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"EAST TIMOR BY SEA"

An evaluation of the New Zealand Defence Force maritime contribution made to INTERFET operations in East Timor September 1999 - February 2000

Warren Cummins
2002
"EAST TIMOR BY SEA"

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A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University

W.M. Cummins
2002
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Force</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<td>DGS</td>
<td>Dili Guard Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLOC</td>
<td>Directed Level of Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoN</td>
<td>Degree of Notice</td>
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<td>Dr</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
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<td>EM</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOO</td>
<td>Fleet Operations Officer</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HODSU</td>
<td>Hydrographic Survey Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NQNorCOM</td>
<td>Headquarters Northern Command</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Inshore Patrol Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>Inshore Survey Craft</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Standards Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPG</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCH</td>
<td>Landing Craft Heavy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCM</td>
<td>Landing Craft Minor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARSAR</td>
<td>Maritime Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Maritime Component Commander, INTERFET</td>
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<td>MIF</td>
<td>Maritime Interception Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>Military Strategic Estimate</td>
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<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLOC</td>
<td>Operational Level of Capability</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
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<td>Operational Preparedness and Reporting System</td>
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<td>ORBAT</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWO</td>
<td>Principal Warfare Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>Readiness Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMN</td>
<td>Royal Malaysian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>Republic of Singapore Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNO (NZ)</td>
<td>Senior National Officer (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STG</td>
<td>Sea Training Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>STOL</td>
<td>Short Take Off and Landing</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Administration East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>Very High Frequency</td>
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Disclaimer

The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Royal New Zealand Navy or the New Zealand Defence Force.
Introduction

During the latter part of 1999 the world's media reported graphic images of horror as the presence of United Nations observers and Indonesian authorities in East Timor failed to stop militia led violence following an independence referendum. Compelled by world opinion and media pressure, Indonesia finally agreed to allow international forces to enter East Timor in order to restore security and re-establish peace in September 1999. In a matter of days Australia was called upon to act as lead nation of the force and responded by seeking partners prepared to make a military commitment in order to carry out a strongly worded and forceful United Nations mandate to preserve lives and restore peace. As operational planning commenced, the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was created and preparations made to deploy a sizeable military force to East Timor.

Recognising the common foreign policy and strategic interests that this mandate sought to protect, New Zealand responded quickly to Australia’s call for defence partners and committed a sizeable, mixed force of air, land and sea forces. Through the relatively short duration of the mission, over 1,100 New Zealand military personnel contributed to the INTERFET operations with East Timor between 20 September 1999 and 23 February 2000, the largest military operation for 40 years. Although the most visible New Zealand activities were achieved by land based military force elements under national command, all of the operations, titled Plan Warden, occurred within a littoral maritime environment and were supported by RNZN maritime assets under direct INTERFET command.

Early force and lift requirements for Plan Warden were focused on maritime assets to move and protect INTERFET ground and air forces as they traversed the 600 kilometer sea voyage to East Timor's only suitable port of Dili. Consequently, to even begin the operation, it was necessary to seek sea forces from contributory nations. New Zealand immediately provided a significant level of available maritime forces to INTERFET in the shape of two frigates and a tanker. Although the length and timing of individual ship service varied, an RNZN unit was then stationed in East Timor for all phases of the INTERFET operation. Later phases of the operation focused on the need to provide the vital lifeline of supplies for land and air force element operations and then safely draw down the forces once security had been restored. While the frigates were progressively
withdrawn from INTERFET service as the strategic situation matured, the tanker ENDEAVOUR provided replenishment and logistic facilities in both the initial and final phases of the operation and eventually even contributed in a minor way to the operations draw-down. In personnel terms alone, over 430 sailors of the NZDF were committed to active service with INTERFET, representing a significant investment of RNZN personnel.

INTERFET was also successful in its own right with its mission clearly achieved. It is regarded as providing a successful template for modern peace enforcement operations. The results for those nations contributing to INTERFET were a variety of successful outcomes related to modern peace enforcement operations at the tactical through to grand strategic levels. New Zealand naval forces played their part in all of these successful INTERFET outcomes and during all phases of the INTERFET mission.

The purpose of this thesis is to detail and evaluate the New Zealand maritime contribution made to INTERFET. It will achieve this by answering three key questions. They are:

1. Why did New Zealand choose to contribute maritime forces as part of the INTERFET relief operations in East Timor?;
2. What activities were undertaken and how effective was the contribution by NZDF Maritime Force Elements to RNZN strategic goals and NZDF Key Result Areas?; and,
3. How effective was the contribution by NZDF Maritime Forces to the New Zealand's Government Key Defence Policy Outcomes?

From the answers to these questions it will also become clear if alternate force element options were possible.

Although maritime forces provided a less visible element of the New Zealand response to the East Timor crisis, their input was no less significant. The assessment of the New Zealand Navy’s strategic and operational effectiveness during INTERFET will provide an important indicator of New Zealand’s foreign policy success in helping to solve a long running problem in this region of the world.
Chapter 1 Background

East Timor sits at the lower end of the Indonesian Archipelago and 600 nautical miles north of Darwin in Australia (see Map 1). Although it is an inseparable part of a large island that encompasses both East and West Timor, two distinct and different cultures operate. Aside from a brief period of Japanese occupation during the Second World War, East Timor had been a stable, if poor, Portuguese colony for over 400 years. This situation changed when Portugal’s colonial empire collapsed as part of the bloodless Carnation Revolution of 1974. Largely left to its own designs, although a Portuguese governor remained in place, East Timor moved slowly towards self-determination and self-government for the first time since colonisation.

Map 1 - East Timor in New Zealand’s area of strategic interest. Source: New Zealand Army

Faced with the possibility of a new and democratic state emerging on their eastern border, Indonesia began a campaign of destabilisation and border incursions into East Timor territory. Meanwhile the formative political parties of East Timor had begun in-
fighting, culminating in an internal coup in July 1975.\(^1\) By August this coup had grown to a full civil war and the Portuguese governor and his staff took the decision to withdraw to Atauro Island, some 23 kilometres north of East Timor. After the events of December 1975, the Portuguese eventually returned to Portugal.\(^2\) The civil war was over in one month leaving the left wing party, Fretilin, the clear victors.

In New Zealand these events were viewed with concern and hasty plans were drawn up to allow a deployment of New Zealand's Armed Forces. These were intended as a contribution for an international peacekeeping force, under the control of the United Nations, to end the civil war. The plan called for elements of all three services, including the deployment of the Royal New Zealand Navy to patrol the East Timorese coast.\(^3\) Eventually, however, no United Nations force was formed and so planning for New Zealand involvement ceased.

Indonesian activity in East Timor, at this point, began to expand. After a series of major border infringements, Fretilin issued a request for help to the United Nations and neighbouring countries, as well as a declaration of independence, on 28 November 1975. No aid was forthcoming and, on 7 December 1975, Indonesia commenced a full-scale assault on East Timor's capital of Dili and the coastal city of Bacau (See Map 2), East Timor's second largest town. These assaults were the beginning of a full-scale invasion with the aim of capturing East Timor and incorporating it as part of Indonesia.

Resistance was far greater than the Indonesians had anticipated and, although able to take and hold the main towns, by April 1976, 35,000 ground troops were required to maintain their presence in East Timor. Despite this, on 17 July 1976 the country was annexed and became Indonesia's 27\(^{th}\) province.\(^4\) East Timorese resistance did not diminish, however, and for over five years the East Timorese resistance movement, Falintil, kept Indonesian forces pinned down through guerrilla activity based from the rugged and often impenetrable highlands of the inner country. The resistance movement continued

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\(^2\) Ibid, p. 15.
\(^3\) Ibid, p. 15.
\(^4\) Ibid, p. 17.
throughout the Indonesian occupation, although time and Indonesian efforts succeeded in wearing it away to a mere shadow of its former self.\(^5\)

Map 2 - East Timor. Source: NZ Army

The reaction by New Zealand, as in many regional nations, was one of diplomatic regret that the United Nations had not been involved in the de-colonisation process. The Indonesian control of East Timor was reluctantly recognised although the incidents leading up to this annexation were not accepted. For the United Nations, similar difficulties were represented by the presence of a pseudo-legitimate government in what was now really a military controlled and occupied colony. The official position adopted by the United Nations was that the annexation was considered illegal, and that Portugal was still the legitimate authority for East Timor.\(^6\) Australian reaction was similarly muted due to concerns over the political leanings of independence troops and in 1979 gave recognition to the takeover by Indonesia.\(^7\)

\(^5\) Ibid, p. 18.
\(^6\) Ibid, p. 18.
\(^7\) Peter Young, “Australia – Indonesia Relations – Never the same again?”, *Asian Defence Journal*, September 2000, p. 5.
Although international protest was muted, the United Nations did adopt a number of resolutions between 1976 and 1982 for Indonesian Armed Forces to be withdrawn from the territory and the right to self-determination to be offered to the Timorese. Through these years the Indonesian Armed Forces were undoubtedly repressing the population, but East Timor was generally ignored by the world and events within the country were unclear. Civilian casualty figures range widely up to about 200,000 for the five years of 1976-80 alone.\(^8\) What became clear in 1991, was that the Indonesian’s were acting as colonial masters in a clear parallel to previous administrations. During a pro-independence rally in Dili during November, an English cameramen captured the brutal and violent end brought to at least 50 civilians by the military. A further 91 were injured and yet another 90 remained unaccounted for.\(^9\) This incident became known as the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre and proved a major turning point for resistance within East Timor.

This massacre was also to prove a watershed for international opinion against Indonesian occupation. Pressure then began to steadily mount for self-determination and from 1995 onwards, Indonesia and Portugal held annual talks to discuss issues of human rights and the like.\(^10\) By 1998, countries such as Australia were being less than subtle in their communications with Indonesia over the issue of East Timor in relation to human rights abuses and self-determination. Simultaneously, it appears that groups of Indonesians were realising that the cost of retaining Timor was higher than any returns that might be made.

Internal political turmoil in Indonesia also contributed to events in East Timor. With the resignation of President Suharto in January 1999, the temporary appointment of President B.J. Habibie led to an offer on 27 January for East Timor to hold a referendum.\(^11\) This offer was accepted and the terms of the referendum enabled the province to choose between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. Later that year in May, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was entrusted to organise the referendum and

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\(^8\) Alan Ryan, *Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, Australia, November 2000, p. 10.
\(^9\) Ibid, p. 11.
\(^11\) Crawford and Harper, p. 20.
the United Nations Assistance Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) was formed to oversee it. Indonesia, meanwhile, undertook to guarantee “that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side”\textsuperscript{12}.

This offer and arrangement was by no means unanimously accepted in Indonesia. Some within the government and military began to surreptitiously rally militia units within East Timor, with the clear intent of influencing the ballot result through intimidation and threat.\textsuperscript{13} This unofficial and blatant policy was carried out in the months leading up to the referendum planned for 30 August 1999. Residents of Timor were beaten and tortured, crowds intimidated at rallies and political gatherings and the populace generally made to fear for their lives. Despite this, 98 percent of all voters turned out to register a 78.5 percent favour for the road to independence.

Sadly – it was also to be a road to death and destruction at the hands of the militia. With at least tacit support from the Indonesian military, the various militia groups unleashed violence and destruction across East Timor. The capital city and other towns were sacked and an unknown number of Timorese were killed. Up to 400,000 people were displaced and many of these were forced to leave the province for other parts of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{14} By 7 September the United Nations had become extremely concerned and the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, issued an ultimatum to Indonesia to restore order within 24 hours or face international intervention.\textsuperscript{15} Despite this, the situation worsened, as Indonesian authorities did nothing to stop the violence. A day later, things were so bad in Dili that the few remaining neutral United Nations observers were forced to evacuate to Darwin – a situation that brought East Timor into even sharper focus for the United Nations. An urgently despatched Security Council mission did manage to get into Dili and were shocked by what they saw.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{10} Agreement between the Govt's of Indonesia and Portugal – NY 5 May 1999, Art 1.
\textsuperscript{15} Audrey Young, “Jakarta given UN deadline”, NZ Herald, 8 September 1999, p. A7.
\textsuperscript{16} Ryan, p. 131.
Coincidentally, the meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation summit (APEC) was scheduled for Auckland between 9 and 13 September 1999. This provided an intensely focused group of national leaders from the surrounding regions with an opportunity to discuss East Timor face-to-face and in-depth. New Zealand and Australian diplomatic and political leaders were instrumental in establishing a consensus that Indonesia should allow a multi-national force enter East Timor and re-establish peace. The process had been used with success previously in Bougainville and pressure was applied to the Indonesian representative to allow a similar, although more forceful process to occur in East Timor. President Habibie did not attend the September meeting, choosing instead to despatch his foreign minister Ali Alitas in his stead while attempting to deal with the increasingly complex and negative political situation developing in Indonesia in the run-up to presidential elections. Notwithstanding his absence, clear messages were able to be sent to Dr Habibie via Dr Alitas and on 12 September Indonesia agreed to allow a United Nations force into East Timor.\textsuperscript{17}

With Indonesian acceptance achieved, the United Nations was now able to act more openly and began formulating plans for an urgent operation to restore security in East Timor. After consulting with regional nations, Australia was persuaded to accept the task of lead nation for a military coalition and offered itself in this role on 14 September. With the coalition leadership confirmed, the United Nations Security Council adopted

\textsuperscript{17} Crawford and Harper, p. 49.
Resolution 1264 on the 15th of September. The resolution invoked Chapter VII of the United Nation’s Charter and authorised the formation of an international force to: “restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations,”. Equally significant, the resolution provided for the use of “all necessary measures” by participating countries to achieve this mandate – a catch phrase for the use of force if required. As operational planning commenced, INTERFET was created and preparations made to deploy a combined international force under the command of an Australian Army officer, Major-General Peter Cosgrove.

The preparations for East Timor’s independence referendum had also acted as a trigger for planning in other regional nations, including New Zealand. Although political interest within New Zealand was generally focused on the positives of democratic initiatives in Indonesia, the military took a more pragmatic view. Directed by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), Air Marshall Carey Adamson, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) began preparing contingency plans for any operation likely in East Timor. The previous (1975) plan was not revisited, rather a completely new initiative taken, based on militia activity and the likelihood of civil unrest leading to a forced withdrawal of UNAMET. Initial plans centred on the possibility of a Services Protected Evacuation of UNAMET observers and any friendly nationals from Dili. This plan was short lived, however, and quickly developed into a more comprehensive plan to insert a company sized land force, supported by elements of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) for insertion and re-supply. The CDF also approached United States Armed Forces Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General H. Shelton in March of 1999 to ascertain what, if any, US forces might be available if an operation became necessary.

The answer was sufficiently clear. Pre-occupied with the imminent air campaign in Kosovo, Shelton indicated that while ‘shooters’ would be unavailable, forces for a

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20 Ibid.
support role might be made available.\textsuperscript{23} By April defence planners had assessed the various force options and likely contingencies. These were reported in a paper to the Minister of Defence and then Cabinet that also made it clear that New Zealand could expect to play a significant role in any multi-national peace support operation and that the environment would be medium to high risk for personnel.\textsuperscript{24} The operation now called for a company sized force of Army supported by one Naval and some logistic and tactical Air units. Ships of the Naval Combat and Support Forces were not considered at this stage as their roles and other strategic tasking did not match any of the perceived requirements in this force option paper.\textsuperscript{25}

From the remaining force elements of the RNZN, the maritime option identified in the paper was HMNZS \textit{Resolution}, the ex-TAGOS R survey vessel.\textsuperscript{26} Equipped with multi-beam side scan sonar and extremely accurate plotting equipment, \textit{Resolution} was considered ideal to conduct surveys of the poorly charted Timorese coast and ports. With a small crew of only 18 and used to such isolated operations that hydrographic surveying involved, \textit{Resolution} also presented as easy option for support operations.

Picture 1.2 - HMNZS \textit{Resolution}. Source: RNZN

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{24} Crawford and Harper, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, p. 23.
Some early thought was also given to using the small RNZN Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) such as coastal patrol vessels.\textsuperscript{27} This idea was rejected as the IPC lacked any real force or self-protection capability and were also unsuitable from a habitability or sea-keeping point of view.\textsuperscript{28} Some consideration was also given to bringing back the disliked \textit{CHARLES UPHAM} from her commercial charter in the Northern Hemisphere. This option would have provided planners with the option of strategic sealift. The requirements of any operation to this point, however, identified only a tactical sealift for a company of army personnel and equipment. Additionally, \textit{CHARLES UPHAM} had not been modified as originally intended to conduct offload operations across the shore and so was unsuitable for the rugged and undeveloped coastline of East Timor. Finally, commercial and political realities precluded such an arrangement and \textit{CHARLES UPHAM} was never recalled. The only other possible support vessel was the \textit{MANAWANUI} – a converted oil rig tender operated as the RNZN diving tender. \textit{MANAWANUI} was also deemed unavailable due to ongoing NZDF commitments to Bougainville.

![Picture 1.3 - The ill-fated strategic-lift ship, HMNZS \textit{CHARLES UPHAM}. Source: RNZN](image)

As the planning process continued, events in East Timor began to influence New Zealand plans more directly. By mid year it was becoming obvious that the situation in East Timor was less benign than originally thought and a revised plan with new force elements was required. To assist in the decision-making process a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) that quantified the level of risk in East Timor and took account of the various activities of those involved in the country, together with aspects such as the topography,

\textsuperscript{27} DLB 0008, RNZN Record of Interview, Air Marshall C. Adamson, CNZM, AFC. 31 January 2002, Wgtn, NZ, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, p. 4.
meteorology and potential operations was constructed. The estimate, first produced in June 1999 by the Operations Branch of New Zealand’s Defence Headquarters, was used to predict the likely shape and size of any NZDF contribution and was then updated as events dictated. This paper also identified the national strategy for New Zealand to continue to be recognised as a good international citizen, and responsible regional partner. It also stated the national end-state with ‘the achievement of a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement brokered by the United Nations, which is broadly acceptable to the East Timorese.’ More importantly, for the first time, the paper identified the option for an infantry battalion to deploy, rather than the previous company sized land force. This was a significant increase in the force size ashore which would involve a much greater footprint of New Zealand activity in Timor. As a consequence, this would also greatly increase both the risk and logistic support requirements. Eventually, both of these key factors would act as prime determinants for other force element selection from naval and air services.

While the exact identity of naval supporting units was still not established in this MSE, the requirement for naval units to provide logistic support and force protection for themselves and the now much larger NZDF units ashore were generally agreed and defined. With this clearer definition available, NZDF planners moved swiftly to provide more detailed force options for the Government. By 17 September the level of additional support had been agreed by the Cabinet. The same day the commitment of a tanker and frigate as the naval component to the (New Zealand) INTERFET Order of Battle was announced publicly together with the expected costs for the total New Zealand operation of 65 to 75 million New Zealand dollars.

The definition of exactly what the naval support platforms would be expected to undertake was still only vaguely expressed and required some better definition for detailed planning and equipping purposes. Australian authorities produced the first INTERFET plan from the Headquarters, Australian Theatre, and published this as the

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29 Crawford and Harper, p. 23.
30 DLB 0008, RNZN Record of Interview, Air Marshall C. Adamson, CNZM, AFC, p. 4.
31 New Zealand Prime Minister, Right Honourable Jenny Shipley, Expect Casualties, New Zealand Herald Article 17 September 1999.
Maritime Support Plan for Operation Warden on 19 September. In this it stated broad details of maritime efforts expected for INTERFET, which were to be focused on:

a. the provision of appropriate combatant and sea lift assets to provide surveillance, escort, sea transport and support to INTERFET as required;
b. preparation of units to relieve those assigned as well as provide redundancy for units assigned;
c. a robust logistic support base centred in Darwin;
d. Other Maritime elements in support of INTERFET (communications, intelligence, hydrographic, Clearance Diving);
e. Co-ordinate the provision of support to coalition navies (i.e. Port services, logistic resupply);
f. Co-ordinate and provide staff support to other headquarters;
g. Oversight of coalition maritime activities.

The Warden Plan also identified four detailed phases of support that maritime forces would provide for the East Timor operation which were:

a. **Phase One.** The initial phase which would create the pre-conditions for deployment. It was envisaged that all maritime forces would concentrate in Darwin and would train with each other to ensure common procedural approaches for any forthcoming operations. Sealift ships would load out with equipment and personnel. Air and sea surveillance would commence in the vicinity of East Timor and support operations would begin to supply forces in-theatre;

b. **Phase Two.** Insertion of INTERFET. Under the protective umbrella of combatant forces, INTERFET would deploy into Dili. Air and sea surveillance would be increased to include aircraft control. Command and control facilities would back up those ashore and forward logistic support would commence;

c. **Phase Three.** Establishment of a secure environment for INTERFET and East Timor. Sustained military sealift would occur under combatant escort. Maritime forces would be co-ordinated to support coalition operations with the possibility of conducting maritime interception operations; and finally,

32 Annex G to HQAST OP WARDEN CONOPS dated 19 September 1999.
d. **Phase Four.** Transition to a UN Peace Keeping Operation (PKO).

This plan finally provided the detail required for New Zealand planning staff in written format. With only one day to go before the plan was implemented, it reflected the operational intent and precluded any further strategic assessment by the JOPG. The plan, and in particular the Maritime Annex, was now passed to the Naval Strategic Headquarters and then the Maritime Operational Headquarters for implementation. Although the Australian planning staff had hastily modified the maritime part of the *Warden* Plan since 5 September, it was generally in line with what the New Zealand JOPG expected and confirmed their assessment and recommendations. The requirement to provide surveillance and force protection was much greater than had initially been expected for a service evacuation and forced the selection of warships. The plan also suggested that it would allow maritime forces from New Zealand to contribute in a tangible manner to the future outcome of INTERFET.

This implementation ended the direct involvement of the Strategic NZDF Headquarters planning group in determining what New Zealand elements would participate in INTERFET. The Headquarters now shifted attention to maintaining the required force levels in place for the duration of the operation, whatever that might be. Immediate proof of the strategic planning process would be quickly established by any operational success as the operation progressed. Quantifying these results, however, would take longer, with much relying on post-mission analysis against the delivery of NZDF Operational Outcomes. Part of this assessment would be the role of any maritime element together with measures of their contribution and effectiveness during INTERFET. Key NZDF indicators would be:

Operational Outcome C: The contribution to a strong relationship with Australia;
Outcome D: A secure and stable Asia-Pacific region; and,
Outcome E: A standing and position in international affairs. \(^{34}\)

After a lengthy, robust planning process disrupted by a rapid deterioration in the situation of East Timor following the independence referendum, New Zealand naval forces were now clearly defined and related to the land forces they needed to support. A frigate and

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\(^{33}\) Dr David Dickens, Interview with Cdre J. Stapleton, RAN, 3 November 2000.

\(^{34}\) NZDF Annual Report 2000, pp. 35-36.
tanker would provide support for INTERFET operations in the form of force protection, surveillance and logistic effort. These would be added to the forces of 10 maritime contributory nations as INTERFET commenced operations on 20 September 1999.\(^{35}\)

Chapter 2   Naval Preparations

Naval Strategic Headquarters planning and preparations ran in parallel with those of the Defence Headquarters organisation. Close liaison between planning staff of both headquarters was assured through their geographic co-location in the defence headquarters building in Wellington. While defence planners concentrated on the national and co-ordinated defence response, Naval Headquarters planning staff refined the proposals for any maritime force elements and advised the JOPG on naval activities in the plan. Naval involvement was, however, seen as minimal in the early planning stages as only the inclusion of HMNZS Resolution becoming involved for surveys was considered a realistic possibility.36 As a result, only limited information was passed to the operational headquarters, located in Auckland, in the initial planning stages and some minor use of staff was made to provide detail of force element options.

As the initial plan for a services protected evacuation came to fruition, various force element possibilities were explored and then subsequently abandoned as the reality of East Timor became apparent and the operation changed to one of peace enforcement. Within the Naval Staff advice was provided on the suitability of the Inshore Patrol Craft, the Charles Upham (Strategic Sealift) and Mana Wanui (Diving Tender). Each was considered and then rejected for practical or commercial reasons by the JOPG. This advice continued throughout 1999 even until early September with the expectation that naval involvement in any operation would be small if not non-existent. As late as June advice via the initiating order included only the requirement for Naval Forces to provide liaison officers to the Joint Force operations group with no specific requirement for any maritime force element.37

The Naval Operational Headquarters also had an important role to play in preparing each ship for the operations ahead. While this was achieved for Endeavour in the form of a warning order, little preparation was possible for the other ships due to the immediacy of reaction required. It was also significant that important intelligence information from the visit of the United Nations Investigating Team did not reach the ships, and in

36 Crawford and Harper, p. 23.
particular CANTERBURY, before she deployed leaving the ship unaware of the exact nature of the state of East Timor. This report may have allowed the ship to prepare better for the forthcoming operation.

Late in the planning cycle discussion was broadened to include the possibility of other force elements. As these were considered, liaison between the staffs of the operational headquarters of the RNZN and the RAN was also used to explore which NZ force elements would be useful to augment the Australian capabilities to be deployed for INTERFET. A short list of possibilities was then advised to the JOPG who, in turn, advised the Government of recommended selections. Once political approval had been received for the selected elements to be deployed, the operational headquarters was advised and immediate consideration applied to what, if any, equipment needs would have to be met before the ships selected could be deployed.

The Naval Headquarters was also required to monitor and evaluate the level of preparation by various ships. This allowed the Headquarters to then be sure that the Naval Forces would be able to provide the required quality and quantity of service if ever required. Each ship was involved in an individual training programme of activities designed to test the full range of skills commensurate with the ability of the crew and equipment fitted. This system had the advantage of also ensuring that Naval Headquarters staff were aware of any deficiencies or strengths in a particular ship and could provide good advice on whether a particular ship was capable at any time as well as provide 'top-up' training for a ship about to change from peace to operational tasking.

Naval training for INTERFET should, therefore, have consisted of two types of activity. Routine exercises would normally maintain a minimum capability level, while others were specifically tailored to raise the levels of capability for the expected operations to be undertaken in East Timor. Due to late changes in the plan and scope of the operation, the ships that ultimately participated in INTERFET were not those initially anticipated by Naval or Defence planners. When the ships were required it was too late to conduct

40 Naval Staff file 3002-0004-02, Comments on the Maritime Support Plan dated 22 September 1999.
42 Dr David Dickens, Interview with Cdre J. Stapleton, RAN, 3 November 2000, p. 6.
tailored training due to the deteriorating situation in East Timor and the need to rapidly deploy. The minimum standard available in each ship was considered satisfactory for the expected operations by Defence and Naval staff. Ship’s staff felt similar confidence, however, where possible, additional tailored exercises were undertaken to provide better training to the crews. In all cases, the ship’s routine exercise activities immediately prior to the operation proved beneficial as they had provided much, if not all, of the necessary tailored training. This included war fighting skills in the above and underwater disciplines, communications and manoeuvring drills in company with other ships of other regional navies.

For normal peacetime operations, the severe fiscal constraints on the NZDF make it impossible to constantly maintain ships at a fully operational level. Consequently, ships are placed at varying degrees of notice for the types of operation that they are able to conduct, given time and resources to prepare them. This allows the ship to be raised to the required level of capability for particular events beyond those routinely undertaken during peacetime operations, such as Search and Rescue. For accounting purposes this Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) for each RNZN ship is ‘purchased’ by the New Zealand Government providing a pool of capability at varying levels of readiness to undertake operational tasks that may be assigned. These DLOC are detailed in an annual Purchase Agreement that provides the funding level and arrangements for Defence from the Government on an annual basis. For 1999/2000, the New Zealand Government purchased and the RNZN was required to supply two frigates with operational helicopters and a third at extended notice for any operations. This requirement was met by the provision of TE KAHA and CANTERBURY although helicopter availability was not always guaranteed. HMNZS WELLINGTON, the other remaining Leander class frigate was available in a run-down condition at Devonport.

43 DLB 0008, RNZN Record of Interview with Air Marshall C. Adamson, CNZM, AFC, 31 January 2002, p. 3.
44 DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Commanding Officer HMNZS CANTERBURY, 15 February 2000, p. 2.
49 Ibid p. 68.
Naval Base for the latter part of 1999 and HMNZS *TE MANA* was nominally available from January 2000.\(^{50}\) For practical purposes though *TE MANA* was unavailable as it was still conducting delivery trials and remained the property of the ANZAC ship project. *TE KAHA* and *CANTERBURY* were expected to be at DLOC’s of 60 days for mid-level contingency operations and 180 days notice for low levels of operation respectively, in the Australia and New Zealand areas of Strategic Interest.\(^{51}\) *ENDEAVOUR* was similarly required to be available for support operations within 60 days of any notification.\(^{52}\)

During peacetime the RNZN conducts a comprehensive activity schedule of operations and exercises. These allow the quality of delivery to be checked by measuring the ship’s performance during the exercises. This performance is then reported via the chain of command to Defence Headquarters using the Operational Preparedness and Reporting System (OPRES). The system provides an objective measurement of ship’s capability against the requirements purchased by the Government. The DLOC sets a broad level against which a ship can be measured, however, one fault or criticism of the system is that it does not encapsulate the full range of capabilities that a ship may have to exceed merely to operate safely.\(^{53}\) Many of the capabilities are also demonstrated simultaneously and are not fully represented in an OPRES report.

These activities assist in maintaining the DLOC capabilities of ships as well as demonstrating New Zealand presence overseas or in home waters. While the strategic planning for any forthcoming operation is being conducted in the Headquarters of the Defence Force, all arms of the forces are expected to continue peacetime exercises unless otherwise directed. During 1999/2000, the NZDF conducted 43 major exercises, although a further 18 were eventually cancelled due to East Timor commitments.\(^{54}\) Many of these exercises were conducted with the Australian Defence Force as part of Closer Defence Relations and the availability of better training assets or opportunities overseas.

\(^{50}\) Ibid p. 68.
\(^{52}\) DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F.Campbell, RNZN p. 1.
As a result of this exercise policy and commitment, routine New Zealand maritime force element training had already commenced in the vicinity of East Timor well before the advent of INTERFET. In mid-July 1999, the New Zealand Naval Task Group 648.1 gathered to undertake operational training in the North Australian Exercise Areas, based out of Darwin. This involved a series of preliminary exercises including a semi-formal assessment of HMNZS *TE KAHA*. All ships were then to take part in a major multinational exercise code-named KAKADU IV, from mid-July to August. The lengthy period in the Darwin area, combined with the intensity of the exercises, would allow ships and personnel to acclimatise to the tropical conditions that prevail throughout the area. In particular, KAKADU proved a highly suitable proving ground for maritime force preparations with numerous international multi-level warfare exercises and replenishment serials providing an opportunity for regional forces to increase their interoperability.  

![HMNZS *TE KAHA* patrolling in the Indian Ocean late in 1999. Source: RNZN](image)

By the end of August all of the New Zealand ships had exercised their various skills and completed the necessary training to varying levels for peacetime tasking. On completion of exercise commitments in September *TE KAHA* was programmed to conduct an operational tour in the Persian Gulf in support of the United Nations sanction against Iraq. The deployment was considered of significant value and took a high priority in planning terms at the strategic level. The Persian Gulf area was considered one of

57 Ibid, p. 6.
higher operational tempo and risk and would normally have required the ship to conduct a full (six week) Operational Level Of Capability (OLOC) work-up. Such a work-up tests the ship’s personnel and equipment under conditions approaching what might normally be expected in the types of operations an RNZN frigate could expect to conduct. Since *TE KAHA*'s introduction to service in 1997 it had proven impossible to programme a work up. To alleviate this, an abbreviated training period and ‘Pre-Deployment Training Assessment’ was conducted in the lead up to Exercise KAKADU on 7 August by Australian authorities and the ship deemed to be at the required level of capability for subsequent tasking. The ship was not prepared or evaluated at OLOC and the subsequent judgement was that such abbreviated assessments proved to be inadequate.

With the completion of KAKADU, ships began to disperse throughout the region for alternative duties and training. The New Zealand Task Group was no exception and *TE KAHA* and *ENDEAVOUR* left Darwin in the company of Australian warships for a major Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) exercise in the South China Sea. This was being used, in addition to the New Zealand Foreign Policy commitment, to further prepare *TE KAHA* for her duties in the Arabian Gulf and both ships began the exercise on schedule on 28 August after a brief stopover in Singapore.

These routine plans and the training exercise changed in concert with ongoing developments in East Timor. While the independence ballot was achieved in relatively benign conditions, the announcement on 4 September of the overwhelming support for independence triggered militia activity against the East Timorese general population. As the days passed, this activity intensified and within days media reports consistently dealt with issues such as the ethnic cleansing. De-facto East Timorese leaders also publicly voiced their concerns, further raising international fears of genocide or forced de-population. By 8 September things had become untenable for the United Nations and the decision was made to evacuate the remaining UNAMET observers. Each of these

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58 Ibid, para. 6, p. 2.
62 Xanana Gusmao, Reported in the *Evening Post*, 9 September 1999, p. 4.
steps, and in particular the evacuation of the UNAMET observers, triggered a series of urgent foreign policy and military reactions in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{64}

With ships suitably positioned throughout the area and within a few days steaming, strategic planners in the defence watch group, contacted naval operational staff who initiated a naval response to the escalating events. This would provide some measure of armed military presence able to demonstrate the New Zealand political will, physical commitment to the evacuation as well as protection or force if Air assets proved unable to conduct the transfer of the United Nations staff from Dili to Darwin.

First to become involved was HMNZS \textit{TE KAHA}. Operating off the coast of Malaysia, \textit{TE KAHA} was advised of her immediate withdrawal from exercises at 0430 on 8 September. Following a brief fuelling from the tanker HMNZS \textit{ENDEAVOUR}, \textit{TE KAHA} headed south at rapid speed in order to be in the vicinity of Darwin should the UNAMET evacuation require naval assistance. After three days travel, \textit{TE KAHA} transited the Wetar Strait north of East Timor early in the morning of 11 September and reported sighting the fires burning in Dili before taking up position in the waters to the south of East Timor.\textsuperscript{65} From here the ship was able to monitor evacuation flights out of Dili while also tracking the movements of up to six Indonesian warships in the vicinity.\textsuperscript{66} Once the evacuations were completed, \textit{TE KAHA} was then directed to Darwin for a briefing on events and the planning in progress for the operation.\textsuperscript{67} As she waited and prepared in Darwin, \textit{TE KAHA} became the first RNZN contribution to the INTERFET Orbat.

Preparations for \textit{ENDEAVOUR} began much further in advance of INTERFET operations. Prior to even commencing the deployment to Australia and Exercise KAKADU in May, the ship was advised to ensure they were prepared for any necessary operations.\textsuperscript{68} This allowed the ship’s personnel to be medically prepared for any eventuality in the region with the necessary vaccination protocols. Despite this unofficial early warning, there was no further notice of requirements until September 1999 while conducting the FPDA

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Crawford and Harper, p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{65} HMNZS \textit{TE KAHA} Report of Proceedings for August dated 19 September 1999, para 7, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Evening Post, Tuesday 14 September 1999, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{67} HMNZS \textit{TE KAHA} Report of Proceedings for August dated 19 September 1999, para 10, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{68} DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F.Campbell, RNZN p. 1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
exercise in the South China Sea. With the expected number of ships arriving off East Timor and Darwin to assist the UNAMET evacuation growing rapidly, fuel supplies had quickly been assessed as a key operational ‘centre of gravity’ for Operation Warden. As a consequence, Australian authorities formally requested the inclusion of HMNZS ENDEAVOUR in the New Zealand contribution on 9 September. ENDEAVOUR was completing the last day of the FPDA exercises before expecting to return to Singapore for crew rest and then making the journey back to New Zealand. With an imminent maintenance period, ENDEAVOUR had not planned to uplift fuel during the visit to Singapore but remained at 60 days notice for any support operations. This plan was amended with the advice on 10 September to uplift 300 cubic metres of crucially needed aviation fuel as well as normal supplies of more readily available F 76 diesel. Although ENDEAVOUR is normally capable of carrying only 170 cubic metres of aviation fuel, judicious management of some of the diesel tanks permitted the extra fuel to be embarked safely. The ship departed from Singapore on 13 September with a small diesel cargo and 470 ‘cubes’ of the critical aviation fuel for maritime and land based helicopters to use. Equally as important, ENDEAVOUR had embarked valuable stores while alongside in Singapore, that TE KAHA had been forced to leave with her urgent departure some days earlier. By uplifting these, ENDEAVOUR ensured their rapid delivery and avoided costly transportation of the stores to Darwin.

Picture 2.2. HMNZS ENDEAVOUR returning alongside Auckland in May 1999. Source: RNZN

70 Dr David Dickens, Interview with Cdre J. Stapleton, RAN, 3 November 2000, p. 6.
71 DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F. Campbell, RNZN, p. 2.
The trip south took longer for ENDEAVOUR than TE KAHA due to her lower power and associated slower speed, finally arriving off the Southern side of East Timor on 18 September. The sea passage was also an eventful one for the unarmed and vulnerable tanker when, on the 15th of September, ENDEAVOUR was approached by an Indonesian landing craft. Adding to the natural tension of the moment was what appeared to be the barrel of a 105 or 155 millimetre field gun protruding from the deck space of the Landing Craft. Over the period of approximately 56 hours the Indonesian Landing Craft remained in the close proximity of ENDEAVOUR on her quarter, before finally breaking this to slowly open out and depart without contact. With the excitement of this event in his mind, the Commander of the ENDEAVOUR manoeuvred through the Indonesian Archipelago going no closer than five nautical miles from any island until clear of the international sea lanes that penetrate the land masses. Once clear and in international waters again to the south of East Timor, ENDEAVOUR joined in loose company with the growing Australian, New Zealand and UK ships now centring on the area. After some initial confusion over intentions, ENDEAVOUR joined TE KAHA and fuelled and provisioned the ANZAC frigate. Once completed, ENDEAVOUR was ordered to a holding position approximately 50 nautical miles south of the Eastern tip of Timor Island on 20 September.

The final major New Zealand naval contribution was to be the older Leander class frigate CANTERBURY. By the end of August, the ship had been away from New Zealand for three months undertaking training in various exercises on the Australian coast. After such a lengthy and busy operating and training period, it was planned that this ship would return to New Zealand for rest and maintenance after a one week gunnery and warfare officer training commitment for the Royal Australian Navy in the East Australian Exercise Areas. Immediately on completion of KAKADU, CANTERBURY departed for Sydney and the East Australian Exercise Areas via a brief stopover in New Zealand to return the Seasprite helicopter which was required to conduct routine periodic maintenance. Even with the helicopter gone, CANTERBURY still provided an ideal training platform for Warfare Officers of the Above Water Specialisation during an

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73 DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F.Campbell, RNZN, p. 3.
74 Ibid, p. 3.
75 Ibid, p. 3.
76 Ibid, p. 4.
intensive firing and exercise week. During the exercises, additional practises were undertaken in Naval Gunfire System (NGS) firings due to equipment problems in the RAN ships. These provided highly beneficial, albeit unexpected, training to the ship’s crew in addition to the Warfare Officers under training. No such training capability exists within New Zealand waters and firing opportunities in NGS are complex and difficult. General drills and exercises were also carried out and, by the end of the week, CANTERBURY had exercised the majority of the above water skills required of a frigate. Although not formally assessed or prepared in advance for the specific operations expected in INTERFET, CANTERBURY was considered by those onboard and in the Zealand Headquarters to be well prepared for low level contingencies. Exercising had been conducted in all warfare areas, firings undertaken on all weapon systems other than the torpedo tubes, and the helicopter well integrated into the ship’s command and control organisation. The ship had also had the benefit of gaining additional training in many areas through proximity to the larger Australian organisation. This was also magnified through ship equipment breakages in other vessels that resulted in CANTERBURY being allocated additional resources. Even as late as the warfare course in September when RAN ships were unable to conduct firings during the warfare officer training, CANTERBURY was able to capitalise and gain additional value.

Picture 2.3. HMNZS CANTERBURY, a gun Leander patrolling off Suai in East Timor, October, 1999.
Despite this, *CANTERBURY* was well beyond her nominal retirement age and key operational equipment was considered old and of limited value in modern warfare theatres. Although most of the ship’s sensors and communications equipment had been modernised, the essential warfighting equipment had not. Anti-air and surface equipment consisted of the 4.5 inch (125 mm) Mk six gun mounting, anti-submarine equipment was the self defence torpedo tubes fitted with obsolescent Mk 46 torpedoes. Only anti-missile equipment had been modernised with the fitting of the independent Close In Weapons System, capable of last ditch protection against anti-ship missiles. The Chief of Naval Staff was not as confident and understood to be reluctant for *CANTERBURY* to become involved in the operation.\(^{78}\) Not withstanding this, as events transpired the need for an additional frigate became essential to allow *TE KAHA* to continue to the MIF operations in the Persian Gulf and naval planners were consulted with a clearer view of the intended activities.\(^{79}\) From the Operation *Warden* Plan it was clear that *CANTERBURY*’s capabilities and training would match the required tasking and the recommendation was made for the ship to enter the ORBAT. This advice was agreed by the Joint Operations Planning Group, then CDF and a final recommendation made to the New Zealand Cabinet.

With this final week of training completed, *CANTERBURY* was conducting a weekend visit to Sydney when she was advised of the possibility that she might be needed to join the INTERFET ORBAT. The Commanding Officer was contacted discreetly by the Maritime Command Fleet Operations Officer, Commander K.N. Corles, RNZN and asked to consider what requirements the ship would have if tasked.\(^{80}\) No commitment was given of any tasking until the following morning 12 September when the Fleet Operations Officer rang again and advised the Commander to return to New Zealand with all available haste. The crew were advised at 0815 that morning in an ad hoc briefing and then began preparing for the rapid transit across the Tasman to Auckland. Arriving some 51 hours later after a very rapid, but fortunately calm, crossing of the Tasman Sea, *CANTERBURY* was prepared in expectation of her inclusion in the INTERFET contribution.\(^{81}\) After 48 hours of preparations, including the attachment of an SH2-G

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\(^{78}\) NZDF DJOP, Capt E.J. Good, RNZN, E-mail transcript dated 7 May 2002.
\(^{79}\) Ibid, p. 5.
\(^{80}\) Glyn Harper, Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, Saturday 13 November 1999.
Seasprite helicopter, the ship sailed at 1915 on Friday 17 September for passage to Darwin via a brief fuelling visit to Cairns.  

Once clear of Auckland, preparatory training for INTERFET began. By now the tasking message for the operation had been received providing some detail of the expected tasks to be undertaken. Training was necessary to bring new members of the ships crew into the team and ensure that command and control was adequate for any tasks of the warning order. This was restricted to areas of known weakness, such as boarding operations, or those with the potential to most seriously compromise the mission, such as Damage Control. By arrival in Cairns all additional training was completed and additional sea training staff disembarked.

After the brief visit to Cairns on 22 September, CANTERBURY continued towards Darwin via the Torres Strait under conditions of total radio silence and darkness other than mandatory navigation lights. This caused some consternation among merchant vessels transiting the busy inner passage of the Great Barrier Reef, unused to the brief sighting of a darkened warship making stealthy passage at speed. Similarly concerned were the resident prawn boats of the Australian fishing fleet who would celebrate the passage with VHF radio renditions of less than tuneful versions of the Village People pop hit “In the Navy.” CANTERBURY did not linger for the remainder of the concert.

Finally clearing the Torres Strait CANTERBURY set course for a rendezvous and short interlude with ENDEAVOUR who was now returning to New Zealand. A spare boat was transferred, fuel taken on board and then both ships parted to proceed to their respective destinations. CANTERBURY hurried towards Darwin, arriving on 24 September to be briefed by officers from the Northern Command Headquarters while awaiting initial tasking for INTERFET. The brief was found to be inadequate as most of the Maritime Command staff worked exclusively for the Australian deployable Joint Headquarters and had, by this time, moved to Dili. Consequently, no great amount of detail could be found from those remaining in Darwin.

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82 Ibid, para. 11, p. 3.
83 Ibid, para. 12, p. 3.
84 Ibid, para. 12, p. 3.
85 Ibid, para. 15, p. 3.
86 Ibid, para. 15, p. 3.
Command and Control arrangements for the New Zealand ships varied from all other NZDF units attached to the INTERFET operation. The Senior National Officer (SNO), New Zealand was appointed on 18 September by the CDF.\textsuperscript{87} Colonel Martyn Dunne, New Zealand Army would act as SNO from a headquarters detachment in the Australian Deployable Joint Headquarters. This would operate initially in Brisbane and then deploy forward to Dili. Suitable Command and Control or staff did not exist to allow the SNO to have control of significant Naval Force elements. Equally, no experience would be resident within the SNO (NZ) organisation. As a result, maritime forces were passed for operational control to Australian and then INTERFET command. This allowed the INTERFET commander to take direct control of the New Zealand ships without having to concern himself with matters of routine administration or support which would be passed from the ships to naval operational headquarters in Auckland.

While in transit to Cairns CANTERBURY was transferred for operational control (OPCON) purposes to the Maritime Commander of Australia. This standard arrangement allows New Zealand warships to undertake routine activities in Australian waters, including Search and Rescue.\textsuperscript{88} Full command of CANTERBURY remained with the Chief of Naval Staff in New Zealand although for practical purposes this was delegated to the Maritime Headquarters in Auckland to ensure that the ships administrative and logistic requirements were maintained at home.

On arrival in Darwin this command arrangement was modified to place CANTERBURY under the OPCON of the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) of INTERFET, Commodore J.R. Stapleton, RAN acting for the Commander of INTERFET. The Maritime Component of the INTERFET headquarters operated initially from the deployable Joint Headquarters in Brisbane and then moved on 21 September to the Dili Library at the forefront of the operation. Co-located with the air, land and overall commands, the headquarters provided little more than a residence in the early days of INTERFET. This HQ reported jointly directly to the Australian Chief of Defence Force via Joint Strategic Headquarters in, Sydney for matters related to Australian Forces, and to the United Nations in New York for matters related directly to INTERFET.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, 15 February 2000, p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{89} Dr David Dickens, Interview Cdre J. Stapleton, RAN, 3 November 2000, p. 9.
This direct reporting between Dili and the CDF (Australia) and the lack of connectivity with other areas of the Australian defence organisation resulted in the Darwin Headquarters, HQNORCOM, not being apprised of progress or operational planning aspects of INTERFET operations, despite their proximity to the operation. This was discovered by CANTERBURY and led to some confusion as she arrived in Darwin anticipating a full brief prior to commencing operations. Staff in HQNORCOM were not aware of sufficient information to provide a good briefing for the ship. The Command and Control organisation appeared very tenuous and even provided little information until the arrival of the first tasking message shortly after arrival in Darwin. This advised CANTERBURY of their transferral to INTERFET operations at 270001Z September 1999 and to prepare to escort HMAS TOBRUK to Dili. With only two days to prepare before her first operation, CANTERBURY and crew rested in Darwin.

All New Zealand naval forces were now in place to assist INTERFET. Both of the operational frigates and the tanker had exercised and generated their capabilities and had also deployed well within the required degree of notice. The ships had, however, undertaken little specialised preparation for the operation and remained at varying DLOC’s, rather than at OLOC as no opportunity was available to generate the higher readiness state. Notwithstanding this, the level of preparedness was considered adequate to the tasks expected. Command and control arrangements in New Zealand, Australia and Dili were in place and INTERFET command had assumed control of the ships. The Royal New Zealand Navy was ready to do business.

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90 Ibid, p. 3.
91 Ibid, p. 4.
TE KAHA’s time with INTERFET in East Timor began well prior to the commencement of Operation Warden on September 20. From her rushed departure from the FPDA exercise on 8 September, TE KAHA’s operational focus was narrowed to include only events in East Timor. At the time of deploying, TE KAHA was conducting the STARDEX exercise in Malaysian waters, a busy and complex exercise, as well as preparing for duties in the Persian Gulf as part of a Maritime Interception Force (MIF). Consequently, the ship was well prepared for operations of any type and quickly made the transition to what would be required near East Timor. As she neared the area of operations limited specific training and preparations began for what was expected, or perhaps more accurately, unexpected, to occur in Timor. On 10 September the ship transferred operational command; reporting by signal to the Operational Control (OPCON) of the RAN Maritime Commander and began preparing for operations by conducting Damage Control, Gunnery and Flying exercises; functions considered likely in the event of a crisis.

By 1300 on the same day, the ship was sufficiently close to East Timor to necessitate a higher than normal state of readiness and the Commanding Officer ordered the ship to Defence Watches. With some trepidation TE KAHA then entered the Wetar Strait (Map

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95 DLA 0165, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr G.R. Smith, RNZN, 16 Feb 00, p. 28.
3), immediately north of East Timor and passed South East towards the Timor Sea. Significantly, that night, the fires that were ravaging Dili by this time were visible to the TE KAHA as she passed, even though the ship was some considerable distance from the shore in order to remain in international waters. 98

By 0600 the following morning, 11 September, TE KAHA had cleared the Wetar Strait and emerged into the Timor Sea (see Map 3) to be met by HMAS DARWIN which had established a patrol line to the south of the island. 99 TE KAHA continued further south to locate the RAN fleet tanker HMAS SUCCESS so she could refuel and replenish on the 12th of September. This transfer included much welcomed food stores to replace those left behind on the wharves in Singapore due to the early departure from STARDEX. The stores also included a bag of freshly baked ANZAC biscuits that served as a poignant reminder of the close working relationship between the two navies and countries. 100

Picture 3.2. SUCCESS’s helicopter prepares to deliver the stores and biscuits. Source: RNZN

More importantly, it signalled acceptance of the TE KAHA as a fully integrated member of the growing maritime force monitoring the developments within East Timor. By this time the Australians had positioned many ships of their combat fleet in the area, which, in addition to the TE KAHA, were joined by the UK’s HMS GLASGOW, together with the

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98 Ibid, p 2, para. 7.
99 Ibid, p 2, para. 7.
100 Ibid, p 2, para. 8.
USNS KILAUEA, a logistics ship and the USS MOBILE BAY, a Ticonderoga Class guided missile cruiser. This membership was to be short-lived in the area of operations, however, as TE KAHA was ordered to proceed to the port of Darwin once the replenishment was completed. Although some confusion arose from this order, which countermanded previous instructions, TE KAHA was able to sort out her tasking through a telephone call to the RAN operational headquarters in Sydney and turned for Darwin. \(^{101}\)

Although the time in the area was short lived, it was not without excitement. An Indonesian Nomad surveillance aircraft approached TE KAHA and was warned off by the ship’s warfare staff on an international radio frequency. This warning was backed by the ship illuminating the aircraft with a fire control radar to establish the height and flight profile. \(^{102}\)

Map 3. The East Timor Area. Source: New Zealand Army

Although withdrawn from the AO by the Maritime Commander Australia, TE KAHA’s presence was now registered with the force. \(^{103}\) The intention was for the ship to receive briefings on events in East Timor and details on plans relating to the future. TE KAHA arrived in Darwin at 0920 the following morning, 13 September and proceeded alongside

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\(^{101}\) Ibid, p 2, para. 8.

\(^{102}\) DLA 0165, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr G.R. Smith, RNZN, 16 Feb 00, p. 28.

\(^{103}\) TE KAHA Report of Proceedings September 1999, para. 8, p. 2.
at Stokes Hill Wharf to await further information. Considerable New Zealand media interest was shown in the ship’s presence although this was not utilised by the ship for publicity, under the firm direction from New Zealand. This was due to the security surrounding both the intentions for *TE KAHA* and the forthcoming operation.

After a number of other ships had similarly berthed in Darwin, a briefing was held by the RAN Commodore Flotillas (COMFLOT), Commodore J.R. Stapleton, RAN in *HMAS ADELAIDE* on Tuesday 14 September. This provided general strategic information on the events of the past few weeks but did not cover the intended activities for the ships leaving the Command and the operational staff of *TE KAHA* still very much in the dark over the intended operations for the ship. It did allow a face to face meeting with COMFLOT though, who was destined to become the INTERFET Maritime Component Commander on 18 September. Two further days were then spent in Darwin at short notice to sail although the crew were no clearer on what was to come. The ship was moved from the wharf to an anchorage and undertook re-supply and training while following the events unfolding in East Timor. Preparations for all expected activities contained within the Operation *Warden* maritime annex to the operation order were progressed. The most notable of these was the loading and preparation of live torpedoes via a barge into the ship’s torpedo tubes on the evening of 16 September in response to the threat of Indonesian submarine activity in the area of operations. Having never been accomplished before by an RNZN ANZAC class warship, let alone via a barge, rather than alongside a wharf, the loading proved yet another unforeseen obstacle to be overcome and was a poignant reminder to the Ship’s Company of *TE KAHA* that they were about to embark on a serious operation.

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105 *TE KAHA* so close Dili seen glowing*, *The Evening Post*, Tuesday 14 September 1999.
107 DLA 0165, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr G.R. Smith, RNZN, 16 February 2000, p. 23.
Although clearly attached to events via the OPCON shift to Australian authorities on 10 September, *TE KAHA* remained a New Zealand individual unit. This changed on 18 September though, while conducting the harbour preparations when *TE KAHA* became New Zealand’s first maritime element contribution to the INTERFET orbat on activation of the task force. With this activation *TE KAHA*’s operational control and responsibility was directly to INTERFET, rather than to a national authority.

With all of the harbour preparations completed and INTERFET in place, *TE KAHA* was finally ordered to sail on the evening of 18 September to commence escort duties of three RAN Landing Craft. The ship sailed at 1930, and that evening joined HMAS *TOBRUK*, in company with warships from Australia and the United Kingdom and the RAN fleet tanker. As a group the small armada then began a slow transit towards the eastern tip of East Timor and the Wetar Strait (see Appendix 1). Over the next 36 hours the group made slow progress to the North and towards the Wetar Strait. *TE KAHA* continued with escort duties while undertaking a number of related maintenance activities. Included was a successful Gun Functioning Trial to check the main gun armament would correctly function if required and allow the ship to clear this major maintenance problem. While this alleviated one of the more significant operational

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defects for TE KAHA, numerous others remained from a list of twenty that affected the ability of the ship. Although many of these were only minor, a number of the defects had the potential to limit TE KAHA in operations. The most serious of them affected both the gun and missile weapon systems, electronic sensors and the main propulsion plant and arose from design faults, coupled with a lack of opportunity to carry out necessary maintenance through an extended period of exercises. Although redundancy existed for some of the defects, the nature of those in areas of the Above and Underwater weapons systems and electronic sensors raise the question of whether TE KAHA’s warfighting equipment was sufficiently prepared for combat operations had the need arisen.

By 20 September the small armada of ships reached the Wetar Strait and began an overnight transit across the top of East Timor. This was timed to arrive at Dili at first light on 21 September to coincide with the arrival of the first aircraft delivering troops at Komoro airport. Once the amphibious ships had been delivered, TE KAHA was not required to remain near Dili for escort operations and was detached to commence two days of air surveillance duties to the south of the island. Using her capable air defence and surface warning radar the SPS 49V5, TE KAHA maintained excellent spatial awareness of air and surface movements in the area and was also able to act as control ship for the P3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft operating in the vicinity as well as for their own SH-2F Seasprite helicopter which could be used for surface surveillance when the P3 was unavailable. These aircraft were engaged in identifying and tracking any surface or submarine movements in the Area of Operations and particularly those of the Indonesian naval forces. Of particular concern was the detection and tracking of the two Indonesian Type 209 conventional submarines, the KRI NANGGALA and CAKRA who had been detected on 21 September by HMAS ADELAIDE. Although both submarines were observed on the surface tracking from East of Dili towards the West Timor port of Kupang, it was considered essential to be certain of their whereabouts as they posed a considerable threat to both military and merchant vessels with their mine and torpedo

112 Ibid, Annex D, para. 1c, f, h, i, 2a, c, d, e, j, m.
114 HMAS ADELAIDE Report of Proceedings September 1999, para 8, p 3
capabilities. Indonesian intentions were still not completely clear at this stage and the
need to track such contacts was considered a high priority by the tactical commanders at
sea in the tense first few days of INTERFET operation.\textsuperscript{115}

The task of Aircraft Controller can only be assigned to ships with suitable radar
characteristics and qualified personnel. The duty normally requires a ship of frigate size
or larger, and involves a trained aircraft controller in the ship maintaining flight safety
details for the aircraft while on task as well as other measures of support when contacts
are discovered. At the same time, the air bridge of helicopters and transport aircraft had
now begun into East Timor from Darwin. \textit{TE KAHA}'s positioning throughout these two
days was directly beneath the air lane and ensured she was available for Search and
Rescue duties, although fortunately these were never called upon.\textsuperscript{116} \textit{TE KAHA} also
conducted distant escort for a number of surface support vessels now beginning to move
vital supplies to the ground forces being established in Dili.\textsuperscript{117}

Meanwhile, the initial ground forces had successfully been established and
\textit{ENDEAVOUR}'s cargo of fuel was urgently required. \textit{TE KAHA} moved to escort the
tanker into Dili late on 21 September at the direction of the Maritime Component
Commander (MCC) who was concerned at ensuring protection of vital supplies.\textsuperscript{118} Once
\textit{ENDEAVOUR} had been escorted safely to the vicinity of Dili, \textit{TE KAHA} was detached to
become the Eastern approach control ship, providing a gateway reporting and controlling
vessel. Subsequently \textit{TE KAHA} also became the Dili Guard Ship, relieving an Australian
frigate on station that required fuel. Although only employed briefly in this role, \textit{TE
KAHA}'s presence ensured continuity of the role during the period of maximum
vulnerability for land forces. This unbroken presence, in the Dili area in particular, by a
ship was recorded by many as one of the key naval contributions, even coming to the
attention of the Commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove who noted the
reassuring effects caused by the presence of numerous warships as early as day H
(landing day) + 48 hours.\textsuperscript{119} Certainly in hindsight, the “persuasive, intimidatory or

\textsuperscript{115} DLB 0008, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr D.W. Bates, RAN, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{116} DLA 0165, RNZN Record of Interview – Cdr G.R.Smith, RNZN, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{TE KAHA} Report of Proceedings September 1999, p. 2, para. 15.
\textsuperscript{118} Dr David Dickens, “The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level”,
\textsuperscript{119} Cdre B.D. Robertson, RAN (Retired), Not learning the lessons of Operation Stabilize, \textit{Journal of the
Australian Naval Institute}, Volume 26, April/June 2000, p. 10.
deterrent nature of major warships” was regarded, by Cosgrove as a key part of INTERFET operations.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{TE KAHA} was also directed to remain available as \textit{ENDEAVOUR}’s escort out of the Dili region once she had completed the fuelling tasks she had been assigned.\textsuperscript{121} This provided an extended break between tanker escort duties and allowed time for \textit{TE KAHA} to conduct another close escort assignment. Late on the evening of 21 September, \textit{TE KAHA} was despatched to the Timor Sea to find the merchant vessel \textit{MV Lady Elaine} and escort it back to Dili to unload essential first line stores and equipment. Once this was completed, \textit{ENDEAVOUR} was first escorted from the area of operations, then re-fuelled \textit{TE KAHA} who resumed her previous tasking of Air Surveillance in the southern areas of the Timor Sea.\textsuperscript{122} After a night of surveillance \textit{TE KAHA} again took up the role of merchant escort and headed back towards Dili protecting two large merchant ships bound for the port.\textsuperscript{123} After passing these over to the Dili Guardship the following day, \textit{TE KAHA} continued west through the AO. At 1000 on 25 September \textit{TE KAHA} signalled operational control back to New Zealand authorities and proceeded to Singapore, with no further part to play in INTERFET.

Picture 3.4. \textit{TE KAHA} approaches Dili harbour for the final time. Source RNZN

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{TE KAHA} Report of Proceedings September 1999, para. 17, p. 2.  
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, para. 17.  
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, para. 18.
TE KAHA had completed a total of 13 days associated with East Timor of which eight days within the INTERFET force. Although short in duration, TE KAHA’s input had been an important and successful contribution for New Zealand. From 8 September until her inclusion as an INTERFET force element on 18 September, TE KAHA’s mission and main utility was as a national strategic element. Arguably, this was the most significant role in a very short operation, much of which was spent in Darwin harbour preparing. The hasty departure from Singapore and subsequent appearance in the Timor Sea played was important in reinforcing New Zealand’s international political and diplomatic efforts as East Timor plunged into anarchy at the hands of the militia. New Zealand’s Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Jenny Shipley, in her first interview on the gathering humanitarian crisis, recognised this on 8 September and opened with the comment that TE KAHA was moving towards East Timor. This made clear New Zealand’s intention to consider the application of military force if the situation did not improve. At the very least, New Zealand would be witness, through the presence of TE KAHA, to the failure of Indonesian security guarantees.

While the capabilities of TE KAHA were deemed suitable for the developing tasks of the INTERFET mission, it was the more generic capabilities of the warship as an element of New Zealand Seapower that matched it to the diplomatic mission and national strategic tasks between 8 – 18 September. As a larger warship and very identifiable national unit, the frigate possessed a number of unique characteristics that made it a suitable, and in this case the preferred, tool for the initial military backing of diplomacy. Key among these was the ability to create presence. It was essential that a New Zealand national presence was established quickly in East Timor as the trouble flared. This provided a valuable breathing space for the New Zealand Government as they struggled to deal with the enormity of the tragedy unfolding and sought to continue to evaluate both diplomatic and military options to deal with the events. This New Zealand presence was noted by

124 Ibid, para. 18.
125 New Zealand Warship ordered to Timor seas, New Zealand Herald, 8 September 1999, pp. 1 – 2.
126 Agreement between the Govt’s of Indonesia and Portugal – NY 5 May 1999, Art 1.
127 Dr David Dickens, The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level, Contemporary South East Asia, Vol 23, No 2, August 2001, p. 11.

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both the International Community and Indonesia as part of the gathering international maritime force. 129

Significantly, the presence of the maritime forces also assisted the New Zealand and Australian governments with the ability to bring the issue of East Timor onto the agenda at the APEC conference and leaders summit by demonstrating the significance of the issue to both nations. 130 In addition to the obvious regional interest in discussing this at APEC, this was significant as it meant that major extra-regional countries and their associated leaders and politicians, already destined to be involved in APEC discussions, such as the United States and Canada, were now free to express their views without being seen as interfering without invitation. This proved the case when President Clinton insisted on 10 September that East Timor be given maximum attention during the APEC summit. 131 Ultimately, it also assisted in convincing both the US and UK that military assistance would be appropriate in backing INTERFET and the United Nations mandate. 132

While this positive pressure worked well on most APEC attendees, it acted as a negative influence on Indonesian authorities. Indonesian President Habibie refused to attend APEC, preferring in the end to despatch his foreign minister, Ali Alitas, in his stead. 133 Not withstanding this, the pressure on Indonesia, via Alitas and the media, was steadily increased throughout APEC as a measure of international resolve, aided in part by the presence of TE KAHA and other maritime units.

The presence of seapower in the Timor region also demonstrated commitment to Australia. By the time of TE KAHA's arrival in Timor waters, Australia had provisionally accepted the mantle of leadership of INTERFET and was searching for regional and international assistance. 134 New Zealand's early commitment and presence ensured good standing with a long-term ally and directly supported Australian efforts. Although he did

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130 Ibid.
132 New Zealand Warship ordered to Timor seas, NZ Herald, 8 September 1999, pp. 1 – 2.
133 G. Ansley, and J. Armstrong, “Urgent meeting on Timor must take delicate route”, NZ Herald, 9 September 1999.
134 Ryan, p. 15.
not comment on New Zealand’s commitment specifically, it is notable that the Commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove referred to “the presence in the area of the USS MOBILE BAY was a welcome asset” in his post-mission address to the Georgetown University. By logical extension, the provision of a New Zealand warship constituted similar, if lesser, international impact.

More visibly, the provision of a warship granted membership of the operational force being developed and permitted New Zealand to voice the need for concessions on the nature of the operation. Prime Minister Shipley established three essential conditions for Indonesia to meet before it would commit New Zealand combat land forces to enter East Timor as part of the peace enforcement force. These three conditions were:

a. Indonesian endorsement of a peace keeping taskforce;
b. United Nations sanction of the force; and
c. for the force composition to be broader than just the initial Australian and New Zealand base.

All of these pre-conditions were met while New Zealand seapower continued to provide presence near the island.

Lending weight to the value of presence was the superior ability of the ANZAC platform with reach and poise, as the ship moved swiftly first to transit and then remain for extended time in the vicinity of Timor and subsequently Darwin. Indonesia suffered additional diplomatic pressure from the knowledge that the ships of its regional partners were now observing activities in East Timor and reporting these, indirectly, to the press. All of these characteristics, augmented by the freedom of manoeuvre, cost effectiveness and graduated responsiveness inherent in seapower, made TE KAHA an ideal addition to the gathering international maritime force.

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137 Ibid, p. 41.
This international diplomatic benefit also assisted in both prompting and gaining United Nation’s support against Indonesia. As further statements from regional and maritime nations highlighted the gathering humanitarian crisis, the United Nations was able to coerce Indonesia to accept that a peacekeeping mission was required, and that their own forces were inadequate to maintain security. Eventually this also contributed indirectly to the Security Council Resolution allowing the formation and deployment of INTERFET.

The application of seapower also served internal New Zealand political aims. The deployment of TE KAHA ended a difficult political period for the Government where inaction over East Timor had been criticised by opposition parties. The Government was then able to claim the moral high ground of swift action after the Referendum inspired violence, by being one of the first countries to commit a military unit into the area.

Finally, the presence of warships during the period from 8 - 18 September provided considerable options for military planners, again highlighting the applicability of seapower. The versatility of platforms able to provide intelligence, as well as a complete picture of the tactical environment was of significant advantage as well as acting as a deterrent to new, and potentially hostile, Indonesian forces attempting to enter the area. As this phase concluded and INTERFET deployed, the large grouping of combat capable ships provided a strong deterrent to the Indonesians from any thought of attacking or hindering the United Nations mandated security force, by aircraft, surface or sub-surface vessels. Once the deployment of land forces began, the capabilities of the ships also acted as a significant deterrent to the militia and Indonesian ground forces from regular military involvement as INTERFET troops landed.

It is significant to note that TE KAHA deployed to East Timor from routine exercises with less than one day’s notice for operations. Despite being at a theoretical Degree of Notice

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142 Ibid.
(DoN) of 60 days, the ship was able to begin operations using its inherent capability. While some of this can be ascribed to the ongoing preparations for a forthcoming deployment, the East Timor operations were seen as merely a continuation of activity, albeit heightened, rather than something new. Such flexible capability was not available within other combat force elements and the presence and versatility of *TE KAHA* served to underscore military commitment while other force elements set about generating Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) and personnel.

It is also valuable to assess *TE KAHA*’s activities against the backdrop of those expected in the Operation *Warden* Plan. This required combatant ships to expect operations in surveillance, escort, sea transport and support to INTERFET.\(^{144}\) Although *TE KAHA* served only eight days within the force structure, in the space of time available, all of the expected tasks were undertaken except sea transport. This length of service permitted *TE KAHA* to be part of Phases One and Two of the plan which foresaw training, preparation and consolidation of forces in Darwin, followed by the insertion of land forces into Dili under the protective umbrella of combatant forces.\(^{145}\)

More generally, there was a clear understanding that the land phase of INTERFET operations could only be undertaken with the protective support of warships, and particularly those capable of protecting the essential supply lines or, in the worst case, providing support to troops ashore via Naval Gunfire Support.\(^{146}\) All of the objectives were achieved and as *TE KAHA* departed from INTERFET, the legacy of operations for further RNZN ships was one of rapid success within the maritime force. Not withstanding this, some issues do remain over *TE KAHA*’s preparedness, had events turned for the worst. Combat equipment defects were noted to a higher level than for other ships and this might have had a detrimental effect on capability. As things turned out though these defects did not prevent *TE KAHA* from fulfilling all tasks allocated to her.

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\(^{144}\) Annex G to HQAST OP WARDEN CONOPS dated 19 September 1999.

\(^{145}\) Ibid.

Chapter Four  

ENDEAVOUR

Of the RNZN ships ultimately involved in East Timor, HMNZS ENDEAVOUR received the longest warning, albeit informally, of what was likely to come. Advised in July 1999 of the possibility of impending activity, the ship’s Commanding Officer, Commander John Campbell, RNZN took steps to ensure that his personnel were mentally prepared for operations. 147 The lack of a formal warning precluded any serious material preparation or direct briefings for the ship’s company, due to the need for operational security. Advice was provided that the ship would remain at 60 days DoN for operations, which theoretically allowed plenty of time to prepare had the need arisen. 148 At the time of the warning the ship was also in the middle of a planned deployment, allowing little to be achieved without drawing unwanted attention to it.

Although this notice provided an incentive for the Command to remain alert and follow events in East Timor via the news media, the greatest preparation for any ship is activity and ENDEAVOUR was not short of this. ENDEAVOUR had deployed from New Zealand in May 1999 for routine training in Australia and then on to South East Asia for more of the same.

ENDEAVOUR is capable of a full load of 9,500 cubic metres (7,500 tonnes) of main diesel fuel and 170 cubic metres (125 tonnes) of specialised marine aviation fuel, known as AVCAT. As the RNZN’s only tanker the ship is normally deployed as part of a RNZN Task Group. 149 Constructed for the RNZN in 1988 ENDEAVOUR’s hull, engineering and accommodation are based on a merchant design, with specialised military equipment fitted to perform the task of re-fuelling at sea. ENDEAVOUR is capable of fuelling up to three ships in sequence for a maximum period of eight hours per day. This restriction is caused by the Lloyd’s registration limit that restricts the crew size to a maximum of 49, which is very small in comparison to most military tankers that perform additional logistic and replenishment roles such as carrying ammunition and supplies. An additional design feature built in when the ship was constructed was the inclusion of mounting points for a small number of ISO containers on the main deck to

147 DLA 0115, RNZN record of Interview, Cdr J.F. Campbell, RNZN, dated 7 January 2000, p. 1.
149 Ibid, p. 2.
allow Task Group ships to store consumable items for deployments. These arrangements rely on the ability of the customer ship to store and recover their own items while ENDEAVOUR is alongside in harbour. ENDEAVOUR is also capable of limited command and control with some limited radio, signalling and telecommunications facilities. These facilities are rudimentary in nature when compared to the warships of the RNZN.

The training deployment had commenced with an unaccompanied although eventful transit to Western Australia. Originally scheduled to be in company with HMNZS TE KAHA and then subsequently HMNZS CANTERBURY, this plan was modified at the last minute due to engineering problems in the other vessels. Despite the lack of a Task Group to support, ENDEAVOUR sailed by herself in order to fulfil an obligation to a number of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships undertaking work-up training which required a tanker consort. Originally this work-up training would have been shared with an Australian tanker, however, none was available, leaving all the training serials available for ENDEAVOUR. Although the work-up was dedicated to the RAN vessels, the nature of such training allows other ships to gain considerable value from the activities, including access to the highly valued RAN Sea Training Group. During the months spent in company with the warships ENDEAVOUR grew highly proficient at her core task of re-fuelling as well as the additional tasks expected of the crew such as damage control and first aid.

By mid-July this work-up training was drawing to a close and ENDEAVOUR, in company with numerous RAN ships and by this time, HMNZS CANTERBURY, sailed as a Task Group to Darwin for exercise KAKADU IV. As it approached Darwin, the small task group grew with the inclusion of HMNZS TE KAHA, HMS GLASGOW and HMAS BRISBANE which had sailed up to Darwin from the east coast of Australia. Once together, the entire group conducted yet another work-up assessment, this time for HMAS ANZAC, before entering Darwin to prepare for KAKADU and join with yet another group of ships who had arrived independently for the exercise. This group included the RAN fleet tanker SUCCESS. After a short period of time in Darwin preparing for the exercise as one of two tankers, ENDEAVOUR was then surprised to find

herself providing all fuelling support to the large group of ships until exercise completion on 14 August, due to an engineering defect in SUCCESS.151 These exercises were to prove vital to ENDEAVOUR in the months ahead. The opportunities provided by the numerous ships and aircraft of the various task groups continued to stretch and exercise the crew and resulted in much higher preparation than would normally have been the case. As a consequence, by the end of exercise KAKADU, staff officers from the RNZN Maritime Headquarters were able to observe and comment that ENDEAVOUR had attained a standard equivalent to OLOC whereby the ship could safely conduct two simultaneous fuel replenishments while supplying a helicopter with stores on the flight deck.152

Picture 4.1. Replenishment crew prepare to pass fuelling equipment to a ship near East Timor.

Source: RNZN

With KAKADU behind her, ENDEAVOUR joined with HMNZS TE KAHA and headed to Singapore in company, yet again, with ships of the RAN. This pattern of intense exercise activity with the RAN and RNZN ships, augmented by numerous re-fuelling exercises with RN, RSN and RMN ships continued until the end of Exercise STARDEX, the Five Power Defence Arrangement exercise, on 9 September. Having previously attained the highly skilled level of capability for OLOC, ENDEAVOUR was then able to maintain the competence because of the nature and pace of Exercise STARDEX activities. As the exercise concluded ENDEAVOUR witnessed TE KAHA’s urgent

151 DLA 0115, RNZN record of interview, Cdr J.F. Campbell, RNZN, dated 7 January 2000, p. 1.
departure for East Timor and awaited a similar tasking.\(^\text{153}\) Again a verbal warning and some basic intentions were provided to the Commanding Officer by Naval HQ staff, although the DoN was not officially reduced from 60 days. The original plan had been for ENDEAVOUR to return to Singapore when STARDEX completed, to allow shore leave for personnel before returning to New Zealand with near empty fuel tanks. This was in preparation for maintenance and inspection to be carried out at home that would require access to the main fuel tanks. With no official advice to the contrary, it was necessary to continue with this plan for the time being. Within the ship’s operations staff though, planning began, to be ready for what was now expected to come. Even so, signalled confirmation did not arrive until after the exercise had finished and the ship was enroute back towards Singapore.\(^\text{154}\)

Once official notification had been received, the plan was modified quickly to account for events occurring in East Timor that now necessitated ENDEAVOUR supplying fuel, and particularly AVCAT, as soon as possible to the maritime forces assembling near East Timor. ENDEAVOUR was advised by signal to load fuel and then proceed to the Timor Sea to become part of Operation DORIX, the New Zealand contribution to the plan for a Services Assisted Evacuation of East Timor.\(^\text{155}\) The requirements for the forthcoming operation now began to clarify, although they created some difficulties. A signal was received advising that the priority was to load 300 cubic metres of AVCAT, an unusual requirement given the peacetime limitation of only 170 cubic metres in the ship’s tanks.\(^\text{156}\) As soon as ENDEAVOUR was alongside this evolution began, modifying normal restrictions on the main fuel tanks to allow the loading of 370 cubes into the forward wing tanks. In addition to their own increased stores requirements for such an unexpected operation at the end of a deployment, over the weekend, ENDEAVOUR’s crew loaded 18 cargo pallets of stores and supplies for TE KAHA, two large submarine fenders and stores for an RAAF squadron that needed to be returned urgently to Australian shores.\(^\text{157}\) Far from the expected state of the crew being relaxed and the tanks empty, the now tense, loaded and fully prepared ship sailed at 1030 hours Monday 13 September 1999 and began the transit of the international sea-lanes through the

\(^{153}\) Ibid, p. 2.

\(^{154}\) Ibid, p. 2.


\(^{156}\) DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F. Campbell, RNZN, dated 7 January 2000, p. 11.

\(^{157}\) Ibid, para. 9.
Indonesian Archipelago towards the Timor Sea. Rather than the expected 60 days notice, the ship had prepared and deployed for operations with less than 72 hours warning.

The transit to East Timor was no less eventful. On Tuesday 14 September, *ENDEAVOUR* developed main engine difficulties and after coming to an unexpected halt was forced to initially drift, and then eventually anchor, approximately 100 miles north of the Karimata Strait while her engineers struggled to find and rectify the problem.\(^{158}\) Almost 18 hours later, at 0200 the following morning, the defect was finally cleared and it was possible to weigh anchor and proceed again towards East Timor. The engineers had found the fault which was caused by a rag that had blocked a small pipe. The additional time spent in transit was not wasted though as the crew began preparing with First Aid training for those not usually involved in such activity. All of the embarked diesel fuel was also ‘polished’ during the transit, a process whereby the fuel is passed through evaporators and filters to strain and purify the end product.\(^{159}\) This ensured that *ENDEAVOUR* would be ready to deliver high quality diesel fuel to any ship or shore platform as soon as she reached the operating area.

Late in the day on Thursday 16 September while passing the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, tension onboard rose appreciably when an Indonesian Frosch Class Landing Craft, *KRI TELUK SANGKULIRANG* suddenly joined and then proceeded to follow the *ENDEAVOUR* for the next 24 hours.\(^{160}\) While this unexpected and silent shadow were enough to worry the crew and commander, the tension was heightened even further by what appeared to be the barrel of a large field gun observed inside the landing craft’s open cargo deck, pointing outwards.\(^{161}\) A very close eye was maintained on the Landing Craft, however, other than changing the position of the shadow from time to time, no move was made to impede *ENDEAVOUR*’s passage or to communicate. Eventually, the Landing Craft left without ever acknowledging the presence of *ENDEAVOUR*.

Eventually, with no escort or shadow, *ENDEAVOUR* slipped through the Wetar Strait at sunset on 18 September and began making ground to the south to rendezvous the

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\(^{158}\) Ibid, para. 6.
\(^{159}\) Ibid, para. 7.
\(^{160}\) Ibid, para. 7.
\(^{161}\) DLA 0115, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr J.F. Campbell, RNZN, dated 7 January 2000, p. 3.
following day with SUCCESS, the RAN tanker, and the group of international warships surrounding her. ENDEAVOUR’s mission at this point was by no means clear, evidenced by a signal from SUCCESS directing ENDEAVOUR to proceed in accordance with her previous orders, when she had received none! Eventually these did arrive, 15 minutes after the previous order to move on.

With her tasking clarified, ENDEAVOUR turned to the south again and headed towards a new rendezvous with TE KAHA, now back at sea and escorting a group of INTERFET landing craft from Darwin to Dili. Finally, at 1330 on 19 September ENDEAVOUR sighted and joined TE KAHA and immediately began transferring the stores and provisions she had brought from Singapore by helicopter, before re-fuelling the ANZAC frigate until after dark. The completion of this evolution brought the last of the INTERFET ships to a healthy fuel state and it was decided that ENDEAVOUR should proceed to a safe distance 50 nautical miles to the east of Timor Island and await developments.

As the INTERFET armada progressed towards Dili, ENDEAVOUR reached a small manoeuvring box well clear of East Timor and remained within a few miles of this position awaiting further orders. This allowed the ship’s company to relax slightly and conduct routine training until TE KAHA joined her on the 20th in preparation for a fuel delivery to Dili. Late in the evening of Tuesday 21 September the two ships slipped from the imaginary box and began the slow transit to Dili, arriving early on the morning of the 22nd. At 0600 that morning, ENDEAVOUR slipped quietly alongside SUCCESS, and began the lengthy process of transferring fuel. At this stage, SUCCESS and ENDEAVOUR were the only fuelling capable logistic ships in the INTERFET force.

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163 Ibid, para. 8.
164 Ibid, para. 9.
165 Ibid, para. 10.
166 Ibid, para. 11.
SUCCESS was anchored one and a half miles from shore in Dili harbour and acted as the staging point for all INTERFET fuel supplies into East Timor during the early phases of INTERFET operations. This was due to the uncertainty of fuel supply as other than what was brought in by INTERFET forces, the only other fuel in the region was controlled by Indonesian forces in the Dili oil storage facility.\(^{167}\) Because this meant that fuel supplies ashore could not be guaranteed, the INTERFET plan relied on a near permanent basing of a military logistic ship in Dili Harbour, capable of supplying both diesel and AVCAT to a Forward Arming and Re-fuelling Point (FARP) at the Komoro airport.\(^{168}\) Initially achieved by under slung load of collapsible fuel bladders, it was eventually improved to a system that used fuel trucks loaded into small harbour landing craft that would come alongside the tanker and be slowly loaded from a small domestic size hose.\(^{169}\) The system was very inefficient and eventually had to be changed due to the small delivery amounts. Supplies were sent ashore throughout the day and night as demand emptied the tanks ashore. Assured re-supply was critical although it placed immediate and severe restrictions on the normal ability of a fleet tanker to move with the patrolling ships and re-fuel them.\(^{170}\) Additionally, it generated an essential requirement for a second tanker to re-supply the ship from strategic stocks and assure a constant supply to the immobile tanker. Had only one tanker been available, a fuelling run to Darwin and back would have taken over five days. Without land based storage capabilities, land and air activities

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\(^{167}\) Cdre B.D. Robertson, RAN (Retired), “Not learning the lessons of Operation Stabilise”, *Journal of the Australian Nautical Institute*, Journal 26, No 2, April/May 2000, pp. 11-12.

\(^{168}\) Ibid.

\(^{169}\) Ibid.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.
would have been forced to be curtailed or even ceased. Such an option was not viable for INTERFET to succeed. The necessary facilities to avoid such an arrangement did not present themselves until after the completion of INTERFET when United Nations authorities took over running of the Indonesian fuel storage site. In essence, INTERFET plans could only succeed if two tankers were available. The plan for a fixed fuelling tanker also required modification as time progressed and the INTERFET ‘ink spot’ technique took effect.\(^{171}\) This part of the plan called for initial INTERFET efforts to be directed to controlling activities in Dili and then moving to various key localities to establish control. Eventually, the ink spots would be joined as sufficient INTERFET forces grew within East Timor. As the ink spots grew from Dili, however, so too the demands for fuel and the plan to re-supply them from fixed locations.\(^{172}\) Eventually, hinterland requirements would have overwhelmed the Dili base and other FARP’s were added to the East Timor infrastructure in preparation for refuelling needs. Adding to the constraints of this plan, initially the maritime fuelling platform task in Dili could only be filled by SUCCESS as her Fleet Tanker capabilities also included the necessary communications equipment to act as a forward command and control platform. This capability dwarfed the initial capabilities of Army communications ashore and guaranteed access for the MCC to key intelligence and command information.\(^{173}\) More importantly, information received could be passed on to the Commander INTERFET, ensuring his situational awareness was improved by access to the better information available in SUCCESS.\(^{174}\) ENDEAVOUR did not possess this capability and was thus the logical mobile tanker while SUCCESS was better suited as the maritime command platform.

SUCCESS was also able to act as the logistic coordinator and forward base for some army, air and all maritime units, particularly for food, mail and some logistic supplies. These extensive capabilities were exercised from 20 September, supporting all operations for INTERFET, until she left the operation on 28 October, by which time Army facilities were in place to cover shore operations. Aside from occasional short forays to sea in the Dili area, SUCCESS remained anchored in the harbour throughout her time in East Timor.

\(^{171}\) Ryan, p. 70.

\(^{172}\) Cdre B.D. Robertson, RAN (Retired), “Not learning the lessons of Operation Stabilise”, *Journal of the Australian Nautical Institute*, Journal 26, No 2, April/May 2000, pp. 11-12.


\(^{174}\) Ibid.
while INTERFET called on ENDEAVOUR to ferry the necessary strategic fuel supplies to top up SUCCESS's larger tanks.

Once alongside SUCCESS on 21 September, ENDEAVOUR began unloading AVCAT to the larger tanker as quickly as capabilities allowed. SUCCESS was at a high state of alert from concerns over the proximity to shore and the associated possibility that either the Indonesian military or militia might attempt to disrupt INTERFET maritime operations or fuel supplies. This state caused some difficulties for the ENDEAVOUR, which, as a minimally manned ship could never be expected to match the manpower needed to provide for its own physical safety. This concern over vulnerability prevented her remaining alongside for longer than absolutely necessary. It did not prevent her unloading and departing however, and ENDEAVOUR commenced transferring the much-needed fuel by large flexible pipes. Over the next five hours 170 cubic metres of AVCAT and 700 cubic metres of diesel were transferred to the Australian tanker before it was discovered that the AVCAT had lost specification since being embarked in Singapore. After arranging to polish this over the next 48 hours and then return to deliver it, ENDEAVOUR slipped from SUCCESS and returned to sea to replenish three RAN warships on a patrol line well away from shore and under the protective umbrella of the Dili Guard ship. Operations ashore were already beginning to draw heavily on maritime fuel reserves and it became clear to both the MCC staff and SUCCESS logistics co-ordinators that they would quickly begin to run short of diesel fuel if efforts were not made to ferry in fresh supplies. So later that night, the plans for ENDEAVOUR were changed and she was despatched to Cairns where a large volume of military grade fuel had been stockpiled in preparation for an exercise now cancelled due to INTERFET operations. Once there, the plan was for ENDEAVOUR to load 3,000 cubic metres of Diesel and return directly to Dili and SUCCESS. Darwin was not used due to questions about supply quantities and the need to preserve stocks for the chain of international warships now rotating through the Australian port on their way to join the force. With TE KAHA assigned as escort for the first 100 nautical miles – well clear of any potential threat - ENDEAVOUR moved off the patrol line at 2300 that night and begin the five-day transit to Cairns. Once clear of the 100-mile limit, ENDEAVOUR bid farewell to TE

176 Ibid, para. 11.
177 DLA 0115, Interview Cdr J.F Campbell, RNZN, 7 January 2000, p. 5.
who returned towards East Timor while the tanker continued east towards the Torres Strait and Great Barrier Reef. The straight forward transit was broken only when ENDEAVOUR rendezvoused briefly to fuel the CANTERBURY now bound for Darwin and provide stores useful for her forthcoming operations.\textsuperscript{178} Otherwise uneventful, the transit passed quickly and ENDEAVOUR arrived at Cairns on 27 September.

On arrival it became obvious that key information concerning fuel supplies had not been passed to the INTERFET MCC. Despite nearly full fuel bunkers in Cairns, a coastal fuel tanker was already in port attempting to unload at the time of ENDEAVOUR’s arrival. This meant that Cairns was oversupplied with fuel eventually having to remain in the coastal tanker. Initially, naval personnel in Cairns attempted to have ENDEAVOUR embark full tanks to relieve the overstock. ENDEAVOUR had been instructed to only take the ordered 3,000 cubic metres. This was an MCC order arising from the belief that this was as much as Cairns could safely spare, while still leaving some minor holdings for transitory ships.\textsuperscript{179} Even worse, it was discovered that the coastal tanker had sailed straight past Darwin enroute to Cairns, where it could have provided much needed stocks closer to East Timor and INTERFET. These pieces of information could not be passed to the MCC in time, due to the lack of signal and message connectivity into the Dili Headquarters. So after a full night spent fuelling, ENDEAVOUR eventually sailed from Cairns early in the morning of 30 September with only 3,000 cubic metres of diesel embarked.\textsuperscript{180} Compounding this issue, the destination for the fuel was now equally unclear. No firm advice had been received from the MCC on where ENDEAVOUR was to proceed to and a destination was requested as the ship cleared the Great Barrier Reef. Without a clear indication a middle course was selected between the two likely possibilities of Darwin and Dili.\textsuperscript{181} Eventually the situation was resolved when, still believing that Cairns possessed little fuel and Darwin adequate supplies, ENDEAVOUR was directed on 1 October by the MCC to proceed to Darwin and attempt to fill her remaining capacity.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{179} DLA 0115, Interview Cdr J.F Campbell, RNZN, 7 January 2000, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, p. 6.
Arriving in Darwin late in the evening on 3 October, it was quickly confirmed that the fuel situation in Darwin was not what MCC believed. Starved of supply by the bypassing of the coastal tanker, Darwin authorities reacted in horror when asked by ENDEAVOUR to supply 3,000 cubic metres of diesel. Finally persuaded to release some of their small remaining supply, ENDEAVOUR moved on to an available wharf and began embarking 1000 cubic metres at lunchtime on 4 October. The process of gaining the fuel was further slowed by the fact that a large merchant vessel was positioned on the fuel installation wharf and so ENDEAVOUR could only load via two small three inch hoses instead of the normal eight inch high pressure fuel couplings available in a tank installation. It was destined to take the ship and shore authorities until 1800 that night before the loading, normally completed in approximately an hour, could be completed. The additional time was not completely wasted, however, as ENDEAVOUR loaded 38 pallet loads of fresh and frozen stores and 24 bags of mail for the fleet. With all stores and the fuel finally embarked, ENDEAVOUR cast off at 2000 and proceeded back to sea, this time in the company of HMAS TOBRUK until clear of Darwin harbour. Once safely outside the harbour limits TOBRUK detached ENDEAVOUR who began an independent transit overnight towards Dili at a faster speed that TOBRUK could not match.

After a quiet night of independent passage, ENDEAVOUR conducted continuation exercises in open waters the following morning. This allowed TOBRUK and her assigned escort, the French Naval Ship (FNS) VENDEMAIRE, to catch up with ENDEAVOUR and then began an escorted passage in to Dili from the Timor Sea. After being detached off the northern coast and loitering clear of Dili until first light, ENDEAVOUR again gently eased herself alongside SUCCESS at 0540 on the morning of 6 October. Fuel immediately began to flow into SUCCESS on one side from ENDEAVOUR, while smaller landing craft with road tankers embarked diesel and AVCAT on the other. With the ship attached to SUCCESS, personnel normally required to watch keep at sea were also released and simultaneously stores were offloaded via a helicopter to whichever ship had ordered them. Although the process ran smoothly, it was arduous and demanding work for the small ships company. By 1300 the transfers were completed and ENDEAVOUR slipped from SUCCESS and proceed back to sea, this time to fuel and

183 DLA 0115, Interview Cdr J.F Campbell, RNZN, 7 January 2000, p. 6.
185 Ibid, para. 5.
replenish the escort and supply vessels, *CANTERBURY* and USNS *SAN JOSE* as they made their way as a group towards the east.

By now the issues of fuel management and Australian reserve holdings were coming to the notice of the MCC who had begun to seek fuel sources from outside of Australia.\(^{186}\) With the *CANTERBURY* and *SAN JOSE* replenishment and an associated stores flying serial completed by 1700, *ENDEAVOUR* reversed course and began yet another independent passage to Singapore to collect and then ferry a full load of diesel and AVCAT back to INTERFET.

After a relatively uneventful journey, *ENDEAVOUR* berthed at the naval basin in Singapore at 0915 on Monday 11 October. Following a now familiar pattern, the ship immediately began filling her tanks over the next 14 hours. After a brief stay overnight for crew rest, *ENDEAVOUR* then sailed the following morning for passage directly back to Dili.\(^{187}\) Again the ship encountered a warship of the Indonesian navy as it made passage through the Indonesian Archipelago waters and was questioned by the *KRI ARUN*, a similar sized and armed tanker, on the afternoon of Tuesday 12 October.\(^{188}\) After advising the *ARUN* that *ENDEAVOUR* was bound for New Zealand via Darwin, rather than giving a precise location, the two ships parted company and the remainder of the passage was uneventful. *ENDEAVOUR* eventually arrived off Dili on the afternoon of Saturday 16 October after a faster than expected transit. Unfortunately this advance in timing was not useful as *SUCCESS* was absent refuelling other ships at sea, forcing *ENDEAVOUR* to loiter until the larger tanker returned at 1700 that evening.\(^{189}\) With the mooring of *SUCCESS* completed, the by now, familiar pattern of replenishment began again, with *ENDEAVOUR* secured alongside and pumping by 1815 hours. After seven hours spent transferring AVCAT and diesel, *ENDEAVOUR* moved away from *SUCCESS* with half of her tanks still full. This time the direction was clear to proceed to Darwin to unload the remainder and ease the fuel shortage developing there. Escorted out of the Area of Operations (AO) by FNS *VENDEMAIRE*, *ENDEAVOUR* headed for Darwin and

\(^{186}\) Ibid, para. 5.
\(^{187}\) Ibid, para. 8.
\(^{188}\) Ibid, para. 8.
\(^{189}\) Ibid, para. 9.
what was assumed to be a simple offload operation to empty the tanks and then return to New Zealand.

By 0900 Monday 18 October ENDEAVOUR had reached Darwin, only to discover that all of the wharves were filled with numerous cargo ships loading or transhipping equipment for East Timor.\(^{190}\) The ship proceeded to anchor in Darwin Harbour to await movements that would allow her to berth alongside and transfer fuel into the naval fuel installation tanks. During the afternoon, however, the arrival of the Canadian tanker HMCS PROTECTEUR signalled an opportunity to accelerate plans to offload. After discussions between the two Commanding Officers, a plan was hatched to transfer diesel directly from ENDEAVOUR to PROTECTEUR, avoiding the inherent delays and frustrations of waiting for the fuel berth or utilising smaller inadequate hoses. With agreement from the Darwin Harbourmaster, ENDEAVOUR berthed alongside PROTECTEUR and began the transfer late in the morning, completing the evolution and returning to anchor in the late afternoon.

PROTECTEUR was now completely full and ready to take up the role ENDEAVOUR had previously fulfilled. Excessive stocks of fuel remained in ENDEAVOUR's tanks though, and the ship still needed to await a berth to unload into the shore tanks. After waiting at anchor until Wednesday 20 October ENDEAVOUR was finally able to berth at an alternate wharf and unload the remaining stock.\(^{191}\) With her tanks now empty, ENDEAVOUR finally sailed at 2200, bound for New Zealand this time and overdue maintenance. With her initial tasking finished, ENDEAVOUR was transferred from the INTERFET task group and headed for home and an early morning arrival in Auckland on Saturday 30 October to the warm welcome of family, friends and numerous media wishing to gain information on East Timor from those who had experienced it at first hand. It was not, however, to be ENDEAVOUR's final contribution to East Timor, although a period of essential maintenance and a Lloyd's survey were required before the ship could return to active duty. This necessitated a return to the previous 60 days DoN for operations. Once in the maintenance period it would take the full amount of time to regenerate the ship and crew to an operational state. With the INTERFET mission now

\(^{190}\) Ibid, para. 10.
\(^{191}\) Ibid, para. 20.
progressing well but, only still in it’s infancy, the priority now was to ensure that *ENDEAVOUR* was prepared for her next activity period scheduled to begin some time after Christmas.

Although work did commence on the ship immediately in Auckland, leave was the greatest priority for most of the ship’s company for the remainder of the month of October 1999. Once this was cleared the crew returned to work and began assisting with maintenance to prepare the ship for further, as yet unspecified, activity. This work continued through into early November as plans began to be formulated for the return to East Timor. By the end of the month these plans were in place for *ENDEAVOUR* to rejoin INTERFET in late January 2000 to relieve HMCS *PROTECTEUR*, which was due to return to Canada. A reduction in the DoN was given informally again as the months of November and December progressed. More importantly, an Operations Order was issued to *ENDEAVOUR* on 22 December on this occasion outlining the details of the deployment. 192 For the first time since INTERFET commenced, an RNZN ship received formal instruction on the mission and objectives, albeit that these stated in writing exactly the mission already undertaken successfully to date. The timing and mission were now clearly identified with the requirement to sail on 10 January 2000 “to support INTERFET/UNTAET by the provision of fuel to forces both ashore and at sea as directed...”. 193 With this clear goals in sight steady work continued to complete the maintenance package and return *ENDEAVOUR* to an operational state. The majority of maintenance work was completed just prior to the Christmas break. Although not yet ready, only small items of critical maintenance remained to be set to work, allowing the ship’s company to take a short Christmas and New Year holiday break. 194 Essential work was continued by the naval shore maintenance authorities and was completed as the year ended.

The short holiday concluded on 4 January when the RNZN Sea Training Group (STG), an element of the Maritime HQ, arrived onboard *ENDEAVOUR* and began assessing both the machinery and staff to ensure that they were safe to return to sea after such a long rest

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and maintenance period. This is a standard practise within the RNZN after lengthy periods of inactivity and ensures that minimum training and safety standards are in force before sea training begins to a specified Level of Capability. In this instance the inspection went reasonably smoothly although two significant areas of concern resulted in long hours the following day as the ship’s staff sought to rectify faults identified in Damage Control and Seamanship. Once these were fixed to the satisfaction of the STG, ENDEAVOUR was finally declared safe and ready to proceed. Extra effort had also been required during the day by the crew not involved, as the ship had also embarked 150 water pumps, a pre-fabricated cool store, including the refrigeration unit, and six large pallets of stores for the United Nation High Commission for Refugees.

At 0900 on 6 January 2000 ENDEAVOUR slipped back to sea in the Hauraki Gulf for a final clearance before she could depart New Zealand. After a day spent demonstrating basic proficiency at drills to the STG, ENDEAVOUR returned to her berth in the early evening. All of the newly installed and maintained equipment had function perfectly and the day was deemed a success. New crew, numbering nearly 25 percent of the ship’s company, had performed well. With minimal time since the break they had integrated well into the small team, although the Captain was aware of the limitations raised by changing such a high percentage of staff in one instance. Although ENDEAVOUR’s proficiency was undoubtedly lower than before the maintenance period, the ship was now ready for operations. This capability generation had occurred well inside the 60 day DoN. Only 16 days had elapsed from the official notice of operational intent and less than two months since plans had been informally advised, despite an extensive maintenance package and crew change and short holiday.

Regrettably, with the ship now ready and at the agreed Level of Operational Capability, plans to move directly back to East Timor were placed on hold due to fuel supplies for the main diesel tanks being unavailable from Marsden Point until Thursday 13 January. This was caused by the delayed arrival of an oil tanker from overseas to replenish national stocks. A forced delay of 48 hours ensued and ENDEAVOUR remained alongside at Devonport Naval Base. One small advantage did arise from this

196 DLA 0115, Interview Cdr J.F Campbell, RNZN, 7 January 2000, p. 16.
unfortunate delay as more stores from New Zealand charity organisations for East Timor were delivered and added to those already in the storage containers. New Zealand organisations were now mobilising to provide relief agencies in East Timor with material. The opportunity to gain free shipping to East Timor had been made by the Naval Authorities and was gratefully accepted by a number of relief agencies. Not all of the stores were appropriate, however, and on Friday 7 January half of a load of shoes was returned to the charity it originated from when it was discovered that all of the shoes were white, high heeled, and made of silk! Ships staff gently explained to the relief agency staff that such delicate podiatry items would do little to enhance the welfare of East Timor’s citizens on the dusty and gravelled roads of Dili or the remainder of East Timor. Still, a vast amount of donated equipment was secured in four ISO containers and would provide much needed relief supplies and equipment to the citizens of East Timor, and particularly Suai, where most of the relief supplies were destined to be delivered for distribution by the New Zealand Army.

Picture 4.3. The New Zealand Army take delivery of relief supplies delivered by ENDEAVOUR to Suai. In the background an RAN LCH approaches the improvised delivery ramp to offload AVCAT tankers.

Source: RNZN

After such lengthy efforts to prepare and store it was almost with relief that ENDEAVOUR finally slipped from the naval base at 0900 Wednesday 12 January and proceeded northwards to Marsden Point to embark fuel. On arrival at Whangarei Harbour though, further frustration occurred because of commercial ships offloading

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198 ibid, para. 5.
supplies at the oil refinery wharf. This delayed ENDEAVOUR berthing until 2000 hours that evening, yet another frustrating delay for the ship now anxious to proceed. This frustration was even further exacerbated when it was discovered that only 5,200 cubic metres of diesel fuel had been ordered, leaving the fuel tanks 800 cubic metres short, even after negotiating an additional 1,200 cubic metres as fuelling progressed.199 With the less than full load, ENDEAVOUR completed the loading and returned to sea at 0500 the following morning of Thursday 13 January. With no reason for further delays in New Zealand, ENDEAVOUR rounded North Cape later that day and settled into the familiar transit pattern en route to Dili, albeit that one further delay was planned in Brisbane to complete the loading of fuel.

The transit to Brisbane was uneventful and provided an ideal opportunity to refine the new crewmembers skills at damage control and replenishment by integrating them into the ship’s organisation and emergency teams. With this achieved, ENDEAVOUR slipped quietly into the Brisbane River and berthed at the Cairncross Wharf at 1330 on Monday 17 January 2000. After a weekend wait for fuelling facilities, filled by the crew taking in the usual attractions of the large city and nearby holiday resorts, ENDEAVOUR shifted from berth on Thursday 20 January down the river to the BP products wharf and began loading the final supplies into her tanks at 0930. Finally filled to capacity with supplies and fuel 21 hours later, ENDEAVOUR headed back to sea at 0630 for the final legs of the passage to Dili via the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Strait. After an absence of just over three months, ENDEAVOUR re-entered the East Timor AO at 0245 on Friday 28 January before anchoring in the entrance to Dili Harbour later that day at 1445 (see Appendix 2).

The situation in East Timor was now considerably altered from when ENDEAVOUR had previously been there. Land force elements had been significantly enhanced, while at the same time maritime force elements had reduced. As a consequence, logistic operations had taken on a different emphasis entirely. The ship’s command and operations staff were briefed on the new roles and objectives expected of them by a similarly new Maritime Component Commander, Commodore Brian Robertson, RAN. Rather than the previous missions of simple fuel delivery, ENDEAVOUR was to assume the role of Task Group Logistic Co-ordinator. Although this role differed from the RNZN Operations

199 Ibid, para. 7.
Order, some prior knowledge and sense of this change had been evident from the numerous media reports in the Brisbane papers and the ship's company had prepared the ship for a greater logistics role before it arrived at Dili. Key to the new tasks had been the emptying of two ISO containers that had refrigeration equipment and were capable of storing fresh provisions. Once emptied, these had been run up to cool store temperatures in expectation of fresh stores and meat being held for delivery to other ships and ashore. With preparations completed and the command and crew briefed, ENDEAVOUR assumed the role of naval Task Group Logistics Commander.

This co-ordination role was put to immediate use on anchoring with the arrival alongside of HMAS JERVIS BAY, a rapid transit quick catamaran that had been leased by the RAN on 17 May 1999, and moved to Darwin in June, in preparation for operations such as INTERFET. The highly powered catamaran represented a leap in naval technology being capable of carrying large numbers of passengers or refugees at the same time as motorised vehicles and stores at speeds up to 50 knots. In October alone, JERVIS BAY delivered 835 personnel, 99 vehicles and approximately 450 cubic metres of stores from Darwin to Dili. Its primary employment was to ferry INTERFET troops, equipment and stores rapidly from Darwin to Dili as a shuttle run of between ten and twelve and a half hours, dependant on loading. Balanced against this, JERVIS BAY possessed only a short range at such high speeds, lacked any military capability or durability and relied heavily upon support for both fuel and logistics, due to its civilian merchant characteristics and manning. It also had no true capability to store meat or fresh rations for extended lengths of time. To operate effectively within INTERFET, JERVIS BAY required the services of the Logistics Co-ordinator to ensure stores and personnel reached their intended destination in a satisfactory state, a fuelling point or installation to provide fuel for the return to Darwin and a trans-shipping facility to unload bulky equipment and vehicles. Although unable to achieve the last, ENDEAVOUR was able to carry out all other requirements of the logistics co-ordinator and fuelling point. Emphasising the busy duty that the Logistic Co-ordination role would bring, as ENDEAVOUR embarked 15

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200 Ibid, para. 11.
201 Ibid, para. 11.
pallets of food, stores and mail from JERVIS BAY on one side, the first of approximately seven daily AVCAT loads were being passed to a road fuel tanker embarked in a coastal landing craft from the other side of the ship.\textsuperscript{205}

By Saturday 29 January all of the humanitarian and other stores and fuel destined for Dili had been unloaded and ENDEAVOUR returned to sea. This time the ship turned west and proceeded to a rendezvous in the Oecussi Enclave to provide HMAS MELBOURNE, the duty RAN warship, with fuel and supplies.\textsuperscript{206} The Oecussi Enclave is a small East Timorese outpost located well inside the boundary of West Timor on the northern coast (see Appendix 3). The enclave had proven beyond the resources available to allow access during the initial INTERFET insertion via the sea and airports of Dili. Consequently, it was left isolated as INTERFET forces established ground forces in the main part of the country. Adding to the dilemma was the awareness by INTERFET officers that the reductions in militia activity in the main part of the country were not being mirrored in the enclave. This was due to the lack of INTERFET ground troops or even the presence of marine or air elements to stay the militia’s hands. Increasing rumours of violence directed against the remaining population of the enclave were eventually confirmed when a young Timorese boy was able to smuggle a letter outlining the parlous state of the enclave to General Cosgrove.\textsuperscript{207} In the letter was a very direct appeal for intervention by the East Timorese citizens remaining in the area. This led to an acceleration of plans to move ground troops forward into the enclave on 22 October 1999.\textsuperscript{208}

The geographical isolation and encirclement of the enclave on three land boundaries by Indonesian territory, however, made it impossible to service by road once ground forces had entered the area. Similarly, fixed wing aircraft were unable to land due to a lack of satisfactory runway facilities. This left only two options to INTERFET planners to either provide stores and additional personnel via the sea or by rotary wing aircraft. Of these two options, the reliance fell most heavily on the maritime logistic chain, as land based helicopters were reliant on re-fuelling once at Oecussi. To achieve this, INTERFET were

\textsuperscript{205} Crawford and Harper, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{207} Crawford and Harper, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{208} Ryan, p. 133.
forced into maintaining a permanent warship presence that was capable of re-fuelling or rescuing a helicopter as it shuttled to and from the enclave via a flight route clear of Indonesian land or the 12 nautical mile territorial limit. Only now ships possessed the necessary freedom of manoeuvre to operate without constraint and INTERFET was forced to devote an RAN Oliver Hazard Perry or Anzac Frigate to the Oecussi Enclave as a permanent guard ship. This in turn placed pressure on the logistic chain to supply the frigate in-situ, a challenge easily met by ENDEAVOUR on 29 January when she rendezvoused with MELBOURNE at 1600 hours and began a lengthy replenishment of fuel and stores using MELBOURNE’s helicopter.209 Best use was also made of these opportunities to train for operations in company and once the replenishment was completed ENDEAVOUR and MELBOURNE operated together until late in the night, training watch keepers, communicators and any other personnel who could gain from the in-company exercises.

Eventually, however, the need for rest from a busy day overcame the training ability and at 2200 hours ENDEAVOUR turned east again and returned to Dili to anchor and supply the now rapidly dwindling fuel supplies of INTERFET ashore.

The pattern of lengthy anchorages and short bursts of activity observed in SUCCESS during the early days of INTERFET were now ENDEAVOUR’s to shoulder. Similarly detailed patterns now also began to emerge while at anchor with the seven daily AVCAT top ups, JERVIS BAY 72 hour re-visit unloads followed by distribution to waiting ships who would despatch uplift parties to ENDEAVOUR, particularly keen to gain their mail and stores as quickly as possible after JERVIS BAY’s visits. Interspersed with this regular pattern would be brief forays to sea for replenishment of the duty warships and then immediate return to the anchorage and the ever-thirsty AVCAT truck.

This pattern continued into the early weeks of the following month. As familiarity was gained with the routine, ENDEAVOUR began experimenting with additional rest break services to the New Zealand forces after discussing the possibilities with the SNO (NZ), Brigadier Martyn Dunne.210 On 3 February these additional services began in earnest,

although the facilities available allowed only a maximum of five New Zealand soldiers per day to come out to the ship for a brief respite from the heat.211 The ship's air-conditioning, shower, laundry and dining facilities were made available to the soldiers as well as the extensive selection of videos aboard in a more relaxed environment than that available ashore. This offering was maintained for a week and included accommodating a visit on behalf of the SNO (NZ) for senior defence officials and the New Zealand Minister of Defence, Mr Mark Burton, on Wednesday 2 February.212

Picture 4.4. The Commanding Officer of ENDEAVOUR, Commander John Campbell, MNZM, RNZN (left), greets the New Zealand Defence Minister, the Honourable Mark Burton (right) and the CDF, New Zealand, Air Marshall Carey Adamson, ADC as they board in Dili Harbour. Source: RNZN

Meanwhile, the INTERFET outposts and guard ships were reaching low levels of fuel and supply and on Wednesday 9 February ENDEAVOUR was instructed to proceed to sea and replenish vital supplies again.213 First call was to the Oecussi Enclave at 1530 hours with a simultaneous fuel and vertical replenishment for 20 pallets of stores and mail to MELBOURNE. Considerable effort was required to provide these simultaneous replenishment evolutions. Although ENDEAVOUR can achieve two fuel replenishments without difficulty, the requirement to ensure that the fresh stores and meat contained in the frozen or temperature-controlled reefers did not spoil meant that every crewmember

211 Ibid, para. 4.
212 Ibid, para. 6.
213 Ibid, para. 8.
in *ENDEAVOUR* was involved other than the essential fuelling and ship handling parties. As the helicopter would leave, the next pallet of food would be passed by hand from the tank deck to flight deck, loaded on to a wooden pallet and secured in time for the next load. This exhausting routine continued for two hours, twice as long as the diesel fuelling.\(^{214}\) Once completed though, the replenishment evolutions were not over and *MELBOURNE* immediately approached for an AVCAT fuelling, yet another lengthy operation for an already tired crew. Finally, as dusk overtook the enclave, *ENDEAVOUR* lowered her boat into the water and transferred her final store—a sailor joining from Australia via Dili.\(^{215}\) Once all replenishment was complete the opportunity was again utilised to conduct continuation training until *ENDEAVOUR* broke away from *MELBOURNE* at 0200 on Thursday 10 February and began an uneventful passage around the coast to Suai, and yet another logistic and fuelling rendezvous.

This evolution was to be different to those previously experienced. Suai is located only 10 kilometres from the West Timor border in an area suspected as likely, and later confirmed, militia activity. Combined with this proximity to West Timor, it meant that an entire battalion of the New Zealand infantry were stationed in Suai to ensure sufficient control, resulting in the need for regular bulk fuel and stores replenishment. At the most distant point of the southern East Timor coast from Dili (see Appendix 2), it was difficult to service with no port facilities, poor road connections to Dili and only a very short runway. Although Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) fixed wing aircraft could land to replenish essential stores, these aircraft could not carry fuel supplies. Rotary wing aircraft were similarly constrained and also suffered from a lack of fuel facilities, essential after a transit across the high mountain ranges traversing the entire length of Timor. A rotary wing detachment of RNZAF Iroquois did operate from Suai during INTERFET but were not used to provide or distribute stores from Dili as this would have removed them from the essential task of supporting the land force. Bulk fuel and supplies were provided by sea after being transferred to landing craft and then across an improvised loading ramp built on the coast near Suai. Although by this stage in the operation a small merchant coastal tanker was available to refuel the main East Timor shore establishments, during its absence to replenish in Darwin, the military resources of

\(^{214}\) Ibid, para. 9.  
\(^{215}\) Ibid, para. 9.
INTERFET were needed to ensure supply. Such was the case on 11 February as ENDEAVOUR anchored in the open bay close to Suai. Transfer operations began to unload the stores and a fuel truck replenished from ENDEAVOUR via a RAN Heavy Landing Craft which then moved to the beach for the Army to uplift the stores. This evolution initially progressed rapidly until weather and tidal conditions became unsuitable late in the evening of 11 February. Forced to stop for safety reasons, the offloading was eventually completed the following day with both diesel and AVCAT supplied to the battalion and air wing. By now ENDEAVOUR's crew were familiar with the activity, if not the pattern, of these evolutions and this allowed Commander Campbell to release some members of his crew to view Army and Air operations and living conditions ashore. At the same time Army personnel were provided with a brief visit to the ship and the opportunity to clear domestic activities, such as their laundry, using the facilities of the ship. Eventually the replenishment was completed and ENDEAVOUR weighed anchor from Suai at 1900 on Saturday 12 February. Returning overnight to the familiar waters and anchorage of Dili harbour the following evening, ENDEAVOUR prepared to re-commence fuel offloads to supply the troops ashore. Unfortunately these off-loads were delayed until the following day by the lateness of the arrival time and a lack of preparation ashore, which required the ship's crew to work until late in the night. The usual pattern then resumed for a further day until ENDEAVOUR was required to return to the Oecussi Enclave to fuel MELBOURNE again at 1500 hours on Tuesday 15 February. After a gruelling three hour combined replenishment of AVCAT and diesel, both ENDEAVOUR and MELBOURNE departed from the Oecussi Enclave in company. This was to be both the first and final departure for MELBOURNE, as she handed over a duty held since her arrival in theatre on 20 January to the incoming United Nations peacekeeping force. With a full handover from INTERFET to the new force, the United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) planned for 23 February, the Oecussi Enclave was the first to be placed within UNTAET's responsibility.

MELBOURNE and ENDEAVOUR continued east from Oecussi and arrived at Dili to anchor at 0730 on 16 February. ENDEAVOUR immediately resumed her replenishment and logistic roles for the next 24 hours at anchor for the INTERFET forces ashore via the LCH and road tanker combination. The following day both MELBOURNE and ENDEAVOUR then rendezvoused at sea for training as they proceeded towards Suai
where a day would be spent replenishing all stocks before UNTAET assumed responsibility for this area as well. After transferring 15 cubic metres of diesel and 46 cubic metres of AVCAT, *ENDEAVOUR* loaded stores from the New Zealand helicopter detachment at Suai and then proceeded back to Dili, again in company with *MELBOURNE*.

Final preparations were now being made for the transition to UNTAET in Dili as *ENDEAVOUR* anchored at 1730 hours on Saturday 19 February. The following two days were devoted to topping all holdings of diesel and AVCAT ashore up to 100 percent so that UNTAET were able to continue operations uninterrupted until their civilian supply organisation took effect. These preparations were completed by late afternoon on 21 February allowing the opportunity for a brief visit by the Commander INTERFET, MCC and the SNO (NZ) to farewell and thank the ship and crew. A large amount of New Zealand Air and Army stores were then embarked from ashore and stored in the containers for return to New Zealand on Tuesday 22 February before *ENDEAVOUR* settled for a last quiet night at anchor in Dili. With this behind her, at 0830 *ENDEAVOUR* sailed in company with *MELBOURNE*, HMAS *LABUAN* and four small landing craft to join others already at sea for a review. At 1200, *JERVIS BAY* with COMINTERFET embarked passed between two lines of assembled ships and signalled the completion of INTERFET operations. Her mission successfully over, *ENDEAVOUR* again joined *MELBOURNE* for a peaceful transit to Darwin and then New Zealand, returning to her berth at the Devonport Naval Base on 16 March 2000.

Over the duration of two separate tours of duty in INTERFET, *ENDEAVOUR* had delivered a total of 12,177 cubic metres of diesel, 1,330 cubic metres of AVCAT and over 90 pallets of food or stored equipment. More importantly, the ship had maintained the vital flow of fuel to INTERFET when *SUCCESS* had required to be stationed in Dili and had then acted as the sole military tanker supplying the less urgent but more diverse (and no less critical) requirements of INTERFET in the busy days near mission end. All objectives of the initial tasking and the later operational instruction had been completed or exceeded. More importantly, the objectives of the Warden Plan had also been achieved to the satisfaction of INTERFET. Specifically, the requirement to provide logistic support to forces ashore and afloat had been met as a direct result of the presence of a
New Zealand tanker, reinforcing the essential role of New Zealand maritime force elements to the overall success of INTERFET. *ENDEAVOUR's* focus throughout the operation had been at the operational level. As a core output for the ship, replenishment operations were to a degree almost routine, yet it is the fact that INTERFET operations were never cancelled or compromised through a lack of fuel resources. This marks *ENDEAVOUR's* contributions as most significant.
The final major commitment by New Zealand maritime forces to INTERFET came in the shape of HMNZS CANTERBURY. CANTERBURY is an older design Leander class frigate that, in 1999, operated in the dual role of training and preparation for lower level operational tasking. This required the ship to be at a 180 day DoN for operations in the New Zealand strategic area of interest. As a result, the ship was assessed regularly for training purposes but did not formally operate under the DoN. A 180-day notice is considered the absolute minimum level of preparedness because many key personnel are absent from the vessel. The notice assumes sufficient time in which to stabilise the crew and provide any training necessary to perform designated operational tasks.\(^\text{216}\)

Purpose built for the RNZN in 1972, CANTERBURY is a steam-powered frigate with semi-manual weapon systems designed for medium and close range engagement above and below water. A helicopter deck and hangar were extensively modernised in 1998 to allow the RNZN’s new Seasprite helicopter to operate from the ship. Communications, sensors and control systems have also been extensively modernised. Crew numbers are higher than for modern frigates to accommodate the manual requirements of the propulsion, weapons and support systems. In 1999 however, the core crew numbers had been reduced to allow higher numbers of trainees to be embarked.

As the pre-cursors to Timor developed throughout 1999, CANTERBURY’s training and operating profile remained unchanged. Despatched in May, CANTERBURY followed ENDEAVOUR to the west coast of Australia and undertook an intensive and lengthy operational training deployment.\(^\text{217}\) This included acting as consort, the assisting ship, for the work-up training of a number of Australian ships and culminated at the KAKADU exercise in Darwin in July. Throughout the deployment CANTERBURY was plagued by a number of engineering defects that affected operations to varying degrees but which did not stop the overall pattern of learning and continuation training. While most were minor in nature, the worst defect saw CANTERBURY withdrawn from the KAKADU exercise.

\(^{216}\) NZBR 56, RNZN Operational Readiness Criteria, para. 0208, pp. 2 – 5.
\(^{217}\) DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 15 Feb 2000, p. 1.
after only four days due to a vibration in the port main gearbox area. As a result, 
*CANTERBURY* did not re-join the exercise again and remained alongside in Darwin for 
15 days before eventually sailing for home. The passage back to New Zealand proved 
uneventful and there was no further indication of any machinery problems arising from 
the defect. Indeed, the period of maintenance in Darwin provided an interesting 
opportunity for the ship’s maintenance crew. They carried out the complete re-alignment 
of a gearbox to the drive train, a repair not normally accomplished outside of a dockyard.

Notwithstanding the engineering frustrations, *CANTERBURY* undertook numerous 
exercises and by the end of August 1999 had attained a sound level of capability well 
above the 180 DoN. This was more closely aligned to a Leander frigate at an Operational 
Level of Capability (OLOC) where the ship would be capable of operating in a multiple 
threat environment with confidence. 218 The numerous trainee sailors and officers 
embarked in the ship gained a high level of knowledge of procedures and skills in both 
warfare and general drills and these were often tested as other ships used *CANTERBURY* 
to support their own training. 219

Arriving in New Zealand on 31 August, the stop in Auckland was designed to be a short 
stay of only two days to allow the return of the SH 2F Seasprite helicopter for essential 
maintenance. With this accomplished *CANTERBURY* then returned to sea without a 
helicopter embarked. The next, and final call of the deployment was to Sydney to act as 
a consort and gunnery training platform during a week’s Principal Warfare Officer 
(PWO) training in the East Australian Exercise areas. 220 For the entire week of 6 – 10 
September, *CANTERBURY* was utilised by the RAN to assess the PWO students who 
required intense practical exercises and assessments in multiple ship and above water 
warfare drills.

As the week at sea progressed, news of events in East Timor in the international media 
was watched by the *CANTERBURY*’s crew via local Australian television channels and 
signalled media reports. Reports of increasing military activity concerning East Timor

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218 NZBR 56, RNZN Operational Readiness Criteria, para. 0104, pp. 1 – 2. 
6. 
were followed by the news through New Zealand defence channels that *TE KAHA* had been despatched to assist in the growing international effort. Initial thoughts in the ship had been that *CANTERBURY* might see some involvement, but without official advice, as the week progressed, it was assumed that this would not be the case. Despite the obvious ferocity of events in East Timor, it was considered that the ship would return first to Sydney to offload the PWO students, followed by a short passage home and then in to a lengthy maintenance period. With this in mind the *CANTERBURY* berthed in *SYDNEY* on 10 September to begin a quiet weekend of leisure activities.²²¹

This peaceful activity was broken on Sunday 12 September when the RNZN Maritime Headquarters, Fleet Operations Officer (FOO), Commander Kevin Corles, rang the Commanding Officer (CO), Commander Warren Cummins, to advise that *CANTERBURY*’s inclusion in the RNZN INTERFET orbat was being considered. After an assurance from the CO that the ship was materially capable, an undertaking was given to ring the following morning with an update on the considerations. At 0800 the following morning, Monday 13 September, FOO rang and confirmed that the possibility of including *CANTERBURY* was high and that the ship was to return to New Zealand as quickly as possible and prepare for operational deployment. In particular, the embarkation of a helicopter was considered vital to extend the surveillance range of the *CANTERBURY*’s sensors.²²²

The Ships’ Company were advised immediately of what, until now, only the Captain had been aware of. This news was greeted with enthusiasm and some concern, particularly from the trainees who did not wish to leave the ship. Fortunately, similar sentiments were expressed by the command elements who considered all on board to be integral members of a well functioning team. The RNZN Maritime HQ agreed to the recommendation for the crew to remain unchanged. After a rapid setting to work of the engineering plant, *CANTERBURY* sailed from *SYDNEY* and began a fast crossing of the Tasman in relatively good weather conditions. At an average speed in excess of 21 knots *CANTERBURY* arrived in Auckland harbour after only 51 hours at sea – one of, if not the, fastest crossing of the Tasman by a warship!²²³

²²³ Ibid, para. 8.
The anchorage in Auckland at 1700 on Wednesday 15 September was the beginning of a frantic two days of preparatory activity for the ship and shore support organisations. As each raced to ensure CANTERBURY was ready, political consideration of the options for INTERFET support continued. These concluded with the agreement and announcement by Cabinet for CANTERBURY to be included in the orbat. The Naval Headquarters was advised of this decision and CANTERBURY sailed at 1915 Friday 17 September in front of a large crowd of families, friends and the media.\textsuperscript{224}

Picture 5.1 Not all of the preparations for East Timor duties were well received! A member of the CANTERBURY's ships company being inoculated prior to departure from New Zealand.

Source: RNZN

Other than the first night, when the emotional strain of a publicised departure late in the evening drained the energies of the crew, the remainder of the passage to Cairns and then Darwin provided an ideal opportunity for training. This was used to conduct internal drills, bring new sailors and officers into the command team and generally prepare the crew for what little was known to be coming. Overall though, the training was focussed on ensuring that the high standards previously observed were maintained and sharpened. This took little effort, as enthusiasm and adrenaline were high within the ship. Elements of the RNZN STG were also embarked for the first part of the passage and confirmed CANTERBURY's abilities to OLOC in key drills, particularly those of damage control.\textsuperscript{225} Despite this enthusiasm, little was known of what INTERFET duties would entail. No

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid, para. 11.
\textsuperscript{225} DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 15 Feb 2000, p. 3.
briefings or information was provided by the RNZN Maritime HQ despite a small amount, including the United Nations report of conditions in Dili, being available. The maritime annex to Operation _Warden_ was not yet available.

One stop in Cairns was required on the journey to Darwin. Although only some hours in duration, this was used to provide the crew with a short break as the ship fuelled for the next leg of the trip. With all preparations completed, _CANTERBURY_ sailed from Cairns and began yet another rapid transit, this time through the tightly constrained waters of the Great Barrier Reef. As the ship headed north under radio silence, a number of merchant vessels anxiously reported to shore authorities sighting the ship as it overtook them at speed. The trip was not without some light relief though as the local fishing fleet sang modern versions of an infamous sea shanty on the VHF radio as _CANTERBURY_ passed. The uncanny ability of the fishing vessels to mark _CANTERBURY_’s passage was eventually traced to the various merchant vessels reports.226 Eventually the fishing fleets fell behind and _CANTERBURY_ cleared the Torres Strait, emerging into the Arafura Sea. Rather than make the direct passage to Darwin, _CANTERBURY_ turned towards East Timor and a short afternoon rendezvous with _ENDEAVOUR_ which was enroute to Cairns. This provided a fuelling opportunity as well as the chance to uplift an extra boat from _ENDEAVOUR_ which would provide a greater capability for boarding operations from _CANTERBURY_, should this be required.227 _CANTERBURY_ then turned towards Darwin again, arriving on 25 September and easing alongside the Stokes Hill Wharf in Darwin Harbour.

The following two days were spent alongside in Darwin awaiting orders for joining INTERFET. Attempts to gain a briefing on activities were only partially successful. Although the staff at the HQ NORCOM attempted to be helpful, they possessed little knowledge of events or activities in East Timor.228 The command and control arrangements for INTERFET remained tenuous and operated directly between Dili and the Australian Strategic Command in Canberra. This had inadvertently excluded those not directly involved with the operation in Darwin, including the NORCOM support elements. Consequently, advice was only provided to _CANTERBURY_ on issues of logistic

support available in Darwin and not what might be required of the ship once in the AO. Eventually this situation was resolved with the arrival of orders transferring operational control of CANTERBURY to the INTERFET MCC together with a tasking and explanatory message.\textsuperscript{229}

CANTERBURY's attachment to INTERFET commenced officially at midnight 27 September with orders to escort HMAS TOBRUK into the AO and then Dili. As CANTERBURY prepared to sail from Darwin, TOBRUK arrived and began loading supplies and ground forces for the second wave of personnel entering Timor. Delays to TOBRUK's loading schedule forced her to wait longer than expected and CANTERBURY slipped from the harbour under cover of darkness at 1900 by herself. Joined some hours later off the harbour entrance, CANTERBURY and TOBRUK began a slower passage towards East Timor and the Wetar Strait (see Appendix 4) overnight.\textsuperscript{230} The time spent waiting for TOBRUK under cover of darkness was usefully employed as all weapon systems were loaded with live ammunition, and the manning of the ship was brought to defence stations, a level of preparedness immediately below the action state, to allow continuous surveillance and monitoring of operations.\textsuperscript{231}

Picture 5.2. Checks being conducted on CANTERBURY's torpedos as she escorts TOBRUK (in the background) towards Dili. Source: RNZN

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Checks being conducted on CANTERBURY's torpedos as she escorts TOBRUK (in the background) towards Dili. Source: RNZN}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{229} DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 15 February 2000, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{231} Glyn Harper, Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 13 November 1999, p. 2.
The following day of transit proved routine for the two ships. *TOBRUK*, the higher value unit in military terms, but slower in practical terms, became the formation guide for *CANTERBURY*. This allowed *CANTERBURY*, the faster escort, to patrol an uninterrupted sector around the landing ship. In the event of harm, the patrolling ship was then able to position to best respond without interference from the guide. These manoeuvring drills were practised throughout the day as they approached the coast of Timor and then put to good effect as night fell. As the ships approached the Wetar Strait, a number of darkened Indonesian surface vessels approached the formation, presumably to identify and track the INTERFET ships. *CANTERBURY* automatically assumed a defensive position ‘up threat’ and shielded *TOBRUK* from any close encounters with the Indonesian vessels, which closed to within approximately 2,000 yards, before turning away.232 The progress of the two INTERFET ships was unimpeded by this approach and *CANTERBURY* and *TOBRUK* rounded the eastern tip of East Timor and headed for Dili. Throughout the manoeuvres the Indonesian ships appeared watchful and reserved, without being overly aggressive. The impression gained by *CANTERBURY* was one of tense reserve in an unfamiliar situation.233 This impression was added to by the fact that no communications took place between any of the ships, despite the fact that both nations had recently exercised together during KAKADU and were well equipped to be able to signal each other.

With the Indonesian surface vessels behind them, *TOBRUK* and *CANTERBURY* experienced no further impediment to the passage into Dili (see Appendix 4). At 0600 hours the following morning, 29 September, once within 10 nautical miles of the capital, *CANTERBURY* passed responsibility for *TOBRUK* to the Dili Guard Ship (DGS), *HMNZS ANZAC*. *CANTERBURY* pressed on towards Dili, and was surprised to be immediately re-tasked by radio from the MCC to begin a search for an Indonesian Type 209 submarine reportedly located close to the west of Dili.234 No sign was found of the submarine, however, and at 1400 hours that afternoon the search was abandoned when *CANTERBURY* was re-tasked to become the DGS to allow *ANZAC* to re-fuel. The DGS’s purpose was to maintain a close and reassuring presence for ground forces in the city and also act as a deterrent as they sought to establish control from both the militia

232 Crawford and Harper, p. 112.
233 DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 15 February 2000, p. 5.
and Indonesia soldiers who remained within its borders. To achieve this, CANTERBURY stationed herself close to Dili on a patrol line only two miles from the shore and maintained a lookout towards the land. This also provided the first opportunity for many of the ship’s company to see at first hand the devastation of the area with numerous fires still smouldering and a pall of smoke hanging low over the city.235 This role was maintained until late in the evening when the British Destroyer, HMS GLASGOW, joined and relieved CANTERBURY.

Following new orders from the MCC, CANTERBURY moved away from Dili and took up station to the east to monitor the tactical picture and identify marine surface traffic. Any contacts discovered in the allocated patrol area, known as area “Eden”, were immediately approached and investigated. Once close enough to confirm the identity, the information was placed into the electronic Link 11 tactical data system that automatically provided a real-time picture of all contacts under surveillance. Most surface combatants within INTERFET and HMAS SUCCESS operated this system, although some did not possess the necessary equipment to achieve or display the electronic link. This ensured that the MCC also had excellent situational awareness of movements within the area as he maintained his operations from SUCCESS for the first six or seven days of the operation.236 CANTERBURY maintained the Eden patrol area until the following day when TOBRUK completed unloading her stores and personnel and was escorted out of the AO and back towards Darwin. Once clear, CANTERBURY bid TOBRUK farewell and turned back to the Eden patrol area and took up a position at the eastern tip of Timor to continue surface and air surveillance and escort merchant vessels into the area.

This patrol duty was not destined to be lengthy. The MCC had now established a routine for issuing patrol orders to the surface units by a routine tasking message every 24 hours to all of the ships, advising the intentions for the following 24 hour period.237 This system worked well, given the flexibility afforded by SUCCESS and her very capable communications suite which allowed the MCC to quickly react to events, plan for future operations and deal with the administration of the maritime operations. The complexity

of this organisation was evident from the volume of traffic under action with between 150 and 200 signals requiring action each day.\textsuperscript{238}

\textit{CANTERBURY}'s tasking message on 30 September changed the tasking from surveillance to one of escort of an RAN Landing Craft with a clearance diving team embarked, in order to conduct a beach survey at the western extremity of East Timor. This was to conduct an assessment of the conditions and beach gradients for later amphibious landings of the 2 Royal Australia Regiment (2 RAR). This would allow them to control the border with West Timor and prevent militia and Indonesian freedom of movement between the two territories.\textsuperscript{239} \textit{CANTERBURY} arrived at Dili after patrolling across the north eastern coast and joined \textit{HMAS LABUAN} late on 1 October. Together the two ships steamed slowly overnight towards the west, well clear of land and any observing ground forces. At first light the following morning \textit{LABUAN} cautiously approached the beach at Batugarde and began the survey as \textit{CANTERBURY} patrolled close to seawards. The township of Batugarde is located close to the border with West Timor and this placed considerable constraint on the \textit{CANTERBURY}'s ability to manoeuvre, as she was required to remain clear of West Timor waters and within the territorial limits of East Timor. It also allowed a first hand view of the effects of the militia when, as the day progressed, numerous small canoes and boats came out from West Timor waters to fish. While numerous, the craft remained rigorously on the western side of an imagined line marking the border while the waters to the east were disturbed only by the presence of \textit{CANTERBURY} and \textit{LABUAN}.\textsuperscript{240}

By early afternoon the survey was complete and \textit{LABUAN} withdrew from the coast and turned for Dili. \textit{CANTERBURY} again hovered in close proximity to provide protection as the ships headed northeast. The progress of the passage was disturbed at 1410 hours when \textit{CANTERBURY} detected an unidentified aircraft closing from West Timor airspace on a direct closing course towards the \textit{LABUAN}. The aircraft was challenged on an emergency frequency but did not respond and the \textit{CANTERBURY}'s guns were brought to immediate notice as a precaution, although the ship did not assume the action state immediately. As this was occurring, \textit{CANTERBURY} was also quickly manoeuvred into a

\textsuperscript{238} DLA (TBA), Record of Interview, Cdr D.W. Bates, RAN, 29 May 2002, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{239} Ryan, p. 74.
position directly in line with the aircraft to ensure that any aggression would be directed
at the frigate first and the Landing Craft would be shielded. Within the frigate, the ship’s
command and warfare staff anxiously watched as the aircraft was hailed repeatedly, but
to no effect. As the aircraft came within 10 miles of the ships, however, it began to ease
away from a direct intercept path and a lookout was able to confirm that the aircraft was a
patrol Nomad, used by the Indonesian military for transport and surveillance.\footnote{Ibid, para. 4.}
With the tension relieved and the aircraft past, the \textit{CANTERBURY} and \textit{LABUAN} continued
towards Dili without further incident. This completed the excitement of the day and
\textit{CANTERBURY} safely escorted \textit{LABUAN} back to Dili. Once \textit{LABUAN} broke away to
anchor in Dili harbour \textit{CANTERBURY} returned to patrol the Eden corridor after a quick
replenishment from \textit{SUCCESS}.

\textit{CANTERBURY}'s location close to Dili in the Eden corridor now afforded an opportunity
to extend their capabilities ashore. Telephone contact had been made between the
Commanding Officer and the SNO (NZ) during the brief visit to Darwin from 23-25
September and this had provided the basis for a work scheme ashore. The ship’s second
in command, Lieutenant Commander Dean McDougall, RNZN was despatched with a
small party to make further contact with the New Zealand Army and establish what, if
any, assistance could be provided. Eventually, a six person work party and four person
protection detail were sent ashore each day that \textit{CANTERBURY} was close to Dili and
these completed a number of projects to improve the conditions for New Zealand soldiers
in Dili.\footnote{Crawford and Harper, pp. 103–104.} This assistance was warmly received as the small New Zealand Army
contingent were busily patrolling and did not have either the time or resources to fix the
poorly equipped accommodation and work spaces. To allow the parties to land, the ship
would briefly leave the Eden corridor, drop the work party, and then return to
surveillance duties. Each evening the process would be repeated in reverse, ensuring that
none of the crew were left overnight in the dangerous confines of Dili. Each member of
the shore party was also armed to offer some measure of protection if they should
become separated from the remainder of the party.
With the first of these work parties completed on Sunday 3 September CANTERBURY was tasked to provide an escort for the Singaporean Landing Ship Tank (LST) ENDURANCE. The LST had recently joined the INTERFET group and had commenced the Darwin – Dili shuttle run to complement the flow of supplies from TOBRUK and JERVIS BAY. Once clear of the AO, the LST was detached and CANTERBURY resumed the now familiar waters of patrol area Eden, moving slowly back towards Dili while identifying all contacts. This surveillance was significantly improved by the presence of the SH 2F Seasprite helicopter being embarked. Although only an interim, and thus unarmed, helicopter for the RNZN, the Seasprite had proved a true success, due to its reliability, payload and endurance. Typical surface surveillance flights would be of 3 hours duration, allowing sufficient opportunity to investigate an area of at least 250 square miles, based on the ship’s position as a centre point. A total of 85 hours was flown by the helicopter during INTERFET, and the helicopter achieved 75 percent availability throughout the operation, a very high percentage indeed when compared to other regional helicopters. Despite this apparently high level of availability, the helicopter did suffer some defects which interrupted surveillance. It was also disembarked from the ship to a shore airfield in Darwin for one patrol for routine maintenance, which proved frustrating for the command.

This patrol routine was now well established and CANTERBURY continued to provide surveillance and identification in the areas to the east of Dili. On 7 October, however, the routine was interrupted when the flight deck crew heard the sounds of heavy gunfire during a damage control training exercise. The noise was reported and CANTERBURY

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closed to within a mile of the coast near Bacau to try to identify the source. Although well within the range of shore fire, the gunfire quickly ceased and the perpetrators were not discovered. The incident was reported to INTERFET HQ and CANTERBURY resumed her patrol line further offshore.\textsuperscript{244} Further excitement followed early the next morning at 0345 when two fast moving aircraft approached the ship from the land. Weapons crews again turned out as a precaution but the aircraft turned away well outside warning range and headed in the direction of West Timor. The aircraft were not positively identified due to a lack of passive electro-optical sensors although later reports suggested that Indonesian Hawk jet aircraft were suspected as the likely perpetrators, based on comment by other ships in the area at the time. This was not to be an isolated incident and in total 10 unidentified aircraft flew at CANTERBURY during the patrols near East Timor. Each event proved stressful as guns crews and operational staff prepared for a possible attack. Fortunately none eventuated.\textsuperscript{245}

The remainder of the day was just as eventful as new orders moved CANTERBURY to act as escort for two LCH moving the first insertion wave of the New Zealand Army to Suai. This escort took the small group close to the shore around the eastern tip of Timor, before turning to the southwest and running along the cost to Suai. This slow transit ended the following day, 9 October when escort duties were passed to HMAS ADELAIDE who was acting as the southern guard ship. Under the protective umbrella of ADELAIDE, the small formation disappeared over the horizon for the landing at Suai while CANTERBURY reversed course and rendezvoused with TOBRUK inbound for Dili from Darwin.\textsuperscript{246} Yet another close escort duty proceeded without interruption and TOBRUK was passed to the DGS early 10 October, allowing CANTERBURY to land a medical emergency and an away team simultaneously. This group worked throughout the day on the newly formed Dili Command HQ building before being recovered in the late afternoon. Meanwhile, CANTERBURY continued surveillance in the Eden corridor, venturing out during the day and then returning in time to recover her sailors overnight.

The following day, 11 October, saw a repeat of this series of events. During one of the visits to Dili news was delivered to the ship that rations planned and purchased had not

\textsuperscript{244} HMXNZS CANTERBURY Report of Proceedings October 1999, dated 1 November 1999, para. 9.
\textsuperscript{245} Crawford and Harper, p. 102.
been loaded into JERVIS BAY or TOBRUK for delivery. Although 90 days of stores are held in the various store rooms of a ship the size of a frigate, fresh rations require replenishment more regularly - normally weekly. Little remained of the initial rations embarked on 27 September, some 15 days previous. Dry rations were called upon and it was discovered that one essential store, flour, had not been stocked to the required level. A hasty request to SUCCESS overcame the situation, however, the event had highlighted a shortfall in the ship’s organisation and this was rapidly rectified internally without any effect on the ability of CANTERBURY to patrol.

After the final visit to Dili to uplift the day’s work party, CANTERBURY joined TOBRUK and commenced a close escort on the LCH towards Suai. The two ships steamed together overnight and the following day via the Wetar Strait with CANTERBURY detaching briefly to open outside the territorial sea to conduct a weapons practise in all systems.\(^{247}\) This provided continuation training for the personnel and proved the electronics were reliably certain of operation. TOBRUK was then quickly rejoined and the two ships arrived off SUAI mid-afternoon on 12 October. The escort was once again passed to ADELAIDE and CANTERBURY turned away from the Timorese coast and headed south to Darwin, arriving the following day. CANTERBURY had now completed the first of what was to become four lengthy patrols around East Timor.

The berthing in Darwin was the beginning of a short rest break before the next patrol. Although the visit was short, there was ample evidence that CANTERBURY had already won a place in the hearts of the local Darwin community when large signs welcoming the CANTERBURY were observed on the wharf stating things such as “Welcome back HMNZS CANTERBURY”. Postcards on sale at the wharf shops were also discovered to have pictures of the CANTERBURY among them for souvenir hunters and proved a popular items for the crew to purchase and send home.\(^{248}\) With the ship fully stored, fuelled and prepared to leave at short notice, the crew were secured for two days and most onboard relaxed.

\(^{247}\) Ibid, para. 15.
\(^{248}\) Ibid, para. 16.
Picture 5.4. Storing ship in Darwin – a manual and time-consuming evolution that took all available personnel after the lengthy patrols. All stores were embarked and the ship fully prepared for the next patrol before any leave was granted. Source: RNZN

The next tasking message from the MCC was received the following day on 14 October and the operations and command team immediately began focussing on a change of patrol orders which would see CANTERBURY escort TOBRUK laden with soldiers and equipment of the first New Zealand Battalion, destined to take up their designated station at Suai via a tactical lodgement over the beach.249 This change in patrol tasking reflected a rapid progress of INTERFET activity in Timor. Where the first patrol had been aligned with the Warden Plan Phase Two (insertion of INTERFET), the second patrol would closely support a modified Phase Three (Establish a secure environment).250

With two day’s of rest behind them, CANTERBURY slipped from the Darwin wharf late on the evening of 16 October, in company with TOBRUK. The two ships immediately turned for Suai and began an uninterrupted passage to arrive off the Timorese coast at 2200 (hours) 17 October (see Appendix 5). TOBRUK proceeded directly to an anchorage as the tidal window was favourable for the smaller LCH’s to tranship to the beach and the amphibious offload began immediately. This continued through until 0730 (hours) the following morning, when unloading was forced to cease as the tidal heights moved.

249 Crawford and Harper, p. 103.
outside acceptable limits. CANTERBURY meanwhile, maintained a mobile patrol immediately to seawards providing presence and tactical firepower if required. With the patrol line so close, limited numbers of CANTERBURY sailors were able to use the time to view the amphibious operations in progress. This proved a fascinating insight into a type of operation not able to be conducted by the RNZN prior to 1999, but a capability that could have been provided during INTERFET, had the original consideration to provide HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM been chosen.

The favourable tidal window returned in the afternoon of 19 October, allowing the final unload of TOBRUK. By 2300 (hours) this had been completed and TOBRUK weighed anchor and proceeded independently for Darwin and yet another load. Meanwhile the two LCH assigned to the amphibious operation were escorted by CANTERBURY as they sailed close to the coast back around to Dili for other operations. Equipment was now pouring into Dili in a variety of military and civilian ships at the same time as the INTERFET ink spot tactic was taking full, albeit early, effect. LCH’s, other landing craft and the various amphibious platforms were fully engaged in transferring equipment from Dili to other key locations such as Bacau, Bataguarde and Suai, and so were in constant demand. Their lack of protective armament and work close to the shore made them potentially easy targets and they were often assigned a protector such as CANTERBURY.

Although no direct amphibious role could ever be offered to CANTERBURY, the INTERFET Warden Plan required an escort for all vital equipment loads or when the landing craft carried large numbers of land forces in the vicinity of East Timor. This ensured that CANTERBURY was also kept busy in close escort whenever an insertion into Suai was taking place over the following week. CANTERBURY witnessed all aspects of the insertion including the varying abilities of the three types of amphibious vessels, these being the Landing Ship Tank (TOBRUK), Landing Platform Dock (SIRROCO and BELLEAU WOOD), and Landing Craft Heavy (BRUNEI, BALIKPAPAN, LABUAN). By the end of the insertion week, 24 October, all essential equipment for the 1st RNZIR

252 DLA 0189, RNZN Record of Interview, Cdr W.M. Cummins, RNZN, dated 15 February 2000, p. 23.
Battalion was ashore safely and while *CANTERBURY* continued as the Suai Guard Ship, the amphibious units moved on to other tasking.

Picture 5.5. Suai landings were achieved by combinations of LCH, such as that shown here unloading a NZ Army truck, which would tranship from larger amphibious ships like the *TOBRUK* in the rear. The operations could only be accomplished in fine conditions and certain tidal windows. *CANTERBURY* can be seen patrolling in the distance. Source: RNZN

As the month of October drew to a close, the Battalion had established sufficient presence in the Suai area to allow *CANTERBURY* to move away from the area and back towards Dili. This was needed to provide assurance in what the INTERFET HQ had deemed the area of highest militia activity, through a constant warship presence. At the same time, warship numbers within the INTERFET task group during the month had been scaled back to reflect the withdrawal of Indonesian forces in East Timor and other pressing strategic requirements for Australia in particular. As the month concluded, *CANTERBURY* became the sole warship on station and was able to roam the northern Dili and Wetar strait waters with considerable freedom looking for activity. This period of tactical freedom also allowed *CANTERBURY* to resume committing personnel to tasks ashore in Dili again. Through the staff of the New Zealand command element, tasks of humanitarian assistance were now sought and found for the sailors each day. This saw ratings and officers alike working to restore markets, provide guards for United Nations food distribution as well as continuing efforts to restore an abandoned Indonesian house for kiwi soldiers to use as a rest facility. The work was varied and challenging but
assisted in providing an important link for the normally isolated sailors to the activity ashore. This type of assistance continued throughout CANTERBURY’s remaining time in East Timor and resulted in over 1350 personnel-hours of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{254} CANTERBURY’s ability to provide these people each day did not result in a lessening of operational ability at sea. The higher manning requirements of a Leander class frigate, although large by comparison to the more modern ANZAC class frigate of the RNZN, allowed for greater flexibility in managing the manpower. Much of the manpower reserve of the ship was dedicated to activity in the event of unexpected action and through a process of risk management, the ship’s command were able to decide on humanitarian tasks taking precedence. This higher manpower, made in many respects, CANTERBURY the better of the RNZN frigates for this phase of the INTERFET operation, as TE KAHA would not have been able to supply daily work parties with such ease.

By 3 November, other warships had begun to rotate into the East Timor AO again and CANTERBURY was ordered back to Darwin for a two-day break. The passage to Darwin was undertaken in complete radio and sensor silence to allow all maintenance to be achieved prior to arriving alongside, as the intended rest break was short and all personnel needed to be able to capitalise on this. The only two activities undertaken

while enroute to Darwin were to replenish from the newly arrived Canadian Tanker HMCS **PROTECTEUR** and to conduct yet another weapon firing to maintain operational capability. Once alongside in the now familiar port of Darwin, activity ceased other than for essential harbour functions.

While in Darwin, **CANTERBURY** received her new tasking message and prepared to sail on 8 November. The message confirmed that the ship would return to Dili to assume the function of DGS and relieve an RAN frigate as the *Warden* Plan progressed further in to Phase Three – establishing a secure environment.\(^{255}\) **CANTERBURY** arrived off Dili late on 9 November (see Appendix 6) and relieved HMAS **SYDNEY** which was required to proceed to the Oecussi enclave and establish a permanent Guard Ship. This was designed to assist in preventing militia activity against the newly established INTERFET ground force in the remote region.

On arrival in Dili, **CANTERBURY** discovered once again that the pace of the INTERFET/*Warden* maritime plan had quickened in concert with events in the land environment. The Oecussi enclave was now within INTERFET control, the border between East and West Timor quiet and pressure on Indonesia to have internally displaced citizens’ return intense.

As a consequence of this numerous Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) were now beginning to return to East Timor by boat and ferry through the port of Dili. As they arrived, each person was required to be processed by INTERFET staff and interviewed to establish their original home, check for health and establish any militia or Indonesian connections. Short-term accommodation and food supplies would then be allocated until some form of transportation was available to return them to their closest homeport. Maritime force elements had a significant role to play in this process to ensure the high number of arrivals did not overrun reception facilities. Each warship allocated to a patrol area or as the DGS, would report boats or ferries as they located them in their designated patrol areas. This information was then collated centrally together with an expected arrival time to ensure that sufficient INTERFET reception staff was available to meet the

boats. In many cases, the maritime elements of this process became so efficient that displaced persons arrived, were processed and were then able to walk straight into the welcoming interior of JERVIS BAY for further transportation to outstations with port or offload facilities such as Suai or Kom (a north-eastern port). Throughout the latter phases of the Warden Plan this process became a smooth and invisible adjunct to the more visible aspects of maritime support.

CANTERBURY's role between 9 and 17 November was to be the DGS and gateway vessel for the shore reception parties. As the various refugee boats would approach Dili, CANTERBURY would advise reception control of the updated, or initial estimated time of arrival in harbour, together with an accurate estimate of numbers embarked in each craft. Daily work parties also resumed, ensuring busy days for all in the CANTERBURY. Most of the time was spent at sea. However, two days at the end of this duty period were spent at anchor in Dili harbour due to a lack of fuel for ships in the AO. PROTECTEUR, the only tanker on station at the time, was unavailable for a number of days due to the requirement to return to Darwin to offload sailors returning to Canada when shore authorities refused to allow them to fly from Dili. This period at anchor still allowed CANTERBURY to carry out tripwire activities to notify the shore authorities of approaching vessels although the range at which warning was provided was considerably reduced through the close proximity of the anchorage to Dili.256

As 17 November approached, orders arrived that altered CANTERBURY's activities again, providing new challenges. INTERFET priority was now directed at broadening the availability of coastal landing points in the available harbours through better hydrographic information. This required the small Hydrographic Survey Unit (HODSU) to be transported to a variety of locations, in company with a protection and surf zone survey capability provided by a Clearance Diving Team when necessary. Normally the capabilities would have been loaded into one of the LCH platforms for transportation, however, none were available due to maintenance rotation and other priority tasking.

Priority for the tasking was for Atauro Island to be surveyed and this was made the initial point once CANTERBURY had sailed from Dili. The only part of East Timor not within

INTERFET control now remained the small island of Atauro, 40 kilometres to the north of Dili. This had been observed closely during previous operations and appeared largely untouched by militia inspired activity so a decision was made at the time to leave the island until all other areas had been secured. After a day's surveying and exploring the island's various landing sites, CANTERBURY turned for the Oecussi Enclave and began a slow overnight passage, impeded by the high number of vessels now streaming back towards Dili. All were investigated at close range, the numbers of refugees assessed and the information communicated to MCC in Dili to allow reception. Eventually the enclave was reached early on 18 November and the HODSU disembarked to allow them to survey close to shore. CANTERBURY then stationed off the coast and acted as a refuelling platform for two of the small INTERFET LCM8 coastal landing craft stationed in the enclave, before training with HMAS SYDNEY for the remainder of the day.257 Training was briefly interrupted to recover the HODSU team and boat and then continued until late at night.

CANTERBURY then returned to the Dili area and resumed the task of DGS, humanitarian assistance ashore and intermittent Search and Rescue (SAR) operations at sea. The HODSU team remained onboard at alert to conduct further surveys as opportunities permitted. During this period two East Timorese boats carrying a large number of refugees were observed and were approached for investigation as they steered towards Dili. Both had come to a halt as their engines failed and CANTERBURY staff boarded and then assisted each boat to either Dili or Atauro Island close by. To move the boats an innovative method of rigid towing was used with the small ferries lashed to the side of CANTERBURY while the frigate slowly made way through the water. This allowed supplies and fresh food to be passed to the crews and passengers in the boats, ensuring that all arrived at their destinations in better conditions than before they had started.258 INTERFET's humanitarian reputation was unquestionably strengthened by this small provision of individual comfort.

The final few days of the month and CANTERBURY's third patrol were devoted again to HODSU support. CANTERBURY sailed from the Dili area on 25 November and moved

257 Ibid, para. 10.
to Kom, a smaller settlement to the east with a good wharf facility but poorly charted. The HODSU team again disembarked and undertook a days surveying while CANTERBURY carried out surveillance operations in the area. When the surveying was completed the HODSU team re-embarked and CANTERBURY transported them to Suai where the process was repeated. This was to be the final involvement of CANTERBURY with HODSU surveying. A total of seven days had been partly associated with HODSU operations, an unexpected but easily supported activity for the frigate. It was not, however, the only hydrographic assistance to INTERFET. Throughout the operations in East Timor, CANTERBURY maintained accurate and detailed hydrographic recordings of all movements and these were supplied regularly to the RAN hydrographic service for inclusion into new charts of the region.

With this interesting array of activities behind her, CANTERBURY completed the third patrol and slipped quietly alongside Darwin’s Stokes Hill Wharf on 27 November. This patrol had been extended twice to facilitate other ship movements and at 21 days length was to be the longest duration for the frigate’s operations in INTERFET. To cater for the inevitable stresses that such long and intense patrols generated, a consequentially longer period alongside had been arranged by the MCC. Once secured, CANTERBURY rested for four full days before the next and final patrol. The problems of such stress had been discussed and planned for between the CO and naval psychologists in Auckland well before operations began. A careful plan was used to ensure that morale stayed high in CANTERBURY, despite the lengthy patrols, delayed visits to Darwin and cramped living and working conditions.259

Steam was raised by CANTERBURY in Darwin harbour on the afternoon of 2 December and, for the first time, a patrol began in daylight.

The final patrol for CANTERBURY contained three main activities, generally repeating the operating profile of the past three patrols (see Appendix 7). First was a two-day period spent as Suai Guard Ship providing presence with the familiar shape of a warship for the Battalion ashore. Once completed, CANTERBURY briefly entered the familiar waters of Dili after a short stop offshore near the southern town of Betano. Here the

ships diving team ventured ashore and investigated the World War II wreck of the HMAS *Voyager*, lost during active service to a grounding and eventually, Japanese attack. After re-fuelling from the Canadian *Protecteur* near Dili *Canterbury* then continued on to the Oecussi enclave to support *Sydney* with humanitarian work in the province.

While the work parties of the two ships were ashore, *Canterbury* and *Sydney* remained offshore in the deep waters of the enclave and prepared for an anti-submarine exercise. Immediately prior to launching the synthetic submarine target used for such combined exercises, the crew of the *Canterbury*'s sonar sensors were surprised to detect what appeared to be a submarine contact in the wake of *Sydney*. Great care was taken to establish that this was a genuine contact through drills designed for such a purpose and then the contact was reported to the MCC at INTERFET HQ. This provoked a rapid response to try to identify the contact as *Canterbury* continued to track it. After 30 minutes of solid tracking *Canterbury* attempted to contact the object and establish communications on under-water telephone. This provoked an immediate reaction and the contact broke away at speed and was lost. Throughout the incident the identity and nature of the contact was never established. As with all such events, it is impossible to classify whether this was an actual submarine or some other form of marine contact, however, reactions in the *Canterbury* ensured that it was treated as the former. *Sydney*'s sonar, regrettably, was inoperative throughout the contact, preventing higher classification of the contact. While the nature of the contact remained unconfirmed, the incident highlighted the need for continuing vigilance and reinforced the openness of INTERFET maritime forces to intrusion and the need for suitable ASW protection.

With this excitement behind her, *Canterbury* completed activity in the enclave on 8 December and returned to anchor in Dili harbour. The final two days of attachment with INTERFET were devoted to IDP tripwire activity as the DGS and preparations for departure. As the longest serving ship in INTERFET at this stage, both the INTERFET
and NZ land command groups visited the ship to farewell the sailors who had shared their experiences from the marine environment. A reciprocal visit was also undertaken by most of the crew to the newly opened ‘Kiwi House’ rest facility which many of the crew had assisted in creating. After final goodbyes to the MCC and other ships in the area, CANTERBURY left Dili on 10 December for her return to New Zealand. Over a three month period the ship had witnessed the establishment of a new country that was now far more secure than when they arrived. After meeting TE KAHA near the Bay of Islands, CANTERBURY led the two ships back in to Devonport Naval Base on 23 December 1999. Unlike the departure, the arrival was muted with only a few naval personnel and families to greet the ship, which quickly secured and allowed personnel to go on leave.

Picture 5.7. The Commander INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove, farewells the Ship’s Company of CANTERBURY on 10 December 1999. The Commanding Officer and author, Commander Warren Cummins is standing to the right. Source: RNZN

CANTERBURY was attached directly to the Command and Control structure of INTERFET due to the ability of the MCC to exercise operational control of the ship. This capability was not resident within the New Zealand force structure in East Timor. Consequently, CANTERBURY, like all of the New Zealand ships, was never recognised as part of the New Zealand forces structure in East Timor. Despite this, and with the concurrence of both the MCC and SNO (NZ), CANTERBURY had worked hard and successfully to ensure their presence was counted towards New Zealand’s combined

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efforts. Humanitarian and national support tasks were completed successfully in addition to the continuous tasking for patrol duties at sea and these had provided every sailor and crewmember the opportunity to visit the shore and experience a small taste of land force activity. CANTERBURY provided capability directly to INTERFET at both a tactical and operational level. Indirectly, the ship also contributed to other, higher level outcomes which will be examined in the next chapter. Tactically, CANTERBURY’s efforts were continually directed to providing the required support for Plan Warden. This was undertaken within Phases Two and Three of the Plan to insert the Land Forces and then establish a secure environment for them to operate within. Specific areas of direct contribution were: Combatant presence, escort in the AO to sea lift vessels, Maritime Search and Rescue (MARSAR), air/sea surveillance and aircraft control, and the support to humanitarian operations. Indirectly, through the support to other vessels or units CANTERBURY also contributed to Warden requirements for Hydrographic survey operations of East Timor ports essential to logistic resupply/operations. The length of service also allowed CANTERBURY to contribute to specific humanitarian and support tasks and see them fully completed, a significant bonus for the crew of the ship, who gained a greater sense of purpose.

Operationally, CANTERBURY’s contributions are most significant when assessed collectively with all maritime operations. Phases Two and Three of the Warden Plan progressed rapidly due to the provision of stores and personnel through a secure maritime environment in to the Dili port facilities. Once there, re-distribution occurred rapidly to the outlying landing points. No disruption occurred to any part of the logistic train, testament to the efficiency of the escorts as much as the logistics ships. This was despite the presence of Indonesian warships in Phase Two of the Warden Plan who, unchecked, could have interrupted or delayed the flow of vital stores, support and personnel from the Warden Plan to work.

Once the initial logistic insertion had occurred and Indonesian security forces were displaced by INTERFET forces, the maritime AO became far more secure as the “protective umbrella” took effect.261 This allowed maritime security elements to progress to Phase Three of the Warden Plan, in concert with land operations, much earlier than

261 Ryan, p. 79.
expected. The warship’s role, while reduced, was no less significant and continued to match INTERFET requirements with capability. The provision of escort to the tactical sealift units, air and sea surveillance and initial humanitarian aid were directly linked to Warden tasks and all achieved successfully. In many cases, ships such as CANTERBURY were asked to supply humanitarian aid more easily than some land units as the maritime environment was relatively secure and the sailors could be spared without interference to operations.

CANTERBURY’s individual contribution to the successful outcome of the INTERFET operation was also recognised on a number of occasions, including direct comment from both the MCC and SNO (NZ). The four CANTERBURY patrols included a brief period during November as the only warship on station. While it is unlikely that a short gap without warship coverage would have seriously affected the mission outcome, had CANTERBURY been absent the MCC would not have delivered the required capability to INTERFET and both the land and maritime forces would have been left vulnerable. When taken into account with all of the service provided during INTERFET, CANTERBURY’s presence and outputs can be directly assessed as contributing to the overall success of the mission.

Not withstanding the above, the operation was difficult and lengthy for the ship. CANTERBURY was fortunate to have completed the entire operation with few mechanical defects, a remarkable achievement considering the previous part of the deployment. During the INTERFET commitment CANTERBURY achieved 92% availability of all her systems through a policy of flexible maintenance initiated by the two engineering officers. The most serious defect was the partial loss of air conditioning for almost the entire operation. Although sufficient remained to operate all the electronic systems with ease, only a minimal amount was available for crew comfort and the duration of the operation was spent in hotter conditions than normal. This undoubtedly led to some stress among the crew but was put into perspective when observing the conditions ashore.

262 Ibid, p. 73.
263 Martyn Dunne, SNO (NZ) letter to HMNZS CANTERBURY, dated 29 November 1999 and Cdre B.D. Robertson, RAN (Retired), MCC signal to HMNZS CANTERBURY, 100620Z Dec 99.
The final assessment of *CANTERBURY* relates to the DoN. The ability of *CANTERBURY* to achieve a four day Readiness Time (RT), despite the 180 DoN is related to the fortuitous exercise programme and individual efforts of the ship’s company, RNZN STG and other support agencies within New Zealand assisted in preparing the ship for duty. By good fortune, the timing of INTERFET capitalised on *CANTERBURY*’s previous deployment and the training to OLOC this had coincidentally provided. Combined, they ensured that *CANTERBURY* contributed significantly to INTERFET and to New Zealand outcomes.
Chapter Six Other Potential NZ Maritime Activity

Analysis so far has focused on what the deployed NZ naval forces did. Some discussion and analysis of what other NZ naval units could have contributed, had they been selected as part of INTERFET is also possible, based on the options that were initially considered by the NZDF JOPG and the eventual operations. In particular, three potential areas of activity were considered and then dismissed: Military Sealift, Hydrographic Operations and alternate warship activity by the RNZN Inshore Patrol Craft. It is valuable to analyse the potential value of each of these areas following the INTERFET mission.

Military sealift was identified as a key requirement for all phases of Plan Warden. Although some early consideration was given by the NZDF JOPG to recalling HMNZS CHARLES UPHAM, this was quickly dismissed and so New Zealand forces were forced to rely on other nations and on commercial sea lift. Military sealift therefore provides the first opportunity for an alternate NZDF Force Element that was not used and can be best assessed using the example of the Suai tactical lodgement of 1 RNZIR battalion. The tactical lodgement by Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) was essential as there was no other method of providing stores and personnel to Suai in sufficient quantity within the eventual timeframe of one week. Initial appraisal of the area had suggested an improvised beach landing point might be possible and that such an entry point would be necessary for ongoing bulk supply as well as initial lodgement. After a survey by an RAN hydrographical detachment and confirmation by a clearance diving team of suitability, army engineers constructed a temporary crossing strip across the soft sand of the beach. This used a heavy grade plastic sheeting bolstered by shingle to allow vehicles to make the transit without becoming stuck. A Landing Craft would nose up to the beach for periods of the day either side of high water and allow vehicles and personnel to exit directly on to the improvised crossing.

265 Annex G to Plan Warden CONOPS dated 19 September 1999, para. 5a – d.
266 New Zealand Army 1150/32 dated 14 June 2000, para. 4.
The gradient of the beach was not suitable for TOBRUK or other larger INTERFET ships to use for a direct landing point so a number of LCH and Landing Craft Minor (LCM) 8 harbour craft were required to ferry from the larger amphibious vessels to shore. A protracted series of shuttle runs was then required to fully unload the deck cargo that could be driven or craned into the LCHs and personnel. LCM 8 landing craft, capable of carrying a single truck or Armoured Personnel Carrier, were brought to Suai as deck cargo on TOBRUK while LCH's were escorted to the area. This situation would have been identical had CHARLES UPHAM been used.267

The requirement to trans-ship from TOBRUK created an unforeseen difficulty as the New Zealand Army had loaded much of their equipment into 96 large, 6.5 metre (20 feet) long International Standards Organisation (ISO) containers for simplicity of transport from New Zealand.268 These are the largest standard container for international shipping and the most economical in which to ship bulk supplies. While the containers could be

268 Ibid, p. 22.
loaded and unloaded in ports with suitable heavy lifting equipment, some could not be lifted from their deck storage position by TOBRUK’s derricks which were not positioned to provide full deck access. Equally, those that could not be lifted could also not all be unloaded in situ due to the sheer volume of equipment they contained, positioning and the manpower that would be required to achieve the unloading in a suitable timeframe.

In total, 38 containers were eventually brought to Suai and landed using heavy lift helicopters from the BELLEAU WOOD and PELILAU.²⁶⁹ Had these not been available, the stores contained within them might never have reached their intended destination or been so delayed through unpacking and re-packing operations in a safe port, that combat land operations could have been compromised. The remainder of the containers were safely transhipped by derrick from TOBRUK to LCH then ashore on a purpose built side loader truck.

By contrast, such containers would have posed no problem for CHARLES UPHAM. As a Roll on Roll off designed vessel, containers could have been driven from the vehicle decks directly into the LCH’s. Full deck access would have been assured and CHARLES UPHAM could have carried the total 96 New Zealand Army containers in a single lift rather than the 38 supplied by TOBRUK, had this been deemed the priority.

In summary, TOBRUK and other INTERFET vessels transported 195 New Zealand vehicles and 96 containers across the beach to support the New Zealand Battalion. Vehicles carried between Darwin and Suai totalled 1,220 lane metres when accumulated for statistical purposes. A total weight of 3,863 tonnes of equipment completed the amphibious lift that took a week in total for ships from Australia, France and the United States to complete.²⁷⁰ TOBRUK lifted and delivered a mix of the equipment that comprised this total and was only hindered in delivery of the ISO containers it could not access from the deck.

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 23.
²⁷⁰ New Zealand Army 1150/32 dated 14 June 2000, para. 1.
New Zealand Army analysis of the amphibious loading concludes that the CHARLES UPHAM was unsuitable for the INTERFET logistic tasks for a number of reasons and that the ship would not have been able to add value to the tactical insertion at Suai.\footnote{New Zealand Army 1150/32 dated 14 June 2000, paras. 5 – 6.} This conclusion is not supported by analysis of the facts. CHARLES UPHAM was rated capable of 3,000 tonnes lift and 1,000 lane metres. Given this, for the strategic lift of stores from New Zealand to Suai, over 75 percent of the stores would have been lifted in one load and would have required no transhipping at Darwin, effectively reducing transit time to only ten days from New Zealand to Suai at an average speed of 15 knots. Commercial shipping costs would also have been reduced by seventy five percent.\footnote{Ibid, para. 4.}

Comment is also made that CHARLES UPHAM could not have achieved value for the strategic lift into the Suai Beach due to a lack of internal lighterage.\footnote{Ibid, para. 5.} This is also not supported by examination of the facts. Most of the equipment movement at Suai was achieved by TOBRUK utilising a docking system available to any vessel with a controllable stem ramp, exactly as found on the CHARLES UPHAM (see Photo 6.2). Other methods were used, such as FNS SIRROCCO, a modern Landing Platform Dock

Photo 6.2. A New Zealand Army Armoured Personnel Carrier backs onto HMAS BRUNEI in preparation for trans-shipping ashore. The Landing Craft is ‘married’ to the rear loading ramp of the TOBRUK with large ropes above the entrance door to allow vehicles to freely move. Note the second LCH receiving stores from the side loading position. Source: RNZN
configured vessel, provided both internal lighterage and embarked heavy lift helicopters, and this unquestionably assisted in the speed of transferral. The process of transfer by SIRROCO was not altogether easy though, as INTERFET MCC staff found this ship difficult to liaise with on occasion and this contributed to some delays in activity.274 Despite this, there is little doubt that custom built capabilities of this sort would be preferable to an unconverted merchant vessel such as the CHARLES UPHAM. Compared with the characteristics and capabilities of the TOBRUK, however, CANTERBURY would have provided a similar level.

Landing craft proved to be very suitable as trans-shipping carriers and could lift all of the stores required on their large flat decks. These were able to ‘marry’ to the larger mother ships for trans-shipping at either a stern door/ramp for wheeled vehicles or from a side position for craned off loading. Side loading required the larger ship to be equipped with a suitable crane and this would have been a limiting factor for CHARLES UPHAM or the more traditional amphibious capability of HMAS TOBRUK.

Army analysis states that sea conditions would have precluded loading LCH’s from a mother ship.275 This does not reflect the sea conditions found at the Suai or any other beaches, for tactical insertion, where conditions permitted all landings to proceed virtually unhindered.276 Occasional delays did occur due to tidal windows but these effects were common for all vessels utilising the beach entry point. No unique restrictions would have affected a CHARLES UPHAM/LCH combination. Had the possible combination of CHARLES UPHAM and LCH’s been utilised, there would also have been no requirement to engage heavy lift helicopters at greater cost and difficulty. This confirms the conclusion that an unmodified CHARLES UPHAM could have achieved a successful contribution to the Warden Plan.

Ultimately, the success of the Suai insertion owed as much to the capabilities of the planning to have the right trans-shipping and helicopter capability available at the right time as it did to any particular ships capabilities. As a non-opposed landing, any vessel

275 New Zealand Army 1150/32 dated 14 June 2000, para. 5.
with bulk cargo capacity and a stern door could have assisted in the transfer and, in the case of *CHARLES UPHAM* this could have provided useful additional bulk freight capability. The fact that *CHARLES UPHAM* had not been modified meant that it was difficult to include in the INTERFET orbat and justified the decisions of the NZDF JOPG.

Phase Two (Insertion of INTERFET) of the *Warden* Plan also called for "hydrographic survey operations of East Timor ports essential to logistic resupply/operations".\(^{277}\) Initial consideration by the NZDF JOPG was for HMNZS *RESOLUTION* to be included in the ORBAT although this was discounted as planning and knowledge of likely threat increased. The *Warden* tasks were consistent with the capability required of the ship, albeit this was, at the time, utilised only for commercial purposes. Utilisation of *RESOLUTION* would, therefore, have required the INTERFET task to be given precedence over commercial work and with probable contractual penalty. Evidence from the operations of the HODSU detachment indicates that *RESOLUTION* would also have provided too high a level of capability.

For the duration of Phase Two of INTERFET, HODSU operated as a detached unit in a small aluminium boat equipped with portable echo sounder and computer. Each evening the boat would return to a mothership to download data and print survey results. This capability was sufficient to meet the requirements and operated at minimal cost, although personnel were exposed and often provided with an escort to ensure safety.\(^{278}\) Comparatively, *RESOLUTION* would have been expensive and unable to achieve many of the shallow surveys for beach landing undertaken by HODSU. Alternate RNZN capability could have been provided in the form of an Inshore Survey Craft (ISC). In addition to the Hydrographic capability, the vessels would also have been able to provide their own computer support, obviating the requirement for a permanent mothership. These vessels were available throughout 1999 and until mid 2000.\(^{279}\) An ISC would have met all requirements and provided sufficient capability, with minor alteration to fit small calibre weapons as for the Inshore Patrol Craft, to ensure independent safety. In certain areas, greater protection would still have been required and this could have been

\(^{277}\) Annex G to Plan *Warden* CONOPS dated 19 September 1999, para. 5b.


\(^{279}\) NZDF Annual Report, 2000, p. 16.
provide in the same manner as it was for HODSU, by frigate, Clearance Diving Team, or a combination of both.

Balanced against these positives, the ISC were of insufficient length and sea-keeping ability to allow independent movement to East Timor across the hostile waters of the Tasman. Either an escort or trans-shipping on a larger vessel would have been required — options that precluded their rapid involvement in the INTERFET operations. Based on these problems alone, the decision by the JOPG to exclude the ISC and RESOLUTION from the ORBAT is considered appropriate.

Finally, it is possible to assess whether the Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) could have contributed to the mission. Additional tasks under Plan Warden were:

Provide a combatant presence;
Combatant escort to sea lift units in the vicinity of East Timor;
MARSAR;
Communications support;
Air and sea surveillance and aircraft control;
Command and Control backup; and,
Provision of helicopter refuelling/forward operating base.$^{280}$

Early consideration was given to using the IPCs for coastal patrol. In the end, the growth of combatant tasks resulted in frigates from the RNZN Naval Combat Force deploying to meet all of these requirements. While the IPC were available, they could not have satisfied the multiple levels of capability demanded by these complicated tasks. Despite the fact that some of the frigates capabilities were not utilised by the MCC during INTERFET, all were available. RNZN frigates were used to provide presence, escort, MARSAR and surveillance on a regular basis. Additionally, unique capabilities such as Anti-submarine Warfare and humanitarian support were also required on a number of occasions.

By contrast, IPC are minimally manned and possess very limited capabilities. The vessels are 105 feet in length and are crewed by up to 13 personnel. No war fighting

$^{280}$ Annex G to HQAST OP WARDEN CONOPS dated 19 September 1999.
capability is available, particularly for surveillance or protection and, unless the manning and accommodation is augmented, they are incapable of protracted operating, primarily due to the lack of watch keeping personnel. IPC are considered capable of only close inshore work due to their limitations. Combined with their relatively slow speed of 13 knots, the vessels would have been unable to provide escort or surveillance capabilities. Limited presence and MARSAR could have been undertaken and the IPCs would have struggled to provide utility to the INTERFET force. Like the ISCs, the IPCs would also have been difficult, if not impossible, to deploy rapidly enough to have provided an effective contribution. The decision by the NZDF JOPG and RNZN to exclude the Inshore Patrol Craft is therefore considered to have been correct.

Overall, the New Zealand ships that did deploy were well-suited to the tactical and operational tasks of INTERFET. Although other Force Elements, such as CHARLES UPHAM's, RESOLUTION, the ISCs and IPCs could have been deployed, these would have provided varying levels of capability and would certainly not, in the case of the IPCs have provided sufficient flexibility to be considered useful. Consequently, the planning process and elimination of non-useful force options by the JOPG and RNZN Maritime Headquarters can be seen to have been a successful adjunct to the operation itself. RNZN force elements that were selected were useful and well employed, justifying their selection.
Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to detail and evaluate the New Zealand maritime contribution to the INTERFET mission in East Timor. INTERFET lasted from September 1999 to February 2000 and was a relatively short-lived mission. Few publications record the activities of the maritime elements of the force, yet the mission was extremely successful, completing all aims in a period of only six months. Evaluating the contribution of New Zealand forces raised three key questions. These provide a construct against which performance could be measured.

First, it was necessary to individually detail the activities taken by the New Zealand Headquarters and the three New Zealand Naval vessels and to assess the contribution these made towards the RNZN strategic goals and NZDF Key Result Areas as these measure operational effectiveness. Once this was achieved, it was then possible to assess the collective contribution of the NZDF Maritime Forces against the New Zealand’s Government Key Defence Policy Outcomes. Third, the forces supplied to INTERFET were only the final iteration of a lengthy and complex process of planning. Using the details of completed activities it was then possible to look back at whether the force selection was justified, or would other ships have supplied better service, different skills or met the mission requirements more exactly.

The activities and analysis of the key elements, both ashore and at sea, involved in providing the New Zealand maritime reaction to East Timor has been detailed in the previous chapters. Individually, the majority of these units operated effectively and contributed well to the overall success of New Zealand’s involvement. There were, however, some minor failures within operational areas, although these did not affect the ultimate outcome of the various missions or events.

The NZDF Headquarters planning group demonstrated sound planning and, despite the late formal notification of the Warden Plan, made the correct Force Element choices. Information was passed at the right time to the next level of Headquarters and good advice was sought as decisions were made.
The Naval Headquarters had minimal direct involvement in Maritime activity. Operational information was passed directly to the Force Elements for rapid reaction. Once in the INTERFET organisation, this often occurred without reference to the RNZN Headquarters. Ships were required to report administratively to the Headquarters and this provided a suitable ‘arms-length’ view of what was occurring in East Timor. The historical association of RNZN ships with the RAN also served the situation well and allowed the Headquarters to focus on other issues.

The warning supplied to the ships prior to operations by the Naval Headquarters, in every case but one, was inadequate. This was not necessarily the fault of the Headquarters who were similarly provided with little warning. Verbal advice, supported no doubt by signal traffic, was provided in each case as ships deployed for INTERFET. In the only re-deployment, by ENDEAVOUR, better advice by written orders and use of the Readiness Time (RT) was achieved. This was the only case of the DoN being applied correctly, suggesting that such constructs are unrepresentative of the true readiness times for warships. The Naval Headquarters also failed to provide key information to at least one ship and no briefings on what to expect in the AO were ever provided. This was a significant information gap that could have provided useful information to the ships to better prepare them for forthcoming operations.

TE KAHA provided a very rapid response, well below the required RT. Due to the short time of attachment to INTERFET, little operational or tactical involvement eventuated, however, the ship provided a significant strategic service while demonstrating the utility of national seapower by being able to re-deploy so rapidly. TE KAHA was also seen to be directly supporting a national ally in a time of military need – a key Defence Outcome. Balanced against this, in an operational situation of considerable threat, questions hang over the true capability level of the ship, given the number and type of defects that were being carried. The lack of a full operational assessment of the TE KAHA’s abilities was a weakness identified by the RNZN.  

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ENDEAVOUR’s involvement in INTERFET was vital due to the shortage of fuelling platforms in the ORBAT. During the first mission ENDEAVOUR’s capabilities were essential to ferry fuel supplies to the static HMAS SUCCESS, constrained to remain in Dili Harbour. During the second mission, ENDEAVOUR became the sole source of military fuel supply and, if unavailable, would have seriously curtailed INTERFET operations. By the time of this second mission in January – February 2000, INTERFET had become established and was cementing the conditions of security in East Timor. This required a larger and more diverse infrastructure ashore and a lesser one at sea, providing an ideal opportunity for ENDEAVOUR to assume the task of Logistics Coordinator. The ship was able to take on the new role and successfully carried this task out until the mission completed. In doing so, the tanker clearly exceeded its expected role.

ENDEAVOUR’s direction early in the operation by the various Headquarters in New Zealand and East Timor was sometimes confused. In particular, the requirement to embark excess AVCAT in Singapore and then the inability to load diesel to capacity in Cairns and Darwin, arose from confused directions as events threatened to overwhelm the operational Headquarters in Dili.

CANTERBURY’s activities in Timor spanned four lengthy patrols that commenced only seven days after INTERFET was formed. The warships capabilities were well utilised with numerous surveillance, escort and guard ship missions. Operational capabilities for self-defence and protection were essential to the conduct of these tasks and were tested against unidentified aircraft and sub-surface contacts, proving the utility of such ships even when at the end of service life.

Over the period of time devoted to the operation this elderly ship achieved a remarkable level of serviceability and flexibility, although these were never able to rectify the one major defect of air-conditioning for most of the deployment. The benefit of larger crew numbers saw the ship well positioned to assist in humanitarian and New Zealand ‘self-help’ operations in the early stages of INTERFET. This was an opportunity that was not wasted and resulted in several successful achievements ashore without detriment to operational tasking. This was achieved by excellent co-operation and effort by those in the ship and the small planning detachment of the SNO (NZ) in Dili. As a consequence,
**CANTERBURY** met and exceeded all operational tasks and measurements against NZDF and RNZN criteria. Achieving this was not easy and there are indications that stress and fatigue were factors that could easily have overwhelmed the crew had the issues not been carefully managed.

With individual assessments completed, the second key question regarding collective contribution to higher outputs can be answered. Analysis at the strategic level can first be made of the RNZN’s actions. The RNZN was delegated the requirement to meet two key broad criteria – quantity of provision of forces to meet the requirements of Employment Contexts and quality of supply of the agreed forces within the designated DoN.\(^{282}\) Both of these criteria were met and exceeded although some aspects of supply quality by the **TE KAHA** are questionable (see Table 1). The actions of the RNZN HQ organisation, while not directly contributing to INTERFET, did act to ensure ship availability and in some areas this is assessed as marginal. A specific area of weakness was noted in the mission briefing and some aspects of Command and Control, particularly in relation to the New Zealand part of this arrangement. Control and briefing for three of the four deployments was ad hoc and led to the **CANTERBURY** not receiving important briefing documents prior to departure from New Zealand.\(^{283}\)

### Table 1: NZ MARITIME SEAPower CONTRIBUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>KH</th>
<th>EN</th>
<th>CY</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>CU</th>
<th>RES</th>
<th>ISC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (Plan Warden task list)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational (Could not complete INTERFET without)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic RNZN (Output Class/EC’s/Notice)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZDF Key Result Areas</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Outcomes (Govt Outcomes)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y – Evidence of contribution  
N – No evidence of contribution  
Shading – Potential RNZN Force Elements and contribution

Quantity of strategic output was provided in the form of two frigates with helicopters and the tanker. **TE KAHA** was preparing at a higher operational level for a mission to the

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\(^{282}\) NZDF Annual Report 2000, p. 68.  
\(^{283}\) Maritime HQ file 3000/11630/ET (and coversheet thereto) dated 9 Sep 99 (Report of the visit to East Timor, 24 August – 5 September 1999).
Persian Gulf and was easily diverted without further preparation to provide a New Zealand maritime commitment for Phase One of INTERFET. The provision of the \textit{CANTERBURY} was a more difficult achievement due to the lower DLOC of 180 days and the shortage of core experienced crew. Consequently, successful generation and deployment of the ship at a high standard represented a significant achievement by the RNZN.

The quality of strategic output was met in broad terms. However, the assessment utilised for \textit{TE KAHA} was an ad hoc one and did not fully assess the ship's capabilities. This was recognised to have been an unavoidable failing by the RNZN, caused by a constant re-prioritising of the ship for other duties.\footnote{NZDF Annual Report 2000, p. 70.} Had a full work up been conducted to assess \textit{TE KAHA}, it may have exposed the high number of defects carried by the ship with potential to effect warfare operations.\footnote{RNZN TG 648.1 Deployment report for 16 August – 4 October 1999, dated 17 October 1999, Annex D, para. 5.} As it transpired, the capabilities potentially affected were not called upon and the ship provided good service for the few days it was associated with the mission. Subsequent service in other operations by \textit{TE KAHA} also proved that the ship was capable and did deliver the required quality of output.\footnote{106} The fortuitous positioning of \textit{TE KAHA} in both physical and training continuums allowed the Readiness Time to be much shorter than the DoN specified, again meeting the strategic requirement for both RNZN and NZDF.

By contrast, selection of \textit{CANTERBURY} was a late decision based on demonstrated capability. The quality of output by the ship was exceeded for both the RNZN and NZDF as the \textit{CANTERBURY} had been at a lower DLOC to the other contributing NZ ships prior to entering the INTERFET orbat. Fortunately, the training pattern for the ship had ensured that \textit{CANTERBURY} was, in fact, at a very high state of preparedness with the crew, including trainees, fully integrated. At 180 days DoN, the theoretical preparedness of the ship would have excluded any possibility of taking part in the operation had it been necessary to be enforced by the RNZN. When tasked, however, the ship was able to deploy, fully prepared, in only four days including, almost unbelievably, a two-day stop in Auckland to recover a new helicopter. Even encompassing the transit time to Darwin, which did include some training, \textit{CANTERBURY} entered the INTERFET orbat 14 days
after initial warning – an impressive achievement indeed. Through the OPRES and other reporting systems, including objective self-assessment by the ship’s command, visiting STG and Defence HQ staff, it was assessed that CANTERBURY’s preparedness was actually much higher than the required standard of Operational Sea Training Instructions. The decision to send and the subsequent results from INTERFET proved this to be the case. No elements of the mission were affected by any system defect during the 76-day attachment to INTERFET. CANTERBURY achieved 68 days in the AO consisting of 15 days guard ship for Suai, 20 for Dili and 21 attached to patrols of the Eden corridor and Wetar Strait. In total 30 escorts were undertaken, 2 SAR and 1350 hours of humanitarian work. Anti-surface warfare skills were exercised against Indonesian surface forces, anti-submarine ones against the two submarine contacts of the patrols and air warfare operations against the 10 unidentified contacts recorded, including the one warning to an Indonesian Nomad.  

ENDEAVOUR also met the required quantity and quality targets for Output Class D3. The Readiness Time target was exceeded, partly due to the timing and position of the ship. Over the duration of two separate tours of duty in INTERFET, ENDEAVOUR had delivered a total of 12,177 cubic metres of diesel, 1,330 cubic metres of AVCAT and over 90 pallets of food or stored equipment. More importantly, the ship had maintained the vital flow of fuel to INTERFET when SUCCESS had required to be stationed in Dili and had then acted as the sole military tanker supplying the less urgent but more diverse (and no less critical) requirements of INTERFET in the busy days near mission end. All objectives of the initial tasking and the later operational instruction had been completed or exceeded.

In summary, the RNZN was able to achieve the required quantity and quality of strategic output Classes D2 and D3 for Naval Combat and Support Forces as part of its total output from INTERFET. The output for Class D3, Support Forces could have been augmented by the provision of CHARLES UPHAM to INTERFET.  

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286 NZDF Annual Report, 2000, p. 70.  
287 Ibid, p. 16.  
288 EN 1630/743 Report of Proceedings, Feb 00, dated 2 Mar 00, para. 17  
At the next higher level, the NZDF was required to meet a variety of Operational Outcomes. The provision of maritime elements, as part of the combined forces provided to INTERFET contributed to these outcomes in three areas. Operational outcome C: A strong relationship with Australia. This outcome is achieved through “the maintenance of balanced military capabilities sufficient to demonstrate a commitment to the common security of the Australia-New Zealand strategic area. Sufficiency is demonstrated by capabilities that are interoperable...”. Contribution to this outcome was clearly demonstrated by the maritime force elements but is demonstrated best by Commander Daryl Bates, the Chief Staff Officer of the MCC who stated “you guys came across, swept into our Command and Control and there was no issue at all...”

NZDF Operational Outcome D: A secure and stable Asia-Pacific region, is achieved by, in part,

“the deterrent effect of balanced capabilities that are interoperable with other relevant armed forces and available as a contribution to the regional efforts aimed at deterring aggression.”

Interoperability with regional forces was achieved by most of the maritime Force Elements. Some issues of interoperability were noted by TE KAHA regarding voice communication with US and other allied units. However, electronic data to provide surveillance was interoperable for both CANTERBURY and TE KAHA and allowed complete integration into the coalition.

NZDF Operational Outcome E: A standing and position in international affairs. This is measured by

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290 Ibid, p 35
291 DLA (TBA), Record of Interview, Cdr D W. Bates, RAN, 29 May 2002, p. 16.
292 NZDF Annual Report, 2000, p. 36.
"delivery of Annual Outputs that provide contributions to collective security operations, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement conducted by the United Nations and other relevant multinational agencies". \(^{294}\)

INTERFET was a United Nations mandated peace-enforcement operation to which the NZDF supplied maritime forces for a cumulative total of 113 days. \(^{295}\) General Cosgrove also generally identified the successful contributions of New Zealand maritime assets in comments in a speech to Georgetown University on ANZAC Day 2000. He identified the utility of sea power for this peace-enforcement operation and other critical elements including, "the deterrent nature of warships, crucial nature of amphibious and lift operations and the reliance on sea lifelines" – all clear references to the contributions made by NZDF ships. \(^{296}\)

Nationally, the final assessment that can be made is whether the New Zealand Government’s National Security Outcomes, key measures of Foreign Policy, were supported by the provision of ships to INTERFET. The examples previously provided, again highlight that this was the case. Outcome C seeks a strong relationship with Australia that supports a secure and stable New Zealand and Australian area of interest. D looks to a secure and stable Asia-Pacific region as part of an open global economy that welcomes New Zealand presence and trade, while E recognises a standing and position in international affairs. All of these outcomes are supported by the maritime elements of INTERFET. Examples of each have been well established previously. The Government of New Zealand provided the best and probably most direct recognition of these outcomes with the statement by the Minister of Defence, on 17 February 2000 when discussing Defence Policy post operations in East Timor:

From the Government’s perspective, the INTERFET deployment to East Timor has been very successful. The United Nations-backed international peace support operation, under Australian leadership, has fulfilled its mission... East Timor has reinforced for us the

\(^{294}\) NZDF Annual Report, 2000, p. 36.
\(^{295}\) Cdre B.D. Robertson, RAN (Retired), "Not learning the lessons of Operation Stabilise", in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol 26, No 2, Apr/Jun 2000, p. 15.
important and constructive role our Defence Force can play in promoting global security.297

Clearly, maritime units of the NZDF contributed well to the various levels of tactical and operational outputs for INTERFET. Minor issues relating to tasking and briefing did affect areas of capability nor did they detract from the overall success of the operation which proceeded smoothly once the ships had integrated into the INTERFET organisation. All of the ships provided good service at the level of operational capability required and, by achieving this in a peace-enforcement operation, New Zealand’s Defence foreign policy was enhanced through the contribution to the National Security Outcomes. This provides a clear linkage of ship activity to foreign policy, not normally visible.

Similar analysis of New Zealand Army and Air involvement in East Timor are identifiable as further areas of study as these will provide similar although different linkages to national foreign policies. The impact of utilising commercial transport for strategic lift of land forces to any operation, in particular, is an area that could benefit from more detailed examination. By examining the tactical insertion in to Suai from a Land operation perspective, for example, considerable insight could be gathered as to how logistics can shape operational planning. This issue was only briefly examined from a maritime perspective in this thesis and by using this as a starting point, an analysis might draw different conclusions when more broadly examined.

Air operations in East Timor covered a wide gambit from the UNAMET evacuation to utility support throughout New Zealand’s involvement in the country. This provides ample time to gain a detailed assessment of operational capabilities and any shortfalls. Detailed analysis of such operations would provide considerable value for planners and policy makers as Air operations tend to be more responsive than other forces in operational theatres. From recent statements made by Australian government and

297 Hon Mark Burton, “Opening address to Defence Policy after East Timor”, NZ Institute of International Affairs, 17 Feb 2000
military representatives, it would appear that New Zealand air assets, especially 3 Squadron, were highly valued.²⁹⁸

New Zealand naval operations suffered a lack of visibility, partly due to the unique and necessary command and control relationship via the RAN. In essence RNZN ships attached for INTERFET duties became RAN units during their attachments. This meant that achievements and activities were attributed to the overall contribution of the RAN, rather than being uniquely identifiable to the RNZN. The closeness of this association is recognised, albeit accidentally, nowhere more poignantly than in Alan Ryan’s early analysis of INTERFET. In his *Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks*, facing page 66, ENDEAVOUR is identified as an Australian unit. To fully assess the maritime contribution to INTERFET, would require a detailed analysis of all activity including particularly, RAN involvement. This is an area that could actively be researched in a number of different aspects such as amphibious operations, command and control or the wider application of Seapower in United Nations missions.

Returning finally to the central question of this thesis, INTERFET’s operational requirements were to achieve three distinct elements. These were to:

“restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian operations, ...”²⁹⁹

The success of the mission to restore peace and security can be judged most accurately by the time the mission took - only five months after inception rather than the planned time of nine months.³⁰⁰

The second part of the INTERFET mission involved forces prior to Phase One which stood watch as UNAMET withdrew from East Timor. While *TE KAHA* was included among this number, the contribution can only be considered in terms of an international presence and observation. UNAMET did return to Dili once conditions of security were re-established and it is notable that there was direct activity to support UNAMET by a New Zealand frigate in the form of a protection detail of *CANTERBURY* sailors for a

food delivery on 5 October 1999 in Dili.\textsuperscript{301} Not withstanding the interrupted duties of UNAMET, success can be attributed to INTERFET for the pace and ease with which transition was made to United Nations control in the eventual form of UNTAET. The two missions overlapped from 26 October 1999 onwards when UNTAET replaced UNAMET and were able to proceed towards a common goal of transition in February 2000.\textsuperscript{302}

The third part of INTERFET’s mission was to facilitate humanitarian assistance within force capabilities. Two of the three naval Ships, \textit{CANTERBURY} and \textit{ENDEAVOUR} contributed directly to this humanitarian assistance. In the case of the former, 1350 man hours of humanitarian assistance were provided early in INTERFET’s operations, a product of the high crew numbers, a relatively secure environment and excellent cooperation between \textit{CANTERBURY} and the New Zealand command element in Dili.\textsuperscript{303} Similar efforts, albeit on a much smaller scale typified \textit{ENDEAVOUR’s} second contribution to INTERFET, particularly through the provision and distribution of relief supplies from the various New Zealand agencies.\textsuperscript{304}

The mission was also clearly judged a success by the United Nations in the form of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who holds the INTERFET mission as a model for future peace enforcement operations.\textsuperscript{305} Given the RNZN’s role in INTERFET, and the demonstration of its operational flexibility and capabilities, confidence can be held that it will again rise to the challenge should it be called upon for future peacekeeping operations.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{301} HMNZS \textit{CANTERBURY} Report of proceedings Oct 1999, dated 1 Nov 99, para. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{302} Ryan, Annex B, p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Crawford and Harper, p. 104.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Ibid, p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{305} Ryan, Annex B, p. xi.
\end{itemize}
Appendix 1
HMNZS TE KAHA
Operations 8-25 Sep 99

Source: RNZN
Appendix 2
HMNZS ENDEAVOUR
Operations 28 Jan-23 Feb 00
Source: RNZN
Appendix 3
HMNZS ENDEAVOUR/CANTERBURY
Operations - Oecussi Enclave
Patrols Three and Four
9 Nov-11 Dec 99
Source: RNZN
Appendix 5
HMNZS CANTERBURY
Operations - Patrol Two
17 Oct-5 Nov 99
Source: RNZN
Appendix 6
HMNZS CANTERBURY
Operations - Patrol Three
9 Nov-26 Nov 99
Source: RNZN
Appendix 7
HMNZS CANTERBURY
Operations - Patrol Four
3 Dec-11 Dec 99
Source: RNZN
RESOLUTION 1264 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4045th meeting, on 15 September 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in East Timor,

Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/513, Annexes I to III),

Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999 and taking note of its outcome, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese people,

Deeply concerned by the deterioration in the security situation in East Timor, and in particular by the continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians,

Deeply concerned also at the attacks on the staff and premises of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), on other officials and on international and national humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Appalled by the worsening humanitarian situation in East Timor, particularly as it affects women, children and other vulnerable groups,

Reaffirming the right of refugees and displaced persons to return in safety and security to their homes,
Endorsing the report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili (S/1999/976),

Welcoming the statement by the President of Indonesia on 12 September 1999 in which he expressed the readiness of Indonesia to accept an international peacekeeping force through the United Nations in East Timor,

Welcoming the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia to the Secretary-General of 14 September 1999 (S/1999/975),

Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia,

Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor, and stressing that persons committing such violations bear individual responsibility,

Determining that the present situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns all acts of violence in East Timor, calls for their immediate end and demands that those responsible for such acts be brought to justice;

2. Emphasizes the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and calls upon all parties to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the protection of civilians at risk, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid;

3. Authorizes the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate;

4. Welcomes the expressed commitment of the Government of Indonesia to cooperate with the multinational force in all aspects of the implementation of its mandate and looks forward to close coordination between the multinational force and the Government of Indonesia;

5. Underlines the Government of Indonesia’s continuing responsibility under the Agreements of 5 May 1999, taking into account the mandate of the multinational force set out in paragraph 3 above, to maintain peace and security in East Timor in the interim phase between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of its result and to guarantee the security of the personnel and premises of UNAMET;
6. Welcomes the offers by Member States to organize, lead and contribute to the multinational force in East Timor, calls on Member States to make further contributions of personnel, equipment and other resources and invites Member States in a position to contribute to inform the leadership of the multinational force and the Secretary-General;

7. Stresses that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees to East Timor;

8. Notes that Article 6 of the Agreement of 5 May 1999 states that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations, and requests the leadership of the multinational force to cooperate closely with the United Nations to assist and support those arrangements;

9. Stresses that the expenses for the force will be borne by the participating Member States concerned and requests the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund through which contributions could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

10. Agrees that the multinational force should collectively be deployed in East Timor until replaced as soon as possible by a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and invites the Secretary-General to make prompt recommendations on a peacekeeping operation to the Security Council;

11. Invites the Secretary-General to plan and prepare for a United Nations transitional administration in East Timor, incorporating a United Nations peacekeeping operation, to be deployed in the implementation phase of the popular consultation (phase III) and to make recommendations as soon as possible to the Security Council;

12. Requests the leadership of the multinational force to provide periodic reports on progress towards the implementation of its mandate through the Secretary-General to the Council, the first such report to be made within 14 days of the adoption of this resolution;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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