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SUBMISSION BASED DIRECT FUNDING:
DOES IT CONCUR WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF EMPOWERMENT?

A thesis presented in fulfilment of
the requirement for the degree of
Master of Philosophy in Development Studies
at Massey University

Caroline Gardner
2000
ABSTRACT

After a review of recent developmental writings, it can be concluded that an effective system for encouraging and promoting endogenous development is yet to be fully articulated in both development practice and theory. It is proposed in this thesis, that SBDF presents an alternative and effective distribution system for small community run project/programmes compared to that which is currently being employed by the majority of ODA agencies. SBDF is based around the idea of partnership between local and international development agencies, this model situates the donor in the role of facilitator to endogenously directed development.

SBDF can be described as a system where local groups plan, design and implement projects with the support of a donor agency. This paper analyses the SBDF system used by the Canada Fund (CF) in Samoa to fund small community-run projects. This funding system differs from other small funding programmes in a number of important ways:

- The fund is actively made available to vulnerable subgroups within the community. The CF utilises networking and ‘cold-calling’ to access these groups. This proactive approach to disseminating information about the fund is specific to the CF.
- The CF provides support throughout the project process where this is required, thereby ensuring that organisational capacity building is an ongoing and organic process.
- A partnership is created between the donor and the local organization. This is defined by open dialogue between both partners throughout all stages of the project and the necessity for local partners to contribute resources and finance to the project; thereby ensuring local ownership of projects.

The study concluded that the SBDF model embodies much of the current theoretical thinking on empowerment, which places emphasis on the need for the primacy of endogenous control in the project process. A number of problems with the SBDF are recognised and recommendations are made for the improvement of the system, namely in regard to how local groups can increase their capacity in the areas of monitoring and accountability with the assistance of the donor agency.
I would like to acknowledge all of those people in Samoa who allowed time for my questions and whose generosity aided this research. Particular thanks goes to Komiti Tumama and Women in Business Foundation (WIB), who were pro-active in involving me in their field trips and introducing me to those involved in their projects. Many thanks to all those who took time out of their schedules to talk with me. Thank you also to Numea Simi and Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop who were both very patient in answering my questions.

I would like to thank CF for allowing me access to their files, and in particular to Don Hunter for making time to talk to me about his work. Thank you also to the support received from the Massey University Graduate Research Fund, and my supervisor Donovan Storey. Thank you also to David and Lorraine, Melita, Mhaidre and Emerson, Katie, Zoe and to Kushla for her support and fine cooking.
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<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>The Canada Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Community Organisation</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Direct Funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRO</td>
<td>Grass Roots Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KT</td>
<td>Komiti Tumama (national headquarters of the village women's committees)</td>
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<td>LNGO</td>
<td>Local Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWA</td>
<td>Ministry of Women's Affairs</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>SBI/F</td>
<td>Submission Based Direct funding</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>WIB</td>
<td>Women in Business Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAD</td>
<td>The theory of Women and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>The theory of Women in Development</td>
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<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
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### GLOSSARY

- **Aiga**
  - Extended family (the extent of this varies)
- **Fa'amatai**
  - The system of leadership whereby leaders are democratically elected to represent their aiga, and are responsible for the use of village resources
- **Fa'asamoa**
  - The Samoan way of life, according to Samoan customs and traditions
- **Fa'alavelave**
  - The times when assistance or recognition should be given, as at weddings and birthdays, or in times of sickness
- **Fono**
  - The villages governing council, made up of matais
- **Fegaiga**
  - The sacred relationship connecting brothers and sisters
- **Pule**
  - Authority, most notably that of the matais, over non matais
- **Komiti**
  - Committee, most often used to in reference to the village Women's committees
- **Matai**
  - The democratically elected leader of the aiga
- **Pulenu'u**
  - The village major, who liaises between village council and government
- **Tuatua**
  - Service, children to parents, villagers to matai, clergy to church
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INTRODUCTION

Western Samoan development cannot be transplanted from elsewhere. It is a process of transformation that should be anchored in local structures and values and which should grow out of the harmonious interaction of a stable economy, and its particular social and political institutions.

Numea Simi (1994:275)

The aid distribution system used by the Canada Fund (CF) was elected as the topic for this study due to its emphasis on the empowerment of local development entities, this philosophy and the system that accompanies it stood-out when compared with the other small funding systems operating in the Pacific. What differentiates the SBDF used by CF from that of other donors, is that the fund is actively made available to community groups who have not previously implemented a project, or received any funding from non-family sources. CF representative, after working with community groups (or NGOs) to identify what needs could be addressed by a community run project, then occupies a support role during the planning stage (and to a lesser extent during the implementation stage). The community gains a sense of empowerment through this process, which allows local groups control and responsibility of development initiatives, at all stages of the project process.

The ideal of empowerment is identified as a paramount aim of both 'Alternative Development' theories and Post-Development critiques. The research for this thesis aims at testing the hypothesis; that SBDF is a system that concurs with the principles of empowerment. In this paper the term direct funding is used to describe the activity of allotting monies to community groups, grass root organisations, or individuals to carry out projects, which are formulated and implemented by the fund recipients. The system could be said to concur with the following recommendation written by Botes and van Rensburg (2000:54):

A reorientation of the thinking of development professionals is therefore necessary in which they should adopt the motto of planning with and not for the people... Facilitators should never come with ready-made solutions or tell
the people what to do, they must rather encourage and assist people to think about their problems in their own way.

Critics of participatory development, which is currently the dominant means of achieving empowerment, argue that participatory methods have failed in numerous circumstances. This is due, in part, to the lack of change in the structure of the system that delivers aid, particularly where these have become mainstreamed. The SBDF model could go some way towards providing a much-needed prototype of a partnership dynamic between the development agendas of small locally based initiatives and donor bodies.

Empowerment theory highlights the need for improving the material and personal outlook of those in vulnerable subgroups within the community. This very basically, concurs with CF focus, which has a well-established WID agenda, this involves CF networking with a number of local women’s CO/NGOs and funding numerous projects with a WID focus. The field-study has a definite bias towards WID projects, the majority of research respondents were women, and consequently empowerment theory has been explored from a WID perspective. This bias aims at providing an opportunity for uncovering the quality of empowerment methods for women and to record the views of women in Samoa, thereby adding to the wealth of information on women in development. It is maintained although, that the issues explored in the research do have relevance for the wider community, also the way CF relates with women’s organisations is illustrative of effective empowerment practice.

Recently all of the taken for granted assumptions of development theory have been examined under the magnifying glass of Post Modernism. This dissection has been made necessary by development activities constantly falling short of their objectives. Chapter One reviews some Alternative and Post Developmental theories, asking the question of whether development still represents a feasible option for alleviating poverty, given the contemporary criticisms of its rudimentary assumptions. This brief discussion of contemporary development theory is necessary to situate SBDF within a theoretical context.
THE STUDY QUESTION

The hypothesis of this thesis is that SBDF as a donor aid disbursal system concurs with the principles of empowerment. Although Empowerment presents an unquantifiable and culturally/situationally defined concept, there are a number of agreed upon indicators of empowerment. These indicators represent the basis of the discussion. A number of subsidiary questions are also investigated in the research, these are:

- How do local Samoan NGO/COs view the system, what recommendations and criticisms exist?
- One of the aims of empowerment is that the poorest have access to tools and resource of change is SBDF accessible to the poorest, and is this access utilised?
- Within the context of the increasing professionalisation of indigenous/local NGOs, does SBDF Facilitate NGO empowerment agendas and actions?
- To what extent can a partnership relationship exist between donor and local CO/NGOs, does SBDF allow for the indigenous direction of development or do donor agendas define what form local development will take?
- What is the potential for SBDF to access marginalised sectors of the community?
METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research for this study aimed at testing the hypothesis - that SBDF effectively embodies the spirit of empowerment theory. This presented a difficult task due to the multitude of variables that contribute to empowerment and in the majority of cases the non-testability and non-empirical nature of these indicators. As both a result of this and the participatory nature of the research the hypothesis has been tested largely on the opinions held by those who have used CF and also those who may utilise the fund at some later date. These opinions have been gathered mainly through in-depth interviews, in some cases with the assistance of written surveys. The aims of these interviews were to:

• Provide a description and analysis of a donor aid distribution system that has been recorded in few development commentaries.
• Establish how local Samoan people viewed CF and whether it was a beneficial system that catered to their needs.
• To investigate the ideas of ownership of projects and review access to funding by various groups.
• To investigate the relationship between CF representative and local organisations and individuals by interviewing both local and CF representatives.
• To form a number of recommendations based on the opinions of those interviewed and observations made of the system, as well as drawing on the theories of empowerment and participation. To provide an analysis of the CF projects over the last seven years by Sector and Region.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

The thesis tests the hypothesis by using both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the aim of gauging the degree of practical compliance to theoretical assumptions. The research strategy involved three main differing systems of collecting data. These were:
• The data collection and analysis of CF files, which provided a break down of
the where the fund has been spent (regions, project types, WID etc.), and
changes in spending over the course of CFs existence.

• The second part of the research involved in-depth interviews with Don Hunter
- the representative for CF in Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands. This was
done over the course of six months.

• The third and largest part of the research involved interviews conducted in
Samoa. The philosophy behind the field research was that it should be
participatory in its approach, consequently research aims and objectives where
questioned throughout the research. Those involved where given the
opportunity to shape discussions and define the issues explored in the study.

THE CANADA FUND DATA

Data from the CF working files was made available to me for the purposes of this study.
From this data a longitudinal analysis was constructed, which included all of the
projects funded between 1991 - 1999. This does not correspond to a discrete number of
projects due to some projects being divided into two or three funding lots, as well as
ongoing program/projects, which received funding over various years.

The CF representative changed in 1994 and which bought about a change in the systems
used to record and store information. This factor, added to the fact that CF is a relatively
new program (established in 1990) meant that information contained in the files was not
homogenous and there were many discrepancies in the data. This informed the research
as to the need for a re-structured information system, a fact that is also being reviewed
at CF. The main lack of information was in the area of project reviews and subsequently
details on project outcomes and success are not used as the basis for analysis in this
thesis.

The interviews with CF representative (Don Hunter) were conducted over the space of a
six-month period; many of these were informal talks slotted in around time spent
working with information from CF project files. The informal interview time would
have totalled around eight hours.
THE FIELDWORK

Due to limitations of time and space, representation from every project subgroup (education, health, women's projects, educational infrastructure, etc.) could not be included in the field study interviews. The subgroups chosen reflect certain trends in aggregate funding, whilst ignoring others (see project limitations for discussion). WID projects make-up between one quarter and one half of each year's projects.

A combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques were used in this study, these included face-to-face interviews, individual surveys, group surveys, and participant observation. Face-to-face interviews were the primary technique used, some of the interviews with larger groups were initially aided by written surveys, these were later discarded as a means of obtaining information, as verbal interviews proved to be most effective. The survey respondents were as follows:

- 9 Workers from NGOs that had received funding from CF
- 5 Workers from NGOs that had not received funding from CF
- 16 Local women who were involved in a project that was supported by CF and a local NGO
- 6 Local people who were not involved in any project associated with CF

The responses from these interviews are represented in graphs, tables and are interspersed as quotes throughout the study.
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<td>Government officials</td>
<td>Survey</td>
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The key interviews included - Numea Simi (Samoan Minister of Foreign Affairs), Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop (Development theorist and NGO worker), Adi Tafunai (Director of the WIBF), Don Hunter (CF representative) and the small-fund administrators at the Australian and New Zealand embassies. These interviews where conducted face-to-face with additional correspondence in some cases. Responses from these interviews are interspersed throughout the thesis.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND REPORTING BACK

Throughout the research all participants were informed as to the relationship between the interviewer/researcher and CF, all respondents, to the best of the author’s knowledge, accepted the fact that the research had no influence over CF funding decisions. The confidentiality of all those providing their opinions and experiences was assured, where direct quotes have been used, the speaker is either unidentifiable or permission has been granted to quote. The majority of the discussions with key informant speakers were open to direct quotation.
All NGOs involved in the research and CF will be sent a summary of the research findings. A copy will also be forwarded to the Nelson Memorial Library in Apia for general access.

**BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH**

There is very little theoretical or empirically-based information available on small project funding, not least in the context of Alternative or Post-Development Theorising. The work is aimed at describing and evaluating CF SBDF system in light of this lack of available literature on the topic.

The CF office in Wellington has an interest in this study, the research has focused on specific areas of interest to the CF these are:

- The spread of projects by region and group over the last seven years
- Ways in which the information about the project has been disseminated, and can be improved upon
- The potential role of monitoring systems

The research is also aimed at providing people in the NGO/CO community in Samoa a chance to express their opinions and criticisms of CF and other donor systems.

**RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND HOW THESE WERE ADDRESSED**

The fieldwork for this paper should be introduced with reference to the critique offered up by Chambers, who writes, “Those concerned with rural development and with rural research become linked to networks of urban rural contacts. They are then pointed to those rural places where it is known that something is being done” (Chambers 1983:16). In Samoa the information, non-financial resources and personal contact (excepting the small proportion that come directly to the CF) are channelled between donor and community group through a limited number of connections, one of these is the regional women’s committee (KT). These same channels were used to contact a large number of the research respondents. This was balanced by eleven out of the thirty correspondents being from a group that has not been partnered by CF at any time. These respondents
were largely NGO workers although three rural and uninvolved people were interviewed. The opinions of the those marginalised by geography and/or social mobility were not represented as effectively as they could have been, this was due to limited resources that restricted the time allocated for fieldwork.

The study was not representative of all subgroups that access the CF. Certain groups such as schools and religious communities where not included in the study, both of which send in a number of applications and receive a large percentage of the available funding. This is primarily due to the study being focused in the direction of women and community funding. These groups were focused on, as the effectiveness of empowering donor practice would be able to be observed more effectively in these situations. Ideally a representation from every sub-group within the community (churches, vocational training institutes, community preschools committees) would have been included in the survey, however again due to time restraints this was not possible. It should be noted that the population was not restricted to those who had received funding; academics, NGO workers whose organisations had not received funding, and Government representatives were also interviewed. Of those interviewed the majority were women, reflecting the previously mentioned bias of the study, as well certain systems and priorities of the CF.

The collection of local opinions for use in statistical information and tables occurred through two different methods - the first surveys, the second informal interviews. The surveys were partially successful, their use in the fieldwork revealed that only six out the ten questions were useful or relevant to the study (while various opinions were sought on the questionnaire, no pilot study was able to be done due to restrictions on time in Samoa). As a result after the first few interviews questions were asked verbally. Conversation and informal questioning resulted in a more enthusiastic response from the majority of respondents. The information gathered from the interviews is combined with the results from the surveys in which the same questions were covered. Discrepancies in the gathering of data are substantiated by the strong trends in the information and opinions given. Data that did not have strong patterns was omitted from analysis in tables. Minority opinions are represented either in the tables or in the text through quotes.
Language presented a barrier to the exchange of information. While the surveys were translated into both Samoan and English, there were problems with the translations at some points, with questions being translated ineffectively. Local Samoan speaking NGO workers who were present for the majority of these interviews mitigated these problems. Answers to written surveys were given in English or Samoan; those in Samoan were later translated.

Due to the wide framework of the study, a number of topics have only received a brief mention. The nature of Samoan culture and its response to development efforts does not receive an in-depth analysis; this is due to the primary focus of the study being on the SBDF system. Reference is made to the Samoan situation where the interaction of local organisations and CF are influenced by the wider cultural environment. For instance the role of faʻalavelave is discussed in the case of the Siumu piggery where CF project expectations originally differed from the local requirements. It needs to be noted that the faʻalavelave system like other components of Samoan culture is only touched on briefly.
CHAPTER ONE - PLACING THE STUDY WITHIN A CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

As Hans Jensen (van den Berg et al. 1998:53) writes, "with almost universal endorsement ... development is not something that can be imported, as if it were duty free cognac".

Empowerment theory cannot be considered as distinct from a broader discourse, generally named liberal or Alternative Development. Other facets of this Alternative Development include - bottom-up theory, grass-roots development appropriate technology and participatory practices. The factor that connects these differing strains of Alternative Theory is their dialectical opposition to mainstream development activities. Methods previously used to 'develop' impoverished peoples - generally taking the form of blueprint-project-solution from the desk of an expert and transposing it to the fields of a developing country, are now generally regarded as patronising and ineffective. These models are now being replaced with ones that emphasis participation, empowerment the knowledge of local people, and their right to determine the future of local development.

This chapter will focus on the strains of Alternative Theory that are based on the ideas of empowerment and participation. The relationship between participation and empowerment is reflexive; one is seldom referred to without the other. The World Bank, for instance has included "empowerment as one of the main objectives of community participation.... The UNDP Human Development (1993:21) Report defines participation in terms of 'people having constant access to decision-making and power'" (Craig and Mayo 1995:2), a phrase that could equally be used to describe pragmatic empowerment. This chapter will firstly discuss participation, which Botes and van Rensburg (2000:41) describe as one of the "most overused and least understood concepts in development practice". It will then go on to outline the reciprocal relationship between empowerment and participation.
While the connection between these two concepts is strong and multifaceted, this chapter also addresses the paradox inherent in both empowerment and participation theory. That is; if local direction and control of development is imperative, then how do new ideas or challenges to traditional hierarchies enter the process without the influence of an outsider? While a number of theorists (Chambers, 1983, Friere 1972) promote the idea of a benevolent and well-trained facilitator who can draw out inspiration and the desire to critique society from those that they work with, other theorists, including a number from the Post-Development school, warn that this role in itself could be replicating traditional Eurocentric and patronising practices. The paradox or question basically put then is - how can local development be encouraged without the ideals and goals inherent to western countries being transposed onto cultures where these will be irrelevant at the least and damaging at the worst?

In reference to recent Post-Development writings the question will also be asked: given the recent challenges to the basic precepts of development does 'development' still represent a feasible option to problems of unequal of poverty? The chapter finishes by answering this question and describing how the praxis of partnership, provides possible answers to some of the problems illustrated in the rest of the chapter.

EMPOWERMENT APPROACH

Empowerment has been used to describe a number of divergent happenings and as some theorists warn, is in danger of becoming an empty rhetoric (Craig and Mayo 1995, Rahnema 1996). This is due to its co-option by numerous mainstream aid organisations. Its inclusion into these mission statements is due to its embodiment of the new development ethic (Alternative Development) in one succinct word. Recently Edwards (1994:282) defined development as:

Empowerment - increasing the control which the poor and powerless (and specifically the poorest and the most powerless) are able to exert over aspects of their lives which they consider important to them.

Axiomatic to the empowerment approach is the centrality of local actors in all stages of the project cycle, the aim of this, being local autonomy in the decision making process.
The role of learning is also a common factor emphasised by empowerment theorists (Friere 1992, Chambers 1983, Escobar 1995). These theorists recommend that so-called experts re-orientate their interactions with local people, to a relationship where both parties can learn from the development process. Friedman (1992) maintains that the secondary, although by no means less salient characteristic of empowerment is that while oppressive structures are challenged at the grass roots, the macro political scenario must also be challenged. The outcomes of this should be the transformation of the political scenario, to one where the achievements of small-scale community development can be supported by political and policy frameworks.

From the panoply of methods for achieving empowerment a pared down continuum of meanings can be constructed, with those who support pragmatic empowerment at one end and those who support strategic empowerment at the other (to borrow Moser's (1989) phraseology). These two poles of opinion closely correspond with the dual methods for achieving empowerment. Pragmatic development centers on self-help and autonomy through participation and decision making (Fowler 1996, Chambers 1983, Knippers Black 1991) and is often related to individual empowerment, which is described as a positive self-concept (Friere 1972), increased self-esteem and self worth (Moser 1989). At the other end of the continuum are those theorists who see strategic empowerment as the most vital form of addressing inequities (Rahnema 1992, Friere 1972, Escobar 1995, Craig and Mayo 1995). This definition sees empowerment as relying on some degree of developed self and situational knowledge (the process of conscientisation). Therefore enabling some kind of strategic change that counter-acts the forces seeking to keep people in situations of poverty, for example; patriarchy, capitalism, traditionalism, colonialism. The empowerment approach in this light places emphasis on a redistribution of power within and between societies.

Most theorists though, fall somewhere in between these two poles (Friedman 1992, Rahman 1996, Weiringa 1994) and see empowerment as a multilevel process of transformation, which must occur at the personal/psychological, societal and political levels, if it is to be fully effective in enacting and sustaining change. One recurring method of achieving holistic empowerment that these theorists advise is a system whereby an appropriately educated facilitator aims at including local actors in the development process. Through such an approach, it is hoped that by addressing
practical requirements, strategic needs will then be identified and addressed. One model, which places emphasis on both systems of gaining empowerment is the one promoted by WAD theorists (Moser 1989). This approach can be described as a two-step process, whereby addressing practical needs in an empowering manner creates the confidence and space for people to then enter into strategic change. The first step is characterised by contacting vulnerable groups, such as, those without self-confidence and esteem, who are not in position to effect change. The second step involves empowerment through learning and skills development then, once confidence has been borne in the individual, the opportunities for improving personal and community situations are increased. Concurring with Parson’s ideology, of power holdings in society, women’s empowerment is not seen primarily as redistribution of power, taking this from those who currently hold it, but rather as a way of accessing latent personnel power which can then be transformed into social action (Macbride-Stewart 1996: 10).

The next step involves empowered individuals being able to effect change for themselves and for others. This progression from personal to political power is presented in a very simplified model. In reality there are complex issues surrounding peoples self-perception and a panoply of factors, which maintain poverty and limiting social hierarchies.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

Participation and empowerment are symbiotically linked within the development process, and one is seldom referred to without the other. The UNDP Human Development Report (1993:21) defines participation in terms of “people having constant access to decision making and power” (Craig and Mayo 19952), a term that could equally be used to describe pragmatic empowerment. The connections between empowerment and participation are multifarious. This chapter will go on to describe

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1 Shadrake (1996) cites an example where a participant on a course aimed at empowerment, was beaten by her spouse as a result of returning home late from a workshop. The NGO worker who relayed this story, pointed out that empowerment was by no means a simple process.

2 Craig and Mayo (1995:5) identify Parson’s functionalism as indicating that power can be increased by the poorest, without detracting from the power of those who currently have it, as power is not a fixed variable.

3 Participation is not a new idea, “The words ‘participation’ and ‘participatory’ appeared for the first time in the development jargon during the 1950s” (Rahnema 1996:117), and were then crystallised into the Alternative People Centered Approach in the 1970s (Pieterse 1998:346). The ideas gathered momentum as a response to the failure of initiatives in the 1980s that used mainly large scale, top down, fiscally focused, centrally planned development systems (Tweed 1995D2: 1). Since that time the idea has reached mainstream development thinking and has become, together with empowerment the current catch phrase and panacea for developments past failures.
these, with particular reference to three factors: the emphasis on bottom-up development, the need for relevant policies, and the redefinition of what constitutes development from an indigenous point of view.

The first of these connections is the need for the inclusion of local entities in the development process, not as passive participants but as knowledgeable and informed actors. Axiomatic to both participation and empowerment is this idea of increasing the involvement and self-determination of those whom development most affects (Chambers 1983). The participatory approach “recognises the receivers of assistance as the most important resource for identifying appropriate programs within the context of their own social and cultural value system” (Tweed 1993D2). Or, as McKinnon (1993D3.1) describes it, “a situation in which the community does not just go along with what is expected of them regardless of whether they like it or not”. Previously, local people involved in welfare-based approaches were regarded as passive recipients who should be grateful for the benevolence of the funding body. This view has changed to one where intended beneficiaries have become integral partners in development to whom donors are accountable. There are dual reasons for this, which can be differentiated as either moral or efficient in their motivation (Shadrake 1996). The Neo-Liberal school of thought views participation as an effective way to secure cheap labour and ensure that services where supplied to communities at their own cost. This view is critiqued by those who promote participation on moral grounds (Rahnema 1992); in that self-determination is a right as opposed to colonialisation and oppression, which are ethically wrong.

The second factor common to both participation and empowerment is the requirement for relevant policies and programs. This is viewed as an outcome of participatory practices and a vital component of empowerment. The role of culture as a primary determinant in local conceptions of appropriate development is recognised by Empowerment theorists as a basic premise for ensuring relevant initiatives. The participation of local people in the project process, most particularly in the identification of needs and planning, is the main method promoted for ensuring cultural factors are considered.
Thirdly, Empowerment and Participatory Theory both aim at redefining the possibilities of development from the perspective of indigenous people. Friedmann (1992), who presents the most thorough theoretical prescription for an alternative development provides the opposing argument to Cowen and Shentons (1996) concept of development as a necessary diabolical combination of destruction and creation (as for change to happen the vestiges of historic action must fall away to make way for the new)⁴. Friedman (19919) maintains that:

*Proponents of an alternative development question the assertion that creative destruction is inextricably linked to the story of human progress. They demand that the question of what furthers human life be examined on its own merits. If social and economic development means anything at all, it must mean clear improvement in the conditions of life and the livelihood of ordinary people.*

The Contemporary aims of development are seen as distinct from economic progress and increased national production, which were, previous to Alternative Theory seen as indicators of effective development. Friedman (1992) recommends a re-working of economic theorising to take account of the factors that separate people from simple rational entities. One example he cites is the idea of mobility within workforces, which assumes people will make rational choices based on available work and therefore be able to move for work. This economic rationalism ignores the realities of people's lives. For those individuals 'logically' assumed to be completely mobile, numerous personal costs will, in reality, be factored into the decision-making process, such as family responsibilities, bonds with family and friends, health and a love of the homeland. It is these factors that Friedman argues largely determine one's quality of life. The aim of autonomy for local developmental decision-making creates space for conceptions of development to be redefined in a culturally (and personally) relevant way.

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⁴ The only way that this will not occur is that after a social change the person still retains both choices; the choice to act in the traditional way and the choice to act in the new. Subsequently, according to Cowen and Shenton (1996) development necessarily entails destruction. Like the other Post-Developmentalists, Cowen and Shenton expose their version of the faulty historical structure of development although offer no plan for a rebuilding of these foundations.
The terms endogenous and exogenous empowerment are useful definitions that illustrate and separate the two main techniques of achieving empowerment, as well as shedding light on the wider precepts that surround the empowerment debate. Garbo (2000) coins these terms in relation to women's empowerment, although her conclusions can easily be extended to cover empowerment in a general sense. Exogenous empowerment refers to the strategies built on the belief that empowerment can be taught and promoted through the influence of appropriate others and that the cultural, social and economic causes of disempowerment can be affected by introduced education and capacity building. The idea of trusteeship established by Cowen and Shenton (1996:460) describes the role of the external development mediator — "the effective purpose of trusteeship [is] to be the deliberate balance between forces of decay and growth". This role is self-determined, as those who consider themselves developed set out to assist others to achieve this state also. Post-development theorists see the role of directing progress, as predominately limiting and oppressive and when referring to development practice, cite few occasions where the subjectivities of the trustee are transmitted in a way that protects the autonomy of the local people. Conversely, Alternate Theorists see the role of trusteeship as a facet of the development industry that can be used beneficially, as described by endogenous empowerment strategies.

Endogenous empowerment "strategies are those whose underlying premise is that external groups can only facilitate empowerment by creating enabling conditions for disempowered groups to empower themselves. The exogenous empowerment strategy implies a top-down approach while the endogenous strategy implies a bottom-up one" (Garbo 2000:169). Garbo's distinction is an important one; she also explains how these techniques relate to different versions of the empowerment concept, which can be seen as either a state that can be given (pragmatic empowerment) or as a process in which it developed over time (strategic empowerment). This distinction begins to take empowerment out from its place on the development catch-phrases shelf and root it more firmly in development discourse where it is culturally and politically defined and therefore not immune to developments historical problems.
Garbo goes on to illustrate how exogenous developments can lead to a situation where exogenous empowerment can occur. Although how and when these two development methods fit into the wider developmental context is not explained, instead it is stated that are both at times are relevant. This chapter goes on to question whether the theory of empowerment does provide a model for practice, and questions whether the dual aims of local autonomy and trustee-lead empowerment are mutually compatible.

**THE PARADOX: HOW DOES STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT OCCURS ENDOGENOUSLY?**

This chapter so far has shown that there are numerous theories on the way empowerment can be made manifest. It has been illustrated that the dual aims of strategic and practical empowerment correspond to two differing methods for achieving empowerment. Alternately, both types of empowerment are achieved through a series of stages, as practical empowerment naturally leads to strategic empowerment. This chapter explores a paradox that exists within these dual aims. Referring to this paradox, Friere (1972) wrote of ‘a fine line that a development practitioner must tread’, what he was describing with this phrase was the difficult task of addressing both strategic (or long-term) and practical (or short term) needs, while allowing for local autonomy. The problem is basically whether trustees can encourage local development without this being directed by their own intent and assumptions. This paradox will be illustrated through the following premises, which are all axiomatic to Empowerment theory:

Premise one: The need for development to be locally directed (Chambers 1992, Rahman 1996).

Premise two: Empowerment occurs by indigenous people gaining an understanding of the forces that work to oppress them and maintain power hierarchies (Freire 1972).

Premise three: An outside facilitator must work with local people to uncover these relationships.

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5 This question will be addressed later in the thesis in relation to donor agendas and the need for NGO/COs to tailor projects to funding criteria, or presumed assumptions about donor priorities.
These three premises are mutually compatible if it is the goal of indigenous groups to uncover oppressive systems and identify strategic needs. In this case development that tackles strategic needs can be endogenously directed. The paradox occurs where development agencies value local autonomy, yet have specific ideas about what constitutes strategic development.

The elements of the alternative development package are contradictory. In effect endogenism as a principle annuls any general formulation of alternative development. 'If the people are the principle actors in the alternative development paradigm, the relevant reality must be the people's own, constructed by them only' (Rahman 1993:220, emphasis in original). By this logic, how can there be a general alternative development theory, let alone a paradigm? There can only be an archipelago of local alternative perspectives. (Pieterse 1998:357)

Two distinct, though overlapping problems arise from the incompatibility of these two premises. The first problem exists when local people's development initiatives focus on short term practical solutions to what is viewed by Western theorists6 as ingrained political/social problems. The second problem occurs when foreign influence is inappropriate to local needs and/or culture. As Blackburn (2000:13) writes:

Here lies the hub of the problem: any predetermined vision of liberation introduced from the outside is ultimately paternalistic, since it presupposes that the oppressed are incapable of determining their own endogenously produced vision of liberation.

Firstly, the question must be asked if it is logically (not to mention morally) tenable for foreign actors to define what constitutes development. While participatory methods have challenged the idea of 'the educated outsider as expert' (Rahnema 1996), Western experts are still in a position to determine what constitutes appropriate indigenous development. Weiringa (1994) takes issue with this paradox in relation to women's empowerment questioning the process by which women's strategic and practical needs

6 The problem itself can be criticised, for being the consideration of the schooled elite/Western theorists. For local project implementers the macro situation may be understood in culturally relevant ways, not apparent to the outsider.
are identified. She maintains that the way needs are perceived by development actors is not questioned. Weiringa observes that women's realities are always discursively constructed, and questions the validity of a 'reality' that exists outside the local space. From this fine of reasoning it is argued that strategic concerns exist only because a planner has labelled them as such.

*It seems therefore, not to be the nature of the activities, which determine whether they effect the relations of oppression which women are faced with, but the context in which they take place, and the political motivation behind them. In other words, the distinction between strategic and practical gender interests is empirically not tenable (Weiringa 1994:840).*

Like Rahnema (1996), Weiringa supports only those issues raised by women themselves and warns of the dangers of the philanthropically motivated outsider. She suggests that the process of real participatory research and implementation could present an anathema to harmful development impositions.

Secondly, the question must be asked, can development workers maintain an objective stance when actively encouraging questioning by indigenous peoples? Friere (1972) addressed this issue, with his emphasis on the foreign development entity as a catalyst or animator to the process he termed 'dialogical education', which aims at the 'conscientisation' of those involved. This is a process rather than an outcome, which challenges the way information, is viewed as a tool to be handed from an educated expert to an unempowered and unknowing local. "In other words, the role of the educator is not to educate the oppressed in the transitive sense, but to create a space in which the oppressed educate themselves and each other" (Blackbum 2000:9).

Both Chambers (1992) and Friere (1972), identify the requirement that the facilitator must actively work to repress the desire to colonise the minds of those they are working with and manipulate the situation to a predetermined outcome. The difference between these theorists could be said to be one of Post-Modernism. Chambers identifies the inability of any development practitioner to become an empty vessel, and work in purely objective terms, as an objective world-view cannot exist; following Post-
Modernist assumptions. The ability and awareness of the need for self-monitoring is subsequently one quality of an appropriate development practitioner. Rahnema (1992) more critically maintains that actors have an inherent tendency to transpose personally held ideals onto those who are being ‘animated’. Subsequently the realisation of empowerment exists along a fine line, on one side exists the possibility of repressive power structures being maintained and strengthened, while on the other side exists the possibility of Western ideas of emancipation or development being delivered to those who do not want them. The previous dilemma cannot be seen outside the debate of what constitutes development and who should define this. The question of whether development can escape its Eurocentric history is one that has been raised by the Post-Developmentalists, and one that is relevant to any contemporary discussion of development.

IS DEVELOPMENT EUROCENTRIC?

Continuing on from the comments made on the paradox of empowerment, Weiringa (1994:842) raises the problem of Eurocentrically defined development indicators or criteria (whether strategic or practical), that determine which local development projects will receive funding:

Women choosing to join a fundamentalist religious group, for instance may feel an important sense of personal fulfilment (Yuval Davis, 1993) yet they may contribute to the growth of a climate in which the rights of other women are restricted. There may be conflicts of interest between groups of women from different classes, races, ethnic communities, ages and sexual preferences, in which one group's increased power or self reliance may impinge upon that of another group.

7 Women and Development Theory (WAD) provides a good example of this dilemma. Feminism views the emancipation of women as occurring under the repeal of patriarchy, although for many indigenous women, the road to empowerment must occur within rather than against cultural constructions of meaning. Also indigenous theorists have pointed out that Western feminism does not consider issues of class and colonisation. Bell Hooks argument (paraphrased, 1981) reads - if am to be equal to the men, that does not place me in a good position, for the men are in turn repressed by white men more powerful than themselves.
This issue is most obvious in the case of competing solidarity’s or identities within a particular subgroup. In cases such as this, and by inference the majority of development scenarios, the possibility of top-down control is realised as development entities are in a position of deciding what constitutes a relevant project, and what shall be funded. Also the agenda that determines who constitutes the poorest, or a ‘vulnerable sub-group’ reflects top-down decision-making and control. The question of whether development practice can rise above this historical and contextually defined patronage is one that is addressed by Post-Developmentalists.

Development’s nomenclature is firmly embedded in its political beginnings. Sachs (1996) maintains that international aid was not concerned primarily with the raising of world-wide living standards but with the division of the world into two distinct political categories using development and the trade it necessitated as hegemonic and ‘normalising’ devices, resulting in an unchallenged linear paradigm for development. This provided the blueprint for development and, symbiotically, industrialisation. The United States of America embodied and created the development agenda as it was to be known for the next several decades, providing itself and Westernisation as a model for social and economic development, which was considered simply “logical evolution” (Esteva 1996:8). Pitted against this ideal was the homogenised other “which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of third world peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped” (Escobar 1997:92-93).

8 Harry S Truman first coined the concept in his 1949-inauguration speech declaring the South an underdeveloped area, saying “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefit’s of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Esteva 1996: 6). “The term Third-World was later coined by Alfred Savvy in 1952 in order to designate the embattled territory between the two superpowers” (Sachs 1996:3). The idea then became entrenched, being shaped to fit the political climate. “Development rapidly emerged as a state policy designed to deal with problems of productivity and unemployment associated with the growth of a surplus population, emigration and/or the threat of economic decline” (Cowen and Shenton 1996:439).

9 Walter Rostow, a Neo-Classical theorist, popularised the idea of development by establishing a theory of stages to describe the transition from undeveloped nation to modern industrial society, focusing on industrialisation as the means for obtaining economic growth, “assuming that this single variable could characterise a whole society” (Sachs 1996:12). The argument follows that these systems were not appropriate to the realities of non-Western people, as among other things they did not account for different socio-cultural contexts. Batiri Williams (1994:224), a Pacific Island theorist, summaries the effects of neo-liberal economic policy on the pacific region “Modernisation has not lead to development in the sense of an increase in the capability of the people for controlling their environment... aspects of the modernisation paradigm are irrelevant to the South Pacific ... The model excludes altogether the important role of traditional customs, economic systems, religion and the military in influencing the structure of information and communication in political and economic development”.

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9 Walter Rostow, a Neo-Classical theorist, popularised the idea of development by establishing a theory of stages to describe the transition from undeveloped nation to modern industrial society, focusing on industrialisation as the means for obtaining economic growth, "assuming that this single variable could characterise a whole society" (Sachs 1996:12). The argument follows that these systems were not appropriate to the realities of non-Western people, as among other things they did not account for different socio-cultural contexts. Batiri Williams (1994:224), a Pacific Island theorist, summaries the effects of neo-liberal economic policy on the pacific region "Modernisation has not lead to development in the sense of an increase in the capability of the people for controlling their environment... aspects of the modernisation paradigm are irrelevant to the South Pacific ... The model excludes altogether the important role of traditional customs, economic systems, religion and the military in influencing the structure of information and communication in political and economic development".
Dower argues that whilst the term ‘Eurocentric’ is informative in that the idea of theoretical development thinking was born from European roots and has spread through most of the world “all [people] accept that development is known, desirable and universal” (Rist 1997:82). It is also not exclusively Eurocentric in nature or possibility. His criticism is that to put-on-trial all development initiatives for their guilt of being Eurocentric is possibly self-defeating in its sweeping condemnation. Dower draws these fairly sensible cautionary words from a detailed analysis of the assumptions behind the concept of development. He maintains that development is not an optional concept but rather is inherent in the course of social interrelations. The Oxford Dictionary defines development as “growth or evolution”. Dower defines it as “a process of socio-economic change subject to human control” (Dower 1996:89) with change being an inevitable social occurrence. Pieterse (1998:353) also maintains that anything more telling than ‘development is transformation’ is a normative clause, and therefore open to regional disparities. Consequently development as a general concept is unavoidable in any situation other than stasis.

Dower also suggests that whilst development initiatives may all be “variations on a Eurocentric theme” (1996:89), these variations may distinguish some development from its paternalistic origins. Furthermore a number of initiatives will exist independently of mainstream development practices and it’s atavistic qualities. So while a number of features may be shared by foreign and indigenous development, these cannot be said to define development in every sense. Rist (1997) argues this point of departure in that, as development means life or what comes to the same thing, as ‘basic needs’ are those things required to sustain life, and are the basis of much development practice. Then to disagree with a developmental notion one can only embed themselves in tautology (as supporting a lack of development, or intervention would appear inhumane) and suggest further development alternatives. These development alternatives in turn exist only due to the assertions of development practitioners and theorists, who are relying on the same definitions of development.

Cowen and Shenton (1996) in their critique of alternative development ideologies, question the philosophical and epistemological grounds on which the underlying assumptions of development theory are based. They suggest that development can occur only “as a panacea to the destruction that has been wrought by progress”. Following
this, another misnomer exists in that alternative practitioners assume that “progress can be consistent with an indigenous conception of social order” (Ibid. 460). A consideration they maintain is limited, due to the fact that indigenous planners will (like all planners) have to formulate all future development solutions in response to the troubles that have been created by historic progress. Furthermore the poor or undeveloped will have to be represented by trustees (the powerful, moral and educated) in any development scenario, which subsequently implies the irrelevancy of indigenous realities. Cowan and Shentons theoretical exploration could be criticised for its minimal reference to current development successes or indeed any contemporary praxis. This reliance on logical inference and historic theory, is critiqued in turn by “alternate theorists who maintain that this form of rationalism is inconsistent with local development realities” (Chambers 1996). The apposite point for this paper is the idea that trusteeship cannot be avoided, in what is known as 'development' practice.

Dower presents a very plausible case for the manifold meanings of development. If the existence of multiple definitions of development negate the hypothesis that development is Eurocentric then the inclusion of indigenous developments and the allowance of conflicting ideals of development, will negate the traditional influence of European powers. As George Shouksmith writes “It is important also to remember that not all these countries will wish to develop in Western ways nor will they necessarily accept Western, Northern Hemisphere goals. Development even economic development must be firmly based in the socio-cultural context of the developing country concerned” (1993:A2). Furthermore, the aims of development as a concept are likely to be understood generally and unequivocally by those who are affected by development and many of those who practice it. “A chance to send all my kids to school” and “more money to spend on our families” (Interview 2000) were cited as very definite needs and represented absolute indicators of development for those involved in procuring these at the local level. These improvements in lifestyle were considered easily directed and obtainable with the help of outside capital.

One of the main failings of Post-Development is that the pragmatics of this future bottom-up and localised development is not elucidated upon. As Pieterse (1998:345) maintains “Post-Development articulates meaningful sensibilities but does not have a future program”. Due to this lack of plan there is a pervasive acknowledgement of the
chasm between action based practitioners and academics that is being drawn deeper by the Post-Developmentalists' neglect to balance their criticisms of the aid industry with any prospective agenda for future action.

PARTICIPATION: THE EMBODIMENT OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT OR AN ADDITION TO MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT?

A number of theorists maintain that the nomenclature of Alternate Development has been co-opted by mainstream development entities. The World Bank, whose policies provided the oppositional impetus for grass roots movements, now includes empowerment in its agenda as an aim of increased community participation (Craig and Mayo 1995:4). With the mainstreaming of participatory practice has also come a devaluing of its essential aims and focuses. This mainstreaming, Pieterse (1998) argues, means the right to be called alternative has been reneged upon, as these have been integrated or compromised into pre-existing aid distribution systems, the same process that has occurred with other Alternative Development theories and rendered them ineffectual.

Conversely, Pieterse (1998) raises the point that the ability of the mainstream to absorb reflexive theorising and translate this into practice is beneficial. The other option being a complete and unlikely restructuring of the development industry “adding on may rather be a source of strength, because for bureaucracies in welfare ministries and international agencies, total breaks are much more difficult to handle than additional policy options” (Pieterse 1998:360). Although the pervasive notion of participation as an add-on anathema to top-down development is not without its critics, Rahnema (1992) raises a number of alternate reasons for the wholehearted adoption of participatory methods by NGOs, Governments and donors. The primary criticism is that it is seen as an effective fundraising device, along with the other catch phrases of contemporary development (such as sustainability and ownership) but that this nomenclature does not necessarily relate to any significant changes in the practice of the organisation that use it. As Numea Simi, the Foreign Affairs Officer for the Samoan Government (1994:275) writes, “the recent call by the aid donor community, and the much publicised annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), are encouraging us to put a ‘human’ face on
development”. A pertinent critique is whether this face can be successful without changes in the body of the development industry to go along with it.

Rahnema (1996:120) argues it has also become one of the “many resources needed to keep the economy alive”. The reasons behind participation’s popularity are manifold. “It was found that whenever people were locally involved, and actively participating in the projects, much more was achieved with much less, even in sheer financial terms” (Rahnema 1996:117). With participation comes potential free labour, which if not used in a constructive or culturally relevant manner poses more of a threat than a failed project that has not involved locals, by misusing the resources of those without enough to begin with. Esteva (1996:8) maintains that participatory techniques have been used, “as a manipulative trick to involve people in struggles for getting what the powerful want”. This opinion is endorsed by Craig and Mayo (1995:5) and Botes and Rensburg (2000) who pose the argument that participation was used as a ‘human face’ on the rather non-human one of structural adjustment. Participation can also be critiqued inline with this thinking, as the burden of providing social services is shifted away from the state to those who can least afford it - the poorer communities themselves. In this light, participation is viewed as a method to promote state fiscal savings. Other theorists and fieldworkers highlight this ‘efficiency’ as a benefit of participation, allowing greater benefits to be spread between more people (Paul in Craig and Mayo 1995:2, Hunter interview 2000).

For participation to avoid the aforementioned pitfalls it must come from the people themselves, otherwise as Rahnema (1996) points out the rudiments of participation are very basically incongruent with its objectives, once the jargon has been set aside. “For the modern construct of participation, a person should be part of a predefined project, more specifically, an economic project, in order to qualify as a participant” (Rahnema Ibid. 120). Following this logic, the aims of participation - the opportunity for local people to define their own development, are only actualised within the predefined boundaries of the participatory project and the accompanying donor objectives. If the development aims and priorities of the locals’ involved fall outside these boundaries then it is unlikely these will be uncovered and acted upon.
PARTICIPATION AS PRAXIS

As participation has been adopted by the mainstream development industry its people-centered roots have been eschewed by its aims and directives simply being slotted into an already existing system. A pertinent question is - do participatory methods in many circumstances simply re-bottle old Eurocentric elixirs? The same system that incited the critique of development and lead to the development of Alternate Development theories is being adjusted to the very divergent aims of people-centered development. The World Bank in the same report that acknowledges the aim of empowerment through the means of participation reported that “people for whom the project was intended were involved in 84 out of the 208 projects approved in 1995” (van den Berg 1998: 50). James Putzel observes that a lack of change in the aid delivery system relates to a lack of any positive change in the results, in a review of EU multilateral accountability systems, he provides an illustration of this:

While Commission officials are no doubt committed to ensuring local approval and participation in every development project they fund, the extent of consultation depends largely on the private consultant's particular commitment to seek out 'all parties concerned'. However, without any requirement to make these missions a matter of public record there is no guarantee that local groups will actually find out about them if the consultants are less than through in their efforts to contact all parties concerned.

(Putzel 1997:80)

Furthermore in this situation, consultants are dissuaded from ‘seeking out’ all ‘parties concerned’ to protect the future of their contract which could last the entire course of the project and therefore present a very lucrative option for the private consultancy group. This study also illustrates how NGOs are excluded from consultancy options, even given the EU mission agenda for full participation in every step of the project process. This was due to fears about “The lack of a clear line of authority and command if NGOs were involved in project management” (Putzel 1997:54). This point - that managers are reluctant to hand over power or are unaware of how to do so, illustrates the first one of three commonly referred to junctures at which the theory of participation does not carry as well into it's practice (Botes and van Rensburg 2000, Rahnema 1996).
One study by Tendler (in Clark 1991:58) states, “of 75 U.S NGO projects suggests that there is a confusion of terms between participation and decentralisation”. Most decision making the study concluded, is decentralised, but dominated by NGO stall and local elite's such as the village headman. Consequently, the personal challenge that exists for development practitioners is to ‘hand over the stick’ (Chambers 1996). This handing-over is a vital part of the process, and one where empowerment objectives can either be facilitated or sabotaged, depending on the abilities and awareness of the practitioners.

The second challenge to effective participatory practice is that “the degree of participation by the target group is difficult to measure” (van den Berg 1998:50). In situations where external development agents are aiming at participation from local contingents, true involvement could easily be confused with the voices of local leaders or elite groups, rather than the entire population. The poorest and otherwise socially marginalised are also reputedly difficult to access (Chambers 1983). Due to the dislocation of development activities from the normal activities that are entered into by the local participants, local opinion could also reflect attitudes and wants, which may not be priorities if the project impetus came from within the community. If the local community does not contribute resources to the project (thereby establishing themselves as stakeholders) it may also be regarded as easier to simply go along with the perceived aims of the development entity. There also exists no baseline to with which involvement can be compared to and subsequently participatory models where experts are eliciting the opinions of locals could easily go astray of the mark.

Furthermore empowerment and participation’s emphasis on process rather than end of project goals means that it fits uncomfortably into traditional project-based structures. Weiringa (1994:835) maintains one of the perceived limitations to empowerment practices is the fact that it does not lend itself to quantifiable targets. As project management structures are focused on goal achievement this makes the accountability of empowerment based project outcomes difficult to assess.

The third problem with introduced project management is that the cost of expert consultants can take large amounts of funds whilst producing minimal results and eroding the faith of locals in the development industry. “Consultants and experts claim a
large proportion of the funds allocated to a task and their costly advice is usually preferred to consultation with farmers” (McKinnon 1993:D3.1). One critique of the now pervasive grass-roots or participatory developments is that the transition from policy to actual changes in the implementation of the projects has been only superficial, not touching on the real dynamic that shapes how projects are formulated. It is possible that a necessary change in the way that project workers view themselves and their roles takes longer to change than does agency policy.

The Lobok Crafts Project provides a good case study of the necessity of participatory processes in achieving project aims where initiatives have been introduced to the project participants. The 1988 New Zealand ODA and Indonesian bilateral project, aimed at improving “The incomes of potter families through technical intervention in production techniques and marketing” (McKinnon 1991:E11), the success of the interventions were delineated strongly by the process used to arrive at and convey innovations. As McKinnon writes:

> The innovations that were easily and consistently adopted independent of adviser or staff supervision had all been transferred through a participatory program in which potters were involved with advisors at every stage: experimentation and discussion, identification of solution, evaluation of results and in some cases training other potters (McKinnon 1993:E11).

Those interventions that had not been accepted by the potters were those that had been decided upon without the participation of all those involved. “For the potters it became just another situation in which they were being told what to do by people of a higher status” (McKinnon 1991 E:11).

**PARTNERSHIP AS ANATHEMA TO TOP-DOWN DEVELOPMENT**

A World Bank publication with the telling title of Implementing Projects For the Poor (emphasis added) explains, “The needs and interests of the poor are not well understood, and little research has been done on how they earn their livelihood and on the social context within which they operate. The poor are often likely to lack a voice and to be excluded from participatory processes unless a conscious and deliberate effort
is made to ensure their participation" (Carvalho and White 1996:9). This extract is indicative of the tone in which the poor are considered, that is, as passive entities who need to be researched and included for their own good. Diametrically opposed to this is the view of Alternative Development theorists who maintain that it is the poor who best understand their own situation and who are adept at surviving in their environmental and social/political context.

The nomenclature of development portrays those who access donor funding as passive, indicated by the usage of terms such as recipients and beneficiaries. Here, this analysis is applied to the terms used to describe the relationship between donors and local NGO/COs. The following binaries, that are present in the majority of development writings, are intended to outline the moral assumptions and power expectations that are implicit in the simple notions of aid and giving:

Donor: Recipient  Receiving ideas, money, development and a superior way of life
Donor: Beneficiary  This implies the passive state of those being given to.
Rich: Poor  This implies the primacy of money as indicator of development
Teacher: Learner  Implies superior knowledge on the part of the teacher/Westerner

Sachs (1992) points out that developmental terms cannot be separated from their pasts. Following this logic, for development science to progress, a new nomenclature must be formulated to describe a new approach. “Alternative development should be renamed, should be given a substantive name, such as participatory development or popular development” (Pieterse 1998:370). Considering this, the term and theory of Partnership poses one distinct possibility:

Development Partner: Development Partner

One recent development model that places emphasis on partnership is the Transfer of Rights approach by Max van den Berg and Brain van Ojik (1998: 10) on which they comment:

[It] differs clearly from the basic needs strategies that were so prominent in the development thinking in the seventies. Under those strategies basic services were made available for the poor. The idea behind our approach,
however, is that the poor should themselves be able to secure access to basic services. Donors should help with organisation building and with the setting-up of basic services for and by the poor themselves.

The way in which these objectives are to be met is not illustrated. The idea of partnership is presented in the end as no more than another objective, along with the instalment of basic needs and access of the poor to credit facilities. A clear strategic model for how partnership between countries can be built into the development system is missing from many people-centered development tracts that identify the aim but not the method.

The approach also reveals in some traditional bias with statements such as “the recipient, too, is often inconsistent. It wants to be treated as a fully fledged partner, but it also holds out its hand and prefers not to think about the situation after the aid has stopped” (van der Berg and van Ojik 1998:83). The idioms of parent and child used here expose a lack of understanding about the roles of players in a partnership, where each party intends to maximise their own benefits. A genuine partnership sees both entities aware of the wider situation and circumstances as well as the other position with as much prescience as can be hoped for. It is unrealistic and unhelpful for the inherent power dynamics to be ignored. If the donor has all the available funding, then it is the indigenous NGOs and COs who need and want to access this, it is the donor who decides who obtains funding and according to what priorities. Through the process of application and decision a partnership can be formed, one where both parties are aware of the dynamics and responsible to the other under certain pre-established conditions.

Some of the previously mentioned problems that plague participatory development can also be avoided in a partnership scenario. If a resource commitment is required by the participants, it is less likely that they will go along with a development initiative that is not thought of as beneficial by the local community. The planning can also be the responsibility of local partners with support from the 'trustee'. In this way the goal of empowerment through learning can be built into the project process. Rather than being an outcome of the project interaction it is an integral component.
This argument could be criticised by saying that all development scenarios represent a partnership situation, in one way or another. If two parties are involved in a development process, simply put there exists a local entity that is being developed, and a more powerful entity who is facilitating this process. What the idea of partnership represents, although, is a reformatting of this relationship, to one in which the spirit of empowerment is intrinsic. One emphasis of partnership could be said to be the equality of influence. This ability is inherent for the foreign entity due to the power structures that construct the original development binaries, i.e. powerful-non-powerful, developed-non-developed, Western-Southern. For example, the donor will be able to limit or restrict funding and support where it sees fit, the recipient on the other hand has only a refusal to participate as a tool to manifest choice. Therefore it is necessary that local bodies be empowered to a position where they are able to control decisions, on what will inevitably affect them. The idea of partnership presents an effective praxis due to it's requirement that underlying motivations be acknowledged.

SUMMARY

The previous chapter has outlined some of the recent development theorising in the debate surrounding Alternative Development. It has been shown that the transposition of new practices onto old structures, while accessible for many institutions, has not translated into fully articulated empowerment strategies. In a number of scenarios the participatory practices that have resulted, do not ensure the full inclusion of the local people they are intended to empower. The connection between empowerment and participation has been illustrated as inseparable. Without participation, in it's full sense, which is local autonomy over the decision making process and the opportunity for local people to define what it is that constitutes appropriate development - it is unlikely that appropriate or empowering development will occur.

Empowerment has been defined in this chapter as an increase in people's individual or collective power to determine their situation. A paradox was shown to exist within the dual theoretical paradigms for achieving empowerment. If endogenous empowerment was to occur, then by inference this has to come from local people's own impetus. This premise was seen as compromised by the involvement of the 'trustee' in the development process, who cannot act objectively and is likely to exert some control and
influence over the development process. This influence is conceived of by Post-Developmentalists as dangerous and motivated by the needs of the external actors. Conversely, Alternative Theorists saw the role of the trustee or animator as an opportunity to facilitate mutual learning and empowerment.

This chapter ended with a discussion of partnership, which presents a possible model for facilitating complete participation and avoiding many of the pitfalls of previous participatory models. The rest of this thesis focuses on the SBDF system, which describes a system that fundamentally changes the orientation of the relationship between community organisations and donors. It is maintained that this system embodies a partnership dynamic - by creating genuine participants through having communities identify what they will participate in and how this will be organised.

From this chapter a number of questions arise, which will be covered in the remainder of the research with reference to the SBDF system studied in the fieldwork. These are:

- Can a trustee enable empowering development through the process of partnership? Is this a realistic model, considering that one partner has inherent power, and the other does not?
- The personnel responsibility of the development practitioner has been shown to be an important variable in the success of participatory methods, what structures are useful in ensuring that the development animator 'hands over the stick'?
- What methods can be used to measure empowerment within a partnership context, who should take responsibility for this accountability?
- What are the aspects of a program that indicate empowering practices?
- Is endogenously directed development compromised by donor agendas?
CHAPTER TWO: HOW SBDF EMBODIES THE SPIRIT OF EMPOWERMENT

INTRODUCTION

There can be very few cases in which outside intervention in the affairs of a community will not produce unintended and undesired consequences.

(Turton 1988 in Shadrake 1996)

This chapter contains an analysis of the SBDF system as it operates in Samoa. This analysis is largely based on primary data obtained from the findings of the field-study and CF data-base of all projects funded since its inception in 1991. Prior to the system being tested against the hypothesis - that SBDF concurs with the principles of empowerment - the concept of empowerment will be explored from a Samoan point of view. The analysis is then structured using empowerment indicators established by Guy and Vansant (1983), and referring also to Botes and van Rensburg (2000) and Overton and Scheyvens (1996) whose work on empowerment and participation is Pacific focused. Following on from the discussion in Chapter One, participation is highlighted as one of the main methods of ensuring empowering development.

This chapter firstly describes the SBDF system and identifies the ways in which it differs from other small funding systems in the Pacific. Secondly the development scenario in Samoa is very briefly introduced with particular reference to the meaning and roles assigned to the theory of empowerment. A study conducted by SIDA is also referred to, as it is one of the few studies of a DF system, the SIDA study reflects some of the findings of this chapter, that the relevancy of projects is increased if local organisations are involved in the process.

THE SBDF SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

In this paper SBDF refers to monies that are disbursed by a donor or funding agency to any local or indigenous development entity\(^1\), whereby the development initiatives,

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\(^1\) This includes any NGO or CO or individual that obtains monies for development purposes, development being defined in this case as a conscious attempt to institute positive change.
implementation and expenditure of the monies are all the responsibility of the fund recipient. The establishment of a partnership between the donor and the local entity is axiomatic to the SBDF model. What differentiates this funding process from the standard donor-recipient relationship in Samoa is, aside from the time and resources contributed by both parties, dual accountability and mutual and reciprocal responsibilities. This chapter will go on to describe these. Although firstly, the CF will be considered in context of the wider activities of the Canadian ODA:

As far as official donor agencies are concerned, the Canadian International Development Agency channels much of its aid through local NGOs: other bilaterals such as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the Swedish international Development Agency also support such organisations.

(Stirrat 1997:74)

CF, which is operated out of the regional offices in Wellington and Canberra, is a small project-funding scheme that serves the wider Pacific region. CF represents a small component of Canada’s overall ODA spending, with each country receiving around several hundred thousand Canadian dollars out of a total aid budget of around two billion Canadian dollars a year (CIDA website). One of CIDAs methods of distributing funding is to directly support local agencies. This is done either through regional offices or through a partnership branch, which handles direct funding for larger countries and projects. Unlike the Wellington CF the central funding system is aimed at supporting Canadian Development agencies working in the South, as well as Southern NGOs. While all regional offices are answerable to CIDA, differences in countries where the fund is being disseminated have resulted in CF being tailored to suit specific circumstances, this is one important factor and one which has lead to the fund being relevant and effective in the Pacific.

There has been a notable increase in the amount of finances available through DF systems in recent years. Fowler (1995) contends that funds are increasingly being disbursed through donor national offices, and that these funds are intended to support local initiatives and agencies. This, he maintains, is a response to the theoretical promotion of participatory and empowerment philosophies, aimed at local and self help
initiatives. Of the direct funding systems reviewed by the researcher CF was the only donor to aim towards goals of empowerment in a structured system that focused on partnership and capacity building; while also facilitating local ownership and control in the development process. Other DF systems in Samoa accounted for only small components of a much larger and more diverse aid budget. In both the Australian and New Zealand consulates Small Grants Scheme were subsidiary programs receiving only small allocations of staff time. As a consequence, those who received funding obtained no project support, and very little monitoring was done. The NZODA small fund administrators conducted an informal monitoring system, mainly through connections and word of mouth. The Australian small funding system had no monitoring procedure at all (see appendix four for a diagram of this system). Both systems had around the same number of submissions as they had funding. The Ambassadors Discretionary Fund had in both cases around 30% more requests for funding than it was able to fulfil, this probably being due to the open categories for funding and the relatively quick decision making time involved. Both systems were known through word of mouth, unlike CF there was no attempt to actively create accessibility of the fund for the poorest.

The following list describes the ways in which the SBDF system differs from other small funding systems in Samoa:

- The CF actively promotes funding availability and networks to reach new communities. Having informal relationships with many existing community organisations that facilitate the dissemination of information about the fund.
- The scheme (in most cases) necessitates a community cash contribution of 40% of the total cost of the project.
- When required, proposal planning and writing is done with the support of the CF representative.
- CF is guided by an agenda to empower communities, and will not support projects that have not been developed by the local community.

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2 In the case of both the New Zealand and Australian embassies, the ambassador's discretionary fund was the only fund not directed according to an official mandate. The other small funding systems run by the consulates were either directed by the Aid Coordinating Committee or were very small funds.

3 This information was obtained through interviews conducted with staff from the New Zealand and Australian Consulates, where the aid to Samoa was largely administered (September 2000).
• The word partnership is officially used to describe the system of communication between the local entity and CF. One of the main roles of CF, as seen by the Samoan CF representative (Interview 2000), is the role of education.
• CF aims to reach the poor sectors of the community and has a large proportion of projects that are women focused.
• The system aims to build the capacity of local NGOs and COs, through support and skill advancement.

Box One. CF Mandate 1999

The mandate of the CF is to provide direct funding to community groups: The six priority areas of assistance are as follows:

* To meet basic human needs by supporting policies and services in areas such as improved water supply and sanitation, health care, and education
* To promote the participation of women in development, especially in decision making roles
* To improve infrastructure services which will strengthen NGOs and other institutional mechanisms for service provision
* To protect and promote human rights and good governance and broaden citizen participation in decision making
* To support small business development within the private sector and
* To protect the environment and promote environmental awareness initiatives

Within the CF six priority areas of assistance, preference is given to projects that meet the following criteria:

* Are well planned and technically feasible
* Do not duplicate existing resources
* Aim to alleviate the effects of poverty by improving access to health, family planning, nutrition, education and employment
* Fit into overall policies and priorities of the countries, and have the support of the communities they serve
* Generate sustainable income for communities
* Create job opportunities in small businesses
* Support institutional capacity building for Pacific Island Non-Governmental Organisations
* Have a positive impact on the development of women and other marginalised groups and the environment
* Show significant cash or in kind contributions from the community group

(Source CF Information Pamphlet 1999)

As this paper will illustrate the SBDF system does not have the full support of the Samoan Government. This is due to the fact that CF operates outside the system managed by ACC (Aid Coordinating Committee) that is illustrated in Chart Two. One of the main factors that enables CF to operate outside the donor role created by ACC is Canada’s few historical political relations with Samoa. Comparatively New Zealand and Australia, have a number of bilateral associations with the Samoan government. The 4

4 "Bilateral aid is defined as the direct transfer of money, goods or services from a First World government to a Third World one" In contrast to bilateral aid which is provided by a donor government through a third party such as a United Nations (UN) agency or local government. Bilateral aid is the major form of aid provided to low income countries. Members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) formed in 1962 from OECD countries provide the majority of world wide aid. In 1980 the assembly of the ODA resolved that all member countries should work towards providing .7 per cent of GNP to official aid assistance. A limited number of countries have achieved this aim. Of this .7 percent part is disseminated through ODA bureaucracies particular to the country for example Canada’s CIDA and New Zealand’s ODA, all of these individual donor agencies have a seat on the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Other monies are directed towards multilateral aid bureaus such as the United Nations, World Bank and the IMF. (Hancock 1989:45)

5 An example of the complexities of bilateral working relationships was illustrated in an interview with a fund co-ordinator, who cited an instance when due to the perceived need to maintain a good working relationship with the
accessibility of the fund depends on two points; firstly, what projects are liable for funding and secondly how many organisations have access to the fund. As Box One illustrates, a wide range of NGO/CO projects will meet the CF criteria. The main guiding principle is that projects meet a community need. Projects that do not meet these criteria include:

- Initiatives that are not community focused, i.e. they benefit individuals
- The business interests of those in already established businesses
- Government projects or projects that have not been initiated through local effort
- Large projects with costs outside the funding ceiling
- Projects that the village could easily complete themselves with no additional assistance. The CF representative maintained that once the role of CF has been discussed, the locals often accede that the project could be completed without funding.
- Projects are also not supported if the organisation is not prepared to provide some of the funding; this applies mainly to initiatives that benefit those groups that implement them. Therefore NGO activities, humanitarian, and relief efforts may not have to have a local contribution.

The Foreign Affairs Minister of Samoa, Numea Simi, describes the primary method used by CF to ensure local communities have access to CF as soliciting projects from the community. This process of solicitation, or as the CF representative refers to it “making the fund accessible to all”, occurs either by advertising the fund through existing channels in the community, or through new contacts facilitated by networking with organisations. In Samoa, newspaper and radio advertising informs the public as to the when CF representative will be available for meetings and consultations. The representative also makes himself available in the villages for informal discussion; one technique used to enter into dialogue with local people is approaching the women’s committees. He also attends social occasions and in rural areas spends time at the local shop or village stall. News of the CF representatives arrival travels fast and he is often

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accessibility of the fund depends on two points; firstly, what projects are liable for funding and secondly how many organisations have access to the fund. As Box One illustrates, a wide range of NGO/CO projects will meet the CF criteria. The main guiding principle is that projects meet a community need. Projects that do not meet these criteria include:

- Initiatives that are not community focused, i.e. they benefit individuals
- The business interests of those in already established businesses
- Government projects or projects that have not been initiated through local effort
- Large projects with costs outside the funding ceiling
- Projects that the village could easily complete themselves with no additional assistance. The CF representative maintained that once the role of CF has been discussed, the locals often accede that the project could be completed without funding.
- Projects are also not supported if the organisation is not prepared to provide some of the funding; this applies mainly to initiatives that benefit those groups that implement them. Therefore NGO activities, humanitarian, and relief efforts may not have to have a local contribution.

The Foreign Affairs Minister of Samoa, Numea Simi, describes the primary method used by CF to ensure local communities have access to CF as soliciting projects from the community. This process of solicitation, or as the CF representative refers to it “making the fund accessible to all”, occurs either by advertising the fund through existing channels in the community, or through new contacts facilitated by networking with organisations. In Samoa, newspaper and radio advertising informs the public as to the when CF representative will be available for meetings and consultations. The representative also makes himself available in the villages for informal discussion; one technique used to enter into dialogue with local people is approaching the women’s committees. He also attends social occasions and in rural areas spends time at the local shop or village stall. News of the CF representatives arrival travels fast and he is often

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Samoa ministries, funding criteria was ignored for a government project which obviously fell outside of these. This is not something that has to be considered by the CF consultative committee.

6 In some cases where the CF will work with a committee associated with Government, the committee will control the funding and be answerable to the CF. One reason that the CF stopped funding to Government was the difficulty in receiving end-of-project reports and the necessary accounting of expenditure.

7 The visits are unannounced, a move which aims at conserving the women’s time and resources (Hunter 2000). If the representative is expected a meal is prepared in accordance with Samoan culture, the surprise visits limit this.
approached by the pastor and other interested locals. CF also uses signage on existing projects and encourages community projects to use the media to generate publicity. The research indicated that informal and formal networking was the by far most effective means of advertising.

Once a community has a project idea, which often comes to light through informal discussion between CF representative and local groups, a written proposal is then the next step in the process. This provides the basis for consultations between CF representative and the local entity. If proposed projects cannot meet CF criteria they are vetted at this point in the process. The proposal process is often spread over a number of representative's visits to the country. In some situations the proposal comes to a point of stasis, and is not pursued by the community. When this occurs, The CF representative, will actively seek-out groups that have not been heard from in a while. Hunter explained in an interview (2000) that he puts in much time with these projects as, “the true community projects are hard to get it is definitely not a smorgasbord” (interview 2000). The reasons that most projects do not finish the proposal process is that either they have obtained funding elsewhere or the entire community does not give their support to the project. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the requirement of a cash contribution means that groups who are not representative of the community are unlikely to raise the funding, or complete the proposal stage. This is an effective means of ensuring projects are of relevance to the community or group, and that projects address real needs. Once the proposal is completed it is then forwarded to the Wellington-based consultative committee via the representative.

The consultative committee is composed of six people, including the CF representatives for the Pacific (currently two) and the Canadian High Commissioner and Councillor, as well as three consultants from the community. There is always a minimum of one person indigenous to the Pacific on the consultative committee. The committee takes into consideration a number of factors when approving funding, these include:

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8 The proposals must be written in English; Hunter sees this as an effective way of ensuring the community's organisation as there is not always a member of the core group that can write report English. In no circumstances that where mentioned in the research did this pose a real restriction. The women's committee or WIB both were available and in the practice of helping community members prepare proposals. The proposals also include quotes, letters of land approval where this is necessary, and any other documentation that is relevant to the process.

9 These members are nominated (for a term of two years) from within the NGO community, by Pacific Island groups or by previous advisors. The members all have relevant experience in the Pacific region.
• That there is a geographic and regional spread of projects
• That there are not too many projects in the same technical or business area (this does not apply to schooling, education etc.)
• Projects must have spin-offs to the community if they do not directly benefit the community, for example, if a copra plant is funded, then the community will benefit as they can sell coconuts to it
• That the capability for implementation exists or can be taught

It should also be noted that the committee, while guided by certain criteria, is in a position to approve projects that fall outside these criteria where a need is identified. An example of this is when the 40% contribution is waived. This occurs when the benefactors of the fund are not those who are implementing the project, such as in the case of a philanthropic organisation. To be exempted from the contribution the organisation must be in a position where they are unable to fund the project, although can ensure ownership of the project through other means such as resource contribution and project organisation.

The committee convenes every three months, therefore once the proposals have completed by local groups there is a comparatively short time before the outcome is known and groups are notified. The short time between proposal submission and acceptance was found in the research to be a favourable aspect of CF system compared to the other donor funding channels. Around a quarter of those interviewed identified this as a major attribute of CF system. Comparatively, ACC was reported in the field-study interviews to take anywhere up to 18 months to process and respond to applications. Some applicants said that they had not heard whether their proposals had been accepted and had subsequently assumed that they had been declined. Although, according to Numea Simi, this was “a load of rubbish” (interview 2000), Simi maintained that the entire system, which is illustrated in Chart Two, took six months at a maximum.

Once the committee has accepted the proposal, and the local partner informed, both parties sign an agreement drawn up to the standard legal requirements of CF (see Appendix Six). That includes the specific criteria of the project that has been discussed
by both parties in the consultation process, or made apparent through the application. The basic content of the contract is that both parties will fulfill their obligations to the other, for example, that CF will fund and transfer ownership once the project has been completed. The contract also outlines how changes in the initial spending plans can be made. The process that this takes is for the local partners to inform the CF representative of the new plans, at which point changes will be okayed or renegotiated.

The hand over of project ownership occurs once the projects expected results have been achieved to a reasonable degree. The expected results do not extend to the stage where the project will fulfill the broader project aims, for example, an infrastructural project such as a sewing room will be handed over at the completion of the construction, rather than when the sewing business is in place and is generating income\textsuperscript{10}. At the point of project completion a report must be completed by the implementing party and forwarded to CF representative. This report is intended to identify the outcomes of the project and lessons learned (example Appendix Five). This evaluation is also backed up by informal visits by CF representative to the projects at differing times after completion. This type of monitoring is dependent on the availability of time and the contact-ability of project participants. A critique of this system, which results in a significant number of projects receiving only very minimal monitoring or evaluation by either party, can be found later in Chapter Four. The end-of-project reports provide the greatest challenge in terms of completion and capacity building.

Charts One and Two on the following page, illustrate the two main comparative systems by which NGOs/COs can request funding. The charts outline the differences between the SBDF system and other donor funding systems in Samoa that are accessible to NGOs and COs (Bilateral programs are not included). Chart One illustrates the control and involvement of the local entity that is inherent in the SBDF system. While Chart Two illustrates how the ACC is responsible for the assessment monitoring and distribution of funding in the majority of small funding systems used in Samoa. In this Chart it is also apparent how little interaction (and therefore support and flexibility) there is between the donor and local organisation.

\textsuperscript{10} One criterion in the funding contract states that the project must be implemented within three years, or the monies must be returned to the CF. This has not presented a problem for local organisations.
Chart one. The SBDF System

Donor Advertises service through informal and formal channels

CO/NGO approaches donor with idea or proposal

Donor declines project as it does not meet criteria

Donor accepts project

Donor consults with group

Project contract drawn up as agreed through proposal or consultation

Implementation

Monitoring

Chart Two. Other Donor Systems for Small Project Funding in Samoa

Donor

GO/CO

Aid Co-ordinating Committee accesses project

Project is declined

NGO/CO informed

Project is accepted

Monitoring

11 The chart illustrates the usual relations between donor and local group, other variations are possible, for example the CO could approach the donor at the implementation stage for assistance or there may be only a one way flow in the monitoring stage from local organisation to donor.
Chart One and Two illustrate the differing relations between donor and local project implementers. As can be seen in Chart One there are five opportunities for the donor and local partner to consult on the project plan. Comparatively, as Chart Two indicates, the only opportunity for local organisations to have contact with the donor is when handing over the project proposal which, in the majority of situations, is then sent on to ACC. Chart One also describes how the process of monitoring and assessment is the responsibility of the implementing partners, as compared to the process in Chart Two where the authority (ACC) takes responsibility for ensuring recipients have implemented the project as agreed. As this paper will illustrate, Chart One illustrates a process where local partners are engendered with confidence, and support, which results in a sense of community empowerment.

At CFs conception, many community or NGO projects were directed through Government. The decision to focus funding directly to communities was made in 1996 and this was largely a response to difficulties in getting Government departments to account for funding, as well as the desire to direct more funds towards community groups. Table Two shows how the focus of the fund and consequently the fund recipients has changed over the course of its operation. 1994-1996 represented a system changeover whereby the government obtained funds in conjunction with NGO/COs this then progressed to the now existing system of the donor consulting with CO/NGOs directly.

Table Two. The Canada Funds Primary Project Partners Between 1991 and 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>GOV/NGO</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>CO/NGO</th>
<th>CO</th>
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<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of NGOs, a similar distinction between organisations is made by CF as to that which is made by Friedman (1992), who views these as domestic external agents
which have necessarily some local roots as compared to Foreign based NGOs, which are not based and staffed entirely in the country of discussion. The aim of local control and involvement has meant that projects that are promoted by an outside catalyst such as the Peace Corps are not likely to receive funding from CF. The decision to limit funding to projects initiated by local people has been made based on the past experiences of CF funding that has seen projects whose impetus was a 'helpful outsider' end when the outsider completed their stay in Samoa. From these experiences the need for the community to be the primary instigator and manager of projects has become apparent. While volunteers are not able to assume management positions under CF projects, they can occupy advisory or facilitation roles, at the discretion of the community management. It is this emphasis on local-autonomy and capacity building that differentiates CF operations from other donor systems in the Pacific.

A SIDA STUDY BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT FUNDING

There has been very little research done on any form of direct funding. The research in 1998 by SIDA, while not wholly applicable to this thesis due to the limited organisations the funding is available to, does however; raise some interesting points as to the benefits of DF as a system of promoting relevant bottom-up development. The SIDA study was commissioned to investigate whether the two forms of funding used by SIDA - direct and indirect - were complementary (Lewis 2000:205-219). SIDA has an informal relationship with CIDA (the Canadian funding authority) as well as with Nordic and Dutch donors who have similar development strategies and lead the way in DR. The study was conducted in Bangladesh where, like Samoa, there are a large number of local NGOs, a number of these having existed since the 1970's. The issues considered in the study were sustainability, local ownership, relevance to the wider development context, feedback and accountability and the implications on the future of development in Bangladesh.

It was pointed out that direct funding extended mostly to "large, well established NGOs... where economies of scale, and English-language abilities among more educated NGO leaders make management of the funding links relatively straightforward" (Lewis 2000:216). This is notably different from the direct funding strategies of the CF where any community grassroots organisation can apply for
funding. The CF avoids funding any organisations without strong connections to the grassroots. The SIDA Dhaka office in Bangladesh did not facilitate the ability of small COs to access direct funds nor was the system of distribution raised in the study.

The regulations for obtaining funding from SIDA are the compliance with five development assistance goals: These are “(i) economic growth; (ii) economic and social equality; (iii) economic and political independence; (iv) democratic development; (v) environmental quality” (Ibid. 207). Swedish projects obtaining funds must also be run by non-profit organisations and donate at least 20% of the total costs to the project, sustainability of the project and the experience in implementation are factors also considered.

The study found that greater relevance was more likely to be achieved by direct than by indirect funding because, true the spirit of the Swedish NGO tradition, Swedish NGOs receive no overall co ordination) from SIDA in Bangladesh. They are left to situate themselves within the local context as long as they keep within the broad terms of SIDA’s objectives. The SIDA office on the other hand has been able to identify more relevant local NGOs for direct support (Lewis 2000:21-6).

Overall LNGOs were seen to have projects that were more relevant to the needs of the poorest where Swedish NGOs were restricted by their lack of comprehension of all the cultural factors, and in some cases took a ‘paternalistic’ view of the indigenous situation.

Like the field-study conducted for this thesis, SIDAs review highlighted the issue of trust between donor and LNGO. The quality of individual relationships and strong communication networks was seen as very important in the success of the direct funding system. Trust between development partners was in part facilitated by the previous working relationships of those at the Dhaka office in their former voluntary positions in local NGOs.

SIDA has not considered its growing support to Bangladesh’s development problems, but as a continuing dialogue around the issues of sustainability,
relevance, NGO relationships with government, and the dangers of a possible duplication of effort. This trust-based model of partnership may have wider implications for other donors reviewing their relationships with NGOs (Lewis 2000:217).

The two funding processes used by SIDA (direct support to LNGOs and funding for NGOs based in Sweden) were found to be complimentary. Direct funding provided funding for experimental and pilot programs, whilst the role of indirect funding was to form links between the non government sectors of both countries” (ibid:208). Both studies highlighted the increased ability of donors to take risks and support new programs, if DF is the system used to disseminate funds. It was also found by the SIDA study and this research that DF enables to the donors to respond quickly to NGO innovation and situational need.

SAMOA AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Fa’aSamoa, the traditional Samoan way of life, has been comparatively resilient to other economic and cultural forces and has been described as the ideal social structure (Storey 1998:63). This is due largely to the cultural value of reciprocity, which is described by Dunlop (1999:55) below:

Reciprocity is seen in the daily lives through the sharing of goods and labour but more visibly in the public exchanges of fine mats, goods and cash at fa’alavelave such as funerals, weddings, and church openings. The sharing of goods ensured family members basic needs were met and also brought the assurance of future support should this be needed. Reciprocity has been likened to a form of social savings, a kind of social security system.

The complex social system in which this reciprocity has been sustained over time and the changes it is facing with increasing Western influence, is the subject of much theoretical debate. On one hand, Fa’aSamoa is juxtaposed against the model of Western

13 While the Fa’aSamoa has absorbed aspects of other cultures, many of the traditional systems of exchange and social organisation are still pervasive, for example 81% of all Samoan land is held under traditional ownership and can not be sold or mortgaged (Hardie-Boys 1994:69 and Stanley 1996:43 1), the village economy is still largely subsistence and the traditional organisational system of village life is upheld and endorsed through Government.
development, which views individualism as the basis for business motivation\textsuperscript{14}. On the other, the two cultures are see as complementary if the correct policies are used to focus change, which is inevitable in the face of increasing technology and globalisation. Recent research supports the view that business success and Fa‘aSamoa are or can be mutually beneficial. Increasingly small business courses are teaching how fa‘atalavelave can be incorporated into business practice, for example, Dunlop (1999) points out that filial relationships provide a loyal market for small business. Furthermore, the requirements of business could be used to frame fa‘atalavelave requirements within a more traditional setting, where only what can be afforded is given. Critiques have also been set against the power structures inherent in Fa‘aSamoa, which Meleisea (1992:5) maintains, “are used to uphold the interests of the powerful and privileged”. Challenges to these traditional power relations are welcomed by those who see Fa‘aSamoa as a malleable system that can be improved upon by the selected introduction of new ideas.

Conversely, many argue that economic individualism is diametrically opposed to Samoa’s communally-based system. The transferral of Western practises onto Samoan culture could, while promoting business activity and success, undermine the traditional social security offered by filial and community relations\textsuperscript{15}. Fairbairn-Dunlop said (interview 2000) when Fa‘aSamoa is operating in its full and proper capacity, “it is supposed to be a system that caters for everyone in the village including the poorest, this should also apply to any project in the villages”. In the past, internal, traditional, colonial and foreign influences have melded most often seamlessly and subtelty\textsuperscript{16} in the creation of modern day Samoa. The debate over how outside influences will shape Fa‘aSamoa in the future continues.

Rather than enhancing modernisation, Samoa’s hierarchical relationships were thought by some to distort and corrupt the administration of investment, loans and development

\textsuperscript{14} The Samoan approach to life is almost opposite to the European: property, wealth, success are all thought of in communal or family rather than individual terms.

\textsuperscript{15} “A reduction in community co-operation and sharing disadvantages the less able members of society” (Schoeffel 1996:1108). The gaps between income are widened if the powerful have less socially instituted responsibilities to share with those who are poor. Another pertinent challenge to Samoan culture is tourism. With its emphasis on sun and surf and skimpy clothing, is the antithesis to certain aspects of Samoan culture, which has a large religious majority with strict rules regarding clothing (mainly women’s). The tourist trade is viewed as a threat to this. (Interview 2000)

\textsuperscript{16} One obvious exception to this was the enforced change bought about by colonialism, The first contact with the Western world occurred in 1772 by a Dutch explorer, Roggeven. The influential contact came later in the early 1800s with the arrival of the first missionaries. Christianity was quickly assimilated into Samoan culture. An engineer talked to in the field study mentioned that in parts of Upolo there is a church almost every 400 meters.
aid. Communal ownership was thought to deny land use for individual entrepreneurship and production for export (Yusuf and Peters 1985 in Hoadley 1992:216). Samoan culture is seen by some as an impediment to much needed development, which was required due to the desires and needs of the population being increasingly influenced by Western culture. Maiava (1988:5) explains that these ideas are now common to mainly one social subgroup - the “new generation of urbanised Samoans, many returned from higher education abroad”. Fairbairn-Dunlop (1991:68) also uses cautionary words regarding those who are pushing for cultural reform, stating, “The greatest challenge lies in the self-seeking reforms advocated by the small though very powerful section of the community who could survive without Fa’aSamoa”.

Fairbairn-Dunlop also suggests that those who advocate that Fa’aSamoa can remain a modern facsimile of traditional Samoa, are also avoiding reality, as Samoan culture has already altered irrevocably. An increased desire for non-traditional goods has resulted in a greater need for cash, which is difficult to obtain in a subsistence economy\(^\text{17}\). The availability of waged work is minimal. The UNDP estimated that in the Pacific region there were 370,000 formal positions for a work eligible population of 1.8 million (UNDP 1994:16)\(^\text{18}\).

What connects many Samoan theorists (Simi, Fairbairn-Dunlop, Melesia, and Schoeffel) is the opinion that however cultural change occurs in Samoa, it should be initiated and controlled by Samoan people. Hoadly (1992:216) argues\(^\text{19}\) facilitating local direction of change is the only way to ensure sustainable development occurs. “Reforms may be made to address the concerns of teachers, civil servants and professionals in Apia and the suggestions of outsiders such as investors aid administrators and international agency advisors will be taken seriously, but these will be adapted to Fa’aSamoa, and change will be voluntary rather than revolutionary”. The alternative option to indigenously directed development; traditional non-empowering, blueprint-approach development), has been pervasive in the past and is well recorded.

\(^{17}\) Two-thirds of the workforce is engaged in subsistence income (Stanley 1996:430). Money is not used in most provision of goods or services in the villages where barter is the primary source of exchange. So whilst a minimum wage of $1.125 an hour reflects labour demand and supply for larger industry it does not reflect the whole economic picture in the villages, in many villages labour is not paid for in cash so there exists no meaningful minimum wage.

\(^{18}\) This opinion reflects the pragmatic ideas of the Neo-Liberals, which saw the inclusion of local participants as one way to ensure the success of a project. Indigenous theorists, move this one step further, to say that allowing indigenous control is the only way to ensure any form of development that is relevant to local people and will therefore be sustainable, this argument having both moral and pragmatic aspects.
The result of development that does not allow for endogenous development is in many cases a devaluation of local culture. As Hau'ofa (in Overton 1999:266) writes: “indigenous culture has often been ignored, and sometimes suppressed, by outsiders in ways which work to undermine the pride and stifle the initiative of Pacific Island people”.

The World Bank noted that while vast funds had been spent in the Pacific Islands little growth was recorded (Singh 1994). A number of points arise from this. The first is that the measures of growth, predominantly GNP and GDP indicators do not take into consideration non-monetary exchanges and therefore the majority of production and service provision in villages is paid for without the use of currency. The second is that programs used by donors are not taking into consideration the needs of Samoan people. Management and the use of funds on non-growth projects are proffered as reasons for little growth. Another criticism of donor intervention in the Pacific is that it is aimed at promoting trade for the benefit of donor countries rather than assisting the populations that funding is intended to benefit. As Singh (1994: 64) writes “aid flows have been motivated primarily by their own interests rather than the priorities and needs of recipient countries”. “New Zealand, Japan and the U.S profit most from the trade imbalance - a classic case of economic Neo-Colonialism. New Zealand exports five times as much to Western Samoa as it buys, the U. S six times as much Australia seven times as much, Japan 96,520 times as much. Foreign aid covers about 60% of the trade imbalance” (Stanley 1996:430).

As this thesis will show the benefits of SBDF are that the development ideas of the donor are secondary to that of the local organisation. If development is endogenously directed, it can be assumed that many of the pitfalls of donor directed spending, for example difficulties in establishing genuine participation can be avoided. This chapter will go on to illustrate how the SBDF system endorses indigenous development decisions.

20 Many cash crop initiatives have failed in the past (Shadrake 1996, Stanley 1996). This can be attributed to projects being incompatible with Samoan culture, which is not focused on mono-cultural farming, as well as Samoa's vulnerability to cyclones and the competition on the world market for goods, which are indigenous to Samoa.
As has been discussed in the first chapter, the concept of empowerment is fractured by a number of divergent focuses. If a continuum of meaning were to be constructed, Paulo Freire (1972) who popularised the idea of the conscientisation of the poor, would inform the far left. The basis of his paradigm being that the structures, which, maintain power dynamics and keep those without power in a position where they are unable to obtain it should be repealed. Freire advocates conscientisation being achieved primarily through education that is aimed at people being able to critically and democratically participate in civil society. At the opposite side of the continuum would be personnel empowerment through the realisation of individual self worth, and inherent strength (Macquirie in Macbride-Stewart 1996: 10). The majority of NGO workers identified empowerment as somewhere in the middle of these definitions (interview 2000), a common factor being the requirement for development to occur from below. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Samoa, Numea Simi, objected to the usage of the term empowerment, as it could imply challenging the traditional hierarchies on which Samoan society is based. “Empowerment has a negative connotation in the Samoan context particularly in a society where there are well demarcated lines of authority. There is no equivalent in our language so we describe it as the windows of opportunity” (Simi Interview 2000).

In Fa’asamoa the inappropriateness of speaking out of turn is well documented. "The behaviors valued in Fa’aSamoa involve knowing one’s place in the system and being able to identify and apply the correct behaviours for a specific situation. Acting above oneself, by showing initiative or originality or speaking out of turn for examples not appropriate behaviour (Fairbaim-Dunlop 1991:62). Social and productive roles in Samoa are also well regulated. There exist complex relationships between brothers (secular) and sisters (sacred), who have a higher status than their brother's in their natal village. A sister's actions and behaviour are representative of family honour and esteem, "her kin will watch over her, to the extent that they value their own status" (Schoellel 1973:83). In return the males are largely responsible for agricultural production and like their sisters are answerable to the matai. It is the matai who is the voice for the aiga and to whom the village obeys and supports. This system can be further (and very basically)
described in relation to the concepts of pule (authority) and tuatua (service). Pule is exercised by the matai namely in the form of distributing resource. Tuatua describes communal obligations, which among other things take the form of items given by the aiga to the matai. In some cases the matai will demand all wages as tuatua, which will then be distributed amongst the whole group\(^1\). Wives have limited rights in the village of their husband, and work, like their husbands, towards the communal good. The aiga must be seen to be the motivation for any activity outside traditional roles, for example, a woman will generally only be permitted to enter into business if it seen as benefiting her family (Dunlop 1999).

**Box 2. The Fa’amatai System**

<table>
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<th>Aualuma</th>
<th>Matai</th>
<th>Faletua ma tausi</th>
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<td>(Daughters)</td>
<td>Village administration</td>
<td>(In marrying wives)</td>
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<td>Hospitality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic tasks</td>
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<td>(Untitled Males)</td>
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<td>Agricultural production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamaiti</td>
<td>(Children)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household jobs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Women, Education and Development: Western Samoa (Fairbairn Dunlop 1991)

Fa’amatai is a complex system that cannot easily be interpreted by an outsider, the subtleties of relationships being both historical and embedded in Fa’aSamoa. Samoan society is based on the aiga\(^2\), a large extended family group with the matai at its head, who is elected by consensus of the clan. The matai is responsible for the lands, assets, and distribution, and sees to the clan’s social obligations and is the aiga representative on the district or village council - the fono. The majority of the population occupies a place within this system\(^3\). “The 1991 census reported that 85.7% of the total population

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\(^1\) This system also extends to the church leader who, like the matai is obliged to give back to the community. Unlike the matai although, the pastor is not judged on his ability to do so. This system can also represent a disincentive for young people to enter into productive work above and beyond their obligations, as the rewards of this will go to the matai (Schoeffel 1996:1108).

\(^2\) While the aiga is the main economic unit, business and income generating activities are often entered into on an individual level. The family will support income-generating efforts, which are done for the family, as money from all resources is pooled to pay for family costs. Consequently women who are in business do not have to double their workload, as their home duties will most often be taken over by another member of the family (Schoeffel 1996).

\(^3\) Western Samoans live in 362 villages (Department of Statistic 1994:53-55), 330 of these are in outlying rural areas, which accounts for around half the population, the other half living in urban or suburban areas. Only 16% of villages have more than 600 inhabitants.
were living under the direct authority of the matai, most of the rest of the correspondents were residents of Apia” (Stanley 1996:432).

Samoa's governmental system reinforces traditional social structures, as only matai can be elected to a parliamentary position of which there are 47; these are then voted on democratically. The parliamentary positions carry with them great power and an increase in the mana of the matai's aiga24. As it is customary for matai to be males, the number of women in decision making roles is limited, which is something reflected in the village setting, where the fono has the power to overrule the decisions made by the Women's committee, the equivalent of the Men's fono. A pulenuu committee links the activities of state and village fono, from every fono one member of the pulenuu is elected, whose job it is to relay issues discussed between government and fono.

The majority of NGO workers (Interview 2000) did not see the aims of Empowerment as incongruent with traditional culture, in some cases comments where made that expressed the possibility of altering traditional systems to increase power equity between certain groups (Interview 2000)25. Indigenous development actors were also aware of the dual aspects of development comparable to those described by Cowen and Shenton (1996), namely, the symbiotic relationship between destruction and creation that is inherent in the development process. Those interviewed, expressed an awareness of the duality of development, most of the perceived dangers of development focused around losses to traditional culture and the values it embodies. The ability for local people to direct development was seen as an anathema to destruction of traditional values being greater than gains made, empowerment was viewed as a technique to facilitate culturally relevant transitions being made.

Empowerment was defined at a Pacific Women's Workshop in Fiji in 1987, “as a leadership style that creates awareness and a sense of power for all women. Pacific Island delegates stated that they needed a sense of sharing of sisterhood to help them in

24 A son or daughter becoming a white-collar worker, particularly a government or church employee, is the ambition of many families (Interview Don Hunter 2000). This has been to the detriment of trades and other blue collar professions, which are not seen as as important and will not bring the aiga as much status.

25 One example of this being Schoefrel's (1989: 10) suggestion of raising the role of the women's committee to that of the men's (pulenuu). This means providing a small wage for members and allowing the committee to enter into discussion with Government on issues involving the community.
their struggle, so empowerment was not just seen in an individual sense” (cited in Macbride-Stewart 1996:10). The concept in Samoa would be situated somewhere at the end of the previously described continuum, focusing on the capacity for people to realise their full potential. The empowerment concept is now well embedded within the national development nomenclature. Samoan small business trainers and other NGO programs have used the term as an indicator of project success, a number of training programs held empowerment as a precondition for successful small business development (Shadrake 1996:85).

For the majority of those working towards empowerment Fa'aSamoa is the context in which bottom-up development will occur rather than empowerment and cultural change essentially altering Fa'aSamoa. In Samoa it would not be appropriate or wanted for a foreign entity to identify significant aspects of the society that could be changed to be more equitable. The desired role of an outside development entity is to enable indigenous groups to define what represent equity issues for them. These attitudes reflect Moser's (1989) ideas; that endogenous development, which in the majority of cases relates to practical needs, creates the confidence, systems and organisation that can then be translated into strategic needs. It is fitting with the opinions of Samoan theorists and with the contemporary ideas of post-development that the impetus, desire and action for change should come from within Samoan culture.

The SBDF system is well situated to fulfil the role of an empowerment enabler. The CF representative (Interview 2000) views the SBDF system as promoting democracy at the grassroots level, “For many it is their first introduction to democratic procedures”. The SBDF provides the opportunity for empowerment to occur in the way ordained by those who access the fund; this includes both practical and strategic development and is spread between numerous organisations and community groups. On could also argue that the very system of handing the control, of finances and project design, to local groups is in itself empowering. The rest of this chapter will further describe how the SBDF system effectively facilitates locally defined empowerment.

26 This is the case with CF funded projects, around 20% of projects were based around strategic change; if strategic change includes any organised lobbying around social or political issues.
HOW SUBMISSION BASED FUNDING FULFILS THE DIRECTIVES SET FORTH BY EMPOWERMENT THEORY

Overton, Scheyvens and Purdie (1999:262), based on a number of case studies in the Pacific, identify four themes that will be used as a basis from which to judge the efficacy of SBDF as a system that concurs with the principles of empowerment. The four themes identified are “the need for diversity: the need for participation: the deficiencies of the project cycle approach: and the deficiencies of modernist strategies”. The inclusion of women into the development agenda will also be discussed. The authors see these as reflecting “recent changes in practice towards more participatory approaches”, which are aimed towards engendering empowerment (Overton et al. 1999). This thesis puts forth the idea that SBDF systems can further extend the compliance of development practice to alternative development theory by providing a framework that necessitates local involvement. As Escobar writes (1995:19) “instead of searching for grand alternative models or strategies what is needed is the investigation of alternative representations and practices in local settings, particularly as they exist in context of hybridisation, collective action and political mobilisation”.

Axiomatic to empowerment is the ability for local people to effectively determine community development agendas. This is one of the points that separate empowerment practices from Neo-Liberal interventions. One example of the failure of Neo-Liberal policies was the attempt to “introduce communal income generation schemes into rural Western Samoa. The project was based on the belief that communal effort, used in church building and village development projects in Western Samoa, could be extended to income generation. The perception was misconceived (Schoeffel 1980:2) and most such projects failed” (Shadrake 1996:31). The aim of empowerment and CF is, rather than adapting projects to perceived local conditions as in the previous project example, to adapt project and funding processes to local needs.

On the following page, Table Three, illustrates the breakdown of indicators of empowerment that will structure the following analysis.
### Table Three. Indicators of Empowerment Used in the Analysis of the SBDF System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Project Design</th>
<th>Empowerment Indicators</th>
<th>Testing methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Consultation and Design | Participation          | • A process approach is used  
|                         |                        | • Capacity building  
|                         |                        | • Quick results responding to local needs  
|                         |                        | • Work done with existing organisations  
|                         |                        | • Local contribution  
| Relevancy               |                        | • Local contribution  
|                         |                        | • Projects have meaning for everyday life and problems faced  
| Implementation          | Diversity              | • Variety of project types  
|                         |                        | • Distribution of funds between regions  
|                         | A range of organisations supported | • A breakdown of organisations supported  
|                         |                        | • One way information flow  
|                         | Community organisations have access to fund | • Number of non affiliated people who possess knowledge of CF  
| Women in Development    | Partnership between donor/ local | • Women’s organisations consulted with  
|                         | (this is discussed in Chapter Four) | • Women’s in decision making roles  
|                         |                        | • No. of projects with WID focus  
| Monitoring              | Partnership between donor/ local | • Indicators of success constructed with local involvement or by local partners  
|                         | (this is discussed in Chapter Four) | • Ongoing dialogue, no closed account approach  

## PARTICIPATION

Genuine participation involves local actors defining what their involvement will be and how this will affect them. “Participation is the key principle, for it contends that all people effected by a development activity should be involved in its conception, implementation and evaluation, and share in its rewards” (Overton 1999:262). As was illustrated in Chapter One of this paper, the failings of participatory theories are often inherent in the structure of ODA money dispersal, which follows a pattern of foreign experts encouraging locals to participate in a project that has not been designed by them.
However much the rhetoric changes to 'participation', 'participatory research', 'community involvement' and the like, at the end of the day there is still an outsider seeking to change things... whoever the person is may change but the relation is still the same. A stronger person wanting to change things for a person who is weaker.... Respect for the poor and what they want offsets paternalism. The reversal this implies is that outsiders should start not with their own priorities, but with those of the poor, although however much insight they have, outsiders will still project their own values and priorities.

(Chambers 1983:141)

As the priorities and control of the project belong inherently to those who instigate a funding contract with CF, participation is axiomatic to the SBDF. If local people are not interested in development initiatives, they will simply not approach CF, or will not complete a project proposal. Phrased more positively, local organisations will suggest projects that are most important to the group. The directives for successful participation against which SBDF will be tested, will be set out under headings designed by Gow and Vansant (1983), these directives on rural participation were established to critique and describe the seven ideal components of an effective participatory system. The framework provided by Gow and Vansant, was chosen as it offers the most comprehensive analysis. Other theorists including, Botes and van Rensburg (2000) and Friedman (1992) are referred to where this adds to the discussion.

a) Implementers of rural development projects should be prepared to follow a process approach.

"The Blueprint Approach emphasises planning from the top and implementation from below. The more successful learning process approach starts below" (Chambers 1983:211). This first indicator of participation is vital as it ensures local bodies have the temporal and structural space to provide an opinion, and through this increase their control over project outcomes. As has been described a process approach is the method used by CF when negotiating the funding contract, which often occurs over several months. This process involves modifying the proposal and project design through discussions between local and CF representatives. Once the project has been funded, the way in which the objectives are obtained is the responsibility of the local partners,
although a dialogue is sometimes maintained between the partners - if the support of the CF representative is required. If changes are to be made to the initial plan, then a consultation is again required, in most cases changes will be differing suppliers or changes in the costing. If surplus funds exist, the local agency, in most cases, requests these be spent on an associated project cost.

As Chart One shows there are five stages of the project during which consultation can occur between the donor and the local entity. Often the consultation process, previous to project acceptance can take anywhere up to six different visits. This compares favourably to the predominant model (Chart Two), where the interaction between the local organisation and the donor is static, resulting in no personal support or advice in the proposal or implementation process.

b) A project should start with small, relatively simple activities that respond to local needs and produce results quickly

This idea was reflected in a study of 'Nature Conservation and Aid in Samoa' by Hardie-Boys (1999) who concluded that there is a need for immediate, clear and tangible benefits which promote local livelihoods if conservation benefits are to be assimilated into the culture. This is a conclusion that could be extended to cover community projects in general, aside from those with an advocacy directive. The immediacy of implementation was nominated by a number of NGO workers in the study as one of the main considerations for ensuring the success of a project (Interviews 2000). The speed of application processing (up to 3 months) at CF was frequently cited as the most efficient compared to all other donors, as was the delivery of finance after acceptance.

Table Four. The Benefits of the SBDF System as Indicated by Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits of the CF system</th>
<th>Number of times benefit identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control/Access community has of funds</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of approval</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk taking ability</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with CF representative</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal writing support</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This factor was seen as a major benefit of CF system. In cases where participants had to wait more than three months to hear whether projects would receive funding, those involved often lost motivation and key people moved on to other things. When the funding did finally arrive, the community was no longer focused on that particular goal. This leads generally to a sense of demoralisation within communities (interview 2000).

As Graph One shows, the trend in project spending is that more projects are being funded for less Canadian dollars.

**Graph One. Mean CF Expenditure per Project**

This decrease in mean project expenditure is due in part to the demand for a financial contribution from organisations that has led to a larger number of projects being funded; these projects also tend to be smaller in scope. This change also reflects the philosophy of the current CF personnel who see small community projects as vital to village empowerment. Communities are advised in the initial consultation process that the donor favours small projects. If a complex project is proposed the methods of realising project success will be discussed. The aim of these consultations is that communities become aware of what is involved in the implementation and running of a project.
Box Three. Aliepata Handicraft Centre

The Aliepata handicraft centre provides a good example of the ability for growth for small projects to gain momentum. The centre, which since its formation has increased in size and gained a loan from a commercial bank, sought initially to provide a sustainable income to the Folau Alofa women's group by providing a place to sell handcrafts and foods to locals and tourists. Nine core members run the Centre, and crafts are sold by 20 others. The first funding grant was to purchase kitchen supplies and improve the structure of the premises to eradicate rain and weather inside and provide for small business training. A second lot of funding was then obtained to provide tables and chairs for customers and ensure security for the shop. This resulted in less work for the women who could then leave up the displays of handcrafts, rather than taking them down at the end of each day. The displays were detailed so this translated into a lot if work. The training is run in conjunction with WIB, was attended by others in the village beside the women's group, extending this business information to those whom would not otherwise have access to it. This resulted in some village action with two 'clean up the beach days' involving the whole village.

The WIBF supported the group by administering the grant, monitoring the project and reporting to the CF. This was beneficial, as the women's group has no easy access to phones and faxes. WIBF also mentored the participants; in return the receiving a fee of 10% of the grant. The involvement with the WIBF also meant greater access to publicity. The relationship was reciprocal with members of the group travelling two hours by bus to obtain the advice of WIBF members and many visits the other way, ensuring an ongoing dialogue.

The smallness of projects allows for the skills within the community to be increased gradually, matching the requirements of the projects, so that local communities can complete the projects without a large amount of assistance from outside the resource base of the community. As the experience and capabilities of a group grows, larger projects, project additions or other projects conducted with the experience of those from past initiatives, are more likely to be funded, as Box Three (above) illustrates.

c) Potential beneficiaries should make a resource commitment to the project to be implemented

This directive is aimed towards ensuring a sense of local ownership. CF requires both commitments in financial and non-financial resources from communities. Non-financial resources include; the management and labour required to implement the project, as
well as food for the labourers\textsuperscript{27} and other miscellaneous contributions. For a group to raise the required contribution and the labour required for implementation, an enthusiastic network must exist behind any project proposal.

The 40\% contribution fulfils two main purposes. The first is that it roots the ownership of the project with the local people who implement it. The CF representative maintains that "there is a very real possibility of creating dependency, all funding arrangements must be reviewed in this light" (Hunter 2000). The second factor is that the contribution restricts the fund being accessed for political means, which has occurred in the past and can alienate the project process from local control and influence. The fund is not used to endorse any leaders influence, as a project for which the community must supply labour and funding is an unattractive platform for political manoeuvrability, proving neither a gift nor an appropriate symbol of an individual's ability to use political contacts for the good of the village\textsuperscript{28}. What a leader may see as an important project, or one that reflects his ability to provide for his aiga, may be very different from what certain sectors of the community deem important, for example, business training for women\textsuperscript{29}.

Nine respondents identified the 40\% contribution as a facet of CF that they would change. Some NGO workers indicated that while this was seen as acceptable, in some cases it was restrictive, proving too difficult for people to raise their component of the funds. The example given of this was one group finding out about the 40\% contribution and then deciding not to go ahead with a project proposal, it was not stated whether this group obtained funding from another source, or what the intended project was.

\textsuperscript{27} It is traditional in Samoa for payment for labour to be made in the form of a mealofoa (gift) at a ceremony conducted at the completion of the project. This gift would generally include fine mats and possibly food. It is also expected that labourers will be fed well while the work is underway.

\textsuperscript{28} The contribution redistributes community funds away from fa'aliveave, which competes with community development projects for discretionary income (Hunter Interview 2000). Local people control this distribution like the project itself.

\textsuperscript{29} Botes and van Rensburg (2000:50) cite numerous situations where powerful sections of the community 'position for patronage' (Friedman 1992:29) this can be to secure power, or to endorse themselves as powerful leaders, by monopolising development resources, to the detriment of the wider community. "This behaviour by more dominant groups has often deprived the weaker and more vulnerable social segments of participation in community affairs. This may also lead to self centeredness and selfish development decisions" (Botes and van Rensburg 2000:49). The following criticisms accurately describe some situations surrounding funding prior to the introduced contribution threshold. The contribution was introduced primarily as a technique to dissuade community leaders from accessing the fund for self-serving ends. The second reason the contribution is used has also been discussed by the World Bank, who in an analysis of project effectiveness recommended "cost sharing to promote sustainability" (Carvalho and White 1996:28), citing three successful projects that had used labour and in one project a cash contribution. This contribution was considered axiomatic to the success of the Projects.
There are numerous cases of funds being raised successfully. Anecdotal evidence indicated that this was most often done through community fundraising efforts, such as selling flowers, oil, or raffles rather than a straight community contribution, as was used in a few cases (interview 2000). Schoefel (1996:129) comments that one reason for the failure of many donor funded projects is the “passive, recipient attitude” that is influenced by traditional values, a colonial past and “The relatively easy availability - at least at a national level - of large foreign aid flows”. CF reports suggest that 62% of the community projects are still operational\(^\text{30}\). This success can be largely attributed to the sense of ownership felt by the community. The CF representative commented that community and personal pride is discernable, when communities have raised their finance or successfully implemented the projects.

Graph Two. Local Partner Contributions Between 1991 and 1999

The graph above illustrates that the number of projects where the local partners do not contribute\(^\text{31}\), either in terms of labour or cash, has become obsolete, while cash contributions are becoming the major trend. This is a result of changed CF policy, and acceptance of this by NGO/CO communities.

\(^{30}\) This figure does not include education programs, also the figure is possibly higher due to 25% of the end of project reports not being held on the CF files.

\(^{31}\) It should be noted that, the resource contribution columns most probably exist well below the real numbers, as not all contributions where noted on the project files.
d) To the extent possible, projects should try to work with existing organisations - formal or informal (and, d1) Where the environment is one of factionalism and conflict it is necessary to work with more than one group

The need for donors to work with local organisations is emphasized by a number of Samoan theorists (Simi 2000, Dunlop 1999, and Melesia 1996). As Batiri Williams (1994:228) writes, “We in the South Pacific region must tread carefully we do not need fast-fix solutions: rather, we need sound, affordable, manageable, short and long term plans to advance development. These must include important traditional knowledge and traditional transmission systems of information and culture with people as the main focus”. The advantages of constructing relationships with indigenous NGO /CO groups are numerous, and include:

- The ability for local organisations to extend information about CFs fund opportunities to members or networks
- The ability for established NGOs to mentor community groups that have not implemented a project before
- Access to local expertise and experience
- The ability to obtain different opinions on issues, and support divergent subgroups within the community
- The opportunity for dialogue to occur between organisations and the donor
- Increasing the relevance of funding to community by supporting longstanding organisations increasing the capacity of already existing development entities

CF has had strong relationships with certain NGO/COs since its inception in 1991, as a result some NGOs have received funding for a greater number of projects than that received by other NGOs. The most prominent of these relationships is with WIB, a professional NGO, and KT, which is a longstanding NGO with traditional ties to the village through regional komiti’s. The relationship with these NGOs is reciprocal, both organisations assist with community project proposals and in the dissemination of information regarding the fund. The committees provide a successful platform for the representative to enter local women’s decision-making forums and discuss project ideas.
The aim is for the fund to be accessible by all groups who have project ideas that concur with the funding criteria. The obvious alliances to the aforementioned NGOs was seen in by some of those interviewed as an unfair bias which has presented some problems with local organisations, due the personal nature of the relationships between development partners. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some organisations have not approached CF as it has been perceived that they have chosen sides, by supporting an NGO involved in similar work. This was often exacerbated by an NGO being supported for more than two projects. As one NGO worker put it “We have received nothing and they would not exist without the Canada Fund, we do not think this is very fair” (Interview 2000). This perceived favourism is due partly to the limited funding pool and partly to the commitment the CF has to building capabilities within NGOs which necessitates ongoing support.

c) A two-way information flow (both formal and informal) between project implementers and potential beneficiaries should be established at the time of project start up.

The standard form of consultation between donor and local partner takes place in the time prior to implementation. This directive is not entirely applicable to the SBDF system, as it is relevant to projects where beneficiaries manage implementation independent of the donor. Communication is maintained in the majority of cases to fulfil the mutually binding contract (namely the required monitoring). In the case of NGO projects, where the NGO obtains funding that will be used to reach other beneficiaries, it is the responsibility of the NGO to ensure that the connection between itself and project beneficiaries are kept this being a direct result of the aim of NGO autonomy. Twenty percent of all project (between 1991-1998) implementers were also the direct beneficiaries, with this amount increasing in recent years.

This is not to say that CF does not have a responsibility to also ensure that the conditions of the funding contract are being kept. While the monitoring and reporting system should indicate how this communication has been factored in to the planning process, this is not always the case. The issue of monitoring and accountability will be discussed fully in Chapter Four.
Emphasis should be placed on building organisational capacity

Botes and van Rensburg (2000:46-47) identify the danger of donors funding hard issues - technological, financial, physical and material, in preference to soft issues - community involvement, decision making procedure, organisational capacity building and empowerment, which are perceived as ephemeral and difficult to measure. They write, “it seems to be assumed that either the soft issues of a project are less important or that everyone knows how to do it”. CF escapes this danger by using a process-based system for project formulation and also due to the emphasis that is placed on capacity building.

Capacity building is one of the primary aims of CF, this is achieved through three main techniques. The first technique is structured learning, taking the form of workshops and funding for advisors, including also the support and training offered by the CF representative. NGO workers generally request training, or the need for it is identified through discussion. The second method of increasing the capacity of NGOs is though funding part of the purchase of office equipment and other necessary capital.

The third method occurs when organisational/personal capacity is extended by involvement in the project process. In the case of small COs the project planning and discussion stage, are instructive in themselves, this process entails basically learning on the job and plays a vital part in creating an awareness of how funding can be accessed. This learning process embodies the concept coined 'dialogical education' outlined by one of the initial forces in the grassroots movement - Paulo Freire, in the early 1970s. Freire's process is described by Blackburn (2000:8) as:

*The educator, rather than deposit 'superior knowledge to be passively digested, memorized and repeated, must engage in a genuine dialogue, or creative exchange, with the participants... The educator must then act as a catalyst, or animator, with the objective of facilitating an educational process in which oppressed people become creative subjects of the learning process rather than passive objects. In other words, the role of the educator is not to*
educate the oppressed in the transitive sense, but to create a space in which the oppressed educate themselves and each other.

Not all CF capacity building is fostered in a Freirian manner, some knowledge, namely accounting practices, is transferred in the traditional, anti-dialogue, banking method that Freire used to describe the process by which foreign experts transpose Western ideas and information onto their Third World subjects. Although the main discussion and implementation methods used are informative to both facilitator and the local partners, and are based on local knowledge. Rahnema (1992), criticises Freirian methods for their lack of attention to the material inequalities faced by the poor, and the possibility of the educator inappropriately imposing education on those who do not want it or do not conceive of themselves as powerless. CF system of capacity building largely avoids these pitfalls, as locals groups choose to work with CF, and bring their ideas and plans to the facilitator and in doing so nominate in what areas learning will occur.

The CF representative (interview 2000) identifies five necessary areas of capacity that groups must have to satisfactorily complete a project. The majority of these can be taught throughout the project process:

- That the community can identify needs, as Hunter says “I've never been in a village were people could not express what their needs were” (interview 2000). The consultative process provides a context for this to occur.

- The capacity to get a proposal written in English; sometimes there is no-one in the group that can do this themselves. “The point is that that the group should be able to find assistance for this”. This is also an indicator of the group’s ability to organise the required resources.

- That the group can implement the project; Hunter maintains that in most simple projects, management skills can be learnt if this capacity does not exist already. My main requirement is that they can supervise a contractor or community worker. He

32 Soft issues refer to those practices, which relate to ephemeral indicators that are difficult to define such as organisational focus, staff training and consolidation of lessons learnt from projects. These types of issues will often relate to organisational capacity or empowerment of participants.
33 A number of theorists (Botes and van Rensburg 2000, Weiringa 1994, Sachs 1992) mention the need for practitioners to be aware of the urge to 'intellectually colonise' participants with ideas.
34 Nevertheless the facilitator is in a position where personal prejudices and opinions can be bought to the discussions. The ability of the representative to manipulate discussions to their ideological viewpoint is an issue that all practitioners need to be aware of. RPA approaches detail many ways that this can be avoided; an interesting topic for further study would be the exploration of what techniques are useful in the SBDF consultation process.
comments, “people have a good idea if the project is working, if their money is involved they have an even better idea if the project is working” (Interview 2000).

- Accountability skills are taught to groups who do not have these already. A project-specific bank account is opened with the money from CF and the local organisation, projects costs are taken from this account with receipts being kept for all expenses, providing the basis for a basic accounting system.

- The capacity to report is the area of greatest difficulty. The monitoring is part of the contractual responsibility of the local partners. CF representative assists local organisations with end-of project reports if these do not meet the required standards. This capacity is one of the most difficult to engender as most often the motivation has decreased upon completion of the implementation stage. If an analytical framework is provided and taught then reports will contain blessings and thanks, with very little information on what occurred in the actual implementation of the project (Hunter 2000).

A number of theorists maintain that a factor restricting development projects in the villages is a lack of local capacity and management skills35 (Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000, Simi 2000). CF views the skills required for small projects as able to be taught and that this ‘capacity development’ is one of the main roles of the CF. As CF representative states, “I see this co-ordinators job as much about education than anything”.

One result of capacity building being factored into the project process is that there is an inherent risk factor, in that groups have not previously assumed responsibility for project funding and implementation. By way of analogy the same risks exist in hiring an inexperienced person over one with experience. CF accepts the risk factor, and with this comes an expectation that around 15% of projects will not fulfil the expected project results, although this risk is limited by all projects being needs-based. If the community nominates an important need then it is unlikely that the project will fail, as all involved care about the outcomes.

35 The prevalent problem in Samoa is the lack of capabilities within NGOs to carry out their roles. There is discussion now of the best approaches through donor assistance to build capacities within the NGOs under an umbrella mechanism focused towards training, advisory services etc” (Simi 2000 Interview).
Past projects have shown that implementing groups are likely to be enthusiastic to learn new skills and to be involved in the decision making process. Hunter (interview 2000) commented that frequently he had people saying to him “we’ve never done this before, it’s very interesting to be involved in this way”. There is a lot of pride associated with the ability for local groups to learn new skills, organise and run projects. As Table Four shows around one fifth of all responses pointed to control over money as a primary benefit.

In the case of organisations, that have hitherto not managed projects, the skills learnt or consolidated through activity, provide a basis of experience from which larger projects are more likely to be funded, from both CF and other donors. In the case of organisations, the process of capacity building has been largely focused around accountability. Many of the accountability reforms made by Samoan NGOs have been spearheaded by the CF representatives, for example KT and WIB have both overhauled accounting and monitoring systems at the insistence of CF, a move which has been beneficial to both organisations (Samoan Interviews 2000).

The ‘priority areas of assistance’ detail infrastructural building for local NGOs, with an emphasis on capacity building. This takes a number of forms, funding as been focused on equipment for offices, as well as formal and training sessions. The only gap in this system being the lack of any provision for wages, which was identified by the majority of NGO workers as the factor required to build capacity within the NGOs. The fund’s guiding philosophy (established by the consultative committee) has not previously allowed for the funding of wages, as this was seen to compromise NGO dependence and sustainability. What the fund does provide for is remuneration for voluntary workers. This is dependent on the organisation being able to come up with a percentage of the required finance themselves, through fundraising or member contributions. A restriction to this kind of remuneration from CF is that fee-paying in member organisations, which would present the most obvious way that finance could be generated within an organisation, is not culturally favoured. This is due to the traditional importance for matai or others in positions of responsibility to give and distribute resources\(^\text{36}\). The idea

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\(^{36}\) The responsibility community leaders have to obtain and distribute resources to their members (or aiga) can be described in terms of pule and tuatua. While the leader can command the tuatua of their memberships their status must be maintained by the provision of services to this group. Although a matai can request money from their aiga it is not as easy for a leader without this traditionally defined relationship to do so.
of payment for these services is not a traditional part of Samoan culture; also the mana
of those in positions of power is measured and maintained by their ability to provide.

Recently (towards the end of 2000) the consultative committee has investigated the
possibility of NGOs receiving remuneration for the time involved mentoring other
groups. This system was used to beneficial effect in the Aliepata Centre project
(described in Box Four). This mentoring fee (around 10% of project) would be available
to any NGO/CO that fulfils a mentoring role to a CO, who will receive project funding
from CF. For this to be effective the mentoring role would have to be established prior
to project acceptance and the mentoring agency would have to provide services to the
implementing CO that could otherwise not be obtained. This system would also extend
to projects, which are proposed by an organisation on behalf of a community or member
base, which would receive the benefits of the project, such as the project described
below in Box Four.

Box 4. Komiti Tumama Medical Cupboards

A good example of capacity building can be seen in the medical cupboard project - a
partnership between the CF and KT. The cupboards, which total 172, meet a definite need
in villages where medical requirements were previously difficult to obtain either because
these were not stocked in the villages or the price of buying, for example, a whole packet
of panadol was restrictive. The cupboards fulfil this need by supplying individual pills,
band-aids etc to villagers as required.

For the women involved in the project at a village level, the new skills required or learnt
included; stock control, basic accounting systems, stock ordering and the organisation
required to keep the stock available to the village. This last point provided occasional
problems for some of the cabinets, as group leaders were reluctant to leave the cupboard
keys (cupboards were locked at all times and accessed by contacting the committee
member holding the key) with another member of the group. This delegation or sharing of
responsibility changed ideas of hierarchy and status, posed a definite learning opportunity
for those involved.

Despite these positive reports, there were some people who saw the project as not within
the capabilities of the local women's groups. Simi (Interview 2000) represented this view
and would not fund the project seeing the money handling aspects of the project as too far
removed from the usual traditional activities of the women, which primarily focus on child
and maternal health. This opinion had been substantiated she maintained, having heard
reports that some of the cupboards were not being run successfully. Conversely,
monitoring conducted by Hunter, and the findings of this fieldwork, indicate that the
project has been very successful. A significant part of the success can be attributed to the
project monitoring and support that as been conducted by KT, who visit the sites regularly
- checking the cupboards are being maintained as was agreed, and providing support where
this is needed. The success of the project is reflective of the need that the project filled and
its importance in the village.
DIVERSITY

“Diversity is an inevitable outcome of development strategies that emerge from everyday actions and the ideas of ordinary people rather than the programs and planners and politicians” (Chambers 1983:262). Under the DF system, needs identification and project design are the task of those who are requesting support for their project, consequently a large variety of programs are supported as these ideas come from disparate groups within Samoa and do not fit into any national agenda but reflect localised development requirements. These projects are often subsistence based due to the needs and life experience of those who design them. The Table on the following page indicates the types of projects supported by the CF throughout its existence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gov</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Small Business</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Educational</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Number of funding allotments (122) was spread between 44 Organisations, 43 groups received one project acceptance resulting in wide variety of project partnerships between local organisations and the CF. In total 55 NGOs received funding, a number of these many had multiple contracts with CF, as Graph Three on the following page indicates.
The following Graphs (Five and Six) indicate the spread of projects compared to population within each region. The regions are divided as follows:

Area one - Apia Urban area (21% of population, 55% of projects)
Area two - North west Upolu (25% of population, 18% of projects)
Area three - Rest of Upolu and Savai'i (54% of population, 27% of projects)

Not included in the Graphs are the Projects with a national Scope (2 or more areas) and the projects focusing on Government Support.
An urban bias within the distribution of project funding is apparent from the graphs, with the urban area receiving far more than its proportional share of projects. It must be taken into consideration however that the head offices of all NGOs are in Apia, and 7% of all projects were NGO capacity building. The Library and Loto Taumafai are also based in Apia together accounting for 8% of the total projects funded. It must also be noted that there are a number of national projects (in total 33% of all projects), such as the honey production run by WIB, that focus on outlying rural areas that are not taken into account in this analysis. Taking these factors into consideration, it can be concluded that there is a moderate degree of urban bias apparent in the direct distribution of funding (not focusing on NGO run programs) and that this be should investigated further. The implication of funding being disproportionately allocated to urbanised regions is that rural regions who are often the poorest are not receiving funding. In 1977, Micheal Lipton outlined some of the relationships between rural poverty and urban development. This analysis could be applied to Samoa, as more people leave the country to look for jobs in Apia (and overseas) rural farms are left in some cases without enough labour to run them. The lack of cash and income earning opportunities in rural areas means that in these regions a downwards poverty cycle could start occurring with more people needing to leave rural areas to look for work.
There is a great need for donors to focus development efforts in rural regions, this is a fact acknowledged by the Samoan Government and CF. The capacity building efforts of CF make it particularly relevant and applicable to regional community development efforts were local people may not have implemented a project before. Efforts should kept being made to ensure regional areas have access to CF.

RELEVANCY: A REVERSAL OF MODERNIST PRACTICES

"Instead of development implying inevitable increases in economic activity and wealth, sustainable development must be a more basic and diverse notion of improvement and well being, even if this involves minimal change and maintenance of existing livelihoods. Ideally, it allows people the option of combining and adapting what they regard as the best of old and new" (Overton 1999:264). The idea of allowing people autonomy over cultural change is vital to ideas of empowerment as well as to the success of the participatory projects. Schoeffel (1996:60-64) cites a number of examples of development projects in Samoa that have not succeeded due to the lack of consideration of cultural factors or in some cases "the accumulated socio-cultural knowledge" from other relevant projects in the Pacific. She suggests the inclusion of an appropriately educated social scientist in the initial stages of a project in order to avoid some of these problems. Although, it should be noted that under the SBDF system, this would not be affordable or required due to the fact that projects are based on local knowledge and are generally on a small scale.

It is likely that traditional knowledge will constitute a significant component of the project plan, as this represents the knowledge base that is accessible to those designing projects, without the initial involvement of donors. Chambers (1983) regards the reliance on traditional ways of doing and knowing as a benefit to the development process. Of the NGO projects currently running, around 70% had a strong connection with either traditional skills or long-term existing social structures.

WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Women in Development (WID) theory is multi faceted, the most influential conceptualisations of women's development will be briefly introduced here. The
arguments that surround women's development reflect a similar paradox as expressed in Chapter One; that is, the paradox that exists between the aim of focusing on strategic needs and the aim of empowerment. As genuine empowerment must be endogenous in its inception, allowing people to define their own development priorities means that strategic agendas may not surface. As empowerment practice places the third party (any development agency, donor, etc.) as a catalyst for endogenous change. This means that donors cannot decide what strategic needs should be addressed. The exogenous role of the donor is inherently limited by the intentions and needs of those whose 'right' it is to determine their own development. Women's roles and rights will generally exist within a web of culturally defined roles, meanings and histories. These arguments are apt for women's development, which focus's on women's subordination to men either as regarded by western theorists or as is the case in the aid industry, where women are depicted by statistics that indicate they are paid less than, men, less educated and more vulnerable to poverty.

Moser (1989) has identified five policy approaches to women's development, which are informative in defining the motivations: and benefits for women's focused policies. This paper focuses on the empowerment approach, which like empowerment theory generally arose from grassroots developments and the theoretical work of indigenous women. This approach views the history of the women's movement in the south as vastly different form that of developed countries, whose experience of colonialism,

37 It was the gender-focused theorist Molyneux (1985) who first made the distinction between strategic and practical needs, which was later, popularised by Moser (1989). The first of these, strategic needs - being the requirements for women to be freed from the structures that maintain their subordination; the second need is focused around basic pragmatic requirements such as water and health. Moser pointed out that most projects for women focused on practical needs that in turn engendered women with the skills required for predicating strategic change. Weiringa (1994) criticises these distinctions for being their empirical inseparability, and for its reliance on outside definition i.e. a planner labelling certain projects as strategic. The terms although, are of use in theoretically simplified scenarios, and do not necessarily transpose to any praxis.

39 These include the Welfare Approach, which was criticized as considering women as passive ingredients in the development mix reflecting the wider policies at the time (1950-1970). Materials were handed out for women; these were often based around their role as mothers, considered the most important by western developers. The Equity Approach was influenced largely by western feminism and saw the need for women to be equal to men in the workforce. Again it took the form of top down interventionist policies, which did not allow women a voice, these policies, which were isolated from women's control, and the wider cultural scenario, which, served in many cases to increase women's workloads. The Anti-Poverty, which still informs many women's development projects, focused entirely on practical needs. Moser (1989) critiques it for increasing women's workloads and not allowing for strategic need policies. The Efficiency Approach saw women's involvement in development initiatives as important in ensuring their success. This combined with cutbacks in social services, meant often women were used to provide cheap solutions to service gaps created by structural adjustment.

38 Weiringa (1994) points out that "The effects of these unequal relations include a skewed sexual division of labour, unequal access of women to basic resources, a limited political representation for women, a certain tolerance for male violence against women and other elements which constitute women's subordinate position in society". These factors listed here are of relevance to women's organisations in Samoa.
class and poverty vastly alter the realities of life, and therefore also necessarily the theories to describe these.

The empowerment approach focuses on bottom-up development and highlights the need for choice and the role of women in making decisions and effecting future development. Consciousness raising and other intangible aspects of women's empowerment are seen as vital steps in the process, such as increased self-esteem, increased skills and the personnel benefits of women working together for change. Although, as Weiringa (1994:834) points out, "beyond this central focus there is no consensus among those who advocate the empowerment of women as a crucial element in the development process". While this factor could be seen as a limitation, it also decreases the possibility of predetermined solutions to problems of a specific socio-cultural context, which require an immediate and local answer. The majority of development practitioners generally accept the importance of the role of women in development projects today, and the inclusion of women's programs and women in positions of power is one indicator as to the effectiveness of women's movements.

Schoeffel's (1989:1) recommendation of how women in Samoa should be included in the policies of Government and donors emphasises the role of dignifying existing roles and work that women do. She writes that they "provide the back-bone of the rural health services and play the major role in the financing and installation of community facilities such as water supplies, electricity generators, schools and building hospitals and dispensaries. Many of them also rim savings and loans clubs and have funds invested in savings accounts and government bonds for future village projects".

Conversely the projects conducted under the rubric of WID in Samoa could be subject to criticisms that they are reinforcing traditional limiting feminised roles. This criticism and the debate surrounding women focused projects mirrors the debate surrounding empowerment. If local people are to enter into endogenous development the role of emancipation as defined by Western scholars may be slow indeed. The perceived needs of local women usually will not be the repealing of traditional patriarchal institutions, and will instead, as in the case in Samoa, be focused around small initiatives that are well grounded in traditional and well established systems - such as KT in Samoa. These
initiatives are likely to connect women's work with that of traditional spheres of women's activities i.e. health and handicrafts. The argument in this paper is that for local empowerment to occur it must do so endogenously, in a way and at a pace determined by local women. Weiringa (1994:836) also points out that the continuous raising of needs and interests is an indication of an effective empowerment process in itself:

Defining women's gender interests should not be regarded as a one-off activity. It should rather be seen as a constant process, in which different interests are prioritised at different times. In fact, the 'success' of certain development efforts may be measured by the way new interests surface or become defined along the way.

Women's empowerment is a primary focus of CF. The system by which projects are established places particular emphasis on women's groups both new and traditional. Subsequently a large number of women-focused projects are funded, this is highlighted by Graph Seven, which shows the number of WID projects is generally around one third of all projects in a year.

Macbride-Stewart (1996:6) warns that one danger to women's organisations is that they will be marginalised and isolated from mainstream development. This is mainly attributed to the patriarchal power holdings in society at large. CF system works to override these biases by working with local women directly. The process by which
projects are funded allows women to occupy positions of leadership, encouraging them to instigate projects with the support of CF representative. The danger of tokenism is also avoided by CF directly accessing and discussing development concerns with women. This involvement remedies some of the exclusions development agents have previously made in Samoa. As Schoeffel writes (1989:7) “Women are generally satisfied with their status and roles in society, but they experience a sense of frustration at their inability to represent themselves to the central government, and in rural development projects”. CF process also achieves a number of subsidiary benefits for women's empowerment although it must be noted that empowerment is difficult to measure quantifiably, and is focused around a process and the immaterial benefits gained, as compared to the simple quantifiable targets that defined the Welfare Approach (Weiringa 1994:835):

- Often projects of interest to men will come to the CF representative via the Women's committees, thereby the women play an important role within in the community, being the conduit between development initiatives and funders.
- Women have the chance to improve or develop skills related to many parts of the project process from planning to bookkeeping.
- When involved in income earning projects women have a chance to increase the raise the standard of living for their families and providing for practical needs. One woman commented on an income-earning project run by WIB. She was very glad that she no longer had to rely on remittances from her children and could now support herself (Interview 2000).
- Women's self esteem is facilitated by having control over development initiatives within the village. This is also promoted by KT's weekly radio show, where one village komiti nominates a number of women to talk about their local group and their achievements on air. The show has had a good response, and has done much to promote women's issues and achievements at a national level. A sense of self-esteem and the consequent acknowledgement of the ability to instigate change is often noted as one of the first indications of empowerment.
- A sense of independence is also gained by women raising the funding and having control of all funds as one woman said (Interview 2000) “That's what makes the CF different we feel we have control of the money”.

SUMMARY

SBDF very basically, is a system that allows local people to plan, design, and implement community development projects, with the support of an international donor. Local organisations, once they have conceived of a project idea, write a proposal for CF, which is then accepted or declined by CF decision committee. If the proposal is accepted the local group is then responsible for implementing and reviewing the project. Throughout all stages of this process CF fulfils a facilitation and support role. CF representative also actively encourages an awareness of the fund within vulnerable sub-groups of the community. It is these aspects of the system as well the fact that dealings between local organisations and the donor occur directly, that differentiate SBDF from other small funding systems.

This chapter has reviewed the findings of the field-study, which investigated whether CF SBDF system concurs with the principles of empowerment. Firstly, the empowerment perspective was discussed with reference to the opinions of Samoan theorists and development workers. This revealed that the most significant aspects of empowering development in Samoa are that local people have control over local development, a factor also reflected in Empowerment theory. Secondly the SBDF system was reviewed with reference to four directives of empowerment. These directives were established by referring to work of Overton and Schyevens (1999) and the recommendations made by Gow and Vansant (1983).

The findings of this analysis were that CF SBDF system concurs with the directives of development theory to a high degree. It was shown that local capacity building, and the promotion of women as proactive development actors, are well-instituted goals of CF system. The method used to promote women's development initiatives (as well as access other vulnerable subgroups, such as those in rural areas) is the active creation of awareness of CF. This awareness was created through CF representative, 'cold calling' on groups who had not heard of CF before and through informal communication within pre-established networks. The point of most importance to this analysis is that development is endogenously determined with the exogenous entity providing assistance in the form of support focused around capacity building.
It has been shown in this chapter that due to local groups determining what are relevant development issues, projects are diverse in their subjects and geographical spread and are tailored to local needs. Although it was pointed out in the study, that proportional to the population, there was greater number of projects in the Apia region than in more rural areas. It is suggested, that this should be looked into further. The following chapters will enter into a more detailed analysis of some aspects of CF system that limit the effectiveness of the system and will suggest ways in which the system could be improved upon.
CHAPTER THREE: CAN SBDF CREATE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND LOCAL ORGANISATIONS: THE CASE OF CF.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the issue of whether an equitable partnership can exist between a local organisation and an international donor, within the context of a DF scenario. In Chapter One the SBDF has been portrayed as a system that embodies the rudiments of empowerment theory. One of the premises of empowerment theory is that local people should have control over the development initiatives that will shape their lives. This chapter will examine the dynamics of how CF is made available to local development groups and will investigate to what degree there is endogenous control of development planning.

This chapter outlines the relationship between the methods used to distribute information about CF and the resulting local awareness of the fund. As has been illustrated in Chapter Two, one of the ways in which CF differs from other donors is that the fund is actively promoted and made accessible to vulnerable subgroups within the community, for example women and remote regional areas. This chapter will illustrate how the success of the fund is dependent on a number of factors related to the dissemination of information about the CF. This process will determine what groups have access to the fund and how partnerships are formed between CF and local organisations. As Batiri Williams (1994:223) writes, in reference to the Pacific Islands: “Those who control information to a large extent will control societal growth and change”. This chapter will review the methods used to disseminate information to local communities and development agencies.

One problem facing donors with an empowerment agenda is that the development aims of the donor and of local organisation/s may differ. This raises the question - who determines what development initiatives are funded and should development agendas be directed from within the country or by an overseas development donor? The question
will also be asked; how can a partnership based on equality of decision-making occur when the power differentials between donor and local organisation are so great? This chapter analyses and discusses some of the barriers to establishing an equal partnership and illustrates how these can or have been overcome. The points addressed will be:

- Do the inherent power dynamics of the donor/LNGO relationship negate the idea of local autonomy?
- Following point one, do these dynamics lead to the donors determining what constitutes appropriate local development?
- Does CF working directly with NGO/COs instead of through Government lead to greater control and/or support for local organisations?
- How do new ideas get introduced if all initiatives are endogenously directed?

**THE MEANING OF PARTNERSHIP**

The term partnership can be used to describe any number of donor/recipient relationships. It is also finding increasing popularity as a description of good development practice. As Stirrat (1997:75) explains: “today almost all respectable NGOs represent their activities in terms of partnership. Thus, rather than supporting or working through local organisations, international development NGOs now work with partners”. This trend is also reflected in the work of donors. Although like other development jargon, for the concept to have meaning it must describe a shift in the way development is being conducted, that is, from the previous situation where a partnership did not exist. If the term is to have any meaning it must be representative of some measure of equality between the two agencies (local entity and donor). This should be multilevel and would have to include a large degree of decision-making autonomy for the local partners.

This paper will use the definition of partnership supplied by Lewis (1997:39) – “an agreed relationship based on a set of linkages within a development project, usually involving a set of linkages at various levels”. He categorises these linkages through their dualistic characteristics, which indicate whether partnerships are liable to encourage participation and respond to immediate needs or are likely to creating an inhibiting dependency and allow for no real dialogue between the partners.
Table Six. Characteristics of Active and Dependent Partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Partnerships</th>
<th>Dependent Partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
<td>Blueprint, fixed term Negotiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blurred roles and linkages</td>
<td>Changing roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear linkages and roles</td>
<td>Individual interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared risks</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate and Dissent</td>
<td>Poor communication flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>Rigid roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity-based origins</td>
<td>Resource based origins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lewis 1997:39

As the above table indicates active partnerships are defined by their ability to be responsive to immediate needs, the role of mutual learning through dialogue is a defining aspect of these. This chapter will illustrate that the SBDF system fulfils all the requirements outlined by Lewis (1997:39) that describe an active and effective partnership.

LOCAL PARTNERSHIP VS GOVERNMENTAL PARTNERSHIP

Simi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Samoa, stated (Interview 2000) that CF is not fulfilling the terms of a partnership as 'they will not let go of the strings'. This comment was made in reference to the fact that CF would not transmit funding through ACC. This system is illustrated in Chapter Two (Chart Two) and describes the method of aid disbursement used by the majority of donors, whereby ACC advises donors what aid monies should be spent on, and takes responsibility for all contact with local organisations, namely accounting and monitoring. Simi maintained that the idea of CF being in partnership with local communities to which funds were allocated did not constitute a 'real' form of partnership. She stated that the only relevant form of partnership was between two Governments.

The reasons given by Simi for the need for all funding to be distributed through ACC is namely the potential of funds going to projects that were considered inappropriate to the development agenda of Samoa (i.e. the Governments). Another reason was the support offered from donors could also be considered culturally inappropriate (again by the
Government). As Simi pointed out Donors base their decisions on their own set of ideas and that this base may be inappropriate for Samoan development" (Interview 2000).

The idea that Local Government could in some situations represent elite power structures was dismissed:

Programs are reached through wide consultations; the so-called 'grassroots' included. We have allocated out of all our bilateral programs funds specifically earmarked to go directly to the so-called 'grassroots'. These are known under several titles of grass root schemes, small projects fund etc. An estimated figure on an annual basis is around St2 million. The grassroots comprises women's committees, youth groups, farmers societies, small scale village tourist operators, urban based NGOs -you name it they are all eligible for these funds ... This funding is available to all groups and is reviewed in an objective way. (Simi 2000 Interview)

As illustrated in Chapter Two, these views were negated by the research interviewees many of whom (around one quarter of those interviewed who had had prior contact with CF) maintained that the distribution of Government-controlled funds was decided by non-objective measures and was difficult for NGOs to obtain. Those respondents who did regard ACC as a fair institution, by a large majority preferred the dependence, speed of approval, and support offered by CF. A number of theorists (Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000, Melesia 1983), also maintain that the interests of the elite are supported by Government and in many cases marginalised people have little recourse to decision making or other influence.

One of the benefits of the SBDF system, is that if NGO/COs have been sidelined by Government policy then these organisations have another chance of obtaining funding through CF. As Fairbairn-Dunlop (2000:9) writes:

Generally speaking smaller NGOs have less access to donors today than in the past... donors tend to rely on recommendations made by the GACC (Government Aid Co-ordinating Committee) or the MWA (Ministry of Women's Affairs), and are less interested in projects which in their opinion require 'too much paperwork'.
The greater the number of funding sources the greater the chances of NGO/COs fitting into donor criteria. In the Samoan situation where CF provides one of the few funding options not directed through ACC, it provides a very important opportunity for marginalised NGOs. If government has policies that exclude certain activities or sectors of the population then CF can redress this to some degree; The KT medical cupboards, represents a case in Point (illustrated in Box Four).

CF sees their relationship with local organisations as a partnership, which is instrumentalised on a project-to-project basis, with each organisation that receives funding entering into a project specific contract with CF. In this way the relationship and responsibilities of each partner are clearly outlined. Both entities are also stakeholders in the project, which results in CF representative supporting project planning in very practical ways, a process that has been described in Chapter Two. This process emphasises the role of learning, which compares favourably with other donor funding programmes that, if directed through ACC, mean that there no direct communication between donor and NGO representatives, so no personal support is available to local organisations. It could also be argued that SBDF establishes clear lines of communication though direct contact between the funding and local partners, as compared to a system where there are dual criteria and process requirements (ACC and donor) and organisations have no direct contact with donors, resulting in a lesser degree of flexibility.

Field-Work revealed a large majority of those interviewed were in support of direct funding as opposed to ACC, which was seen as inefficient, slow in making decisions and lacking in objectivity.

Table Seven. Support for Aid Distribution Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO affiliated</th>
<th>Support SBDF</th>
<th>Support the ACC</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-affiliated</th>
<th>Support SBDF</th>
<th>Support the ACC</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The motivations of The Samoan Government were questioned by a number of those interviewed. The following statement is from an interview with one NGO worker in Samoa (2000) and illustrates the dual motivations that ACC was perceived to have by some respondents:

_X donor told us [NGOs] to apply for these funds, because if we didn’t, then funds would be reverted to government so we did. Our NGO applied for X amount, and the donor looked over our project and agreed that we needed x amount to achieve our goals. Then the Aid Coordinating Committee looked at the proposal. They said, "You only need x..." They cut the budget by two thirds and said we could try other avenues to get the remainder. What has that meant to our program? That means that instead of funding for a three-year program, I have funds for only one year only, and then I need to scramble to try to get funds for other years. It means we have had to change the whole program.... But does this (incident)... mean that Government is cutting back on us NGOs (requests for funding) so that Government gets more funding._

(Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000:11)

Another common perception was that the ACC did not support the work of NGOs, this was due mainly to difficulties experienced by NGOs in securing funding and a lack of other support, such as advice and capacity building. The time taken to respond to applications and requests was also seen by some to be a lack of interest and commitment on the part of ACC. Nepotism was cited as a reason for a lack of faith in ACC, as one respondent said: "There is favouritism, you know where the money will go and it is never to us, as they do not like us" (Interview 2000).

While ACC was generally regarded with suspicion, other attitudes were also held. One frequent description of the system was that it was 'hard and fair' a comment also used to describe CF management. Those who stated this, on the whole preferred CF for reasons of speed or the support offered, but maintained that ACC was also effective. Two respondents (NGO workers whose organisations had received funding through ACC), saw the committee as a necessary factor for ensuring projects were spread evenly between development sectors and geographical regions. These respondents also saw ACC as effective in ensuring that agencies were not ‘competing for the same service
provision' or that an agency was not receiving multiple funding from different donors, a viewpoint also held by Simi.

Non-Samoan representation for funding bodies is largely preferred to Samoan representation. This was due to the fact that an outsider is seen as more politically independent and immune to the pressures facing Samoan people, namely to look after their *aiga*. The majority of NGO workers described the CF representative as fair but demanding. The opposite finding for this research was the CF representative was seen to be more objective than a local person could be. Objectivity and a lack of nepotism were the most frequently mentioned reasons for the preference of the SBDF system. The willingness for local people to work with non-locals was also represented by the answers to the question: Who is best suited to manage development projects? Illustrated in the following graph:

**Graph Eight. Interview results – Who is the Preferred Manager of Development Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyone with experience &amp; Leadership</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Member of Chiefly wife</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO SBDF**

Numerous theorists (Friedman 1992, Sachs 1996, Sanyal 1997) identify one of the major impediments to participatory development as the lack of a supportive global framework. Without policy support, which only Government can provide, the benefits gained from local initiatives can be reversed or stifled. Schoeffel (1996:5) in her study of the Pacific Islands identifies the role of Governance and institutional strengthening as vital issues for donor support:

*Development can only occur if the necessary institutions are in place and operating properly. A common problem affecting all Pacific Island*
Developing Member Countries is institutional weakness and poor management. While this problem may be related to problems of resource management; governance issues and human resource management are of equal importance.

While it does not fit the CF agenda to fund government initiatives, a working relationship is maintained between CF and Government (although not at the cost of donor autonomy). CF maintains a degree of reciprocity of information with the Samoan Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is notified with the acceptance of each project and a working relationship exists between Simi and Hunter. A number of understandings also exist between the Samoan government and CF. One of these is that CF will not fund primary or secondary education, which is the domain of the New Zealand and Australian donors who have experience and expertise in this field. CF provides for some sectors that are not catered for by other donors such as vocational training and pre-schools. Donor funding niches are established partly through policy decisions and in the case of CF partly through public demand, which exists due to a 'donor hole', i.e. as other donors do not focus funding in these areas, as determined by internal policy. A possibility exists although, that CF may fund projects, which are not deemed inappropriate by ACC. In this case there may be government policies that present a barrier to the success of these initiatives. This situation, although it has not occurred in past, could present a problem at some stage in the future.

**METHODS USED TO CREATE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF CF**

The fieldwork pointed to informal and formal networks (NGOs) as being the greatest channel of information dissemination (as opposed to signage, advertising or the media). As Table Ten shows, the majority of respondents (48%) had no knowledge other projects sponsored by CF. Of those that did know of other projects, this information came mainly from the same NGO network that they were affiliated with. The majority of those who had information about other projects were NGO workers; this knowledge came through professional networks. This was indicative of the fact that signage and media reports of projects funded by the CF were not a significant component of the increased knowledge of CF activities.
### Table Ten. How Interviewees Knew of Other Projects Sponsored by the CF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How projects were of Known about</th>
<th>no others known</th>
<th>1-2 known of</th>
<th>3+ known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Word-of-mouth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signage/proximity to project.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From CF representative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48%</strong></td>
<td><strong>41%</strong></td>
<td><strong>11%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Knowledge of CF came predominantly through an affiliation with NGOs partnered by CF. This leads to the conclusion that word-of-mouth and informal networks were the most effective systems for transmitting knowledge of projects and information about CF. This can be seen as a conclusion compatible with Samoan culture generally, as Batiri-Williams (1994:222) writes:

> To a large extent communication modes and information affected the pace and extent of social, political and economic growth throughout Pacific history. Oral traditions have, and will continue to have, an important role in disseminating information. Effective traditional information and communication techniques should be developed and made part the normal planning and development process.

The field-work also pointed to the fact that many people had an incomplete knowledge of the SBDF system. This extended from no awareness of the fund at all (mainly those not involved in any CF projects, but also a significant number of those who were involved in a project managed by an NGO partner), to an awareness of the fund but no knowledge of who was eligible for funding (also those involved in NGO partner projects), to an incomplete understanding of the criteria and systems of the CF (mainly NGO workers).

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1 The respondents provided the same source of information where multiple projects where known of, it some cases it can be suggested that this is a simplification, and possibly there were more ways that information was obtained. The question of how those responsible for first hearing of the fund (of those who had received funding would have been beneficial) although this question elicited no responses, due mainly to the inability of NGO workers to pin point a specific source.
As was expected NGO workers had a much more complete knowledge of the CF, than CO workers or those not affiliated with any project at all, although this was not so in all cases. One NGO, that had never received funding from the CF but whose directors expressed a desire to obtain some assistance for their programs, explained their previous reluctance to place a proposal with CF as follows: “We thought we would wait for CF to approach us, then we would know that they were interested” (Interview 2000). Through contact with CF representative, they later realised that the responsibility of soliciting funding had to come from the organisation itself and were preparing to discuss their ideas with CF. Graph Eight illustrates another area of knowledge that was lacking: this was the point at which official ownership was handed from CF to the local partner. Recent theory has tied closely the success of development projects to a sense of local ownership of the initiative. Obviously if this information regarding the pragmatics of this ownership is not known by local partners the idea of ownership will be impaired. While the research indicates that local partners had a feeling of project ownership, the formal understanding of this could be increased. This awareness is also tied to the practice of monitoring, as the official hand-over of ownership coincides with the end-of-report assessment.

Graph Nine. When the Ownership of a Project is Handed Over – Survey Responses

The most important factor the research revealed was that the non-NGO respondents did not know they were able to submit applications for funding. The majority of these

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2 The survey respondent included in this graph are those who were involved in a project that was partnered by CF.
interviewees expressed an interest in the CF and the funding system. This interest was in the form of questions about what projects could be funded and how contact could be made with the CF representative.

Another area of understanding to be worked on is the need that donors have for projects to be sustainable. In the context of either traditional gifts, fa'atalavelave or remittances there is no requirement for sustainable use of the items received, as the act of giving and the rituals surrounds this are lasting in themselves, consequently the idea of sustainability is new to many of those requesting funds. As this is a concept of vital importance to donors, it is necessary that the local partners, current or potential, assimilate this idea. The knowledge that community groups and communities have of CF is the most important factor in ensuring the fund is accessed directly by those who occupy lower socio-economic groups. The fund is relatively young, so it can be assumed that the process of knowledge dispersal will continue to reach wider and wider audiences.

Box Five. Komiti Tumama A Conduit Between Communities and Direct Funding

The KT community network has been an invaluable system for facilitating the CF representative direct and meaningful access to community groups in the villages. KT has long-standing routes within the community. In Samoa there is a strong belief "that community institutions - in this case women's committees - have a responsibility for village development in fact a duty to ensure families a good quality of life. Village responsibility for village development is at the heart of the Fa'aSamoa social system, wherein family members tuuau (serve) their families by sharing their resources so as to ensure the community good. "These customary village institutions were never replaced in the years of the New Zealand administration, but were used by the latter as the foundation for a system of Government/village partnerships for development - foreshadowing in many ways the present governance agenda. In these partnerships, if a village was responsible for providing the land and building and maintaining the asset while the government provided the technical staff to run the facility. This system continues today" (Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000: 1).

The extent to which it continues is in its capacity it has held for around 80 years established in the early 1930s. The role of KT was all encompassing of village health and included both curative and preventative health practices. The relationship between the Government and KT, which had existed prior to the formation of the national affiliations with the government, was clear-cut. "The government provided information and a health nurse who was to visit every village once a month for check-ups. The information came in through various channels but was always disseminated through the country by the Women's Committees. "Committee leaders were instructed to read to all village women the health articles which appeared each month in the government newspaper 0 le Savali" (Thomas 1996).

"The duties that came to be classified as health were extremely wide ranging and touched every aspect of individual and community life... In the years through to the 1990s the KT came to play an integral role in every village activity, so much so that they are now considered a traditional group and the female equivalent to the council of chiefs" (Dunlop 2000:3). The committee's continuation and success is reliant upon its congruence with traditional values and social roles. While it has challenged the traditionally perceived role of women and successfully raised women's political status within the villages it has done so within the customary norms of Fa'aSamoa. The same achievements could not have been sustained at such a vast level if the roots of the community were not so firmly connected with KT.
FACTORS THAT LIMIT THE DISSEMINATION OF FUNDING INFORMATION

The previous chapter identified the benefits and necessities of using traditional information dissemination systems. The field-work uncovered two main opinions on this topic; these can be divided into those who view Fa’a Samoa as an equalising social system and those who view contemporary Samoan culture as one that protects the interests of the privileged\(^3\).

It could be maintained that if those in positions of power are likely to use their influence to protect their own interests, then informal networks are also likely to replicate powerful interest holdings to some degree. If this is the case then the donor aim of ‘reaching the poorest’ could be jeopardised by the usage of informal networks to disseminate information, as those in positions (who are more likely to have access to the information about funding) power may use this knowledge for their own good. The field-work did not endorse this assumption, many of the informal networks were linked to NGOs who had contact with the poorest and who were driven by philanthropic values. Consequently many networks focused on those in poor villages. There was some indication that family routes accounted for some informal networking that lead to CF partnerships. This would be expected of a system such as Fa’a Samoa that is so firmly based around the aiga. Any bias towards family and known networks can also be understood in relation to the time it takes for the system to be explained and for this knowledge to then be utilised by a collective. One case that endorses this reasoning is the WIB run coconut oil production program, which consisted of small micro-expelling presses that could be operated by a few people. The participants in this program where

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\(^3\) The same distinction can be made with theorists, at a basic level, the former opinion is held by Simi (2000) and the later by Maiava (1993) and Fairbairn-Dunlop (2000).
initially chosen selected according to financial need, although the programs proved
difficult to monitor and inefficient as the machines where not used to capacity.
Consequently a number of the machines where moved to the villages of the trainers, a
move which could be interpreted as a bias, but is described by WIB as a method for
ensuring the machines are used effectively.

The idea of partnership in funding projects was new to people who were accustomed to
receiving untied remittances with no responsibilities towards the donor (generally family who are overseas). Aid funding was considered amongst other things (in the survey) to be a *mealofa*, which in Samoa means gift, which has intricate and longstanding cultural meanings. Within this context the ideas of accountability and partnership are foreign. This is not to say although that these ideas are culturally inappropriate, simply that care needs to be taken with the dissemination of information and processes focused on the outcome of understanding. One example of this difficulty in transferring new ideas was that it was mentioned that the 40% contribution was difficult to make understood. It was said that:

*Often those we talk to think that the 40% is a fee that goes to the Canadian Government, and then their project will be completely funded.*

One method that could be used to facilitate the transmission of new ideas is a pamphlet with the criteria and workings of the CF system described in non-technical language. To be effective this would have to be translated into Samoan, as a number of those who would constitute the most vulnerable groups are likely not have English language skills. Although the majority of those interviewed did not see the fact that not all Samoan people are fluent in English as a limitation in the proposal stage of the process. When asked about whether the requirement of English language type-written proposals was an inhibiting factor, the majority of respondents said that it was fine:

*As the person who has to read it is English (Interview 2000)*

A number of interviewees recommended using the same format as local Government forms where there are dual translations in English and Samoan and a translator is
employed at the Government/donor end. This would be a difficult system to use however, as the time it would take to translate at every stage in the proposal writing process would negate the benefits of the a quick acceptance time. Translation would also use resources that could be better used as funding for community projects, given the acceptance of current practices.

From the point of view of CF, the requirement for proposals to be written in English has multiple benefits. The first of these is that time and resources are saved by not having to engage translation services. The second and most salient aspect of this requirement is that it serves as an opportunity for organisations to use resources from the wider community. Help with proposals often comes from either a member of the village or an NGO. The accessing of this support was seen as indication of a group's ability to manage resources and as testament to wider community support. The field-work did not indicate that this was a barrier for the involvement to those who were not literate in English, as access to those with these capabilities was readily available.

IS IT BENEFICIAL TO HAVE AN EXCESS OF APPLICATIONS?

One negative aspect of an increase in community awareness is that this would logically translate to more applications for funding, leading to a surplus of proposals over available funding. While this would be indicative of greater accessibility within the community, it may also negate one of the primary benefits of the CF scheme, which is the speed of approval and the relatively short between the proposal and implementation stage for approved projects. This would not necessarily be a positive situation. The interviews with local NGO members in Samoa noted that one of the main benefits, as compared with projects sent through the ACC, was the length of time taken for projects to be accepted. In this waiting time, motivation was often lost, as one NGO representative illustrated:

*If people are left waiting they become disillusioned, and people also move on. Donors want good leaders, these people will not necessarily sit around waiting for someone to tell them they can go ahead, they will go and find something else and then a year and half later when the project is accepted, the group will no longer be together (interview 2000).*
Although an increase in proposals may not necessarily follow increased efforts at information dissemination as the amount of submissions is dictated by a number of other factors. These include, the capabilities of CO/NGOs and time the CF representative can spend with communities in the proposal stage of the process, which could hold the amount of proposals received, in equilibrium with the number that can be funded.

The paramount consideration for the dissemination of information is not the amount of proposals received as a result but rather that people in lower-socio economic groups have access to the information required to utilise the CF fund. If vulnerable groups such as the rural poor have access to the fund then it can be said that the fund has been successful in its distribution and has fulfilled its aims. Another important consideration, as this discussion has illustrated, is that there needs to be a quality of understanding, especially in concepts that may be new to local people, such as sustainability and the need for monitoring and assessment.

COLLABORATION OR CONSTRAINT: THE ROLE FUNDERS PLAY IN INFLUENCING NGO AND CO AGENDAS

As illustrated in Chapter Two, local partners have full responsibility for designing and implementing initiatives. This chapter further analyses the extent of endogenous control and examines the influence the donor has on the autonomy of local groups. As Carew-Reid (1989:115) observes:

*Development policy is affected in many ways by the aid agencies themselves: for example the type of training supported, expert meetings funded, technology and information transferred, expert assistance provided, research undertaken, institutional structures promoted and capital projects selected for support.*

Three main temporal points can be identified at which donor influence can shape the local development agenda, these are - the initial needs identification, the consultation process and the funding approval stage. These will be discussed in turn with reference to the findings of the field study.
The first stage of needs identification often occurs independently by the local CO/NGO group. This will often have been done before any contact with the donor has been made. Although in some cases ideas will be discussed within the first meeting between CF representative and the local group. The process of accurate and accessible information exchange about CF operations is vital at this juncture to inform local entities what projects are likely to be funded by CF, and important principles that must be taken into account in the planning process. One proviso of CF system that directs interaction at this stage of the process is that the local partners must initiate the identification, planning and design of the project. Whilst the representative might illustrate how the fund could be used and what criteria projects must conform to, the job of the representative is not to identify community needs.

**Box Six. A Group Discussion Focusing on CF Funding Criteria**

In one group committee discussion the women's committees involved identified a number of projects that they would like to start in their village (this was a rural area). The women had not heard of the availability of the fund before, and all expressed an interest in the details of it. Of the ideas expressed, not all of these fitted with the project funding criteria of the CF. Many of the ideas mentioned were projects that would represent too great a challenge for a group that had not implemented a project previously, such as a nightclub. Other items that would benefit the village would not be considered sustainable such as a vehicle. This discussion illustrates the requirement for the CF representative to explain the parameters of the fund and its focus on small-scale community development. The ideas suggested by the group were:

- Preschools, a nightclub, vehicles, a committee meeting room, piggeries, chicken farm and a shop

The ideas that required explanation were project sustainability and the need for the project to benefit the entire community rather than individuals. The first interaction groups have with the CF representative involves much discussion about what development initiatives are considered feasible by the CF. This process is of vital importance to these new ideas being understood and assimilated into project plans.

One finding of the study was that of those interviewed who were not affiliated with a women's committee or any other project being funded by the CF, only a small number (one out of the five people) immediately identified a project need, this was a piggery for the village. Upon discussion of what other villages had used the fund for, interest in CF was expressed. Only two of those approached had no interest in the fund or the projects being run by other groups. In one case CF was associated solely with the honey project in the same village. The respondent did not like honey and did not see the point of the project, nor could identify any ways in which CF could be accessed.

Comparatively organised groups (for example groups under the umbrella of KT or WIB) were able to instantly suggest ways that CF could assist them. This could be
attributed to the energy and sense of achievement that already existed in the groups due to their involvement in KT or WIB projects, which as Chapter Two pointed out, can be said to be an indication of empowerment in itself. NGOs were likewise able to identify strategies and projects that could be supported by the CF. As Chapter One has expressed the capacity to identify needs is an inherent human ability. The case studies indicate that the process of needs identification is, while inherent to all individuals, assisted by group interaction and access to information. The groups able to identify their goals and needs easily all had an understanding of their group abilities that came from organised action in the past this constitutes a positive example of empowerment.

The influence that the representative has on the process of needs identification could be said to be one of facilitating focused group discussion in a similar manner to the consultation phase. The personal capacity of the representative will dictate how the empowerment aims of this process have been fulfilled. The representative must be an individual who is prepared to 'hand over the stick'. The interviews suggested that The CF representative was effective in this role, the only enforcement of ideas occurred in regard to monitoring and accountability, this was an area where there exists tension between the requirements of the CF and the actions of the local partners (this is discussed fully in Chapter Four).

The second stage, where interaction occurs between the representatives of the donor and NGO, is the consultation phase. This requires differing inputs from the representative in every scenario, some CO projects where local partners have not implemented a project before will require much consultation. Other projects that are straightforward, or are proposed by experienced parties may require no interaction between the CF and local representatives. The form this input takes as been discussed and described in Chapter One, this chapter will discuss the possibility of bias in the representative's role. One NGO worker spoke of the input of the CF representative as follows:

*CF is a stakeholder in the projects. The NGO (name of NGO removed) would be nothing without the input of CF. They have provided a lot more than money; they have invested lime and helped develop working ideas.*
With this input comes the possibility of the donor using subjective criteria in the consultative process, it can be inferred that if CF representative is helpful in this process then a withdrawing of this support would prove fatal to (some) projects that were not deemed worthy by the representative. One could also argue that this judgement is an inherent part of the representative’s job. The use of intuitive judgement, as Rahnema (1996) suggests, cannot be withheld at a certain juncture, as no decisions or discussions can exist without a cultural and/or personal history and context, which provides the experience and background upon which decisions are made. The research did not reveal any cases where the representative used his judgement to the detriment of a proposal. Nevertheless, the scope that the representative has in determining what projects do fit the criterion is considerable. Endeavours to increase the transparency of the decision making process should be made to allow greater public resource to decisions deemed unfair or against CF criteria (see recommendations).

The third stage where CF can direct the nature of local development is the decision making process, which is conducted in Wellington, by CF committee described in Chapter Two. It can be argued that the criterion established by the consultative committee has much influence upon the project application process and project formulation in many cases. The question must be asked, to what extent can a partnership exist when the partners have such unequal resource and power bases? Stirrat (1997:76) identifies the flaw in partnerships between local and international bodies as a lack of symmetry:

Although both parties may wish to deny it there is an indissolubly asymmetrical partnership between the partners. At the most basic level, the donating NGOs choose their partners and are unlikely to choose partners whose aims do not approximate their own. In practice the agenda is set by the donors, not the receivers, and the receivers are accountable to the donors for the assistance they receive.

Stirrat also points out that there is an equalising balance through exchange as, at some level, the local partners are necessary to validate donor spending. As this chapter has already suggested a partnership is based partially on the acknowledged roles of both parties. The power disparity that the donor has in directing projects, may come down to
the fact that “that donors like to have a degree of control over their ‘partner’” Bebbington (1997:131). Although the donors inevitable right of veto may be balanced if the requirements and expectations of the donor are made covert, and most importantly if there is the intention to empower local entities. If donor agendas are acknowledged then local organisations also have a ‘right of veto’ by not entering into a contract with the donor, which is simply done by not sending in a proposal.

Another discussion surrounding donor agendas is that local NGO/COs must conform their project plans to meet donor criteria if they are to obtain funding. This occurs overtly -NGOs conforming to donor criteria’s, and on more covert levels - donor preferences becoming ingrained into the national development psyche, at the cost of indigenous ways of working. The overt influence that donors have is that projects may be shaped to fit the presumed donor criteria. As Weiringa (1994:836) describes:

> Women’s groups try to ascertain in advance which criteria certain funding agencies apply, and don’t even submit proposals, which they might see as vital but which don’t fit. In other cases women’s groups are forced to see as their interests certain activities which are alien to their organisation, a situation might easily lead to tensions within the organisation.

From one viewpoint Wieringa’s conclusions are supported by the findings of this research, as CF received a minimal amount of proposals that did not fit its agenda. Although in view of the broadness of project possibilities, (basically all projects with a community focus), this can be seen a good point, as NGOs have an awareness of projects likely to be funded. This knowledge is largely related to the fact that CF representative will enter into consultation with the any groups whose submissions do not fit the criteria or are not adequately prepared firstly receives submissions.

The main consideration in the discussion of overt influence is that firstly, the criterion is very broad, and few development projects do not fit these. Fieldwork indicated that the projects that were not compliant with the criteria were unsustainable, had no community input or benefited only individuals. These requirements are well supported in contemporary development literature and work to ensure that funds are not usurped by the powerful few.
The second point is that there is some flexibility with project criteria, as Box Six shows, if projects do not fit the basic criteria or at the implementation stage project objectives change, but still benefit the community, they are still likely to be funded. The apposite point for this analysis is that the cultural divide, becomes less of a barrier if there is some flexibility as to what projects are accepted and a desire to see all project proposals within a cultural context.

Simi’s suggestion to mitigate the possible problems that arise by having no local knowledge on the committee is to have some consultancy with the Samoan Government. This consultancy would negate many of the previously mentioned benefits of the system, namely CFs objectivity, speed of approval and the funding of NGO/COs not supported by other donors and ACC. Simi also does not acknowledge the fact that there are people on the committee with connections to the Pacific Islands and experience in the development field. As this study has already described the partnership between the donor and local contingents exists within the local context rather than at the Government level.

**ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW IDEAS AND THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY NETWORKING**

Chapter One has introduced the tension that exists between the empowerment directive - that donors must allow the direction of development to come from within the local culture, and the need for new ideas to be introduced into the NGO and community development culture. The requirement for new ideas to be introduced to CO/NGO networks has been raised by a number of writers. Research conducted by the Women’s Social and Economic Development Program in Fiji found that “While training and access to loans was valued, women also needed new ideas, and in particular new technology so they could consolidate their informal sector activity” (Dunlop 1999:46). As stated by one WOSED member “we can’t all grow cabbages” (Dunlop 1999:46). Another respondent added to this idea saying: “I say a price but then I have to drop it or

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4 Consequently while fa'alamlevaleve is not strictly a small business project, it meets local requirements. This is good example of SBDF's responsiveness to local development needs, rather than a strict adherence to the donor priority of encouraging small business development.
else they'll [the buyer] go somewhere else. Its so hard to get the rewards, when everybody is doing the same activity” (Dunlop 1999:94).

Networking provides one solution to the problem; that the need for project ideas must come from within the culture, if networks are voluntary they present a perfect opportunity for organisations to share information and lessons learned from projects. As Fairbairn-Dunlop (interview 2000) says:

_Networking provides an opportunity of an influx of new ideas, although this networking must be autonomous, I don't like the control of NGOs by central bureaucracies._

The apposite point for this study is that the encouragement of voluntary networking should be supported by donors. There is often a cost to this form of information contribution, as members will come from different and geographically distanced areas. This may not be expensive though, as Ecowomen has shown, teleconferencing can present a cost efficient method of program support and information sharing.

**Table Nine. The Origins of WIB Project Initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beekeeping project</th>
<th>Government sought FAO to write a country study on bee keeping, FAO contacted WIB for assistance</th>
<th>After the results were obtained, a year was the date set for the next stage, so instead WIB contacted PIDs (NZODA) for the training of two women.</th>
<th>Once the women were trained then funding was obtained form CF for a workshop and the capital costs for hives for families to operate</th>
<th>The hives are now being regularly monitored.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The fine mat project</td>
<td>This was borne out of research done by the Ministry of Women's affairs, 14 components where identified, mat production was one.</td>
<td>WIB then drew up a project plan and obtained funding for this project</td>
<td>Women were training in traditional mat weaving, sponsors where found for mats.</td>
<td>The program continues to operate, providing an income for a number of women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft workshop</td>
<td>This idea came from a regional Ecowoman Conference.</td>
<td>A Pacific Island craft Expo was organised and a Fijian trainer was bought in to run workshops</td>
<td>Workshops had a good attendance.</td>
<td>Different groups were formed after the workshops to make and all handicrafts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DIRECT FUNDING AND THE GREATER POSSIBILITIES FOR RISK TAKING

CF is regarded by both Samoan NGOs (Interviews 2000) and it's management as an agency with a greater ability to take funding risks than other donors. The reasons for this are numerous but relate mostly to the pared down bureaucratic system that the projects must pass through to be accepted. Also the relationship of CF representative to the community means that CF is quicker to respond to the immediate needs of organisations. CF representative enters into discussions with NGO workers on risk minimisation (in the form of planning) by the main means of face-to-face discussion, which is done in a comparatively quick amount of time compared to other donors (see Chart Two).

The small amounts of money disbursed also allow for greater risks to be taken as the risks of failure are proportionately less i.e. the amount spent on one project by another donor translates to many more CF projects. In light of this, a project with a greater considered risk can be included in the same funding round as projects run by NGOs with a solid track record for implementing successful projects. The acceptance of the risk factor of funding projects without a proven track record has been discussed in Chapter Two. WIB is a successful example of an NGO that received its initial funding from CF, and once projects had been implemented successfully then secured funding from Government. This pattern is illustrated in Table Eight. This risk factor combined with the need for CF to account it's spending to Canadian constituencies illustrates the commitment of CF to the learning process. Lewis identifies this as one of the primary issues in an active partnership.

SIGNING OFF - THE DONOR ADVERTISING TRAIL

No matter how well meaning the external funding agency, the mere fact of financial dependence on outsiders makes the notion of true community development somewhat spurious (Hall in Dunlop 1991:104)
The view represented by Hall, above, was mirrored through a number of the interview respondent’s comments on the signage that is used to notify people as to donor support of local projects. The objection lay in the fact that the signs negated the aims of empowerment, by labelling the ownership and means of the project, as belonging to an overseas donor. As one respondent said:

*Some signage borders on being very patronising, this, one would think, negates the aim of fostering a sense of ownership.*

There was a distinct division of attitudes regarding the signs between those interviewees whose primary role was as part of a village community and those who had a professional role in which they were in frequent contact with aid industry representatives. Those respondents in the villages, many of whom had conducted a project with some aid assistance, saw it as the donor's right to put up a sign:

*Well they gave the money, so they should be able to have a sign to say so.*

![Graph Ten. How Respondents Knew of Other Projects also Funded by the CF](image)

In the view of CF, the signs fulfil multiple purposes. The first is to raise awareness of the funds existence and to encourage greater awareness of the community’s ability to directly access donor funding for local projects. The second is to fulfil some of the aims of the Canadian Consulate in terms of raising awareness of Canada and it's presence in the Pacific. The surveys identified that the signs were somewhat effective in raising awareness of CF with five percent of respondents recognising another Canada Fund sponsored project by it's sign. Although as Graph Ten indicates the majority CF
knowledge was gained through informal networks. CF representative also commented that the signs provided an opportunity for the community to thank the Canada Fund for their contribution towards a particular project.

Differences in the donor philosophies and aid dissemination techniques were apparent in the signage used. The European Union and the Australian ODA generally used large signs saying the project was sponsored by, or donated by the donor, the CF signs shown in Picture One follow this format. Conversely some of the signage used by CF identified a partnership relationship with the wording and format used. The issue of how the signs contributed or detracted from a sense of ownership in the communities was difficult to ascertain. Although if signs endorsed the aim of partnership that guides CF, this would be an appropriate method of raising awareness of the fund and one in keeping with its philosophical grounds. The recommendation of this thesis is that CF signage should follow a format that highlights the partnership relationship between the two parties. Picture Two shows the result of the donor requirement to label projects.
Picture One. CF Signage that does not Identify the Partnership

Picture Two. Donor Labelling
The field study indicated that CF was preferred to other donor funding methods in Samoa that were mostly directed through ACC. This was due to reasons largely related to the partnership relationship that exists between CF and local organisations. The benefits of direct funding were largely focused around the support CF offered local NGOs, the speed of approval of proposals and the objectivity the representative has in his interaction with the local organisations. The reasons for these advantages were the relative lack of bureaucratic procedures at CF and the capabilities of CF representative.

Underlying the support of CF representative is a system, which encourages discussion and mutual learning, as well as placing great emphasis on the abilities for local groups to direct development initiatives.

There were some areas where CF activities could be improved. The first of these was the system of information dispersal. It was found that there were large gaps in individuals and communities knowledge of CF. The most striking point was that many people did not know that their community group was eligible to request funding for community projects. It was also found that the concept of partnership was new to many people, and that this required a lot of explanation. This finding supported the statements of both Hunter and Tafunai who maintained that an education process was required before most people were able to use CF for the good of their community.

This report recommends that handouts outlining CF processes, be used to support the process of education, these should be written in Samoan, in language that can be understood by lay people. It was noted that the most effective form of awareness raising was the use of informal networks, which is in keeping with traditional cultural methods of learning. The pamphlets are considered to be a device that can aid this transmission of information, and be used as a reference for informal information dispersal.

It was noted that the accessing of rural groups was a vital part of the representative’s job and one that made the fund available to those who may not hear about it from informal networks. This work was seen as vital in ensuring any marginalised groups had knowledge of the fund. The access to communities provided by NGOs was invaluable in allowing the CF representative an opening into village scenarios. The point that a
large influx of proposals could also negate one of the advantages of the CF system is also pointed out. The emphasis on taking the fund to those who have never obtained funding before and who are in rural areas is an effective technique for ensuring the fund is not utilised by only those with social mobility. This active awareness creation separates the CF from other small funding systems, which rely solely on established networks for knowledge to be taken into the community.

This chapter has reviewed the question of whether a partnership can exist between local Samoan organisations and international donors within the context of SBDF. The concept of partnership has been reviewed with reference to the indicators of effective partnership outlined by Lewis (2000). Referring to a partnership as a multi-level set of linkages that focus around mutual acknowledgement of each entities role and motivations. Axiomatic to the idea of partnership is that there is some equality of decision making and that lines of dialogue between the parties are open. It can be concluded that an active partnership does exist between CF and local organisations.

The role and training of personnel has been highlighted through-out this paper as a significant component in the handing over of power and control from donor to local organisations, which has been identified as a primary component of empowerment strategies. This chapter identifies the actions of the representative as highly influential as to whether a partnership relationship exists. The role of networks was seen as a useful factor in ensuring that new ideas are available to NGO/COs without the donor having to be largely involved in the process of project formulation.
INTRODUCTION

International development assistance, which started largely as humanitarian aid from the more affluent countries in the North to the less affluent countries in the South, has evolved over the years. This evolution has been characterised by a redirection of funds from Northern governments to NGOs, in the form official development assistance. One reason given for this change is the perceived failure of governments to address the developmental issues. This has led citizens' groups and communities to take these issues unto themselves. In frustration, these minute and diverse groups have taken on the challenge and the responsibility of community development. But far from the chaos that these "anarchic" tendencies are expected to produce, local initiatives have emerged as the focus of new development paradigms. as Sanyal (1997:28) points out, NGOs have come to be considered the embodiment of the new alternative development ethic.

NGOs are often put forward as appropriate vehicles to increase participation, protect human rights, strengthen local-level planning or as agents of democratisation, although, as this chapter will discuss "such assertions are not always supported by evidence" (Uphoff 1996:42). The focus of this chapter and one of the main critiques of NGO activity is their lack of monitoring and assessment capabilities. A contemporary discussion of donor funding systems must also be placed within the context of the increasing professionalisation of NGOs, which has been prompted by the increased donor and public emphasis on NGO activity.

Firstly the changing roles of NGOs will be outlined. This chapter will then focus on the relationship between the CF and local Samoan NGOs. The pivotal point of this discussion is how CF can improve its services to local NGOs. The field study identified monitoring and accountability as areas that require the most energy in terms of capacity building. This includes accountability to donors for funds expended and accountability from the donor to local Samoan developmental groups for funding decisions. This chapter will also discuss how monitoring systems can be developed and whether this should be done at the direction of the donor?
The questions that will guide the discussions in this chapter are as follows: What can be done to encourage empowerment based monitoring and accountability systems? How can downward as well as upward accountability be encouraged in relation to CF activities? Do diplomatic responsibilities restrict CF from funding advocacy based NGO activities that are opposed to Government policy?

THE INCREASING POPULARITY OF NGOS

Post-modern writing places its faith in either in nothing, or in social movements of various kinds combined with the international NGO network (Lehmann 1997.561).

The structure of the aid industry is rapidly changing. One distinct area of transformation is the increasing interest from both donor and local governments in the capabilities of NGOs. Lester Salamon (in Edwards and Hulme 19962) describes the global post-1980 growth of NGOs and COs:

A veritable associational revolution now seems underway at the global level that may constitute a significant social and political development of the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation state was of the nineteenth century.

Two divergent reasons for the increasing popularity of NGOs are often cited. The first supporting argument for NGOs originates from the increasing prevalence of Neo-Liberal economics. Many theorists argue that Neo-Liberal policy has come to dominate development policy and aid transfers in the last 15 years (Hulme and Edwards 1996, Moore 1993). It has thus been named the “New Policy Agenda” (Hulme and Edwards 1996). This agenda embraces the ideals of limited Government and views NGOs as a direct and efficient substitute for the state, namely in the provision of welfare policies. This focus has been supported by the actions of GROs and NGOs, who Fairbairn-Dunlop (2000: 1) maintains have “hastened to fill the 'gaps' created by government cutbacks and structural adjustment policies”.
The second reason for the popularity of NGOs is that they are seen to embody the new development agenda. This agenda is termed Alternative Development in theory and the praxis is described by the work of NGOs. Drabeck (1989:9) articulates the current feelings on the situation in writing: “If official aid donors and Government have not been able to provide the answers, perhaps we should be looking to the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), which are playing an increasingly active role in development”. Or as Brodhead (1987:1) puts it “Official support for NGOs has less to do with what NGOs themselves may consider to be their unique contributions to development thinking and action than with factors such as public disillusionment with the results of 20 years of official development assistance”.

The following list of comments illustrates the divergent and extensive qualities that NGOs as a group are accorded; many of these are considered as oppositional to those of the state:

- “It is assumed that NGOs can be more flexible, are closer to the target group and are more altruistic than governments in their efforts to alleviate poverty” (van den Berg et al 1998:17).
- “They are also well placed to act as facilitators to expose relevant decision makers to those best placed to articulate the concerns of the poor, to act in a sense as channels for local democracy” (Clark 1991:59).
- NGOs are autonomous from both the market and Government, which allows for effective bottom up development, as organisations are un-bureaucratic and have legitimacy in relation to peoples concerns (Sanyal 1997).
- NGOs are more responsive and flexible than heavily bureaucratic agencies such as the state.
- NGOs permit governments to achieve development aid penetration into areas where they would be uncomfortable to become involved directly.

As a reaction to these various claims about the effectiveness of NGOs, a number of theorists maintain that these qualities have not been proven. In reference to the work of NGOs in the Pacific, Schoeffel (1993:E1:1) writes:
The conventional wisdom of bottom up in the NGO aid sector is not always effective in the Pacific Islands region. In fact in my observation NGO projects areas likely to fail as bilateral and multilateral projects. Many naively suppose that it is right to bypass government and work only with NGO and communities.

A number of theorists maintain that the advocates of grassroot development are uncritically proclaiming the growing importance of NGOs. Biggs and Neame (1996) and Uphoff (1996) suggest that NGOs are being offered up as a panacea to development problems in a dialogue that askews the realities and complexities of the real world. Furthermore, Uphoff maintains that the majority of NGOs are not accountable to any constituency or client base, as in the majority of cases NGOs are differentiated from membership organisations:

Service organisations the category that I think most NGOs belong in, deal with clients or beneficiaries. These people did not create the organisation they are dealing with and cannot hold it accountable for its actions in the same direct way that members can (Uphoff 1996:25).

While theorists such as Fowler (1990) and Clark (1991) maintain that the comparative advantage of NGOs lies in their associations with the grassroot and the quality of relationships that can be fostered with clients, the point raised by Uphoff (1996) is that NGOs cannot be seen as more effective than other organisations or the motives of any development actors as inherently more honourable than any others. In all situations it is the quality and therefore the measures of the work that should determine its worth. Consequently the role of monitoring and accountability is increasingly becoming important for NGOs who are receiving more public funds and are consequently more answerable for their actions. As this chapter will go on to illustrate, the process of monitoring community goals, particularly ones focused around empowerment is not a simple process, nor are the structures and capacities for this currently in place.
Theorists have identified two trails of accountability; these are commonly termed upward and downward paths of accountability. The first of these, upward accountability, describes the accounting of expenditure done by the implementing parties for the donor. The trail downwards describes the accountability of the project implementer to those that are affected by development interventions; for example, the NGO is downwardly accountable to those who attend training courses designed to fulfil a community need. Firstly the implications of upward accountability will be discussed, which compared to downwards accountability are more fully instituted. The methods CF uses to monitor projects will then be reviewed, as these are a primary means of establishing accountability.

In this thesis accountability refers to the methods employed to measure the success of projects, although as Thandon (1996:53) writes: “all parties aspire to a comprehensive view of the subject, in most practical situations accountability boils down to the domain of finance. This narrow operational view of the subject is partly a consequence of the ease of establishing specific and quantifiable criteria for measuring financial accountability”. While this statement is true of CF to some degree, project monitoring is increasingly being focused on, as a primary means by which accountability can be established, one part of this process should be a system of project accounting.

The NGO workers interviewed in the research, found that the requirement for accounting was time consuming, and the comment was made more than once that CF was, compared to other donors the most insistent that end-of-project reports be completed and accounting systems be established. Balancing these comments, there was also, in the majority of cases an acceptance and understanding of the need for these systems, although one comment made was indicative of the fact that monitoring systems were perceived as being based on a distrust of NGOs. Comments from CF worker and other NGO workers revealed that much work had gone into establishing accountability systems for some of the NGOs who had been partnered by CF on numerous occasions. This was a stage in the project cycle that required constant support from CF representative and constituted a major area of capacity building.
One factor that is viewed by a number of theorists as limiting to NGO activity is the need for accounting upwards to multiple donors, with divergent requirements and standards. The field-study found that in Samoa there were indeed a number of different standards required from NGOs in terms of accounting to donors. The main discrepancy in monitoring standards required by donors was that often a number of donors did not ensure the completion of project monitoring. This meant that many NGOs did not have the capacity or experience for these tasks. CF has aided a number of NGOs through this monitoring process. It is the view of CF representative that the neglect of donors to enforce strident accountability practices is limiting to NGO capacity in the long term.

Conversely, financial accounting for COs proved easier as CF was able to establish systems as soon as proposals had been accepted. The requirement of CF is that all funds (that of the communities and CFs) are placed into a separate bank account at the commencement of the project implementation. This system has proven reasonably effective as all withdrawals can be matched to receipts meaning that money is less likely to be confused with funds from other sources. Also a simple system of matching withdrawals with receipts can be easily maintained. This system grew from previous cases of money being lost in complicated systems where several different projects were being directed from the same account.

Downwards accountability describes the need for implementers of development initiatives to be answerable to the people who are affected by these interventions. Wallace (2000:28) writes that the “systems for upward accountability are framed within business concepts of proving efficiency, effectiveness and value for money have become far more developed than have tools for downward accountability to beneficiaries. Indeed they have become additional barriers which prevent local people from accessing development processes that directly affect their own lives”. It could be argued that there is a definite lack of downwards accountability, and that this in part could be corrected by greater transparency in decision-making, while the means of accountability and transparency are set in place for donor countries in the form of public documents and annual reports (this is not to suggest that full transparency exists, there are many references to the difficulties of obtaining information). Systems for ensuring accountability and transparency to people in recipient countries are generally
non-existent or prohibitively selective in their provision of public information (Putzel 1997).

For any donor system aiming to provide social services, transparency is vital in ensuring public accountability exists. If special interest groups cannot access information relating to all parts of the project decision making cycle, then the ability to raise informed objections to activities suspected of being detrimental to local development, or of not providing an adequate service, will be restricted. As Putzel (1997: 87) has observed: "A lack of transparency and public information about EU projects from the first stage of indicative programming right through project approval makes it difficult for citizens groups to influence the shape of developmental projects". While Putzel refers to large multilateral projects that are managed and monitored by contractors nominated by the EU, rather than the small-scale projects implemented by communities. The observation made is pertinent, that systems should be in place to allow for public comment, which reduces the possibilities of harmful or unpopular projects being entered into, and creates a forum for complaints.

Any publicly funded system that presumes to be accountable for the services it provides, must allow for the democratic process of public discussion, and be answerable to public complaint. In the case of CF, increased transparency would provide the opportunity for influence or objection to certain funding decisions, and would prove useful in informing people of past funding decisions. This would assist in maintaining and making apparent any discrepancies in the mission statement and the stated criteria for funding and actual funding decisions. As Putzel (1997:77) writes of the EU system "the absence of publicly available strategy papers outlining the criteria on which aid projects are accepted or rejected limits the extent to which the commission can be held accountable for its choice of project proposals", this could easily be written to describe the current CF system.

THE CF SYSTEM OF MONITORING

"Assessing NGO performance is a difficult and messy business" (Edwards and Hulme 1996:4).
The prescription for best practice offered by empowerment outlines that the involvement and autonomy of local participants in the monitoring and assessment stage of the project, is of paramount importance if any meaningful conclusions about the success and relevance of the project are to be made. Research has shown (both that conducted by this author and by others), that this stage of the project process is the most difficult in many circumstances.

One of the barriers to monitoring done within an empowerment agenda is the difficulty in quantifying and therefore measuring empowerment outcomes. The most prevalent of these is the aim of empowering project participants; others include sustainability and the degree of ownership felt by participants. Empowerment generally defies quantification, as the indicators of this are ephemeral and non-material. Also the predominant methods for monitoring are based largely around quantitative and empirical evaluation methods and are not well suited to something that cannot be seen, weighed or measured. Consequently qualitative measurements are generally regarded as a more appropriate way of ascertaining whether empowerment initiatives have been effective, as Weiringa (1994:843) writes: "The quality of change introduced may be more important than the number of people reached, courses given, or sewing machines handed out".

Qualitative measurement is difficult for a number of reasons, it is time consuming and the complexities and variations of project environments make performance standards difficult to find or apply. Essentially there is also no consistent comparison for standards to be measured against. "Unlike business (which must make a profit) and governments (which must face elections), the bottom line for NGOs shifts according to the situation at hand" (Edwards and Hulme 1996:9).

If the opinions of those involved are the basis for qualitative assessment this too could also be problematic as participants may respond only as the implementing NGO would like them to, rather as they would if they were in a more powerful position, for example the position of the consumer. Also the monitoring stage will be constrained by any power disparities that have existed throughout the course of the project. As if there is not some equality between all those involved, evaluation is either unlikely to occur or will not touch on the real issues, as those involved will feel no sense of power. As Table Twelve shows, entering into in-depth analysis of before-and-after scenarios is expensive
and seldom used. Although as Carvalho and White (1996:33) point out: “Several lessons can be learned from the experience of the 1970s about how to improve monitoring and evaluation. The ultimate objective of any impact evaluation must be to make a with-project versus without-project comparison, as this concept is at the very heart of the notion of impact”.

Table Twelve. Evaluation Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Selection Criterion for control group</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
<th>Frequency of use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Very cheap</td>
<td>Nothing is learned</td>
<td>Very common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive</td>
<td>Program participants prior to intervention</td>
<td>Cheap</td>
<td>Change in outcome due to other factors</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matched comparison</td>
<td>Judgemental pairing</td>
<td>Better than random when target population is small</td>
<td>Results may not be generalisable</td>
<td>Occasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randomised control design</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Statistical inferences can be drawn</td>
<td>Can be expensive</td>
<td>Rare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Small funding systems are known for being difficult to account for, a fact that is true of the SBDF system. This is due to the number of projects sponsored and their spread throughout different geographical regions, which results in a lot of time and resources being required for monitoring. One of the premises of empowerment is that local people should evaluate development initiatives themselves, or possibly in conjunction with an external agent (Knippers-Black 1991, Gow and Vansant 1983). Another factor that contributes to the difficulty of monitoring is the inexperience of some project implementers in project assessment and management. This chapter goes on to show how these factors have influence over the success of the CF monitoring system and recommends some ways in which these barriers could be remedied.

CF system uses two forms of monitoring. These will be reviewed in reference to Empowerment theory. The first method of assessment is a project report that must be conducted by the local partners at the completion of the project implementation phase. This report outlines what has been accomplished and learned and whether the anticipated project outcomes have been achieved (an example of the recommended end-of-project assessment can be seen in the Appendix). The second method is informal visits to project sites, by the CF representative. These will be discussed in turn.
While the reporting system meets the empowerment criteria of allowing local partners to identify project successes and failures, in practice, a number of problems have arisen. The majority of problems are related to a lack of time and resources committed to the monitoring stage of the project cycle, a fact that was mirrored by both donor and local partners. The following table indicates the number of projects, were end-of-project reports were completed by the local partner.

Graph Eleven. The Percentage of End-of-Project Reports Completed by Year

As the Graph indicates, every year between 1991 and 1998, around one half of reports were not completed. This failure to complete the contract terms was common to all implementing entities, including government agencies, COs and NGOs. Of those reports that were completed the majority were received after a number of requests from CF. CF representative (interview 2000) identifies this general lack of capacity as related to decreased motivation once the project has been implemented, and the fact that many organisations are out of practice. Where NGOs rely on further funding in the next financial year, reports are more likely to be finished, in some cases; CF funding was withheld until the donor received outstanding reports. A major restriction in the completion of reports is the accounting, which posed a challenge for many organisations. This is one point where the CF sees a responsibility to encourage NGO capacity.

While much time had been spent passing on monitoring skills to local NGO workers, the CF representative is not routinely or formally involved in monitoring any projects, due largely to limitations on time in the partner countries. Some informal monitoring is
done, which is integrated into the other activities of the representative, for example, meeting with new groups, proposal consultations and discussing new projects. While this system fits in with the informal nature of the promotion side of the representatives work. The system has a number of flaws:

- If groups do not complete an end of year report there may be no record of project outcomes.
- Informal monitoring means that there are no longitudinal studies completed, also if monitoring is not performed strategically, important factors in the projects success or failure may be ignored.
- The lack of standardised information makes analysis of the system difficult, i.e. between regions and sectors etc.
- Community Projects are less likely than NGOs to have informal monitoring done, as the relationships with NGOs are ongoing and NGOs are also easier to locate.
- Lessons and information cannot as easily be exchanged between groups and networks if there is no record of assessments and lessons learned.
- One factor arising from the lack of formal monitoring systems is the proliferation of informal systems, which rely on observation, client/participant responses, and anecdotal evidence. These systems fit organically into cultures that are based on vocal traditions rather than written ones as well as NGO culture. The main criticism of informal systems as compared to formal monitoring systems is the lack of any firm data as to the effectiveness of programs and the lack of transparency this leads to.

The balance between intuition and the need for formal research is a difficult one. Research is often time consuming and costly, and there have been many criticisms of expensive research programs that never eventuate into anything fruitful. This danger does not of course offset the requirement for careful analysis of needs and possible solutions to problems. It does raise the question of how much intuition is acceptable, and what statistics are required and meaningful. Adi Tafunai, the director of WIB, regarded the conventional statistics required by donors and as somewhat misleading. She illustrated this point with the following example: when reviewing an organised talk
for 20 people, Tafunai regarded the number of attendants as meaningless, although the one person who was influenced by the talk she maintained, was a meaningful figure. So she would record this one person when the donors wished to see 20 written down. As the comments from Tafunai suggest deciding what constitutes worthwhile information is not a simple matter. The question also arises, should donors, who have presumably a reasonable knowledge in Western statistical and survey methods, direct project monitoring. Fairbairn-Dunlop supports this cause of action, she suggests that “more checks and balances are required, systems of accountability should be put in place before the project begins” (Interview 2000). She went on to suggest that to achieve greater capacity in NGOs for monitoring and prior-to-project research, donors could be instrumental in setting up systems that fulfil their requirements in terms of document keeping and recording of results. Then donors should monitor these systems until they are well in place. She pointed out that in her opinion it was not a matter of accountability versus independence but rather a question of internal versus external accountability, which was of paramount importance to the future of NGOs (interview 2000). Fairbairn-Dunlop also raised a strongly held objection to the ideas presented in contemporary development writing that; imported statistical or accounting methods are culturally inappropriate models. She dismissed the idea that concepts of Western Development such as accountability were being enforced to the detriment of indigenous cultural methods of organisation and systems of reciprocity, saying:

Guiding and educating must be intrusive - this is necessary for increasing capacity. NGOs must be accountable. To say that it is intrusive to educate is ridiculous.

Fairbairn-Dunlop's comment pre-empts the criticism that Biggs and Neame (1996:47) raise, this is that introduced monitoring systems can cramp the activities and reduce the benefits of NGO work:

There is a risk that techniques and language (of the dominant development agenda) will become so embedded in NGOs that any sense of critical perspective will be lost; reliance on the linear, mainstream mode l- with its emphasis on developmental input-output indicators - will become the essence of NGOs existence. Such a lack of critical perspective detaches NGOs from the
Another criticism against the imposition of accountability or monitoring systems is that excessive pressures for immediate results can deter agencies from institution and capacity building, or focusing on ‘soft’ development issues. Perceived pressure to show results could also endanger participatory processes, as Botes and van Rensburg (2000:50) write: “Any pressure on development workers to show results, may force them to take matters out of the hands of community people and complete them themselves”. This is possibly exacerbated by NGOs desire to retain market dominance which entails retaining donor funding. In the push to be become accountable and ‘an attractive investment’. Wallace (2000:29) notes how regular business methods have been introduced to NGOs making development more closely resemble other business arenas where investment and accountability to shareholders are essential for survival. As a number of theorists have recorded (Wallace 2000), NGOs are now using mainstream business terms such as ‘market share, value for money and demonstrating impact and benchmarking’. Wallace illustrates how this could be potentially hazardous for development and the real possibility of partnerships between locals and NGOs, as NGOs will become less likely to engage in participatory practices. There may also be a pressure to show only the positive outcomes of projects, to appear more successful for funding bodies, which would result in incorrect information.

The conclusion of this paper is that both donors and NGO/COs should be involved in the establishment of monitoring systems and the discussion of what indicators should be used and how these should be measured. Considering both CF directive to build NGO/CO capacity and the time restrictions of the CF representative, this paper recommends that a local person be employed to assist local organisations with establishing monitoring systems and completing end-of-project reports. This position would also be responsible for conducting monitoring for CF, in addition to that done by the groups themselves (this is discussed further in the recommendations).
THE CONCERNS OF NGOS IN SAMOA

Throughout the field-work both donor representatives and NGO/CO workers repeatedly raised the issue of project and organisational sustainability. The meaning of sustainability was subject to different (between NGO and donors) but consistent interpretation within the two agencies (i.e. all donors all held the same opinion). Donor representatives regarded self-sustainability as a matter of NGOs becoming financially independent of donors. While NGO workers viewed the first step of sustainability as the securing of wages, thereby allowing for the sustainability of the organisation.

The field-work revealed that around three quarters of NGO workers identified the lack of funding for wages as a major impediment to the work of their organisation, 15% of interview respondents identified trouble in obtaining money for projects as a major impediment to the work of their NGO (interview 2000). The future of organisations was also seen as being endangered by a lack of funding. The point was raised that there was tension between the pervasive donor aim to build the capacity of NGOs and the reluctance of donors to contribute funds to wages. “Many official agencies are unwilling to support long-term horizons, careful nurturing, and gradual qualitative results that characterise successful institutional development” (Edwards and Hulme 1996:7). NGO workers in Samoa argue that capacity building cannot be done without provision for wages for a designated time, one respondent mentioned between one and three years.

There was also concern from NGO workers, that new staff and younger people could not be involved in organisations without wages, as the young often had commitments and were not in a position to work without some form of remuneration. A number of NGO workers regarded the success of WIB as dependent on the amount of funding this organisation had received. It was assumed that with similar funding for wages other organisations could also maintain a higher profile, which in turn would mean greater chances of receiving funding.

Fairbaim-Dunlop (2000:9) also comments on the flow-on effect of waged support:

*A more invidious trend is donor funding for staff salaries. NGO workers are no longer volunteers: they are salaried employees. These NGOs cannot be*
called voluntary organisations. Furthermore, official support gives these
groups a great advantage over volunteer groups because their administrative
stability gives them greater credibility with donors as well as Government aid
screening committees.

The following case study of WIB will make more apparent the reasons for this support
and some of the criticisms of it.

WIB: A BRIDGE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AIMS AND THE LOCAL
COMMUNITY

WIB has become what is termed a professional NGO. It does not have a membership or
a discernible constituency other than that, which is determined by its mission statement
and project-by-project aims. It is supported mainly through public funding, that of
donors and the Samoan Government.

WIB was founded in 1990-1991 by a group of women who saw the need for support
systems for women who wanted to go into business. An awareness of this need for arose
out of the fact that the founders could not obtain the help that they themselves required.
This need was consolidated by the taro blight of 1993 which drastically reduced the
earning potential of many families: “Local families who sold taro at the markets saw
their income fall from around 400 Tala a week to 30 or 40 Tala” (Tafunai 2000
Interview). Since that time and with the assistance of donors, the organisation has
grown to include a staff of eight, and conducted numerous projects, all with the
common aim of poverty alleviation. Due to CFs ability to take risks, CF partnered WIB
for many of its earlier projects, as Table Thirteen on the following page shows:
Table Thirteen. Donor Funding of the WIBF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project/program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Donor Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIBF financing enterprise savings mobilisation Project</td>
<td>Working with disadvantaged women</td>
<td>UNDP UNIFEM</td>
<td>Oct 98- Sept 99</td>
<td>T 24 757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 model coconut oil businesses</td>
<td>Purchase install DME press in 5 villages</td>
<td>Canada Fund</td>
<td>1996-</td>
<td>T 36 345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training to women and young people for business development</td>
<td>Canada Fund</td>
<td>2 years 97-98</td>
<td>T 2 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in establishing coconut oil processing businesses</td>
<td>Canada Fund</td>
<td>Feb. 98</td>
<td>T 52 930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Making</td>
<td></td>
<td>NZODA</td>
<td>Proposed</td>
<td>NZ 19 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuit production</td>
<td>Establish small business production for youth</td>
<td>Canada Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>T 19 454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Country Profile on Women and Development - Samoa (Fairbairn-Dunlop 1998)

CF and WIB work in a partnership capacity to achieve a number of aims, these include:

- The provision of services and training to the rural poor
- To institute an effective monitoring and accountability system for WIB
- To support the work of other NGOs where possible, this has taken the form of vehicle sharing between the WIB and KT.
- The ability for COs who have not previously implemented a project to successfully understand the CF system and complete the proposal stage.

The director of WIB, Adi Tafunai, asserts that their current achievements of WIB would not have been possible without the initial support of CF. Part of this support has been the funding of two vehicles, that are essential for the field visits upon which the success of many projects lie. The projects conducted by CF and WIB must also be okayed by the Samoan Government who WIB receives substantial funding from. This funding
comes via the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MWA) a quasi-governmental organisation whose agenda is “the advancement of the social and economic position of women in Western Samoa” (MWA 1993). WIB is responsible for implementing priority four (Small Business Development) of the MWA priority action agenda, and is answerable to a board of directors (Dunlop 1999:12). The relationship between WIB and the Samoan Government is reciprocal, one staff member described this by saying: “we are accountable to them, and the are accountable to us”. Adi Tafunai said that if the CF funded their project they would still wait for ‘a nod from Government’ before proceeding. The communication between Government and WIB is channelled through the MWA, which:

Has the mandate to unify government and NGO projects into a cohesive national plan for women. It operates under an advisory board committee composed of government representatives and selected NGOs and is the first stop or (screening agency) for funding proposals. This very powerful group has links with the Government aid advisory committee and directs donor support to the NGOs it considers 'best' to run programs. (Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000:8)

Some criticisms of this support have been made. The first of these is that WIB has been supported at the cost of traditional NGOs who do have traditional and well-established links to the village, which WIB is seen as not having.

Government has embarked on a series of restructuring activities aimed at drawing NGOs into national partnerships for development. While couched in terms of support and capacity building for NGOs, these measures are very centralising and challenging to NGO autonomy, capacity and morale. Furthermore, the restructuring process appears to be favouring a small cadre of what I will call newer ‘professional’ NGOs, to the detriment of a larger group of long standing community-based NGOs such as the Komiti Tumama. (Fairbairn-Dunlop 2000:8)

Fairbairn-Dunlop goes on to say that the Government's funding choices could be interpreted as a preference for institutional capabilities over people's representation.
The second criticism is that the lack of a membership means accountability and monitoring are not consistently internally monitored, as stakeholders are not those who are benefiting from initiatives. This lack of democracy is something that has been connected with the need for stringent monitoring of projects. The lack of consistent monitoring systems was one observation made by Dunlop.

*The WIBF does not have a database on the number and spread of training by project, or the number of women attending the programs. These records were being kept informally. However, these records had not been collated into a final form nor evaluated. (Dunlop 1999:113)*

The system by which possible WIB projects are identified, places WIB somewhere in the middle of the development theory continuum where at one end is top-down blueprint projects and on the other is endogenous development originating from within communities themselves. It is perhaps this placement that is so appealing to a number of donors. This position describes a great number of service provision NGOs, who are not responsible to a membership although take their leads from identified needs within the target population. These needs are established through feedback from workshops and training courses and by informal means. The primary needs identified were training for women and assistance with income generation. Although the relationship between these identified needs and the means to obtaining them is in no way clear-cut. Much of the difficulty in translating needs to policy and projects lies in the necessity of teaching women new things.

Tafunai (2000 interview) commented on the difficulty in teaching women new skills and concepts and talked of the reluctance many women felt at the need to secure an independent income, when hitherto financial needs had been met by overseas remittances. Tafunai explained how this change represented a difficult and very necessary change for the women who would not always be able to rely on funds from overseas. In talking of the resistance to change and the short-term acceptance of new activities Tafunai used the Samoan term *fiafiapo‘po* which translates loosely to ‘happy for a short time’, to describe people whom where introduced to new ideas. She said that when changes were integrated into communities these had to be followed up, otherwise benefits where likely to be forgotten.
Another example of the difficulties faced by WIB, is in ensuring that programs meet the needs of its target population and that these programs are well attended. Dunlop's (1999:81-86) study of the informal sector in Samoa found that roughly four out of five women were engaged in the informal sector, mainly in agriculture and that 84% of those interviewed earned less than 100 Tala a week. 12 women said that they wanted training to “help us run our businesses better”. Although, in Dunlop's (1999) research of workshops run by WIB it was found that training workshops were poorly attended.

Table Fourteen. Number of participants at Four Training Workshops attended by Dunlop 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Type of Workshop</th>
<th>Number of trainers</th>
<th>Number of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safane</td>
<td>Handicraft/bus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafagaolii</td>
<td>Handicraft/bus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falealupotai</td>
<td>Handicraft/bus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatavai</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuleia</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaipua</td>
<td>Handicraft/consult</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor DUE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lano</td>
<td>DME training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapapalfi</td>
<td>Handicraft/bus</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanugamanono</td>
<td>Handicraft/bus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dunlop 1999:115

This table illustrates some of the problems facing NGOs who are providing services that are regarded as necessary by both target populations and donors, namely ensuring the successful participation of intended beneficiaries. As discussed in Chapter Two, participation is vital to the success and moral substantiation of development projects.

A predominant view was that the work of unprofessional NGOs was being overlooked in favour of NGOs that fit into Western notions of hierarchy and business organisation. This was seen to be a snowball effect as the more resources an organisation accessed the more capable it was able to appear worthy of further funding. CF was (is) seen to be an exception to this rule by providing opportunities for organisations that do not have the backing of the Government to receive funding, as well as supporting those that do. Furthermore as it has been shown that the success of WIB was initially influenced by
the guidance and funding of CF, and that this support is vital to NGOs do not at the initial stages have a record of project success behind them.

THE ROLE OF ADVOCACY IN RELATION TO SBDF

Streeten (1997) maintains that NGOs while not living up to a number of their often extolled virtues are frequently effective in bringing structural (Moser 1989) issues into the public realm. He maintains that: “in situations where civil liberties are suppressed, NGOs are the only means of expressing people’s concerns” (Fernando 1997:19). Furthermore he states that NGOs are likely to further this role, as international bodies increasingly consider NGOs as the people’s voice. The role of advocacy is one of vital importance to NGOs. It will be briefly discussed whether SBDF is a system, which (potentially) supports or hinders the role of NGO advocacy.

The role of advocacy for non-governmental citizens is vital to ensure a dynamic developmental environment that enables structural change and democratic revision of laws and citizens rights. Peck (1996) describes the dual role of NGOs as one of rallying for change and supplying services that Government cannot provide. These roles are illustrated in the Chart Three below.

Chart Three. NGO Roles

FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Representational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>public welfare</td>
<td>mobilisation, advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public policy</td>
<td>advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIDA (1996:2)
Two points that present possible restrictions to the advocacy work of NGOs will be mentioned. These are the lack of funding for non-project based work and the diplomatic responsibilities of funding entities. The restriction of NGOs not being able to obtain funding for organisational rather than project-based work has been discussed in Chapter Three. A further restriction of project-only funding may be a lessened ability for NGOs to fulfil advocacy roles, if advocacy actions fall outside discreet projects. As Commins (1997:152) writes: “there are donors, especially individuals, who demand excessively low operational overheads, and there are the questions from partner agencies and low income communities about the expenses of large international NGOs. These are issues that will remain difficult to resolve for NGOs seeking to engage in policy work”. This criticism is applicable to the SBDF system, as all funding is given on a project-to-project basis. One solution to this difficulty is for NGOs is to have advocacy work organised as a project, that can then be proposed for CF funding. The only barrier to this method of raising funding would be that the advocacy project runs contrary to CF criteria or CF cannot fund advocacy work as it is against it's diplomatic responsibilities.

Of the NGOs reviewed in the field-study, there was no tension present or past between the advocacy agendas of these NGOs and the Samoan Government or CF, although in other Pacific Islands where CF also funds NGO work, the issue of conflict between advocacy and donor diplomatic responsibilities had been raised. In the Cook Islands CF has supported numerous REAP (an environmental group) projects. One project was a radio show where CF was named as a sponsor at the end of each of program. This lead to an association in the public mind between CF and REAP. At this time REAP was raising a public campaign in objection to certain environmental policies the government was initiating. One of the Government ministers subsequently raised an objection to CF that their funds were being spent inappropriately in funding REAPs advocacy program. An internal CF investigation revealed that CF funded radio show had not been used to promote the protests against Government policy, and that all other REAP funding had been spent and accounted for adequately. While this issue was resolved an interesting question was raised: is funding restricted by the diplomatic responsibilities of donors?

The answer to this question was not made clear by this research, although one point of interest can be made. When an NGO is dependent on Government (ACC) recommendations for funding from donors, it would seem logical that this same NGO is
not in a good position to rally against government for institutional change or raise public consciousness on these issues. In some instances SBDF may provide a solution to this problem, as advocacy-based NGOs can gain funding from non-government sources, or without a government recommendation.

SUMMARY

This chapter has focused on the relationship between local Samoan NGOs SBDF, with the aim of investigating whether SBDF is beneficial to the objectives of local NGOs and COs. The findings of the field-work revealed that SBDF was favoured by the majority of NGO workers, and that it provides an alternate funding route to ACC which directs the majority of donor funding available to NGOs and small COs. This was an important point as it was thought by a number of NGO workers that the state favoured professional NGOs to more traditional membership based organisations. The research did not identify which NGOs where more successful in their work, what it did highlight was that direct funding enables organisations not favoured by the mainstream to also receive funding and support. In some cases this could mean that advocacy roles or minority issues are not repressed by lack of access to funding.

One challenge to the effective working of CF system is the accountability both of CF to local organisations and visa-versa. CF has no clear system to ensure downwards accountability. As organisational transparency is a prerequisite for good development practice, this thesis recommends that this deficiency be remedied by the publishing of reports of the decision committee. This would also enable local organisations to see more clearly how CF criteria is applied in the decision making process.

The lack of a comprehensive monitoring system was one of the primary areas of deficiency uncovered through the research. A number of reasons have been mentioned as to why a monitoring system is beneficial, the main one is so that it can be concluded by both internal external entities whether development initiatives have been successful and what lessons have been learned from these. While it was established that CF had been of assistance in furthering NGO monitoring capacities. It was apparent that work still needed to be done in this area. One restriction to CF in Samoa achieving this is the
time restrictions of CF representative. Due to this it is recommended that a local person be employed to assist NGO/CO with this stage of the project.

The concerns of the NGOs were primarily the mandate of CF not to supply non-project based funding for wages. The majority of NGO workers maintained that staff funding was necessary to ensure the sustainability of their organisations. This thesis supports the funding model whereby mentor NGOs receive a ten percent fee for assisting smaller COs with projects. This organisational fee would also apply to member organisations and NGOs who were not themselves the beneficiaries of project benefits. In this system basically a sum for NGO management and wages is accounted for in the project budget.
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This thesis asks the question: Does the SBDF system employed by the CF in Samoa, to disseminate funding to and local NGOs and COs system, concur with the principles of empowerment. To answer this question, the findings of the field-study have been reviewed against the directives set out by Guy and Vansant (1983) as well as Overton and Scheyvens (1999). The field-study aimed at investigating how the CF SBDF system is perceived by Samoan NGOs, and whether it is effective in encouraging endogenous development. This chapter outlines the conclusions that can be drawn from the field-study, and makes a number of recommendations for ways in which the CF could further achieve their aim of facilitating empowerment.

CONCLUSION

Chapter One introduced the empowerment and participatory-based approaches to development, and identified the common axiom of these theories. That is, that the paramount consideration of donor intervention should be to promote endogenous control of development initiatives. The writings of both Alternative Development theorists, and Post-Developmentalists, were used to illustrate the argument; that systems, which do not value local control of development, are likely to devalue vernacular cultures and result in unwanted and unsustainable development initiatives.

The idea of development was discussed, referring to the writings of Post-Developmentalists. The point was made that developmental values and standards are neither universal nor absolute, but rather are defined in culturally specific ways. Therefore, for development to have meaning to those whom it affects, it must be defined by them and be consistent with local requirements and cultural values. The main difference between the two contemporary paradigms explored in Chapter One, is that while Post-Developmental writers offer no agenda for future change, Alternative Development Theory outlines methods and directives, by which development activity can advance and become more relevant to local needs.
Based on Alternative Development theory, Chapter Two outlines the directives of Empowerment and uses these to critique the CF system of aid dispersal. The conclusions of Chapter Two, are that in Samoa the CF concurs with the directives of Empowerment to a high degree. The primary factor that defines CF as an empowering system is the responsibility local groups have for every stage of the project process. The full participation of partner communities is further ensured by the necessity of local groups contributing both finances and resources to the project. This requirement ensures that community projects have the backing of a significant proportion of the community, and that the project is 'owned' by the implementing group. The second most salient aspect of the system is that vulnerable subgroups within the community are actively sought out. This process necessitates that the CF provides support for those communities who have hitherto not implemented an externally funded development project. It is these factors that differentiate SBDF from other donor systems used to disseminate funds in the Pacific.

While Chapter Two maintained that SBDF supports endogenous development, Chapter Three introduced the notion of partnership, and discussed whether a partnership could exist between a donor and a local organisation, investigating whether endogenous development can occur if development criteria is determined by the donor. The conclusions reached in this chapter are that given the CFs open criteria and flexibility in what projects are funded, local organisations effectively determine what development initiatives occur within their community. The CF was preferred by a large majority of those interviewed, this is due to the fact that the representative offers practical support and is seen as non-biased in his dealings with local organisations. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that both development entities (donor and local organisation) are stakeholders in the project. A partnership relationship is determined by equality within the consultative process and the fact that both parties contribute time, human resources and finance to the project.

The study pointed to the importance of the personnel skills in ensuring the success of an SBDF system. The interaction between the fund representative and local groups was of vital importance, especially in discussing potential project ideas and accessing new communities. The research reflected the findings of Alternative Development's earlier theorists, Friere (1972) and Chambers (1983), who identified the capability the
representative must have to be able to 'hand over the stick'. The research indicated that the CF representative has much influence in the outcomes of the interaction between local and the CF.

While it was found that SBDF actively encourages endogenous development a number of aspects of the system need improving for these to work adequately. The most apparent of these is the monitoring and accountability stage of the project process. It was found that the majority of end-of-year reports are not completed by local organisations and that CF representative has no systematic monitoring system established. In light of the schedule of the CF representative and the time required to contact new communities and groups, it is a conclusion of this study that a position should exist for a local person to assist communities with monitoring, and to establish a project database. The transparency in decision-making was also seen as lacking, it is suggested that reports of the decision-making committee be available to interested parties in Samoa.

This paper has high-lighted the tension that exists between culturally specific interpretations of development (Western and Indigenous). The past has indicated that what connects the myriad of development efforts in a number of different countries and cultures, is that indigenous culture has been repressed in order for Western ideas of development to be enacted. As has been outlined in this thesis, current methods to empower local people (which essentially means allowing these actors to determine their own futures) still fall short of genuinely creating a space for the different conceptions of living and development to be realised. One factor that plays a role in this is the inability of development workers to shed their culturally constructed understandings of development (life). One benefit of the SBDF system is that the potential for development workers to transpose their ideas on to local communities is decreased, by the inherent nature of the system. That is, as local people must identify their development needs and conceive of the project themselves, local actors are necessarily determining what for them constitutes development; if local people are not interested in a project it will not occur, as there will be no one to implement it.

Participatory methods have aimed at, rather than coming to pre-conceived development problems with ready-made solutions, planning and identifying needs with rather than
for local people. Although, the usage of the term and the practice of participatory methods have been widely criticised for being only a modification of traditional blueprint planning structures. The benefits of donors utilising SBDF is that it would radically alter the structure and system of aid delivery. Although, one limitation to the widespread usage of this system, which concurs with recent trends in the funding of local (and international) NGOs, is that in practice NGO capacity has to be increased at a practicable rate. This thesis concludes that the SBDF system concurs with both the principles and spirit of empowerment to a high degree, and recommends this system as one, which could further enhance local development capabilities.

APPLICATION OF SBDF TO OTHER SCENARIOS: SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM

Essentially the SBDF system is a donor funding strategy that conforms to the local social/cultural environment. This occurs by making funding and support available to local organisations and communities, who may then follow their own development agendas. It is the opinion of this author, that the SBDF system could be manipulated to fit a number of different regions and requirements. Below the salient features of the SBDF system have been reduced to a number of categories, which may be helpful for its application in other scenarios.

A Number of aspects define the SBDF system:

- A partnership relationship is established between the two parties. This is defined by the mutual funding contributions, time investment in the planning process (if this is required by the local organisation) and public acknowledgment of this relationship.
- SBDF is a system whereby funds are allocated directly to community groups to be spent on a project as agreed by both the funding body and the implementing organisation.
- A committee presides over the decision making stage, this committee should be made of people experienced in development with a knowledge of the region and culture. There should be representation of the country or region on this committee.
• The Fund should be actively made available to local communities. This access should focus on those who are marginalised in some way, and previously have not been involved in implementing a donor-funded project, such as - regional women, geographically isolated communities and those without resources or voice. Donors can work with NGOs to access these groups.

• Donors should establish working relationships with local NGOs, especially those with traditional ties to the community.

• The representative or facilitator should have the time and experience to discuss the communities needs and means of providing for these. The Participatory Action Methods outlined by Alternative Theorists (Chambers 1996, Rahman and Fals Borda 1991) could be of help in this process.

The following cultural factors were of assistance to the running of the SBDF system in Samoa:

• Cohesive social groups with established systems for group decision-making. Samoan culture is structured by well-defined social collectives - these include villages, family units and other subgroups within these, such as Komiti Tumamas and the fono. These established systems are effective for assisting the CF in reaching 'new' groups.

• The social infrastructure that is necessary for information to be disseminated is well established. This includes NGO organisations - NGOs were the channels through which large networks were accessed. They were also instrumental in informing other groups of the fund, and in facilitating the CF representative’s access to memberships.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This report recommends that the CF has: - the criteria for funding, mission statement aims of the funding, responsibilities of the partner, and other relevant information translated into the language (languages) used in each of the partner countries. This should be made available for distribution through appropriate avenues such as NGOs, SUNGO, churches etc.
2. In the case of the above situation, consideration should be given to adequate distribution of pamphlets in rural areas.

3. It is recommended that funding decisions and allocations be made available to the public in the recipient country, as well as easily accessible information on criteria for funding and guiding philosophies. Following the recommendation in 1.1 these should be available in Samoan. One way of achieving this is a country specific annual report that could be made available to Government departments, Universities, Libraries, NGOs, Umbrella groups and any other interested parties. A contact number/address for complaints and/or queries should also be included. This would move the system towards ensuring transparency in the recipient country and establish a standard to be met by other donors. It is also noted that such transparency could also serve to alienate certain groups, whom decisions do not favour.

4. It is recommended that the systems of accountability be reviewed. The possibility of employing a (part time) project monitoring support person in Samoa is raised here. The advantages of this would be:

- An extensive knowledge of local culture networks etc
- Increased capacity building, by using and providing training for a local worker, greater cost efficiency by employing locally - less travel and wage costs.
- Less demands upon the already tight schedules of the CF representatives, who would still maintain some degree of informal monitoring (similar to what is currently being done) due to the nature of the job. Representatives would benefit from another opinion and full assessments as to project outcomes.
- Allowing more time for the New Zealand based representative to devote to supporting new projects and projects in the proposal stage, this would be particularly the case if many smaller projects where being processed in a certain time span, as these projects take more time.
- The assistant job (possibly a two or three year contract) would allow an individual to up-skill or put into place skills that could later be of use to the
NGO community. This would be a direct capacity building solution to the documented problem of the lack of trained staff in NGOs.

- The assistant would be able to compile a database of project successes and failures; this job would also enable some longitudinal analysis to be done of projects implemented 4-6 years ago. This could provide some informative histories, which could be used in future project planning, and answering questions such as: where are communally owned assets five years on? Did training courses eventuate in any positive action?

- The worker would be available in Samoa all year to provide support for the reporting and monitoring stage of the process, which was the project stage that most CO/NGOs had difficulty with.

5. It is recommended that a data-base be constructed with full descriptions of the project undertaken and an analysis of the outcomes of the project. This would prove helpful for new projects (that bare any similarities to old ones) and would provide the foundations of a data-base that could be formed between donors at some date in the future. As well creating a useful tool of learning for the organisation.

6. It is recommended that the wording of signage, in all scenarios - be chosen to reflect the wider philosophies of the CF. Signs erected outside some project sites by NGOs illustrate the idea of partnership between the local organisation and the CF. On these signs the idea of a partnership is made apparent in the wording and lettering on the sign. It is suggested that other community organisations be educated to use the same wording on signage. This would change the emphasis from a donation to the more empowering focus of the partnership between the community and the donor. The benefits of this would be:

- Through the educational process organisations would become of the wider developmental issues regarding partnership and ownership.

- Community groups would have their titles on public display; this would serve as a public validation of the achievements of the group, possibly adding to a sense of community achievement.
Hypothetical Chicken Farm

*Apia Women's Committee in partnership with the Canada Fund*

- The idea of partnership rather than patronage would be publicly acknowledged; this would lead to the idea being transmuted into the public consciousness.

7. This research supports the ideas currently under consideration at the CF. These are that mentoring NGOs receive a proportion of total project costs for their work in assisting the implementation of projects. This would be able to be accessed if the agency receiving the fee is occupying a mentor role towards another CO, or is implementing the project for the good of a population other than its own membership. This system would mean that a number of NGOs would receive this fee to assist them in the administration of philanthropic work.
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only consider supporting complementary projects)

- those that are solely for religious purposes
- those that show no cash or in kind contributions from the community group
- those that are detrimental to the environment
- those that have a detrimental effect on women

Please note: Scholarships, attendance at conferences and recurring administrative expenses will not normally be considered for funding.

**HOW MUCH WILL THE CANADA FUND PROVIDE FOR PROJECTS?**

Typically, a project might range from anything between Cdn $1,000 to Cdn $20,000, with a maximum limit of Cdn $50,000. Projects must be completed within two years. Funds are generally provided on a one-time, non-recurring basis. Financial and narrative reports are essential upon the completion of the projects. All projects will be closely monitored to ensure they are being implemented in conformity with the signed contract and the Canada Fund Guidelines.

**HOW TO APPLY FOR FUNDING**

The Canada Fund Co-ordinator responsible for your country can be called upon for guidance in preparing project requests if needed. The Co-ordinator can also help you determine if your project is likely to be considered for funding. Detailed requirements and application guidelines are available from the Co-ordinators.

All applications for funding must be made in writing and should provide the following information:

- a detailed description of the project, including specific objectives and expected outcomes
- information on who will benefit and the project's impact on women and children
- the project's contribution to a sustainable environment
- comprehensive background information about the implementing group or organisation, (i.e. membership, past experience with project implementation and financial accountability, etc.)
- a detailed budget including all local contributions in cash or in kind (e.g. labour, construction materials, land)
- a work plan that includes starting and completion dates
- the name, address and other contact information of the person or group responsible for the project
- letters of support from technical advisers and/or relevant government agencies
- details of other organisations to which you have also applied for assistance

When applications are submitted, it is important that the amount being requested from the Canada Fund is clearly identified in the local currency.
WHAT IS THE CANADA FUND?

In the spirit of the partnership between Canada and the island states of the Pacific, the Canada Fund provides financial support for small-scale local initiatives within Canada’s six priority areas for overseas development assistance. These are:

- to meet basic human needs by supporting policies and services in areas such as improved water supply, sanitation, health care and education
- to promote the participation of women in development, especially in decision making roles
- to improve infrastructure services that will strengthen NGOs and other institutional mechanisms for service provision
- to protect and promote human rights and good governance, and to broaden citizen participation in decision making
- to support small business development within the private sector
- to protect the environment and promote environmental awareness initiatives.

Within these broad guidelines, the Canada Fund is designed to be flexible, allowing it to work in partnership with local initiatives that provide people with the means to help themselves. The mandate of the Canada Fund is to provide direct funding to community groups.

Projects in twelve Pacific Island nations are eligible for Canada Fund assistance through Canada’s High Commissions in Wellington and Canberra; Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Palau, Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia. Funding for regional projects that cover two or more of these countries is also available. Canada Fund Co-ordinators are based in Australia and New Zealand and spend much of their time travelling in the region. During their visits Canada Fund Co-ordinators meet with local people to help them identify projects, to assist with funding applications and to monitor the progress of projects once funds have been disbursed.

WHAT TYPES OF PROJECTS DOES THE CANADA FUND SUPPORT?

Particular emphasis is placed on helping people to help themselves. Local contribution and participation - in cash or kind - will greatly increase the potential for Canada Fund support.

Within Canada’s six priority areas of assistance, preference is given to projects that meet the following criteria:

- are well-planned and technically feasible
- do not duplicate existing resources
- aim to alleviate the effects of poverty by improving access to health, family planning, nutrition, education and employment
- fit into overall policies and priorities of the countries, and have the support of the communities they serve
- generate sustainable income for communities
- create job opportunities in small businesses
- support institutional capacity building for Pacific Island non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
- have a positive impact on the development of women and other marginalised groups and the environment
- show significant cash or in kind contributions from the community group
Receive Batch of Proposals/Applications from MFA (ref: Noumea)

Review proposals and submit recommendations to 1st Secretary, AusAID

Recommendations Approved

Recommendations Declined

Edit the letter accordingly and prepare formal letter of advice to the MINISTRY OF FOREIGN (attention: Noumea Simi). Include a summary of Trust Account for confirmation by MFA.
CANADA FUND CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT

Project Title: ........................................

Contribution: $..............

Country: TONGA

Implementing organization: ........................

Project No: #....

1. The project objective is to ......................................

2. Budget approved:

Total request and Canada Fund contribution: ............................

3. Special conditions of funding .....................................

4. The (...) acknowledges that it has authorization for use of the above contribution and agrees to accept responsibility for using it for the objective outlined above.

5. The (...) agrees to ensure adequate supervision of the project implementation.

6. The amount of $....... represents the Canada Fund's full contribution to the project. Any additional costs remain the responsibility of the (...).

7. The (...) agrees to consult in writing in advance with the Canada Fund Co-ordinator on any proposed major changes to the budget or to the project direction.

8. The (...) agrees to maintain accounting records so that project funds can be clearly identified and verified. The (...) agrees to allow an audit of the books and evaluation of the project by the Canadian High Commission, or its designate.

9. Obligation to Report
The (...) agrees to forward, immediately on completion of the project, (estimated date ..............), a project-end report to the Canada Fund Co-ordinator for Tonga, Canadian High Commission, P.O. Box 12-049, Wellington, New Zealand, which should include the following:
* actual results achieved in relation to the project objective outlined above and budget approved, any difficulties encountered and measures taken to overcome them
* a financial report with supporting documentation (e.g. copies of relevant invoices and receipts)
* impact on the environment
* the project's impact on women including number of women in decision-making positions
* comment on the project implementation by the recipient
* an outline of how the recipient will assume and maintain responsibility for the completed project
* any other project related justification documents
* any lessons learned that could be applied to other projects

10. **Publicity**

   The (...) agrees to seek publicity for the project and source of funding and to copy any media coverage to the Canada Fund Co-ordinator. Suitable recognition should be given to Canada for its contribution. Some "Canada" adhesive labels, which may be useful for this purpose, will be forwarded along with the payment.

11. As acceptance of the above terms and conditions, the (...) is requested to sign the Canada Fund Contribution Agreement. One signed copy is to be held by the (...) for its own record purposes; the other signed copy should be forwarded to the **Canadian High Commission (PO Box 12-049, Wellington, New Zealand)**

12. Once the High Commission has received the fully signed Agreement, the project payment will be released.

---

**For the Canada Fund**

Signature

Name..................W R Bowden M.S.C

Position.............Counsellor

Date..................9 January 2001

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**For the (...)**

Signature

Name

Position

Date

---

cc

* Ms Veila Tupou, Aid Coordinator, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Defence

* Don Hunter, Canada Fund Coordinator for Tonga
GUIDELINES FOR WRITING REPORTS ON CANADA FUND PROJECTS

NGOs, organisations or groups receiving Canada Fund assistance are required to make a report when the project is completed. This is part of their obligation under the agreement entered into with the Fund. Please use the headings and answer the questions in these guidelines when writing your report.

THIS IS NOT A FORM AND SHOULD NOT BE FILLED IN. THE REPORT SHOULD BE TYPED SEPARATELY.

PROJECT NAME AND NUMBER
*Please get these details from the Contribution Agreement*

Project Name: 

Project No:  

Name of NGO/organisation/group:

PROJECT OBJECTIVE

1. State the project objective as given in the Contribution Agreement.

PROJECT RESULTS

2. What are the project results?

3. Are the results different from the objectives? If the results are different describe how and why they differed.

4. Did the project benefit women. If it did describe how?

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

*Please take the time to tell us about the project.*

5. How was the project carried out? Were there any difficulties in carrying out the project? If so how were they dealt with?

6. Can you think of any useful lessons learned from the project? If you were to do it again what would you do differently?

PUBLICITY

7. Did the Canada Fund assistance to the project get publicity? List any coverage the Canada Fund received from the following: television; radio; newspaper; posters; signs; stickers; public meetings; official openings. *Please attach clippings from newspapers or newsletters, project photographs, and photographs of signs.*
PROJECT MAINTENANCE
8. How is the project going to be maintained after its completion?

GENERAL COMMENTS
9. Please comment on whether the project was successful or not and on any other aspect of the project you would like us to know about.

FINANCIAL REPORT
The financial report consists of:
# A contribution statement
# A list of receipts covering project expenditure.
# Copies of receipts

10. Contribution statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada Fund Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11. Please describe the local contribution, whether it was in cash, labour, material, land or in some other way, or a combination of the above.

12. Receipts list.
Number the receipts. Describe what payment the receipt is for. Give the amount on the receipt. Add to get the total of the receipts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receipt Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</table>

Total of receipts
Funds not spent
Project total

13 Attach receipts to the report.
14 If the total of receipts is less than the project total you have funds left over (unspent funds.) Unspent funds cannot be spent without the approval of the Canadian High Commission. With approval unspent funds can be used in a way that is related to the project objectives. If you wish to do this write or fax the Coordinator. If you are unable to spend the funds in a way related to the project objectives they must be returned to the Canadian High Commission, Wellington.

PERSON SIGNING

15. Report prepared by:

Name:

Position held:

Signature:

Date:

CHECK LIST

1) Don't write your report on these guide lines. Have it typed up on separate paper.

2) Attach any newspaper clippings and photographs to do with the project.

3) Attach receipts covering the project expenditure.

4) If you have unspent funds write to the coordinator saying how you wish to use them.

Send the report to:

Don Hunter
Canada Fund Coordinator
PO Box 12-049
Wellington
New Zealand

Telephone: (64-4) 4954 103
Fax: (64-4) 471 2082

September 2000