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The Emperor’s New Clothes: New Zealand’s Whole of Government Approach to National Security

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Abstract

The *New Zealand’s National Security System* (NSS) document is presented as the central framework for New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security and crisis management. Despite the terms regular use in New Zealand Government agency documentation, no clear articulation of what a whole of government approach means, has been forthcoming from central government. The author’s experience at the operational level of New Zealand’s national security system was characterized by a lack of coordination and leadership, duplication of effort, and differing agency priorities and objectives to national security issues. From these experiences, he proposed the hypothesis that the New Zealand Government’s vertically structured government departments inhibit a whole of government approach to security. This paper explores this hypothesis through a textual analysis of the NSS that examines its suitability to New Zealand’s unique security context and its effectiveness in addressing the risks and hazards to New Zealand’s national security interests.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

The connectivity and complexity of the current global security environment is without precedent. Rapid developments in technology have produced many positive advances for humanity, as well as a number of unintended negative consequences. The factors of globalisation, the information revolution, and new types of potential adversaries, have contributed to the creation of national security risks and challenges that are global, multi-faceted, non-linear and unpredictable. To respond to the greater complexity of the global security environment, the New Zealand Government published *New Zealand’s National Security System* (NSS)¹ as the central framework for the conduct of its national security operations.

The NSS defines national security as:

“...the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life.”²

New Zealand’s national security system encompasses all significant risks and hazards, both natural and man-made, to the New Zealand population and environment.³ The NSS cites globalization and trans-boundary issues as drivers for the extension of national security risks faced by modern societies beyond their territorial borders. This observation is supported by security and intelligence agencies of different nations that seek to identify trends in global security. These include the United States Department of Defense’s *The Joint Operating Environment 2010⁴* and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence’s *Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040⁵*. The change in nature of national security, proposed by the NSS, incorporates a wider range of government agencies into New Zealand’s security sector. The New Zealand Government’s recognition of this fact is demonstrated in the NSS’s articulation of the requirement for a whole of government approach to national security.

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² Ibid. p. 3
³ Ibid. p. 3
Commitment to a whole of government approach is also reiterated in New Zealand Government agency documentation and is focused towards developing a more integrated and coordinated response to national security issues. Conceptually a whole of government approach has merit, and should enable the agencies involved in New Zealand’s national security sector to address complex security issues in a comprehensive manner. The question that this statement raises is; how is New Zealand’s whole of government concept being implemented by national security agencies incumbent within traditionally structured government departments? A number of subsequent questions naturally follow this initial enquiry. Do all agencies involved with the promotion of New Zealand’s national security interests place the same emphasis on the achievement of national security outcomes? Or do New Zealand’s government departments remain focused on those ministerial outcomes for which they are functionally accountable? Does the New Zealand Government apply a whole of government approach to national security, or is this simply idealistic rhetoric that cannot be achieved in its current structure?

Although the phrase ‘whole of government’ is used regularly in New Zealand Government national security documents, no clear definition of what comprises a whole of government approach has been forthcoming from central government. My experiences as a practitioner at the operational level of New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security events have been characterized by a lack of centralized coordination and leadership, duplication of effort by contributing actors, and different priorities and objectives between participating agencies. Are these observations symptomatic of the diffuse nature of contemporary national security issues or do they indicate an incomplete understanding amongst New Zealand Government agencies of what a ‘whole of government’ approach to national security is? Given the absence of a national security strategy, and the organization of the New Zealand Government into ministries with clearly delineated areas of responsibility, is a whole of government approach the most effective methodology for New Zealand to pursue its national security interests? Shaped by my personal experience, and perspectives developed during discussions with military and other government agency colleagues, I propose the hypothesis that the New Zealand Government’s vertically siloed departments inhibit a whole of government approach to security.

Development of the this hypothesis was influenced primarily by my service in the New Zealand Army where I was involved in the planning and execution of military operations to support stability in Afghanistan and East Timor, humanitarian aid and disaster relief in Samoa, and civil
defence and emergency management within New Zealand. These practical observations were supported by research I conducted as a lecturer in Operational Art and Strategy, Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation for the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University. The aim of this thesis is investigate the validity of this hypothesis. My motivation for undertaking the research was to determine whether evidence supported my experience and if the current organizational structures of New Zealand Government agencies involved with national security issues negate the effectiveness of its whole of government approach. My research and findings are intended to stimulate further research amongst organisations involved in New Zealand’s national security sector towards developing new structures or strategies that more efficiently pursue New Zealand’s national security interests.

Soon after commencing my research, I realized that my initial hypothesis was based on a narrow perspective, and a superficial knowledge of New Zealand’s system of government within which the NSS operates. My perception was strongly shaped by a viewpoint that was biased towards the military aspect of national security operations, and included only limited consideration of the role that other agencies would play, and the different approaches that could be used. To be able to objectively analyse the New Zealand Government’s methodology for responding to national security issues, I was required to develop an understanding of, not only New Zealand’s state institutions, but also the ideals on which they were founded. My research used an inductive methodology to examine the NSS and to determine this system’s suitability for effective responses within New Zealand’s national security context. The primary research question used to facilitate my examination was; does the current organization of New Zealand Government agencies inhibit a whole of government approach to national security? To further investigate the primary research question, my knowledge gaps surrounding some of the relevant concepts needed to be filled.

Firstly I sought to determine what New Zealand’s national security context was within its particular strategic environment. This question would allow me to understand the factors that influenced the development of the NSS and the method with which the New Zealand Government prioritises its actions to ensure its citizens security. The next supporting question sought to determine what is meant by a whole of government approach. By seeking a common definition of a whole of government approach, I could measure the New Zealand Government’s application of this approach against recognized best practice. Establishing how the New Zealand Government applies a whole of government approach to national security
and why it chooses this approach was my next secondary research question. By identifying New Zealand’s particular application of whole of government initiatives, I could examine points of difference with other states’ methods and analyse this variance against New Zealand’s specific national security context. Next, I examined different New Zealand government department responses to the publication of NSS. By distinguishing differing levels of compliance or interest to the document, I could measure the effectiveness of the NSS in instilling a whole of government approach to national security. My final secondary research question asked whether there were any barriers that existed within New Zealand government departments that inhibit a whole of government approach to national security and why they exist. This question supports the measurement of the effectiveness of New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security and provides insights for further research to improve the NSS.

In designing my research I made three key assumptions. The first assumption was the NSS would remain the central framework for New Zealand’s national security operations throughout the period of my research. The second assumption was the trend of broadening national security risks that incorporate complex social issues will remain central to New Zealand’s national security context. The third assumption was that New Zealand would retain a Westminster model for the organization of its government. Throughout my research these assumptions remained valid. Although specific threat types and groups, such as cyber security and ISIL may have become more prevalent, the nature of the contemporary security environment has not changed. As the scope of New Zealand’s national security operations cover several government agencies and levels of execution, I have limited my research to the actors and agencies that exert the greatest level of influence within the NSS. This limitation means that the non-governmental organisations that are involved in New Zealand’s national security operations were not included in my research.

I have deliberately focused on New Zealand’s Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) as the lead agency of the NSS and the central department for coordinating the executive branch of New Zealand’s Government. Roles of the Prime Minister, as chair of the highest decision-making body in the NSS, and Chief Executive of DPMC, as National Security Advisor, were examined as principal agents within New Zealand’s national security. My research was deliberately concentrated at the political and strategic levels of the NSS so as to mitigate any bias I may have given my previous experience at the operational and frontline levels of this system. My practical experience allowed me to better determine the points,
within the NSS, at which the strategic or political intent was no longer being understood and thereby undermining the desired whole of government approach. By examining areas of the NSS where I was least experienced, allowed me to recognize the ill-informed, superficial nature of my initial hypothesis and more objectively explore the integrity of the NSS. A further limitation to my research was the use of only unclassified sources to investigate the NSS. This limited my ability to use primary source literature from New Zealand government departments that could not be publicly disclosed in my thesis. This was balanced by utilising publicly available corporate documentation from New Zealand departments and libraries. Despite these limitations, my examination of the NSS will be presented in the following manner.

The body of my argument consists of six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter introduces the NSS to describe the central framework that structures the New Zealand Government response to national security risks and events. The chapter discusses the four sections that constitute the main body of the NSS document; purpose, the existing national security system, recent improvements to the system and conclusion. The purpose establishes the importance of the government’s national security responsibilities and defines national security within the New Zealand context. It identifies New Zealand’s national security objectives, foundational principles for balancing the state’s security interests and introduces the New Zealand Government’s expanded national security concept. The existing national security system is then discussed, in particular the transition from a threat-based national security methodology to a risk management model. The principle of subsidiarity is introduced as a key concept within the NSS. It is this principle that drives New Zealand’s three tiered approach to national security issues. The roles of central government within the NSS are identified before an examination of New Zealand’s national security governance structures. A description of the Domestic and External Security (DES) system, which is the foundation of New Zealand’s national security, is followed by examination of the three levels of authority that comprise the DES system. The criteria, risk characteristic and management requirement thresholds for central government involvement conclude the description of New Zealand’s existing national security architecture.

The discussion of recent improvements to the system examines the influence that reviews of New Zealand’s intelligence and security community have had on the introduction of new measures to strengthen the current national security processes. The seven elements of a successful national security system are presented in the NSS as additional principles that guide agencies towards ensuring effective contributions to national security operations. The
elements identified as leadership, accountabilities, lead agencies, intelligence community, value for money, balancing security and liberty, and external relationships are discussed within New Zealand’s national security context. The National Security Advisor is identified as a focal point for coordination of national security activities and reiterates their leadership of the NSS. New Zealand’s national security process is presented to show the two broad concepts used in the conduct of security operations, that clearly delineate between routine security activities and those requiring whole of government management. This links to the lead agency concept introduced in the NSS to enhance coordination and preparedness of involved agencies. The lead agency concept is particularly relevant when discussing the use of the intelligence community in support of national security activities. A brief consideration of the five annexes that support the NSS displays their linkages to the appropriate sections within the system. The introduction of the NSS concludes with general observations regarding issues surrounding the document that make it different from similar policy documents.

In chapter three, the influence of the Westphalian model used by the New Zealand Government is examined, in particular, the importance this concept places on sovereignty within territorial borders. The theories of Hobbes and Locke are used to demonstrate the necessity of sovereign authority within society and the need for the society’s members to cede individual liberty to pursue common interests. The focus of this section is on representative authority and the way the citizens entrust the state institutions to act in a manner consistent with the collective will. This examination leads to Max Weber’s theory on legitimate authority. Weber’s views on the routinisation of charismatic authority, in particular, the concept of charisma of office. Charisma of office is used to demonstrate the way the legitimacy of the political office in which the NSS was created gives legitimacy to the document itself. Once an explanation of political authority based on Weber’s theory has been developed, the chapter examines the way this authority is reinforced through the use of New Zealand’s national security discourse. The section on discourse introduces the importance of language in creating and defining particular contexts within specific fields. The discussion examines the way dominant political groups can use the control of discursive fields to strengthen their positions of power. The examination of discourse leads into the following chapter which examines the theory of securitisation and the interactions between the specific actors involved in New Zealand’s national security system.

The fourth chapter examines how different actors are influenced by the language and constructions of New Zealand’s national security discourse. The theory of securitisation
introduces the way in which dominant political actors use language to place greater importance on particular issues by linking them to the field of security. This assertion is supported by a discussion of the use of security discourse to strengthen an agent’s power, or enhance their charisma within the security sector. The security discourse initiated by New Zealand’s Government through the publication of the NSS, is examined to determine the state’s aims in creating the document. This examination explains how the NSS has expanded New Zealand’s traditional approach to national security and how the system presents the Prime Minister and the DPMC as the principal actors within New Zealand’s national security. New Zealand's institutions of government are introduced to demonstrate how political authority in New Zealand is determined and legitimised by its citizens. The discussion of government institutions provides the theoretical foundation for how the NSS was constructed and reveals the document's position relative to other national policy. An examination of New Zealand's legislative and executive branches identifies their respective roles in establishing, prioritising and leading national security operations. The section focuses on central government as the lead actor in security issues of greater magnitude, complexity and duration. The next section of the chapter examines the current New Zealand Government. It discusses the New Zealand National Party under the leadership of John Key. An examination of their tenure as government identifies major decisions they have made and significant crises that have occurred during this time. This examination is followed by a similar analysis of New Zealand's DPMC. Particular focus in this section is in the National Security Advisor's (NSA) responsibilities and the department's role in leading the ODESC system in coordinating OGD within the NSS. The section concludes with an analysis of DPMC as an enactor of securitisation. It asserts that the establishment of the security discourse in the NSS legitimises the DPMC's position as an authority on security matters. It presents that the NSS centralises power in the DPMC over OGD and empowers the NSA as chief decision maker within New Zealand's national security system.

Chapter five examines the relationship between the foundational theories of New Zealand's machinery of government and the concepts for national security management articulated in the NSS. The chapter introduces the whole of government concept as it is applied by Governments with similar state institutions such as the United Kingdom and Australia. The term 'whole of government' is defined to determine the meaning of this approach as it applies to this paper. The discussion also differentiates between the whole of government approach and other closely related concepts such as the comprehensive approach and joined up government. After establishing a common definition of the whole of government approach for
this thesis, the chapter examines the context in which the New Zealand Government seeks to apply this approach. New Zealand central government documentation which promotes the whole of government approach within its agencies is examined to construct a perspective of how the approach is viewed within New Zealand’s Government institutions. Following the creation of a New Zealand context for the whole of government approach, an analysis is presented regarding the suitability of this methodology for addressing national security issues. The analysis of New Zealand’s whole of government approach determines the compatibility of the state’s governance structures to utilise a concept that operates across traditional departmental borders. The discussion of New Zealand’s whole of government approach examines the difficulty agencies have in realising the concepts put forth by the NSS. This argument demonstrates that New Zealand’s government agencies lack the appropriate mechanisms to act consistently with the prepositions in the NSS. It shows that the inability to realise the strategic vision proposed by the NSS originates in the lack of a sub-discourse that would allow the concepts to be critically examined before being presented as policy. This sub-discourse would ensure any security apparatus constructed was subject to the scrutiny of actors at all levels of the national security system. New Zealand’s current national security system is measured, not solely by what is presented within the NSS, but also what is notably absent from the document. Despite emphasising a whole of government approach to national security, the NSS fails to define what is meant by this term and what its successful application looks like.

A significant amount of literature has been produced providing commentary on various organisations use of a whole of government or similar concept of response to complex security issues. The majority of academic work in the security domain has been on the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s application of this approach, with particular focus on stability operations. The common threads throughout the literature indicate that despite universal support for the concept of a comprehensive, integrated approach to security, the success in implementing these strategies has been negligible. This may be attributed to the fact this concept has not been defined as composing of a particular combination of constituent parts or processes. Matthew Flinders’ discussion of the United Kingdom’s experience with ‘joined up’ government and its attempts to measure the effectiveness of this approach in

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enhancing government performance. In particular, he identifies the themes of control, coordination, accountability and power as key in evaluating the performance of ‘whole of government’ activities. Flinders’ assertion aligns well with my examination of the New Zealand Government’s approach to security given the similarities in structure and historical linkages between these nations. Academic literature specifically addressing New Zealand’s whole of government approach to security is very limited, and primarily focuses on New Zealand Defence Force’s participation in peacekeeping, or stability operations. This research explores New Zealand’s broader security concept, and seeks to understand its whole of government approach.

My initial research sought to establish an understanding of New Zealand’s security context within its strategic environment, and to determine what factors drive the development New Zealand’s national security system. The primary sources for this area of research were the NSS document, Defence White Paper 2010, and security-relevant New Zealand government department corporate documentation. The White Paper outlines New Zealand’s enduring national security interests as well as indicating New Zealand’s strategic outlook to 2035. New Zealand’s strategic outlook is articulated by presenting an all-encompassing security context driven by influences from shifts in economic power bases, narrowing of the state’s military advantage, and challenges from weak states and terrorism. The NSS discussion of New Zealand’s national security context aligns with the enduring national security interests presented in the White Paper. Annexes A and B of the NSS provided a detailed explanation of the factors that are most likely to have a significant impact on New Zealand’s national security. These annexes enhance the concept of national security beyond the White Paper by discussing those national security issues that lay outside the mandate of the Ministry of Defence. In particular, the NSS annexes provide more emphasis on the national security risks presented by New Zealand’s volatile natural environment. The documents reviewed in order to understand New Zealand’s national security context, appeared to be significantly influenced by other western nations’ ideas on national security. The national security strategies of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia also express a broadening nature of their national security risks despite very different geostrategic positions from New Zealand. My

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7 Flinders, Matthew. “Governance in Whitehall.” Public Administration (Blackwell Publishers Ltd) 80, no. 1 (2002): 51-75
9 Ibid. p. 23-33
10 Ibid p. 24-25
next enquiry was an investigation of what is meant by the term whole of government approach to determine a base understanding of this concept.

Academic journal articles were sourced to develop my comprehension of what a whole of government approach is and what previous research into whole of government approaches within public service had identified. Mathew Flinders suggests that the origins of whole of government initiatives lie in the concept of ‘joined up government’ that was introduced in the Modernising Government policy document released by the United Kingdom’s Blair Government. Flinders’ assertion is supported by Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, Christopher Pollitt and Perri6. Pollitt’s article provides an explanation of the factors that drive Governments towards applying initiatives capable of resolving complex social issues. Pollitt presents a general context for whole of government action and provides a definition for the term “whole of government” that is accepted and used by other authors. Perri6 portrays a history of whole of government approaches that contends that this concept originates much earlier and the term whole of government is simply the latest name for the bureaucratic principle of coordination. To measure the effectiveness of New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security; New Zealand’s unique application of the approach was determined by studying government agency documentation.

My research focused on the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) as the lead organization for New Zealand’s national security operations. The DPMC Statement of Intent and Annual report publications from the release of the NSS to 2014 were examined to find out how the whole of government approach was being articulated to subordinate agencies. Despite frequent use of the term whole of government, no clear definition of what this concept means was included in these documents. The most recent definition of whole of government is found in the glossary of the Review of the Centre document, and provide no greater clarity as to what is required to achieve a whole of government effect. After answering the gaps in my knowledge of New Zealand’s national security operations, a synthesis of the research was conducted to determine whether there are qualitative differences between the New Zealand government agencies involved in security, and whether these differences persist at all levels of the departments involved. My examination determined that the NSS as a policy document is not the only system exerting influence on the relationships between actors involved in New Zealand’s national security sector. To comprehend how other state institutions impact upon New Zealand’s national security system, I expanded my research to
incorporate New Zealand’s model of government so as to understand the theoretical foundations through actors exercise power and authority within the public service.

Academic publications by Richard Mulgan, Chris Eichbaum, and Richard Shaw propose that New Zealand follows a Westminster model of government. Mulgan discusses New Zealand’s liberal democratic foundations and their origin in the United Kingdom. Eichbaum and Shaw explain the way influence is exerted within New Zealand’s system of government, from its citizens through their House of Representatives to the executive branch of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Literature by Gianfranco Poggi, Christopher Pierson and Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall were used to examine the modern state institutions that govern, not only New Zealand’s domestic relationships, but also their interactions with other sovereign states. This research led to an investigation of New Zealand’s bureaucratic machinery, in particular, how concepts of authority are exercised within government. Eisenstadt’s translation of Max Weber’s theories on charisma and institution were used as a foundation for analysis of New Zealand’s bureaucratic model. Michel Foucault’s discussion on discourse, specifically how actors use it to strengthen their power, was used to understand the messages the NSS intends to convey to its audiences.
CHAPTER TWO - NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

This chapter examines the NSS publication to determine its importance as the central framework for the New Zealand government’s national security operations. The chapter introduces and analyses the four sections that constitute the main body of the document to establish its position as an official government document and identify how it is legitimised as government policy within New Zealand’s security sector. Discussion of the NSS’s first section, Purpose, establishes New Zealand’s national security context and the importance of national security issues to the New Zealand Government. This section indicates why a national security document has been produced and outlines the New Zealand Government responsibilities for national security. The discussion also presents the New Zealand Government’s definition of national security, and the principles that underpin their approach to emerging, or realised national security risks. Introducing the foundation concepts of the NSS, creates a framework for use throughout this paper to measure the system’s effectiveness against the factors that influence New Zealand’s national security environment. The New Zealand Government definition of national security is important, as it provides the scope of action expected from the NSS. From this definition, are derived the national security objectives that focus the planning and resource allocation of government agencies involved in New Zealand’s security sector. This section of the NSS also explains the New Zealand Government’s management of risk approach to national security which includes both preventative and crisis response measures. The principle of subsidiarity is discussed to demonstrate how authority is legitimised through the three-tiered system of response proposed in the NSS. This tiered approach also indicates the threshold for central government involvement in national security operations.

In order to identify the key actors and agencies within the NSS, I explain the DES system which has been the foundation of New Zealand’s national security operations since 1987. This discussion introduces the chief political decision makers and their senior advisors within the NSS. It also demonstrates where the responsibilities of leadership and coordination of national security operations lie. New Zealand’s national security process and the lead agency concept will be introduced to identify the New Zealand government departments’ assigned national security responsibilities and authority over other agencies for specific national security objectives. The recent improvements to the systems are presented as these changes indicate the intended direction envisaged by the New Zealand Government for its national security activities. This discussion includes the new measures being introduced in the NSS to achieve
greater accountability in national security operations. The chapter is concluded with an
analysis of the New Zealand Government’s intent in releasing the NSS and the deficiencies that
make the document different from other official communications.

Structure

The New Zealand’s National Security System (NSS) document asserts that it is the ‘first time’
that a comprehensive view of New Zealand’s national security interests has been described by
a New Zealand Government to its agencies and public. The NSS is an unclassified document
that the New Zealand Government’s Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC)
released in May 2011 to describe the central concepts and framework through which New
Zealand ensures its national security. The NSS is seventeen pages in length and divided into
four sections: Purpose, The Existing National Security System, Recent Improvements to the
System, and Conclusion. The sections explain the circumstances that frame New Zealand’s
national security, describe the current national security apparatus and introduce the
improvements to the system established after reviews of the intelligence and security sectors.
The document’s discussion is supported by five annexes: Context, Riskscape, Officials
Committee on Domestic and External Security, Lead Agencies, and ODESC Support Groups
which add a further ten pages. The annexes provide additional information that reinforces the
key concepts introduced in the main body, particularly the specific elements that constitute
New Zealand’s national security environment and the specific responsibilities of the
government agencies involved with national security.

The NSS is openly available to the New Zealand public, in PDF file format, on the DPMC
website.\footnote{Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Publications,” Department of Prime Minister and
Cabinet, http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dpmc/publications.} The document is presented plainly on a simple white background and not supported
by any foreword remarks or endorsement by either the Prime Minister, as chair of Cabinet
Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (DES), or the Chief Executive
Officer of DPMC, as National Security Advisor and chair of Officials’ Committee for Domestic
and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC). This differs from other similar government
documents, such as the DPMC annual Statement of Intent, New Zealand’s Cyber Security
Strategy or The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System.\footnote{Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination, “The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS),” ed. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Wellington, New Zealand 2014).} In the absence of
an authorising signatory, official departmental title, or agency branding, the document’s
presence on the agency's website is the only evidence to indicate that the NSS is a product of DPMC.

**Purpose**

According to the NSS, one of the most important responsibilities of any state government is to guarantee the security of the citizens to whom they represent.\(^{13}\) The NSS document expands the definition of national security beyond its traditional focus on territorial integrity, and includes those institutions that uphold effective governance, confidence and prosperity such as public safety, economic stability and environmental security challenges.\(^{14}\) In order to perform this responsibility, the NSS asserts that a government requires "well led, strategically focussed, co-ordinated, cost-effective, and accountable"\(^{15}\) national security mechanisms that incorporate risk management and possess the flexibility to respond to evolving security issues.\(^{16}\) The NSS perspective of national security is based on the increasingly complex global security environment. The international security environment is far more complex and interconnected than ever before. Globalisation, rapid advances in information technology, and the increasing influence of non-state actors, have created security risks and challenges that are global, multi-faceted, non-linear and unpredictable. Trans-boundary challenges such as pandemics, climate change, cyber-attack, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have extended the national security interests of a state's society beyond its national territorial borders. The NSS is posited by the New Zealand Government as the first presentation of a comprehensive view of New Zealand’s national security interests. The document is also described as an articulation of the necessity of coordination between government agencies for an effective response to security challenges.\(^{17}\) According to the NSS, this document is designed to provide an overview of the organising architecture within which strategies and policies regarding New Zealand’s national security are developed and employed. The NSS describes the mechanisms for achieving a coordinated 'whole of government' response to New Zealand’s national security problems.

The NSS defines national security as a condition which allows the citizens of a nation to go about their lives free from fear and able to seize opportunities to advance their way of life.\(^{18}\) It

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\(^{13}\) Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security System." p. 3
\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 3
\(^{15}\) Ibid. p. 3
\(^{16}\) Ibid. p. 3
\(^{17}\) Ibid. p. 3
\(^{18}\) Ibid. p. 3
incorporates the principles of preparedness of government agencies and the protection of people, property and information, both tangible and intangible. The NSS document identifies seven key objectives that underpin New Zealand’s national security. The first of these objectives is the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which addresses the need to cater for the physical security of New Zealand’s citizens and maintain the integrity of the state’s territorial borders. The second objective is protecting lines of communication that focuses on maintaining the networks and infrastructure that allow New Zealand to interact globally. Objective two disappears and is not mentioned again from this point in the NSS. Future references to New Zealand’s national security objectives mention only six, and protecting lines of communication is absent from the Annex D allocation of lead agencies to specific national security objectives. New Zealand’s third national security objective, strengthening international order to promote security, emphasises New Zealand’s preference as a small state for a rules-based international system that will allow it to exercise sovereignty from a position of equality. This objective also demonstrates the will to conduct deliberate external action to protect New Zealand’s national interests abroad. The fourth objective focuses on the support of economic growth and the sustainment of economic prosperity to allow the New Zealand Government to protect and enhance the quality of life for all tiers of New Zealand society. The fifth national security objective, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, protects New Zealand’s underlying value base and institutions of government by preventing or confronting activities intended to undermine its core values, or overturn its democratic conventions. The sixth objective, ensuring public safety, protects New Zealand’s citizens and communities from natural and man-made threats and hazards. It prevents the realisation of emergent threats and mitigates the risks of those that are unavoidable. The seventh objective is protection of the natural environment. This objective aims to preserve New Zealand’s natural and physical environment and strengthen the nation’s stewardship of its organic resources. This spectrum of national security objectives differs from New Zealand’s traditional understanding of national security.

The New Zealand Government previously viewed national security in terms of protecting the state against military or political violence. The NSS presents globalisation, transnational

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19 Ibid. p. 3 As the National Security System document is not referenced it is assumed that this definition originated from the authors of the document and therefore represents a unique description of New Zealand’s national security context.

20 Ibid. p. 3

21 Ibid. p. 4
border issues, climate change, terrorism, cyber-security and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as factors that contribute to a broadening of the modern concept of national security. These factors are multiplied by the greater connectivity and awareness provided by rapid advancements in information technology that extend the scope of New Zealand’s national security interests from external and domestic threats to encompass social, economic and environmental factors abroad.

The NSS requires the New Zealand Government to balance multiple interests in order to fulfil its comprehensive national security responsibilities. The NSS categorises long term or short term consequences, domestic versus external benefit, public good versus private interest, and financial versus non-financial implications as conflicting interests that must be incorporated into national security planning. The document asserts four principles enable the New Zealand Government to balance these competing interests surrounding national security. The first principle states that the NSS will address all significant risks to the country and its citizens in order to promote confidence within the nation and improve quality of life. The next principle argues that the government's pursuit of national security objectives will be accountable and fulfil their responsibilities for protection of New Zealand citizens, national interests and territorial borders whilst continuing to respect individual civil liberties and the rule of law. The NSS uses the principle of subsidiarity to apportion the authority, responsibility and resources during a national security response to the level of government closest to the crisis situation. Subsidiarity is applied to national security decision-making, to enable the most appropriate actors to respond to, and manage a national security event. Maintenance of New Zealand’s independent control of its national security, is the final principle proposed by the NSS. This principle is balanced by acknowledging the benefits of being an active participant in an international order that is consistent with New Zealand’s national values.

The Existing National Security System
The New Zealand Government definition of national security presented in the NSS, encompasses all risks and hazards to New Zealand’s people, environment and institutions. The NSS definition incorporates any threat or danger to national security, whether they are internal or external, manmade, or naturally occurring. The comprehensive nature of this definition creates a significant challenge for the government agencies involved in New Zealand’s national security sector. The breadth of potential capabilities required by the New

22 Ibid. p. 4
New Zealand government agencies to successfully protect its citizens in all these areas is significant. The NSS adopts the proactive approach of risk management to simplify this national security challenge. Risk management allows potential security risks to be forecast, and an awareness of their existence to be developed prior to their manifestation. A risk management approach places greater emphasis on preparedness and resilience within government agencies, regional authorities and the community, in response to national security challenges. This differs from the previous threat-based assessment process which was highly reactive; taking action only in response to security threats as they appeared. The NSS asserts that a threat-based approach engenders an ad hoc response by responsible agencies to evolving crises and the inefficient management of national security resources by central government.

The NSS highlights the necessity for the New Zealand Government to integrate its national security mechanisms in order to provide a cohesive, coherent and coordinated response to national security crises. The system proposes to achieve this by orchestrating the unique strengths of New Zealand’s government departments towards specifically identified national security objectives. The NSS states that an open and transparent national security architecture that devolves authority to the agencies closest to the specific risks is essential to achieving this coordinated response. The document acknowledges that as much as practicable, however, this structure must be backed by a central framework capable of coordinating an escalation of response if necessary. The NSS acknowledges that although the government can identify some risks and plan for them in advance, to prevent or mitigate the adverse effects of their realization, other events may occur unexpectedly, or with greater magnitude than anticipated. New Zealand’s national security architecture requires sufficient flexibility to account for such unpredictability. The NSS is designed to provide specific direction to New Zealand government agencies on their national security responsibilities; however it maintains the ability for the departments to exercise judgement in the application of their resources towards national security events. The NSS proposes its approach to risk management aims to: reduce the frequency and extent of any disruption and harm to normal societal function; amalgamate protective and preventative security processes and assets; improve New Zealand’s national resilience and develop contingent capacity; respond rapidly to crisis situations and restore stability; and restore a normal functioning society quickly and efficiently. The NSS asserts that despite the limitations of risk management, it forms the base policy of many of the government agencies relevant to New Zealand’s national security operations. The NSS proposes that risk management can be used for prioritisation of department national security
objectives, and in the development of policies and processes that optimise the use of resources towards the achievement of national security goals.

The NSS states that the principle of subsidiarity strengthens national security operations by creating the capacity for an escalating response to national security risks or events. Accordingly, the New Zealand Government asserts that the management of national security events is best achieved by authorised agencies closest to those communities directly affected by a particular incident. To achieve this NSS presents a three-tier model for the management of responses to national security threats. The first tier of response is for incidents primarily affecting the security of individuals. These security activities are routine in nature and managed by single agencies, as initial responders, under their organisational standard operating procedures. The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) is the process used in the case of larger events requiring interaction between multiple emergency services such as major motor vehicle accidents.

CIMS is based on similar systems used in North America and Australia, and was adopted by New Zealand in 1998 following the Emergency Services Review of the mid-1990s. The system was developed by a steering group of stakeholder agencies including Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Development, New Zealand Police, New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Fire Service, New Zealand Customs Service, Department of Conservation, Maritime New Zealand, Ambulance New Zealand and DPMC. The current version of CIMS is endorsed by ODESC and the system is reviewed every five years. CIMS is used as a framework for coordination and cooperation of the emergency management agencies’ response to a crisis situation. CIMS is used in multi-agency situations such as major road accidents, search and rescue, and civil contingencies. The system has become, not only the basis for first-line response, but also higher level coordination arrangements, such as those used in the emergency operations centre of the Ministry of Health during the H1N1 epidemic in 2009. As CIMS is based on international processes, it allows New Zealand emergency management agencies to respond quickly with contributions to emergencies in other countries (for example, the Australian bush-fires in 2009, and similar events in North America).

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23 Ibid. p. 6.
24 Ibid. p. 6
25 Coordination, "The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)." p. ii
26 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security System." p. 6
The second tier of response identified by the NSS, is for incidents of a magnitude in which communities are affected. In these circumstances, regional authorities will assume primacy for coordination of the responding agencies and will utilise CIMS protocols to manage their response. The third level of response is for security issues of the scale and complexity that have the potential for national level consequences. These operations are managed by central government through a lead agency or group of government departments such as Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management or Ministry for Primary Industries. Routine security activity, such as border security operations and biosecurity checks, are overseen by the appropriate Minister and their department. Security threats identified by the New Zealand Government as requiring a whole of government response are managed through the NSS by ODSEC. Table 1: Risk Response Thresholds, on page ten of the NSS, outlines the responsibilities of first line responders, regional authorities or lead agencies, and central government in relation to the characteristics and resource demands of a particular security circumstance. Local authorities are expected to resolve routine, simple, localised events that require standard resources and can be managed through standard operating procedures. Small to medium scale issues that affect the community, and require coordination of multiple agencies, are led by a regional authority, or designated government lead agency.27 Central government leads all situations of greater complexity and scale that demand significant resources, or an enduring response.

27Ibid. p. 10
The internal relationships and processes, with which New Zealand’s national security is managed, are illustrated in Figure 1 above.\(^{28}\) The diagram demonstrates the two broad concepts the NSS uses to guide the conduct of New Zealand’s national security operations. Routine security activities are undertaken by the appropriate government departments and collection agencies within their own organisation, and under the direction of a lead agency. The NSS identifies a lead agency for each national security objective to enhance coordination of responses to these risks.\(^{29}\) The second concept identified in the diagram is the role of ODESC leadership in a whole of government or national level response through the NSS. The threshold for central government leadership in national security operations is when a risk or event may endanger or undermine: New Zealand’s sovereignty, reputation or national interests abroad; the security or safety of its citizens; and the functioning of the economy, community and environment. Central government may also lead in circumstances that: are unusually demanding of resources; are ambiguous as to which agency should lead; or require a whole of government response.

\(^{28}\)Ibid. p. 13  
\(^{29}\)Ibid. p. 14
The NSS, however, provides no further clarity as to how this greater level of coordination will occur, or the ambiguity of leadership will be resolved. The government may also intervene in situations where the initial response was deemed insufficient, or where government contribution enhances national security. The NSS states two roles for New Zealand’s central government within national security. The first is to maintain the confidence of New Zealand’s citizens during normal conditions. This is achieved through effective policy, state institutions and resource allocation which encourage national development. The second, more important, role is to provide leadership in emergency, or crisis situations. In this role, the use of their legitimate authority, as the elected government is crucial in minimising disruption, and to the rapid restoration of the normal function of society. The NSS suggests that as both these roles are fulfilled using the same governance mechanisms that experience gained in one will be transferable to the other.

New Zealand’s national security governance structures use the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) system to address national security issues. New Zealand Governments have used DESC as the foundation for national security planning and governance since 1987. The system operates at three levels; the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination (DES), Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) and Watch Group level. The DES is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes ministers of government agencies relevant to the specific situation. Specialist advisors are invited to attend, should the nature of the security issue require their expertise. The DES is the New Zealand Government’s highest decision making authority for national security matters and its primary functions are: the development of policy involved with national security; consideration of the intelligence community in particular issues of oversight, organisation and prioritisation; and leading and directing the response to a national crisis, or circumstances affecting national security. The DES have been authorised, by Cabinet, the Power to Act, which allows the committee to take action without further reference to the full Cabinet, should urgency, or operational reasons necessitate an immediate response.

Senior officials of various government agencies support the decision making of the DES.

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30 Ibid. p. 6
31 Ibid. p. 7
32 Ibid. p. 7
33 Ibid. p. 7
34 Ibid. p. 7
35 Ibid. p. 7
These officials comprise the second level of the DESC system, ODESC, which consists of government executives from central government departments with security interests such as: Chief Executive Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), Secretary to the Treasury, State Services Commissioner, Commissioner of Police and Chief of Defence Force. ODESC is chaired by Chief Executive DPMC and advises and assists DES deliberation and decision making on national security issues. ODESC is responsible for coordinating the activities of multiple government agencies in the achievement of national security objectives and risk management. The third level of the DESC system uses watch groups to monitor emerging situations of national security significance. They are formed and coordinated by the Security and Risk Group (SRG) for a specific purpose and meet daily during a security event until the response plan is fully activated. Watch groups comprise of senior officials from government departments who focus on developing a detailed situational awareness of a national security issue. This enables the most appropriate lead agency to be identified for the response to the issue and builds the foundation for ODESC advice to the DES.

Recent Improvements to the System
The New Zealand Cabinet introduced a number of new measures to the NSS as a result of the 2009 review of security and intelligence. These changes aimed to strengthen and expand the mandate of the NSS, improve strategic planning and efficiency, and integrate planning across external and domestic lines of operation. The review required the relevant government agencies to adjust the processes and procedures they had employed to meet the greater demands of the complex contemporary security environment. However, it did not change the central framework of the national security system. The review suggests seven key components which enable the operation of a successful national security system. The seven elements of Leadership, Accountabilities, Lead Agencies, Intelligence Community, Value for Money, Balancing Security and Liberty, and External relationships are used to articulate the adjustments that have been made to the NSS.

Strong policy leadership from central government is identified as an important part of the NSS. The review clearly defined leadership responsibilities, within the NSS, to enable the efforts of multiple actors across several security sector agencies to be coordinated towards the achievement of specific national security objectives. National security leadership
responsibilities designated by central government, not only integrate and align departments internal processes, but also assist in overcoming compartmentalisation of security responses between different agencies. The central role of ODESC, the review, included the development national level strategic policies based on input from relevant government agencies.\(^{39}\) The ODESC terms of reference assign the committee the responsibilities to coordinate advice from security agencies to government, oversee security policy development, guide strategic planning on national security matters, and prioritise and operationalize national security directives.\(^{40}\) Additionally, the review makes ODESC accountable for governance and assurance of New Zealand’s intelligence community.\(^{41}\) It reiterates that the existing statutory and supernumerary duties of actors involved in national security activities are not superseded by the ODESC framework. The ODESC framework is presented as a common concept of national security that agencies can use to enhance cooperation and improve the quality of the advice they offer to the New Zealand Government. The review identified the Chief Executive of DPMC as the National Security Advisor (NSA), and the focal point for the coordination of New Zealand’s national security activities. The NSA is authorised to deliver advice on national security matters to central government and lead the whole of government response to security threats.\(^{42}\) The NSA is supported in this role by the Directors of the Security and Risk and Intelligence Coordination Groups. The NSA’s leadership role is further augmented by the New Zealand Government’s issuing of a National Security Statement when circumstances require.

The structure of the New Zealand Government response to security events, in the post 2009 NSS, is based on the assumption that the lead agencies identified, possess the “…expertise, authority and experience…”\(^{43}\) to manage the security risk for which they have been allocated responsibility. The lead agency is expected to resolve routine national security matters, within the capabilities of its department. During more significant events that require multiple agency involvement, ODESC assists the lead agency to facilitate the necessary response to a particular circumstance. The designation of a lead agency establishes clarity around leadership responsibilities during a national security crisis. The concept allows preparation and mitigation to occur before risks are realised, and the allocation of specific responsibilities for management of national security risks. Through the lead agency response model, government

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\(^{39}\) Ibid. p. 12  
\(^{40}\) Ibid. p. 11  
\(^{41}\) Ibid. p. 12  
\(^{42}\) Ibid. p. 12  
\(^{43}\) Ibid. p. 14
agencies and central government develop response architecture for potential contingencies, and practise them prior to an actual event.\textsuperscript{44}

The 2010 review of the New Zealand’s intelligence community identified the need for the country’s intelligence agencies to improve the coordination, evaluation, efficiency and prioritisation of its collection activities. Prior to the 2010 review, New Zealand intelligence agencies worked relatively independent of each other and were not focussed on supporting the country’s national security objectives.\textsuperscript{45} To rectify this, the government established the Intelligence Coordination Group to develop closer relationships between intelligence organisations and the law enforcement agencies such as New Zealand Police and the Customs Service.\textsuperscript{46} The requirement to collect information across a wide spectrum of potential risk areas indicates that the operations of the New Zealand intelligence community are strongly linked to a wide spectrum proposed in the NSS.\textsuperscript{47} This short summary encapsulates the full extent to which the New Zealand intelligence community is discussed in the NSS. This observation is somewhat surprising given the risk management approach proposed in the NSS and the significant role intelligence agencies traditionally play in national security operations.

Demonstrating value for money in government agencies involved in national security operations is difficult due to the sensitive nature of the information being gathered. The dynamic character of national security issues also prevents accurate empirical measurements being used to determine effectiveness of response. The NSS proposes five criteria to evaluate a national security system’s efficiency as a whole. The first attribute is the system’s coherence across all of its elements. The second measure is the level of connectedness between the system’s component parts and with other relevant systems. The third proposed principle is the completeness of the system’s structure. The fourth criterion is the clarity of understanding regarding the total system’s operation. The fifth measure is the consistency of agencies’ procedures and standards of operation.\textsuperscript{48} There is no further elaboration of these criteria within the post review NSS document. This leaves significant room for interpretation as to how each attribute is defined, and what constitutes success. Validation of the NSS extends beyond the internal examination of the system’s efficiency.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 14
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 15
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. p. 15
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. p. 15
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. p. 15
The NSS aims to strike an appropriate balance between maintaining national security and protecting the liberty of New Zealand’s citizens. External oversight is conducted by the Auditor General, Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, the Privacy Commissioner and Ombudsman, through regular reporting and scrutiny of security agencies. These regular examinations seek to reassure the New Zealand public that the appropriate checks and balances on their security agencies are in place, and sufficiently robust. The NSS identifies strengthening New Zealand’s relationships with external partners on security matters as important. The NSS document presents the aim of developing a national security system that optimises the benefits of the long established linkages between New Zealand’s security agencies and their foreign counterparts through a more deliberate and coordinated approach to the management of these relationships. This coordinated approach seeks to realise the benefits of the relationship, not only for the particular agency involved in fostering the relationship, but across the NSS as a whole.

**Conclusion**

The conclusion of the NSS comprises of a total of eight sentences. It briefly summarises the broad concepts discussed in the document however it does not link the summary to the purpose of the document presented during the introduction. In its conclusion, the NSS reiterates the change to a more demanding security environment. It states that the greater complexity, fiscal constraint and demand for transparency, should further involve central government in the management of New Zealand’s national security sphere. The NSS asserts that the New Zealand Government retains its long standing foundation whilst recognising the areas in which the management of security issues can be enhanced. The observations presented in the conclusion are further supported by an examination of the annexes of the NSS.

**Annexes**

Annex A of the NSS outlines New Zealand’s security context. Twenty security themes are presented ranging from those risks that affect the individual citizens such as criminal activity and serious traffic accidents, to larger security issues, like interstate conflict and arms proliferation that threaten global society. These themes portray New Zealand’s security

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49 Ibid. p. 16  
50 Ibid. p. 16  
51 Ibid. p. 16  
52 Ibid. p. 17  
53 Ibid. p. 18
environment as being characterised by the absence of an existential military threat. The significant potential risks to New Zealand’s national security are centred on the vulnerabilities inherent in the nation’s geographic isolation and its volatile natural environment. Other major national security concerns are New Zealand’s heavy reliance on a stable, rules-based international system and its limited ability to support rapid population growth. Annex B consists primarily of two diagrams and their accompanying text. The first diagram, Figure 2: Risks to Security, has been sourced from the Canadian National Security Policy and adapted to New Zealand’s security situation.54 The citation does not clarify which version of the Canadian National Security Policy this diagram was taken from, therefore the extent of modification cannot be ascertained.

![Figure 2: Risks to Security](image)

Figure 2: Risks to Security

Figure 3: Indicative National Risks demonstrates the relative likelihood versus the relative magnitude of consequences for different security risks to New Zealand. The conclusion that interstate conflict and large scale warfare are no longer the central security planning focus for the New Zealand Government is reinforced in the text of Annex B.55 Annex B states that the concept of relative risk has been incorporated into New Zealand’s legislation and practices of the country’s emergency services and civil defence organisations since the mid-1990s. The New Zealand Government intends the NSS to be used as a guiding framework for the transformation of strategic planning and operations in the New Zealand security sector along

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54 Ibid. p. 21
55 Ibid. p. 21
Annex C discusses the ODESC terms of reference. The annex introduces the purpose of the committee which is presented as a bullet point summary of the duties already discussed in the NSS main body text. Membership of the ODESC is not fixed and attendance at its meetings is by invitation of the Chair. Makeup of the committee is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the security matter being attended. The convening of ODESC is only initiated under the authority of its Chair. ODESC can be assembled either on their own initiative, or in direct response to a request from an agency with an appropriate security concern. Usually ODESC meetings are only held when required to resolve a specific issue. Annex D outlines the lead and supporting agencies which have been designated responsibilities for the security risks identified under New Zealand’s national security objectives. The agencies and responsibilities are assigned so that they are consistent with the identified agency’s specialist sector expertise. It is stated in the supporting text that this list is only indicative until detailed consultation is completed and that the lead agency may change as a situation progresses. The

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56 Ibid. p. 21
57 Ibid. p. 23
58 Ibid. p. 25
final annex, Annex E, discusses the groups who are responsible to directly support ODESC functions. These groups are the National Assessments Bureau (NAB), Security and Risk Group (SRG) and Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG). Annex E provides a brief description of the way each group assists ODESC with their national security responsibilities. The NAB’s role is to support the New Zealand Government’s decision-making process through the provision of policy relevant assessments surrounding national interests. The SRG synthesises policy and operations to facilitate New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security issues. The ICG ensures collaboration and governance of the New Zealand Intelligence community. While the NSS document main body and annexes discuss New Zealand’s national security in general terms, it does not explain the challenges of implementing national security policy for the New Zealand Government.

**General**

For assessing the practicality of the NSS, it is crucial to highlight, not only what is included in the NSS document, but also what is not. I offer that the New Zealand Government has four objectives in publishing the NSS document. The first objective is to demonstrate to the New Zealand people that the government understands their security needs and concerns. The second objective is to demonstrate the government’s commitment to develop structures to address these needs. Thirdly, it provides a conceptual framework for constructing a security community in New Zealand that will enable a whole of government response to national security issues. The final objective of the NSS is to establish clear lines of authority within New Zealand’s national security architecture. I propose that this objective is the greatest driver for the New Zealand Government’s production of the NSS. This conclusion is derived from the observation that authority within New Zealand’s national security system is the only clearly defined concept in the NSS document.

As previously mentioned, the NSS does not have any introduction or foreword that clearly articulates how the need for this document arose. No author or authors are identified to allow further investigations of the thought and theories behind the work. The lack of citation and bibliography would suggest that the document is primarily original, yet this cannot be verified independently. The limited referencing, which consists of four footnotes in total, is used only to expand upon the points to which they pertain in the text. The only citation that indicates the origin of a source used is the reference to the Canadian National Security Policy as the

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59 Ibid. p. 27
basis for the Risks to Security diagram in Annex A. Even in this case, the document does not cite which version of the policy was used and what the rationale was for using the Canadian National Security policy to frame New Zealand’s security context, rather than the United Kingdom or Australian models. The absence of these elements raises questions regarding the credibility of the NSS as the guiding framework for the development of doctrine and procedures within New Zealand’s security community. This is of particular significance that one of the most dominant features of the NSS is the notion of authority. In the next chapter, I explore the concept of authority in the context of New Zealand’s Westphalian Lockean model of government.
CHAPTER THREE - WEBER, LOCKE AND DISCOURSE

The legitimacy of the NSS comes from its origins in New Zealand’s democratic system of government. Democratic legitimation asserts that a state's citizens are the highest authority within their territory and views the institutions of state as necessary mechanisms for coordinating the actions of society. The state office holders, as elected representatives of the people, enact policy on behalf of the electorate in pursuit of agreed national interests. Liberal theorist John Locke asserts that direct influence of the state should be minimised to allow constituents the liberty to realise their individually determined interests. In New Zealand's case, its government derives its institutions from the Westphalian model. This model facilitates interaction between states as the central political representative of its people and asserts the equal right to autonomy and independence within its territorial borders. In this chapter I examine the influence of the Westphalian model used by the New Zealand Government and the importance it places on sovereignty within territorial borders. The theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke demonstrate the necessity of sovereign authority within society, and the need for the society's members to cede individual liberty to pursue common interests. The focus of this section is on representative authority and the way the citizens entrust the state institutions to act in a manner consistent with the collective will. This examination links to the next section which introduces Max Weber’s theory on legitimate authority.

Weber’s views on the routinization of charismatic leadership, in particular, charisma of office, demonstrate the way the legitimacy of the political office from which the NSS originated, gives legitimacy to the document itself. I link Weber’s theory to explain how the NSS assumes authority as a product of the state. This chapter argues that the NSS receives its authority not from the legitimacy of empirical validation of its assertions, but from the charisma of the office from which it was issued. Once the chapter develops, an explanation of political authority based on Weber’s theory, it examines the way this authority is reinforced through the use of discourse. The section on discourse introduces the importance of language in creating and defining particular contexts within specific fields. It examines the way dominant political groups can use the control of discursive fields to strengthen their positions of power. This discussion leads into the following chapter which examines the role of discourse in the area of national security, with particular reference to the theory of securitisation and the interactions between the specific actors involved in New Zealand's national security system.
Westphalian Model
The modern state is a deliberately engineered institutional construction. The process of creation may differ between states, but they all originated from a collective desire to bring a state into being. The modern state is not a gift from a god, nor possesses its own spirit; it is the manifestation of the will of its constituents. The creation of New Zealand as a state, was no different with its fusion of British colonial and native Maori communities’ desire for independence. Its path was made easier by the coincidence of this aspiration with Britain's desire for decolonisation. From the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, emerged the beginnings of a new international system, based upon a number of sovereign states who recognise the legitimate existence of each other, and acknowledge no higher authority than their own. This was a transition from societies constructed from multiple sources of power, to societies represented by a single legitimate authority. The preceding system, feudalism, was premised upon a society underpinned by ties of personal fealty. Under feudalism, successful authority was dependent upon the monarch's ability to mobilise resources controlled by multiple lesser power holders. In this model, power was not universally controlled nor applied by the monarch, but dissipated throughout the territory, and often used to further the personal interests of its wielders. Charles Tilly states that feudal rulers were conquerors and tribute takers, not heads of state who regulated life within their realms. He adds that inside their territories, rivals and subordinates frequently used force to serve their own interests, while affording little attention to the interests of the state.

The Westphalian model is characterised by the coexistence of multiple states, each exercising sovereignty over its territory. Theoretically, they are equal to one another, and autonomous

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61 Ibid. p. 95
62 Ibid. p. 95
65 Ibid. p. 9
66 Ibid. p. 34
67 Ibid. p. 34
and independent.\textsuperscript{68} The system operates under international law and a balance of power. In the Westphalian model, law and power operate between states, not above them. Compliance of states within the system is dependent entirely upon the will of each individual state, as they retain absolute decision-making authority within their borders.\textsuperscript{69} Sovereignty over its own territory is essential for the acceptance of a state’s position within the Westphalian system.

Sovereignty has been defined as “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community”\textsuperscript{70} with the provision that no other “final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{71} Both Hobbes and Locke emphasise the importance of sovereignty within a civil society. Hobbes asserts that without the constitution of a sovereign power to rule over them, members of a community will assume a ‘state of nature’. He presents that in this state, individuals will selfishly pursue their own interests in whichever way they see fit, regardless of their effect on other members of the society. Hobbes proposes that to prevent this chaotic environment, members must mutually agree to cede their individual will to a sovereign agent or agency, who will determine and represent the collective will of the group. Hobbes considers this 'social contract' irrevocable and unquestionable, because by creating the sovereign power, the members have authorised all of its actions.\textsuperscript{72} The only limitations he places on the power of the sovereign, are that they cannot command individuals to self-harm, nor deny the necessities of life. He qualifies this by stating that the obligation of the society to obey the sovereign power is only valid as long as the sovereign retains the ability to protect the people. That is, they are able to maintain law and order within the territory of the society and protect the members from external harm. Despite agreeing with Hobbes on the importance of sovereignty, Locke positions the sovereign power not in an agent but in the people of a society.\textsuperscript{73}

Locke asserts the institutions of a state exist to facilitate the rights and liberties of its citizens. He presents the people as the best judge of their own interests therefore the state must be restricted in its scope and practice to provide the greatest possible freedom for its citizens.\textsuperscript{74} Locke asserts individuals are originally in a state of nature which allows them the freedom to

\textsuperscript{68} Poggi, \textit{The development of the modern state : a sociological introduction}. p. 89
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. p. 89
\textsuperscript{70} Pierson, \textit{The modern state / Christopher Pierson}. p. 11
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. p. 11
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. p. 12
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. p. 12
\textsuperscript{74} Gregor McLennan, David Held, and Stuart Hall, \textit{The Idea of the modern state} (Milton Keynes [England]: Open University Press, 1984). p. 41
act and dispose of their possessions as they see fit, without consideration or reference to other individuals. This state of nature is only constrained by the basic principles of morality – individuals should not take their own life, should preserve each other, and not adversely impact another individual’s freedom. Locke proposes that freedom and equality are possible due to an individual’s capacity for rational thought that follows the laws of nature. He states the right to govern one’s affairs and uphold the natural laws is as inherent as the respect for the rights of others. Locke’s ‘state of nature’ is undermined by ‘inconveniences’ that exist within a societal group. Not all individuals respect the rights of others, when individuals are left to enforce the laws of nature, different interpretations cause disagreement over the meaning of law, and loosely organised individuals are vulnerable from external aggression. Locke’s proposed solution for these ‘inconveniences’ is the creation of both an independent society and a political society or government. These bodies accept the concept that authority is bestowed upon government to pursue the interests of the governed, however this authority is contingent upon their maintenance of the people’s approval. This contract does not transfer all of the rights of the citizens to the state. It permits the state to undertake law making and enforcement on behalf of its constituents, as long as its actions preserve their natural rights.

Locke saw the state as an instrument for the protection of life, liberty and material possessions of its people. The state’s very existence was for the protection of an individual’s natural rights and those enshrined in the rule of law. He posits that society is composed of a community of individuals that existed prior to the state, and that the state is a voluntarily established institution that responds to a society’s demands. As a modern state, New Zealand’s ideas of sovereignty lie completely within Locke’s theory of state. Its formation as a state occurred when most western nations had already accepted and refined the Westphalian model. The demographic makeup of indigenous Maori and European settler predisposed the citizens of early New Zealand to adopt a system of government that supported individual liberty and equality. The spectrum of national security presented by New Zealand’s Government in the NSS, is consistent with this pursuit of equity for its citizens and protection from all harm. There are however, inconsistencies between the NSS with Locke’s idea of liberal state based on societal consent. These inconsistencies are seen in the way that New Zealand’s national security interests and objectives are identified and prioritised in this document. The New Zealand Government imposes a national security context and objectives of its own design.
without consultation to the public it serves. Locke’s theory places strong emphasis on the importance of government by consent. He presents that this consent could be revoked if the governing fails to sustain the goodwill of the governed.

Legitimate government requires the consent of its citizens and government can be dissolved if the trust of the people is violated. Universal public consultation about national security was last undertaken in 1986 and led to the production of New Zealand’s first Defence White Paper. The NSS states that it has retained the context developed from 1987 as the foundation for the development of New Zealand’s national security architecture. The security environment and concerns of New Zealand citizens have changed dramatically since 1986, so do conclusions made from this data remain valid? Elected representatives are expected to act, not in pursuit of their personal interests, but consistent with their position as holders of public office. This means that political order within a constitutional state is seen to depend, not upon the capricious ‘rule of men’, but the rational rule of law. Critics of this model, such as Lenin, claim that this is a facade behind which a minority exercise real power through the machinery of the state and its monopoly of violence. To refute this claim, it is necessary that politicians under a law-governed system are subject to the constitutional order and laws that they help make and enforce. Their exercise of state power must be through ways that are legal, constitutional, and constrained by publicly accepted processes.

Authority and Legitimacy

The issues of legitimacy and authority are essential for a state to operate within the Westphalian model. Authority and legitimacy infer that under normal conditions, the actions and demands of the state will be accepted, or at least not actively opposed by its citizens. This idea of a state authority requiring the approval of the masses aligns, with Locke’s concept of ultimate sovereignty remaining with the people. Max Weber’s theories concerning the construction of legitimate authority within a social organisation, follow this Lockean model. Weber identifies that legitimacy of an order or policy, may be articulated in four ways. The first is by tradition, which is a belief that the legitimacy of an object has always existed. The second

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76 Ibid.p. 37
78 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “New Zealand’s National Security System.” p. 14
79 Pierson, The modern state / Christopher Pierson. p. 16
80 Ibid. p. 15
81 Ibid. p. 14
82 Ibid. p. 16
83 Ibid. p. 18
The way is through the alignment of consistent affectual attitudes on behalf of the audience. The third form is in the rational belief in the absolute value of the object. The final means of legitimacy is in the object’s establishment in a manner which is recognised as legal.\textsuperscript{84}

Weber asserts the legitimisation of an object is guaranteed in two ways. The first is by aligning it to the self-interested motives of involved parties. An example of this would be business interest groups lobbying a government for political reforms that enhance their capacity to generate capital. The second way is the antithesis of the first in that it occurs for purely disinterested motives. In this way, factors such as emotionally determined loyalty to an organisation, belief, or the need to conform, override the level of self interest in the issue.\textsuperscript{86} An example of this, is the acceptance of government decision-making, realised through policy and law making, by the electorate. Consistent with these constructions of legitimacy, Weber asserts that there exist three types of legitimate authority: rational, traditional and charismatic.

The first type of authority, rational authority, pertains to the legality of normative patterns of rules and upholds the rights of actors elevated to authority under those rules to issue commands.\textsuperscript{87} These rules are created by agreement, for expediency, or through rationalisation and have a claim to obedience by the members of the society.\textsuperscript{88} This obedience is not owed to an individual as the person issuing the command, but to the legal authority given to the office (institution) occupied by the individual. Rational authority is a representation of the collective will of the people; therefore, in obeying rational authority, the people are simply complying with their own direction.\textsuperscript{89} Under rational authority, obedience to a command is owed only through the acceptance of the impersonal, legally established order, and the scope of authority given to an office.\textsuperscript{90} This form of authority is characterised by the presence of a permanent central political body, which is governed by rules. This central political power is divided into specified fields of competence, each of which directs the implementation of these rules and has the means to carry them out. The hierarchical organisation of government agencies operates under certain technical rules and norms which standardise the operation of

\textsuperscript{86} Weber and Eisenstadt, \textit{Max Weber on charisma and institution building; selected papers}.p. 12
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid}.p. 46
\textsuperscript{88} Weber, \textit{The theory of social and economic organization}.p. 329
\textsuperscript{89} Pierson, \textit{The modern state / Christopher Pierson}. p. 19
\textsuperscript{90} Weber, \textit{The theory of social and economic organization}. p. 328
each office. There must exist a separation of the property of the government from the personal property of the officials who administer it to ensure accountability and transparency of government. Functions of government are ensured through the independent and objective conduct of duties by office holders and all administrative acts, decisions and rules are recorded in writing. Unlike rational authority, in traditional authority, the individual is the personal embodiment of the traditional office.

The second type of legitimate authority identified by Weber, is traditional authority. This concept refers to the acceptance of authority as a ‘natural’ order which has always existed. Individuals exercising traditional authority are designated through the transmission of traditional rules. Their role is not seen as the mechanistic imposition of law, but that of a senior member or mentor within the group. Obedience is owed to the individual who occupies the traditional position of authority, or is selected on a traditional basis, not to established rules and procedures. The commands of traditional authority are legitimised through the traditions surrounding their appointment and the conformity of the individual’s personal decision making within the traditional sphere. Traditions determine the content, purpose and scope of traditional authority. Any attempt to exercise authority outside the traditional boundaries will undermine the individual’s legitimacy and endanger the acceptance of their traditional status. The personal element of traditional authority allows an individual in authority to bestow their pleasure or displeasure, likes and dislikes, arbitrarily, without adherence to formal principles.

Traditional authority is governed primarily through the ethical, judicial or sensible reasoning of the appointed individual and their administrative staff. Administrative staff that support the holder of traditional authority are personally selected based on their familial ties or favoured status with the appointee. Their roles are not defined by a sphere of competence set down by an impersonal rules and procedures, but by the momentary desires of the anointed authority. It is around this point that traditional authority most differs from rational authority. The personal and informal nature of the relationship between the traditional authority and

91 Ibid. p. 330-332
92 Ibid. p. 341
93 Ibid. p. 341
94 Ibid. p. 341
95 Ibid. p. 341
96 Ibid. p. 341
97 Ibid. p. 342
98 Ibid. p. 343
their staff, mean several key elements of a legal authority are absent. In a pure type of traditional authority there is: no clearly defined sphere of competence; no rational order of superiority or inferiority among staff; no regulated system of appointment or promotion; no requirement for specialised technical training to assume a role; and no fixed remuneration by way of a salary.99 The most obvious examples of traditional authority are in legitimacy held through religious authority or the customs and practices of long established orders.

Charismatic authority is the third type of legitimate authority identified by Weber and relies on devotion to a specific sacredness, heroism or character of a charismatic leader.100 It rejects the logic and rationality of legal and traditional authority and rests entirely upon particular characteristics of an individual which sets them apart from ordinary people.101 The possession of exceptional powers or qualities that provide benefit or reassurance to the community in specific circumstances, raise an individual above the normal people. Accordingly, the charismatic individual is regarded as exemplary or divinely gifted. It is through this perception of extraordinary favour that the other group members view the charismatic individual as a leader.102 These abilities may be identified based upon previous success in a related area, or may emerge during situations of collective distress.103 The maintenance of authority by a charismatic leader is directly related to their ability to fulfil their promise to the community and to institutionalise their charisma. Should the leader’s exceptional power fail to meet the needs and expectations of the followers, the individual’s charisma and the authority it brings will disappear. In this respect, charismatic authority is significantly more unstable than the other forms of authority.

This instability raises the importance of establishing an effective means of succession to enable the charisma to endure and its advantages to the community to remain. Through the desire to prolong the vision, or continue to receive the benefits of charisma, both the leader and followers seek to change its transitory nature to something more routine.104 Without routinisation, the charismatic authority tends to dissipate with the disappearance of the leader. The followers, particularly those immediate agents of the leader, are also interested in ensuring the continuation of the ideals and interests of the charismatic authority. Despite its rejection of the rational, a degree of routinisation occurs almost as soon as the leader’s

99 Ibid. p 343
100 Weber and Eisenstadt, Max Weber on charisma and institution building; selected papers. p. 46
101 Ibid. p. 51
102 Ibid. p. 48
103 Ibid. p. 18
104 Ibid.
Charisma is recognised and a following develops. The establishment of a structure of tasks, rules and obligation, followed by codification of group beliefs, are usually the first steps. Once the emergence of structure begins, followers seek to enhance their status or receive reward for performance of activities that contribute to the collective cause. This corporate group, which Weber defines as a social relationship, limits the admission of outsiders, and acts as the administrative organisation and agents of the leader to ensure adherence to their vision. Weber proposes a number of solutions for achieving charismatic succession, one of which may be termed charisma of office.105

Charisma of office

Weber asserts the concept of charisma can be transferred through rituals such as election in modern states from one individual to another.106 Prior to the modern state, charisma was magical and was disassociated from an individual and instilled in the effectiveness of the ritual acts. This view of special abilities as a transferable entity, meant that legitimacy of the charisma was not seen in the person, but in the office they held.107 Weber cites the anointing of religious office holders or the coronation of a monarch as examples of this.108 With the successful performance of a series of specific rituals, previously unremarkable individuals are transformed into possessors of exceptional virtue or wisdom. Aligned to the desire for enduring succession, are the interests of the group in maintaining the benefits they currently receive. Routinisation allows norms of eligibility to be created, and institutionalises a shift from a loose community, into a stable organisation. The longer this organisation exists, the more institutionalised its structure becomes, to the point at which it supersedes the original character of the charismatic authority and assumes charisma of its own.109 Charisma of office is when charisma is no longer associated with the exceptional talents possessed by an individual, but when the individual assumes a position within an organisation that holds its own charisma.110 This is evident in states which have an enduring history of representational government.

There are two main lines of thought within the theory of representative authority. The first is the right to speak and act for the government, which is derived from holding appropriate

105 Ibid. p. 57
106 Ibid. p. 57
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
110 Ibid. p. 71
office. The second is the right to represent the electorate, which comes through election by the citizens of a territory.\footnote{April Carter, \textit{Authority and democracy} (London Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1979). p. 29} It is the elected aspect of representation that I focus on in this section in order to explain the concept of delegated authority. Delegation is accepted as authorization by the consent of the delegator being apportioned to the delegated. With this authorization, the delegated is permitted to initiate action on behalf of the group they represent, until such time as the delegation is removed. Hobbes proposes that through the idea of delegated authority, any action initiated by state leadership has been authorized by the citizens through their original acceptance of governance.\footnote{Ibid. p. 31} This concept, however, is the foundation of the Locke’s theory on social contract between the elected representatives and electoral body, in which the agent’s authority to act in the name of the electorate is limited and revocable.\footnote{Ibid.} This point of difference in the theories of Hobbes and Locke, is the variation between delegation and representation. A delegate may have political authority, but not the right to make decisions, issue commands, or demand the respect of the people. Political authority in constitutional and representational governments therefore relies more heavily on the voluntary consent of the citizens.\footnote{Ibid. p. 32}

Not only does authority in these types of government come from the concept of representation, but also from limitations on the government’s power by state institutions, and the political freedom of the populace.\footnote{Ibid. p. 32} These factors legitimize the public freedom of a state’s citizens to openly criticise their government’s decisions, and initiate action to change the territory’s laws and policies. The opportunity to vote allows the citizens of representative governments to demonstrate their acceptance of the current government’s actions, or to transfer authority to another agent. In this way, the electorate are not expected to display unconditional or unquestioning obedience to the incumbent political authority.\footnote{Ibid.} Voluntary consent does not imply belief in every individual piece of legislation or decision enacted by a government, only in the consistency of these decisions with accepted values, and the limits of government power to make decisions for the citizens. This second point infers a commitment from the citizens of a state to accept the majority of government decisions in most circumstances, even if doubts exist. Respect for political office and an understanding of expected compliance is important in enabling political authority.
The respect for political office and the authority held by it, are not sufficient to gain voluntary compliance by the electorate. A belief in an individual’s competence to fill the role of a political representative is a significant factor in achieving acceptance as a political authority. This suggests that even in law-governed societies, an individual’s persuasiveness and charisma play significant roles in determining suitability for political office. Even the electoral processes that are used to determine the office holders of government in a democratic society, are a competition between candidates over which individual is the most competent to fulfil a specific role.\(^{117}\) April Carter presents two reasons for why politicians are bestowed with special status as members of a society. The first explanation is through traditional deference to rulers, carried over from historical class based systems. The second motive is the individual’s professional expertise in the field of politics.\(^{118}\) In modern democracies, it is the professional model of political authority that is most common. This model can be viewed through two contexts: recognition of individual professionalism by other politicians; and the estimation of professional ability by the layman.\(^{119}\) The second context emphasises the disparity between the politically educated professional and the politically aware public.

In modern democracies, the citizens are obliged to elect these political professionals as their representatives and entrust the governance of the state to them.\(^ {120}\) The trust by the electorate is based on the rationale that the nature of political authority, realised in representative government, exists to promote the common good of the collective group.\(^ {121}\) The idea of authority being entrusted to individuals or offices to act on behalf of the common good, is reinforced by the public rituals recognised by the electorate to invest political authority upon their selected representatives. In New Zealand, this is visibly demonstrated by the rituals surrounding the operation of its Parliament and the honorific titles given to members of the Government. These actions establish a mystique and reverence surrounding the duties of exercising political authority. It permits the individual occupying the portfolio of a particular field to be viewed as an authority within that field for as long as they hold office. This is reflected in the NSS in the decision-making powers afforded to the DESC and NSA.

\(^{117}\) Ibid. p. 33  
\(^{118}\) Ibid. p. 34  
\(^{119}\) Ibid. p. 36  
\(^{120}\) Ibid. p. 37  
\(^{121}\) Ibid. p. 39
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s concept of general will presents the conditions required for political authority to exist.\footnote{Ibid. p. 39} The first condition he asserts, is that the organisation that portrays an expression of general will engenders the respect and voluntary compliance of the masses. Rousseau’s second point is that general will must be directed towards the common interests of the political community being served. The final condition presented by Rousseau is that any decision-making by a political authority must be as closely aligned to the community’s understanding of ‘the right decision’ as possible.\footnote{Ibid. p. 39} To reinforce the people’s rationalisation of a political authority’s pursuit of the common good, governments actively inform their citizens of actions taken in the interests of the state in the public domain. A component of developing this awareness is the articulation of threats and risks through the use of discourse.

**Discourse**

For the purpose of this discussion, I follow Michel Foucault’s definition of a discourse as a series of statements that occur at a particular time and create an effect within a social or cultural field.\footnote{Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb, *Understanding Foucault / Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato and Jen Webb* (London : SAGE, 2000, 2000), Non-fiction. p. 34} Discourse is used by institutions to legitimise their interests by transforming the social context in which they exist.\footnote{Andrea Mayr, *Language and power : an introduction to institutional discourse / Andrea Mayr*, Advances in sociolinguistics (London ; New York : Continuum, c2008, 2008), Bibliographies Non-fiction. p. 2} Foucault asserts that language is one of the most important forces that shape our experiences.\footnote{Ibid. p. 31} He states that discourse may be understood as "language in action". It is an explanation which shapes our understanding of self and our capacity to determine value, truth and right from wrong.\footnote{Ibid.p. 31} The thoughts we have, and actions we take, are influenced and regulated by the different discourses to which we are exposed. Foucault identifies discourse as the way through which relationships of power, knowledge and truth are shaped and experienced between actors in a particular context. Through this complex network, a concept is communicated and understood between actors.\footnote{Ibid. p. 32} Specific discourses that occur between actors and their experiences within a particular space are identified as separate social and cultural fields.\footnote{Ibid. p. 33} Fields such as education, politics, science and sport are understood as sectors within a society, and are used in particular ways by their members to establish unique rules and procedures, roles and positions, regulations for
behaviour, and hierarchies.\textsuperscript{130} An example is a political system which, sets procedures for conducting sessions of its Legislative Branch, distinguishes between the roles of politician and official, identifies certain types of behaviour as inappropriate, and adopts a hierarchical structure that provides greater authority to some offices over others.\textsuperscript{131}

Fields use discourse, not only to influence external audiences, but also to convey expectations to those within the field, that is, to speak about itself to itself.\textsuperscript{132} This suggests that discourse is the principal means through which fields or institutions develop the social framework that defines them.\textsuperscript{133} In this way, understanding of sectors and institutions are constructed and reconstructed through the use of discourse. This does not assert that discourse is obediently followed as dogma, but that it provides the basis for actor’s comprehension of a situation which, in turn, influences the actions they put into practice.\textsuperscript{134} Foucault suggests that discourse is a routine element in the struggle between ideologically opposed groups to create an understanding of a situation that best serves their own interests.\textsuperscript{135} I introduce Foucault’s theories on discourse to demonstrate how the dominance of a discursive field allows actors to construct, not only the context, but also the perception of other actors in the same field. This ability to influence, introduced by Foucault, is taken forward by Jürgen Habermas from ‘language in action’ to the deliberate use of language to manipulate behaviour. Habermas argues that specialist fields of discourse are the ‘strategic’ use of language, which aim to orient specific ideas towards success and persuade the audience to take certain actions.\textsuperscript{136} This is a functionalist paradigm of ‘language in use’ which interprets discourse from its social aspect.

The functionalist paradigm focuses not on the structural properties of a discourse, but the purpose and function of what the language used is trying to achieve. According to this theory, language is used to mean and do something that is linked to the context within which it is used.\textsuperscript{137} In this way, dominant groups use discourse to create and affirm their position of dominance.\textsuperscript{138} This is evidenced by the rise of particular institutional discourses in the ‘New

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. p. 33
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. p. 33
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. p. 33
\textsuperscript{133} Mayr, Language and power : an introduction to institutional discourse / Andrea Mayr. p. 5
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. p. 5
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. p. 5
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. p. 7
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. p. 3
The use of ‘enterprise’ discourse promotes an economic model as the most effective manner for undertaking all activities within a wider free market economic culture. This discourse is inclusive of previously non-economic public services. Enterprise discourse creates the perception of users of public services as 'consumers' and sees public institutions being managed like commercial operations. The ability of discourse to use language as a significant tool in exerting influence stems from its tendency to generate knowledge about the world and how individuals act within it. To achieve this, discourse brings into existence the context it claims to be describing. By discourse, Foucault means a group of statements which provide a language for talking about, therefore representing the knowledge on a particular topic within a particular context.

Foucault argues that discourse constructs the topic. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully discussed and influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others. Foucault presents important theoretical concepts for understanding institutions as sites of discursive power. He does not limit discourse to textual discourse, but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. The field of politics creates processes for conducting legislative sessions; it differentiates between roles of politician and bureaucrat, determines behaviours and language that are appropriate within the field, and establishes a hierarchy of positions that give greater authority to some offices. During their construction, the structures and authorizations developed through discourse of specific fields develop a prestige or power of their own within the field. This means that when an individual assumes a particular role within a field their identity and behaviour are shaped and governed by the processes of that field. It also means the individual receives the esteem and authority of the office they hold for the duration of their tenure. This idea links clearly with Weber's theory of the charisma of office discussed earlier. This is most commonly demonstrated in the political institutions of representational governments where members of the electorate are endowed with special reverence as soon as they are elected to political office. Office holders use discursive fields to reinforce this

139 ‘New Capitalism’ is defined as the latest iteration of radical restructurings with which capitalism has retained its continued utility. These transformations have affected not only the economy but also the political and social spheres. Ibid. p. 3
140 Ibid. p. 3
141 Ibid. p. 3
142 Ibid. p. 3
143 Danaher, Schirato, and Webb, Understanding Foucault / Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato and Jen Webb. p. 33
144 Ibid. p. 33
145 Ibid. p. 33
veneration by constructing political contexts that promote them as the most competent individuals to further the common good.

In democratic states, political discourse is used to legitimise the exercise of political power. It justifies the existence and actions of a government institution while delegitimizing opposing groups.146 Steven Lukes proposes that if institutions can shape the values of people, they may be able to make them act contrary to their best interests. He sees that the capacity of power to exercise ideological coercion is realised through discourse.147 This is affirmed by Louis Althusser’s assertion that ‘ideological state apparatuses’ play a significant role in influencing or changing political relations.148 An example of this is the projection of citizens as consumers within capitalist societies, through the language of public service agencies.149 For example, in the consumerism discourse, there is a greater emphasis of personal responsibility for their quality of life (health, education, security...) through effective personal choice. The acceptance of the role of personal choice by the citizens enables the ideology of consumerism to construct social practices as individual, rather than public, or systemic concerns.150 This acceptance is premised on the citizen’s rationalisation of the sources of the discourse as being expert in this particular field.

As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, the view of political authority as ‘experts’ in the areas they are elected to govern, is dependent upon the ‘charisma’ of the office they hold, rather than the expertise they bring as individuals. In order to maintain and reinforce the confidence of the citizens, a state’s government will use discourse to persuade the people of their effective pursuit of the common good. The central role of language in exercising ideological influence emphasises a more persuasive use of power by dominant political groups. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony identifies that dominant groups within a society can create a stronger position for themselves by persuading the cultural formations within society such as the media, education system, courts or religious organisations, to accept the values and decisions they present through ideological means.151 Voluntary acceptance of the dominant group ideology is achieved through its presentation as universally beneficial and supporting the common good. This process is developed by agents who generate a political

146 Mayr, Language and power: an introduction to institutional discourse / Andrea Mayr. p. 12
147 Ibid. p. 13
148 Ibid. p. 13
149 Ibid. p. 13
150 Ibid. p. 13
151 Ibid. p. 13
discourse in which their claims of public good appear natural. The acceptance, or consent of an ideology, is not permanent and must be continually maintained by reproduction of the discourse. In such political contexts, state’s agents use discourse to construct an understanding among citizens that reinforces supporting values and ideas for their decisions and actions. The most tangible representation of a specialist field or organisation that frequently utilises language to achieve influence and consent, are a state’s institutions of government.

This chapter has introduced the theories and principles that underpin New Zealand’s system of government, and influenced the construction of the NSS. It has created a theoretical framework for how New Zealand’s political authority addresses the collective national security concerns of its citizens. The discussion of the Westphalian model emphasised the importance of sovereignty in the modern state. This was then linked to Locke’s concept of a state’s highest authority being held with its people as this best links with New Zealand’s system of government. Locke’s ideas were reinforced through Weber’s theories of legitimate authority and, in particular, charisma of office. Weber contends that the ritual ordination of elected representatives into political office transfers the reverence afforded to that office to the individual occupying it. This prestige is then reinforced through the use of language in particular discursive fields to allow political office holders to be accepted as competent decision makers within their appointed sector. The next chapter I use the theory of securitization for the basis of its analysis of the discourse of the NSS. It introduces New Zealand’s institutions of government and examines the current New Zealand Government’s role in the development of the NSS. The key actors involved in New Zealand’s national security system are introduced before a discussion of the intended audiences of the document and how discourse is used within the NSS to establish confidence in the system. The following chapter identifies the difference between the theories on which the NSS was based and the actions of the parties involved within New Zealand’s national security system.

152 Ibid. p. 14
CHAPTER FOUR - SECURITIZATION, INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND ACTORS

The previous chapter presented that discursive fields are constructed and controlled by dominant political groups to strengthen their positions of power. This assertion was supported by Habermas’ ideas on the strategic use of language by actors to orient an audience towards specific issues in order to persuade them to take certain actions. This chapter examines the actors that interact within the discourse relating to New Zealand’s national security system. I use the theory of securitisation in order to demonstrate the ways in which government agents use language to place greater importance on particular issues by linking them to the field of security. The concept of securitising agents explains how securitisation of an issue occurs. This is supported by a discussion of the use of security discourse to strengthen an agents’ power or enhance their charisma within the security sector.

The security discourse, initiated by the New Zealand Government through the construction of the NSS, is then examined to determine what the state seeks to achieve through the document’s creation. This study explains how the NSS has expanded New Zealand’s traditional approach to national security and how the system presents the Prime Minister and the DPMC as the principal actors in New Zealand’s national security discourse. The section on New Zealand’s institutions of government demonstrates how political authority in that country is determined and legitimised by its citizens. The discussion of government institutions provides the theoretical foundation for how the NSS was constructed and reveals the document’s position relative to other national policy. An examination of New Zealand’s legislative and executive branches identifies their respective roles in establishing, prioritising and leading national security operations. This section focuses on central government as the lead agency for security issues of greater magnitude, complexity and duration. It also asserts that central government also is responsible for the identification of security risks, prioritisation of national security issues, and the provision of direction to security agencies at lower levels.

The next section of this chapter examines the current New Zealand Government. It describes the New Zealand National Party under the leadership of John Key. An examination of their tenure identifies major decisions they have made and significant crises that have occurred during this time. This examination is followed by a similar analysis of New Zealand’s DPMC. Particular focus in this section will be in the National Security Advisor's (NSA) responsibilities and the department’s role in leading the ODESC system. The section concludes by discussing the position of DPMC as the main actor of securitisation within New Zealand. I assert that the
establishment of a national security discourse in the NSS legitimises the DPMC’s position as the ultimate authority on national security matters. I affirm that the NSS centralises power in the DPMC over other government departments, and empowers the NSA as chief decision maker within New Zealand’s national security system.

The second part of the chapter examines the intended audience of the NSS. Locke’s theory of government is used to compare the influence the NSS exerts on New Zealand’s civil society. The analysis focuses on national security, in particular, the areas of interest to the New Zealand public. The first element discussed is the concept of liberty. This is particularly relevant given the recent extension of government surveillance powers in New Zealand. It examines the balance sought between preserving the freedom and privacy of individuals and gathering information to ensure collective security. This discussion leads into chapter four which synthesises the research presented in previous chapters to identify the discrepancies between the political theories that New Zealand subscribes to and the exercise of political authority by its office holders within the NSS.

**Securitization**

Security beliefs occupy a central part in a society’s ethos. Daniel Bar-Tal presents that a society's security beliefs are constructed through its member’s perceptions of military, political, economic and cultural experiences. Serious or prolonged threats to various aspects of a society’s member’s life or wellbeing create a situation of insecurity. These collective experiences of insecurity lead to the construction of security beliefs related to the likelihood of threats and the society’s ability to deal with them. The greater the perception of the threat, the more prominence the security beliefs hold within the society. Bar-Tal places security within a social psychological framework which identifies it as a set of beliefs and feelings that are inherent in human nature. This theory differs from the traditional security theories which illustrate security in terms of military capabilities, alliances and deterrence. The social psychological approach asserts that security is based on human needs and the mental

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154 Ibid. p. 90
155 Ibid. p. 87
156 Ibid. p. 87
157 Ibid. p. 87
158 Ibid. p. 88
159 Ibid. p. 88
processes individuals use to make sense of their situation. In this approach, security (or insecurity) is understood through the fears that members of a society possess with respect to threats to their way of life, surroundings, values, identity or status. In a society such as New Zealand’s, which is bereft of an existential military threat to its state sovereignty, the social psychological perspective has the most rational appeal. The all risks and hazards approach identified in the NSS is consistent with this premise. Security beliefs allow a society's members to validate their need for protection, surety and survival. Individuals will endeavour to use any means available in the pursuit of security. This suggests the achievement of a state of security is a society's most important objective. The desire to realise a 'state of security' causes a society's members to define the conditions that are representative of such a 'state'. Security beliefs are, not only key mechanisms for expressing the need for member sacrifice in achieving collective safety, but also in mobilising the society against perceived threats.

The term security has strong emotional appeal and is rhetorically powerful. The use of security as a tool for state influence falls into the theory of securitization. The theory of securitization originated from the Copenhagen school of security studies. Securitization states that any issue can be located on a spectrum of government interest ranging from non-politicized (government does not want to deal with it therefore it is not introduced for public debate) through politicized (issue is part of public policy and addressed under routine government process) to securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat and justifies the use of emergency measures and actions outside normal political procedure). Securitization is initiated when an agent uses the rhetoric of an existential threat to promote an issue's significance above the conditions of normal politics. This initial articulation is called the securitizing move but does not guarantee the issue's securitization. An issue is not securitized until it is accepted as a genuine security concern by the securitizing agent's intended audience. In such a case, an audience's acceptance of an issue as a valid security issue may occur through either persuasion or coercion. Securitization does not require the manifestation of an actual threat, only the construction of a shared understanding between the securitizing agent and

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160 Ibid. p. 88
161 Ibid. p. 88
162 Ibid. p.89
163 Ibid. p. 89
164 Ibid. p. 89
166 Ibid.p. 24
their audience, over what is considered to be an existential threat. Thus, security issues do not gain importance through the existence of a genuine security threat, but because the perception of a threat has been created by discourse, in the mind of the audience.

Once an issue has been securitised, the population’s sensitivity to its presence legitimises the breaking of the rules governing societal interaction under normative conditions. Democratic governance requires the reasons for the labelling of a situation as a security issue to be argued in the public domain, in order to legitimise the extreme measures taken to address it. By politicizing issues, states aim to avoid this examination through the appearance that security matters are transparent and seek to preserve collective interests. This idea differs from other types of social issues that cannot be altered (natural laws) or should not be placed under political control (private sector) and are considered part of the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens. By controlling the security discourse, political authority limits the scrutiny of its action and is able to circumvent the usual liberal democratic processes. This highlights the danger of the state’s use of securitization in that it becomes a technique for legitimising political decisions. The emotional investment of a state’s citizens in the goal of attaining national security allows the government near carte blanche powers to ensure security is achieved. As national security is presented as a politically neutral necessity, and is universally desirable among members of society, it is difficult to oppose. Actors realise the political capital inherent in a discussion of national security means that any policy pursued under the umbrella of a recognised security threat is difficult to contest. Invoking the name of security for political issues and public policy, has a tendency to relegate other more routine concerns and legitimise emergency mandates that increase the power of the securitizing agent. Where competing interests exist, routine matters are sacrificed for the more pressing claims of attaining security. A consequence of securitisation is the creation of threats among the people which can stimulate insecurity, and strengthen the power of those in dominant political positions.

Given the political benefit to be gained from security discourse it may be proposed that, even if the attainment of universal security were possible, it is not actually being sought by

\[\text{167 Ibid. p. 26} \]
\[\text{168 Lucia Zedner, Security / Lucia Zedner, Key ideas in criminology (London ; New York : Routledge, 2009, 2009), Bibliographies Non-fiction. p. 45} \]
\[\text{169 Ibid. p. 45} \]
politicians. Although it is difficult to suggest that policy makers are deliberately exploiting fear in order to further their political ends, the influence associated with security would definitely be within their scope of awareness.\textsuperscript{170} The challenge for securitizing agents is that if security is expanded to encompass all areas necessary for human existence, it becomes a study of everything and nothing.\textsuperscript{171} This assertion can be extrapolated to the concept of national security that promises to respond to the needs of every citizen against all potential risks and hazards, however lacks the capacity to effectively address them. This then becomes \textit{symbolic security} or \textit{security theatre} where measures are introduced in the name of security, however they exist, primarily to allay the fears of the populace.\textsuperscript{172}

Measures at global airports in response to the 9/11 attacks, and the United Kingdom Defence Force deployment of armoured vehicles against a handheld anti air missile threat to Heathrow airport, are extreme examples of this. More common symbols are neighbourhood watch schemes, security marking systems for personal items, and community safety programmes, none of which have been proven to have any direct impact on reducing risks but are reassuring to the public that their concerns are being taken seriously.\textsuperscript{173} The power of the security discourse resides in the promises made by political actors to address all threats and hazards to individual and community safety.\textsuperscript{174} The naming of an issue as an existential threat, is recognised under securitization theory as a speech act.\textsuperscript{175} This means that in naming a certain situation a security problem, the government can claim special rights, which have been determined by the state and its elites.\textsuperscript{176} A successful speech act must be communicated appropriately using commonly understood security language and create a situation that includes an existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible resolution. The status of the securitizing actor is central in this matrix. An individual must hold a position of authority although not necessarily official authority.

Political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and interest groups are common securitizing agents. The NSS states that routine security concerns are raised by citizens through

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. p. 20 \\
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. p. 45 \\
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. p. 22 \\
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. p. 22 \\
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. p. 22 \\
\textsuperscript{175} Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, \textit{Security : a new framework for analysis} / Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde.p. 26 \\
\textsuperscript{176} Waever, \textit{Securitization and Desecuritization}, p. 46-86
\end{flushright}
the appropriate government departments to be resolved by the Ministers and officials responsible for the relevant sector. For threats, risks or circumstances of exceptional magnitude or complexity, the responsibility for identification and declaration of a security issue lies with the New Zealand Government’s executive branch and its supporting officials. New Zealand’s institutions of government play an important role in leading its response to national security. These institutions help identify the key office holders who exercise the greatest influence on the NSS.

New Zealand's Institutions of Government
Hermann Heller describes the function of the state as the autonomous coordination and initiation of the social processes within a given territory. He argues that the state is ideally formed through the achievement of an agreement between the differing interests existing within the same territory. This agreement is materialised through the reference to common needs or interests by the different parties. These common, or state interests are dynamic, and are susceptible to influence by changes in internal and external demographics, as well as economic, military and political factors. The modern state was created to be the "single decision centre" which undertakes all social activities, at the societal level, that require the "authoritative allocation of value". This assertion is supported by the concept that no individual or organisation can engage in the activity of rule except as an agent or delegate of the state. Even when this authority is bestowed upon individuals or organisations, the state determines their scope of action in accordance with its rules.

New Zealand operates with a Westminster model of government. This system is characterised by concentration of political power in a collective and responsible cabinet, the accountability of government ministers to Parliament, a constitutional bureaucracy with a nonpartisan expert civil service, an opposition party acting as a recognised executive in waiting, and parliamentary sovereignty with a unity of executive and legislative branches. Charles-Louis Montesquieu theorized the categorization of state power into legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government which undertake law-making, law administration and law interpretation.

178 Ibid. p. 88
179 Ibid. p. 92
180 Ibid. p. 92
respectively within liberal democracies. In New Zealand, the Montesquieu model is exercised in the form of a parliament as the legislature, ministers and public servants as the executive, and the courts as the judiciary system.

The balance of power within New Zealand Government structures lies with the Cabinet. Despite New Zealand’s position as a constitutional monarchy, neither the Queen nor her representative exert real power within the executive branch. The Governor General always acts on the advice of cabinet ministers whose legitimacy comes from the legislature.\(^{182}\) The separation of power in the New Zealand system is blurred by the necessity for members of the executive council to be Members of Parliament. This requirement allows the Prime Minister and their senior party members to exert significant influence over Parliament and the legislative process. As long as the support of their caucus is maintained, which is generally assured through the party disciplinary system, Cabinet can dominate Parliament and the legislative process.\(^{183}\) This is inconsistent with Locke’s idea of limiting the state’s power in order to maximise the individual liberty of its citizens or Montesquieu’s premise that branches of government should not be dependent upon each other. New Zealand is, thus, a prime ministerial type of government in which the Prime Minister provides the link between the executive and legislative branches of the state.\(^{184}\) Despite political power lying firmly within the office of the Prime Minister, the government must maintain the confidence of the House of Representatives to continue to govern and retain the consent of its citizens. Accountability of the state to its citizens is demonstrated in New Zealand’s system of responsible government.

The principle of responsible government makes the executive branch accountable to the House of Representatives and consequently to the people.\(^{185}\) Parliament limits the executive branch’s activities by retaining approval for any proposal to: levy a tax, raise or receive a loan, or spend public finances.\(^{186}\) Further limitations to the government’s power take place in the Parliamentary chamber during question time, where ministers answer oral questions from Members of Parliament (MPs), and through Parliamentary debates on proposed legislation.\(^{187}\) Additionally, select committees examine proposed spending of government departments, review state sector agencies previous year’s financial performance, and initiate

\(^{182}\) Ibid. p. 41
\(^{183}\) Ibid. p. 48
\(^{184}\) Ibid. p. 85
\(^{185}\) Ibid. p. 60
\(^{186}\) Ibid. p. 60
\(^{187}\) Ibid. p. 60
inquiries into the policy, administration and expenditure of government agencies.\(^{188}\) The granting of supply is the primary way that Parliament enforces the accountability of the executive branch to the examinations discussed above. Supply in this context is defined as possessing the financial authority needed to govern.\(^{189}\) To exercise the executive function of the New Zealand Government, a party or parties must command the confidence of Parliament and hold the support of a majority of MPs.\(^{190}\) This means the ruling party must not be defeated on confidence votes or legislation granting supply.\(^{191}\)

The majority party or parties must draw its Cabinet from the House of Representatives and is responsible for its actions to the same organisation. New Zealand’s executive branch is a parliamentary bureaucracy and is established after the completion of parliamentary elections. Under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system used by New Zealand, the House of Representatives play a greater role in determining who will govern, than under the First Past the Post system used previously.\(^ {192}\) Under MMP, it is unusual for a single party to gain an election night majority.\(^ {193}\) Coalition, or minority governments are formed during post-election negotiations between political parties with representation in the House.\(^ {194}\) Once a government has been formed, the Prime Minister, usually the leader of the dominant political party, selects senior ministers to form the executive branch, Cabinet.

**Prime Minister**

The Prime Minister is the main actor within the New Zealand Cabinet.\(^ {195}\) The Prime Minister allocates portfolio responsibilities to ministers, controls the agenda of Cabinet meetings, establishes the organisational and administrative rules for the operation of Cabinet, and determines the strategic direction of the government.\(^ {196}\) Despite this power, the role and authority of the Prime Minister is established primarily in convention and is not formally

\(^{188}\) Ibid. p. 61

\(^{189}\) Shaw and Eichbaum, *Public policy in New Zealand: institutions, processes and outcomes* / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 60

\(^{190}\) Shaw and Eichbaum, *Public policy in New Zealand: institutions, processes and outcomes* / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 60

\(^{191}\) Ibid. p. 60

\(^{192}\) Ibid. p. 60

\(^{193}\) Ibid. p. 60

\(^{194}\) Ibid. p. 60

\(^{195}\) Ibid. p. 83

\(^{196}\) Ibid. p. 83
ratified within New Zealand’s constitution.\textsuperscript{197} This structure does not conform to Weber’s concept of legal authority discussed earlier, but is an expression of the charismatic authority afforded to the office of Prime Minister through its institutionalisation within New Zealand’s political system. Reverence is transferred to the occupier of the appointment of Prime Minister and they are perceived by other members of government, and New Zealand’s public, to possess a greater ability to make decisions, over a number of fields, towards improving the collective good. For the New Zealand Prime Minister, this ‘charisma of office’, reinforced by their position as chair of the DES, and Minister responsible for the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB),\textsuperscript{198} affirms them as a ‘securitising agent’ in the national security discourse. The acceptance of this individual’s ability to construct security discourse only remains as long as they hold the office of Prime Minister.

John Key is New Zealand’s current Prime Minister. He assumed this appointment when he led the National Party to victory in the 2008 New Zealand General Election. A Helen Clark led Labour Party Government had dominated New Zealand politics for the preceding nine years. Clark’s style of leadership developed a New Zealand political context that revolved around, and was dependent upon, her personal leadership skills.\textsuperscript{199} In this environment, success in New Zealand politics came down to the ability of an individual to control, or at least manage actors and events.\textsuperscript{200} In two previous elections, New Zealand’s voters preferred Clark to both Bill English and Don Brash respectively. Logically, Labour maintained its successful campaign strategy in 2008, when the proven Clark was opposed by the inexperienced John Key.\textsuperscript{201} In keeping the same campaign approach, Labour failed to appreciate significant differences in the circumstances surrounding the 2008 election. Helen Clark’s ability to influence New Zealand’s political agenda during her tenure of government, had given her an advantage over her political opponents.\textsuperscript{202} By 2008 however, Clark’s dominant leadership style and self-assuredness, was perceived by the New Zealand public as arrogant and authoritarian.\textsuperscript{203}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid. p. 83
\textsuperscript{198} Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "Ministerial List," Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/ministers/ministerial-list.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid. p. 25
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid. p. 26
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. p. 26
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. p. 26
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2008 election was likely to be a reflection of the New Zealand electorate's belief of whether three more years of Helen Clark's leadership was in their best interests. The modern political campaign is based heavily around the party leader.\textsuperscript{204} In the majority of elections it is the party leader who the public entrust with their vote.\textsuperscript{205} In New Zealand's 2008 General Election, both major political parties structured their campaigns in this way. For the Labour Party, it was a continuance of the strategy that had successfully won three previous campaigns, however they failed to account for the organisational changes of the National Party to become more effective in a MMP electoral campaign, and they underestimated the appeal of John Key to the New Zealand public.

As party leader, John Key set the tone of National's 2008 election campaign. He embodied the values and attitude that the party wanted to convey to the New Zealand electorate, and was very much the personification of the National Party brand.\textsuperscript{206} National campaigned offensively from the outset, and sought to construct the election into a head to head contest between Helen Clark and John Key. National suggested one on one debates between Clark and Key, rather than the usual format that included all party leaders.\textsuperscript{207} The freshness of Key was pushed by the National Party and contrasted with Clark's enduring presence.\textsuperscript{208} Key's relative inexperience in the political domain was balanced by the choice of Bill English as his deputy, whose experience was a counterpoint to Clark's background in public service.\textsuperscript{209} Key's recent entry to politics had its appeal. He had never served in a National Government and, therefore, had no association with past decisions.\textsuperscript{210} The main point of difference between John Key and Helen Clark, did not come down to either competence or judgement, but their ability to interact with the voting public.\textsuperscript{211} Whilst both leaders utilised the same tools to display their connectedness with the voters, John Key was more strategic in his application.\textsuperscript{212}

Key used his life story to develop a rapport with New Zealand voters very early in his political career. His narrative of the kid from a state welfare-funded house who became a millionaire,
was a dream to which ordinary New Zealanders could relate. Key's background is impressive. He succeeded professionally in investment banking at Merrill Lynch. He worked for the company in Singapore, London and Sydney, and also served as a member of the Foreign Exchange Committee of the United States Federal Reserve Bank in New York. Key was perceived as a candidate with a proven record of professional success, free from the burden of previous party failure and with "political views sufficiently flexible to avoid caricature." The sharing of his story made Key more real and intimate to the people, and meant that by the time of the election, New Zealand voters had a perception of him as a "possessor of personal experience with an understanding of economic and financial matters." This perception became particularly relevant to New Zealand's 2008 election as the global financial crisis significantly changed the economic landscape during the campaign.

National determined that economic policy and law and order were the two policy issues of greatest concern to the New Zealand voting public. This conclusion may be validated by the fact that following John Key's appointment as party leader, National surpassed Labour in public opinion polls. Although initially close, within six months National had established a large gap, and Key had overtaken Clark as preferred Prime Minister. TV3 polls indicated that from May 2007 onwards, more voters believed that John Key understood the economic problems facing New Zealand better than Helen Clark. National achieved a significant victory in the 2008 election. It secured 44.9% of the party vote and increased its electorate MPs by ten. From this dominant position, National quickly formed a coalition government with the Maori, Act and United Future parties. Where the desire for change by New Zealand’s voting public may have contributed to the National Party’s 2008 election win, this was not the case in New Zealand’s 2011 general election.

Between the 2008 and 2011 general elections, New Zealand’s political environment could be characterised as lacking any credible opposition to the incumbent government. In this benign
atmosphere, public support for Prime Minister John Key and his government increased.\textsuperscript{222} During the 2008-2011 periods, the New Zealand Government performance was more managerial than visionary.\textsuperscript{223} Many of the government’s policy moves were a continuation of the previous administration under Helen Clark. This strategy gave some continuity to the electorate and allowed the National Party a smooth transition into power. The Key Government was most active in financial sector reform and received some criticism surrounding controversial policies such as the sale of state assets. However, this criticism was mitigated somewhat by the public’s confidence in the Prime Minister’s proven abilities in this area as a successful businessman. For New Zealand, the impact of the global financial crisis was muted, and public expectations of the Key Government’s efforts to protect them were met.

John Key led New Zealand in the same way as he led the 2008 election campaign. He remained the central image of the government, and maintained a high level of visibility both domestically and internationally. The Prime Minister grasped any opportunity to promote the New Zealand brand, including a heavily publicized appearance on The Tonight Show in the United States, and a round of golf with President Barak Obama. John Key appeared to take a personal interest in issues that concerned the New Zealand public. He continued to cultivate his ‘down to earth’ image by being seen at events mixing with New Zealanders from avenues of society such as the Big Gay Out and Auckland’s Polyfest. As well as the global financial crisis, a series of unexpected events occurred during the 2008 to 2011 period. A mine explosion at Pike River in 2010, two major earthquakes in Christchurch less than six months apart, and the grounding of the container ship \textit{Rena} that threatened environmental disaster, all required central government involvement in response. Also during 2011, New Zealand hosted the Rugby World Cup which also demanded national security coordination. Despite this series of significant events, the New Zealand Government’s popularity remained consistently strong.\textsuperscript{224} John Key’s personal appeal remained high; he retained a significant advantage in the preferred Prime Minister polls, despite criticism of central government leadership during the national security responses.\textsuperscript{225} These indications of public support, affirmed to the Key Government that

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid. p. 37
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid. p. 121
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid. p. 120
the electorate endorsed their leadership. It was from this position of strength that the National Party began its 2011 general election campaign.

John Key was once again the centre of National’s 2011 general election campaign. The party message was portrayed as a personal one, with Key writing in the first person and finishing with his personal signature. The National party position was one of continued faith in the successful leadership of the last three years. In the absence of an effective opposition leader to provide an attractive alternative to the incumbent government, National comfortably won re-election in 2011. Throughout its next three year tenure, the Key Government continued with its programme of expansionist foreign policy, in particular, strengthening New Zealand’s relationships with the United States and China. The National Government also persisted with controversial economic policies in the face of significant public dissatisfaction. During their 2011 to 2014 term, the New Zealand government placed greater emphasis on national security matters, particularly in the area of cyber security. John Key and his government received significant criticism regarding their handling of cyber security issues, particularly the government’s use of surveillance and with whom they were sharing the information.

The strongest pressure on the Key government came during the 2014 general election campaign, when a number of adverse events occurred in quick succession. Minister Judith Collins’ integrity was questioned over a conflict of interest with the corporation, Orivida, and author Nicky Hager released his book Dirty Politics which criticised the National Party’s use of political power. Megaupload founder Kim Dotcom established a political party to contest the election and promised a ‘moment of truth’ that would force John Key’s resignation. Dotcom’s moment of truth fizzled, despite the appearance of journalist Glenn Greenwald, WikiLeaks’ founder Julian Assange and whistle-blower Edward Snowden. Not only did this event fail to achieve the resignation of the Prime Minister, but appeared to galvanise National party support. The 2014 general election was again won convincingly with a campaign centred on John Key to lead the country and through the continued absence of a credible alternative for state leadership.

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226 Ibid. p. 43
The Key-led National Government continues to actively pursue a public security discourse. The Prime Minister appears assured and confident when discussing issues of national security, and utilises his personal charisma to reassure the New Zealand public that all actions are being taken to ensure the safety of New Zealanders. When critiqued or questioned on the rationale behind issues raised in security discourse, the New Zealand Government invokes the emotion of public safety and the common good whilst challenging their antagonist’s loyalty, knowledge or courage. An example of this is the Prime Minister’s emotive cry for the Labour Party leader, Andrew Little, to “...get some guts...” during the parliamentary debate on the deployment of New Zealand troops to Iraq. Although the Prime Minister is a dominant role within New Zealand’s system of government, they are supported in the exercise of their executive authority by a group of senior ministers that comprise the executive branch of government.

Cabinet
The Cabinet is the New Zealand Prime Minister’s senior advisory and leadership group. It directs executive branch operations, oversees the policy agenda, makes key decisions and is responsible for most legislation presented to the House of Representatives. The New Zealand Cabinet consists of twenty ministers chosen by the Prime Minister to lead key sector portfolios. Cabinet is responsible for overseeing the government's financial position, constitutional arrangements and machinery of government. The duties of the Cabinet are undertaken in accordance with the principles of collective responsibility, confidentiality and consultation. This means that Cabinet, as a group, jointly accept responsibility for its decisions, all discussion within Cabinet remains confidential, and Ministers should consult with relevant parties prior to presenting a proposal to parliament.

Cabinet plays a central role in every phase of New Zealand’s policy making process. It establishes the government’s policy agenda through the management of the issues presented from a variety of sources. Policy issues may be inherited from previous governments, linked to prior policy decisions, referred from the state sector or another branch of government. Natural disasters, both domestic and international, or civil or military conflict that affects New Zealand’s national interests, are externally generated issues that may require Cabinet

229 Shaw and Eichbaum, Public policy in New Zealand : institutions, processes and outcomes / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 78
230 Ibid. p. 76-77
231 Ibid. p. 78
232 Ibid. p. 78
decisions. The power for inclusion of an issue on the Cabinet agenda lies primarily with the Prime Minister. When a matter is approved for consideration by Cabinet, it is rarely addressed by all the ministers of Cabinet, but by Cabinet committees. Cabinet committees consist of ministers with portfolios relevant to the issue being examined, and are supported by senior bureaucrats. It is in these committees that views are exchanged openly between members and exhaustive consideration of policy options occurs before specific recommendations are presented to the full cabinet for final approval. The DES identified in the NSS is such a committee, and responsible for detailed consideration of matters of national security on behalf of Cabinet. The Cabinet committee for domestic and external security coordination includes the ministers of: Civil Defence, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Government Communications Security Bureau, Health, Security Intelligence Service, Police, Primary Industries and is chaired by the Prime Minister.

Parliament
New Zealand has a unicameral parliament in which the House of Representatives is democratically elected using the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system for a three year term. Under the MMP system, all New Zealand citizens and permanent residents over the age of eighteen cast two votes to elect their representatives. The first vote is for the political party they wish to govern and the second is for the individual to represent their geographic electorate. This means a political party may be represented in parliament through either winning electorate seats, or by receiving more than five percent of the party vote. The number of physical electorates is determined by using the data from the most recent census and the number of Maori who exercise their option to enrol on the Maori electoral roll. Electorate numbers and their boundaries are produced in order to ensure all citizens have an equal opportunity for representation. The South Island General Electoral Roll is fixed at sixteen electorates. The electorates in the North Island General Electoral Roll are determined by the number of eligible voters, less those on the Maori roll, and their boundaries are established by

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233 Ibid. p. 78
234 Ibid. p. 80
235 Ibid. p. 80
236 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security (DES)," Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/committees/des.
237 Shaw and Eichbaum, Public policy in New Zealand : institutions, processes and outcomes / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 48
238 Ibid. p. 131
how these citizens are distributed.\textsuperscript{240} New Zealand provides guaranteed representation for Maori by maintaining a separate Maori electoral roll which is used to elect Maori representatives to parliament through designated Maori electorates. These Maori seats are determined through numbers registered on the Maori roll and their distribution across the country.\textsuperscript{241} Once the number of North Island and Maori electorates are calculated and added to the sixteen South Island electorates, this total is subtracted from the one hundred and twenty available seats in parliament to establish the number of positions to be assigned in accordance with the results of the party vote.\textsuperscript{242}

As the legislative branch of the state, the New Zealand parliament is comprised of the Governor General, as Sovereign’s representative, and the elected members who represent the citizens. The primary function of parliament is making law. The executive branch cannot enact primary legislation without the consent of the elected representatives. This means that a significant amount of legislative proposals are examined by opposition parties and the general public as they are processed. Legislative proposals are put forward either by members of the parliament as the result of parliamentary debates, or through public submissions to select committees. Select committees consist of members of parliament from all parties, and are supported by bureaucrats. These committees are established to: scrutinise all legislation, conduct financial and performance reviews of public bodies, review petitions to parliament, initiate inquiries into policy issues, and report on multilateral and bilateral international treaties.\textsuperscript{243} The Royal Commission on the Electoral System described New Zealand’s select committees as the means for providing parliamentary checks on the executive and administrative branches of the state.\textsuperscript{244} Select committees play an important role in the development of policy as they are unfettered by the party politics of the parliamentary chamber. They have the advantage of being able to use actors beyond parliament to assist effective policy development. These actors include interest groups, business and union representatives and individual citizens who want to raise their concerns with the state.\textsuperscript{245} A significant advantage of New Zealand’s select committee step of government is that it affords

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{243} Shaw and Eichbaum, \textit{Public policy in New Zealand : institutions, processes and outcomes / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum}. p. 57
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid. p. 57
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid. p. 57
an opportunity for the public to participate in the legislative process.\footnote{Ibid. p. 57} Select committees are critical links with the general will of New Zealand’s public. These links are consistent with Locke’s theories of the civil society being the sovereign authority within their territory. These institutional channels allow civil society to raise issues with the government and for the government to maintain the consent of its people.

In 1986, a Defence Committee of Enquiry conducted a public consultation of New Zealand’s populace regarding defence and security issues.\footnote{Frank Corner, Defence and security: what New Zealanders want / report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry ([Wellington, N.Z.]: The Committee, 1986, 1986), Non-fiction, p. 38} The purpose of the 1986 Defence Review was to discuss public defence and security concerns in an open forum.\footnote{Ibid. p. 7} The committee were authorised to receive public submissions on a discussion paper on New Zealand’s future defence policy. This authorisation allowed them to question groups and individuals who made submissions on the paper and commission a public opinion poll to collect data on public attitudes to defence and security matters. The committee prepared a report based upon the data collected from public submissions and polls to be taken forward into the Defence Review.\footnote{Ibid. p. 1-2} The Defence Question: a discussion paper was released to stimulate public debate and demonstrate the basis for New Zealand Government thinking on future defence and security matters.\footnote{Ibid. p. 1} The purpose of the consultation process was to gather public opinion prior to the production of the 1987 Defence White paper.\footnote{Ibid. p. 1} The Defence Question paper was circulated to members of the public at their request and presented four aims for its presentation.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2} The first aim was to provide a framework for consideration of defence and security issues and to provide a point of reference for public submission to the Defence Committee of Enquiry.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2} The second aim was to outline feasible defence and security options and invite the New Zealand public to comment on them.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2} The third purpose of the paper was to examine the central propositions of the document through public scrutiny.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2} The final aim of The Defence Question was to presents the New Zealand Government’s thinking around defence and security in order to generate focused public debate.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2}
The next part of the public consultation was the receipt and consideration of 4182 written submissions by the Defence Committee of Enquiry.\(^\text{257}\) Once an examination of all the submissions had been received, a series of public hearings, with selected respondents, enabled the committee to gain greater clarity of the views expressed in their submissions. Nine public hearings were conducted between 6 March and 24 April 1986. Meetings with the public were held in Nelson, Rotorua, Christchurch and Dunedin, with Auckland and Wellington hosting two and three forums respectively. A total of 107 individuals representing personal interests and community groups appeared before the committee. Additionally the committee consulted government officials from New Zealand's Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Ministers Department, Ministry of Civil Defence and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. The US Ambassador, Deputy Director for the US Arms Control and Disarmaments Agency and a consultant to the Australian Minister of Defence made contributions to the consultation process. From these meetings, the committee was able to elicit the fundamental concerns of the New Zealand people on defence and security issues.\(^\text{258}\)

Once the review of submissions and public hearings had been completed, the committee consulted government statisticians and academic survey specialists before engaging polling agency, National Research Bureau, for the conduct of a public opinion poll. The questions in the poll were developed to examine areas of concern highlighted during the submission process. The issues explored included: perceptions of national interests, external relationships with other states, and the future role of New Zealand’s Armed Forces. The poll allowed the government to gauge public attitudes towards the access of nuclear powered and armed ships and the future of the ANZUS alliance. The poll consisted of personal interviews with 1600 New Zealand residents over 18 years of age, and was conducted over the period 26 April to 19 May 1986. The public consultation process allowed the Defence Committee of Enquiry to establish an understanding of the New Zealand public’s perception of defence and security issues. The public submissions and hearings provided the framework for New Zealand's defence options, while the poll results demonstrated the level of public support for each option presented. The New Zealand Government developed the foundations of its Domestic and External Security Coordination system from the data collected from the 1986 consultation.\(^\text{259}\)

\(^{257}\) *Defence and security: what New Zealanders want / report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry.* p. 5

\(^{258}\) Ibid. p. 7

\(^{259}\) Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security System." p. 7
The New Zealand Government initiated the 2009 Defence Review in recognition of the fact that its national security environment had changed dramatically since the last Defence ‘white paper’ was released in 1997. The aim of the 2009 review was to take a pragmatic view of New Zealand’s defence capabilities and ensure New Zealanders’ continued safety in a complex global security environment. The review was conducted by Secretary of Defence, John MacKinnon, with advice from Chief of Defence Force, Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae, and an advisory panel consisting of Simon Murdoch (former Secretary of Foreign Affairs), Martyn Dunne (former Commander Joint Forces New Zealand) and Robert McLeod (Managing partner, Ernst and Young). Additionally, government agencies including New Zealand Police, New Zealand Customs Service, New Zealand Immigration Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Security Bureau and Ministry of Fisheries, contributed to the review.

The consultation process was launched through the publication of the Defence Review 2009: Public Consultation Document. This document clearly outlined the New Zealand Government’s context of the national security environment. It contained a submission form with ten questions to focus petitioners on the major issues the government wanted discussed. The public consultation process for Defence Review 2009 occurred between June and October 2009. The Ministry of Defence received 494 submissions and held 23 public meetings throughout New Zealand. Submissions came from a variety of sources. Individuals contributed 222 responses and 27 came from organisations. A further 16 submissions were from Business and three local governments contributed to the process. New Zealand Defence Force personnel submitted 226 responses during the internal consultation process. Additionally, 143 young people were surveyed to gain insight into how this demographic view defence and security issues.

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261 Ibid. p. 6
262 Ibid. p. 6
263 Ibid. p. 8
265 Sanders, "Defence Review Consultation: Summary Of Submissions." p. 6
266 Ibid. p. 45
267 Ibid. p. 6
Officials
Earlier chapters present that New Zealand’s DESC system operates under a three-tiered structure. This system functions like other government structures in that the first tier, or political executive, is responsible for decision making while the remaining tiers, the officials and watch groups, implement the decisions made. Elected representatives make up the political executive of the New Zealand Government and they are supported in their decision making role by the bureaucratic executive.\textsuperscript{268} The ODESC components of the NSS are the bureaucratic executives who accept responsibility for the effective functioning of the system. In the New Zealand context, the bureaucratic executive consists of career officials who assist the elected representatives in the conduct of their ministerial duties. The bureaucratic executive advises the political executive on: feasibility of policy, cost benefit analysis, different policy options available, and provide oversight of the operation of policy programmes. The interaction between a Minister and their officials is important. The most important of these relationships is between the Minister and his department’s Chief Executive (CE). As the political head of a department, the Minister establishes the overarching policy strategy within the parameters determined by their Cabinet responsibilities.\textsuperscript{269} The department CE is responsible for supporting their Minister’s strategy by ensuring the actions of the agency are focused towards achieving the directed policy objectives.\textsuperscript{270} The authority exercised by the CE over the other officials within the department, is consistent with Weber’s concept of bureaucratic authority.\textsuperscript{271}

Weber identifies three specific elements required to constitute bureaucratic authority. The first element is the presence of routine activities required for the purpose of supporting the bureaucratically governed structure. These activities are deliberately allocated as official duties.\textsuperscript{272} The second element is possession of the authority to give commands required for the performance of official duties.\textsuperscript{273} The final element identified is regular and continuous completion of official duties by persons who are appropriately qualified to do so.\textsuperscript{274} Weber’s idea of bureaucratic authority is established within his larger concept of bureaucracy as a social organisation. In his theory of rational and legal charisma, Weber divides modern

\textsuperscript{268} Shaw and Eichbaum, Public policy in New Zealand : institutions, processes and outcomes / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 92
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid. p. 92
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid. p. 92
\textsuperscript{271} Weber and Eisenstadt, Max Weber on charisma and institution building; selected papers. p. 66
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid. p. 66
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid. p. 66
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid. p. 66
bureaucracy into six features. The first feature is fixed and official jurisdictional areas governed by specific rules, laws and administrative regulations. The second feature is a hierarchical system and graded levels of super- and subordination in which higher officials there supervise lower offices. Weber’s third feature of bureaucracy is the management of offices through the use of written documents to initiate, monitor and record activity within the department. The fourth feature is the expectation that office holders have the appropriate qualifications, training and experience to fill their appointment effectively. Weber’s fifth feature is that the official duties assigned an office holder are their primary employment and demand their full-time employment. The final feature is management of the office by a stable set of general rules that can be learned by officials. The comprehension of these rules constitutes a specialised technical knowledge that only officials possess. The impersonal, rules-based nature of a bureaucracy allows: rational and merit-based advancement for its officials and the provision of objective advice to agency leadership. The New Zealand Government’s bureaucratic configurations reflect these principles.

New Zealand’s Government manages most areas of public policy in vertical, sectorial aligned organisations that are effective at delivering policies specific to their particular area and provide clear lines of accountability and management. As such, the focus of the New Zealand Government’s Ministers and officials is primarily within agency boundaries and concerned with achievement of departmental objectives. The importance that New Zealand government agencies place on national security is reflected in the prevalence of this term’s discussion in the agencies’ corporate documentation. During a search of the websites and publications of the twenty-two New Zealand government departments identified as lead agencies for national security objectives, only those agencies with traditional interests in the security field had any reference to the NSS. Examination of the Statement of Intent and Annual Report documents of the government agencies identified in Annex C of the NSS, indicates an interesting pattern. The term ‘national security’ appears in only thirty-four of the seventy-seven documents researched, occurring two hundred and ninety-six times in total. The term is used by nine

275 Ibid. p. 66
276 Ibid. p. 66
277 Ibid. p. 67
278 Ibid. p. 67
279 Ibid. p. 68
280 Ibid. p. 68
281 Ibid. p. 68
282 Ibid. p. 69
government agencies with DPMC, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Police, New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Customs Service being the most prolific. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Health include only cursory statements such as:

“...the Ministry works within the National Security System with other agencies to address a range of hazards and threats to New Zealand.”\(^\text{284}\)

Or

“...review the regime for lawful interception to ensure it remains appropriate for national security and law enforcement without imposing unnecessary or excessive costs on the sector.”\(^\text{285}\)

When the search was narrowed to specifically find discussion of the ‘National Security System’ only eleven agency documents contained this word combination in a total of twenty instances. The only agencies to discuss the NSS itself were DPMC, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This data suggests that the majority of New Zealand government agencies are either, unaware of their national security responsibilities, or simply do not place great importance in this area. Some of the agencies, who do not discuss national security, have been designated as lead agency for specific national security objectives in the NSS. This indifference should be of concern, not only to the National Security Advisor and Prime Minister but also the New Zealand public.

All government agencies are rational and impersonal, but some wield more power and influence than others. The Treasury, State Services Commissioner and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet are the most powerful government departments within New Zealand.\(^\text{286}\) These three organisations are called the “central agencies”\(^\text{287}\) because their responsibilities span the public sector and they undertake direct administrative support to Cabinet and the Ministers.\(^\text{288}\) The central agencies’ broad responsibilities involve: coordinating policy development across the public sector, ensuring the consistency and quality of advice provided to Ministers, coordinating government department’s activities toward the achievement of the


\(^{286}\) Shaw and Eichbaum, Public policy in New Zealand : institutions, processes and outcomes / Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum. p. 93

\(^{287}\) Ibid. p. 93

\(^{288}\) Ibid. p. 93
collective objectives of the New Zealand Government, and resolving disputes between
government departments. Each central agency has a specific role and the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet's role is to support the political executive. This is significant to this
study as DPMC is the primary agency for national security decision making within New
Zealand.

DPMC was established in 1990 after a report which recommended the creation of two
separate channels for advice to the Prime Minister. The department was formed "to supply
impartial, high quality advice and support to the Prime Minister and Cabinet". DPMC
identifies its overall objective as "Good Government, with effective Public Service Support". A
contributing outcome to this objective is "The intelligence system and national security
priorities are well led, coordinated and managed." In the achievement of this outcome, the
CE DPMC assumes a significant role in New Zealand's national security system. The NSS
identifies the NSA as the senior official accountable for the provision of national security
advice to the government. They are also responsible for leading and coordinating the whole of
government response to national security issues. The role of NSA is directly linked to
appointment of the chair of ODESC. ODESC is responsible for determining strategic direction
and ensuring a coherent interagency response to national security issues. Owing to the
proximity of their relationship to the Prime Minister, the position of CE DPMC assumes some
of the Prime Minister's 'charisma of office'. They are recognised as a securitising agent within
New Zealand's national security system, by virtue of the office they hold. The effectiveness of
the NSA as a securitising agent, however, is measured by the receptivity of their intended
audience to the referent object proposed. Locke’s model of the state asserts the audience of
securitization to be civil society. In New Zealand’s case, however, the public is both the
audience and referent object of the national security discourse.

289 Ibid. p. 93
290 Ibid. p. 93
291 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "About DPMC," Department of Prime Minister and
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
295 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security System." p. 12
296 Ibid. p. 12
New Zealand’s Civil Society
As elected representatives of the people, the New Zealand Government aims to ensure continued acceptance by the electorate through the implementation of policy that appears pursuant with the greater good of its people. This is achieved by developing legislation that is consistent with the ideals and values that are recognised as key elements of New Zealand’s national identity. The social identities of a state represent the names, ideals, groups and categories by which a state is recognised. The identification and classification of these different objects and behaviours, provides definition and structure, which allows the state to act within a potentially complex, ambiguous and uncertain environment. The naming and codification of these behaviours and entities, provides meaning and guides the way other actors identify them. The intersubjective meanings of these identities provide structure, not only to the international system, but also within states themselves. A state’s social identity is developed through the interaction of its members within various social contexts. Through interaction, members associate each other with the possession of certain identities. The affiliation of members to particular identities, creates the expectation of behaviours consistent with the ideals of the group.

The identity of a state is based upon their interaction with other states and the relations between their constituent social actors. In this way, the identity of a state is derived from its domestic and external relations. Anthony Smith asserts that national identity is a multidimensional concept that cannot be reduced to a single component. He identifies the following factors as fundamental to a concept of national identity: a homeland or historic territory, collective mythology and historical memories, common mass public culture, shared legal rights and duties for all members, and a common economy. Smith clearly differentiates between the nation and its national identity, and the state. He presents that the former are

298 Ibid. p. 103
299 Ibid. p. 104
300 Ibid. p. 104
301 Ibid. p. 105
302 Ibid. p. 105
303 Ibid. p. 105
305 Ibid.p. 14
unifying ideals constructed through the shared memories, myths and traditions resulting from ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and political interaction of community members. These ideas may, or may not be, consistent with the legal and bureaucratic functions of the state institutions.

Roxanne Doty presents that collective identity based on the ‘nation’, is grounded in neither territorial authority, nor the right of political authority, to determine the rules and policies that govern members’ behaviour within specific boundaries. The inclusive and exclusive boundary of a nation is constructed through the state’s discursive authority. It is the political structure of the state, in situations of uncertainty and ambiguity, that imposes fixed and stable meanings regarding who are, and who are not, citizens. This political structure establishes the specific political community it is said to represent. Doty asserts that the construction of national identity is fluid and dynamic. The conception of a national identity is perpetually constructed and reconstructed, however this transiency is not apparent. The central concept that binds a nation’s members continues to be influenced by internal and external change. Ideally, central government uses claims to a national identity to develop a closer relationship between the people and the state. The strength of this relationship, and the areas in which it assumes authority, are never fixed, and are socially, politically and discursively constructed.

The political authority of the state assumes the primary role in the discourse that determines individual’s inclusion within the collective idea of the nation. Through this discourse, the government differentiates between those actors included within the national identity, and those considered as external to this group. This aligns to Frank Fischer’s assertion that discourse does not simply reflect a social or political reality, but essentially constructs the
fields of action that it describes. The state authorities use discourse as a political device for adapting to an ever-changing security environment. The NSS authors claim the document is consistent with New Zealand's democratic values and serves the nation's best interests. This claim, however, has not been verified through public consultation.

Richard Mulgan argues that New Zealand is a pluralist society composed of individuals who identify with multiple groups, each with different values and interests. Mulgan posits that New Zealand society's behaviour can be understood through the influence of its constituent groups and their values. In a pluralist society, the behaviour of individuals cannot be explained without appreciating the influence of the groups to which they belong. Pluralists recognise the impact of gender, ethnicity and economic status on social behaviour and the distribution of political power. Pluralist theory rejects the presence of a single fundamental social divide that permits the understanding of societal and political behaviour. Instead, it selects the theory most appropriate to explain particular behaviour. This rejection of a single issue that overrides all others, is the point of difference between pluralism and other social theories. As a pluralist society, New Zealanders are not solely focused on their collective national identity, but also to the various interests groups to which they belong. New Zealanders value these group memberships equally and look to their government to protect and enhance their interests.

Aligned to its pluralist society, New Zealand's state institutions facilitate a pluralist approach to governance. The New Zealand Government's decision making is heavily influenced by interest group pressure to enact policies that best support those group objectives. To view New Zealand's state institutions as existing solely as a forum for adjudication between the nation's

318 Ibid. p. 9
319 Ibid. p. 10
320 Ibid. p. 10
321 Ibid. p. 10
322 Ibid. p. 11
323 Ibid. p. 12
324 Ibid. p. 13
competing interest groups, does not account for the complexity of the actors involved. In reality, New Zealand’s bureaucratic officials and elected politicians are actors with their own ideas and objectives that they pursue, at times, at the expense of public interest. Pluralist theory asserts that within state institutions, also exist competing interests and values. Examples of these disparities are: opposing political parties, differences between elected representatives and career bureaucrats, and divisions between government departments. New Zealand’s pluralistic tendencies are the product of political structure. Liberal democracy asserts that individuals are free to live as they see fit, as long as this does not impinge on the same rights of other community members. It also asserts that all individuals are equal and have an equal voice in matters affecting their wellbeing. The political system of a liberal democracy is expected to ensure equal attention to all its people’s individual, or group interests, and needs. This expectation is difficult to meet and, in New Zealand, like other liberal democracies, people are not free to follow their interests equally and fairly. Bureaucracies pursue interests to promote greater efficiency, sectorial interest groups influence government for desired outcomes and, during elections, political parties seek to dominate popular opinion to secure the majority vote.

New Zealand’s national identity is dominated by two cultural perspectives, Maori and Pakeha. The prominence of these two groups grew out of the construction of New Zealand as a nation state. The Treaty of Waitangi not only created New Zealand as a British colony, but also formalised the perception of Maori as an ethnic community. The Treaty, in establishing an agreement between Maori and the British Crown, also constructed the New Zealand settler identity, Pakeha. The amalgamation of these distinct cultural entities has led to a New Zealand narrative of nationalism that is dynamic and complex. The development of New Zealand as an independent nation, with its own unique identity, relied heavily upon the two narratives of liberal democracy and biculturalism. Liberal democratic institutions are characterised by the right of all adult citizens to vote and distinct political parties compete, periodically, for power on a democratic basis. The elected representatives of the people are determined by a free, fair electoral process and representative power is moderated through constitutional arrangements and rule of law. The aim of the liberal democratic state is to ensure the conditions that allow

325 Ibid. p. 13
326 Ibid. p. 14
327 Ibid. p. 14
328 Ibid. p. 17
329 Ibid. p. 17
330 Ibid. p. 18
individuals within a society to pursue their interests without political interference. This includes the individual’s ability to participate freely in the exchange of goods and labour in the market, and conduct economic transactions in order to acquire private wealth and resources. These ideas underpinned the concept of ‘English liberalism’ which saw the state as an adjudicator over the interactions between individuals pursuing their own interests, in accordance with the rules of economic competition and free exchange.331

Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were two of the first advocates of liberal democracy.332 Their argument built on John Locke’s inference that there must be limits upon legally sanctioned political power. Bentham and Mills asserted that liberal democracy was aligned to political institutions that would ensure the accountability of the governing to the governed. They stated that only through democratic government could political decisions that supported the interests of a society’s individuals be effectively selected, authorised and controlled.333

Democracy is a political decision making system which involves structuring the mechanisms for the daily operations of the state through representative institutions staffed through periodic elections. It confers the entitlement on citizens to choose those they want to represent them in government. The primary purpose of elections is to identify the candidate desired by the majority of citizens within designated electorates to staff legislative and executive branches of government. This condition establishes that the government is formed by representatives of the largest number of citizens and, that through those representatives, it will be held directly, or indirectly accountable, to the people.334

Democracy does not necessarily mean an increasingly active share for the governed in the authority of the state.335 Bentham and Mill also believed that humans act to satisfy wants and avoid pain. They argue that people seek to fulfil desires, maximise utility and minimise suffering. Additionally, they assert that the governing will act in much the same way as the governed. Accordingly, they must be accountable to an electorate that validates the

331 McLennan, Held, and Hall, *The Idea of the modern state*.p. 43
332 Ibid.p. 42
333 Ibid.p. 42
335 Weber and Eisenstadt, *Max Weber on charisma and institution building; selected papers*.p. 72
appropriateness of their actions. This suggests that a state should aim to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Bentham and Mill proposed that this could be achieved through the support of four subsidiary goals: provision of subsistence, producing abundance, favouring equality, and maintaining security. Of these goals the last was considered the most important as without security of life and property, individuals lack the incentive to work and generate wealth which, in turn, limits the capacity for a growth in commerce. The key liberal supposition was that the collective good could be realised if individuals interacted in competitive exchanges, pursuing utility with the minimum of state interference. Liberalism promotes the assertion that the individual’s freedom to pursue the livelihood of the choice and accumulate wealth is sacred. The preferred mechanism it identifies for the achievement of this is the market.

It is in the marketplace that individuals can selfishly pursue their own interests according to their own abilities and preferences. Liberalists see exchange in the market as beneficial to everyone who engages in it. They extrapolate the result of this activity to be an enhancement of society’s welfare as a whole. Capitalism is the realisation of the institutionalised beliefs and practices defined under liberalist ideology. It can be understood as a market orientated political economy, or system of production and exchange. Capitalism can also be a society in which control over the property required for production is concentrated in the hands of a small section of the people, whilst most of the rest sell their time as labour in a system of wages. Production is undertaken for the purpose of exchange, not direct consumption by the producer. The transactions facilitate the purchase of other goods for consumption, and take place among individuals unknown to each other. As key stakeholders within the market, businesses seek to influence the government directly and indirectly through their membership of various business associations. Business associations are among the many interest groups found in capitalist societies. They enjoy unmatched capacity to influence state decision making given the reliance of these states on business for revenue and overall levels of social well-being and security. Globalisation has further reinforced this power with the capacity of investors to respond to undesirable government action by moving capital to another location. This potential to affect state revenue provides the ability for capitalists to ‘punish’ governments for actions they disapprove of. Even in democratic states, business contributions to election

336 McLennan, Held, and Hall, *The Idea of the modern state*. p. 43
337 Ibid. p. 43
campaigns, policy research institutes and individuals make them sympathetic towards the interests of their benefactors.

New Zealand was gifted its institutions of government under its status as a former colony of the British Empire. Accordingly, its underlying concepts of political identity strongly resemble the same liberal democratic capitalist ideals of the United Kingdom. New Zealand’s independence was gained without a binding nationalist struggle from which a national identity could be formed. It occurred almost by accident, as Britain sought to deconstruct its empire. This led the Settler and Maori communities to maintain their separate concepts of identity, rather than adopting a common New Zealand character. In New Zealand’s case, the origins of the state clearly predate its national identity. In this respect, the creation of a concept of national identity was, and will continue to be, driven primarily by the state. Early colonial governments, with support of the majority of Maori, modelled national identity on the mother country, and endeavoured to project the image of a ‘Britain of the South Pacific’. This process of colonial settlement, however transformed the Maori from the dominant culture to indigenous minority through the superseding of local economies and social practices by ‘English liberalism’339. Although afforded the formal status of British subjects under the Treaty of Waitangi, many of the new concepts of state contrasted with traditional Maori views of social interaction. Individualised, property-based subjecthood clashed with the Maori ideals of collective, familial group membership. The Treaty of Waitangi incorporates a blend of pre-modern Maori and modern western concepts of political community and national identity which remain an enduring point of tension until the present day.340 The theme of partial inclusion for Maori remained consistent in New Zealand governance until the 1970s.

New Zealand’s bicultural approach was developed as part of the response to the resurgence of ethno cultural ‘identity politics’ during the decolonisation period of global society.341 Biculturalism in New Zealand sought to recognise that the Treaty of Waitangi was a founding agreement with Maori, and its conditions should be honoured. With this understanding, it is suggested that biculturalism was accepted through its sense of establishing equality. New Zealand’s commitment to biculturalism was manifested in the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal for the resolution of claims of breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. Other measures

340 Ibid. p. 24
341 Ibid. p. 119
included, according Te Reo Maori national language status and the national anthem being sung in both English and Maori. This bicultural approach remains the predominant view of New Zealand’s national identity.

Forms of collectivism, such as biculturalism and multiculturalism, challenge the liberalist concept of individual rights and the conditions in which liberty is exercised. This tension creates a dilemma for a liberal democratic government that must seek to address the individual concerns of its constituents equally but, at the same time, maintain the support of the majority to remain in power. It does this through the careful use of language to create the perception of expertise and engender confidence. Governments also use the avoidance of the definition of key terms and creation of a broad scope of national security that is obscure, yet all encompassing. The NSS relies heavily on the New Zealand government’s authority to legitimise national security issues.

CHAPTER FIVE - NEW ZEALAND'S WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH AND THE NSS

The key theme of the NSS document is the strengthening of New Zealand's whole of government response to national security. The previous chapter discussed New Zealand's institutions of government and how they are designed to protect the interests of the country's people. This chapter examines the relationship between the foundational theories of New Zealand's machinery of government, and the concepts for national security management articulated in the NSS. The discussion introduces the whole of government concept as it is applied by governments in mature liberal democracies. I define the term 'whole of government' in the context of public management, in order to determine the meaning of this approach as it applies to national security. The discussion differentiates between the whole of government approach and other closely related concepts such as joined up government. After presenting a common definition of the whole of government approach as it applies to this thesis, the chapter examines the context in which the New Zealand Government seeks to apply this approach to national security operations. I use New Zealand Government agency documentation that espouses the whole of government approach within their organisation to describe how the approach is used within New Zealand's government agencies.

Following the creation of a New Zealand context for the whole of government approach, this chapter presents an analysis of the suitability of this type of response to national security issues in New Zealand. The analysis of New Zealand's whole of government approach examines the compatibility of the state's governance structures with a concept that operates across traditional departmental borders. The discussion of New Zealand's whole of government approach highlights the challenges that agencies have in implementing the concepts articulated in the NSS. This chapter argues that New Zealand's government agencies lack the appropriate mechanisms to act consistently with the propositions in the NSS. I argue that the inability to realise the strategic vision proposed by the authors of NSS originates from the lack of a national security sub-discourse. A national security sub-discourse allows the whole of government concept to be critically examined by the actors responsible for implementing it. The presence of a sub-discourse that includes not only government agencies, but also civil society that ensures any security apparatus is subject to the scrutiny by actors involved at all levels of the national security system. Despite emphasising a whole of government approach to national security, the NSS fails to define what is meant by this term. Additionally, it does not describe how the concept could be implemented; neither does it explain the benefit of a whole of government approach in responding to national security issues.
Many modern democracies have sought to enhance the coherence of their government agencies’ response to complex domestic and international issues. These cross agency initiatives have become known as a whole of government approach. Whole of government is defined by the New Zealand Government as a

“...term of considerable elasticity, intended to describe a subject applying to a large section, if not the entirety, of the State sector. In practice, it can mean anything from the entire State sector to a lot of Public Service departments.”

The breadth of this statement however does not provide sufficient clarity with which to examine the whole of government approach as an effective response to New Zealand’s national security issues. To establish a working definition, this chapter introduces other descriptions of the whole of government approach. The OECD suggests that a whole of government approach is

“...the use of formal and informal networks between different departments within a government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of actions that the government will take to achieve its desired objectives.”

New Zealand’s closest security partner, Australia, also uses a whole of government approach in its public service. The Australian Government public service defines whole of government as

"... public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.”

The Australian definition of whole of government emphasises the holistic treatment of social issues by multiple agencies, guided by its central government’s policy and operational agendas.

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Academic researchers of the whole of government approach are no more definitive in describing the concept. Christopher Pollitt argues that the whole of government approach is the aspiration to enhance vertical and horizontal coordination between government agencies. The approach is seen to eliminate instances where different policies undermine each other, create synergy between stakeholders in a particular policy area, and provide citizens seamless, rather than disjointed public services.\(^{347}\) Tom Ling suggests that whole of government is an umbrella term for describing the differing ways that formally separate organisations are aligned to pursue the objectives of the current government.\(^{348}\) Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid assert there are multiple frameworks used to contribute to the development of a theory of what a whole of government approach is, however, there is no overriding theory that encapsulates all the key elements of the concept.\(^{349}\)

Christensen and Laegreid present that the origins of the whole of government approach lie in the concept of joined up government introduced into UK politics by the Blair Labour Government in 1997.\(^{350}\) Joined up government was designed to counteract the fragmentation and disintegration that occurred in public administration under the New Public Management reforms.\(^{351}\) Christensen and Laegreid argue the New Public Management reforms created multiple self-centred agencies which inhibited cooperation and coordination, thereby degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service.\(^{352}\) They assert that New Public Management reforms devolved the power of political executives to the extent that they were being held accountable for activities over which they had little information, control, or influence.\(^{353}\) Joined up government was seen as an approach that would not only strengthen central political control, but also could respond more effectively to the increasingly complex social problems. The Blair Government argued that societal problems were 'wicked issues' that required holistic thinking, the capacity to operate across institutional boundaries, public

\(^{347}\) Christopher Pollitt, "Joined-up government: a survey," *Political studies review* 1, no. 1 (2003). p. 35

\(^{348}\) Tom Ling, "Delivering joined–up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems," *Public administration* 80, no. 4 (2002). p. 616


\(^{351}\) Ibid. p. 99


\(^{353}\) “The challenge of coordination in central government organizations: The Norwegian case.” p. 99
involvement, and the willingness to develop innovative approaches for their successful resolution.354

Wicked issues are seen by government to possess a complexity that bridges the boundaries of traditional sectoral organisations, policy areas and administrative levels. Joined up government coordinates government activity, across multiple agency boundaries without undermining an agency's core responsibilities.355 The concept of Joined up government is posited as the opposite of tunnel vision, vertical silos and departmentalism.356 Christensen and Laegreid contend that there is no clear distinction between the concepts of joined up government and whole of government. They assert that joined up government and whole of government are "fashionable slogans rather than scientific concepts" and are often used interchangeably by government agencies, politicians and scholars as synonyms with other similar terms, such as networked government, cross-cutting policy or horizontal management.357 The Comprehensive Approach is another similar concept to a whole of government approach, but is more specifically aligned with crisis management. Like whole of government, the Comprehensive Approach has no commonly accepted definition.358 Karsten Friis and Pia Jarmyr argue that the Comprehensive Approach implies an approach focused on integrating the political, security and social dimensions of a crisis situation.359

The discussion of a whole of government approach, joined up government, and the comprehensive approach, identifies the difficulty in establishing a common understanding of the distinctions between these three concepts. All three concepts seek to better integrate responses to complex issues, and improve cooperation between responding agencies. The research of this paper suggests that there is no single whole of government approach that can be used by government agencies, academics or politicians that will achieve an effective response for every situation. Organisations are required to develop cross department approaches that are effective in resolving specific issues within a particular set of circumstances. There is no templated solution for the whole of government approach,

354 Ling, "Delivering joined–up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems." p. 622
355 Ibid. p. 616
359 Ibid. p. 11
however, as New Zealand’s nearest economic and security partner, Australia may provide some direction in this area.

Despite the lack of a common model, Tom Ling argues that there are identifiable principles and challenges that, if overcome, enable effective multiagency cooperation. The Australian Public Service presents a modified version of Ling’s model as “Best Practice Whole of Government”. The Australian model is shown at Figure 4.

Figure 4: Best Practice Whole of Government

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360 Committee, "Connecting Government: Whole of government responses to Australia’s priority challenges." p. 13
361 Ibid. p. 13
Successful cross departmental operation is characterised by five core elements. The first is a clearly defined leadership role. Leadership duties can be shared by contributing government agencies or coordinated under a designated lead agency. However, these authorities must be clearly laid out for all the involved organisations to appreciate. The second element is to consider the importance of relevant expertise and effective working relationships over the status of individuals or organisations, in relation to the specific demands of the operation. The third element is designing flexible processes and outcomes that achieve a successful response to a particular issue, as opposed to the strict adherence to the set organisational rules and structures that lack relevance. The collective pooling of resources is the fourth factor that assists in overcoming siloed accountabilities and reluctance of government officials to provide assets that contribute to other agencies’ objectives. The fifth factor is the commitment of involved agencies to achieving a collaborative outcome for the whole of government, rather than protecting individual sectoral interests. These elements are enabled by greater cooperation and collaboration between government agencies, at all levels, to create a shared comprehension of the impacts of complex issues on organisational boundaries. Despite the presence of guiding principles, implementation of a whole of government approach is challenging for a bureaucratically structured organisation.

Accountability for policy advice and service delivery is not as clearly defined within a whole of government initiative as it is within vertically structured, sector focussed agencies. Measurement of whole of government activity effectiveness is challenging, due to the sophisticated nature of the issues and responses involved over the breadth of government agencies. This intangibility places whole of government initiatives at odds with traditional expectations of accountability and value for money. Thus, a measurement system is also necessary. Significant staff and management time, as well as financial investment, are spent in government agencies creating arrangements to facilitate cross-department operation. Cross-departmental policies involve more actors, are harder to supervise and evaluate, and are more difficult to coordinate, therefore, run greater risk of failure. These challenges make whole of government initiatives more fragile than traditional sectoral institutions. To overcome this fragility, governments must develop a whole of government approach that is unique to the particular context in which they operate. A range of countries have prioritised the adoption of a whole of government approach as a response to complex social issues.

362 Ibid. p. 14
363 Ibid. p. 14
364 Pollitt, “Joined-up government: a survey.” p. 38
Despite the common identification of the benefit of this approach, the whole of government methodology used by each state will vary in accordance with their philosophical and cultural differences. The differences of approach revolve primarily around the extent to which authority is wielded by central government within a whole of government response.

To study the pragmatism of the whole of government approach, this chapter examines it through three different perspectives: structural, cultural and myth-based. This model is used as all three perspectives discussed are evident in New Zealand’s whole of government approach to public management. Christensen and Laegrid argue that in the structural perspective, political and administrative leadership consciously design or reorganise their institutions to get the component agencies to better coordinate activities.\(^{365}\) They assert that through the cultural perspective, public organisations evolve naturally through the influence of their history and traditions, and the cultural compatibility of change with the institutional norms. This perspective places greater emphasis on the need for cultural change and is less preoccupied with procedural reforms than the structural approach.\(^{366}\) The myth-based perspective provides a sceptical view of new approaches as passing fashions, symbols or fiction. The perspective views the expression ‘whole of government approach’ as a buzzword used by governments to portray their actions as serving the best interests of their citizens.\(^{367}\) This chapter focuses on the structural perspective as my research suggests that this perspective is the most relevant to New Zealand’s experience of the whole of government approach.

Christensen and Laegrid identify there are two types of structural perspective taken in implementing a whole of government approach to public management. The hierarchical view assumes that the political and administrative leadership within a government is homogenous and concurs with the whole of government measures proposed.\(^{368}\) This perspective is a top down approach that seeks to develop greater efficiency and coherency through the establishment of greater organisational structure.\(^{369}\) The measures in a hierarchical methodology aim at strengthening or reasserting the power of central government. Examples of these measures include the establishment of strategic units such as new cabinet

\(^{365}\) Christensen and Lægreid, "The whole-of-government approach to public sector reform." p. 1061
\(^{366}\) Ibid. p. 1062.
\(^{367}\) Ibid. p. 1062.
\(^{368}\) Ibid. p. 1061.
committees, interagency collaborative units, lead agency approaches, or cross sectoral programmes. 370 Government leadership apply a hierarchical approach by strengthening accountability and governance systems, and limitation of financial management authority. The use of such measures reinforces central government power by lessening subordinate agencies’ autonomy. 371 An example of these measures is the requirement for New Zealand government agencies to demonstrate how their operations comply with New Zealand State Services Commission Better Public Services programme. 372 The negotiative version of the structural perspective differs from the hierarchical type because it is primarily a bottom up approach. The negotiative style perceives internal authority within public organisations as heterogeneous with different interests, functions and structures. 373 A negotiative approach uses the necessity of different agencies to work horizontally to achieve the effective resolution of a security issue. 374 Negotiative approaches originate at the public service delivery level in an environment of limited resources and organisational uncertainty. Enhanced outcomes are negotiated between different actors involved in the collaborative delivery of public services. Academic research by Perri6, Robert Gregory, Jonathan Boston and Chris Eichbaum, suggests the New Zealand Government uses a structural perspective in its implementation of a whole of government approach to public management. 375 Is this perspective, how do New Zealand’s government departments understand it was meant by a whole of government approach?

An examination of the whole of government approach in New Zealand produces evidence of all three perspectives introduced above. Central government utilises a top down, structural view to strengthen its power and achieve greater efficiencies through the restructuring of agencies, and the introduction of processes that centralise key decision making under their remit. The myth perspective is demonstrated through the use of whole of government discourse to engender support for the establishment of new structures within the government. As discussed in chapter three, the strength of a discourse is relative to the esteem with which the principal agent of the discourse is held by their audience. As the concept of whole of government is advocated by New Zealand’s current Prime Minister and one of the New Zealand Government’s central agencies, DPMC, its articulation by these agents validates it as

370 Christensen and Lægreid, "The whole ‐ of ‐ government approach to public sector reform." p. 1061
371 Ibid. p 1061.
373 Christensen and Lægreid, "The whole ‐ of ‐ government approach to public sector reform." p. 1061.
374 Keast, "Joined‐up governance in Australia: How the past can inform the future." p. 222
375 Christensen and Lægreid, "The whole ‐ of ‐ government approach to public sector reform." p. 1061.
current best practice for New Zealand government departments. The fact that the term “whole of government” is only loosely defined by the principal agents, and in the NSS, leaves significant space for interpretation, thus creates reluctance among the discourse audience to challenge the concept’s appropriateness. This complicit acceptance arises from the fear of appearing to lack understanding of this important concept, thereby exposing a professional deficiency. The way the term whole of government is used by New Zealand government agencies in their corporate documentation, reflects their acceptance of the legitimacy of the discourse.

The use of the expression, whole of government, by government agencies is in general terms, and only in the context that their agencies is aligned to the currently identified best practice to achieve the best outcome for the public. The term is inserted to add emphasis, or highlight the agencies’ understanding of the complexity of contemporary social issues. No government agencies, outside the DPMC and NZDF, offer their audience a definition of what a whole of government approach means, and how it is the most effective methodology for resolving issues within their specific sector. The superficial use of the whole of government concept aligns to the myth perspective, as government agencies attempt to construct a sense of confidence and competence to the New Zealand public. This whole of government rhetoric or window dressing, not only fails to create a shared understanding of the concept’s meaning among the New Zealand public, but also within government agency’s subordinate agencies.376

In response to the lack of clear expectations of what is required from them, by their strategic leadership, frontline agencies use a case based negotiative perspective to construct a whole of government approach with relevant partner agencies which is unique to the particular circumstances and relationships involved. This bottom up approach permits successful outcomes to occur, and indicates the presence of a different application of the whole of government methodology at the lower levels of the system. The negotiative perspective is ad hoc, and only remains valid as long as the relationships between frontline actors involved in the response and the conditions surrounding the issue remain constant. The fragility of this approach is highlighted when the context of the issue changes or necessitates the reconstruction or renegotiation of the accepted operating procedure. The susceptibility of negotiative approaches to degradation or disintegration by changing factors, undermines the ability of agencies to develop a shared framework for whole of government initiatives within their organisation. While the lack of a rigid whole of government framework provides flexibility

376 Gregory cited in ibid. p. 1062
and adaptability to frontline agencies in developing effective working relationships with partner organisations, it can lead to inefficient use of critical resources, and the pursuit of objectives that are not consistent with those of central government.

The presence of differing top down and bottom up perspectives in applying the whole of government concept, suggest a disconnect between the whole of government approach desired by the New Zealand Government’s political authority and the application of a cross agency response to security issues. The gap appears to be at the government agency senior bureaucrat level, who should be playing the important role of, not only providing accurate and timely advice to government ministers and the Cabinet, but also extracting strategic guidance from the government and translating this into objectives and outcomes that subordinate agencies can develop into effective operational plans. Within New Zealand’s national security system this responsibility is assigned to ODESC under the leadership of the NSA.

Ensuring a well led and coordinated national security and intelligence system, is a key objective of New Zealand’s DPMC. DPMC aims to instil world class processes for responding to national security crises and building greater resilience among the nation. The agency defines its role as the central ministry that identifies and assesses potential risks and hazards to New Zealand. This role includes ensuring adequate preparedness of security agencies and coordinating and leading responses to incidents effectively. ODESC is the mechanism DPMC uses to lead and promote whole of government preparedness and collaborative responses to national security events. The NSS outlines how New Zealand uses the DESC system to resolve national security issues. Chapter one introduced the processes through which ODESC advises DESC decision making on national security issues and facilitates the appropriate response by the relevant lead agencies, in line with these decisions. DPMC considers the NSS document to be of significant importance within New Zealand’s national security sector. DPMC hold the NSS as a comprehensive document that articulates New Zealand’s security context and is a significant improvement from the previous system for responding to national security events. A study of the DPMC’s corporate documentation, since the release of the NSS, suggests that the influence of the document has weakened the further time moves from its release.

378 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “New Zealand’s National Security System.” p. 10
DPMC’s Statement of Intent and Annual Report documents over the period from 2011 to 2014 show a pattern that indicates less reliance, by the department, on the NSS as a driver of New Zealand’s national security.\(^{379}\) The earlier reports are more definite in their discursive linkages to the NSS, which is clearly identified as the framework for New Zealand’s collaborative national security operations. The 2011 and 2012 DPMC Statement of Intent documents directly assigned specific roles and foci of work for the SRG, NAB and ICG. This attribution of designated responsibilities to particular agencies provided a level of accountability for activities undertaken within New Zealand’s national security sector. The language used in the 2011 and 2012 documentation, is consistent with the language used in the NSS, and reinforces the contextual themes introduced by that document. The DPMC 2012 Annual Report reiterates the importance of the NSS in providing ‘top level guidance’ on the New Zealand Government’s national security interests.\(^{380}\) The NSS strongly influenced DPMC’s national security discourse over the period 2011 and 2012.

Despite DPMC’s promotion of the NSS as the new and effective framework for national security operations, as early as their 2012 Annual Report, the agency were proposing alterations to the new system. The lead agency concept had become a ‘cluster group’\(^{381}\) of relevant agencies centred on the six national security objectives presented in the NSS. The cluster approach was established by the SRG to provide ‘top down’ security management and foster a more comprehensive approach to national security.\(^{382}\) The DPMC Statement of Intent and Annual Report documents of 2013 and 2014 no longer refer to the NSS in their discussion of national security. Although the 2013 documents continue to refer to the sub-agencies of DPMC with specific foci of work in national security, the language used to discuss New Zealand’s national security operations is largely generic. Given the previously asserted importance of the NSS in this section, the absence of reference to the system in recent DPMC

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\(^{380}\) "Annual Report for the year 2012." p. 19

\(^{381}\) Ibid. p.17

\(^{382}\) Ibid. p. 19
documentation is surprising. National security structures and mechanisms are referred broadly as “overarching national security strategies” or “an annual National Security Plan”. The NSS is no longer the framework that guides New Zealand’s national security operations. DPMC, as author, was the champion of the NSS as a new improved framework for coordinating complex national security responses. DPMC’s corporate documentation in the years immediately following the NSS’s release, reinforced the concepts and language promoted by that publication. The DPMC State of Intent (SOI) of 2012 and 2013 reassert the NSS as high level guidance for the conduct of New Zealand’s national security operations. Various government departments included extracts from the NSS documents to demonstrate the system’s importance in New Zealand’s national security sector. Government agencies in the discourse of national security papers strongly promoted the NSS as a central framework for their collaborative policies. The later editions of DPMC reports rely less on the concepts from the NSS and contain several variations from the system’s operating procedure. An example of this is the lead agency concept introduced in the NSS being replaced in 2012 by the ‘cluster group’ methodology. Post 2012, DPMC documents no longer refer directly to the NSS in the context of national security.

In the 2013 DPMC Statement of Intent, subordinate agency responsibilities are still outlined separately for the coming period of the reporting. Since 2013, the language of the DPMC documents on national security has been generic and conceptual, which is a distinct change from previous iterations of the documents that were specific in their identification of expected actions and accountabilities. References are now made in broad terms to “an Annual National Security Plan” or “National Security strategies”, not to the NSS specifically. In its 2014 departmental reports, DPMC discusses itself as the sole agency organisation directly involved in national security. The attribution of separate roles to subordinate agencies such as the SRG, ICG and NAB no longer occurs. Instead, the foci of work of the SRG and NAB are combined, and the ICG is subsumed into the term New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC). This may be to promote whole of government cooperation or dissipate the accountability of a particular agency. However, none of the documents clearly states this goal. The 2014 DPMC Annual report discusses national security very broadly compared to previous editions. Changes to New

383 “Annual Report for the year ended 2013.” p. 19
384 Ibid. p. 20
385 Ibid. p. 20
Zealand’s national security architecture are discussed, but no elaboration is provided as to why these changes are needed.

The non-specific tenor of the national security discourse originating from DPMC provides ample room for that agency to exercise control over the other government agencies’ perception of New Zealand’s national security context. By positioning itself as the dominant agency within national security sphere, DPMC can construct and manage the discourse within the security and broader government sector. DPMC can assume the role of securitising agent for any issue it deems important enough to pose an existential threat to the state’s security.

The New Zealand Government’s sudden emphasis on cyber security is an example of this agent based approach. Prior to 2012, cyber security was included in the overarching gambit of national security. After the establishment of New Zealand’s national cyber security office in 2012, security objectives that apply specifically to cyber security begin to appear in DPMC reports. A search of parliamentary records shows no evidence of debate in the House of Representatives or public consultation taking place. This lack of public debate is inconsistent with the requirement for transparency of government action in New Zealand’s Westminster system of government and its liberal democratic principles.

There are concerns relating to a single agency dominating New Zealand’s national security discourse and the possible use of their positional power to pursue self-interested agendas. These concerns are further amplified if that agency is the component of central government that represents the head of government. New Zealand’s DPMC represents the office of the Prime Minister who assumes this role by virtue of leading the political party that received the majority of votes from the New Zealand electorate. Their leadership is enhanced by the charisma of office that their political appointment holds with the New Zealand public. It is this charisma, which creates a strong position for the New Zealand Prime Minister to exert significant control over New Zealand’s national security discourse regardless of their innate abilities. The strength of the Prime Minister’s charisma of office in the security sector allows their office, to determine the major threats to New Zealand’s national security. Through this control, DPMC constructs national security threats for the New Zealand government agencies and the nation’s citizens through the national security discourse.

As the chair of DESC and by positioning the Chief Executive of his own office as National Security Advisor, the New Zealand Prime Minister, not only has the power to set the national security agenda, but also controls its execution through the ODESC system. The lack of reference to the NSS, and less specificity surrounding accountabilities and responsibilities in
recent national security documentation, create a national security context in which New Zealand’s Prime Minister is the dominant securitising agent within the nation’s national security discourse. The central roles of the Prime Minister and NSA within New Zealand security mechanisms, amplified by their charisma of office, make any articulation of an issue as a security threat immediately accepted by the government department and the nation’s public audiences. By using the strength of this charisma, combined with the power inherent in linking an issue to the security discourse, the New Zealand Government can circumvent or minimise the scrutiny of any legislation related to a securitised issue.

By declaring a national security threat extreme or imminent, New Zealand’s Government can shorten the time in which any legislation is debated in Parliament or open to public consultation. The 2014 National security speech by John Key is an example of this construction of a national security threat to achieve policy aims. The Prime Minister’s speech presented the Islamic State organisation (ISIL) as an existential threat to New Zealand’s national security in order to rapidly introduce new counter terrorism laws. The proposed new legislation focuses primarily on increasing the powers of surveillance for government agencies on persons it identifies as risks to national security. ICG determines potential threats and monitors any further action that SRG coordinates through the ODESC system. As a result, all the agencies involved in counter-terror operations are subordinate organisations of the Prime Minister’s office. Ironically, while DPMC claims that NSS and other security orientated policies are designed to protect the Westminster system, the structure of these new measures bypasses the checks and balances inherent within the Westminster system that are included to prevent such a concentration of power in any single individual or agency.

The content of the Prime Minister’s 2014 speech is important in that it identifies ISIL as a threat of sufficient magnitude to warrant special legislation to counter its effects. A degree of security theatre surrounded the delivery of the Prime Minister’s speech. The fact that the Prime Minister himself introduced the proposed new measures is significant as it indicates to the audience his direct support for the policy and prominence of the threat in New Zealand national security spectrum. The speech portrayed ISIL as an imminent threat of such magnitude that it required the Head of the State to inform the citizens personally, rather than a Minister, or even the National Security Advisor. Media coverage of the speech was extensive. All New Zealand’s broadcast media were represented at what was officially a New Zealand Institute of International Affairs’ event. ISIL was presented as an imminent threat to New Zealand’s national security and the Prime Minister insisted on implementing changes in which
are to be enacted quickly to ensure the citizens’ protection. The Prime Minister announced that New Zealand Government response to counter ISIL outside NZ focuses only in Iraq and will not extend into Syria. This suggests that the defeat of ISIL may not be the actual objective of the introduction of increased powers of surveillance within New Zealand. Yet, as New Zealand’s Prime Minister and his officials are the initiators and controllers of New Zealand’s national security discourse, which other actors are able to challenge the validity of the threats they portray?

The dominance of New Zealand’s national security discourse by the Prime Minister and his department, prevents an effective sub-discourse occurring between government agencies involved in the New Zealand’s security field. This lack of a sub-discourse prevents the necessary translation of the strategic or political concepts into frontline actions or objectives through which successful national security operations can be implemented. Senior officials in government agencies possess the expertise and experience to provide effective advice, both upwards and down, to create realistic expectations of what particular support and capabilities their agency offers to a security response. In the Westminster system, these bureaucrats play an important role in ensuring that key decision makers within central government fully comprehend the implications of their decisions and that frontline agencies have a clear appreciation of the political expectations for their contribution to national security activities. Another important function of senior officials is relationship management with partner agencies and establishing the particular components each will contribute within a whole of government approach.

It is at the senior government official level that agency responsibilities will be negotiated and leadership authority determined. Centralisation of power in one agency or person without accepting direction from departmental leadership, is inherently problematic. Agency leadership determine working relationships within their agencies and with other agencies. Without their involvement in the process of leadership, frontline agencies develop relationships of convenience on an ad hoc basis to achieve a short term outcome to address an existing issue. An examination of New Zealand government agency national security documentation suggests that the senior bureaucrats act only as a ‘post-box’ for transferring higher level guidance. By simply passing political direction to frontline agencies without adding any analysis or clarity to support operational development, these officials prevent the necessary sub-discourse required to implement an effective whole of government approach. This reticence of bureaucrats may be attributed to the obtuse strategic guidance that
documents like the NSS provide which is broad and conceptual in nature. The bureaucratic public services function more efficiently with clearly defined rules, processes and structures. New Zealand’s imprecise definition of national security and the subjective prioritisation of security issues by the Prime Minister, create an atmosphere of uncertainty that is at odds with the structurally focussed environment of the career bureaucrat. The centralisation of power in New Zealand’s security system inhibits government agencies from developing well planned, proactive, integrated or collaborative approaches with other departments. As authority within the NSS is held with central government, agencies may be reluctant to expend time and resources in areas that are later determined to be outside the government’s interest. When a national security agenda is set by the Prime Minister and NSA, agencies involved in the security sector seek to be more responsive to the security issues identified by these principal agents.

For New Zealand’s size and security landscape, adopting a whole of government approach to national security would seem logical. Given New Zealand’s centralised institutions of government, operating across agencies boundaries should be commonplace. Paradoxically, due to centralised institutionalism, agency leadership are potentially unwilling to expend their agencies’ resources to achieve other agencies’ outcomes. Owing to this paradoxical situation and the centralisation of power in the office of Prime Minister, the NSS fails to provide sufficient leadership from central government to enable the development of a successful whole of government approach to national security in New Zealand government agencies. Despite the centralisation of power in central government, and the institutional competition between agencies, the NSS envisions security agencies applying greater breadth in their roles and identifying the areas of crossover in which they can support other actor’s security objectives.

Despite emphasising the importance of cross-departmental synergy, the NSS offers no compulsion for agencies to adopt this approach. The greatest impediment to best practice for whole of government operations is a cognitive one. A significant change in culture by bureaucratic officials away from the rules and process driven institutional silos needs to occur. The NSS document even asserts that security responsibilities are not more important than ministerial accountabilities. Membership of key groups within the NSS is not clearly defined apart from the chairs of DESC and ODESC. Current committee membership is discussed briefly as is the need to call in specialist advisors when necessary. The environment created by the fluid nature of the key actors involved in the NSS is not conducive to the development of

386 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security System." p. 12
enduring working relationships, operating procedures and continuity of a cohesive strategy. A whole of government approach must be unique and appropriate to the security context in which it is expected to operate and to the actors involved in its use. The New Zealand Government models their approach to national security on Britain and Australia. Discourse in New Zealand’s national security literature indicates a propensity of New Zealand officials for following the models of our traditional partners. To successfully address the particular security needs of their citizens, the New Zealand Government should develop a whole of government approach that attends to its own specific concerns.

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the New Zealand government’s whole of government approach to national security. In examining the NSS and exploring New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security, my research achieves four objectives. The first objective is to provide a sustained critique of New Zealand’s current national security system. This critique identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the NSS and guides future research areas for strengthening the system. The second objective is that it provides an interpretive framework for how the New Zealand Government will act in the future, especially in the face of significant national security challenges or events. My research achieves a third objective of providing a mandate for legislative change in New Zealand’s national security sector. The fourth, and final, objective is that my research is also a call for accountability within New Zealand’s national security field.

My initial hypothesis was that the current structure of New Zealand’s government agencies inhibits the implementation of a whole of government approach to security. To explore this hypothesis, I examined the NSS document which is identified by DPMC as the central framework for coordinating New Zealand’s national security response. My examination of the NSS, found the document discusses New Zealand’s national security operations very broadly and lacks definition and specificity. An example of this is the NSS definition of national security which encompasses all risks and hazards, natural or man-made, to New Zealand’s people, environment and interests. The NSS document is proliferated with the inconsistent use of terminology and a failure to define the context in which its concepts will be implemented. The lack of clarity in the NSS generates confusion, not only for the government agencies expected to apply the framework in national security responses, but also in determining the document’s true purpose. The absence of an introductory chapter, or foreword, from an appropriate political authority, leaves the reader unsure as to how the need for a national security system document arose, and the timing of its release to conjecture. Lack of citation and a bibliography suggest the NSS is an original work constructed entirely upon the author’s initiative, yet the document is endorsed by a government department through its presence on their website. The main body and annexes of the NSS only discuss New Zealand’s national security context and machinery in general terms. The document does not identify or explain the challenges of implementing national security policy and, in this respect, it fails to be the central framework it purports to be. I propose the New Zealand Government has four objectives in publishing the NSS document. The first objective is to demonstrate to the New Zealand people that the
government understands their security needs and concerns. The second objective is to demonstrate the government’s commitment to develop structures to address these needs. Thirdly, it provides a conceptual framework for constructing a security community in New Zealand that will enable a whole of government response to national security issues. The final objective of the NSS is to establish clear lines of authority within New Zealand’s national security architecture. My research identified the concept of authority in New Zealand’s national security operations as the most dominant theme within the NSS.

The NSS outlines the three-tiered model used by New Zealand in response to national security issues. Routine security matters are resolved at the level of authority closest to the community affected by a particular event. In this way, minor incidents are dealt with by frontline agencies using internal processes. For security risks of greater magnitude or complexity, central government will provide leadership and coordinate a whole of government approach in response through the DESC system. The DESC system also operates at three levels; the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination, Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination, and watch groups. The Cabinet committee is the highest decision making authority with New Zealand’s national security field and they are supported by the Officials Committee who are responsible for implementing the decisions made. The criteria for a national security response to be escalated to central government leadership level are only loosely defined in the NSS. This leaves significant subjectivity on the part of the New Zealand Government for which issues it wishes to be involved in. The subjective nature of the NSS, created by its broad, conceptual discussion of national security, is of concern, particularly when the systems described in the document centralise the power of New Zealand’s national security discourse in a single government agency. The chief decision maker within New Zealand’s national security system is the Prime Minister, as Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination. The Prime Minister’s influence over New Zealand’s security sector is further strengthened by the position of National Security Advisor being held by the Chief Executive of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Their filling of these appointments identifies the Prime Minister and Chief Executive DPMC as securitizing agents within New Zealand’s national security discourse. As securitizing agents, the Prime Minister and NSA have the potential to use the strength of security discourse to circumvent the traditional limitations on the exercise of power within liberal democratic government.
As a liberal democracy, New Zealand follows Locke’s theory that the state exists only to facilitate the liberty of the individuals that constitute its civil society. Locke argues the people who compose a society remain the sovereign authority within the territory they occupy. He asserts that individuals ensure freedom and equality through rational thought that follows the laws of nature. He admits that not all individuals respect the rights of others, and differing interpretations can lead to disagreement. Locke also suggests that loosely bound individuals are vulnerable to external aggressors therefore actively seek means to strengthen the bonds of community. To overcome the ‘inconveniences’ identified; Locke proposes the creation of an independent society and a political society, or government. Locke’s theory argues that political authority is delegated to the government by the people for as long as the state’s decisions are perceived as consistent with the general will of society. In a Lockean model of state, it is essential that authority remains distributed amongst the political bodies endorsed by civil society. Political power must be decentralised in order for the civil society to exert influence over the political society and ensure the transparency of government action. The decentralisation of power throughout the political body breeds competition between government agencies which, in turn, creates greater scrutiny of agency performance. To retain their mandate for government from the people, the state must exercise political authority in ways that are legal, constitutional and constrained by publicly accepted processes.

The New Zealand Government’s exercise of political authority within the security sector, aligns with Weber’s theory of ‘charisma of office’ for public acceptance. Weber asserts that authority can be legitimised through devotion of followers to the specific sacredness, heroism or character of a charismatic leader. He argues that exceptional powers or qualities that provide benefit to the community, raise the charismatic individual above the ordinary people. Weber states, however, that charismatic authority is volatile and only last as long as the benefits of the charisma continue to be received. To enable the continued receipt of the advantages of a specific charisma, the leader and followers seek to institutionalize the charisma by giving it structure. This institutionalization of charisma occurs as the community assigns tasks within the group, establishes rules and procedures, and through the codification of group beliefs. Once charisma becomes routinized, the community of followers seek to ensure its continuity by transferring the charisma from the gifted individual to a more stable construct. Weber proposes that one of the ways of achieving this, is termed charisma of office. He asserts that charisma is held in a position of public office and transferred through rituals from one individual to another. The incumbent officeholder wields the charismatic authority only as long as they maintain their appointment. Weber argues that in modern states this transfer occurs
during elections when incoming politicians assume the charisma of their office and are viewed as exceptional by virtue of the position they hold. The concept of charisma of office is most evident in states that have a history of representational government like New Zealand.

The rights to exercise representative authority come from holding the appropriate political office and through the delegated authority to govern, received from the electorate. This caveat on representative authority is consistent with Locke’s theory that political authority relies on the consent of civil society. Representative authority is also legitimised by the limitations placed on its power by state institutions and the political freedom of its people. In New Zealand, representative authority is exercised by a House of Representatives, Parliament. State leadership is then determined by the political party with the majority of representatives forming the executive branch, Cabinet. In the New Zealand system, the separation of power premised by Montesquieu, is manifested in the Parliament as legislature, Cabinet as executive, and Courts as judiciary branch. This separation is blurred, however, by the requirement for members of the executive branch to also be Members of Parliament. This requirement allows the Prime Minister, who selects Cabinet ministers, and their senior party members, to exert significant influence of New Zealand’s House of Representatives and the legislative process. Thus New Zealand’s model of government is inconsistent with Locke’s argument of limiting the power of the state to maximise the individual liberty of its citizens. Civil society, however, entrusts representative authority to the state based on the rationale that the government exists to pursue the common good. Political bodies reassure the public that their actions promote the common good through the use of discourse.

Discourse is used by actors within a field to legitimise their interests. Foucault asserts that discourse is ‘language in action’, a concept extrapolated by Habermas to be the ‘strategic use’ of language to orient a specific audience to take a desired action. Habermas’ theory is a functionalist paradigm that examines the purpose and function of what language is trying to achieve. Of particular significance to my examination of New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security is the function of language to create knowledge about the security field through discourse. Foucault argues that discourse constructs the topic, and brings into existence the context that it claims to describe. He views discourse as not only textual, but includes the structures and practices that form the objects about which they speak. The structures and authority created through discursive practices within a specific field, establish a hierarchy that gives greater prestige or power to some offices within the field. This means an individual’s identity and behaviour are shaped by the role they assume within a field.
In liberal democracies, political discourse is used to legitimise political power. The term security is rhetorically powerful and carries significant emotional appeal. Political actors realise the potential for security discourse to be used to strengthen their authority in other policy sectors by tying an issue to the security field. The strength of the security field comes from society’s need to feel safe and free from fear.

National security is difficult to oppose, as it is seen as a politically neutral necessity and universally desirable for all members of society. Daniel Bar Tal asserts that security beliefs play a central part in a society’s ethos and are constructed through its member’s perceptions of military, political, economic and cultural experiences. These collective experiences lead to the construction of security beliefs relative to the likelihood of threats and society’s ability to respond to them. The greater the perception of the threat, the more prominence security beliefs assume in society. Security beliefs allow a society’s members to validate their need for protection and will use any means available in pursuit of security. This assertion suggests that the achieving a state of security is the most important objective of society. Invoking the umbrella of security for political issues and public policy tends to relegate routine concerns and legitimise extraordinary measures that strengthen the power of the political authority. The theory of securitization argues that any issue can be presented as an existential threat that justifies the use of procedures and actions that are outside normal political process. A consequence of the political use of securitization is that the construction of threats within civil society can stimulate insecurity, which enhances the power of those actors already in a dominant political position. Barry Buzan asserts that an issue is only considered to be securitized, however, when a recognised securitizing agent’s articulation of a threat is accepted by their intended audience. Once an issue is securitized, society’s sensitivity to a threat’s existence creates an acceptance of measures in response that circumvent the requirements for government accountability and transparency to its people. By controlling the security discourse, a political authority can minimise, or bypass public scrutiny of its actions. The strength of security discourse is unique, in that it is the only social discourse with the urgency and impact that has the capacity to create a centralised model of political power inside a decentralised construct of government.

The NSS centralises authority for New Zealand’s national security operations in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister exerts authority over the NSS through their leadership of the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security. Their authority in the security field is further strengthened by the NSA appointment being tied to the office of Chief Executive
DPMC. Legitimised through charisma of office, the New Zealand Prime Minister and NSA can monopolise and control New Zealand’s national security discourse. The acceptance of the Prime Minister and NSA as securitizing agents by the New Zealand public, gives them the capacity to introduce an issue into the national security discourse. This is achieved by constructing the issue as an existential threat to the common good of New Zealand. Through their control of the security discourse, the Prime Minister and his department can strengthen the hegemony of power already inherent in New Zealand’s Prime Ministerial type of government. An implication of this centralisation of authority is that the power of the securitizing agents is of sufficient strength that the government agencies involved in New Zealand’s security sector can be manipulated, rather than negotiated with. By centralising authority for the NSS in DPMC, the New Zealand Government aligns to the hierarchical type of the structural perspective for its whole of government approach to national security.

The NSS lacks the elements that provide the clear direction required within the structural perspective to enable lower levels of the system to implement the whole of government approach proposed. Frontline agencies ensure successful resolution of security events, by coordinating with other contributing organisations at the incident site, by negotiating pragmatic working relationships. In this way, the lowest levels of the NSS apply a negotiative methodology to the structural perspective of the whole of government concept. These differing applications create significant challenges for the middle tier agencies within New Zealand’s national security system. Bureaucratic officials with New Zealand’s government agencies are responsible for linking political intent with operational reality. The centralisation of power with central government, removes the agencies’ ability to work with peer agencies to develop common processes for the application of a cross-agency response. The NSS construct of authority leaves New Zealand’s government agencies in ‘no man’s land’. They are stuck between a political authority that dominates New Zealand’s security field through its ability to construct and control the national security discourse and the frontline agents who must successfully resolve security issues for the New Zealand public. This impotent position may contribute to the agencies’ lack of engagement with the responsibilities assigned to them in the NSS. The disparity of power within this relationship reduces the transparency of government action as it removes the aspect of competition inherent in a distributed power model. This creates a political environment in which elites are created. These elites strengthen their power by centralising authority in their office which allows them to enact measures that reduce their accountability to the electorate. Through this reduced accountability to the electorate, the state usurps civil society as the sovereign authority within the territory they
occupy. The centralised power model created in the NSS is not consistent with the Westminster model of government used by New Zealand.

Under the New Zealand model of Westminster government, the people are represented by Parliament. It is through New Zealand’s Parliament that a significant amount of legislative proposals are examined by opposition parties and the public as they are processed. These proposals are introduced by either Members of Parliament from Parliamentary debate, or by public submission to select committees. New Zealand’s select committees are the means of providing Parliamentary checks on the executive and administrative branches of the state. These committees are critical links between the general will of the New Zealand public and their government. It is through these links that civil society raises concerns with the political authority, and the state maintains the consent of the people. The 1986 Defence Committee of Enquiry is an example of one of these select committees.

The 1986 Defence Committee of Enquiry conducted a public consultation of the New Zealand population to determine their defence and security concerns. The findings of this process were manifested in New Zealand’s 1987 Defence White Paper and the foundations of the DESC system. Despite further public consultation occurring during the defence and security reviews in 1996 and 2009, it is the 1986 data that the NSS authors assert is the basis for New Zealand’s national security system. The NSS offers no explanation of why the 1986 data is given precedence over later public opinion. One reason may be due to the significant difference in the levels of public engagement between the three reviews. The 1986 consultation drew over 4000 submissions, whereas the combined submissions from 1996 and 2009 did not total more than 500 petitions. The use of the 1986 consultation may suggest that the New Zealand Government believes that the New Zealand public are apathetic to national security issues. Alternatively, it may indicate the New Zealand Government is not actually interested in hearing the security concerns of its civil society, but more focussed on establishing its control over New Zealand’s security sector. By constructing a national security context that encompasses the entire gambit of social issues, the state has the freedom to securitize any of these issues, making them difficult to oppose. The ability for the New Zealand Government to securitize a social issue is further strengthened by the charisma of office given to political actors within New Zealand. The NSS exacerbates the centralisation of power by asserting the authority of central government within national security operations and establishing the dominance of the DPMC over New Zealand’s security discourse. The dominance of a single agency over all other agencies involved in New Zealand’s national security system, not only undermines the
implementation of an effective whole of government approach to national security, but also creates hegemony of power that is inconsistent with New Zealand’s liberal democratic ideals.

In answering my primary research question, I argue that my initial hypothesis was correct, but only to a certain extent. New Zealand government agencies are obstructed from applying a whole of government approach to national security by their organisational structures. The primary inhibitors to cross-agency cooperation are the bureaucratic institutions of New Zealand’s government agencies that focus those organisations within their specific policy fields by aligning accountability, funding and performance to sector objectives. This reluctance towards multiagency cooperation is evident in the New Zealand government agencies’ disregard of their national security responsibilities. Although a lack of desire by its government agencies can undermine New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security, central government leadership that encourages cross-agency cooperation could mitigate this hesitancy. New Zealand’s central Government, however, appears more intent upon strengthening their political authority within the security field, than removing the departmental boundaries that inhibit a whole of government response to national security issues. By centralising power within the DPMC, the New Zealand government removes the ability of other agencies to exert influence within the NSS. This construct removes the willingness of government to expend time and resources in optimising their activities within the national security field, as their efforts will not be reflected in departmental outcomes. The New Zealand public also appear disinterested in national security issues, but for different reasons. New Zealand’s people place significant trust in their political leadership to make decisions that contribute to the common good. In New Zealand, the charisma of office bestowed on political institutions and transferred to the individuals holding key appointments extends to the field of security. The New Zealand public accept the national security interests articulated in the NSS originated from experts in the security field, and are an accurate representation of civil society’s needs. It is the unique combination of the three aspects discussed above that inhibit New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security.

By exploring New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security, my research identified that the potential benefits of this type of approach were not being realised. The discrepancies identified in my research suggest an examination of responsibility and accountability within New Zealand’s national security system is overdue. Asking where responsibility for national security lies and to whom the New Zealand government is
accountable for its decisions surrounding national security issues are questions that need to be answered. Despite this, the NSS provides a solid basis for developing a more effective cross-agency response to security issues. My research also indicated several opportunities for future enquiry into New Zealand’s national security system that are beyond the scope of this thesis.

The validity of a whole of government approach to New Zealand’s national security operations is one of these opportunities. For a country of New Zealand’s size and resources, a whole of government approach would seem the best option for exploiting the synergy of interagency cooperation to achieve resolutions disproportionate to the sum of the resources committed to a security response. This assertion is made without the benefit of researching different methodologies used for coordinating national security operations. Whilst whole of government initiatives have been successful used in policy areas outside of security and by other states, the uniqueness of New Zealand’s national security context demands an operating system that is customised to that particular environment. Regardless of the approach adopted, the national security system must meet the specific national security interests of New Zealand’s civil society.

New Zealand’s national security interests should be determined by the civil society. Not only is this consistent with New Zealand’s Lockean model of liberal democracy, but also public ownership of their security interests will stimulate a greater attentiveness towards government action within the security field. The foundations for New Zealand’s current national security interests and their associated objectives, are a public consultation process conducted in 1986. The global environment and demographic of New Zealand’s civil society have changed significantly since then, and the validity of 1986 data in the current era must be questioned. The New Zealand Government has presented the New Zealand public their contemporary national security interests, however do not explain how these interests were derived. Attempts at public consultation, regarding defence and security issues, accompanied the defence reviews of 1996 and 2009, but were not well supported by the people. Changes to the NSS seek to modify components of an institutionalised system that was developed to meet the challenges of a global security environment very different from the present. The 1987 security framework was designed after open consultation with the New Zealand public. A series of surveys were conducted to empirically measure the fears of the nation. The results demonstrated concerns consistent with the traditional understanding of national security. The greatest fear was nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union. The foci for international engagement were the traditional ‘friends’ in Europe, Canada and the United States. This foundation for New Zealand national security governance structures was
maintained in later defence and security policies, despite the upheavals in the global context. This has left the New Zealand system for the management of security issues largely unaltered from that established in response to the fears of the citizens during the Cold War period. Changes to New Zealand’s national security architecture have been primarily superficial. Rebranding of existing components, and the addition of more subordinate level organisations, has only served to strengthen its bureaucracy. Institutionalization theory indicates that the further an organisation departs from its origin, the more resistant will its members be to modifications in processes and procedures. This would suggest that the longer New Zealand’s 1987 approach to security is maintained, the less likely government agencies will increase their investment of time, people and resources within the NSS. The New Zealand public share their government agencies’ indifference towards national security. Although public interest is currently high, due to the controversial introduction of increased surveillance powers of New Zealand intelligence agencies, and the debate surrounding the government’s decision to deploy troops to Iraq, this is not the norm. This heightened sensitivity to security issues is a significant opportunity to conduct research into New Zealanders security concerns, needs and wants. From such research, the New Zealand Government would have contemporary national security interests that are consistent with the general will of its civil society and reflect the country’s unique security environment. This contemporary focus would allow the NSS to be further developed into a more complete national security system.

In this research, I articulated four secondary research questions that enabled me to explore the validity of my primary hypothesis that the current structure of New Zealand’s government agencies inhibits the implementation of a whole of government approach to security. The first question, what is New Zealand’s national security context within its particular strategic environment, examined New Zealand’s national security context. The 2010 Defence White Paper and 2011 NSS were the primary sources for gathering data on issues identified by NSS as being a threat to New Zealand’s national security. The security context constructed by the White Paper and NSS is one of breadth not depth. It covers a range of risks from individual security concerns to global systemic issues. The lack of definition in the discussing New Zealand’s spectrum of national security threats allows any issue to be introduced into this field with only tenuous links to national security. This situation seats power within New Zealand’s national security field with the political authority. Specific to the NSS, the power to introduce an issue into New Zealand’s security discourse is invested in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Defence White Paper and NSS were produced by the New Zealand Government with limited public consultation therefore the security context and interests presented in these
documents are more representative of the concerns of the political authority rather than the New Zealand public. New Zealand’s national security context and the national security interests that fall from it, should reflect the fears and concerns of the New Zealand population. A deliberate public consultation should be undertaken to identify how the New Zealand public perceive their security environment, their national security concerns and the national security interests that are derived from this process. This consultation would then provide a core framework from which to develop New Zealand’s whole of government approach to national security.

My remaining supplementary research questions explored the whole of government approach, its use in liberal democratic governments, and the ways through which the government applies the concept. The research examined the difficulty for bureaucratically structured organisations to articulate what a whole of government approach is. My research concluded that there was no universal approach to whole of government initiatives, and organisations are required to develop cross agency procedures that are effective in resolving the specific issue at hand. The Australian Public Service presents a model of “Best Practice Whole of Government” that proposes five core elements for successful cross departmental operations\(^{388}\). The first element is clearly defined leadership roles. The NSS aims to achieve this through the delegation of a lead agency for specific issues, however, as my discussion asserts most New Zealand agencies do not identify these security responsibilities in their corporate documentation.

The second principle identified by the Australian Public Service as ‘best practice whole of government’ is the importance of relevant expertise and effective working relationships over the political status of individuals or organisations. This element is important in the context of New Zealand’s national security system as the security responsibilities of the key decision makers within the NSS are supplementary to their primary role. The Prime Minister and Chief Executive of DPMC are not chosen for office because of their security sector expertise, yet are expected to make decisions that affect the national security of New Zealand’s people. The focus for the individuals and the agencies identified in the NSS remain with their primary departmental accountabilities, not in expending resources towards resolving security risks and threats that may not eventuate.

\(^{388}\) Committee, "Connecting Government: Whole of government responses to Australia’s priority challenges." p. 13
The NSS attempts to practice the third element, flexible processes and outcomes, by remaining relatively vague in its approach to national security response. This lack of clearly defined roles however leads New Zealand Government agencies to be selective in their prioritisation of their national security responsibilities. An agency’s full participation in national security operations usually only occurs if the activities undertaken directly contribute to departmental objectives or accountabilities. This ‘siloing’ of agency resources is the antithesis of the fourth core element which is the collective pooling of assets. The use of appropriate resources shared amongst contributing agencies to achieve the best outcome for the New Zealand public should be the aim of any national security response. Aligned to this concept is the fifth, and final, element for best practice whole of government, agency commitment to collaborative outcomes in whole of government activities. Despite the presence of these guidelines for best practice, implementation of a whole of government approach will remain difficult for New Zealand’s bureaucratically structured government departments. The development of a national security strategy would be an effective bureaucratic device for introducing the whole of government best practice principles into New Zealand’s national security apparatus.

New Zealand’s national security system needs to be focussed on meeting the security concerns of its public placing power in the hands of the people not the political interests of the government of the day. A deliberately constructed national security strategy to operate within a security context based on comprehensive public consultation would provide a strong foundation for developing more collaborative national security architecture. A national security strategy, as a stand-alone policy document, could introduce responsibilities and accountabilities outside of departmental objectives that hold the same level of accountability to central government.

Only a national security strategy based on the security interests would ensure consistency and stability of national security objectives. Separating national security objectives from the fleeting influence of political interest allows agencies to take a long term, more proactive approach to planning for and resourcing their responsibilities in this area. As national security objectives will not change with a change in government, departments can implement their own strategies for meeting their assigned security goals that go beyond New Zealand’s three year term of representative government. This creation of departmental strategies could identify cross agency relationship that would enhance not only the collaborative outcomes achieved but also the organisation’s commitment to the whole of government culture.
The title of the *National Security System* is a misnomer. The NSS document is not the embodiment of a complete system. It is incomplete in the sense that it does not include every significant element. No overarching strategy for national security is presented. Additionally, no universal understanding among New Zealand’s Government agencies, of what national security is, has been provided. No commonality of terms, procedures and standards has been established by the authors, and the networks and connections between actors involved in the NSS, both internal and external, remain ill-defined. The NSS simply describes the framework under which the New Zealand Government aspires its security agencies to work. The NSS document is only a single component of the system it purports to be. Without appropriate definition and direction from central government, agencies will continue to function under their institutionalised perceptions of the security environment. Agencies involved in national security activities will struggle to operate in a coherent, whole of government fashion, without the development of a complete New Zealand national security system.
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Non-fiction.


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