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Maori and the Anti-Apartheid Movement:
Generating a Space to Oppose Domestic Racism
1959 - 1985

LIN JOHNSON
2007
Maori and the Anti-Apartheid Movement:
Generating a Space to Oppose Domestic Racism
1959 -1985

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University

Lin Johnson
2007
Acknowledgements

Ehara taku toa i te toa takihangi engari taki mano.

My strength lies not in my right hand but in those who stand around me.

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<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>Auckland City Libraries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMC</td>
<td>Auckland District Maori Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Alexander Turnbull Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA</td>
<td>Auckland University Students' Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABTA</td>
<td>Citizens' All Black Tour Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Citizens' Association for Racial Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COST</td>
<td>Citizens Opposed to the Springbok Tour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Halt All Racist Tours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOHR</td>
<td>Maori Organisation On Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOST</td>
<td>Mobilisation to Stop the Tour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWWL</td>
<td>Maori Women's Welfare League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>New Perspectives on Race</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZMC</td>
<td>New Zealand Maori Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZRFU</td>
<td>New Zealand Rugby Football Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZRRC</td>
<td>New Zealand Race Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZSCM</td>
<td>New Zealand Student Christian Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZSS</td>
<td>New Zealand Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZUSA</td>
<td>New Zealand University Students' Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>People Opposed to Waitangi</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Socialist Action League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN-ROC</td>
<td>South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARB</td>
<td>South African Rugby Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>South African Sports Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUP</td>
<td>Socialist Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAL</td>
<td>University of Auckland Library</td>
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<td>UWL</td>
<td>University of Waikato Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>VUW</td>
<td>Victoria University of Wellington</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>Waitangi Action Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>Waitangi Action Committee</td>
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<td>WCL</td>
<td>Workers Communist League</td>
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# Glossary

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Maori Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>ake, ake, ake</td>
<td>forever and ever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iwi</td>
<td>tribe, people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaumatua</td>
<td>elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaupapa</td>
<td>proposal, plan, theme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ka whawhai tonu matou</td>
<td>we continue to fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingitanga</td>
<td>the King movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>mana</td>
<td>authority, prestige, power, charisma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mana motuhake</td>
<td>autonomy, independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maoritanga</td>
<td>Maori culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>marae</td>
<td>meeting area of whanau or iwi, focal point of settlement, ceremonial courtyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maranga mai</td>
<td>rise up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>take</td>
<td>cause, reason, issue, topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>tane</td>
<td>male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tangata whenua</td>
<td>local people, people of the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>te reo</td>
<td>the language, the Maori language</td>
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<tr>
<td>tikanga</td>
<td>custom, rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tino rangatiratanga</td>
<td>absolute sovereignty, Maori control of all things Maori</td>
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<tr>
<td>whakapapa</td>
<td>genealogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whakatauaki</td>
<td>proverb</td>
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<tr>
<td>whanau</td>
<td>family, extended family</td>
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Introduction

Creating Political Space through Apartheid Sport

The unknown author has appropriated a space on a public fence, inscribed it with a message and created a new space of consciousness. The political graffiti is designed to provoke thought – to encourage the viewer to question and to perhaps translate consciousness into action. This demonstrates the use of public space as a political resource to construct and deploy a counter-hegemonic language and present an alternative vision of society. As the message suggests, New Zealanders are hiding behind myths which exist within and which influence New Zealand society. Implicit in the message is the demand for change. There is no hint as to who is 'hiding' or what the myths are. Context supplies the answer.

The photograph appeared in an anti-racist newsletter to mark Christian Action Week in 1982. The purpose of the publication by the National Council of Churches (NCC) Programme on Racism was to raise the awareness of Pakeha New Zealanders about the reality of racism. 'It exists,' stated the publication, 'and has been a part of a way of life since Whites first landed in this country. Although we pride ourselves ...about human rights...freedom and equality, the bleak reality is that...this country is based on

and operates under a doctrine of White racism ... White people [must] come out from behind the myths that have sheltered them for so long.\textsuperscript{2} The National Council of Churches was one of many groups which either turned their attention to domestic racism or increased their anti-racist activities following the 1981 Springbok Tour.

By 1981 domestic racism had evolved into a major issue of contention. During the late 1950s incidents of overt racism appeared before the public gaze.\textsuperscript{3} While these caused an outcry and had the potential to expose racism, discrimination and inequality, for the majority of Pakeha these were isolated incidents and bore no relation to the reality as they knew it. Most were shrouded by two powerful and persistent myths which lay at the centre of the national imaginings of Pakeha New Zealand. The ‘one people’ discourse provided a vision of national homogeneity and underpinned the Pakeha imperative of assimilation through to the 1960s and integration into the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{4} ‘One people’ was premised on a central ideology of egalitarianism which held that Maori and Pakeha were equal: all had equal opportunities, status and access to the institutions upon which society rested. Racial equality suggested racial harmony. The view that New Zealanders enjoyed the best race relations in the world was widely held by Pakeha, expressed by many Maori and reinforced by commentators abroad. A comparison which was regularly made between the status of Maori and the indigenous peoples of Australia, North America and South Africa, ensured that New Zealand’s reputation shone brightly.\textsuperscript{5} While race relations in New Zealand were arguably better than in such countries, as James Belich points out, ‘better is not great.’\textsuperscript{6}

During the 1970s the myths of ‘one people’ and racial harmony began to unravel through Maori activism. bell hooks, the black American feminist and social activist observes that

\textsuperscript{2} ‘Come out from behind the Myths’, in National Council of Churches newsletter, 27 June-4 July, 1982, ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], Auckland City Library (ACL).
\textsuperscript{4} The ‘one people’ myth possibly had its origins at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. As each leading chief signed the Treaty Lieutenant-Governor William Hobson is said to have uttered the affirmation ‘He iwi kotahi tatou’ (Now we are one people). For a Maori point of view see Pat Hohepa. ‘Maori and Pakeha: The One-People Myth’ in Tihe Mauri Ora, ed., Michael King, Wellington: Methuen New Zealand Ltd, 1978, pp.98-111.
\textsuperscript{6} James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders From the 1880s to the Year 2000, Auckland: Allen Lane, 2001, p.190. See Chapter 6 for Belich’s explanation of the stereotype ascribed to Maori as ‘better blacks’ and the formation of the ‘Best Race Relations’ ideology.
‘our struggle is also a struggle of memory against forgetting.’ In this, part of the agenda of black activism was to create spaces where one could remember the past, relate these stories and in doing so illuminate the present. This also underpinned Maori activism and as Linda Smith notes, ‘the need to tell our stories remains the powerful imperative of a powerful form of resistance.’ This is aligned with the work of Edward Said on colonial discourse who, in his seminal text *Orientalism*, argues that the colonised subject is created by the knowledge and words of the Western coloniser. Maori activists were committed to ensuring that both Maori and Pakeha did not forget the past and became aware of the repercussions of colonisation in the present.

As the graffiti on the fence created a space for a new consciousness, so too did the actions of Maori activists and a small number of anti-racist groups. Maori activists drew on liberation ideologies from abroad and fused them with domestic issues. A broad Maori rights/land rights movement emerged and activists appropriated public spaces and presented a new view of race relations. The Pakeha version of colonisation was contested as activists introduced a new narrative – a story of devastation, resistance and survival. Issues of land alienation, a treaty never honoured and domestic racism populated the discursive space. In turn Pakeha were confronted with a counter-history and a new vision of contemporary society premised on institutional racism. Despite the efforts of Maori activists many Pakeha remained ignorant of their past or were resistant to the domestic racism discourse.

Maori activists took the opportunity to rectify this situation during the 1981 Springbok Tour. The space which the Tour provided was used as a political resource in which they sought to create a new consciousness about domestic racism amongst anti-Tour

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7 bell hooks, *Yearning: race, gender and cultural politics*, Boston: South End Press, 1990, p.147. bell hooks adopts a lower casing for her name which to her signifies that what is most important in her work is the ‘substance of the books, not who I am’. [En.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_hooks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_hooks) retrieved on 9 November 2006.


10 Hauraki Greenland points out that it was only a ‘movement’ in a tenuous sense in that it existed as a number of ‘localised groups, tasks and campaigns.’ Nevertheless, all Maori activism was directed towards issues of equality in some form or another and all were underpinned by the promises encapsulated in the Treaty of Waitangi but which had never been realised by Pakeha. See Hauraki Greenland, ‘Ethnicity as Ideology: the Critique of Pakeha Society’ in *Tauiwi: Racism and Ethnicity in New Zealand*, eds. P. Spoonley, C. Macpherson, D. Pearson & C. Sedgwick, Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1984, p.87.
supporters. Activists drew attention to domestic racism and made an ontological link between the oppression of black South Africans and the oppression of Maori. Moreover, they asked anti-tour demonstrators why they were prepared to oppose racism and injustice which occurred 12,000 miles away and yet continued to ignore racism within New Zealand. Their challenge was for the anti-apartheid movement to turn their focus towards the struggle against domestic racism. The anti-racist text at the beginning of this introduction is a direct outcome of this discourse and marks the end-point of this study.

While the actions of Maori activists in 1981 were crucial in promoting a shift towards the struggle against domestic racism by Pakeha groups, this was not a discrete event. In earlier periods similar openings were created through the apartheid sport debate which presented Maori activists with the opportunity to draw attention to historical and contemporary grievances. Ranginui Walker places Maori activism within a long and continual struggle ‘for social justice, equality and self-determination, whereby two people can live as co-equals.’ The apartheid sport debate ran alongside a more general Maori activism and was another avenue whereby this struggle was carried forward.

This thesis has two main purposes. First it will be argued that the apartheid sport debate and the involvement by Maori in the anti-apartheid movement provided opportunities for the articulation of indigenous discourses related to historical and contemporary grievances and most particularly domestic racism. This enabled Maori activists to place domestic issues before the wider public thereby creating new spaces of consciousness and providing an avenue for such issues to be recognised and acted upon. As such the apartheid sport debate became a force for social change and an important vehicle in the struggle by Maori for equality.

Analysis is grounded in scholarship pertaining to contentious politics and social movement analysis which stresses the importance of symbolic resources and discourse as vital components in effecting social change. In this, discourses and languages constructed and activated through the formation, activities and mobilisation of social

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movements challenge dominant discourses and hegemonic practices. The perspectives and articulation of a counter-hegemonic language through social movement activities gives rise to new spaces of contestation, consciousness and cultural production. Thus mobilisation provides a concrete form for these discourses and alternative visions of society which are embedded in the language of social movements or dissenting groups. These are then presented and re-presented through an engagement with wider society, thereby engendering spaces of consciousness and opportunity and ultimately promoting social change.

Clearly social movement activities provide vital opportunities for indigenous rights groups or those who have been oppressed and marginalised. As Melucci observes, they engender new ‘spaces of representation’ which are firmly placed within the public gaze and provide opportunities for minority groups to establish a political presence which hitherto may have been hidden. Moreover it enables such groups and their political vision to enter the consciousness of mainstream society and to be recognised as alternative political groups. As Alice Feldman notes, social movement processes and activities ‘create critical openings for injecting messages and demands into mainstream decision-making processes and translating them into potential foundations for change.’

An explanation of spatial concepts used in this thesis is necessary. One of the many outcomes of Postmodern and Postcolonial scholarship has been the reassertion of a spatial perspective into social and cultural analysis. Underpinning this thesis is the relationship between physical, social and mental space and social transformation. Physical space is crucial for the development of social movement activities and contentious politics. The widespread opposition by Maori to apartheid sport which

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13 Michael Lipsky has viewed protest action as a ‘political resource’ for relatively powerless groups. By this Lipsky means those groups which ‘relatively speaking are lacking in conventional political resources.’ Michael Lipsky, ‘Protest as a Political Resource’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.62, No. 4, 1968, p. 1154.


developed from the late 1950s can be directly related to the migration of Maori from geographically marginalised communities into an urban space. This environment provided readily accessible communication resources, access to information and streets upon which to stage demonstrations. Public space was used as a political resource by radical Maori protest groups which emerged in the 1970s and provided a place for the dissemination of indigenous discourses and the staging of dramatic and contentious protest actions. Through their involvement in the anti-apartheid movement new physical spaces were made available in the form of public forums, meetings and demonstrations. Physical space was often much more than merely a backdrop but constituted a creative and dynamic resource whereby symbolism, discourse and dramatic action came together within the context of mobilisation. This was especially evident during the 1981 Tour.

Social space is entwined with activities and relationships in physical space. At its simplest, 'space is at once result and cause, product and producer' of social relations and to change one is to change the other. As a social product space is 'simultaneously the medium and outcome, presupposition and embodiment, of social action and relationship.' Thus all social relationships and activities have a spatial form and location and are created out of a network of relations. It follows, therefore, that the creation and control of space is a component of hegemonic power. It is, as Doreen Massey observes, 'both the message and the medium of domination and subordination' for it 'tells you where you are and it puts you there.' Differences between individuals and social groups are actively produced and reproduced through hegemonic power as a strategy to create and maintain certain social divisions that maintain its empowerment.

Through the involvement of Maori activists in the anti-apartheid movement, new social spaces were inhabited and new relationships were formed. This provided opportunities whereby an agenda related to domestic racism could be advanced and the subordinate spaces which Maori inhabited could be contested. Moreover the anti-apartheid movement consisted of a large and diverse range of organisations within a liberal and

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18 Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, p.129.
leftist network. Maori activists became part of this and claims could be made, interests promoted and demands could be advanced via a variety of channels.

Spaces of consciousness consist of two interacting processes. Physical spaces are transformed into concrete spaces of consciousness via action, symbolism or discourse which is inscribed on this space. Thus, for example, the graffiti on the fence at the beginning of this introduction transformed a blank space into a bounded anti-racism space. The transference of the signs or symbols encapsulated in the message to the mental processes of the viewer has the potential to engender a new consciousness about domestic racism. The hopes of activists who disseminated such messages was that a new consciousness would be translated into concrete political gains thus leading to social change.

The second purpose of this thesis is to investigate the opposition by Maori to apartheid sport through the lens of three rugby campaigns in 1960, 1970 and 1981. This addresses the politics of protest and the ‘who, where, when and why’ questions which form the near ground of this study. The intention is to show the changing nature of the debate over twenty years and that the response by Maori activists reflected the changes which were occurring within Maori society. The growth and development of Maori protest politics were a significant influence. This applied to both moderate and radical activists although there were differences in emphases. While both groups opposed apartheid, the response by radical activists and their involvement in the anti-apartheid movement was shaped by domestic issues, liberation politics and their identification with the oppression of black South Africans. For moderate activists, while not delivering a discourse which linked domestic racism with apartheid, the debate provided the opportunity to establish a public presence and Maori profile. This provided a space for Maori involvement in politics which were underpinned by aspirations for self-determination. This was particularly evident from the late 1970s when the push for self-determination and Maori rights were being forcefully and publicly articulated. Despite differences, both radical and moderate activist groups in their different ways sought to attend to the mana of Maori through the apartheid sport debate.

The distinction which I make throughout the thesis between moderate and radical
activism is not unproblematic. There is no simple and fixed distinction – categories blur and fold into each other in particular situations. Moderate activists took part in or supported the Bastion Point occupations which were deemed ‘illegal’ and hence classified as radical actions. Moreover there is a grey area in which one’s perspective constructs an action as moderate or radical. Demonstrations, marches and street theatre fall into this category. A street theatre performance by a group of clowns during the 1981 Tour protests was not deemed a radical action whereas the street theatre of Maranga Mai which acted out issues of land alienation and domestic racism was judged offensive and radical by many Pakeha. Perhaps the discourse encapsulated within an action determines the terminology radical and moderate? Again this raises a number of issues. Many Pakeha, for example, would regard the discourse by Maori for tino rangatiratanga as radical. Most Maori activists, and arguably most Maori, would therefore be considered radical. Whilst acknowledging ambiguities, for the purposes of this thesis a radical activist is someone who employs vigorous, dramatic and contentious forms of protest action; who is prepared to break the law and who places an anti-colonial discourse firmly before the public. Moderate activists are those who generally employ conventional avenues such as lobbying, the press and establishing dialogue with authorities through which to register their protest.

There is perhaps a need to justify why this study is heavily underpinned by a ‘who, how, when and why’ agenda. Historical theory and scholarship have become strongly influenced by postcolonialism, postmodernism and poststructuralism. While important insights have emerged out of the ‘post turn’ there is often a sense that somehow the grounded struggles of people in history exist at some subterranean level or get lost within theoretical concepts and innovations. In conceding that one can ‘never know what really happened’ I also believe that the ‘post’ turn has inhibited the desire to try to find out. Kerry Howe makes an observation which fits with this line of reasoning: ‘whatever else history might be, sometimes at least it should attempt to be about what happened and why, instead of being entirely consumed by studies of discursive practice. Moreover, while it is not fashionable to do so I would make a plea for more “curiosity-driven” research. Otherwise we can end up endorsing ignorance, and in the long run simply “not knowing” cannot be to anyone’s benefit.’

The apartheid sport issue generated considerable protest and bitter debate during the period with which this thesis is concerned and the anti-apartheid movement was one of the major social movements of the twentieth century. Despite this, and the fact that the issue brought New Zealand ‘the closest it has come to civil war,’ surprisingly little has been written about the issue particularly from the late 1960s onwards. In terms of the involvement and response by Maori, scholarship is almost entirely absent. The exception is Aroha Harris’ *Hikoi: Forty Years of Maori Protest.* In some works one is left wondering whether or not Maori were involved. Yet Maori played a key part in the anti-apartheid movement from its inception and were heavily involved in the 1981 Tour both in leadership positions and as anti-tour supporters. Geoff Chapple manages to incorporate Maori involvement into his work on the 1981 Tour as does the publication by the Wellington tour coalition COST, albeit to a lesser extent. For the most part in other works Maori appear as minor adjuncts to Pakeha involvement. With such a dearth of scholarship I hope that this work will place the issue on the table and lead to further scholarship in this area.

**Structure and parameters**

The first three chapters of this thesis are structured around three individual apartheid sport campaigns, all of which involve rugby. It is for pragmatic reasons that this format has been chosen: the topic is large and to cover the involvement by Maori in every campaign 1959-1981 would be unrealistic in an MA thesis. Nevertheless aspects of the intervening years will be discussed where necessary and used for contextualisation purposes. While Maori organisations and individuals who supported sporting contact with South Africa are not a focus of this thesis, the relationship between these and Maori anti-tour groups became an integral part of the debate at certain times and will be discussed where appropriate. All three chapters are underpinned by spatial concepts and in particular the creation and utilisation of space for an indigenous discourse to be articulated, and the politics of protest are infused throughout.

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22 Aroha Harris, *Hikoi*.
Chapter One investigates the 1960 'No Maoris No Tour' campaign which arose in response to the decision of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) to exclude Maori from the All Black team to tour South Africa. At heart the debate was an effort to re-affirm the 'one people' ideology which had ruptured by the segregation of Maori and Pakeha on the rugby field. The widespread opposition to the NZRFU decision by Maori was facilitated by the changing nature of society in which new physical and social spaces were inhabited thus increasing the opportunity for protest. This debate marked the emergence of popular protest which made Maori visible and increased the political profile of some Maori leaders. Whether the rugby debate generated a general discussion on racial discrimination and the extent to which a space was created for issues of domestic racism to be addressed will be explored.

The 1970 All Black Tour to South Africa is the focus of Chapter Two. This discusses the leading role which radical and conservative Maori activists took in opposing the tour and the intense anti-tour activity which took place both within Maoridom and within wider society. It will be demonstrated that the event created new opportunities, networks and spaces whereby domestic issues could be presented. The events of the tour raised broader discussion on domestic racism. Whether this led to a wider acknowledgement by Pakeha New Zealand and thus challenged the 'one people' and 'racial harmony' discourses, will be discussed.

Chapter Three discusses the 1981 Tour. This is divided into two sections with the first discussing the actions of radical and moderate groups in seeking to prevent the tour from taking place. Opposition was widespread and was shaped and reflected the events and political agenda which had evolved throughout the decade of the 1970s. The second section is focused on the 1981 Tour and the aftermath during which many Maori radical activists were charged with tour offences and underwent lengthy trials. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how radical activists used the physical and social spaces which the tour presented to create a political space upon which they inscribed a counter-hegemonic discourse. Through symbolism, discourse and dramatic, action activists sought to create a new consciousness amongst anti-tour supporters about historical and contemporary grievances.
Chapter four is different from the other chapters in that Pakeha are brought to the foreground and become the focus of attention. It is acknowledged that the 1980s was a period of intense and high-profile Maori activism and one in which Maori activists were placing many issues of contention before Pakeha New Zealand. Nevertheless this thesis is concerned with generating space through the anti-apartheid movement and not through general Maori activism. During the 1981 Tour, Maori activists generated a space for domestic racism to be recognised. Their challenge to Pakeha within the anti-apartheid movement was to fill and expand this space by directing their attention to the struggle against domestic racism. This chapter examines the response by Pakeha to this challenge through to 1985. While the focus is on the anti-racism work of HART, other Pakeha groups will be discussed where appropriate. The measures taken and the effectiveness of HART in creating a space for domestic racism to be recognised and addressed form the core of this chapter.

The conclusion will reiterate my original argument that the involvement by Maori in the anti-apartheid movement was a force for social change and was but another avenue in the long struggle by Maori for equality, justice and self-determination.

Sources
This thesis draws on a diverse range of sources. The first major category is the archived records from various organisations. Core resources for the 'No Maoris No Tour' campaign are the O'Regan Family – Diaries and Papers and the New Zealand Citizens All Black Tour Association Records, both of which are located at the Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL). These records consist of correspondence, press statements, pamphlets and newspaper clippings.

Key resources for the 1970 and 1981 campaigns are the Trevor Richards Papers (ATL) and the Michael Law Collection, at the University of Waikato Library (UWL). These records provide minutes and records of conferences, press statements, correspondence between HART and Maori organisations and various anti-racist groups, newspaper clippings and editions of Amandla. Also included are newsletters from indigenous rights groups including Waitangi Action Committee, Maori Organisation on Human Rights, Maori Peoples Liberation Front and Te Matakite O Aotearoa. The records of the Citizens' Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and the Auckland Committee on
Racism and Discrimination (ACORD), at the Auckland City Library (ACL), are also a rich source of information in the form of CARE newsletters and magazines, correspondence between indigenous rights groups, press statements and newsletters from Maori activist groups. Additionally the ACORD records contain anti-racism material, reports of anti-racism training workshops, and numerous reports conducted by ACORD on institutional racism.

The Auckland District Maori Council (ADMC) records, which are archived in the New Zealand & Pacific Collection at the University of Auckland Library (UAL), provide correspondence between the ADMC and the New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC) pertaining to the various debates surrounding the 1981 Tour. The records also contain correspondence involving disputes between the ADMC and government officials, MPs and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, press releases and television interview transcripts, speeches and addresses by prominent Maori academics, and newspaper clippings.

Forming a core resource for the period following the 1981 Tour are the HART: Aotearoa Records. These consist of press releases, information on various anti-racism campaigns, newsletters, circulars to branches and correspondence between members, and Amandla. The records from the Conference of Churches in Aotearoa New Zealand Programme on Racism provide material on anti-racism workshops. Both sets of records are housed at the ATL. Also providing valuable material on anti-racism activities are the CARE and ACORD records at ACL.

The second major category of sources is interviews which I conducted with some key people involved in both the anti-apartheid and anti-racist movements. A full list is provided in the bibliography. These are supplemented by interviews conducted by Megan Wishart with HART and CARE people which are archived at the Oral History Centre in the ATL. The voices of a greater range of Maori activists have been accessed through a range of sources including the Wellington Springbok Tour Association archives (WSTA) at Victoria University which contain taped interviews with Maori and Polynesian activists; the Paul Diamond series Nga Tamatoa: The Maori Protest Group Nga Tamatoa thirty years on; documentaries, including Mereta Mita’s Patu!; and material archived at Radio New Zealand.
Information gathered from a range of newspapers, magazines and newsletters form a third category of sources. Publications such as *Te Ao Hou* and *Kaunihera Maori* provide Maori perspectives on the 1960 and 1970 campaigns. Socialist publications including *Unity*, *Socialist Action* and *The Republican* are useful in providing a leftist perspective as well as considerable commentary on Maori activism. *Broadsheet* is a valuable resource for information on the involvement of Maori women during the 1981 Tour and the furore over Donna Awatere’s articulation of Maori sovereignty. In tracing discourse on racism and attitudinal shifts throughout the apartheid sport debate and anti-racist activities after 1981, the main source is newspapers. In these, coverage of key events such as Waitangi Day, editorials and letters to the editor columns provide a rich source for analysis. *Broadsheet* contained feminist attitudes towards Maori sovereignty. The heavy reliance on newspaper material and particularly correspondence columns in ascertaining discourse is problematic for it raises issues of subjectivity, pre-disposition and calculated intentions of the Editor. To combat this, these sources are supplemented by published surveys and studies. The latter included a study commissioned by Project Waitangi which surveyed attitudes towards the Treaty of Waitangi and domestic racism.

In 1921 Maori were insulted by a visiting Springbok rugby team which made clear their anger and distaste at having to play against a Maori rugby team. The ensuing brief debate was finally brushed aside by a Herald correspondent which reveals much about attitudes towards Maori:

> The incident may now be considered closed and the Maori race will be as quick to forget it as they have been in expressing their indignation at a wanton insult.²⁴

This thesis begins after forty years of remembering and struggle by Maori against racial discrimination on the rugby field. While few recognised it at the time, looking back from a vantage point forty-six years later, these events constituted the beginning of a process whereby the lid on domestic racism was gradually lifted. That the apartheid sport debate generated the space for this to be effected forms the essence of this thesis.

²⁴ *New Zealand Herald*, 15 September 1921.
Chapter One
1960 'No Maoris No Tour' Protest

In 1956 it seemed that the long rugby debate between the Springboks and Maori was over. The two met on a rugby field and the following day the touring team was entertained at Turangawaewae Marae at Ngaruawahia. Maniapoto leader Pei Te Hurinui Jones told the Springbok team that 'Maori people have a great deal of admiration' for them. In response Danie Craven said that 'If other South African teams come to your country they should play against more Maori teams.' Amidst the atmosphere of goodwill and friendship, 'everyone embraced and sang "Now is the Hour."' There was every reason for Maori to believe that Maori rugby players would also be accepted for future All Black tours of South Africa. On 10 May 1960, an all-white All Black team flew out of Auckland's Whenuapai Airport on the first leg of their rugby tour of South Africa. The period between these two events is the focus of this chapter.

The exclusion of Maori rugby players from the 1960 All Black Tour to South Africa unleashed the largest and most sustained protest since the debate had emerged in 1921. The issue during the 1960 tour protest was a simple matter of equality. Both Maori and Pakeha anti-tour protesters based their actions on the belief that all New Zealanders were equal: all had the same opportunities, and access to the same institutions and resources. This applied to the rugby field. The Treaty of Waitangi was often invoked as support for this claim. Indeed, Maharaia Winiata from Kingitanga was explicit and stated that 'Waitangi was the cornerstone of the relationship between two peoples' which guaranteed Maori equality with Pakeha.²

Underpinning the intensity and widespread nature of protest by both Maori and Pakeha was the exclusion of Maori which called into question the national identity of New Zealanders as 'one people.' Maori had been segregated on the rugby field according to

¹ Warwick Roger, Old Heroes: The 1956 Springbok Tour and the Lives Beyond, Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991, p.117. Danie Craven was President of the South African Rugby Board.
² Dominion, 13 August 1959, New Zealand Citizens All Black Tour Association Papers (CABTA), 77-202, ATL.
'race' and therefore New Zealand's famed reputation for equality and racial harmony was at stake. There were however, significant differences between the Maori and Pakeha perceptions of 'one people.' For Maori 'one people' meant the right to be equal and the right to be different, whereas for Pakeha 'one people' was grounded in an assimilative imperative which meant the obligation was not to be different, but to be equal and the same.

In many ways the 1960 tour protest was both an ending and a beginning. It marked the end of nearly forty years of protest which had been conducted mainly by Maori leaders who spoke on behalf of their people. It was also a beginning in that new Maori groups and individuals added their voice to that of Maori leaders, support was given to Maori by a large number of Pakeha, and protest became co-ordinated, leading to a more active form of protest. This created a space for some Maori to develop a public and political profile and, of more significance, it made Maori visible. The underlying dynamic contributing to the 'newness' and intensity of protest was the changing nature of society. For Maori it was a time of rapid urbanisation. Maori and Pakeha were sharing a new social space and Maori became more visible. This process brought new perspectives, problems, and social relationships.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the apartheid sport issue and the context within which the controversy emerged. The body of the chapter traces the three main forms of protest through the Churches, Maori leaders and wider popular protest. Participation by Maori in the latter owed much to the new social spaces they occupied which provided the opportunity for protest. The main argument throughout this thesis is that the apartheid sport debate provided openings and opportunities for issues of domestic racism to be articulated. This resulted in a new consciousness whereby such issues were recognised and acted upon. While there is no evidence that Maori deliberately used the 'No Maoris No Tour' debate for the purpose of drawing attention to racial discrimination outside the rugby debate, a consequence of the debate was a broader discussion of racial discrimination. This resulted in action being taken by several groups to address the issue. This is the subject of the final section of the chapter.
Background
Public debate surrounding New Zealand's rugby sporting contact with South Africa had a long lineage. In 1921 scandal erupted during the Springboks first tour of New Zealand in which they played a game against a Maori team. This was an ill-tempered event and the Springboks made it clear they resented having to play against Maori. This was given substance when a cablegram, written by a South African reporter, was leaked to the press clarifying the attitudes of the Springboks towards Maori. The event and the ensuing protest, set in train a debate about what should be done with Maori players which was to last for the next fifty years.3

At issue was the matter of race. Integration was the expressed ideal within New Zealand, whereas South Africa enforced a rigid segregation. How could the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) maintain a rugby tie with the Springboks in a country which not only segregated its coloured population, but which refused to accept Maori players as part of the All Black team? After all, the central plank of New Zealand's identity was that all were equal and thus all were 'one people' - a homogenisation which signified racial harmony and racial unity.4 The way in which the NZRFU dealt with this was to exclude Maori from teams to tour South Africa and, until 1956, not to schedule games between the Maori All Blacks and visiting Springbok teams.

Until 1959 protest over apartheid sport, although small, steadily increased and it came principally from Maori groups and Maori leaders.5 Geographically and socially marginalised, and with little political power within mainstream Pakeha New Zealand, Maori made little headway in gaining effective support. In 1948 however, a small but significant number of Pakeha individuals and groups supported the Maori protest against the 1949 tour to South Africa. Maori had become more visible through the enormous

contribution of the Maori Battalion during World War II and a measure of gratitude, respect and pride towards Maori was expressed through the Pakeha population.⁶

By 1959, when protest erupted over the proposed 1960 all-white team to tour South Africa, New Zealand society was undergoing rapid change. Maori and Pakeha were coming together as Maori moved out of rural areas and into towns and cities.⁷ New physical spaces were inhabited and thus new social relationships were formed. Maori set about creating support structures and formed a web of clubs, culture groups, welfare organisations and church groups.⁸ Such organisations also brought into being a new consciousness of Maori identity as opposed to iwi identity and a growing political consciousness of the subordinate place accorded to them in society.

Acts of racial discrimination were widespread, although rarely acknowledged by most Pakeha, and seldom spoken of publicly by Maori. However debate was slowly increasing,⁹ accelerated by the ‘Bennett incident’ of February 1959 when Dr Henry Bennett was refused service at a Papakura hotel because he was Maori.¹⁰ This caused a national scandal and brought to light further reports of racial discrimination being practised in hotels, cinemas, hairdressers and schools. Further, David Ausubel, an American Fulbright scholar at Victoria University from 1957-1958, had called into question New Zealand’s race relations reputation and argued forcefully that a ‘colour bar’ was evident in areas of housing, hotel accommodation, employment, credit, and

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⁶ Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, pp.15-18.
⁷ In 1936 11.2% of Maori lived in urban areas, by 1951 this had risen to 19%. In 1961 29% lived in cities with a further 21% living in town districts and country townships. See D.Ian Pool, The Maori Population of New Zealand 1769-1971, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1977, p.23.
⁸ For example, the Maori Women’s Welfare League was established in 1951. See Tania Rei, ‘Maori Women’s Welfare League 1951—’ in Women Together, ed., Anne Else Wellington: Daphne Brasell Associates Press, 1993, pp.34-38. The first university Maori club was established at Auckland in 1953. See Fay Hercock, A Democratic Minority, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994, p.66. The Victoria University Maori Club was formed in 1955, and the Federation of Maori Students was formed in 1960. See Te Ao Hou, December 1960, pp. 50-51.
¹⁰ Dr Henry Bennett was well respected and from one of the leading and most respected families (Maori or Pakeha) in New Zealand. He was a senior Medical Officer, brother of the high Commissioner to Malaya, and son of the former Bishop of Aotearoa. On the incident see John Harre, ‘A Case of Racial Discrimination in New Zealand’, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol.71, 1962, pp.257-260.
ordinary social interaction.' Ausubel warned of severe racial tension in the future unless Pakeha recognised that racial discrimination was a significant problem.

Within this milieu a new generation of Maori leaders, many of whom had honed their leadership skills during the war, emerged to continue the struggle for equality and self-determination. Men such as Colonel Arapeta Awatere, Colonel James Henare and Bishop Wiremu Panapa were prepared to speak out confidently and forcefully for Maori rights. It was against this backdrop that protest against the 1960 all-white, All Black Tour of South Africa emerged.

The Opposition by Maori to the 1960 Tour
The first voices raised in opposition to the proposed tour by an all-white All Black team came from the Churches. In October 1957 the Manawatu Marist Maori Missioners voiced their opposition in their journal, Whiti Ora, and called for a sporting boycott against South Africa. This was based on their opposition to apartheid which they stated 'was unjust, inhuman, and opposed to the teaching of Christ.' They argued that excluding Maori from the team would be 'snubbing Maoris again...practising discrimination... and deserting the African natives who badly need some champions.' In effect, said the Missioners, New Zealand would be supporting and condoning apartheid.

The solution was simple:

We should stay home in 1960. If we do, we will show the world what New Zealand thinks of apartheid. It will do more to rock the South Africans than 50 speeches about it. We might play a part in halting the evil instead of helping it on. We would keep faith with our own Maori people.

The notion that New Zealand rugby teams should not go to South Africa because of the way South Africa treated their coloured population had rarely been expressed since the inception of the debate. Nor was it to feature as the debate developed. In advocating an anti-apartheid stance, the Missioners were ahead of their time and perhaps the first

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11 Ausubel, 'Race Relations in New Zealand', p.238. John Orbell recalls that Ausubel was also involved in the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest and was 'very aggressive about the inequalities of the race situation in New Zealand. We thought that he was simply transferring his experience from one unique situation to another, perhaps without too much knowledge'. Email interview with John Orbell, 17 August 2006.
13 'Editorial', Whiti Ora, October 1957.
organisation to publicly suggest a sporting boycott against South Africa because of its apartheid policy.\textsuperscript{14}

Early in 1958 the NZRFU announced that it had accepted an invitation to tour South Africa in 1960. Although a decision had not been reached on whether or not Maori would be included in the team, Cuthbert Hogg (chairman of the NZRFU) indicated that it was likely that there would be no change in the NZRFU policy regarding Maori. To include them, he argued, would be to expose them to racism and discrimination.\textsuperscript{15}

Following the announcement, individual church members, church groups, presbyteries and diocesan synods throughout New Zealand began to protest. A growing awareness of apartheid had developed within the Churches following the Second World War and had been condemned by various church leaders during the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{16} They had become increasingly critical of the Government for its stance at the United Nations where it continually abstained from voting against the domestic racial policies of South Africa.\textsuperscript{17} In 1957 the Maori section of the National Council of Churches (NCC) expressed ‘deep concern of the suffering being experienced in the relationships among the peoples of South Africa through the application of the apartheid policy.’\textsuperscript{18}

In 1958, however, the protest by the Churches, with the exception of the Marist Maori Missioners, was not about how apartheid affected the coloured population of South Africa, but rather how it affected Maori. More specifically their protest was against the NZRFU which they believed would once again exclude Maori from the All Black team. They argued that if Maori were not welcome in South Africa, then the tour should be cancelled. The Presbyterian Church, a leading player in the debate, expressed the view of the mainstream churches that ‘the people of New Zealand, Maori and Pakeha, are one people before God and the law’ and that the NZRFU should send a team ‘only if it can be chosen on the basis of merit.’\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} Richards states that in 1948 O.E.Middleton was ‘one of the first’ individuals to take an anti-apartheid stance. See Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p.17.
\textsuperscript{15} Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p.18.
\textsuperscript{17} Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts, pp.12-26.
\textsuperscript{18} Te Ao Hou, May 1957, p.64.
\textsuperscript{19} Davidson, Christianity in Aotearoa, p.159.
The voice of Maori was not prominent during this first phase of protest. Little came through the press, and statements from the Churches generally came from Pakeha leaders. However there is no doubt that Maori ministers and lay preachers were involved in discussions over the issue within the churches as well as on marae and at hui throughout New Zealand. People such as Ruawai Rakena (Methodist), Whakahuihui Vercoe (Anglican), Manu Bennett (Anglican), Hemi Potatau (Presbyterian), Maharaia Winiata (Methodist), and Wiremu Panapa (Anglican Bishop of Aotearoa), as well as lay readers such as James Henare were all exerting strong leadership within Maori society and the Maori church.

An event in which Maori were visible took place in October 1958, and it provides an insight into the discourse of Maori churchmen at that time. Under the auspices of the Anglican hui aroha programme a meeting dubbed the 'Brains Trust' was convened to discuss the anticipated exclusion of Maori from the tour of South Africa. Chaired by the Rev. Whakahuihui Vercoe, the panel consisted of the Rev. Mangatitoki Cameron, Maori Missioner at Waitara; Hetekia Te Kani te Ua, lay reader, tribal chief and authority on Maori history and culture, from Puha near Gisborne; Harold Miller, librarian from Victoria University and James Ritchie, lecturer in psychology at Victoria University. The audience included Bishop Wiremu Panapa and Michael Jones, president of the Ngati-Poneke Maori Association.

Discussion crystallised around two issues: whether or not Maori should go to South Africa if they were invited, and what should be done if they were excluded from the team. Hetekia Te Kani te Ua suggested that the decision to include or exclude Maori lay with South Africa and not the NZRFU. Bishop Panapa stated categorically that ‘Maoris should be included ... otherwise the team should not go.’ Debate on whether Maori should go if invited formed a major part of the forum. The paternalism of the NZRFU which sought to ‘protect’ Maori from insult was rejected. Michael Jones stated that Maori should go and if they were discriminated against or excluded from social gatherings in South Africa then ‘that is when we all come home.’ He said he had spoken to Maori rugby players who might be selected for the tour and all had expressed a desire to go. The issue, he suggested, was not that Maori would be embarrassed, but that their

20 Davidson, Christianity in Aotearoa, pp.135-139.
21 Dominion, 28 October 1958. The following paragraph draws on this source.
Pakeha team mates would suffer embarrassment: 'Johnny Smith should have gone (in 1949) but he confessed to me that he would rather not go. He feared embarrassment to his team-mates, not to himself.' Bishop Panapa argued that people only assumed that Maori would be embarrassed and treated in a discriminatory manner:

Is not everybody being presumptuous - people, newspapers, the New Zealand Rugby Union - in assuming they are right when they say our people in a football team in South Africa would be embarrassed?... I wonder whether the Rugby Union here is not inflicting on itself something which might never happen.

After a discussion on the stance taken by South African rugby selection committee chairman Frank Mellish, who had pressed for the inclusion of Maori, the participants agreed to support the tour provided Maori were able to be included as part of the All Black team.

While the actions of the various churches dominated this first phase of protest and the voice of Maori outside church structures was rarely heard, this does not indicate that ordinary Maori people were not concerned or were not registering their protest in their own way. The issues were well aired on marae, however these failed to reach the Pakeha mainstream because discussions on marae generally stayed there. As James Henare remarked, 'the silence of the Maori...was not to be taken to indicate that he had not strong feelings on the matter. Traditionally, the Maori was loath to express his opinions before the world and he was reluctant to enter a controversy that must involve embarrassment to others.' Action to be taken over an issue was often conducted 'face to face' through Maori leaders who established dialogue with the appropriate authorities, often on marae. For example, at the annual Coronation celebrations at Ngaruawahia on 8 October 1958, Maori speakers took the opportunity to register their concerns about the tour with Government representative at the function, the Hon. Jerry Skinner. Maori speakers argued 'that it was wrong in principle for New Zealand rugby teams going to South Africa to exclude Maori players.' While Skinner concurred with the sentiments, he stated, in line with the Government's policy, that the matter lay with the NZRFU and not the Government.

22 Northern Advocate, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
23 Correspondence, Private Secretary, Office of the Minister of Agriculture to the Secretary for Maori Affairs, 13 October 1958, MA1, 36/1/21, part 2, Archives New Zealand.
In May 1959 the NCC condemned the tour, and on 9 June 1959 eight national church leaders issued a statement, drafted by the NCC, arguing that 'in selecting a team to tour South Africa, no player should be excluded on grounds of race' and unless the South African Rugby Board (SARB) could ensure that Maori players would be 'treated in all respects like other members of the team,' no team should be sent.\(^ {24} \) The statement acknowledged the NZRFU's desire to 'save Maori players from humiliation...[However] other considerations were more important' and the time had come to 'consider whether we can continue to condone what is...an affront to the conscience of the overwhelming majority of New Zealanders.'\(^ {25} \) The Anglican Archbishop, Reginald Owen, declined to sign the statement but six of his bishops, including Bishop Panapa, did sign. Archbishop Owen, who was renowned for his extreme conservatism, opposed the action on the grounds that historically 'Maoris had never been included...and this practice has been followed...solely in the interests of the Maoris.'\(^ {26} \)

The voice of Maori coming through the church during this early phase of protest was small, but significant, reflecting the narrow space which Maori occupied within church structures. As Allan Davidson argues, the mainstream churches tended to reflect the assimilationist and paternalistic attitudes within society and they controlled the organisation and structures of the Maori church.\(^ {27} \) It was not until the 1970s that the assimilationist policies of the churches began to be reversed and Pakeha paternalism was replaced with a degree of Maori autonomy. Thus in the context of the 1960 tour debate some Maori viewed the stance by the Churches as hypocritical: while the Churches were vocal in demanding equality for Maori on the rugby field, they were simultaneously denying them equality within church structures. The Maori Advisory Board representative on the NZRFU, Ralph Love, slated the Churches for this hypocrisy stating that he 'had yet to see a Maori receiving the full rights and privileges of their Churches among their bishops and other high dignitaries.'\(^ {28} \) However, the space for some Maori church leaders, and indeed Maori in general, to speak out publicly and exert influence in relation to the rugby issue was soon to widen, following a formal announcement by the NZRFU on the status of Maori for the 1960 tour.

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\(^ {24} \) *New Zealand Herald*, 9 June 1959. The church leaders were Roman Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Congregational, Greek Orthodox, Quaker, and Congregational.

\(^ {25} \) Ibid.


\(^ {27} \) Davidson, *Christianity in Aotearoa*, p. 128.

\(^ {28} \) *Evening Post*, 13 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
On 12 June 1959 the NZRFU clarified its position with regard to Maori and the tour:

The New Zealand Rugby Union has decided not to include Maori players in the New Zealand team to visit South Africa in 1960. This decision has been arrived at after making full inquiries into the whole position and after consultation with the Maori Advisory Board. In reaching this decision, the union has been concerned with the best interests of its Maori players... Acting in close collaboration with the Maori Advisory Board, the union has always adopted a policy which gives the Maori footballer advantages over the pakeha, advantages which far outweighs any problematic disadvantages he may suffer over the present decision.  

The NZRFU further stated that the SARB had laid down no conditions on the racial composition of the All Black team and had left it entirely at the discretion of the NZRFU, although there was clearly discussion of the issue.

Ralph Love, representative of the Maori Advisory Board on the NZRFU Council, issued a statement to explain how Maori rugby administrators had arrived at their decision. This statement was confusing and ambiguous as Love appeared to support racial discrimination and indeed declared outright that his 'very presence on this rugby council shows that I am in favour of discrimination in rugby.' Essentially Love's argument revolved around the issue of differential treatment. Maori rugby was a separate institution and, he argued, no different from other Maori separatist organisations and institutions through which Maori were attempting to maintain their identity. To demand equality on the rugby field could well spell the end of a separate rugby institution for Maori. In other words, Maori could not have it both ways: they either retained their own institutions which strengthened their identity, or they assimilated into Pakeha institutions in pursuit of equality which, in Love's words, could result in the 'submergence of the Maori.'

A week later Love clarified his statement in which he conflated racial discrimination with differential treatment, and argued that separate institutions were necessary for the promotion of Maori well-being and identity. It was ludicrous, stated Love, that those who

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29 *New Zealand Herald*, 13 June 1959.
30 Danie Craven (SARB) informed Cuthbert Hogg (Chairman NZRFU) that 'it is better if they do not come, but we simply have no option.' Cited in Templeton, *Human Rights and Sporting Contacts*, p.32. See also Thompson, *Retreat from Apartheid*, p.20. Thompson points to contradictory statements by Craven in 1959 and 1965 which suggest that Maori were excluded at the request of the SARB.
31 *Dominion*, 13 June 1959; *Evening Post*, 13 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
32 *Evening Post*, 13 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
were opposed to racial discrimination and who argued for equality for Maori were in fact calling for something which 'was [un]favourable to the Maori race.'

This statement failed to stem a tide of anger which had been directed at Love, principally for comment that he supported racial discrimination in rugby.

Love was condemned by numerous tribal groups, organisations and individuals for his statement that he supported racial discrimination. The Maori Women's Welfare League (MWWL) 'strongly disagreed' with Love's support for racial discrimination. The Raukawa tribal executive committee found his views 'repulsive' and called for Hon. Eruera Tirikatene (MP Southern Maori) to reprimand Love. In his cabinet position as associate to the Minister of Maori Affairs (Prime Minister Walter Nash) Tirikatene had the authority to reprimand Love and further, Love was Tirikatene's private secretary. Ngati Kahungunu iwi stated his views were 'belittling to Maoridom' and the Mawhera Tribal Committee said his comments were 'pathetic [and] not an indication of the feelings of Maori in general.' James Henare stated that he was 'compelled to dissociate myself as strongly as I possibly can from that sentiment.' Love's family (Te Ati Awa) also registered opposition: Wi Hapi Love, brother of Ralph Love, acted as spokesman and stated that 'we are perturbed to think that my brother's personal views should be accepted as the family's in sporting, educational, and social circles...and I wish to dissociate myself and my people from such views.'

At the same time as Love was being condemned, Eruera Tirikatene registered the first protest by a Maori political leader on the decision taken by the NZRFU. On 16 June, following discussion with fellow Maori MPs, Paraire Paikea and Tiaki Omana, Tirikatene issued a strongly worded press statement in which he made clear that he was speaking 'as a chief and spokesman of the Maori race and not as a Government official.' Tirikatene was strongly critical of the NZRFU with whom he had spoken and

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33 Evening Post, 22 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202-ATL.
34 Dominion, 18 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
35 Dominion, 16 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
36 Ibid.
37 Christchurch Star, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
38 Northern Advocate, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
39 Dominion, no date, (circa June 1959), O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
40 Dominion, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL. Tirikatene had been unable to consult with the other Maori MP, Inaka Ratana due to illness.
41 Hon.E.T.Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 16 June 1959, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
conveyed the ‘feelings of the vast number of Maori individuals who had spoken with me in this matter. Now...they have chosen to ignore my words.’ Thus the time had come, said Tirikatene, to speak out publicly:

We have a word in the Maori language - “whakamomori” - meaning ‘to suffer in silence’...this silence of courtesy and humbleness has ended...If we are told by the New Zealand Rugby Union that we cannot go irrespective of whether we wish to, for the South African Rugby Union have not directed against our being included- then we think less of our team-mates who are still prepared to go as a team ostensibly representative of the Dominion...If New Zealand with its most harmonious bi-racial relations in the world is forced...to accede to the policy of racial segregation of another country, have we not a most excellent opportunity as a people...to show the world where we stand and thereby exemplify the principles of racial equality for which New Zealand has been lauded.\(^{42}\)

Tirikatene’s statement issued a challenge to Pakeha New Zealand, including the Government, to take a stand on racial equality. He stressed that this was ‘a time when our Pakeha brethren can show us where they stand.'\(^{43}\) This statement was tantamount to accusing Pakeha of condoning racial discrimination in New Zealand if they supported the tour. It also called for more than lip-service to be paid to the often iterated statement that New Zealand enjoyed the best race relations in the world. The following day the Auckland Star reported that ‘An appalled silence followed any mention of the name of...Mr Tirikatene, in the precincts of Parliament today...his statement...drags the Government, however reluctantly, into the controversy.'\(^{44}\)

Tirikatene’s statement, as Neil Lonsdale suggests in Fig 1.1, would have been the last thing which Nash would have wanted. He had no wish for the Government to become involved in the debate and had consistently stated that the issue was a matter for the NZRFU and not the Government or the Prime Minister. At the same time he consistently expressed his abhorrence of racial discrimination.\(^{45}\) Now Tirikatene had involved the Government and posed a dilemma for the Prime Minister. If he disowned Tirikatene the Government’s majority could be jeopardised in the 1960 election.\(^{46}\) If he supported

\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Auckland Star, 17 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
\(^{45}\) Nash had personally denounced racial discrimination most of his life. Indeed it was not until after he became Prime Minister (1957) that New Zealand voted against apartheid in the United Nations (1958) for the first time. However despite considerable pressure from his official advisors who repeatedly urged him to denounce the NZRFU decision, he refused. See Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1976, pp. 333-335.
\(^{46}\) Labour had only just sneaked into power in the 1957 election with a two seat majority.
Tirikatene he would bring the Government and the electorate into the controversy against the NZRFU. That would, in all probability, lead to the cancellation of the tour.

In the event Nash supported Tirikatene’s right to speak: ‘The statement Mr Tirikatene made was one he was entitled to make as a representative of the Maori race. I think he was right to say what he did as a Maori chief. He definitely keeps the Government out of it in every way.’

But of course Tirikatene had brought the Government into the issue. He had made the rugby debate a domestic racial issue which New Zealanders, including the Government, should address. Implied was that the response made by Pakeha would indicate their attitudes towards Maori. Furthermore the notion that the Government should become involved was spreading. This was particularly supported by Maori as the Prime Minister also held the Maori Affairs portfolio. Indeed, comments appeared almost immediately after Tirikatene’s statement, including one from James Henare who stated he was ‘sorry to see no lead yet from the Prime Minister who in his portfolio of Minister of Maori Affairs is the official leader of the Maori race… [It is] not too late even now for Mr Nash to give

Figure 1.1. ‘A “hospital pass” from the only Maori in Cabinet.’

47 *New Zealand Herald*, 18 June 1959.
advice to the Maori people, who are simply perplexed by the position that has arisen.\textsuperscript{48} The Raukawa Tribal Executive stated that ‘Maoris will continue to fight against this racial discrimination...The Prime Minister has said very little on this important matter. We would also like to hear the views of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Holyoake.’\textsuperscript{49} Within the general public reaction was mixed. Speaking at a meeting in Auckland, Nash’s statement that the ‘Government has no right to interfere with the Rugby Union’ was greeted with an enthusiastic vocal endorsement.\textsuperscript{50} However many were of the opinion that the Government should become involved as evidenced by Nash’s Papers which contain bundles of individual letters urging the Government to intervene.\textsuperscript{51} The New Zealand Herald stated the case quite bluntly, ‘the final decision whether or not to invoke the principle of racial equality must rest with the Government.’\textsuperscript{52}

Tirikatene’s action was significant because he stepped outside the narrow space of Government within which he was constrained and directed by Pakeha imposed rules. From the onset of the controversy the Prime Minister had sought to stifle discussion by placing a caucus ban against publicly expressed opinions of individual Members of Parliament.\textsuperscript{53} Neither the rugby tour nor the NZRFU decision was discussed by Cabinet,\textsuperscript{54} and politicians of both parties agreed to make no comment on the issue.\textsuperscript{55} Tirikatene found the means to circumvent Pakeha power by invoking his status ‘as a chief and spokesman of the Maori race’ and by claiming the right to give ‘expression to the identity of the Maori people as inheritors of a cultural and social heritage borne of that specific culture.’\textsuperscript{56} In effect, Tirikatene exercised his right to te mana motuhake.

In speaking out, while Tirikatene created a significant space for the issue to be ignited and debated publicly, this would have been of concern to the Prime Minister who sought to narrow such a space. As well as a ban on discussion by parliamentarians, the Government imposed a ban immediately following the NZRFU announcement which prevented any news of the issue being reported through the state-owned Broadcasting

\textsuperscript{48} Northern Advocate, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
\textsuperscript{49} Dominion, 16 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
\textsuperscript{50} New Zealand Herald, 3 March 1960.
\textsuperscript{51} Cited in Templeton, Human Rights and Sporting Contacts, p.33.
\textsuperscript{52} New Zealand Herald, 20 June 1959.
\textsuperscript{54} New Zealand Herald, 18 June 1959.
\textsuperscript{55} CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{56} Press Statement by Hon. E.T. Tirikatene, 16 June 1959, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
While the ban had been lifted by February 1960 due to public protest, it continued to remain in place for Maori News broadcasts - a programme designed primarily for the benefit of Maori in rural areas where the reo was commonly used, and where English literacy was low. Tom Newnham, who was living at the largely Maori community at Te Araroa, observes that while people were aware of the debate, 'the true extent of this debate largely escaped us' and we 'had no idea of the way it was sweeping the country'.

Efforts to stifle discussion failed and opposition by Maori to the tour snowballed following Tirikatene’s statement. An opening had been created for Maori to voice their opinion and they simultaneously registered their support for Tirikatene and their opposition to the decision of the NZRFU. Support for Tirikatene came from numerous tribal group leaders and individuals. Most notably, MP Paraire Paikea supported Tirikatene’s comments and followed his example by speaking publicly on the rugby issue, and the large Wellington Tribal Executive endorsed Tirikatene’s stance. Kingitanga congratulated him ‘on behalf of the tribes of the Waikato, Tamaki, Hauraki, King Country and Bay of Plenty’ for his ‘leadership and outstanding statement concerning the prejudice shown by the Rugby Union.’ In acknowledging Tirikatene’s action, Maharaia Winiata (secretary of Kingitanga) stated:

Mr Tirikatene has the right as a Maori leader and an individual to express his views... for we in New Zealand have not yet deteriorated to the condition when the State owns a person’s body, soul and spirit... Tirikatene has won the admiration of the Maori people for he has truly taken the mantle of Ngata, that other spokesman for the Maori people, in a matter that is truly political, affecting as it does the standing of this country in the eyes of millions abroad.

Considerable criticism was directed at the NZRFU Maori Advisory Board. Maharaia Winiata expressed his contempt for both Love and the Board:

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57 ‘The submissions of a deputation to Right Hon. W. Nash, Prime Minister, and Hon. J. R. Marshall, Acting Leader of the Opposition from New Zealand Citizens’ All Black tour Association and supporting organisations and citizens’, 26 February 1960, p. 2, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL. This will hereafter be referred to as ‘Submissions of CABTA deputation’.
59 Dominion, no date, (circa June 1959), CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
60 Evening Post, 21 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
61 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p. 20.
[They] have completely ignored Maori and general public opinion in their attempts to appease the moguls of the New Zealand Rugby Union. They are seeking the consolation of a doubtful Pacific Islands tour, insensitive to the deeper implications of racial prejudice in world sports.\textsuperscript{63}

The Mawhera Tribal Committee criticised Love whom they claimed was,

\ldots quite happy to snatch at the sop offered by the Rugby Union rather than stand by the principles of his race... For the Maoris to accept this is to sell their birthright for a mess of potage because we believe that the Maoris' birthright is equality... Maoris do not want a consolation prize. They want the right to go with their Pakeha brothers if selected.\textsuperscript{64}

At the same time tribal groups and individuals publicly opposed the decision of the NZRFU. James Henare found the decision 'inexplicable and inexcusable' and one which 'endangers the country's proud reputation abroad.'\textsuperscript{65} Numerous tribal groups stated that the decision was an act of racial discrimination, New Zealand's reputation would be tarnished, and unless the decision was reversed, the tour should be abandoned.\textsuperscript{66} A statement from the Ngati Otautahi Tribal Committee typifies such sentiments: 'We...protest at the exclusion of Maoris... We feel this discrimination... destroys our world famed reputation of racial equality...the attitude of the New Zealand Rugby Union should be, no Maoris - no tour.'\textsuperscript{67}

Urban organisations joined the protest by tribal groups. Miria Logan, Dominion president of the Maori Women's Welfare League, stated that the League had from its inception fought to eradicate racial discrimination and unless Maori were included, the tour should be abandoned.\textsuperscript{68} The Maori section of the NCC called for the abandonment of the tour, not only because of the discrimination against Maori but because of the 'disservice done by the tour' to those struggling against apartheid sport in South Africa.\textsuperscript{69} In addition the Central Council of Catholic Maori Clubs reflected the views of the parent body and

\textsuperscript{63} New Zealand Herald, 16 June 1959. A tour of the Pacific Islands had been proposed by the NZRFU for the Maori All Blacks—no doubt to compensate Maori for their exclusion from the tour of South Africa.

\textsuperscript{64} Christchurch Star, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.

\textsuperscript{65} Northern Advocate, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.

\textsuperscript{66} Numerous tribal organisations registered statements in the mainstream newspapers, particularly 16 - 22 June 1959.

\textsuperscript{67} Christchurch Press, 23 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.

\textsuperscript{68} New Zealand Herald, 18 June 1959.

\textsuperscript{69} Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p.19.
stated that an all-white All Black team could not properly represent New Zealand. At a conference in July, Maori students from the four universities, the Teachers' Training Colleges and Massey Agricultural College called on the NZRFU to either reverse their decision or abandon the tour. More than one hundred students voted and members stated that their opinion reflected Maori opinion throughout New Zealand. The Young Maori Leaders' Conference in August 1959 passed a remit condemning the NZRFU decision and proposed that a group of elders speak with the Maori Advisory Board. Whether this took place is unknown although it seems unlikely as in September the Board had refused to meet a deputation of Maori leaders who sought to convince them to withdraw support for the NZRFU decision. Maori sportsmen became actively involved and a group of Maori rugby players circulated a petition throughout New Zealand calling on the Maori Advisory Board to withdraw its support for the NZRFU. This had gained over seven hundred signatures by February 1960.

The wide and diverse response by Maori groups was a new and significant phenomenon. No longer was protest confined to Maori leaders who spoke on behalf of their people. Ordinary Maori people were now speaking out. This reflected the changes which had occurred with the shift to an urban environment. Groups and clubs, such as students from various institutions, had formed, become organised, and linked with each other, thus generating greater political awareness and promoting popular protest. Of significance was that Maori had commanded a space within which they were recognised. Also, for the first time since the inception of the apartheid sport debate large numbers of Pakeha joined with Maori to oppose an all-white rugby tour. The growing opposition to the Rugby Union decision was indicated by two surveys conducted by mainstream newspapers. An Auckland Star survey, conducted in June 1959 before protest had gained momentum, showed that sixty-two percent wanted the tour called off. However of these, eight percent were agreeable to the tour proceeding if the team was not identified as a national representative team. This left fifty-four percent opposed to the

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70 Dominion, 4 July 1959. The meeting of the Central Council of Catholic Maori Clubs took place at Ketemara marae, near Hawera, and the decision taken represented Catholic Maori from the Wellington archdiocese and the South Island.
71 Dominion, 6 July 1959.
72 Craccum, 2 October 1959.
73 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p.21.
74 'Submissions of CABTA deputation', 26 February 1960, p.3, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
tour. When the *New Zealand Truth* surveyed its readers, it found that seventy-five percent of its readers thought that the tour should be abandoned.

Protest was new in another sense as the form of protest shifted from being merely words in newspapers, to actions and words being inscribed on streets and banners, and expressed in halls, churches, pubs and clubs. The urban space was crucial for this development as it provided relatively accessible communication resources which assisted the organisation of protest, access to the press, and highly visible spaces within which demonstrations could be carried out.

The 'newness' and visibility of popular Maori protest was exemplified by the use of an innovative form of protest. An all-Maori group, the Howard Morrison Quartet, used the space which they occupied - as popular entertainers - as a political resource, and registered their protest against the tour through song.

Oh, my Old Man's an All Black
He wears the silver fern
But his mates just couldn't take him
So he's out now for a turn.

Fe, Fi, Fo, Fum
There's no hori's in this scrum.

*My Old Man's an All Black* was a significant and highly effective act of protest for it was a trenchant political statement couched in humour. It was a best-seller: the tune was 'singalongable' and catchy, the lyrics were memorable, and it was performed by a highly popular group. These factors ensured that it seeped into the public consciousness and stayed there. Further it became a staple song of the Quartet which they performed regularly throughout New Zealand, and ad-libbed using an array of ever-changing and sharp political asides. Through a creative use of space, the Howard Morrison Quartet played an important role in raising public awareness about the 'No Maoris No Tour'.

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75 CABTA, *No Maoris No Tour*, p.11.
76 Ibid. *New Zealand Truth* was a national weekly newspaper with the country's largest circulation.
78 Gerry Merito wrote the lyrics but appropriated the tune from the Lonnie Donegan song, *My Old Man's a Dustman*.
79 Indeed the song has remained a staple in the oral tradition of rugby culture. The emphasis has 'mutated from Maori being excluded from the game for ethnicity, to players being excluded for foul play.' See 'My Old Man's an All Black', [http://folksong.org.nz/myoldman.html](http://folksong.org.nz/myoldman.html) as retrieved on 2 Feb 2007.
protest, and the popularity of the song ensured that the issue stayed firmly within the public gaze.

Arguably, however, the most significant feature of popular protest was that it became organised and channelled through a nation-wide organisation. A week prior to the NZRFU decision, and in anticipation of an unfavourable result, a small group of citizens met at the home of Frank Winter (Chairman of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board) in Wellington to discuss ways to combat such a decision. The outcome was the formation of the Citizens' All Black Tour Association (CABTA) whose stated objective was 'To combat racial discrimination in the selection of the 1960 rugby team to tour South Africa, and to demand the abandonment of the tour if absolute equality of treatment cannot be assured.'

Framing the CABTA campaign was the slogan 'No Maoris No Tour'. This was a highly effective frame which identified an injustice and proposed a solution at the same time. Injustice frames are particularly effective in convincing others to join in social movement activities for they tap into peoples moral codes and provide a focus for moral indignation. The 'No Maoris No Tour' slogan announced a moral issue which struck at the heart of New Zealand society: New Zealanders were not one people for they were now being segregated according to race. Thus the parameters of protest were clearly identified and the solution made clear. New Zealanders could be one people through 'No Maoris No Tour'.

Holding positions of office on the committee were: Rolland O'Regan (Chairman), a Wellington surgeon and Catholic layman; Joan Stone (Secretary), a welfare officer in the Department of Maori Affairs and Dominion Secretary of the Maori Women's Welfare League and Frank Winter (Treasurer). On the wider committee were Maori and Pakeha representatives from a diverse range of organisations including Churches, trade unions, student organisations, public servants, rugby footballers, teachers and academics. This ensured that the protest movement, as it evolved, reached across many social groups and provided the opportunity for popular protest. In September

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80 CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, p.6.
82 CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, p.6.
1959 CABTA established a national organisation which consisted of a Wellington Executive to administer the Associations' affairs, and a National Council with representatives from all the branches. CABTA spread rapidly with twenty major branches being established outside Wellington and a number of less formal groups in smaller towns and rural areas.  

CABTA provided a space for Maori leadership and a political profile through public and active protest. While the organisation mounted an extensive publicity campaign through press advertisements, pamphlets, and press statements, they also utilised a more active and visible form of protest through public meetings and marches. This provided the opportunity for Maori to establish a visible and political presence and it took them out of the confines of protest through the press. Maori leaders, including Manahi (Doc) Paewai (Kaikohe) and Arapeta Awatere (Auckland), as well as taking on organisational and leadership roles in local branches and on the National Council, fronted the large CABTA demonstrations and public meetings which became a hallmark of the campaign.

Organising protest and taking it onto the streets, into public places and to the steps of parliament gained publicity, not least because it was anti-establishment. As Pam Wall recalled, in a climate where the discourse 'to dissent is to be disloyal' was prominent, it was 'very unusual to hold a protest march, let alone one directed at rugby.' Arguably this was the greatest contribution of CABTA. It instituted a model of protest which was visible, active, and dramatic, and was far more effective in raising awareness than words in a newspaper.

CABTA's first major march and public meeting took place in Wellington in August 1959 when nine hundred people, headed by Arapeta Awatere, Maharaia Winiata, and Doc Paewai marched from Parliament Buildings to the Town Hall. There, in front of an audience of two thousand, they took the stage with George Nepia, and numerous Pakeha who either spoke as individuals or as representatives of groups. Speaking on behalf of Kingitanga, Winiata's speech was significant for he invoked the Treaty of Waitangi as the basis for equality in New Zealand. The decision of the NZRFU, he

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83 Ibid.
84 Pam Wall interviewed in 'My Old Man's an All Black', Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand, 1 April 2005, Radio New Zealand Archives, Christchurch. Pam Wall (Ngati Taiwa) was a founding member of CABTA.
85 Dominion, 13 August 1959.
stated, affected the very basis of New Zealand's way of life which had been laid down by Governor Hobson and the Maori chiefs. The ideas encapsulated in the Treaty of Waitangi provided the foundations of the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. It was 'of the same family of ideas as the Charter of the United Nations. Unity, equality and liberty were the keynotes - and the Rugby Union cut across all three.'

Arapeta Awatere chose to remind New Zealanders that equality for Maori with Pakeha had never been an issue on the battlefield: 'The Maoris in three wars had marched shoulder to shoulder in defence of principles with their white fellow New Zealanders.' He then reminded the audience that Maori had paid a significant price during the war for the benefit of all New Zealanders and he appealed to all Pakeha to support the cause of equality for the benefit of both races.

Doc Paewai noted that the NZRFU 'cared who it offended in South Africa but it didn't care who it offended here.' Haka and action songs punctuated the proceedings. Such meetings were significant in that they drew Maori and Pakeha together in a common cause, and they provided opportunities for Maori to place their perspectives in front of the general public.

Accompanying the organised protests by CABTA were the actions taken by independent groups, particularly student bodies. Students at universities and training colleges in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch organised and demonstrated. The most notable was in Wellington where six hundred students from Victoria University and the Wellington and Palmerston North Teachers' Training Colleges defied the police and marched from Kelburn to the steps of Parliament. The march made effective use of physical space employing a dramatic approach and framing the procession as a funeral march: it was conducted in slow time, people marched in twos and it was conducted in complete silence. Prime Minister Nash spoke to all the students in the social hall of Parliament Buildings of his personal feelings on racial discrimination and of his intention not to interfere with, or criticise, the 'well considered decision' of the NZRFU. Bernard Grice, leader of the student body, told the Prime Minister that they would not applaud his speech as his words had been 'an elegy on something which the students thought was dead.'

It is not known how many Maori participated in the march but it is almost certain that Maori students at Victoria University such as Tipene O'Regan, Whatarangi Winiata and Janet Winter were present.

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86 Ibid.
87 Evening Post, 13 August 1959.
88 New Zealand Herald, 19 June 1959.
Students at Auckland also became organised and a number of Maori participated. Several groups were formed including the Auckland Students' All Black Protest Committee led by Ian Pool, Pat Hohepa, Turia Royal and John Orbell. The group petitioned, organised a survey of public opinion, coalesced student groups, and organised and assisted in CABTA marches and demonstrations. Protest was taken to a new level when a group of students, including Pat Hohepa, broke into a meeting of the International Rugby Football Union and confronted Danie Craven. John Orbell recalls that the numbers of Maori actively involved both within and outside the university were small and notes that 'there was some frustration among our group that Maori did not get more involved.' However, the number of Maori students attending university and Teachers' Training Colleges at that time was very small. The key point is that Maori were involved and through this moved into new social spaces where many took on leadership roles.

That there could be repercussions from authorities, workmates and friends may have underpinned a lack of active protest amongst some Maori as well as Pakeha. As Pam Wall notes, 'Don't rock the boat' was a common sentiment. Ranginui Walker remembers considerable trepidation when registering his protest through the signing of a petition. He recalls being 'a mature student at the time and petitions were being circulated...And when the petition came along I felt very brave putting my name to this and thinking [with fear] this might go to the Government. You had to be brave because we had such a repressive society.' He possibly had reason to be concerned. This was a climate in which fear and paranoia of Communism and Communist subversion were prevalent, and investigation of dissenters was being carried out by the New Zealand Security Service (NZSS).

CABTA leaders were almost certainly under scrutiny by the NZSS. Prime Minister Nash had been informed that if it were not for the Communists the controversy would never

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89 Craccum, 12 August 1959, p.5.
90 Email interview with Ian Pool, 15 August 2006. Ian Pool recalls Craven telling them that "Bantu" had to have inferior universities because they were like kindergarten children. Pat Hohepa, who was a university boxing blue and trained at Kaikohe by Doc Paewai, almost hit him.
91 Email interview with John Orbell, 16 August 2006.
92 J.K. Hunn, Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement, p.25. Hunn reported 75 Maori at universities in New Zealand in 1956. In 1959 there were 50 students (both part-time and full-time) at Auckland University and 60 at Auckland Teachers' Training College. See Te Ao Hou, June 1959, pp.37-38.
93 Pam Wall interviewed in 'My Old Man's an All Black', Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand.
94 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
have developed into such a contentious issue. The acting-Leader of the Opposition, Jack Marshall, was convinced that some leaders within CABTA were to blame for engendering ‘unhealthy emotional attitudes amongst ordinary Maori people’ and for this reason CABTA should be condemned or disregarded. The implication was that CABTA had been infiltrated by the Communist Party. Certainly Maharaia Winiata was subject to scrutiny. The Director of the NZSS, Major Herbert Gilbert, stated that although Winiata had resisted ‘Communist attempts to enlist his sympathies for many years,’ he had come increasingly into contact with Communist Party members through CABTA and the campaign against nuclear warfare. He had finally ‘succumbed...to the Communist-front organisation, the New Zealand China Society... visited Peking in 1959’ and come back thoroughly subverted as evidenced by ‘his statement that “the word of God is spoken through the mouth of MAO TSE TUNG.” Whether or not CABTA leaders were aware that the NZSS was monitoring them is not known. If they were, it appears to have had little effect on their commitment to the ‘No Maoris No Tour’ campaign.

Despite an extensive campaign by CABTA and accompanying widespread protest against the tour by trade unions, Maori organisations and committees, churches, and student groups, the NZRFU remained unmoved. Efforts by CABTA to meet with rugby officials at both provincial and national levels were refused. CABTA could have employed more powerful weapons, such as enlisting international support: the United Nations, with its aim of promoting human rights and freedom for all regardless of race, gender or religion, would have been an obvious avenue. Further CABTA could have actively sought support from the South African Sports Association (SASA) which had been formed in 1958 to promote and further non-racial sport. However, the official CABTA line was that the racial policies of South Africa were not their concern and they ‘consistently refrained from seeking support from organisations...in South Africa.’

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95 Sinclair, Walter Nash, p.335.
96 Correspondence from Rev. Angus Ross to Jack Marshall, 29 March 1960. Ross was responding to a letter in which Marshall had clearly stated such sentiments. J. Marshall Collection, MS-Papers-1403:79:5, ATL.
97 Certainly Communists and Socialist groups were involved in the protests and within CABTA. However CABTA was not a Communist-led organisation.
98 Correspondence from H.E.Gilbert to Mr J.Marshall, 27 April 1960, J. Marshall Collection, MS-Papers-1403:104:3, ATL. This was written shortly after Winiata’s death. Surveillance was clearly thorough - Gilbert noted that ‘among the wreaths at his funeral was one from the National Executive of the Communist Party.’
99 CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, p.10,
Nevertheless, it is clear that some did seek support from South Africa. Arapeta Awatere established contact with the Archdeacon of Cape Town who stated that he was 'very much in favour of the inclusion of the Maoris in your team or else the cancellation of the tour.'\(^{100}\) Similarly, Awatere was in contact with Dennis Brutus (secretary of SASA) and it is clear that information was being exchanged between the two in order to strengthen both their campaigns.\(^{101}\) Following a statement by Craven that it would be dangerous for Maori to tour South Africa because the non-white population was so backward and primitive, Brutus suggested to Awatere that a challenge to this could be advantageous to the anti-tour protest. Non-whites, he wrote, were 'opposed to this fresh importation of racial prejudice' and the suggestion that they were 'primitive' would be 'repudiated even by those who support apartheid in sport...If Craven's statement and his subsequent denial could be challenged from New Zealand, it would be a great help in forcing the issue.'\(^{102}\)

The CABTA national body declined to elicit support from abroad and instead launched a nation-wide petition. In this it hoped to gain massive public support and thereby pressure the NZRFU into cancelling the tour. Nearly fifty prominent citizens, the majority of whom were Pakeha churchmen, educationalists and Federation of Labour members, sponsored the petition. The first fifteen sponsors on the petition were Church leaders. This was, no doubt, intended to lend credibility and respectability to a protest which was commonly said to involve 'only two percent of the lunatic fringe of the population.'\(^{103}\) Maori included Arapeta Awatere and James Henare (ex-Maori Battallion commanders); George Nepia, Johnny Smith and Doc Paewai (New Zealand and/or Maori All Blacks); Bishop Panapa, Maharaia Winiata (Kingitanga), T. Ropiha (ex-Secretary of Maori Affairs), the Maori Women's Welfare League and Frank Winter.\(^{104}\) The petition protested:

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\(^{100}\) Correspondence from Archbishop of Capetown, C. Wood, to Arapeta Awatere, 5 November 1959, CABTA Records 1959-1960 (Auckland Branch), MSS & Archives A-245, University of Auckland Library (UAL).

\(^{101}\) SASA campaigned vigorously in South Africa against the tour and made objections to the NZRFU on many occasions. Further, both SASA and the African National Congress (ANC) launched No Maori No Tour petitions. Although the majority of the petitions fell into the hands of the security police some portions survived and were smuggled out of South Africa to New Zealand and passed on to the Prime Minister. See Richard Thompson, 'Rugby and race relations: a New Zealand controversy, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol.69, No.3, September 1960, pp.285-287.

\(^{102}\) Correspondence from Dennis Brutus to Arapeta Awatere, 15 October 1959, CABTA Records 1959-1960 (Auckland Branch), MSS & Archives A-245, UAL.

\(^{103}\) Pam Wall interviewed in 'My Old Man's an All Black', Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand.

\(^{104}\) CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, p2.
...at the discrimination exercised against footballers of Maori descent by their exclusion on racial grounds from selection for the New Zealand Rugby team to tour South Africa in 1960, and if absolute equality of treatment for members of a team selected on merit alone cannot be assured, call for the abandonment of the tour.\textsuperscript{105}

Over 160,000 signatures were eventually gathered making it, at that time, the second largest petition in New Zealand’s history.\textsuperscript{106}

On 26 February 1960 a deputation of fifty CABTA members led by Rolland O'Regan, and supported by a progress return of 140,000 petition signatures, met with the Prime Minister and the acting-Leader of the Opposition, John Marshall. This meeting, explained the deputation, was necessary because the NZRFU had refused to meet with them and had ignored the widespread protests of the people.\textsuperscript{107} Most of the Maori petition sponsors were present and were joined by Miraka Szaszy (MWWL), Wellington CABTA member and university student, Whatarangi Winiata, and Whetu Tirikatene (representing Eruera Tirikatene).\textsuperscript{108} A strong protest was registered, criticising the Government and the Opposition for the ‘stifling of discussion’ on the issue and for its concerted ‘boycott of the subject.’ Submissions by the deputation stated that:

The Rugby Union committed an act of gross and indefensible racial discrimination against the Maori people, and not one of our Pakeha parliamentarians has uttered one word of public condemnation of this act. Their silence has given consent and, indeed, has tacitly approved and condoned this act... This is not neutrality... The Government and the Opposition have silently taken... the side of the Rugby Union.\textsuperscript{109}

Furthermore the submissions deplored the Government-imposed censorship of the issue through the New Zealand Broadcasting Service which, although recently lifted, remained in place for Maori News broadcasts. This was condemned as ‘news suppression... censorship is an instrument of tyranny, and is intolerable in a free society.’ The Opposition was also criticised for failing to denounce such actions.\textsuperscript{110} Thus the submissions requested that Members of Parliament be free to state their opinions on the tour and that the ban on the issue being broadcast on Maori News be lifted. Further,

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} CABTA, \textit{No Maoris No Tour}, p.11.
\textsuperscript{107} ‘Submissions of CABTA deputation’, 26 February 1960, p.1, O'Regan Family- Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
\textsuperscript{108} CABTA, \textit{No Maoris No Tour}, p.15.
\textsuperscript{109} ‘Submissions of CABTA deputation’, 26 February 1960, p.2, O'Regan Family- Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
they requested that no state farewell be given to the all-white team and that the Prime Minister use his influence to force the tour’s abandonment. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the submissions drew attention to the fact that New Zealand’s policy on race relations ‘could be summed up in the words “We are one people” which were spoken by Governor Hobson...we are now not so sure.’ Thus the request was made for the Government to make a declaration on New Zealand’s racial policy.111

The meeting was reported as being heated with ‘bitter and angry words passed’ and Bishop Panapa leading the Maori delegates in a haka.112 Marshall told the deputation that CABTA had ‘done harm’ and had caused disunity amongst New Zealanders. Nash, refused to alter the Government position on the issue and, reportedly, treated the deputation in an angry and discourteous manner by berating individual members and engaging in personal attacks on them.113 This included correcting Sir David Smith, chancellor of the University of New Zealand and a former Supreme Court Judge, on a point of grammar while he was still speaking.114

The next day, at Kaukapakapa, Bishop Panapa spoke from the pulpit about the meeting. It was ‘ludicrous and most ridiculous that the Maori had to go to the Prime Minister, cap in hand, and tell him that New Zealanders were one people, just after the anniversary of the Treaty of Waitangi.’115 Further, Panapa stated, he had recently visited the Lambeth Conference in London where there were twenty-eight coloured bishops who were ‘all as one with Pakeha bishops. To come home and find this situation is almost incredible.’ He urged Maori not to rest on their reputations, but to take an active stand ‘on your own feet and be worthy of your ancestors.’116

Following the meeting, and using the time honoured tradition of appealing directly to the Crown, Hone Heke Rankin, paramount chief of the Northern Maori tribes, made a direct request to the Governor General of New Zealand, Lord Cobham, for the invoking of the Treaty of Waitangi. He requested that the Queen be asked to intervene to prevent the racial discrimination which was being directed against Maori by the NZRFU, and he

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111 ‘Submissions of CABTA deputation’, 26 February 1960, pp. 3-4, O’Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
113 New Zealand Herald, 29 February 1960.
114 New Zealand Herald, 2 March 1960.
116 Ibid.
asked for the Queen to continue the Royal protection which had been guaranteed to Maori under the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. There was no intervention by the Queen or the Governor General.

While the campaign's impetus had largely declined following the unsuccessful CABTA deputation, the Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960 revived protest. Eruera Tirikatene once again spoke out strongly. In a reference to his first speech he acknowledged 'with profound appreciation' that Pakeha had indeed 'shown us where they stand.' He then restated the case for the inclusion of Maori in the team and argued that New Zealand's reputation for harmonious race relations and equality was the model for the world to follow. Should New Zealand fail to demonstrate this, 'we will give rise to despair among the millions of our dark-skinned brethren' and 'New Zealand will have lost the finest quality and value it ever possessed, bi-racial harmony.' Tirikatene called on the NZRFU to take the necessary action to avert this, and to consider people before the 'selfish passion for a game and greed for possible profits.'

This final phase was characterised by increasing levels of protest and direct action. In a deputation to Prime Minister Nash the Federation of Labour urged the abandonment of the tour, not least because of the unstable political situation in South Africa and the danger this posed to the All Blacks. Nash issued a statement before departing the country on an overseas trip reaffirming his support for the NZRFU who had acted as 'true friends' of Maori, and re-stating that the Government could not interfere in the decision of a sporting body. There was nowhere left for the protest to go but to the public. In April the All Black trials in Wellington were disrupted as protesters invaded the field, conducted a sit-down, and were eventually forcibly removed by the police. Large 'No Maoris No Tour' street demonstrations and marches were mounted in Wellington and Auckland. At a state farewell for the team in Parliament buildings, over a thousand

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117 CABTA, No Maoris No Tour, p.13.
118 On 21 March 1960 South African police opened fire on Black and coloured South Africans at Sharpeville who were protesting the pass laws. Sixty-nine people were killed and over 400 injured. See Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, London: Abacus, 1995, pp. 280-281.
119 Eruera Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 22 March 1960, O'Regan Family Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
120 Ibid.
121 New Zealand Herald, 5 April 1960.
122 New Zealand Herald, 6 April 1960.
123 Richards, Dancing on our Bones, p. 25.
demonstrated outside. Inside All Black manager Tom Pearce spoke of the NZRFU decision to exclude Maori,

...which sprung only from the love of the Maori...these gentle people we are not to distance under any circumstances...let it never be said that the Rugby Union is unmindful of the Maori footballer because that is a statement that is resented in the extreme.\(^{124}\)

In Auckland, on the eve of the All Blacks departure, between 3000-5000 people marched up Queen Street to Myers Park. The march was led by Arapeta Awatere, Frank Haig and Doc Paewai.

[They] walked under a banner...that read in big letters “No Maoris No Tour”. ...they marched six after six after six, thousands of people, men, women and children, hundreds carrying children or wheeling them in pushchairs and prams...and a very large proportion of these were Maori...thousands of people were on the kerb to see them go by...and they clapped such slogans as “No Maoris No Tour”, “No Colour Bar in New Zealand” and “Shame, No Tour”.\(^{125}\)

At Myers Park between seven and eight thousand people heard Arapeta Awatere speak of the principles of racial equality which were of more value than ‘any dirty, stinking politics. In war we marched together on a matter of principle: today we march again-on a matter of principle. You have come here and declared your support of those principles. You are not hiding behind a game of football as some are doing.”\(^{126}\) Doc Paewai told the crowd that the NZRFU ‘should apologise for the great hurt it had inflicted on the Maori people.”\(^{127}\) Amongst the numerous speakers was Rev. Winton who read out an open letter to the All Blacks from Dennis Brutus:

You cannot be unaware, however, that the vast majority of South African’s, together with more than 180,000 of your fellow-countrymen are opposed to this tour because it represents the further imposition of racial discrimination in South Africa and the acceptance of this unfortunate prejudice by your own country...We therefore appeal to you...to decline to be a party to a calculated insult both to your Maori countrymen and to the millions of non-white South African...In the name of ...ideals which you surely hold dear, we beg you to withdraw.\(^{128}\)

\(^{124}\) Statement from Tom Pearce, in ‘My Old Mans an All Black’, Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand.

\(^{125}\) Eyewitness account (name unknown) of the march in Auckland, 8 May 1960. The item was prepared for broadcast by James Boswell of the New Zealand Broadcasting Service but it never went to air. In, ‘My Old Man’s an All Black’, Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand.

\(^{126}\) New Zealand Herald, 9 May 1960.

\(^{127}\) Ibid.

\(^{128}\) The open letter had been included in correspondence by Brutus to Maharaia Winiata. Winiata had died 6 April, before the arrival of the correspondence. His widow had passed the letter on to Rev. Winton (CABTA)
The final act of the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest was at Whenuapai Airport. A group of thirty to forty Auckland University students broke out from the departure building and ran towards the main runway in an attempt to delay the All Black's flight to South Africa. The NZBC, which had failed to report on the large demonstration two days earlier, reported this event and stated that it was a 'token protest that the tour was on...some of the demonstrators were taken to the police station for interrogation.'

Opening up the discussion on domestic discrimination

I don't think any other issue could have made the question of race relations debated over every bridge table, over every bar, every hairdressing salon, almost in every shop, in every house, in every family. You couldn't have picked on an issue which wasn't more universally concerned and I believe that this great national debate did an enormous amount to clarify our thinking in New Zealand on race relations, not only among Europeans, but among Maoris also.

Rolland O'Regan

An unintended consequence of the tour protest was that, as Rolland O'Regan indicates, it created an opening for discussion about race relations and racial discrimination within a wider societal context. John Orbell recalls that within the group of university students with which he was associated, 'as the arguments and discussions went on over the tour that issue broadened out to discrimination in general.' Newspaper correspondence columns and editorials frequently commented on such issues. Following Ralph Love's first statement in 1959, considerable comment arose over the issue of differential treatment. This crystallised into a view that Maori were privileged and Pakeha were discriminated against. 'Kiwi' represented a typical view stating that it was time to 'bring to an end the generations-old discrimination against the pakeha' and cited examples of Maori privilege such as separate fishing rights, separate electorates and the four Maori seats in Parliament. Most galling was the issue of a separate Maori All Black team as 'Maori footballers have double the chance of earning international honours.' A Dominion editorial asked whether Maori should retain their privileges with respect to
representation in Parliament, taxation, land laws, a Government Department, their own schools and tribal authorities, and argued that if the Government adhered to the principle of racial equality regarding the tour, Maori privilege must be put to an end.133 Such sentiments reflected the strength of the ‘one people’ ideology which was premised on equality and made no room for difference.

Others drew attention to discrimination practised against Maori. ‘Pop’, a tour supporter, suggested that we first ‘clear up our own backyard. In Auckland, and perhaps in other places, there is definitely a colour bar. Landlords will not let houses or flats to Maoris, who are forced to live in third-class houses...Also, the chances of Maori getting a booking in a good hotel are nil’.134 Others spoke of becoming more aware of racial discrimination being practised. ‘Margaret’ had observed an instance of racial discrimination being directed towards a Maori friend and noted that combined with the sport debate, ‘we hardly present a picture of lack of discrimination.’ 135

Yet another section of the population saw racial discrimination only in relation to the rugby issue. Outrage was expressed that Maori were being discriminated against and there was little comment of it existing in a wider sense. Time and again correspondents stated the New Zealanders enjoyed harmonious race relations, all were equal, and that New Zealand’s image abroad was being tarnished. As Pakeha’ wrote, ‘New Zealand has always prided itself on freedom from racial prejudice...this situation has drawn the attention of other countries to us, and they are waiting to see if we are going to stand firm in our beliefs.’136

This was undoubtedly so and condemnation from abroad added to the wider debate. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial commented on the situation whereby ‘New Zealanders must realise and resent the fact that their country’s shining reputation for racial tolerance and mutual respect must be tarnished in this way.’137 Following Sharpeville, and a request from Prime Minister Nash for a minutes silence to remember the dead, the London Daily Telegraph called New Zealand’s proud reputation into question and

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134 New Zealand Herald, 3 March 1960.
135 New Zealand Herald, 10 March 1960.
136 Dominion, 18 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
137 Newspaper clipping, no name and no date, (Circa 1960), CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
delivered a blistering attack on New Zealand’s ‘hypocrisy’ stating that it had little cause to lecture South Africa on the treatment of its indigenous population:

In the expansionist warfare of last century...Maoris were robbed of most of their land and two-thirds of their numbers...New Zealand may pause to reflect that they owe their present prosperity and immunity from racial strife to measures so brutally effective as to make Sharpeville look like a vicarage garden party...The Africans may not think themselves lucky in many respects. If they study the fate of the... Maori they may think themselves lucky to be alive at all.  

Richard Thompson made the link between racism at home and abroad and slated the hypocrisy whereby claims of racial harmony were made and yet an all-white team could be sent to South Africa. He argued that ‘Nothing is to be gained by turning a blind eye to this situation of partial racial disharmony; nothing can be done about a problem until we are prepared to admit that the problem exists.’ For Thompson, the all-white tour exposed the long-held idealisation of racial harmony as a myth.

There was no sense that Maori deliberately used the apartheid sport issue as a means of introducing issues of domestic discrimination in a wider societal context. Indeed, for the most part, Maori leaders concurred with the dominant discourses that Maori and Pakeha existed together in a state of equality and racial harmony, and that this situation was envied abroad. It was the decision of the NZRFU to segregate Maori from Pakeha which threatened to destroy this happy situation. As James Henare observed:

New Zealand has championed racial tolerance and has actually made it work. Now comes a decision which must endanger the country's proud reputation...[Maori] have never felt before that racial equality did not apply in New Zealand but now it is possible some of them may wonder. Exactly the same will apply to every Pakeha, because there is none today who would believe we have not achieved racial equality.  

Tirikatene went further and spoke of ‘the incredible state of affairs with its most harmonious bi-racial relations in the world’ but at the same time challenged Pakeha to live up to this reputation by supporting the ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest.  

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138 New Zealand Herald, 4 April 1960. This article also included condemnation of the United States and its treatment of its indigenous population.
140 Northern Advocate, 19 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
141 Dominion, no date, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
Little comment was forthcoming from Maori about domestic discrimination although undoubtedly it was spoken of on marae. Nevertheless some comments did filter through the press which indicated that the apartheid sport issue had provoked some discussion on these wider issues. At a Wellington Tribal Executive meeting it was stated that 'The Rugby Union's action has only brought to the surface something that has been there all the time' and that while relations had improved over the last few years, 'we know that racial discrimination exists in New Zealand.'

Waka Clarke, Auckland Maori leader, acknowledged a 'colour bar' and that Maori were 'short of complete equality' and while Maori preferred to not make waves over such issues in the hope that full equality would eventually be achieved, 'Would we not be a little further on the way to 100 per cent Maori-Pakeha equality if the New Zealand Rugby Union made a stand?'

Taken as a whole, the apartheid sport issue did elicit considerable discussion over the wider issues of domestic discrimination. Whether the comments were positive or negative, and whether or not people disagreed or agreed that racial discrimination existed within a wider context, a new consciousness had been raised. In December 1960 the editorial in Te Ao Hou stated that 'Suddenly, it has seemed, there has been a great... interest in and awareness of the whole race. Newspapers have devoted more space than ever we remember...to Maori problems and difficulties...one fact emerged clearly [from the 1960 rugby campaign] that any suggestion of racial discrimination will be deeply resented and combated...This is a most heartening sign.' Such optimism was misplaced and once the tour was over, public debate on racial discrimination faded away. Nevertheless, the tour campaign had created a new awareness which resonated deeply within some individuals and provided the impetus to address the wider issue of domestic discrimination.

Aftermath

On 22 September 1960 a petition was presented to the House of Representatives by Eruera Tirikatene on behalf of 'Bishop Panapa and fifteen others, mostly eminent churchmen.' The petition referred to the 160,000 signatures which had been gathered.

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142 Evening Post, 21 June 1959, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
143 Press, no date (circa 1958), CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
144 Te Ao Hou, No.33, December 1960, p.1. Te Ao Hou was a Maori Affairs magazine and was first published in 1952.
146 New Zealand Herald, 23 September 1960.
during tour protest and was a response to the 'nation-wide discussion of the act of the NZRFU [which] revealed widespread confusion and uncertainty in the public mind' with regard to the principles which guide race relations in New Zealand; what problems exist; and how these problems should be solved.\textsuperscript{147} As Aroha Harris points out, with the rugby issue underpinning the petition, it could have simply requested that the Government intervene in the matter of future sporting contact with South Africa.\textsuperscript{148} Instead it explicitly yoked apartheid sport with domestic racism.

In the first instance the petition reminded Parliament that 'race relations in New Zealand since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi had been based on absolute equality of Maori and Pakeha.'\textsuperscript{149} The exclusion of Maori from the 1960 All Black Tour was framed within a wider context of racial discrimination meted out to Maori in 'hotels, boarding houses, cinemas and barber shops, and in certain spheres of employment.' However, in relation to these, the NZRFU had committed 'the most flagrant, single act of racial discrimination ever to have taken place in New Zealand.'

The petition called on the Government to 'adopt a formal, full and solemn statement' on 'New Zealand's policy in race relations,' and to provide 'a gauge' by which discriminatory practices 'may be judged.' Thus Panapa's petition sought to commit the Government to a policy on race relations by which domestic issues could be addressed and at the same time would leave the Government with no choice but to intervene in any future racial discrimination with regard to sporting contact with South Africa. This had been the intent of submissions made by CABTA to Prime Minister Nash and Jack Marshall in February 1960 which had also called for a 'formal, full, solemn and bi-partisan statement of policy on race-relations.'\textsuperscript{150}

Satisfying the demands of the petition and accompanying calls for legislation on racial discrimination fell to the National Government which came into power in November 1960. The Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, who was an enthusiastic supporter of

\textsuperscript{147} 'Petition of the Bishop of Aotearoa, W.N. Panapa and others', 22 September 1960, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.

\textsuperscript{148} Harris, Hikoi, pp.32-33.

\textsuperscript{149} 'Petition of the Bishop of Aotearoa, W.N. Panapa and others', 22 Sept 1960, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. This paragraph is based on the same source.

\textsuperscript{150} 'Submissions of CABTA deputation', 26 February 1960, p.4, O'Regan Family Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
Jack Hunn, accepted his advice on legislation pertaining to racial discrimination.¹⁵¹ Hunn was of the view that such legislation, particularly in matters of ‘accommodation and employment would leave room both here and overseas for an exaggerated impression of the degree to which discrimination operated, would exacerbate existing feelings, and would be virtually unenforceable in practice.¹⁵² Thus the Panapa petition and a similar petition by the Canterbury Maori Executive in 1964 were both rebuffed. Bills by the Opposition Labour Party, such as the Unfair Discrimination Bill 1963 and the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill 1964 were voted down by the Government.¹⁵³ In 1966 the United Nations introduced the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for signature and ratification by members. This was signed by New Zealand. However, by the end of the decade the National Government had issued no formal policy on race relations, and the United Nations Convention was not ratified until 1971 with the adoption of the Race Relations Bill.

A positive outcome of the 1960 tour, however, was the formation of two anti-racist organisations whose broad objective was to work against racial discrimination at home and abroad. In March 1961 the Canterbury Association for Racial Equality was formed. The main aims of the organisation were ‘to maintain a constant watch for evidence of racial discrimination in New Zealand...record it and offer organised support...and to record evidence of racial discrimination throughout the world and record the progress of those who fight against it.’ The group also sought to initiate study on the origins of racial prejudice, provide lectures on the subject, and issue publications.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Jack Hunn, Deputy Chairman of the Public Service Commission was most notable for the Hunn Report. Appointed to write a report on the aims and policies of the Department of Maori Affairs by Prime Minster Nash, Hunn included a comprehensive study into the situation of Maori in New Zealand at that time. This was the first time such a study had been conducted. While the report promoted the ‘integration’ of Maori as a national project it clearly had an assimilationist agenda and thus was resented by many Maori. See J.K. Hunn, Report on Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement, Wellington, 1961.


¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Christchurch Star, 30 March 1961, and newspaper clipping, no name, 30 March 1961, MA1, 36/1/21 Part 2, National Archives New Zealand. The officers and committee of the organisation appear to have been overwhelmingly Pakeha. Norman Gray was the only recognisable Maori in the group.
In October 1964 the Citizens' Association for Racial Equality (CARE) was formed in Auckland 'to promote racial equality' in New Zealand and abroad.\(^{155}\) Many of the founding members, including Frank Haigh, John Reid, Harold Innes and Sarah Campion, had been heavily involved in the 1960 anti-tour campaign. Although a largely Pakeha organisation, some Maori including Matiu Rata MP, Whetu Tirikatene, and Hone Tuwhare were involved either as supporters or members from its inception. One of CARE's first actions was to arrange a panel discussion on the 'position of the Maori in present day New Zealand.'\(^{156}\) Ranginui Walker was at this meeting:

I had high hopes, knowing about domestic racism as I did...However there was no thought of addressing domestic racism...It was a bit of a disappointment that this white liberal group didn't really address domestic racism. Instead, it was focused on racism in South Africa...I think that the cause that they espoused was a worthy one, but it was an all consuming one, and domestic racism was left on the side.\(^{157}\)

Certainly CARE became heavily involved in both the anti-apartheid struggle and the campaign against apartheid sport and arguably this was their main focus. Nevertheless CARE was also heavily involved in domestic issues. During the 1960s it was primarily a pragmatic organisation which focused on helping newcomers (particularly Maori and Pacific Island migrants) adjust to city life. Thus it established homework centres, arranged budget and sponsorship for families needing assistance, and established inquiry centres which were the forerunner of the Citizens Advice Bureau. The organisation also exposed instances of racial discrimination, lobbied Government for a Race Relations Act and made a submission opposing the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Bill. Therefore the charge that they neglected domestic issues is open to contest.\(^{158}\) However Ranginui Walker's perception was one which was shared by other Maori activists during the 1970s.

The formation of two small anti-racist groups was a small but significant step and a direct outcome of the 'No Maoris No Tour' controversy. A protest which had started out to

\(^{155}\) Newnham, 25 Years of C.A.R.E., p.3. The first meeting was chaired by Dr John Reid, Auckland University, and the inaugural committee consisted of Harold Innes (President), Gladys Salter (Secretary), W. Glass, S. Campion, E. Pilkington, N. Karaka, F. Haigh and others.

\(^{156}\) Included on the panel were Koro Dewes, Matiu Rata and Dr Muriel Lloyd Pritchard. See Newnham, 25 Years of C.A.R.E, p.3.

\(^{157}\) Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.

\(^{158}\) See Newnham, 25 years of C.A.R.E, for an overview of some of the work with which CARE was involved. The many days which were spent going through their voluminous archival material made me appreciate the extent of CARE's anti-racist work as well as their work of a more pragmatic nature.
ensure equality for Maori rugby players had broadened out to create a space for discussion on racial discrimination in a wider societal context. In many ways this reflected a protest which had ‘movement’ and ‘new spaces’ at its heart. Urbanisation created new social spaces for Maori and thus new relationships which provided opportunities for protest. Popular protest emerged taking protest out of the confines of the press and the hands of kaumatua and into public spaces upon which messages and personalities could be inscribed. Maori were made visible through speaking out and taking an active role in protest activities. New Maori leaders, who had increased their mana, leadership qualities, and skills through the war, stood up and took leadership roles within iwi and/or social movement activities and created a new political space. New and innovative protest through popular song transmitted messages throughout New Zealand. For many Maori it was a politicising experience, not least because protesters directly challenged authority. Also of significance was that for the first time since the inception of the debate Pakeha joined with Maori in substantial numbers to uphold the principle of racial equality, and to maintain the vision of ‘one people’ and New Zealand’s reputation for racial harmony. Both had ruptured through the segregation of Maori and Pakeha on the sports field. All created new spaces of consciousness and an awareness of racial discrimination. While this was contested by many Pakeha, for a very few the issue resonated to such an extent that it was acted upon. New spaces were once again created.
Chapter Two

1970 All Black Tour to South Africa

The issue is whether the New Zealand national team should play against a team which is not national and which is selected on the basis of race... Ought Maoris accept the humiliation of having conferred on them, temporarily, the "Honorary" status of a "racial" group to which they do not belong? And ought they, or any other New Zealanders, consent to the temporary conferment on them of privileges denied to 15 million people in the country of their hosts, knowing that this is linked with the flagrant denial of all kinds of basic human rights to these 15 million?

Dennis Brutus

The issues raised by Dennis Brutus were not ones which New Zealanders generally cared to confront in the late 1960s. The 'No Maoris No Tour' campaign had achieved its aim with the concession by South Africa that Maori rugby players in the All Black team would be welcome during the 1970 tour of South Africa. The proposition that the tour should be abandoned because of the way South Africa treated its coloured population was not one which was readily accepted. Nevertheless for over two years a small anti-tour movement continually placed the issue within the public gaze and forced a consideration of the questions Brutus raised. The involvement by Maori in this wider tour debate is the focus of this chapter.

With the inclusion of Maori in the team to South Africa guaranteed, support for an anti-apartheid stance was not large. Many who had supported the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest saw no reason to interfere with the politics of another nation. Whereas the anti-apartheid movement sought to isolate apartheid, tour supporters argued that apartheid could be broken down by demonstrating to white South Africa that coloured and white people could live together in harmony.

Maori who opposed the tour fell into two groups. A more moderate grouping consisted of organisations such as Maori committees, councils and executives, the Maori Women's Welfare League and Maori MPs. Their protest was generally registered through the press by leaders and kaumatua, or on marae and at hui. The other grouping was

youthful and employed a more activist stance. Consisting largely of radical Maori activists and students, these young people spoke out forcefully and publicly, demonstrated, organised events and took other forms of direct action. Underpinning the intensity and nature of their involvement were both domestic issues and international trends and events. They were the first generation of urban born Maori, were highly educated and resented their marginalisation and the subordinate status of Maori within a Pakeha dominated society. Liberation politics from abroad crystallised their resentment and participation in the new social liberation movements politicised Maori in a material manner. The struggle against apartheid sport sat easily with many Maori youth who located the oppression of Maori in racial terms and thus could identify with black South Africans.

The chapter begins with a brief background detailing changes which occurred during the 1960s and which determined the nature of the 1970 debate. Examining the opposition by Maori to apartheid sport forms the body of this chapter. While the moderate strand of Maori activism will be discussed, the focus is principally on young Maori activists. This will sustain an argument that the anti-apartheid movement was a resource which provided opportunities for young Maori to insert an indigenous discourse into the debate. Through their involvement they were profiled and presented, and new social networks were formed within a broad leftist movement. This led to new opportunities to represent their cause and address domestic issues. In addition, young Maori began to challenge the political hegemony of their elders and claim a political space, within which they addressed issues in a more public and forceful manner. The extent to which the apartheid sport issue promoted broader discussion on race relations and the signs of new spaces being created for an indigenous discourse through this debate, form the final section of the chapter.

**New Directions 1960-1970**

The first change to occur during the 1960s was the successful resolution of the ‘No Maori No Tour’ debate. Following the 1960 protest, the perception existed that the 1960 All Black Team would be the last all-white team to tour South Africa. The strength of protest promised widespread disruption should such a situation occur again. Deputy-leader of the Opposition, Jack Marshall, made it clear that the NZRFU had ‘a responsibility...to see that this situation does not arise again’ and it should be made
clear to the SARB that ‘as long as the country maintains its present racial policy, it will not be possible to send a fully representative New Zealand team to South Africa.’

Optimism that Maori would be included in the 1967 All Black Tour of South Africa grew from 1964. In that year Pat Walsh and Ralph Love were invited to the 75th Anniversary celebrations of the SARB. This was widely seen as an indication that South Africa was ready to receive Maori players. During the 1965 Springbok Tour of New Zealand warm relations were established between Maori and the Springboks at the official Maori welcome at Poho o Rawiri Marae and were reinforced at the Maori /Springbok game. Most importantly, Danie Craven (SARB president) publicly intimated that Maori would be accepted in 1967.

With the Springboks still in New Zealand, Prime Minister Verwoerd announced that South Africa had not changed its policy on mixed teams. Protest began immediately, all the mainstream newspapers stating that the tour should be cancelled. In parliament Matiu Rata asked Prime Minister Holyoake to give his assurance that there would be no tour. Holyoake, while stressing that the Government should not interfere in the affairs of sporting bodies, made an important statement:

The Government regards...full racial equality as basic to New Zealand’s way of life and its harmonious development in the future. It cannot regard that principle as outweighed or qualified by special considerations which have domestic application elsewhere in the world. It is the view of this Government that as we are one people we cannot be truly represented by a team chosen on racial lines.

In February 1966, prior to NZRFU discussions on the tour invitation, Holyoake made clear what was expected of the NZRFU and they duly cancelled the 1967 tour. This reaffirmed the ‘one people’ ideology which had weakened through the rugby debate and demonstrated to the world the egalitarianism and racial harmony for which New Zealand was renowned.

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3 Not widely reported, however, was the SARB stipulation that they went as non-playing guests and thus were not eligible to take part in any of the special games arranged. At the time of the invitation Senator de Klerk (Minister of the Interior) said that the visit of the two Maori representatives would not create a precedent for a mixed team'. Cited in Richard Thompson, 'Unsporting Relations with South Africa', New Zealand Monthly Review, September 1968.
4 Dominion, 2 September 1965.
The second change during the period was a shift to an anti-apartheid stance by a small section of the population. The final demonstration at Myers Park in 1960 had adopted a resolution which condemned apartheid, and pledged to support ‘South African nationalism.’ Little came of this until 1964 when CARE pledged to oppose apartheid, and to ‘press for a sterner policy on the part of the New Zealand Government towards the supporters of apartheid.’

During the 1965 Springbok Tour voices were raised against apartheid. Tom Skinner (president of the Federation of Labour) and MPs Eruera Titikatene and Matiu Rata, called for a boycott of the games. The latter stated that New Zealanders should protest ‘against the violation of human rights carried out by the South African Government’ and take steps which might influence their policy of apartheid. CARE held its first public anti-apartheid meeting in the Auckland town hall and an audience of two hundred, a high proportion of whom were Maori, voted to appeal to the SARB and the NZRFU that they ‘immediately, jointly reaffirm adherence to the Olympic Charter in its exclusion of discrimination through colour, race or creed.’ Hone Tuwhare, one of speakers, ‘had no objection to the Springboks being welcomed ‘but do not say it is in my name or for the Maori race. If I welcome them I want to shake hands with black as well as white.’

A third feature was the emergence of a new and more radical form of Maori activism. The first contemporary Maori activist group to emerge was the Maori Organisation On Human Rights (MOOHR). This was formed in 1968 by Tama Poata who was to become one of the most influential activists of the following decade. Drawing much of its ideological inspiration from the trade union movement, and essentially humanitarian in its aims and objectives, MOOHR pledged to ‘organise the Maori people and Pakeha friends in defending human rights of all national minorities in New Zealand, especially

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6 New Zealand Herald, 9 May 1960.
7 ‘CARE’ promotional pamphlet, no date, (circa 1960s), CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
8 Dominion, 15 May 1965, New Zealand Herald, 8 June 1965.
9 New Zealand Herald, 1 April 1965 and 10 April 1965.
10 New Zealand Herald, 30 June 1965.
11 Ibid. The other speakers were Eddie Isbey (Waterside Workers Union), Harold Innes (first president of CARE), and Whetu Tirikatene (student, and daughter of Eruera Tirikatene).
12 The initial impetus for the formation of MOOHR was the introduction of hostile land legislation in the form of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 which Maori perceived would lead to the alienation of the land which remained in their possession.
13 Poata was a member of the Communist Party, an organiser with the Drivers Union in Wellington, and was heavily involved with the Peace Movement from the mid-1960s.
the rights of the Maori people.'MOOHR located the oppression of Maori and racial discrimination in terms of class inequality and advocated a 'pan-racial struggle along class lines as the most effective strategy for resolving issues of racism and inequality.'

At the same time Maori student activism emerged. The young people were acutely aware of the social, economic, cultural and political marginalisation of Maori within a Pakeha dominated society and many located this in racial terms. They rejected the status quo whereby political space was the province of Maori leaders and elders who worked quietly behind the scenes to have grievances rectified. Believing that this achieved little, they spoke out forcefully and publicly for Maori rights and sought to claim the space which Maori had been guaranteed through the Treaty of Waitangi. Their mode of activism was a modern expression of the long struggle for tino rangatiratanga.

Fuelling Maori student activism were liberation struggles abroad. For young Maori, liberation politics and the rhetoric of oppression, decolonisation and black power, dovetailed with domestic grievances and engendered a belief that society could be changed. As Maori activist Syd Jackson observed: 'We were a product of the 60s and the movements that were taking place internationally at that time...We really believed that we could change the world and that we would successfully change the world in a very short time.'

It was within this confluence that the 1970 apartheid sport debate took place. New Zealand had demonstrated a 'No Maoris No Tour' stance, a small anti-apartheid movement was developing and Maori activists were emerging to demand the space which Maori had been guaranteed in 1840.

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15 Ibid.
17 Syd Jackson interviewed by Paul Diamond in 'Nga Tamatoa: The Maori protest group Nga Tamatoa thirty years on', Paul Diamond (Producer), Radio New Zealand, 2001, Radio New Zealand Archives, Wellington. Hereafter this source will be referred to as Diamond Series.
Establishing Parameters

In April 1968 the SARB invited the NZRFU ‘to send its national team to our country in 1970.’\textsuperscript{18} Although seen as a breakthrough by Tom Morrison, chairman of the NZRFU, who interpreted it as constituting an open invitation, it was no different from previous invitations. While the NZRFU promoted the belief that South Africa would accept Maori, following pressure from CARE for an assurance that a national team would include Maori, Morrison had to admit that no such assurance had been given.\textsuperscript{19} In September 1968, amidst growing concerns expressed by members of the public, sports and newspaper columnists and CARE, Prime Minister Vorster made a statement that previous All Black teams had included players with ‘Maori blood’ and similarly there would be such players in the 1970 team which ‘we will receive...as in the past and will give them our warm traditional welcome as in the past.’\textsuperscript{20}

Following Vorster’s assurance, the debate settled into one which was explicitly anti-apartheid. For many, there was no need for further protest. This included some of the leading campaigners of the 1960 protest such as Bishop Panapa, Rolland O’Regan, George Nepia and Doc Paewai. As O’Regan stated, the ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest had never been about South Africa’s domestic policy but ‘for a fully representative New Zealand team chosen on merit alone and regardless of race to play in South Africa...Maori will now be accepted... we have achieved that aim.’\textsuperscript{21} Sir Turi Carroll noted: ‘If a European invited a Maori to his home as his equal, would the Maori refuse? South Africa has opened the door and said Maoris may be included. One cannot alter apartheid in two or three years.’\textsuperscript{22}

All major political parties adopted a position of non-interference. Only under ‘exceptional circumstances,’ said Prime Minister Holyoake, should New Zealand Governments ‘interfere in activities of sporting bodies.’\textsuperscript{23} Norman Kirk, Leader of the Labour Party, stated that ‘politics should have no place in sport’ and he supported the tour because ‘all New Zealanders...are now apparently acceptable’ and this ‘represents a softening of the

\textsuperscript{19} Thompson, ‘Unsporting Relations with South Africa’, p.9.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Dominion Sunday Times}, 14 April 1968, O’Regan Family - Diaries and Papers, 89-097-3, ATL.
\textsuperscript{22} Newspaper clipping, (no name), 13 October 1968, Auckland District Maori Council Records (ADMC) 1962-1991, Maori MSS MP 1991/4, Box 22, Folder 35, Special Collections, UAL.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{New Zealand Listener}, 20 March 1970, p.7. Holyoake argued that the circumstances surrounding the 1967 tour were exceptional because they had implications for domestic issues.
South African attitude.'\[^{24}\] The Social Credit leader, Vernon Cracknell, noted that it was 'not proper for us to interfere in the internal politics of another country.' Moreover, 'most Maori people want the tour to continue, and they are the most affected.'\[^{26}\]

Unlike the 1960 protest, the churches were divided. The Methodists supported the tour provided Maori were treated the same as whites.\[^{26}\] So did the Catholic hierarchy, although the Catholic Press was strongly opposed.\[^{27}\] The Anglican hierarchy with the exception of the Bishop of Aotearoa, Manu Bennett, opposed the tour. Bennett believed that 'the best way to promote understanding between peoples is to meet, regardless of the circumstances of that meeting.'\[^{28}\]

On the anti-tour side were those who opposed the tour irrespective of any concessions granted to Maori. Forming the backbone of this small grouping at the onset of the debate was CARE, Maori student activists, and some Maori MPs. As the debate developed the wider student body, the Federation of Labour, individual church leaders, and various Maori groups and organisations, including MOOHR and the Auckland District Maori Council (ADMC), became central players in the anti-tour debate.

Three major issues underpinned this stance. The first was that apartheid was a fundamental breach of human rights and to have sporting contact with South Africa was to support a policy which denied the black population such rights. The aim of the anti-tour campaign was to focus on stopping rugby sporting contact with South Africa as a means of isolating apartheid. The second issue was that international opinion was strongly opposed to apartheid, and by maintaining sporting contact with a racist regime New Zealand's reputation for racial tolerance would be damaged. Thirdly, the view that Maori players and supporters would be promoted to 'honorary white' status for the duration of the tour was seen by Maori in particular as offensive and humiliating for both Maori and black South Africans.\[^{29}\] A fourth position was held by some young Maori,

\[^{24}\] Ibid.
\[^{25}\] Ibid.
\[^{26}\] New Zealand Herald, 28 April 1969.
\[^{27}\] Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p. 55.
\[^{28}\] Kaunihera Maori, Autumn Issue 1969, p.25.
\[^{29}\] The argument crystallised around the view that Maori would not go to South Africa as Maori. Rather their 'Maoriness' would be suspended for the duration of the tour and they would be classified temporarily as white New Zealanders. Thus they would be able to share the advantages which a white status accrued and would have no part in the experience of the coloured population.
activists: they identified with the oppression of black South Africans and offered support from one coloured and oppressed people to another.

**Student Protest - Claiming and Creating Political Space**

The first sign of opposition to the 1970 tour came at a national conference of the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students during Easter 1968. During debate over the tour President Syd Jackson asked 'How can we, a coloured people, go to a country that practices apartheid?' Jackson put forward a motion that even if Maori were included in the team they should not go to South Africa. This was passed 45 votes to 26. The resolution came to the attention of Dennis Brutus, President of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), who wrote congratulating Jackson for his stance and assuring him of 'the support of South African sportsmen opposed to racialism.'

The letter, which was passed onto CARE, spurred the group into action.

Since the Springbok tour of 1965, CARE had devoted little attention to the apartheid sport issue preferring to re-orient its focus towards domestic issues. This was the result of an Annual General Meeting in November 1965 and following the Springbok tour, which had urged the Management Committee to 'devote, as far as possible, equal attention to racial questions in New Zealand and abroad.' Although CARE was a largely Pakeha organisation, it had always included some Maori supporters. In the late 1960s these included Titewhai Harawira, Whetu Tirikatene, Matiu Rata and Syd Jackson.

While some Maori activists were to become strongly critical of CARE from the early 1970s for its Eurocentric perspective and for failing to prioritise issues of domestic racism, from its inception CARE had been a valuable resource in creating space for Maori. CARE drew attention to issues of racial discrimination and provided opportunities for Maori to impart an indigenous discourse to a Pakeha audience.

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30 Tehran Journal, 4 May 1968, Gary Clover Papers, Box 2, item 11, MSS & Archives A-127, University of Auckland Library (UAL). Tehran Journal was a daily newspaper in Iran.
31 Correspondence Dennis Brutus to Syd Jackson, 6 May 1968, Gary Clover Papers, Box 2, item 11, MSS & Archives A-127, UAL.
CARE invited Matiu Rata to speak on the apartheid sport issue at a Special General Meeting in June 1968. Earlier in the year Rata had spoken out strongly against the tour:

The issue has never been whether or not Maoris should be in any team to tour South Africa. The issue is whether or not we, as a nation with an enviable reputation in race relations, can afford to have anything to do with a country that continues to practice repugnant racial policies...I doubt that any Maori player in South Africa could have a clear conscience when it is realised that he has obtained a sporting privilege denied to indigenous South African’s.34

Rata was rebuked by the Mr D. Walker, the leader of a trade mission recently returned from South Africa, who suggested that the traders had received 'a bit of a blow by Mr Rata’s unfortunate comments.' 35 For some, economic concerns outweighed the wider moral issue. Rolland O'Regan was also critical of Rata stating that his demands were 'impossible' and such a refusal to play 'could have harmful consequences and would accomplish no positive good. It is ...the wrong policy.' 36 At the CARE meeting Rata pressed for a national anti-apartheid campaign against the 1970 tour. Although those at the meeting agreed, Tom Newnham stated that 'many of us felt that "We are doing this because it will be a shameful thing if this protest is not made". But we never thought we would win.' 37

The CARE campaign, which called for the abandonment of the 1970 tour and the cessation of all sporting contact with countries supporting apartheid, was launched at a public meeting in the Auckland Town Hall on 5 August 1968. 38 An audience of approximately one hundred heard speeches from CARE members Richard Thompson, Rev. Ted Buckle, Syd Jackson and Matiu Rata. Thompson denounced New Zealand’s willingness to participate in sporting relations with South Africa as ‘morally offensive, politically stupid and unsporting’ and contrary to overseas opinion and the United Nations Human Rights Conference. 39 Matiu Rata condemned the policy of apartheid and stated that there was no obligation to accept the rugby invitation to tour South Africa.

34 New Zealand Herald, 8 April 1968.
36 Dominion Sunday Times, 14 April 1968, O’Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-3, ATL.
37 Tom Newnham, ‘Stopping the 1970 Tour-The Campaign So Far’, December 1969, T.O. Newnham Papers, MS-Papers-6003-5, ATL.
38 New Zealand Herald, 6 August 1968.
39 Richard Thompson’s address was reprinted as ‘Unsporting Relations with South Africa’, New Zealand Monthly Review, September 1968, pp.9-10. The United Nations Conference to which Thompson referred had called for a ban on sport with South Africa while it continued to practice apartheid.
in 1970, or to continue present relations with them. Further, 'if Maoris are included in the team it seems quite ridiculous that they should occupy a position which is denied to the black population...people who have helped contribute to the country’s growth. We must make it obvious that we cannot condone its policy.'

Syd Jackson’s speech was of a different tenor and reflected the new and more radical activism which was beginning to develop. His speech was one of the earliest public statements which identified Maori as an oppressed people and which spoke forcefully of domestic discrimination in the context of the apartheid issue. It marked a shift whereby young Maori activists, impatient with the efforts of their elders, began to create their own political space.

In the first instance Jackson opposed apartheid and rejected the status of Maori as honorary whites:

> It would be wrong for Maoris as New Zealanders, for Maoris as a coloured people, to go to South Africa, for to do so would be to suggest that we condone the repugnant racial policies practiced by that country...Maoris would travel in a New Zealand team in that country for the entertainment, and also for the ego-satisfaction of a white minority, and these Maoris would travel under the fictitious and very temporary guise of having achieved that much sought after status of white skin.

However, of most significance is that Jackson used the political space created by the CARE platform to offer a trenchant critique of race relations in New Zealand. He criticised Pakeha for not taking the lead in the struggle against apartheid sport ‘because for a Maori to do so is inevitably to lay himself open to the charge of being a racist, a proponent of brown power, or worse.’ Further:

> If all was as sweet in our little paradise as people would have us believe, then this move should initially have come from the European side of the population. It is the voice of New Zealand that I should like to have heard going around the world against these tours rather than the voice of the Maori, as an illustration of the strength of the relations between our peoples...

40 *New Zealand Herald*, 6 August 1968.

41 'I’m against 1970 tour’, CARE pamphlet, [no date], Box 1, Item 1, Gary Clover Papers, MSS & Archives A-127, UAL.
Elaborating on race relations in New Zealand, Jackson stepped outside the myth of racial harmony and cited instances of racial discrimination in terms of employment, housing and the negative attitudes of Pakeha toward Maori. Thus, he stated, the argument that the All Blacks would provide a lesson to the white South Africans in harmonious race relations was based on a false premise. New Zealanders were in 'no position to hold ourselves up as having ideal race relations...and I'm not sure that we should let such a hypocritical image be hoisted overseas.'

Jackson framed the apartheid sport issue in terms of a shared oppression: as black South African's were oppressed, so too were Maori.

No Maori should go to South Africa, for how can we, when seeking equality, when wanting equality ourselves, go to a country which actively denies another coloured people, solely on the grounds of their colour, the rights we either enjoy, want extended or are striving to achieve for ourselves...We too are a coloured people...we too have a colour problem.

Implicit throughout was that those who supported apartheid sport also supported racism in New Zealand. The failure of Pakeha to take a lead and oppose the tour not only demonstrated a lack of 'strength' between Maori and Pakeha, it demonstrated an inherent racism. Eric Gowing, Bishop of Auckland, was more explicit in this regard when he stated, 'What we think about sporting contacts with South Africa depends on what we think about racism.'

Thus Jackson used the CARE meeting as a political resource in order to advance a political agenda outside the apartheid sport issue and thereby bring domestic issues to the consciousness of a wider audience. Although the meeting was covered in the press surprisingly the New Zealand Herald ignored Jackson's speech completely.

Jackson became the face of CARE's anti-apartheid campaign and his photograph and speech fronted an anti-tour pamphlet, ten thousand of which were distributed throughout New Zealand. The speech was delineated under two bold sub-headings, 'We are coloured too' and 'NZ racial harmony a myth?' The latter indicates the beginning of an

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Bishop Gowing cited in a statement by the NZUSA in support of the petition against the 1970 Tour, 28 May 1970, Trevor Richards Papers, M5-papers-6613-09, ATL.
assault by Maori activists and CARE on the myth of racial harmony. As Tom Newnham observed, ‘we were pretty confused in those years...Most liberals believed...in the great New Zealand myth...We wanted to believe it and we wanted to make it come true.’

The extent to which Jackson’s message resonated with the wider public is unknown. However, the newly formed MOOHR which ‘opposed all forms of racialism and discrimination against Maori’ and were committed ‘to rectify apartheid and all its evils’ made their support known.

In a letter to Syd Jackson, Matenga Baker and Tama Poata expressed ‘deep respect for your outright statements.’ Further, ‘It is our duty to struggle for truth so that our Maori people may be made aware of the injustices committed...[we] unconditionally stand with you so that we may be identified as one united force.’ Thus networks of solidarity between activists were emerging and the domestic racism discourse was beginning to be inserted into the apartheid sport issue.

While such networks were being created, the growth of the anti-apartheid movement was dependent on educating the wider New Zealand public about apartheid. To this end CARE, and the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, brought Dennis Brutus to New Zealand in February 1969. His campaign was extensive with addresses at public meetings, churches, schools, Maori groups, universities, as well as press, radio, magazine and television interviews. As a consciousness-raising exercise Brutus was effective and CARE branches sprang up in a number of towns and cities.

But it was amongst the student body at the University of Auckland that Brutus’ message was particularly well received. During orientation fortnight, over two thousand students heard him speak on apartheid and outline his reasons for opposing all sporting contacts between New Zealand and South Africa. The Auckland University Students Association (AUSA) and CARE then co-sponsored a public meeting at the Auckland Town Hall which gained considerable support.

47 ‘Extracts from the MOOHR Constitution’, MOOHR newsletter, December 1970, Box 29, M. Law Collection [uncatalogued], UWL.
48 Letter to Syd Jackson from Matenga Baker and Tama Poata (MOOHR), 20 March 1969, Pei Te Hurinui Jones Papers, MS-Papers-5220-034, ATL. In 1969 Matenga Baker was Chairman and Tama Poata was Secretary of MOOHR.
50 AUSA Annual Report (part b), 1969, Trevor Richards Papers, MS-papers-6613-02, ATL.
51 Ibid. See also Newnham, Interesting Times, p.156.
Students from the Auckland University Maori Club emerged as a leading anti-tour force. Linda Smith, a student activist at this time, recalls that Maori Club was a very conservative organisation and generally avoided political issues. However there were two groups of Maori students within Maori Club; those who were conservative and 'were successful just by getting here and didn’t see a reason to rock the boat' and those who were interested in political issues. This latter group, which included Syd and Hana Jackson, became a driving force within the anti-tour campaign.

Following Brutus’ visit the ‘political’ students from Maori Club in conjunction with other university groups, organised a protest march on ‘United National Freedom from Racial Discrimination Day’, 21 March 1969. Over 2000 marched from the university to the Civic administration building. There they presented a letter of protest to Mayor Dove Meyer Robinson stating that ‘Apartheid would be reinforced by this tour and New Zealand’s reputation for racial tolerance and harmony endangered.’ Moreover the conferring of the status ‘honorary white’ upon Maori players and supporters was an

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52 Marti Friedlander, (photographer), in Harris, Hikoi, p.36.
53 Linda Smith, Diamond Series.
54 ALISA Annual Report (part b), 1969, Trevor Richards Papers, MS-papers-6613-02, ATL.
21 March was Sharpeville day and the march was also in remembrance of those who died during the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.
affront to Maori in particular. In Wellington students held a vigil outside the South African Consulate. Their letter of protest was refused by the Consul General.

On 15 March 1969, amidst rising protest, the New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC) announced their support for the 1970 tour of South Africa. John Booth (NZMC secretary) stated that the decision was made in the belief that 'a mixed team playing on South African fields, and a mixed Maori-Pakeha group of supporters sitting together in the stands and staying together in South African hotels, will make a crack in the walls of apartheid and may bring a little more aroha to the grim situation in South Africa.' Norman Perry, consultant to the NZMC, made it clear that the decision was 'not an expression of the Maori love for rugby' but was the result of several years of 'research and study...on a deeper level.' Part of this process included his discussions with African and Asian leaders.

Discussion was limited and confined to churchmen. Influential were the views of Dr Niles of Ceylon, who saw no advantage in 'isolating South Africa completely from the international community either in sport or politics.' Change would only be forthcoming through establishing 'cordial relationships' thus paving the way for dialogue on the apartheid issue. Also influential were the views of a black South African churchman, Rev. Alphaeus Hamilton Zulu, who believed that the sight of Maori participating on equal terms in a mixed team would offer hope to black South Africans; keep alive their desire for racial equality and would help dismantle the barriers of apartheid. These views led the NZMC to deduce that 'black South African organisations regarded the visit as a tremendous breakthrough that would help their cause.'

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55 Craccum, 3 April 1969.
56 As a response to urbanisation and the changing nature of Maori society, Tribal Committee's were replaced by the NZMC in 1962.
58 Norman Perry was instrumental in persuading the Government to agree to the establishment of the NZMC in 1962. He was a former secretary to Sir Apirana Ngata, former secretary on NZMC, one of the most significant and recognized lay leaders in the Presbyterian Church, deeply involved in the Maori Synod, member of the International Laity Committee of the World Council of Churches 1955-58, involved in various peace missions in Asia, and heavily immersed in Maori Affairs. See www.presbyterian.org.nz/4103 as retrieved on 1 February 2007.
60 Niles was Chairman of the East Asia Christian Conference, and President of the World Council of Churches.
62 Daily News, 6 June 1970, Pei Te Hurinui Jones Papers, MS-Papers- 5220-034, ATL.
63 Thompson, 'White Maoris and Black South Africans', p.12. Perry refused to name the 'African friends' claiming that it would 'put them in the firing line in their own country'. See Auckland Star, 28 March 1969.
The NZMC ignored the expressed opposition to the tour from organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC) and SAN-ROC. Although Brutus had impressed many New Zealanders during his recent tour, he failed to influence the NZMC. Pei Te Hurinui Jones stated that although the Council was impressed with Brutus’ eloquence and handling of the media they were ‘not by any means impressed by all that was made known about him.’ Despite Tom Newnham’s insistence that the NZMC reveal exactly what was ‘made known about him’ and by whom, they remained silent.

Concerns about domestic race relations also informed the NZMC decision. They stated that they ‘treasured New Zealand’s multi-racial society [and] in particular the goodwill experienced by the Maori people in recent years concerning a fully representative team.’ Henare Ngata observed that while Maori had felt ‘betrayed in the past’ by the acquiescence of Pakeha to the dictates of South Africa, in 1967 Pakeha had shown their sincerity by forcing the cancellation of the tour. This demonstrated that ‘a great deal of goodwill towards the Maori people did exist among Pakeha’ and the Council believed in ‘fostering and maintaining good relations between the two races.’ Therefore, support for the tour was more likely to sustain racial harmony than would a decision to oppose the tour.

The final decision was made in March 1969 following an assurance by South African Consul, Peter Philip, that Maori and Pakeha supporters ‘will enjoy exactly the same facilities … will be treated as New Zealanders without any discrimination. As regards to hotel accommodation, no differentiation will be applied to any Maori supporters.’ With this assurance, Sir Turi Carroll announced that ‘the principle of equality between Maori and Pakeha is maintained’ and therefore ‘the Council supports the tour.’

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64 New Zealand Herald, 27 March 1969, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
65 Correspondence Tom Newnham to NZMC, 27 March 1969, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL. Tom Newnham believed that the South African Consulate had influenced the NZMC by discrediting Brutus as a communist agitator. See Tom Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game, Auckland: Graphic Publications, 1975, p.39.
68 H. Ngata, ‘South African Rugby Tour’, Kaunihera Maori, p.3.
Students from the University of Auckland Maori Club rejected the NZMC decision and this broader sentiment among Maori. Intent on stopping the tour a group of thirty members (and several non-Maori supporters) went back to their home marae at Rotorua, East-Coast and Gisborne over Anzac weekend 1969.71 Included in the group were Syd and Hana Jackson, Pita Sharples, Toby Curtis, Hone Ngata, Tom Newnham and family and Henderson Tapela - a young black African who was studying in Auckland.72 The purpose was to make their elders aware of the implications of apartheid for black South Africans and convince them to oppose the tour. As Ranginui Walker explained, the objective for those opposed to apartheid sport was to ‘conscienteise’ Maori, particularly those in rural areas, by ‘telling them what apartheid is and what it means. Maori people are under-educated, they don’t read, their one concern is their marae, or they are raising money to refurbish their marae, or build their marae. They just hadn’t been conscientised about what was happening in South Africa.’73

Supporting the students was Rev. Hemi Potatau - a Presbyterian minister, ex-Maori Battalion and a student at Auckland University. His presence as a kaumatua lent a seriousness and substance to the take of the group. Moreover, although some were competent in te reo, they were entering into a situation in which they were pitted against kaumatua with great experience and knowledge and correct protocol was a requirement. Hemi Potatau was able to lead the group onto marae, use his extensive knowledge of tikanga and give the group credibility in the eyes of those they were seeking to convince.74

This action also reflected the new activism of Maori youth who were challenging their elders’ decisions and claiming a political space. It was clearly recognised as a significant step. Maori Club president Hone Ngata observed, the trip was ‘historic’ in that it was ‘a long time since young Maoris have had the guts to go back to their leaders and talk about things like this.’75

Convincing the elders of rural Maoridom to oppose the tour was not easy. Most were associated with district Maori councils and marae committees. Although unanimous

71 New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1969.
72 Henderson Tapela was president of the New Zealand African Students’ Association.
73 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 Sept 2006.
74 Ibid. See also Newnham, Interesting Times, pp.157-158.
75 New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1969.
support for an anti-tour stance was gained from those at Mataatua Marae in Rotorua, many of the elders at Ruatoria were affronted by the group and refused to meet with them. 76 Nevertheless they were welcomed by Pinamine Taiapa, renowned carver and leader of the tangata whenua, and the issue was debated at length with a large number of Ngati Porou from TikiTiki in the North to Tokomaru Bay in the South. Hana Jackson recalled Tom Te Maro and some of those involved in Kotahitanga saying that it was good that they were concerned about the oppression of black people, ‘but what about Maori?’ 77 At the close of the meeting, Taiapa asked all the speakers to indicate where they stood on the issue, and a large majority was opposed to the tour. 78

In Gisborne, as the group was refused permission to go onto Poho o Rawiri Marae, a public meeting was held at Gisborne Girls’ High School. Here they confronted some of the big names in Maoridom including Arnold Reedy (NZMC), George Marsden (Tairawhiti member, Maori Rugby Advisory Board) and Henare Ngata (NZMC). 79 The students put forward their arguments opposing the tour and Hemi Potatau addressed himself individually to some of his ex-Maori Battalion comrades and reminded them that many had died in the fight against Nazism. Therefore, ‘How can you support the present day Nazis who crush their fellow men?’ 80

Henare Ngata accused the students of being obsessed with the tour issue and suggested that there were more pressing concerns for Maori. Noting their ‘sharp young intellects’ and educational ability, Ngata commented that this and ‘their desire to embrace a cause’, should be directed towards eliminating educational, economic and social disparities between Maori and Pakeha, as well as working on issues concerning land and ‘the place of traditional Maori cultural values in modern society.’ The students should visit again in the future ‘and discuss matters about which our people are more concerned than the South African tour.’ 81 He also defended the pro-tour stance of the Tairawhiti delegates to the NZMC noting that their decision reflected local opinion. 82

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76 Email interview with Tom Newnham, 17 September 2006.
78 New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1969.
79 Ibid. Tom Newnham believes that by the time of the Gisborne meeting the Maori leaders were ‘so embarrassed by the local strength of feeling against the tour that they attended to put their side’. Email interview with Tom Newnham, 17 September 2006.
80 Cited in Newnham, Interesting Times, p.157-158.
81 New Zealand Herald, 29 April 1969.
82 Ibid.
Although the students failed to convince the hierarchy Tom Newnham recalls that the vast majority of people at the meeting were anti-tour.83

Following Brutus’ visit, the wider student body became organised. At the 1969 New Zealand Universities Students Association (NZUSA) Easter Council meeting, it was decided that an ad hoc committee would be established through AUSA to co-ordinate existing opposition to apartheid sport. Two remits were passed with the first calling for the ‘cessation of all sporting links between New Zealand and South Africa, and New Zealand and Rhodesia’ and [these] should ‘not be resumed while South Africa and Rhodesia allow politics to influence their sporting decisions.’84 The second remit called for contact to be made with CARE and other organisations with a view to the establishment of an ad hoc body, the function of which was to ensure ‘the cessation of the 1970 Tour.’ A letter sent to CARE, explained that ‘in some areas CARE has got a poor reputation… it would be best to establish another group to fight against the tour.’ At a practical level it was felt that a new body would be able to focus entirely on the tour whereas CARE’s energy was divided between racism at home and abroad. Further, a student organisation would be able to draw the students together and thus provide a strong base with which to ‘knock the tour on the head.’86

Fourteen people attended the foundation meeting of HART on 15 July 1969, including Tama Poata (who suggested the name HART) along with two other representatives from MOOHR, and Syd and Hana Jackson representing the New Zealand Maori Students’ Association.87 At the following meeting Trevor Richards and Syd Jackson were elected Chairman and Vice-Chairman of HART respectively with the latter also appointed Tactics Officer.88 The Maori Women’s Welfare League was present and represented by Meri Penfold. This organisation, recalls Michael Law, ‘was there from day one’ and always strongly supportive of HART.89

83 Email interview with Tom Newnham, 17 September 2006.
84 Correspondence Trevor Richards (AUSA) to CARE, 6 May 1969, Trevor Richards Papers, MS-papers-6613-04, ATL.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Minutes of the Formation Meeting of HART, 15 July 1969, NZUSA & AUSA papers (part a), Trevor Richards Papers, MS-papers-6613-01, ATL.
88 Minutes of the Meeting of Hart, 28 July 1969, AUSA annual report (part b), Trevor Richards Papers, MS-papers-6613-02, ATL.
89 Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006.
HART was a significant development for Maori activists for it created new social and political space and thus provided opportunities for networking with a diverse range of groups and organisations. This created openings which Maori could utilise to their advantage in representing their cause.

The anti-apartheid movement was, as Michael Law explained, a mixture of fluid groups with a considerable cross-over of membership or supporters between groups.

It was a put on the hat for the moment. It’s a cluster of people on the political left who place a high priority on race both nationally and internationally and who have a loosely shared socio-economic analysis...It’s a broad left social movement that pops up under different organisational names as it suits...we were essentially a bunch of open-ended lefties who moved through whatever organisation or took whatever organisational form was required.90

Thus Maori activists, having established a presence in HART, gained access to a broad activist network, within which most groups were engaged in anti-racism activities in various ways. These included groups such as CARE (which some Maori had always been part of), the New Zealand Race Relations Council (NZRRC)91 and the New Zealand Student Christian Movement (NZSCM). Opportunities came out of these networks. For example, Don Borrie, who was secretary of the NZSCM and the NZRRC and heavily involved in the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR), 92 recalled that he established a close relationship with Maori activists and ‘made sure that there was room available for them to engage with the NZSCM.’ In addition, he was able to ‘open doors for Maori activists to use if they wished.’93

**General Opposition to Apartheid Sport**

Following the decision of the NZMC the apartheid sport protest developed a dual character. Firstly it became as much a protest against the NZMC as it was against apartheid sport. Secondly it separated into two strands of protest which may be

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90 Ibid.
91 The New Zealand Race Relations Council was formed in February 1970. Don Borrie recalls that it arose out of discussions he had with Tama Poata, Tom Newnham, and Allan Todd. Borrie notes that he had difficulties with the Council in that it was not specifically anti-racism 'but it was as close as we could get'. Interview with Don Borrie, 13 July 2006.
92 In 1969 the World Council of Churches, based in Geneva, initiated a Programme to Combat Racism which was directed towards the elimination of racial discrimination. It provided funds for groups throughout the world which were struggling against white discrimination.
93 Interview with Don Borrie, 13 July 2006.
characterised as moderate activism and radical activism. The former consisted generally of Maori groups such as Maori committees and councils which held meetings and hui and registered their protest through the press or letters to appropriate organisations. Their take was placed securely within an anti-apartheid framework. The latter group was more youthful and largely comprised of students and MOOHR members. In common with New Left groups of the time which emphasised action and confrontation, they advocated an action-oriented stance. They used highly visible and disruptive actions, as well as more conventional measures and generally employed a forceful rhetoric. Above all, while they also opposed apartheid, some took the opportunity, as Syd Jackson had in 1968, to press forward contemporary Maori grievances.

Many Maori were highly critical of the NZMC. Numerous Maori committees, executives, and councils disagreed with the decision and were angered that the NZMC had failed to consult Maori people, yet claimed to represent Maori opinion. The Chairman of the Taumaranui Maori Committee, Hikaia Amohia, represented a typical view stating, ‘They should have withheld a decision to support the tour until district councils, Maori committees and other organisations had time to discuss the issue and forward their recommendations. They decided too hastily.’ Many tribal groups, including Waikato-Maniapoto and Te Waipounamu, dissociated themselves from the NZMC stance and called on them to reconsider their decision.

However it was from young Maori activists that the greatest criticism came. Their view was that Maori grievances would never be addressed adequately through channels such as the NZMC which was merely a ‘talk’ and remit-passing organisation and which failed to represent the Maori people. They therefore sought a greater voice within the political process and envisaged a situation where they could influence the policies and practices of the major institutions upon which society was based.

The Auckland District Maori Council (ADMC) chairman, Patu Hohepa, was particularly critical. At the 1970 New Zealand Federation of Maori Students annual conference he urged young people to seek representation on local Maori committees and on the Maori

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95 Ibid.
Council itself in order to break the hegemonic control of a group who were ‘out of touch with Maori at grass roots level’ and yet who spoke and made decisions for Maoridom.\footnote{New Zealand Herald, 11 May 1970.}
He noted that the NZMC was Government created and an imposed hierarchical structure ‘that doesn’t work... Power should start from the people, not from groups which were not representative. The Government prefers to hear the voice of the Maori Council that it created in its own way rather than that of our four Maori members of Parliament’ who were true representatives of Maori opinion.\footnote{Ibid.}

Tama Poata suggested that the NZMC leadership had ‘acted the “Uncle Tom” role and middle-roaded their moral attitude to their disgrace. The New Zealand Maori Council have exposed their hypocrisy which leaves no doubt as to why the Maori people do not give to them as freely as their traditional generosity would expect...The narrow thinking of this body is considerably exposed.’\footnote{Correspondence from Tom Poata to Syd Jackson, 20 March 1969, Pei Te Hurinui Jones Papers, MS-Papers-8220-034, ATL.}

At a large hui at Poho o Rawiri Marae in Gisborne in June 1969, the NZMC decision and indeed the tour itself, were both strongly debated.\footnote{Central Hawkes Bay Press, 23 June 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.}

A clear division existed between the views of the elders and the young Maori present. The latter spoke of their bonds with other coloured people, how the NZMC decision would be regarded as Maori approval for apartheid in the eyes of the rest of the world and that ‘a sense of one’s common humanity’ must be a paramount consideration.\footnote{The article gives no indication who the ‘young Maori’ were. Nevertheless the intimation was that they were young Maori students, and as Syd Jackson was also mentioned it seems likely that the young people were in fact from the Auckland University Maori Club.}

Many elders spoke of the All Black ‘row’ as symptomatic of the gap between the rural elders who had received little formal education and young Maori students ‘living in the city, mixing with educated Pakehas and often thinking as Europeans.’ The elders emphasised that the NZMC reflected rural and conservative opinion which saw the problem as ‘not apartheid in South Africa, but any hint of it here.’\footnote{Central Hawkes Bay Press, 23 June 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.}
At the same meeting both Matiu Rata and Syd Jackson disputed the authority of the NZMC to make a decision on behalf of Maori, and claimed that the Maori MPs view was more representative of the Maori voice. Jackson noted that a 70 per cent Maori vote for Labour was an indication that Maori parliamentarians reflected the majority view, and Matiu Rata stated that the Labour Party spoke 'with more authority for our people than any other organisation.' \(^{102}\) Tom Poata, however, claimed that as so many Maori were members of the trade unions, it was fair to regard the unions as a more representative Maori voice than the NZMC. \(^{103}\)

Whether or not the NZMC decision did reflect the opinion of the majority is difficult to ascertain. The meeting at Poho o Rawiri mentioned above indicates that many elders were pro-tour. Furthermore, numerous letters in mainstream and Maori newspapers indicate that there was significant support for the tour. A Manawatu Maori community leader, Mr B. Ngatai, noted that he was closer to ordinary people than those organisations who claimed to represent Maori opinion, such as the Maori MPs and his findings indicated that the majority of Maori supported the tour. \(^{104}\) An 'Otorohanga Maori' wrote of a survey conducted amongst the local Maori community which showed ninety-four percent of men and forty percent of women supported the tour. \(^{105}\)

The extent to which Maori concurred with the NZMC position and supported the tour in the interests of maintaining harmonious race relations is also unclear. For some it was a simple love of rugby which underpinned their support. As Sir Turi Carroll remarked in 1965, 'Maori people love their rugby too much to allow a side issue to mar their enjoyment of the game.' \(^{106}\) Others suggested that the tour would break down the barriers of apartheid. Nevertheless issues of maintaining racial harmony may have prompted a pro-tour stance. Mary Hume who worked at the Department of Maori Affairs recalled having many arguments over the issue and trying to convince a Maori District Welfare Officer to oppose the tour. She observed that 'he couldn’t afford to be on my side because that would put him offside with the others. It was hard for Maori and...Polynesians to join in. They had achieved a precarious acceptance in their streets

\(^{102}\) *Central Hawkes Bay Press*, 23 June 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.

\(^{103}\) Ibid.

\(^{104}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1969.

\(^{105}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 16 May 1970.

\(^{106}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 9 April 1965.
and in their workplace...If they came out strongly anti-racist they were going to have so many battles on their hands.'

In December 1969 a deputation of young Maori, concerned that ‘the council is not truly reflecting the majority Maori view’, met with the NZMC. Led by Rev. Potaka-Dewes the group included representatives of the Ratana Youth Movement, the Maori section of the Wellington Diocese, and the Maori University Graduates Association who also represented the views of the MWWL and the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students. The group informed the NZMC that they were ‘ashamed and humiliated’ by the NZMC decision because ‘the principle of racial equality was of supreme importance to the Maori people.’ In addition, ‘the promise of “honorary white” status for Maoris in South Africa was offensive.’

Despite widespread criticism and deputations the Council refused to alter their decision. In response to the accusation that they had failed to consult with the people, they argued that they did not regard their decision as a new decision and thus there was no need for discussion with the Maori people in general. The issue had always been about equality for Maori with Pakeha and with that achieved, the issue had been resolved. Further, the Council noted that they had received no remits on the matter, no communication or expressions of protest from District Councils, individuals, local committees and no proposals for a new stand or an anti-tour campaign.

Accompanying the student protest was protest from a variety of Maori groups. The Maori Women’s Welfare League objected to the status of Maori as ‘honorary whites’ and they were opposed to apartheid and racial discrimination in any form. A number of tribal and Maori committees, some of which had also been critical of the NZMC, came out and opposed the tour. These included the Ngapuhi Maori executive.

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107 Mary Hulme interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4174, Oral History Centre, ATL. Mary Hulme was an Auckland CARE committee member.  
108 Dominion, 5 December 1969.  
109 Dominion, 8 December 1969.  
Waikato/Maniapoto District Council,\textsuperscript{113} and the Waihopai Maori Tribal Committee. The latter, who represented all Maori in Southland apart from Bluff and Stewart Island, reflected the views of the many Maori groups in the passing of a resolution which opposed the decision of the NZMC and the classification of Maori as ‘honorary whites.’ President George Te Au further noted that even if this criterion did not apply, the members of the committee also opposed the tour on the grounds of apartheid.\textsuperscript{114}

The Auckland District Maori Council (ADMC) opposed both the 1970 tour and all future sporting contact with South Africa. This had much to do with the efforts and influence of urban-based activists Ranginui Walker and Patu Hohepa who had joined the ADMC in the late 1960s. Their leadership and authority was based on achievement as opposed to a hereditary basis, and they spoke out for Maori interests much more forcefully and abrasively than did their predecessors.\textsuperscript{115} Ranginui Walker explained that ADMC, in common with other District Maori Councils, was a very conservative body which consisted of both marae and Maori committees. From the late 1960s, when he and Patu Hohepa assumed leadership positions, much work was done to rebuild an ailing ADMC network and gain the trust of the people under the jurisdiction of the Council. The result was the formation of a large democratic system which eventually incorporated thirty-six Maori committees from Wellsford in the North to Port Waikato in the South.\textsuperscript{116}

In the late 1960s, Walker recalls that Syd Jackson arrived at an ADMC meeting and requested that they oppose the tour. He notes that while he did not need convincing, the objective was to ‘conscientise our committee members... and ordinary Maori people who hadn’t had the advantage of education that we had. We had to explain what apartheid meant...But they were open to persuasion because they trusted us - that we were honourable and we were educated and were giving them the real oil.’ To have the large ADMC united over such an issue was no mean feat and as Walker reflects, the council ‘was always opposed to sporting contact with South Africa as a consequence of our conscientisation.’\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{113} Taumarunui Press, 6 May 1970, Pei Te Hurinui Jones Papers 1969-1970, MS-Papers-5220034, ATL.
\textsuperscript{114} Southland Times, 17 April 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
Maori MPs Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan and Matiu Rata were outspoken in their opposition. Rata in particular was relentless in voicing his opposition at numerous hui and public meetings and through newspaper articles. He generally framed his anti-apartheid message in moral terms as well as the damage which a tour could do to the reputation of New Zealand. While Rata campaigned hard within the public arena, he also used his position within Parliament to press his anti-apartheid stance and to criticise Government support of apartheid sport and their woeful record of abstentions on resolutions on human rights and apartheid at the United Nations.

Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan publicly stated her opposition on many occasions. In 1969 she refused to attend an official reception for visiting South African parliamentarians arguing that she had been opposed to apartheid over the past ten years and had ‘questioned the wisdom of South Africa’s apartheid laws.’ Thus, it was reasonable to decline to honour parliamentarians ‘who are pledged to the perpetuation of these policies.’ At the 1969 Labour Party Conference she proposed a national referendum on whether New Zealand should maintain sporting contact with South Africa. This, however, was not supported by other delegates.

As the departure of the All Black team drew closer, protest escalated and became more active. On the 7 May 1970 a deputation of thirty organisations led by Tom Skinner called on the Prime Minister. Included in the deputation were representatives from HART, CARE, MOOHR, NCC and the Ratana Youth Organisation. The deputation requested that the Government refrain from giving official approval for the tour and refrain from giving a farewell function which would give the impression abroad that New Zealand supported apartheid. This request was ignored.

At the end of May 1970 two petitions which had been circulating throughout New Zealand for several months were presented to Parliament. The first was the petition of

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120 Kaunihera Maori, Summer Issue 1969.
121 New Zealand Herald, 8 May 1970. Tom Skinner was a member of the Racial Discrimination Committee of the International Labour Organisation- a United Nations specialised agency- which sought the promotion of social justice as well as human and labour rights. Thus he acknowledged that he was placed in an awkward and embarrassing position of having to explain why New Zealand did not actively discourage sporting contact with South Africa. Cited in 'New Zealand Federation of Labour: Deputation to the Prime Minister Right Hon. Keith Holyoake', 26 February 1970, J. Marshall Collection, MS - Papers-1403: 214:3.
122 New Zealand Herald, 7 May 1970.
Dr P. Hohepa and 7,400 others and the second was from John Good (HART) and 12,209 others.\textsuperscript{123} The HART petition requested that the tour be cancelled 'because it is morally wrong to accept and participate in racist sport, denying fair play to those whose skin is deemed to be the wrong colour' and it called on Parliament to declare that the tour did not have its support.\textsuperscript{124} Patu Hohepa's petition stated:

For too long New Zealanders have listened to the Government preach what it did not practise. We the majority of the Maori people deplore contacts with the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. Maori players becoming honorary or temporary whites to visit South Africa is a shame on the nation.\textsuperscript{125}

The submissions by Tama Poata and Patu Hohepa to the Petitions Committee were significant as they took the opportunity to speak of domestic issues.\textsuperscript{126} Poata stated that 'high-level talk about racial harmony is mere lip-service' in New Zealand. He was scathing about current claims that the four Maori seats in parliament were evidence that apartheid existed in New Zealand and he rejected the suggestion that these should be abolished in the interests of equality for all New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{127} He pointed out that apartheid in New Zealand was not to be found in the Maori seats, but within the 'century-old inequality of opportunity in varying degrees still suffered by the Maori under a series of Pakeha-dominated Governments.'\textsuperscript{128} Poata's submission was criticised by the chairman of the committee (Mr V. Young) who informed him that the committee had shown great 'tolerance in accepting them. A lot of points made are not relevant to the petition.'\textsuperscript{129}

Although Hohepa's submission was less explicit, it contained veiled criticism of domestic race relations, noting that the majority of Maoridom had expressed abhorrence over apartheid and were opposed to the continuation of sporting ties with South Africa. 'Has the Government no sensitivity to the pleas of its largest minority group in the country which is coloured, proud and aware of its international obligations to other oppressed minorities?' he questioned. Moreover, 'continuing to ignore our pleas is to continue to

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[124] New Zealand Herald, 4 May 1970 and 29 May 1970.
\item[125] Newnham, Apartheid is Not a Game, p.48.
\item[126] New Zealand Herald, 29 May 1970.
\item[127] This was a popular and often-expressed view amongst Pakeha who equated the Maori seats with Maori privilege and argued that 'apartheid' existed. The Maori All Black team and the Maori Education Foundation were also popular variations on the Maori privilege discourse.
\item[128] New Zealand Herald, 29 May 1970.
\item[129] Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
trample on our mana.' Thus Hohepa identified Maori as an oppressed people and under a government which paid little attention to their concerns.

Numerous meetings and hui were held around New Zealand to discuss the anti tour issue. This included a ‘No Tour’ rally in March 1970 at Western Springs Stadium which was co-organised by CARE and the University of Auckland Maori Club, and a major hui convened by the ADMC at Te Unga Waka Marae in Epsom a week prior to the departure of the All Blacks to South Africa. The hui of around 300 people included Elizabeth Murchie from the MWWL, MPs Koro Wetere and Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, Maori representing the Progressive Youth Movement and members of the general public. Patu Hohepa fronted the meeting which he framed to show ‘the deep concern and shame of Maori people ... at the prospect of New Zealand’s trampling on the rights of the non-white people of South Africa.’ It was hoped that this shame would be conveyed through the news media to the world. Hohepa hoped that the meeting would ‘awaken the conscience of New Zealanders’ to the fact that the tour would ‘demean the Maori people and aid and comfort the white minority in South Africa as well as lowering New Zealand’s image in the eyes of the world.’

Both HART and CARE protested through to the departure of the All Blacks. Large demonstrations took place on the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre which drew over 1000 marchers along Queen Street in Auckland and additional demonstrations in Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton. While press statements, speeches, letters to parliamentarians and petitions formed a large component of their protest, incidents of direct and radical action increased as the All Black departure approached. Anti-tour slogans were painted on the field at Eden Park, the goal posts at Lancaster Park in Christchurch were sawn down and the offices of the Auckland Rugby Football Union were set on fire. Direct action occurred at the final All Black trials when hundreds of demonstrators sat on the roads and blocked access to Athletic Park and seventeen

130 New Zealand Herald, 28 May 1970. The italics are mine.
131 CARE pamphlet, no date (circa March 1970), CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL. CARE brought Dennis Brutus out to New Zealand over Easter 1970. Syd Jackson fronted the ‘No Tour’ rally at which Brutus spoke.
132 New Zealand Herald, 8 June 1970.
133 ‘Invitation to hui’, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
134 New Zealand Herald, 8 June 1970.
135 Richards, Dancing on Our Bones, p.51.
demonstrators were arrested and charged with disorderly behaviour after a large group streamed onto the field and disrupted the trial game.\textsuperscript{136}

MOOHR was particularly active under the HART umbrella during this period and campaigned hard through its newsletters, press statements, letters to newspapers, Maori publications such as \textit{Te Maori}, and through the organising of demonstrations. On the eve of the All Blacks departure MOOHR, in conjunction with Don Borrie from the NZSCM, organised a demonstration at Cuba Street Mall in Wellington. In a joint press statement MOOHR, NZSCM and Rev. Potaka Dewes called for support for the demonstration and asked 'all thinking New Zealanders...to dissociate from racist sport and all its ugly consequences for our country...to stand together and oppose racism.'\textsuperscript{137} Also included was a small insertion related to domestic issues. The Holyoake Government and indeed successive governments were criticised for failing to uphold the principle of racial equality at home and indeed have 'long paid lip-service' only to such principles.\textsuperscript{138}

The All Blacks departed for South Africa from Wellington on 13 June following three days of escalating demonstrations and protest in the city. A formal farewell inside Parliament House, which the four Maori MP's declined to attend, was accompanied by a moderately large protest outside. About 350 demonstrators threw dirt, flour and paint bombs, staged a sit-down on the road, chanted 'The whole world's watching' and swarmed the barriers. Seven were arrested and charged with 'disorderly conduct, indecent language and obscene language.'\textsuperscript{139} The following day a thousand people protested outside the Wellington Grand Hotel where a farewell dinner for the All Black team was being held. Thirty four protesters were arrested.\textsuperscript{140} A march to Rongotai Airport, tight police security surrounding the All Blacks departure and Tim Shadbolt tearing across the tarmac at Rongotai Airport form the last images of a long campaign against the 1970 tour.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 25 May 1970.
\textsuperscript{137} 'Joint Press Statement, NZSCM, MOOHR, Rev Potaka Dewes', 7 June 1970, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 12 June 1970.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Dominion}, 13 June 1970.
Broader Discussion on Domestic Racism

While some Maori activists introduced domestic issues into the anti-tour debate did these resonate with the mainstream Pakeha population? Did the anti-tour debate broaden into domestic issues? Was the apartheid sport debate a vehicle for creating a new consciousness about domestic racism?

Although the comments by Maori activists which referred to domestic discrimination failed to elicit any response within the mainstream press or within letters to the editor columns, the anti-tour debate did result in wider discussion on race relations. Much of this was negative and there was little indication of a more understanding attitude towards Maori emerging. As with the 1960 debate a dominant discourse was that of Maori privilege, suggesting that Maori were the beneficiaries of an apartheid system which was in operation within New Zealand and which discriminated against Pakeha. ‘All Kiwi’ stated:

I disagree that New Zealand does not support apartheid. We practice it here with our separate Maori rolls and Maori Land Court. Until all New Zealanders live under one rule and one law we are practising our own form of apartheid. So why all the fuss about a rugby tour?¹⁴¹

Maori privilege was seen on the rugby field by their right to ‘form a racially selected team and to have special facilities offered’ expressed another newspaper correspondent. Thus, discrimination ‘is practiced against the European.’¹⁴² The fact that ‘Maori privilege’ was so often commented upon reflects the centrality of this discourse and the threat which alleged ‘Maori privilege’ posed to the ‘one people’ ideal.

Indirectly race relations were critiqued by some advocating and justifying a pro-tour stance. These expressions advocated that New Zealanders should not be concerned with the politics of another country, but rather should ‘clean up our own backyard’. This was succinctly expressed by Thomas Love: ‘Think not of apartheid my Maori race, straighten up our own shores.’¹⁴³ Pakeha pronouncements often pointed out that Maori and Polynesians were the problem ‘in our own backyard.’ The letters to the editor

¹⁴¹ New Zealand Herald, December 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
¹⁴² New Zealand Herald, 19 March 1970, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
¹⁴³ Central Hawkes Bay Press, 23 June 1969, CABTA Papers, 77-202, ATL.
columns provide ample evidence of this. One correspondent to the *New Zealand Herald* stated:

> It would be better for some of those protesting to take a long hard look at the many very unsavoury situations existing in New Zealand with its increasing Polynesian population, and help sort out problems here before criticising the situation in other countries.\(^{144}\)

Another challenged 'T. Newnham and others to solve our own racial upheavals in Otara and Ponsonby before concerning yourself with another country's problems.'\(^{145}\)

There was no widespread discussion over racial discrimination and only isolated instances when it was acknowledged. Rolland O'Regan spoke of inequality between Maori and Pakeha and of racial discrimination occurring in the areas of accommodation and employment opportunities.\(^{146}\) The Auckland Methodist Synod stated that they did not 'claim that New Zealand's hands are clean in the matter of race relations' and several politicians spoke out on the issue.\(^{147}\) This included the President of the Labour Party, Mr Douglas, who noted that New Zealanders should never become 'smugly complacent' on the question of race relations. 'This would lead to false beliefs that racial discrimination did not occur in this country.'\(^{148}\)

By far the dominant discourse was that New Zealanders lived together as one people and in a state of racial harmony. Popular pro-tour opinion, both Maori and Pakeha, expressed the view that the tour should proceed as it would help break down the barriers of apartheid by providing an example of New Zealand's harmonious race relations for South Africa to emulate. A correspondent in *Te Ao Hou* provides a typical example of such expression. The tour would:

> ...show South Africans that two different people can play together as a team in a friendly manner, practising together, mixing together socially and living amicably together, showing mutual respect for one another's failings, beliefs, traditions and feelings...We in New Zealand are one people living and working side by side in harmony.\(^{149}\)

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\(^{144}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 16 May 1970.  
\(^{145}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 14 March 1970.  
\(^{146}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 14 December 1968.  
\(^{147}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 28 April 1969.  
\(^{148}\) *New Zealand Herald*, 22 March 1969.  
\(^{149}\) *Te Ao Hou*, Jun/Aug, 1969, p.54.
An anti-tour discourse also supported the view of harmonious race relations. This opposed the tour on the grounds that New Zealand’s renowned race relations reputation would be blemished. It was a view widely shared by both Maori and Pakeha. Matiu Rata spoke of whether we could afford ‘as a nation with an enviable reputation in race relations’ to support South Africa. Numerous correspondents to newspapers expressed similar sentiments:

We have a fine reputation derived from our success in multi-racial harmony. But the maintenance of our reputation lies in the balance...If the All Black tour goes ahead our reputation will be tarnished.

In short, while the 1970 tour debate did provide openings for some discussion on domestic discrimination it failed to generate a widespread response which acknowledged that this existed. The two dominant discourses arising from the 1960 tour debate – that Maori were privileged and that New Zealanders were one people living in racial harmony - retained their centrality in 1970. That these discourses clearly contradict each other suggests that while ‘one people’ was widely touted, it was more mythical than real.

Yet there were signs of change beginning to occur. Two events which took place in the aftermath of the tour support the argument that the apartheid sport debate created a space for indigenous discourses to be presented and recognised. Most important they point to the direction which Maori activists were taking on the apartheid issue.

The first was the development of radical Maori activism. In September 1970 Nga Tamatoa (Young Warriors) formed and became one of the most significant activist groups of the 1970s. The initial core of Nga Tamatoa consisted of students from the Auckland University Maori Club who were heavily involved in the 1970 anti-tour protest. However the group expanded rapidly to include Maori from diverse social groups. This included school students, gang members, white and blue collar workers and the unemployed.

151 New Zealand Herald, 16 May 1970.
The formation of Tamatoa marked the emergence of Brown Power in New Zealand. The group developed a politicised identity based on 'blackness' through which they identified with black people throughout the world.¹⁵² They were influenced by the Black Power ideology of Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton who argued that Black liberation was to be brought about, in part, through a separatist stance within which black consciousness and identity could develop and thus provide the basis for political strength. While there was a place for whites it was in a supportive capacity and their main task was to acknowledge that they were the oppressors of blacks and the beneficiaries of institutional racism.¹⁵³

Thus Tamatoa, and groups which were joining them by the mid 1970s, deliberately chose to occupy a separate activist space on the margins within which they re-centered Maori and marginalised Pakeha. Whilst continuing to retain contact with leftist Pakeha groups and participate in social movement activities, their focus within such groups was to prioritise Maori concerns, particularly domestic racism. This had implications for their relationship with groups within the anti-apartheid movement. Over time tension emerged between Pakeha groups which were fighting for blacks in South Africa, and Maori who were claiming a space within which the struggle against domestic racism could be advanced. For such activists, while the struggle against apartheid was important, domestic racism was their number one issue and they argued that this should be the number one concern of all New Zealanders. This was the underlying dynamic of the relationship between many Maori activists and the anti-apartheid movement following the 1970 tour protest. It was to reach its ultimate expression in 1981.

The second event concerned the actions of Patu Hohepa who was a major force during the 1970 tour and was clearly recognised as such. In March 1972 he, along with Tom Newnham and Trevor Richards, was invited to present papers at the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid.¹⁵⁴ He went with the support of the ADMC, MOOHR, Nga Tamatoa Council, the four Maori MPs, the Auckland division of the MWWL and two district councils who asked him to represent their views on apartheid sport. During his presentation he told the committee that he had come to New York to assure them of the

¹⁵⁴ New Zealand Herald, 20 March 1972. Running for three days, the Special Committee on Apartheid opened each year on the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre.
'Maori peoples allegiance to the principles of the United Nations in the fight against apartheid' and that Maori abhorred the decision of the New Zealand Prime Minister to support contact with the 'white racist regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria.'155 The Government, he said, refused to disseminate information or news about apartheid and thus 'we find ourselves forced out onto the streets and sports fields to fight against the abomination of apartheid.'156

Prior to the trip Hohepa had indicated he would use the opportunity 'to give a new point of view on race relations.'157 Tom Newnham recalls that 'Although the invitation was solely to talk about the anti-apartheid movement, Pat was determined to talk about race relations in New Zealand which he did very effectively...he was officially representing the ADMC but he conveyed the views of Nga Tamatoa unofficially.'158 Interviews also provided an opportunity to speak of race relations and on one occasion he spoke of 'problems between Pakeha and Maori and Pakeha and Islander' and he gave notice that New Zealand may be on the verge of bitter racial strife over racial questions as Maori and Island groups 'have strong feelings on racial issues.' He further noted that the decision of the National Government to support the 1973 tour 'symbolises to them the continuing refusal of the Government to sympathetically address itself to them.'159

The United Nations delegation received widespread coverage through the New Zealand press. A New Zealand Herald editorial stated that:

Rarely do resident New Zealanders go overseas to criticise their country's attitudes and policies before world bodies...People are rightly free to air their views and plead their cases. But it may be wondered how balanced a picture the committee receives of New Zealand attitudes and reasons if it hears no more than the expressions of minority groups.160

Sir Keith Holyoake (Minister of Foreign Affairs) would not be drawn in to any discussion, merely stating that the Government always had a representative at the meetings, and he would therefore be available to make a statement if required.161

155 New Zealand Herald, 23 March 1972.
158 Email interview with Tom Newnham, 17 September 2006.
159 Evening Post, 25 May 1972, M. Law Collection, Box 1 [uncatalogued], UWL.
The key point of Hohepa's journey to the United Nations is that through involvement in social movement activities, opportunities were presented for an indigenous discourse to be presented to a wider audience, in this case an international audience. The message he delivered through newspaper interviews and to United Nations forum delegates then rebounded back to New Zealand.

The apartheid sport debate was constantly evolving. The issue had moved from a 'No Maori No Tour' debate to one which was explicitly anti-apartheid. By the early 1970s, some Maori activists had placed domestic racism alongside apartheid. The reasons for a strong anti-apartheid stance can be located in the rise of activism within the more youthful population. Influenced by liberation politics, politicised through social movement activities and angered by the social, cultural, economic and political marginalisation of Maori, these people identified with the oppression of the coloured people of South Africa and opposed apartheid directly and vigorously. At the same time, their involvement in the anti-apartheid movement created opportunities whereby issues of domestic racism could be taken to mainstream Pakeha New Zealand. Further, engagement with groups under the broad anti-apartheid umbrella created new opportunities, networks and spaces whereby their cause could be represented and advanced. Young Maori developed a political profile. Alongside, many Maori groups opposed apartheid in a moderate but no less important way and perhaps their contribution has been underestimated.

While the anti-tour debate failed to broaden out into discussion on domestic discrimination there was some discussion on domestic issues with the 'Maori as privileged' discourse evident. However the dominant discourses that New Zealanders were 'one people' and enjoyed the 'best race relations in the world' retained their centrality. Nevertheless the signs were that change was looming.

In 1981 the Springbok rugby team toured New Zealand. At the end of this there would be few New Zealanders who could or would assert that New Zealanders 'we are all one people' living in a racially harmonious society. The opposition by Maori to this tour, the spaces which they utilised and created to present an indigenous discourse and their part in challenging the two dominant myths which had formed the central plank of New Zealanders identity for so long, is the focus of the following chapter.
Chapter Three

1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand

In February 1979 Hirini Mead, Professor of Maori Studies at Victoria University, requested that all iwi place a rahui on rugby in response to the sanctioning by the NZRFU of a proposed trip to South Africa by six New Zealand rugby players. The intention was to place a tapu on all rugby fields and on rugby as an activity which would be lifted when the tour was abandoned. Mead initially failed to gain wide support and the terms of the rahui were amended to exclude all primary school children and rugby football fields and to apply only to rugby union competitive games. The Ringatu Church put in place the first rahui at Te Wainui Marae in the Bay of Plenty. A second ceremony was performed at Victoria University by Rev. Tawhao Tioke for both Maori and Pakeha, one hundred of whom had signed a petition of support.

The rahui was a significant action. Tipene O'Regan articulated this well when he gave his support 'because of your attempt to oppose [sporting] contact in a Maori way as against the general trend in Maori political action of mere imitation of western political modes, techniques and approaches.' The rahui was an expression of the drive for self-determination which was running through Maoridom. 'Maori should not rely on HART to protest,' said Mead. 'We must protest on our own behalf and do it successfully...and do things for ourselves.' A few months later he observed, 'the things that are happening around us represent our long struggle to be heard, to be noticed, to make decisions on our own behalf and shape our own future.' The action of the rahui was a means of creating a space for Maori to be recognised, determine their own course of action, develop pride in Maoritanga and attend to their mana as a people. The subsequent 1981 Springbok Tour provided a similar space.

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1 The Northern Transvaal Rugby Union had invited the rugby players to attend their festival matches in March 1979. Included in the selection was Tane Norton, All Black Captain.
2 Paanui 3, 'A Rahui on Rugby Football', Maori Studies Department, Victoria University, 26 March 1979, Trevor Richards Papers, 99-278-34/09, ATL.
3 Paanui 4, 'Te Rahu-i-Nga Kupa Tautoko', (circa March/April 1979), M. Law Collection, Box 30 [uncatalogued], UWL.
4 Hirini Mead, 'A Rahui on Rugby Football', 23 February 1979, M. Law Collection, Box 19 [uncatalogued], UWL.
5 Hirini Mead, 'He Ara Ki Te Aomarama', ADMC Records 1962-1991, Maori MSS MP 1991/4, Box 22, Folder 38, Special Collections, UAL.
The events of the 1981 tour unleashed the largest, most sustained and divisive protest ever seen in New Zealand's history. Anti-tour protesters were opposed to the policy of apartheid and sought to isolate South Africa in order to force its Government to change its policy. They argued that by playing rugby with South Africa, New Zealand was condoning the policies of a racist regime. Opposing this view were those who argued that New Zealanders were entitled to play sport with whoever they wished. Politics had no place in sport. For many Maori the issue was more complex. While they opposed apartheid they were also protesting as a mark of solidarity with other oppressed peoples. To demonstrate against apartheid was also to demonstrate against the oppression of Maori. For some the issue was weighted towards the latter.

Maori politics merged with the apartheid sport debate and opposition by Maori activists to the 1981 tour reflected the events of the preceding decade. This was a pivotal decade during which Maori activism grew and matured. From the mid-1970s both radical and moderate activism took centre-stage. Both gave public expression to the long struggle for self-determination and equality. Maori land rights, domestic racism, the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori rights and self-determination were placed in the forefront of the political landscape. These issues shaped the response by many Maori in 1981.

The body of this chapter falls in two sections. The first examines the period leading up to the tour during which numerous groups sought to prevent the tour. This is very much a 'who, where, when and why' section. Nevertheless during this period moderate Maori activists claimed a space to attend to issues involving their people, determine their own course of action, offer new perspectives and deal with their own affairs.

The focus of the second section is the tour and the aftermath during which many Maori were prosecuted for their part in the tour demonstrations. The purpose of this section is not to give an account of the involvement of Maori in the numerous tour protests. This has already been well documented, including a comprehensive work by Geoff Chapple. Rather the focus is on why Maori protested and the issue of creating and utilising space for an indigenous presence and discourse to be recognised. Reflecting the demand for self-determination and the desire to have Maori issues recognised, activists created and claimed a political space through numerous actions and events. The response by many

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6 Chapple, 1981: The Tour.
Maori was entwined with the issue of domestic racism. Thus activists used the opportunities which the tour presented to draw attention to historical and contemporary grievances. Through the profiling of these issues activists were also attending to the mana of Maori. While hostility to the Maori take was evident, the final section of the chapter suggests that the beginnings of a new consciousness of domestic racism had emerged.

**Background**

The 1970s was a decade when activists articulated Maori grievances and aspirations forcefully and with increasing vigour. In doing so they presented a Maori version of colonisation which called into question the ‘one people’ notion and largely unraveled the myth of racial harmony. The 1975 Maori Land March brought into existence a Maori land rights movement which saw numerous contestations over land, including the high profile occupations at Bastion Point and Raglan Golf Course. Alongside grew a broad Maori rights movement which contested a range of issues including the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori language and domestic racism. A range of new radical activist groups were formed during the latter years of the decade which included Waitangi Action Committee (WAC), He Tua and Maori Peoples Liberation Movement. These were not discreet groups and there was a considerable cross-over of membership. Nga Tamatoa ceased operating in its original form and many of its members filtered into the new activist groups.7

The various struggles were important consciousness-raising events. Actions at Bastion Point and Raglan directed attention to a history of land theft and the continuing impact of these actions on contemporary Maoridom. Treaty protests brought to consciousness the treaty promises which had been made and never honoured by the Crown. Above all they engendered a cultural reawakening for young urban Maori, who had been distanced from iwi and cultural roots. Through the campaigns of the 1970s the past was ‘invoked as a source of inspiration’ and a reminder that their activism was a continuation of a long heritage of indigenous activism which sought to reassert tino rangatiratanga.8

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7 Donna Awatere, one of the original members of Tamatoa, reformed the group towards the end of the decade. It was supported by a new generation of radical activists including Ripeka Evans and Hilda Halkyard and became, to a large extent, part of the black women’s movement. Donna Awatere cited in Diamond series. See also Christine Dann, *Up From Under: Women and Liberation in New Zealand, 1970-1985*, Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1985, p.35.

Moderate activists pursued the same goal and throughout the decade articulated these more publicly and forcefully. The ADMC in particular became more radicalised, largely through the influence of Ranginui Walker and Patu Hohepa. As Walker notes, 'We (ADMC) were the trouble-making radicals. We always dragged hard things onto the table.' Following a decade of numerous struggles, Hirini Mead issued a challenge to the Pakeha hegemony in mainstream politics. In a paper he presented at the New Zealand Labour Party Maori Policy and Advisory hui at Wahiao Marae (Whakarewarewa), he called for a separate Maori Parliament. This was followed by Matiu Rata breaking with Labour and the establishment of the Mana Motuhake political party. He stated, 'We will master our own affairs, we must command our own destiny.'

The issue of domestic racism had a key role in shaping the response made by many Maori activists during the 1981 tour. Throughout the decade racism and discrimination became a focus of attention. Accusations of police racism and the deliberate harassment of young Polynesians, Maori and gang members frequently made headline news. Incidents such as the 1971 killing by police of young Mongrel Mob member Daniel Houpapa and the unsatisfactory explanation for this left a residue of anger and injustice. The actions of a Police Task Force, formed in 1974 to deal with violence and disorder in Auckland, were found to be discriminatory and racist. A report by the ACORD found the police to be over-zealous in their policing habits and that Maori and Pacific Islanders were targeted and over-represented in police arrests. Similarly, the attitude of police toward gangs was an area of contestation. Ranginui Walker spoke of Pakeha and police paranoia in relation to Black Power gangs and suggested the police were often deliberately provocative and forced retaliatory action from gang members.

Maori rights activist groups and Pakeha anti-racist organisations, particularly CARE and ACORD, drew attention to instances of racism and applied an institutional racism

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9 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
10 Hirini Mead, 'He Ara Ki Te Aomarama'. The paper was read on 2 September 1979.
13 'The Task Force and Race Relations', CARE Annual Report, 1975, CARE Records, NZMS 845, ACL. The ACORD report, 'Task Force-A Failure in Law Enforcement: A Disaster in Community Relations' was written by Dr Oliver Sutherland and Ross Galbreath.
14 Ranginui Walker, 'Korero', Listener, 6 May 1978.
analysis to colonisation and its legacy.\textsuperscript{15} This suggested all the institutions of society were premised on a structural inequality which subordinated Maori and therefore all Pakeha were racist. The greatest social issue in New Zealand was white racism and ‘the greatest problem facing Maoris is the Pakeha problem.’\textsuperscript{16}

Towards the end of the decade race relations deteriorated through several high profile incidents. In May 1979 He Taua, a group of Maori activists, confronted and physically assaulted engineering students at Auckland University who were practising their annual capping stunt-a parody of the haka. The ‘haka’ was a grossly offensive act and despite repeated requests to have it withdrawn, these had been ignored. The event stimulated a national debate which resulted in the publication of a report on race relations.\textsuperscript{17}

Following the haka party incident the group Maranga Mai toured the North Island and performed a play of the same name. This dramatisation centered on land and Maori rights struggles during the latter part of the 1970s and offered a damning indictment of Pakeha society. At its heart lay the issue of white racism. The controversy which erupted reflected a lack of understanding of the message which was being imparted. For many Pakeha, such as Manukau City Councillor Peter Aldridge, the play was ‘filth and insulting...It aims at stirring up racial hatred.’\textsuperscript{18}

At the end of the decade the myth that New Zealanders enjoyed harmonious race relations was rarely expressed. However, the majority of Pakeha failed to acknowledge that domestic racism was an issue and in a 1980 Heylen Poll 60.8% stated that Maori were neither discriminated against nor disadvantaged.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, Maori activism had met with considerable hostility by many Pakeha. Such issues were to become a central part of the 1981 Tour as radical activists sought to bring their version of the reality of domestic racism and Maori grievances to Pakeha anti-tour supporters. Tension also existed between some Maori activists and groups within the anti-apartheid movement.

\textsuperscript{15} The term institutional racism was first used by American civil rights activists Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton. They argued that racism was about power and the deliberate subordination of one group by another in order to maintain control over that group. This subordination was effected through the institutions of society which were designed to perpetuate the unequal relationship and maintain a White power base. See Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, \textit{Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America}, pp.3-5.


\textsuperscript{19} See Appendix 1, p.127.
Whilst acknowledging that the struggle against apartheid was important, Maori activists argued that undue emphasis was placed on this issue and that there was a lack of support for Maori concerns. Within CARE this debate came to a head at the 1973 AGM resulting in a walk-out by a number of Maori, including Titewhia Harawira, who claimed that CARE failed to listen to Maori and was consumed by the apartheid sport issue.20

The perception was that Pakeha, who were supposedly sensitive to domestic racism, either patronised or failed to relate to Maori concerns and thus perpetuated a relationship which subordinated Maori. Frustration had earlier boiled over at a 1971 NZRRC conference. ‘For once YOU listen to what we Maoris want instead of telling us what you consider good for us’ stated Syd Jackson of Nga Tamatoa.21 Pakeha liberals were dismissed as being of little benefit for they failed to either relate to Maori or comprehend the structural basis of domestic racism. Hana Jackson stated:

While we do not deny the value of the work they are doing, it must be stressed that the Anti-Apartheid Movement is predominantly a group of white ‘liberals’ who do not relate, in any way, to the problems of white racism in New Zealand and who make little, if any, attempt to relate to us, the indigenous people of New Zealand.22

Despite the uneasy relationship between the anti-apartheid movement and some Maori activists, the latter still vigorously supported protests against apartheid sport. For groups such as MOOHR and Te Matakite O Aotearoa the issue was not necessarily one of priorities: all forms of racism needed to be addressed and eliminated.23

The radical Maori discourse did have some impact on the anti-apartheid movement. From the mid-1970s there was increased involvement in Maori campaigns. HART formalised its involvement in domestic issues in 1975 and announced that ‘racism in South Africa and racism in New Zealand are but two sides of the same coin.’24 Michael Law explained that ‘the core of our argument was the link between domestic racism and

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20 Interview with Rangiuni Walker, 8 September 2006.
23 ‘Extracts from MOOHR Constitution’, in MOOHR newsletter, December 1970, M. Law Collection, Box 29 [uncatalogued], UWL; Te Matakite O Aotearoa, ‘Press Statement’, 21 April 1981, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-08, ATL. MOOHR was superseded by Te Matakite O Aotearoa which formed following the 1975 Land March. Many MOOHR members joined Te Matakite, including Tama Poata who took on a leadership role.
the promotion of relations with white South Africa.\textsuperscript{25} From 1976 when domestic issues began to dominate the political agenda, HART and CARE supported the cause by publicising various land rights campaigns through the news media and their own newsletters and educating their supporters over wider issues of domestic racism. Moreover, many individuals lent physical support and presence to the Maori land rights movement and particularly the events at Bastion Point and Raglan.\textsuperscript{26}

John Minto explained that HART sought to explicitly link apartheid and domestic racism. Many large meetings and conferences were held in the late 1970s and early 1980s and 'we always made a place for a section on racism and we usually got some Maori people to speak.'\textsuperscript{27} At the same time HART was asking its supporters to put more effort into the struggle against domestic racism:

Since Bastion Point, even Pakehas with good track records on issues of domestic racism are starting to distance themselves from contemporary issues. The He Taua incident exposed this, the Maranga Mai incident merely confirms it... the Pakeha response runs the risk of giving credence to those who...claim that we have a blind spot when it comes to New Zealand issues.\textsuperscript{28}

Clearly the perception that anti-apartheid supporters side-lined domestic issues in favour of international concerns continued to exist and as is indicated, perhaps there was truth to this claim.

Thus by the end of the decade there existed a large radical activist network of politically aware Maori, committed to tino rangatiratanga and nursing historical and contemporary grievances. Pakeha New Zealand, they believed, was unsympathetic to Maori concerns and dismissed claims of domestic racism. Moreover, for some activists, the anti-apartheid movement had 'a blind-spot' towards Maori issues. Moderate activists were seeking to have Maori attend to their own affairs and demanding a place for Maori in the political process. Standing apart was a large group of disaffected young urban Maori, many of whom had intimate experience of domestic racism. The efforts of the anti-apartheid movement ranged alongside. Strong links had been forged between groups

\textsuperscript{25} Email correspondence with Michael Law, 20 April 2007.
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{27} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{28} Article by HART written for unknown publication, (circa 1980), M. Law Collection, Box 22 [uncatalogued], UWL.
such as HART and Te Matakite during the various Maori struggles and an effort had been made to reach out to Maori and Polynesian peoples. It was within this confluence that the 1981 Springbok Tour took place.

**Pre-Tour Politics**

In September 1979 the anti-apartheid movement held a 'Stop the 81 Tour' planning conference at Elsdon Youth Camp in Porirua. Approximately eighty people attended including Tama Poata, Heta Te Hemara and Eva Rickard from Te Matakite O Aotearoa. This reflected the links which had been strengthened between HART and Maori land rights groups during the land struggles at Bastion Point and Raglan and the influence of Tama Poata who, as John Minto stressed, was always strongly supportive of HART.\(^{29}\)

Michael Law recalls that they were disheartened 'because we really believed that the 81 Tour was going to take place and we could get no support or traction.' The public 'just did not believe the tour was going to take place' and therefore there was no need to campaign.\(^{30}\) He recalls the impact of Eva Rickard:

> Eva’s speech was awe-inspiring...she didn’t trust Muldoon an inch, affirmed just how critical and central this kaupapa was, and urged us to mobilise around the forthcoming tour...she was very emphatic that we had to work on what we were doing and was also firm in her view that Maori could see through Muldoon and would be there in large numbers when the time came...the low level of people involved wasn’t that apartheid wasn’t a concern...it was just that right now, lots of activists had a lot of immediate issues to contend with...We left that meeting lifted in optimism.\(^{31}\)

With a focus on stopping the tour the Maori contingent advocated a more direct and aggressive stance in order to gain publicity and build support for the anti-tour campaign. This clearly reflected their engagement in active protest and the issues within which they were embroiled at the time.\(^{32}\) Eva Rickard noted that getting arrested gained good publicity. Tama Poata, was ‘interested in tactics’ and from his ‘experience gained at Bastion Point and Raglan’ suggested that HART ‘must not be afraid’ to employ large-scale disruptive action. The anti-apartheid movement was ‘not bold enough’ and it was important to get young people like He Taua involved who were ‘impatient’ and would

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29 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
30 Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006. Law further observed that they ‘despaired because they believed that Muldoon had conned activists into thinking it was a non-issue, and he was getting away with his lying to the Commonwealth and the world’. This refers to the Gleneagles agreement in which Muldoon consistently presented the view that New Zealand was honouring its terms.
31 Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006; Email correspondence, 20 April 2007.
32 The paragraph is based on hand-written notes (author unknown) of the meeting. Trevor Richards Papers, 99-278-35/2.
make their presence felt. Don Borrie (NZSCM) spoke of the difficulty in attracting support from Pacific Islanders and Maori. The problem was that HART was 'a predominantly Pakeha organisation' and he stressed the need to move into areas such as Cannons Creek in Porirua to consult, work with and establish solidarity with Polynesian people. The key issue, stated Heta Te Hemara, was that 'to achieve national credibility, HART must be seen to be active in what's going on in New Zealand. There is apartheid in New Zealand.' Thus a consensus at the meeting was that there was a need to encourage people to draw parallels between domestic racism and apartheid.

On 12 September 1980 the NZRFU announced that it had invited the Springboks to tour New Zealand in 1981. The announcement, made on the third anniversary of the death of Steve Biko, was seen by many as deliberately provocative. This was given weight several months later when the NZRFU released a tour itinerary which scheduled the final test match for 12 September 1981. Peter Sharples, Cultural Affairs Director with the Department of Maori Affairs, spoke out against the tour stating that it would 'split New Zealand down the middle' and contribute to a 'decline in race relations.'

Protest began immediately and through to the arrival of the Springboks in July 1981 protest by Maori was conducted through the two avenues of moderate and radical activist groups. While there was overlap between the two, generally moderate groups employed conventional methods of protest such as lobbying, correspondence, dialogue and the media. Although radical groups also utilised such methods, more active dissent was also incorporated into their strategy to stop the tour. Their main mode of protest was through demonstrations and marches.

On the day of the NZRFU announcement demonstrations were held in Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. Three hundred marched in Wellington and took part in a rally during which Tama Poata, in a hard-hitting speech, linked apartheid with the struggle of Maori and aboriginal peoples in Australia and stated that 'imperialism was the source of the oppression of Blacks, Maoris and Aboriginals in all three countries.' The following day demonstrators carrying placards 'Stop the 81 Tour' and 'Rugby yes, racism

33 Steve Biko - a black resistance leader - was tortured to death by South African police in 1977.
34 Dominion, 16 September 1980. Peter Sharples was a former Race Relations Executive Director.
35 Unity, October 1980.
no,' disrupted a Fiji v New Zealand Fifteen game.\textsuperscript{36} A few weeks later Mana Motuhake members, under the banner of their party, led seven hundred people on a march down Karangahape Road (Auckland) in the first major protest against the 1981 Tour.\textsuperscript{37} Patu Hohepa announced the policy of Mana Motuhake in regard to sporting contact with South Africa: ‘No contacts, trade, embassy until the indigenous people rule the country...We are for human rights and dignity.’\textsuperscript{38}

The first national mobilisation against the forthcoming Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand took place on 1 May 1981. An estimated 65,000-75,000 people marched in 27 cities and towns in the largest mobilisation in New Zealand's history.\textsuperscript{39} The \textit{Dominion} estimated between 10,000-15,000 marchers in Wellington, 15,000 in Auckland, 2000 in Dunedin, and 3500 in Palmerston North.\textsuperscript{40} Many Maori were there ‘silently marching with the masses.’\textsuperscript{41} Others marched under banners such as ‘He Taua-fight racism,’ ‘Korero-Tia Wahine ma,’ ‘Maori students-anti-apartheid,’ ‘Black Unity’ and ‘Women against racism-oppose the tour.’\textsuperscript{42} In Auckland speeches were given by three speakers including Syd Jackson and Tom Newnham. Jackson spoke from a trade union perspective and thanked ‘all of you who are workers and joined with us tonight in this expression of solidarity with the Black workers in South Africa who are denied the most basic human rights...I salute you and thank you for that expression of fraternal solidarity with our brothers and sisters in South Africa ...the tour can be stopped, the tour will be stopped.’\textsuperscript{43}

A second mobilisation was held on 3 July. Numbers had increased in the main centres, particularly Auckland, but were down in the smaller centres.\textsuperscript{44} In Auckland Mana Motuhake were prominent as was the broad range of Maori activist groups which were prominent during the May mobilisations. In Wellington Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan spoke to 17,000 marchers and explained that it was not so long since Maori experienced

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Dominion}, 15 September 1980.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Socialist Action}, 3 October 1980.
\textsuperscript{39} Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p.212.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Dominion}, 2 May 1981.; \textit{Socialist Action}, 15 May 1981, puts the number of Auckland marchers at 30,000.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Dominion}, 2 May 1981.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Socialist Action}, 15 May 1981.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Dominion}, 4 July 1981. In Auckland the Police Chief Superintendent put the numbers at 25,000 to 30,000.
racism by law. She urged all Maori to oppose the tour and expressed the hope that no marae would welcome the Springboks.\textsuperscript{45}

The strong showing of Maori activist groups and individuals who were evident at the mobilisations were, in part, a reflection of efforts by HART to cultivate support. They organised a ‘Rally against Racism’ at Otara in November 1980 when Sam Ramsamy, Chairman of SAN-ROC, toured New Zealand.\textsuperscript{46} The chosen location reflected a greater effort by HART to ‘reach out’ and go directly to Maori and Pacific Island people. John Minto recalls that ‘there were a lot of Pacific Island people and Maori people there …It was a bloody good meeting about racism in New Zealand and South Africa. There was a real sense of reaching out to groups that at that time didn’t have a voice in the mainstream media.’\textsuperscript{47} The Rally was rounded off with a performance by Maranga Mai. Minto also notes that wherever Ramsamy went, HART organised for him to meet with and talk to Maori people, thereby not only raising an awareness of apartheid but providing an opportunity for the articulation of an indigenous discourse.\textsuperscript{48}

The formation of coalitions also played a part in gathering and focusing Maori support. HART initiated the formation of city-based coalitions throughout New Zealand in order to broaden the base of the anti-apartheid movement and bring in people who were against the tour but did not want to join HART or CARE.\textsuperscript{49} Although HART played a spearhead role within the coalitions, it was but one voice amongst many groups which were widely diverse in aims and ideologies and included student groups, churches, Maori organisations, women’s groups and trade unions. The Auckland coalition MOST (Mobilisation to Stop the Tour) registered twenty-two organisations at its first meeting.\textsuperscript{50} John Minto explained that MOST was a very inclusive umbrella and ‘was not a top-down committee sort of thing. We said everybody is welcome and if you turn up your voice counts just the same as anyone else.’\textsuperscript{51} It also made provision for all forms of protest:

\textsuperscript{45} Socialist Action, 10 July 1981.
\textsuperscript{47} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Sunday News, 6 August 1981.
\textsuperscript{50} Chapple, 1981: The Tour, p.37.
\textsuperscript{51} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
We said come along even if you only want to write a letter to the paper, that's fine. If you want to march, that's fine. And if you want to invade Rugby Park and stop the game, that's also fine...violence was not condoned and our aim was non-violent direct action and that was the consensus of the coalition.\textsuperscript{52}

Thus within MOST small groups were able to organise as independent and autonomous units and plan specific actions which were unknown to the broader coalition. Maori groups, particularly WAC, Maori Peoples Liberation Movement and several Black Women's organisations were a strong force within the Auckland coalition.

The Wellington coalition COST (Citizens Opposed to the Springbok Tour) was more structured. It consisted of a committee responsible for general tasks such as finance, leafleting, fund-raising and promotional activities, and a separate Marshals Committee responsible for the planning, decision-making and implementation of all protest actions. This latter group was headed by Alick Shaw and included Tama Poata and Eruera Nia.\textsuperscript{53} Maori groups such as WAC and Te Matakite O Poneke were among those with a significant representation at the weekly COST plenary meetings.

From the time of the NZRFU announcement through to the arrival of the Springboks numerous Maori groups, organisations and individuals came out against the tour. Te Matakite O Aotearoa recognised the 'terrible sacrifices of the Black people in their fight against apartheid...We also recognise that it condones racism to play sport with a racist team...We stand alongside oppressed people...and will oppose the tour using every means possible.'\textsuperscript{54} Hone Harawira of the Maori Peoples Liberation Movement and the WAC observed that if Maori and Pacific Island people did not oppose the tour:

\ldots then we are as guilty as all the backsliders, backstabbers and racists who condone a system that selects its sportsmen/women on the basis of racial segregation. We also condone the facism of the South African regime and give credence to its policies of racial elitism. To welcome the Springboks would be to accept conditions for other people that we would never accept ourselves, so we as Maori and Pacific Island people have no option but to come out in complete opposition to the tour.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Walker and Beach, eds., \textit{56 Days: A History of the Anti-tour Movement in Wellington}, p.9, p.28.
\textsuperscript{54} Te Matakite O Aotearoa, 'Press Statement', 21 April 1981, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
\textsuperscript{55} Hone Harawira, 'Maori and Polynesian groups against the tour', \textit{Amandla}, April-June 1981, p.15, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
The Maori Women's Welfare League was opposed to any form of sporting contact with South Africa and Te Huinga Rangatahi called for a total boycott of the tour and requested that all marae withdraw their facilities to the Springboks 'because of South Africa's oppressive policies of racism to black and coloured people.' Hato Petera College decided to withdraw its 11 teams from the secondary schools' rugby competition if the tour went ahead and not to allow its sports grounds to be used either by the Springboks or the All Blacks.

All Maori MPs opposed the tour. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan was particularly active issuing press statements and attending public meetings where she repeatedly called on all Maori to oppose the tour and, if it did go ahead, to withdraw the usual courtesies on marae to the Springboks. Many Maori people, she stated, 'have had a taste of apartheid attitudes here at home' and thus Maori must make it plain that they resent apartheid and all it represents, otherwise 'we will share the shame in the eyes of the world.' Bruce Gregory, MP for Northern Maori, also issued numerous press statements opposing the tour and 'any rugby team based on racial superiority... should not be tolerated... to play against the Springbok rugby team would be a sad travesty of justice and an indignity to the rest of the human race.'

Mana Motuhake took the view that New Zealanders would be turning their 'backs on those South Africans... struggling against apartheid and paying a high price for doing so.' Moreover, the tour undermined New Zealand's 'supposed commitment to racial equality and the development of a genuine bicultural society.' Maori, as indigenous people, 'should support the struggles of other people like black Africans for equality and independence.' Matiu Rata reacted forcefully to a request by Prime Minister Muldoon to the Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath Ramphal, that violations of human rights in Commonwealth countries be discussed at the next heads of government
meeting. Muldoon was 'not prepared to have my country, which has a record in the field of human rights second to no member of the Commonwealth, insulted in the manner which is currently occurring.' This created a space for domestic issues to be highlighted. Rata agreed such an issue should be raised and Mana Motuhake would 'balance' Muldoon's view and send a report which would include 'the number of Maoris in jails, health problems, education, unemployment, loss of land and the Treaty of Waitangi.' Such problems have arisen, said Rata, because Maori had been 'ignored for 140 years and Maori rights denied.'

The churches were united in their opposition to the tour. However, while the hierarchy of the various churches was anti-tour, there was considerable division at congregational level with some parishioners renouncing their faith in protest. Further, a survey conducted after the tour indicated that church members were under-represented in anti-tour demonstrations. Paul Reeves, Anglican Archbishop of New Zealand, stated that if the tour went ahead it would show black South Africans that New Zealanders 'cared more about their freedom to play games than they did about the lack of freedom among the majority to live with basic human dignity.' The Bishop of Aotearoa, Manu Bennett, acknowledged that while he had advocated a 'bridge-building' policy in the past, having gained a greater knowledge of the effects that apartheid had on the black population, he was 'sure that the whole thing had failed.'

During the lead-up to the tour Maori leaders were central in anti-tour activities and dealt with many issues in their own way. They claimed a space for Maori to attend to their people, determined their own course of action and were a significant voice in the anti-apartheid campaign. Through knowledge of tikanga and Maoritanga they were able to dispute issues on terms which Pakeha, having little such knowledge, were unable to. Moreover Maori politics often merged with the tour protest and were utilised effectively by Maori anti-tour leaders.

62 New Zealand Herald, 6 July 1981.
63 Ibid.
64 Dominion, 15 September 1980.
In August 1980 the NZMC announced its opposition to the tour. President Graham Latimer stated that while the South African Government had relaxed some of the worst aspects of apartheid, it was 'still not doing enough... [Apartheid] has no place in the modern world.' At the time of the announcement the majority decision was fragile and was not a true indication of anti-tour support. Three District Councils opposed the tour, two supported it, three were unable to decide and one had not discussed the issue. While Taitokerau had announced its support of the tour in July 1980 this prompted considerable debate in the North. By January 1981 they had reversed their decision, particularly 'because sporting contacts with South Africa had changed considerably in recent times.' On the eve of the Springbok tour eight Councils opposed the tour, one was undecided and only Tairawhiti supported the tour.

Ranginui Walker explained that convincing the NZMC to oppose the tour was difficult due to the 'big rural rump.' Auckland and Wellington were the only two urban Councils and the rest were rural 'whose members were all conservative and all liked rugby. On the East Coast the only time they (Tairawhiti) saw international sporting contacts was when they came to play in Gisborne. So they were always going to be pro-tour.' Therefore to convince them to oppose rugby sporting contact with South Africa was almost impossible. Walker recalls that the ADMC continually sent motions down to the NZMC to oppose the tour:

...and every time it was debated we would be defeated, and roundly defeated... However we were relentless...we never gave up and we continued to lay it on the table. And as things got worse, gradually opinion changed. At one point opinion was 50-50 and then 60-40 and even then, when we winning the debate they remained neutral. Finally they put it to the vote and we won the vote and the NZMC now had a resolution on the books - no sporting contact with South Africa.

Race relations conciliator Hiwi Tauroa called for a postponement of the tour in January 1981, not on moral grounds, but rather in the belief that its disruptive influence would

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69 Malcolm MacLean, 'Almost the same, but not quite...Almost the same, but not white: Maori and Aotearoa/New Zealand's 1981 Springbok Tour', Kaupipi: Journal of Post-Colonial Writing, Vol.XX111, No.1, 2001, pp.69-82, p.69.
71 Auckland Star, 30 June 1981, M. Law Collection, Box 7 [uncatalogued], UWL. By 1981 Tauranga Moana District Maori Council was affiliated to the NZMC. This council, which covered the area from Papamoa to Katikati and included 22 maraes represented by 18 committees, was unanimous in its opposition to the tour.
72 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 Sept 2006.
73 Ibid.
exacerbate 'serious social problems here.' He believed that New Zealanders should put their energy into these rather than a controversial tour.\(^74\) Nevertheless he failed to take a stand on this and indeed appeared to support the tour. This included putting his name forward to coach the All Blacks during the Springbok Tour\(^75\) and his pronouncement that city councils which were threatening to close their facilities to the Springboks would be acting in a racially discriminatory manner.\(^76\) Both actions raised considerable controversy. The latter decision, which he based on the Race Relations Act, resulted in Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan demanding his resignation as he was 'incapable of fulfilling his role' and had 'allowed his personal stance on the Springbok tour issue' colour his judgment.\(^77\)

Tauroa then decided to go to South Africa 'to see and listen for myself' and pledged to support the anti-tour movement on his return 'if I see only what the South Africans want me to see.'\(^78\) On his return he called for the postponement of the Springbok tour stating that while 'very real changes' were being made, the apartheid system was still there in substantial form. He observed that the laws of apartheid imposed severe hardship and humiliation on black South Africans and were 'utterly ridiculous.' New Zealand could 'accelerate change for 18 million blacks by postponing the tour,' thus applying pressure on the South African Government to put 'some real effort... into dismantling the system.'\(^79\)

Ben Couch, Minister of Maori Affairs and Minister of Police, became embroiled in controversy. On 14 June when interviewed on television he admitted supporting apartheid 'because of the conditions I found when I went there.'\(^80\) Widespread public condemnation and a sustained attack by Opposition members in Parliament followed which questioned his competence to hold a Cabinet position.\(^81\) Calls were made for his resignation including David Lange who observed that Couch had done 'nothing, before or since, which justifies his holding that job and that salary. We have been content up to

\(^74\) New Zealand Herald, 9 January 1981.  
\(^75\) Auckland Star, 12 February 1981, M. Law Collection, Box 7 [uncatalogued], UWL.  
\(^77\) Ibid.  
\(^79\) Waikato Times, 26 June 1981, M. Law Collection, Box 8 [uncatalogued], UWL.  
\(^80\) Craccum, '2+2=5', 30 June 1981. This article consists of an unedited transcript of the interview between Ian Fraser and Ben Couch on 'Newsmakers', TVNZ, 14 June 1981.  
\(^81\) New Zealand Herald, 16 June 1981.
now to have him as some sort of patronised pet of the National Cabinet...when he puts New Zealand in jeopardy abroad that is enough." Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan saw the issue in terms of what this meant for Maori. Couch as the Minister of Maori Affairs had the responsibility to enhance the rights of all Maori, and his views on apartheid revealed that he was 'potentially the greatest danger to the rights of the Maori people that we have seen for many years.'

Out in the public arena criticism of Couch was severe. Anti-apartheid organisations called for his resignation, as did Ranginui Walker of the ADMC. Walker had long been a critic of Couch, not least for his 'incompetence as a politician' and his 'denial of his Maoriness.' Further, following the 1981 Waitangi Day celebrations earlier in the year, Walker had severely criticised Couch for his 'provocative' and 'belligerent' stance towards the WAC protesters and he took Couch to task for his reiteration of the comment that he was a New Zealander first and a Maori second. This, stated Walker, was provocative in the context of the gathering at Waitangi and it was also 'a sycophantic denial of Maori identity that panders to the Pakeha ego and his monocultural ethnocentric world view.' Walker suggested that if Couch was unable to speak for Maori as his position demanded, he should surrender his portfolio to someone better suited to the task.

While Walker received a scathing response from Couch, he was subjected to a blistering attack from Muldoon who accused him of continual political bias and stated that it was a pity he held an important position for he brought 'nothing but shame upon your people by your continually politicised activities.' Walker stuck to his position stating that Couch was an 'embarrassment' and noting that subsequent events had proved 'Couch was not sophisticated enough to deal with complicated issues which might cross his single-minded love for rugby.'
Sir Graham Latimer inadvertently became caught up in the issue and became a target himself. Following the Fraser interview Latimer made the comment, 'I put a blanket over my head when I saw him getting murdered because I had begged him not to appear.' The response from such a comment was predictable and he was caricatured and ridiculed throughout the media. Others were not amused and this, in part, contributed to a withdrawal of support for Sir Graham and a call from the ADMC in December 1981 for his resignation as President of the NZMC. The ADMC viewed the 'blanket' statement as 'politically partisan [and bringing] the Presidency into disrepute.'

As the tour became imminent and with the first game of the Springbok Tour against Poverty Bay at Gisborne, Tairawhiti decided to officially welcome the Springboks. Invitations were issued to District Maori Council members. Controversy erupted with anti-tour groups taking the view that it would be construed as Maori support of the apartheid regime. Toka Te Kani, head of Poho o Rawiri Marae stressed that the decision to welcome the Springboks was grounded in Maoritanga; 'with visitors from afar...you invite them, you welcome them and you treat them with hospitality and with dignity and grace.' This view was re-iterated by Sir Graham Latimer who said it was the Maori way to welcome visitors. The ADMC took the view that while Tairawhiti were entitled to go against the decision of the NZMC 'because the realm of tribal mana and marae is outside the jurisdiction of the Council,' it was inappropriate for any member of the NZMC to accept the invitation for this was against official NZMC policy. Hirini Mead claimed that Tairawhiti was distorting Maori tradition and 'playing with words and with Maori custom. ...We don't welcome every Tom, Dick and Harry that wants to come to a marae.'

Latimer accepted the invitation and stated that members were entitled to decide for themselves. While he did not want to go, 'I see it as my responsibility to Tairawhiti...' 

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88 Ibid.
91 New Zealand Herald, 26 June 1981.
they’ve asked me and I have accepted.” Ranginui Walker pointed out that as President of the NZMC he was obliged to represent the collective view of the district councils, and that view was opposed to the Springbok tour. Moreover, with the Government not providing a reception for the Springboks the Maori people would be seen as giving an official reception on behalf of all New Zealanders. Patu Hohepa stated that he would call for the resignation of Latimer as Chairman of the NZMC should he attend the reception as Latimer would reduce the mana of the council by attending.

With the arrival of the Springboks imminent, attempts to prevent the tour intensified. In early July Ranginui Walker, along with three others, sought a court order to stop members of the Springboks being granted visas. They challenged the right of the Minister of Immigration, Mr Malcolm, to issue temporary visas to the Springboks, claiming that the action would contravene the Document of International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, which New Zealand had ratified in 1972. The case was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

At the same time Bruce Gregory suggested that Maori could act as mediators in the dispute both at a national and international level. Maoridom had ‘a very good rapport with the Black nations as well as the White nations’ and it had the calibre of people, who could mediate and ‘avert a tragedy to New Zealand and the international brotherhood of man.’

Rino Tirikatene, Ratana Minister, commended Gregory’s initiative and observed:...

...for too long New Zealand has been reticent to recognise...well qualified Maori leaders...Rua Rakena...Manu Bennett...Dame Te Atairangikaahu...Mrs Te Reo Hura, are a few examples of the capacity of leadership Maoridom possesses. I find it inexplicable that the unique contribution of Maori leaders has so often eluded the perception of the New Zealand Governments - except in war-time.
Although Gregory planned to gather a group of Maori leaders together and approach the NZRFU, the Government and the South African Embassy for visas to enter South Africa, nothing came of this initiative. The key point is that as with the rahui initiative, Maori were applying their own analysis to the rugby debate and claiming a political space for Maori initiative and leadership. At the same time the message of the unequal relationship between Maori and Pakeha was being brought to public attention.

Drawing on remembered historical grievances, a further distinctive analysis was employed. On the 13 July the ADMC called on the Commissioner of Police to invoke the S.86 Crimes Act against NZRFU to stop the match scheduled for Gisborne. Citing as a precedent the arrest of Te Kooti for Unlawful Assembly in 1889 they argued that the police were in danger of a racist application of the law if the precedent was not followed. The precedent for this appeal was the arrest of Te Kooti who had expressed a desire to visit his relatives in Gisborne. Pakeha opposition to the visit threatened to disturb the peace so he was arrested to avoid possible disturbances. This precedent, said the ADMC, was applicable to the Springbok match.

On the 20 July 1981 the Springboks were officially welcomed at Poho o Rawiri Marae. Named after the tipuna Rawiri Te Eke Tu Terangi, the chief of Turanga (Gisborne), the meeting-house had witnessed the making of many significant decisions. It was here that the leaders of Ngati Porou had made the decision to place their young people at the service of the Crown at the beginning of the Second World War. It was here that the request came for the Maori Battalion to be re-organised 'to serve alongside "Pakeha brothers."' And it was at Poho o Rawiri Marae in January 1946 that members of the 28th Maori Battalion were welcomed home - a huge occasion led by Sir Apirana Ngata.

Now, in 1981, a crowd of about sixty demonstrators gathered in the evening to 'greet' the Springboks. Denied entrance onto the marae they assembled behind barriers placed fifty

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103 Template of letter to be sent to unknown bodies from the Auckland District Maori Council, (no date), ADMC Records 1962-1991, Maori MSS MP 1991/4, Box 22, Folder 35, Special Collections, UAL.
metres away. Some elders, upset that protocol had been abandoned and that admission was on a ticket-holder basis, walked out of the welcome in solidarity with the young protestors. Hone Ngata, a descendant of Sir Apirana Ngata who had been the inspiration behind the marae, stood with the protestors. Denied entry to the marae and his own whakapapa, Ngata was bitterly aggrieved, more so when he saw Pakeha guests being made welcome. Donna Awatere, daughter of Colonel Arapeta Awatere, Maori Battalion commander, was there, feeling ‘incensed at the marae welcome. Incensed at the soiling of the memory of the great 28th Maori Battalion.’ Demonstrators greeted the Springboks with a haka and shouts of ‘Racists,’ ‘Freedom for South Africa,’ ‘Remember Biko’ and ‘Remember Soweto.’

The large crowd inside included some of Maoridom's elite such as Sir Graham Latimer and Henare Ngata. The Springboks were given a traditional warm Maori welcome which included action songs (in which the visitors participated) and speeches. When it came to Sir Graham Latimer’s turn to speak he laid down a mighty challenge:

There is no doubt in my mind that we will not be making another welcome on a Maori marae unless your Government can show it is prepared to change its policy of apartheid...As ambassadors you must endeavour to bring about changes in your country or face isolation. It is difficult to suggest how you as individuals can achieve changes - in fact for me to do so would be presumptuous – but you must find a way.

The following day direct radical protest action against the tour began and Maori were at the forefront. Mark Scott, a roofing contractor, crashed a land rover through the main gates and onto the rugby field in Gisborne. Sacks of broken glass were emptied onto the field by Scott’s three passengers, Ripeka Evans, Sophie Stockman and Mereana Pitman. Of the action Pitman observed, ‘A lot of people have said to me when they heard about the glass incident that it was that that finally got them off their backsides.’

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106 Waikato Times, 23 July 1981, M. Law Collection, Box 8 [uncatalogued], UWL.
111 Chapple, 1981: The Tour, p.66.
1981 Tour

The numerical strength of Maori opposed to the tour is difficult to assess. A National Research Bureau poll which began on the day of the final match and was concluded four days later shows that 54% of New Zealanders were opposed to the tour. People living in the four main urban centres were overwhelmingly opposed to the tour whereas the provincial areas were divided.\footnote{\textit{Evening Post}, 12 Oct 1981, WSTA 00010, Box 2, ‘COST Strategy’, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW. For public opinion surveys 1971-1981, see Appendix 2, p.127.} There is no indication of the extent to which Maori opposed the tour. Nor is there any reliable indicator of the depth of Maori involvement in the tour protests. Based on two surveys the Victoria University History Department attempted a social analysis of the Springbok Tour protestors in the Wellington region. Little could be gauged in terms of Maori involvement: of the 714 responses to the survey only thirteen were from Maori.\footnote{Peter King and Jock Phillips, ‘A Social Analysis of the Springbok Tour Protestors’ in \textit{Counting the Cost: The 1981 Springbok Tour in Wellington}, eds., David Mackay et al., Wellington: History Department Victoria University, 1982, pp.3-5.} This result, the authors acknowledge, is open to question as a variety of factors may have contributed to this response.\footnote{The authors acknowledged the limitations of the study and these were clearly identified. See King and Phillips, ‘A Social Analysis’, pp.3-14.}

Based on photographs, film footage, newspaper reports and anecdotal evidence, indications are that Maori were a strong presence in the anti-tour protests. Eva Rickard had promised at Elsdon Camp in 1979 that Maori would come in behind the tour in their thousands.\footnote{Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006.} Numbers aside, it is known that the broad radical activist network which had been building throughout the 1970s came out against the tour. Included in the masses were groups such as WAC, Maori Peoples Liberation Movement, He Taua, Nga Ringa Wera, Storm Troopers, Mongrel Mob, Black Power, Black Dykes, Ponsonby Black Women’s Movement, Polynesian Panther Party and Orakei Action Committee. The small group Nga Uri Tupakanga from Palmerston North was there, along with numerous similar groups and its members played a strong role in the demonstrations.

Ray Ahipene-Mercer who was involved with COST from its inception and who assisted with marshaling, recalled that participation by Maori and Polynesians far exceeded his expectations.\footnote{WSTA interview with Ray Ahipene-Mercer, MCD 00096, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.} However he also observed:

\footnote{114 Peter King and Jock Phillips, ‘A Social Analysis of the Springbok Tour Protestors’ in \textit{Counting the Cost: The 1981 Springbok Tour in Wellington}, eds., David Mackay et al., Wellington: History Department Victoria University, 1982, pp.3-5.}
\footnote{115 The authors acknowledged the limitations of the study and these were clearly identified. See King and Phillips, ‘A Social Analysis’, pp.3-14.}
\footnote{116 Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006.}
\footnote{117 WSTA interview with Ray Ahipene-Mercer, MCD 00096, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.}
We are as disparate in our views as Pakeha... A large number of Maori and Pacific Islanders supported the Wellington demonstrations. But also let's not forget there were many many Maori, as there were Pakeha, who supported the tour. I'd be surprised if there was a Maori that supported apartheid, but many supported the tour and went to the games and caused a lot of problems.  

The number of Maori who either supported or opposed the tour is not hugely significant for the purposes of this chapter. What is significant is why they protested and how Maori claimed a space through the anti-tour protest to make a place for domestic issues to be profiled.

The Victoria University study uncovered a variety of motivations for an anti-tour stance. While all participants stated that their opposition was to apartheid, many had additional motivation. Twenty per cent of respondents were dissatisfied with the Government's handling of the tour and twelve per cent were concerned with New Zealand's image abroad. Some, particularly women, expressed hostility to 'the dominance of rugby in homes, schools, and society in general' and the macho rugby culture. Others expressed an abhorrence of Prime Minister Muldoon and the divisive effect the tour had on society. A small number expressed concern about the inherent racism of New Zealanders and their willingness to consider a game of rugby 'more important than human suffering - wherever it may be.'

Many Maori expressed similar concerns often underpinned by Maori perspectives and priorities. On the divisive nature of the tour, the Maori perspective was, as Mana Motuhake noted, that the tour would 'divide our own people.' Similarly, while Pakeha expressed antipathy towards Muldoon, particularly his hypocrisy over the tour issue, for many Maori anti-Muldoonism stemmed from issues such as Raglan and Bastion Point. Ray Ahipene-Mercer was 'absolutely sure that there was a wash-over' from issues such as 'Bastion Point... overstayers... society was starting to fall apart.'

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119 King and Phillips, 'A Social Analysis', p.11.
120 Ibid, pp.11-12.
121 Ibid.
122 Mana Motuhake O Aotearoa newsletter, September 1980, M. Law Collection, Box 30 [uncatalogued], UWL.
There was no indication during the tour that antipathy to rugby existed. However it is likely that this existed amongst some elder Maori whose voice was not often heard in public discourse. The rahui in 1979 brought into focus the negative effects of rugby upon Maori. One correspondent noted the many elders supported the rahui 'because as a people we suffered under its sociological influences - racism, alcoholism, violence were all promoted within its culture...Rugby was seen for what it was, a tool for socialising Maori into mainstream culture, and a mainstream way of thinking, behaving and consuming.'\textsuperscript{124} This view contradicted the prevailing discourse which stressed the positive benefits which Maori rugby players attained, such as respect, equality and mana. Brendan Hokowhitu observes, rugby 'was one of the few spheres where tane could achieve success and compete with Pakeha men on an “even playing field” and, accordingly, gain mana in the Pakeha world.'\textsuperscript{125} As the correspondent observed, the views of the elders and the rahui which they 'bravely promoted' were too advanced and they were 'against a tide of resistance because so many Maori...were unquestioning about the good that came from rugby.'

Opposing the tour was often seen in terms of maintaining the integrity and pride of Maori. This was expressed by many including Witi Ihimaera who noted that 'Maori people are committed to fighting against racism because it is a fight for our own pride and dignity.'\textsuperscript{126} Hirini Mead cited a whakatauaki for his analysis of the situation:

\begin{quote}
Rarangi tangata ka ngaro ka ngaro, rarangi maunga tu tonu tu tonu.
\end{quote}

(Man passes on, but the mountain remains standing)

This proverb indicates that people with all their loves and hates and their well meant actions and faults pass into oblivion, but New Zealand as a nation remains to face the judgment of history and other nations. Ultimately the issue is Black oppression in South Africa and racism in New Zealand. There is really only one question to ask: What is the right thing for Maori to do, so that our mountains continue to stand proudly?\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{124} Comments from 'Kathleen' in a New Zealand history forum on the 1981 Tour. This site called for anecdotes and memories of the 1981 Tour. www.nzhistory.net.nz/forum/viewtopic.php?t=193 as retrieved on 10 October 2006.


\textsuperscript{126} Socialist Action, 4 September 1981.

Through the issue of the Springbok tour Mead took the opportunity to claim a distinctive place for Maori. Maoritanga was centered through the whakatauaki and a thread of continuity linking the past, present and future was identified. In using cultural framing as a mechanism Mead invoked a Maori identity which both inferred an inherent morality and warned of the implications to the mana of Maori if the Springbok tour was not opposed. Essentially Meads' action and message epitomised what was central to the involvement of many Maori in the tour protest. In a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons they, like Mead, used the space and the opportunity which the tour provided to attend to the mana of the people.

There is no doubt that for Maori, as for Pakeha, the fundamental motivating factor which propelled thousands onto the streets was to express their abhorrence of the apartheid system and to stop the tour. However merging with this were Maori politics and issues of the past decade. The discourse by many Maori activists clearly reveals that the apartheid sport issue was entwined with domestic racism and this provided a strong motivation to oppose the tour.

Maori activists firmly identified with the struggle of Black South Africans and were committed, as Hilda Halkyard stated, ‘to show our black solidarity for the black movement in Azania.’ The identification by Maori with the oppression of Black South Africa was a sentiment expressed time and again. A Maori demonstrator in the May 1

mobilisation noted, ‘Maybe it will show people around the world that we care what’s happening to our brothers – you know – they’re suffering. The same as we’re suffering here. Same system.’ Hone Harawira stated, ‘We are very much in the same situation as our black brothers and sisters. Here the development of racism is not so blatant but it exists nonetheless.’ Thus, for some, apartheid was only different from domestic racism by degree and as Penny Poutu notes, ‘we said of course it’s different but it’s no less important.’ The conflation of the two issues led to a view being articulated that ‘supporting the tour meant supporting apartheid in South Africa and supporting South

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129 Protester interviewed in Mereta Mita (Director), Patu!, 1983, F3794, The New Zealand Film Archive, Wellington.
130 Hone Harawira, ‘Maori and Polynesian groups against the tour’, Amandla, April-June 1981, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
131 Interview with Penny Poutu, 7 August 2006.
Africa meant condoning their own people's oppression. The tour therefore became a vehicle to protest against apartheid and racism in New Zealand.

Many Pacific Island activists shared the same views as Maori. Throughout the 1970s strong links had been forged, particularly amongst women and young people. From 1978 Maori and Pacific Island women began meeting in consciousness-raising groups and in 1980 the first National Black Women's hui was held. Out of this came the United Congress of Maori and Pacific Women in March 1981. The term Black Women signified a common bond of being the most oppressed sector of society. Pacific Island and Maori youth had also forged links under a shared experience of racism, injustice and social inequality. The Polynesian Panther Party always had Maori in its ranks and groups of young Maori and Pacific island peoples combined to form various groups including the Maori and Pacific Peoples Action Komiti and the 'Polynesian Front.'

Pacific Island people also identified with the oppression of Black people in South Africa as an interview conducted with a Samoan social worker following the tour revealed:

**Question:** Why did you march?
**Answer:** My reasons for marching were because I experienced racism in New Zealand, quite blatantly and quite violently.

**Question:** But did you feel anything for the Blacks in South Africa?
**Answer:** Shit yeah. By calling myself a Black, to me is a political connection that I identify with Black brothers and sisters overseas...I'm a victim of racism, and some would argue that in South Africa racism is a lot more blatant and oppressive and I would agree with that. But my experiences as a Black and a Polynesian are very real.

For some Maori, while their participation in the protests may have had a dual purpose - apartheid and domestic racism - it was clearly weighted towards the latter. The increasing involvement of young Maori (and Polynesian) in tour protests over time was particularly noticeable and the reason for this may also be located in the 1970s. Ben Dalton of WAC explained that the tour provided the space and opportunity for such groups to make a statement about racism, particularly in relation to their experiences with the police:

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132 WAC, 'The Struggle of the Maori People', CCANZ Programme on Racism Records, 92-085-2/3, ATL.
135 WSTA interview with Polynesian activist, MCD 00084, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
It was coming sooner or later, and the tour just provided the right vehicle for it. Black youth have been beaten over the head so many times by the Red Squad in their various guises. Whether the Task Force or the Crime Control Unit, or any other name they care to give it...A lot of Black people saw and thought now was a good chance to voice their opposition to the type of brutality the police had been laying on them for years.\footnote{Socialist Action, 9 Oct 1981.}

Many Maori youth became involved in the more violent demonstrations in Auckland and gravitated towards Patu Squad, the more active of three protest squads within MOST.

Through Patu Maori claimed a space to determine their own course of action, make their own decisions and be recognised publicly as a distinctive identity. Patu was led by Maori activists who included Hone Harawira, Donna Awatere and Ripeka Evans, and it had a core membership of Maori groups including WAC, Maori Peoples Liberation Movement, Black Women's groups and the Polynesian Panther Party. Greg Chapple suggests that the hard-line stance which Patu advocated and its reputation as the group most likely to breach police lines, appealed to disaffected Maori youth.\footnote{Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.} More likely, as John Minto noted, people gravitated to groups where they felt comfortable and Pacific Island people and Maori were more comfortable under the leadership of Maori.\footnote{Evan Poata-Smith, 'The Political Economy of Maori Protest Politics 1968-1995: A Marxist Analysis', PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2001, p.157.}

The participation by Maori youth in the anti-apartheid movement brought them in from the margins to inhabit new social spaces within which they were united with thousands of mainstream New Zealanders in a common cause. Many were politicised through their participation in the anti-tour protests. Evan Poata-Smith argues that it is not the scale of oppression which develops consciousness 'but the actual experience of fighting against oppression that forms the material basis for the growth of revolutionary ideas'.\footnote{WSTA interview with Maori youth worker, MCD 00095, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.} The involvement of Maori youth undoubtedly politicised many in a material manner and contributed to an awareness of what might be possible. As a Maori youth worker observed, 'The tour provided the beginning of consciousness' for many young people.\footnote{Chapple, 1981: The Tour, p.269.} Through participation in the protests new social spaces were created and the activist network extended. Will 'Ilolahia, Polynesian Panthers leader, observes it was the first time that many Pacific Islanders had been involved in something confrontational and the
Auckland protests ‘united a lot of us Maori and Pacific Islanders and a lot of work came out of this... It set up some steadfast relationships between us.’\footnote{141}

Gang members also came in from the margins, set aside their differences for the duration of the tour and took the opportunity to make a statement about their experiences with the police. Ranginui Walker observed that 1981 was ‘significant in that the Bro’s came out in force. They were right in the front-line taking on the cops and I think there was a bit of pay back on the cops... years of resentment came out.’\footnote{142} John Minto concurred and noted that at the third test match protest did ‘boil over’ and a lot did attack the police but ‘that was a reflection of their experiences with the police over a very long time.’\footnote{143} Such violence was not one-sided and Father Terry Dibble reflected that while the ‘gangs were determined to deal to the cops,’ the police were also intent on dealing to gang members.\footnote{144} John Minto pointed out that the Red Squad, which was involved in meting out much violence during the demonstrations, was all volunteers many of whom had been members of the Police Task Force and other special policing units which had been involved in harassing and victimising young Maori and Pacific Islanders wherever they congregated.\footnote{145} The implication from Minto was that in volunteering for the Red Squad, they were racist.

However, the involvement by gang members was not merely to ‘have a go’ at the police. Although this was a popular pro-tour supporter perception and often expressed through the media, this merely reflected a mainstream stereotypical image of gang members as individuals who were outside the pale with few redeeming qualities. That they would protest for any moral reason was not freely accepted within the mainstream. As Police Commissioner Walton observed, ‘they are not so concerned with apartheid’ and only joined in the demonstrations to confront the police.\footnote{146} John Minto strenuously denied this and noted that he had visited the King Cobras months before the tour when he spoke about apartheid and showed a film. Further:

\footnote{141}{Will 'Ilolafia, cited in Polynesian Panthers, p.90.}
\footnote{142}{Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.}
\footnote{143}{Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.}
\footnote{144}{Father Terry Dibble interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4173, Oral History Centre, ATL.}
\footnote{145}{Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.}
\footnote{146}{Tom Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire, Auckland: Real Pictures and Tom Newnham, 1981, p.80.}
They turned up to all the marches and protests... They knew precisely why they were there. They had their own banners, "King Cobras oppose apartheid sport". Many members were arrested and attacked by police. Many said these people were only there to cause trouble. Not true. They were there for the right reasons. They were there because they wanted to support Black South Africans. They knew exactly what the issues were.  

Ray Ahipene-Mercer also notes that although the media tended to focus on gangs, they were really not a key component and just another group. He added that 'of course they understood the issues...I talked with many of them.' In taking a front-line position gang members were inevitably involved in violent actions and their visibility and hence their notoriety increased. Negative conclusions were easily drawn. While elements of 'pay back' did feature, there was another aspect which failed to reach the mainstream media. During the third test match protest in Auckland a gang member stated that they took the front-line in a protective role:

Because we have seen on TV the extreme violence Red Squad has used on unarmed peaceful protesters. We were not armed. But we were determined to protect those behind us from baton charges. We all received blows from long batons and there were several attempts by the police to remove our patches...We know that the riot squads will be used to attack us after the tour, and our presence was a protest against this also.

This did indeed occur and Maori and Pacific Island youth in particular became the target of excessive police attention. Syd Jackson condemned the 'victimisation by the police' of Maori youth and argued that it was a 'political decision to attack young Maori militants to ensure that they are got rid of effectively, got out of the way – into prisons preferably. It's so that they can't play the important role of politicising young people.'

Thus the tour provided the opportunity for gang members and Maori and Polynesian youth to protest against apartheid and at the same time to take a stand against the perpetrators of their oppression and victimisation in New Zealand. While mainstream Pakeha New Zealand possibly failed to understand that the experience of domestic racism underpinned the actions of such groups, other Maori activists were determined to ensure that Pakeha New Zealand became aware of such issues.

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147 John Minto interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4169, Oral History Centre, ATL. Donna Awatere recalls visiting and enlisting support from Black Power. See Awatere, My Journey, pp.71-72.
150 Awatere, 'Rugby, Racism and Riot Gear', p.11.
151 Socialist Action, 23 October 1981.
Since the early 1970s one of the main imperatives of Maori activists had been to activate the process of decolonisation. Disputing the Pakeha version of colonisation and bringing to mainstream New Zealand the Maori experience of colonisation was a powerful form of resistance. Maori sought to dissolve the 'one people' myth by reminding Pakeha of promises made and broken, of the actions of their ancestors and of the complicity of Pakeha in the present who perpetuated and benefited from a system based on structural inequality and racism. Inscribing the Maori version of colonisation onto the consciousness of mainstream New Zealand had most recently been effected through the demonstrations at Waitangi and the street theatre group Maranga Mai. Anti-tour protests provided similar opportunities.

Radical Maori activists deliberately used the opportunities which the tour provided to create a political space for Maori and to place an indigenous discourse before the wider public. Ripeka Evans explains:

At the end of 1980 Donna Awatere and I spent two days reviewing white attitudes to our kaupapa. We decided that the Springbok Tour was a chance to get New Zealand whites to turn their eyes from overseas racism to take Maori. We realised that the whites who would care about our brothers and sisters in Azania would be the ones who would have the most potential to care about our struggles...We decided to play a keynote role as Maori women and to bring attention to our kaupapa at every opportunity.152

Activists made use of meetings, rallies and demonstrations to present their take. Coalition meetings provided an ideal forum. Father Terry Dibble recalled that during the MOST meetings, 'WAC took every opportunity it could to say that it is all very well to oppose the situation of racism and justice 12,000 miles away, but what about the problem here. And you know, we had no answer for that.' Within COST meetings speakers, including Dun Mihaka and Eruera Nia, were extremely critical of COST for failing to take up the issue of racism in New Zealand. One Maori youth worker stated that he 'walked out of COST meetings ... People were quite happy to focus on South Africa but not ...on racism in New Zealand...they [anti-apartheid groups] have to face the issue. Why is their membership only white and middle-class?'

153 Terry Dibble interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4173, Oral History Centre, ATL.
155 WSTA interview with Maori Youth Worker, MCD 00095, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
Some used the forum to draw attention to the Treaty of Waitangi while others promoted contemporary grievances. Mereta Mita captures the latter vividly in *Patul* when a Maori speaker at a MOST meeting stated:

What I’m really saying to you is, you fight that thing in South Africa but remember that it happens here too. And when you think of Steve Biko, you remember Daniel Houpapa. You remember the Jury brothers who got wasted inside because they had nothing to live for. And you tell me why I shouldn’t swear at a policeman. You tell me what I haven’t got to fight for.¹⁵⁶

Maori drew parallels between the oppression of Maori and the oppression of Black South Africans. On this, Penny Poutu who was involved with various activist groups, including Nga Uri Pakenga, recalls attending HART meetings and demonstrations in Palmerston North:

When people started talking about apartheid and how bad it was, we were mentioning things that were happening at home. We worked really hard at connecting it with Waitangi issues and the oppression of Maori... The whole notion that it might not all be well at home was coming through because these Maoris around the place were saying its OK to think about South Africa but remember Bastion Point...remember who it is filling up our prisons and what they are filling up our prisons for, and where is our language...And so people all over the country, Maori elements of the Springbok tour protest were holding up the home flag saying that its alright to throw rocks at South Africa but all is not well here. Let’s not pretend.¹⁵⁷

In many ways this was an extension of the work many Maori activist groups were involved with at the time – the Waitangi protests had been reactivated by WAC and domestic racism was being tackled through both Pakeha and Maori groups using a variety of educative strategies. The tour was merely another opportunity to extend the work with which they were already involved and bring it to the attention of a wider public.

Demonstrations provided the opportunity to draw attention to historical grievances and enabled deeper parallels to be displayed. Through chants, banners and flags Maori asserted their identity as Maori and at the same time drew attention to historical grievances. At the New Plymouth match the banner ‘Remember Parihaka’ was raised and when the chant ‘Remember Soweto’ was uttered, the Maori response was

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¹⁵⁶ Maori activist in Mereta Mita (Director), *Patul*, 1983, F3794, The New Zealand Film Archive, Wellington.
¹⁵⁷ Interview with Penny Poutu, 7 August 2006.
'Remember Parihaka.' Likewise, 'Remember Biko' was coupled with 'Remember Te Whiti.' The photograph below illustrates the space which Maori activists created.

Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou! Ake! Ake! Ake!' was used extensively on banners and in chants and became a central symbol of the tour protest. The use of te reo, the position of Maori activists and the banner fronting the march, indicates a Maori assertiveness and a claiming of Maori identity. The words had considerable significance and have been attributed to Rewi Maniapoto and the defenders during the battle of Orakau in 1864.

Confronted with a demand for their surrender by General Cameron, the defiant response was thrown back: 'Ka whawhai tonu ahau ki a koe, ake, ake, ake', (I shall fight you forever, and ever, and ever). During the tour the words were used as a source of inspiration and invoked a past which was steeped in struggle. While the banner was unfurled at a protest against apartheid sport and at one level may be taken as an announcement that the struggle against apartheid will never cease, its significance lay

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158 Ibid.
159 Kapil Am (Photographer) in Tom Newnham, By Batons and Barbed Wire, p.20.
160 Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p.126.
much deeper. This banner epitomised what the tour protest meant for many Maori activist groups. It represented but another phase in the struggle by successive generations since 1840 for justice, equality and self-determination. By marching and protesting under this banner, Maori were defiantly announcing their intentions to carry forward the historical struggle against their oppression. This combined with the prominent role Maori were playing in leading the way and in many instances controlling events, was intended to raise the consciousness of Pakeha New Zealand to take Maori. Through such forms of protest and the symbolism utilised, Maori were reclaiming the space which the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed and thus a new space within Aotearoa.

What is striking in the photograph is that women have commanded a leading and authoritative role. Maori women were a strong leadership presence during the tour and Donna Awatere notes that the leadership of black groups was all women. Furthermore, in MOST all three Chief Marshalls were women and in Patu Squad thirty three of the thirty seven marshalls were women. From the late 1970s some radical Maori women had claimed a place at the head of the Maori struggle. For them, Maori men had compromised their position as leaders through their ‘physical, emotional, psychological and sexual alliances’ with Pakeha. Thus they were too close to the Pakeha world to give the form of leadership which Maori required. It was therefore up to those Maori women, who refused to ally themselves with the ‘White Nation’ and who had gained strength through their suffering under a triple oppression of racism, sexism and classism, to provide the strength and make a stand against white racism and oppression. Maori women made a conscious decision to take the lead during the tour and use the opportunity to ‘bring attention to our kaupapa.’ The women in the photograph stand for much more than the leaders of a march: they symbolise the space which women have claimed in leading the struggle for self-determination.

In highlighting the oppression of Maori, radical activists often faced hostility from Pakeha anti-tour supporters. There was no objection to the form of protest – numerous groups used protest marches and demonstrations to draw attention to their cause. Bringing the issue into meetings and onto platforms at rallies was a different matter. Prior to the tour

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163 Ibid, p.13, p.16.
Hilda Halkyard was skeptical that Pakeha would make the connection between apartheid and racism in New Zealand and 'Liberal whites would take any chance not to look at what's happening to blacks here.' Mary Hulme noticed a lack of interest:

> We noticed it on a lot of occasions when Maori people came up to speak at rallies and demo's. It was very noticeable and pretty sad to see a lot of the audience turning off and turning away. In other words they didn’t mind listening to speeches that hampered South Africa but when we were attacked here for our treatment of Maori people, indigenous people, that was unwelcome, and there was quite a lot of rejection.

Similarly Penny Poutu noticed that when 'we mentioned things that were happening at home...it didn’t go down well with the blue rinse brigade and intellectuals.' Their response was that the situation of Maori bore little resemblance to what was happening in South Africa. In attempting to communicate issues of domestic racism Hilda Halkyard observed that Maori ‘got a real hard time from the whites. Like on the night of the first game at Eden Park I started to talk about the Treaty of Waitangi and somebody called out, “What’s that got to do with it?”'

While some Maori activists believed that such comments reflected hostility towards Maori issues, this was not necessarily correct. Most Pakeha protestors were there for a specific purpose – to protest against the presence of the Springbok rugby team in New Zealand. The discourses by Maori regarding domestic racism and the Treaty of Waitangi were not rejected, rather they were not seen as relevant to the occasion. As Ray Ahipene-Mercer stated:

> The Springboks were coming here to play in 1981 and the principal reason that people and groups sprung up all over the country was to oppose apartheid in South Africa...They were not there to oppose what was going on here...That’s not why COST and other groups were set up. They were set up to oppose the Springbok tour. They weren’t set up to oppose Waitangi Day...  

Alick Shaw rejected the criticism by Maori activists that COST ignored domestic issues. COST, he said, was set up to oppose the tour and to build support for the struggle against apartheid. While many members would agree that domestic racism was

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165 Mary Hulme interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4174, Oral History Centre, ATL. Mary Hulme was a CARE committee member.  
166 Interview with Penny Poutu, 8 August 2006.  
important, COST was not set up to deal with such issues, but was an organisation set up for a specific purpose and for a particular time.\textsuperscript{169}

The issue of domestic racism became quite acute with claims of racism within the coalitions. John Minto noted that MOST meetings ‘were a big learning experience about racism’ and while conflict between Maori and Pakeha was to some extent ‘inevitable... these things were generally argued out.’\textsuperscript{170} Within COST debate over this issue became increasingly bitter. Some Maori criticised COST as being elitist, hierarchical and a Pakeha dominated organisation – just like New Zealand society – and that it failed to consult or include the views of minority groups.\textsuperscript{171} One Polynesian COST member noted that ‘Pakeha organise...and see things quite differently. Pakeha is the dominant culture so everything goes along Pakeha lines. That’s the reality so that immediately does exclude a lot of Polynesians...We are victims and have insights that Pakeha don’t have...It is very important that the victims of racism get consulted.’\textsuperscript{172} The expression of such sentiments, within COST plenary meetings, was highly effective in refocusing the apartheid issue towards domestic racism.

Charges of racism by Maori activists gathered force following the Springbok match in Palmerston North. At the last moment COST, which was responsible for organising the protest, altered their plans to breach police lines, invade the field and force a cancellation of the game. This was against the wishes of the large Auckland contingent which included many Maori and the Palmerston North coalition. Instead, 5000 protesters marched to the police lines then turned back.\textsuperscript{173} John Minto recalls that ‘the level of frustration was huge...Donna Awatere was absolutely beside herself...they were all bloody livid ...not with us but with the Wellington crowd.’\textsuperscript{174} Awatere perceived the decision to be racist in that ‘no blacks at all were allowed to participate in decision making...Ted Nia and Tom Poata both Wellington marshals and part of the black contingent were also excluded...This lip-curling racist behaviour won’t be forgotten by

\textsuperscript{169} Walker and Beach, eds., 56 Days: A History of the Anti-tour Movement in Wellington, p.94.
\textsuperscript{170} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{171} Walker and Beach, eds., 56 Days: A History of the Anti-tour Movement in Wellington, pp.85-86.
\textsuperscript{172} WSTA interview with Polynesian activist, MCD 00084, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
\textsuperscript{173} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006; Walker and Beach, eds., 56 Days, pp.21-23. The change of plan was a reaction to the demonstration in Wellington (Molesworth Street) when protestors were viciously batoned by police.
\textsuperscript{174} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
any black who was there that day.\textsuperscript{175} Awatere’s reaction, while understandable, reflected her other agendas – a desire for confrontation, the promotion of strong female leadership and the highlighting of domestic racism. More importantly it reflected the general challenge to Pakeha dominance which was running through Maoridom and the demand for equality, self-determination and a part in decision-making processes.

This was made clear at the COST plenary meeting following the Palmerston North protest. Debate over the decision erupted and strong words were spoken by Ted Nia who slated the committee for ‘selling out’ and for ‘shutting Maori out’ of the decision making process.\textsuperscript{176} Further, ‘Every day in this country black people are oppressed and this has given them the commitment to fight back. We are prepared to ... take the police batons. That is the depth of our commitment to the struggle against racism.’\textsuperscript{177} Such debates provided a forum for the expression of Maori demands for equality and the placing of wider issues of domestic racism in front of an audience.

Following the Maori All Black/Springbok game in Napier, more charges of racism were forthcoming. The protest was organised by Maori from COST and proved, said Eruera Nia, the ‘blacks could successfully control a demonstration. Nobody was arrested. Nobody was beaten up. We protected our people...We conducted ourselves as Maoris.’\textsuperscript{178} Nevertheless he also felt that more Pakeha could have supported Maori and their lack of response reflected yet again their preparedness to support blacks in South Africa but not Maori in New Zealand. The lack of support, stated Nia, was ‘fairly typical and indicated a lack of full understanding of Maori problems.’\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{Tour Aftermath}

While the tour created space for Maori activists to profile domestic issues, the high number of arrests of Maori tour protesters and the ensuing court cases ensured that the tour was kept alive for two years following the Springboks departure. More importantly Maori activists and Pakeha supporters took the opportunity to keep the issue of domestic racism in the foreground as they argued that the charges laid against Maori were an

\textsuperscript{175} Awatere, ‘Rugby, Racism and Riot Gear’, pp.13-14.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Walker and Beach, eds., \textit{56 Days: A History of the Anti-tour Movement in Wellington}, p.38.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid, p.86.
example of racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{180} The courts, streets and the popular press provided a space through which the domestic racism discourse was iterated and political statements were made.

Arrests during the tour totaled 1944 and subsequent arrests took the total to just under 2000. The number of people finally charged was 1520 and with some facing more than one charge, eventually 2254 charges were laid.\textsuperscript{181} Although the number of Maori and Pacific Islanders who were arrested and charged is unknown, it appears that they were over-represented. Of the fourteen protesters who were sentenced to jail, six were from Patu Squad. Further, CARE noted that of the twenty-five protesters who were appearing before a judge for the taking of depositions, the majority were Maori or Polynesian.\textsuperscript{182} Of the 24 arrested on charges arising from the 12 September demonstration in Auckland, 21 were Maori and Pacific Islanders.\textsuperscript{183}

Following the tour police continued to round up and arrest protesters, particularly Maori and Polynesians. HART, ACORD, CARE and the WAC condemned the police action. Ben Dalton (WAC) stated that such actions were racist and commonplace:

\begin{quote}
They're constantly raiding all the known gang haunts. They raid people's houses and people's places of work. The police have gone out of their way to hunt down people of the Patu Squad who were in the front lines...That's indicative of what they do to us. It's their whole attitude toward Black people in this country.\textsuperscript{184}
\end{quote}

The street outside the Auckland District Court became an anti-racist space with pickets set up and demonstrations mounted. Banners reading 'Arrest Racist Cops,' 'Fighting Racism is No Crime' and 'Stop the Victimisation' were accompanied by picketers who spoke to passersby and the press on the issue.\textsuperscript{185}

Various groups and individuals kept the issue in front of the wider public. Ranginui Walker condemned the racist nature of the arrests and observed that 'these were

\textsuperscript{180} The tour trials coincided with the trials of those arrested at the Waitangi Day protest in February 1981. Both received extensive media coverage, and the same issues of domestic racism, particularly in relation to institutional racism featured.
\textsuperscript{182} CARE newsletter, March 1982, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
\textsuperscript{183} Socialist Action, 22 October 1982.
\textsuperscript{184} Socialist Action, 23 October 1981.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
selective arrests and Maoris and Pacific Islanders are easy victims of the courts. \(^{186}\) John Minto stated that the tour arrests showed racial bias and argued that 'there was a direct relationship between the colour of skin and the charges being brought.' Of the Auckland arrests most Maori and Pacific Islanders had been charged with rioting, while Pakeha had been charged with unlawful assembly - a much less serious offence. \(^{187}\) While Pakeha escaped jail terms for unlawful assembly, Hinengaro Davis received a six month prison sentence from Judge Sinclair who observed that she was a 'disruptive influence' and a 'stirrer.' \(^{188}\) Richard Prebble, MP for Auckland Central, commented that 'This has never been a criminal offence in New Zealand before' and the jail sentence, along with those handed down to five other Patu members, were 'clearly out of line with sentences the court normally gives for offences of this nature.' \(^{189}\)

The issue spread overseas as various groups appealed for international assistance. CARE and the ADMC applied to Amnesty International in London to grant political prisoner status to the jailed anti-racist activists. \(^{190}\) HART contacted the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid to inform it about the plight of the anti-apartheid demonstrators and requested that they be deemed political prisoners. In turn, Prime Minister Muldoon condemned HART for spreading 'outright lies' and said it was a commentary on the committee that 'it had taken such garbage seriously.' \(^{191}\) Ranginui Walker described those jailed as scapegoats and victims of political decisions by the government who failed to prevent the tour from taking place. Moreover, the 'sentiment against the tour was such that thousands felt obliged to protest...to jail these protestors is a gross insult when ...internationally the reputation of New Zealand was salvaged only by the action of those who protested.' \(^{192}\)

Others took direct public action to advertise and raise the consciousness of the injustice and the racist nature of the tour arrests. Led by a banner 'Free all Political Prisoners,' four hundred people marched in Auckland on 12 Sept 1982 to demonstrate their
opposition to apartheid and racism in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{193} The march wound its way from Eden Park to Mount Eden prison where they demanded the release of the Patu prisoners. Ripeka Evans spoke on behalf of those yet to appear in court and linked the struggle against racism in New Zealand and South Africa:

The court cases in a way are strengthening the anti-apartheid cause in this country and strengthening the struggle against racism here. And when we struggle against racism internationally we have to remember the home fires...the strongest thing that led me and hundreds of Maoris and Pacific islanders through the tour was the fact that we felt the home fires burning every time we went out on a march...the tour didn’t stop on Sept 12, it will not stop when the last court case is heard. It will go on as long as there is injustice, as long as the New Zealand government walks hand in hand with the government of South Africa. And as long as it supports the oppression of the Maori people in this country.\textsuperscript{194}

Such demonstrations, along with pickets and the court cases were widely publicised through the press, left wing publications and newsletters of Maori groups. The international media also found their way to the courts. An Australian film crew interviewed defendants during some of the trials with one reporter remarking, ‘We’re in for anything that’s got a bit of punch.’\textsuperscript{195} With many of the Maori defendants using the courts as an opportunity to make political statements, this ensured that the domestic racism discourse spread to an international audience.

Within the court many Maori defendants and supporters went on the offensive and expressed their contempt and rejection of the Pakeha judicial system. They were under no illusion that they would find justice through the courts: ‘There is no justice in this court...Your justice is not our justice’ observed one defendant.\textsuperscript{196} Hinengaro Davis iterated similar sentiments to which the judge argued that New Zealand had one of the best justice systems in the world. This was greeted with derisory laughter.\textsuperscript{197} The Patu defendants referred to themselves as ‘political prisoners’ and the court as ‘the court of injustice.’ Many conducted their own defence and often accused the police of lying and the judges of accepting such lies.\textsuperscript{198} The integrity of the latter was questioned and they

\textsuperscript{193} Socialist Action, 19 February 1982. 12 September was the anniversary of the death of Steve Biko.
\textsuperscript{194} Socialist Action, 24 September 1982.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Socialist Action, 19 February 1982.
\textsuperscript{198} Walker, ‘The Genesis of Maori Activism’, p 278.
were variously accused of 'being on the same side as the police,' of 'contempt of court' and being 'white male capitalists.' All earned swift retribution and a spell in jail.199

The court, especially during the preliminary hearings, provided a forum for making strong political statements. Paul Barcham (Nga Uri Tupakanga) demanded the right to be tried on a marae and refused 'to make any plea until Maoris attain full equality in this country.'200 Defendants and supporters made political statements through wearing torn jeans and T shirts bearing black unity symbols and messages reading 'The Treaty is a Fraud,' 'Korero Maori' and 'Rock against racism.' Statements such as, 'Your justice is not our justice. Our culture has been oppressed by this society since the Treaty of Waitangi was signed,' had the effect of expressing their rejection of the Pakeha court, and drawing attention to the oppression of Maori.201

The expressions of contempt for the judicial process were eventually no longer tolerated:

Yesterday afternoon Judge Callender banned all public from the remainder of the proceedings. He also dictated to the defendants what they were to do and how they were to behave in court- no eating, no smoking, no drinking, no passing out of political material, no comments from the defendants, no putting your feet on the tables, no moving around during the proceedings, and stand up every time he comes in and every time he goes out. He threatened to treat every breach as a contempt of court.202

In September 1983 the trial took place of six Patu members charged with rioting and unlawful assembly during the final rugby test in Auckland in 1981. Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was visiting New Zealand, took the stand as a defence witness for Hone Harawira. On his arrival at the court Bishop Tutu said that he had come to demonstrate his solidarity with people who were fighting against apartheid.203 Harawira recalls that he asked 'if he could tell about apartheid...he spoke for about twenty minutes...You could have heard a pin drop' in the courtroom as Bishop Tutu spoke at length and with emotion of what apartheid was and how it affected his people.204 'To be anti-apartheid,' stated Bishop Tutu 'is to be pro-justice. It is to seek a non-racial democratic society in

200 Evening Standard, 17 August 1981, Marsden Collection, Massey University Library.
202 Waitangi Action Committee newsletter, (circa 1982), HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
203 Socialist Action, 9 September 1983.
204 TV2, 'Eating Media Lunch', November 2006.
which people count for what they are...It is not an anti-white movement, it is a concern for equity and justice.\textsuperscript{205} The six defendants were found not guilty.

The acquittal marked the end of two years of court appearances by many Patu members. All were backed by the WAC which organised a strong defence committee (Patu 5 Defence Komiti) as well as HART, CARE and MOST, all of which raised funds for the defendants. MOST raised over $100,000 for legal fees and some lawyers attached to both HART and other anti-racist groups gave freely of their expertise.\textsuperscript{206} Many gave their services free of charge for the defence of some of the more complex court cases, while for those defendants conducting their own cases, lawyers set up workshops to give briefings on procedures and legal defences.\textsuperscript{207} There is no doubt that the tour arrests and subsequent court cases provided numerous opportunities for Maori to inject an indigenous discourse into the proceedings. However, for those jailed and for those who lost their source of employment due to protracted depositions hearings and court cases, along with the expenses incurred through attending such events, the emotional and financial strain on individuals and families was significant.

New Consciousness

While the discourse by Maori was not always well received there is no doubt that many Pakeha were politicised into issues of domestic racism. The efforts of Maori activists, in deliberately drawing attention to this, were supported by events and incidents which brought to the foreground issues of racism in a wider sense. For the first time many Pakeha were physically confronted with a version of race relations in New Zealand which was different to which they had understood. Many were horrified at the violence and racial abuse directed towards anti-tour supporters and particularly Maori. Penny Poutu recalls that ‘the division that was caused in the name of rugby was the most extreme division I have ever experienced. Violence, anger, overt racism was directed to me as an anti-springbok tour activist.’\textsuperscript{208} Such instances had a considerable impact as one protester indicates:

\textsuperscript{205} Socialist Action, 9 September 1983.
\textsuperscript{206} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{207} Chapple, 1981: The Tour, p.317.
\textsuperscript{208} Interview with Penny Poutu, 8 August 2006.
I've always been a model of respectability... a pillar of the community and all that... and I've changed. Boy have I changed. Quite recently an old Maori lady said to a friend of mine (a gentle lass who was spat at a few weeks ago by some pro-tour louts at a march) ... "now you'll begin to realise what its like to be on the other side! I've been hassled for years" That has made me think very hard... and there is repression in this country... I have heard tales of Maoris and Pacific Islanders being picked on for years, and only half listened... I would tend to ignore this along with most of the country; now I ponder...

Directly witnessing instances of racism and violence may have had a greater impact than listening to Maori activists speak on the issue at rallies and coalition meetings. Certainly the actions and violence meted out by the police had a profound impact. For many Pakeha it was the first time they had encountered the police when they were not friendly community constables. Now, they were law enforcement officers who battered people fighting for a moral cause and standing up against injustice, racism and inequality. Maori activists were quick to point out that for Maori and Pacific Islanders this was nothing new:

The reason why I smile... when people bring up violence is that we have been battered down most of our bloody lives by the cops and nobody seems to be crying about us... we go to Bastion Point and get beaten shit out of.

The new space which the 1981 tour created was a new consciousness about domestic racism. As Ray Ahipene-Mercer observed, 'most people were forced at some level to start thinking about the journey of this country.' Rather more directly and with the events of 1981 still raw, a Maori youth worker observed that 'All of a sudden Pakeha were confronted by the facts... that what they had been fed was bullshit... The tour provided the beginning of consciousness.' There was, however, a difference between the development of an awareness of domestic racism and translating this into action.

For the majority of people, when the Springboks went home, so did they. Nevertheless some took up the domestic racism struggle. This was the positive spin-off from the tour. Mary Hulme, long-time CARE member, observed that the positive aspect of 1981 'was the lesson... and we needed to learn it, that it was easy to get passionate about

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209 Report from an anti-tour protester, WSTA 00015, Box 7, 'Miscellaneous Material', J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
210 Maori activist in Mereta Mita (Director), Patu!, 1983, F3794, The New Zealand Film Archive, Wellington.
212 WSTA interview with Maori Youth Worker, MCD 00095, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
something far away and overlook injustices close to home.\footnote{213} Sandra Coney, as with a growing number of Pakeha, marked her commitment by supporting the Waitangi Day protests because 'I was concerned that thousands of New Zealanders were prepared to get on the streets about racism in another country but not prepared to give the same level of support for protest against racism in our own country.'\footnote{214} Ray Ahipene-Mercer noted that a positive effect of the tour was that from 1982 people started saying:

Well what about now? What's going on in this country...small groups of us started to sit down and have these conversations...Pakeha groups took on the mantle of becoming educators in the workplace about the Treaty of Waitangi....It was absolutely a positive spin-off. \footnote{215}

Maori politics merged with the 1981 tour and shaped the response of many Maori opposed to the tour. The land and Maori rights struggles of the 1970s and the more forceful articulation of tino rangatiratanga were expressed through the events of 1981. Maori activists, in many instances, put self-determination into practice, not least through Patu Squad. The tour provided the opportunities for Maori to create spaces for Maori, Maoritanga and Maori issues to be profiled and brought to public awareness. Above all, Maori activists attended to the mana of the people by pushing historical and contemporary grievances, particularly the issue of domestic racism, to the forefront of public consciousness, by attending to the pride and dignity of Maori through an anti-tour stance and by taking on and implementing their own action. Following the tour Canon Hone Kaa articulated their challenge:

The anti-apartheid movement had mobilised itself to fight racism in South Africa. It now had to begin to search its own soul about where it had been, where it was going, what tactics it should use to face the issue of racism at home.\footnote{216}

Immediately following the tour the anti-apartheid movement turned its attention to the struggle against domestic racism. This will be the focus of the final chapter.

\footnote{213} Mary Hulme interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4174, Oral History Centre, ATL.
\footnote{214} Sandra Coney cited in Camille Guy, 'The Queen Was Not Amused', Broadsheet, July/August 1982, p.7.
\footnote{216} Canon Hone Kaa, in Mereta Mita (Director), Patu!, 1983, F3794, The New Zealand Film Archive, Wellington.
Appendix 1

Do you feel that the Maori people are discriminated against or disadvantaged in any way?

<table>
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<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Committed party Voters</th>
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<td>1.0</td>
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</table>

Figure 3.2, 'Heylen Poll taken on 7 June 1980.'

The sample polled contained 92.5% Europeans, 4.4% Maori, 1.8% Pacific Islanders and 1.3% others. Maori were under-sampled (they made up about 11.5% of the population in 1980)

Appendix 2

Public opinion survey on sporting contact with South Africa

<table>
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<th>May</th>
<th>Sept</th>
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Figure 3.3, 'National Research Bureau Poll, September 1981.'

217 Auckland Star, 25 June 1980, M. Law Collection, Box 27 [uncatalogued], UWL.
Chapter 4

1981-1985, Pakeha Attending to Domestic Racism

Ripeka Evans asks: "Will this mass of energy fade off or be directed to domestic racism?" She hopes so. She dreams that come February 1982 that dedicated band of Waitangi demonstrators will be joined by the thousands of New Zealanders who are currently on the march against racism.

Sandra Coney

A persistent discourse by Maori activists throughout the apartheid sport debate was that while the struggle against apartheid was important, so too was the struggle against domestic racism. They consistently challenged the anti-apartheid movement to devote more energy to Maori concerns and perceived a lack of interest on the part of many Pakeha. During the 1981 Tour some Maori activists noted that thousands of Pakeha were prepared to mobilise against racism which occurred 12,000 miles away but would 'not look at what's happening here...fighting overseas racism must be easier to cope with for whites.' Nevertheless, as indicated by Ripeka Evans, the hope and the challenge following the Tour was for the anti-apartheid movement to turn its energy to the struggle against domestic racism. While thousands of Pakeha did not materialise at Waitangi in 1982 there was a significant Pakeha presence. This was one of the first actions by the anti-apartheid movement which had accepted the challenge and turned its attention to domestic racism. The anti-racist work of HART 1981-1985 is the focus of this chapter.

The initial task for the HART leadership was to negotiate a space for domestic issues within their movement and to convince its supporters to accept anti-racist work as their responsibility. Moreover, it needed to negotiate its role within a climate where Maori activists were demanding the right to direct the liberation struggle and anti-racism activity. Both issues resulted in a political debate which was cross-cut with ideological tensions; issues of Maori autonomy and friction between some Maori activists and the Pakeha Left. These were to shape the initial role which HART adopted and will be discussed in the first section.

1 Sandra Coney, 'Women Against the Tour', Broadsheet, September 1981, p.11.
Maori activism was based on the imperative of presenting an indigenous account of colonisation. As Linda Smith observes:

Telling our stories from the past, reclaiming the past, giving testimony to the injustices of the past are all strategies which are commonly employed by indigenous peoples struggling for justice.¹

This was a powerful form of resistance and laden with a counter-hegemonic discourse. Laid bare before Pakeha was a history of Maori oppression, marginalisation, land alienation, resistance and survival. Central to the discourse was a treaty which had been signed by Maori and Pakeha and never honoured by the latter. The task for Maori in presenting their history was to persuade Pakeha to listen, to acknowledge and to put right the wrongs of the past.

For HART, the core of their work also lay in presenting a new narrative of colonisation - one which accorded with that of Maori. Through direct action coupled with education, HART appropriated public spaces, inscribed them with a new version of New Zealand’s history and turned them into public spaces of consciousness. These actions were intended to create a new consciousness amongst Pakeha of historical injustices and domestic racism within contemporary society. Through anti-racism education HART sought to make Pakeha aware of institutional racism and convince them to work for change. In accordance with anti-racism work carried out by numerous groups during this period, the aim was to create a ‘new Pakeha.’⁴ These issues form the body of the chapter.

A final section discusses the significance of the work of HART and indeed the anti-racist movement, in changing public attitudes towards domestic racism. While change was apparent, the suggestion is that many Pakeha clung to notions of ‘one people’ and discourses which had been dominant throughout the apartheid sport debate retained their dominance in 1985.

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¹ Smith, Decolonising Methodologies, pp.34-35.
This chapter will not provide an exhaustive account of the anti-racist work with which HART was involved. Rather it uses examples to demonstrate broad areas of activity. The reason lies in the structure of HART which was a movement consisting of diverse groups and individuals. Moreover it had no formal membership but mobilised supporters through newsletters, local and regional branches and national conferences. Groups were semi-autonomous and individual branches, while generally adopting suggestions from the national council, made their own decisions over which issues to pursue. This flexibility resulted in numerous local issues being contested. While the work of HART is the focus, numerous other groups were involved in anti-racist work and will be mentioned where appropriate.

Maori activism has been omitted almost entirely from the events of this period. This is deliberate as the focus is on the Pakeha response to the challenge by Maori to attend to domestic racism. However it should be acknowledged that during the period under discussion Maori activism was intense and hugely significant in creating a consciousness amongst Maori and Pakeha over domestic issues. As John Minto recalled, groups such as Nga Tamatoa opened doors in the 1970s and the Waitangi Action Committee broke the doors down in the 1980s.5

**Negotiating a Space**

The day after the final Springbok/All Black test match in Auckland, Joe and Rene Hawke welcomed over three hundred people onto Orakei Marae to commence another campaign to save the land of the Ngati Whatua people.6 Leaders of the anti-apartheid movement in Auckland, many whom had been on the front lines of the protest the day before, were present as Joe Hawke outlined the government's history of broken promises over the land at Takaparawha (Bastion Point). He explained that he had invited the anti-apartheid leaders because 'any group involved in international issues also had to be involved in local issues. The anti-apartheid movement could play a more positive role than they had in such local issues - a more physical and active role.'7

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5 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
6 *Socialist Action*, 18 September 1981. Prime Minister Muldoon had increased his efforts to subdivide and sell off land at Bastion Point when many people were heavily involved in opposing the Springbok Tour.
7 Ibid.
Many of the speeches expressed a commitment to fight domestic racism. David Williams, President of CARE, stated that attention should now be directed to domestic issues as well as apartheid. John Minto spoke of how he had become involved with the anti-apartheid movement and how the issue had been so clear in relation to South Africa. However,

It takes a lot more guts to look at discrimination in this country. The lines are less clear. We can all vote, and everyone can get an education, for instance. But the more I have been involved I have come to see that just the same kinds of things that occur in South Africa occur here in New Zealand, only in a more subtle form.

The first task for the anti-apartheid movement was to negotiate a space for domestic issues within their organisations. This was not an issue for groups such as CARE which had always been committed to both domestic and international racism and ACORD whose primary function was to attend to domestic racism. For HART it was much more complicated. People generally supported this body because of its anti-apartheid thrust, not because it addressed domestic issues. Moreover, within HART was a diverse range of groups and individuals who took differing ideological positions in relation to domestic issues. During the 1981 Tour HART and the local coalitions such as COST and MOST had been able to gather these people together to support an external and moral cause. Although this was, in a sense, also an internal cause in that apartheid was in New Zealand via the Tour, the wider issue of apartheid lay outside New Zealand. It was precisely because it was external (and therefore did not affect people directly), and it was a standard moral cause, that enabled the anti-apartheid movement to become a united dissenting force. While tension was apparent within the coalitions, the Tour was a ‘one-off’ event and ideological differences often received less attention as preparation for protests took precedence. The proposal after the Tour that domestic racism become a focus was a very different scenario, for this challenged the position of various groups and individuals within New Zealand. Thus people began to define their position and their interests separately and began to push their own agendas.

During the immediate aftermath of the Tour, discussion occurred within HART and the two major coalitions, COST and MOST, on the direction of their organisations and the place which domestic issues should occupy. In October 1981 twenty-five delegates from

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8 Ibid.
HART branches throughout New Zealand attended a National Council meeting of HART: The New Zealand Anti-apartheid Movement (HART:NZAAM) during which a decision was made to campaign against domestic racism. This decision, said John Minto, was based on a growing awareness over the past six months that there was 'a responsibility to take up anti-racist issues here in New Zealand as well as overseas.' At the HART AGM in December 1981 the parameters were defined over the position which domestic issues would occupy within the organisation. Fighting apartheid was to remain the 'main focus' of HART and the struggle against domestic racism was to become 'a priority.'

MOST, which consisted of twenty-five member groups, made the decision to stay in existence and direct its efforts towards domestic issues. Andrew Beyer, chairman of MOST, observed that the 1981 Tour had brought to the surface issues of domestic racism and that the consensus reached among MOST members was that 'we have an ongoing role in combating racism.' This would involve an education campaign to help New Zealanders 'front up to their own racism' and raise an awareness of the history of the social conditions which had led to 'dormant racism' in many Pakeha. MOST continued for about a year although a defence committee remained in action providing support and raising funds for those charged with tour offences.

At the final COST meeting at Maraeroa Marae (Porirua) in October, a large number of people met to determine the nature of the organisations to follow COST and the future of the anti-apartheid movement. The issue of whether the latter should attend to domestic racism, or whether this should be the role of a separate organisation, produced sharp debate. Pressing for separate organisations was the Workers Communist League (WCL), many of whom were in leadership positions within COST. This had been the consensus of a WCL meeting held in September to discuss the same issue. Alick Shaw had argued that the focus on South Africa was paramount and 'if we turn the attention of the anti-apartheid movement away from South Africa, we will end up with no anti-

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9 HART had merged with the National Anti-Apartheid Council in August 1980 to form HART: The New Zealand Anti-Apartheid Movement. Throughout this chapter it will be referred to as HART.
10 Socialist Action, 23 October 1981.
11 Unity, December 1981. John Minto was elected National Chairman of HART with David Cuthbert vice-chairman. Other national councilors were Rona Bailey (Secretary/Treasurer), Trevor Richards (International Affairs) and Penny Bright (Trade Union Officer).
12 New Zealand Herald, 23 September 1981.
13 Unity, November 1981.
apartheid movement and no movement against domestic racism.\textsuperscript{14} At Porirua, Trevor Richards pointed to the collapse of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States after it took on the domestic anti-racist mantle. Richards argued that the same thing would happen in New Zealand if the anti-apartheid movement turned towards domestic issues.\textsuperscript{15}

Eventually two resolutions were passed. The first, proposed by WCL members Alick Shaw and Simon Wilson, called for HART Wellington to resume its role as the anti-apartheid organisation in Wellington.\textsuperscript{16} The second, by Dickson Chapman and Heta Te Hemara, called for the establishment of an autonomous Wellington anti-racist organisation to fight domestic racism.\textsuperscript{17} In April 1982 AROW (Anti-Racist Organisation in Wellington) was formed to work towards the elimination of domestic racism, to support other groups involved in anti-racist struggles and to establish links between anti-racist groups in Wellington and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{18}

Underpinning the Porirua debate and forming part of a wider debate was the emphasis which various groups placed on issues of class and race. The traditional Marxist political analysis of capitalism places class as its fundamental social category. Class division is the most significant thing which shapes society and racial division is a by-product of this conflict. Therefore the issue of racism is subordinate to class because it is only through a class revolution that racism will disappear. The struggle against domestic racism should be supported but it must not fragment the left and dilute class solidarity.\textsuperscript{19}

The WCL expressed the basic position held by most New Zealand socialist groups. 'New Zealanders should not turn their backs on ...the struggle of racism at home...the work that needs to be done is vast and urgent.'\textsuperscript{20} However the issue of domestic racism was secondary to class struggle. The priority of the anti-apartheid movement should be to

\textsuperscript{14} Unity, October 1981; Socialist Action, 30 October 1981. Alick Shaw was a WCL member and chairman of the COST marshals' committee during the 1981 Tour.

\textsuperscript{15} Unity, November 1981.

\textsuperscript{16} Walker and Beach, 56 days: A History of the Anti-Tour Movement in Wellington, p.95.

\textsuperscript{17} Unity, November 1981.

\textsuperscript{18} Unity, April 1982.

\textsuperscript{19} Alistair Bonnett observes that Leftist critics of the anti-racist movement stress the fragmentation of class solidarity which this engenders and hark back to a 'mythic time of social togetherness.' This ignores the fact that the Left, including the Marxist Left, has always been fragmented with dissension running through it. Alistair Bonnett, Anti-racism, London: Routledge, 2000, pp.165-166, Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{20} Unity, October 1981. While there were ideological differences between socialist groups, the primacy of class as the basic cleavage in society was held by all during the early 1980s.
intensify its work amongst the working class and build a ‘mighty mass movement such as we saw during the course of the tour.’ 21 This would enable ‘the working class, Maori and Pakeha, to win political power and establish a socialist New Zealand. Then real measures could be taken to compensate for years of Maori oppression...and mass education programmes would be carried out to destroy all forms of racist ideology.’ 22

This conflicted with the ideology of many Maori activist groups which took the view that Maori were an oppressed section of the working-class. Racism was the basic cleavage in society and they knew as ‘Blacks have always known that to overthrow racism means to overthrow the State and Capitalism.’ 23 Others, particularly the Black Women’s Movement, had a triple focus on racism, capitalism and sexism, and accorded these equal statuses in a hierarchy of oppressions.

The continuing focus of the anti-apartheid movement on South Africa, the reluctance of groups, particularly the WCL, to have the anti-apartheid movement involved in domestic racism and the primacy which socialist organisations accorded class over race, led to considerable tension between some Maori groups and the left. These were not alleviated when Alick Shaw stated that those people calling for a focus on domestic racism were ‘hijacking’ the anti-apartheid movement. 24 The debate became entwined with the conflict which had emerged between Maori radicals and WCL members during the Tour over the perceived side-lining of Maori from decision-making during tour protests, and the bitterness felt by some activists who believed that Pakeha were only interested in the struggle against apartheid. ‘Liberal whites take any chance not to look at what’s happening here’ stated Hilda Halkyard. 25

Further fuelling the growing disillusionment was a position taken by some that Pakeha would never commit fully to the struggle against domestic racism because it was in their interests to retain structural inequality and thus maintain their privileged position. 26 This had its roots in a form of cultural nationalism which developed amongst radical groups

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21 Ibid.
22 Unity, March 1983.
26 Ibid.
during the 1970s and posited a polarisation between Pakeha and Maori cultural values.\textsuperscript{27} This developed into a view that the oppression of Maori was a product of traits which were inherent within the Pakeha psyche. In turn, this led to a notion that Pakeha had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo which conferred Pakeha privilege at the expense of the oppression of Maori.

They've got too many benefits that get in the way of true commitment to justice. I got sick of hearing whites mouthing off about how they don't have benefits and how they don't personally oppress blacks. While our kids are getting beat up, can't get jobs, can't get health care, can't get education, can't get self-respect, can't get nothing. They won't see what's going on in their own backyard. They don't want to see...\textsuperscript{28}

The confluence of this notion as well as issues related to the 1981 Tour and post-tour ideological debates, crystallised into a view that the Pakeha left was incapable of supporting or understanding the Maori liberation struggle. As Evan Poata-Smith points out, it was widely recognised by many Maori activists 'that the working class was no longer capable of bringing about revolutionary change and the trade union was powerless, while the anti-racist movement was obsessed with racist regimes internationally and ignored racism at home.'\textsuperscript{29} Thus Maori, became 'aware that black people in New Zealand essentially stand alone' in the struggle against domestic racism.\textsuperscript{30} The way forward was for Maori to direct the liberation struggle and the solution was through Maori Sovereignty.

This was articulated in December 1981 in a Black Unity document presented at a conference in Suva.\textsuperscript{31} It launched a stinging attack on 'the white left' and the 'white trade union' for their inadequate support for Maori causes:

The white left in New Zealand has accused the Maori Revolutionary Movement of being divisive, of being a threat to the working class. These white, micro-neurotic intellectuals say it is not racism or sexism that's the issue but the working class struggle... The Maori forms a super-oppressed section of the working class. We see that it is the responsibility of the white working class to remove the 'super' oppression. But they will not. Both the

\textsuperscript{27} Greenland, 'Ethnicity as Ideology: the Critique of Pakeha Society', pp. 86-100.

\textsuperscript{28} Zena Tamanui cited in Awatere, 'Rugby, Racism and Riot Gear', p.12.


\textsuperscript{30} Awatere, 'Rugby, Racism and Riot Gear', p.12.

\textsuperscript{31} Black Unity was a Maori nationalist group comprised of women, including Mereta Mita, Ripeka Evans and Donna Awatere. It split off from the left and rejected Marxist class analyses. Mereta Mita explains that the group was 'rooted in indigenous identity based on land, language and history, which is innately expressed through whakapapa.' Republican, October 1982, pp.11-13.
Labour Party and the Trade Union movement (in NZ) leave the Maori to fight the biggest struggle on their own. Now these stoolies are openly joined by the white left.

The solution to domestic racism for Black Unity lay not in any form of alliance with the Pakeha left as 'the aims of Maori revolutionaries and the white left are not the same.' Rather it lay in re-imposing Maori sovereignty: 'The Maori want a return of our autonomy. Maori control of Maori things means control of all Aotearoa...Our struggle is for our sovereignty.'

The fall out was severe as the Auckland Trades Council, with its Socialist Unity Party (SUP) leadership, evicted the Polynesian Resource Centre (PRC), which had Ripeka Evans at its head, from the Trade Union Centre. Friction had been building between Evans and Bill Andersen, President of the Auckland Trades Council and SUP member, for some time over issues of Maori autonomy and the promotion by Evans of the separate interests of women and blacks. Arguably the Black Unity attack on trade unions provided Andersen with the justification he needed to expel the radical group. Although HART, which occupied the same building, insisted on being able to continue working with the PRC, the Trades Union Council (TUC) management refused to allow the group into the building and subsequently evicted HART from the building due to 'irreconcilable contradictions.'

Following the Black Unity document came Donna Awatere's explicit articulation of Maori sovereignty in mid-1982 which shook the Pakeha Left. Few activist or leftist groups remained unscathed as Awatere directed her attack at trade unionists, feminists, socialists, the anti-apartheid movement and the broad anti-racist movement in general. She berated the Left for their lack of support for the Maori liberation struggle and their

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33 Ibid.
34 The PRC was set up at the initiative of Maori unionists Dave Clark and Syd Jackson to provide the unions with resource material related to domestic racism and Maori land. See Bruce Jesson, Republican, May 1982.
35 TUC Report, 'Facts Re Eviction of Polynesian Resource Centre', Republican, July 1982, pp.7-9. This issue of Republican printed material sent to Bruce Jesson from Bill Andersen over the issue. Included was the Black Unity document, Trades Council and TUC documents, and a rank-and-file leaflet by Communist Party members supporting the PRC.
36 Ibid.
37 Donna Awatere's articulation of Maori sovereignty was first published as three articles in Broadsheet - 'The Death Machine' (June 1982), 'Alliances' (October 1982), and 'Beyond the Noble Savage' (January/February 1983).
reluctance to accept the right of Maori to determine and control the struggle against domestic racism.\textsuperscript{38} Pakeha activists, argued Awatere, resisted change and perpetuated a system of structural inequality because they sought 'to maintain their system of privileges.'\textsuperscript{39} Despite the various cleavages within society, all Pakeha had gained these privileges through the oppression of Maori.\textsuperscript{40} Underpinning this oppression lay 'white hatred' and racism.\textsuperscript{41} Thus social change for Maori could only come about through the re-assertion of Maori sovereignty for 'without sovereignty we are dead as a nation... It is sovereignty or nothing. We have no choice.'\textsuperscript{42}

While the post-tour debates produced considerable tension between the Pakeha left and some Maori activist groups, this constituted only one political strand. Many Maori activists collaborated with Pakeha groups, and indeed some organisations such as the Waitangi Action Alliance (WAA) consisted of both Maori and Pakeha.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, there was a new forcefulness amongst Maori activists and the view that Maori should lead the liberation struggle was strong. This, along with expressions of Maori sovereignty, produced considerable insecurity and fear amongst some Pakeha as the following conversation reveals:

\begin{quote}
I think it's a big power thing
I think it's another Idi Amin regime
I see it as the same forms of oppression that exist today changing hands.
Where the hell am I if it does change hands?\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

Thus it was within an uncertain and potentially volatile political climate that HART, with newly elected national chairperson John Minto at its head, turned its attention to domestic racism. Education and raising the awareness of Pakeha New Zealand about

\textsuperscript{38} Donna Awatere, \textit{Maori Sovereignty}, Auckland: Broadsheet Magazine Ltd, 1984, Ch.2.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, p.27.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, pp.26-29, 35.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, pp.14-15.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, p.32.
\textsuperscript{43} For example Penny Poutu recalls that Waitangi Action Alliance had both Maori and Pakeha supporters. However, the group insisted on having Maori leadership. Interview with Penny Poutu, 8 August 2006. With the revival of protest at Bastion Point a Joint Working Group which consisted of representatives from church groups, the Orakei Maori Action Committee, CARE and HART was formed. See \textit{Socialist Action}, November 1981. See also Sharon Hawke, ed., \textit{Takaparawhau: The People's Story}, Auckland: Moko Productions, 1998, p.56. This notes that the Hawke whanau guided the activities of the Joint Working Group.
\textsuperscript{44} This was part of a brief conversation which was apparently inadvertently recorded between two interviewers immediately following an interview with a 1981 tour protestor. The interviewee had expressed views which accorded with tino rangatiratanga. WSTA interview with Polynesian activist, MCD 00084, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
domestic racism were judged to be their 'most urgent tasks.' \(^{45}\) In part, HART was constrained by a Maori forcefulness which demanded the lead in the struggle against domestic racism and which, to some extent, sought to direct the activity of Pakeha. \(^{46}\) The space which HART initially occupied was generally one in which they supported Maori activists on issues which they were contesting, such as Bastion Point and, most particularly, the Treaty of Waitangi. These issues had always been supported by the Pakeha left. However with a new commitment to domestic issues by HART in particular, and a strong Maori rights movement, Waitangi Day was turned into a nation-wide day of protest. Through direct action coupled with education HART sought to create a new consciousness about domestic racism via the Treaty of Waitangi protests.

### Attending to Domestic Racism – Direct Action and Education

The task for those attending to domestic racism was to present a new narrative of New Zealand's history. Through this it was hoped a new consciousness would be raised and a new Pakeha identity would be formed. This was one which acknowledged that since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi institutional racism lay deep within the social, economic and political structures of society. In creating this new identity the myths of the past, which showed colonisation as a relatively benign process within which harmony and equality existed between Maori and Pakeha, had to be dismantled. The new

\(^{45}\) *Amandla*, no date (circa 1982), Citizens Opposed to the Springbok Tour (COST) Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.

\(^{46}\) Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.

narrative showed colonisation as a long brutal process – of a treaty which had never been honoured, land theft, cultural marginalisation and oppression. Above all, the new version stressed that domestic racism was a Pakeha problem. A major avenue for presenting this was through direct protest action accompanied by education. In this way Pakeha activists increased the space for Maori issues to be disseminated to Pakeha New Zealand.

The campaign against the Government proposal to sub-divide and sell five acres of Bastion Point for private housing was strongly supported by the leadership and supporters of HART and CARE, as well as a range of individuals from a number of churches, including the National Council of Churches, the Trades Council and socialist groups such as the WCL, Socialist Action League (SAL) and Socialist Unity Party (SUP).48 Leading members of the anti-tour coalitions, including Terry Dibble and David Williams (CARE), were represented on a Joint Working Group on Bastion Point which was formed to oppose the proposed subdivision.49 All groups supported demonstrations, marches and two reoccupations of Bastion Point in 1982 which contributed to a groundswell of public support.

Direct action was accompanied by reports of the issue and its historical context in the newsletters of various organisations thus increasing an awareness of the issues involved.50 In Amandla the Bastion Point struggle was presented as ‘over one hundred years [of] unjust and immoral dealings over the ancestral lands of the Ngati Whatua’ and a ‘clear indication of the methods which have been used for two hundred years to dispossess Maori people of their land.’51 HART presented a history which would leave no reader in doubt that colonisation was premised on land alienation and the oppression of Maori. ‘Today of the 700 acres of Ngati Whatua land declared “inalienable” in 1873, the tribe has effectively been left with one-quarter of an acre...occupied by the church and the graveyard at Okahu Bay’.52

50 HART and SAL were particularly strong in using their newsletters, Amandla and Socialist Action, to identify the issues and provide ongoing reports of the Bastion Point protests and re-occupations.
51 Amandla, ‘Dirty hands at Bastion Point’, no date (circa May/June 1982), COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.
52 Ibid.
Arguably it was through the Treaty of Waitangi protests that Pakeha made their greatest contribution in increasing the space for Maori issues. The central anti-racist view was that the oppression of Maori stemmed from the failure of successive governments to honour the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. Consequently domestic racism, explained HART, is a product of the 'broken contract'. Moreover the Treaty was 'a fraud' because Maori people lost all that it had promised to protect and honour. Thus Waitangi Day protests became a focus and a major avenue by which Pakeha activists were able to present a new version of New Zealand's past and raise the consciousness of Pakeha New Zealand over treaty issues and by extension, domestic racism. For HART the ultimate aim was to 'educate Pakeha New Zealanders about racism in our society' and instil a desire to actively work against it and effect change.

Early in 1982 HART announced that it would actively oppose the forthcoming Waitangi Day celebrations and support all protests mounted by Maori activist groups. The reason HART explained was,

...because the dishonouring of the Treaty by Pakeha has set the tone for racial inequality in New Zealand. This in effect means that the Treaty becomes a celebration of massive Maori unemployment, failure in the Pakeha education system, high imprisonment rate and poor health...Before New Zealanders can look for solutions...we must stop celebrating the failure of New Zealand society to give a fair deal to the Maori people.

The effect of HART's new commitment to domestic issues was evident during the 1982 Waitangi Day protests, as the number of Pakeha swelled the ranks of protesters throughout New Zealand. At Waitangi, Auckland, Tauranga, Palmerston North, Wanganui and Wellington, protesters denounced the Treaty as a fraud and the celebrations 'a whitewash for the oppression of Maori people.' The various HART branches developed links with local activist groups including WAC and WAA with whom they either co-organised or supported protest action. Auckland HART, along with other Pakeha groups including CARE, increased the ranks of the WAC at Waitangi to over three hundred people. A combination of vigorous protest and a large, well-armed police presence, many of whom had policed the 1981 Tour protests, resulted in twenty nine

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53 HART Press Release, 'HART to Support Protests against the Treaty of Waitangi', Watangi Action Committee Newsletter, no date (circa 1982), CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Unity, February 1982.
arrests with nine people being charged. \textsuperscript{57} Marches were held in Auckland (organised by HART and WAC), Wellington and a group marched from Palmerston North to Wanganui. The Wellington march of 650 people was the culmination of a week of activities organised by WAC and given full support by HART. Geoff Walker, HART Wellington chairman, stated:

To celebrate the treaty’s signing was to celebrate high Maori unemployment and imprisonment rates, Maori failure in the education system and the alienation of Maori land...To continue to observe the treaty once a year is to resort to farce and hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{58}

Protest and Pakeha involvement escalated from 1983. In that year a variety of protests and activities were initiated in all four main centres with HART giving full support to organisations such as WAC and WAA. Many of these extended outside of Waitangi Day and were a mixture of action and education. For example, in Christchurch, HART was part of a coalition of groups which took action leading up to Waitangi Day, including picketing and public leafleting outside the District Court to focus attention on institutional racism. A tent was erected and in Cathedral Square where the Bastion Point documentary, Bastion Point – Day 507, was screened hourly. Other actions included marches, rallies, the burning of the Union Jack and on Waitangi Day protesters disrupted a re-enactment of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{59}

In Auckland a coalition People Opposed to Waitangi (POW), took on the mantle of organising the Waitangi protests. Initiated by the WAC and led by Maori, POW was the means whereby Maori leadership could direct and organise Pakeha support for a Maori cause. Modelled along the lines of MOST, POW catered for all levels of commitment and consisted of about twenty-five different groups including the WCL, CARE, ACORD, HART, church groups, students, Maori groups, land rights groups, White Dykes and other Pakeha organisations. The aim was to put an end to the ‘celebrations’ by using the dual avenues of direct protest action and education.\textsuperscript{60} POW organised numerous events including seminars on the Waitangi issue, concerts, the production and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid. Members of the Blue Squad, formed from Wellington Police for the 1981 Tour, were flown to Waitangi ‘in case of trouble.’ The group was equipped with helmets, long batons and shields for the occasion. See Auckland Star, 30 January 1982.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Unity, February 1982.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Amandla, April 1983, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL. Bastion Point – Day 507 was directed and produced by Mereta Mita, Leon Narby and Gerd Pohlman in 1980.
\end{itemize}
dissemination of 25,000 leaflets written in five languages detailing the history of 'broken promises,' street stalls, public meetings and rallies.\textsuperscript{61}

Direct protest action was taken at Waitangi with a significant Pakeha presence. A group marched from Auckland to Waitangi where they joined other protesters and a large police presence. CARE reported the celebrations as ‘bizarre’ and ‘ridiculous…mass arrests without provocation; the evening ceremony punctuated by skirmishes between police and protesters.’\textsuperscript{62} Pre-empting potential trouble police arrested ninety-nine people including John Minto and Dick Cuthbert (HART), Oliver Sutherland (ACORD) and innocent members of the public.\textsuperscript{63} Handcuffed and crammed into two police buses, each with seating for only thirty-three people, this action gained considerable publicity. John Minto called for an inquiry into the arrests which were unprovoked and a ‘gross violation of the rights of New Zealanders to protest’ and Prime Minister Muldoon claimed that it was ‘not a Maori protest’ as only four Maori were arrested.\textsuperscript{64}

In 1984 a large contingent of Pakeha from various anti-racist groups including HART, CARE and ACORD lent support to the Hikoi ki Waitangi which marched from Ngaruawahia to Waitangi. HART explained that their large contingent was marching principally to demonstrate their support for kotahitanga (unity). Their presence was not publicised throughout the march and ‘no HART banners or flags were displayed so as not to detract from the purpose of the hikoi.’\textsuperscript{65} On Waitangi Day HART co-organised and/or supported protests throughout New Zealand.

By 1985, Waitangi Day protest activities, barring the hikoi, were the largest to date. Demonstrations were held in the main centres and all combined active protest with educative activities, many of which continued outside Waitangi Day. HART Wellington became part of a Wellington Waitangi Coalition which structured its activities around the slogan, ‘Waitangi - what is there to celebrate?’ The coalition distributed leaflets outlining the history of Wellington and how Pakeha had acquired the land illegally, and a large contingent of demonstrators marched to Parliament where speakers addressed many

\textsuperscript{61} Amandla, April 1983, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.  
\textsuperscript{62} CARE newsletter, April 1983, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.  
\textsuperscript{63} Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, pp.223-224.  
\textsuperscript{64} Dominion, 9 February 1983; New Zealand Herald, 11 February 1983.  
\textsuperscript{65} Amandla, March 1984, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
issues and explained why Waitangi Day gave no cause for celebration. POW in Auckland descended on popular Auckland beaches distributing leaflets about race relations in New Zealand and organised a demonstration at Aotea Square. In Hamilton HART and CORSO combined prior to Waitangi Day to show the BBC documentary on Maori Radicalism, *Maori - The New Dawn*, and organised a follow-up discussion on Waitangi Day. At Waitangi over three hundred protestors disrupted the official service and staged a noisy non-violent demonstration.

Waitangi Day protests were backed by features in *Amandla*. These presented a Treaty which had been 'signed in good faith by many chiefs' and dishonoured by the Crown, and of 'continuous protest and debate,' racism and oppression. Moreover, the Treaty had enabled the Crown to develop a 'legal framework to facilitate the alienation of Maori land on a vast scale,' thus implying duplicitous Pakeha intentions. For such historical abuses and the same 'abuse which continue today,' New Zealanders should 'feel ashamed' stated HART. The following Bob Brockie cartoon, printed in *Amandla*, framed the Treaty in terms of a deceitful document underpinned by Pakeha aspirations of land alienation. The key point is that through *Amandla*, HART provided another space for the dissemination of a new narrative of colonisation.

Figure 4.2, 'Great Moments in NZ History - Signing the Treaty of Waitangi', Bob Brockie

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66 *Amandla*, February 1985, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
67 Ibid.
The Waitangi Day protests were significant actions. Activists inscribed a new discourse onto a public space set aside to celebrate New Zealand's national identity. In this they created what may best be described as a public space of consciousness which presented a counter-hegemonic discourse. Taking the protest onto the Treaty grounds at Waitangi was particularly significant. This space had historically symbolised an identity of 'one people' and was supported by attendant notions of egalitarianism and racial harmony. These myths, at the centre of Pakeha identity, were strongly contested by activists who by their very actions demonstrated a different reality.

Pakeha protesters played a crucial role in creating a new consciousness of Treaty issues. The Waitangi Day protests were staged dramatic events and as such their impact was heightened through numerical strength. Large numbers of protesters increased visibility and ensured the message reached a wide audience. The swelling of the ranks of WAC by Pakeha activists from 1982 performed this role and this, along with the messages presented, resulted in greater media newsworthiness. Arguably however it was the nature of the protests at Waitangi which were of most significance. Pakeha protesters did not merely 'make up the numbers' but joined with Maori activists in mounting strong actions. The confrontation between angry protesters and police kitted out in riot helmets and using long batons, sent shock waves through New Zealand. Extensive media coverage followed and the events and messages encapsulated spread throughout New Zealand in newsprint and on television. This prompted comment and debate through the media on the events and wider issues associated with the Treaty. While Prime Minister Muldoon attempted to side-line the protestors as merely a 'Springbok tour reunion,' some took a more informed view. The Evening Post editorial reflected that 'thoughtful New Zealanders are right to ask themselves just what we have to celebrate at Waitangi.' Whether reactions were positive or negative, the Waitangi protests resulted in an increased awareness amongst viewers.

For Pakeha activists the messages they disseminated were multiple and generally aimed directly at Pakeha. Through action and discourse vocalised and inscribed on banners and placards, Pakeha activists demonstrated their solidarity with Maori activists and support for the Maori cause. Simultaneously they sought to create a new

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71 New Zealand Herald, 11 February 1983.
72 Evening Post, 5 February 1983.
consciousness amongst Pakeha by delivering a message which was designed to provoke thought and arguably, a sense of shame. As the following illustration depicts, for many the message was that the problem was a Pakeha problem.

Figure 4.3, 'Waitangi Day protest, Wellington 1986', Gil Hanly

'Aotearoa land of the wrong white crowd' is designed to unsettle the viewer while at the same time issuing a challenge to consider what the right white crowd might be. Who is the wrong white crowd and why are they accorded this label? The viewer is inevitably led to consider his/her position as a Pakeha. Other placards induce a sense of shame – 'Remember Bastion Point,' 'Unite to Fight Racism' and 'Pakeha Responsibility.' All require Pakeha to consider the Treaty of Waitangi and their complicity in maintaining a society built upon the unequal relationship between Maori and Pakeha. This was precisely the purpose of such a protest. Ultimately it disturbs because it strikes at long-held assumptions of Pakeha identity and induces feelings of insecurity, guilt and shame. Such discourse was intended to jolt Pakeha into anti-racist action and commit to a process of social transformation which as Ranginui Walker points out, 'Pakeha are as much a part of as are Maori activists.'

73 Gil Hanley, (photographer), in Harris, Hikoi, p.90.
74 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p.234.
Anti-racism work

While HART initially had a strong focus on supporting Maori causes, it also sought to develop other facets of anti-racism work. Their commitment was to increase New Zealanders' understanding of the nature of racism and to working actively at both a local and national level.\(^7^5\) There is no doubt that following the Tour many anti-apartheid supporters transferred their energy to the anti-racist cause. Numerous anti-racism groups were formed and many people supported HART, most particularly in the Waitangi Day actions. As a Polynesian activist observed, 'we had a lot of support from the white middle-class...so many white people were politicised during the tour we have now been able to use the tour to our advantage.'\(^7^6\) Nevertheless there were difficulties within HART and other groups in either gathering and/or maintaining support for anti-racism work as opposed to support for Waitangi Day demonstrations.

The issue of guilt had a significant impact on HART in this respect. Many Pakeha, consumed by guilt by the actions of ancestors (which had led to the oppression of Maori), and their privileged position within society (an outcome of the latter), found it difficult to cope with anti-racism work. Within this area they were subjected to a relentless stream of messages about these issues, particularly at anti-racism workshops, within coalitions and from some Maori activists. The latter were hard-hitting and at times explicitly anti-Pakeha:

Hatred and arrogance has been the attitude of every Pakeha since Captain Hobson...Our history has been one of domination by the white man...He has stolen our land. He has killed us with his weapons and his treachery. He has literally thrashed our language to near extinction...decimated our people with his filthy diseases...Pakehas, ever since they first set foot on the shores of Aotaeroa have tried to rip the guts out of the Maori people.'\(^7^7\)

The message from Maori activists was that 'Pakeha should feel ashamed of themselves.'\(^7^8\) The publication of Donna Awatere's Maori sovereignty articles in Broadsheet had a profound impact as Pakeha were faced with a hard-hitting account of the oppression of Maori. As Gay Simpkin observed, people were standing up at

\(^{75}\) Amandla, January-June 1982, COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1.
\(^{76}\) WSTA interview with Polynesian activist, MCD 00084, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
\(^{77}\) WAC Resource Sheet for CCANZ Programme on Racism, CCANZ Programme on Racism Records, 92-085-2/3, ATL.
meetings and labelling themselves as oppressors and 'crying their eyes out about how terrible we'd been to Maori.' Moreover some Pakeha in Auckland experienced difficulties within the POW coalition. This claims Bruce Jesson was a 'largely Pakeha organisation with a Maori leadership and an anti-white perspective.' Thus with an organisation working within these parameters 'Pakehas inevitably have to take a certain amount of shit, and many – torn between guilt and resentment – couldn't cope with it.' Therefore, as John Minto recalls, many Pakeha developed a guilt mentality which had significant implications for HART:

It was that sort of notion of "I've taken on the guilt from the past"...I think that you have to accept the whole history and say yes it was wrong...But if you take it on, and I saw many many Pakeha take it on, it becomes an incredibly destructive force for change. Because if a person is going to promote change and build for change anywhere they have got to feel positive about themselves and who they are...If Maori are going to stand tall and fight they've got to feel good about themselves. Same with Pakeha. You can't beat all Pakeha into a corner where they are carrying all the bloody guilt of the world around. And a lot of people did that and they just disappeared into the world somewhere.

Many put their energies into other causes, particularly the Environmental and Peace Movements and resurfaced within HART during the 1985 anti-tour campaign. These were all 'safe' liberal causes in that the issue of personal inequality and ones place within society required no self-examination.

Towards the latter part of 1982, HART signalled that it intended to take more initiative and action against domestic racism. To date, much of its focus had been towards providing support for Maori activists at Bastion Point and the Waitangi Day 'celebrations'. A circular pointed out that following the 1981 Tour HART had accepted as a priority their responsibility to fight racism in New Zealand and while 'greater involvement had varied from centre to centre...we have a responsibility to encourage all our supporters to become more involved in domestic racism issues.' Moreover, while HART had seen its role 'as one of supporting other groups,' the time had come 'to work out its own stance and policy to fight racism in New Zealand.' While support for Maori activists

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80 Republican, December 1983.
81 Ibid.
82 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
83 HART circular, 'HART Against Racism – Where are we going', no date (circa September/October 1982), HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09.
84 Ibid.
and initiatives would continue, 'we must now start to initiate action on our own account.'

This points to the beginning of a new confidence within HART leadership in terms of anti-racism work. John Minto recalls that while the guilt issue impacted upon the leadership within HART to some extent, most worked through it quite quickly. The point was reached where they realised that if HART was going to have any effect 'we had to feel good about ourselves, feel good about our organisation and get out and support these things in a practical way.' Furthermore, remarks Minto, 'most of us felt better in initiating things and it gave us more credibility to our support work as well – it wasn’t just seen as a token effort which it was for some groups.'

In moving away from a mainly support role, HART threw off some of the constraints which to some extent had stifled initiative. This was in part the attempt by some Maori activists to direct HART’s activity. Asserting their right to self-determination, the demand of Pakeha groups was that they consult with Maori before taking any initiative and fall in line with Maori requirements. As one activist stated, 'I feel that Pakehas have a role in the anti-racist movement...and it is not up front. They should take their place according to and in consultation with blacks...If you want to help, we’ll tell you how you can help rather than you telling us how you are going to help.' Another was adamant that Maori had ‘the right to veto. We want to be consulted first. We get a bit tired of patching up the mistakes of well-meaning but offensive so-called anti-racists.’ In terms of HART consulting with Maori groups, John Minto recalls that he was ‘always resistant to that. Yes certainly we [HART Auckland] kept in touch with Maori activists but the thing is if you’ve got to consult with Maori, who do you consult with?’

John Minto’s comment reflects the problem which many groups, including HART, faced when taking on a purely supportive role. In one sense they placed their organisation, in terms of anti-racism work, at the service of Maori activists. The implication for the

85 Amandla, no date (circa mid-1982), COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.
86 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
87 Email correspondence with John Minto, 7 January 2007.
88 WSTA interview with Polynesian activist, MCD 00084, J.C. Beaglehole Room, VUW.
90 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
autonomy of Pakeha groups is obvious and Minto notes that there was a sense that some Maori activists were trying to direct HART and moreover, saw it as a right to have access to HART's monetary resources. They wanted to 'take the resources which HART had and which were incredibly limited...and use our resources fifty fifty on racism.'\textsuperscript{91} Similarly Don Borrie recalls that Titewhai Harawira 'was determined to have all resources available from CORSO for development and liberation of Maori. She and I came to a fundamental split over that. I wanted an international arm as well. She never forgave me...She was very angry with whites who were busily engaged with international struggle.'\textsuperscript{92} The movement away from a largely supportive role by HART firmly established an autonomous position in anti-racist activity.

From 1983 HART branches implemented new anti-racism initiatives which had been drawn up in 'HART action for 1983' and approved by the national body. Within this document three areas of action were identified: commitment to Waitangi Day protest, education and actively working against institutional racism.\textsuperscript{93} While suggestions were put forward each branch decided its own course of action. John Minto explained that one of the strengths of HART was that the branches were semi-autonomous and therefore could make their own decisions on which issues to pursue. This 'enabled HART to respond flexibly to lots of issues.'\textsuperscript{94} The 'HART action for 1983' document suggested that branches become involved in local issues. This indeed occurred and over the next few years a myriad of diverse issues was taken up by various branches. For example Hamilton HART drew attention to the fact that Hamilton was built on confiscated land and supported local issues such as the land struggle at Raglan.\textsuperscript{95} Auckland HART was heavily involved with Bastion Point and supporting protesters charged over the Springbok Tour demonstrations. HART initiated the formation of the Political Prisoners Support Group which assisted with transport and accommodation costs for families who had to travel long distances when visiting those imprisoned for Tour offences.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{91} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006. 
\textsuperscript{92} Interview with Don Borrie, 13 July 2006. Borrie was Chairman of CORSO for several years. 
\textsuperscript{93} 'HART action for 1983', November 1982, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL. 
\textsuperscript{94} Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006. 
\textsuperscript{95} Amandla, February 1985, M. Law Collection, Box 21[uncatalogued], UWL. 
\textsuperscript{96} Amandla, April 1983, M. Law Collection, Box 21[uncatalogued], UWL.
Attending to institutional racism became a focus and again numerous issues were pursued. HART requested that branches conduct empirical research in order to ascertain the extent of institutional domestic racism within their local area. To this end visiting local schools to ascertain Maori/Non-Maori pass rates, visiting the local Labour Department offices to gain statistics on unemployed Maori/Non-Maori and visiting the courts were suggested. While it is not known the extent to which this was taken up by HART branches, almost certainly HART Auckland, which made the suggestion, was involved in such activity.

HART put considerable effort into challenging overt instances of institutional racism. MPs, local councils, and the Boards of various institutions were lobbied over numerous issues of inequality. The low representation of Maori and Pacific Islanders in positions of responsibility became a focus. For example HART mounted a campaign against the decision by the Auckland Regional Authority (ARA) to appoint Stan Lawson, ‘a well-known apologist for apartheid and white minority rule,’ to the ARA. This appointment was made, stated HART, despite two ‘eminently suitable Maori people being nominated for the position’. The ARA had only ever had one Maori person hold a position on it despite ‘years of Maori protest and calls for a regional voice in decision making’. HART addressed the ARA and made a strong representation on two points: that of Maori representation on the ARA as a right and that they consult with Maori people on all ARA decisions at all times. The Auckland Hospital Board was also lambasted by HART for their employment practices relating to social workers and for failing to take into consideration the needs of a multi-cultural society. John Minto stated it was ‘disgraceful that less than a handful of the 170 Social Workers employed are Maori or from the Pacific Islands...If qualifications are seen as a problem then appropriate training should be arranged by the Board.’

HART was not alone in contesting instances of institutional racism and organisations such as CARE and ACORD were also heavily involved in numerous similar issues. A particular focus was the education system which anti-racist groups claimed was monocultural and failed to address Maori needs. ACORD demanded the abolition of the

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97 HART circular to all branches, 'HART Against Racism-Where are we going?', no date (circa November 1982), HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
98 HART:Aotearoa, 'Outline of ARA Campaign', no date, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
99 HART Press Release, 10 July 1984, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
School Certificate examination following the widespread ‘failure’ of Maori in the 1982 English paper. This examination was discriminatory, stated ACORD, with its preference for ‘tricky questions and fine distinctions that test the skills of the most competent English speakers.’ In pursuit of their goal of a wide spread of marks ‘to ensure the failure of many candidates,’ Maori end up in the negative statistics.\(^{100}\) By 1985 issues of Maori ‘failure’ and discrimination within the education system were being heavily contested by both Maori and Pakeha. The push for a bilingual system as one means of addressing these problems had become a focus. Much of CARE’s work in that year was directed towards effecting improvements for minority groups within the education system. These included a call for the reshaping of the curriculum to cater for Maori needs, a focus on the needs of Maori in intermediate schools from which ‘the high failure rate of the Maori people could be traced’ and a call for minority group representation on educational bodies.\(^{101}\)

COST, which had been resurrected in response to the proposed 1985 All Black Tour of South Africa, called on Prime Minister Lange and the Government to officially recognise the Maori language, make available the opportunity for a bi-lingual education and provide a Maori broadcasting service. COST argued that ‘the very core of the Maori culture has been repressed and denigrated over the years’ and the Government had within it the power to end this ‘sorry history of repression…and the actions and omissions of successive governments in this country.’\(^{102}\)

All HART initiatives were followed up with reports in Amandla which also devoted large spreads to analyses of institutional racism as well as creating special supplements on the issue.\(^{103}\) Statistics which depicted the unequal position which Maori occupied in society were regularly published and related to analyses of institutional racism. Articles written by Maori activists as well as by various Pakeha anti-racist groups, including ACORD, were given considerable space. In this, HART was implementing its major strategy in its commitment to attend to domestic issues – raising awareness and educating its readers about issues of domestic racism.

\(^{100}\) ‘ACORD Media Release’, no date (circa January 1983), ACORD, NZMS 521, ACL.

\(^{101}\) Newnham, 25 Years of C.A.R.E., pp.32-33.

\(^{102}\) Correspondence John Forman to Prime Minister David Lange, 24 July 1985, COST Records, 2003-254-06, ATL.

\(^{103}\) Amandla, ‘Racism in Aotearoa – Special Supplement’, no date (circa 1983), COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.
This was a central feature of HART's new campaign on domestic racism and was given full expression during anti-racism week 2-8 May 1983 which HART initiated. While activities varied from centre to centre, the main approach was one of educating and raising the consciousness of New Zealanders about the degree of racism which existed within their own country. HART Auckland held protests at Bastion Point and picketed the Housing Corporation offices and both activities demanded the return of land to the Ngati Whatua people. Over one hundred secondary schools were offered a team of people to speak on domestic racism. While few accepted the offer, students spoken with were interested although 'often unsympathetic.' In addition throughout the week stalls were organised, meetings were held and anti-racism literature and leaflets were distributed. Wellington held several workshops at which Tipene O'Reagan and Tony Davis-Waho spoke of Wellington's history and nineteenth century history (NZ) respectively. Christchurch set up information stalls, leafleted in Cathedral Square, held a Rock against Racism concert and a film evening and work places, schools and tertiary institutions were visited by people engaged in anti-racism work. Other centres such as Nelson, Palmerston North and Rotorua provided a wide range of similar activities as those included in the main centres.

The aim of anti-racism education was to create a new Pakeha identity. The new Pakeha acknowledged their own racism and that of society and were pro-active in working for structural change within society. The protester illustrated earlier, who carried the placard 'Land of the Wrong White Crowd' and who was thus conscious of the 'oppressor' element of her Pakeha heritage, was the new Pakeha. Maori activists also posited a vision of the new Pakeha as one who worked to change the structures of society which perpetuated institutional racism. As Maori activist Atareta Poananga stated, 'you need to participate in anti-racist courses to acknowledge your own racism. With this awareness, you must ...join Pakeha groups working for change according to the kaupapa (objectives) Maori people articulate – however we define these. This is our challenge to you and an indictment of you.'

104 Amandla, July 1983, COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
In defining the desired new Pakeha identity HART advocated a tripartite model of Pakeha society.\textsuperscript{109}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racist</th>
<th>Non-Racist</th>
<th>Anti-racist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personally prejudiced &amp; bigoted</td>
<td>Not personally prejudiced or tries not to be.</td>
<td>Tries not to be prejudiced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminates.</td>
<td>Regards all as equals &amp; does not discriminate.</td>
<td>Analyses racist aspects of institutions takes part in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits from living in a racist society.</td>
<td>Benefits from living in a racist society.</td>
<td>Works for change in institutions using all possible channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lets it keep going.</td>
<td>Lets it keep going.</td>
<td>Benefits from living in a racist society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| EG: Racists and non-racists derive ‘benefits from living in a racist society’ and allow this situation to continue. The anti-racist Pakeha also derives benefits but attempts to change society. Consciousness of personal and institutional racism marked the difference between the anti-racist who was the new Pakeha, and the liberal non-racist Pakeha. The intention of the illustration was to encourage a consideration of the position which the individual occupied within a society structured upon inequality and his/her role and responsibility as a member of the privileged majority. Thus stated HART, New Zealand...is a racist society. Pakeha values and assumptions underlie all procedures and practices. Institutions...follow Pakeha models and operate according to the rules made by Pakehas. Members of the dominant group hold the power...as long as it continues all Pakehas can be described as racist regardless of their personal attitudes.\textsuperscript{110} |

Anti-racism education in the form of seminars and workshops was a central feature of the educative thrust of groups involved in anti-racism work. There were a variety of forms and while some workshops were Pakeha organised and led, others utilised Maori advisors and leaders. In Palmerston North, Penny Poutu recalls that Nga Uri Tupakanga ‘got involved with the whole educative thing with Pakeha here talking about injustice and racism ...we had workshops...we gave Saturday lectures.’\textsuperscript{111} The WAA also had a strong educative stance and was in conflict with WAC in Auckland:

\textsuperscript{109} Amandla, July 1983, COST Records, fMS-Papers-7818-1, ATL.  
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{111} Interview with Penny Poutu, 8 August 2006.
They didn't accept our position on a focus on education. And they didn't like it because we had Pakeha in the organisation. We said there would be Maori leadership but we believed the way forward was embracing Pakeha people to fight racism of which they were an essential element... So our job was education and protest and they thought we were little sell-outs for this... They came to the same position after a couple of years.  

Individual HART branches organised a variety of anti-racism workshops and seminars for their supporters. While these had been initiated in 1982, activity increased following their new stance on domestic issues in 1983. Seminars were generally led by guest speakers, including Maori, who spoke on a variety of issues. Waitangi Day became a major avenue for such events. In 1985 HART Hamilton screened a documentary *Maori - The New Dawn* which was followed by a seminar and discussion. Robert Mahuta introduced the film and participated in the discussion along with over one hundred people, including both local Labour MPs.  

Although a commitment to the organisation of seminars and workshops varied between HART branches, Auckland and Hamilton were particularly active. The latter had initiated one of the first seminars early in 1982 'to look at racism in Hamilton.' As a follow-up, and to 'experience Maoritanga,' marae visits were organised.  

HART members also participated in workshops and seminars on Maori sovereignty. In Auckland dissension within the POW coalition following the 1983 Waitangi Day protest resulted in intense debate over issues of Maori leadership. The outcome was a move to make Maori sovereignty the bottom line for participation in POW and a series of meetings were organised for Pakeha to discuss the issue. Many were less than constructive for they were set up on the same basis as POW with the emphasis on constituent groups rather than individuals. Thus heated discussions erupted over both Maori sovereignty and political ideologies. Nevertheless some meetings were well organised and chaired and utilised a range of speakers, including Ranginui Walker, Mitzi Naim and Atareta Poananga, to elucidate the issue of Maori sovereignty. HART made its stance on Maori sovereignty clear to its supporters: 'If you can’t accept the idea of Maori sovereignty and begin to come to terms with it – start packing your bags and
looking for somewhere to go. Thus acceptance of Maori sovereignty was the bottom line for participation in HART’s anti-racism campaign.

Of a different form were workshops run by facilitators trained in anti-racist techniques. Anti-racism workshops were first introduced to New Zealand in 1974 by a group of American anti-racists from the Detroit Industrial Mission. New Perspectives on Race (NPR) came out of this initiative and through workshops, seminars and the dissemination of anti-racist material it sought to instil in Pakeha a greater awareness of ‘white attitudes,’ the structural basis of institutional racism and their role in reforming society. NPR was eventually superseded in 1982 by the Programme on Racism set up by the NCC ‘In growing awareness that apartheid in South Africa is not the only manifestation of racism.’ This was developed by Mitzi Nairn and Rev. Bob Scott who organised and presented anti-racism workshops throughout New Zealand. Topics for workshops included the Treaty of Waitangi, Introduction to Racism, Biculturalism, and Decolonisation. Maori sovereignty was a central issue within all workshops. These were solely for Pakeha in recognition that they were responsible for domestic racism and thus it was a Pakeha problem. HART concurred with this position stating that ‘white racism is a white problem’ and ‘Maori need not put their energy into solving this.’

HART supporters participated in a range of workshops conducted by trained anti-racist educationalists. In 1982 NPR conducted the first anti-racism workshop for Auckland HART supporters. Prior to the event they were optimistic that it ‘could change the face of Pakeha anti-racism work in Auckland.’ The NPR Annual Report stated:

[The] course did not work well. Partly a difference in expectations and an unwillingness to accept that Pakehas, even highly committed active Pakehas, are the problem and that this must be faced if we are to work on racism. The temptation to locate racism as out there, in those people, while ignoring our own is real but we were unable to get the HART

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116 HART worksheet, no date (circa 1983), HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
117 This was at the instigation of Don Borne and ACORD, and was funded by the World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism.
118 ‘Incorporation of New Perspectives on Race’, 22 December 1975, ACORD, NZMS 521 [uncatalogued], ACL.
122 HART newsletter, no date (circa 1985), COST Records, 2003-254-10, ATL.
123 New Perspectives on Race, newsletter, February 1982, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
course to confront this issue...It appears that those who are activists need to catch
themselves out "being racist" before they are willing to spend time on their own racism.\textsuperscript{124}

Quite clearly the participants refused to accept the 'I am a racist' label which the
programme demanded. NPR used the technique 'Racism Awareness Training' (RAT) a
component of which was acknowledging one's own racism.\textsuperscript{125}

Nevertheless HART supporters continued to attend professional workshops. In 1984
HART supporters from various branches attended the 'First National Pakeha Anti-
Racism Gathering' near Tauranga.\textsuperscript{126} Participants came from all over New Zealand and
discussed a range of domestic issues including institutional racism, bi-culturalism,
'Pakeha responsibility for the Treaty of Waitangi' and Maori sovereignty. The latter
resulted in intense discussion and debate. Central to the discussion was the question,
'What will happen to us if there is Maori sovereignty?' As one participant stated,

There was a lot of fear coming out. People were freaking out but were open to what was
happening, open to some explanation of what our place is. Somebody said anything
would be better than the society we've got now. We've got to work to change it. Maori
sovereignty means to me returning the land, Maori control over Maori things.\textsuperscript{127}

The key issue is that workshops provided a bounded anti-racism space within which a
new consciousness was being created. The Tauranga workshop was particularly
important for it brought an eclectic mixture of people together: 'middle-class educated
people...mens and womens groups...HART, ACORD, the dykes...the unemployed,
anarchists.' Moreover while many had a well-developed anti-racism perspective, 'at the
other end were young people with a first-time involvement in anti-racism.' This brought a
range of opinion – 'lots of people came from different angles' - thus generating intense
discussion and a new consciousness. One participant noted, 'we didn't achieve great
things but most of us left feeling positive, and keen to get stuck into anti-racism work.'\textsuperscript{126}

Nevertheless anti-racism workshops were not always successful. Issues of guilt and the
confrontational style of some workshops permeate the literature of anti-racism groups.

\textsuperscript{124} New Perspectives on Race, Annual Report 1982, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
\textsuperscript{125} By the mid-1980s the RAT technique had fallen out of favour. See A Sivanandan, 'No Such Thing as
\textsuperscript{126} 'The First National Pakeha Anti-Racism Gathering, 7th-9th Dec, 1984', Project Waitangi Inc: Records,
2005-006-06, ATL.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
One participant recalled leaving a workshop ‘harangued, bullied and frightened.’

Another noted that if people ‘are accused and lambasted as happened...there is a risk of hardening and entrenching the very attitudes that you are attempting to eliminate.’ Guilt was another theme with participants expressing anger that they were made to feel guilty. Inevitably some participants did develop feelings of guilt and shame which manifested itself in either inactivity, or a paternalistic attitude towards Maori. In 1985 HART observed that over the past three years they had ‘attempted to run anti-racism workshops for HART people and while some were successful, others were spectacular failures and resulted in guilt, division and inaction.’ HART suggested a shift in emphasis in which discussion was oriented around action and ‘doing things’ as a means of ‘avoiding the potential dangers of...guilt-tripping.’

Midway through 1985 HART expressed disappointment in their campaign against domestic racism and indicated that there was a need to increase their commitment to anti-racist work. The HART National Council observed that following the 1981 Tour the importance of incorporating domestic racism had been ‘acknowledged by all.’ However, ‘some areas have taken domestic racism on as their first priority while others still do very little, despite their supposed commitment.’ HART therefore questioned what role it should play in the struggle against racism and ‘where should work on domestic racism figure in HART’s priorities?’ Moreover, John Minto recalled that there was a ‘consistent challenge from Maori’ that HART should be putting more effort into the struggle against domestic racism. In the light of the comments expressed by the HART National Council this was possibly valid and it was one with which Minto concurred.

A major disappointment, as expressed by the National Council, was that the transferral of energy from the ‘mobilised masses’ of 1981 into the campaign against domestic racism had not been as successful as hoped.

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129 Correspondence from workshop participant to Mitzi, Bob and Barbara, October 1986, CCANZ Programme on Racism Records, 92-085-2/3, ATL.
130 Correspondence from eight workshop participants to NCC secretary, 30 September 1985, CCANZ Programme on Racism Records, 92-085-4/3, ATL.
131 NCC Programme on Racism newsletter, January 1986, Sinclair, Mary: Papers, 93-212-1/3, ATL.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006. I suggested to John Minto that in the light of the numerous anti-racism activities in which HART was involved, this was an unreasonable charge. He felt that it was ‘quite justified.’
racism had not occurred. HART suggested people were prepared to protest against apartheid because the campaigns were short-lived with clear achievable goals. By contrast, 'the campaign against domestic racism is inevitably a long hard haul...the anti-racist has no rest until the war is won.' Tom Newnham believed that the focus on domestic racism had alienated many anti-apartheid supporters: 'It was easy to march [against apartheid]...rather than be aware of issues on your own back door. This involves a lot more soul searching and honesty than just the anti-apartheid issue.' As indicated earlier, issues of guilt were also entwined in this process.

Arguably the issue was more fundamental. For many people their priority was the anti-apartheid issue, not domestic racism. As one member of the HART leadership observed, 'I disagree with your idea that HART people have been united over their disgust at racism- incorrect, it's over apartheid. To me and you that may be the same thing but to many of our supporters it is not.' The simple fact was that the issue of domestic racism failed to attract the huge support that an anti-apartheid position did.

This was borne out by the campaign to stop the 1985 All Black Tour to South Africa. On 3 May 1985 an estimated 60 - 70,000 people marched nationally against the proposed tour to South Africa. COST '85', which spear-headed the Wellington campaign, estimated 25,000 marchers making it one of the biggest marches in the city's history. Although the WCL presented the mobilisation as a protest 'against sporting contact with apartheid and against racism in this country,' the majority mobilised against apartheid and sporting contact with South Africa and not racism in New Zealand. As one marcher, in registering anger at domestic issues being introduced during the march, noted, 'This was neither the time nor the place...What the marchers wanted to protest most strongly about was the fact that a tour to South Africa by the All Blacks was planned and to make this point loud and clear to the Rugby Union.'

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137 Ibid.
138 Tom Newnham interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC-4171, Oral History Centre, ATL.
141 COST newsletter, no date (circa May 1985), Private Collection of K. Taylor.
143 Letter to COST, 3 May 1985, COST Records, 2003-254-06, ATL.
Nevertheless for Maori activists as well as the committed core of the anti-apartheid movement, which since 1981 had devoted considerable energy to domestic concerns, the issue was both apartheid and domestic racism. The anti-apartheid movement chose to make such links explicit indicating that it had come a long way since 1981. No longer were there only Maori activist groups keen to draw attention to domestic racism. On posters, leaflets and in newsletters, the anti-tour coalitions used the space which the anti-tour campaign provided to present the issue as a dual protest. In Auckland the ‘No Tour ’85’ coalition distributed bi-lingual leaflets which explained that opposition to the tour ‘is only the beginning of the fight against racism which must continue in Aotearoa.’  \(^{144}\) In Wellington ‘COST ’85’ framed the issue as ‘Fight Apartheid in South Africa: Fight racism in Aotearoa.’  \(^{145}\) Newsletters detailed the oppression of both black South Africans and Maori and detailed negative statistics in terms of health, education, employment, housing, imprisonment and poverty. \(^{146}\)

As they had done in 1981, Maori activist groups also took the opportunity to press the Maori take. In Wellington during the May mobilisation, PATU (Pacific Action Towards Unity) speakers Ripeka Evans and Kiwi Pesamino urged Pakeha to march for black South Africans and against racism in New Zealand. \(^{147}\) A negative reaction was forthcoming with COST ‘85’ receiving considerable correspondence from Pakeha, angered that such issues were being raised. Maori activists were accused of creating a problem which did not exist and of ‘pouring forth their venom.’ \(^{148}\) In a typical response one correspondent wrote:

\[\text{I can understand that Maoris could advocate an “it must not happen here” stance, but it seems to me that there is an inference that it is happening here and that is a gross exaggeration... Anti-apartheid protests should be just that. If Maoris wish to speak on behalf of their people, well and good, but let it be about the concern for those black people in South Africa. Maori grievances are}\]

\(^{146}\) ‘Stop The Tour’ news-sheet, no date (circa 1985), Private Collection of K.Taylor.
\(^{147}\) Unity, May 1985. The new meaning assigned to PATU since the 1981 tour reflects the close links and affinity which had developed between Pacific Island people and Maori activist groups. These were developed largely within the Black Women’s Movement and particularly through the efforts of Black Unity. However activists, including members of the Harawira whanau, developed links through activism over Pacific nuclear issues.
\(^{148}\) Correspondence to COST, 3 May 1985, COST Records, 2003-254-06, ATL.
another matter. To make them appear as a parallel problem to apartheid is an unwarranted exaggeration in order to gain a propaganda point.\textsuperscript{149}

The plenary meetings also reveal that while lessons had been learned in 1981, the discourse had changed little. Maori played a more prominent role with people such as Ray Ahipene-Mercer, Eruera Nia and Heta Te Hemara in leadership positions. Clearly COST '85 was mindful of the bitterness which had arisen during the 1981 Tour over leadership issues as a comment on a planning sheet indicates: ‘Every effort must be made to have women and Maori people involved in leading positions.’\textsuperscript{150} PATU representatives, including Kiwi Pesamino, Donna McLeod, and Dickson Chapman attended the plenary meetings and used this forum to speak on domestic racism. Although Maori (and Pacific Islanders) constituted a relatively small group, Kerry Taylor who was involved in the protest campaign and attended COST '85 plenary meetings recalls that PATU were very vocal in putting their message forward. Further, from a vantage point twenty years later, his perception is that the discourse from Maori was that Pakeha continued to neglect issues of domestic racism. Moreover, he had the perception that there was a degree of frustration from some ‘traditional’ trade unions that these issues were continuing to be raised.\textsuperscript{151}

Ideological differences continued to be contested and cause friction and the 1985 apartheid sport issue was cross cut with sectarian debate. Within the plenary meetings of the coalitions the issues which had been fought over in 1981 were fought over again in 1985. The difference was that by 1985 the WCL had broken with traditional communist theory which accorded class primacy in a hierarchy of oppressions. Now race and gender were accorded equal significance as class.\textsuperscript{152} Debate within the trade union movement occurred over issues of race and class and over the possibility of their support for the tour fragmenting their working class membership.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} COST '85 planning sheet, no date (circa 1985), COST Records, 2003-254-01, ATL.
\textsuperscript{151} Conversation with Kerry Taylor, December 2006.
\textsuperscript{152} As the WCL stated in \textit{Unity}, October 1985, ‘The struggle for women for their emancipation and of Maori for self-determination are seen as distinct processes in their own right. Although bound up in the struggle against capitalism they each possess their own historical roots and dynamics and will not be resolved simply by the abolition of the capitalist system.’
\textsuperscript{153} For a discussion on the attempts by HART to enlist trade union support see Camille Guy, ‘Protest Politics and the Political Culture of Rugby’, \textit{Republican}, July 1985.
The 1985 tour protest revealed that while change had occurred since the 1981 Tour, much had remained the same. While HART and the coalitions had explicitly linked domestic racism with apartheid, the discourses which were evident in 1981 were reiterated in 1985. Maori activists continued to assert that Pakeha were not concerned with domestic issues and some Pakeha were reluctant to accept that domestic racism existed. Moreover HART had expressed disappointment that many HART supporters had failed to commit to the struggle against domestic racism. Had the anti-racism campaign and the efforts of groups such as HART, CARE and ACORD had an influence on public attitudes?

Changing Attitudes?

In November 1986 a study was conducted by Synergy Applied Research for Project Waitangi to obtain information on Pakeha attitudes towards the Treaty of Waitangi and racism in New Zealand. The survey revealed a change in attitude towards the Treaty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of the Treaty</th>
<th>Present %</th>
<th>Five Years Ago %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A piece of our history</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A focus for protesters</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It protects Maori rights</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A basis for Maori and Pakeha to live equally</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 4.5 'Survey of Pakeha Attitudes to the Treaty of Waitangi, Nov 1986'

Of significance is the proportion of respondents who stated that they currently saw the Treaty as a basis for Maori and Pakeha to live equally compared to their view five years earlier. Further the proportion of those who reported that the Treaty meant nothing to them is less than the proportion of those who reported having held this view previously. The most commonly cited reasons for the change in attitude was seeing newspaper and television reports and listening to Maori people talk about the Treaty. Treaty issues had assumed a greater profile by 1986, not least as a result of the change to a Labour

154 'A Survey of Pakeha Attitudes to the Treaty of Waitangi and Related Issues', Synergy Applied Research for Project Waitangi, November 1986, Project Waitangi Inc: Records, 2005-006-09, ATL. The information in the following two paragraphs is drawn from this study.
Government in 1984. More sympathetic to Maori aspirations than the National Government, Labour passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1985 which made the Waitangi Tribunal retrospective to 1840. Within months claims were lodged by Tainui, Ngai Tahu and Te Ati Awa. Correspondingly these and by extension Treaty issues, prompted considerable coverage through the press. However there is no doubt that the Waitangi Day protests and the educative campaigns of anti-racist groups had a considerable impact in changing attitudes towards the Treaty of Waitangi. While the focus of this chapter has been on Pakeha groups, both Maori and Pakeha groups played their part in different ways and at times combined in protest action and education to effect such changes.

In terms of changing attitudes towards domestic racism the Synergy study revealed there was little change from a Heylen poll conducted in 1980. The latter had shown that 38.3% believed Maori were discriminated against. The Synergy study revealed that 37.8% believed that Maori were discriminated against and 36.4% stated that racism in New Zealand was caused by Maori activists, or that reverse racism existed in that Pakeha were discriminated against. Sustaining this latter view was the ‘Maori privilege’ discourse which had been in circulation since the 1960 No Maori No Tour protests. In 1986 this retained its centrality with Maori privilege being seen in the form of access to separate schools, sports teams, special benefits and loans, Maori housing, apprenticeship and work schemes and electoral seats. Thus Pakeha were seen as a disadvantaged sector of society.

While few people now iterated the view that New Zealanders enjoyed the best race relations in the world, many responses in the Synergy survey, revealed that the belief in equality and the ‘one people’ ideology remained dominant. Statements such as, ‘Let us call ourselves New Zealanders’ and ‘We are all New Zealanders’ signified that for many Pakeha, ‘one people’ remained at the core of an imagined national identity. Maori were the stumbling block to the complete fulfilment of this ambition. Maori ‘have got to get their act together and not rely on being stirrers of the past and split NZ like they are.’

Basing an argument on one small survey is less than satisfactory. Between 1984-1990 Margaret Wetherell and Jonathon Potter conducted extensive research into racism in New Zealand. While an in depth discussion of the study lies outside the scope of this thesis, it is enough to note that it revealed a prevalence of racist discourse with themes similar to those iterated above.

That the anti-racism campaign could effect a widespread change of public opinion in relation to domestic racism in the space of four years is unrealistic. While it is clear that many Pakeha supported the anti-racism campaign, it is also clear that many did not. As John Minto recalls, many within HART 'were resistant' to the turn to anti-racism. To change attitudes which had been entrenched and which were part of the Pakeha psyche was going to take longer than a few years of anti-racism activity. Moreover Ranginui Walker observes that in response to land claims before the Waitangi Tribunal a 'white backlash' was being manifested as Pakeha landowners feared dispossession. Anger and fear had also coalesced around the issue of Maori sovereignty. In 1986 Jane Kelsey railed against 'the current anti-Maori crusade' and located it in a Pakeha fear of Maori self-determination.

Ripeka Evans and other Maori activists were no doubt disappointed that the mass of 1981 anti-tour supporters failed to turn their attention to the struggle against domestic racism following the tour. HART also expressed disappointment that 'the transferral of energy did not occur' and the lack of commitment by some of their branches to the anti-racism campaign. Moreover there remained a consistent challenge throughout the period from Maori activists that HART could put more effort into domestic issues. Nevertheless HART's contribution was significant. Their anti-racism work was directed towards raising awareness amongst Pakeha about the historical injustices perpetuated upon Maori and the implications of these in contemporary terms. Arguably the Waitangi Day protests were the most significant. As Jane Kelsey observes, the efforts of the anti-

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158 Interview with John Minto, 7 May 2006.
161 'Special Newsletter for Branches on Domestic Racism Work', 11 June 1985, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
racist movement were 'vitally important in raising the Treaty to public and political prominence.'\textsuperscript{162} Through action and education HART appropriated physical spaces and transformed them into anti-racism spaces. Within these, whether at Waitangi, on picket lines, on placards, contesting institutional racism at ARA meetings, or on stalls set up during anti-racism week, they disseminated a counter-history and an anti-racism message. This was backed up by education through newsletters, workshops and seminars. HART announced a problem and provoked thought. They were part of a movement which sought to create a 'new Pakeha.'

In July/August 1985 a series of meetings were held at branch and national level to discuss HART's role in terms of domestic issues.\textsuperscript{163} At the end of 1985 HART announced:

\begin{quote}
In addition to the work in support of the oppressed people of South Africa HART has undertaken a stronger commitment to working on racism in Aotearoa. The sale of racist souvenirs, the campaign for recognition of Maori as an official language, support for local Maori grievances and challenging Pakehas to work towards bi-culturalism are all areas in which HART plans to work. As always education and action will go hand-in-hand...\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Through action and education HART sought to create spaces for a new consciousness.

\textsuperscript{163} Special Newsletter for Branches on Domestic Racism, 11 June 1985, HART: Aotearoa: Records, 93-042-09, ATL.
\textsuperscript{164} HART, 'End of Year Appeal', December 1985, M. Law Collection, Box 21 [uncatalogued], UWL.
Conclusion

In the early 1990s both HART and CARE disbanded. Formed to oppose the 1970 All Black Tour, HART spent twenty-two years in the struggle against apartheid. Domestic racism received considerable attention from 1981 onwards. In 1993 CARE followed suit having worked for twenty-nine years against apartheid in South Africa and racism in New Zealand. Prior to disbanding, Tom Newnham wrote to the CARE committee:

When I look back on more than 25 years I am struck by the fact that right through that time from the very beginning we operated in exactly the same way. A small group of earnest friendly concerned people... deliberating on the racial matters of the moment...we did an important job, and generally had quite a few small victories and played our part in the big ones. Nothing has changed – well yes, some things have. The Maoris have stood up, don’t need CARE and some of them even resent us.

Newnham recognised that Maori had created and claimed a significant political space which Pakeha New Zealand could no longer ignore. Thus CARE perceived that its anti-racism work was no longer necessary. The formation of the group in 1964 was one of the first concrete outcomes of the space which the apartheid sport debate had generated for domestic racism to be recognised and addressed. Often criticised by Maori for being obsessed with apartheid, and despised by many Pakeha for the issues which they raised, throughout the years CARE had continued to press for the rights of Maori.

CARE’s decision to disband was a reflection of the new political climate in which a greater commitment to biculturalism was being promoted and concrete measures were being put in place. One of the first was Project Waitangi which was initiated in 1986. Its broad educational aims were for Pakeha to acknowledge their commitment under the Treaty of Waitangi, that Maori should be recognised as tangata whenua and that the history of New Zealand should be studied by Pakeha. The new political space which Maori occupied was largely an outcome of their activism during the preceding two decades. This included the involvement of activists in the anti-apartheid movement.

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¹ Correspondence Tom Newnham to CARE Committee, 8 December 1992, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
The argument throughout this thesis has been that the apartheid sport debate and the involvement of Maori activists in the anti-apartheid movement created a space for domestic racism to be brought to the attention of Pakeha New Zealand. As such it was a force through which social change could begin to be effected. Although this study has focused on the apartheid sport debate as a single issue, it has also shown that it was part of the wider domestic political landscape. For many Maori activists the issue never stood alone and the oppositional response was both shaped and embedded within a contemporary and historical struggle for equality. During the period under investigation and particularly from the 1970s, Maori activism grew and matured as issues related to Maori rights populated the political space. Physical spaces were appropriated and inscribed with a discourse of Maori rights, liberation politics, self-determination and domestic racism and placed before the Pakeha mainstream. The agenda was grounded in an historic struggle. As Syd Jackson of Nga Tamatoa stated, the aim of radical Maori activism was ‘to pressure for change and to have those matters in which our people had been fighting for year after year finally recognised and acted upon.’ What the anti-apartheid movement provided was another avenue through which grievances could be presented.

It was an important avenue. Looking back on the events surrounding the apartheid sport debate the spaces which were generated for the profiling of domestic racism are clear. Some arose accidentally and were a result of the issue itself rather than the actions of activists. The 1960 'No Maoris No Tour' protest, for example, broadened to discussion on wider issues of discrimination. Although Pakeha were generally resistant to the idea that domestic racism was a feature of society, for some the link between discrimination on the rugby field and domestic discrimination was made. Thus a new consciousness was created and the outcome was the formation of the first anti-racism/anti-apartheid groups and a push by some Maori leaders for legislation on racial discrimination. This was significant for it marked the beginning whereby the lid began to be prised open on domestic racism.

From the 1970s some radical Maori activists deliberately used the spaces which the apartheid sport debate engendered as a political resource to present a counter-hegemonic discourse. The oppression of black South Africans was fused with the

³ Syd Jackson, Diamond Series.
oppression of Maori and the message was disseminated at public meetings, hui and demonstrations, through pamphlets and the media. Through participation in the anti-apartheid movement the issues were placed within a broad leftist network. This generated new social spaces and thus produced opportunities to present an indigenous discourse. A dominant agenda was to convince the anti-apartheid movement to support Maori in their struggle against domestic racism. In 1981 this agenda was placed before the thousands who mobilised against apartheid.

Through involvement in the anti-apartheid movement, opportunities were presented for Maori to expand the discursive space into the international arena. Domestic racism was presented at the United Nations and the high profile court cases following the 1981 Tour were covered by an international media. During these events Maori activists and the anti-apartheid movement took the opportunity to draw attention to the oppression of Maori.

Crucially, involvement in the anti-apartheid movement provided some Maori with a space for the development of a public political profile. This was particularly important during the 1960 rugby debate. It generated the opportunity for Maori leaders who were marginalised within the mainstream political process, to take on a public political profile and assume leadership positions within the 'No Maoris No Tour' movement. By the late 1970s the response by some moderate Maori activists to the apartheid sport issue reflected aspirations for self-determination. They took ownership of issues which involved Maori and conducted a protest along indigenous lines. As I have argued, both moderate and radical Maori activists in 1981 were attending to the mana of Maori in various ways.

The argument that the apartheid sport debate was an avenue for social change is substantiated by the events which followed the 1981 Tour when many groups and individuals within the anti-apartheid movement turned their attention to the struggle against domestic racism. This was a direct response to the space which Maori activists had carved out for domestic issues during the 1981 Tour and their subsequent challenge to anti-apartheid supporters. Chapter Four in this study has focused explicitly on the anti-racism thrust of HART. Through education and action HART sought to raise Pakeha awareness about historical injustices and issues of domestic racism in
contemporary terms. It was an important time as Pakeha anti-racist groups aligned with the narrative which Maori activists were presenting.

While many HART supporters were committed to addressing domestic issues, there were also many who were resistant. Anti-racism education which sought to construct a ‘new Pakeha’, and the acceptance of tino rangatiratanga, were contested and issues of guilt had a negative impact. Nevertheless this period was a step forward as many Pakeha did commit to the struggle against domestic racism. From the mid-1980s onwards with the formation of Project Waitangi and other initiatives, including the Treaty of Waitangi Act, change began to accelerate. Public attitudes changed towards a more positive view of the Treaty of Waitangi and the actions of Maori activists and Pakeha anti-racist groups played an important role in this.

Despite this progress, there was no great shift in attitudes towards domestic racism within the Pakeha mainstream. Many remained resistant to the idea that Maori were oppressed, or that society was founded on a system of institutionalised racism. From the late 1960s Maori activism and the actions of anti-racist groups, particularly during the 1980s, had sought to bring Pakeha ‘out from behind the myths’. The agenda was to create a bi-cultural society which was founded on equality and which recognised difference within this framework. This entailed the dismantling of the ‘one people’ myth. Throughout the period under study the ‘one people’ discourse, with attendant notions that Maori were a privileged sector of society, was dominant. Although the notion that New Zealanders enjoyed the best race relations in the world had almost disappeared by 1981, and few spoke of ‘one people’ as if it were a reality, the desire for ‘one people’ remained a central ideology within mainstream Pakeha New Zealand. Neither Maori activism nor the profiling of domestic racism through the apartheid sport issue was successful in dismantling this discourse, which was prominent in 1980 and remained so throughout the time frame of my thesis. It remains to this day.4

4 One of the most recent expressions of this was a speech on ‘Nationhood’ by Don Brash, Leader of the National Party, in 2004. Brash spoke of ‘the dangerous drift towards separatism’ and his intention to establish ‘one rule for all’. This would remove racial divisiveness and Maori privilege. Then, stated Brash, ‘we really will be one people as Captain Hobson declared us to be in 1840’. See ‘An address by Don Brash, Leader of the National Party to the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 January 2004’. www.national.org.nz/files/Orewa Rotary Club_27Jan.pdf. as retrieved on 1 May 2007.
This thesis has been heavily underpinned by a 'who, where, when and why' focus. I make no apology for this. The response by Maori was significant and distinctive as many applied both an indigenous analysis and indigenous concepts within their oppositional stance. Moreover it is a part of history which deserves to be recorded. The involvement by Maori in the anti-apartheid movement, with the exception of Aroha Harris' analysis in Hikoi, has been overlooked within the historiography and for the most part has been relegated to the margins. Even Ranginui Walker, who is regarded as the leading authority on Maori activism, has not pursued the issue. Nevertheless what Walker does provide is a framework within which to place all Maori activism. This has been utilised in this thesis. The involvement of many moderate and radical Maori activists in the anti-apartheid movement has been placed within the ongoing and wider struggle by Maori for equality, self-determination and justice.

Sometimes Maori activism is at a low level and at other times it builds to a high point. During the period covered in this thesis it was particularly strong, developing into a Maori rights movement which encompassed many issues. Maori activism cannot be pigeon-holed into discreet causes: all issues are intertwined and the kaupapa remains constant. The apartheid sport debate was one strand within a widespread activism. Through this debate Maori activists generated new spaces whereby domestic racism was brought to the consciousness of Pakeha New Zealand. Ultimately it became an avenue through which social change was effected, albeit at a rate slower than Maori activists would have wished.
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