Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.
Banal Nationalism and New Zealand Human Geography

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Philosophy

in

Geography

at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

Matthew Garth Henry

1999
Abstract

Nationalism has often been linked with the 'irrational other', and consequently, as a form of nationalist discourse, the routine articulation of national identities in 'Western' nations has often been overlooked. In order to uncover the routine nationalism of 'Western' nations the thesis draws upon the theoretical concept of 'banal nationalism' in combination with poststructuralist ideas of a performative subjectivity. Using this approach the thesis presents a discursive analysis of a series of human geography texts presented in the New Zealand Geographer between 1945 and 1990. During this period the thesis identifies a series of epistemological discontinuities in New Zealand human geography, partly reflecting New Zealand human geography's position vis-à-vis Anglo-American human geography. However, the thesis also identifies a common thread in New Zealand human geography, that reiterates human geography's relevance to 'the nation'. Through the banal and rhetorical reiteration of 'the nation' in New Zealand's human geography discourse the thesis argues that New Zealand human geography has performatively constituted the New Zealand 'nation' as the unimagined context for social life. In this sense the thesis suggests that, rather than merely reflecting the social context in which New Zealand human geography is situated, through the performative unimagination of 'the nation', New Zealand human geography is a partly constitutive of that 'nation'. Consequently, the thesis notes that geographers need to maintain, and develop, a critical attitude towards the banal elements of social life, because it is through these banal elements that myriad forms of power are expressed.
Acknowledgements

To my supervisors, Dr Lawrence Berg and Professor Paul Spoonley, for their inestimable advice and support.
# Table of Contents

**CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

**CHAPTER TWO: SUBJECTIVITY**

**INTRODUCTION**

**CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO SUBJECTIVITY**

- Phenomenology
- Symbolic Interactionism

**ANTI-HUMANIST ACCOUNTS OF SUBJECTIVITY**

- Structuralism
- Poststructuralism

**CONSTRUCTING SUBJECTIVITY**

**CONCLUSION**

**CHAPTER THREE: NATIONS AND NATIONALISM**

**INTRODUCTION**

- Hobsbawn
- Gellner
- Anderson

**Summary**

**BANAL NATIONALISM**

- Reiterative practices: an alternative approach to nationalism
- Remembering and Forgetting
- Imagining 'the Nation'

**CONCLUSION**

**CHAPTER FOUR: ANGLO-AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY**

**INTRODUCTION**

**REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY**

**QUANTITATIVE GEOGRAPHY**

**CHALLENGES TO POSITIVIST HUMAN GEOGRAPHY**

- Behavioural geography
- Humanist geography
- Radical geography
- Postmodernist geography
List of Plates

PLATE 1: LESLIE ADKIN, TARARUAS, WAIPEHEI TRACK 1927 ................................................................. 125
PLATE 2: WILLIAMS HALL-Raine, TE WHAI-RI-SAWMILL 1920 ......................................................... 126
PLATE 3: WILLIAM MATTHEW HODGKINS, MITRE PEAK, MILFORD SOUND ....................................... 129
PLATE 4: JOHN GULLY, IN THE SOUTHERN ALPS 1881 ............................................................... 130
List of Tables

TABLE 1: COEFFICIENT OF LOCALISATION .................................................. 177
TABLE 2: COEFFICIENT OF LOCALISATION .................................................. 178
TABLE 3: FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 1 MODE MATRIX ...................................... 179
TABLE 4: CONCENTRATIONS OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES ................................ 180
TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF FACTORIES ..................................................... 180
in a paper that Felix Driver described as, "One of the few explicitly critical attempts to wrestle with geography's colonial past" (Driver, 1992, p. 26), Hudson defined the link between geography and empire in starkly instrumentalist terms, arguing that as a discipline geography had been largely formulated to, "serve the interests of imperialism in its various aspects" (Hudson, 1977, p. 12). Driver cites Thomas Holdich's 1899 (a future President of the Royal Geographical Society) declaration, as to the scope of geography, as one such expression of 'modern' geography's imperial genealogy:

Truly, this period in our history has been well defined as the boundary making era. Whether we turn to Europe, Asia, Africa or America, such an endless vista of political geography arises before us, such a vast area of land and sea to be explored and developed; such a vision of great burdens for the white man to take up in far-off regions, dim and indefinite as yet (Holdich, 1899 quoted in Driver, 1992, p. 27)

Whilst Hudson's paper, and a later paper by Peet (1985), firmly situated the history, and practice, of geography in the material world, Barnes and Gregory (1997) argued that geography's strategic function was legitimated by the application of a putatively neutral, and detached, body of knowledge that could be applied to practical questions that arose outside the academy. Such an approach needed the appearance of a clinical separation between human geography and political practice, appealing to the value-free tenets of science to support it, and indeed to highlight geography's political involvement was, "a betrayal of scholarly integrity" (ibid., p. 16). As a consequence Driver noted that, "little is known about the ways in which geographical knowledge was socially constituted" (Driver, 1992, p. 29), and that, "we [geographers] need to do more thinking about the way geographical knowledge is constituted, and the various forms it takes" (ibid., p. 30). Edward Said writes that geographical
knowledge constituted a critical axis of the entire colonial process, since, "We would not have had empire itself without important philosophical and imaginative processes at work in the production as well as the acquisition, subordination and settlement of space" (Said, 1989, p. 216). The creation of these 'imaginative geographies' rather than exposing the secrets of spaces and places, enabled geographers to 'conqueror truth', by establishing the 'regimes of truth' through which the landscape was read.

In a roundabout way an awareness of geography's complicity with imperialism, and its stratagems of disavowal, combined with Driver's belief that geographers needed to become more nuanced in their thinking about the power relations involved in the construction of geographic knowledge, provided this thesis with its inspiration. However, rather than the 'imaginative geographies' of imperialism this thesis is concerned to examine the 'imaginative geographies' of nationalism, and in particular the relationship between geography and nationalism in the context of New Zealand human geography. In a very general sense the thesis attempts to situate New Zealand human geography between two discourses: firstly, the Anglo-American geographical tradition; and secondly, that of New Zealand nationalism. Within this framework what this thesis examines are the textual practices that routinely implicate New Zealand human geography in the imagination of the New Zealand 'nation, and which constitute the New Zealand 'nation' as the assumed, taken-for-granted, and categorically distinct 'reality' into which New Zealand human geography probes.

The choice of nationalism as the substantive focus for a geography thesis may appear, at first flush, slightly anachronistic given the belief that the 'new world order' promised by the technologies of globalisation would seem to dissolve nationalist chauvinism in the acid bath of a new digital enlightenment. But Birch succinctly notes that almost all the world's land surface is, "now divided between nations and states" (Birch, 1989, p. 3), and that if nationalism is the ideology that maintains these entities, then nationalism is, "the most successful ideology in human history" (ibid., p. 3). An ideology so successful that Ernest
Gellner ventured to note that in the contemporary world, “a man [sic] must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears” (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). But, paradoxically, despite the seeming ubiquity of ‘nations’, the discursive practices of nationalism are subject to a curious amnesia, so that if nationalism is presented as a feature of the contemporary world it is represented in terms of a return of a repressed, irrational force. Ignatieff wrote in these terms that, “The repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism” (Ignatieff, 1993, p. 2). The humans geography students’ book of common prayer The Dictionary of Human Geography (Johnston, Gregory and Smith (eds.), 1994) expresses a similar view, abet less forcefully, when under the entry for ‘nationalism’ it states that conventional wisdom held that nationalism was destined to disappear, due to the forces of modernity, but that, “However, far from being a spent force, the persistence of ethnic-based territorial units and their politicisation throughout ethnically plural industrialised societies has in a number of instances threatened the stability of many well established states” (Smith, 1994, pp. 406).

Nationalism is this sense is a phenomena of excess that periodically erupts, threatening social stability. A result of transmogrifying nationalism into a phenomenon of the ‘irrational other’, either defined spatially or temporally, is that the routine imagination in which ‘our nation’ (i.e. the New Zealand ‘nation’) is occluded. This routine imagining of ‘the nation’ is itself a form of ‘nationalist’ discourse, that whilst differing from more overt displays of nationalist imagination still constitutes ‘the nation’ as an entity to which it is seemingly ‘natural’ to belong. Consequently the key point that this thesis develops is that nationalism is not a force of the ‘other’, but is deeply imbedded in ‘our’ banal practices of signification. Consequently, like imperialism, nationalism is also deeply imbedded in human geography’s practices of signification.

As such, what needs to be examined are those practices of signification, and therefore the approach taken in this thesis has been to closely examine a variety of New Zealand human geography texts. Consequently, the theoretical starting point of the thesis is the position that geographic writing is not simply reflective of a geographic ‘reality’ where, “words are felt to link up with their thoughts or objects in essentially right and incontrovertible ways” (Eagleton,
1983, p. 134); but rather geographical writing, by drawing upon prior interpretations, is intertextual, defined as, "the process whereby meaning is produced from text to text rather than, as it were, between text and world" (Rylance, 1987, p. 113). 'Truth' in this perspective is not produced from outside texts, but is produced from between them, and the process of producing geographical writing partly constitutive of the 'reality' that it purports to describe. With this in mind, the primary textual material that forms the basis of this thesis comes from the New Zealand Geographer (NZG). Predominately, this material includes papers published between 1945 and the late 1980s, supplemented by shorter material published in the NZG during the same period, and papers published in Pacific Viewpoint (Asia Pacific Viewpoint since 1996). Whilst Barnes and Duncan (1992) extended the notion of 'the text' beyond the traditional idea of the printed page to include cultural productions such as paintings, maps and landscapes, as well as social, economic, and political institutions; the primary material of this thesis in mainly concerned with the text as a written word.

The thesis is comprised of six substantive chapters bounded at each end by an introduction and conclusion. The first substantive chapter (chapter two) begins by briefly outlining various approaches to subjectivity that have utilised in geography, going on to outline the concept of a performative subjectivity that is used throughout the thesis. The concept of a performative subjectivity is based on poststructuralist notions of subjectivity, particularly the ideas of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. The following chapter (chapter three) examines the various ways that the concepts of 'nations' and 'nationalism' have been approached, examining in particular the highly influential work of Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm. This chapter concludes by introducing the work of the social psychologist Michael Billig and his concept of 'banal nationalism'. The concept of 'banal nationalism' has been obliquely referred to in the introduction and provides, alongside the notion of a performative subjectivity, the theoretical focus of the thesis. Chapter four provides a brief genealogy of Anglo-American geography from the 1940s to roughly the present, outlining the various competing epistemological
hegemonies, as well as various continuities and discontinuities. Again thematically the fifth chapter is closely related to the previous chapter in that a genealogy of New Zealand human geography is constructed. Chapter six returns to the question of nationalism, and specifically the various rhetorical motifs utilised in New Zealand's nationalist discourse. The seventh, and final chapter, brings together the two strands of the thesis — of nationalism and geography— to explore, through reference to a series of texts contained within the NZG, some of the ways that New Zealand geography has articulated a form of 'banal nationalism'.

With this in mind it is time to step into the narrative.
Chapter Two: Subjectivity

In a stable which is almost in the shadow of the stone church, a man with grey eyes and grey beard, lying amidst the odour of the animals, humbly seeks death as one would seek sleep.... The man sleeps and dreams, forgotten. He is awakened by the bells tolling the Angelus. In the kingdoms of England the ringing of bells is now one of the customs of evening, but this man, as a child, has seen the face of Woden, the divine horror and exultation, the crude wooden idol hung with Roman coins and heavy clothing, the sacrificing of horses, dogs and prisoners. Before dawn he will die and with him will die, and never return, the last immediate images of these pagan rituals; the world will be a little poorer when this Saxon has died (The Witness — Jorge Luis Borges)

Introduction

The above passage from Jorge Luis Borges vividly expresses the performative concept of subjectivity that is developed in this chapter, and which will be used in conjunction with the notion of ‘banal nationalism’. In the passage the worshipper is the final point in a series of reiterative utterances — ‘pagan rituals’ — and when he dies so to dies Woden, illustrating the idea that abstract objects — Woden in Borge’s passage — are constituted through reiterative rituals, rather than simply being reflected in those rituals. For the purpose of this chapter subjectivity is taken to be those concepts that ground our knowledge claims, and our understandings of who we are (Weedon, 1997, p. 32) Debates about the human subject and subjectivity appear to lie at the heart of twentieth century philosophy, where “the critique of the subject is taken [as] the principle lesson of the philosophy of the second half of this century — and already, to a large extent, of the first half” (Henry, 1991, p 166). The first section of the chapter outlines some of the approaches that have been pursued in human geography in delineating human subjectivity, beginning with the implicit subjectivity of positivist human geography before moving on to humanist, and anti-humanist, accounts of subjectivity. The second section of the chapter draws on the work of Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler, to construct the concept of performative subjectivity adumbrated in Borge’s
'witness'. Before moving into the substance of the chapter a caveat needs to noted. Any examination of subjectivity is fraught, since immense difficulties exist in 'mapping' something that has no precise spatial and temporal boundaries, and where the very metaphor of 'mapping' is in itself is problematic (Gregory, 1994; Pile and Thrift, 1995). With this caveat in mind the account of subjectivity that follows has to be regarded as provisional, constituted for the larger purpose of the thesis, and consequently not a comprehensive 'survey map'.

**Contrasting Approaches to Subjectivity**

The purpose of this section is to outline the contrasting approaches of humanist, and anti-humanist, thought regarding subjectivity, delineating four — phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, structuralism, and poststructuralism — of the various intellectual strands encompassed within these positions. Firstly it is important to note that in human geography overt humanist, and anti-humanist, strands of subjectivity were constituted as a reaction against the implicit subjectivity of positivist spatial science (Pile, 1991). Spatial scientists largely adhered to the 'Enlightenment project', launched in the seventeenth-century Europe, which emphasised societal progress led by scientific rationality. Scientific rationality was based on a belief in autonomous, sovereign, self-conscious individuals who were essentially the same, and able to make similar moral judgements. The entwined belief in scientific progress, and the sovereign individual led in turn to the proposition that universal truths existed, and whose discovery and ultimate integration was the goal of scientific endeavour (Barnes, 1996). A particular feature of such an epistemology was the categorical separation of the knower from the known, a separation that was a necessary condition for knowledge (Bordo, 1986; Barnes and Gregory, 1997).

In contrast, Ley and Samuels argued that the purpose of humanist geography was to put, "man [sic], in all his reflective capacities, back in the centre of things as both a producer and a product of his social world...." (Ley and Samuels, 1978, p. 7). By placing questions of meaning and value at the centre
of humanistic geography such an approach directly confronted the positivist separation of the knower and the known as the fundamental condition for knowledge. The purpose of such a positioning was expressed by Ley who noted that, "the facts of human geography cannot be viewed independently of a subject whose concerns confer their meaning, a meaning that directs subsequent action. Unlike the natural sciences, then, the social sciences cannot escape the task of interpreting the domain of consciousness and subjectivity (Ley, 1981 p. 214). Therefore, at the core of humanist geography was the idea of an intentional human agent, and its embodiment in the autonomous, intentional subject (Gregory, 1981). A useful summary of some of the assumptions surrounding 'individuality' and human agency is provided by Heelas:

We regard ourselves as being capable of acting on the world, exercising our will power, and we feel that we have the ability to alter many of our psychological attributes (as when we 'make up our minds to be calm'). A number of expressions, in fact, focus on the powers of the self with respect to itself — e.g. 'self-determination', 'self-possession', 'self-respect', and 'self-assurance' (1981, quoted in Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 76)

Despite the conflict between humanist, and positivist accounts of subjectivity, the figure of the autonomous subject is common to both. In this respect the commonality between humanist, and positivist geography can be seen in the early linkages between behavioural geography and humanist geography (Johnston, 1997). However as these links dissolved humanist debate circulated around phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism (Gregory, 1981; Gregory, 1989; and Pile, 1991). An examination of these two approaches forms the basis of the following sections.

Phenomenology

The phenomenological approach was founded on the importance of reflecting on the way that the world was made available for intellectual inquiry. One of phenomenology's main concerns was to uncover the world as it showed itself before scientific inquiry (Pickles, 1985). In contrast to positivism,
phenomenology claimed, firstly, that 'observation' and objectification' were never the simple exercises that conventional science assumed them to be, and secondly, insisted that, "we exist primordially not as subjects manipulating the objects in the external 'real', physical world, but as beings in alongside and toward the world (Pickles, 1985). As a method phenomenology involved three main movements: firstly, the suspension of one's presuppositions; secondly, the reflection, not on the objects of perception but on the way objects were originally given, experiences that Husserl called *phenomena*; and thirdly, the disclosure of the essence (*eidē*) of the phenomena (Pickles, 1985). In this way phenomenology was an *eidetic* science since it not only critiqued but also provided an alternative to positivistic science (Entrikin, 1976). Phenomenology aimed to ground the frameworks of empirical science by revealing the essential nature of their objects, and the concepts that constituted their empirical domain, a process whereby, "One endeavours to peel off successive layers of a priori judgement and to transcend all preconceptions in order to arrive as a consciousness of pure essences (Buttimer, 1976, p. 279). To this end in humanistic geography three strands of phenomenology entwined: descriptive; transcendental; and constitutive phenomenology. Very briefly, descriptive phenomenology dealt with the 'essential structures' that undergrided empirical sciences; whilst transcendental phenomenology dealt with the 'essential structures of intentionality; and constitutive phenomenology, dealt with the structures of social meaning (Pickles, 1985). Together these phenomenological approaches provided for a people-centred form of knowledge based in human awareness, experience and understanding. Phenomena were seen to be necessary to the study of, and reflection on, the meaning of being human in specific spatial and temporal contexts (Pile, 1991). The social context—or 'lifeworld'—of being human was characterised by sets of unquestioned meanings and routines that determined behaviour, and consequently the demand of phenomenology was for each knower to return to the self, to expose the individuals 'lifeworld', and to bring it to consciousness, "Each knower should recognise himself [sic] as an intentional subject, i.e., as a knower who uses words —intended meanings— to render his [sic] intuitions objective and communicable (Buttimer, 1976, p. 279; also see Pile, 1993). Pile likened the
phenomenologist to an archaeologist, “digging ever deeper into the inner depths” (Pile, 1995, p. 124), but problematically notes that, “the archaeo-phenomenologist can never be sure if the true self has been found, especially because it is the already-buried (false) self which does the digging, using the tools provided by the lifeworld (ibid., p. 124). Because phenomenology sought to disinter ‘essential meanings’ it foreclosed an investigation of the opaqueness of communication, and the role of communication in the (re)production of the subjective and experiential self in the world (Pile, 1993). Consequently while phenomenology had radical intentions of questioning the unquestioned by suggesting a (true) inner world and a (false) outer world, it denied that a dialogic relationship existed between them. Such a perspective constituted subjectivity as the attribute of a concealed foundational essence, and the role of the phenomenologist was to disinter the subjects ‘true’ identity.

Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism primarily developed from American empirical sociology and social psychology, taking form within human geography with Beger and Luckmann’s 1967 The Social Construction of Reality (Pile, 1996). Symbolic interactionism assumed that human behaviour was founded upon shared meanings, and was consequently concerned with the symbolic life of social worlds, emphasising the links between symbols of all kinds and the ways that individuals constructed and maintained their self-images (Pile, 1991). These self-images existed as both symbolic expressions of the individual self (subjectivity), and shared according to the type of interaction (intersubjectivity) within the boundaries of the social setting (contextuality) (Pile, 1991). This provided an approach for humanistic geographers who were concerned at phenomenology’s idealism, ensuring that subjectivity and social context were considered together, “the environment is not in the head. Consciousness cannot break loose from a concrete time-space context, from the realities of everyday living; notions of pure consciousness are as much an abstraction from human experience as any isotropic plain (Ley, 1978, p. 45; Pile, 1996). The assumption was that humans organised their emotions, feelings, desires,
and spatial behaviour through selves, that in turn were defined through their social interactions (Pile, 1991). The result was the insertion of a dynamic self between 'cognition' and 'behaviour', where the self developed in relation to place, and where places limited what individuals could make of them. Consequently, places were not simply expressions of an identity, but were also constitutive of an identity. Such an approach allowed four insights: firstly, the 'real' was masked by a veil of symbolic meanings; secondly, the individual was split into separate selves; thirdly, there was an internal relationship between people and place; and finally, people responded in specific ways at different times, and in different places, because they have learnt a 'repertoire' of possible selves (for a dramaturgical account of subjectivity see Goffman, 1959; Pile, 1996). Such insights, however, assumed that the whole of a person's experience involved the negotiation between the self and external behaviour in space (Wilson, 1980). So while it was assumed that the self was splintered, there was no account of the splintering, and therefore no account of the relationship between these 'parts' and the external world. Consequently because symbol interactionism did not distinguish between distinctive kinds of internal relationships between the 'I' and the 'me', this relationship was assumed to be unproblematic (Pile, 1996).

To summarise, humanist geography involved a sustained inquiry into the ways that human subjects internalised, at a variety of 'levels' —from the body itself through levels of being, experience and reflection, senses of space, place, environment and landscape— those elements that 'constituted' subjects as selves in the world. The model of personhood that was adopted by the humanists emphasised the centrality, and intentionality, of human agency, and placed human values and experiences as integral to the study of people and place (Ley, 1989). While humanist geography brought an overt focus on subjectivity and agency to human geography, which had been missing from positivist spatial science, humanist geography also reiterated common-sense assumptions about the sovereign individual of the 'Enlightenment. With this in mind the chapter turns to anti-humanist accounts of subjectivity.
Anti-humanist Accounts of Subjectivity

In contrast to the humanist concept of the sovereign subject, anti-humanist thought questioned the capacity and authority of individual subjects to autonomously direct their actions. Within the loose umbrella that covers anti-humanism this section briefly outlines structuralist, and post-structuralist approaches to subjectivity. An exposition which has both a contrastive function, and which serves as an introduction to the performative approach to subjectivity constructed in the final section of the chapter.

Structuralism

Human geography's first encounter with structural explanation began with a debate between Ratzel and Durkheim at the end of the nineteenth century, where Durkheim tried to assimilate human geography into his concept of morphologie sociale, and the wider construction of a realist social science (Gregory, 1978a). However, while Durkheimian structuralism influenced the Vidalian school, human geography's first encounter with structuralism was slight, and it was not until a second encounter, with thought derived from Piaget and Althusser, as part of the critique of positivist geography that the links grew stronger (Tuan, 1972; Harvey, 1973; Sayer, 1976; and Gregory, 1978a). The structuralism inspired by Piaget and Althusser involved a set of principles and procedures, derived from linguistics and linguistic philosophy, that involved moving 'beneath' the visible and conscious designs of active human subjects in order to expose the essential logic that bound those designs together in enduring and underlying structures. While structuralism did not deny the existence of an external, universal reality, it did deny the possibility of human beings having access to this reality in an objective, universal, non-culturally-determined manner (Fiske, 1990). Structuralism's enterprise, therefore, was to discover how people made sense of the world, not what the world was (ibid.). The impact of structuralism on human geography was to stress the importance of clarifying the theoretical constructs with which geographers worked, Gregory's (1978a) 'unexamined discourses'. In particular structuralism forced
an acknowledgement that the ‘facts’ did not speak for themselves, and that
empirical inquiry required a theoretical sensibility. One particular consequence
of this sensibility was a suspicion towards voluntarism, that contra to humanist
thought social life could not be explained in terms of the capacities of human
agency. It is in the construction of a ‘de-centred’ subjectivity that structuralism,
in particular, differed from the humanist approach.

Working within the structuralist framework Athusser (1971) developed a theory
of ideology that decoupled the concept from a close cause and effect
relationship between the social superstructure and the economic base. Rather
than defining ideology as a set of ideas imposed by one class on another
Althusser redefined ideology as ongoing and all-pervasive set of practices in
which all classes participated. One of the most ubiquitous ideological practices
was ‘interpellation’, a concept characterised as, “All communication addresses
someone, and in addressing them it places them in a social relationship. In
recognising ourselves as the addressee and in responding to the
communication, we participate in our own social, and therefore ideological,
construction” (Fiske, 1990, p. 175). The power of Althusser’s concept of
ideology as a practice lay in the ability of the dominant to engage the
subordinate in its practices, and thus to lead the subordinate to construct
subjectivities that were complicit with it, and against their own socio-political
interests (Fiske, 1990). The conclusion of Althusser’s theory was that ideology
was inescapable, for although our material social experience may contradict it,
the only means of making sense of our experiences are always ideologically
constituted, and thus no non-ideological vantage point exists (Fiske, 1990).
Having said that, however, Foucault suggests that ideology always implies the
possibility of a non-ideological gaze, because it assumes that someone,
somewhere, can pierce the smokescreens of delusion to describe what is
‘really’ happening. Someone will be able to say who is actually dominant,
where the real interests of the subordinate lie, and will be able to definitively fix
the lines of power around the fortunes of different groups.
Poststructuralism
drew on and extended some of the insights of structuralism, especially Saussurian linguistics and Althusser's critique of the subject, bringing into human geography the concepts of discourse and deconstruction (Sarup, 1989; Barnes and Gregory, 1995). In terms of subjectivity, poststructuralism absorbed the anti-humanist critique of the unified subject, and developed it to constitute subjectivity as a protean site of disunity, conflict and contradiction (Weedon, 1997). In accepting this critique, however, poststructuralism diverged from Althusser's position in seeing that the production of subjectivity as a discursive rather than ideological effect. While Althusser represented his critique of the subject as a scientific exposé, upon which a 'real' could be uncovered, poststructuralist writers, such as Foucault, maintained that no extra discursive 'real' could be known outside of cultural systems, and that consequently discourses were systems of epistemological possibility (Phillips, 1985). As with structuralism, poststructuralist thought views language as a critical medium for defining and contesting, social organisation and subjectivity, since through it we enter socially, historically, and spatially specific discourses; discourses that determine the specific possibilities of subjectivity. However, language cannot have any political effect except in, and through, the actions of individuals who become its bearers by taking up the forms of subjectivity that it proposes, and acts upon them (Weedon, 1997). The individual, therefore, is both able to draw upon a range of possible subjectivities, and at any particular moment of thought or speech be subjected to the regime of meaning of particular discourses; and be enabled to act within those possibilities. In respect to language, therefore, a discourse represents the limits of what can be said about the world, consequently appearing to be immutable. But discourses are protean and fragile because of their embeddedness within regimes of power, and that, "Acquisition of knowledge under different discourse regimes is thus neither rational or progressive, but at best contingent and halting. Although there are truths, there is no Truth" (Barnes and Duncan, 1995, p. 141). As previously noted poststructuralist
thought brought into human geography the concepts of discourse and deconstruction, of which the former has been briefly explicated. However, the following lines focus on deconstruction.

Deconstruction is Derrida’s method of destabilising truth claims, and of noticing how truths are produced (Norris, 1982; Spivak, 1989; Sparke, 1995). As such, "a deconstructive approach offers less of a critique targeted at flawed representation, and more of a reflexive ethic and critical attitude towards the possibility of full representation in general" (Sparke, 1995, p. 4). Specifically, deconstruction breaks the link between presence and the logocentric system by showing that the assertion of presence is undermined by other definitions within the logocentric system itself (Barnes, 1996). Questioning of the presence of causality is carried out from within the system of causality itself, and as a result, "deconstruction appeals to no higher logical principle or superior reason but uses the very principle it deconstructs" (Culler, 1983, p. 87).

Deconstruction's general strategy is to isolate pivotal distinctions, distinctions that provide the basis of presence for the entire logocentric system, and then to show that those distinctions are inconsistent and paradoxical because of the rhetorical moves required to construct them (Barnes, 1996). In this way, "the text is seen to fall by its own criteria — the standards or definitions which the text sets up are used reflexively to unsettle and shatter the original distinctions" (Lawson, 1985, p. 93). This is possible because of Derrida’s radicalisation of Saussure’s notion that there was no necessary relationship between signified and signifier, to argue that meaning is always underdetermined since there are no fixed relationships within a system of signifiers, with which to anchor meaning. Consequently, if meaning comes from the orchestration of signifiers that are not tied to signifieds, then the system of signifiers is inescapable, to wit Derrida writes that we:

cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward the referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word outside of writing in general.... There is nothing outside of the text (emphasis in original, 1976, p. 158).
The quote's last line has been critiqued as a disconnected textualism (see Harley, 1990), but as Spivak makes clear in her translation of *Of Grammatology* the line, "There is nothing outside the text" can also be translated as, "there is no outside text" (Derrida, 1976). What this refers to is the idea that meaning can only be generated and communicated textually (Rylance, 1987; Barnes and Duncan, 1992). If meaning can only be generated textually then the inconsistencies that deconstruction seeks to uncover are not simply mistakes, but exist in the logic of language itself, and, "Mirror representations always fail because there is nothing outside the text; our truths are only those that we write to ourselves" (Barnes and Gregory, 1994, pp. 141-142).

In contrast to Derrida's approach to destabilising truth claims, Foucault pursued an approach that traced the history of discourses, the exclusions upon which they rested, and the discursive contingency of truth claims (Rabinow, 1991; Gutting, 1994). The concept of discourse was highlighted earlier in the chapter and does not require reiteration here, but it is important to realise that the concept of discourse represented a clear break for poststructuralism with the ahistorical categories of humanism and structuralism, such as human nature, timeless meaning or universal rationality (Barnes and Duncan, 1992). Although structuralism 'de-centred' the individual, and thus broke with humanism, it still posited tranhistorical structures underlying ideologies (Gregory, 1978a). In contrast Foucaultian inspired poststructuralism constituted discourses as conventional and historical, varying through time and space, and differing in the 'truths' that they constructed (Barnes and Duncan, 1992). 'Truth' in this sense is deeply connected to the exercise of power, a point explicated below:

... truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1986, p. 72-73).

By focusing on the constitution of discourses in specific spatial and temporal practices, and the interactions between different discursive practices, it becomes possible to argue that the co-ordinates of subjectivity are constituted by the practices they seem to describe (Butler, 1990, 1993; Pile and Thrift, 1995). It is the Foucaultian inspired strand of poststructuralism, entwined with the work of Judith Butler, that provides the theoretical basis for the following section in which a performative concept of subjectivity is constructed.

**Constructing Subjectivity**

The previous section outlined both humanist and anti-humanist approaches to subjectivity. The purpose of this section is to introduce the concept of performative subjectivity that will be used throughout the rest of the thesis. This section begins by outlining Foucault's work, and the notions he developed regarding subjectivity, then turns to feminist critiques of Foucault's work, and finally ends with Judith Butler's extension of Foucault's work toward the concept of a performative subjectivity.

In a self-characterisation of his work Foucault noted that, "the goal of my work during the last twenty years.... has been to create a history of the different mode by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 208). In writing these 'histories of the subject' Foucault provided a schema of three, interconnected, modes of the objectification of the subject: 'dividing practices', scientific classification', and 'subjectification'. 'Dividing practices' referred to the processes of social objectification and categorisation whereby humans were given both a social and personal identity, and constituted modes of manipulation that combined the mediation of a 'science' with the practice of social and spatial exclusion (Rabinow, 1991). In this sense subjectivity is a product of domination, whereby identity is attributed by the act
of separation. The second mode — 'scientific classification' — is related to the first, and arises from the modes of inquiry that attempt to construct themselves as sciences (Foucault, 1971). The human subject is thus an interstitial object of inquiry, constituted between various disciplines. The third mode of objectification — 'subjectification' — concerns the way that a human, "turns him- or herself into a subject" (Foucault, 1982, p. 208), a process that differs from the previous two modes of objectification in that in subjectification, subjectivity is not attributed but actively produced (Rabinow, 1991). This process of self-formation takes place through a variety of, "operations on [people's] own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct" (Foucault, 1980), and characteristically entails a process of self-understanding, and disclosure, mediated by an external authority figure.

In his analysis of the early Christian ascetics Foucault drew the distinction between two different forms of the disclosing self. The first is exomology, or the dramatic expression of the situation of the penitent as a sinner, that makes manifest his or her status as a sinner (Foucault, 1997). The second is exagoreusis where a continual verbalisation of thoughts is carried on, in relation to the complete obedience of the subject to someone else; a relation modelled on the renunciation of one's will and of one's own self (Foucault, 1997). To illustrate exagoreusis Foucault uses Cassian's example of the monk who stole bread:

At first he cannot tell. The difference between good and evil thoughts is that evil thoughts cannot be expressed without difficulty, for evil is hidden and unstated. Then the monk prostrates himself and confesses. Only when he confesses verbally does the Devil go out of him. The verbal expression of the crucial moment. Confession is a mark of truth. This idea of the permanent verbal is only an ideal: it is never completely possible. But the price of the permanent verbal was to make everything that could not be expressed into a sin (Foucault, 1997, p. 248).

Whilst different, exomology and exagoreusis share the common element that you cannot disclose without renouncing. In exomology the sinner must 'kill' his or her self through ascetic maceration, while in exagoreusis, by
permanently verbalising your thoughts, and permanently obeying your master, you are renouncing your will and yourself. Foucault argues that it is the second technique—exagoreusis—that becomes progressively more important, "From the eighteenth century to the present, the techniques of verbalisation have been reinserted in a different context by the so-called human sciences in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute, positively, a new self (Foucault, 1997, p. 249). For example Foucault shows us how during the nineteenth century there was a vast proliferation of scientific discourses about 'sex,' because 'sex' was seen as holding the key to self-understanding, and through doing so new forms of subjectivity were formed (Foucault, 1978).

As the subject becomes of greater concern Foucault postulates the development a particular regime of power—bio-power—a power that, "brings life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life" (Foucault, 1978, p. 264-265). This 'bio-power' coalesces around two poles: firstly, the scientific categories of humanity become the object of sustained political attention; and secondly, the body is conceptualised as an object to be manipulated and controlled (Rabinow, 1991). Together these fusions of power and knowledge constitute a 'disciplinary technology', that circulates around the objectification of the body, the aim of which is to forge a, "docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1977, p. 17). This is done through the training of the body, through the standardisation of actions over time, and through the control of space. Discipline proceeds from the organisation of individuals in space, and it requires a specific enclosure of space, and once space is enclosed the disciplinary grid permits the sure distribution of individuals, who are to be disciplined and supervised, enabling the inconspicuous direction of activity (Rouse, 1994). Foucault's representation of Bentham's Panoptican stands as a vivid metaphor for the establishment of an unobtrusive disciplinary grid, a particular technique of power whose general aim was the deployment of surveillance:
Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance... was organized as a multiple, automatic, and anonymous power.... This enables the disciplinary power to be absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervising; and absolutely ‘discreet,’ for it functions permanently and largely in silence (Foucault, 1977, p. 176-177).

Foucault points to another form of rationality embodied in the Panoptican, that of normalisation. By ‘normalisation’ Foucault refers to a system of finely graduated and measurable intervals, around whose ‘norm’ individuals can be distributed (Rabinow, 1991). Normative order is vital for the ‘regime of bio-power’ since:

Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour... it effects distributions around the norm.... [The] juridical institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory (Foucault, 1978, p. 144)

Foucault’s description of the ‘regime of bio-power’ as regulatory is important because it points to a subjectivity that is constituted through the various ‘meticulous rituals of power’ of the contemporary age. Power for Foucault is not necessarily repressive in the sense of a negative prohibition, because power works, positively, by constructing what it means to be human in the first place. Power can, therefore, be recognised when a subject willingly says ‘yes’ to some mode of behaviour, or when a subject sees this mode as particularly expressive of their ‘real’ identity. Regulation occurs, therefore, when force from ‘outside’ works as self-discipline from within.

Foucault’s accounts of subjectivity have been criticised on a number of grounds (Sawicki, 1994). Hartsock, a feminist standpoint theorist, has argued that Foucault’s rejection of modernity and its emancipatory theories, his refusal to envision alternative orders, and his emphasis on resistance and destabilisation over transformation, rob feminism of elements that are indispensable to its emancipatory goals (Hartsock, 1990). Hartsock is particularly suspicious of
Foucault's moves to reject the subject, and universal theories of history at a time when many marginal groups are breaking silence, rejecting their object status within dominant discourses, and constructing oppositional political subjectivities, theories and progressive visions of their own. Indeed Hartsock asks, "Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather then objects of history, that just then the concept of subjection becomes problematic? (Hartsock, 1990, p. 163-164). Ultimately for Hartsock, Foucault's analytic of power fails feminism because it, "fails to provide an epistemology which is usable for the task of revolutionizing, creating, and constructing" (ibid., p. 164). Consequently, Hartsock proposes the epistemic privilege of the feminist standpoint, attributing Foucault's failings to his position as a privileged, white male. What response can be made to these searching criticisms? Judith Butler (1990; 1993) has argued that feminist politics without a feminist subject is both possible and desirable. In Butler's framework, the notion of a 'feminist subject' refers to a fixed, stable identity that serves to ground feminist theories, and politics; but Butler's objection to identity-based politics is their tendency to appeal to a pre-discursive "I" as their ground, and support, that is, their tendency, "to assume that an identity must first be in place in order for political interests to be elaborated and, subsequently, political action to be taken" (Butler, 1990, p. 142). Drawing on Nietzsche, Butler argues that feminism need not assume that there exists a, "doer behind the deed" but rather that, "the 'doer' is variably constructed in and through the deed" (Butler, 1990, p. 142). In these terms:

*gender* is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, for... the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence. Hence, within the inherited discourses of the metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative —that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be (ibid., p. 25).

Critics of poststructuralist critiques of the subject are, therefore, wrong to conclude that the discursively constituted subject precludes the possibility of agency, since socio-linguistic constructionism does not entail historical
determinism (Sawicki, 1994). As a process, signification harbours within itself what epistemological discourse refers to as 'agency', since, "Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency" (Butler, 1990, p. 147). Because all signification occurs within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat, agency is constituted through repetitive variation. Butler describes identities as unstable self-representations—"fictions"—and the subject is not a thing, a substantive entity, but rather the process of signification within an open system of discursive possibilities, and consequently the 'self' is a regulated, but not determined, set of practices (Butler, 1990). So when the subject is said to be constituted:

that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects (emphasis in original, Butler, 1990, p. 145).

In this sense commonalities exist between the Althusserian notion of interpellation and performativity, but whereas interpellation assumes a non-ideological core, performativity denies that such a foundational essence exists (Butler, 1995). A key idea here is that the performative act cannot be reduced to an intentional process originating in a singular subject, since.

Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model.... (Derrida, 1988, p. 18).

In this way the performative utterance 'succeeds' (always provisionally) not because of the governance of intention, but because that action echoes prior actions, and consequently, "accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices" (emphasis in original, Butler, 1995, p. 205). This means that the performative 'works' to the
extent that it draws on, and covers, the conventions by which it is mobilised. So in this sense no statement can function performatively without, "the accumulating and dissimulating historicity of force" (ibid., p. 205). Here we see the importance of the discursive practices that Foucault examined because they form the conventions for citation, citations that structure but do not determine the performative utterance. It is this concept of performative subjectivity, constituted through the regulated repetition of social practices, that will be used throughout the thesis to animate Billig's (1995) concept of 'banal nationalism'. Such an approach to subjectivity enables the articulation of nationalist discourse to be viewed as constitutive of a nationalist subjectivity, rather than simply presenting nationalist subjectivities as the deformation of an essential, 'true' subject. A performative approach presents nationalism as constitutive of subjectivity through the micro rituals of language, and social practice, that determine and give authority to possible regimes of knowledge.

The idea of a performative subjectivity needs to be distinguished from the dramaturgical concepts of performance (see Goffman, 1959). Goffman used the metaphor of the theatre to describe the social processes through which 'actors' executed different performances in front of different audiences. In Goffman's words, "this self is a product of a scene that comes off and is not a cause of it... [the person] and his [sic] body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time" (Goffman, 1959, p. 252-253). In this way the self is constantly created and recreated through interactions with other actors (Bell and Valentine, 1995). An important part of Goffman's notion of self-presentation is the concept of audience segregation, so that, "those before whom one plays one of his [sic] parts won't be the same individuals before whom he [sic] plays a different part in another setting" (Goffman, 1959, p. 57). The problem has been the literal interpretation of Goffman's use of dramaturgical metaphors of stage and backstage, so that people play roles in public (the stage) in order to communicate an image of themselves that they wish others to believe; while the 'real' stage (backstage) is not revealed (Bell and Valentine, 1995). In this literal interpretation, the social world is a play of misrepresentation, implying that an essential self lies beneath
the misrepresentation, which manipulates the image of the self presented 'on-stage'. It is through the link between an actively manipulating subject and an essential subject that Goffman's concept of performance and Butler's notions of performativity differ. However the metaphor of the mask remains useful, because where performance covers an essential subjectivity with an array of masks, the performative refers to the very construction of masks as constitutive of subjectivity.

**Conclusion**

To conclude a number of points need to be reiterated. The purpose of this chapter has been to move from a conception of subjectivity that emanates from a bounded sovereign individual to a point where subjectivity can be conceived as process. A process that, however, does not take place without boundaries, but is regulated by the multiple threads of discursive possibility. The key here is that subjectivity is regulated, for the verb to 'regulate' contains within it aspects of domination —"1 control by rule. 2 subject to restrictions." (OED); and aspects of subjectification —"3 adapt to requirements" (OED). Subjectivity, therefore, is continually constructed through the repetitive minutiae of social practices; social practices that academia is imbricated in, rather than a portraitist of, and social practices that are both regulated from outside as 'domination', and from within as 'subjectification'.
Chapter Three: Nations and Nationalism

-A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the same place.
-By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that's so I'm a nation for I'm living in the same place for the past five years.
So of course everyone had the laugh of Bloom and says he, trying to muck out of it:
-Or also living in different places.
-That covers my case, says Joe.
-What is your nation if I may ask? says the Citizen.
-Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland.

(James Joyce Ulysses, 1922)

Introduction

James Joyce's words succinctly illustrate the myriad ways in which 'the nation' can be conceptualised, and the problems associated with any such attempts at conceptualisation. Joyce draws on the temporal, ethnic, and geographical elements implicit in a common-sense knowledge of the constituent features of the nation, to parody, and render complex, Bloom's seemingly straightforward definition of the nation (Johnson, 1995). In expressing this confusion Canovan (1996) writes that much literature about nationalism, and nations, expresses an air of frustration that stems from, "a sense that there is something peculiarly elusive about nations, reinforced by the feeling that they are in any case such ramshackle constructions of myth and illusion that they scarcely deserve serious analysis" (ibid., p. 50), a feeling not assuaged by the vast array of literature that proffers differing definitions of the nation, and nationalism (see Hobsbawm, 1992). With this in mind this chapter, firstly, presents a selective exegesis of Hobsbawm's, Gellner's, and Anderson's approaches to nations, and nationalism; three theorists that Treanor (1997) identifies as having dominated the last decade's study into nationalism. The second section of the chapter introduces the work of Michael Billig, and the concept of 'banal nationalism'.
Hobsbawm

A useful place to start is with Hobsbawm's (1983) introduction to *The Invention of Tradition* (Hobsbawn and Ranger (eds.), 1983) which, while not confined to questions of nationalism, examines the construction of 'traditions' that claim antiquity. Hobsbawm uses the term 'invented tradition' to include 'traditions': actually invented, constructed and formally instituted; and to those 'traditions' less easily traced but which emerge within a datable period of time, and which constitute a, "set of practices, normally governed by either covert or overtly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (Hobsbawm, 1983, p. 1). Despite the claim that these 'sets of practices' command a direct lineage with the past, the peculiarity of 'invented traditions' is that their continuity is an illusion, being largely a response to contemporary situations. It is the contrast between the flux of the contemporary world, and attempts to locate certain social practices as invariant within that flux, that make 'invented traditions' interesting for Hobsbawm.

In delineating 'tradition' Hobsbawm is careful to distinguish it from 'custom'. The key characteristic of 'traditions', including invented ones, is invariance, where the 'past', 'real' or 'invented', imposes fixed practices. 'Custom' in contrast has the function of motor, and fly-wheel, since it does not preclude innovation and change, through innovation is structured by the dictates of precedent. What 'custom' does is to give any change the sanction of precedent. Hobsbawm uses the example of a judge to illustrate the distinction between 'custom' and 'tradition'. 'Custom' is what judges do, 'tradition' is the formal paraphernalia and ritualised practices that surround their substantial action. The 'invention of tradition' is a process of formalization and ritualization, characterised by the reference to the past through acts of repetition (note the connection between this, and the rituals of performative subjectivity).
As part of this process Hobsbawm notes that while the invention of tradition is, and has been, a fairly universal process, it is with the transformation of the modern age that 'invented traditions' have clustered. On one hand, old uses were adapted for new conditions, whilst on the other hand, old models were used for new purposes. Consequently, while the appearance of continuity still bound institutions with their past, those institutions changed into something quite different, examples of which included the Catholic Church, the Military, and Universities. More interestingly, however, was where ancient materials were used to construct new 'invented traditions' for new purposes, and in particular the 'invented traditions' of 'the nation' (Hobsbawm, 1983). For such purposes, "a large store of such materials is accumulated in the past of any society, and an elaborate language of symbolic practice and communication is always available" (ibid., p. 6), whilst at the same time completely new rhetorical materials came into existence as part of national movements. One important difference identified by Hobsbawm between the old and new 'invented traditions' was that whilst the former were specific, and strongly binding social practices, the latter tended to be quite unspecific and vague as to, "the nature of the values, rights and obligations of the group membership" (ibid., p. 10). But if the manner of these obligations remained undefined, the practices that symbolised them became virtually compulsory, for example standing up for the national anthem, and the flag ritual in the United States (ibid.). The crucial element, argues Hobsbawm, is the invention of a 'club' iconography, rather than the 'clubs' statutes and objects, thus for example:

The National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty, and as such they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves they reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation (Official Indian government commentary, quoted in Firth, 1973, p. 341).

Hobsbawm's argument as to the importance of 'invented traditions' in the constitution of nations is extremely useful because, firstly, it highlights 'the nation' as a historically specific entity, and the importance of social practices in the construction and maintenance of nations as social entities; and secondly,
the presentation of 'invented traditions' as protean is particularly useful because it provides a way of viewing nationalist discourses as dynamic.

A more focused approach to nationalism is elaborated in Nations and nationalism since 1780 (Hobsbawm, 1992). Hobsbawm notes that much of the literature on nationalism has revolved around Renan's question: What is a nation? The problem being that no way exists of telling an observer how to distinguish a nation from other entities a priori. Attempts to establish objective criteria for nationhood have been based on a single criteria such as language, or ethnicity; or a combination of criteria, for example Stalin's definition of a nation as, "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture" (Stalin, 1912, quoted in Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 5). Such objective definitions have failed because only some members of the large number of entities that could be defined as 'nations' are indeed defined as such, and that exceptions can always be found because we are trying to fit historically dynamic entities into a permanent and universal framework. The alternative, argues Hobsbawm, is a subjective definition, where either the collective, or the individual, can voluntarily call the nation into being. The subjective approach, however, is open to two objections: firstly, defining the nation through its members consciousness of belonging is tautological, and provides only an a posteriori guide to what the nation is; and secondly, it can lead to an extreme form of voluntarism, where all that is needed to create or recreate the nation is the will to do it. Since both the objective and subjective approaches are unsatisfactory, "it is more profitable to begin with the concept of 'the nation' (i.e. with 'nationalism') than with the reality it represents" (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 9). Since nationalism is a concept that is socially, historically, and locally rooted, it must be examined through the terms of those contexts.

To this end Hobsbawm's position regarding nationalism can be summarised in five points. Firstly, nationalism is used in the sense of a, "principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 9; a position derived from Gellner, 1983). This principle also implies that the
political duty of the citizen to a polity that encompasses and represents the nation, overrides all other obligations. It is this obligation that distinguishes 'modern nationalism' from other, less stringent, forms of national or group identification. Secondly, 'the nation' is not regarded as a primordial or unchanging social entity, rather it is historically specific to 'modernity', "the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is modernity" (ibid., p. 14; cf. Smith 1981, 1986); and is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state. Here Hobsbawm stresses the artefact, invention, and social construction that enters into the making of nations, quoting Gellner, "Nations as a natural God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent... political destiny, are a myth...." (Gellner, 1983, pp. 48-49). Hence, nations do not make states and nationalisms, but nationalisms make nations and states. Thirdly, nations exist not only as a function of a particular kind of territorial state, but also in the context of a particular stage of economic and technological development. For example, the emergence of a standard national language relied upon the constellation of technologies that included printing and mass schooling. Nations, therefore, must be analysed in terms of the specific intersections of the political, technical, administrative and economic. Fourthly, nations are a dual phenomena, constructed basically from above, but which cannot be understood unless analysed from below (cf. Gellner, 1983). The reasons for this being threefold: firstly, official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what exists in the minds of citizens; secondly, we cannot assume that national identification is a primary, or exclusive, form of identification; and thirdly, national identification can change over time. Finally, Hobsbawm notes that the nationalism of long-established nations (e.g. Britain and France) has been neglected. Hobsbawm's exposition of his own position concludes with the statement that, "I cannot but add that no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed political nationalist.... Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.... Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong, or at least to make an effort not to (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 12-13). But interestingly, whilst being a political nationalist excludes a person from the serious study of nations, for Hobsbawm, such study is not
incompatible with an awareness of, and pride in, a scholar’s own national identity. This position can be explained somewhat by Hobsbawm’s scepticism as to the strength of nationalism, and the depth of its roots in the thought and behaviour of people, a position he holds with Breuilly (1992) contra Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983). Only if nationalism is a loosely held identity could it be possible to assume a degree of epistemological separation from one’s national identity, and the study of nationalism.

In concluding Hobsbawm speculated about the future of nations and nationalism, prompted by the break-up of the USSR, and the creation of a large number of new ‘nations’. In looking at nationalist movements, Hobsbawm maintained, that paradoxically it is in Western Europe that they have the greatest power to disrupt the oldest established nation-states. Yet however, nationalism is no longer the historical force that it was in the era between the French Revolution and the ‘end’ of imperialist colonialism after World War II. In the ‘developed’ world of the nineteenth century the building of a number of ‘nations’ that combined both the nation-state, and the national economy was a central element of historical transformation, whilst in the ‘dependent’ world of the first half of the twentieth century, movements for national liberation and independence were the main agents for political emancipation. Whilst the national liberation movements of the ‘third world’ were modelled on the nationalism of the ‘West’, in practice the states that were constructed were generally the opposite of the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous entities that came to be seen as the ‘natural’ form of the nation-state in the ‘West’. They were, however, more like, than unlike, the western nationalism of the liberal era (Hobsbawm, 1992). Both were typically unificatory and emancipatory processes, although in the latter the reach more often exceeded the grasp. In contrast to these nationalist movements Hobsbawm noted that, “The current phase of essentially separatist and divisive ‘ethnic’ group assertion has no such positive programme or prospect” (ibid., p. 170) demonstrated by its, “attempts to recreate the original Mazzinian model of the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous territorial nation-state (‘every nation a state —only one state for each nation’)” (ibid., p. 170). Such movements, argued
Hobsbawm, were irrelevant to the problems of the late twentieth-century, and the erection of barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world seem to simply be reactions of weakness, and fear, to a combination of international migration and socio-economic transformation, since, "Wherever we live in an urbanised society, we encounter strangers: uprooted men and women who remind us of the fragility or the drying up of our own families' roots" (ibid., p. 173). As indicated by his view of contemporary, reactionary nationalism, the nation today is, "in the process of losing an important part of its old functions, namely that of constituting a territorially bounded 'national economy' which formed a building block in the larger 'world economy'" (ibid., p. 181). Consequently, we are living in curious circumstances, with the technology of the late twentieth century, the free trade of the nineteenth, and the rebirth of the interstitial centres characteristic of world trade in the Middle Ages. To each of these developments the ideology of nations and nationalism is irrelevant, and from this observation, "The basic political conflicts which are likely to decide the fate of the world today have little to do with nation-states, because for half a century there has not existed an international state system of the nineteenth-century European type" (ibid., p. 183). Despite its prominence, therefore, nationalism is becoming less important since the history of the world, "can no longer be contained within the limits of 'nations' and 'nation-states' as these used to be defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or even linguistically" (ibid., p. 191). Nations and nationalism will be present in this history, but in subordinate roles. Thus paradoxically, whilst nationalism is a product of modernity, in turn modernity will become nationalism's gravedigger.

As previously noted Hobsbawm drew upon the approach articulated by Ernest Gellner, while simultaneously disagreeing with elements of Gellner's work. In particular Hobsbawm and Gellner share a belief in both, the invention, and modernity of nations, while disagreeing over the relative strength of nationalist thought. Gellner (1983) offers a series of definitions about the state, the nation, and nationalism, maintaining that, "Nationalism is primarily a political principle,
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (ibid. p. 1). In these terms nationalist sentiment, "is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment" (ibid., p. 1), and a nationalist movement is one, "actuated by a sentiment of this kind" (ibid., p. 1). In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the power-holders from the rest. While the nationalist principle could be asserted in an 'universalistic' spirit, nationalism has not usually been so reasonable. The fact that mitigates against any 'general, sweetly reasonable nationalism' is that there exists a very large number of possible nations on earth, and there is also room for a number of autonomous political units, and problematically these two are not congruent. Consequently not all possible nationalisms can be realised, resulting in the degree of frustration. Gellner goes on to note that most nations have until recently existed, not in compact homogenous units, but in complex patterns with other nations, and that consequently it follows that the only way a territorial political unit can become ethnically homogenous is to kill, expel, or assimilate all 'non-nationals'. The unwillingness of non-nationals to suffer such fates renders the peaceful application of the nationalist principle difficult.

At this point Gellner's is dependent upon two undefined terms: state and nation. Gellner begins his definition of the state by drawing on Weber's definition of the state, as that agency within society which possesses the monopoly on legitimate violence. This definition is not entirely satisfactory, however, since there are states who lack either the will, or the means, to enforce their monopoly on legitimate violence. For example, the Feudal state did not necessarily object to private wars between fief-holders, as long as they also fulfilled their filial obligations; whilst the state that counts tribal populations amongst its subjects, does not necessarily object to the institution of the feud, as long as those who indulge in it refrain from endangering neutrals (Gellner, 1983). From this perspective the state can be defined as:

the specialization and concentration of order maintenance. The state is that institution or set of institutions concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also
be concerned with). The state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts have separated out from the rest of social life (Gellner, 1983, p. 4).

Since not all societies are state-endowed the problem of nationalism does not arise for stateless societies, argues Gellner, because if no state exists the question as to the congruence of the borders of the state and the nation cannot be asked. The circumstances in which nationalism arises has not normally been when the state has been lacking, or its reality in is doubt. The problem, however, has been the states boundaries, and/or the distribution of power, rather than the absence of boundaries or power, thus:

Not only is our definition of nationalism parasitic on a prior and assumed definition of the state: it also seems to be the case that nationalism only emerges in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted. The existence of politically centralized units, and of a moral-political climate in which such centralized units are taken for granted and are treated as normative, is a necessary through no means a sufficient condition of nationalism (Gellner, 1983, p. 4).

However, whilst the problem of nationalism fails to arise where no state exists, it does not follow that the problem of nationalism arises for every state. The nation has come to appear as an inherent attribute of humanity, while for Gellner both the state and the nation are historical contingencies, rather than universal necessities. Neither states nor nations exist at all times, and under all circumstances, moreover nations and states are not the same contingency. While nationalism holds that the nation and the state are bound together, the state has emerged without the help of the nation, and some nations have emerged without the blessings of their own state (Gellner, 1983). Out of this position Gellner proposes two temporary definitions: a cultural definition where, "Two men [sic] are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" (ibid., p. 7); and a voluntaristic definition where, "Two men [sic] are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation (ibid., p. 7). Each definition has merit in
that they explain some element of nationalism, but neither is completely adequate (Gellner, 1983). If nations are defined as groups that 'will' themselves into existence, then too many communities will be caught in the nation net, and equally the definition of nations in terms of a shared culture has the same problem. The paradox that Gellner identifies is that, "nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect the other way round" (ibid., p. 55). Consequently, it is not the case that the 'age of nationalism' was the summation of an awakening of nations, rather:

... when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men [sic] willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy (Gellner, 1983, p. 55).

So in these terms it is nationalism that engenders nations, selectively using, and radically transforming existing rhetorical symbols. While nationalism may use any old 'shred and patch' to invent a nation, "Nonetheless the nationalist principle... has very deep roots in our shared current condition, is not at all contingent, and will not easily be denied (Gellner, 1983, p. 56; cf. Hobsbawm, 1992). The basic deception and self deception practised by nationalism is that while nationalism generally represents the imposition of a high culture on society, through the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal, society formed with mutually substitutable atomised individuals, held together by a shared culture that replaces a complex array of local folk structures; the reality as Gellner presents it is that nationalism usually conquerors in the name of a putative folk culture, "Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the Volk...." (ibid., p. 57). So, drawing on Durkheim, society no longer worships itself through religious symbols, instead a, "modern streamlined, on-wheels high culture celebrates itself in song and dance, which it borrows (stylizing it in the process) from a folk culture which it fondly believes itself to be perpetuating, defending, and reaffirming" (Gellner, 1983, p. 58). Here Gellner emphasises the modernity of nationalism, as opposed to its
putative antiquity, along with the importance of a ‘high’ culture to the nationalist project (Gellner, 1994). Indeed a high culture, defined as, “one whose members have been trained by an educational system to formulate and understand context-free messages in a shared idiom” (ibid., p. viii), is a precondition for any social participation at all. For Gellner (1994) it is the new importance of a shared ‘high’ culture that makes people into nationalists, as the congruence between their own culture, and that of the political, economic and educational bureaucracies that surrounds them becomes the single most important fact in their lives. It is the concern with the achievement of this congruence, and its maintenance, that turns people into nationalists. The primary concern of these nationalists is to ensure their membership of a political unit that identifies with their idiom, and it is this process that is nationalism (Gellner, 1994).

The question arises for Gellner as to whether or not nationalism will continue to be a major force, or a general political imperative in an age of advanced, perhaps completed, industrialism. He postulates two possible visions of the future of culture in industrial societies: a convergence thesis, and an incommensurability thesis, and between them string an infinite range of intermediate compromise positions. In the convergence thesis all industrial societies will eventually come to resemble each other, with only high cultures effectively existing, and where folk cultures are artificially maintained. The high cultures that survive are tied to a shared cognitive base and a consciously global economy, and consequently inter-cultural and inter-linguistic differences change into merely phonetic ones, where only the superficial tokens of communications differ, whilst the semantic context and social context become universal. In such a context, “No nationalist inhibitions would then impede inter-cultural amity and inter-nationalism” (Gellner, 1983, p. 117). In this hypothetical world of the global continuum of homogenous industrial culture, differentiated phonetically but not semantically, the age of nationalism would have passed. However, Gellner does not believe this is will come to pass, quoting Reve, “Nations are not all alike. They weren’t alike in poverty, and they are not alike in luxury” (quoted in Gellner, 1983, p. 118). Conversely, the incommensurability thesis holds that each culture has its own standards of reality, and that no
culture may be legitimately judged by standards pretending to be universal. Gellner holds a position somewhere between the two poles, stating that:

The shared economic infrastructure of advanced industrial society and its inescapable implications will continue to ensure that men [sic] are dependent on culture, and that culture requires standardization over quite wide areas.... This being so, the definition of political units and boundaries will not be able to ignore with impunity the distribution of culture. By and large, ignoring minor exceptions, the nationalist imperative of the congruence of political unit and of culture will continue to apply. In that sense, one need not expect the age of nationalism to come to an end (Gellner, 1983, p. 121).

While the 'age of nationalism' may not be expected to come to an end, it is to be expected that the sharpness of nationalist conflict will diminish (Gellner, 1983). What caused acute nationalism were the social chasms created by 'early industrialism', and its uneven distribution; but, however, Gellner optimistically maintained that 'late industrialism' no longer engenders such deep chasms. Late industrialism will have to accept cultural differences, provided they are superficial, and do not engender barriers between people. While folk cultures are unlikely to survive except in a 'token and cellophane-packaged form', "an international plurality of sometimes fairly diverse high cultures will no doubt (happily) remain with us" (Gellner, 1983, p. 120). This 'diversity' combined with institutional inertia produce a context in 'late industrial' society where it can be expected that a quiescent nationalism will continue to persist, a position not dissimilar to Hobsbawm's one (1992).

Anderson

The chapter now turns to the approach articulated by Benedict Anderson (1991), an approach that Johnson (1995) argues has been generally regarded as the most authoritative recent account of nationalism. Anderson begins by noting that theorists of nationalism have been irritated by three paradoxes: firstly, the objective modernity of nations to the historians eye versus their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists; secondly, the universality of
nationalism as a socio-cultural concept in the modern world; and thirdly, the
'political' power of nationalisms versus their philosophical poverty. Anderson's
point of departure is that nationality and nationalism are cultural products of a
particular kind, and to understand them we need to consider how they came
into historical being; how their meanings have changed over time; and why,
today, they command such deep emotional legitimacy (cf. Hobsbawm, 1992).

Very generally Anderson argues that nationalism, as an artefact, emerged near
the end of the eighteenth century as the result of the intersection of discrete
historical forces, but once constituted became 'modular' in that it was able to be
transplanted into a great variety of societies, and merged and re-emerged
within different constellations of political and ideological power. Anderson
famously proposes that 'the nation' can be defined as, "an imagined political
community— and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). The nation is imagined because, "the members of even
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (ibid., p. 6). A point that Gellner also makes when he states that, "Nationalism
is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where
they do not exist" (Gellner, 1969, p. 169). The problem that Anderson sees with
Gellner's statement is that he (Gellner) is so concerned to show nationalism as
a masquerade, that he implies that 'true' communities can exist which can be
advantageously juxtaposed with nations; instead Anderson states that,
"Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by
the style in which they are imagined" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). 'The nation' is
limited because even the largest nation has finite boundaries beyond which lies
other nations, since, "No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind [sic]"
(ibid., p. 7). 'The nation' is sovereign because it emerged as a concept in an
age when the Enlightenment and Revolution were undermining the legitimacy
of the 'divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm', and that, "The gage and
emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state" (ibid., p. 7). Finally, 'the nation'
is imagined as a community because regardless of actual inequality, and
exploitation, it is conceived of as a horizontal comradeship, and it is ultimately
this fraternity that has made it possible over the last two centuries for people to
die in the name of 'the nation'. A point illustrated by the difference between
Montjoy's distress at the mingling of noble and peasant blood after the battle of
Agincourt, "For many of our princes woe the while!/Lie drown'd and soak'd in
mercenary blood:/So do our vulgar drench their peasant limbs/In blood of
princes (Henry V; iv, 7. II. 72-75); and Henry's declaration that, "For he to-day
that sheds his blood with me/Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile" (Henry V;
iv, 4. II. 61-62), a fraternal imagining that underpins the modern nation (Howard
and Rackin, 1997).

Like both Hobsbawm (1992) and Gellner (1983), Anderson argues that the
possibility of imagining the nation only arose when the religious and dynastic
imaginings of antiquity lost their axiomatic grip on human life, and in the desire
for a new way of linking fraternity, power, and time together, "Nothing perhaps
more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism...."
(Anderson, 1991, p. 36). If the development of print-as-commodity enabled a
new sets of ideas about simultaneity, and consequently the development of
communities of 'horizontal-secular' and 'transverse-time', why did 'the nation'
become so popular? The answer, speculates Anderson, is capitalism. One of
the earliest forms of capitalist enterprise —book-publishing— was constantly
searching for new markets, markets that initially comprised of literate, Latin
speaking Europeans. These readers formed a wide, but thin strata of the
population, and once that potential readership became saturated the logic of
capitalism dictated that the much larger monoglot markets beckoned. The
process of vernacularization was given further impetus through external factors,
including: changes in the character of Latin, the impact of the reformation, and
the spread of specific vernaculars as administrative languages. In Anderson's
estimation of the three factors, the latter two contributed directly to the
development of national consciousness, primarily through the dethronement of
Latin as the hegemonic language of imagining in Europe. What made the
nation imaginable, therefore, was the interaction between a system of
production (capitalism), a technology of communications (printing), and
linguistic diversity. The latter point is particularly important since, "mutual
incomprehensibility was historically of only slight importance until capitalism and print created monoglot mass reading publics” (Anderson, 1991, p. 43). In pre-print Europe the diversity of languages was such that had print-capitalism tried to exploit each potential niche it would have remained petite, however, once languages were able to be arranged within limits imposed by grammars and syntaxs, it became possible to create mechanically reproducible print-languages that could be disseminated through a much larger market. Consequently, the development of print-languages laid the basis for national consciousness in three ways. Firstly, print-capitalism created unified fields of exchange, and communication, so that while the speakers of the variety of Frenches, Englishes and Spanishes may have talked to each other in mutually incomprehensible conversation, they become capable of understanding each other through written communication, becoming aware of the other members of their ‘language-field’, and the limits to that field, and thus, “These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community” (Anderson, 1991, p. 44). Secondly, print-capitalism gave a fixity to language which, “helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (ibid., p. 44). Thirdly, print-capitalism created languages-of-power that differed from older administrative vernaculars, and in turn because some dialects were closer to each printed language-of-power they became markers of power which reinforced the status of the print-language.

Language, therefore, has a twofold importance for Anderson. Firstly, its apparent primordialness, where each language, “looms up imperceptibly out of a horizonless past” (ibid., p. 144), results in languages appearing to be rooted beyond almost everything else in contemporary society. Consequently, language has the ability to connect the present to the past. Secondly, the experience of language suggests unisonance, so that, “Singing the Marseillaise, Waltzing Matilda, and Indonesia Raya provide occasions for unisonality, for the echoed physical realisation of the imagined community” (ibid., p. 145). If nationalness has a aura of fatality, it is a fatality embedded in history since from the start ‘the nation’ has been conceived in language, not in
blood, and consequently one could be 'invited into' the imagined community of 'the nation' (ibid.). The nation as historical fatality, and as a community imagined through language presents itself as simultaneously open and closed. While the nation is accessible through language, it is closed by one's own mortality and the limitations mortality places on learning different languages, which gives language a degree of privacy, and hence the nation a degree of exclusivity.

Towards the end of the second edition of Imagined Communities Anderson (1991) recollects that in the original edition he naively believed that the official nationalism of colonised Asia and Africa was modelled directly on that of the dynastic states of Western Europe, a position he modified in the latter edition to argue that the immediate genealogy of colonial nationalism needed to be traced to the imagining of the colonial state. For Anderson three institutions of power bring into relief this genealogy: the census, the map, and the museum. The power of these institutions lay in the profound way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion, "the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry" (ibid., p. 164). In an interlinked way the census, the map, and the museum constituted, "a total classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the state's real or contemplated control..." (ibid., p. 184). The effect of this grid was to present an image of infinite distribution where objects were either here, or there. A warp that crossed the waft of serialisation, an assumption that the world was made up of replicable plurals. Anderson sums up the power grid with the metaphor of the 'Glass House' drawn from the Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toet, a metaphor that resonates with Bentham's Panopticon, and indeed this section of Anderson's text bears the traces of both Mitchell (1991) and Foucault (1977, 1978).

At the end of Imagined Communities Anderson stated that for the nation, as the person, "Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of 'forgetting' the experience of this continuity — product of the ruptures of the late eighteenth century— engenders the need for
a narrative of ‘identity’" (Anderson, 1991, p. 205). Yet this national narrative, contrary to individuals has no clearly identifiable birth and death (if it occurs). Because there is no Originator of ‘the nation’s’ biography it can not be written ‘down time’ through a series of a chain of begettings, and instead the only alternative is to fashion it ‘up time’; a fashioning that inverts the usual genealogy since it starts from the ordinary present. As an example Anderson draws on Fernand Braudel, for whom the deaths that mattered were the myriad anonymous events, which, aggregated and averaged, “permit him to chart the slow-changing conditions of life for millions of anonymous human beings of whom the last question asked is their nationality” (ibid., p. 205). The nation, however, snatches from the going mortality rate, “exemplary suicides, poignant martyrdom’s, assassinations, executions, wars, and holocausts” (ibid., p. 206), to construct a national identity as a continuous narrative, originating in the present, and told for the present.

Summary

To summarise a number of points can be highlighted. Firstly, there are possibly as many approaches to nationalism, and nations, as exist nations in the world. With this rather than trying to undertake a comprehensive survey of contemporary theories of nations and nationalism, this section has simply tried to highlight three related approaches from Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson; approaches that have been argued to be among the most persuasive of contemporary theories. The directions taken by these three theorists show both commonalities and differences. All three agree that nationalism and nations are social constructions of modernity, while disagreeing over the strength of nationalist thought, and the future prospects for nationalism. One common element of all three theorists has been the search for the origins of nationalism among various constellations of power, knowledge, institutions and technology. The positioning of nationalism within these constellations is an important feature of the work by Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson, because it locates nationalism within the social practices of life, rather than as existing a priori. The social constitution of nationalism provides a point of connection with the
following section, where Michael Billig's work apropos nationalism will be examined.

**Banal Nationalism**

"In a riddle whose answer is chess, what is the only prohibited word?"

I thought a moment and replied, "The word chess."

( *The Garden of Forking Paths* —Jorge Luis Borges)

The purpose of this section is to explicate the work of Michael Billig, and in particular his concept of 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1995). The aim being to provide the theoretical framework within which the nationalism of 'Western nations' can be understood, and more specifically the nationalism of New Zealand human geography can be analysed. Towards this end the approach that Billig proffers is both an extension of these paths that Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson explore, and a quite different departure from those paths. In common with Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson, Billig constitutes nations, and nationalism, as socially constructed entities specific to modernity. However in contrast to these three theorists, Billig's substantive focus is not to uncover the putative origins of nationalism, but rather to expose the contemporary reproduction of nationalist discourse in 'Western nations'. Billig sees this contemporary reproduction as taking a specific form that, paradoxically, constitutes 'the nation' as the taken-for-granted context of social life whilst simultaneously occluding 'the nation' as that context. In searching for the repetitive unimaginings of the contemporary 'nation', the approach that Billig takes entwines with the concept of a performative subjectivity constructed in first chapter, and indeed this entwining will be an important theoretical couplet throughout the remainder of the thesis.

**Reiterative practices: an alternative approach to nationalism**

In the opening passage of his book *Banal Nationalism* (1995) Billig quotes the then United States President George Bush, who before the start of the 1991
Gulf War stated that, "We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations (George Bush, 16 January, 1991, quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 1). In the new world order evoked by George Bush, "no nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbour" (George Bush, 16 January, 1991; quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 1). While Bush was articulating an order of nations, for Billig what was particularly interesting was its unspecified assumptions, since:

Bush did not justify why the notion of nationhood was so important, nor why its protection demanded the ultimate sacrifices. He assumed his audience would realize that a war, waged by nations against the nation, which had sought to abolish a nation, was necessary to affirm the sacred principle of nationhood (Billig, 1995, p. 2).

Billig believed that it might be considered unusual to begin a book on nationalism with the Gulf War, because the term nationalism invites the reader to look elsewhere for examples, since according to customary usage George Bush is not a nationalist, but separatists in Quebec or Brittany are, and a book about nationalism is expected to deal with such figures. Such a book should, therefore, discuss dangerous and powerful passions, outlining a psychology of extraordinary emotions, yet for Billig this is misleading because such an approach always locates nationalism on the temporal or spatial periphery, and consequently largely ignores the nationalism of 'Western nations'; and if nationalism is located in the 'Western nations' it is usually perceived as a temporary condition of extreme emotion. But between such crises, however, nations such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand continue to exist, are reproduced daily as nations, and their citizenry constituted as nationals. For such reproduction to occur, Billig argues that a whole concatenation of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations, and practices must be reproduced, and moreover, "this complex must be reproduced in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times" (Billig, 1995, p. 6). The linkages between 'banal nationalism' and the rituals of power that engaged
Foucault and Butler can be seen here in the appreciation that the authority of contemporary social practices relies upon their citation of prior practices. To describe such rituals Billig uses the term banal nationalism; to cover:

the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.

It is argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition (Billig, 1995, p. 6; emphasis added).

Hence, banal nationalism is to be found in the ‘forgotten’ habits of social life, including those of thinking, and language, and it involves being situated physically, legally, socially and emotionally with a ‘homeland’, that in turn is itself situated in a world of nations since, “...only if people believe that they have national identities, will such homelands, and the world of national homelands be reproduced” (ibid., p. 8). A critical study of banal nationalism must then examine the gaps in language through which the unexamined passes, but by extending the scope of nationalism:

... the analyst is not safely removed from the scope of investigation. We might imagine that we possess a cosmopolitan broadness of spirit. But, if nationalism, is a wider ideology, whose familiar commonplaces catch us unawares, then this is too reassuring... nationalism has seeped into the corners of our consciousness; it is present in the very words we might use for analysis (ibid., p. 12).

This points to both the ubiquity of nationalist discourse, and the impossibility of achieving a categorical separation between the researcher and the object of study. Indeed the question that needs to be posed then is does any examination of nationalism itself performatively constitute what it purports to describe? There is no answer to this question except to keep the question itself alive through a constant, critical awareness of the implications of nationalism.

For Billig standard definitions of nationalism tend to locate nationalism as a phenomena that exists outside, or prior to the ‘nation-state’. For example
Rogowski defines nationalism as the 'striving' by members of nations, "for territorial autonomy, unity and independence" arguing that this definition matches everyday usage, and that, "we routinely and properly speak of Welsh, Quebecquois and Arab nationalism (Rogowski, 1985, pp. 88-89). Similar definitions can be found in the work of Hobsbawm (1992), and Gellner (1983). The problem with such definitions are that they ignore how nationalism is maintained once the putative goals of autonomy, unity and independence have been achieved, and consequently nationalism is constituted as a force that creates 'nations', or threatens the stability of existing 'nations'. Nationalism can also appear as a developmental stage that mature nations grow out of once established, assumptions that can be found in Deutsch (1966), and Hroch (1985). Hroch, for example, proposes three stages of nationalism, the first two describing the awakening and diffusion of the 'national idea', and the third describing the translation of that 'national idea' into the 'nation-state'. There are, however, no further stages to describe what occurs to nationalism once the nation-state has been established. Nationalism does not entirely disappear, however, becoming instead something that is surplus to everyday life. A point that Giddens makes clear when he describes nationalism as, "a phenomenon that is primarily psychological" (Giddens, 1985, p. 116), and which occurs when the, "sense of ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines" (ibid., p. 218), and consequently ordinary life is affected by nationalism only, "in fairly unusual and often relatively transitory conditions" (ibid., p. 218). The problem of reserving the term 'nationalism' for such outbreaks of 'hot' nationalist passion is what such usage omits—a continually 'remembered' nationalism. Consequently, by narrowly focusing on forms of hot nationalism rather than banal nationalism, theorists of nationalism have projected nationalism onto others, and naturalised 'our' nationalism out of existence.

This process can be seen in two intertwined types of theorising: projecting theories of nationalism, and naturalizing theories of nationalism (Billig, 1995). Projecting theories of nationalism tend to define nationalism in a restricted way as an extreme/surplus phenomenon, equated with the outlook of nationalist
movements. Consequently when there are no such movements, nationalism is not seen as an issue. By and large, the authors of such theories are not themselves partisans of nationalist movements, since these theorists often claim that nationalism is impelled by irrational emotions, and they rhetorically distance themselves from such nationalist discourse by claiming to produce a rational account of something inherently irrational. Hobsbawm's (1992) belief as to the impossibility of being a committed nationalist, and a historian of nationalism fits into this approach. However, "The theorists themselves live in a world of nations: they carry passports and pay their taxes to nation-states. Their theories tend to take this world of nations for granted as the 'natural' environment, in which the dramas of nationalism periodically erupt" (Billig, 1995, p. 16). Since the nationalism that routinely reproduces the world of nations is theoretically ignored, and nationalism seen as a condition of the 'other', then such theories can be represented as rhetorical projections, where nationalism as a 'condition' is projected on to 'others', whilst 'ours' is overlooked, forgotten, and even theoretically denied. In contrast to projecting theories, naturalising theories of nationalism present nationalism as a universal feature of humanity. So contemporary loyalties to nation-states are depicted as instances of emotions that are psychologically endemic to the human condition. Thus such loyalties can be theoretically transmuted into 'needs for identity', 'attachments to society' or 'primordial ties', attachments that are posited to be universal psychological states, and not peculiar to the age of nationalism. Consequently 'nationalism' ceases to be a specific problem for investigation, and indeed, ironically, often the lack of such loyalties (i.e. the lack of patriotism in established nations) can be viewed as a problem. In such an approach the existing conditions of consciousness appear 'natural', occluding the temporal specificity, and social construction of nations (Billig, 1995). The consequence these entwined forms of nationalist theorising is that 'our' nationalism is either forgotten, or sublimated into 'patriotism', whilst overt nationalism is seen as a property of the spatially, or temporally, differentiated 'other'.

It is important to realise that Billig does not positioning 'banal nationalism' as alternative to 'hot nationalism', rather he is concerned at what occurs in periods
where 'hot nationalism' is not evident, suggesting that 'banal nationalism' is the regulatory discourse that maintains the conditions for the articulation of 'hot nationalism'. This distinction is made clear where Billig notes that, "The yearly calendar of the modern nation would replicate in miniature its longer political history: brief moments of nationalist emotion punctuate longer periods of settled claim, during which nationalism seems to disappear from sight" (ibid., p. 45). While each nation has its national days that disrupt normal routines, "Another routine..., must be found for the special day which formally breaks the everyday routine. This special routine must enable the actor to perform the expected emotion" (ibid., p. 45). It is paradoxically, therefore, the banal that enables the extraordinary to occur in nationalist imagining.

For Billig, the problem with constructing concepts of nationalism is that the concepts that may be proffered as casual factors may indeed be historical constructions of nationalism, because of the way that nationalism has constituted the 'invented permanencies' that always seem to have existed (see Hobsbawm, 1983). A prime example of such an 'invented permanence' is language, for if language is an 'invented permanence' of nationalist discourse, "then language does not create nationalism, so much as nationalism creates language; or rather nationalism creates 'our' common-sense, unquestioned view that there are, 'naturally' and unproblematically, things called different 'languages', which we speak" (Billig, 1995, p. 30). The final clause of Billig's statement is an important caveat because he does not argue that language is an invention of nationalist discourse, but that the assumption that people speak categorically distinct 'languages' may well be an invention of nationalist discourse. This argument entwines with Anderson's (1991), but differs in that while Anderson sees 'the nation' as an 'imagined community' arising from print-capitalism's utilisation of vernacular languages, Billig argues that, "Nations may be 'imagined communities', but the pattern of the imaginings cannot be explained in terms of differences of language, for languages themselves have to be imagined as distinct entities" (Billig, 1995, p. 36). In making this distinction Billig draws upon Foucault (1971) who argued that the formulation of standard grammars for languages, along with the disciplines of medicine and
economics, arose in the context of emerging modern states that were imposing order, and conformity, on their citizens (also see Foucault, 1977; 1978), and consequently the languages that depict the world of nations as 'natural' are themselves historical constructions of nationalist discourse.

Remembering and Forgetting

If it appears 'natural' for nationalism to be presented as a phenomena of the 'other', allowing 'us' to forget 'our' own nationalism, then if 'our' nationalism is to be remembered what seems to be common-sense needs to be critically examined, and stepped beyond. Ideology has been claimed to speak with, "the Voice of Nature" (Barthes, 1977, p. 47), whilst others have argued that ideology comprises the habits of behaviour, and belief, that combine to make any social world appear to those who inhabit it as the natural world, and consequently forget that their world is a historical, social construction (Billig, 1991; Eagleton, 1991). In this respect nationalist discourse constitutes the world of nations as unthinkingly 'natural', a perspective that Gellner elegantly sums up in his statement that in today's world, "a man [sic] must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). But while the construction of nationality is forgotten, through its putative 'naturalness', paradoxically nationality is also something that seems 'natural' to remember. Thus the remembering of nationality involves a complex dialectic between forgetting and remembering, a point that Renan expressed when he claimed that forgetting was, "a crucial element in the creation of nations" (Renan, 1990, p. 11). Every nation has its history, what Billig terms its 'collective memory', and this is simultaneously both a remembering and forgetting as 'the nation' celebrates its antiquity, and forgets its historical regency.

In an earlier paper Billig noted that, "Ideology itself will be a form of social memory, in so much as it constitutes what is collectively remembered and also what is forgotten or what aspects of society's history continue to be commemorated" (Billig, 1990, p. 60). In this discussion of memory Billig made
the distinction between memory as a process, and memory as an object of thinking. In the former Billig argued that whenever a piece of 'common-sense' is discursively used it must be recalled, or memorated, and in this sense memoration involves little invention but much reproduction of shared themes. But paradoxically when people articulate these shared themes they often do not realise what they are doing as memorizing. Conversely where memory is taken as an object, the past is an overt discursive concern, a concern that either takes the form of a reconstruction of the past or a commemoration of the past; in both these cases memoration involves the use of discursive commonalities. In memorating one set of issues what becomes equally important is that which is not the subject for interesting discussion because:

As one matter is spoken (or written) about, so others are kept from immediate dialogic attention. Where topics of conversation become ritual, one might speak of a 'dialogic unconsciousness': what is habitually spoken about may be dialogically functioning to prevent, as a matter routine, other matters from coming to conscious, conversational attention (Billig, 1997, p. 32)

It is only critically examining these gaps in discursive problemization that the contours of particular discourse can be illuminated (Billig, 1990). The key point here is that the dialectic of remembering and forgetting is a social process rather than individual acts of selective amnesia (Middleton and Edwards, 1990).

In the context of nationalism Billig takes Renan's concept of 'collective amnesia' and extends it to argue that a parallel forgetting occurs when the present is forgotten, so that while national identity in established nations is banally remembered because of its embeddedness in those routines of life that constantly 'flag' nationhood, these 'flaggings' are so ubiquitous that they operate mindlessly rather than mindfully (Langer, 1989). Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* expresses this dialectic of remembering and forgetting, "[T]he *habitus* —embodied history, internalised as a second nature and so forgotten as history—is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56; 1977). *Habitus* refers to the dispositions, practices, and routines of
the familiar social world, and describes the 'second nature' that people must acquire in order to pass mindlessly through the banal routines of daily life (Bourdieu, 1990). As patterns of social life become habitual or routine they embody the past in a process of enhabitation, and once thoughts, reactions, and symbols have been turned into routine habits they become enhabited.

Billig represents the idea of banal reproduction, through the metonymic image of the unwaved flag. Barthes in his essay 'Myth Today' discusses an issue of the magazine Paris Match, where on the cover of the magazine, "a young Negro in French army uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on the fold of the tricolor" (Barthes, 1983, pp. 101). While the tricolour that the soldier faces in the photograph was to be saluted appropriately, mindfully if you wish, the photograph on the magazine was not for saluting. The magazine could lie in the corner, eyes could flick over it, and it would eventually be tossed in the rubbish bin without ceremony or penalty. The flag on the magazine, therefore, among countless other flags, provided a banal reminder of nationhood, a remembering that was 'mindless' because it occurred as other activities were being consciously engaged in.

**Imagining 'the Nation'**

If the remembering and forgetting of 'our' nationhood operates mindlessly, through what mechanisms does the dialectic operate? In order to explore the banal flagging of 'the nation' it is necessary to examine the familiar habits of language, which requires paying attention to the habitual usage of words such as 'the people', or 'the society', and to the metaphors through which 'nations' are imagined. It is these small, habitual words, and the metaphors of nationalist imagining that are the focus of the following section.

Billig (1990) has argued that the subject is rhetorical in that people use discourses to think, and argue, about the social world; arguments and thoughts that are structured by the rhetorical resources that such discourses incorporate. Such an approach contrasts with the belief that rhetoric, and metaphors, are
essentially obfuscatory, a view clearly expressed by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, "when we use words metaphorically; that is in other senses than that they were ordained for;... [we] thereby deceive others" (Hobbes, 1651/1962, p. 34). Such a position reflected the Enlightenment view of 'the truth' as a product of an empirical science suspicious of figurative devices (Lakoff and Johnston, 1980). This sentiment was incorporated by the British empiricists, and the Vienna positivists, reaching human geography during the heyday of the 'quantitative revolution', during which time Harvey wrote that, "the form in which... metaphors are cast seems to hinder objective judgement" (Harvey, 1967, p. 551). However recent geographical study has challenged the obfuscatory concept of rhetoric, and metaphor, arguing instead that rhetoric and metaphor are key components in the construction of meaning (Buttimer, 1982; Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Barnes, 1992; Demeritt, 1994; Barnes 1996; and Cresswell, 1997). Indeed Cresswell stresses the role that metaphors play in the constitution of spatial subjectivities:

> [M]etaphors are acts that encourage some thoughts and actions and discourage others, and this has geographical implications. Many metaphors are distinctly geographical acts that encourage spatial thoughts and actions while prohibiting others. Most metaphors we use in daily life are neither the root metaphors of grand theories, nor the obviously geographical metaphors of mapping and position. Many are metaphors that tell us what and who belong where; they are, as such, constitutive moments in the spatiality of everyday life (emphasis in original, Cresswell, 1997, p. 334).

Since metaphors are culturally grounded, and unavoidable ways of comprehending the world, their creation and maintenance is an inherently political project with material effects (Cresswell, 1997), and Hebdige writes that, "Metaphors are themselves an essential (if unstable) component of realpolitik, acting as focalizing agents capable of drawing together diverse, even antagonistic constituencies" (Hebdige, 1993, p. 272). It is the ability for metaphors to draw together 'antagonistic constituencies' that is particularly important in the constitution of nations as horizontal communities (see Anderson, 1991).
If metaphors have an important role in different discourses, how do they work? When metaphors are used the unfamiliar (tenor) is expressed in terms of the familiar (vehicle), simultaneously exploiting similarity and difference by working paradigmatically, for both vehicle and tenor must have enough similarity to place them in the same discourse, whilst enough difference must exist for the comparison to have a necessary element of contrast (Fiske, 1990). It through this contrast that metaphors, "are the jolt, the frisson, that makes us see the world in a different way: a way that could not be imagined before the metaphor was used (Rorty, 1989, p. 16), but as metaphors are, "savoured rather than spat out" (ibid., p. 16) they acquire a habitual use, becoming dead metaphors (Barnes and Duncan, 1992). The frequent appeal to dead metaphors evokes in the reader's mind an assurance of objectivity, and, "it is seldom noted how the effect the 'objectivity' can be attained by the use of nonpoetic language, that is to say, by language in which dead metaphors rather then vivid ones provide the substance of the discourse" (White, 1978, p. 114). It is these 'dead' metaphors that are especially important for banal nationalism, because they evoke no frisson in the reader, they appear to be objective. Thus the metaphors that constitute the unimagination of 'the nation' present 'the nation' as an 'objective reality', occluding the imaginative process of remembering and forgetting that performatively constitutes 'the nation'. The significance of dead metaphors are that they provide the literal basis upon which other metaphors are coined, and are hence forgotten as social constructions, a point that has particular relevance in the latter chapters when some of the rhetorical motifs of New Zealand's nationalist discourse are examined. The effect of dead metaphors can be likened to that of metonyms, where if metaphor works by transposing qualities from one plane to another, metonyms work by associating meanings within the same plane. Unlike metaphor, however, metonyms works through contiguity, and since they do not require transposition they can seem more 'natural' than metaphor, and are, thus, a powerful mode of communication because they are unobtrusive, (Fiske, 1990). 'Realism' is necessarily a metonymic mode of communication, because metonyms can operate unobtrusively and banally, So Jakobson argues that metonymy is the normal mode of the realistic novel, whereas metaphor is the normal mode for poetry. In
the habitual use of dead metaphors, and metonyms ‘the nation, as an ‘imagined community ceases to be reproduced by acts of imagination, but instead the discursive possibilities of ‘the nation’ are not so much imagined as their absence becomes unimaginable.

The metaphors of the nationalist unimagining are one element of the textual flagging of banal nationalism, while another is the rhetoric of pointing —deixis. Deixis is a form of rhetoric that, “has to do with the ways which sentences are anchored to certain aspects of their contexts of utterance” (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 118), so for Billig, “‘We’ may be used to evoke an identity between speaker and audience, but it is not immediately clear who constitutes this audience. Throughout this ambiguity of deixis, the little words can flag the homeland, and, in flagging it, make the homeland homely” (Billig, 1995, p. 106). Words that are commonly used deictically include: ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘here’, or ‘now’, and to understand the meaning of a deictic statement, listeners have to interpret it from the position of the speaker, putting the speaker at the centre of the interpretative universe. So ‘I’ is recognised as the speaker, ‘you’ as the listener and ‘we’ being the listener and the speaker invoked collectively. However, in contemporary political discourse the deixis becomes more complicated, because ‘we’ are not typically the immediate listener, and speaker, since ‘we’ have been extended to refer to ‘imagined communities’, that include the party, ‘the nation’, all reasonable people, and various other combinations (Billig, 1995). The deixis of nationalist imagining invokes the collective ‘we’, placing ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland, whilst ‘this’ is often used to deictically indicate place. Problematically, however, if ‘the nation’ is deictically indicated, what is actually being referred to, since:

The speaker, in a television studio or on formal platform, has no object to indicate. The country is the whole context, which stretches beyond the individual locations of any speaker or listener, and, therefore, it cannot be indicated as the speaker’s (or listeners’) own particular ‘here’ (ibid., p. 107)
Despite this problem there appears to be no ambiguity when political leaders indicate a specific nation: "this is still the best country in the world" (John Major, quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 107); "This, the greatest country in human history" (Bill Clinton, quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 107). "The nation" is evoked as the national place of 'us', a community that has to be unimaginatively imagined, and the assumptions of nationhood accepted for the routine phrases to do their rhetorical business. Thus through the routine rhetorical of position 'the nation' continues to be made habitual, and to be enhabited.

Deixis also takes another, even more, enhabiting form, which because it involves no metaphorical pointing, hardly even seems deictic. The definite article can be used to refer to 'this/our' country, 'the nation' not needing to be named to be indicated as the ground upon which the figures of speech appear. Disraeli claimed he wanted to, "live in the eye of the country" (quoted in Billig, 1995, p. 107); What country? Which people? Which nation? No specification is necessary, because 'the nation' is 'this nation' —'our nation'. In an analysis of a sentence in a British newspaper, "Government pressure has forced colleagues to increase dramatically the number of students" (quoted in Achard, 1993, p. 82), Achard commented that the frame of the text is 'the nation' without being designated as such, so that Britain is the assumed context of the ongoing discourse although, "the term 'we' is not used, and no external point relative to this universe is designated" (Achard, 1993, p. 108). By using the term 'this' a comparison is implicitly invoked with other countries, but when 'the nation', or 'the Prime Minister', or 'the economy' is used no such comparison is made, and consequently what is 'ours' is presented as if it were the objective world, since 'the' is apparently concrete, 'objective', and uncontroversial (Billig, 1995). Here 'the nation' has simply been unimagined as the context for social action, an unimagination that is routinely flagged.

As the nation is being routinely 'flagged' within the text, 'the nation' also needs to be routinely unimagined, and in this process the rhetoric of pointing becomes deeply entwined with the rhetoric of memoration. In this vein Billig states that, "[A] nation is more than an imagined community of people, for a place —a
homeland—also has to be imagined" (1995, p. 74). Nationhood involves a distinctive imagining of a particular sort of community, rooted in a particular concept of place, that exists beyond the immediate experience of place. A connection exists between this imaging of place and Anderson's (1991) conception of the imagined community, in that both are conceived to stretch beyond immediate experience. So for example, "[F]or American patriots, the United States is not merely the America they know: their America is to be conceived as a unique, vast but homely totality. In this respect, the unity of the national territory has to be imagined rather than directly apprehended" (Billig, 1995, p. 74). In the modern nationalist imagination, one national territory does not shade gently into another, since nations stop and start abruptly at demarcated borders (Billig, 1995). Rathzel (1994, also see Hage, 1996) suggested that the German word 'Heimat' expresses a prime symbol of the nation. Heimat and homeland captures a duality of meaning, where the country is the place of 'our' personal homes and, as such, it is the home of all of 'us'. In this sense the homeland is imagined as a unity, right up to the border, and no further, to be separated from the other different foreign 'essence' that marks out the territory on the other side, or as Anderson puts it, "state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory" (Anderson, 1991, p. 26). In carrying out this imagining a familiar figure in the early stages of 'nation-building' is the nationalist-as-poet, with the mystic bond between people and place an often repeated theme (Ignatieff, 1993; in the New Zealand context see, Jones, 1989; Jensen, 1996). Once nations are established, however, the poets are typically replaced by prosaic politicians, and the epic ballads by government reports as the context for utterance becomes routinely assumed.

**Conclusion**

To conclude this chapter a number of points need to be reiterated. Firstly as has been articulated throughout the discussion of 'banal nationalism'; nationalism cannot be relegated to the historical past, or the distant present; since it is an endemic feature of contemporary life. 'We' paradoxically,
however, do not recognise banal nationalism in 'our' social life because of the very ubiquity of nations, and nationality in 'our' consciousness. While such an approach does not deny the existence of 'hot nationalism', it suggests that the articulation of a periodic 'hot nationalism' relies upon the routine flagging of nationality. In this sense the nation is assumed as the context for social life, and to have a nationality is seemingly a natural fact. Consequently an examination of nationalism must be cognisant of the ways that nationalist flaggings are situated textually, and habitually forgotten. This leads to the second point where if nationalism is so ubiquitous, it is because it is pervasive in the tools with which we construct meaning in the world —language. Therefore since banal nationalism inhabits our use of language, it is language that we must examine, and in particular the prosaic narratives everyday life, those cold statements that rely on the transparent mask of objectivity.
Chapter Four: Anglo-American Geography

What makes geography a tradition—a contested tradition—... is precisely that it has a story, a history.... I would go so far as to claim that it is only when we take the tradition seriously that we can appreciate how incoherences become evident, how new questions and older practices fail to provide the resources to deal with new issues (Livingstone, 1994, p. 420).

Representing geography's past is inevitably an act of the present, however much we attempt to commune with the past. Indeed, the idea of mapping the historical landscape depends on the construction of perspective, a view from the present, around which the panoramas are made to revolve (Driver, 1992, p. 36).

Introduction

This chapter steps away from the prior discussions of nationalism, and aims to outline some of the major epistemological threads that have constituted post-World War Two, Anglo-American human geography. The purpose of which is to present one discursive framework within which the epistemological contours of New Zealand human geography can be positioned. Which this in mind two points need to highlighted. Firstly, the 'historical narrative' of Anglo-American geography constructed in the following chapter is of necessity brief, and provisional, it is a narrative constructed for a purpose other than to illuminate Anglo-American geography, and must read in conjunction with the following chapter on New Zealand human geography. Consequently, while Anglo-American geography will be presented as providing a disciplinary framework for New Zealand human geography, it is impossible to argue that the larger purpose of the thesis, to explore the banal nationalism of New Zealand human geography, has not in turn provided a framework that has structured the reading and presentation of Anglo-American geography. Secondly, it is important to realise that epistemological periodisations used in the chapter should be regarded less as evolutionary progressions, than as the foregrounding of competing hegemonies in human
geography. With these points in mind the chapter is broadly comprised of two sections. The first section outlines the regional approach in Anglo-American geography, and the challenge to it by the rise of positivist quantitative geography; whilst the second section starts with the hegemony of positivist geography, and explores the various approaches arising from the dissatisfaction with positivist geography.

**Regional Geography**

British, and American geography was dominated for much of the first half of the twentieth century by regional geography (Johnston, 1997). Like environmental determinism, regional geography was an attempt at generalisation, but differed in that it lacked a structural explanation, and consequently differed from the law making attempts of previous geographical writing. As its name suggests regional geography was the study of the geography of regions, characterised by an interest in the specific situations of specific localities (Paterson, 1974). Gregory notes that the classical approach of regional geography was through chorology, where the study of regions was held to be important for strategic reasons, and when contemporary geography insisted on the centrality of the regional approach it was often associated with nationalist discourses (Gregory, 1994; Barnes and Gregory, 1997). To this end Gregory (1994) cites the example of Vidal de la Bache's monograph *France de l'Est* that was written as an attempt to show that Alsace-Lorraine was a distinctive pays, irrefragably bound to France rather than Germany. For these reasons regional geography has been criticised for its occlusion of the political implications, and interests, of its writings (Gregory, 1994).

It is with the work of Richard Hartshorne that regional geography received its imprimatur as the central epistemology of human geography (Gregory, 1994). Hartshorne based his perspective on an exegesis of German regional geography, and his 1939 book *The Nature of Geography* (Hartshorne, 1939), quickly became established as the definitive statement of the geographic orthodoxy (Gregory, 1994; Johnston, 1997). The book defined the limits of
geographic inquiry that at the time, since "Geography was a subject grasping for a discipline. Hartshorne synthesised the work of many scholars who had gone before —largely scholars from Germany, France, the British Isles, and the United States (de Souza, 1989, p. vii). Livingstone described Hartshorne’s project as seeking, "to determine the nature of geography from scrutinising its history" (Livingstone, 1992, p. 306); whilst Lukermann claimed that The Nature of Geography was, “a search for authority to validate the conclusions drawn from selected premises —largely formulated by Hettner, who had philosophical associations and leanings rather than historical associates (Lukermann, 1990, p. 58). Gregory maintains that Hartshorne’s exegesis of Hettner was highly selective, and while his, “approval of Hettner (in particular) was unrestrained,... the regional geography that he constructed was purged of both the physico-ecological and the cultural-historical implications that were indelibly present in Hettner” (Gregory, 1994, p. 51).

In the 1939 book Hartshorne argued that geography was:

a science that interprets the realities of areal differentiation of the world as they are found, not only in terms of the differences in certain things from place to place, but also in terms of the total combination of phenomena in each place, different from those at every other place (Hartshorne, 1939, p. 462);

and within this definition geography’s primary concern was to provide accurate descriptions of spatial variations in the earth’s surface, seeking, “to acquire a complete knowledge of the areal differentiation of the. (Hartshorne, 1939, p. 462). Geography’s principle purpose, therefore, was the systematic integration of relevant characteristics, to provide a total description of a region identifiable by its peculiar combination of characteristics (Johnston, 1997). In this view there was a close, but distinct relationship between geography and history, where history provided a synthesis for ‘temporal sections of reality’, whilst geography undertook the same task with ‘spatial sections of the earth’s surface’ (Hartshorne, 1939, p. 460; Smith, 1989; Gregory, 1994). Regions were to be identified by their homogeneity with prescribed characteristics that were
selected for their salience in highlighting areal difference. Hartshorne identified two types of region: the formal (or uniform) region, where the whole area was homogeneous with regard to the phenomenon under review; and the nodal (or functional) region, where unity was imparted by spatial organisation around a common node. Fundamentally, identification of such regions rested on the geographical use of maps, where in the wider academic division of labour, "geography is represented in the world of knowledge primarily by its technique of map use" (Hartshorne, 1939, p. 464; also see Hart, 1982). Following these guidelines, the 'classic' regional study usually comprised of a sequence of physical features, climate, vegetation, agriculture, industries, and population, summarised into a collection of individual maps to produce a set of formal regions (Freeman, 1961; Johnston, 1997).

While regional geography reigned as the hegemony in Anglo-American human geography, differences did exist between the British and American approaches. During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s British geographers appeared less concerned with philosophical and methodological debate then their American counterparts (Johnston, 1997). According to Wooldridge and East, "geography ... fuses the results, if not the methods, of a host of other subjects ... [it] is not a science but merely an aggregate of science (Wooldridge and East, 1958, p. 14), and in its simplest form the, "geographical problem is how and why does one part of the earth's surface differ from another" (ibid., p. 28). Statements such as these indicated that a strong trans-Atlantic body of common opinion existed about the role of regional geography, despite some differences (Johnston, 1997, Stoddart, 1990). A major difference, however, between British and American geography by the 1950s, was the attitude to physical geography. In the United States interest in the physical environment waned, which may have been a consequence of the excesses of environmental determinism, and a desire to see society as a formative agent in landscape change (Johnston, 1997). This trend was not repeated in Britain, where according to Wooldridge and East:
To treat geography too literally as an affair of the 'quasistatic present' is to make both it and its students seem foolish and superficial. It is true that our primary aim is to describe the present landscape; but it is also to interpret it... Our study has therefore always to be evolutionary.... It is unscholarly to take either landforms or human societies as 'given' and static facts, through we must not let temporal sequences obscure spatial patterns (Wooldridge and East, 1958, p. 47).

Similarly, Darby (1953) argued that he was inclined to think that the foundations of geographical study lay in geomorphology, and historical geography. Geography students in British universities during the 1950s rarely specialised in either physical or human geography, since both were considered essential parts of a geographical education, and as researchers, most British geographers specialised in either physical, or human geography, but with a regional specialism that was integrated into a regional synthesis (Johnston, 1997).

The regional geography hegemony lasted throughout the 1940s, and into the 1950s, but during the 1950s a dissatisfaction began to develop as to regional geography's worth, with Freeman noting that, "disappointment with the work of regional geographers has led many to wonder if the regional approach can ever be academically satisfying and to turn to specialisation or some systematic branch of the subject" (Freeman, 1961, p. 141). Freeman suggested three reasons for the disenchantment: firstly, the naivete of regional classification; secondly, the 'weary succession' of physical, and human 'facts' characteristic of much regional geography; and thirdly, the model of regional writing that suggested that the earth's surface could be clearly divided into regions, eventually proving erroneous. Gregory (1994) identifies two other significant criticisms: firstly, regional geography's parochialism, resulting from its idiographic epistemology; and secondly, regional geography's reinstated of a covert environmental determinism, in the shift from the description of the 'physical' landscape to that of the 'cultural' landscape (see Peet, 1977). Another criticism came from Ackerman (1945) who believed that a failing of regional geographers was a weakness in their topical specialisms, a problem
that could be rectified by more training, and research in detailed systematic studies.

However, despite Ackerman's prompting it would not be until the 1950s that widespread changes in human geography's epistemology would begin to occur. A posthumously published paper by Schaefer (1953) is often cited as the origin of the 'quantitative and theoretical revolution' in geography (Johnston, 1997). Schaefer's paper challenged Hartshorne's interpretation of the works of Hettner and others, criticising Hartshorne's exceptionalist claims for regional geography, while presenting an alternative approach to geography based on the tenets of positivist science. Schaefer observed that science was characterised by explanation, and that explanations required laws, "To explain the phenomena one has described means always to recognise them as instances of laws" (Schaefer, 1953, p. 227). Within this geography, "has to be conceived as the science concerned with the formulation of the laws governing the spatial division of certain features on the surface of the earth" (ibid., p. 227), and consequently the spatial arrangements of phenomena, not the phenomena themselves, should be the subject for the search for law-like statements. In taking this approach geographical procedures would not differ from those in other sciences, since observation would lead to a hypothesis, which would be then tested against large numbers of cases to provide the material for a law if it were thereby verified. The argument, articulated by Hartshorne, against the nomothetic definition of geography was termed exceptionalist (Johnston, 1997). Exceptionalist approaches claimed that geography did not share the methodology of other sciences because of the special nature of its subject matter —the study of unique places, or regions. Schaefer argued, however, that geography was not peculiar in focusing on unique phenomena as all sciences dealt with unique events that could only be accounted for by an integration of laws from various systematic sciences, but that did not prevent the development of laws, and consequently, "it is, therefore, absurd to maintain that the geographers are distinguished among the scientists through the integration of heterogeneous phenomena which they achieve. There is nothing extraordinary about geography in that respect"
The exceptionalist view of geography, argued Schaefer, arose from the misapplication of Kant's analogy between geography and history, a position developed by Hettner, and utilised by Hartshorne. For Schaefer this was a false position because both history and geography can be sciences for, "What scientists do is ... They apply to each concrete situation jointly all the laws that involve the variables that have reason to believe are relevant" (italics in original, ibid., p. 56). While Johnston (1997) notes that Schaefer's paper did not produce much reaction in print, despite later claims, the paper did draw a considerable response from Hartshorne, in a letter to the editor of the *Annals* (Hartshorne, 1954), and three, later, substantive pieces (Hartshorne, 1955a, 1958, 1959).

The purpose of Hartshorne's (1955a) piece was to indicate flaws in Schaefer's scholarship, arguing that Schaefer was limited in his references, drew insupportable conclusions, and misrepresented the views of others (Gregory, 1978a). More generally Hartshorne claimed that Schaefer's paper, "ignores the normal standards of critical scholarship and in effect offers nothing more than personal opinion, thinly disguised as literary and historical analysis" (Hartshorne, 1955a, p. 244). In the final section Hartshorne turned to the antiexceptionalist argument arguing that Schaefer in coming to the conclusion that geography should take process laws from the systematic sciences and use them to produce morphological laws, came close to advocating the exceptionalist claim that he sought to critique. Hartshorne summarised Schaefer's position as, "geography must be a science, science is the search for laws, and all phenomena of nature and human life are subject to such laws and completely determinable by them" (ibid., p. 242). Such scientific determinism stood in contrast to what Hartshorne believed geographers did. The most substantive of Hartshorne's replies to Schaefer was his 1959 monograph (Hartshorne, 1959), which was both a response to Schaefer's arguments, and a vehicle to discuss issues raised since his 1939 book. The monograph aimed to disclose geography's 'essential' character to provide a methodology through which geography could meet the need for, "new conceptual approaches, and more effective ways of measuring the interrelationships of phenomena"
In discussing the meaning of areal differentiation, geography was defined as, "that discipline that seeks to describe and interpret the variable character from place to place of the earth as the world of man" (emphasis in original, ibid., p. 47). Furthermore Hartshorne considered that human and natural factors did not have to be identified separately, and consequently the division between human and physical geography was unnecessary. In relation to temporal processes, Hartshorne argued that geographers needed only to study proximate genesis, because landscapes were stable and, therefore, the study of their change was irrelevant to geography, and consequently classification by appearance rather than by origin was more important in the study of areal differentiation. In answering the question —'Is geography divided between systematic and regional geography?'— Hartshorne developed a position different from his earlier work (Johnston, 1997). In his 1959 monograph Hartshorne accepted that studies of inter-relationships could be arranged along a continuum, “from those which analyse the most elementary complexes in areal variation over the world to those which analyse the most complex integrations in areal variation within small areas” (Hartshorne, 1959, p. 121). While every ‘truly’ geographical study used both approaches, Hartshorne had no doubt that the regional approach was superior. This, however, does represent a downgrading of the regional approach from its formerly central position in the geographical enterprise. In Johnston’s (1997) opinion while Hartshorne and Schaefer disagreed over the method of constituting scientific, geographic knowledge both agreed that the goal of scientific understanding was important for geographical study.

**Quantitative geography**

The similarity of Hartshorne’s position with the overall goal of positivism led some commentators to see little difference between the two in ends, if not in means (Gulke, 1977; 1978; Gregory, 1978a; and Johnston, 1997). The major basis of the methodological, and philosophical differences between Schaefer and Hartshorne, lay in Hartshorne having a positive view of geography, whilst Schaefer articulated a normative view (Johnston, 1997). While Hartshorne was
a supporter of the positivist scientific method, his problems existed because of his views on geography's uniqueness; Schaefer on the other hand accepted the full positivist position, and showed that uniqueness was a general problem of science. So Gulke observed that by extending the idea of uniqueness to everything, "Schaefer effectively removed a major logical objection to the possibility of a law seeking geography and demonstrated that Hartshorne's view of the uniqueness as a special problem was untenable for anyone who accepted the scientific model of explanation (Guelke, 1978, p. 380).

Schaefer's insistence on the need for geographers to develop laws created a major crisis within the discipline, and within a decade of Schaefer's paper many human geographers were adopting elements of the positivist manifesto (Gulke, 1977). Presented with a choice between quantification and a contemplation of the Hartshornian unique Gulke observed that, "Not surprisingly, most geographers opted for geography as a law-seeking science" (ibid., p. 385), because by then:

Universities were expected to produce problem-solvers or social-technologists to run increasingly complex economies, and geographers were not slow in adopting new positions appropriate to the new conditions. Statistics and models were ideal tools for monitoring and planning in complex industrial societies (Gulke, 1978, p. 45).

These comments connect the discipline of geography to a wider will-to-power —'rational' management— in a similar way to geography's earlier connection with exploration and imperialism (Driver, 1992; Godlewska and Smith, 1994). In this context quantitative geography supplanted regional geography as the reigning epistemological hegemony. The term 'quantitative revolution' is slightly misleading in that the emphasis is placed solely on quantification, whilst the change in human geography was not solely confined to the application of statistical and mathematical methods, but also involved the conjoint construction of formal theories of spatial organisation (Gregory, 1994). These changes were in some sense evolutionary rather than revolutionary, formalising a long-standing, but ill-defined, commitment to a form of positivism, Livingstone
suggests that, "Geography's confrontation with the vocabulary of logical positivism... was a post hoc means of rationalising its attempt to reconstitute itself as spatial science" (Livingston, 1992, p. 328), and consequently appeared as a technical revolution seeking philosophical legitimisation (Johnston, 1997; Gregory, 1994). The apogee of the 'new' philosophy of geography was possibly Harvey's (1969) tract, despite Burton's earlier contention that, "the revolution is over, in that once-revolutionary ideas are now conventional" (Burton, 1963, p. 156). Other important texts in the entrenchment of positivist human geography included: Morrill (1970), Alber et al. (1971), and the essays collected in Chorley and Haggett (1965, 1967).

An important process in entrenchment of the scientific method was quantification, and in particular the use of statistics. The main attraction of statistics was their putative precision, and lack of ambiguity in description compared to the English language, an attraction illustrated in Cole's (1969) annotation of a text from Stamp and Beaver (1947) that showed its supposed ambiguities (see Barnes, 1996). Responses to the 'new theology' of geography was varied, with two interrelated points being the main foci of contention: firstly, whether quantification was sensible in geographical research; and secondly, whether law-making was possible. Quantification was largely accepted as important although its extent was questioned. Spate noted that, "This is, like it or note, the Quantified Age. The stance of King Canute is not very helpful or realistic; better to ride the waves, if one has sufficient finesse, than to stake attitudes of humanistic defiance and end, in Toynbee's phrase, in the dustbin of history (Spate, 1960, p. 391). More pressing to geographers than the issue of quantification was the problem of theory and the role of laws in geography (Johnston, 1997). In replying to critics of law-seeking Golledge and Amedeo (1968) argued that these critics had conceptualised scientific laws as universal postulates, which brooked no exceptions, and in contrast they identified a number of scientific laws, that could be applicable to human geography. It appears, however, that the differences soon became a non-issue as the quantitative and theoretical material came to dominate geographical journals.
However, not all of human geography was subsumed by the new hegemony, with cultural, and historical geography standing apart (Johnston, 1997). It was from these sub-disciplines, especially historical geography, that criticism of the quantitative hegemony came as these sub-disciplines looked outside geography for inspiration. Criticism of logical positivism in human geography circulated around logical positivism's empiricism, exclusivity, autonomy, and universality. Regarding the first, the relationship between observational statements and theoretical languages was shown to be much more problematic than positivism had allowed. Secondly, the assumption that the 'objective' methods of the natural sciences could be extended into the humanities, and the social sciences, to provide a unitary system of inquiry was challenged. Additionally the application of qualitative methods showed the importance of recovering meanings, intentions, and values as highly important elements in human geographical inquiry; and conversely these 'subjective' concerns were also argued to be an important part of the natural sciences (Woolgar, 1988). Thirdly, it was argued that the detachment of science from social life was untenable, and that the embeddedness of science in social life required an explicit reflection on the politics of human geography, and in particular on the ways geography's various 'regimes of truth' were constituted, and imbricated in wider relations of power/knowledge. Finally, the natural sciences were shown to be context-dependent, and consequently the extension of scientific generalisation became a precarious, negotiated achievement, rather than a deterministic process (Rouse, 1987). This also applied to the social sciences, and humanities. in that they were forced to recognise that explanations and understandings developed in one setting could not be automatically applied to other settings. As a consequence of the growing critiques of positivist human geography a series of alternative threads rose into prominence, and it is these alternative threads that the following section adumbrates

Challenges to positivist human geography
In the following section five jostling geographical epistemologies are outlined: behavioural, humanist, radical, postmodern, and feminist geography. Roland Barthes wrote that, "discourse (discursivity) moves in its historical impetus by clashes. A new discourse can only emerge as the paradox which goes against... the surrounding or preceding doxa" (Barthes, 1987, p. 200), pertinent comments since much of the initial impetus for the radical, and humanistic, approaches came as a reaction against the limitations of positivist human geography. Binding together the epistemological critiques of positivist human geography was a belief in the failure of spatial science to provide useful paths to understanding (Johnston, 1997).

**Behavioural geography**

One course of action to address some of the limitations of spatial science was through tinkering around the edges, an approach announced, in Cox and Golledge's 1969 collection of essays, as behavioural geography. In many ways behavioural geography was a reaction against the dominant normative and mechanistic models of 'man' (Pile, 1996), a gendering that Pile leaves intact since he believed that, "behavioural geography is constituted through an implicit, undisclosed, oppressive and obstructive masculinism" (Pile, 1996, p. 19; also see Rose, 1993 for a discussion of the masculinity of geography). Linkages existed between behavioural geography and humanistic geography, at least in the early stages of their respective development, and both Brookfield (1969) and Mercer (1972) saw behavioural geography as a new kind of humanism because it put a thinking human at the centre of geographical analysis, a concern which was supposed to be the defining feature of humanistic geography (Pile, 1996). The two streams of thought separated, however, when humanist geographers began to insist upon the essential subjectivity of both the investigator and the investigated in ways that departed from the strictures of behavioural geography (Ley, 1981). As behavioural geography developed conceptually, mental processes and cognitive representations came to be of central importance, since they represented the filter between the mind and behaviour. Consequently two issues came to
dominate behavioural geography: overt spatial behaviour; and in-the-mind environmental perception, whilst the 'Image' became a pivotal term (Pile, 1996).

Derived from the work of Boulding (1956; 1973) behavioural geography drew on the idea of the 'Image' in two particular ways. Firstly, as a cognitive structure consisting of limited perceptions of the world, that could be elicited, specified, and measured; while secondly, as mental maps of the world carried around in our heads. The 'foundational studies of behavioural geography drew upon the concept of the 'Image' as a cognitive structure (White, 1945, 1964; Wolpert, 1964, 1965; and Hägerstrand, 1965, 1970) in examinations of decision-making processes. In these studies the 'decision' was based on a cognitive structure that was defined by a bounded, or contextual, image of the world. For example White's (1945, 1964) work evaluated the ways that flood-plain dwellers assessed the risk of flooding, and argued that people were rational, but that this rationality was bounded (Pile, 1996). Similarly in Wolpert's (1964) study of Swedish farmers, the farmers did not make 'optimal' decisions, but were 'satisficers' or more concerned with avoiding risks than maximising returns, and that people were limited by their personal abilities. In contrast to White, and Wolpert, Hägerstrand (1965) was less concerned with the limits of human rationality than with the limits of the model's spatial behaviour, arguing that behavioural variables needed to be incorporated into models of spatial patterns. While this work was used to suggest the importance of behaviour in the production of spatial patterns, behavioural geography came to define itself in terms of its interest in the individual. Strictly speaking, argues Pile, "behavioural geographers were interested in aggregating individual cognitive processes and overt behaviour into spatial patterns.... This tended 'to work backwards' from observable behaviour to make inferences about the mental processes that operate in the mind" (Pile, 1996, p. 27). Consequently, while the concept of 'bounded rationality' had some impact, it faltered when it tried to interrelate people's preferences, mental processes, and spatial patterns (Pile, 1996).
The second approach to behavioural geography involved excavating people's putative 'mental maps', a 'cognitive mapping' that Downs and Stea characterised as a, "process comprised of a series of physiological transformations by which an individual acquires, codes, stores and recalls, and decodes information about the relative locations and attributes of phenomena in his everyday spatial environment" (Downs and Stea, 1973, p. 9). Here it was assumed that mental maps were a central component of actual behaviour, although the process of constructing these maps was largely unknown (Walmsley and Lewis, 1984). While the 'image' and the 'map' were not the same for everyone, and different cartographical practices changed the way that people thought through space (see Massey, 1995), behavioural geographers came to see 'cognitive mapping' as representing the mechanics of the mind, rather than simply one, metaphorical, method of organising spatial information (Pile, 1996). Both cognitive mapping, and bounded rationality shared a view that something mental intervened between behaviour and environment —the image. They also shared believed that while the conscious mind was 'rational' there was another layer that held either 'irrational', 'unconscious' or biological impulses (Pile, 1996). This 'subconscious' layer, however, was never theorised because, it was assumed to be universal and unalterable, and indeed one of the subsequent criticisms of behavioural geography was that it assumed away 'covert' mental processes, consigning them to the untheorised 'black box' of the subconscious.

Proponents of behavioural geography predicted that their studies would come to rival the hegemony of the quantitative revolution (Burton, 1963). But by the start of the 1980s Thrift noted that, "The halcyon days of behavioural geography are long gone. With them have passed the days when behavioural geographers made inflated claims for the explanatory power of their subject area (Thrift, 1981, p. 359). Thrift recognised two criticisms of behavioural work: those which perceived it as presenting the individual decision-maker as little more than a programmed automation; and those which claimed that behavioural geography ignored the 'fact' that society was greater than the sum of its individual parts. In a similar vein Massey (1975) argued that behavioural
geography treated the external world as immutable, and hence supported the status quo; whilst Cox (1981) claimed that behavioural geography, rather than representing a break with the mechanistic models of spatial science was simply 'business as usual'. However, in contrast to Thrift's (1981) conclusion, rather than a slowing down in the pace of work in behavioural geography, Johnston (1997) argues the opposite seems to have occurred (see Golledge and Rushton, 1984; Golledge and Timmermans, 1988, and Timmermans and Golledge, 1990).

Humanist geography

While behavioural geography involved the modification of the work within the positivist framework, alongside it from the early 1970s another critique of spatial science emerged. This approach argued for a focus on the individual as a decision-maker, but contrary to behavioural geography denied the goal of explanation and prediction (Cosgrove, 1989; Johnston, 1997). This opposition was clarified by Entrikin's definition of humanistic geography as:

> a reaction against what they believe to be an overly objective, narrow, mechanistic and deterministic view of [the human being] presented in much of the contemporary research in the human sciences. Humanist geographers argue that their approach deserves the appellation 'humanistic' in that they study the aspects of [people] which are most distinctively 'human': meaning, values, goals and purposes (Entrikin, 1976, p. 616).

As noted previously the early steps of humanistic geography were made alongside those of behavioural geography, but the two diverged when humanistic geography insisted on the subjectivity of both the investigator and the investigated in ways which departed from the formal strictures of behaviouralism (Gold and Goodey, 1984; Pile, 1996). Indeed, early humanistic geography shared a more general critique of positivism's claim to objectivity, and came to be represented as a form of criticism through which geographers could be made more self-aware and cognisant of the 'hidden' assumptions, and implications, of their methods and research, rather than as a coherent methodology for a 'postbehavioural' revolution in geography (Entrikin, 1976).
Alongside critiques of positivist human geography, humanist geography also advanced a critique of 'structuralist' approaches in geography (Duncan and Ley, 1982).

Within the basic framework of humanist geography two strands can be distinguished. The first involved a self-consciously theoretical approach to humanistic geography that draw upon a variety of ideas derived from the social sciences including phenomenology and existentialism (Christensen, 1982; Relph, 1970); and whose practice was typified by ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism. Relph's introduction of a phenomenological approach to humanistic geography was followed by Tuan (1971). For Tuan geography was a mirror, where the study of landscapes was the study of the 'essences' in the societies that moulded them, in the same way that the study of literature and art revealed much about human life. Tuan claimed that, "The model for the regional geographers of humanist leaning is... the Victorian novelist who strives to achieve a synthesis of the subjective and the objective" (Tuan, 1978, p. 204).

Within the phenomenological approach Buttimer directed geographers' attention to the concept of 'lifeworld', "the pre-reflective, taken-for-granted dimensions of experience, the unquestioned meanings, and routinized determinants of behaviour" (Buttimer, 1976, p. 281, also see chapter one). However, while accepting the need for humanistic approaches, Gregory (1978b) argued that these approaches ignored the constraints on social action which existed as part of the life-world of the actors, and thus, "A geography of the life world must therefore determine the connections between social typifications of meaning and space-time rhythms of action and uncover the structures of intentionally which lie beneath them" (ibid., p. 139). While Gregory argued for a more materialist humanist geography, he later noted that this theoretical stream of humanist geography had became linked to a humanist tradition within historical materialism (Gregory, 1981), a rapprochement promoted by Kobayashi and Mackenzie (1989).

The second stream of humanist geography can be characterised by a self-conscious effort to connect with that special body of knowledge of expression.
and experience about what it means to be a human being on this earth
(Mening, 1983). This strand displayed a deep concern with particularity, and
specificity, rather than with general theories of spatial organisation, and its
methods included hermeneutics, historiography, literary criticism, and art
history (Johnston, 1997). Within this broad framework understanding social life
involved participatory field work, the methodology that, according to Smith
(1984), was the hallmark of much geographic humanism, and whose strength,
"derives from the unique insight it offers into 'lay' or folk' perceptions and
behaviours. True to the pragmatic maxim, the method allows the truth of a
social reality to be established in terms of its consequences for those
experiencing it" (ibid., p. 356-7). Other repositories of meaning included literary
texts and the landscape, thus Pocock described humanistic strategies ranging
from, "library search, to the observational, to the experiential" (Pocock, 1983, p.
356). However, as Porteous points out, the use of literature as a basis for some
humanistic work has been highly selective, since:

Plays are not considered, poetry is but occasionally used, the novel reigns supreme. The
advantage of the novel lie in its length (meaty), it prose form (understandable), its
involvement with the human condition (relevant), and its tendency to contain passages,
purple or otherwise, which deal directly with landscape and places in the form of
description (geographical) (Porteous, 1985, p. 117).

Porteous goes on to argue that by focusing on novels, geographers had
concentrated on nineteenth century, rural contexts, and consequently by
limiting themselves to specific aspects of the world had denied themselves both
the possibility of probing deeply into what it all meant, and the possibility of
shaping the future (Mening, 1983).

Towards the end of the 1980s the more self-consciously theoretical strand of
humanistic geography began to braid together, and entwine, with a wider
interest in cultural theory. The result being that it become increasingly difficult
to identify a distinctive humanistic geography (Johnston, 1997; cf. Buttmer,
1990). In addition, what had become especially problematic in humanistic
graphy, were critiques of human agency, and the human subject, that
emerged from postmodernist and poststructuralist work. These critiques argued that the autonomous, neutered, and sovereign human subject at the core of humanist geography was a fiction, that suppressed the multiple ways that subjects were constructed, and which normalised a white, masculine, bourgeois subject, from which others were to be seen as departures or deviants (Gregory, 1994).

Radical geography

The term 'radical geography' was introduced in the early 1970s to describe geographical writing that was critical of positivist human geography, but which lacked an all-embracing, descriptive adjective. The concerns of radical geography, especially in the United States, emerged from three issues during the 1960s: the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, and pervasive urban poverty (Johnston, 1997). Out of these concerns developed a wider critique of capitalism, and subsequently radical geography developed largely as a negative reaction to the established discipline (Peet, 1977). This work introduced topics such as poverty, hunger, health, and crime to human geographers whom had largely ignored these topics. Despite the appellation, however, Peet claimed that the early 'radical' geography was actually liberal in its approach, since:

Radicals investigated only the surface aspect of these questions — that is, how social problems were manifested in space. For this, either we found the conventional methodology adequate enough or we proposed only that existing methods of research be modified to some extend if they are to serve the analytic and reconstructive policies of... radical applications (Peet, 1977, p. 245).

The formal case for a Marxist analysis was first presented by Falke (1972) who characterised geography, and other social sciences as, "highly sophisticated, technique-orientated, but largely descriptive disciplines with little relevance for the solution of acute and seemingly chronic societal problems... theory has reflected the values and interests of the ruling class" (Falke, 1972, p. 13). However, the major case for a Marxist-inspired geography was contained in
David Harvey’s (1973) apostasy, which traced his intellectual development from a liberal approach to an acceptance of a Marxist one. For Harvey, Marxist theory provided, “the key to understanding capitalist production from the position of those not in control of the means of production... an enormous threat to the power structure of the capitalist world” (ibid., p. 127), whilst the goal of such work was to, “identify real choices as they are immanent in an existing situation and to devise ways of validating or invalidating those choices through action” (ibid. p. 149). These goals were made more explicit in Harvey’s (1984) historical materialist manifesto; while his 1982 book tried to extend Marxian theory (Harvey, 1982). Through Marxism, Harvey sought to make geography relevant, while Eliot Hurst polemically announced that, “geography is irrelevant to contemporary society” (Eliot Hurst, 1980, p. 85), and that embracing Marxism would be insufficient to make geography relevant. Rather, Eliot Hurst argued that geography could not be incorporated within Marxism, but had to be transcended and superseded by it, and consequently for geographers to become Marxists, they had to commit professional suicide. Less dramatically, during the 1980s, Marxist and other realist work led to an integration of the geographical understanding of capitalist society with that of other social scientists (Johnston, 1997). This involved the realisation that while capitalism was a global phenomena, it operated on a variety of inter-dependent spatial scales, and consequently capitalism was organised globally, justified nationally, yet experienced locally (Taylor, 1989). The recognition of the contextuality of life, and its structuring and restructuring in locales, led to the development of geographically informed social theory, and calls for the restructuring of human geography (Johnston, 1997).

Regarding social theory Thrift (1983) made the distinction between compositional and contextual theory: where, contextual theories focused on the role of locales as settings, within which people learnt how to act as human agents; while compositional theories classified individuals on certain criteria, and allocated beliefs and behaviours to them accordingly. Giddens’ (1984) structuration approach is an example of a contextual approach where, “spatial structure is now seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds but
rather as a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced" (Gregory and Urry, 1985, p. 3). One important element of work on localities originated with Doreen Massey (1984a), who argued that understanding the changing locational patterns of industries required an appreciation of the links between economic, and social change. Local social structures varied in how labour processes were organised, and from comparing two regional case study Massey concluded that:

although both... are now being drawn into a similar place in an emerging wider division of labour, their roles in previous spatial divisions of labour have been very different; they have different histories. They bring with them different class structures and social characteristics, and, as a result, the changes which they undergo... are also different (Massey, 1984a, p. 194).

The result, a regional mosaic of unique areas reflecting the interpretations of local contexts by the actors involved in a wider changing industrial geography. A position which seems remarkably similar to earlier regional approaches in human geography. Indeed Massey pleaded that it was, "necessary to reassert the existence, the explicable, and the significance, of the particular, What we [must do]... is take up again the challenge of the old regional geography, reject the answers it gave while recognizing the importance of the problem it set" (Massey, 1984b, p. 10). In turn, this 'localities' work was subjected to a number of critiques. For example Cochrane wondered whether Massey's work in the Changing Urban and Regional System (CURS) programme was, "just a cover for structural Marxism with a human face, or... the cover for a return to empiricism with a theoretically sophisticated face" (Cochrane, 1987, p. 355), and concluded that the programme contained that danger, that as a guide to political action, it might to suggest that local struggle could suffice, rather than a realisation that the parts cannot be readily be isolated from the whole (see Harvey, 1996; cf. Massey, 1994).

By the 1980s radical geography had become less combative for four reasons: Marxist thought was itself subject to strong critiques; the failure of socialist-inspired states made Marxism's revolutionary goals less certain; the discipline
had become more professional, and less accepting of radicals; and a number of the 1960s-1970s 'radicals' had joined the disciplinary 'establishment' (Peet and Thrift, 1989). Perhaps emblematic of the changes taking place within 'radical' geography was its relabeling as 'political economy':

to encompass a whole range of perspectives which sometimes differ from one another and yet share common concerns and similar viewpoints. The terms does not imply that geography as a type of economics. Rather economy is understood in its broad sense as social economy, or way of life, founded in production... Clearly this definition is influenced by Marxism... But the political-economy approach in geography is not, and never was, confined to Marxism... So while political economy refers to a broad spectrum of ideas, these notions have focus and order: political-economic geographers practise their discipline as part of a general, critical theory emphasising the social production of existence (ibid., 1989, p. 3).

In summary, the group of approaches that began as 'radical' geography in the 1960s as a reaction to both positivist human geography, and the crisis of capitalism during the 1970s, became during the 1980s, as Marxist thought was subjected to criticism, "more sober and less combative" (Peet and Thrift, 1989, p. 7), and more narrowly professional (Johnston, 1997). Nevertheless, Peet and Thrift concluded that, "The political economy-approach... has survived counterattack, critique, and economic and professional hard times, and has matured into a leading and, for many, the [their emphasis] leading school of contemporary geographic thought" (ibid., p. 7).

Postmodernist geography

By the end of the 1980s, the majority of Anglo-American human geographers had rejected the positivist approaches associated with spatial science (Barnes, 1996). At the same time there was a growing disillusionment with radical geography because of its implicit belief in explanation and progress, and its limited treatment of individuals. Geographers sought an approach that both avoided the implicit material determinism of positivist and Marxist approaches, and the voluntarism of humanistic approaches (Johnston, 1997). Within this context human geographers began to engage with, and contribute to the
debate, around postmodernism. To talk about postmodernism is to enter a
debate of Byzantine qualities, and consequently postmodernism is,
"infuriatingly difficult to define" (Cloke, Philo and Sadler, 1991, p. 19). According to Dear, "Postmodernity is everywhere, from literature, design and
philosophy, to MTV, ice cream and underwear" (Dear, 1994, p. 3), an ubiquity
that only aggravates the problems in grasping its meaning, since postmodernist
discourse seems capable of instant adaptation in response to the context, and
choice, of its interlocutors (ibid., p. 3).

Cloke et al. (1991) make the distinction between postmodernism as an object of
study, and postmodernism as an attitude(s); whilst Dear (1986) classifies three
components of postmodernism: postmodernism as style, postmodernism as
method, and postmodernism as an epoch. In Dear’s classification of
postmodernism as style, architecture has become the paradigmatic art, and has
often been take as a starting point in general discussions about postmodernism
(see Harvey, 1989). Postmodernist architecture has been criticised for its
attention to facade variation, diversity in colour, design elements, and
iconography which is taken to be no more than superficial gilt, critiques that
can be linked to the idea of postmodernism as epoch (Dear, 1986), and
postmodernism as object (Cloke et al., 1991). However, as Bourdieu (1984),
and Ley and Mills (1992) note critiques that take this approach are incomplete
for style is centrally implicated in the constitution of meaning, and identity;
either in supporting or resisting dominant discourses, and this occurs in the
postmodern built environment as well. Cloke et al. (1991) argue that most
geographers who have discussed postmodernism have tended to treat it simply
as an object, as a condition of the contemporary world that involved a
distinctive shift in the temporal and spatial organisation of economic, social,
political, and cultural processes. Thus for Jameson (1984) postmodernism is
the culture of late capitalism, while for Harvey (1989) the condition of
postmodernity is an integral element of the new phase of post-Fordist flexible
accumulation. So Harvey states that:
There has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972.

This sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new dominant ways in which we experience space and time....

But these changes, when set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface appearance rather than as signs of the emergence of some entirely new postcapitalist or even postindustrial society. (Harvey, 1989, p. vii).

But as Cloke et al. (1991) argue, while studies using this approach have begun to make a useful start in illuminating the 'geography' of postmodernism, they have done so from the familiar perspectives of Marxist geography, and humanistic geography. In this respect these accounts of postmodernity are resolutely modern in that culture and art are represented as epiphenomenon of economic logic, and on this score they have been criticised for their totalising character, for their claim to authority in an unreflective metanarrative, and for their inadequate portrayal of the experience and struggles of the 'other' (Gregory, 1990; Deutsch, 1991; and Massey, 1991).

The above critiques have come from a stream of thought that conceives of postmodernism as an attitude. The postmodernist 'attitude' is represented as suspicious of 'grand' intellectual positions such as Marxism, and humanism; and instead Cloke et al. (1991) argue that one of the key premises of a postmodern attitude is a need to comprehend the human world less in terms of 'grand theory', and more in terms of, "humble, eclectic and empirically grounded materials" (italics in original: ibid., p. 171). The naturalism and totalisation that Gregory (1989) identified as dominating the modernist paradigm was attacked as being irrelevant to understanding the modern world (Lash and Urry, 1987). For Gregory postmodernism provided, "a particularly vibrant statement of the polyphony that characterises (and ought to characterise) contemporary social theory" (Gregory, 1989, p. 379). In a substantial critique of the approaches that dominated post-World War Two Anglo-American geography Cloke et al. noted that:
human geographers will increasingly come to recognise the gravity of the challenge that postmodernism as attitude poses to the most conventional theorisations of the human world, and will begin to appreciate that a sensitivity to the geography of this world – to its fragmentation across multiple spaces, places, environments and landscapes is itself very much bound up with (and an impetus for) a postmodern suspicion of modernist ‘grand theories’ and ‘metanarratives’....These manoeuvres will doubtless cause much unease and controversy, however, given that they cast doubt on the stability of the foundations from which most human geography had proceeded over the last thirty years or so (1991, p. 200).

For Dear, to ignore the postmodern challenge, “is to risk disengaging geography once more from the mainstream” (Dear, 1994, p. 9), while, “To accept is it to encourage new ways of seeing, to relish participating at the cutting edge of social and philosophical inquiry, to convince our peers of the significance of space in contemporary social thought and social process, and to help forge a new politics for the twenty-first century” (ibid., p. 9). Graham accepted Dear’s view that postmodernism had flourished in human geography, but noted with concern that, “Postmodernism is emancipatory for it frees us from the dominance of any exclusive paradigm or meta-narrative (Folch-Serra, 1990) yet it is also dis(en)abling because it provides us with no tools for taking yes/no positions (McDowell, 1991)” (Graham, 1995, p. 176).

Cloke et al. (1991) conclude their discussion of postmodernism by speculating on the future direction of a ‘postmodern human geography’. In the first place they expected that numerous human geographers will continue within the approach typified by Harvey (1989), unravelling the spatial dimensions to postmodernity as object. Within this process there will be an ongoing debate about both the extent to which the ‘space-economy’ of the contemporary world is being ‘flexibilised’, and the extent to which it is possible to ‘read off’ matters of culture, politics, and ideology from the workings of the changing ‘space-economy’. In the second place Cloke et al. expected that human geographers would increasingly come to recognise the gravity of the challenge that the postmodernist ‘attitude’ poses to modernist theorisations of the world. Ironically, however, for a series of discourses that contest the metanarratives,
and hegemony of modernist theory, postmodernism itself can be presented as another hegemonic metanarrative, and its claim to the veracity of its claims about ‘truth’ can be subjected to an infinite regress.

Feminist geography

One of the approaches that developed in human geography which challenged both positivist, and the critiques of positivist, human geography was feminist geography. One of the first papers discussing gender issues in geography was published in *Antipode* (Burnett, 1973), but that it was not until the 1980s, that feminist geography became more than an ‘occasional curiosity’ (McDowell, 1993a). The first task of feminist geographers was to make women visible by developing a geography of women, and in this early feminist work McDowell (1993a) identified three themes. Firstly, the largely empirical task of delineating the spatial differences in women’s status by demonstrating, “man’s inhumanity to women” (ibid., p. 163), an approach that was to become criticised for its ethnocentrism. Secondly, the examination of the ways that women were excluded from analyses of urban areas that focused on public rather than private activities. And thirdly, the uncovering of patriarchal power, which illustrated the lacunae of geographers to the embodiment of gender divisions in the built environment. This ‘feminist empiricism’ paralleled concerns of other geographers for social justice, and stimulated, “a common focus on excluded or oppressed groups —be they women, the working class or ethnic minorities — [that] united ‘radical’ geographers” (ibid., p. 174). For McDowell feminist empiricism was the foundation for a challenge to the masculinist domination, even epistemological foundations, of human geography, since, “It made women and men visible as both academic authors and subjects, thus challenging the implicit masculinity of the discipline (emphasis in original, ibid., p. 175). The ‘geography of women’ approach was criticised because it explained gender inequality through the concept of gender roles, in conjunction with notions of spatial constraint. Foard and Gregson (1986) argued that such an approach narrowed the focus to women, emerged out of a static social theory, and presented women as victims; and while this approach showed how women
were spatially constrained and separated, it also constructed a narrow view of space that was conceived almost exclusively in terms of distance.

The limitations of this model, and frustrations with attempts to implement some of these insights of this approach, led to a critical reconsideration of the limits of liberal feminism and towards a fuller institutional analysis (Wekerle, 1984). The result was a break between liberal feminist geography, and the developing socialist feminist geography. Socialist feminist geography reworked Marxian categories to explain the interdependence of geography, gender relations and economic development under capitalism, while one of its key debates revolved around the question of how to entwine gender and class analyses. Through a focus on urban and regional scales socialist feminist geographers became increasingly attentive to the ways that gender relations differed from place to place, and not only reflected, but partially determined local economic changes. By the late 1980s, however, feminist geographers had largely moved away from an exclusive focus on gender and class systems, and the modernist approaches typical of socialist feminists (McDowell, 1993a).

In the latest stream of feminist analysis, work categorised as both poststructuralist (Di Stefano, 1990), and as postmodern (Harding, 1986), the salience of gender itself as an analytical category, and as the basis for common interests was fiercely debated (McDowell, 1993b). Feminist geographers working within this latest stream drew upon a broad range of social theory, including psychoanalysis and poststructuralism, in order to understand the constitution and contestation of gender relations, and identities. The encounter with postmodernism stimulated a debate about 'situated knowledge' which led to the situation whereby:

geographers sympathetic to the postmodern deconstructive project are... reluctant to abandon gender as a difference that makes a difference, if no longer the difference. The current aim within feminist geography is a move towards... 'partial' or 'situated knowledges' that recognize that the positionings of white British women in the academy, to take but one example, are not the same as those of other women, women from
different ethnic or class backgrounds, and that this makes a difference to knowledge construction (McDowell, 1993b, p. 310)

Such an approach indicated that, "attention should be refocused on multiple differences, none of which are theoretically privileged over any other" (ibid., p. 310). From this perspective Haraway suggested that the gender specific perspective of women is the preferable grounding for inquiry, since, "there is good reason to believe vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful (Haraway, 1991, p. 306), a technologically inspired reimagining of Hegel's master-slave dialectic.

Alongside, and connected with, these streams of thought has been feminist standpoint theory, where rather than seeing gender discrimination as unfair, and rooted in rational humanist notions of rights, obligations and justice, this perspective celebrates difference, and seeks to reverse rather than abolish the traditional allocation of superiority to all that is masculine (McDowell, 1993b). Thus, in Di Stefano's words:

Anti-rationalism comes face-to-face with the denigration of feminized nature and attempts to revalorize the feminine in the light of this denigration.... Anti-rationalism celebrates the designated and feminized irrational, invoking a strong notion of difference against the gender neutral pretensions of a rationalist culture that opposes itself to nature, the body, natural contingency, and intuition. This project sees itself as a disloyal opposition and envisions a social order that would better accommodate women in their feminized difference rather than as imperfect copies of the Everyman (quoted in McDowell, 1993b, p. 306, emphasis added).

From this viewpoint the vision of equality that imbued work in the empiricist or rationalist mode, the sameness with men that appears to be being sought, is rejected as a gendered, masculinist version that denied the differences between women and men (McDowell, 1993b). Although standpoint theory has been increasingly attentive to the differences between women, it has been argued that anti-rationalism and standpoint theory, "still shares —with feminist empiricism— an urge for generalizable, universal knowledge" (Harding, 1986, p. 27). Harding has suggested that the search for a feminist standpoint is just
as oppressive and totalizing as the claims of rational humanism, since like that perspective, it remains wedded to a notion of essentialised identities, and to an universal 'other' (McDowell, 1993b). For Harding standpoint theory exists as a useful form of transitional knowledge, from which it is a small move to postmodern scepticism about any universal claims.

The changing emphasis in feminist geography can be captured in three 'c' words: constraints, context, and constitution (McDowell, 1993b). Despite the recent (re)focus on questions about place, particularity, representation, positionality, embodied knowledge and textual strategies, argued McDowell (1993b) it has been the decentred, relativist view from nowhere that seems to have appealed to many geographers, rather than the situated knowledges of feminism. The challenge of feminism reaches to the very heart of geography's epistemological systems, as well as challenging the masculinist hold on the structures of power inside and outside the academy, so for McDowell, "[F]eminist scholarship may pose a disruptive challenge to our discipline but the potential enrichment and intellectual it offers seems indisputable" (ibid., p. 316).

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, before proceeding to situate New Zealand human geography within the Anglo-American tradition, a number of themes need to reiterated. Firstly, this chapter has to be seen as highly provisional, because it excludes much of the richness of geography's history in the search for a degree of clarity. With this in mind, however, the chapter has identified a series of epistemologies that have competed for hegemony in geographic discourse. None of these epistemologies has existed in isolation from either the supplanted epistemology, nor the challenging epistemologies, but rather they have been constantly metamorphosing in the face of new circumstances. In this sense, therefore, Anglo-American human geography has been characterised by epistemological discontinuity, but at the same time a series of continuities have also been woven into the discipline. The key one among these have been the
continually perceived need for human geography to produce socially relevant knowledge.
Chapter Five: New Zealand Geography: A Brief History

Academic geography began in New Zealand when the government was attempting to restore profitable conditions for agricultural production and to foster industrialisation. The research of New Zealand geographers has only occasionally transcended the strictures of these dual concerns.... (Le Heron, 1987, p. 264).

Introduction

The previous chapter briefly outlined a history of Anglo-American human geography, concentrating on the emergence, and hegemony, of different epistemological strands, with the aim the general context for this chapter. Following on, therefore, from the previous chapter, this chapter constructs a genealogy of New Zealand human geography. The chapter, reflecting New Zealand geography's common genealogy with Anglo-American geography, follows the structure of the previous chapter, stressing the epistemological continuities, and discontinuities, that characterises human geography.

The chapter begins by outlining the 'foundational' orthodoxy in New Zealand geography, as expressed by George Jobbers and Kenneth Cumberland — regional geography— followed by an exploration of the gradual replacement of the regional orthodoxy by quantitative geography in the New Zealand context. Standing outside this line of development, in its opposition to both regional and quantitative geography, is the work inspired by Keith Buchanan, which forms another section of the chapter. Finally the chapter concludes with an exposition of the alternative approaches to geography articulated in the 1987 special issue of New Zealand Geographer (NZG).
Regional Geography

Regional geography's position within New Zealand geography is intricately connected to the institutionalisation of the discipline within the New Zealand university system. Regional geography was contained as part of the first courses taught by George Jobbersn, but although Jobbersn professed a definite regional approach there is little evidence that he strongly argued the philosophical case for regional geography (Hammond, 1992). Instead it was Kenneth Cumberland who strongly articulated the case philosophically, and methodologically, for regional geography. Upon his arrival in New Zealand in 1939, Cumberland recollected that:

Up to that point when I came to New Zealand, nobody had ever asked me what Geography was, but here I found people who had not the least idea what it was. I got a mild environmentalism. I had just read Hartshorne which opened my ideas to all other sorts of possibilities and the illogic of environmentalism. So when I got here, I had begin to think about that, especially once Jobbersn got me involved in persuading other scientists that Geography had to justify itself (Cumberland, quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 184).

Karl Popper, the philosopher of science, was at Canterbury University College during the period that Cumberland was beginning to articulate a Hartshornian regional geography. In Popper, Cumberland found an ally in getting geography accepted by other academics at Canterbury:

All these Junior Lecturers worshipped Popper and in one of my conversations with Popper, I mentioned that one of my problems was to get Geography accepted as a science and could he help me? He gave me most of his reprints and things like the 'Poverty of Historicism' and 'The Open Society' and so on and it was all there, as plain as could be. There was just as strong a place for Geography as there was for any other of the sciences in that it was a non-particularising science (Cumberland, quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 185).

The need to entrench geography as a legitimate discipline within the University of New Zealand provides one explanation for the lack of philosophical
dissonance as to geography’s methods, and for the effort expended to maintain
disciplinary unity among the departments of geography in New Zealand.
Anderson noted that at the time Cumberland, “felt that in order to establish the
standing of the subject as a university discipline within Auckland —that they
had to develop some common view of Geography and it was within that context
that they found, [Cumberland and Fox] the Hartshornian paradigm” (Anderson,
quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 185). Cumberland utilised Hartshorne’s work
both as a foundational epistemology for the nascent discipline, and as a
disciplinary norm, and in doing so undertook a process not dissimilar from that
which Hartshorne undertook in American geography.

The research papers and proclamations contained in the early issues of the
NZG part reflected Jobberns and Cumberland’s efforts to establish academic
geography in New Zealand. In these early issues Jobberns and Cumberland
positioned regional geography as a coherent approach, and highlighted the
ways that geography could be useful to ‘the nation’. For example in ‘Geography
and National Development’ Jobberns argued that, “We must know the
geography of our country” (emphasis in original, Jobberns, 1945, p. 17; also
see Jobberns, 1944), in order that planning for national development could
take place, whilst geography was seen to have applications in government,
planning, education, and even foreign policy (Cumberland, 1956).

Two pieces in the first issue of the NZG clearly articulated the position of
regional geography in the New Zealand context. The first, written by
Cumberland (1945), opened with a quote from Hartshorne, “While human
phenomena contribute perhaps a minor part in comparison with nature to the
formation of the earth surface considered as a whole, in the consideration of its
differential character, they constitute a factor of major importance” (emphasis in
original, Cumberland, 1945, p. 1), clearly signalling the importance of the
regional approach to geography. Cumberland went on to outline the purpose of
NZG, which was to satisfy a popular domestic curiosity about the, “regions
which have been so strongly differentiated by ‘human phenomena’ during a
brief yet eventual century of European settlement” (ibid., pp. 2-3); while the
explicit aim of the NZG was to, "... interpret the Dominion to its people and to provide for overseas readers a body of geographic knowledge about this country" (ibid., p. 4). Within this aim the journal, "aspires to stimulate within New Zealand the study of geography" (ibid., p. 4), and, "... to be of assistance in the affairs of the Dominion, in the solution of its problems —internal and external— and in the further development and conservation of its resources — natural and cultural" (ibid., p. 4). Not only did this piece situate regional geography as the reigning orthodoxy in New Zealand human geography, it also positioned human geography in the service of the New Zealand ‘nation’, a discursive positioning that has been constantly reiterated by geographers.

The second piece, written by Jobberns (1945), further reinforced the positioning of geography in the service of ‘the nation. Jobberns concurred with Cumberland’s view as to the purpose of the NZG, writing that, "The main function of this journal will be to interpret our country to ourselves and to the outside world" (Jobberns, 1945, p. 5). Jobberns’ pragmatism is evident in his hope that, "... the editorial policy of the journal will not be too much concerned with trying to define the limits of geography" (ibid., 7), a hope expressed, however, within the discursive limits of regional geography, since, "The concept of the region is one of the most useful that geographers have given us" (ibid., p. 13). Rather than basing regions on physical features Jobberns writes that, "Regions without people are not of such absorbing interest as those to which the people themselves have given distinguishing character" (emphasis in original, ibid., p. 15), and here Jobberns’ approach leads him define the region as an area in which the people have a community of interest, and outlook, of which they are strongly conscious. This definition, argued Jobberns, was particularly relevant to New Zealand since, "Anyone who has travelled about New Zealand must surely be aware of our rather amazing diversity of such regions" (ibid., p. 15). As an example, "Circumstances of location alone must tend to give northern people a sense of being a more or less self-contained, self-sufficient regional entity. In the North Island, as in the South, contrasts between east and west are almost as sharply defined" (ibid., p. 15). In addition to articulating the importance, and relevance, of regional geography in New
Zealand, Jobberns saw a place for geography in developing 'the nation'. Indeed the idea of the distinctive region was closely linked to regional development, so that in New Zealand, "We frequently hear complaints about the centralisation of industry in metropolitan areas like Wellington and Auckland, about the neglect of the South Island... I believe that the productive possibilities of the Northland region and Hawkes Bay, for example, are by no means fully developed" (ibid., p. 16). Geography could contribute to 'national development' through descriptions of 'the country', region by region, descriptions that would provide the knowledge of what exists to be planned for (Jobberns, 1945).

While the geographer could provide for 'national development' by describing the internal order of regions within the 'nation', the geographer could also provide for 'national development' by describing 'the nations' place in the world. Jobberns stated that, "We have achieved a political autonomy but most of us are still strongly colonial in outlook and will continue to be so for a long time because our people and all our culture and traditions are of Britain" (ibid., p. 17), but also, "New Zealand must know the Pacific better so that we may see more clearly what and where are our responsibilities and interests" (ibid., p. 17). Both Cumberland's and Jobberns' papers indicate a strong tradition within New Zealand geography of articulating the putative relevance of geography and geographers to the planning process and 'the nation'.

In an elegant restatement of the virtues of regional geography Cumberland's 1955 presidential address, delivered to the First New Zealand Geography Conference, posed the question —'Why Geography?'— (Cumberland, 1956). To answer this Cumberland noted that another question must also be posed — 'What Geography?'. Cumberland's reply to his own question is worth highlighting in detail because it is a late restatement of regional geography's position as the geographic orthodoxy, an orthodoxy that needed to be maintained in order for geography to exist academically. Cumberland stated that, "Whilst there are in New Zealand no longer as many different kinds of geography as there are geographers, it is unfortunately true that there are
certain deep cleavages of viewpoint” (Cumberland, 1956, p. 2), an oblique reference to Keith Buchanan's 1954 inaugural address, and the subsequent exchange of letters between Cumberland, Hartshorne, and Buchanan in 1955. While argument amongst geographers as to 'what geography?' maybe stimulating, Cumberland writes, “their subject is not likely to find favour, respect and acceptance amongst the other disciplines so long as that argument concerns the very basis and nature of geography” (ibid., p. 2). Not only does geography have to be a unified discipline:

The subject is even less likely to win a respectable place amongst the sciences so long as some claim for it a scope and content that has little relation either to logic or to the long and venerable history of the subject, or so long as they propose for a field better cultivated by other sciences —as a consequence of which it comes to have all the appearances of a trespasser (ibid., p. 3)

Cumberland defined the geography as, "... simply the study of what places are like" (Ibid., p. 3). Note that Cumberland used the term 'study' rather than 'science', since he believed that whether or not geography was a science relied on, "... whether he who practices it preserves an open mind, employs objective methods, and is basically honest" (ibid., p. 3), rather than any nomothetic inclination, and in claiming geography as the study of 'what places are like' Cumberland maintained an exceptionalist position. The explanation of the similarities, and differences between places required, "... a rigorous discipline and clear-cut methodology"; and geography as a discipline could be clearly delineated, not by comparing the discipline to the 'systematic sciences', but by comparing the discipline to history; since historical studies, "assess the contribution of these things to the character of different times" (ibid., p. 4), whilst geography studied 'things' contribution to the personality of different parts of the earth's surface.

In delineating the boundaries of geography, and arguing for the importance of those boundaries, Cumberland articulated a utilitarian role for geography, "One advantage of geography is that it enables a man [sic] to know his place in the world, the role of his [sic] own country on the international stage and the
position of his [sic] own town or city in the national scene" (ibid., p. 5); whilst in recent times, "... the claims of geography to a place in training for citizenship and to foremost rank in the system of institutional education have been advocated repeatedly" (ibid., p. 5). Cumberland emphasised education as being particularly important in New Zealand and Australia given, "their increasing awareness of their position as 'offshore islands', close to the insurgent nationalism and teeming millions of the mainland of Asia" (ibid., p. 8). However, while Cumberland restated the relevance of regional geography for the New Zealand 'nation', the orthodoxy was being challenged.

In her 1955 MA thesis Gorrie wrote that three of New Zealand's geography departments had maintained the Hartshornian definition of geography, which was itself the restatement of, "old truths" (Gorrie, 1955, p. 357), but that, "The fourth university department of geography deviates" (ibid., p. 357). The fourth department —Victoria— under Keith Buchanan, and Harvey Franklin articulated an approach to geography that by-passed the Hartshornian orthodoxy. Keith Buchanan in his 1954 inaugural address indicated this divergence when he stated that, "My own training, under Professor R H Kinvig at the University of Birmingham has been a very different tradition, a tradition which emphasises geography as above all a human or social science and which derives from the luminous teachings of geographers such as Roxby and Fleure... (Buchanan, 1954, p. 2). In this address Buchanan advocated a geography that was definitely not 'areal differentiation', "I accept the view of Barrows that it is concerned only with the mutual relationships between men and the natural environments of the areas or regions in which they live (ibid., p. 2). In response Cumberland sent a copy of the address to Hartshorne for review, writing:

With only three full departments in New Zealand, a declaration of faith such as Buchanan's comes along very rarely....
Divergence of viewpoint is to my mind an admirable thing at the university level.... But in the schools (and in the NZ Department of Education which, through its publications and its inspectorate, largely determines syllabuses) a suggestion to put the clock back will cause only despair and confusion (Cumberland, 1955).
In reply, Hartshorne's review also indicated a concern for divergence, "To anyone who proposes to relight that flame, calling upon all his colleagues to follow the torch with him—even though it means the abandonment not only of subsequent development in geographic thought but also of a large part of the field cultivated by geographers for centuries, one may well ask a series of questions (Hartshorne, 1955b, p. 3). The review, not surprisingly, was extremely acerbic with Hartshorne writing that, "If the address is somewhat confused and unsophisticated, it nonetheless is useful in demonstrating the ultimate bankruptcy of the concept of man-nature relationships as the basis for a field of science" (Hartshorne, 1955c, p. 9). Again, reiterating Cumberland's concern that Buchanan's work represented an antediluvian return, Hartshorne wrote that, "Recent developments in geography in New Zealand have given promise of a productive future. It would be unfortunate of the clock were turned backwards to the environmentalist tradition common in America and Britain half a century (ibid., p. 10). Hammond (1992) observed that Hartshorne's review was written at the same time as he was responding to the paper by Schaefer (1953), a confluence which could explain the ferocity of the attack.

A copy of the review was forwarded to Buchanan, who tried to identify the source of his New Zealand opposition, "... I would be grateful if you would inform me whether the review was written at the request of the NZ. Geographer and/or the Department of Geography at Auckland" (Buchanan to Hartshorne, letter, 19/7/1955). In reply Hartshorne continued the attack, questioning Buchanan's scholarship, and indicating that a divergence from 'areal differentiation' was not acceptable:

No doubt I wish to assure New Zealand geographers my presentation of the classical German concept of geography is worth more attention than the brief sentence of dismissal in your address, and likewise to point out to them that the same work contains what I believe to be significant criticism of the concept of your address fifteen years later. Finally,—and this is an assumption on which we might not agree—I am convinced that to further the standing of our field, to ourselves as well as to others, an essential need is meticulous scholarship in methodological writings no less than in substantive work. To
achieve this requires mutual criticism at the risk of personal displeasure (Hartshorne, 1955b).

Thus the rift between the Auckland and Victoria geography departments commenced, a rift which would persist until the retirement of Buchanan in 1975 (Hammond, 1992). Ironically, Hartshorne's review was never published, the then editor of the NZG, Fox stating in a letter to Hartshorne that, "... there was every likelihood of an academic breach if the matter were pursued, and pressure [not to publish] was brought on by my colleagues in the other university centres" (Fox, 1956).

One indicator of the rift in geography was the formation in 1960 of a new geographic journal —*Pacific Viewpoint*. In contrast to the stated purpose of the NZG (see above) *Pacific Viewpoint's* first editor wrote that its publication was initiated by two considerations: firstly, the increasing world importance of the Asian and Pacific countries; and secondly, the need for an interdisciplinary journal that was basically geographical in its emphasis (the Editor, 1960). These considerations were reiterated in the foreword to the new journal where Victoria University's Vice-Chancellor, J. Williams noted that, "The Journal is a recognition that New Zealand's destiny is that of a Pacific country...." (Williams, 1960, p. iii) and that there was an increasing awareness in New Zealand of the need for co-operation between Pacific nations. A 1984 editorial, 'Pacific Viewpoint: Twenty-Five Years On', reiterated these two considerations, adding retroactively a third, "... that the journal had a part to play, however small, in the maturing process that New Zealand was experiencing as a society and as an academic community" (Editors, past and present, 1984, p. 114). This conviction was associated with a belief that, "... a journal removed from the tutelage of British and American customs would allow the emergence of a different standpoint within the discipline. It was a case of the child trying to slough off the parents" (ibid., p. 114). The aims, therefore, of the *Pacific Viewpoint* stood in direct contrast to those of the NZG, embodying a quite different approach to human geography, and a quite different imagination of New Zealand's position in the world.
Quantitative Geography

If Buchanan's work at Victoria was an antecedent for 'radical geography', during the 1950s and 1960s, in orthodox New Zealand geography the hegemony of regional geography was beginning to wane, as the techniques of positivist geography offered new vistas for geographical investigation. It is too neat to present this shift in epistemological hegemony as a distinct evolutionary succession, with regional geography as an archaic relic. Rather quantitative geography supplemented regional geography, whilst the latter gradually shaded into the former. By the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NZG the out-going editor Ray Hargreaves could observe that, "When the New Zealand Geographer was founded regional geography was the central theme of New Zealand geographic thought, and this is reflected by the number of regional articles published. In the last decade only three regional descriptions have appeared in the New Zealand Geographer" (Hargreaves, 1969, p. 87). The dearth of 'regional descriptions' prompted Hargreaves to write that in this sense the NZG was failing to fulfil the hopes expressed by Cumberland (1945) that the journal would attempt to satisfy the 'common curiosity' about New Zealand's distinctive parts. Geography, wrote Hargreaves, "... is now using newer techniques, particularly the use of mathematics, and where applicable this is to be welcomed" (Hargreaves, 1969, p. 88), but conversely he was concerned that the practitioners of the 'newer' techniques often failed to communicate their findings to an lay-audience.

A number of trends that characterised departmental practice in New Zealand need to be highlighted in order to understand the institutionalisation of quantitative geography in New Zealand (Hammond, 1992). One practice was for departments to encourage promising students to go overseas for postgraduate studies, and Hammond noted that much of the credit for this practice could be laid at Jobberns door. A second practice was for departments to make budgetary provision for departmental visitors. Leslie King, the person most credited with introducing quantitative methods into New Zealand,
embodied these two practices. King, a Canterbury graduate, went to Iowa on a Fulbright scholarship in 1957 where his supervisor was Thomas who had been at Northwestern University with Garrison. Schaefer's influence, even after his death, was still powerful at Iowa and King returned to Canterbury a committed proponent of quantitative geography (Hammond, 1992). Roger McLean, a student at Canterbury recalled that:

We were establishing ourselves within science in Australia and New Zealand. Enthusiasm was due to our youth and the fact that we were coming in with the North American quantitative revolution and King and Golledge were not far behind. And biking away completely away from Cumberland and Fox. Reform was in the air. It was all process oriented (quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 195).

Similarly Peter Holland, who was taught by Golledge, Rayner, and King recollected that, "Any undergrad majoring in the late 1950s at Canterbury could not have avoided these changes that were taking place in Geography" (Holland quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 195). King left Canterbury at the end of 1962 by which time the use of quantitative techniques had become well established. In contrast to the active resistance to Buchanan's 'radical geography', Cumberland promote areal differentiation vigorously but did not overtly obstruct the passage of quantification, accepting it on the proviso that it could be accommodated with areal differentiation, "Cumberland was not entirely opposed to new ideas in Geography, provided they could be rigorously defended and the method suited his intellectual standpoint" (Chalmers, quoted in Hammond, 1992, p. 199). Perhaps the most important feature in the acceptance of quantitative geography was the inability of one powerful professor to dominate the discipline in New Zealand. By the time of King's return to New Zealand, "... the ideological arguments which characterised the Hartshorne/Schaefer debate had been subsumed by the rapidly developing technology which was enabling computers to be used in the universities. It was a case of practice being dictated more by technology than theory" (Hammond, 1992, p. 200), a point also made in the wider context of the previous chapter (Livingstone, 1992; Gregory, 1994; and Johnston, 1997).
The twenty-fifth anniversary edition the NZG contained a series of reviews of New Zealand geography that included: urban geography by Johnston (1969), economic geography by Stokes (1969), and historical geography by Perry (1969). A brief examination of these reviews is illustrative of the change in intellectual hegemony from regional geography to quantitative geography, as the reviews stand as statements on New Zealand geography and of New Zealand geography, from a position that assumed quantitative geography was the vanguard of geographic research, and in this respect the reviews are partly manifestos that articulated the superiority of quantitative epistemology and techniques.

Johnston's (1969) review begins by noting that a separate urban geography had not been recognised in the early years of New Zealand geography, but that an interest in towns had developed as part of the, "general patterns of the human occupation and settlement of the earth" (Jobberns, quoted in Johnston, 1969, p. 121). Early urban geography was based on Sauer's (1925) methodological position, introduced to New Zealand geography through the lecturing of his students at Canterbury, and through contacts between Sauer and Jobberns. In this approach the culture of landscape was the focus of attention with a strong evolutionary theme (see R. O. Buchanan, 1948), and consequently, argued Johnston (1969), people as such, and any geographical patterns not immediately reflected in the visible landscape, were almost totally ignored. Into these evolutionary investigations of landscape was fused a strong belief that the description of geographic regions —regional geography— was the apogee of geographical study. This belief, Johnston (1969) maintained, was a reflection of the London training of early appointees to teaching positions in New Zealand (especially Cumberland and Fox), and the stated views of the Canterbury examiner prior to 1948. The key New Zealand urban geographer, Leigh Pownall wrote that urban geography was, "a part of regional geography which, because of its scale of enquiry, considers its features at greater depth than more general geography" (Pownall, 1953, p. 144), and that work in urban geography should conclude by combining, "its results into a concise statement,
in which as much of the material as possible is presented in the form of maps" (ibid., p. 144). For Johnston, "With an interest in cultural rather than economic influences and in the definition of formal regions, most studies in this period were of individual towns as unique landscape features" (Johnston, 1969, p. 122), and that consequently few links were made between urban and agricultural practices, and the external relationships of urban areas were almost entirely contained in the definition of its 'tributary area'. Pownall's methodological statement concluded that, "The primary justification for the discipline is that it advances knowledge... its ultimate aim is the mastering of all knowledge about urban settlement on our earth" (Pownall, 1953, p. 151). Such an aim required the collection, classification, and ordering of information on each place, leading to the production of inductive generalisations (see Pownall, 1957). Coeval with this inductive work was the development of ideas concerning the operation of the New Zealand urban system as a system rather than a series of discrete entities (Macaulay, 1954; Anderson, 1951; Anderson and Franklin, 1955; Duncan, 1955; Whitelaw, 1962; and King, 1962). The classification of urban centres into hierarchies fitted into the concept of geography as areal differentiation, but the existence of specialisation indicated interaction between areas (Johnston, 1969). Work examining those interactions included: Ward's (1963) study of the distribution of motor spirit, Rimmer's (1967) work on ports, and Lowe's (1966) study of telephonic flows.

In a section of his review entitled, 'The Revolution Cometh' Johnston (1969) assessed the entrenchment of quantitative techniques in New Zealand geography, and while the spread of the 'revolution' had been slow, he writes, "... the concepts have now been generally accepted and most departments of geography in New Zealand teach courses in the use of quantitative techniques" (ibid., p. 130). In particular Johnston highlighted the work of King and McCarty as apostles of the revolution; but noted that, "So far, few New Zealand studies have indicated much interest in the development of theory, and most of those completed have been merely tests of generalisations and hypothesis propounded elsewhere and have illustrated Golledge's claim that orthodox urban theory is applicable in this country" (ibid., p. 131). The acceptance of
quantitative geography in New Zealand meant, however, that, "New Zealand now appears to be in the mainstream of world trends" (ibid., p. 135). A similar position to that articulated by Stokes' (1969) review of New Zealand economic geography.

Stokes' wrote that the economic geographer's most useful contribution to 'national life' was the, "... regular critical commentary on economic policy, and a persistent demand for careful, rational, overall planning for the best social and economic organisation of areas" (Stokes, 1969, pp. 136-137). However, following Johnston's (1969) comments, New Zealand economic geographers had largely avoided approaching economic geography from an overtly theoretical point of view (Stokes, 1969). Stokes provided brief descriptions of various topics approached by New Zealand economic geographers, noting the participation in New Zealand economic geography by members of various government departments. The contribution of these governmental agencies had enriched economy geography, but problematically, "... perhaps the more pragmatic turn of mind of these members has unduly flavoured the field in geography for there has been little in the way of theoretical ideas produced" (ibid., p. 160), while much of the work done could be characterised as consisting of, "descriptive, factual reporting" (ibid., p. 160). These static descriptions, "... have become historical documents which have added little to our comprehension of the processes involved in producing the regional variations in economic activity with which the economic geographer is concerned" (ibid., p. 160). One of the drawbacks for New Zealand economic geographers, contended Stokes, had been a lack of education in the correct use of quantitative techniques, a weakness that was being overcome and consequently, "a basis is being laid for a far more thoughtful analysis of processes in New Zealand that are both economic and geographic" (Stokes, 1969, p. 160).

The optimistic proclamations for quantitative geography continued in Perry's (1969) review of New Zealand historical geography. Perry noted that, with the exception of Cumberland (1950) and McCaskill (1966), "Methodological debate
has not, however, been a prominent characteristic of New Zealand historical geography" (Perry, 1969, p. 94). Generally, however, methodology has been proclaimed by example, or had existed through default, and a methodological pragmatism had prevailed (ibid.). But, argued Perry, in a geographical world, "... where method and theory are receiving considerable emphasis their comparative absence from contemporary historical geography is dangerous" (ibid., p. 97). In addition to this weakness, Perry notes a number of other lacuna in the practice of New Zealand historical geography, and consequently, "Historical geography... has tended to drift slowly from the mainstream of geography into the backwater...." (ibid., p. 104). As historical geography drifted from the mainstream it had not, "... played an adequate part in recent intellectual ferment within geography, the so-called quantitative or theoretical revolution" (ibid., p. 104). The pressing need, therefore, was for historical geography to catch up with the rest of the discipline in its use of a quantitative methodology (Perry, 1969). In hindsight this is an irony given it was through historical geography's drift into the backwater of human geography that critiques of positivist human geography were introduced into Anglo-American, and New Zealand geography.

In addition to highlighting quantitative geography's supplanting of regional geography, collectively the reviews noted the relevance of geography to 'national development', a connection that can be clearly seen where Johnston, and Stokes discussed planning's relationship to geography. Stokes states that, "One of the more popular topics for talks to the Society [NZGS] by both geographers and planners has been the close relationship between geography and planning" (ibid., p. 157). In the division of labour regarding 'national development' G. A. Town wrote:

The geographer can make a special contribution to the whole planning process. Planning research, landuse surveys, site investigations, social studies, economic appraisals and the intelligent communication of ideas through a variety of publications are all tasks for which the geographer has shown himself particularly well equipped (Town, 1970, p. 27-30).
While this might be a noble view of the geographer's contribution, McQueen (1965) had earlier criticised the production of such 'regional surveys' as introverted, and useful only within their terms of reference. Consequently what was required was a greater awareness of regional economic variation within a national rather than sectional context (Stokes, 1969). While Stokes saw a positive relationship between planners and geographers, Johnston differed writing that, "... many planners do not appear to recognise the value of the geographer's work, and some of those who occasionally address groups of geographers often confuse the latter's aims with those of the compiler of a gazetteer or encyclopaedia" (Johnston, 1969, p. 132). However, while others might not recognise geographer's relevance to 'the nation', geographers were certain of their own relevance to 'the nation'.

**Emerging Radical geography**

If Stokes', and Johnston's, reviews pointed New Zealand geography unswervingly towards a future firmly based in positivist theory and methodology, then the work carried out, and inspired, by Buchanan, and Franklin pointed to another geography —radical geography. As previously noted the exchanges between Buchanan, Cumberland, and Hartshorne, occurred while Hartshorne was responding to the Schaefer paper, and hence Hartshorne was operating on two fronts, attacking Buchanan's nascent radical geography, whilst attacking the basis for a positivist spatial science. For Marcus (1987) the conflict between Buchanan and Cumberland blinded geographers to one of the most important moments in modern geographical history, the introduction of a humanistic geography with Marxist elements in the paper 'West Wind, East Wind' (Buchanan, 1961). In this paper Buchanan observed that the world was at a turning point which was forcing 'the West' into a reappraisal of its role, and values, and that geography as a discipline concerned with the interpretation of the relationships between humans and the earth was intimately tied to this reappraisal. Buchanan wrote that, "A geography conceived as a 'study of areal differentiation' or as 'a study of the discovery,
identification and explanation of earth patterns' is no longer satisfying, for such
a study cannot give adequate weight to the accelerating, expanding and
planned transformation of the environment by man" (Buchanan, 1961, p. 120); and if geography was to contribute to the world, "... it can scarcely be in the
direction of the 'what-places-are-like' geography" (ibid., p. 125), therefore what
was required was a deeper understanding of the social and economic
structures of life. Consequently, geography had to become more cognisant of
the changing landscape, and to this end Buchanan introduced the idea of the
'ideology of landscape', to understand humans transformation of the landscape,
and the ways that different ideologies produced different transformations. The
study of the changing interrelations between societies and their environment
was illustrated through reference to the planned transformation of the
landscape by the countries of the 'Socialist camp'. If these countries were to be
studied, argued Buchanan, just as the study of geomorphology rested on
geology, and human geography on economics and sociology, then if the
societies geographers were concerned with were socialist, then the socio-
economic orientation needed was a Marxist one (Buchanan, 1961).

Buchanan concluded the paper by deploiring the inquisitorial suspicion that
accompanied any deviation from geography's doxa, and included a scathing
denouncement of contemporary human geography, described as the:

... 'folding-in' on the traditional fields, a monotonous churning out of sterile and outmoded
descriptive studies, a sedulous avoidance of the geography —the controversial and
challenging geography— of the non-Western three-quarters of the world, an increasing
preoccupation with the refinement of techniques long shown to be inadequate or
outdated (Buchanan, 1961, p. 136).

What was required, argued Buchanan, was a reformation of geography with
both new viewpoints, and new techniques. This nascent 'radical geography'
that Buchanan was articulating, was developing at the same time as
'quantitative geography' was being entrenched as the reigning hegemony in
New Zealand human geography; and until, the emergence of 'radical
geography' into the 'mainstream' of Anglo-American geography during the
1970s, New Zealand human geography was characterised by a hegemonic discourse—'quantitative geography'—and by its subterranean 'other'—Buchanan's 'radical geography'.

By the end of the 1960s W.B Johnston (1984) wrote that New Zealand geography by virtue of an expansion of numbers, a multiplication of controversial ideas, and the elaboration of new approaches was marked a healthy divergence of scholarly interest. By the 1970s, "... intellectual confidence had grown beyond the problems of dependence and national identity to a more profitable curiosity about the nature of our habitat, economy and society, the failures and the inadequacies" (W. B. Johnston, 1984, p. 25). In contrast to the relevancy debate being carried on in other countries, "Relevance [in New Zealand] has been of concern for geographers from the beginning..." (ibid., p. 25), and that more particularly during the 1970s, "Geography is becoming regarded as ranking among the more 'relevant' subjects... to the needs of the modern community" (Lister, 1970, p. 31). However, Woolmington wrote that geography, especially in New Zealand, was too close to the, "... narrow and unreal 'Hartshornian' circumspection of the discipline" (Woolmington, 1970, p. 175) to attempt any new definition of the discipline. But, however, the discipline was in flux between two poles of thought: the science of spatial analysis, and the general field of environmental studies. Woolmington reflected that debate about these points view could consume many hours, but of more importance than methodological debate was the manipulation of methodology on the 'real world'. In the manipulation of the 'real world' geography's place was to be in the broad field of environmental planning, since geography conceived as a general, synthetic discipline would be of more social value than if it was conceived as a specialist discipline (ibid.). Consequently in a panegyric affirmation of quantitative techniques he wrote that, "... we can waste too much time on such matters of definition..., particularly when we have all our new exciting methodological toys to play with, for its is these new methodological toys which give geography (whatever geography maybe) its new special value in application to problems of the real world" (ibid., p. 180). While Woolmington's comments directly contrast with W. B. Johnston's
belief in the diversity of approaches in New Zealand human geography, the two, however, are not inimical if we accept that both writers accepted the quantitative hegemony, and that diversity arose from the myriad fields of study that geographers were entering, rather than geography's differing epistemologies.

Such a diversity of topics led W. B. Johnston (1970) to echo Hargreaves' (1969) comments that disciplinary fragmentation was leading academic geographers further away from lay geographers, and from those geographers trained in the literary tradition, but that quantification had to be accepted as the disciplinary norm in geography, with the proviso that geographers remembered the Mock Turtle's four branches of arithmetic—ambition, distraction, uglification, and derision. The point being, contra Woolmington, that quantification was not an end in itself, rather that in New Zealand, "... the national need is not for people who only propound problems. If geography is to continue to grow in status, we, as geographers, must continue to become more useful" (W. B. Johnston, 1970, p. 21). Quantification may have been accepted but whether as an 'end' or a 'means' appeared uncertain.

In a review of the New Zealand Geography Society's (NZGS) conference the reviewer wrote that the Proceedings confirmed, "the view that many of the innovations of a decade ago (some of which were viewed with caution and even scepticism) have now gained wide acceptance" (Morn, 1972, p. 97). In the reviewer's opinion the 'innovations' of the 'New Geography' as expressed in the Proceedings showed a large degree of continuity with previous methodologies in geography. The embedding of quantitative geography, and the evolution of its techniques was further commented on in a review of following NZGS conference where, "... it seemed significant that the need to justify Geography as a discipline seems to have passed, it is no longer important to define the discipline or construct any specific methodological framework" (Broke, 1973, p. 85), and that in most conference sessions the, "... subject matter and technique exhibited continuing evolution and refinement rather than radical innovation" (ibid., p. 86). A note of warning was sounded, however, because, "There
seemed to be a continuing reluctance to regard mathematical and statistical techniques in their more appropriate perspective as tools and not ends in themselves" (ibid., p. 86). While Broke pointed to the continued utilisation of quantitative techniques in New Zealand geography, quantitative geography's hegemony was beginning to wane in Anglo-American geography, a descent marked by Harvey's (1973) apostasy, and the coeval emergence of humanistic, and radical critiques of positivist geography. However, Johnson (1974a) at the end of a review of Harvey's (1973) book, in the NZG, concluded that quantification should not disappear as quickly as it emerged, because the empirical investigation that it provided would be necessary to a new, more just society, since efficient long term spatial organisation was just as important as justice.

One important field of inquiry for geographers was in studying New Zealand’s regional development. Jobberns' (1945) paper was a harbinger of studies of national development, suggesting that geographers should play their part in encouraging national and regional development. Some years were to elapse, however, before other geographers indicated their attention to make New Zealand development their primary objective (Le Heron, 1987). During the late 1960s Governmental attention centred on the National Development Conference (NDC), and by the 1970s the idea of regional development had gathered electoral support, whilst a struggle was occurring among geographers, and others, to demonstrate theoretically and empirically the technical case for and against regional policy (Le Heron, 1987). W. B. Johnston cautioned that, "In the same way as when national planning was first introduced, Government may find that its professionals are not yet ready to provide an understanding of the phenomenon to be planned" (W. B. Johnston, 1973, p. 192. During the early 1970s, in particular, the limits of such studies were defined by the National Development Commission (1972), and MacDonald (1972), a narrow agenda that, Le Heron (1987) argued, ignored the questions of structural inequality that work such as Jensen's (1969) raised. For example Cant (1974), and Johnston (1974b, 1976) led attempts to gauge the extent of variations in social well-being, defined by access to income, work that
provided a material justification for analysis but which stressed measurement of variation at the expense of theoretical discussion about the categories being utilised (Le Heron, 1987). Interest in measuring regional imbalances and inequality abated after the publication of Taylor's (1976) paper which criticised the empirical basis of regional policy, and highlighted the chameleon-like characteristics of regional inequalities. Implicit in Taylor's opinion, however, was the assumption that the case for regional policy could still be determined (Le Heron, 1987). Other geographers were less sanguine about the policy makers optimism regarding the effectiveness of regional policy, Le Heron arguing that of the regional development work carried out during the 1970s it was not difficult to discern their ahistorical and apolitical character, and that:

... neither historically-specific origins of nor remedies for differing growth rates in enterprises and regions were satisfactorily diagnosed. Empirical studies conducted under largely unacknowledged structural conditions provided no basis for extending explanation, though they did effectively undermine the assertion that regional disparities would be found to support government intervention. Moreover, the modus operandi of most geographers — that spatial planning was an improved version of national development planning— had escaped critical scrutiny (Le Heron, 1987, p. 273).

While Le Heron was highly critical of regional development carried out within the positivist framework, not all studies of regional development utilised such a framework. Within this alternative approach, which emerged from Buchanan's 'radical' geography, some of the most significant contributions were made by Harvey Franklin. Franklin's analyses (1955, 1967, 1969) were informed by Marxian and Weberian social theory, and he stated that writing about development in New Zealand, "... commits one to write about capitalism. New Zealand's geography displays the wholesale and exclusive impact of capitalism, its associated technology and institutions" (Franklin, 1978, p. 1). Franklin (1969) argued that structural changes to New Zealand's economy would have to occur but presciently observed that, "The cumulative effect of these changes can only result in a degree of social change unprecedented in New Zealand history...." (ibid., p. 52). As Franklin sketched the structural possibilities for further capitalist development, Armstrong (1966, 1969, 1970)
theorised on the regional expression of the restructuring prophesied by Franklin. Armstrong was critical of the New Zealand government's record on regional development, urging that economic reconstruction, "must take place within a total environment planned to counter the dangers of polarisation and regional inequality" (Armstrong, 1969, p. 242), and that more research was urgently required, since regional development policy was being formulated in a vacuum.

Challenging Positivist geography — 'Alternative Approaches'

As the 1970s ended the structural problems facing the New Zealand economy became more apparent (Kelsey, 1995). At the Eleventh Geography Conference in 1981, the Chairman of Fletcher Challenge, Hugh Fletcher questioned the legitimacy of public planning in a market economy, taking umbrage at idea that, "market forces and the private sector cannot be trusted to produce the society we want" (Fletcher, 1982, p. 5). His comments were in direct contrast to Lister’s belief that geographers had something to offer the business community, "Above all, there is a contribution that requires the coordination of data to demonstrate opportunity within the regional context, and help provide the basis for feasibility studies that will lead on to commercial production" (Lister, 1978, p. 8). So by the end of the 1970s quantitative geography may have tried to make itself useful to the New Zealand 'nation', but was anyone prepared to listen?

Intellectually, as well, by the end of the 1970s the pre-eminence of quantitative geography was waning with Hong-Key Yoon writing that, "... readers will witness that the quantitative positivistic approach which was once a revolutionary force in geography has now become a conservative force which must defend its position" (Yoon, 1981, p. 40). In the place of quantitative approaches, "humanistic, dialectical and phenomenological inquires are rampant" (ibid., p. 40), and that, "Perhaps the spirit of philosophy in our discipline which was driven out by the quantitative revolution is now being allowed to return from exile" (ibid., p. 40). As an indication of the change that Hong-Key Yoon indicated, in 1987 a special edition of the NZG appeared, the
result of an invitation to New Zealand geographers to contribute short articles that would be regarded within the discipline as 'alternative' (J. Johnston and Le Heron, 1987).

In the editorial to this issue the guest editors, Judith Johnston and Richard Le Heron observed that New Zealand's geographical community was being challenged, and that questions at the two previous geography conferences had focused on the relevance of geography to political decision-making, the validity of objective scientific methods for analysing current issues, the relationship between geography and social and environmental change, and the relevance of non-New Zealand models as the conceptual frameworks guiding the construction of knowledge. The editorial entitled 'A Deepening Stream', echoed Holcroft's seminal essay, 'The Deepening Stream' (Holcroft, 1940), which was written for, and won, the essay section of the 1940 literary competition conceived as part of New Zealand's centennial celebrations. In the essay Holcroft called for the construction of social knowledge that both informed, and provided a guide for social action in New Zealand, counsel, maintained J. Johnston and Le Heron (1987), that remained relevant given contemporary questions about the role of geography. The stated purpose of the special edition was to make a first step, "... in guiding New Zealand geographers into building social theory that more closely matches present social realities in New Zealand" (ibid., p. 116), an implicit criticism of the failure of 'quantitative geography' to move beyond technical tweaking. For the editors, the construction of said social theory was a necessary first step in the 'indigenisation' of knowledge that would guide social action (ibid.). It is interesting to note the similarity the editors call for the construction of the indigenous knowledge, and R. J. Johnston's (1969) criticism of New Zealand urban geographers for a failure to effectively utilise geographic theory. The difference being that R. J. Johnston maintained that New Zealand geographers should use the orthodox theory of Anglo-American geography, theory that was assumed to be universally applicable. The editors were critical of any such approach, arguing for the development of situated theory and knowledge. Of course the question remains to what extent do theories of indigenous theory
and knowledge restate the universalist assumptions of R. J. Johnston's position, in a similar way that postmodernist suspicions of 'metanarratives' themselves potentially constitute a 'metanarrative'.

Within the general framework provided by the editors, the papers in the special issue circulated around the axis of capitalist dynamics, gender issues, and ethnic questions. Like the three reviews contained in the Twenty-fifth anniversary edition of the NZG the papers in the special issue stood both as a description of New Zealand geography, and a mediation on New Zealand geography.

Pawson (1987) opened his paper by stating that as a consequence of the decline of positivistic geography, space had been reconceptualised as socially produced, and in turn spatial production was seen to guide and limit social relations. The redefinition of the spatial had been the result of three, interrelated streams of thought: firstly, the implications of social theory for human geography; secondly, the introduction of Marxist approaches; and thirdly, the influence of feminist approaches. Consequently, for New Zealand geography the reconceptualisation of space, and the revival of 'place' made it imperative that, "...New Zealand geographers engage these themes to explore their own society, and particularly in a period of long-delayed social change" (ibid., p. 123), an exploration that to date had been the preserve of historians (Belich, 1986, Phillips, 1987, Sinclair, 1986a). The bulk of Pawson's paper examined the social production of urban space, and the rationality of urban design, in order to demonstrate how urban form reproduced particular social relations, and inhibited the expression of alternative social practices. In concluding, Pawson maintained that an exposition of the ideologies of urban form was required, since contemporary spatial and social practices constituted a pattern of subordination and specialisation that crippled both men and women (see Kennedy, 1985).

While Pawson focused on the social production of urban space, Evelyn Stokes, Louise Dooley, Lousie Johnson, Jennifer Dixon and Susan Parsons provided a
collective statement of feminist perspectives in geography (Stokes et al., 1987). Dooley (1987) observed that the philosophical bases of logical positivism, humanism and phenomenology enjoyed established positions within human geography, whilst feminist philosophies occupied a tenuous position within the discipline. A major reason for feminist geography’s position had been representation as ‘radical’, a representation that had enabled feminist perspectives to be ignored as, “... overtly, political, biased, and therefore not serious contributions to the construction and teaching of geographical knowledge” (ibid., p. 139). Thus a gap existed between the epistemology articulated by feminists, and what was constructed by ‘mainstream’ geography as ‘feminist’, and it was this gap in geography that enabled feminist perspectives in geography to be excluded from serious consideration (ibid.).

Johnson (1987) highlighted the implicit norms of orthodox geography, stating that, "If Humanistic Geography taught us to question ourselves, as well as the fact-value and subject-object distinctions in the discipline, Marxist Geography urged us to examine the politics of research" (ibid., p. 143), and that geography was neither socially, nor politically neutral. The paper noted the move in geographical research towards disadvantaged or minority groups but stated that, "The outcome of this challenge was to be all too limited. Poverty, like capitalism is still with us and now we have mainly white and male geographers, specialising in development studies and Marxist perspectives, steadily climbing unaltered promotion ladders" (ibid., p. 144). Whilst radical approaches had largely failed, argued Johnson, they still offered inspiring examples to follow, but that feminist approaches needed to be incorporated into order to deepen radical geography. In this sense Johnson articulated a socialist feminist that embraced the entwined analysis of class, gender and ethnic inequalities; self-reflexive analysis; and the definition of research problems by oppressed groups, to ultimately end oppression. For a feminist geography to be introduced to the discipline, Johnson identified three events that had to occur. Firstly, personal experiences, and politics needed to be scrutinised; secondly, the foundations of geographical knowledge had to be scrutinised; and thirdly, a feminist tradition in geography had to be legitimised.
Finally in a piece entitled 'Prospects' Stokes (1987) argued that geographers were well equipped to explore and analyse the ramifications of the lived life of women, but that while more research was required the real issue was, "...ensuring that feminist analysis is given the status and credibility normally accorded to male views" (ibid., p. 148). Collectively, the papers argued that the epistemological basis of geography actively excluded feminist perspectives from the 'core' of the discipline, that and consequently, to paraphrase Hanson and Monk (1982), New Zealand human geography had excluded 'half of the human' in human geography.

A similar widening of geography's epistemology was the concern of Stokes' (1987) paper that opened by noting that whilst geographers had contributed to the task of documenting imperial expansion into New Zealand, and in particular the Maori population; latterly throughout the 1950s to the 1970s Pakeha geographers had contented themselves with descriptions of demographic and economic issues, of Maori urbanisation and land development, largely ignoring any cultural issues (see Metge, 1952; Frazer, 1958; Pool, 1966; Forster, 1969; Nield, 1971; and Rowland, 1971). The 'geography of Maori' was, therefore, largely directed towards problems of the assimilation of Maori into European New Zealand culture, guided by notions of progress, equality and equal opportunity, and that consequently few geographers had attempted to assess New Zealand's social and economic geography within the context of imperialism, and the effects of that relationship between the immigrant ruling culture, and the indigenous people (an exception being Meek, 1947). For Stokes the frameworks that structured research into the 'geography of Maori' drew heavily on western institutional and theoretical frameworks, and that the pervasiveness of these models had constrained indigenous approaches to research. From this position Stokes proceeded to advocate an alternative approach to research about Maori, based in the Maori world, since, "there is a good deal of Maori geography which can be researched but let it not be constrained by boundaries of Pakeha academic discipline" (Stokes, 1987, p. 111).
Such an approach would not be exclusive to Maori, but nor would it be completely complementary with western based research, as Stokes warned:

... kia tupato, Pakeha. Be careful Pakeha. Tread warily. This is not your history or geography. Do not expect all to be revealed to you. You must be prepared to serve a long apprenticeship of learning on the Marae. You must know the language and understand the culture. You must acquire he ngakau Maori. You must show respect for the tapu of knowledge. Do not expect that because you are an academic or experienced researcher in the Pakeha world that all this will come easily to you" (ibid., p. 121).

Within this 'Maori geography', "The sternest critics will be Maori people who expect some benefit from the researcher to accrue to them" (ibid., p. 121). Stokes on one hand in arguing for a geographical epistemology based on a Maori ontology stands on the periphery of the discipline, but in arguing that Maori geography must remain relevant —to Maori— Stokes positioned herself within a long standing tradition of New Zealand geography, of 'relevance' to people outside the discipline. While Stokes did not argue for geography's relevance to the 'New Zealand nation', she does advocate the need for a particular geography's relevance to another potential nation —a Maori 'nation.

As previously noted, geographer's have long accorded geography a special relevance in the realm of planning, so if Hugh Fletcher's (1981) comments pointed to one challenge for geography, another challenge was contained in a review by Louise Johnson (1989a; see also 1984, 1987, and 1989b). In an extended review Johnson drew upon feminist, and poststructuralist theory to deconstruct one planning text —A. S. Mather's (1986) Land Use— highlighting the way that Mather's text affirmed, "... the male view of the world and male power in the world" (ibid., p. 85), with the hope that planners would gain an insight into their own discourse, and begin to construct a less oppressive practice. The review concluded by noting, in Mather's text, and more generally in geography's texts, that while women were usually absent, marginalised, or included in stereotypical ways, in textual terms they were necessary to the operation of masculinist discourses, and if geography, and planning were to be anything other that patriarchal, "... they have to incorporate women, women's
needs and women's interests" (ibid., p. 91). Johnson suggests that such an exercise, "... would transform existing discourses and render them incapable of use within the patriarchal state" (ibid., p. 91), and that a 'true' feminist geography or planning practice, "would destroy the whole notion of centralising power and using it in such a way as to plan for anyone" (ibid., p. 91). Johnson argues that geography was a worldly discourse whose limits needed to be uncovered, and expanded, to provide the basis for a new practice that could not be used for centralised planning, an oblique criticism of New Zealand geography’s constant reiteration as to its relevance to ‘national development’.

The review uses a different set of theoretical tools than Stokes et al. (1987), showing a move from a socialist feminism, to a more 'poststructuralist' inspired feminism, drawing upon Gross' (1987a; 1987b; and , 1987c) ideas of sexism, and Foucault's (1977, 1978) conceptions of power. Together these two theorists form an uneasy relationship, since on one hand there is a sensitivity to the 'micro politics of power', fused with the assumption that patriarchy's subordination of women is a historically universal system. In addition to this awkward juxtaposition, it is ironical that while Johnston and Le Heron (1987) called for the development of an 'indigenous epistemology', in Johnson's review its theoretical basis is derived from 'European high culture' (especially the work of Foucault).

A riposte to the textual concerns that Johnson illuminated can be found in Harvey Franklin's plenary address to the 1993 NZGS Conference. He recalled that what he liked about geography was its power to disconcert, to make one realise that conventional wisdom was wanting. In this power to disconcert Franklin reaffirmed the basis of geography as observation since, "... often observation is streets ahead of the statistics and the theories that are available" (Franklin, 1993, p. 1), and that, "It is Geography's inclination to observation, rather than theory that makes it attractive to me" (ibid., p. 1). However, while still professing an attraction towards geography, Franklin regretfully noted that for both academic and institution reasons he would be unlikely to take a university geography course at the present. In academic terms, Franklin was
struck by the lack of change in geography over the past 40 years, with most articles being *landeskunde* pieces. The danger of doing such 'bread and butter geography' was that students and practitioners often become stalled in 'Dullsville'. (ibid.), and the geographers that do get away from 'Dullsville' unfortunately often do so by leaving the discipline, or by ignoring much of the current geographical literature, and that consequently some geographers who leave 'Dullsville' enter, "... that enormous and so fashionable geographic reservation Bunkumland; often one must note because they — poor ingenu and ingenue— are in search of an overarching view for themselves" (ibid., p. 2). Drawing examples from *The Professional Geographer*, *Geographical Review*, and *Antipode*, Franklin argued that those social theorists that enter 'Bunkumland' are engaged in nothing more than, "... Mataeology, vain or unprofitable discourse" (ibid., p. 3). However, in Berg's (1994) opinion, Franklin's defence of empirically based geography is indicative of an approach to New Zealand geography that ranked, and continues to rank, empirical investigation over theoretical debate. An approach that has enabled geographers to construct a niche for themselves in the intellectual division of labour, as well as the wider culture in which they work (ibid., 1994). By privileging empirical investigation, and field work, human geographers have been able to construct the discipline as a 'frontier' discipline, a masculine construction that entwines with similar motifs articulated in New Zealand nationalist discourse to 'prove' geography's relevance to the 'nation'.

**Conclusion**

The previous chapter examined the construction of Anglo-American geography highlighting a series of different intellectual threads, including: regional geography, spatial science, radical geography, humanistic geography, feminist geography, and postmodern geography. At various times, and in various contexts, some of these threads have occupied a hegemonic position within geographic discourse, but the hegemony of any particular thread was neither total nor permanent. New Zealand geography partly reflects the changes that have occurred in wider Anglo-American geography. For example Cumberland
drew upon Hartshorne's formal statements, and authority, to argue a place for geography in the New Zealand academic system, while contra to Cumberland's efforts another thread of Anglo-American geography, quantitative geography was drawn upon to articulate a new epistemological basis and role for New Zealand geography. But New Zealand geography has not been constituted solely through reference to Anglo-American geography. This chapter has tried to indicate that New Zealand geography has drawn upon Anglo-American geography in quite strategic ways in order to answer questions, and critiques, that have been articulated in New Zealand, from both within, and outside, the discipline. The strategic utilisation of Anglo-American geographic discourse within the New Zealand context has lead to a much more blurred series of intellectual discourses, where different threads of thought intricately intercept, interdict, and entwine. And while these intellectual discourses have become blurred, what has been constantly reiterated throughout is the desire by geographers to remain 'relevant' to the putative needs of 'the nation'. Through notions of relevance New Zealand's geographic discourses have been constituted as of this world, and in this world, and it has been this desire to remain relevant that has both, caused conflict and change within geographical discourse, and provided a common problemisation, around which the different intellectual approaches in New Zealand geography have orbited, and continue to orbit.
Chapter Six: Rhetorical Motifs of New Zealand Nationalism

Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.

—Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 6)

[i]t is not enough in talk of the nation to say 'we'; there must be some content to that description. The imagined community has to be continually re-imagined as a specific nation with particular features.

—Taylor and Wetherell (1995, p. 74)

[i]he New Zealander lives a more natural life than the Englishman, that he takes more exercise, that he has plenty of originality and resource, and that he is full of an 'overflowing vitality and virility.' The New Zealander plays football as the Japanese played the game of war — 'for all they were worth'. He beats the Englishman because he lives nearer to nature, and England will be beaten more and more by colonials as time goes on, 'unless she wakes up to the fact that men, and women, and children are of more importance than partridges, and pheasants, and grouse, and gives them the chance, that every Maorilander has, of getting their fair share of fresh air, and 'the smell of the earth'.

—Vail e (1905 quoted in Sinclair, 1986a, p. 151)

Introduction

In their different ways the three quotes above express the approach of this chapter. The quotes from Anderson (1991), and Taylor and Wetherell (1995) highlight the idea that the specific styles used in imagining specific 'nations' need to be examined; whilst Vaile's (1905) statement expresses some of particular motifs that have been reiterated in New Zealand's nationalist discourse. The aim, therefore, of this chapter is to outline a series of rhetorical motifs that have been used in New Zealand's nationalist discourse, to provide a basis for the following chapter to examine how such motifs have been articulated in New Zealand human geography. Previous chapters introduced the ideas of 'banal nationalism', and a regulated subjectivity to conceptualise the performative constitution of 'nationhood'. To borrow from Butler (1990) it is
possible to say of nationalism that there is no national identity beyond the expressions of nationality, that identity is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results. The approach, therefore, of this chapter is not to search for the genesis of New Zealand nationalism, but rather to explore the expressions of New Zealand nationalism; since it is through these expressions, sometimes exclamatory, often banal, that the entity known as the 'New Zealand nation' has been, and continues to be, constituted.

The chapter on banal nationalism stressed the importance of rhetoric, and metaphors, as extremely important constitutive elements in the imagining of 'nationhood'. To this end this chapter concentrates on three motifs of New Zealand's nationalist discourse: the connected motifs of 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain'; the motif of 'the land'; and the motif of 'Fitness'. The treatment of these motifs must, of necessity, be impressionistic. But will come become apparent is that the three motifs are highly complex, even contradictory, encompassing a diverse variety of statements and positions, that constitute the 'New Zealand nation' as a constant object of problematisation.

'Better Britain'—'Greater Britain'

Belich (1996) in his history of nineteenth-century New Zealand identified, and differentiated, between the Pakeha 'myths' of 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain'; 'myths' that provided an important series of metaphors which have been utilised in New Zealand's nationalist discourse to imagine both the putative characteristics of a distinctive New Zealand 'nationhood', and the position of the New Zealand 'nation' in a world of 'nations. In particular these entwined motifs have enabled the New Zealand 'nation to be imagined, paradoxically, as both an appendage of Britain and Europe, and transcendent over Britain and Europe. By appendage, New Zealand has been imagined as a peripheral outpost of the 'metropolitan core'; whilst by transcendent, New Zealand's peripheral status has been imagined to free New Zealand from the shackles binding the core to 'tradition', allowing New Zealand an immanent superiority.
The peopling of Pakeha New Zealand, and the articulation of a specifically New Zealand image, were entwined processes; processes that extended from Wakefield in the 1830s to Vogel in the 1870s and 1880s, the purpose of which was to, "swiftly and thickly seed New Zealand with British people and money" (Belich, 1996, p. 279). This 'seeding' was part of a much wider diaspora involving perhaps 50 million people (Gould, 1979), but problematically New Zealand, "did not want people with the strongest push and inherently had the weakest pull" (Belich, 1996, p. 278). When the 'New Zealand' colonies entered the migrant market a number of associations had to be negated. Firstly, at the time most British had never heard of New Zealand, and of those that had the two most common associations were with convict Australia, and a belief that 'New Zealand' was settled by cannibals. In order to negate these associations, a counter-balancing narrative had to be constructed to attract immigrants. In this counter-narrative 'New Zealand' was constituted as a Britain-in-waiting, located the South Pacific, an imagining expressed in a poem of the period, "A land there lies/ Now void; it fits thy people; thither bend/ Thy course; there shall thou find a lasting seat; /There to thy sons shall many Englands rise; /And states be born of thee" (Canterbury Papers, quoted in Thomson, 1854, p. 184). This latent New Zealand paradise once wedded to selected and progressive 'Old Britons' could be expected to produce impressive offspring—the Britain of the South Seas (Fairburn, 1989; Belich, 1996).

Within this textual imagining two particular variants of the 'Britain of the South Seas' prophecy were articulated, New Zealand as either a 'Better Britain', or a 'Greater Britain'. Both of 'myths' were variants of the Wakefieldian hope to reproduce Britain in the South Pacific. The first variant, 'Better Britain' ranked, "paradise over progress; Arcadia over Utopia; and quality over quantity" (ibid., p. 302). 'New Zealand' was to be a 'Better Britain' in a number of ways: firstly, immigration to New Zealand would 'improve' individual Britons; and secondly, 'New Zealand' was to be more British than Britain, in the sense that the English, Scots and Welsh would assimilate. But importantly, whilst the 'Better Britain' narrative constituted 'New Zealand' as an evolutionary improvement
apropos 'Old Britain, 'New Zealand' would be permanently subordinate to 'Old Britain'. A status was vividly expressed by Anthony Trollope who wrote that, "The New Zealander among the John Bulls is the most John Bullish. He admits the supremacy of England to every place in the world, only he is more English than any Englishman at home. (Trollope, 1873, p. 632).

In contrast the 'Greater Britain' motif imagined 'New Zealand' to have a future so brilliant that New Zealand would not simply replicate, but eventually transcend Britain. In this vein Thomson wrote that, "New Zealand, England's most distant colony, will in a few generations cast a lustre over Queen Victoria's reign which men absorbed in the turmoil of European politics cannot fully comprehend" (Thomson, 1854, p. 280); while Cholomondeley referred to New Zealand as, "a nation that is to be, a giant yet in his cradle" (Cholomondeley, 1854, p. 224). On these claims Charles Dilke wryly commented that:

Closely resembling Great Britain in situation, size, and climate, New Zealand is often styled by the colonists 'the Britain of the South', and many affect to believe that her future is destined to be brilliant as has been the past of her mother-country. With the exaggeration of phrase to which English New Zealanders are prone, they prophesy a marvellous here-after for the whole Pacific, in which New Zealand, as the carrying and manufacturing country is, to play the foremost part, the Australias following obediently in her train (Dilke, 1868, v.1, p. 398).

Despite the differences both the 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain' motifs implied a reproduction of Britain (Belich, 1996). The former suggested that 'New Zealand', as a new Britain, would be qualitatively superior to the old, yet mirror it more closely that the other Neo-Britains (Australia, Canada, South Africa); whilst the latter emphasising parity with, or even superiority to, Britain. The 'Greater Britain' expectation of ultimate independence positioned 'New Zealand' with a fraternal relationship in a family of Greater Britains, unlike the enduring subordinate status implied by the 'Better Britain' motif.
Not only was the rhetorical imagining of a 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain' important, but so was the manner in which it was undertaken. Between 1837 and 1880 more than 40 books and 100 pamphlets were produced by immigration agents trying to attract migrants to New Zealand (Belich, 1996). For Belich the monopolisation of information about 'New Zealand' by immigration agents, and the sheer repetition of common themes in the genre, tended to 'naturalise' crusader literature, and consequently, "Propaganda became subliminal when it merged imperceptibly with what appeared to be objective geography, ethnography or history. Government statistics, the New Zealand Handbooks and Yearbooks, and New Zealand history itself—all have their roots in crusader propaganda" (Belich, 1996, p. 283). The importance of the crusader literature cannot be understated, because the images contained within them, through repetition, became key metaphors in the banal production, and reproduction, of 'New Zealand' nationalism.

As previously noted the 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain' motifs articulated two important elements of 'New Zealand's' nationalist discourse: transcendence, and appendage. On one hand the 'Greater Britain' motif proposed a future for 'New Zealand' that transcended that of the 'mother-country', so 'New Zealand' was to be superior than what went before; but on the other hand, New Zealand was to be an appendage of the 'mother-country'. On this theme, James wrote, that New Zealand in being, "Young, small and a long way from home life can be hard. On the other hand, there is no-one to tell you can't do something" (James, 1990, p. 124). James's statement sums up nicely Pakeha New Zealanders' ambivalence towards Britain, a relationship which has, "shifted between slavish adoration and foot dragging covert rebellion, mixed with affront when 'home' does not seem to want 'us' any more" (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 142).

The tropes of transcendence and appendage, within the motifs of 'Greater Britain and 'Better Britain', can be seen at the 1906-7 New Zealand International Exhibition. International exhibitions, held in European metropolitan centres, North America, and Australasia since the mid-nineteenth
century have been one of the most distinctive of, “modernity’s symbolic inventions” (Bennett, 1991, p. 30). Bennett contends that as contrived events international exhibitions have been, “obliged to seek the occasions for their staging outside themselves” (ibid., p. 30), and by far the most popular pretext for holding such events has been, “that other symbolic invention of modernity, the national celebration” (ibid., p. 30). So for example the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876 marked a hundred years of American independence, and Brisbane’s EXPO ’88 marked Australia’s bicentennial celebrations of European settlement, examples of a long line of international exhibitions, staged in conjunction with national celebrations, that marked the passing of the time of the ‘nation’ (Dibley, 1997).

In New Zealand, the New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition, held in Dunedin in 1889-90, marked the passing of fifty years since the proclamation of British Sovereignty; the New Zealand International Exhibition of 1906-7 was held in Christchurch on the eve of the country’s attainment of Dominion status; whilst the 1940 Centennial Exhibition, held in Wellington, marked one hundred years since the proclamation of British Sovereignty (Thompson, 1926; Palethrope, 1940; and Dibley, 1997). Despite both international exhibitions, and national celebrations being products of modernity each has its own differentiated temporality, where the former celebrated the passage of progress, while the latter marked the achievements of ‘nations’ (Bennett, 1991). The two temporalities are not antithetically opposed, however, but rather the ambition of the exposition is to superimpose the time of the nation onto the time of modernity, seeking to establish the host nation as, “among the foremost representatives of the time, and tasks, of modernity” (ibid., p. 31). A theme that intersects with the ideas of transcendence and appendage expressed through the ‘Better Britain’ and ‘Greater Britain’ motifs. In this vein James Cowen, the author of the 1906-7 Exhibition’s Official Record, proclaimed that the exposition was an inventory of, “the highest products of the world’s workers in the utilitarian and the beautiful” (Cowen, 1910, p. 107). For instance, at the 1906-7 exhibition, two examples can be seen where New Zealand was inserted into the narratives of progress, and high culture (Dibley, 1997). The first concerned the
way in which the narrative of progress was articulated in the 'Department of Labour Court'; whilst the second concerned the 'Hall of Statuary' which sought to position New Zealand in a narrative of high culture. The 'Labour Court' provided an account of the working conditions of 'the New Zealand worker', and of the growth in industry which had developed under the watchful eye of the benign state, in opposition to a depiction of the evils of British sweated labour. This provided an opportunity to compare the superior working conditions of New Zealand workers with their counterparts in Britain, a point that Cowen noted, "the sociological side of the exhibition was full of meat for thought, especially for those earnest-minded New Zealanders who are anxious above all things to keep this land free from social iniquities, and grievous wrongs so deeply rooted in Old World Communities (Cowen, 1910, p. 226). In this way the Exhibition announced New Zealand at the international forefront of progressive social policy, and consequently as more modern that the imperial centre (Dibley, 1997).

By positioning New Zealand as a harbinger of 'modernity' it required that New Zealand be anchored in relation to Britain (a synecdoche for Western Europe), and that an 'ancient Maoridom' be constructed to supply, "a timeless, primitive otherness against which a modern settler unity and identity could be asserted, and it provided an entity against which the nation's modernity could be asserted" (Dibley, 1997, p. 10). By constructing this 'ancient Maoridom' a settler identity could be constituted that emphasised progress, and future prospects, against a 'primitive Maoriness' whose 'savagery and barbarity' was of the past, and which had been transcended by the development of a 'civilised' modern nation. This construction of an 'ancient Maoridom' by Pakeha, took a particular form where Maori were supplied with a history that prefigured, and mirrored, settler history, so, "there was room for an heroic Maori past, starting in India or the Caucasus, blossoming in the colonisation of the Pacific, finding expression in the discoveries of Kupe (a Maori navigator in the mould of Cook) and the coming of the great Fleet, and ending in the defence of Orakau" (Sorrenson, 1979, p. 84). Yet, argues Dibley, for Maori to occupy this space as a 'primitive' origin of the nation their investment with European origins
appeared necessary, so that, "Only in New Zealand were indigenous people transmogrified into precocious European navigators and colonials, co-opted into settler history rather than expunged from its records. Only in New Zealand was it conceded that history had occurred before Europeans trod the stage" (Denoon, 1983, p. 207). But by insisting that Maori were 'long-lost cousins, "the settlers were still able to believe that history began within European colonisation...." (ibid., p. 207).

By staging the exhibition New Zealand sought to solicit Britain's gaze by revealing to the imperial centre New Zealand's modernity, thus both confirming New Zealand's appendage and transcendence. At this point before comfortably consigning the modernist rhetoric of the exhibition to the historical wastebasket, to lie alongside the 'puffery' of the 'Greater Britain' and 'Better Britain' motifs, it might be illustrative to recall the rhetoric of another exposition —Brisbane 1988. Bell (1996) argues that the agenda of the Expo '88 pavilion when it was designed, and built, was to operate as a site for the expression of a putative New Zealand identity to an international audience, "Built as a representation of the nation's sum achievements over time, it may be described as a physical landmark of history, culture and progress. The stance taken assumes that within this is even more progress to come" (ibid., p. 83). Present articulations of transcendence and appendage may take different forms than those of the past, but there is an identifiable genealogy that connects present to the past, and whose reiteration performatively constitutes the New Zealand 'nation'.

"The Land"

A second motif in New Zealand's nationalist discourse centres on ideas of 'the land'. The influence of the 'land' in the development of a 'national character' has been claimed as having an enduring significance in New Zealand's nationalist discourse (Sinclair, 1986a, 1986b; Fairburn, 1989; Philips, 1996; Bell, 1996). In an essay written for the 1940 Centennial celebrations, Holcroft stated that New Zealand's 'national soul' had been formed through a struggle with 'the shadow' of the New Zealand bush, "Our grandfathers and sometimes
their fathers before them, passed through the primeval shadow, and emerged from it as the founders of a nation....” (Holcroft, 1940, p. 28; see plate one). While for Sinclair, “In New Zealand it was the work of clearing the bush and ‘breaking in’ the land which was seen as central to the process of building a nation” (Sinclair, 1986a, p. 8; see plate two), and the people who undertook this process, “were the founding fathers and mothers” (ibid., p. 8). While the image of ‘the land’ was an important rhetorical resource, it was used in a number of different senses, but which importantly maintained the centrality of ‘the land’ in a putatively distinct New Zealand ‘nationalism’. With this in mind two particular rhetorical threads can be identified: the ‘sublime landscape’, and the ‘productive landscape’. In the first usage the landscape was (and is) represented as, “beautiful but potentially dangerous: sanctified, visited, enjoyed, photographed, then left; a vision to inspire” (Bell, 1996, p. 29); whilst in the second, the landscape, “is beautiful and beautifully cultivated, a tribute to both nature itself and to the efforts of human labour” (ibid., p. 29).
Plate 1: Leslie Adkin, Tararua, Waipehei Track 1927
Plate 2: Williams Hall-Raine, Te Whaiti-Sawmill 1920
The ‘Sublime landscape’

Regarding the ‘sublime landscape’, early European depictions of New Zealand emphasised the majesty, and awe, of the landscape (Bell, 1996). The sublime was a concept that came into usage during the eighteenth century to denote a new aesthetic concept, held to be distinct from the beautiful and the picturesque, and associated with ideas of awe, vastness, and majesty (Botting, 1996; see plates three and four). The depiction of New Zealand’s ‘sublime landscape’ as, “green, large, dramatic and inspiring” (Bell, 1996, p. 34) was utilised to promote ‘the country’ as suitable not only for the aesthetic gaze, but also for immigration and tourism, and which continues to do so, “Portrayals of the magnificence of nature live on in the present: the postage stamps, the coffee table books, the calendars and the advertising campaigns..., the array of postcards; and in company and government department logos” (ibid., p. 34). The ‘sublime landscape’ in the contemporary international contest for tourists, is a central component in New Zealand’s self-image (Bell, 1996). For example the New Zealand Tourism Board (NZTB) stated that, “Interest in the environment and unspoiled nature is mounting throughout the world. The natural beauty and freshness of the New Zealand environment is one of our best known and most appealing features” (NZTB, 1995/96, p. 30). A point that is reinforced by the use of specific icons in marketing New Zealand overseas, “majestic mountains, warm welcoming people, sheep, large numbers of green hills, green landscapes” (NZTB, 1996, p. 25). The irony of the ‘sublime landscape’ motif is that in emphasising New Zealand’s undeveloped landscape it stands in direct contrast with another motif of ‘the land’ —the ‘productive landscape’. The two motifs, however, can be drawn together since the ‘sublime landscape’ can be viewed as a collection of features that should be conserved, both for intrinsic and utilitarian reasons, and it is these utilitarian reasons that connect the ‘sublime landscape’ with the ‘productive landscape’. A connection that can be illustrated through a series of quotes from the NZTB that first reiterated the representation of the ‘sublime’, “The natural environment is one of New Zealand’s major attractions” (NZTB, 1996, p. 40), but enframed that
representation with an aim that included, "Protecting and enhancing our environment in a manner consistent with monitoring environmental values in a growing market economy. Environmental outcomes will be achieved through means that impose least cost on the economy and the environment" (ibid., p. 47). It appears that the characteristics of the 'sublime landscape' have become transmogrified into useful attributes of a 'productive landscape', a point that leads onto the second derivative of 'the land' motifs.
Plate 3: William Matthew Hodgkins, Mitre Peak, Milford Sound
Plate 4: John Gully, In the Southern Alps 1881
The ‘Productive landscape’

Edward Wakefield’s New Zealand Company, and the other settler associations commodified the ‘sublime vista’ into saleable Arcadian plots (Bell, 1996); while Fairburn wrote that, “of the themes constituting the Arcadian conception of New Zealand, the most common was the notion of New Zealand as a land of natural abundance” (Fairburn, 1989, p. 29). This Arcadia was imagined through an abbreviated reference to the book of Deuteronomy as the ‘land of milk and honey’ (Fairburn, 1989). If, however, New Zealand was imagined as a rural Arcadia it was not a conventional Arcadia, since it required a large degree of utopian, state-sponsored collective effort in order for the Arcadia to flower (Belich, 1996), and problematically ‘the land’ itself was occupied by people who intended to stay put.

During the late-nineteenth century arguments over the best means of controlling, distributing, and using land was the central debate within both Pakeha and Maori communities, a view that might also hold in contemporary New Zealand (Brooking, 1996). For Pakeha, “ownership [of land] somehow improved the character of the owner and enriched in a moral and spiritual sense all those who lived off the land” (ibid., p. 141-142), and land, or more specifically the Pakeha ownership of land, was argued to be an important tool in ensuring ‘law and order’ in the New Zealand. A point forcefully expressed by the New Zealand Prime Minister, William Massey who stated in 1926 that, “He [Massey] wanted to have every man become the owner of the house he occupied.... If they were able to that, they would have VERY MUCH LESS OF THIS BOLSHEVISTIC NONSENSE” (emphasis in original, quoted in Fairburn, 1989, p. 260). The putative moral rectitude that arises from the ownership of land can be seen in more contemporary expressions, for example Robinson notes that, “The house, still the centre of its owners existence, has always been to the very act of civilisation. In New Zealand, the development of the house has been basic to our church at any time” (Robinson, 1990, p. 5), whilst the ownership of a house created a stable society (ibid.)
A belief in the righteousness of land ownership was fused with the idea that persons had an obligation to use 'the land' productively, and those that did, had the strongest claim to ownership (Brooking, 1996). As a consequence the main models of land tenure available to Pakeha settlers in the nineteenth-century, three were largely rejected: the British 'tripartite' system; the South American 'latifundia' system; and Maori communal ownership, since, "most settlers rejected the option of the empty sheep walks and deer parks of the Highlands, the vast barren stations of Australia, the huge estancias of Argentina devoid of human habitation save a few wild and untrustworthy gauchos, and the sparsely peopled verdant bush of pre-European New Zealand" (ibid., p. 145). Another factor in the rejection of these models was the deep connection to a 'ruralist' discourse (ibid.). 'Ruralism', is the belief that the country way of life is morally superior to that of the city, and hence socially preferable (Williams, 1973). Farmers' leaders, farmer politicians, and rural newspapers used 'ruralist' metaphors to describe farmers as the, "backbone of the economy, the bedrock of society, the only real workers, the only true producers, the lifeblood of the nation, the purifier of politics, the red blood corpuscles of the body politic" (Brooking, 1996, p. 141). A similar imagining occurs in contemporary discourse, where for example:

At about Leeston something unusual happens, even to the most committed urbanities. It's about here that the country finger instinctively goes up from the steering wheel in a restrained gesture of greeting to fellow travellers passing in the opposite direction. It's a bit of Anglo-Saxon recognition that says something of the intrinsic worth of people in this sparsely populated area of the country (Stringer, 1997, p. 30);

whilst in a contemporary imagining of a provincial town, "There are no delicatessens. No chic wine shops. There's in fact, not a semblance of big-city style —I sighted but one BMW in a week, and, while there were plenty of the ubiquitous four-wheel-drives, most of which were mud-splattered and clearly used for the purpose for which they were built (Legat, 1997, p. 87). In this 'ruralist' discourse the transition from a rural to a urban society represented a kind of 'fall' from Eden (Williams, 1973). Dennis Glover forcefully expresses the
distinction between the subjectivity of the city, "We in the city live as best we can,/ Fettered by fears of by-laws and police./ Our short perspective magnifies alarms;/ We feel uneasy when the gas man calls;/ And hopes decline, through tabulated years,/ To quarter-acre sections neatly fenced" (Glover, 1981, p. 22); and the subjectivity of the country, "Therefore, beyond the city, we are glad to find/ Your country, where the flat roads run/ Like helter-skelter across the land,/ With its frontier the capricious ford/ And your fields that lie towards one another,/ Mountains being near" (ibid., p. 22). The rhetoric of ruralism, especially when it drew in Biblical allusions of 'sin' and 'virtue', enabled Pakeha New Zealanders to imagine themselves morally transcending both the British and Maori, heralding in a Arcadian land of yeomen farmers.

The 'moral' imagining of the 'productive landscape' enframed a usufructuary interpretation of land rights, which deeply undermined Maori land tenure, and legitimised the alienation of Maori land, since, "An essentially usufructuary interpretation of land rights condemned Maori even more firmly than overt racism because they could not present a legitimate case for holding on to their land, even through most settler politicians accepted that Maori were the original owners" (Brooking, 1996, p. 161). The usufructuary notion of land rights can be traced to John Locke and the Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel, who argued that the 'waste lands' of North America could be better used by 'Englishmen' rather than the 'Indians' who needed only a small amount of the continent for their subsistence (Reynolds, 1987). Similarly in New Zealand, Earl Grey noted, "to that portion of the soil, whatever it might be, which they occupied, the aboriginal inhabitants, barbarous as they were, had a clear and undoubted claim...", but argued that, "I must regard it a vain and unfounded scruple which would have acknowledged their right of property in land which remained unsubdued to the uses of man" (quoted in McIntyre and Gardner, 1971, p. 60). So in New Zealand the moralistic tenor of the debate over land, constituted through the 'use it or lose it' discourse, enabled the alienation of Maori land, since such an alienation was not only best for all concerned, but ultimately morally 'right'. The result would transform, in the words of the hero of The Toll of the Bush Geoffery, "a wilderness into a garden" (Satchwell, 1905, p. 7); and
turn Maori, exemplified by Pine in the same novel, from being a 'lazy beggar' into a useful citizen with a, "wooden house and a flock of sheep" (ibid., p. 417). The invidious position of Maori, and the assumption of the 'moral superiority' arising from Pakeha land ownership was made clear by John McKenzie:

[Maori] ought to cultivate their land, and produce something from it. He did not think that it was a wise thing to encourage them to sell their land for the purpose of being idle and doing nothing, and living on what he might call the proceeds of their capital. They should endeavour to turn their land to good account, and derive the same benefit from it as Europeans. When Europeans got land it was immediately turned to good account. The Europeans cultivated it, improved it, and endeavoured to make something of it to keep themselves and their families, and if they encouraged the natives to do more than live in idleness, and realise on their lands when they find themselves short of money, they would be doing a good thing for the Natives themselves (NZPD, 1898, 92, p. 302).

An irony given the importance of Maori agriculture in supporting the establishment of the various New Zealand colonies, but which illustrates the selective process of remembering and forgetting that occurs in nationalist discourse.

The 'land' as a motif in New Zealand nationalist discourse has been imagined through a number of different tropes, two of which have been explored here. Perhaps it is the motif of the 'the land' as 'productive' which has had the most impact allowing New Zealand to be imagined as distinctive from both Maori and Britain, introducing a sense of superiority that stems from the putative sense of moral 'fitness' that arises from the 'productive ownership' of land. So here again in imagining the relationship of the 'New Zealand nation' to the 'land', the ideas of transcendence become apparent, but also the notion of appendage exists since it would be the European ownership of land through which an Arcadian paradise would flourish.

'Fitness'

The third motif that this chapter explores is the motif of 'fitness'. In Sinclair's opinion New Zealanders' self identity, "has been extremely physical,
emphasising hard work, athletic prowess. There has been a constant demand for fitness, not only for sport and war, but in education; an affirmation of health and efficiency" (Sinclair, 1986a, p. 13), a notion of ‘fitness’ that extends beyond the physical (Sinclair, 1986b). At this point it is useful to recollect Haraway’s (1991) argument that at the beginning of the industrial revolution in Europe the representation of both nature and political economy drew upon metaphors of the body, that in turn resuscitated organic metaphors developed in ancient Greece (also see Foucault, 1971). In turn economics provided the metaphors for the representation of the natural, with perhaps the most famous example being Darwin’s account of how his own evolutionary narrative of competition, and struggle, was inspired by the writings of Smith and Malthus (Gibson-Graham, 1996).

In the New Zealand context, Dr Duncan Macgregor wrote in 1876 that, “our people, in so far at least as they have neither been assisted nor forced to come hither, have run the gauntlet of a natural selection, which only the fittest survive” (Macgregor, 1987, p. vi), comments echoed by Irvine and Alpers who wrote that, “The stock from which New Zealanders are sprung is not only British, but the best of British” (Irvine and Alpers, 1902, p. 421). In articulating such a belief the New Zealand ‘nation’ was imagined as both an appendage of Britain and transcendence apropos Britain, since it was widely believed that the superior ‘races’ of Europe would inevitably displace more ‘primitive races’ (Belich, 1986; Banton, 1987). In New Zealand at its most extreme it was believed that Maori would simply ‘die out’ —the ‘fatal impact thesis— or at the very least become ‘Brown Britains’ (Belich, 1986). In this sense the motif of ‘fitness’ was used to refer to ‘racial fitness’, and the New Zealand ‘nation’ imagined as a ‘white British nation’. The motif of ‘fitness’ was not only used to define a relationship with a hierarchically ordered external ‘other’ such as Maori, but also to define an internal ‘other’. Sullivan (1995) argues that British settlers brought with them approaches to work and welfare that had been constituted by the debates of the 1830s over the New Poor Law, and social Darwinism, and hence, “the ideals of individualism and self-help were strongly entrenched in New Zealand settlements where the concept of poor relief was
repugnant to and strongly resisted by settlers who had hopes of a new society free of poverty and want" (ibid., p. 10). The majority of the poor were regarded as being poor as a result of their own moral turpitude, and that consequently there should be no relief for the 'undeserving poor' (Sullivan, 1995).

Drawing on Spencer's social eugenics, withholding help from the 'undeserving poor' would, it was argued, would cumulatively lead to a better 'race' as inferior specimens were weeded out. But problematically for Spencer the birth-rate was declining among the 'fittest' (i.e., the middle classes), while the fertility of the 'unfit' was increasing, a perspective that Russell expressed in the New Zealand context, "... it would appear that this problem [declining birth rates] of the deliberate limitation of families is one that must be dealt with from an economic as well as from a moral and religious standpoint" (Russell, 1919, p. 125). From such a perspective there was a problemisation in New Zealand focused around a concern at New Zealand's declining birth rate, and the physical and moral degeneration of 'Empire and country' (Sullivan, 1995). For the founder of the Plunket movement Truby King, character was firmly linked to the body, so to build healthy bodies was to build healthy minds, and that disciplined regulated bodies produced moral, normalised citizens (Ollsen, 1981; Sullivan, 1995). The object therefore was to, 'reduce moral degeneracy' by training mothers to produce 'fit Truby King babies', a process consisting of the production of, "prescriptive norms of mothering, body technique, corporeality and character..." (ibid., p. 14). Drawing on Foucault's imagery the practices that developed around Truby King's 'truth' about the physically fit infant, "amounted to a comprehensive surveillance infrastructure which subjected the mothers and infants of the nation to continual scrutiny both from within and without (Sullivan, 1995, p. 14)—a Plunket book panopticism. In this way the belief in the superior 'fitness' of the New Zealand 'nation' was fused with a public health discourse that was aimed at protecting that 'fitness', of which town planning was an important element (Coates, 1935; Sinclair, 1986a; Pawson, 1987).

Another social practice through which the New Zealand 'nation could show its putative 'fitness' was through sport. Body practices such as sport have been
intimately linked to the building of modern nations (Lever, 1983; Harvey and Sparkes, 1991; and Andrews, 1993). Whilst in the New Zealand context the important role of sport in the articulation of a New Zealand nationalism has been noted (Sinclair, 1986a; 1986b; 1988; Fougere, 1989; Philips, 1996; and Bell, 1996). For example, Sinclair has argued that, "War and sport are about the only ways in which people of different nations, or other groups directly confront and measure up against one another" (Sinclair, 1986b, p. 5), so that success in sport equated to national fitness in a competitive world. At the turn of the century it was declared in Zealandia that as a result of the widespread adoption of rugby, there was no danger of New Zealand, "rearing a nation of milksops, effeminate fops, luxurious dandies..." (1890, quoted in Sinclair, 1986a, p. 143). Indeed success at sport was lauded, and continues to be lauded, as one sign of the proof of the superiority of New Zealand vis-à-vis the 'Old World. Bell commented that sport and in particular rugby, "has united spectators in their belief that their nation shares a collective identity, while reflecting qualities that in this society are seen as desirable: macho prowess, individual effort, disciplined training, and a chance to prove successful against far larger countries" (Bell, 1996, p. 159). Through social practices such as sport, and public health, the New Zealand 'nation' has been imagined as morally and physically 'fit', and able to transcend the 'enfeebled' nations of the 'Old world'.

A discourse that has explicitly drawn on the imagery of 'fitness' in contemporary New Zealand has been economics. Gibson-Graham argue that the 'the economy' has been commonly represented as an organism whose functioning is always in potential jeopardy, and that consequently the faltering national economy, "is often compared to healthier bodies elsewhere, all poised to invade and deprive the ailing, or less fit, organism of its life force. Economic and industry policy is formulated to remove the internal, and create immunity to the external, threats to reproduction (Gibson-Graham, 1996, p. 105). In the contemporary New Zealand context, state intervention in market processes is represented as a threat to the 'fitness' of the body economic, and that a lack of 'national economic fitness' would result in New Zealand slipping towards 'third-
world status' (Hawke, 1992; Kelsey, 1995). This is a point stressed by the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) who stated, and who continue to state, that regulation, "blunts competition and innovation and encourages lobbying and other socially wasteful activities" (NZBR, 1996), and that if regulations were not loosened, New Zealand would, "soon lose attractiveness to investors if it fails to maintain a margin of excellence over competing economies" (Matthew, 1997, p. 19). A particularly galling position given the amount of time spent in New Zealand's nationalist discourse promoting the connection between New Zealand and the 'western nations', and the superiority of New Zealand vis-à-vis those 'western nations'. In this metaphysical conception of the national economy as an organism, all other considerations must be subsumed to assuring the economic organisms 'fitness'. Again the ideas of transcendence and appendage emerge, since New Zealand's economy is located among the 'developed' Western economies, "New Zealanders are accustomed to making international comparisons with the relatively rich countries of the world, especially those which belong to the OECD" (Hawke, 1992, p. 449), but where New Zealand has to struggle harder, to be 'fitter', in order to keep that status. But through the process of struggle, New Zealand is imagined, and represented, as morally, if not materially, superior to the rest of the world. The apotheosis of which can be perhaps seen in Gareth Morgan's comments regarding the recent Australian sporting performance at the Commonwealth Games:

For goodness' sake, let the market rule —avoid the contrived outcomes of state intervention as a privileged group of subsidy sycophants would wish it.... The 'paucity' of Hillary Commission funding is reason to rejoice. It gives New Zealand more cause to celebrate the quality of its athletes' sporting achievements and less ground to suspect that the medals are simply badges for some quango meeting its industrial production targets. Fewer of ours are fool's gold (NZ Herald, September 22, 1998, p. A11).

To briefly summarise, the trope of fitness has taken form in New Zealand's nationalist discourse through a complex range of expressions, spread through a multitude of different narratives: 'racial', health, sporting, and economic. Utilising the 'fitness' motifs has enabled the New Zealand 'nation' to be
imagined as distinct from, and superior to, other ‘nations’ because of its putative ‘fitness’. Conversely the utilisation of such a motif has necessitated a constant surveillance to ensure that ‘fitness’ does not slide into ‘flabbiness’, illustrating how the performative rhetoric of nationalism has a disciplinary function as well as a constitutive one.

Conclusion

To conclude a number of points need to be reinforced. Firstly, nationalist discourse needs to be seen as performatively constitutive, where expressions of nationalism constitute the very thing to which they are referring. Secondly, the expressions that constitute nationalist discourse are part of a long chain of previous expressions, and reiterated in specific contexts. The motifs that have been explored in this chapter: ‘Greater Britain and Better Britain’; the ‘land’; and ‘fitness’ take different forms in different times and spaces, but draw upon previously articulated expressions to provide continuity between past and present imaginings of the New Zealand ‘nation’. It is also important to realise that these motifs do remain aloof from each other, but can be used in mutually reinforcing, or contradictory ways, so for example the motif of ‘fitness’ can be linked support the motif of ‘the land’ which in turn links to ideas of a ‘Greater or Better Britain’. These motifs are rhetorical in that they have been articulated to persuade the audience and speaker of the existence, and contours, of the New Zealand ‘nation’; and performative in that in being persuasive, the speaker banally constitutes the New Zealand ‘nation’. Throughout the chapter the three motifs that have been highlighted have been linked together through the ideas of transcendence and appendage, ideas that have referred particularly to New Zealand’s imagined relationship with a world centred on Britain, and Western Europe. While the argument that has been presented in this chapter is only partial, and much could be included that would enrich and deepen the argument, it provides a starting point with which to begin to explore the textual practice of New Zealand geography in terms of the articulation of a New Zealand nationalism.
Chapter Seven: Banal Nationalism and New Zealand Geography

I remember standing by the bar and thinking that words didn’t mean anything any more. Patriotism honour courage vomit vomit vomit. Only the names meant anything. Mons, Loos, the Somme, Arras, Verdun, Ypres.

But now I look round this cellar with the candles burning on the tables and our linked shadows leaping on the walls, and I realize there’s another group of words that still mean something. Little words that trip through sentences unregarded: us, them, we, they, here, there. These are words of power, and long after we’re gone, they’ll lie about in the language, like the unexploded grenades in these fields, and any one of them’ll take your hand off.

Pat Barker — The Ghost Road

Introduction

In 1945 George Jobberns called for New Zealand geographers to ‘know the geography of our country’ through the medium of orderly, systematic regional descriptions, a rallying cry that neatly encapsulates the approach that dominated the early period of New Zealand human geography. But as has been argued Jobberns’ cry has remained a constant touchstone for New Zealand human geographers operating in different epistemological and social contexts. This chapter will examine the ways that New Zealand human geography has performatively constituted ‘the nation’ as an object of study. Towards this end, therefore, the chapter examines a series of New Zealand human geography texts to highlight the banal flagging of ‘the nation’ in those texts.

Before starting this analysis it is, however, useful to recap the concept of banal nationalism, and the various rhetorical motifs that have been identified. Banal nationalism operates not through overt declarations of nationalist fidelity, but rather through the articulation of the ordinary, and easily passed over. In Billig’s words, “Banal nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in so doing, enhabit them. Small words, rather
than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely conscious reminders
of the homeland, making 'our' nation identity unforgettable" (Billig, 1995, p. 92).
In turn through a complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting the banally
imagined community of 'the nation' is inhabited, and given performative
substance through the rhetorical articulation of motifs of identity. In the New
Zealand context the previous chapter indicated a series of motifs that have
been used rhetorically in this dialectic of remembering and forgetting. These
include the motifs of: 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain'; the 'productive' and
'sublime' landscape; and ideas of 'fitness'.

The chapter is divided into three sections, roughly corresponding to the
epistemological divisions made in chapter four. The first section examines a
series of texts loosely connected by the regional geography epistemology;
whilst, the second section undertakes the same analysis for texts connected by
a quantitative epistemology; and the third section examines a series of texts
that articulate a series of 'alternative approaches' in New Zealand human
geography.

**Regional Geography**

Chapter five presented regional geography as the 'founding' epistemology of
New Zealand geography, as constituted by scholars such as Cumberland and
Jobberns. This section examines regional geography in a different light, not
apropos of its position within New Zealand geography, but rather 'the nations'
position in regional geography. Towards this purpose, therefore, seven texts,
forming four groups, within the rubric of regional geography are examined. The
first group of texts are from Cumberland (1945) and Jobberns (1945), texts that
have been previously presented in relation to their status in defining the early
boundaries of New Zealand human geography. The second group of texts,
Pascoe (1945), and McCaskill (1949), are among those systematic, orderly
descriptions called for by Jobberns (1945). The third group is comprised of
Cumberland's (1956) presidential address. The final set of papers, Fox (1948),
and Cunningham (1958), examine New Zealand’s position as a ‘nation’ in a world of ‘nations’.

Both Cumberland’s and Jobberns’ papers appeared in the first issue of *New Zealand Geographer* (NZG), and shared a common approach to geography. They have, however, different priorities with Cumberland outlining the purpose of the new journal, while Jobberns’ was concerned to delineate the approach that geography should undertake. Despite these differing priorities both scholars took pains to construct a relationship between geography and needs of ‘the nation’. In the foreword to the first issue of the NZG, Cumberland (1945) wrote that a principle justification for publishing the new journal was that a ‘common curiosity’ existed about New Zealand, so that:

> What to some was a petty South American state and to others an island off the coast of Australia, has in the last few years been rediscovered and found to be a prominent member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, a Pacific power and a small but worthy partner of the older and more potent of the United Nations—an independent, youthful community with as high a standard of living and as great a social and economic attainment as any (Cumberland, 1945, p. 2).

Within New Zealand as well, argued Cumberland, there existed the same ‘common curiosity’ about its distinctive regions. In these passages ‘the nation’ is given rhetorical substance through a variety of motifs. Firstly, New Zealand is imagined as an individual, independent ‘nation’ in a world of ‘nations’ through its membership of both the British Commonwealth, and the United Nations. Secondly, and closely connected to the first point is that the independence of ‘the nation’ is reinforced by Cumberland’s emphasis on New Zealand’s economic and social achievements. New Zealand’s connections with Britain are further flagged when Cumberland notes that in New Zealand there exists a curiosity, “about the regions that have been so strongly differentiated by ‘human phenomena’ during a brief yet eventful century of European settlement” (ibid., p. 3). A remembering that erases Maori from both the landscape, and ‘the country’. Through this dialectic of remembering and forgetting the discursive markers of ‘the nation’ as an object of geographical study are performatively

142
constituted in the text. Having established these discursive markers the text states that the aim of the NZG was to, “interpret the Dominion to its people and to provide for overseas readers a body of geographic knowledge about this country” (ibid., p. 4). A shift occurs here, where the discursive contours of ‘the nation’ were firmly constituted earlier in the text, New Zealand can now be deictically flagged as ‘the Dominion’, and ‘this country’. At the end of the ‘Foreword’ Cumberland wrote that the name, style and format of the NZG, “may each in turn bring to mind some one or other of the long-established journals of geography” (ibid., p. 4), but that he hoped to produce a journal, “not without its originality and individuality” (ibid., p. 4). These wishes for the new journal have a allegorical quality that on one level points to the themes of appendage and transcendence associated with New Zealand nationalist discourse, while on another echoing the institutional symbols that signify ‘nationhood’ —coins, banknotes, and flags.

A similar combination of rhetorical flagging, and remembering occurs in Jobberns’ (1945) paper, in the same issue of the NZG. This paper has been previously cited apropos of Jobberns’ call for geographers to ‘know their country’ as a basis for planned intervention, a maxim that has remained a constant theme through New Zealand human geography. While reciting this maxim, however, Jobberns narrates a genealogy of national origins that delineates the discursive borders of ‘the nation’ which is to be brought into knowledge. Under the heading ‘Habit and Habitat’ Jobberns wrote that:

These New Zealand islands are our earthly home —our habitat. A hundred years ago this habitat had been little altered from its primitive condition by the small population of Polynesian stock. Within this hundred years our people have changed the face of the country. They came here from Britain transplanting their, culture, tradition or habit of living and set out on the gigantic task of transforming the new land in the image of the land they had left (ibid., p. 6).

This tightly packed genealogy of the New Zealand ‘nation’ expresses well the entwined processes of deictical pointing and remembering. Firstly, there is the deixis —‘our earthly home’, ‘our habitat’, ‘our people’, ‘the country’— through
which 'the nation' is banally flagged, and the reader implicated in a relationship vis-à-vis 'the nation'. The inhabited nation that is flagged is entwined with images of the natural —'our earthly home', 'our habitat'. In turn these autochthonous associations are juxtaposed with a selective remembering of the social origin and construction of 'the country'. Here Jobberns constitutes a binary between those of 'Polynesian stock', who little altered the primitive condition of the landscape, and those from 'Britain' —'our people'— who, in contrast, in a fit of Herculean endeavour transformed the landscape. In emphasising the 'gigantic task' of landscape transformation, Jobberns flags the motif of 'fitness', a motif that emphasises the 'British' transformation of the landscape. New Zealand here is imagined as an antipodean 'Britain' —in 'culture, tradition or habit of living'— a key motif in New Zealand's nationalist imagery. The 'Britain of the South Seas' motif is reiterated by Cumberland (1950), and Murphy who wrote of New Zealanders that, "Today he [sic] is not only meeting the requirements of the dominion but is also gallantly and persistently shipping one thousands tons of food a day to Britain, his spiritual 'home' at the northern antipodes" (Murphy, 1952, p. 14). New Zealand as an 'antipodean Britain' is flagged more explicitly later in the paper, where, "Our nation began as a British colony.... We have achieved a political autonomy but most of us are still strongly colonial in outlook and will continue to be so for a long time because our people and all our culture and traditions are of Britain" (ibid., p. 17). This genealogy is more than a statement of origin in that it defines the discursive possibilities of the New Zealand 'nation'. So when Jobberns stated that, "We talk of planning but we must first know first what we have to plan with. We must know the geography of our country" (italics in original, ibid., p. 17), he was reiterating, and performatively constituting, the discursive structures through which 'we' may know 'our country'. Not only have the borders been defined, but so has the audience, since 'our country' is comprised of 'our people', and 'our culture' comes from Britain.

Jobberns' call for geographers to know the geography of their country resonates with a belief in the ephemerality, and insecurity, of the New Zealand 'nation'. A theme expressed by Holcroft's (1940) when he described the shallow
roots of Anglo-Saxons in New Zealand soil, “We have no ancient landscapes strewn with memorials of past ages; nor is there the influences of a native literature hanging over our villages and quiet places, converting houses and stone slabs into shrines visited by pilgrims. We are still strangers in the land. There are no great battlefields on which on a stand has been made for liberty (ibid., p. 23-24). In a classic piece of understatement Pound writes that, “Maori, one imagines would disagree. Holcroft’s ‘we’ will not be theirs” (Pound, 1994, p. 97). In this sense to know the geography of ‘the country’ is part of a desire to possess the soil, to root ‘the nation’ in that soil, and part of this process is the erasure of Maori from the landscape. In a sense a form of textual terra nullus operates to forget Maori, while remembering, and in doing so performatively constituting, the ‘British’ origin of the New Zealand nation. In this sense to borrow from Joseph Conrad, Jobberns ‘conquered’ truth by establishing the particular ways of reading the landscape (Driver, 1992).

While Cumberland, and Jobberns ruminated on geography the following texts are inquiries of geography within the regional geography fold. In the same issue of the NZG that contained Jobberns’, and Cumberland’s pieces was Pascoe’s description of the Canterbury high country (Pascoe, 1945). The piece’s tenor is indicated by the early observation that, ”Virile nor’west winds sweep the river flats” (ibid., p. 20), and that like the landscape, “All these men [who work the high country] are tough physically if not burly in stature” (ibid., p. 21). The toughness of the people, and of the landscape, are reinforced by Pascoe’s disavowal of luxury, ”Bridge all the rivers, iron out the hills, bulldoze away the boulders, and the cake-eaters of civilisation enter the rugged paradise to become as unwelcome as other locusts” (ibid., p. 21). In the first instance the Canterbury high country is clearly linked with the pioneer origins of the New Zealand ‘nation’, a construction that emphasises notions of ‘toughness’ and ‘fitness’; whilst expressions of unity form a second element of Pascoe’s paper. This theme of unity is most clearly expressed when Pascoe recounts the parable of a farm-manager who retired to the town, concluding that:
Secretly he wished he was back where the men jostled each other, where a Boer War veteran told tall ones, where every man could break a horse...; where horses, dogs, sheep and men all blended into a self-contained community, the product of perfect organization and a spacious way of life in a country whose rigour they understood and unconsciously loved (ibid., p. 29).

By knotting together the motifs of unity and fitness the superiority of the rural vis-à-vis the urban is emphasised, "Pony was a product of a city area. Had he stayed there, the chances are that he would have remained stunted in body and mind. He chanced on a roustabout's job in the back-country and grew physically and mentally" (ibid., p. 31). The description recounts an almost exclusively masculine narrative, where women if they intrude into the text enter as a mirror for the masculine world; "Most all have the sensibility to adapt themselves to the ways of their men, with whom their relations are equable. They have all the pleasant dignity of other back-country men and their solid virtues of endurance at tough mustering and hospitality" (ibid., p. 36). These motifs weave through the text coalescing in the image of the organic community. This community—a high-country Arcadia—is contrasted with the putative softness, luxury, and implied disorder of the town, and as such articulates those motifs that imagine New Zealand as a rural Arcadia formed by emigrants escaping the industrial wen of Britain. It is in the ordered, organic community that the Canterbury high-country epitomises that the locus of 'real' or 'true' New Zealand is to be found, or so is indicated in Pascoe's paper.

A regional description that takes a different approach in indicating 'the nation' as an object of geographical inquiry is McCaskill's (1949) description of the Coromandel. An approach that can also be seen a long line of New Zealand regional descriptions (see Aitken, 1947; Pascoe, 1948; Critchfield, 1951; Tweedie, 1952; Farrell, 1954; Pirie, 1954; Ward, 1957; and Owen, 1961). In particular McCaskill draws upon motifs of the 'sublime' and 'productive' landscape to articulate a specific narrative of New Zealand nationhood. The piece opens with McCaskill stating that:
The Auckland Provincial District, occupying one quarter of New Zealand and supporting one third of the population, offers some challenging problems in landscape interpretation. Although average relief is lower and climatic contrasts are less strongly marked than in other parts of the country, human occupation of a varied terrain has created that remarkable diversity of landscape within short distances which distinguishes New Zealand in general (McCaskill, 1949, p. 47).

The position of the 'Auckland Provincial District' in the text is interesting, because while 'Coromandel region' is overtly defined by the provincial district, the district is an administrative division within the larger framework of 'the nation'. But this social relationship is occluded when McCaskill defines the uniqueness of the 'Coromandel region' through the variation of the region's landscape from the rest of 'the country', and in turn defines New Zealand's distinctiveness from other 'nations' in the same way. McCaskill here utilises a variant of the 'sublime landscape' motif to imbue 'the nation' with rhetorical content. From defining regions through the putative distinctiveness of their landscapes arises a point that hinges on the multiple meanings contained in the word 'country'. One meaning of 'country' refers directly to ideas of nationality — 1a the territory of a nation with its own government; a state. b a territory possessing its own language, people, culture etc. (OED)— but immanent within this definition is the equation of the 'country' with the physical 'land'. The concept of 'the country' functions as a medium of exchange that enables the 'nation' as a socially constructed entity to conceptually coexist with the 'land' as a physical entity. In this way 'the country' can be used to elide the social construction of 'the nation', presenting 'the nation' as springing from the earth, as an apparently natural rather than social entity. In turn not only is the region 'naturalised' but so is 'the nation' since, argues McCaskill, it is New Zealand's landscapes that distinguish 'this nation' from other 'nations'.

Another form of imagining occurs where McCaskill situates the Coromandel region within the New Zealand economy. Historically, argues McCaskill, the Coromandel region, "... was one of the earliest developed regions of New Zealand and played an important part in the country's economy last century"
(McCaskill, 1949, p. 47); whilst in the present, after the decline of the Coromandel’s extractive industries, and through the application of fertiliser and new farming techniques, "... the face of the Thames Valley was completely transformed, and from a region of comparative insignificance it grew to be an important contributor to New Zealand’s wealth" (ibid., p. 70). Here McCaskill turns to the 'productive' landscape motif, with which the Coromandel region can be situated as an economic contributor to 'the nation's' economy. In outlining the Coromandel’s transformation from an extractive to a pastoral economy McCaskill also flags a wider narrative of New Zealand’s development as 'Britain's antipodean farm'. In two ways, therefore, by reiterating the motifs of the 'the sublime' landscape, and 'the productive' landscape, the landscape is utilised as a metonym for a distinctive New Zealand national identity in McCaskill’s text.

In his 1955 Presidential Address Cumberland outlined what he believed was both the correct approach to geography, and geography’s raison d’être. Whilst the previous chapter explored the former, here, the later becomes interesting. Cumberland (1956) maintained that rather then pressing for geography as a technique for earning a living, "I am much more concerned with geography in education for citizenship and for life" (ibid., p. 7). The basis for this concern was that:

Never was there more compelling necessity for the 'man in the street' to know what the world is so that he might know where he is himself. If all the vaunted material and spiritual advantages of our democratic way of life are to be preserved and protected, if mankind is to make still further progress, if peace is to be preferred to atomic annihilation, then every man must have what Sir Halford Mackinder called 'that mental foundation for judgement in action' which rests on a knowledge of one's own region, both as a yardstick by which to measure all others and as a guide to the study and understanding of the problems of the world at large (ibid., p. 7)

This extensive quote from Cumberland contains a number of interesting features. Firstly, there is a diectic function in the text. Cumberland in referring to ‘our democratic way of life’ is indicating a common relationship with the
reader, based on an assumption of a shared sense of community; while in pointing to 'our democratic way of life' the piece reminds the reader of how to imagine that community. In this banal way both the form and content of the New Zealand 'nation' as an imagined community is flagged. The second feature of the piece is the constitution of the 'region' as the basic context for knowledge, and understanding, since it is through an understanding of 'one's own region' that, Cumberland argues, other regions of the world can be compared, and contrasted, with 'one's own region', and that 'one's own region' can be seen as one region in a world of regions.

In noting that regions exist in a world of regions, Cumberland makes a point similar to both Anderson (1991) and Billig (1995), who both observe that a consciousness of national identity also presupposes an international context, or that nations exist in a world of nations. Obviously, however, the region as Cumberland conceives it is not the same as notions of 'the nation'; but the concept of the region that Cumberland uses assumes the existence of 'the nation', and it is this unspoken nation that mediates between regions. For Cumberland a geographical education was particularly relevant to New Zealanders and Australians because of their increasing awareness as, "... 'offshore islands', close to the insurgent nationalism and teeming millions of the mainland of Asia" (Cumberland, 1956, p. 8). In contrast to the 'insurgent nationalism' of Asia, Cumberland posits the idea of a 'sane nationalism' that was to be, "... based on an objective appreciation of the causes and consequences of the differences from one place to another" (ibid., p. 8). In the text 'insurgent nationalism' is explicitly linked to New Zealand and Australia's 'other' —Asia. In contrast to the explicit connection of 'insurgent nationalism' with Asia, the geography of 'sane nationalism' is left unspecified. But while the geography of 'sane nationalism' is left unspecified, by proximity New Zealand and Australia occupy the obverse position to Asia, as exemplars of a 'sane nationalism'. 'Sane nationalism', in this context can also refer to a developmental progression, whereby 'nations' progress from an irrational or 'insurgent nationalism' through to a rational or 'sane nationalism'. Cumberland quotes from Sir Cyril Norwood where this developmental function is made clear,
"... we shall never attain to a sane nationalism until the ordinary folk in all leading countries and, later on, all countries, know much more about the world in which they live...." (emphasis added, Norwood quoted in Cumberland, 1956, p. 8). The conception of a ‘sane nationalism’ is the basis for Cumberland to argue that the development of a ‘sane provincialism’ would be equally useful for citizens. This ‘sane provincialism’ would provide the, "... future citizen with an objective basis for understanding the different parts of his [sic] own country—in providing that informed basis for exercising a wise discretion and a sound judgment in domestic, local, provincial and national affairs" (ibid., p. 8). The ‘sane provincialism’ that Cumberland proposes is a supplement to ‘sane nationalism’ rather than a replacement for it. The concept of ‘sane provincialism’ presupposes two things. Firstly, following the developmental progression noted above, a ‘sane provincialism’ necessitates a prior ‘irrational provincialism’. Such a progression can be linked to in discourses about New Zealand history which emphasise the distinction between the historical past and present, where the present is represented as qualitatively and quantitatively superior than the past (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). The second point circulates around the word province. The primary definition of province provided by the OED is, “a principle division of a country etc.” While among the definitions of provincialism the OED gives is, "[a] concern for one's own local area rather than one's country". The key point here is that the existence of a province assumes the existence of an entity —‘the nation’— to which both the province and the ‘citizen’ belong, and are partly constituted by.

Consistent with the regional approach he advocated Cumberland argued that the development of regional knowledge culminating in a ‘sane provincialism’ would provide a prerequisite, "... of impartial, fact-founded judgement and a necessary basis for the effective discharge of the responsibilities of citizenship in an advanced and progressive democratic country" (Cumberland, 1956, p. 9). Without referring to New Zealand by name, in this passage Cumberland banally enhabits New Zealand as ‘an advanced and progressive democratic country’ in the world, performatively constituting ‘the nation’ as a entity to which
people are assumed to 'naturally' belong, and to which certain 'values' are
ascribed.

Cumberland positions the New Zealand 'nation' in a world of nations, a position
that Fox (1948) and Cunningham (1958) also examined through an exploration
of New Zealand's foreign policy. Fox quite clearly situates New Zealand when
he states that, "New Zealand, as a part of the British Empire...." (Fox, 1948, p.
15), and that, "The people of New Zealand were content in their semi-isolation
and looked towards Britain, not only as 'home', but as the mainstay of
economic life and the bulwark of dominion defence" (ibid., p. 15). Cunningham
reinforced these comments when he notes that, "... New Zealand helps to
represent Britain on one side of the world in the same way as Britain helps to
represent New Zealand on the other" (Cunningham, 1958, p. 156). A view that
clearly draws on the motif of New Zealand as a 'Britain of the South Seas'.

Having positioned New Zealand vis-à-vis Britain, the two writers argued that it
was imperative that more attention had to be paid to Asia and the Pacific, if, "... if
Australia and New Zealand are to preserve their mode of life and standard of
living, their place in the world and their national security and integrity...." (Fox,
1948, p. 16). The greatest threat to New Zealand and Australia, argued Fox,
was Asia's expansion, with the solution being that, "the empty tropical lands of
Australia must be occupied before the outward expansion of Asiatic people
produces an undesirable infiltration. Yet if Australia is to maintain her 'white'
supremacy in population, closer settlement of the rest of the country must be
encouraged (ibid., p. 27), whilst in New Zealand a similar process of closer
settlement was also required. Closer settlement, however, took a particular
form where secondary industry was largely artificial and uneconomic, "... so
that to import artisans and the like is merely to perpetuate an uneconomic
condition" (ibid., p. 28), and instead, "The closer settlement of existing
farmland... —there lies New Zealand's answer to possible domination from
without" (ibid., p. 28). Fox here draws on the 'productive land' motif, not only as
a marker of past identity but also as a constitutive element of a continuing
identity, an identity under putative threat from 'Asian infiltration'. A belief in the
'Asian threat' to New Zealand's national identity also structured Cunningham's (1958) paper. Cunningham's response to this 'threat' was to maintain that New Zealand had to be prepared to participate with the 'West' in pursuing the 'Cold War'. In particular Cunningham argued that New Zealand had to be prepared to become engaged in a conventional war in Southeast Asia, because, "As island outposts on the edge of a sea of colour, New Zealand and Australia would be among the first to be overrun" (ibid., p. 158).

The key feature of both Cunningham's and Fox's papers were the ways in which the New Zealand 'nation' is imagined. The imagining that takes place performatively constitutes 'the nation' as aligned with Britain, Australia, and the United States, and opposed to the 'Asian hordes'. In turn putative characteristics of the New Zealand 'nation' are also flagged: in Fox's paper, the centrality of the 'productive land' motif; and in Cunningham's paper the 'whiteness' of the New Zealand 'nation'. In concluding each respective paper the two authors reiterated the importance of a geographical understanding of the world. Fox writing that, "Now is the time for New Zealanders to think, if they wish to preserve their way of life. A wider understanding of world affairs, a global viewpoint, is needed...." (Fox, 1948, p. 28); while Cunningham concluded that, "... events and developments occurring in the multiform and multiracial 'land bridge' of Southeast Asia should be pondered over by New Zealanders as anxiously as they analyse events at home" (Cunningham, 1948, p. 160). While Cumberland (1956) argued that geographical knowledge was a prerequisite for effective citizenship, Fox, and Cumberland present a much harsher view, arguing that geographical knowledge is a prerequisite for the very survival of 'the nation'. In this sense Fox, and Cunningham articulate a much 'hotter' nationalism than does Cumberland, but in both cases 'the nation' is constituted as something that is deemed necessary, and 'natural'.
Collectively the papers examined in this section have enacted Jobberns' (1945) call to geographers to know New Zealand, both internally and externally, through the medium of descriptive regional geographies. However, these descriptions have not simply reflected a pre-discursive reality, rather they utilised existing discursive motifs to unimaginatively imagine the discursive contours of the New Zealand 'nation'. In particular the regional geographies presented here drew upon the putative characteristics of the New Zealand landscape to act as metonyms for the New Zealand 'nation'. These metonymic chains, in turn, by using phrases such as 'the country', and emphasising 'the landscape' naturalised the New Zealand 'nation'. The transformation of the 'landscape' is also the locus for a series of narratives which stressed the 'Britishness' of the New Zealand 'nation'. Through these two rhetorical processes the New Zealand 'nation' has been banally remembered in regional geography.

Quantitative Geography

The chapter now turns to examine the banal flagging of 'the nation' in New Zealand quantitative geography. The previous chapter noted that while the epistemology of quantitative geography was different, but not categorically different, from that of regional geography, the theme of relevance continued to enframe the developing epistemology. Whilst regional geography delineated regions in their specificity, in contrast quantitative geography sought to uncover, describe, and explain the laws of spatial organisation, laws that systematically bound geographic areas together. Because of these changes, therefore, 'the nation' as a social and geographic entity was rhetorically constituted in a different way to that which occurred with regional geography. In the texts that follow the New Zealand 'nation' is statistically described, and presented to the reader as a complete object in-itself, and consequently 'the nation' was 'naturalised' as a pre-discursive reality.
The statistical presentation of 'the nation' can be linked to one of the characteristic features of European modernity, the constitution of the world-as-exhibition (Mitchell, 1991). The world-as-exhibition rendered things as objects to be viewed and to, "set the world up as a picture... [and arranged] it before an audience as an object on display, to be viewed, investigated, and experienced" (ibid., pp. 175-176). This ordering created the impression that, "... the gaps between things are an abstraction, something that would exist whether or not the particular things were put there. This structural effect of something pre-existent, nonparticular and nonmaterial is what experienced as 'order' (ibid., p. 79). In turn such an ordering was a central component of spatial science (Gregory, 1994). This exhibitionary structure is well expressed by McCarty, who wrote that human geography lacked a system of scientific classification, and that, "Ideally, a geographically-orientated system of classification would consist of sets of categories within which geographic phenomena would be placed according to their demonstrated tendencies to more basic phenomena, and with each other on the earth's surface" (McCarty, 1963, p. 6). In spatial science, argued Gregory (1994), the conception of a immanent spatial order was derived from neoclassical economics: for example Harvey wrote that economics was, "the most successful of the social sciences in developing formal theory" (Harvey, 1969, p. 118), and that in the absence of any indigenous theory in geographical thought, a properly "theoretical geography" (ibid., p. 118) could utilise economic theory. The utilisation of neoclassical theory as the basis for spatial science, suppressed in human geography the ways that its claims were embedded in particular social structures, and sought to represent its contingent logic as a singular, universal, and enduring rationality that could not be meaningfully questioned because it to was conducted under the aegis of a supposedly dis-interested sciences. Consequently, "Like neoclassicism, this vision of human geography tacitly endorsed the existing structures of social life, which were left in almost complete darkness...." (Gregory, 1994, p. 62).

One of these enframing 'structures of social life' is 'the nation', signified in quantitative geography as 'the national economy', or more banally 'the
economy'. The emergence of a discourse of 'the economy' represented the reimagination of 'the nation' as the geopolitical container for the 'economic system as a whole' (Mitchell, 1998). In this reimagination the, "system was represented in terms of a series of aggregates (production, employment, investment and consumption and synthetic averages (interest rate, price level, real wage, and so on), whose referent was the geographic space of the nation state" (Mitchell, 1998, p. 89). In turn, the idea of 'the national economy' was not theorised, but was introduced as a common-sense construct that provided the boundaries within which the new averages and aggregates could be measured (Radice, 1984). As a consequence the development of a discourse of 'the economy', "provided a new language in which the nation-state could speak for itself and imagine its existence as something natural, bounded and subject to political management" (Mitchell, 1998, p. 90). Mitchell observed two other consequences of this development: firstly, the reimagination of an international order made up of a series of self-contained geographic entities — a world of nations; and secondly, the imagination of 'the nation', not in terms of material and spatial extension but instead in terms of the, "internal intensification of the totality of relations defining the economy as an object" (Mitchell, 1998, p. 90). In these ways 'the nation' is performatively constituted through the reiteration of 'national statistics', and it this banal flagging and rhetorical construction that the following texts express.

A useful place to start is Johnston's (1969) review of New Zealand urban geography. As previously argued the paper clearly articulated the pressing need for New Zealand human geography to adopt a quantitative approach, in order that geography could better serve 'the nation'. In doing so Johnston also flags 'the nation' as the object of geographic research. The major requirement was for a synthesis to organise the various narrow analyses on individual towns, urban phenomena, and phenomenon-complexes, but, however, before this could occur, "... the major gap in New Zealand urban research must be filled with studies of the spatial organisation of the country's economy...." (Johnston, 1969, p. 133). This statement contains two levels of imagining that both flag 'the nation'. Firstly, there is the deictical flagging through reference to
'the country', but because the stress of the statement is placed on 'the country's economy' the flagging of New Zealand as 'the country' becomes even less noticeable. A second flagging occurs, however, through the genealogy of ideas apropos of 'the economy', because the very concept of 'the economy' rests upon the assumed existence of 'the nation' as a putatively 'natural', social and geographical, entity. In turn the epistemological borders of 'the nation' are called into being, and ossified, by the repetition of the aggregate statistics and averages that are assumed to merely describe the pre-discursive 'nation'.

The need for 'studies of spatial organisation' can be interpreted through Jobberns' (1945) call for geographers to 'know their country', where these spatial studies are another way of enacting, through knowing, New Zealand. The review concluded with Johnston (1969) observing that New Zealand appeared to be in the mainstream of geographical trends through the increased use of quantitative techniques, and that, "Distance from the main centres of geographical innovation may produce some time-lags in the acceptance of new ideas, but may also contribute to the separate development of significant contributions to urban theory within New Zealand, for there is little in the country's urban scene which is peculiar to it" (ibid., p. 135). It is this concluding sentence that is particularly interesting. Firstly, there is the constitution of New Zealand geography as peripheral to Anglo-American geography. As has been noted the motifs of appendage and transcendence occur frequently in New Zealand nationalist discourse, and they also reappear in Johnston's text. New Zealand human geography is constituted as peripheral to the mainstream of geographical thought, but through the utilisation of quantitative techniques is still connected to the geographic mainstream. New Zealand's peripheral position is reinforced by Johnston's statement, "there is little in the country's urban scene which is peculiar to it" (ibid., p. 135).

This final comment — 'that there is little in the country's scene that is peculiar to it' — has a number of different inflections. Firstly, by emphasising the similarities between New Zealand and other countries Johnston protects the legitimacy of quantitative geography by arguing that whilst the techniques were
developed elsewhere they are relevant in the New Zealand context, and in this sense New Zealand is imagined as part of a larger universal structure. New Zealand's urban scene was, therefore, represented as basically the same as Britain's, and the United States', the centres of mainstream geography. A view that intersects with the 'Better Britain/Greater Britain' motifs that imagine New Zealand an antipodean Britain. Paradoxically, however, when Johnston observed New Zealand's commonality with Britain and the United States he ignored the inscription of power relations into specific landscapes, and geography's raison d'être to critically examining these specific landscapes. Robertson noted that nationalism involved the, "universalism of particularism", and the, "particularism of universalism" (Robertson, 1991, p. 73), and this becomes pertinent when it is recalled that Johnston called for —'studies of the spatial organisation of the country's economy'—using an epistemology that both strived towards the universal, and relied upon a concept of 'the economy' that relied upon to the geographically bounded, singular nation (Mitchell, 1998). In these varied ways Johnston's text banally indicates the 'nation' as an entity, and the New Zealand nation specifically, while at the same inhabiting the New Zealand 'nation' through a selective process of remembering that places New Zealand as an appendage of Britain and the United States.

Johnston's review noted that early examples of statistical modelling in New Zealand's geographical research were undertaken by Linge, in a series of studies that examined the distribution of manufacturing in New Zealand (cf., Hewland, 1946; and Pappe, 1946). Because of the status of Linge's papers it is useful to examine one of those studies (Linge, 1961), to highlight the statistical imagination of New Zealand. Linge (1961) began by inserting a geographical focus into questions about manufacturing in New Zealand, noting that, "Investigations into the locational aspects of industrial development could be of considerable assistance to the central government and ad hoc local authorities" (ibid., p. 195). A call to relevance that has been noted as constant motif in New Zealand geography. The paper goes on to argue, similar to Johnston (1969), that, "few inquires have been made into spatial variations in the growth of individual industries... into the... industrial structure of various regions..." and
that, "... whether for economic or social reasons there should be a national policy towards the location of new manufacturing" (ibid., p. 195). Linge presents the location of manufacturing is a function of an underlying structure, largely unknown at the present, which was in turn enframed within another structure — 'the nation'— the presence of which was indicated by the call for a 'national policy'. In contrast to Johnston's (1969) later assertion that New Zealand's geography was largely derivative, Linge highlighted the particularity of New Zealand by arguing that while theoretical and practical grounds exist for the concentration of industries in metropolitan centres, in the New Zealand context two factors: the friction of distance, and the lightness of industrial units, meant that metropolitan concentration might not be advantageous.

Having indicated the relevance of geography to questions of 'national industrial policy', Linge outlined three statistical models that could be used to describe New Zealand's spatial organisation, including: the 'coefficient of localisation'; an 'index of economic diversification'; and the 'positive refined index of diversification'. The key feature of Linge's paper was the utilisation of statistical tables through which whose data the three models operated (for examples see appendix one, tables 1, and 2). These aggregate tables are interesting because of their rhetorical status, and the way that they banally enhabit 'the nation'. Firstly, the tables have an important rhetorical purpose derived from their putative transparency and objectivity (Barnes, 1996). Regarding transparency Lefebvre writes that, "Comprehension is thus supposed, with meeting any insurmountable obstacles, to conduct what is perceived, i.e. its object, from the shadows into the light" (1991, p. 28). Statistics in this sense are supposed to act as the agent which conducts 'spatial organisation' from the dark into the light, and consequently the social construction of statistics themselves are occluded, a point highlighted by Barnes (1996) in his exploration of the genealogy of inferential statistics.

Linge's use of statistical tables presents 'the nation' as the enframing structure whose being is assumed as 'natural', rather than as a social construction. The tables in Linge's paper, draw upon statistics collated by the then Department of
Labour. This source is interesting in two respects apropos the articulation of banal nationalism. Firstly, the statistics used in Linge’s paper are a necessary part of the construction of the ‘national economy’ in economic theory, a construct that relies on notions of ‘the nation’ (Mitchell, 1998). Secondly, in the New Zealand context, “Government statistics, the New Zealand Handbooks and Yearbooks... —all have their roots in crusader propaganda” (Belich, 1996, p. 282); and has been previously noted what Belich terms ‘crusader literature’ contained rhetorical elements which have been constantly reiterated in New Zealand’s nationalist discourse.

In the context of banal nationalism, Linge’s statistical tables performatively constitute ‘the nation’ within which ‘the economy’ and ‘spatial structure’ exist. The statistics that the paper relies upon, rather than being the perfectly transparent medium through which the ‘real’ world presents itself to us, are themselves social constructs, with specific genealogies, and in this context deeply complicit in the banal imagination of ‘the nation’. The tables of aggregate statistics have another function in flagging New Zealand, a function which imbues the flagged ‘nation’ with rhetorical content. For example Linge’s first table (appendix one, table 1) presents New Zealand as categorised into employment districts, with each district presented in statistical comparison with other regions. In this sense these statistical tables have a normalising function which binds together ‘the nation’ under a common rationality. Normalisation refers to a system of finely graduated and measurable intervals with which individuals can be distributed around a ‘norm’ (Foucault, 1977, 1978), and as a form of power, normalisation has to, “qualify, measure, appraise, and heirarchize” (Foucault, 1978, p. 144). The normalisation of regions under the gaze of geographers, whose purpose is to know ‘their country’, is another way in which ‘the nation’ enframes those distributions, while appearing to disappear. In a way Foucault’s (1977) metaphorical image of the panoptican has a particular resonance with the banal flagging of ‘the nation’, since the controller of the panoptican does not have to be present to control the inmates, similarly ‘the nation’ does not have be overtly present, textually, to structure the subjectivity of its citizens, and research carried out in its name.
If ‘the nation’ is banally remembered through the putative use of statistics, then another element of remembering also occurs in Linge’s text. Linge frames the debate about the location of manufacturing within two lines of concern. The first line emphasises the impact of manufacturing on the urban areas of Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch; whilst the second thread expressed a concern that New Zealand’s industrial resources were being concentrated into those three urban areas. These concerns converge at the point where New Zealand’s young were being attracted to, “the highlights of great wens —Auckland, Wellington or Christchurch” (Linge, 1961, p. 196). Linge’s conjuring of the ‘great wens’, in bringing together the images of congestion and cancer, articulates a concern at the putative evil of urbanity that exists in many forms in New Zealand’s nationalist discourse (Fairburn, 1989; Belich, 1996). Here, therefore, ‘the nation’ is imagined in two different ways: firstly, through the use of statistics collated in tables, which flag ‘the nation’ as the absent enframing structure for those statistics; and secondly, the problemization of the ‘great wens’, drawing upon existing nationalist rhetoric, which gives the statistically imagined ‘nation’ content.

The modelling of New Zealand through concepts of ‘rational economic space’ was, however, not simply confined to geography. W. B. Johnston argued that with the establishment of the National Development Council in 1969, and the publication of its reports:

The clear assumption was that as long as the overall national and sector growth targets, expressed as annual average rates of increase in real GNP, were achieved, it did not matter how the various parts of the country contributed. To all intents and purposes New Zealand has neither length, nor breadth, nor depth: it was non-dimensional economic space, ‘a pointed economy’ (W. B. Johnston, 1973, p. 189).

W. B. Johnston’s point directly refers to the generalisations of spatial science, but as has been argued the statistical imagining that spatial science relied upon, rested upon ideas of ‘the economy’, and which banally flagged New Zealand. Papers by Cant (1971), and McDermott (1973) further illustrate the
statistical imagination of the New Zealand nation. Cant (1971) examined changes in the location of manufacturing in New Zealand, noting that a traditional concern of historical geography had been to examine the relationships between phenomena whose location in space changed over time. To examine changes in the structure and location of New Zealand manufacturing Cant utilised a 'three factor analysis model', and indeed a primary focus of the paper was to examine the usefulness of 'three factor analysis' in New Zealand, rather than to examine the usefulness of models results. Cant described the rationale for examining manufacturing as that, “Since 1956 the scale and significance of manufacturing in New Zealand has continued to increase and present economic planning suggests that it will make an increasingly important contribution to national income....” (Cant, 1971, p. 41). Here Cant flags the notion of a 'national income', one of those aggregate statistics of 'the economy' that exist by virtue of the assumed existence of 'the nation'. As with Linge's (1961) paper Cant's modelling relies on the existence of aggregate statistics collated into tables (for example, see appendix one, table 3). As in Linge's paper Cant's statistics rely on an aura of objectivity to hide the genealogy of their construction, and in particular in the belief that statistics, such as used in the paper, merely reflect an underlying reality rather than having a dialogical relationship with 'reality'. In turn 'the nation' as flagged through aggregate statistics, and presented in its fulsome unity in tabular form, is also constructed as an objective unremarkable 'reality' enframing all else—it is the assumed context for all other identities. A similar form of remembering and forgetting can be seen in McDermott's (1973) analysis of spatial margins, and industrial location in New Zealand. The purpose of McDermott's paper was to try and delimit the spatial margins of five New Zealand industries to determine the usefulness of 'spatial margins' for locational explanation in a New Zealand context. As with both Linge's (1961) and Cant's (1971) paper a key element in the putative legitimacy of the analysis lies in the presentation of aggregate statistics in tabular form (for example, see appendix one, tables 4 and 5). In the use of statistics 'the nation' is routinely flagged as an entity which exists, and which enframes all other distinctions. Linge's (1961), Cant's (1971) and McDermott's (1973) paper are indicative of the statistical flagging of the
New Zealand nation, a flagging that operates through the repetitive process of remembering and forgetting as presented in tables of aggregate statistics.

Summary

The papers examined in this section have all banally flagged the existence of 'the nation' as an enframing entity, and in doing so given 'the nation' rhetorical substance. This performative process of flagging 'the nation' occurred in a number of ways. Firstly, there were the repeated affirmations of the need for geographical research to be useful to the needs of 'the nation', a call consistent with the approach of the previously hegemonic regional geography. However, in order that geography be relevant to 'the nation' a conception of 'the nation' was required. This conception of 'the nation' was articulated through quantitative geography's search for, and articulation of, the putative laws of spatial structure. As has been argued this spatial structure rested upon a conceptual 'order' that a priori assumed the existence of 'the nation'. In particular it was through the use of the concept of 'the economy' and statistical modelling that 'the nation' was performatively constituted as the enframing structure within which elements of 'the nation' could be remembered, distributed, and compared.

Alternative geographies

As previously argued by the 1980s the hegemony of quantitative human geography in New Zealand was beginning to wane as the approach came under pressure from approaches within the discipline which questioned the epistemological and methodological basis of quantitative geography, and external social pressures that questioned the relevance, and application, of human geography's interventions in the social. The papers contained within the alternative approaches issue of the NZG stand as an attempt to reconstitute New Zealand geography in the light of these pressures. While the alternative approaches stand in opposition to quantitative geography, they do express a series of discursive commonalities with both regional and quantitative
geography, particularly in the constitution of New Zealand human geography in the service of 'the nation'. However, where the 'alternative approaches' differs from the previous two epistemologies is through the imagining of 'the nation' that it presents. In particular this imagining involves the contestation of hegemonic discourses of national identity, and the remembering of previously forgotten narratives. But despite these new contours of remembering and forgetting 'the nation' remains in the 'alternative approaches' papers as the context for identity. Following this argument, therefore, this section examines five texts that articulate a radical or alternative approach to New Zealand human geography. The first is Buchanan's 1961 paper 'West Wind, East Wind', followed by Welch (1982). Together these papers express a broadly radical critique of geography and society. The final three papers: Johnston and Le Heron (1987), Pawson (1987) and Stokes (1987) come from the 1987 'alternative approaches' issue of the NZG.

As has been noted Buchanan's paper, and his work, were early forerunners of the radical critique in human geography, but what will be noted here is the constant flagging of 'the nation' in Buchanan's text. Buchanan (1961) wrote that one of the great changes in the world was the rising power of the Socialist bloc vis-à-vis the Western world, and to this end, "we shall be forced by these challenges to a drastic re-examination of our whole Western way of life, of our political, social and economic values, of our concept of the Good Life...." (Buchanan, 1961, p. 119). Buchanan, through the deixis of 'we' and 'our', flags 'the nation', which given the context of his speech, to the Third New Zealand Geography Conference, is banally indicated as New Zealand. In a more subtle way than Jobberns' (1945) paper, Buchanan also imbues the New Zealand 'nation' with rhetorical content, through noting 'our whole Western way of life', which is contrasted in the text with the Eastern Bloc. Buchanan's text does not engage in an extensive process of remembering and forgetting but what does occur is the constant reiteration of 'the nation' as the context for the geography as the study, "of the changing interrelations between societies and their environment" (emphasis in original, Buchanan, 1961, p. 125). The construction of 'the nation' as the context of understanding can be seen where Buchanan
writes that, "What we tend to forget is the extent to which in the West 'socialist' mechanisms of planning are used to buttress, indeed to ensure the survival of, essentially capitalist social and economic structures" (ibid., p. 121), the 'social and economic structures' that Buchanan refers to are highlighted, and presented in national terms, in the following passage, “The British managed economy, the French économie dirigée, the German soziale Marktwirtschaft are clearly examples, however mild, of the shift towards national economic collectivism" (emphasis in original, ibid., p. 121). The move towards socialism, presented in Buchanan's text is defined in terms of 'the national'. To this end it is useful to recall Gregory's (1994) argument that in the context of a critique of spatial science, the rationality of spatial science tacitly endorsed existing structures of social life. While Buchanan's text overtly challenged some of these structures of social life, it also banally constitutes 'the nation' as the context for changes in social and economic activity, leaving the existence of 'the nation' itself unexamined.

While Buchanan examined the challenges posed by the rising power of the 'Socialist camp', Welch (1982) examined the pressures caused by transnational capital in New Zealand. The importance of 'the nation' and national identity is a key aspect of Welch's paper, since the crisis of capitalism that occurred during the 1970s, and consequently, "the concept of national survival has acquired a more pressing meaning" (Welch, 1982, p. 3). Welch highlighted three options to solve this problem: closer relationships between the state and transnational capital; scientific socialism; and anarchism. Regarding the former, "If the libertarian philosophy is adopted by ruling (political) elites then national, regional and local identities and the well-being of the majority may well be sacrificed to the false god that is capitalism" (ibid., p. 3). In contrast Welch argued that if global capitalism is to changed according to social democratic principles, then, "social democracies must ensure that their territory-based administrative-political infrastructures are resilient and able to provide strength-in-depth" (ibid., p. 4). New Zealand, noted Welch, was in a poor position to resist global capitalism, a weakness stemming from a shallowly rooted national identity:
Under Britain's dominant influence, innovative moves in the fields of economic and political organisation in New Zealand were effectively stifled for 130 years. Only when the close economic relationship with Britain came under challenge after 1960 did New Zealanders stop to question their identity. The result was not reassuring for it showed that a confident society had yet to emerge in a full and vibrant form. Actors were playing their parts but still hesitated to believe in them. Moves to create a national society in the 1870s has been rushed and local and regional identities not given time to gel. New Zealand identity is thus a frail thing. Once the outer (national) crust is removed, there appears a self-conscious uncertainty (emphasis in original, Welch, 1982, p. 4).

In this extensive extract Welch reiterated the feeling of shallowness that Holcroft (1940) expressed, and which has both been an element of New Zealand's nationalist discourse and a feature of earlier geographic flaggings of the 'the nation'. But interestingly this shallowness is not presented as the result of living in a land 'without history' (cf. Holcroft, 1940), but as a result of the British influence. Welch here draws upon the motif of appendage but inverts its usage, so that New Zealand's position as a 'Britain of the South Seas', rather than being constitutive of a New Zealand identity has instead stunted its development. To resist transnational capital, "New Zealand must be confident about its identity and secure in the knowledge that it has political and administrative strength in depth" (Welch, 1982, p. 7), and that geography has a important role to play because, "it is rooted in place" (ibid., p. 6). By emphasising the situatedness of geography, Welch rearticulated Jobberns' (1945) call for geographers 'to know their country' as a way of inhabiting the landscape, and in a dialogic process that constituted geography as both a servant of 'the nation' and as an imaginer of 'the nation'.

The importance of geography, due to its rootedness, that Welch emphasises points to the epistemologies that are articulated in the 'alternative approaches' issue of the NZG. J. Johnston and Le Heron's (1987) editorial introduced the 'alternative approaches' issue of the NZG, which they opened by arguing that the radical critique in geography had deepened the divisions within the discipline, and that an understanding of alternative epistemologies was
required to understand the changes in geography. Additionally a series of questions had been raised about the relevance of geography and in particular, "the relevance of non-New Zealand models as conceptual frameworks guiding the construction of knowledge and our understanding of our society (ibid., p. 115). The questioning of non-New Zealand models distinguishes this collection of papers from both the regional and quantitative epistemologies, and from Buchanan's, and Welch's texts within this section, and situated the papers within some of the concerns of postcolonialism (see Crush, 1994).

In response to these questions the special issue made, "an essential first step in guiding New Zealand geographers into building social theory that more closely matches present social realities in New Zealand" (J. Johnston and Le Heron, 1987, p. 116). A process of indigenisation in knowledge construction that includes three steps, namely: the use of international literature; theorising how general processes have developed in New Zealand; and finally turning these into distinctive policies relevant to New Zealand society (ibid.). It is this process of constructing an 'indigenous epistemology' which is particularly interesting on two grounds: firstly the metonymic chain in which ideas of 'indigenization' and 'the nation' are situated; and secondly the specific genealogy that connects J. Johnston and Le Heron's ideas of an 'indigenous epistemology' to elements of New Zealand's nationalist discourse. Regarding the first point it is useful to recall the OED's definition of 'indigenous'. The OED defines indigenous as —1a (esp. of flora and fauna) originating naturally in a region. b (of people) born in a region. 2 (foll. by to) belonging naturally to a place— a definition that emphasises the natural as a defining feature of the indigenous, and as has noted one of the key disguises that 'the nation' wears is that of a 'natural entity'. To this chain can be added the observation made by Berg and Kearns (1996), who drawing on Derrida's (1976) notion of the 'metaphysics of presence', argued that the right to speak is determined by a person's physical presence in a bounded geographical space. In this sense the legitimacy of an indigenous epistemology to produce 'truth' is mediated by proximity to the 'reality' it claims to speak the 'truth' of. Geographers then can have a greater 'right to speak' if they can demonstrate that their knowledge is
situated in specific contexts. This view, therefore, is the direct antithesis of the universal approach expressed by Johnston (1969) when he noted that ‘there was little in the country’s urban scene particular to it’. The key point here is that it is the New Zealand ‘nation’ which is imagined as the context for social action, a point made clear in the following passage, "The Alternative Approaches papers suggest that a growing number of geographers are aware that improved indigenous and social theory could become integral to informing and guiding New Zealand’s future" (Johnston and Le Heron, 1987, p. 117). Here the theme of relevance is reiterated, within the context of assumed continuance of the New Zealand ‘nation. However, a paradox occurs in articulating an indigenous epistemology, because while the imagination of an indigenous knowledge gains power through its association with ‘naturalness’, the authors of the papers in the special issue examine human geography in overtly social constructivist terms. It is through this slippage of meaning that the New Zealand ‘nation’ continues to be flagged as putatively ‘naturally’ occurring entity.

The desire for the development of an indigenous epistemology, by J. Johnston and Le Heron, reiterates themes of nationalist discourse that stretch to Holcroft’s (1940) essay, The Deepening Stream. The link between Jobberns’ and Holcroft’s intellectual positions apropos the shallowness of New Zealand’s national identity has been made previously in the chapter. J. Johnston and Le Heron (1987) draw on Holcroft’s call for the construction of social knowledge that was both critical of, and provided the basis for, social action. Such knowledge would be an antidote to the rootlessness of humanity in New Zealand and which resulted in an endemic insecurity. What is important about Holcroft’s text is the context for its production. Briefly, the text was produced for the 1940 Centennial Celebrations as an entry in the Government sponsored literary competition. The public recollection of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the annexation of the ‘country’ by the British Crown, served as an occasion for the articulation of an explicit New Zealand nationalism, and in this context Holcroft’s text was a part of this nationalist discourse (Pound, 1994; Sinclair, 1986a). In turn the nationalism evident at the time of the centenary was part of a wider set of discourses, one articulation of which was the rise,
during the 1940s and 1950s, of a ‘literature of national identity’ (Jones, 1989; Gibbons, 1991). So J. Johnston and Le Heron, in noting the counsel of Holcroft, are drawing on a text that is a small, but significant, textual monument in New Zealand’s nationalist discourse. Similar to the way that aggregate statistics have a genealogy of construction, so does an ‘indigenous epistemology’, a genealogy constituted partly through the rhetorical elements of nationalist discourse.

In the ways outlined above the construction of an ‘indigenous epistemology’ can be linked to elements of nationalist discourse, in particular through the assumption that ‘the nation’ simply exists as a social reality. This point is important because the papers examined below by Pawson (1987), and Stokes (1987), contest hegemonic narratives of geography, and national identity, by pointing out the specificity of power/knowledge relations, and by exposing counter-narratives of identity. As this occurs, however, the New Zealand ‘nation’ is argued as being misrepresented through hegemonic narratives of identity, a misrepresentation that can be ‘cured’ by more ‘truthful’ narratives.

Two features of Pawson’s (1987) paper are particularly interesting. Firstly, Pawson’s paper concentrates on the inscription of power relationships in the urban landscape, and in particular the centrality of the ethos of house ownership in New Zealand. For Pawson this ethos, and its legislative supports, helped to construct a normative gender order, an order he argued, “has been reproduced in New Zealand’s built environment” (ibid. p. 125). The substantive focus of Pawson’s paper is, therefore, to demystify the specific processes through which this normative gender order, and the urban form it takes, have occurred. By focusing on the power relationships underlying home ownership, Pawson directly examined the ‘land’ motif that occurs in New Zealand’s nationalist discourse. A secondary element of the paper is the examination of the legitimacy ascribed to urban planning in New Zealand, through its putative ability to provide solutions to urban hygiene. Here again Pawson confronts another of the motifs of New Zealand nationalist discourse, that motif concerned with ‘fitness’. Together these two concerns result in an urban
planning that, “reflects the disciplinary requirements of capitalism and the desire to promote public health” (ibid., p. 126). For Pawson the purpose of exposing the power relations of urban planning can be explained in the following passage, “It is important that New Zealand geographers engage these themes to explore their own society, and particularly in a period of long-delayed social change. It is a society emerging from a colonial heritage....” (ibid., p. 123). The meaning of this passage is made even clearer when in concluding Pawson cites Kennedy’s suggestion that present social and spatial relations constitute, “a pattern of subordination and specialisation in which both men and women are caught and crippled because neither can live a full life” (Kennedy, 1985, p. 344). This observation is pertinent argues Pawson for, “If Sinclair (1986a), in his review of New Zealand’s national identity, is correct that this is becoming a softer, less harsh place then it is an opportune time to tackle such issues” (Pawson, 1987, p. 126). Pawson’s comments here point to a view of New Zealand that emphasises a budding maturity as ‘the nation’ emerges from the colonial past; and the critical examination of the power relations that Pawson exposes is part of the process of sloughing of the colonial past, and building a more inclusive and nuanced set of narratives of nationhood. The key point here, however, is that while ‘the nation’ is imagined in more inclusive terms it still remains as the assumed context for an identity. This leads to a paradox because on one hand, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, by looking at geography against the grain, Pawson brings the process of remembering and forgetting of ‘the nation’ in sharp relief; but on the other hand by broadening the rhetoric of nationalist discourse perhaps ‘the nation’ slides ever further from visibility as its imaginative borders are encountered less often.

As with Pawson’s paper, the process of articulating counter-narratives of national identity is a feature of the paper by Stokes (1987). In her paper Stokes challenged the nationalist rhetoric of ‘one people’, and the legitimacy given geography to intervene into the world of Maori. In the light of the Johnston and Le Heron’s call for ‘indigenous epistemologies’, Stokes argued that much of the geographical work on Maori drew, “heavily on institutional and theoretical frameworks derived from Western Europe, with some more recent influences
from North America" (ibid., p. 118), and that more generally issues of a distinctive New Zealand perspective, and interpretation of research, had not been explored in any systematic way. Regarding geographers research on Maori, Stokes wrote that, "Researchers directed attention towards 'problems' of integration of Maori into a New Zealand nation, guided by notions of development and progress, racial equality and equal opportunity" (ibid., p. 119), and consequently studies of this sort had resulted in the development of a, "Pakeha geography of Maoris" (ibid., p. 119). In contrast, Stokes argued for the development of a 'Maori geography' based on an epistemology that exists outside the normal boundaries and conventions of Pakeha academia.

These comments point to the ways that geographers have served a particular construction of New Zealand 'nation' —a Pakeha 'nation'. In a similar way to Pawson, Stokes highlights a remembering of the narratives of nationhood that emphasised the specific constellations of power/knowledge involved in their construction. However, a difference lies between the two papers, since while Pawson argues that a more critical remembering of the past can free the present from its history, for Stokes, "We cannot change our past. In the Maori world view the past is part of the present. The Pakeha view that history is something to put behind us is inadequate. We cannot escape our colonial past as one of the outposts of British imperial expansion...." (Stokes, 1987, p. 121). 'We', and 'our' flag the New Zealand nation of which the reader is assumed to be a member, but this flagging indicates a nation imagined in conflict. By presenting contrasting Maori and Pakeha views of history as emblematic of larger conflicts within New Zealand, the imagining of 'the nation' as constituted through one set of discourses is exploded. This point is clearly made when Stokes quotes Awatere, "At its most conservative it [Maori sovereignty] could be interpreted as the desire for a bicultural society, one in which taha Maori receives an equal consideration with, and equally determines the course of this country as taha Pakeha" (Awatere, 1984, p. 10). But while the epistemological borders of 'the nation' have been challenged and exposed with new alternative rhetorical resources articulated, as with Pawson, 'the nation' remains as the assumed context for an identity.
Summary

The defining feature of the alternative approaches articulated above was the call for 'indigenous epistemologies' which would enable social theory to better match social reality in New Zealand. In various ways the papers above have actively contested some of the narratives that have been used to constitute both New Zealand geography, and the New Zealand 'nation', and in doing so argued for more nuanced, critical and inclusive narratives. But in arguing for these reconstituted narratives 'the nation' remains as the performatively constituted fable. A new set of characters, and plot, may have been added to the rhetorical resources out of which 'the nation' is constituted, but the existence of the 'nation' is still assumed, and to have a 'nationality' still appears as natural as having, "a nose and two ears" (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). Hayden White sums this irony up nicely when he writes, "This drama can be followed by the reader of the narrative in such a way as to be experienced as a progressive revelation of what the true nature of the events consists of.... But actually what has happened is that a set of events originally encoded in one way is simply being decoded by being recoded in another." (White, 1978, p. 97).

Conclusion

To conclude I want to reiterate two themes that have run through this chapter. Firstly, despite the different epistemological approaches that have been brought to, and institutionalised in, New Zealand geography a common theme has been the continued effort by New Zealand geographers to ensure the disciplines relevance to the needs of the New Zealand 'nation'. Consequently this desire to posit geography as relevant to New Zealand has seen 'the nation' conceived as an object from which geographical knowledge can be extracted, and applied. This perspective has occluded the position of geographers within the New Zealand 'nation', and the constitution of a subjectivity that conceives of having a nationality as 'natural'. Consequently, in articulating the relevance of geography to the New Zealand 'nation', and the belief that they were mirroring a pre-discursive reality through their texts, geographers have banally flagged,
in form and content, the New Zealand 'nation'. By deictically indicating 'the nation', assumed to be the New Zealand 'nation', throughout the texts examined, geographers have banally situated the New Zealand 'nation' as the context for geographical study. And in turn through the connected process of remembering and forgetting, which has reiterated a series of motifs of New Zealand's nationalist discourse, the New Zealand 'nation' has been performatively constituted by New Zealand geographers. The point being that New Zealand geography persuaded itself of it's relevance to the needs of New Zealand 'nation', but in doing so persuaded itself of the enduring existence of the New Zealand 'nation'. The irony being that despite the protestations of difference among the various epistemologies, the positioning of New Zealand 'nation' as the putative object of analysis has remained constant, while its discursive borders have been periodically rearranged.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This thesis has continually argued that human geography, and human geographers are of this world, and that as such deeply implicated in the power relations of the world in which they live. As a consequence an imperative of a critical geography is to examine the 'unexamined discourses' through which geography has been constituted. The introduction illustrated this argument by drawing attention to human geography's complicity in the imperial projects of the 'West', an important process of critique in its own respect. The focus of this thesis, however, has been to examine the relationship between New Zealand human geography, and another constellation of power relations — 'the nation' and 'nationalism'. In particular this thesis has tried to show that New Zealand human geography has been constituted between the geographical discourses of Anglo-American academia, and the rhetoric of New Zealand's nationalist discourse. In regard to nationalist discourse, an approach has been articulated that emphasises the banality of flagging through which 'the nation' is simultaneously, and paradoxically, remembered as an identity, whilst being forgotten. This 'banal nationalism' has been contrasted with the doxa of nationalism that constitutes nationalism as a phenomena of either the 'irrational other' or the 'irrational past'. In either respect nationalism is safely quarantined from 'our' national identity, and if the quarantine cordon is breached it becomes merely a temporary aberration which can be contained. Linked to the banal flagging of national identity has been the concept of performativity, where 'the nation' does not exist beyond the expressions of its existence, so that a 'national identity' is a performative subjectivity constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results.

Taken together these two sets of concepts have outlined a form of nationalist discourse that constitutes its object — 'the nation' — in the unremarked reiteration of textual signifiers. These textual signifiers not only deictically
indicate a relationship between the text and its reader, constituting both within the discursive borders of the unspecified 'nation', but also utilise selectively remembered and forgotten rhetorical motifs to give the imagination of 'the nation' continuity. In the New Zealand context, this thesis identified a series of related rhetorical elements, including motifs of: 'Better Britain' and 'Greater Britain', the 'sublime landscape' and the 'productive landscape', and 'fitness'. Paradoxically, however, despite the continuity that these motifs purport to provide in the imagination of the New Zealand 'nation' it is their protean quality that has enabled the imagination of 'the nation' to slide constantly from consciousness, and hence become the assumed, and unremarkable, context for social life and an identity. Just as the imagination of the New Zealand 'nation' is constantly in the process of production, so to has New Zealand human geography. The thesis highlighted a series of different epistemological approaches in New Zealand human geography, but despite the discontinuities that changes in epistemology have caused, a series of continuities have been argued to exist which have continually reasserted New Zealand human geography's relevance to the needs of the New Zealand 'nation'. However, in articulating this need, rather than merely describing the New Zealand 'nation' as an object, these texts have actually, in part, performatively constituted the New Zealand 'nation'. In this sense New Zealand human geography has throughout its history articulated a banal nationalism. Importantly, however, this banal flagging of the New Zealand 'nation' in the texts of New Zealand human geography has not remained the same. In the first instance, nationalist discourse, and specifically New Zealand's nationalist discourse, has never spoken with a simple, unchanging voice; and secondly, New Zealand human geography itself has changed. What has remained, however, is the flagging of the New Zealand 'nation' as an entity which is assumed to simply exist.

Why is this important? Firstly, and most generally, national identity does not simply just exist, rather national identities are situated within powerful social structures that constitute hegemonic relations of inequality. These social structures conduct a power that in its ultimate form is direct physical power, euphemistically referred to as 'Defence'—'national defence'. This should have
a particular resonance for geographers given Johnston's (1997) claim that the largest employer of Anglo-American geographers is the military. Secondly, and connected to the first, is that the geographic flagging of 'the nation' constitutes it as more that a geophysical entity, instead it becomes a homeland worth, if necessary, sacrifice. This should also have resonance in the New Zealand context, given the human sacrifices that have been made in the name of the New Zealand 'nation'. It maybe argued that these points are not really relevant since New Zealand neither has an extensive defence industry, nor have human sacrifices been required for a long time. However while these concerns are valid, they miss the point about 'banality', in that the reiteration of the 'banal' maintains the discursive conditions whereby calls for action, in the name of 'the nation' can have meaning. A critical human geography, therefore, must expose the power relations of space, and an important part of this process is the examination of human geography's own entwining with those power relations. These power relations do not always speak harshly, often calling softly, indeed so softly as to be unnoticed; unnoticed, that is until either a sacrifice is required, or the limits of its discursive possibilities are encountered. Such a process of exposition is of necessity halting, and fraught, but hopefully the arguments that have been presented in this work, at the very least, provide the metaphorical frisson through which the specificity of a particular set of power relations can be brought to the imagination, and seen in the weird light of a winter's afternoon.
Appendices
Appendix One: ‘Quantitative Statistics’

Table 1: Coefficient of Localisation

Source: Linge (1961, p. 198)

Table I
Method of Determining the Coefficient of Localisation:
Engineering Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Districts</th>
<th>Percentage of the Total Labour Force in Each Employment District</th>
<th>Percentage of Workers in Engineering Products in Each Employment District</th>
<th>Divergences plus or minus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>+15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whangarei</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paeroa</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauranga</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotorua</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisborne</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Plymouth</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanganui</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmerston North</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masterton</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Hutt</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blenheim</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westport</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greymouth</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashburton</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timaru</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oamaru</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunedin</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>+1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invercargill</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.00 100.00 +24.9/-24.9

Coefficient of Localisation for Engineering Products: 24.9/100 = 0.25
### Table 2: Coefficient of Localisation

- **Source:** Linge (1961, p. 199)

#### Table II

**Coefficients of Localisation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Groups in New Zealand</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewellery and Instruments</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders’ Woodwork</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime and Cement</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat Freezing</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricks and Tiles</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Products</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foodstuffs</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanning</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knitted Wear and Hosiery</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Goods</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Wood Products</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Milling</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawmilling</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Textile Products</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Paper Products</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery and Glass</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit and Vegetable Preserving</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax, Rope and Twine</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boatbuilding</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Produce</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Textile Articles</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuit Baking</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Goods</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar and Confectionery</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woollen Milling</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Manufacturers</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Factor Loadings for 1 Mode Matrix

*Source: Cant (1971, p. 42)*

#### Table I

**Factor Loadings for 1 Mode Matrix: Regional Components of New Zealand Manufacturing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment District</th>
<th>$l_1$</th>
<th>$l_2$</th>
<th>$l_3$</th>
<th>$l_4$</th>
<th>$l_5$</th>
<th>$l_6$</th>
<th>$l_7$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whangarei</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>+0.30</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>+0.21</td>
<td>+0.05</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauranga</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>+0.21</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotorua</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisborne</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>+0.09</td>
<td>+0.04</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napier</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>+0.32</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hastings</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>+0.39</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Plymouth</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>+0.21</td>
<td>+0.42</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanganui</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmerston North</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masterton</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
<td>+0.18</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Hutt</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>+0.33</td>
<td>+0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>+0.69</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blenheim</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>+0.39</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greymouth</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>+0.08</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>+0.23</td>
<td>+0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashburton</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timaru</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>+0.10</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oamaru</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>+0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunedin</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>+0.06</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invercargill</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>+0.09</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eigenvalue**

|          | 7.52 | 2.98 | 2.37 | 1.74 | 1.23 | 1.08 | 1.00 |

**Cumulative percentage of variance accounted for**

|          | 32.7 | 45.7 | 56.0 | 63.5 | 68.9 | 73.5 | 77.9 |

Factor loadings greater than 0.40 are underlined.
Table 4: Concentrations of Selected Industries

Source: McDermott (1973, p. 66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Number of factories</th>
<th>Percentage of NZ's factories</th>
<th>Percentage of national labour force</th>
<th>Percentage value of national production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Metal</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheetmetal</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire Working</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Products</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Products</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.E.I (Stationary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5: Distribution of Factories

Source: McDermott (1973, p. 72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Area</th>
<th>Stationary</th>
<th>Basic Metal</th>
<th>Adjusted Metal</th>
<th>Sheetmetal</th>
<th>Wire Working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Auckland-Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes Bay</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>33*</td>
<td>8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southland</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number occurring within margins</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number occurring outside margins</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total factories</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Denotes plants falling beyond the 1969 spatial margins to profitability based on Auckland.

References


Hartshorne, R. (1955c). *Unpublished review of K. M. Buchanan’s Inaugural Address at Victoria University College*. Copy held in Historical Collection, Department of Geography, Massey University.


196


New Zealand Tourism Board, Wellington.


