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The Changing Face of Palestinian Leadership

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

The face of Palestinian leadership has developed and diversified greatly since the British Mandate period, with many groups claiming representation of the Palestinian people and the national movement. The unresolved matter of Palestinian leadership is central to Israeli occupation and any resolution. Established in 2005, the development and success of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement represents a new chapter in Palestinian leadership building upon Palestine’s established history of popular resistance. This thesis examines the effects of the BDS movement on the direction and strength of Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian national movement. Using a distributed leadership framework, the research analyses how the grassroots, transnational nature of the BDS movement has modernised and globalised the Palestinian struggle. The difficult political environment of the occupation has caused formal Palestinian leadership to be greatly compromised through the restrictions tied to the Oslo Accords and formal peace process. The organisational structure of the BDS movement allows it to operate outside of these realms, counter-positioning itself against the failed US-led diplomacy. The thesis questions the use of the common comparison of BDS with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; the wider politics of the situation and relationships between Palestinian leadership bodies differs vastly from those of apartheid South Africa. The comparative thread throughout the research is two-fold: an objective comparison of the BDS movement with anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; and an analysis of BDS’s own use of the comparison as a strategic and organisational tool. The recent rise of protest movements present an alternative to formal political institutions. The BDS movement represents a broader trend in political leadership as the advent of new media has shifted an element of power into grassroots mass movements. This thesis finds that the BDS movement has reintroduced grassroots resistance and leadership to the Palestinian political system. Its distributed leadership model has provided an alternative outlet that circumvents the restrictive formal political process. However, as the BDS movement does not seek the institutionalised power that any future Palestinian state requires, formal Palestinian leadership must incorporate the movement’s grassroots elements traditional to Palestine.
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Thank you to Mum, after six years you are now relieved of your proof-reading duties. To my friends, you no longer have to hear about my thesis but thank you for always listening and providing much-needed distraction. I promise I’m done.
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Abbreviations

AHC  Arab Higher Committee
AIPAC  American Israeli Public Affairs Committee
ALF  Arab Liberation Front
ANC  African National Congress
BDS  Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
BNC  BDS National Committee
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions
DFLP  Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
EU  European Union
IDF  Israel Defence Forces
MDM  Mass Democratic Movement
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation
oPt  Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA  Palestinian Authority
PACBI  Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel
PCP  Palestinian Communist Party (now PPP)
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation
PPP  Palestinian People’s Party (formerly PCP)
UDF  United Democratic Front
UN  United Nations
UNHRC  United Nations Human Rights Council
UNLU  Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
## Glossary

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<tr>
<td>Al-Nakba</td>
<td>‘The Catastrophe’ – the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertive action</td>
<td>The valued power of the strength of the aggregate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>Pre-1967 borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterarchy</td>
<td>Unranked power sharing arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intifada</td>
<td>Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quartet</td>
<td>Peace mediation team of the UN, EU, US, and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafrigh</td>
<td>The placing of civilian members onto an organisation’s payroll</td>
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Introduction

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement was established in 2005 and has quickly grown in prominence and power. The movement has influenced high profile cases such as SodaStream’s withdrawal from the West Bank following increased negative publicity after Scarlett Johansson’s endorsement saw her leave her role with Oxfam. The BDS movement is firmly established as a form of Palestinian leadership that is central to one of the longest ongoing conflicts. By way of introducing our study of BDS, this section highlights key issues and questions that shape the research: the role of leadership; the nature of leadership in Palestine; the complexities and challenges for analysis of Palestinian leadership; and the impact of technological change and globalisation upon modern leadership forms. This thesis examines how Palestinian leadership is developing in response to the changing socio-political environment. What effects have new global political and social relations had upon modern Palestinian leadership? Why have these developments had an effect? While the BDS movement represents a new chapter in Palestinian leadership, it is built upon Palestine’s long established history of popular resistance. Examining how it differs from previous boycott-based campaigns, through the application of a conceptual framework, illuminates how these new factors have contributed to the BDS movement becoming the most effective campaign to date.

Furthermore, as the movement models itself to a significant extent off the anti-apartheid movement against South Africa, engaging this comparative thread throughout the thesis will contribute another level of analysis to the research questions. The comparative thread throughout the research is two-fold: an objective comparison of the BDS movement with anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; and an analysis of the BDS movement’s own use of the comparison as a strategic and organisational tool. This study is important as the BDS movement is representative of modern transnational social movements that are altering the face of political leadership.

The BDS movement has its origins in centuries of boycott-based campaigns against Zionism and Israeli occupation. Formally established in 2005 by Palestinian civil society, the BDS movement has developed a global presence with organisational networks on numerous operational levels. Despite the international nature of the BDS movement, Palestinian ownership remains a core principle with the BDS National Committee (BNC) based in the West Bank. As its name suggests, the movement advocates boycotts, sanctions and
divestment against the state of Israel. The model draws strongly from the South African anti-apartheid movement which saw international pressure aid the cessation of apartheid policies; the BDS movement labels Israel an apartheid state. The movement is based upon three goals (Israeli obligations) which are non-negotiable: ending the occupation and dismantling the wall; equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel; and the right of return for Palestinian refugees as per UN resolution 194 (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). There is no set political agenda beyond achievement of these objectives. The BDS movement does not fit traditional leadership frameworks. Instead this thesis applies a conceptual toolkit drawing upon a distributed leadership framework, complemented by relational leadership and social movement leadership frameworks. This amalgamated distributed leadership framework provides a comprehensive means for analysing the organisational structure of the BDS movement incorporating the strong modern social movement components to be found therein.

Globalisation and technological change play large roles in the BDS movement’s distributed leadership organisational structure and success. The monumental changes induced by these two phenomena prompted development of a new area of political research – Politics 2.0. This field is an “intersection of social media, social and political sciences, and web technology” and relates directly to the research of this thesis (Shah, 2014, p. 188). By way of example, Van Stekelenburg and Roggeband (2013, p. xii) contend that the future of social movement research focus lies in the question “how are dynamics of contention influenced by the development toward globalisation, the diversification of societies, the more diffuse mobilising structures, and the emergences of new communication techniques?” Specific to this is the advent of social media (e.g. Twitter and Facebook), which is playing an increasing role in Arabic social movements as society shifts away from traditional vertical mainstream media, such as the large news conglomerates that have typically held a monopoly on information dissemination. Howard and Hussain (2013, p. 4) pose a central question for the research of modern social movement - “Where is social change possible through new communication networks? How have social movements operated across global contexts since the growth of digital media?” This thesis examines these broader research questions through examining the development of the BDS movement and how it is in turn developing Palestinian leadership.
Upon recent travel to the West Bank I witnessed the existence of numerous sources of Palestinian leadership, both competing and cooperating. A recent deal reached between Fatah, Hamas, and other political movements and independents has seen the formation of a national consensus government in an attempt to provide a unified source of Palestinian leadership. Until this development, leadership of the Palestinian national movement could be identified through a number of channels: the multi-factional Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO); the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank; the Hamas-led government in Gaza; the community-led popular resistance (e.g. the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee that focuses on strengthening grassroots resistance between Palestinian villages); and the BDS movement. These groups do not form a homogenous representation of Palestinian leadership, with each organisation differing in its goals and means of goal achievement. The separate channels of Palestinian leadership arose under (and often as a result of) disparate political, economic and social conditions.

The literature asserts that leadership is inextricably linked to the success or failure of a political or social movement. Nashif (2009, p. 163) states that “one of the productive ways of grasping political reality is the study of political leadership.” Analysing the development and nature of the leadership of a political movement over time is a valuable means of evaluating the movement itself. The modern study of political leadership extends far beyond the traditional ‘legitimate’ sources stemming from states and their associated governments. The political movement for the freedom of Palestine from occupation, whether through a one- or two-state solution, has been active since the early 20th century. The face of Palestinian leadership has developed and diversified greatly since the British Mandate period (1923-1948), with many groups claiming representation of the Palestinian people and the national movement. The question of Palestinian leadership has a long history, becoming particularly important with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the occupation of the Palestinian Territories in 1967. The unresolved matter of Palestinian leadership is central to contesting the Israeli occupation and shaping any acceptable resolution. The newest forms of Palestinian leadership have come to reflect the increasing dissatisfaction with traditional forms of Palestinian leadership and the related formal peace processes. They are instead founded upon grassroots leadership and utilise the opportunities presented by globalisation and modern technology.
The BDS movement combines Palestine’s history of boycott-based popular resistance with the modern political and social environment. The research questions of the thesis are:

- Have previous Palestinian boycott-based campaigns engaged distributed leadership models and were these successful?
- To what extent does the BDS movement employ a distributed leadership model and how is this model important to its success?
- As a modern social movement, what effects have globalisation and technology had upon the organisational structure of the BDS movement?
- How does the BDS movement’s non-traditional leadership interact with other forms of Palestinian leadership, and how does it affect the Palestinian national movement?

Analysis of Palestinian leadership is complicated for a number of reasons. Palestine exists as a quasi-state and while it has the trappings of state and institutional apparatus, it does not have the corresponding power and freedom. Similarly, political leadership can act only within Israeli-determined confines. Equally, Palestinian leadership exists in many different forms and locations, both traditional (e.g. political movements such as Fatah and the formal representative organisation the PLO) and non-traditional, such as BDS. Finally, Palestinian leadership does not exist solely within Palestine, but has come to be dispersed and active globally. The difficult political environment of the occupation has caused formal Palestinian leadership to be greatly compromised through the restrictions tied to the Oslo Accords and formal peace process. The grassroots basis of the BDS movement provides an alternate leadership model and as a result circumvents many of the restraints the traditional leadership faces. The organisational structure of the BDS movement allows it to operate outside of these realms, counter-positioning itself against the failed US-led diplomacy. The BDS movement concurrently challenges and cooperates with other forms of Palestinian leadership.

The conceptual framework uses six criteria to measure distributed leadership: heterarchical structure; informal and formal leadership; transnational character; concertive action; conjoint agency; and frame resonance. Heterarchical structure denotes an unranked power-sharing arrangement that allows for numerous leadership configurations; the level
of heterarchy present represents the development of diffuse leadership and diverse organisational networks. The presence of informal and formal leadership increases the flexibility of power-sharing arrangements and ability to function in both institutional- and community-based realms. Concertive action is the valuing of the strength of the aggregate which accounts for the potential power of every aspect of the organisation. Conjoint agency flows from concertive action and is the presence of natural synergy within these different elements of the collective. Transnational character is the geographical distribution of leadership, linked to globalisation. Frame resonance reflects a movement’s message transversing geographical, social and cultural boundaries in a context-sensitive manner. Together these criteria provide a means of analysing the presence of a distributed leadership model; the progress of the BDS movement can be tracked over time against each criterion. While the existence of a distributed leadership model does not signify leadership success in itself, it does provide a useful basis for examining how this non-traditional leadership model impacts upon Palestinian leadership and what the unique operating structure of the BDS movement means for Palestinian leadership in a wider sense. Analysing the degree of distributed leadership present in the campaigns draws a correlation between the long-term success of a boycott-based campaign and the distributed leadership model. The application of the framework to the historical Palestinian boycott campaigns traces the development (or lack thereof) of the model against varying levels of campaign success, with each criteria able to be individually analysed.

The thesis is divided into in eight chapters. Mindful of the research questions established in chapter one, chapter two sets up the conceptual framework, beginning with an assessment of traditional leadership frameworks before detailing the non-traditional frameworks which contribute to the six criteria constituting the distributed leadership framework. Chapter three provides a literature review and examines the existing literature and application of traditional frameworks to Palestinian leadership, in addition to the literature on BDS and its South African comparator in the anti-apartheid movement. Chapter four outlines the methodology of the thesis, justifying the qualitative approach of the research and use of a comparative thread to the project. Chapter five provides the historical context of boycott-based campaigns in Palestinian resistance, working through the three major campaigns since the 20th century as well as the modern origins of the BDS movement. Each of these provides a critical juncture to which the distributed leadership
framework is applied. The framework permits identification of the presence (or indeed absence) of distributed leadership criteria and the ways in which this affected the boycott campaigns of the past. Chapter six details the formal establishment of the BDS movement and its organisational structure. Subsequent analysis is structured around three critical junctures provided by the major Israeli military operations against Palestinian resistance in Gaza since 2005. These military operations greatly shifted the Israel-Palestine conflict and thus the opportunities for the development of the BDS movement. Chapter seven then positions the development of the BDS movement’s distributed leadership model against broader Palestinian power relations and its impact assessed. Chapter eight summarises the BDS movement as the changing face of Palestinian leadership through the distributed leadership framework analysis.
2.0 Conceptual Framework

Traditional political leadership theory is applied to leadership of formal state political systems and institutions such as regime leadership, political parties and governments. There is a wealth of theory on both political parties and individual leaders but the popular resistance within Palestine (of which the BDS movement is part) does not fit easily into such frameworks: BDS transverses both political and social movement, and national and transnational leadership frameworks. The three goals that form the basis of the BDS movement are both political and social: ending the occupation and dismantling the wall; equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel; and the right of return for Palestinian refugees as per UN resolution 194 (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). Political in that they challenge and involve nation states and their governments, and the Israel-Palestine issue is viewed in the mainstream as a political issue, and social in that the BDS movement has a strong focus on equality and rights. Despite purposefully not prescribing a political solution, the BDS movement still exists within both political and social movement realms; it is a social movement that provides political leadership. The BDS movement similarly encapsulates both national and transnational frameworks as it is based on a Palestinian national movement and the central leadership (the BDS National Committee) is Palestinian. However, the BDS movement is a globalised movement with distributed leadership and networks among numerous countries; its strength and success relies upon this transnational character. For these reasons a distributed leadership framework will be the dominant framework applied, complemented by elements from relational and social movement leadership frameworks to customise the framework for a ‘best fit’ with the BDS movement.

Defining the term leadership has proved a constant challenge to scholars over the decades. Stogdill (1974, p. 259) argues that “there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.” How leadership is defined depends upon the purpose of the research causing definitions to be “arbitrary and subjective” (Yukl, 2006, p. 8). This research uses a definition of leadership that is broadened beyond the traditional scope of individual leaders and hierarchical power relations. Leadership is the “contributing to social order, introducing major change, giving meaning and purpose to work and to organizations, empowering followers, and infusing organizations with values and ideology” (Clark & Clark as cited in Bass & Bass, 2008, p.24).
This chapter evaluates leadership models in order to establish a working set of leadership framework criteria for analysis. To this end the chapter is structured into three main parts. First, an evaluation of traditional leadership frameworks focussing on the dominance of the transformation-transactional dichotomy and Weber’s ideal types of authority in mainstream leadership theory. Second, an evaluation of non-traditional leadership frameworks assessing the conceptual features of distributed, relational and social movement frameworks. Third, based on the preceding evaluations, establishment of a definition and justification of the key criteria through which BDS leadership might be conceptualised and evaluated over time. The onus of this chapter then is to establish an appropriate framework of analysis for the BDS movement. The following chapter provides a literature review which in turn expands on the application and implications of this framework for Palestinian leadership.

2.1 Traditional Leadership Frameworks

Traditional leadership frameworks have provided immeasurable insight into and value for the study of political leadership. However, traditional frameworks are limited in their ability to account for non-hierarchical and decentralised leadership structures as the focus has largely been on leaders in the singular sense. In the field of professional leadership studies a cyclical process has tended to occur, alternating between favouring ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ leadership frameworks. The terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ represent the concentration of power and organisational structure, rather than describing the efficacy of the overall leadership. Early to mid-20th century scholarship centred on individual leaders and the characteristics and methods that made a leader ‘great’ through a subsequent political regime e.g. Mussolini and fascism, Lenin and communism (Paige, 1977, pp. 12-15). Arafat’s transformation of the PLO during the late 1960s, from a tool of the Arab states to a guerrilla movement and then Palestinian national institution that shaped the national movement, is a prime example (see Parsons, 2013b; Khalidi, 2013).

The terms ‘leadership’ and ‘leader’ did not feature highly in academic publications until electoral and voting behaviour studies became common-place in the latter half of the 20th century (Blondel, 1987, p. 36). There arose a general disillusionment with established
strong leadership frameworks (such as the trait theory) in the 1970s as scholars believed the topic had become exhausted and irrelevant. The sole emphasis placed on leaders was replaced by behavioural frameworks that shifted the focus towards rational behaviour e.g. path-goal theory and normative decision theory (Yukl, 1999, p. 285). However, interest in strong leadership was revived by the 1980s with the rise of theories such as Burns’ (1978) transformational-transitional dichotomy and the popular expansion of Weber’s (1947) charismatic leadership (Shamir B., 1999, pp. 49-50).

These strong leadership frameworks were based upon leadership typology and thus a singular leader. Weber first wrote of types of authority in the early 1900s with charismatic authority providing the basis for charismatic leadership frameworks. The charismatic leadership theory placed importance upon emotions and values of followers, but only with regards to the role of the leader and how charisma is used to influence followers. Burns’ transformational-transitional leadership framework became the dominant means of leader analysis of the time. Transformational leaders are defined as ‘event-makers’ who challenge the existing processes and institutions; they advocate previously unrealised wants and needs and create a new vision (Rotberg, 2012, pp. 22-23). This is contrasted with transactional leaders who work within the established framework with a specific focus on the mechanisms of statecraft and electoral success, exchanging only pre-existing interests with followers (Rotberg, 2012, p. 23). This mode of analysis focuses on singular leaders, despite the potential for the framework to have been expanded and developed to evaluate leadership organisations as either transformational or transitional.

Strong leadership theories, as well as numerous other traditional frameworks, are highly applicable to other forms of Palestinian leadership such as charismatic leadership, most notably personified by the late Fatah-leader and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat. The clan system, and Husseini and Nashashibi families, dominated Palestinian leadership during the British Mandate and continued through to the Great Revolt (1936-1939). Leadership was a battle of personalities, not subject to democratic procedure, resulting in hierarchical, top-down power structures that eventually co-opted the grassroots movement (Jamali, 2008; Qumsiyeh, 2011). The application of leadership frameworks to Palestinian leadership will be further examined in the corresponding section of the literature review.
The transformational-transitional and charismatic leadership frameworks remain in wide circulation; however both theories impose strict limitations to the scope of the leadership that may be analysed. Yukl (1999, p. 286) points to conceptual weaknesses in each theory: “ambiguous constructs, insufficient description of explanatory processes, a narrow focus on dyadic processes, omission of some relevant behaviours, insufficient specification of limiting conditions (situational variables), and a bias toward heroic conceptions of leadership.” This dyadic component of these strong leadership theories largely sees the focus limited to two variables and a causal relationship – how the leader influences the followers. However, as evidenced by Arafat’s leadership of the PLO, this dyadic approach over-simplifies the independence of the leader variable. As both a transformational and charismatic leader, Arafat’s leadership influenced and was influenced by numerous variables: followers, the changing political context, and the organisational structure of the PLO. Whilst Arafat had an important direct influence on his followers, these strong leadership theories fail to give adequate impetus to alternative variables.

The traditional strong leadership theories are unsuitable frameworks for the analysing the BDS movement as organisational processes, relationships and structures are largely overlooked. Yukl (1999, pp. 287-288) identifies eight key group-level processes unaccounted for by dyadic processes:

1. how well the work is organized to utilize personnel and resources;
2. how well inter-related group activities are coordinated;
3. the amount of member agreement about objectives and priorities;
4. mutual trust and cooperation among members;
5. the extent of member identification with the group;
6. member confidence in the capacity of the group to attain its objectives;
7. the procurement and efficient use of resources; and
8. external coordination with other parts of the organization and outsiders.

As these are the key features of the BDS movement’s leadership that set it apart from other sources of Palestinian leadership, an appropriate framework will have most of its focus on these organisational components.
These strong leadership theories came to be replaced with the weak leadership theories of shared and distributed leadership; they were deemed more appropriate for “flattened and transient systems that employ remote, virtually connected, and temporary members” (Shamir B., 1999, p. 50). The more traditional leadership frameworks struggled to account for the shifting leadership and organisational dynamics that resulted from the opportunities provided by globalisation and advancements in technology. Distributed leadership theories had been proposed decades earlier and, while failing at first to have a major impact on leadership frameworks, provided a starting point for the shift in the 1990s (see Gibb, 1958; 1968, Benne & Sheats, 1948; Katz and Khan, 1978). The advent of the digital age, in conjunction with globalisation, removed traditional organisational constraints on society. Globalisation has altered “the practice of local politics because of the dispersion of political actors whose interest and influence affect local politics . . . Power dynamics are no longer geographically localised, they are now globally spread” (Takavarasha, Cox, & Bigirimana, 2014, pp. 368-369). These developments greatly increased the capacity and complexity of collective leadership initiatives e.g. social movements. A reassessment of how political leadership is framed was required to accommodate and analyse the growing influence of non-traditional leadership.

2.2 Non-traditional Leadership Frameworks

This section begins with an examination of distributed leadership, widening to include the associated and supplementary relational and transnational social movement frameworks. For the purposes of this research, the relational and transnational models serve as a subset within the primary distributed leadership framework. Theories and analysis of social movement leadership are often naturally encompassed by an overarching distributed leadership framework due to the organisational structure of many social movements. The relational and transnational social movement frameworks augment the toolkit for analysing BDS. There is no pre-existing set of distributed leadership criteria formally established as a framework for analytical purposes. Part of the original contribution made by this thesis is to suggest one such set. This is done through a careful and critical examination of distributed leadership in conjunction with relational and transnational social movement frameworks.
2.2.1 Distributed Leadership Framework

Gronn (2002) and Yukl (1999) are proponents of the shift towards weak leadership theories, arguing that leadership scholarship would be better informed by using a unit of analysis based upon patterns of distributed and shared leadership that focuses on collective leadership. Yukl (1999, pp. 292-293) defines this leadership typology as:

A shared process of enhancing the collective and individual capacity of people to accomplish their work roles effectively. This alternative conception of leadership does not require an individual who can perform all of the essential leadership functions, only a set of people who collectively perform them.

Some leadership functions (e.g., making important decisions) may be shared by several members of a group, some leadership functions may be allocated to individual members, and a particular leadership function may be performed by different people at different times. The leadership actions of any individual leader are much less important than the collective leadership.

Distributed leadership criticises the leader-follower and leader-member exchange (LMX) theories that hold a hierarchical leader as a central tenet, and instead allows a wide range of member and leadership relations (such as horizontal or indirect) to inform the leadership framework.

The term ‘leader’ still features within the distributed leadership framework but in a less formal sense and with the emphasis on the value of the collective. Harris (2009, p. 5) states that distributed leadership is not simply the antithesis of hierarchical leadership:

Distributed leadership essentially involves both the vertical and lateral dimensions of leadership practice. Distributed leadership encompasses both formal and informal forms of leadership practice within its framing, analysis and interpretation. It is primarily concerned with the co-performance of leadership and the reciprocal interdependencies that shape the leadership practice.

Harris suggests there is a broad misconception in the literature about the character of distributed leadership in that distributed does not denote egalitarian. Gronn (2009, p. 208) writes that recent research has indicated distributed leadership features a hybrid of hierarchical and heterarchical ordering. Where hierarchy denotes a ranked, vertical power order, heterarchy describes an unranked and horizontal power-sharing arrangement that
allows numerous ranking configurations. Such a structure featured during the early stages of the first Intifada with the leadership of both the popular committees and UNLU organised vertically and flexibly, incorporating the grassroots populace and numerous political factions (Robinson, 1997). This leadership directly contrasted with that of the hierarchical, elite-led Great Revolt. Harris (2009, p. 9) stresses the importance of distributed leadership as it has not only a solid theoretical framework, but also an encouraging (though not yet conclusive) empirical basis.

Gronn (2002, p. 428) contends that orthodox leadership frameworks (e.g. leader-followers) are prescriptive, rather than descriptive, creating an inability to reflect the continually changing labour dynamics within a group. These orthodox frameworks can fail to accommodate leadership practices that are adaptive in nature, deviating from the prescription, and therefore overlook many real life practices. Although Gronn (2002; 2008) developed his distributed leadership framework for the discipline of education, the framework is widely applicable and well articulated. Drawing on a number of distributed leadership scholars, Gronn (2002, p. 429) states that the weight of leadership cannot be measured in one individual, but must instead be an aggregate of leadership within the organisation. In this view, leadership may be measured in some, many, or all of the organisation’s members as each may play a leadership role at some point regardless of their differing positions. Gronn (2002, p. 429) clarifies that it is not cumulative individual acts that is the unit of analysis for distributed leadership, but instead the holistic notion of “concertive action”. There are three forms of concertive action: spontaneous collaboration in which leadership expands beyond social and situational contexts; intuitive working relations arising from organisations’ interdependence and thus shared space working and social space; and institutionalised practices which formalise structural relations (Gronn, 2002, p. 430).

Emanating from concertive action is conjoint agency. Gronn (2002, pp. 431-432) states that “to the extent that conjoint agency is contractual, the contract is a psychological bond (through synergy) which strengthens a coincidence of efforts, goals, and resources in the pursuit of mutually agreed ends.” Thus, distributed leadership requires the strength and effects of leadership to be examined in an organisation (or collaboration of organisations) as a whole, rather than focussing primarily on an individual or exclusive leadership team.
The distributed leadership framework extends the notion of leadership to allow for new organisational structures and methods that have partially arisen from advancements in technology. The BDS movement is a prime example of these new structures and methods permitted by technological developments e.g. Facebook, Twitter, smartphones and access to email, and blogs. BDS movements exist in numerous countries and numerous places within these countries. They are able to operate as independent entities whilst contributing to and remaining linked to the wider BDS movement through electronic communications. Nearly every aspect of the BDS movement employs social media both as a means of organisation and protest. While distributed leadership organisations are not conditional upon technological advancements, this aspect of Gronn’s framework raises questions about the role of technology for comparison with the anti-apartheid movement, with claims that the BDS movement is progressing at a much faster rate (Nieuwhof, 2010; Murray, 2008; Awwad, 2012).

2.2.2 Relational Leadership Framework

Arguably, the distributed leadership framework is inextricably linked with the relational leadership framework as both focus on the connections that construct collective leadership. Traditional leadership theory views ‘relational’ in terms of independent individuals and subsequent relationships, as previously evidenced with Arafat’s leadership of the PLO. Relational leadership challenges this, proposing a redefinition of ‘relational’ as “a view of leadership and organisation as human social constructions that emanate from the rich connections and interdependencies of organisations and their members” (Uhl-Bien, 2006, p. 655). Like distributed leadership, relational leadership expands leadership beyond the individual and traditional hierarchical structures. Hunt and Dodge (2000, p. 448) define the parameters and central tenets of the relational leadership framework:

The relational focus is one that moves beyond unidirectional or even reciprocal leader/follower relationships to one that recognizes leadership wherever it occurs; is not restricted to a single or even small set of formal or informal leaders; and, in its strongest form, functions as a dynamic system embedding leadership, environmental, and organizational aspects.
Echoing distributed leadership, Uhl-Bien (2006, p. 662) (drawing on Foucalt) iterates relational leadership’s focus on the collective dynamic, viewing power not as commodity for individuals but as a distributed social process. Traditional leadership framework analysis of traits, behaviours, leader typology and techniques are replaced with an examination of the emergence of processes of leadership and management in organisations (Uhl-Bien, 2006, p. 662). Relational leadership framework questions:

- How realities of leadership are interpreted within the network of relations
- How organisations are designed, directed, controlled and developed on the bases of collectively generated knowledge about organizational realities
- How decisions and actions are embedded in collective sense-making and attribution processes

(Uhl-Bien, 2006, p.662; Dachler, 1992, p. 171)

Such questions are appropriate not only for examining the BDS movement, but also the PLO. A relational approach explores the organisational relations that the earlier strong leadership frameworks did not account for. The PLO leadership used *tafrigh*, the placing of civilian members (primarily Fatah) onto the payroll during the 1970s as a management process for bureaucratisation. “*Tafrih extended to the leadership and principal cadres of the civilian organization as well as the ‘mass organizations’*” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 460).

Uhl-Bien (2006, p. 668) stipulates that the relational leadership approach is not a theory but an overarching framework, as it may be applied to numerous methods and approaches of examining the relational dynamics of leadership. Murrell (1997, p. 39) furthers the scope of the relational leadership framework stating that at the collective level it suggests that the “whole process by which social systems change and . . . the socially constructed roles and relationships developed that might be labeled leadership.” In this regard, the relational leadership framework contains the capacity to look at leadership and the role of social movements in society. This framework requires analysing the degree to which the BDS movement is rooted in Palestinian society and/or international activism. Gronn (2009) also addresses the issue of power, disputing Hatcher’s (as cited in Gronn, 2009, p. 210) claim that power is a separate phenomenon that “over-determines all other dimensions”. Gronn believes Hatcher is correct in questioning the relation between power and
leadership, but that power is not an independent variable that triumphs over the influence of distributed leadership.

2.2.3 Social Movement Leadership Framework

Social movement leadership and organisational theories and analysis often fall under the distributed leadership framework. Conceptually, a social movement is comprised of four elements: informal networks of interaction; shared beliefs and solidarity; collective action on a contentious issue; and various forms of action largely outside of institutional realms (Della Porta, 2011). Upon reviewing conceptual definitions of social movements, Diani (1992) proposes that cultural and political movements be encapsulated within the broader social movement category. “Social movement actors are engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change either at the systemic or non-systemic level” (Diani, 1992, p. 11).

Della Porta (2011, p. 2440) states that during the past two decades transnational social movement organisations have grown significantly with regards to numbers, resources and membership, public resonance, and institutional access. Globalisation and the subsequent development of transnationalism has led to an “interplay of actors at different geographical levels, going beyond disciplinary borders between internal and international politics” (Della Porta, 2011, p. 2440). Globalisation is the “integration of separate nations, regions, or even individuals into a wider global system . . . characterised by increasing the linkages and connections between peoples and countries and by the growing knowledge of these interactions” (Milner, 2011, p. 973). The advancement of technology one of the main factors in the spread and speed of globalisation. Transnationalism is best defined as “not an enmeshed or bound network, but rather as a honeycomb, a structure which sustains and gives shapes to the identities of nation-states, institutions and particular social and geographic space” (Clavin, 2005, p. 439). Transnationalism sees institutions, individuals and ideas replaced by new organisations and networks. Klotz (2002, p. 63) proposes that for social movement theory to be adapted to transnational activism, the success of a movement must be assessed over three areas: states, international institutions and civil society. Transnational social movement analysis requires expanding the framework to account for the targeting of broader power structures.
Brown and Hosking (1986) directly apply a distributed leadership framework to social movements, while Morris and Staggenborg (2004) use the framework as part of their analysis of social movement leadership. Keck and Sikkink (1999), Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield (1997), Tarrow (2011), and van Stekelenburg and Roggeband (2013) all examine social movements within the social movement discipline, analysing from a wider global political point of view and using social movements as a framework in and of themselves. Advocating for a bottom-up distributed leadership system in social movements, Brown and Hosking (1986, pp. 72-73) highlight the difficulties that this approach incurs. Decision-making without the presence of formal authority or positional power causes complications in managing relationships, resources, activities and values. Brown and Hosking (1986, p. 72) state that these difficulties cumulate to form a larger issue:

The dilemma of how to achieve a sufficient degree of ‘order’, to provide the basis for action, but not too much. The latter would involve . . . the loss of flexibility, the maintenance of the present order tak[ing] over as the valued ‘end state’ to be preserved, unchanged, at all cost.

This potentiality mirrors the social movement development model used by Zald and Ash (1966). The Weber-Michels institutionalisation and goal displacement model reasons that as a social movement establishes a social and economic base amongst broader society, leadership is replaced by a bureaucratic structure that accommodates itself to the societal base – as occurred with the PLO in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. This results in three changes: goal transformation, organisational maintenance, and oligarchisation (Zald & Ash, 1966, p. 327). The Weber-Michels model uses charismatic leadership as a starting point, with this developing into formal bureaucracy, and produces a “maintenance of the present order” – an appropriate framework for Arafat and the PLO (and the deterioration of the first Intifada) and one that will be examined in the Palestinian leadership literature review. Brown and Hosking (1986) use the distributed leadership framework and deduce a similar risk for social movements, suggesting certain homogenies regardless of the leadership framework. But as Kriesi (1996, p. 156) emphasises, such social movement transformations are not certainties and remain conditional.
Distributed leadership is arguably an inherent feature among transnational social movements (and networks) due to their obvious internationally dispersed organisational structure. Where once multinational corporations were the sole representation of transnationalism, the focus has shifted to transnational social action (Klotz, 2002, p. 50). Organisations and platforms such as Avaaz and Change.org are built entirely upon connecting people globally, facilitated by the internet, to create transnational campaigns around specific political and social causes. However, the nature of the social movement organisations has largely been generalised, with Klotz arguing that the differences between types and relationships of non-state actors have been overlooked: “critical differences abound in agenda, organization, ideology and class-base” (Klotz, 2002, p. 50). The trend amongst transnational social movements is towards decentralised and informal coalition arrangements (Smith J., 2005, p. 235). Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 182) argue that distributed leadership models highlight “the importance of interactions among participants and networks within movements in the exercise of leadership of organizing skills.” They also propose that cooperation among organisations within the movement increases when there is either heightened opportunity or threat (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 182).

Within a distributed leadership framework, Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 188) propose more hierarchical ideal leadership ‘tiers’. The first tier encompasses the uppermost formal leadership positions; the second consists of the immediate leadership team of those in the highest positions; the third tier is ‘bridge’ leaders – community mediators between top leadership and followers who are responsible for executing master plans; and the final tier is made up of organisers who engage both with connecting members and helping organisations, but still have active leadership roles. Although the leadership is distributed, Morris and Staggenborg (2004) endorse a hierarchical division of labour within the distribution.

The distributed leadership within transnational movements creates ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ leaders and with that, a potential North-South divide. ‘Inside’ leaders are those who are local and with strong ties to affected communities; ‘outside’ leaders tend to be in more privileged and removed positions. The advantages of a combination of the two are potential increased resources, skills and attention which can then widen the range of options available to the movement (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 178). Disadvantages exist in possible ideological differences and disproportionate influence of outsiders due to varying skill levels. Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 178) state that such conflicts are not
surprising given the structural pressures and cultural differences existing in insider-outsider interactions. However, they conclude that the diversity provided by insider-outsider movement leadership increases the overall strategic capacity (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 181). The inside-outside feature can translate further into a North-South divide, with insider activists from the less developed South and their outsider counterparts from the North (Smith, 2002, p. 508). However potential benefits can occur. Northern groups can increase their credibility by not appearing to be acting ‘for’ those in the South, but instead ‘with’ them. Southern groups are provided with greater leverage and information than they would have independently (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 93).

A survey of human rights transnational social movements showed huge disparities between the use of and access to technology as a means of communication between North and South groups (Smith J., 2005, p. 242). The constant proliferation of technology is bridging this divide, as witnessed by the live Twitter feeds from Gaza during Operation Protective Edge which directly connected those in the North with the events in Gaza. However, differences between operational mechanisms and capabilities of the global north and south still remain. Technology is becoming an increasingly inseparable method of organisation for social movements. Bennett (2005, p. 218) states that transnational protests have moved beyond conventional organisation, featuring hyper-organisation in the form of website, email and now social media communication. These new features allow for exceptionally fast organisation in the absence of a central organisational structure. A new model of transnational social movement network organisation sees a polycentric, distributed structure that is composed of diverse networks mobilised through a technological infrastructure (Bennett, 2005, p. 215).

The North-South activist interaction, and indeed the prevalence of transnationalism amongst movements, can be seen as a product of globalisation. Drawing upon existing social movement literature, van Stekelenburg and Roggeband (2013, p. xiv) conclude that social movement evolution is a response to globalisation and its processes, explaining the increase in transnationalism. The transnational character that many social movements and organisations are assuming is described by Falk (1993) as ‘globalisation-from-below’. Falk (1993, p. 39) applies this term to describe international civil society that forms a network of “transnational social forces animated by environmental concerns, human rights, hostility to
patriarchy, and a vision of human community based on the unity of the diverse cultures seeking an end to poverty, oppression, humiliation, and collective violence.” The literature suggests a shift in both social movement leadership and organisational practices that seek to develop the role of an international civil society in order to use globalisation to their advantage.

Whether applying a distributed leadership framework, or closely related variation, there is broad consensus amongst the social movement literature on the role of framing. Keck and Sikkink (1999), Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield (1997), Alger (1997), and Kriesberg (1997) all address framing with regards to the role of transnational social movements in global politics and policy setting. But as Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 180) point out, framing is reliant on leadership, and the ability and capacity of leadership is in turn reliant on the organisational structures and networks. Benford and Snow (2000, p. 613) state that social movements are not “carriers” of ideas and meanings, but rather “signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meanings for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers.” Keck and Sikkink (1999, p. 96) propose that an effective collective action frame “must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions.” The framing of an issue plays a large part in the success of a social movement, especially its ability to translate internationally; an organisation must be able to achieve ‘frame resonance’.

Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 184) state that due to the great importance and difficulty of framing work, the role is undertaken by leaders and leadership teams. Different approaches are taken depending on the leadership structure in an organisation. Resources, decision-making and agency may be centralised in leaders, allowing them greater autonomy over the framing process, or an organisation may distribute the leadership-associated framing work (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 184). Drawing on Ganz’s work on diverse leadership, Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 184) suggest that the more diverse the leadership, the wider the range of problems that can be addressed to provide a more effective framework. However, Rochon’s (1998, pp. 22-25) two-step process proposes that ‘critical communities’ are where the framing values originate. It is these values that then circulate through society upon which they are subsumed by a social
movement. Movements “coalesce around the perspectives developed in the critical community”, evolving into effective ideological frames which mobilise activists and create social and political support (Rochon, 1998, pp. 30-31). Framing emanates from original critical communities, but requires the social movement leadership to transform values into ideological framing that resonates more broadly.

An important external actor in framing is the media. Noakes and Wilkins (2002, p. 650) propose that media frames are situated “between the collection action frames advanced by social movements and the ‘mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.’” Framing results in an interactive relationship between how the media interprets and presents issues, and how social movements engage and mobilise ‘extra-institutional political action’ (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 650). Both social movement and individual frames interact with and are influenced by media framing; the framing process employed by a movement is not a standalone process (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 651). Tarrow (1994, pp. 119, 123) contends that media “do as much if not more to control the construction of meaning than state or social actors” and therefore social movements must vie for “cultural supremacy” against not only states and counter-movements, but also the media. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, p. 115) state that the interaction between social movements and the media is a transaction between two highly complicated systems. Each actor has multifaceted internal relationships. Social movements can be composed of numerous groups with differing media strategies; media outlets all have internal working relationships, but also operate in distinct national and international political economies (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 115). Not only must the framing of a social movement be context-sensitive for the local populace, but also for the media who engage with and influence the communication of the framing.

2.3 Leadership Framework Criteria

Drawing on the work outlined above, this section establishes the leadership framework criteria used to analyse BDS leadership. Due to my epistemological and ontological positioning, selection of framework criteria as means of analysis follows the interpretivist approach that the research employs. This positioning will be elaborated in chapter four. As noted above, there is no ready-made set of criteria upon which to draw although the six
criteria outlined below are all drawn from the existing literature, primarily the distributive leadership framework, augmented by the relational and social movement frameworks.

**Heterarchical Structure**

Heterarchical structure denotes an unranked power-sharing arrangement with numerous potential configurations and is the first organisational criterion. Distributive leadership requires the presence of some form of heterarchy in the organisational structure. However this is not to say that hierarchy must be also be absent, recalling Gronn’s (2009, p. 208) premise that distributed heterarchical leadership does not equate to egalitarianism. Distributed leadership is likely to feature a mixture of hierarchical and heterarchical leadership arrangements, and it is the degree to which heterarchy is present that is an important measure; this is so because the level of heterarchy corresponds to the level of development of diffuse leadership and diverse organisational networks. Furthermore, examining the organisational structure of the leadership allows for follow-up analysis of where power and leadership potential lie.

**Informal and Formal Leadership**

The presence of both informal and formal leadership provides the second organisational criterion. Whilst this is linked to the criteria above, it has separate implications for the nature of the movement and the flexibility of power-sharing arrangements. Informal and formal leadership perform distinct roles, operating in different organisational networks, but need not exist in a hierarchical structure. Having both these forms of leadership present allows increased functioning of the organisation in various realms (e.g. institutional, community-based), with the leadership remaining linked and unified. The combination of these forms of leadership would include the presence of Morris and Staggenborg’s (2004, p. 188) ideal leadership tiers which sees a natural (and arguably necessary) coexistence of informal and formal leadership.

**Concertive Action**

Concertive action focuses on the strength of the aggregate rather than individual efforts and is an operational criterion. Distributed leadership must value the collective over the
individual. This focus takes into account the entirety of the potential power of every aspect of the organisation when working as a whole. Gronn (2002, p. 430) proposes three types of concertive action: spontaneous collaboration, intuitive working relations and institutionalised practices. This typology allows scope for analysis based on whether concertive action is present, and if so, in which forms. Concertive action is strongly tied to a heterarchical structure with a heterarchy naturally moving the focus away from individual pursuits and reward.

**Conjoint Agency**

Conjoint agency, like concertive action, is a mode of operating within a distributed leadership system. It examines the nature, rather than structure, of the organisation in question and is an operational criterion. The higher degree of conjoint agency present the greater the synergy for pursuit of a mutually agreed upon outcome. Conjoint agency cannot be forced and instead arises in relation to concertive action. Concertive action focuses on the strength of the aggregate and values the potential power of each element in different configurations; conjoint agency focuses on the presence of natural synergy within these different elements of the aggregate and is psychological rather than contractual. With regards to a distributed leadership framework, conjoint agency provides a means for an analysis of the wider operation of all organisations involved in the movement. The interactions of all organisations, and thus the degree to which conjoint agency is either present or absent, has significant effects upon the efficacy of the distributed leadership structure and thus the upon the strength of the movement.

**Transnational Character**

Transnational leadership is a geographical criterion which takes into account the organisational character of the movement. Where and how the movement’s leadership is spread is indicative of the geographical distribution and raises questions about the impact of globalisation upon distributed leadership. When a movement and its leadership are transnational, the likelihood of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ leadership is increased and so too the associated advantages and disadvantages. Transnationalism is closely linked to the development and use of technology.
Frame Resonance

While frame resonance is originally a feature of social movement leadership frameworks, the transnational character of many social movements naturally sees a distributed leadership structure emerge. Frame resonance is predominantly a geographical criterion as it is tied to transnational success. Frame resonance is important for distributed leadership as the movement’s message must traverse geographical, social, and culture boundaries. Framing must be both context-sensitive and unified. Analysis of frame resonance is in turn an analysis of distributed leadership, raising questions of the process for framing and who it is done by. Effective transnational frame resonance is unlikely to be centrally controlled.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined traditional leadership frameworks, finding significant limitations in their applicability to modern social movement leadership. A distributed leadership framework presents an effective form of analysis for the BDS movement, allowing for contemporary developments in leadership organisation and methods. The BDS movement presents a specialised leadership case as it transverses many leadership frameworks. The distributed leadership framework incorporates the elements of the BDS movement which set it apart from other forms of Palestinian leadership, such as its transnational nature and use of developing technology. The distributed leadership framework is strengthened when combined with social movement and frameworks; the BDS movement is a transnational social movement with relational networks that simultaneously provides political leadership to Palestine. A framework must allow analysis of the networks between organisations at local, regional and international levels all the while situating the movement in the current socio-political environment. With no established leadership framework criteria, six distributed leadership criteria have been extracted based on the existing literature: heterarchical structure, transnational character, informal and formal leadership, concertive action, conjoint agency, and frame resonance. These criteria examine both the organisational structure and nature of the leadership and demand a multi-dimensional analysis of the BDS movement. The following chapter will examine the use of leadership frameworks, both traditional and non-traditional, in existing literature on Palestinian leadership. Whilst a distributed leadership conceptual framework provides an effective means of analysing the modern leadership of the BDS movement, alternative frameworks
provide insight into the traditional Palestinian leadership which forms a crucial part of the history that has shaped Palestinian popular resistance.
3.0 Literature Review

Palestinian leadership exists in numerous forms and has developed to reflect a unique political environment. The Oslo accords provided partial self-governance with the creation of the PA, but as Palestinian politics remains bound by the Israeli occupation, grassroots popular resistance has co-evolved alongside the formal leadership. While the research focuses on the BDS movement, this modern leadership does not operate in isolation from other forms of Palestinian leadership. Palestinian leadership, both historical and current, is a significant factor in shaping the BDS movement. Mindful of the strength of conceptual and theoretical work on leadership in the abstract, and of the complex history and heterogeneity of Palestinian political leadership on an empirical level, this literature review is organised into two main sections. The first part reviews the existing literature on Palestinian leadership. Traditional leadership frameworks are highly applicable to numerous forms of Palestinian leadership, providing a useful background by which to juxtapose the newest form of Palestinian leadership – the BDS movement. This part is divided into sub-sections on leadership: the clan system during the British Mandate; Fatah and the PLO after the formation of Israel; Arafat as an individual charismatic leader; Hamas as a response to failed leadership; and Palestinian leadership within Israel. The second section focuses on three aspects of the BDS movement: existing literature on the BDS movement; comparison with the anti-apartheid movement and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; and the specific use of ‘Israeli apartheid’ in the literature. Due to the complex history of Palestinian leadership, the literature review concurrently provides an overview of the political context and each organisation's structure.

Traditional frameworks do not aptly account for the large role of technology and globalisation on the development of the BDS movement. While the literature on BDS identifies these important modern factors, applications of frameworks to analyse the effects on non-traditional leadership are absent. The goals of this literature review are to identify how certain frameworks are useful for forms of Palestinian leadership (important as the boycott-based campaigns exist in relation to the other sources of Palestinian leadership), and to highlight the need for BDS to be examined through an appropriate conceptual framework reflecting the new globalised and technological conditions under which it has developed. This thesis contributes to the field of modern Palestinian
leadership and the emerging scholarship on Politics 2.0 – the intersection of politics with technology and social media.

3.1 Palestinian Leadership

There is very little literature on Palestinian political leadership that directly applies a leadership framework to the empirical material, and those that do favour traditional frameworks. Until recently most Palestinian leadership aligned well with more classical leadership styles. The suitability of traditional leadership frameworks to Palestinian examples serves to highlight the differences between previous forms of leadership and the newer forms of popular resistance, the latter requiring adaptable non-traditional frameworks. The histories of the main sources of Palestinian political leadership have been well covered (particularly of mainstream political movements) though analyses of more contemporary developments are significantly more limited. The existing literature and corresponding traditional frameworks have a crucial inability to transfer to new and adapting forms of leadership that relate closely to developments in globalisation and technology. As the newest form of Palestinian leadership the BDS movement is inextricably linked with such developments. This area has yet to be comprehensively analysed through a conceptual framework and is the scope of this thesis.

Sahliyeh (1988), focusing on the West Bank, stated almost three decades ago that political trends existing within this complicated environment have received inadequate attention. Despite the date of publication, many of the questions raised by Sahliyeh (1988, p. 3) about Palestinian leadership still apply today:

Do they [West Bankers] possess sophisticated political institutions and a recognized, legitimate leadership capable of making crucial decisions and implementing them? . . . Will West Bank Palestinians, living under conditions of military occupation and influenced by strong pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist sentiments, continue to allow outside players to speak on their behalf, thereby diminishing the possibility of local initiatives? Will they try to adapt to Israel’s occupation by developing their own political institutions and leadership . . . Or will they seek political rights within Israel, as many of their fellow Palestinians did after 1948?
These questions have been raised since the occupation of the Palestinian Territories in 1967, yet only minimal advances have been made in answering them. The Oslo Accords and resulting formation of the PA failed to produce the anticipated break-through, despite receiving assistance and billions of dollars over many years.

3.1.1 1923-1948: Leadership under the British Mandate

Palestinian leadership first reached a crisis during the British Mandate period. Nashif (1977; 2009) examines the development of Palestinian political leadership during this period and how the challenge to Palestinian identity had adverse effects. A clan system was the main determinant of Palestinian leadership; Arab mayors constituted the Palestinian leadership, with the Husseini family dominating these positions. With the British Mandate, the Arab Higher Committee was established in 1936 and Amin Husseini was selected by the British as mufti. The British Mandate period saw the emergence of numerous political parties associated with the powerful clans and while they failed to become dominant popular organisations, A. Khalidi (2013, p. 23) argues that collectively they represented the heterogeneous nature of the Palestinian national movement.

The pan-Arab approach to the Palestinian issue took root during this period. However, Rubin (1981, p. 236) argues that Palestine was only part of the framework of politics for the Arab states during this period, with internal and regional struggles over “power, leadership, ideology, identity, and economic policy” determining the “framework for coping with the conflict”. The issue of Palestine was at the forefront of the Arab struggle and remains so today. R. Khalidi (1997) examines Palestinian leadership using theories of national identity, particularly post-colonial nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism. The traditional Palestinian leadership system disintegrated with the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the dramatic transformation of Palestinian identity (Nashif, 2009). Nashif states that the collapse of Palestinian leadership correlates to the conflict with Israel and implies a direct relationship between Palestinian identity and leadership structure. It was the Palestinian mentality which allowed for the accepted leadership system prior to 1948, and when “the traditional components of leadership in the Arab mentality” collapsed, so too did the respective leadership structures (Nashif, 2009, pp. 163-164). Al-Nakba also saw a profound physical and geographical collapse which equally contributed to the disintegration of established
leadership structures. The Palestinian population remains highly dispersed, however the advances in technology have negated the physical barriers that crippled the leadership during this period.

3.1.2 1958-1969: PLO and Fatah Genesis

During and directly after the creation of the state of Israel, Palestine became a pan-Arab issue with Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian leadership dominating the Palestinian political arena. The next emergence of Palestinian political leadership in a largely autonomous form was not until the formation of Fatah in 1958 and the PLO in 1964 (Smith C., 2013). As the main identifiable form of Palestinian political leadership, there is a wealth of literature on Arafat, Fatah and the PLO. The literature traces the main developments from guerrilla leadership through to nationalist leadership in exile, and finally institutionalised leadership within the oPt.

The strengthening of pan-Arab nationalism as the dominant narrative resulting from the creation of the state of Israel was reflected in the regional political approach towards Palestine. For many political factions, such as the Arab National Movement, the framework for the liberation of Palestine would only occur once Arab unity had been achieved. Fatah provided the political counter-point, with leaders stipulating that liberation must precede Arab unity and therefore military action was preliminary to politics (Smith C., 2013, p. 271). A national identity framework continues through into analysis of this next period of Palestinian leadership, with the PLO credited with the task of reconstructing Palestinian national identity (Parsons, 2013b, p. 214). Khalidi argues that attempts to rebuild Palestinian identity and nationalism was as much an Arab enterprise as it was Palestinian; there were a number of Arab parties competing for control of the Palestine issue. Parsons’ (2013b, p. 209) analysis shows that over time the PLO shifted its basis away from a radical anti-colonial approach to nationalism towards diplomacy.

The PLO has numerous leadership structures comprised of members from the different political factions that constitute the PLO. Parsons (2013b) provides comprehensive detail on the organisation and leadership of the PLO, both historically and in its current state. The Palestinian National Council (PNC) is the legislative body of the PLO and the effective
national parliament, comprised of representatives from both within the oPt and diaspora and has convened in numerous Arab cities. The first PNC adopted the Charter in 1964 that articulated the aims of the PLO and was amended in 1968 to reflect greater independence and nationalism (Parsons, 2013b, pp. 209-210). Also created was the Basic (Fundamental) Law which provided a codified constitution. The PNC elects the Executive Committee, the highest leadership body and similar to a cabinet, which is led by the Chairman of the PLO. Political factions have allocated seats within the EC, with minor factions holding observer status, and the remaining seats are contested by independents who may also be faction members (Parsons, 2013b, p. 212). The Palestinian National Fund acts as the treasury of the PLO with offices in both Jordan and the West Bank (Parsons, 2013b, p. 213). A definitive feature of the PLO leadership during its early stages was the diaspora which saw the Palestinian national movement “led from outside” (Parsons, 2005, p. 17). Parsons (2005, p. 25) proposes that the PLO provided “institutional coherence” despite initially lacking authoritative leadership – later provided by Arafat and Fatah. The organisational structure of the PLO articulated divided management institutions situated under a hierarchical umbrella leadership.

Fatah, the largest political faction of the PLO, was founded earlier but officially launched in 1965 (Parsons, 2013b, p. 210). Fatah has two leadership bodies: the executive Central Committee and legislative Revolutionary Council. The battle of Karama saw Fatah’s guerrilla leadership gain a vital victory that restored Palestinian nationalism following the defeat of Arab states during the Six Day War. Since its founding, the PLO had been chaired by Ahmad Shuqaryi, a lawyer and diplomat with strong ties to the Arab Higher Committee and Arab League. However, the devastating 1967 war saw Shuqaryi replaced by caretaker leader Yahya Hammuda who was more strongly aligned with the guerrilla movement (Parsons, 2013b, p. 211). In 1969 Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO. His defiant nationalist guerrilla leadership provided a necessary contrast to the pan-Arab leadership that fell into disarray following the Six Day War. Muslih (1990, p. 4) reiterates the importance of nationalism to the success of the PLO, asserting that the PLO has been synonymous with Palestinian nationalism since 1969. Fatah became the majority faction in the PLO and has remained so since, providing the PLO with the missing authoritative leadership (Parsons, 2005, p. 27).
Sayigh (1997) provides one of the most comprehensive analyses of transformation of the Palestinian national movement from the creation of the state of Israel until Oslo. His work on the PLO during this period has been widely praised with its unparalleled use of primary and secondary sources. Sayigh uses armed struggle as the dominant perspective to frame his work, arguing that armed struggle “provided the political impulse and organizational dynamic in the evolution of the Palestinian national identity”. These effects extend from the initial guerrilla leadership, where armed struggle was a self-evident tool, through to the formation of political institutions and diplomatic engagement that saw a new class of bureaucratic elite establish authoritative leadership (Sayigh, 1997, p. vii). Sayigh’s work explicitly focuses on how the use of armed struggle by the PLO, such as the battle of Karama, was central to the formation of Palestinian national identity finding that it increasingly distinguished the PLO from Arab states.

3.1.3 1973-1993: Institutionalisation of the PLO and Formation of Hamas

In 1973 the success of the PLO saw the PNC create the Central Council to serve as an intermediary body between the PNC and EC providing an additional management structure. Again following a pan-Arab defeat (the 1973 Yom Kippur/October War) Arafat provided decisive nationalist leadership during a fraught period for the PLO. However, leadership of the PLO came with direct challenges regarding the future direction of the organisation and Palestinian national movement. The shift towards institutionalism and diplomacy began with the Ten Point Program that resulted from the 12th meeting of the PNC in 1974. The program built upon the idea of a provisional national authority, which Parsons (2013b, p. 215) argues provided “the conceptual bridge to diplomacy”. By 1974 the Arab League declared the PLO to be “the sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people and soon afterwards, the third PLO chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly (Parsons, 2013b, p. 217).

The PLO, and indeed Fatah, have undergone a marked transformation over the decades. This transformation aligns closely with the Weber-Michels model of organisation transformation. This model premises that as an organisation “attains an economic and social base in the society, as the original charismatic leadership is replaced, a bureaucratic structure emerges . . . The participants in this structure have a stake in preserving the
organization” (Zald & Ash, 1966, p. 327). Three changes occur with this process: goal transformation, which commonly sees a “diffusion of goals” due to pragmatic leadership and conservatism; organisational maintenance that shifts the focus towards maintaining membership and resources, thereby adhering to societal norms; and oligarchisation, or in many cases bureaucratisation (Zald & Ash, 1966, pp. 327-328). Arguably this transformation took place three times: once during Arafat’s leadership as the PLO transitioned into a diplomatic player; again following the Oslo Accords and establishment of the PA; and lastly as Abbas struggled to wield power at the end of Arafat’s charismatic rule.

Sayigh focuses on the increasing neopatrimonial character of Palestinian politics during this period, driven largely by Fatah and thus affecting the PLO. “Deepening bureaucratization facilitated political management and propelled statist transformation, but the particular mode of the centralization owed much to the unique role of Arafat, who strove to concentrate the key means of control in his own hands.” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 454). The use of taftrigh had begun the PLO’s process of establishing a bureaucratised power structure prior to the start of the Intifada. Unpaid volunteers became ‘petty salariat’, causing an “undermining of civilian organization and fragmenting or co-opting potential sources of dissent within it” (Sayigh, 1997, p. 461). Sayigh’s state-centric approach has been criticised as not distinguishing clearly enough between the widely different political environments of the 1950s and the 1970s-90s. While Sayigh proficiently identifies the vacuum within Palestinian leadership during the earlier pan-Arab approach and contrasting state-building focus of the PLO post-1968, Masalha (1999, p. 142) believes the state-centric framing obscures these crucial differences. Questions have also been raised as to whether it is indeed necessary to categorise and view the PLO as a ‘statist’ entity (Barnett, 2000, p. 171).

Chehab’s (2007) work examines the foundations and development the next source of Palestinian leadership to emerge during this period: Gaza-based Harakat al-Maqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement) which has its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood and came into formal existence in the first Intifada in 1987. Berman (2003) argues that despite widespread secularism among Muslims in Palestine during the 1970s, Sheik Ahmed Yassin gained support for his Islamist movement due to the establishment of a social service network. This network provided the resources for civil society that the
Palestinian economy could not and the Israeli government would not. Yassin funded the movement’s activities through zakat and Arab donors (Berman, 2003, p. 8). Hamas’s identity and aims were articulated in its 1988 Charter, linking Palestinian nationalism with Islam and calling for the obliteration of Israel (Hamas Convenant 1988, 2008). Yassin had four defined stages to the development of his movement: institution building through the use of charities; strengthening the roots of resistance within households and improving its political credibility; developing military capabilities; and moving beyond Palestine to establish relations with Arab and Islamic neighbours (Chehab, 2007, pp. 21-22).

The leadership of Hamas faced continual difficulties during its early stages due to deportation and imprisonment of leaders. Abu-Amr (1993, p. 14) finds that such impediments caused Hamas to reorganise the central and committee leadership, developing successive leadership structures. The dispersion of Hamas’s leadership outside of the oPt helped to mitigate Israeli actions. Hamas is structured into three interdependent wings. The social welfare and political wings undertake the administration and propaganda of these areas. Within the political wing sits the Majlis al-Shura - the General Consultative Council that provides political direction. The council is elected from representatives from local consultative councils with members in Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and exile. The General Consultative Council then elects the Political Bureau with both these leadership structures based outside of the oPt. The head of the politburo is the primary leader of Hamas, generally performing the role in exile. Additionally, an Executive Office consists of the members of the politburo, the chair, deputy-chair and secretary of the Consultative Council, and a small number of elected members from the Consultative Council (Mash'al reelected leader of Hamas politburo, 2009). The military wing (the al-Qassam Brigades formed in 1992) undertakes more covert independent activities. Despite Hamas’s complex leadership organisation, the literature tends to focus on the movement’s ideologies and Islamic nature.

Ramahi reviews the relationship between Hamas and the PLO. Hamas distinguished between the PLO as a national framework and the PLO as a political structure. The PLO as a national framework was accepted by Hamas in the Charter, but the political strategy of diplomacy and engagement with Israel was rejected (Ramahi, 2014). Initially the PLO offered seats to Hamas on the PNC but the conditions set out by Hamas caused an
insurmountable incompatibility. This divergence only increased as the PLO became further engaged with the ill-fated peace process and subsequent institutionalisation.

3.1.4 Post-1994: Oslo and Institutionalisation

The second instance of the Weber-Michels model of transformation was notably much more dramatic and can be clearly traced through Parsons’ (2005) work on the PA – a natural complement to Sayigh’s conclusion at Oslo. Parsons uses a conceptual framework to trace the development of the PLO from a liberation movement to institutionalised national authority. He combines a historical-structural and transition approach in order to analyse both the progression from PLO to PA, and PA toward statehood (Parsons, 2005, p. 4). Despite the title denoting From Oslo to al-Aqsa, the framework is applied from 1964, reaffirming the precedent in Palestinian leadership scholarship to examine the development of organisations against the lengthy historical context. Analysis of the seven framework criteria across nine key dates deduces that the Oslo process was “a means of resecuring the authoritative leadership of the Diaspora-based elite, precluding the formation of a cohesive alternative leadership from the occupied territories.” (Parsons, 2005, pp. xxix-xxx). The first Intifada proved a challenge for Arafat and his failure to apply the intifada to the fight for self-determination forced Arafat to “manipulate social divisions through patron-clientelism instead, in order to secure a ruling coalition for the PA.” (Parsons, 2005, p. 6). Power was concentrated in the hands of the elite as the PLO’s focus shifted inwards and it became more conservative. With Arafat at the helm of both Fatah and the PA, the same transformation also took place amongst these organisations. The PLO leadership reasoned that Palestinian self-determination was to be achieved through a diplomatic institutional solution (Parsons, 2005, p. 55).

The Oslo Accords provided the grounds for the establishment of PA which was to provide the Palestinians with a measure of self-government. A strong power structure was built around Arafat, President of the PA, and his movement Fatah in the hopes of providing a legitimate Palestinian government to secure a peace deal. Le More (2005) finds that as a result of this, the EU and international donors fostered an environment of authoritarianism and repression, failing to support the development of a democratic, transparent, accountable PA. Literature critiquing the PA in this manner often overlooks, or rather does
not emphasise enough, the severe limitations to the PA’s operating abilities resulting from Israel’s occupation.

Whilst not drawing upon the Weber-Michels model, Brynen (1995) also examines the formation and effects of the Palestinian elite within the PA. Brynen uses a number of frameworks with which to analyse the elite: primordial perspective, social change perspective, and an organisational perspective. The primordial perspective draws upon the clan model, as outlined in the British Mandate section, with Brynen (1995, p. 33) discrediting this theory due to the dramatic political and economic developments that have taken place within Palestine. Contrastingly, the social change perspective views the formation of the elite in terms of modernisation and the changing socio-economic and political context. The social changes that occurred during the generational shift of leadership to Arafat and the guerillas “sustained the emergence of a new Palestinian nationalist leadership” (Brynen, 1995, p. 35). This perspective ties the leadership structure of the PA to changes that took place in Palestinian society 20 years prior. This model demonstrates the interrelated nature of Palestinian leadership and why examination of leadership sources must be situated in the broader historical context. The organisational perspective emphasises the role of institutions and identify how the structure and functioning of the PLO saw Fatah concentrate its power through the bureaucratisation of the PLO (Brynen, 1995, p. 37). This elite formation perspective aligns very closely with the Weber-Michels model highlighting how, despite the unique environment in which Palestinian leadership operates, it follows traditional leadership framework patterns.

### 3.1.5 Arafat & Charisma

Weber’s theory of legitimate authority argues that there are three ideal types of authority: rational-legal, traditional and charismatic. Charismatic leadership is a traditional leadership framework that focuses upon the qualities of the individual leader and the effects of this ‘charisma’ upon the respective regime. As Weber’s theories became popular in the 1980s critiques emerged on the contemporary use of Weber’s ‘ideal types’ and ‘legitimacy’ (Hekman, 1983; Grafstein, 1981). Weber defines charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional qualities.” (as cited in
Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xviii). Charismatic leadership therefore relies upon “devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber as cited in Eisenstadt, 1968, p. 46). Weber has been critiqued for not distinguishing between the authority arising from a revolutionary ideology as opposed to a charismatic leader, as it may be the former that sees a dynamic figure become a dominant leader (Sheleff, 1997, pp. 48-49).

There is disagreement as to whether Arafat can be classified as a charismatic leader with Klein (2004) arguing against, while Ghanem (2010), Jarbawi and Pearlman (2007), Pradhan (2008) and Calas (1993) all call upon Weber’s authority typologies to classify Arafat as charismatic. Klein (2004, pp. 31-32) states that while Arafat was an icon, neither his personality nor leadership were strong enough to stand on their own as charismatic. Rather, it was upon Arafat’s death that his leadership become heroic, with underlying weaknesses and faults forgotten, leaving Arafat as a Palestinian symbol (Klein, 2004, p. 34). Contrastingly, Ghanem (2010), Pradhan (2008) and Jarbawi and Pearlman (2007) all identify Arafat as ruling via charismatic authority. They argue that the ensuing lack of strong leadership and increase of factionalism among Fatah and the PA following Arafat’s death is symptomatic of a post-charisma transition. Sayigh (1997, p. 691) states that when the neopatrimonial system was eventually threatened during the early 1990s, Arafat’s control was deeply personalised to the point that Palestinian politics was subject to his individual temperament and decisions. Despite declaring a symbiosis between leader and cause, Sayigh (1997, p. 691) goes on to emphasise that Arafat was not wholly a free agent, but rather it was his ability to “adapt, co-opt, and control through statist political institutionalization and neopatrimonial bureaucratic management.” Arafat exercised a decidedly personalised authoritative leadership, with any charismatic tendencies becoming apparent only posthumously when his successor attempted to maintain this authority.

### 3.1.6 2000-2008: The Rise of Hamas

There is extensive agreement among the literature regarding Hamas’s development and 2006 electoral victory as a consequence of the growing dissatisfaction with the Fatah-run PA and failing Palestinian economy. Hamas’s growing popularity and strength reflected the
lack of effective Palestinian nationalist leadership during the post-Oslo period prior to the 2006 elections. The literature forms a strong consensus not only on the claims of Palestinian Authority corruption and funds mismanagement prior to and during the second Intifada, but also how these eventually came to influence the 2006 elections (Grynkewich, 2008; Le More, 2006; Levitt, 2006; Phillips, 2009; Bouris, 2010). While the PA was relying upon donor funds for budgetary support to pay civil servants, Hamas was building ground support by supplementing the welfare system. The Oslo Accords had initially threatened Hamas’s power by removing the decentralised power model that was operating in the Palestinian Territories, but the long-term outcomes of the peace process ultimately provided an economic operating platform for Hamas prior to the second Intifada. “Hamas operates in a context of opportunities and constraints, being attentive to the fluctuating needs and desires of the Palestinian population and cognizant of the power relations and political feasibility” (Mishal & Sela, 2000, p. viii). As allegations of corruption and elitism grew, the Hamas leadership used this to their advantage, increasing popularity through basic welfare provisioning.

Mishal and Sela (2000, p. vii) categorised Hamas as a social movement due to this community provisioning emphasis. It was predicted that so long as peace negotiations fail to reach any agreement and do not provide material gains, Hamas would maintain a political vitality and represent Palestinian nationalism (2000, p. ix). Despite stating that Hamas is a social movement, Mishal and Sela emphasise the degree to which Hamas is able to operate as a political actor. “Hamas is fully acquainted with and adaptable to the political world, driven by primordial sentiments, conflicting interests, and cost-benefit considerations, a world of constant bargaining and power brokering, multiple identities and fluid loyalties” (Mishal & Sela, 2000, p. viii). Herzog (2006) uses a political framework to reach similar conclusions, arguing that Hamas entered the process of evolving from “radical rejectionism to mainstream politics” – though this process is far from complete.

Although Hamas has clear traditional political elements, the combination of these with its social movement foundations and diffuse leadership structure lend Hamas to non-traditional leadership frameworks. Hamas meets Della Porta’s (2011) four conceptual elements of a social movement framework: informal networks of interaction; shared beliefs and solidarity; collective action on a contentious issue; and various forms of action largely
outside of institutional realms. Hamas does not face the same limitations and complications that other sources of Palestinian leadership do; rather, the difficulties incurred by the Fatah-run PA and PLO have provided fertile grounds for Hamas’s expansion and counter-movement. However, the newly-formed 2014 national consensus government deal that Hamas has signed does tie them in part to the formal governance structures in the West Bank and may impose associated Palestinian leadership limitations onto the organisation.

Despite the existence of dispersed, transnational and tiered leadership organisation within Hamas, the movement does not compete with the BDS movement for operating space. Hamas does engage with popular resistance, but does not adhere to the principle of nonviolence as BDS does. The diffuse organisational structure and subsequent guarded complicated lines of communication have also caused difficulties for the movement in articulating a unified position (Baker & al-Mughrabi, 2014). In particular, the Al-Qassam Brigades often act independently, and sometimes at odds, from the other Hamas leadership structures (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, 2009). The similarities between the organisational structures of Hamas and the BDS movement are extremely superficial.

3.1.7 Post-2004: Abbas and Charisma

The political system had been built around Arafat’s personality and leadership meaning that his successor Mahmoud Abbas, who lacked charismatic authority, struggled to govern that same system and it thus required structural alterations (Ghanem, 2010, p. 109). Jarbawi and Pearlman account for imperfections in applying a framework to Palestinian leadership due to the lack of a “monopoly on coercion” stemming from the Israeli occupation, but nonetheless find Weber’s charismatic authority framework provides a constructive analysis. Weber’s theory states the ‘routinisation of charisma’ is necessary for the continuity and everyday functioning of the regime (Jarbawi & Pearlman, 2007, p. 7). This routinisation is fraught with issues, namely finding a successor, as charismatic leaders avoid promoting those who may undermine their power. Indeed, Jarbawi and Pearlman (2007, p. 12) and Pradhan (2008, p. 303) identify the power vacuum left with Arafat’s passing and Abbas’s struggle for control after years of Arafat working against him. With
decades of power concentrated solely in Arafat’s leadership, political institutions were structured specifically around Arafat and required Abbas to attempt to reform the system to shift away from reliance on personal power (Jarbawi & Pearlman, 2007, p. 15). Abbas sought to transfer power towards another of Weber’s types - rational-legal authority. However, this move away from charismatic authority did not consolidate Abbas’s power as he had hoped. Herzog (2006, p. 86) argues that Abbas’s comparative leadership weakness was a large factor in Hamas attempting to gain legitimate political power. The resulting elections saw Hamas win a majority of seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council and a mandate to rule. Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections diverted Abbas’s transition to rational-legal authority away from the PA.

Abbas had three established institutions to negotiate, where Arafat initially had one (Fatah) and was able to directly influence the establishment of the latter two (the PLO and PA). Abbas used Fatah’s much delayed sixth General Conference in 2009 to revitalise national leadership and assert authority. Parsons (2013b, p. 213) identifies the revival of the PLO’s Executive Committee following the PNC’s 2009 special session as Abbas “invest[ing] in the PLO leadership as a source of additional legitimacy.” Broning (2011) also emphasises 2009 as a point of departure for the leadership with Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad implementing a Palestinian state-building programme through the PA. Broning also ties assessment of the BDS movement to Abbas’s attempted transformation of national leadership. Broning believes that BDS will have limited success due to its non-alignment with the PA’s strategy (Rapoport, 2011). While Abbas and the PA are crucial to the state-building process, Broning’s approach places near sole emphasis on these actors affecting change with regards to establishment of such change. Rapoport (2011) reviews Abbas as being at the helm “without a shred of charisma” again inferring post-charisma phase in Palestinian leadership and all the difficulties that creates.

More literature focussing on Abbas and his attempts at state building is emerging, particularly with regards to ‘good governance’. Schanzer’s (2013) book on Arafat, Abbas and the failed Palestinian state is the first to qualitatively assess Palestinian leadership and good governance. While Abbas does not have the charismatic rule that Arafat did, Schanzer argues that there has in fact been continuity between the two leadership regimes due to Abbas’s autocratic tendencies and lack of institution building (Barnidge, 2014, p. 92).
These similarities are identified through the lens of good governance, with Abbas inheriting “the mess that his predecessor had created” (Schanzer, 2013, p. 108). While beneficial outcomes for the Palestinians are equally lacking from both Arafat’s (namely the latter half) and Abbas’s rule, the leadership and legitimacy of each is markedly different. Abbas may use autocratic measures and institutionalise power, but he does not have the personality and following that Arafat did as sole leader of the Palestinian national movement.

In summary, the concentration of power that Arafat held that sees the literature apply a charismatic authority framework to his leadership, and indeed the framework provides an apt explanation of Palestinians politics post-Arafat. The absence of definitive individual leadership provided the social and political space for the BDS movement to begin its operations within the oPt from 2005. Increased institutionalisation had splintered formal Palestinian leadership, and Abbas was unable to effectively wield the limited Palestinian state apparatus with Oslo still dominating the political narrative.

3.1.8 Palestinian-Israeli Leadership

Turning away from the oPt to politics within the Green Line, there are a number of sources that focus on Israeli Arab leadership – Palestinian Israeli citizens. Both Bligh (1999) and Jamal (2006) examine the leadership role and influence Arabs within Israel were able to have during the first and second Intifada respectively. Jamal (2006) draws upon Higley and Lengley’s unity and differentiation continuum to explain the Arab leadership in Israel and its relative lack of success. Using both unity and differentiation there are four main models, each with different implications for leadership ability. The most effective combination is a united and highly differentiated elite, allowing for both consensus and broad representation (Jamal, 2006, p. 7). The opposite, a disunited elite with little differentiation, sees in-fighting and factionalism become apparent. Jamal (2006, p. 7) proposes that Arab leadership in Israel is disunited and highly differentiated. This model sees constant contestation between factions for both power and influence, resulting in an elite that favours informal institutionalism and clientalism (Jamal, 2006, p. 7). As with all other forms of Palestinian leadership, Arab leadership within Israel faces extreme limitations. Jamal clarifies that the use of ‘elite’ does not refer to a governing elite, but rather “the leadership of a dominated minority that seeks to overcome the structural barriers set by the
hegemonic Jewish majority, and its shortcomings cannot be disconnected from the Israeli system of control.” (Jamal, 2006, p. 7). The cited Higley and Lengley theory on elite structure and implications on effective governance can also be applied to other the other sources of Palestinian political leadership. For example the unity and differentiation variables could be measured within the PLO over time, seeing how these changed and whether or not effects such as institutionalism and clientalism occurred – which Sayigh’s (1997) work suggests they did.

3.1.9 Conclusion

In a review of Khalidi’s *Iron Cage* on Mandate-era Palestinian leadership, Parsons (2007, p. 523) states that the work still aptly describes the current situation: “a divided Palestinian elite, trapped in a paradoxical framework, compromised by the need for patronage, insecure amid growing socio-economic discontent, fearful amid grassroots rebellion, weary amid the wreckage, desperate for a temporary diplomatic lifeline.” Whilst significant changes and events have occurred in the half century since the Mandate leadership, the literature demonstrates that Parsons’ summary still applies due to problematic continuities within mainstream Palestinian leadership. The literature provides thorough analysis of the development and institutionalisation of the PLO and PA through the application of frameworks. There is clear alignment between traditional leadership frameworks and mainstream Palestinian leadership – both individual and organisational. The persistence of a factional elite recurs, causing Palestinian leadership to be vulnerable to bureaucratisation and clientalism in order to maintain a monopoly on power, ultimately increasing the chances of a power vacuum once this ‘strong-man’ politics ceases. Abbas has struggled to retain this monopoly, despite his use of autocratic leadership, creating the political space for the operations of the Hamas and BDS movement leadership.

3.2 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

3.2.1 Palestinian Popular Resistance

Qumsiyeh (2011) focuses on the development of the popular resistance and includes BDS in this category. Disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority has seen the Palestinian national movement further develop community-based political leadership,
particularly in the West Bank. Qumsiyeh (2011) stresses that popular resistance is not a new phenomenon in Palestine, but with the lack of progress made by official representatives and the erection of the Separation Wall, grassroots resistance emphasising nonviolence has become increasingly prominent. Qumsiyeh focuses on the nonviolent methods employed in the struggle for Palestinian freedom, stating that the popular resistance is often overlooked by foreign states who instead favour the ‘legitimate’ leadership of the PA. His work also emphasises the need for interconnectedness between the different sources of leadership of the Palestinian national movement, noting that each “forms just one factor in inducing political and social change” (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 226).

Nearly all of the literature cites the Oslo Accords as causing a major shift in Palestinian politics and leadership due to a lack of tangible outcomes causing discontent and dissatisfaction with the PA amongst the general populace. Mainstream Palestinian leadership is identified as having failed in advancing self-determination, and in turn this failure is the cause of the re-emergence of a dominant popular resistance leadership network. The success of the popular resistance has attracted the support of other Palestinian leadership sources. Both the village-based popular resistance and BDS movement employ and focus on the Israeli-apartheid narrative as a central tenet of their leadership strategies.

3.2.2 BDS Movement

As the BDS movement is the newest source of Palestinian leadership, originating in 2005 and gradually increasing in international attention and influence since then, there are limited academic studies on the movement. With a few notable exceptions, the sources that do address BDS detail its history and both the internal and external politics of the movement, but fail either to employ a conceptual framework of analysis or to examine BDS from the wider perspective of Palestinian leadership. Qumsiyeh (2011) is one of the few exceptions to the second charge, providing a comprehensive examination of the BDS movement and situating it in the context of Palestine’s history of popular resistance. This allows Qumsiyeh to draw wider leadership inferences. Erakat (2012b) positions the development of the BDS movement against the “collapse of the PLO and PA”, arguing that the Oslo Accords left a power vacuum for Palestinian leadership. Erakat believes that every
renewed peace negotiation process the PLO enters into signals regression from a possible strong national liberation movement on an international stage. The Oslo Accords have weakened the PLO and thus associated Palestinian leadership, resulting in a lack of a national liberation strategy (Erakat, 2012b, pp. 1-2). The literature on the PLO and associated leadership frameworks highlights the tensions caused by the elite leadership structure and bureaucratisation transformation, and the Oslo Accords have served only to exacerbate these issues. “This inevitable rivalry intensified as the Palestinian Authority has gradually replaced the PLO as a political structure and the nature of the Palestinian question was significantly reduced.” (Dana as quoted in Erakat, 2012b, p. 2).

The BDS movement provides an alternative source of Palestinian leadership and liberation strategy. Erakat (2012b, p. 2) writes that “by providing a central Palestinian reference point and authoritative guidance to global solidarity, the BNC [BDS National Committee] has partially filled a void left by the disappearance of a once commanding PLO, even though it has no claims to do so.” Ananth (2013) focuses on the strategy employed by the BDS movement and the international reaction to it. Ananth (2013, p. 130) defines BDS as a movement because there is a coherency that extends beyond its dispersed nature, composed of Palestinian leadership and international solidarity. Ananth (2013, pp. 130-131) states that because of the BDS movement’s “heterogeneous and variegated” nature, it is a crucial element for Palestinian freedom. These characteristics open power-sharing arrangements not present in formal Palestinian leadership which are necessary to place the movement beyond the control of the Israeli occupation. Ananth’s analysis speaks strongly to a distributed leadership framework in terms of the BDS movement’s structure, as it clearly contrasts with the existing forms of Palestinian leadership.

An important part of any movement is the framework that the leadership constructs. Ananth (2013, p. 136) argues that the BDS movement has used its three demands to highlight the framework of the Israeli oppression: the demand for the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees and end to colonisation demarcates colonialism; the demand for full equality of Palestinians in Israel reflects apartheid; and the demand for the end of the occupation and removal of the separation wall represents occupation. The BDS movement’s framing of the Israeli oppression is designed to manufacture frame resonance, particularly in countries associated with colonialism and with those who campaigned for
equal rights. Erakat (2012b, p. 3) similarly identifies the use of the movement’s three demands to provide a framework but, unlike Ananth, draws international law and human rights frames from the demands. Ananth (2013, p. 137) states that the BDS movement is a shift towards “a transformative praxis of emancipatory resistance that matches the evolving socio-spatial apparatus of oppression.” Ananth (2013, p. 137) also emphasises the transnational role of not just the movement but also the oppression, stating that the political and economic sources of oppression are present far beyond the geographies of Israel and Palestine. The limitations of the movement are also highlighted, listing a lack of political programme beyond liberation, the North-South divide, and heterogeneity as a double-edged sword, as potential difficulties (Ananth, 2013, p. 141). These identified limitations parallel those proposed by distributed leadership and social movement frameworks.

Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009) provide a comprehensive overview that incorporates the history of boycotts and sanctions against Israel with the present-day BDS movement. Like Ananth, Bakan and Abu-Laban also focus heavily on the framing of both Israel and Palestine and how the BDS movement seeks to challenge and reframe the occupation. Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009, pp. 31-33) draw upon Charles Mills’ racial contract theory to explain the hegemonic framing of Israel as an unchallengeable victim. Mills’ theory proposes that there is an accepted racial hierarchy that permeates western ideological norms. This concept influences the construct of a “Gramscian framing of elite hegemony in the extension of European imperialism.” (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 33). With regards to Israel-Palestine, this racial contract theory sees Israel privileged with its European roots and colonial character in the Western-dominated international arena, whilst Palestinians’ non-white rights are neglected. Drawing from Said’s post-colonial theories, Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009, p. 33) are highly critical of mainstream academic and policy discourse stating that there is a “near absence of normalised discourse regarding Israel-Palestine . . . the charged atmosphere of dialogue and critique is significantly rooted in an ideology of entrenched Orientalism.” The authors argue that the development of the BDS movement requires expanding this discourse and the movement has indeed aided generation of a normalised reasoned debate around the Israel-Palestine situation (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 46).
Generation Palestine (2012) and The Case for Sanctions against Israel (2012) are both edited works that focus solely on the BDS movement. Each contains chapters written by prominent activists, academics, politicians, and international figures (such as Ilan Pappe, Richard Falk, Omar Barghouti – founder of the BDS movement, Naomi Klein) focusing on different aspects of the movement. Generation Palestine provides useful insight from those directly involved in the BDS movement, but is largely based on opinion and historical facts rather than academic analysis. Both books examine the progress of the BDS movement through chronological detailing of its activity and achievements. Where the volumes that examine the PLO and PA provide thorough analysis of the organisations through applying frameworks that incorporate the historical contexts, the works dedicated to the BDS movement are largely interest pieces aimed at generating awareness. Critique of the BDS movement and its organisation and role in Palestinian leadership is absent. The focus of the majority of the BDS movement literature is on quantifiable events and successes and does not examine the organisational structure of the leadership and movement, and how this impacts upon its progress. As shown with the overview of traditional Palestinian leadership sources, the development of structure and organisation are critical elements to any potential leadership due to the numerous complications faced both within and outside of the Palestinian territories.

3.2.3 South Africa Anti-Apartheid Movement Comparison

All of the aforementioned BDS literature, and indeed nearly all publications on BDS, draw parallels between the BDS movement and Palestine, and the anti-apartheid movement and the ANC in apartheid South Africa (see Lloyd & Schueller, 2013; Di Stefano & Henaway, 2014; Emery & Will, 2014; Barghouti, 2011). Purkayastha and Kidwai (2012) and Akuno (2012) extend the comparison to India’s independence struggle and the American black civil rights movement. The Palestinian BDS movement combines tactics used in apartheid South Africa with the Palestinian (and wider Middle Eastern) history of boycotts and sanctions as tools of political leverage. The comparison with apartheid South Africa is a deliberate framing tool used by the BDS movement. Israel is framed not only as the oppressor, but as a racist and colonialist oppressor. Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009, p. 44) state that the application of the term apartheid directly challenges the framing of Israel as an ‘exceptional state’ based on Judaism. Israel is currently regarded as exceptional due to the West’s reluctance to hold it accountable to international law. By applying the term
apartheid, BDS seeks to redefine Israel as a pariah state. The comparison has increased support for BDS; many of those who supported the anti-apartheid movement now identify with the Palestinian case (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 44).

The similarities between apartheid in South Africa and Palestine are well identified, but there is little literature examining and comparing the relationships between formal and informal political leadership sources. Analysis of the organisational arrangements and relationships between the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement, compared with those of the PLO and BDS are absent. Murray (2008) touches briefly on the interaction between the BDS movement and other Palestinian political leadership sources, but only to make mention of the complications related to the West Bank-Gaza power divide. More general comparisons between Israel-Palestine and South Africa are present, but these fail to account for power dynamics between leadership sources. The literature focuses on the development of the movements and methods employed, but fails to place the two movements against the formal political and national leadership structures. Di Stefano and Henaway (2014, p. 25) state that the PA has yet to wholly endorse the BDS movement, instead limiting its boycott actions so as not to agitate its benefactor Israel. The PA is extremely restricted in its ability to engage in such resistance against Israel due to the stipulations of the Oslo accords, notably that of economic cooperation as per the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). The authors argue that this is where the BDS movement’s capacities lie, with the ability to use a horizontal grassroots approach that circumvents these seemingly non-democratic structures (Di Stefano & Henaway, 2014, p. 25). The BDS movement appears to avoid the difficulties faced by other forms of Palestinian leadership, specifically the limitations imposed by a relationship with Israel, but this does not mean that BDS does not face its own unique issues.

Significant differences between the two movements exist due to demographics, globalisation and international opposition. The black population in South Africa had an overwhelming majority (Ananth, 2013, p. 138) while the Israeli Jewish population holds the majority in Israel and only recently lost its overall majority when the oPt are included. Globalisation has had two effects: Israel has reduced its reliance on Palestinian labour from the Occupied Territories through the import of other sources of labour; and globalisation
has changed the means and processes of production, greatly complicating attempted boycotts due to production becoming an often multi-national practice (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 36). Finally, perhaps the greatest dissimilarity is the strong opposition it faces from the Zionist lobby, largely in the United States and parts of Europe (Ananth, 2013, p. 140). The literature invokes the BDS/anti-apartheid comparison with the general aim of using similarities (and even dissimilarities) to inform and develop the movement. However, in South Africa the anti-apartheid boycott movement was used in conjunction with the political party (the ANC) in an already established movement; the BDS movement for the liberation of Palestine was created as an alternative outlet for the Palestinian national movement, seeking to advance the movement where the PLO and PA have stagnated. Though the BDS movement does not hold a political agenda beyond liberation, some of its operations and leadership challenge the methods of the Palestinian formal leadership.

Klotz’s (2002) work, while not comparing South Africa and Israel-Palestine, examines the South African anti-apartheid movement using a transnational movement framework with a strong emphasis on the role of globalisation and technology. Klotz’s article provides a key point of reference for analysing the comparison of the anti-apartheid and BDS movements under the guise of a distributed leadership/transnational movement framework. In light of globalisation and dramatic advances in technology, Klotz (2002, p. 50) raises two crucial questions: “Is this new globalism profoundly different from earlier eras of interdependence? Will activists . . . be more successful now than comparable movements of the past?” Klotz addressed these issues by comparing the movements for the abolition of slavery in the United States and the end of apartheid in South Africa. These two movements are similar in their transnational characters, facing challenges of distance, culture and time, whilst each occurring in different centuries in which globalism and technology were markedly varied. Klotz’s examination of the South African anti-apartheid movement under a transnational social movement framework provides the starting point for an update of this work using the BDS movement and the further development of globalism and technology. Klotz’s original questions speak directly to the claim that the BDS movement is progressing at a faster rate than the South Africa anti-apartheid movement did.

Klotz (2002, p. 60) argues that the South African anti-apartheid movement was part of a larger anti-colonialism struggle and this resonated in the framing of the movement.
Human rights dominated the anti-apartheid discourse in the UN and the West, whilst in Africa and other Third World countries the movement was portrayed using an anti-colonial frame (Klotz, 2002; Gurney, 2000). Arguably, it was this double use of frames that gave the movement a critical adaptability to its transnational arena. Klotz (2002, p. 61) identifies labour unions as pivotal catalysts in the success of the boycott on South African goods. Another crucial pillar of support for the movement was the UN; the ANC received both material and moral backing from the UN (Klotz, 2002, p. 62). This aspect begins to draw links between the interactions of a transnational social movement with more formal political institutions and how this affects its activities and success. The ANC worked largely in unison with the other actors in the anti-apartheid movement and in turn, the UN worked with the ANC. While the PLO’s relationship with the UN is not that of the ANC’s, the UN has provided backing through resolutions and speaking platforms for the PLO (Parsons, 2013b). Gurney’s (2000) work identifies the continual crossover between the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement, with ANC members often the representatives of the movement – particularly when travelling abroad. Abdul Minty, former British Anti-Apartheid Movement secretary, states “the worldwide movement was effective because it was a coalition of committed governments and people’s movements in the West that managed to influence policy at the national level, as well as institutions like the UN.” (as quoted in Erakat, 2010). Klotz (2002, p. 63) examines the South African anti-apartheid movement using three layers “to disentangle specific effects of activism”: state policies, international institutions and civil society. The anti-apartheid movement succeeded in influencing all three of these layers and consequently set the foundations for an expansion of a human rights agenda - “these wider effects hold consequences for the normative foundations of the contemporary global system” (Klotz, 2002, p. 69).

3.2.4 Israeli Apartheid

“Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza make Israel the only state in the world today where apartheid is the prevailing system of administration.” (Hallaj as quoted in Bishara, 2001, p. 141). Such a position is now relatively common amongst the BDS literature, but the initial labelling of Israel an apartheid state faced academic criticism. One of the first major references to Israel being explicitly apartheid came in Davis’s book Israel, an Apartheid State in 1987. This is the only work written comparing South Africa and Israel when both were still operating under apartheid policies. Although the anti-apartheid
movement was achieving significant progress in South Africa, Davis argued that it was Israeli apartheid that was the more vulnerable of the two. Israel is a creation of the UN and therefore relies on the ‘enlightened’ opinion of the West, it does not have the natural resources of South Africa, and the Israeli apartheid system is more radical (Davis, 1987). Davis’s position was labelled as extremist in an academic journal review (Peleg, 1989). This initial apartheid assessment still holds true with Davis modifying and updating his work in 2003, citing Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within as a sequel to his 1987 book. References to Israel as ‘apartheid’ in the literature are becoming increasingly common. In his later work, Davis takes a strong legal approach, proving the existence of Israeli apartheid through institutionalised discrimination in the legal systems.

Bishara (2001) examines the apartheid system using the Oslo agreements and segregation of the Israeli and Palestinian economies. Bishara argues (in concurrence with literature on the Palestinian economy) that the Oslo agreements did not provide the positive solution, or even positive impact, they were touted to. Instead, the Oslo agreements were “economic documents” that only further exacerbated the declining Palestinian economy (increasing its dependency on Israel) and increased Israel’s hegemony and control over the oPt (Bishara, 2001, pp. 118-130). The economic power wielded by Israel has led to an apartheid system in the West Bank with Palestinian ‘bantustans’ and Israeli settlements, rights and resources administered through segregated and unequal systems (Bishara, 2001, p. 133). Literature on Israeli apartheid provides strong links with the failed peace process and the segregated administrative system it helped legitimise.

The majority of works which apply the term apartheid to Israel are all quick to qualify the term with regards to its UN definition, stating that South Africa can be used as a comparison, but it too was an example of apartheid and not the definition per se (Davis, 2003; Erakat, 2012a; Greenstein, 2012; Loach, O’Brien & Laverty, 2012; Barghouti, 2011). This issue is identified as one of the greatest challenges to the Israeli apartheid narrative used by the BDS movement:

The question is not “Is Israel the same as South Africa?”; it is “Do Israel’s actions meet the international definition of what apartheid is?” And if you look at those conditions which includes the transfer of people, multiple tiers of
law, official state segregation, then you see that, yes, it does meet that
definition – which is different than saying it is South Africa. No two states are
the same. It’s not the question, it’s a distraction.

(Klein as quoted in Loach et al, 2012, p.200)

The BDS movement uses the term apartheid as a framing tool, however as Erakat (2012a)
identifies, this is a double-edged sword. Labelling Israel as an apartheid state draws instant
parallels with South Africa, allowing for a symbolism that resonates in the public’s mind.
On the other hand, the comparison with South Africa risks becoming the sole focus with
dissimilarities used to discredit the analogy (Erakat, 2012a, p. 93). The majority of the
literature identifies this risk of the apartheid comparison framing, but does not analyse the
internal BDS leadership strategy for the framing.

3.3 Conclusion

The literature provides a clear picture of the suitability of traditional leadership frameworks
for existing ‘traditional’ Palestinian leadership sources and how this contrasts with framing
the BDS movement. How each existing Palestinian leadership source fits into a traditional
framework allows identification of their structural organisation and the environment in
which they operate, but more importantly denotes the weaknesses in both these areas.
These weaknesses give rise to alternate forms of leadership (e.g. the PLO and PA
inadequacies provided the foundation for Hamas’s rise to power), with the BDS movement
seemingly utilising the ineffectiveness and dissatisfaction with the existing Palestinian
leadership options. The literature on the BDS movement does not have a strong focus on
the structural organisation of BDS and any impact this has on its effectiveness. Rather the
literature provides an anecdotal chronology of BDS events and achievements largely based
on opinion pieces by those supporting the movement. The edited books on BDS all feature
writing by movement founder Omar Barghouti and serve more as tools for BDS awareness
than analysis. Whilst points are made for improvement of the movement, there is no
structural examination and critique of BDS leadership. Only Qumsiyeh links BDS with the
full history of Palestinian boycott campaigns which provided the precedent for the
movement and serve as a point of boycott leadership reference.
The South Africa anti-apartheid movement has provided a useful framework and narrative for the BDS movement and nearly all the literature on the BDS movement applies a comparison between the two. However, once again there is an absence of focus on the movements’ organisation and also their relationship and interactions with respective formal leadership sources. The history of the anti-apartheid movement and ANC is well documented, but the comparative work on BDS does not take this into account; the emphasis is on the framing of Israel as apartheid. In sum, the literature presents a strong foundation for analysing the BDS movement through a non-traditional leadership framework in light of the existing traditional leadership sources. The literature on the BDS movement and South Africa comparison provides useful information on the details of each, but ultimately lacks theoretical backing and fails to move far beyond a descriptive account. The following chapter will detail and justify the research methods used in examining the questions that remain about the organisational structure of the BDS movement and this new phase of Palestinian leadership.
4.0 Methodology

The topic of Palestinian leadership, as with Israel/Palestine more broadly, presents a set of interesting and related methodological challenges for the researcher. The availability and bias of material presents a potential obstacle, particularly as BDS is relatively new, grounded to some extent in social media and continually evolving. This chapter will outline and justify the research methodology and methods used to mitigate the challenges. The methodology analyses the principles and theories of the method, whilst the method explicitly outlines the tools used to conduct the research. Due to the practicalities of the research and limited sources available, a qualitative method will be used. The sole use of qualitative research limits the ability to triangulate the data and increases the risk of bias, particularly when the research has a high reliance on secondary sources. However, these issues are tempered by the application of a leadership conceptual framework and use of the comparative research method, as these strengthen the objectivity of the analysis. The distributed leadership framework employed in the research relies predominantly upon the qualitative research method, applying a social constructivist relational approach to leadership. The BDS movement must be analysed in terms of both a Palestinian leadership context and an international social movement. The BDS movement is the newest form of Palestinian leadership, emerging from the popular resistance tradition, but with its global organisation, support and networks the BDS movement is simultaneously a transnational social movement. This dual nature of the BDS movement requires a methodology that allows for a relational and holistic approach in order to encapsulate the unique character of the leadership.

This chapter will begin by examining the ontological and epistemological foundations of the methodology. Why the nature of the research naturally favours an interpretivist approach and qualitative method are explained, and the benefits and disadvantages this methodology are analysed against a quantitative or mixed methods approach. The research uses inductive reasoning as it is allows ‘theory-building’ and therefore favours conceptual frameworks. The chapter will then explain how the use of a conceptual framework and comparative method help to offset weaknesses attributed to research that is exclusively qualitative. Lastly, the weighting of the types of sources employed in the research will be outlined and critiqued. With the research largely limited by practical considerations, available and appropriate sources are consequently automatically refined and this must be
factored into the research methodology. The advances in technology, particularly social media, have significant implications for how political research is conducted. The BDS movement heavily utilises developments in technology and social media requiring the research to reflect this internet-based approach.

### 4.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Ontology and epistemology are the foundations of a methodology; the ontological position of the researcher affects their epistemological position, and this largely determines which research method is favoured. Ontology is a theory of ‘being’, questioning whether there is an independent ‘real world’ or whether it is a social construct (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 18). Epistemology questions knowledge of the world; what we can know and how we can know it. Positivist and empiricist disciplines (e.g. the natural sciences) favour quantitative research as epistemologically there is an observable and measurable ‘real world’, and ontologically this world is independent from interpretation (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 22). Quantitative research generally focuses on information which is numerically measurable and therefore favours the approach of proving or disproving a hypothesis. Alternately, interpretivist disciplines, such as those of the social sciences, generally employ a qualitative research method due to the belief that the world is a social construct which is not independent from interpretation (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 30). This interpretation affects outcomes and meanings. Qualitative research seeks out the why and how of behaviour and uses a range of techniques (e.g. ethnographic, grounded theory) to understand context-specific experiences and practices (Devine, 2002, p. 197).

Political theory in particular has shifted away from universal foundations towards an interpretivist tradition (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 30). It must be noted that there is often significant crossover between the different approaches and research methods are generally employed in terms of appropriateness and feasibility. Studying the relational structures of Palestinian leadership and the BDS movement requires an interpretivist approach as the development, interactions and effects extend beyond those of numerical value. The BDS movement is described as a “qualitatively new stage” in the history of Palestinian popular resistance (Barghouti O., 2011, p. 61). As well as the insufficient data available, quantitative research would not provide the nuanced analysis required to examine the
complexities of the relationships between the state and non-state actors involved in Palestinian leadership.

4.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods

While there is often an ontological reasoning behind the use of research methods, due both to the research discipline and the researcher’s personal beliefs, debate exists over the advantages and disadvantages of using either the quantitative or qualitative method. Quantitative research allows for hypothesis generation and testing that is reproducible. Conclusions should be free from subjectivity, thus minimising researcher bias. The use of independent numerical data to measure the accuracy of the theory behind a concept has the ability to increase quantitative research’s external validity (Bryman, 2012, p. 171). A qualitative method allows for multiple perspectives and theories with a focus on social complexities in order to “understand the interactions, processes, lived experiences, and belief systems that are part of individuals, institutions, cultural groups” (O'Leary, 2010, p. 114). The qualitative research method relies upon inductive reasoning, whereby theory and data are linked and conclusions are suggestive rather than definite (Bryman, 2012, p. 27). Berg and Lune (2012, p. 8) state that qualitative research “seeks patterns among cases, but do not reduce these cases to their averages.” The unique context in which Palestinian leadership operates requires such an approach; a pattern and theory must link the findings, but not deduce them. The political environment of Palestine is unlikely to be replicated in a different case study and therefore while a pattern may emerge, the high number of variables does not allow for a quantifiable theory.

Palestine is a case study that is surrounded by such rare conditions that any framework is unlikely to provide a perfect fit. A post-colonial perspective would hold that application of Western theory is an inappropriate approach to studying this non-Western phenomenon. The current form of the Middle East is a product of colonialism and borders that European states constructed. Edward Said (2003) argued that the study of the East can never be objective when produced by those embedded in colonialism, and even the categorisation of the East and West aims to polarise the two. Theory must be adaptable and tailored to the Palestinian environment, as to impose the opposite would be a misrepresentation of Palestinian leadership. The leadership framework applied to the research is based mainly
upon a distributed leadership framework, but draws upon aspects of relational and social movement frameworks so as to provide a ‘best fit’ model. As shown in the literature review, other forms of Palestinian leadership align closely with traditional leadership frameworks, but the BDS movement presents a very different case whilst still remaining highly relational to these other forms of leadership.

Due to a number of factors the qualitative method is the more suitable and effective research approach. The lack of pre-determined hypothesis for the research does not make it suited for quantitative analysis. Similarly, the complicated social and political nature of the research is unlikely to be accurately portrayed and accounted for through empirical findings. Lastly, the influences on and effects of Palestinian leadership requires a holistic view; Palestinian leadership operates within its unique context, and the BDS movement operates in relation to other forms of leadership. The qualitative method encapsulates meaning, process and context (Devine, 2002, p. 199), all of which are foci of the research. The development of leadership could be measured quantitatively (commonly done through election results or assigning numerical values to personality traits), but this method would restrict the research to a limited number of measurable leadership variables.

A mixed method approach would aid ‘triangulation’ and therefore increase the validity of the research by using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to check each other (Read & Marsh, 2002, p. 237). However, there is an absence of quantitative data about Palestinian leadership development and the BDS movement. Quantitative data exists primarily on formal political leadership such as political parties and their leaders, and governments. Formal Palestinian political leadership, in a governmental sense, has a relatively short history (dating back to the establishment of the PA in 1994) and does not operate in a free, traditional democratic sense or space. These factors, combined with the difficulties of obtaining accurate and complete information, do not lend Palestinian leadership to quantitative survey. The number of external and uncontrollable variables presently at play in the Palestinian political and leadership systems create considerable barriers to testing hypotheses in isolation under a traditional quantitative method.
The research uses a conceptual framework as the primary means of analysis. A conceptual framework is privileged over a theoretical framework for a number of reasons. There is no developed theory for the Palestinian leadership in question, with the research aiming to contribute to this field. Rocco and Plakhotnik (2009, p. 126) state that as qualitative research often examines understudied areas, searching for ‘emergent theory’, conceptual frameworks are used to situate the study. The research is observational and therefore requires a conceptual context for interpretation; there are no defined variables by which to test a theoretical framework. A conceptual framework allows the researcher to synthesise existing views in order to provide an integrated way of examining a problem (Imenda, 2014, p. 189). A conceptual framework can be defined as an “end result bringing together a number of related concepts to explain or predict a given event, or give a broader understanding of the phenomenon of interest” (Imenda, 2014, p. 189). Furthermore, a conceptual framework “grounds the study in the relevant knowledge bases” that provide the foundations for the research questions and their significance (Rocco & Plakhotnik, 2009, p. 126). Inductive reasoning, as used for this research, is often ‘theory-building’ and therefore favours conceptual frameworks.

A conceptual framework will be applied to the qualitative research as a means of both strengthening the analysis and protecting against researcher subjectivity. The use of a framework provides a set of objective measures of analyses, developed independently from the case study, and provides another element to the research that is less vulnerable to researcher interpretation. The research takes elements from both intrinsic and instrumental methods of case studies. An intrinsic case study seeks understanding of the case in itself; an instrumental case study aims to inform an issue or theory (Punch, 2014, p. 121). The research seeks to better understand the BDS movement, but also to understand it with regard to Palestinian leadership and as an example of distributed leadership. Qualitative research tends to focus on individual cases in order to form a ‘causes-of-effects’ explanation (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 23). Of course, causality is not the sole focus of qualitative research, with interpretivist approaches seeking meaning and understanding beyond the explanation (Vromen, 2010, p. 256). As the research will be based on qualitative data, any generalisations made will be *moderatum* generalisations (Bryman, 2012, p. 406). Traditional interpretivism rejects generalisations but the qualitative method does allow for limited generalisations based upon experience – *moderatum* generalisations (Payne & Williams, 2005).
4.3 Comparative Method

A comparative thread will exist throughout the thesis as a continuing means of counter-analysis for the BDS movement. The comparative method has the ability to expose unforeseen differences and similarities between the cases, thus providing the potential for better-informed policy and strategy (Hopkin, 2002, p. 249). Where quantitative comparative methods are highly analytical and tend to draw upon large sample numbers, qualitative comparative research is viewed as holistic and looks “at the phenomena within their contexts . . . as ‘wholes’” (Hopkin, 2002, p. 261). The comparative method employed will draw upon John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference (Moses & Knutsen, 2012, p. 99).

This method uses the similarities between cases and their systems to nullify certain differences and emphasise others:

Case selection is used in a way to control for causal effect. By choosing cases that are largely similar at the outset, any observed difference between the cases cannot be explained by those similarities. In short, all cases share basic characteristics (effective control), but vary with respect to some key explanatory factor. The presence or absence of this factor can then be used to explain any variation in outcomes (as the other relevant explanatory variables are controlled for by case selection).

(Moses & Knutsen, 2012, p. 99)

While there are obvious difficulties with implementing this method in its pure state due to the improbability of finding such similar cases for comparison, the basis of using the ‘similar’ to distinguish between negligible and important differences in outcomes is a useful method for this particular research.

The research will use a ‘small-N’ comparison as is common with qualitative research. A small number of cases opens the research to risks of unrepresentative findings and over-reliance on interpretation and thus observer bias (Hopkin, 2010, p. 300). However, this method of comparison allows for a greater depth of analysis, with qualitative comparative research looking at “the phenomena within their contexts, looking at the cases as ‘wholes’ (complex combinations of configurations of variables)” (Hopkin, 2010, p. 301). The research will not use ‘cases’ in the classic sense, but rather a singular comparative case will weave through each section where appropriate as a further means of analysis. The
comparative element examines the BDS movement and formal Palestinian leadership with the anti-apartheid movement against South Africa and its respective formal leadership institutions. Whilst a wider comparison would allow identification of ‘general trends’ and further inform surrounding theory (Hopkin, 2002, p. 249), the case of apartheid South Africa is deemed sufficiently similar by the literature to constitute a feasible and informative comparison. From a temporal perspective, as Kasrils notes, both forms of oppression began in May 1948 with the legislation of apartheid in South Africa and the creation of the Zionist state of Israel (2013, p. 22).

The use of the comparison is critical for analysing BDS as the movement seeks to use many of the same strategies used by the anti-apartheid movement, but clearly has yet to have the same impact. The comparative thread throughout the research is therefore two-fold: an objective comparison of the BDS movement with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; and an analysis of the BDS movement’s own use of the comparison as a strategic and organisational tool. The literature features both positive and negative reviews of the comparison with South Africa. While many advocate the use of South African apartheid as a tactic for the BDS movement, scholars such as Chomsky regard the comparison as defective to the point of being counterproductive (see Chomsky, 2014). The comparative research method aims to extend beyond the initial general comparisons provided in the literature, which largely focus on the use of tactics and apartheid framing. The comparative element of the research will examine the role of leadership, both within each of the movements and the corresponding interactions between leadership sources and any consequential effects. The inclusion of a modified comparative method provides the qualitative research with an additional element of analysis helping to limit subjectivity and bias. The comparative element is a coherent thread in the research; it affords the study some additional insight but it does not frame the entire thesis. In this sense the research is not classified as a comparative case study per se (Punch, 2014, p. 121).

4.4 Sources

This masters-level project on BDS and Palestine is necessarily subject to certain practical limitations, including financial, geographical and timeline constraints. For these reasons the qualitative research will not involve primary data generation. However, I have travelled
independently to Israel and the West Bank and witnessed the different forms of Palestinian leadership and the difficulties under which they operate. The research will instead focus on conceptualising and analysing existing primary and secondary sources. Primary data provides original material that has not yet been interpreted and is free from researcher bias. The primary data used in this research will largely be a result of the creation and proliferation of electronic resources. Primary sources will include organisations’ documents, non-government organisations’ documents and government documents. The main primary sources will provide key information such as statements from the BNC, PACBI and other key actors in the BDS movement. Television programmes, web blogs, social media accounts and commercial media accounts transverse both primary and secondary data sources depending on the information provided and accessed. Some of these sources tend towards subjectivity and bias but allow access to views and information not always available through official information channels. The development of technology sees a shift to online research in order to understand and analyse “methods for political activism in the information age” (Solo, 2014, p. xxiv). The implications of new technology upon political research are detailed later. By using a wide-range of non-obtrusive sources this will aid internal ‘triangulation’ of the research method, limiting the likelihood of error and increasing the objectivity (Read & Marsh, 2002, p. 237). The primary sources will mainly be used for obtaining data on the Palestinian political leadership sources and the historical context in which they operated.

Secondary sources are interpretations and analyses of primary sources and therefore must be scrutinised for subjectivity (Stewart & Kamins, 1993). Secondary sources used in the research will include books, edited chapters, peer-reviewed journal articles, opinion pieces and published organisational research reports accessed via online databases and library catalogues. Secondary sources will be used to support and negate evidence amongst both primary and secondary sources so that the research remains objective and does not necessarily align with preconceived views. Secondary sources will be used for all areas of the research, with leadership framework material available solely through a combination of journal articles, books and edited chapters. Due to the nature of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a strong bias exists in many secondary sources on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. Caution must be applied to secondary sources, cross-referencing where possible. Much of the information on the BDS movement is available predominantly though proponents of BDS. There is a lack of readily available information and case studies on the organisational
structure of the BDS movement from non-BDS or peer-reviewed sources. Recent developments may not feature in secondary sources and the media may not report on events due to their own agenda, which will limit the internal triangulation.

The developments in technology and social media play a large role in all modern social movements, the BDS movement included, requiring research to focus increasingly on internet-based sources. “The birth of the internet (the Net), the first cost-effective, globally interactive communication medium, opened the door to modes of intercourse, transaction, and data gathering and dissemination” (Anderson & Kanuka, 2003, p. 1). As a research tool the internet increases ease of access to a wider range of information. The self-publishing nature of the internet creates a “truly new body of information” (Fielden & Garrido, 1998, p. 27). The continual expansion of the internet has seen a dramatic shift of social interaction and communication to online fora. Solo and Bishop (2014) initiated a new field of study for research to develop alongside the technology-driven changes to society. ‘Network politics’ encompasses the use of networks “to enable one of more individuals or organizations to engage in political communication including expression, organization or voting” and any accompanying issues (Solo & Bishop, 2014, p. 232).

Alahmed (2014, p. 12) states that these developments have not been adequately addressed in social movement research, particularly in the Middle East where new technologies play an important political role:

It is important to study the connection between social media and social movement in the Middle East . . . it is key to understand how these movements are changing society and political positioning in the Arab world by shaping a civic life and empowering institutions based on the cyberspace environment.

The research will utilise internet sources where appropriate to incorporate and reflect the effects of these technological developments upon social movements such as BDS.

4.5 Conclusion

Palestinian leadership is a complex subject matter, presenting a number of potential difficulties. Palestinian leadership cannot be studied in isolation from the unique
environment in which it exists, nor can one form of leadership be analysed in complete
insolation from other leadership sources with which it must interact. For these reasons, a
qualitative research method is best suited to examining the BDS movement. The use of a
qualitative research method also arises out of an inability to use a mixed methods
approach due to the nature of the research and lack of useful quantitative data. The
weaknesses associated with using solely a qualitative approach are ameliorated by the use
of a conceptual leadership framework and comparative method. Both framework and
methods increase objectivity. The framework has developed independently from the case
study. The research uses both primary and secondary sources in order to provide some
form of triangulation within the qualitative method, with care taken to allow for biases and
subjectivity present. As a modern social movement, the BDS movement heavily utilises the
developments in technology and social media requiring the research to reflect this
internet-based approach. The ever developing nature of the BDS movement and
Palestinian leadership in general means that more recent developments and events are
accessible only through the media and self-propagating websites. However, the use of a
qualitative research approach allows an in-depth analysis of the relational structures of
Palestinian leadership and the BDS movement that would not be possible through
quantitative research. The methods used in the research will engage with the developing
field of ‘network politics’ that is focussed on the effects of new technology on political
research.
5.0 Distributed Leadership in Palestine’s Narrative of Boycott: The Foundations of the BDS Movement

BDS is not a new tactic of the Palestinian national movement. Since the first use of boycotts against the Zionist colonial threat in the 19th century, boycotts have increasingly become the dominant form of Palestinian nonviolent resistance, growing in strength with each new campaign. A number of significant boycott-based campaigns occurred both within Palestine and abroad before the 2005 founding of the BDS movement. Although this period is not part of the BDS movement proper, it is part of the long narrative of boycott-based campaigns in Palestinian history. The formal BDS movement refers to the BDS activity after, and as a result of, the 2005 Palestinian civil society BDS statement (see Appendix B). BDS activities prior to this are defined as campaigns, and while they are part of the greater Palestinian BDS movement history they do not constitute a BDS movement in themselves.

Applying the distributed leadership framework to these preliminary developmental stages of the BDS movement allows the changes to the organisational structure to be tracked against the successes and failures of campaigns. Such application is based upon the interpretivist approach that views the world as a social construct and therefore is not independent from interpretation. The conceptual framework is a tool for interpretation and understanding of events which are time and context bound. The framework provides criteria to measure the existence and prevalence of a distributed leadership model. While the existence of a distributed leadership model does not signify leadership success in itself, it does provide a useful basis for examining how this non-traditional leadership model impacts upon Palestinian leadership and what the unique operating structure of the BDS movement means for Palestinian leadership in a wider sense. BDS leadership does not operate independently from formal Palestinian leadership sources, rather it acts in relation to them. Examining how the BDS movement’s structure has developed over time, concurrently examines its relationship with other Palestinian leadership sources, as well as external developmental factors.

This chapter examines key boycott-based campaigns prior to the 2005 launch of the BDS movement. While much literature exists on these historical events, analysis here is based
on organisational structure with respect to a distributed leadership framework. The purpose of this section is not to re-document the events of Palestine’s popular resistance and linked BDS campaigns, but to identify the leadership structures and relationships surrounding these key events. The priority of the chapter is to develop a framework-based analysis, not the Palestinian historical narrative. The campaigns examined are the Great Revolt, the Arab League boycott, the first Intifada, and the modern origins of the BDS movement. The BDS movement campaign also features in Table 1 to aid tracking of the development of the framework criteria. Analysis of the BDS movement using the distributed leadership framework will occur in the following chapter, with the campaign split into critical junctures to examine the development in greater depth. These boycott-based campaigns will be examined as ‘wholes’, identifying which (if any) distributed leadership elements were present. It has already been shown that actors such as the PLO fit traditional leadership frameworks and such actors feature in the key boycott-based campaigns. This chapter examines how the involvement of formal leadership sources affected the boycott-based campaigns and any potentiality for a distributed leadership organisational structure.
5.1 BDS Movement Origins – pre-2005

Table 1: Distributed leadership during pre-2005 boycott-based campaigns

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5.1.1 The Great Revolt 1936-1939

The origins of the BDS movement can be traced far back beyond the 2005 Palestinian civil society BDS statement. The tactics of boycotts, divestments and sanctions are certainly not a new feature of the Palestinian (and international) opposition to pre-1948 Zionism and the 1967 Israeli occupation. As already mentioned, both the Arab nations and Palestinian popular resistance employed boycotts and sanctions against Israel and its occupation of the Palestinian territories. One of the first uses of boycotts as a form of protest was the
Palestinian economic non-cooperation against Zionist colonies in 1880 (Qumsiyeh, 2011, pp. 207-208). Since then, the use of BDS has become increasingly frequent as a means of resistance against Zionist colonisation and the Israeli occupation. Despite these frequent uses of boycott-based campaigns, a lasting and coherent movement with international reach and global impact failed to establish itself. As a point of comparison, the Zionist movement achieved significant global influence; firstly with the British during World War I which led to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, then subsequently gaining support in the United States during World War II which provided backing for the formal establishment of the state of Israel (see Schneer, 2010 and Cohen, 2003 respectively).

The BDS method became prominent during the 1930s under the British Mandate. There were continual strikes and boycotts by the Palestinians against both the British and the Zionists. Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009, p. 35) identify the contemporary parallels of this initial consumer-driven revolt with the current BDS movement heavily featuring “anti-consumerist activism” and strikes. The Arab Higher Committee (AHC) was established in 1936, becoming the central form of Palestinian leadership. The Great Revolt of 1936-1939 saw a combination of armed and popular resistance. The AHC had only hesitantly joined the revolt as it was not confident of the strength of Palestinian people and their popular resistance (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 87). The British ruled the AHC unlawful in 1937, using arrests, exile and executions to split the leadership. Factionalism grew within the AHC, the grassroots movement diminished and power was left largely in the hands of the British appointed Mufti (Qumsiyeh, 2011, pp. 85-86). Although clearly there were strong opposition forces at play, the organisation of the popular resistance failed to provide the united leadership that the grassroots campaign required. The clan system of leadership in Palestine was not compatible with a distributed leadership-based movement due to its fixed hierarchical structure that centralised power in individuals.

One of the basic factors which led to the Palestine tragedy was the problem of leadership and the lack of democratic organization on the part of the Palestinians . . . Personalities might rise to leadership by personal charm, family background and a dose of nationalism. Once a leader was in the saddle, he was usually not removable or changeable by democratic procedure. Authoritarianism on the part of a leader might lead to dissensions and conflict
of personalities, which might weaken the whole national body. This was true of most of the Arab world and the Palestinians were no exception.

(Jamali, 2008)

While boycott-based activities continued through the popular resistance movement, no notable impact was achieved due to the structural and organisational limitations of the leadership. The hierarchical clan system still dominated the leadership system and the popular resistance was unable to form a viable independent leadership structure. The popular resistance presented informal decentralised leadership, but the dominating clan system did not allow space for the establishment of competing formal leadership within the resistance. Stein (1990, pp. 66-67) argues that the political elites were initially caught unaware by the revolt due to an inwards focus on power maintenance, but the Mufti quickly used the revolt to concentrate his authority. The Mufti and AHC required “the [rebel] bands to continue their activities against the British and Zionists, but they did not wish to see them grow sufficiently strong and cohesive to challenge their authority and possibly disregard future instructions to halt their actions” (Arnon-Ohanna as quoted in Stein, 1990, p. 69). The leadership of this early use of BDS tactics therefore reflected the characteristics of the divisive clan leadership system whereby the Husseini and Nashashibi clans competed against one another (Nashif, 1977). Qumsiyeh (2011, p. 88) states that “the grassroots movement was co-opted by self-serving elite leaders . . . new leaders from the traditional political families jockeyed for power and, like their predecessors, paid little attention to the grassroots movement.” The popular resistance and associated boycott-based campaign were hostage to the elite leadership system and unable to impact either British or Zionist policies (King, 2007, p. 57). The political elites restricted the power local Palestinian leadership which had significant consequences for the following decade – a pattern that the first Intifada mirrors (Stein, 1990, p. 81).

Turning to the framework criterion, it is clear that a distributed leadership model was not present as the leadership of the revolt became increasingly subject to the formal elite leadership system. Disaggregated grassroots popular resistance did feature during the Great Revolt, but not only was informal leadership not a joint organisational model with the formal leadership, the hierarchical clan system trumped informal leadership. The
informal and formal leadership present was not the mixed operating model that distributed leadership embodies. Without the presence of these first two organisational criteria (heterarchical structure and informal and formal leadership), there is very little scope for the action criteria – concertive action and conjoint agency. Concertive action is heavily reliant upon a heterarchical structure as the value is measured in the collective, not the individual. The hierarchical elite leadership during this period was instead focussed on individual efforts and gains. Similarly, as conjoint agency (the synergy of collective) stems from concertive action, it too was not present. The early boycott-based campaign was limited to within Palestinian borders and did not have a transnational character. Although there were the beginnings of regional Arab nationalist anti-Zionism during this period, the boycott activity was specifically targeted within Palestine and therefore the last criterion, frame resonance, was not a necessary element at this time. In sum, there was only a weak presence of informal and formal leadership and this was quickly overshadowed by the popular resistance’s subordination to the elite formal leadership.

5.1.2 Arab League Boycott 1948-1979

The next major campaign with clearly identifiable BDS elements came in 1948 when the League of Arab States (Arab League) called for a boycott of Israel. The boycott came in response to the creation of the state of Israel and Al-Nakba that same year. This campaign clearly differs in nature from the others, founded on a statist approach – one of its criticisms. The boycott had three main tiers: prohibition of Israeli goods and services; prohibition of individuals and private and public sector entities from engaging in business with any entity that does business in Israel – a blacklist; and prohibition of any entity in the League from engaging in business with a company or individual doing business with the US or those on the blacklist (Weiss, 2013, p. 2). The Arab League established a separate bureau, the Central Boycott Office, to administer the boycott. Formally, the boycott is still in action but many Arab states have signed agreements with Israel that ended the boycott – not least of all the Palestinian Authority through the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I Accord) that stipulated economic cooperation (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993). The boycott had no real political impact, though there was a significant negative economic impact for Israel during the height of the boycott, largely due to the 1970s oil embargo (Feiler, 1998, p. 105).
The greatest criticisms of the Arab League Boycott are centred upon the fact that the boycott did not emanate from a grassroots movement. The statist nature of the leadership meant that the boycott was unable to achieve frame resonance as the message failed to transverse the required geographical, social and cultural boundaries:

Coercion and economic force shared little of the moral or ethical arguments that typically characterize solidarity work . . . This problem was exacerbated as the proponents of the boycott represented increasingly authoritarian governments and regimes and in which cases of corruption emerged. Within these dynamics the boycott failed to resonate with many groups and movements who have extended solidarity to Palestinians.

(Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 208)

Bakan and Abu-Laban identify three inherent faults with the Arab League boycott, all of which relate to its organisational structure and approach: its statist-based organisation “which obscured how boycotts may be a form of peaceful resistance to colonialism and racism”; its regional, not international, scope; and its ineffectiveness in publicising the Palestinian issue, particularly the human rights aspect (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, pp. 33-34). All three of these critiques directly address the subsequent lack of distributed leadership criteria. Arab statist leadership occurred as the boycott began prior to the founding of the PLO; Palestine was a pan-Arab issue due to the geographical self-interests of neighbouring states. The statist leadership blocked development of informal or heterarchical leadership structures. Both the regional focus and lack of effective framing limited the frame resonance.

Although the Arab League boycott has not officially ended, for analytical purposes this BDS campaign shall only be assessed until the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty which signified the beginning of the end of the boycott. The Arab League boycott initially appears to meet some of the criteria for a distributed leadership framework. Although lacking both organisational criteria (heterarchical structure and informal and formal leadership) with the leadership solely in the hands of Arab states, the actors were transnational and seemingly working towards a collective goal. The leadership of the boycott existed in the Arab member states of the Arab League – notably this meant the transnational character initially excluded Palestinian leadership. Concertive action values aggregate strength, not that of
the individual, with conjoint agency deriving from this. On the surface, this BDS campaign would seem to embody these two framework criteria, however these are extremely superficial qualities of the Arab League boycott. Concertive action does not refer to valuing the aggregate strength of individual states. Concertive action refers to individuals in a leadership structure, each with valued leadership potential regardless of position. The Arab states are run as hierarchies (many authoritarian as noted above) and their cooperation in the leadership of a boycott is not reflective of this criterion. Similarly, the conjoint agency this BDS campaign initially demonstrates is equally superficial. Conjoint agency represents synergy for the pursuit of mutually agreed upon ends, which in this case was applying economic pressure against the development of the Israeli state; but the self-interested motives behind the apparent synergy were not compatible with conjoint agency.

The eventual favouring of states’ own economic interests saw the boycott disintegrate as Arab states opened dialogue with Israel. Sadat was facing civil unrest as he sought to offset the costs of armed conflict with Israel (e.g. the October/Yom Kippur War and border conflicts). Egypt was the first to deviate from the boycott as Sadat sought American economic assistance for his struggling economy through a peace treaty with Israel (Smith C., 2013, p. 346). These weaknesses are well identified as contributing to the failure of the Arab League boycott as a BDS campaign to achieve any lasting political or international impact.

5.1.3 First Intifada 1987-1993

The first Intifada presents the first real popular grassroots campaign with very strongly identified BDS characteristics that operated both separately and with links to the formal Palestinian leadership. The first Intifada married a distributed leadership network with BDS tactics, yet the most visible outcome from the campaign were the ill-fated Oslo accords. The Oslo accords provided the exiled PLO leadership a return to power within the oPt, undermining the residual local leadership from the Intifada (Robinson, 1997, pp. 176-177). The model of organisation used for the leadership of the first Intifada and the formal political leadership, and the interaction between these two variables, are factors that need to be examined to understand why the Intifada had limited success. The first Intifada saw the presence of both firmly established formal and informal Palestinian leadership and a
competition emerged between the two. Applying the distributed leadership framework will allow an analysis of the individual leadership elements both within and between these different leadership sources. The application of the framework will identify the weaknesses of this attempted distributed leadership campaign, whilst situating the leadership within the wider Palestinian political environment.

The PLO was now well established, as were its affiliated political organisations – Fatah, the PFLP, DFLP, ALF, As-Sa’iqa and others. Following its relocation from Beirut to Tunis in 1982, the PLO increasingly focused on the oPt in an attempt to retain leadership relevance (Parsons, 2013b, p. 216). Hamas, under its Muslim Brotherhood precursor, had a strong foundation and latent potential that would become apparent early on during the first Intifada. Though sparked by uncontrolled events in 1987, the foundations of the first Intifada had been well established in the preceding years through both the Tunis-based PLO and a grassroots movement. Prior to the Intifada, intellectuals and activists were distributing material on nonviolent protest amongst the Palestinian population (King, 2007, p. 4). “Grassroots leaders shaped within these civilian movements expressed novel ideas about pressing for civil and political rights. They challenged monopolies of power and truth based on armed struggle, viewing nonviolent sanctions as a more realistic alternative.” (King, 2007, p. 2). A Palestinian nonviolent movement was seen not only as a way of achieving rights, but also as a means of providing new leadership and power relations. Leadership from the Arab states was hindered by self-interest and began to splinter, with Arab states entering into diplomatic talks with Israel e.g. Egypt and the condemned Camp David Accords. In the lead up to and initial stages of the Intifada, the PLO had been weakened by its distance from Palestinians and challenges to its power through the creation of the Rejectionist Front coalition in 1974. However, the PLO used the latter half of the Intifada to increase its standing as the authoritative Palestinian leadership and institutionalise its power, mainly around the central figure of Arafat, as it sought to control the Palestinian national movement and re-establish itself within the oPt (Parsons, 2005, pp. 26-34).

There were a number of different sources contributing to the leadership of the first Intifada – both cooperating and competing. Firstly, formal Palestinian leadership came from the PLO, but the PLO itself had a dispersed regional structure with exiled leadership in Tunis
and leadership branches in the West Bank and Gaza, organised under the rubric of the PLO’s ‘Western Sector’. This oPt directorate was established in 1968 and headed by Arafat’s second in command, Khalil al-Wazir. The Western Sector was divided into regional committees and power was devolved respectively (Sayigh, 1997, p. 207). Al-Wazir was a major architect of the first Intifada and wished to expand the uprising, fearing Arafat would seek early diplomatic gain. His assassination by Israel in 1988 prevented such development of the Intifada and indeed his speculations proved true (Sayigh, 1997, p. 618). Secondly, leadership presented in the non-PLO Islamic organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Finally, popular committees provided local grassroots leadership to the first Intifada. Unlike the current BDS movement, the first Intifada demonstrates a merging of formal and informal Palestinian leadership sources for the national movement. Although these three leadership blocs were united in cause against the Israeli occupation, there were underlying tensions between leadership inside and outside of the oPt. Both Parsons (2005) and Qumsiyeh (2011) state that the Tunis leadership was threatened by the local leadership within Palestine and sought to limit the local networks in order to maintain a monopoly on political organisation.

The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) formed in the early years of the Intifada and was originally composed of the grassroots leadership and popular committees. Although the UNLU was composed of Fatah, the DFLP, PFLP, and later PCP factions, the leadership maintained a grassroots character as these affiliations were not primary motivators (Robinson, 1997, p. 97). However, as the Intifada progressed, the popular committees and UNLU underwent a professionalisation that saw their leadership further absorbed by political factions of the PLO and thus lost their popular social base (Robinson, 1997, p. 95). This structural change arguably diminished the power and popularity of the UNLU and any associated campaign, as those on politically-funded salaries were determining the strikes for a populace already inundated by economic hardships (Robinson, 1997, pp. 98-99).

The first Intifada continued as a boycott-based campaign with great impact. Palestinians boycotted Israeli goods and focussed on a growing home economy, refused payment of taxes to the occupation authorities, and workers undertook general strikes against Israeli day labour. Not only did the cost of the military occupation greatly increase for Israel, but
it simultaneously lost hundreds of millions of dollars due to the Intifada (Saleh, 1990, p. 49).

However, the changes in leadership organisation and structure were not conducive to lasting success. Robinson believes the alterations to the UNLU occurred out of benefit to the PLO and Israel. Israel was more comfortable dealing with known and centralised leadership with whom it might negotiate. The PLO worked to undermine Intifada efforts administered beyond its control to prevent a haemorrhaging of leadership authority. “The whole structure of alternative grassroots authority, in particular the popular committee framework, was a development beyond Tunis’s reach, and therefore it was viewed as a potential political threat.” (Robinson, 1997, p. 99). It must be noted that the professionalisation of the grassroots movement that saw leadership shift back into the hands of the PLO was also a response to the environment. The pressure Israeli policies (curfews, economic war, and “bone-breaking”) were exerting upon the Palestinian populace limited those both willing and able to participate in the leadership of the grassroots movement (Bargouti, 1990, p. 112); there were severe repercussions against those involved in the popular committees.

The leadership during the first Intifada was dispersed among several different leadership sources, with only the early grassroots movement using a distributed model within its organisation. The grassroots leadership of the BDS campaign utilised a distributed leadership organisational model with power decentralised in popular committees throughout the oPt. However, this model was viewed as a threat by formal political leadership who moved to compromise its grassroots operations. Although the majority of the popular committee members had always been PLO affiliates, the local leadership had not been subordinate to the PLO in Tunis. As the Intifada progressed, the distributed leadership model was negated as the PLO imposed “its centralized power hierarchy on a population in which day-to-day authority was located at the grass roots . . . [this] represented a transition from grassroots to traditional factional leadership.” (Robinson, 1997, pp. 94, 99). The popular committees in the early stages of the BDS campaign had a heterarchical leadership structure. Organisation occurred both “horizontally on a geographic basis” and “vertically along lines of . . . expertise” (Pearlman, 2011, p. 103). A combination of informal and formal leadership within the resistance was also present during this period. Leadership was distributed amongst the specialised committees, with coordinating committees for each community. The establishment of the UNLU provided the intifada with an additional central leadership structure, operating under a consensus-
based approach. Pearlman (2011, p. 104) states that “the UNLU was less an actor than an ongoing process of coordination among major factions in the occupied territories . . . The combination of the UNLU and popular committees engendered a new organizational structure for the national movement.”

The cooperation between leadership in and out of the Palestinian territories also lent the boycott campaign a transnational character. However, the transnationalism was from within the same Palestinian leadership organisation and a result of imposed exile. Indeed, the transnationalism of the intifada campaign was a leading cause in the loss of heterarchy beyond the initial years. The Tunis leadership viewed the internal popular leadership as a threat and moved to increase its control of the popular committees, implementing a hierarchical leadership structure that displaced much of the heterarchical grassroots. Another cause of the loss of heterarchy was the clash between informal and formal leadership sources. The popular committees and UNLU initially constituted an effective merger of the two, but the Tunis-based PLO favoured formal leadership. Power was transferred away from informal grassroots leadership and into institutionalised PLO structures. The presence of inside and outside leadership of the intifada, including its boycott dimension, resulted in destructive tensions between informal and formal leadership sources that culminated in the secret Oslo channel and the ill-fated Declaration of Principles in 1993.

By these means, any shows of concertive action and conjoint agency became increasingly superficial. Claims of being mass-based grassroots resistance continued despite the transformation from a popular resistance to that of a politically motivated one seeing actors value self-interest over the aggregate, resulting in the negotiating of a political deal that would consolidate power for the PLO. The formal PLO leadership undermined the oPt leadership on an international stage by privately negotiating on behalf of Palestinians accords that would shape the peace process for the following two decades. The multi-lateral 1991 Madrid Conference and subsequent Washington talks that involved an oPt-based Palestinian delegation became irrelevant with the signing of Oslo I. Oslo put into power “a political elite geographically and politically removed from the realities of post-Intifada Palestine” (Robinson, 1997, p. 176). The aforementioned action criteria features
were increasingly corroded as the popular committees ceded autonomy to the hierarchical PLO.

Concertive action and subsequent conjoint agency certainly featured in the popular committees and UNLU when they were operating under an authentic distributed leadership model. The UNLU was a leadership of organisations. “Individuals on the Command [UNLU] were not on a high level in their organizations, not even on the second level, but probably on the third level, because they were not meant to be a leadership.” (Ghassan Khatib as quoted in King, 2007, p. 206). The strength of the aggregate was the focus, with potential power of each aspect of the organisation valued – the very definition of concertive action. Using Gronn’s (2002) three types, the concertive action present during the first half of the Intifada can be classified as intuitive working relations. Interdependence and shared working and social spaces defined the concertive action between the organisations of the UNLU. The concertive action of the first Intifada extended beyond the spontaneous but did not reach institutionalised levels, with factions and communities acting concertedly upon their own accord.

Elias Rishmawi, a leader in the tax revolt program of the Intifada, believed that the use of nonviolence during the first Intifada saw the Palestinian national movement achieve frame resonance for the first time. Frame resonance requires a unified message that is able to translate geographically across socially constructed divisions.

Palestinians were able to present the Palestinian nation to the world as being a civilized nation applying the human values determined by the international community, including the American community. As a result, there was clear international sympathy with the Palestinians on both the official and popular levels.

(Rishmawi, as quoted in Allen, 2002).

The media has an important role in the efficacy of framing, with the first Intifada being the first campaign in which media was a decisive factor. Prior to the Intifada, Palestinians received little attention from the US media, however this dramatically changed from 1987
(Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, pp. 654-655). Although boycott-based campaigns had been used previously in the Palestinian national movement, the ‘nonviolent’ narrative resonated internationally this time around. The Israeli media noted this deliberate tactic. Stone-throwing was a large part of the Intifada and though this contradicted the nonviolent framing, it did in fact aid frame resonance. The contrast between stone-throwing adolescents amongst women and children and heavily armed IDF soldiers was broadcast internationally – David and Goliath (King, 2007, p. 261). The two sides became framed as an occupation army and a civilian population. “Not even the most brilliant public relations campaign could have nullified or even moderated the powerful message generated worldwide by television images of the disturbances” (Shalev, 1991, p. 41). Wolfsfeld (1993) argues that for an initial period there was in increase in resonance of the Palestinian ‘injustice’ frame against the Israeli ‘law and order’ and ‘terrorism’ frames. However, Israel limited media access to the West Bank and Gaza from 1988 forcing a shift in reliance on Israeli sources and the redistribution of journalists to cover Eastern Europe (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 655). The differences in media coverage, and therefore framing, of the first Intifada led Noakes and Wilkins (2002, p. 655) to argue that “media access for the Palestinian independence claim is at least in part a function of the social and political contexts in which that claim is made.” The achievement of frame resonance during the first Intifada would have required the leadership to be able to propagate both the conflict and framing independently from Israel’s control – something the media and technology did not yet allow for.

Like the other distributed leadership criteria, frame resonance existed only during the first half of the Intifada. Initially the Palestinian framing of the Intifada paralleled and thus resonated with Western social movement frames (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 665). But this resonance abated due to both the environment that the media was operating in but also as Palestinian leadership shifted away from nonviolent boycott methods. The Tunis-based PLO leadership did not provide united support for the nonviolent movement, something King (2007, p. 292) attributes as a key reason for the collapse of the campaign. The signing of the Oslo Accords which saw the PLO enter into negotiations with the ‘enemy’ dramatically changed the coverage and interpretation of the Intifada away from resonating social movement frames (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, pp. 665-666).
The first Intifada essentially presents two situations. The first half was a boycott-based campaign dominated by grassroots popular committees which successfully used a distributed leadership model. The organisation and nature of the leadership during this period matches all the distributed leadership framework criteria through the UNLU and popular committee leadership structures, with the exception of transnationalism – the movement was not transnational in the true sense. However, the PLO leadership in Tunis felt increasingly threatened by this alternative form of leadership and sought to impose a hierarchical leadership structure that redirected power back to the PLO. King (2007, p. 292) succinctly summarises the actions of the PLO stating “Not only did the PLO fail to support the intifada strategy, but by putting first the taking over of the uprising, it placed organizational supremacy ahead of its stated goals.” The first Intifada was a ground-breaking grassroots campaign for the Palestinian national movement, but the involvement of formal Palestinian leadership compromised the distributed leadership structure that the campaign required to maintain widespread involvement and thus a high level of pressure on Israel. The return to a hierarchical formal Palestinian leadership allowed Israel to determine the terms of engagement. The movement shifted from a boycott-based campaign to diplomatic negotiations which saw the signing of the Oslo Accords and establishment of the PA, further institutionalising formal Palestinian leadership and ending the popular resistance.

5.1.4 Modern Origins 2001-2004

This period does not represent a homogenous BDS campaign or the BDS movement proper. However, examining this period allows the identification of the foundations of the BDS movement and how these influenced the organisational structure of the movement, and whether distributed leadership characteristics presented themselves in the early stages. The PA had been formed in 1994 to administer portions of the oPt. Alongside that, the residue of the PLO sought to provide diplomatic leadership for the Palestinian national movement. It was assumed that formal Palestinian leadership sources were to lead, and ultimately resolve, the Palestinian national movement, with the PA acting as an interim step towards self-determination (Parsons, 2013a, p. 222). The PA became further bureaucratised for power to be concentrated in a fixed hierarchical leadership structure with an emphasis on security. Due to the leadership model and the difficult environment in
which it operated, little progress was made towards resolving the occupation and the PA became increasingly unpopular.

The second Intifada began in late 2000 but differed from the first as it was dominated by violence and armed resistance and thus could not employ the same social movement frames and achieve the resonance of the first. The post-September 11 War on Terror also created new difficulties for the framing of the Palestinian national movement. Noakes and Wilkins (2002, p. 667) state that President Bush’s likening of Hamas to the PA’s Al-Qaeda resulted in the PLO losing legitimacy in the US media and saw an entanglement of coverage of the second Intifada with the War on Terror. The War on Terror became a macro-frame operating ideologically as a “taken-for-granted way to think [that] the world internalized by mainstream politics” (Handley, 2010, p. 446).

Simultaneously, a growing number of BDS events began to take place around the same time. These precursory BDS campaigns were distinct from previous activity as they were increasingly initiated independently from Palestinian organisations and leadership; BDS campaigns were occurring outside of Palestine and the Middle East. The first Intifada had been driven by an unprecedented grassroots movement within Palestine. The PLO had begun to undermine the grassroots leadership during the latter half of the Intifada and establishment of the PA further weakened this alternative leadership.

The disjunction between the grassroots organization of authority in place in the West Bank and Gaza and the logic of power consolidation by the PA often led to stalemate. The PA responded to this situation by trying to divert resources from nongovernmental organizations and other representatives of grassroots authority (Robinson, 1997, p. 94)

Formal Palestinian leadership and grassroots leadership sources were again at odds as the elite leadership worked to monopolise power. The start of the 21st century saw a revival in Palestinian civil society as it increasingly sought to circumvent formal leadership through BDS activity.
Momentum for the BDS movement began building from 1997 when Gush Shalom, an Israeli peace activism group, called for a boycott of settlement products. The following year the EU used the list of products published by Gush Shalom to recommend a settlement import ban (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 208). The South Africa analogy started to emerge as a principal tactic of BDS campaigns with Matzpun basing their 2001 call for an Israeli boycott on the effects the anti-apartheid boycotts were able to achieve (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 209).

Significant backing for a BDS movement against Israel came from the 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban. It was here that the UN definition of the apartheid (see Appendix C) was applied to Israel to demonstrate that Israeli policies were racially discriminatory and to advocate for a BDS strategy to fight this new case of apartheid (Erakat, 2012a, p. 87). Parsons (2005, p. 182) cites the work of the conference as being a “triumph of Palestinian and Arab social activism . . . that put the lame efforts of the PA to shame.” However, three days after the conference the September 11 attacks occurred, completely overshadowing any potential effects of the conference and igniting the War on Terror.

Academic boycotts became the next major BDS campaign strategy, gaining enough momentum to facilitate the establishment of a separate organisation. A 2002 British-based academic boycott led by Stephan and Hilary Rosen was the catalyst for the expansion and development of this BDS campaign (Qumsiyeh, 2011, p. 209). A few months later there was a Palestinian call for an economic, cultural and academic boycott of Israel, and Palestinian academics built upon this, issuing a statement in October 2003 for an Israeli academic boycott. These campaigns led to the foundation of the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) which was launched April 2004 to coordinate the related Palestinian BDS campaigns (PACBI, 2008). PACBI is comprised of numerous Palestinian (and now also non-Palestinian) organisations, NGOS, unions and associations, and has a central advisory board, founding committee, and steering committee.

The formal launch of the BDS movement is attributed to the 2005 Palestinian civil society coalition’s call to action. However Qumsiyeh (2011, pp. 215-218) cites 46 separate BDS initiatives prior to the 2005 Palestinian civil society statement, amongst them businesses, churches, organisations, associations, unions, universities (and student unions), political
parties and parliamentary groups, and councils. Unifying organisations, such as PACBI, were present during this period; however there was no official BDS organisation or operational structure to provide coherence.

These early BDS campaigns naturally leant themselves to a heterarchical structure for a number of reasons; the first being a result of the type of organisations conducting the campaigns. Many of the groups undertaking and promoting a BDS movement featured heterarchical leadership structures. PACBI, as the most notable precursor, had its leadership distributed across a number of separate organisations that were equally valued for their contribution. Secondly, the geographical distribution of the BDS campaigns and their associated organisations resulted in a default heterarchy with no enforceable hierarchical structure – also imparting a transnational character. Lastly, the lack overarching or more centralised leadership that would have combined the campaigns into a formal movement means this period of BDS activity defaults to a heterarchical structure.

Similarly, concertive action is a default feature of the precursor BDS movement. As with any popular social or political movement, the strength of the aggregate is crucial to the success of the movement and therefore concertive action is often inherently valued. BDS tactics require collective power to achieve the desired pressure and detrimental effects on the target. The calls for BDS that each group made within the course of its own campaign demonstrates concertive action due to the knowledge that boycotts, sanctions and divestment are not individual-based tactics; each organisation holds its own important leadership potential and value. The concertive action present during the modern origins can be classified as ‘spontaneous collaboration’. There were no formalised relations, with the precursory BDS movement yet to outline definitive working relations and goals. Consequential conjoint agency was present during this period as actors were working in synergy. However with the formal BDS statement yet to exist, there was no mutually agreed upon goal, only the aims existing within each individual campaign. PACBI had its own conjoint agency shown by its 2004 statement that outlined its goals and methods endorsed by member organisations (PACBI, 2004). Conjoint agency between all of those undertaking BDS campaigns was not present.
5.2 Conclusion

Numerous key Palestinian campaigns with BDS elements to them have taken place periodically throughout the history of the Zionist project in Palestine, the establishment of Israel and its occupation of the Palestinian territories. Popular resistance and campaigns with BDS elements arose in part from a lack of authoritative or formally organised Palestinian leadership. The most significant pre-2005 BDS campaign, the first Intifada, saw popular resistance merge with the formal leadership of the PLO, ultimately resulting in an entrenchment of formal Palestinian leadership with the establishment of the PA. The current BDS movement has arisen in great part due to the failings of this formal Palestinian leadership. The PA acted to weaken grassroots leadership, but as the PA increasingly became the target of Palestinian criticism, momentum for the Palestinian national movement began to shift again in favour of grassroots activism including BDS campaigns.

None of the campaigns examined met all the distributed leadership framework criteria. Attempts were made to use a distributed leadership as the operating model for previous BDS campaigns, but lasting success was not achieved. The hierarchical leadership structures of the formal leadership sources (Arab or Palestinian) had a corrupting influence on the grassroots, heterarchical models with campaigns compromised over self-interested power consolidation. The first Intifada demonstrated the closest example of a BDS campaign operating under a distributed leadership model and was arguably the most effective. However as the PLO increased its involvement in leadership of the Intifada, the distributed leadership structure was replaced by the PLO’s traditional hierarchical elite leadership model. With this shift, the boycott campaign diminished and formal diplomacy became consolidated as the dominant, and failed, approach of the PLO-led national movement. The modern origins of the BDS movement appear naturally inclined to distributed leadership, but were not operating under an organised movement. The use of boycott-based strategies is not a new feature of the Palestinian national movement, but the BDS movement presents the first case of the explicit articulation of BDS strategies as the sole basis of a campaign.

The combination of informal and formal leadership was not present prior to the 2005 launch of the BDS movement. Informal leadership existed across the campaigns; formal leadership only truly existed within campaigns and organisations. Frame resonance was not
present despite links being made with South African apartheid. The absence of a formally organised leadership structure resulted in the absence of a framing strategy. Instead the highly distributed nature of the campaigns meant associated framing was context-sensitive but not unified. Although effective transnational frame resonance is not linked to central leadership, framing must be adequately coordinated to provide a recognisable resonance. The framing of the BDS campaigns was not effective enough in terms of both message and coordination for the socio-political environment of the time. These modern BDS campaigns provided a strong foundation from which the BDS movement could launch, but until a degree of unity between the campaigns was achieved, the use of BDS for the Palestinian national movement could achieve only limited success. The advent of new technology and social media during shifting socio-political conditions in the upcoming years would aid these necessary important organisational and framing developments which would see the BDS campaigns evolve into a powerful global movement. The following chapter will examine how such developments have impacted upon the leadership and organisational structure of the BDS movement, and analyse the efficacy of this new leadership force in providing alternative leadership for the Palestinian national movement.
6.0 Development of the BDS Movement: 2005-present

Over the past few years Israel’s greatest advantage and the thrust of its assault have centered around the rift within the Palestinian movement and the weakness of the disunited Palestinian leadership. . . The most difficult task that we face today is that of creating a unified leadership and strategy binding on all, from which no political or military decisions will depart, and within whose framework no single group or party has a monopoly on the decision-making process.

(Barghouti M. , 2012, pp. 7-8)

Where once popular resistance existed to fill a Palestinian leadership void, the BDS movement now exists to circumnavigate existing formal leadership and the restrictions faced by such. Unlike its predecessors, the BDS movement has developed into a transnational social movement with a distributed leadership organisational structure. Examining the organisational structure of the BDS movement is important not only to analyse how the movement operates within itself, but how it operates within the wider power dynamics of Palestinian leadership. The distributed leadership model is not a measure of leadership success; rather, the conceptual framework is used as a means of analysing the leadership and organisational structure of BDS and the implications this holds in the context of wider Palestinian leadership. The BDS movement exists with the objective of obtaining Palestinian self-determination, not establishing a monopoly on future Palestinian leadership. The leadership provided by the BDS movement aims to be a means to an end.

The first segment of this chapter examines key organisational information of the BDS movement. The chapter then builds upon this information, analysing the development of the BDS movement against the wider political environment. Critical junctures, in the form of Israeli military operations, are used to demarcate a timeline by which the distributed leadership framework is applied. The Israeli military operations of the past two decades have provided the greatest opportunities for development of the BDS movement, with each causing a significant shift in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Lastly, how the organisational structure of the BDS movement impacts upon Palestinian and Israeli power
relations is examined. A subsection analyses the comparison with the anti-apartheid movement, retaining a focus on implications for future Palestinian leadership.

6.1 BDS Movement Establishment

6.1.1 Palestinian Civil Society 2005 Statement

On July 9 2004 the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the Israeli construction of the separation wall in the oPt to be in violation of international law. The ICJ stated that construction must cease, existing structures be dismantled and reparations made for associated damage (International Court of Justice, 2004). This was a monumental ruling for the Palestinians and was the catalyst for the weekly protests against the wall that began in 2005 and would spread to numerous Palestinian villages. The ruling provided initial impetus for a cohesive BDS movement, building upon the sentiment expressed at the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism. On the one year anniversary of this historic ruling the BDS movement was formally launched; a statement calling for BDS against Israel was endorsed by over 170 Palestinian organisations, associations, unions and political parties (Barghouti O., 2010) (see Appendix B). The BDS movement states that the signatories represent the three main components of the Palestinian people: “the refugees in exile, Palestinians under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the discriminated Palestinian citizens of the Israeli state” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, n.d.).

The call for BDS created coordination that was previously lacking. Setting three objectives, the statement gave focus and a means of unifying BDS campaigns. “Most important among the sources of conceptual coherence is the “Palestinian United Call” of July 9, 2005, which names three obligations that Israel must meet, but that function, also, as three objectives or outcomes that BDS, as a strategy for change, seeks to achieve” (Aboud, 2012, p. 210). The 2005 statement set three non-negotiable obligations for Israel that formed the underlying strategy for all BDS campaigns within the movement: ending the occupation and dismantling the wall; equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel; and the right of return for Palestinian refugees as per UN resolution 194 (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). This overarching strategy is the key feature of the BDS movement, based upon international law.
and UN resolutions, lending the BDS movement a crucial form of support for international campaigns. The old Arab League Boycott, for example, did not follow a rights-based approach that was in keeping with international law and thus caused boycotters (e.g. World Trade Organisation states) to compromise and weaken the boycott (Hever, 2013, p. 110). The 2005 Palestinian civil society call became the reference for the global BDS movement (Barghouti O., 2011, p. 218). There is no factional power divide and the 2005 call is respected by the numerous BDS campaigns.

The 2005 statement also specifically articulated the South African apartheid comparison as a means of framing the BDS movement:

Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression; we, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era.

(Palestinian Civil Society, 2005)

The Palestinian civil society leadership used the universal human rights, as set in customary international law by the respective United Nations Declaration, which framed the South African anti-apartheid movement to draw parallels as an attempt to shame the international community over its inconsistent defence of human rights. The statement does not explicitly label Israel as an apartheid state, but invokes a comparison through Israel’s discriminatory policies and how such injustices may be fought using the same tactics as those used against South Africa.

Barghouti (2011, p. 61) summarises the 2005 call thus: “The Palestinian Civil Society Campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel is above everything else a deeply rooted yet qualitatively new stage in the century-old Palestinian resistance.” The unified strategy statement (2005) provided cohesion to independent global BDS campaigns all the while retaining a Palestinian grassroots leadership structure. The distributed leadership framework will provide a means of analysing this “qualitatively new stage”. 
6.1.2 BDS National Committee

The central leadership of the BDS National Committee was established in 2008. Prior to this, BDS lacked formal leadership which limited its ability to function in more institutionalised political realms. The 2005 call caused a dramatic increase in momentum, prompting formation of a central coordinating body. In 2007 the first Palestinian BDS Conference was held in Ramallah (Appendix D), attended by representatives from Palestine alongside those from South Africa, Spain, Norway, Canada and Britain. Recommendations included: a general BDS strategy; local Palestinian BDS campaign; the Arab campaign; and the international campaign. Tactics focussed on consumer boycotts, education, awareness and promotion, campaign-building, strategy, targets, alliances, and coordination (Conference Steering Committee, 2007). The most significant recommendation was for the creation of a steering committee - the BNC from 2008.

The establishment of the BNC provided key development that can be measured through the framework criteria. Firstly, the BNC meant that BDS leadership was primarily Palestinian. Although international leadership was still a large component, central leadership was based in the West Bank in the hands of Palestinian grassroots. Secondly, the BNC is not composed of individuals instilled with power, but rather is a collection of principal Palestinian-based BDS organisations. Lastly, the central heterarchical leadership structure gave BDS a means of securing a coherency whilst allowing for leadership dispersal. “Regarding the BDS movement, it is key to recognize that it is led by Palestinians – the BNC specifically. The BNC is the largest coalition of Palestinian civil society unions, NGOs, political parties, and networks, representing Palestinians in the OPT, inside Israel, and, crucially, Palestinians in exile, who are the majority of the Palestinian people.” (Barghouti O., 2011, p. 218). The distinct Palestinian grassroots character reflected the long history of popular resistance.

27 Palestinian organisations are members of the BNC. Key organisational and strategic roles of the BNC include:

- Formulating strategies and programs in accordance with the 2005 civil society call
- Serving as the Palestinian reference point for BDS in the region and worldwide
- Facilitating coordination and providing support to BDS campaigns in all locations
- Campaigning with BDS activists locally and worldwide by preparing and disseminating BNC statements
- Coordination with BDS activists locally and worldwide, including organising meetings and conferences
- Awareness raising and training activists about BNC analysis, standards and campaign work
- Developing BDS in Arab countries

(Palestinian BDS National Committee, n.d.)

The explicit detailing of these priorities for the BNC immediately references two distributed leadership criteria: transnational character and concertive action. This list also identified a framework criterion that required development to achieve a distributed leadership model: frame resonance.

The relationship between the BNC and the overall BDS movement is summarised by Hallward and Shaver (2012, p. 397): “While the BDS movement is quite loosely organized, the BNC does serve as a focal point for coordinating various BDS campaign efforts, organizes a yearly conference, formulates strategies and programs, and acts as the Palestinian reference point for global BDS activities.” BNC coordinators’ positions exist both within Palestine and internationally, with coordinators touring to increase global support (Nieuwhof, 2010).

6.2 BDS Leadership: Balancing Palestinian Ownership with International Involvement

6.2.1 International BDS Groups

Unions, NGOs, associations, councils, churches and businesses along with individual academics, performers, film makers, writers and more have taken up the BDS policy and become either supporters or signatories of the movement. Simultaneously, as a result of the 2005 BDS call and growth of the movement, new BDS organisations had been founded. These organisations are often internationally based and used as an organising point for campaigns and protests in individual cities e.g. BDS-Quebec and BDS Wellington. Many of
these BDS organisations have their origins from Palestine solidarity organisations and campaigns (Aboud, 2012, p. 204).

BDS-Quebec and the BDS activity in Montreal provide one of the few cases of thoroughly documented BDS organisation. The 2005 BDS call was the catalyst for BDS activity in Montreal. In 2009 a committee formed with the purpose of improving the coordination and implementation of the BDS strategy in Quebec. As BDS became the dominant strategy and narrative of Palestinian liberation politics, enhanced cooperation and exchange needed to occur between different associations. BDS-Quebec was not established to create a “permanent, formal organizational structure, but rather to achieve a greater degree of interorganizational cooperation and both to enhance coherence and to bridge some divisions that seemed to be emerging in BDS work” (Aboud, 2012, p. 206). The fact that the need for this existed on a regional level is indicative of the organisational challenge facing global cohesion of the movement.

The reasoning behind the establishment of BDS-Quebec is reflective of the philosophy for founding the larger organisational bodies of the movement; the focus was cooperation and coherence rather than power consolidation.

The sphere of political work on BDS is characterized structurally by a configuration of associative relations that is more horizontal than vertical in shape, relatively decentralized, but wherein the pattern of interactions is sufficiently stable and regular to constitute an identifiable and fairly distinctive network of relations.

(Baboud, 2012, p. 206).

BDS-Quebec has strategic ties to the “center of BDS organizing and strategizing” – the BNC and also PACBI (Aboud, 2012, p. 208). Within the local movements there are organisational centres and within the global movement there is an organisational centre. The local horizontal leadership structure aligns with the global Palestinian-based horizontal structure. There is “fluidity and variability within and across the gradations” (Aboud, 2012, p. 208). This system allows for concurrent autonomy and coordination at several organisational and geographic levels of the movement.
### 6.2.2 Palestinian BDS Leadership and Self-determination

One of the greatest challenges facing the BDS movement is growing support through the proliferation of international BDS groups and campaigns, each semi-autonomous and context-sensitive, whilst retaining an overall sense of Palestinian leadership. Context-sensitivity is a key factor in achieving frame resonance for a transnational movement. The majority of BDS campaigns that have been established post-2005 have been in the West and emerged from existing solidarity networks (Ananth, 2013, p. 139). International support is the basis of BDS and thus structurally requires the space for non-Palestinian leadership. However, self-determination cannot be achieved in its truest sense if leadership does not inhere in Palestine. For Falk (2013, p. 87), "Non-Palestinians active in the PSM [Palestine Solidarity Movement] have a political responsibility to defer to the lead of Palestinian civil society, who currently best represent Palestinian democratic aspirations."

Falk argues that not only should Palestinians hold the leadership authority, but that there is an onus on non-Palestinians to defer to a Palestinian lead. In a similar vein, Barghouti (2011, p. 219) notes: “Where we have problems is when any group tries to appropriate the right to set the movement’s goals or parameters instead or on behalf of the Palestinians.”

In the wake of the Oslo calamity and the failure of the PA, Palestinian civil society has worked to “reclaim its role as the true expression of the collective Palestinian political voice” and return to its historical role of grassroots popular resistance leadership (Moor, 2014). This revitalised Palestinian civil society was the necessary basis for leadership of BDS.

### 6.2.3 Achieving Context-sensitivity

International BDS organisations work largely under BNC leadership whilst remaining semi-autonomous. For the BDS movement to achieve the international support it requires to effectively pressure Israel, context-sensitivity must be achieved in each different location. Context-sensitivity stems from adaptable leadership and strategy and is strongly tied to framing. Context-sensitivity must be present for frame resonance to be achieved in a transnational environment. Barghouti (2011, pp. 218-219) asserts that the organisational structure of BDS naturally provides the operating conditions necessary for context-sensitivity:

> Context sensitivity is a key principle of the BDS movement that the movement’s leadership, the Palestinian BDS National Committee (BNC), takes
to heart. BDS is not an ideology or run by a political party; it is a wide movement that brings together groups and individuals of diverse ideological and political backgrounds that converge on the utmost respect for international law and the morally consistent application of human rights to the question of Palestine . . . What differs from location to location according to the political and organisation context is the specific target of the BDS campaign and the tactics used in local work.

The nature of the BDS movement means that support cannot simply be passive, but must be an active contribution by way of a boycott, divestment or sanction action. Transnational support requires campaigns to be tailored to different environments, using a narrative that appropriate for the diverse situations. Barghouti (2011, p. 217) notes that not ‘one size fits all’ but “if the basic premise that Isra
el needs to be pressured is accepted, then various forms of boycott, divestment, and sanctions can be adapted according to the specific context in each country.” Different factors must be accounted for: the level of support amongst the local populace - which can be tied to the nature of local diaspora; traditional national foreign policy allegiances; and the number of businesses able to be effectively targeted. BDS campaigns operate independently but use Palestinian-based BDS leadership to maintain “coordinating mechanisms” (Ananth, 2013, p. 139). This heterogeneous character ensures adaptability to changing socio-political environments. Such coordinating mechanisms can occur at a regional level, such as the 2010 Montreal Conference which saw a meeting of Canadian BDS activists and networks who focus on BDS strategy and increasing associational ties (Aboud, 2012, p. 205).

The BDS movement currently operates on a number of levels – international, regional, national, local – and the “informational and analytical relay” between all four provides conceptual coherence (Aboud, 2012, p. 210). Aboud argues that this interaction between the four layers of the BDS movement increases the potential for achievement on both international campaigns and local targets. Local campaigns are diverse in their targets - ranging from dockworkers’ unions refusing to unload Israeli cargo in Sweden, the US, India and South Africa, to a peaceful disruption of the ‘Distinguished IDF Musicians’ Jerusalem Quartet’s performance in Edinburgh, resulting in a subsequent challenge to the London Declaration on Combating Anti-Semitism through the British legal system (see Ziadah, 2013
The autonomy allotted to each local BDS organisation allows for customised campaigns and targets with the BNC leadership providing coordination and coherence at the global level. Devolved leadership provides for context-sensitivity which in turn increases the likelihood of the frame resonance.

### 6.2.4 The Role of Framing

Framing is closely tied to context-sensitivity. For frame resonance to be achieved, the framing must resonate with local populace and thus adapt to the socio-political climate. Frame resonance is crucial to the transition from passive to active support that BDS requires. The BDS movement has been framed in two ways: through the use of the term apartheid and drawing a comparison with the South African anti-apartheid movement, and the use of universal human rights as the foundational basis of the movement. The 2005 BDS call made use of both these frames, with the framing of the movement not deviating over the following decade; this indicates the achievement of a successful, context-sensitive framing strategy.

BDS employed a strong framing strategy from its establishment. Universal human rights as a frame of reference required less context-sensitive adaptations than the use of apartheid as not only are universal human rights widely accepted (especially in the West where the BDS campaigns were emerging), but they do not stir the same controversy as the term apartheid and the recent historical comparison. “Conditions seen as antithetical to or limiting of human liberty, self-development and actualization, choice, equality of treatment and opportunity and dignity are thus the overriding object of attention and concern in BDS organizing. This overriding object contributes an element of coherence and cohesion to the pursuit of the BDS strategy locally and internationally” (Aboud, 2012, p. 210).

Apartheid itself is framed by human rights and equality. “Even as the BDS movement advocates diversity and ingenuity in designing and implementing BDS campaigns in various settings, the Palestinian BDS Call with its comprehensive emphasis on Palestinian rights remains the movement’s frame of reference” (Barghouti O., 2010, p. 226). Using human rights to frame the BDS movement naturally lends itself to context-sensitivity.
Using apartheid to frame both the BDS movement and the Israeli occupation has pointed positives and negatives. Applying the term apartheid to Israel draws an instant parallel with apartheid South Africa. The comparison with South Africa provides a largely recognisable and successful movement for the public to associate with. Those who were a part of the South African anti-apartheid movement or who demonstrated against apartheid are forced to question why they are not participating in the BDS movement if they are not already doing so. However, the apartheid framing also causes a number of challenges. The largest of these is the lack of differentiation between apartheid as a phenomenon and South Africa being an example of apartheid rather than the definition of it. Applying apartheid to Israel has caused numerous challenges to the analogy as Israel obviously differs from the South African situation in significant ways (Erakat, 2012a, p. 93). Frame resonance with apartheid requires the BDS movement to generate a better understanding around the term apartheid and how it need not only apply to South Africa. Without this, the framing mechanism appears weak, as the dissimilarities of the comparison become a main point of critique even amongst those who do not support the Israeli occupation (see Carter, 2006; Chomsky, 2014; Pogrund, 2012; 2007).
6.3 Distributed Leadership Framework Analysis

This section analyses the BDS movement against a distributed leadership framework, using key events in recent Israel-Palestine history to demarcate developmental stages – both for BDS and Palestinian leadership as a whole. Events and developments leading up to and during these critical junctures will be examined.

Table 2: Distributed Leadership of the BDS Movement Development post-2005

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<tr>
<th>BDS Campaign Period</th>
<th>Distributed Leadership Framework Criteria</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Heterarchical Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 Establishment</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Cast Lead 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Pillar of Defence 2012</td>
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<td>Operation Protective Edge 2014</td>
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6.3.1 BDS Movement Establishment 2005

The previous chapter examined the pre-2005 origins of the BDS movement and any distributed leadership criteria that it naturally displayed. The BDS movement proper inherited from this the transnational character, heterarchical structure and concertive action criteria – the latter two being present by default. The 2005 Palestinian civil society
call for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel shifted the presence of these criteria from incidental to purposeful. The call came from over 170 organisations, with some of these already operating under a heterarchical structure such as PACBI. Power and leadership was devolved not only amongst the signatories of the call, but through the statement that power was also offered to organisations and those who would join the movement. The statement emphasised that non-Palestinians were the ones who could effect change in the international arena. “We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel” (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005).

Heterarchical structure thus became a deliberate means of leadership organisation. Concertive action became another deliberate feature of BDS. Value and leadership was attributed to the aggregate strength of the movement; the call emphasised the role of both individuals and organisations in terms of international solidarity. Releasing the call in itself is an example of concertive action: Palestinian civil society was inviting a strengthening of international leadership in BDS as the movement dependent upon the power of the collective. The concertive action shifted from spontaneous collaboration to intuitive working relations as interdependence and shared working space became increasingly important to the BDS movement.

The 2005 call outlined three specific objectives that every subsequent campaign used as a reference. This mutually agreed upon outcome presented the movement with conjoint agency. It also leant a cohesion that had not existed prior to this point, with relationships between associations developing naturally to form sharing and support networks. Such activity, and thus conjoint agency, did not develop instantly. The 2005 call presented a clear need for the coexistence of formal leadership, but this need was not fulfilled until 2008. Frame resonance remained dependent on both effective framing strategies from the leadership and also the political environment of the time – an important point of difference with apartheid comparison.

The South Africa struggle benefited from an international climate in which former colonies were gaining independence from colonization as well as from the promotion of liberal principles such as equality for all. Palestinians and Arabs face the reality of a ‘global war on terror’, with racial profiling of Arabs and the labeling of Palestinian freedom fighters as Al Qaeda-type terrorists.

(Eid & Kalideen, 2008, p. 81)
The political environment presented additional challenges for the Palestinians and subsequent BDS movement. The War on Terror remained the dominant narrative during this period and the BDS movement struggled to compete (Zalman & Clarke, 2009, p. 102). The phrase ‘the war on terror’ became widespread; its usage expanded beyond the initial aftermath of the September 11 attacks and came to vilify many Arabic peoples. The movement was not able to challenge the strong global narrative that the US was disseminating during this early formative stage.

6.3.2 Operation Cast Lead 2008-2009

Two key developments for BDS and its leadership occurred between 2005 and 2008: the BNC was established and Israel launched Operation Cast Lead (see Appendix E). These had profound effects on the two missing distributed leadership framework criteria – informal and formal leadership, and frame resonance. The BNC provided BDS with a formal leadership structure, whilst Operation Cast Lead altered the political environment to increase frame resonance. Prior to the first BDS conference in 2007, the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign had released the report Towards a global movement: A framework for today’s anti-apartheid activism (2007). This 170 page “extensive study” effectively acted as both the BDS movement’s manifesto and instruction guide, covering methodologies, strengths and weaknesses, the history of Palestinian and Arab boycotts, BDS initiatives, the South African apartheid comparison, and future strategy. It was clear that the movement was expanding the professional aspects of its organisation, not bureaucratically but to provide a solid and coherent unified basis from which to expand global operations. This framework provided the foundation for formal leadership within the movement.

Crucially, establishment of the BNC did not negate the presence of the informal grassroots leadership that is a central tenet of BDS. Unlike previous popular resistance, the emergence of formal leadership of the movement was not linked to the separate formal Palestinian leadership sources e.g. the PA and PLO. Formal leadership of the BDS movement came from within the grassroots leadership base and the movement remained distinct from other sources of leadership. The formal leadership structure was not established for hierarchical purposes but rather for coordination and strategic goals. The
establishment of the BNC and increasing professionalisation of the movement saw ‘institutionalised practice’ concertive action complement the existing intuitive working relations concertive action. The BDS movement began to formalise structural relations through its development of formal leadership, whilst still retaining the organic interdependence of organisations within the movement.

The creation of the BNC also saw the framework criterion of conjoint agency shift from an incidental to confirmed presence. The BNC strengthened the degree of concertive action by providing the foundations for a more advanced collective network; conjoint agency emanated from concertive action. Whilst conjoint agency cannot be forced, the establishment of the BNC essentially codified the synergic nature by which the BDS movement would operate. The roles that the BNC was ascribed allowed the movement’s heterarchical structure to remain intact through the formalisation process. The formal leadership was deliberately Palestinian whilst the movement drew strength from international campaigns. This is important not only for the movement’s internal operation but also in regards to its positioning as a source of legitimate Palestinian leadership. The BDS movement does face the North-South divide that transnational movements must negotiate, but the composition of the BNC was a clear signal that the BDS movement is first and foremost a grassroots Palestinian national movement.

Operation Cast Lead (see Appendix E) provided the first major Israeli offensive since the formal establishment of the BDS movement; it raised questions of proportionality and Israel’s actions were largely deemed disproportionate (Wells-Greco, 2010, p. 403). The casualties amplified frame resonance for BDS as global popular opinion shifted with reporting of the war and subsequent accusations of Israeli war crimes (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 30). The BNC released a statement reiterating the BDS call for boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel using the human rights and apartheid frames (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2008). Bakan and Abu-Laban (2009, p. 30) also link the increase in international solidarity, and thus frame resonance, to the numerous change of governments that occurred internationally during this period, particularly in the US. Barack Obama’s campaign for ‘change’ offered a break from the previous Republican George W. Bush’s pro-Israel policies. Obama’s campaign was a source of modest optimism for the Palestinian community (Kuttab, 2011). The shift in political environment and
proliferation of international BDS organisations that tailored the framing in a context-sensitive manner saw a marked increase in frame resonance.

Operation Cast Lead also saw new technology, particularly social media, add a new dynamic to conflict framing. Directly referencing the media in regards to Operation Cast Lead, Caldwell et al. (2009) establish the divide between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ media and how the proliferation of the latter has changed power dynamics. Vertical media is traditional ‘top-down’ mass media, whereas horizontal is personalised new media sources e.g. blogs, YouTube, Facebook. Caldwell et al. (Caldwell, Murphy, & Menning, 2009, p. 3) argue that this new horizontal media has caused an unprecedented circumventing of the ‘gatekeeper’ and agenda-setting roles of mass media. “With easy access, enormous reach, and breadth, this upstart has flexed sufficient muscle during recent conflicts to alter or transform our traditional view of information and its impact on populations and military operations” (Caldwell, Murphy, & Menning, 2009, p. 2). The BDS movement itself is highly reliant on horizontal new media to promote the movement and engage with supporters. The advances in technology meant that the movement was able to reach a wide international audience independent of mass media control. The use of this horizontal social media contributed to an increase in frame resonance, even if this did not translate directly into a notable growth of active contributions to BDS straight away. We might also note that this period saw a significant compromising of formal Palestinian leadership bodies, in particular the violent split between Fatah and Hamas. As a form of nonviolent popular resistance, the BDS movement was able to operate outside of this fraught political realm using a distributed leadership model and gain valuable traction for the Palestinian national movement.

6.3.3 Operation Pillar of Defence 2012

Between Israel’s 2008 and 2012 military operations the BDS movement developed its leadership strategy and increased its popular support (refer to Appendix H for Operation Pillar of Defence). A number of significant events, both BDS- and international politics-based, directly contributed to the development of these pillars of the BDS movement. The concertive action and conjoint agency of the BDS movement were continuing to evolve through conferences and an increasing network of organisations endorsing the BDS movement. The instutionalised practice type of concertive action was being strengthened.
The Kairos Palestine Document (a theological statement) of 2009 saw Christian Palestinian leaders advocating the use of boycotts and divestment “as tools of justice, peace and security” (Kairos Palestine, 2009, p. 15). This followed in the footsteps of 1985’s Kairos South Africa that spoke out against apartheid as a “tool in the struggle against oppression and occupation” (Kairos Palestine, 2009, p. 3). Churches provided an important network for the BDS movement, particularly in the US; the Kairos Palestine Document added an additional transnational leadership tier to the BDS movement with formal Christian endorsement. Again, the call and document came specifically from Palestinians but produced an international platform for non-Palestinian Christians.

Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) began in 2005 but achieved real prominence by 2010 and was held in 97 cities by 2011 (Jamjoum, 2013, p. 209). For IAW to be an organisational success, it has required the building of new networks within the BDS movement:

Within cities and towns where IAW is organised, activists have had to develop their capacities to put together a series of events in a coordinated fashion with other places around the world . . . this process has led groups to work collectively that may not have done so otherwise. Also significant is the fact that the international nature of the event has necessitated increasing levels of international coordination, allowing active organisations and individuals to develop links with one another based on common purpose.

(Jamjoum, 2013, pp. 211-212).

The development of BDS activity networks affected numerous distributed leadership criteria. Both informal and formal leadership aspects were expanded; unofficial networks developed while coordinated international success required the evolution of organisation networks at the formalised leadership level. Jamjoum (2013, p. 213) states that methods of increasing communication for the IAW framework, which is the same as the BDS framework, would strengthen the overall movement. IAW has since become a highlight of the BDS movement’s calendar; it now represents an example of self-perpetuating frame resonance.
Further contributing to frame resonance was the 2010 Freedom Flotilla (see Appendix F). The Israeli Defence Force raided the flotilla that was carrying aid for the Gazan population, killing nine activists in the process. Both the international attention and condemnation of the flotilla raid saw an increase in support for the BDS movement (Barghouti O., 2011, p. 205). As a direct result of the flotilla raid, a number of high profile actors and musicians cancelled appearances in Israel (Lim, 2012, p. 224), even if not all of the entertainers aligned their cancellations as support for BDS. Civil society organisations in Britain, South Africa, Sweden and Norway did respond openly to the BNC’s appeal for BDS action. Additionally, foreign powers imposed sanctions against Israel with Nicaragua suspending diplomatic relations, South Africa and Turkey recalling their ambassadors, and Norway reaffirming its arms sanction on Israel and calling for other states to do so (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2010). The use of international law to frame the BDS movement increased in both relevance and resonance with the global community during this period.

The BNC held the Third National BDS Conference at the end of 2011. The Arab Spring (see Appendix G) protests provided the opportunity of extending BDS through the synergy that existed amongst these grassroots movements. The Arab Spring presented new Arab support for the Palestinian national movement that circumvented the formal statist leadership; many of such leaders were constrained by economic policies and treaties with Israel. Representatives from the West Bank and international support partners attended the conference. Reflective of both the difficulties of the Palestinian political environment and all the distributed nature of the BDS movement, Gazan and Palestinian refugee representatives were unable to attend due to Israeli restrictions (BDS Conference Team, 2012).

BDS “witnessed impressive growth in 2011” and the conference was used to develop strategies to further the movement (BDS Conference Team, 2012). Utilising the increased publicity following the flotilla raid, the movement achieved notable successes during 2011 in Veolia’s loss of contracts and support from numerous student and workers’ unions (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2014c). Of particular note was the spread of the movement beyond traditional Palestine solidarity groups, with BDS becoming a
‘mainstream’ and popular movement. The BDS movement was purposely contrasted to the peace process, emphasising how the formal peace process removes Palestinian popular agency. The framing of the BDS movement slightly diversified in order to capitalise on the repetitive failings of the peace process and any respective negative sentiment towards such. This aspect of the framing sought resonance amongst the Palestinian population and also the Arab popular movements; the BDS movement sought to provide leadership and solutions that were not state-dependent. The Arab region became an increasing target of the BDS movement’s framing strategy. The conference also reaffirmed the Palestinian ownership of the BDS movement, with Omar Barghouti stating that whilst the movement models itself on the South African anti-apartheid movement, and indeed other national liberation movements, BDS is firstly a Palestinian movement rooted in decades of popular resistance (BDS Conference Team, 2012).

Operation Pillar of Defence saw a refocussing of media attention on the Israel-Palestine issue. A ceasefire was negotiated with Hamas, whilst peace talks resumed with the PA, highlighting the discrepancies between the formal sources of Palestinian leadership. Indirect dialogue only occurred between Israel and Hamas when negotiating ceasefires; direct dialogue occurred between Israel and the PA, seemingly increasing the mainstream leadership’s dependence on an active relationship with Israel. The BDS movement was actively working to refocus the Palestinian national movement away from these restrictive power relations. At the same time, the Arab Spring encouraged a re-engaging with the pan-Arab approach that featured in historical Palestinian boycotts. However, unlike previous boycott campaigns, the targeted support was popular grassroots Arab resistance successfully wielding social media. The period leading up to and including Operation Pillar of Defence thus saw the BDS movement not only strengthen each of the distributed leadership criteria, but concurrently develop its international strategy and wider power relations as the movement increasingly sought to juxtapose the formal peace process and associated leadership. The BDS movement leadership adapted to profit from the political environment, whilst retaining the grassroots distributed leadership model so crucial to the Palestinian mandate.
6.3.4 Operation Protective Edge 2014

The Fourth National BDS Conference was held during this period, increased in scope and size from previous conferences. Preparatory workshops had been held prior to the conference and were expanded upon during the conference. “Effective sector-based, one-year BDS action plans were drawn and follow-up teams were formed in the 9 parallel workshops” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2013). The BDS movement greatly increased in size in terms of both supporters and affiliated organisations over the prior five years, requiring strategies, organisation and accountability to be developed in tandem with this growth. There were two focuses of the conference: the enhancement of Palestinian grassroots BDS activism (locally and through the diaspora); and establishing solid foundations for the BDS campaign in Arab countries (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2013).

The BDS movement had developed strong operations within Palestine and in the West, but had not made a significant inroad in the Arab nations despite the historical support of the Arab League. In light of the Arab Spring and in keeping with its central tenet, the BDS movement now sought popular Arab grassroots support. In terms of frame resonance, uprisings within the Arab Spring states all associated their struggle with that of the Palestinian occupation. Al-Saliby (2011) identified the limitations on the Arab BDS movement prior to and during the earlier stages of the Arab Spring: “the failure of civil society and the Arab media to frame BDS beyond the immediate consumer boycott and as a global movement with a wide range of economic targets continues to limit its potential growth.” Frame resonance of the BDS movement had increased in the Arab countries due to the Arab Spring and natural concertive action and conjoint agency existed between the Arab grassroots uprising and those of BDS (refer to Appendix G). The 2013 conference focussed on the growth and organisation of Arab-based BDS movement initiatives to capitalise on the grassroots activism developed through the Arab Spring.

Prior to the launch of Operation Protective Edge, formal Palestinian leadership underwent a major development with the announcement of a unity government. The once divided Fatah and Hamas, along with other political factions and independents, formed a consensus government with the assurance of holding elections within six months. However,
the PLO, which lacks Hamas representation, would still be in control of the negotiations with Israel (Hatuqa, 2014). The formal leadership sought to unify their command of the Palestinian national movement, whilst simultaneously engaging in the divisive peace process. The national unity government immediately contended with numerous issues, not least of all deep Israeli government antipathy to the project: Hamas was viewed as ceding power to a Fatah-loyal government; Abbas faced pressure to reconstruct the national liberation strategy to reflect the popular movement; the PA was bound by Oslo to cooperate with Israel; and the PA condemned Hamas’s aggression towards Israel in Gaza (Joudeh, 2014). All the while, questions were raised over the PA’s role and power. Khaled el-Gindy (as quoted in Joudeh, 2014), former advisor to the Palestinian leadership on status negotiations, stated that the PA is “completely irrelevant. It cannot influence the United States, it cannot influence Israel, it cannot influence Hamas, it cannot influence Egypt.”

When scrutinised, the ‘unity’ of the formal Palestinian leadership appears to be a façade. The April 2014 deadline that had been set for the latest round of Israel-Palestinian peace talks passed without progress and the talks collapsed again (Williams, 2014). Shortly thereafter simmering tensions spilled over from the West Bank and East Jerusalem to the Gaza Strip as Israel launched the phenomenally destructive Operation Protective Edge in July (see Appendix I).

Like its two precedents, this military operation garnered significant attention in the international media as claims of Israeli war crimes surfaced (Reuters, 2014a). Moreover, 2014 was designated as the UN International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, signifying the growth in international importance of the issue which had previously been limited to an International Day of Solidarity (United Nations, 2014). BDS movement organisations held numerous protests in their respective locations predominantly using social media as the organising vehicle. Protests in Wellington, New Zealand were organised and promoted as a Facebook event (Wellington: March for Palestine, 2014). Protests were held in over 60 countries throughout Europe, Asia, Australasia, the Americas and the Middle East (including Israel) (Mondoweiss, 2014; The Guardian, 2014). Many of these protests were organised by endorsers of the BDS movement as part of the August 9 Day of Rage, with nonviolence as the central principle of the protests. The BDS movement created the #GazaDayofRage Twitter hashtag to link all messages and photos from the global protests and promote BDS activity (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2014a). Placards
and chants at the protests drew on the apartheid and human rights framing (Mondoweiss, 2014).

The heightened international attention on the Palestinian occupation saw a proliferation of the Twitter hashtags such as #FreePalestine, #GazaUnderAttack and #BDS. By 21 July, the #GazaUnderAttack had been used four million times (Clarke-Williams, 2014). Farah Baker, a 16 year old Palestinian in Gaza, saw her Twitter followers increase from 800 to over 200,000 within weeks as she was live tweeting information and images of the conflict (al-Helou, 2014). It was an important outlet: since 2010 the number of monthly active Twitter users increased from 30 million to 271 million (Statista, 2014). The BDS movement’s Twitter account (@BDSmovement) currently has 36,200 followers (BDS Movement, 2014). The use of Twitter in conjunction with blogs, Facebook and interest group websites demonstrates the increase in strength in ‘horizontal’ media simultaneously with the development of the BDS movement.

The framing of BDS, and indeed Israeli occupation, reached its highest level of resonance to date during this period. Prior to the military operation, a BBC poll of 25 countries saw Israel already ranked as the third most negatively influential country on the world with a declining trend line (BBC World Service, 2013). Operation Protective Edge ended in August and the BNC worked in unison with Gaza organisations to issue a statement appealing to the international community to intensify BDS activities (Gaza Civil Society Organizations, 2014). Activism on US university campuses saw a 114 per cent increase in ‘anti-Israel’ events scheduled from the beginning of 2014-2015 academic year compared to the same period last year, many of which are direct BDS campaigns (Anti-Defamation League, 2014). Moor (2014) argues that the BDS movement had successfully internationalised the occupation stating that “countries whose diplomats have only contributed peripherally to the “peace process” have seen their grassroots activists take a leading role in the fight against apartheid.” The achievement of well-developed distributed leadership model by the BDS movement created high levels of frame resonance.

There is a complimentary growth of social media uptake within Palestine. Although low against typical western countries, for the Arab region relative Palestinian Facebook
penetration rates are above average. Demographically 83% of Palestinian users of Facebook are in a youth age bracket (15-29 years), the second most youthful user population in the MENA region (Salem & Mourtada, 2011, p. 7). Of importance is Salem and Mourtada’s (2011, p. 17) finding that Palestinian Facebook usage increases during times of conflict and unrest, particularly among youth, “as it can provide an outlet for discussion, communication and protest.” Social media is an increasingly important tool within Palestine, but overall internet access is still limited. The Digital Access Index (DAI) measures individuals’ ability to access and use new information and communications technology. As of 2010, Israel had a digital access index of 0.70, whilst Palestine’s was at 0.38 (Salem & Mourtada, 2011, p. 10). With regards to the BDS movement, social media is a more effective tool for communication and organisation in the West where internet access and social media usage rates are highest. However, the statistics show that in the Arab region young Palestinians utilise social media at proportionally high rates, and with these rates further increasing during conflict. Howard and Muzammil (2013, p. 5) suggest that these changing demographics and expanding use of the internet has seen civil society organisations “pulled online”.

Social media allows BDS to strengthen a number of distributed leadership framework criteria. Firstly, the transnational character becomes increasingly dynamic with internet and social media present at some level in every country. Through ‘viral’ trends (such as #FreePalestine and #BDS) the movement is able to register with both individuals and groups where there are no existing physical BDS network. This furthers concertive action; the power of the aggregate grows. Lastly, frame resonance is enhanced. With Palestinians using social media during times of conflict, images and news can be instantly and directly disseminated around the world to fellow social media users. This is particularly useful in the West, where social media usage is the most prevalent.

Following Operation Protective Edge, BNC Arab Affairs Coordinator Zaid Shuaibi emphasised the need for Arab countries to intensify their BDS activities in order to hold Israel accountable stating that complicit international corporations that “enable Israel’s regime of occupation, settler-colonialism and apartheid must pay a price . . . in the Arab world” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2014b). They did. Kuwait, which has not consistently applied the boycott, recently ceded to a BDS appeal to exclude Veolia from a
$750 million contract (Silver, 2014). Veolia, with operations in the West Bank that violate international law, has been a frequent and successful target of the BDS movement in Europe and Australia. This recent exclusion from an Arab state represents an important geographical development for the movement and is described as “the tip of the BDS iceberg in the Arab world” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2014b). Kuwait was jointly lobbied by the BNC and a PLO Executive Committee member. The BDS movement worked in conjunction with formal Palestinian leadership to achieve a BDS victory.
7.0 Palestinian Power Relations and Effects

Power relations surround and interact with BDS and its organisational structure. Aboud (2012, p. 212) states that “In assessing BDS politics, its organizational practices must be situated and understood in relation to the constellation of power relations of which it is a part and within which it is manifest in the form of actions and interventions.” These power relationships are not simple, encompassing Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan as well as the PA. Beyond Palestine, international BDS campaigns must contest with their own inter-state and local actors (Aboud, 2012, p. 212). Furthermore, the BDS organisational structure encounters relations with non-state actors; “Some of these act in ways that are complementary to and supportive of BDS aims, others in ways that intentionally (or less intentionally) impede and seek to undermine the advancement of BDS” (Aboud, 2012, p. 213). Pro-human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, are often complementary; those in favour of Israeli policies typically hinder BDS activity – notably the Anti-Defamation League and American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

7.1 Palestinian Leadership Dynamics

The organisational structure of the BDS movement has important effects upon its positioning and strength in regards to other sources of Palestinian leadership. Each of the four levels of the BDS movement (international, regional, national and local) are run by volunteers who manage independent campaign funding. “The activities of a broad coalition of self-funded and self-directed activists from diverse societies are what drive BDS. The movement draws strength precisely through its diffuse organisational structure” (Moor, 2014). One of the greatest criticisms levelled at other sources of Palestinian leadership is the reliance on external funding and how this compromises the autonomy of the leadership, e.g. the PA being funded by the EU which enforces conditionality (see Bouris, 2010; Tocci, 2007). The organisational structure of the BDS movement allows a significant degree of immunity from Western states and Israel. Khalida Jarrar (as quoted in Joudeh, 2014), member of the PFLP and PLC, names security coordination, failure to respond to calls for unified leadership, and lack of negotiation strategy as issues Abbas must address - all of which are “circumstances dictated by Israel.” Falk argues that BDS not only circumvents these pressures but has grown sufficiently to side-line formal leadership. “At this time
governments have been temporarily marginalised as political actors in relation to the struggle. This is itself a momentous development” (Falk, 2014a).

The BDS movement does have relationships with the traditional sources of Palestinian leadership – both cooperative and competitive. The 2012 BDS conference framed the movement with respect to the formal Palestinian leadership sources: “despite internal political divisions between the political parties, BDS is an unshakable point of consensus among them” (BDS Conference Team, 2012). Hamas has openly declared its support for the BDS movement stating “We in Hamas appreciate and welcome these economic boycotts against the Zionist occupation and we consider it a step in the right direction toward pressuring the occupation to stop its settlement activities and its Judaisation of the Palestinian land” (Middle East Monitor, 2014). Indeed, Hamas implored Arab and Muslim states to follow the example that the European states had set in boycotting Israel after numerous European companies and official organisations adopted economic boycotts such as the Norwegian and Dutch governmental pension funds and Danish Danske Bank (Middle East Monitor, 2014). In addition, the EU recently banned the import of Israeli settlement poultry and eggs with threats to ban all Israeli meat, poultry and dairy if Israel does not sufficiently label the origin of produce (EU threatens Israel with total ban of poultry unless it marks products from settlements, 2014).

The PA has a more complicated stance towards BDS. Abbas stated in 2013 “We don’t ask anyone to boycott Israel itself. We have relations with Israel, we have mutual recognition of Israel” (quoted in Kane, 2013). The PA instead endorses boycott limited to products from West Bank settlements. Abbas’ position on the BDS movement caused internal divisions with the South African Palestine Embassy releasing a statement declaring its support for BDS movement and clarifying that “The Palestine Liberation Organisation and the State of Palestine is not opposed to the Palestinian civil society-led Boycott, Divesment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.” (as quoted in Kane, 2013). The PA’s relationship with Israel is in part dictated by the Oslo Accords, particularly in terms of economic agreement and secruity coordination. During the recent bout of protests in the West Bank, the non-intervention of PA security forces in conflicts between Palestinian protestors and the IDF was a cause of political tension. The PA actually attacked a Hamas-organised demonstration in Hebron creating issues within the unity government and
heightening discontent amongst the general populace (Qandil, 2014). Senior advisor to Abbas, Mohammed Shtayyeh, stated that the PA must be revised from “a service provider” to “a resistance authority” (as quoted in Qandil, 2014).

Interestingly, the most recent National BDS Conference saw members of the PLO Executive Committee and Palestinian Legislative Council take part (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2013). Messages from Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, PFLP Secretary General Ahmad Saadat (both incarcerated), and PNI Secretary General Mustafa Barghouti “confirmed the firm endorsement of BDS – as a main strategy of resistance and global solidarity with Palestinian rights – by leaders of the Palestinian national struggle” (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2013). However, a session focussed on accountability and difficult questioning of a PLO official saw an expression of discontent that resulted in a PA minister leaving. Certain elements within the PA do not support engagement with the BDS movement; indicative of that, activists were arrested by the PA after staging a peaceful protest in Ramallah – a move condemned by Amnesty International as a violation of rights (Abunimah, 2014).

7.1.1 Comparative Anti-Apartheid Leadership Dynamics

The anti-apartheid movement against South Africa serves as a model and comparison for BDS. With previous sections detailing the organisational structure of the BDS movement and its external relationships, this section analyses how these compare with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. There are significant differences between the cases and their political environments which much of the comparative literature overlooks. Leadership structures involved in the anti-apartheid boycott movement differed greatly from those of the BDS movement. This raises questions over the validity and usefulness of the both BDS’s and the literature’s invocation of the comparison.

The call for the South Africa boycott emanated from the ANC and was in fact derived from its Freedom Charter (Ananth, 2013, pp. 137-138). The ANC had ‘Four Pillars of Struggle’ against apartheid: mass internal political struggle by the oppressed; the underground political network; armed resistance; and the international boycott and solidarity (Kasrils, 2013, p. 19). This involvement of the ANC aligns more closely to the first Intifada whereby
more formal political leadership organisations were involved in leading the boycott, ultimately resulting in the institutionalisation of these organisations in both cases. However, unlike the First Intifada, the anti-apartheid boycott became global with international organisations becoming part of the movement. Ananth states that “the leaders of the South African anti-apartheid movement realized early on that international boycott would be a useful tool in their fight against apartheid”, highlighting that the global boycott was one element of the anti-apartheid movement and wielded by the South African leaders to aid their cause.

This raises questions over the degree to which the boycott campaign is a strategy used by Palestinian society or is situated in international activism. Both PA and PLO have mixed relations with BDS creating a potentially fraught dynamic, whereas the anti-apartheid boycott was a tool of the black South African political leadership. Changes in society (including technological) have meant that transnational activism has evolved greatly since Apartheid South Africa. International activist groups often have multi-issue bases and global protests are increasingly easily organised through Bennett’s (2005) notion of hyper-organisation – void of central leadership structures. The call to defer to Palestinian civil society is well documented, yet unlike the South African model, the challenge for BDS lies less in garnering international support and more with regards to managing relationships between different leadership sources.

Much like Palestine, the movement for liberation in South Africa had been in effect long before the creation of the formal boycott movement. Resistance efforts had been occurring sporadically prior to apartheid becoming official South African policy, but lacked central organisation. Dialogue was the primary method used by the ANC leadership until the formal adoption of apartheid in 1948. Armed resistance was added to the liberation strategy through the establishment of Umkhonto e Sizwe (the armed wing of the ANC) in 1960. International pressure became an increasingly important pillar of the movement from the late 1960s as the boycott gained momentum. But Ngeleza (2005) states that mass mobilisation within South Africa was the most important pillar against apartheid. The 1980s saw the South African government increasingly ban ANC political activities. The United Democratic Front formed in 1983 as a decentralised coalition of anti-apartheid organisations, adopting the Freedom Charter and forming a very close relationship with the
ANC (Suttner, 2005). In addition, the UDF formed an alliance in 1988 with the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) - the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) in an attempt to fill the political void that followed the banning of political activity which affected the ANC (Ngeleza, 2005). The MDM had a strong focus on strengthening grassroots structures and increasing the number of organisations involved in the anti-apartheid movement.

The relationship between the different liberation leadership structures presents very differently to that of the Palestinian national movement. Murray (2008) argues that it is important for the future of the BDS movement that such differences are addressed: “While the BDS movement has been gaining momentum, it may be losing its sense of direction as contradictions at the heart of the apartheid analogy have surfaced that demand resolution” (Murray, 2008, p. 145). The formal and informal leadership sources were unified in the anti-apartheid movement, with central organisational structures firmly established within South Africa. Within the anti-apartheid movement both informal and formal leadership were present to provide distributed leadership, but the movement was also able to draw on external formal political leadership. The primary focus of the campaign was mass mobilisation within South Africa using internal politics and boycotts, which then lead to increased international solidarity (Ngeleza, 2005). In this sense, internal frame resonance was the primary focus of the anti-apartheid movement with this then used to build international frame resonance.

In contrast, Palestine exists as a quasi-state with the occupation and Israeli apartheid largely externally imposed. The dynamics of Palestinian leadership are greatly different to those of South Africa and the effect of these relationships within disparate environments has been overlooked in comparing the two cases. The varied leadership sources of the Palestinian national movement are far less unified than those of the South Africa comparison, with each holding different positions on acceptable occupation ‘solutions’ and concessions. The PA acts as a governing body for the oPt; failure to end the occupation in the eyes of Palestinians has seen the BDS movement emerge to circumvent formal Palestinian leadership. The unification of the anti-apartheid leadership in South Africa saw the boycott movement used as one component for liberation, whereas the nature of the state of Palestinian leadership structures sees the boycott movement as a largely stand-
alone technique – with the occasional exceptions as highlighted by the 2013 conference and Kuwait boycott initiative.

In the Oslo scheme, the PA serves precisely to diminish internal mass mobilisation against occupation (Parsons, 2005). Commenting in 2005, Nieuwhof (as cited in Bardou, 2005) identified the lack of boycott inside Palestine as a weakness of BDS and the main point of difference with South Africa. The existence of a border (albeit a highly debated one) between Israel and the oPt and separation of powers between the two is a significant point of distinction between the Palestine-South Africa comparison. The nature of the Israeli occupation means that internal Palestinian boycotts and political mobilisation will have limited economic and political effects upon Israel, requiring international BDS activity to be the dominant component to pressure Palestinian self-determination. Thus the BDS movement holds international frame resonance as its primary framing focus. This is not to say that BDS will be any less effective, but that there are very different implications for analysis of the movement in terms of broader leadership in the Palestinian political environment. “Under prevailing circumstances of ongoing Israeli land expropriation and settlement expansion, many analysts and activists are finding it self-defeating and illogical to draw parallels with the South Africa struggle for equal rights for all South Africans within a single state and stop short of the demand for equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis within some kind of a ‘one-state’ democratic framework” (Murray, 2008, p. 146). The apartheid South Africa comparison has many useful aspects for BDS and the Palestinian national movement, particularly in terms of framing. But ultimately, Palestine presents a case for which there is very little precedent; power and leadership relations are specific to the environment.

Beyond political relations there are significant economic differences with the South Africa comparison. These differences are due to the effects of globalisation and the financial power that operates within foreign policy. Although these issues are not directly related to the BDS movement’s organisational structure, they are an important point of contention within the South Africa comparison and speak to broader power and leadership dynamics. The first clear difference that is the development and expansion of free market economics provides BDS with logistical difficulties. Sloan (2014) argues that well-known, already disliked international corporations are “low-hanging fruit” for the BDS movement and in
reality there are hundreds of thousands of companies trading with Israel who consistently change names, headquarters and management. Whilst there have been publicised big-brand victories in Europe (e.g. G4S and Veolia), British-Israeli trade was up 28 per cent from the previous year in the first half of 2014 to £2.5 billion (Sloan, 2014). Globalisation and the liberalisation of markets has seen international trade experience unprecedented transformations and expansion in the relatively short period since the anti-apartheid boycotts. The result is that “the machine of modern commerce is an extremely hard one to slow” (Sloan, 2014).

There are arguments that the boycotts, sanctions and divestment against apartheid South Africa were not actually effectual in ending apartheid. Levy (1999) states that numerous studies have questioned the effectiveness of economic sanctions and that the use of South Africa as a ‘success’ story is a fallacy. Sanctions did not lower South African trade flows, with GNP growth increasing following European and American sanctions in 1986 (Hazlett, 2008). Rather, economic action taken against South Africa saw the National Party increase oppressive apartheid measures. Apartheid in South Africa ended due to effective political opposition by the black majority, the growing internal economic cost of maintaining apartheid, and the removal of the communist threat with the fall of the Soviet Union (Levy, 1999, p. 415). Parallels of these factors can be seen in the Israel-Palestine case. There is at best a narrow Jewish majority in the population between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea (Eldar A., 2012) and numerous reports cite the growing economic cost of the Israeli occupation (see Swirski, 2008; Hever, 2012). While there is no doubt that the international attention and pressure placed on the apartheid regime in South Africa by the boycott movement aided its collapse, it was only one of many factors.

The second, and arguably more important, difference is that of ‘political money’. The pro-Israel lobby wields substantial power through financial resources, particularly in the US where the matter of Israel is essentially exempt from political debate (Petras, 2006; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Such a block on foreign policy development is the real crux of the problem, one that the BDS movement does not really address. Sloan (2014) states that were the boycott movement against South Africa to incur such opposition that utilised vast financial resources for strategic purposes in both the US and Britain, it would have minimal chance of success. In short, the BDS movement employs the comparison with apartheid
South Africa as a tool in its operation, but the comparison must recognise key differences between the two cases and engage with the additional factors that pressured apartheid.

7.1.2 Israeli Relations

Israel has felt increasingly threatened by BDS and its challenge to the hegemonic framing of Israel. South Africa set a dangerous historical precedent for colonial powers; Israel and allies fear the BDS movement as it has worked before (Ananth, 2013, p. 137). Within its own jurisdiction, Israel has passed a number of laws in response to BDS. The cabinet approval of the 2010 Loyalty Oath Bill represented a growing anti-BDS sentiment amongst Zionist institutions with non-Jews required to swear loyalty to Israel specifically as a Jewish state – debate was extended on the bill. The 2011 Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott (Boycott Law) explicitly outlawed any calls for boycotts regardless of proof of damage (Ananth, 2013, pp. 134-135). Israel has also run public relations campaigns and legal suits in North America and Europe against BDS movement organisations, increased surveillance of BDS supporters, and debated further anti-boycott laws (Abulhawa, 2014). In Australia, Tel Aviv-bases legal centre Shurat HaDin attempted to bring a racial discrimination case against academic Jake Lynch who, as a supporter of BDS, refused to endorse Dan Avnon’s fellowship from Hebrew University. Avnon himself did not support the case. It was touted as a legal litmus test for the BDS movement against charges of anti-Semitism; the case was eventually dismissed by the Federal Court and Shurat HaDin forced to pay Lynch’s costs (Goldberg, 2014). The legal action only brought further attention to the BDS movement – something Jewish community leaders could only lament. Extending to Australian academe, the case highlights how far reaching the anti-BDS efforts extend.

The BDS movement became tantamount to a ‘strategic threat’ with Netanyahu assigning responsibility for countering it to the Ministry of Strategic Affairs (White, 2013). However, Israel has also employed tactics that play off the complicated power relations within Palestinian leadership. A report from Israeli daily newspaper Hareetz states that the most recent round of peace negotiations was a case of Israel “advancing the peace process with the Palestinians [to] stave off a large portion of the boycott threats” (as cited in Abulhawa, 2014). The increase in strength of the BDS movement has dramatically shifted the power
dynamic that has long dominated the Israel-Palestine peace process. Israel has little control and sway over BDS and does not command the terms of engagement as it has done with the PA and PLO. Based on past actions and rationale, Israel’s resumption of peace talks with formal Palestinian leadership appeared as an attempt to undermine BDS and fragment the Palestinian national movement.

The transnational character of the BDS movement is crucial to managing Israeli countermeasures. The distributed nature of the BDS movement limits the effects and pressures that Israel can place on the movement. The strong Palestinian foundations that impart Palestinian ownership are much more vulnerable due to the occupation. This is the same limitation faced by formal Palestinian leadership. However, the BDS movement has become a firmly global movement with leadership and partner organisations dispersed in every continent. This transnationalism in conjunction with a popular grassroots nature has severely limited Israel’s capacity to provide effective counteraction. Munayyer identifies two shifts occurring in the Israel-Palestine issue. The first is the movement from states to civil society after years of states failing to provide any tangible progress. Falk believes that the Palestinian leadership is beginning to address this shift. “Palestine is continuing to its state-building project on the West Bank coupled with the realisation that the political energy of its national movement has shifted to a combination of civil society activism and Hamas resilience and resistance” (Falk, 2014c). This causes a second shift away from a statist partition approach towards that of a rights-based one. “Civil society actors are far more inclined to focus on people and their rights rather than borders and the brokering of political power between factions or states” (Munayyer, 2014). The organisational model of BDS then has significant effects that extend far beyond operations within the movement. Distributed transnational organisation has allowed the movement to move beyond the political trappings that have so compromised formal Palestinian leadership.

7.2 Palestinian Leadership Moving Forward

The BDS movement has significantly impacted upon the leadership of the Palestinian national movement by providing a popular grassroots leadership body with global impact. The movement’s unique organisational model has allowed it to progress, both in terms of effective distributed leadership and international political sway, beyond previous
Palestinian popular resistance campaigns. However, as the BDS movement is that of a Palestinian national movement for self-determination, other sources of leadership hold equal importance when assessing future strategies. According to BDS founder Omar Barghouti (2010, p. 58) “The entire Palestinian conceptual framework and strategy of resistance must be thoroughly and critically reassessed and transformed into a progressive action program capable of connecting the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and justice with the international social movement.” Whilst Barghouti proposes that the strategy to pursue should be that which is based upon “Gradual, diverse, context-sensitive, and sustainable campaigns of BDS”, this does not imply that the BDS movement should provide the dominant Palestinian leadership. The BDS movement exists to help realise Palestinian self-determination and the movement purposefully does not offer a political programme beyond that of liberation via achievement of the three objectives (Ananth, 2013, p. 141). Formal Palestinian leadership cannot be neglected just because of the restricted environment in which it currently operates.

BDS has allowed for the critical re-establishment of a bottom-up grassroots power structure in Palestine to be incorporated into future political models. Barghouti (2010, p. 58) proposes that “The PLO must be resuscitated and remodeled to embody the aspirations, creative energies, and national frameworks of the three main segments of the Palestinian people.” While clearly the BDS movement is yet to fully achieve its objectives, lessons from it organisational structure and method of leadership can begin to be incorporated into formal leadership institutions by way of stimulating an increase in energy and unity - arguably the greatest Palestinian threats to Israeli occupation.

Oslo has long been the dominant peace framework and narrative within which both Palestinian leadership and foreign powers have acted. However, Falk (2014b) proposes that a post-Oslo phase is quickly approaching as European states are beginning to ‘break rank’. Sweden recently became the first Western European EU member to officially recognise the Palestine, a move that caused Israel to recall its ambassador (Sweden recognises state of Palestine, 2014). Britain and Ireland have joined Sweden in recognising the State of Palestine, though the UK resolutions are a non-binding parliamentary vote causing Israeli officials to claim the actions are only symbolic (Keinon, 2014). Although the resolutions will not affect government policy, they do signify a movement away from the
strict adherence to the US-run, dismal Oslo process as the sole means of conflict resolution. A senior Israeli diplomatic official (as quoted in Ahren, 2014) admitted that was cause for concern “because it’s a public opinion setter. . . Had it failed, it would have strengthened those who urge the government against supporting the Palestinians’ unilateral steps and to push them towards negotiations with Israel instead.” Matters of statehood are where a unified Palestinian leadership model must take precedence; the BDS movement takes no position on statehood as it takes a rights-based approach (Hijab, 2014). The BDS movement can provide the grounds for Palestinian self-determination, but any post-Oslo developments require formalised political Palestinian leadership for matters of state.

The shift away from Oslo comes not only from the changing stance of Western Europe, but also in that “civil society nonviolent militancy and political leadership is beginning to occupy centre stage in Palestinian hopes and dreams, particularly taking the form of the growing BDS campaign” (Falk, 2014b). During Operation Protective Edge there was increased pressure on the both the PLO and PA within the formal leadership realm, with calls to revise the PLO leadership and end negotiations ruled by US-Israeli monopoly (Joudeh, 2014). Abbas’s recent speech and actions at the United Nations saw him condemn Israel’s actions as genocidal, cast doubt on direct negotiations and the willingness of Israel to engage, and submit Palestine’s request for full membership on the Security Council. These actions from the formal Palestinian leadership are increasingly aligning with the informal leadership. “The formal authority structure representing the Palestinian people on the global stage seemed to be in temporary sync with pro-Palestinian civil society activists around the world” (Falk, 2014c).

In sum, the BDS movement has progressed towards a strong distributed leadership organisational model; the result not only of the growth and strategy of the BDS movement, but also the changing global political climate. The BDS movement has managed to simultaneously cooperate with and circumvent formal Palestinian leadership due to its transnational grassroots structure. This structure has also imparted Palestinian ownership of the global movement through the Palestine-based BNC and recognition of the need for deference to Palestinian civil society. In an important step for the Palestinian national movement, the unique qualities of the movement allowed it to operate outside of Israeli-
imposed restrictions. However, the BDS movement is simply a facet of the Palestinian national movement for self-determination, albeit a critical one.
8.0 Conclusions

The BDS movement has re-established the tradition of Palestinian popular resistance boycott campaigns under the new political, social and economic conditions that globalisation and modern technology have created. This research aims to examine how the BDS movement has come to represent a new chapter of Palestinian leadership through an analysis of the development of its organisational structure. The BDS movement represents a broader trend in political leadership as the advent of new media has shifted an element of power into grassroots mass movements, as evidenced in the Arab Spring and Occupy movements. Palestinian leadership has only been examined through traditional leadership frameworks, with this research developing the field of analysis on the new non-traditional leadership. The distributed leadership framework established in chapter two provides the scope for analysis against the broader socio-political changes that globalisation and advanced technology have fostered. With the BDS movement growing in strength since its formation in 2005, the research examines how the development of a distributed leadership model effected its success at both a Palestinian and global level.

Each chapter provides a contextual basis from which to build subsequent analysis. Chapter three begins by reviewing the existing literature on Palestinian leadership, finding formal leadership to be the dominant area of research. Traditional leadership frameworks aptly explain the development of and subsequent tensions between these often competing leadership bodies. The formal Palestinian leadership is a product of its environment, with the Israeli occupation creating significant limitations for the PA and PLO manifesting in public dissatisfaction. With the BDS movement relatively new to the literature, and a subsequent absence of any framework analysis, chapter four details the conceptual research method used to analyse this undeveloped area of Palestinian leadership.

Due to the unique and complicated nature of the political environment, the development of Palestinian leadership bodies is an interrelated process. With the relationships between the formal Palestinian leadership organisations evident through traditional ‘strong’ framework analysis, chapter five focussed on the non-traditional popular resistance leadership during major boycott-based campaigns. While this period is not part of the BDS movement proper, it is part of the long narrative of boycott-based campaigns in Palestinian
history and informs the modern development of a distributed leadership model. The framework was applied to the Great Revolt, Arab Boycott, first Intifada and the modern origins of the BDS movement. The organisation of BDS campaigns changed dramatically in response to differing political environments – specifically the different formal Palestinian leadership actors. There have been attempts to use distributed leadership as the operating model for previous BDS campaigns, but lasting success was not achieved. The hierarchical leadership structures of the formal leadership sources (Arab or Palestinian) had a corrupting influence on the grassroots, heterarchical models with campaigns compromised over self-interested power consolidation.

Using the historical context of distributed leadership in Palestinian boycott campaigns, chapter six analyses the development of the BDS movement proper against the new social and political environment. The Oslo peace process caused a definitive separation between formal and informal Palestinian leadership which had not been present during the previous boycott campaigns. Since its establishment in 2005, the BDS movement has strengthened the presence of the framework criteria: heterarchical structure, informal and formal leadership, concertive action, conjoint agency, transnational character, and frame resonance. The consolidation of these criteria has occurred through both internal BDS-driven actions and forces outside the movement’s control. The founding of the movement with the 2005 Palestinian civil society call utilised the existing BDS-oriented organisations, allowing the BDS movement to inherit transnational character, heterarchical structure and concertive action framework criteria. One of the most significant steps in the movement’s development was the establishment of the BNC in 2008. The effects of this were threefold: it gave the movement formal leadership; the identified purposes of the BNC gave the movement increased coherency and strategy and thus strengthened the two operational framework criteria; and the BNC confirmed Palestinian ownership of the BDS movement, increasing the effects of the movement’s relational dynamics with formal Palestinian leadership as it came to challenge the status quo.

The BDS movement continued to evolve the distributed leadership model through the strengthening of organisational networks at regional, national and global levels; the growth of the movement correlated to the growth of the model. However, the major
developments that continued to take place were progressively the result of opportunities presented by external factors. The military operations undertaken by Israel faced growing international criticism; a shift in global politics occurred with the Obama administration attempting to moderate US foreign policy on the Middle East. Such a move by Israel’s main ally, in conjunction with Western European governments’ increasing relations with Palestine, contributed to changing the momentum of popular opinion in favour of Palestine. The increase in social media usage also played a primary role in the development of the BDS movement. Not only did the movement itself utilise social media to expand its operations (through the removal of traditional social and geographical barrier as social media became a key promotional and organisational tool), but this new media altered the power structures controlling the delivery of information. Traditional hierarchical mass media once held a monopoly on the portrayal of conflicts, in turn allowing Israel to restrict access to, and thus filter, its military activity in Gaza. Social media allowed Palestinians to broadcast conflict developments and images in real time across the world. Twitter and Facebook saw this information and graphic imagery go viral through the use of hashtags. In response, local BDS-activity increased with social media proliferating and connecting organisational networks. Global politics and social media developments greatly aided the frame resonance of the BDS movement. It was the existence of a grassroots distributed leadership model that allowed the BDS movement to utilise these opportunities and see the distributed organisational structure become largely self-perpetuating.

Chapter seven draws upon the framework analysis to examine the BDS movement against the broader Palestinian political dynamics. The BDS movement’s use of apartheid and comparison with South Africa has drawn both commendation and criticism. The research finds that each of these reactions is valid. Applying the term apartheid to Israel not only causes resonance with the movement’s human rights framing, but draws upon an existing supporter base in those who protested against apartheid South Africa. In this sense, the BDS movement’s South Africa analogy is extremely successful for improving frame resonance. However, the comparison with the anti-apartheid movement is problematic when its use is expanded beyond the organisational model of the BDS movement. The wider politics of the situation and relationships between Palestinian leadership bodies differs vastly from those of apartheid South Africa. The distributed leadership model of the anti-apartheid movement worked in conjunction with the formalised black leadership
bodies in South Africa; this practice is limited in the Palestinian situation, particularly with the PA. Historically, the involvement of formal leadership resulted in a loss of distributed leadership criteria from Palestinian boycott campaigns and with it, diminished success. While elements of formal Palestinian leadership practise cooperation with the BDS movement, competition remains an obstructive feature. This disunity is an area of exploitation for Israel, as unified Palestinian leadership is an identified problem. For this reason, the BDS movement has been classified as a strategic threat to Israel due to its popular grassroots basis and growing international influence. The conditions in the Oslo Accords have forced the PA to cooperate with Israel with regard to the BDS movement.

Where the anti-apartheid movement sought equality within the state of South Africa, the BDS movement exists with the objective of Palestinian self-determination. While BDS does not purposely propose a political solution, the notion of self-determination causes political differences and complications beyond that of the anti-apartheid movement. The BDS movement provides strong leadership for the Palestinian national movement, but the movement purposely limits itself to its three objectives: ending the occupation and dismantling the wall; equality for Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel; and the right of return for Palestinian refugees as per UN resolution 194 (Palestinian Civil Society, 2005). Thus it does not engage with Palestinian politics beyond self-determination and does not seek the institutionalised power that any future Palestinian state requires. For decades the US-led peace process has consistently failed to produce tangible achievements for the Palestinians. The BDS movement however has produced results for the Palestinian national movement that formal leadership engaged in diplomatic and power-consolidation efforts has not. By reintroducing grassroots resistance and leadership to the Palestinian political system, the BDS distributed leadership model has provided an alternative outlet which circumvents the restrictive formal political process. This research demonstrates that in order to achieve effective integration and unity, the formal Palestinian leadership should adopt a holistic approach by incorporating the BDS movement’s grassroots elements that are traditional to Palestine.
Appendices

Appendix A – Key Palestinian Leadership Events

1948 – Disintegration of traditional Palestinian clan leadership system
1958 – Formation of Fatah
1964 – Establishment of the PLO
1965 – Official launch of Fatah
1968 – Fatah and other independent guerrilla groups enter the PLO
1969 – Arafat elected as Chairman of the PLO with Fatah the majority faction of the PLO
1974 – The beginning of PLO institutionalisation with the Ten Point Program
1982 – Expulsion of PLO from Beirut and relocation to Tunis
1987 – Formation of Hamas
1991-2 – Peace process attempts through the Madrid Conference and Washington talks
1994 – Establishment of the PA on terms of the Oslo peace process
1996 – First PA presidential and legislative elections
2004 – Death of Arafat
2005 – Election of Abbas as PA president; establishment of the BDS movement
2007 – Attempted Palestinian national unity government
2006 – Hamas legislative election victory
2008 – Establishment of BNC
2014 – National unity technocratic government formation
Appendix B

Palestinian Civil Society Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel Until it Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights

9 July 2005

One year after the historic Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which found Israel’s Wall built on occupied Palestinian territory to be illegal; Israel continues its construction of the colonial Wall with total disregard to the Court’s decision. Thirty eight years into Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel continues to expand Jewish colonies. It has unilaterally annexed occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and is now de facto annexing large parts of the West Bank by means of the Wall. Israel is also preparing – in the shadow of its planned redeployment from the Gaza Strip – to build and expand colonies in the West Bank. Fifty seven years after the state of Israel was built mainly on land ethnically cleansed of its Palestinian owners, a majority of Palestinians are refugees, most of whom are stateless. Moreover, Israel’s entrenched system of racial discrimination against its own Arab-Palestinian citizens remains intact.

In light of Israel’s persistent violations of international law; and

Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel’s colonial and discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective remedies; and

Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine; and

In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott, divestment and sanctions; and
Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression;

We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace.

These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination and fully complies with the precepts of international law by:

1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall

2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and

3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.
Appendix C


Article II

For the purpose of the present Convention, the term 'the crime of apartheid', which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhumane acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them:

a. Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty of person
   i. By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
   ii. By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
   iii. By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or groups;

b. Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;

c. Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognised trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association;
d. Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof;

e. Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by submitting them to forced labour;

f. Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.
Appendix D

BDS National Conferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First National Conference</td>
<td>22 November 2007</td>
<td>Ramallah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second National Conference</td>
<td>31 May 2010</td>
<td>Nablus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third National Conference</td>
<td>17 December 2011</td>
<td>Hebron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth National Conference</td>
<td>8 June 2013</td>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Operation Cast Lead

27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Casualties (total)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>1,387 – 1,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Human Rights Council, 2009)

Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, which ran for three weeks. A number of important political developments occurred prior to this and contributed to the launch of Israel’s 2008 operation. Hamas had won the 2006 legislative election and a democratic mandate. Upon Hamas’s electoral victory the Quartet promptly announced that it would only deal with the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government if Hamas met three conditions: a renouncement of violence; the acceptance of previous agreements (those that the PLO and Fatah-led PA had signed); and the recognition of Israel (Tocci, 2007, p. 2). Hamas did not agree to the conditions and Israel and the Quartet refused to enter into any functional relationship with Hamas. A Palestinian national unity government was brokered by Saudi Arabia with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister. This did not sit comfortably with the US who were pushing for Abbas and the PA to have sole control, operating under the Quartet principles, to undermine the election results (Rose, 2008). Fatah security forces were built up independently from Hamas in order to provide Fatah with the capability to undertake a coup. Conflict erupted between Fatah and Hamas as the national unity government was dissolved and each claimed a ruling authority. Despite the external backing of Fatah’s forces, Fatah was not able to overpower Hamas in Gaza and by mid-2007 the Palestine territories were de facto divided with a Hamas-run Gaza and PA-run West Bank (Rose, 2008).

The Annapolis Conference in November 2007 held the purpose of restarting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process based on the Quartet’s Roadmap. The conference was hosted by the US and attended by major diplomatic bodies (the UN, EU), Arab League members, G8 members, financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), as well as other notable countries such as China (The Associated Press, 2007). President Bush hoped to gain international
credibility and backing for peace talks from the presence of these attendees. A steering committee was established for continuous negotiations working towards a final two-state solution, with ultimate oversight by the US (Joint understanding read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference, 2007). Hamas was not invited to the conference, with the US seeking to strengthen Abbas’s standing in Palestinian leadership. However, with Hamas controlling Gaza it limited Abbas’s ability and mandate to enter into negotiations and thus raised questions over the effectiveness of such peace talks. Hamas dismissed the talks as being “doomed to failure”, and indeed the talks did not amount to any tangible progress (Hamas says 'Annapolis doomed', 2007). Fatah received Israeli and American assurance that loyalty to the peace talks would achieve results for the Palestinians and thus discouraged a relationship with Hamas. However, the stagnation of the peace talks between Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert served to increase Hamas’s popularity (Smith C., 2013, p. 517).

An Israeli raid into Gaza saw six Hamas militants killed on 4 November 2008. Hamas responded by increasing rocket attacks into Israel, breaking the ceasefire reached in June (McCarthy, 2008). Israel launched its military action under the justification of self-defence in order to prevent an immediate threat. Under the UN Charter system, self-defence is only applicable against an actual armed attack and not just the threat of such. Israel’s initial raid (a provocation) was undertaken to prevent a threat of armed attack; thus it was Israel who broke the ceasefire and any claims of self-defence under customary international law were inadmissible (Erakat, 2009, pp. 171-172). Israel used traditional mass media in conjunction with an official IDF blog to communicate its justifications (Zeitzoff, 2014, p. 8). However, with civilians comprising 70 per cent of the high Palestinian casualty rate, Israel’s actions were viewed as disproportionate (Erakat, 2009; Zeitzoff, 2014). Hamas sought an agreement to lift the Gaza blockade following Israel’s withdrawal and Hamas’s subsequent ceasefire. However, the US and Europe offered weapon monitoring assistance in Gaza that prevented the need for Israel to engage with blockade concessions (McGreal, O’Loughlin, & Batty, 2009).

The UNHRC commissioned a Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, headed by Richard Goldstone. The controversial Goldstone report found both Israel and Hamas culpable of
war crimes and urged each party to undertake their own investigations (Human Rights Council, 2009). Israel refused to cooperate with the mission, criticising the numerous accusations the report laid against Israel. Goldstone, a Jew, was ostracised and boycotted by the Jewish community and retracted his findings that it was Israeli policy to purposely target Palestinian civilians (Urquhart, 2011).
Appendix F

Gaza Flotilla Raid

31 May 2010

The Israeli Defence Force raided the flotilla that was carrying aid for the Gazan population. During the raid on the flotilla nine activists were killed upon the MV Mavi Marmara, sparking international outrage and a diplomatic rift with Turkey, as eight were Turkish nationals (BBC, 2013). That non-Palestinians were killed in the raid added to the severity of the international attention. The UN commissioned inquiries into the incident and once again Israel did not comply with the investigation. The 2010 Human Rights Council Fact Finding Mission found that the Israeli blockade of Gaza was unlawful “collective punishment” and the actions of the IDF during the flotilla raid were disproportionate, incredibly violent and unacceptably brutal. Israeli military conduct constituted “a grave violation of human rights law and international humanitarian law” and as such the Mission supported prosecutions under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Human Rights Council, 2010, p. 53). Israel rejected the report as being biased, with the United States expressing concern over the tone and conclusions of the report. The US was the only nation to vote against endorsing the report at the UN and the Human Rights Council’s European members abstained from voting (Lynch, 2010). Ban Ki Moon established a Panel of Inquiry chaired by Sir Geoffrey Palmer. The Panel had strict terms of reference with limitations imposed that it was not to make definitive findings of either fact or law (Panel of Inquiry, 2010, p. 8). The Panel deemed that the Israeli blockade was a lawful legitimate security measure and the flotilla acted recklessly. Although the IDF’s actions were excessive and unreasonable, the activists engaged in violent resistance which required military personnel to use force but no satisfactory explanation for the loss of life was provided by Israel (Panel of Inquiry, 2010, pp. 4-5).
Appendix G

Arab Spring

18 December 2011 – present

The Arab Spring began in December 2010 in Tunisia as a civil revolt against the long-standing Ben Ali regime and quickly spread to other Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states (Dewey et al, 2012, p. 1). The Arab Spring is strongly linked to the digital revolution that saw internet usage and social media activity increase dramatically in the region. Social media was a catalyst in the first mass protests in Tunisia which were sparked by Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid. A similar case of self-immolation occurred only months earlier, but as it was not filmed no one knew about it whereas the images of Bouazizi were uploaded to Facebook (Beaumont, The truth about Twitter, Facebook and the uprisings in the Arab world, 2011). Social media became a primary tool of the Arab Spring activists with the technology being used to develop activist networks, organise and coordinate protests, and disseminate information locally and internationally (Dewey et al, 2012, p. 1). Social media facilitated the diffusion of the Arab Spring throughout the region. Much like the BDS movement, the movements in the MENA region were characterised by “independence, lack of hierarchy, and a structure based on a network of networks” (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 98). While social media was not the cause of the Arab Spring, there is agreement amongst the literature that social media was an important facilitative tool (see Dewey et al, 2012; Rane & Sumra, 2012; Howard & Hussain, 2013; Harb, 2011; Khondker, 2011). “The advent of social media has enabled actors to communicate directly and constantly across vast geographical distances, which increases the potential for cross-national diffusion between corresponding social movements as in the case of the Arab uprisings” (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 99).

Social media usage was not a predictor of the likelihood that an uprising would occur in the MENA region, but it played an important role when uprisings did occur. The technological advances allowed networks of protestors to achieve political organisation where it had previously been unsuccessful. “Civil society actors have flourished online, largely because much of the internet’s infrastructure is independent of state control” (Howard & Hussain, 2013, p. 4). Following the start of the civilian uprisings, Facebook users in Tunisia increased eight per cent in the first two weeks of January 2011 and usage shifted from social to
political purposes (Salem & Mourtada, 2011, p. 3). Social media aided protestor mobilisation as civilians were inspired by their national and regional counterparts (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 103). Not only did social media allow local citizens to act as journalists in the releasing of information and footages of the uprisings, but advice on nonviolent tactics was communicated. Social media provided a key channel for the diffusion of ideas, tactics, goals and communication systems between the MENA states that sustained collective action (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 108). Howard and Muzammil (2013, p. 11) state that amongst nations with large Arab populations “political action is largely based on the emulation of successful examples from others.” The Arab Spring uprisings stood in solidarity with Palestine who for decades had nonviolently resisted an oppressor (Baroud, 2012). Palestinians also protested in solidarity with Arab Spring states, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, however the Palestinian Authority shut down these protests (The Electronic Intifada, 2011). Shlaim (2014, p. 384) argues that the regime change produced by the Arab Spring reinforced Palestinian belief in the efficacy of nonviolent resistance. In 2011 the Third Arab Bloggers’ Meeting was held in Tunis and saw bloggers and activists involved in the Arab Spring come together in solidarity and debate how to fuel engagement in the reshaping of Arab states. Palestinian bloggers were denied visas but participated via Skype (Vecchi, 2011).

In Tunisia and Egypt the movements used freedom and democracy as framing, emphasising that the protests were nonviolent and non-Islamic. This had important repercussions in international politics as the United States had itself been pushing such frames in the MENA region and thus had to offer support in keeping with Obama’s ‘new beginning’ policy towards Islam (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 108). While the uprisings were the product of decades of oppression by authoritarian regimes, they were greatly assisted in their progress by social media.

Where social media had a major impact was conveying the news to the outside world, bloggers and Twitter users were able to transmit news bites that would otherwise never make it to mainstream news media. This information has been instrumental in garnering the attention of the citizens of the world who expressed solidarity with those suppressed individuals and may even put pressure on their own governments to react.

(Al Qassemi, as quoted in Beaumont, 2011).
Social media was critical in obtaining international support and facilitating collective action networks in an unprecedented manner in the MENA region. Despite social media playing a critical role in the Arab Spring, the long-term outcomes of the uprisings remain dependent on internal political and wider geopolitical factors (Rane & Sumra, 2012, p. 109).
Appendix H

Operation Pillar of Defence

14 November 2012 – 21 November 2012

<table>
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<td>Israeli</td>
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(Human Rights Council, 2013)

Israel and Palestine entered into direct peace negotiations in 2010 following the flotilla incident. However, the talks did not amount to any agreed upon progress on either side and abated in 2011. Tensions between Gaza and Israel increased in 2012, culminating with the launch of Operation Pillar of Defence in November. The operation lasted eight days with numerous Palestinian casualties occurring during the short period. The events of the Arab Spring saw Israel desire to act forcefully in the uncertain Arab regional environment (Shamir E., 2012). Israel’s main military objective was to disable Hamas’s armed capabilities. Ahmed al-Jabari, a commander of the al-Qassam Brigade (Hamas’s military wing), was killed at the beginning of the operation.

Operation Pillar of Defense was the first conflict in which both Israel and Hamas engaged social media as a means of communication in attempts to affect international opinion. Both sides used Twitter (@IDFSpokesperson and @AlQassamBrigade respectively) in an attempt to contextualise their actions in a favourable light whilst criticising the other (Zeitzoff, 2014, pp. 3-4). Analysis of the hashtags #GazaUnderAttack and #IsraelUnderFire shows that conflict intensity was affected by social media public support. As support for Hamas increased, Israel decreased its conflict actions and increased social media communication (Zeitzoff, 2014, p. 5). Israel and Hamas were sensitive to changes in public support via social media, not those of international mediators, demonstrating the significant role of new horizontal media upon conflicts.

Israel and Hamas refused direction negotiations and a ceasefire was mediated by Egypt and the US. Hamas once again sought an end to the naval blockade of Gaza and re-opening of
the borders; Israel negotiated for the ceasing of rockets into their territory and an
abatement of weapons smuggling into Gaza. Both Hamas and Israel publically claimed
victory following the truce (Beaumont, Sherwood, & Black, 2012). Hamas’s easing of the
Gaza blockade via conflict with Israel reinforced the weakness of the US-led peace talks;
years of formal negotiations had not delivered any results for the Palestinians (McGreal,
2012). The ceasefire agreement not resolving the deeper issues between Hamas and Israel
and left the region vulnerable to subsequent escalations in violence.
Appendix I

Operation Protective Edge

8 July 2014 – 26 August 2014

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</table>

(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014)

Israel’s most recent military assault on Gaza began 8 July 2014 following weeks of heightened tension after the alleged kidnappings of three Israeli teenagers. Israel accused Hamas of the kidnappings, despite Hamas’s continual denial of involvement, and launched a three week search for the teenagers. However, evidence has been presented that Israeli authorities knew the boys were dead but continued with the search in order to increase anti-Arab sentiment (Peled, 2014; Eldar, 2014; al-Gharbi, 2014; Zavadski, 2014). Israeli raids and mass detentions in Gaza and the West Bank ignited fatal clashes between the IDF and Palestinians. The teenagers’ bodies were found 30 June and following the burial, a Palestinian teenager was abducted and burned in retaliation causing further riots in the oPt (Kershner, 2014). Rocket launches and airstrikes were increasingly exchanged between Gaza and Hamas with Israel’s military operation formally beginning 8 July, leading to a ground invasion ten days later (Carlstrom, 2014). Claims of disproportionate use of force and war crimes were again alleged against Israel due to the high number of Palestinians killed, the majority of whom were civilians, and Israeli attacks upon schools and medical facilities (Rights group accuses Israel of war crimes over Gaza school raids, 2014). After 50 days an open-ended ceasefire was brokered by Egypt with conditions nearly identical to that of the 2012 ceasefire agreement (Sherwood & Balousha, 2014). As with the previous military operations, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry to assess the claims of human rights violations. Results of the inquiry will be reported to the Human Rights Council by March 2015, with Israel already dismissing the inquiry (Reuters, 2014b). Additionally, Ban Ki Moon stated the UN would be investigating strikes against UN schools in Gaza, as well as allegations of Hamas storing weapons at UN sites (UN announces Gaza war inquiry, 2014).
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