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THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT OF EAST TIMOR:
A CASE STUDY OF A LOCAL NGO, YAYASAN ETADEP
(Yayasan Ema maTA Dalan ba Progressu)

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of
the requirement for the degree of Master of Philosophy
in Development Studies at Massey University,
New Zealand

ANACLETO DA COSTA RIBEIRO
2000
Dedicated to the people of East Timor and NGOs or development agents involving in the rebuilding East Timor who believe that development is:

"Go to the people
Live among the people
Learn from the people
Plan with the people
Work with the people
Start with what the people know
Build on what the people have
Teach by showing, learn by doing
Not a showcase but a pattern
Not odds and ends but a system
Not piecemeal but integrated approach
Not to conform but to transform
NOT RELIEF BUT RELEASE." *

(Dr. Y.C. James Yen)

* The Credo of Rural Reconstruction
The Philosophy, Principles and Practice of Rural Reconstruction,
International Institute of Rural Reconstruction.
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I would like to thank my Lord for His extraordinary blessing so that I can formulate this piece of work. In the most difficult times when I confronted with so much problems in my studies there was always way out. My prayers were always answered.

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ABSTRACT

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been actors on the development stage longer than the World Bank, the United Nations or any other official agency. Throughout the 1980s they have played a greater role than previously because of their greater diversity, credibility and creativity. Therefore, they have now moved to the centre stage of development as significant development agents in the civil society sector. Being significant agents in development, it is important to understand their roles. The current spectrum of NGO activities has emerged from the 19th Century, and been shaped in the past 30 years by the search for alternatives and by emerging new needs and concerns.

Realising the importance and relevance of understanding the role NGOs in development, this study seeks to assess the role of a local NGO, ETADEP, operating in the specific development context of East Timor. The situation in East Timor was unfavourable due to its unstable political status which has been the predominant factor affecting and shaping an NGO's work in this local context. Thus, to gain a better understanding of the role NGOs in East Timor, the assessment should be in line with the existing factors and problems faced by an NGO in this specific context. In addition, this study also attempts to define and classify local NGOs in East Timor i.e. ETADEP into an alternative typology.

This study collects firsthand data through interviews, observations and secondary data from archival records or documents such as: reports, evaluations, publications. Documents were selected from ETADEP's files between the years 1987 and 1998. Informal in-depth interviews were also conducted with relevant individuals who have been either actors of grass-root development or partners of ETADEP.

The findings of this study concludes that ETADEP though operated in such a unfavourable atmosphere has contributed to the process of improving socio-economic welfare of the rural community and sustainable development in East Timor through the strategy of strengthening local self-reliance groups and grassroots organisations.

Specifically, ETADEP has functioned as: a) the facilitator of development aimed at improving the socio-economic welfare of the rural community; b) the communicator between the local government, donors and the local community and
between the local communities; c) the *embryo for NGOs and grassroots organisations*; and d) the *catalyst of innovations and participatory development approaches*.

The study has also identified that ETADEP, though having multiple identities due to its incapability to identify itself properly in such a situation has embedded the four defining characteristics to be considered as an NGO in this context. Thus, a tentative typology is developed based on four main essential descriptors i.e. orientation of activities, scope of operation, main forms of control and its links with donors. This scheme, therefore, has placed ETADEP into a multiple scheme typology. However, comparatively speaking, in terms of focus and scale of ETADEP's programs, it is more appropriate to categorize ETADEP as a *development-oriented NGO*. 
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

To begin this chapter will highlight the emergence of NGOs in development by briefly tracing back to their historical roots and addresses some characteristics and given opportunities for NGOs. Secondly, this chapter identifies and discusses the problem of definition and classification of NGOs. Thirdly, it presents the focus of this study by addressing the importance of understanding the role of NGOs in a development context notably in Indonesia and East Timor, where the development atmosphere is oppressive and fourthly, it justifies the relevance of the study to East Timor's development. Finally this chapter discusses the methodology for this study.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NGOs' EMERGENCE

Voluntary organisations -- or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as they more formally known -- have been actors on the development stage longer than the World Bank, the United Nations or any other official agency. Throughout the 1980s they have played a greater role than previously because of their greater diversity, credibility and creativity. Therefore, they have now moved to the centre stage of development as significant development agents in the civil society sector.

Being one of the significant agents in development, it is important to understand their roles. In order to understand their roles today, it is necessary to examine their historical roots. This section, therefore, provides a historical background of the emergence of NGOs. It describes how the current spectrum of NGO activities has emerged from the 19th Century, and been shaped in the past 30 years by the search for alternatives and by emerging new needs and concerns.

Non-Governmental Organisations had existed before the twentieth century in both the "North" and "South". John Clark observed that although different types of voluntary organisations existed throughout the world well before the twentieth century, NGOs as they are currently known, have a relatively recent history (Clark 1991:34).

Northern NGOs, such as the Catholic Church based CARITAS and Save the Children Fund emerged just after World War I and gained strength towards the end of and immediately after World War II. Hence, Oxfam started in 1942, Catholic Relief
Services (CRS) in 1943 and the American Co-operative Agency for Relief Everywhere (CARE) in 1945 (Clark 1991:34). These NGOs are involved primarily in what can be termed "care and welfare" activities inherited from the charitable work or philanthropy which flourished in industrialised countries from the 19th Century onwards. Such work led to organisations being formed by the middle and wealthy classes to provide relief and welfare to the poor and less privileged, either to meet their material needs or to help them meet their needs themselves. It was a way, albeit a limited one, of transferring resources from rich to poor. This kind of work has been termed voluntary action and led to the establishment of NGOs commonly called charities, charitable or welfare organisations.

Originating immediately following the First World War, the number of NGOs was added to in the aftermath of the Second World War as a response to the war victims' need for relief. Subsequently, these organisations' focus shifted, geographically, to developing countries and providing help for long term development as well as ongoing provision of relief in response to emergency situations (Cleary 1997:3).

At the start of the period of 1950s and 1960s NGOs' development work fitted into a conventional "modernising" school of thought (Clark 1991:35). This period was dominated by Northern NGOs and marked by a neglect of Southern NGOs. Development for Northern NGOs was exported Northern ideas, Northern technology and Northern expertise to the South. However, after mounting of criticisms against them, they shifted to a new role, that of providing a service to the popular Southern grassroots organisations and self-help movements. This period was also marked by the increased funding opportunities from Northern voluntary sources led to a mushrooming of Southern NGOs. Many of these grew rapidly to become national level institutions which served as intermediate channelling organisations for Northern funding agencies or donors.

Another important development mark in this period was the emergence of new political concepts from the Third World intellectuals, such as Liberation Theology, which greatly influenced the thinking on NGOs. Development theory, once dominated by Northern practitioners, now became more an indigenous process, led by the people themselves. Furthermore, in the beginning of 1960s NGOs more or less pursued a common agenda. But by the end of 1960s there had been a considerable change. Some remained with their traditional activities, others progressed to new activities and analysis at different rates. And many Southern NGOs became more assertive (ibid.).
In the 1970s new approaches emerged which had broadened the spectrum. In this period many NGOs engaged in self-help came to realise that development was a process of liberating the poor, both for their physical oppressors and from their own resignation to poverty rather than for the vested interest of economical and political elite. Brazilian NGOs, for example, inspired by ideas of Paolo Friere, pioneered the approach of “conscientization” which is a combination of political education, social organisation and grassroots development (Friere 1972). This approach was designed to help the poor to perceive their exploitation and to realise the opportunities they have for overcoming such exploitation through mass organisation.

Subsequently, NGOs in other countries developed similar approaches to “empowering” the poor, for example, through adult and functional literacy programs in Indian sub-continent. During this period, throughout much of the Third World countries NGOs concentrated on fostering structures to help the poor in their struggle against injustice which led to the age of social development.

Throughout the 1970s the advocacy movement came to prominence because NGOs had realised that poverty was a political issue. NGOs then began programs of development education, public campaigning and parliamentary lobbying in pursuit of political changes. Adopting an advocacy role, created a conflict for NGOs who were dependent on government funding or a conservative donor (Clark 1991).

Following the emergence of the advocacy movement in the 1980s there was an important leap in advocacy work. Though rather timid, Northern NGOs started to speak out and had gained more credibility with their public and their counterparts in overseas. However, the most important mark in this period was the emergence of a number of parallel advocacy groups in the Third World countries. North-South networks of advocacy have increased the authenticity, analytical strength and power of NGO advocacy (ibid.). What they were doing, therefore, was addressing the deeper causes of disadvantage by advocating change and raising public awareness of issues.

From the course of events mentioned above I can conclude that there are two main historical roots from which today's NGOs are derived. These two historical roots can be found in what can be termed the “care and welfare” and “change and development” activities of NGOs. The “care and welfare” is involved more in relief activities and the “change and development” complement their care and welfare activities both by helping people to help themselves -- working with people rather than doing unto them -- and working to bring about wider changes in society.
NGOs AS ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT AGENTS

One of the reasons to consider NGOs as an alternative actors in the development process is that the number of NGOs has grown over the past 20 years. In addition, their scope of work has widened, to the extent that they are now concerned or involved in almost every aspect of human need and endeavour. Some of them have global impact and significance while others affect individuals, particular communities or groups at the local level. The following facts and figures reported by the Commonwealth Foundation (1996) in Harare illustrates the NGOs’ importance in development.

The Commonwealth Foundation (1996) reports the size of the NGO sector varies widely across countries. In Britain there are estimated to be over 500,000 NGOs. The turnover of the 175,000 of these that are registered charities is estimated at £17 billion per year.

In Canada, the Canadian Environmental Network of NGOs has 2,000 membership groups in membership. Zimbabwe has an estimated 800 NGOs, which have spent Z$300-400 million on projects since independence. One of these NGOs has an annual budget of over £600,000 and works with 80,000 rural families.

In Sri Lanka one rural development NGO alone have 9,000 paid fieldworkers and 41,000 local fieldworkers, working in 10,000 villages. In Bangladesh there are at least 12,000 local groups receiving local and central government financial support, and a rural development NGO has helped 85,000 villages take advantage of an immunisation programme. Another, which makes credit available to poor people, has 900 branches and works in 23,000 villages. In India one estimate refers to 100,000 NGOs, while another claims 25,000 registered grassroots organisations in one state -- Tamil Nadu -- alone.

Kenya has 23,000 women’s organisations. Uganda has over 1000 local NGOs and over 20 foreign based ones, which together received £17 million in 1990. In Australia more than half of all the country’s welfare services are supplied by not-for-profit charitable organisations. They are estimated to number more than 11,000, turning over a total of A$4.4 billion per year, and mobilising an estimated 93 million volunteer hours.

Moreover, the United Nations Development Program (1993) estimates that the total number of people "touched" by NGOs in developing countries across the world is
probably 250 million (20 per cent of the 1.3 billion people living in absolute poverty in developing countries), and that this will rise considerably in the years ahead.

Besides the increasing number of NGOs, their growing involvement in the resolution of development problems has also precipitated a rapid increase and the expanding role of NGOs as significant actors in development compared to the state. Especially in many Third World countries, NGOs have emerged as the response to declining role of the state in promoting development. Development, as they define it, is not working. Malpractice, inefficiencies by government agencies, therefore, have changed donor agency focus from the public to the ‘private’ sector (NGOs). Thus, for many donors, NGOs are now the preferred channel for aid funding (Vakil 1997:2057).

Additionally, NGOs become important because they have distinctive characteristics or strengths which can distinguish them from other organisations or state. John Clark in his book entitled *Democratising Development, The Role of Voluntary Organisations*, points out that NGOs activities mostly target or serve the poor or the poorest of the poor; NGOs value people's participation in development; NGOs always question the orthodox development by promoting new approaches; NGOs tend to remain small in their activities and focus; and it is believed that NGOs' staff are very committed to their work (Clark 1991:52).

Having such outstanding characteristics, NGOs attract many bilateral and multilateral donors for funding their activities. For example, in the perspective of funding agencies or donors such as The World Bank, NGOs are regarded as reliable partners for channelling aid. The World Bank reveals the importance of NGOs on the basis that NGOs have expertise so they have much to offer in experience and skills and local contacts; in terms of scale, NGOs have adopted US $7,600 million of aid; being donor links of World Bank, there has been an increasing proportion of bilateral aid goes via NGOs (presently one-third of NGO resources); one-third of Bank-financed projects now involves NGOs which means the increased of collaboration; the powerful influence of NGOs with the public, media, politicians and officials; and the increasing NGO emphasis on advocacy, especially regarding the Bank (Cleary 1997:6).

Apart from their strengths, NGOs have also problems that should be considered seriously. When the strengths fail to come up in practice then weaknesses start to resemble. Generally, these problems include legitimacy, leadership, staff problems, project design, learning disabilities, and financial accountability. These are the weakness which might have been encountered by NGOs (Clark 1991).
Above all, putting together the above facts, the specific characteristics and the their increasing role and the increasing number of NGOs in many countries have positioned NGOs as an alternative agent of development apart from the state and any other existing institutions in the civil society.

THE CHANCES FOR NGOs' WIDER ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT

Though NGOs have encountered problems there have been also a number of positive developments nowadays which provide wider space for them to function well despite continuing challenges. The Commonwealth Report on NGOs (1996) outlined the following trends which are presently evident:

• NGOs are increasingly being recognised by governments as potent forces for social and economic development; important partners in nation-building and national development; valuable forces in promoting the qualitative and quantitative development of democracy; and, not least, important contributors to GDP.

• Governments are recognising the need for themselves and NGOs to work together, and the need for such co-operation to extend to other key players, including funders, disadvantaged people themselves, other sectors of civil society, and the wider public.

• At the wider international level, regional and international organisations, and multilateral and bilateral agencies concerned with aid and development are becoming more and more responsive to the views of NGOs and are placing more and more emphasis on recognising, involving, supporting and working with them.

• Many NGOs have themselves been re-examining and evaluating their work, redefining their roles, whom they serve and are accountable to, and endeavouring to function more effectively and efficiently (The Commonwealth Foundation Report 1996).

Above all, the emerging relationship between NGOs and governments is the most crucial issue to be addressed in terms of providing space for NGOs. Nowadays, it can be argued that the role played by NGOs in working with and supporting governments and intergovernmental international authorities has come to be complemented by the role of questioning and challenging them. In some places, and on some issues, there is open hostility. In other places, and on other issues, recognition of
NGO achievements is tempered by resistance to allow them to participate in affairs which are seen as the preserve of governments or intergovernmental authorities. But on many issues and subjects there is, at worst accommodation, and at best, active understanding and partnership. Most governments recognise that as long as NGOs operate within the law, their activities are legitimate, including those which may at times be discomforting. Thus, it is important that NGOs can take advantage from this relationship in order to achieve their goals.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING NGOs

In order to have a better understanding the role of NGOs, this study also addresses the problem of definition and classification of NGOs and create a scheme to tackle the classification problem for this particular debate. It is important distinguish NGOs from other forms of organisations. Besides, it is also relevant to classify them from what they are and what they do. Such definitions and classifications are but steps along the way, however, to a full understanding of NGOs' role.

There are diverse ways of defining NGOs and those definitions somehow implicitly illustrate the role they have. NGOs, by definition, according to John Clark (1991) are organisations that involve in six different roles: relief and welfare, technical innovation, public service contractors, popular development agencies, grassroots development organisations and advocacy groups.

The World Bank defines NGOs as private organisations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development (Cleary 1997).

Other authors have also attempted to classify NGOs from different perspectives. Korten's analysis (1990), for example, cuts across several dimensions. He describes four types of NGOs based on what could be considered as the client group: people's organisations or membership organisations which are the "first party"; and Voluntary Organisations (VOs); Public Service Contractors (PSCs); and Government Non-governmental Organisations (GONGOls), all of which are "third party" or service organisations. Within the service organisations, Korten addresses the issues of values by defining VOs as NGOs that are "value-driven" or cater to the policy priorities of public sector and donor budget. He also outlines the evolution of the "development-oriented
NGOs at the macro-level in what he terms "four generations," referring to several other dimensions including level of operation and orientation (Korten 1990:148).

Moreover, the activities performed by NGOs according to Cleary (1997) can be identified in a threefold classification such as: those promoting sustainable development or environment activities; those which engage in relief work; and those involve in advocacy activities. Some NGOs engage in all three identified activities, and many engage in two, or some engage in advocacy alone.

The variety of definitions and classifications mentioned above shows the diversity and inconsistency in defining and classifying the NGO sector. It is the consequence of a lack of a clear framework for classifying NGOs. It could be argued that this lack of a framework seriously impedes an understanding of the NGO. For practitioners, on the other hand, the lack of a scheme for defining and classifying NGOs has other implications having to do with knowledge transfer and experiential learning. While the work of NGOs gains importance along with continuous pressure to do more with less funding, there is a growing need for a body of experienced-based knowledge and learning that can be shared among NGOs (Vakil 1997:2057).

Without some way of defining and classifying NGOs, however, it becomes difficult to determine which kinds of organisation can benefit from the experiences of a particular NGO. For example, can NGOs based in the industrialised countries learn something from community-based NGOs in the Third World (and vice versa)? Are NGOs that focus on development very different from those that are oriented to advocacy? Or are the regional or national differences among NGOs significant enough to impede cross-learning among organisations located in different parts of the world?

THE FOCUS OF STUDY

The main focus of this study is on the assessment of ETADEP's (East Timor Association for Development and Progress) role in the context of development in East Timor. This provides a development context where an NGO's role might be questioned and conditioned by the existing political oppressive atmosphere state. The importance of stressing the need of understanding the context for this analysis lies on the grounds that a specific context where an NGO operates will have a different impact on the role of a specific NGO (ETADEP). Thus, it is not relevant, for example, to judge the
effectiveness an NGO operating in East Timor with an NGO operating in Java or Sumatra, as they are operating in different context of situation or atmosphere. Though both are operating under an authoritarian rule, each is affected differently due to the existing local conditions. NGOs in East Timor might be more pre-occupied with how to survive within the oppressive political atmosphere caused by the unresolved political status of East Timor, whereas NGOs in Java or Sumatra might be pre-occupied with how to shape their role in advocacy. In other words, promoting advocacy in Java or Sumatra might be successful but it might not be a success for an NGO operating in East Timor. Therefore, it is worth understanding the specific context of development as a pre-requisite to assess the role of a specific NGO. The following will highlight the oppressive atmosphere for NGOs in Indonesia and East Timor.

The Oppressive Atmosphere for NGOs in Indonesia and East Timor

In general it can be argued that the political atmosphere in Indonesia is unfavourable and it can condition the role of NGOs. For example, political concerns have seen some Indonesian voluntary organisations reject the direct translation of the term "NGO" because of perceived 'anti-government' connotations. These organisations' preferred terminology is Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya Masyarakat (LPSM - People's Self-Reliance Development Groups, often-shortened LSM), conveying the idea that they are people's organisations also involved in development and in no way a threat to stability (Cleary 1997:4).

It has been, therefore, a common perception by the majority of Indonesian officials or authorities that NGOs are not partners but rather a power opposing the government policies. There are at least two reasons for such a justification. First, there is still a strong view among the state and its apparatus that they are the only actors either in planning, strategy, or in the implementation of development in Indonesia. This attitude admits participation in the development process but it is limited to only providing resources -- not in terms of providing new alternatives for development or new approaches which may affect the existing procedures. Second, NGOs are suspected of being channels for western ideology which is regarded as more liberal and irrelevant to the Indonesian ideology and political culture (Soetrisno 1995). Indeed, this suspicion does make sense because many NGOs in Indonesia receive funds from western countries. This situation automatically indicates the oppressive political atmosphere in Indonesia which all NGOs should be aware of including NGOs in East Timor.
In line with this context ETADEP was established in 1987 in East Timor and started its initiatives after the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) had completed its relief and emergency services in 1986. Its mission was to improve the socio-economic life of the rural community of East Timor where issues indicated that the majority of the rural community in East Timor was still living in a pervasive state of poverty due to the shortage of economic resources and lack of infrastructure.

Since 1987 the projects and programs delivered by ETADEP have covered almost all the 13 districts of East Timor with a wide range of beneficiaries. ETADEP has also been involved in various community development initiatives such as: integrated rural development program including agriculture, livestock or animal husbandry; clean water and sanitation; co-operatives or credit unions; capacity building of local grassroots and NGOs and development of net-working. This wide coverage, indirectly, indicates the high acceptance of the people to ETADEP services and also indicates the capability of ETADEP to enhance co-operation with other agents both formal and informal.

Additionally, ETADEP was financially supported by international agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Konrand Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the Australian International Development Agency (AusAid) for most of its activities. These respective donors, however, have their own agendas which might compromise ETADEP's ability to act independently.

Being a local NGO in this context, ETADEP should have contributed to the development in various sectors and it might have undertaken a quite challenging role in an unfavourable political atmosphere during Indonesian occupation. The remains of political turbulence after the civil war in 1975 and during the 'integration' with Indonesia (1975-1998) also aggravated the social and political structure which may have prevented people maximising their potentials in development. Thus, the political context which generates instability and social problems has led ETADEP to a situation where it might have taken a 'sitting on the fence' strategy in order to avoid any serious problem of relationship with the local government in one way and to survive on the other in achieving its goals.

Bearing in mind the political atmosphere faced by ETADEP in East Timor, I can, therefore, argue that any assessment of the role of local NGOs in East Timor, including ETADEP, should be in line with the context of the problems faced by East
Timor which *de facto* became the 27th province of Indonesia since 1976 but finds this unacceptable and is still for self determination. A situation exists where by the East Timorese people and the Indonesian government are more preoccupied with political issues rather than human rights economic or social matters. Thus, the role of ETADEP as a local NGO in such an unfavourable political atmosphere may be questioned especially when dealing with sensitive issues such as democracy, advocacy and participation and empowerment.

**THE RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY TO EAST TIMOR'S DEVELOPMENT**

The assessment of the role of NGOs (ETADEP) in the context of development of East Timor can be justified as it is in parallel with the strategies to be implemented in the process of building a nation-state by a newly independent state of East Timor in the near future – an independent state which is governed by civil society. It has been raised in discussions that East Timor development will be based on the principles adopted by The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in the First Timorese National Convention held in Peniche in April 1998 in an historical document – Magna Carta. This document focuses precisely on these important issues of fundamental human rights principles (Magna Carta 1998).

However, these same principles can only be meaningful to Timorese society if important steps are taken to promote good governance and democracy. Thus, one of the parameters or ingredients to achieve these goals is the empowerment of civil society where people can genuinely participate in the process of development. Following this perspective, NGOs’ role are significant.

Another important point is the legal recognition or acknowledgement of the role of NGOs in development of an independent East Timor. It can be seen in accordance with the strategies and action plans adopted by CNRT in "A Strategic Development Plan for East Timor" at the Melbourne Conference 5th – 9th April, 1999. It recognises the role of NGOs based on the following idea:

"The government of East Timor ought to endorse policies of good governance, participatory democracy and transparency. For this to occur, the role of non-government organisations must be recognised as integral part of this process. The government of East Timor ought to recognise that NGOs function as precursors of the empowerment of the Timorese civil society and, in doing so, are enhancing the process of participatory democracy;"
It is proposed that NGOs and the government of East Timor work together to promote the vision that the existence of a participatory democracy is a condition *sine qua non* for a healthy democracy and subsequently provides the right environment for sustainable development, long lasting peace and harmony in the society (Pereira 1999:8)."

Regarding the recognition mentioned above, it is critical to assess the role of NGOs (and in particular, ETADEP) – as they have been and will be the key players in the context of development in East Timor’s future. Besides, this assessment may serve as an entry point for further investigations on the related topic in the future development of East Timor.

THE PURPOSE OF STUDY

As far as I am concerned, specific study has not been conducted to assess the role of local NGOs such as ETADEP in East Timor. Assessments have been done but have merely related to ETADEP’s project performance for the sake of ETADEP’s accountability to funding agencies. This narrow scope of assessment will not lead to a full understanding of the role ETADEP in East Timor’s development. Thus, it is necessary to examine the problems and the factors contributed to the role of local NGOs, ETADEP, in order to reach a better understanding.

Nor have there yet been any attempts yet to define and classify local NGOs in East Timor including ETADEP. Thus, a specific classification scheme needs to be constructed for the purpose of this assessment in order to have a full understanding of ETADEP’s role in the context of development in East Timor. The classification will fall into two main categories: essential and contingent. For example, the 'essential' or primary descriptors are: orientation and level of operation; whereas the 'contingent' or secondary descriptors are: sectoral focus, evaluative attributes such as accountability, efficiency, values, control over resources, gender equality, and level/types of participation, etc.

Based on the background and context of the problem mentioned earlier in this chapter, this study seeks to answer the central question: "*What is the role of ETADEP in the development context of East Timor?*"

Specifically, this study has three main purposes to achieve, they are:
To assess the existing development situation of East Timor as the predominant issue which compromises the role of NGOs in East Timor;

To assert the role of ETADEP as the local NGO in the context of development in East Timor.

To construct a typology for ETADEP

METHODOLOGY

This study can be characterised by its primary research nature which studies firsthand data through interviews, observations and by its secondary research nature which concentrates on archival records or documents such as: reports, evaluations, publications, etc. (Walsh 1996:10).

Sources of Data

Research derives data from the following main sources:

1. ETADEP's archival records or documents: Documents such as project reports, evaluations, monitoring, internal and external publications or other relevant sources for assessing ETADEP's performance. Documents selected come from ETADEP's files between the years 1987 and 1998.

2. Informal interviewees: To enrich the assessment I conducted informal interviews with relevant individuals who have been either actors of grass-root development or partners of ETADEP. I selected people to interview because they were from one of three main groupings associated with ETADEP. The first group includes ETADEP's staff, both present and former field officers, middle and top management and the board of foundation. Those interviewed must have worked for ETADEP for at least three years. The second interviewee group come from ETADEP's partners (i.e. the local government, consultants, universities, and individuals); and the third are beneficiaries (target groups) of ETADEP. The three interviewee groups were chosen in order to gain an understanding of their perceptions on ETADEP's role. Interviews were conducted in East Timor from December 1998 until February 1999.

The range of data covers ETADEP's performance during one decade from 1987 up to 1998 by identifying internal and external factors which might have contributed to
the performance of ETADEP. It takes into account the internal management, organisation and human resources aspects of ETADEP as well as the socio-economic and political context which have predominantly influenced or conditioned the process of development in East Timor.

Techniques of Data Collection

The choice of different specific techniques for this research is to justify the needs for the inquiry. The techniques or methods for data collection is referring to specific concrete ways of seeking data or information about situation or people's lives, experiences or activities. As Wadsworth states:

"...if you think there is one world or one reality – or if you think there are multiple 'worlds' or 'realities' – these are your different methodological (or epistemological) assumptions and they affect your choice of techniques or methods" (Wadsworth 1997:35).

There are four techniques applicable in this research: individual interviews, evaluation, personal observation, and document study. First, individual interviews were conducted to collect information from the three main groupings associated with ETADEP. In these interviews, I sought answers to particular questions by asking questions about ETADEP's role. It was simply a face to face meeting in which I had a particular kind of conversation with the interviewees. These interviews were not overly structured so that it allowed the interviewees to express their perceptions in an in-depth manner without being locked by the structure. Besides, according to Hausfeld, such an approach does not force results in one direction hence closing the researcher's eyes to other possible results, and to the context within which the topic exists and operates (Hausfeld, F.1973). I asked two critical open-ended questions in the interviews: "What do you know about ETADEP?" and "What do you think ETADEP has done for the development of East Timor".

A second technique for collecting information was through my personal observation while working at ETADEP. Being a staff of ETADEP for six years (1993 – 1998), I have been involved and observed actively various activities such as routine meetings, discussions, training, workshops and field activities. My personal experiences working with ETADEP enabled me to explore more in-depth information. I have been also in charge of different positions in ETADEP's management such as: administrative assistant, chief of information and documentation, editor-in-chief of internal
publication, and the assistant of program co-ordinator. These various jobs contributed a extensive reliable information about ETADEP.

As well as talking to people, and observing situations directly, there is a range of written material that was drawn on for indirect evidence of what is going on. These comprise of written records and archival records through a document study in ETADEP's library.

I realise that written documents often represent the 'official' views of 'reality', hence they can be useful to find out what, for example, an organisation thinks it is doing, or wants other people to think it is doing. There might be quite different perceptions appear when we come into reality. For this reason, Wadsworth suggests that most written accounts should not be relied on as accounts of all the 'realities' of a situation, but if we could read of some of the ways they represent reality, that could tell us plenty of things too (Wadsworth 1997:56).

THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis is divided into six chapters and will be organised in the following structure: Chapter One is the introductory chapter which starts by providing a brief historical background of the emergence of NGOs and their growing important role in the present development context. The focus of study, relevance, the objectives of assessment, and the methodology of the research are the also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Two is the Literature Review which presents a framework of thinking which serves as a basis for understanding the role of NGOs in development. This chapter firstly examines theoretical debates which focus on the new development perspectives and how NGO may be fitted into it. The discussion then moves into the classification and definition issue by pulling together attempts in the past and then present a framework for the classification and alternative definitions of NGOs. Thirdly, this chapter discusses issues which may compromise the role of NGOs in the context of development in the developing countries or the Southern NGOs. It includes the relationship between governments and NGOs, and the legitimacy and the accountability of NGOs.

Chapter Three covers issues which might have affected the development process in East Timor. This chapter discusses the political status of East Timor which has
remained as the major obstacle for the Indonesian government in developing East Timor by identifying major problems faced by Indonesian government during two decades of occupation. Understanding the political context is crucial for NGOs and other development actors in order to assess the role of NGOs in this specific situation.

Based on the previous assessment on development context of East Timor the Chapter Four covers specifically the role of ETADEP as a local in East Timor in line with this context. First, ETADEP is introduced and its existing major development programs and strategies are described. This chapter then provides an evaluation and the assessment on ETADEP’s development programs or activities and strategies during the period 1987 until 1998.

In order to have a better understanding of the role of ETADEP, Chapter Five constructs a tentative typology for ETADEP based on the discussion or description of ETADEP’s programs in the previous chapter. This chapter starts by highlighting the problems associated with the classification faced by ETADEP.

Finally, based on the above assessment, the Chapter Six presents findings and will conclude the discussion in this thesis. This study does not recommend any future actions in this discussion due to uncertainty of ETADEP’s future role the development context in East Timor.
SUMMARY

This chapter has highlighted the importance and relevance of understanding the role of NGOs as significant agents of development context from their historical roots. NGOs have involved in a spectrum activities ranging from relief and care to change and development. Throughout the 1980s they have played a greater role than previously because of their greater diversity, credibility and creativity. Their outstanding characteristics have positioned NGOs in the centre of development as an alternative agent nowadays.

It has been argued that setting up a scheme for defining and classifying NGOs is important because the lack of a framework will impede an understanding of the NGO sector. The variety of definitions and classifications shows the diversity and inconsistency in defining and classifying the NGO sector has other implications having to do with knowledge transfer and experiential learning.

This discussion has specifically pointed out the relevance of understanding the role of NGOs in a specific development context notably in Indonesia and East Timor, where the development atmosphere is oppressive and unfavourable for NGOs to optimise their work. Thus, in line with this context or atmosphere of development i.e. in East Timor, that the case of the local NGO, ETADEP, should be assessed.
NOTES:

1. The words "North" and "South" are not geographical expressions but they mean, respectively, here "developed countries" and "developing and less developed" countries which are sometimes also differentiated as "high income" and "low income" countries (The Commonwealth Foundation Report 1996).

2. The National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) adopted an historical document, *Magna Carta* which focuses precisely on these important issues of fundamental human rights principles. However, these same principles can only be meaningful to the Timorese society if important steps are taken to promote good governance and democracy.

3. The First East Timorese National Convention in the Diaspora was successfully completed in April 1998 in Portugal. Hailing the creation of a new inclusive umbrella organisation, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), and the proclamation of a Magna Carta setting out the groundwork for a free East Timor, the Convention marks a major step forward for the process of achieving peace and freedom in East Timor.

4. CNRT’s Strategic Planning for Development, Melbourne Conference 5-9 April 1999. The Conference is a critical stage of development planning in the CNRT preparations for independence in East Timor, and the process for nation building that will follow.
CHAPTER TWO
THE BOUNDARIES FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF NGOs IN DEVELOPMENT

This chapter aims at setting boundaries and defining concepts as a basis for a better understanding of the roles of NGOs in the context of this discussion. It firstly attempts to frame NGOs in a relevant development perspective, especially the new perspectives where NGOs are recognised as the catalysts of development from below approaches. Secondly, this chapter will address the definition and classification issues of NGOs by presenting some of the intellectual debates surrounding what NGOs are. This section, finally, will move on looking at the NGOs’ legitimacy and accountability issues in order to have a full understanding of the context which may compromise the roles of NGOs.

THE NOTION OF "DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW"

Theoretically speaking, "development from below" does not represent any comprehensive theory of development but the ideas do form a fairly coherent set of principles of development practice. Like dependency theory, they are a response to the failure seen in the process of modernisation and are united by an anti-industrial theme. They include populist people-centred development approaches, calls for environmentally sustainable development, alternative economic approaches and a focus on women in development.

Much like dependency theory, development from below turns conventional wisdom upside down. The emergence of these ideas in 1970s, 80s, 90s were driven by the fact that the past conventional models of development practice were seen by many to have failed. Critics argued that conventional models, often called the top-down or trickle-down model of economic growth, had failed because the institutions that were created to foster development from the top had themselves become the greatest hindrance to development (Sanyal 1997:22). The primary target of this criticism was the state.
This new alternative perspective includes a series of themes which stress participation, empowerment, bottom-up as opposed to top-down approaches to development, process rather than blueprint projects, and indigenous rather than expert knowledge (Stirrat and Henkel 1997:67). To emphasize this argument, key texts of the new perspective frequently play on this opposition and use titles such as: *Rural Development: Putting the Last First; Whose Reality Counts?; Farmer First*. Politically, the new orthodoxy represents a form of populism and sees itself as attempting to overthrow the remnants of colonialism or the forms of neo-colonialism that have developed since World War II (ibid.).

This new perspective is evident in various terms such as "development from below", "grassroots development", development from within", "participatory development" and more recently "empowerment", "self-help or self-reliance development" and "people-centred development." These terms may be pronounced differently but they convey the same concept, namely the concept of putting people first, not as an object of development but as the subject of development. For this discussion, I will use "development from below" to represent these themes.

Within this new perspective there are new important approaches which can be identified in order to represent the notion of 'development from below' such as: "small is beautiful", "appropriate technology", "basic needs", "urban bias", "target the poor", "participation and empowerment", based on the ideas of some relevant authors. These new ideas emphasise the way development should be focused on in practice. Among these approaches, the idea of participation and empowerment have emphasised more the mechanism of development practice because these approaches have begun to indicate how the principles should be implemented in practice (Overton 1998:27). The following will briefly point out the approaches have been put into practice by development practitioners nowadays.

'Small is beautiful' is one of the approaches adopted by 'development from below' practice in designing a project is inspired by the principle of "small is beautiful". E.F. Schumacher (1973) presented this notion as an alternative way in the way of thinking about scale. This implies that the smaller the scale of a project the better off for the people. It argues for a distinction between absolute and relative costs and questions conventional views which favour the larger over the small-scale projects.

The advantage of designing a project based on this principle is that the project can maximise the use local capital, labour and resources and promote more
independence and participation of the local people. This, undoubtedly, leads to much less dependence on external sources (ibid.), and consequently may avoid malpractice in development such as corruption, inefficiency and complicated bureaucracy.

The 'appropriate technology' approach is small-scale technology which has the following characteristics: locally owned and operated, labour intensive, use of local resources and low technology which means easily operated and maintained. It does not have high operating costs and also enables the use of renewable resources and goes with the local customs and practices. People's knowledge is important to be considered in this case. It is a specific technology that answers the specific needs of the target population and it is more innovation than invention (Dunn 1979).

The 'basic needs approach' conveys the idea that satisfying the basic needs of target people is a must for project designers in planning stage. It is important to prioritise the basic needs such as shelter, clothing, food, education, etc., before a project lead to other secondary needs because these needs are essential as they are the fundamental rights of people. This approach suggests that project design should emphasise the needs rather than the wants of the target people. It means that a project is designed in order to satisfy those things that might be required to maintain human life rather than wants which are only to make life more enjoyable (Overton 1998:25).

The urban bias approach emerges in response to one of the failures of the conventional development theory, namely the focus more on urban areas rather than rural areas. In conventional development practice, there is tendency to treat the rural society as a backward sector, incapable of progress, whilst the urban sector is seen as forward-looking and the key to development. Michael Lipton (1977) argues that development should concentrate on rural areas. Planning and administration cannot be managed by only the elite in urban areas but also by the rural areas and the benefits must be distributed equally. This unequal treatment is enforced by the fact that urban population are more ‘advanced’ (political, visible, articulate) and have more access so that the political process tend to be in favour of urban dwellers. Therefore, any assessment of development project must avoid urban bias. The development agent should at least stand in the shoes of the target people to see their problems. A good plan should be designed based on the belief that the target people know their problems and the solutions that will work, better than others know them (Oliver 1983:77).

Target the poor is an approach mainly concerned about poverty eradication in development. One of the questions to ask if development is to be measured is: ‘what has
happened to poverty?' Thus, poverty alleviation should be the first concern of development practitioners before tackling other issues such as inequality, human survival and environmental degradation. By targeting the poor, development projects must address the needs of those most in need, in this case mostly rural people (Chamber 1983). There must be a change in the way development meets basic needs rather than pre-occupation with aggregate economic growth.

The Participation and Empowerment approaches have recently begun to make the link between the above principles and how they might be put into action. It also offers a further critique of the conventional development practice.

NGOs have often shown a central concern with fostering 'participation' and 'empowerment' as the most dominant elements in promoting development from below. Many NGOs have placed much of their emphasis on participation and empowerment (Streeten 1997:193). For example, the direct purpose of a program may be improvements in health or literacy or agriculture or credit, but NGOs are often more concerned with how much these projects enhance people's power.

It is evident that most development comes from 'above', through government plans and departments, foreign aid, and external agents. The top-down planning approach, for example, has been a failure because the target people or the participants do not drive the process because the people are not considered of having enough capability in sharing their views and ideas in the whole development project process. They are seen as having a lack of expertise, resources, etc., and the external agents (aid agencies, government agents) know better. This approach often leads to an alienation of the local people.

Seeing such failure, many development practitioners and planners are now calling for 'development from below' (Stohr and Taylor 1981) in which there is much greater participation of the people who are the 'targets' in the whole process of development. The key elements of such an approach include: a) people identify their own problems and needs, not outside experts; b) people suggest solutions to these problems and needs, or at least are involved in discussions about possible solutions; c) there is primarily use of local labour and resources which are low cost, low tech and involve less of a burden of debt; and d) people themselves evaluate the scheme, perhaps in conjunction with any external donors, and re-assess their problems and needs. This participation will result in increased motivation and involvement of the target people in
the development process. Therefore, development agencies must treat the people as the main actors that make the plan and implement it (Oliver 1983:77).

This may sound fine in theory but putting into operation may not be easy. Rahnema (1992) argued that this approach might be ineffective by pointing out some problems facing such a participatory approach. First, there is the question of who represents 'the people'. Second, poor people are often the most powerless in society, therefore, they need to be 'empowered' to articulate their needs. Third, there is the issue of 'seeing the wood for the trees' whereby people are primarily concerned with local issues and may not see or understand wider structural causes of local problems. Thus, Rahnema's concept on participation will be judged in the following:

"To involve the 'patients' in their own care was the instrumental task which the participatory concept has been assigned by development" (Rahnema 1992:123).

Theories of participation in development have been extended in recent years to encompass the notion of 'empowerment'. This implies more than merely 'participation', which may be quite passive in practice and still operate under conditions of oppression and exploitation. 'Empowerment' involves something more, the active involvement of people in such a way that gives them the ability - the power - to change their own lives for the better. It perhaps the epitomy of the development from below idea (ibid.).

'Empowerment' has close links with the work of Paulo Friere (1972). He believed that that education (or conscientization) of people about the structures and processes of their oppression should be the first critical step towards their liberation. It means that once people become aware of their condition, they will take steps to free themselves from exploitation and subordination.

Another author, John Friedmann (1992) attempted to suggest ways in which empowerment might be facilitated through the work of NGOs and other agencies. In this sense, empowerment is an intensely political process because it seeks to break down the status quo of political power relations and oppression and give power to the poor and marginalised groups in the society. It does not necessarily seek a defined 'end' (in terms of a development model) but sees as critical the process of empowerment and liberation as a means for people to determine their own development objectives. It puts much emphasis on community development, people's organisations and NGOs.

There is also another alternative model of empowerment, for example, proposed by Sen and Grown (1987:87). This suggests four strategies for development
practitioners such as popular education, consciousness-raising, political mobilisation and legal change. These can be applied at either grassroots or national level. Consciousness-raising programs, for example, are important because, before people can be mobilised to work change, they must have an understanding of development issues affecting their lives.

Above all, though these approaches sound fine in theory to put them in practice effectively, there is a need for a reliable agent to facilitate or to actuate these themes in practice. NGOs, therefore, as many have argued have proven to be reliable agents or catalysts of promoting 'development from below.'

NGOs: THE CATALYSTS OF "DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW"

In line with the emerging of this new orthodoxy that NGOs are regarded as significant agents of development from below. As Stirrat and Henkel (1997) argue, one of the central features of the new orthodoxy is its celebration of the role of NGOs as the primary agents in its vision of development.

Generally, NGOs are largely recognised as facilitators of development from below. NGOs are largely known for their strengths or strategies in popular participation, political role, serving the poor, small scale, flexibility, and innovations etc. Many authors argue that because of the anti-state orientation of the bottom-up approach, NGOs are chosen to be the principal agents for implementing the development from below. This decision was backed up by the following claims about NGO's strengths.

First, NGOs are the most appropriate agents for initiating 'development from below' because their organisational priorities and procedures are diametrically opposite to those of the institutions at the top. NGOs are primarily interested in community building and empowering the poor. To achieve these objectives they rely on procedures that are democratic, decentralised, and based on co-operation rather than competition (Sanyal 1997:28).

Second, because many NGOs are small in size, not bureaucratic in their management style, and staffed by volunteers who truly care for the poor, they are more efficient and responsive than the government agencies in meeting the specific needs of the poor (ibid. 1997). However, NGOs' participatory programs may become highly problematic when they become large. Decision making becomes complex and there is
greater chance of the benefit being manipulated by the local elite. Therefore, the majority of NGOs’ programs avoid these difficulties by remaining quite small (Clark 1991).

Third, because NGOs are located closer to the poor than are the government agencies, they are more aware of the particularities of local resources and constraints, and this makes them more innovative than government in designing poverty alleviation projects (Sanyal 1997:28). In addition, the proximity to the poor give NGOs the advantage of being able to concentrate on just a few activities relating to the needs of the poor. Its physical base, therefore, is usually close to concentrations of poverty and its likely to be trusted by the poor. NGOs often work in remote areas where perhaps no government official is seen from one year to the next, though it is not always the case (Clark 1991:54).

Fourth, because NGOs have gained legitimacy as a result of their effectiveness and accountability, they are autonomous and free from control by either state or market institutions. This autonomy is essential for the success of bottom-up efforts, because if NGOs are dependent on the state, they would be controlled or co-opted, thereby losing their legitimacy. Likewise, if NGOs were to be directed by market institutions, they would be influenced by profit-seeking motives, which would cause community solidarity bonding to degenerate into market-based exchange relationships. In contrast, the autonomy of NGOs from both the state and market institutions would encourage self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and social innovations on their part, thereby enhancing the chances of self-reproduction of this grassroots based institutional form (Sanyal 1997:28).

Finally, NGOs deliberately keep a large distance between themselves and political parties and are not involved in the wheeling and dealing of the usually corrupt political process. This provides them autonomy from dominant political institutions controlled by elite and makes them effective in organizing and empowering the poor (Korten and Klauss 1984).

The recognition of the above strengths has raised the status of NGOs as main agents of promoting the principles of development from below. This might, however, put NGOs at risk when operating in an oppressive political atmosphere especially in authoritarian states where the notion of 'development from below' is seen as challenging the government. Politically speaking, as John Clark (1991) argues, the role of NGOs is about removing the barriers which restrain people from achieving the full productive
capacity. This is an inescapable NGOs’ political business though it threatens those who in power. In this case, NGOs must take sides; siding with the poor against those who comprise the barriers to a just development (Clark 1991:58).

Bringing together these new ideas of this new perspective, a definition of ‘development’ can be asserted based on Korten’s definition:

“Development is a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their aspirations.” (Korten 1990: 67)

Above all, the above discussion has placed NGOs in this framework of new development perspective, development from below or people-centred development. It can be argued that based on this, NGOs' role can be judged. Besides, this may also serve as a basis for understanding NGOs role in comparison with other agents of development. Having positioned NGOs in this framework of thinking, it is adequately relevant to discuss issues closely related with NGOs role in the following sections.

BUILDING CONSENSUS ON DEFINING "NGO"

Nowadays, there is wide variation in what the term "non-governmental organisation" or NGO means. The result is a great deal of confusion, and a considerable amount of misunderstanding that may detract from the focus and the purpose of assessing the role of NGOs. Thus, in order to tackle this problem it is necessary to establish a tentative definition for this discussion.

Since the term "NGO" was first introduced by United Nations in 1949, it has been applied to a broad spectrum of organisations. The term NGO may include organisation such as "voluntary organisations," "non-profit associations," "international non-governmental organisations," "non-governmental development organisations," "new social movement organisations," "people's organisations," "membership organisations," and environmental organisations."

Generally speaking, there is sometimes uneasiness about the use of the term NGO because it has developed a negative rather than positive response. It defines organisations by what they are not, rather than by what they are. In some countries non-governmental is taken to imply anti-governmental. Some people therefore prefer the use of terms such as voluntary organisation, private voluntary organisation, or the American
terms non-profit organisation or not-for-profit organisation. Despite the lack of consensus about the term "NGO," a large literature has been produced on NGOs and many claims have been made concerning their role, as if there were a true and authentic model NGO, consistent over time and context (Fernando and Heston 1997:11).

Aside from the name "non-governmental organisation" one of the first problems in identifying a workable definition for the NGO sector is the lack of agreement regarding what term to use. Anna Vakil, for example, identifies three major terms which are commonly used interchangeable in practice namely NGO, Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) and Nonprofit Organisation (NPO). Indeed, these terms as their usage suggests do not appear to be interchangeable (Vakil, 1997:2058).

Gorman, for example, defined the PVO sector as "nongovernmental (private), tax-exempt, nonprofit agencies engaged in overseas provision of services for relief and development purposes" (Gorman 1984:2). There are some shortcomings of this definition. The inclusion of "overseas" activities in this definition implies that the organisations being referred to are exclusively those based in the developed countries and that their mandate is "relief and development" in the nations of the Third World. This excludes that whole class of organisations based in the Third World which are also oriented to relief and development. Moreover, even this definition were accepted at face value, reference to tax status does not account appropriately for the significant differences among tax laws of the developed nations (Salomon and Anheier 1992a).

Korten (1990) uses PVO and NGO interchangeably in his descriptions of "people-centred development," referring to a wide range of organisations including those based in Third World countries. Whether PVOs are equivalent to NGOs or, alternatively, whether NGOs are a subset of PVOs, is a question that has not been fully explored (Vakil 1997:2059).

As mentioned earlier in the US context, the term non-profit organisation (NPO) is also sometimes used interchangeable with NGO. Salamon and Anheier, however, define NPOs in terms of: legal status of the organisations; economic/financial; functional; and structural/operational. They conclude that the structural/operational definition is most appropriate. They identify five critical features of NPO: they are formal, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing and voluntary (Salamon and Anheier, 1992a: 11-12). While Salamon and Anheier acknowledge that the term NPO is commonly interpreted by many as being equivalent to NPO, they suggest that NGOs actually represent a subset of those NPOs "engaged in economic and social
development" (Salamon and Anheier, 1992a: 5). The nature of the relationship between the two concepts needs further clarification, and Salamon and Anheier's work on the nonprofit sector strongly suggests that it is probably a structural/operational definition that would be most useful in defining NGOs as well (Vakil, 1997:2059).

Gordenker and Weiss (1995), furthermore, in the context of a discussion of global governance, describe NGOs as private, self-governing, formal and non-profit. Omission of the "voluntary" feature acknowledges the increasing professionalization of the NGO sector. The core concept of NGOs becomes the characteristic of being private and self-governing.

It is not easy to define the NGO sector, but those attempts mentioned above indicate how authors have attempted to contribute to the definition maze and it also indicates that the term 'NGO' is open to many interpretations by different people in different contexts. Most researchers agree there are difficulties associated with the definition of NGO and they get on with what they want to describe. However, it is more important to understand the social role of NGOs, than to reach and agreed-upon definition of the term. In this regard, the relationship between NGOs, the state, and society in different context was regarded as of crucial importance (Fernando and Heston, 1997:11).

Above all, two approaches to defining NGOs can be found, one broad and the other narrow. The broad definition holds that every organisation in society which is not part of government, and which operates in civil society, is a non-governmental organisation. While the broad definition is based on semantic correctness, it is problematic because it embraces a huge number and variety of diverse organisations.

The narrow definition, derived from recent usage, refers to a specific type of organisation working in the field of development - one which works with people to help them improve their social and economic situation and prospects. This definition is also problematic, because it is both restrictive and broad. Because some take development to exclude welfare and also action on broad social, economic and environmental issues, it can be restrictive. Confusion abounds because there are many different approaches to what is broadly called development work, including some which are contradictory and others which are viewed by some as being the very antithesis of development. The term is used, for example, by organisations as varied as the World Bank and small scale community-based organisations supporting economic projects for people adversely
affected by the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

A TENTATIVE DEFINITION OF "NGO"

Keeping these inconsistencies and lack of consensus in mind, this chapter offers a practical and workable definition which is based on four defining characteristics which enable NGOs to be distinguished from other organisations in civil society. They are voluntary, independent, not-for-profit and not self-serving. Each of these characteristics is described. The following proposed definition is built upon the four defining characteristics for NGOs.

Being voluntary means NGOs are formed voluntarily. There is nothing in the legal, statutory framework of any country which requires them to be formed or prevents them from being formed, but result from people’s self-chosen voluntary initiative to pursue a shared interest or concern (Fowler 1997:38). Besides, there will be an element of voluntary participation in the organisation whether in the form of small numbers of board members or large numbers of members or beneficiaries giving their time voluntarily. This characteristic does not preclude NGO's staff from being paid.

Independent means the NGOs are self-governing or autonomously managed. They are formed by private initiative, in that they are not part of government nor controlled by a public body. In addition, within the laws of society, they are controlled by those who have formed them, or by “Boards of Management”2 to which such people have delegated, or are required by law to delegate, responsibility for control and management. (The Commonwealth Foundation 1996).

The third proposed characteristic of NGOs is not-for-profit conveying the notion that they are not for personal private profit or gain, although NGOs may have employees, like other enterprises, who are paid for what they do (Fowler 1997). But in NGOs, the employers - Boards of Management - are not paid for the work they perform on Boards, beyond (most commonly) being reimbursed for expenses they incur in the course of performing their board duties. Additionally, NGOs may engage in revenue-generating activities but they do not, however, distribute profits or surpluses to shareholders or members. They use revenues generated solely in pursuit of their aims.
Finally, the fourth proposed characteristic of NGOs is that they are *not self-serving* in aims and related values. It means the aims of NGO is to improve the circumstances and prospects of disadvantaged people who are unable to realise their potential or achieve their full rights in society, through direct or indirect forms of action; and/or to act on concerns and issues which are detrimental to the well-being, circumstances or prospects of people or society as a whole. These aims give NGOs clear values and purposes which distinguish them from other organisations existing primarily to serve the interests of members or individuals.

The first three defining characteristics begin to suggest essential conditions which should be present in the environment in which NGOs function. Their existence should be enabled, permitted and encouraged but not required by law. The law should also allow them to function independently but nonetheless within the laws which apply to society as a whole. The law should be in terms that ensure that NGOs are not for the personal profit of those who direct their affairs.

The fourth defining characteristic concerns the aims and values, and thus generally defines the particular types of NGOs with which this assessment is concerned—organisations which are not serving the self-interests of members, but are concerned in one way or another with disadvantage and/or the disadvantaged, or with concerns and issues which are detrimental to the well-being, circumstances or prospects of people or society as a whole.

The suggested definition created by the four characteristics is largely watertight in that it clearly separates NGOs from other organisations operating in civil society. Many organisations engage in some activities which are comparable to those which wholly characterise NGOs. It can be noted that the fourth defining characteristic is of central importance, both to defining NGOs, and to understanding their activities, which are described in the following section.

Thus, alternatively, based on the above defining characteristics, NGOs might be defined as voluntary, self-governing, not-for-profit organisations in the civil society that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people, or with concerns and issues which are detrimental to the well-being, circumstances or prospects of people or society as a whole.
ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES OF NGOs' CLASSIFICATION

Many authors have contributed their perspectives to the debate on categories of NGOs and their views varied widely, however for the purposes of clarity and brevity, this discussion will focus on eight who have extensively addressed the subject.

Esman and Uphoff (1984) classified NGOs into three types of rural local organisations or those organisations which could be considered community-based. The first, local development associations, are described as being area-based and multifunctional (Esman and Uphoff 1984:61-62). The second are co-operatives which represent a range of organisations involving primarily in pooling of economic resources such as capital, labour, land or products. The third are interest associations which are defined by certain common features of their membership. This, for example, will bring together people of similar ethnic, religious or economic status; or those who wish to make specific improvements in such matters as water management, public health, etc.

Another author, Fowler (1985) argues that differentiating among NGOs based on what they are is more useful than classifying them by what they do. He then identifies two critical attributes for facilitating this, namely accountability and resources control characteristics. Concerning the "induced development" model he makes reference to the importance of "downwards accountability" to the target or beneficiaries is often absent in NGOs which tend to be upwardly accountable to funding agencies (Fowler 1985:20). An issue related to accountability is control over resources or how far the decision making process of the organisation are altered or compromised by receiving external funds (ibid:22).

In 1995 Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) proposed another classification scheme for NGOs which focused on women's NGOs. DAWN placed NGOs within the broad categories of institutional location, organisational composition and activity content. They further subdivided these into seven overlapping types according to how effectively the NGOs meet the goals of feminism, defined as assisting women in achieving empowerment through organisations: outside-initiated, small grassroots, worker-based, affiliated a political party, service-orientated, research type and coalitions (Vakil 1997:2061).

Another author, Elliot, pursues quite a different a strategy for classifying NGOs and proposes a classification scheme based on what constitutes development or what is called orientation (Elliot, 1987:57-59). According to Elliot, NGOs are oriented into
three activities: welfare (one that delivers services to specific groups); developmental (the support of development projects which have as their ultimate goal improvement in the capacity building of a community to provide for its own basic needs); and lastly, empowerment (one that sees poverty as the result of political processes and is therefore committed to enabling communities to enter those processes (Elliot 1997:58).

NGOs can be also classified in terms of their level of operation. Bratton distinguishes between community based and national NGOs which he subsumes under the more general title "indigenous" on the one hand in contrast to international NGOs on the other. He makes an important distinction on the basis of client group between "membership organizations that help themselves and service organisations that help others" (Bratton 1989b:571).

In a much quoted classification, Korten identifies three generations of development NGOs strategies. He refers to these as: relief and welfare; local self-reliance; and sustainable system development (Korten 1987:147). The first generation strategies involved the NGO in the direct delivery of services to meet an immediate deficiency or shortage of needs for food, healthcare or shelter. Such strategies are particularly relevant to emergency or humanitarian relief (Korten 1990:115);

The second generation of NGOs, according to Korten's classification, is local self-reliance which concerned with NGO involvement in long term development work or capacity building. This second generation strategies focus the energies of NGO on developing the capacities of the people to better meet their own needs through self-reliant local actions (Korten 1990:118).

The third generation, sustainable systems development, involves in the larger institutional and policy context affecting development NGO work, or participation in the process of policy formation by government and multilateral organisations (Korten, 1987:148).

In addition to these three generations of NGOs, Korten has also identified a fourth involving support for people's movement promoting a broader social vision (Korten, 1990:127). This involves political advocacy and campaigning on issues such as third World debt, military spending and international trade regimes, etc., insofar as these affect the development prospects of particular communities' countries or regions.

Korten refers to these as generations of development NGO strategies because he claims that one type of involvement leads on to the next and that this can be seen historically in the evolution of NGO development work. Many development NGOs
began in response to a pressing human catastrophe or crisis and their activities moved on from one generation to next as their understanding of the complexities of development issues and problems became more sophisticated (Atack 1999:856).

Another author, Wolch, in his book on the voluntary sector in United States proposes an elegant three-dimensional system for analysing organisations. The first system is advocacy-direct service or whether an organisation is involved with providing services or seeking to affect the outcomes of public or private decisions on issues that impact immediate clients or broader constituencies. The second has to do with commodification regarding whether there are cash payments for goods or services provided and the third is participatory/elitist or the extent to which the production of output involves consumers or clients (Wolch 1990:26).

Like Korten, Brown takes an evolutionary and macro-level view of the NGO sector as topic for study. Brown identifies four types of organisations: people’s (or membership) organisations which are community-based; developmental NGOs which operate at the national level; and international voluntary agencies; and lastly, bridging organisations which act as intermediary institutions performing a range of functions including building associations, networking, partnership and coalitions among organisations (Brown 1991:812-820).

Observing these eight schemes, Vakil (1999) concludes that that orientation, levels of operation, client group and degree of commodification are important descriptors of organisational types. Second, there is a need to incorporate the notion of NPO into an overall classification scheme. Third, a number of authors refer to alternative modes of classifying NGOs according to measures such as accountability, control over resources, values, participation and congruence with feminist ideals. Finally, most of the classification schemes described make little mention of diversity of activities within individual NGOs and overtime (Vakil 1999:2062).

In addition to the schemes mentioned above, Philip Eldridge developed a classification scheme based on realities of NGOs in the context of Indonesia. According to Eldridge, NGOs in Indonesia can be classified into two types based on their activities or programs. The first type of NGOs is labelled as “LSM Pembangunan” or development-oriented NGOs. He argues that this type of NGOs basically concentrate on conventional community development programs such as: irrigation, drinking water, health care, agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts and other income generating activities. The second type, he labelled as “LSM Mobilisasi” or Mobilisation-oriented
NGOs. This type of NGOs concentrates its activities on education and mobilisation of the poor concerning issues of ecology, human rights, women’s status, advocacy of people’s rights, etc. (Eldridge 1988). The first classification may be fitted into the category of development-oriented NGOs focusing on development, and the second may be fitted into the advocacy-oriented NGOs category.

A FRAMEWORK FOR NGOs CLASSIFICATION

Most of these previous classification schemes have sacrificed comprehensiveness and clarity for the sake of simplicity. The price that has been paid for this is an inability to identify adequately units of analysis that in turn seriously impedes development of an understanding of, and shared learning by, NGOs (Vakil 1997:2062). This argument makes sense because in practice there are probably many more types of NGOs active in the field than the existing classification schemes would acknowledge. Having argued that labelling organisations by their attributes contributes to greater precision in identifying types of NGOs, Vakil then suggests that a more useful approach to the classification problem is to focus on organisational attributes (ibid.).

Based on the work of previous authors two categories of major descriptors can be proposed for the classification framework i.e. essential or primary and secondary descriptors. The essential descriptors include orientation and level of operation. The secondary descriptors include sectoral focus (such as health, housing or agriculture) and other evaluative factors (such as accountability, participation and gender equality) (Vakil 1997:2062). Each is discussed in greater detail below.

The Orientation: A Spectrum Of NGOs Activities

Classifying NGOs in terms of their orientation will refer to the type of activities that NGOs engage in. This can be subdivided into six categories: (a) welfare, (b) development, (c) advocacy, (d) development education, (e) networking and (e) research. This sub-division is only applicable to the context of this discussion because it should be noted that many NGOs may be multi-functional or they can have more than one orientation.

The welfare-oriented NGOs can be defined as NGOs delivering services to specific groups based on the charity model. As Korten (1990) refers it to his first
generation of NGOs or the activities in the first stage of development which aimed at providing basic needs of the poor and often in response to disaster or war (Korten 1990:115)

The *development-oriented* NGOs are of the greatest interest to analysts and observers. These NGOs have as their ultimate goal enhance the capacity-building of community in order to meet their own basic needs. The notion of capacity-building in this discussion will conform with the meaning of development according to Eade and Williams (1995) as follows:

Strengthening people's capacity to determine their own values and priorities, and to organise themselves to act on these, is the basis of development (Eade and Williams 1995:9).

Moreover, development-oriented NGOs can also be classified into two distinct types of NGOs. The first is *membership* organisations (Bretton 1993) whose beneficiaries are the organisations' members themselves. The second, *service* organisations that act as intermediaries in providing services to other organisations or to entire population. This particular type of development-oriented NGO that is the subject of much of the literature on accountability, legitimacy and participation (Brett 1993; Wolch, 1990).

The *advocacy-oriented* NGOs, furthermore, involve in activities of influencing policy or decision-making related to particular issues and building social support both among like-minded organisations as well as in the wider population around these issues (Vakil 1997:2063). This orientation concerns involvement in the larger institutional and policy context affecting development or participation in the process of policy formation by governments and multilateral organisations (Korten 1987:148).

NGOs with a *development education* orientation have the focus on education in major development issues such as global inequity and debt and most of these NGOs are also active in advocacy work. These NGOs are based in the industrialised countries (Lemaresquier 1987).

The *Networking-oriented* NGOs are those organisations operating at the national and regional level that channel information and provide technical and other assistance to NGOs on the lower level and individuals (Vakil 1997:2063). They can function as bridging NGOs.

Finally, Vakil (1997) proposed a *research-capacity* orientation which has been rapidly developed in the NGO sector, specially with the increasing acceptance of
participatory research as a legitimate means of acquiring knowledge along with the pressing need for interventions based on sound information (Vakil 1999:2063).

**The Level of Operation**

NGOs also work at different levels and on different scales. Many analysts distinguish between *international*, *national* and *community-based* NGOs with international NGOs being based in industrialised countries with their work extending beyond one country. Others are national or regional (serving one region within a country) in scope. Then there are local NGOs which work within defined small geographical areas (Esman and Uphoff 1984). Additionally, there is a fourth type, the *regional* NGO which is growing in number and are becoming increasingly active in networking and advocacy works (Vakil 1997:2064).

These different levels of operation, however, have been providing a space for partnership between each level. Because of their scope of activities, international, national and regional NGOs tend to be service organisations, whereas community-based NGOs are more likely to be membership organisations (Vakil 1997:2063).

**Secondary Descriptors**

Secondary descriptors are those which are increasingly referred to in the literature, but are dependant upon particular theoretical, disciplinary or policy perspectives and may therefore not pertaining to all classes of NGOs. Thus, two set attributes can be found such as *sectoral focus* and *evaluative attributes* of NGOs.

The *sectoral focus* is a set of attributes which classifies the activities of NGOs by sector. This set of attributes is especially critical for analysts in particular policy fields. The type of intervention that an NGO provides influences its structure, operating procedures, resources requirement and management strategies (Vakil 1997:2064).

Because of the growing trend of the state withdrawal from a development role in Third World countries, questions related to such evaluation attributes of NGOs as accountability, efficiency, values, control over resources, gender equality, and levels/types of participation, have moved closer to the centre of discussions. Vakil, (1997) argues many of these evaluative attributes tend to be debated in the context of development-oriented service NGOs operating at the international and national level and are therefore not pertinent to all types of NGOs (Vakil 1997:2064).
The discussion of the two main descriptors is based primarily on Vakil’s typology framework which indicates an extensive analysis on the problem of classification. For the context of this discussion, however, the essential descriptors will be considered primarily whereas the secondary attributes will be discussed separately later related to issues of legitimacy and the accountability of NGOs in development process.

The NGO Pretenders

Apart from the typology of NGOs mentioned above there are also organisations that, in some circumstances, closely resemble NGOs, and are often claimed or present themselves to be NGOs. But in reality they do not possess two of the four defining NGO characteristics claim themselves to be NGOs but are not inspired by the principles and values of voluntarism. A common occurrence for these kind of organisations who have parents which are not NGOs is when an NGO (claiming to fulfil all four defining characteristics) is in reality controlled by a parent body which is not an NGO. This creates some confusion in the minds of the public. These types of organisations can be termed as NGO Pretenders. There are acronyms used across the world for these types of NGOs (See Appendix 1. Table of Acronyms of NGO Pretenders).

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOs AND THE STATE

One factor that has contributed to the NGOs' political vulnerability is their inability to co-operate with each other and the state. The lack of co-operation between NGOs and their unwillingness to forge institutional linkages with governments has limited the impact their activities can have. Sanyal argues that to be effective, NGOs must abandon their autonomy fetish and begin to work closely with dominant institutions, such as the state (Sanyal1997: 30).

Therefore, building a constructive relationship with the state is crucial for NGOs to act effectively because the domination of state is unavoidable especially in Third World countries. This is in line with what David Korten observes that over the past three decades the guiding assumption has been that development belongs to government alone (Korten 1987). Because it is evident that NGOs and governments each have distinctive roles and responsibilities in the development process depending on particular
circumstances, NGOs will need to take the right strategy in dealing with the state, either a complementary or an antagonistic role.

This relationship is often described as friendly but also tense. At its worst it can be openly hostile. This sentiment is often reciprocated. As John Clark described, NGOs were often distrustful and critical of government and wary of forging close contacts, but NGOs require of the government little more than the freedom to get on with their chosen task. The government is quite happy with this relationship as long as it does not threaten and challenge the government (Clark 1991:74).

In many cases, NGOs are suspicious of the governments and they are reluctant to have a closer relationship with the government or other governmental institutions. There are, however, certain reasons for NGOs to act in this way. Sanyal (1997) describes this attitude as fears of NGOs based on four reasons. First, and perhaps the most popular is that state institutions are primarily interested in co-opting NGOs so as to make them yet another arm of the state. Hence, a state initiative to assist NGOs is, in essence, the kiss of death. Second, by co-operating with the state, which is marked by bureaucratic procedures, NGOs are likely to lose their non-bureaucratic management style and become stodgy and ineffective, much like the state. Third, by engaging with state, NGOs are likely to become engulfed and tainted by the wheeling and dealing of the often corrupt political process. This would adversely affect the NGOs’ legitimacy and their effectiveness in working with civil society. Fourth, continuous state assistance for NGOs would encourage their dependence on the state and the loss of their innovation and entrepreneurial qualities (Sanyal 1997:21).

Besides, tension may also arise when NGOs subscribe to a development theory different from that of government, specially regarding NGOs who stress people’s participation, empowerment and democracy. Official structures usually present barriers to this approach. The NGO may choose to keep out of the government’s way or to oppose the state outright. The government is uneasy about such NGOs. On the one hand they may well recognise the economic value of their projects, but on the other hand government sees the empowerment elements as trouble-making (Clark 1991:74).

Facing such a situation, many NGOs begin to change their strategy in order to sharpen their political analysis, self-awareness and persuasiveness for relating to the government. They have to learn how to position themselves in different contexts and environments so that their goals can be achieved. In other words, NGOs should know how to deal with the government. This will enable NGOs to see how various policies of
the state deliberately or inadvertently conflict with or facilitate their own development objectives (Clark 1991:75). NGOs, for example, may seek to influence government policy disinterestedly, to support generally beneficial changes to development process, but they can also lobby government for more self-interested reasons, such as increased funding for their own work.

John Clark (1991), however, offers three options to be considered by NGOs in dealing with the state that is opposing the state, complementing it, or reforming it. Opposing the state will mean using existing channels to frustrate any government plan which is negative for the poor. Complementing the state will mean evolving its own program so that it fills the gaps in the government’s services in such a way as to make those services more relevant to the poor and more subject to democratic influences. And reforming the state would mean more deliberate collaboration with government with a view to helping the state improve the services it provides. The NGO would position itself not so much as a co-producer but as co-director of these services, not taking responsibility for actual service delivery, but helping to strengthen the existing system (Clark 1991:76).

Being an important part of civil society the relationship between NGOs and the state can be affected in terms of the dominance of state over the two sectors in society. This case is most evident in the South. The relationship has been represented by the metaphor of “the prince” representing governmental power; “the merchant,” representing economic power; and “the citizen,” who embodies people’s power (Korten, 1990:96). Northern NGOs may not face the same problem with the state as faced by Southern NGOs where the state's role is dominant. The following diagram (see picture 1) is adopted from Alan Fowler’s description of the three main spheres in society (government, business, and voluntary sector) illustrates the typical difference in dominance of the three players between the two poles (Fowler, A. 1997: 23). The figure indicates that in the North the government sector is less dominant whereas in the South the dominance of state is evidently greater.

Furthermore, as far as this relationship is concerned, the degree to which NGOs choose to, and are able to build an effective relationship with government and the potential problems they may encounter depends greatly on the social and political context of the particular country. Rajesh Tandon (1987) describes three categories of regimes which afford very different environments for NGOs. They are the military or dictatorship, single party and liberal democratic states.
Military and other dictatorships may include China, the Philippines under President Marcos, Chile under General Pinochet, Bangladesh under President Ershad) and, in my opinion, Indonesia under Soeharto’s regime. In such a climate there is limited scope for NGO-Government collaboration, particularly in addressing externally generated problems.

Second, other single party states, usually Marxist oriented, include Kampuchea, Cuba, Burma, Tanzania and many other countries in Africa. Typically the government or the Party assumes the role of “vanguard of the people”; it sees no need for autonomous, independent structures and there has usually not been such a tradition within the country. The government tolerates NGOs only in so far as they facilitate its own programmes. The rise of indigenous NGOs in such countries is usually very slow or non-existent.

Third, in liberal democracies such as India, Brazil, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the situation is most complex. The NGOs may 'play' mixed roles – collaborating with governments on specific programmes and challenging on the other areas. Governments may appear to be pro-poor, use populist slogans, and sometimes take progressive action, but are usually more attentive to the vested interest groups on whose support they depend.

Additionally, the relationship between NGOs and the state can be tracked in terms of the treatment of state of the civil society. The treatment can be categorised into
five stages of treatment from a hostile state to a benevolent state (Hadenius and Uggla 1996:1629) as follows:

Stage 1. The state does not tolerate independent civil activity. Threshold: *de facto* right to form autonomous organisations.

Stage 2. The state accepts autonomous organisations, but does not provide a space for it. Threshold: state withdrawal opening up a space for independent activity.

Stage 3. A space for independent activity exists but the practice of governance does not promote autonomous organisation. Threshold: favourable institutional structures

Stage 4. The stage provides favourable structures but no active support. Threshold: active state programs in support of civil society.

Stage 5. The state actively promotes autonomous organisations.

I will argue that as far as this topic is concerned, the first and the second categories are the most relevant to this discussion. It is evident that during Soeharto’s rule, Indonesian NGOs experienced an oppressive situation where the military regime played a predominant role in the government. For 34 years the government of Indonesia was controlled and managed by the military under its dual-function rather than by a civil government. In such an atmosphere the government could not tolerate NGOs except to facilitate its own programme. Challenging the government would mean a threat for the NGOs' survival.

THE LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NGOs

Non-Governmental Organisations have become increasingly important agents of the development process in the countries of the South. The NGO growth and official funding of NGOs are not new phenomenon, but the trends are evident nowadays that it gives rise to important questions concerning NGOs’ performance and accountability, NGO-state relations, and the ability of NGOs to act independently in pursuing their goals. Edwards and Hulme, for example, specifically highlight that official funding:

- Encourages NGOs to become providers of social and economic services on a much larger scale than hitherto, even though their long-term comparative advantage in this field is doubtful.
- Compromises the performance of NGOs in other areas of development activity such as institutional development and advocacy.
- Weakens the legitimacy of NGOs as independent actors in society.
• Distorts the accountability of NGOs away from grassroots and internal constituencies, and over emphasises short-term, quantitative outputs (Edwards and Hulme 1996:962).

If these hypotheses are true then this must cast doubt on the ability of NGOs to be effective vehicles for delivery of the New Policy Agenda (i.e. promoting economic efficiency and good governance) and the long-term sustainable poverty alleviation. There are, however, signs that greater dependence on official funding may compromise NGO performance in key areas, distort accountability, and weaken legitimacy.

Edwards and Hulme, therefore, stress two criteria of NGOs’ legitimacy that is performance and accountability:

“Performing effectively and accounting transparently are essential component of responsible practice, on which the legitimacy of development intervention ultimately depends (Edwards and Hulme 1995:6).”

NGO's Legitimacy

The Collins English Dictionary defines "legitimacy" as "the condition of being in accordance with law or principle ... conformity to sound reasoning ... authenticity and genuineness" (The Collins English Dictionary, 1992). The last characteristic is particularly important for NGOs since their distinguishing feature is voluntarism – the fact that they can only invite voluntary involvement in their activities and must therefore use discussion, bargaining, accommodation and persuasion in their dealings rather than bureaucratic control (Fowler 1988; Uphoff 1993).

Atack (1999) defines "legitimacy" on the normative basis of NGO involvement in the development process. These normative questions can be grouped together under the concept of “legitimacy13” which concerns moral justification for NGOs’ political and social action. Based on this, he builds up the four criteria for a NGOs’ legitimacy: representativeness, distinctive values, effectiveness and empowerment (Atack 1999:855). However, this discussion will concentrate on the two issues of performance measurement that is legitimacy proposed by Edwards and Hulme.

The crucial problem for NGO’s legitimacy is basically derived from external factors or force, as Edwards and Hulme pointed out:
"Indeed, the New Policy Agenda thrusts the question of legitimacy into centre of stage, for if NGOs are becoming more responsive to external concerns, are substituting for government and are growing larger on the basis of foreign funding, what is happening to the links -- to their values and mission, and to their relationships with the poor, supporters and others -- through which they derive their to intervene in development?" (Edwards and Hulme 1996:966).

Moreover, in order to be viewed legitimate NGOs have to be self-financing and have a social support. It has been argued that popular support and self-financing provide a basis for legitimacy because NGOs that are dependant on external funding for their survival have a much weaker claim. But even if voluntary organisations are not member-controlled, they can still gain legitimacy by being transparent, accountable and acting in a spirit of genuine partnership with others (Edwards and Hulme 1996:967).

There are at least three reasons to the question of legitimacy of NGOs concerning the increasing reliance on official donors. First, as Van der Heijden precisely describes it, quoting a traditional African proverb:

"If you have your hands in another man's pocket, you must move when he moves" (Van der Heijden, 1987:106).

This, consequently, has serious implications for NGOs' missions. As Edwards and Hulme describe that the degree to which a strategy or mix of strategies compromises the logic by which legitimacy is claimed needs to be considered carefully, and can provide a useful means of testing whether organisational self-interest is subordinating mission when a choice is being made (Edwards and Hulme 1992:213).

Second, the funding of NGOs to deliver social services change the nature of the relationship with donors from one partnership, to one of contracting which has made the legitimacy of NGO is no longer based upon values and voluntarism but on its contract to a legitimate agency (ibid : 967).

Third, As a result of NGO substitution for the state in key aspects of the development process, particularly the provision of services, there are deeper concerns about the possibility of "re-writing of the social contract" between government and its citizens (Farrington and Bebbington 1993:188).
NGO Accountability

Concerns about NGO accountability have been raised by number of NGO scholars (Kramer, 1981, Tendler, 198, and Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Representative of this genre of enquiry is John Clark (1991) who raised questions of accountability. He asks: "To whom should (NGOs) be accountable? To their board of trustees, to their governments, to donors, to their staff, or to their project partners?" Besides, the question - which manifests itself variously as issues of legitimacy, representativeness, democracy, etc - has been identified by many scholars as a major source of NGO vulnerability to external criticism and internal inefficiencies (Najam 1996:340).

The concept of accountability - the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions - is a crucial component of claims to legitimacy (Edwards and Hulme 1996:967). But in practice, as Najam (1996) has pointed out this concept is often confused with a much narrower and short term concept of project evaluation and monitoring. Najam has argued that formal discussions are restrictive in that they focus primarily on accountability to NGO donors and on mechanistic project evaluations (Najam 1996:341).

According to Edwards and Hulme, to be effective it requires a statement of goals, transparency of decision making and relationships, honest reporting of what resources have been used and what has been achieved, an appraisal process for the over-seeing authority(ies) to judge whether results are satisfactory, and concrete mechanisms for holding to account (i.e. rewarding or penalising) those responsible for performance (Edwards and Hulme 1996:967).

Furthermore, they argue that NGOs have multiple accountabilities that is 'downwards' to their partners, beneficiaries, staff, donors and supporters; and 'upwards' to their trustees, donors and host governments (ibid). Accountability to all these various groups has presented NGOs with problems since there may be varied and even conflicting objectives. More specifically, Nadil Najam proposed a conceptual framework for NGO's accountability with three distinctive categories: NGO accountability to patrons; NGO accountability to clients; and NGO accountability to themselves (Najam 1996:340).
The most obvious NGO-patron relationship would be between NGOs and donors. This is the level at which accountability is most often analysed. Donors can be both external which includes governments, foundations, or other NGOs which make substantial outlays, very often for specific purposes or areas of activity; or internal sources also are most often individual members who contribute smaller amounts for much broader more general area of activity. The simplest level of responsibility for which NGOs are accountable is that of spending designated money for designated purposes (Najam 1996:342).

In this formulation of donor-NGO interaction, the donor asserts financial control by seeking accountability for the money and policy control by seeking accountability for the designated purpose. Since policy accountability is far more difficult to put into operation than fiscal accountability, the latter can become a de facto means of achieving the former (ibid.). Finance provided by donors can, therefore, be a means both of ensuring that donors’ policy agenda is adopted by the NGO and holding the NGO accountable to the agenda by keeping close tabs not only on whether the said money is spent, but also on how it is spent.

Moreover, a relationship becomes one of patronage when failure to fulfil the stated or implied responsibility can lead to a withdrawal of whatever support is being provided to the NGO. This is why NGO-patron relationships normally have very clear, though often unwritten, lines of responsibility. Not surprisingly, then, the mechanism for enforcing accountability also tend to be strong: grants are cancelled, membership dues dwindle, accreditation is revoked and collaborative arrangements are reconsidered (Najam, 1996:344). Since the patrons have both the power to hold the NGOs accountable and the means to punish the NGOs, the most important danger lies not in the NGO’s abusing the trust but in the patron’s abusing its power of punishment.

Another category is the NGOs’ accountability to clients. NGOs are also accountable to clients who are individuals or groups to whom NGOs provide goods and services. Most directly, the clients of NGOs comprise the people that its programs are designed to benefit and those who are in catchment of NGOs’ activities can be indirect beneficiaries (i.e. community at large, the state).

Najam argues that the obvious line of responsibility is for NGO to be accountable to the needs and aspirations of the community it is working with (Najam 1996:345). It means that serving community interest, as defined by the community itself, is the stated primary goal of much of NGOs' activity in development. However,
this is not always the case. In reality, NGOs often tend to be more accountable to host government agencies than to the communities where the relationship with government agencies is that of client. This is largely because government agencies often have some form of coercive mechanism at their command which results in community aspirations being ignored since they lack the mechanisms to hold the NGOs accountable (ibid.:346).

There is very little discussion in the literature on the question of NGO accountability to themselves. This type of accountability becomes important when the necessity for internal accountability becomes greater. Such internal accountability manifest itself at various levels. For example, NGOs are ultimately responsible to their vision that made them NGO, in the first place. They are responsible to their stated mission, to their staff, to their larger constituency, and finally to the NGO's community at large (Najam 1996:348).

Tendler, J. (1982), however, makes a valuable contribution to understanding how, and whether, NGOs are accountable to their own stated vision, mission, and goals. Her work seems to suggest that NGO are often willing to change their own goals about the process in order to fulfil the product demanded by donors. This obviously overlaps with the issue of accountability to patrons and donors. More importantly, however, it is a confirmation that, in being flexible in their accountability to their own stated goals, NGOs may very often change them. While the positive side of this is that NGOs are dynamic institutions, the negative side implies a sense that they can too easily be swayed either by the victims of donors or by strong and charismatic leaders (Najam 1996:349).
SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to lay the basis and boundaries for understanding the role of NGOs in the following points. The role of NGOs should be framed in line with the emergence of new perspectives in development practice. NGOs have been regarded as development agents which are involved in promoting development from below because of the strengths they have.

It has been also argued that defining and classifying the NGO sector is not an easy question because of the existing inconsistencies and various definitions and classifications by different authors in different context of discussion. Therefore, it is important to design an alternative definition to suit an specific discussion.

The effectiveness of NGOs, especially in the Third World countries’ context, is crucially aggravated by their relationship with their dominant governments or state. Furthermore, this section has demonstrated that due external and internal forces, the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs have been put into question in terms of assessing the performance of NGOs in the process of development.
NOTES:


2. The term "Board(s) of Management" is used as a general descriptive one. The constitutions of individual NGOs and/or the laws under which they register and function may use other terms, such as "Trustee(s)", "Director(s)", etc.

3. Legitimacy as a moral term is conventionally applied to the state, in Western political theory, but it is also relevant to organisations or political actors within civil society, such as NGOs (Atack 1999: 857).
CHAPTER THREE
AN OVERVIEW ON THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT OF EAST TIMOR

To begin this chapter will provide background on the political status of East Timor. This will provide the basis for a better understanding of how the political situation is the predominant factor affecting the process of development in East Timor. The discussion will review the main political events which occurred during the Portuguese administration and leading to Indonesia's occupation. This is followed by a discussion of the Indonesian development strategies and the existing problems to highlight atmosphere for development which is coloured by East Timor's political status during Indonesia's occupation. Therefore, argue that the unfavourable political status of East Timor created an atmosphere where people were predominantly preoccupied and affected by East Timor's political status. In such a situation, NGOs or any development agents must have faced many problems while involved in the development work. This chapter, finally, moves on highlighting the major opportunities or chances for NGOs' to intervene in this context of development.

THE BACKGROUND OF EAST TIMOR'S POLITICAL STATUS

It is important to consider the socio-political context of East Timor as a predominant issue or factor before determining the role of NGOs in East Timor. As Dr. Loekman Soetrisno points out, a project takes place within a process where three main factors are inter-related i.e. the actors (agents and decision makers in management level and donors), the target and beneficiary groups and the socio-political context (Soetrisno, et al., 1993:14). It means that dynamics and changes occurring in the process of project implementation is, consequently, the interaction of those three factors or variables. Therefore, I will argue that it is relevant to consider the socio-political situation of East Timor as a major destabilising factor in this context of development in East Timor.

The socio-political atmosphere in East Timor can be described as oppressive and unfavourable. I will describe this situation by quoting the report of ETADEP's field co-
ordinator in of the organisation's evaluation and planning meetings, December 1996, to illustrate how the real situation has affected the performance of a development agent:

"We could not implement our plans effectively for this month because the situation on the ground did not permit it. There has been increasing tension for the last month. The army has currently clashed with the guerrillas in the bush and now they have intensified their activities nearby our base camp. The villagers were intimidated. So, people are so afraid to get to work.... I think we should also think of removing 'Joao' from our base camp to the main office in Dili temporarily because he has been targeted by the local army for his involvement in the clandestine movement."  

This illustration reveals the real situation faced by a grassroots NGO worker which might have aggravated the performance of any development agents in East Timor. The above type of atmosphere was common and frequently dominated ETADEP's agenda. However, sometimes some ETADEP's staff would take this situation as a reason to justify their incapability of performance by blaming the situation although in fact that was not always the case.

The question of the political status of East Timor -- integration or self-determination -- is a de facto and a de jure matter. There are at least two basic arguments underlining the political status of East Timor. De facto East Timor has been occupied by Indonesia since 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor on 7th December, 1975 and formally declared East Timor its 27th province on July 17th, 1976 which was based on Act No.7 of 1976. De jure status is based on The United Nations still recognising Portugal as the administering power and the territory was regarded as a non self-governing territory. Portugal has the formal administrative power of East Timor and it has never recognised either Indonesia's de facto sovereignty over the region. Portugal always appeared at international forums to diplomatically press Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the island diplomatically. Therefore, Indonesian occupation was, automatically, in defiance of ten United Nations' resolutions. Since the annexation, the Indonesian government made efforts to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese, to ensure the people were integrated into Indonesian development but Indonesia has encountered intensive resistance by the East Timorese.

The prolonged issue of East Timor's sovereignty, however, prevented the Indonesian government from establishing legitimate control. Hence its development
efforts in East Timor proved difficult. The unresolved political status was illustrated by the former Indonesian foreign minister Mr. Ali Alatas as "the gravel in the shoe."

**The Unprepared Decolonization Process**

The argument between Portugal and Indonesia was based on each country self-justification of their legitimacy over East Timor. Each country criticised the other and justified their actions based on their criticism. Indonesia blamed Portugal for irresponsibly leaving East Timor unprepared, whereas Portugal condemned Indonesia for the forced integration policy while East Timor was undergoing the process of self-determination. Indonesia’s government, with its strong military support argued that it undertook a process of decolonizing East Timor and that the majority of East Timorese chose to become part of Indonesia which was reinforced by the Declaration of Balibo in July 17, 1975. Therefore, following this logic, there was no need to hold a second referendum under the auspices of United Nations.

Many politicians have argued that the first party that should be blamed for this situation is Portugal. Its abandonment and lack of preparation of the East Timorese in 1975 led to a prolonged process of self-determination resulting in a chaotic situation in 1975. According to Abidin (1994), an Indonesian intellectual, the East Timor issue was refutably a case of decolonization utterly mishandled by the erstwhile colonial power. If Portugal had shown a higher regard for the civic and political rights of a people whom it had oppressed and neglected for over four centuries, Portugal might have effected a less stormy decolonization (Abidin 1994:12).

The process of decolonization of Portuguese’s colonies including East Timor started when The Armed Forces Movement (AFM) Coup overthrew Caetano’s fascist regime in Lisbon on April 25, 1974. This coup marked a change in government policies. The AFM were weary of supporting an archaic feudal power clinging to its last vestiges of colonial empire and wanted to replace it with a capitalist modernisation and raised the issue of decolonization. Antonio de Spinola, the new head of Junta of National Salvation, being inspired by their experience in fighting against the liberation movements in Africa, preferred some form of independence for the colonies. In this case, Spinola favoured a progressive autonomy for the colonies within a Portuguese framework (Taylor 1990).
According to Grant Evans (1975), the coup took small and isolated Timor totally by surprise. Prior to the African wars Timor was a 'hardship posting', a place for political exiles - deportados. The political dictatorship exercised before the coup had isolated the Timorese from any knowledge of the struggles for liberation in Asia, even from the upheavals taking place in neighbouring Indonesia. Only one serious uprising took place in 1959 when a number of the embattled Permesta Movement in Sulawesi landed in East Timor and were granted political asylum (Evans 1975:5). However, some months later, they engineered an abortive uprising against the Portuguese which was ruthlessly crushed with a reported killing of up to 500 people.

The coup was also a matter of surprise for other parties with an interest in East Timor, for example, Indonesia, where the intelligence services were pressing the government to annex East Timor; neighbouring powers such as Malaysia and Australia, staking out their place in the region's rapid development; and the industrialised nations of Western Europe, Japan and the United States, concerned about strategic and economic interests in Southeast Asia. All these actors markedly influenced East Timor's decolonization. The emerging state's struggle for independence became a dynamic interplay between these powerful forces whose interests shaped, restrained and determined the outcome (Taylor 1991).

After the coup, in response to the immediate change, speculations raised about the East Timorese's future generally denote three main possibilities for its future, that is: 1) Timor's continued association with Portugal, 2) Timor's emergence as an independent state, and 3) Timor's amalgamation with neighbouring Indonesia. However, the speculation was far from idle, for a number of politically interested parties had a direct stake or a strong interest in East Timor's future. These actors included the political groupings in East Timor itself, and the government of Portugal, Indonesia, USA, Australia and their allies (Hoadley 1975).

The Political Turbulence

In 1974 political turbulence occurred while East Timorese were preparing for the process of decolonisation which is known as the civil war. In response to the immediate decolonization process, five political groupings emerged:

1. Uniao Democratica Timorense-UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), formed in May 11, 1974 founded by the elements of the former pro-Portuguese party
with the main goal to see that Portugal fulfilled its responsibility to lead East
Timor gradually toward independence while maintaining a privilege
relationship with Portugal.

2. Associacao Social Democratica de Timor-ASDT (Social Democratic
Association of East Timorese), which later on became Frente Revolutionario
de Timor Leste Independente-FRETILIN (the Revolutionary Front of
Independent East Timor).

3. Associacao Popular Democratica de Timorense-APODETI (Social
Democratic Association of East Timor).

There were also two small parties: Trabalhista (Labour Party) and KOTA
(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), People’s Party.

Following the formation of political parties the Portuguese government managed
to support the newly born political parties through the process of a general election or
campaign. The most important thing to do was the introduction and campaign of parties’
programs and political education leading to general election on August 1975. Later
developments showed that within a short time FRETILIN had gained strong support
from the population especially in the rural areas, the students and the low ranking civil
servants.

However, because of technical reasons, the general election was postponed to
November 1975. Unfortunately, UDT having predicted that they would lose on the
election launched a coup d’etat on August 11th, 1975. Ten days later, FRETILIN with
the support of the majority of people fought back and forced UDT to move near to the
border between East Timor and West Timor, Indonesia. The Portuguese government
could not handle the unstable situation and left East Timor on August 28th, 1975.
Afterwards FRETILIN unilaterally proclaimed the independence of East Timor as the
"Republica Democratica de Timor Leste" (Democratic Republic of East Timor). While
FRETILIN controlled the territory it is estimated that more than three thousand people
were killed (Jolliffe 1978).

Indonesia’s Illegal Occupation

Though the civil war and the control by FRETILIN over the territory has been
used as an argument by the Indonesian government and its allies to ensure its action
over East Timor, Indonesian annexation has been regarded as illegal since 1975 as it
has never been recognised and accepted by the international community. The annexation or intervention, has violated two fundamental norms of international law. Firstly, it was a denial of the right to self-determination and secondly, the military intervention constituted an act of aggression forbidden by the United Nations Charter and Customary Law (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva -- ICJ, 1992).

Furthermore, in order to legitimise its annexation, Indonesia unilaterally declared East Timor as an integrated part of Indonesia through the Act of Integration signed on 31st of July 1976 only six months after the invasion. The act was signed by the two defeated political parties (UDT and APODETI) who represented the minority of East Timorese people at that time when at least 80% of East Timor were under control of FRETILIN, and the territory was in the state of total war. Therefore it was invalid. Under such circumstances how could Indonesia test the will of the people? Indonesia claimed that a popular representative assembly had been elected so as to represent the wishes of the majority of East Timorese and that the process of election was democratic and free from any pressure. An election in the FRETILIN controlled part of East Timor clearly could not and did not happen.

Though it was an illegal annexation it has been prolonged in the UN agenda. For example, it continued on the agenda of discussion though the UN Security Council has twice called on Jakarta to withdraw "without delay," and eight General Assembly Resolutions have been adopted. It has been maintained with help from the United States and its allies (Scheiner 1998). This existing situation has prevented the UN from finding a quick resolution for the question of East Timor. This suggests that the economic and strategic interests of countries such as Australia, U.S. and other European countries prevailed in delineating their attitude and certainly contributed to the lack of political willpower of the United Nations.

This situation suggests that from the outset, the illegal occupation should be considered as an aspect of global politics which has also played a major part in the creation of the East Timor problem. In 1975, when the Cold War was the order of the day and international communism the spectre that haunted the free world, it was easy to take sides in the civil war that was taking place in East Timor (Anwar, D. 1997). FRETILIN, the major political party in 1974, was suspected to have an affiliation with China and adhered to Marxism and communist ideology. Having been traumatised by the loss of Vietnam war, the United States of America and its allies did not want another Cuba in South East Asia.
AN OVERVIEW ON INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Although the occupation was illegal, the Indonesian government initiated its development strategies in East Timor which were intended primarily to legitimise its illegal annexation in East Timor. The following will highlight the development strategies adopted from 1975 up to 1999 and policies introduced by the Indonesian government in East Timor during its occupation. Some problems are also identified.

Immediately after the invasion over East Timor on December 7th, 1975, the first development policy was adopted -- The Early Indonesian Development Policy -- and ran from 1975 to 1976. During the first eight months the Indonesian government established a provisional administration power in East Timor to organise the administration system in preparation for the integration or the so-called referendum which was held on July 17th, 1976. The general policy outlined during this period was to support a rapid integration of East Timor into Indonesia. All activities, including economic, social and cultural, had one ultimate goal and that was to serve the interest of integration. The second priority was assisting in the social welfare of the population who were very poor during Portuguese administration.

During this period, Regulation No.19 of 1976 was passed covering a number of items regarding development policy in East Timor. There were two main emphases. The first was on domestic regional affairs including social welfare, agriculture, health, education, religion, culture and public workers. The second area of focus was the financial sector. Jakarta budgeted hundred of millions of dollars every year to support the local economy which Indonesia claimed had been destroyed by the civil war (Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 1980).

Following immediately after the early development policy the Crash Program Policies were introduced from 1976 to 1979. The objective of this strategy was to accelerate East Timor’s development so that it could catch up with the other provinces. This period was marked by the propaganda with the motto ‘implementing development in order to catch up with other provinces.’ The idea was to reconstruct the whole infrastructure destroyed by the civil war. The policy however, was based on a false premise that the civil war was the cause of all the infra-structural damage and not Indonesia’s invasion.
The crash program was subdivided into three phases: the rehabilitation phase (October 1976 - March 1977), the consolidation phase (April 1977-March 1978) and the stabilisation phase (April 1978-March 1982). According to The Book of 20 Years of the Development of East Timor (1996:106), the rehabilitation stage was aimed at fully rehabilitating the conditions that existed at the beginning of the integration, and included rehabilitating the available facilities and infrastructure. During this period it was assessed that the people’s economy was in a very bad state, the income per capita of East Timor people was not more than US$ 40 or about Rp.80,000. Education levels were also rated very poorly in that almost 93% of the people were illiterate and there were only 10 with a university degree. Also during this stage there was a strong propaganda campaign supporting the Indonesian Republic. This was deemed important since few East Timorese knew much about Indonesia before.

In the consolidation phase, though some problems were diminished, the overall situation was still far from good. Most of the infrastructure was not yet repaired though Jakarta claimed it allocated a large amount of money for the repairs. At this stage government corruption was widespread in East Timor. In actuality, reconstruction continued but it only supported the administration and military operation.

As the follow-up to the Consolidation Phase, the Stabilisation phase took place from April 1978 until March 1982. The objective of this phase was to reassert a secure situation in support of the growth of development of East Timor. The main target of the of this period was to support and improve the capability and skills of the government staff as a whole and in its integrated capacity (Radjakarina, et al. 1996:112).

Additionally, during this stage some reconstruction took place and administration activities were organised but focused on the main cities. The improvement in land transportation infrastructure continued with the construction of 1,264 km of road-works, which included 159,70 km of asphalt road and 1,1044.30 km of gravel roads (Radjakarina, et al. 1996:113). Again, facilities at this stage were mainly for the military and the government while the people in the rural areas were still living in poverty.

By this time the Indonesian authorities claimed that the situation was stable and settled enough to enable an increase in the activities of development in various sectors, including the establishment of the village structures and other supporting facilities. For example, the village community security institutes, LKMD, were initially established in 1982. These development initiatives were mostly concentrated in the urban areas as it
was, however, hard to maintain security in the rural areas because of the intensive armed resistance in the villages.

As a follow-up of the crash programs the Indonesian government applied another strategy by implementing Short-Term Planned Development, from April 1982 to March 1984. The development still focused on infrastructure of several sectors as pre-requisite in order to accelerate the development process in East Timor was the case in other of Indonesian provinces. Besides, this condition could support the government in strengthening the foundation for the integration of East Timor.

Another focus of this period was in preparation of East Timor to follow the system of Five-Year Development Plans (REPELITA), such as Indonesian Republic had been doing since 1969. During this period, government tried to arrange the development plans on the basis of sectors, sub-sectors and programs. The development policies and their implementation were based on the arrangements made in other provinces but adjusted to the situation and condition of East Timor (Radjakarina, et al. 1996:116).

Meanwhile, though the Indonesian authorities claimed that the situation in East Timor was stable, during this period the resistance had intensified their activities, they were operating not only in the bush but had moved into the urban areas. The Indonesian government in order to tackle this potential disruption deployed more troops in East Timor. It was evident that during this five-year program, Jakarta was pre-occupied with the strategies in dealing with armed resistance and underground movements.

After nine years of occupation with so many problems Jakarta introduced the First Five-Year Development Plan. This period was called the period or the phase of development, and was the first Five-Year Development Plan for East Timor, which lasted from April 1984 to March 1989. The new policy aimed to equalise the implementation of East Timor's development with other provinces and was based on the idea that East Timor as a part of Indonesia deserved to be equalised with the other provinces. The priorities of this policy were in five main sectors: agriculture, communication, education, health and government apparatus. However, by introducing this policy, Indonesia also aimed to show to the international community that, politically, East Timor was stable and the people were happy with Indonesian policies.

The socio-economic conditions, according to reports of Amnesty International (1985), appeared much better, based on the observation of the normally functioning administration, schools, public buildings and roads. During this period many East
Timorese students were sent to study at universities in Java and Bali so that they could gain more understanding of the reality and accept the integration. These students, however, became one of the most important wings of resistance against Indonesian occupation.

Security was gradually restored since the resistance changed its warfare strategy from a conventional war to guerrilla warfare, but casualties on Indonesia's part continued. Civilians were the targets of reprisals by Indonesian military. At this period, for the first time peace talks commenced between the local government and armed resistance led by Xanana Gusmao. Land communications were improved to try open better access to the isolated areas of East Timor. In fact, this was to support the security operations throughout the territory rather than for use by the general population.

Until the end of 1989, Jakarta continued to expand its development activities in the territory through another development phase, the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1989-1994). The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs claimed that the results of development during 15 years were substantial (Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 1992). Physical development had advanced, particularly the increase in the number of sealed roads and there was also an increase in buildings and the provision of some public services. Nevertheless, development created problems such as unemployment and limited job opportunities.

According to Indonesian authorities, the result of development during the period of 1989-1994 revealed encouraging development and improvement in economic sectors, for example the region's economic growth which recorded a 7.45% growth rate per annum. Additionally, East Timor's per capita income, though still relatively low, kept on growing from about Rp 80,000 (US$40) in 1976, to Rp 132,450 (US$66) in 1983; Rp306,850 (US$153) in 1988; Rp 698,230 (US$347.6) in 1993 (Radjakarina, et al. 1996:192).

Additionally, during this period, having virtually closed the island after the invasion in 1975, Indonesia carefully stage-managed foreign visits in an attempt to satisfy international indifference. Thus, in 1989, believing that it had reduced the armed resistance to a point of insignificance and suppressed the population, Indonesia carefully opened parts of East Timor to foreign travel, hoping to promote images of normality in the shadow of other world upheavals (Cox 1991:57). This situation, however, can be seen as an opportunity for non-state institutions or agents to participate in the process of developing East Timor.
During this period armed contacts with the guerrillas were decreasing, and the Indonesian army in the cities and towns throughout the territory introduced new forms of oppression. It was done in order to create a state of terror in the civilian population to prevent any increase in clandestine or underground activities and to undermine East Timorese resistance. Indonesia expected to eliminate the resistance in five years but, in fact the resistance was still much alive and even the resistance had changed their strategy from armed struggle by working much more at diplomatic or political and clandestine levels. Even during this 'quieter' period, on November 12, 1991, the tragedy of the Santa Cruz cemetery occurred, where hundreds of young Timorese were massacred by Indonesian troops during a peaceful demonstration for independence.

This period also marked the direct political impacts which have severely affected the performance of local NGOs, especially ETADEP. For example, following the Santa Cruz Massacre, in December 1991 the Indonesian army, suspecting ETADEP maintained contact with the resistance guerrillas confiscated ETADEP's Single Side Band radio which meant that communication was cut off between the main office in Dili and the base camp in Raimate, Loes, district of Ermera. At the same time, ABRI launched tight security and political control in the areas of the Loes valley by establishing small units of military posts spread all over the area.

Another major event occurred affecting ETADEP's work in November 1992 when the leader of East Timor resistance, Xanana Gusmao, was captured. A few days later, the Indonesian army detained ETADEP's deputy director, Gilman dos Santos, for having supported resistance's underground movement activities and ETADEP's facilities and transports were confiscated. This situation created a psychological trauma among ETADEP's staff and discontinued ETADEP's activities for a year before operating again but were under pressure due to the traumatic experience in the past.

The latest development strategy introduced was the **Third Five-Year Development Plan (1994 - 1999)**. Being the 27th province of Indonesia for two decades, Indonesian authorities emphasised that development strategies in East Timor were inseparable from the constellation of Indonesia national development aimed at establishing a just, equitable and prosperous society based on Indonesian ideology and the constitution. Thus, as the sub-system in a concerted national development system, the goal and strategies of East Timor development should be adopted in line with the goals and strategies of national development.
Within the Third Five-Year Development Plan, starting in April 1994 that would end in March 1999, East Timor development was focused on three priorities i.e. poverty alleviation; improvement of quality of human resources; and reinforcement of resolute and dynamic socio-political condition. According to The Book of 20 Years of the Development of East Timor (1996), specifically, the goal of the East Timor development plan was to realize material and spiritual wellbeing of in a more harmonious, just and equitable manner for the East Timor people as individuals and society. This could be achieved by improving people's income to alleviate poverty, enhancing the quality of human resources in general and of young generation in particular, and to nurture East Timor people to be more self-reliant manifested in the people's improved participation in development activities (Radjakarina 1996:297).

It was evident that during this period Indonesian government had acknowledged serious problems faced by the local government in implementing their programs due to the political instability. Thus, taking into account the region's conditions and problems, the Indonesian government undertook other ways of reinforcing socio-political in order to be conducive to development activities in the context of establishing unity and integrity. During this period Indonesia was also increasingly preoccupied with other internal political tensions, as the consequences of the internal emergence of new waves of democracy, and with the nature of political development in East Timor which was pressing for self-determination.

QUESTIONING INDONESIA'S DEVELOPMENT

Logically, if development had really won the hearts and minds of the East Timorese, the intensity of people's resistance against Indonesia over these two decades would have decreased. If development really worked or it really benefited the people then there would be no space for resistance to survive over the 24 years of occupation. In fact East Timorese resistance was even more active and had more support during 1980s and 1990s than before. Therefore, I could argue that the development strategy conducted by the Indonesian government has been widely rejected by the East Timorese because it has never benefited nor satisfied the needs of the people of East Timor.

Additionally, there is a reality to argue that Indonesia has failed to implement its development strategies in East Timor. The outcome of the August 1999 referendum
where the majority of the population (78.5 percent or 344,580) voted for the independence and only a small number (94,388, or 21.5 percent) accepted the integration with Indonesia, has proven that Indonesian presence or its development strategies have been rejected ever since. The following main facts underline the reasons for rejecting the Indonesian development in East Timor.

The first issue to be addressed as a failure of Indonesian development in East Timor was the constant human rights violations. Development must be defined on the basis of human rights for development and human rights can not be treated separately. The nature of the relation between both can be illustrated as between theory and practice where human rights is the theory and development is the practice. Neither human rights (theory) nor development (practice) can be contrasted. Thus, from this relationship, development can be judged, i.e. human rights may serve as a value to evaluate the development (Juliantara, D. 1998). In Indonesia human rights is seen as a separate issue from the development and it was seen as a threat for instability.

In accordance with the national strategy, East Timor development strategies had based on the 'Trilogi Pembangunan' (The Three Development Principles), a well-known political development strategy introduced by Soeharto’s regime. The strategy emphasised three major components; economic growth, equal distribution and political stability. The basic argument for this strategy was that economic growth was necessary to magnify the national income and an increased income would lead to promoting people’s well-being through equal distribution of wealth. However, in order to maintain and sustain the development, political stability was needed. It does make sense because in the past the political instability had been seen as a counter-productive factor for the development. Thus, in the name of development, the authorities could take any measures necessary to secure stability which included violating human rights.

Human rights violation has been a great concern during Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor. It has been at the centre of the international criticism against Indonesia. Since the invasion, it has been reported that East Timorese have been subjected to continuous gross violations of their human rights. The United Nations and the international community have repeatedly condemned the violations as breaches of international law, however, the human rights situation in East Timor continues to worsen. Though UNHRC (The United Nations Human Rights Commission) has many times expressed its deep concerns about this situation, Indonesian authorities made little progress towards complying with their commitment agreed to at earlier UNHCR
sessions. The human rights abuses were evident in the continuous reports of violation in East Timor, including reports of extrajudicial killing, disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention (UN Human Rights Commission on situation of human rights in East Timor in 1997).

According to reports in 1997, there was an atmosphere of fear and depression: 'Flagrant abuses, including arbitrary arrest and torture of prisoners, are still committed by the Indonesian military in East Timor. East Timorese people live in an atmosphere of constant fear and repression' (Benjamin 1997: 30). The Global Exchange, for example, reported that the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor is one of the worst atrocities of the last century. The occupation claimed the lives of over 200,000 Timorese, one-third of the original population (Scheiner, C. et al. 1998).

Besides the political pressures and human rights violations, during Indonesia's occupation most East Timorese still live with pervasive poverty. The poverty of East Timor is a direct by-product of colonial neglect and two subsequent decades of de facto war. Though Indonesia claimed it had alleviated the poverty in East Timor, in 1997 East Timor ranked only marginally ahead of the five poorest countries in Africa, with a per capita income of just 168 US dollars a year. Jeremy Wagstaff (1999), Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal reported that most of its 850,000 citizens still live in tin-roof huts and more than half of them can not read (World Wall Street Journal, August 27, 1999).

Another issue to be addressed is the imbalance of development. It was evident that during the Indonesian occupation there was a heavy spending on infrastructure. In fact, Indonesia ploughed more money per capita into East Timor than into any other province. In the latest fiscal year, it paid for all but 15% of East Timor's $116 million budget. "That's more than twice as much as any other province", reported Jacqueline Pomeroy, a World Bank economist monitoring East Timor's transition (World Street Journal, August 27, 1999).

Indonesian authorities claimed that the money had gone into building an infrastructure that Portugal failed to build. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry wrote in "The Untold History of East Timor, a brochure it published in 1995:

"In 1974, [East Timor] had only 20 kilometres of paved roads. "Since then, 3,800 kilometres of roads have been built, including 428 kilometres of paved highways and 18 bridges."

Indonesian authorities frequently argued that a lot had been added since. But critics say the roads were built mainly for the battalions of troops stationed in East
Timor to fight the FALINTIL guerrilla army, which has waged a dogged resistance in the mountains.

While the size of Indonesian aid appears generous, there was suspicion that much of the money wasn’t used for its intended purpose. Even though East Timor received more state money per capita than any other province, it still ranks low on the development scale. Even now, only 27% of houses have electricity, against a national average of 78% (World Street Journal, August 27, 1999). The unemployment rate of East Timor in 1997, according a joint survey conducted by East Timor University and the Department of manpower of East Timor province, was 3.51% and it rapidly increased to 6.67% in 1998 (Universitas Timor Timur 1998).

Additionally, to justify the failure of Indonesia’s development in East Timor, the latest report from FAO in December 1999 revealed that East Timor was among the poorest regions in Asia. Approximately 50 percent of the population were considered below the poverty line, life expectancy was around 56 years, whilst only two out five people were literate. The level of infrastructure and the provision of essential services were also poor, with only 30 percent of households having access to potable water and 22 percent having electricity. Less than half (49 percent) of the number of villages were accessible by paved road before the crisis (FAO Special Report December 1999).

THE RESISTANCE POINT OF VIEW ON INDOONESIAN DEVELOPMENT

Another way for judging Indonesian development policies in East Timor should be the resistance of the people of East Timor to Indonesian hegemony. Resistance would symbolise people of East Timor who have suffered and been marginalized both directly and indirectly as a consequence of development in East Timor. The idea being if people are happy and have good lives, they would have no need to resist even against their land’s occupation. Therefore, it is worth assessing Indonesia’s development program in East Timor from this point of view.

Although Indonesia claimed that integration brought significant development and material improvement for the local population, freeing them from the shackles of Portuguese colonialism, the reality was different. Rejecting this contention, Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the resistance, asserted that there were confrontations at all levels of these improvements. Indeed there were no material benefits that could compensate
the Timorese for their sacrifices. The infrastructure projects initiated by the Indonesians did not benefit the local population and were part of a strategy to subjugate the people (Domm 1990:127). In an interview with Robert Domm, the Australian journalist in 1990, Xanana Gusmao contested that the true intended beneficiaries of the development projects were the Indonesian military, especially corrupt generals, Indonesian civil servants exploiting economic conditions, and Indonesian transmigrants brought in by the government and to whom the most fertile land is offered.

Criticising Indonesia’s economic and political development in East Timor, Xanana Gusmao reaffirmed the political and economic rights of East Timorese:

".... they consider that in East Timor economic rights should prevail over political rights. We consider that they are treating us like animals to be fattened. We are human beings like all others in the world. We do not think that politics is a question of being able to read and write, but of feeling that freedom is a natural right, something that always existed." 4

Furthermore, he added that the Indonesian occupation and its economic developments violated the traditional Timorese cultural attachment to their land. He emphasised that the East Timorese were essentially rooted to their culture and traditions. They had their concepts of life, of existence, and lived to realise them. They were impregnated spiritually and existentially with the concept. The occupiers prevented East Timorese from realising, from practising their traditions, their customs, and this was what essentially offended the East Timorese people (Domm 1990:128).

The resistance’s perspective on Indonesia’s development strategies during the two decades of occupation had the ultimate goal to eliminate the resistance so that stability could be secured. It was evident that Indonesian authorities considered seriously the significance of the existing resistance by the East Timor. The most viable proof was the outnumbering presence of military in East Timor to ensure stabilisation in East Timor. The actual number of troops in East Timor since 1975 is not known, but two patterns are apparent. Indonesia always claimed to have fewer troops and it had reduced the troop number in East Timor, for the sake of suggesting that there was no military problem, but at the same time it had maintained numbers, or in fact increased them. According to a report from East Timor International Support Centre (1998), there were 30,000 to 40,000 Indonesian armed forces in East Timor. It was verified that there were 15,000 armed forces personnel in the capital of Dili alone where Dili’s population was 110,000 (ibid.). Thus, if the figure of 40,000 military personnel is correct and total
population of 800,000 is assumed, then there was one military person for every 20 civilians.

From this perspective of development, I should conclude that the development strategies implemented and the extensive resistance by East Timorese against these strategies during two decades of its occupation has clearly indicated that the Indonesian government failed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the East Timorese. Thus, the development policies adopted by Indonesia have been merely political tools or propaganda to force the people to accept its illegal occupation.

**CHANCES FOR NGOs' INTERVENTION**

Though the situation was unfavourable, NGOs could intervene to contribute to the development process. An intervention can only work if NGOs have gained adequate understanding by assessing the given situation carefully before adopting strategies. NGOs in this context, I presume, should adapt themselves to the situation rather than adapt the situation to them. Promoting development activities dealing with humanitarian and relief works or community development programs will have a greater likelihood of success than if involved in the promotion of democracy and human rights issues. Adopting a supplementary role with the existing power or government may be more strategic rather than an antagonistic or challenging role against it. After considering the existing risks and assessing the existing constraints and strengths, the following major chances were identified.

One of the severe consequences created by the occupation was the closure of East Timor for outsiders. From 1975 to 1988 East Timor was totally cut off from international community and even the rest of Indonesia. The military made it very difficult to enter or leave the region. Every activity occurring inside the territory was kept under tight control. This closure, therefore, prevented people from mobilising and participating effectively in development. Trade and private investment were almost non-existent and development activities were mostly dominated by the government and military.

The first chance of intervention of NGOs in East Timor came when humanitarian organisations such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a US humanitarian organisation, and the International Red Cross were firstly allowed to enter East Timor in
1981. It happened because in 1979 there was a disastrous famine which was said to have rivalled its Cambodian and Biafran counterparts in severity. The total death rate rose at that time to 1,400 per month (Famine Relief 1979:31). This matter, however, became the subject of a heated debate in the American Congress in 1981, which forced the Indonesian government to open East Timor to humanitarian organisations.

Forced by these facts, the Indonesian government approved the *Opening of East Timor Policy* in 1989. The idea was officially proposed by the former governor of East Timor, Mario Viegas Carrascalao and was supported by President Soeharto. Economically speaking, the purpose of the openness was to attract private investors to create a private sector in East Timor. It was also opened for outsiders to come to East Timor without any restriction and therefore it has same status to the province as the other provinces. The openness, however, was also a political strategy adopted by Indonesian authorities to show to the world that the situation in East Timor was politically stable.

Regardless of the political nature of this openness policy, it offered a good opportunity for wider development activities to happen. The policy of opening East Timor can be seen as an entry point for NGOs in East Timor and other agents to intervene actively in the process of development during Indonesian occupation. Besides, this new policy has also attracted NGOs and other development agencies outside to contribute to the development process of East Timor. Encouraged by this opportunity, therefore, some Timorese intellectuals founded ETADEP on September 23, 1987. The formation of ETADEP was initially aimed at continuing the relief work left by Catholic Relief Services which had finished in 1986.

Following the opening of East Timor, another chance for NGO intervention in East Timor was opened with the 'Go East Policy' adopted by international aid agencies in delivering their resources to Indonesia. During the period of 1990s many of the donors in Indonesia changed their focus of attention more to the eastern part of Indonesia in allocating their financial support. International aid agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank preferred to channel their funding through NGOs in the eastern part of Indonesia.

For example, the USAID has no longer supported NGOs in western Indonesia involved in community development activities such as co-operatives, micro-credits, water and sanitation projects but it would prioritise NGOs in the eastern region for these activities, whereas NGOs in the western part would be supported for activities
promoting democracy, advocacy and human rights. In another example, the Switzerland
government through Swiss Development Co-operation (SDC) decreased its aid to
Indonesia but with the exception to the development in the eastern part (Ibrahim, R.
1996).

For local NGOs in East Timor it was seen as a good opportunity to intervene as they would gain more financial support. In the case of ETADEP, it was evident that there were four international funding agencies that would support ETADEP, namely United States Agency for International (USAID) Development, Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA), Australian International Development Association Bureau (AIDAB), and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). Having these multiple donors has also created problems for ETADEP such as the problem of accountability and also the vested political interest of each donor. However, this situation attracted more NGOs in the west to build networks with NGOs in the East Timor due to the change of aid flow to the east.

In order to intervene effectively in such a situation NGOs need to build a constructive partnership with local institutions. From this context there are some potential partners to rely on. The first party to consider is the local government or the military authorities. It is not possible to distinguish between the civil government and the military, as they were in fact identical under Soeharto’s regime. I should argue here that in this particular case the local government played a predominant role because it had the power as the single actor of the development. This situation suggests that other actors may be allowed to participate as long as they will not be challenging or threatening the government.

In the case of ETADEP, the involvement of the government was mostly in the formal procedural stages of NGOs’ development activities, basically in terms of asking permission for NGO’s activities because mostly the government agents are more preoccupied with other business. My experience indicated that the government officials were so keen to be involved in the ceremonial ribbon cutting when the NGOs’ projects were finalised and at worst, they claimed it as one of their successful contribution to the development. As one of ETADEP’s field staff clearly explains this attitude by saying:

"It is very hard to have their participation or assistance when we needed them. They like to make promises but never keep them."

5
However, I still believe that not all government departments were bad, there were also some departments that were very supportive of NGOs. Thus, approaching the government authorities for seeking some support is important for NGOs in this context.

Another potential partner, perhaps the most reliable, is the East Timor Catholic Church. Building partnership with the Catholic Church is important because of the significant role played by the Catholic Church of East Timor in the development process of East Timor. The Church is a corporate entity which has consistently avoided political partisanship, but it has become the 'voice of the people', interpreting their aspirations and seeking to defend individuals against the persistent violation of human rights and it has repeatedly called on the Indonesian government to respect the dignity of the people.

Additionally, the Catholic Church has been recognised by the Indonesian authority as one of the pillars in the development of East Timor together with the government and the army. Seeing that the Church truly represents the majority of the population who are Catholics, the government needs its support to persuade the people to accept its local administration, co-operate with its development programs and respond positively to its other provisions. NGOs, therefore, should take this opportunity by working together with the Church in East Timor specially in having more access to the target community. Taking this chance, most of ETADEP's initiatives have involved the local parishes (parochial districts) as reliable partners in its development projects. For example, in promoting a Credit Union program to the local community, ETADEP usually started with local priest as the first link to the target people.

Above all, another opportunity came up in 1990 when the Indonesian government issued a mandate which provided a wider role for NGOs' involvement in development. Through the decree of "Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri, Nomor: 8 Tahun 1990 Tentang Pembinaan Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat," it asserted the role of NGOs as follows:

- to promote community's participation for improving their welfare;
- to promote community's participation in development;
- to promote self-reliance of the community;
- to promote the capacity building of its members to achieve its goals (The Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs 1990).⁶

This may serve as an opportunity for NGOs to be more flexible. The issuance of this decree indicated the legal recognition of the government for the importance of NGOs' role as potential partners of government.
SUMMARY

The current political status of East Timor has been the by-product of Portuguese colonisation and the prolonged process of decolonization or self-determination. Since then it has remained as the predominant issue affecting development process conducted by Indonesia during its two decades of occupation in East Timor. People are mostly preoccupied with this unfavourable situation. The background analysis of the political status indicates that all the policies and strategies of development adopted by Indonesia have been for the sake of justifying its de facto illegal occupation. By introducing development strategies in East Timor, Indonesia basically aimed at 'removing the piece of gravel from the shoe'.

Though Indonesia has forced its development policies during the two decades of occupation, the East Timorese constantly rejected them. The constant resistance against the occupation which has led to constant human rights abuses by the military have, however, created an unstable or unfavourable atmosphere for development to take place. Thus, it suggests that any change for development in East Timor can only happen if there is a change at the political level.

Though the situation was described as oppressive and unfavourable, NGOs could, however, intervene in this context by assessing the situation carefully. There were four major chances for the intervention have been identified in terms of; the policies adopted by the government i.e. the opening of East Timor; the flow financial support by donor to the eastern part of Indonesia (Go East Policy); the potential partners such as the Catholic Church of East Timor and the local government are also worth considering; and the legal recognition by the Indonesian government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ mandate nomor 8, 1990) has provided a wider space for NGOs to actuate in the development work.
NOTES:

1. During our meetings or discussions the security issue was the major problem for many staff. I translate this expression roughly from the original Indonesian version as follows:

"Ami labele halao serbisu fulan ida ne'e tanba situasaun iha lapangan ladun diak. Bapak sira foin daudauk tiru malu ho ema aillaran. Agora nee tentara sira halo operasi maka'as tebes iha besik ita nia base camp. Tentara sira halo interogacao ba povo sira e balu ema kaer tiha ona... Nee duni hau hanoiuntuk sementara 'Joao' pindah tiha mai iha kantor Dili tanba bapak sira buka hela nia tanba desconfia nia halao serbisu ba clandestina."

2. Permesta Movement (Perjuangan Semesta) or the Total Struggle was an uprising in Sulawesi of 1958-1961. This movement emerged as an opposition against the Indonesian former president Soekarno's efforts to change the Indonesian constitution.

3. The Book of 20 Years of the Development of East Timor was published in 1996 by Indonesian authorities in East Timor as a form of political propaganda to show the achievements of development in East Timor during 20 years of its occupation. This book may serve as representing the official views of the Indonesian authorities and their policies in East Timor development.

4. In September 1990, Robert Domm was the first outsider, to make direct contact with East Timor guerrilla headquarters and he recorded the first ever interview with the resistance leader Xanana Gusmao. The interview achieved with courageous determination, single-handedly smashed the Indonesian illusion of the resistance being voiceless, insignificant handful of 'terrorists'.

5. I interviewed Cosme Soares, ETADEP's field coordinator for Rural Drinking Water Program. His comments are common among the ETADEP's staff when it comes to arguing on the co-operation with the local government at the operational level.

6. The mandate stipulates the general guidelines for assisting NGOs or Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Local Self-reliance groups) in terms of shaping their role which basically in promoting participation and people's self-reliance. I translate it from the original text of Indonesian as follows:

"Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat berfungsi sebagai: 1) wahana partisipasi masyarakat guna meningkatkan taraf hidup dan kesejahteraan masyarakat; 2) wahana partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan; 3) wahana pengembangan keswadayaan masyarakat; 4) wahana pembinaan dan pengembangan anggotanya dalam usaha mewujudkan tujuan organisasi/lembaga" (Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 8, Tahun 1990:8)
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF ETADEP IN PROMOTING GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT IN EAST TIMOR

The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of ETADEP in the framework of its major programs in promoting grassroots development in East Timor. Firstly, this chapter briefly discusses the origin of ETADEP. The chapter will then focus on ETADEP's community development programs and strategies promoted by ETADEP at the community grassroots level by highlighting a spectrum of rural community activities from 1987 until 1998. Furthermore, it also identifies issues and some major problems which might have compromised or prevented ETADEP from maximising its potentials.

THE ORIGIN OF ETADEP FOUNDATION

The Yayasan ETADEP (Ema maTA Dalan ba Progresso) was legally founded on September 23, 1987 under the regulation dated 10 December 1981, nomor SK 496/1991/UM/PN DIL. in Dili East Timor. The formation of ETADEP aimed to continue the programmes pioneered by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) which was basically involved in relief work from 1983 to 1987 concentrating in Raimate, Loes Valley, the district of Ermera. In fact the name 'ETADEP' was originally adopted from the CRS agriculture program namely East Timor Agriculture Development Program. It is an example of ETADEP's close attachment to its origin, the CRS.

The foundation was represented by nine members who signed the document of the foundation and automatically became ETADEP's founders. These nine founders represented different sectors i.e. two members of local parliament, two from business sector and three from government sector (two civil servants and one head of regency), one local priest of the Catholic Church and one local farmer. Most of these people have, one time or another, occupied strategic positions in the government. The inclusion of different members of society was indeed a good strategy for ETADEP in such politically dominant context of East Timor.

ETADEP adopted its legal organisational form as a yayasan, or foundation, as most NGOs in Indonesia, because of the flexibility it provides. Indeed, to form a
Yayasan did not require too much bureaucracy and costs less compared to forming other organisations. The formation of a yayasan does not require a particular number of members, two or three members are eligible or adequate and it can be legalized by a public notary or legal representative. It requires no more than Rp.200,000 (rupiah) for the registration. However, while it is easy to form a yayasan it is more difficult to develop it as a democratic form of organisation.

As an extension of CRS, during the first four years (1987-1991) all ETADEP’s efforts were basically to maintain and complete the CRS programs which focused on development of agriculture, i.e. intensification, extensification and diversification of agriculture to rural community in Loes Valley. During this period ETADEP shifted CRS’ approach from relief to development orientation. The changes in approach from CRS’ previous programs were in terms of approaches, scope, resources and orientation.

However, the transition from CRS to ETADEP had brought strong influence on ETADEP’s orientation, working values and principles. In some cases, the local people still found it difficult to distinguish between ETADEP and CRS. This ambiguity of perception resulted in a crisis of self-identification. For example, there are some inconsistencies in what actually ETADEP stands for. The name ETADEP’ has been abbreviated differently from three different names; namely Ema Mata Dalan ba Progressu (the guide for development), East Timor Association for Development and Progress (the formally used name), East Timor Action for Development and Progress (rarely used except in specific occasions to address the role of ETADEP in challenging the government). These inconsistencies, however, indicate the difficult reality faced by ETADEP to set up a clear mission statement and self-identity.

Nevertheless, under the act of its foundation, ETADEP’s roles are strictly stated. ETADEP should function based on the Indonesian Five Principles (Pancasila) or the ideology of Indonesia and the 1945 Indonesian Constitution along with the goal of promoting the welfare of East Timorese farmers. Thus, in order to achieve its goals ETADEP should act as follows:

.... to assist and provide extension services to the local farmers in the field of agriculture; to support the local government agricultural programs; to work together with the local farmers' groups; to conduct other activities or programs that support the goals of the foundation (The Act of ETADEP Foundation 1987).
These four statements do not provide any wider space for ETADEP's expansion into additional development areas beyond the agricultural field with the focus of rural farmers. However, in practice ETADEP has informally adopted its own strategies which are more flexible compared to the one agreed upon the act. ETADEP has internally agreed upon the following mission:

"... to improve the social and economic standards of poor people in East Timor; to promote development efforts based on ideas of self-reliance and participation; to strengthen the capabilities of rural communities in line with 'help towards self-help' principles; to function as a development institution which contributes to coping with social and economic problems in East Timor society."

In contrast to CRS, ETADEP has visibly expanded its activities into almost all parts of the thirteen districts of East Timor. This breadth of activities stretches from the western region, which includes the three main districts of Ermera, Bobonaro and Liquica, to Manatuto district in mid-East Timor, as far as the most remote and underdeveloped villages in the Eastern region of the province, Baucau and Lospalos respectively (See Appendix 2: the map of East Timor).

Thus, according to the statistics of The Project Progress Narrative Report No.8, 1996 Grant AID No.497-0364-G-SS-1104-00, the total population of ETADEP's beneficiaries has reached an approximate total of 189,035 people. This amount covers 35,419 of direct beneficiaries and 153,616 of indirect beneficiaries. The direct recipients are those actively involved and benefiting from the outcomes of the projects whereas the indirect ones are those not directly involved in the process but who benefit from the outcomes of ETADEP's development programs.

Such an extensive scope of operation, however, suggests a wide social acceptance by the rural populations to ETADEP activities as well as its organisational capabilities to actively co-operate with various parties ranging from informal leaders, traditional institutions, religious organisations to government agencies both at district and provincial levels.
ETADEP’S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS PROFILE

From 1987 until 1998 ETADEP has contributed to the development process of East Timor through its various grassroots community development programs. Albeit within its limitations as a local NGO, ETADEP has directed all of its programs according to the ideas of participation, democracy and people centered development. It implies that community development programs should be started from below and within the community. Based on these principles, ETADEP attempted to improve people’s socio-economic welfare through creating and strengthening local grassroots organisations and down-stream NGOs. This can be seen by looking at the projects and programmes ETADEP implemented. Examples of ETADEP’s grassroots programmes are discussed below.

Rural Community Development Programmes

The programme was carried out initially in the villages of the western part of East Timor especially in the region in the Loei Valley which included the three districts of Bobonaro, Ermera and Liquica. However, after 1990 these programs had been extended to other areas throughout East Timor. Under the umbrella of this programme ETADEP carried out six main interrelated projects; i.e. the promotion of drinking water, animal husbandry, agriculture and agroforestry projects, 'Usaha Bersama (UB)' (pre-co-operatives) groups and credit unions (CU).

The Rural Drinking Water Program

Clean water supplies projects carried out by the local government were still focused on district and sub-district towns. The rural communities still did not have access to clean water in East Timor and, due to an underdeveloped infrastructure, basic needs facilities were far from sufficient. Thus, ETADEP’s anticipation to meet this immediate need was an appropriate strategy in improving rural communities’ welfare.

Most of the rural people especially those in isolated areas used traditional methods to deliver water i.e. using bamboo 'kadoras'. Women and children had to walk for a long distance to bring the water from the source. This problem, however, resulted in low productivity as well as the social welfare status of rural people. Helping the people with water supplies facilities will mean better access to the water.
To meet these critical needs, in 1989 ETADEP prioritised the program to provide drinking water facilities from among the other critical activities. The development of drinking water programs by ETADEP was actually a follow-up of the project left by CRS in 1982 but with a different approach. As part of its relief strategy CRS quickly responded to the immediate needs of the rural people. They, however, did not establish adequate preparation for the rural people to sustain the outputs. ETADEP, on the other hand, realised the failure of the previous approach then adopted a participatory perspective in order to achieve project sustainability. The achievement of this project is illustrated in table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of Projects</th>
<th>Location (Subdistrict/District)</th>
<th>Number of Beneficiaries (people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PAMP* Atudara</td>
<td>Cailaco/Maliana</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PAMP Siamado</td>
<td>Maubara/Liquica</td>
<td>952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PAMP Raiheu</td>
<td>Cailaco/Maliana</td>
<td>1,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PAMP Uluana</td>
<td>Maubara/Liquica</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>PAMP Faturasi</td>
<td>Atabae/Bobonaro</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>PAMP Asulau</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PAMP Poerema</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>PAMP Fulioro</td>
<td>Lospalos/Lospalos</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>PAMP Caicido</td>
<td>Baucau/Baucau</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>PAMP Fohorem</td>
<td>Covalima/Covalima</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>PAMP Hatolia</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PAMP Leimea krai</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PAMP Sare</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>PAMP Cacaulidun</td>
<td>Dili/Dili</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>PAMP Norema</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>PAMP Raimate</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>PAMP Matadouro A</td>
<td>Dili/Dili</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PAMP Mascarenhas</td>
<td>Dili/Dili</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>PAMP Lebutelu</td>
<td>Maubara/Liquica</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cailaco/Bobonaro</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>PAMP Blaltara</td>
<td>Hatolia/Ermera</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>PAMP Ermera</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>PAMP Matadouro B</td>
<td>Dili/Dili</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>PAMP Asalau</td>
<td>Cailaco/Bobonaro</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>PAMP Ponilala</td>
<td>Ermera/Ermera</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>PAMP Laelaia</td>
<td>Laleia/Manatuto</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>PAMP Liabala</td>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>PAMP Bobokase</td>
<td>Ambeno</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>PAMP Lacio</td>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>PAMP Laclubar</td>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>PAMP Ainaro</td>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>PAMP Maubisse</td>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>PAMP Makadade</td>
<td>Atauor/Dili</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Information and Documentation Section of ETADEP, 1997

* PAMP: Program Air Minum Pedesaan (Rural Drinking Water Program)
 ** data not available
The table indicates that the project has benefited not only the people from the three main areas (Ermera, Liquica, Bobonaro) but has expanded to almost all other areas of East Timor. Based on an evaluation in 1996, physically the project has sur-passed its target of 3 units per year; in fact it has achieved 200% of the target. One reason for this achievement is the significant amount of money allocated to this project by donor agencies, especially from CIDA which has concentrated its aid for the development of water supply facilities in East Timor.

In order to ensure the sustainability of this program, ETADEP used a different approach compared to the CRS period which was done merely to meet immediate needs without considering the needs of sustainability. Therefore, in order to satisfy the needs of the rural people for water supplies, ETADEP had to take a more responsive and anticipatory manner to assist the target people, i.e. identify the needs and take effective strategies to satisfy them in a sustainable manner.

Inspired by the principles or ideas mentioned above, ETADEP in the initial stages set up pre-conditions with the rural people. These included their willingness to contribute in the development of the facilities in terms of labour, local materials (sand, stones, etc.) and a contribution of money (Cruz 1993:17). Besides, they were also encouraged to protect the water spring and maintain the water facilities under the supervision of ETADEP’s staff.

To achieve success of participation and sustainability, ETADEP’s program implementation had followed six stages. First, a written request came from the local rural community stating their needs for the water supply facilities endorsed by the local government authority. Second, in co-ordination with local government authority, an initial survey was done at the location of the potential project by ETADEP’s staff. Third, ETADEP’s staff specialising in water projects conducted a technical survey in the location. The fourth stage was the Social Preparation. In this stage ETADEP’s staff facilitated the formation of *Kelompok Pemakai Air* (Pokmair) or a Water Users’ Group. The division of labour was also defined in which the task of women was to prepare meals for their groups on duty and attending the meetings or discussions, whereas the task of men was to collect local materials (stone, sand) and involved in the construction of the facilities, and attending the meetings. During this stage the contribution of the group to the project was also decided and a plan for the construction work was set up. In the fifth stage, the construction of the water supply facilities was carried out. The sixth
stage was monitoring and participatory evaluation carried out by ETADEP's staff (Cosme 1997:15).

Though not serious there were some problems encountered in this program particularly on the sixth stage with insufficient of monitoring due to the lack of human resources. ETADEP had only two personnel with qualified technical skills and they also had been involved in assisting many other projects including assistance for other development agencies. This automatically constrained the frequency of assistance of target groups in ETADEP's programme (Bulletin FAROL 1997). Thus, problems of maintenance and internal management of water users' groups were evident though it was identified that approximately 70% of the facilities are still functioning.

Above all, an important down-flow of having this program was that ETADEP had also used the water supply facilities as an opportunity, or an entry point for other development activities, such as projects relating to health care and to raising rural people's consciousness about the environment, livestock, etc.

The Animal Husbandry Development Project

This project of was started in 1983 by CRS projects with 100 farming households in Loes Valley. As an extension to these projects ETADEP was involved in distribution and redistribution of livestock such as cows and buffalos to farmers. In principle, the animals were distributed to the farmers to breed and use for their farming activities with the offspring of these animals being redistributed to other farmers for the same reason.

This strategy was, however, aimed to assist in equipping the poor farmers with a 'productive means' important as a prerequisite for maximizing the preparation and cultivation of their land without depending heavily on machines (tractors) and also to increase the population of livestock which had been lost as the consequence of war in 1975. ETADEP in contrast to CRS moved from utilising these animals for agriculture purpose to using them as also a commodity to increase the household income of the farmers.

After 1983, 1089 Balinese cows and 580 carabao or water buffalo were imported by CRS from Bali to East Timor and distributed mainly to farmers in Loes Valley. In 1993, ETADEP increased the population further with approximately 2,000 animals distributed to 60 farmers’ groups covering 2,129 of members from the three main districts (subdistricts) i.e. Ermera (Hatolia), Liquica (Maubara), Bobonaro
(Cailaco) (Bulletin FAROL 1994). Table 2 illustrates the livestock population and its distribution according to regions.

In order to support the rural people in increasing productivity, ETADEP had also demonstrated and introduced activities of raising and fattening of these animals and conducted training on animal husbandry for the rural farmers. In addition to this, ETADEP constructed a livestock stall in the base camp. This was to stress the importance of 'teaching by showing'. ETADEP wanted to make the rural people aware of the importance of putting the livestock into stalls and its negative consequences when these animals were left free. The rural community, in turn, responded positively to this effort. For example, they have set up regulations or consensus at the village level on how to keep livestock in safe place and sanctions for those letting their animals free.

Table 2. The population of livestock distributed to target groups in March 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maubara</th>
<th>Atabae</th>
<th>Cailaco</th>
<th>Hatolia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cows</td>
<td>buffalo</td>
<td>cows</td>
<td>buffalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: P3M Raimate (1993)

Though there was a significant increase in the animal population, ETADEP’s experiences indicate that the traditional values were the major problem in the success of this program. As the field staff explained, although the population of cows and buffalo had gradually increased, they were not being used to increase production but rather consumption, especially in rituals where animals were sacrificed. Livestock became a symbol of social status: the more livestock one had, the higher one’s social status. This situation, therefore, indicated that the increase of livestock population by ETADEP did not mean improvement in the economic welfare of the people.

Agriculture Programs

In contrast to other provinces of Indonesia, there are considerable land resources in East Timor, resulting in a shortage of labour for farming activities. Thus, to address this immediate need for farming activities, ETADEP has been developing an agricultural service system by operating five big tractors to assist the farmers in preparing and cultivating their farmland. This project was carried out extending the
original CRS program-East Timor Agricultural Development Program (ETADEP) in 1983. The high demand for this service was understandable in this context because there was extensive land which needed to be cultivated.

Data collected from evaluations indicated that ETADEP significantly developed the agricultural program compared to the CRS period though with limited resources available. In addition, ETADEP adopted different working concepts and operational strategies in providing agricultural services to the rural communities. There were some positive strategies and concepts identified in terms of the provision of the means of production.

In terms of tractor services to the farmers, ETADEP annually generated around 1,352.45 hectares wet rice fields and dry farm land (Narrative Report 1996). The effectiveness of using tractors also contributed to the increase of production. In general, the farmers who used tractors had either gathered a harvest twice in a year or the one year had wider coverage of land cultivated. Assuming that one-hectare production is equivalent to 3,000 kg, it means that ETADEP has contributed directly by an amount of 4,057.35 tonnes of paddy. This contribution would be higher if the indirect services provided through parishes are taken into account.

In addition to this advantage, through the operation of five tractors ETADEP attempted to foster people's self-reliance. For example, through the services delivered to the rural farmers, ETADEP also encouraged the farmers to pay Rp. 135,000 in order to cover some of the operating costs of these tractors (the cost in the market was Rp.150,000 up to Rp.200,000). Though it was still subsidised, this strategy had, at least, introduced the mechanism of market to the farmers so that they would not be surprised when they had to pay for the market price in the future. This approach was very significant in order to sustain ETADEP's assistance in long-term development.

It was in contrast to the previous CRS program where farmers were encouraged to cultivate their land by giving intensive subsidies such as cash, food and livestock. ETADEP, on the contrary, had directed all its agricultural projects mainly on raising farmers' awareness and self-reliance. This strategy was not so spectacular as it was in terms of expanding work scope and numbers of farmers involved, but it had, however, enabled a change of mentality from a 'beggar' to be an 'entrepreneur' mentality (Nugroho, et.al. 1996).

The integration of agricultural programs with activities was another advantage of ETADEP's approach. The agricultural program was integrated directly with social
forestry programs i.e. constructing terraces and planting food crops or fruits. Besides, in some locations this program was also integrated with the distribution livestock. Thus, though the agricultural projects were still focusing on the locations where these projects were initially initiated, ETADEP had extensively replicated and multiplied this model to other farmer groups so that they could take it their model. It has proven effective that ETADEP had conducted cross-visiting among local groups which involved different farmer groups from other areas in order to introduce the integrated agricultural development model.

Moreover, in order to raise rural community's awareness and participation in developing the agricultural sector, ETADEP through the farmer groups and social contacts provided agricultural extensions through a wide area.

Apart from the positive impacts of this program, some evaluations identified problems faced by ETADEP. First, the scope of ETADEP's agriculture program was very limited due to limits of resources and inputs, namely human resources, tractors, and agricultural extensions, whereas there was a high demand for a sustainable agriculture development in the future. The operation of 26 tractors provided by CRS to agriculture services for farmer created a high dependency of the farmers to these mechanic resources. ETADEP's strategy to reduce the number of tractor from 26 to five tractors has failed to satisfy the needs for these resources by the local community. Moreover, If ETADEP could achieve a higher increase of production in the future, it will contribute significantly to the welfare of the farmers. For example, there was no concrete support by ETADEP for marketing the yields or the problems of not having fertilisers (artificial and manure) faced by the farmers.

The management of farmers' groups was not capable of ensuring the sustainability and viability of their program in the long-term. Assistance was still needed to strengthen these groups in order for their survival. Besides, these groups were not capable of providing cash (saving and credits) in a significant amount to develop their initiatives in agricultural sector.

The Development of Agroforestry Program

Apart from the previous agriculture development policies which were concentrated on lowlands or wet land agriculture, ETADEP in 1992 introduced a new alternative model for sustainable agricultural development of East Timor through the concept of agroforestry which focused on uplands. This effort, however, also indicates
ETADEP's deep concerned for the improvement of a friendly environment, biodiversity and productivity of the East Timor community.

The introduction of agroforestry programs in the context of development in East Timor was relevant. The lowland of East Timor covers 3,150 km square which is dominated by dryland i.e. 162,437.77 hectares and one third (58,540.5 hectares) of this is covered by wet land. The dryland extends from east to west in the northern part of East Timor is more heavily populated compared to the more sparsely populated southern part. This indicates that the population in the north is heavily dependent on dryland agriculture. Besides, the population in the dryland inherited traditional practice of burning and slashing, shifting or swidden agriculture which, in fact, may have endangered the environment of East Timor.

Moreover, the local government has not paid much attention to issues related to the environment and their approaches were still not integrated. Departments such as Department of Agriculture, have relied on a sectoral approach so that they had not been capable of resolving these problems.

In addition to the traditional practices, there was indication that in some cases, burning and slashing on the hills around the cities or towns were done purposively by the army (ABRI) as a security strategy -- to have a clear view on the movement of guerrillas to towns.

ETADEP's efforts to introduce agroforestry was, however, relevant in this context of development in East Timor. There were four reasons why agroforestry was worth developing in East Timor. First, the land of East Timor is categorised as semi-arid, especially in the mountainous northern part which is mainly sloping land where burning and slashing were most evident. Thus introducing agroforestry would be effective to handle these practices. Another reason was that most of rural settlement was dispersed and the scale of business and trading was relatively limited which has created a problem for a rural community to sell a single commodity. Third, the strategy of having diversity of commodities in an agroforestry program may serve to anticipate the fluctuating price of commodities in the market. Fourth, the existing low soil fertility requires adequate natural fertilizers which can be taken from manure and the residues of the alley crops (Suryokusumo, T. 1994).

Through this program, ETADEP adopted an organic agriculture concept in developing agroforestry. It was in line with the fact that the rural community was financially incapable of obtaining chemical or artificial fertilisers, pesticides, and supply
of prime seeds and technical skills. Organic agriculture was adopted in order to maximise the use of local resources or potentials and it is environmentally friendly. Besides, it would not create dependency so that the community could increase their bargaining power with the outsiders (Bulletin FAROL 1997).

Through agroforestry programs ETADEP tried to encourage the rural community’s understanding about the conservation and utilisation of their lands. One example of ETADEP’s strategy in handling the low fertility soil in East Timor that was through the introduction of alley farming system by planting leguminosa (clericidae, sepium, kaliandra, flemingia, lamtorogung) as reinforcing plants on the terrace. Apart from the organic fertilizers from plants residues, additional organic were obtained by utilizing manure of animals raised by the target groups as a component of agroforestry program.

Another important issue in this program was the adoption of participatory rural appraisal methods. In fact the development of an agroforestry program has followed the following participatory stages of development using participatory methods. a) An initial survey conducted to identify and prioritize the needs of the target groups and followed by the introduction of agroforestry program to local community; b) Participatory Rural Appraisal methods were conducted to identify problems and designing a work plan for the program; c) strengthening the management of target groups; e) the implementation of agroforestry program; d) ETADEP’s staff conducted assistance and supervision; participatory evaluation; f) the follow-up of this program by other relevant programs.

Specifically, in the implementation stage, ETADEP adopted the following strategies. First, the distribution of prime seeds and breeding of local fruit-trees was carried out based on the local groups needs or request. Second, the construction of terrace along the hills and followed by the planting of fruit trees as the basic crop and then the farmers started planting gamal trees to eliminate elephant grass. The planting of gamal was useful as it can either protect the terrace or serve as food stock for livestock. The implementation also included formation and the capacity building of grassroots organisation in order to sustain the program in the future. Finally, demonstration of agroforestry program by constructing a sample for each target group where the people can directly experience the concept of an integrated approach. The demonstration sites were critical since agroforestry was relatively new in the context of development of East Timor. Farmers need a concrete examples as a reference to understanding the principles behind agroforestry.
Since ETADEP introduced agroforestry in 1992, though still in a trial and error stage, it reached a significant number in terms of the distribution of this programs which cover several areas as samples. Table 2 demonstrates the distribution of ETADEP’s agroforestry program.

In addition to the significant number of target groups, the multiplication of this program model has only been implemented in a few areas of the three districts, eg. Ermera, Liquica and Bobonaro, which are in the scope of ETADEP’s work. Local government departments, especially the department of forestry, were not involved in this program, so that ETADEP’s initiative to apply this new model locally was very important in reinforcing an integrated approach to development in East Timor.

Table 3. The Distribution of ETADEP’s Agroforestry program 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Target groups</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Location Sub-district</th>
<th>land width (hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanita tani Sare</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanita tani Dirhatilau</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaktara</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watubleter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaibuti Robu</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manukbea</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leburae Meo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanita tani Siamado</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebuhae</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laoleaco Duni tuir</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moris Foun Sukar hun</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakoto</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marabia Foho tutun</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlau</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illi manuk</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmer (Behau)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behau</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laclubar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lei</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naulee</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>242</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Information and documentation Section of ETADEP (1997)

From the reports and evaluations outcomes I have identified four major constraints faced in this program. a) Water supply shortage occurs during the dry season; b) incapability of the local people to produce manure and lime which has resulted in these products being imported from outside of East Timor; c) the farmers responded apathetically and passively against the program and even demanded cash for
the work in their own farm;\(^3\) d) the uncertainty of the people on their land property status which has lessened their motivation to work. The internal managerial problems are identified in terms of lack of supervision and monitoring from ETADEP and LPIST for the target groups due to lack of resources and overworked burdened the staff (Bulletin FAROL 1995).

To effectively develop this program, ETADEP has been extending its network with other NGOs in Indonesia. As far as this program is concerned ETADEP has closely worked with LPIST, whose main focus is development of agroforestry in Indonesia. ETADEP has been a member of 'Konsorsium Pengembangan Dataran Tinggi- NusaTenggara,' a Consortium specialised in development of uplands in Nusa Tenggara, which functions as an umbrella for NGOs from Bali, West and East Nusa Tenggara and East Timor. One of the main strategies or approaches of development adopted by this consortium is the introduction of Participatory Rural Appraisal methods.

In terms of creating and strengthening down stream-NGOs, ETADEP in 1991 established a local NGO, Yayasan Halarae, to sustain the agroforestry program specialised in development of dryland agriculture and agroforestry in East Timor. Later in 1997 another grassroots organisation was also formed, Yayasan Raimaran, also with the focus on the development of agroforestry in East Timor.\(^4\) The emergence of these NGOs, however, indicates the growing importance of grassroots communities of developing agroforestry in East Timor.

The Promotion of Usaha Bersama (UB) or Pre-cooperatives Groups

From 1991 until 1993 ETADEP promoted pre-cooperatives (UBs) as one of the strategies in fostering economic self-reliance initiatives at the grassroots level. The number of groups established was 15 UBs, each with an average membership of 20 farmers mainly concentrated in the areas of the Loes Valley, district of Liquica. These UB groups' activities concentrate mainly on the improvement of the members' economic production base, i.e. their dry farming system, cultivation of fruit trees, handicrafts and establishing small shops or kiosks. Quite different from those established in rural Java, all these UBs were not forced to become 'saving-credit' institutions. Instead, they functioned to organise small shops or kiosks for consumption in order to meet the basic needs of the surrounding population (Soetrisno and Sinaga 1995).
However, evaluation outcomes of 1995 indicated that since 1993 there was no significant progress in development of UBs for the rural community in East Timor. It indicated that people had little desire to join the UBs because they did not see them as potentially improving their households’ economic status. The major incapabilities of the promotion of UBs was the lack of concept in developing this program by ETADEP.

Following the failure of the UBs, ETADEP took another path through the promotion of a Credit Union in East Timor, which in many ways subordinated UBs in terms of management, membership, saving-credit yields, scope of beneficiaries, prospect of legality and asset growth.

The Promotion of Credit Unions

Until 1990s ETADEP has focused its programs on certain areas especially in the three districts i.e. Ermera, Liquica, and Bobonaro and tended to be sectoral meaning certain sectors of economy were taken as entry points for designing the programs. Now that this strategy was not relevant anymore ETADEP concentrated on a new approach i.e. human resources development. Therefore, ETADEP’s strategy of promoting Credit Unions in East Timor has been a breakthrough in the process of the rural community development in the context of development of East Timor.

There are three basic arguments underlining the choice of this strategy by ETADEP in East Timor. First, socio-culturally speaking the rural society of East Timor has a strong mechanism of social cohesion. The social structure was constituted by the traditional communities which were strongly influenced by the local tradition was actually a potential if the orientation of these communities and the community leaders are guided to activities of improving their economic welfare (Publikasi dan Dokumentasi Yayasan ETADEP 1993).

Second, in general the character of the rural household economy of rural community remains at subsistence which means there is very limited production activities. Thus, diversification was almost non-existent due to lack of working capital. Meanwhile, the process of accumulating financial capital almost non-existent because of lack of motivation. Therefore, in order to solve these problems, ETADEP’s through Credit Union's courses or training, attempted to raise the motivation of rural people.

The third reason for promoting credit unions was that though the government bureaucracy had implemented in all the areas of East Timor. The top-down development programs by the government were not effectively implemented at the
grassroots level. This condition automatically created a vacuum in developing the society which requires initiatives starting from the rural communities themselves. The promotion of Credit Unions by ETADEP, therefore, was an effective strategy or alternative model for creating people's initiatives through their direct or active participation in the process of Credit Union development (Gomes 1996:8).

Additionally, the promotion of Credit Unions in East Timor, was legally reinforced by the Indonesian government policies concerning co-operatives. Indeed, the financial deregulation of 1983 and the bill number 25 on co-operatives passed in 1992 has implicitly provided a basis for promoting Credit Unions in East Timor (Bulletin FAROL 1996).

Considering these chances and the needs of the rural community in the context of development of East Timor, in co-operation with CUICO-I (Indonesian Credit Union Co-ordination Office) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), ETADEP first started to develop Credit Unions in 1990. Generally, the objective of promoting Credit Unions in East Timor is, first, to promote a sustainable and viable economic institution amongst the low-income groups, including peasants and other segments of the rural population. Through Credit Unions, security of savings and the provision of relatively low cost are provided to meet the members need for cash (Nugroho 1996).

Specifically, promoting and introducing Credit Unions at the rural community level is also a strategy aimed at protecting them from private money-lending practices. Since the existing formal financial institutions (banking system) have been burdened with manifold limitations and did not reach the poor target groups, private money-lenders were able to establish themselves which can be exploitative. As a consequence the rural population were trapped into using 'private moneylenders' (loan sharks). This system burdened the rural poor people with a very high interest rates increasing people’s poverty.

In contrast, through Credit Unions, rural people have financial access to meeting their economic problems in various sectors including food, in period of shortage during the pre-harvest period, production costs for subsistence and commercial agriculture, the education of the children, expenses for health care; or simply for meeting expenses of traditional ceremonies and emergency situations.
Credit Union Development in East Timor

In quite a short-term process, as demonstrated in table 4, Credit Unions have significantly developed in terms of membership, saving accumulations, volume of credits borrowed and number of borrowers. This performance forms the basis for an optimistic view of the viability and sustainability of Credit Unions in East Timor.

According to an evaluation in 1996, of the 23 CU units spread of nine regions in East Timor, there were 18 successful units, and five collapsed units. The failure of the collapsed units was caused by some factors such as: the lack of human resources quality in management, very bad management practices, monetizing has not been established in some areas, the mediating institution (Church) was not used, the market expansion did not touch the areas where Credit Unions were established (Narrative Report 1996). In other words, if the mode of production in one area is subsistence, there are many constraints for the CU growth.

Table 4: The Growth Indicators of Credit Unions in East Timor (1990 – 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>December 1990</th>
<th>September 1997</th>
<th>Total Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Number Credit Unions</td>
<td>10 units</td>
<td>23 units</td>
<td>13 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Number of members</td>
<td>808 people</td>
<td>3,650 people</td>
<td>2,842 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Total amount of savings</td>
<td>Rp 20,399,750</td>
<td>Rp 750,000,000</td>
<td>Rp 729,630,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Credit balance</td>
<td>Rp 17,815,125</td>
<td>Rp 800,000,000</td>
<td>Rp 782,184,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>Rp 22,420,725</td>
<td>Rp 950,000,000</td>
<td>Rp 927,579,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Total income</td>
<td>Rp 1,632,375</td>
<td>Rp 165,239,584</td>
<td>Rp 163,607,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Total costs</td>
<td>Rp 333,250</td>
<td>Rp 55,348,650</td>
<td>Rp 55,015,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Puskopdit (Center of Credit Unions) Hanaimalu, 1997

The successful Credit Unions usually made use of the key persons in the region from where it drew members. At first, the key persons were trained by ETADEP to be capable instructors and managers for the Credit Unions in their own area. The key persons, being influential persons in the community, could easily influence people to join in the Credit Unions hence allowing Credit Unions to grow rapidly. The successful Credit Unions also made use of mediating institutions (e.g. Church) to give information and to influence the people to join in the Credit Unions. The Church has deep roots among the East Timor people, so it is easy for the Church to motivate the people to become Credit Union members. The Church also functions as controller. If there was problem in Credit Union, it was solved through this mediating institution. If for instance there was stuck credit, it was anticipated by announcing this after preaching in the
religious mass. This specific role from the Church helps the Credit Unions and develops the community towards rationalisation and efficiency.

Moreover, the routine meetings conducted by the members and executive board created an egalitarian atmosphere and sense of belonging to the CU. The sense of belonging motivated the members to get involved in developing and solving any problems existing in the Credit Union. Debate and discussions often happened in meetings. This atmosphere not only helped the Credit Union to solve any problems, but trained the members and the executive board to think and to behave in transparent way to the management of the Credit Union. Many rural people found it as an important venue for expressing their views and criticism.5

The short-term target of the successful CU, e.g. increased economy security for the members was achieve bit by bit. The CU members, in general, felt that they could avoid moneylenders through this institution. The ease of getting credit with low interest and simple procedures increased members’ productivity. The indicator of this success is that there was upward economic mobility among the members. Members could achieve economic successes, such as having a stall which they could not have before becoming a Credit Union member. Some members were even able to buy a car for public transportation.

For villages which have undergone moneytization and have been reached by market expansion as an impact of economic development, the existence of CU supports the integration of the national and regional economy into the local economy. The demand for cash as the impact of the economy development cannot be fulfilled by the government because of the geographically difficult area. The formal financial institutions and banks cannot provide the cash for the rural people therefore, Credit Unions can act as the local formal financial institutions (Nugroho 1996).

In line with the significant growth of CU in East Timor and its viability and long term sustainability, ETADEP established an umbrella organisation, the Centre of Credit Unions, ‘Hanai Malu,’ in 1996 which works autonomously and takes the leading role in developing Credit Unions in East Timor. The umbrella organisation was legally authorised by the department of co-operatives under the legal status: nomor:13/BH/KWK-27/IV/1996 dated 24 April 1996. The establishment of this centre as a new NGO also marks the development of Credit Union movement in East Timor and an ETADEP success in creating new NGOs.
STRENGTHENING GRASSROOTS ORGANISATIONS AND LOCAL NGOs

From the above community development programs it has been identified that in order to sustain its role in the development of East Timor ETADEP has relied on the strategy of strengthening grassroots organisations as an embryo for new or downstream NGOs. Strengthening the grassroots organisations is an important pre-requisite in terms of the implementation of community development programs. For example, water, agriculture and agroforestry programs can only be sustained if they have a strong foundation as part of a self-reliant organisation.

Since the beginning ETADEP has avoided forming grassroots organisations with top-down approach. In the past (CRS period) grassroots organisations were formed by stimulating inputs of sectoral activities in order to facilitate the process of implementing programs without preparing the local community. It was evident in the past, the formation of grassroots organisation did not go through the common process i.e. social analysis, individual awareness building, motivation, group formation, capacity building and extension services (Soetrisno and Sinaga 1993:17). Therefore, the farmers when asked the reason for staying in a group, stated they wanted access to tractors and livestock distributions. When they found that these services no longer existed they felt there was no more reason to stay in a group (ibid.).

Furthermore, the purpose of forming grassroots organisations was not based on the ideas of self-reliance and participation. An evaluation in 1991 indicated that the formation of grassroots organisations was too ambitious and there was no sign of success in the implementation. Joachim Metzner and Rumawas (1991) stated two reasons of past failures were the paternalistic project oriented approach and the political climate which prevented people from expressing their views. ETADEP realised this situation and considered this issue as an important prerequisite for achieving a sustainable grassroots development (Metzner and Rumawas 1991).

In addition to the strengthening of grassroots organisations, since 1991 ETADEP in co-operation with its major funding agency -- USAID, focused its strategies on development and strengthening of local NGOs. The project document agreement between ETADEP-USAID clearly indicates that the approach focused more on institutional rather than functional issues. Indeed, in practice ETADEP has a strong focus on creating new grassroots organisations or NGOs rather than on how the newly
formed NGO functions. These means efforts to optimise or strengthen the existing capacities at the grassroots level was rather neglected.

The USAID agreement with ETADEP proposed as the indicators for the project success the creation four NGOs between 1991 to 1993. However, it did not reach the target. There was only one NGOs formed from 1991 until 1992, 'Yayasan Halarae' which focused on agroforestry development in the district of Maliana. Since ETADEP was unable to do this job, in 1994 USAID offered this task to another NGO from Java "Bina-Swadaya", which co-operated in East Timor. Evaluations identified that Bina Swadaya Timor Timur had also failed to reach the target in creating four independent and self-sufficient NGOs though in fact a significant amount of US$ 250,000 has been allocated for this project (Nugroho, et.al. 1996).

The failure has proven that the concept of formation of grassroots organisation was based more on technical purpose rather than social one, i.e. as instruments for the implementation of activities such as agriculture, water supplies, CU, etc. In a normal condition these technical functions can be effective, but in the context of East Timor it is important to form a grassroots organisation that is 'compatible' with the local situation -- grassroots organisations that can function consolidation basis for the grassroots community who have suffered from disintegration for long period due to the political conflict in East Timor (Soetrisno 1993). This, however, has proven that the project’s failure was not due to the poor performance of ETADEP but rather the unfavourable local conditions in East Timor.

Having assessed that this strategy failed, the USAID-ETADEP program took a new approach of proving sub-grants to Church institutions that were committed to development in East Timor. In this case, ETADEP was acting merely as facilitating agency channelling aids to other institutions. These institutions were the Maryknoll Sisters in Aileu, Klaret Mission in Covalima, and Delegatus sosial in Dili. This approach was based on the assumption that these Church institutions could function as development-oriented agents. Though they did not explicitly identify themselves as NGOs now were legally formed as yayasan, they were in fact NGOs, just like many other organisations explicitly identify themselves as NGOs.

In general this strategy was successful as it can directly benefit the people and sustainability of the outputs were guaranteed, though rather limited. It was because these institutions were still heavily dependent on external funds. This means if the donors terminated their support there was no guarantee the Church groups could
independently survive. This also proved that in this context the 'project-oriented-
approach' adopted by donors (USAID) was no longer relevant. It would be more
effective if the subgrant approach lasted for a longer period of time rather than a very
limited of time in order to prepare these intuitions to take the lead.

Another attempt to form new NGOs occurred in 1996 when ETADEP guided by
USAID established an embryo NGO "Yayasan OTAS' with the main focus on
promoting democracy and human rights issues in East Timor. This was, however, a
strategy of USAID in order to force ETADEP out from its role community development
activities into its involvement in a more strategic role i.e. advocacy, democracy, human
rights, etc.

However, this NGO failed to survive due to intensive disagreement between
ETADEP's chairman and USAID. USAID argued that it was time for ETADEP through
OTAS to become involved in advocacy, democracy, etc. On other hand, ETADEP was
not ready yet to involve in issues that were challenging the Indonesian government.
According ETADEP's leadership this strategy was not relevant to the context of
development of East Timor because the proposed mission was risky and that might even
threaten ETADEP's survival. The position of ETADEP is understandable because the
leadership of ETADEP learned from the past experiences that building a good relation
with the Indonesian government would be more effective. ETADEP had some
experiences with poor government relations and remembering in 1992 ETADEP was
seriously suspected due to the involvement of its staff in the underground movement
(see chapter 3 for more details).

This situation, therefore, suggests that a donor agency's intervention in
introducing new strategies should not beyond the capabilities of the local NGO,
ETADEP. In terms of creating new NGOs, it should be ETADEP that fully determines
what type of NGOs are appropriate in the particular situation and in what time it should
be actuated.

The validity of this perspective has been validated when ETADEP, without too
much intervention from donors, succeeded in forming new NGOs. In 1996, for example,
ETADEP helped established 'Yayasan Hanaimalu' an NGO which concentrates on the
development of Credit Unions and served as the umbrella organisation for all Credit
Unions in East Timor. Following this, late in 1997, with the same resources, ETADEP
helped to establish an NGO, Yayasan HAK, which was involved mainly on advocating
human rights issues. This NGO become very popular in addressing the needs of East
Timorese in terms of human rights. Moreover, in late 1998 ETADEP had also succeeded in forming a grassroots NGO named *Yayasan Raimaran* which focuses on dryland agriculture. This, therefore, indicates that ETADEP is able to be successful in these strategies when left to do it alone.

Above all, I will argue that that creating or establishing new NGOs was not problematic, but it becomes problematic when it has to survive and sustains its programs in the future independently, let alone in the context of development in East Timor which did not support the survival of NGOs.

**MOBILISING PUBLIC OPINION ON GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES**

One of the key issues is the lack of communication and the existing gap of information between the government, NGOs and the rural communities. This situation could potentially alienate the communities’ contribution in the development process. If the people are not well informed about government policies, then they tend to be apathetic, sceptical and defensive to the government development policies (Marlessy, C. 1993).

ETADEP as a people-oriented agent of development emphasised the importance of placing people as the centre of development. They have also concerned about the imbalance in the local media’s representation of the reality which tended to be a one-way means of transmitting government policies. Thus, there is a need for an immediate channel for representing the aspirations or realities of the rural communities so that they can have a voice in deciding their own future. The following quote by one of the editors of *Bulletin FAROL* asserts the reality:

"We often read on the newspaper saying: "the head of regency 'X' or the government official 'Y' says...." It is hardly read: "the man 'A' or 'B' from the rural community saying this or that.... etc."(Bulletin Farol, November 1996).

Based on this reality, therefore, in 1992 ETADEP set up *Bulletin FAROL* as the first NGO publication in East Timor. The publication was designed to fill in the information gap. This media takes a bridging role in providing balanced information for both the local government and the rural community in East Timor. It also functions as a
channel of information for the rural community at the grassroots level on community development issues; and serves as a medium mobilizing public opinion on East Timor development issues (Bulletin Farol 1993).

Bulletin FAROL has a multipurpose role. It is designed to raise the problems of the grassroots community to the surface; to introduce various grassroots community self-reliance activities to the public so that they are taken into account in the process of development of East Timor; to introduce various appropriate technologies to the rural community and to provide information of government policies concerning the rural development to the community (Terms of Reference of Bulletin FAROL, 1993).

As a grassroots media, Bulletin FAROL has either raised the grassroots communities concerns or satisfied the need for adequate information so that they can catch up with the development process. The content of the publication clearly outlines the role of this media. It represents the reality of the grassroots communities through its seven columns where each column outlines different issues/topics (see Table 5: Table of Contents of Bulletin FAROL).

Another strategy was to use this medium to build networks. For this reason, Bulletin FAROL has targeted readers from different groups. The first target is the grassroots community and local community leaders who need information concerning grassroots development issue i.e. local government policies and strategies, and other development agents’ (NGOs) activities. The second target was the local house of representatives and government authorities or decision-makers at all levels whose needs for accurate information concerning the reality of the grassroots community is very crucial so that it can help them make a right decision to assist in achieving the people’s needs. The third target group is the local institutions (church, universities, NGOs) that have been actively involved in the community development process in East Timor. The fourth target is the NGOs outside of East Timor especially within Indonesia. In fact, ETADEP has shared various information and knowledge on grassroots development with other NGOs throughout Indonesia and vice versa. The last target is ETADEP’s donors. This publication may serve as another independent reference for evaluation of ETADEP’s performance.
Table 5: Table of Contents of Bulletin FAROL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Columns/Headings</th>
<th>Description of content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st Column:</strong> The Profile</td>
<td>This first column introduces a person, a group or an institution of grassroots community who is active, creative and successful in community development. By raising these potential profiles it seeks to have the support of the local government and other agencies. Besides it might be a motivation for the community themselves to realise their potentials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Column:</strong> The Special Report</td>
<td>This section provides an in-depth analysis of current and actual development issues in East Timor especially in the perspective grassroots development, i.e. government policies and strategies and its impacts on the rural community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Column:</strong> Around Etadep</td>
<td>This section provides actual or up-to-date information on ETADEP’s development activities and its linkages with other agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th Column:</strong> Women Issues</td>
<td>This section highlights women’s roles and involvement in grassroots development promoted by ETADEP and other institutions in East Timor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th Column:</strong> Our Guest</td>
<td>This section introduces a person from the grassroots community who may be seen as an ideal actor of development because of his or her skills and performance in development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th Column:</strong> Appropriate Technology</td>
<td>This section contains information on practical appropriate technology skills for the local rural community. It is illustrated in a practical way, eg. pictures. Mostly it written in Tetum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7th Column:</strong> Book Review</td>
<td>This section attracts the attention of the readers on new publications related to issues of development and NGOs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1992 to 1998 Bulletin FAROL launched its 12 editions which covered a range of issues or topics concerning development of grassroots communities in East Timor namely, credit unions, women’s issues, agriculture, environmental issues, agroforestry, fishery, clean water and the profiles of NGOs in East Timor. For each edition there were approximately 500 exemplars printed.

However, during its twelve editions Bulletin FAROL failed to run it professionally due to the lack of skilled human resources. There was only one editor with basic skills in journalism. Additionally, the Bulletin was run as a part-time effort by its editors whose main job was to handle community development projects. This
situation, therefore, prevented Bulletin FAROL from developing into a professionally presented publication. Since editors and writers were only involved in the publication on a part-time basis it had frequently failed to meet its deadlines as a quarterly publication.

Another problem was the future viability and sustainability of the bulletin. The publication was not self-financed but was heavily dependent on funding from donors especially USAID. In fact, there was no attempt from ETADEP to develop it independently or manage it as a self-financed publication. Therefore, there was an indication that the publication would stop with the end of USAID’s contract with ETADEP in 1996.

However, within these limitation, in my opinion, the bulletin has not only served as a two-way communication channel for the government and rural communities, it has represented the aspirations of the grassroots community to the government as well as serving as an effective method for ETADEP to reinforce its role in promoting advocacy in the context of development in East Timor.

**ETADEP’S NETWORKING AND PARTNERSHIP**

Apart from the grassroots community development projects mentioned above, ETADEP has actively taken part in development through dialogue and networking. The aim was to build contacts and communication with broader parties for the understanding of development problems in various aspects specific to East Timor, and of Indonesia in general. It is a part of ETADEP’s concern that development efforts undertaken at the community level should be linked at a macro level to the decision making processes in order to produce favourable circumstances for local development (ETADEP’s Brochure 1994).

ETADEP has created a wide network of relationships with NGOs and other agencies (See Appendices 3 and 4). It has close relationships with both local NGOs or NGOs outside of East Timor. Office visitors signing ETADEP’s guestbook includes people from various agencies such as local, regional and international NGOs, human rights commissions, foreign embassies in Indonesia, universities, United Nations agencies for East Timor issues, religious organisations and political leaders, etc.
ETADEP realises the importance of building alliance and networking with other NGOs in order to shape its role. Thus, ETDAP has established a wide network with many NGOs either at local, regional, national and international levels. Through networking and alliance-building, ETDAP could identify common interests and concerns, share information, provide support to each other and maximise the use of available resources to achieve common goals. In other words, ETDAP has developed a co-operative strategy in order to improve the impact of their operations. The wide range of ETDAP’s networking can be seen in the form of its participation in workshops, seminars, research and dialogues with various parties including universities, NGOs, regional governments, religious organisations and international agencies. Bulletin FAROL has also been effectively used as a means for facilitating the networking.

At the local level, for example, ETDAP in 1996 initiated the setting-up of a local NGO forum, the East Timor NGO Forum which takes the role as the co-ordinator of all East Timor NGOs. At the national and regional level, ETDAP has been a member of The Consortium of Development of Uplands in East Nusa Tenggara which has close affiliation to an international NGO, The World Neighbours. Within this consortium ETDAP was initially introduced to new concepts of development approaches such as the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in the development of agricultural in highlands. Another example, the Lembaga Pengembangan Inisiatif Strategis untuk Transformasi (LPIST) has been working closely with ETDAP. LPIST is an Indonesian NGO involved in the development of Strategic Initiatives for Transformation especially in introducing the concept of agroforestry development in East Timor.

Albeit ETDAP’s wide networking, ETDAP has taken a passive role in the process of building networks with other NGOs. ETDAP was more involved in the technical process rather than playing a pro-active role as the key resource for analysis and resolution of problems especially related to ETDAP’s experience in grassroots development in East Timor.

In the context of the resolution of the issue of East Timor, ETDAP has also played an important role in widening its networking especially with foreign embassies and United Nations organisations. Indeed, ETDAP has been pointed to as a reliable source of information because of its proximity to the grassroots rural community. For example, the United Nations special investigators, ambassadors, United States Congressmen, etc., came to visit the “three pillars”; the Governor (the government), the
Bishop (the Church), ABRI (the army), and they would make the last visit to ETADEP as representing a component of the civil society.

Another important connection is ETADEP’s relationship with donor agents. Unlike other small local NGOs in Indonesia, ETADEP did not face any difficulty in building its relations with donor agents or funding agencies. This condition is understandable because of the political status of East Timor which still remained on United Nations agenda. Therefore, ETADEP has attracted overseas donors or funding agents to co-operate with it. I believe these donor agencies have their own agenda in channeling their aid in this political context of East Timor. Since the beginning of its establishment ETADEP has closely co-operated with international development agencies from various countries among others USAID, CIDA, the Embassy of New Zealand, CRS-USCC, KAS, AIDAB (AusAID).

Among the other donors USAID was the biggest partner of ETADEP in terms of the significant funds allocated to ETADEP’s programs. Data from the Strategic Planning Workshop report of ETADEP Foundation in 1993 revealed that from 1991 until 1995, USAID allocated US$ 940,184 which is equivalent to Rp. 1,916,834,000. The second large donor was the KAS, a German agency which allocated an amount of Rp. 452 million. The third large donor agent was CIDA. There was no exact data available to calculate the amount of funds by CIDA because of its different approach in delivering aid through ETADEP. For example, the CIDA-ETADEP contract states that allocation of funds is based on the proposal of rural community groups with an amount not exceeding Rp. 25,000,000. for small scale business.

In addition to the amount of donation, each donor has affected ETADEP differently because each has its own policy and strategies in delivering aid. Take for example, USAID and KAS. The USAID’s programs neither define specifically the basic objectives of its assistance to ETADEP nor provide any feedback on ETADEP’s performance except for specific areas such as finance and administration. On the contrary, KAS assisted ETADEP in all the stages of project implementation, i.e. from planning until the end of the process. These two approaches have, however, its positive and negative sides (Joachim Metzner 1993). The USAID model, as the director of ETADEP argued, can be seen as a challenge and opportunity for ETADEP to develop itself independently and creatively according to ETADEP’s needs and capability. Whereas the KAS model was also preferable because of its continual and special guidance and supervision which indeed was needed badly by ETADEP.$^7$
The negative sides of these two models are also identifiable. The USAID model would not be relevant if ETADEP had no courage to take risks and willingness to be innovative in its actions within such a fear and oppressive political atmosphere of East Timor. For example, ETADEP failed to manage an embryo NGO named 'OTAS' in 1995 which was designed by USAID to handle issues of advocacy, human rights and environment in East Timor. The KAS model, on the other hand, having provided continuous guidance, never-ending evaluation or supervision in all stages of ETADEP management process has created dependency for ETADEP. Therefore, it has been counter-productive for ETADEP's creativity and self-dependency.

The relationship of ETADEP with the "three pillars" include the local government, the church, and the army was built up by its top management personnel. In general it was done through individual or personal connections by ETADEP's founders because of their close affiliation to the leaders of these institutions.

In relation to the local government, it was not difficult for ETADEP to build a close relationship with the local government and the army. For the purpose of this discussion the army is treated as inseparable from the government. One of the reasons is that most of ETADEP's founders had close affiliation with the government. Hence ETADEP was able to use this opportunity to build its relation with the government.

However, in some cases this individual approach was not effective when the ideas of promoting development was challenging the government. It was evident in 1992 ETADEP failed to hold a seminar on "People Centred Development Strategy," although the director had approached the government authorities to have a permission. The reason for the cancellation was not clear but reports indicated that the local authorities were unable to attend the seminar because of their routine business at office. In fact the seminar had been prepared for one month.

Moreover, using its connection to the government, ETADEP had approached the government's National Land Office, to issue 2000 land certificates to farmers in Loes Valley, Liquica, since 1989 but it appeared to be a time consuming matter. This issue had remained one of ETADEP's most persistent problems, causing disappointment after disappointment. Indeed the farmers had been waiting for seven years before an agreement was reached in 1991 that ETADEP should provided an amount of money to facilitate this process (Narrative Report 1991). It is unwise, however, to become too optimistic as land matters are an extremely sensitive issue in East Timor and solutions are rarely forthcoming. In the end decision on the issuance of certificates could actually
be little influenced by ETADEP and depended largely on larger overriding political factors.

At the provincial level, ETADEP has been passively involved in discussions of with the provincial Board of Development Planning of East Timor. Later in the 1990s ETADEP was frequently invited to join some local government activities. For example, in 1995 ETADEP was given opportunity to chair one of the government groups on environmental protection, the Kelompok Pelestari Sumberdaya Alam (KPSA), a government organised group involved in the protection of natural resources in East Timor.  

Data from reports and evaluations indicated that at the grassroots level, most of ETADEP's programs were done in co-ordination with the head of villages and head of sub-districts. For example, ETADEP co-ordinated and consulted with the local government in technical matter such as in the provision of seedlings and material for construction, etc. In many circumstances, ETADEP needed a letter of recommendation by the head of sub-districts to facilitate their work in the villages.

At the grassroots level, in general this relation was described as not so effective. An interview with Augusto Goncalves, the leader of a farmer group in Lebutelo village of the subdistrict of Maubara, Liquica, describes this situation as follows: "The local government has been merely to complement what ETADEP is doing.... but sometimes we have to wait until one year to get what the government have promised to us, so many people are disappointed. It seems to be too complicated."  

In order to shape ETADEP's role in policy making in the development process of East Timor, the chairman and one of the founders of ETADEP was elected as member of the local provincial representatives in 1995. According to ETADEP's top management this move was, however, a good strategy for ETADEP in actuating its role for advocacy or mediator in the change of government policy. But, on the contrary, later development indicated that he failed and even became co-opted by this situation. Interviews with key staff members revealed the USAID as the big donor had criticised this move saying that it has been against ETADEP's values of non-partisan and non-affiliation.

Above all, it is difficult to describe this relationship explicitly. From all of ETADEP's reports this relationship was merely described in short monotonous statements which I can argue implicitly expresses ETADEP's reluctance and caution in
building its relationship with the local government. The following statement is taken to represent the common expression on the relationship from reports (1988 up to 1996):

"In general, the relations with government are satisfactory. Nonetheless, there is a continued need for improved support of ETADEP’s work from government authorities in the village and district level administrations" (ETADEP-USAID-The Project Progress Narrative Report No.8, 1996)

In contrast to the relationship with the government, the relationship with the Catholic Church has been more constructive. In some circumstances this relation can also be described as exclusive and more informal because some staff and leaders of ETADEP get along well with the leaders of the churches in East Timor. It is also understandable because all of ETADEP’s staff are members of Catholic Church. From my observation there is a perception among outsiders that ETADEP is identical to a religious organisation. Therefore, the choice of Church as the mediating institution for actuating and facilitating the development programs of ETADEP was an accurate strategy in the context of development of East Timor.

In practice, it was evident all of ETADEP's community development programs or initiatives started with the Church as its first partner. One good example is the effective relationship of ETADEP with the Church in promoting the Credit Union in East Timor. It is important to recognise the strategic position of the Catholic Church in East Timor. The leaders of the Catholic Church have a strategic position and role with the government, the military and the community.

STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF ETADEP

Another ETADEP's strategy to strengthen its capacity is the development of human resources through education or training for its staff. ETADEP has allocated a significant amount of funds for this program as an investment for ETADEP’s future independence. In general, most of the training's topics are related to management which are aimed at improving ETADEP's staffs management capacity. Table 6: The Profile of Human Resources Development or Training, shows the profile of ETADEP’s human resources development program. Many staffs have participated in relevant courses which have helped them in their respective position.
Though a large portion of funds have been allocated for the development of human resources, these skilled human resources were, however, not used appropriately in the management of ETADEP. Since 1993 ETADEP has failed to fit these resources to its structure which has resulted in an exodus of most of the skilled staff. These well-trained staff left ETADEP to work for government institutions and other NGOs in East Timor. Many argued that there was no future to work with ETADEP. This condition, however, indicates that NGOs being small, voluntary in nature and with low wages, an unclear career or future, etc. has made them unable to secure their skilled resources for a long period of time. As for ETADEP, many have used NGOs just as a training ground or a transition phase before they involve in their real life or career.

Table 6: The Profile of ETADEP’s Human Resources Development/Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Participants (ETADEP's Staff)</th>
<th>Topic of Training/Course</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aleixo da Cruz</td>
<td>Program for development managers</td>
<td>Makati, The Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jose Vilanova/ Norberto G</td>
<td>utilization of extension media</td>
<td>YAO/Kupang/Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maria de Lourdes</td>
<td>Management of NGOs</td>
<td>YIS/Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Antonio da Conceicao</td>
<td>NGO comparative study</td>
<td>Yogyja/Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>All ETADEP's staff</td>
<td>English Course</td>
<td>ETADEP/East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>L.O. Petrusz</td>
<td>Credit Union</td>
<td>NTT/Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ETADEP's staff</td>
<td>Computer training</td>
<td>ETADEP/East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Florentino Samrento</td>
<td>Planning, monitoring &amp; evaluation</td>
<td>Sydney/Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aleixo da Cruz</td>
<td>Management of NGOs</td>
<td>Binawadaya/Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Noemia C. Dias</td>
<td>Financial and economic analysis</td>
<td>NTT/Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aniceto Lopes</td>
<td>Paralegal Course</td>
<td>Cisarua/Indonesia</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Victor Carvalho, Aleixo Cruz, Aleixo Silva, Aniceto</td>
<td>Administration and accounting for voluntary organisations</td>
<td>YIS/Solo/Indonesia</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Editors of Bulletin Farol</td>
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<td>ETADEP/East Timor</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Jose Vilanova</td>
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<td>Proposal &amp; Report writing</td>
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<td>Aleixo da Silva</td>
<td>Regional Workshop on poverty alleviation</td>
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<td>Antonio C. &amp; Anacleto Ribeiro</td>
<td>Journalism</td>
<td>Irian Jaya/Indonesia</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Anacleto Ribeiro</td>
<td>Program for development managers</td>
<td>Asian Institute of Management, The Philippines</td>
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In addition, since 1993 ETADEP does not include the development of human resources or training in the design of its programs anymore. ETADEP has even taken a passive role e.g. ETADEP would allow its staff to participate in training and workshops
when they were invited and funded by other institutions. This situation coincided with the fact that the development program of ETADEP was stagnating which has, automatically, impact on the ETADEP’s efforts in strengthening its grassroots organisations or beneficiaries.

THE PROBLEMS OF ETADEP’S MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION

Apart from the external environmental problems, the internal problems of ETADEP’s management and organisation must also be taken into account. From the evaluations and interviews some major problems have been identified. Indeed, all staff I interviewed expressed their concern about the internal management of ETADEP.

During the last five years (1993-1998) ETADEP’s development suffered from stagnation of its program development. No new innovative programs have been introduced in this period. Nor has there been any further co-operation with donors in looking forward to new development programs (Nugroho, et al 1996).

The stagnation of programs has also led to stagnation in the growth of the organisation. The leadership of ETADEP has not changed. The decision making process was still top-down where the lower management is heavily dependent on the top management. It was evident that organisations adopting the form of yayasan, in fact not democratic because it gives dominant authority to its board of founders. There is no division between the executive board and the founders. In the case of ETADEP, the founders had been acting as the directors in the executive board. This leadership situation functions much like a 'one man show' and the result is program innovation is paralyzed.

Additionally, the existing leadership has affected the success of program implementation in the field. In fact many ETADEP field officers complained about the late allocation of resources to the project site due to mismanagement by the main office in Dili. For example, the money allocated for planned activities was many times diverted to meet other unplanned or incidental activities without any clear reason.

There was not a clear standard in career promotion of ETADEP's staff. In fact staff working with ETADEP were contracted as project staff. The contact was on a year basis and would be renewed every year so that they could not guarantee their future. Most of staff complained about the low wages and the higher ranks they should have
according their capacity but they failed to be satisfied. Many qualified staff were frustrated by this condition and had to leave ETADEP to work for other NGOs and government institutions. Since 1995 ETADEP has lost its ten middle management staff who have been equipped with high skills while working with ETADEP for years. This situation, however, will threaten the survival of ETADEP as an NGO in the long run.

Evaluations found that though ETADEP had good standards either for its organisation or its management, the standard procedure for operation was not applied consistently (Narrative Report 1996). For example, in practice many decisions and regulations were not implemented consistently due to the 'one man show' character adopted by the manager in the program implementation. If these procedures were followed, then many of these problems would automatically solved.

Another problem is the lack of an effective management for organisation’s assets. My observations indicate that the portfolio or asset management of ETADEP was managed ineffectively. For example, the physical assets such as unused computers, tractors, motorbikes, machines, etc. were abandoned. At worst, some of these assets disappeared.

The control mechanism was not effective. The control over the implementation of programs was not effective because there were only few committed staff working towards the implementation of the programs. Financially speaking, ETADEP did not conduct adequate cost and benefit analysis in order to be financially efficient in the implementation of programs. I have an impression that since ETADEP obtained funds easily it tended to lose control. Besides, ETADEP had not conducted effective and regular evaluations for its programs and finance management. In fact, while ETADEP had set up monthly and yearly evaluation agendas, it failed to be implemented accordingly.10

Another problem in the management of ETADEP was the low solidity of team work at all levels of ETADEP’s management. The teams work at the top, middle, and low level of ETADEP’s management was not co-ordinated and controlled effectively. For example, job descriptions designed for a team work in one level was not used to enhance the solidity for team work at another level (Narrative Report 1996).

Above all, the failure of internal management of ETADEP, as many staff argued, has been a triggering factor for funding donors to discontinue their assistance to ETADEP. It has been argued that USAID, as the major funding agency for ETADEP, did not continue its assistance because of this internal problem.
SUMMARY

A general conclusion can be drawn from the assessment that within its limitations and constraints in the context of development in East Timor, ETADEP has attempted to direct all of its programs to the ideas of participation, self-reliance, and empowerment at the grassroots level. Evaluations indicate that ETADEP has been involved in a spectrum of activities aimed at improving the socio-economic life of the rural people through its community development programs such as rural drinking water, agricultural, pre-cooperatives, animal husbandry or livestock distribution.

ETADEP has also introduced development approaches i.e. participatory development approaches which are regarded new in the context of development in East Timor. These approaches were applied effectively through development programs such as the credit unions and agroforestry. Moreover, in order to shape its role in promoting advocacy, ETADEP has approached the local government authorities through its leaders. Another way to voice the concerns of the rural community is through its internal media, Bulletin FAROL.

It has been identified that ETADEP, in order to maximize the impact of its role in promoting grassroots development has adopted the strategy of enhancing its network with other NGOs both local and national and international level. Another strategy was through strengthening of the local grassroots organisations and NGOs in order to ensure the sustainability of the outcomes of development.

This chapter has also identified that to achieve its goals ETADEP has encountered some problems specially when dealing with the donors and from its internal management and organisation of ETADEP.
NOTES:

1. These mission statements are written on ETADEP's brochure published in 1991. This brochure, though was published later, it has been used as an important means to introduce ETADEP programs.

2. In the rural or remote areas of East Timor, people still using kadoras. It is made of bamboo which serve as pipes to bring water from the mainstream to their houses.

3. According to Frans Taolin, an evaluator from LPIST (the Institution for Development of Strategic Initiatives for Transformation) in 1995, this attitude was inherited by the failure of the past development approach which was more output-oriented rather than process-oriented so that the people value 'development' in a materialistic view i.e. development has something very closely associated with money and goods (Taolin, F. 1995). The evaluation, therefore, argued that the major challenge in developing agroforestry in the future was how to change this perception, from money-oriented to process-oriented.

4. When I interviewed both Paulo Amaral, the director of Yayasan Halarae, and Augusto Goncalves, the director of Yayasan Raimaran, both admitted that ETADEP had supported and facilitated them in the process of founding their organisations.

5. Being a member of the credit unions, I observed that the topics in the debate and discussion revolved not only around Credit Union matters, but also issues concerning people's daily life problems, such as how to live economically. The members were very enthusiastic they were given the chance to speak out their concerns in the group discussions.

6. I interviewed Aleixo da Cruz, the co-ordinator of East Timor NGO Forum. He used to work with as the co-ordinator of ETADEP-USAID program since 1987. He left ETADEP in 1995 to join another local NGO in Dili, East Timor. He is very critical on ETADEP's management and leadership.

7. I interviewed Gilman dos Santos, the director of ETADEP in December 1999. He also emphasized the different approaches by the donors and admitted the flexibility of each provided by each donors. For ETADEP USAID and KAS are still considered as the big donors.

8. The director of ETADEP was appointed by the Governor of East Timor to lead this forum which involves various NGOs and institutions in East Timor. The main concern of this forum is to deal with environmental issues in East Timor.

9. I interviewed Augusto Goncalves. He is a rural activist who has closely worked with ETADEP in promoting Credit Union programs successfully in the areas around Loeis Valley, Liquica district. In 1998, supported by ETADEP he managed to establish a local NGO, Yayasan Raimaran with the focus on agroforestry.

10. ETADEP has a well designed plan for evaluations as a mechanism control for its activities every month. Regular meetings at the management level to discuss the problems in the field were frequently delayed due to many uncertain reasons. Many staff and target groups complained about this situation.
CHAPTER FIVE

A TENTATIVE TYPOLOGY FOR ETADEP

Although ETADEP has engaged in various community development programs, there have no attempts yet to classify ETADEP's activities into a scheme of NGO typology. This section will, therefore, construct a tentative typology for ETADEP which can serve as basis for a better understanding of ETADEP's role in the development context of East Timor. This chapter will first address the problems associated with the lack of classification faced by ETADEP and based on this a typology scheme is developed adopting the descriptors by the relevant authors' scheme of NGO-typology discussed in the literature review.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Undoubtedly, at a conceptual level, ETADEP has embedded the four defining characteristics i.e. voluntary, independent, not-for-profit, and not self-serving, to be categorised as an NGO in this context of discussion. I will argue that defining ETADEP as an NGO, the fourth defining characteristic (not self-serving) is of central importance to the aims and values of ETADEP. This implies that ETADEP is not serving the self-interests of members, but are concerned, in one way or another, with disadvantage and/or the disadvantaged, or with concerns and issues which are detrimental to the well-being, circumstances or prospects of people or society as a whole in East Timor.

In a 1993 workshop held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, ETADEP formulated eight core values as reference point of its development programs. These principles were independence, non-sectarian, social justice, self-reliance, developing human resources, ecological concerns, principles of local institution development, and equality between men and women (The Strategic Planning of ETADEP Foundation 1993). These principles serve as basis for ETADEP's inclusion as an NGO according to the four defining characteristics of an NGO (see Appendix 5).

Although ETADEP's core values define it as an NGO, in practice this seems not to be how it sometimes defined itself. My experience with ETADEP reveals that one of the major questions among the staff was how to identify themselves distinctively in relation to other organisations in the context of development in East Timor.
Subsequently, ETADEP had identified itself with different attributes within different situations. Although this floating strategy may have confused many people, in fact it was an effective and risk-free strategy for survival. In the context of East Timor situation where the political atmosphere was unpredictable and unfavourable this strategy seems to work. In addition to this situation, ETADEP has identified itself in four different attributes, which are 'East Timor Agricultural Development Program,' 'East Timor Association for Development and Progress,' 'Ema Mata Dalan ba Progressu,' 'East Timor Action for Development and Progress.'

Firstly, ETADEP initially identified itself as the *East Timor Agricultural Development Program* which shows its closeness to its origin with CRS. In fact that during the first four years, ETADEP's activities were mainly to continue and to complement the agricultural projects inherited from CRS. Only later did ETADEP start to develop new strategies of grassroots development. This situation, however, created confusion among the local people in terms of how to distinguish ETADEP as a separate entity from CRS. It was common that, for example, many people still address ETADEP as a component of the agricultural program of CRS.²

Secondly, ETADEP was also known as *East Timor Association for Development and Progress*. It was adopted basically to identify itself to external partners specifically in relation to international agencies, donors, etc from overseas and also to facilitate the networking of ETADEP.

Thirdly, ETADEP is known as *Ema Mata Dalan ba Progressu* which means *guide for development*. This identity was adopted as the legal name for ETADEP through the act of foundation. Though it was forcibly abbreviated to suit to the original name ETADEP (East Timor Agricultural Development Program), it was commonly used for ETADEP's administration and correspondence. Additionally, this also identifies ETADEP as a local, indigenous NGO.

The fourth identity is *East Timor Action for Development and Progress*. Though it was never used formally it came up many times in discussions among staff and NGOs to show the desire of ETADEP to be play a wider or ideal role in promoting grassroots development in East Timor. The word 'action' however implicitly denotes the desire of ETADEP to pursue a more challenging role in advocacy, empowerment and democracy rather than complementing the role of the state (involved in community development programs).
The above outlines the problem of self-identification faced by ETADEP. The difficulty in identifying itself has affected ETADEP’s performance, especially in the orientation of ETADEP’s development programs. For other agencies or ETADEP’s partners, failing to identify ETADEP properly will lead to failure in the transfer of knowledge and technology or resources. Being incapable of identifying which type of NGOs suitable for delivering resources in a right situation has led to failure in the implementation of programs. The failure of USAID in fostering advocacy programs through ETADEP in East Timor was an example of the lack of understanding of what type of NGO ETADEP belongs to in the context of development in East Timor. ETADEP was forced to adopt new strategies of change which was not compatible with either ETADEP’s capability or the situation of East Timor. Therefore, establishing ETADEP’s place as an NGO will be important in order to avoid the same mistake in the future. The following scheme of typology will put stress on certain relevant descriptors of typology.

THE ORIENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Classifying NGOs in terms of its orientation will refer to the type of activities that they are engaged in. NGOs’ activities can be subdivided into six categories: (a) welfare, (b) development, (c) advocacy, (d) development education, (e) networking and (e) research (Vakil 1997:2063). It should be noted that this sub-division is only applicable to the context of this discussion because many NGOs may be multi-functional or they can have more than one orientation. In relation to the above categories, ETADEP may be fitted well into some categories especially in terms of welfare, development, advocacy and networking. Since 1987 has involved ETADEP’s in a range of development activities which is relevant to this classification though with different focus.

Korten (1990) described welfare-oriented NGOs as delivering services to specific groups based on the charity model. He refers to them as first generation NGOs or as NGOs involved activities in the first stage of development which are aimed at providing basic needs of the poor -- often in response to disaster or war (Korten 1990:115).
ETADEP may fit this category in relation to its evolution from CRS, which was involved primarily in relief work. In fact, reports and evaluations of ETADEP’s program during the four years of transition from CRS to ETADEP (1987-1991) reveal that practices of the charity model were still evident until. The main strategies of ETADEP’s programs at the earlier stages were to maintain and continue the basic programs inherited by CRS such as agriculture, livestock distribution, water supplies with the intention to satisfy people’s immediate basic needs.

Specifically, ETADEP is relevant classified as a development-oriented NGO based on its strategies adopted for its community development programs. Being in this category, ETADEP belongs to the group of NGOs, according to Eade and Williams (1995:9), that have as their ultimate goal to enhance the capacity-building of a community in order to meet its own basic needs. The description of ETADEP’s programs indicates that ETADEP has directed all of its development programs towards the goal of promoting people’s self-reliance and capacity building, specifically through the strategies of strengthening the local, grassroots organisations and NGOs.

In addition, ETADEP can also be categorised as “LSM Pembangunan” or development-oriented NGO according to Phillip Eldridge’s typology on Indonesian NGOs. This type of NGO involves mainly in conventional community development programs such as irrigation, drinking water, health care, agriculture, animal husbandry, handicrafts and other income generating activities (Eldridge 1988). ETADEP’s involvement in community development projects such as rural drinking water, agriculture, animal husbandry has included ETADEP in this category.

In line with David Korten’s most quoted classification, the evolution of NGOs which he termed the ‘four generations of development NGOs,’ ETADEP can be placed in the second generation of development NGOs. This implies that ETADEP has been involved in promoting local self-reliance and involved in long-term development work or capacity-building, with the intent that benefits would be sustained beyond the period of NGO assistance (Korten 1987:118). However, based on this category it remains clear that during the period of time ETADEP has not significantly advanced beyond this stage of development to another stage that is to the second generation of development NGOs.³

Moreover, NGOs can also be classified in terms of its advocacy-oriented activities. NGOs of this type will be involved in influencing policy or decision-making related to particular issues and building social support both among like-minded organisations as well as in the wider population (Vakil 1997:2063). This orientation is
involved in the larger institutional and policy context. The NGOs attempt to affect development or participation in the process of policy formation by governments and multilateral organisations (Korten 1987:148).

Involvement in advocacy has been a goal of many Indonesian NGOs, including ETADEP since the beginning. The adoption of the identity: East Timor Action for Development and Progress indicates ETADEP’s advocacy role. Even though in reality ETADEP’s advocacy programs were not transparent due to the difficult political context for development in East Timor, there were, however, attempts to actuate in this area. ETADEP’s leaders had approached the government with the hopes of shaping decision-making, concerning development issues at the grassroots level. Another example of ETADEP’s advocacy role was through the publication, FAROL Bulletin. This media has been used as an effective channel to voice and raise grassroots peoples’ concerns and needs to the local government. Therefore, in this context, ETADEP can be fitted into the category of an advocacy-oriented NGO.

Realising the effectiveness of building networks to shape its role in promoting grassroots development, ETADEP has established links with other NGOs and organisations. ETADEP’s wide networking allows it to be fitted into this category of networking-oriented NGO. According to the classification by Vakil (1997), networking-oriented NGOs are those NGOs operating at the national and regional level that channel information and provide technical and other assistance to NGOs on a lower level and to individuals. They can also function as bridging NGOs (Vakil 1997:2063).

LEVEL OF OPERATION

Apart from the orientation descriptors, NGOs can be classified in terms of their scale of operations. NGOs work at different levels and on different scales. Some are international, in that their work extends beyond one country. Others are national or regional (serving one region within a country) in their scope. Then there are local NGOs which work within defined small geographical areas.

The scope of ETADEP’s operation, in this context, is defined through its wide coverage which targets rural people or beneficiaries covering almost all the thirteen districts of East Timor. This coverage was initially concentrated in the three main areas or districts around the Loes Valley (i.e. district of Liquica, Ermera and Maliana) but
since 1990 it has expanded through other districts on the eastern part of East Timor. Moreover, the main targets of ETADEP’s development programs were the rural villages which included different groups within the village level. From this point of view, I will argue ETADEP is classified as *local or rural community-based NGO* justifying the notion of classification according to Esman and Uphoff (1984). This category places ETADEP as being area-based which through its development programs bringing people together within the rural community or region to promote its development by self-help.

**MAIN FORMS OF CONTROL**

The increasing diversity of the activities and organisational types of NGOs has led to a situation where they operate and are registered and incorporated in a wide variety of legal forms. In addition, NGOs take many different organisational forms. The words used to describe them include "private voluntary organisation (PVO), non-profit organisation, not-for-profit organisation," etc. From the welter of descriptive language - which is confusing to many - two principal forms of NGO can be distinguished. Private NGOs which are controlled privately and independently by their founders and participatory NGOs which have a more democratic structure in that they are controlled by bodies elected by, or otherwise representative of, their membership.

Legally, as stated in the Act of Foundation, ETADEP adopted the organisational form of *yayasan* which was commonly adopted by Indonesia’s NGOs because of its flexibility. In this perspective ETADEP can be classified as a *private NGO*. However, the organisation form adopted by the nine ETADEP’s founders, as indicated in the identification of ETADEP’ internal management problems, in fact did not provide any space for a democratic organisation to exist. ETADEP’s founders had full control over the management, mobilisation of resources etc and the mechanism of control was almost non-existent. It has been one of the major problems frequently complained by the staff which has caused many to resign from ETADEP.

**LINKS WITH DONORS**

Another relevant descriptor of NGO-typology is the link between NGOs and their donors. This relation is described as not beneficial for NGOs because it creates
dependency for NGOs as they rely on these donors in order to survive. It is a common occurrence that NGOs are controlled by the donors. In addition to this situation, different forms of organisations emerged in form of "Bongos (Business-organised NGOs), Pongos (Political NGOs), Dongos (Donor-organised NGOs)" (The Commonwealth Foundation Report 1996). These are examples of other organisations which are formed by, and/or under, the direction of other organisations which are not NGOs, such as private business, political parties, funders, and also religious proselytising groups. These latter are the subject of concern in a number of countries.

In line with the above framework of thought, ETADEP may be categorised as a Donor-oriented NGO. The first reason for this is that originally ETADEP was established in order to continue the agricultural projects inherited by CRS which was under the USAID scheme. This, however, automatically indicates the control over ETADEP by its donors since the beginning. Besides, based on the description of ETADEP's performance and its relation with donors ETADEP was highly dependent on external funds for surviving in its development programs. Another example can be identified from the design of ETADEP's organisational structure which clearly shows its focus or orientation to the donors. The organisational structure though has varied into some extent but it was basically designed to satisfy the needs of the donors as the following chart shows.

Chart 1. The General Organisational Structure of ETADEP 1993

[Diagram of the organisational structure of ETADEP 1993 showing the hierarchy from Director to Program Units for USAID, CIDA, KAS, and AIDAB programs.]

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SUMMARY

This section has addressed the main problems and the relevance associated with the construction of tentative typology for ETADEP. The typology is developed based on four essential descriptors i.e. orientation of development activities, scope of operation, main forms of control and its links with donors. It is important to realise that in the context of development in East Timor it is not an easy to put ETADEP into a watertight typology. Thus, this scheme of typology has placed ETADEP into a scheme of multi-type of NGOs based on the fact that ETADEP was involved in multifunctional tasks ranging from relief to change in promoting grassroots development. However, comparatively speaking, in terms of focus and scale of its programs and taken into account the political context of East Timor, ETADEP is more appropriate to be categorised as a development-oriented NGO.
NOTES:

1. In September 1993 ETADEP conducted a Strategic Planning Workshop in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to formulate the long term development strategy for next ten years. This workshop which involved all donors and ETADEP's partners was meant as forum to respond the challenges faced by ETADEP in East Timor.

2. I have observed that many rural people especially those from the Loes Valley, District of Liquica who previously benefited from CRS programs preferred to address ETADEP as CRS. There are also some staffs that still find it difficult to differentiate between ETADEP and CRS. Some still believe that ETADEP is a component of CRS program.

3. In his category of four generations of development NGOs, Korten claims that one type of involvement leads on to the next, and this can be seen historically in the evolution of NGO development work. Many development NGOs began in response to a pressing human catastrophe or crisis, and their activities moved from one generation to the next as their understanding of complexities of development issues and problems became more sophisticated (Korten 1990:127).

4. I found out through my interviews with many staffs and leaders of other NGOs argued that ETADEP's leaders, especially the chairman of the foundation used its personal capacities to approach the local government. This attitude they saw as an effective way to actuate ETADEP's role in advocacy due to the context development in East Timor.

5. I build up this organisational structure to illustrate or summarise the general trend of ETADEP's organisational structures design which is basically donor oriented. There was no significant change in the structure since the beginning of ETADEP's establishment. Instead, the main idea was the same that is to accommodate the needs of the donors. The program design was more sectoral and donor-based rather than integrated. Each donor was treated as separate units within the structure.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to answer its central question: "What is the role of ETADEP in the context of development of East Timor?" by arranging the ideas following this structure. It starts by setting the scene or stage (chapter 1, 2, 3) and then within the boundaries of this scene or stage that the role of ETADEP is assessed and asserted. Following this structure the study has addressed the following points:

- In general, this study has addressed the importance of understanding the role of NGOs as alternative development agents in promoting development nowadays from their historical roots. NGOs have emerged to satisfy the current new needs and concerns in development work within a spectrum of activities ranging from relief to change and development, from challenging and complementing the role of state. NGOs have outstanding characteristics and strengths that make them unique in comparison to the state or other institutions in civil society.

- This study has pointed out the relevance of understanding the role of NGOs, ETADEP in the specific context of East Timor where the political situation or atmosphere was the predominant factor affecting the work of NGOs. It is also argued that, in principle, there is recognition by East Timorese leadership and community for NGOs’ participation in the future development of East Timor. The case of ETADEP as an experienced local NGO in East Timor may serve as a model of NGO to be developed in the future.

- At theoretical level, this study has underlined that the role of NGOs should be judged in line with the framework of the emergence of new perspectives in development practice. It has been argued that NGOs are regarded as catalysts of 'development-from-below' through the approaches such as: small is beautiful, target the poor, urban bias, appropriate technology and participation and empowerment approaches. Among these approaches participation and empowerment have been the dominant jargon adopted by NGOs.

- In addition, this study argues that defining and classifying the NGO sector is not an easy question due to the existing inconsistencies by different authors with different schemes. Therefore, based on various authors’ schemes, this study has
built up a tentative definition and classification or typology scheme to suit this specific discussion. The definition is based on the main four characteristic i.e. voluntary, independent, not-for-profit, and not-self-serving. The tentative typology is based on four main descriptors such as: descriptors i.e. orientation of development activities, scope of operation, organisational attributes and its links with donors.

• The effectiveness of NGOs work, especially in the Third World countries’ context, can be judged by the nature of their relationship with their dominant governments or state and donors. This study argues that due to external and internal forces, the legitimacy and accountability of NGOs have been put into question in terms of assessing the performance of NGOs in the process of development.

Having set up these boundaries for assessing NGOs in global context in the previous chapters, this study then assesses the specific context of development in East Timor to satisfy the first objective of this study: To assess the existing development situation of East Timor as the predominant issue which compromise the role of NGOs in East Timor in the following points:

• An analysis of East Timor political background has suggested that the unresolved political status of East Timor has prevented NGOs from operating optimally in East Timor. It is the by-product of Portuguese colonisation and the prolonged process of decolonization. Since then it has remained as the predominant issue affecting development process conducted by Indonesia during its two decades of occupation in East Timor. Thus, all the policies and strategies of development adopted by Indonesia have been for the sake of justifying its de facto illegal occupation. By introducing development strategies in East Timor, Indonesia basically aimed at integrating East Timorese into its own development.
This study also argues that any change for development in East Timor can only happen if there is a change at the political level. In fact, though Indonesia has forced its development policies during the two decades of occupation, the East Timorese people have constantly rejected it. The constant resistance against the occupation which has led to constant human rights abuses by the military have, however, created an unstable or unfavourable atmosphere for the development to take place.

Therefore, within this unfavourable situation, the study has, however, identified four major chances for NGOs' intervention in East Timor development. These chances are identified in terms of: the policies adopted by the government i.e. the opening of East Timor; the flow financial support by donors to the eastern part of Indonesia (Go East Policy); the potential partners such as the Catholic Church of East Timor and the local government; and the legal recognition of NGOs' role by Indonesian authorities.

After assessing the situation and identifying the chances for NGOs in development context of East Timor, the study assesses and asserts the role of ETADEP in the framework of this context (to satisfy the second objective of this study: To assert the role of ETADEP as the local NGO in the context of development in East Timor) in the following points:

- Initially ETADEP was established in 1987 to continue and maintain the work of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) which focused on relief work. ETADEP's closeness to its origin can be justified by its name 'ETADEP' which was actually derived from the name of CRS' agriculture component program 'East Timor Agricultural Development Programme'. Being an extension from its origin has created some problems for ETADEP in terms of its pursuing its orientation and operation of the programs, especially during its first years of transition from CRS to ETADEP.

- It has been identified that though within its limitations and operating in an unfavourable atmosphere, ETADEP has directed all of its programs to the ideas of development-from-below i.e. participation, self-reliance, empowerment on the grassroots community. ETADEP has been involved in programs of improving socio-economical life at the grassroots level in the framework of integrated rural community development programs such as water projects,
animal husbandry, agriculture, pre-cooperatives, credit unions and agroforestry. Through these programs ETADEP has also applied or introduced new approaches or models of development at the grassroots level in East Timor.

In addition, in order to achieve its goals in promoting grassroots development in the development context of East Timor, ETADEP has functioned as:

- **The facilitator** of development aimed at improving the socio-economic welfare of the rural community. This role is verified through its main community development programs such as: water supply, pre-cooperatives, animal husbandry, agriculture, UBs, Credit Unions and agroforestry programs. In this case, ETADEP provides various inputs by assisting the target groups in terms of provision facilities, capital, materials, training, etc so that they can be self-reliant.

- **The communicator** between the local government, donors and the local community and between the local communities. It has been assessed through the bridging and advocacy role taken by ETADEP in raising issues concerning rural people’s needs and vice versa by maximizing its networks. Bulletin FAROL is one example of this role.

- The **embryo for NGOs and grassroots organisations** in East Timor. The strategy of strengthening local organisations has been relevant to preserve or to sustain the development outputs at the grassroots level. ETADEP has succeeded in strengthening new NGOs from the grassroots organisation it assisted. There are four NGOs already established and those target groups (credit unions) can potentially be NGOs in the future.

- **The catalyst of innovations and participatory development approaches.** ETADEP has pioneered the application of Participatory Rural Appraisal and other participatory approaches in designing and implementation of its development programs, such as agroforestry, water projects and credit unions, etc. In the context of East Timor these approaches are considered relatively innovative and participatory as they have never been implemented or applied before.

This study has also identified some general issues and problems which might have prevented ETADEP from achieving its goals optimally by addressing the following points:
This study has outlined that ETADEP has taken different approaches to the Three Pillars (the local Government, Military and the Church) to ensure the effectiveness of its development programs in East Timor. ETADEP always needed recognition by the local government and military for its work in the community. The involvement of government in ETADEP programs can verifiable on the cutting of the ribbon or in the inauguration of the projects. The Church, on the contrary, has been the main partner of ETADEP where ETADEP should rely on as an intermediate institution for implementing its programs.

In relation to the donors, there is an indication that ETADEP has been heavily dependent on donors assistance in order to sustain its programs. This, however, has raised a serious question for the sustainability of ETADEP's programs in the future. Besides, the findings of the study indicates there was a tendency that donors agencies had a strong intervention in the decision-making of ETADEP's programs. This situation forced ETADEP to act, in one hand, according to donors' needs but, on the other hand, ETADEP should confront with donors when there was a threat for ETADEP's survival when dealing with the unfavourable situation.

This study has also revealed that there were serious problems in ETADEP's internal management has led to the stagnation of ETADEP's programs. It was evident constant criticism from staff regarding the lack of management, organisation and leadership of ETADEP has prevented it to optimise the use of its resources. Subsequently, ETADEP has become merely a training ground for its staffs before they left to work with other institutions, as ETADEP could not assure their future.

Having asserted the role and identified the problems associated with it, the study in order to provide a better understanding on ETADEP's role, constructs a tentative typology for ETADEP (to satisfy the third objective this study) in the following points:

- The study has identified that ETADEP has multiple identities due to its incapability to identify itself properly in such a situation. However, the study argues that ETADEP has embedded the four defining characteristics to be considered as an NGO in this context.
- The tentative typology is developed based on four main essential descriptors i.e. orientation of activities, scope of operation, main forms of control and its links
with donors. This scheme, therefore, has placed ETADEP into a multiple scheme typology. However, comparatively speaking, in terms of focus and scale of ETADEP's programs, it is more appropriate to categorise ETADEP as a development-oriented NGO.

Above all, a general conclusion can be drawn that within the existing constraints ETADEP has attempted to contribute to the process of improving socio-economic welfare of the rural community through the strategy of strengthening local self-reliance groups and grassroots organisations in order to achieve a sustainable development in East Timor.

Finally, due to uncertainties in the future development of East Timor, I should argue that this study does not attempt to provide any concrete recommendations for ETADEP's future actions. It makes sense in fact that the newly independent East Timor is facing a new development perspective which is more likely different from the context ETADEP used to be involved. This different setting of scene or stage will, of course, demand different roles to play. However, it is still relevant to consider the significant role of NGOs in the future development of East Timor. The case of ETADEP may serve as a model to be developed in the future.
### Appendix 1.

#### The Acronyms of NGO pretenders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRINGO</td>
<td>An NGO which is no more than a briefcase carrying a well written proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefcase NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComeN'GO</td>
<td>An NGO that appears spasmodically: only used by the owners when the NGO pasture looks greener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come and Go NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGO</td>
<td>NGOs set up by business in order to participate in bids, help win contracts, and reduce taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRINGO</td>
<td>Organisation established for illegal purposes, especially import-export (i.e. smuggling); common in transition economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONGO</td>
<td>Created and owned by donors to do their job while shifting overhead costs outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Organized NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANGO</td>
<td>NGO used as a front for something else; not uncommon in Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONGO</td>
<td>Type of GRINGO used to capture or redirect non-profit funds allocated by the official aid system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-Owned NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRINGO</td>
<td>Variation of a Quango, but with the function of countering the actions of real NGOs; common in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government-Run &amp; Initiated NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANGO</td>
<td>A criminal NGO providing services of the money laundering, enforcement and protection variety: prevalent in Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafia NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONGO</td>
<td>An NGO which is the personal property of an individual, often dominated by his or her ego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Own NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGI</td>
<td>A person who operates as if he or she is an NGO but without an organisational affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Governmental Individual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANGO</td>
<td>An aspiring, defeated or banned political party or politician dressed as an NGO; species of Central Asia and Indo-China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHANGO</td>
<td>NGO existing only in the mind of the speaker; used to bolster an argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phantom NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PONGO</td>
<td>Established to capture or direct NGO funding to home constituency as a defence against incursion by opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician's NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANGO</td>
<td>Para-state body set up by government as an NGO, often to enable better conditions of service or create a political distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2.
The Map of East Timor

Source: Map No. 4111 Rev. 4. UNITED NATIONS, Department of Public Information Cartographic Section
November 1999.
Appendix 3.

List of NGOs Working in East Timor

1. Yayasan ETADEP (Ema Mata Dalan ba Progressu)
2. Yayasan Biahula (local NGO, focused on water programs)
3. Yayasan HAK (Local NGO, Human rights and Justice)
4. CARE Timor Timur (Branch or representative office)
5. CARITAS Timor Timur (Branch or representative office)
6. Yayasan Bina Sejahtera Lestari
7. Yayasan Bina Swadaya Dili
8. Yayasan Bina Swadaya Ambeno
9. Yayasan Dian Desa Tintim
10. Komisi Keadilan dan Perdamaian
11. USC-Canada East Timor
12. Yayasan Rai Maran* (local NGO)
13. Yayasan Rai matak (local NGO)
14. Yayasan Halarae *(local NGO)
15. Yayasan Balibo Sejahtera (local NGO)
16. Yayasan Hati Kudus Yesus (Church related organisation)
17. Yayasan Naroman (Church related organisation)
18. Yayasan Sao Jose (Church related organisation)
19. Yayasan Santo Yosef (Church related organisation)
20. Yayasan Cahaya Kasih Rosario (Church related organisation)
21. Yayasan Leno Dalan ba Povo* (local NGO)
22. Puskodit Hanai Malu* (Local NGO)
23. Yayasan MICARD (Local NGO)
24. Yayasan Hanoin Ema Kiik (Local NGO)
25. Yayasan Pencinta Kaum wanita (local NGO)
26. Yayasan Serafim (Local NGO)
27. World Vision Indonesia – Aileu (Representative)
28. Yayasan Canossa (Church related organisation)
29. Yayasan Dom Carlos(Church related organisation)
30. Yayasan Dom Bosco (Church related organisation)
31. Yayasan Santo Paulus (Church related organisation)
32. Yayasan Wiraswasta Tani (Puslawita) (Church related organisation)
33. Yayasan OTAS * (local NGO)
34. Delegatus Sosial (Delsos) Dili (Church related organisation)

* These NGOs are closely affiliated with ETADEP in terms of their foundation and operations.

Source: Compiled from various sources of both government statistics and ETADEP's files in December 1998.
Appendix 4.

The List of NGOs and Institutions as Partners of ETADEP Outside of East Timor.

1. United State Agency for International Development (USAID), American Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia
2. Australian International Development Agency Bureau (AIDAB), Australian Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia
3. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Representative Office in Jakarta, Indonesia
4. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canadian Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia
5. YLKI-Jakarta, Indonesia
6. Lembaga Pengembang Inisiatif Strategis untuk Transformasi (LPIST)-Jakarta, Indonesia
7. Badan Koordinasi Koperasi Kredit Indonesia (BK3I) -Jakarta, Indonesia
8. ELSAM, Jakarta, Indonesia
9. LPPS-KWI, Indonesia
10. USC-Canada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
11. International Forum for Indonesia Development) INFID Jakarta, Indonesia
12. YPPM Alfa Omega, Kupang, NTT, Indonesia
13. Balai Penelitian GETAS, Jakarta, Indonesia
14. Yayasan Bina Darma, Jakarta, Indonesia
15. YPMD Irian Jaya, Indonesia
16. YIS, Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera, Solo, Indonesia
17. Yayasan Tananua, NTT, Indonesia
18. Yayasan HAUMENI, NTT, Indonesia
19. Yayasan Hijau Indonesia (YAHI)
20. Winrock International, Kupang, Indonesia
21. World Neighbours, Bali, Indonesia
22. CRS, Jakarta, Indonesia

Source: Compiled from various sources of ETADEP's correspondence files in December 1998
## Appendix 5

### VALUES AND PRINCIPLES OF ETADEP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Non sectarian</th>
<th>Realising social justice</th>
<th>Realising self-reliance</th>
<th>Human resources development</th>
<th>Realising ecological orientation</th>
<th>Realising the development of local institutions</th>
<th>Realising equality of women and men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taking influential persons as members, but not in their quality as representative of institutions or groups</td>
<td>Non affiliation to certain religion</td>
<td>Given priority to the needs and aspiration of the less well-off (poor) common people</td>
<td>Urging community participation in decision making</td>
<td>Realising professionalism</td>
<td>Developing environment oriented community</td>
<td>Establishing co-operation with several parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non affiliation to certain ethnic groups</td>
<td>Non affiliation to certain ethnic groups</td>
<td>Final target group: community levels having less access to resources</td>
<td>Giving priority to the use of local sources</td>
<td>Respecting local values</td>
<td>Giving priority to local human resources</td>
<td>Realising sustainable development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non affiliation to political organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Realising inter-community solidarity</td>
<td>Strengthening self-financial capacity</td>
<td>Realising an open and democratic management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report on the Strategic Planning Workshop of ETADEP Foundation (Annex 9)
Yogyakarta - Indonesia, September 10 – 12, 1993. INFODOK, ETADEP
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