

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

Abstract

In conventional psychoanalytical theory of the subject, the mother and father are given a preeminent position in explaining how the subject comes into being. This approach, stemming from Freud's emphasis on oedipal relations, reinforces the typical family unit and the cultural hierarchy of father, mother and child. Narrative, by contrast, frequently explores the atypical, and in the process provides avenues of subjectivity that resist oedipal interpretations. Intrigued by the expression of fraternal discord in literature, I explore the way brotherhood can both split and establish the character as a subject. To do so, this thesis traces pairs of brothers in three different novels in order to examine possible overlaps and connections between the experience of brotherhood and the conditions of subjectivity. While the brotherhood of *The Brothers Karamazov*, *East of Eden* and *Ender's Game* do not provide a singular narrative of subjective formation, each, in their own way, demonstrate the primacy of the brother as a source of trauma. Understood as a *hostile communion*, this form of brotherhood suggests that neither brother character should be recognised as an individuated subject who is able to think and act unaccompanied by the influence of the his brother.

By drawing on Juliet Mitchell's exploration of siblings and Jacques Lacan's mirror stage, I advance a reading of each text which exposes the delusion of the ego's agency and autonomy. Moreover, as a subject is extricated from the brother bind, I explore how the experience of brotherhood shapes encounters with others outside of the brother pair. This second line of enquiry is underwritten by the work of both Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas, and suggests that the trope of fraternal discord can operate as a mechanism to allow characters to move from the paralysing familiarity of family to engaging with the strangeness of strangers. As a result, I argue that recognising the hostile communion of brotherhood can significantly impact thematic interpretations attributed to texts.

Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks goes firstly to my supervisor, Bill Angus, for his support and direction throughout this project. Likewise, I wish to acknowledge Lisa Emerson's valuable input to develop the delivery of the content in the early stages.

Thanks to Teach NZ for the assistance provided throughout 2014 which enabled me to take ako beyond the classroom.

My deepest thanks and appreciation to my wife, Heather, whose moral support and encouragement has helped me to pursue my passion.

Finally, to my brothers, Daniel, Tom, and Sam, who provided me with too many reflections to ever get trapped by them.

Table of Contents

- i. Abstract
- ii. Acknowledgements
- iii. Table of Contents
- v. Title Page
- 1. Introduction
- 13. Chapter One — The Brothers Karamazov: Trespass
- 35. Chapter Two — East of Eden: Polarity
- 54. Chapter Three — Ender's Game: Occupation
- 74. Reflection
- 78. Works Cited

This page has deliberately been left blank

**Hostile Communion:
The Intrasubjective Experience of Brotherhood in Narrative**

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

English

at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand.

Clancy Cummins 2015

Introduction

This thesis explores intrasubjectivity between brothers in narrative. It aims to elucidate how the intimacy of brothers can both prohibit and necessitate subjective individuation and also suggests that there is a connection between the outworking of the brothers' intimacy and how they go on to encounter other characters. In this project I focus primarily on the cause and effect of hostility within brotherhood. As a relational trope that repeatedly manifests itself in literature, fraternal discord demonstrates how the intimacy of brotherhood can force differentiation in the face of hostile similitude. In its repetition, fraternal discord frequently unveils the imaginary or fictional nature of the ego, and by doing so, creates a crisis for characters trapped within the experience of brotherhood—the brother constantly calls into question the credibility of the ego. In other words, the brother's closeness, either psychically or physically, means that the ego is exposed as a fabrication, and the experience of this hostile form of brotherhood is traumatic. In this thesis a unique form of brotherhood is explored, one which produces characters who are unwillingly trapped in communion: a phenomenon that suggests that neither character should be understood as an individuated subject. Yet the narratives of this project also reveal that this brother bond can be circumvented, and with the reconciliation of the brother to the self, fraternal discord can operate as a mechanism to open up characters to encounter others outside of the brother pair.

As a preliminary investigation, the novels of this project were picked for their range across date of publication, genre and type of brotherhood depicted. The narratives also trace brotherhood at different stages of the characters' lives: young men, teenagers and children. While three novels are by no means a comprehensive study of the trope, the novels selected do provide an entry point into discussing how characters are destabilised by their brothers, and how this experience enables or restricts them from encountering others outside of the family unit. In this way, fraternal discord is associated with coming of age narratives, where the character transitions from the familiarity of family to the strangeness

of strangers. Throughout my chosen narratives, *The Brothers Karamazov* [1880], *East of Eden* [1952] and *Ender's Game* [1985], I argue that it is the brother who functions as the dominant “(de) formative” (Chiesa loc. 187) force on the subject. By emphasising these “lateral” (Mitchell loc. 65) intrasubjective experiences, I attempt to redress a reading practice which overlooks a character’s siblings in favour of intergenerational relations. Instead, I claim that the presence of fraternal discord across narrative genres suggests that there is more to brotherhood specifically, and siblings relations in general, than has been recognised by literary criticism.

Underpinning much of the project’s intention is the work of psychoanalyst Juliet Mitchell in *Siblings: Sex and Violence* (2003). Mitchell, who is primarily known for her analysis of Freudian thought and feminism, attempted to rectify another of Freud’s “blind spots” (Irigaray 11) in psychoanalytical theory—the psychic impact that siblings have on each other. In *Siblings*, Mitchell suggests that “psychoanalytic theory in all its versions omits [siblings] from a structuring role in the production of unconscious processes” (loc. 2582). Mitchell’s argument provides an avenue to understand the animosity that appears in narratives of fraternal discord in a new way:

In discussions of ‘otherness’, whether of gender, race, class or ethnicity, hatred of the other is explained by the obvious fact that the ‘other’ is different. Sibling experience displays the contrary: the position occupied by the sibling is first experienced as ‘the same’ – hatred is for one who is the same; it is this hatred for a sameness that displaces which then generates the category of ‘other’ as a protection. It is the one who can now be imagined to be utterly different who can thenceforth be loathed or loved. (loc. 1055)

These ambivalent positions are explored in each of the novels, whereby characters oscillate between narcissistic love or hatred towards the brother that undermines their unique existence. In this manner, Mitchell’s emphasis on sibling relations interrupts methodologies and approaches in psychoanalytic theory which prioritise the father or mother’s role in the psychic processes. In each chapter I describe how fathers and

mothers of the selected novels are either absent or ineffectual in their role of producing a subject. I argue that it is instead the brother who initiates the formative crisis, articulated by Mitchell above, as the pair attempt to survive the trauma of similitude. During and after the trauma of brotherhood, the nature of the character's interactions with others (outside of the brother pair) becomes a secondary focus, where I connect the experience of brotherhood to the way in which the subject encounters others.

Two analytical concepts play an important role in this project: the subject and the other. Firstly, while Lacanian thought frames the discussion of the subject, it should be noted that his conceptions of the subject are explored rather than employed *carte blanche*. Following Mitchell, I suggest that the brother experience manifested in the novels complicates the subject of Lacan's articulation—especially with regard to his insistence on the oedipal stage. It is instead Lacan's early expressions of subjective formation found in his mirror stage that is most noticeable in the narratives of this project. Jacques Lacan's mirror stage was his first significant breakthrough that theorised "the formation of the ego through the identification with an image of the self" (Homer 18). On this point, Lorenzo Chiesa, in *Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan*, explains: "this specular image does not need to be provided by a mirror: the image of another child of approximately the same age will also be perceived by the subject as a specular image, that is to say, without recognizing the other as other" (loc. 212). Lacan's mirror stage provides this project with a conceptual framework of how the ego can come into being in response to the image of an other; and as a result, how brothers, through their reflective potential, falsify each other's ego constructions. Chiesa also recognises this line of thinking in Lacan's "intrusion complex", which "provides further proof of the importance of the mirror-stage theory while relocating it to a wider context. This [intrusion] complex finds expression in the relationship that is established between the child and his sibling, whom he considers as a rival" (loc. 414). Moreover, Chiesa asserts that the "resolution of the intrusion complex", provides a means for the subject "to recognise the other as other, to acquire a 'self'-conscious ego" (loc. 417). This project, through the application of Juliet Mitchell's

emphasis on siblings and Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, aims to redress psychoanalysis' prioritisation of the intergenerational (or vertical) relations at the expense of siblings (lateral), and in doing so, suggests that there are multiple pathways to subjective individuation.

Employing Lacan's mirror stage in this manner requires a flexible understanding of his 'subject', which Bruce Fink provides comprehensively in *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*, as the "split between ego ... and unconsciousness ... between consciousness and unconscious, between an ineluctably false sense of self and the automatic functioning of language (the signifying chain) in the unconscious" (45). In Fink's application, "*the subject is nothing but this split*" [emphasis in original] (45). For the purpose of this project, the subject is not simply the character of the narrative, but instead is understood as the bisecting process which is producing a character. However, it also should be recognised that this Lacanian subject is distinct from the 'subject' of philosophy, or, as Fink describes: "the Lacanian subject is neither the individual nor what we might call the conscious subject (or the consciously thinking subject)" (35). As this project explores both the intrasubjective and the interpersonal, for clarity, a discussion of the 'subject' is always restricted to analysis which recognises the way in which the character in question is split by his brother. In contrast, I employ the term the 'self' to suggest a self-consciousness or self-aware character forming after the subject has recognised or extricated himself from the brother bind. Any ambiguity arising from the application of either term is unintentional; however, it serves as a demonstration of the difficulty of exploring the type of brotherhood observed. For, as shall be observed, some characters of the narratives exist as both subject and self, but only after the brother bind is comprehended and circumvented.

As discussed above concerning the mirror stage, Lacanian thought also frames the role that 'the other' plays in this thesis. For the brother characters in the novels, a problem arises in that "the ego qua imaginary identity individuates the subject only by way of a

detour through the other” (Chiesa loc. 191). In other words, in this thesis it is the brother who provides a means of identification, but who must also be differentiated against. Moreover, this process is “alienating in the sense that it [the image or brother] becomes confused with the self” (Homer 25). Even in its normal application Lacan’s mirror stage is fundamentally an alienating process; however, in this thesis the experience is exacerbated because the characters in the selected novels are alienated not simply by an image of themselves, but by their brother. Therefore, in order to map the relational pairs in this thesis, the reflective brother, whose psychic intimacy and / or physical proximity is unavoidable, will be termed the *brother* (lower case o). This *brother* character thus comes to stand as the physical embodiment of a theorised internal function, and as a result, through his psychic intimacy or physical proximity, the *brother* is continually splitting his brother (and vice versa). Being a brother’s keeper in this project is the shared ensnaring of each brother in a reflective impasse. Crucially, what emerges in response to the *brother’s* falsification of the ego is a set of constituting oppositions, a means of demarcating the *brother* from the subject. In this response, the *brother*, as Lacan’s other, is connected with the unconscious or repressed desires of the subject, and the tension between (and within) characters is reflective the process of subjectivity itself. This unique mind, body and blood experience is a hostile communion, a *brother* bind which refuses the sovereignty craved by the ego. By linking Lacan’s mirror stage to the experience of *brotherhood*, I propose a level of intimacy between characters that is rarely acknowledged by literary criticism.

While the *brother* emerges out of an interpretation of Lacan’s other, his Other, (capitalised O) “has many faces or avatars” (Fink 13) and confuses both my application of the phrase and the thematic aims of this project. Lacan depicts the “Other as language (ie., as the set of all signifiers) ... as demand... as desire (object a) [and] ... as jouissance” (Fink 13). In contrast, while recognising the significance and role of Lacan’s other and Other for his theories of the subject, my application of the Other is taken from Emmanuel Levinas’s approach to questions of interpersonal responsibility. Levinas, shaped through his own

and his family's experience of the Shoah, conceptualised a movement away from phenomenology's obsession with the self—which, for Levinas, can be tied to the intellectual justification of both Hitlerism and Stalinism (Morgan 25). As a result, the Levinasian Other (which, for clarity, will always be capitalised) represents the “asymmetrical and non thematizable” (Rapaport loc. 6011) being that is no longer demarcated within the axis of the subject. I will refer to the Levinasian Other as an unreflective Other, stressing the difference of the Other which is outside of the parameters of *brotherhood*. Despite my distinction between Levinas' and Lacan's conceptualisations, the “homonymy” (Harasym 79) between their others is more than skin deep, in fact, it demonstrates the phenomenological heritage of both thinkers and also illustrates the way each thinker responded (in their own discipline) to Cartesian thought (Harasym x) and the enlightenment subject (Ruti loc. 64).

Colin Davis, in *Levinas, an Introduction* states: “The ultimate failure of phenomenology, for Levinas, lies in its inability to envisage an encounter with the Other which does not entail a return to the self” (loc. 542). It is precisely this conceptualisation which becomes so meaningful for the literary criticism I am undertaking: one which describes an encounter with the Other that preserves the Other's otherness. As I have previously noted, the familiarity of family in my narratives operates as a barrier to the strangeness of strangers. Moreover, the Levinasian Other exists outside of the self-centred or “totalizing” mode of perception commonly demonstrated by analytic philosophy (Hand *Emmanuel Levinas [EL]* 36). Levinas rejects the desire to reduce or define all encounters through the parameters of the subject's experience. Instead, Levinas states that the Other “overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him” (*Totality and Infinity [TI]* 87) and “exceed[s] *the idea of the other in me*” (emphasis in original) (*TI* 50). Therefore, in order to connect the *brother* and Other, *brotherhood* narratives are traced causally to discover how the subject encounters unreflective Others beyond or outside of the *brother* experience. In this manner, this project utilises narrative's ability to both express and traverse internal and external worlds. By applying the theoretical positions of psychoanalysis and philosophy as

operating in parallel with regard to both the other and Others, I aim to demonstrate how the experience of *brotherhood* influences how a subject can emerge as an ethical and self-aware character in an interpersonal narrative.

In literary theory and interpretation Levinas is frequently placed alongside Mikhail Bakhtin, especially with regard to their positions concerning the Other. Developing the connection between the two thinkers, authors such as Michael Eskin, Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan and Micheal Holquist have established how resonances between Levinas and Bakhtin facilitate a discussion regarding the self and the Other. For example, Erdinast-Vulcan describes the similitude between Levinas and Bakhtin in their shared insistence of the self “living on borderlines, facing the other, irremediably vulnerable and infinitely responsible” (43). As will become apparent throughout this project, the trope of brotherhood in the novels acts as means to travel from intrasubjective imprisonment to interpersonal lived experience. In other words, the *brother*, through his reflective potential, functions as the warden to imprison or liberate his brother to the world of unreflective Others. Here Bakhtin, not only with his detailed analysis of *The Brothers Karamazov*, but also for his conceptualisation of the function of dialogics in novels, demonstrates the significance of dialogue in the novel genre. After publishing his seminal work, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1929), he later reflected on Dostoyevsky’s oeuvre in 1961 in preparation for a reprint. In these notes Bakhtin states “everything internal gravitates not toward itself but is turned to the outside and dialogized, every internal experience ends up on the boundary, encounters another, and in this tension-filled encounter lies its entire essence” (287). Bakhtin's perspective of the dialogic nature of the novel enables this project to map both intrasubjective and interpersonal elements with the *brother* and the Other characters of the novels, and in doing so, provides a means to link Levinasian themes of ethical responsibility to their expression in fiction.

While Bakhtin’s focus on *The Brothers Karamazov* shapes the direction of this project, so too does Ricardo Quinones in his chapter concerning *East of Eden* in *The Changes of Cain*:

Violence and the Lost Brother in Cain and Abel Literature (1991). Operating as a comprehensive study of fraternal discord, *The Changes of Cain* traces how the motif of dysfunctional brotherhood repeats and reiterates the archetypal sibling conflict of Cain and Abel in Genesis four. Appearing in various allusions in all the novels of this project, Quinones establishes why Cain and Abel's mythic potency is connected to the trope of fraternal discord in western literature:

The violence of Cain against his brother comes to represent necessary physical and psychological facts of individuation, the flight from an undifferentiated communion that is either stagnant or does in fact only serve to concern a real disruption. The physical slaying of the brother assures the coming into being of the self. (19)

Quinones' exploration of the trope initiated my search for theoretical positions to develop and explain the psychoanalytical phenomena within my narratives, yet my significant point of departure is the role of the *brother* in determining how unreflective Others are confronted after the brother bind is circumvented. Therefore, while Quinones usefully describes the individual's entry into selfhood through fraternal conflict, he does not specifically address the way in which that division effects encounters with unreflective Others outside of the brother pair. Instead, Quinones explores how the brotherhood in the narratives demonstrates thematic concerns of the author and culture of the text. Despite these divergences in focus, Quinones successfully elucidates brotherhood's intimacy and identifies what he describes as the "tragedy of differentiation" (9) between brothers operating in his narratives. In a similar manner to the *brother* neologism adapted through Lacanian thought, I employ the phrase 'hostile communion' as an adaptation of Quinones' emphasis of the "undifferentiated communion" (19) of brothers in narrative. Moreover, hostile communion attempts to acknowledge both Juliet Mitchell and Teresa Brennan's discussion of the borderline—a subject who is shaped by lateral rather than vertical concerns. Hostile communion is employed throughout the thesis to signify the unique brother experience of mind, body and blood unwillingly overlapping and converging.

The final and most contemporary thinker employed in this project is Teresa Brennan, who explored the interpersonal nature of affect in *The Transmission of Affect* (2004).

Essentially, Brennan suggests that the borders of the subject are permeable: “the emotions or affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can enter into another” (3). Brennan explains that “In Freud's economy, only the subject experiences the affects he or she produces”(14). However, challenging contemporary and individualistic assumptions of selfhood based on Freudian thought, Brennan describes the issue with this Freudian notion:

The foundational fantasy, which can be analyzed in psychoanalytic terms up to a point, explains how it is that we come to think of ourselves as separate from others. But it does not account, of itself, for the energetic level at which we are not separate from others - the level at which my affect enters you and yours, me. (14)

As has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, this project looks particularly at shifting from an emphasis on the vertical or generational elements in psychoanalytic thought to a discussion on the lateral or intrasubjective. Brennan thereby suggests that “the transmission of affect also works between individuals who are coupled as partners or peers, between not-exactly-consenting adults in private and in public” (41). Interestingly, Brennan’s line of exploration becomes less observable as the age of the *brothers* decrease. Despite this, affect theory does help to describe the intimacy of brotherhood that escapes articulation in dialogue; for example, how the *brothers* in my chosen narratives seem to be locked in a hostile communion that defies simple articulation. In this project, I pay particular attention to affectual violence which emerges as an expression of denials of responsibility and brotherly resemblance.

Despite the echoes of Cain and Abel that can be connected to each text, the narratives of this project do not express a simple model for lateral subjectivity. Instead, the fraternal discord depicted in each narrative suggests a complex intimacy of brotherhood which prohibits subjective individuation and consequently, consistently undermines interpretations that emphasise a character’s agency and autonomy. Throughout the thesis

I trace moments of intrusion, trespass, convergence, occupation, repulsion and expulsion between the *brother* characters. In this way, the *brothering* of the narratives should not be understood as a relationship between two separate entities, instead, *brotherhood* consistently resists boundaries, either physical or psychic. In short, *brotherhood* is the *experience* of hostile communion. As a result of identification made against the image of a *brother* (rather than image of the individual) the subject's encounters with unreflective Others are frustrated and complicated. In other words, ego constructions that were established as constituting oppositions fail to retain their relevance or potency when faced with the strangeness of strangers. Here the secondary aim of this project emerges to explore how brotherhood as an intrasubjective experience can shape interpersonal encounters with unreflective Others. Ultimately, I suggest that a sensitivity to the complexity of character in literature can significantly impact thematic interpretations and further empowers fiction in its role exploring the depths of the human psyche.

Chapter One investigates *The Brothers Karamazov*, by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and focuses primarily on the characters of Ivan Karamazov and his half-brother Smerdyakov. Importantly, this *brother* pair differs from the other novels primarily because the character's experience each other as young men, but in addition, they are half-brothers—the legitimate and illegitimate sons of Fyodor Karamazov—and are separated by both status and education. In their encounter Ivan and Smerdyakov are simultaneously attracted and repulsed by the reflection that the *brother* proffers. However, this unique situation does not prevent the *brother* bond from forming, and the outworking of the experience of *brotherhood* demonstrates the versatility of the trope. *Brotherhood* for Ivan and Smerdyakov is understood as an act of trespass: an offence to the established perimeters of the ego. Chapter One traces how Ivan's denials of responsibility and brotherly resemblance actually re-enact subjective individuation, and as a consequence, further inhibits Ivan's character from moving into a position where he is able to accept Other characters for who they are. Through the intrusive presence of the *brother*, *The Brothers Karamazov* also introduces the theme of ethical responsibility that persists

throughout narratives of fraternal discord, and this theme is magnified through the foils of Father Zosima and his brother Markel. The chosen version used exclusively in Chapter One is Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky's 1990 translation.

Chapter Two explores John Steinbeck's *East of Eden*, taking the second generation of Trask brothers, the twins Caleb [Cal] and Aaron [Aron], as the primary focus. *East of Eden* presents a deliberate and sustained literary allusion to not only the Cain and Abel narrative of Genesis, but also to the twins Jacob and Esau—illustrating both the biblical influence of the trope and its potency in fiction. While recognising the allegoric nature of *East of Eden*, I claim that both Cal and Aron blur the binaries that they are associated with, and demonstrate the complexity of the human subject in a powerful manner. Moreover, *East of Eden* is unique within this thesis as it deals with the intimacy of twins, and the brotherhood depicted exhibits the significance and challenges of oppositional differentiation for the subject. Through brotherhood, Cal and Aron are trapped and dependent on the other as an antithesis—creating a polarised coexistence which intensifies the experience of brotherhood and emphasises the traumatic intimacy of the pair. Consequently, I suggest that the interpretations of individualism attributed to the novel overlook or fail to acknowledge the unique experience of brotherhood presented. In Chapter Two I develop the argument that Cal and Aron should not be perceived as independent subjects, instead, the two are completely dependent on each other to construct and maintain each ego through inversion. Cal and Aron's polarity create an subjective impasse, and while Aron's aversion to this intimacy manifests itself through fantasy and escapism, Cal, always in opposition, seeks truth and experience.

Chapter Three discusses Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game*, and explores the brotherhood of Andrew [Ender] and Peter Wiggin. *Ender's Game* is a popular science fiction novel, the first of a series of five. While the impact of brotherhood on both Peter and Ender is explored, like the novel, this chapter is primarily focussed on Ender's experience of brotherhood. Peter's presence occupies Ender's unconscious and this forces Ender to deal with the

reality of his own nature. In a more vivid (and arguably accessible) manner than the other novels, the brotherhood of *Ender's Game* demonstrates how the brother gets under the skin of the character and acts as a traumatic exposure to the fictional nature of the ego. Of particular use to this project is the exploration of brotherhood in relation to the motif of the mirror and mirroring. *Ender's Game* depicts the intensity of childhood for a subject raised with little parental and adult supervision, and, as a result, stresses the influence of both siblings and peers on the subject's psyche. Consequently, this chapter also recognises the influence that Valentine Wiggin, Peter and Ender's sister, has in providing an alternative means of identification and problematises the role siblings of the opposite sex may have in prohibiting or necessitating subjective individuation. I propose that Ender's intrasubjective experience of Peter and Valentine prepare him for exposure to Other beings, and in this transition, Ender moves from the known intimacy of siblings to encounters with the unknown and alien.

The final section of this thesis is a brief reflection which focuses on the mechanisms of the project to interrogate its successes. The complications of the interdisciplinary nature of this project are also reviewed whereby psychoanalysis, literary interpretation and continental philosophy overlap and intersect in difficult and destabilising ways. Finally, I end by stressing the importance of challenging a reading practice where intergenerational relations are prioritised over lateral, sibling experiences.

Chapter One

The Brothers Karamazov: Trespass

Central characters in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* are regularly investigated using two hermeneutic lenses: the layering and pairing of doubles, and the triangulating allocations of the oedipal arrangement. While both these interpretations find ready examples in *The Brothers Karamazov*, what remains largely overlooked is the way in which brotherhood itself operates as a "(de) formative" (Chiesa loc. 313) subjective experience, and the role the hostile communion of brothers plays in thematic questions of universal brotherhood. The "steady diet" (Ornstein 310) of oedipal readings of the novel, initiated by Freud's interest in the arrangement he perceived in Dostoyevsky's life (Vladiv-Glover 8), have relied on the relationship between Dmitri and his father, Fyodor, in their contest for Grushenka. While this approach regarding vertical relations offers insight, I postulate that the half brothers Ivan and Smerdyakov become bound in a manner which circumvents the oedipal arrangement. The pair instead reflect each other: impacting both their understanding of self and their perceptions of unreflective Others. This line of inquiry is both underwritten by and adapted from the 'double' interpretation common in Dostoyevsky's oeuvre—a reading initiated through Dostoyevsky's explorations into this psychological encounter through his novella *The Double* (1846). Therefore, when critics understand the half brothers Ivan and Smerdyakov as doubles, I suggest that they could more usefully be understood as *brothers*, acting within an accord that simultaneously confirms and threatens the ego. In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Smerdyakov, as *brother*, invades Ivan's established ego as one who is not I, but also, not Other. This experience of brotherhood for Ivan and Smerdyakov is thus described as an act of trespass, an offence to the established perimeters of the ego.

As in all the novels of this thesis, the unique family unit of the Karamazovs exhibits the impact of both absent and ineffective parenting. In fact, sharing the emphasis that Juliet Mitchell places on siblings, I suggest that in the narratives of this project, the absence or

ineffectiveness of parents (particularly mothers) is a precondition for *brotherhood* to emerge in narrative. Mitchell, in *Siblings*, argues provocatively for a “Law of the Mother,” which should “intervene at the level of sibling murderousness and incest” (loc. 968). Without this maternal intercession, siblings are not placed and ordered in series, and as a result, I argue that the brothers of the Karamazov family are more susceptible to the traumatic crisis of *brotherhood*. For, despite the abnormality of the Karamazov family compared to the traditional Western family unit (one father and three separate mothers), the Karamazov brothers also share the reality of growing up without a mother’s intervening presence. All of the brothers’ mothers died early in the lives of their children and all were abandoned by their father, Fyodor Karamazov. Dmitri, the eldest, was rescued by a cousin of his mother and was subsequently passed around her extended family as a child. Ivan and Alyosha were sons born out of Fyodor Karamazov’s second marriage, and after this second wife died, the two boys were similarly raised by relatives. The elder, Ivan, grew resentful of the handouts and his dependency, while Alyosha, the youngest, in the “complete opposite” way, seemed oblivious to them (21). The final brother of the family is Smerdyakov, who, significantly, is the “same age” (Chiesa loc. 212) as Ivan but illegitimate: born to Fyodor and the town’s mentally disabled Lizaveta Smerdyastchaya—who died in childbirth. Smerdyakov was raised in his father’s household, but as the foster child of his servants: Grigory and Martha.

Owing to Dmitri’s ongoing conflict with his father and Alyosha’s enrolment as a novice in the local monastery, only Ivan and Smerdyakov reside with their father: Ivan as a guest and Smerdyakov as a servant. This physical proximity, along with shared intellectual interests, age, and temperament all play important roles in establishing connections between the pair. Importantly for the discussion of this novel, Chiesa explains that:

by means of the continuous acquisition of new imaginary identifications corresponding to different crucial moments in the subject's psychic life, the mirror-stage experience is repeated indefinitely throughout one's existence due to the imaginary relationships that are established with other human beings. (loc. 209)

209)

Therefore, as discussed in the introduction, although Ivan and Smerdyakov have been raised apart from one another and conceive of themselves as independent entities, the mirror stage still operates as a mechanism to describe the encounter. *Brotherhood in The Brothers Karamazov* emerges not through the early formative years as in the other narratives of this project, but in the narcissism that is nurtured through each young man's experience of the other. For, as Mitchell describes, "narcissistic self-love has only a mirror image" (loc. 716). Understood optically, Smerdyakov is transfixed by Ivan when he arrived at their father's house, and through religious and philosophic conversation Smerdyakov attempts to impress Ivan (128). Fyodor Pavlovich, their father, observes this in one particular conversation regarding Christian conversion, and he accuses Smerdyakov of setting it all up for Ivan's "praise" (128). In response, Ivan initially had a "special interest in Smerdyakov, and had even found him suddenly very original" (266). Both young men were eager to demonstrate the uniqueness of their thinking, especially with regard to religious topics. In this manner, Smerdyakov's exploration of the loopholes of Christian conversion (128) could be understood as imitating Ivan's more comprehensive published book review on the roles of Church and State (62). As an early demonstration of the narcissistic impulses manifested in the mirror stage, each brother receives from the other a reflection which exaggerates their own importance without compromising their ego formations. It is not until later in the narrative that the trauma of similitude surfaces for Ivan. Even so, in this early experience an important hierarchy emerges, Ivan, as educated, is viewed by Smerdyakov as a teacher and mentor for him to learn from.

Against the hostile communion of *brotherhood* developing above, another pair of brothers, Father Zosima and his late brother Markel, act as a foil to critique both the experience of *brotherhood* and the expressions of individualism and atheism offered by both Ivan and Smerdyakov. Zosima, known primarily for his mentoring role in Alyosha's life, was himself profoundly shaped by his older brother Markel, whose influence became a "pointer and a destination from above in [Zosima's] fate" (285). I will return to this brother pair later on,

yet at this stage it is important to understand that although Ivan and Smerdyakov's hostile communion dominates this chapter, much of what is meaningful about their experience of brotherhood is magnified by examining the interpersonal nature of Zosima's teaching and his appeals to universal brotherhood. In fact, following Mikhail Bakhtin's suggestions about polyphony and dialogics, Ivan's ideas and actions are frequently placed in discourse with Father Zosima's. Zosima's teaching and life will be interpreted as a foil to present an alternative to the trope of fraternal discord, emphasising instead the possibility of creating cohesive communities of selves through universal brotherhood.

As *brother*, Ivan requires elaboration. Throughout the majority of the narrative Ivan is detached and aloof, convinced of his own self containment. His role in the novel is one of an intellectual, an "eyewitness" (16), a critical observer, but rarely as an active participant. Ivan continually thinks, but rarely acts. Ivan embodies what Teresa Brennan terms the "foundational fantasy", in determining how he is "separate from others" (14). Discussing this concept with his brother Alyosha, Ivan asserts: "I, for example, am capable of profound suffering, but another man will never be able to know the degree of my suffering, because *he is another and not me*" [emphasis added] (237). The phrases, 'not you' and 'not me,' become a motif that reverberate throughout Ivan's narrative thread as he attempts to maintain or assert his self containment. This component of his character is perhaps best articulated in his struggle to "*understand* how it's possible to love one's neighbours" [emphasis added] (236). However, as Mari Ruti notes,

Levinas stresses that the ethical relationship to the other is not one of thinking. Thinking, according to him, seeks to triumph over all otherness, to synthesize or summarize it so as to confine it within thought's conceptual system of abstraction. In this sense, thought aims at precisely the kind of possession of the other that Levinasian ethics is meant to counter. (loc. 357)

Ivan's struggle to comprehend unreflective Others before acting actually reinforces his distance from Others and reveals his attitude to the borders and boundaries of his body and mind. Moreover, his critical stance toward Others culminates in his verdict of the

possibility of loving “one’s neighbour abstractly, and even occasionally from a distance, but hardly ever up close” (237). It is therefore meaningful to consider the experience of brotherhood as an act of trespass; while Ivan is willing to observe the unreflective Other outside the perimeters of his established ego, he still maintains his critical “distance” (237).

Ivan’s borders and boundaries are continually strained as crises of responsibility accumulate in his encounters with Other characters. As a result, Ivan’s attitude of critical detachment is frustrated by the interpersonal reality of the narrative, and perhaps most significantly, by his father and half brother Dmitri, whom he struggles to love. As Anna Berman’s engaging discussion of the significance of siblings in *The Brothers Karamazov* asserts: “throughout the novel, Ivan struggles with the idea of being his brother’s keeper, attempting to reject this role, yet at the same time never fully letting go of his sense of responsibility” (270). Developing this reading from Berman in light of Ivan’s experiences and Brennan’s “foundation fantasy” (14), I suggest that Ivan’s delusions of self-containment are fully articulated by his sustained denial of his role in what Levinas describes as the “intersubjective world” (qtd. in Hand *The Levinas Reader [LR]* 150). Negotiating the “abounding thematic resemblances” (Eskin 66) between Bakhtin and Levinas with regard to ethical encounters with Others, Michael Eskin, in his book, *Ethics and Dialogue*, demonstrates how both thinkers “displace” first philosophy from “its traditional conceptualisation as either ontology or epistemology” (69). While Bakhtin’s first philosophy is initiated in the moment where you find yourself being and become an active participant in it by co-existing, Levinas, on the other hand, insists that the Other is prior: the Other comes before the self. Yet for both thinkers, it is the ethical, interpersonal encounter that institutes the subject as a self. Moreover, Levinas, while sharing Bakhtin’s aversion to Heidegger’s metaphysical phenomenology, insists that the call of the Other precedes the call of the conscience (Eskin 36). Navigating these theoretical positions, I suggest that Ivan, through his delusions of self-containment and his attempts to remain an eyewitness, consistently ignores the calls of the unreflective Other throughout the majority

of the novel, and thus it is only through the “tragedy of differentiation” (Quinones 9) that he comes into being, being-with and being-for. Ivan’s desire to “understand” (236) before simply loving his neighbour reflects the predicament voiced by both Levinas and Bakhtin: “It is impossible to remain a spectator of the Thou, for the very existence of the Thou depends on the 'word' it addresses to me. And... only a being who is responsible for another being *can enter into dialogue* with it” [emphasis added] (Hand LR 66).

Smerdyakov, operating in parallel to Ivan, shares this fundamental denial of an interpersonal reality, but also comes to personify the consequences of this denial on a subject. While Ivan continually chooses to detach himself from unreflective Others, Smerdyakov had no choice in his isolation. The product of Fyodor Pavlovich’s drunken rape of the town’s insane and homeless, “Stinking Lizaveta” (96), Smerdyakov is born in the bathhouse adjacent to the servant quarters. Thus from the moment of his birth Smerdyakov was positioned outside of, yet attached to, the Karamazov family. Even Smerdyakov’s name signifies his mistreatment: in Russian, Smerdyakov literally means son of the stinking one. Two additional phenomena are important in establishing Smerdyakov’s “arrogant nature [which] seemed to despise everyone” (124) . Firstly, as a child he was caught by Grigory hanging cats, and was denigrated and dehumanised, called a “monster”, “begotten of bathhouse slime” and “not a human being” (124)—importantly, this episode stayed with Smerdyakov all his life (124). Secondly, Smerdyakov developed an aversion to food (125). Sharon Cohen argues that “Smerdyakov’s relationship to food is a metaphor for his relationship to the world: mistrusting everyone and everything, he methodically objectifies it to deny it any vitality, and in doing so, deliberately renounces any kind of pleasure” (45). I would extend the meaning of the metaphor to suggest that Smerdyakov is suspicious of anything that can intrude on his established perimeters, either psychically or physically. Julia Kristeva’s seminal *Powers of Horror* also discusses the psychoanalytic aspect of food loathing, calling it “perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection” (2). In this manner, Smerdyakov’s food loathing is a symptom of the abject which “disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders,

positions, rules" (4). Smerdyakov's self-containment in the face of a hostile and unloving world is his means of survival. This is also evidenced by Smerdyakov's obsession with his immaculate dress, which I argue he wears to as costume to distract from his vacuous existence. For, even after his culinary training in Moscow, he returned "just as unsociable, and felt not the slightest need for anyone's company" (125). The exception to this attitude I suggest is in his narcissistic attraction to Ivan, which acts to initiate the *brother* bind and later 'keep' each brother in a reflective impasse.

Ricardo Quinones, in his exploration of the regeneration of the Cain and Abel archetype in literature, discusses the "brother's keeper" biblical allusion, and in particular, the "power of the words" of Genesis four "to arrest attention and to direct it to a new kind of significance" (8-9). While *The Brothers Karamazov* was not one of his chosen narratives, reading Quinones in combination with *The Brothers Karamazov* stresses the way in which shared denials of fraternal responsibility actually establish both Ivan and Smerdyakov as *brothers*, despite each character's insistence of his own independence. Ironically then, in *The Brothers Karamazov* Quinones' "new kind of significance" (9) is the inauguration, through their repeated utterance, of the *brother* bind. *Brotherhood*, as initiated by reflection, enters the narrative through the familiar cry of Genesis 4:9: "Am I my brother's keeper?" The allusion reverberates in two consecutive chapters from both Smerdyakov and Ivan. Alyosha initially questions Smerdyakov about Dmitri's whereabouts and receives the sharp reply: "Why should I be informed as to Dmitri Fyodorovich? It's not as if I were his keeper" (226). In what will be observed as typical Smerdyakov fashion, he makes the connection, but denies the family association. Berman suggests that "Smerdyakov is deliberate in his attempt to both point out his awareness of the sibling relationship he has to Alyosha, while at the same time, through removing the word brother, to show his active rejection of this sibling bond" (279). The allusion appears again shortly afterwards, this time voiced by Ivan when Alyosha once more enquires after their brother Dmitri: "What have I got to do with it? Am I my brother Dmitri's keeper or something?" (231). Each brother, echoing Genesis four, refuses his role in fraternal responsibility, and by doing so,

their unique individuality is paradoxically undermined by their mirrored responses. In other words the brother's keeper role, which is so adamantly refused by both brothers, is in fact a means to initiate the 'keeping' of each brother in a reflective impasse—and I suggest that their shared denial of fraternal responsibility is precisely the trigger which will force Ivan to encounter the fictional reality of his ego.

Describing how sibling bonds reveal themselves through “the fear of annihilation” rather than the oedipally derived “fear of castration” (loc. 244), Juliet Mitchell's emphasis on sibling similitude demonstrates how the ego is unsettled by someone who is the same rather than someone who is different. In a state of pre-recognition, Ivan's ego is confronted by the threat of Smerdyakov: he is unsettled by the intrusion of Smerdyakov into his perception. In this, Ivan fears he “is not unique or even irreplaceable” (Mitchell loc. 1431). Ironically, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, the denial of fraternal responsibility and the imagined independence of each character actually triggers the trauma of *brotherhood*. As has been discussed, both Smerdyakov and Ivan regard themselves as highly original and independent individuals, yet their growing intimacy threatens the established perimeters of each ego. Shortly after Alyosha recounted Smerdyakov's similar denial of fraternal responsibility discussed above, Ivan experienced a feeling of “unbearable anguish” which increased in intensity “the closer he came to home” (265). This anguish is described as an optical infringement: “some being or object was standing and sticking up, just as when something sometimes sticks up in front of one's eye and one doesn't notice it for a long time” (265). Ivan is unconsciously processing the way he mirrored “the lackey” (266), Smerdyakov, in his attitude and response concerning Dmitri. This similitude disturbs his understanding of self and he concludes that “it was precisely this man that his soul could not bear” (265). Through his mirrored response to Dmitri's whereabouts Ivan is split—he is now forced to repress his unconscious recognition of the similitude he has to his *brother*, the lackey, the cook, the “broth-maker” (128).

This project's application of Lacan's mirror stage stresses that *brothers* are alienated through the similitude and reflective potential of each other. Unconsciously, Ivan's ego is affronted by the likeness of their shared response regarding Dmitri's location. Yet Mitchell argues that "recognition cannot ultimately be reflective, it cannot stay as the mirror relationship... Each child... must accord the other the recognition of its autonomy" (loc. 2547). In this regard, while Lacan's mirror stage provides a means to perceive the similitude of the *brother* and observe his destabilising impact on the subject's ego, the mirror metaphor fails to accommodate the fact that two beings must emerge from the shared reflection. Moreover, the reflection presented by the *brother* is a misrecognition [méconnaissance] (Lacan 2). Therefore, I suggest that because of the reflective potential of the *brother*, constituting oppositions emerge to establish distance between each *brother* and the reflection observed. Constituting oppositions act to preserve the ego in response to the reflected image. In other words, constituting oppositions provide each *brother* a means of differentiation in the face of a debilitating reflection. Importantly, however, these are *fictional* oppositions which structurally dictate the experience. The most important of these oppositions is the perspective of Ivan where he interprets himself as intelligent and Smerdyakov as stupid. Smerdyakov, on the other hand, perceives himself as the student and Ivan as the teacher. Both of these oppositions emerge based on their experiences early in the narrative in their father's house, and, as has been identified above, these oppositions establish and enforce hierarchies, further demonstrating the educational and class differences between the brothers. Despite the hierarchal nature, these oppositions allow the *brothers* to form images of themselves in relation to the confronting image of the other, but as will be observed, these fictional oppositions fail to stand up against the reality of the events of the narrative.

In "Balaam's Ass': Smerdyakov as a Paradoxical Redeemer in Dostoevsky's 'The Brothers Karamazov'", Sharon Cohen argues convincingly for a reconsideration of Smerdyakov's role in the narrative. In this essay Cohen suggests that "Smerdyakov as an adult has cemented into a man completely cut off from the rest of the world" (48). However, I would also stress

that Smerdyakov was birthed outside of the family, and throughout the novel he is continually excluded from the family unit. This is evidenced through the language used when the other brothers discuss family matters with him. In the aforementioned brother's keeper discourse between Alyosha and Smerdyakov, the modifying adjective "my" in the four times repeated "my brother" demonstrates the relationship is not shared or reciprocal (225). In fact, while the dehumanisation of Smerdyakov is initiated by his 'father' Grigory, it is continued by the other characters: "he's a chicken, an ass, a viper, an insect, a dog" (Hruska 480). In his continual denigration, Smerdyakov's humanity is denied through an "emotional and spiritual" starvation (Hruska 481). In contrast, on returning home after meeting with Alyosha, Ivan is unable to maintain distance with Smerdyakov despite his fury at the intrusion Smerdyakov has made into his psyche. Ivan's intended response in the face of Smerdyakov's knowing look of intimacy is: "Get away, scoundrel! I'm no friend of yours, you fool!" (267), but instead he inquires, "How is papa, asleep or awake?"... softly and humbly, to his own surprise, and suddenly, also to his own surprise, sat down on the bench." (267). Therefore, while even the "angel" (105) Alyosha maintains relational distance in his encounters with Smerdyakov, Ivan, despite himself, twice fails to either voice the distinction in kinship or even insert physical distance between himself and his *brother*. In short, Ivan fraternises with Smerdyakov more than any other Karamazov in the novel, and in response, Smerdyakov determines to fulfil Ivan's desires.

From Teresa Brennan's perspective, the submissive and "feminine" position taken by Smerdyakov in the *brother* experience could be understood as collusion, "because even if the attention [he] receives is negative at least it gives [him] an image: it gives [him] borders or boundaries that, even though they are restricting, are welcome insofar as they give [him] an identity" (174). As has been noted, borders and boundaries are of pivotal importance to both Smerdyakov and Ivan. Ivan's sense of self is grounded by his belief that he is isolated and self-contained. Yet after the *brother* bond is established, Ivan's unconscious desires are projected and received by Smerdyakov. Most importantly, Ivan's contempt for his father is affectively absorbed by Smerdyakov. Smerdyakov understands

his brother to be an “intelligent man” (268) and as a consequence, interprets clues to decipher his *brother's* desires. This is evidenced through the way the pair collude regarding their father’s murder. While Ivan’s patricidal desires are projected psychically, through insinuation and subtle clues, he does express his exhaustion to Alyosha concerning the oedipal love triangle that dominates the narrative’s focus: “Viper will eat viper, and it would serve them both right!” (141). Ivan, before he deliberately removes himself from the action at the pivotal moment, questions why Smerdyakov “came to consider himself somehow in league” with him and “always spoke in such tones as to suggest that there was already something agreed to and kept secret, as it were, between the two of them” (267). I propose that Smerdyakov, attentive to the affect transmitted, kills their father to solidify his role in the *brother* experience and by doing so attempts to preserve an experience which enforces his borders (if only in opposition) outlined by Brennan above.

In a similar manner, but observing a different outcome, Joyce Oates, in her elucidation of the double interpretation of the novel, discusses the way the power structures are inverted after the murder:

Ivan and Smerdyakov is an obvious example of the relationship between mysterious doubles, with Ivan apparently the stronger and more intelligent, and Smerdyakov the instrument of his will. Ivan's unconscious wishes for his father's death direct Smerdyakov, who communicates with the unconscious directly: Smerdyakov is, then, the master, the controller of fate simply because he is able to penetrate the barrier of consciousness that must conventionally deny evil impulses. (Oates 208)

In response to Oates, and following the line of interpretation employed for Smerdyakov, I likewise recognise the “mysterious” (Oates 208), psychic element in the *brother* pair as the affectual transmission which confirms Ivan’s desire for patricide. Moreover, Oates’ “penetration of the barrier of consciousness” (208) articulates exactly the intimacy of *brotherhood* I am exploring—and more particularly, the act of trespass whereby

Smerdyakov intrudes on Ivan's sovereign territory. In return Smerdyakov receives a confirmation of his subjectivity that countermands the sustained dehumanisation he has received from unreflective Others. In short, Smerdyakov has found a means to 'see' himself without having to rely on the veneer of costume.

Although Ivan attempted to escape his family by fleeing to Moscow, after Smerdyakov murders their father the *brother* experience resumes in three "meetings" (603) when Ivan returns for his father's funeral and Dmitri's trial. These three meetings come to demonstrate the significance of the *brother* bind as it unites the pair and divides the subject. In the first meeting, Ivan calls on Smerdyakov to ease his mind regarding the murder of their father and to confirm Dmitri's guilt. In this interview, like those that follow, Smerdyakov is "compose[d]" (605) while Ivan is agitated and anxious for information. For example, in Ivan's frustration to know if Smerdyakov was indeed involved in the murder, he becomes angry and he finally acknowledges Smerdyakov's brotherhood: "You have a lot to explain to me right now, *brother*, and let me tell you, *my dear*, that I shall not let myself be toyed with!" [emphasis added] (606). This is a revealing spoken Freudian slip from Ivan, but in reply, Smerdyakov confirms his own feeling of "sole friendship... heartfelt devotion... [and] pity" (606) for Ivan. What Smerdyakov does reveal is his understanding of their similitude: "I thought you were like I am" (608). It is significant that while Ivan unconsciously recognises his kinship with his *brother* (something that neither his other brothers nor his father explicitly does), Smerdyakov is arguably more insightful in his articulation of their reflection. Leaving the meeting, the residue of the encounter haunted Ivan: "He wanted sooner to forget something, as it were," (609) and indeed, "he almost forgot about Smerdyakov for a time" (611). Mikhail Bakhtin here provides a useful description of the way in which the "dialogic dismantling of Ivan's consciousness" plays out—through

the loopholes in Ivan's thoughts... his sideward glances at another's words and another's consciousness... his attempts to get around the other's words and to replace them in his soul with an affirmation of his own self... the reservations of his

conscience that serve to interrupt his every thought... The other's discourse gradually, stealthily penetrates the consciousness and speech of the hero. (222)

It should be noted that in the extract above Bakhtin is referring to numerous others and their dialogic impact on Ivan. In contrast, this project prioritises Smerdyakov as the fundamental and reflective *brother*, and thereby I assert Smerdyakov is *not yet* an other in Bakhtin's sense. However, as Bakhtin observes, the "penetration" (222) of Ivan by others and "especially with Smerdyakov" (222) fully illustrates the fragility of the ego edifice and describes Ivan's futile quest to maintain his position as an eyewitness.

An element of Smerdyakov and Ivan's experience which has received little attention from critics of the novel is the psychosexual dimension of their interactions. Despite both Joyce Carol Oates and Mikhail Bakhtin's observation of Ivan being "penetrated" in the preceding paragraphs, neither critic explores what this implies about the phallic dimension of power within the novel. Clearly, the hierarchy of teacher and student, master and servant, legitimate and illegitimate, educated and uneducated, favours Ivan, but increasingly in the encounters between the two Smerdyakov achieves dominance. It is also significant that Smerdyakov is described as a eunuch three times throughout the novel, once by the unnamed narrator (125), and twice through the focalisation of Ivan (267, 605). Moreover, in each instance of Ivan's description, Smerdyakov is mentally castrated to prevent Ivan from recognising the impotence he feels in the presence of his half-brother. Remembering the importance of the image in the mirror stage, it is possible to suggest that for Ivan, the image of Smerdyakov in the mirror of *brotherhood* is itself phallic, "some being or object was standing and sticking up" (265) and thus is intrusive and disempowering to the erection of his own ego edifice. As Mitchell states: "this illusory 'I' comes and goes in the mirror; it either vanishes or is upright and omnipotent – in other words, phallic" (loc. 1372). If, however, it is the image of the *brother* that is observed in the mirror, the 'I' of my construction can be dominated by the projected image of the *brother*. In other words, there seems to be a correlation between Ivan's attempts to maintain his own ego and Smerdyakov's acts of trespass which demonstrates the significance of the phallus not only

within the traditional oedipal arrangement, but also outside of it. This psychosexual dimension of *brotherhood* is discussed in more depth in Chapter Three regarding *Ender's Game*.

In the second meeting, Ivan enters Smerdyakov's lodging and is confronted by his *brother* writing in a notepad and wearing spectacles. This scene affronts Ivan's perceptions of Smerdyakov and infuriates the more educated man, "this most trifling circumstance suddenly made Ivan Fyodorovich even doubly angry, as it were: 'Such a creature, and in spectacles to boot!' " (613). Smerdyakov, affectively attentive to Ivan's displeasure, torments him and "slowly removed them and raised himself a little from the bench, but somehow not altogether respectfully, somehow even lazily" (613). Smerdyakov's eyes meanwhile were "decidedly malicious, unfriendly, and even haughty" (613). This scene, like the many incidents that precede it, describes the way in which the two have punctured each other and the catastrophic tension in the situation. Smerdyakov's goading continues; "there was something hard and insistent, malicious and insolently defiant in his voice" (614). Here the reader witnesses the only act of physical violence between the pair; Ivan, enraged at Smerdyakov, "jumped up and hit him as hard as he could on the shoulder with his fist" (614). As shall be observed throughout this project, physical acts of violence occur when the confronting similitude of the *brother* becomes too much to bear; the violence itself is an act of abjection, an exorcism of the *brother* within. Smerdyakov, following the violence experienced at the hands of his *brother*, claims: "beatings do go on all the same, as in the time of Adam and Eve, sir, and there will be no stop to it, sir" (616). In typical Smerdyakov fashion, he hints at their kinship through the way Cain beat Abel to death, while Ivan, in response to the Genesis reference, will later in that same chapter exclaim "I must kill Smerdyakov ... ! If I don't dare kill Smerdyakov now, life is not worth living" (617). Ivan's insistence on fratricide as a solution depicts precisely the hostile communion of *brotherhood*. Evidenced in different outcomes in every narrative of this project, Quinones explains that "as the biblical story and its long and productive history reminds us, the opposite of brotherhood is death" (5). Ivan and Smerdyakov now arrive at

their reflective impasse. Smerdyakov continues to avoid his true experience of Ivan through his denial of kinship, meanwhile Ivan insists on his innocence with regard to the murder of the father.

In *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Mari Ruti describes the type of Levinasian dilemma present in the meetings between Smerdyakov and Ivan as “a link between the crisis of sovereignty brought on by the inherently relational nature of subjectivity and the notion that we are ‘persecuted’ by the other” (loc. 767). Each *brother* in each interview is undermining and destabilising the other, and in the final interview, the veiled nuances between the two disappear. The last meeting again takes place in Smerdyakov’s lodging and Ivan approaches Smerdyakov thinking “this time maybe I’ll kill him” (620). In his rage, Ivan has attacked and abandoned a drunk peasant on the way over and he is unravelling due to the questions of guilt that plague his mind. He is anxious to hear the facts from Smerdyakov, feeling that his half truths do not add up. The *brother* experience intensifies, as Smerdyakov “grinned contemptuously... with a sort of wildly hateful look” (622) that developed into a “sort of repugnance” (622) and reached its final state as “insane hatred” (622). Ivan, anxious for absolution, “jumped up and seized him by the shoulder” (622). Smerdyakov meanwhile, who recoiled with tears in the last attack now, “was not in the least frightened” (622) and proceeds to reveal the details of the murder. In response, Ivan’s ego edifice fractures. Furious with impotent rage, Ivan is psychically castrated by his *brother*. The language of the fracture used by Dostoyevsky reveals the weight of the traumatic revelation of guilt to Ivan, who values above all, his critical detachment and delusions of self-containment. Ivan “shook, as it were, in his brain, and he began shivering all over with cold little shivers,” and continued “shaking with convulsive fear” (624). The destabilisation of Ivan gradually leads to full “emotional collapse” (Ornstein 313). Ivan is trapped both psychologically and physically by his responsibility in the murder of his father: “He rose, obviously intending to walk about the room... But as the table was in his way and he could barely squeeze between the table and the wall, he merely turned on the spot and sat down again” (631). Once again Ivan’s action

in a physical space elucidates the intimacy of the pair, just as Ivan failed to escape Smerdyakov when the bond was established and sat down beside him on the bench, he now cannot escape Smerdyakov despite his revulsion. Ivan is inescapably tethered to Smerdyakov as his *brother* and partner in crime.

During this final meeting, the constituting oppositions that demarcated the *brother's* ego identifications fail. Ivan concedes that Smerdyakov is “much more intelligent than [he] thought” (631), and as explained above, Smerdyakov’s submissive and servile responses disappear as his attachment to his teacher is abandoned. In this, Smerdyakov confirms his actions were the result of Ivan’s teaching: “It was true what you taught me... if there’s no infinite God, then there’s no virtue either, and no need of it at all” (632). Yet Smerdyakov’s lessons in atheism ring hollow when Ivan, the teacher, refuses to live by the same principles. Michael Wreen describes that through patricide “Smerdyakov brings the lawlessness of Ivan's conception of the universe to its logical conclusion” (320). While Ivan’s ideas regarding God and man are regurgitated by Smerdyakov, these philosophical positions become simple sound bites which lack the consideration and thought that accompanied them. In this manner, Ivan’s unique stance towards the existence of God is “vulgarised” (Wreen 320) by his *brother*, the servant. Moreover, what had been an intellectual exercise for Ivan is birthed by Smerdyakov into the world of action, and in this moment Ivan loses his critical detachment from the world. Smerdyakov, the “sophist” (Cohen 54), becomes fixed to the argument while Ivan awakens to the reality of interpersonal experience. In short, there is no eyewitness position left for Ivan to occupy. After confronting the fact that Smerdyakov is smarter than he initially assumed, Ivan is forced to accept that he was foolish not to see his role in the murder earlier. Smerdyakov, meanwhile, is assaulted by Ivan’s denial of the student / teacher identification (632). Ivan learns a bitter lesson from Smerdyakov in the consequences of denying his own interpersonal reality. As Cohen observes, Ivan’s “thesis” towards Smerdyakov’s intrusion runs parallel to his attitude towards God (Cohen 54): “It’s not that I don’t accept God, Alyosha, I just most respectfully return him the ticket” (245). However, Ivan learns that

brotherhood, (in all its manifestations) cannot be returned. Therefore, I suggest that Ivan's thesis is rendered meaningless when faced with the reality where the individual is not an autonomous unit. It is pivotal to note that after leaving Smerdyakov's house in a state of agitation, he encounters the peasant that he knocked down before the meeting "lying in the same spot, unconscious and not moving" (633). After the final trespass of Smerdyakov, Ivan awakens to reality of lived experience and his collision with the peasant earlier demonstrates that no one is able to maintain their isolation and distance in the face of unreflective Others. Significantly, Ivan's first act after the meeting is to go to great lengths to ensure the welfare of the peasant—thus his first real experience of loving a neighbour up close is forced upon him by his own actions (633).

In contrast to Ivan's ethical awakening to the world of unreflective Others through his confronting experiences of *brotherhood*, the singular and hostile *brotherhood* Smerdyakov experiences confirms his already established world. Smerdyakov articulates precisely the issue Bakhtin explores for a character coming into being in Dostoyevsky's narratives: "I cannot manage without another; I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another by finding another in myself (in mutual reflection and mutual acceptance)" (252). I propose that Smerdyakov's world, closed now to both Ivan as *brother* and unreflective Others, offers no contradiction to his fixed thesis, and through Ivan's exit after the third meeting, entry into an interpersonal world is denied. It is essentially this denial of and by unreflective Others that culminates in Smerdyakov taking his life. The day after the suicide the prosecuting lawyer in the murder trial expresses the dilemma in an interesting light: "it seems that this thesis, which he was taught, ultimately caused the idiot to lose his mind" (696). Smerdyakov's suicide should not be understood as an act of self-negation, but rather as the ultimate denial of the unreflective Other. Through suicide, it is the unreflective Other who is finally and radically eliminated. Smerdyakov's suicide note develops this interpretation: "I exterminate my life by my own will and liking, so as not to blame anybody" (651). Understood best in terms of implosion or collapse, Smerdyakov's note articulates the fullness of denied humanity; he does not

simply take his life, he exterminates himself like the “insect”(Hruska 480) he was considered to be. In addition, blame, as opposed to guilt, is both projected and denied. While guilt penetrates the subject, Smerdyakov’s acceptance of blame allows him to retain, in death, the boundaries he prized in life. Berman notes: “to love Smerdyakov becomes the ultimate challenge which everyone fails” (264). While my reading of the novel shares Berman’s insistence on the impact of sustained dehumanisation, I also recognise the significance of Smerdyakov’s sustained detachment from Others. This hostility, both received and projected, isolates Smerdyakov and prohibits the *brother* (as other) and unreflective Others from puncturing his surface.

Yet Ivan’s transition from solipsism to the recognition of interpersonal reality is not smooth or instantaneous. In fact, in the final chapters of the novel Ivan must “take on board that [he is] not unique and omnipotent” (Mitchell loc. 4211). For, as Mitchell elaborates, “the loss of the grandiose self and the acceptance of others who are like one will remain crucial. The subject must also survive in a world of other people; self-esteem and respect for others are two sides of the same coin” (loc. 4211). After rescuing the peasant Ivan returns to his lodging, falls asleep, and has a nightmare of a devil.

Significantly, the way the devil is perceived and encountered by Ivan echoes his earliest disturbances bought about by Smerdyakov, as “some object” which “irritated him, troubled him, tormented him” (634). I understand the devil to be the unconscious manifestation of *brotherhood*: the devil exposes the misrecognition inherent in the mirror stage. Ivan’s encounter with the devil is not an exorcism, but rather an internal revelation. The devil forces Ivan to witness and experience his own lack of borders, his lack of self containment, his stupidity and his nastiness. In short, what was falsely projected onto Smerdyakov now has to be accepted as part of the self. Recounting the nightmare to Alyosha, Ivan’s description of his devil echoes his interpretation of the reflection proffered by Smerdyakov: “He’s terribly stupid, but he makes use of it. He’s cunning, cunning as an animal, he knew how to infuriate me...” (652). Ivan concludes his description of the devil by stating: “I would much prefer that he were really he and not I!” (652). “Not I” once

more sings out from the text, first in the concession above, and then by Alyosha's reassuring reply of "not you" (653). This time, however, Ivan is realising 'I' is not something he can determine. Because of this painful and confronting dream Ivan learns "a great deal that's true about myself" (653). Ivan realises that the devil is "the embodiment of myself, but of just one side of me ... of my thoughts and feelings, but only the most loathsome and stupid of them" (637). Ivan is experiencing the trauma of misrecognition. Through the devil encounter Smerdyakov is reinstated as an unreflective Other to Ivan, and the devil is Ivan's reconciliation of the unconscious to the conscious; the devil allows Ivan to finally *reflect* on himself for what he really is. Through the acts of violence (physical and psychic) and the inevitable failure of the constituting oppositions, the reflective impasse is surmounted and Ivan awakens to the reality of an interpersonal world of Others.

Bakhtin's discussion of the type of co-existence suggested by Dostoyevsky's work is most evident when the hero's independence fails him. As a result, Ivan's experience of Smerdyakov's *brotherhood* can be interpreted as an experience revealing the myth of autonomous being. Bakhtin states that "to be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside himself, he looks *into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another*" [emphasis in original] (287). Ivan, therefore, is only able to comprehend the truth of his nature by viewing himself as the devil. I suggest that Ivan's departure from solipsism is initiated through his awakening to the world of unreflective Others and in the acceptance of the part he played in his father's murder. Moreover, the devil of the unconscious disappears after insisting that Ivan: "Open, open to him [Alyosha]. There's a blizzard out there, and he's your brother" (650). When Alyosha brings the news of Smerdyakov's suicide, Ivan begins to open up to his Other brother. While in the past Alyosha has met with Ivan in their father's house, in Father Zosima's cell, in other characters' homes and in a tavern, this is the first time the brothers meet in Ivan's lodging. First through the window, and then through the door, Ivan opens to Alyosha. As Levinas asserts, "the possibility for the home to open to the Other is as essential to the essence of

the home as closed doors and windows" (TI 172). While Smerdyakov's presence was an act of trespass, Ivan now welcomes and hosts his Other brother. Importantly, images of home, opening and the face, all occur following the dream of the devil, and all are crucial metaphors that Levinas uses in describing ethical encounters with Others. In his following conversation with Alyosha, Ivan awakens to the interpersonal nature of being. In this state of extreme distress, Ivan considers the Others he has mistreated and his interactions with them: "I like Liza. I said something nasty to you about her. I was lying, I like her... I'm afraid for Katya tomorrow... I love your face, Alyosha. Did you know that I love your face?" (652).

Alongside the hostile communion of *brotherhood* evidenced between and within Smerdyakov and Ivan, brotherhood as a metaphoric relationship resounds throughout the novel to demonstrate how lateral and ethical encounters with unreflective Others can be initiated and sustained. As alluded to earlier in the chapter, this ideal is voiced most coherently by Father Zosima and through his processing of his brother Markel's death. In fact, Levinas himself was particularly fond of quoting Markel in order to explain his position concerning the responsibility demanded when facing the Other: "Each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and for each one, and I more than others" (qtd. in Hand LR 182). Markel's role in challenging the way Smerdyakov was treated is further heightened when one considers the lines immediately preceding those above: "it is not possible for there to be no masters and servants, but let me also be the servant of my servants" (289). Furthermore, when Zosima himself reflects on Markel's stance, he himself considers: "Why can my servant not be like *my own kin*, so that I may finally receive him into my family, and rejoice for it?" [emphasis added] (317). Because the teachings of Zosima and the teachings of Ivan deliberately oppose each other (especially concerning faith and belief), I propose that rather than the fallibility or infallibility of the thesis, the *brothering* of the narrative suggests that it is through the lived experience of the characters whereby the lessons of each teacher reveal their subjective truths.

Levinas, himself demonstrating the complexity of the form of universal brotherhood

advocated by *The Brothers Karamazov*, writes in *Totality and Infinity* “that all men are brothers is not explained by their resemblance, nor by a common cause by which they would be an effect”, rather, “it is my responsibility before a face looking at me as absolutely foreign . . . that constitutes the original fact of fraternity” (213). Therefore, it is meaningful that Zosima concludes his contemplation by recounting the teachings of the “mysterious visitor” of his youth, who asserted “until one has indeed become the brother of all, there will be no brotherhood” (303). From a Levinasian standpoint, it is important to note the ordering of the action to the outcome. Smerdyakov’s suicide demonstrates the failure of brothers to act as brothers, and more generally, the consequences of delusions of self-containment in an interpersonal word. Foreshadowed in detail by the mysterious visitor early on in the text, Smerdyakov and Ivan’s attitude to the Other runs its eventual course throughout the novel:

Everyone now strives most of all to separate his person, wishing to experience the fullness of life within himself, and yet what comes of all his efforts is not the fullness of life but full suicide, for instead of the fullness of self-definition, they fall into complete isolation. For all men in our age are separated into units, each seeks seclusion in his own hole, each withdraws from the others, hides himself, and hides what he has, and ends by pushing himself away from people and pushing people away from himself. (303)

While Smerdyakov’s solipsism and autarchy ultimately result in his suicide, Ivan, who literally pushed the peasant over before the meeting, encounters him again after leaving Smerdyakov and immediately acts to restore him to health, arguably beginning his journey to accepting the unreflective Other and attempting to save his brother Dmitri.

Ivan has few actions and even less role in the final book of the novel that deals predominantly with the trial of Dmitri. Because of his “brain fever” (691) resulting from the debilitating impact of the devil on his psyche, Ivan works to organise an escape for his innocent brother Dmitri and confesses in court to his role in the murder. It was, however, too little and too late. Despite his insistence in court to “take me instead of him” (687), his

strange and confused confession is attributed by the defence as a last ditch attempt “to save a brother” (713). Ivan, who spent most of the novel struggling to comprehend the Other from a distance, finally encounters the guilt of this deliberate distancing. Berman, through her reconsideration of the significance of Smerdyakov to the narrative, insists that it is precisely the mistreatment of Smerdyakov that “reinforces the idea that everyone is guilty before everyone, making the guilt for the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich a truly universal phenomenon. Smerdyakov acts as the lynchpin of the novel, the overlooked brother in a world based on forming lateral bonds” (281).

Lateral bonds, delivered through the trope of brotherhood and sustained by Zosima’s teaching is arguably Dostoyevsky’s ideal depiction of the interpersonal nature of existence. For, as Levinas reflects:

The biological human brotherhood - conceived with the sober coldness of Cain - is not a sufficient reason for me to be responsible for a separated being. The sober coldness of Cain consists in conceiving responsibility as proceeding from freedom or in terms of a contract. But responsibility for another comes from what is prior to my freedom... Responsibility does not come from fraternity, but fraternity denotes responsibility for another, antecedent to my freedom. (qtd. in Hand LR 180)

Through recognising that Ivan and Smerdyakov are trapped by the allusive power of Cain and Abel, false reflections and delusions of self-containment, *The Brothers Karamazov* emphasises the shared dimensions of both *brotherhood* and brotherhood. Both the experience of *brotherhood* and the lateral relationship of brotherhood articulate the inescapability of an interpersonal world, and by doing so, highlight the priority of action before comprehension.

Chapter Two

East of Eden: Polarity

John Steinbeck's *East of Eden* is a multi-generational and interfamily exploration into free will and personal crises of liability. Fraternal discord, as a literary trope, emerges in both the key families of the narrative: the Trasks and the Hamiltons. While the nine siblings of the Hamilton family demonstrate the significance of lateral connections primarily through differentiation, it is the hostile communion of the Trask family line that will be the focus of this chapter. Within this family, the twins Cal and Aron prove the most intimate and demonstrate the *brotherhood* experience most vividly as it profoundly impacts the nature of their subjectivity. While in *The Brothers Karamazov* the Cain and Abel allusion subtly bind the *brothers* Ivan and Smerdyakov, *East of Eden* is a more direct adaptation of Cain's narrative. Because of the extended literary allusion, critics such as Joseph Fontenrose, Bruce Ouderkirk and Terry Wright have often archetypalised key characters, and by doing so have produced restrictive and limiting interpretations. In contrast, my intention is to focus on the brotherhood of Cal and Aron without having to impose the Cain and Abel allusion on every nuance of the text. Instead, I support an "organic and adaptable" (Leatham 124) allegory and suggest that working around the mythic potency of Cain and Abel in *East of Eden* could in fact produce a less deterministic and more liberated reading of the text which demonstrates the hostile communion of *brotherhood* and problematises the free will notion commonly stressed by the above critics. This reading, therefore, questions interpretations of agency, autonomy and the independent subject, and instead explores the reflective potential of the brothers, and in particular, *brotherhood's* outworking in pre-oedipal fantasy for Aron and aggression for Cal. Moreover, I suggest that the aggressive "self-sufficiency" of Cal (440) and the fantasies of Aron are the product of authorial constructed oppositions emerging from the *brother* bind. Finally, exploring the implications of the Other of Levinasian thought and Bakhtin's suggestions regarding dialogics, I claim that the individualism suggested by Steinbeck (through the slogan of "timshel" or "thou mayest") and advanced by critics such as Bradley Stephens and David

Wyatt actually overlook the unique experience of *brotherhood* depicted throughout the novel.

As a significant proportion of the text has taken place before Cal and Aron enter the novel, a brief explanation of their parents' narratives is required. Firstly, Cal and Aron's father, Adam, foreshadows the trope of fraternal discord by his repeated acts of self-exile when the intimacy of brotherhood becomes too much to bear. Charles, Adam's half-brother, usefully describes the process as it repeats itself in the early stages of the novel:

You'll stay around a year or so and then you'll get restless and you'll make me restless. We'll get mad at each other and then we'll get polite to each other—and that's worse. Then we'll blow up and you'll go away again, and then you'll come back and we'll do it all over again. (105)

While Adam's oscillating experience of brotherhood is interrupted by his marriage to Cathy Ames, his half-brother Charles remains trapped by the primacy of *brotherhood* and is unable to encounter unreflective Others for the rest of his life. Interestingly, Charles is so repulsed by Cathy's similitude to himself that when Cathy conceives (from her clandestine intercourse with Charles) Adam and Cathy are forced to leave the family farm and head west to the Salinas Valley, California. Once again, as in the other narratives of *brotherhood*, the family unit is incomplete or fractured when Cathy abandons the twins shortly after their birth. As a result of Cathy's violent departure, Adam suffers an emotional breakdown and withdraws into himself. The baby boys remain unnamed for over fifteen months until Samuel Hamilton, an idealised father figure of the novel and neighbour to the Trasks, beats Adam out of his stupor and instigates the naming process. In the interim, however, the twins are simply dubbed "you" individually and "they" collectively (253).

Bruce Fink, elucidating Lacanian theory, describes the significance a name has in the subjectivising process: "this signifier - more, perhaps, than any other - will go to the root of his or her being and become inextricably tied to his or her subjectivity" (Fink 53). As a component of Lacan's mirror stage, where the child is provided a signifier to assist in

establishing the ego, this phenomenon is disturbed through the “undifferentiated communion” (Quinones 19) of Adam’s address. For nine months of Lacan’s mirror stage (sixth months till eighteen months) the twins are offered no signifier to distinguish themselves from each other. They must instead look to the *brother* to construct an ego. As indicated in the introduction, Lorenzo Chiesa describes how the mirror image can be provided by another being (loc. 212), making this particular mirroring process is twice as alienating. As Chiesa elaborates: “a double misrecognition (meconnaissance) takes place: in fact, the ego not only, as it were, ‘finds itself’ at the place of the other... but also provides the subject with a deceptive impression of unity” (loc. 216). If Cal and Aron are to be understood in this manner, the specular image is first and foremost the *brother*; therefore, my substitution of Chiesa’s “image” with *brother* elucidates the crisis: “The [*brother*] that institutes the subject as an ego is the same [*brother*] that separates the subject from himself” (loc. 262). This unique situation establishes the *brother* bind, and the experience of *brotherhood* throughout the novel is one of hostile communion. The twins, as their household servant Lee describes, exist as “two sides of a medal” (292); their ego identification is sustained by the inverted reflection of the *brother*. In this manner, the twins will come to respond to one another through oppositional differentiation. Therefore, instead of the reflected similitude of the *brother* confronting an already established ego, (as in Chapter One between Ivan and Smerdyakov) it is the *brother* who actually assists in forming the constituting oppositions necessary for the establishment of the ego in the mirror stage of *brotherhood*.

However, as Levinasian thought demonstrates, by constructing their egos in this way Cal and Aron are in fact caught in a dilemma of understanding difference simply through opposition: “If the Same were to establish its identity by simple opposition to the Other, it would already be part of a totality encompassing the Same and the Other” (qtd. in Davis loc. 884). Throughout the chapter I maintain that the totality of the *brother* experience locks each *brother* in stasis, preventing subjective independence and authentic encounters with unreflective Others. More specifically, Aron’s narcissistic fantasies and Cal’s

aggression function to isolate each subject and prevent access to a world of Others. As a result, following Bakhtin's emphasis on dialogism, it is not until Cal enters into dialogue with unreflective Others that he is liberated from the polarising totality of *brotherhood*.

Beginning with physical descriptions, the twins are established through their oppositional dependence on the other. This in turn has a significant impact on the way the twins are perceived by unreflective Others, and consequently, how they go on to engage with with those Others. The twins, in a manner reminiscent not of Cain and Abel, but of Jacob and Esau, are dizygotic or "fraternal" twins, each has a distinctive appearance that sets them apart (Gen. 25:25). Aron's wide eyes "gave him an expression of angelic innocence... His hair was fine and golden. The sun seemed to light up the top of his head" (332). In contrast to Aron's ethereal appearance, Cal is "more like" his father Adam, earthy and grounded: "His hair was dark brown. He was bigger than his brother, bigger of bone, heavier in the shoulder, and his jaw had the square sternness of Adam's jaw" (333). Thus, in the Levinasian totality of *brotherhood* experienced by the twins, neither is provided a means of differentiation from the other which is not oppositional. In this, Cal and Aron are not offered a vision of themselves without forcing polarity. From a Levinasian standpoint, Steinbeck's attempt to differentiate the boys actually unifies them. Even as an eleven year old boy Cal struggles with the privileged difference of his *brother*, and as a result, desires to be more "like" Aron:

'Dear Lord,' he said, '*let* me be like Aron. Don't *make* me mean. I don't want to be. If you will *let* everybody like me, why, I'll give you anything in the world, and if I haven't got it, why, I'll go for to get it. I don't want to be mean. I don't want to be lonely. For Jesus' sake, Amen.' [emphasis added] (376)

The revealing words in this extract are *let* and *make*, implying a subjectivising force beyond Cal's control which he associates with God. Cal's desire to resist God's (or Steinbeck's) authorial predetermination is futile, and instead he remains trapped in the *brother* experience. Cal and Aron are never able to know themselves without the traumatic oppositional intimacy of their twin.

In *Siblings*, Mitchell provides a detailed discussion of twins and the oppositions that manifest themselves in that unique subjective experience. Mitchell states: “pulling in the opposite direction is the tug of identificatory processes – as a twin becomes more different, both also become more alike” (Mitchell loc. 4198). Oppositions, as have been discussed in the introduction, function as a psychic space to project the ego and thus protect the subject from the intimacy of the *brother*. Yet these oppositional identifications are fabrications, constituting, and emerging in response to the intrasubjective nature of *brotherhood*. What persists throughout the narrative is the hostile communion of the *brother* pair—the misrecognition and misconstruction of the ego in polarity. The allegoric nature of *East of Eden* implies that the twins establish and maintain simple oppositions, essentially associating Aron with good and Cal with bad:

Cal said, ‘He’s good. He doesn’t do bad things. He doesn’t think bad things.’

‘Now you’re telling about yourself.’

‘Sir?’

‘You’re saying you do and think bad things.’

Cal’s cheeks reddened. ‘Well, I do.’ (451)

In this manner and sustained throughout the text, I claim that *brotherhood* in fact betrays the thematic movement from “we to I” that critics such as Wyatt insist takes place from *Grapes of Wrath* to *East of Eden* (qtd. in Steinbeck loc. 148). Instead, I suggest that every action in the *brother* bind is not an action, but a reaction. The free will or “thou mayest” (301) interpretation of the text is consistently undercut by the oppositional ‘choices’ proffered—*brotherhood* both precedes and overrules all interactions and responses. Free will for the *brothers* is therefore always determined within parameters of the *brother* experience. I suggest that this dilemma is sustained until Cal is able to take up an independent position as what I have referred to as a ‘self’.

While the narrative bypasses a decade of the twins early life, the reader understands the *brothers* as “true intimates” (Quinones 11) when they become the focus of the narrative at age eleven. As has been outlined above, the *brothers* are frequently described as physically

distinct; however, their clothing and actions unify the pair. The boys are in uniform: “dressed in overalls and faded blue shirts,” with each wearing a “perfect turkey tail feather tied with tape against his temple” (331). They are hunting with bows and arrows and after a rabbit is struck there is a sense of confusion as to which brother is responsible. While Cal’s manipulation of Aron is certainly present, Aron concludes to tell his father that he does not know “which one hit it” (334). Each boy desires the recognition of their father, yet neither are willing to compromise the other to achieve it. Moreover, the “tension” (333) in this exchange is symptomatic of tension between *brothers*. Cal deliberately gets under the skin of Aron, destabilising him to test his limits and love. Aron’s observation of Cal “always wanting to fight” (334) articulates precisely the unsettled intimacy of the *brother* bind. Cal prods and pokes at Aron’s weak spots, in particular, his speculation over their ‘dead’ mother. I understand this interaction as evidence of affectual transmission—a form which Brennan describes as “dumping” (30). Cal’s insecurity of being placed in front of his father with no success is outworked through goading and animosity towards Aron regarding his secret fantasies about their mother. Cal later revels in his “secret tool” considering it the “sharpest weapon he had found” (335).

Teresa Brennan describes “the process whereby human affective responses are linked and paired” as “entrainment” (52). The phenomenon of Cal and Aron’s hostile communion is one of taking “opposite positions in relation to a common affective thread” (9). The unique psychic environment producing entrainment for the twins is evidenced through their father’s emotional detachment and the absence of a mother. Applying Brennan’s interpretation of Lacan, the twins can be understood as having “uncircumcised heart[s]” (125): that is, they have not been granted a position in the oedipal arrangement. Not only do the twins grow up removed from dominant cultural forces on the ranch, their father—for their first 11 years at least—is completely without desire and has let his “life lie fallow” (293). At the same time, no mother figure exists to provide an alternate means to establish the subject. For Brennan,

the uncircumcised heart... is seeped in the ego’s imaginary, in psychophysical

territory where, convinced of its own entitlement, it *refused to acknowledge the existence of others*. This refusal is the reason it cannot feel the feeling of others. It assumes those others do not feel. [emphasis added] (115)

In the twin's entrainment Aron sustains his ego in response to the *brother* bind through fantasy, which is made possible by Cal sustaining both egos through his aggression. Neither boy is able to acknowledge their *brother* or Others, as selves, primarily because neither boy exists autonomously as himself. Therefore, while ten-year-old Abra Bacon's entry into the narrative intensifies the ego dilemma for both, it does not resolve the *brother* bind nor immediately open the twins to the world of unreflective Others. Abra's roleplaying statement of "I'll be your mother" comes hard up against Cal's "brutality," but "Aron, she saw, was caught up in her story" (344). Aron immediately begins a narcissistic fantasy attempting to avoid the hostile communion of *brotherhood*. In this early encounter, Aron establishes a fantasised mother attachment to Abra. However, later in the novel Aron's catharsis by pretending "you're my mother" (422) solidifies the narcissistic attachment, and by doing so, Aron sidesteps, but does not break, the *brother* bind. Through Abra acting as his mother, Aron finds a way to see himself without looking at Cal. Cal, on the other hand, avoids this fantasy through his aggression towards Abra, but also remains at a reflective impasse with his *brother*. This predicament demonstrates both the entrainment that affectually binds the brothers and the unique hostile communion of *brotherhood* for the twins.

Cal and Aron blur the lines of identity and independence. As they age and mature, each depends on the other for oppositional differentiation. These oppositions are continually repeated throughout the novel till the point that the reader cannot observe a new element in one without looking for its counterpart in the *brother*. Steinbeck's unification of the twins is so sustained that for the large majority of their role in the text, each *brother* is completely deprived of agency. Cal and Aron function as two poles, held in the suspense of opposition until Aron's death. The outworking of this intimacy is perhaps best described in the way Cal uses his *brother's* warmth to assert his ego, and ironically "attracts more

aggression towards [him]" (Brennan 112):

Cal did not question the fact that people liked his brother better, but he had developed a means for making it all right with himself. He planned and waited until one time that admiring person exposed himself, and then something happened and the victim never knew how or why. Out of revenge Cal extracted a fluid of power, and out of power, joy. It was the strongest, purest emotion he knew. Far from disliking Aron, he loved him because he was usually the cause for Cal's feelings of triumph. He had forgotten—if he had ever known—that he punished because he wished he could be loved as Aron was loved. It had gone so far that he preferred what he had to what Aron had. (345)

Cal's early interactions with unreflective Others, exemplified fully by his first moments alone with Abra Bacon, refuse Otherness. Instead, Cal dominates the encounter by aggressively "prod[ding]" her "certainty" (345). In short, Cal treats Abra in a similar manner to how he earlier treated Aron, as an other, not as an separate and independent being. Yet Cal's aggression creates a reciprocal response for his *brother*, whereby the "angelic" (361, 420, 485) Aron is alleviated of affectual grounding. Aron, through Cal's aggression, is granted an "openness that allowed his affection to plunge like a puppy" (345). Through entrainment, the negative affect of the pair is received and projected by Cal, but the consequence for Aron is likewise damaging. For, as Brennan states: "without aggression to the other or the self, there is no guilt or shame. Without feeling separation from the other, which one must also feel as a consequence of becoming distinct, there is no greed or lust or anger at being separate and, therefore, lacking" (110). I suggest that at this stage in the novel Aron is able to float through life in narcissistic fantasies precisely because of the unencumbered affectual freedom proffered by the *brother* bind.

Despite his earliest desires to avoid being lonely, "Cal had to learn loneliness" (439). After Aron's attachment to Abra, Cal becomes a free electron whose charge is not diminished by distance, but he remains fully dependent on the *brother* for ego identification. Cal "drifted"

was “restless” (439) and his disturbance culminates in his arrest for vagrancy. Afterwards, Cal explained his feelings to his father who picks him up from the Sheriff’s station:

‘I get restless at night—like an alley cat, I guess....When I can’t sleep I walk around... to try to blot it out.’

Adam considered his words, inspected each one. ‘Does your brother walk around too?’

‘Oh, no, sir. He wouldn’t think of it. He’s—he’s not restless.’ (450)

Yet again, understanding Cal’s actions is grounded by the fact that his brother does the opposite, demonstrating the unique way the hostile communion of the pair is sustained. As a means of contrast to the Cain and Abel archetypes insisted by some critics, it is worthwhile to again note Jacob and Esau; whereby, at an early age Esau became “a man of the open country, while Jacob was content to stay at home among the tents” (Gen. 25:27). And, as with Jacob and Esau, parental preference becomes a subjective element for the twins—it is precisely Adam’s unspoken preference for Aron that makes Cal work so hard to earn his father’s love. Even Abra’s mothering of Aron excludes Cal, much like Rebekah’s love for Jacob excludes Esau (Gen. 25:28). I suggest that critics such as Fontenrose, whose fixation with the “myth invoked” (127) by Cain and Abel in *East of Eden* overlook the multiplicity of references embedded in the text, and by simply focusing on Steinbeck’s correspondences to Genesis four, devalue the thematic significance of the expression of brotherhood throughout the novel.

Negotiating between Brennan’s “uncircumcised heart[s]” (115) and Mitchell’s emphasis placed on sibling similitude, I maintain that the unique hostile communion of *brotherhood* undermines the potency of the oedipal arrangement in this narrative. In fact, throughout *Siblings* Mitchell sustains a critique of the oedipus complex as it functions in Lacanian and Freudian psychoanalytical theory of the subject, suggesting that the Oedipus complex cannot articulate or accommodate the experience of sibling relations:

The Oedipus complex is a metaphor for a nexus of relationships; with the acknowledgement of the castration complex both sexual and generational

difference can be represented. Lateral relations such as Remus and Romulus, Cain and Abel, the twins who feature in various creation myths, form not a nexus but a series. (loc. 3595)

As beings with uncircumcised hearts and without active generational difference to moderate desire, Aron instead develops a Kleinian “pre-oedipal” (Mitchell loc. 1086) attachment to his girlfriend. It should be understood as pre-oedipal precisely because no prohibitive force enters the narrative to reorient Aron away from the desire to possess Abra as his fantasised mother. Moreover, the space in which this mother identification is developed (and later sustained) is womblike and the entry is an invagination:

The long skirts of the willow hung down nearly to the ground. Abra parted the switches like a curtain and went into the house of leaves made against the willow trunk by the sweeping branches. You could see out through the leaves, but inside it was sweetly protected and warm and safe. (421)

Cal, meanwhile, observes his *brother* being absorbed with and by Abra, and, as a consequence, struggles to maintain his inverted reflection.

While the ‘normal’ oedipal function would help to instigate a subject through the splitting of the unconscious and the ego, neither boy experiences this generational ordering in the narrative. Lacan describes the psychic process at play in the normal oedipal process as: “the identification by which the subject transcends the aggressiveness constitutive of the first subjective individuation... it constitutes a step in the establishment of the distance by which, with feelings akin to respect, a whole affective assumption of one's fellow man is brought about” (Lacan 95). When I suggest that the twins have no position in the oedipal arrangement because they are trapped within the *brother* bind, I do not suggest that other significant attachments cannot be made. Instead, I claim that these attachments emerge *in response* to the *brother* bind. Thus Aron’s narcissistic and fantasised pre-oedipal relations are understood as a symptom of *brotherhood*. In this, Aron seeks a way out of the hostile communion he shares with Cal. Firstly Aron attaches himself to Abra as a mother, and then his identification shifts to the Reverend Mr Rolf as a father, as he becomes more and more

devoted to purity. Consequently, when Aron leaves Salinas and enters Stanford University he feels “miserable” and “nauseatingly home-sick” (520), and his letters to Abra become increasingly sexually explicit: “In a frenzy he poured joyous abjectness on paper to send to [Abra], and he went to bed purified, as a man is after sexual love. He set down every evil thought he had and renounced it. The results were love letters that dripped with longing” (521). Abra, discussing her concern with Lee regarding the letters states: “I think Aron, when he didn’t have a mother...made her everything good he could think of” (493). To which Lee insightfully replies: “That might be. And then you think he dumped it all on you” (493). Therefore, while the oedipal process *should* offer a means for establishing some semblance of subjective individuation, (both at a symbolic level and in an intersubjective exchange) Aron’s pre-oedipal identification actually increases his narcissism. As Abra later explained to Cal: “he writes me love letters now—only they aren’t to me...It’s like they were to—himself” (496). In this manner I claim that Aron is primarily unable to emerge as a self-aware being because he is unable to observe or overcome the *brother* bind, for, as Quinones notes of Aron: “His vision is a projection of himself. He does not see the world but sees only what he wishes to see. In this sense, his unalienated vision, his unified sense of being, is dependent on a denial of otherness” (142).

Aron and Cal’s unresolved lateral concerns shape all their encounters with unreflective Others. Thus when Aron moves to Stanford University to study, although he is removed from the *brother*, he cannot make meaningful connections with Others as he remains psychically fractured and incomplete. However, the physical distance from Salinas to Stanford initiates a reversal of the polarity of the *brothers*. Ironically, in Cal’s absence Aron becomes more sexualised and begins to take “an increasing joy in a concept of his own wickedness” (520). Always in opposition, Cal meanwhile worked selflessly to offer Adam a monetary gift to compensate for his failed entrepreneurial scheme. At Stanford, despite being offered a chance to enter a world of Others, Aron “did not try to learn the life around him or to enter it” (520). Mitchell’s interpretation of the means of “differentiation” offered

to twins proves particularly useful in understanding the *brother* bind of Aron and Cal: “there is in fact no evidence that twins turn out to be one good and one bad – it is, I believe, how we, the viewer, overcome the dilemma of someone being too nearly the same as another, we need to make crude differences” (loc. 4008). I maintain that it is precisely Steinbeck’s ‘crude’ oppositional differentiation that undercuts key thematic individualistic interpretations of the text. In his desire to elevate the individual, Steinbeck instead creates a collective, where both agency and autonomy is undermined by intrasubjective experience. In this oppositional state, Aron’s former obsession with purity is actually outworked through the “joyous abjectness” (521) of his letters to Abra. Bruce Fink usefully explains the Lacanian *jouissance* which can be observed at work in Aron’s narrative thread whereby he “delicately balanc[es] the attraction and the repulsion,” (xii) of “what the subject orchestrates for him or herself in fantasy” (60).

If Aron’s actions by sustaining a fantasy in the face of the *brother* bind lead to narcissistic pre-oedipal attachments, it is Cal’s unconscious and oppositional roaming at night that fully reveals what Lee describes as Cal’s “personal hide-and-seek” as he “tr[ies] to find himself” (484). While Fink asserts that Lacan’s “*jouissance* ... comes to substitute for the lost ‘mother-child unity’” (60), I instead emphasise the unique unity of the “two egg” (342) twins as countermanding the function of the mother. I also maintain that both Cal and Aron unconsciously forego subjective independence to sustain the *brother* bind and the fictional egos that accompany it. Ironically, while Aron longs for a mother and pretends one in a virginal Abra, Cal actually encounters their prostitute mother through his nightly roaming. Cathy Trask has become Kate Ames, the mistress of a particularly masochistic brothel in Salinas. Once again in opposition, Aron *fantasises* the mother in Abra as “pure and beautiful”(493), while Cal instead “wanted to dig out the *truth*” [emphasis added] (441). Cal’s confirmation of Kate’s existence is revealed through his attendance at the “Circus” an unspecified, carnivalised sex act at Kate’s brothel (441). Therefore, Aron’s narcissistic desire for union with his fictionalised mother should be contrasted against Cal witnessing a primal scene of his mother’s making.

The twins transition from denying Otherness to attempting to assimilate Others as the *brother* bind becomes strained. Mitchell describes this state of existence as borderline: “The borderline is unsure who he is and everyone else gets in the way of his existence unless they are assimilated to him. It is not only, then, that the borderline patient or personality has not entered the Oedipal phase. It is that he is dominated by lateral rather than vertical concerns” (loc. 542). Cal, like Aron, is trapped by oppositional *brotherhood* whilst attempting to reconcile the confronting image of his mother with himself. This is best shown in Cal’s acknowledgment of his mother’s existence to Lee when Cal states in confidence: “I hate her...because *I’ve got her in me*” [emphasis added] (444). As Kate proves to be no mother, Cal’s interest now turns to his father who “is good,” and Cal wants to please his father “because [he is] not good” (477). Despite side-stepping the oedipal arrangement, Cal remains constructing himself within the false oppositions of the *brother* bind established above. In this manner both Cal and Aron should be understood as borderline, both characters are unsuccessfully attempting to assimilate into themselves the mothers of their construction—Aron with Abra, Cal with Kate. Yet by doing so, they remain subjected primarily to their *brother*.

Teresa Brennan, whose interpretation of subjectivity could be said to run parallel to Mitchell’s, also observes “borderline clients” who lack boundaries, and who are “more susceptible to the impact of the other, susceptible as well as liable to ‘leakage’ ” (26). As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, Cal and Aron’s ego instability spills over to each *brother*; the fragility and misrecognition of subjectivity within *brotherhood* triggers aggression in Cal and fantasy in Aron. In this project’s application of affectual transmission, Brennan’s ‘other’ mentioned above is first and foremost the *brother*. It is, after all, the *brother* who sustains and nurtures the borderline position. The Other, understood in this project as unreflective and alien, is only genuinely encountered through dialogue once the *brother* bind has been comprehended. After Aron discovers the truth about his mother and flees to the Army, Abra again provides insight into his actions:

Aron didn't grow up... He wanted the story and he wanted it to come out his way... When you're a child you're the center of everything. Everything happens for you. Other people? They're only ghosts furnished for you to talk to. But when you grow up you take your place and you're your own size and shape. Things go out of you to others and come in from other people. It's worse, but it's much better too. (575)

This permeability of selfhood referred to by Abra articulates the type of dialogism Bakhtin explores. By emphasising the penetrative function of dialogue, Bakhtin "posits the co-existential authoring activity of the 'other in me'(Rogot 211)" (Eskin 89). Therefore, I claim that what Abra asserts as Aron's *childhood* is primarily the result of Aron's obliviousness to the primacy of *brotherhood*. I suggest instead that Aron's "Edenic" (Ouderkirk 236) fantasy is sustained by Cal absorbing and expelling their negative affect, Aron's pre-oedipal attachment to Abra, and his self-enclosure at Stanford. However, this fantasy of purity and innocence was shattered when Cal vengefully exposed their mother to Aron. As discussed in the previous chapter, physical violence between *brothers* takes place when the *brother* bind becomes too much to bear. The violence is an act of abjection, an attempt to beat out confronting unconscious elements that are presented by the *brother*. After leaving Kate's, Aron "cut [Cal] down with a fist like a whip," and ran into the dark, "screaming like a brokenhearted *child*" [emphasis added] (564). Immoral behaviour, which Aron had previously aligned to Cal, is now witnessed as being inherently part of who he is. One by one, the false constructions of Aron's ego and the fantasies that sustained them are confronted by both reality and his own unconscious desires, and, as a borderline being, Aron's fragility and permeability are finally exposed.

Instead of reconciling the false oppositions that sustained his ego through fantasy, Aron's reaction to his real mother is to enlist as a soldier in World War One. By enrolling in the Army, Aron attempts to escape the *brother* and find completion in another form of collectivity, as a 'brother in arms'. From Mitchell's position this action can be understood as a desire for unity in the face of division: "What one half of the twin needs is an institution in which he is accompanied by other people who need not be seen at all as

themselves but instead only as the means of satisfying his need to complete himself” (loc. 1576). I suggest that for Aron, admission into the Army is the ultimate denial of unreflective Otherness. While Aron’s inability to reconcile the purity he desires against “not feel[ing] clean” (574) preserves the *brother* bind, Lee, on the other hand, offers Cal a means out of the *brotherhood* experience by demonstrating the complexity of an ego constructed not in simple opposition to his *brother*, but in conjunction: “Did you ever think of yourself as a snot-nose kid—mean sometimes, incredibly generous sometimes? Dirty in your habits, and curiously pure in your mind” (567). Lee’s reconciliation of the oppositions previously aligned with Aron or Cal that had trapped Cal in *brotherhood* is the first step in the movement from the hostile communion of *brotherhood* to community.

Mikhail Bakhtin, in discussion of Dostoyevsky’s *Poor Folk* states:

the hero’s self-awareness was penetrated by someone else’s consciousness of him, the hero’s own self-utterance was injected with someone else’s words about him; the other’s consciousness and the other’s words then give rise to specific phenomena that determine the thematic development of [the hero’s] self-awareness.” (209)

Whilst *East of Eden* and *Poor Folk* are significantly different novels, what Bakhtin ascribes to the novel (as a unique mode of literature) is the possibility for ego constructions to be confronted and redressed through the force of dialogue. In light of this, I claim that it is only through dialogic intervention that Lee offers Cal a means out of the reflective impasse of *brotherhood*.

Following from Bakhtin’s dialogism, I suggest that the function of dialogue in *East of Eden* initiates the awakening to the unreflective Other. Bakhtin states:

The consciousnesses of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or as things – one can only relate to them dialogically. To think about them means to talk with them; otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side: they fall silent, close up, and congeal into finished, objectivized images.” (68)

After being simultaneously chastised and liberated by Lee in the exchange detailed above,

Cal realises the importance of the voice of the Other: “ ‘Talk away,’ said Cal, and he smiled and repeated, ‘Talk away’ ” (567). While Abra’s “story” (575) offered a narcissistic vision for Aron, through dialogue she becomes the first unreflective Other for Cal. The ethical awakening to the world of Others is demonstrated through Cal’s attempt to confess to Abra his role in Aron’s disappearance and enlistment. In order to do so, Cal must engage her in conversation. However, in the process he learns that his negative affectual barrier that supported his ego is also barrier to encountering unreflective Others, or as Abra simply states: “I didn’t want to talk to you mad” (574). Moreover, in the silence that has dominated their encounters for the last six years, Cal cruelly objectivised Abra as his “brother’s girl” (574). This mode of identification is unsurprisingly rejected by Abra who replies “I am *not* your brother’s girl” [emphasis in original] (574). Abra’s response destabilises the *brotherhood* experience and forces a means to think about unreflective Others without reducing them to the known totality of *brotherhood*. Reinforced through narrative focalisation, Abra’s status as Other is fully evidenced by her shift from a participant in the brothers’ narrative to an independent character. It is not until after this exchange (in Chapter 52 of 55) that Abra truly possesses her own narrative thread. When Abra and Cal’s conversation finishes, the reader follows Abra home where her family situation and her unique desires are visible; this significant change in narrative style is only accessible to the reader after the *brother* bind is comprehended and circumvented by Cal. As observed with Ivan and Alyosha in *The Brothers Karamazov*, the Levinasian metaphor of home acts as a site for accessing and engaging with unreflective Others.

Just as Abra rejects Cal’s label as Aron’s ‘girl’, Levinas suggests that the Other always exceeds our interpretations of them (*TI* 172). If Cal’s awakening to the world of unreflective Others is initiated through the dialogue of both Lee and Abra, Levinasian thought helps to extend the suggestions about access to the Others opened by Bakhtin. In his last major philosophical work *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence [OB]*, and following criticism from Jacques Derrida, Levinas attempted to theorise a means of encounter with the Other that resists thematisation and totalisation (Hand *EL* 50). Here

Levinas makes the distinction between “saying” and the “said” (OB 5). In saying, the Other is preserved in discourse, the act of saying is continual and unfinished. In contrast, the said is a finished interpretation of the Other—much like Cal’s simplified definition of Abra as his “brother’s girl” (574). In this state, Abra is both objectivised and finished, she is placed into the oppositional mode of thinking that has dominated Cal’s ego constructions. As Ruti demonstrates, “to this grasping, greedy attitude toward the other Levinas opposes a reciprocal, ‘interhuman’ discourse which does not aim to reduce the other to a set of concepts, for when the other is mediated by concepts, he is forced into a mold that is alien to him” (loc. 363). Oppositional thinking, therefore, must collapse if the unreflective Other is to be preserved as Other in the encounter. In the final (liberating) act of opposition between the *brothers* Cal learns to preserve Abra’s “asymmetrical” (Rapaport loc. 6011) Otherness in his developing relationship with her. By doing so, he attempts to preserve her difference and in the process becomes more self-aware. Bradley Stephens, considering the overlap between the work of Steinbeck and Sartre, asserts: “Self and Other, or even ‘us and them’, are brought into an ongoing and tacit dialogue that drowns out any hierarchical rhetoric of superior and inferior, right or wrong” (186). While Stephen makes a salient point, I believe that not all characters in *East of Eden* become selves, most notably, Charles and Aron—characters for whom the *brother* bind has ensnared and locked subjectivity in stasis.

Mitchell, following George Engel’s exploration into twins, suggests that “on a twin’s death, there is a definite diminution of the survivor’s narcissism” (loc. 1323). Significantly, the news of Aron’s death in the battlefields of France in WW1 directly corresponds to Cal and Abra’s first date on a long awaited spring day when the wild azaleas bloom. The novel sustains the winter as being “reluctant to let go its bite” (586) and I suggest that much like the *brotherhood* of Cal and Aron, the winter “hung on... long after its time” (586). The pathetic fallacies, first of the extended winter and then the wild azaleas blooming, symbolise the new life that emerges out of the lonely and cold experience of *brotherhood* for Cal. However, after returning from the date, the news of his brother’s death and his

own involvement and responsibility sends him into emotional turmoil as he struggles to comprehend the division of being alone and no longer being bound to his brother. Ricardo Quinones, discussing *East of Eden* in *The Changes of Cain*, asserts that “unity and communion, truly founded or illusory, do not last forever, as new orders and new types of being emerge” (114). Cal, released from the *brother* bind, but overwhelmed by guilt, approaches Abra to restore his illusory sense of unity: he leads her to the willow tree where Aron and Abra played mother and son. This time, however, Abra refuses to be complicit in another fantasy. Cal states:

‘I want you to go inside the willow tree with me. That’s what I want to do.’

She stopped and her hand pulled him to a stop. ‘No,’ she said. ‘That’s not right.’

‘Don’t you want to go in with me?’

‘Not if you’re running away—no, I don’t.’ (597)

In the final pages of the novel, Abra denies Cal’s objectification twice. Abra understands the dangers of fantasy, as she has been a victim of that mode of objectification; for when Aron destroyed the fantasised mother, once more in a veiled image of maternity, “he tore [her] up” (576). In the face of the denied objectification, and in his awakening to the unreflective Other, Cal instead asks Abra “what to do” and “listen[s]” (597). In this “willingness to listen” (Bakhtin 299) Cal returns to his father’s side where an ambiguous resolution is offered in the final lines: “Timshel” (601), which is best understood as “thou mayest rule over sin” (306).

Despite the uplifting nature of the final words, the reality of the *brother* experience of *East of Eden* consistently undercuts the “thou” in “thou mayest” and challenges interpretations of liability and individualism. I claim that throughout the novel, Cal and Aron are trapped by their *brother* in affectual entrainment. In this manner, Steinbeck ‘keeps’ each *brother* in stasis, in an experience whereby both Aron and Cal are denied entry into the world of selves. Trapped in a polarising existence, it is precisely the boy’s constituting oppositions that determine their actions. Ironically, these acts of difference maintain the unity and totality of *brotherhood*. Critiques of Cal and Aron before they are subjectively separate

denies both the experience of *brotherhood* and overlook the cause of the crises in the text. Instead, I propose that neither character fully exhibits free will throughout the narrative. Finally, this stance should not be considered as pre-deterministic, instead, I suggest that it is only the reconciliation of the *brother* to the subject through the dialogism of the novel that enables a self to emerge who can actually achieve free will.

Chapter Three

Ender's Game: Occupation

Ender's Game, by Orson Scott Card, centres on the character Ender Wiggin as he is trained in intergalactic warfare to destroy an alien race. As a science fiction novel with a child protagonist, *Ender's Game* differs greatly in content from the other narratives of this thesis; however, what it shares with the *The Brothers Karamazov* and *East of Eden* are crises established and outworked through a unique experience of brotherhood. Peter Wiggin, the eldest of the family and fearing a loss of status and annihilation by Ender's existence, consistently exhibits narcissistic aggression, which in turn has a profound impact on Ender's psyche. While Peter's physical role in the *brother* experience is brief and intense, occurring only in the first three chapters of the novel, *brotherhood* resonates as a destabilising and alienating motif throughout the whole text. Moreover, I argue that it is only through the outworking of the hostile communion of *brotherhood* that Ender is able to establish connections with an unreflective Other: the alien "Buggers" (Card 1). *Ender's Game* is further differentiated in the way that *both* Ender's siblings, Peter and his sister Valentine, through their reflective potential, establish and threaten Ender's "alienated imaginary identity" (Chiesa loc. 73). Therefore, while this project has sustained a focus on brothers and brotherhood, I aim to recognise the wider sibling experience by exploring the role Ender's sister, Valentine, has in Ender's narrative quest to experience lateral bonding without falsifying ego constructions. This last and more speculative consideration fits within the larger goals of the project to challenge a reading practice whereby vertical and hierarchical roles are prioritised, as opposed to what I assert are more the impacting lateral and intrasubjective experiences.

As Carl Malmgren notes, through the encounter with the alien Other, science fiction "explore[s] the nature of selfhood from the vantage point of alterity" (16). Understood in this light, *Ender's Game* depicts a continuum of alterity, presenting a range of experiences from identification to alienation. I suggest that Ender is in fact first alienated through the

reflective potential of his *brother* and later develops self awareness only in response to what is alien. In the dystopian future of *Ender's Game*, Earth is overcrowded and there are birth restrictions; consequently, Ender is marginalised from the outset as a “third” child (2). The World Government insists on two children per family and additional children are not typically permitted schooling, healthcare or citizenship. Although he bears the humiliating title of “third,” Ender is “requisitioned” (24) by the International Fleet when his siblings, Peter and Valentine, show promise in their tests for admittance into Battle School. Following two Bugger invasions in Earth’s recent history, gifted and talented children are actively recruited for military training as early as six years old. Into this social environment Ender was born “to be half Peter and half Valentine” (24): half Peter’s aggression and half Valentine’s empathy.

Structurally, the entire novel is framed around Ender’s experience of *brotherhood*. The opening lines of the book establish the *brother* bind, wherein the Wiggin children are being discussed by International Fleet selectors. The conversation explains Ender’s natural ability while at the same time demonstrating his kinship to Peter:

‘I tell you he’s the one. Or at least as close as we’re going to get.’

‘That’s what you said about the brother.’

‘The brother tested out impossible.’ (1)

From the outset, Ender and Peter are thus described through their similitude. Each *brother* reflects the other and this similitude undermines subjective individuation. In Ender’s split through the mirroring function of *brotherhood*, Peter comes to personify the dangerous and threatening unconscious, and as a result, any violent acts or thoughts are immediately attributed to his likeness to Peter. Moreover, the final page of the novel attempts to redress the fraternal conflict: “Back and forth across the ansible Ender and Peter *spoke*, with Peter pouring out the story of his days and years, his crimes and his kindnesses” [emphasis added] (330). Initiated in the opening lines of the novel and only fully reconciled through the dialogics of the closing lines, I claim that *brotherhood* persists

as the central subjective experience and the paramount force in Ender's narrative as a subject.

As described in the introduction and elaborated in Chapters One and Two, this project's application of Lacanian thought interprets *brotherhood* as the function and experience by which the subject is split. In this, the *brother* operates as the imaginary other of the mirror stage. Bruce Fink describes subjectivity as, "the splitting of the I into ego (false self) and unconscious brings into being a surface, with two sides: one that is exposed and one that is hidden" (45). In a similar manner to the medal metaphor used by Lee to describe Cal and Aron in Chapter Two, Valentine also describes the oppositional nature of her brothers as "two faces of the same coin. And I am the metal in between" (238), to which Ender replies, "the trouble with coins is, when one face is up, the other face is down" (238). I claim that *Ender's Game* articulates precisely the dilemma of *brotherhood's* intrasubjectivity—two beings who are unindividuated and held in hostile communion one against the other. Peter's aggression floods Ender's psyche, and Ender's very existence reminds Peter of his reproducibility, and as a result, both *brothers* force false ego constructions based on a necessity to oppose or repel the *brother* who is always too close. Throughout this project I have employed psychoanalytic theory by suggesting that the *brother*, as Lacan's other, remains connected to the subject's unconscious, and the physical and psychic intimacy of the *brother* necessitates fictional ego constructions that prevent a self (self-aware being) from emerging. In short, I stress that there is no possibility of autonomous existence within the mirror stage of *brotherhood*. In this manner, Ender's experience of the violence and intimidation he receives at the hands of Peter bind the pair into polarising and oppositional modes of identification. Peter is primarily associated with brutality—a "husbandman of pain, planting it, nurturing it, devouring it greedily when it was ripe" (125). Ender, by contrast, is an unwilling warrior (Blackmore 131).

Unwillingly echoing and acting out the abuse received by Peter, Ender frequently resorts to violence to survive debilitating encounters with unreflective Others. Mitchell describes

this violent pattern as the repetition and reworking of “sibling trauma... in any future event that displaces and dislodges a person from who and where they thought they were” (loc. 3854). This is first witnessed when Ender is introduced at Elementary School having his “monitor” (1) removed—what he regards as evidence that he has failed his testing. The monitor, which has been “watch[ing] through his eyes ... [and] listen[ing] through his ears,” (1) is the way the assessors at the Battle School have been tracking his early years and development. Ender, who is expected to be disappointed due to missing out on Battle School, is actually relieved: thinking that his failure will release the catastrophic tension at home: “Peter won’t hate me anymore. I’ll come home and show him that the monitor’s gone, and he’ll see that I didn’t make it, either... He’ll forgive me that I had my monitor a whole year longer than he had his” (1). Ender’s interpretation of events leads him to believe that the hostility experienced at the hands of Peter will finally cease when he is no longer a reminder of Peter’s failings. In fact, the removal of the monitor is the final test of the assessors in Battle School; how will Ender deal with threats (including Peter) when the attackers know he is no longer being watched? After returning to class to be bullied by a child named Stilson—who immediately notices the monitor’s absence—Ender defends himself the only way he understands how, he wins “for all time” and unknowingly kills the child (6). The next day when Colonel Graff comes to the Wiggin home to offer Ender a place in the Battle School, Ender learns that this calculated aggression is precisely the type of action valued by Battle School selectors, for, when asked to give an account of his actions Ender states: “Knocking him down won the first fight. I wanted to win all the next ones, too” (19).

Despite Ender’s desire to resolve problems without violence, in two separate instances before he even reaches the Battle School he uses calculated violence to preserve himself. Ender simply cannot master the existence of Peter inside of him. As has been discussed above, the first of these episodes actually earn him his spot in Battle School. After these incidents Ender laments, “I am just like Peter” (7) and later, “I am Peter. I’m just like him. And Ender hated himself” (34). Jeremy Proulx describes Ender in these incidents as

“completely selfish, acting purely out of instinct, with regard only for himself” (25), but I would also stress that these violent reactions display the fragility of Ender’s ego constructions and the barely submerged presence of Peter in his psyche. In fact, the shifting from comparison (“like”) to metaphor (“am”) and back is a revealing articulation of the extent of the *brother* bind—throughout the novel Ender cannot comprehend his acts of aggression and violence without attributing them to Peter. Thus in the opening chapters both Peter and Ender act out the hostile communion of *brotherhood*, and in his acts of violence Ender is continually reminded of his similitude to his *brother*. The violence articulated by his repetition of Peter’s aggression unearths and exposes Peter’s existence in Ender. As a result, despite attempting to construct his ego in opposition to Peter, the very oppositions prove false. As Chiesa notes, the ego for Lacan is only ever an imaginary identity, and as an imaginary identity it “individuates the subject only by way of a detour through the other” [read *brother*] (loc. 191). Here I suggest that constituting oppositions emerge to demonstrate how the character comes to (falsely) understand himself as different from his *brother*, and how both authors and readers use oppositions to establish difference while paradoxically reinforcing the characters’ intrasubjective dependence. In *Ender’s Game* I propose that Ender’s constituting oppositions revolve around his aversion to violence precisely because of his proclivity towards it: “Ender didn’t like fighting. He didn’t like Peter’s kind, the strong against the weak, and he didn’t like his own kind either, the smart against the stupid” (21).

Understood in terms of images, Peter’s aggression (viewed by Ender) and Ender’s weakness (viewed by Peter) helps to explain how the “the ego is a psychic agency caused in the subject by his alienating identification with a series of external images” (Chiesa loc. 199). Peter takes exception to both the weakness and the ability that he *sees* in Ender and responds by aggressively asserting his dominance over others (i.e.: his unindividuated siblings). Moreover, Peter’s jealousy has a physical symbol, the monitor itself represents the key point of tension—Ender was tested for a full year longer than Peter. Mitchell demonstrates how jealousy is outworked in the sibling experience:

The sibling occasions a degree of jealousy to which the response is a wish to kill. In the child this is quite conscious – it becomes unconscious when it is realized that it is forbidden. In time the child also realizes that not killing hopefully ensures not being killed. This awareness is arrived at through lateral play, and the play also creates and enacts rules which ensure that the murderousness either becomes unconscious or is directed into lawful channels, ‘the right to kill.’ (loc. 3869)

It is this play that Peter uses to legitimise his aggression and fear of annihilation. When Peter forces Ender to play as a “Bugger” (10) he attempts to alienate his *brother* by reanimating a goodies versus baddies game. As the alien Bugger, Ender is legitimately victimised and thus a ritualised violence toward the baddie is permissible. After Ender returns home from his encounter with Stilson, Peter also immediately recognises that Ender’s monitor is gone and voices his violent jealousy: “He keeps the little sucker till he’s six years old... I lost mine before I was five. He almost made it, little bastard, little bugger” (10). As Mitchell theorised, Peter’s jealousy is enacted through violent role-playing games, which would “start mean” and not end “until the astronaut decided it was over” (10).

Significantly, both parents are absent from this episode of abuse: Mom is “out,” while Dad is “never in” (11). In fact, the abuse takes place in an environment completely lacking parental intervention (Gross 120). Like the other narratives of this project, parents are absent (or dead) in pivotal moments of tension and aggression. Because the astronaut and Bugger game represents the final physical confrontation between Ender and Peter it requires close attention, not only for the *brother* implications, but also for the way it will foreshadow the possibility of Ender encountering unreflective Others later in the narrative. For the purposes of my reading of *Ender’s Game*, the game of Bugger and astronauts opens up three key elements for this chapter’s focus: firstly, it demonstrates the catastrophic tension between the *brothers*, and, as with all violence between the *brothers* in this project, Peter’s acts of violence should also be considered an act of abjection, an attempt to reject the weakness he associates with Ender from himself. In addition, as mentioned above,

Ender's repetition of the violence should be understood as the reenactment of the sibling trauma faced at home. Secondly, the sexualised nature of the game establishes the pre-pubescent homosexual tension that will persist alongside *brotherhood* throughout Ender's narrative. Finally, as the game involves Ender donning a Bugger mask, Ender is forced to consider unreflective Otherness which will later develop from psychopathic empathy to ethical responsibility as Ender reconciles Peter's reflection to himself.

Like Mitchell, who stresses the fear of annihilation that the sibling comes to represent, Ricardo Quinones in *The Changes of Cain* also describes the archetypal role of brothers in literature as "unwanted shadowy duplications, where what the spirit really craves is uniqueness" (7). Therefore, it is crucial to note that the first act of the game is Peter forcing Ender to wear a mask, an attempt to disguise Ender's likeness to himself, and by doing so, Peter's aggression attempts to circumvent the narcissism which causes it (The *brothers'* physical likeness is discussed later in the novel (314).). Moreover, by Ender having his monitor removed when he was six, Peter's own failure is exaggerated. Peter's actions demonstrate his fear of annihilation, which he utters in the middle of the violence of the game—"I don't want a better little brother" (12). As Mitchell reiterates time and again throughout *Siblings*, "because each sibling evokes the danger of the other's annihilation, siblings are going to want to kill each other" (loc. 680). Peter's success in the testing is undercut by Ender's own brilliance, and as Colonel Graff, the recruiter, later states: "Your brother hates you because you are living proof that he wasn't good enough" (23). If *Ender's Game* could be connected to the archetypal Cain and Abel myth that often stands as a prototype for Western narratives of *brotherhood*, it is best illustrated through Peter's dismissal compared to Ender's acceptance into Battle School. As Quinones explains: "differences between brothers is rendered more grievous by... some arbiter, divine or paternal, but always fatherly—and hence authoritative and decisive—is rendering judgement vis-à-vis the difference" (12). Reconfiguring Quinones slightly, I claim that difference in *brotherhood* is fundamentally a by-product of the *brothers'* similitude. Differentiation is *forced* by both authors and arbiters precisely because of the hostile

communion fundamental to *brotherhood*. In *Ender's Game*, the International Fleet selectors, in particular Colonel Graff, play the role of arbiter and the earlier rejection of Peter is made more significant through his messianic praise of Ender as "the one" (1).

The nature of the violence is also significant in the way the *brother* bind manifests itself later in the narrative. After Peter forces the Bugger mask onto Ender, he strikes a violent blow to Ender's head and then placed his "toe against Ender's groin" and "pressed with his foot" (10). Ender's very existence embodies Peter's psychic impotence, and the narrative reverberates with *brotherhood's* psychosexual tension and symbolic castration. James Campbell's exploration into depictions of the homosocial and homosexuality in "Kill the Bugger: 'Ender's Game' and the Question of Heteronormativity" provides a useful tie-in for this discussion in the way it traces homosexual and homosocial behaviour throughout the text. Firstly, by highlighting the significance of Ender's continual association with the term "Bugger," Campbell moves on to demonstrate how the narrative employs "a concept of childhood that acknowledges pre-pubescent desire" (494). It is also meaningful to recognise the children as "libidinal... loving and hating each other in a competitive and potentially violent environment" (Campbell 501). As already noted, Ender's abuse at the hands of Peter is reworked throughout the novel and encounters between other aggressive forces are either overtly or explicitly sexualised. Once again Mitchell provides the link between the events of the narrative and the outworking of the sibling experience: "the younger child can also introject the violence of the older sibling and then need to re-externalize it in others" (loc. 3877). Introjection in this instance could be understood as the process whereby *brotherhood's* hostility is stored in, but not recognised by, the subject. I claim the *brother* bind for Ender is acted out through calculated aggression and psychosexual domination. Consequently, in Battle School Ender's relations with peers who attempt to assert power over him all contain, or are outworked through, nuanced or explicit homosexual references. As Campbell notes, Ender's encounters with the antagonistic Rose the Nose (494), Bernard (495) and Bonzo (496) take place in a "nasty, competitive, and alienating institution mediated through a discourse centering on images

of the phallus and the anus" (494). The significance of these elements for *brotherhood* is my claim that the nature of the violence and encounters themselves echo Peter's subjugation of Ender, and as a result, become part of Ender's narrative quest to experience lateral bonding without sexualised aggression.

The final element revealed through the violent role playing game is that Ender is forced to wear the face of the alien Bugger while he is victimised by Peter. In the midst of the violence of the game Ender contemplates: "But this isn't how it feels to be a bugger... They don't wear this face like a mask, it *is* their face" (emphasis in original) (11). Even at this point in the novel, six years before he unknowingly commits xenocide against the alien race and fourteen years before I claim that he enters into an ethical relationship with the unreflective Other, Ender, through the *brother* experience, is introduced to the idea of radical alterity. While he cannot move from this stage for some time, in this episode, a prefiguration of the metaphorical "face" (TI 207) of Levinasian thought shifts his whole attitude toward the alien Other. On this point Cole Bowman notes: "By doing this, Ender has taken the first step in a complex process of reconciling the two species' perceptions of each other" (loc. 2444). Despite this moment foreshadowing Ender's eventual connection to the alien Buggers, it is not a recognition of the other as other (Lacan), nor does it detail a responsibility for Others that supersedes the self (Levinas). This early moment, however, does demonstrate how the *brother* experience instigates Ender's movement into his next, and arguably more dangerous stage: his "psychopathic" and "borderline" (Mitchell loc. 536) approach to combat. *Brotherhood's* complex love/hate oscillation is outworked through the Freudian "reversal to its opposite" (Mitchell loc. 552)—a state of being whereby what is loved becomes hated and vice versa. This pendulum is first demonstrated by Peter after the violence of the game, who, thinking Ender is asleep states: "I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I know how it feels, I'm sorry, I'm your brother, I love you" (15). Developed fully in Ender's narrative thread, Ender describes his version of Mitchell's "oscillating relationship" (loc. 552) in a unsupervised meeting with Valentine much later in the narrative:

In the moment when I truly understand my enemy, understand him well enough to defeat him, then in that very moment I also love him. I think it's impossible to really understand somebody, what they want, what they believe, and not love them the way they love themselves. And then, in that very moment when I love them... I destroy them. I make it impossible for them to ever hurt me again. I grind them and grind them until they don't exist. (240)

By understanding, assimilating and annihilating Others, Ender demonstrates the borderline psyche of a subject trapped by lateral rather than vertical concerns.

Ender's decision to enter Battle School is only made after Graff's observation that "there'll be brothers there" (24). Despite the positive metaphorical significance of brothers, Graff's astute observation also demonstrates his intuition with regard to Ender's psyche: Ender needs an antagonist (*brother*) to develop and maintain his ego constructions. These enemies, as previously discussed, come in the form of Bonzo, Rose the Nose, Bernard and in the ever present threat of the alien Bugger. However, as alluded to in earlier paragraphs, Ender's inability to circumvent the *brother* bind also forces him to seek out other lateral connections that will help to shore up the fictions of his constituting ego oppositions. Ender will come to depend on introjecting his friends to assist him against the proximity and potency of his more reflective enemies. Discussed in more detail in Chapter Two with Cal and Aron from *East of Eden*, both Mitchell and Brennan share a focus on the borderline—one which recognises the permeability of affect on the self (Brennan) and one that highlights the importance of lateral as opposed to vertical relations (Mitchell). Due to the limited physical intimacy of the *brothers* throughout the narrative, Teresa Brennan's affect theory is less crucial to the *brotherhood* of this novel. Nevertheless, Mitchell usefully observes, "splitting, projection and introjection are all processes that characterize both a psychopathological borderline personality and normal peer group interactions" [emphasis added] (loc. 558). Like Cal and Aron of *East of Eden*, Ender enters a borderline state when he begins to introject peers to himself, but only through the filter of the *brother* bind.

Throughout Battle School Ender makes intimate friendships with several children and they all have a significant function in Ender's ego constructions. Shen, Alai, Petra and Bean all support Ender in times of crises, yet throughout the entirety of the narrative they are never accepted as unreflective Others. Part of this is due to the "isolation" that Graff forces on Ender to create the sense that "he can never come to believe that anybody will ever help him out, ever" (39). However, two friendships in particular reveal Ender's permeability: his friendship with Alai, where "Ender had come to feel a unity so strong that the word we came to his lips much more easily than I" (173), and his relations with Petra, who, despite his adult mentor Mazer Rackham's insistence that "Petra is Petra, and you are you", Ender instead maintains that "part of what I am is her. Is what she made me" (288). I suggest that Ender cannot establish ethical relationships with Others as he remains trapped in the *brotherhood* experience which prevents Others from being accepted as unreflective. Ultimately, the friendships that Ender forms become accessories to his purpose and goal. This itself is a reflection of the way Peter uses Valentine back on Earth to achieve his own goals for international influence (132). As Ender and his close friends progress from Battle School to Command School, the friendship "gradually disappeared" and he became as "distant" and "demanding" as his mentor, Mazer Rackham, was to him (283). In this way ethical and genuine relationships which preserve the Other are not possible in Ender's narrative until after the *brother* bind is surmounted.

A key motif which elucidates the psychic intimacy and the cognitive signature that Peter has in Ender's unconscious is revealed through the psychological training game, known as the Giant's Drink or Fantasy Game. The game is used by the teachers of Battle School to access the inner fantasies of the students. In Ender's case, the final stage involves him confronting his siblings in a cave at "The End of the World" (73). As Colonel Graff explains, "The End of the World in the game isn't necessarily the end of humanity in the bugger wars. It has a private meaning to Ender" (122). I suggest that for Ender, this final stage of the game reflects the inner depths of his unconscious and the hostile communion of siblings. At this stage of the fantasy game Ender is first presented with a snake (which will

eventually transform into Valentine after he stops killing it) and immediately afterwards Ender is confronted with a mirror; however, the reflection provided is not of Ender's avatar, but is instead an image of Peter. Ender's dramatic and violent reaction to Peter in the reflection fully demonstrates the way in which Ender is assaulted by the manifestation of Peter in the unconscious and the trauma inherent in *brotherhood*:

the room in the castle at the End of the World... was the one dangerous place left. And Ender, however often he vowed that he would not, always went back there, always killed the snake, always looked his brother in the face, and always, no matter what he did next, died... All the while, the face of Peter Wiggin in the mirror stayed and looked at him. I'm trapped here, Ender thought, trapped at the End of the World with no way out. (142)

Understood best as an actualisation of Lacan's mirror stage, Ender comes to realise that his *brother* signifies the one thing he cannot escape. This "private meaning" (122) is the inescapable *brother* bind, the realisation of fictional ego constructions based on false oppositions.

After the shock of the mirror reflection, Ender realises he is trapped by the *brother* bind and is unable to reconcile his ego constructions with the image of Peter that he sees in the mirror. As a consequence, despite avoiding the fantasy game in Battle School, "it lived in his dreams" (119). Following Freudian thought, the "unconscious... manifests itself at precisely those moments when our conscious defence mechanisms are at their weakest; for example, through our dreams when we sleep" (Homer 67). Ender's dreams thus demonstrate the intrusive presence of Peter embedded in his psyche. While Ender attempts to deny the game's potency, the attempt is ultimately futile: " 'This game knows too much about me. This game tells filthy lies. I am not Peter. I don't have murder in my heart.' And then a worse fear, that he was a killer, only better at it than Peter ever was" (119). The fantasy game opens up many possibilities for interpretation, significantly, it is also through the game that Ender encounters unreflective Others, for, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the Buggers reconstruct the game to establish their

connection to Ender. The End of the World, therefore, represents the “end” or limits of Ender, and through its deconstructive force on the ego, Ender begins the process of accepting and reconciling the confronting violence and aggression associated with Peter to his own self. Colonel Graff, attentive to the impasse that the fantasy game unveils, recruits Valentine’s help to reorient Ender away from the paralysing stasis represented in the reflection. Valentine writes a brief personal letter to reassure Ender’s doubt: “YOU ARE NOTHING LIKE YOU-KNOW-WHO...MAYBE YOU SEEM MEAN, BUT IT WON’T FOOL ME” [emphasis in original](151).

The power of dialogue and the Other’s voice plays a significant role both within the novel and within this project. Using Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism, I have claimed that it is through dialogue the subject can begin to accept the split of subjectivity and move beyond the reflective impasse of *brotherhood*. However, the inauthenticity of Valentine’s letter infuriates Ender as “all that it said was about Peter. About how he was not at all like Peter” (152). Instead of finding comfort or truth in the words, Ender felt intense loss, “the one precious real thing was his memory of Valentine, the person who loved him before he ever played a game, who loved him whether there was a bugger war or not, and they had taken her and put her on their side” (152). Ender’s reaction was to immediately log on to the fantasy game and confront the End of the World once more. This time, instead of killing the snake he attempts to eat it, imitating what he saw in Peter’s reflection; however, when the snake drew near to his mouth he instinctively kissed it: “And the snake in his hands thickened and bent into another shape. A human shape. It was Valentine, and she kissed him again” (152). Despite Ender’s attempts to dissociate himself from Peter, the *brother* bind remains in place after Valentine’s letter to Ender through his uncontrolled repetition of Peter’s actions. Moreover, I suggest that instead of resolution, a fantasy of incest is exposed, and thus the characters in the game transform in the mirror into a dragon and a unicorn—mythic creatures for whom human prohibitions and love laws do not exist. But while Ender attaches himself to Valentine in his fantasy, linking “arm in arm” and walking out into “cheering multitudes” he “didn’t notice that every member of the

multitude wore Peter's face. He only knew that wherever he went in this world, Valentine was with him" (153). While there is no easy interpretation for the events of the game or the game's resolution, what does ring out through the whole simulation is the way in which Ender negotiates between violence and incest, and in doing so, remains trapped by his sibling's presence in his unconscious.

Mitchell, paying close attention to both clinical and fictional accounts of incest, stresses that, "violence towards each other and incest with each other are born of the same problematic": similitude (loc. 4025). A precondition for any incest is absence of prohibition or intervention, and in this manner, both the parental neglect of the Wiggin children and Ender's removal from the family nurtures his unconscious desire to possess his sister. Mitchell explains incest as:

the crossing of boundaries, or perhaps, if we think about its sibling base, the absence of them. It indicates depravity not simply because it is forbidden but because the other is not 'other'; there is no recognition of the needs, the feelings, the place of the other person; no responsibility, only the osmotic engulfment of seduction. (1294)

By tracing the implications of incest in the novel, I endeavour to emphasise how both violence and incest demonstrate how lateral relations come to play the dominant subjectivising force in Ender's narrative. While I maintain the primacy of the *brother* in Ender's development, Valentine must also be recognised as a significant intrasubjective presence, and in this role Valentine turns Ender away from annihilation and murder towards a desire for the unity of similitude. Mitchell also maintains that "sibling incest would create a situation like twinning where the other is needed but not as another separate person" (loc. 1571). While no direct incident occurs to confirm physical incest, Ender and Valentine, like Ender and Peter, demonstrate an attachment to the other which complicates the psychic and physical boundaries between the siblings. This unique sibling intimacy, as Mitchell demonstrates in the title of her book, manifests itself in two distinct phenomena: sex and violence. In this manner, similitude and sameness operate both

within and between genders, continually frustrating the ego's attempts for sovereignty within the subject.

As both Ender and Valentine are forced to bear the weight of Peter's aggressive dominance, they are also victims of parental neglect. In their optimistic oversight, the Wiggin parents allow Ender and Valentine to placate Peter's aggression. Here Mitchell employs an inflammatory new term for psychoanalysis—the law of the mother—which should “intervene at the level of sibling murderousness and incest” (loc. 968). Mitchell's “provocative reference to Jacques Lacan's notion of the ‘law of the father,’” (loc. 967) explains how through each individual parent's absence, the Wiggin parents enable both violence and incestual attachments. Neither Wiggin parent is letting the children know “that there is room for you as well as me” (Mitchell loc. 966), which is further exacerbated for Ender as the “third” (2) child. Two additional moments between the siblings hint at the sexualised conduct within the sibling triangle. Firstly, some years after Ender's departure, Valentine and Peter confront each other in the woods outside their new home:

‘I've been deciding,’ said Peter, ‘whether to kill you or what.’

Valentine leaned against the trunk of the pine tree, her little fire a few smouldering ashes. ‘I love you, too, Peter...I've been thinking of castrating you in your sleep.’ (126)

In *Ender's Game* sibling sexuality is always expressed in opposition to Peter's aggression and violence. Threats, jokes and actions articulate and display the unindividuated tension of all three characters dependent on their siblings for identity constructions. The second episode occurs when Ender returns to Earth and Graff recruits Valentine to inspire Ender to once more return to his training. The encounter takes place on a lake and Ender's first comment after not seeing Valentine for four years is about her beauty. Dressed in bathing suits and after a confused attempt at playful intimacy, Valentine confesses: “When you were little and Peter tortured you, it's a good thing I didn't lie back and wait for Mom and Dad to save you...Do you know what Peter used to do to me because I stopped him from hurting you?” (235). Always veiled and indirect, the relations between Ender and Peter,

Valentine and Ender, and Peter and Valentine undermine subjective individuation and trap all three siblings in hostile communion.

Combining the thinking of Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas, I propose that if the Other is to be recognised as an unreflective and asymmetrical being instead of being assimilated into the subject, some form of dialogue is required. However, the Buggers do not communicate in a way that humans can interpret. As the epitome of the Other, Buggers remain ethically unencountered, isolated and victimised throughout the novel. Ender himself refers to this idea in the novel when Graff explains to Ender the issue with interspecies communication. In this exchange, Ender neatly summarises: “So the whole war is because we can’t talk to each other” (255). As has been observed in previous chapters, Mikhail Bakhtin’s theories regarding the unique form of dialogue in the novel demonstrates the way in which characters may emerge from narcissistic and self-absorbed states to encounter Others through dialogic intervention. However, as Wayne Booth elucidates when introducing Bakhtin’s thought,

Understanding cannot be understood as emotional empathy, or as the placing of oneself in another’s place... This is required only for the peripheral aspects of understanding. Understanding cannot be understood as translation from someone else’s language into one’s own language. (qtd in Bakhtin loc. 482)

Ender’s “empathy” (300) as a product of his sibling experience, becomes his greatest weapon in the fight against the Buggers. However, in the empathy manifested in his psychopathic borderline state, Ender is not allowing Others, whether human or alien, to be unreflective.

Colin Davis elucidates Levinas’ attempt to distance himself from the “transcendental Egos” implied by the phenomenology of Husserl, who suggested that the Other could be “known by empathy and assimilated... as a reflection of myself” (loc. 618). However, according to Levinas, by doing so Husserl “leaves no place for the Other as Other” (Davis loc. 622). This theory is most evident when Ender’s searches through old video footage to understand the

Buggers' attack strategies, which he then uses in his own tactics to wage xenocidal warfare against the alien Other. Trapped in his borderline and psychopathic approach to warfare, Ender's "reversal to its opposite" (Mitchell loc. 552) loves what he hates and destroys all but one of the alien population. This is precisely where Levinasian thought comes to make a meaningful contribution to the thematic concerns of the novel. Levinas attempted to redirect phenomenology away from the self and towards the Other. By doing so, he argued from the stance that the Other pre-exists the self. My emphasis on the *brother* narratives has recognised this approach, but insists that until the subject (pre-self) overcomes the lateral obstacles placed in its path, encounters with unreflective Others are unethical—aggressive, assimilatory or introjectory.

Brett Patterson's contribution to *Ender's Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate is Down*, states: "Card is arguing that science fiction is able to illuminate exactly what Levinas describes: how we come to understand ourselves more clearly in our relationships with what's outside of us. Science fiction, through exaggerated difference, exposes what happens in all encounters with other life forms, human or not" (loc. 2733). While the image of Peter in the mirror provides an explicit link to the phenomenon of the *brother* which I have demonstrated, it becomes even more meaningful in the final chapters when the unreflective Other is finally accessed through the external version of the same mirror. The alien Buggers survive the xenocide by hiding a pupa of a hive Queen and physically building and leaving behind a copy of the fantasy game (on a Bigger world that Ender helps colonise) to direct Ender's attention to it. Despite destroying all but one of the entire species, the Buggers manage to access Ender's unconscious and reconstruct the End of the World stage of the fantasy game to speak to Ender. Achieved through the paradigm of Science Fiction's generic conventions, the Buggers, who communicate telepathically, seek out the force that is destroying them and determine in Ender's unconscious the real of the fantasy game. It is Ender's unique sibling condition, the balance of Valentine's empathy and Peter's aggression, that sets him up to win over the Buggers in the final battle. However, with the realisation that the training game he thought he was playing was

actually the war on the Buggers on their many planets and outposts, Ender loses “control” exclaiming, “I didn’t want to kill them all. I didn’t want to kill anybody! I’m not a killer! You didn’t want me, you bastards, you wanted Peter, but you made me do it, you tricked me into it!” (300).

After Ender unknowingly and unwillingly commits xenocide, he comes face to face with how his siblings experience shaped him for this very act. Through xenocide, Ender’s purpose, “what [he] was born for” (300) is achieved. He is left empty, exhausted by the regimen of battles masquerading as games and guilty for the destruction of the alien race. The trauma of being used in this way haunts Ender in a nightmarish passage that follows the final destruction of the Bugger home world. In his dreams he sees all the victims of his violence and awakens to the otherness of Others. Significantly, in his delirious states the dreams

always ended with a mirror or a pool of water or the metal surface of a ship, something that would reflect his face back to him. At first it was always Peter’s face, with blood and a snake’s tail coming from the mouth. After a while, though, it began to be his own face, old and sad, with eyes that grieved for a billion, billion murders – but they were his own eyes, and he was content to wear them. (302)

Ender’s reconciliation of the *brother* bind only emerges after being the victim *and* perpetrator of violence towards unreflective Others. Ender’s ego-centric conscious is unable to reconcile the acts of violence he committed, and thus in his unconscious, where Peter resides, his dreams excavate and exhibit Peter’s true form. By doing so Ender recognises the fictional and constituting nature of his ego constructions and begins approaching the reality of selfhood. Like Ivan, who in *The Brothers Karamazov*, could only reconcile himself to Smerdyakov in his dream of a devil, Ender also required the psychic reorientation of a nightmare to reconcile the *brother* to the self. As a result, Ender emerges from *brotherhood* with a profound sense of guilt and responsibility for his actions. This responsibility to the unreflective Other which prefigured the self is at the

core of Levinasian thought. For, as Mari Ruti states, “the properly human, for Levinas, therefore begins when I transcend my ontology and begin to exist for the other” (313).

Jeremy Proulx in his chapter, “Illusions of Freedom, Tragedies of Fate”, expresses the intimacy of Ender and Peter by exploring how the novel “reveals the many ways in which all of us are pre-determined to act, ways that are out of our control but that *also define our character as individuals*” [emphasis in original] (28). Proulx describes this element as “disturbing” and argues that “we all have a Peter inside of us, a part of us that is completely self-interested and willing to destroy others to protect these interests” (28). Moreover, Proulx concludes by stating “our freedom is really a product of forces that we cannot detect or even imagine” (30). While I agree with the sentiment of Proulx’s argument, this thesis has endeavoured, through psychoanalysis and affect theory, to expose unconscious forces and the significance of the *brother* to reveal the “foundational fantasy”— “how it is that we come to think of ourselves as separate from others” (Brennan 14). In literature, readers are often willing to consider characters as unitary and whole in order to determine meaning. Philosophical readings of characters and narratives can overlook or bypass the intrasubjective experiences that shape interpersonal relations. Therefore, what needs to precede the type of analysis carried out by Proulx is an exposure of the very fantasy of subjective individuation, and as a result, a recognition and elucidation of the foundational fantasy allows the primacy of others (internal) and Others (external) to be fully realised.

In the final pages of the novel, Ender is reunited with Valentine on a meteor named Eros, (further hinting at the incestuous connection) where he led the attacks against the Buggers. With persuasion from Valentine, the two enlist as colonisers to the Bugger worlds. Ender, explaining his motivation to Valentine, states: “I’m going because I know the buggers better than any other living soul, and maybe if I go there I can understand them better. I stole their future from them; I can only begin to repay by seeing what I can learn from their past” (316). Here Ender will discover the message that the Buggers left behind—the End of the World, constructed in physical form. Ender considers it as “the

closest they could come to talking. To writing me a note” (319). Ender is finally punctured by the dialogue of an unreflective Other. As previously mentioned, behind the mirror “in which the rough shape of a human face had been scratched” (321) lies a Bugger Hive Queen in pupa. Through the physical proximity and the intimacy of Ender’s experience of the Buggers, the queen is able to communicate telepathically to Ender. Here he learns that the once the Buggers discovered that humans were sentient they “never came again” (322). Thus Ender resolves to “carry” the Queen, telling the “story” (322) to the rest of humanity, and in doing so, “Ender gives himself up to these moral demands, eventually deciding to use the rest of his life rebuilding the [Bugger] species and civilization” (Patterson 113). From being alienated by family to being united as an ethical self by the alien, Ender and his siblings exhibit the split between conscious and unconscious, the trauma of similitude and the force that both the other and Other can exhibit on the subject and self. By emphasising the significance of not only *brotherhood*, but siblings more generally, readers can interrogate and hypothesise new realms of subjective experience—ones which cater to the diverse reality of fictional narrative rather than forcing narratives to maintain and exert hierarchies of father, mother and child.

Reflection

Throughout this project I have stressed the primacy of the *brother* in “(de) form[ing]” (Chiesa loc. 187) the subject. In each narrative I traced a pair of characters and their experience of brotherhood to claim that *brotherhood* can operate intrasubjectively: in the space before ‘I’. This approach required a causal reading of the novels in order to map the effect of the *brother* on the subject. However, outside of this causality between the subject and his *brother* is the unreflective Other, who in the chosen narratives have been identified as different characters of the texts. These Others, understood from a Levinasian standpoint, precede the self, and through encounters with the Other—primarily through the influence of non-totalising dialogue—access to an interpersonal world is achieved. While I have suggested that the hostile communion of *brotherhood* is inherently traumatising in that it falsifies the ego and doubly alienates the subject, I have also linked the outworking of *brotherhood* to the establishment of a self. This ‘self’, a state of being self-aware, awakens in the character a recognition of the social nature of their existence. Each character is confronted by the interpersonal reality of the narrative and I argue that any character that emerges as a self in the novels makes ethical decisions to preserve the otherness of the Other.

Early on in the research for this thesis I observed that in many narratives of fraternal discord, *brotherhood* traps or locks characters in a reflective impasse, prohibiting subjective individuation and preventing non-totalising encounters with those outside of the *brother* bind. Both Mitchell and Brennan have discussed this state of being as borderline, where the subjects are unable to engage with Others without reducing them to their own egos. However, egos apprehended (*The Brothers Karamazov*), constructed (*East of Eden*) or demarcated (*Ender’s Game*) in *brotherhood*’s reflection also fail to maintain their potency or purity when the subject enters into dialogue with unreflective Others. Therefore, by avoiding the term ‘relationship’ to describe *brotherhood* and instead emphasising intrasubjective ‘experience’, I have reserved discussing relationships to

interactions with unreflective Others. By doing this, the attempt was to consistently recognise *brotherhood* as operating within the subjects. *Brotherhood* thus becomes an ongoing reenactment of the split fundamental to subjectivity itself. The phrase 'hostile communion' symbolised this unique physical and psychic experience—where the mind and body of the character are not truly their own in a cartesian sense. In addition, I have suggested that the impact of the intimacy of *brotherhood* has been largely overlooked by critics of each novel: whose readings often attempted to add meaning to each text by discussing characters as unitary or whole without recognising the significance of the *brother* within. In particular, interpretations that stress a character's agency or autonomy fail to fully grasp the intensity of the *brother* experience.

Two key complications have emerged in the exploration undertaken in this dissertation. Firstly, while Lacan's other became vital in determining the mirroring aspect of the *brother* experience, cultural forces, language and symbolic elements have been avoided by side-stepping his 'big Other' (Homer 44). This factor becomes more significant if one is to develop the 'inequalities' presented in each *brother* pair, for example: Smerdyakov is a servant and less educated than Ivan; Cal is less attractive than his brother Aron; and Ender is a social outcast as the third child. All these elements are acknowledged as pivotal, yet they have been subsumed under the *brother* experience instead of being developed alongside. Another conceptual dilemma presented in this project is the issue with distinguishing *brothers* from Others. Despite outlining the parameters of their use in the introduction, at times the laboured application of the terminology highlights the difficulty of phrasing the key terms of this thesis. Upon reflection, I consider this dilemma to speak more broadly to tension between epistemology and ontology.

In this thesis I have explored how *brothers* can become unreflective through an exposure to the fictional nature of their ego, and by no longer 'seeing' themselves in their *brother*, some characters of the novels can go on to become beings who respond to unreflective Others in an ethical and selfless manner. This movement from solipsism to selflessness

occurs as a result of the traumatic encounter with the *brother* within—ultimately exposing the myth of agency and autonomy. Colin Davis identified this element in Levinasian thought, whereby “the Other makes me realize that I share the world, that it is not my unique possession, and I do not like this realization. My power and freedom are put into question. Such a situation is ethical because a lot depends upon how I respond” (loc. 1016). In this way I have suggested that fraternal discord can and does operate in parallel to ethical responsibility, and in each novel a heightened awareness to the debt of responsibility follows the acts of violence emerging in response to the *brother* who is unsettling the ego. This shift in emphasis allows for an alternative reading of the novels—for, as Trepanier notes of *The Brothers Karamazov*, “both egoism and individualism preclude a sense of community, thereby making it impossible to be responsible for anyone other than oneself” (202). If in each text more attention is given to the lateral, sibling experience of the characters, readings can emerge which accentuate, betray or augment established thematic interpretations of each text.

Despite the divergences in the focus for the key thinkers underpinning this project, all share a fundamental insistence on the social reality of human existence. In particular, “for both Levinas and Lacan, the other is constitutive of subjectivity, so that we are not merely talking about how one subject relates to another but about how the other is always already integrated into the very ontological texture of the subject” (Ruti loc. 3872). The complexity of the subject suggested by this thesis becomes most meaningful when one considers the nature of the character, as subject, discussed by literary criticism. Throughout this project I have questioned the vertical and hierarchical role the father and mother have been given in subjective experience, and have observed that oedipal readings of novels disavow the “(de) formative” (Chiesa loc. 187) and intrasubjective experience of *brotherhood*. By focusing in particular on the narratives of brothers, this project opens the door to reconsidering the role siblings play in the formation of egos and selves. As a result, more attention should be given to the depiction of the sibling experience in narrative—even in exploring questions of similitude that resist gendering. A sensitivity and attention to the

nuances of intrasubjectivity allows a reader to fully engage with the primacy of the other and Other. This heightened awareness to the complexity of subjectivity in literature can significantly impact thematic interpretations of texts and further empowers fiction in its role exploring the depths of the human psyche.

Works Cited

- Bakhtin, Mikhail. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Trans. Emerson, C. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. Kindle file.
- Berman, Anna. "Siblings in 'The Brothers Karamazov.'" *The Russian Review* 68.2 (2009): 263-282. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.
- Blackmore, Tim. "Ender's Beginning: Battling The Military In Orson Scott Card's 'Ender's Game.'" *Extrapolation* 32.2 (1991): 124-142. Web. 5 June. 2015.
- Bowman, Cole. "Bugger All! The Clash of Cultures in 'Ender's Game.'" *Ender's Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate Is Down*. Eds. Decker, K.S. and W. Irwin. Chichester: Wiley, 2013. 101-111. Kindle file.
- Brennan, Teresa. *The Transmission of Affect*. Ithica: Cornell UP, 2004. Print.
- Campbell, James. "Kill the Bugger: 'Ender's Game' and the Question of Heteronormativity." *Science Fiction Studies* 36.3 (2009): 490-507. Web. 20 June. 2015.
- Card, Orson Scott. *Ender's Game*. London: Hachette Digital, 1991. Kindle file.
- Chiesa, Lorenzo. *Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007. Kindle file.
- Cohen, Sharon. "'Balaam's Ass': Smerdyakov as a Paradoxical Redeemer in Dostoevsky's 'The Brothers Karamazov.'" *Christianity & Literature* 64.1 (2014): 43-64. Web. 17 Feb. 2015
- Davis, Colin. *Levinas: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Wiley, 2007. Kindle file.
- Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. *The Brothers Karamazov*. Trans. Pevear, Richard and Volokhonsky, Larissa. New York: Farrar, 2011. Kindle file.
- Erdinast-Vulcan, Daphna. "Between the Face and the Voice: Bakhtin Meets Levinas." *Continental Philosophy Review* 41.1 (2008): 43-58. Web. 10 April. 2015.
- Eskin, Mikhail. *Ethics and Dialogue: In the Works of Levinas, Bakhtin, Mandel'shtam, and Celan*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.

- Fink, Bruce. *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997. Print.
- Fontenrose, Joseph. *John Steinbeck; an Introduction and Interpretation*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964. Print.
- Gross, Melissa. "Prisoners of Childhood? Child Abuse and the Development of Heroes and Monsters in 'Ender's Game.'" *Children's Literature In Education* 38.2 (2007): 115-126. Web. 5 June. 2015.
- Hand, Sean. *Emmanuel Levinas*. New York: Routledge, 2009. Kindle File
- , ed. *The Levinas Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. Print.
- Harasym, Sarah. *Levinas and Lacan: The Missed Encounter*. Albany: State U of New York P, 1998. Print.
- Homer, Sean. *Jacques Lacan*. London: Routledge, 2013. Kindle file.
- Holy Bible: New International Version*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Bible, 2011. Kindle file.
- Hruska, Anne. "The Sins of Children in 'The Brothers Karamazov': Serfdom, Hierarchy, and Transcendence." *Christianity And Literature* 4 (2005): 471-495. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.
- Irigaray, Luce. *Speculum of the Other Woman*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. Print.
- Kristeva, Julia. *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. Print.
- Lacan, Jacques. *Ecrits : The First Complete Edition in English*. Trans. Fink, Bruce. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005. Print.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*. Trans. Lingis, Alphonso. Pittsburg: Duquesne UP, 1998. Print.
- . *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Trans. Lingis, Alphonso. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2012. Print.
- Leatham, Jeremy. "Out of Eden: Dualism, Conformity and Inheritance in Steinbeck's 'Big Book.'" *East of Eden: New and Recent Essays*. Eds. Meyer, M.J. and H. Veggian. Amsterdam: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013. 123-145. Web. 30 April. 2015.

- Malmgren, Carl. "Self and Other in Sf: Alien Encounters." *Science Fiction Studies* 20.1 (1993): 15-33. Web. 6 June. 2015.
- Mitchell, Juliet. *Siblings: Sex and Violence*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. Kindle file.
- Morgan, Michael L. *The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Kindle file.
- Oates, Joyce Carol. "The Double Vision of 'The Brothers Karamazov'." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 27.2 (1968): 203-213. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.
- Ornstein, Paul. "The Novelist's Craft: Reflections on 'The Brothers Karamazov'." *American Imago* 69.3 (2012): 295-316. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.
- Ouderkirk, Bruce. "The Unconventional Morality of 'East of Eden'." *East of Eden: New and Recent Essays*. Eds. Meyer, M.J. and H. Veggian. Amsterdam: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013. 231-257. Web. 30 April. 2015.
- Patterson, Brett. "Why Ender Can't Go Home Philotic Connections and Moral Responsibility." *Ender's Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate Is Down*. Eds. Decker, K.S. and W. Irwin. Chichester: Wiley, 2013. 112-123. Kindle file.
- Proulx, Jeremy. "Illusions of Freedom, Tragedies of Fate the Moral Development of Ender Wiggin Jeremy." *Ender's Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate Is Down*. Eds. Decker, K.S. and W. Irwin. Chichester: Wiley, 2013. 21-32. Kindle file.
- Quinones, Ricardo. *The Changes of Cain: Violence and the Lost Brother in Cain and Abel Literature*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991. Print.
- Rapaport, Herman. *The Literary Theory Toolkit: A Compendium of Concepts and Methods*. Chichester: Wiley, 2011. Kindle file.
- Ruti, Mari. *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015. Kindle file.
- Steinbeck, John. *East of Eden*. Ed. Wyatt, David. London: Penguin, 2000. Kindle file.
- Stephens, Bradley. "Jean-Paul Sartre, John Steinbeck and the Liability of Liberty in the Post-War Period." *Journal of European Studies* 2 (2008): 177-192. Web. 11 May. 2015
- Trepanier, Lee. "The Politics and Experience of Active Love in 'The Brothers Karamazov'." *Perspectives on Political Science* 38.4 (2009): 197-205. Web. 24 Feb. 2015.

Vladiv-Glover, Slobodanka. "Dostoyevsky, Freud and Parricide; Deconstructive Notes on 'The Brothers Karamazov'." *New Zealand Slavonic Journal* 1993: 7-34. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.

Wreen, Michael. "Monadology of 'The Brothers Karamazov'." *Philosophy and Literature* 10 (1986): 318-24. Web. 17 Feb. 2015.