape plan, put the cell at greater risk for capture.

While each of these operations had some degree of operational success, overall the cells still acted somewhat amateurishly. They were on average no larger than three men, were financed by Rossa and received limited support from the I.R.B. The small size of each cell speaks to its division of labour. From the beginning of the operation to its end, the cells were each directed by an Irish-American cell leader who recruited a minimal number of local I.R.B. members, identified and assessed the target, planned the operation, constructed the bomb and then carried out the operation. In other words, these cells operated in a ‘vertical’ manner, disregarding the need for specialists to carry out supporting activities. While some of the operational risk was mitigated by carrying out bombings in the evening or early morning, there was nevertheless a failure in operational planning and subsequent poor execution of a plan if one was made.

A pattern of carelessness played a large part in all three of these plots, which suggests the agents lacked field experience and were mostly learning on the job. During the Salford Barracks’ bombing the cell members left packages at a Beer House to be picked up later, a major breach in operational security. In the Mansion House attempt, the agents constructed the bomb with materials that could be traced back
to them. Moreover, the cell members placed the bomb in an ineffective location, where not only would the damage have been minimal; the fuse could be seen from the road. The Liverpool Town Hall case was perhaps the most extreme case of conspirator amateurism, where other than the cell members being quite easily spotted at 4:10 am in the morning, they also placed the bomb ineffectively and did not appear to have a pre-planned escape route, which contributed to their capture.

The 1881 Rossa Cells can be described as novice cells in which the Irish-American agents recruited by Rossa had little experience in terrorism operations. The cells were small, inexperienced, carried out all phases of the operation and had limited support. This confluence of characteristics while reinforcing the cell’s compartmentalisation leading up to an operation contributed to the breakdown of the cell’s operational security during the execution of the operation. In essence, the cells can be described as operating in a ‘vertical’ manner to maintain compartmentalisation but this ultimately became a weakness due to the inexperience of cell members. The cells subsequently demonstrated high-levels of carelessness while in a compartmentalised state in which, planning failures lead to heightened risks, resulting in operational failures. The amateurish Rossa Cells of 1881 eventually gave way to the larger and more advanced Rossa Cells of the second bombing campaign. These cells while still lacking a high-level of sophistication were generally more successful simply through the establishment of support systems on the British mainland in advance of cell operations.

During the latter half of 1882, O’Donovan Rossa began preparations for carrying out a second wave of bombings on the British mainland. He sent agents from America to Great Britain as early as June 1882 to begin preparations for establishing cells in London, Liverpool, and Glasgow. This involved setting up logistical networks to first source chemicals to manufacture nitroglycerin, second bring detonators and other bomb components onto the British mainland from America and Ireland, and finally recruit cell members.

Ultimately, Rossa and his committee set up two networks of cells in England. The first was a cell in Liverpool led by Timothy Featherston, which provided mostly support functions to an operational cell in Glasgow under the control of Peter Callaghan. The second network was an operational cell in London under Dr Thomas Gallagher, which was also responsible for a support cell in Birmingham. The Liverpool and Glasgow cells were responsible for three bombings in Glasgow during January 1883.
Timothy Featherston (alias Edward O’Brien Kennedy) was the leader of the Liverpool Cell, which provided support and instruction for the Glasgow Cell\(^7^3\). The remaining cell members were Patrick Flanagan, Henry Dalton (alias John Henry O’Connor), Daniel O’Herlihy and Dennis Deasy who were all members of the same cell between June 1882 and April 1883\(^7^4\). The professional dynamiter, T.J. Mooney has also been linked to this cell. While his involvement is not clear, it seems he might have had a support role in planning attacks and possibly helping prepare explosive devices\(^7^5\). The taking of an alias was standard practice for many of the Irish Americans who went to Britain to carry out terrorist acts. It made the investigation of these terrorist networks extremely challenging due to the difficulty in clearly identifying agents, their associates, and links to secret societies.

Peter Callaghan led the Glasgow Cell\(^7^6\). Other members of his cell were Henry McCann, Terence McDermott, James Donnelly, Thomas Devaney and James McCullagh\(^7^7\). These men were all Irish labourers and members of both the Ribbon Society\(^7^8\) and I.R.B\(^7^9\). Most of the cell was known to the police due to linkages they had with the I.R.B. in Glasgow, which met twice weekly\(^8^0\).

Both Featherston and Dalton were sent to England from America at separate times between June and November 1882, to carry out early cell forming activities\(^8^1\). They were the leading operatives in the Glasgow bombings, recruiting Irishmen for both the Liverpool and Glasgow cells. Between June 1882 and March 1883 both Featherston and Dalton were seen in Glasgow regularly purchasing nitric and sulphuric acid and espousing ‘propaganda’\(^8^2\). McCullagh and McDermott both members of the Glasgow Cell were also involved in purchasing bomb making chemicals\(^8^3\). The purchased chemicals were then smuggled into Cork, Ireland where they were turned into nitroglycerin\(^8^4\). It appears that Deasy, Flanagan and Featherston from the Liverpool Cell were responsible for smuggling chemicals, dynamite and other bomb components between Ireland and England\(^8^5\). Additionally, Featherston and Dalton may have instructed other cell members in the use of dynamite\(^8^6\). All of these supporting interactions during the second bombing campaign show a reduced level of operational security that compared to the first bombing campaign made them more vulnerable to discovery. In fact, during their trial a former member of the I.R.B. who had turned Queen’s evidence was able to link Featherston to other members of the cells\(^8^7\).

On 20 and 21 January 1883 three explosions occurred in Glasgow within three hours of each other, all set off by members of the Glasgow Cell\(^8^8\). The first explosion occurred at the Tradeston Gasworks in Kilbirnie Street at 10:10 pm on 20 January 1883\(^8^9\). The gasometer, which was used to store gas, was one
A lignin dynamite charge was used in this explosion, which destroyed the gasometer, seriously injuring nine people and scorching nearby houses as well as cutting off gas in many streets. Devaney, McCann, and Donnelly were all identified as being at the scene.

A second partial explosion occurred at 12:30 am on 21 January 1883 on the Possil Road Bridge in Glasgow, which crosses the Forth and Clyde canal, with what was described as a ‘feeble’ lignin dynamite charge. The objective of this explosion was to blow up the aqueduct causing Glasgow to flood. However, instead of the dynamite fully detonating, the dynamite caught fire immediately becoming ineffective.

The final explosion occurred at a disused goods shed near the Buchannan Railway Station, blowing out its walls and roof. This target seems to have had little meaning and as such, appears to be at odds with the prior two attacks. However, in the Annual Inspector of Explosive’s Report from 1883 it was commented that this bombing was used ‘to intensify to alarm while the other attacks were calculated to excite.’ This appears to be a likely conclusion while also demonstrating that the cell was sophisticated enough to carry out multiple attacks in a single operation.

Detectives and members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) arrested the agent Deasy on 28 March 1883 in Liverpool upon his arrival from Cork. It seems the Liverpool Cell had been infiltrated by an apparent agent provocateur named ‘Red’ Jim McDermott who had worked with Featherston and Deasy in the manufacture of infernal machines in Cork, Ireland. He had apparently convinced Deasy to make the trip to Liverpool with the devices while carrying letters that would incriminate the rest of the cell. Deasy was found to be carrying a trunk with bomb making materials including two tin boxes filled with forty to fifty pounds of lignin dynamite, a pocket book listing incriminating chemicals and a letter of introduction stating:

Dear Pat,

The Bearer Dennis Deasy is the young man I asked you to seek employment for, he is a good fellow and will mind his business whereever [sic] placed.

Yours Edmond
The Pat in this letter refers to Patrick Flanagan, a member of the Liverpool Cell whereas the identity of Edmond is unknown. This letter suggests that Deasy was a new recruit in the Liverpool Cell and this smuggling operation was most likely his first assignment on the British mainland.

Deasy was to meet Patrick Flanagan on arrival at Lime Street Station, Liverpool. He had been given the letter and tin boxes by a man called Murphy whose actual identity may have been ‘Red’ Jim McDermott, along with paper instructions to go to a lodging house at 43 Regency Street, Liverpool, which was in an area known for its Fenianism. Police after discovering the above paper trail arrested Flanagan on the evening of 28 March 1883.

Both Deasy and Flanagan’s functions were as supporting actors within the Liverpool Cell rather than roles that would take part in actual dynamite attacks. Police after arresting Flanagan found various objects and materials in his lodgings amounting to a revolver, a false beard, and chemicals for making a detonator, including a chlorate and sugar mixture as well as concentrated sulphuric acid otherwise known as oil of vitriol.

Inside two of the tin boxes found hidden in Deasy’s trunk was a dangerous amount of nitroglycerin mixed with sawdust, which oozed out immediately after opening. The components found on Deasy were obviously intended to make an explosive device. It was surmised that to detonate the bomb the bomber was required to open a tap to drip oil of vitriol onto layers of paper in inner brass cylinders below of which, the number of layers arrayed were used to control the timing of the explosion. After approximately twenty minutes and the paper having sufficiently dissolved, the vitriol would make contact with the chlorate and sugar mixture, initiating a flame that would have been driven downwards into the nitroglycerin thus detonating the bomb.

This explosive device was labelled by government experts as ‘ingenious’. It was described in a Chemical Laboratory Report dated 30 March 1883 as a device that could be ‘managed by a very slightly skilled person more easily and with much more safety to himself than I could have believed’. The device was easy to set up, just requiring the agent to turn on the tap after it had been placed.

Moreover, it was found this device was similar to the device recovered from the Possil Bridge attempt in Glasgow on 21 January 1883 linking the bomb makers. Deasy following his arrest gave up information
to the police implicating Featherston, Dalton, Flanagan, and O’Herlihy in exchange for money and immunity.\textsuperscript{112}

The Information Deasy supplied helped lead to the dismantling of both the Liverpool and Glasgow cells and ultimately an end to Rossa’s second bombing campaign.\textsuperscript{113} Featherston was arrested in Cork on 30 March 1883 followed by six more arrests seven months later.\textsuperscript{114} He was found with a formula for Fenian Fire along with chemicals showing high-levels of purity along with a test tube purchased in Glasgow intended for bomb making purposes.\textsuperscript{115} Featherston had been living in Cork since June 1882.\textsuperscript{116} His capture in Ireland suggests he was involved in smuggling bomb components and chemicals between Liverpool and Cork, highlighting his cell’s support role. It should be noted that during the trial of the Featherston Cell, Rossa supplied funds for their defence, which demonstrated his links to the agents.\textsuperscript{117} However, Rossa had not been focused purely on the Liverpool and Glasgow cells. He had at the same time set in motion plans to form another cell in London under the Clan agent, Dr Thomas Gallagher.

Dr Gallagher was described in a Home Office report as ‘the leader of a gang that came from America to England for the purpose of committing murderous outrages on a vast scale by means of dynamite.’\textsuperscript{118} Dr Gallagher had formed his cell along with several supporting logistic networks that utilised couriers, all while under the direction of Rossa and a select few intermediaries that Rossa trusted. All of Dr Gallagher’s cell members were recruited in America and then sent to England over a three-month period. The cell was comprised of Dr Thomas Gallagher (alias Fletcher), his brother Bernard Gallagher, Albert George Whitehead (alias James Murphy), Thomas James Clark (alias Henry Hammond Wilson), William Joseph Lynch (alias William Norman), William Ansburgh\textsuperscript{119} (alias John Kent), and an agent called John Curtin.\textsuperscript{120}

Dr Gallagher first went to Great Britain during October 1882 visiting London, Dublin and Glasgow before returning to America in December.\textsuperscript{121} Two of his brothers Bernard and Daniel Gallagher along with William Ansburgh visited England and Scotland in January 1883 although Bernard returned to America after being recalled by Dr Gallagher, albeit for a short period, before returning to England.\textsuperscript{122} Bernard Gallagher had been involved in some kind of support role during the 20 January 1883 bombings at the Tradeston Gasworks in Glasgow and Possil Bridge, which might account for his leaving England rather hurriedly.\textsuperscript{123} These early visits were most likely designed to set up relationships with local I.R.B. circles, to scout targets, and establish cell members such as Ansburgh in London, to learn the lie of the land prior to the arrival of other cell members.
John Curtin arrived in London from New York on 6 February 1883\textsuperscript{124}. There seems to be little
information about Curtin even though British authorities identified him as one of the designated
bombers\textsuperscript{125}. He did travel between London and Glasgow, and had been seen in Glasgow on both 16
February and 7 March. From 12 March to the 17 March, he worked for a shipbuilder in Glasgow\textsuperscript{126}.
Additionally, Gallagher had sent him money three times while he was in Glasgow\textsuperscript{127}. Curtin had become
so short of money at one point he had pawned his own watch\textsuperscript{128}. His money issues imply he was in a
holding pattern until the remainder of the cell had arrived and completed their initial preparations\textsuperscript{129}.

Albert Whitehead was next sent to England on 12 February 1883 to head-up a nitroglycerin factory. He
set up a paint shop at 128 Ledsam Street, Birmingham that in addition to paint also sold small amounts
of chemicals\textsuperscript{130}. Whitehead over the next two months turned a back room at 128 Ledsam Street into a
nitroglycerin factory\textsuperscript{131}. From around 22 February to 4 April 1883 he purchased chemicals from two
manufacturing chemists in Birmingham that totalled more than 1,500 pounds of nitric acid and over
3,000 pounds of sulphuric acid\textsuperscript{132}. The manufacturing chemists delivered the chemicals by cab to 128
Ledsam Street, which was clearly marked with A. Whitehead across the door\textsuperscript{133}. Whitehead in an
attempt to avert suspicion had placed orders of nitric and sulphuric acid that were never more than two
hundred pounds each. He had additionally attached a funnel to the furnace in order to carry fumes away
from the house\textsuperscript{134}. Additional orders were made on 6 March, 14 March, 28 March, and 4 April\textsuperscript{135}.

Whitehead had some dispute around 16 March as to the strength and colour of the nitric acid\textsuperscript{136}. Testing
by the manufacturer using a hydrometer found it was of the correct strength\textsuperscript{137}. The quality of the nitric
acid was important, as it needed to be a specific gravity in order that it could be turned into
nitroglycerin\textsuperscript{138}. As such, Whitehead while trying to ensure the superiority of the chemicals along with
the volume of chemicals he was ordering may have unwittingly raised undue suspicion to his
activities\textsuperscript{139}. Regardless, the launching of a nitroglycerin factory in England compared to the first
bombing campaign was a significant escalation, in terms of the quality and quantity of nitroglycerin
made available on the British mainland.

Throughout the existence of the Gallagher Cell, the American Exchange\textsuperscript{140} in London was used to
surreptitiously pass information between Dr Gallagher and other cell members\textsuperscript{141}. He signed up at the
exchange on 24 November 1882 and was a constant visitor until December\textsuperscript{142}. After December, visits
stopped until 27 March 1883 when he returned to England where he once more became a frequent
visitor at the Exchange, until his arrest on 5 April 1883\textsuperscript{143}. Letters would be addressed to Gallagher under
the alias Fletcher, who would respond to agents in turn using their aliases. Usually, an agent upon arriving from England would make first contact with Dr Gallagher by leaving a letter at the American Exchange to let him know where he was staying.

Dr Gallagher next sent William Lynch to England from New York on 6 March arriving in Liverpool on 20 March 1883. Dr Gallagher had given Lynch a small six by four inch box containing a small spring to smuggle into England. However, Lynch broke the box up and threw it overboard after he had opened it and become nervous over its contents. Upon arriving in London on 22 March, Lynch took a room under the alias William Norman in the Edwards Hotel. He next visited the American Exchange and left a letter for Gallagher with his address. Even though Rossa had recommended Lynch, he was to become the weak link in the cell, appearing to have second thoughts unbeknown to Dr Gallagher.

Prior to Dr Gallagher arriving in England to finish setting up his cell two dynamite plots took place in London on 15 March 1883. The first one occurred at the Government Board Offices building at Whitehall and the second at the Times Publishing Office in Playhouse Yard, London. The explosion at the Government Board Offices occurred at 7:50 pm and was followed by an attempt at the Times office at 9:50 pm.

There was some speculation that the Home Office rather than the Local Government Board Offices was the target based on most maps showing the offices marked as the Home Office. These attacks were significant as they were the first by ‘dynamitiers’ in which a device was exploded in London, precipitating heightened media attention and increased contributions to the Clan’s National Fund. Noticeably, they show a determination in disregarding the potential consequences for their actions if captured. The *Dundee Courier* makes clear this point by stating, ‘The miscreant may be said to have gone into the fiendish plot with the ropes around their necks, or with a great risk of having the ropes soon put around them.’

The Government Board Offices explosion occurred after a bomb was placed in an interior room of the building on the basement floor, located between Whitehall and St James Park facing King Charles Street. The device estimated to contain some twenty-seven pounds of ordinary dynamite was placed on the windowsill of an interior room causing four thousand pounds in damages. The explosion created a ten foot by three-foot hole in the room and damaged adjoining houses, with the damage extending as far away as Great George Street and Parliament Street, each approximately 400 feet.
away. This device was found to have had some similarities to the Possil Road bridge bombing in Liverpool on 21 January 1883 including, the tin bonnet box used to house the device.

The explosive device used at the Times Office was placed on an outside windowsill of the Times Building but the detonator failed. After the I.O.E. had examined the device, it was found that the nitroglycerin compound was quite impure and therefore unstable, and that the components were similar to that used in the Glasgow bombings. Chief Inspector Majendie of the I.O.E. in an interim report stated, the device ‘remarkably resembled in its main features one which occurred on 20th, January on the Possil Canal Bridge at Glasgow and on which I recently reported.’ The tin bonnet box used to house the device was similar as was the nitroglycerin compound although, the proportion of nitroglycerin was larger in the Times Office attempt. Additionally, the method of detonation was the same as the Possil Bridge attack in Glasgow, with a drip feed tap that when turned on would allow oil of vitriol to drip onto the Potash of Chlorate mixture, composed of potash and sugar, causing instant detonation. While nobody was ever arrested for these two operations, it appears likely the agent Henry Dalton had some form of coordinating function in planning them based on his linkages to both the Liverpool and Gallagher cells.

Dalton (alias John O’Connor) arrived from America on 28 February 1883, returning to England after the Glasgow bombings on 20 and 21 January 1883 in which he was believed involved by the authorities. He had been observed carrying out what appeared to be scouting activities on the Houses of Parliament and the basement of the Treasury Building, the latter being next door to the Local Government Board Offices. Dalton was arrested on 4 April 1883 as an accomplice to the Gallagher Cell. However, it would perhaps be more accurate to say he was a cell handler who operated across all the Rossa Cells including maintaining contact with Featherston of the Liverpool Cell. He was found carrying detonators, a pocketbook with instructions on how to make Fenian Fire, and dynamite that was of the same composition as found on the agent Deasy after his arrest. Moreover, at his lodgings on Fulham Road were found pieces of fuse and receipts for the manufacture of fulminate of mercury. Since no arrests were ever made for the Times Office and Government Board Office plots, the question that then begs to be answered is who then carried them out?

Dalton appears to have coordinated the cell that carried out these attacks after being identified as scouting at least one of the target locations. One can also surmise that the explosive devices were sourced via the Cork – Liverpool logistics network based on the composition of the bombs. A two-man
cell could easily have perpetrated these acts, as there was a two-hour window between attacks, easily enough time to walk from the London Government Board Building to the Times Office Building. As such, authorities linked both T.J. Mooney and Terrence McDermott to these attacks. While both had been connected to the Glasgow attacks two months prior, the true terrorists for this particular attack will probably always remain unclear due to a lack of eyewitnesses.

Following the London bombings, Dr Thomas Gallagher and Thomas Clark arrived in England on 26 March 1883 signalling that preparations were near ready to activate the cell. Gallagher first travelled to London where he took a room at the Charing Cross Hotel. On 27 March, Gallagher telegraphed Whitehead informing him he had arrived and wanted to visit him, thereafter spending several hours with him at his Birmingham paint shop. Gallagher then met Lynch at the American Exchange and both walked to visit the site of the explosion at the Local Government Board Offices in Charles Street. It was here, according to trial transcripts, that the following communications took place between Lynch and Dr Gallagher: Lynch stated, ‘Is that what we are to do’, and Dr Gallagher replied ‘Yes, but it won’t be child’s play.’ At the House of Commons Dr Gallagher stated, ‘This will make a great crash when it comes down.’ Again, at Scotland Yard he stated ‘This will come down too’. Dr Gallagher then told Lynch to stay put only visiting Lynch when additional funds were needed. Dr Gallagher had told Lynch ‘not to let himself run short as the old man [Rossa] would provide for them.’

Next, on 31 March, Dr Gallagher went to Savages Hotel on Blackfriars Road looking for Ansburgh but he could not locate him. It was not until 5 April that Dr Gallagher finally made contact with Ansburgh. On 2 April, Gallagher told Lynch to go to 128 Ledsam Street, Birmingham, ask for Albert Whitehead, and ‘tell him I sent you for the material’. Gallagher gave Lynch money to buy a trunk in which to carry the material back to London.

Lynch left London for Birmingham on 2 April where he met with Whitehead. However, Whitehead informed him he should have brought waterproof rubber bags to transport the nitroglycerin safely back to London thus questioning Lynch’s experience with dynamite. Lynch could not find any rubber bags to purchase in Birmingham so returned to London on 3 April, where upon after arriving, left letters for Gallagher at both the American Exchange and at the Charing Cross Hotel, where Gallagher was staying, to contact him so they could meet to discuss next steps.
However, by late March, police had become aware of the chemical deliveries to Whitehead’s ‘paint shop’ and had put it under surveillance. Undercover police went to the suspected premise on 31 March and observed Whitehead with what looked like acid stains on his fingers and clothes, giving them cause to return later to secretly search the premises. Police covertly entered the paint shop on the nights of 2 April and 3 April each time at around 2 am, using a skeleton key to gain access. Whitehead, who lived next door, was unaware of these searches. Police found seven tins of glycerin, nitric and sulphuric acid, a bucket containing a yellowish substance, probably nitroglycerin, and a vat of white liquid. Additionally they found a pocket book referring to Henry Wilson, the alias for Thomas Clark, a letter from Wilson with his hotel’s address along with receipts for chemicals, and papers with New York addresses. Police continued to watch the paint shop from 3 April up until Whitehead’s arrest on 5 April, observing both Clark and Lynch’s activities on these days. At the time of Whitehead’s arrest the dynamite factory was in full production mode with some two hundred pounds of manufactured nitroglycerin, six hundred pounds of nitric acid, seven hundred pounds of sulphuric acid and one hundred and twelve pounds of glycerine discovered upon searching the shop.

Lynch upon returning to London on 3 April without the nitroglycerin met with Dr Gallagher who informed him that another courier (Thomas Clark) had already picked up ‘material’ from Whitehead that morning. Lynch subsequently travelled back to Birmingham, this time with a waterproof rubber bag that Dr Gallagher had purchased from a shop in Charing Cross. It was here that Whitehead had filled the rubber bag with an unknown white substance, which was most likely nitroglycerin in a liquid pure state. Lynch while waiting for Whitehead went out and purchased a trunk to transport the rubber bag. While Lynch was in Birmingham Dr Gallagher had gone to the Beaufort Hotel on Southampton Street and reserved Lynch a room for two months, under the cover of a medical student using the alias John W. Norman.

Lynch next received a telegram from Dr Gallagher telling him to return to London and meet him at Charing Cross Station on 4 April. Lynch in return telegraphed his train’s arrival time to Gallagher and returned from Birmingham with a trunk containing an India rubber bag with two hundred and fifty pounds of nitroglycerin. Dr Gallagher met Lynch at London’s Charing Cross Station and gave him further instructions to get to his lodgings. Lynch checked into the Beaufort Hotel late on 4 April along with a trunk in which one other person helped him carry into the room, most likely the cabman.
The next morning on 5 April, police arrested Lynch, Whitehead, Gallagher, and Clark. Both Clark and Lynch had been under police surveillance since being seen at Whitehead’s paint shop, leading police to Gallagher. Dr Gallagher and Thomas James Clark were arrested together at 17 Nelson Square on Blackfriars Road. Lynch, who had only been in the country two weeks before being arrested, was somewhat the reluctant terrorist in the cell and ultimately turned Queen’s evidence during the trials of the other cell members. Other than Dr Gallagher and Whitehead, Lynch had not met any other members of the cell so was not able to incriminate additional cell members. Rather, information found in Gallagher’s room following his arrest produced a paper trail in which the remaining cell members were quickly arrested.

In Gallagher’s room was found a suitcase with two Indian rubber fishing stockings each holding forty pounds of nitroglycerin along with cards for both Clark and Ansburgh’s hotels. Clark had visited Dr Gallagher several times in the past so clearly had an active role in the cell. The waterproof stockings used to transport the nitroglycerin were analysed by Chief Inspector Majendie of the I.O.E. who found that each could carry up to 250 pounds of nitroglycerin. Majendie noted that transporting nitroglycerin via this method was a much safer alternative to housing it in a solid box, where exposure to higher temperatures could lead to its premature detonation. Forty pounds of nitroglycerin were found in each stocking, which while not enough to destroy a building could have caused extensive damage to its interior. Dr Gallagher was also found with US$2,345 along with one hundred and fifteen pounds and two admissions to the House of Commons.

Postal orders that Dr Gallagher had sent were examined and it was found he had sent money to a man in Glasgow. This man was his brother Bernard Gallagher who was later arrested and charged with conspiring to blow up the Glasgow Gas Works and the Possil Bridge on 20 January 1881. He also received a letter from John Curtin, which police had intercepted following Dr Gallagher’s arrest stating, he was planning to stay at 12 Woburn place until he received new orders. Curtin was arrested on 8 April 1883, as was William Ansburgh who was arrested at the Savages Hotel on Blackfriars Road. However, both men were later released due to a lack of evidence connecting either of them to the Gallagher Cell. The evidence found in Gallagher’s room indicated a significant lapse in the cell’s operational security, which had eventually led to the arrest of the three remaining cell members.

Police determined that Dr Gallagher was the leader and paymaster of the cell, and along with Curtin and Ansburgh, were all identified as the cell’s bombers. In total two hundred and seventy pounds of
nitroglycerin was found in London following the breaking up of the cell\textsuperscript{216}. Based on evidence provided by Majendie, it was enough to destroy a building\textsuperscript{217}. Consequently, there were seven charges brought against the Gallagher Cell that included conspiring to blow-up the Houses of Parliament and Scotland Yard\textsuperscript{218}. This included:

- (a) Feloniously conspiring with Norman and others unknown to make and levy war within this realm
- (b) Feloniously conspiring with Norman and others unknown to subvert the constitution as by law established
- (c) Feloniously conspiring with Norman and others unknown to overthrow the power of the Queen in Ireland
- (d) Knowing of the treasonable association in America called the Fenian Brotherhood...by manufacturing large quantities of nitro glycerine with the intent of employing the same in the furtherance of the object
- (i) ...assembling conspiracy together with Norman and others unknown within the jurisdiction of the Crown to blow up and destroy public buildings of Her Majesty (names unknown) with nitro glycerine and to prepare provide and have nitro glycerine to use in the same furtherance of this conspiracy\textsuperscript{219}

These charges make evident the increasing threat of terrorist cells in terms of their targeting and explosives capabilities when compared to the first bombing campaign.

The Gallagher Cell, even though the authorities interdicted it before it could carry out any attacks, was able to, along with the Liverpool and Glasgow cells, show significant advancements over the Rossa Cells of 1881. They were well coordinated and supported from the very start, being set up gradually over several months, to ensure both men and materiel’s were established on the British mainland prior to the cell beginning work.

The Rossa Cells of the second bombing campaign were set up in four stages. Stage one entailed making early contact with the I.R.B. and the preliminary scouting of targets. Stage two involved, recruiting additional cell members from the I.R.B. Stage three set about establishing nitroglycerin factories and supporting chemical supply networks. Setting up a local dynamite factory required a much more sophisticated supply chain network compared to gunpowder in order to get nitroglycerin and other bomb components to the cell. Finally, stage four began final preparations for an attack including, setting up courier networks between the nitroglycerin factories and cells, the additional scouting of targets and the construction of bombs.
In the case of the Gallagher Cell, Dr Gallagher travelled to London, Glasgow, and Dublin between October and December 1882, most likely making contact with local I.R.B. Circles and performing some preliminary scouting of targets. Dr Gallagher on his return to America then set about recruiting cell members and sending them to England in stages, during the first three months of 1883, in order to avoid suspicion. First, Ansburgh who was designated as a bomber was sent to London in early January to possibly begin coordinating with local I.R.B. Circles for the supply of bomb making materials, particularly detonators. Second, Curtin, a designated bomber with a minor logistical role was sent during February 1883. The bombers also put the bombs together, so for Curtin to have bomb components in his room was expected. Third, Whitehead then followed Curtin to set up a nitroglycerin factory in Birmingham. Fourth, Lynch, the cell’s courier, then followed Whitehead to London during March 1883 and was soon followed by the arrival of Dr Gallagher and Clark on 26 March 1883 to wrap up preparations and begin the operational phase.

Gallagher’s Cell, which had been very close to carrying out an operation, failed on three counts. First, cell members had associations with outside actors that ultimately compromised the cell’s operational security. Dr Gallagher had apparently collaborated with Rossa men outside of his cell. They had in turn, talked to an associate called ‘Red’ Jim McDermott who appears to have been a government informer and who had already been instrumental in the break-up of the Featherston Cell. In a similar vein, Curtin had been boarding in a house that he unknowingly shared with a member of the constabulary. The constable had grown suspicious of his late night activities and followed him to Dr Gallagher’s hotel after which he reported Curtin to his superiors.

Second, the purchase of chemicals from Commercial Chemists by Whitehead and delivery to his hidden nitroglycerin factory appears to have raised their suspicion who subsequently, tipped the police off. After a covert examination of Whitehead’s paint shop by detectives determined that suspicious activities were indeed going on, around the clock surveillance was placed on the premises leading to the collapse of the cell. Similar to the first bombing campaign, once agents were arrested, hotel cards and bomb components found with the bombers implicated other cell members.

Third, while secret communication networks had been set up to pass information between agents in America and England, and between cell members in London, they were not always maintained, as in the case of Lynch attempting to contact Dr Gallagher directly in his hotel on 2 April. Moreover, internal communication networks between agents in different cities had not been set up. As such, these types of
communications were less secure, in which the telegraph was relied on to pass information. Ultimately, this paper trail so to speak was the final nail in the coffin for the Gallagher Cell.

Overall, these failures are best summed up by Alexander Sullivan, the current President of the Clan na Gael at the time, who identified two areas he believed were the undoing of the Rossa Cells. First, the men chosen to carry out the work did not stick to their orders with cell leaders, such as Dr Gallagher, associating with other Rossa men, compromising the secrecy of the operation. Second, Sullivan believed that the men sent on these missions needed to be better trained in handling explosives. Townsend comes to the same conclusion stating that, ‘Rossa was let down by technical incompetence’. As such, there are several examples in which the device only partially detonated such as the Possil Bridge attempt or the agent appeared to have had a limited understanding of explosive materials, such as Lynch.

Table 4.1 below lists the bombings carried out during the first and second bombing campaigns. Each table entry shows the date of the attack, the target, the type of explosive charge, and whether the plot was a success or failure. Success of the operation was considered in the operational context of Rossa’s Dynamite Party during this period. That is, whether the cell was able to complete its mission by successfully detonating their explosive device thereby showing they were capable of striking anywhere on the British mainland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cell(s)</th>
<th>Explosive</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 January, 1881</td>
<td>Salford Barracks, Salford</td>
<td>O’Donnell Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite**</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March, 1881</td>
<td>Mansion House, London</td>
<td>McDonnell Cell</td>
<td>Gun Powder</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May, 1881</td>
<td>Liverpool Police Barracks</td>
<td>McGrath Cell</td>
<td>Gun Powder</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June, 1881</td>
<td>Liverpool Town Hall</td>
<td>McGrath Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June, 1881</td>
<td>Loanhead Police Station, Edinburgh</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Gun Powder</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January, 1883</td>
<td>Tradeston Gasworks, Glasgow</td>
<td>Featherston and Callaghan Cells</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January, 1883</td>
<td>Possil Bridge, Glasgow</td>
<td>Featherston and Callaghan Cells</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January, 1883</td>
<td>Disused Goods Shed, Buchanan Street Station, Glasgow</td>
<td>Featherston and Callaghan Cells</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March, 1883</td>
<td>Local Government Board Offices, Whitehall, London</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March, 1883</td>
<td>Times Office, London</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April, 1883</td>
<td>House of Commons and Scotland Yard, London</td>
<td>Gallagher Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cell is suspected of this attack.
**Suspected only, may have been gunpowder.
Table 4.1 presents three interesting patterns. The first is that there was a transition from gunpowder to dynamite between the first and second bombing campaigns requiring a mind-set and skill set change to accommodate the more sophisticated support systems required of dynamite. Second, attacks became more coordinated in the course of the second bombing campaign with multiple bombings occurring during the same operation between January and March 1883. Lastly, the cells were moderately successful in the eleven conspiracies listed in Table 4.1.

The Rossa Cells carried out four successful bombings and one unsuccessful attempt between January and June 1881. Between January and March, 1883 it had three successful bombings and three unsuccessful attempts. That is, the Rossa Cells during the first campaign had an eighty percent success rate while during the second campaign the success rate dipped to fifty percent. Over both campaigns, the success rate was sixty percent. A caveat to the moderate success of these cells is that, the British authorities broke up most of the cells during either their pre-operational phase or after only one operation. Specifically, there was no cell able to maintain a long-term presence on the British mainland.

From October 1883 through to January 1885, a third bombing campaign ensued on the British mainland. This time around, the Clan na Gael under Alexander Sullivan was in full control of the cells. The primary difference between the third bombing campaign and the prior ones is that all plots were carried out in London with one cell responsible for most of the attacks.

The third bombing campaign was an extremely prolific affair in which sixteen bombings were carried out in London by Clan na Gael cells between 30 October 1883 and 24 January 1885. Three known cells operated in London during this period. The first was the Burton Cell, which was made up of Harry Burton and James Cunningham, and was responsible for approximately fourteen of the sixteen attacks. The second was the Daly Cell, which included James Francis Eagan, John Daly, and William McDonnell, but was broken up before it became operational. The third and final cell was the Lomasney Cell consisting of Captain W. Mackay Lomasney, his brother Michael Lomasney and the conspirator John Fleming, which was responsible for a single bombing. This campaign represents a further period of escalation in the targeting of symbolic high-profile structures and high-value political targets, in addition to accepting some form of human collateral damage.

During July 1883 the agent, John Daly, arrived in England and met with Fenians in Glasgow and London. Daly was considered a dangerous man by authorities with experiences gained from the 1867 Fenian
Rising and linkages to both John Devoy and J.J. Breslin of New York, the latter a leading member of the Clan. It was believed by police that Daly was originally sent to England to assassinate James Carey, the infamous informer from the Phoenix Park Murders. However, this mission was stymied after a lone assassin murdered Carey while on a ship headed for South Africa.

Daly was then approved to carry out an attack against the British Cabinet while it was in session at the House of Commons. For this operation, he joined James F. Egan, a long-time agent of the Clan who lived in Birmingham with his wife. Additionally, William McDonnell a long-time friend of Egan may have been complicit in this affair based on letters he had sent to Egan, but to what extent is not fully understood, as there was not enough evidence to charge him. Burton stayed with Egan from 6 September 1883 to 9 April 1884.

Egan, who had been living in Birmingham since 1880, was an agent of the Clan and believed by authorities, to be an officer in the I.R.B. Letters found in his possession upon his arrest seem to corroborate his involvement in Clan activities, with one indicating there was no need to purchase small arms for the types of activities being carried out. Additionally, in an I.R.B. meeting held a few hours prior to the Victoria Station bombing on 26 February 1884 an undercover policeman had heard Egan state, this ‘night we shall be avenged; we shall be free.’ It appears Egan was well aware of other dynamite plots taking place on the British mainland during this period.

The Daly Cell had planned to attack members of the British Cabinet in the House of Commons by throwing percussion devices laden with dynamite from the stranger’s gallery onto the Treasury Bench. While Daly was staying with Egan, he communicated with Breslin who along with Devoy were trustees of the National Fund. Breslin seems to have masterminded the attempt on the House of Commons and then taken control of it by planning, funding, and providing explosive devices for the operation. Daly appears to have been the cell leader who assisted in the planning and would have been the agent to carry out the attack.

Communications between Breslin and Daly were carried out through letters, in which codes were used to secretly pass information. For example, ‘a parcel of law letters’ referred to hand shells for a percussion device. Aliases were used to hide the sender and recipient, with John Daly using the alias Thomas McDermott and Breslin using the alias James Browne. Letters were used to request money, explosive components and pass important information between the parties. For example, in one letter...
Breslin had stated, ‘the feet which are not born yet will wear boots’, which meant, do not commit to the attack until you are ready. The disadvantage in communicating with letters is that they could take anywhere from twenty to thirty days to travel between England and America, which contributed to the planning of this operation spanning from September 1883 to April 1884.

It was during this period Daly discovered he was under surveillance by British authorities. In fact, Daly had been under surveillance since 11 October 1883. His interactions with the I.R.B. whilst in England may have alerted police to his activities who had informers planted within the organisation. One such person was John Moran, a police informer and Fenian, who had seen Daly several times during 1880 and had linked him to the I.R.B. However, it seems most likely that a member of the I.R.B. called Dan O’Neil may have informed on the cell purely based on his moral opposition to skirmishing.

Once the police had identified Daly, they set up surveillance on his lodgings. This involved renting a house that looked out upon Eagan’s and moving in a police detective and his large family with the intent of ‘deceiving Daly and to watch him’. Interestingly enough, the inspector’s children were employed to keep local tabs on the residents of the house, with detectives watching the children. A third level of surveillance included detectives following Daly around Birmingham, and as far afield as Wolverhampton. Moreover, the police began intercepting Daly’s letters.

The code in the intercepted letters would have most certainly alerted police to some kind of plot in progress. Subsequently, in an attempt to secure communications Daly and Breslin by February 1884 were using couriers, usually crew members on steamships, to deliver letters to each other. For example, one particular letter Daly had written on 14 February 1884 indicated several pieces of coded information. First, that he was running short of money, second, that the ‘old firm’ (I.R.B.) would not provide support, third, that he needed ‘another bottle’ (nitroglycerin) and finally, that he knew he was being watched by police. By March, plans were underway to smuggle hand shells along with other bomb components into England from America signalling the near end of the cell’s preparation phase.

Originally, a courier named Hayes was designated to bring explosive components into England for the Daly Cell. However, Breslin did not trust Hayes to ‘safely and intelligently’, carry the dynamite and other bomb components from New York to Liverpool. Subsequently, it was determined Daly would be the better candidate to transport the materials and he returned to America. He left New York for Liverpool in early April as a crew member on the Steamship City of Chester and was arrested upon his
arrival at Birkenhead, Liverpool on 11 April 1884. When Daly was taken into custody, he and Egan had been under observation for several months.

On Daly, they found three hand shells with dynamite charges, some bomb components and two sets of instructions on how to use them. The bomb components were for detonators including, small bottles of sulphuric acid and a red powder identified as a chlorate mixture. After the explosive devices were analysed by the I.O.E. it was found that if detonated they would have been extremely effective in killing or maiming people. Each percussion device involved the breaking of a tube, filled with sulphuric acid, using a lead cylinder, which would then come into contact with a chlorate mixture causing an instantaneous fireball that would detonate the dynamite charge. The following instructions found on Daly for arming, transporting and using this device demonstrate its complicated and dangerous nature:

“Directions.

“Preparations to be made for using.- Withdraw the rubber cork from the small vial containing the sulphuric acid, and insert in the vial one of the leads sent for that purpose, tightly replacing the cork again, or, better still, putting in a new cork. Then cut the top of the cork off in a line with the top of the neck of vial, taking care that it is so tightly in place that there is no possibility of the acid being likely to escape, as the least touch of it when the vial is placed in the machine would cause its explosion.

“When the vials with leads and acids in them are all ready as described, they should be carried around in the vest pocket wrapped in paper until required for use.

“Using Machine.- Withdraw the cork from the mouth of the tube in the machine, keeping that end up so the red powder in the tube will not be spilled out. Then carefully wipe the vial over for fear any acid could possibly have escaped, and place the small vial gently in the tube bottom downwards, at the same time placing the small slide over the mouth of the tube to prevent the vial from falling out. The instrument is all ready for use when this is done. “In throwing it is best to draw the hand back gently with the mouth of the tube pointing to the rear, then throw as quickly as possible in the direction required. “You will particularly remember that the small vial is not to be placed in the tube until you are about to use the machine, as carrying it around in this manner is risky.”

Egan was arrested on 11 April 1884 in Birkenhead, Liverpool on the same day as Daly. Upon searching Egan’s residence police found incriminating Fenian correspondence in Daly’s room along with a bottle of nitroglycerin buried in the garden behind the house. The bottle was a fist flask made of thick brown glass, which would have been easy to smuggle into the country. It contained enough nitroglycerin to make two pounds of dynamite. It was determined that this nitroglycerin was of a superior quality to that found in Birmingham. The correspondence included a veritable paper trail of both Daly and
Egan’s activities while Daly had been living with Egan. The paperwork furnished police with a list of American and British contacts, correspondence from high-ranking local I.R.B. members to Egan and other correspondence requesting money etc. from Clan contacts. Following the trials of Daly and Egan, Daly received a life sentence while Egan received twenty years in prison.

Meanwhile, at around the same time the Daly Cell was being broken up, the Burton Cell had already completed its first wave of bombings and was about to launch another. The Burton Cell was responsible for the majority of terrorist bombings on the British mainland between October 1883 and January 1885. Police identified Harry Burton as the leader of the cell that also included James George Cunningham (alias James Cunningham Gilbert) and possibly one other agent who was never identified.

Both Burton and Cunningham were Irish Americans and apparently stood out based on witness accounts. Burton had a large ginger moustache and a face that one apparently could not forget whereas Cunningham had a coppery skin tone. These physical features along with their American accents made it difficult for them to blend in with the British public. Their general modus operandi was to carry out a coordinated series of bombings after which, the cell would break up with Burton and Cunningham returning to America, and then re-entering England just prior to the next series of bombings. To avoid suspicion they would always travel under aliases and stay at different boarding houses during each series of attacks.

The Burton Cell was directly linked to three bombings in London and was very likely the author of eleven more prior to the cell being broken up at the end of January 1885. It may have begun operations earlier than what is believed, most likely being responsible for two near-simultaneous bombings that occurred on the London Underground on 30 October 1883 at 8 pm. This was the first time the underground had been attacked, which because of its growing role as a public mass transit system within central London, was an event that could be easily visualised by the public.

This first attack was relatively minor, occurring between Charing Cross and Westminster Station, causing light damage to cables and lamps. However, the second attack was a much more serious event occurring near Paddington (Praed Street), damaging several carriages, and injuring sixty-two people. It was believed that in both cases, explosive devices, each with just a few pounds of dynamite, were dropped onto the tracks from carriages while the train was in motion. In the first case, little damage
was produced other than windows being blown out at Charring Cross Station. It was believed that large venting holes above the point of explosion had lessened its effects\textsuperscript{278}.

In the second case, a bomb had fallen under a passing up-town train thirty yards from Praed Street station\textsuperscript{279}. This had caused mass casualties and a two-foot hole in the tunnel brickwork with the guards brake carriage, located near the rear of the train, suffering the most damage\textsuperscript{280}. The \textit{Sheffield Daily Telegraph} described the scene as follows. The ‘floors and seats were strewn with a confused medley of broken and powdered glass, splinters of wood, nails and bolts, diversified here and there by umbrellas left behind by the terrified and wounded passengers.’\textsuperscript{281} Following the explosion the train continued on to Edgware Station where the passengers disembarked in a state of confusion\textsuperscript{282}.

Both bombings, it appears, were originally designed for their nuisance value rather than to cause mass injuries. This reasoning is based on the bombs being dropped onto the tracks rather than being left on the trains. As such, the injuries caused at the Praed Street bombing were due to an unexpected time delay in the charge exploding. That is, after the device had been dropped onto the tracks the dynamite began to burn prematurely, not exploding until the flame reached the detonator\textsuperscript{283}. This delay, timed with a passing up-town train, subsequently created the conditions to generate a deadly explosion. No one was arrested in these outrages leading one to speculate that it was an early operation by the Burton Cell, a cell that would coincidently carry out a near identical operation at Gower Street Station in early January 1885, just over one year later\textsuperscript{284}.

The next dynamite attack kept within the same theme of targeting London’s transportation network with the Burton Cell this time beginning a series of bombings against central London railway hubs, which included Victoria Station, Charing Cross, Paddington, and Ludgate Hill railway stations. These were central railway hubs with large amounts of people transiting them daily making this form of attack ideal for terrorising the British public.

On 26 February 1884, an explosion rocked the left luggage office in London’s Victoria Station Cloak Room destroying the Ticket Office, Parcel’s Office and Waiting Room\textsuperscript{285}. On 27 February, an unexploded device was found at the Charing Cross Railway Station and on 28 February, another unexploded device was found at Paddington Street Station. On 1 March, the final unexploded device was found at the Ludgate Hill Railway Station\textsuperscript{286}. All three recovered devices were examined by the I.O.E. and found so
similar in design, that there was no doubt the devices had come from the same source and that the operation as a whole was a 'common action between all the conspirators.'

Each device had a twenty-one-pound dynamite charge made up of forty-five slabs (twenty pounds) of the American manufactured dynamite, Atlas Powder A. The dynamite was attached to a tin box that contained a clockwork mechanism attached to a breach-loading pistol that upon reaching a set time, would fire, shooting a powder only cartridge (no bullet) into several fulminate of mercury detonators setting off the dynamite charge. Each of the detonators had eagles stamped on their undersides suggesting they were commercial detonators manufactured in Germany, which were universally available on the open market.

The devices had been hidden in portmanteaus of varying sizes and then deposited in the cloakrooms of the four stations between 7 and 9 pm on 25 February. The bomb found at Paddington Street Station measured eighteen inches long, by eleven inches wide, by eight inches deep. They were each timed to run for four hours and had been set to go off at midnight but in each case, the timer mechanism had failed. The clock in the Paddington Station device had stopped at 9:15 pm after the mechanism connecting the clock to the gun had become stuck whereas in the Charing Cross and Ludgate Hill Station attempts the powder cartridges had failed to go off even though the guns had fired.

It was believed that Burton, Cunningham and up to three other cell members were involved in these plots (see Figure 4.2). While the portmanteaus had been bought locally, both the dynamite and detonators had most likely been smuggled into the country from America via Hamburg, although some of the detonators might have been purchased from a local mining district. The eighty pounds of dynamite and thirty odd detonators used in all four bombs suggests that an extremely effective smuggling network had been employed to bring these explosive materials into London.

It seems that Burton and Cunningham had put the bombs together at the Waverley Hotel in Great Portland Street, London. This location was generally convenient to all four-railway stations. They had checked in on 20 February with two bags and a trunk, and then checked out on 25 February, a day prior to the Victoria Station bombing. Following the London railway station plots, the conspirator's room was found and searched by police. Inside the room under a mattress was found a cashbox, which matched the cashbox in the unexploded Paddington Station device. Additionally, a coat and some of the bomber's clothes had been found in the portmanteau at Charing Cross Station. The police were
able to measure these garments and use this data to garner some information on the physique of one of the still, yet to be identified bombers. Burton was later positively linked to the Charing Cross Station attempt during his April 1885 trial after being identified by several witnesses, including an employee at the railway station and a shopkeeper who had sold him several portmanteaus. Cunningham on the other hand was believed sighted by a witness at Paddington Street Station who had identified a man with a similar coppery skin tone leaving a portmanteau in the cloakroom. Following this series of bombings both Burton and Cunningham left for America before returning during May 1884 for the next run of attacks.

The third series of attacks were executed on 30 May 1884. They were carried out against Scotland Yard at 4 Whitehall Place, the Junior Carlton Club, which was a London gentlemen’s club at 69 St James Square and the residence of Sir Watkins William Wynn, a member of parliament, at 20 St James Square. Moreover, there was a failed attempt on the same day to blow-up Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square. Targeting by the Clan na Gael had at this stage grown bolder with these attacks being directed against the ruling establishment, the centre of British law enforcement and a symbolic landmark of British power in which collateral damage now seemed less of a concern.

The bombing at Scotland Yard was by far one of the most physically destructive of all the attacks carried out by the Burton Cell, utilising a bomb containing five to six pounds of dynamite. The explosion occurred at 9:15 pm in a public urinal located in the corner of the building right below a detective’s office killing a ‘commercial traveller’, seriously wounding a constable and causing extensive damage to the local area. This included significant structural damage to the north-eastern side of Scotland Yard, numerous injuries to people in an adjacent Public House and the destruction of over three hundred windows in the same street. The urinal on the ground floor, which was open to the public, had been rightly seen as a security concern in which a guard was normally placed in its general vicinity.

On the same night as the Scotland Yard explosion, another bombing occurred at 9:20 pm at the Junior Carlton Club in St James Square injuring five female servants and causing damage to the kitchen and cellar. Witnesses had seen two men acting suspiciously, leaning over a railing on the back half of the building who then appear to have thrown a bomb down some steps.
Figure 4.2: Reward notice for Victoria Station bombing and other London railway station plots on 26 February 1884.313.
The Wynn residence also in St James Square was bombed soon after in which witnesses describe a man throwing a device at the house and then escaping by horse in the ensuing darkness as all the surrounding lamps had been blown out\textsuperscript{314}. The bomb caused a large four foot by eight-foot fracture in the house as well as breaking windows and damaging furniture\textsuperscript{315}.

The explosive charges in these last two bombings were believed to have contained small amounts of dynamite with both devices set off by ordinary fuses although there was some discussion of a percussion fuse being used\textsuperscript{316}. In the case of the Junior Carlton Club bombing the \textit{Manchester Evening News} had stated, the ‘fragments even on the following afternoon all smelt strongly of chemicals, such as those used in the manufacture of nitroglycerine compounds.’\textsuperscript{317} The use of ordinary fuses is somewhat confirmed by a black hand bag containing a device, which had been found in Trafalgar Square next to one of the Lions under the Nelson Column at around 9:30 pm\textsuperscript{318}. In it was an eight-pound charge of Atlas Powder A formed into flat cakes, along with four detonators and a two fuse system, the latter of which had extinguished itself prematurely\textsuperscript{319}. The two-fuse system was comprised of a slow match fuse connected to a normal or safety fuse\textsuperscript{320}.

It was believed that the Burton Cell was responsible for all the attacks on 30 May 1884\textsuperscript{321}. This operation was certainly feasible for a two-man cell to execute, as all targets were easily within fifteen minutes walking distance of one another. Specifically, where a timed bomb would have been used at Scotland Yard whereas fuse or percussion devices were used in St James Square\textsuperscript{322}. See Figure 4.3 in which the proximity of the three targets to one another is shown.

Two days after the Scotland Yard series of bombings, Burton left for Paris on 2 June and from there returned directly to New York on 30 September\textsuperscript{323}. Burton’s reasons for travelling to Paris were most likely to meet a Clan agent to plan the next series of attacks, the agent possibly being General F.F. Millen but this cannot be confirmed\textsuperscript{324}. Based on newspaper reports, the next series of terror attacks were planned in Paris with a well-known Irish agent who had requested that three men were needed to carry them out\textsuperscript{325}. Additionally, Burton might have intended to travel to New York from mainland Europe so as to escape detection by British authorities who were closely watching British ports following the last series of bombings. Cunningham also appears to have returned to New York at some point as he arrived back in England on 20 December 1884 and Burton a few days later\textsuperscript{326}. 

123
Figure 4.3: Map of three dynamite attacks on 30 May 1884.
Prior to the Burton cells final series of bombings, the Lomasney Cell launched a brazen attack on London Bridge at approximately 5:40 pm on 13 December 1884\textsuperscript{328}. The bridge was a highly visible thoroughfare in the heart of London, which during a normal workweek, had up to 50,000 people crossing it daily\textsuperscript{329}. However, on the Saturday the bombing occurred, the pedestrian traffic would have been somewhat less\textsuperscript{330}.

On the Saturday evening of the attack at approximately 4:30 pm, three men hired a row boat from a boat keeper at Queenhithe on the Thames, which is less than a mile upstream from London Bridge\textsuperscript{331}. One of the men had been recognised as previously renting a boat from the same boat keeper\textsuperscript{332}. With two men on the oars and one on the rudder, the later who carried a parcel approximately nine inches square, the boat slipped down the Thames and under the Southwark Bridge on a strong ebb tide\textsuperscript{333}. Their intent was to place a large explosive device in a gully hole sixteen inches in diameter on the side of the bridge just above the waterline\textsuperscript{334}. However, the gully holes on the bridge had been grated over in order to harden the bridge on the orders of Chief Inspector Majendie of the I.O.E. based on threats they had received\textsuperscript{335}. Consequently, the bombers had to suspend the explosive device below the waterline in a waterproof casing forcing them to deviate from their original plan, thereby increasing the danger of the operation\textsuperscript{336}. This was a difficult manoeuvre, done while hidden under the shadows of the bridge in a strong current during the lowest tide in months, requiring at least fifteen minutes to complete\textsuperscript{337}. Before the cell members could row away from the bridge, the device prematurely exploded literally vaporising the cell\textsuperscript{338}. A watchman who witnessed the explosion stated there was a small flash followed by a larger one after which he detected the smell of dynamite\textsuperscript{339}.

The violent explosion blew out many windows in buildings along the riverfront, twisted lampposts, and knocked down travellers on the bridge\textsuperscript{340}. While causing little visible destruction, hidden damage was found after further inspection by divers in which, fissures in the pier were found extending up to six feet deep into the bed of the river\textsuperscript{341}. Grating over the gully holes had most likely limited greater damage to the bridge. A strong ebb tide ultimately ensured no evidence was found within five miles of the bridge making the investigation quite problematic and long running\textsuperscript{342}. However, an initial lead did quickly materialise, coming from the boat keeper due to the non-return of the boat\textsuperscript{343}.

A couple of months later during February 1885 the owner of a boarding house reported finding suspicious materials on the ground floor of his house\textsuperscript{344}. The registered occupants, one of whom was
later confirmed as Captain Lomasney, had not returned after leaving the house during December 1884. As a result, the boat keeper was also able to identify a picture of Captain Lomasney. Inside the room was found dynamite and an electrical apparatus for exploding a device while submerged under water, indicating the room had almost certainly been used to construct the bomb for the London Bridge operation. It is difficult to know what type of electrical apparatus was used to detonate the explosive device if one was used at all. If used, it would have been extremely risky requiring an electrical wire being run to a source of electricity, such as a small battery, in order to complete the circuit and detonate the bomb. The fact that the room had been paid up until February suggests that the Lomasney Cell might have been planning other bombings.

British police offered a 5,000 pound reward for information leading to the arrest of the conspirators even though American newspapers had begun reporting the names of the suspected agents. It was not until 1891 that a letter from the Assistant Police Commissioner of the C.I.D. to the Undersecretary of State confirmed that Captain W. Mackay Lomasney, his brother Michael Lomasney and another cell member called John Fleming were responsible for this bombing and were killed during the course of it. The letter stated, they were all ‘blown to atoms by the premature exploding of the explosive agent used which was supposed to be dynamite.’

The fourth and final rounds of bombings by the Burton Cell were carried out against the London Underground at Gower Street on 2 January 1885 and then the Tower of London, Westminster Hall and House of Commons on 24 January 1885. Other than the Gower Street bombing, the remaining targets signified a major escalation in the targeting of the ruling elite in which politicians were now considered fair game, as were innocent bystanders. As such, the cumulative nature of these attacks while potentially stimulating contributions to the National Fund was also causing a backlash in which the New York Times commented created a ‘spirit of vindictiveness towards Irish people in London’. Moreover, in America there were calls to introduce a bill to ‘suppress and prevent the organisation of conspiracies in this country for using dynamite or other explosives for the purposes of assassination at home or abroad.’ Ultimately, it seemed, the attacks were now ‘doing more damage to the Irish cause then good’.

The bombing at the Gower Street Underground occurred at 9:14 pm while the train was travelling from Kings Cross to Gower Street Station. It was caused by what was believed to be a percussion device containing approximately two pounds of dynamite being dropped onto the tracks while the train,
travelling at 14 mph, was in the Gower Street Tunnel. This method appears identical to the London Underground bombings on 30 October 1883 in which the Burton Cell may have also been involved. However, the resulting destruction this time was minor with only windows being broken on a passing train and some damage to a signal box. Witnesses had identified Burton and Cunningham along with one other man on the train during the bombing, one of which was carrying a package. The third man appeared to be wearing a dark overcoat, which would have been able to conveniently hide a small percussion device.

Based on witness statements, the cell members who had been travelling in the third class compartment had attempted to gain access to the brake van, which was in front of the third class compartments. However, they were denied entry on account that only people with luggage could travel in the brake van. A witness next spotted Cunningham leaning out the window presumably ready to drop the percussion device on the tracks. It was also noticed that one of the men who was seen on the train with a package wrapped in American-made cloth was seen getting off the train without it. Other than the preceding comment nothing much is mentioned of the cell’s escape, as the passengers were not held upon disembarking at Gower Street, a policy that was later changed.

Twenty-two days later on 24 January 1885, the Burton Cell carried out its final three bombings against the Tower of London, Westminster Hall and the House of Commons. All three attacks used similar kinds of explosive devices and were near simultaneously executed, occurring within thirteen minutes of each other, implying a well-coordinated attack by the cell. Each bomb was made up of approximately five to eight pounds of Atlas Powder A, compressed into six by six inch slabs with a fuse that once lit was used to initiate a timer made up of sulphuric acid burning through cotton wool. This process would take approximately twenty minutes to trigger a detonator that would set off the dynamite charge.

Cunningham’s movements leading up to these outrages involved first, arriving in Liverpool with a brown trunk from New York on 20 December 1884. Upon leaving Liverpool four days later the trunk was much heavier and believed to be loaded with Atlas Powder A, suggesting the dynamite had already been smuggled into the country. On 24 December 1884, Cunningham travelled to London’s Broad Street Station by train and was then delivered to a boarding house on Prescott Street by cab, checking in under the alias of Cunningham. He stayed at the boarding house until 14 January 1885 where upon he moved to another boarding house on Scarborough Street just a few minutes away from the last one, registering under the alias of Dalton.
Cunningham had made some trips to the Tower for planning purposes, going on Mondays and Saturdays when it was open and during one of these trips, taking an official ‘Tour of the Tower’. During these scouting activities, it was discovered that packages could not be bought into the Tower, so he ended up buying a large oversized overcoat in which an explosive device could be attached to the inside and then inconspicuously carried into the Tower hidden from view. Carrying the device under the coat was completely feasible based on the size of the Westminster Hall bomb, which was made of compressed dynamite measuring twenty-seven-inches long, twenty inches wide, and two and a half inches thick. In fact, a witness had stated that an object that size could have been easily ‘fastened about the waist under a large coat with elastic webbing.’ Moreover, wearing an oversized coat during January would not have raised any suspicion. The device with little risk to the agent could then be planted in an optimum location for maximum damage, a fuse attached and then lit.

Burton who had arrived back in the country on 24 December 1884 had picked up a trunk on 10 January 1885 from an unspecified location and transported it to 90 Turner’s Row in Bow. Based on a witness statement, Burton had visited the Tower of London with Cunningham during January but only Cunningham had been seen on the day of the explosion.

The first bombing occurred in the Armoury at the Tower of London at exactly 2 pm on 24 January. This left a hole of approximately ten feet long and four feet deep and resulted in a fire, a large amount of damage, and the injury of fourteen people, many of them women and children, mostly from breaking glass. On the day of the explosion, Cunningham had arrived at the Tower between 12 noon and 1 pm and planted the bomb in the armoury, underneath the Banqueting Hall, inside the White Tower. The Saturday the explosion was carried out appears to have been specifically selected, as it was a designated ‘free day’ making Cunningham’s entry to the Tower less noticeable. This was the oldest part of the Tower and had been upgraded with new firefighting equipment during 1845, which had facilitated the fire being quickly extinguished. The hour leading up to the explosion had been slow with only ten people entering the Tower making the activities of Cunningham somewhat easier to carry out. However, he was not completely inconspicuous as was observed during his trial where two police constables had identified him as being at the Tower in the hours leading up to the explosion. The device had been placed against a wall in the armoury with the force of the explosion being so great that quarter inch plate glass cases containing armour had been shattered. Prior to the explosion, a witness had seen smoke coming out of a box in the armoury. Within four minutes of the explosion, the gates
to the Tower were closed and a police line formed in front of it so the authorities could carry out interviews with the exiting patrons\textsuperscript{387}.

During these police interviews, which lasted for four hours, Cunningham was identified by a witness as acting suspiciously and was arrested after giving ‘contradictory answers’ to police questions\textsuperscript{388}. Cunningham was subsequently arrested and his room at the boarding house searched in which chlorate of potassium and a fulminate of mercury detonator, similar to that used in the 1884 London railway station plots, were found hidden in his socks\textsuperscript{389}.

The final two plots at Westminster Hall and the House of Commons occurred on 24 January at approximately the same time as the Tower of London bombing. The bombing at Westminster Hall occurred around 2:10 pm after an explosive device was left on steps of St Stephens Crypt leading into the building\textsuperscript{390}. A constable spotted what looked like a burning roll and carried it into Westminster Hall. He subsequently dropped it after liquid leaking from the package burned his hands resulting in an explosion, which caused severe injuries to the constable in addition to injuring another fellow officer and some members of the public\textsuperscript{391}. The explosion left a three-foot diameter hole in the floor blew the hinges off the gates leading into the crypt and badly damaged its roof\textsuperscript{392}. It was estimated that the device contained around six pounds of dynamite\textsuperscript{393}.

The last explosion at the House of Commons occurred three minutes after the explosion in Westminster Hall at 2:13 pm, inflicting damage on a wide scale but causing no injuries\textsuperscript{394}. This explosion was the result of an explosive device placed in a passageway a small distance beyond a barrier at the entrance to the House of Commons\textsuperscript{395}. The passageway connected the ‘Aye’ Division Lobby behind the government benches with the Southwest Chamber\textsuperscript{396}. The device was placed underneath the Peer’s Gallery beneath a seat usually occupied by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable William Gladstone\textsuperscript{397}. The explosion was found to have gone off in a downward tendency, which is ‘peculiar with dynamite’, causing significant damage to the Post Office in the building’s lobby, the Ventilation Chamber in the House of Commons, an electric lighting house and the Prime Minister’s chair\textsuperscript{398}. The \textit{New York Times} commented that if the two hundred Members of Parliament had been in session ‘many would have been killed including Gladstone’\textsuperscript{399}.

Following Cunningham’s arrest, Burton was linked to him through information from two principal sources. The first came after a reward for information leading to the conviction of the conspirators was
posted and a cab driver named Crosby had come forward. Crosby had remembered dropping off an American with a trunk at 90 Turner Road, Burdett Road, Bow. This person turned out to be Burton arriving back in the country during late December with a trunk, later identified as Cunningham’s. Cunningham had apparently ‘disposed’ of this trunk sometime after arriving in London on 24 December 1884. It appears he dropped it off at the Aldgate Railway Station Cloakroom, which had been picked up by Burton on either 12 or 13 January 1885. The police investigating the Bow address found Burton with the trunk, which linked Burton to Cunningham, and to the Tower of London bombing. Burton was brought in for questioning on 3 February and arrested on 5 February 1885. He was found in possession of a plan for the House of Commons and guides for Beauchamp Tower at the Tower of London, and Westminster Palace.

The second source involved Burton’s stay at a boarding house from late December 1884 to early January 1885. Unknown to Burton was that a city constable already occupied the lodgings and had grown somewhat suspicious of his activities. The constable had written a report to his superiors on 9 January documenting his observations resulting in a detective being assigned to follow Burton on 10 January. Subsequently, a plain-clothes detective while following Burton saw him in the company of Cunningham and was subsequently able to identify both Burton and Cunningham on 4 February during the police investigation.

Table 4.2 below lists the bombings carried out during the third bombing campaign. The table shows for each plot the date of the attack, the target, the explosive charge used and whether it was a success or failure. Success is considered in the operational context of the Clan during this period. That is whether the cell was able to complete its mission by setting off their explosive device successfully thereby creating terror and publicity through the power of the act. In this context, the London Bridge bombing is considered an operational success even though the bomb exploded prematurely killing all cell members. While minimal damage was done to the bridge and the cell was vaporized, a key bridge in the heart of London had been attacked, making this bombing an outstanding operational success.

The table clearly shows the success of most plots during this period. In particular, the dominance of the Burton Cell for the majority of these attacks, the standardised use of dynamite, target escalation and finally the use of near-simultaneous attacks on 30 October 1883, 26 February 1884, 30 May 1884 and 24 January 1885. Target escalation went from attacking the transportation network of London to symbolic structures of the ruling elite. Not shown in this table is the gradual acceptance of collateral damage or
the targeting of high-value targets such as politicians. Out of the sixteen plots between 1883 and 1885, five are considered failures indicating a seventy percent success rate. As such, the success of the Burton Cell cannot be understated. It had succeeded where many others had failed by operating on the British mainland for over a year. The long-term survival of the cell almost certainly contributed to its success. That is, as the cell succeeded cell members became more adept at their work.

Table 4.2: Plots during the third bombing campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Explosive</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 October, 1883</td>
<td>London Underground, between Charing Cross and Westminster</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October, 1883</td>
<td>London Underground, near Praed Street</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February, 1884</td>
<td>London Victoria Station, Cloakroom</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February, 1884 (found on the 27th)</td>
<td>London Charing Cross Station, Cloakroom</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February, 1884 (found on the 28th)</td>
<td>London Paddington Station, Cloakroom</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February, 1884 (found on March 1st)</td>
<td>London Ludgate Hill Station, Cloakroom</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April, 1884</td>
<td>House of Commons, Whitehall, London</td>
<td>Daly Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May, 1884</td>
<td>Scotland Yard, London</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May, 1884</td>
<td>Junior Carlton Club, St James Square, London</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May, 1884</td>
<td>Sir Watkins William Wynn, St James Square, London</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May, 1884</td>
<td>Nelsons Column, Trafalgar Square, London</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December, 1884</td>
<td>London Bridge</td>
<td>Lomasney Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 January, 1885</td>
<td>London Underground, Gower Street</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January, 1885</td>
<td>Tower of London</td>
<td>Burton Cell</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January, 1885</td>
<td>Westminster Hall, London</td>
<td>Burton Cell*</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cell is suspected of this attack.

There are three major reasons for the success of the Burton Cell. First, following a wave of attacks, Burton always departed England and returned to New York thereby complicating any police investigation. It appears Cunningham may have also followed the same arrival-departure pattern although it cannot be confirmed in all cases. In effect, the agents always returned to a sanctuary in which extradition for prosecution would have been complicated.

Second, the Burton Cell was small, limited to at least two, possibly three members with minimal outside contact contributing to a highly compartmentalised state. There was mention of a third member of the cell during Burton and Cunningham’s trial but he was never identified so subsequently cannot be
confirmed as a core member of the cell. Up to two more members it seems were also brought on board if the operation necessitated it such as the London railway station plots on 26 February 1884.

Third, cell members did not associate with other cells and had limited contact with other organisations such as the I.R.B. or at least, not to the extent cells had done so in the past such as the Gallagher cell. To avoid further suspicion, aliases were used in external interactions and accommodations were changed regularly. Moreover, Burton worked as a Cabinetmaker in London for small periods between May 1884 and January 1885 diverting attention away from his true mission. To limit the more risky external interactions such as the purchasing of bomb making chemicals locally, explosive materials were smuggled into Great Britain mostly from America as in the case of the agent John Daly. By not manufacturing dynamite locally, cells were able to standardise the type of dynamite used as in the case of Atlas Powder A versus say using different variations of homemade lignin dynamite. Cells thereby reduced interactions with local chemical suppliers, which in the case of the Gallagher Cell had led to a breakdown in operational security. Subsequently, a high-level of compartmentalisation enabled a greater degree of secrecy thereby protecting the cell from informers and the suspicion of other external actors, both of which had been contributing factors in the downfall of the earlier Rossa Cells. As such, the Burton Cell was able to effect four waves of coordinated near-simultaneous dynamite attacks between 1883 and 1885.

Each wave of bombings required detailed scouting and planning. This ensured the outrages either occurred at the same time using timed explosive devices or were timed to occur near simultaneously through a mixture of timed and thrown devices. The former was extremely difficult to pull off due to the still unreliable nature of timer technologies as proven in the London railway station plots on 26 February 1884. The latter required the targets to be proximate as in the 30 May attacks against Scotland Yard, the Junior Carlton Club and Sir Wynn’s residence. The capability of a cell to pull off near-simultaneous bombings implies the cell was sufficiently sophisticated enough to where it could be split into sub-cells that could synchronise their individual actions during an operation. However, the Burton Cell had two features that weakened compartmentalisation.

The first weakness can be attributed to what has been described as Burton and Cunningham’s unusual physical characteristics. This includes their Irish-American accents, dark skin tones and distinguishable facial features as compared to the standard Londoner, effectively making it more difficult for them to
blend in. While it did take over a year to arrest them, witnesses who did eventually identify them found their features somewhat memorable. For example, during the Gower Street Underground bombing on 2 January 1885 a witness had remembered Cunningham’s coppery skin tone and American accent\textsuperscript{413}.

The second vulnerability of the Burton Cell was in the purchase and transportation of portmanteaus used to hold the explosive devices. The portmanteaus were traceable back to sellers and the cab drivers who would transport them along with the agents to their accommodations. They also left personal effects inside the portmanteaus that assisted police in their investigations. These weaknesses were used by the police in re-creating timelines that could be used as evidence against cell members.

The fourth and fifth bombing campaigns during 1887 and 1896 respectively, in comparison to those occurring between 1881 and 1885, were not true campaigns. Rather, these were attempts by the Clan na Gael to resurrect attacks on the British mainland in an effort to re-create the successes of the earlier campaigns.

Sullivan endorsed the attempted fourth bombing campaign for two principle reasons. First, it was a means to oppose the introduction of the ‘coercionist’ Crimes Act of 1887\textsuperscript{414}. Second, it was to use the highly publicised celebration of Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee to reignite a new ‘reign of terror’ on the British mainland\textsuperscript{415}. At this time, the majority of the Clan opposed renewing any kind of terror strategy in Great Britain so it was up to a small secretive group within the Clan, led by an agent based in France, to coordinate this campaign\textsuperscript{416}. There were two phases to this campaign that played out during 1887.

The first involved targeting the Houses of Parliament and Westminster Abbey during the Queen’s Jubilee celebrations in June 1887\textsuperscript{417}. While the Thanksgiving service was underway outside St Pauls Cathedral on June 22 1887, both targets were to be bombed\textsuperscript{418}. A five-man cell was quickly put together in preparation for the attacks. This involved the arrival from America of Joseph Moroney (alias Melville), Thomas Callan (alias Scott), and Michael Harkins on 21 June\textsuperscript{419}. Two additional members of the cell smuggled dynamite into Great Britain although their identities and time of arrival in England are unknown\textsuperscript{420}. The operation was to be directed from Paris, France by the Clan agent General Millen through Moroney, the acting cell leader in London\textsuperscript{421}. However, the plot was quickly aborted after a member of the British police visited Millen in France and informed him they were aware of the plot\textsuperscript{422}. 
Millen had become known to Scotland Yard through the British Secret Service agent Major Henri Le Caron, who had become a close confident of Sullivan. Upon receiving information about the plot, they had approached Millen in accordance with current counter-terrorism strategy. Cook comments that countering terrorism at this time was based on ‘deterrence’ such as persistently and plainly following suspected agents, rather than ‘entrapment’. Even though Millen’s plans had been scuttled, the dynamite cell was left intact and operational, and still capable of doing significant damage in London.

Following the failure of the jubilee operation, Millen targeted the House of Commons for attack. Upon arriving in London, both Callan and Harkins had taken rooms in separate boarding houses in Islington, each located within twenty minutes of the other. Most likely, the dynamite that had been smuggled into the country for the jubilee operation ended up in the room of an Irish-American called Joseph Cohen (alias Brown), who had been living in a house on 42 Lambeth Road, London since July 1887. While it is unclear what Cohen’s initial role in the cell was, he through interactions with other cell members eventually became the cell’s leader after Moroney had left for Paris on 8 August. The police had received tips about Moroney near the end of July and had followed him during visits to the House of Commons on the fourth and fifth of August 1887. They would have seen him in the company of Harkins, as they took a tour of the Stranger’s Gallery at the House of Commons, although to what extent they connected the two at this stage is unknown. This precipitated Moroney’s departure to Paris on August 17 and then to America on 17 September. Upon Cohen taking up the central leadership role in the cell, the entire plan fell apart after he died of natural causes during October 1887, which triggered police to uncover the cell.

Cohen, Harkins, Callan and Moroney were all linked together based on frequent visits Harkins had made to the bedridden Cohen. Prior to Cohen’s death, both Harkins and Callan had been witnessed carrying a heavy tin box, believed to be laden with dynamite, from Cohen’s room to Callan’s room at 24 Baxter Road, Lower Road, Islington. Following Cohen’s death, his connections to the Clan made Harkins an instant suspect. The police ultimately linked both Callan and Moroney to Harkins. Moreover, Cohen was found with post-marked envelopes from France suggesting links to Millen in Paris. Callan in the meantime, panicked by current events, had attempted to get rid of the dynamite. He threw most of it into a water closet in the back yard of his boarding house and tossed the rest of it into the neighbour’s garden. The dynamite subsequently blocked the water closet requiring it to be unclogged, with what was recovered being thrown into a dustbin. The neighbours meanwhile picking up what they thought...
was mortar from their garden had put it into their oven to dry, causing it to explode. The remnants from the explosion were put into a dustbin as well. The following letter by Callan shows his fragile state of mind at this time.

Nov. 17th, 1887. Dear friend Joe,—I received your kind present last night, and it was a very welcome present, you bet. All I had was 7s., and that looked very blue. I had to do away with all the tea last week, as there was two of my dear friends came to see me to my room before I got out of bed, and wanted me to go to work, and they have taken very good care of me for the last two weeks; they have seen that I would not get lost. I have not seen Harry for a month. I do not know what has become of him. He promised to meet me the day after Joe died, and I went there three days; as I did not see him, I did not get any of the money that Joe had; I thought that Harry would get it, and that he would give me some of it, so you can’t blame me for getting away with the tea, as I was here all alone, and did not know where to write to, and did not know anyone knew where I was. I thought it better to do away with it than to have them get it and see how it was done up. They have done you down fine; they have got your picture in most all the papers; they have got you in one paper where you are in an hotel with a woman, and in another where you and Joe first met, and every place where you have been in beside. I intend to leave for home in a few days, as I am sick and tired of this business. I sent for money last week, and as soon as I get it I will start from this d—d hole. That poor man Joe, I will never forget him, he was one of the best men ever walked. I remain, yours, Thos. Scott.

This letter indicates Callan had been extremely short of money and feared Harkins, named as Harry in the letter, had deserted him. Tea in this letter is a code word for dynamite, which he writes was disposed of because he had lost contact with everyone. Joe is a generic name that refers to both the recipient of the letter, which is probably Moroney, and Cohen.

The oven explosion led to the premises of Harkins and Cohen being extensively searched by police where large quantities of dynamite were found. Over twenty-two pounds of dynamite was found at 24 Baxter Street while six pounds of dynamite was found at 26 Baxter Street. After examination of the explosive remains by Chief Inspector Majendie of the I.O.E, it was found to have been manufactured in America and wrapped in paraffin paper to keep it dry. The dynamite in each of the dustbins, totalling twenty-eight pounds, became crucial in convicting Callan and Harkins.

The most significant advancement from the attempted fourth bombing campaign was the setting up of a Clan Headquarters in France to coordinate operations. While dynamite was still smuggled into Great Britain from America, the act of selecting targets and coordinating aspects of the operation from France allowed greater control over activities on the British mainland. Subsequently, while the jubilee
operation was cut short, planning for the subsequent attempt on the House of Commons seems to have continued right up to the time of Cohen’s death. This indicates that the security of communications between Millen in France and the cell on the British mainland had been tightened up compared to the earlier attempt. The use of the continent as an operational headquarters by the Clan took another step forward during the attempted fifth bombing campaign in 1896.

The Clan by 1896 was still split into opposing factions made up of the Cronin and anti-Cronin wings. The anti-Cronin wing was completely controlled by William Lyman who believed in a ‘policy of force’ and maintained satellite executives in Dublin and London. The Cronin wing was made up of the Clan old guard led by John Devoy. The I.R.B. favoured the Cronin wing, which meant the Lyman wing would not receive much in the way of materiel support from local I.R.B. circles as they had in past campaigns. Nicholas Gosselin, head of the Special (Irish) Branch to the Home Secretary in speaking of the anti-Cronin wing’s lack of support stated, there ‘is no sign of unrest or desire on the part of the people themselves to enter into conspiracies, and if we are successful in finding out Lyman’s plans I think the principal danger will be over.’ Subsequently, it is fair to say that conspiracies at this late point in the nineteenth century originated mainly from America.

William Lyman was described in a secret report dated 7 October 1896 as ‘rich, sober, determined, and a fanatic in his hatred of England.’ He was said to be a contractor who was worth over half a million dollars. During December 1893, Lyman had already tried to initiate a plan to assassinate government officials in Dublin using a cell made up of two members. However, the cell’s attempts failed after they shot and killed the suspected informer Patrick Reid, a suspect in the 1891-3 bombing campaign in Dublin. A subsequent scheme also failed, which involved blowing up an expansive section of the Welland canal between Canada and America to create friction between the two countries. This conspiracy failed after the agents involved in the plot lost their nerve. The failure of both these conspiracies led to Lyman laying the groundwork for a new bombing campaign on the British mainland during 1896.

The plot was laid out in America between March and May 1896. However, the British authorities had by this time infiltrated the Clan in America and set up a network of informers, which had ‘managed to worm into the very heart of the American Conspiracy.’ Gosselin had five men who were in deep cover with the Clan in England and Ireland, and had been sent to America to infiltrate the organisation, four of whom succeeded, some of which became confidents or associates of the leadership in both wings.
example, one of the informers had been ordered to watch a certain Clan leader named Dan Maher and was subsequently able to copy down numerous names and addresses of Clan members who lived in London, providing additional leads in monitoring suspected Fenian activities. Subsequently, this comprehensive infiltration of the anti-Cronin wing by Gosselin’s network of informers doomed any plans that Lyman might have had from the very start. As such, British authorities knew the names of all cell members before they had even sailed from America.

Over a period of around nine weeks, between July and September 1896, a four-man cell began to establish itself in London and Antwerp. The cell was made up of P.J. Tynan, the cell leader and ex-leader of the Irish National Invincibles, his Second in Command Edward J. Ivory (alias Edward Bell), John Kearney (alias John Wallace) who was said to have been involved in the 1882 Glasgow Gas Works explosion, and Tom Haines. Haines had replaced another cell member named Cooney (alias the Fox) who Lyman had sent to England to assassinate Mr Joseph Chamberlain, a cabinet minister and imperialist who had strongly opposed attempts to introduce Irish Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893. Information of the conspiracy was relayed by spies to the authorities, which forced Cooney to return to New York. It appears these men had been trained in the art of dynamite warfare before leaving for the continent.

Tynan’s job was to formulate plans to carry out attacks on the British mainland and to control and coordinate the cell members in various roles. It does not appear initial targets had been designated although there was some hint that the Russian Czar, who would be travelling to Scotland and then France during the same time period, might have been targeted. Moreover, reports indicated that Russian nihilists had contributed to the revolutionary fund generating some credibility to this story. However, this scheme was somewhat debunked as a desperate story created by the British in an attempt to extradite Tynan from France to England for the Phoenix Park Murders following his capture after the plot fell apart. The little information available regarding the targets for this cell suggest none had been selected at this early stage of its lifecycle.

The plan was to send Kearney and Haines to Antwerp to set up a dynamite factory and then for Ivory and Tynan to travel to London and Ireland to recruit up to ten agents to help smuggle dynamite into England using India rubber bags slung around their necks. The agent Kearney was given US$5,000 and sent to Antwerp to set up a bomb factory. Sometime later Tom Haines, a Clan member with bomb making experience, was sent to assist Kearney. The other two agents Ivory and Tynan travelled to
England and then on to Antwerp where they had met up with Kearney and Haines and rented a house to store chemicals and manufacture dynamite\(^{467}\). From Antwerp, Ivory travelled to Glasgow to purchase chemicals and organise a ‘physical force section’\(^{468}\).

However, on 3 August 1896 Gosselin had received a letter from one of his informers in Antwerp describing the entire plot\(^ {469}\). The informer met with Gosselin on 22 August both of whom first travelled to Antwerp, finding Kearney and Haines, and then to London where they found Ivory and Tynan\(^ {470}\). Surveillance of these men eventually tracked them to Antwerp. Soon after, Gosselin received a wire informing him that bomb making chemicals had been delivered to a house in Antwerp\(^ {471}\). As a result, Gosselin issued orders to arrest the cell members. Ivory was arrested in Glasgow on 11 September 1896, Kearney and Haines were arrested in Rotterdam with thirteen bombs, and Tynan escaped to France where he was arrested\(^ {472}\). Inside the Antwerp house, which acted as both a headquarters and bomb factory was found explosive devices and stores of sulphuric, and nitric acid along with other chemicals to manufacture dynamite\(^ {473}\).

The Tynan Cell while hobbled from the very start by spies nevertheless managed to introduce a new variant of cell. This first required establishing a bomb-making factory on the continent. Lyman’s intent in using Antwerp to manufacture dynamite and explosive devices was to hide the stockpiling of explosive materials from British authorities. The advantage in using foreign soil as a base of operations was that it hampered investigations by British authorities. For example, while the cell was based in Belgium they were arrested in the Netherlands requiring local authorities in both countries to collaborate with the British in order to carry out arrests\(^ {474}\).

The evidence found on the agents in Rotterdam and in their residence in Antwerp as well as a police report on the chemicals found in their house created additional complexities during the British trial of Ivory. In the case of documents found on the conspirators arrested in the Netherlands, the government only agreed for them to be released for prosecution purposes in England if they remained under the care of a Rotterdam police officer\(^ {475}\). Additionally, extradition treaties created complications in bringing the alleged terrorists back to England to face trial\(^ {476}\). For example, Tynan was never extradited from France because extradition based on the British Explosives Act of 1883 was not part of the original treaty with France\(^ {477}\). Moreover, the French had taken offence at the extent British detectives had operated independently of local authorities in Belgium, which appears to have had some influence on their final
decision to free Tynan along with the evidence he had in his possession. Subsequently, the release of Tynan meant there was very little chance in convicting Ivory who was eventually released from custody on 19 January 1897.

In conclusion, the first gunpowder campaign, two dynamite campaigns and two-attempted dynamite campaigns present terror cells as undergoing four stages of change between 1881 and 1896. The first bombing campaign represents a trial period in which cells were somewhat amateurish where cell members acted with a careless disregard for their own personal security and cells operated with minimal levels of compartmentalisation. While relatively few plots were successful, the low profile nature of the targets within an operational landscape in which the authorities had yet to fully adjust to this new threat, allowed several of the terrorist bombings to go unpunished.

By the second bombing campaign, cells had become more advanced as security was stepped up. Support cells were imbedded in British cities over a six month period providing bomb making materials along with in some cases command and control functions over other cells. In effect, systematic supply chains and communications networks were set up during the second bombing campaign. However, while compartmentalisation had certainly improved compared to the first bombing campaign, the secrecy of the cell was still wrought with carelessness mostly caused by unsecure external linkages to outside actors, eventually leading to the downfall of all the cells.

The third bombing campaign was marked by bombing successes. A single cell was able to invoke a seventy percent success rate against high-profile targets in London that was notable for a gradual increase in intensity over time within a complex law enforcement environment. This was carried out under a cell strategy that affected a high degree of compartmentalisation, making the cell all but impossible to interdict using existing counter-terrorism measures. By making efficient use of time and space through the effective application of bomb making technologies, the cell was able to minimise its external interactions and carry out near-simultaneous bombings thereby reducing its exposure to threats in the operational landscape.

The attempted fourth and fifth bombing campaigns are more about what could have been. The direction the cell was heading pushed American based Clan command and control activities and bomb making
factories offshore to the continent. Consequently, basing these activities in European countries added another layer of complexity in tracking down, arresting and then extraditing terror suspects.

Chapter 5 will next use the information from this chapter to consider the adaptive characteristics that allowed both Rossa and Clan cells to operate and survive in the operational landscape. These characteristics will be analysed to find evolutionary variations that signify the cell’s evolution. This data will then be used to map out the evolutionary history of terrorist cells for the Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael between 1881 and 1896.
Chapter 5

An Evolutionary Analysis of Victorian-Era Terror Cells, c. 1881 – 1896

The Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael violently challenged British hegemony in Ireland between 1881 and 1896. This first entailed three intense bombing campaigns throughout Great Britain between January 1881 and January 1885, followed by attempts to reignite new campaigns during June 1887 and September 1896. All of these campaigns were predicated on well-funded foreign controlled terror strategies against primarily, high-profile public structures on the British mainland. They were designed to re-inspire the Irish cause for self-determination and reassert the presence of physical force factions within the Clan and Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.), which had been over taken by land agitation and the growing popularity of Home Rule. As such, terrorist cells became the instruments of factional forces within Fenian organisations during the last two decades of the nineteenth century in an effort to remain relevant.

Approximately nine cells operated within the British landscape between 1881 and 1896, perpetrating a total of some twenty-eight bombings and attempted bombings. Each of these cells had their own unique Victorian-era characteristics, which based on their descriptions in the previous chapter, have been categorised into six main developmental periods:

- 1881: Novice Rossa Cells
- 1882: Rossa Support Systems
- 1882 – 1883: Advanced Rossa Cells
- 1883: Sullivan Support Systems
- 1883 – 1887: Sullivan Cells
- 1896: Lyman Support Cell

The intent of this chapter is to document the evolutionary history of both the Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael terror cells between 1881 and 1896. This chapter will first, summarise the cells from each of the campaign periods, which will result in identifying adaptive characteristics and forming events within each of the developmental periods identified above. Next, this information will be used to help locate
common evolutionary variations that signify vital evolutionary changes as cells adjusted to disturbances in the operational landscape. These disturbances account for changes in technology, changes in cell strategy and changes in counter-terrorism policies of government and law enforcement agencies. This will be done by examining cell complexity, cell field dispositions, and the operational presentation of cells in order to highlight their diversity, robustness, and productivity as they changed over time. The evolutionary variations will then be summarised using a feedback diagram to show how these cells evolved. Finally, this information will be summarised as a cladogram representing the evolutionary history of Victorian-era terror cells as they evolved in Great Britain between January 1881 and September 1896.

The novice Rossa cells of 1881 were small and made up of no more than three cell members. They operated at night and bombed mostly low-profile targets, which had been pre-selected by O’Donovan Rossa and his Dynamite Committee. These characteristics resulted in minimising the cell’s signature to avert suspicion from both police and members of the public, during operations.

The Dynamite Party’s *modus operandi* when setting up cells in England involved O’Donovan Rossa sending his own trusted Irish-American agents to England. Once there, they would coordinate with Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) circles to recruit additional cell members on an as needed basis¹. Between 1881 and 1883 Rossa himself appears to have used men he personally knew to act as chief agents on English soil. For Rossa, trust trumped experience when selecting agents to work in England, which ultimately contributed to operational missteps that in some cases, led to the early demise of cells. Rossa’s control over these men once on the British mainland was subsequently based on the trust he put in his cell leaders and latter his cell handlers. However, the financial resources of his party were also a mechanism for ensuring cells followed top-level directives.

Funds for operations were sent via postal orders from America to operatives in London for both living and operational expenses such as the purchasing of portmanteaus. A lack of financial support was normally never an issue during Rossa’s bombing campaigns. A government report had stated, ‘Rossa’s agents, are said always to have sufficient funds in hand to enable them to escape from England at a moment’s notice.’² Rossa in effect controlled the purse strings through an agent called Captain Spearman, who was treasurer of the Dynamite Party³. For example, between October 1880 and April 1881 police reports showed Rossa spent US$7,004 on his terror cells in England⁴. However, while Rossa
controlled the finances and directed targeting, all operational elements were left up to the cell. In this respect, other than learning on the job, a cell’s only other support was through its associations with the I.R.B.

These early Rossa Cells were to varying degrees able to tap into local I.R.B. support networks. The financial dependency of the I.R.B. on the Clan was in turn rewarded by I.R.B. circles supporting the Rossa Cells with extra cell members, bomb making materials and operational planning information. If one examines the Liverpool I.R.B. Circle and its relationship to the McDonnell Cell during the Mansion House plot on 16 March 1881, it is somewhat apparent that both Mooney and Moore had been recruited from the local I.R.B. In fact, John Denver, a prominent Liverpool I.R.B. member, had known the Irish-American agent Ed McDonnell. As such, Denver opened up the resources of the local I.R.B. circle to McDonnell’s Cell but in doing so any spies the police might have recruited or planted were also privy to this association. This linking of cells to I.R.B. circles was in fact an operational security risk cell leaders had underestimated when utilising I.R.B. support networks. The police monitoring of I.R.B. circles had become well established by 1883, demonstrated by monthly police reports at the county level detailing the activities of secret societies in both Ireland and England.

Each operation during the first bombing campaign was carried out in an operationally vertical manner. That is, the cell once established had few members and as a result, carried out all steps of the operation including scouting, planning, acquiring explosive materials, constructing bombs and deploying them. This vertical characteristic had the added benefit of strengthening the compartmentalisation of cells during planning but not necessarily during execution.

Likely reasons for the failure of several operations were that the plans for these early operations were not fully thought through most likely due to the inexperience of the agents. This was doubly reinforced by the cell operating vertically decreasing outside interactions with more experienced conspirators. For example, in the case of the Salford Barrack’s bombing, scouting had been carried out only a day or so in advance of the attack, most likely explaining why the meat storage shed instead of the armoury was bombed. Moreover, in the case of the Liverpool Town Hall bombing an escape route was not preplanned resulting in the capture of the terrorists. The lack of experienced cell members was somewhat offset by the types of targets chosen and the lack of security protecting these targets during this early period.
All plots during the first bombing campaign were uncoordinated actions carried out by single cells. Targets were spread out geographically between Salford, Liverpool, and London. Most were relatively low profile with the Mansion House in London being the only high-profile target attacked during 1881. Overall, these operational characteristics point to the simplicity of the early Rossa cells and the inexperience of the agents, which nevertheless still allowed them to achieve some level of success by orchestrating less complex operations.

Several of the bombings used gunpowder, which was more widespread and widely used then dynamite at this time. Gunpowder compared to dynamite required less skill on the part of cell members to transport, store and handle. Dynamite had become difficult to purchase in England following the Salford Barracks explosion whereas gunpowder could still be purchased locally with little difficulty, and then easily turned into an explosive device by compacting the gunpowder and attaching a fuse.

While dynamite was initially used infrequently, when it was used, the agents lacked the experience to deploy it effectively. For example, during the Liverpool Town Hall bombing, an explosive device containing dynamite was placed outside the structure rather than on its inside. This is an effective technique for gunpowder where the explosive force is directed in mostly one direction. However, in the case of dynamite, the force is evenly distributed making the inside of a structure the best possible location to cause the greatest damage. There was only one confirmed case of dynamite being used during the first bombing campaign so it is understandable that the knowledge in how to deploy it for terrorism purposes was still being learnt. As such, the agents during this early period likely would have deployed dynamite in the same manner they would have gunpowder that is, against the outside structure of a building. This lack of knowledge highlights the underlying lack of support systems during this first bombing campaign.

During 1881, there were no systematic support systems in place such as explosives training, communications, chemical and component supply networks. This shows that the early Rossa Cells did not carry out any ‘deep research’ and were not predisposed to carry out an extended bombing campaign in Great Britain suggesting, this campaign might have been a dry run to gain experience and test British reactions for future campaigns. This statement should only be considered in light of improvements made during 1882 leading into the second bombing campaign in which, support systems...
were developed on the British mainland, the cells became more sophisticated and targets came to be more high-profile.

During 1882, a decision was made within the Dynamite Party to adopt dynamite as the preferred explosive for Rossa’s advanced cells. This prompted the establishment of explosive training schools in America and the forming of bomb-making support networks on the British mainland prior to beginning the second bombing campaign. Subsequently, from this point onwards, dynamite became the favoured explosive of cells particularly because of its storage, transportation, and operational qualities. While it was dangerous to manufacture, once produced, it was generally safe to store and transport as long as temperature and confinement conditions were met such as transporting dynamite in wooden boxes, leather bags or in a frozen state. Operationally, dynamite was ideal for blowing up structures due to the near instantaneous nature of the explosion in which a much larger force was generated compared to an equivalent amount of gunpowder.

As such, during 1882 the Dynamite Party went about putting into place systemised modes of explosives training, secret communication networks, and supply networks to support a durable bombing campaign in 1883. In addition, the advanced cells tapped into existing I.R.B. circles and their support networks as had been done during 1881. A school for teaching the manufacture of explosives and explosive devices was set up in New York sometime in 1882. There were two locations for the school to divert attention away from a single location. One was located at No 15 Chambers Street, New York where lectures took place and another at 1 Bushwick Avenue, South Brooklyn where explosive compounds and devices were made. At the first location, O’Donovan Rossa’s office was located on the second floor, above the floor used for lectures. The school moved to a new undisclosed location on 5 July 1882 after its former location was publicised in the *London Times*.

Upon entering the school, Clan members were required to take an oath. The oath in part specified, they will return to the place whence they came and work as ordered by a chief who shall be personally unknown to them and every strategy is resorted to keep them from making acquaintances in this country or from becoming known to anyone while here except those introduced by the men taking charge of the school.

As described by Rossa, men from Ireland, England and Scotland were trained. By around June 1882, the school claimed to have twenty-six current students. Ultimately, the skills learnt by the trainees in both the manufacture and deployment of dynamite generally added to the operational efficiency,
effectiveness, and safety of cells while preparing and using explosive devices in Great Britain. In particular, students were taught how to make explosives out of small pocket flasks, how to manufacture clockwork timers and how to utilise acids to create timers\textsuperscript{18}. However, before these skill sets could be utilised on the British mainland, safe, secure communication procedures had to be put in place in order to support, and supply manufacturing networks for dynamite operations.

Systemised modes of secret and secure communications were introduced in the latter half of 1882. The I.R.B. in a letter dated 27 September 1882 from a Liverpool I.R.B. Circle talks exactly to this point. It describes the advantages of implementing standardised communication practices including coding letters, using aliases and delivering them to a common private address for pick up\textsuperscript{19}. The advantage of such a system was that it ensured the secure delivery of important information by reducing carelessness when information was passed between agents\textsuperscript{20}. The Clan followed these same principles of secrecy by utilising aliases when operating in England, and using coded letters when passing information back and forth between agents in England, and leadership in America. Couriers who worked as crew on steamships that crossed the Atlantic sometimes carried out the latter communications.

A system of communications was also set up in Great Britain between the cell leader and cell members. For example, the Gallagher Cell employed the American Exchange in London as a letter drop for cell members arriving in the country. However, communications between cell members located in different cities such as Gallagher in London and Whitehead in Birmingham used open forms of communication including, the telegraph or regular mail, which were unsecure and vulnerable to interception by the authorities. Having secret and secure communication protocols were crucial factors in promoting robust supporting logistics networks used to supply explosive materials to cells.

Systemised modes of dynamite manufacture and distribution were initially set up during 1882 as dynamite became increasingly more difficult to acquire following Rossa’s bombing campaign in 1881. To meet the subsequent demand for pre-built explosive devices, the United States had turned the manufacture of explosive devices into something of a small cottage industry. For example, around October 1881 shipyard workers in Boston had come up with a couple of new designs. The first involved grounding down coal to fit glass or tin tubes containing a fluid, which when exposed to the furnaces of a British steamer, would explode\textsuperscript{21}. The idea was that these pieces of exploding coal would be placed in the bunker of a steamer so after several days on the open ocean they would be used, causing a catastrophic explosion\textsuperscript{22}. Another form of explosive device being developed involved filling a tube with
potassium or some other explosive substance, and then tapering it off with a wick. The tube would then be placed in a ‘case’ of petroleum (crude oil), which would soak the wick eventually reaching the potassium causing an explosion and fire²³.

One of the advantages of manufacturing explosive devices in America was that they could be made relatively cheaply. According to a newspaper report dated 3 August 1881, Peoria, Illinois was a centre for the manufacture of explosive devices²⁴. Many of the pre-made devices deployed by the cells would have come from this area. They were transported to England on steamships such as the Steamship Adriatic of the White Star Line, in which couriers serving as crew delivered ‘packages’ to Rossa’s agents²⁵. In one well documented case around the beginning of July 1881, Customs Officials discovered ten explosive devices hidden on the ships Malta and Bavarian²⁶.

Rossa had initially looked at contracting out the construction of one hundred explosive devices during April 1881, paying one hundred dollars per machine. Agents in Great Britain were waiting on the machines to carry out ‘work’, one job of which, was to blow up parts of the British Underground Railway system²⁷. On 25 April, Rossa’s Dynamite Party ordered ten explosive devices, which were to be delivered to England hidden in cargo²⁸. It appears following a tip, Customs officials and Liverpool Detectives between 1 and 2 July 1881 intercepted these same devices²⁹. First, six infernal machines containing lignin dynamite were discovered on the ship Malta upon arrival in Liverpool from New York, hidden in barrels filled with sawdust in place of cement³⁰. Second, on 2 July four more explosive devices were found on the ship Bavarian upon arrival in Liverpool³¹. The Annual Explosives Report for 1881 stated that each of the machines would have cost no more than seventeen shillings to make, which would have been relatively cheap for this period³².

In addition to smuggling explosive’s materials into Great Britain from America, bomb components including dynamite and detonators, were also brought into the country from Canada, Ireland and the continent. Methods ranged from, using couriers hiding infernal machines in shipping cargo to, landing explosive materials at different points along the Irish coast³³. For example, a Rossa courier, Patrick Sweeney, transported dynamite in one-pound packages from Canada to England³⁴. Another courier named Dennis Sullivan was believed to have been one of Rossa’s most prolific couriers carrying dynamite and other bomb components into Great Britain from America multiple times³⁵. Weapons and ammunition were not generally smuggled into Britain from America because they could be purchased cheaply in Europe³⁶.
In contrast to the above smuggling operations, Rossa’s Dynamite Party set up dynamite factories in both England and Ireland. The reasoning behind using local factories was to address the risk associated with smuggling dynamite and bomb components into Great Britain from other countries. The first factory was in Cork, Ireland and was used to support bombings carried out during the second bombing campaign. Rossa’s Liverpool Cell created a supply chain starting with, buying chemicals in Glasgow, smuggling them into Cork, Ireland where they would be turned into lignin dynamite and then smuggled back into England via Liverpool. The support cell then ensured these explosive materials were distributed to operational cells, which would use them to construct bombs and carry out attacks. The Cork dynamite factory was used to support several attacks in London and Glasgow during the second bombing campaign such as, the attempted bombing of the Possil Bridge in Glasgow, on 21 January 1883.

A second local manufacturing operation to produce nitroglycerin was established in Birmingham, England during February 1883. This nitroglycerin factory was set up initially to support the Gallagher Cell. A chemical supply chain was not required in this case as the factory cell acquired the needed chemicals in modest quantities from local commercial chemists on a regular basis. The Birmingham factory while only in full production mode for two months produced 270 pounds of nitroglycerin before being shut down by the authorities on 5 April 1883.

Overall, the advanced Rossa Cells of 1883 and 1884 had significantly matured in comparison to the Rossa Cells of 1881. By establishing systemised support networks during 1882, the foundation for a durable and long-term bombing campaign was put in place. The advanced Rossa Cells were four to five man cells, split between support and operational functions, with cells coordinated by cell handlers. The support cells were put together first, followed by the gradual formation of operational cells over several months. Additionally, the cells utilised a cell handler who was linked to both the Liverpool Cell and London Gallagher Cell in some form of coordinating capacity. Cell handlers were an invaluable addition to cell operations affording an intermediate linkage between leadership in America and terror cells on the ground. They to some degree improved the control and coordination of operations, which had been minimal during the first bombing campaign.

Agents in the advanced Rossa Cells had specialised roles. For example, William Joseph Lynch, a member of the Gallagher Cell, was the cell’s courier whose only contact was with Dr Thomas Gallagher, the cell leader, and Albert George Whitehead the cell’s explosives manufacturer. Joseph Curtin and William Ansburgh were designated bombers who interacted with Gallagher but had very little contact with the
remainder of the cell. Specialisations compartmentalised certain roles, which in turn increased operational security and the level of expertise of individual cell members making them less likely to incur mistakes. Moreover, the production of nitroglycerin was extremely dangerous, so required a role that had to be specialised in order to produce an effective product.

Some of the men in the advanced Rossa Cells had been specially trained in how to manufacture and handle dynamite, and put together rudimentary explosive devices. The training these men received in America gave them the necessary expertise to purchase chemicals required to support local factory cells. However, the systemised process to complete these activities was quite different between the Liverpool-Glasgow cells and the Birmingham-London cells.

Cell members in the Liverpool-Glasgow cells were utilised to purchase chemicals locally, smuggle them into Cork, Ireland and then return with bomb components that could be easily assembled prior to an operation. In contrast, the process of developing dynamite for the Gallagher Cell was highly compartmentalised with chemical purchases and manufacturing all carried out by a factory cell in Birmingham. Once nitroglycerin had been manufactured, certain members of the London Cell acting as couriers secretly transported the nitroglycerin from Birmingham to London. The Liverpool-Glasgow cells in comparison, utilised operatives distributed over a larger geographical area with a greater number of interactions occurring outside the cell, indicating a reduced level of operational security.

As cells became more coordinated and better supplied, targeting and operational tempo was in turn escalated. Target selection during the second bombing campaign incorporated planning consecutive attacks during a single operation against mostly high-profile targets. Intensive attacks of this nature caused a heightened reaction in the operational landscape from both the authorities and the public signifying the increasing sophistication of the advanced Rossa Cells. The three consecutive bombings in Glasgow on the evening of 20 January and the early morning of 21 January 1882 followed by double attacks in London on 15 March 1882 were the first coordinated bombings of this kind during the bombing campaign period.

Preparing for coordinated attacks required planning ahead of time to assess each target including proximity to one another, bomb placement, any civilian and police presence as well as identifying escape routes. Preliminary scouting helped determine the configuration of the device's fuse and
whether the cell had to be split into several sub-units to carry out the operation. For example, the three targets in the Glasgow bombings were each within one hour’s walking distance. The interval between each explosion of approximately two hours suggests that a single sub-unit of the Glasgow Cell could have carried out all three bombings.

Following the dismantling of the last of the Rossa Cells by the authorities during April 1883, some of the support systems such as local dynamite factories, were discontinued during the third bombing campaign. Instead, dynamite distribution networks originating from America were tapped to smuggle mostly Atlas Powder A into England. This effectively eliminated the need for purchasing chemicals locally and the special couriering of bomb components between cities in the United Kingdom. Consequently, contact with the I.R.B. was minimised unless the operation required additional manpower to supplement a cell. These factors played into the operational strategy of the Burton Cell whose survivability was premised on returning to America following each series of bombings.

The Sullivan cells between 1883 and 1885 were a diverse mix that reaped both enormous successes and monumental failures. At one extreme, the Burton Cell operated for more than a year, arguably being responsible for fourteen of the sixteen plots during the third bombing campaign. At the other extreme, the Lomasney Cell vaporized itself during its first operation to blow-up London Bridge. The cells during this period were two to three man cells made up of primarily Irish Americans, who were sometimes supplemented by up to two more cell members on an as needed basis.

Oversight of cells during the third bombing campaign was undertaken by a combination of leading officers of the Clan, based in America, and agents in France. For example, the Daly Cell was in regular communication with J.J. Breslin in America who along with John Devoy managed the National Fund. On the other hand, Captain W.M. Lomasney was already a leading officer of the Clan and a member of the Revolutionary Directory, so most likely there was very little oversight of his cell during the ill-fated London Bridge operation. In contrast to the Daly and Lomasney cells, Clan officers in America managed oversight of the Burton Cell. However, some degree of operational instruction was still received from a Clan agent living in France.

After each series of attacks, the Burton Cell disbanded and its key members returned to America. This cell strategy let the Clan plan and control within the confines of a safe haven, the timing of future attack series in advance of the cell returning to the British mainland. Assuming the Burton Cell carried out a
series of attacks during October 1883 then the remaining series, which ensued during February and May 1884, and January 1885, implies they had been coordinated to align with seasonal conditions. The seasons most likely did play into operational planning, as attacks during the autumn, winter and early months of spring would have taken advantage of the inclement weather and shorter days. Bombings by the Sullivan cells took place day and night whereas those of the earlier Rossa Cells occurred at night. Moreover, the cells of the third bombing campaign undertook near-simultaneous attacks against higher-profile and more complex targets.

The complexity of attempting to bomb a high-profile target such as London Bridge was reinforced by the destruction of the Lomasney Cell during the course of this operation. The placement of the explosive device was extremely important to carry off this attack. With the gully holes covered up by the authorities, the bomb had to be attached to the bridge through some other means. This was done from an unstable rowboat, at night, during an ebb tide, which resulted in the device detonating prematurely. However, this individual bombing during the third bombing campaign was the exception with most attacks being carried out near simultaneously against a series of targets.

During the third bombing campaign the Burton Cell used near-simultaneous bombings exclusively. The advancement of bomb timer technologies had made a significant influence on the cell’s ability to carry out these complex operations. Each operation required extensive planning based on a target’s level of difficulty such as access and police presence, their proximity to one another, the timing of the explosions and the capability of cell members to function independently. For example, the bombing of London’s Victoria Station and the failed attempts at three other railway stations on 26 February 1884 were intended as simultaneous attacks with all four devices set to go off at midnight. The number of targets and the size of each explosive device required the Burton Cell to utilise up to three more cell members to help deliver the bombs to their targets. As such, whoever delivered each device would have had to start the timer from a secondary location, transport by cab the portmanteau containing the device to the railway station and deposit it in the cloak room without raising suspicion.

In contrast to the London railway station attacks, the series of bombings on 30 May 1884 at Scotland Yard, the Junior Carlton Club and the residence of the politician Sir Watkins William Wynn, were intended to be near-simultaneous efforts with the bombs going off at 9:15 pm and around 9:20pm respectively. The pattern of bomb use in this case was completely different. This conspiracy was quite complex as a timed bomb was planted in the Scotland Yard building, requiring an agent to
surreptitiously enter the building, set it and then continue on a fifteen minute walk to St James Square to toss percussion or lit fuse devices at the final two targets. The timing of the explosions suggests at least a fifteen to twenty minute timer on the New Scotland Yard device giving the cell members time to get to St James Square and throw their bombs five minutes after the Scotland Yard explosion.

The final series of bombings on 2 January 1885 against the Tower of London, Westminster Hall, and the House of Commons demonstrates the organisational flexibility of the Burton Cell. This operation required the cell to be split up, with other cell members brought in to provide additional manpower in order to create the effect of near-simultaneous attacks. Cunningham carried out the Tower of London bombing solo after extensive scouting with Burton. Burton was most likely associated to the Westminster Hall explosion and supplementary members of the cell were probably used for the bombing at the House of Commons.

There is no doubt the Burton Cell operated under a well-orchestrated strategy that created the conditions for its long-term survival. The cell was small and tight, and therefore conducive to being highly compartmentalised. Moreover, it limited interactions with persons and organisations outside the cell. While there was some operational security risk in potentially supplementing the cell with members of the I.R.B, these temporary agents would have reduced Burton and Cunningham’s own exposure to potential witnesses during operations. For example, if Burton and Cunningham had been seen at all four railway stations during the 26 February bombings, police could have identified them much sooner. Additionally, the cell effectively disbanded after each string of bombings with Burton and Cunningham returning to America to safely plan new operations, so were not in London long enough to be tracked down by police. The success of this strategy creating what can be termed a ‘super cell’, may have had some influence in attempts to resurrect the bombing campaigns during 1887 and 1896, both of which utilised support systems on the continent.

During 1887, Sullivan went about attempting to revive the bombing campaign strategy. The main cell was located in London while Clan Headquarters for this new campaign was located in France. A first bombing attempt was planned during the Queen’s Golden Jubilee but failed after a British agent compromised the Clan leadership in America. A second and latter attempt against the House of Commons suffered an unexpected misfortune when a lead agent died of natural causes leading to the arrest of the cell. Similar to the third bombing campaign, dynamite was smuggled into England from America rather than being manufactured locally, and the concept of engaging cell handlers, also used
during earlier campaigns, had been taken a step further with both operational and targeting direction
received directly from France.

The close proximity of Clan Headquarters to England improved command and control functions. This
allowed decisions such as the designation of new targets, to be communicated faster and with greater
secrecy to agents on the ground. Secrecy was tightened during the second bombing attempt against the
House of Commons after eliminating contact with Clan leadership in America from targeting and other
operational decisions, creating a compartmentalised Command and Control structure. This distributed
leadership model was further developed during 1896 by the Lyman wing of the Clan na Gael during the
attempted fifth and final bombing campaign.

During 1896, William Lyman recruited four Irish Americans to form a support cell on the continent led by
P.J. Tynan, the former leader of the Irish National Invincibles. This support cell was based in Antwerp for
the purpose of manufacturing nitroglycerin, recruiting cell members and formulating bombings on the
British mainland. However, this attempt to start a new bombing campaign failed relatively quickly as the
British authorities had infiltrated the Clan na Gael in America to the highest levels. In effect, the British
knew about most activities going on in this cell after they had identified all the cell members and put
around the clock surveillance on them.

The speed, at which the Lyman Cell was broken up, highlights differences in police strategies between
1887 and 1896. The 1887 Melville-Cohen Cell was openly deterred from its first attempt, compromising
the police’s ability to arrest the remainder of the cell sooner. In contrast, the Tynan Cell was taken apart
immediately. However, the benefits of using the continent to base support activities quickly became
apparent during attempts to prosecute the terrorists. Two major difficulties emerged.

First, British investigations on the continent were restrictive in the sense that detectives were bound by
local laws and international treaties complicating arrests and possible extraditions. Second, the
complexity of trying to prosecute a member of the Tynan Cell who had been captured in Scotland was
shown to be extremely high, particularly in retrieving evidence and extraditing the other terrorists from
the Netherlands and Belgium. Additionally, obtaining evidence from the arrested cell members in the
Netherlands and from a house in Belgium where nitroglycerin production had taken place was
problematic, as both countries needed the evidence to carry out their own prosecutions. These
complications revealed that establishing a support cell in Antwerp had effectively created a base within
a sanctuary from which to launch terror operations. If the Clan had not been so extensively infiltrated by British agents this campaign might have succeeded along the same lines as the third bombing campaign.

The lifecycles of the various Rossa and Clan cells between 1881 and 1896 indicates a form of evolutionary change did occur across time and place during the bombing campaigns. Rossa, during the first bombing campaign, recruited and sent Irish Americans to England to set up novice terrorist cells, representing a first generation of cells on the British mainland that were uncoordinated and focused mainly on lower priority targets.

This was followed during the second bombing campaign by a new generation of better coordinated and more advanced cells underpinned by support networks and cells. These cells pursued higher-profile targets and utilised local cell handlers to sustain a long-term campaign. However, the limited success of the Rossa Cells and conditions within the operational landscape led to the Clan initiating a third bombing campaign between 1883 and 1885 using several different cell strategies.

The most successful of the cell strategies resulted in the Burton Cell surviving for over a year by utilising to some degree, a France-based cell handler to assist in carrying out well coordinated attacks against high-profile targets in London. Targeting during this period was steadily escalated introducing more complexity including, the targeting of politicians.

This was followed in 1887, by taking the concept of the cell handler and developing it into a Clan Headquarters located on the continent during an attempted fourth bombing campaign. This concept was further refined nine years later into a headquarters and dynamite support cell located on the continent during a short-lived attempt to begin a fifth and final bombing campaign on the British mainland. Even though British authorities quickly dismantled this cell, it nevertheless represented what would have been a new generation of terrorist cells, which were to be coordinated and supplied directly from the sovereign confines of European countries.

Overall, the development of these terrorist cells from novice, to advanced, to expert, to a potentially new generation of cells, points to a campaign derived flow of evolutionary change over time and place. Now that it has been determined these cells have potential for evolutionary change from one bombing
campaign to the next, the above adaptive characteristics will be used to identify evolutionary variations, which were earlier termed, the fuel of evolution.

Three types of evolutionary markers will be explored in order to unearth evolutionary variations over time and place. The first evolutionary marker will be based on changes in the complexity of cells in order to better understand the diversity of cells that existed from one bombing campaign to the next. The second evolutionary marker will review changes in the field dispositions of cells primarily to understand how it affected the robustness of cells. Finally, the presentation of operational events will be examined to determine how productive these cells actually were. However, before attempting to identify evolutionary variations, the origins of cell formation will be studied to provide a starting point for analysis. The starting point in this case represents the inception of the cell and in the context of identifying evolutionary variations, how its origins might have influenced later generations of cells.

An important question that needs to be answered in this analysis is how O’Donovan Rossa prior to the January 1881 Salford Barracks bombing came up with the concept of cells. Rossa’s solution in using terror cells during the first bombing campaign was copied in subsequent campaigns, so understanding his motivations are crucial in considering how cell formations begun.

An examination of both local and foreign influences leading up to the Salford Barracks bombing points to three factors that affected Rossa’s decision to use the cell as an instrument of terror. First, Rossa’s imprisonment with brutal treatment by wardens at Chatham Prison, England following a life sentence for treason and conspiracy in 1865, and subsequent pardon in 1870 severely changed him. Murphy describes Rossa’s prison life as ‘dominated by defiance and punishment’. Rossa stated in his record of prison life that it ‘changes a man, and the treatment I received changed me into doing many things I thought myself incapable of when in the world.’ He had been pardoned based on an agreement he not re-enter the United Kingdom for twenty years. As such, Rossa travelled to New York where he stated, ‘we would be able to unite the factions and do everything we liked for the men at home.’ However, upon arriving in New York he found himself disgusted by Irish politics that on the one hand, preached saving Ireland but on the other hand did nothing to support the revolutionaries, not even sending money, arms or ammunition.
There is no doubt that Rossa’s life up to 1881 left him with a need to actively participate in the fight for Irish freedom. His participation in the Clan na Gael was highly contentious as he believed resources were being misused in supporting land agitation and funding unrealistic projects to sink British warships. In his frustration, Rossa formed the Dynamite Party, leading two bombing campaigns from America between 1881 and 1883. While this explanation puts into perspective his motivations for violently engaging the British on their mainland, the actual concept for cells most likely came from a confluence of both local and foreign operational landscapes at the time.

First, the Irish revolutionary organisations at the time such as the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (est. 1858) and the Clan na Gael (est. 1869) were secret organisations. These groups used Masonic type rituals and organisational structures that included sub-group structures of camps and circles. Sub-groups along with established rituals, used to maintain secrecy, in many ways imitated compartmentalised cells, so to transition from a circle to a terror cell was not necessarily a great leap forward.

Second, terrorism had been spreading across Europe since the mid-nineteenth century in which it was now considered a legitimate tactic by many secret revolutionary organisations. For example, from 1875 onwards political terrorism in Russia by groups such as the People’s Will (est. 1879), had increased against police and government officials who worked for a dictatorial monarchy. In fact, terrorism had become so bad in Russia during the mid-1870s that a Supreme Executive Commission had been established to fight it. Moreover, publications such as Sergey Nechayev’s *Catechism of the Revolutionary* were made public, providing in no uncertain terms a blueprint for a political terrorist organisation including, the networking of sections, which could be otherwise thought of as cells. Whether the Russian catechism influenced Rossa or any of his associates is unknown but the success of the early cells suggests they had enough of a grasp of cell concepts to operate on the British mainland.

The first of Rossa’s bombing campaigns, made up of generally small novice cells was arguably a dry run for Rossa’s campaign strategy. The sixty percent success rate of these first cells was encouraging enough to result in the cell concept becoming the adopted organisational norm during subsequent bombing campaigns. However, the forming of support cells during Rossa’s second bombing campaign between 1882 and 1883 was a direct result of the changing operational landscape following the first bombing campaign. That is, the difficulty in purchasing dynamite in Great Britain and the increased monitoring of ports of entry into the United Kingdom warranted the formation of factory and support cells in both
Ireland and Great Britain to manufacture nitroglycerin. Ultimately, deciding to use cells as an instrument of terror in many ways seems like a natural choice for Rossa, based on the surrounding influences of the local and global landscape at the time. However, these cells once established did not just suddenly start wreaking havoc on the British mainland. Rather, to be truly successful they had to evolve to a point where the cell would be able to operate and survive against opposing forces in the operational landscape.

The terror cells of the bombing campaign era became increasingly more complex over time. This was because of maturing bomb making technologies, the specialisation of cell members and cell strategy being adjusted to increase the survivability of cells. The adoption of dynamite instead of gunpowder originated from Rossa’s first bombing campaign during which, gunpowder had predominated. However, gunpowder had lacked the intense explosive characteristics needed to extensively damage the structures targeted. By Rossa adopting dynamite during the second bombing campaign, complexity within the cells increased first, in the construction of bombs and second, through the introduction of systems to support the manufacture and transportation of nitroglycerin and other explosive materials.

The nature of putting a bomb together composed of dynamite was much more complex and varied then one made of gunpowder. While gunpowder could be easily purchased, high quality dynamite was difficult to obtain in Great Britain during the campaign period. This required it to be either, manufactured locally or smuggled into Great Britain from other countries such as America.

Rossa’s cells tried to make dynamite locally during 1883 but this approach was fraught with added complexity that contributed to the un-necessary exposure of cell members to external actors. When making dynamite, nitroglycerin had to first be manufactured, requiring chemicals to be purchased locally. In the case of the Birmingham nitroglycerin factory, manufacturing chemists were engaged to supply and deliver chemicals to the cell’s front company where the factory operation took place. In contrast, the factory in Cork, Ireland had cell members in support roles purchase chemicals in Glasgow, which were then smuggled into Ireland where lignin dynamite was manufactured, and then passed illegally back into Great Britain. In both of the above cases, the benefits did not necessarily outweigh the costs, as both exposure to chemical suppliers and the smuggling of materials betrayed cell members to external actors, which consequently compromised the cell’s operational security.
The high-level of complexity directly associated to the support systems in the second bombing campaign was reduced during the third and attempted fourth bombing campaign. During the third bombing campaign, dynamite was smuggled into the country from America prior to each series of attacks or was sourced from previously stockpiled American-made Atlas Powder A. While a local manufacturing operation was again set up during 1896, it was located in Belgium, which provided many of the same advantages as smuggling dynamite into England from America. Moreover, the European mainland was much closer providing ready access to Great Britain through England’s east coast ports.

Putting together a bomb with a dynamite charge required one or more detonators, a timer and housing, all contributing to the increasing complexity of the bomb making process. While commercial fulminate of mercury detonators remained unchanged during the second and third bombing campaigns, bomb timers in comparison became more advanced over time ultimately benefiting the operability of cells.

Bomb timers during the Rossa period were primarily fuse and acid based. They generally limited the length of time prior to a bomb exploding to twenty or thirty minutes. Near the end of the second bombing campaign, percussion timer technology while understood was not used for bombings until the third bombing campaign. Percussion devices were highly complex and dangerous mechanisms that necessitated both knowledge and fortitude to use. They required the agent to arm the bomb while on the move, this in itself creating an unstable device, which had to then be quickly thrown to avoid a premature detonation. Around the same time, clock timers that were capable of delaying the detonation of a bomb for several hours were introduced. These timers had been integrated into the detonation mechanism of the bomb, the design of which could vary by operation. Subsequently, as bomb-making technologies became more complicated, cell members had to become more knowledgeable in order to safely put together and properly utilise these devices. This required specialising, that in some cases required learning specific bomb making skills.

The early cells of the first bombing campaign were multi-functional or as described earlier, vertical cells. That is, they purchased bomb-making materials locally, built the bombs, scouted the target, planned the attack, and then carried it out. However, during the second bombing campaign, support systems were introduced, which required cell members to develop specialised skills.
Cell members during the second bombing campaign were divided between support and operational roles. Support specialties included, a chemist type role for manufacturing nitroglycerin for which specialised training was required and a courier role for both international and local deliveries. In addition, there was an operational specialist type role for purchasing and storing supporting materials such as bomb making chemicals and housings for explosive devices. Operational work subsequently became more focused on scouting the target, planning the operation, constructing the bomb, which again required some specialised training, and then executing the operation. During the third bombing campaign, support activities related to local nitroglycerin manufacture were dropped entirely, removing the need for specialties associated to manufacturing nitroglycerin and purchasing chemicals locally.

Supporting the local manufacture of nitroglycerin inevitably increased the size of a cell. During the second bombing campaign, the size of a Rossa Cell on average was five to eight members, which included support cell members. In contrast, during the first and third bombing campaigns the multi-functional nature of cell members are reflected in the smaller cell sizes, which on average were two to three members per cell. As the introduction of dynamite and the on-going advances in bomb making influenced the make-up and size of cells, each cell’s strategy was additionally impacted, as objectives were re-orientated to take advantage of technical changes in the operational landscape.

During the first bombing campaign there was little in the way of cell strategy as this campaign was a dry run of sorts for the novice Rossa cells. Primarily, the cells managed all their activities in a ‘vertical’ manner to ensure compartmentalisation was preserved. During the second bombing campaign, cell strategy matured and subsequently increased in complexity as it realigned to the new supporting structures for communications, the manufacturing of nitroglycerin and smuggling of bomb components. Cell strategy during this period focused on gradually building out support systems, support cells, and finally advanced operational cells. During the third bombing campaign, cell strategy was re-orientated to focus on survivability in response to the rapid dismantling of the Rossa Cells. This was achieved by dropping certain elements of the support strategy including, the purchase of chemicals and the manufacture of nitroglycerin locally. This allowed the cell to focus mostly on the operational aspects of bombings.

Figure’s 5.1 through 5.4 show linkage diagrams for each of the bombing campaigns. These diagrams show events and associations linked to each cell. It should be noted that the dotted lines in the figures represent unconfirmed associations. From these diagrams it can be seen that a gradual increase in
associations is indicative of growing complexity between bombing campaigns and accordingly, greater cell diversity overall. They progressively show the smaller sized novice Rossa cells in Figure 5.1, with very few associations between actors being superseded by the larger and more complex support, and advanced cells in Figure 5.2. Actor associations in Figure 5.3 show a significant decline during the third bombing campaign indicating the exclusion of support cells, which contributed to the cells’ smaller size. One observation that can be made from this analysis is that as a cell’s complexity increased, the cell correspondingly grew in size, whereas as complexity lessened, it became smaller.

The operational disposition of terror cells across the various campaigns was primarily influenced by the introduction of dynamite, changes in cell strategy, and the gradual de-centralisation of control by Clan leadership in America. Some of these same changes have already been highlighted in terms of complexity.

With the complete adoption of dynamite from the second campaign period on, the concept of support versus operational cells was born. To connect these new structures necessitated implementing systemised courier networks to transport bomb-making materials between them. The support cells were located locally in Great Britain and in other countries such as Ireland. However, during the third and attempted fourth and fifth bombing campaigns, place became more relevant as cell handlers, headquarter cells and support cells were positioned in ‘sanctuary’ countries such as France or Belgium. Ultimately, these geographical dispositions played into cell strategy.

Cell strategy in the context of operational disposition reflects how cells gradually gravitated to London over time and during the same period went from static to dynamic configurations. During the first bombing campaign, Rossa concentrated his cells in the Liverpool and London urban areas while during the second bombing campaign he focused on the urban areas of Glasgow and London. Liverpool and Glasgow were most likely selected by Rossa to take advantage of support from local I.R.B. circles and because the targets in these cities were not as well protected as London’s. During the third dynamite
Figure 5.1: Link Diagram of novice cells from Rossa’s first bombing campaign.
Figure 5.2: Link Diagram of support and advanced cells from Rossa’s second bombing campaign.
Figure 5.3: Link Diagram of Sullivan Cells from the third and attempted fourth bombing campaigns.
Figure 5.4: Link Diagram of Lyman Support Cell from attempted fifth bombing campaign.
campaign, Sullivan focused purely on London’s high-profile targets, which even though, well protected, were located within an urban environment that was ideally suited for terrorism operations.

Subsequently, the variance in locales was a risk versus benefits type decision made between each cell’s geographical disposition that is, the city it was located in and the high-profile structures it was targeting, which could influence cell strategy. In this sense, as the benefits increased, the risk went up. As such, a cell’s disposition was often forced to change in response to operational needs.

Cells went from organisationally static to flexible configurations between 1881 and 1896. During the first bombing campaign, cells were organisationally static meaning; they did not intentionally split up during operations, as these were fairly simplistic and uncoordinated affairs. This changed during the second bombing campaign where cells were becoming somewhat more flexible due in part to their support and operational duties sometimes overlapping. During the third bombing campaign, the Burton Cell embraced organisational flexibility in order to enact its cell strategy. That is, it was regularly split up to carry out near-simultaneous bombings after which, the cell dispersed until reformed prior to the next series of attacks. A further form of organisational flexibility occurred during the attempted fifth bombing campaign after the Lyman Cell was formed on the continent to carry out both support and headquarters’ work. That is, the command and control element of the cell was able to carry out recruiting activities in addition to planning and coordinating operations. Overall, the organisational flexibility of a cell was an important capability that based on operational needs allowed it to execute more sophisticated attacks. This same flexibility was also inherent in the decentralising of Command, Control, and Communication structures under which cells operated.

During the first bombing campaign, cells were completely controlled by Rossa and his Dynamite Party committee from America. However, this changed during the subsequent bombing campaigns as cell handlers were introduced locally to orchestrate operations and coordinate efforts. During the second bombing campaign, Timothy Featherston and Henry Dalton acted as cell handlers on the British mainland, providing limited Command, Control and Communication’s oversight on behalf of Rossa for several cells at a time. This included support, scouting, and coordination activities. Cell handlers circumvented the slow process of communications between leaders in America and cell leaders in England, in which letters could take anywhere from four to five weeks to be delivered.
During the third bombing campaign while some oversight still emanated from America, a Clan agent in France was responsible for additional planning in support of the Burton Cell. Cell handlers at this time did not handle multiple cells as occurred during the second bombing campaign. That is, each terrorist cell had a one to one relationship with either, a cell handler in America or on the continent, contributing to a higher degree of compartmentalisation.

Command, Control, and Communication responsibilities were further decentralised during the attempted fourth bombing campaign where a headquarters’ cell was set up in France. This was built upon on during the attempted fifth bombing campaign where the complete planning, targeting, and coordination package was to be undertaken from Belgium. Utilising cell handlers locally and headquarter cells on the continent, in effect decentralised Command, Control and Communication responsibilities from handlers in America, creating more robust cells on the British mainland.

By examining Figures 5.1 through 5.4, one can see how cell dispositions changed over time through the various bombing campaigns. While cell disposition is static in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 shows new local support cells, local cell handlers and the geographical distribution of cells between Glasgow and London. Figure 5.3 on the other hand does not show any local support cells but instead shows, cell handlers and their unique relationships with individual cells as well as the concentration of cells in London. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the geographical distribution of a support and headquarters’ cell on the continent.

Ultimately, through changes in the geographical and operational disposition of cells, organisational flexibility and decentralisation of Command, Control and Communication responsibilities, the robustness of cells was increased. As such, in accordance with these changes and the increasing complexity of cells, the presentation of operations became increasingly more sophisticated.

The presentation of bombing operations during the three active campaign periods became more advanced as attacks escalated. While targets during the first two bombing campaigns were mostly low profile, this changed dramatically during the third campaign period where all targets became high profile. As bomb making technologies improved, the targeting of high profile targets became more feasible resulting in an increasing attack frequency and an escalation in the complexity of operations such as the London Bridge bombing. The actual expertise of the bombers also improved over time as the early operatives often incorrectly placed their devices causing little damage but by the third bombing campaign, they were placing their bombs inside structures for maximum effect. As targeting escalated
and the cells became more adept at deploying explosive devices, the frequency of attacks accordingly went up because of the improved coordination of cell members during operations.

Coordination during operations grew from single bombings to consecutive bombings during the same operation, to near-simultaneous bombings grouped together as a series of attacks. As the frequency of bombings increased and began occurring near simultaneously, percussion or fuse thrown devices began to be used in coordination with timed devices. This strategy maximised the effectiveness of the small cell by more efficiently coordinating cell members during operations. That is, by selecting targets proximate to one another and then planning an attack profile with different device types, it created the impression of simultaneous bombings. One improvement resulting from advances in the coordination of operations was that the cell should have gotten better over time, especially as operations became more complex and frequent.

Success rates of attacks through the three active bombing campaigns do not show a consistent pattern of improvement. The ability of a cell to successfully detonate an infernal machine during the first bombing campaign indicated a seventy-five-percent success rate, followed by a fifty-percent success rate during the second bombing campaign, and finally a seventy-percent success rate during the third bombing campaign. The reasons for such an unusual pattern of success can be rationalized as follows.

During the first bombing campaign, the bombings had taken the police by surprise by targeting weakly protected low-profile buildings. During the second bombing campaign, the main attack failure occurred attempting to bomb high-profile targets in London where police had ramped up protection following earlier plots. Attacking targets in London required highly compartmentalised cells in order to blend in and operate amongst an on edge public and a police force that was on high alert. During the third bombing campaign and with an intensive police presence in London, both pre and post operational planning for the Burton Cell was critical in bypassing building security and the inevitable police investigations. Most importantly though, post operational planning had become an integral part of cell survivability turning the Burton Cell into an extremely productive and robust ‘super cell’. What this pattern implies is that the outcome of an attack was not just determined by a cell’s capabilities but also by how well its strategy adapted to actors and disturbances in the operational landscape during and after an attack.
Finally, Figures 5.1 through 5.4 shows how the presentation of operations changed over time. It is obvious that from the first to the third bombing campaign, operations had progressed from single attacks to near-simultaneous bombings, where all targeting was geographically grouped together by city and by attack series, and had escalated to high-profile targets. Additionally, the presentation of operations during the second bombing campaign was overshadowed by the extensive use of support cells. Compared to the first bombing campaign and third bombing campaign, factory cell support systems increased associations and activities that compromised operational security and delayed plots. In effect, the strategy used by a cell drove the presentation of operations and ultimately its productivity.

Up to this point, the main reasons for forming the Rossa and Clan cells have been identified and an analysis using evolutionary markers completed. These findings have uncovered five common evolutionary variations that fuelled the evolution of terrorist cells. These include advances in bomb making technologies, the development of cell and cell member specialisations, the diversity of cell strategies, the improving operational capabilities of cells and finally, the refining of the Command, Control and Communication’s structure.

The first evolutionary variation transpired from cells adapting to advances in bomb making technologies, which contributed to the diversity of cells. Transitioning from gunpowder to dynamite, from fuses to clock timers and from timed devices to percussion devices influenced other adaptive characteristics including cell specialisations, cell member specialisations, cell strategy, targeting, and the coordination of bombings. A return feedback loop from the cell also spurred innovations in bomb making technologies such as in the advancement of timers and percussion devices, to better resemble the outcome of simultaneous operations.

The second evolutionary variation came about as cells and cell members developed specialisations or divisions of labour as a requisite for handling new bomb making technologies. Vertical cells, which took on all aspects of an operation, evolved into support and operational cells resulting in these cells developing their own group characteristics specific to the cell’s overall specialisation. That is, a factory cell specialising in manufacturing nitroglycerin on the British mainland could focus purely on the complexities of that work ranging from, setting up a front company to determining its chemical needs. As cells specialised, they became more robust as the multi-functional capabilities of cell members were split into support and operational specialisations allowing expertise to develop in the purchasing and smuggling of chemicals, bomb construction, and operational use of explosive devices.
The third evolutionary variation resulted from a constantly evolving operational cell strategy that orientated the cell for long-term survivability within the operational landscape. Cell strategy evolved in stages from a trial stage, to support stage, to finally a mature stage that incorporated a more focused geographical positioning of cells and eventually, the use of foreign sanctuaries to allow a single cell to operate successfully in the local landscape for extended periods. The Burton Cell during the third bombing campaign is the end result of evolving cell strategies and as such became a ‘super cell’, which was extraordinarily robust and productive as it took advantage of limitations in police investigative techniques to bypass threats from the operational landscape.

The fourth evolutionary variation comes about from the evolving operational capabilities of the cell, as bomb-making technologies advanced and cell strategy evolved. Consequently, the cell became more proficient as targeting moved from low profile to complex high-profile targets such as London Bridge. In turn, it then became more productive as uncoordinated single bombings evolved into coordinated consecutive bombings and then to highly coordinated near-simultaneous bombings. High profile targeting created additional complexities such as a heightened police presence, which forced other operational capabilities including, advanced scouting, and detailed planning to mature making the cell more operationally robust.

The fifth and final evolutionary variation results from evolving systems of Command, Control, and Communications. Cell operations began with an extremely centralised command structure and rudimentary system of control, which in due course evolved into formally organised, and somewhat decentralised Command, Control and Communication systems utilising cell handlers and eventually headquarter cells based on the continent. A cell’s operational strategy influenced to what extent these responsibilities were subordinated to local actors to ensure cells were better coordinated and more responsive to operational tempo as a means to make them more productive.

These evolutionary variations were the fuel that fed the evolution of Rossa and Clan cells between 1881 and 1896. However, they would not have existed without disturbances emanating from the operational landscape, some of which had to be bridged, in order for the cells to remain viable. There were five significant sources in the landscape, from which disturbances arose.

The first source involved the influence of the Clan na Gael, the Dynamite Party, the I.R.B, the Land League and Home Rule movement upon terror operations in Great Britain. This included creating the
conditions for O’Donovan Rossa to form the Dynamite Party and start the first two bombing campaigns, Alexander Sullivan to start the third bombing campaign and the Clan to bring to an end, the bombing campaigns between 1885 and 1887. These organisations were responsible for the setting up of general guidelines for their associated campaign strategies, gradually decentralising American based Command, Control, and Communication functions and providing essential support activities on the British mainland. The second source was dynamite, its associated bomb making innovations and the extensive systems that were built up to support its operational use. The third influence was coercion legislation and legislation to halt the acquisition of chemicals for illegal purposes in addition to, the tightening up of enforcement surrounding the acquisition of dynamite. The final fourth and fifth sources came from the police threat including, C.I.D and I.O.E. investigations into the explosives used, with the latter employing an early form of explosives forensics.

Figure 5.5 represents the five evolutionary variations as feedback loops to show how cells evolved between 1881 and 1896. This diagram shows two crucial elements of the cell. First, it highlights important feedback loops within the cell that maintain its viability. Second, it shows the cells centre of gravity that is; the primary controlling influence of the cell, which if absent would severely inhibit its operations. The sources of the evolutionary variations are spurred by the origins of cell formation and disturbances in the operational landscape shown on the diagram’s perimeters.

Figure 5.5 begins with bomb making, which from the second bombing campaign on, utilised dynamite as the preferred explosive increasing the complexity of the cell’s operational environment. Cell strategy became crucial during the third bombing campaign as tempo and targeting were escalated, inducing increased responses from the landscape. As such, cell survivability became critical to maintaining tempo.

Cell and cell member specialisations varied extensively between bombing campaigns, which are to a certain extent represented by the size of the cells over time. Agent specialisations during the second bombing campaign evolved extensively as compared to the multi-functional agents of the first bombing campaign. However, these dynamite support specialisations increasingly exposed cells to external actors resulting in their downfall. Subsequently, during the third bombing campaign, local support systems for dynamite manufacture were discontinued as more surreptitious means were used to acquire dynamite.
Figure 5.5: Summary Feedback Diagram of evolutionary variations for terrorist cells during the bombing campaigns.
During the attempted fourth and fifth bombing campaigns, the supply of dynamite and other bomb components were shifted to the continent, which ultimately is where Command, Control, and Communications would have been based, if the cells had not been pre-emptively dismantled.

Campaign strategy next influenced Command, Control and Communications, which became increasingly decentralised from the second bombing campaign on. This occurred in the form of local cell handlers being introduced on the British mainland to oversee cell operations. However, during the third bombing campaign the three active cells on the British mainland each acted independently of the other. This occurred because of each cell’s unique cell strategy, which drove its organisation and operations, and to some extent, the decentralisation of Command, Control, and Communications, which worked to isolate cells from one another.

Eventually, as cell strategy adjusted to threats in the operational landscape and bomb making technologies improved, targeting was escalated increasing the complexity of operations as bombings began to occur near simultaneously. The evolution of these operational capabilities eventually resulted in more advanced timers being developed including, the construction of hand-thrown percussion or fuse devices to support near-simultaneous bombings.

Ultimately, this diagram shows two important feedback loops. The primary one being advances in bomb making, which ultimately influenced the organisational and operational characteristics of the cell. This resulted in changes in cell strategy, which escalated targeting and increased the tempo, and severity of bombings. As the cell became more operationally active, the decentralisation of Command, Control, and Communications made cells more autonomous in order to increase operational efficiency. Within this feedback loop is a second smaller one. This loop results from evolving bomb making technologies that enabled the cell to increasingly execute more synchronised attacks, which in turn, drove improvements in bomb timer technologies.

The final step of this analysis uses a cladogram to show the evolutionary history of the Rossa and Clan terror cells between January 1881 and September 1896. Figure 5.6 represents the evolutionary tree for the Rossa and Clan cells, with the cells grouped by the categories specified at the start of this chapter. To diagram an evolutionary history of the cell’s adaptive characteristics, innovations and forming events came together in this diagram.
Figure 5.6: Cladogram showing the Evolutionary History of Rossa and Clan terrorist cells between 1881 and 1896.
The evolutionary history in Figure 5.6 is represented by a main trunk with branches splitting off to form various types of cells. Wherever a branch occurs, the adaptive characteristics on the main trunk up to that branch are inherited whereas, the adaptive characteristics on the branch are unique characteristics necessary for that cell to survive in the operational landscape at that time and place. That is, the cell inherits those characteristics on the main trunk and adopts the new adaptive characteristics on its branch. For example, all four branches inherit from the main trunk Irish Americans recruited in America and sent to England to lead cells and carry out seasonal bombings under the cover of darkness. The novice Rossa Cell shows seven adaptive characteristics on its branch that it adopted for operational purposes in Great Britain during 1881. Some of these were adapted further during later operations such as the adoption of dynamite following the mixed use of gunpowder and dynamite during the first campaign. This same concept applies to targeting by geographical location, targeting by level of prominence, the coordination of operations and the advancement of bomb timers. Much like a family tree, this diagram groups and orders data into inherited and unique characteristics eventually ending in the Lyman Support Cell. Figure 5.6 represents the evolution of both the Rossa and Clan terrorist cells between 1881 and 1896. By examining this diagram, it is possible to see the evolutionary variations described earlier, along the main trunk. This diagram ultimately shows that these Victorian-era cells did evolve due primarily to changes in the cell’s operational landscape, particularly through the introduction of dynamite.

In summary, the criticality of bomb making technologies during the Rossa and Clan led bombing campaigns became the centre of gravity for cell operations between 1881 and 1896. As such, disrupting the supply of dynamite and its associated support systems became a key strategy of British authorities. The difficulty in obtaining dynamite on the British mainland from 1881 onwards caused cells to oscillate between extremes affecting both operational security and effectiveness during the bombing campaigns. This included, using less effective explosives, manufacturing dynamite locally, smuggling dynamite from America and finally, manufacturing and smuggling dynamite into Great Britain from the continent. However, by 1885 Irish terrorism on the British mainland came to an abrupt halt resulting in terrorist efforts being redirected back to Ireland with bombings, such as the Dublin Four Courts explosion on 8 May 189349.

As such, the supply and demand of dynamite became a significant disturbance in the evolutionary landscape for which adaptive characteristics were adopted, some of which were passed on to future
generations of cells. This explanation will be elaborated on further in Chapter 7 as the evolutionary concepts of terrorism cells are described. The next chapter will continue the examination of Victorian-era terror cells by analysing the Irish National Invincibles whose operations on the Irish mainland transpired simultaneously alongside the second and third bombing campaigns but with a different *modus-operandi*. 
Chapter 6

The Assassination Cells of the Irish National Invincibles, c. 1881 – 1883

The Irish National Invincibles (I.N.I.) was a terrorist organisation active in Dublin between December 1881 and January 1883. It emerged from a conglomeration of I.R.B. and Land League members, particularly those devoted to applying more extreme methods in disrupting the rule of Westminster. The I.N.I. was singularly devoted to removing prominent or symbolic figures from the Irish landscape. The assassinations of the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish and Under Secretary Thomas H. Burke in Phoenix Park during May 1882 became its signature and literally only success, creating shock waves around the world. However, the Phoenix Park operation was not the only plot carried out by the Invincibles. Several attempts were also made against W.E. Forster, the Chief Secretary prior to Lord Cavendish, and then following the Phoenix Park Murders additional assassinations were attempted before the organisation was eventually dismantled.

This chapter will describe and analyse in three steps the Invincible assassination cells. First, the factors for initiating the I.N.I. organisation will be examined. Second, the operational activities of I.N.I. cells will be described. Third, a synopsis of the Invincible assassination cells will be developed, which will first identify the initiators of their formation followed by identifying adaptive characteristics. It will then be determined whether evolutionary variations existed in order to understand if I.N.I. cells evolved.

The I.R.B. Directory, or possibly an inner circle within the Directory, sent John Walsh, a representative of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B, to Dublin from Middlesbrough, England sometime in November 1881. It can only be speculated at this time as to what act triggered Walsh being sent to Dublin. Possibly, the assassination of the Russian Czar, Alexander II on 13 March 1881 and the reverberations this caused throughout Europe might have encouraged a subset of the I.R.B. in England to pursue a similar course of action in Ireland. However, a more plausible explanation is that the suppression of the Land League in October 1881, including the arrest of Parnell, frustrated an inner circle of the I.R.B. who interpreted Parnell’s Home Rule strategy by way of land agitation as failing, precipitating the need for more direct action on the Irish mainland. In this sense, as Townsend comments, the I.N.I. may have been more closely linked to the ‘agrarian world’ than the realm of Fenianism and armed rebellion. In addition,
Rossa’s Dynamite Party might have had some level of influence in pushing the I.N.I. as something of a second front against British rule in Ireland while the bombing campaigns continued on the British mainland.

The I.N.I. was funded from money Walsh received from the conspirator P.J. Sheridan who was suspected of having links to O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party. Sheridan was perceived to be an organiser of the group as well as being linked to the Land League and New York based Rossa funded *Irish World* newspaper. According to Carey, he had received money from Sheridan to carry out terrorist acts in Ireland. It was stated in a *New York Times* article that the ‘informer Carey deposed that Mr. Sheridan had an interview with him and gave him money to forward projects of assassination.’ Sheridan eventually ended up in America where he could not be extradited so was in the end never arrested for his involvement in the I.N.I.

Sheridan’s association with the *Irish World* essentially linked him to O’Donovan Rossa and the Dynamite Party who funded the paper. Rossa’s group was later suspected by police as being ‘if not active participants at least instigators and abettors’ in the Phoenix Park Murders. In fact, a meeting of the Dynamite Party during early May 1882 had passed a ‘sentence of death’ on the British Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, and the Chief Secretary of Ireland. Additionally, according to an accounting of the National Fund (previously the Skirmishing Fund) in September 1882, up to US$12,000 had been loaned to the *Irish World*. This seems to be a large amount of money to run a revolutionary newspaper. While it cannot be proven, the large amount of money directed to the *Irish World* suggests a portion of it might have been used to fund the Rossa Cells operating on the British mainland and arguably for operations linked to the I.N.I. Subsequently, Rossa and the Dynamite Party might have been financial contributors with some degree of executive level influence over the I.N.I.

The process of forming the I.N.I. first involved creating an Action Committee to run the organisation’s day-to-day operations. Walsh initially met Frank Byrne, the Secretary of the Land League in Great Britain, who introduced him to Captain Edward McCafferty, a member of the I.R.B. It was McCafferty who had introduced Walsh to James Carey, a member of the I.R.B. since 1861 and treasurer of the organisation at the time. James Carey commented that Walsh had come to him with the idea of forming the Irish National Invincibles. Carey’s statement to police as to how the Invincibles were formed stated that he, James Mullet, Captain Edward McCafferty, Daniel Curley, John Walsh and P.J
Sheridan met several times during the first week of December 1881 in both Phoenix Park and the Angel and Midlands Hotel in Dublin to discuss the formation of the organisation. Eventually an Action Committee of four principals was assembled consisting of James Mullet, the Chairman, James Carey, Dan Curley and Edward McCafferty. However, Mullet was arrested on 4 March 1882 and his position taken over by Dan Curley, with Tom Brady replacing Curley’s vacant position on the committee. The principals were responsible for recruiting other members of the organisation most of which according to Tynan came from the I.R.B.

Recruits that were considered for the I.N.I. were only allowed entry into the society after the committee had given its approval. The recruit was then sworn in under an oath by placing his hand on a knife and swearing ‘to secrecy, to implicit obedience to his leaders, to act when called upon by them, and to deal death to all tyrants.’ The significance of the knife during this ceremony was important. Tynan stated that, ‘The creed of the Invincibles was “War to the knife.”’ This creed derived from General Jose Palafox (1780-1847) a Spanish Nationalist who made a similar statement, ‘War even to the knife (Guerra y cuchillo),’ when asked to capitulate at the first siege of Saragossa in 1808. As such, it implies a ‘suicidal courage’ and daring that strongly affected the culture of the I.N.I. organisation.

The I.R.B. appears to have been a major source of new members for the I.N.I. This was most likely because each I.R.B. Circle had their own ideological flavour, some of which were more ideologically extreme then others, making them ideal recruiting pools. For example, Carey commented that it was Curley and Mullet who recruited most of the men for the I.N.I. One of those recruited was Joe Brady, a member of Dan Curley’s I.R.B. circle, who later ended up having a significant role in the Phoenix Park Murders.

One of the most important recruits was Peter Tynan who became the organisation’s “Number One” or leader. Carey commented that Tynan appeared to be a military man, maybe from America and possibly a Land Leaguer, who always seemed to have money to give to the Invincibles. In fact, Tynan was a member of the 13th Middlesex “The Queens Westminster” Rifle Volunteers, which accounts for his military appearance. He was also affiliated to the Land League in some way due to his friendship with Frank Byrne who lived only six doors away in London. Tynan had been recruited into the Invincible organisation by Walsh and Byrne early on at an unknown date. Tynan took over the reins upon Walsh leaving Dublin once he had formed the Invincibles.
Tynan’s status as “Number One” was questioned by John Walsh who had stated during the March 1883 trial of the Invincibles that it was really Carey whom ‘he styled the real ‘No. 1’”27. However, Walsh’s statement was likely swayed by Carey turning Queen’s evidence and a ploy to shift the focus away from Tynan, the true “Number One”. It was Tynan who debriefed members of the cell, including Carey, following the Phoenix Park Murders after which, he gave orders for the murder weapons to be destroyed28. Tynan was ultimately, a behind the scenes leader of the Action Committee providing both planning direction and oversight (see Figure 6.1)29.

Figure 6.1: Key members and supporters of the Irish National Invincibles from 21 April 1883. The key members are indicated by red tick marks30.
The Invincible organisation was centralised with Tynan the leading authority from which all command and control directives were transmitted to members of the Action Committee. The Action Committee would then transmit these orders to the rank and file. Tynan stated, he had direct control over ‘the direction and guidance of all plans, the carrying out of which was left to his own judgement.’ However, Tynan was advised by Byrne and Sheridan on target selection, creating a three man executive with Tynan acting as an intermediary between the executive and Action Committee. Each principal in the Action Committee controlled several sub-officers who in turn controlled ‘rank and file’ members. Directives were transmitted either by verbal or written communications using couriers. The communications were destroyed once read eliminating any form of paper trail.

Tynan stated that the Invincibles comprised, ‘the braver and more determined members of the Land League’. The Invincibles had links to both the Land League and I.R.B. leadership, most certainly opening up recruitment to the more extreme members from each organisation, at a time when the strategy of land agitation mixed with constitutionalism was wavering. Parnell’s detention, coercion, a loss of confidence in constitutionalism and the assassination of the Russian Czar Alexander II during March 1881 may have ultimately provided the inspiration to carry out immediate and violent action. As such, the Invincibles offered to a small number of conspirators ‘heightened levels of conspiracy’ and ‘a sense of immediate and exhilarating purpose’.

Consequently, the creation of the Invincibles seems to have been based on a schism of extremes. On the one hand, the current Land League struggle had generated minimal repercussions whereas on the other, the type of action the Invincibles were proposing would take the struggle to a completely new level. The Invincibles represented an extreme approach in which the assassination of high-value targets would become the organisation’s *modus operandi*. This form of attack was not unheard of in Ireland. In fact, land issues had created such desperation in some counties that assassination attempts against Landlords had sometimes become an inevitable response. For Example, during 1878 Ribbonmen and Fenians had targeted Lord Leitrum, the 3rd Earl of Leitrum for acting with impunity in the ruthless exploitation of his tenants through evictions, increased rents, intimidation and sometimes violent criminal behaviour. Several assassination attempts were made against him before he was finally gunned down and then clubbed to death on 2 April 1878. Unsurprisingly, there was some pushback to the extreme nature of this organisation. Tynan stated that the I.R.B. was ‘officially’ opposed to the
formation of the Invincibles as did it appears, the mainstream Land League who clearly demonstrated their dissatisfaction following the Phoenix Park Murders.\(^{41}\)

The Land League denied any link to the Phoenix Park Murders even though both Sheridan and Byrne were land leaguers. According to the *Graphic* newspaper the Land League considered the Phoenix Park Murders ‘a blow, the disastrous consequences of which cannot be exaggerated’ based on the perception that Lord Cavendish would offer a more sympathetic ear to the Irish Land League cause.\(^{42}\) The *Graphic* stated:

> The assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke have excited a thrill of horror and indignation in every civilized country, and, with one or two noteworthy exceptions, the journals of all parties have joined in fierce denunciation of the crime, as particularly heinous at a moment when coercive policy had been almost unreservedly abandoned, and one of the murdered men was actually a messenger of conciliation.\(^{43}\)

In fact, the San Francisco branch of the Land League had offered a US$5,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the assassins.\(^{44}\)

The central strategy of the I.N.I. was to ‘remove all tyrants’ starting with Ireland’s Chief Secretary Forster and the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland Earl Cowper and then relative ‘to the further operations of the Dublin branch it was to be left to its own discretion.’\(^{45}\) John Walsh commented that his reason for wanting to form the Invincibles was to start a sequence of events that would eventually end in ‘open warfare’.\(^{46}\) Tynan expands on Walsh’s vision of open warfare by commenting in his memoir that street fights as he termed them were the forerunners of revolution leading to guerrilla warfare against the British that would eventually end in a war of independence.\(^{47}\) That is, terrorism was to be the first step in achieving open warfare.

Subsequently, the I.N.I. was formed as an extremely secret organisation. It was initially created with the expectation it would contain no more than two hundred and fifty members throughout the United Kingdom with no more than fifty in the Dublin branch.\(^{48}\) The core of the organisation was to be in Dublin with unlinked cells in other regions.\(^{49}\) In reality though, the organisation never got close to this number with the organisation according to Carey, having around thirty members as of July 1882, all located in Dublin.\(^{50}\) However, Campbell suggests a cell may have existed in Galway, where there was a strong tradition of secret societies and might have been involved in some agrarian murders, although this could
never be proven. Ultimately, the methodical formation of the Invincibles suggests it was designed from the start to make an immediate impact upon the operational landscape.

While the history of the I.N.I. is overshadowed by the Phoenix Park Murders, the first actual attempts at assassination by Invincible cells were made against the Chief Secretary of Ireland between 1880 and 1882, the Right Honourable W.E. Forster. Forster, otherwise known as ‘Buckshot Forster’ for his perceived harsh treatment of the Irish people, was a controversial figure who had run the Irish Administration from 1880 to 1882, during the high point of the Land League campaign. In fact, the I.N.I. made at least four known attempts against Forster before he left Ireland on 2 March 1882, which provides an early insight into how the organisation operated leading up to the Phoenix Park Murders.

The attempts on Forster first involved gathering intelligence on his movements, routines, protective detail, and other relevant characteristics to construct an intelligence profile. This was achieved according to Carey by watching him ‘day and night’ and included an informant inside Dublin Castle named Joseph Smith who gathered information on Forster’s movements. Forster usually travelled with a specially assigned detail of armed officers dressed in ‘bullet-proof shirts’ or ‘shirts of mail’. Tynan stated, the ‘movements of the enemy were very uncertain, and information of his intended goings and comings was always unreliable.’ In fact, Tynan goes on to say, that the British usually spread false information regarding Forster’s movements to throw off potential attackers.

All attempts against Forster occurred while he was travelling by horse drawn carriage between various locations in Dublin. These attempts were planned in detail, with cells of ten to fifteen men used to secure a designated ambush site through which Forster was expected to travel. A standard cell consisted of a cell leader that would direct the operation, men who would act as watchers and signallers, car drivers to take men to and from the ambush site and then a hit team, which was assigned to stop Forster’s carriage and carry out the assassination.

The *modus operandi* for these attempts usually involved watchers being positioned along part of the expected route of Forster’s carriage. Often times, Forster’s carriage was followed by an I.N.I. car that would signal a watcher who would then make a signal, such as waving a white handkerchief, which would be passed down the chain of watchers finally notifying the hit team of Forster’s impending arrival. An alternative tactic involved an I.N.I. car that would precede Forster’s carriage and then signal the rest of the group as it approached the ambush point.
In stopping Forster’s carriage, which only occurred twice, split second decisions had to be made. The first being whether to stop the carriage based on immediate security threats and second, whether to proceed with the actual assassination once Forster’s carriage had been halted. In three of the operations, the attempts were aborted because of the presence of mounted police or of Forster’s family. In the latter case, the injury of women and children was too great a risk. Irish Land Leaguers had learnt this the hard way after been labelled ‘Irish savages’ by the media for accidently killing an innocent female bystander during an attack60. By being able to stop an assassination midcourse arguably demonstrates some level of discipline within the I.N.I. Tynan stated, their ‘hands were stayed by authority; they knew that their young leader was controlled by some outside orders, the mystery of which strengthened the bonds of discipline.’61 However, these comments might have been an effort by Tynan to exaggerate his influence within the organisation hiding the fact that some failures were potentially due to other factors such as, loosing ones nerve.

The attempts against Forster tended to fail because of either poor intelligence or a breakdown in the signalling system during an operation. In most cases, the former was the culprit with Forster failing to show up or there being too many guards surrounding his carriage when he did appear. As such, an intelligence failure was the principle reason that the Invincibles were unsuccessful in their final attempt to assassinate Forster as he left the country for good.

On 19 April 1882, it had been publicly announced when and on which train Forster was to leave Dublin62. Subsequently, Forster’s route from the Viceregal Lodge in Phoenix Park to the Westland Row Railway Station was scouted by the Invincibles, with an area near the Dublin Quays, where the street narrowed, being chosen for the ambush63. Based on Forster’s previous departures from Ireland, it was believed he would leave from the Westland Row Railway Station in the evening, and travel to Kingston64 where he would take the overnight mail steamer to Liverpool65.

Under the command of Dan Curley, a cell of fifteen Invincibles waited for Forster’s carriage to discover only his wife and daughter occupied it66. The Invincible Cell immediately concentrated their efforts at the Westland Row Railway Station and then began watching Dublin Castle believing that Forster would follow his family early the next morning, as had been his routine in the past67. However, Forster had finished wrapping up his work early that day and taken the earlier 6 pm train to Kingston68. As such, inaccurate intelligence accounted for this miss whereas other failed attempts were caused by operational missteps69.
At least two attempts against Forster failed due to the unpredictability of using hand signals or horse drawn cabs to signal Forster’s approaching carriage. Forewarning the approach of Forster’s carriage was necessary to ready the hit team for stopping the carriage either by grabbing the reins of the horse or by using a cab to block the carriage. For example, in one operation the signalling system failed twice, first, during an attempt to ambush Forster’s carriage on the way to Dublin Castle and second, on its return trip.\(^70\)

In the first attempt, a cell led by Dan Curley and consisting of James Carey, a man called Rowles, Joe Leonard, a man called McMahn, Joe Brady, a man called Martin, Tim Kelly and Michael Fitzharris the cab driver, allowed Forster’s carriage to pass by after Rowles missed Carey’s signal.\(^71\) On Forster’s return journey a cab driven by Fitzharris travelled in front of Forster’s carriage to signal the cell members of Forster’s approach. However, Fitzharris’ horse stumbled and fell, allowing Forster’s carriage to pass without incident.\(^72\) The importance of these failures emphasise how just a minute failure in timing was enough to muck up the entire operation. Tynan eloquently makes this point when he stated, ‘How important minutes are often in the solution of great events!’\(^73\)

These attempts against Forster, while they fell short, demonstrated the Invincible’s narrow focus of one target at a time. By concentrating on a single target, the Invincibles were able to learn a lot about Forster’s movements, security detail and routines. This helped generate an intelligence profile that assisted operationally when real-time intelligence was received from Dublin Castle such as planning the timing and location of ambush points. While planning necessitated determining the route of Forster’s carriage, the time it took to travel and identify an ambush point along the expected route determined the size of the cell. The cell size could be adjusted upwards to try to mitigate some of the guesswork in identifying his route. The larger cell was able to cover a greater ambush area to better warn of his approach giving the hit team time to possibly fine tune preparations. I.N.I. cabs in this sense became important instruments in the ambush as they could be used to follow Forster’s carriage as it left a location such as Dublin Castle, signalling the watchers as it closed in on the ambush point. It seems that in the majority of these attempts the Invincibles generated good enough intelligence to be able to accurately predict Forster’s route. However, the plans were ruined by operational failures or a police presence that was too large to overcome. While these operations ended up just attempts, they created an experienced and tight core of cell members who were now joined in a shared goal through common experiences. Among them were Joe Brady, Tim Kelly, Dan Curley, James Carey and Michael Fitzharris.
who were to become members of the Phoenix Park Cell. Tynan stated, ‘The INVINCIBLES were eager to wipe out their past misadventures, and were in a perfect state of discipline.’ Tynan stated, ‘The INVINCIBLES were eager to wipe out their past misadventures, and were in a perfect state of discipline.’ 74 The latter part of this statement is a result of the need to rectify the former, and possibly an acknowledgement of the experience gained by certain cell members from the Forster attempts. Ultimately, at this point in their existence, the Invincibles needed a success and could not afford to make any more mistakes.

According to Tynan, after Forster had left Ireland there was a discussion on making an attempt against Earl Francis de Grey Cowper, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. It was discussed only as an option using a newly invented ‘hand-grenade’ that could be carried in a small satchel, which had been created in 1881 by a man named Wheeler. However, Cowper left Ireland on 27 April 1882 and was replaced by Lord Spencer who arrived in Ireland on 6 May along with the new Chief Secretary of Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish.

Based on evidence from Carey, an article in the radical Freeman’s Journal on 2 May 1882 suggesting a ‘clean sweep’ of Castle officials prompted an order the next day to assassinate Under Secretary Thomas H. Burke. This cleansing of Dublin Castle was a strategy to rid the administration of ‘permanent officials, inheriting the same traditions, and acting in the same spirit’ said to have influenced the action of the past Chief Secretary. This order would have come from Tynan who regarded Burke, a high-ranking Irish Catholic administrator, with disdain who as part of the Castle leadership had supported coercion and other crimes against the Irish people. Moreover, there were no other high-ranking figures left in Ireland at that time, after both Forster and Cowper had returned to England, leaving Burke as the best possible option to continue their active work. The timing of Burke being selected as a target was suspiciously close to Prime Minister Gladstone’s announcement of the Kilmainham ‘treaty’ to the House of Commons on 2 May and the release of Parnell and two other leaders from prison the same evening. Subsequently, the question must be raised as to whether the Phoenix Park operation was planned to undermine the treaty.

This question can be answered by examining the targeting pattern of the Invincibles, what was known of the Kilmainham ‘treaty’ at this time and the value of Burke as a target. The Invincibles during this early period were tenacious in their targeting of leading members of the Castle’s political hierarchy. Regardless of the treaty, they would have continued to target Forster if he had remained in Ireland in order to affect the clean sweep of Castle leadership. However, based on comments by Parliamentary
representatives of the Land League, they appear to have been unaware of any negotiations between Parnell and the Government suggesting that the true nature of Kilmanham was unknown at this time\textsuperscript{82}. Moreover, Burke in his role as Under Secretary was neither British nor a member of its aristocracy, which questions whether his death would have caused the same reactions if Lord Cavendish had not been assassinated alongside him. As such, while the timing is suspicious, it is more likely a result of the momentum of the Invincibles targeting strategy intersecting with hidden events in the operational landscape. In this sense, the resignation of Foster most likely prompted the \textit{Freeman’s Journal} article, which in turn intensified the effort to remove the last remaining member of the ‘old guard’.

Subsequently, the focus shifted to Burke who remained the sole Invincible target up to the Phoenix Park Murders on 6 May 1882 (see Figure 6.2).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{PhoenixParkVicoms.png}
\caption{The victims of the Phoenix Park Cell. Chief Secretary Lord Frederick Cavendish is on the left and Under Secretary Thomas H. Burke is on the right\textsuperscript{83}.}
\end{figure}

In preparing to assassinate Burke, the Invincibles again undertook detailed planning, applying the same intelligence techniques used in the Forster attempts. This involved carrying out surveillance on Burke to learn his routines, picking a time and location for the assassination and determining the weapons to be used\textsuperscript{84}. It seems that at some stage a decision was made to carry out the assassination in Phoenix Park during daylight hours. Most likely, this was because the residences of the Under Secretary, Chief Secretary and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland were all located in Phoenix Park and were all reasonably close
to each other. Burkes daily routine would have frequently taken him between these residences and Dublin Castle, providing the Invincibles with the greatest opportunity to intercept him.

Phoenix Park was of course a public park, where people walked, played polo and carried out other leisure activities. Additionally it had a high military and police presence with the Mountjoy Army Barracks housing the Ordinance Survey, a Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) Depot and two police barracks, all located within the park’s boundaries. Tynan commented that carrying out the assassination in Phoenix Park during daylight hours would be unexpected and generate enough of a surprise for the cell to quickly execute the attack and escape. While the Invincibles had narrowed the targeting area to Phoenix Park, the size of the park being some 1,752 acres required the ambush area be further refined for the cell to have any chance of intercepting Burke.

The final location chosen to await Burke was opposite the Viceregal Lodge near the walking track and road. An Invincible named Dwyer had reconnoitred Phoenix Park most likely looking for the best place to carry out the assassination. It was expected that Burke would be returning to the park via cab and he would travel by the Viceregal Lodge, if coming in through the main Parkgate entrance. Overall, preparing the ambush site opposite the Viceregal Lodge was a logical choice and one that again reduced the chances of failure.

The decision to use knives was both practical and symbolic. Carey suggested assassination by knife first, because knives were cheap and second, they would not raise the awareness of police compared to that of a gunshot. It was suspected, based on Carey’s testimony, but never proven, that Frank Byrne recruited the help of his wife to purchase surgical knives in England and then smuggle them back into Ireland under the folds of her dress. While Police determined it was a female that smuggled these weapons into the country, they determined it was not Mrs Byrne. They in fact never determined who that individual was. Overall, ten long surgical knives used for ‘amputating large joints’ and one rifle were smuggled into Ireland over two trips. Based on comments by Tynan the thinking in using a woman to smuggle these items into Ireland was that her gender would have provided some degree of safety from being searched. However, Tynan also believed that it was not gender that would get her safely back into the country but the ‘secrecy of the transaction’. Once the knives were received, cord was wrapped around the handles to increase the size of the grip in order for them to become an effective stabbing weapon while basic sheaths were made to hold them (see Figure 6.3).
While much pre-planning had gone into the attempt on Burke, the actual assassination occurred only after three initial attempts to intercept him had failed. On 5 May 1882, Carey commented that he went to Phoenix Park and met members of the assassination cell opposite the Viceregal Lodge. This included Tynan (Number One), Pat Delaney, Tom Caffrey, Dan Curley, Joe Brady, Joseph Smith, Michael Kavanagh and John Fitzharris along with two jaunting cars. Each of these jaunting cars could carry up to four men, and were known for their ‘lightness and speed’. Smith, who worked for the Board of Works in Dublin Castle, and had previously assisted in the Forster attempts was added to the cell as he was the only one who could confirm Burke’s identity. They waited for Burke during the morning and later that evening but in each case missed him.

On the evening of 5 May 1882, a discussion took place as to the possibility of ‘mounted hussars’ intercepting the cell resulting in countermeasures being proposed. This involved three of the Invincibles being armed with revolvers to disable the hussars should the need arise and a jaunting car used to take the assassins quickly away from the scene, which ‘was considered to be the most important sequel to the “suppression” of the Secretaries.’

On the morning of Saturday 6 May, the Invincible Cell met at the Royal Oak Tavern in the Kilmainham area of Dublin to plan another assassination attempt against Burke in Phoenix Park, as he travelled to work. The cell included Dan Curley as the cell leader, with Joe Brady and Tim Kelly as the bladesmen and then, Joseph Hanlon, Michael Fegan, Tom Caffrey and Pat Delaney acting as protection for the operation. Finally, James Carey and Joe Smith acted as signaller and spotter respectively in addition to both, John Fitzharris and Michael Kavanagh, as the drivers of the jaunting cars. See Figure 6.4
for the key members of the cell. However, upon arriving at Phoenix Park they discovered they had missed Burke who had already left for work\textsuperscript{104}.

Curley after receiving further information from Smith that day concerning Burke’s whereabouts met with most of his cell members at the Wren Public House in Chapelizod at 3 pm\textsuperscript{105}. Joseph Smith had been in Dublin Castle working on carpet at the time and had relayed information that Burke had returned there following swearing in ceremonies for both Lord Cavendish and Lord Spencer\textsuperscript{106}. Accordingly, it was believed Burke would be heading back to one of the residences in Phoenix Park later that afternoon. Carey, Hanlon and Smith travelled to Phoenix Park in Fitzharris’ car whereas Brady, Kelly, Delaney and McCaffrey took Kavanagh’s car\textsuperscript{107}. Both Curley and Fegan arrived at Phoenix Park by other means, probably on foot\textsuperscript{108}.

As the Invincible Cell was positioning itself for the assassination, both Cavendish and Burke, following the swearing in ceremonies proceeded to Dublin Castle to wrap up some business. Burke left the Castle at around 6 pm on foot and was followed by Cavendish at around 6:30 pm who travelled by Hackney cab with an aide-de-camp\textsuperscript{109}. Cavendish at some point decided to leave the car and walk through Phoenix Park to his residence. Burke’s usual routine in the meantime was to take a cab from Phoenix Park’s Parkgate entrance to his dwelling. This was the form of transport Burke was expected to be traveling in. However, Burke had come across Cavendish just past the Lord Gough statue as he drove up the main road in a cab. Burke breaking from routine decided to leave his cab and walk with Cavendish the rest of the way to one of the residences in the park, most likely the Chief Secretary’s\textsuperscript{110}.

The attack took less than two minutes, occurring during daylight hours on a Saturday evening, while people were enjoying various leisure activities in the park. In fact, many of the witnesses had unwittingly seen the assassination thinking it was either, friends roughhousing or a brawl\textsuperscript{111}. Figure 6.5 shows a sketch of the crime scene highlighting important features in the area of the attack\textsuperscript{112}. 

189
The cell had been split into two groups with Curley leading the operation. The first group consisting of Curley, Hanlon and Fegan were all armed with revolvers, although Curley may have also carried two surgical knives. This group was to protect the cell from police, military or civilian interference. The second group consisted of Brady and Kelly, each armed with two surgical knives while Caffrey and Delany appear to have been unarmed. This group was made up of two men who were the bladesmen and were to carry out the act along with two additional men in close proximity to stop anyone from intervening during the assassination.

Witnesses later noted that four of the men were seen standing under a clump of trees opposite the Viceregal Lodge and two more were a few yards away lying down. There were apparently seven men
in the main assassination party so why the other man was not spotted is unknown. The witness had stated he thought they ‘must be up for something bad’\(^\text{117}\). Two cars were spotted in close proximity with one only seven yards away and another one approximately fifty yards distant on the Dublin side of the Gough statue\(^\text{118}\).

The initial plan had been to use Fitzharris’ car to intercept and stop Burke’s cab\(^\text{119}\). However, this changed after Burke was spotted walking along the path next to the road. A statement by a witness says he saw a man following Cavendish and Burke waving a handkerchief\(^\text{120}\). The man had then jumped into a car and was driven away into the park\(^\text{121}\). Smith at this stage had identified Burke to Carey who had then waved a white handkerchief towards Curley’s assassination party\(^\text{122}\). They had then jumped into Kavanagh’s car and raced to the rest of the cell where Carey confirmed that Burke was approaching\(^\text{123}\). Carey and Smith were then told to leave when Burke and Cavendish were approximately two hundred yards away\(^\text{124}\).

The assassinations occurred at 7:17 pm and were well coordinated and quick. This included two groups of men walking towards and then past Burke and Cavendish. The second group comprising the bladesmen, after walking a further twelve feet, had about faced and then attacked the victims from behind, with Brady stabbing Burke in the back and Kelly stabbing at Cavendish as he turned to defend himself\(^\text{125}\). During the attack, Cavendish was heard to yell by two passing bicyclists ‘Ah! You villain!’\(^\text{126}\)

The bodies of Cavendish and Burke were found by witnesses with Cavendish’s lying in the road a few yards from Burke’s\(^\text{127}\). Cavendish had been stabbed in the side of the neck, right lung and had several defensive stab wounds in his right arm appearing to die instantly\(^\text{128}\). Burke on the other hand had received eleven stab wounds to the heart, throat, neck and breast and had a severely lacerated left hand appearing to die as a result of a more ferocious attack\(^\text{129}\). Police determined that whoever carried out the murders knew something about anatomy due to the wounds inflicted\(^\text{130}\). This would have been something of a necessity due to the surgical nature of the blades that is, being thin and of about ten to twelve inches in length\(^\text{131}\). The seven men then left in two cars with Fitzharris taking Curley, Fegan and Hanlon through the main Parkgate entrance back into Dublin and Kavanagh leaving with Brady, Kelly, Caffrey and Delaney through the Chapelizod gate entrance\(^\text{132}\). Tynan commented that Kavanagh’s car had left the murder scene at 7:20 pm indicating the murders took no more than two to three minutes to complete from start to finish\(^\text{133}\).
During the same evening of the murders, a card with 'Executed by Order of the Irish Invincibles' written on it was left at the *Dublin Express* newspaper office followed by cards being left at two other newspaper offices the next day. Additionally, a debriefing of some of the Invincibles involved in the assassinations occurred at McCaffrey's house the same evening to provide a full accounting of the operation to Tynan (Number One). Debriefed were Carey, Curley and Brady who then on the following night destroyed the knives on orders received from Tynan. Carey stated, 'The blades were broken into little pieces and the handles were burned.'
It was originally thought that the target was the new Chief Secretary, Lord Cavendish and that Under Secretary Burke had been an unfortunate victim. However, it seems the opposite was true. It is fairly certain that the assassination of Cavendish was more a result of happenstance then planning as he had only taken up his appointment that morning and per police thinking, the Invincibles could not have ascertained his routine at that early stage of his term. Additionally, based on how the Invincibles had previously focused like a laser on Forster, the attempt on Burke would have been quickly abandoned had Cavendish become the prime target in order to create a new intelligence profile. Ultimately, since the murder occurred right outside the Viceregal Lodge the target was almost certainly going to be someone of high-value, which was an added bonus for the location. While it was never confirmed if Cavendish had been a target, it is with a high degree of certainty that Burke was the primary target and Cavendish most likely was in the wrong place at the wrong time based on a random series of events, which lead him to be walking with Burke.

The Superintendent of “G” Division, Chief Inspector John Mallon was placed in charge of the investigation following an initial investigation of the crime scene. Witnesses had identified, correctly so it seems, eleven assassins of which descriptions had been provided for four of them in addition to a driver as they left Phoenix Park in a car. The group was said to be made up of three men dressed as ‘gentlemen’ and the remainder dressed as ‘roughs’. Additionally, a description of the horse and car was provided. That is the, ‘horse was described as chestnut, lazy and dark brown.’ The car was described as a ‘red olive colour, dark green with white and chocolate colour.’ Mallon assigned his best men to track the whereabouts of the car from around 7:30 pm onwards and to identify all other witnesses at the scene at around 6 pm. Police using witnesses were then able to re-create the route of the car as it left the park by recording the times it was sighted on an ordinance survey map.

Four of the assassins and a driver left Phoenix Park via the Chapelizod gate and travelled east in a jaunting car along the park’s perimeter and were last seen at around 8:15 pm in the Kilmainhaim area of Dublin. The trail of the car was eventually lost as it entered Dublin’s maze of streets. After this, there was little else to go on other than several false leads that wasted police time. For example, on 14 August 1882 a sailor after being arrested in Venezuela confessed to the murders but was found to be on a ship at the time of the murders. It was discovered he was trying to get free passage back to England. Subsequently, Mallon relied primarily on human intelligence to track down the assassins. A prisoner, most likely James Mullet who was the previous chair of the Action Committee, provided
information that James Carey, Daniel Brady, Joseph Hanlon and Michael Fitzharris were the principals in the plot\textsuperscript{154}. However, there was still not enough evidence to arrest them at this time\textsuperscript{155}.

On 29 July 1882, Mallon received information that Carey was in possession of the knives used in the murder\textsuperscript{156}. A tenant in the same house that Carey lived had grown suspicious of his frequent visits to the attic and had reported him to the police in the hopes of getting a reward\textsuperscript{157}. Subsequently, his boarding house was searched and two Hausfinley surgical knives and a Winchester repeating rifle were found\textsuperscript{158}. Bloodstains were found on one of the knives but due to limitations in forensics at the time, police could only determine the blood was human\textsuperscript{159}. These two knives were most likely leftover from the cache of eight knives that had been originally purchased in England, assuming the other six knives used in the operation had been subsequently destroyed.

Police suspected Joseph Wales, the treasurer of the County Carlow I.R.B. in Bootle, Liverpool and John Fleming a member of the same I.R.B. circle of knowing about the Phoenix Park plot\textsuperscript{160}. The circle had been infiltrated by police who had found that Fleming’s shop was used for Fenian meetings between Irish Americans, which included the transfer of suspicious packages\textsuperscript{161}. Wales was later arrested and found with money that he admitted was for Fenian purposes along with letters from 24 January 1882 to 27 September 1882 detailing activities of the I.R.B. In particular, a letter from 27 September 1882 puts together both P.J Tynan (Number One) and Fleming in a Saturday night meeting of the I.R.B\textsuperscript{162}. Fleming was later killed along with other members of the Lomasney Cell during the London Bridge bombing on 13 December 1884\textsuperscript{163}. What this suggests is that elements of the I.R.B. might have had some kind of support role in the Phoenix Park plot such as smuggling the knives into Ireland, although this was never proven.

The extent to which the Phoenix Park Murders heightened the threat of Irish terrorism was not just localized to Ireland. The murder of Lord Cavendish had shown that all levels of government were vulnerable to terrorism and as such, created ‘great alarm as to what the desperados may do next.’\textsuperscript{164} His murder was a worldwide event as was his public funeral in which the size was ‘second to none’ during the latter part of the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{165}. Foreign news organisations documented the impact with mostly negative and disastrous themes.

The \textit{New York Herald} commented that this political event had been as tragic as the assassination of the Russian Czar Alexander II during 1881\textsuperscript{166}. In German newspapers, the assassinations were severely
denounced and compared to anarchist attacks, which would contribute to Prime Minister Gladstone’s downfall\textsuperscript{167}. In French papers there was a general consensus that the ‘event is pronounced most disastrous, both for Mr. Gladstone and Ireland, but at the same time the Irish themselves are absolved from the actual crime, which is laid down to the American Fenian organisations, and the English Government is exhorted not to abandon its policy of conciliation\textsuperscript{168}.

Subsequently, the murders changed the operational landscape in which terror cells operated. The Kilmainham ‘treaty’ was compromised leading to a new coercion themed Prevention of Crime Act (Ireland) 1882\textsuperscript{169}. Additionally, security details became mandatory for high-ranking officials such as Prime Minister Gladstone and the threat of terror made the public more suspicious, making it more difficult for cells to operate in the landscape\textsuperscript{170}.

Following the Phoenix Park Murders, the group attempted several more plots in Dublin against prominent and symbolic targets on orders from the Invincible’s executive. The most significant plots were against Judge Lawson, a high-value target and two jurors, Dennis J. Field and a Mr. Barrett, both who were considered symbolic targets.

Judge Lawson had presided over several political cases involving the Land League and was targeted due to his rigid and harsh nature when sentencing prisoners\textsuperscript{171}. Tynan commented that two cells of Invincibles were available in Dublin for this operation\textsuperscript{172}. The first cell appeared well organised and under the control of officers whereas the other cell was smaller and less organised\textsuperscript{173}. Nine men in total were taken from both cells to be used in the attack, with three of them acting as spotters\textsuperscript{174}. The plan was to assassinate Lawson in Dublin while he walked through St Stephen’s Green with his security escort of four men\textsuperscript{175} as spotters relayed his position back to the rest of the cell\textsuperscript{176}. However, one of the spotters Patrick Delaney, who had been involved in the Phoenix Park operation attempted to go it alone. He lunged at Lawson with a gun while following him along Leinster Street but was tackled to the ground and captured\textsuperscript{177}. Subsequently, the operation was aborted and the cell members debriefed accordingly\textsuperscript{178}.

A final plot to carry out simultaneous assassination operations against two jurors, Dennis J. Field and Mr. Barrett, was attempted on 27 November 1882. Both men had been on the jury that had convicted the Land Leaguer Francis Hynes who had been sentenced to death for shooting a man and executed in September 1882\textsuperscript{179}. Tynan stated that knives were to be used during both these attacks\textsuperscript{180}. Joseph
Mullet ordered two cells to carry them out. However, the Barrett attack never happened, as he was not home at the time the Invincible Cell called at his house. This was not the case for Field.

The attack against Field was important, as some of the men involved in this operation had been part of the Phoenix Park Assassination Cell. As such, their involvement in this plot to some extent helped break open the Phoenix Park case and bring down the I.N.I. organisation. The operation against Field occurred in a similar vein to the Phoenix Park attack and was very nearly successful. Lawrence Hanlon and Daniel Delany acted as spotters whereas Joe Brady and Tim Kelly waited on Kavanaghs' jaunting cab outside Field’s house. Hanlon upon spotting Field waved a handkerchief identifying Field as he approached his house. Field was attacked by Brady and Kelly at his front door, stabbing him at least six times during which, Brady had apparently yelled ‘you villain’. Field ultimately survived the attack by feigning death.

A witness had seen the men and was able to accurately identify Tim Kelly and Joseph Brady as the bladesmen, and Michael Kavanagh as the car man. Other witnesses were also able to describe the men as they waited for Field and as they drove away in the car following the attack. Hanlon was also later identified by a witness. The car was eventually traced from a cab registration number seen on it to a man who had purchased it the evening of the attack and who had then immediately sold it to a man who had re-painted it and then sold it once again. This clean-up process of incriminating evidence suggests a possible method for how the Invincibles might have gotten rid of the cars used in the Phoenix Park operation but this cannot be proven. The cars from the Phoenix Park Murders were never found, which suggests they had probably been quickly disposed of in some way indicating a high degree of pre-planning by the principals in that plot.

Chief Inspector Mallon was subsequently tasked with carrying out several additional investigations in addition to the Phoenix Park Murders. This involved interviewing more than 1,000 witnesses between December 1882 and May 1883. Finally on 13 and 14 January 1883, and after months of investigation, members of “G” Division supported by Royal Marines in plain clothes arrested twenty-three members of the I.N.I. organisation located in five houses around Dublin, effectively dismantling the organisation.
Following these arrests, James Carey turned Queen’s evidence against his fellow Invincibles, as did Joseph Smith. While the foot soldiers of the Invincibles and members of the Action Committee were brought to trial, the executive including P.J. Tynan, P.J. Sheridan and Frank Byrne were able to escape to America and never bought before the courts, although Tynan was nearly caught in 1896. However, before the I.N.I. was broken up, it had inspired an independent copycat organisation in America near the end of 1882. This organisation demonstrates how high-value targeting by the I.N.I., while small in scale, can produce disproportionate reactions in the landscape.

The Irish National Revolutionary Society of Invincibles (I.N.R.S.I.) was an oath based American Irish revolutionary organisation formed along the same lines as the I.N.I. organisation. This organisation was completely independent of Rossa, the Clan na Gael and the I.N.I. organisation. It was formed during September 1882 and lasted only two months. The I.N.R.S.I. was also known as the Irish National Revolutionary Association or the Invincibles. This organisation had a written constitution which was very similar to the one used by the I.N.I. It was run by a President, Vice-President and Secretary and was to maintain a membership of no more than fifty men who had to pay initiation and regular subscription fees. Members while sworn to secrecy could belong to other Irish organisations. However, their membership of the I.N.R.S.I. was to remain secret to those outside the organisation. The American Invincibles planned one plot, which was an attempt to blow up the cargo ship Castalia by placing an explosive device against the hull at night. However, amongst the three men cell picked for the operation was an informant who provided parts of the device to the police. Subsequently, the operation was called off after police were spotted watching members of the cell. Nothing further is known about the I.N.R.S.I.

Overall, it can be concluded that the formation of the I.N.I. was methodically orchestrated but other than the Phoenix Park Murders, it failed consistently to successfully complete an operation. The next section will examine the I.N.I. cells in an evolutionary context to determine if they were apt to evolve between 1881 and 1896.

The Irish National Invincibles formed as a result of a schism between the members and leadership of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, and Land League during late 1881. This schism pitted those in favour of a more immediate approach to achieving open warfare against others who favoured the Land League led strategy based on agitation that was supposed to end in Home Rule. In many ways the reasons for
forming the Invincibles was similar to the reasons Rossa used to form the Dynamite Party. That is, it was an attempt to rejuvenate the physical force element of the Fenian movement, which was participating in what was perceived as an ineffective strategy that was slowly leading to irrelevancy. However, the key difference between the Invincible and Rossa Cells was the form of terror used to achieve their aims.

The form of attack essentially distinguishes the Invincible Cell from the Rossa and Clan cells between 1881 and 1896. The Invincible Cell carried out mostly unsuccessful assassination operations in broad daylight within a large urban Victorian-era city that required a high degree of planning. Targeting was orientated towards high-value members of the British ruling class and members of the Irish Judiciary. As such, ‘human intelligence’ was critical to accurately predict a target’s future movements. Target selection was extremely centralised, with the I.N.I. Executive picking targets and providing funding while Tynan worked alongside the Action Committee in formulating plans. In order to attempt assassinations repeatedly, the Invincible Cell was highly compartmentalised limiting its interactions with outside actors. This increased the survivability of I.N.I. cells allowing them to operate for nearly a year in Dublin. However, the only real success they had was the Phoenix Park Murders, which while gaining worldwide attention nevertheless gave the Invincibles a pretty low batting average as a terrorist organisation.

The real failure of the Invincible Cell came in the form of either incomplete intelligence or a level of complexity in which only the smallest mistake could cause an operation to be aborted such as a horse slipping or a signaller missing a spotter’s signal. In some cases, these failures were just bad luck or decisions designed to allow the cell to fight another day. However, one can deduce that in some cases the level of complexity of the target’s profile such as the target travelling in a carriage at high speed with a security detail was not anticipated in the planning, which operationally meant, mechanisms were not in place to effectively stop the carriage and contain the security detail. Ultimately, the Invincible Cell was not looking to fight the security detail but rather to make it ineffective by carrying out a rapid and surgical assassination using the element of surprise making for a time centric attack model with little margin for error.

The Invincible Cell was controlled by a cell leader and organised into spotters, signallers, protective details, bladesmen or gunmen, and drivers. The spotters were used to visually identify the target to a signaller who would signal the identity of the target to other signallers spread out along the target’s route, which was usually accomplished by just waving a white handkerchief. The spotter might also be in
the form of a cab preceding the target, which would be identified by a signaller. The assassination party would be divided into a sub-unit for protection and a hit team, with the protection used to deter inquisitive passers-by or to counter police or military intervention. The bladesmen would usually carry out their work with knives although earlier attempts against Forster were made with revolvers. They would then make their escape in a waiting car, which had been chosen for its speed, lightness and carrying capacity. The number of men in a cell was scaled up or down based on the accuracy of human intelligence and the need to protect the assailants such as during a daylight attempt in a public space. Many of the attempts against Forster along with the murders of Cavendish and Burke incorporated cells of ten to fifteen men to address the uncertainty of the targets route, its speed and to suppress public, police or military intervention. Following the Phoenix Park Murders the size of the cell was scaled down as assassination attempts were made against targets while they were on foot at known locations such as the six man cell used in the Fields attempt. The reasons for scaling down the cell size suggests improving human intelligence that was able to more accurately deduce the target’s route, less threats from police or military escorts and less complexity in the targeting profile such as the target travelling on foot versus travelling in a carriage at speed.

Figure 6.6 shows a linkage diagram of the Phoenix Park Murder Cell as it existed on 6 May 1882. This diagram highlights the larger eleven-man cell and its roles including spotter /signallers, a protective detail, bladesmen and drivers. The public location of the attack and the police and military presence in Phoenix Park along with the daylight attempt, all underscored the need for five men to act as protection. The method of attack was designed to surprise, with speed and silence used to avoid undue attention. Of significance are the getaway drivers, which were used to transport the cell members in fast cabs out of the park and quickly into the streets of Dublin where tracking them would be complex.
Figure 6.6: Link Diagram showing L.N.I. Cell at time of Phoenix Park Murders on 6 May 1882 at 7:17 PM.
Overall, the I.N.I. cells were orientated towards assassinating dynamic targets. That is, there was a particular emphasis on gathering accurate intelligence, target identification and communications, split second go/no-go decisions and methods of escape, which quickly blended the attackers into the general population. By employing assassination as the form of attack, the Invincible Cell caused disturbances in the landscape that directly influenced the police protection of important persons, the introduction of coercive crime act legislation and the accelerated use of government run human intelligence networks to investigate secret organisations. Figure 6.7 shows the trunk and branch of the Invincibles’ adaptive characteristics, as they would have been presented in an evolutionary tree where assassination operations were a form of attack.

The lone evolutionary branch in Figure 6.7 effectively shows that the Irish National Invincible Cell failed to evolve. The one cell-forming event in this diagram shows the creation event for the organisation by a radical faction of plotters from the I.R.B. and Land League. The branch in this diagram shows adaptive characteristics that the Invincible Cell adopted in order to survive and operate in the operational landscape.

All command and control activities for the cell were extremely centralised with targeting coming from the Invincibles’ executive while operational orders, and planning came from Tynan, and the Action Committee. This ensured tight operational control, which was warranted against the high-value targeting strategy of the organisation. The men in the group had been recruited from the I.R.B. and Land League and were all dedicated and to some degree zealous in the Invincible mission.
Detailed planning was unique and specific to assassinations. It included, determining whether single or near-simultaneous operations were to be attempted, discerning the quality of intelligence received and identifying the mode and speed of transportation in which the target was travelling. This all played into the scaling of cells which would increase or decrease in size according to the target’s profile. Amongst this information was a limited human intelligence component that was somewhat accurate and extremely critical in planning an operation.

Operations were planned against high-value or symbolic targets and carried out during the day for both surprise and symbolism. The latter demonstrated they could strike at anyone, anywhere at any time. The use of member specialisations made each cell member’s job less complex, allowing the job to be done more effectively, most of the time. Specialisations were indispensable, especially if the intelligence was vague, in order to cover more ground and subsequently allow the cell to respond more effectively as the target approached.
As such, the Invincible cells represent early versions of assassination cells in the Irish operational landscape. However, they had no significant changes in complexity, operational disposition and presentation during their one-year period of activity. The cell was static both organisationally and operationally indicating that it did not adapt and evolve as the landscape changed around it. The operational landscape had numerous disturbances between 1882 and 1883 resulting from the Forster attempts, the Phoenix Park assassinations and then again after the Judge Lawson, Field and Barrett assassination attempts. Subsequently, police pressure was gradually intensified and public awareness alerted to terrorist acts. These disturbances in the landscape created evolutionary variations that the cells failed to respond to, resulting in the I.N.I. cells eventually being broken up. That is, there were continued failures in gathering accurate real-time intelligence, failures operationally, failures in communication and failures in discipline. The last failure was exacerbated in later operations by cell members taking increased risks as a result of the Invincibles’ growing record of failed attempts, and the need of its members to achieve another success.

It must be noted that the assassination cells of the Invincibles were incompatible with the dynamite cells operating on the British mainland during 1882, which is why the Invincibles are shown on a separate evolutionary trunk. That is, the adaptive characteristics associated to these two types of cells are significantly different from one another. These contrasting characteristics can be explained by the differing reactions in the operational landscape that each form of attack initiated. Bombings were highly dependent on support systems, technical skill sets and differed significantly from assassinations in operational execution. As such, reactions to bombings were also somewhat different resulting in specific countermeasures orientated towards stopping the flow of dynamite into Great Britain whereas reactions to assassinations were more focused on increasing human intelligence networks and the personal protection of high-value targets.

The next chapter will take the findings from the bombing campaigns and assassinations of the Irish National Invincibles to answer the research questions and identify linkages to the evolutionary framework.
Chapter 7

The Evolutionary Framework and Victorian-Era Terror Cells

This chapter will draw together the evolutionary analysis of terror cells from the Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael between 1881 and 1896, and the Irish National Invincibles between 1881 and 1883 to answer the four research questions posed in Chapter 1. This will involve, reviewing the sources in the operational landscape that influenced the development of the formations, operations and patterns of terrorist cells, which will then be followed by describing how and to what extent they were used. Next, the types of actions security organisations conducted against terrorist cells will be examined, which will lead into the final research question detailing how and to what extent these terrorist cells evolved. This research study will then summarise the high-level concepts of a terror cell’s evolvability, and the low-level concepts that can trigger its evolution.

The sources that spurred the development of Victorian-era terror cells between 1881 and 1896 came from five key influences in the landscape of which dynamite was a central determinant. These influences originated from general guidelines linked to campaign strategies, the decentralisation of command, control and communication structures, cell level strategies, the adoption of dynamite and innovations in bomb making.

Campaign strategies emanating from O’Donovan Rossa’s Dynamite Party and the Clan na Gael were the driving forces as to how long and in what form terror cells operated on the British mainland. The development of cells and specialisations to support the manufacture of dynamite was based on the adoption of dynamite as a terror weapon, which required dependable supply sources. Subsequently, campaign strategy generated in response to British legislation and increased enforcement linked to acquiring dynamite locally necessitated building long-term sustainable supply networks, which prompted new groupings of factory, support and operational cells. However, the determination of whether these support systems were based in Great Britain, America or the continent was influenced by decisions that matured over time as the successes and failures of prior bombing campaigns were realised, and lessons were learned.
Campaign strategy passed through a Command, Control, and Communications structure (C3) that over time was gradually decentralised to England and then the continent. The cells of the first bombing campaign were strictly vertical, that is, carrying out plots in their entirety under their own recognisance, while operating within a primitive C3 structure based in America. However, one practice started during the first bombing campaign and continued throughout the other campaigns was American leadership handpicking Irish Americans to lead the cells and then coordinating efforts to bolster them on an as needed basis.

From the second bombing campaign on more coherent C3 systems were put in place to improve coordination and increase operational tempo. This was achieved over time by decentralising C3, which included using cell handlers on the ground to organise, coordinate, instruct and eventually control the Rossa, Sullivan and Lyman cells. Ultimately, to safeguard campaign strategy, cell handlers were utilised as a more direct means to transmit and coordinate a campaign style strategy through individual cell strategies. As such, while each cell still operated under their own tailored strategy, there was a general campaign strategy, which provided guidelines for each bombing campaign such as targeting. The forming of cell strategies was not just triggered by a campaign strategy but by also, the increasing effectiveness of police investigations including, forensics type investigations by H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.). These influences help explain the diversity of cells operating on the British mainland during the bombing campaigns.

While it has been shown that cell handlers tended to coordinate events for their particular cell or cells during the second and third bombing campaigns, the extent this was applied was determined by each cell’s strategy. As such, the operational disposition of cells mostly adhered to the guidelines set out by cell strategies such as during the manufacture of nitroglycerin on the British mainland in 1883. The extensive variety of cell strategies ultimately corresponds to their varying patterns of success, eventually resulting in an extremely productive and robust ‘super cell’ being formed during the third bombing campaign. However, during the attempted fourth and fifth bombing campaigns, cell strategy begun moving towards a single strategy transmitted by a single cell handler or headquarter cell on the continent. Ultimately, while cell strategy had an immediate influence on cell organisation and operations, innovations in bomb making in turn influenced cell strategy, driving the cell to become more productive.
The advancement of various types of bomb timers such as percussion and clock timers allowed cells to carry out near-simultaneous attacks. Subsequently, a cell was able to split into smaller sub-units in order to synchronise the placement of explosive devices at different locations. These types of operations in effect, influenced cell strategy. This effect was exhibited during the third bombing campaign, which was responsible for turning London into a geographic ground zero for terrorist operations comprising, the near-simultaneous bombings of high-profile targets in a series of well-coordinated attacks.

While the operational landscape triggered the evolution of the Rossa and Clan cells during the bombing campaign period, the same cannot be said for the cells of the Irish National Invincibles (I.N.I.), which developed under different conditions and as a result, to a much lesser extent.

The I.N.I. cells existed in Dublin for a limited time, operating between December 1881 and January 1883. These assassination cells had an extremely poor success rate with their only triumph being the Phoenix Park Murders. However, the reactions elicited from the landscape because of attacks against high-value political and judicial targets far outweighed their dismal record. As such, the development of I.N.I. cells was negatively influenced by the organisation’s doctrine, the Phoenix Park Murders and pressures associated to police investigations.

The targeting of the Chief Secretary of Ireland’s position and other prominent persons for assassination drove the underlying formation and operation of I.N.I. cells. That is, an I.N.I. Cell used in an operation was dynamically formed based on the selected target, available intelligence and other targeting criteria such as mode of transportation, which also dictated how an operation was to be accomplished. In this respect, for I.N.I. cells to operate in Dublin for just over a year required them to be highly compartmentalised. Subsequently, it was the far-reaching impact of multiple assassination attempts against the Chief Secretary’s position culminating in the Phoenix Park Murders, which caused disturbances in the operational landscape that effectively stifled the organisational and operational development of the Invincible Cell.

The high-profile assassinations of the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Lord F. Cavendish, and the Under Secretary, T.H. Burke, caused three major disturbances in the landscape. These included the mandatory assignment of security details to high-value targets, increased vigilance by the public and the introduction of a coercive crime act. These influences along with a high-profile police investigation made the landscape more complex for an I.N.I Cell to navigate. Moreover, police pressure on I.N.I. cells
became even greater as the organisation carried out additional assassination attempts, causing several more investigations to be started. Rather than adapting to these disturbances, the I.N.I. cells remained intransigent to change such as maintaining the same form of attack used in the Phoenix Park Murders. As such, an on-going lack of accomplishments played into cell members taking additional risks in order to achieve one more success, leading to the organisation’s eventual downfall.

In answering this first research question, three concepts are evident in how terrorist cells responded to disturbances, as triggered by their complex interrelationships with actors in the operational landscape. These include, how cells interpret and then adapt to their operational space followed by the campaign and cell strategies being undertaken.

First, the form of attack used by a terrorist cell significantly affected how the landscape was interpreted, both in how it was used and how actors in the landscape reacted to its activities. That is, a form of attack based on bombings relies largely on supply pipelines to keep the explosives flowing, whereas assassinations rely heavily on actionable intelligence to profile the target. In this sense, the cell’s on-going interpretation of the landscape ultimately determined whether it could do its job.

Second, there is a correlation between a cell’s success and its ability to adapt to disturbances in the landscape. The inability of a cell to respond to new threats, which were created to counter its operations, will eventually lead to its downfall. However, these threats can be circumvented as long as there is a diversity of cells to absorb any losses or if the cell adapts to the threat by modifying or introducing organisational and operational changes. The ability to adapt to these threats indicates the cell’s complexity, which depending on the severity of these changes, can lead to the cell evolving into a new form.

Third, the development of cells in all cases was based largely on a campaign strategy or a combination of campaign and individual cell strategies. For example, during the bombing campaigns cells operated under broadly defined strategies in which individual cell strategies provided the framework for cell operations. In effect, campaign and cell strategies were blueprints for their organisation and operation. A key piece of this strategy was targeting from which it can be deduced that the more complex and risky operations were ultimately seen as the most profitable in the sense of, exacting reactions from the landscape and gaining mutual experiences that increased trust and co-operability within the cell.
Overall, the nature of the unique reactions of cells to disturbances in the landscape shows that cell development is never quite the same for any cell. The variables within the landscapes are difficult to predict due to interrelationships between actors and cells, which can act to increase or decrease the evolvability of cells over time. Correspondingly, trying to understand what in an operational landscape causes a terrorist cell to evolve is best understood in the short term.

The next question in this research study will examine how and to what extent terror cells were utilised, to see exactly how diverse they were. The cells of the bombing campaigns have perhaps the greatest clarity, as there was no question as to their operational use. That is, they were used as instruments of terror by the Dynamite Party and the Clan na Gael to carry out trans-national bombing campaigns on the British mainland between 1881 and 1896. There were four diverse groupings of dynamite cells deployed during this period.

During the first bombing campaign, the Rossa Cells were highly autonomous and inexperienced, and while not used extensively, were still effective in eliciting reactions from the landscape. These early cells were not supported as part of any long-term campaign and as such, did all their own operational work. Consequently, their bombings in Great Britain against mainly low-profile targets could be considered a dry run to gain valuable experience and to test British responses in advance of a more extended campaign.

The Rossa Cells of the second bombing campaign were more advanced, entering a period of sustainable campaigns that emphasised an extensive build-up period, prior to committing to long-term operations. Support cells were formed to create supply networks for chemicals used in the manufacture of nitroglycerin by factory cells, which was then supplied to operational cells. During this period, cell handlers were introduced to coordinate the operation of cells, which were deployed to carry out multiple bombings in a single operation as a means to induce greater responses from the landscape.

The Sullivan cells of the third bombing campaign simplified operations by smuggling American-made dynamite onto the British mainland to bomb high-profile targets in the heart of London. Cell handlers were still utilised but had now graduated to operating on the continent. One terror cell in particular during this period, deemed a ‘super cell’, was extremely productive. It was used extensively to generate terror by carrying out near-simultaneous bombings through a series of operations on the British
mainland. Targets during this period were gradually escalated to higher-profile public structures in addition to injury or death becoming an acceptable consequence of the campaign strategy.

In contrast to the cells of the third bombing campaign, the cells of the attempted fourth and fifth campaigns began to rely on the continent more extensively to house first, a rudimentary headquarters’ cell and then both, headquarter and factory cells. These cells were not used to any great extent as police prematurely shut down both campaigns before the cells could become fully operational.

While the bombing campaigns were in full swing on the British mainland there were also significant terror activities being carried out in Ireland during 1882. The I.N.I. and its cells played a central role in these activities, which ultimately generated some significant disturbances in the landscape.

The I.N.I. cells were designed for one purpose only: The assassination of high-value political and judicial targets. Each I.N.I. Cell was extremely compartmentalised and made up of handpicked men who were capable of killing up close. These cells were initially used extensively to carry out attempts to first, assassinate the Chief Secretary of Ireland, and then the Under Secretary, which led to the Phoenix Park Murders, their one and only success. The use of the knife by the murder cell to stab to death both the Chief and Under Secretaries of Ireland was extremely symbolic as it communicated to both the political establishment and the public their ‘war to the death’ mind-set. Following the Phoenix Park Murders, the I.N.I. cells operated less extensively and mostly against lower value targets as a result of the highly public police investigation and the disapproval of the Phoenix Park action among the public, both of which to some degree, limited future I.N.I. cell’s activities within the landscape.

Overall, the terrorist cells of the Dynamite Party, Clan na Gael and I.N.I. were employed to change the paradigm of a revolutionary movement that was losing relevance. It has been shown that a diversity of Rossa and Sullivan cells were created during the first three bombing campaigns to bomb public structures throughout Great Britain, one of which became highly robust and productive. The I.N.I. in contrast, used a combination of assassination and the targeting of high-value government officials in Dublin, to generate terror. This utilisation of I.N.I. cells was such, that the Phoenix Park Murders was enough to cause disturbances in the landscape, which ultimately doomed the organisation.
The deployment of cells has shown that diversity created from campaign and cell strategies manifested
differently than those generated under a single strategy. That is, a more diverse range of Victorian-era
cells were formed by the Dynamite Party and Clan na Gael then those organized by the I.N.I. As such,
there were two characterisations of diversity, one based on quantity or insurance, and another based on
quality. In the former case, several cells operating simultaneously using a variety of strategies, which
included the innovative use of dynamite technologies, created redundancy, productivity and robustness,
as well as increased social interactions with actors in the landscape. This amounted to increased
reactions from the operational landscape and accordingly, cells becoming more diverse over several
bombing campaigns leading to the formation of a ‘super cell’. In contrast, the single strategy of targeting
high-value targets compensated for the I.N.I cell’s limited social interactions by creating
disproportionate reactions in the landscape. However, the creation of sameness through the lack of
innovations and strategies failed to promote the generational evolution of the cell resulting in the I.N.I.
organisation’s eventual collapse. Consequently, this characterisation of two types of diversity represents
strategic differences in the utilisation of terror cells during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century.

Other than dynamite and revolutionary societies, the security forces are the next greatest disturbance in
the cell’s operational landscape. As such, understanding counter-terrorism responses helps understand
to what extent cells were required to adapt in order to operate and survive.

Responses by government and state security organisations to the upsurge in bombings on the British
mainland were comprised of four inter-related security responses. First, bombings during the first and
second bombing campaigns spurred legislative responses in the form of coercion and regulatory
legislation to assist police in the investigation of terror suspects. This included the introduction of the
1883 Explosives Substance Act, which came about from the illegal manufacture and supply of dynamite
on the British mainland during the second bombing campaign. Second, H.M. Inspector of Explosives
Office (I.O.E.) led by Col. V.D. Majendie developed an early form of explosive forensics, which
contributed significantly to introducing effective anti-terrorism measures and supporting police
investigations of terror plots in both Ireland and Great Britain. Third, human intelligence developed from
eyewitnesses, suspicious members of the public, criminal informer networks, beat cops and government
agents was crucial in identifying associations with cell members, as a means to identify potential cells.
Human intelligence peaked in 1896 after police employed an extensive agent network in America to
break up the fifth bombing campaign. The fourth and final action by the authorities was to increase police protection of high-profile public structures by allocating dedicated constables to provide security.

This four pronged counter-terrorism strategy led by Scotland Yard Detectives was somewhat successful. Specifically, tips from members of the public, agent provocateurs, informers and anti-terrorism measures foiled several of the plots from the second bombing campaign on. This included the arrest of the Gallagher and Featherston Cells, the disruption of the London Bridge attack and both the attempted fourth and fifth bombing campaigns. However, this counter-terrorism strategy was not always successful.

The success of the Rossa Cells during the first bombing campaign was marked by surprise and luck. Specifically, security responses had yet to be effectively employed, as attacks had just begun on the British mainland. In this case, the police were only able to break up terror cells following an attack, mostly due to the cell’s inexperience. However, during the third bombing campaign, cell strategy was the deciding factor in responding to the counter-terrorism strategy. Namely, a ‘super cell’ that was formed during this campaign used near-simultaneous bombings in a series of attacks to create a steady attack tempo. In this case, cell members disbanding and returning to America between each series of attacks made the ‘super cell’ highly robust. This cell strategy was something Scotland Yard was unaware of until after the conspirators had been captured, which proved that the cell in order to survive and operate had by late 1883 adapted to the increasing complexity of the security environment. The multi-pronged government, police and public responses to the bombing campaigns were in contrast, a much more comprehensive reaction to terrorism on the British mainland then that undertaken by police against the I.N.I. cells in Ireland.

It was not until the Phoenix Park Murders that the D.M.Ps “G” Division began to truly understand the highly compartmentalised I.N.I. cell. This plot prompted three major counter-terrorism responses in the operational landscape. The first was to institute mandatory security details for high-value persons, which contributed to the operational failure of an I.N.I. Cell attempting to assassinate a judge in Dublin. Second, the British Parliament introduced the coercive Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act 1882, which gave police, enhanced powers of investigation and prosecution. Third, “G” Division ramped up its investigation of the Invincibles by employing human intelligence sources to identify early on, the main actors involved in this terrorist act. However, due to a lack of evidence little could be done to arrest the suspects until additional attempts carried out by the I.N.I. led to the arrests of several major players.
involved in the Phoenix Park Murders. Generally, all three responses in the operational landscape worked together to eventually bring the Phoenix Park terrorists to trial and break up the I.N.I. organisation.

Overall, these responses to terrorism spanning the last two decades of the nineteenth century highlight three important trends. First, responses were either unique to one environment or could span multiple environments such as the use of human intelligence and the I.O.E. across Ireland and Britain. Second, a small event by a cell was able to induce a much larger reaction in the operational landscape, which might on the one hand, alter it to the cell’s advantage or alternatively, change it to the cell’s disadvantage forcing the cell to adapt to survive. The Phoenix Park Murders altered the operational landscape negatively, requiring its cells to evolve generationally if they were to survive. In contrast, the intensive use of informers and agent provocateurs by the authorities to interdict cells during both the second and third bombing campaigns likely influenced the strategy of the Burton ‘super cell’ to adopt a more highly compartmentalised approach to its missions. Finally, following on from the second trend the more security force strategies in a single space, the more responses that were generated in the operational landscape, and the more severe these responses could be. The arrest of the Gallagher Cell is an example of legislation, public support, police investigative work and informers working together to bring down the cell. Ultimately, the security forces were the primary responders to acts of terror so how they reacted and then how the cell responded in turn, determined the continued viability of the cell in the landscape.

In answering the first three research questions, it has been shown that there are extensive and complex interactions between cells and the operational landscape, which moulded the operational dispositions of the cell and the level of operational complexity they could undertake. As such, the final research question will examine, how and to what extent terrorist cells evolved. That is, what fundamental evolutionary concepts can be applied to these terrorist cells to show how they evolved, and then what limiting factors were introduced, to restrict the pace and extent of their evolution.

The primary evolutionary concepts that allowed these terrorist cells to evolve were the evolutionary variations in the landscape along with the diversity and complexity of cells. Within each of these three concepts are influences that spur and limit evolution. The first, evolutionary variations are generated from sources in the operational landscape and regarded as fuel for the evolution of cells.
Evolutionary variations are considered essential for a terrorist cell to evolve. When addressing the earlier question, which examined sources in the operational landscape, it was found that complex interrelationships created disturbances that predisposed terrorist cells to evolve. This finding is supported by the feedback loop constructed for the cells of the bombing campaigns where it was shown that advances in bomb making such as the introduction of dynamite, were a primary influence in the evolution of dynamite cells. Positive feedbacks loops in this case represented the cognitive capacity of the cell, keeping pace with the increasing complexity of dynamite technologies originating from the operational landscape. As such, an evolutionary variation can prompt a cell to evolve. However, a lack of or disregard for evolutionary variations were additionally shown to incite the destruction of cells and in some cases, the cell’s entire parent organisation.

The cells of the I.N.I. are a case in point. Following the Phoenix Park Murders, several responses were undertaken by security organisations to uncover the plotters, and protect high-value persons going forward. However, evolutionary variations were never generated in the operational landscape to prompt evolution, leaving the I.N.I. Cell with stale operational methods, which had been proven ineffective in the pre-Phoenix Park landscape. Subsequently, these failures encouraged the I.N.I. Cell to take even greater risks resulting in its members becoming ill-disciplined, which eventually contributed to the demise of the entire organisation.

While it has been shown that evolutionary variations must exist for a cell to evolve, a diversity of cells is a crucial quality to ensure a cell does evolve. In examining the utilisation of cells, it was found that diversity had two main drivers. First, during the bombing campaigns a variety of cell strategies contributed to diverse forms of terrorist cells. This drove both innovations such as the evolution of bomb making technologies and productivity from near-simultaneous bombings. Second, the single strategy of the I.N.I. created terrorist cells that embodied sameness, which while creating a quality cell that peaked with the Phoenix Park Murders, tended to inhibit innovations and productivity over time. In each case of diversity, the cell’s productive and innovative capabilities contributed to its overall robustness.

To summarise the diversity of terrorist cells, one can observe that the I.N.I. took on a holistic single strategy approach to engage in terrorism compared to the individual cell strategies of the bombing campaigns. As such on the one hand, a diversity of cells created the conditions to increase innovation,
productivity and robustness, which sustained further diversity that resulted in a ‘super cell’ eventually evolving from the operational landscape. Whereas on the other hand, the cells of the I.N.I. lacked a catalyst to drive these same factors and as a result, once they became unproductive were eventually dismantled. One additional point found in the examination of security responses was that failures in productivity might incentivise the organisation to increase the diversity of cells as a means to improve efficacy. While this did not occur for the I.N.I, the failure of the second bombing campaign arguably influenced the Clan na Gael to address productivity during the third bombing campaign by associating each cell to a cell strategy. However, diversity also has some potential traps, particularly for an evolving terrorist cell, which must be avoided in order to avert disaster.

At times innovations spurred from diversity can lead to productivity that has the opposite effect on the effectiveness of cells. This form of breakdown happened during both the second and third bombing campaigns. Throughout the second bombing campaign, attempts to produce nitroglycerin locally led to a deterioration in the compartmentalisation of cells due to additional associations required to create supply networks. Another interesting case is the Lomasney Cell during the third bombing campaign, which had attempted to blow-up London Bridge through an extremely innovative but risky plan. However, operational complexities created unstable conditions resulting in the cell literally vaporising itself. In both these cases, innovation originating from diverse cells caused unexpected outcomes that contributed to their demise.

As such, diversity can be summarised as self-perpetuating to some degree but of course, when dealing with complex human interactions this is difficult to predict. While it has been shown that diversity can sustain the evolution of cells, a cell must also be complex in order to drive innovation, generate productivity and boost robustness.

Complexities associated to a terrorist cell were represented by the adaptive characteristics it adopted in order for the cell to operate and survive in the operational landscape. The cladograms constructed in this research study used adaptive characteristics to depict the evolutionary history of cells. These diagrams helped clarify how complexity changed between different cell types for a particular time and place. For example, during the bombing campaigns, the adoption of dynamite and advances in cell strategy caused cells to assume adaptive characteristics, such as support cells or near-simultaneous bombings to promote innovations, increases in productivity, and improvements in robustness. On the other hand, the I.N.I. Cell displayed adaptive characteristics such as the scaling of cells, which indicated
it supported some level of complexity that would have made it capable of evolving if conditions had been amenable. However, while complexity can aid the cell’s evolution, its inherent nature, like innovations, can also create weaknesses that lead to its rapid collapse.

Complex systems in these case studies were reliant on a core evolutionary variation to keep them going. Within the context of terrorist cells, these key variations can be thought of as centres of gravity. As such, if these variations were removed from the evolutionary system, the system would have gradually failed. In the case of the bombing campaigns, the centre of gravity was represented by advances in bomb making, which was prompted by the adoption of dynamite. If we changed this variation within the cell’s evolutionary systems, we might have ended up with gunpowder becoming the explosive of choice. In this case, as an explosive to destroy structures it would have being less effective and required fewer support systems. Consequently, a less complex system would have likely been generated reducing the evolvability of the cell.

Now that evolutionary variations, diversity and complexity have been explored to illustrate a terrorist cell’s level of evolvability, the extent to which these cells evolved will be examined next. In effect, is there a form of selection based on evolvability that applies to terrorist cells and if so, is it unplanned or is there some form of control over it?

Figure 7.1 shows an evolutionary pattern for terrorist cells during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The sources that caused cells to evolve were extracted from the cladograms constructed in previous chapters and represented in an abbreviated form to only show cell-forming events. These diagrams should be read from the bottom up and from left to right.
Figure 7.1: Abbreviated Cladograms showing the Evolutionary History of terrorist cells between 1881 and 1921.
There are two key features represented in Figure 7.1. The first is that the majority of forming events for the Victorian-era cells (bottom left hand corner) are derived from factionalism within the larger organisation. Additionally, risks associated to smuggling dynamite into England caused a secondary forming event resulting in the creation of local Rossa support cells. The second key feature of Figure 7.1 is that all the cells during the bombing campaign period were dismantled by the authorities, albeit one, the Lomasney Cell, which blew itself up. The dismantling of cells was in effect an important influence in the evolution of cells during the bombing campaigns, which prepared the landscape for the next generation of cells. That is the failure of a prior generation of cells provided the ‘informational fuel’ for the next.

However, some cells did not evolve. The I.N.I. cells are a prime example of cells that fell short of evolving even though they did have the opportunity. They formed, had one major success and were then later dismantled by the authorities without having any impact on future cells. In one more case, the Dublin bombings of 1891-3 is another example of a dead-end cell that never progressed beyond an amateurish nature consisting of sporadic attacks most likely due to a lack of any linear direction such as campaign or cell strategies.

So to what extent did these late Victorian-era cells evolve? First, they evolved generationally based on adaptive characteristics they adopted due to disturbances coming from the operational landscape and the collective cooperation and action of the cell. If cooperation was stable within a cell, it was then apt to evolve. For example, the Burton Cell by increasing the complexity of their targets increased the cost of the activity, which required increased cooperation between cell members. In addition, the more successes they had the more trustworthiness was generated through the sharing of mutual experiences. Alternatively, if skills were not shared, which might have been the case of the reluctant agent William Lynch from the Gallagher Cell, or if agent provocateurs feed false information to cell members such as the agent provocateur ‘Red’ Jim McDermott, cooperative instability ensues and the cell becomes less likely to evolve.

Second, cells evolved inter-generationally based on the adaptive characteristics they inherited from previous forms of the cells. For example, the successes and failures of the Rossa Cells became an informational resource for the evolution of the Sullivan cells. The same can also be said for the Lyman Cell a decade later in which the success of the third bombing campaign almost certainly prompted the
Clan’s attempt to use it as a model for another terrorism campaign. The decision to move all support operations to the continent mirrors the earlier bombing campaigns, which was an adaptive tool to shield the preparatory work of support cells from the British authorities.

With respect to generational and inter-generational evolution, there are two key observations to be made. First, the operational landscape largely drives the inter-generational evolution of cells whereas cooperation and its management are crucial for generational evolution. Second, a greater range of information is passed at the inter-generational level then at the generational level. Particularly, the failure of cells in previous generations provides the ‘informational fuel’ for future generations. In both cases, the information passed will be the skills used frequently versus those used rarely with the latter representing unsuccessful characteristics.

Third, cells survived until the authorities stopped them, the cell was internally compromised or leadership ceased operations such as in the third bombing campaign. Taken as a whole, the majority of these Victorian-era cells, including the I.N.I were eventually dismantled by the authorities. This occurred because they either lacked cooperative stability, the sophistication to adapt to disturbances within the operational landscape or introduced innovations that essentially weakened compartmentalisation, which ultimately reduced their level of robustness.

Overall, it has been shown that cells between 1881 and 1896 evolved rapidly through a process of selection that was both planned and unplanned. The evolution of each set of cells for a bombing campaign was rather rapid occurring in a planned fashion within a year or less of a prior bombing campaign. The Lyman Support Cell is the oddball amongst them, forming approximately one decade later from the end of the third bombing campaign with some variations of adaptive characteristics used during the earlier campaigns. In the end, these cells kept on forming as long as elements within the operational landscape continued to endorse the strategy of dynamite warfare. In contrast, there were no new cells created through unplanned events. However, the Burton Cell evolved generationally through unplanned disturbances in the landscape caused by innovations in explosive timers. This allowed mixes of different explosive devices to be deployed during operations that increased the cell’s productivity.
While evolution from planned events occurred rapidly, evolution from unplanned events had less predictable timeframes. In effect, planned evolution is controlled and unhindered, whereas unplanned evolution depends on whether cells when confronted by threats survive, and are then able to evolve in some way to adjust to the threat. However, the Lyman Cell suggests that the evolution of cells can still occur even after some extended period of time within the same operational landscape. This can be theorised as passing adaptive characteristics at the cognitive level inter-generationally from one generation of leadership to the next. The cognitive sources in this case would have originated from the ‘Sullivanites’, who would have transferred information to Lyman and his executive.

Ultimately, the evolutionary study of terror cells and cell formations has produced both general and detailed level concepts. First, Figure 7.2 visualises the general concepts of evolution as applied to terrorist cells within an evolutionary flow. The cells of the bombing campaigns are used in this diagram to help communicate these evolutionary concepts. This diagram reads from left to right and shows how cells evolved through planned and unplanned selection into diverse formations based on the six main evolutionary concepts identified in this research study. These are evolutionary variations, diversity, productivity, innovations, robustness and complexity.

This flow of evolution begins with disturbances in the landscape, which create evolutionary variations that are fuel for the evolution of a terrorist cell. These variations in the landscape, depending on their sources, can enhance the survivability of a terrorist cell if the conditions are right or ultimately destroy it, if they are not. As such, each terrorist cell has a centre of gravity, represented by an evolutionary variation that is crucial to its evolution. For a terrorist cell to evolve there must be a progression of planned or unplanned selections within the same landscape, which cause terrorist cells to evolve rapidly either generationally or inter-generationally, to sustain a diversity of cells. A diversity of terrorist cells can occur in varying quantities and result in cells becoming more productive, innovative and robust over time, encouraging more diversity. However, as has been shown, innovations spurred from diversity can sometimes lead to the destruction of the terrorist cell. As such, in order for a terrorist cell to operate and survive in the landscape, it must have some degree of complexity to adopt adaptive characteristics. These inherited or recently learnt adaptive characteristics are crucial in determining how effective a cell will become at operating and surviving in its operational landscape once it has evolved.
Figure 7.2: Summary of high-level concepts for the evolution of a terrorist cell.
Next, Figure 7.3 models the more detailed concepts of cells based on the first three research questions posed in this study. That is, how they developed, how they were utilised and how security organisations responded to them, which together represent interactions that moulded the cell. The concepts are generalised in this diagram by using the I.N.I. Cell to show these concepts. Figure 7.3 should be read outwards from the altered landscape. This diagram illustrates how sources from the landscape can trigger the evolution of a cell and in what way each diverse cell might respond differently to each influence, which ultimately drives the fundamental principles laid out in Figure 7.2.

This diagram shows that counter-terrorism sources can have a unique impact on the environment in contrast to other actors in the landscape. Responses by security organisations to cell operations can be either unique to one environment or span several. As such, they can alter the landscape to the cell’s advantage or disadvantage. In the latter case, the cell may be forced to evolve in order to survive. Moreover, as security sources multiply within an operational landscape, the more reactions that can be generated, cumulating in more severe responses. Accordingly, a small event by a terrorist cell can induce a much larger reaction in the landscape. This reaction can be exacerbated by a terrorist cell’s interrelationships with other actors in the landscape. However, these interrelationships also represent other disturbances, which in their own right can have significant effects in triggering the evolution of a cell.

As such, rather than try to understand these complex interrelationships over the long term it is best to interpret them in the short term. These disturbances are then understood by a terrorist cell within the sub-context of their form of attack. Depending on how a terrorist cell adapts to these disturbances they might evolve to become more productive and robust, or they might fail forcing a new generation of more effective cells. How they adapt is primarily based on the campaign and/or cell strategy they end up following along with the collective cooperation of cell members. Overall, the complexities involved in shaping terrorist cells mean that no one formation will evolve the same way, which equates to the uniqueness of each cell.
Figure 7.3: Summary of the more detailed concepts that trigger the evolution of a terrorist cell.
This chapter has answered the four research questions posed at the start of this study and summarised key features, which determine a cell’s evolvability. There is little doubt that while attributes of cells such as compartmentalisation rank highly to explain a cell’s effectiveness, its operational landscape far outweighs these attributes in terms of operability and survivability. The landscape contains the fuel for a cell’s evolution, which emerges from disturbances as evolutionary variations to drive the engine of planned or unplanned selection. However, before the cell is even formed, an event in the landscape has created the need for a new revolutionary organisation, the idea for a terror campaign or necessity for an individual attack. A second set of sources may then determine the evolvability of the cell, which can originate from a cell both internally and externally. It has been found in this study that mechanisms including cooperative stability were just as influential in causing a cell to evolve, as were opposing sources such as the security forces. Another set of sources were then responsible for ending organisations and campaigns, with cells as a result being broken up or retired. While the power of the operational landscape cannot be understated, this research has ultimately shown that the cell does not have to be a complete slave to it. Rather, if it remains dynamic enough to adapt and evolve when necessary, it will absorb the immediate disturbances and gradually over time build to becoming an incredibly dangerous instrument of terrorism. The cell in this sense has reached equilibrium within the operational space and clearly harnessed the conditions to undertake an effective asymmetric conflict.

The next and final chapter will conclude this study by reviewing the evolutionary framework to identify its limitations as well as making some judgements as to its effectiveness in projecting adaptive characteristics across greater timeframes and against contemporary terror organisations.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

This study began by questioning whether we truly understand how and why terrorist cells change over time and place. The complex strategy of terrorism and the razor thin margin that must be maintained between inspiration and terror was linked to the diverse and incendiary nature of cells to create reactions in the landscape, which forced change. This rudimentary approach to understanding why cells evolved was further broadened creating an evolutionary framework and methodology to identify and map out the evolutionary history of cells over time and place.

This chapter will analyse the framework and evolutionary method to understand its limitations. It will first examine its success in decomposing the complex inter-dependent relationships between terror cells and actors in the operational landscape as well as, determining the evolvability of a cell. Particularly, as a means to better understand where terrorist cells come from and why they look and act the way they do. This will include questioning the extent an evolutionary history can be built out over time and place by performing a cursory examination of potential links to Irish terror cells in the early twentieth century. Finally, this chapter will address how this framework might be applied to other organisations such as Al Qaeda.

The process of evolution for a cell can be summarised as the transmission of improved informational resources to a cell either generationally or inter-generationally across time and place. The initiators of these transmissions are actors in the operational landscape who generate disturbances that interact with the cell to sometimes effect evolutionary change. The landscape was defined early on in this study as, a construct of the operational context of the cell through which disturbances could be identified that influenced the operability and survivability of the cell. This construct was vital in identifying actors and flushing out disturbances that resulted in evolutionary variations.
The mechanism for developing the operational landscape required developing a detailed historical model of ultimately political and social interactions. These involved a variety of revolutionary, political and security organisations forming associations that became increasingly tangled over time. From these associations emanated disturbances in various forms such as legislation or the adoption of dynamite, some of which filtered down to cells and some that did not.

The interpretation of these interactions over a two-decade period represented a limitation of this framework. That is, to predict outcomes within a landscape is complicated to start with, becoming increasingly more difficult as political, social and technical complexity within it increases. Subsequently, within an historical context using predictability to help build out interactions is problematic. As such, this study has posited it is better to study interactions in the short term as a means to better understand outcomes and the impact they have on a cell’s evolution. Consequently, this becomes a limitation, as we do not have a complete picture of the operational landscape as it builds up over time, which affects our understanding of the cognitive representation of information that is passed generationally and inter-generationally between cells. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the landscape in the short term was adequate for this research study, which helped to identify disturbances that developed into evolutionary variations.

Evolutionary variations output from the operational landscape resulted in the planned or unplanned selection of certain cells. In most cases, these cells evolved into new forms that improved their operability and/or survivability. For example, the cell might have adopted a new characteristic such as a cell strategy that improved it operationally while negating a disturbance in the landscape that had threatened its survivability. As part of identifying evolutionary variations, one had to look for markers indicating an evolutionary change. This involved identifying adaptive characteristics and then looking for changes in a cell’s complexity, operational disposition and operational presentation over time. This occurred at both a generational (the Irish National Invincibles) and inter-generational level (the dynamite cells).

A limitation in identifying evolutionary variations is in the understanding of symbol use and terrorist cells. Symbols can tell us many things about cells such as its arrival into the landscape.
and its level of cognitive sophistication\(^1\). The I.N.I. effectively made itself known after the Phoenix Park Murders through cards left at newspaper offices bragging of the attack. In contrast, the dynamite cells showed us a level of sophistication in adopting dynamite. However, these comparisons are few based on the limited application of semiotics or more specifically, the field of symbolic anthropology, to the study of terrorist cells versus the study of terrorism\(^2\).

Ultimately, the more symbols we can link to a terrorist cell the more information we have available to understand how it interprets the world and in this sense, its reactions to disturbances in the operational landscape. While this limitation relates to a less then comprehensive ability to identify all evolutionary variations it also points to another limitation in trying to gain a comprehensive understanding of the social construct of a cell.

To evolve, the cell needs some internal stability to pass information generationally or inter-generationally. Subsequently, the cell must have a stabilized system of interaction such as cooperability to ensure cognitive information is reliably transmitted. While instability within the cell can be identified through informers, agent provocateurs or ‘weak link’ cell members, the secrecy a cell engenders makes it difficult to fully understand its social construct. This limitation is a common problem in the study of terrorism, even from a historical context. Certain things we are able to understand such as cell size, the division of labour and the degree of interactions with other groups. Moreover, we can make the assumption a cell is healthy based on its length of survival and success of attacks. However, understanding the extent of the social hierarchy within a cell and the management of cooperation requires information that is sometimes just not available. For example, unless one was a cell member how could the signals for stressors be identified, which cause a cell member to disclose valuable information that threatens the survivability of the cell. The limitations in developing a complete social construct of a cell will always be difficult unless first-hand accounts are available for examination.

These three limitations to some degree, restricts the ability to project the evolutionary framework forward in time. To some extent, the framework was able to link the bombing campaigns between 1881 and 1887 with the attempted campaign in 1896. The link was the Irish-American William Lyman who had at his fingertips a wealth of knowledge in the form of ex-participants of the bombing campaigns such as Alexander Sullivan, who had led the successful 1883-1885 campaign. Lyman and his connections ultimately became the informational fuel for
the inter-generational evolution of terrorist cells in 1896. Whether you could extend the informational fuel associated to the bombing campaigns and the I.N.I. assassinations into the twentieth century is less a limitation of the framework but more a restraint on the evolution of terrorist cells in of itself.

In Lyman’s case, the inter-generational evolution of the Lyman cell occurred within an operational environment that while changing, still contained many of the same actors although the influence of some had diminished over time. Moving into the twentieth century the technological environment and actor landscape was changing. A technical revolution was underway, in which the telephone, aeroplane, Model T and growth of military industries were dramatically altering the landscape. Moreover, the Wyndham Land Bill of 1903, which was designed to encourage Landlords to sell their estates, followed by additional legislation in 1909 to strengthen the 1903 Bill, effectively snuffed out the land issue. However, Home Rule was still a factor under John Redmond, the new President of the Irish Parliamentary Party, and heading towards another bill that was eventually introduced into the House of Commons in 1912. Without going too much further into this new landscape, it is obvious that the early twentieth century operational landscape was undergoing a dramatic shift away from what had existed during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

As such, ex-Clan agents who ventured into this new landscape may have only been influential to a limited degree. However, it is unclear as to what extent if any they might have prejudiced the terror component of the Irish Volunteers, Active Service Units and Squad during the 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish war. A case in point is Thomas Clark who became somewhat influential during the first decade of the twentieth century. Clark, an associate of the conspirator Dr. Thomas Gallagher, had been imprisoned along with other members of the Gallagher Cell during the early 1880s. Clark after his release from prison in 1898 travelled to America where he trained with Volunteers before returning to Ireland in 1907. On his return, he was co-opted into the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. and became instrumental in its revitalization. The I.R.B. was influential in forming the Irish Volunteers during 1913, which did carry out assassinations during the Anglo-Irish war. In this case, Clark might have provided some indirect informational fuel leading to the terror aspect of the organisation based on his experiences from the early 1880s.
However, this example while purely demonstrative and speculative does seem to a large degree show a limitation in the on-going evolution of terrorist cells across operational landscapes.

With the limitations of the evolutionary framework now understood, we now review how it applies to contemporary terror cells. Taking an organisation such as Al Qaeda, one can see why an examination of its operational landscape is crucial to understanding how its cells have evolved and to what extent they are being franchised across different regions. To understand franchising one must first understand the root organisation. By first reconstructing the operational context in which the first generation Al Qaeda organisation interacted with external actors such as foreign governments, then disturbances linked to the creation of its cells can be identified. There is obviously a contentious religious aspect to this organisation that spans across different countries creating an added level of complexity, which would be much easier understood in the short term if this analysis were carried out.

Once the disturbances in the operational landscape are isolated and translated into evolutionary variations, evolutionary branches will form for cells, if they are determined to have evolved. This process of transformation comes to life through a feedback loop diagram, which would be crucial in determining whether cells are being franchised and if so, whether it is planned or unplanned. As such, to apply planned franchising to Al Qaeda cells would require some kind of trans-national evolutionary variation representing an extreme decentralisation of command, control and communications. This could be accomplished by examining the operational dispositions of cells in order to identify ‘point persons’ who link these franchised groups together. In contrast, if franchising were not planned, these capacities would not exist indicating that the organisation is a copycat. Ultimately, the process of planned franchising may be lengthy. Subsequently, this would be reflected as a continuation of evolution along the original Al Qaeda trunk through the on-going transmission of cognitive capital over time and place.

This research study has striven to show how evolutionary principles can be used, to explain by what means terrorist cells come into existence. It has introduced a research methodology to decode the extremely complex process of the initial and on-going creation of terrorist cells, which is immersed in complicated interrelationships between cell members, cells and actors in
the operational landscape. It has shown that terrorist cells, given the chance, will evolve into more complex and diverse cells as part of an on-going evolutionary cycle. This process can make cells smarter and without a doubt more interesting if they are given the opportunity to burrow further into the landscape. The importance of the landscape to this on-going cycle cannot be stressed enough. It fuels the evolution of terrorist cells. Without a reactive landscape, the cell is impotent, while with one it can thrive. To conclude this study, the evolutionary framework has exposed patterns and concepts once previously hidden. It offers a beginning to a better understanding of how and why terror cells form, which while not amounting to complete certainty will at the very least ensure we are not as surprised when new cells enter the landscape.
Appendices

Appendix

The Sinking of H.M.S. Dotel

H.M.S. Dotel was a British war sloop built in 1880 with a crew of 158. It weighed 1,124 tons was wood planked with an iron frame and powered by both sail and steam. Its dimensions were 51.8 metres long by 11 metres wide and 4.6 metres deep. It sunk on 26 April 1881 and currently lies in the waters off Punta Arenas, Chile.

"H.M.S. Dotel, lately blown up in the Strait of Magellan"

Figure A1: H.M.S. Dotel.

The H.M.S. Dotel sank suddenly following two explosions on 26 April 1881 at 10 am while at anchor off Punta Arenas (Sandy Point), Chile in the straits of Magellan. Following an investigation by H.M. Inspector of Explosives Office (I.O.E.) and tests on H.M.S. Bullfinch it was determined that the explosion was most likely caused by a solvent called Xerotine Siccative exploding by accident. This chemical was considered to be highly volatile especially when exposed to heat. It was believed that fumes from the chemical, which had been stored in one of the forward unventilated coalbunkers, had mixed with air and was then ignited by most likely an unsuspecting crewmember. This is thought to have caused the initial explosion, which would have ruptured the foremost bulkhead of the coalbunker allowing the gaseous mixture to enter the forward magazine containing up to six tons of gunpowder, creating the second and more deadly explosion. While the official report countered any possibility that Irish terrorism was the cause of this event, information from this research study suggests there is still an element of doubt as to the true source of the explosions.
A lecture, reported on by the New York’s Sun Newspaper on 20 March 1880, by Russian Chemist Professor Mezzerhoff to elements of the Clan na Gael including, O’Donovan Rossa, emphasised early on the power of dynamite to attack high-profile targets. He used as an example how at a cost of only one hundred and fifty dollars, a device could be built to sink an eleven million dollar British warship ‘covered in armour 22 inches thick.’ In fact, American based Irish revolutionary organisations such as Rossa’s Dynamite Party were quite capable of developing devices to carry out such bombings. Workers in Boston during 1881 had apparently developed a technique in which coal was ground down into brick like shapes and then hollowed out so glass tubes or even tin cases filled with an explosive mixture, most likely nitroglycerin, could be hidden inside. This coal was intended for British steamers with the idea being that the coal would be carefully placed into certain ship’s bunkers, which would not be used until one or two days out of port. While this information suggests Irish terrorists were capable of this level of attack, the fact that the Doterel was anchored, and coaling had not yet taken place gives some credence to the official explanation of the events leading up to the sinking. The I.O.E. had actually disputed whether this form of attack would work believing it could only be accomplished ‘through the skilful and calculated application of small charges in actual contact with selected spots, or by the use of very much larger charges than it would be reasonable to believe [it] could be surreptitiously introduced on board a well ordered vessel.’ However, following the sinking of the Doterel a certain amount of chatter emanating from O’Donovan Rossa, whose Dynamite Party was responsible for bombings on the British mainland during the same period, implies, that maybe there could have been an Irish terrorist element involved in the sinking. The following comments made by Rossa should be taken with a high degree of caution as he had a history of inserting himself into the middle of high profile events such as the Phoenix Park Murders, in order to exaggerate his status within the Fenian movement.

Rossa made several comments between May and June 1881 that suggests a terrorist plot may have caused the sinking of the H.M.S. Doterel. First, Rossa commenting on the Doterel sinking during May stated, ‘an English warship blown up, will I saw a letter last December that told me the plans were laid in three of them’. However, the letter that Rossa comments on was never found during this research study. Second, during the same month he commented that, ‘the writer of that letter commands a party of eight men, it was his party laid the work in the “Doterel” last winter in Chatham. They laid the same work in two other warships.’ Note, a similar Xerotine Siccative explosion occurred on H.M.S. Triumph of the coast of Coquimbo, Chile on 22 November 1881, although the warship did not sink. In June 1881, Rossa claimed that the sinking of the Doterel was through the efforts of ‘Fenian Agency’. The eight men
involved were living in England at the time. They consisted of a man called Mulholland and another called A. McCabe who both lived in Liverpool, P. Corcorau and L. Sheehan who lived in Manchester, P. Mulhan and a man called Sullivan who lived in Birmingham, and J.W. Alpie and a man called McGrath who lived in London. Finally, in April 1883 a police report states that a conspirator plot had been uncovered that planned to use imitation lumps of coal, made up of small round bottles of nitroglycerin, coated in tar and then mixed with pieces of coal to look like lumps of coal. These would then be placed in coal yards and coal sheds throughout cities in England. It was stated by a conspirator that the warship *Dotere* was blown up in the same way.

This information shows that Rossa certainly had the motive, means and resources to carry out this bombing even though it was a complex operation. However, the ship being at anchor and with apparently coaling not yet underway raises the question of whether they were involved. Rossa certainly liked to plant himself in the middle of major terrorist acts such as the Phoenix Park Murders on 6 May 1882, which this research study suggests he and his Dynamite Party had some degree of involvement. So indicating his involvement in this event may not be that far fetched. Nevertheless, the final minutes prior to the first explosion on H.M.S. *Dotere* will never be known. The question is whether a sailor perhaps lit a cigarette in an unventilated bunker filled with volatile Xerotine Siccative fumes causing the initial explosion or that coaling was just getting underway resulting in imitation lumps of coal filled with nitroglycerin exploding due to some form of heating or percussion event. Further and more detailed research is needed, perhaps in the form of explosive forensics, to fully understand whether the sinking of H.M.S. *Dotere* was an accident or an act of terrorism.
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CO – Records of the Colonial Office
CRIM – Records of the Central Criminal Court
CUST – Records of the Boards of Customs
FO – Records of the Foreign Office
HO – Records of the Home Office
LAB – Records of the Labour Department
PRO – Domestic Records of the Public Records Office
T  – Records of H.M. Treasury
WO – Records of the War Office

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RIC  – Royal Irish Constabulary
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31 OBriin, 31, 166 and Pollard, 73, 86.
32 Whelehan, 9.
33 Whelehan, 7.
34 See the description of the Local Government Offices attack. Short, 105-106.
35 Short, 48, 48-50, 75-76.
First, on page 160 Townsend simplifies Rossa’s reason for forming the Dynamite Party based on there being no hope of armed rebellion. Second, on page 161 he states Rossa ‘stuck to gunpowder’ which is mostly true for the first dynamite campaign but not for his second. Townsend, 160-161.


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The Irish World was committed to espousing ‘skirmishing propaganda’. Whelehan, 73.
Whelehan, 73-77 and Townsend, 120 and Comerford, 207.
Whelehan, N. "Cheap as Soap and Common as Sugar: The Fenians, Dynamite and Scientific Warfare."

"The Irish Dynamiters" The Star 9 September 1884: 4.
O’Donovan Rossa" Nottingham Evening Post 4 February 1885: 4.
"O’Donovan Rossa" Nottingham Evening Post 4 February 1885: 4.
The name change from Skirmishing to National as explained by Whelehan represents the shift in the fund’s ownership from O’Donovan Rossa to John Devoy. It additionally removed a ‘contentious’ element of the fund’s name, which limited the its financial growth. Whelehan, 82.
TNA CAB 37/14/4, 2.
“Mr Michael Davitt in America” Freeman’s Journal 3 July 1880: 7.
Whelehan, 252.
Townsend, 126.
Comerford, 207.
Comerford, 225.
Comerford, 226.
Comerford, 226-227.
Comerford, 228.
Comerford, 228.
Kelly, 50.
INA A-Files, Box 4, A626 and INA A-Files, Box 5, A705. “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
Jackson, 122.
Foster, 403 and Kelly, 47.
Comerford, 239.
Foster, 403.
Kelly, 48.
Whelehan, 263 and Townsend, 121 and Comerford, 241.
Jackson, 48 and Townsend, 123.
Jackson, 48 and Newsinger, 76.
English, 203.


111 Townsend, 123 and Kelly, 3.

112 Foster, 382, 392 and Comerford, 231.

113 Comerford, 230.

114 Campbell, 25 and Comerford, 288.

115 Comerford, 228.

116 The 1880 General Election saw 63 Irish Party seats won by Home Rulers of which, twenty four were confirmed Parnellites. Comerford, 233, 240.

117 INA A-Files, Box 4, A500.

118 Comerford, 233.

119 INA A-Files, Box 4/116/A26493D and Townsend, 160.


122 Kelly, 53 and 60.

123 INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

124 INA A-Files, Box 4, A500.

125 INA A-Files, Box 5, A676.

126 “A Press Organ.” The Times 24 March 1884.

127 P.J. Sheridan was an Irish conspirator whose name has been associated to several revolutionary organizations. Sheridan was an advocate of skirmishing who had links to the Land League, Dynamite Party, I.R.B and Irish National Invincibles. Sheridan was an organizer in the Land League and appears to have carried out the same function for the Irish National Invincibles. TNA HO 144/113/A25070. “Arrest of P. J. Sheridan in USA, one of Phoenix Park Murderers.” and Whelehan, 260.

128 “A Press Organ.” The Times 24 March 1884.


131 “A Press Organ.” The Times 24 March 1884.

132 INA A-Files, Box 4, A500 and “The Irish Dynamiters” The Star 9 September 1884: 4.

133 INA A-Files, Box 4, A500 and INA A-Files, Box 6, A754.

134 INA A-Files, Box 5, A666 and Comerford, 241.

135 TNA HO 144/116/A26493D.

136 TNA HO 144/116/A26493D.

137 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.

138 INA A-Files, Box 6, A717.

139 INA A-Files, Box 6, A717.

140 INA A-Files, Box 6, A754.

141 INA A-Files, Box 6, A754.


144 TNA HO 144/115/A26302. “Arrest of Dynamiters at Liverpool (1883).” and “The Dynamite Party”
Lincolnshire Chronicle 30 April 1886: 3 and “The Dynamite Party: Its History and Operations.” Manchester
Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser 15 December 1887: 5.
145 TNA PRO 30/60/12. “Returns of Explosive Outrages and Discoveries of Explosives by HM Inspectors of
Explosives, 1881-1885: Home Office Memorandum concerning the sentencing of dynamite conspirators;
reports on prisoners convicted of causing explosions, 1891.”
146 TNA HO 144/72/A19. “Miscellaneous Papers of Irish Affairs (1880-1889).”
147 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
148 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
149 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
150 Comerford, 228.
152 Comerford, 230.
153 Townsend, 110.
154 Townsend, 114.
155 Foster, 406.
156 Comerford, 237 and Townsend, 159.
157 Comerford, 244.
158 TNA PRO 30/60/12 and Townsend, 223.
159 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
160 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
161 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
162 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
163 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
164 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
165 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
166 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
167 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
168 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
169 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
170 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
171 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
172 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
173 English, 207 and Bardon, 370.
174 INA Folder 2, “Phoenix Park Murders.”
175 Comerford, 243.
176 English, 213 and Townsend, 166.
177 English, 213 and Townsend, 166.
178 Townsend, 166.
179 Townsend, 168 and Bardon, 370 and Short, 72.
180 English, 209.
182 Townsend, 166.
183 Townsend, 168.
184 English, 208.
185 TNA HO 144/72/A19.
186 Kelly, 52 and Bardon, 370.
187 Foster, 381, 412 and Comerford, 238 and Campbell, 50 and English, 203.
188 Campbell, 25 and Comerford, 51, 65 and English, 203.
189 INA A-Files, Box 4, A616.
190 Comerford, 241.
John J. Breslin was a leading figure in the Clan na Gael from its inception in 1869 and through the dynamite campaigns. He had aided the father of the Fenian movement James Stephens in his escape from Richmond Jail, Dublin in 1865 and lead the Whaler Catalpa in the 1875 rescue of Irish patriots from Australia. He was subsequently linked to Rossa as a trustee of the Skirmishing Fund but was most well known for leading the effort to construct a miniature submarine fleet for the Clan in the early 1880s. His involvement in the dynamite campaigns was as a member of the Revolutionary Directory, which latter involved him coordinating a cell on the British mainland. TNA CAB 37/14/5, 1 and Short, 33, 37, 41, 62, 261 and "Tracing the Emerald Club." The New York Times 20 April 1883: n.p.

Whelehan comments that Breslin’s payout for apparently just acting as a ‘watchman’ of the vessel increased the friction between Rossa and the Clan. INA A-Files, Box 6, A737 and Whelehan, 141.

Whelehan, 141 and Short, 43.

Whelehan, 141.


TNA CAB 37/14/4, 8.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 8 and “A Moribund Conspiracy” Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser 21 November, 1891: 9.

Caron, 212.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 8 and Caron, 212.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 9 and Caron, 211.


TNA CAB 37/14/4, 14.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 14.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 13 and Short, 226.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 13.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 12.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 13.

Short, 147.

TNA CAB 37/14/4, 13.

Kelly, 3.

Comerford, 239.

Townsend, 120.

Kelly, 100.

Kelly, 100.

Kelly, 100.

A description for the acronym U.S. is unknown. It might have simply referred to the United States but this is speculation.
Le Caron, 220 states that this name came from using the symbol of a triangle on all correspondence coming from this executive.


Kelly, 101.


Kelly, 100 and Whelehan, 297.

Whelehan, 180.

Le Caron, 260-261 and Whelehan, 180-181.


TNA CAB 37/14/4, 7.


Townsend, 165.

Whelehan, 299.

Whelehan, 296-297.

English, 209.

English, 209 and Jackson, 120 and Bardon, 375-377.

English, 209 and Jackson, 120 and Bardon, 375-377.

Bardon, 383.

Bardon, 384.


TNA PRO 30/60/13/2. “The Irish Republican Brotherhood; William Lyman and the Clan na Gael; P. J.Tynan and the Dynamite Conspiracy of 1896 (1887-1896).”

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

Kelly, 58 and "Dynamite in Dublin" Motherwell Times 9 January 1892: 2.

Bardon, 411.

The Healyites were a faction of the anti-Parnellite majority in the Irish Parliamentary Party who supported Timothy Healy M.P. Campbell, 28.

Kelly, 59.

Kelly, 60.

269 Campbell, 28.
270 "Dynamite Outrage in Dublin" Dover Express 30 October 1891: 2.
271 "Dynamite Outrage in Dublin" Dover Express 30 October 1891: 2.
272 "Dynamite Outrage in Dublin" Dover Express 30 October 1891: 2.
273 "Dynamite Outrage in Dublin" Dover Express 30 October 1891: 2.
274 "Violent Explosion at Dublin Castle" Leeds Mercury 1 January 1892: 8.
275 "Violent Explosion at Dublin Castle" Leeds Mercury 1 January 1892: 8.
276 "The Explosion at Dublin Castle" Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser 9 January 1892: 15.
277 "The Explosion at Dublin Castle" Daily Gazette for Middleborough 6 January 1892: 3.
280 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
281 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
282 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
283 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
284 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
285 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
286 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
290 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
291 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
292 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
293 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
294 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
295 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529. "Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893)."
296 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)." and "Dynamite in Dublin: Explosion at Four Courts Coventry Evening Telegraph 8 May 1893: 3.
297 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
298 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)." and "Dynamite in Dublin: Explosion at Four Courts Coventry Evening Telegraph 8 May 1893: 3.
299 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
300 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
301 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
302 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)." and "Dynamite in Dublin: Explosion at Four Courts Coventry Evening Telegraph 8 May 1893: 3.
303 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
305 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
306 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
307 TNA HO 144/248/AS4847. "Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893)."
309 Bardon, 411.


Bardon, 413.

TNA HO 144/357/B15410. “Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin (1893-1894).”

“Dynamite in Dublin” Gratham Journal 2 December 1893: 3.


TNA HO 144/357/B15410. “Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin (1893-1894).”

“Dynamite in Dublin” Gratham Journal 2 December 1893: 3 and “Trial of Walter Sheridan” Freeman’s Journal 18 April 1894: 3.


TNA HO 144/357/B15410. “Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin (1893-1894).”


“The Mysterious Affair at Dublin” Coventry Evening Telegraph 29 December 1893: 3.


“Dynamite Outrage in Dublin” Dover Express 30 October 1891: 2.


“Dynamite in Dublin: Explosion at Four Courts” Coventry Evening Telegraph 8 May 1893: 3.


TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.

TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.


OBriin, 142.

Short, 75.

McEnnis, J. The Clan-Na-Gael and the Murder of Dr. Cronin. 1889., 68.

Short, 141.

Campbell, 59.

Campbell, 59.

TNA CAB 37/14/5, 3 and TNA PRO 30/60/12..

TNA CAB 37/14/5, 5 and Townsend, 172.

TNA HO 144/72/A19.

TNA CAB 37/14. “Memorandum by Chief Secretary of Ireland, April 13 1885.”, 2 and Townsend, 172.


Townsend, 163 and Short, 141-142.

TNA HO 144/116/A26493D.

Herlihy, 21.

Herlihy, 23.

Herlihy, 60.

TNA Records of HM Treasury (henceforth T) T 1/14746. “Papers on Police and Criminal Administration Ireland (1883).” and Herlihy, 64 and Short, 75.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA HO 144/72/A19.

TNA HO 144/72/A19.

TNA HO 144/72/A19.

TNA HO 144/72/A19.

TNA HO 144/72/A19, 1.

TNA HO 144/72/A19, 1.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746 and Townsend, 138.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA PRO 30/60/12.

TNA PRO 30/60/12.

TNA PRO 30/60/12.

TNA PRO 30/60/12.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746 and Herlihy, 131.

Herlihy, 123.

Herlihy, 122 comments that “G” Division was the seventh division of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, hence its alphabetic designation.

Herlihy, 122.

Herlihy, 123.

Herlihy, 125.

Herlihy, 129.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.

TNA T 1/14746.


Wilkes, 47.

Fry, 4 and Herlihy, 137 and Wilkes, 38.


“Protection of Public Buildings in London and Edinburgh by Augmentation of Police and Military Forces (1883-1886).”
“Protection of Public Buildings in London and Edinburgh by Augmentation of Police and Military Forces (1883-1886).”
“Protection of Public Buildings in London and Edinburgh by Augmentation of Police and Military Forces (1883-1886).”
“Protection of Public Buildings in London and Edinburgh by Augmentation of Police and Military Forces (1883-1886).”
“Memorandum to Metropolitan Police as to use of Greek Fire and Protection of Buildings (1887).”
Townsend, 171 and “The Alleged Dynamite Plots.” The Times 1 August 1884: 10.
The importation of dynamite into the United Kingdom was only allowed after Nobel’s patent on dynamite expired during March 1881. TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1882.”, 17.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.
TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
The Irish National Library (henceforth INL) Manuscript (henceforth MS) INL MS11648. “Walsh: Phoenix Park, A collection of cuttings.”
TNA HO 144/247/A54529. “Dynamite outrage in Dublin (1893).”
TNA HO 144/247/A54529.
TNA HO 144/114/A25908. “Dynamite explosions at local government offices (Fenians) (1883-1885).”
TNA HO 144/357/B15410. “Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin (1893-1894).”
430 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 10.
432 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
433 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
434 TNA PRO 30/60/12.
441 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9 and “The Dynamite Party” Lincolnshire Chronicle 30 April 1886: 3 and “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.
442 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9 and “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.
443 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2.
447 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1882.”, 43.
450 INA A-Files, Box 4, A506.
451 INA A-Files, Box 6, A737.
454 Eissler, 57-63.
456 TNA LAB 59/3, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1886.”, 42.
457 TNA LAB 59/3, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1887.”, 47.
459 Short, 69.
460 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1885.”, 60.
461 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 49.
465 Eissler, 69.
466 Mohanty, 24.
467 Mohanty, 24.
468 Eissler, 84.
470 Eissler, 58.
471 Whelehan, 160.
472 Whelehan, 124.
473 Merrerhoff is most likely talking about the Clan’s foray into building submarines and INA A-Files, Box 6, A752.
474 INA A-Files, Box 5, A752.
476 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529.
477 Whelehan, 158.
482 INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.
483 TNA HO 144/247/AS4529.
484 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 49.
485 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 47.
486 INA A-Files, Box 5, A666.
488 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 50.
490 Short, 181.
529 Lees, 64, 82.
530 Lees, 86.
531 Lees, 64, 42.
534 Lees, 47.
535 Lees, 69.
536 Lees, 69.
537 Lees, 84.
538 Ward, 142.
539 Lees, 60, 61.
541 Royle, 260, 267.
542 Royle, 283.
543 Royle, 285, 263.
544 Fry, 3.
545 Bardon, 369.
548 Salmi, 119.
549 Salmi, 42.
552 Sussman, 123.
553 Sussman, 123.
554 Ward, 21.
555 Ward, 14, 31.
556 Ward, 11.
559 Lees, 68.
560 Ward, 27.
561 Salmi, 101.
562 Salmi, 101.
563 Salmi, 101.
569 Whelehan, 163.
The National Archives (henceforth TNA) Records of the Home Office (henceforth HO) TNA HO 144/116/A26493D. “Special Commission for Trial of Gallagher and Others in Dynamite Plot (1883).”


TNA CAB 37/14/5. “The Case of John Daly (1885).”, 1.

“The Sligo Conspiracy Case.” Nation 17 May 1884.

“The Sligo Conspiracy Case.” Nation 17 May 1884.

“London Correspondence.” Freeman’s Journal 17 November, 1884.


“The Results of the Last Two Commisions.” Freeman’s Journal 29 November 1884.

TNA CAB 37/14/5, 1.

The Irish National Archives (henceforth INA) INA A-Files, Box 4, A506. “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880 -1883).”

TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2.

TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2.

TNA HO 144/116/A26493F. “Statement of Norman Alias Lynch not of use as Evidence (1883).”


TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

TNA CRIM 1/18/4.


TNA HO 144/116/A26493F.

TNA HO 144/116/A26493F.

TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

Kelly, 66.

English, 205.

Notes – Chapter Four

1 The Irish National Archives (henceforth INA) INA A-Files, Box 6, A717, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880 -1883).”

2 The National Archives (henceforth TNA) Records of the Home Office (henceforth HO) TNA HO 144/116/A26493. “Criminal Cases against Members of the Gallagher Cell (1883).”

3 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

4 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

5 An explosion occurred in Loanhead, a mining village about six miles south of Edinburgh, on 12 June 1881 in front of the Loanhead Police Station. Apparently, a small pipe bomb filled with gunpowder had been placed on the windowsill of the charge-office where it had exploded at around 2:30 am Sunday morning causing some minor damage. The investigation tentatively linked the explosion to Irish extremists based on the recent bombing attempt against the Liverpool Town Hall on 10 June. However, the size of the device and the target selected raised questions as to its purpose. Based on Loanhead containing a large number of Irish miners along with rioting and disturbances taking place on Saturday evening this might have been a case of criminal mischief rather than terrorism. “Explosion at Loanhead Police Station” Aberdeen Journal 41 June 1881: 5 and “Fenian Plots” York Herald 18 June 1881: 7.

6 TNA HO 144/75/A1586F. “Police report on Salford Barracks Explosion (1881)” and “Supposed Fenian Outrage: Attempt to blow-up Salford Barracks” Dundee Courier 15 January 1881: 3 and “The Explosion at the Salford Barracks” Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser 27 January 1881: 6 and “The

7 The weather during January 1881 was described by the Times as ‘The Great Blizzard’ with temperatures dropping to as low as minus 30 degrees Celsius, snow showers covering England and huge snowdrifts in central London causing stoppages in train services, and downed telegraph lines throughout England effectively isolating towns in the provinces. “The Gale and the Snowstorms”, The Times 20 January, 1881: 2.


22 The ‘Manchester Martyrs’ comprised, three I.R.B. men who were hanged in Salford Prison for the killing of a Police Constable during the rescue of Thomas Kelly from a prison van in Manchester during March 1867. Whelehan, 94.


24 TNA HO 144/75/A1586F. “Police report on Salford Barracks Explosion (1881)”.

25 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”

26 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.

27 INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.


29 INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

30 INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

31 INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

32 Earlier references specify Edward O’Donnell versus Edward McDonnell and James McGrath versus John McGrath. It is believed these are the same people based on the timeline of the outrage attempts. These are possible pseudonyms used by the conspirators to mislead investigators or possibly the names were just recorded inaccurately.


INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.


INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A671.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 47.

INA A-Files, Box 5, A670.

Townsend, 162.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836. “Explosion near the Town Hall, Liverpool (1881-1882).” and Short, 65.


TNA HO 144/81/A5836 and TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 47.

This information is based on a petition written by McKevitt to the Home Office during February 1886 requesting his remaining 15 year sentence be commuted. The petition attempts to show McKevitt as an unwilling partner in the affair and provides details of the event that attempt to show him a ‘tool’ of McGrath and not a hired assassin. TNA HO 144/81/A5836B. “James McKevitt case for Dynamiting Building (1881).”

TNA HO 144/81/A5836.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836 and “The Attempt to Blow up the Liverpool Town Hall” Nation 25 June 1881: 13.


TNA HO 144/81/A5836B.

“Attempt to Blow up the Liverpool Town Hall” Nation 18 June 1881: 6.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836B.

“Attempt to Blow up the Liverpool Town Hall” Nation 18 June 1881: 6.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836.

“No Title” Freeman’s Journal 11 March 1881: n.p.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836 and “The Attempt to Blow up the Liverpool Town Hall” Nation 18 June 1881: 6 and “The Liverpool Outrage” Freeman’s Journal 17 June 1881: 5

The British Bulldog Revolver was small enough to be hidden in a coat pocket and could fire .44-.45 caliber bullets. That is, it was easy to hide and had stopping power.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836 and “Attempt to Blow up the Liverpool Town Hall” Nation 18 June 1881: 6.

TNA HO 144/81/A5836.
The Ribbon Society was formed between 1805 and 1807. Its aims were both sectarian and agrarian, opposing Protestants and British land ownership. Its members formed various Ribbon organisations in their local areas, such as the Molly Maguires, and were identified through their wearing of ribbons hence the name, Ribbon Society. Pollard, H. *Secret Societies of Ireland, Their Rise and Progress.* London: Phillip Allan & CO, n.d., 32-34.

The Glasgow Explosions at the House of Commons” *Aberdeen Evening Express* 16 January 1889: 2.


“The Dynamite Party in America” *Glasgow Herald* 17 June 1881: 5.

“The Liverpool Outrage” *Freeman’s Journal* 17 June 1881: 5.

“Dynamite Explosions at Local Government Offices (Fenians) (1883-1885).”/n


The Ribbon Society was formed between 1805 and 1807. Its aims were both sectarian and agrarian, opposing Protestants and British land ownership. Its members formed various Ribbon organisations in their local areas, such as the Molly Maguires, and were identified through their wearing of ribbons hence the name, Ribbon Society. Pollard, H. *Secret Societies of Ireland, Their Rise and Progress.* London: Phillip Allan & CO, n.d., 32-34.


TNA PRO 30/60/12 and Short, 123.

TNA HO 144/115/A26302 and TNA PRO 30/60/12.


TNA PRO 30/60/12 and Short, 123.

TNA HO 144/115/A26302 and TNA PRO 30/60/12.


TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 48 and TNA HO 144/114/A25908. “Dynamite Explosions at Local Government Offices (Fenians) (1883-1885).”


98 Whelehan, 124 and Short, 156.
99 Whelehan, 124.

101 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
102 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
103 “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.
104 TNA PRO 30/60/12 and TNA HO 144/115/A26302 and “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.
105 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
106 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
107 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
109 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
110 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
112 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
117 TNA HO 144/115/A26302.
118 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and “Dynamiters” The New York Times 29 April 1883: np and also see Short, 126.
119 Note, the spelling of Ansburgh is sometimes shown as Ansberg. However, the former appears to be the correct spelling based on deposition documents in TNA Records of the Central Criminal Court (henceforth CRIM) CRIM 1/18/4.
121 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
122 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
123 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and “The Dynamite Outrages: The Prisoners again at Bow Street.” Freeman’s Journal 27 April 1883: 5 and Short, 134.
124 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
125 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
126 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
127 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
128 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
129 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
130 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” Kildare Observer 7 April 1883: 5.
131 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” Kildare Observer 7 April 1883: 5.
132 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “The Dynamite Outrages: The Prisoners again at Bow Street.” Freeman’s Journal 27 April 1883: 5 and “The Dynamite Conspiracy” More Arrests” Gloucester Citizen 9 April 1883: 3.
133 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
The American Exchange was a banking organisation that in addition to offering banking services provided reading and writing rooms to Americans living in London who purchased a membership. Moreover, it appears this facility could be used by customers as a drop off and pick up point for letters and other items. “Thomas Gallagher, Alfred Whitehead, Henry Wilson, William Ansburgh, John Curtin, Bernard Gallagher, Royal Offences: Treason 28th May 1883.” Old Bailey Proceedings Online, March (2011) retrieved 15 February, 2012 http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?ref=t18830528-620.
177 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “The Dynamite Outrages” *Freeman’s Journal* 13 April 1883: 5.
181 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and Short, 136.
183 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” *Kildare Observer* 7 April 1883: 5.
186 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
187 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
189 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
192 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” *Kildare Observer* 7 April 1883: 5.
194 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
195 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
196 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.
197 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.
198 TNA CRIM 1/18/4 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” *Kildare Observer* 7 April 1883: 5.
201 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and TNA CRIM 1/15/8 and “Dynamite Conspiracy” *Kildare Observer* 7 April 1883: 5.
204 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and TNA CRIM 1/15/8.

205 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

206 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

207 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

208 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

209 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.

210 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

211 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

212 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

213 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

214 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

215 TNA HO 144/116/A26493 and TNA PRO 30/60/12.

216 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

217 TNA HO 144/116/A26493.

218 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

219 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.


221 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.

222 TNA CRIM 1/18/4.


226 TNA HO 144/114/A25908.

227 TNA PRO 30/60/12.

228 “The Dynamiters” Belfast News Letter 27 December 1892: 3.

229 TNA PRO 30/60/12.

230 “The Dynamite Party” Lincolnshire Chronicle 30 April 1886: 3.


232 TNA CAB 37/14/5. “The Case of John Daly (1885).”, 2.


234 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2.


236 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2.

237 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and “The Dynamite Plots.” The Times 28 April 1884: 10.


240 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 2 and TNA PRO 30/60/12.

241 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 1.

242 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 1.

243 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 1.

244 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 4.

245 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 3.


248 Whelehan, 126 and Townsend, 164.


252 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 4.

253 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 4.

254 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 4.

255 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 7 and “The Dynamite Conspiracy: The Charges against Daly, Egan and McDonnell” Exeter and Plymouth Gazette 9 May 1884: 2.


257 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9 and “The Alleged Dynamite Plots.” The Times 1 August 1884: 10: n.p.

258 “The Alleged Dynamite Plots.” The Times 1 August 1884: 10.

259 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9.

260 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9-10.

261 TNA CAB 37/14/5, 9.


266 “The Dynamite Plots.” The Times 28 April 1884: 10.

267 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.


269 Cunningham was originally from Cork, Ireland. However, he had moved to America in 1879 and remained there for five years before returning to England in 1884, although his exact date of return might have been earlier assuming he had taken part in the October, 1883 outrages. “Londons Great Terror: Dreading More Outrages by Dynamiters.” The New York Times 27 January 1885: n.p.

270 “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 13 May 1885: 10.


272 TNA PRO 30/60/12.

273 TNA PRO 30/60/12 and TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 49 and “The Outrages on the Underground Railway” Sheffield Daily Telegraph 1 November 1883: 5 and see also Short, 160.

274 “Yesterday the Duke and Duchess of Connaught Commenced their Journey to India” Manchester Evening News 3 November 1883: 2.

275 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 49.

276 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 49.

277 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.”, 49.


281 “The Outrages on the Underground Railway” Sheffield Daily Telegraph 1 November 1883: 5.
The Outrages on the Underground Railway" *Sheffield Daily Telegraph* 1 November 1883: 5.

TNA LAB 59/2, "Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1883.", 49.

TNA PRO 30/60/12.

TNA HO 144/133/A34707 and Short, 176.


TNA HO 144/133/A34707 and “The London Outrages: Attempt to blow up Ludgate Hill Station.” *Dundee Courier* 3 March 1884: 3.


TNA HO 144/133/A34707.


TNA PRO 30/60/12 and “The London Dynamite Outrages: The Prisoners again at Bow Street.” *Freeman’s Journal* 24 February 1885: 5.


305 TNA PRO 30/60/12 and “Fearing more Dynamite: London Greatly alarmed by the recent explosions” The New York Times 1 June 1884: n.p.


313 TNA PRO 30/60/12.

314 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1884.”, 38 and “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 10 March 1885: 12


316 TNA LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1884.”, 38.


321 TNA PRO 30/60/12.


323 Whelehan, 124.


The Dynamite Outrages” Manchester Evening News 2 June 1884: 4.


“The Dynamite Party” Lincolnshire Chronicle 30 April 1886: 3.


TNA HO 144/145/A38008. “Dynamite Outrage at London Bridge (1884-1891).” and Short, 201.

TNA HO 144/145/A38008.

TNA HO 144/145/A38008.


361 “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 17 February 1885: 12.


364 “The Dynamite Outrages on the Underground Railway” Morning Post 5 February 1885: 5.


373 “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 17 March 1885: 12.


376 “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 17 February 1885: 12.


284
404 TNA HO 144/133/A34707.
408 “The Dynamite Outrages.” The Times 10 February 1885: 12.
410 Short, 166.
416 Short, 233.
417 Short, 233.
418 Short, 233.
420 Short, 233.
423 Caron, 283 and Short, 233.
424 Cook, 63.
442 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2. “The Irish Republican Brotherhood; William Lyman and the Clan na Gael; P. J. Tynan and the Dynamite Conspiracy of 1896 (1887-1896).”
443 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
444 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
445 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
447 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
448 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
450 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and “The Secrets of the Clan na Gael” *Reynolds Newspaper* 15 November, 1896: 1.
451 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
452 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
454 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
457 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
459 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
465 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and “The Dynamiters” *The Star* 17 September 1896: 1.
466 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
467 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
469 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2.
470 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and “The Dynamite Conspiracy: Arrest of Tynan and Three Others.” *Nenagh News* 19 September 1896: 3.
471 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and TNA Records of the Foreign Office (henceforth FO) FO 5/2348. “Dynamiters; Haines, Edward J. Ivory (Bell), Kearney (Wallace), P. J. Tynan (Garth or Gordon) (1896-1897).”
472 TNA PRO 30/60/13/2 and TNA FO 5/2348. “Dynamiters; Haines, Edward J. Ivory (Bell), Kearney (Wallace), P. J. Tynan (Garth or Gordon) (1896-1897).” and “The Dynamite Conspiracy: Arrest of Tynan
Patrick Tynan was still very much wanted for the Phoenix Park Murders. However, many of the witnesses had died by this time, which made any chance of conviction questionable.

Notes – Chapter Five

1 The Irish National Archives (henceforth INA) INA A-Files, Box 5, A663, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
2 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.
3 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.
4 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.
5 The National Archives (henceforth TNA) TNA HO 144/81/A5836B. “James McKevitt Case for Dynamiting Building (1881).”
6 TNA Records of the Home Office (henceforth HO) TNA HO 144/81/A5836B.
10 Eissler, 69.
13 INA A-Files, Box 6, A717.
14 INA A-Files, Box 6, A728, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
15 INA A-Files, Box 6, A716, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
16 INA A-Files, Box 6, A716.
17 INA A-Files, Box 6, A717.
19 TNA CO 904/10.
20 TNA CO 904/10.
21 TNA HO 144/86/A7266. “Manufacture of Infernal Machines in USA (1881).”
22 TNA HO 144/84/A7266.
23 TNA HO 144/84/A7266.
25 INA A-Files, Box 5, A676, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
27 INA A-Files, Box 5, A676.
28 INA A-Files, Box 5, A676.
31 TNA CUST 33/390 and “Discovery of Infernal Machines at Liverpool.” Kildare Observer 30 July 1881: 2.
33 INA A-Files, Box 6, A728, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
34 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
35 INA A-Files, Box 5, A663.
36 INA A-Files, Box 4, A506, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
37 INA A-Files, Box 5, A655, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880-1883).”
38 TNA Domestic Records of the Public Records Office (henceforth PRO) PRO 30/60/12. “Returns of explosive outrages and Discoveries of Explosives by HM Inspectors of Explosives, 1881-1885: Home Office memorandum concerning the sentencing of dynamite conspirators; reports on prisoners convicted of causing explosions, 1891.”
39 TNA Records of the Cabinet Office (henceforth CAB) CAB 37/14/4. “The Organisation of the United Brotherhood, or Clan na Gael in the United States (1885).”
42 Rossa, 284.
43 Rossa, 416.
44 Rossa, 417.
45 Rossa, 430.

Notes – Chapter Six

4 TNA HO 144/113/A25070. “Arrest of P. J. Sheridan in USA, one of Phoenix Park murderers.”
5 TNA HO 144/113/A25070. “Arrest of P. J. Sheridan in USA, one of Phoenix Park murderers.”
6 The Irish National Archives (henceforth INA) A-Files, Box 6, A717, “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880 -1883),” and INA A-Files, Box 6, A728.
7 INA A-Files, Box 6, A717.
8 INA A-Files, Box 6, A737.
12 INA Folder 2, “Phoenix Park Murders.”
15 Tynan, 432.
16 Tynan, 559.
18 Tynan, 468.
20 Rudorff, X.
24 Tynan, 556.
25 Tynan, 446.
26 Tynan, 433, 451.
27 Tynan, 558.
29 Tynan, 556.
31 Tynan, 456.
32 Tynan, 455.
33 Tynan, 455, 518.
34 Tynan, 455, 518.
35 Tynan, 455, 518.
36 Tynan, 428.
38 Comerford, 243.
40 Bardon, 365.
41 Tynan, 432.
46 TNA HO 144/113/A25251. “Arrest of John Walsh in France in Connection with Phoenix Park Murders.” and see also Corfe, Chapter 3.
47 Tynan, 430, 462.
51 Campbell, 175.
52 The Right Honorable W.E. Forster because of his position was unfortunately used by the media as a focal point for the contempt of the Irish people. His nickname ‘Buckshot’ was given to him by the media, which had been based on the belief he had ordered the use of buckshot when police, had on occasion, fired upon Irish crowds. Reid, T. Life of the RT Hon. W.E. Forster (in Two Volumes). London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1888., 235, 301.
54 Tynan, 498.
55 Tynan, 458.
56 Tynan, 458.
57 Corfe, 145.
58 Tynan, 458 and Reid, 467ii.
59 Corfe, 144.
60 Tynan comments that land leaguers during an attack on an Irish Landlord had unfortunately shot to death his Sister in law. In fact, the person shot was a lady, well known in Dublin circles, who along with her Brother in law and his wife had been ambushed by three land leaguers. They had fired several shots into their carriage killing her instantly. The media in England had to some degree publicised this brutal act by publishing letters between her Brother in law and the Right Honourable W.E. Gladstone M.P, which negatively portrayed the land leaguers. Tynan, 463 and “Ireland.” The Times 4 April 1882: 10 and “Ireland.” The Times 7 April 1882: 5.
61 Tynan, 463.
62 Tynan, 562.
63 Tynan, 457.
64 Kingston is now named Dun Laoghaire. It was known as Kingston from 1821 to 1920 before being renamed to Dun Laoghaire. It is on the coast approximately twelve kilometers to the east of Dublin’s city centre.
67 Tynan, 465.
68 Tynan, 562.
73 Tynan, 459.
74 Tynan, 472.
76 Tynan, 563.
79 Tynan, 476.
80 Tynan, 470.
84 Tynan, 472.
85 Corfe, 185.
86 Tynan, 476.
87 Molony, 175.
90 Tynan, 552.
91 Tynan, 552.
93 Tynan, 446.
99 Tynan, 566.
100 Tynan, 477.
101 Tynan, 477.
102 Tynan, 566.
104 Corfe, 185.
105 Corfe, 185.
106 INL MS5449, 6.
107 Molony, 152, 181 and Tynan, 567.
108 Corfe, 185.
114 Molony, 183, 212.
116 INA Folder 2, “Phoenix Park Murders, RIC Inspector’s Reports on Suspected Persons, 1883” and see also Corfe, Chapter 4.
117 INA Folder 2. “Phoenix Park Murders.”
118 INA Folder 2. “Phoenix Park Murders.”
119 Corfe, 191.
122 Tynan, 568.
123 Tynan, 568.
127 INA Folder 2. “Phoenix Park Murders.”
132 Tynan, 569.
133 Tynan, 570.
169 Molony, 69, 105 and Tynan, 260 and Townsend, 164, 166, 168.
170 Molony, 69, 105 and Tynan, 260 and Townsend, 164, 166, 168.
172 Tynan, 503.
173 Tynan, 503.
174 Tynan, 504.
176 Tynan, 503.
178 Tynan, 505.
180 Tynan, 506.
181 Tynan, 508, 571.
182 Tynan, 571.
183 This is the same comment apparently yelled by Cavendish as he was being stabbed. It is unknown why he made this statement. INL MSS449, 2 and Tynan, 571 and see also Corfe, Chapter 4.
184 INL MSS449, 2.
185 INL MSS449, 8.
186 INL MSS449, 11.
187 INL MSS449, 13.
188 INL MSS449, 18.
189 INL MSS449, 4.
190 Around three hundred Royal Marines had been brought to Ireland during December 1882 to support the police in an auxiliary role. INA Folder 6, “Phoenix Park Murders, RIC Inspector’s Reports on Suspected Persons, 1883”.
191 Tynan, 301 and Townsend, 177.
194 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
195 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
196 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
197 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
198 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
199 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
200 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.
201 INA A-Files, Box 6, A739.

Notes – Chapter Seven

2 Sterelny, 8.
3 Sterelny, 14
Notes – Chapter Eight

2 Most acts of terrorism are symbolic, the reasons of which have been studied extensively. However, analyzing symbolism at an operational level once more suffers from a deficiency of data at the cell level.
8 INA WS368, 13 and Jackson, 156.

Notes – Appendix

1 “H.M.S. DOTEREL, blown up at Punta Arenas, 26 April 1881.” The Illustrated London News, 14 May 1881.
3 A-Files, Box 6, A752. “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880 -1883).”
4 HO 144/86/A7266. “Manufacture of Infernal Machines in USA (1881).”
6 A-Files, Box 5, A676. “Miscellaneous Police Reports on Fenianism (1880 -1883).”
7 A-Files, Box 5, A676.
8 LAB 59/2, “Inspectors of Explosives Annual Report for 1881.”, 44.
9 A-Files, Box 5, A676.
10 A-Files, Box 5, A676.
11 A-Files, Box 6, A773.
12 A-Files, Box 6, A773.