Reflexivity in psychology:
Practices and performances

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University

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ABSTRACT - This thesis is an inquiry into practices of reflexivity in psychology. It starts from a recognition of the difficulties in defining such a concept and proceeds to examine ways by which psychologists conceive and construct reflexivity. It utilises a methodology by which reflexivity can be understood and subsequent analysis reveals coarticulating discourses acting to produce reflexivity. Such discourses are themselves construed as a 'new resource', and consequently are used for critical analysis in order to reveal reflexivity 'at work'. This thesis maintains a concern with its own status as thesis, psychological text, work, with reflexive performance acknowledged through different forms of textual expression. It attempts reflexive engagement within the topic rather than production as a treatise about reflexivity alone.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - This thesis took a long time to write, and I would like to thank the people who helped me complete the task.

Dr Mandy Morgan, my supervisor, has been supportive and encouraging throughout the process. Her dedication and professionalism allowed me to not only explore the various ways in which this topic might be approached, but also gave me the confidence to continue with, what seemed at times, an impossible task. She listened to my ideas, guided my thinking into heretofore unfamiliar realms, read innumerable drafts, and was always optimistic and respectful. She allowed space where she could have pushed for results, and from this space a thesis emerged. For her wise countenance I am forever grateful.

My gratitude goes also to Dr Keith Tuffin who not only encouraged me to pursue this topic but offered support and continuous faith in my abilities to complete the work.

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PREFACE - This is a progressive piece of work which can be read as a process. Written in the order that you find it, it attempts to demonstrate progression from 'naive explorer' to 'informed investigator'. The introduction is informed by initial reading, an attempted literature review, and work up to a particular point. It was written prior to a substantial change in direction. However, in order to demonstrate 'progression', it was deemed imprudent to alter the introduction by including new ideas developed along the way. Although it would be an interesting exercise, and it is tempting to adjust both the introduction and the first few chapters by incorporating new insights, such alterations would not only change the reader's experience of this work, but would also disrupt the development of reflexivity as a concept which can be understood through the work of the thesis.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this introduction is to prepare you for what lies ahead. It gives a brief explanation of how this work came to fruition as both a project and a process, and attempts to explain why this work takes the form that it does, and indeed, why, at this time, it could not have been done any other way (not by me anyway).

Deciding on a research topic for a Masterate thesis can seem more daunting and cause more angst than the preparation and writing of the work itself. We (the students) are warned about the criteria we should adhere to, and it is suggested that we would be wise to choose our topic carefully as our project will occupy the bulk of our time for at least 12 months. Above all, we are encouraged to choose something which interests us; to choose something which will be sufficiently interesting over a long period of time.

This thesis, which you are reading now, evolved after much agonising over many different and interesting areas of study. The topic finally came to fruition when I asked myself which area of psychology was I most excited about. What topic made me want to poke about, to find out, to query, and to think about what other writers were saying? Still having difficulty deciding I noticed how engrossed I became when recalling the work of Beryl C. Curt (1994).

Beryl was constructed through the collective labour of seven social psychologists, all based in the UK. In her text ‘she’ discusses a current ‘climate of problematisation’, and suggests that both ‘herself’, and other writers (eg. Ashmore 1985; Mulkay 1985; Gergen & Gergen 1988; Woolgar 1988b; Edwards & Potter 1992; Stainton Rogers & Stainton Rogers 1992a, cited in Curt, 1994), inspired by a critical “interest in and concern about the ‘social world’” (p.5), are engaged in taxing the boundaries of traditional academic thought and writing. In part Curt’s text explores the use of dialogue within the text. Proposed ideas are often questioned or clarified by an exchange between ‘Beryl’ as ‘author’, and a device known as the ‘interrupter’. For example, an exchange taking place in Beryl’s text may read something like this:

Interrupter: I hardly think you can inform readers of the essence of Beryl's work in just these few sentences, and by the way, I object to being called a ‘device’. I am a technique not a tool!!!
Author: Okay, point taken. I apologise profusely. And, I agree that a few
sentences would never be enough to describe Beryl's work. However, this thesis is neither about Beryl, nor her work. I am simply demonstrating how Beryl’s use of dialoguing attracted my interest. Interrupter: I think you may have just made up something called ‘dialoguing’. I’m not sure if you can do that without some kind of explanation. What do you think?

Author: I think you are steering me into an area that is not appropriate for the moment. You are supposed to be an example, not the prima donna of this thesis so please be quiet for now.

Another technique used by Curt, 'The Box', is very similar to that used by Edwards and Potter (1992). For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box A The Box</th>
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<td>In the text of Curt, and of Edwards and Potter, the box acts as a container for text set aside from the rest of the text. It is a place where the authors can make explanations, explain definitions, wax reflexively, and have a space in which to converse without interrupting the flow of the general text.</td>
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Both of these techniques allowed Curt to explore the text being written as it was being written. If points became obscure, or sounded authoritative without warrant, 'the interrupter', or 'the box' were available to the author for reflexive comment. This reflexive aspect of Curt's text caught my interest at the time of reading and when I recalled the work I couldn’t help but ask the question, how reflexive can you be?

Shortly thereafter I was reading a paper by Gill (1995) suggesting that we need to rethink our understanding of reflexivity. I began to wonder, could I look at reflexivity as a thesis topic? Thinking about it quite seriously, it suddenly seemed as though everybody was talking about it. People were being asked to be more reflexive in articles submitted for publication, students were asking, well, how do you do reflexivity anyway, lecturers were attempting to explain, but nobody seemed to know what it really was. My initial question expanded to include: what do people mean when they say 'reflexivity', or 'being reflexive'?), what is reflexivity ‘really’?; what is it not?; is it anything?; how does it work?; what are psychologists saying it is?; does the way authors position themselves in discussions about reflexivity have an effect upon reflexivity?
I still wondered whether 'reflexivity' was important enough to be considered as a topic for a masterate thesis. I wondered whether it had genuine significance, and, whether there was any serious debate about reflexivity among esteemed writers in psychology? My wonderings were ill-founded. As I read in the area, I noticed that reflexivity is considered a problem, and to my surprise, not a current problem. Reflexivity has been a problem for quite some time (eg. Oliver & Landfield 1962; Bannister 1977; Lawson 1985; Potter & Wetherall 1987; Lather 1988; Wilkinson 1988; Potter 1988; Gill 1995). I noticed that other disciplines took the issue of reflexivity seriously (Crick 1982; Lawson 1985; Woolgar 1988; Ashmore 1989; Steier 1991), and that in recent years, in psychology, reflexivity has generated intensive debate (Wilkinson 1988; Potter 1988; Henwood & Parker 1994; Henwood & Pidgeon 1994; Parker 1994; Smith 1994; Reicher 1994). Furthermore it was being suggested in some circles that psychology could not do without reflexivity, and that it was necessary, for the future of the discipline, to address it and to use it (Bannister 1981; Wilkinson 1988; Gergen 1991; Burman & Parker 1993; Curt 1994; Gill 1995).

The 'ability of reflexivity' to generate so much literature indicated, to me, that it may qualify as a thesis topic and I was so pleased when my supervisor agreed with me, because by now I was keenly interested. My objective had become to look closely at reflexivity; to try and establish its characteristics; how to do it; and in particular to see what psychologists were saying about reflexivity, and what this might mean. I was ready to begin in earnest. I gleefully plunged into the delightful array of reflexive thought and text I had gathered around me and very soon came to a grinding halt amid much confusion. The literature is indeed a delightful array, a delightfully different array: reflexivity always seems to be just out of reach and forever elusive; it is talked about as meaning one thing, and then talked about as meaning another; people seem to talk about reflexivity, after suggesting that they are doing reflexivity; people do reflexivity, and don't talk about it, so you're not sure if it is reflexivity or not; reflexivity is objectified\(^1\), and in

\(^1\) I ask for forbearance from readers of any criticism of my own objectification of reflexivity at this stage of the text. At this time I was not writing directly on the subject and although I was gaining some insight into the difficulties of writing 'about' 'reflexivity' I wasn't fully aware of the problems in approaching 'reflexivity' as a central theme. I am aware now that I have objectified 'it' myself, not only through pronoun use, but also by naming, eg. 'being reflexive', 'reflexivity'. At this stage I know of no other way to discuss 'reflexivity' so that the text is accessible to readers, other than allowing 'it' to be seen as 'the object' of discussion. As the work continues so may this objectification of 'reflexivity'.
some cases reified, which seems somehow, not useful; it is turned into a tool, and consequently seems to no longer be 'reflexivity', but it is still called by that name.

Such confusion. When reading some texts I found myself wading through jargon and having difficulty negotiating exactly what writers were saying; with other texts I felt compelled to comment, even while sometimes feeling slightly in awe of writers' apparent grasp of their subject. I was having an interesting time as I engaged with these works. Many thoughts about language, objectification, reification, positioning, post-modernism and structuralism came to mind as I tried to work out how to write up this most interesting topic in a way that would be useful to me, and useful to readers, and in a way that might express how reflexivity was affecting my life and my thoughts about psychology. It became quite a struggle as I became more and more convinced that most of the authors I was reading were masters of their field fully immersed and conversant with their material. Their writings seemed articulate and well-rehearsed. They spoke with authority and conviction. They seemed to know what they were talking about, and as a reader trying to engage with their text I sometimes felt inadequate, and doubted that I was up to the task.

Yet, I remained puzzled. I was engaging with writers who were discussing reflexivity with authority and conviction, however I wondered how they could maintain, or have, this 'authority over reflexivity'. My readings so far seemed to indicate that reflexivity might have a number of different meanings. How did these writers decide so convincingly about a concept that seemed, to me, to be almost impossible to grasp?

I began to wonder why I thought of their texts as authorities, and where my feelings of inadequacy might be coming from. I wondered what this might mean about my relationship with their text. It seemed that I was placing myself in a subordinate position to their authoritative position. They were the masters and I was the student.

I reminded myself that I was in the process of researching and writing a masterate thesis. By all accounts in a few months time I may be awarded the distinction of Master. Would this distinction mean that I also could speak with authority? Did it mean that I could begin to speak with authority now? I very much doubted whether the title of Master would make me any more authoritative than I was now. However I remained aware that I was still
placed in relationship to the texts of these writers, and that seeing myself as a mere student was preventing me from fully engaging with the texts.

As I thought more about this problem I began to realise that my entire interaction with my research material was exactly that - an interactive relationship, and ongoing process whereby the text I read 'spoke' to me, and I 'spoke' back to the text. In effect, we were in conversation. Engaging with positions of authority or subordination was not necessarily useful. Although I remained aware that I was/am a student, and that the texts I was/am conversing with are written by writers with more experience in this field than myself, it became clear that I could not afford to subordinate myself and de-value my response, if I wanted a full engagement. I was myself in the process of a student transcending to 'master' and what I needed to do to make this transition was to fully engage with the texts I was reading, and understand that from my position as transcending student, my thoughts and my comments had their own validity, and could be allied with the thoughts and comments of the authors I was reading.

It was an understanding of the interactive relationship that allowed me to see this work as both a project and a process. Named as a masterate thesis and as a piece of research which asks questions, the work is a project. The project cannot come to fruition without a process of engagement. The process of engagement involves my interaction with the texts of others, and a transition from student to master as I engage with these texts.

My usual procedure in this type of interaction, that is, in reading the texts of others is: thinking aloud or in my head; making notes; jotting down questions; allowing, or noticing streams of consciousness and where they might go; enjoying this sense of interaction as the words of others evoke words of my own. This interactive process is then translated so that it is suitable as a finished assignment, journal article, or, as in this case, a masterate thesis. I would suggest that during this translation reflexive elements of thought may become lost. A finished product does not necessarily include elements which may have influenced the final product. However, it may be, erroneously, assumed that a final product speaks as an authoritative representative of a discipline. I wonder whether psychology as a discipline can afford to ignore this translation process without sustaining some consequences in doing so. It seems that psychology has always been
about locating, or identifying fundamental processes or mechanisms that will allow prediction of human behaviour (Gergen & Gergen, 1984), yet psychologists have largely ignored the primary process of translation taking place within the discipline itself. This seems irresponsible. A discipline implementing tools to facilitate prediction of human conduct and translating findings into authoritative texts is in danger of becoming a controlling and powerful icon. Such a discipline must allow resource to questioning its own ideals and foundations, plus resources to question such ideals and foundations, otherwise a position as predictor of human behaviour becomes questionable.

I doubt many people would argue that one of the most prominent features of human existence is its continuously changing character, a feature largely obscured through attempts at prediction. Human existence is not static, but, rather, has a sense of impermanence, a sense of movement or animation that can be considered as the essence of what we take to be human life (Gergen, 1984). I would suggest that awareness of reflexivity, and incorporation of reflexivity within the discipline, may contribute to an awareness of this changing character.

Without reflexivity psychological research, and psychological texts, must remain in stasis, containing little or no movement. If psychology does not attend to reflexivity it may maintain an authoritative stance, but without the inherent movement that serves as the essence of human life. Without this movement psychology will not necessarily be about the study of human beings, it will be about the study of something else, or the production of something else, possibly whilst retaining a facade of researching social thinking and behaviour. This may not be a problem for some people as it can be argued that if psychology becomes about 'something else', then the discipline is demonstrating that it, too, can change with the times, and keep up with the changing character of existence. However, other disciplines seem to be engaging with reflexivity as active participants, and as a consequence they are able to question and critically assess their motivations and directions. I suspect that a scenario for a psychology that does not incorporate reflexive thinking and action is that the discipline may become the dinosaur of the social sciences. Such a relic of the past does not necessarily offer much to the budding social scientist, unless of a palaeontologic bent.
It was this line of thinking that led me to believe that not only is the topic of reflexivity interesting, but the entire concept of reflexivity, and its place in psychology today is an important area that needs to be both explored and addressed. The issue of reflexivity encroaches on all areas of psychology, and is not something that should be left for minor discussion (from time to time) by a few isolated social psychologists. However, for me, despite having determined both a motivation and a reason for pursuing reflexivity as an issue, the problem still remained of how to address reflexivity as a thesis topic so that it would be both accessible, and useful.

Having established the interactive nature of my engagement with the material, and a sense of conversing with texts, I took stock of the confusion I still felt when reading about reflexivity. The fluidity of the 'thing' was uppermost in my mind, in particular the way it seemed impossible to 'pin down'. I was reminded of Lawson's (1985) suggestion that as a central theme, reflexivity (R) cannot be approached directly. Approached directly it at once ceases to be central and no longer has the character of a theme. I became aware that this was part of my difficulty in addressing the elusive R. It seemed that if I followed traditional guidelines for writing a thesis, that is: introduction; literature review; method; analysis; discussion; conclusion, then the elusiveness of reflexivity; the problems which seem to arise around it; the myriad of questions it generates; and above all, the processes of being reflexive would be diminished, and maybe even lost. It seemed difficult to fit R into a traditional framework without running into problems with, for example, language use. I also suspected that a traditional framework would not allow maintenance of my own reflexive reading and writing processes. The nature of the research seemed to dictate a different approach and I suspected that the subject needed to dictate (sometimes with constraints) its own form. In other words, although I am the principal author, the texts that I read, the subject itself, and the comments I make, all need to take their own positions within the work.

Therefore, at this point, if you are keen for a bit of adventure, and for what might be a good read, I would invite you to join me on an exploration of reflexivity, and, in particular, reflexive practices in psychology. At this stage I don't think the format will be too much out of the ordinary as I am restricting myself to using verbal language and writing as my means of communication, indeed I expect you will find the work will contain traditional
elements, such as a literature review, interspersed among the chapters. However, I suspect that I may need to make innovations along the way, and if I do, I shall explain these at the time. What emerges may be as much of a surprise to me as to you. Most of what you have read so far has developed from readings and past thinking, but much of what is to come is new territory. Because of the apparent confusion surrounding R I hope that granting findings some space to dictate new directions will allow the work itself to be seen as a reflexive practice, and this can be considered as one of the aims of this thesis.

As I think upon aims right at this minute, I consider that it may be useful, both for myself, and for you to be aware that as much as I would like this work to be an exploration that can go where it wills, I do have aims that need to be achieved. As I see it the aims for this thesis are as follows:

- To show the importance of reflexivity for the discipline of psychology by examining and discussing reflexive practices in psychology.
- To demonstrate reflexivity in action, in other words to give a performance of reflexivity.
- To allow the work to assist in its own direction, but to ensure that it remains accessible to readers.
- To produce a scholarly piece of work that qualifies for the title of Masterate thesis.
- To trust in my own process of interaction, both with my own writing and the writings of others.
- To listen to the advice of my supervisor.

The purpose of this introduction is now over. The pages that follow are designed to fulfil the aims of this work and are arranged as chapters. For those of you who wish to know where you are going the following page contains chapter outlines. These outlines were written after all chapters had been completed and I would like to emphasise my previous invitation to join me as I explore reflexivity. You might have more fun if you skip the following page and come with me straight into Chapter One.

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2 These outlines have emerged as much briefer than originally intended. It was considered that detailed outlines may adversely effect an evolutionary reading of the work.
Chapter One - where the thesis begins again and the formulation of ideas is observed as a process leading to a direction.

Chapter Two - where a false start is put aside and a theoretical orientation emerges.

Chapter Three - where reflexive inquiry is temporarily abandoned as 'critical' analysis takes place.

Chapter Four - where 'critical' analysis continues until a group of objects are identified for discussion.

Chapter Five - where what was going to happen becomes something quite different.

Chapter Six - where a traditional format overtly intrudes resulting in the demonstration of a 'new' resource.

Chapter Seven - where the thesis is reviewed and abandoned, allowing other directions to emerge.
CHAPTER ONE - LET'S START AGAIN

On page two of the introduction I talked about the confusion I experienced when reading about reflexivity (R). I talked about the elusiveness of R, the apparently different meanings of R, about how R was talked about rather than practised, and when it was practised I wasn’t sure if it was R or not. I mentioned that R is sometimes turned into a tool, whereby it loses its reflexive qualities, yet is still called R, and that I had some problems with what I saw as objectification and reification of R. All of these issues were raised after I had done some reading in the area. During this chapter I go back to the beginning of the thesis, to when I first began to read, in a focused way, in the area of R. When I first began to research I made diary entries of my readings so that I could keep track of my own thinking processes. At that stage they were not intended to form part of the final work. I have no intention now of incorporating the entire diary into this work, that would be a thesis in itself, but I do wish to share diary excerpts. The diary entries assist in illustrating some of the confusions already raised, plus the evolution of such confusions. These confusions are quite probably pivotal to my ‘problems’ with R, and possibly even the ‘problem’ of R. Using these entries allows me to share the difficulties I encountered in trying to define and make sense of R.

In a sense Chapter One serves as a definition of the construct, albeit in a way that illustrates how the nondefinable can be defined as nondefinable. I think it is important for the chapters that follow, the thesis itself, and reading of the thesis, that the opportunity is provided to experience my initial readings. Such an experience may allow some further insight into how this work has developed, and also give you the opportunity to make up your own mind about some of the issues under discussion. I have chosen the following excerpts deliberately, as they appear to map a gradual movement towards the actual writing of the thesis, and the process within which we are now engaged. They are in chronological order, and have not been altered for inclusion in this work. My intention now is to share these excerpts, and along the way generally discuss what is happening in each one, hopefully arriving at a neat and tidy summary which will lead us gently into Chapter Two.

11 March 1996 - What does reflexivity mean to me? Right this minute I do not know. I already have a sense (disclaimer), I already know that I have been influenced by the two articles I have read so far. Gadlen and Ingle (1975) talk about reflexivity as being about ‘relations between things’, and ‘having an awareness of differing subject positions’ - authors how many? readers how many? within text/ outside text, one person can have more than one position. Is reflexivity about positioning then? ....
Potter (and Edwards, 1992) use the reflexive box - what for - to show that they are thinking about what they are doing and therefore are being reflexive - sounds like an excuse for reflexivity - which means - that I must think I have some idea of what reflexivity is supposed to be - what is it and where have I picked it up from???? Do I just have some bias against Potter's box here, and do I confuse reflexivity with introspection?

In this engagement I come across R as positioning, R as thinking, R as introspection, and R as some obscure idea which I seem unable to grasp. I also begin to have difficulties around being influenced by other readings and, I would suggest, being a socially constructed production (that is, where have I picked it up from?). Instead of answering what R is for me I have gone looking for an explanation of R, or what R is. However I suspect that my idea of reflexivity at this stage is that R could be some kind of introspective technique, although it involves more than simply thinking about what one is doing.

19 March 1996 - So what is happening? Not a lot. Looking through Ashmore's (1989) The Reflexive Thesis (probably hoping for a simple explanation of reflexivity - why- because no-one ever seems to say what it is). Ashmore talks about three forms or interpretations of reflexivity (p.32): Reflexivity as Self-Reference (R-reference); Reflexivity as Self-Awareness (R-awareness); Reflexivity as the Constitutive Circularity of Accounts (R-circularity). Certainly don't understand the last one yet (haven't had a good look though). What is interesting is that 'reflexivity as self-awareness' seems to be brushed over somewhat, the other forms seem to be thought of as more significant somehow (nothing to back this up with at present). It seems to me, that any form of reflexivity must involve self-awareness, and that R-awareness may be the most interesting - it also seems to be the most difficult because of the degree of introspection involved. That is, one may become carried away by introspection. What does getting carried away by introspection mean? What does it mean for the discipline? What does it mean for me? END OF ENTRY.

Still searching for someone else's meaning, I notice a sense of frustration around being unable to find any definitive answers. I suspect that in my studies to date I have been used to saying - 'here is the construct, this is what it is (or this is how it is operationally defined), let's take a look at it'. However, to add to my collection of R (ie. as positioning, as thinking, as introspection) I have found three new interpretations (albeit from sociology). Having a definition, or a title for forms of R allows me to ignore R as a 'thing' and focus on 'its' properties. I begin to chat about self awareness (probably quite unaware of this shift in focus) and of aligning this with introspection, but have now developed some queries about the meaning of introspection, and maybe, of how it might be involved with R.
20 March 1996 - ... the literature so far seems to be trying to structuralise reflexivity, which refuses to be structuralised as far as I can tell so far - which is not very far at all (seem to be stuck in sociology). Therefore the way to do/know/use reflexivity may be to have no plan and no structure - could be scary - certainly the way to write about it may be to have no plan or structure, maybe then 'the ubiquitous it' may reveal itself, or at least metamorphose into a state which may be more fluid than we imagine.

How will I get this done without a plan? What if I arranged a departmental brainstorming meeting about reflexivity - taped - then transcribed - SOME DATA!!! The thought of some data brings a sense of relief - something concrete - ..... 

I suggest that the literature is trying to structuralise R, but do not remind myself that I have been doing the same thing in my search for meaning. I do not notice that I am still searching for meaning, either 'the ubiquitous it' or at least some sort of 'state', even as I suggest having no plan and no structure. I want something 'concrete', and not having a plan seems out of the question.

25 March 1996 - Just when you think you're on a roll and starting to get somewhere (don't unpack) the whole thing changes direction again and becomes another topic - or does it? What has come up? Reading Henwood and Parker (1994) - reminded that different disciplines are constructed differently, so, naturally, they will probably conceptualise reflexivity in different ways. Immediately reflexivity cannot be a thing, or a something, if this is so - that is, there cannot be a definitive explanation of what it is and how to do it (for those structuralists who are pulling their hair out and want to know what it is - which is probably me, or was me, and probably still is me really). I wonder now - what does the way psychology conceptualises reflexivity say about psychology? ..... 

.... My partner has just walked in, noticed what's on the screen and asked "Well, what is reflexivity anyway? Can you give me five other words that describe it because I mentioned it to my philosophy tutor the other day and it seemed to just pass him by." So after a slight discussion on the formlessness of some things he throws his hands in the air, walks out of the room saying "So, you're doing a thesis about nothing!"

Interesting!! END OF ENTRY.

There is a shift in my thinking here as I suggest that R cannot be a 'thing'. I moved through this same process in the diary entry of 19 March when I began to talk about self awareness, but didn't notice. I do notice here that I would still like 'to know', 'to have a definition', but with my newfound revelation, achieved with the help of Henwood and Parker, my focus shifts to see R as conceptualised, brought into being, and possibly as shaped and crafted anew depending upon the context. R has differing meanings. From this a new thought develops and the language of psychology as a reflection of the discipline is questioned.

Any newfound revelations are short lived however when it turns out that others still want answers. They don't want to know that 'things' are 'formless'. Just as I previously wanted 'concrete' definitions, others also want substance, they want definitions, they want to know what things are, they want to know that things are things, not that things are
nothing. (I believe I went to sleep that night wondering if I could hand in a hard covered book filled with blank pages as my thesis (ie. no/thing) - the idea was very appealing, and could have solved what was beginning to seem like a very problematic topic).

11 April 1996 - Reading Lawson (1985, 'Reflexivity: The post-modern predicament') who suggests that the reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, is difficult because their concern with reflexivity, although pervasive, is largely implicit. The problem being that they cannot approach reflexivity as a central theme directly, as it would at once cease to be central, and would no longer have the character of a theme. This feels confusing at a first read, but I guess this means that what the writer is saying about reflexivity would become the central theme, rather than reflexivity itself. I wonder now, is this a reason why reflexivity appears to be such a slippery eel? Is this a reason why reflexivity appears to be 'nothing'?...

Ideas about positioning, introspection, self awareness, and even definitions seem to have been left by the wayside for the time being as I begin to explore philosophy. I appear to have found some evidence indicating that it may be okay for my thesis to be about nothing. If R cannot be written about directly, if it cannot be something that can be grasped, then it may well be nothing. (This line of thinking seemed very logical at the time and I was sure I had found a precedent for a revolutionary new type of thesis, based upon Lawson’s comment).

18 April 1996 - The biggest problem is that I don't want to do a thesis anymore, the whole idea is silly. It seems like a very large time wasting exercise which is going to produce some written text which can keep other people wasting time replying to it, marking it, or whatever. And all the time none of us are admitting that the written text is nothing at all. Well here we have R-reference raising its head immediately. My belief that the written text is nothing at all has come chiefly from the writings (my readings) of Derrida (a written text), therefore my statement, if it is true, must also be false, or something like that....

The biggest problem is that whenever I read a parcel of writing about reflexivity (because it seems to come in parcels/time blocks/a group getting together a group of writers talked about, etc.) I get a completely different idea about which direction the thesis should go, how it should start in particular, and a completely new list of references and avenues to crawl down. I have generated a table covered in books and readings most of which I have not read. Each parcel generates a new lot and as I get caught up in a new one the previous one, plus its entourage falls by the wayside. Consequently I continually feel like I have far too much to read, and if I read something new I will lose my train of thought, which always seems like it was the universal answer to the whole problem. (Because of this process each new lot of reading does spark a burst of confidence and a flying leap into the fray, which inevitably ends in frustration once more). This biggest problem may be common to all thesis writers, and I would suggest that with a set of guidelines/aim/goal one could stay on track, however the problem is that the topic looks at reflexivity. Reflexivity moves around. If the topic is how psychologists are using/writing about reflexivity it sounds more simplified, however I still have to look at reflexivity (which moves around) and supposedly have to give my reader some idea of reflexivity, which I can't do just by talking about it. It seems like it is necessary to at least look at reflexivity before discussing how psychologists use it. I should imagine it would be useful for me to sound as though I knew what I was talking about....
I keep forgetting that a thesis is supposed to demonstrate that you can write a research type paper, so I guess they want you to put all the stuff together and wouldn't be interested in an interesting compilation of thoughts about thoughts, or text about text! Personally I can't really see what the difference is. If I wish to prepare a thesis which looks at reflexivity why can't I use whole pieces of other people's writings. For example, Lawson's first chapter is great, and very nicely puts some background into the picture. Why not a compilation of others writings photocopied into the thesis (at this stage the thesis, in my mind, is a big black book with blank pages, which is why I continually refer to it as the thesis) with my own comments and analysis to tie them all together. In part this is what people do anyway except they spend ages trying to put it into their own words, unless its completely new material of course (if that's possible)....

About an hour ago I thought of the idea of getting a list of definitions from people (academics). This would be the starting point of the thesis. A couple of pages, or maybe just one, of quotes. Each, hopefully about three lines. The quotes would be in answer to the questions - What does being reflexive mean to you?, or What do you think of when you hear the term reflexivity? Something like that anyway....

Seven days later, a very long entry. I seem to have been thinking a lot about R being 'no/thing', and it has generalised into thoughts about language and written texts. What is most interesting in this entry is that I have quite easily adopted the use of the term R-reference. (This is the term used by Ashmore (1989) as an abbreviation for 'reflexivity as self reference'). Among my frustrations and confusion I recognise an elusive quality of R - "R moves around". My desire to find a meaning for R is still present - I wish to sound as though I know what I'm talking about, possibly indicating that having a definition would assist my credibility. I sense a constraint with the traditional thesis format. This may be an indication of a lack of confidence in my own initiative to either push or follow the topic where it may need to go, or it may indicate that a traditional format does not suit all research topics. I seem determined to get some sort of fixed starting point, somehow, and have again turned to data collection (it seems I have not recognised that the texts I am reading and working with, and even my own response, are all data).

27 April 1996  (Nine days later after working on the questions and format for a data collection two new ideas emerge...)

1. Reflexivity may not necessarily be simply a technical concept found in the writings of various disciplines. If it was, surely we would be able to explain it, that is; this is what it is; this is what it does; this is how you do it. Reflexivity, so far, has defied concrete explanation at every turn and seems to me to be more of an action-

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3 Reflexivity as self reference relates to the paradoxical nature of self-referential propositions. For example: The statement 'There is no truth' can be neither true nor not true. It is discussed in detail by Lawson (1985), and is supported at great length by Oliver and Landfield (1962) as a problem which must be faced by psychologists - "What is to be accounted for must be accounted for, else the venture is a failure, and any psychological venture is a failure if in its accounting it fails, or refuses, to take into account its own accounting" (p.123), and furthermore, psychologists need to take reflexivity seriously if they are not to fall into the paradoxes of self reference. This stance is supported by Holland (1977). Both Lawson and Holland cite Marx as an example of the incorporation of self-reference into theory, ie, If, as Marx argues, the view or ideology of individuals or classes are the product of their social and historical position, then this must also be true of Marx and his theory (Lawson, 1985, p.21).
oriented process, that is, and here I get stuck, as I can't always grasp the idea of processes. However, I have the feeling that because reflexivity does seem to be a process rather than some kind of happening, the questions and issues around the process become both difficult to contain, and difficult to answer. This is most likely why, in the case of this thesis, it may be useful to describe a practice, rather than discuss reflexivity as such. 

Discovering R as process, and a practice changes my view of the work. I no longer necessarily feel as though I am always coming up against a brick wall. What has seemed like a wrestling match, an interminable struggle with concepts and ideas begins to lose impetus and becomes more relaxed.


16 May 1996 - Movement of the text, and of reflexivity continues to shift even though the gathering of answers to questions was supposed to pave the way toward an analysis. Will still head that way, but am not as sure of how it will turn out. A brief look at the answers indicates that R-awareness is uppermost in people's minds - the only thing actually, no other sense of reflexivity seems apparent so far. 

.... I'm thinking, particularly after reading 'K is mentally ill' (Smith, 1978), and 'Heuristic research' (Moustakas, 1981), that it would be very interesting and possibly a good solution to present the work as both a practice and a piece - wasn't that my very original/first idea, can't remember. This means that the workings of the thinking will be demonstrated, as well as the results. Title: 'Reflexivity in psychology: practices and performances'.

Work continues steadily with continued readings plus the gathering of answers to questions posed to various members of the psychology department. A few little hiccups as R continues to 'do its thing'. After reading two pieces of work that I would suggest are fine working examples of R in practice I decide on a solution for a way to present this work, including an aptly suited title.

However, as the following except demonstrates, a way to present the work does not necessarily mean I know how to do this, nor does it mean that previous fears, and conditioning have been dropped.

13 June 1996 - First entry for a while, been busy, sometimes, with the lit. review. Have just spent at least an hour staring out the window and wondering what the problem is? Why does the thesis not begin? Why does it seem almost clear in my mind, and yet not transfer to paper? I have gone through writer's and starting block, I have gone through - I still don't know enough. But I have decided just now, that the problem is that I am still trying to write a thesis. It seems to make sense. I need to drop all ideas, and all pretence

4 R-political is a term coined by the author (me) and refers, at this stage, to the practice of 'reciprocity' named as 'reflexivity'. R-political could be considered as the reflexivity you do when you are not doing reflexivity, in other words a 'Clayton's reflexivity, and will be discussed in another chapter. *(claytons/adj.colloq./serving as a substitute;imitation, Delbridge & Orsman, 1986).
that this is 'a thesis', the type that I see bound, the type that I have read. I need to drop all ideas of how I am doing this, that is, making sure all the literature is to hand, and is all neat and tidy. I need to drop all pretence of telling people, well the literature review is underway, and I have formulated the introduction (which has changed at least three times in as many days, despite me thinking for a couple of weeks that it was set). I am treating the topic like a laboratory report, and trying to structure it to make sure that I pass, and that I do a good job. I think I just need to write about reflexivity, and be reflexive at the same time, and if it doesn't make sense to people, try to get it into some sense making order after it is finished (after I have written enough). So let's try a different approach, let's stop doing the things I think I'm supposed to be doing, and start writing.

This entry was, in fact, my final diary entry, and from this point the thesis began again with an entirely new introduction (the one you have read) which allowed the work to evolve into the form you are reading now.

Chapter One, as a format, is now to be left behind as we move on to Chapter Two. I am hoping that it has been both useful and interesting. As a brief summary, this is how I see Chapter One.

One purpose has been to demonstrate difficulties I found in defining R in a way that was manageable and accessible. A further purpose has been the opportunity to introduce some burgeoning concepts that developed as a direct result of mapping my own thinking processes, in the form of these diary entries. These are concepts such as;

different ways of looking at R, for example, as positioning, as introspection;
noting that some writers do make definitions of R, for example, R-reference, R-awareness;
the priority and influence of a search for meaning and definition;
the movement of my thinking processes;
the idea of R as process, as no/thing;
the movement and fluidity of reflexivity;
R-political

Chapter Two will now take a more traditional format as the categorisation of R is explored.
POSTSCRIPT: As you are aware part of the intention of this work is for the thesis to serve as a performance of reflexivity as well as examining reflexive practices in psychology. I would love to be able to say that what you have just read is an example of R, but unfortunately I cannot do that. What I can say, however, is that because the above performance demonstrates, for example: some modicum of self-awareness, (Woolgar 1988; Ashmore 1989); a relational aspect (Gadlin & Ingle 1975) (eg, between you and me, the texts I've read and us, this text and us); in part a description of the research process (eg, Moustakas 1981); an examination of the topic and my own investigation of that topic (Potter & Wetherall, 1987); a wisp of an exploration of traditional frameworks of understanding (Lather, 1988) it could be construed by some as either reflexive practice, or, at least, as having components of reflexive practice. In other words, if you wish to, you can decide that Chapter One is a demonstration of R.
Chapter Two will commence with a brief review of how this chapter evolved. This present chapter is not the original version of Chapter Two nor is it anything like the first written draft, however the new direction is allied with these previous efforts. Some background relating to the current format shows how this new direction emerged.

During Chapter One a search for meaning and definition in my exploration of reflexivity led me to believe that the next logical step must be categorisation. As aptly suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980); in order to understand things and experiences we encounter in the world we usually categorise, in ways that make sense to us. Because other writers had developed definitions and explanations of reflexivity (for example: Wilkinson’s (1988) ‘personal’ reflexivity, ‘functional’ reflexivity, and ‘disciplinary’ reflexivity; and Ashmore’s (1989) R-reference, R-awareness, and R-circularity) I suspected that I should be able to do the same.

Despite my problems with defining R I thought a strict and orderly categorisation procedure would allow both myself and readers to make some sense of the texts I was reading. Such a procedure, combined with a review of reflexivity, was planned to examine ‘writers’ definitions and explanations of R, and to categorise certain ‘forms’ of R by examining similarities between definitions. Looking at discourses of reflexivity would also serve to review relevant literature thus fulfilling the usual thesis expectation of a literature review. What emerged was not what was intended.

Formal engagement with the literature raised many questions inappropriate for inclusion in a ‘literature review type’ chapter, for example: When is reflexivity reflexivity? When is reflexivity something else? Are these definitions different names for the same thing? Is reflexivity a tool? If reflexivity is used and incorporated as a tool does it cease to be reflexivity? Such questions could have been relegated to a later chapter however ‘leaving them for later’ detracted from a clear understanding of both the texts I was engaging with and the text I was attempting to write. The chapter appeared incomplete if
Questions were 'left unanswered'. Chapter Two was supposed to be a categorisation and overview of the literature, a locator for both myself and readers. Engaging with arising questions as well as attempting a literature review turned the chapter into something else entirely and also assumed that readers were cognisant with any prior reading I had done.

Attempts to categorise continued to raise questions rather than produce a handy list of 'types' for presentation to readers. The most common similarity between definitions seemed to be the word 'reflexivity'. Taking note of this somewhat flippant observation instigated a return to 'reflexivity' as the 'object' of exploration and to the objectives of this chapter. Although I had indicated a categorisation exercise the basic objective was to examine discourses of R and to try and understand, or to see, how R was constructed in psychology. Putting aside for a moment the format of a traditional literature review and focusing on the construction of R allowed a shift in direction toward maintaining a focus upon reflexivity as discursive, and thus, as an object (Parker 1990). In other words discourses of reflexivity define the object 'reflexivity'.

The objective became to view R as object rather than for example, diversifying into discourses of psychology about R and becoming lost in the vagaries of similarities and differences among varying schools of thought. R as object maintains a focus upon R and also allows the question - What is reflexivity? - to be addressed. Whereas I had been examining definitions of R, and had failed to recognise that such definitions were influenced by elements and qualities, such as author positioning, or, entwined discourses acting to produce the object, which in themselves may be related to such a question. By exploring R as object it was possible to suspect that such elements and qualities may emerge.

A useful way to examine reflexivity now seemed to be to take a discourse analytical approach and examine discourses of reflexivity with an awareness of discourse being about objects and discourse analysis about discourses as objects (Parker 1990). The tools of reference for this focus and the resulting methodology were based upon Parker's (1990) steps for identifying discourses and consequently a Parker 'style' discourse analysis.
Because this is a thesis exploring reflexivity, not discourse analysis, I do not intend to enter into discussion or debate about the theoretical basis of discourse analysis or different approaches currently in vogue. Readers will need to be aware that discourse analysis is a perspective assuming "that experiences, selves and social and psychological phenomena are constituted in and through language" (Garfinkel, 1967; Potter and Wetherall, 1987; Gergen and Davies, 1985; Shotter and Gergen, 1989, cited in Widdicombe, 1993, p. 96). There are differing theoretical models, but all share a concern with the ways language produces and constrains meaning and the ways in which social conditions give rise to forms of talk (Burman and Parker, 1993; Burman, 1991).

Here, briefly, are my reasons for using the basis of 'Parker’s style' of discourse analysis as a methodology for analysis of reflexivity.

My reading of Parker understands that his approach to discourse analysis is informed by post-structuralist concepts (Parker 1990), for example Foucault’s (1981, cited in Burman and Parker, 1993) work, enabling analysts to look both at how objects and subjects are constructed in discourse. Parker suggests that the ways by which we are positioned as subjects and the ways we think about objects constructed by discourse are all framed by discourses. Analysis of discourse allows us to reframe an object, thus treating it as only one possible 'truth' which is held in place by language and power. He suggests that "discourses do not simply describe the social world, but categorise it, they bring phenomena into sight" (Parker, 1990, p.191).

In so far as discourses of reflexivity are concerned implications at this stage were that analysis of such discourses may reveal objects, subjects and subject positions. My own investment in a search for meaning and definition meant that I was elated at the possibility of a way of analysis which may 'bring phenomena (read reflexivity) into sight'!

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5Power here refers to power relations reproduced by discourses, suggesting for example, that institutions are structured around, and reproduce power relations.

6Subject position is also a post-structuralist concept suggesting that among discourses the very persons who are engaging in them will also be found. In other words discourses incorporate a location for subjects within any given repertoire (Davies and Harre, 1990).
Parker presents certain criteria for identifying discourses and simplifies these criteria by suggesting a number of steps which analysts can follow in order to maintain a focus upon discourse as an object; thus elucidating not only how objects are constituted, but also how subjects are enabled and power relations are produced within discourse. It was decided that for the purposes of the present dilemma (that is, some kind of sense making of discourses of reflexivity) to follow some of these steps as a criteria for discourse analysis. Some steps rather than all steps were followed because although each of Parker's steps are fundamentally 'undoable' there are too many for the scope of this work. A particular focus of this thesis is an exploration of what reflexivity is, and, what reflexivity means to psychologists. It was considered that the chosen steps would assist in identifying components of the discourse relevant to the focus questions.

The steps are as follows:

1. To treat objects of study as texts.
2. To explore connotations.
3. To ask what objects are referred to, and to describe them.
4. To map a picture of the world presented by the discourse.
5. To locate subject positions produced by speakers.
6. To identify the coarticulation of discourses and how they constitute the same object in different ways.

In other words: Reflexivity as an object of study will now be treated as text. That is, discourses of reflexivity as text is 'reflexivity', and therefore an object that can be analysed. Exploring the connotations means that I read/look at/examine/classify the text so that I can identify the objects referred to, plus describe them in order to map a picture of the world presented by particular discourses. At the same time subject positions should become apparent, and effects of coarticulating discourses.

The following chapter will discuss the analysis of reflexivity. There is not the space to include every text of reflexivity ever to be published and the discourses chosen concentrate upon examples of the published work of authors having a major influence upon my thinking during this project. Because a major aim of this thesis is the

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Coarticulation refers to the ways in which discourses intertwine to produce objects. For example a discourse may produce a particular object, but when the discourse is coarticulated with another discourse, together they may produce a different object.
examination and discussion of reflexive practices in psychology the majority of examples are from this discipline. The subject positions we will be looking at will therefore be those of psychologists.

Some readers may wonder why certain writers are chosen over others. I would suggest that in my search for meaning and definition of reflexivity writers mentioned in the following chapter presented their work with interpretations and definitions that I was able to make some sense of. For example, Gill (1995) influenced the focus of this thesis; Ashmore (1989) informed me of R-reference, R-awareness, R-circularity; Henwood and Parker (1994) reminded me of differences in conceptualisation. Making sense of such works led to the sense making of other works and allowed ideas for this work to take some form. Because such sense-making both influenced my own thinking about reflexivity, and acted as a locator for my proposals about reflexivity, it seems sensible to analyse the texts which have had such an influence upon this work.
CHAPTER THREE - AN ANALYSIS OF REFLEXIVITY: THE DISCOURSES

Seven prominent discourses have emerged from my reading of the text. This chapter describes each discourse and discusses the worldview they present. For the purposes of this discussion each discourse is to be treated as a separate bounded object although this is not necessarily how they operate as text. In effect the discourse analysis is a process of deconstruction. Reflexivity will be taken apart to see 'what is going on' and then 'put back together', by way of examining worldview, subject positions and coarticulation of discourses, to see how reflexivity is produced as an object. In other words it will be 'put back together' to 'see how it works'. Subject position and coarticulation will be discussed in the following chapter.

Description of the discourses is organised by the derivation of underlying metaphor, and terms relating to these metaphors. In other words, I have identified terms, or types of talk, produced by each discourse and applied metaphoric status to these terms. It was Pepper (1942, cited in Sarbin, 1986) who demonstrated that "the root metaphor provides the framework for the construing of occurrences in the natural and man-made worlds" (p.4). He suggested that "any world hypothesis, is derived from a basic or root metaphor" (p.4). It is relatively common to treat expression (discourse) as a literal expression unless we are constantly reminded or remain aware of its as if quality. "Once a metaphor has done its job of sense making, the metaphoric quality tends to become submerged" (Sarbin, 1986, p.5). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also suggest that "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (p.3). Identification of metaphoric status becomes necessary in order to understand the worldview produced by the discourses. Categories of analysis and the types of questions asked will also be similarly constrained by the choice of root metaphor (Sarbin, 1986). In other words the analysis and discussion I am writing here is as much deserving of analysis as that which is being analysed.

In this analysis the application of metaphoric status will allow a view of the constraints placed upon production of discourses by the submerged (root) metaphor which has been
defining the discourse as reality. The manner in which each discourse has been producing the world in a particular way will then become apparent.

As stated above seven prominent discourses have emerged. They are: the scientific discourse, the production discourse, the identity discourse, the organic discourse, the chameleon discourse, the cosmic discourse, and, the Herculean discourse. Using examples from the text I will now explain the emergence of each discourse from the text.

The SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of pragmatism. If I first expand my view of ‘pragmatism’ as metaphor, understanding of the coherence of the discourse and the metaphor will be enhanced⁸.

Pragmatism explains a world organised around practical values and attention to facts. Assertions are evaluated by their practical consequences and bearing on human interests. Emphasis is upon practicalities, with an absence of personal and social commitment. This is not to say that accountability is disregarded, rather, it becomes understood in terms of values and biases which may impinge or have effect upon practical issues. This worldview produces a scientific discourse containing talk involving: effect and consequences, data, proof, methods, experiments, observations, evaluation, research, analyses, objectivity, constructs, concepts, theories⁹. Humanity becomes viewed as an interplay of impersonal forces.

Although all of the discourses emerging in this analysis are treated as ‘equal’, in the sense that each discourse can be considered an object with the same status, this does not necessarily mean that they are equal in terms of power. Among the texts under analysis, the scientific discourse appears with greater frequency than any other in psychologist’s writing of reflexivity and consequently is considered as a dominant discourse occurring within the texts. Perhaps this is not necessarily surprising given that

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⁸ There are four sources that I have used to develop my understanding of metaphors allied with these discourses. They are ‘The Concise Macquarie Dictionary’ (Revised ed.) (1982), ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary’ (9th ed.) (1995), Roget’s Thesaurus’ (1962), and my own pondering upon definitions and how and if they make sense to me and to my supervisor.

⁹ The types of talk shown as examples are selected from analysed text. For example, ‘data’ (Smith, 1994, p.260), ‘methods’ (Curt, 1994, p9), ‘observations’ (Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p.124). Not all selections are subsequently used when illustrating the use of discourses, but all have been considered in the construction of discourses.
psychology as a discipline maintains a stance as 'a science', albeit a 'soft science'. What will be of interest, however, are the effects, if any, of such a dominant discourse within the text.

The following examples illustrate use of the scientific discourse. I have tried to include as much variety as possible within the scope of available space. In each example, as with all of the text, the topic under discussion is 'reflexivity'. Although, as mentioned previously, discourses are coarticulated within the text, the illustrations here focus upon 'reflexivity' as located within scientific discourse.

In this extract Oliver and Landfield (1962) are suggesting that "the reflexivity of psychology lies in the fact that the psychologist is the object of his own study" (p.124).

"...Even when his subject matter may consist of fragmentary aspects of mental life, ultimately the psychologists observations have to fit into an understanding of the whole man, including the less tractable aspects of himself such as the qualities enabling him to be a researcher, his values, and all the facts of his consciousness..." (Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p.124) (Underlining added)

In this text the writer suggests that there are practical consequences allied with psychological practices; psychological practices being, 'psychologists observations' and the practice of research. It is suggested that the psychologist, while making observations, has a responsibility toward 'the whole man'. In other words there are human interests which are at stake. Even in the role of researcher the psychologist must expect to take into account his own values thus ensuring accountability as a practising psychologist. Consciousness is reduced to facts, and facts require attention. Here, they are included with accountability.

Oliver and Landfield ostensibly admonish psychologists suggesting that they cannot afford to create fragmented practice and must practice a 'whole psychology' if they are to consider themselves as understanding 'whole man'. This admonishment is placed within the realm of a scientific discourse. In terms of worldview the use of the scientific discourse, here, keeps a firm focus in the area of pragmatism despite appearing to suggest alternative views. This suggests that in practical terms whole understanding is needed rather than fragmented understanding.
The following extract maintains a focus upon pragmatism, in this instance in terms of accountability and objectivity. A shift is suggested which appears to be the antithesis of pragmatism, referring as it does to personal and social commitment, yet the use of the scientific discourse suggests that this 'shift' can be incorporated into and will enhance the worldview.

"...the tactic of reflexively writing in the personal and social bases for knowledge (as part of making the research process accountable) can be conceptualised as moving towards a stronger form of 'objectivity' than is provided by the traditional scientific mode of reporting in psychology."

(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p.236) (Underlining added)

It was earlier suggested that incorporated into a worldview of pragmatism is an emphasis upon practicalities, with an absence of personal and social commitment. The suggestion here maintains that personal and social commitment can be incorporated, and that there is a good reason why incorporation should take place. The good reason appears to be accountability within the research process. In other words this extract as well as the previous extract maintains that values or biases (personal and social) impinging upon practical issues, such as the research process, must be taken into account, with the emphasis upon accountability. Tactics can therefore be incorporated and justified by the enhancement of objectivity.

Henwood and Pidgeon's ('talk about') "...reflexively writing" is bounded by the scientific discourse. In effect, a tactic such as 'reflexively writing' becomes grounded firmly within a worldview of pragmatism. It is construed as a practical solution to issues of accountability and strong objectivity.

In the next extract Bannister (1977) confidently uses the scientific discourse with familiarity and ease.

"...Flexivity enters experimental work when one theorising experimenter confronts another theorising experimenter and insists that he is the 'scientist' and the other is his 'subject'. Method and hypothesis become inevitably entangled in the communicative relationship between 'experimenter' and 'subject'. The problem will remain until we experiment 'with' and not 'on'."

(Bannister, 1977, p.211) (Underlining added)
The worldview is organised around attention to facts and hypothesis testing via procedures such as experiments. There is a practical solution to the problem of 'inevitable entanglement' produced by the involvement of 'reflexivity'. That is, to alter the way in which experiments are conducted. Focus upon pragmatism is thus maintained. Specified procedures for gathering of facts may suffer some alteration, that is, "...until we experiment 'with' and not 'on'..." but their basis (experiments) will remain of primary use.

Of interest in the following extract is the minimalist use of the scientific discourse, yet the argument is interred within a worldview of pragmatism relating to goal orientation, effect, and the practical reasons why something 'new' might be conducted.

"The point of these 'new literary forms' is not to document or describe problems of reflexivity but to give a practical demonstration of their effect (Woolgar, 1982). The goal is to remind the reader that the text is not a mere record of events, a collation of facts, but is a complex, multifaceted social achievement (Stringer, 1985)." (Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p.183) (Underlining added)

It is suggested that the effect of 'new literary forms' is the focus of interest here, rather than the literary forms themselves or what they may contain. The organisation of the text is around the practical aim, or practical value, of a specific goal in order to evaluate a demonstrated effect. The 'new literary forms' are talked about in terms of pragmatism. Use of the scientific discourse allows them to be placed within the worldview of pragmatism while they appear to be somewhere else.

The reduction of 'the indefinable' to 'the manageable' is produced by the following illustration.

"The concept of reflexivity is not easy to define because it appears in the literature in a number of "guises." each having several possible levels of analysis. At its simplest however, it may be considered to be disciplined self-reflection (ie. the rigorous

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10 This text does not contain the word 'evaluate', but I am taking the liberty of assuming here, that if something is to have a demonstrated effect then in order to notice the effect it must be observed/measured/evaluated somehow, otherwise we will not be aware of its existence.

11 Use of the term 'new literary forms' is generally allied with the cosmic discourse. This will become clear when the cosmic discourse is discussed. One can use the term and appear to be taking up a position within the cosmic discourse, but as has been demonstrated here this may not necessarily be the effect.
contemplation of one's academic navel, if you like, in order to assess its origin, nature, and activity - if any!)."  
(Wilkinson, 1988, p.493) (Underlining added)

Wilkinson talks about reflexivity as something which is not easy to define. She utilises the scientific discourse to place boundaries around 'reflexivity' and to assimilate the undefinable into definable. Reflexivity becomes placed as a 'concept'. It is also a concept that can be analysed, that is, it has 'several possible levels of analysis'. One of these levels is named as 'simplest'. Reflexivity can also be known by another name, that is 'disciplined self-reflection'. Within this text an indefinable 'concept' is rapidly reduced to something manageable by using the scientific discourse. This could be considered as practical task management. Reduced to a 'manageable concept' reflexivity is now open to assessment. It can be evaluated in terms of 'origin, nature, and activity', and presumably the practical consequences of these and their bearing upon human interests. In other words, talk within this text is organised around a worldview of pragmatism.

By use of these illustrations I have attempted to show my understanding of the scientific discourse in action. I am beginning to develop an idea of how use of the scientific discourse locates the psychologist and how the psychologist may utilise such a discourse in order to discuss certain subjects or areas in psychology, but I would like to leave discussion of this until the following chapter. My aim now is to discuss and illustrate the remaining discourses in the same manner as above. The intention is to ensure that by the end of this chapter there is some clarity about how each discourse operates within the text.

The PRODUCTION DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of performance. It relates to the 'work' of the psychologist, and work produced within the discipline of psychology. Performance explains a worldview organised around the execution, or fulfilment of duties or tasks, known as 'work'. 'Work' is explained as an act or process of performing or carrying out a necessary production, or practice within a discipline. There are requirements within disciplines to perform particular tasks, or to carry out particular practices, and specialised skills are necessary for optimum production.
The production discourse contains talk of ‘types’ of work, and talk of requirements necessary to perform such work. For example: practice of research, reflexive practice, experimental work, empirical work, the work of interpretation, interpretative exercise, research exercise, construction of data, discourse analysis, the psychological enterprise, debate, can all be considered as ‘types’ of work. Qualities needed to perform, or produce, the work are contained in talk such as: agility, flexibility, imagination, skills, skills of self-critique, tools, tactic, observations.

The following examples illustrate the production discourse within the text.

"As the psychologist attempts to bring his work to a state of fixity, he does so with much agility, flexibility and imagination."  
( Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p.121) (Underlining added)

This illustration demonstrates with some clarity that the psychologist not only partakes in the performance of work, but that the task of the psychologist is also to bring the work to fulfilment, in this instance 'a state of fixity'. In order to execute this task the skills of agility, flexibility and imagination are utilised. The indication here is that it is useful for the psychologist to have an abundance of these particular skills in order to ensure adequate performance.

In the following illustration the production discourse indicates divisions among practices and the difficulties of merging productions with differing constitution.

"It is far from clear that a reflexive psychology, one which embraces as it must the psychology of the practicing psychologist, can coherently be formulated within the natural scientific tradition."  
( Gauld & Shotter, 1977, p.4) (Underlining added)

There is a clear division between 'reflexive psychology' and 'the psychology of the practicing psychologist'. They are named as separate practices. The indications are that psychology, as a discipline, is constituted in a particular way by the 'practicing psychologist'. As a 'separate discipline' it must be assumed that 'reflexive psychology' contains unique practices and performance skills, as does 'psychology'. If one discipline 'embraces' another, one assumption is that there will be a change in constitution and a coherent constitution within 'the natural scientific tradition' will not be possible. The
production discourse illustrates, by inference, that processes of performance are not necessarily the same across disciplines.

Emphasis in the next illustration is upon the development of skills.

"C.A. Bowers (1984) argues that 'reflexivity' and 'critique' are the two essential skills we want our students to develop in their journey toward cultural demystification. I argue that the same is true for those of us who teach and do scholarly work in the name of feminism."

(Lather, 1988, p.575) (Underlining added)

'Reflexivity' and 'critique'; which in other locations could be described by any number of other names, for example, practices, processes; are named as specific and attainable skills which are amenable to development. The development of these specialised skills is talked about as essential in order for necessary task fulfilment, that is 'cultural demystification' and the practice of 'scholarly work'. In this illustration the production discourse effectively reduces 'reflexivity', and 'critique' to performance orientated criteria (thus foreclosing alternative views) and organises the text around task performance and skill development.

'Types' of work are a focus in the following illustration.

"...I shall suggest that one of the virtues of discourse analysis is exactly its incorporation of a certain type of reflexive practice which offers up detailed interpretations of scientist's texts for scrutiny. Moreover this practice is displayed in a way which is itself a New Literary Form designed to facilitate certain interpretative procedures on the part of the reader."

(Potter, 1988, p.39) (Underlining added)

Discourse analysis is talked about here as a psychological practice, as a 'type' of work performed within the discipline, or as a process leading toward a complete production. The process of discourse analysis incorporates another specialised 'type' of work, that is, 'reflexive practice', thus enhancing its capabilities, or skill base, and allowing a particular type of performance to be carried out. Inferences are that 'manoeuvrability' may be a characteristic of 'types' of work here, as the 'specialised reflexive practice' is displayed in a certain way as part of an overall performance and production design.
In this final illustration reflexivity is named as a practice able to be used for a specific purpose, in this instance 'to enrich an analysis'.

"... and reflexivity was here being used to enrich an analysis, rather than being pursued for its own end. This type of exercise can produce a mountain of data, and dialogical reflexivity can turn into infinite regress if one is not careful."

(Smith, 1994, p.260) (Underlining added)

There is an inference of manoeuvrability as the practice is talked about as something which can be either used or 'pursued for its own end'. The process of using becomes named as a practice in itself, that is, 'this type of exercise', which produces 'data', a common product of psychological performance. To 'take care', or, 'being careful' is a skill that can also be added to the psychologists repertoire of necessary skills for specialised productions. The implications are that care needs to be taken when dealing with certain practices, in this instance, dialogical reflexivity. The production discourse is utilised in this illustration to talk about a specific performance.

The next discourse to be illustrated is the IDENTITY DISCOURSE which coheres around a mixed metaphor of selfhood/personhood. The focus is upon a person's identification, or specification as 'something', sometimes as research subject, and sometimes as research subject with a purpose. The identity discourse contains talk such as: self-reference, self-reflexivity, self-reflexive, self-referential, self-reflection, human research, personal issues, personal experience, telling stories about ourselves, showing ourselves to ourselves, our own role, epistemological position, theoretical position, committed feminist researcher, the analyst, researchers, feminist uses, feminist conceptions, feminist reflexivity, psychology, psychologist, practicing psychologist, psychologists.

Selfhood explains a world where the self continuously refers back to the self. The 'self' becomes a referent suggesting that 'it' is both the object and the subject of the research, thus producing, for example, the researcher as a research subject. As research subject such talk as: self, role, position, allows the production of personhood and the research subject can be constituted as a person as well as a research subject. Constitution as a

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12 The use of the term 'research subject' here, reflects its common usage in psychology where participants are generally known as research subjects.
person allows the adoption of named identities, which sometimes incorporate roles, such as, analyst, feminist researcher, practicing psychologist, to be drawn from other discourses.

The identity discourse is illustrated in the following texts.

"Social science can be considered an implicitly self-referential discourse in that if it is about humans and their social arrangements then it is (also) about those humans in those social arrangements who are responsible for the production of social science." (Ashmore, 1989, p.32) (Underlining added)

In this illustration the identity discourse clarifies and places boundaries around 'social science'. The possible meaning of the self as referent is literally explained. It is suggested that the researcher within social science is produced as a research subject because the self must be both the object and the subject of research.

The following is another illustration of the self referring back to the self. In this instance the identity discourse clarifies and places boundaries around 'reflexivity'.

"...telling stories about ourselves/our culture eg. 'Once Were Warriors' is a form of reflexivity." (Steier, 1991, p.3)

In this next illustration selfhood explains personhood as produced by delineation of roles and alignment with the adoption of a named role. The identity discourse is used to allow constitution as a person, subsequently allowing the researcher to adopt the named role of committed feminist.

"However, in taking reflexivity seriously the committed feminist researcher could extend his or her reflexive analysis by means of a continuous monitoring of his or her own role within the research relationships, making a self-conscious attempt to delineate as fully as possible the forms and processes of his or her influence." (Wilkinson, 1988, p.498) (Underlining added)

13 A book written by Alan Duff about a particular part of New Zealand life, subsequently made into a New Zealand produced and directed film.
It is suggested that the researcher taking part in research will have an influence upon outcome through participation in such research. Suggesting researcher influence allows research to be known as a relationship. A monitoring requirement indicates that the self is referring back to the self thus constituting the researcher as research subject. The self becomes conscious of the self. As research subject the researcher suggests personhood by nominating the position in relationship as a role. As a person with a role the researcher is then able to name such a role, in this instance, as committed feminist.

The following illustration emphasises boundaries among roles.

"Ultimately, psychology cannot leave itself out of its account for the reality with which it deals. Reflexivity will always be more important for the work of psychologists than it is for the work of straight-forward natural scientists. Unfortunately, psychologists have been more prepared to accept this fact of life on the level of individual investigations than on the level of the discipline or its sub-disciplines."

(Danziger, 1993, p.42) (Underlining added)

The identity discourse acts here to demarcate boundaries between named roles, these roles being 'psychologists' and 'straight-forward natural scientists'. It serves also to acknowledge 'psychology' as a discipline within which 'psychologists' work, and also demarcates boundaries around the discipline and the workers. It acknowledges the production of personhood whereby named roles can be adopted.

Of interest in the next illustration is an apparent blurring of boundaries which appear to obscure the production of personhood and possible purposeful intent.

"Reflexivity is, as I hope has been clear, an essential part of the theoretical position I am proposing, which requires analysts to make explicit the position from which they are theorising, and to reflect critically upon their own role - not simply becoming the 'certified deconstructors' (Jackson, 1992) of other people's discourse. As such the reflexivity proposed is clearly recognisable as a 'feminist' reflexivity (see Wilkinson, 1988) based on the notion that the researcher's values should be 'acknowledged, revealed and labelled' (Reinharz, 1983:172) and that the researcher is 'accountable' for her interpretations (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1995)."

(Gill, 1995, p.179) (Underlining added)

In this illustration talk of a 'theoretical position' allows the speaker to be constituted as a person. A request for analysts to reflect critically 'upon their own role' (that is, for the self
to refer to the self) and from a particular 'position', allows analysts to be constituted as persons as well as research subjects, hence adoption of a named role, that is, analyst. The discussion about 'reflexivity' produces both persons and research subjects so it also may be named, in this instance as 'feminist reflexivity'. The naming of 'feminist reflexivity' is supported by a reiteration of selfhood, suggesting that the researcher as 'self' should refer back to the 'self' via acknowledgment of values and self-accountability. The researcher is then also produced as a research subject with the implicit self allowing personhood and thus the adoption of the named role of researcher.

So far, I have illustrated three of the discourses under discussion. I think it would be useful to mention here that discussion of the discourses in this way means that as the illustrations are examined both readers and myself are able to recognise different discourses at work within the text. This can sometimes become confusing, certainly it can for me anyway as I feel drawn toward discussing all the discourses I see operating rather than only the one under discussion. This paragraph is to serve as a reminder that each discourse will be discussed in turn no matter what else is occurring within the text, and that coarticulation of discourses, plus subject positioning will be discussed in the following chapter.

The ORGANIC DISCOURSE coheres around the metaphor of the organism. Organism, in this instance, explains a world where systems are analogous to a living being and organic processes. Systems composing a material structure are active, growing entities with particular requirements needed to sustain growth and maintain processes. Parts of the structure can function interdependently in terms of the whole, or appear independent depending upon conditions, but parts are always interconnected to a structure. The organic discourse contains talk such as: life, branches, whole, beginning, created, structured, frameworks of understanding, at the heart, character, processes, process, origin, nature, activity, fact of life, sentient beings, process of feeding back, demand(s), thrives, requires rootedness, grounding.

The following examples illustrate the organic discourse occurring within the text. The organic discourse does not appear as complex as the previous discourses and for the majority of illustrations it appears with little surrounding text. It will become clear in the
following chapter however, that although this discourse may appear comparatively straightforward this does not in any way effect its status.

"It is evident that if psychology, as a whole or in any of its branches, is concerned with the process of thought, it cannot while it is dealing with the latter, avoid whatever problems accompany reflexivity."

(Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p.114) (Underlining added)

In this instance 'psychology' is talked about as an organic structure or system able to function in more than one way. As a whole organism 'psychology' has the ability to divide into branches. It appears that the organism is able to act either interdependently, as a 'whole', or independently, as 'branches', that is, either can be 'concerned with the process of thought'.

"Reflexivity is at the heart of personal construct theory."

(Reason & Rowan, 1981, p.192) (Underlining added)

'Personal construct theory' is talked about as having a 'heart', a vital and essential part, necessary for survival. This not only denotes personal construct theory as an organic structure consisting of interconnecting parts, but produces reflexivity as a central component of such an organic structure.

"At its (reflexivity's) simplest however, it may be considered to be disciplined self-reflection (ie. the rigorous contemplation of one's academic navel, if you like, in order to assess its origin, nature, and activity - if any!)

(Wilkinson, 1988, p.493) (Underlining added)

In this illustration 'reflexivity' is linked with a body part, in this instance, a 'navel', thus allied with part of a complex whole, an organised material structure. As part of an organic system 'reflexivity' is conferred with characteristics relating to organism, that is, 'origin, nature and activity'. Particular characteristics such as these allow 'reflexivity' to be assessed and talked about analogous to organism.

"There could be infinite sayings about reflexivity, and still reflexivity would not be captured. Reflexivity will exhaust us long before we exhaust it. (Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood (1975:159))."

(Ashmore, 1989, p.26) (Underlining added)
'Reflexivity' becomes analogous to a living being. Not only can it not be captured as, for example, an elusive wild animal, but it is also granted agency. 'Reflexivity' and 'us' are placed in opposition, each engaged in tempestuous rivalry, with 'reflexivity', in this instance, proposed as victor.

"...reflexivity seems to demand an institutionalisation of doubt and thrives on a certain dose of uncertainty."

(Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, Trow, 1994, p.92) (Underlining added)

Analogous to a living being 'reflexivity' is active and makes demands. It becomes a growing entity developing vigorously when fulfilled by 'a certain dose of uncertainty'.

"On the one hand reflexivity requires rootedness, a context in which and on which it can act... On the other hand, reflexivity appears to demand an ontological insecurity, and institutionalisation of doubt, the need to disembed intellectual forms from 'the immediacies of context' (Giddens, 1990)."

(Gibbons et al, 1994, p.102) (Underlining added)

This illustration also talks of 'reflexivity' as analogous to a living being, by naming the requirements within which 'reflexivity' gains agency and the ability to act. 'Reflexivity' requires a context where it can become fixed and established, where nourishment is provided. When discussing 'the other hand', 'reflexivity' remains as organism with agency. As in the previous illustration it is able to make demands. It also remains as an entity with particular requirements, or 'needs' in order to assume action.

Each of these illustrations has shown the organic discourse used to explain a world cohering around the metaphor of the organism. Objects are interconnected to whole structures; they are viewed as organic processes.

Cohering around a metaphor of 'change' is the CHAMELEON DISCOURSE. Change explains a worldview where 'objects' are not necessarily always the same. It explains a world of multiple viewpoints and alternative ways of looking at 'objects'. 'Objects' are not necessarily fixed or static. They can be different, altering in condition and appearance. A worldview explained by 'change' allows recognition of more than a single ultimate

14 'Objects' is applied here in the same context as it is used in this analysis. It refers to objects as discursive representations.
principle; the world becomes multidimensional. The chameleon discourse contains talk of: types, aspects, forms, guises, levels, kinds, extremes, perspectives, multiple, different, open-ended, ambiguous, alternatives, shifting, multifaceted.

"Reflexivity can be briefly described as the, more or less, critical review of one's premises (Lawson, 1984) and can take the extreme form of a loss of belief in the fundamentals whether these be epistemological, moral or aesthetic. In this extreme case, all premises are permanently open to revision. Such a process is facilitated by the capacity to take up new perspectives from which to review previous commitments. It has been argued that this loss (or impermanence) of foundations characterises the present epoch (eg. Lyotard 1984; Deluze & Guattari 1983; Jameson 1984)." (Michael, 1990, p.179) (Underlining added)

This illustration talks about ways 'reflexivity' can be construed, that is, it 'can be briefly described as ...', and it 'can take the extreme form of ...'. The implications of the chameleon discourse here are that it may also be possible to talk about 'reflexivity' in a different way and that this explanation is not necessarily static or fixed. There is talk of premises remaining open and of new perspectives, implying alternative or multiple ways of viewing. The chameleon discourse makes reference here to a multidimensional worldview where many points of view may be valid.

Attention is drawn in the next illustration to the multiplicity of 'reflexivity' itself, rather than ways of construing 'reflexivity'.

"Reflexivity is seen as more than the condition of the psychological enterprise, of the reflective study of sentient beings. Reflexivity is also hailed as aiding accountability for discourse analytic readings by rendering interpretative resources and processes public and available for evaluation (Potter, 1988)." (Burman & Parker, 1993, pp 8-9) (Underlining added)

'Reflexivity' has various forms and can perform more than one function. It is 'seen as more' than one particular 'condition', that is 'the psychological enterprise'. Presumably in the condition of the psychological enterprise reflexivity is functional in some way, so it can be assumed that in a different condition it utilises a different function. Hence, in this instance it is 'also hailed' as able to perform a function which 'aids accountability for discourse analytic readings'. The chameleon discourse suggests in this illustration that
reflexivity, as an object, does not necessarily remain the same, and can alter in condition and appearance.

The following two extracts focus upon multidimensional views of the world.

"Finally we hoped that the process of feeding back would offer the opportunity for a reflexive analysis of the research process and our own role in case-conference discourses. This would 'democratise' the research by giving participants the opportunity to comment on our interpretations. We would explicitly recognise that there are multiple ways of conceptualising the case conference."

(Marks, 1993, p.139) (Underlining added)

The chameleon discourse clearly exposes in this illustration, multiple viewpoints and alternative ways of looking at things, in this instance, 'the case conference'. It allows for a multidimensional worldview.

"...methods must be open to reflexive self-critiquality. They must be sufficiently 'open' to alternative readings that we cannot be accused of being ineffective, or no more than relativistic."

(Curt, 1994, p.9) (Underlining added)

In this illustration there is a suggestion that in order for us to either be or appear effective multiple viewpoints and alternative ways of looking at things need to be employed.

In the next two illustrations it is the 'fluidity' of 'objects' which become the focus.

"Researchers with backgrounds in social studies of science, humanistic, or feminist research may conceptualise the issue of reflexivity differently. However, all face up to the task of making sense in some way of multiple, ambiguous and shifting meanings."

(Henwood & Parker, 1994, p.220) (Underlining added)

The suggestion here is that conceptualisations may be 'different', in other words they do not necessarily have to be the same. It is suggested that 'reflexivity' is not necessarily a fixed or static thing, but can alter in condition and appearance. This is inferred by 'multiple, ambiguous and shifting meanings' in relation to 'reflexivity'. The implications are of a multidimensional worldview allowing for difference and things that do not necessarily remain the same.
"... and reflexivity was here being used to enrich an analysis, rather than being pursued for its own end. This type of exercise can produce a mountain of data, and dialogical reflexivity can turn into infinite regress if one is not careful."

(Smith, 1994, p.260) (Underlining added)

The chameleon discourse in this illustration suggests that 'reflexivity' is more than one thing. It becomes something that can be used, and something which can be pursued. If care is not taken with the handling of 'reflexivity' it can also turn into something else, that is, infinite regress. This is a worldview of movement and fluidity, things are not necessarily fixed or static, and can alter in condition and appearance.

The COSMIC DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of expansion. Expansion explains a developing world with expanding ideas. Boundaries relax offering new and alternative conceptions of production, and contemplation of traditional performances. There is an enlargement of the scale or scope of disciplinary understanding. Different ways of thinking and speaking can be incorporated into what may have been a constrained disciplinary worldview.

The cosmic discourse contains two types of talk. It talks of: new mental stances, consciousness altering and raising, new Literary forms, exciting developments, cultural demystification, infinite sayings, and phenomena to be studied. It also contains talk such as: release from constrained ways of thinking, examining current frameworks of understanding, democratising research, rendering resources and processes public.

The following examples of the cosmic discourse illustrate exciting developments, expanding horizons, ways of enlarging the scope of disciplinary understanding, and the constraints of traditional worldviews, respectively.

"Reflexivity in these cases is a means of exploring one's own analysis, and is an exciting development which challenges the literary skills of the social scientist."

(Potter & Wetherall, 1987, p.184) (Underlining added)

'Reflexivity' is talked about here as something that can be used, in this instance, for exploration of 'one's own analysis'. Heralded as an 'exciting development' indications are that exploration of this kind has not previously been in common use. It is something
different, is allowing exploration of other ways of being in the world, and is greeted with enthusiasm.

“If we are to do reflexivity justice, Esterson is saying, we must recognise that it requires a new mental stance, an altered state of consciousness.”

(Reason & Rowan, 1981, p.168) (Underlining added)

Here, the focus is upon expanding horizons. Disciplines are faced with new tasks, in this instance ‘to do reflexivity justice’. New tasks need new ways of thinking, and alterations in ways of being in the world. Disciplines need to expand what may have been constrained and bounded ways of thinking in order to encompass new developments.

“C.A. Bowers (1984) argues that ‘reflexivity’ and ‘critique’ are the two essential skills we want our students to develop in their journey toward cultural demystification.”

(Lather, 1988, p.575) (Underlining added)

An emphasis upon ‘cultural demystification’ here gives a hint of secrets or obscurities needing exposure or clarification. A journey towards demystification of the cultural construction of the journeymakers infers ways of thinking and speaking which previously may not have been a part of a constrained disciplinary worldview. Enlarging the scale and scope of disciplinary understanding by talk of ‘cultural demystification’ allows incorporation of expanding ideas.

“Our own frameworks of understanding need to be critically examined as we look for the tensions and contradictions they might entail. Given such self-reflexivity, what DuBois (1983) calls “passionate scholarship” can lead us toward the development of a self-reflexive paradigm that no longer reduces issues of bias to a canonised method of establishing scientific knowledge.”

(Lather, 1988, p.576) (Underlining added)

In this illustration there is talk of ‘critically’ examining current ‘frameworks of understanding’. It is inferred that such a course will assist in the release of boundaries and constrictions surrounding the establishment of ‘scientific knowledge’. Ideas will be expanded and developed with the introduction of new ways of thinking, in this instance, ‘a self-reflexive paradigm’. New developments will have an effect upon methodology, that is, ‘issues of bias will no longer be reduced to a canonised method of establishing scientific knowledge’, thus enlarging the scope of disciplinary understanding.
"The history of reflexivity in the arts and humanities is as extensive as it is in philosophy. The difference is that the phenomenon has here been more frequently thought of as liberating than as threatening. Reflexivity promises a release, however temporary, from the constraints of representational realism."

(Ashmore, 1989, p.xxiv) (Underlining added)

'Reflexivity' is here named as 'phenomenon' inferring it is observable, it could be remarkable and there may be some question surrounding 'its' occurrence. The implications are that it does not necessary fit a 'traditional' worldview as it appears unstable (there are differences of opinion relating to the effects of reflexivity, ie, liberating or threatening), and that a traditional view, here named as 'representational realism' entails constraints. However, if thinking can be expanded, and reflexivity incorporated the boundaries restricting a constrained worldview can be released allowing other ways of being and thinking in the world.

The HERCULEAN DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of adversity. This is a world of arduous trial, of objects in opposition. Interests are opposed, forces are in conflict and there is contradiction of ideals often resulting in paradox. The Herculean discourse instigates talk of: problems, fallacies, dilemmas, difficulties, concerns and struggles.

The Herculean discourses that follow illustrate, respectively, adversity and opposition, contradiction of ideals, forces in conflict, struggle, and adversity.

"The way to surmount reflexive difficulties is to be aware of them and how they differentiate psychology from the other sciences, and to draw the consequences. Psychologists should seek to avoid fallacies of reflexivity, but not reflexivity."

(Oliver & Landfield, 1962, p.124) (Underlining added)

This illustration suggests ways and means by which 'difficulties' can be surmounted, and that 'fallacies' should be avoided. The worldview presented is one of adversity and opposition. 'Reflexivity' is surrounded by 'difficulties' and 'fallacies'. In other words 'reflexivity' is flawed and confronting it creates conflict.
"We have not solved those problems of reflexivity which are inescapable in a 'science of behaviour' remembering that 'psychology' is itself a human behaviour. ... The problem will remain until we experiment 'with' and not 'on'."

(Bannister, 1977, p.211) (Underlining added)

Here the focus is upon contradiction of ideals. 'Reflexivity' aligned with 'a science of behaviour' creates 'inescapable problems'. The inference in this illustration is of the paradoxical situation incurred when these two opposing forces necessarily meet, that is, 'psychology' as a human behaviour, must incorporate 'itself', yet the consequences are 'problems'. Without some kind of solution 'the problem will remain' and the conflict of opposing forces will continue.

"Doing DA (discourse analysis) involves a constant struggle to make sense of discursive organisations while avoiding reading practices of this kind. That is, the concern is with the discourse 'itself' rather than with the assumptions, expectation and ideas we might smuggle into it. The process of analysis is, much of the time, one of actively purging our readings of these things. In this sense, then, DA is a reflexive practice - it is a debate with our own taken-for-granted reading practices."

(Potter, 1988, p.48) (Underlining added)

In this illustration of forces in conflict 'reflexive practice', used to describe 'actively purging our readings of these things', is named as 'a constant struggle'. It is, however, incorporated into discourse analysis in order to 'do' discourse analysis. Paradox occurs here as well as the previous illustration yet the solution in this case is validation of adversity rather than negation or proposals for solution.

"The attempt to draw attention to our own role in the construction of our data implies that the more reflexive we are, the more progressive our work is. Such an approach leads to navel gazing and a competitive struggle 'to be more reflexive than thou'."

(Marks, 1993, p.139) (Underlining added)

Here it is the 'struggle' which is named once more as surrounding reflexive practice. Incorporation of the practice creates opposing interests. That is, users becomes engaged in 'competitive struggle'.
"...there are dilemmas raised by the conceptions of subjectivity and power which underpin discourse analysis, and with the notion of reflexivity it advocates (which has little in common with feminist conceptions)."

(Gill, 1995, p. 165) (Underlining added)

This illustration of adversity again focuses upon objects in opposition. These particular 'conceptions' and 'notions' are the site of problems and are contributing to a difficult situation, in this instance, they are raising dilemmas. There also appears to be a contradiction of ideals occurring here, that is, discourse analytic conceptions versus feminist conceptions.

At this point each of the seven discourses has been described and the worldview presented by each discourse has been demonstrated by the use of illustrations from the text. To briefly recap, the discourses are: the scientific discourse cohering around a metaphor of pragmatism, the production discourse cohering around a metaphor of performance, the identity discourse cohering around a metaphor of selfhood, the organic discourse cohering around a metaphor of organism, the chameleon discourse cohering around a metaphor of change, the cosmic discourse cohering around a metaphor of expansion, and the Herculean discourse cohering around a metaphor of adversity.

Besides a demonstration of my reading of the text the intention of this chapter was to place some clarity, or sense of understanding, around the ways in which each of these discourses present the world. That is the reason for focussing upon each discourse as a single object. They are all discourses of reflexivity yet in terms of worldview each provide a different 'picture'. It will be quite clear, however, that there are very few instances, if any, in the illustrations where a discourse is articulated 'alone' even though this demonstration has alluded to them as such. Most of the illustrations are producing two or more discourses in, for example, a single sentence, and it is toward this 'coarticulation of discourses' that attention will now turn.

Because each discourse has been identified it should now be possible to identify the types of objects the discourses produce when coarticulated. As well, clear identification of each discourse allows a sense of subject position for speakers to emerge. This includes constraints which may or may not apply to such positions. In effect, this is the
next stage of the process of 'taking apart' the text. Subject position and coarticulation of discourses will be the topics under discussion in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR - SUBJECT POSITION AND COARTICULATING DISCOURSES

During Chapter Three, while discussing the scientific discourse, I mentioned an idea that was developing in regard to use of the scientific discourse and location of the psychologist within the text; and how the psychologist may utilise discourse in order to discuss certain subjects or areas in psychology. My reference to the location of the psychologist referred to subject position and I shall briefly address this reference before we return to analysis.

To recapitulate; during Chapter Two while discussing 'Parker's style' of discourse analysis it was suggested that Parker's approach enables the analyst to look at how objects and subjects are constructed in discourse. It was suggested that the ways by which we are positioned as subjects and the ways we think about objects constructed by discourse are all framed by discourses. There was mention of Davies and Harre (1990) and the post-structuralist concept suggesting that among discourses the very persons who are engaging in them will also be found. In other words, discourses incorporate a location for subjects.

Within the analysis of this text the 'subjects' who are subject to analysis are psychologists, that is, those who are writing discourses of reflexivity. Within the text the psychologist writes in order to speak to us as readers. Essentially the way that the text can be perceived is as a relationship between addressee and addressee (Parker, 1990). As readers we become the addressee and can also be positioned as subjects within the text precisely because we take up a position in order to read, or understand the text. As a simple example, I read the text as a woman, whereas someone else may read it as a man, with different subject effects depending upon the gender position. However, the different ways by which readers as subjects may read involves a much broader analysis than is under consideration here. The focus of this analysis is the addressor, that is, the psychologist (and I believe one sociologist whom for the purposes of this analysis will be considered under the addressor label of psychologist15).

15 The sociologist referred to here is Ashmore (1989). Ashmore's work 'The Reflexive Thesis' although written from his perspective as sociologist, crosses boundaries and examines reflexivity in a number of disciplines, including psychology. Because his work has had a distinct influence upon
For each of the seven discourses identified in this analysis I have also identified a subject position provided for the psychologist by the use of each discourse. In other words when the psychologist uses a particular discourse he/she is located in a particular way within the text. Some subject positions have been identified by noticing the effects of coarticulating discourses, whereas others appear to be distinct products of a single worldview.

What I intend to do now is to briefly remind readers of each discourse and discuss subject position and coarticulation in relation to that subject position as it is produced by the discourse. My intention is to look at each discourse following the same order as in Chapter Three. In effect the analysis now takes into account Step 5 of Parker’s steps, that is, locating subject positions produced by speakers, but includes mention of coarticulation. By the end of this part of the analysis the picture of the world presented by each discourse, and the subject position produced by each discourse should be clear. Clarity in these areas will enable a move toward a full discussion of the coarticulation of discourses and the objects produced by such coarticulation.

The SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of pragmatism and contains talk such as: effect and consequences, data, proof, methods, experiments. The scientific discourse is organised around attention to facts and an absence of personal and social commitments. Accountability also forms a part of this discourse with practical values and researcher biases present within the talk.

The use of this discourse places the psychologist in the subject position of procreator. In other words the scientific discourse is a generator of other discourses. In these texts it legitimates the generation of discourses allied with the science field, for example, the production discourse. The scientific discourse fosters the use of such generated discourses by creating a sound and solid position for articulators. When the scientific discourse is coarticulated with, for example, the production discourse, the psychologist is provided with a powerful position supported, and endorsed, by a legitimate and widely

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this work (that is, it was one of the first texts to be read, and for a while formed a framework for most of my thinking about reflexivity) he has been included as an author under analysis.
accepted worldview, that is, pragmatism. The scientific discourse acts as a standard against which competing discourses, for example, the cosmic discourse, can be debated.

The following example, previously used on page 26 as an illustration of the scientific discourse, also serves to illustrate the production discourse as generated by the scientific discourse. This is how the illustration was presented on page 26, with talk relating to the scientific discourse emphasised.

"...the tactic of reflexively writing in the personal and social bases for knowledge (as part of making the research process accountable) can be conceptualised as moving towards a stronger form of 'objectivity' than is provided by the traditional scientific mode of reporting in psychology."

(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p.236) (Underlining added)

This is how the illustration will now be discussed, that is, with talk relevant to the production discourse also emphasised.

"...the tactic of reflexively writing in the personal and social bases for knowledge (as part of making the research process accountable) can be conceptualised as moving towards a stronger form of 'objectivity' than is provided by the traditional scientific mode of reporting in psychology."

(Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p.236) (Underlining added)

'Tactic' and 'traditional scientific mode of reporting' are both examples of talk contained in the production discourse. 'Tactic' can be considered as a way of producing work, or a requirement that a psychologist might be expected to perform (for example, 'use a tactic') in order to produce work. 'Traditional scientific mode of reporting' can be considered as a 'type' of work. Because the production discourse itself has been discussed previously I won't discuss its production within the text here. The focus here is upon generation of the production discourse by the scientific discourse.

In this illustration talk focuses upon making the research process accountable and moving towards a stronger form of objectivity, both examples of the scientific discourse. Without the scientific discourse talk of tactics and traditional scientific modes of reporting is unwarranted. A review of the types of talk contained within the production discourse, for example, practice of research, experimental work, construction of data, shows
associations with talk contained within the scientific discourse, for example, research, experiments, data. As demonstrated with this illustration the scientific discourse generates the production discourse. Use of the scientific discourse allows the psychologist to talk about the 'type' of work that takes place within the discipline. In other words, use of the scientific discourse provides the psychologist with the subject position of procreator because it allows legitimate talk, or generation, of other discourses.

The next discourse to be discussed in relation to subject position is the PRODUCTION DISCOURSE cohering around the metaphor of performance. This discourse contains talk of 'types' of work, for example: practice of research, reflexive practice, experimental work, discourse analysis; and talk of requirements necessary to perform or produce such work, for example: agility, flexibility, imagination.

The use of this discourse provides the psychologist with the subject position of producer, or director, of various practices in psychology; that is, 'types' of work. Besides allowing the psychologist to direct the 'types' of work performed the use of this discourse also allows the psychologist to direct which types of skills are useful and need to be developed, in order to perform the work produced by psychologists. The following illustration, provided by Parker (1994) demonstrates clearly the directive use of the production discourse.

"A central argument is that qualitative research in general, and a focus on reflexivity in particular, requires theoretical grounding."

(Parker, 1994, p.239) (Underlining added)

'Qualitative research' and 'a focus on reflexivity' are both produced as 'types' of work performed by psychologists. In order to perform in either arena the psychologist is required to have, or acquire, the 'skill' of 'theoretical grounding'.

Illustrations of psychologist as producer are not always as transparent as Parker's. In this illustration from Potter (1988) it is less apparent.

"The analyst constantly has to ask: why am I reading this passage in this way? And what features of the discourse allow me to produce this reading? The studies draw attention to the detail of their readings of transcript. To this extent they are drawing upon a reflexive analytic strategy.

(Potter, 1988, p.48) (Underlining added)
The focus of this passage is a ‘type’ of work, that is, ‘a reflexive analytic strategy’. The direction occurs in the use of questions. There is a requirement to be cognisant with ways of reading, and features of discourse, and also to draw attention to such details when ‘writing-up’ a study. These are the skills which are useful and which need to be developed in order to perform a reflexive analytic strategy. The producer, that is the psychologist, has produced a practice in psychology, and directed the way to do it.

I would like to suggest that coarticulation of the production discourse and the scientific discourse add strength, conviction, and consequently authority, to the production discourse; the production discourse has a subtle and legitimating backer for support. It will be quite clear that both of the abovementioned illustrations also draw upon the scientific discourse, for example, ‘qualitative research’ and ‘analytic’ respectively. As was discussed previously the production discourse cannot be generated, in these texts, without the presence of the scientific discourse and the two discourses are always found in coarticulation.

The following discourse produces two subject positions which appear interchangeable, rather than one clearly perceptible subject position as in the previous two discourses. It is the IDENTITY DISCOURSE and it coheres around a mixed metaphor of selfhood/personhood. The identity discourse contains talk such as: self-reference, self-reflexivity, self-reflexive, our own role, theoretical position, the analyst, researchers, feminist reflexivity, psychologists.

Within this discourse the self continuously refers back to the self. With the ‘self’ as a referent indications are that the self is both the object and the subject of research, for example, human research is undertaken by humans. Use of this discourse produces and locates the researcher/psychologist as a research subject. This allows the researcher/psychologist to position his/herself alongside, or the same as, any other, or all other, participants in a research process, plus, allows research relationships to be viewed as equatable\(^\text{16}\). Such talk as, for example, ‘self, role, position’, act to produce personhood, thus constituting the researcher/psychologist as a person as well as a

\(^{16}\) In other words, a ‘same/no difference’ relationship.
research subject. The two subject positions apparent within this discourse become those of research subject, and person. Constitution as a person allows the adoption of named roles, such as, 'analyst, feminist researcher, practising psychologist', to be drawn from discourses such as, in this instance, the production and scientific discourses.

Deconstructing the identity discourse shows quite clearly its composite structure and the way it is able to draw references of identity from other discourses in the text. The coarticulation of the identity discourse with other discourses adds another dimension to the psychologists dual position of subject/person. Within the identity discourse a person is located as research subject and as person. Coarticulation provides person with a named role, that is, person adopts a named role from another discourse. Once a named role has been adopted persons location as person shifts and becomes 'designated person', for example, analyst, feminist researcher, practicing psychologist.

It could be suggested that the identity discourse actually produces three subject positions, that is, research subject/person/designated person, and that they are so intertwined they appear interchangeable. However, I would suggest that the positions are 'research subject' and 'person/designated person' because more often than not, the purpose behind location as a person is adoption of a named role. What is of interest here is that even though the identity discourse articulates object and subject as interchangeable, and in essence 'the same', the naming or designating of roles acts to separate and create difference. In effect there is an element of 'disguise' inherent within the identity discourse. There are times when it masquerades as defining equivalence while camouflaging imbalance.

The following example, used previously on page 32, illustrates the dual aspects provided by the identity discourse, including an element of disguise.
“However, in taking reflexivity seriously the committed feminist researcher could extend his or her reflexive analysis by means of a continuous monitoring of his or her own role within the research relationships, making a self-conscious attempt to delineate as fully as possible the forms and processes of his or her influence.”

(Wilkinson, 1988, p.495) (Underlining added)

The use of ‘own role’ and ‘self-conscious’ allow the speaker to be produced, respectively, both as a ‘person’, and as ‘research subject’. Positioning as ‘research subject’ suggests equivalence in the relationship between researcher and research participants. All are research subjects/participants, even the researcher, and all are subject to some kind of monitoring. Constitution as a person allows designation of a named role, in this instance, ‘committed feminist researcher’, allowing the researcher/psychologist to claim identification. Such a designation intrudes upon the equivalent relationship by differentiating between the researcher as ‘research subject’, and the researcher as ‘designated person’. The apparent equivalence of the research relationship is ostensibly diminished. The diminishment of equivalence is, however, not apparent until the action of the identity discourse within the text is disclosed.

The ORGANIC DISCOURSE coheres around the metaphor of the organism. Talk such as: life, branches, whole, origin, thrives, produce psychology and the work of psychology as a living entity. The organic discourse provides the psychologist with the subject position of the gardener, or biologist. Speaking from this position allows the psychologist to maintain direction and control over growth because the psychologist is in charge of the growing environment. It is the psychologist who infers for example, ‘creation’ - ‘Reflexivity can be created...” (Gadlin & Ingle, 1975, p.1008); ‘frameworks’ or ‘structures’ - ‘Our own frameworks of understanding...” (Lather, 1988, p.576); that objects evolve, have characteristics and movement - “...in order to assess its origin, nature, and activity - if any!” (Wilkinson, 1988, p.493); and that objects need sustaining - “...reflexivity seems to demand...and thrives on...” (Gibbons et al, 1994, p.102). When coarticulated with the Herculean discourse, maintaining stability of the environment can be assured by the ‘gardeners/psychologists’ instigation of structures and frameworks thus ensuring that organisms do not get out of control and cause problems.

Cohering around a metaphor of change is the CHAMELEON DISCOURSE. It contains talk of types, aspects, forms, multiple, alternatives, shifting, multifaceted. As discussed
previously, the metaphor of 'change' allows a multidimensional worldview, it allows for recognition of more than a single ultimate principle.

The chameleon discourse provides a subject position for the psychologist of legitimate arbitrator and acts to legitimate pluralism. Use of the chameleon discourse legitimates entry, or allows other discourses to join or merge with easily recognised well established discourses, such as, the scientific discourse. As 'legitimate arbitrator' the psychologist can use the chameleon discourse to 'open doorways'. For example, 'new literary forms' (cosmic discourse), or 'discourse analysis' (production discourse) can be considered as aspects, perspectives, or even alternative views within the discipline of psychology. The chameleon discourse sanctions inclusion of such views within coarticulated scientific and production discourses. This inclusion suggests that there is not necessarily only one acceptable objective measure of truth, but that there may be alternative perspectives that can be legitimately discussed. A discourse such as the cosmic discourse can legitimately be debated alongside a scientific, production or identity discourse because the chameleon discourse 'paves the way' for this to happen.

The following example, previously used on page 30, illustrates the chameleon discourse acting to legitimate pluralism.

"...I shall suggest that one of the virtues of DA (discourse analysis) is exactly its incorporation of a certain type of practice which offers up detailed interpretations of scientist's texts for scrutiny. Moreover this practice is displayed in a way which is itself a New Literary Form designed to facilitate certain interpretative procedures on the part of the reader."

(Potter, 1988, p.39) (Underlining added)

Emphasised in this illustration are examples of the production discourse (DA, practice), the scientific discourse (analysis), the chameleon discourse (a certain type, Form), and the cosmic discourse (New Literary Form). Incorporation of the chameleon discourse focuses attention upon the idea of a multidimensional worldview, implying alternative ways of viewing the world; hence talk such as 'type', or 'form' can be applied to talk contained in other discourses such as 'analysis' or 'practice'. Discourse analysis can contain discrete virtues, and 'types' of practices can exist because the chameleon discourse is acting to legitimate the incorporation of more than one ultimate principle, that
is, it is acting to legitimate pluralism. The psychologist introduces this discourse as 'legitimate arbitrator', thus sanctioning coarticulation of the discourses within this illustration. Legitimate sanctions support coarticulation of, for example, the cosmic discourse (New Literary Form) with the scientific and production discourses, which in turn grants the cosmic discourse legitimate authority, within this illustration.

An interesting facet of the chameleon discourse is, however, that it also introduces an element of instability. Talk such as multifaceted, alternative, open-ended, and shifting, act to contradict a single objective reality. Such contradictions have effects. This effect of the chameleon discourse can be seen in the emergence of the Herculean discourse.

The COSMIC DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of expansion. It contains talk of: new mental stances, consciousness altering and raising, exciting developments. It also contains talk such as: release from constrained ways of thinking.

The example used above to illustrate the chameleon discourse also illustrates the cosmic discourse coarticulating with the chameleon, scientific and production discourses. Used alongside the chameleon discourse the cosmic discourse surreptitiously advocates political change whilst allowing the psychologist to be viewed as 'merely' entering into debate. For example, talk of new mental stances, new literary forms, release from constrained ways of thinking, and democratising research, are implicitly political. Such talk advocates what should be happening within psychology, and what psychologists should be doing. However, when coarticulating the cosmic discourse the psychologist is able to be indirect rather than blatant. In effect, when the cosmic discourse is coarticulated with the scientific, production and chameleon discourses, as in the above illustration, the psychologist becomes positioned as a democratic artisan rather than a politician. Coarticulation allows the psychologist as democratic artisan to participate in debate rather than appear to be acting in opposition to a 'dominant' worldview.

The HERCULEAN DISCOURSE coheres around a metaphor of adversity. It contains talk of: problems, fallacies, liabilities, difficulties, concerns and struggles. Surprisingly, the Herculean discourse appears to provide a subject position for the psychologist as Houdini. That is, use of the Herculean discourse can provide an effective escape route
and allow disruption of objects under discussion. To talk of something as a problem, a liability, or containing fallacies, shifts the focus of discussion onto, for example, consequences of problems, or problem solving. Instead of focusing upon reflexivity psychologists can focus upon the problem of reflexivity. Focus upon the problem suggests that reflexivity is problematic whereas something else may be problematic, such as, ideals in conflict. When a 'subject' does not fit easily into recognisable parameters an effective tactic is to utilise the Herculean discourse thereby avoiding the 'subject' as a central theme.

That completes identification of subject positions. A brief recapitulation of the discourses as I now understand them, shows that each discourse together with its underlying worldview, and the subject position it provides for psychologists, has been identified and named. As labelled discourses they appear as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Worldview</th>
<th>Subject Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Procreator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Producer/Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Selfhood</td>
<td>Human Subject/Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>Organism</td>
<td>Gardener/Biologist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chameleon</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Legitimate Arbitrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmic</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Democratic Artisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herculean</td>
<td>Adversity</td>
<td>Houdini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While writing this section of the analysis I have noticed that although each discourse has been identified and reduced to a bound object (that is, defined by the boundaries of worldview and subject position), when discourses coarticulate such boundaries can become blurred.

Subject position appears to enable the psychologist to talk about some things, but not necessarily about others. Although a discourse provides a location from which the psychologist can speak (write) it also places constraints upon the speaker depending upon the worldview produced by the discourse. Moreover, some speaking locations
appear to be produced in isolation by a discourse as a single object, and thus appear to act singularly, whilst other positions appear fortified as discourses coarticulate. In other words, coarticulation alters the status of the discourse and consequently effects positioning.

This altering of status is the area upon which I would like to focus now. The objects under analysis are discourses of reflexivity. The discourses of reflexivity are in coarticulation; if boundaries are blurring in coarticulation it becomes necessary to explore such blurring in order to examine any shift in status.

In isolation the scientific discourse produces the subject position of procreator. As has been previously discussed it is a generating discourse. In coarticulation the scientific discourse can be viewed as legitimating the generation of each of the other discourses. The entire text under analysis can be considered as psychological discourse because it is produced by psychologists. As a discipline psychology applies the scientific discourse to disciplinary affairs; as a procreating discourse it becomes a legitimating discourse.

In other words, if psychologists were not using the scientific discourse in the first place, the other discourses under analysis here may not exist in the form that they do. From this point of view the subject position of procreator allows the psychologist to produce the other six discourses. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the psychologist can speak as procreator from other locations. If, for example, the focus of text is upon the cosmic discourse, indications are that the psychologist has changed location, and is speaking as democratic artisan, rather than procreator. However, if the psychologist coarticulates as procreator, that is, the scientific discourse remains dominant within the text, I would suggest that such a speaking location confers constraints upon other discourses.

In other words the scientific discourse overrides other discourses. Discourses such as the cosmic, or the organic become constrained by pragmatism. They appear to offer worldviews of expansion and organism, but the cosmic has nowhere to expand, and the organism cannot grow how it wishes. They are held in check by the scientific discourse and the procreator. What this indicates for this analysis is that as procreator the
psychologist can talk about some things, but not about others; the worldview of pragmatism places constraints upon the speaker. As procreator the speaker can only speak from a location produced by pragmatism.

A similar process occurs with the production discourse. Despite its own worldview of performance the production discourse is generated by the scientific discourse, and is, therefore, surreptitiously dominated by pragmatism. Although in coarticulation the production discourse may appear alongside the cosmic discourse, for example, “Our own frameworks of understanding need to be critically examined” (Lather, 1988, p.576), the ‘skills’ of ‘critical examination’ act as a constraint to users of the production discourse. Constrained by pragmatism the producer has no way of performing other than that provided by the production discourse. By incorporating the production discourse, as in this example, users of the cosmic discourse have no way of expanding their ideas. In coarticulation the producer becomes the pragmatic producer, and consequently speaks from a constricted worldview. Speaking as pragmatic producer constrains the discourses in coarticulation.

The dual positions of research subject/person produced by the identity discourse maintain duality within coarticulation yet are enabled or constrained in different ways. As previously discussed, constitution as a person produces the subject position of designated person. In coarticulation, designated person drawn from the scientific or production discourses is substantiated by pragmatism, and consequently maintains a powerful position. In essence, designated person, can be fortified by coarticulation, which enables speaking with some authority. However, adoption of named roles from constrained discourses could have consequences depending upon whether or not the psychologist also adopts a role. (For example, if the psychologist as ‘the researcher’ believes a researcher should act and speak from one particular location only, the effects could be restrictive)

17 ‘Critical examination ‘skills’” is produced by the production discourse.
18 Powerful here refers to discourses that override other discourses by constraining the worldview of other discourses. The ability to override another discourse indicates some superiority or supersedence which is translated here as ‘powerful’.
As research subject I would suggest that the psychologist is able to harmoniously coarticulate with discourses such as chameleon, cosmic or organic, and maintain a position. These three discourses do not appear to have such an overt investment in dominance, and it is in coarticulation with these discourses that the identity discourse focusing upon the psychologist as research subject is most often found. However, the psychologist as research subject in coarticulation with the production, scientific or Herculean discourses finds difficulty in maintaining a stance, and has a tendency to diminish, disappear, or become neutralised. In effect the 'strong' position of the scientific and production discourses, coming as they do, from a worldview of pragmatism, have a tendency to override this portion of the identity discourse hailing as it does from a worldview of selfhood. They clash, and pragmatism wins. The Herculean discourse simply neutralises research subject by declaring such discourse a problem.

The organic discourse and its subject position of gardener/biologist is somewhat different. It appears to be benign except when coarticulated with the Herculean discourse. The Herculean discourse with a worldview of adversity, provides impetus for the gardener to install frameworks, create structures, and arrange living environments in order to diminish problems. Coarticulation of the organic and Herculean discourses produces a town planner in charge of design as well as maintenance of environment. In other words the subject position of gardener is transformed.

Although the organic discourse appears benign when coarticulated with discourses other than the Herculean I would suggest that it may produce constraints in terms of worldview. Coarticulation with a worldview of organism may act to reinforce the idea of structural systems analogous to organic processes as relevant and applicable to all 'things'. Such a view may create bias and alternative 'systems' may be dismissed, or passed by.

With regard to the cosmic discourse, the psychologist as democratic artisan appears to maintain this position in coarticulation. However, as has been discussed, the cosmic discourse appears to require coarticulation with the chameleon discourse in order to be considered legitimate. It could therefore be suggested that in coarticulation with the chameleon discourse, the democratic artisan becomes the legitimate democratic artisan. In coarticulation with other discourses, and without the presence of the chameleon
discourse, the democratic artisan may not be considered legitimate, and may, therefore, lose some authority.

The chameleon, and Herculean discourse appear to be able to coarticulate with any of the other discourses and remain unaltered. They appear to transcend the authority of pragmatism and have their own authority. They are not restricted by a worldview of pragmatism, and can be coarticulated with any discourse in any situation. The Herculean discourse may be viewed as constraining other worldviews but, it itself, is not constrained. Indeed the Herculean discourse can act to constrain even the chameleon discourse; Houdini can suggest, for example, that a particular perspective proposed by the legitimate arbitrator is a problem.

At this stage of the analysis I want to get a big load hailer, stand on a chair, and shout, 'Hey, look what I've discovered'. It simply never occurred to me that the discourses may be effecting each other in this way. It now appears that the scientific discourse, a dominant discourse, is able to influence and override practically all of the other discourses. The chameleon discourse, despite less use than the scientific discourse, still maintains a powerful position as 'door opener', and the Herculean discourse, used sparsely, appears as a powerful discourse. It has the power to disrupt each of the discourses under analysis, even itself, for example, a problem can be a problem.

My explanation of how the discourses look after considering coarticulation goes something like this.

The scientific and production discourses and a portion of the identity discourse tend to be grouped together. In coarticulation, they are formidable, but constrained by their own worldview.

The chameleon discourse is formidable and generally unconstrained by worldview. It is often joined by the cosmic discourse, and the other portion of the identity discourse, both of which gain legitimate status in this union. Thus, these three in coarticulation can also be considered as formidable, and not necessarily constrained unless they coarticulate with one of the above.
The organic discourse appears as a floater and coarticulates with all the other discourses. However, it acts to constrain by virtue of its worldview. In coarticulation it is surreptitious. When acting overtly it coarticulates with the Herculean discourse.

The Herculean discourse coarticulates with any of the other discourses. It can be formidable and acts as a disruptor.

I believe at this stage of the analysis some clarity has been gained about worldview, subject position, and coarticulation of discourses. It seems appropriate now to discuss how all that has been deconstructed coarticulates to produce the object - reflexivity.
I wonder now if it is appropriate to 'discuss how all that has been deconstructed coarticulates to produce the object - reflexivity'. At the beginning of this analysis I proposed that the analysis is a process of 'taking apart and putting back together'. I assumed that in order to expose the phenomenon of reflexivity, reflexivity as text must first of all be deconstructed; that deconstruction would reveal the 'make-up' of reflexivity. Once the 'make-up' was understood I assumed it could be put back together thus revealing a clearly understandable reflexivity. I wonder now whether I haven't been mistaken in this assumption. As I think about what 'putting it back together' might mean; it seems to be about taking a look at how located speakers might construct R; how they put it together. The phenomenon has been revealed by deconstruction, and the deconstruction seems to suggest that there may not be one definitive clearly understandable reflexivity.

These are my thoughts as I commence this chapter. In particular I notice that I am not clear about what the analysis has revealed which makes it very difficult to inform readers. Therefore my intention is to carefully discuss my understanding of the analysis, and how reflexivity is revealed through this understanding.

Deconstruction is about revealing, unwrapping, disclosing, taking apart and having a look. Deconstruction of the text (discourses of reflexivity) has meant that I have produced some understanding of discourses of reflexivity. I have seen how several objects (seven discourses) coarticulate to produce reflexivity. The answer to - 'what is reflexivity?' - appears to be, that reflexivity is an effect of coarticulating discourses. It is the result of a textual process, the process being coarticulation of discursive objects. No doubt reflexivity could be produced differently, but in psychology, within the texts under analysis, it is produced by the seven objects which have been revealed by the deconstructive process of discourse analysis.

19 I use the word 'carefully' here because although I expected the analysis, at this point, to produce a clearly definable 'object' I now find I am experiencing some confusion about what are objects and what are not, and what is actually going on here anyway. It will be useful for me, and maybe for some readers, if I carefully, step by step, 'uncover' my understanding, so that productions of the analysis are quite clear.
Deconstruction of the text has disclosed the production of reflexivity. It has shown that reflexivity as an object is unstable. Reflexivity is not like a 'table', or like 'doing the dishes', both of which could be considered as relatively stable objects. Stability here is referring, generally, to consensus. As 'stable' objects, a 'table' and 'doing the dishes', are produced by coarticulation of discourse in the same way that reflexivity is produced by discourse, but there is general consensus about their production. Consensus about production produces a 'stable' object. There is no such consensus about reflexivity.

Reflexivity is unstable because the discourses producing reflexivity coarticulate in many different ways. The ways by which they coarticulate produce different effects, even though coarticulation may be naming these different effects as reflexivity. There may or there may not be a 'true' reflexivity; this analysis has revealed that as an unstable object reflexivity can be many things.

The discourses used to talk of reflexivity produce the object - reflexivity. For example, use of the cosmic discourse produces reflexivity as expansive, use of the Herculean discourse produces reflexivity as problematic, use of the chameleon discourse produces reflexivity as changeable. Discourse produces an object which is consistent with the worldview of the discourse. In this analysis discourse is producing objects (reflexivity) consistent with, pragmatism, performance, selfhood, organism, change, expansion, and adversity; the worldviews of the seven disclosed discourses.

For example, producing reflexivity as expansive, through the cosmic discourse, produces movement away from dominant paradigmatic thinking into, for example, 'new literary forms'. Reflexivity takes on a qualities of exploration and trying out new or different things. These qualities are provided by the cosmic discourse infusing reflexivity with a worldview of expansion.

A reflexivity produced by use of the scientific discourse will have different qualities. It is unlikely to appear as, or incorporate, a 'new literary form' because the scientific discourse does not incorporate talk of expansion. Infused with a worldview of pragmatism this is a reflexivity which may concentrate on, for example, theoretical paradox, or accounting for theory by examining consequences of actions. It will be a pragmatic reflexivity.
Assuming that discourses of reflexivity are bounded objects, as above, and during the analysis, allows me to speculate about how use of discourses might produce reflexivity prior to influences of coarticulation. Use of a discourse will allow located speakers to produce a reflexivity consistent with a particular worldview. The reflexivity produced will reflect characteristics of the producing worldview.

A reflexivity as produced by bounded objects is, however, conjecture. The discourses are bounded only as objects of analysis. However, viewing them as bounded provides clear productions of worldview and subject position, and demonstrates reflexivity as an effect with characteristics related to production. Understanding these textual processes means I can understand why, for example, coarticulation of ‘chameleon, cosmic, production, and identity’, compared to coarticulation of ‘scientific, production, identity, and Herculean’, will not necessarily produce the same reflexivity. Worldview, subject positions, and consequently characteristics, intertwine in coarticulation.

During Chapter One I was confused about the apparent movement and fluidity of reflexivity. Reflexivity appeared as an object with movement and fluidity, but it, in itself is no/thing. After looking at how it is constituted it becomes clear that it is the textual processes producing reflexivity which ‘move’ (intertwine) as part of the process of coarticulation, not any such thing as reflexivity. In other words, movement is not a characteristic of the ‘object’ reflexivity, it is characteristic of discourses in coarticulation.

In coarticulation boundaries blur, subject positions adjust, and power relations²⁰ emerge. The discourses appear to be competing. The ‘reflexivity/effect’ is characterised by whichever is the most powerful, the most dominant discourse within coarticulation. Use of the discourses either constrains or enables worldviews, and produces different effects depending upon the power relationships constructed in/through coarticulation. In order to understand and recognise a produced effect it is necessary to have access to the discourses used to produce the effect. The discourse analysis applied in this thesis has provided access to discourses of reflexivity so that effects of production can be recognised and talked about.

²⁰ Power relations refers to systems of domination and subjugation that are reproduced by discourses.
For example, as an effect reflexivity is characterised as 'something' that can be created. The effect is often brought under the umbrella of the production discourse and named as a 'practice'.

Naming reflexivity as practice locates the psychologist as producer/director and infuses the produced effect with a performance worldview. As an effect directed by the producer, the ontological status of reflexivity can become submerged if, for example, it is named as a specific and attainable skill (p.30), or if it is assumed that skills are required to perform reflexivity (p.30). In other words, reflexivity will be considered 'a skill', or 'skill oriented', rather than an effect.

The production discourse is surreptitiously dominated by pragmatism (p.56), the worldview of the scientific discourse. Naming reflexivity as practice therefore indicates an effect produced by coarticulation of scientific and production discourses. In such coarticulation, the producer becomes the pragmatic producer (p.56) with a production oriented reflexivity reflecting a worldview infused with pragmatism. Such infusion not only legitimates the status of reflexivity as practice, but also produces an effect characterised by pragmatism. For example, reflexivity can be infused with the characteristics of a definable object (p.28), thus allowing it to be shaped and directed. It can be designed as various practical problem solving tools, thus characterised as malleable; able to be used to carry out specific practical functions (p.27). It can be used to focus upon accountability and objectivity (p.26), or considered in more general terms of usefulness. Characterised as such it can act to restrain 'reflexivity/effects' produced by other discourses. For example, Potter and Wetherall discuss 'new literary forms', but produce the aim of such work as goal orientated, thus restraining characteristics of such forms within the realm of the scientific discourse (p.27). Such restraints maintain 'new literary forms' as bounded, and aligned with a pragmatic reflexivity, rather than an expansive (cosmic) reflexivity.

To summarise so far, it seems clear that reflexivity is no thing, in the sense that it is no one object. Rather, coarticulation of discourse produces a number of effects all named reflexivity. It is not stable. As an effect reflexivity has characteristics provided through its production. Subject positions provided by discourses adjust during coarticulation, and systems of domination and subjugation emerge (pp54-59). The character of reflexivity is
consistent with the most dominant discourse within coarticulation. In psychology reflexivity is often named as 'practice'. This particular naming produces an effect with particular consequences resulting from coarticulation. Access to 'discourses of reflexivity', has been produced here by using discourse analysis which has provided the means to talk about the effects and the 'consequences' of coarticulation. The production of reflexivity in this analysis is an effect of my own initial assumptions and the choice of analysis. Different assumptions and a different analytic resource may have produced a different reflexivity, for example, reflexivity may have emerged as a stable, bounded object, rather than an effect of coarticulating discourse.

This analysis has revealed the scientific discourse as dominant in psychology. Not only is it the discourse of most frequent use, it also allows the psychologist, as procreator, to generate the other six discourses as psychological texts. However, its dominance acts to constrain other discourse with its worldview of pragmatism. As demonstrated above coarticulation of the scientific and production discourses acts to constrain reflexivity to a worldview of pragmatism, and can act to disenfranchise the coarticulation effects of other discourses (p.56). This indicates that a reflexivity/effect produced by this discourse may be warranted a powerful and dominant position compared to effects of different coarticulation. The legitimate arbitrator of the chameleon discourse may diffuse this power position by producing a reflexivity/effect infused with change. However, although the chameleon discourse is an enabler, it is not as often used as the scientific discourse, and, if the chameleon discourses comes under domination any change it introduces may be assimilated into scientific/production discourse. The domination of the scientific discourse leaves little room for effects which may be just as legitimate as a 'pragmatic reflexivity', and it may even be detrimental to the discipline to approve such dominance without acknowledgment of possible consequences.

However, it is all very well to propose dire consequences and suppositions from the confines of this analysis alone. I am also very much aware of how the scientific discourse constrains my own assumptions, not only in the way I talk of dominance and subjugation, power relations, competing discourses, and the relationships between discourses, but

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21 Psychology here refers to the text under analysis. The text is considered as psychological discourse and is being used as representative of the discipline.
also in the way this work is framed and presented. I have been trained and I work within the discipline of psychology. My own 'speak' is dominated by the scientific discourse. For this work I could not coarticulate the chameleon discourse with its worldview of change, multiple viewpoints and alternative ways of looking at things, with the cosmic discourse, offering alternative conceptions of production, in order to explain reflexivity because reflexivity may have looked something like this.
nothing
It is unlikely that this thesis would have been even considered for a grade if it had been presented in such a form, so in essence this entire work is dominated by the scientific discourse. The scientific discourse not only dominates discourses of reflexivity, and my own 'speak', but also produces institutional constraints which determine how a psychology thesis should be performed.

What I am thinking now is that talk of how the seven discourses coarticulate, produce, provide and create could 'go on for ever'. With my own talk, and thinking, dominated by the scientific discourse, which can make talk of other discourses frustrating and difficult, and 'the fact' that I don't have for ever for this work, I think it may be more useful to make use of the seven discourses as a resource²².

Reflexivity is contained in language, and a resource that looks at language, that is, discourse analysis, has been used to look at reflexivity. Access to 'discourses of reflexivity', produced by the resource of discourse analysis, provided the means to talk about effects and 'consequences' of coarticulation. In the same way that discourse analysis, as a resource, produced the seven discourses, these seven discourses may now be considered a resource enabling me to talk about another text.

What I propose is to briefly look at a text, and see how my 'new' resource informs what is happening in terms of effects of coarticulation and power relations. In other words the text will be analysed so that the reflexivity produced, plus the possible consequences of such a production, are exposed. The preparation for this task, and the results are available in the following chapter.

²² To 'make use of' the seven discourses 'as a resource' is also a constraint of the scientific discourse. 'Useful' becomes a criteria for 'practice'.
CHAPTER SIX - DISCOURSES OF REFLEXIVITY: A RESOURCE IN ACTION

Three texts were considered for analysis; Smith (1978), Moustakas (1981), and Smith (1994). The first two were cited in Chapter One as 'fine working examples of reflexivity in practice'. It would be extremely interesting for me to look at these now, ten months later. Analysis would surely reveal my own personal construction of reflexivity at that time, which I could compare to where I might be now. I have no doubt that an analysis of these works would also reveal aspects of power relations unapparent on a 'normal' reading.

However, the final choice was Smith (1994). Smith was also read near the beginning of this work, and it was this particular reading which gave me the idea of R-political:

R-political is a term coined by the author (me) and refers, at this stage, to the practice of 'reciprocity' named as 'reflexivity'. R-political could be considered as the reflexivity you do when you are not doing reflexivity, and will be discussed in another chapter (footnote 3, p.14).

During my first reading of Smith I had a 'feeling' that he named what he was doing as 'reflexivity', but was actually talking about reciprocity. As his text was published as part of a special issue incorporating reflexivity I suspected that Smith was being 'politically correct' in addressing the issue, but that he was actually talking about something else. Consequently the term 'R-political' emerged. This presumption of mine was obviously based upon my own vague, unformed, and unvoiced preconceptions of what I thought reflexivity was, and had no basis in anything other than an unexplored feeling.

My presumption now is that Smith's reflexivity is produced as an effect of his particular coarticulation of discourses of reflexivity, and it is this presumption which I wish to briefly explore. I do not intend to analyse the entire work, because that would be a thesis in itself, so I have chosen to include Smith's abstract, plus two other excerpts which appear to particularly relate to talk of reflexivity. From these excerpts I have looked at 'discourses of reflexivity' in order to determine both the produced effect/reflexivity, and power relations occurring in the text.

The first excerpt for consideration is the following abstract.

23 A different Smith to 1978.
ABSTRACT
This paper considers some of the implications of reflexivity for the practice of psychological research. After a brief consideration of the theoretical background to a concern with reflexivity, this paper goes on to examine how various researchers have attempted to incorporate components of reflexivity in their research practice. While a group of sociologists of science have operationalized reflexivity by self-conscious concern for their own role in the construction of social-scientific knowledge, new paradigm co-operative inquirers interpret a need for reflexivity by including their participants as fully self-reflexive co-researchers. Mulkay's suggestion for a dialogic analytical exchange with one's participants is also considered. The second half of the paper illustrates an attempt at reflexive practice in the author's own research. This was a project concerned with identity change during the transition to motherhood, and aimed to allow the women a strong hand in helping to shape to project's direction. Preliminary analysis of a woman's data was taken back to her for her comments, and her reflections on the data were incorporated in the final case study. A detailed example of the investigator and participant's discussion of a piece of data is provided. (Smith, 1994, p.253).

Although this excerpt is considered to be an entire production, for the purposes of analysis it will initially be treated as though individual productions are occurring within the whole. The excerpt begins with coarticulation of the scientific and production discourses (recognised through the terms: paper, implications, practice, psychological research; respectively) thus producing a legitimate location for Smith as procreator of the work. However, my reading of this abstract identifies two particular productions as pivotal to Smith's argument for the effect/reflexivity he is about to demonstrate, and because of their importance to his construction I will concentrate upon these. They are identified below.

ABSTRACT
This paper considers some of the implications of reflexivity for the practice of psychological research. After a brief consideration of the theoretical background to a concern with reflexivity, this paper goes on to examine how various researchers have attempted to incorporate components of reflexivity in their research practice. While a group of sociologists of science have operationalized reflexivity by self-conscious concern for their own role in the construction of social-scientific knowledge, new paradigm co-operative inquirers interpret a need for reflexivity by including their participants as fully self-reflexive co-researchers. Mulkay's suggestion for a dialogic analytical exchange with one's participants is also considered. The second half of the paper illustrates an attempt at reflexive practice in the author's own research. This was a project concerned with identity change during the transition to motherhood, and aimed to allow the women a strong hand in helping to shape to project's direction. Preliminary analysis of a woman's data was taken back to her for her comments, and her reflections on the data were incorporated in the final case study. A detailed example of the investigator and participant's discussion of a piece of data is provided. (Smith, 1994, p.253).

Looking at each production individually allows examination of discourses in coarticulation.
"After a brief consideration of the theoretical background to a concern with reflexivity, this paper goes on to examine how various researchers have attempted to incorporate components of reflexivity in their research practice." (Underlining added)

'Theoretical', 'examine', and 'research', are considered as examples of the scientific discourse. 'Various researchers' represents the identity discourse. 'To incorporate', thought of as the skill of incorporating, and 'research practice' are examples of the production discourse, whereas 'components' belongs with the chameleon discourse. In this sentence scientific, production, identity and chameleon discourses are in coarticulation.

The 'legitimate arbitrator' (chameleon) introduces a worldview of 'change', with talk of 'components of reflexivity', indicating that reflexivity is 'made up' of many parts; reflexivity can be viewed in various ways and is not necessarily static. Although the chameleon discourse is a legitimating discourse in its own right, within the context of this production the idea of 'components' is further fortified by coarticulation with the scientific and production discourses. In other words the chameleon is assimilated into scientific/production discourse. Reference to multiple 'designated persons', provided by the identity discourse, that is, 'various researchers', in coarticulation with the scientific and production discourses not only lends authority to the work of these researchers, but empowers the work itself, that is, more than one or two 'designated persons' are endorsing the incorporation of components of reflexivity in research practice. In essence the outcome of coarticulation of the chameleon discourse with the formidable combination of scientific, production and identity discourses serves to convincingly sanction the concept of a manifold reflexivity.

With the concept of a manifold reflexivity a legitimate and convincing production of a dominant paradigmatic worldview (provided by coarticulation of the scientific and production discourses) Smith can now incorporate a justification for the 'methodology' used in his paper.
"...new paradigm co-operative inquirers interpret a need for reflexivity by including their participants as fully self-reflexive co-researchers". (Underlining added)

In this production immediate coarticulation is of the cosmic, production and identity discourses. 'New paradigm', and 'need for reflexivity', in other words different ways of thinking, are examples of the cosmic discourse. The production discourse is represented by 'interpret' (the skill and requirement of interpretation), whereas 'co-operative inquirers', and 'fully self-reflexive co-researchers', are provided by the identity discourse.

The location of 'democratic artisan' provided by the cosmic discourse is legitimised by previous use of the chameleon discourse (the door opener), hence a 'legitimate democratic artisan' is able to speak here with some authority.

Within this production the expansive worldview of the cosmic discourse provides a 'space' for a 'need for reflexivity' to be considered. Presented as a 'need' which is awaiting fulfilment, it is a 'new paradigm need' granted legitimate status by previous coarticulations. Coarticulation here with the production discourse (that is, interpret) indicates that 'new paradigm co-operative inquirers' still do 'work' under the auspices of a performance/pragmatism worldview, thus the cosmic discourse is also assimilated here within the dominant paradigm.

An expansive worldview also allows an expansive choice of 'designated persons' (identity discourse). Use of the cosmic discourse allows researchers to adopt the named role of 'co-operative inquirers'. As 'co-operative' inquirers, researchers are able to cooperate, in this case with participants. Participants are located as 'research subjects' (identity discourse), that is, they are 'fully self-reflexive'. However, participants are also granted 'personhood' by the proviso of a role, or position, within the confines of the research project, and thus can take a place as 'designated persons', named in this instance as co-researchers. Locating participants as 'research subject/designated persons' allows them to become the 'needed' reflexive component.

Analysis of these two productions shows the first production ostensibly using the chameleon discourse to 'pave the way' for the second production which uses the cosmic discourse to articulate a justification for Smith's methodology. Smith justifies a way of
producing an effect by coarticulation of the above discourses. He can now name the effect as reflexive practice which he proceeds to do - "...The second half of the paper illustrates an attempt at reflexive practice in the author's own research".

Smith has produced a reflexivity/effect consisting of: the return of data to participants, with participant's reflections on such data incorporated into the final study. The scientific discourse has dominated coarticulation of production, identity, chameleon and cosmic discourses and allowed Smith as 'procreator' to shape, or direct this reflexivity/effect. Such a reflexivity/effect maintains characteristics of the dominant paradigm, in this instance represented by 'analysis of data by both researchers and co-researchers is a reflexive practice'.

Smith's abstract indicates that his study does 'legitimately' incorporate a reflexive component. This has been demonstrated by his coarticulation of discourses of reflexivity. However, what is of interest here is that the author does not incorporate a reflexive component relating to himself and his input, or influence upon his work. In other words there is no apparent reflexivity on the part of the author. Smith may argue that 'co-researchers' have attended to the 'need for reflexivity', however an analysis of the following two excerpts indicates that power relations among Smith and co-researchers are not necessarily as they 'appear'. On a first reading coarticulation of discourse within his paper produces power relations as equivocal, however analysis reveals Smith's location as 'procreator' whereas 'fully self-reflexive' participants are located as 'research subjects'. If Smith is 'in charge', a director of the work, rather than a co-researcher then some onus of fulfilling a need for 'author reflexivity' must surely lie directly with him. But, before discussing this aspect, and subsequent consequences, if any, analysis of the following two excerpts displays the production of power relations amongst Smith and participants.

"If one's view of a person is as a self-reflexive agent, presumably that holds for the respondent as well as for the researcher. Given that your respondent will therefore be doing this reflexing anyway, why not enlist her/him as a co-researcher in the project?... ...Furthermore, it is asserted that one can take advantage of the equivalent propensity to reflection and reflexivity on the part of the participant. Thus one enlists interested parties as co-researchers in a research project which becomes a collaborative activity, with all participants closely involved at every stage of the project from inception and construction, through execution, to dissemination" (pp.254-255).
Analysis of this excerpt assumes that the discourses are articulated from a primary location of procreator established in the analysis of the abstract. For ease of reading it has been analysed one sentence at a time.

"1) If one's view of a person is as a self-reflexive agent, presumably that holds for the respondent as well as for the researcher. 2) Given that your respondent will therefore be doing this reflexing anyway, why not enlist her/him as a co-researcher in the project?. ... 3) Furthermore, it is asserted that one can take advantage of the equivalent propensity to reflection and reflexivity on the part of the participant. 4) Thus one enlists interested parties as co-researchers in a research project which becomes a collaborative activity, with all participants closely involved at every stage of the project from inception and construction, through execution, to dissemination" (pp.254-255). (Underlining and numbering added)

The first sentence uses the identity discourse, recognised through the terms: one, person, self-reflexive agent, respondent, and researcher, to produce both the researcher and the respondent (participant) as research subjects. Researcher and respondent are produced as interchangeable object/subjects, that is, the same, or equivalent.

In the second sentence coarticulation of identity and production discourses occurs. The production discourse produces reflexivity as skill-based performance known as 'reflexing'. This performance becomes a requirement (it is understood from the previous excerpt that there is a need for reflexivity) for another performance, that is, 'the project'. As in the abstract the 'respondent' as research subject is granted personhood by the proviso of a role within the project, that is, co-researcher. In this excerpt this proviso covertly proposes that such a move will fulfil the need for reflexivity.

The third sentence also coarticulates identity and production. 'Reflection' and 'reflexivity' are produced as performance, with 'reflexivity' deriving from the previous articulation of 'reflexing', and 'reflection' being categorised alongside reflexivity. The identity discourse locates the researcher (named here as 'one') as 'designated person', and the 'participant' as research subject rather than designated person (because in this production the participant has not yet been given a role). This indicates that they occupy different positions, however, it is suggested, in this sentence, that they each have an 'equivalent propensity to reflection and reflexivity'.
The final sentence in this excerpt coarticulates identity, production, and organic discourses. The researcher, as 'one', and 'co-researchers', appear to be located as 'designated persons', although it is the researcher who does the 'enlisting', and thus must take up a location as 'designated/director'. The 'research project' produced by the production discourse as performance, 'becomes a collaborative activity', which is also a performance produced by the production discourse. In essence there is no change here. Although the research project is identified as 'changing', 'becoming something else', it stays the same, that is a performance produced by the production discourse. This is substantiated by the return to 'project' a little further along. 'Collaborative activity' and 'all participants' are coarticulated through the production/identity discourses thus relocating researcher and respondents as 'research subjects', that is the same, or equivalent. The project is described as a production of the organic discourse (recognised through the terms: inception, construction, execution, dissemination); a creation of collaboration, which allows collaborators (research subjects) to appear located as nurturers (gardeners) of the work.

The coarticulation of identity, production and organic discourses within this excerpt act to produce a 'picture' of 'equivalent nurturers'. There have been several shifts in identity location which may be confusing at times, however, analysis allows the 'collaborative activity' produced as a nurtured organic creation to be seen as a performance of the production discourse. As has been shown, the 'collaborative activity' is produced by the production discourse rather than the organic discourse, therefore the speakers location has not changed. I would suggest that this leaves the author as a 'designated producer' wearing the clothes of a gardener. This is not to say that the work is not collaborative, however, the nature of the collaboration becomes debatable. Questions which may be raised by this debatable aspect are addressed by Smith in his final paragraph.

"Although I went out of my way to make them feel involved and engaged in the project, I was still, of course, an academic researcher with a set of expectations and requirements... Thus it might be said, for example, that the women were not totally free to challenge a reading I took to them because I was in the position of authority. While I recognise the validity of such arguments I would suggest the power relations are not necessary unidimensional. For example, as part of my introductory brief to the women, I suggested that as a man I could never be the expert on identity change during pregnancy, that I would always remain the novice or outsider while they became the expert."
In this excerpt Smith acknowledges his location as 'academic researcher', that is, 'designated person', whereas participants are articulated as 'them'/women'. They are no longer located as 'designated persons', but are located as 'research subject'. Although both parties have previously been articulated as 'equivalent', the naming, or designating of Smith's role acts to separate and create difference. Therefore it must be assumed that there is no equivalence in their 'collaborative' relationship. Smith's articulation of power relations which are 'not necessarily unidimensional' sounds like a trade-off. The women may be 'the expert on identity change during pregnancy' however Smith is located as 'the expert researcher' and the process Smith and participants are involved in is 'research'. Location as 'procreator' places the author in a powerful authoritarian position. Smith fails to acknowledge the dominance of such a position, and I would suggest that power relations constructed within the research are obscured despite Smith's ratification of multidimensional power relations.

The dominant paradigmatic scientific discourse, in coarticulation with the production and identity discourses, have acted to produce a reflexivity/effect which takes the form of an unequal reciprocity, an oxymoronic effect. The chameleon, cosmic and organic discourses have been co-opted for this production which demonstrates how these particular discourses can be manipulated. In this instance they are constrained by the dominant worldview of pragmatism and participate in the production of a pragmatic reflexivity/effect.

Analysis using the resource of 'discourses of reflexivity' has illustrated the produced reflexivity within Smith's paper, and aspects of the status of power relations. The consequences of his coarticulations are a particular effect, in this instance an unequal reciprocity. There is no doubt that Smith's reading of the literature and consequent coarticulation of discourse produce unequal reciprocity as a legitimate reflexivity/effect. As a legitimate 'form of reflexivity' there may be doubt as to whether Smith, as 'co-author', is required to demonstrate a reflexive aspect other than that provided by co-researchers.
As far as R-political is concerned I can no longer suggest that this example is not reflexivity, however I would suggest that it is still political. The discourse has articulated a need to address reflexivity and Smith has judiciously addressed this need.

Possible consequences of legitimising this form of reflexivity/effect raises questions best directed toward the discipline. Does psychology wish to support diverse degrees of power relations, such as unequal reciprocity, or no reciprocity, within research relationships? What does it mean for psychology if 'unequal reciprocity' is a legitimised form of reflexivity? If there is a recognised need for reflexivity, does 'unequal reciprocity' fulfil the need? What is the need addressing? Why has the need arisen? How would psychology provide an effect producing equal reciprocity? Would equal reciprocity allow psychologists to critically assess motivations and directions? Are several different forms of reflexivity necessary or should psychology standardise reflexivity? What happens to reflexivity if standardisation is attempted?

These are not hypothetical questions. Examining the effects of discourses of reflexivity raises issues concerning relationships within psychology. Produced by the discipline such issues must become the responsibility of the discipline. Used as a resource, 'discourses of reflexivity' has allowed a look at the reflexivity produced in Smith's paper, and it would be interesting to take other reflexive works and apply the same criteria. Outcomes may advise us, as psychologists, of some of the questions we need to be asking.
CHAPTER SEVEN - AN AIRY-FAIRY THING

28 February 1997 - Somehow the thesis has to finish. Perhaps it is appropriate to complete the work as it began. After all it can only give the appearance of ending. Thoughts about it, questions, the process of creation, being and doing, none of these stop; in its own way the work continues even if nothing is written.

But still, this work must finish. The analysis of Smith seems a good place to end. A concept has been explored and something has come out of it. Mostly, at the moment, I notice all the things that I wanted to say, all the things that have been left out, and how the thesis has turned out quite differently to what I expected. I think I had a bit more flamboyance about me at the start; I was feeling courageous and had many ideas I thought would work; I tried some which did work, and some which didn't, and didn't get time to try others at all. You could say the experience of doing this work has almost been humbling, but again, looked at a different way, maybe it has been constraining. I feel as though parameters have been met, which is a good thing - the task which had to be done has been completed. The constraints I feel are possibly institutional constraints, paradigmatic scientific discourse constraints. I have gathered so much information about the topic and what has emerged is only one possible way that it could be done which seems the antithesis of my early assumptions. So many other possibilities, exciting challenges, yet the work always had to fit certain guidelines. I feel almost sad, but maybe something else is going on, perhaps I just don't want to leave the work.

Thinking about my feelings at the moment I suspect what is occurring here is I have had a shift in my own subject position. The location I am in now is far different from where I was placed during the beginnings of this work. This brings to mind the idea of transition from student to Master. It is almost as though my location near the beginning was something like 'naive student', at the beginning of an adventure, the unknown, but the experience of the work, the 'new knowing' has changed that. Within the work I took on the 'designated person' name of researcher/analyst. It becomes a role in which it is very easy to become lost. Writing style and persona both change in the effort to impart 'results'. As I shed that name I notice that I am no longer the 'naive student'. I feel 'informed', I 'know' something. But, I don't think this is a transition from student to Master. I am no longer sure that such a transition can occur, or that there is any such thing as 'Master', other than an institutional title conferred after the successful completion of a task. Maybe it should be called something else. I suspect it is an unattainable illusion, depending, of course, upon the construction of 'Master'.

Maybe that is what is occurring here. I think I had in mind something like 'The Sorcerer's Apprentice' without the disastrous consequences. My view of 'Master' was somewhat like Mickey's view of the sorcerer. I thought that doing the work might effect such a transition, yet what has occurred is that I know a lot more about Parker's discourse analysis, and how it can be related to reflexivity, and I could probably talk with A Walt Disney film in which Mickey Mouse plays the part of an apprentice sorcerer. Aspiring to the position of Master Sorcerer before he is ready, his attempts at wizardry go disastrously wrong, as his spell continues to reproduce itself ad infinitum.
confidence about this work. I thought 'Master' was a 'thing', yet it seems as though it also may be no/thing. Perhaps I should not be so harsh. I suspect that something else is also occurring here. In my transition to 'informed knower' I notice that it is no longer easy to write in this free-style fashion, especially within the thesis. Why is this? Has something been lost in the shift to 'informed knower'? Have I retained aspects of the researcher/analyst role so that I doubt the inclusion or worth of this style? At the beginning I was convinced of its validity. What has changed?

Thinking, thinking, thinking.... I suspect that my 'new knowing' has influenced my thoughts on reflexivity. Currently I think of reflexivity as effects of coarticulating discourse. Prior to this study I had different ideas. I thought that the diary entries were reflexive comment upon my own process. They are comment upon my process. They are more than comment; they are my process, but are they reflexivity? I also thought that the inclusion of 'me' within the introduction was reflexivity. Now I suspect that the inclusion of 'me' is possibly no more than the inclusion of 'me'. It lets people know where I am coming from, but is it reflexivity?

I thought both of those textual forms were performances of reflexivity. I now suspect that the diary entries are a form of 'introspection'. There is nothing 'wrong' with introspection, I simply now suspect that reflexivity and introspection are different. Possibly, they are not even allied (except through discourse). I am also very well aware that if I wished I could make the diary entries, and the inclusion of 'me' into 'reflexivity' by coarticulating discourse in order to justify both my position and my argument. --- There is so much more work to be done here, it seems almost a crime to leave it. I expect further exploration of the discourses would reveal more and more information, the surface has only been skimmed. BUT, is that an enquiring, explorative mind speaking, or the scientific discourse suggesting that the work needs to be finished properly! Whatever properly might be. Perhaps that doesn't have to happen at all.

I notice how much more relaxed I feel about the always asked question - What is reflexivity? This is because I have an answer - "Well, reflexivity can be many things, but you can think of it as an effect of discourse". Having an answer is very comfortable. Reflexivity does not need to be thought of as 'an airy-fairy thing' as one of the respondents to my long forgotten questionnaire suggested. Reflexivity is not an 'airy-fairy', changing around, all over the place thing at all, it is the coarticulating discourses that make it appear so.

I guess it is this comfortable, relaxed feeling which allows the work as it is to finish, to be presented as a 'fait accompli'. Although it is tempting to expand my 'free range' thoughts this is obviously not the place to open up discussions about introspection vs. reflexivity, what has been left out, consequences of shifting author positions, etc etc etc. They all offer possibilities for exploration which need to be left for another project.

If I think upon the achievement of aims, way back on page 8, I wonder if the aims did need to be achieved, or whether their service was more as a useful tool to get the work going. Out of all six aims I can only be sure that I have achieved the last one - To listen to the advice of my supervisor.
I have tried ‘to trust in my own process of interaction, both with my own writing and the writings of others’, but have not always been that trusting, an effect of position I expect. Where I have trusted I have been pleased with the outcome.

Whether this is a scholarly piece of work or not is a decision which will be made by examiners. In places I think it is very scholarly, in particular the analysis sounds convincing and informed, I’m convinced. But, I have to wonder, what is scholarly anyway? (Apart from convincing and informed - for me).

I have allowed the work to assist in its own direction, but I am unsure whether or not it has remained accessible. I was keen for it to be accessible to all as I think some important issues informed by post-structuralist concepts develop a language of exclusion isolating the very issues which are being addressed. However, the difficulties of accessibility become obvious when explanation/exploration is itself limited/constrained by language. I suspect that the accessibility of this work may be obscured for some, particularly when Parker, discourse analysis as methodology, and the subsequent analysis, are addressed.

Whether or not this work ‘demonstrates reflexivity in action’, and ‘shows the importance of reflexivity for the discipline of psychology’ is something I will leave to the discretion of readers. Obviously I am biased and cannot possibly attest as to whether or not this aim has been fulfilled. Although I can’t help wondering whether I should actually change the title to ‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’, as I suspect the work may be more about ‘me and reflexivity’, than ‘reflexivity in psychology’.

However, it is an ending I am working towards, not a new topic. As a final word I am reminded of the influence of Ashmore’s ‘The Reflexive Thesis’ at the beginning of this work, and the enjoyment I received from his experimentation with textual form. In closure I would like to borrow his concluding few lines as they seem just as appropriate for this thesis as they were for his.

“That’s it. It is now all yours. But remember:

“Neither I nor you would have come this far if there was nothing to be said.”

REFERENCES


Any work is influenced by more than just cited works. This thesis is informed not only by my entire learning in psychology but also my life experiences. It would be impossible to list all influences. However, the nature of this work deems it prudent to at least make available other non-cited works which have had a bearing upon this work. This is not only in deference to non-cited authors, but also serves to locate this work as influenced by certain texts in particular. It is also for those who have found themselves intrigued and wish to 'read' more.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX II
Response to Questions by psychologists, Department of Psychology, Massey University.

During Chapter One the idea of a small questionnaire was raised. The purpose was to gather definitions of reflexivity from other academics in the psychology department. This task was completed, and although answers were not used, either as a format, or a resource, they did have an influence upon this work. Viewed discursively the answers also make interesting data for analysis although this will not take place here. They are included in an appendix both because they were influential, and because they will be of interest to those intrigued by reflexivity.
1) What does the term reflexivity mean to you?

Reflexivity is such an airy-fairy thing - Comment made in conversation by a respondent to the questionnaire.

1.1 Reflexivity means being aware of the constructive processes and assumptions that work in shaping an account and acknowledging these in an account.

1.2 Understanding and unpacking the implications of any psychological propositions made by an analyst for that analyst. So the system of explanation necessarily includes the explainer.

1.3 Reflexivity is associated with post-modernist approaches to research and writing in which the author has some awareness of her own position in a particular context and incorporates that awareness into her own writing or research.

1.4 Reflecting upon the research - process of reflection. Critical awareness/gaze. Ability to see one's own work as a product of construction. This awareness is a pre-requisite for 'reflexivity' -

1.5 The reflexive metaphor is the mirror. An opportunity to stand back from one's activities (teaching, writing, research) and critically examine them.

1.6 In general - when action and acted upon are the same person (The cat licked itself). In writing when the writer writes of their own process in composing text (self reflexivity) and material is recursive and comments on its own producedness (as though my speaking is more than me - and has more implications than for me).

1.7 It's like Escher's drawing of the hands which are drawing each other - creating something by creating something (?hope that makes sense). And being aware that this is happening.

1.8 As far as I'm aware it is a model for qualitative research. I don't know what it 'means', but would speculate it is derived from reflex. Therefore it may have something to do with exploring automatic reactions/responses to stimuli, either from the environment or from within the individual. i.e. thoughts/feelings that appear to come out of nowhere but are triggered by something.

1.9 An exercise metaphor, being able to stretch both/or number of ways a similar distance, horizontal buzz. Difficult to think of in terms of text.

2) What does 'being reflexive' mean to you?

2.1 Attending to the "fact" that any work I do is a construction made up of different resources, and that the assumptions I bring to my research are going to shape what I find and how I present it. Basically acknowledging somehow in my work, that it is one possible version or interpretation of an account or subject area.

2.2 Engaging in analysis which recognises the need to 'contain' me of the analyst.
2.3 Being reflexive means developing that awareness of one's own particular position or situation in a certain social and historical context, and the part that has to play itself in the knowledge of others.

2.4 Reflecting upon the means and tools used in the research. - The critical resources employed in the research exercise - words, methods, constructions etc - where did they come from? Why did I use these? How does my context inform my research?

2.5 Being upfront with ones research perspective - looking back and acknowledging what traditions, authors have influenced what you are currently doing. Examining ones activities (teaching, writing, research) and critically examining them.

2.6 Reflecting on my own process - of reading, learning, writing, acting out, and how these actions re-form myself and my future actions - an ongoing spiral -

2.7 Reflecting on my own work (or whatever) and seeing/thinking/writing about how it is reinforcing, recreating, reconstructing beliefs, language games, relationships, ways of speaking, types of speech, genres etc.

2.8 Observing own responses to stimuli, from environment or individual, or maybe a process where you interact on a continual basis without trying to explain/observe what is happening. Natural process unfolding - therefore no predetermined goal/direction?

2.9 Being able to step back, recontextualise, acknowledge yourself, part, talk in 2nd person, sometimes first?

3) If you were being reflexive what do you think you would be doing?

3.1 Commenting on the processes I went through in order to present my analytic conclusions or review of studies.

3.2 Engaging in analysis which recognises the need to 'contain' me of the analyst - in other words, shifting to a meta level of analysis.

3.3 I don't really know - maybe I would be reflecting on all this and trying to understand it - maybe I would be staring at my navel.

3.4 Reflecting. Critically standing back and exploring my role and work within the context in which it takes place.

3.5 Engaging thoughtfully and carefully with ones practises. It stands in stark contrast to the blind adherence to positivist approaches to research.

3.6 Thinking about what I have done and being aware of how my thoughts transform my sense of self and reshape my actions and reflections from here on ....

3.7 Reflecting on my own work (or whatever) and seeing/thinking/writing about how it is reinforcing, recreating, reconstructing beliefs, language games, relationships, ways of speaking, types of speech, genres etc.
3.8 Observing own responses to stimuli, from environment or individual, or maybe a process where you interact on a continual basis without trying to explain/observe what is happening. Natural process unfolding - therefore no predetermined goal/direction?

3.9 Walking backwards in the sand and viewing your footprints as you go.