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Planning for a Night Out: Local Governance, Power and Night-Time in Christchurch, New Zealand

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Abstract

This research explores the changing nature of local governance and how power is exercised within Christchurch City Council's decision-making process of its revitalisation of the Central Business District (CBD). A governmentality theoretical framework extends the scholarly debate on local government decision-making and allows for the exploration of social relations and lived realities of young people who use the night-time spaces created by the CBD revitalisation process. Three research questions structure the thesis: how is power exercised during CBD decision-making processes within Christchurch City Council?; what governmental technologies are adopted by Christchurch City Council to revitalise the CBD between 1999 and 2010?; and, what are the lived realities of the young people who use the revitalised spaces of the CBD?

Christchurch, New Zealand's second largest city, is the case study because of its recent CBD revitalisation and the significant changes to its decision-making processes. These changes impact on the way revitalisation is executed. The decision-making process of CBD revitalisation is examined through a qualitative methodology. Methods involved: document analysis; observations; individual, semi-structured interviews (with elected and non-elected local government representatives, business people, and police); and, focus-group interviews with young people who enjoy the CBD night-time entertainment spaces.

There are three key research findings. First, power is simultaneously dispersed to an outside organisation and concentrated within the Council in fewer people. Particular actors have significant influence over decision-making. Second, governing at a distance occurs using technologies of a key stakeholder group followed by changes to internal Council decision-making. A post-political turn emerged where consensus is encouraged and political dissent discouraged. Third, the revitalisation project is successful in the creation of a vibrant night-time economy where young people drink and socialise. Paradoxically, these new subjects are constituted through the revitalised spaces as a problem, bringing into stark relief the conflicts between public and private interests in Christchurch's CBD revitalisation.

This research offers new possibilities for planning scholars. Governmentality allows for the critical examination of power in local governance with the explicit inclusion of the lived realities of the subjects of that governance.

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Abbreviations

CBD	Central Business District
CCHL	Christchurch City Holdings Ltd
CCMF	Central City Mayoral Forum
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CERA	Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CPIT	Christchurch Polytechnic Institute of Technology
EU	European Union
LAP	Local Alcohol Policy
LATE	Local Authority Trading Enterprise
LGA	Local Government Act
LTFS	Long Term Financial Strategy
LTCCP	Long Term Council Community Plan
LGOIMA	Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PX	Public Excluded
RMA	Resource Management Act
RTD	Ready to Drink
SOL	South of Lichfield
STV	Single Transferable Vote
TAFM	Transparency, Accountability and Financial Management
UDS	Urban Development Strategy

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

When justifying the Christchurch City Council's efforts to attract young people to the city, as well as acting on 'central-city drunkenness', Mayor Bob Parker explains to a Christchurch newspaper journalist why, among other things, the Council had pursued revitalisation of the CBD:

Do you want to know the really big problem facing Christchurch and other cities over the next few decades, Parker asks? A greying population ... And unless a city can grow its population – attract a continuous addition of new young residents – it will just become one giant, impoverished rest home ... Christchurch has to do everything it can to keep the people coming. And a revitalised inner city is a big part of that. Which in turn is why the Council, under him, has acted on boy racers and central-city drunkenness. (McCrone, 2010, pp. C2-C3)

Between October 1999 and September 2010, the Christchurch City Council carried out an ambitious Central Business District (CBD) revitalisation programme intended to revive day-time retailing, office development and residential development. The Council's plan, however, not only turned the CBD into an attractive night-time entertainment space for young people, it also provided a space for 'uncivilised'¹ behaviour. Due to revitalisation, the CBD became more 'vibrant', busier, and 'young' at night, than during the day. As the above quote from the Christchurch daily newspaper *The Press* (McCrone, 2010) illustrates, the mayor wants young people in Christchurch, but *not* young drunk people in the CBD.

Not only was the CBD revitalisation work ambitious, but the way in which it was governed was novel for the Council. The Council, and its stakeholder group the Mayoral Forum, were intent on creating an exciting city centre. They wanted a city centre that would attract businesses back from the suburbs, encourage retailing, and entice people to live there because of its convenience and vibrancy (Christchurch City Mayoral Forum, 2001).

¹ I specifically use this term that so often appears in the media and in other discourses related to young people at night. This is so that it can be problematized and subject to criticism. I draw on the work of Elias (2000) who argues that what is considered 'civilized' or 'uncivilized' changes over time and place.

By mid-2010, this vibrancy was especially evident at night. Many restaurants, bars, and newly created public spaces for meeting friends had been established, and an increased number of young people were gathering in the centre city, especially in the later part of the evening. At the same time, day-time retailing had yet to show any significant growth. Offices and businesses remained stubbornly in the suburbs, and only limited numbers of people had ventured into the central city to live and experience its vibrancy.

As the media highlighted uncivilised behaviour (McCrone, 2008), city leaders came together to try and tackle alcohol use within the CBD at night (*The Press*, 2008), and the mayor admitted that he could not recommend walking on the streets after midnight (*The Press*, 2009).

Many studies have explored drinking and the night-time economy (Chatterton & Hollands, 2003; Hubbard, 2011; Jayne, Valentine, & Holloway, 2011; Martinic & Measham, 2008; Waitt, Jessop, & Gorman-Murray, 2011; Winlow & Hall, 2006) but few have examined the relationship between the ways in which cities are governed and the night-time spaces created and embodied (although see, Hobbs, Lister, Hadfield, Winlow, & Hall, 2000). This thesis starts from the premise that contemporary forms of governing the 'post-industrial' city – with its reliance on consumption – contribute to the creation of spaces that young people have come to occupy and dominate at night (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002, 2003; Hayward & Hobbs, 2007; Roberts, 2013). The behaviour of young people within these created spaces causes consternation in the media, and on the part of the City Council, police, and some residents. It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss the rights and wrongs of young people's behaviour within the CBD at night. Rather, the thesis seeks to unravel the power relations associated with governance and decision-making within local government that have led to the creation of spaces that are so enjoyed by young people.

This research is also a response to the lack of critical attention, within the planning discipline, to the effects of governance on subjects, in this case, young people. Young people's voices are, therefore, included within this thesis as they are important

subjects of these governed spaces and not mere objects of a council's decision-making process. The way they inhabit, experience, and socialise within these spaces is important for two reasons.

First, decision-makers and planners need a deeper understanding of the impact of their decisions in creating spaces where activities take place that they did not envisage. Roberts and Eldridge (2009) argue that a failure to understand how the night is experienced means underlying changes to the city cannot be fully understood.

Second, young people are also part of the power relations associated with governing a city. Although they do not tend to participate in public consultation processes during revitalisation projects, they nevertheless assert themselves through their occupation and behaviour within the night-time spaces created by the Council. The CBD at night becomes a space for young people.

Changing Cities

Hubbard (2006) argues that over recent decades, many western cities have experienced a hollowing out of their centres. Businesses, employment, and residential living have all declined within city centres. Scholars attribute this to inner-city congestion, urban sprawl, cheaper commercial space on the fringes, the advent of office parks, and the rise of covered suburban shopping malls with free parking. Hubbard (2006) notes that while this trend is less obvious in European cities with strong planning controls, it is very evident in American cities.

In an effort to halt this decline of the city centre and to attract more investment and people to their cities, councils have turned to CBD revitalisation projects to stimulate economic growth and vibrancy to their city. Often the revitalisation revolves around flagship projects such as waterfronts (Doucet, van Kempen, & van Weesep, 2011; Oakley, 2007; Sandercock & Dovey, 2002), sporting events (Raco & Tunney, 2010), and cultural activity (Darchen & Tremblay, 2013; Degen & García, 2012). Sometimes the revitalisation is focussed simply on cafés, bars, and restaurants (Burnett, 2014; Lugosi, Bell, & Lugosi, 2010).

As scholars argue, cities now openly compete with one another for investment to sustain growth they believe is economically, socially, and culturally necessary, and revitalisation projects are one way of attracting this investment (Cox, 1995; T. Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1989; Jonas & McCarthy, 2009). These projects reflect that spatial configurations of the modern western city have not only changed but have also transformed from sites of production to sites of consumption (Jayne, 2006; Zukin, 1998). Zukin (1998) describes how the service economy has become paramount in the post-industrial era. The revenue base for CBDs is now heavily reliant on consumption: retail during the day; food and alcohol in the evening and the night (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Miles, 2010; Shaw, 2010). Cities are increasingly upholding the primacy of their CBDs through revitalisation rather than applying planning regulations to halt relocation of residential, retail, and office development in the suburbs.

Revitalisation strategies have been successful in attracting people to the city centres in the evening for dining, drinking, and entertainment. In addition, they have also led to the rise of the night-time economy, when large numbers of primarily young people come to these centres to enjoy the bars and nightclubs (Hubbard, 2011; Jayne, Valentine, & Holloway, 2008a; Measham & Brain, 2005). Hobbs, Hadfield, Lister & Winlow (2003) use the term 'night-time economy' to describe the combined effects of the relaxation of the liquor licensing laws and the structural changes in the entertainment industry leading to large increases in the number of licensed premises. These operate into the early hours of the morning alongside fast food outlets, taxis, and other ancillary services. The concept is closely tied to the alcohol and leisure industry.

Councils are caught in the ambiguity of actively pursuing growth of the night-time economy, where excessive consumption is encouraged, but at the same time wanting to present a safe city image and a degree of civility and respectability (Elias, 2000). More and more councils are willing to be involved in this balancing act, given that the night-time economy is fulfilling a greater role in a CBD's viability (Hobbs, Winlow, Hadfield, & Lister, 2005). In post-earthquake Christchurch it appears this ambiguity is worth enduring as bars and restaurants are now seen as vital components for the

rebuild of the city (McCrone, 2014b; McDonald, 2014; Stewart, 2014). As Roberts and Eldridge (2009) note, councils welcome the conversion of once derelict spaces to enlivened spaces but, are “caught in a similar tension of attracting tourism and business on the one hand, while managing the obverse effects of the night-time economy on the other” (Roberts & Eldridge, 2009, p. 70).

In Christchurch - New Zealand’s third most populous urban area and largest city in the South Island (see Figure 1 below) - revitalisation attempted to stop the exodus of retail businesses and office spaces to the suburbs. In the belief that they must compete for capital, decision-makers in Christchurch have put effort into CBD revitalisation projects to make the CBD look attractive with paving, outdoor seating, plants and art. The Council has also positively encouraged and worked with the private sector, and made significant financial investments itself, to ensure redevelopment of inner-city properties, turning them from neglected alleyways into café and bar precincts.




Figure 1: Map of Christchurch Showing Major Shopping Malls

Source: Designed by Hullabaloo Design and adapted from Google Maps. (Shopping malls mentioned in this thesis are highlighted in red)

Changes associated with the rise of a market economy have influenced how local government now governs, and makes decisions about the physical fabric of cities.

Decision-Making within Local Governance

Harvey (1989), Hall and Hubbard (1998), and other scholars building on their work (Blakeley, 2010; Doucet, 2012; Ward, 2011), argue that the way cities are governed has coincided with changes to an entrepreneurial and competitive city. Hall and Hubbard's work was to map "the myriad ways in which new modes of governance are implicated in the economic, social and cultural transformation of Western cities" (T. Hall & Hubbard, 1998, p. 3). Scholars argue that how decisions are made within contemporary local government has changed since the 1990s (Börzel, 1998; Davies, 2011; Denters & Rose, 2005; Kjær, 2004; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 1996; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Stoker, 1998). They state that decision-making is now set within a broad range of institutional arrangements and processes encompassing elected representation, appointed management, and participation by various networked actors, and is termed local governance. This term 'governance' emerged as a key concept in the 1990s (Kjær, 2004). It has provided ways to theorise about shifting power relations of decision-making between the state, interest groups, and civil society (Griffin, 2012). The term has also had an effect on the actual practice of governing and how decision-making is undertaken (Kjær, 2011).

The term governance now has multiple meanings and is used in a variety of different settings. For the purposes of this thesis, local governance is defined in relationship to local government. Whereas local government refers to democratically elected local authorities, local governance involves a broader range of institutions, actors, processes, and practices at the local level interacting with local government to make decisions about resource allocation (Hambleton, 2008; Newman, 2001; Pierre & Peters, 2000).

While the literature on local governance is replete with examples of how business networks have been involved with local government to increase economic activity in their city (Geddes, 2006; J. Hall, 2006), there is less emphasis on the creation of new

subjects who use those economic spaces. Larner (2009) calls on researchers to explore the actual experiences of people living within cities under new governance regimes:

...we don't know nearly enough about how people experience cities on an every day basis. In contemporary cities there is a whole raft of emotions and experiences which may or may not have anything to do with neoliberalism. How are cities lived? What is the 'affectual economy' of different cities? How do mundane practices and technologies shape urban environments? (p. 390)

This thesis, therefore, extends scholarship on the changing nature of local governance to examine the power relations in local governance and how young people experience night-time spaces.

Local Governance as a Form of Governmentality

Academic analysis is divided on the merits of the concept of local governance. There are those who see the renewed prominence of governance through networked partnerships at the local level as a positive way forward to empower communities, solve difficult issues, and provide voice to previously disaffected communities (Healey, 1997, 2003; Sørensen, 2000). There are those who see it as a means to embed and 'naturalise' neoliberalism² (Davies, 2011; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Other scholars recognise there are both positive and negative aspects to contemporary modes of local governance and these are contingent on contextual factors, including place and time (Larner & Butler, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; Swyngedouw & Moulaert, 2010).

The latter group of scholars use a governmentality approach based on Michel Foucault (2007). Following Walters (2012, p. 11), governmentality is fundamentality concerned with the exercise of power as it relates to the "conduct of conduct" or the "art of governing". Seen through the lens of governmentality theory, local governance is understood as rationalities, strategies, tactics, and technologies to "govern at a

² According to Burchell (1996) and Larner (2009), neoliberalism is a short-hand term for a complex concept that privileges the market and entrepreneurial forms alongside minimal government and individual choice not only for economic well-being, but also for social, environmental, and cultural well-being. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion.

distance” at the local level (Blakeley, 2010, p. 132). Governmentality literature, therefore, focusses on the ‘how’ of different modes of governance and illuminates the different ways in which power is exercised in society and in political contexts (Walters, 2012). Analysis using a governmentality approach identifies how power is exercised by focusing on the everyday mundane practices and material mechanisms.

Modes of governing that are utilised in local governance are increasingly used in non-statutory planning. In the discipline of planning, Swyngedouw has been instrumental in extending the debate on the relationship between neoliberalism, local governance, and the city using governmentality analysis. Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez (2002) argue that revitalisation of the city centre using megaprojects and place marketing is not just in response to the crisis in which cities found themselves in the 1980s. Instead, the projects become the means through which urban and political change can take place.

Experiencing the Night-Time Economy

The night-time economy provides one way in which to view the mutual relationship between governing of the urban environment and those who experience it. In order to better understand the often contradictory thinking and decision-making on CBD revitalisation and drinking in public spaces, this research takes the approach suggested by Jayne, Holloway and Valentine (2006) that allows the researcher to delve more deeply into the “social relations and cultural practices associated with the emergence of particular kinds of urban drinking spaces” (p. 465). This approach facilitates understandings of the real and lived experiences of those young people affected by the decision-making of local government. It also provides a voice for the subjects that is often missing in governmentality research (Gibson-Graham, 2006) by exploring young people’s use of the CBD at night, their activity, and the relationships they forge. Roberts and Eldridge (2009) and Jayne et al. (2006) also argue that better

understanding is needed of how plans and policies impact on the people who use those spaces:

Until focused theoretical and empirical study seeks to understand fully the discursive and differential construction of drinking, and its impact on urban life and public space, then academic impact on planning and policy that seeks to balance or account for conflicts and tensions that arise around drinking, drunkenness and public space cannot be achieved. (Jayne et al., 2006, p. 466)

Hubbard echoes this general sentiment about the need for scholars to focus on relations within the city and their diverse materiality, as “much contemporary writing reduces the city (and, likewise, the countryside) to the status of a container or backdrop for human activities, downplaying (or, worse, ignoring) its profligate role in shaping economic and social relations” (Hubbard, 2006, p. 2).

It is in this vein that this research explores not only how decision-making and power shape the CBD but also how young people are shaped using these revitalised spaces at night. While the behavioural issues arising from young people’s use of the CBD at night may be regarded – at one level – as their own personal responsibility, there has been little public discussion and academic research on the role of council in creating the spaces where the night-time economy is thriving. This is not simple environmental determinism at play but rather an examination of how place shapes people and vice versa.

Research Questions

This thesis is about the changing nature of local governance and the implications for the night-time economy. It examines the decision-making process of the Christchurch City Council that led to revitalised spaces in the CBD, and in so doing explores two key research themes: how power is exercised within local government decision-making, and the lived realities of young people using the revitalised spaces. I have three research questions:

1. How is power exercised during CBD decision-making processes within Christchurch City Council?
2. What governmental technologies are adopted by Christchurch City Council to revitalise the CBD between 1999 and 2010?
3. What are the lived realities of the young people who use the revitalised spaces of the CBD?

This thesis, therefore, seeks to understand the tensions at the intersections of CBD revitalisation, local governance and the participation and regulation of young people's use of Christchurch's night-time public spaces. It documents the practice of local governance within a New Zealand local government setting by examining Christchurch City Council's decision-making process on CBD revitalisation prior to the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. It explores why the need for CBD revitalisation became an issue, how it was problematized (Huxley, 2006), and ways solutions were advanced.

Following a governmentality approach, the thesis details how a political rationality of a vibrant city emerged and the technologies that arose to implement that rationality (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1991; Lemke, 2001; N. Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006; Walters, 2012). It then looks at the impact this type of decision-making process has had on CBD revitalisation and its creation of an inner-city night-time economy where young people, in particular, congregate to drink.

Through a process of analysis of 210 Council documents, numerous media articles, observations within the CBD at night, and interviews (17 individual and two focus groups) with elected representatives, business people, authorities that regulate activities in the CBD at night, and the young people who occupy the spaces at night, this thesis examines how local governance is undertaken and how the resultant spaces are experienced.

Christchurch Earthquakes

Shortly after thesis fieldwork began, Christchurch and the surrounding area experienced two large earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks. The first, on

4 September 2010, was a 7.1 magnitude earthquake with an epicentre 40 kilometres west of Christchurch. While no lives were lost in this earthquake, many buildings sustained damaged within the CBD, and elsewhere in the city power was cut, water, sewerage and other services were disrupted, and large areas of the city experienced liquefaction, leaving the ground covered in a thick layer of silt. Despite the devastation of parts of the CBD, the night-time economy recovered very quickly and within two weeks young people returned to socialise there as they had done before the earthquake. In contrast, the day-time economy appeared to suffer and required the intervention of the Christchurch City Council to help businesses attract shoppers back to the CBD (Breward, 2010).

On 22 February 2011, Christchurch experienced its second major earthquake. This time it was a 6.3 magnitude earthquake centred within the city and at a shallow depth. This earthquake had a devastating effect on the city, with 185 people killed, over 11,000 injured, liquefaction in two-thirds of the city, 10,000 buildings requiring demolition, tens of thousands of homes damaged in some way, and infrastructure discontinued or restricted to parts of the city for over 2 years. The earthquake and aftershocks severely affected the CBD and the government declared a national state of emergency, cordoning off all the CBD for 2 months.

Figure 2 below shows a popular night-time spot for young people, SOL Square, before and after the earthquakes. When the state of emergency was lifted central government established a government agency— Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) – with special statutory powers to coordinate the response and recovery. Over 2 years the CBD cordon gradually reduced as around 1,000 buildings were demolished.



(photo: Adrienne Rewi)



(photo: CPIT website)



Figure 2: SOL Square Before and After the Christchurch earthquakes

(photo: Karen Johnston)

Thesis Outline

In this introductory chapter I have established the need for a detailed examination of the links between power, local governance modes of decision-making, Christchurch CBD revitalisation and its use by young people. The thesis brings together and advances several areas of work and sits at the nexus of planning and urban geography.

Following this introductory chapter, literature is reviewed and the theoretical framework of the thesis is outlined in Chapter 2. Theoretical literature on governance, planning, entrepreneurial cities, and the night-time economy is drawn from geography, planning, and public policy. The chapter examines the rise of the term 'governance' in local government, and how that governance has affected decision-making, planning, and power relations between communities and councils. Governmentality literature is used to assess how power operates within these circumstances.

The research methods used in this study are the focus of Chapter 3. A qualitative research approach using multiple methods involved semi-structured interviews with elected local government representatives, business people, and police; focus group interviews with young women and men who occupy the CBD night-time spaces; observations; and documentary analyses. I reflect on the ways studying young people's drinking affected my own drinking practices.

Chapter 4 describes local government in New Zealand, and Christchurch, the case study used in this thesis. An historical and contemporary overview of the institutional context of local government in New Zealand is provided to understand how and why local government has evolved to what it is today. In particular, the background examines how decision-making processes have evolved. An overview of Christchurch gives a sense of the uniqueness of the city's communities, economy, environment, and culture as well as the political landscape.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present empirical data. In particular, Chapter 5 looks at the Council's decision-making process. Council reports and documents, coupled with interviews, explore the rationale for CBD revitalisation, and how new ways of working with the community actually took place. The reasons for taking a more entrepreneurial path than a regulatory path are explored.

Chapter 6 provides data to understand the processes that changed the internal structure of the Council to implement new ways of decision-making within the Council. As a consequence of these processes, the Council turned away from traditional ways of

making decisions to a more corporate approach that focused on efficiency and effectiveness. This new approach changed power relations within the Council, reduced political oversight, and concentrated power with the mayor and senior staff.

Young people and the night-time economy are the focus of Chapter 7. Through focus group interviews and observations, this chapter examines how and why young people use the revitalised spaces at night. Young people actively resist the notion that they should behave in a civilised manner. This failure to conform to the idealised CBD subject the Council envisioned means the process of creating subjects is unending. New means of regulating behaviour are brought to bear on young people, such as heightened surveillance, private security guards and safety patrols, while at the same time allowing the continuing concentration of bars within revitalised spaces.

The empirical data from the preceding three chapters are synthesised and discussed in Chapter 8. A new political rationality is formed around a vibrant city centre that enables new technologies of government. The desire for a vibrant 24-hour city successfully creates a night-time economy. The objectives of enhancing day-time retail and residential developments, however, have been less fully achieved. The Council intended the type of decision-making undertaken in this case to draw on a wide range of people and their expertise; in practice power become concentrated within the mayor and senior staff. Elected representatives were not deeply involved and lost not only their input into the project but also their oversight role.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by exploring what the research findings mean for local government decision-making and planning in New Zealand. A brief outline examines what has happened to the Christchurch City Council following the major earthquakes that occurred in September 2010 and February 2011. The thesis ends with a reflection on why the Council has suffered so badly in the eyes of the public and central government after the earthquake, and outlines a new research agenda to explore decision-making and power in times of disaster.

CHAPTER 2: GOVERNMENT, GOVERNANCE, GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE NIGHT-TIME CITY

This chapter presents a review of literature and outlines the theoretical framework related to the core of the thesis: how power is exercised within decision-making processes; the governmental technologies used to make decisions on the revitalisation of Christchurch's CBD; and the lived realities of young people using those revitalised spaces, to highlight the challenges of accepting, unconditionally, theories of local governance. Governmentality provides the overall theoretical lens through which this thesis views the decision-making process and the framing of young people as problematic subjects.

First, local governance theories are examined to illustrate the changing context for decision-making within local government. Local governance literature has had a significant impact, both theoretically and in practice, on how decision-making now takes place within local government. The term 'local governance' is still widely used by practitioners and local government politicians despite it receiving sustained critique from many quarters, including early promoters of the concept (Rhodes, 2011; Stoker, 2011).

There are currently debates about whether the rise of local governance is due to neoliberalism, or whether local governance is a way to embed neoliberalism (Davies, 2011). In reviewing the literature this chapter identifies the multiple meanings of neoliberalism. This chapter examines these and other debates to highlight the challenges of accepting, unconditionally, theories of local governance. This is important for this thesis as neoliberalism promotes the concept of an entrepreneurial city and the night-time economy. The chapter also covers the democratic dilemmas of local governance as these relate to the way stakeholders and others are included, or not, in decision-making processes.

Second, to understand local government decision-making this chapter draws on two bodies of literature: governance theory and governmentality theory. Governmentality is distinguished from governance in that it recognises that government is actively

involved in constituting subjects. Nor does governmentality accept that political decisions are based on rational and neutral facts (Lemke, 2007). Michel Foucault (2007), on whose work governmentality theory is based, used the term 'government' to mean the conduct of conduct to understand the exercise of power. He was interested in understanding how governing was used to shape or affect conduct rather than just acting directly on people. He used government in both a wide and narrow sense. 'Narrow' relates to governing of one's self through to the wider interpretation of governing in the political realm. Foucault was interested in the practice of government, which raised the questions: "who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed?" (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). From this understanding, local governance is a form of governmentality. Governmentality provides the overall theoretical lens through which this thesis views the decision-making process and the framing of young people as problematic subjects. The focus narrows to academics who take critical approaches. By 'critical' I mean those scholars who focus on aspects of power within decision-making. Scholars are divided in their arguments about the benefits of a wider governance approach to decision-making. Some, such as Booher and Innes (2002) and Healey (1997), argue in favour of governance through networks, as this can ensure greater public participation and empower groups. Others, such as Jessop (2002), Peck and Tickell (2002), and Davies (2011), see governance as part of an ongoing neoliberal project. A group of scholars adopting a Foucauldian approach to political power use governmentality theory to suggest that neoliberalism is an art of governing and there are both positive and negative outcomes from governance (Blakeley, 2010; Larner & Butler, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005). To understand power relations at work, they approach governance by examining how it is undertaken (Geddes, 2011). This chapter examines these different schools of thought in relation to local governance, decision-making and power. This is a productive way in which to examine the political rationality, that emerges from decision-making and leads to particular technologies of decision-making. The theory of governmentality is also useful as it bridges the gap between how governing takes place within local governance, and self-governing by young people within the spaces created by the revitalisation project.

Third, this is followed by an examination of governance and planning within the New Zealand context. Place matters to the construction of knowledge and most of the literature on governance arise from the United Kingdom and Europe. The literature on governance within New Zealand is therefore explored to ascertain if there are variations from the international literature.

Finally, the chapter turns to a discussion of how cities have changed over time. It is suggested cities have become entrepreneurial in the wake of deindustrialisation as a means to stimulate economic development and this development has fostered competition with other cities (T. Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Harvey, 1989). According to Roberts and Eldridge (2009) and Ward (2011) this need for cities to compete with one another has led to a planning and urban design industry that travels around the world and promotes the vibrant 24-hour city to enhance the attractiveness of one city over another (see Montgomery (2011) for example). In many instances this has fostered the night-time economy where young people congregate to drink (and be 'disorderly') in the very spaces that have been created for a vibrant city.

Within this thesis I use the term 'space'. Much has been written about the meanings of space and place (see R. Johnston et al., (2000, pp. 767-773) for a definition of space, place and human geography). Following Johnston and Longhurst (2010, p. 16) I use the term *space* "to refer *not* to something that is abstract, absolute, static, empty, "just there," ultimately measurable, and able to be mapped, but to something that is complex, changeable, discursively produced, and imbued with power relations". I use the term *place* to refer to specific places. Places cannot be separated from understandings of space.

Local Governance³

The shift to different processes of decision-making by local government has influenced how cities see their role and the services they provide. Hall and Hubbard use the term 'entrepreneurial' to denote the way modern cities are now being managed and governed (1998, p. 2). They argue that the emphasis of local government has shifted from traditional welfare and service delivery policies directed towards their own community, moving towards more economic development and growth policies, which are directed out from the community to capture national and international capital. To implement these policies, local government has worked with and alongside other public and private organisations and agencies. This contemporary form of local governance has meant local government now displays many of the characteristics that were once the sole preserve of the private sector. Not only do these new economic development policies promote the idea of competing cities, they also signal a new way of governing a city.

Governance, and its local corollary, local governance, is a slippery and ill-defined term in the academic literature. Some, like Pierre and Peters (2000), argue that governance is not new and the state has always worked with outside organisations. As a concept, the term has been important, however, for signifying contemporary changes to the way decisions are made within a wider context of multiple organisations and actors at different scalar levels and within institutions and their processes. Research on governance and networks has allowed an understanding of the wider forms of

³ I make a distinction between community governance and local governance. According to Moulaert (2010), community governance has its basis in grass roots community development or a more bottom linked approach. This is designed to allow issues or agenda to be set and decided by the community itself and is often directed at the social and economic inequalities of the system. Through their research on socially innovative community development practices in the European Union, Moulaert (2010) states that these researchers are interested in bottom-up practices that communities undertake for themselves to satisfy their basic needs and quality of life issues. This is similar to the community governance role for local government initiated by Clark and Stewart (1994). This concept of community governance is distinct from the field of local governance concerned with a broad range of institutional arrangements and processes for local public decision-making within local government encompassing management, political representation, and participation by various networked actors.

governing that takes place in society alongside the state⁴ and that power is not located in one domain (Walters, 2004). What has been lacking is a critical account of governance possibilities and limitations, particularly of how power operates within networks. As Blakeley (2010) and Larner and Butler (2005) note, these new processes of governing alter power relations. Swyngedouw goes further and argues that the focus on governing and managing leads to what he describes as a “post-political condition” (2009a, p. 604).

Scholars have documented the increasing interest in governance over the last 25 years (see, for example, Kjær, 2004; Kooiman, 2003; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). The term local governance has come to include not only local government but also other vertically aligned institutions such as regional and central government (known as multi-level governance) (Rhodes, 1997), and horizontally aligned groups and actors (known as networked governance) (Davies, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2005). It involves new processes of governing that resort to less hierarchy and markets (Rhodes, 1997), and more networking (Börzel, 1998; Davies, 2002). These new processes have often referred to the role of local government now being that of ‘more steering and less rowing’ (Rhodes, 1996) based on D. Osborne and Gaebler (1992). Practices, driven by quite different theoretical agendas but often associated with governance, include citizens’ juries, public/private partnerships, and increased public consultation and participation (Aulich, 2009; Davies, 2002; Fenwick, Johnston Miller, & McTavish, 2012).

Local Governance as a Response to Neoliberalism

Much of the debate as to whether local governance has positive or negative outcomes for cities revolves around the reasons for its prominence in the 1980s and 1990s as a mode of governing. A number of scholars argue that governance arose, in part, to ameliorate the worst excesses of the ‘roll-back of neoliberalism’ period (Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Stoker, 1998). Following World War II, welfare states expanded to provide services directly to citizens, reflecting the support for social democratic parties and collective provision in the United Kingdom, Western Europe/Scandinavia, and New

⁴ Following Jessop (2009, p. 416), I am mindful of the difficulty of defining the state. From an institutional perspective the state includes “The executive, legislature, judiciary, army, police and public administration”. The state also has formal sovereignty over its population.

Zealand. This was, in part, a response to the failure of market provision of services in the 1920s and 1930s. Post-war economic growth underpinned new state-led social investment and redistribution, which was felt to be the best means of ensuring social well-being (Jessop, 2002; Newman, 2001).

Jessop (2002) notes that the rise to prominence of governance is linked to factors such as the failure of some worldwide macroeconomic coordination mechanisms, the post-war shifting of power blocs, the rise of identity politics, and social movements. From these changes came a concern with national competitiveness, dissatisfaction with top-down planning, and 'problems' associated with dependency created by the welfare state. The old order of political and economic organisation was deemed inadequate when faced with these challenges. By the 1980s, Blakeley (2003) argues that the state became constructed as problematic rather than the solution for the provision of welfare services. Newman (2001) notes, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, governments privileged markets as they thought they offered economic efficiency through competition and greater choice to consumers. "The public sector was, throughout this period, viewed as a target of reform rather than as an agent through which social change could be delivered" (Newman, 2001, p. 56).

The changes in the 1980s resulted in privatisation of government assets, deregulation, and market-orientated ways of providing services (Larner, 2000). The term 'neoliberalism' appeared in the academic literature to explain a new wave of public policies, and scholars questioned the role of the market in the provision of services (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Aligned with neoliberalism was reform of the public sector within the western world, which became known as new public management (NPM) or managerialism (Hood, 1990). A call for smaller government was made but, as detailed later, a reduced government role does not necessarily mean less governance.

Running through arguments on the emergence of local governance is the role of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism refers to a free market approach to economic, social, and environmental problems. A reduced role for the state and greater individual choice is

promoted. Regulation by the state is concentrated on promoting competition and promoting market solutions. There are, however, many variations. Neoliberalism does not have a fixed set of attributes and is responsive to local political and social contexts. It is, therefore, selectively adopted and adapted by countries (Larner & Walters, 2000; Newman, 2013b; Ong, 2007; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2013).

Neoliberalism, nevertheless, is widely recognised as a common thread to the major changes that took place within the public sector starting in the United Kingdom with Margaret Thatcher and in the United States with Ronald Reagan, and then moving to other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries including New Zealand (Boston & Eichbaum, 2014; Bush, 2005; Geddes, 2005). Even with the misgivings about the term neoliberal, Peck (2013) asserts that:

After all, for all its mixed achievements on the ground, the hegemonic grip of neoliberal ideology continues to be manifest in the form of unrelenting political pressure for market-oriented and voluntarist modes of governance, based on the principles of devolved and outsourced responsibility, along with a correspondingly circumscribed regulatory solution space. (p. 16)

Neoliberalism is, therefore, a useful concept for explaining the context, albeit constantly shifting and variable, within which governance and decision-making takes place. As noted above, public sector restructuring within the context of neoliberalism is termed new public management (NPM) and was a widespread phenomenon throughout the world, including in New Zealand (Boston & Eichbaum, 2014). These reforms are influenced by the notion of managerialism, which is the philosophy that places management as the key priority (Hood, 1990). NPM, while instituted to varying degrees around the world, is based on the view that there are intrinsically few differences between private sector and public sector management. Therefore, the reforms included: private sector management practices focussing on efficiency, effectiveness, and output budgeting; enhanced accountability requirements; performance pay; the use of markets or quasi-markets for delivering services; privatisation of assets; contracting out of services; use of competition and consumer choice; and a greater concern with image (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996).

Local governance has been shaped by many of the NPM practices such as effectiveness and efficiency, privatisation, contracts, performance measures and imbued with an ethos of competition, commodification and entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989; Theodore, Peck, & Brenner, 2011). Stoker (1998) also views local governance as a response to neoliberalism. He provides a more critical analysis of governance as one that is “used to provide the acceptable face of spending cuts. It is a code for less government” (p. 18). Governance scholars, particularly those concerned with local governance in the United Kingdom, went on to document and analyse trends in governing, and offering “another way of seeing the world and the role of local government ... its ideas entered the world of practice” (Stoker, 2011, p. 16). The extensive research that Stoker (1998, 1999, 2000), Rhodes (1996, 2000) and others undertook within a large government-funded research programme⁵ helped the theory of governance become translated into practice within local government. This alternative way of seeing the world involved promoting networks as a means of delivering services in addition to markets and hierarchy and “a more networked, partnership-based and participative way of doing politics” (Stoker, 2011, p. 16).

According to Rhodes (1996), one of the intended (and unintended) consequences of the impacts of the NPM reforms on central government, particularly in the United Kingdom, was the ‘hollowing out of the state’. He outlined the form of governance that emerged due to the reform of the public sector that had become characterised by increased fragmentation of organisations and more centralised control through such things as audits and performance measures. He argues that the multiplication of policy networks emerged as a consequence, and these networks are integral to new governance. In his analysis, networks are synonymous with governance. He defines governance as, “self-organizing, inter-organizational networks” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 660), and goes on to describe networks as:

the several interdependent actors involved in delivering services. These networks are made up of organizations which need to exchange resources (for example, money, information, expertise) to

⁵ United Kingdom’s Economic and Social Research Council’s Local Governance Programme invested £2.3million in 27 research projects and ran from 1992 to 1997 (Stoker, 2011).

achieve their objectives, to maximize their influence over outcomes, and to avoid becoming dependent on other players in the game. (Rhodes, 1996, p. 658)

As Rhodes succinctly states, following Osborne and Gaebler (1992), “[t]his transformation of the public sector involves ‘less government’ (or less rowing) but ‘more governance’ (or more steering)” (1996, p. 655). Some scholars question whether the state has indeed hollowed out. Scharpf (1994) contends that the state is still very active and that networks have added to the hierarchical structure. He coined the phrase that they work within ‘the shadow of hierarchy’. Taylor (2002) suggests that, paradoxically, the state has increased its powers and that hollowing out has been exaggerated. Steering is a very powerful mode of government, and with network complexity comes the need for more management by the state.

Rhodes’ explanations of networks within governance encompass what has been characterised as the Anglo-governance school (Börzel, 1998; Marinetto, 2003). Scholars draw a distinction between governance in continental Europe and in the United Kingdom. Kooiman’s (1993b) influential work states that European reforms were less radical and based on different premises than those in the United Kingdom. In continental Europe they were based on public/private partnerships and task sharing, while networks set limits to the state’s ability to implement policy (Mayntz, 1993). At the Max Planck Institute, Mayntz and Scharpf, while still in agreement about the ascendancy of networks within governance, rely on formal game theory to explain changes in governing (Mayntz, 1993; Scharpf, 1994). Another European grouping (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Klijn, Koppenjan, & Termeer, 1995; Kooiman, 1993a) preferred a management approach based more on the process of governance to explain institutional change and the role of people within and outside of those institutions.

Whatever the nuances of the different approaches, all the ‘governance schools’ saw networks as pivotal within governance (Börzel, 1998). Drawing on all of these accounts, governance has the following characteristics:

- A changed pattern of rule from one largely based on the state using hierarchy and bureaucracy to one where the state also uses networks and partnerships;
- A move to a greater role of leadership, coordination, and steering than just direct provision of services;
- Greater use of markets at all scalar levels from local to global, corresponding with a more circumscribed regulatory regime;
- Greater use of stakeholders combined with greater emphasis on public consultation/participation.

Local governance as a concept, therefore, seeks to understand the changing nature of government. It is often used as a shorthand term to describe the particular changes outlined above.

The apparent turn from government to governance at the local level has been observed in numerous studies around the world (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998; Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Blakeley, 2005; Denters & Rose, 2005; Fenwick et al., 2012; Geddes, 2006; Leibovitz, 1999; Mitchell-Weaver, Miller, & Deal, 2000; Stoker, 2011; D. Wilson, 2000). These scholars observe that local governance has many of the same characteristics as governance at the national level. Examining six western countries, Bas Denters (2011) concludes that the role of local government actors in governance varies depending on their prior central-local relations. While there is always interdependence between central and local government it is not an equal relationship, as the centre can always enact legislation to change the relationship (Rhodes, 1997). Therefore, according to Denters, the resulting forms of local governance differ between countries and are conceived as: “governance by local government (Sweden and Germany); governance by municipal networks (Netherlands); governance by regime (United States); and governance by multi-level partnership (United Kingdom and France)” (Denters, 2011, p. 326).

New Zealand took some of the key concepts of local governance from the United Kingdom. New Zealand, however, has a slightly different pattern of local governance

compared with the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions as local government has a different relationship with central government. Although local government has a precarious constitutional position, local government is relatively financially independent with only 13% of its revenue coming from central government grants and subsidies (Local Government Rates Inquiry Panel, 2007).

A reforming Labour government in New Zealand led the world in public sector reform in the late 1980s (Boston et al., 1996). The reforms were radical and comprehensive and resulted in widespread job losses in the public service, and restructuring (including corporatisation and privatisation) (Duncan & Chapman, 2010). New Zealand was considered one of the exemplary models of NPM by two of its leading proponents, Osborne and Gaebler (1992). They noted enthusiastically that, “New Zealand has gone the farthest along the entrepreneurial path” (1992, p. 330). Given these changes at the national level, it is unsurprising that radical changes at the local level also took place.

In New Zealand, decision-making within a local governance context takes place under both the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). It is surprising that, given there are two pieces of legislation relating to local governance, there is limited academic research that examines their combined relationship and impact. Perkins and Thorns (2001) and Swaffield (2012) are notable exceptions in this regard. A detailed explanation of the reforms and how they have had an impact on governance and planning is undertaken in Chapter 4.

There has been a wide variety of scholarly interest in local governance in New Zealand. This ranges from investigating broad structural reforms that usher in new governance modes (Bush, 2005; Cheyne, 2011, 2012a), strategic planning and coordinating and steering local communities (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010; Leonard & Memon, 2008; Local Futures Research Project, 2006, 2011; Reid, Scott, & McNeill, 2006), partnerships (Larner & Butler, 2005; Local Partnerships and Governance Research Group, 2005), decision-making and representation (Drage, 2008, 2011), political leadership (Cheyne, 2004a, 2012b; Hambleton, 2008), reduced land-use regulation (Grundy & Gleeson,

1996; Gunder, 2003; Perkins & Thorns, 2001), and public participation (Bond & Thompson-Fawcett, 2007; Cheyne & Comrie, 2002).

Of most relevance to this research are studies of local governance involving strategic planning, decision-making, and reduced land-use regulation. These are outlined in Chapter 4. Local political leadership and partnerships are discussed below.

Cheyne (2012b) argues that the local political leadership model introduced by central government for the new Auckland Council in 2010 indicates a move towards a strong mayor model in the council-manager form. The enhanced role and new powers given to the Auckland mayor under the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 have been replicated, although diluted for the rest of the mayors around New Zealand under the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Act 2012. Traditionally, New Zealand has operated with a weak mayor model whereby the power of the mayor has been largely symbolic (Cheyne, 2004a; Leach & Wilson, 2000). Power has been derived from personality traits rather than formal powers (Asquith, 2012). Cheyne (2012b) suggests that New Zealand could be shifting towards a mayor-council form which Svava and Watson (2010) note provides executive power to mayors. Moves to stronger local political leadership is occurring alongside changes in governance at the local level. Leach and Wilson (2004) argue in favour of an enhanced role for mayors to support the new style of local governance involving networking and partnerships.

Larner and Craig (2005), undertaking research on local partnerships in New Zealand using a governmentality approach, found that the role of community activists could be seen as political rationalities at work embedding the activists within the governing process. They conclude that, in reality, it is more complicated as the activists understood what was taking place and were using the process for their own ends. The role of activists within this context is difficult because:

the political context of their work remains fraught, with their activities directly linked to the politicisation of local issues, while at the same time they are increasingly required to make their political claims technical, or turn their contests into collaboration (Larner & Craig, 2005, p. 419).

Local Governance as a Means to Embed Neoliberalism

An alternative view to the one presented above on the rise of governance is that offered by Peck and Tickell (2002) and Davies (2011). Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that the 1980s was a period of 'roll-back' neoliberalism, where the focus was on deregulation and retrenchment of the state. This shifted in the 1990s to a period where governance was one of the ways of ushering in more radical changes for the state at all scalar levels, both national and local. They have coined the phrase 'roll out neoliberalism' to characterise the change to a period when neoliberalism was consolidated through new modes of governance, regulatory reform and institutions. Geddes' (2005) comparative study of local governance encompasses countries in what he terms the 'neoliberal heartland', which includes New Zealand and Australia. Bush (2005) and Aulich's (2005) studies are cited by Geddes to show that New Zealand and Australia display many of the key features of local governance although there are notable differences. Many of these differences revolve around central–local relationships. Based on a comparative study of local governance in countries throughout the world Geddes (2005) concludes that the underlying context for these changes has been neoliberalism. Like Peck and Tickell (2002) he is at pains to point out that the impact of neoliberalism differs across countries and that local governance outcomes are also variegated.

Davies (2011) emphatically argues that network governance, in particular, is part of the strategy of neoliberalism. He understands network governance as:

a form of neoliberal ideology, defined not simply as the championing of free markets but as an active project for economic and political modernisation inspired by informational capitalism, the heart of the 'connectionist' objective of fostering an entrepreneurial, reflexive and communicative sociability. (Davies, 2011, p. 5)

Governance: Those in Favour

Local governance is increasingly associated with statutory and non-statutory planning as planners seek to work with partners, key stakeholders and the public (Brownill, 2009; Illsley & Coles, 2009; Majoor, 2011). Healey (2003), in her influential book *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*, reflects that one of the reasons she developed the concept of collaborative planning was because of the fast pace of change to governance. Houghton, Allmendinger, and Oosterlynck (2013, p. 223) argue that although planners work within hierarchical and judicial structures they have “also taken on aspects of ‘governance’, as increasing efforts are made to engage with multiple actors and agencies in developing and agreeing both to formal statutory plans and to nonstatutory spatial strategies”.

Local governance decision-making is often associated with an entrepreneurial approach to capturing global capital investment and using it to promote cities. Watson (2009) notes, planners have often been associated with state-led planning and have been perceived as standing in the way of market-led development. As local government decision-making changed, planning professionals have been increasingly caught between the need to plan for the ‘public interest’ as well as meet the demands of global capital (Sandercock, 2003) and the need to plan for the increasing diversity of people and income inequality (Watson, 2009). Healey (1997) and other prominent planning academics (Forester, 1993; Innes, 1995) argue that a widened participatory and partnership approach can assist planners in local government to mediate between competing interests within the capitalist, political economy (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003a). This raises the question of whether planners are fully aware of the contextual changes and the power relations that operate within the new decision-making process of local governance. Healey (1997) contends the constraints on participation can be understood and changed through acknowledging power relations and creating the right environment for decision-making and participation. Other scholars do not share this view because structural constraints in power relations cannot be easily overcome (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Neuman, 2000).

Campbell and Fainstein (2003a) argue that planning practice has had to respond to, and cope with, changes in how society, the economy, and the environment are governed. According to Sandercock, planning was based on “a rational model of problem-solving and decision-making to guide state intervention. The context here was to ameliorate the excesses of industrial capitalism” (1998, p. 26). This rational model of planning permeated the planning profession until the 1970s, leading the profession to believe that by utilising scientific, rational, and comprehensive means they could objectively and expertly assess problems from a public interest point of view and provide solutions without recourse to politics (Allmendinger, 2002). Sandercock contends that since the 1980s the western world has become more economically conservative and “more subservient to industrial and finance capital” (1998, p. 28). The planning profession’s role in encouraging and facilitating developments spurned by the global capital now means planners are not necessarily seen as ‘objective’ and acting in the public interest. Cities have increasingly experienced diversity through immigration, disparity of incomes, and uneven development. It is in this context that planners have had to respond to more diverse demands than in the past. Vanessa Watson (2009) also notes that while globalisation has had a differential impact on cities around the world depending on their circumstances and past histories, one common thread has been the increased income inequality and poverty and the rise of informal economic activity. Growing spatial disparities have also been noted between the revitalised CBD areas, mega project developments, and luxury residential areas often located near suburban areas that have not experienced the same amount of investment (Watson, 2009).

As well as the changes in physical contexts for planning, there have also been changes in approaches to decision-making that have had a major impact on planners. Citizens have increasingly demanded a greater say in how their cities develop. This has developed as a reaction to two main forces. First, Sandercock (2003) argues that it is a result of people and communities becoming disenchanted with the rational-comprehensive model of planning. This disenchantment has led to the rise of new social movements where people demand participation in the decisions that affect them and their cities (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003a). Planners have had to respond to

this changed context by providing their advice in an open and transparent manner and adhering to new decision-making processes. They have also realised that some type of public consultation and support makes planning implementation more successful (Watson, 2009). Second, as mentioned earlier, it has been associated with the changes in the public sector due to NPM (see for example, Diefenbach, 2009; Hood, 1990; Kjær, 2004).

While local governance has provided new opportunities for planners to involve the community in decision-making, it is now criticised. Allmendinger and Haughton (2012b) argue that the partnership governance approach now prevalent in planning in England is part of the neoliberalisation of planning. Instead of widening participation, they argue that input is tightly circumscribed and that while communities are encouraged to have input into local plans it is, however, within prescribed boundaries. The partnership governance arrangements facilitate a carefully choreographed consensus while promoting a growth agenda. The following section outlines the competing perspectives of local governance.

Governance: Those Against

Local governance theories have only recently been subject to a criticism. This, Swyngedouw (2005) argues, is in part due to governance practices appealing both to organisations such as the World Bank pursuing a neoliberal agenda and to those organisations and planners seeking greater participatory practices within government. Two of the initial leading theorists of local governance, Rhodes (2011) and Stoker (2011), now express doubts that local governance can indeed deliver what they had hoped. When reflecting on his academic career, Rhodes (2011) agrees that the Anglo-governance school approach of viewing governing needs to be reconceptualised. Stoker (2011) also questions whether the role of local governance or community governance, as he terms it in this article, is a sufficient role to sustain local government:

The role [of community governance] may leave local government as a bystander in the effective governance of a country with other tiers of government, public agencies, partnership organizations and third sector trusts having a bigger and more substantial role. It is not a role that ensures that local government is embedded in either the body or soul of citizens or particular stakeholders. Offering to be a place shaper or community governor places local government on a slippery slope to the sidelines of governing arrangements. (2011, p. 28)

Critics of the concept of governance, such as Enroth (2011), point out that it has dilemmas related, on the one hand, to democracy and social justice such as accountability, legitimacy and participation and, on the other hand, to managerial dilemmas associated with steering, controlling and coordinating. These dilemmas are now examined.

Democratic Dilemmas

A key challenge for any networked or collaborative governance arrangement such as a partnership is accountability and responsibility. It is more difficult to be held to account when there are multiple actors, not solely the local council. When a local project is the responsibility of numerous agencies, more dispersed action is involved, which blurs accountability and increases the democratic deficit. Melo and Baiocchi describe this situation as a “trade-off [which] is essentially one between efficiency and accountability; in Dahl’s terms, between system effectiveness and citizen participation” (2006, p. 589). On the one hand, networks and partnerships are a challenge for accountability as they can – and often do – exclude the public generally and include favoured interests. On the other hand, through these networks, citizens have greater access as users and possibly as members of a key stakeholder group if ‘citizens’ are identified as a stakeholder group (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Critics of this form of accountability have pointed out that only certain privileged voices may be heard through these mechanisms (Blakeley, 2005). Therefore, most scholars see the need for two forms of accountability: representative accountability and participatory accountability (Kjær, 2004).

Melo and Baiocchi raise questions relating to local governance and participation. Of interest here is whether governance structures favour “the representation of middle-class and elite interests” (2006, p. 596). This is because the coordination of market interests may override public values. They go on to say that “The basic democratic values – such as equality, universalism and respect – are very distinct from market values, and may conflict in zero-sum situations” (2006, p. 596).

Swyngedouw (2005) raises other concerns about accountability within governance arrangements. Whereas representational democracy is based on a codified system of rules, governance through networks is not. Indeed the word ‘stakeholder’, now in common usage within governance discourse, refers to the notion that participants are able to participate in decision-making about issues in which they have a stake Swyngedouw (2005). This opens up issues concerning entitlement and exercises of power.

Le Galès (2011) analyses policy instruments as a means of determining how governance is operationalised. He points to two quite different outcomes for democracy based on the employed modes of governance. In some places and in some contexts, he argues, policy instruments are developed within a governance framework that can promote effective participation amongst a wide group of actors. Within the countries that are introducing these policy instruments the mode of governance is moving towards the desired deliberative democracy ideals. In the United Kingdom, however, Le Galès has witnessed other policy instruments of a mode of governance that “leads to profound changes of behaviour and allows a remarkable comeback of state elite to govern and to constrain various groups in society” (p. 154). He shows how in the United Kingdom New Labour governed using performance measures, audit control and league tables, all of which have created a disciplinary control via individual responsibility. Le Galès’ work shows how governance can create, at the same time, albeit in different jurisdictions, both a move towards a more deliberative democracy and a move to a more controlling society with decreased democratic ideals. These governance tensions and dilemmas are examined in the next section.

Other concerns about public participation and representative democracy include: unequal power relationships; institutional design; lack of policy outcome from the participation process; consultation fatigue; expectations of empowerment rather than participation; and professional control of the process (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Blakeley, 2003; Chhotray & Stoker, 2009; Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & Knops, 2004; Pløger, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2005).

Public participation and governance debates tend to focus on whether participation is promoted for consumer empowerment or citizen participation; in other words, whether participation is a top-down policy-prescribed approach or a bottom-up citizen-initiated approach. Fears are expressed in the literature that public participation can endanger democracy in that only certain, usually privileged, minority voices can be heard and represented as the majority. For example, as Blakeley (2003, p. 11) observes, “many mechanisms designed to enhance participation tend to favour the participation of those who are already participating”.

Managerial Dilemmas

Working with multiple organisations within networks produces managerial dilemmas of how to coordinate and steer. Without the clear lines of hierarchy that bureaucracies offer, there are very real issues of how to create and implement policies. Kickert et al. (1997) show that managers in the public sector working in governance networks lack clear lines of power and authority and often have no clear strategies or goals. To compensate for the lack of hands-on control, performance measures, audits, and evaluations have been introduced to offer a different mechanism of restricting resources to organisations. Rhodes (1996) was one of the first to argue that new tools needed to be found to manage networks and create cooperation among the various actors.

Tensions and conflicts arise in governance when the state attempts to achieve things through networks and non-state actors. Governance is as subject to failure as is the market. Jessop (2000) notes that markets, states, and networks are all prone to failure but the fact that they, by some measure, deliver results is due to what he termed

metagovernance. That is “the governance of government and governance” (Jessop, 2000, p. 23). Metagovernance is a means to provide the management and mechanisms of coordination to help overcome managerial dilemmas. Klijn points out that “although network governance requires a different form of government, it certainly does not require a less active one” (2008, p. 520).

Power Dilemmas

Many scholars (see, for example, Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Blakeley, 2010; Brownill & Carpenter, 2007; Haughton et al., 2013; Sending & Neumann, 2006) have argued that governance theories have paid insufficient attention to how power actually operates within networks, partnerships and participatory practices.

Some planning theorists, (such as Campbell & Fainstein, 2003b; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Sandercock, 2003; Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000) especially those adopting a postmodern theoretical framework, critique collaborative planning because it does not give sufficient attention to structural contexts and power relations. Campbell and Fainstein identify the constraints on planning power:

Planners operate within the constraints of the capitalist political economy, and their urban visions compete with those of developers, consumers, and other more powerful groups. When they call for a type of development to occur, they cannot command the resources to make it happen. Instead, they must rely on either private investment or a commitment from political leaders. They also work within the constraints of democracy and of the governmental bureaucracy. Their goals, however, often have low priority within the overall political agenda. Thus, despite the planning ideal of a holistic, proactive vision, planners are frequently restricted to playing frustratingly reactive, regulatory roles (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003b, p. 8).

Nevertheless, the communicative turn in planning has had a significant influence not only in planning theory but also in planning practice. Some critics of collaborative planning practice refer to the ‘dark side of planning’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Yiftachel, 1998), arguing that although planning can be used for

public good ends, it can equally be used as a means of public control and oppression.

According to Yiftachel, exploring planning's dark side:

broadens our understanding of planning as a double-edged activity that uses its principles and tools in either regressive or progressive ways. This view comes from linking planning to the state apparatus that provides planning's legitimacy and power.
(Yiftachel, 1998, p. 403)

These planning scholars contend that collaborative planning theory is not sufficiently critical of how collaboration is designed and implemented by professional planners or of what it produces. It assumes that the goals of planning are progressive rather than oppressive (Yiftachel, 1998). Yiftachel provides numerous examples of research to show that planning can facilitate discriminating spatial policies for ethnic groups, the poor, and women (1998). He draws on Foucault's (1980) work on power to show how planning can be used for social control.

Many studies of governance note that the issue of power is often neglected or under-theorised (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; M. Taylor, 2000). Steven Lukes (2005), in his classic study into the use of power, describes three 'views' of power:

- i. One-dimensional;
- ii. Two-dimensional, involving non-decisions;
- iii. Third-dimensional, involving latent decisions.

The one-dimensional view of power is a pluralist one, where power is held by many different groups and individuals. It is observable when there is conflict in decision-making processes. This view of power was first described by Robert Dahl (1961) in his study *Who Governs?*, which explores decision-making in the United States city of New Haven, in the 1950s. This study and its view of power were subsequently critiqued, and a further view of power, which Lukes labelled the two-dimensional view of power, was posited by Bachrach and Baratz (1975). They suggest that power is also in use when issues are prevented from getting onto the political agenda. Non-decisions can be extremely powerful: "some person or association could limit decision-making to

relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals” (Lukes, 2005, p. 6). The third dimension of power, which Lukes himself identifies, does not need conflict to be observable or to be associated with overt behaviour. Power in this view is where there is latent conflict by influencing, shaping or determining wants. A person is not aware of their real interests in this situation and it is more difficult to detect when power has been exercised. Lukes believes this is the most effective use of power: “[i]ndeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others, to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” (2005, p. 27). These three dimensions of power, which conceptualise power as domination and as ‘power over’ can be contrasted with Foucault’s notion of power.

The Foucauldian view of power is that power is inevitable, invisible, and exercised through a discourse developed in relations between actors. In this instance, power is very diffuse and difficult to place responsibility and hence accountability (Kjær, 2004, p. 52). Power cannot be possessed but only exercised. It is not only repressive but productive. Foucault explored how the productive aspect of power was more potent than its repressive effect:

But it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. ... If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 2000b, p. 120)

When one takes this view of power the questions are not ‘who has power’ or ‘why is power being used’ but ‘how is power being exercised’. This then leads to examining the techniques and practices of power.

Local Governance as Governmentality

A group of scholars argue that local governance can have both beneficial and negative outcomes (Blakeley, 2010; Larner & Butler, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; M. Taylor, 2007). Using governmentality theory, these scholars argue that it is crucial to understand how power operates within a local governance mode of decision-making. This can be achieved by shifting the focus from forms of governance to practices of governing. A governmentality analysis of the everyday mundane practices of decision-making can highlight the beneficial and negative outcomes of governance within a particular situation. Larner and Butler note, “[o]ne of the major accomplishments of the governmentality literature has been to focus attention on the relatively mundane practices through which political power is exercised” (2005, p. 89).

Governmentality is a useful lens through which to view governance. Governance and governmentality both understand that the management and governing of people and populations are carried out by both state and non-state institutions (see, for example, Butler, 2004). It is through various processes and technologies that communities, citizens, and organisations are enrolled in their own governing (Dean, 2010; O'Malley, 2000). Lemke (2007, p. 44) articulates this usefully for this thesis as “the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence”.

Governmentality differs from governance in two important areas. Lemke (2007, p. 54) argues that governmentality, unlike governance, recognises that government is “actively involved in constituting agents, identities and interests”. Second, governmentality does not accept that political decisions are based on rational and neutral facts. Lemke contends that much of the governance literature assumes that major structural inequalities can be overcome through good governance and “a technocratic model of steering and managing” (p. 55) and downplays fundamental conflicts and radical alternatives to the established order.

Foucault developed the concept of governmentality to understand how the art of governing took place and used the term government to mean the conduct of conduct to understand the exercise of power. In this conception, government is used as a verb rather than a noun – how is society governed (Gallagher, 2012). His research explored how governing was used to shape or affect conduct rather than acting directly on people (Foucault, 2007). He used the term ‘government’ generally as in his work he demonstrated that up until the 18th century in Europe, the term was used in a wide range of areas such as in religion, medicine and education. In these areas, government was used to refer to a wide range of problems, such as self-control, pastoral care and family relations (Lemke, 2007). He therefore used the term conduct of conduct to refer to, not only these more pastoral concerns, but also the political form of government. In this latter area, his focus was of how rule turned to ‘less government’, and where expert knowledge of the market became important and was deemed natural. The management of freedoms and the practices of security were paramount. Governmentality as a theory is argued to be unique in that it addresses the linkages and tensions between the art of governing subjects and subject’s self-governance (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 2007; Lemke, 2001; P. Miller & Rose, 2008; N. Rose et al., 2006; Walters, 2012).

As a tool for analysis, the concept of governmentality involves a number of terms that have particular meanings. According to Walters (2012), governmentality is formed from the word governing, meaning an art of governing, and ‘mentalities’, meaning the collective taken-for-granted modes of thought and knowledge underpinning that governing. Governmentality invokes much more than the traditional concept of top-down governing (Dean, 2010). Government has two aspects: the exercise of authority over others, and how we govern ourselves. Governmentality therefore links the exercise of authority with the formation of identity or subjects. Political rationalities are ways of representing and knowing a phenomenon so that particular policies appear reasonable and therefore amenable to change (Lemke, 2001; P. Miller & Rose, 2008). Political rationalities have a moral characteristic, are based on particular knowledge and expertise and use discourse to embed and normalise them (P. Miller & Rose, 2008). Strategies, techniques and tactics to overcome problems identified as

governmental or political rationalities are known as technologies. These are often the mundane routines of life such as performance measures, manuals, codes of conduct, and audits. "It is through technologies that political rationalities and the programmes of government that articulate them become capable of deployment" (P. Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 63). Dean (2010) identifies a framework for conducting an analysis using governmentality that involves four dimensions: visibilities (ways of seeing); knowledge (ways of thinking); technologies (expert knowledge and techniques); and, the formation of identities.

Foucault (1980, 1995, 2007) developed an understanding of how power operates within governing. His main interest was how governing takes place, the technologies of governing within particular regimes, and how these regimes emerge, become normalised, and then transform people and place. Governance is therefore a subset of governmentality (Walters, 2012).

A number of planning scholars have used Foucault's notion of power relations and knowledge to explain how power and planning interact in the form of rationalities. They view power in a relational way (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Huxley, 2000; Yiftachel, 1998). Another group of scholars (for example, Burchell et al., 1991; Dean, 2010; Lemke, 2002; O'Malley, Weir, & Shearing, 1997; N. Rose et al., 2006) have taken Foucault's idea of governmentality and extended its analysis to understand how governing is now taking place within the neoliberal era. This approach is used to enable an understanding of the mechanisms and processes of governing and therefore demonstrate how actual political practice takes place (O'Malley et al., 1997). Miller and Rose (2008) argue that political power in the modern era is a dispersed form of power exercised through many diverse authorities. Instead of imposing constraints, (although this can occur) power is exercised by shaping discourses and using strategies and technologies so that people not only accept a regulated freedom, but actively become self-disciplinary subjects. While aspects of government may now reside within partnerships, voluntary and private sectors, this "does not necessarily render them less governable" (P. Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 81). Local governance is not a reduction in local state power but a change from formal to informal arts of governing and introduces

new governmental actors. Therefore, power is not reduced, but, rather exercised in a different manner and across multiple sites. Governmentality takes a critical examination of the rationales, technologies, and techniques used in governing. In particular, it aims to make clear the different styles of thought and knowledge that legitimise certain phenomena and how techniques and practices are conducted to overcome problems. Knowledge and expertise, defined within particular political rationalities, is crucial to 'claims of truth'. Power is exercised not necessarily through control but rather "education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement" (P. Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 55). People that are not persuaded to conduct themselves in a particular manner, are according to P. Miller & Rose deemed "anti-social" and controlled by other means (p. 60).

It is not just the state that governs but also a large range of authorities over many different places and for different purposes. From this construction, N. Rose et al. (2006) argue that:

instead of seeing any single body – such as the state – as responsible for managing the conduct of citizens, this perspective recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives. Hence, a second set of questions emerges: "Who governs what? According to what logics? With what techniques? Toward what ends?" (2006, p. 85).

Foucault's concept of governmentality was a response to the challenges of understanding the art of governing occurring in the 1980s as a result of neoliberalism in the western world (N. Rose et al., 2006). Foucault emphasised that the art of governing in this period was about less government and governing through freedom of choice:

Foucault suggests that liberalism is not so much a substantive doctrine of how to govern. Rather, it is an art of governing that arises as a critique of excessive government – a search for a technology of government that can address the recurrent complaint that authorities are governing too much. (N. Rose et al., 2006, p. 84)

Local governance viewed through the theoretical lens of governmentality, therefore, addresses the debates about the role of the state and whether, under the changes noticed since the reforms of the 1980s, the state has hollowed out, devolved responsibilities, decentralised, and moved upward to transnationals and global forces or sideways to other partners. From a governmentality perspective, governance has never been confined to the state. Governing has always occurred at different levels and at different sites. Governmentality theory, therefore, addresses the issue of how the state can govern at a distance through these other bodies. It does this by examining the technologies of the state and how these are extended into civil society so that civil society self-regulates itself (Bevir & Rhodes, 2011).

The conduct of conduct involves governing through freedoms not prohibitions. Foucault emphasised that those who govern always have a degree of freedom, just as those who are governed have freedoms. In other words, there are always other possible ways in which to conduct oneself. It therefore follows that, while governing bodies hope their subjects will conduct themselves in a certain way, they will not necessarily do so. As Dean notes “it is possible for them to act and to think in a variety of ways, and sometimes in ways not foreseen by authorities” (2010, p. 21).

Governmentality theory shows that the state has not ‘lost’ power to civil society and other actors within networks. As Newman (2001) argues, power has been dispersed:

This view of power as productive, ... provides a sharp contrast with governance literature. ... arguments about the ‘hollowing out’ of the state or the ‘fragmentation’ of power fail to capture the way in which state power has been realigned. Rather than the reduction of government, the shifts ... can be viewed as the dispersal of state power across new sites of action, augmented by new strategies and technologies. (Newman, 2001, p. 168)

A changed rationality of government has occurred so that civil society is not a passive object but instead both an object and a subject of government. Civil society is not apart from the political power of the state but is part of the power of the state. This is how government in the modern liberal era operates (P. Miller & Rose, 2008); as Foucault noted “as the modern art of governing less” (Philo, 2012, p. 507).

Civil society is intricately involved with the state. It is often not only coordinated and steered by the state but also funded and actively supported by it so it can deliver services, implement policies, and monitor others. In this way, M. Taylor (2007) asserts, the state can be an even greater presence in society rather than governing through its own institutions. Relations of power are important. While there may be many new and diverse actors involved in governing what are important are the processes and practices of how that governing now takes place. With a governmentality approach, power is a relation and operates through others. In this case, power does not have to be a zero-sum game, that is, when civil society and other actors have more power it does not follow that the state must have less (Blakeley, 2010).

Shortcomings of Governmentality Theory

McKee (2009) argues that, although governmentality theory offers significant insights into governance, particularly about power, it has limitations. These concern the way in which scholars do not focus on empirical reality and the politics of resistance. She suggests that a research method is required that involves empirical as well as text analysis, that is sensitive to context and time. Research should examine the concrete art of governing rather than relying solely on rationales within documents. Further, she argues, resistance within governmentality theory needs a stronger focus. 'Government of the self' is a key theme in governmentality theory. In this art of government, the concern is not with suppressing individuals' freedom but in creating citizens with a regulated freedom such that they conduct themselves by normalisation and consent rather than through coercion. O'Malley et al. (1997) critique governmentality theory because it does not sufficiently allow for conflict and resistance. They maintain that a stronger focus is needed on the 'resistant' subject. These points are picked up in this research because the obvious failures of self-regulation by young people in the night-time economy calls into question the actual process of subjectification.

The Post-Political Condition

Swyngedouw (2009b, 2011a, 2011b), using governmentality to critique local governance, finds that large-scale revitalisation projects are a means to implement

urban and political change. The governance of revitalisation projects often involve less formal government structures and greater reliance is placed on new agencies such as partnerships (Darchen, 2013; Doucet, 2012). As Swyngedouw et al. (2002) demonstrate in their study of 12 European Union (EU) countries undertaking large-scale urban development projects, the informal participatory mechanisms extend to who participates and therefore whose interests are paramount. They find that participation is limited to selected professionals, to the detriment of traditional organised groups and the public in general, leading to a loss in democratic accountability. Many of the projects are also initiated by suspending normal planning mechanisms or “bypassing statutory regulations and institutional bodies” (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, p. 543).

Drawing on political theorists (Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1998; Žižek, 1999) who advance the idea that political choices are increasingly constrained by appeals to the threat of necessity, Swyngedouw (2011a) illuminates the changing nature of government to governance. He argues that, while governance has been expansive in terms of governing and controlling, it has a narrowing effect on the political aspects of local government. Contemporary forms of local governance have elevated forms of decision-making, such as consensus and expert opinion, so that the political is replaced. Swyngedouw terms this the ‘post-political’ condition. Debate, disagreement, and ‘dissensus’ are not favoured. This post-political condition is achieved through local governance, which favours stakeholders within informal arrangements alongside management and experts to solve problems where policies rather than politics are practised (Swyngedouw, 2009a). This, he argues, has been to the detriment of the political aspects of local government:

The consolidation of an urban postpolitical condition runs, so I argue, parallel to the formation of a postdemocratic arrangement that has replaced debate, disagreement and dissensus with a series of technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, accountancy metrics and technocratic environmental management. (Swyngedouw, 2009b, p. 1)

Lemke (2007, p. 45) substantiates these arguments by referring back to the concept of governmentality. He argues that the so called “end of politics” that is so common in the discourse of local governance, is part of the art of governing and is itself a “political program”.

Swyngedouw argues that the post-political condition takes place through the construction of creative and entrepreneurial cities. Truly political demands based on ideology are reduced to debates and negotiations over policy and governing:

[The] view of the political as a space of dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict stands in sharp contrast to the consolidating consensual ‘politics’ of contemporary neoliberal socio-environmental governance, an assemblage that a growing body of literature identifies as ‘postpolitical’. (Swyngedouw, 2009a, p. 608)

He argues that to return to the political would require the acceptance of conflict. This post-political (sometimes also referred to as depoliticisation) condition has arisen because certain policies are seen as ‘common sense’ and become elevated beyond politics. While politics still occurs, it is not in the democratic arena and revolves more around managing and governing. Swyngedouw’s work has been explored by Allmendinger and Haughton (2012b) in the planning discipline. They argue that spatial planning in England has fostered a way of working so that opposition does not fundamentally challenge the pro-growth agenda. They use the term “post-political planning” to describe spatial planning that:

has become both hegemonic and problematic in that it mobilises and reproduces acquiescence for policies and strategies that favour certain groups or interests whilst marginalising more radical alternatives. (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012b, p. 93)

An area within local government that scholars say has changed due to new forms of governing and managing is the night-time economy.

The Night-Time City

The rise of the night-time city and in particular the night-time economy is seen by numerous scholars as representing an entrepreneurial, urban 'boosterist' regime (T. Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Hobbs et al., 2000; Shaw, 2010; Talbot, 2007). Harvey (1989) first documented the transformation of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. By this he means the shift in the aims and practices of urban governance from managing urban services and infrastructure to stimulating entrepreneurial arrangements, such as public/private partnerships, to finance urban projects. He also identified, "an albeit subterranean but nonetheless vital connection between the rise of urban entrepreneurialism and the postmodern penchant for design of urban fragments rather than comprehensive urban planning" (Harvey, 1989, p. 13). Since this time other scholars have noted these changes around the world and they have become normalised governance practices for local government (Cento Bull, 2005; Didier, Peyroux, & Morange, 2012; Doucet, 2012; Jonas & McCarthy, 2009; MacLeod, 2011).

The rationale for revitalisation strategies by local government is based on the need for cities to have vibrant city centres that attract people from elsewhere so that cities can compete with one another (Jessop, 1998; Jonas & McCarthy, 2009; Pløgger, 2010). Whether cities can actually compete with one another is a moot point (Amin & Thrift, 2002), but the concept contains a seductive appeal to which councils increasingly adhere and so implement policies to compete with other similar cities.

Another group of scholars see the night-time economy as part of the 'creative city' concept (Florida, 2005). Florida maintains that what successful cities have in common is a 'creative class' of people. These professionals congregate in cities that offer a particular quality of life. One of these qualities is a vibrant nightlife. Peck (2005) argues that one of the reasons the creative city concept has been picked up by cities all around the world is because it is a relatively easy and fiscally modest way to enter into the city competition stakes. He further asserts that cities following this path have:

a proclivity for 'soft', pliable and task-oriented modes of urban governance, organized around short-term, concrete projects (like funding competitions or development schemes), rather than progressive and programmatic goals (such as poverty alleviation or environmental sustainability); and a substantially neoliberalized urban policy environment, within which a range of competitive and market-oriented metrics, techniques and rule regimes are displacing urban-Keynesian systems, like comprehensive planning, bureaucratic delivery, needs-based approaches, and progressive socio-spatial redistribution. (Peck, 2005, p. 764)

Despite differing views on the impetus for the night-time economy it is enjoyed by large numbers of young people around the world who congregate in cities to socialise and drink (Boyd, 2010; Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Demant & Landolt, 2013; Jayne et al., 2006; Jayne et al., 2011; Lyons & Willott, 2008; Measham & Brain, 2005; Schwanen, van Aalst, Brands, & Timan, 2012; Valentine, Holloway, Jayne, & Knell, 2007; Yeo & Heng, 2013). This is not to suggest that problematic drinking is restricted to young people (Babor, 2010) or to people drinking outside of the home (S. L. Holloway, Jayne, & Valentine, 2008). Nor do all young people drink heavily, nor drink only in the city centre. They have other options, such as staying at home or attending parties in domestic spaces. Research, however, shows that young people are drinking more alcohol and that it has become a normalised activity (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Lyons & Willott, 2008; Martinic & Measham, 2008). In addition, alcohol and how it is consumed have changed the way city centres are now experienced in the night, and this makes it worth studying (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Hadfield & Measham, 2009; Roberts, 2006).

While some scholars, for example Zukin (1991), have pointed to the polarisation effects from the entrepreneurial city, with city revitalisation sitting alongside rundown parts of the city, what has not been sufficiently examined is the polarisation that has emerged between the day-time and night-time economy. Promoting economic development and growth based on bars and cafés, has left local government decision-makers satisfied with activities associated with cafés by day but increasingly unsettled by activities associated with bars and their users at night, or more accurately in the early hours of the morning (McCrone, 2008; *The Press*, 2009).

Young people's use of the CBD space at night, and what is seen, by some, as their problematic drinking and behaviour are often discussed, in terms of individual responsibility, health, and safety. As O'Malley and Valverde (2004) argue, pleasure from alcohol is acceptable in the modern liberal age so long as it "equates with rational and responsible enjoyment" (p. 6). While significant emphasis is placed on individual responsibility for behavioural and alcohol consumption, the spaces where drinking takes place have been created by councils, often in association with the private sector.

The desire to offer a vibrant 24-hour city is, however, undermined by what is deemed to be anti-social behaviour by many of the young people who participate in activities associated with the night-time economy (Eldridge & Roberts, 2008; Roberts, 2006; Roberts & Turner, 2005). Decision-makers believe that consumers are attracted to vibrant and safe centres and that lack of safety will harm the night-time economy (Raco, 2003). In order to present a 'safe city' as well as a 'vibrant city', councils have instituted measures that they hope will still attract people and capital to their urban area (Roberts & Eldridge, 2009; van Liempt, 2013). Increased police presence along with the prevalence of surveillance methods, hard-hitting campaigns modelled on the 'broken windows' theory⁶ (Harcourt, 2001), and 'one way door' policies are all designed to curb the excesses of anti-social behaviour while ensuring the civilised drinkers can still participate in the vibrant city (Burrell & Erol, 2009; A. Crawford & Flint, 2009).

Planners, urban designers, and architects worldwide promote vibrant 24-hour cities in order to revitalise the inner-city (Montgomery, 2004b; Prince, 2012; Roberts & Eldridge, 2009; Ward, 2011). This revitalisation has coincided with liberalised alcohol laws and changes in the liquor industry to create a vibrant, lucrative, and important component of a city's night-time economy that is now rivalling the day-time economy of the CBD (Hadfield & Measham, 2010; Hayward & Hobbs, 2007). In New Zealand, the number of alcohol outlets more than doubled between 1990 and 2009, the amount of pure alcohol drunk increased by 25%, alcohol types changed with large increases in

⁶ This theory, in police studies and criminology, holds that an active enforcement, including zero tolerance of minor crimes, such as graffiti, litter, and public drinking, will avert more serious crime and not lead to general decline of an area. This is challenged by Harcourt (2001).

wine, decreases in beer, and spirit-based drinks (RTDs) became the fastest growth area. Supermarkets are now a major supplier of alcohol (The New Zealand Law Commission, 2009). In Christchurch, licensed premises trebled between 1989 and 2011. In 1990, there were 387 liquor licences; at the time of the February 2011 quake there were 1,120.⁷

The term, the night-time economy, first emerged in planning literature in the United Kingdom. It arose from work by Charles Landry and his group Comedia to deregulate the alcohol and leisure industry at night (Comedia, 1991). A subsequent conference in Manchester in 1993 on the 24-Hour City soon initiated academic articles (Bianchini, 1995). At the time it was envisaged that the United Kingdom could follow the continental European style of a diverse and mixed cosmopolitan nightlife that would help the economy by extending a central city's operating hours (Bianchini, 1995). Bianchini advocated for planners to be more flexible in their approach to the night-time economy:

This means that town planning and urban policies ought to be more like the culture itself of the city: more flexible, open-ended, holistic, pluralistic, innovation-orientated and, at the risk of appearing élitist, perhaps more cultured as well. (Bianchini, 1995, p. 125)

Shaw (2014) notes that the ideas advocated by Bianchini and fellow planning academic Montgomery (1995) were never fully realised – mainly due to the alcohol and leisure industry overwhelming the night. Shaw (2014) does acknowledge that alcohol and leisure were only the first two components of Bianchini and Montgomery's envisaged night-time culture that would attract residents and tourists back into city centres. Later, and with extensive research on the night-time economy (Hadfield, 2009; Hadfield, Lister, & Traynor, 2009; Hadfield & Measham, 2009, 2010; Hobbs et al., 2003; Hobbs et al., 2000; Hobbs et al., 2005), scholars were critical of the stance taken by the early planners in not identifying the rise of problematic drinking with the relaxed planning controls and alcohol deregulation. This culminated in a strong exchange between Montgomery and Hadfield in the professional journal *Town and Country*

⁷ Data obtained from Alcohol Licensing Team at Christchurch City Council.

Planning (Hadfield, 2004; Montgomery, 2004a, 2004b). Montgomery lamented that a binge drinking culture had emerged in England instead of the sophisticated and urbane renaissance that he had envisaged:

It seemed a great idea, and I certainly had visions of elegant café society, with British people strolling about civilised streets as the Italians do – pullover draped over the shoulders, an attractive woman on one's arm. (Montgomery, 2004b, p. 82)

Montgomery went on to blame local planners and poor implementation, and the English culture itself. Now living in Australia, he contrasted the English drinking cultures with that of Australians, New Zealanders, and continental Europeans, which he described as sophisticated. Hadfield's (2004) reply was that the planners could have foreseen the consequences of a deregulated liquor industry and the blame should not lay with individuals but with both the powerful alcohol and leisure industry promoting demand, and with a lack of spatial control by councils. Montgomery (2004a) did not agree that the cause of drinking within city centres lie with business but rather with individual responsibility. Montgomery has since undertaken a consulting role with Dunedin City Council in New Zealand on economic development and city revitalisation (Montgomery, 2011).

Roberts and Eldridge (2009) took the above exchange as a starting point for their exploration of planning for the night-time city. Montgomery and Hadfield espouse the two extremes on the debate about the nature of drinking within the night-time economy. Latham (2003), Roberts and Eldridge (2009), Jayne et al. (2008b), and more recently Shaw (2014), all call for a more nuanced understanding of drinking within the night and all share the view that it is not a homogenous experience and there are differing dynamics at play, much like the day-time. Roberts and Eldridge (2009) summarise the differing views on the causes of the rise of the night-time economy. At the risk of being associated with 'moral panic', they argue, on the one hand, that there are real issues of crime and disorder associated with drinking in city centres late at night. On the other hand, relying on individual responsibility is a simplification of the factors involved, which they identify as:

‘Boosterism’, 24-hour cities, the ‘cultural turn’, the relaxation of licensing hours, changes in youth culture, the expansion of higher education and changes in the drinks industry have contributed towards a steady expansion in late-night, alcohol related entertainment – ‘drinkertainment’. (Roberts & Eldridge, 2009, p. 208)

Numerous scholars have explored young people and drinking in the night-time economy (Chatterton & Hollands, 2003; Hayward & Hobbs, 2007; Hobbs et al., 2005; Hubbard, 2011; Jayne et al., 2008a; Measham & Brain, 2005). Their research highlights that drinking by young people in city centres is a vital part of the economies of cities. The economy of a city has now been stretched from a day-time activity to an evening economy and into a night-time economy that is mainly occupied by young people. Councils are caught between acknowledging the role of the night-time economy in ensuring the viability of a city centre and not wanting to condone the behaviour of drunk young people.

As Valentine et al. (2007) question, while media and political concerns abound regarding anti-social behaviour and drinking, why then do so many people continue to drink in public spaces? Valentine et al. found that people drinking in public places were having a good time and did not generally feel unsafe. Part of the pleasure of drinking and being drunk in public spaces was sharing that experience with large numbers of others, having fun and feeling a sense of ownership of the spaces. Jayne et al., in their review of drinking and public space, argue that “drinking is a practice that appears to go hand in hand with negotiating and navigating the risky city” (Jayne et al., 2006, p. 463). Many of the bars and nightclubs are now concentrated in a particular area, due to urban revitalisation, which means negotiating this risk is often a shared experience with many diverse others. This all adds to the excitement. Jayne et al. (2006) and Demant and Landolt (2013) are at pains to point out there are many diverse practices of drinking in cities and experiences are specific to spaces and places and are not homogenous.

Research that has explored the experiences of young people in the night-time economy refers to the enjoyment young people derive going out late at night, drinking,

and socialising (Martinic & Measham, 2008; Measham & Brain, 2005; Roberts, 2013; Waitt et al., 2011). This includes young people in New Zealand (Hutton, 2009; Lyons & Willott, 2008; McEwan, Campbell, & Swain, 2010).

Martinic and Measham (2008) in their comparative work on young people and drinking around the world argue that changing attitudes to drinking in the 21st century is “increasingly complex and contradictory” (2008, p. 32). While the media and politicians do, at times, assert a moral panic around young people’s drinking, there have also been changes that have contributed towards young peoples increased drinking in public spaces. These include: changes in the leisure industry and the types of alcohol and premises now offered; extended adolescence resulting in delayed responsibilities; and, the search for ‘liminal experiences’ and identity by young people. Their research shows that ‘extreme drinking’ by young people varies depending on cultural and social values, time and place. Extreme drinking is, however, not without boundaries and they argue it is a “controlled loss of control” but, nonetheless, “represent[s] a significant change in drinking patterns, illustrating the shifting role that young people play in a changing modern world” (Martinic & Measham, 2008, p. 262).

Chatterton and Hollands (2002), use the term ‘urban playscapes’ to reflect the relationship young people have with the night-time economy. They argue that young people’s identity has been increasingly connected to consumption, leisure, and popular culture, particularly in city centres. Jayne et al. (2006) postulate that young people congregating together at night is a way for them to connect and belong in public spaces, a situation that may not be tolerated by authorities in other situations if consuming alcohol was not the mediating factor.

Roberts (2013) confirms that the ‘big night out’ is now a recognised feature of young people’s drinking. It involves behaviour that would not be normally tolerated during the day. In Roberts’ study young people’s drinking varied depending on the night of the week, who they were with, and the event to which they had just been. The young people enjoyed unexpected encounters with friends and strangers and discussed their experiences in terms of emotions. Roberts also identified that the spatial

concentration of bars and nightclubs was part of the experience in terms of the ease of moving from bar to bar and the large numbers of people around these bars.

Measham and Brain's (2005) study confirmed a deliberate and determined drunkenness on the part of young people going on a big night out. This was not, however, without boundaries as it involved a calculated amount of alcohol to balance risk and pleasure. Hadfield and Measham (2009) note that young people will often buy cheap alcohol at an off-license, drink that at home or at a party, and then go into town, a phenomenon known as preloading. From their study of a diverse range of drinking establishments they found that young people enjoyed going out and meeting new people, being out of their normal routine, and having new experiences.

Research highlights the highly segmented market of bars, pubs, and nightclubs to cater for all tastes and finances. Chatterton and Hollands (2002) note that the types of outlets now cater to a diverse range of young people, especially targeting women. Waitt et al. (2011), in their study of young women drinking in Wollongong, Australia, noted that going out and drinking was a spatialised and embodied experience. The women in their study enjoyed dressing up, drinking to excess, transgressing, and relating their drinking stories to each other after the event. Rather than trying to emulate men's drinking, Waitt et al. (2011) found that women's drinking was part of their feminine identity. Lyons and Willott (2008) also found that young women who did drink large amounts of alcohol on a night out did not perceive it as binge drinking. The participants in their study drank as part of their work-life balance. Story-telling after a night out was all part of the enjoyment and drew friends together.

Chatterton and Hollands have noticed in the United Kingdom that a new 'regulatory regime' is taking place whereby local government is increasingly expected to regulate the night-time economy:

the local state has been left to deal with some of the social problems and negative consequences of the development of mainstream nightlife, and has had to balance these with its desire to encourage the 'entertainment city'. City centres, then, are increasingly being deregulated with respect to the cultural economy

and aiding corporate investment in the licensed sector, while at the same time young adults are experiencing greater social and spatial control through formal mechanisms such as CCTV and informally through pricing and dress codes. (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002, p. 105)

This bears a striking resemblance to New Zealand. The New Zealand Law Commission undertook a detailed enquiry into the legislation and regulations surrounding alcohol (2010). They made many recommendations to amend legislation, some of which were rejected by central government, such as increasing excise tax, minimum pricing, and raising the purchasing age from 18 to 20 years (Maclennan, Kypri, Langley, & Room, 2012). Central government did, however, accept the recommendations that local government should be more involved in the regulation of alcohol and extended local government powers to control density, location, and operating hours of licenced premises. City and district councils are currently in the process of producing a Local Alcohol Policy (LAP) under the Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012 to include these powers.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the governance debates at the local level involving processes and institutional arrangements for decision-making. It has shown that there are two main arguments in public policy and planning scholarship. A number of scholars maintain the renewed interest in local governance provides a useful platform for enhanced participation and community empowerment. The alternative argument is that this form of governance is a way to embed neoliberalism. A way forward through these debates is to use the concept of governmentality to understand how neoliberalism is an art of governing and to analyse how power is exercised through governance. Theorists who have used a governmentality approach show there can be both positive and negative outcomes from governance – and these depend on place and time.

Governmentality theory is also fundamentally concerned with the process of creating self-governing subjects and is the theoretical framework that guides this thesis. It provides the conceptual tools necessary to explore power, decision-making processes,

governmental technologies, and the lived realities of young people using revitalised CBD spaces. This chapter also explored the notion of a post-political condition arising from local governance. Revitalisation projects provide the means through which local governance can be changed and de-politicised.

Finally, the literature was reviewed on how the night is experienced by young people. The literature from geography and planning notes that the way young people use and enjoy the night is specific to space and place. A variety of diverse practices and experiences are noted and scholars call for a more nuanced understanding of how young people participate in the night-time economy.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area... I write for users, not readers (Foucault, 1994, pp. 523-524).

This thesis explores the power relations that shape decision-making in local government. It is appropriate, therefore, that it also explores the power relations that shape methodology.

In this chapter, I situate the research within broad ontological and epistemological debates that shape the methods and analytical procedures that follow. Using a governmentality framework, I adopt a case study approach as this allows consideration of complex issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis draws on governmentality theory to explore how decisions are made within the changing power dynamics. It then analyses the lived realities of the young people who use the revitalised spaces facilitated by the Council. This dual approach of detailing how decisions are made in conjunction with understanding the impact of the implementation of those policies on young people is relatively unique in the field of local governance. The research, therefore, required a range of qualitative methods and analytical procedures.

The methods used in this research were documentary collection and analysis; semi-structured individual interviews; focus group interviews with young people; mental mapping; auto-photography; and observation of the CBD at night.

The chapter provides a discussion of ethical research considerations. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection on my position within the research. The conclusion urges planning scholars to adopt holistic research designs that enable the use of multiple methods. Such an approach allows for an examination of power, decision-making and local governance impacts.

Governmentality Framework

Governmentality theory is the framework used here to guide a detailed study of the micro-politics of Christchurch's CBD: its revitalisation; its intended use; and, the unintended problems associated with its use by young people. Scholars have critiqued governmentality because there can be a tendency to provide an historical, abstract and systematised version of governing and that social relations can be lost. This is mainly because governmentality studies tend to provide a perspective only from the governors or programmers (O'Malley et al., 1997). In a similar vein, Gibson-Graham (2006) contend that governmentality studies often leave out the voices of the subjects. It is for these reasons that I extended governmentality approaches and used a variety of methods. The methods allowed for detailed examinations of: texts; reports; minutes; strategy documents; and, newspaper reports; as well as semi-directed individual interviews; focus group interviews; mental mapping; auto-photography; and observations. I give detail about these methods later in the chapter.

Flyvbjerg's (2001) work on social science methods, following Foucault, sparked debate on which methods are appropriate for planning and other social science scholarship. He is particularly insistent that the social sciences should not try and emulate the physical sciences and that knowledge and methods need to be different. He argues that the social sciences should not try to emulate the natural sciences because there is not one 'truth' or grand theory to describe society. Rather, he advocates methods that expose values and power relations and are reflexive in nature.

Yiftachel (2001) notes in a special symposium series in the journal *International Planning Studies* that Flyvbjerg's critical approach to planning and its methods is important in that he is supplementing a critical literature within the planning theory field. Critical theory is comparatively significant in other disciplines such as geography, feminist studies, political science and sociology where power and research methods have been examined for some time (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).

Case Study

Yin (2009) argues that a case study approach allows researchers to assess complex issues and power relations in-depth; if research questions involve 'how' or 'why' questions then a case study approach may be relevant. Flyvbjerg (2001) concurs, noting that if in-depth analysis is required when examining complex situations, a case study method is suitable.

Choosing a case study became problematic in terms of timing for this thesis in that it was difficult to find a suitable project to fit the timeline of a PhD. The research questions involved decision-making and power relations and I wanted to study a situation that involved three main groups connected to local government, namely elected representatives, staff, and a community group. One way to view power relations was through the decision-making processes that lead to multiple-use conflict in public places. Christchurch City Council was considered a suitable council to study, as it is a large, predominantly urban city council that I knew very well. I had conducted research at the Council for university research projects over many years so I had a general background and understanding both of the issues the Council was facing and of how its decision-making processes were undertaken (Cheyne, 2004b; Drage, 2008; K. Johnston, 2000; K. Johnston & Memon, 2008; Local Futures Research Project, 2006; Memon & Johnston, 2008).

As Flyvbjerg notes (2006a), a good case study should be an in-depth examination with rich and thick description. By choosing Christchurch, the city in which I live, I had ready access to data and a good knowledge of urban politics. In government circles during the 1980s and 1990s, Christchurch City Council could be regarded as an exemplar of community engagement and of resistance to the NPM ethos of privatising assets and services. For example, in 1993 the Council received the Bertelsmann Award for excellence in local government, in particular for their receptiveness to the needs of the public (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1993). In 1998, the chief executive of the Business Round Table, Douglas Myers, dubbed the Council the 'People's Republic of Christchurch' for its extensive use of public participation and for going against the trend of privatising

assets. This term became a source of pride for the people of Christchurch and the Council. By the mid-2000s this image has “steadily eroded” (Vallance, Perkins, Bowring, & Dixon, 2012, p. 1699) and the Council has become more business-focussed. I therefore considered that the Council may be a critical or even a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006a).

I began to watch issues that arose that would potentially highlight relations of power and multiple-use conflicts. Initially, I followed issues on which the Council was consulting using the special consultative procedure under the Local Government Act. A project to establish a university music centre within a central city heritage site was a potential case study. It arose very quickly and attracted much public disquiet; however, the project vanished as quickly as it had arisen due to the overwhelming public opposition. Several other projects were suggested to me by a staff member at the Council but they were narrow in scope and would not have offered insights into wider processes of the City Council or other Councils (Bradshaw & Stratford, 2005).

Partly because of timing, I began to think about concerns in Christchurch that were ongoing and involved conflict between various groups. Young people drinking very late at night in the city’s CBD was one such issue that had received many letters to the editor of the local newspaper and had featured in articles over a sustained period of time (Claridge, 2005; McCrone, 2008; *The Press*, 2008, 2009). Young people’s drinking was the topic of public meetings and Council disquiet, and concerned not only the Christchurch City Council but also other cities in New Zealand and overseas. It was also an appropriate case study, as understandings gained would be applicable to other contexts (Flyvbjerg, 2006a), and would demonstrate the impacts of planning on the people that used CBD spaces. This was not some abstract notion of the effects of planning and decision-making on a city but a case that showed the actual implementation of a series of decisions and plans by various groups and their realities on the young people of a city.

reading of published reports, Council meeting reports and minutes, and popular media items such as newspaper articles and radio interviews. Table 1 shows each of the phases of the research.

Table 1: Overview of Research Methods

	Purpose	Data Source	Methods
Local Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How decisions were made over CBD revitalisation. • Who was and was not involved. • Review of new CBD projects in light of use (and abuse) of spaces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 former councillors and 2 former mayors • 1 current councillor • 2 former staff • 2 current staff • 2 business people • Documentary collection <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Council reports ○ CBD strategies ○ Safer City strategies ○ Newspaper coverage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-depth semi-structured interviews. • Discourse analysis
Buildings/Spaces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of revitalised spaces. • Young people's behaviour at night. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 bar owner • 1 police officer in charge of alcohol strategy and enforcement • 1 District Licensing Inspector from Christchurch City Council 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-depth semi-structured interviews • Photographs of CBD spaces taken by researcher.
Young People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social relations and cultural practices when drinking in CBD spaces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two groups of young people. A total of 8. Recruited using snowballing technique. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group sessions with each group before and after their night out. • Photographs and maps they created. • Observations of the CBD at night after focus group sessions.

The decision to involve young people in my research was influenced by the work of Jayne, Holloway and Valentine (2006). In their review of research into urban drinking, they comment that future research should have a greater understanding of the cultural practices and social construction of drinking. In terms of my research, I wanted

to understand the perspectives of the young people who were actually using the created spaces rather than just examine the local governance and decision-making processes of the Council. The research method therefore consists of three aspects: local governance; buildings/spaces; and young people using these spaces.

Document Collection

Before the interviews, I collected all the publicly available Christchurch City Council and committee agendas, reports and minutes related to CBD revitalisation, from 1998 to the end of 2010, to build a picture of the decision-making process, acquiring knowledge about the Council processes and context. As the September 2010 earthquake had damaged the Council building, I had no access to Council records or archives. Fortunately, from 1998 the City Council archived all its reports and minutes to its website. I therefore systematically searched through thousands of reports and minutes and saved approximately 210 documents that mentioned, or were related in some way, to the CBD revitalisation process and/or alcohol and drinking concerns in the CBD. I chronologically ordered the committee agendas, reports, and minutes following decisions related to CBD revitalisation and its progress between 1998 and 2010 and compiled a summary of events. This detailed 12-page summary (see Appendix N) listed the sequence of events including: election results; appointment of new CEOs; establishment of committees; and reports to committees and decisions taken (or not taken). The summary also included details such as: matters heard in public excluded sessions of the Council; prolonged absences of any meetings on CBD revitalisation; and when important decisions had obviously been made but not reported to a public meeting of the Council.

This summary was useful in that I constantly referred to it during my analysis to check what had or had not taken place. I was able to follow the flow of decisions and often had to back track and reconfirm what decision had been taken and in what committee. This follows Crang's (2005) advice that to keep the contextual and qualitative nature of data it is important to re-read material and, while doing so, reflect on how, why, where, and when each part fits together. I followed both how particular decisions

were made and where decisions were not made that conceivably should have been made. This is what Flyvbjerg (2006b) calls non-activities or deciding not to decide. The narrative from the Council reports and minutes proved very useful during interviews, as I was able to remind interviewees of events that had taken place 10 or 12 years earlier. This allowed me to focus the questions for particular interviewees. It also meant I could ask for clarification during my interviews.

I also clipped the newspaper for items regarding CBD revitalisation and drinking within those spaces. I started this in 2009 although I was able to go back further using the internet. I was interviewed by *The Press* about the rebuilding of the CBD and the role of bars, restaurants and nightclubs (McCrone, 2012). Following the February 2011 earthquake, given the limited number of Council meetings, *The Press* was a valuable resource of information on what the Council was doing. I continued to clip the newspaper until the October 2013 Council elections, as issues about local governance and decision-making related, in my opinion, to the processes and structures the Council had implemented before the earthquakes. The clippings were extensive (see Figure 4), and filled 16 × A3 books.



Figure 4: Newspaper clippings

(photo: Karen Johnston)

Semi-Structured Individual Interviews

Following Longhurst (2009) and Dunn (2005), I used in-depth semi-structured interviews to supplement the document analysis of how and why decisions were taken. This method is well established and used to understand complex behaviours, and gain insight into different perspectives. The minutes of the Council only document the final decisions taken and do not document the discussions that take place. The interviews with Council-related participants provided different perspectives on why and how certain decisions had taken place. Participants outside the Council were able to bring alternative perspectives on events relating to CBD revitalisation and young people drinking. Information sheets, tailored to each group of participants, were mailed to prospective participants (see Appendices A-C).

Interviews began with a background question determining the period during which the participant had been associated with the Council, the different positions they had held or the time they had been involved with the CBD revitalisation in some way. An interview guide was used to prompt discussion (see Appendices G-I). Due to my knowledge and background of local government, the interviews flowed freely and were conversational in style.

I conducted 17 face-to-face semi-structured individual interviews with current and former elected representatives (including two former mayors) and staff, people representing the business community (including a bar owner and developer), and people involved in night-time regulation. Interviewees with elected representatives and staff at the Council are identified as either 'former' or 'current'. Current relates to the 2010-2013 Council term in which these interviews were conducted. People representing authorities that are involved in night-time regulation included a police sergeant who was responsible for alcohol strategy and enforcement within the city and a Council district licensing inspector responsible for alcohol licensing and regulation. I wanted their perspectives on how the CBD was being used at night. All the interviews were recorded and I transcribed, verbatim, all the data.

The decisions relating to the CBD revitalisation processes that I examined spanned four Council electoral terms or triennia from 1998 to 2010. I wanted to interview a range of councillors and mayors who had been on the Council at various times, in particular councillors who had served for long periods with different mayors and chief executives. I also wished to interview a cross-section of councillors, from those who had been chairs of committees to those who had not. On occasions a participant recommended another person to interview.

Recruitment of currently serving councillors was to have taken place in September 2010, a normally quiet time for councillors as council elections were held in October 2010 and meetings and Council duties had been stopped. Due to the 4 September 2010 earthquake, I did not feel I could contact councillors and ask for an interview when they obviously had more pressing concerns. Unfortunately, before fieldwork resumed, the 22 February 2011 earthquake took place. The earthquakes meant that it was extremely difficult to contact current councillors. As time went on, the Council came under increasing criticism of its governance and handling of the earthquake response and rebuilding of the city along with the suitability of the then CEO (Gorman, 2011). This I believe was the reason key elected representatives did not want to be interviewed, including the then current mayor, Bob Parker, and Sue Wells, a city councillor from 1998, who was then Chair of the Regulatory and Planning Committee. There were, therefore, more past elected representatives interviewed than currently serving elected representatives. Past elected representatives, while having the benefit of hindsight, can also be more critical of current Council decision-making as they are not involved.

Two of the 17 interviewees did not wish to be named but were comfortable with identification of their professional positions. Partly because of this, and partly because I did not want this case study to become a study about particular personalities, I have chosen to refer to all interviewees through their professional positions.

Focus Group Interviews

Data collection began with young people who used the revitalised spaces at night as I wanted to gain an understanding of how the CBD was being used and what young people in particular thought about the spaces. I used focus groups for this aspect of the research (Cameron, 2005) as the young people went out together at night, and their interaction in the interview therefore reflected this. Other researchers examining young people and their drinking have also conducted focus group interviews (Lyons & Willott, 2008; Martinic & Measham, 2008). I initially intended to conduct three focus groups of young people but, after having conducted two focus groups, the February 2011 earthquake intervened and access to the CBD was not permitted. Because of the way I conducted the focus groups (meeting them before they went out at night into the CBD and then interviewing soon after their night out) I decided not to conduct any further focus groups.

Focus group members were recruited through my own networks. I wanted young people (18–30 years old) who regularly went into the CBD at night to drink. Because young people typically go out at night in groups, I made contact with one young person and they in turn asked their friends if they would be part of the focus group. Using my own networks meant ease of contacting young people I knew went out drinking at night in the CBD. A possible disadvantage of this approach is that because they knew me they may have felt ill at ease disclosing what they did. While this may have been the case, the two young people I knew appeared to be very open about discussing what they did and were unperturbed about their friends relating stories about them. This tends to show that for the young people I interviewed, going out at night and getting drunk was normal behaviour; they had no concern about discussing such activities in front of someone they knew. Another disadvantage of using my own contacts was that the group of young people were of a similar type. This was confirmed when all the young people (five young women in one focus group and three young men in another focus group) talked about different areas of the CBD or different bars they would not go to or were not popular, and described the type of young people who would go there. I gave each young person a small questionnaire to fill in at

the beginning of the focus group discussion to provide a context for the information they were providing and for any information that I might use in the thesis. The participants' pseudonyms and their details are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2: Focus Group Participants

Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation	Living Arrangements	Income
Emily	Female	21	European/ Pākehā	Student	Parental home	<\$25,000
Alexia	Female	20	Australian Greek	Retail assistant	Parental home	<\$25,000
Rose	Female	21	NZ Pākehā	Student	Flatting	<\$25,000
Cathy-Ann	Female	20	European	Student	Flatting	<\$25,000
Jennex	Female	20	NZ Māori	Office Administrator	Parental home	<\$25,000
Jethro	Male	23	Pākehā	Student	Flatting	<\$25,000
Wayne	Male	21	European	Student	Flatting	<\$25,000
Hemi	Male	22	NZ European	Student	Flatting	<\$25,000

I met with each of the focus groups to explain the research and ask them to sign the consent form. I met with them as close as possible to when they were planning their night out. For the young women's group, this meant meeting them early on a Friday evening at the house of the parents of one of the participants as they were preparing to go out together.

We arranged to meet the following Sunday afternoon (which for the young women's focus group was their normal time for regrouping after the weekend's activities). Like the individual interviews, the focus group interviews were semi-structured and I used an interview schedule (see Appendix J).

Both focus group sessions were relaxed and lively with much laughter as the young people recounted their evening out. Telling stories about their night out is part of the experience of going out, as noted by Martinic & Measham (2008). The young women's focus group routinely met on a Sunday to share stories about their previous night out, especially if they had been separated during the night. One participant's comment

would spark another participant's comment; they would often reinforce each other. As Cameron (2005) notes, there is a synergy that develops with focus groups as they feed off each other's comments and remind each other of events.

Mental Mapping

I started the focus group sessions asking them to draw a map of where they had gone in the CBD the previous night and other nights. These are included in Chapter 7. This technique of mental mapping is useful for understanding the mental image of a place that people carry with them in their heads. It can illustrate a relationship between people and place (L. Holloway & Hubbard, 2013). This exercise created some surprise among the participants. While both groups had some difficulty in remembering the location of streets and the bars within those streets it initiated a discussion on where they went and the distances between different bars. The exercise of producing the maps, enabled the participants to remember different bars and their experiences within those bars and the surrounding areas. The maps were also useful in highlighting the effects of the September 2010 earthquake on their pattern of movement between bars.

Auto-Photography

Each participant within the focus groups was asked to send me some photos that best illustrated a great night out on the town with their friends. This technique is used to supplement other methods and can elicit new information (M. E. Thomas, 2009). None of the young people provided me with photographs at the Sunday afternoon focus group sessions as they had all forgotten. Subsequently, I received photographs from the young men and we had an email exchange of why they were important. These are included in Chapter 7. It is now a very common occurrence for young people to take photos from their cell phones and upload them to their Facebook pages. Rather than giving them disposable cameras or asking them to take photos on their cell phones for the purposes of this research, I asked for earlier photographs, taken before they became aware of my research. This is a more naturalistic approach than their taking

photos of what they think I, as a researcher, want to see. The photographs were useful as they highlighted some of the material that had been discussed in the focus groups.

Observations

From May 2009, I attended Council meetings relating to CBD revitalisation and liquor licensing and regulation. In addition, I attended public meetings about people drinking in the city, and drinking more generally. The first meeting I attended in June 2010, 'Alcohol: The Ripple Effects', was run by a community organisation called Healthy Christchurch. This was useful as I could introduce myself to the relevant speakers and later interviewed them (police officer and liquor licensing inspector). I learnt of events and activities on the issue of drinking of which I had previously been unaware. I chose events and meetings that contributed to the general context of my research and provided multiple perspectives on drinking and decision-making.

In addition, I observed the spaces both at night and during the day. I wanted to understand if there was a diversity of public use and users in the CBD at night and to get a sense of the CBD at different hours of the day and night; this involved going into the CBD both at night and during the day. I went to the places that the young women had told me about during the focus group sessions and noted on their map. I recorded my observations into my cellphone, using it as a dictaphone so my recordings were as unobtrusive as possible. The first night I went into the CBD was Friday November 12th 2010. It was 'early' in the evening at 9.45pm. I stayed until around midnight. It was a warm evening with many people sitting outside with a diverse range of people and ages. This was after the September 2010 earthquake but before the February 2011 earthquake. My second visit was on Saturday 20th November 2010 from midnight until around 2.30am. On this occasion, there was a light drizzle, which meant young people were not congregating outside as much as they would on a fine evening. There was much less diversity of ages and I was noticeably older than most of the people around me. I was also treated differently, for example, bouncers outside bars would smile at me and wave me into the bars without putting a stamp on my hands as they did to the other younger patrons.

Analysing Data

Undertaking research that examined power relations using a governmentality approach led naturally to using discourse analysis to interpret the data. This is because both governmentality and discourse analysis are derived from Foucault's scholarship on power and knowledge. In undertaking discourse analysis of the data I drew on the work of Rose (2001) and Waitt (2005). While Foucault's work has been influential, his methodological approaches are vague. Waitt (2005) therefore synthesised the work of Rose (2001) and identified the following seven strategies to help interpret and analyse discourse:

1. Suspend pre-existing categories: examine your texts with fresh eyes and ears.
2. Familiarisation: absorb yourself in your texts.
3. Coding: identify key themes to reveal how the producer is embedded within particular discursive structures.
4. Persuasion: investigate within your texts for effects of 'truth'.
5. Incoherence: take notice of inconsistencies within your texts.
6. Active presence of the invisible: look for mechanisms that silence.
7. Focus on details. (Waitt, 2005, p. 180)

Taking the above strategies as a guide I undertook discourse analysis of my multiple forms of data. The first process of analysis was undertaken during the collection phase. As already mentioned, when I collected the Council documents I compiled a large summary statement. Through this process I was considering the events that had and had not occurred, who were and were not represented, and decisions that were taken and not taken.

The first analysis of the interviews was undertaken during the transcription process, which I prepared⁸. While I was typing I could again hear the participants' voices. After

⁸ The transcription codes I have used are as follows:

// The double oblique indicates where talking overlaps with another speaker who begins to talk at the same time.

Word Underlined words highlight particular words that are spoken with emphasis.

completion of the transcript I went back and highlighted passages that on first reflection appeared interesting. I read and reread the transcripts throughout the writing of the thesis, highlighting different parts of the texts as key themes began to appear. The key themes were based on my research questions, the empirical and theoretical literature I had read, particular places within the CBD and Christchurch, and concerns that were highlighted post-earthquake with the Council. I made headings of these key themes and cut and pasted quotes from the data to put under these themes.

I looked for examples of how technologies were used for effects of truth, such as statistics. I focused on the everyday mundane details. Above all, I immersed myself in the data from the time it was collected, continually aligning or contrasting new pieces of text with that from another participant or Council document.

Ethics

The research for this thesis went through a full ethics approval procedure rather than a low risk notification (see Appendix M). Major ethical concerns were of the possibility of harm to me when conducting observations within the CBD at night and the potential for the participants of the focus groups to experience embarrassment or discomfort when disclosing intimate experiences during interviews. Because I interviewed a range of participants, four different information sheets were provided to potential participants (Appendices A-D): two consent forms (Appendices E and F), four different interview guides (Appendices G-J), a transcript release form (Appendix K), and a focus group participant questionnaire (Appendix L). Although I had intended to accompany the police on their night patrol through the CBD and had received ethics approval for this, the earthquake in February 2011 made this impossible.

(word) Word/s contained in round brackets are words that the transcriber found difficult to interpret and may be incorrect.

() A set of rounded brackets containing no words indicates a word or part of a sentence that could not be interpreted.

[laughs] Italicised words in italicised square brackets indicate the tone of the conversation.

[word] Words in square brackets have been inserted by in order to make a sentence clearer and/or more understandable.

... Three consecutive dots in a sentence indicate points where the speaker has halted their current speech and moved on to another similar line of thought mid way through a sentence.

--- Three dashes indicate areas where sentences have been left hanging.

All individual interviewee participants were given the option of reviewing their transcript. They were then asked to send back a transcript release form. A few participants sent an email informing me that the transcript could be released. Some participants did not reply to my emails regarding releasing the transcript. In these cases, I emailed the participant saying that if I did not receive a reply to the email I would presume they were happy for the transcript to be released. All participants were kept confidential and only identified by their professional positions, even though 15 out of the 17 individual interviews stipulated they did not need to keep their identity confidential.

Focus group participants were not given the option of amending the transcript as it is not practical for any one person to amend the group discussion as everyone is jointly constructing the discussion. I did, however, ask if there was anything people did not want included in the research at the beginning, during, and at the conclusion of the focus group interview. I reiterated this because I could not assure complete confidentiality in a group interview. I also gave focus group participants the right to withdraw their data from the research for a period of three weeks after participation. No one chose to do so. I asked focus group participants to bring to the interview three current photographs that best illustrated a night out on the town with their friends. I gave an undertaking that if I used any of their photographs in the thesis or future publications all faces would be blurred electronically to ensure anonymity.

Because of the potential for participants to reflect on their drinking after the focus group interviews I followed Waitt's (2011) advice and provided telephone and website details of an Alcohol Drug Helpline within the information sheet sent out to prospective participants (see Appendix D). Within the website was a test to assess whether a person had a drinking problem, which I also undertook to be aware what the participants may be alerted to if they chose to do the test.

Reflexivity and Positionality

During the course of my research, I began to notice that my ideas towards alcohol were changing. At the beginning of the research, I had no particularly strong views towards drinking. During the second year of my thesis project I attended various public meetings that addressed the issue of excessive alcohol consumption and usually but not exclusively focussed on young people's drinking. After listening to many presentations, which highlighted the medical and social problems of alcohol, I found my attitude to drinking had changed. A few months later, during a day skiing, my husband and I investigated a small café near the top of the ski field. Hoping for a cup of coffee or soup, we were surprised they sold only cold drinks and drink containing alcohol. Top of the list was schnapps, which my husband suggested I try. I almost surprised myself with my strong response of "Definitely not – what on earth are they doing selling alcohol on top of a ski field?" A year earlier, I would most probably have said yes to a warming schnapps.

The phenomenon I experienced is part of being a social science researcher. Flyvbjerg (2001) states that what sets the social sciences apart from the natural sciences is that self-reflecting humans are studied. In addition, the researchers are also self-reflecting – what Anthony Giddens calls the 'double hermeneutic' (Giddens, 1982). The entire research process takes place within a particular context that gives sense and meaning based on the self-reflection and self-understanding of both researcher and researched.

This idea is further examined through the concepts of 'positionality' and 'reflexivity'. Positionality is the idea that it is important to understand, as a researcher, what your position is within the world in relation to your subjects. Your gender, ethnicity, economic status, and other traits affect the way you view the world. Self-reflecting on your position as a researcher is called reflexivity. This process of reflexivity and positionality creates a greater awareness of how the researcher produces knowledge. The knowledge that is created is in part due to the way the researcher views the world, is part of that world, and therefore can only ever be partial and 'situated'. Knowledge is partial, in the sense that all knowledge is created at a particular point in time and

within a particular context, which in some ways affects that knowledge. Reflexivity is advocated as a method in the social sciences to counter the idea that the knowledge created is objective and neutral (G. Rose, 1997). Knowledge also relates to power, a further reason why researchers wish to identify their positionality. Knowledge created by researchers can give voice and credibility to some groups and ideas while ignoring or silencing others (Haraway, 1991). Knowing that my own situated knowledge will be partial, I will nevertheless situate myself. This is important as a researcher as I am not from nowhere and no particular time.

I am positioned both inside and outside this project. My professional life has positioned me in four areas that are crucial to local government – working for a council, advising community groups who are working with councils, a consultant advising central government on local government, and a research assistant undertaking research from the perspective of an elected representative.

After graduating with a planning degree in 1985 my first job was at a medium-sized city council within the research and policy section. Within two years, central government announced major reform of local government that eventually culminated in the 1989 amendments to the Local Government Act 1974. I was involved in implementing the reforms within council. This included the annual plan and, after the 1996 amendments, the Long-Term Financial Strategy. With the advent of the Local Government Act 2002, I was working as a consultant advising councils, central government, and in particular, community groups how to work with local government. Rounding off this experience was working as a research assistant to a researcher who was concerned with the role of elected representatives. These diverse roles gave me an insight into different experiences of local government.

Because of my local government background there was often a sense of connection with the governance and buildings/spaces interviewees. I had an overall knowledge of how processes within local government generally worked because I knew the historical changes that had taken place, and had been part of the implementation of these changes.

Always in the background during my fieldwork research were the Christchurch earthquakes. Interviewing in temporary premises, discussions about how our houses had fared, and a sense of togetherness that “we’re all still here sticking it out in trying circumstances” pervaded the interviews.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodological approach to research design methods and analysis. A case study was used to explore the complex nature of the decision-making process and to understand the experiences of the young people using the revitalised spaces of the CBD. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two broad bodies of research examining governance. Those that consider governance to have beneficial outcomes and those that consider it part of the neoliberal project. Using a governmentality approach allows an alternative way of considering governance through understanding how power relations operate and the subjectivities they create. The research design enabled multiple ways of gathering fine-grained data.

CHAPTER 4: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Christchurch City Council has undergone major changes in how it works with other organisations and the public, and how it makes decisions. These governance changes are situated within an historical context of evolving roles and functions of local government, beginning with its establishment. This chapter provides an historical and contemporary context to the way decision-making is undertaken.

To understand the changes that have occurred at the Council for the period of this research, this chapter situates them within the wider historical context of local government in New Zealand, and shows how decision-making and modes of governance are continually evolving in response to legislative reforms and wider international trends. These changes shape and explain the characteristics of council decision-making and its wider governance role. It also introduces the main legislation that provides the primary means by which governance and revitalisation of the CBD occur: a) the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), which is the main statute governing and regulating land use development ; and, b) the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) that influences local government decision-making and participation with the public. These two statutes have a major bearing on how governing takes place within local government.

Cities differ, each shaped by their particular physical and social geography or spatial arrangements combined with the type of people and leaders that emerge at a particular time. These matters all have an impact on how governance and politics takes place. The second section of the chapter, therefore, provides specific details of Christchurch City Council as context for the case study of CBD revitalisation process and the data presented in the following three chapters. The impacts of reforms on the structure and political representation in Christchurch are described. This chapter's key themes outline local government's historical focus on services to properties; the reduction of political representation; NPM reforms that focus on efficiency, accountability, and transparency; the increase of consultation with the public; and a

move towards and then backwards from a legislated mandate of what can be described as local governance. The legislation governing land-use planning is outlined. Because of the difficulties that the Christchurch City Council experienced in implementing this planning legislation within an urban environment the ideological underpinnings of the RMA is discussed along with its performance-based framework. This provides a context to the Council's new local governance decision-making processes under the LGA.

History of Local Government Form and Function

The early functions of local government in New Zealand following European settlement were tied to representation and governance arrangements. The local government structures established by the British colonisers were based on the view that there was local control over local services. However, the system of local government was subordinate to central government and narrowly focused on services to property (Cheyne, 2002, 2006; Leonard & Memon, 2008; Mulgan, 1997). Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, which gave the British Crown the right to make laws and govern, a few unsuccessful attempts were made to establish local government (Cheyne, 2002). Provincial government was established under the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 and a number of municipalities evolved within Provincial government boundaries. Canterbury, one of the initial six provinces, was established in 1862, along with the municipality of Christchurch. Provincial government was abolished in 1876. The municipality of Christchurch became a City Council not long after its establishment (Bush, 1995). Bush (1995) argues that the major constitutional decision to abolish provincial government occurred so that some functions could be recentralised and other, more local services, provided for by local government. Counties were created for the rural areas and more municipalities (cities and boroughs) appeared for the towns (Mulgan, 1997). The municipalities and counties both had elected councils with municipalities directly electing a mayor.

Representation and property ownership in local government has always been linked, and this has had an influence on the functions of councils. Mulgan (1997) states that

voting in local elections depended on how much property a person owned: the more property, the more votes that they had (up to a total of five). Mulgan further notes that although plural voting for municipalities was abolished by the end of the 19th century, counties continued with plural voting until 1974. Ratepayers are still entitled to vote in more than one local authority if they own property in those areas⁹. Voting rights based on property ownership had effects in two main areas. First, voting rights effectively disenfranchised Māori (who tended to own land collectively (Cheyne, 2002)) and women (who, had obtained the right to vote, but did not generally own land in their own name). Second, it meant that because only property owners were voting and paying rates, there was a strong tendency to provide only services that would enhance properties. Thus, as Polaschek (1956) argues, the functions of local government right from its early development were strongly tied to services to property. This meant local government had powers to set rates and make by-laws, and provide for the establishment and maintenance of streets, water and sewerage systems, and lighting (Bush, 1995; Cheyne, 2002; Drage, 2008).

Because property owners had to tax themselves, the development of new functions away from services for properties was weak. The form, function, and development of local government were hampered by having such a system (Sutch, 1956). In addition, rates were and still are based on the value of a property. Therefore, the higher the value of a property, the greater the amount paid in rates. This arguably further reinforces the reluctance by councils to promote any functions that do not add value in some way to a person's property or the general economic development of the area. Significant spending by a council was also discouraged through the legal requirement to hold a referendum in order to raise a loan for any capital items. This requirement continued until 1989.

After the abolition of provincial government, the number of municipalities and counties increased dramatically, as did special purpose authorities such as boards for roads, education, harbours, rabbits, rivers, fire prevention, electricity, and hospitals (Drage, 2008, p. 59). This was related to general population growth, which was starting

⁹ Local Electoral Act 2001.

to occur, and to the land settlement process, which was progressing rapidly following the land wars of the 1860s (Cheyne, 2002). Christchurch City Council's first functions in 1862 included "artesian water supply, drainage and street lighting" (Bush, 1995, p. 9). The growth of local government continued so dramatically that by 1920 there were 117 boroughs, 129 counties, and 379 special purpose boards (Cheyne, 2002, p. 123). Between 1920 and 1974, central government sought unsuccessfully to reform local government and reduce the number of authorities. As Mulgan (1997) notes, local communities valued local autonomy and resisted amalgamation of their local authority into a bigger council, particularly if amalgamation was likely to lead to an increase in rates. This growth in the number of local authorities along with people's reluctance to amalgamate authorities left the larger cities in a difficult situation.

While reform was unsuccessful during this period, the functions of local government proliferated. Local authorities invested heavily in infrastructure after World War II and took on new functions such as libraries, swimming pools, cemeteries, recreation facilities, firefighting, and pensioner flats, and a greater emphasis was put on public health and inspection services (Bush, 1995, p. 35). During the 1970s councils moved into more social provision, with schemes to renovate and upgrade homes, citizens advice bureaux, community centres, crèches, community development, and work schemes (Bush, 1995, p. 61). While not managing to achieve amalgamation of territorial authorities, a Labour government introduced the concept of regionalism in the new LGA 1974. Many special purpose authorities were subsumed within regional government.

Reducing Local Government

In 1989, a Labour government extensively reformed local authority structures, functions, and corporate governance arrangements. This followed the major reforms of the public sector at central government level, and the same principles and values of NPM were applied to the local government sector. These were the first comprehensive amalgamations of local authorities to take place since their inception (Bush, 1995). New Zealand local government structures now had a clear three tier system of elected

representatives. Regional councils were responsible mainly for environmental management and land transport planning. City and district councils (known as territorial local authorities) were responsible for regulating land use and providing services and facilities. Community boards, which had no revenue-raising ability and were optional, were responsible for advocating for their communities.

Amalgamations of councils meant that the number of councils and elected representatives was drastically reduced. Table 3 shows that before amalgamations in 1989, there were 375 local authorities, including 217 territorial authorities. These included city, district and unitary councils (a council undertaking both regional and territorial functions). Seventy-four territorial authorities remained after amalgamation. The number of authorities has steadily decreased, most recently in 2010 with the creation of the Auckland Council. The Auckland Council was formed by combining one regional council and 7 city and district councils, and creating 21 Local Boards, which have a decision-making role delegated to them by Auckland Council, but do not have power to raise rates.

Table 3: Number of Local Authorities in New Zealand, 1988–2010

Local Authorities	1988	1995	2010	2013
Regional Councils	22	12	11	11
Territorial Authorities ¹⁰	217	74	67	67
Auckland Local Boards	-	-	21	21
Community Councils & Boards	136	148	116	109
Total	375	234	215	208

Source: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011, 2014; Drage, 2008)

As well as reducing the number of local authorities, the 1989 reforms also reduced the number of elected representatives, as outlined in Table 4. The 2,352 elected

¹⁰ Includes five unitary authorities from 1995, and Auckland Council from 2010. It excludes special purpose authorities.

representatives of territorial authorities in 1983 were reduced to 997 in 1995 following the amalgamations, and were decreased again, to 767, in 2013 due to subsequent representation reviews (Drage, 2008, p. 9), major reform in Auckland and central government appointed commissioners to run one district council.

Table 4: Number of Elected Representatives in Local Authorities in New Zealand, 1983–2010

Local Authorities	1983	1989	1995	2010	2013
Regional Councils ¹¹	47	198	131	108	113
Territorial Authorities ¹²	2,352	1,088	997	783	767
Auckland Local Boards	-	-	-	149	149
Community Boards	-	948	864	574	538
Total	2,399	2,234	1,992	1,614	1,567

Source: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011, 2014; Drage, 2008)

In New Zealand, local government’s powers and responsibilities have been determined by central government. As well as making major structural changes in 1989 as outlined above, central government also introduced new governance and management aspects of local government influenced by the changes that had been made to the core public service based on NPM. The next section outlines the changes to the LGA since 1989 and focusses on how these changes have, at times, both expanded and contracted the role of local government. As Drage (2008) argues, the changes to governance and management of local government in New Zealand have had a major impact on the role of elected representatives and how decisions are made. Harvey (1989), in his work on urban governance, demonstrated that how cities govern radically alters what, where,

¹¹ In 1983 there were only two regional councils with elected representatives: Auckland Regional Authority and Wellington Regional Council. The remaining councils at the regional level had appointed representatives from the territorial local authorities, and their administration was conducted by the principal territorial authority. They were called United Councils.

No election was held by the Canterbury Regional Council in 2010 and 2013 as central government appointed commissioners to run the council.

¹² No election was held by Kaipara District in 2013 as they were being run by government appointed Commissioners.

and how activities are provided. The following section, therefore, shows how, legislatively, local government has been made to change its governance and management.

Reforming Local government

Reforms of local government that began in 1989 were, according to Pallot (2003) the most comprehensive and far reaching of all reforms since the abolition of the provinces in 1876. They had an impact on every sphere of local government activity, from the political to the managerial and to its interface with the community. Even more important, over time, reforms in one sphere have had a consequence on other spheres.

The reforms of local government followed the changes that had taken place in central government with the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988, and the Public Finance Act 1989. They were based on NPM principles¹³ and were designed for greater transparency, accountability and efficiency and contestability (Duncan & Chapman, 2010; Memon, Davies, & Fookes, 2007). The reforms were designed to ensure local government placed a greater emphasis on the financial side of their operations and emulated private sector practices (S. Thomas & Memon, 2007). Marshall & Sproats (2000) note that the reforms followed a similar path to local government restructuring that had occurred around the western world. In addition to the financial aspects of the reform, there was a public participation component (Cheyne, 2002). The reforms sought to separate political and management decision-making. They did this by requiring the CEO to be the sole employer of all staff within a council, and to be on a renewable contract. Under the new regime, elected representatives were to set policy and to leave organisational matters to the CEO and management team (S. Thomas & Memon, 2007).

The reforms also required councils to separate policy and regulatory functions from service delivery functions. Service delivery functions were encouraged and, in some

¹³ See Chapter 2 for an explanation of NPM.

cases (e.g. roading), were required to be delivered by a Local Authority Trading Enterprise (LATE) (K. Johnston, 2001). Accrual based financial information was required as was audited non-financial performance data (Bush, 2005; Lapsley & Pallot, 2000). All of this information was brought together in a draft annual plan. There was a statutory requirement for consultation on the draft annual plan prior to its adoption. At the end of the financial year, councils were required to publish an annual report. Importantly, there was to be consultation with the public over the annual plan in a legislatively prescribed manner. The requirement to use the special consultative procedure when consulting on the draft annual plan, and on other significant proposals, along with the new purpose of local government, placed a new emphasis on public participation, which was seen as an important aspect of local government's accountability to citizens (Cheyne, 2002; Forgie, Cheyne, & McDermott, 1999). This was seen as particularly important, given the reduction of elected representation. The role of management was clearly strengthened through the introduction of corporate management and planning techniques. The legislation was silent, however, on the governance role of the elected representatives (Drage, 2008).

Further reform was enacted in 1996 with the Local Government Amendment Act (No. 3) extending the financial information and reporting requirements of a council. The financial requirements were on broadly similar lines to the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, which central government had adopted for its own actions (S. Thomas & Memon, 2007). Central government considered that local government should meet more stringent reporting and accountability requirements. According to Pallot (2003) the management accounting changes, while appearing to be technical in nature, have had a profound impact politically. She argues that not enough attention was given to the fact that these private sector practices were going into the public sector realm where public accountability is just as important if not more important than managerial accountability. Referring to changes within central government, but which are relevant to local government, she states:

Within the core public sector, privatization also took the shape of NPM reforms which made governmental agencies appear more like the private sector and shielded their most important dimensions

from public scrutiny. Departments were recast as commodity producers making their services more amenable to contracting out. Managerial accountability (in particular, for outputs) displaced, or attempted to disguise the lack of, public accountability for matters such as outcomes, social justice and the legitimacy of processes. (Pallot, 2003, p. 151)

Therefore, while changes meant managers and staff became more accountable through mechanisms such as performance measurement, there was less public accountability.

By its very nature a Long Term Financial Strategy (LTFS) required a local authority to have given thought to what it was planning to do over a 10-year horizon. Strategic plans therefore become very common within local government, although they were not required by law. Many local authorities, in addition to beginning a strategic planning process for their actions, also acknowledged the wider need of a strategic plan for their community, which led to the development of a corporate planning culture within local authorities (K. Johnston, 2001).

Local Government Act 2002

The election of a Labour-led government in 1999 led to a major review of local government legislation and a complete revision of the LGA 1974, culminating in the LGA 2002. Driving this review was the need to simplify the LGA 1974, provide a sustainability focus, increase accountability, and a desire for local government to have a greater role in leading and working with the community as well as its more traditional role of providing services. This had been a feature of reforms in the United Kingdom (Tewdwr-Jones, Janice, & Allmendinger, 2006) and influenced the New Zealand review (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010; Department of Internal Affairs, 2000, 2001; Local Futures Research Project, 2011).

The reform of the LGA 1974 made significant changes in key areas. It provided local government with empowerment similar to a power of general competence (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010), introduced a sustainability focus (S. Thomas & Memon, 2007) promoted a community-based planning process (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010; Local

Futures Research Project, 2006; Memon et al., 2007; S. Thomas & Memon, 2007) that included significant measurement requirements (K. Johnston & Memon, 2008), strengthened the overall reporting regime of local government (Reid, 2002), and required specific statements on governance (Drage, 2008). Some of these changes are outlined in more detail below.

The LGA 2002 granted local government a form of a power of general competence (Cheyne, 2008). This power is based on the principle that local government should be able to undertake any function it wishes to undertake. Under previous legislation local government had operated under the principle of ultra vires, meaning it could not undertake any functions unless they were stipulated under the legislation (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010; Bush, 2005; Cheyne, 2002, 2006).

Possibly the greatest change to the LGA 2002 was the emphasis on planning with and on behalf of the community. This required councils to work with community and interest groups within their area, with other councils, and with central government (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010). In many ways this requirement was similar to what Stoker (2011, p. 16) terms “a community governor” role. The Act required local authorities to develop a process for identification of social, economic, environmental and cultural outcomes¹⁴ for community well-being (Memon & Thomas, 2006). Local authorities were required to produce a long-term planning document, the Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP). Central government and other parties were invited to make submissions, provide information, and participate in identification of community outcomes. They were also encouraged to align their own annual and strategic plans and budgets with the community outcomes that had been identified. A large 5 year study focussed on strategic planning and governance under the LGA 2002 (Local Futures Research Project, 2006, 2011; Reid et al., 2006) found that while there was the potential for local government to provide for a leadership and facilitative role for their areas it was made difficult by the strategic planning framework in the Act and the

¹⁴ An outcome is defined as “a desired result or state of affairs. Another way of viewing community outcomes is as ‘the things that the community thinks are important for its well-being’” (New Zealand Society of Local Government Managers, Local Government New Zealand, & Department of Internal Affairs, 2003, p. 39)

competing accountability requirements. In addition, local government had not been given any new powers with which to execute these new roles. The hoped for 'joined-up' approach did not eventuate in many cases around the country due to lack of involvement by central government (Local Futures Research Project, 2011).

The LGA 2002 outlined governance principles. These are contained within Part 4, Section 39 and require local authorities to ensure that:

- the role of democratic governance of the community, and the expected conduct of elected members, is clear and understood by elected members and the community; and
- the governance structures and processes are effective, open, and transparent; and
- so far as is practicable, responsibility and processes for decision-making in relation to regulatory responsibilities are separated from responsibility and processes for decision-making for non-regulatory responsibilities; and
- a local authority should be a good employer; and
- the relationship between elected members and management of the local authority is effective and understood.

The governance role for elected representatives, while still not articulated in the principles above, however, did require governance statements to be prepared every 3 years by each council. These were to be comprehensive statements and ranged from the functions, responsibilities, and activities of a local authority to consultation policies, key planning, and policy documents to members' roles and conduct. The practical effect of this was, however, disappointing. According to Drage (2008)

It appears from reading all the governance statements that most appear to be documents put together by management, with data drawn from various templates, for councillors to approve. It is, therefore, assumed that many councils did not use this opportunity to debate and discuss these roles. (p. 128)

The LGA 2002 was therefore a major change for local government in terms of governance, planning, working with the community, and accountability for actions (Reid, 2002). As Brosnan and Cheyne (2010) remark, the LGA 2002 can be seen as a move forward in working with the community although this legislative requirement was short-lived and subsequent reforms in 2010 have removed the mandated responsibility for local authorities to engage communities in a process of identifying community outcomes. Drage (2008) argues that the changes signified an undermining of the role of elected representatives. She contends that the reforms have created a more corporate style of decision-making and one that has not been lessened with the more recent amendments to the LGA.

A centre-right National-led government review of the LGA 2002 in 2010 emphasised the need for 'getting back to basics' (Minister of Local Government, 2010). This reform of the legislation, known as the 'TAFM review' (Transparency, Accountability and Financial Management), was therefore designed to encourage councils to focus on 'core services'. and away from community-led local strategic planning (Brosnan & Cheyne, 2010). The legislation subsequently passed, according to the Minister of Local Government (2010), sought to control council costs, rates and activities through encouraging councils to focus on 'core services', setting limits on rates and debt, and enabling comparison of councils through financial and non-financial reporting. Most importantly, the planning process was 'simplified' and the LTCCP was changed to the Long Term Plan. The broader governance role that had been provided in the LGA 2002 was arguably undermined by this, with the requirement that councils have to "focus on the outcomes the council will achieve" (Minister of Local Government, 2010, p. 5). Finally, section 32 of the 2010 Amendment Act permitted councils to enter into long term contracts for the provision of water services.

While some councils were working well with their communities or particular stakeholders such as central government agencies, under the wider governance role in the LGA 2002 (Burke, 2004) other councils had found it difficult to meet the spirit of the role as enshrined in the community outcomes process (K. Johnston, Cheyne, & Parker, 2005; Leonard & Memon, 2008). This is also highlighted by the fact that a

submission by Local Government New Zealand (the peak body for councils in New Zealand) to the Select Committee considering the LGA 2002 Amendment Bill 2010 agreed that the community outcome process could be combined with a council's own Long Term Plan.

The proposal to remove sections 91 and 92 is supported as long as councils retain the ability to continue to work in partnerships and involve citizens and agencies in these processes should they choose however we see no value in the requirement to consult on outcomes every three years, a more permissive approach makes sense (Local Government New Zealand, 2010, p. 15).

Removing the requirement for the community outcomes process in the legislation will mean that some councils will not engage in these processes.

Following a general election and a new Local Government Minister, a new reform programme was introduced as part of the government's "broader programme for building a more productive, competitive economy and better public services" (Minister of Local Government, 2012, p. 1). This culminated in the 2012 Amendment to the LGA 2002 (Cheyne, 2012a). This built on the 2010 amendment by focussing on a narrower range of local government activities and costs. Part of Section 10, which sets out the purpose of local government, was changed to emphasise infrastructure and regulatory functions, while the promotion of social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of communities was removed. New powers were introduced for mayors. Similar to the powers that were extended to the Mayor of Auckland by the Local Government (Auckland) Act (2009), other mayors will be required to lead the development of council plans, policies and budgets, appoint the deputy mayor, establish council committees and appoint chairs to council committees. There is provision within the LGA to provide for a council to overturn the appointments made by a mayor (Department of Internal Affairs, 2012). The amendment also provides increased powers to the Minister of Local Government to intervene when there are problems with councils (Kessaram, 2013).

The legislative reforms that are outlined above show that local government in New Zealand is indeed a creature of statute, and its functions and how those functions are expected to be undertaken depend on central government and its reform agenda. Centre-right and centre-left governments since 1988 have all left their mark on local government, pulling and pushing it towards and then away from a wider role within the community in which it serves. When the broad empowerment role was introduced to promote community well-being in 2002, it was coupled with a stronger accountability regime both financially and through public participation to its citizens. When that requirement was removed in 2010 and 2012, the accountability regime remained. Hence, while there have been cycles of expansion and contraction of local government's role, the financial management and accountability processes have only expanded. As Drage (2008) has already developed, this has entailed a corporate model of decision-making without any accompanying increase in the democratic representative role.

The Resource Management Act 1991 was another major piece of legislation that affected how councils could work with their communities, and, in particular, how they could implement CBD revitalisation. This is covered below.

Resource Management Act 1991

At the same time as the Fourth Labour government was making changes to the LGA 1974 in the late 1980s it was also reforming planning legislation. Thomas and Memon (2007) note that the reforms were influenced by neoliberal policies. It was into this climate that the Resource Management Act 1991 was enacted. New Zealand scholars point out that the Resource Management Act was promulgated in an era when there was faith in the potential of market processes to deliver good planning outcomes, although the results have largely been disappointing (Grundy & Gleeson, 1996; Jackson & Dixon, 2007; Vallance et al., 2012). The purpose of the RMA 1991 that replaced the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources (Memon & Perkins, 2000). The RMA intended that the effects of the activities would be controlled, thus creating a supposedly more flexible

system (Memon & Perkins, 2000). The previous legislation stipulated the activities that were allowed within a particular zone, although Miller notes that the “planning system was relatively liberal with most district schemes providing for a swathe of land uses that had only to meet set performance standards, such as separation distances, height requirements and noise or parking standards” (2011, p. 13).

As many scholars have noted (Gleeson, 1994; Grundy, 1995; Gunder & Mouat, 2002; Memon & Gleeson, 1995; C. L. Miller, 2011; Perkins & Thorns, 2001), when the Act was first promulgated New Zealand was undergoing many fundamental changes to the way the state interacted with society. The changes driven by the government were part of a market-led approach that sought to open up the New Zealand economy to more competition and, at the same time, promote sustainable management and public participation. As part of the review of the planning and local government legislation at the time, this approach signalled a move to ensure a greater reliance on private property rights and private choice and less on regulation. The resulting Act was therefore very different from its predecessor, the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The RMA focussed very much on the effects of activities rather than activities themselves.

Baker, Sipe and Gleeson (2006) use the term ‘performance-based’ to describe the regime of planning under the RMA. Underlying performance-based regulation or effects-based regulation is the idea that any impacts of land use are related to their physical elements rather than the land use itself. Performance-based regulation is, therefore, based on two components, a desired end result and standards to measure if the desired end result is met, or not. Performance-based regulation has received wide based endorsement and is preferred over prescriptive zoning as it is seen as flexible, faster and enables more discussion among stakeholders. In their study of planning cases in performance-based regimes in New Zealand, Australia and United States, they found that flexibility was difficult to implement when both the public and developers wanted certainty. In addition, prescriptive zoning had to be used as an overlay on performance standards to obtain some consistency within the plans. Finally, they found that the complexity in developing performance standards meant that the

process was “more time-consuming and costly than the systems that they replaced” (Baker et al., 2006, p. 408).

Gunder (2003) notes further that the RMA allowed for the move away from planning in the public interest which has meant a depoliticisation of planning. Planners do not now have the legislative mandate to consider socio-economic change. He contends that the RMA only retains a role for “planning as a facilitating process for resource management to ensure an enabling environment for health, safety, social and cultural well-being, and, above all, wealth creation” (Gunder, 2003, p. 251). The minister who finalised the RMA into legislation, Simon Upton, verified this argument in a lecture in 1995 to the Waikato Law School:

We deliberately avoided a definition that sought to define sustainable management as a state of social, cultural, economic and environmental well-being. To have done so, would, of course, have allowed decision-makers to enquire into the social, cultural and economic effects of resource use on people, thereby returning us to a world of resource allocation by wise planners rather than market participants. ... the Act is, likewise, not concerned with the “need” for any particular resource use. A statute concerned with the effects of resource use is not concerned with adjudicating between competing needs for resources which will, by definition, depend on the extent to which people and communities are prepared to pay for them. Distributional questions are the province of the tax system not the resource management system. Certainly, the notion of planning for the allocation of resources according to some centrally determined view of need has no place in the sort of market economy on which we rely today. (Upton, 1995, pp. 40-41)

Because of the limited means within the RMA to plan and direct growth and development of the urban and built environment, most councils within New Zealand have had to explore other ways to achieve their objectives. As Miller (2011) notes, there is limited room to direct CBD revitalisation under the Act:

In reality the intense environment focus of the RMA coupled with its avoidance of social and economic concerns meant that it would never be the only means to undertake comprehensive and strategic urban planning. It certainly could not easily deal with the concepts of planning that underlie the English Urban Renaissance programme

or the comprehensive central city designs undertaken in many Australian cities (p. 90).

Pollock also noted the inability of planners and planning to direct development when he undertook a comparative study of planning systems between Australia and New Zealand in 2008. His study noted the lack of a strategic planning framework within the RMA for land use planning in New Zealand and he suggested changes “to improve the mechanisms to allow local bodies to actively participate in urban regeneration and renewal” as cited in C. L. Miller (2011, p. 90).

The RMA attempted to meet the demands of both the environmental movement on the one hand, and, on the other, business interests which wanted market principles to determine where development occurred. It was hoped that the legislation would provide “maximum environmental benefit with minimum environmental regulation of the market” (Ericksen, Berke, Crawford, & Dixon, 2003, p. 12). These twin objectives have proved hard to reconcile and the Act has been criticised for being unwieldy, bureaucratic, litigious, and dealing poorly with urban planning (C. L. Miller, 2011). The environmental movement is likewise disappointed with the RMA. Peart (2007), on behalf of the Environmental Defence Society, said that they had hoped that the RMA, with its focus on environmental sustainability and public participation, would enhance environmental outcomes. After 16 years of implementation of the RMA, however, they are disappointed.

Our unease over poor environmental outcomes in key areas has increased. Areas of particular concern have been poorly managed coastal subdivision and development, degraded water quality in our lakes and rivers and the ongoing loss of indigenous habitats and outstanding landscapes on privately owned land. (Peart, 2007, p. 1)

Subsequent amendments have also failed to address the major failings, as Peart sees it, of increasing environmental outcomes and instead the focus has been on process and compliance problems with the RMA.

Ericksen (2003) also argues that too much attention has been focused on compliance problems of the RMA. In his view, shortcomings, at both the local and regional levels,

are the reason that the RMA has not delivered greater environmental outcomes. At the national level, he criticises lack of funding to enable the then newly created governmental agencies of the Ministry of the Environment and Department of Conservation to assist in building capacity of local government to implement the RMA. Nor had any national policy statements, critical to the hierarchy of plans, been released by central government until recently (Department of Conservation, 2010; Ministry for the Environment, 2014). Because of the lack of capacity building at the local government level, Ericksen also argues local government has not implemented the RMA well. An inadequately funded and supported local government sector, in his view, could not convince the public of the value of an effects-based approach. He contends that:

For local politicians, the cases I have touched upon clearly show that it is sheer folly to not understand the mandates under which they operate, to be stingy with resources, to use election cycles to push staff unreasonably to produce complex plans to meet unrealistic deadlines, to fail in reviewing their plan adequately before public notification, and to not have the moral fibre to own their plan when negative reactions emerge from the vocal minority. These failings in governance at regional and district levels have contributed to public disappointment in the RMA. (Ericksen, 2003, p. 8)

For Ericksen, therefore, the problems of the RMA and achieving outcomes are to do with funding and capability at both national and local government levels. Bührs, however, contends that it is the effects based nature of the RMA that is at issue. When interviewed for a publication on the 20 year anniversary of the establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (D. Young, 2007), he argued that New Zealand had to return to a planning based on “constraints and limits” and states:

A major flaw in New Zealand’s institutional framework relates to the RMA, notably its ‘effects’ orientation, which has brought about incremental management - an inability to deal with cumulative effects, and has resulted in a virtual lack of rational and integrated planning, which became a dirty word. (As cited in D. Young, 2007, p. 62)

Swaffield (2012) in his study of peri-urban areas in Christchurch concurs with Bührs and notes that planners have resorted to non-statutory planning and local governance modes of working under the LGA in order to define urban growth areas because of the limited scope under the RMA. To implement the growth strategy and direct private development, however requires translating the outcomes desired to the performance-based regime under the RMA. This has proved risky and uncertain. Having outlined the two main statutes that govern planning, the discussion now turns to the decision-makers.

Representing Local Government

Elected representatives in New Zealand local government have two key roles. They make decisions within a democratic structure to ensure facilities and services are provided to the citizens of the area. They are also representatives acting on behalf of the people in their area to ensure that different interests in the community are allocated resources (Drage, 2008). This section of the chapter explains the processes by which elected members represent their communities and how this relates to their decision-making role within the unfolding changes to the practice of governance at the local level.

Council Membership and Basis of Election

Local elections are held triennially in New Zealand and councils are required to review their electoral system and the number of elected representatives at least once every 6 years. There is a right of appeal to the Local Government Commission. As Drage notes (2008), the Commission's rulings have been a source of reduced numbers of elected representatives in addition to council amalgamations.

Councils are able to choose to hold elections using the First Past the Post system or a proportional system, Single Transferable Vote (STV). Simultaneous elections, by postal voting, are held for the office of mayor, for the ward-based councillors and for community boards.

As noted earlier, the mayor is directly elected. As a result of amendments to the LGA 2002 in 2012 the mayor now has slightly different powers from those of other elected representatives, providing a greater executive leadership. The reforms of Auckland's governance were introduced in separate legislation which strengthened the role of the mayor. Cheyne (2011, p. 46) argues that the change to the role of mayor within the Auckland legislation is "to an unprecedented level of significance". However, she argues that, these changes notwithstanding, the system of mayoral leadership in New Zealand local government reflects what is known as the "weak" mayor model because the mayor does not have separate decision-making power or the power of veto (Svara & Watson, 2010). It is only through the entire elected representatives that decisions can be made. The position has only one vote and shares the same collective responsibility as other elected members. The main role of a mayor is that of leadership and as the voice of a council.

The 1989 reforms introduced to local government the council-manager model. This reflected the changes to the state sector whereby a council appoints a manager (now usually referred to as a CEO¹⁵) who in turn is responsible for all staff. The mayor and the CEO therefore have a close relationship although it is not always a smooth relationship (Controller and Auditor-General, 2012).

Representative of Communities

Fair and effective representation requires that local-authority elected members are representative of their constituents. Research has shown that this is not the case and elected representatives tend to be male and overwhelmingly pākehā, older, and from higher socio-economic groups. In 2004,¹⁶ men comprised 73% of territorial local authority elected representatives. Male mayors accounted for 81% of mayoral positions, 75% were over the age of 51 years, 94% were of the New Zealand European ethnic group, and 75% had previously held positions in local government (Shi, 2005).

¹⁵ At Christchurch City Council Mike Richardson was called a City Manager, and since 2003 when Lesley McTurk was appointed the position has been called a CEO.

¹⁶ Local Government New Zealand commissioned this research and has not updated the data.

Remuneration of Elected Representatives

Remuneration of elected representatives was first introduced in 1989 as part of the reform package. The Remuneration Authority first set remuneration for elected representatives in 2003. The system of remuneration from 2003 through to 2013¹⁷ was a pool of money for each council with considerable discretion for how each council could distribute that money among members. The base salary for each local authority was based on its population and the complexity of its business. The Authority also sets the rules for determining the reimbursement of costs to elected representatives (Remuneration Authority New Zealand, 2013). The salary for elected representatives now allows the role to be a full-time paid position.

Structuring Decision-Making

Under the LGA 2002 councils must determine their committee structure. Following each triennial election all committees are disestablished and a new committee structure is established by the incoming mayor. The 2013 Amendment to the LGA 2002 Section 41A (3) now enables a mayor to establish committees and appoint the chairperson of each committee, although, Schedule 7 of the LGA still permits the council to overturn these appointments.

Councils can have standing committees and other sub-committees. Every committee and subcommittee is subject to the control of the parent body that appointed it. A committee can only set up a subcommittee within its field of activity and delegated powers, and it may delegate any of its functions, duties and powers to the subcommittee. A committee chairperson is responsible for presiding over meetings of the committee, ensuring that the committee acts within the powers delegated by a council, and as set out in a council's delegations register. A committee chairperson may be removed from office by resolution of a council.

¹⁷ The system was significantly reviewed and amended in time for the 2013 elections (Remuneration Authority New Zealand, 2013)

The legal requirements for council meetings are set down in the Local Government Act 2002 and the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA). All council and committee meetings must be open to the public unless there is reason to consider some item in the 'public excluded' part of a meeting.

Although meetings are open to the public, members of the public do not have a right to speak, unless prior arrangements are made. Councils in their standing orders can provide an opportunity for residents to address the council. Many councils have a public forum at the beginning of meetings where people can speak without having previously notified the council and many also have an opportunity for members of the community to bring a deputation (having previously requested the opportunity to speak at a council or committee meeting). LGOIMA contains a list of the circumstances where councils may consider items with the public excluded. (These circumstances generally relate to protection of personal privacy, legal privilege or commercial negotiations.) All council and committee meeting agendas and minutes are public documents but a part of the agenda can be public excluded and the minutes of that part of the meeting are not public.

The mayor, committee or community board chairperson is responsible for maintaining order at meetings and may, at his or her discretion, order the removal of any member of the public for disorderly conduct, or remove any councillor or community board member who does not comply with standing orders. Minutes of meetings must be kept as evidence of the proceedings of the meeting. These must be made publicly available, subject to the provisions of the LGOIMA. For an ordinary meeting of the council, at least 14 days' notice of the time and place of the meeting must be given. Extraordinary meetings generally can be called on 3 working days' notice. During meetings, the mayor and councillors must follow standing orders (a set of procedures for conducting meetings). The council may suspend standing orders by a vote of 75% of the members present.

Christchurch City

Christchurch City is New Zealand's second largest city, with a population of 348,435¹⁸ (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). From 2001, it has grown by 10%, which is slightly greater than the national average growth rate. It has a slightly older age profile and fewer Māori than the rest of New Zealand. It is located on the east coast of the South Island within the Canterbury Regional Council area.

Māori oral tradition suggests moa-hunting Māori tribes first appeared in Canterbury about one thousand years ago. By about the 1600s Ngai Tahu, the iwi of the area, began settling in Canterbury.¹⁹ The first European landed in Canterbury in 1815, although it was not until 1850 that the English settlers who were to found Christchurch arrived (J. Wilson, 2005). The city is modelled on an English city and was designed from plans brought out from England. It still prides itself on its English origins, complete with the tourist attraction of punting on the Avon River, and is known as the 'Garden City'. Reinforcing this view was the reaction, from the public, to an article in *The Press* shortly after the February 2011 earthquake by historian Dr Katie Pickles (Pickles, 2011). Pickles suggested, in her opinion piece, that the damaged statues of early English settlers of Christchurch marked the end of an era and that "February 22 is our postcolonial moment". Letters to the Editor showed that many Cantabrians did not share that view.

The original urban area of Christchurch was confined within four avenues, which were later re-named after four of the city's first superintendents: Bealey, Rolleston, Moorhouse, and Fitzgerald (J. Wilson, 2005). Christchurch City has now grown to cover an area of 150,000 hectares, 30% in urban use, but the four avenues are still used to

¹⁸ The 5-yearly Census of Population and Dwellings that was to be undertaken in March 2011 was postponed to March 2013 because of the 2010-11 earthquakes. Data presented here are from the 2006 Census because the earthquakes displaced a significant number of people. The Census 2006 figures are therefore used to better reflect the population as at 2010. This figure is for the 'usually resident' population.

¹⁹ The word iwi is a Māori word that loosely refers to a 'tribe' or the grouping of already settled Polynesian people who had traditionally had 'ownership' of land in a particular area. The word *iwi* has become part of everyday English in New Zealand.

define the scope of the CBD revitalisation area. Around 8,000 people lived within the four avenues before the earthquakes (Statistics New Zealand 2006).

There are two distinct geological areas. The Port Hills are part of a series of large eroded volcanoes that now form the harbours of Banks Peninsula. The Canterbury plains have been formed by gravels deposited by rivers running from the Southern Alps. The majority of Christchurch is located on the shingle fans of the Waimakariri River. This large flat area has allowed the urban area to grow out into the surrounding rural areas. Bordering the plains to the north-east are the sand dunes and coastal sandflats. A low-lying peaty area occurs between the dunes and flats and the plains themselves. The waters of the Avon and Heathcote rivers flow through the urban area of the city and are a significant feature (J. Wilson, 2005).

The districts of Waimakariri and Selwyn surrounding Christchurch are growing at a much faster rate than the city and have a significant impact on the city's natural, physical, and social resources, contributing to the local economy. Currently, these districts have a combined population of 77,000. This is a combined growth of 19% since 2001. There has been substantial building activity in these areas in recent years, due to an increase in the number of people who are living on lifestyle blocks, and commuting to Christchurch for work. Since the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 there has been rapid growth in these areas, as around 5,000 residential properties within the city are unable to be rebuilt upon.

Christchurch City Council²⁰

History

Up until the early 20th century, the Christchurch City Council shared governing of the urban area of Christchurch with eight boroughs and four roads boards, and was surrounded by four counties (J. Wilson, 2005). This meant that right from this early

²⁰ This section provides a background on Christchurch City Council as it was in 2009 when the research was initiated. Following the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, the situation changed radically at the Council both internally and in its relationship with central government. Those matters are not outlined in this background but are part of the data collected in the fieldwork conducted for this thesis.

period, development of the city was directed by a large number of councils, all with ambitions for their areas and less concern with the city as a whole.

Before the major amalgamations of 1989, Christchurch had already amalgamated with a myriad of small boroughs and counties to the east of the city centre. The areas covered were generally the lower socio-economic areas of Christchurch. Reforms in 1989 created a new Christchurch City Council formed from the amalgamation of Riccarton Borough, Heathcote County, the former Christchurch City Council, the Waimairi District Council, part of the Paparua County Council, and Christchurch Drainage and Christchurch Transport Boards. These areas are all essentially part of the metropolitan area of Christchurch. Banks Peninsula District Council amalgamated with this enlarged City Council in 2005.

The former boroughs and counties had thriving suburban areas and had been planning and developing relatively large retail areas (J. Wilson, 2005). Riccarton Borough, for example, started planning for the growth of the Riccarton shopping area in the late 1960s. Retail and office development was actively promoted by the boroughs and counties as a way of raising revenue through increased rates. The 1989 amalgamation brought these competing suburban areas together but the spatial arrangements of almost self-sufficient suburban areas had been set (J. Wilson, 2005). Wilson (2005) also notes that the new amalgamated Christchurch City Council, while not only being larger, took on a greater variety of projects at the behest of citizens including upgrade projects to enhance and promote the city.

Elected Representation

Following the establishment of Christchurch City in 1989, the mayor and councillors have been elected under the first past the post system. At the time of establishment there were six community boards, each comprising two wards. Each ward was represented by two councillors. There were, therefore, 24 councillors standing in 12 wards, with 6 community boards (Douglass, 1999). Following a representation review in 2001 the wards were reduced by half to the community board areas, meaning there were 12 councillors representing larger wards. (See Chapter 6 for a more extensive

description of how this review took place and the main actors involved.) Following amalgamation with the neighbouring Banks Peninsula District Council in 2006, a new ward and an additional elected representative were included along with two new community boards.

Within Christchurch City Council many councillors have been selected by political parties but political party influence is waning. For example, in 2001 the mayor represented the *Christchurch 2021* party, 12 councillors represented the *Christchurch 2021* grouping, 8 represented the *Citizens* grouping, and 4 were independent. The *Christchurch 2021* party is affiliated to the New Zealand Labour Party, which is centre left. There is no party whip system, although the elected members of each ticket may meet as a caucus before taking major decisions. There is a noticeable trend away from political party influence on candidates, and, since 2009, both elected mayors have been independent.

In Christchurch, a community board governs two adjoining wards. Councillors and three other elected members from each of the two wards sit on each community board. A community board is a distinct legal entity. It is not a council committee; rather, it is a unit of sub-local government. A community board cannot borrow money or levy a rate and remains dependent on its 'parent'. In Christchurch the Council allocated \$NZ390,000 in the 2009–2010 year to each community board to spend on special projects for each area. The community board model adopted by Christchurch City Council following the 1989 amalgamations was regarded in local government circles in New Zealand as leading the way. This was because it received a relatively large amount of money from the Council to allocate as it saw fit within its area. With changes in the Council, this system has altered, and the community boards do not now have as much autonomy.

Structures for Decision-Making

In 2001, the Christchurch City Council had the following standing committees:

- Property and Major Projects
- Community and Leisure
- Sustainable Transport and Utilities
- Arts, Culture and Heritage
- Parks, Gardens and Waterways
- Regulatory and Consents
- Strategy and Finance

By 2009, the committee structure had been significantly changed (see Chapter 6).

Management Structure

When research for this thesis began in 2009, the Chief Executive Officer of Christchurch City Council was Tony Marryatt. The CEO had eight senior managers reporting directly to him. This includes directors responsible for human resources, corporate services, public affairs, strategic investment, regulation and democracy, city environment, community services, and strategic development. In 2014, the Council employs around 3,000 staff and is the second largest council by population in New Zealand (Christchurch City Council, 2014b; Statistics New Zealand, 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the broad changes that have shaped local government in New Zealand since its inception. Because of the lack of a constitutional basis for local government (Reid, 2002), its form and functions can vary considerably, depending on the view of the particular government in power. Local government is still relatively independent in that it raises the majority of its own income. Amendments to the LGA 1974 in 1989 marked the beginning of a major change to local government structure; the number of elected representatives; and its functions. These changes, including enhance public participation and a role in community well-being (later removed),

along with prescriptive planning and accountability requirements, generally based on NPM have brought tensions (S. Thomas & Memon, 2007).

Christchurch City Council was not immune to these changes and had to change and adapt. The chapter has also outlined the current shape of the Council. The following two data chapters examine how the Council changed and made decisions during this era regarding the revitalisation of its CBD.

CHAPTER 5: DECISION-MAKING AT A DISTANCE

...what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions. (Foucault, 2000a, p. 340)

From late 1998, following the election of a new Council and a new mayor, Christchurch City Council began publicly voicing its concern that retail and office activities were declining in the centre of the city. It launched a series of initiatives to reverse this trend. The Council agreed that regulatory means of maintaining the primacy and vitality of the CBD were not being successful. Instead, it turned to non-regulatory means of revitalising the city centre. While the Council had been involved in CBD initiatives before 1998, this new era saw a greater focus on the CBD, involving an outside advisory group and, ultimately, land purchases.

This chapter shows why and how the Christchurch City Council came to rely on new decision-making processes to revitalise the CBD, rather than use the more traditional regulatory means through its City Plan and the RMA. (See Johnston (2011) where I began an initial analysis of this material.) The chapter shows how, beginning in the late 1990s, decision-making changed dramatically by using publicly available Council documents from the Council's website, newspaper reports, and semi-structured individual interviews with past and present elected Council representatives, staff, and people outside the Council. The changed decision-making process for CBD revitalisation altered the power relations within the Council. The changes by the Council were based on an articulated need to be entrepreneurial and to ensure the Christchurch CBD competed successfully with other city centres in New Zealand and, indeed, with the city's own suburban shopping malls. The Council moved away from its traditional ways of decision-making to governing at a distance by using an outside body. These new ways of decision-making, which began with the Mayoral Forum, facilitated developers to create the night-time economy in Christchurch's CBD that attracted large numbers of young people. These empirical data address research questions one and two outlined in Chapter 1: How is power exercised during CBD

decision-making processes within Christchurch City Council; and what governmental technologies are adopted by Christchurch City Council to revitalise the CBD between 1999 and 2010?

Chapter 6 explores in detail how decision-making changed, examines the Council's committee structure that was dismantled, and how this influenced decision making. Chapter 7, the third and final data chapter, looks at how the spaces that were created by this new decision-making process were used by young people at night.

The first part of this chapter analyses the ways in which the CBD was constructed as a problem, followed by the particular path or techniques the Council then chose to revitalise it. The mayor, in particular, had become frustrated with the RMA and the Council's plan under that Act (called in Christchurch, prior to the earthquakes, the City Plan but generally referred elsewhere in New Zealand as a District Plan). This chapter, therefore, details why this frustration arose and what steps the Council undertook. The second part of the chapter examines the non-regulatory means the Council adopted for revitalising the CBD, namely a new advisory body called the Mayoral Forum, as well as strategy documents, and ultimately, the purchasing of property.

The Beginnings of a New Era

In the October 1998 local government elections, Garry Moore was elected mayor following the retirement of the previous mayor, Vicki Buck. As is required by law, the chief executive submitted a report to the inaugural Council meeting in November 1998 outlining a possible committee structure for the new Council. (As noted in Chapter 4, following each council election, the new council establishes a new committee structure.) The report by the Chief Executive Mike Richardson referred to the findings of a Processes and Structures Working Party the Council had established earlier in 1998 to review the Council's processes and structures and to recommend any improvements for the next term of Council. He noted the Working Party had recommended that the Central City Committee be disbanded (Richardson, 1998) and, from that time, all matters relating to the planning of the CBD would be discussed at a

new standing committee, the Strategy and Resources Committee. The chief executive concurred with the Working Party's recommendations. Among the recommendations that related to CBD revitalisation was one that Council-wide processes (including public accountability) should be the responsibility of the Strategy and Resources Committee.

The Council agreed with the working party's recommendations and instituted a system of six standing committees. Hence, in that term of Council, matters relating to CBD revitalisation went through the Strategy and Resources Committee, which had a comprehensive and wide purview. The committees were to have a membership of eight of the 24 councillors (plus the mayor *ex officio*). The Strategy and Resources Committee, because of its responsibility for Council wide processes, included in its membership the chairpersons of the other five committees. This type of committee structure, albeit revised by the new Council, was typical of the decision-making structure of the Christchurch City Council and for most councils throughout New Zealand at that time. In part, this was due to the Local Government Act 1974 section 104 and the Local Government Act 2002 section 41A, which both refer to the functioning of standing committees, although they were, and are not obligatory.

Table 5 outlines the committee structure for the 1998–2001 term, for the preceding term, and for the subsequent four terms, showing the extent of the changes.

Table 5: Standing Committee Structure over Time

Council Term	Standing Committee Structure						
1995–1998	Strategy & Resources	Projects & Property	Community Services	City Services	Environmental	Parks & Recreation	Central City
1998–2001	Strategy & Resources	Projects & Property	Community Services	City Services	Environment	Parks & Recreation	Resource Management
2001–2004	Strategy & Finance	Property & Major Projects	Community & Leisure	Sustainable Transport & Utilities	Arts Culture & Heritage	Parks, Gardens & Waterways	Regulatory & Consents
2004–2007	No standing committees. Weekly Council meetings & publicly notified seminars with notes sometimes available. Portfolio group meetings that were not publicly notified.						
2007–2010	Regulatory & Planning committee and fortnightly meetings of Council.						
2010–2013	After September 2010 earthquake, seven committees were established but never met. After February 2011 earthquake, committees were established in July 2011 but did not operate for many months, and then sporadically. The committees were Long Term Plan, Central City, Communications, Heritage and Arts, Housing and Community Facilities, Regulatory and Planning, Transport, and Water and Wastewater. In June 2012, the committees were disestablished and four new committees appointed: People, Environment and Infrastructure, Corporate and Financial, Planning.						

As can be seen in Table 5, in the 1995–1998 term of Council there had been a standing committee that focused on the central city. This was disbanded at the next term of Council, and an outside body, the Mayoral Forum, then undertook most of the CBD revitalisation work but reported to the Strategy & Resources committee. This continued for the 2001–2004 term. In the following term, all committees were replaced by seminars and portfolio group meetings. Some of these were publicly notified and notes (not formally agreed minutes) were sometimes available. Weekly Council meetings took place. The 2007–2010 term saw the return of a planning committee and fortnightly meetings of Council. As one of these meetings was to receive community board minutes, there was, in effect, only one Council meeting a month to make decisions on all matters other than planning. There was much less information available to the public about Council activities than ever before. The 2010–2013 term was overshadowed by two earthquakes. Initially, committees were established without terms of reference and delegations of authority. Council staff had to write reports to following meetings to rectify this. After a year, the committee structure was reviewed and reduced to four committees, along with a Long Term Plan committee.

Problematization of the CBD

The problematisation of a CBD in decline and in need of revitalisation through a new process can be traced to a staff report presented to the Strategy and Resources Committee in October 1999 (Dovey & Hay, 1999). That report, discussed in more detail below, outlined the work the mayor had been undertaking of his own initiative with outside organisations and people. The October 1999 report is in stark contrast to a report to the Environment Committee 2 months earlier. In August 1999, a report from planning staff was presented to the Environment Committee (Dryden, 1999) comparing retailing patterns in the central city with the ten largest suburban centres. The report was part of a series of information reports from the Environmental Policy and Planning Manager to keep councillors informed of general city development, planning and environmental issues. There was no analysis within the report outlining what these figures meant in terms of the central city. The planners raised no concerns

with the councillors about the nature of the CBD because of the information contained within the report. This differed markedly from the later October 1999 report, which not only raised concerns about the health of the CBD but also suggested new ways of dealing with the concerns. This is not to suggest that the planners were not concerned about the CBD, but to show that, at a particular point in time, a new articulation of the problem of the CBD began.

The August planning report's tables with data on the number of shops and commercial floor space are abbreviated and included in Table 6 and Table 7. In 1998, the number of retail shops in the central city and in the ten main suburban centres was similar – 576 retail shops in the central city, and 599 in the suburbs. Table 6 shows the breakdown of shops between the suburban centres and the central city.

Table 6: Number of Shops, Restaurants and Wholesalers in the Central City and the Ten Largest Suburban Shopping District Centres in Christchurch City 1998

	Retail Trade	Restaurants, Cafés & Bars	Personal Services	Wholesale Trade
Ten Largest Suburban Centres	599	68	122	72
Central City	576	183	215	201
Total	1,175	251	337	273

Source: Christchurch City Council report (Dryden, 1999)

Commercial floor space was also compared in the report between the suburban centres and the central city, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Commercial Floor Space in the Central City and the Ten Largest Suburban Shopping District Centres in Christchurch City 1995

Shopping District Centre	Total Floorspace (m ²)
	1995
Riccarton	71,670
Papanui/Northlands	72,825
Sydenham	40,810
Hornby	30,030
Shirley	14,440
Linwood	22,780
Church Corner	25,273
New Brighton	36,830
Bishopdale	12,980
Merivale	20,920
Total	348,558
Central City (1998 figures)	1,633,661

Source: Christchurch City Council report (Dryden, 1999)

Floor space in the central city in 1998 measured 1,633,661m² compared with 348,558m² floor space in all of the suburban shopping centres in 1995. There is no mention in this report of concern about the decline of the CBD in relation to growth in the suburban centres.

Two months after the August 1999 planning information report and almost a year into the term of the new Council, a report that mentioned for the first time decline of the CBD and proposed a strategy for its revitalisation came before a Council committee. The purpose of that staff report (Dovey & Hay, 1999) was, first, to inform the Council on the mayoral initiatives that had been taking place for a year on revitalising the central city. The recommendations of the report sought Council approval to establish a board that would facilitate or undertake property development projects to revitalise the central city. The report also informed the Council by way of background that the central city was declining compared with the relative growth in the suburbs. According to this report, since the 1950s, the overall proportion of the city's activities taking place in the central city had declined:

In retailing terms, this [retail activity] is now under 20% of total turnover. With continuing restructuring of business activity office functions are continuing to change and a good deal of office space in the Central City is vacant (currently 17%). (Dovey & Hay, 1999, p. 1)

The report went on to state that despite the work of successive Councils, the central city would still be challenged by the population drift to the suburbs and growing suburban shopping centres that were competing with the central city. The subject of the central city competing with the suburban centres had been raised 10 years earlier in an article by the assistant city planner Ken Lawn (1989). The justification of introducing new business zones near the central city where “anything goes” (p. 27) was to “allow the central city to compete with the suburbs”(p. 28). While the Council eventually tempered this zone to delete retail uses, it highlights the tension that existed in the minds of the councillors and the planners between the central city and the suburban centres.

Returning to the 1999 report, in subsequent commentary, both the mayor and staff suggest a threat to the central city from suburban growth that required revitalisation of the CBD, which could not be achieved through planning or civic projects as had been done in the past:

It is to capitalise on these trends, and to ensure that the Central City can meet the continuing and real challenges from the suburbs, that the mayor has recently initiated a number of discussions to see how the resources of the Council, business and the community can be better harnessed to these ends. (Dovey & Hay, 1999, p. 2)

The civic projects mentioned above began in the early 1990s under the title Enhancement Projects. These included street improvements in various areas and civic projects such as the Town Hall, Convention Centre, the Entertainment Centre, the expansion of the library network, the upgrade of swimming pools, a new art gallery, parking buildings, and bus interchange. A former senior manager reflected on how those projects came about and on the focus of the Council at the time:

... the challenge was to put in place a series of legacy projects that were going to measurably add to the life of the city. And in a way the focus on the central city came out of that but wasn't a driver of it. It was more about, in my recollection and my reflection, about Christchurch as a whole, as a place to live, a great place to live. And eventually out of that came, well, the heart is not beating that particularly well. The planners started to get into looking, around the late 90's, 95, 96, 97 ... the consequences of suburbanisation of retail activity and the loss of vitality in terms of central city retailing. (Former Senior Manager,²¹ interview October 2011)

The City Manager at the time of the Enhancement Projects also recalled why they had come about and what they included, and noted that they were not focussed solely on the central city:

It was a case of "what is our big picture vision for trying to transition our city?", and it is almost the language we were talking about, from being a large provincial centre to being a modest little city. And that led to the Enhancement Projects programme which involved building the Convention Centre, the additional swimming pools, which at the time meant the QEII expansion, Centennial pool, the Art Gallery which was the final Enhancement Project. ... But in between, there were a whole lot of suburban projects. I think we built eight new libraries across the suburbs through that period. Christchurch South, Fendalton, New Brighton, Shirley, Papanui, significant extension on Halswell and Central. Westpac Trust Centre [Entertainment Centre, now known as the CBS Arena] as well. The buying and using the A and P Showgrounds [Agricultural and Pastoral] on Curletts Road, buying a lot of land on the Port Hills. I think we doubled the amount of publicly owned land in Christchurch during the decade of the '90s. A lot of that was buying the Port Hills to protect them as open space. Travis Wetland, isn't that ironical. ... The point I'm making is this was a city-wide strategy. This was not a central city strategy. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

The Council had achieved previous projects to enhance either the CBD or the city generally through direct provision of facilities. The new process, suggested by the October 1999 report, and eventually accepted by the Council, was a new way of decision-making by working in partnership with the private sector. This eventually led

²¹ I refer to interviewees as either current or former staff or elected representatives. 'Current' relates to the 2010-2013 Council term in which these interviews were conducted.

to the direct involvement of the Council in commercial property development or at least land-banking property for future private property development. These previous enhancement projects had been undertaken by the Council within its existing standing committee structure.

Frustration with the Resource Management Act

The October 1999 staff report provided background information to explain why the current mayor had been undertaking initiatives throughout the year on revitalising the central city. Neither the mayor nor staff had reported these initiatives to a Council committee before this point. The mayor of this time, when interviewed, referred to what was being portrayed as this seemingly unstoppable suburban shopping mall growth. He was particularly frustrated with the Council's own City Plan and the Resource Management Act and explained that this was the reason why he had proposed a different process of revitalising the CBD:

Former Mayor We tried to tighten up the size of the malls.

Karen So you tried that?

Former Mayor Yeah, yeah. Riccarton slipped something through before we got it [tighter controls] through and they got 35 more shops. That's when they extended the Mall.

Karen So when you say Riccarton, was that under the old Council?

Former Mayor No. This is in my time as mayor. They managed to find a loophole with a clever planning lawyer and they extended the mall, 35 more shops.

Karen And why do you feel the mayor and the elected representatives couldn't stop that [growth of the suburban shopping malls]?

Former Mayor Because the Resource Management Act has put the power of planning into the hands of planners, lawyers, engineers and very little coordinated planning has taken place in New Zealand for decades, really. In Christchurch it is a particularly bad example. I got on the Council to get involved in planning. Within one term I was fed up with the Resource Management Act and didn't sit on hearing panels from then on.

Karen And so you felt you had very little control?

Former Mayor None whatsoever. I can honestly say that in 15 years on the Council I had no impact on the City Plan. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

A former City Manager also felt frustrated with the RMA and that he had not paid enough attention when the Council's first City Plan under the RMA was written.

We made a mistake with our planning scheme. I think we got the Resource Management Act wrong and I feel quite culpable. Because I was the first planner [as City Manager]. Curiously, I think when I became Chief Executive I almost took my hands off the things I knew best and focussed on the things I didn't know so well. What we did, I think, was we adopted a too pure approach of an effects-based model and resource management, and we kept trotting out legal opinions. We should have tried much more to influence the pattern of city development in particular retail and ironically ... Riccarton Borough's aspirations to build a big retail centre [was] potentially stymied by [the local government] amalgamation. But we then let it get away because we produced a district planning document under the Resource Management Act which enabled major retail expansion in suburban areas. And that was a mistake. It was recognised as it was happening as "oh, can't we stop this", and every time the appropriate professionals and lawyers got asked, the answer was "no you can't". Other councils were getting different answers. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

A senior manager at the time reiterated the point that the sprawl of the suburban shopping malls was in part due to the Council not realising soon enough what was happening, and to the difficulties of the RMA:

Former Senior Manager We had slow growth in the '90s. We still had significant suburbanisation and, in a way, the rise of the suburban malls in the mid '90s and beyond caught the City Council out by surprise.

Karen

Why?

Former Senior
Manager

In one sense there wasn't the sophistication in the knowledge of business activity that persists today. In another sense, it's a consequence of the RMA and the permissive regime of the RMA which has the bias towards development on an incremental basis and permitting it unless there are demonstrable or negative externalities that you can measure in quite a specific sense at a point in time, and it doesn't deal well with incremental or cumulative effects. And it isn't a strategic planning statute; in other words, it's not envisaging a future and then strategising to work towards it. It's envisaging a property market functioning with minimal interventions to manage external effects: development by development. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

This former senior manager went on to explain that not only was the newly created Christchurch City Council coming to terms with the new RMA legislation, it also had to create a new City Plan and, at the same time, work with the existing plans of the five amalgamating authorities:

The Council was making really heavy weather of grappling with moving from a transitional [district] plan as at 1991, which was a composite of the district plans of the amalgamating authorities, the former Christchurch city plus Waimairi, Paparua, etc., moving that into an integrated RMA-compliant plan. And there was a philosophical bias in writing that plan towards very much aligned with the effects-based regime and, as a consequence, envisaging the central city and working towards a desired future didn't really, in my view, figure strongly. A lot of those business guys, they're property owners, were quite right to put their hands up and say, "look what kind of central city are we trying to plan for here?" And it's not just a whole lot of rules in a district plan. It is how do we envisage that look and feel. And that was found a bit wanting, and hence, we started to see the more informal mechanisms to try and get new thinking into central city planning. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

Former councillors also felt that in hindsight they had allowed the City Plan to be written under the new RMA without enough restrictions in terms of limiting the spread and growth of retailing and commercial development outside of the CBD:

I think by that stage [1992] there had been a whole lot of retailers that had just disappeared [in the CBD]. Then, of course, we had the development of the malls in Shirley, Eastgate and so on. Riccarton just seemed to have grown and grown and grown, but I think that had probably started before 1992. By that stage, the Resource Management Act had come in and replaced the Town and Country Planning Act. There was, I suppose, a bit of a laissez faire attitude to planning after the RMA. ... The view seemed to be taken by the planners, and certainly the advice we were being given as councillors was that planning had changed under the RMA. If someone was to go out and buy a whole lot of land that might be residential and propose a development there - might be retail or commercial - and if it met the other objectives of the Act, like if there weren't detrimental effects on the environment or they could mitigate those things, then really there was little you could do to oppose that. You couldn't oppose it on the basis that it would compete with the central city, even if it meant that it could decline. There was a sort of view, you had to let market forces work. So I think as councillors, we sort of adopted that view. That's what the advice to us was, but I think it was probably advice that we shouldn't have acted on, on reflection. (Former Councillor E, interview November 2011)

Business people within the city were also well aware of what was happening to the city under the new rules of the City Plan and the RMA, as one business person notes below:

I understand there was a mistake, an oversight in one of the plans, which ... I think the intention was to keep the retail development and certain types of business inside Blenheim road. That didn't happen, and as a consequence, the whole of Blenheim road is retail or offices or near retail. And the zoning - there's huge tracts of land that still can be developed with retail or near retail business. So there was a failure in the City Plan, and it's also been very hard to bat against the RMA. And that's been right around the country, I understand. (Business person, interview November 2011)

Some former councillors stated that when the Council had tried to restrict development outside of the central city, it had had its decisions appealed to the Environment Court and then lost. This then engendered a stance of making concessions to developers rather than trying to restrict development:

Karen Why wasn't the District Plan ever tightened up to restrict retailing in the suburbs to enhance the primacy of the inner city?

Former Councillor B That's a very good question. I think the principal reason is that the Resource Management Act was very permissive. And basically, if you could demonstrate that this was a good use of the natural and physical resources, if you could demonstrate that you could avoid, remedy or mitigate the effect, you could do anything, anywhere. And on many occasions when the City Council attempted to restrict development, the developer would take a case to the Environment Court and win it. Therefore, City Council planners, instead of recommending that we adhere strictly to the principles of the city plan, would tend to recommend concessions to the developer on the expectation that if we went to the Environment Court it would be lost. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

The Council's own City Plan came in for some criticism by being too permissive in the past in allowing retailing and commercial activity within industrial zones. This had happened against staff advice:

Former Senior Manager [There was a] relative loss of vitality and a relative loss of role [of the central city] to the suburbs in the face of a planning regime that was not assisting; in fact, it was positively enabling the suburbanisation trend. The Council made some bad decisions in the late 1990s as they were trying to finalise the City Plan, and they liberalised the ability for business to intrude into industrial areas.

Karen These are the office parks?

Former Senior Manager Yes, yes, and there was a massive rise off the back of the wave of suburbanisation of business activity worldwide. You know, you don't so much need a central place location anymore because technology can connect you, etc. Never mind the chemistry issues around it, but, and so against officer advice, the Council decided that the City Plan would allow a whole range of activities into industrial areas. Over a period of several years, about 80,000m² of floor space got constructed in erstwhile light industrial areas that were non industrial uses. And that sucked more activity out of the central city. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

The growth of the suburban shopping areas in comparison to the central city is illustrated in Table 8 (floor space) and Table 9 (employment growth). These data

support the comments from the former senior manager that most of the suburban shopping centres were growing at a much greater rate than the central city.

Table 8: Commercial/Retail Floor Space of the Central City and the Ten Largest Suburban Shopping District Centres in Christchurch City 1995 and 2006

Shopping District Centre	Total Floor space* (m ²)		Change	% Change
	1995	2006		
Riccarton	71,670	87,437	15,767	22%
Papanui/Northlands	72,825	84,450	11,625	16%
Sydenham	40,810	41,925	1,115	3%
Hornby	30,030	39,556	9,526	32%
Shirley	14,440	38,544	24,104	167%
Linwood	22,780	37,408	14,628	64%
Church Corner	25,273	36,607	11,334	45%
New Brighton	36,830	31,940	-4,890	-13%
Bishopdale	12,980	18,685	5,705	44%
Merivale	20,920	17,741	-3,179	-15%
Suburban Total	348,558	434,293	85,735	25%
Central City Total	1,600,000	1,700,000*	100,000	6%

*Of the 1.7 million-m² floor space, 260,000m² is retail, and 414,000m² is office floor space.

Source: Dryden (1999) and Christchurch City Council data.

A central city business person, when interviewed, noted that there had been very few new office developments in the CBD in recent times:

There hasn't really been a new building put up in the centre of Christchurch, except for the IRD [Inland Revenue Department], for 20 odd years. You know the Price Waterhouse would have been the last. The Ibis hotel. But there was very little incentive to build in the inner city. And the costs of building in the inner city seemed to be, well the developers told me, seemed to be so great that the incentive to buy cheap land outside the four avenues and build on that where I understand that the regulations weren't as tight or as expensive. (Business person, interview November 2011)

Table 9: 2006 Employment Comparing Central City to other Areas in Christchurch

Business Area	Industrial	Office	Retail	Services	Total
Central City	3	45	20	14	18
Sub Regional Centres	0	3	16	3	4
District Centres	2	5	12	5	5
Current Industrial Areas	76	29	27	17	38
Airport	2	2	1	3	2
District Town Centres	4	5	7	6	5
Out of Centre/Small Commercial	13	11	17	52	28
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy using Statistics New Zealand business data

Table 9 shows that total employment in the central city was 18% of all employment in the city. The central city only accounted for 20% of retailing employment less than the 27% of retailing employment in industrial areas. This was due to the relaxation of retailing within the industrial zones at the time of incorporation of submissions into the City Plan for Christchurch in 1999. This was changed with Variation 86 which became operative in 2009. Other centres, outside of the central city accounted for 35% of retailing employment. The industrial areas also had 29% of office employment.

Attempts to Increase Regulation

Frustration with the RMA and the apparent inability of the Council to stem the expansion of the suburban malls, regarded as threatening the viability of the central city, has been a constant recurring theme up to the earthquakes. In 2003, the councillors and staff invited retired Environment Court Judge, Peter Skelton, and Professor of Planning at Lincoln University, Ali Memon, to give a series of seminars on matters related to the Christchurch City Plan and relevant Environment Court decisions. This was initiated to guide the Council towards more comprehensive planning under the RMA. At the time, the Council was losing some important Environment Court cases in favour of increased suburban development and retail

activity, for example, the Applefields case.²² This case related to former horticultural land that the owners sought to have rezoned as residential. Despite various appeals over 12 years by both the Canterbury Regional Council and the Christchurch City Council, residential zoning was finally granted in an Environment Court decision directing the City Council to amend its City Plan in 2012.

Back in 2003, a staff report to the Council proposed seminars about Environment Court decisions for elected members:

The purpose of this report is to outline a draft brief ... to provide staff and councillors an overview of relevant Environment Court decisions regarding the ability to do and provide more comprehensive planning within the RMA. In this case, the term comprehensive planning refers not just to effects-based planning, but incorporates aspects such as scale, sequence, timing and enhanced outcomes rather than just avoiding remedying or mitigating adverse effects. (Bachels, 2003, p. 1)

According to Professor Memon (personal communication, May 2011) the seminars highlighted the weaknesses in the City Plan and what evidence would be needed from the Council. The seminars emphasised that the Council's City Plan was too weak to stop retail development outside of the CBD. The Council either had yielded to private developer pressure to allow retailing out of the centre or had lost crucial Environment Court cases through poor evidence. Two seminars were held, but they were discontinued when a new CEO was appointed in May 2003 and organisational restructuring took place. A current planning staff member recalls the seminars and the reasons why they were initiated.

Yes, I know that we went and talked to them both. When the city plan was going through the machinations in the '90s from notification in '95 and some decisions, about '98 and '99. One of the decisions they made really opened the door to big box retail to go almost anywhere into what had previously been more pure industrial zones. That I think has since been seen as a mistake but

²² Applefields Ltd v Canterbury Regional Council C018/98 [1998] NZEnvC 56 Environment Court of New Zealand, New Zealand, 9th March 1998. Johns Road Horticulture Limited v Christchurch City Council [2012] NZEnvC49 Environment Court of New Zealand, New Zealand, 26 March 2012.

it came through the submission process.... Then the Council looked at a variation to this, I think it's called Variation 86, which was to redo some tightening up on retail. There was also a concern about suburban office development. I think part of the advice that we were seeking from Ali and Peter was actually about the chances of success if we pursued the Variation 86 and also the office stuff. There were some views around that it was all too hard, that the RMA wasn't going to work for proactive planning and it was all effects-based and it's going to be really, really hard to bring us back. They were basically saying, no you should give it a go and do it. ... it was in the early heady days of RMA when we, and I wasn't really part of it, but Bob Nixon and others were sort of pioneering the very much effects-based model and so on. I'd have to say some of us were never that comfortable with that. Having been a planner of the old school early on, more prescriptive planning is something where I'm much more at home. It was some of that sort of stuff, I think, that they were endeavouring to get a feel from some experts on the Council's chances of doing this. I think where it has moved to from there was the central city strategy, there hasn't been much RMA stuff come into it so far. It was more about incentives and other non-regulatory ways of doing things which in a way is good. It's more LGA than RMA focussed in a way. (Current Planner, interview November 2011)

This planning staff member reflected on the seminar, and observed that the Council was promoting an effects-based planning model. Despite saying he was more comfortable with prescriptive planning, he approved of the CBD revitalisation strategy that began in 1999, which was not about using the Council's powers under the RMA, but instead used incentives and other non-statutory planning under the LGA such as the development of the revitalisation strategy.

The Council did eventually initiate Variation 86 to limit retail and office development in the industrial zones. The first attempt to restrict development was rejected by the Environment Court in 2002. Variation 86 was then notified in 2004 and made operative in 2009. By then, much retail and office development had occurred in the industrial zones. A current senior manager gives some background on this Variation:

So, I think one of the key things was understanding that - and this is my perception and I don't actually have the detail figures - it wasn't so much that the central city was in an absolute decline. What was happening was the proportion of growth was lessening

in the city and being concentrated in the outer areas. So, it wasn't in some respects that there was a withdrawal of activity, there was just a lack of growth. The Council did put together Variation 86, which is to basically try and control particularly office park development, and that has had a couple of recent successes. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

The Variation that the manager refers to was made operative on 16 November 2009, 10 years after Mayor Garry Moore had initiated the Mayoral Forum, which he says had been in response to the difficulties of achieving progress for the central city through the City Plan. Former councillors from the time are still unable to pinpoint why the Council never altered its City Plan earlier than Variation 86 to restrict development in the suburbs following the seminar:

I think things probably hadn't been tightened up in the District [City] Plan when they should have been because of the view that the RMA was drafted in a way that you couldn't prevent, for example, The Palms being created. The Palms was actually on commercial land, but it gobbled up residential land around it to expand and so on. I mean we had this issue because of the decline at New Brighton as well. When The Palms was developed and Eastgate was developed, it detrimentally affected New Brighton. I guess it was just the view that RMA didn't really enable us to take a restrictive approach to these things. I think that by the time Ali Memon and Peter Skelton came to Council, the worst had happened really. Damage had been done. (Former Councillor E, interview November 2011)

As this former councillor notes, established town centres, such as New Brighton, also suffered from the expansion of major mall developments. Another former councillor comments on these difficulties:

In addition, our staff members, when they devised the new City Plan based on the Resource Management Act, made it an effects-based plan rather than a zone based plan. And they said that you could no longer use zoning as an implement of planning - you had to use effects-based. You could do these activities here provided you produced these effects or didn't produce the bad effects. So our City Plan is a very complex and difficult document. At the time, some town planning experts praised it, said the Christchurch City Council is the only council which had endeavoured to fully implement the principles of the Resource Management Act, the

effects-based plan. In actual fact it was a terrible, terrible document to manage because you no longer had clear rules; you can do this here, you can't do it there. ... Now that's terribly difficult. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

The Council planners, did make claims that the Christchurch City Council pursued an effects-based district plan. In an article on writing district plans, a Christchurch City Council planner at the end of the article states that, "I have been involved in progressing an 'effects-based' District Plan for Christchurch City since 1992" (Nixon, 2000, p. 25). The Council's strong emphasis on an effects-based approach within its district plan made it increasingly difficult for it to control the spread of retailing and office development.

Miller (2011) argues that one of the reasons planners throughout New Zealand were reluctant to bring in an effects-based plan in the early days of the RMA was because of the experience of the Christchurch district plan. The plan was identified as complex to use, and indeed took over ten years from 1995 to 2005 to become operative. When Christchurch's plan became operative in 2005, it was in the final 28% of territorial authorities to do so (J. Crawford, 2006). An effects-based approach, as in Christchurch, has meant that if the effects of a development are managed, such as car parking, noise and light issues, developers have found it relatively straightforward to keep expanding suburban shopping malls. The most recent such mall development was in 2012 on the outskirts of Christchurch when the neighbouring council, Waimakariri District Council, among others, appealed to the Environment Court from a decision of the Christchurch City Council to allow a plan change that would have allowed a large retail and office complex to be developed.²³ In this case, the Christchurch City Council approved a plan change request to its City Plan from a developer to allow approximately 9.2 hectares of land to be rezoned from horticultural and agricultural uses to an office and retail development known as the Styx Centre. The site was adjacent to an already large retail centre (32,700m²) known as the Supa Centre and a New World supermarket. At paragraph 19 of his judgement, the judge notes:

²³ Kiwi Property Holdings Limited v Christchurch City Council [2012] NZEnvC 92, New Zealand Environment Court, New Zealand (16 May 2012).

[19] It is common ground that the New World, the Supa Centre and proposed Styx Centre will function as a single retail destination. In respect of its combined core retail provision alone the proposed Styx Centre will be second only in size to the former Christchurch central business district.

The February 2011 earthquake occurred while this appeal was going through the Environment Court. The court decided to reconsider the size and scale of the proposed development on the recovery of the CBD in the wake of the earthquakes because of the development's potential effects on the CBD. The original City Council decision on the plan change proposed no restriction on the scale of development after the year 2021 and concluded that the development would not have any detrimental effect on the function, vitality and amenity of the CBD. The judge noted at paragraph 97 that the City Plan was still weak in terms of defining scale, form and function of a centre relative to other existing centres, a point made by Skelton and Memon in their seminars in 2003 (A. Memon, personal communication May 2011). The judgement addressed the impact of the earthquakes on the recovery of the CBD with the proposed development and decided that the development should have the size and scale of offices and retail reduced. The Christchurch City Council, however, did not address the potential effects of the proposed retail development on the CBD post-earthquake at the reconvened Environment Court hearing and did not put forward evidence to reduce the retail component of the development. A former senior manager from the Christchurch City Council reflects on this very recent proposed expansion of suburban retail and office development and the Council's response:

[Take the] Styx Centre development, which is in north Christchurch, where the Supa centre is next door to that. AMP Trust are trying to mount a new sub-regional shopping centre. Nominally, 45,000m² of floor space, which, in addition to the already 20,000 which is at the Supa centre, would make it larger than Riccarton Mall, for God's sake! And this is 3 kilometres down the road from Northlands [shopping mall]. And for whatever reason, the city seemed relaxed about it or at least they were completely relaxed about it before the quakes. To be fair, Judge Borthwick has said 'I want to hear evidence of post-quake effects of this centre on the CBD'. And the City [Council] has sort of woken up and are now proposing some limitations on the quantum of office floor space. But still, they haven't got it in terms

of, 'we don't need it'. We gained the reputation as the most over-shopped urban area in Australasia in terms of retail floor-space per capita. And it's persisted. Yet this is not a rich town. What you end up with in the CBD is hundreds of square metres of rubbish floor-space that the earthquake finally tipped over. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

A more recent and post-earthquake example of not wanting to use regulation to stem the expansion of retail and commercial activities into the suburbs was reported in the media. This related to the review of the District Plan in which councillors were suggesting billboards and incentives to encourage redevelopment in the CBD:

She [mayor] said the Council had been criticised as preferring development in the CBD over suburbia, but this was not true. ... Gough [councillor] said he would prefer to offer incentives to developers, rather than wielding "big sticks" to stifle urban sprawl. (R. Young, 2014, p. A1)

A Christchurch bar owner with developments in the CBD laments the expansion of the suburban retail areas and malls in particular:

Karen Going back to the past CBD revitalisation plans pre-earthquake. Why do you think that the Council undertook them?

Bar Owner Well, Christchurch city actually in itself was dying and it was going broke. Seriously going broke.

Karen And why do you think that was?

Bar Owner The proliferation of shopping malls. A classic is like Dunedin; they don't have shopping malls. The only mall in Dunedin is in North Dunedin in the middle of town – George Street. And George Street, you go down there, and it's always vibrant always busy even though they only have 100,000 people. There's always people charging around, there's eateries all around it, they're always making a dollar and they won't let shopping malls go into Dunedin. (Bar Owner, interview December 2011)

Within the business community, however, there are differing views on the means of achieving a vibrant city centre. Some still do not want restrictions put on businesses

outside of the CBD. Rather, they place an emphasis on making the CBD attractive to encourage businesses to locate in the centre rather than in the suburbs, as this interviewee from the business community outlines:

Karen And I wondered why they [the Council] allowed all that development to go ahead?

Business Rep Because the plan permitted it, that's why.

Karen But why didn't they change the plan?

Business Rep Because they thought the plan was too hard to change. And the plan was in the process of being changed when the earthquake struck. And that had been in process for at least 5 years. It just went on and on. But I'm a firm believer in a non-prescriptive agenda. I mean, fundamentally what will recreate our city is not a prescriptive agenda, because that will discourage the recreation of downtown Christchurch. What will recreate downtown Christchurch is that we provide a commercial proposition that is attractive to people who want to find a place to land their capital. And if the central city is attractive and makes good sense and that's fundamentally driven by people living, working and playing in our central city, if it's attractive in that sense, it will happen. If it isn't, if the Council makes some sort of prescriptive agenda that isn't attractive, it won't happen. (Business representative, interview October 2011)

Resource Management and Liquor Licensing

Effective linkages between the City Plan and liquor licensing were also a difficult matter for planners according to a liquor licensing inspector. An inspector was asked about how well the two pieces of legislation worked together within Christchurch:

Karen How does the District Plan under the Resource Management Act and Liquor Licensing mesh together? Does that work very well? Can you say in your City Plan, in this area we're not going to have any Off Licences?

Licensing Inspector Well you could but if you have any understanding of how the Resource Management Act works and how you get a plan change through, the reality is that it doesn't happen. It's just too difficult. I can't think of any, and I've been lobbying our councillors to change things for a number of years now. Not just a policy but some rules in the City Plan because that's ideally where you want them sitting. But it is not happening.

Karen Why not?

Licensing Inspector As I said I think it is just too hard because you've got to go through that public consultation process. I think under the RMA it becomes too hard to justify putting that rule in there. There's always been this sort of hands-off approach for liquor because liquor under the RMA is just another retail commodity. (Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

The Christchurch City Council, therefore, seems to have placed itself in a contradictory position regarding growth of retail development outside of the CBD. Former elected representatives interviewed stated they had been frustrated that the Council could not halt the rapid growth of retail in the suburbs, which affected the viability of the CBD. For many years, however, and continuing after the earthquake, the Council has not taken the steps necessary to alter the City Plan and restrict development to ensure the primacy of the CBD. This problem constituted part of the justification for the introduction of new decision-making processes to revitalise the CBD.

Introducing an Outside Body for Decision-Making

Because of the Council's inability to stop the growth of retail outside the CBD through regulatory means via its own City Plan, in 1999 the mayor, Garry Moore, decided to implement initiatives that would enhance the CBD to draw both residents and business back into the centre of the city by means other than regulatory. These new means led the Council to explore different ways of decision-making in addition to enhancing the city centre through developments in the public spaces and actively purchasing property for private purposes. The mayor was explicit about why he had sought to revitalise the CBD by other than regulatory means through the planning process:

I was trying to bypass the planning. I was trying to directly influence the investors and see if we could get Council projects to work alongside them. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

For over a year, from the election in 1998 to October 1999, the mayor, on his own initiative, had been meeting with a core group of around 37 key stakeholders to discuss central city issues (Dovey & Hay, 1999). The stakeholders represented various interests within the central city of Christchurch such as retailers, commercial tenants, developers, and the hospitality industry. There had been no reports to a Council committee during the time of these discussions. A report to the Council from the Strategy and Resources Annual Plan Working Party (Christchurch City Council, 1999b), however, recommended changes to the coming budget, including \$25,000 for the Mayoral/Central City Forum for the year beginning 1 July 1999 and an additional \$40,000 in the same year and the following year for Feasibility Studies/Seeding grants as a result of Forum. These financial additions were incorporated in Council's annual plan (Christchurch City Council, 1999a). Explanations for this expenditure and Forum were under the heading 'To Keep the Centre of Christchurch Alive'. The Annual Plan explained:

The Council is committed to ensuring the city centre remains the heart of the community. A vibrant city centre benefits the local economy, employment and tourism. Proposed initiatives which relate directly to the city centre include the building of a Bus Interchange (\$19.2M spread over two years) and Christmas decorations for the Central City (\$113,000).

A forum process is being put in place. The objective of this will be to enliven the "Four Avenues" by encouraging housing development and new commercial activity within them. Our vision is for a city which continues to have a strong heart and doesn't simply become a low density sprawl of suburbs. (Christchurch City Council, 1999a, p. 7)

The Dovey & Hay report (1999) mentioned that, as well as meeting with around 37 key stakeholders, there had been workshops with around 70 additional invited representatives. David Yencken, who had been the State Secretary for Planning and Environment in Melbourne, had facilitated these workshops. The report said that Mr

Yencken had led a major change for Melbourne that had included revitalisation of the Yarra waterfront area, which included the Southgate initiative involving commercial and retail development.

The report said a concern identified at the workshops was the difficulties the Council was facing in ensuring the primacy of the central city because of the expansion of the suburban centres. Ways in which this could be overcome were outlined in the report:

The Proposed City Plan's stance on the distribution of retailing has been weakened through the public hearings process, but this issue will be further addressed through the Environment Court appeal hearings to come. The Council will need to continue to use, and find new, non-regulatory methods to achieve Central City revitalisation. (Dovey & Hay, 1999, p. 3)

The future Environment Court hearings did not, however, strengthen the central city area for retailing and, despite the seminars conducted by Skelton and Memon (A Memon personal communication 2011), the Styx Centre Environment Court hearing²⁴ in 2012 shows that the Council still remains reluctant to restrict retailing outside of the CBD. Instead, from 1999, the Council focussed on the suggested non-regulatory methods to revitalise the central city that involved major expenditure on public space and acquiring private properties.

The report noted it was not desirable that initiatives should originate from various Council committees and units within the organisation. It suggested a more integrated management approach was needed for the central city and that the Council alone could not achieve the commercial and residential initiatives that this process had identified:

These projects could be, or are being, furthered by the Council or other agencies such as Christchurch and Canterbury Marketing or Canterbury Development Corporation. These bodies alone, however, will not be able to achieve many of the commercial initiatives, for example, the scale of residential activity sought in the

²⁴ Kiwi Property Holdings Limited v Christchurch City Council [2012] NZEnvC 92, New Zealand Environment Court, New Zealand (16 May 2012).

Central City, without private sector support and input. It is vital that some formal structure for public/private partnership be established in order to achieve Central City revitalisation by property development. Its success will depend on it. (Dovey & Hay, 1999, p. 4)

The report suggested that a commercial agency working outside the Council would be the most appropriate vehicle for driving a public/private partnership and suggested an interim board be set up to establish a board for the revitalisation of the city (Dovey & Hay, 1999, p. 5). It is perhaps not surprising that the stakeholders should prefer a commercial type arrangement to lead the revitalisation strategy, as many of the stakeholders were from the private sector. Processes were put in place to select the interim board and in a report to the Strategy and Resources Committee on 10 April 2000, membership was made public. The report noted that the Interim Board had already met on several occasions and was in the process of establishing a statement of corporate intent, a structure for the board, and specific project developments. These developments included a draft concept plan for the central city area, establishing a fresh produce market, residential projects, student accommodation, and Innovation Canterbury (Bachels, 2000c).

The Interim Central City Board included the mayor (chairperson), three city councillors, and eight people identified as business and community leaders. By the following month, June 2000, the Interim Board had written a statement of corporate intent for the board, programme targets, and measures. The overall aim of the board was to: “position the Christchurch Central City as the Australasian capital of quality lifestyle and urban sustainability” (Bachels, 2000b, p. 1). The objective of the new board was:

To provide leadership, to act as an initiator or investment catalyst on appropriate projects, to work closely with the Christchurch City Council, and to actively market and participate in, through development projects, the revitalisation of the Central City.
(Bachels, 2000b, p. 2 Appendix)

The report stated that the best mechanism to achieve this objective was through a council company (Local Authority Trading Enterprise (LATE), under the LGA 1974). This

June report also noted that there had been a Council seminar held one month earlier in May 2000, where the following points had been noted as is highlighted in the excerpt below:

- That the formal reporting structure provide for the input of Standing Committees into central city projects.
- In selecting Board members, emphasis should be placed on business people with appropriate skills, and that it would be inappropriate for property developers to be Board members.
- The Constitution to provide for the retirement of Board members.
- The Strategy and Resources Committee rather than CCHL to recommend Board appointments to the Council.
- Chairs of Standing Committees should not be members of the Board. (Bachels, 2000b, p. 2)

These points show there was some disquiet about the role of elected representatives with the central city revitalisation, and with the board in particular. The Council appeared to want a more direct input into the project after the initial handing over to a board.

The details of the June 12th report to the Strategies and Resources Committee seem to have been contentious because an additional and expanded report was written for the June 22nd Council meeting (Bachels, 2000a). This expanded report included extensive background information. The report addressed reasons for the CBD revitalisation, mayoral initiatives during 1999 and the rationale for a new agency (the Central City Board). It also included appendices that proposed frameworks for the relationship between the Council, the Mayoral Forum and the Central City Board, a revised Central City Board Statement of Corporate Intent and the Mayoral Forum terms of reference and performance targets and measures. It was within this report that the first mention was made of the term 'community governance'.²⁵

²⁵ See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the differences between local governance and community governance. In June 1999 the Christchurch City Council had hosted a seminar on community governance (Richardson, 1999).

To achieve this vision of revitalisation will require the active contribution of many groups, and public agencies, with the City Council at the heart of that process. That is, application of the Community Governance model. (Bachels, 2000a, p. 2)

The 14 members of the Interim Board, formally constituted as the Mayoral Forum, included the mayor, three councillors, eight business and community leaders, and two property developers.

This amended report to the June 22nd Council meeting was still contentious, and the Chair of the Strategy and Resources Committee moved seven new or amended recommendations that were carried by 18 votes to 5. While one of these recommendations was for a LATE to be established, known as the Central City Board, this appears not to have been done, as there is no reference to such a LATE in the Council's subsequent Annual Reports where it is required to disclose such information. In fact, while the Central City Board is still mentioned in passing in reports at least up until February 2001 (Bachels, 2001), it was the Mayoral Forum that was the main driver of the CBD revitalisation. Former and current councillors remembered this period when the Mayoral Forum was introduced as a new decision-making technique:

It [the Mayoral Forum] had been going for a while and it had no official position. He would consult people. There's nothing wrong with that. It was always good if the mayor could come up with good publicly supported projects and things and he did that on a number of occasions. We didn't resist that as a committee. It was good. But he wanted them to be the decision-makers. He actually almost despised the councillors and the Council committees and wanted to transfer more decision-making to outside bodies. ... it was worrying a lot of us because you can't really have outside organisations making Council decisions. (Former Councillor D, interview October 2011)

A current councillor also recalls this time:

Yeah, there was this Mayoral Forum and the community board felt that we were the local elected members and we felt quite disillusioned. I think the community board chairperson was on it or may have been able to attend it at certain stages but we sort of felt a little bit of concern that local people elect local community

board members from the inner city to represent them and you've got this Mayoral Forum that de facto are doing the role of the community board. (Current Councillor A, September 2011)

A former senior manager also recalls this initial period when certain business people were included within this decision-making body and many others were not included:

It sort of went off line in a way. It went into an informal, or not a formal, governance structure and Garry drew a group of business leaders together. ... I guess I've got two views on that. One was great, because it was an example of engagement and recognition that Council can't do it alone. These guys have a vested interest from a commercial point of view - if you're going to do anything useful you've got to do it together, all that sort of stuff which is pretty topical now in terms of central city recovery plan. However, from my recollection and my perspective, it was not very engaging of a whole range of stakeholders in the central city other than property owners and larger businesses. The frame of reference was a business frame. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

A business person also concurs that the Council was hesitant about this new body taking responsibility for the CBD:

It [the Council] was uncertain about the Mayoral Forum because the Mayoral Forum was appointed by the mayor to advise him and to help him. And I think the elected members were suspicious of it and its authority and a suspicion that either committees or councillors were being circumvented in some sort of way. And so there were councillors who were for it and councillors who were against and certainly officers of the Council who were a bit suspicious of it. ... And there was also a suspicion, I think, of its composition and the motives of some of the people who were members of the Forum. (Business person, interview November 2011)

A current senior manager recalls that the mayor, Garry Moore, led the process for the revitalisation of the CBD. The decision-making process for the revitalisation was also not undertaken through the normal channels of a Council committee but through the mayor and the Mayoral Forum:

But if we think about the central city there wasn't a strong councillor led interest in the central city. There was a very strong Garry Moore led interest in the central city. Garry was a very strong advocate for the central city but it was very much driven out of the mayor's office in that sense rather than out of the normal committee or portfolio structure. (Former Senior Manager, October 2011)

The following mayor, Bob Parker, took up this mayoral led initiative and continued to champion the CBD from 2007:

He had picked up from Garry, and Bob came from a ... I think Bob, like Garry, had a personal interest in urbanism and the central city, but Bob had also come to it through his role as the chair of the UDS [Urban Development Strategy] because of course at a macro level, the UDS had three strands. Its fundamental strand was around containing the outward expansion of the periphery and a key to that was reconsolidating the centre to perform like a centre. So Bob had had a lot of that exposure in his role there. He had had an interest in urbanism so in some respects there was a very natural flow from Garry's enthusiasm to Bob's enthusiasm. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

Both mayors therefore had pivotal roles in the revitalisation of the CBD. Garry Moore implemented the revitalisation strategy initially through the Mayoral Forum and then through Council meetings, of which he was chair, rather than standing committee meetings. Bob Parker continued with the Council-meeting approach.

From the Council reports and their recommendations plus the interviewees above, what emerges is a council that is not fully comfortable with the notion of a body (in this case the Mayoral Forum) taking the lead role in the CBD revitalisation. There was a tension between the democratically elected representatives and the largely mayoral appointed members of the Forum. The City Manager in July 2000 was requested to write a further report to the Council on the status of the Mayoral Forum (Richardson, 2000). In this report, Richardson distinguishes the new Mayoral Forum from the previous Council Central City Standing Committee that operated under the previous

term of Council and under a different mayor. The previous standing committee of Council had been tasked with implementing Council projects and programmes within the central city. The Mayoral Forum was different:

It seems to me that the intention of the Mayoral Forum is significantly different. It is to bring together a number of individuals who have a combination of expertise and interest in the central city on one hand, and are also stakeholders able to themselves influence decision-making of other organisations on the other. Constituted in this way the primary role is one of a catalyst: to generate ideas, to ask questions, to stimulate debate, to generate enthusiasm and a climate for decisions to be taken by a range of stakeholders leading to central city revitalisation. (Richardson, 2000, p. 2)

As the City Manager highlights, it is from this point that the Council was consciously beginning to use the concept of local governance. The Council decided to constitute the Mayoral Forum as a working party and not a Council committee. This meant that it would be more informal and would not have to notify its meetings publicly.²⁶ It also meant that it would not have powers delegated to it from the Council to make decisions and would, therefore, be advisory. Nevertheless, the full Council accepted the Forum's major pieces of work, such as the first CBD revitalisation strategy, without amendments. The Mayoral Forum also had its own budget of \$150,000 with Council staff reporting directly to it.

The mayor at the time believed the Mayoral Forum was needed and would be part of a partnership with the community:

Because if you trace a common thread through all of my time at the Council, I'm a believer in collaborative frameworks not isolated frameworks. So, too often institutions become self-serving and I believe Council needed to actually form partnerships with other organisations in public, private and community sectors and so that's what I did. I did that right through. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

²⁶ Under the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (LGOIMA) councils must adhere to certain disclosure and reporting requirements if their meetings are of a decision-making nature. The Mayoral Forum would not have been subject to these requirements.

The former mayor is acknowledging that he wished to move away from a position where the Council is solely making decision about the CBD revitalisation to a more partnership or collaborative model. A political rationality emerges that favours decision-making with key stakeholders as partners rather than solely the elected representatives making the decisions.

As previous interviewees stated, there was not unanimous support for working with the Mayoral Forum within the elected representatives. Part of this reluctance may have been attributed not only to the mayor working closely with the Mayoral Forum but also to staff having a close working relationship with the Forum rather than elected representatives on the revitalisation strategy. A current senior manager identifies the initial revitalisation strategy as being driven by the mayor working with a small group of staff:

It was very much a mayoral initiative and the mayor had worked with individual staff which seemed to have been a legacy of the Mike Richardson [former City Manager] days about how the organisation worked, in that individual politicians seemed to step right down into the organisation and drive parts that they were interested in. So, I think there had been a relatively small team which had grown by some degree by the time I got here. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

A business person concurs that the Mayoral Forum worked closely with the mayor and very few other people or organisations:

...it was a pretty closed shop. It was really with the mayor and appropriate people he would ask along. And it really was a problem identifying group and trying to get some solutions to issues we saw that were hindering the city. (Business person, interview November 2011)

In 2000, the Mayoral Forum, with the aid of staff, undertook public consultation, which included questionnaires and public meetings. The Forum then submitted the Central City Strategy – Stage 1 report to the Strategy and Resources Committee in February 2001. The committee and Council accepted the strategy document without any

changes. It became a published document and was pivotal in establishing the principles and projects for the next 5 years and beyond of CBD revitalisation projects (Christchurch City Mayoral Forum, 2001).

A staff report accompanying the Central City Strategy – Stage 1 again recommended a Central City Board or some type of similar agency to manage the developments although this never eventuated (Bachels, 2001). The Forum’s report to the Christchurch City Council highlighted that the centre of the city was declining and businesses were moving to the suburbs and that the suburban shopping centres were almost at a size where they could compete with the centre of the city for services. Among the strengths of the CBD the Central City Strategy noted “a rise in the café society” (Christchurch City Mayoral Forum, 2001, p. 10). Feedback from the public consultation showed the greatest support for the following:

- Focussing on projects east of Colombo Street
- Transport and parking
- Improving living conditions and the environment
- Safety and security
- A greater mix of housing styles
- Greater inclusion of residents in their neighbourhood strategies
- Heritage retention
- A river promenade
- Incentives to halt the business drift from the centre to the suburbs
- Youth activities such as bands, skate parks, events, entertainment, and festivals
- More attractive green streets, public art, and open spaces
- Improvements to Cathedral Square, and
- Tourism opportunities that would benefit all citizens.

The Forum’s vision for the centre city was:

A vibrant, exciting, safe and sustainable Central City heart; a heart with a strong and healthy economy, environment, culture and society (2001, p. 12).

The objectives that have the most relevance to the night-time economy for this research were:

B. Economic development: To encourage the widest range of viable commercial, service, educational, residential and other business activity to locate within the Central City, and to promote the Central City accordingly.

D. Social interaction and wellbeing: To encourage and promote arts, cultural, heritage, leisure and entertainment activities within the Central City and to enhance social interaction and safety (2001, p. 13).

Figure 5 provides a timeline for events relating to decision-making on CBD revitalisation from 1998 to 2013.




Figure 5: Timeline of CBD Revitalisation Projects 1998–2013 in each Term of Council

From the beginning of the CBD revitalisation project, the Mayoral Forum was simultaneously aiming to attract more people into the centre of the city during the day and at night; however, it was aware of public concerns about safety, particularly at night. The Christchurch City Council has participated in an ongoing series of Quality of Life Reports since 1999 that included a survey on perceptions of safety. From 2000 to 2012 the surveys consistently reported that Christchurch residents had the lowest perceptions of safety in the centre city after dark of all the major cities in New Zealand (Quality of Life Project, nd). These survey reports were reported to the Council and were often the focus of newspaper reports (Claridge, 2005).

There was no recognition within the Central City Strategy that revitalising the centre of the city could lead to issues with young people and alcohol. References were made in its appendix, which outlined strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and desired outcomes analysis, to “personal safety especially at night”, “a safe central city for all, during the day and at night”, and “cafés/nightlife seen as a cultural strength”. Desired outcomes included “a vibrant and exciting street life in the central city day and night” and “a festival nightlife: cafés, theatre, movies, buskers, concerts, etc.” (Christchurch City Mayoral Forum, 2001, pp. 42-45). The actual achievements of the revitalisation strategy before the earthquakes are addressed later in this chapter.

Mayoral Forum behind the Scenes

Once it was established, only sporadic and limited mention was made of the Mayoral Forum’s work in the public record. In 2003, a report from a staff member supporting the Forum’s work outlined a self-review the Forum had undertaken. The report acknowledged that communication lines needed to be improved with the Council:

It [the Mayoral Forum] has recently undertaken a review of its operation and format in an endeavour to improve its effectiveness in advising and assisting the Council in meeting common goals and objectives for the Central City. It has recognised the importance of improving communication lines with the Council, and intends providing more regular reports on progress. (Hinman, 2003, p. 1)

The report went on to list the current members of the Mayoral Forum, its work focus, and its intended regular reporting. The Mayoral Forum continued to be named in various public Council reports but no substantial reports or information came to the Council again from the Forum.

In August 2007, it was suggested in the Council's seminar notes that members of the Mayoral Forum be thanked for their contribution. A planning officer working closely with the Forum recalls when it finished its work. At least in this planner's view, the main legacy of the Mayoral Forum had been to raise the profile of the central city within the Council:

The Forum never came back after – I'm just trying to think – it might have been [Mayor Garry Moore's] last term. The Forum was pretty much shut down and they went in different directions. They had decided that it had done its job. There were issues – with a bit of suspicion that some of them [members of the Forum] were perhaps in it for their own interests. By that stage, the Council had picked it up as a Council thing. To express it another way: at the start of this process I guess the central city was one of numerous things that the Council was involved in but perhaps wasn't mainstream. By the time the Forum had finished its work, it was right up there as one of the top things that the Council knew it needed to be doing. So I guess the need for the Forum had passed – not necessarily the need for ongoing consultation – but the need for the Forum was seen by the Council as to have passed. (Current Planner, interview November 2011)

One of the main achievements of the Mayoral Forum, according to the planner, was that it raised the profile of the central city to something in which the Council should be actively involved. The planner also highlights one of the problems of a key stakeholder group, that is, conflict of interest.

A current senior manager at the Council, when interviewed, recalls when the Mayoral Forum was officially wound up:

Well, the Mayoral Forum had, by the time I arrived, sort of largely run its course. I recall one of the early jobs I had was to formally disestablish the Forum because it had basically stopped meeting. So it wasn't actively operating by 2006. Not in a formal sense of

having regular meetings or driving certain directions. ... In some respects, like a lot of these forums, it may have achieved its natural purpose and was therefore struggling to actually have a reason to exist. It may also have been slightly political because it was driven out of the mayor's office as far as I could understand. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

This current senior manager also reiterates the view that the Council continued the work of the Mayoral Forum and implemented, in a more vigorous way, the revitalisation of the CBD through land purchases.

Land Purchases

After the Mayoral Forum's rather public and visible start within Council's processes, its work continued outside the gaze of publicly notified agendas and minutes. One year after the release of the Central City Strategy – Stage 1, a report to Council recommended the purchase of land called the Turners and Growers site (Bachels, 2002). The report's author outlined the context for the reason to consider purchasing this land:

The Central City Mayoral Forum (CCMF) has for some time identified the importance of the appropriate redevelopment of this site as a key to achieving significant central city revitalisation benefits. Attempts have been made over the last two years to achieve this redevelopment through private developers. These endeavours have been unsuccessful and it is now considered that the only way to get development that achieves many of the objectives identified in the Central City Strategy Concept Plan Stage 1, adopted by the Council and the CCMF in March 2001, is through direct Council intervention. The concept plan gives priority to regeneration of the east side of the central city with a focus on residential and business development with improved public space. (Bachels, 2002, p. 1)

The report went on to emphasise the role and importance of the Mayoral Forum:

It is clear this is an exciting and visionary opportunity for the Council with associated risks and rewards. The Central City Mayoral Forum strongly supports the recommendation to purchase the site and proceed with establishing a process for comprehensive redevelopment of the site for east-central city revitalisation including a new public park and residential and mixed uses. (Bachels, 2002, p. 4)

A planner, who worked closely with the Mayoral Forum notes that the Turners and Growers site was a major piece of work for the Mayoral Forum:

The idea of buying Turners and Growers really came through the Mayoral Forum. Steve Collins and others were working with the then owners who were simply proposing to subdivide it and put more warehouses on it. We were trying to keep it in one ownership and nobody was going to buy it. The Forum really persuaded the Council to purchase it and then to work out a system of how it might be sold and developed. Well the development never quite got off the ground. But that was one of the things that the Forum was pretty much involved in. (Current Planner, interview November 2011)

The Central City Strategy – Stage 1 document produced under the guidance of the Mayoral Forum and written by Council staff therefore had a vital role in not only guiding public works but also property purchases by the Council. The Council bought the property but was never able to attract a private sector partner that was able to begin residential development. In November 2006, the Council entered into an agreement with Urban Winery Christchurch Ltd and sold the land. The Council also altered its City Plan, by way of a variation, to ensure residential and mixed uses would be compatible with the site. The company intended to develop an urban winery and village. By February 2011, no development had begun and the Council decided to spend \$4 million to buy back the land from Urban Winery to help the developers fund a slightly different project (Theelen, 2011b). Before this eventuated, and a few weeks later, the second and most devastating earthquake to the central city occurred, halting all work on the CBD. A subsequent government agency in control of planning for the rebuild of the central city – Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) –

announced plans for a new covered sports stadium on the site, 14 years after the Council had bought the site for residential and mixed uses development.

A current senior manager maintains that although the Turners and Growers site purchase was a bold move by the Council, in hindsight it should have undertaken even bolder moves to make a difference to the CBD:

Current Senior Manager I think [in] 2004 there had been very typically rosy expectations that if we did this that would be enough to kick things off. By 2007, the reality of actually buying land, aggregating it and doing a deal wasn't going to be enough, so what were the next steps you were really going to have to take? So I think like a lot of these projects some of the issues were identified relatively early and the Council, like a lot of public authorities, took what it saw to be quite radical steps but in essence given the issue, probably they needed a far more radical or far more comprehensive response to the issues that they were trying to tackle.

Karen So what would be the radical?

Current Senior Manager Well, for example – and we were learning as we went along – for example, I think in 2004 there was a genuine identification that re-stimulating modern higher-density living into the centre of the city was a key way to support the centre. If I'm being absolutely honest, the Turners and Growers site came along. If you were taking a really hard-nosed approach, you would have looked back and said that actually this site is too big for a market that is undeveloped in that way. It's probably slightly too removed from the centre but it was an opportunity and the Council got in there. In hindsight, that was quite a big step for the Council but they probably needed to take a bigger step. I mean, what we hear and what we were hearing by 2009 from overseas experts was that to really capitalise change the Council probably had to control probably upwards of 30% of the central city land bank to really start to shape the decisions of private individuals. And so, looking back, while at the time, Turners and Growers seemed to be a very strong step, what it demonstrated was that it was the right step but it needed to be done much more strongly, much more forcefully. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

This senior manager is suggesting that the Council needed to buy and control almost a third of the land in the central city to ensure its survival as the premium retail and commercial centre of the city. He did not suggest equally bold moves through the Council's regulatory processes.

The Council made further land purchases in 2008 in pursuit of the central city revitalisation (see Figure 6). From developer, David Henderson, it bought five inner city blocks of land for approximately \$17 million, which he had bought 2 years previously. The Council had already been working closely with Mr Henderson on revitalisation proposals. For example, in August 2006, before a seminar meeting on central city lanes re-development, the notes of the seminar state that the participants had undertaken a walking tour of the central city lanes area, including a briefing by Dave Henderson and Nigel Mayson at the Property Ventures office (Christchurch City Council, 2006b). Buying the five properties was highly controversial for three reasons. First, the CEO and senior staff conducted the process with extreme speed, giving councillors only one day to digest their reports and recommendations and one meeting to make a decision. Second, councillors did not discuss the purchase publicly nor was the proposal open for public consultation. Third, the business community was also vocal in its opposition as independent valuations were not sought by the Council for the properties in question and the deal was seen as a 'bail out' for a developer on very favourable terms that included first right of refusal to buy the properties back. Mr Henderson at the time was in serious financial difficulty and involved in creditors' meetings. Despite these concerns the Auditor General found that the Council's decision-making process was within the bounds of the LGA 2002 (Brady, 2009).



- 1 & 2 Para Rubber properties
- 3 Welles Street property
- 4 Penny Cycles property
- 5 Sydenham Square
- 6. Turners and Growers site purchased in 2002 from Turners and Growers

Figure 6: Council Central City Property Map

Source: Designed by Hullabaloo Design and adapted from Google Maps

Mayor Bob Parker, in a full-page newspaper advertisement explaining the purchases, said:

Council has bought four of the five sites to safeguard its plans to revitalise the Central City, south of Lichfield Street. If Council had not purchased these sites they could have been developed as tilt slab, big box retail.

In another part of the advertisement one of the most interesting questions that the Council posed to itself was:

Why does the City Plan not protect development on the central city properties? Answer: The City Plan addresses the basic land use framework for Christchurch. Being involved as a land owner gives Council full control over the development and enables it to achieve change in the area more quickly than through the City Plan. (Christchurch City Council, 2008, p. D18)

The Council bought the properties before they were available for open sale, which would have set a market value. This was a pertinent point, given the drop in values due to the financial crisis affecting property values in 2008. The CEO, Tony Marryatt, was quoted in a further newspaper article as saying, “What we paid for the properties is irrelevant because he [Dave Henderson] will buy them back off us” (van Beynen, 2008, p. A1).

A year later staff presented to the Council the central city south master plan, which would utilise four of the five properties bought from Mr Henderson (Breward, 2010). The master plan stated that what “follows outlines how the Council will develop its property” (Christchurch City Council, 2009b, p. ii). The Council envisaged seeking development proposals for some of the properties and offering back to Mr Henderson the properties they had acquired from him the previous year so he could develop them in accordance with the master plan. In December 2010 a newspaper article reported that Mr Henderson had failed to meet the deadline to buy back the first of the five properties (Conway, 2010). In fact, Mr Henderson was bankrupted only 2 days before the newspaper article.

A former City Manager recalls giving advice against the purchase of the Turners and Growers site, and he also disagreed with the Council buying more land from Dave Henderson:

I think he [Mayor Garry Moore] woke up to issues around the central city that we should have fixed in my view through the planning scheme not by trying to spend public money other than by doing the public spaces well. I advised the Council against

buying the Turners and Growers site because they didn't know what they were going to do with it. The Council went down the road around the turn of the century and bought a large tract of moribund land east of Manchester Street. I remember saying to Council, unless we have a plan for what we are going to do with this I think this is a mistake. That advice was obviously not taken on board which is fine, that's what the process is about. But then the albatross of that land. Then sitting on the outside only, quite why the Henderson blocks were added to that land holding that the city had and hadn't been able to do anything with for probably 9 years at that stage I don't know. This was something to do with solving the central city problem but it wasn't a solution. And the problem was that the central city had lost its comparative advantage and we hadn't been able to minimise that through the one regulatory role that we really have which is the City Plan. And I would have given that analysis very clearly around about the turn of the century. I knew that had gone wrong 2 ½ years before I finished and I was stating that. I don't remember what, if anything, we were doing to actually change the District Plan, I don't remember. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

Although this former City Manager recalls giving advice against the purchase of the Turners and Growers site, it is evident that a high priority was not being placed on regulatory measures to uphold the primacy of the CBD.

Achievements of the Revitalisation Project

A second stage of the revitalisation strategy was released in 2006 (Parfitt & Theelen, 2006). There is no mention of the Mayoral Forum having a role within the Strategy – Stage 2 document that accompanied the report (Christchurch City Council, 2006a). It appears to have been a staff-led document, as there were no previous reports to the Council, within the public record, about its development and involvement of elected representatives. Yet, at this time of no standing Council committees, informal Council seminars may have been attended by elected representatives. (This is covered in detail in the next chapter.) The Strategy – Stage 2 document lists the priority projects that arose from the first Strategy document and notes that only four out of the 22 projects were completed (Christchurch City Council, 2006a, p. 6). The Stage 2 document goes on to highlight five priorities: “increasing the number of residents – 30,000 by 2026,

growing our businesses, enhancing our public spaces, redeveloping under-utilised sites and improving transport” (p. iv). A current senior manager who was also involved at the time explains what the Stage 2 document was hoping to achieve:

What the second volume did was start to put some flesh on the issues. So the issue of competition with the suburban areas – it started to put some flesh on what might you have to do to really make residential happen in the central city. What might you have to do to the public realm. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

Despite the Stage 2 document detailing projects to achieve growth in the five priority areas listed above, most of the interviewees when questioned about the achievements of the revitalisation process did not believe there had been great successes. A former senior manager does not think that the fundamental role of the central city changed with the revitalisation process:

Karen So do you think it [revitalisation] was successful?

Former Senior Manager No, no ... Nothing in terms of Council led revitalisation projects. The Bus Exchange was a success.

Karen What about Poplar Lane and SOL²⁷ Square and then later Cashel?

Former Senior Manager Well, beginnings but those, and maybe I’m being unkind saying they achieved nothing. They began to try and find, through those sort of developments, alternate uses for otherwise relatively derelict run down inner-city and started to create the groovy, funky alternative sort of spaces. And that was with some success but arguably ---

Karen But not the day-time economy?

Former Senior Manager No, it was the night-time economy. Like, you look at the decline in pedestrian numbers – just inexorable. So yeah combining with Dave Henderson and Garry, they did do some stuff, I must acknowledge that, but the fundamentals of the role of the CBD haven’t changed.

Karen So in actual fact all they did do is help create the night-time economy?

²⁷ SOL stands for South of Lichfield.

Former Senior
Manager

I suppose though, if you think about it, it's really important to have a good day-time population for sure, underpinned by shop front activity. But the role of central cities worldwide are 24 hour 7 days a week environments with entertainment and night-life and all that goes with that and that's critical too. (Former Senior Manager, interview October 2011)

C. M. Hall (2008, p. 247) in his study of SOL Square as a branding, marketing and place promotion development noted that it had become a major destination in Christchurch and a flagship in the Council's revitalisation programme. His study participants agreed that "SOL has given the Christchurch central city a 'new lease of life' ". He reflects, however, "whether the branding of some spaces in commercial terms is yet another way to differentiate between those who are wanted in cities because they can afford to consume, and those who cannot" (p. 248).

Consuming within SOL Square and other revitalisation areas was predominately a night-time affair. As the former senior manager identified the revitalisation projects had not been particularly successful for the day-time. Figure 7 shows the overall continuing decline of day-time pedestrians in the central city over time albeit with a slight increase in 2008. In 2003, 12 extra sites were added to the survey to reflect new areas of retail and pedestrian activity. In 2008, a further site at SOL Square was added, making 73 recording sites in all. The SOL Square recording site was ranked 68th in terms of number of pedestrians.




Figure 7: Pedestrian Counts in the Central City 1997–2008

Source: Canterbury/Westland Branch of the New Zealand Property Institute (2008)

Observations undertaken as part of this research indicated retailing in the newly revitalised spaces was fragile. The new spaces were particularly successful for the night-time economy but in some cases, less successful for the day-time economy. For example, SOL Square, a lane development developed by Dave Henderson around 2003, was initially intended to be a mix of retail, residential, and entertainment uses. When I visited SOL Square in November 2010 there were no retail shops remaining within the development. Some of the retail shops had been bricked up and incorporated into the adjacent bars as shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8: SOL Square Showing Former Retail Premises Incorporated into Adjacent Bar

(photo: Karen Johnston)

As a current senior manager confirms, retailing proved to be unviable within SOL Square while restaurants and bars were successful. This diminished any chance for a mixed uses environment as envisaged by the revitalisation strategies:

Like Dave [Henderson] to his credit he tried to introduce retailing. The very early days particularly His Lordships Lane [SOL Square] there were shops. But there was not enough of a magnet to drag people down. They were somewhat eclectic shops and I think like any good businessman he decided actually what made money for him there was alcohol. So progressively they all sort of vacated out of there. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

Employment and office development had also not improved greatly. The previous Table 9 shows that in 2006 total employment in the central city was only 18% of all employment in the city. The central city accounted for 20% of retailing employment less than the 27% of retailing employment in industrial areas. This trend is further highlighted by the large growth in retail floor space in the suburban shopping areas compared with modest growth in the central city over time (Refer Table 8).

Residential growth was also a key priority of the Strategy – Stage 2 document. The target was to increase the number of residents by 30,000 by 2026. This ambitious target was not being realised. The Council's own development of the Turners and Growers site, mentioned earlier in this chapter, had failed to eventuate. There had been some limited residential development in the Poplar Lane area, and Dave Henderson had established short-term accommodation above the retail and bar area in SOL Square but this had proved problematic. As a current senior manager notes:

It's always instructive to me that one of the early parts of SOL Square that Dave Henderson put in was Living Space, which is short-term accommodation, really quite a good concept. But the problem was that he was the same person that had a whole lot of bars below and there was inevitable conflict between his tenants in here and his visitors saying it was too noisy. And I think the classic market decision was actually what was making more money. This was a nice to have but this was what really generated the income. I think as a landlord torn between two things, I mean Dave was probably pumping for the fact that he was getting more money out of his bar tenants than he was ever going to get out of Living Space. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

Despite this the senior manager thought that if residential development was able to be established within the CBD in the future, it would have a stabilising effect on the night-time economy and the behaviour of people within those spaces:

- Current Senior Manager The problem is, it is not young people who have a stake in the city. It is not as though this is, in that sense, their back yard. The central city is just a place to congregate before they disperse back to the suburbs. ... and again looking across best practice in the world, it's by having the centre as the backyard for a full time community that owns and values that space that gives you a much more balanced life. What we were seeing with SOL Square was a very unbalanced view of the central city.
- Karen Although if you have people living in there you can have tensions.
- Current Senior Manager Well, you do but I wonder if people are living there, and they are there in the early part of the evening, doesn't that send messages to bar owners, to people who own that, that actually says our game is not about crushing 1,000 young people in from 11 o'clock at night till 1 in the morning. There's actually a clientele that is here at 6 in the evening that lives around here that owns it so I'm going to modify my offering as well. ... From my point of view, if you had SOL Square with an embedded community around it you wouldn't have got the sort of concentration and perhaps excesses associated with SOL Square. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

This view has been tested somewhat because of the earthquakes and the CERA's requirement of the Council to produce a recovery plan for the central city. In that plan the Council reiterated the senior manager's view that the central city in the future should have a mix of land uses that would enable it to be both vibrant and safer (Christchurch City Council, 2011a). The accompanying document to amend the district plan included a section on noise and entertainment provisions. A new objective encouraged entertainment and hospitality activities:

12.2(b) Central City Objective: Encourage Entertainment and Hospitality Activities. To encourage entertainment and hospitality activities to locate in and around the core of the Central City, to assist in attracting people to enjoy and spend leisure time in the Central City, strengthen the role of the Christchurch Central City as a visitor destination, and to provide for a safe and vibrant night-time economy in the centre of Christchurch.

The reasons given for this new objective were:

Enhancement of the Central City will include encouraging vibrancy for residents, workers and visitors alike, by providing for more entertainment and hospitality uses such as cafés and restaurants, and bars, taverns and nightclubs. This must be subject to a high level of safety being maintained, and also to an enhanced level of noise amenity for central city residents. (Christchurch City Council, 2011b, p. 146)

Rules to control these entertainment and hospitality activities were solely by noise standards as noise was seen as the only adverse effect of these uses. A higher noise level was designated for around the Lichfield Lanes areas where the former SOL Square was located. A lower noise level was designated for most other areas of the central city.

The liquor-licensing inspector interviewed had discussed with planners at the Council new rules to put in the recovery plan to lessen the impact of bars and nightclubs on the CBD at night. The inspector was frustrated at what planners indicated could or could not be done within the rules:

We sat down and talked to the planners quite early on to try and get our views in there but I think the planners missed the point because they've got that RMA background. For example, we said to the planners, restaurants, shut your restaurants at 1 o'clock. Restaurants shouldn't morph into bars. Your diners are a separate group, keep them separate. Same with bars – we should close the bars at 3 or 4 o'clock [am] or have a one way door or something. But the planners were looking at the effects of the bars being open at that hour. And they said "Well, it's noise issues, so we'll put a noise restriction on it after that time". But it's not the noise that's the problem, it's the people that are milling around that becomes the problem. If you're looking at it from a crime and violence perspective, that's when your drunks get beaten up or attack someone else. That's what your problems are not noise. Inner-city is where you want that noise. (Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

The current senior manager also had his doubts about the usefulness of the noise rules in the new recovery plan, although, thought that attracting residential into the centre city would moderate the noise:

It's there in the plan, to concentrate the retail core and to bring the urban community much closer around it. And if you've got an urban community that was living and recreating there that would have stopped that night-time economy. It would have moderated some of that night-time economy. If you look at what we did in Volume 2, we actually tried to, we recognised that as you brought people into the centre, if that was to be achieved you had to manage, particularly the noise issues a lot better than the existing City Plan had done so. I think we raised the levels of the internal attenuation in buildings. But we also created a number of nodes in the centre where in fact the generated noise levels could also be higher so we tried to reflect them. I think it was an honest attempt but I have my doubts about it. But we tried to say there will be areas where this congregation will occur and we need to allow for it but what we wanted to do was protect the opportunity for people to come in and to make that attractive. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

Inner city residents post-earthquake did not share this senior manager's view. In a newspaper article, residents who lived near Victoria Street, a newly designated noise level area after the earthquakes and a place where new bars had established, complained about the problems associated with these new bars:

Victoria Neighbourhood Association street co-ordinator Marjorie Manthei said residents were fed up with endless noise, vandalism and "urinating and vomiting" outside their homes. ... Victoria St had been home to several late-night licensed premises before the quakes, but those were mostly restaurants that were "quite different to premises that are primarily bars and are open to 3am", Manthei said. (Mathewson, 2013, p. no number)

Many interviewees agreed that the greatest achievement of the revitalisation process had been the night-time economy:

Karen And you touched on the CBD at night with young people. Do you think that was an outcome of how they revitalised the central city?

Business Yes, yes. Well, they didn't revitalise it, they put a few pieces of
Rep sticking plaster over bits of it. Yes, I do. The Strip was created to absolutely operate from 11pm to 5am. The whole Lichfield Street, the Poplar Place, all designed for young people to enjoy themselves very late at night. And that's actually, sort of, counterintuitive to having a good social fabric in your central city. I mean the players who come out between 11pm, first of all who do a lot of drinking somewhere else and then come into the city at 11pm to play all night, I mean that's not a functional city.
(Business representative, interview October 2011)

A current senior manager at the Council states that the revitalisation was not targeted towards young people and the Council did not intentionally plan the CBD for night-time entertainment attractive to young people. The fact that the most successful outcome of the revitalisation process has been the night-time appears to have come as somewhat of a surprise:

Karen Did you at any point realise that [the Central Business District revitalised spaces] would become a magnet for young people at night in the way that it did?

Current Council To be honest I don't know that we really articulated the young
Senior person market. ... I don't know if we ever said, "are we consciously
Manager tapping into the young person's market?" I think because partly young people come with a bit of a two-edged sword, tapping into that market. Because while there is that night-life and energy, there is also the down side of that with drunkenness, assaults, and abuse, and alcoholism and un-cleanliness.

A current Council planner detailed how bars and restaurants were successful because they were functioning almost 24 hours a day:

The Strip is ... how much of a goldmine it is, I don't know, but it should have been because that had different clientele at different times of the day. Lunch times it was people going to buy lunch and perhaps have a drink if it was business stuff. After work business people and then on Thursday, Friday, Saturday nights after 11pm it was suddenly turned into the area where people would go, usually liquored up from somewhere else. They'd come into town

and that started to get copied by SOL Square to some extent also Poplar Lane a little bit and the other big one was Manchester Street. I suppose that was not expected but there were varying views on that. (Current planner, interview November 2011)

A business person interviewed for this research also concurred that the night-time economy had been the biggest beneficiary of the revitalisation process:

Karen Under the previous revitalisation work that has happened, there has been the creation of these spaces where really the most successful thing has been the night-time economy and not the day-time.

Business person You're quite right, it became a night-time economy and quite a lot of vested interests in making it like that. And I think that certain people thought it very successful in coming into the city.

Karen So how did the CBD revitalisation get so skewed towards the night-time economy than the day-time?

Business person Well, I think there was a certain magnetism about the cafés and bars that grew up in old buildings like SOL Square, like The Strip, which you couldn't get in the suburbs. (Business person, interview November 2011)

The greatest achievement in terms of the night-time economy was facilitating lane developments where there could be a concentration of bars. This made it easier for young people to meet and socialise. A bar owner of three establishments within SOL Square outlined how this worked commercially:

Bar Owner Certainly, it's [SOL Square] known as an area. Well, the whole area is pubs so people tend to want to come because they can move around. But the police hate that. (Bar Owner, interview December 2011)

The police did indeed not like the concentration of liquor outlets and had insights into why the Council and planners had permitted this concentration of bars:

Police Sergeant Within the Council there has always been this, what's the word, sort of like conflict. This inner turmoil of, we want a vibrant inner city, we want to encourage business people in here, we want to generate an income for people and then, oh actually it doesn't

look that flash at 3 o'clock in the morning but we're not around so, what we can't see doesn't affect us. But then you look at the streets at 3 o'clock in the morning and the cost of picking up the paper, cleaning the sidewalk of vomit off it, all that sort of stuff. Somehow that has to change and I think they're getting better but it's still difficult to convince people.

Karen Why?

Police Because they're not out there. They don't see it. They don't
Sergeant understand. They just look at we have to ... their idea of vibrancy
is based on their understanding. And they don't have the
understanding of what it is like at 2 o'clock in the morning, 3
o'clock in the morning, picking up broken people. They don't
understand that. Or they don't want to understand. There's this
conflict all the time, inner conflict within the Council and decision-
makers of how do we balance this.

Karen So looking at the draft recovery plan, did you say that you didn't
think that planners did have a good understanding of the
relationship between the drinking and those lanes and
enforcement?

Police Planners have often struggled with the concept of the night-time
Sergeant economy. They think of the evening economy. They struggle to
understand the night-time economy because they're not there,
they don't go out and so what looks nice during the day-time and
the evening often creates problems in the night-time economy.
(Police Sergeant, interview September 2011)

The Council's liquor licensing inspector echoed these same sentiments:

... ask those councillors, how often are they out at 3 o'clock in the morning? I remember standing up in front of ... saying that the City Mall is busier at 3 o'clock in the morning than it is at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. And they gave me this complete blank look. From my reading of her face, she had no idea, none at all. You know we have a vibrant, thriving night-life economy down at The Strip. ... The Strip at 3 o'clock in the morning, it's just chocker with people.
(Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

The former Mayor who had been instrumental in the CBD revitalisation, however, felt that the success of the night-time economy was a good thing and was not achieved through planners but particular property developers:

- Karen So it seems that the night-time economy was quite successful arising out of all this?
- Former Mayor Yes, very.
- Karen Did you anticipate that when you started?
- Former Mayor No a lot of it was organic rather than ... you know it just shows you that planners can't plan every bloody thing. And it took ballsy individuals that invested to actually attract it. And like it took Dave Henderson's genius to actually get SOL Square going. And Paul Bradley and John whatever his name is and Lyell Hood to do Poplar Lane. And it was the individuals that made the thing work. I thought it was quite special. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

A current senior manager at the Council did think that the revitalisation process was starting to make changes to the area just before the earthquake:

So High Street became the successful day space between Poplar and SOL and there was a real opportunity. And there was quite a bit of work going on either through the tram and through the upgrading of the pedestrian space. If you think about just prior to September, we'd upgraded Cashel and the High Street bit, we were in the process of laying all the new paving down High Street to Lichfield and then beyond Lichfield as far as Tuam. So we were actually pushing the public realm down there to create that connection and as part of that we were pushing the tram lines as well. I think that really had the opportunity because if you went down there on a Saturday morning it was quite an enlivened space. (Current Senior Manager, interview May 2012)

A current councillor, however, acknowledged that retailing had not been successful in SOL Square and the night-time economy had been the main beneficiary:

But the old inner-city was quite a good playground. Now it's like bars and restaurants and I don't think there's any specific focus. The hospitality industry are quite concerned over not having a specific focus on hotels. One of the tensions we've always had is that you know, we've created these bars, and I was sort of critical of South of Lichfield [SOL Square] because it was always promoted in terms of the tourism and stuff. But you walk through there in the day and it's dead. Not much sun and at night not the most friendly of environments. Too many drunk people in a confined

place. Neighbouring businesses in Manchester Street getting windows broken, vomit, urine, you know huge headaches. And that was sort of promoted as being big bars in the central city and what we want to aspire to. (Current Councillor A, September 2011)

Since the revitalisation process that started in 1999 with the formation of the Mayoral Forum and the release of strategy documents and master plans up to 2009, there have been various assessments about the success or otherwise of a revitalised central city. Some of the interviewees stated that it was beginning to change. Nevertheless, in a newspaper article in December 2010, 3 months after the first earthquake, Mayor Parker acknowledged that the central city was not healthy: “The future of Christchurch’s city centre is balancing on a knife edge” (Gates, 2010). He was commenting on the Business Association’s manager Paul Lonsdale view that the city did not need the Styx Mill retail and office suburban development (mentioned earlier in this chapter) and was proposing that the developers move development into the centre of the city. The mayor agreed and made further suggestions, some of which the Council had been debating for the past 11 years, “a new Christchurch City Council committee focusing exclusively on central-city issues; interest-only loans for the refurbishment of small, heritage shops; major planning changes and a new inner-city mayor’s advisory panel chaired by retailer Richard Ballantyne” (p. A1).

Conclusion

The political rationality of the need to revitalise the CBD was established early in the term of the then new mayor in 1999. A strategy of establishing an outside body for decision-making on the revitalisation of the CBD was the only option explored. Tighter regulation to uphold the primacy of the CBD and limit the extent of suburban and industrial retail development was not finalised until 2009. Councillors and staff alike seem to have shared a consensus view that the exodus of retail and offices from the CBD could not be controlled through their City Plan under the RMA. Establishment of the Mayoral Forum was not smooth and as has been shown there were fears from the councillors that the Mayoral Forum would be undertaking a role that they felt was theirs. The Council was eventually persuaded to establish the Mayoral Forum after the

CEO wrote a report to the Council suggesting the Mayoral Forum was a new way of working with the community. The Mayoral Forum swiftly produced its first strategy document, supported by a budget and staff, which was to set the scene for future revitalisation projects. Council accepted the reports without changes and subsequently went on to buy properties aligned with the strategy documents. These were highly controversial purchases. Interviewees differ on whether the revitalisation process was a success or not. Some believed it was beginning to show signs of revival, while others were not so optimistic. This question can never be answered as the earthquakes have begun a new process for the CBD. People did recognise, however, that while the day-time economy was faltering within the CBD, the night-time economy was flourishing. As one interviewee concluded, what the Mayoral Forum did achieve and what the revitalisation process proceeded to do was to raise the profile and importance of the central city. While planning changes and the previous mayor's advisory panel, the Mayoral Forum, have been covered within this chapter, the changes to the Council's own decision-making structures in terms of committees is covered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: DECISION-MAKING AT THE COUNCIL

Relations of power are not in themselves forms of repression. But what happens is that, in society, in most societies, organizations are created to freeze the relations of power, hold those relations in a state of asymmetry, so that a certain number of persons get an advantage, socially, economically, politically, institutionally, etc. And this totally freezes the situation. That's what one calls power in the strict sense of the term: it's a specific type of power relation that has been institutionalized, frozen, immobilized, to the profit of some and to the detriment of others. (Foucault, 1988, p. 1)

This chapter presents data on evolving Council decision-making structures that had an impact on the CBD revitalisation process. It documents how Christchurch City Council changed its internal decision-making processes and structures, the impact that change had on power relations within the Council, and how it contributed to a particular type of revitalised CBD. Decisions concerning the revitalisation of the CBD moved from being made by an outside body, the Mayoral Forum, to a smaller, streamlined Council. In 2004, at the beginning of the then mayor's third term and after the number of councillors representing the community had been halved from 24 to 12, the committee structure of the Council was radically altered. One year later the Mayoral Forum disappeared from the public record and was disbanded.

I argue, using document analysis and interview data, that the changed decision-making model had a profound effect on how Council made decisions. The Council moved from a traditional committee decision-making model to a more 'corporate', or business-like decision-making model. Power relations changed so that councillors had less knowledge of Council affairs, the mayor and senior staff had greater influence, and CBD revitalisation continued swiftly. This chapter addresses research questions one and two: How is power exercised during CBD decision-making processes within Christchurch City Council; and what governmental technologies are adopted by Christchurch City Council to revitalise the CBD between 1999 and 2010?

Traditional Standing Committee Decision-Making Model

Before the changes in 2004, the Christchurch City Council, like most councils in New Zealand, had a system of standing committees. Through standing committees councillors received information, debated ideas and projects, and made decisions. Standing committees are permanent committees of a council established for the term of an elected council, and focus on particular functions, for example, planning, strategy and finance, arts and culture, and parks and recreation. A subset of councillors comprise the membership of a committee. Those councillors have voting rights. While other councillors may attend and join in the debate, they do not have voting rights. Standing committees can have some delegated authority from the council giving them decision-making power in certain areas.²⁸ The full council cannot change a decision made by the committee under delegated authority. Large decisions are not usually delegated to standing committees, but the role of a standing committee in this instance is to investigate an issue, hear any public views, and debate the issue publicly. For example, at Christchurch City Council before the changes in 2004, reports going to a standing committee for consideration could be one of three different types: Part A – matters requiring a council decision, Part B – reports for information, Part C – delegated decisions.

A standing committee at Christchurch City Council usually had a more relaxed and informal style and councillors were not usually restricted to a certain time constraint to air their views. This can be contrasted with a council meeting, where at times there is often a strict time limit to talk to an item. The standing committee model can also help develop areas of expertise for councillors on that committee, and the chairperson in particular. The chairperson of a standing committee usually works closely with senior staff and councillors to set the monthly agenda and outline the forthcoming work programme for that committee.

²⁸ This authority is outlined in LGA 2002 Schedule 7 and a council is required to explain these details in its Governance Statement prepared under section 40 of the Act.

Following a standing committee meeting, the recommendations of that committee go to the full council meeting at the end of the committee cycle – usually at the end of the month or six weeks. Items from the standing committee that require a council decision could then be re-debated or simply accepted by the full council.

The standing committee system at Christchurch City Council also permitted two phases of public involvement in Council decision-making if so desired. It was quite common for members of the public to speak to standing committees either on a matter raised within a report that was currently in front of the committee or on a matter that was within the general purview of the committee. These are called delegations. The public was aware of what the committee was discussing because under LGOIMA the agenda of the committee has to be publicly notified and copies of the agenda and associated reports made available to the public before the meeting. Delegations were also possible to the full council meeting at the end of the committee cycle although this was a more formal forum. The two phases also allowed councillors to seek views from the community on matters raised within reports to a committee. There was time, between when a councillor received the agenda and reports of the standing committee and the actual meeting, to consult their constituents and time between the meeting of the standing committee and the council meeting.

An example of how a standing committee operated prior to 2004 is given in the following report in 1998 to the Council's Central City Committee. This is also one of the early references to the changing nature of the CBD and the initial stages of the competition between the central city retailers and the suburban mall retailers. In the report from staff it was noted that a small group of retailers in the centre of the city had approached the Council asking for assistance to enable more retailers to open on Sundays and to promote Sunday trading:

Sunday opening in the city centre is vital to the survival of the city centre, however we feel that it is important that we are not seen as rushing the city centre retailers into it; it must be their decision. For this reason we were delighted when a group of retailers at the Bridge of Remembrance end of the City Mall (who are now known as the Bridge Retailers Association) approached City Centre

Marketing wanting to get more retailers open on Sundays and to promote Sunday opening. Their plan was to get each retailer who would benefit from the promotion to contribute a small amount each week towards an advertising campaign. They asked for our advice and help to achieve this. (Williams, 1998, p. 5)

In this particular case, in 1998, both the Council and the retailers were interested in expanding opening hours during the day in order to ensure the survival of the city centre. Sunday trading followed and it is significant to note that with the advent of Sunday trading there were no other day-time hours left for trading. After Sunday trading the only other alternative to extend the operation of the CBD was during the evening or at night. This type of matter would be publicly debated by a standing committee. It would usually be reported by the media so the public would be kept informed of the Council's decision-making.

In another slightly earlier example, (showing how committees operated) a report to the same Central City Committee sought approval for criteria to treat applications seeking the use of the footpath for additional outdoor tables and seating in conjunction with open-air cafés. The report noted that the Council was receiving numerous applications (P. Atkinson, 1998). Christchurch was thus experiencing the beginning of the rise of the café society, particularly during the day. The Committee deferred the report to the following month where it returned with expanded recommendations that included reference to liquor licences and reserving the right to withdraw the licence to occupy road space in response to non-compliance of conditions. In terms of decision-making, the report went to a standing committee meeting where it was deferred to the following month but with amended recommendations. Following the standing committee meeting, the recommendations were slightly altered again at the full Council meeting. While this process of presenting reports to standing committee meetings with recommendations then being adopted by the full Council meeting can be criticised as cumbersome and slow, it does permit all councillors and the public opportunities to have input into the recommendations.

A former councillor and chair of standing committees who liked the standing committee structure explained how the system worked inside the Council:

And committee chairmen especially get a chance to improve their knowledge and understanding hugely. Because the system was always that the committee chairman and chief officer advising the committee would meet together to go over the draft agenda and the committee chairman could raise any matters that he didn't understand. ... And sometimes the chairman would make a different recommendation from the staff recommendation. ... And staff members who had written particular reports would be there with councillors in the room when the committee met. ... Anyway, you'd go over the agenda a week before the committee. It would go out to the media and to the councillors and to the public and then you would have your committee meeting and then about ten days later you'd have the Council meeting. So it was a very thorough process. And those chairmen were of course the spokespersons. So there was a chairman of Parks, a chairman of Works, a chairman of this and that and so they tended to be the experts and the media tended to go to them. The media wouldn't go to the mayor to ask about a roading question; they'd go to the chairman of the Works committee. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

As a former chairperson it is clear that this councillor gained power from the standing committee structure.

Each newly elected council must, on coming to office, establish new standing committees, special committees, and subcommittees. The process under the LGA (1974 and 2002) means that the committees of the previous council have been discharged and a new council must formally establish new committees. In practice, at the end of each council's 3-year term, it usually undertook a review of how its committee structure had performed and considered if it would like to alter the committee structure.

In 1998, as noted in the previous chapter, the Council had established a working party to review the committee structure before the elections in October. The City Manager then wrote a report for the incoming Council's inaugural Council meeting in November 1998 outlining the previous Council's working party findings and recommending that the new Council adopt the committee structure, which it did. At that time, the working party identified nine principles to guide the establishment of the standing committees:

- (i) Each of the significant activities as they appear in the 1998 edition of the Christchurch City Council Plan should be the responsibility of one Standing Committee that is a significant activity should not be split between two or more Standing Committees.
- (ii) Council wide processes (including public accountability) should be the responsibility of the Strategy and Resources Committee.
- (iii) It is highly desirable to have not more than six Standing Committees (including Strategy and Resources) for practical and timetabling reasons. With a monthly Council cycle five Standing Committee meetings can be held one per day for the week before the Strategy and Resources Committee Monday meeting.
- (iv) Standing Committees should not, within their terms of reference, have a mixture of regulatory and non-regulatory responsibilities.
- (v) In dividing the significant activities between Standing Committees they should be grouped into thematic areas.
- (vi) While acknowledging that workloads will never prove to be equal, they should be balanced as much as possible.
- (vii) Each Standing Committee should have a membership of around eight councillors (plus the mayor ex officio). This gives sufficient numbers to provide for a range of perspectives while keeping the committee small enough for effective working.
- (viii) Ideally, each councillor should be on two committees only.
- (ix) Strategy and Resource Committee should have responsibility for Council wide processes, and therefore should include in its membership the chairperson of the other committees. (Richardson, 1998, pp. 1-2)

From these principles, it can be seen that considerable thought went into the mix of committees for the Council and how the workload would be shared among councillors. The standing committees were the key component of the decision-making model of the Council and were extremely important. The chairpersons of these committees were also highly sought-after positions. Christchurch City Council, at the time, had a process whereby the mayor would recommend chairpersons for each committee, which would have to be agreed to by the Council at the inaugural meeting.²⁹

²⁹ The LGA 2002 was amended in 2012 to provide mayors with greater powers. Section 41A (3) enables a mayor to establish committees and appoint the chairperson of each committee, although, Schedule 7 of the LGA still permits the council to overturn these appointments.

In 2001, the last year of that term of the Council, a similar process was again followed for reviewing the structures of the Council's decision-making model. The report to the Council by the City Manager explained how important this review was:

The purpose of this report is to recommend that a working party be set up to undertake a review which allows elected members to consider what has worked well and what has been less satisfactory in terms of the conduct of Council business during the current term. In short, a review of Council governance. It is recommended that the working party report back to the Strategy and Resources Committee in August or September. It must be noted that even if adopted by the Council at that time the status of any resolution is that of a recommendation to the Council following October's election. Partly for that reason the process of involvement in the working party and working through the issues may be at least as important as the recommendations themselves. (Richardson, 2001a, p. 1)

The City Manager also noted, in relation to decision-making structures, that the Council had used for the first time a new structure, the Mayoral Forum:

This triennium has seen the innovation of a Mayoral Forum as a "new" structure and debate over the most appropriate structures for progressing Council's Central City objectives; over the last nine years this has been the area of constant change between each triennium. (Richardson, 2001a, p. 2)

It is interesting to note that the decision-making structures for dealing with the central city had been an area of constant change over some time.

In September 2001 the City Manager reported back to the Council on the outcomes of workshops and discussions a councillor working party had had over the review of its structures and processes in preparation for the new Council triennium in November 2001 (Richardson, 2001b). He summarised the outcomes of the working party and said:

Overall the conclusion can be drawn that our use of Standing Committees and Community Boards is an effective mechanism for many of the decisions which the Council makes and should continue to provide the core of the Council's governance framework. (Richardson, 2001b, p. 1)

The City Manager went on to say that the workshops had identified several areas that needed improvement. He mentioned two possible areas for improvements:

Having more informed decision-making by establishing small working groups/workshops of staff, elected members and community during the development stage of a project.

Putting the Council in a position to more consistently influence the decisions of other key organisations and decision-makers which have significant impact on the future of Christchurch (that is the community governance approach). (Richardson, 2001b, p. 1)

The City Manager's reference to the community governance approach and its different focus to the local governance model were outlined in Chapter 2. The City Manager was a strong advocate of the community governance model. His vision was to work with the community because:

Council would need to work on wicked issues, as the English called it, and thereby would be one of several players around the table. And it would commit to bringing to the outcome of the process some specific projects it could run. And other parties at the table having gone through the decision-making process would commit to their legs and put the whole lot together and you've got a strategy. That is what we tried to do with the Aranui model, in my mind. Council committed to doing something with Waioni Park taking down some houses and rebuilding some houses and opening up the park and doing some stuff on the roads, and other parties were doing other things. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

The City Manager duly reported to the incoming Council in November 2001 and recommended the establishment of standing committees that the previous Council's working party had agreed upon. One month later, however, he wrote another report to the Strategy and Finance Committee on a further process for a governance framework. The purpose of the report was to:

recommend that the Council put in place a more formal and comprehensive framework of governance. It was evident in elected member seminars both prior to and following the recent election that there is considerable uncertainty and inconsistency around aspects of current decision-making processes. We can also

anticipate that a new Local Government Act is likely to require all councils to put in place something along the lines of a framework of governance (including a code of conduct). (Richardson, 2001c, p. 1)

Despite the workshops held before the election there still appeared to be disquiet over the decision-making model the Council was using. The City Manager's suggestion of a governance framework, and what he envisaged would be part of that framework, were mirrored in the LGA 2002 that was enacted the following year. In that legislation there was a requirement to produce a governance statement. (See Chapter 4 for an explanation of a governance statement and what is legally required to be included.)

In the same report, the City Manager also recommended the Council consider issues for a Council policy document on processes for standing committees and subcommittees. The 15 points outlined, which had partly arisen from the councillor workshops held during the year, covered such things as delegations, terms of reference, work programmes, criteria for late items, conduct of meetings, role of chairman (sic) and an annual review process. Quite clearly councillors still had many concerns regarding the operation of the standing committees.

During this term of Council, a former councillor considered that while there were probably too many committees, they had been created to give councillors a chairing role. According to this councillor, some of the personalities of those chairs were possibly the reason why committees were later abolished:

So 2001 there were a lot of committees, probably too many. Committees were created to give people chairs and they worked reasonably well. There were a couple of chairs who I think probably abused their chair position in that they filtered information that came to the committee. So they would have a meeting with staff pre the agenda going out and then get reports edited or rewritten and for that reason, in 2004 they decided to get rid of committees because it was considered that chairs had too much power. So that was around people's behaviour really that drove it. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

Deciding on a committee structure was contentious and is reflected in the numerous reports that went to the Council. Neither the governance framework nor the process

document on standing committees was presented in that term of Council. A report in December 2002 reviewed the committee structure and recommended changes to sub-committees (James, 2002). The City Manager reported on the new governance requirements as part of his overview of changes that would need to take place for the implementation of the new LGA 2002. He said that many aspects of the governance statement and code of conduct the Council was already working on would be presented to the Council shortly (Richardson, 2003).

Despite debate and concern, no changes were made to the committee and decision-making structure. Changes would come in the next triennium at the end of 2004. Figure 9 below provides a timeline for changes to internal decision-making within Christchurch City Council from 1998 to 2013.




Figure 9: Timeline of Changes of Standing Committees 1998–2013 for each Term of Council

Three Pivotal Changes

Around 2004 three major changes coalesced that impacted dramatically on the Council's decision-making model. First, the City Manager Mike Richardson resigned and left the Council in May 2003. He was replaced by Dr Lesley McTurk. Second, the number of councillors was reduced from 24 to 12. Third, committees were abolished.

A New Style of City Manager – A CEO

Mike Richardson and Lesley McTurk had different management styles and philosophies. While Mike Richardson focussed on the community and public service, Lesley McTurk was brought into the Council as a reforming manager to realign the Council to efficiency lines. As the former City Manager said in interviews:

I picked up a Deloitte Award for best managed city. ... when I did my acceptance speech I said the key to this is the high level of trust between councillors and staff and community boards and increasingly over the last 12 or 15 years, the community. And that is the key to it. If you focus on efficiency at best you might reduce some costs. If you focus on building trust and creating value for your community then you can do something excellent. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

Councillors can attest to this philosophy that Mike Richardson brought to his management of the Council, as one former councillor notes:

And the other thing that has changed, and it had changed during Lesley McTurk's time, was the distance from staff. So again in 2001 when Mike Richardson was still there I had really, really good relationships with staff. But we would also have working groups with combined councillors and community board people and staff. We sat round tables together and developed strategies. That stopped with Lesley McTurk when staff weren't allowed to talk to councillors. That's probably one of the saddest things that has happened and changed at that place. Even now, I think there's that culture of separation and they're not allowed to talk to councillors. Certainly staff under about tier two aren't allowed to talk to the media and they always used to be able to. They kind of had professional experience that they were allowed to talk on. So that's shutting down and closing down the staff. And staff not delivering to councillors is, I think, has really changed the

organisation and there's, I think quite a lot of, you know, there's definitely separation between the two. And some of that has come from this governance/management corporate model being imposed. And we're not corporate we're representative democracy. It doesn't work. So for me a lot of the pleasure of Council has gone because of that lack of interaction with staff. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

In contrast to Mike Richardson's style of management, Lesley McTurk made specific changes to increase the distance between councillors and staff:

The 2002 Act redefines the role of elected representative and provides greater clarity on the differences between local body governance and management. In the past, councillors were too often involved in management issues. Under the new Act, employees no longer work with politicians to skew the advice given to Council, according to McTurk. (The Director, 2005, p. 12)

Not all agreed that this approach by Dr McTurk reflected the true spirit of the LGA or that it was helpful for the community. A current councillor notes the decision-making changes that were brought in by the new CEO:

Current Councillor A	I think really probably the bigger change would be the change in the chief executives. So you went from Mike Richardson, to Lesley McTurk to Tony Marryatt. And the biggest change I noticed was between Mike Richardson and Lesley. [With] Mike Richardson, my feeling within the organisation was that it was very community focussed and Mike Richardson was quite instrumental in the new Local Government Act, which was talking about the four well-beings. But I think the Council prior to that, probably because of his influence, was pretty good at most of those things anyway. So in 2002 there was a new framework and I guess the excitement of that was really tempered by the fact that there seemed to be quite a reduction in the role of representation and more a focus on the split between management and governance. I remember going to one of the training sessions with Lesley McTurk and it was with, you know, newly elected councillors and community board members. And they brought in business people to talk to us about how to be a good board. And I guess that stuff is important but, you know, you can't help but think, we're not the private sector. We're actually there for a public reason and our role is actually really different because, you know, of course we have to look at the big picture strategically, we have to set policy but we also have to represent the people that are in our wards and are our
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think this might have been in Lesley's time, certainly it's changed again with Tony [Marryatt] and with Bob [Parker] going in a different direction again, the Forum eventually got closed down because it was almost seeing itself as a committee of Council. It was starting to be a bit of a concern I think within the Council and probably within the executive team and possibly some councillors, that here is some unelected group who were having a very powerful influence perhaps more so than the elected representatives. So there was that sort of tension that came out after a while. There was also potentially one or two members of the Forum who were certainly seen by others as using it to their own personal advantage. That probably also helped to, not initially close it down, but lessened its influence. And Garry [Moore] also got off-side with a couple of them 'cos he saw they seemed to be there for themselves as much as they were for the central city. So it went a little bit pear-shaped at that point. Having said that, in the early days and getting things like the first stage of the central city strategy underway it was a pretty powerful tool. (Current planner, interview November 2011)

Reduction in Numbers of Elected Representatives

The second pivotal change to happen at about the same time was the reduction in the number of councillors representing the city from 24 to 12. The current wards and community boards are based on six community areas that were established in the 1989 restructuring of local government. At that time, each community board covered two wards with two councillors elected by each ward, hence 24 councillors. The Local Electoral Act 2001 requires councils to review their representation arrangements at least once every 6 years. In Christchurch this review took place in 2003 before the 2004 elections. The Council-led review recommended abolishing the six wards and constituting eight new wards, each with two councillors – a total of 16 councillors. This was appealed to the Local Government Commission (Local Government Commission, 2004).

At the hearing the Council submitted that it favoured eight wards as, "The Council would function more efficiently with a lesser number of members" (Local Government Commission, 2004, p. 8). The Commission, however, decided that a change to eight wards was a significant change and did not necessarily group communities of interest together. It noted, "a Council elected under a six ward model could have a reduced

membership from the current membership of 24 (a Council of 12 or 18 members was generally favoured by those who sought the division of the City into six wards)” (Local Government Commission, 2004, p. 9). The Commission decided it was better to have six wards based on the boundaries of the existing 12 wards by combining two wards. The Commission then had to make a decision about the number of councillors representing the city, deciding between 18 or 12. In its determination it refers to the mayor, Garry Moore’s submission: “In his presentation to the Commission the mayor advised that his personal initial view on membership was that the Council should comprise 12 members” (p. 10). The Commission agreed with the mayor and halved the number of councillors from 24 to 12.

The reduction in the number of elected representatives had wider consequences both politically for the Council and in terms of decision-making as is outlined by the former City Manager:

So we reduced down to 12 councillors. As a result of that it became a full-time job. There were also changes to remuneration policy at the national level. A backbench councillor through the mid-90s was probably getting about \$24,000/year, ballpark. And all of a sudden going to 12 and with their remuneration raised they were on \$90,000. Plus, in many cases, a company directorship, so you can add another \$15,000. So, you’ve got people earning suddenly over \$100,000. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

The Council had also elected to have a salary only basis for remuneration of elected representatives (Goodman, 2012). This meant that there was no extra income based on meeting fees and hence no financial incentive to continue committee meetings.

Before the reduction in councillor numbers, there had been a political party grouping in place with a dominance of ‘Christchurch 2021’ elected members (a grouping of Labour and Progressive party members). In the 2004 elections Christchurch 2021 won only one seat (plus the mayor), Independent Citizens gained three seats, and the independents gained the remainder of the seats. A former councillor speculated that the combining of the wards meant:

The effect of this was to combine owner occupied housing areas with rental housing areas. And the owner occupied housing areas always out vote the rental housing areas because research shows that it is about five years before people who move into an area actually vote. And rental people move on so often. So the effect of that to the 2021 group was that it went down from 13 members out of 24 to 1 out of 12. Now it's back up to 3. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

This former councillor also suggested that halving the number of councillors meant there was less diversity on the Council:

I could go along with 16 probably 24 was a bit high, maybe 20 would be a good size for a Council in Christchurch. But you've got to recognise that democracy selects people for the Council in a very random sort of way. If you've got a Council of 24 there's a good chance you'll finish up with a couple of accountants, maybe a couple of lawyers, maybe one or two former school teachers, two or three businessmen, maybe one or two media people but there'll be a fair amount of diversity. Maybe somebody from the Indian community like Ishwar Ganda or the Chinese community like Jimmy Chen. But if you cut the Council down to 12 the chances are that you are going to finish up with an inadequate range of skills within that team. And there are some people who are pretty analytical.... There are others who are not analytical but they are very good at grass roots community stuff and will give honest opinions about their feedback from constituents and that's very valuable. A Council will not be effective unless it's got that range of abilities. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

In addition to the halving of the number of councillors, in March 2006 the Banks Peninsula District Council was finally amalgamated with the Christchurch City Council and one further representative was added to make the total 13. The representative from Banks Peninsula was Bob Parker who went on to become the mayor of Christchurch in 2007.

Abolition of the Standing Committees

The third pivotal change to the Council was the abolition of the standing committees. Prior to the 2004 election the General Manager Regulation and Democracy Services wrote a report to the Strategy and Finance Committee (Mitchell, 2004a) outlining the

work that a sub-committee had been doing on whether or not to adopt a committee structure and the results of a Council seminar on the topic. The sub-committee recommended the continuation of the standing committee structure and the following committees: Parks & Water Services, Transport & Utilities, Community & Leisure, and Regulation, based on the following points:

- (a) Bring a focus and development of expertise to consideration of an issue
- (b) Enhance Council efficiency and effectiveness
- (c) Enable an issue to be studied in depth
- (d) Allow for a better division of workload
- (e) Hear deputations
- (f) Act as a filter to the Council. (Mitchell, 2004a, p. 2)

The report also noted, however, that at a Council seminar there were a range of views about the committee structures, and an option was put forward to have no standing committees at all and for the Council to meet weekly or fortnightly. The rationale for this was:

... when debate on issues occurs in a committee then councillors who are not members of the committee are not privy to that debate. This can lead to reports being debated by a committee or subcommittee and then the Council's decision going against the committee's recommendation with the councillors who are not present not necessarily having the same degree of information and understanding as the committee members themselves. Further there is no reflection of the debate that occurred at a committee meeting reported in the Council agenda. (Mitchell, 2004a, p. 3)

This latter view prevailed because at the inaugural Council meeting on 27 October 2004 the Council voted to adopt a schedule of Council meetings and seminars. The associated report (Mitchell, 2004b) did not mention standing committees or why the proposed schedule of Council meetings along with seminars was being adopted. From this time, the Council met weekly with the mayor as chairperson. Up to five seminars a month were held where information was provided to councillors for discussion but no decisions were made. Initially, these seminars were not held in public, but this changed

after considerable debate about the lack of transparency in the media (Editor, 2006; Scanlon, 2005). The newspaper, *The Press*, found that: “12 of the 16 meetings and seminars listed on the Council’s website [for the month] were tagged closed to the public” (Scanlon, 2005, p. A1). The Council subsequently advertised the seminars publicly, but no reports from staff or minutes were readily available. There was the option for the public and media to request reports under the official information act, although this would be an onerous task. The lack of minutes proved to be a concern for some councillors:

... but the other thing about these informal workshops or informal meetings is that there’s no minutes kept and it’s not clear, often it is not written down or even summarised at the end of the meeting what the outcome of the meeting is so everyone goes away with a different understanding of what the outcome was. They’re [seminars] not meant to be decision-making gatherings but staff ask for guidance so councillors will express views on things and then the report that comes to Council will be written based on that guidance. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

The following month a report tabled at the Council meeting agreed on the formation of portfolio groups. Interestingly, in spite of the weekly Council meetings, this report was still tabled at a Council meeting because it was too important to wait for the next Council meeting. This style of tabling reports at meetings because of urgency was to be a common theme in this term of Council. The report (Robertson, 2004) noted that councillors had been meeting informally and that it was proposed that three portfolio groups (People Matters – Strong Communities, Environmental Diversity, and Place for the Future – Liveable City), be formed and four councillors appointed to each. There was no chairperson appointed to the portfolio groups and they were not open to the public. The portfolio model was outlined as a strategic level arena in which councillors could discuss matters with senior staff as strategy was developed. The portfolio groups were therefore designed to initiate reviews and updates of strategies and monitor the progress of work as it was being prepared for presentation at full Council meetings.

A former councillor considered that committees were abolished so that the mayor could have greater power and this was more easily accomplished because of the reduced number of elected representatives:

It was mainly because Garry Moore wanted more personal authority. And that's why mayors support it. The other reason was that I think committees and sub-committees had proliferated to the degree that it had got embarrassing because it was quite a big Council at 24 members and of course it was to be reduced to 12 so therefore the discussion had to be held ... how that would be dealt with in terms of committees because with half the number of councillors it just wouldn't fit. ... We said that there had to be a number of core committees, still a smaller number and virtually no sub-committees. There would have been a big change anyway but when the new Council came along ... he [the mayor] somehow managed to persuade them not to have any committees and just to have portfolios which was a disastrous decision in my opinion. (Former Councillor D, interview October 2011)

This former councillor, who was also a former committee chairperson, also laments the loss of committees because it meant elected representatives did not get into the detail and scrutinise matters:

Former Councillor D They [portfolios] weren't real committees with delegated responsibility. That's the real difference. Currently they have committees but they don't have any delegated responsibility to do anything. It is folly for a Council with only 13 people on it to try and make decisions about everything. Just too much. The fact that there aren't committees to specialise, to bore down into the issues, to create forward looking budgets, to do the consultation and to sift through all the dross and come out with the things that really matter and then either decide them with a delegation (or recommend to a Council meeting).

Karen So given that your order papers were so large and you were dealing with such big projects, what happened to all that sort of work once the committee was gone?

Former
Councillor D

That's a damn good question and I'll tell you what the answer is. It just didn't get done. It didn't happen. The work I'm talking about, let's take an example. Say that Blenheim Road deviation project. If that was to be done today the conceptual work would be done by the staff without any councillor input whereas I and my committee would have had a grip on it from the very beginning.

Karen

So you were like an advocate?

Former
Councillor D

Exactly. And that's what's being lost, you see. A champion for a project, an advocate for a project. Somebody who has support of a small group of other councillors who also know about that project who had it from the beginning, at the concept stage, the budget stage, the detailed planning stage, the consultation stage, the tweaking and changing. ... And eventually the committee itself passed it and said that is the project, let's take it to the Council. Then we have to argue for it there and get it through. So all of that stuff has been lost. What happens now is that most of that happens all at the staff level and suddenly a proposed project gets put up with all of that stuff having been done just by staff... All of that has been lost – the political, the genuine political input, understanding. The leadership is lacking, that's fundamentally the problem with Christchurch now. It's not just about Bob Parker, it's about the whole Council failing to show leadership and exercise genuine leadership and drive and make things happen. (Former Councillor D, interview October 2011)

A current planner at the Council acknowledged that the move to portfolio groups and seminars meant that more Council business was conducted in private and not in the public arena:

In a way they turned the whole Council into a committee because instead of the Council meeting once a month it was actually meeting once a week. And they also moved to a system where they would run formal seminars which were public excluded so that they could thrash out things before they came back to Council. I guess the cynic would say that it was a way of bypassing the system of having to have everything out in the open and they wanted to deal behind closed doors. I'm not so sure that was necessarily intended at the time but that's sort of the way it evolved. (Current Planner, interview November 2011)

In May 2005, a Council seminar was held to discuss the progress of the portfolio groups and the concerns around them (Christchurch City Council, 2005a). Notes from this seminar referred to another seminar that was held on the same topic but no notes from that meeting were publicly available. The May seminar identified teething troubles with these structures; however, the next steps identified were for the portfolio groups to submit their feedback to the mayor. The mayor subsequently tabled a report at the Council meeting of 8 December 2005. Again, the matter was considered too urgent to be considered at the next weekly Council meeting. In the report the mayor considered that the councillors, “seemed very happy with the way Portfolio Groups are working” (Christchurch City Council, 2005b, p. 1). His suggestion was to have the portfolio groups submit a work programme for the whole Council to approve each six months. The notes of the previous May seminar (Christchurch City Council, 2005a) suggested otherwise with many issues being raised that related directly to the way portfolio groups were operating. The points that related solely to the portfolio groups (other unrelated points have been left out) were:

- Major issues have been referred to the Council without prior consideration by either a Portfolio Group or a Council Seminar.
- Time to be allocated for visioning and looking ahead.
- No vehicle for identifying required changes to the City Plan.
- Items for agenda for Portfolio Groups.
- No information sharing amongst Portfolio Groups.
- Put mechanism in place to facilitate communication between Portfolio Groups, the Council and Community Boards.
- Job description required for Portfolio Groups.
- Too much is being done too quickly.
- Community Boards not being involved.
- Distribute a weekly summary of Council Seminars and Portfolio Group meetings to all Elected Members. (p. 2)

As these are only notes from a seminar, they may not have been the consensus of the meeting. Some councillors, however, had some misgivings about the portfolio groups. The mayor went on his report to say:

If we look at the areas where we have responsibility for matters as a Council as a whole, for Economic Development and Employment and Regulatory matters, then we have not functioned in these areas as well as I would like. We must also put aside more time for monitoring and strategic development. (Christchurch City Council, 2005b, p. 1)

There were no recommendations attached to the report.

The new decision-making structure favoured swiftness over councillor scrutiny. Asking questions and debating in the public arena was reduced for two main reasons. First, councillors had discussed and asked questions of staff and of each other in the seminars and in their portfolio groups. Therefore, when the item came before the Council meeting they did not often need further clarification. While this may have been beneficial for councillors and staff, it did not allow matters to be deliberated publicly. Media coverage was necessarily limited because of the lack of debate. This meant city residents typically received very little information via the media. Second, councillors had limited time to debate matters. While they may have debated behind closed doors in the portfolio groups or seminars, when it came time to make decisions at the full Council meeting standing orders were sometimes strictly enforced so that councillors were allotted 3 minutes to speak. A notice of motion was also required to get matters re-examined by staff.

Some councillors favoured the new structure and preferred the portfolio groups to the previous standing committee structure, as this former councillor notes:

They had committees, then we had portfolio groups, which was a closer, and I believe, a better alliance between the elected members and the senior staff, as participating advisors but not decision makers. I found that particular process extraordinarily helpful as opposed to the master servant relationship that exists in the committee structure. Because I found most, if not all, of the senior staff that worked on the portfolio groups, the ones that I

was associated with were very balanced, very professional, liked the fact of being able to talk on an equal status but remembered absolutely that they were still servants of the Council. That's not up-stairs down-stairs, there was far less differential and I found far more productive. I learnt a lot. Then there is people in the Council who resented the fact of not having committees. In my view they were power hungry people. You could see that instead of sitting halfway down a table and being part of a meeting they wanted to sit at the top of the table and chair it from there. (Former Councillor A, interview September, 2011)

This councillor preferred portfolio groups to committees for three main reasons. First, there was a closer working relationship with staff. Second, as meetings were public, excluded councillors could have free and frank discussions among themselves without having to worry about the media reporting on what they said. Third, the lack of committees meant that councillors could not wield as much power as they had been able to if they were a chair:

Karen You had people appointed to chair the portfolios?

Former Councillor A Yes, what we did, the group I was with, we just rotated it, your turn next time, I'll follow you, whoever ... there was usually 4 of us from memory.

Karen So who would set the timetable or agenda for portfolio meetings?

Former Councillor A The timetable was done by recommendation of the Council officers in terms of availability of space, availability of staff so that they knew their programme and presented it to the Council for endorsement and then adopted by the committee as its working document. And in terms of the agenda, they'd just chew the fat with us. We would say we would like next time to touch on x. They would say we're going to report on y and z and we'd say yes or no. It was cohabiting in its best and I believe in a most productive way. (Former Councillor A, interview September, 2011)

This councillor did not like the committee structure because of the power that resided with the chairperson. The portfolio groups altered the power relations through their lack of a formal chairperson and formal process of setting agendas and work

programmes. Effectively, power relations were increasingly concentrated in the mayor, CEO, and senior staff influencing the portfolio groups. This same former councillor went on to say:

Former Councillor A Portfolio groups recommended, they had no decision power. But it was far more inclusive with people that frankly knew a whole lot more or could access a lot more information than councillors could. The staff who had their *raison d'être* and had a range of contacts outside. If a councillor went to do the same thing, it would take a whole lot longer.

Karen In terms of community input into the portfolio meetings, were there any deputations?

Former Councillor A Yes, a little, but minimally. The ones I was involved with tended to let the staff talk with the community and bring back the consensus.

Karen I don't think they were publicly notified?

Former Councillor A They weren't public meetings.

Karen No. And how do you feel about that?

Former Councillor A I'm fine with that.

Karen Because?

Former Councillor A Because it enabled very free and frank discussions which the committee structure tends not to be. You can talk in confidence. You can talk about budgets that might have been PX (public excluded). (Former Councillor A, interview September, 2011)

This councillor was quite relaxed about the staff having more control over the portfolio groups than the councillors. This also applied to consulting with the public. The councillors under the portfolio groups were moving away from their representative role towards a decision-making role based on what was put before them rather than directing what should be put before them. There was also the ability to have political debates over important matters, such as budgets, in private.

There was a different view that councillors were too accepting of staff advice and did not challenge it in an open debate. For example, one councillor said:

it seems to me there's a group of councillors who accept largely the advice of the staff and regard it as their duty to push that through. So there's not the open debate that there used to be in the old days. And one of the reasons for that is that elected members are not given the information that they really need to have. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

Another councillor also felt that the lack of a committee structure meant there was a lack of monitoring of Council performance by councillors:

Former Councillor C Well, I think that the difficulty with not having a committee structure is that I think it gives staff much more control.

Karen When do you think that started to happen?

Former Councillor C I think as soon as they did away with committees. It's in a committee that you often monitored performance of the Council operations. Because I think that governance is not just about making high level decisions. Governance is also about monitoring operational performance. And I don't know that that's sort of happening in the current environment. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

A current councillor also noted that without the committee structure there was less information available to the community:

Karen What would happen to other issues like community facilities, community services. What sort of pushed those issues through?

Current Councillor A Nothing really. There would be a workshop and, you know, we'd have huge problems. There were flip-flops over the ... you look at the High Court case over the rent increase. You look at the Early Learning Centres and the whole fiasco, you know, going to market rents and then charging and then cutting the funding and then giving the funding back. And you look at the reduction in community funding and the nonsense that turned out to be. Um, there were working parties that were established. So there was a Housing Working Party and there was a Community Grants Working Party but because they met in PX [Public excluded], I mean, how could the community be engaged. And I just think

when the Council put out its Long Term Plan and didn't mention that it was cutting community funding and made it seem like it was increasing the amount available people really got upset and rightfully so....It's really interesting when I reflect on the whole Long Term Plan process. I think, personally I wanted it to be open.

Karen It was all in private?

Current Councillor A It was all in private and staff would present all the little details around activity management plans and levels of service and apart from the fact that it was done in secret, which I didn't like, I thought it was a really good process. As councillors, we were given really detailed information.... So the elected members felt really engaged which is good but my argument was that we spent a year getting our minds around this and then we give the community 6 weeks. And how does the community understand the detail and why don't we actually engage with the community to start with and find out what their needs and concerns are. (Current Councillor A, September 2011)

A former councillor also had a different view of the nature of standing committees and believed that they did provide a useful platform for creative ideas:

Former Councillor B And, I've been very concerned ... that it has abandoned the standing committees which gave detailed examination of all projects and programmes. So you had standing committees, a group of maybe seven or eight councillors with a chairman. Staff, specialist staff reporting to them, attending the meetings and you had this very creative interaction between the staff and the elected members. The staff are presenting reports, technical reports, the councillors can ask questions, and the councillors, well they don't become expert engineers or town planners, they get a grasp of the essentials of the engineering disciplines and planning disciplines and so on. At the same time, the councillors can keep the feet of the staff on the ground. So that they can't rush away and do airy-fairy stuff. The Council can all the time emphasise the priorities as seen by the public. And between that, what I call creative tension, I think you get good policies coming out.

Karen Why do you think they did away with committees then?

Former Councillor B Well, to the person on the outside, it may be seen that the process is cumbersome and bureaucratic. That everything first goes to a committee before it goes to the Council. That may seem bureaucratic. To some extent it is. ... So the idea was to cut out that layer of bureaucracy, of committees, and just have reports

going straight to the Council. But the trouble with this system is that it means that projects go to the Council in an apparently final form, but they haven't necessarily had the rough edges knocked off them.

Karen But Mr Moore was inside, wasn't he? He wasn't looking at it from the outside like the public would look in and see. He knew because he had been on the Council for quite a while before he became the mayor.

Former
Councillor B Yes, well Garry was always a bit impatient of Council processes. So when he became mayor he wanted to do things differently and instead of dealing with inner-city development through the ordinary committee processes, he wanted a separate project group set up. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

The previous City Manager also saw a lot of merit in the standing committee structure:

Alongside reducing the number of councillors down they did away with committees and for me committees were where issues got talked through. The media normally attended and the public would on some issues but I don't accept the message from businessmen that Council should be efficient in its decision-making, and that means quick. I think local government is different and I think that having lengthy debate in your committee and then re-litigating at some length in Council afterwards with potential on-going media coverage and community involvement in-between with interested parties, approaching their councillors or coming in to see the mayor, I think all of that is terribly healthy. I don't think that in terms of secrecy, I don't think it was a change of degree I think it was a significant change in model. (Former City Manager, interview April 2012)

There were councillors who did not like the demise of the committee structure but felt some concerns with the performance of the committees could have been changed. A former councillor was unsure why the committees had been abolished:

I really don't quite understand it because people might say committees are a waste of time. I actually found that in the committees the real work of the Council was done. It is in that environment that you actually engage more with Council staff, not at the Council level, and a wider range of Council staff that you would not normally experience at a Council meeting. It's where you can request reports and follow up on different things. I think

that when Lesley McTurk came, both her and Garry thought, and they were right to some extent, that there were too many committees, and that a lot of officer time was being spent on reports that didn't necessarily go anywhere and it's a fair criticism. Often councillors at a committee meeting would say I think we should have a report on something or rather and that diverts officers' valuable time in an exercise that may not be going anywhere. I think that there was a fair criticism that often councillors at committee meetings dealt with some detail that was really a matter of staff work and they should just get on with it. So I think that the committees did need to be restructured. There needed to be far fewer committees and maybe councillors more focussed on what their role was. But I think it was a mistake to do away with them completely. (Former Councillor E, interview November 2011)

The mayor, however, welcomed this 'corporate model' of decision-making. In an article in the *Listener*, he was quoted as arguing:

Traditional Council standing committees were abolished – Moore [the mayor] claims these had been used by committee chairmen “as power bases to keep others in the dark” – and replaced with broad “portfolio groups” where ideas were thrashed around by councillors and staff away from the public gaze, before being refined in open-forum “seminars” and then presented to full Council for adoption or rejection.

For Moore, it was all about making local government more like corporate governance – less time spent on parish pump detail, more attention to big-picture strategy. (Macfie, 2007, p. 26)

The former mayor reiterated these points when interviewed:

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| Karen | Was there a bit of reluctance on the part of some councillors [to the Mayoral Forum]? |
| Former Mayor | Absolutely. People like David Close were dead against it because they saw it as the mayor sort of having a play toy really. Because there were a whole lot of them who were deeply steeped in Council folklore who believed that everything had to go through committees, Council standing committees. And in my opinion that didn't necessarily make committee decisions any good. So, you know, you get your advice from within the institution and then that goes to the councillors. Often the public knew about it because the press published something about it, often wrong. |

Then people could get up in arms about it and it was too late, the decision had been made. Now not all decisions were like that but a lot were. And I wanted to see the institution much more effective and so the mayor's central city working party was an attempt to work alongside the private sector who had significant investments in the central city and see if we could get those investments more harmonious with what the Council was doing, with what each other was doing.

Karen The other thing that you instituted, I think, through your time was changing the way decisions were made in the Council so that there weren't standing committees.

Former Mayor That again was another of my commitments. ... What I had seen for years was Council staff could spend years working on policy, bring it out and people go ... we don't even like it. And what I wanted to do was to see decision-making made effectively much closer to the action. And so, we formed focus groups and portfolio groups. Councillors went to a portfolio that attracted them. And then their job was to, we had our strategic plan as a Council, and their job was to select within the strategic plan the bits that they would focus on. Then their job was to sit down with Council policy staff and people in the community who were impacted by the policy and to actually come up with ideas that a. needed change or b. new policy that we needed. So they met, and it's all measured so you can see, the community services one was particularly well measured and they did all sorts of things. And it depended on how well they were led actually. The transport one was hopeless.

Karen Did you have assigned chairs?

Former Mayor They chose their own chairs. And they shared the chair which is the other thing I was very strong about. I had seen domineering chairs, chairpersons, push a committee in a certain direction. It was hard to prove that was what was happening often. And so I, we, then instituted a process of every Tuesday, we'd have seminars in the morning and in the afternoon. So the councillors, the seminars were in public so anyone could come and have a listen. And the portfolio groups would run their stuff through a seminar to see what the rest of the councillors thought about it. So that gave the public an opportunity to have an input. And then things were often sent back to the portfolio group for work on or if people were happy about it and thought that enough work had been done on it then we met every week as a Council. And the Council meeting would then have what had been a seminar as a formal policy statement document which then went out for consideration by the whole Council. That to me was a much more

democratic system. The public could have an input in the portfolio group. They could have an input in the seminar and they could also have an input in the full Council meeting. And to me that is much, much better. Standing committees in my opinion are a thing of the past really. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

Although the mayor states above that the seminars were open to the public, the Council only opened them to the public after much criticism from the media (Editor, 2006; Scanlon, 2005). Reports were not readily available to the public and nor were minutes kept:

Karen You said before that there were some problems with the standing committees, that people influenced the standing committees. Did that change when you moved to portfolio groups?

Former Mayor Yes, because they're much more open.

Karen Yes. So then who did the influence lie with?

Former Mayor It was shared. ... Basically what I was doing was, look, there were a number of people, I could name them, who dominated their committees. And they ran the committees like a fiefdom. And the bureaucracy fell in behind that. And what I was trying to do was to actually, and it was something Lesley McTurk and I both worked on, where we were trying to actually stop. ... And what we tried to do was actually cross across sections rather than have all the engineers here and all the planners here and all the community services here, all the sports here. So, the disciplines tended to have committees that reinforced that discipline but didn't look across the institution. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

One former councillor did not share the mayor's view and believed that the change of culture had started with the amendments to the LGA in 1989, which focussed on the separation between governance and management:

It was the 1989 Act that changed things and I think it is a change of culture. Garry was fond of using the expression, board of directors. The Council is like a board of directors and the mayor is the chairman of the board. Now I reject that. I think that a board of directors has a much narrower range of responsibilities. The Companies Act requires them to act in the best interests of the company, which means in the best financial interests of the company. And they are not bound to listen to individual

shareholders in the way that a Council is. A Council is actually, obviously a democratic institution where the elected members are responsible to the community for their decisions. And not just to turn up for an election every three years. They have got a duty, I believe, to listen to the community and to be responsive to what people are saying. (Former Councillor B, interview April 2012)

In September 2006, a year after the new system had been introduced, a review report of portfolio groups made recommendations to change the way the groups worked (Parfitt, Evans, & Shearing, 2006). The report, written by two councillors and a General Manager, recommended that the current three portfolio groups be grouped into two and a third created to cover the area of regulatory, economic development, and governance. Membership of this third portfolio group would all be councillors. The new portfolio groups then became: infrastructure and environment; sustainable communities; and regulatory, economic development, governance. The objective and principle of portfolio groups were defined and agreed on as:

The portfolio group system is established to enable elected representative leadership, and involvement in the development of the broad strategic areas of Council activity.

- The portfolio system is intended to complement the Council's decision-making processes and not conflict with them.
- Portfolio groups will function using the Council's Standing Orders and Code of Conduct as a guide.
- Portfolio groups will generally identify their forward programme and set a schedule for Council seminars.
- Portfolio groups will report at least monthly to the full Council.
- Portfolio groups will be responsible for reviewing existing strategies before going to the Council.
- Portfolio groups to take a leadership role in the development of strategies and the presentations to the Council.
- Portfolio groups will work closely with Community Boards on strategic matters that affect their communities.
- Portfolio groups will meet weekly and where appropriate with community groups and stakeholders.
- Portfolio groups will agree on, and nominate their spokespersons. (Parfitt et al., 2006, pp. 2-3)

The minutes of the Council meeting show it was resolved the report would be held over to a later meeting. It appears the Council never discussed or debated the report as no record can be found. In the following year, just before the elections, a report for information only went to Council on the portfolio groups achievements (Carey, 2007). The report's purpose was to:

... give the Council, as requested by the mayor, a brief summary of the topics covered and the achievements/highlights of the work undertaken on the Council's high-level strategies by the three separate portfolio groups during the three years that they have been meeting. (Carey, 2007, p. 1)

The report, in bullet points, listed the topics covered and/or their achievements. At around this time mayor Garry Moore declared his intention not to stand in the forthcoming elections and at those elections the Banks Peninsula representative, Bob Parker, was elected mayor at the end of 2007. The new Council formed in 2007 had to decide on its committee structure. A report to the new Council (Gilbert & Mitchell, 2007) observed:

There was a clear consensus by all present of the need to have a standing committee of the Council, called for the purposes of this report the "Regulatory and Planning Committee" to recognise the high degree of importance that the community and the Council places on achieving the right outcomes in the Council's town planning processes. The establishment of this committee is also to recognise the importance to the community of achieving the outcomes from the Urban Development Strategy. (p. 3)

The report acknowledged, that on the matter of having additional standing committees, there was not a unanimous view. The minutes of the Council meeting note that three councillors moved an amendment to have additional standing committees, but this vote was lost. In addition to the one standing committee for planning, a Long Term Council Community Plan Working Party was established, as were fortnightly Council meetings. One Council meeting a month was devoted to receiving Community Board reports. The report never mentioned the previous seminars and portfolio groups and they were not revived by this Council. Other than reports for schedules of meetings and appointment of people to the various

committees the Council had established, there were no further reports to this Council on the structure of its decision-making during its term in office. Therefore, in the 2007-2010 triennium the Council had re-introduced one standing committee, a working party, a monthly Council meeting to receive community board reports, and a further Council monthly meeting. There were no seminars or portfolio meetings or standing committees to provide for councillor and public input. Despite the introduction of a regulatory and planning standing committee, there was now less involvement for councillors in debating matters and less information available to be reported to the public via the media.

The frustrations continued for some councillors. Although one standing committee had been created in the planning area, some councillors wanted more committees within the structure. Councillors also talked about the pressure they felt under if they did not wish to make a decision:

Former Councillor C And then 2007 there were no committees at all and there was this thinking that because there were only 12 then 13 councillors that they could work as a committee of a whole for everything. What I observed and experienced in the 2007 term was that stuff was coming straight to Council ... councillors hadn't been too exposed to it before it got there. So, and it was quite a pressure to make decisions and not to send things back or to go to a workshop. We got criticised, or any councillor that suggested that, got criticised as being indecisive.

Karen Were portfolio groups happening?

Former Councillor C No, nobody had any, in 2007, nobody had any mandate on any topic. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

This former councillor outlines how power relations changed because of the abolition of the standing committees and other consequential changes:

Karen So under these different arrangements from the standing committees to these workshops and seminars that don't have minutes, do you think there has been a change in the people who get to have an influence on the ultimate decisions?

Former
Councillor C

Yes, I think because of the way that it is working now the mayor and the senior staff have much, much bigger influence. There haven't been committees and there haven't been portfolio groups so there's been very little opportunity for councillors to sit down and really get their teeth into something. A couple of other things have been happening. So Bob [mayor] directs the agenda for Council meeting ... so the filtering of what gets on the agenda is happening with the mayor and the other thing that happens is that the senior management team also filter a lot of stuff coming through. So I'll talk to staff and they'll say "oh we wanted to bring this report but we can't get it in front of you, we need to present to you but we can't get it there" and stuff doesn't come or again stuff gets rewritten by senior management. Or the other thing that happens if a report does come the general manager presents it and they've got no knowledge of the nitty-gritty of the report. The report writers aren't in front of us. So that is another change. Staff that wrote the report always presented to Council in the past now it's all done through these general managers. So it's kind of very controlling and I find it frustrating because we're not getting good information because of that. We're reading the report, the general manager will turn up and they can't answer the questions that we've got. The other thing that Bob has brought in last term and this term was that councillors have to ask questions about these Council reports before they get to the meeting. So people send questions out and the answers come to all the councillors but then if councillors ask questions at the meeting they get criticised for not having done their homework. So that's another way ... it's shutting out the public. The public sitting there would also have those questions but they don't get asked because they've been asked beforehand. And asking questions and having discussions is a way of informing and showing that councillors want to dig a little bit deeper.

Karen

Who has gained in power out of these changes?

Former
Councillor C

I think the mayor has gained in power and because he's very aligned with the CEO. I think it's that pairing. And then Bob's loyal voters, the ones that vote with him often are the ones that have power. I have been quoted as saying this. Over the Henderson deal particularly I didn't have good information to make that decision and it was rushed as well and it was at that stage that Tony Marryatt [CEO] said to me that "as long as 8 of the 14 of you have got enough information that's enough for me." So there's that lack of professionalism coming from the top of the staff to not supply us with the information. Yes, I think that's where the power is definitely sitting. I felt really disenfranchised from decision-making. (Former Councillor C, interview October 2011)

Some of the consequential changes to the abolition of the standing committees were also crucial. The agenda was now only set by the mayor and hence directed what the councillors could discuss and decide. Even to get matters debated became a difficulty. General Managers, sometimes with little knowledge of the report, would present it to Council and could not answer questions from councillors. Political debate was also closed down as councillors were required to ask questions before the public Council meetings and were pressured not to ask those same questions within the open Council meeting.

The previous two terms of Council had not had standing committees (other than the planning committee instituted in 2007) because it was concluded that they were not effective or efficient. However, Christchurch City Council before 2001 had had standing committees. Another former mayor explained their value in achieving projects for the city:

Former Mayor I think we had a strong committee system so that the committees would meet every month. We had a regular schedule of committees and there would be a lot. I attended all the committee meetings, nearly all the committee meetings. They were quite clear about what they wanted to do. There was sufficient time for councillors to think about things. At the start of each term we'd take time to talk about what we wanted to do and getting to know each other as well.

Karen So it wasn't just one thing (in achieving projects), it wasn't just the committee structure?

Former Mayor No a very active Council.

Karen And a diverse Council?

Former Mayor Yes and using their talents as well. I've got some skills but others have got some much better skills in some areas that I don't have, like property skills at that stage at all.

Karen Why do you think it (standing committee structure) was dismantled?

Former Mayor I've got no idea, no idea.

Karen What were the downsides?

Former Mayor There were no downsides. (Former Mayor, interview April 2012)

On 4 September 2010, just before the elections, Christchurch experienced a major earthquake. The incumbent mayor Bob Parker was re-elected. In December of that year the newly elected Council received two reports on the establishment of committees for the current term of Council (Mitchell, 2010; Sullivan, 2010). The Council agreed on nine new standing committees: Long Term Plan Committee, Metropolitan Funding Committee, Regulatory and Planning Committee, Transport Committee, Water and Waste Water Committee, Central City Committee, Heritage and Arts Committee, Communications Committee, and Housing and Community Facilities Committee. There was no more accompanying information explaining the background to this return of so many standing committees that the Council had had in the previous 10 years. In a report to the newly established Central City Committee in February 2010 (Theelen, 2011a) the purpose was outlined as:

to promote and co-ordinate the revitalisation of the Central City of Christchurch in accordance with the Council's adopted Central City Vision, and the key strategies, policies and programmes approved by Council to facilitate its continued development and the premier civic, retail, business and residential centre of the City, the region, and the South Island of New Zealand. (Theelen, 2011a)

The scope of the committee covered the following areas:

The Central City Committee shall be responsible for reviewing as appropriate and making recommendations to Council on the following strategies/plans (and any others specifically requested of it by Council):

- Central City Strategy Stage II and Stage III
- City for People
- Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy (Central City Actions)
- The development and recommendation of policies relating to the development of the Central City to the Regulation and Planning

Committee in respect of the District Plan, and review changes or variations.

- Central City South Masterplan. (Theelen (2011a, p. 1)

A former city councillor commented on this renewed interest in standing committees, stating that it would also take a culture change within the Council to understand how they could provide leadership for the Council:

After the last election last year they set up some committees but the point is, is that they had lost the culture. Culture had gone, they didn't know what committees were, they didn't know how they worked, what they did, the sorts of things they should cover. So they set up a small number of committees with very, very narrow briefs so that still they are only covering only 20% of what the Council does and the other 80% is still not covered by committees and they think they have done the job. They also think ... their mentality now is that they are like members of the public that come into the Council to complain about things that haven't been done. Whereas the committees I was in ... they were where things started and they governed about what was going to happen. (Former Councillor D, interview October 2011)

Approximately 1 month after the first standing committee meeting on the central city in 7 years, the second and more devastating earthquake struck Christchurch virtually destroying the central city. The Council halted all committee meetings.

Conclusion

This chapter documented the changing of the internal decision-making processes of the Christchurch City Council. Promoted as a more inclusive way for councillors to be involved, the new processes took place within a changing environment for elected members. First, their numbers were halved from 24 to 12 and a new reforming CEO was appointed. Elected representatives were divided on the new decision-making structures when interviewed. Some felt it allowed greater collaboration with staff; others pointed to concerns about loss of the formal rules that enable decision-making. They felt disempowered. With the loss of committees and their chairpersons, power was concentrated in the mayor as he was the only elected representative chairing a formal Council decision-making structure. Indirectly this meant staff also had greater

power as they were now only formally reporting to the Council meeting and not to standing committees and their chairpersons. A year after the standing committees were abolished, the Mayoral Forum informally disbanded. The work they had started was continued by staff reporting directly to the Council.

The changing internal decision-making structure meant decisions on CBD revitalisation did not go through formal structures. The elected representatives did not lead the process and have substantial input. There was no ongoing formal scrutiny of the process by either councillors or the public. For many years, as there were no standing committees and therefore no chairpersons to provide leadership, only the mayoral position was chairing a Council meeting.

The following chapter provides data from young people who used the revitalised spaces the Council had created. While the Council had been trying to revitalise the day time in terms of retail and office space, and unsuccessfully, residential space, in reality it was the night-time economy that prospered in the new spaces. Even though this economy was successful financially, the subjects of those spaces, the young people, were constituted as problematic. The chapter examines the young people's experiences of the revitalised spaces.

CHAPTER 7: YOUNG PEOPLE'S USE OF NIGHT-TIME SPACES: CONFORMING, TRANSGRESSING AND CONTROLLING

We don't want to get rid of the vibrancy. We value our night-time economy and we certainly didn't want to do anything to damage that. (Cr Stephanie Cook, Wellington City Council 28 August 2013 Radio New Zealand National, speaking on submissions to their proposed Local Alcohol Policy)

Young people's use of newly created inner-city public spaces at night is crucial for understanding decision-making about CBD revitalisation and drinking in public spaces. Jayne et al. (2006) suggest that research agendas should delve more deeply into, "social relations and cultural practices associated with the emergence of particular kinds of urban drinking spaces" (p. 465). My research builds on this and argues that better understanding of a variety of perspectives on drinking in particular public spaces, including the context and relationships that occur within those spaces, is necessary to assist planning and policy formulation for urban spaces. As outlined in Chapter 2, a gap exists in planning and governmentality theories because previous research has failed to take seriously the notion of agency and resistance.

Amin and Thrift (2002) also challenge scholars studying cities to look in more depth at the processes happening within a city. They encourage a focus on the day-to-day routines, the happenings that give a city 'texture'. They suggest an analysis of a city has to take into account its messiness, its diverse contradictions, and its diversity. Among other things, they encourage scholars to write about how bodies inhabit and engage with a city.

This chapter first focuses on the lived realities of young people who use the night-time space that was facilitated by new types of decision-making processes and structures. The Council wished to create a vibrant CBD, and while this was not very successful for the day-time it was extremely successful for the night. Young people are drawn to the CBD at night because it is an inviting, lively, space with an almost carnivalesque-like atmosphere. From my observations, young people make up the vast majority of the

people within the CBD after midnight and there is a sense that the public space is their public space at least for a few hours once or twice a week. As Winlow and Hall (2006) have observed in their research many young people drink, or have drunk, large amounts of alcohol, they dance, meet friends, and have a fun time with other young people. In many ways they are conforming to the image of young revellers, attracted by the marketing of the bars and nightclubs, using and getting pleasure from the enhanced public spaces the Council has provided.

Second, the chapter explores the idea that young people's use of the CBD at night is part of their resistance to behaving in a certain civilised manner. They permit things to occur that they would not necessarily permit during the day-time and they sometimes conduct themselves in a way that would not be considered civilised (Elias, 2000). While young people were not greatly involved in the decision-making process of the revitalisation of the CBD, they nevertheless show agency in the way in which spaces are used at night. Through their embodied experiences, they seek to claim the CBD at night.

Finally, the chapter documents how the Council, the police, bar owners, and the media view the behaviour that is occurring in the pre-earthquake revitalised space at night. The strategies put in place to control this behaviour show they are there to temper the worst of it but at the same time continue to allow young people to enjoy themselves and contribute to the revitalisation of the CBD. This chapter addresses research question three: What are the lived realities of the young people who use the revitalised spaces of the CBD?

Conforming

How Young People Use the CBD at Night

Five young women agreed to be part of a focus group, conducted 16 October 2010, and beforehand I met with them early on a Saturday night. They had all been invited to two 21st birthday parties and one woman had also been invited to an engagement party. The idea was that they would go to these functions and then move into the CBD. They explained to me that this is what they usually did. They were old school friends

and the weekends were their only time for catching up together. They usually met around 5–6pm to get dressed, talk, drink, generally catch up, and then go to any functions and then into the CBD. They did not regularly go into the CBD in winter as it was too cold. It was currently a period of many 21st birthday parties. If there were no functions to go to they would drink at home first (usually a bottle of wine each) then go into the CBD.

They explained that the earthquake would affect their normal route in the CBD. They usually started at a bar in SOL Square and then walked up Manchester Street to the Iconic Bar. Manchester Street had been closed off since the earthquake. When I asked if they would walk to the Iconic Bar they said they would not go into Latimer Square as they considered that unsafe, and they did not want to walk too far in their shoes. Their next destination would be a bar in Hereford Street.

They usually met on the following Sunday afternoon to review the previous night's happenings, given the group would often break up during the evening and they liked to get together on a Sunday to catch up on who went where and did what. If they broke up, they tried to stay in pairs for safety reasons. Their catch up on a Sunday was usually the last time they would see each other until the following Saturday night. I interviewed them as a group during their usual Sunday catch-up. Sometimes they would go out on other nights together as a group. Thursday used to be a favourite night out. I asked about Friday nights – a night when people went out with work mates after work and the night had a different atmosphere and feel. This group preferred Thursdays or Saturdays. This type of ritual for going out and drinking is well documented (Martinic & Measham, 2008; Measham & Brain, 2005).



Figure 10: Map of Christchurch CBD Showing Popular Night-Time Spaces for Young People

Source: Designed by Hullabaloo Design. (Popular night-time spaces mentioned in this thesis are highlighted in red. The green streets represent the four avenues that originally marked the urban boundary of the city and, for this research, the CBD revitalisation area.)

The women have routines and firm ideas about where and how to start their night out:

- Karen So you get dressed together at one of your places, like the other night I saw you all getting dressed at your place? And you drink then, at home?
- Everyone Yeah.
- Emily Yeah, quite like to go out bold so. *[laughs]*
- Alexia Emily's house is deemed to be the easiest place to go just 'cos her parents like having people around.

Emily Yeah, and a lot of the time they take us as well, or my brother does.

Alexia He's very good for that.

Karen Oh, right, a taxi service?

Alexia Otherwise, we go to Jennex's house.

Emily Yeah.

Karen And, if you get together and you're having a good time together at home, would you just say, oh, we won't go into town?

Emily Sometimes.

Alexia It's been done.

Everyone Yeah.

The women typically meet at one person's house (usually a family home) before heading into the city. They know which house in which to meet and a clear plan on how to get transport into the CBD. In contrast, the young men's focus group, (conducted 21 November 2010) did not have such an organised ritual and they usually met at a suburban bar where they made their plans or met at a bar in the CBD and then texted their friends to see who was in town and where they were. They said they enjoyed this part of the evening. At other times, they would be at parties in the suburbs and then go into town:

Jethro: If I was going out, like my ideal night out would be you'd get into town about 11.30–12. Have a drink or two outside of Vespa and just sit there chatting. And that's a real good place to co-ordinate with friends, 'cos you've got a chance to sit down so you can work out where people are and all of that. A lot of time in town is based around co-ordinating where everyone else is.

Young people are not only drawn to the CBD, they are also pushed. The Council has instituted noise controls through its regulatory role in the suburbs. The young men said that if they were at a party at someone's house and they wanted to party on past midnight it was almost imperative that they move into the CBD because of noise controls and the prospect of upsetting the neighbours in their suburb. They would also go into the CBD following an organised university social event. Both focus groups said the main reasons they go into the CBD at night was to continue partying, to celebrate some type of event in their lives, meet up with friends and generally socialise, meet potential partners, dance, and listen to music and karaoke.

Another reason to relocate into the city at night was that three of the young people still live at home. The young women said they would often start out drinking at home, which would make them want to go into the city to go dancing. They could have a much more social time in the CBD than at home:

- Rose And after the wine's flowing [at home], like, oh, actually let's go dancing like //
- Alexia and because often the house that we're at isn't a flat. So, it's – like we feel, like, oh, we should probably go or we may as well, we're all drunk and happy and having a good time we may as well go and dance like. And we'll get to the point where we're, like, oh, let's dance.
- Emily Yeah, and the dining room just doesn't cut it anymore.
- All [laughs]
- Emily So off we go.

While drinking was mentioned as a reason to go into town at night, it did not feature as the predominant reason, because of their finances:

- Jennex Well, we usually drink beforehand 'cos we're all quite poor.
- Emily Yeah, I never buy drinks.
- Rose I'll buy a couple at most but //
- Alexia Mostly we don't go there for drinking. We go there after drinking.

All the young people talked about the cost of drinking at the bars: as they were either university students or earned less than \$25,000 per year, cost was an issue. Therefore, they drank at home before going out, a practice called preloading, which makes economic sense if they want to get drunk, as this exchange shows:

- Rose The cost of a bottle of wine for me to drink before I go out is the same cost of one glass of wine when I'm out.
- Emily That's my biggest issue with town. Is that I can drink a whole bottle for \$7 whereas I can have one glass in town.
- All Yeah.

Drinking, and at times getting drunk, to enjoy the entertainment and to socialise in the CBD at night was expected. There was an attitude by the young people that drinking made the experience of being in town enjoyable:

Karen And do you think you could go out on the town and not drink?
Rose Well, 'cos I mean, I've done it before, as you know, sober driver into town. Like I get so tired. You know, it's 11 o'clock at night and there's nothing to kinda keep you going, there's no ---. 'Cos, I mean, the thing is you drink, and you have fun. And also like if I'm not drinking I'd rather be doing other things than being in town. You know, 'cos if I'm not drinking for a reason town's not where I want to be. I don't want to go dancing if I don't want to drink.

Going into the CBD at night to socialise and party is something the participants have been doing for a long time and cannot imagine not doing in the future. It is part of their routine and they very much enjoy it:

Karen How long have you been going out together as a group?
All *[laughs]*
Emily Since we could.
Alexia It was sort of, like, well if there's nothing on at the weekends, there's no celebration of a birthday or whatever, and we all feel like hanging out and having a good time, that [CBD] was naturally the place we'd go. Where would you find a venue with music, why would we not go there, kinda thing?
Karen Mmm, yeah.
Emily And you don't have to clean up the mess.

The CBD night-time economy is bound up with friendships, socialising and drinking alcohol. One participant commented that she does not like to go into the city at night if she is not drinking. Drinking is, therefore, connected to going out to the CBD.

Pleasurable Spaces

At the beginning of each focus group session, participants were asked to draw a mental map of where they went in the CBD at night and to highlight the bars and nightclubs they visit. This helped elucidate the relationships that they have with the CBD at night (L. Holloway & Hubbard, 2013). Figure 11 below shows the mental map drawn by the young women and Figure 12 is the mental map drawn by the young men.



Figure 11: Mental Map From Young Women’s Focus Group Showing Bars and Nightclubs They Visit

The exercise surprised the young people when they realised the places they frequently went to were in concentrated areas. The key determinants of where they visited were: the bars that they liked; the public spaces around the bars, such as SOL Square; the price of drinks at the bars; the music and entertainment on offer; who they were with; and the concentration of bars so that the young women, in particular, did not have far to walk in their ‘going out’ shoes. For the young women their night usually began at SOL Square with two bars that they liked there, Yellow Cross and Fat Eddies. They said that they then would go to Boogie Nights, ending up at My Bar before ending their night at KFC. The fast food outlets were important (drawn above as Mc for McDonalds, BK for Burger King, and KFC). As noted further on, some young people preferred not to drink before they went out and were, therefore, hungry at the end of the night. The September 2010 earthquake also had an impact on where they went as some roads

were blocked and made the journey to some bars too far, again particularly for the young women. That such a comparatively small item as women's shoes can impact on how the CBD is used has also been mentioned by Crang (2012). He notes that while most urban planning is predicated on uniseasonal and temporal assumptions, items such as shoes have an important influence on how and where people use a city. In the young women's focus group shoes constrained the distance they were willing to walk from one bar to the next. This is exacerbated at night when they are more likely to be wearing shoes that are less appropriate for walking long distances than shoes worn during the day. Shoes then, at least for women, define the spatial importance of the concentration of bars and night clubs.

The young men usually liked to start in Vespa bar in Poplar Lane. They would then go to SOL Square and Fish & Chip's bar. Interestingly, the young men put down bars that had been damaged and closed due to the earthquake but were important to them, such as Tree House. They put down bars that they did not like such as Goodbye Blue Monday. The young men expressed surprise at how many bars they would visit in a concentrated area depending on various occasions, the night of the week and who they were with.




Figure 12: Mental Map From Young Men’s Focus Group Showing Bars and Nightclubs They Visit

The CBD at night caters to different niche market segments as it is not one homogeneous space for drinking (Hobbs et al., 2003). Rather, there are places for listening to live music, music for dancing, karaoke, and quieter bars for conversation. Bars were also seen as suitable for different groups, according to age, ethnicity and class.

The young people also talked about going to different bars depending on what sort of friends they were with:

- | | |
|--------|---|
| Jethro | We actually go to a few establishments. |
| Wayne | When you write them down on a map // |
| Hemi | They’re all pretty close together. |
| Karen | You wouldn’t go over here, like we went to Rockpool, My Bar? |
| Jethro | It’s like, maybe once or twice a year when you’re having a really trash night out, maybe. Depending on who you’re with. When I go out with the real estate agents we always go to Malbas. |

Although the young people tended to pre-load with alcohol before they came into the CBD at night, they were also acutely aware of which bars offered the cheapest alcohol and when:

Wayne Christchurch Idol is a karaoke bar with very cheap rice vodka, so ---
Karen Right.
Hemi 11 standard drinks for something for like \$7 or something very vicious, yeah.
Wayne But, um, Treehouse is a karaoke bar, which is good fun.
All *[laughs]*
Hemi It's got a mechanical bull. But usually you pick places based on, what you said before, the sort of people who are going to be there. You're not going to like My Bar or Shooters because of the clientele *[laugh]*. But, ah, yeah ---
Wayne The RTD crowd.
Hemi The \$4 drinks crowd.
Karen What's that?
Hemi \$4 drinks. They do drinks specials that are like, before 11.30pm it's \$4 to drink.

The bars are offering diverse experiences and the young people in the focus groups are well aware of the different experiences that can be had in different bars and the types of people who would usually frequent the bars. In much the same way as day-time retailing targets and appeals to different market niches, so too does the night-time entertainment sector. Young people are aware of bars that catered more to the older age groups (i.e. 25–35 years and older) and bars that catered to different socio-economic groups:

Emily Shooters. That's on the corner here.
Alexia Yeah, but we don't go there. It's right next door to Boogie Nights.
Karen Are you too old for that now?
Rose Not too old but like it's a different it's different //
Cathy-Ann It's sleazy.

In this exchange, the young women compare and contrast bars next to each other. Some bars, such as Shooters, have a reputation, according to the young women, for sleaze and should be avoided. A similar discussion came up in the young men's focus group.

Karen We went there [Shooters] last night.
 Wayne Shooters!?
 Jethro It's disgusting, eh.
 Hemi It's a special breed in there.

Here Hemi, Jethro and Wayne all agree, Shooters is 'disgusting' and the reference to 'a special breed' is a derogatory comment meant for those who do like the bar Shooters. There is good humour in these comments, yet they also highlight the nuanced night-time geographies of young people. The night-time crowd is also divided by age and music style, as the next exchange highlights.

Karen So I just thought now, when you mentioned Twisted Hop, you haven't got Poplar Lane in there [map]. Do you go there?
 Jennex It's older people. *[laughs]*
 Lots Older people.
 Rose It's not even just that, it's more alternative like there's a place down there called, um, Goodbye Blue Monday, which is quite alternative //
 Emily It is a live band but it's, like, um
 Alexia Indie music and stuff like that sort of, yeah ---

Measham and Brain (2005) reporting on young people drinking in England note the high degree of market segmentation of establishments selling alcohol designed to appeal to a wide range of young people. A greater variety of drinking establishments have appeared in the United Kingdom since the mid-1990s. These appeal to a wider spectrum of young people than before, and offer new alcoholic drinks. Likewise, the variety of establishments and those whom they targeted were well understood by the research participants.

The photograph in Figure 13 below was provided by one of the male focus group participants to represent what a great night out is for him. He explains it as follows:

The drinks in the photo are called Jager bombs which is a shot of Jagermeister and a glass of red bull and the reason there's so many is because it's sort of like dominoes, when you hit the first one in it knocks the next one in and so on. This was basically a massive Jager Bomb train and had been put on by the bar for free for no apparent reason (there wasn't any special occasion). It was great cos it's

interesting to see people doing inventive things with drinks rather than just sculling a whole lot of beer, plus it was something you never see and really made it a unique night (and it was completely unexpected). (Hemi, 22 year old pakeha male student)



Figure 13: Photograph from Hemi Illustrating a Great Night Out

As evidenced in this image and the description by Hemi, young people appreciate establishments – bars and clubs – that make an effort to entertain the customers. These are party spaces with each bar having a different ‘vibe’. Businesses try hard to create unique experiences. Also important for Hemi and other focus group members is the price of alcohol. In order to keep the young people in bars, the entertainment must be good, and the price of alcohol low.

Concentration of Bars

A key part of the revitalisation strategies was creating precincts. Bars were concentrated within particular precincts, which the young people found useful and enjoyable as they did not have to walk far and socialising with friends was easier:

Jethro The thing with SOL I guess is, like, if you look at Yellow Cross and it's a huge line you'll go, let's go to Fish & Chip's instead.
Karen Because they're all so close?
Jethro Because they're all there and you can see where everyone is.

This corresponds with a bar owner interviewed about the concentration of bars within SOL Square. He admitted that some bars were not as profitable as others but when they were concentrated this was not such a commercial problem as people would move to another bar:

Karen So you don't mind that the Fish & Chip Shop doesn't make a lot of money because they move around your other ones?
Bar Owner Yeah, well honestly we're not into losing money. But in that particular precinct Fish & Chip's doesn't make any money at all. Fat Eddies makes good money, and the same for Yellow Cross. Fish & Chip's, because younger people pre-load. And that's the same with a lot of other places that are in that market like Mad Cow.

This bar owner then reflected on how the spatial configurations of pubs and bars had changed over time and the range of factors that had occurred to influence those spatial changes:

Karen So why did you become involved in businesses in the CBD?
Bar Owner Because ultimately that's where the people were. Oh, certainly, drinking culture has changed. Like the environment has changed dramatically from just the 20 years I've been in the industry. Obviously, drink driving had a huge effect. Sale of Liquor Act in 1992 changed and took the word 'need' out of the act. Previously in the act you had to prove a need before you could open a hotel. ... But when they took the word need out, as soon as a successful bar started, people wanted to buy the shop next door and set up a bar beside it to try and get their trade. So that brought in precincts and that would drag more people because they had more choices and they don't have to walk so far. So that was how, with that one little thing – taking the word out of the act – caused a whole change in the way we sold liquor or the way we entertained ourselves, really.
Karen So then it became much more concentrated?
Bar Owner Into precincts and areas.

The young people in the focus groups agreed with the bar owner – they went to particular places because a group of bars they enjoyed were located together. This concentration of bars of a similar type is a key to the young people being able to go out and walk from bar to bar:

- Karen So do you go to places because of the bar or is it because of where it is in town?
- Wayne Probably a bit of both. So ...
- Jethro Bars are generally better, based on where they are in town.
- All Yeah.
- Jethro Whereas, say, if you ask someone who drives a Nissan Skyline and is 17 years old they would probably have a completely different view on what is a really good bar and where to go in town.
- Hemi They'd be going to Shooters.
- Jethro Whereas we would say a better bar is SOL Square or Poplar Lane.
- Karen Ok. So what are you looking for in an area when you go out? Or is it just the bar?
- Hemi I suppose it's helpful when the bar is close to other bars 'cos if you do want to leave and go somewhere else you don't have to trek, you know, a hundred miles. Like Iconic sort of might suffer from that a bit because to get there you have to walk so far away from all these other bars and then all the way back if you don't want to be there. I guess that's why, um...
- Karen Especially now it's difficult with the road cut off.
- Hemi Yeah, and with SOL Square and Poplar Lane that just shows how it works because all those bars in one area makes it easy to get around.

Although the September 2010 earthquake caused relatively minor damage to the CBD, some buildings needed to be demolished. As a result, some roads were blocked, which affected where the young people could easily travel.

The bars catered to different groups of people or niche markets. This differentiation was obvious to the young people interviewed:

- Karen There's a definite feel to each place?
- Lots Yeah.
- Alexia Absolutely. And when you go in there you either know that you fit in or you know that you don't.
- Karen So how do you know?
- Alexia Just by looking at the people around you, by the feel of....

Alexia assesses the feel of a place by stepping into a bar and looking around. This type of 'affectual economy' (Larner 2009) gives an insight into the ways in which cities are lived and experienced.

Temporal Nature of the CBD

The actual time the participants spent in the CBD at night is relatively short. This brings into question why there is so much media and public attention on the young people's behaviour in the CBD at night-time. The young people acknowledged this when they discussed the times of the week and day they went into the CBD. For both groups, Saturday night was the preferred night. This was the night when the city was busiest, and for them, most exciting. Friday night tended to be a night to go out with work friends or family for drinks after work. They acknowledged that bars tried to entice young people into town on a Wednesday and Thursday night as well by offering discounted drink prices. The weather was also critically important. The young people tended to go out more in the warmer months than during winter. They acknowledged that the weather, even in the summer was critical to whether they would go out and how long they would stay out:

- Karen So is town really only buzzing on a Saturday?
Hemi Yeah.
Karen Just one night a week? So all the other nights are pretty quiet?
Wayne Oh, Thursday and Friday is not so quiet but the other nights //
Jethro They tried to sort of get Wednesday night going as well for a while.
Wayne Yeah, you don't really ... A lot of the times the bars themselves won't even be open. Like those bigger places like Shooters and Malbas will only be open sort of 3 nights a week, sort of thing.
Jethro See, if you go out on a Thursday, like Malbas is one of the busiest places, that and Iconic for example are quite busy.
Wayne Yeah, those sort of places that do the drink specials.

A typical Saturday night would start at around 11pm in the CBD. Going in any later such as 11.30pm or midnight would be difficult because of the lack of taxis. They also did not like to go in any later as that would mean that they would often have to queue to get into their favourite bars. This was something they no longer liked because they were older (all were 23 years old or younger). The time when the young people left the

CBD varies. It is usually around 3am. This means they are in town for only about 4 hours on a Saturday night, and generally, between once a week or twice a month, depending on whether they are earning money or not and whether it is winter or summer.

The definition of when the night time starts is crucial to understanding the sometimes conflicting reports about both the ideal type of consumers in the CBD and the activities that occur there. As the Police Sergeant who leads the alcohol strategy and enforcement team clarified:

The city has three distinct time zones. You have the day-time economy, the evening economy, which is primarily restaurants and used to include the Court Theatre and the Isaac Theatre and those sorts of things. And then you've got the night-time economy. So day-time, evening, night-time. Now night-time usually starts at around about 12 o'clock, 1 o'clock in the morning, because people have this propensity to pre-load. (Police Sergeant, interview September 2011)

This definition agrees with my own observations during the night. On the first occasion out at night in SOL Square, I arrived at 9.45pm and sat in the outside area of a bar. It had been very quiet but suddenly people started to arrive and the noise levels increased noticeably. This was very much an older age group and included a few groups of international tourists. The rest of the people were in couples talking animatedly. There was a 21st party upstairs at the Yellow Cross Bar complete with fancy dress costumes and that was closed to the general public. At 10pm bouncers came on duty and shortly after two policemen arrived and talked to the bouncers. There were now more people around. There were groups of older men (50 years and older) coming into drink and groups of older people walking through SOL Square and gazing in on the people sitting at the bar. I left at 11.30pm and at that time no one was visibly drunk, and it was still predominantly an older group of patrons.

My second observations started at 12.15pm at the Mad Cow Bar. I wanted to visit as many of the bars mentioned by the young women's focus group as possible. In stark contrast to my first observations, the average age was much younger and I was now

one of the few older people around, either on the streets or in the bars. The bouncer at the Mad Cow smiled at me and did not even put a stamp on my hand. I left the CBD at 2.30am after visiting four more bars and passing numerous others. As the Police Sergeant had identified, there was a marked change in the age groups visiting the CBD. I observed the changeover happening between 11pm and 1am, as noted by the focus group participants and the police that young people go into town around 11pm or midnight and leave between 2 and 4am:

Karen And then once you get into [town], this is like on your typical night, what time would you leave town?
Hemi It depends on the night, I guess, how much of a good time you're having.
Jethro I rarely go before 2.30am 3am.
Wayne Yeah. An early night would be, yeah, 2.
Karen And like last night?
Hemi I don't know what time we got home.
Wayne I think it may have been //
Jethro We were in BK (Burger King) about 2.30, 3.
Wayne I think I got home about 3.30.

Councillors and other interviewees spoke about the need to make the CBD at night a more civilised place that older people could enjoy and not be put off by young people misbehaving. Comparisons were drawn to Melbourne's night-life by the business representative:

The security at night, particularly, of the central city was perceived to be not adequate and discouraged people from going in there. It turned into a bit of a playground for wild young people and the perception was that it wasn't a good place to go, particularly in the evening, which is a real shame because if you go to places like Melbourne, it's completely the opposite. Everyone goes into the central city and has a good time. (Business representative, interview October 2011)

From my observations, however, older people were enjoying what the bars had to offer in terms of eating and drinking and sitting at outside tables until around 11.30pm. The young people did not dominate the night until after midnight. While the literature often refers to a need to have a more inclusive night time (Roberts & Eldridge, 2009) it is debatable whether older people actually want to stay in the CBD

after midnight. As this former (older) councillor notes, he goes into the CBD to dine which usually happens before midnight.

I was selective, I would go to the Terrace [The Strip], the odd time into SOL Square. I only ever once visited Poplars. Didn't enjoy it as much as I enjoyed SOL Square. 'Cos I would like to eat as well as enjoy a drink. And I could do that on the Terrace [The Strip], and I could do it in SOL Square, the Fish & Chip's [bar], for instance, is a love of ours, less so in the Poplars. (Former Councillor A, interview September, 2011)

A business representative, however, does believe older people want to use the CBD after 11pm. He was also confident that the purpose of the revitalisation was to attract young people into the city late at night. He had been in the CBD late at night, past midnight, had experienced what it was like, and he did not like it. He contrasted it with his experience in Auckland where he had been during the Rugby World Cup, "Everyone was having a good time but no one was vomiting, no one was urinating, no one was beating up on some other people, and they were just having fun." He went on to compare his Auckland experience with that of Christchurch:

Our kids are going crazy in there late at night. And they're young kids, I mean really young kids. And that to me is a very dysfunctional situation. What we should be seeing in our central city, is families having a good time, people like me being able to go in there and feel comfortable, young people having a good time but all together, integrated community enjoying themselves. Well that's not what you saw in the central city. (Business representative, interview October 2011)

It is debateable whether comparison between Auckland during the Rugby World Cup festivities, where there were planned and organised festivities, and Christchurch on an ordinary weekend evening is fair. Whether families wish to be out past midnight is also a moot point. The business representative is, however, articulating a widely held view the CBD should be a more inclusive place at all hours of the night. Whether the term 'night-time' means the early evening as well as past midnight, needs to be clarified when speaking to people.

In the view of one current councillor, the Council was not providing alternative options for young people at night and indeed was not good at responding to articulated young people's needs in general:

You look at the boy racer issue. The idea of having a burn out pad or a youth facility for car enthusiasts has been raised repeatedly, but hasn't happened. Issues around safety, late night transport options, under age venues in town, you know, non alcoholic venues with local music. You know a lot of stuff that has been asked for but we've been very slow to act on [it]. (Current Councillor A, September 2011)

Based on the young people's comments earlier, however, some of the participants did not want to come into the CBD at night if they were not going to drink.

The above councillor contends that the Council had been almost anti-young people concerning the CBD:

- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| Current Councillor A | Cashel Mall redevelopment is a really good example of how not to engage with young people. It's just terrible. Thirteen year olds were arrested outside the Stewart Fountain. And the Council had no qualms about doing that. |
| Karen | From an outsider's point of view it seemed, the whole Cashel Mall, High Street, Stewart Fountain, was a way to exclude young people from there. |
| Current Councillor A | Oh, yes absolutely. And they set up a working party to name the Hack Circle because they wanted to change the name which was bizarre. It never had a name in the first place. And they spent like 2 years meeting and couldn't come up with anything. What a waste of time. Actually, what's bad about young people outdoors kicking a hacky sack. I mean it's great, it's exercise, it's getting them away from TVs and computers and outdoors, healthy thing. I mean the classical music! It's all about gentrifying the inner city... and it seems to be the public space has really gone into private space. And it's not to say that we shouldn't support inner-city retailing. But actually, a lot of young people spend a lot of money, and most marketing targets young people so it's a real contradiction. It's like, if you're a rich young person you're welcome and you're well behaved but if you don't have money |

and you're a bit wild you're not welcome. Public space should be about a place where people can play and it shouldn't be about who can afford it or who can't. (Current Councillor A, September 2011)

This current councillor describes how the Council spent time renaming a public space that was used by young people to play the game hacky sack. It had been known informally as the Hack Circle. The revitalisation of this area removed their favoured spot for playing the game and where they used to congregate during the day. The business owners in the area wanted a new name to reflect the revitalised area (Gates, 2009). The Stewart Fountain, further along from the hacky sack playing area, also a place that young people used during the day, had classical music broadcast around it to deter young people from spending time in the area. The Council was, therefore, consciously trying to exclude certain young people from these public spaces during the day and through the revitalisation. This councillor also felt that there was a need for alternative entertainment options for young people.

Transport Issues

When the young people were asked what they did not like about the CBD at night, one of the problems was transport. They had all tried public transport but these buses generally did not go late enough, were not frequent enough, did not run to where they wanted to go in the CBD, were relatively expensive, and were difficult to co-ordinate with a group of friends. They usually used taxis, and they acknowledged there was a shortage of taxis at the key times – 11.30pm to go into the CBD and around 3 to 3.30am, when they needed to go home.

The young women appeared to be more organised than the young men in their travel arrangements. This in part was because they would usually begin their night out at one of the houses of the young women. They therefore had to negotiate how to get to that place at the beginning of the night as well as get from there into the CBD and then home:

Karen So how did you get there last night? Like, how did you get to Emily's?

Emily I usually go and retrieve most of them.

Karen And then you got your brother to drop you all off in town?

Emily [Emily's brother] works at 6.30 on a Sunday morning so he is probably not going out.

Karen How do you get home then?

Cathy-Ann Taxi.

Jennex Yeah, we hunt around for a taxi. Well there's normally like more than – you never go by yourself. We're always with two of us, like, share. And we even know some taxi drivers.

Alexia And if I'm alone I'll always go for a particular type of person.

Cathy-An Yeah, like you always look at the driver as well.

Rose I don't think that we've ever had a horrifying experience. You just really do notice the difference between a good guy and a bad one.

The young woman are aware they are drunk when they are coming home in a taxi and therefore have to be aware of safety, the taxi driver and taxi company they choose. The cost of the taxi is factored into their night out. If they are sharing a taxi, the cost is often less than an individual bus pass, if it were available. While in the city, the young women tended to stay together as a group for safety reasons. They were conscious of looking out for each other and if they did become separated, they tried to stay in touch by cell phone.

Transgressing: "I'm so much more awesome when I'm drunk"³⁰

The young people openly acknowledged that they transgressed the 'norms' of conduct when they went out at night. Drinking enabled them to do that. Drinking is the defining feature of the young people's nights out together. Measham and Brain (2005), in their study of young people drinking in Manchester in 2004, confirmed that young people plan to go out and get drunk. They called this "deliberate and determined drunkenness" (2005, p. 272). The focus group participants also had this planned approach to drunkenness and instituted measures to ensure it would happen quickly and for the least cost. For example, to enhance and accelerate the intoxication effects of drinking some of the young people interviewed do not usually eat till the end of their evening on their way home around 3am:

³⁰ Quote from young person focus group.

Alexia But we don't normally eat before we drink wine.
 Emily I don't like eating and drinking.
 Alexia Yeah, Emily pretty much usually doesn't have dinner.
 Karen And the rest of you do?
 Cathy-Ann I'll drink and I get really hungry.
 Emily Yeah, well, that's the thing. But I can't eat like during the day.
 Alexia I would have dinner every time.
 Karen So why don't you eat?
 Emily Oh, it takes just so much more effort to get drunk. *[laugh]* More to throw up.
 Alexia To be honest, I'd appreciate it if they ate a bit more before they drunk.
 Jennex I'm not hungry when I'm going out.
 Emily Me either. No, 'cos I know I'm going to eat bad food at the end of it all. *[laugh]*

The young people interviewed said they drank so that they could be less inhibited in their actions and do things they would not normally do without the effects of alcohol. Paradoxically, being drunk removed inhibitions and gave them the ability to behave in ways that made them feel more in control of their actions and their environment. Being drunk allowed them to behave in uncivilised ways. They enjoyed these acts of transgression, which were a major part of the reasons why they drank and then went into the CBD:

Karen What do you like about drinking?
 Rose Social, like the social.
 Emily Oh, we just want to be so invincible don't we, Cathy-Ann.
 Cathy-Ann Yes, we do.
 Alexia Yes, it definitely loosens you up a lot. Sort of, 'cos you know throughout your week you've probably had some hard things or whatever.
 Rose I just like the mischief we get up too.
 Lots Yeah.
 Cathy-Ann You're invincible, and new stories.
 Rose I love waking up the next day and thinking, oh, my God, what about how we did that //
 Emily Who was that, who was that?
 Lots *[laughs]*

They continue:

- Rose You get into mischief.
Emily The entertainment levels are right there.
Rose I'm so much more awesome when I'm drunk.
Jennex Yeah, like, people are able to shine. Like, take [friend] for instance.
 He's really, really quiet. He's a really cool guy. He will open up a lot
 more.
Emily Same with [friend]]. I remember when [friend] first started
 drinking and she was just a completely different person.
Rose Normally, I mean, it doesn't change who we are it's more that you
 just don't care.

The young men openly admitted that they wanted to go beyond their normal
behaviour:

- Hemi I still generally have the intention of getting drunk and then going
 nuts in town.
All Yeah.
Karen So when you do go into town what are the reasons?
Hemi Umm //
Karen To carry on with a party?
Jethro Yeah, yeah, meet up with people that weren't at the party. Get on
 the piss with them and get a bit crazy.

The threshold of behaviour of the focus group participants is also higher than would normally be acceptable during the daytime, although when the behaviour escalates to violence it is less well tolerated. Their own risk analysis allows the young people to rationalise it as part of the trade-off required for the enjoyment of the night. Winlow and Hall (2006) also documented this link between alcohol, violence, and pleasure-seeking. In their research they note that young people are very aware of the reduction in what they call "social control ... and reduction in moral and behavioural regulation" (2006, p. 95) and that this can be closely linked to an increase in violence. This violence, however, does not necessarily lead to young people forgoing the night-time attractions:

- Rose Which is what happens when you walk into Shooters. Like, you
 walk through Shooters and you'll get like //
All Groped [laughs]

Alexia I think through town you'd probably be surprised at how often you get touched. They don't even look at you. It's just like, that's a bum, grab it. That's a breast, grab it.

While these quotes suggest young people are much less inhibited at night because of the use of alcohol, and therefore allow and perform certain behaviours, their resistance to being civilised for a specific spatial and temporal period is clear. Their resistance is not an organised, aware, political movement but, rather, a form of resistance enacted through their bodies on the streets against the controls and moral values to be civilised.

From my observations the young people looked very comfortable at night in the CBD spaces. This was confirmed by the police:

Karen they [young people] look very comfortable in the CBD at night. It's like theirs. Do you get that sense at all about young people in the CBD at night?

Police Sergeant Yeah, I do. Young people take ownership. Once they arrive in there they take ownership of the place and they do what they want to do.

Unlike Winlow and Hall (2006) study of young people in the north east of England, where it was found that young people were anxiously competitive and facing increasing violence, the young people in this Christchurch study were optimistic and enjoying themselves. Violence, while present, was not a major concern:

Wayne It's not too bad inside, like, Poplar Lane and SOL Square. But when you're walking around going to fast food joints, after, when you're about to go home.

Hemi Yeah, that fast food area tends to be a bit of a hot spot around 3 o'clock in the morning when people have all left the bars and trying to get food and they're all lining up, trying to get home, sort out with people, something just happens.

Wayne I've seen a few fights around there.

Despite saying that violence was less noticeable around SOL Square, Hemi went on to describe a time when he was a victim of violence:

Hemi I've been beaten up in town before. I got absolutely thrashed last year.

Karen Really?

Hemi Me and some mates were lining up at Fish & Chip's to go upstairs, 'cos the lines go upstairs, and, um, we sort of cut in the side of the line. This girl in front of us said 'oh, you know, what are you doing?' We said, 'oh, you're in front of us, you shouldn't worry about it, face the front'. The guys behind us got really angry, grabbed me around the throat and my mate grabbed him around the throat and they backed off. But somehow they got upstairs before us. You have to go up 2 by 2 and as soon as my foot hit the top step I got king hit and kicked in the head by about 7 people, all his mates that were up there and stuff. They split my lip and I had to go home with blood all over me. It's the first time I've ever had any trouble in town but I actually still feel safe in town 'cos that was just a complete freak, out-of-the-blue thing that happens.

Karen And then what happened after you got hit? Did the bouncers break it up?

Hemi Yeah, that's the thing, the bouncers tend to shirk their responsibilities quite a bit as well.

Karen Shirk?

Hemi Yeah, like, they let the guys who beat me up in there and then when I went to go back in there to get an ID on these guys so I can go to the police, they wouldn't let me. They just want to offload, to get you out of the way so they don't have to have responsibility for you. The first question the bar manager asked me when I went back on Monday or the Sunday was, was it inside the bar, 'cos if it's outside the bar it's not their problem.

Karen So do you get the feeling that they just pushed it out on the street and then they don't care?

Hemi Basically, yeah.

Karen And you other two have, you felt unsafe? Has anything happened to you?

Jethro Oh, it's not so much that you feel unsafe per se, it's just that, I don't know, there's always basically shit going on around. Like, you always, like, you can't go out in town without seeing someone in a scrap or someone mouthing off. And you avoid it, like, it's easy enough to avoid it, just take no notice.

Hemi You keep your wits around you and after a while you know how to deal with those things, you know how to avoid them and all that, but I guess the people that haven't been in that situation before sometimes might.

Hemi's main resentment related not to the violence but to the fact that the bouncers, and the bar manager the following day, were concerned only whether the incident had happened in the bar or outside of it. Violence in the night and the use of bouncers to

assist in its regulation has been very well documented (Hobbs et al., 2003; Hobbs et al., 2000; Hobbs et al., 2005). In this incident, Hemi's risk analysis does not deter him from going back to the CBD at night:

- Wayne I got mugged in first year [of university].
Hemi Did you?
Jethro I mean, I haven't really had any problems recently but certainly back when I was in the Halls [of residence at university], and to be fair, the group of mates I was with, there were a couple of guys that weren't the kind of guys to back away from anything. So as soon as someone said anything they would spark up and next thing you know you're being dragged in 'cos your mates are in it. There was nothing in it, it was sort of handbags at ten paces most of them but *[laughs]*.
- Karen And, Wayne, did you say that you've been mugged?
Thomas Yeah, *[laughs]*, oh, the guy I was with got robbed in town by a big Māori boy opposite Burger King.
Jethro Opposite Burger King?
Wayne Yeah.
Hemi Was it quite populated?
Wayne Oh, outside Real Groovy on Colombo Street. Down by McDonalds, really.
Jethro A friend just got attacked as well.
Wayne Yeah.
Jethro He broke his eye socket and the whole works. Like he just got set upon. He was walking with two girls I think, just walking down Worcester Street towards from the Bicycle Thief [bar and restaurant] towards town and three guys just came out and pushed him and started beating the hell out of him.
Hemi Yeah, a lot of stuff happens in those isolated places where there's not the big crowds around the people. Heaps of stuff still happens in those areas but they pick people out in those areas.

While physical violence was only mentioned by the young men's focus group they did not expressly equate it with the use of alcohol. They believed violence was mainly carried out in an unprovoked and random manner by other young men who were not in town to drink but rather to 'scrap'.

Controlling

In 2006, the Christchurch City Council, the police, and Community and Public Health, met. They wanted collectively to be more proactive in dealing to the problems, as they

saw it, in the CBD at night. They established the Inner City Alcohol Accord. This policy brought in a voluntary One-Way Door Policy where once a person leaves a licensed premise after 3am in the morning they cannot enter any other licensed premises (Christchurch City Council, 2009a). The police in Christchurch felt this was an effective strategy to curb the drunkenness on weekends. The Christchurch Police Sergeant explains:

And that, I mean, I used to come to work at 6.30 in the morning and a lot of people on day shift came in for their early shift would see people staggering around the streets at 7 o'clock or 8 o'clock in the morning. They had been drinking all night. Whereas that [one-way door policy] changed that because normally those places would be closed by 4. So that made a big, big difference. And started to get the industry working together and working with the agencies to come up with some good ideas on what we can do. (Police Sergeant, interview September 2011)

A liquor-licensing inspector who had been at the Council for 20 years, including as a resource management enforcement officer, thought the Alcohol Accord had been a staff initiative between the various agencies and not a councillor-driven process:

... it's all been done from the bottom up. It's not driven from councillors doing anything or any committee pushing us to do something. It's all been done by the inspectors, by the police, by the community public health getting together and saying, look we know this is a problem let's deal with it. So we've actually gone out and addressed those issues. We established the CBD Alcohol Accord...the issue we were concerned with was crime and violence late at night. You know, there was just too much of it. There was a complete barrage of negative press. There was no support from up top and there still isn't today, although they'd like to think there is. But we got those kind of things, it's hard to sort of say, but we got those things done. Started communicating with the licensees, brought in the one-way door policy and as they started cutting back on 24 hour licences bringing off-licences back all those type of things, dealing with the party buses. None of that is Council driven. (Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

This view that the Alcohol Accord was a staff initiative is partly reinforced by the former mayor in that he did not think that there were any real problems in the CBD at

night. Any problems arising, were in his view, because of pre-loading and not the fault of the bars:

Karen Media over time and the police weren't very happy about the young people in the city at night-time.
Former Mayor To me, I didn't agree with the cops and a lot of what they said. (Former Mayor, interview December 2011)

When asked whether the CBD revitalisation projects such as SOL Square, Poplar Lane, and The Strip, had had an impact on the city, the inspector believed their concentration was a factor:

Licensing Inspector We developed precincts as opposed to bars. Yes, Christchurch is a funny place because of its geographical location. You know the way the bars were set up. You can go out for a night's entertainment because there's so many of them, 60 something bars in the centre city. You can start your night in The Strip, wander up to SOL Square, across to Poplar Lane, down to the Cashel Manchester corner and back into The Strip. It's that moving around that gives it quite a vibrant sort of thing and of course there's a lot of people out there doing that.

Karen And has that created more problems?

Licensing Inspector Yes, for the simple reason that, as I alluded to before, most of the problems actually happen not in licensed premises anymore. We just don't see the fights in there because of security, duty managers doing their job better. You get that argy bargee when people walk past each other. (Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

The local newspaper, *The Press*, in its many newspaper articles on young people and the night echoed many of the sentiments of the police sergeant and the licensing inspector. Ironically, a recent article on the rebuild of Christchurch following the earthquakes heralded the arrival back into the CBD of the bars and nightclubs (See Figure 14).




Figure 14: Collage of CBD Night-Time Newspaper Headlines

Source: The Press 2008-2014

Young people were very perceptive about the paradox that the Council found themselves in between wanting to increase any sort of activity within the CBD even if it only turned out to be the night-time economy, and being seen as concerned with the behaviour of young people and wanting a safer city image.

Young people felt that the initiatives set up by the Alcohol Accord, such as the 3am one-way door policy, were just a token effort to control the night time environment in order to be seen to be doing something:

Jethro ... a huge amount of the problem, in my mind, is that you've got those authorities like the police and the Council and often you just get the impression that they want to be seen to be doing something.

Hemi It's definitely easy to point the finger at young people and say it's all your fault. But, like I said earlier with, um, bars just kicking you out and not being their problem anymore, even though they got you drunk or got you beaten up or something, bars definitely need to take more responsibility for the state they get them in and not just pushing them out and saying no, it's your problem now.

Karen And how would be the best way to get your contribution?

Jethro I reckon the best way to do it would be to, which ever private developer was, um, doing, actually building stuff, would be better to go directly to them rather than going via Council process. I'd rather go straight to the person whose doing it.

Wayne Mmm, especially if you gave them large sections instead of having, like, those one building where it would be like that building inside that's fine. But when there's a group of buildings knocked over if they were, sort of, if one person's doing – redeveloping – them all. It would be quite...that would be the thing that you'd want, as opposed to all disjointed.

Hemi Yeah, 'cos I guess that's how SOL Square worked out with Dave Henderson doing it all in one big go.

These young men would like to bypass the Council with their suggestions for revitalisation and go straight to the developers. The police had a different view and one that was linked to planning:

Karen What would you like the Council to do differently in the rebuild of the city?

Police Sergeant To get the synergies between the day-time, evening, and night-time right. So that you just don't design something for the day-time or the evening. You've actually got to design it around thinking what's going to happen at night. Either that or shut the city at 12 o'clock. ... Have something for young people. You've got to actually give them something to do which is safe. Think about the relationship between getting people in and getting people out and then what do they want to do. So you have to have a transport system that accommodates the night-time economy. And you have to have a food service industry that accommodates it but in a safe way. That's what they've got to do, get those synergies right. (Police Sergeant, interview September 2011)

The liquor licensing inspector felt that some of the public and elected representatives outcry over young people's drinking was fuelled by misunderstanding different patterns of drinking and different types of alcohol. He was concerned over the Council's use of liquor bans in public spaces which he did not think was warranted as he saw the problem as litter, not intoxicated people in public spaces.

Licensing Inspector I got opposition to a Henry's liquor store going in. And around the corner is a supermarket. I got 85 objections for the Henry's bottle store, I got 5 objections for the new supermarket. And if you think it through logically supermarkets sell roughly 17 times more liquor than all independent retailers. So if you actually ask yourself where is the booze coming from, it's coming from supermarkets.

Karen Is it because people are worried about hard liquor or RTDs,³¹ spirits?

Licensing Inspector That's another good point. Because if you look at most of the RTD's they're only 5% or 4%, they're exactly the same as beer.

Karen So what do you think is going on here?

Licensing Inspector It's not their drink. So they are seeing that as a problem, it's a young person's drink. And young people litter it's just the way of it. So they're seeing it [litter] around the place and that becomes their focus. They just have a perception that if it is an RTD it must be harmful. (Licensing Inspector, interview October 2011)

³¹ RTDs stand for Ready to Drink mixes.

The media's fascination with young people drinking in the CBD at night and the Council's concern to be seen to have a safe city has perhaps overly highlighted young people's drinking practices. Other places where drinking occurs were seen as more of a concern to the police and do not get the same attention from the media or Council:

Uncontrolled drinking environments are our biggest problem. 65 plus per cent of what Police are dealing with in regards to alcohol is uncontrolled drinking environments. So it's people drinking at home, people drinking in the streets, people drinking at parties, they're the biggest problem that we have. Licensed premises by and large do a reasonable job. (Police Sergeant, interview September 2011)

Controlling the night-time economy, according to the interviewees, was an initiative led by district licensing staff, the police and community health. They believed that the Alcohol Accord, which included a one-way door policy and restricting closing hours, had helped alleviate violence and crime. It was acknowledged problems were not occurring within bars because of the use of security guards. This is similar to the studies conducted by Winlow and Hall (2006). Problems with violence were occurring within public spaces because of the geography of the concentration of bars through a revitalisation strategy of precincts.

Conclusion

This chapter has documented how young people within Christchurch used the Council created revitalised spaces. From around midnight, there was almost a carnival type atmosphere, in which young people predominated. The spaces contributed to this atmosphere because of their concentrated nature: small alleyways; multiple bars; nightclubs within those confined spaces; and, outdoor features where people could linger. This concentration of bars and restaurants into precincts was vital for the alcohol industry as the young people and bar owner attest to. It was also a key strategy of the revitalisation process. Young people have been framed problematic because of their behaviour. New regulations were introduced to curb the worst excesses of their behaviour but at the same time allow the night-time economy to continue functioning because of its importance for a vibrant city centre that attracts visitors.

The following chapter discusses these points, along with the issues raised in the previous two data chapters, in relation to the theory and literature examined in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION: POWERFUL PLANNING PARADOXES

Power is everywhere: not that it engulfs everything, but that it comes from everywhere. (Foucault, 1998, p. 122)

This research uses governmentality as an analytical tool to examine the practices of local governance, in particular, decision-making techniques and the exercise of power. The concept has been adopted for its utility in understanding how governing has changed and what technologies have been invoked by elected representatives, staff, and outside organisations. It also assisted understanding of the lived realities of the young people who use revitalised CBD spaces. The concept of governmentality is particularly useful for understanding power relations within local governance. In governmentality terms, governing involves many other actors and institutions within and beyond the state, a concept at the core of local governance. As Walters (2012) argues, contemporary governance is a subset of governmentality, that is, one of the many modes of governing that has occurred over time. Governmentality is centrally concerned with relations of power and the investigation of rationalities, techniques, and technologies to shape conduct. This thesis documents how governing relationships changed to privilege particular interests, and suppress others. Relations of power are diffuse and relate not only to interactions within the state, but also to interactions beyond the state. In this research, these interactions occurred within Christchurch City Council and between the Council and outside organisations and individuals. A political rationality emerged about ways of governing that helped create ways of thinking about the CBD, what needed to happen within the CBD, and how that should be done.

In this chapter, the data on governance and decision-making (Chapters 5 and 6) are linked to the data on young people's experience of the CBD at night-time (Chapter 7). Young people are the subjects of the revitalised CBD and their voices are included in this research. As Gibson-Graham (2006) note, governmentality studies do not always

include the voices of their subjects and the process of governing and creating subjects is therefore always incomplete. This thesis has attempted to join the voices of young people, as subjects, with those of the governors.

Foucault's understanding of power relations was founded on the linkages between knowledge and power. For Foucault, knowledge is constitutive of power. In other words, Francis Bacon's (as cited in Flyvbjerg, 1998) famous saying that, "knowledge is power" is turned around and is succinctly described by Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 27) as, "power *defines* what counts as knowledge and rationality." This chapter, therefore, draws from concepts in the local governance literature, such as networks, partnerships, leadership, and key stakeholders, and follows the structure of governmentality by examining specific political rationalities, technologies, and techniques of government that arose from a detailed examination of the CBD revitalisation project and the spaces that it created. This is what Walters (2012, p. 58) calls the "specificity of governance" and that Rose et al. (2006, p. 97) state are the "cutting edges of governmentality". This examination is followed by the voices of the young people who use these spaces and who are, in turn, shaped by them. Finally, the chapter widens the discussion to include the significance of the findings for local government in New Zealand.

Political Rationalities of Christchurch's CBD

Political rationalities, according to governmentality analysts, are ways of thinking about a problem so that it becomes amenable to technologies of government. Following Foucault, Lemke (2001) argues that power can only be studied when the political rationalities supporting it have been analysed. Framing a problem becomes crucial so that it can become amendable to technologies of government and ways of intervention.

Vibrant City Centre

Within this research, the framing of the problem of the CBD can be pinpointed to a particular event – when the Dovey and Hay (1999) report was presented to the

Council. This report framed the problem of the CBD with statistics to show the extent of the retail and commercial sector that had moved to the suburbs and industrial zones of the city. It also reported on work the mayor had undertaken on his own initiative, for the past year, on new ways to tackle this problem of decline in the CBD. The political rationality that emerged was the need to create a vibrant city centre that would attract businesses. The interventions or technologies of government flowing from this new political rationality are covered in subsequent sections but first it is important to examine the background and context of why the mayor's fellow elected representatives were willing to consider new technologies.

Circumventing Planning

As was evident in the interviews, the former mayor in particular, but also other elected representatives, were frustrated in their ability to plan for the city. They directed their frustration at the RMA and their own District Plan developed under this legislation. The mayor observed that the RMA had put power into the hands of planners, lawyers, and engineers, which he implied, had been taken away from the elected representatives. Other interviewees, both elected members and former senior staff, also attested to the fact that it had proved difficult to contain activities to particular zones within the city. Evidence suggests that Christchurch City Council took a strict approach in its first District Plan, attempting to follow closely the intent of the new RMA.

Central government passed the RMA during a period of market-led reforms and it reflects the emphasis of allowing the market to function with interventions by planners through a Council's District Plan confined to managing the effects of an activity. Implementation of the Act involved managing the effects of activities and not controlling the actual activities themselves. Under the Act, the difficulties of planning for urban, and in particular, for social and economic well-being have been well documented in the literature (Grundy & Gleeson, 1996; Gunder & Mouat, 2002; Memon & Gleeson, 1995; C. L. Miller, 2011). Christchurch City Council was one of the Councils that attempted to implement the Act in an effects-based form (Ericksen et al., 2003; C. L. Miller, 2011). Under the RMA, potentially any activity could be permitted

provided its adverse effects on the environment could be avoided, remedied or mitigated. Christchurch City Council became known among planners as implementing an effects-based plan that proved difficult to make work. As Miller states, although the Christchurch City District Plan, “retained zones as a basic means to separate incompatible uses, it proved complex to use ” (C. L. Miller, 2011, p. 184). This also accords with the work of Baker et al. (2006) who found that effects-based, or using their term, performance-based regimes, such as New Zealand’s are difficult to implement and administer. They note that, like Christchurch’s District Plan, performance-based rules have to be connected back to traditional zoning to provide some degree of certainty.

The Act, combined with the Council’s approach to its District Plan and crucial decisions by elected representatives at the time of the District Plan hearings, meant that the Council’s ability to shape the growth and direction of the city’s residential, office, and retail development was severely hampered. In hindsight, most of the elected representatives interviewed – both current and earlier – regretted the direction the Council had taken with its land-use planning. It was not until Variation 86 to the District Plan was made operative in 2009 that the Council was able to limit the extent of office and retail development in the industrial zones. They recognised that the declining attractiveness of the CBD was partially due to the spread and growth of offices in business parks and retail in covered malls in the suburbs, and the Council’s failure to limit this growth. The Council allowed ‘the market to decide’ where retail and office activities were located and the mayor was particularly frustrated with this approach. Peck (2013) argues that this is emblematic of neoliberal reformers:

This may also help to explain the mood, or temper, of the neoliberal reformer—endlessly frustrated, impatient, seeing (potential) setbacks at every turn and socialist-interventionists under every bed, and as a result always (re)targeting obstacles to, and opponents of, the rolling program of market-oriented transformation. (p. 16)

Recent 2013 RMA amendments are designed, in part, to streamline the processes within the Act so that consents are processed more quickly (Ministry for the

Environment, 2013). None of the amendments address the concern raised in this research, which is that the effects-based nature of the RMA inhibits comprehensive planning. This reinforces the comments of Bührs (quoted in D. Young, 2007) and Baker et al. (2006). Streamlining processes of the RMA will not solve the inherent difficulties of an effects-based or performance-based regime of planning. By its very nature, a performance-based regime will always be administratively intensive, litigious and difficult to implement. Councils have turned to non-statutory planning and local governance processes such as partnerships and participation. In order, however, to implement the findings from these processes either councils have to resort back to the RMA to direct development or have to be actively involved in the development process. In Christchurch City Council's case, it commenced the RMA process to halt the proliferation of retail and office premises in the industrial areas in 2002. It took until 2009 for that variation to be made operative because of appeals through the court system. This delay and uncertain outcome was part of the justification, by the participants in this study, for the Council's revitalisation process and purchasing significant tracts of land in the CBD for development.

It is now acknowledged, by others (Aburn, 2006), and the Council itself (Christchurch City Council, 2006a, pp. 12-13), that elected representatives sitting on a hearing committee permitted the removal of previous restrictions on retailing in largely industrial zones. The councillors, at that time, had accepted the view from some submitters that a liberal approach should be taken with regards to the retail distribution within the city. A former senior manager agreed with this. When the Council realised the impact of this decision it then took some time to bring in new rules via Variation 86 through the RMA. Planners, however, still seem particularly wedded to the notion of localised effects of activities. This is seen in the 2012 post-earthquake Environment Court hearing of the Styx Centre retail and commercial development, where Christchurch City Council planners did not submit evidence on the effects of new retail development on the outskirts of the city on the recently devastated CBD. It was left to the judge to restrict the extent of development that could occur (see footnote 23).

Given this background of difficulties with the RMA and the Council's District Plan, it is possible to see why the mayor's fellow elected representatives were willing to consider a new political rationality for viewing the CBD. The new rationality was that the CBD needed to be vibrant and differentiate itself from the suburbs so that businesses would be attracted back to the centre (Dovey & Hay, 1999). This rationality did not solely rely on the need to resort to regulation, which in any event had been difficult to achieve and is still regarded by some councillors as undesirable (R. Young, 2014). Interviewees also expressed concerns that the CBD needed to compete with other cities both in New Zealand and globally. The CBD's main competitors, however, were the suburbs. The Council preferred to use non-statutory, rather than zoning or other regulations, to achieve planning objectives. Le Galès (2011) notes that often when one policy instrument fails another is sought. Le Gales and Lascoumes (2007) suggest that there has been a move away from regulations with a "command and control" emphasis to a "form of regulation by information – one that privileges persuasion" (Lascoumes & Le Galès, p. 16). Rather than use planning regulations as a policy instrument, the Council turned to its own resources to enhance the public spaces to create a CBD that it believed people and retailers would want to come to without the coercion of planning regulations. As Peck (2013) states, circumscribed and limited regulation is emblematic of neoliberalism. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) demonstrate that this was the case in their study of thirteen cities in Europe. Revitalisation projects superseded a city's plan as a viable alternative and had the added attraction of creating a feature that could add to its competitive edge.

The Council created a political rationality for the need for a vibrant city centre, which eventually justified the Council's investment both in public spaces and private property purchases. This seductive appeal of 'incentives' rather than 'sticks' for the Council has continued with the rebuild of the city after the earthquake (R. Young, 2014).

The RMA operated - in Christchurch's case - as was intended by the architects of the Act. That is, a market-led approach allowing the market to decide where activities should be located. The Council then allocated public resources in order to attract certain sectors of the market into revitalised CBD spaces. Businesses were, therefore,

relatively unfettered in choosing where to locate and, furthermore, were subsidised into locations where they were 'wanted' by the Council. Rather than seeing this as a failure of the RMA, it is an example of the Act working to its original founding premise (Upton, 1995).

Obscuring the Downside of CBD Revitalisation

Dean (2010) notes that visibilities are important to how political rationalities emerge based on what is illuminated and obscured. Neither the interviewees, nor any of the advice provided to the elected representatives, anticipated the emergence of the night-time economy and associated, as they saw it, uncivilised behaviour. From around 2000 there was ample evidence, particularly from the United Kingdom but also from around the world, that the revitalisation could lead to the sort of night-time economy that cities there were experiencing (Boyd, 2010; Demant & Landolt, 2013; Doucet, 2012; Eldridge, 2010; Hadfield, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2000; Jayne et al., 2006; Roberts, 2006). Within Christchurch City Council the discourse of a vibrant city was always highlighted in discussions, meetings, and documents. Nor was any consideration given to the impacts of New Zealand's liberal alcohol laws and drinking culture. Instead, this aspect of the revitalisation was obscured.

In the view of the media, the rebuild of the central city following the 2010–2011 earthquakes is predicated on a vibrant night-life (*The Press*, 2012) and the rebuild is seen as moving along when announcements are made of new developments that include bars and restaurants (McDonald, 2014).

Governmental Technologies for Decision-Making

In governmentality theory, strategies and technologies are the ways in which interventions become possible within a particular rationality. Lemke (2001, p. 191) notes that once a political rationality has been established, certain strategies emerge to solve the problem. Technologies include such things as "agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms". Dean (2010, p. 42) stresses the point that technologies form

part of the material mechanisms through which “authority [is] constituted and rule accomplished”.

The techniques and technologies are place and time specific and can therefore be quite different from one place to another. Le Galès (2011) argues that different modes of local governance are implemented in different countries, some of which increase deliberative democracy, while others suppress groups. Identifying the modes of governance, or techniques of governing, is therefore important in order to see power relations at work.

Technologies needed to underpin a political rationality of a vibrant city are different from technologies required to enhance the primacy of the CBD. The latter can be achieved through planning regulation, while the former requires different technologies. The technology that was employed to ensure the political rationality of a vibrant city was initially the establishment of the Mayoral Forum. This external advisory group of non-elected people was selected by the mayor and led the ideas, public consultation, and engagement with staff, and recommended strategy documents to the Council for approval. The Mayoral Forum was working to a political rationality that legitimated new ways of working and new involvement by the Council. After the Mayoral Forum had finished, because of various difficulties, the Council then changed its own decision-making structures.

Mayoral Forum

The Mayoral Forum was initially chosen by the mayor to be representative of interests within the CBD. The structure of its representation was informal. The mayor initiated the Forum by inviting members, and its formation was not reported formally to the Council until a year after it had been in existence. It was described as an advisory body to the mayor but it was granted its own budget, and staff reported directly to it. More importantly, its recommendations, primarily through the CBD Strategy document (Christchurch City Mayoral Forum, 2001), were not altered by the Council and it became the leading document for the revitalisation of the CBD and future strategy documents.

The accountability of the Mayoral Forum was not explicit. This meant a non-transparent means of governance set a powerful direction for the CBD for those entitled to participate and disempowered those not invited to participate. On the one hand, the Forum was more flexible, nimble, and reflective of some of the business interests that eventually would locate there. The Mayoral Forum was an external group who were encouraged to pursue a particular agenda of revitalisation. That agenda was to stop the exodus of businesses and high-end retailers out to the suburbs and increase business, retail, and residential opportunities in the CBD by means other than regulatory measures. As an advisory group to the elected representatives, it was clearly very powerful because its report was fully accepted by the Council and it became the driving force for subsequent documents and actions. It drove the discourse of a vibrant city centre. In particular, its approach emphasised public/private partnerships, financial incentives for private sector developments, and marketing as attractants. It recommended that public space be enhanced and integrated with private sector spaces. One interviewee noted that, while it may not have halted the decline of the CBD, it did highlight to a new degree the importance and relevance of the CBD and why ratepayers' money should be spent there. As other interviewees noted, Council project spending from this time appeared to be focused on central city space and not over the entire city as they believed had been the case in the past.

The Mayoral Forum is characteristic of an organisation at a distance from local government created to govern a local government process. Key stakeholders within retail, business, arts, and real estate formed the Mayoral Forum – people who had a stake in a particular outcome of the governing group of which they were members. Walters (2004) notes that such groups have long been associated with governing and are not a particularly new phenomenon. Stakeholder groups, like other partnerships, are a means to govern at a distance. The mayor, at the time, wanted to create a separate stand-alone agency or LATE but, despite several attempts, the Council never agreed. Numerous Council reports stated that the scale of commercial initiatives within the CBD required private sector support and a formal structure for a public/private partnership was needed. The wider elected representatives resisted this idea as interviewees reported they felt a formalised unelected outside body should not

be undertaking such tasks. Even more recently, a senior manager at the Council, when interviewed, maintained the Council was pursuing other mechanisms such as a Business Improvement District³² for parts of the CBD until the 2010/2011 earthquakes occurred. In any event, the Council took it upon itself to enter into commercial activities, eventually purchasing property worth over \$17 million.

Forming partnerships and networks is a key part of local governance in neoliberal times (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012b; Geddes, 2005; Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). In Christchurch, staff repeatedly urged for the Council to form a commercial agency, believing that a public/private partnership would be more appropriate to run a revitalisation project than the Council (Bachels, 2000a; Dovey & Hay, 1999). Staff see external agencies as desirable because they enable developments and initiatives to be undertaken quickly and flexibly outside the Council democratic and accountability requirements and can be focussed entirely on the needs of city revitalisation to the exclusion of other Council priorities (Roers, 2007).

Swyngedouw (2005) has examined institutions very similar to the Mayoral Forum. He argues, on the one hand, that these new governing bodies, typically recruit members from the private sector and civil society, and they can offer greater democratic possibilities and bottom-up involvement. On the other hand, they also disperse power away from the state and empower new actors while disempowering others. They do not necessarily work within the rules and norms to which other democratically elected bodies must adhere. This was evident in the case of the Mayoral Forum. As P. Miller and Rose (2008) and Newman (2001) argue, governing at a distance through organisations such as the Mayoral Forum are not evidence of the hollowing out of the state argument, but rather the creation of multiple centres of power so that power becomes dispersed. By giving up some control, the Council was able to extend its influence. Power, in the Foucauldian sense, is not a zero-sum equation (Blakeley, 2010). When one group, such as the Mayoral Forum exercises power, it does not

³² Business Improvement Districts, now common within local government, are areas where businesses decide what improvements are needed to their areas to enhance their business environment. A council will then levy a rate on their behalf to raise funds for those improvements.

necessarily follow that the Council has less power. Paradoxically, as well as dispersal of power, there is also a concentration of power in parts of the governing body through new technologies. This is discussed in the next section.

Changed Culture

Some of the elected representatives, when interviewed, stressed that changed decision-making structures had brought about a changed culture within the Council. The change of culture was between the elected representatives themselves, between staff and elected representatives, and between the community and elected representatives.

Elected representatives said they had noticed a change in working relationships between elected representatives from the left and right of the political spectrum (see Chapter 6). Before the reduction in elected representatives in 2004 there had been a reasonably evenly divided Council associated with left and right political groupings, and interviewees felt they had worked well together. Although robust debate occurred, considerable progress was made on major projects. Such projects included the Enhancement Projects instituted under the mayoralty of Vicki Buck. Due to a fortuitous increase in income the Council embarked on a major programme of building and setting aside money for social initiatives. It was stressed during the interviews that these were city-wide programmes and not merely focussed on the central city. The Enhancement Projects were undertaken with a vision of turning the city from a small provincial town to a metropolitan city. There was a focus on tourism but not on late-night entertainment. Some interviewees said the fact that elected representatives from both the left and right could generally agree on such an expansionist programme was reflective of good working relationships. Past elected representatives interviewed did not see that happening since the standing committees had been abolished.

The 1989 amendments to the LGA also contributed to a change in the culture of the organisation. The amendments stipulated that governance and management roles should be clearly differentiated. Among other initiatives, when Lesley McTurk was CEO, a very rigid separation of elected representatives and staff was put in place. This

separation reflected not only the requirements of the Act but also the CEO and the culture that was being promoted within the organisation. This separation meant that councillors could not get easy access to staff and staff were not permitted to speak to elected representatives outside a Council meeting (Drage, 2008). The mayor still retained access to the senior management team.

In addition to the Mayoral Forum, changed decision-making styles and structures were instituted as a technology of governing that had the effect of concentrating power. In order for these changes to happen three separate and contingent areas came together: representation was reduced; a new and reforming CEO was appointed; and, internal decision-making of the Council was changed.

Reduced Representation

A central statutory body, the Local Government Commission, reduced numbers of elected representatives at Christchurch City Council from 24 to 12. Although the Council could not agree and recommend to the Commission a suitable number of elected representatives, the mayor submitted to the Commission that 12 was his preference. The Local Electoral Act 2001 stipulates that the membership of territorial authorities is to consist of not fewer than 6 members or more than 30.

As seen earlier in Table 4, there has been a marked decrease nationally in elected representatives decreasing by 30% between 1989 and 2013. Some of this decline, as Drage (2008) notes, was due to the narrowing of criteria within the triennial review, basing it solely on population, which councils must take into account. She also argues that the Local Government Commission, when involved in appeals, has contributed significantly to decreased numbers of elected representatives. There has, therefore, been both a legislative driver for reduced numbers of elected representatives and a

driver through central government's appointed Commission who are not accountable to the electorate.³³

The reduction in elected representatives within Christchurch City Council both reduced representation for the community, and led to a significant defeat for the Labour affiliated councillors at the 2004 election. The rhetoric behind the reduction in elected representatives was couched in discourses of 'efficiency' in decision-making. With a smaller number of elected representatives, the mayor at the time, argued the Council could act more like a board of directors and make decisions quickly. As Foucault and N. Rose et al. (2006) argue, the criticism of excessive government in liberal times has led to an art of governing that appears to be governing less. Reducing numbers of elected representative and acting like the private sector are some of these ways.

While it has often been argued that councils should act more like the private sector with a reduced number of elected representatives emulating board of directors, this fails to recognise that councils are democratically elected to represent the diverse views of their constituents (Drage, 2008). The neoliberal view that local government should conduct itself more like the private sector has, however, become pervasive. A political rationality has emerged of a small and efficient elected council. This has created self-regulating councils favouring a reduced number of elected representatives or instigating amalgamation proposals with neighbouring councils. Drage made this argument in her study of the Christchurch City Council's elections in 2010 where one of the subjects for electors was "a corporate-type governance model introduced which has effectively created a decision-making process with reduced opportunities for public input and changed the political dynamics of the Council" (2011, p. 155). Governing more like the private sector – within a corporate model based on ideas of efficiency and speed – has helped promote the idea that local government should be less political or adopt a post-political condition, as Swyngedouw (2009a) proposes. This is discussed later in this chapter.

³³ Central government's role in reducing elected representatives is also evident in the legislation establishing the Auckland Council, which has only 21 elected members for a population of over 1.5 million.

A New CEO

As shown in the data on Christchurch, the next major change was the appointment of a new CEO, Lesley McTurk. The previous CEO had had a strong community development ethic and was a firm believer in providing service to the community. He stated in his interview that he was not strongly in favour of the NPM ethos that was embedded in the amendments to the Local Government Act. Although the new CEO was not from a local government background, she was hired specifically to be reformist. Combined with a reforming mayor, the pair became a formidable duo.

Internal Decision-Making Changed: “They ran the committees like a fiefdom”³⁴

More than any other area, the changed decision-making structures were the technology of governing that most enabled power relations to concentrate within the mayor and senior staff and away from elected representatives. The premise behind the changed decision-making structures was that all councillors should be involved in all aspects of the Council business. The previous standing committee structure had not precluded all councillors being involved but only appointed committee members were able to vote. All councillors still had a further opportunity to participate when a committee’s recommendation came to the full Council. Some former councillors suggested that one of the reasons standing committees were abolished was because of strong personalities who were chairing the committees. The remuneration of elected representatives may have also been a factor in councillors not opposing the abolition of committee meetings, although this was not mentioned by any of the interviewees. In 2004 the Council had elected to remunerate councillors on a base salary only (Goodman, 2012). It could have chosen a combination of a base salary and meeting fees. With remuneration not linked to meetings there was less of an incentive for councillors to continue with committee meetings.

As Newman (2001) and Blakely (2003) have noted of the reforms in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the public sector was seen as a target of reform rather than an agent of change. In much the same way, the Council’s political structures of standing

³⁴ Quote from former mayor when interviewed.

committees were a target of reform as they were seen as chairperson's fiefdom's and hindering effective decision-making.

A consequence of abolishing standing committees meant that all formal Council authority fell to the mayor. The depth of understanding within particular areas of Council that had been spread through the elected councillors, and chairs of committees in particular, was gone. Chairs and their committees had been the drivers for pushing ahead projects, understanding public concerns, and gaining an in-depth knowledge of their fields. The mayor could not have such an in-depth knowledge of all facets of the Council's business and so senior staff became the drivers of particular projects and the activities of Council. The informality of the seminars and portfolio groups meant there was less chance for groups of elected councillors to formally lead areas. There was also no longer a formal process through which to advance projects, initiatives, and policies except through the annual plan and Long Term Council Community Plan process. Councillors could not retain authority over areas they had once held. A further consequence of this lack of authority became expressed as frustration by the councillors towards the mayors and each other (Cairns, 2013a, 2013b). These tensions were not clashes over political debates on, for example, what a project should entail, where it should be located or how much it should cost. Instead, these were tensions about councillors working together, such as which councillors had greater access to information and who were in the favoured, so-called 'A' team of the mayor. As Allmendinger and Haughton (2012b, p. 94) have described in relation to English spatial planning, these tensions at Christchurch City Council were symptomatic of "a system that embraces and rewards those willing to work within the parameters of the mainstream and re-inscribes troublesome others as problematic, counterproductive or having 'vested interests'". The consequence of this, in the longer term, was a Council unable to work together after the earthquake (Sachdeva & Heather, 2012). While this had been the case before the earthquakes, the weakness was exacerbated after the earthquakes by the extent of decisions that needed to be made. It also meant that councillors became shy of political debate lest they be seen once again as not working well with each other.

Within the Council there was a move to community governance under the City Manager between 1998 and 2003. His aim had been driven by a community empowerment model of governing that followed Clarke and Stewart (1994) whom he had studied. This raises the question: how can a concept such as local governance, or the closely related community governance, be used for quite different ends? Le Galès (2011) has written that this is possible and that what is important is the end purpose of governing and who is or is not benefiting from this regime of governing. Newman (2013a) offers another explanation through her research of feminist activism and New Labour policies in the United Kingdom. Her research participants felt that their notions of empowerment and active citizenship had been co-opted by New Labour. She develops an argument that new ways of governing can “re-signify” (p. 10) terms, thereby using the concept for a different purpose than that for which it was intended. In this research, concepts such as governance, partnerships, and participation were re-signified and used by the mayors to both disperse power outside of the Council and concentrate power within it thereby leaving elected councillors frustrated and weak. The language and ideas of working with key stakeholders and the wider community was compelling for fellow elected councillors but eventually many of them felt left out of the processes that had been established.

Entrepreneurial Leader

The mayor who began and drove this process of CBD revitalisation considered himself an entrepreneurial leader. Cheyne’s (2004b) study of local political leadership within the New Zealand setting is useful for understanding the leadership that emerged within Christchurch City Council. At the time of this research, the mayors of Christchurch did not have any executive power and they could not veto any decisions made by a Council. They were primarily symbolic leaders, but, as Cheyne (2004a) notes, mayors have influence over the governance structures of a council. The two mayors used their influence to remove standing committees for various periods of time, which served to concentrate authority in themselves and senior staff. During some periods, seminars and portfolio groups were adopted as an alternative; at other times there was no alternative except a formal Council meeting where strict rules

governing speaking times were observed. While Cheyne's (2004a) study included Christchurch, she notes that it was undertaken during a time when Mike Richardson had been the city manager. When he left, in 2003, the initiatives, which Cheyne documents, were led mainly by the then Mayor Garry Moore. Soon after, in May 2003, a new CEO was appointed and at the beginning of the new triennium in late 2004 standing committees were abolished. The mayor and CEO is a pivotal relationship in New Zealand and this relationship influences political leadership. Before the appointment of a new CEO, Christchurch City Council had been hailed as a leader in community governance (Cheyne, 2004a); however, when the city manager left it became obvious that he had been the main driver of the concept within the Council (Richardson, 1999).

As mayor, Garry Moore also wanted the wider Council to be more entrepreneurial and nimble at making decisions, much like the private sector was assumed to be. With the CEO he organised seminars for newly elected councillors that gave them information on how to be more like a board of directors. By abolishing the traditional standing committee structure of the Council he hoped the Council would make decisions more rapidly and emulate the private sector. The changes also meant that he chaired all decision-making arenas. Power relations changed and moved away from elected councillors and concentrated in the mayor, the CEO and senior staff. Hambleton and Gross (2007) argue that there is a need to foster strong political leadership at the local level to respond to the challenges to governing within local government. Hambleton (2008) elaborated on this point in his report to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance. He maintains that civic leadership requires leadership in three spheres: political, managerial, and, community. In Christchurch's case, political leadership became concentrated in the mayor. The research findings substantiate this, as considerable disquiet was acknowledged by some of the elected councillors, although not all, as they felt they had become more removed from issues and discussions. Christchurch City councillors are not alone in their concern about the relationship with management. The Controller and Auditor-General (2012) in her 2010/11 audit of local government commented on the relationship and responsibilities between a CEO and elected members. She identified that the common risk was of elected members

deferring too much to professional staff. One of the interviewees, a former councillor, certainly gave that impression. Other interviewees that were current councillors felt that when they did not defer enough they were characterised as holding back the Council. The Controller and Auditor-General went on to say that:

Alternatively, the elected members may be so politically divided that they struggle to come together to exercise effective and collective governance. (Controller and Auditor-General, 2012, p. 49)

This was certainly the case at Christchurch City Council because of the concentration of power between the mayor and CEO and the dispersal of power to the Mayoral Forum and away from elected members.

Newman (2001) outlines how in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s reforms of local government's traditional committee structure was led by central government. It was imposed from above and based on modernising local politics and included stronger political executives because of perceived shortcomings of the traditional committee structure. She notes that the reforms were viewed by different stakeholders simultaneously as: strengthening local democracy, increasing local electoral turnout, strengthening accountability, concentrating political power, and weakening local democracy. As already noted in Chapter 4, New Zealand does not have the same political party influence at the local level as the United Kingdom. There has been, however, a similar discourse in New Zealand local government about efficiency, quicker decision-making and flexibility. In the New Zealand context, rather than being imposed from above, Christchurch City Council has been persuaded by the discourse to reform itself, at least for a particular period.

Shifting Power Relations

The above discussion outlines the governmental technologies used to support the political rationality of a vibrant city centre. Cumulatively, these technologies shifted power relations so that power became dispersed to the Mayoral Forum and concentrated in the mayor and, indirectly, in the senior staff. This research shows that the decision-making process was contingent on a number of factors coming together.

Principally, these were a reduced number of elected representatives, and a new mayor who was instrumental in employing a reformist CEO and who wished to involve the business community in the revitalisation in the CBD. The Mayoral Forum, supported by staff was the organisation that led the revitalisation project. The mayor became a strong force in the revitalisation of the CBD but not in fostering collective deliberation by elected councillors. In essence, he developed a sole leadership model. This is indicative of neither a deliberative nor a representative democracy approach. Through the various technologies of governance, a post-political condition (Swyngedouw, 2009a) emerged in which “debate and disagreement and dissensus” are replaced with “consensus, agreement and ... technocratic ... management” (p. 604). In this research, the post-political condition was achieved by removing the arenas where political debate, disagreement, and dissensus could take place. The Mayoral Forum took over the role of a traditional standing committee and essentially removed any political debate about the merits of the revitalisation process. When the Mayoral Forum was discontinued, rather than decision-making reverting to the standing committees, these committees too were discontinued. The remaining arena for political debate was the Council meeting, which was a tightly controlled setting and proved too constraining for detailed debate on matters such as the revitalisation. This is consistent with the work of Allmendinger and Haughton (2012a), Deas (2014) and MacLeod (2011) where the political setting is circumscribed with technical parameters precluding substantive and fundamental disagreement. In Christchurch City Council’s case, at one point, councillors were expected to supply written questions to reports on forthcoming agendas and these were answered before the public Council meeting. At another time, the elected representatives met prior to Council meetings to have their questions answered. In both instances, councillors who wished to ask the same questions in the public forum or who had major disagreements with what was being discussed were deemed unhelpful and troublesome. There were, however, traces of the political when the Council controversially purchased large tracts of central city land.

Young People's Social Relations

Young people interviewed for this research enjoyed the new spaces created as a result of the Council's revitalisation work. SOL Square, Poplar Lane, The Strip, and the places in between were spaces they could easily utilize as they afforded young people enhanced ways to socialise. They were extremely convenient spaces to meet up with friends either planned or serendipitously. Young people could come into these spaces pre-loaded with inexpensive alcohol, dance, and socialise without spending large amounts of money. They could also continue to drink until the early hours of the morning. The spaces were very well designed within a concentrated geography allowing them to easily move from one bar to the next. This accords with the work conducted on drinking within the night-time economy (Chatterton & Hollands, 2002; Demant & Landolt, 2013; Lyons & Willott, 2008; Measham & Brain, 2005; Roberts, 2013; Valentine et al., 2007; Waitt et al., 2011)

The political rationalities of a vibrant city are to produce consumers of the new revitalised spaces or, as Osborne and Rose (1999) so succinctly argue, to produce consumers of "commodified contentment" (1999, p. 757). The Council was extremely successful in achieving those subjects with the creation of the revitalised spaces. As Dean (2010) notes, however, the subjects or identities actually created do not necessarily reflect the subjects or identities that the governing techniques wished to form (p. 43). Newman (2001, p. 169) argues that the "attempt to constitute new forms of subject [is] through a series of dualities: between active, working citizens and the 'socially excluded', or between responsible (job seeking) recipients of welfare benefits and those who did not deserve state support". In this research, the same could be said between the duality of the civilised and uncivilised drinker.

The Council was successful in producing civilised consumers in these spaces until about midnight but was surprised with young people's behaviour after this time. The emphasis, particularly in the media, has been on identifying young people's unacceptable behaviour. From this study, the actual time that the participants were in the CBD at night was very limited and yet their behaviour looms so large in the media.

Hubbard (2011) has suggested that these night-time spaces are actively sought out by the media to highlight and condemn inappropriate behaviour as society attempts to redraw the fine line between civilised and uncivilised behaviour. The Council has not given serious consideration to restricting the hours of operation of the bars and nightclubs from their current 4am closing time to midnight (although there has been discussion of a 3am closing time) or to the density of bars and nightclubs.

The young people interviewed said they and their friends habitually drank to get drunk. This concurs with research in the United Kingdom (Measham & Brain, 2005) and New Zealand. Lyons & Willott (2008) also found that their young women participants felt that binge drinking while socialising with friends was a part of their everyday life. The revitalised public spaces, and the concentration of bars within those spaces, made it very convenient for young people to socialise, drink, and enjoy themselves. Were these uncivilised young people the hoped-for subjects of the governing rationalities that took place, or were they resisting the civilised drinker identity? Formation of actual identities does not necessarily coincide with the idealised identities imagined through governing. Young people's particular ways of consuming, however, do not conform to the idealised civilised consumer. They are resisting this notion and, by their actions, are defiantly declaring themselves to be resisting those that govern them. They are therefore both subjects of their governing and resistant subjects. Foucault acknowledged that subjects could resist:

And then we started this grand theatre, of which we can say, it seems to me, that we have here a phenomenon of resistance completely correlated to the systems of power that were destined to stifle it, and which only served to incite it. (Foucault, Gordon, Patton, & Beaulieu, 2012, p. 109)

An inclusive city, Eldridge (2010) argues, should provide opportunities for young people that are not based solely on bars and nightclubs. As the focus group participants noted in this research, however, if they were not drinking then the CBD at night was not where they would want to be. Drinking and the CBD at night is therefore inextricably linked for the participants of this study. When they are drinking they enjoyed sharing that experience with friends and others. Waitt et al. (2011) similarly

argue that going out, drinking, and transgressing are all part of the pleasure for young people and a pleasure they are not likely to want to give up. In line with Valentine et al. (2007), the focus group participants had a sense of ownership of the revitalised CBD spaces. The police also concurred saying that the CBD was young people's space at night and they owned it.

Negotiating and navigating the risky city was part of the pleasure for the focus group participants as Jayne et al. (2006) and Hubbard (2007) have also found in their work. It was through alcohol that the young people connected with one another and gained a sense of belonging in the CBD. Eldridge (2010) has argued that councils need to offer entertainment that is not alcohol based. Some of the interviewees agreed with this, however, for the focus group participants, alcohol was the facilitator of their enjoyment of the city at night. As Martinic and Measham (2008) found in their study, the focus group participants sought out liminal experiences using alcohol.

The revitalisation of the CBD with its focus on precincts and lane development has proven to be an ideal environment for the night-time economy. As Roberts (2013) has argued, the concentration of bars ensures ease of movement for people and increases the likelihood of excessive drinking.

The Council, placed controls and restrictions on young people by instituting a one-way-door policy and liquor bans for public spaces. Eldridge (2010) argues that practices such as happy hours and discount pricing should be considered by councils. Instead, the focus has become one of blaming individuals for drinking to excess in the spaces the council has actively created for night-time socialising. O'Malley and Valverde (2004) argue that, when behaviour over the use of alcohol and drugs becomes what is not considered a rational response, the discourse changes from that of pleasure to that of problem subjects. Young people within the night-time economy have been framed as problematic because they have not regulated their behaviour. This is not to suggest that all young people who enjoy the night-time economy in Christchurch are problem subjects. Governmentality theory maintains that governance is always failing

and therefore new techniques are needed to ensure self-control of subjects through the use of such techniques as bouncers, CCTV, one-door policy, and alcohol-free zones.

“Planners Struggle with the Concept of the Night-Time Economy”³⁵

Throughout the process of the revitalisation of the CBD, the discourse of planners, urban designers, and policy makers was that of creating an inclusive, vibrant, 24-hour city that would be attractive to everyone. While the night-time economy has been very attractive to young people, some interviewees lamented that it is not inclusive and that the behaviour of young people prevents older people and young families from enjoying the city. From my observations, older people were prevalent in the night-time until around midnight. The evening economy, that is the time from around 5pm to 11pm as one participant termed it, is to a great extent, inclusive. This is the time during which people go to movies, theatres, and restaurants. These types of activities generally do not operate past 11pm. In addition, they require a disposable income, something the focus group participants did not have. Other than from young people, there is not a great deal of demand for activities to extend from the evening into the night. It is this third period in the day, from 11pm to midnight to 3–5am that mainly young people want to inhabit, not families with children and older people. Having pre-loaded with cheap alcohol at home, the night-time is young people’s time free (supposedly) from the disapproving gaze of others. They can take control of the streets and the revitalised public spaces, which was confirmed by both the police and the liquor licensing inspector. This activity works very well for the bars and cafés who are selling cappuccinos during the day, dinner and alcohol in the early evening, and alcohol during night-time.

The police sergeant and liquor licensing inspector both lamented planners’ understanding of the night-time economy. The police sergeant suggested planners needed to get out more often into the CBD after midnight to see how the CBD and its revitalised spaces were being used. The liquor licensing inspector felt that planners did not understand the problems occurring in the CBD and their reliance on effects for

³⁵ Quote from Police Sergeant when interviewed.

planning rules under the RMA misunderstood the situation. The planners response has been to institute rules around noise levels, thus purposefully concentrating the bars and nightclubs. Jayne et al. (2008b) highlight the importance of the density and location of bars in understanding drinking culture. With the rebuild of the city, noise levels have been the only regulatory mechanism used and no mention has been made of the density of bars.

Young people's self-control is continually called into question by the media, the Council, and police. Lemke (2001) explains how governmentality can show how regulatory means of control have been largely replaced by techniques of self-regulation. He calls for study into individual's ability for self-control. Intoxication adds another dimension to this self-control. It is, however, calculated drunkenness. The young people in the focus groups planned their nights out with many intending to get drunk, which agrees with Measham and Brain's (2005) study. The young people wanted to lose self-control, which gave them an excuse to behave in ways in which they would not normally behave or to tolerate such behaviour from others. This has also been noted by Roberts (2013). That whole groups of young people behave in this way does not mean they are merely conforming to each other's expectations. Amin and Thrift (2002) echo the understanding that the spaces and the subjects created by governmental techniques do not always conform to what the decision-makers desired:

In other words, urban spaces are not predictable machines for reproducing bounded and controllable relations. ... Thus themed spaces are often used in unpredictable ways by consumers, ways which have little or nothing to do with the maximal consumption they are designed to unleash. And, indeed, these spaces can sometimes be the focus of explicit resistance, all the way from taking packed lunches to actual protest. (Amin & Thrift, 2002, p. 129)

Young people interviewed in this research were well aware of, and articulated, how they were being controlled within the CBD spaces. They understood they were part of a governing system that allowed them to drink and that the night-time economy would not be shut down. This concurs with Hayward and Hobbs (2007) and Hobbs et al. (2005) and their research of governance and control in the night-time economy. The

extent of the controls was to blunt the worst excesses of their behaviour so the night-time economy could continue to function. The police, liquor licensing inspectors, and others introduced measures to control but not prevent the functioning of the night-time economy. The limited control ensured the night-time economy could continue and flourish because it prevented night-time behaviour from getting completely out of control.

The Changing Nature of New Zealand Local Government

While focused on Christchurch City Council, this research has broader implications for local government in New Zealand and beyond. In Christchurch the entrepreneurial mayor who brought the need for CBD revitalisation to the fore with a new political rationality and altered power relations by introducing new governmental technologies was able to do so working within the 'weak mayor' model of local government in New Zealand. By first establishing the Mayoral Forum and then by making changes to the decision-making structures of Council, power became concentrated in the mayor as he chaired the only decision-making body.

Interviewees pointed out that the mayor in this situation became more vulnerable as he became associated with every policy and initiative of the Council, both good and bad. Instead of chairpersons of committees taking responsibility for different areas, it fell and continued to fall to the mayor to be spokesperson for all areas of the Council both large and small. This continued throughout the earthquakes and left some councillors feeling disenfranchised. This continues after the earthquakes (Cairns, 2013a). During the time of this research, the LGA had not been amended to provide slightly greater executive powers to the mayoral role as has recently been done in 2012. Without these extra legislative powers, it was still possible for the mayors, Garry Moore and Bob Parker, to strengthen their executive leadership through technologies such as the Mayoral Forum and the abolition of standing committees. The abolition of standing committees means there is little delegation of areas to councillors so they can develop areas of expertise. In Christchurch, this has led to bitter disputes and resentment among some of the councillors.

In New Zealand local government the weak mayor model within a council-manager system is changing (Cheyne, 2004a). The mayoralty in Auckland Council, under separate legislation, has increased executive powers: the mayor has a specific office with independent advisors and budget resources and is able to appoint a deputy mayor and chairs to standing committees (Asquith, 2012). Power relations have the ability to shift even more power to the mayor under this new arrangement although this is through an open and transparent process. The consequences of this can be, as seen in Christchurch, that the remainder of the elected representatives feel resentful of the directions taken and undermined in their ability to represent their constituents. Local government, unlike central government, is not based on party political parties, whip systems, and party machinery. As power is unevenly distributed discontent can smoulder and resentment build. Rather than debate matters – thereby ensuring intense scrutiny of different options to address problems – the focus has become one of changing power relations. This happened not only because of the particular personalities of mayors, but also because of the change in Christchurch City Council processes. This argument relies on the assumption that a healthy democracy depends on all elected representatives having the same access to influence. Changes within local government in New Zealand are currently moving away from that presumption in subtle ways.

Conclusion

While new partnerships and ways of working have been forged, local government is still governing, albeit at a distance. The state has therefore not hollowed out (Rhodes, 1996) but is using a form of decision-making that favours particular entrepreneurial interests and projects. Local government in New Zealand is moving towards a more executive style of mayor, with increased power.

While activities were not strongly regulated public resources were focussed on the 'failing' CBD. This research has investigated both the rationale for a vibrant CBD and how one entrepreneurial solution was favoured over other planning regulation solutions. It has also examined the governmental technologies adopted by the

Christchurch City Council and how – using these technologies – power relations changed and become both concentrated in the mayor and senior staff and dispersed to the Mayoral Forum.

The spaces created by the revitalisation process proved highly successful for the night-time economy. A key focus of the revitalisation strategy was the use of precincts and lane development. This created a concentration of bars and nightclubs and public spaces where young people could congregate and socialise. The young people interviewed for this study enjoyed and took ownership of these spaces in ways that are not seen nor would probably be permitted during the day. Alcohol and the night-time economy facilitated the young people's ownership of these spaces.

Finally, in this chapter I demonstrated how the subjects created through this governing of spaces resist and negotiate controls. Importantly, young people are well aware of, and negotiate, themselves and these regulations.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

Governing by local government has changed rapidly in New Zealand, especially since 1989, when public sector reform resulted in new structures and processes. The rationale for these reforms was that local government, like central government, needed to be more efficient and effective, and managed more like private sector organisations. At the same time, local government was to be more open and accountable and more inclusive of citizens. Balancing democracy and efficiency led to tensions and contradictions.

Drawing on document analysis and interviews with elected representatives and staff, business people, regulators of the night-time, and the young people who occupy the spaces at night-time, I argue that using local governance processes has, at the same time, dispersed power to an outside organisation and concentrated power in the mayor and senior Council staff. Christchurch City Council was still firmly governing the CBD revitalisation project through a range of technologies – but from a distance. Although local governance appears to offer more involvement for different sectors of the community, research suggests it depoliticises the decision-making process and favours some actors over others. Planning regulations were not pursued vigorously, while entrepreneurial activities by the Council were favoured. Power relations within the Christchurch City Council changed giving the mayor and senior staff a greater impact on the process. There was less scrutiny by the wider elected representatives and the community.

The research has also sought to extend the scholarly debate on local governance by examining the lived realities of drinking in the night-time economy. Previous studies have shown that drinking by young people is shaped by the CBD spaces they inhabit. These spaces are considered part of a dynamic relationship between interrelated factors such as, alcohol laws and regulations, drinking cultures, the leisure and alcohol industries, youth seeking liminal experiences and identity, cities becoming sites of consumption, and local governance.

As outlined in Chapter 4, two major pieces of legislation impacting on the planning and management of cities were reviewed and enacted at about the same time. The main land-use planning legislation, the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, was extensively reformed culminating in new legislation, the RMA 1991. The LGA 1974 was progressively reformed beginning a series of major changes starting in 1989. The new RMA had twin forces defining its conception. On one hand, there was a strong environmental and sustainability focus coupled with greater citizen input; on the other, it was part of a market-led performance-based approach favouring limited regulatory intervention that allowed the market to determine the location of activities, while planners were left dealing with the effects of those activities. Likewise, the LGA reforms incorporated changes that were in tension with one another such as enhanced public participation processes and greater emphasis on efficiency and contestability. The local government sector in New Zealand, therefore, had two vital pieces of legislation affecting form and function under a new philosophy that impacted on planning and governance, with inherent tensions.

Within this context this thesis set out to understand the practice of local governance in New Zealand's local government setting. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 explored both how governance at the local level is practised and the spatial outcomes of that governance. Through original empirical research, I have explored how power operates within local government decision-making and highlighted the spatial and lived impacts. Chapters 5 and 6 examined the governmental technologies used by the Christchurch City Council in its decision-making for the revitalisation of its CBD and showed how power was exercised. Chapter 7 has sought to understand the lived realities and social relations of young people who use the revitalised spaces at night and who have been constituted as a problem.

The decision-making process associated with Christchurch City Council's CBD revitalisation from 1999 to 2010 provided a case study of the changing nature of local governance. Before 1999, projects had been conducted to enhance the CBD but arguably not to the scale or intensity of this period.

Interview data show the mayor had been frustrated with the RMA and the Council's apparent inability to slow the development of retail and offices outside the CBD through the planning process. On becoming mayor in 1998 he was able to use his position to gather together informally a group of key stakeholders to lead the revitalisation of the CBD. A new political rationality was formed based on an entrepreneurial approach to create a vibrant city centre. The research has shown that, through various governmental technologies, the Council governed at a distance to revitalise the CBD. It did this primarily through a group, known as the Mayoral Forum, which became formally recognised by the Council in 1999. It was given a budget and staff who reported directly to it. The Mayoral Forum undertook consultation with the public. It produced a revitalisation strategy document that would guide the revitalisation of the CBD until the earthquakes. The Mayoral Forum became a new centre of power which was dispersed away from the Council. The Council's intention had been to gain advice from people who had a stake in the revitalised CBD. This led, however, to conflict of interest issues and meant the direction of the CBD was largely in the hands of an unelected group, led by the mayor. The interests of the key stakeholders became paramount for the future direction of the CBD and how it would be used. The mayor, with senior staff, had a very powerful role within this group, without being subject to requirements under the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. Meetings did not have to be held in public, minutes recorded and made available to the public. The Mayoral Forum was able to achieve its objectives in a way the Council could not necessarily have achieved, which accords with the concept of the Council governing at arm's length.

Following the disbandment of the Mayoral Forum, the revitalisation project continued through the Council. The mayor led changes to the decision-making processes of the Council. The majority of Council committees were abolished and were replaced by full formal Council meetings chaired by the mayor. This happened within the context of a number of key changes within the Council. First, the number of elected representatives was reduced by half. Second, a reforming CEO was appointed who implemented a rigid separation between staff and elected representatives. Abolishing standing committees meant that the mayor alone chaired meetings that had decision-making powers.

Information, knowledge, and leadership became concentrated in one person, which left many elected representatives uneasy. This had the effect of concentrating power to the mayor and senior staff.

While the revitalisation was intended to boost day-time retailing of the CBD and increase residential accommodation, this was only partially successful. Instead, over time the night-time economy flourished, with retailers in these spaces closing down and their premises becoming included in adjacent bars. The revitalisation project had not significantly altered the role, or enhanced the primacy, of the CBD sufficiently to entice shoppers back to the CBD and away from shopping in industrial zones and suburban malls. Many retail outlets within the revitalised spaces could not compete and hence moved out or closed down. In addition, it was observed that trading within core parts of the CBD was increasingly at the lower value end of retailing.

The mayor initiated the Mayoral Forum partly, he said, because he had been very frustrated with the Council's inability to plan under the RMA and its City Plan. The Council chose not to alter its City Plan and use its regulatory powers more effectively to stop the expansion of retail and office development in the suburbs and to ensure the primacy of the CBD for retail and office development until a variation to the plan was made operative in 2009. Instead, it allowed the exodus of retail and offices to cheaper land in the suburbs, while public money was spent to revitalise the CBD to entice retailers and residents back.

The revitalisation of the CBD had the greatest impact on the evening and night-time economy. The CBD, with its numerous and concentrated bars and nightclubs, made it ideal for people to meet friends, have unexpected encounters and socialise. Until about 11pm, diverse age groups used these revitalised spaces. Young people became the predominant users of these spaces, particularly after 11pm. The fact that their behaviour, according to the media, police, health authorities and others, crossed the line from civilised to uncivilised behaviour brought consternation to the Council. Measures were then put in place to attempt to control the behaviour of the young people. Young people who were interviewed expressed their enjoyment of going out

and getting drunk, so they could free themselves from normal inhibitions and feel more 'in control' of themselves and their environment. They wanted to transgress, within certain boundaries and alcohol and the night-time spaces gave them the freedom to do that. They saw the revitalised spaces as ideal for their night-time entertainment needs.

This thesis has explored the changing nature of local governance and the implications for the night-time economy. It examined the decision-making process of the Christchurch City Council that led to revitalised spaces. The three research questions at the outset were:

1. How is power exercised during CBD decision-making processes within Christchurch City Council?
2. What governmental technologies are adopted by Christchurch City Council to revitalise the CBD between 1999 and 2010?
3. What are the lived realities of the young people who use the revitalised spaces of the CBD?

These questions have given rise to particular themes, namely power in governance and social relations in the night-time economy.

Power and Governance

The benefits of local governance are debated within the academy, particularly the exercise of power. This thesis uses governmentality as a tool to provide a way to understand and show how power operates within governance.

The thesis has explored how local governance has been practised within local government in New Zealand. The research has attempted to identify the changed nature of governing that has taken place within Christchurch City Council and to assess its impacts both spatially and on the users of those spaces. What is apparent is that the Council has not hollowed out, as suggested by Rhodes (1996), as the Council – or at least the mayor and senior staff – were very much in control of what was taking place.

Not only was the Council steering and rowing it was also 'bridging', in the sense of providing a safe conduit for private sector investment in the CBD. It did this by purchasing large tracts of land. Paradoxically, power was both dispersed and concentrated. Power was concentrated in the mayor and senior staff, and dispersed to the partnership group, the Mayoral Forum. Knowledge, and with it power, was realigned from the elected councillors to the mayor and senior staff. It has not been a case of the Council minimising its involvement in the CBD; rather it has increased its role, particularly from a public investment point of view. What has emerged is a changed process of governing that has allowed the private sector to continue to expand the retail and office development in the suburbs, while the Council has taken an entrepreneurial approach facilitating the private sector within the more 'risky' area of the CBD, with public investment in both public and private spaces. Hubbard (2006), for example, argues that revitalisation projects have not always provided the financial return promised and therefore public/private partnerships are often entered into to reduce the risk to the private sector. This has certainly been the case in Christchurch, with the Council's purchase of significant land holdings.

This research shows that, while governance at the local level is intended to involve a wide group of actors in decision-making, the governmental technologies adopted in this case served to disperse power to an outside group, where some members had an interest in the CBD, and concentrated power in the mayor and senior staff. When the mayor led changes to decision-making processes and structures within the Council, elected councillors who raised concerns about the changing nature of governing within the Council were portrayed as negative and unhelpful. The new decision-making processes and structures, such as the portfolio groups and seminars, were for the most part informal and not open to the public. The standing committee structure, that had been dismantled, had allowed knowledge to be spread among elected councillors. The aim of the new structure, the Mayoral Forum, was to work with key stakeholders and create collective solutions. Being 'apolitical' came to be seen as a virtue within local government in Christchurch under the leadership of both the initiating mayor and his successor.

Social Relations in the Night-Time Economy

The public spaces created in partnership with the business community along with liberal alcohol legislation and a particular culture of drinking in New Zealand inevitably led to a revitalised CBD that was based on 'cappuccinos by day' and 'alcohol by night', a path already taken by many cities around the world, and one with known pitfalls (Burnett, 2014; Eldridge, 2010; Eldridge & Roberts, 2008; Hayward & Hobbs, 2007; Hobbs et al., 2000). The continuing popularity of this type of revitalisation, as seen after the earthquake, is that it provides to the owners of property and to the Council through rates, a reliable form of income. Young people, in turn, have been constructed as problematic. Council has not recognised the mutually constituted relationship between the construction of night-time CBD spaces and the lived realities of young people.

The young people who came to use these newly created vibrant spaces have also been a focus of this thesis as Larner (2009) has urged scholars to address. Often the subjects of planning and governing do not have their voices heard (Gibson-Graham, 2006); here, however, the young people's voices are important to understand how they have been shaped by the production of these spaces. A governmentality approach also examines how the process of governing and the production of governable spaces shapes the subjectivity of those being governed. The vision for the revitalised CBD was for a boutique shopping experience by day, within old disused warehouses and factories located in alleyways, and civilised pleasures at night, in cafés, bars, and nightclubs. The city at night has been represented as a place of excitement and transgressive pleasures (T. Osborne & Rose, 1999). In the neoliberal era this desire for pleasure has been utilised and commodified. The young people interviewed agreed it had been a success. While they were not behaving in the civilised manner hoped for by the planners and elected representatives, they were, however, enjoying the transgressive pleasures offered by the new revitalised spaces.

Producing governable subjects has not been successful within the night-time economy. This research shows that, while governable spaces have been created, the young

people who have occupied those spaces at night, have not been the expected ideal subjects. A governmentality perspective argues that governing creates subjects who are required to conduct themselves responsibly and when they do not do so they are deemed anti-social. While the young people in this research may conduct themselves in ways that society deems appropriate during the day, during the night and when drinking alcohol they actively forsake that responsibility.

Research Insights

Local governance as a concept signifies new ways of governing and making decisions within contemporary local government. Working with multiple organisations and networked actors and different processes within institutions are all part of these new ways. When power relations are specifically examined, however, the research shows that power is dispersed to particular actors outside of local government and concentrated within local government.

This is problematic for planners as they are increasingly working with outside partners and key stakeholders. Planners need to be more alert to how power is exercised within the new processes and whose voices are included, ignored or marginalised. Processes for community input, such as for the revitalisation process, are now carefully choreographed. Major political questions are not debated at the beginning of the process, such as, should the Council invest public money in the CBD or enhance the primacy of the CBD through regulation. Political arenas are lost for debate and instead decision-making and input revolved around more technical matters.

This study has been critical of the political leadership of the two mayors during the period 1999-2010. They were working within a council-manager system and weak-mayor model. In 2010, legislation was amended to provide an enhanced and strengthened role and new executive powers for the Auckland mayor and in 2012 legislation was also amended for the remaining mayors, although with caveats. There has, therefore, been a move towards a strong-mayor model.

Political leadership depends not only on a legislated mandate but also on leadership styles. The two mayors involved in the revitalisation strategy chose a style that did not encourage political debate. Indeed, with the abolition of standing committees it was difficult to debate many matters fully. Further strengthening of the role and powers of mayors has the potential to create conflicts with fellow councillors. Future research could examine decision-making structures, like committees, to ensure that all elected members have arenas for strong and robust political debates.

Planning for urban areas and directing where development should be located under the RMA and District Plans has proven difficult. By its very nature the performance-based regime of the RMA does not adequately and easily permit this to happen. It is an administratively intensive process with uncertain outcomes. Attempts to streamline RMA processes, as provided for in the recent 2013 amendment to the RMA, will not overcome concerns expressed within this study. Those concerns include uncertainty of outcomes, long timeframes due to legal challenges and, most importantly, an inability to direct development. As shown in this thesis, however, the RMA was never intended to allow councils to direct where development should go. In that respect the RMA has delivered what was intended, a circumscribed form of regulation. With, or perhaps because of these constraints, councils have turned to investing public money to entice the private sector into particular areas.

Many young people enjoy getting drunk and socialising with others in public spaces at night. The revitalised CBD of Christchurch proved to be an ideal space for this to happen. This has now become a normalised pattern and it is difficult to see this changing with or without ideal spaces in CBDs at night. Young people derive a particular pleasure and a type of freedom as drinking helps lose inhibitions, and, as one participant said, they become more “awesome”. Should alternative late-night entertainment be offered for young people? Based on the participants in this study, if young people are not drinking, then, the CBD is not an attractive place for them.

In part, the fascination by the media and Council with the, so called, uncivilised bodies within the CBD at night helps perpetuate a myth that this is where the main problems

with alcohol occur. As the police sergeant in this study noted there are greater problems for the Police with drinking at home, in suburban streets and at organised parties.

Councils are caught in a contradiction between wanting a vibrant night-time but not wanting people to be uncivilised. Christchurch City Council has currently put its Local Alcohol Policy on hold but to date it has not recommended policies that would affect the density of bars and nightclubs (Christchurch City Council, 2014a), a strategy highlighted in overseas studies to reduce violence (Eldridge, 2010; Roberts & Eldridge, 2009). Using noise level controls through its District Plan has had the opposite effect of concentrating drinking areas.

Councils need to address the inherent tensions between residential development within CBDs and the CBD at night as a site of consumption and leisure. Not all potential (and current) residents want to reside in the CBD because of its very late night opportunities. Unless these tensions are fully explored, there will be continuing problems between residents and the young people who enjoy the CBD late at night through to early in the morning. It is unlikely that young people will want to stop coming into the CBD at night. While some participants in this study expressed a desire for a more inclusive night time, it is debatable how many families and older people want to be in the CBD past midnight. There is unlikely to be a sizable number of people wanting to go to, for example, theatres, movies and the gym past midnight to warrant CBD businesses staying open.

Post-Earthquake Focus

As seen in Chapter 6 interviewees talked about the new opportunities after the earthquake to revive the CBD in a way that had not been achieved before it. Many felt the Council had a unique opportunity to bring back retail, office, and new residential developments to the CBD now that they essentially had a 'blank canvas' on which to work. Yet, media reports, Environment Court decisions, and pronouncements from CERA, the government agency set up after the earthquake, suggest the past pattern of

development has been accelerated rather than altered. As this research ended, new land for residential development on the periphery of the city was opened up ahead of time, but only a few new residential developments have been announced for the inner city. New office developments have appeared in the suburbs and on the periphery of the city. While media have reported extensively on the cost of building within the CBD, little development had occurred (Cairns & McCrone, 2014; McClure, 2014; McCrone, 2014a; Stylianou, 2014a, 2014b). An Environment Court hearing on the Styx Centre, a major new shopping development on the outskirts of the city, showed that planners (as reported in their evidence and lack of it) did not think the development would have a major impact on the new and emerging CBD. The Council in 2013 advertised more land for business purposes on the periphery of the city near the airport.

The new District Plan to guide the rebuilding of the city, initially promulgated by the Council, and then overtaken by CERA, proposes several entertainment precincts defined by noise levels. These areas are specifically to encourage late night entertainment where noise levels can be higher than in other parts of the city. One precinct is located adjacent to a planned new sports stadium so that sports fans can exit the stadium and continue to socialise in the city at night. These developments show the Council, and now the government agency CERA, are actively encouraging drinking and socialising in the night by creating new spaces for development after the earthquake. The main headlines in the media have focussed on developments that signal a return to the bars and nightclubs in the centre city (McDonald, 2014; Stewart, 2014). Media debate has again emerged about concerns of drinking for young people and whether this should be allowed to return to the CBD.

The Council has also acknowledged that it needs to review its District Plan.³⁶ In a report to the Council (de Ronde, 2013) the City Planning Unit Manager stated that “while the current outcomes-based plan provides considerable opportunity, it also creates a regime that quickly requires a large amount of evaluation, assessment and processing” (p. 2). This reiterates the point made by many former councillors, when interviewed, that the City Plan aligned very closely with the intent of the RMA in focussing on

³⁶ Christchurch City Council now refer to a District Plan rather than a City Plan.

effects rather than activities, which meant the councillors felt that they could not easily control the extent of development outside of the CBD.

After the earthquake and up until the 2013 election there was a continual breakdown in working relationships among elected members and between some elected representatives and the CEO (Cairns, 2013b; Sachdeva, 2011). Rather than robust debate on matters, councillors focused on how meetings were run, on the lack of information coming to the Council, and their sense of being shut out of the decision-making process. This pattern had been well established before the earthquakes with the abolition of the standing committees. The earthquake and aftermath put extreme pressure on a Council that was already struggling with governance processes and relationships. Subsequently, the government appointed a crown observer to assist the Council with concerns related to its CEO and internal conflicts between the elected representatives so that the Council could focus on earthquake-related matters (Sachdeva & Heather, 2012).

Reacting to these deficiencies, and because it was contributing significant money, central government determined that a new government department, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), would be established in Christchurch, reporting to a cabinet minister to manage the rebuild of the city. Extensive and unprecedented legislative powers were accorded to the minister including the power to override legislation without recourse to parliament, and the power to suspend, amend, cancel or delay any Council plans and policies.

The relationships between central government, Christchurch City Council, and the Christchurch community have not been harmonious. Both central government and the business community have suggested different governance arrangements based on the idea that, in a time of disaster, governing through local representative democratic institutions is not effective and that strong powerful leadership is required (McCrone, 2013; Stylianou, 2014c; *The Press*, 2012). Future research could explore why local democracy appears to be so easily side-lined when arguably it is at that very time when it is most needed to make difficult political choices.

The thesis draws on scholarship within and beyond planning literature. Debates about power, people, and planning are crucial for understanding governance, local government, and decision making. I contribute to planning scholarship by highlighting the ways in which power is exercised, within local government and beyond. The combination of governmentality theories and multi-disciplinary literature allows for new insights into local governance, governable spaces, power and the lived experiences of young people.

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Appendix A: Information Sheet for Governance Interviews



MASSEY UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
TE KURA PŪKENGA TANGATA

Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Information sheet for research participants – Governance interviews

Thank you for considering participating in my research. Please read the following information to help you decide if you wish to participate.

This research is part of my doctoral studies within the school of People, Environment and Planning at Massey University. The findings will be used to gain knowledge and understanding of local government, decision making and its impact on young people's use of public spaces at night.

Project

I want to identify the decision-making processes and impacts around central business district (CBD) redevelopment and young people's use of Christchurch's public spaces at night-time.

Your Involvement

I am interested in interviewing people who have had, or currently have, a formal role in local decision-making. I would like to interview you because you [are/were a councillor/staff member]. The interview will take approximately 1 hour, at a time that suits you. Questions will focus on the reasons for CBD redevelopment projects, how decisions were made, your views on the finished projects, how these spaces were being used at night-time, public participation input particularly from young people and what, if anything, you think should be done differently in the rebuild of the CBD.

I will audio-record our interview. You may ask to have the recording turned off at any time. The recorded interviews will be transcribed and a copy of your contribution will be sent to you to ensure accuracy of the information, if you request.

The results

The findings will be used for my PhD thesis and also may be used for articles, book chapters, published and unpublished work and presentations. A report on my research will be prepared for research participants and other interested people. If interested, I will contact you when it is completed, and provide a summary of the main findings.

Your Rights

You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:

- decline to answer any particular question;
- withdraw your data from the study up until three weeks after participating in the research;
- ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;

- provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give permission to the researcher;
- be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.
- ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview.

Confidentiality

All the data collected will remain secure under lock or on a computer database accessible by password both during and after the completion of my research.

Your identity will remain confidential, unless you specifically state otherwise, and you may use a pseudonym.

Individuals will not be identified by name in any publications or reports, unless consent has been obtained.

Unless otherwise stated, personal names or any other information which would serve to identify you as an informant will not be included in this research or in any future publication or reports resulting from this project.

If you have any queries about this study, please feel free to contact me or my supervisor Associate Professor Christine Cheyne ph. 06 356 9099 ext. 2816, email C.M.Cheyne@massey.ac.nz.

Thank you for considering this invitation.

Yours sincerely

Karen Johnston
PhD Student
School of People, Environment & Planning
Massey University
334 Worsleys Road
Christchurch
ph 03 338 9511
cell 027 2492939
karen.johnston.12@uni.massey.ac.nz

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, Application 10/52. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, please contact Professor Julie Boddy, Chair, Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, telephone 06 350 5799 x 2541, email humanethicsoutha@massey.ac.nz.

Appendix B: Information Sheet for Bar Owner Interviews



MASSEY UNIVERSITY
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AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
TE KURA PŪKENGĀ TANGATA

Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Information sheet for research participants – Buildings/Spaces interviews

Thank you for considering participating in my research. Please read the following information to help you decide if you wish to participate.

This research is part of my doctoral studies within the school of People, Environment and Planning at Massey University. The findings will be used to gain knowledge and understanding of local government, decision making and its impact on young people's use of public spaces at night.

Project

I want to identify the decision making processes and impacts around central business district (CBD) redevelopment and young people's use of Christchurch's public spaces at night-time.

Your Involvement

I would like to interview you because of your experience in working in the CBD as a [a bar/building owner]. The interview will take approximately 1 hour at a time and place that suits you. Questions will focus on your experiences in the CBD at night-time, the attraction of the area, how the CBD is being used during the day and particularly at night-time, what is or is not working well in the area and what you may like the council to do differently in future CBD redevelopment projects.

I will audio-record our interview. You may ask to have the recording turned off at any time. The recorded interviews will be transcribed and a copy of your contribution will be sent to you to ensure accuracy of the information, if you request.

The results

The findings will be used for my PhD thesis and also may be used for articles, book chapters, published and unpublished work and presentations. A report on my research will be prepared for research participants and other interested people. If interested, I will contact you when it is completed, and provide a summary of the main findings.

Your Rights

You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:

- decline to answer any particular question;
- withdraw your data from the study up until three weeks after participating in the research;
- ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;

- provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give permission to the researcher;
- be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.
- ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview.

Confidentiality

All the data collected will remain secure under lock or on a computer database accessible by password both during and after the completion of my research.

Your identity will remain confidential, unless you specifically state otherwise, and you may use a pseudonym.

Individuals will not be identified by name in any publications or reports, unless consent has been obtained.

Unless otherwise stated, personal names or any other information which would serve to identify you as an informant will not be included in this research or in any future publication or reports resulting from this project.

If you have any queries about this study, please feel free to contact me or my supervisor Associate Professor Christine Cheyne ph. 06 356 9099 ext. 2816, email C.M.Cheyne@massey.ac.nz.

Thank you for considering this invitation.

Yours sincerely

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This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, Application 10/52. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, please contact Professor Julie Boddy, Chair, Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, telephone 06 350 5799 x 2541, email humanethicsoutha@massey.ac.nz.

Appendix C: Information Sheet for Regulation Interviews



MASSEY UNIVERSITY
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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Information sheet for research participants – Regulation interviews

Thank you for considering participating in my research. Please read the following information to help you decide if you wish to participate.

This research is part of my doctoral studies within the school of People, Environment and Planning at Massey University. The findings will be used to gain knowledge and understanding of local government, decision making and its impact on young people's use of public spaces at night.

Project

I want to identify the decision making processes and impacts around central business district (CBD) redevelopment and young people's use of Christchurch's public spaces at night-time.

Your Involvement

I would like to interview you because of your role in regulating the use of the CBD spaces. The interview will take approximately 1 hour at a time and place that suits you. Questions will focus on your role, the behaviour of young people within the CBD at night-time, how the spaces are being used by young people, how you regulate the behaviour, what is or is not working well in the area and what you may like the council to do differently in the rebuild of the CBD.

I will audio-record our interview. You may ask to have the recording turned off at any time. The recorded interviews will be transcribed and a copy of your contribution will be sent to you to ensure accuracy of the information, if you request.

The results

The findings will be used for my PhD thesis and also may be used for articles, book chapters, published and unpublished work and presentations. A report on my research will be prepared for research participants and other interested people. If interested, I will contact you when it is completed, and provide a summary of the main findings.

Your Rights

You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:

- decline to answer any particular question;
- withdraw your data from the study up until three weeks after participating in the research;
- ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;

- provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give permission to the researcher;
- be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.
- ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview.

Confidentiality

All the data collected will remain secure under lock or on a computer database accessible by password both during and after the completion of my research.

Your identity will remain confidential, unless you specifically state otherwise, and you may use a pseudonym.

Individuals will not be identified by name in any publications or reports, unless consent has been obtained.

Unless otherwise stated, personal names or any other information which would serve to identify you as an informant will not be included in this research or in any future publication or reports resulting from this project.

If you have any queries about this study, please feel free to contact me or my supervisor Associate Professor Christine Cheyne ph. 06 356 9099 ext. 2816, email C.M.Cheyne@massey.ac.nz.

Thank you for considering this invitation.

Yours sincerely

Karen Johnston
 PhD Student
 School of People, Environment & Planning
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 ph 03 338 9511
 cell 027 2492939
karen.johnston.12@uni.massey.ac.nz

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, Application 10/52. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, please contact Professor Julie Boddy, Chair, Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, telephone 06 350 5799 x 2541, email humanethicsoutha@massey.ac.nz.

Appendix D: Information Sheet for Young People's Focus Groups



MASSEY UNIVERSITY
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TE KURA PŪKENGĀ TANGATA

Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Information sheet for research participants in young people's focus groups

Thanks for considering being part of a young people's focus group for this research. I would very much like you to take part. Please read the following information to help you decide if you wish to be a participant. You have been chosen because you are a friend of a friend who has suggested that you might be interested in my research.

This research is part of my doctoral studies within the school of People, Environment and Planning at Massey University. The findings will be used to gain knowledge and understanding of local government, decision making and its impact on young people's use of public spaces at night.

Project

I want to identify the decision making processes and impacts around central business district (CBD) redevelopment and young people's use of Christchurch's public spaces at night-time.

Your Involvement

As a member of a focus group I will firstly meet with you and your friends to explain the research. I would like to do this as close as possible to when you are planning a night out together in town. I will ask about your plans for the evening, for example, where you intend to go and why. I will also ask you to send me electronically three of your current photos that best illustrate a great night out on the town with your friends. This first meeting will probably only last for half an hour. I will ask you to sign a consent form that indicates that you are willing to take part. Secondly, I will arrange a further meeting to discuss how your night went, where you actually went and why, what parts of the town are best and why and what sorts of things you are looking for in an area when you go out. We will discuss why the photos that you sent me are important to you. This second meeting could take up to one and a half hours. I will provide some food and drinks (non-alcoholic!)

You may ask any questions about the study at any time during participation. If you do not feel like contributing to the group discussion there is no pressure to do so. The group discussion will be audio recorded but I won't be identifying you or any individuals when I write up the results of the research. You may use a pseudonym (a made up name). Also, I will ask people in the focus groups to agree not to discuss with anyone else what was said in the group.

However, I will not be able to guarantee full confidentiality because there are other people in the group. You have the right to ask for the audio recording to be turned off at any stage and you also have the right to withdraw your data from the research up until three weeks after participating.

Afterwards I will send you a summary of what was discussed at the focus group. I won't be sending out a transcript of the whole discussion because it is not practical for any one person to change the group discussion. However, I will ask you throughout the discussion if there is anything that you have said that you would not like to be included in the research.

The photographs that you sent me will remain your property but I will ask your permission to use them in my thesis and future publications (I will use them in such a manner that no person will be able to be identified).

The results

The findings will be used for my PhD thesis and also may be used for articles, book chapters, published and unpublished work and presentations. A report on my research will be prepared for research participants and other interested people. If interested, I will contact you when it is completed, and provide a summary of the main findings.

If you have any queries about this study, please feel free to contact me or my supervisor Associate Professor Christine Cheyne ph. 06 356 9099 ext. 2816, email C.M.Cheyne@massey.ac.nz.

Thank you for considering this invitation.
Yours sincerely

Karen Johnston
PhD Student
School of People, Environment & Planning
Massey University
334 Worsleys Road, Christchurch
ph 03 338 9511, cell 027 2492939
karen.johnston.12@uni.massey.ac.nz

If, after participating in this research you feel unsure about your alcohol drinking habits and would like to talk to someone about it you can call the Alcohol Drug Helpline on 0800 787 797 or go to their website: <http://www.alcoholdrughelp.org.nz/>

This project has been reviewed and approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, Application 10/52. If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, please contact Professor Julie Boddy, Chair, Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, telephone 06 350 5799 x 2541, email humanethicsoutha@massey.ac.nz.

Appendix E: Participant Consent Form- Individual



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM - INDIVIDUAL

I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I agree/do not agree to the interview being sound recorded.

I wish/do not wish to have a transcript of my recording returned to me for checking.

I wish/do not wish to have a summary of the research sent to me when it is completed.

I would like my role to be kept confidential in the reporting of this research YES / NO

I would like my identity to be kept confidential in the reporting of this research YES / NO

If YES

A pseudonym of my own choosing can be used in this research YES / NO

I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet. I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw my data from the study up to three weeks after interview, and to decline to answer any individual questions in the study.

Signature: Date:

Full Name - printed

Email contact details
for sending
information to you:

Appendix F: Participant Consent Form- Focus Group



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I understand that the Focus Group responses will be audio-taped and that I have the right to have the audio-tape switched off at any stage.

I agree not to disclose anything discussed in the Focus Group.

I wish/do not wish to have a summary of the research sent to me when it is completed.

I agree/do not agree to have my photographs reproduced in the research acknowledging that no person will be able to be identified.

A pseudonym of my own choosing can be used in this research YES / NO

I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet. I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that I have the right to withdraw my data from the study up to three weeks after interview, and to decline to answer any individual questions in the study.

Signature: Date:

Full Name - printed

Email contact details
for sending
information to you:

Appendix G: Interview Guide - Governance



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces Interview Guide - Governance

Introduction

- Self introduction and explain purpose of interview
- Outline general topics that could be covered by interviewee
- Explain purpose of the audio recording
- Check that they still have a copy of the information sheet
- Assure confidentiality and have the participant sign the consent form

The following questions will be a guideline to the interviews.

Foundational Question

1. Could you please clarify when you were voted onto the council, the Mayors and Chief Executives you've worked with and the roles that you've held over time?

Governance in General

2. Over your time at the council, there have been changes in the governance of the council (i.e. removal of committees, introduction of seminars and portfolio groups, increasing use of workshops, increased separation between elected representatives and staff and increased use of outside appointees on bodies advising council such as the Central City Mayoral Forum). Have these changes impacted on the decision-making of the council? If so, which ones in particular and how have they changed the decision-making. Prompt – Influence and connections – where does influence lie? Who has more/less influence. Community input, transparency and accountability.
3. Why do you think these changes were instituted?

Governance of the CBD revitalization process

1. Why was the Central City Mayoral Forum established for CBD revitalization projects in 1999? Was the Forum already established for other reasons?
2. Did the council authorise the Mayor to begin the CBD revitalisation process with the Central City Mayoral Forum in 1999? (not according to the public record)
3. What level of consensus/support was there for the Central City Mayoral Forum's involvement in the CBD revitalisation process? In 2000 many reports were discussed at the council about the relationship between the Forum and the council.
4. How was the relationship managed?
5. As an advisory group how successful has it been? Benefits, issues?
6. In 2003 report about lack of information coming back to the council – was that an issue and is it still an issue?
7. Is this group still guiding the council for all CBD revitalization projects? Who is now on it?
8. Where did the need for Stage II arise from? This appeared in the Mayors report in April 2000 – SOL Charette and Cashel Mall. No reports saying the need to move to Stage II.

9. Was the forum involved in all revitalisation projects eg New Regent Street, Cashel Mall? If not why not?
10. At various times council recommended establishing a board as a LATE and more recently an independent agency. None of these proceeded - why ?
11. Stage I of the CBD revitalisation strategy was adopted in February 2001. In May 2001 reports to council were mentioning the need for a Safer City Strategy. Was there ever any linkages made between these two processes?

CBD Revitalisation Projects

12. In your opinion why had the Council undertaken these projects?
13. What did the Council expect to achieve?
14. How well do you think these aims were achieved?
15. How satisfied was the Council with the results?
16. What would the Council have been least satisfied with?
17. Over time, more and more emphasis on economic development. How was social well-being catered for?
18. In 2003 Skelton and Memon undertook a series of seminars on recent Environment Court decisions. Said the District Plan needed to be tightened up regarding retail development outside of the CBD. How was this acted on?

Participation of Young People

19. In what ways did the Council attempt to get young people's input?
20. How successful was this?

The Night-Time Economy

21. Who did the Council expect would use these spaces at night-time?
22. How were those spaces used? Was it what you expected?
23. What did you think of young people's behaviour in the CBD at night-time?
24. Why do you think it was taking place?
25. What did you personally like about the CBD at night-time?
26. What did you personally dislike about the CBD at night-time?

CBD Post Earthquakes

27. Was the Central City Mayoral Forum used in an advisory capacity for the rebuild of the CBD? If not why not?
28. Were young people's view sought – if so how?
29. What aspects of previous CBD revitalisation projects do you hope will be carried over to the rebuild of the CBD?
30. What aspects of previous CBD revitalisation projects do you hope will be changed for the rebuild of the CBD?
31. Do you think the CBD will be used in the same way and by the same types of people as in the past? Why?
32. Do you think there will be the same young people's behaviour in the CBD at night-time in the rebuilt CBD? How have those issues been taken into account for the new CBD?

Thank participants for their time and participation in the interview. Inform them that I may contact them soon to clarify information. Remind them that they may contact me to ask questions or give additional information relevant to the research. Recheck if there is anything they do not want me to type up from the audio tape. Go through consent form again to check about transcript being sent, transcript release form, confidentiality and summary of research. Remind them that I will be in touch in 3 weeks time to check whether they wish to remain part of the research

Appendix H: Interview Guide – Bar Owner



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces Interview Guide – Buildings/Spaces

Introduction

- Self introduction and explain purpose of interview
- Outline general topics that could be covered by interviewee
- Explain purpose of the audio recording
- Check that they still have a copy of the information sheet
- Assure confidentiality and have the participant sign the consent form

The following questions will be a guideline to the interviews.

Foundational Question

1. Could you please explain your involvement over time with businesses within the CBD.
2. When did it begin?
3. What areas have you been located in?

CBD Located Businesses

4. What was the reason that you became involved in businesses within the CBD?
5. What attracted you to the areas?
6. In your opinion why has the Council undertaken past CBD revitalization projects?
7. Were you involved in any way in assisting the Council with the revitalization plans? Were you consulted?
8. What did you think about the decision-making processes of the Council?
9. How well do you think the aims of the revitalisation have been achieved?
10. How satisfied were you with the results?
11. What are you least satisfied with?
12. What would persuade you to return to those locations?
13. Do you know of other businesses that had moved away from these locations? Why?

CBD Spaces

14. What do you like most about the public spaces around your business?
15. What do you like least?
16. What would you like to see happen in the future for these spaces?

The Night-Time Economy

17. Is most of your business conducted during the day-time or night-time?
18. What do you think of young people's behaviour in the CBD at night-time?
19. Why do you think it is taking place?
20. What are you doing to curb this behaviour?
21. What are some positive and negative examples of night-time activities in the CBD?
22. What do you personally like about the CBD at night-time?
23. What do you personally dislike about the CBD at night-time?
24. What do you think of the rebuild plan for the CBD?

Thank participants for their time and participation in the interview. Inform them that I may contact them soon to clarify information. Remind them that they may contact me to ask questions or give additional information relevant to the research. Recheck if there is anything they do not want me to type up from the audio tape. Go through consent form again to check about transcript being sent, transcript release form, confidentiality and summary of research. Remind them that I will be in touch in 3 weeks time to check whether they wish to remain part of the research.

Appendix I: Interview Guide - Regulation



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces Interview Guide - Regulation

Introduction

- Self introduction and explain purpose of interview
- Outline general topics that could be covered by interviewee
- Explain purpose of the audio recording
- Check that they still have a copy of the information sheet
- Assure confidentiality and have the participant sign the consent form

The following questions will be a guideline to the interviews.

Foundational Question

1. Could you please explain your involvement with the regulation of the former CBD.
2. How long have you been involved in this type of role?
3. Over time have you noticed any changes within the council towards the CBD from a decision making point of view? What are those changes and why do you think they have occurred?

Behaviour within the CBD

4. Can you describe the difference in the behaviour between day-time and night-time?
5. How would you describe the behaviour that occurred in the CBD at night-time?
6. Is behaviour like this confined to the CBD?
7. What time at night did this behaviour start and when did it end?
8. When did this behaviour become a major problem? Other things occurring at this time that impacted on this?
9. What do you think are the causes for this behaviour?

CBD Spaces

10. What were the worst/best spots for public drunkenness? Why?
11. What were the factors that created the worst/best spots?
12. What would you like to see happen in the rebuild of the CBD?
13. What would you like the council to do differently in the rebuild of the CBD?
14. In what ways is planning of the CBD integrated with licensing?

The Night-Time Economy

15. What do you personally like about the CBD at night-time?
16. What do you personally dislike about the CBD at night-time?

Thank participants for their time and participation in the interview. Inform them that I may contact them soon to clarify information. Remind them that they may contact me to ask questions or give additional information relevant to the research. Recheck if there is anything they do not want me to type up from the audio tape. Go through consent form again to check about transcript being sent, transcript release form, confidentiality and summary of research. Remind them that I will be in touch in 3 weeks time to check whether they wish to remain part of the research.

Appendix J: Interview Guide – Young People’s Focus Group



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Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces Interview Guide – Young people’s focus group

Introduction

- Self introduction and explain purpose of interview
- Outline general topics that could be covered by interviewees
- Explain purpose of the audio recording
- Check that they still have a copy of the information sheet
- Explain that we will also use their photos that they have previously uploaded to me and I will get them to make a map where they went on their latest night out on the town together
- Assure confidentiality and have the participants sign the consent form
- Ask participants to keep the information shared in the focus group confidential
- Explain that I will ask them periodically if there is anything that they have said that they do not want included in the research

Background information: participants will be asked to fill in a form with questions for my contextual information (reminding them that they do not have to answer).

The following questions will be a guideline to the interviews.

Warm up exercise

1. Thinking about your last night out together on the town, can you make a map of where you went and tell me a little about each place.

Contextual Questions

2. How long have you been going out on the town together as a group? How old were you? What was the occasion/circumstances when you first went out on the town?
3. What are the main reasons that you go out on the town?
4. Please describe a typical night out on the town together? (When during the week, what time, location, particular occasions, your mood and feelings)
5. What do you like most about going out on the town?
6. What do you like least about going out on the town?
7. What would be considered a successful night out on the town?

Places within the CBD

8. Could you please explain how you plan your typical night out on the town together?
9. How do you choose which bars and nightclubs to go to?
10. Which bars are the best and why?
11. What part of town are they in?
12. What are you looking for in an area when you go out?
13. Do different age groups go to different places? Places for different groups?
14. What areas wouldn’t you go to and why?

15. Do you ever get hassled? By whom?
16. How do you keep yourself and each other safe?
17. Tell me about a time when you felt unsafe
18. How would you describe the 'feel' of in the CBD at night-time?
19. Do you ever feel discouraged from going out at night to the CBD?
20. In your opinions, what does the CBD need to help make your night-out a good one?
(Prompt: better lighting, better public transport, more 'safe' zones, more police, less police, etc.)

Drinking

21. Please describe a typical drinking experience when you go out on the town? (What do you drink, when and where, how much)
22. When you go out on the town, how much do you typically intend to drink? Do you actually drink more than you intended or less? Why? Do you intend to get drunk?
23. What are the main influences in your decision to drink? (Your peers, family other?)
24. Do you drink in other locations? (at home, dinner etc and if so how much would you drink in these locations?)
25. Do you get together to drink as friends without going out on the town?
26. Why do you drink when you go out on the town? Could you go out on the town and not drink or only drink a little bit?
27. What do you like about drinking?

CBD Revitalisation

28. Has the earthquake had an impact on your nights out on the town? If so, in what way? How did the CBD feel after the earthquake?
29. There will have to be some redevelopment of the CBD – what changes would you like to see in the CBD?
30. Would and how would you like to contribute?

Your Photos

31. Can you now tell me why you chose these photos to send to me.
32. What are the photos about?
33. What do they mean for you, your thoughts and feelings?

Thank participants for their time and participation in the interview. Inform them that I may contact them soon to clarify information. Remind them that they may contact me to ask questions or give additional information relevant to the research. Recheck if there is anything they do not want me to type up from the audio tape. Go through consent form again to check about pseudonyms and summary of research. Remind them that I will be in touch in 3 weeks time to check whether they wish to remain part of the research.

Appendix K: Authority for Release of Transcript



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AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
TE KURA PŪKENGA TANGATA

AUTHORITY FOR THE RELEASE OF TRANSCRIPTS

Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

I confirm that I have had the opportunity to read and amend the transcript of the interview(s) conducted with me.

I agree that the edited transcript and extracts from this may be used in reports and publications arising from the research.

Signature: **Date:**

Full Name - printed

Appendix L: Focus Group Questionnaire



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Participant Questionnaire for the research project

Planning a Night Out on the Town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Filling in this questionnaire is voluntary. All information you provide will be kept in the strictest confidence. The purpose of this questionnaire is to provide contextual information for a project that seeks to understand local governance, decision-making and its impact on young people's use of public spaces at night. Your participation in this research project is most appreciated. Thank you for your time.

1. Name: _____
2. Email: _____
3. Age: _____
4. Sex/Gender: _____
6. Ethnicity: _____
7. Occupation: _____
8. Housing: Parental home Shared flatting Rent
Own
9. Income: Less than \$25,000
\$25,000 - \$65,000
Over \$65,000

Appendix M: Ethics Approval



MASSEY UNIVERSITY

30 July 2010

Karen Johnston
334 Worsleys Road
CHRISTCHURCH 8022

Dear Karen

Re: HEC: Southern A Application – 10/52
Planning a night out on the town: Governing inner-city night-time spaces

Thank you for your letter dated 29 July 2010.

On behalf of the Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A, I am pleased to advise you that the ethics of your application are now approved. Approval is for three years. If this project has not been completed within three years from the date of this letter, reapproval must be requested.

If the nature, content, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please advise the Secretary of the Committee.

Yours sincerely

Professor Julie Boddy, Chair
Massey University Human Ethics Committee: Southern A

cc A/Prof Christine Cheyne
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Te Kunenga
ki Pārehuroa

Appendix N: Summary and Sequence of Council Events

1998 February 17, report to Central City Committee setting out criteria to deal with the numerous applications that the City Council is now receiving for additional outdoor tables and seating in conjunction with open air cafes. The rise of the café society in Christchurch. Mayor Vicki Buck & Councillors, Councillors Oscar Alpers, Carole Anderton, Graham Berry, David Buist, David Close, Graham Condon, David Cox, Anna Crighton, Newton Dodge, Carole Evans, Morgan Fahey, Ishwar Ganda, Pat Harrow, Ian Howell, Alister James, Lesley Keast, Charles Manning, Garry Moore, Margaret Murray, Denis O'Rourke, Gail Sheriff, Barbara Stewart and Ron Wright. City Manager Mike Richardson.

1. This report was deferred to the March meeting of the Committee with expanded recommendations. Criteria for allowing tables and chairs on the footpath included
 - “(xii) If a liquor licence is to be issued then the Council reserves the right to withdraw the licence to occupy road space on the basis of non compliance of the conditions. This power be delegated to either the Environmental Services or City Streets Manager.
 - (xiii) The conditions of the licence will vary according to the size, the sale of liquor and location.Recommendation:
 1. That the Council adopt the view that in the Central City maximum use of extension of outdoor seating and tables onto the footpath/roadway be encouraged unless there are identifiable safety issues which cannot be resolved.
 2. That where officers cannot resolve these issues and the applicant still seeks to proceed with the application, the request be referred to the Central City Committee.”p6

At the Council meeting of 25/3/98 the recommendations were amended to:

1. That the Council adopt the view that in the central city use of extension of outdoor seating and tables onto the footpath/roadway be encouraged.
Note difference to above recommendation from the committee.
2. 1998 April 2, report to Central City Committee explaining success of the Sunday trading campaign for the central city. The rise of the consumer focussed city. Mayor Vicki Buck.
3. 1998 November 4 Inaugural council meeting. New mayor, Garry Moore and Councillors Carole Anderton, Paddy Austin, Erin Baker, Robin Booth, Sally Buck, David Buist, David Close, Graham Condon, Barry Corbett, Anna Crighton, Carole Evans, Morgan Fahey, Ishwar Ganda, Pat Harrow, Ian Howell, Alister James, Lesley Keast, Charles Manning, Denis O'Rourke, Gail Sheriff, Barbara Stewart, Sally Thompson, Sue Wells and Ron Wright.

4. Establishment of committees, no Central City Committee.
5. 1999 February 11, Environment Committee. Employment Figures.
6. 1999 July 7 Environment Committee. Report on retailing trends in the CBD compared to suburbs.
7. 1999 October 18 Strategy and Resources Committee. First report and mention of the Mayoral Forum activities. Nothing earlier had been discussed in any committee. Reporting on what the Mayor had done and reiterating why this was important. Recommendations around setting up the Central City Board.
8. 1999 October 28 Council meeting. Report of Chairman of the Strategy and Resources Committee as requested from the 18th October meeting, on the process for the appointment of the Central City Board. The report says that “discussions have now been held over several months on the way forward for a central city revitalisation programme.” These discussions were not reported in any form to the Council during the year. Report recommended experienced business people should be on this Board and outlined a process for candidates. This included a short list identified by Councillors referred to CCHL (the Council’s holding company) for them to interview and make recommendations to the Council for appointment.
9. 1999 November 25 Council meeting. Report by the Chairman of the Strategy and Resources Committee. The sub committee had met and considered 12 people forwarded by Councillors. It was recommended that the Board comprise 10 people of which 2 should be Councillors being the Mayor and Cr Crighton. Cr Austin would be the 3rd if that was the wish of the Council which it was at the Council meeting. The CCHL was recommended to interview for 8 directors and appoint those persons on behalf of the Council. The interview panel was Messrs James, Stock and Taylor. At the December 1999 meeting of the Council Cr Stewart was also added.
10. 2000 April 10 report to Strategy and Resources Committee outlining progress on Central City Board. The interim board membership from the business and community is Craig Boyce, Philip Carter, Mike Fletcher, Antony Gough, Lani Hagaman, Joy Simpson, Darryl LeGrew, Ros Burdon. The Board had already held a series of meetings (presumably not in the public domain), was establishing a statement of corporate intent, the structure of the board and project specific developments. These developments included: Draft Concept Plan for the Central City Area, establishment of a fresh produce market, residential projects, student accommodation and Innovation Canterbury. \$150,000 suggested for funding the Board which had been included in the draft Annual Plan.
11. 2000 April 19 Council meeting. A supplementary item under public excluded section of the meeting on Central City/Economic Development.
12. 2000 June 12 report on Statement of Corporate Intent of the Central City Board which requires the Board to lead and stimulate central city revitalisation in association with CCC. The overall aim for the Board is: “to position the Christchurch Central City as the Australasian capital of quality lifestyle and

urban sustainability.” p1 The purpose of the Central City Board is to lead the revitalisation of the Christchurch Central City area. Therefore recommended to be set up as a LATE. A Council seminar had been held on 12 May 2000 (not in public presumably) and the following points were noted.

- That the formal reporting structure provide for the input of Standing Committees into central city projects.
- In selecting Board members, emphasis should be placed on business people with appropriate skills, and that it would be inappropriate for property developers to be Board members.
- The Constitution to provide for the retirement of Board members.
- The Strategy and Resources Committee rather than CCHL to recommend Board appointments to the Council.
- Chairs of Standing Committees should not be members of the Board.

The Council appears to want to have more of a hands on approach after the initial handing over to the Board. They appear more prudent.

13. 2000 June 22 Council meeting, report of the Resources and Strategy Committee with an amended report adding additional information that was not adopted. It was requested at the Committee meeting that further background information be included and explanation of how the Central City Board would relate to the Mayoral Forum and how each would be related to the City Council. Councillors maybe having unease at the relationship of all these bodies and possibly having very little information on the Mayoral Forum. Nothing had been reported to the Council or a Committee in public about the Mayoral Forum since 18th October 1999. “To achieve this vision of revitalisation will require the active contribution of many groups, individuals, and public agencies, with the City Council at the heart of that process. That is, application of the Community Governance model.”p2 The interim Board (called the existing Subcommittee) was recommended as being reformed as the Mayoral Forum. The report outlined the relationships between the Mayoral Forum, the Council, public, Council committees and others. There was the Terms of Reference for the Mayoral Forum. The provisional statement of corporate intent was amended with Crs Evans and Sheriff voting against them. There was an item on the public excluded section of the Council order paper discussing central city economic development.
14. The report was just adopted by the Council meeting. Firstly the item from the Strategy and Resources Committee was considered separately and at the end of the Council public meeting. The Chair proposed 7 new recommendations which was carried on division no. 2 by 18 votes to 5. The recommendations amongst other things requested that the Director of Finance report back to the committee on the structure and process for establishing the Board, the issue of commonality of Board membership and the Mayoral forum, a business plan be

submitted by the Board and additional members be suggested for the Forum by Chairs of committees.

15. 2000 July 17 report by City Manager (not having written any previous reports) on status of central city Mayoral Forum and how it might have oversight over central city marketing. City Marketing conducted by the Council staff was being phased out. It was described as marketing for the purposes of retailing and entertainment. He described the marketing proposed by the Interim Board as a different form of marketing. "Its objective is couched in terms of marketing the central city as a location for investment; for developers, and also for businesses and for people to live." p 1 City Manager also talks about the Mayoral Forum in local governance terms.

In the past the Council has operated with both a central city standing committee and also a central city subcommittee (in the term before last). In each case these were established as Council committees with the delegated responsibility for implementing projects and programmes within the central city – like any other Council committee such as City Services or Community Services. It seems to me that the intention of the Mayoral Forum is significantly different. It is to bring together a number of individuals who have a combination of expertise and interest in the central city on one hand, and are also stakeholders able to themselves influence decision-making of other organisations on the other. Constituted in this way the primary role is one of a catalyst: to generate ideas, to ask questions, to stimulate debate, to generate enthusiasm and a climate for decisions to be taken by a range of stakeholders leading to central city revitalisation.

The City Manager also recommended setting up the Mayoral Forum as a working party rather than a council committee thereby being out of the public domain.

16. 2000 July 17 report to Strategy and Resources Committee. Proposed timeline for the development of a strategy for the central city revitalisation.
17. 2000 August 14, report to Strategy and Resources Committee. Proposed funding and staff structure servicing Mayoral Forum. Central City Strategy Stage I outlined including public consultation.
18. 2000 December 4, report to Strategy and Resources Committee. Update on progress. Seminars and workshops have been happening and are scheduled to take place – not publicly notified.
19. 2001 February 12 report to Strategy and Resources Committee. Update on public consultation process for CBD revitalisation. Included Youth Survey results.
20. 2001 February 12 report to Strategy and Resources Committee Stage I report. Seeking approval to release Stage I document. Report also went to a special meeting of the Strategy and Resources Committee on the 19 February. Report was adopted.

21. 2001 April 17 report to Strategy and Resources Committee by City Manager on a proposed review of council's governance. Now starting to mention the words governance.
22. 2001 May 14 report to Strategy and Resources Committee on security specialists to assist in central city in early hours of Saturday and Sunday. In the report chairperson of the Christchurch safer community council had talked to the Mayoral Forum that a Safer Strategy be developed.
23. 2001 September 27 Supplementary report by the Mayor and City Manager to the Council meeting on a review of Council structures and processes. Again mention of community governance and the ability of the Council to influence the decisions of other key players in the city.
24. 2001 November 8 Inaugural council meeting The Mayor, Garry Moore (Chairperson). Councillors Oscar Alpers, Carole Anderton, Paddy Austin, Erin Baker, Helen Broughton, Sally Buck, Graham Condon, Barry Corbett, David Cox, Anna Crighton, Carole Evans, Megan Evans, Ishwar Ganda, Pat Harrow, Alister James, Lesley Keast, Denis O'Rourke, Gail Sheriff, Barbara Stewart, Ingrid Stonhill, Sue Wells, Chrissie Williams, Norm Withers and Ron Wright.

No further reports to the Council on the CBD revitalisation strategy, mention of the Mayoral Forum or the Central City Board until 1 ½ years later in September 2002 when report on Turners and Growers. Obviously progress was being made on investments in the central city as these were part of the public excluded section of the Council. Central city economic development received funding as part of the 2001/02 Annual Plan.

25. 2002 February 12 Dave Hinman report to Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee on Bedford Road transport issue. Gives background information on Ian Athfields work on the Lanes or Heritage areas in 1998. Report had added recommendations at the 28 February 2002 Council meeting being: Recommendation 1 was adopted without alteration. Recommendation 2 was also adopted,subject to:

The views of residents and property owners in Bedford Row being sought. An updated concept plan of the proposed Bedford Row redevelopment being prepared.
26. 2002 March 6 Christchurch City Council Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee Agenda report to committee on funding needs for commercial strategy by Mark Bachels.
27. 2002 May 1 Christchurch City Council Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report by Bob Nixon Where to with the city plan? Looks at Environment Court decisions and urban growth issues.
28. 2002 June 24 Christchurch City Council Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report by Mark Bachels. Update on future path Canterbury project and the urban development strategy.

29. 2002 August 9 Regulatory and Consents Committee. Report by Prusas on preparation of sale of liquor policy document. In the past it has been an administrative document. Staff think it should now be more holistic. Collaboration approach. Suggested a working party be established. The minutes from the Council say to review other Councils documents first.
30. 2002 September 16 Strategy and Finance Committee. Report by Allan Johnson talking about having bought the Turners and Growers site as part of CBD Revitalisation process and what was being proposed for it. The aims/vision and objectives for the development of the site have been agreed by the working group of the Central City Mayoral Forum and the Corporate Team chaired by Sir Miles Warren. Reference is made to a July Council meeting where councillors passed the following resolution: 'reiterate its commitment to a fair open and transparent process if and when it engaged the private sector to develop residential accommodation on the Turners and Growers site'. Obviously some councillors uneasy about the decision-making process for the site. Chair added a few extra recommendations being to set up a mainly council working party and three members of the mayoral forum to assist staff in implementing the process. Minutes of the committee show that a recommendation was altered to add Sir Miles Warren as the chair of the council working party.
31. 2002 November 5 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee report on Lichfield/Tuam Swap. Describes CBD revitalisation as a reason to consider swapping the one way street system. Recommended setting up a working party with the Chair of the Mayoral Forum on the working party. Mayor moved slightly different recommendations at the 21 November 2002 Council meeting which widened the scope of the review of the streets to everything within the four Avenues.
32. 2002 November 8 Regulatory and Consents follow up report on sale of liquor policy document.
33. 2002 November 13 Council Emergency Meeting on Liquor Ban for the Central City area.
34. 2002 November 27 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report on future workshop for Commercial Strategy.
35. 2002 December 2 Review of Committee Structure.
36. 2002 December 20 Council Emergency Meeting minutes. CBD Liquor Ban and associated submissions. Yani Johansson makes a large submission lamenting consultation with youth.
37. 2003 February 7 Property and Major Projects Committee, Turners and Growers site development options. Report from committee different recommendations from staff report. Further amended at the council meeting.
38. 2003 February 14 Regulatory and Consents Committee. Report on Environment Court decisions relating to urban growth.
39. 2003 March 5 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report on significant issues facing Christchurch and the urban planning and growth

- Special committee's role. This included referring to Skelton's role in reviewing Environment Court decisions. Committee deferred report till following month. It then prioritised the work programme with urban renewal at the bottom of 5.
40. 2003 March 5 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report on Commercial Strategy.
 41. 2003 March 5 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee. Terms of reference for Skelton.
 42. 2003 April 4 Property and Major Projects Committee, Turners and Growers site progressing development options. Moved into confidential section of meeting.
 43. 2003 April 10 Regulatory and Consents Committee. Report on draft Alcohol policy. Had been one seminar the report reported on that. Going to be another seminar and then reported back to committee in May 2003.
 44. 2003 May 9 Regulatory and Consents Committee. Draft discussion document on draft Alcohol policy. At council key stakeholders was widened to include Community Boards, Alcoholics Anonymous, the Salvation Army, City Mission and other social service agencies likely to have an interest in the topic.
 45. 2003 May 22 Council meeting welcomed new CEO Dr Lesley McTurk.
 46. 2003 June 6 Property and Major Projects Committee, Turners and Growers site City Plan implications.
 47. 2003 July 24 Regulatory and Consents Committee. Ongoing progressing of zoning for site.
 48. 2003 July 14 Strategy and Finance Committee report by Dave Hinman report on Central City Mayoral Forum Update. First report of any type of CBD revitalisation strategy information except for Turners and Growers and various roading works since 2001 February report. Report talks about lack of information coming back to the Council and says that it has reviewed its own operations and makes recommendations.
 49. 2003 October 17 Regulatory and Consents Committee Liquor ban bylaws under new LGA 2002.
 50. 2003 October 17 Regulatory and Consents Committee Draft Alcohol Policy. Report on initial consultation phase and moving to draft alcohol policy.
 51. 2003 November 11 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee, report on Cathedral Square redevelopment – stage V. To hear and consider submissions. 85 written submissions received.
 52. 2003 November 26 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee, presentation of bound urban renewal annual report.
 53. 2003 December 19 Council meeting public excluded section. It was resolved that members of the public be temporarily excluded from the meeting for consideration of a report by the Chairman of the Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee regarding options for a central city promotion programme. It was further resolved that the following persons be permitted to remain at the meeting following the exclusion of the public, as parties involved in the

- proposal referred to in the report: Mr Antony Gough, Mr Peter Townsend, Mr Steve Collins, Mr Peter Guthrey and Mr Richard Ballantyne.
54. 2004 February 10 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee progress on Cathedral Square redevelopment – stage V.
 55. 2004 February 11 Regulatory and Consents Committee Liquor Ban Bylaw.
 56. 2004 March 5 Regulatory and Consents Committee Introduction of Liquor Ban Bylaw.
 57. 2004 March 11 Arts, Culture and Heritage Committee, report on New Regent Street revitalisation project. The report had been requested from the Committee in February 2004. Chairs recommendation that this project be carried out in conjunction with the Central City Mayoral Forum.
 58. 2004 March 16 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee progress on Cathedral Square redevelopment – stage V. In accordance with the Council resolution of 26 February 2004 an invitation has been extended to representatives of the Cathedral Square Stakeholder Group and the Mayoral Forum to allow for further discussion as resolved by the Council.
 59. 2004 March 18 Appointment of Linda Rutland to fill the vacancy in the Ferrymead Ward left by Erin Baker.
 60. 2004 March 25 Council meeting slightly revised Arts Culture and Heritage Committee report by adding: It was resolved that the Committee’s recommendation be adopted, subject to clause 2 of the recommendation being amended to read “That the project be reviewed in conjunction with the Central City Mayoral Forum, as a city revitalisation project”.
 61. 2004 April 6 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee. Report on upgrading Cashel Mall. No mention made of Mayoral Forum.
 62. 2004 April 7 Cathedral Square Completion Subcommittee established with the Mayor and Crs Wright, Anderton, Sheriff and Williams. Obviously difficulties in completing the work.
 63. 2004 April 13 Strategy and Finance Committee report on Safer Christchurch.
 64. 2004 May 11 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee report on Lichfield Lanes giving the Committee an update on progress. Background on why Lichfield Lanes are being redeveloped – Ian Athfields report of 1997-98.
 65. 2004 May 17 Strategy and Finance Committee Financial assistance for Bedford Row owner as part of CBD revitalisation. Mr Harwood had not picked up the previous money on offer. References to the Mayoral Forum. At the subsequent Council meeting it asked staff to report on whether the Council should consider taking an equity interest rather than making a cash grant.
 66. 2004 May 17 Strategy and Finance Committee report on Central City Cultural Precinct Policy.
 67. 2004 May 27 Council meeting, supplementary report by the chairman of the Arts, Culture and Heritage committee on the Odeon Theatre retention. In the minutes it is noted that the Mayoral Forum discussed this deputation and

- supported the recommendation of the Committee and supported the retention of the Theatre.
68. 2004 July 7 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee report on Variation 86 retail distribution which reports on the effects of the liberal District Plan policies on the city's retailing.
 69. 2004 July 16 Property and Major Projects Committee public excluded section of meeting report on evaluation of development proposals for the Turners and Growers site.
 70. 2004 August 13 Property and Major Projects Committee public excluded section of meeting report on evaluation of development proposals for the Turners and Growers site.
 71. 2004 August 16 Strategy and Finance Committee report on Governance issues for the next Council. A subcommittee had been meeting and recommended the retention of committees.
 72. 2004 September 1 Urban Planning and Growth Special Committee Urban Renewal Annual Report. Not attached.
 73. 2004 September 13 Strategy and Finance Committee report on Bedford Row Equity Issues.
 74. 2004 September 20 Sustainable Transport and Utilities Committee, Central City Transport Concept Plan. Reference to CBD Strategy Stage 1. Run by the Central City Transport Working Party.
 75. 2004 October elections. Mayor Garry Moore and 12 Councillors Helen Broughton, Sally Buck, Graham Condon, Barry Corbett, David Cox, Anna Crighton, Carole Evans, Pat Harrow, Bob Shearing, Gail Sheriff, Sue Wells and Norm Withers.
 76. 2004 October 27 First Council meeting following elections. Interesting speech from Mayor. Meeting schedule passed. Showed only council meetings and seminars. No committees as suggested in report of August 16 2004.
 77. 2004 November 4 Extraordinary meeting to re discuss meeting schedule. Also public excluded section item on Turners and Grower site.
 78. 2004 November 25 Council meeting. Report on establishment of portfolio groups to replace committee meetings. At the meeting additional information was provided on the underlying principles, scope and communications. It was also stated that the model would be reviewed after 6 months.
 79. 2004 December 5 Council meeting report on appointments to committees and subcommittees - but no real committee only hearing panel.
 80. 2005 March 3 Council. Report regarding Lichfield Lanes development in terms of parking restrictions. Is the Mayoral Forum still meeting?
 81. 2005 April 7 Council. Report Turners and Grower redevelopment with Urban Winery Holdings.
 82. 2005 May 25. Minutes of a seminar in which governance issues were discussed.
 83. 2005 Mayoral reports started summarising what the Mayor is doing. No mention of Mayoral Forum.

84. 2005 August 18 report on the adoption of the Safer City Strategy.
85. 2005 August 30 seminar on transport concept to support the central city revitalisation.
86. 2005 September 22 Council report on central city marketing promotional campaign. Report noted that: Following representations from Mayoral Forum and staff CECC was contracted to deliver and manage a promotional campaign and facilitate the formation of a strong central city business group. - \$850,000 pa was allocated for three years funded from an increase in parking revenue. 2004/05 – 2006/07.
87. 2005 October 27 report on adoption of central city transport concept plan. Mention made of a new stakeholders group called the central city revitalisation liaison group convened by the Mayor.
88. 2005 November 2 Seminar to review governance arrangements specifically around the formation of additional portfolio groups in the economic development and regulatory/governance areas.
89. 2005 December 1 Council report on decision making from the OAG. Important statements about informal meetings.
90. 2005 December 8 report by Mayor to Council meeting on governance issues.
91. 2006 February 8 Council seminar on Avon River (Central City) Strategy. Long gestation period (2 years) and run out of the Greenspace Unit.
92. 2006 February 23 Council report on draft programmes of the portfolio groups for January – July 2006. No mention of CBD revitalisation.
93. 2006 March 2 Avon River Masterplan . Report said that the work arose out of the Christchurch Central City Strategy Stage I report.
94. 2006 March 6 Banks Peninsula amalgamated with Christchurch City. Bob Parker became the sole representative of Banks Peninsula on the council. Councillors now number 13.
95. 2006 March 16 presentation by Police to the Council on central city safety and the related topic of crime prevention through environmental design.
96. 2006 March 16 Council report from portfolio groups on the Strategic Plan.
97. 2006 March 30 Council meeting contained the Mayors Report which referred to him meeting with the Central City Advisory Group. Who are they?
98. 2006 April 20 Council agenda, Mayors report detailing work on what he called the South Of Lichfield Charette and redevelopment of Cashel Street Mall. Both appear to come out of nowhere. No reference to these developments in the Council order papers.
99. 2006 May 2 Council order paper. Oral update on Central City Transport Projects support Central City Revitalisation.
100. 2006 May 2 Council Seminar. Oral update on Designing City Mall. Notes to seminar were provided.
101. 2006 May 23 Council Seminar. Presentation to councillor on City Mall revitalisation project. Mention in the minutes of the distinction between day-time v night-time. Talk about this being Stage II revitalisation project.

102. 2006 July 20 Council agenda, Mayors report mentioning that he was involved in a Central City South Charette meeting.
103. 2006 July 25 Council Seminar on Central City Revitalisation – Proposed Stage II Strategy. In notes to seminar John Suckling from the Mayoral Forum is there. Mayoral Forum must be continuing although there has been no reference to it in formal reports to Council for a long time.
104. 2006 August 11 Council Seminar on Lichfield Street two way and bus exchange. As always these projects are tied back to the Central City Revitalisation
105. 2006 August 15 Council Seminar on Central City South and Central City Lanes Redevelopment. Apparently a planning and design workshop was held in March – cannot find any reference to that in the public records. A Lanes Plan has also been prepared. This does not seem to have been in the public record either.
106. 2006 September 7 Central City Revitalisation Stage II report to Council. Does not outline the process thus far about how Councillors have been involved. Appendices A – F attached to report. Comes before Council without any formal report to Council to go ahead with this work. Does not say if the Mayoral Forum was involved. Only earlier reference to be found is in the LTCCP discussions on Friday 25 November 2005 minutes p21 where it is stated that “A charette with Dimitri is planned for March 2006. In discussion, noted that existing level of service to be maintained. Virtually 6 reports in one. Minor changes to the reports at Council by Councillors. There was one objective put in – to increase the number of residents living within the four avenues to 30,000 by 2026.
107. 2006 September 28 Council report on reviewing portfolio groups. The proposal provides for the establishment of two new portfolio groups as substitution for the existing three groups.
108. 2007 February 20 Seminar on City Mall Business Improvement.
109. 2007 February 22 Council meeting new CEO announced. Tony Marryatt.
110. 2007 March 1 Council report on the Avon River Master plan.
111. 2007 March 13 Seminar on City Mall Special Consultative Procedure – interesting wording – “The aim of the seminar is to inform the Council on the options available for the City Mall special consultative process, to present the legal implications and to get guidance on how best to proceed with the special consultative process in order to reflect the views of the Council.”
112. 2007 April 10 Seminar on CBD revitalisation update on progress. No report or notes.
113. 2007 June 7 Council report seeking delegations to proceed with negotiations with Business Building Systems Ltd (BBS) for the Lichfield Lanes revitalisation project.
114. 2007 July 25 Seminar on update of City Mall work.
115. 2007 July 26 Council report on City Lanes project after consultation recommendation for adoption.

116. 2007 August 9 CEO report to Council on City Mall Project regarding vehicle access to Mall. Council had approved in principle to change Cashel Mall and Street to a one-way road. Staff had not commenced the special consultative procedure because of confusion they felt the community would feel if they consulted on a slow road while it was being constructed at the same time. The staff recommended completing the service lane and then consulting later.
117. 2007 August 14 Seminar on CBB revitalisation. Notes to the seminar said that copies of the "Central City Action Tracker" and "Project central city – a world class city with heart" were tabled. Also noted :” The seminar expressed the Council’s recognition and appreciation of the years of work contributed by the members of the Central City Mayoral Forum. Does this mean that they are still working on it?
118. 2007 September 20 Council report on portfolio group achievements 2004-2007.
119. 2007 October 2 Seminar presentation on Safer Christchurch. District Commander reiterated a 2am closing aspiration. It was noted: “Those present were reminded that the council had set the policy which allowed 24 hour licensing.”
120. 2007 October 4 Council report on establishing an Urban Regeneration Agency which would implement the Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy and the Central City Revitalisation Strategy. Designed so that the council could intervene in the market place directly and quickly. This was agreed to by the Council. This was to have been established by August 2008 but never was. No further mention made of this Agency.
121. 2007 October Elections and new Mayor - Bob Parker and Councillors Ngaire Button, Helen Broughton, Sally Buck, Barry Corbett, David Cox, Yani Johanson, Claudia Reid, Bob Shearing, Gail Sheriff, Mike Wall, Sue Wells, Chrissie Williams and Norm Withers
122. 2007 November 7 Council report on establishment of Committees. Cr Williams, Johanson and Broughton attempted to establish 2 more committees but that was voted down.
123. 2007 December 13 Council report on establishment of Committees. Report stated the return of the Regulatory and Planning Committee and a LTCCP Working Party. It had previously been discussed at an informal gathering on 1 November 2007. Seminars and portfolio groups appear to have been dropped.
124. A noticeable drop in the number of publicly available meetings of the Council. 2 Council meetings a month (one to consider the Community Board reports and one for general matters) plus the one standing committee Regulatory and Planning. No seminars or portfolio groups - don’t know if they have been completely dropped or just out of the public gaze.
125. 2008 August 7 Regulatory and Planning Committee report on Urban Design Draft Issues and Options for Business Zones.

126. 2008 September 4 Report to Regulatory and Planning Committee. Adoption of Annual Report to the Liquor Licensing Authority for the Period Ending 30 June 2008.
127. 2008 October 30 Council report on its submission to the government on the National Alcohol Action Plan. The Council did not support the Plan. "The primary Goal in our view should be "To make individuals responsible for their actions and for society to find alcohol abuse unacceptable."
128. 2009 April 2 Alcohol policy and Liquor Control Bylaw Subcommittee Agenda.
129. 2009 April 23 Council submission on the Sale and Supply of Liquor and Liquor Enforcement Bill. Interesting statistics – 1990 397 liquor licences, 2006 1,051 and 2009 1,120.
130. 2009 May 28 Council report on Central City South Master Plan. Goes over the history of CBD revitalisation particularly the 2006 Central City South Charrette - something that never got sign off from the Council to go ahead. Talks about Council purchasing 3 properties from Henderson. Presents the Master Plan for the Central City South area. There was obviously controversy over the report as it had to be voted on clause by clause.
131. 2009 June 4 Alcohol Policy and Liquor Control Subcommittee. Various reports outlining what different agencies are doing so that this subcommittee becomes the oversight body for alcohol-related issues. Looks at various initiatives of the council to combat alcohol-related harm.
132. 2009 June 23 Alcohol Policy and Liquor Control Subcommittee.
133. 2009 July 23 Council report on changes to traffic movements to, amongst other things, assist the Police to manage disorderly behaviour on The Strip.
134. 2009 September 3 Report to Regulatory and Planning Committee. Adoption of Annual Report to the Liquor Licensing Authority for the Period Ending 30 June 2009. Mention is made that the community and media have focused a great deal on alcohol during the year.
135. 2009 October 22, Council report on submission to the "Alcohol in our lives" report by the Law Commission. Useful statistics in the report.
136. 2010 February 25 Council report on the findings from Gehl Architects on their report Public Space Public Life Study of Christchurch. Said that a report had been presented to the Council in March 2009 but can't find any record of that. Also says that 3 Councillor workshops were held following June 2009.
137. 2010 September 2 Report to Regulatory and Planning Committee. Adoption of Annual Report to the Liquor Licensing Authority for the Period Ending 30 June 2010.
138. 2010 December 7 report on earthquake recovery and council's response.
139. 2010 December 7 Council report on the establishment of committees. Re-establishing 9 Committees including a Central City Committee.